The Israeli Democracy Index

2013

Tamar Hermann
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THE ISRAEL
DEMOCRACY
INSTITUTE

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Tel.: 1-800-20-2222, (972)-2-530-0800; Fax: (972)-2-530-0867
email: orders@idi.org.il
Website: http://en.idi.org.il/
The Israel Democracy Institute Press, P.O.B. 4702, Jerusalem 9104602

All previous issues of the *Israeli Democracy Index* can be downloaded from our website: http://en.idi.org.il/

The Israel Democracy Institute is an independent, non-partisan think-and-do tank dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy. IDI supports Israel's elected officials, civil servants, and opinion leaders by developing policy solutions in the realms of political reform, democratic values, social cohesion, and religion and state.

IDI promotes the values and norms vital for Israel's identity as a Jewish and democratic state and maintains an open forum for constructive dialogue and consensus-building across Israeli society and government. The Institute assembles Israel's leading thinkers to conduct comparative policy research, design blueprints for reform, and develop practical implementation strategies.

In 2009, IDI was recognized with Israel's most prestigious award—The Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement: Special Contribution to Society and State. Among many achievements, IDI is responsible for the creation of the Knesset's Research and Information Center, the repeal of the two-ballot electoral system, the establishment of Israel's National Economic Council, and the launch of Israel's constitutional process.

IDI's Board of Directors is comprised of some of the most influential individuals in Israeli society. The Institute's prestigious International Advisory Council is headed by former US Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

The Guttman Center for Surveys at IDI holds the largest, most comprehensive database on public opinion surveys in Israel. Over a span of sixty years, the Center, based in Jerusalem, has applied rigorous, innovative, and pioneering research methods enhanced by its unique "continuing survey." It has documented the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding thousands of issues, in all aspects of life, in over 1,200 studies that have been conducted since 1947: from everyday concerns to politics, culture, ideology, religion, education, and national security.

The Israeli Democracy Index is a public opinion poll project conducted by the Guttman Center for Surveys. Since 2003, an extensive survey has been conducted annually on a representative sample of Israel's adult population (1,000 participants). Each survey presents an estimate of the quality of Israeli democracy for that year. On the whole, the project aims at assessing trends in Israeli public opinion regarding realization of democratic values and the performance of government systems and elected officials. Analysis of its results may contribute to public discussion of the status of democracy in Israel and create a cumulative empirical database to intensify discourse concerning such issues.

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We owe a debt of gratitude to the many individuals who assisted us in producing the *Israeli Democracy Index 2013*.

Our deepest thanks go to the staff of the IDI Press; the Dialog Institute, which conducted the field work; Dr. Rafi Ventura, who aided in the preliminary framing of the topics for the Democracy Survey; and last but not least, the unnamed respondents, from all levels and sectors of Israeli society, who devoted their valuable time—without remuneration—to answering the survey questionnaire. Without them, this undertaking could not have succeeded.

As in past years, the 2013 *Index* is dedicated to the memory of Prof. Asher Arian, founder and creator of this project.

Prof. Tamar Hermann
October 2013

Insights and Major Findings

The 2013 *Israeli Democracy Index* points to a number of interesting trends in Israeli public opinion on issues related to Israeli democracy:

1. **Overall findings** – Despite surprises in the 2013 elections, and far-reaching changes in the government's makeup, the outcome of the vote did not lead to major swings in public opinion on the topics examined in the survey. In most cases, there were moderate shifts relative to previous years. In areas where changes were identified—for example, a slight improvement in the perception of politicians as hard workers who are doing a good job or a greater belief in the political influence of citizens—further studies are needed to determine, with an appropriate level of validity, whether there is a real change in public opinion and awareness. These indications of opinion stability are highly important, given the common assertion of the media and certain decision makers that public opinion is constantly spinning in different directions. In fact, in the analysis below, clear and consistent connections can be found—not for the first time—between the opinions of respondents on democracy-related issues and background variables, such as national identity (Jew, Arab), level of religiosity, self-identification with stronger or weaker social groups, and self-described location on the left-right spectrum of political and security affairs. It is therefore obvious that these are not random associations but deeply rooted worldviews that are difficult to manufacture or manipulate politically without a genuine shift in the reality of the respondents.

2. **"New politics"** – The proximity of the survey to the 2013 elections, and their dramatic results raises the question of whether the public believes that a new politics is emerging in Israel, and if so, what they think of it. Although the "new politics" is generally seen as a positive phenomenon (we identified eight subcategories of this favorable attitude), only a small majority of the public believe that the recent elections were in fact a reflection of a new politics. Among the weaker or excluded groups (low-income individuals, Arabs, those

who identify themselves with weak social groups, and so on), the share who believe that the outcome of the recent elections signals a new politics is undeniably low. This means that those in the weak/excluded groups do not expect that the results of the 2013 elections will solve their problems.

3. **Israel's overall situation** – Contrary to the common portrayal in the media, the Jewish public (and thus the total sample, since Jews constitute a majority of the sample, in accordance with their proportion of Israel's population) tends to assess the country's overall situation as average ("so-so"); in other words, the situation in Israel is not glowing, but is not dismal either. In this area, there is virtually no change from last year's findings. By contrast, Israel's Arab population—always a minority whose long-term status is not secure (see below)—tends to define Israel's situation in more negative terms, though here too we found a strong inclination toward the middle response. The group that clearly sees the situation as less good is the younger age cohort; the bad news for those who expect this to spur young people into action, however, is that there is no evidence in the survey to suggest that this group wishes to shake up the system or even challenge its basic elements in order to generate change from the ground up.

4. **The younger age cohort** – A salient finding throughout the survey is the greater tendency of Jewish respondents in the younger age cohort to express views ranging from patriotic to nationalistic compared to the older age groups. One explanation for this is the greater presence of religious and haredi Jews in the younger age cohort because of the higher birth rate among these groups and because these groups more than the other groups tend to espouse patriotic/nationalistic views. Nonetheless, the finding can be attributed to more than demographics. Young Jews—to the chagrin of some and the satisfaction of others—are perhaps slightly less "political" than their elders (i.e., less interested in politics), but they are unquestionably more "Jewish-patriotic" and as a generation they desire a more "Jewish" state. At the same time, their commitment to democratic values—again, as an age group and not necessarily as individuals—is less than their parents' or grandparents' generation.

In many other respects, the younger age group is quite similar to the other cohorts, such that it appears that their degree of conformity with mainstream Israeli-Jewish society is high. Due to the small size of the Arab sample (which parallels the proportion of Arab citizens in Israel's adult population at 15%), it is difficult for us to draw conclusions about the views of the younger Arab age group with certainty. However, as detailed in the report, there are some signs here and there that members of this age cohort also conform quite strongly to their group of origin, although they have a more noticeable tendency than older Arab adults to express dissatisfaction with, and alienation from, the state.

5. **The state of Israeli democracy** – Assessments of the state of Israeli democracy were found to be less favorable. The responses to the survey indicate that the chief failing concerns the right to live with dignity. With respect to democratic values such as freedom of religion and freedom of expression and assembly, the situation is seen as appropriate

6. **Being part of the state** – Regarding estrangement from the State of Israel, and conversely, pride in being Israeli, the survey findings do not support the bleak picture common in Israeli discourse. There is, indeed, a small but steady decline in the general public's feeling that they are part of the state and its problems, and there is a similar decline in the sense of pride in "Israeliness." With respect to the Jewish public, this is a slight drop; the vast majority still feel themselves to be part of the state and its problems and are proud to be Israeli. By contrast, only a minority in the Arab sample report feeling part of the state and its problems, and pride in being Israeli is quite low. Stated otherwise, this is a population that does not feel "at home" in its Israeli citizenship, which should come as no surprise, since Israel defines itself as a "Jewish and Zionist" state. What is more, the Jewish majority generally expresses a readiness to exclude Arab citizens from decision-making in crucial matters (see below), and has a growing desire, particularly among young adults, for the state to be seen as more Jewish and less democratic.

7. **Influence of voting patterns** – Of particular interest in this year's survey is the finding that voting patterns in the 2013

Knesset elections are not a good explanatory variable for differences in the respondents' positions on major questions. That is to say, on many key topics there are no significant differences between the views of voters for one party and another, and there is no consistent similarity between the opinions of respondents who voted for the same party. Moreover, even on questions where we would expect to find differences between the views of voters for parties in the government and voters for parties in the opposition, significant differences were not found. The resulting conclusion is that voting in Israel in 2013 does not reflect a clear worldview, that voter identification with parties is weak (hence the party's positions on foreign and domestic issues are not variables that shape voters' opinions), and that the parties do not serve as political "oracles" for their voters, meaning that the views expressed by party leaders are not ideologically binding—even for their own voters.

8. **Explanatory variables** – In this survey, as in the past, the so-called "classic" explanatory variables—such as sex, ethnic origin, education, income, and often, age and voting pattern—were shown to have little or no effect on the views of the Israeli public. The variables in 2013 that were found to be particularly influential are tensions between Jews and Arabs, the division between religious and secular Jews, and the differences between right and left on political/security issues. This is in contrast to the right-left division in the economic sphere which was found to have negligible influence because the Israeli public tends to cluster in the middle of the spectrum around the notion of a welfare state, and rejects both socialism and a totally free market.

9. **The Jewish-Arab divide** – The greatest share of respondents identified the tension between Jews and Arabs as the most serious area of friction in Israeli society. In topics related to the relations between Jews and Arabs, we found trends that are seemingly paradoxical and even contradictory. One phenomenon is the increased preference among the Jewish public for either the "Jewish" or the "democratic" component in the definition of the State of Israel, alongside a drop in preference for the combined definition of "Jewish and

democratic." Likewise, we found a clear willingness to make Jewish halakhic law (*mishpat ivri*) the cornerstone of the Israeli legal system. A small majority of Jews also favor government backing for the establishment of new communities throughout the country, (by Jews only, not by Arabs). However, only a minority support the third element of the draft bill "Israel: the Nation-State of the Jewish People," namely, revoking the status of Arabic as an official language of Israel.

While this year there is a decline in the share of Jews who believe that the government should encourage Arab emigration from the state, the Jewish public is divided as to whether Jewish citizens should be given more rights than non-Jewish citizens. The fact that roughly half of the respondents consider the latter to be an acceptable policy is extremely problematic in terms of democracy, since the essence of democracy is the principle of equal rights for all citizens and this principle is enshrined in Israel's Declaration of Independence.

It should be noted in this context that while a decline was recorded this year in the share of Jewish respondents who hold that decisions crucial to the state in matters of peace and security, and society and economy, must be made by a Jewish majority, a large proportion of the Jewish sample believe that Arabs should not take part in a referendum to approve a peace treaty with the Palestinians, if and when such a referendum is held.

The survey also reveals that a majority of the Jewish public considers the Jews to be the "chosen people," and that there is a direct correlation between this view and support for excluding Arabs from a possible referendum. This leads us to conclude that this sense of "chosenness" entails the exclusion of others.

Notwithstanding the above, the fact that the largest share of respondents sees Jewish-Arab tensions as the major type of tension in Israeli society takes on a slightly different cast if we consider the following: whereas in the past, when Jews were asked which type of "other" they would not like to have as a neighbor, they indicated that they would be most bothered by having Arabs as neighbors, today they would be more concerned about living in proximity to foreign workers, with Arabs dropping to second place. Arabs are most disturbed by

the prospect of living next to a homosexual couple; having Jewish neighbors now ranks second.

10. **Perceptions of willingness to compromise** – The question of how much "others" are willing to compromise in the name of coexistence was instructive in terms of how groups in Israeli society view each other. We found that Arab respondents believe that Jews are willing to compromise more than Jews believe the same about the Arabs. Religious Jews hold that secular Jews are more willing to compromise than the converse, and people on the right feel that people on the left are more open to compromise than people on the left feel about the right. All of this, of course, affects each group's assessment of its chances to advance its status within the existing power relations of Israeli society.

11. **Political institutions** – As we do every year, we examined the image of politicians in the eyes of the public, and the degree of trust in the institutions of the state. While the majority of respondents feel that politicians are more concerned with themselves than with the public, there has been a certain upswing in the assessment of the performance of politicians and in the perception that Knesset members are generally working hard and doing a good job; however, understandably perhaps, there is nostalgia for the politicians of yesteryear. In addition, we found a slight downturn in the public's trust in most of the state and political institutions that were studied, as well as in all holders of public office. Not surprisingly, data indicate a clear difference between the levels of trust of the Jewish and Arab populations. Most Arab respondents—in keeping with the feelings of alienation noted above—do not have trust in any of the political institutions or officeholders in Israel.

12. **Political parties** – Despite the very low level of trust in Israel's political parties and the fact that voter preference does not appear to play a significant role in shaping public opinion on political issues, it is important to note that the majority of those surveyed hold that there are genuine differences between the parties and their vote matters. The majority of respondents are also interested in reducing the number of parties in Israel,

and would prefer a few major parties to the numerous small parties in Israel today.

13. **Influence on policy** – We found a certain increase this year in the feeling that citizens are able to influence political decisions. This feeling, however, is still very low compared with what is expected from a democratic country. It seems that the majority of both Jews and Arabs feel unable to influence government policy or impact the decision-making echelon.

14. **International indices** – The annual international comparison did not reveal anything exceptional. As was found last year, in most international indices Israel is located roughly at the midpoint of the scale, adjacent to the new democracies. Israel scored particularly high in political participation, and received low marks for civil liberties and religious and ethnic tensions.

Introduction

In 2013, as in previous years, the *Israeli Democracy Index* seeks to examine the institutional, procedural, and perceptual aspects of Israeli democracy. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive, up-to-date portrait, and at the same time identify trends of change and elements of stability in Israeli public opinion in the political and socioeconomic spheres. Readers should bear in mind, however, that the survey on which the *Index* is based measures the feelings, opinions, and judgments of the general public, meaning that this is not an "objective" or professional assessment of Israel's situation. Inevitably, the public sees things in a way that may prove in future, or even at present (in the opinion of experts), to be inaccurate or imprecise. Nevertheless, perceptions, attitudes, and emotions play a major role in the public's behavior (including its electoral preferences), making it eminently justifiable in our view to invest effort and resources in exploring them.

Structure of the report

The *Israeli Democracy Index 2013* is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides the background, showing the distribution of opinions on Israel's overall situation and Israeli democracy today. In the second chapter we describe the public's views on various topics, in particular the political system. The third chapter discusses matters of religion and state, focusing on perceptions of the source of authority in decision making. In the fourth chapter, we analyze attitudes on the interplay between citizens, the state, politics, and society. The fifth chapter presents 13 democracy indicators compiled by international think tanks. In each of these, Israel is ranked in comparison with 27 other countries and with its own placement in previous years.

The questionnaire

The questionnaire for this year's Democracy Survey was constructed in February–March 2013 and consisted of 34 content questions (some with multiple sections, for a total of 74 questions) and ten sociodemographic questions. Of these, 70% were recurring questions asked each year (for the full questionnaire, see

Appendix 1; for a multi-year comparison, see Appendix 2). Note that certain questions, due to their emotional content or specific relevance, were posed to Jewish respondents only (for example, question 15 regarding a possible contradiction between democratic principles and Jewish religious law). In Appendices 1 and 2, such questions are specifically marked.

Data collection

The data were collected by the Dialog Institute via telephone interviews between April 8 and May 2, 2013, in other words, two-and-a-half to three months after the 2013 elections (which took place on January 22).

The questionnaire was translated beforehand into Russian and Arabic, and the interviewers who administered these versions were native speakers of these languages. A total of 146 respondents were interviewed in Arabic, and 102, in Russian.

Regarding the method of data collection, this year we also included 200 cell phone users, primarily to offset the difficulty (familiar to anyone involved in data collection via phone surveys) of obtaining responses from young interviewees using a landline phone.

The sample

The study population was a representative national sample of 1,000 adults aged 18 and over (852 Jews and 148 Arabs). The sampling error for a sample of this size is ±3.2%. The survey data were weighted by sex and age. (For a sociodemographic breakdown of the sample, see Appendix 3; the self-defined identity characteristics of the respondents are presented in Appendix 4.)

Navigating the report

To make it easier to navigate the report, maintain the thread of the discussion, and avoid burdening the reader with too many statistics, two references have been included alongside the text: the first indicates the page where the question appears in Appendix 1 (the full questionnaire with the distribution of responses for all questions, in a three-part format: total sample, Jews, and Arabs); and the second, the page number where the same question appears in Appendix 2 (which includes only the recurring questions, comparing this year's responses with those

of the total sample through the years). Thus the references in the text appear as follows:

Israel's overall situation

Question 1
Appendix 1, p. 138
Appendix 2, p. 159

In the Appendices themselves, there is a reference alongside each question to the page in the text where it is discussed.

We hope that the abundant data below (which can be analyzed in additional ways and from many and varied perspectives) will help those who deal with the topics we surveyed to gain a better understanding of the current map of opinions in Israeli society on issues related, directly or indirectly, to Israel's democratic character, and will assist scholars in their writing and research. We are also placing at the disposal of the public the raw data used in the *Index* (in SPSS) on the Guttman Center for Surveys site, within the IDI site: (www.idi.org.il).

Chapter 1:
How is Israel Doing?

In this chapter, we will attempt to explore the mood of the Israeli public as a whole and its minority groups in particular. Our purpose in doing so is to lay the groundwork for the data analysis in the subsequent chapters.

The 2013 Democracy Survey was conducted a few months after the recent elections for the 19th Knesset (January 2013), when the new government was already in place; thus, at the time of the survey, the election had already been decided, but the practical significance of the new coalition arrangements was still largely unknown.

Israel's overall situation

Question 1
Appendix 1, p. 138
Appendix 2, p. 159

We posed the question: "How would you assess Israel's overall situation today?" In the sample as a whole, the most frequent response (41.1%) was "so-so," which can be understood as not wonderful, but not terrible either. In other words, the public is not especially happy with the overall situation, but neither is it embittered or angry. This interpretation is bolstered by the finding that those respondents who view the situation as "very good" or "quite good" (35.2%) exceed those who consider it "very bad" or "quite bad" (21.6%).

Figure 1: Israel's overall situation



If we compare the distribution of responses to this question with the corresponding data from last year, we find a slight downturn in the percentage of respondents who are satisfied with the situation (in 2012, 38.1% rated Israel's overall situation as "very good" or "quite good," while this year showed a slight dip, to 35.2%). However, this difference is not statistically significant, enabling us to conclude that the overall trend of increasing satisfaction with the situation since 2003 has not changed. Stated otherwise, for the most part the responses to this question support the impression we received last year as well when analyzing the data, namely, this may not be a public in the greatest of spirits, but its mood is not as despondent as certain media reports would have us believe.

Figure 2: Israel's situation through the years (very good and quite good; total sample; 2003-2013; percent)



Predictably enough, as in past years, a breakdown of the responses by nationality shows a sizeable difference between Jews and Arabs. In the Jewish sample, the most common response is "so-so" (43.1%); not far below it are the positive assessments of "very good" and "quite good" (36.7%), while the negative opinions lag far behind (at 18.4%). By contrast, among Arabs respondents the most frequent assessment of Israel's overall situation is negative (39.1%), followed by "so-so" (30.8%), with the positive assessment at the bottom of the scale (27.6%).

Table 1.1 (percent)

	Very good and quite good	So-so	Very bad and quite bad	Don't know / refuse	Total
Jews	36.7	43.1	18.4	1.8	100
Arabs	27.6	30.8	39.1	2.5	100

A breakdown by age indicates that the younger Jewish respondents see Israel's situation as less good than the older adults do (only 33.8% of young people define it as "very good" or "quite good," as opposed to 52.2% in the 65+ age group). Among Arab respondents—perhaps because of the "floor effect," i.e., the inherently pessimistic view of the situation—the differences between age groups are not significant: both cohorts tend to see the situation as bad, to varying degrees.

Somewhat surprisingly, a breakdown of responses by voting patterns in the 2013 Knesset elections does not show an unequivocal connection between the electoral success of the party the respondents voted for and their assessment of Israel's overall situation today.

Self-defined location on a left-right security/political spectrum actually emerges as a highly reliable predictive variable.

Table 1.2 (percent)

	Right	Moderate right	Center	Moderate left	Left
Situation very good and quite good	41.1	45.4	35.5	30.0	21.1
Situation so-so	39.8	40.2	46.3	47.1	37.9
Situation very bad and quite bad	16.7	12.7	16.8	22.8	37.9

As shown in Table 1.2, the proportion who feel that the situation is "very good" or "quite good" is highest among the moderate right-wingers (45.4%). The "hard-core" right—with 41.1% who take this view—is evidently less satisfied with the present situation, but certainly more content than the moderate or "die-hard" leftists. The latter are the group with the highest

share of respondents who characterize the situation as "very bad" or "quite bad" (37.9%); but the moderate left is not much happier, with 22.8% holding similar views. As for the right (both subgroups), center, and moderate left, those offering an upbeat assessment clearly outnumber the respondents who take a negative stance. By contrast, the balance is reversed among the hard-core left wing.

A breakdown of the total sample by income level reveals, as expected, that more respondents who report a below-average income define the situation as "very bad" or "quite bad" (26.4%) than do those with an average (19.8%) or above-average (16.8%) income. Despite this, even among the less-than-average income group, the most common response was "so-so" (40.3%).

Looking at the Jewish sample by level of religiosity, of those who define themselves as national religious/haredi-leumi, or as traditional religious, the proportion who assess Israel's situation as "very good" or "quite good" (49.5% among the first group, and 41.4% among the second) exceeds those who view it as "so-so" and "very bad" or "quite bad." The distribution of responses in these groups clearly differs from that among the haredi, traditional non-religious, or secular respondents, whose most frequent response is "so-so."

Similarly, if we break down the Jewish sample by self-defined association with very strong, quite strong, quite weak or very weak social groups, the share of respondents who assess the situation as "very good" or "quite good" among those who identify themselves with the weaker groups is roughly one half that of the respondents who align themselves with the stronger ones.

These differences led us to pose a practical question: What does the public think can be done—and are they willing to bear the price of narrowing the gaps?

Willingness to pay higher taxes to reduce the gaps

Question 26
Appendix 1, p. 155

To the question "Do you agree or disagree that we must narrow the gap between rich and poor in Israel, even if this means that most of us will have to pay higher taxes," a clear majority of respondents—Jews and Arabs alike—answered positively (63.5%). This is a surprising finding, since the question was posed in numerous contexts in the past, in Israel and many other countries, and the willingness to pay increased taxes was always low.

Table 1.3 (percent)

	Jews	Arabs
Agree strongly and agree somewhat	64.2	60.3
Disagree strongly and disagree somewhat	30.9	27.5
Don't know / refuse	4.9	12.2
Total	100	100

We broke down the responses based on self-identification with the stronger or weaker group. In all cases, the majority agreed that we must narrow the gaps even if its means paying more taxes. A similar finding emerged when we broke down the responses by income level of the respondents: in all three groups—below-average income, average income, and above-average income—a majority were willing to pay more taxes in order to reduce the disparities in Israeli society (60.7%, 68.9%, and 67%, respectively). As expected, a breakdown by political orientation yielded the following differences: the percentage of those on the left who agreed to pay more taxes to narrow the gaps is greater than the corresponding proportion on the right, while the center is closer to the left than to the right on this question.

Table 1.4 (percent)

	Right	Moderate right	Center	Moderate left	Left
Agree strongly and agree somewhat	54.1	66.7	75.2	75.3	75.4
Disagree strongly and disagree somewhat	43.5	29.3	22.3	18.8	19.7
Don't know / refuse	2.4	4.0	2.5	5.9	4.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

From the topic of Israel's overall situation, we moved on to an assessment of Israel's democracy.

Functioning of Israeli democracy

Question 5
Appendix 1, p. 139
Appendix 2, p. 160

We asked respondents: "In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the functioning of Israeli democracy?" The responses of the total sample indicate that the public is divided on this question, with a slight advantage to the satisfied group: 49.7% (of whom 6.2% were very satisfied, and 43.5%, satisfied) expressed satisfaction with the functioning of Israeli democracy, as opposed to 46.7% who voiced dissatisfaction, to varying degrees. This finding is not particularly encouraging; but again, it does not seem to point to an irate or frustrated public, in part because the results this year are not fundamentally different from the previous assessment, two years ago (Figures 3 and 4).[1]

Figure 3: Satisfaction with functioning of Israeli democracy (total sample and by nationality; percent)



1 It should be recalled that the 2011 Democracy Survey was carried out in March 2011, that is, before the tent protests in the summer of that year. The fact that this year's finding is similar to that of 2011 indicates that the protests did not spark any fundamental shift in the Israeli public's perception of the functioning of Israeli democracy.

Figure 4: Satisfaction with functioning of Israeli democracy (satisfied and very satisfied; total sample; by year; percent)



However, a breakdown by nationality—Jews and Arabs separately—shows that the reference to the total sample obscures a worrisome situation: while a majority of the Jewish sample (albeit not a large one) are satisfied or very satisfied with the functioning of Israel's democracy (54.3%, compared with 42.7% who are very dissatisfied or dissatisfied), here too—as in the question above on Israel's overall situation—we found a large and unequivocal majority of Arab respondents who are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (68.2%), as opposed to 24.8% who reported being satisfied or very satisfied.

We examined the association between assessment of Israel's democratic performance and self-identification with the left or right on political/security issues. Here too, the variable of political orientation was found to have high explanatory value. Not surprisingly, the share of dissatisfied respondents is highest among those who align themselves with the "hard-core" left (56.7%), while that of satisfied respondents is greatest in the moderate right camp (66.2%).

To summarize the mood of the public, based on the three questions discussed above: this year saw a slight, but statistically insignificant, dip in the assessments of Israel's overall situation and the functioning of its democracy by the total sample; however, the general upward trend of the last few years has not abated. Notwithstanding the above, the difference in satisfaction between Jews (the satisfied) and Arabs (the dissatisfied) should obviously be borne in mind by policy makers and the highest political echelons.

Upholding democratic principles

Question 12.1–12.4
Appendix 1, p. 146
Appendix 2, p. 167

We wished to learn to what extent, in the opinion of the respondents, the following four principles of democracy are upheld today in Israel: freedom of religion, the right to live with dignity, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly.

As shown in Figure 5, the outstanding exception among the four in the total sample is the right to live with dignity: in this case, the most frequent response is that this right is upheld "too little" or "far too little" (41.8%). In other words, the chief democratic shortcoming as seen by the respondents this year is in the economic sphere. There is certainly reason to assume that this emphasis is the belated result of the protests of summer 2011 and the many smaller protests that have occurred here and there since then. The most common response in the other three categories (freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly) is that these rights are upheld "to a suitable degree" (40.7%, 40.3%, and 44.4%, respectively).

We wished to know if there was a connection between the economic standing of the respondents and their views on whether the principle of the right to live with dignity is upheld in Israel today. Accordingly, we broke down the responses of the Jewish interviewees by income level. The correlation that we found was expected: at the two lowest income levels, the most frequent response was that this right is insufficiently maintained (below-average income – 43.9%; average income – 37.9%), while the most common response among interviewees with above-average incomes was that this right is upheld "to a suitable degree" (37.7%).

Figure 5: To what extent are these democratic freedoms upheld in Israel today (total sample; percent)



Table 1.5 (percent)

	Too much/ far too much	To a suitable degree	Too little/ far too little	Don't know / refuse	Total
Below-average income	14.2	39.3	43.9	2.6	100
Average income	17.3	34.2	37.9	10.6	100
Above-average income	19.3	37.7	33.2	9.8	100

In the same vein, we looked for a correlation between level of religiosity and perceived observance of the principle of freedom of religion. We found that the group most likely to feel that freedom of religion is insufficiently upheld are the haredim (35.8%), followed by the secular, one third of whom (33.7%) hold that the right to freedom of religion is not being properly maintained in Israel;

however, the most frequent response of the secular interviewees (36.6%) was that freedom of religion is being upheld to a suitable degree. Note the particularly high share of traditional religious followed by the national religious/haredi-leumi respondents who feel that freedom of religion is being honored today in Israel to a suitable degree (54.7% and 51.6%, respectively).

Table 1.6 (percent)

	Too much/ far too much	To a suitable degree	Too little/ far too little
Secular	25.5	36.6	33.7
Traditional non-religious	23.6	46.6	25.5
Traditional religious	23.4	54.7	21.1
National religious/ haredi-leumi	19.8	51.6	23.1
Haredi	24.5	32.1	35.8

We decided to examine respondents' perceptions of freedom of expression in Israel in accordance with their self-defined political orientation. The most common answer among all political camps was "to a suitable degree."

And how do Arabs see the fulfillment of these rights in Israel today? As Table 1.7 shows, the picture is not clear-cut. The most frequent response is that these principles are upheld "to a suitable degree"; yet, given the opinions of Arab respondents on other questions, we feel that the distribution of the findings casts doubt on the reliability of the responses in all categories of this question.

Table 1.7 (percent)

	Freedom of assembly	Freedom of expression	Right to live with dignity	Freedom of religion
Too much/far too much	28.3	29.5	29.5	36.1
To a suitable degree	32.3	36.5	38.5	36.8
Too little/far too little	28.4	23.7	23.1	18.1
Don't know / refuse	11.0	10.3	8.9	9.0
Total	100	100	100	100

What is the new politics?

Question 29
Appendix 1, p. 156

A salient feature of the 2013 elections was the promise of the parties—several of which garnered many votes as a result (in particular, Yesh Atid and Bayit Yehudi)—to usher in an era of "new politics." We wished to explore the meaning of this phrase in the eyes of the public, and the extent to which Israel's citizens believe that the recent elections truly reflected a new type of politics.

We first asked an open-ended question: "There has been talk recently about 'a new politics.' In your view, what is the most important aspect of this development?" The responses were coded into four categories: (1) "new politics" as a concept with positive implications; (2) "new politics" as a concept with negative implications; (3) there's no such thing as "new politics"; (4) am not familiar / don't know.

Figure 6: Attitudes toward the "new politics" (total sample; percent)



Breaking down the responses in accordance with these categories revealed that in the total sample a majority of respondents (53.5%) ascribe a positive meaning to the term "new politics."

Surprisingly, in light of the very frequent use of the term "new politics" in election ads only a few months before the survey was conducted, the second largest category (30.3%), after positive implications, turned out to be those who were completely unfamiliar with the term ("don't know / am not familiar"). As indicated in Figure 6, 10% of those interviewed, who were grouped together in the third largest category, held that there is no such thing as "new politics." Their responses largely reflect skepticism, even cynicism, with such comments as "election gimmick," "nothing ever changes," and the like.

Of particular interest is the fourth, and smallest, category, consisting of those who actually ascribe a negative meaning to the term "new politics." Those included in this category frequently identified racism as the chief component of the new politics (primarily Arab respondents); alternatively, the Jewish respondents saw it as a "cover-up" for the politics of the "white" Ashkenazi middle class. Other responses casting the new politics in a negative light contained such "compliments" as "disgusting," "taxes" (apparently inspired by the budget debates following the elections, around the time the survey was conducted), and "a mess."

Did the recent elections reflect a "new politics"?

Question 30
Appendix 1, p. 156

From the general, open-ended question, we continued to a more concrete one: "In your opinion, do the results of the recent Knesset elections reflect a new politics?"

The prevailing feeling in the total sample (51.2%), at least when the survey was carried out, was that the elections indeed reflected a new politics. Since, as stated, the bulk of the respondents considered the new politics "a good thing," we can assume that this statement about the outcome of the elections also reflected, for the most part, a positive stance.

It should be noted that a majority of Jewish respondents (52.9%) felt that the recent elections reflected a new type of politics, while only a minority of the Arab sample (though a sizeable one, at 41.9%) shared this view—perhaps because the Arab public has fewer expectations of a genuine shift in Israeli politics in the wake of the elections.

Figure 7: Do the results of the recent Knesset elections reflect a new politics? (total sample; percent)



Impact of the summer 2011 protests on the elections

Question 31
Appendix 1, p. 157

We also examined the public's opinion on how much, if at all, the results of the recent elections were affected by the protests in the summer of 2011.

As Figure 8 indicates, the Jewish public is split, more or less evenly, on this question: 46.5% feel that the elections were influenced by the protests, while 43.7% hold that they were not. Among the Arab respondents, who were less involved in the protests, the most common response (50%) was that the elections were not affected by the protests. Only a minority of the Arab interviewees (32.7%) took the opposite view.

Figure 8: How much were the recent elections affected by the summer 2011 protests? (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Summary

In this chapter, we examined the degree of satisfaction with Israeli democracy, the extent to which democratic principles are upheld, attitudes toward the concept of "new politics," and the effect of the summer 2011 protests.

- The most frequent response to the question on Israel's overall situation was "so-so" (41.1%); among the remainder, more respondents assessed the situation as good than as bad. A breakdown of the results by nationality showed that among Arab respondents, the most common assessment was negative (39.1%).
- A majority of the Israeli public (63.5%), including all sectors, are willing to pay more taxes in order to narrow the country's socioeconomic gap.
- Respondents who indicate satisfaction with the functioning of Israeli democracy slightly outnumber those who are dissatisfied (of the total sample, 49.7% versus 46.7%, respectively). At the same time, a breakdown by nationality shows a sizeable majority of Arab respondents who are unhappy with Israeli democracy.
- As for upholding democratic principles—freedom of religion, expression, and assembly, and the right to live with dignity—the responses were not uniform. With respect to the first three rights, a clear majority holds that they are maintained to a suitable degree or better. But in terms of the right to live with dignity, a notable percentage of the total sample (41.8%) feels that this principle is upheld too little.
- Coding of the responses to the open-ended question, in which respondents were asked to specify the most important aspect of the "new politics," indicates that 53.5% noted positive elements; almost one third stated that they were not familiar with the concept; 10% said there is no such thing; and 6.2% ascribed negative meanings to the term. A very small majority of the total sample responded positively on the question of whether the recent elections reflected a new politics, while only a minority of the Arab respondents shared this view.
- Addressing the impact of the summer 2011 protests on the 2013 elections, the Jewish respondents are split between those who hold that the elections were affected by the protests and those who take the opposite view. Among Arab respondents, however, the majority feel that the protests did not affect the outcome of the elections.

Chapter 2:
The Political System

We now move on to the subject of attitudes toward the political system specifically. The first group of questions dealt with the public's view of politicians.

How hard are Knesset members working?

Question 8.3
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 165

Given the constant criticism in the media (and consequently, in public discourse) of the performance of Israel's elected representatives, we sought the reaction of the interviewees to the statement: "Overall, most members of the Knesset work hard and are doing a good job." In the total sample, opinions were almost evenly divided: 48.1% did not agree with the above statement, meaning they feel that most Knesset members (MKs) are not working hard or doing a good job, as opposed to 45.8%, who agree that all in all, Israel's MKs are doing what is expected of them. As shown in Figure 9, the differences between Jews and Arabs on this question are very slight, with a similar split in the responses.

Figure 9: Overall, most Knesset members are working hard and doing a good job (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Perhaps because this year's survey was conducted not long after the elections, when the promise of "something new/different" still lingered in the air, a comparison with previous surveys where this question was asked shows a substantial increase in the share who hold that the MKs are actually performing their job faithfully: from roughly one third in the two previous assessments (2011 and 2012: 33.1% and 33.9%, respectively) to about 46% in the present survey. Of course, additional surveys are needed to determine if what we are seeing is a genuine upswing in the public's assessment of Knesset members' performance.

Figure 10: Most Knesset members are working hard and doing a good job (total sample; by year; percent)



For whose benefit are Knesset members working?

Question 8.5
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 165

Next, we moved on to exploring whether politicians are seen as working for the good of the general public or for their own benefit. Here too, we asked respondents their opinion of a statement, namely: "Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public." Unlike the previous question, here the distribution of responses was far from balanced, particularly in

the Jewish sample but also among the Arab respondents. Both groups show a marked tendency to agree with the statement that politicians look out first and foremost for themselves: 71.5% of the Jews and 55.2% of the Arabs agree with this less-than-flattering assessment.

Figure 11: Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public (agree totally or somewhat; total sample and by nationality; percent)



Although this year's findings with respect to politicians' focus of concern tend toward the negative, it should be noted that they show some improvement over last year, with a 10% drop in the share of the total sample who consider politicians to be self-centered (68.8% this year, compared with 78.1% last year).

Politicians of today versus those of the past

Question 33
Appendix 1, p. 158
Appendix 2, p. 176

The third question in this set dealt with a comparison between the politicians of today and those of yesteryear: "When you compare Israeli politicians today with what you know or remember about Israeli politicians of the past, are today's better, worse, or the same?" Based on the assumption that we all tend to see the past through rose-colored glasses, we expected that the comparison would work against today's politicians, and in fact, as the responses show clearly,

the past does seem rosier than the present. An interesting finding in this context is that, for reasons unknown, the Arab respondents are more nostalgic than the Jews: 44.4% of the total sample (43.2% of the Jewish sample, and 50.6% of the Arab sample) hold that the politicians of days gone by were better than today's.

Figure 12: Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public (total sample; by year; percent)



Figure 13: How do Israeli politicians of today compare with those of the past? (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Despite the nostalgia that we identified this year, a comparison of the 2013 findings for the Jewish sample with those from the last time the question was asked (2008) shows (as in the previous questions) a certain improvement in the assessment of today's politicians versus those of the past. Thus, there was a sharp drop in the percentage of respondents who feel that present-day politicians are worse—from 66.4% in 2008 to 44.4% in 2013—and even an upswing in those who hold that they are better than their predecessors: from 3.5% in 2008 to 12.6% in 2013.

We wished to see if the age of the interviewees played a role in their assessment of today's politicians as opposed to those of the past. Surprisingly enough, no significant, consistent difference was found between the age groups in the Jewish sample. In other words, (perhaps) contrary to expectations, older respondents were not more or less nostalgic than younger ones.

Figure 14: How do Israeli politicians today compare with those of the past? (total sample; by year; percent)



Trust in institutions

Question 6.1–6.10
Appendix 1, p. 140
Appendix 2, p. 161

From here, we moved on to the public's level of trust in state institutions—a question that always generates great interest. As in all previous surveys, this year as well the IDF enjoys the highest level of trust in the Jewish sample (90.9% declared that they trusted it "to a large extent" or "to some extent"). The President of Israel is in second place (with 78.7%), followed by (in descending order) the Supreme Court (62.7%), the police (61.9%), the government (57.9%), the Knesset (54.5%), and the prime minister (51.7%), all of them trusted by a (large or small) majority of the sample. At the bottom of the scale are those institutions that did not earn the trust of a majority of the Jewish respondents: the media (47.2%), the Chief Rabbinate (43%), and the political parties (only 36.7%).[2]

2 According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, published by Transparency International in May 2013 (*TheMarker*, July 1, 2013), the institutions considered the most corrupt by Israelis are the political parties and the Chief Rabbinate. This may explain the findings in our survey—here too, these two institutions earned the lowest levels of trust.

As in previous years, the trust placed by Arab citizens of Israel in most of the above institutions is lower than that of the Jews—with the exception of the political parties, where the Arabs expressed greater trust than the Jews (43.2% versus 36.7%, respectively), and the media, where the levels of trust are virtually identical (Arabs – 48.1%; Jews – 47.2%). The "trust ranking" of the Arab respondents is therefore very different than that of the Jews: in the Arab sample, the list is headed by the Supreme Court (49.7% state that they trust it "to a large extent" or "to some extent"), followed by the media (48.1%), the police (43.5%), the political parties (43.2%), the President of Israel (41.7%), the Knesset (38.5%), the IDF (34.9%), and the government (33.3%). Lowest on the scale is the prime minister, with a trust rating of 31%. One finding that warrants special attention is the fact that not a single institution or major officeholder in the Israeli political system earned the trust of a majority of the Arab public.

Despite the slight improvement in the image of politicians over last year's survey, we actually encountered a certain drop in the level of trust of the Jewish public in all institutions surveyed, with the exception of a rise in trust in the media (from 46.3% in 2012 to 47.2% this year) and the political parties (from 34.1% last year to 36.7% this year).

We moved on to examine the level of trust among Jewish respondents in the three preeminent institutions of Israeli democracy: the Knesset, the government, and the Supreme Court. Our findings revealed that of the three, the Supreme Court topped the list, despite sizeable differences between respondents' level of trust in the Court when broken down by education, political orientation, and religiosity (as shown below).

The higher the respondents' level of education, the greater their trust in the media, the Supreme Court, and the president of the state; however, the percentage of academics who trust the political parties (32.5%) and the Chief Rabbinate (29%) is much lower than that of respondents with lesser education. There is no difference between the various levels of education in the degree of trust expressed in the prime minister, the Knesset, or the police. As in past surveys, the extent of trust in the media is greatly affected by self-described political orientation. Thus, the Jewish left displays much greater trust in the media than we found among the right.

Figure 15: Trust in institutions and public figures (to a large extent or to some extent; by nationality; percent)



Table 2.1 (percent)

	Trust the media to a large extent or to some extent
Right	35.0
Moderate right	37.0
Center	56.0
Moderate left	70.4
Left	63.7

We broke down the attitudes of the Jewish sample toward the three primary institutions (the Supreme Court, the government, and the Knesset) based on self-described location on the right-left political/security spectrum. This year, as in the past, the Supreme Court holds the top position among the moderate left, hard-core left, and center, though it ranks much lower on the right, and even more so, the hard-core right. As for the government, the moderate right and the center are the groups expressing the greatest trust, followed by (a minority of) the moderate left, and lastly, the "die-hards" on both right and left. Though some will be surprised at this finding, which seemingly lumps together two such disparate groups, the lack of trust at either extreme is nonetheless explainable: both the right- and left-wingers—each for their own reasons—are dissatisfied with the government. The right thinks that it is too left-leaning, and the left, that it tilts too far to the right. With regard to the Knesset, we found the highest levels of trust in the moderate left and the center. Here too, the lowest levels were recorded on the left and the right.

The data show, then, that every political camp—and even subgroup—has its own institutional "dream team" and "nightmare lineup," and that the levels of trust are lower in the two extreme subgroups than in the moderate and center ones.

Table 2.2 (percent)

Rank (from high to low)	Right	Moderate right	Center	Moderate left	Left
Position 1	IDF (89.9)	IDF (95.5)	IDF (95.5)	President of Israel (94.2)	President of Israel (84.6)
Position 2	President of Israel (66.7)	President of Israel (80.5)	President of Israel (80.5)	IDF (90.0)	Supreme Court (79.1)
Position 9	Political parties (36.8)	Political parties (42.3)	Chief Rabbinate (39.7)	Prime minister (34.3)	Political parties (33.3)
Position 10	Media (35.1)	Media (37.1)	Political parties (33.9)	Chief Rabbinate (22.9)	Chief Rabbinate (17.9)

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows, as expected, that the haredim have the lowest level of trust in all three major institutions (the Supreme Court, government, and Knesset), compared with the other groups. Not surprisingly,

opinions were most divided over the Supreme Court: the secular respondents show much greater trust in it than the other groups do; it also ranks much higher than the Knesset and the government in the level of trust placed in it by secular Jews. In the traditional groups, the greatest level of trust is reserved for the Knesset and the government.

Table 2.3 (percent)

	Trust the Knesset to a large extent or to some extent	Trust the government to a large extent or to some extent	Trust the Supreme Court to a large extent or to some extent
Secular	58.0	59.4	72.5
Traditional non-religious	56.0	61.8	66.1
Traditional religious	61.1	71.6	61.7
National religious/ haredi-leumi	41.3	56.1	51.1
Haredi	33.8	25.0	24.1

Balance of power in Knesset as representative of public opinion

Question 11
Appendix 1, p. 145
Appendix 2, p. 167

As we saw above, of all the institutions we examined, the political parties are the ones that earned the lowest levels of trust. To enhance our understanding of this finding, which is highly problematic from a democratic standpoint, we grouped together several questions dealing with Israel's political parties.

The first question that we addressed is the representativeness of the parties in the Knesset. We asked: "To what extent does the balance of power among the Knesset parties reflect the division of opinions in the general public?" As shown in Figure 16, there are major differences in perceptions of representativeness between Jews and Arabs. In fact, there is an inverse distribution of responses in these two groups: a majority of Jews (63.3%) see the balance of power between the Knesset parties as representative of the division of opinions in the public, while a minority of Arabs share this view (35.9%).

This difference presumably reflects the feeling of the Arabs that as a minority, even a Knesset constituted on the basis of democratic elections does not offer them adequate representation,

since the parties that they vote for will always be in a minority position, and what's more, they will be outside the government (or at least that has been the situation until now).

As for the total sample, it turns out that opinions have remained virtually unchanged since the last time we posed this question, in 2011; but there has been some improvement compared with 2007 and 2008, which marked a low point in the public's attitude toward the political establishment.

Figure 16: How well does the balance of power among Knesset parties reflect the opinions of the general public? (by nationality; percent)



Continuing with this topic, we looked at whether Jews who voted for parties that did not pass the electoral threshold (Ale Yarok, Gimlaim, Am Shalem, HaYisraelim, Otzma LeYisrael, Eretz Hadasha, and others) believe, to the same degree as Jews who voted for parties that are represented in the Knesset, that the party makeup of the Knesset faithfully represents the division

of opinions in the general public. While voters for these parties make up a very small proportion of our sample, the findings indicate that they too—like the voters whose parties did pass the threshold—feel, for the most part, that the balance of power in the Knesset is representative of public opinion. Stated otherwise, no difference in outlook was found on this question between those whose parties did not make it into the Knesset (meaning that they themselves are not represented there) and those whose parties did pass the threshold (giving them parliamentary representation).

Breaking down the responses according to self-identification with the right or left on political/security issues reveals that the highest share of respondents who agree that the balance of power between parties in the Knesset is an accurate reflection of public opinion is found on the right, though the differences between them and the centrist and left-wing respondents are not statistically significant or consistent.

Figure 17: Does the balance of power in the Knesset reflect public opinion? (to a large extent and to some extent; total sample; by year; percent)



From here, we moved on to two questions dealing with perceptions of differences between the parties.

Are there differences between the parties?

Question 13.5
Appendix 1, p. 147
Appendix 2, p. 169

When the interviewees were asked to relate to the statement: "There are no real differences between the political parties in Israel today," a majority of the total sample (55.3%) did not agree with it; that is, they see substantial differences between the parties. The pattern of responses on this issue was found to be very similar among Jews and Arabs.

Figure 18: There are no real differences between the political parties in Israel today (total sample; percent)



We found certain differences, though not large ones, in the distribution of opinions on this question in line with respondents' self-identification with stronger or weaker social groups: interviewees who located themselves with the stronger groups (like those with an academic education) were less inclined to agree with the statement that there are no differences between the parties than those who associated themselves with the weaker groups or had a lower level of education. One explanation may be that the less educated and those who align themselves with the weaker groups (there is of course some overlap between the two

variables), feel that none of the parties understand them or relate to their needs, and thus, in their eyes—to a greater degree than in the stronger groups—the parties are all "the same."

A breakdown by self-described political orientation points to some differences on this question between the right and center camps, on the one hand, and the left, on the other. True, the greater portion of all the camps rejects the statement that there is no difference today between the parties, but the majority on the left (and moderate left) clearly exceeds that on the right.

Table 2.4 (percent)

	Right	Moderate right	Center	Moderate left	Left
Disagree totally or somewhat that there are no differences between the parties	54.8	52.3	53.9	64.0	69.7

Bearing in mind that a majority of respondents hold that there are differences between the parties, we then looked at opinions on the importance of voting for one party over another.

Does it matter which party you vote for?

Question 13.3
Appendix 1, p. 147
Appendix 2, p. 169

In keeping with the previous question, the responses to the statement: "It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation," show that a majority (58.1% of the total sample) consider it incorrect, meaning that it *does* make a difference whom you vote for. In other words, here again the prevailing opinion is that there is a difference between the parties. The majority among the Arab respondents (61.5%) on this question is slightly higher than that among the Jews (57.5%), but the distribution of responses is similar.

Comparing this year's results with data from previous surveys, we found a notable increase in the share who do not agree that it doesn't matter whom you vote for, that is, who feel that it definitely does make a difference: from 51.1% in 2012 to 58.1% in 2013.

Figure 19: It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Desirable number of parties

Question 8.7
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 166

We wished to learn if the public is interested in reducing the number of political parties in Israel. Accordingly, we examined the rate of agreement or disagreement with the statement: "It would be better for Israel to have only a few large parties instead of the many parties it has today." A majority of Jewish respondents (67.8%) agreed with this statement, meaning that they support a reduction in the number of parties. By contrast, among Arab respondents, opinions were split virtually down the middle: 47.8% favor reducing the number of parties, compared with 43.9% who oppose it, apparently for fear that measures to reduce the number of parties would harm their political representation, which is based on a variety of (small) Arab parties.

Figure 20: It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation (disagree somewhat or totally; total sample; by year; percent)



We broke down the responses of the Jewish sample by voting pattern in the 2013 Knesset elections. Our assumption was that those who voted for the major parties would wish to boost their strength even further by limiting the number of parties, and would therefore agree with this statement to a greater extent than those who had voted for the smaller parties (which would presumably disappear or be "swallowed up" if steps were taken to reduce the number of parties). This hypothesis was refuted, however, and no correlation was found between the size of the party voted for and the position of its supporters regarding the need to reduce the number of parties in future.

Breaking down the responses by self-described location political orientation, we found that it is actually the left, whose electoral support is weaker, that is most in favor of reducing the number of parties, perhaps in hopes that such a move will help create a united left-wing camp.

Figure 21: It would be better for Israel to have only a few parties (agree somewhat or totally; by vote in 2013 elections; percent)



Table 2.5 (percent)

	Right	Moderate right	Center	Moderate left	Left
Agree totally or somewhat that it would be better for Israel to have only a few large parties instead of the many parties it has today	65.3	68.2	61.1	79.4	70.7

From here, we continued on to various aspects of decision making in Israel, particularly in the realm of majority-minority relations.

What makes a decision "democratic"?

Question 25
Appendix 1, p. 155

In recent years, there has been much discussion on whether majority decisions are inherently democratic. One side almost always supports this notion, while the other argues that this criterion is insufficient in that majority decisions are democratic only if they pass a number of tests—the most important being respect for basic democratic values, for example, safeguarding the rights of minorities.

We asked: "Which statement do you agree with more strongly? (1) Decisions made by the government and Knesset, elected by the majority in free elections, are by definition democratic; or (2) Decisions that conflict with such values as equality before the law, minority rights, and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if made by a government and Knesset elected by the majority in free elections." The most frequent (though not majority) response among Jews and Arabs alike (45.1% and 41.3%, respectively) was that the fact that the decision was made by a majority is enough in and of itself for it to be considered democratic. A lower percentage (Jews – 34.8%; Arabs – 35.5%) also demanded that it meet the test of democratic rights. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the share of respondents who answered "do not know" or refused to answer is especially high (roughly 20%), suggesting that the issue is not well understood by the public and hence it might be appropriate to engage in various "educational" activities to clarify this important topic.

Figure 22: What makes decisions "democratic"? (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Decisions on peace and security issues: Is a Jewish majority necessary?

Question 13.1
Appendix 1, p. 147
Appendix 2, p. 168

We asked the respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority." Predictably enough, there were substantial differences on this question between Jews, as members of the majority, and Arabs, who belong to the minority. Thus, as expected, a solid majority of Arabs (79.5%) are opposed to the statement, while the bulk of the Jewish respondents (66.7%) in fact call for a Jewish majority on decisions relating to peace and security.

Comparing the distribution of responses this year with that of previous surveys, we found a gradual, though significant, decline among the Jewish public who feel that a Jewish majority is necessary for such decisions—from an all-time high in 2010 (82.9%) to 77.8% in 2011 and 66.7% in 2013. Thus, it would be safe to state that we are seeing a downward trend in the demand to exclude non-Jews on matters of peace and security.

Figure 23: Decisions crucial to the state on peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority (Jewish sample; percent)



Figure 24: Decisions crucial to the state on peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority (agree somewhat or totally; Jewish sample; by year; percent)



Decisions on social and economic issues: Is a Jewish majority necessary?

Question 13.2
Appendix 1, p. 147
Appendix 2, p. 168

From issues of peace and security, which are highly sensitive politically, we moved on to whether decisions crucial to the state involving governance, society, and the economy should also be made by a Jewish majority. This year, as in the past, the proportion of Jews who would require a Jewish majority on social and economic issues is lower than the corresponding percentage on matters of peace and security, though it still constitutes a majority (56.9%). That is to say, a majority of the Jewish public in effect do not recognize Arab citizens of Israel as having equal standing when it comes to making decisions crucial to the state, even if these are not decisions that could potentially create a conflict between their citizenship and their nationality. As expected, the share of Arabs who disagree with the need for a Jewish majority on decisions involving social and economic issues is also high, at 73.1%.

Figure 25: Decisions crucial to the state on social and economic issues should be made by a Jewish majority (Jewish sample; percent)



Figure 26: Decisions crucial to the state on social and economic issues should be made by a Jewish majority (Jewish sample; by year; percent)



As in the previous question, however, here too the Jews are showing signs of becoming more moderate in comparison with last year: the percentage who agree with this exclusionary statement dropped from 69.5% in 2011 to 56.9% this year.

On a related topic, if a decision is made by the proper authorities—the legislature or government—how binding is it in the eyes of the public? We chose to examine this question in the relevant context of military service in the West Bank.

Right to refuse military service in the West Bank based on opposition to the occupation

Question 22
Appendix 1, p. 153

As shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, there is a fundamental difference between the positions of Jews and of Arabs on the question of following orders. In both cases—refusal to serve in the West Bank based on opposition to the occupation, and refusal to participate in the evacuation of settlements based on opposition to a government decision to do so—a majority of the Jews hold that there is no right of refusal (in the first instance, the majority is larger: 62.8% versus 50.9%). A majority of the Arab respondents, by contrast, actually support the right to refuse orders in both cases (59.6% compared with 55.8%, respectively). This difference can be explained by the degree of legitimacy attributed to government decisions in Israel: whereas a majority of Jews recognize the legitimacy of the government, deriving from it the obligation to comply with its decisions even in cases where they do not agree with them, Arab citizens are less inclined to acknowledge the authority of the government, and thus—at least theoretically—are not disturbed by non-compliance with official decisions.

Table 2.6 (percent)

	Jews	Arabs
Definitely have/I think they have the right to refuse	31.4	59.6
Definitely don't have/I think they don't have the right to refuse	62.8	29.5
Don't know / refuse	5.8	10.9
Total	100	100

Right to refuse to participate in evacuation of Jewish settlements based on opposition to a government decision

Question 23

Appendix 1, p. 153

Table 2.7 (percent)

	Jews	Arabs
Definitely have/I think they have the right to refuse	41.8	55.8
Definitely don't have/I think they don't have the right to refuse	50.9	34.0
Don't know / refuse	7.3	10.2
Total	100	100

Cross-checking the responses to both these questions—refusal to serve in the West Bank due to opposition to the occupation, and refusal to participate in the evacuation of settlements due to opposition to a government decision—yields a high degree of consistency. In other words, most supporters of the right to refuse in one situation express the same opinion in the other, and the converse: most opponents in one case are also opposed in the other.

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed the attitudes, opinions, and assessments of citizens regarding politicians, key political institutions of Israeli democracy, and the decisions made by them.

- Roughly one half of the public feels that Knesset members are hard workers who are doing a good job. This finding continues the multi-year trend of a slight upturn in the image of politicians in this context. At the same time, a significant majority of Jews (71.5%) think that politicians are more concerned with their own interests than with those of the public. Among Arab respondents, a smaller majority (55.2%) share this view. When asked to compare today's politicians with those of yesteryear, the greatest share (some 50%) held that the politicians of the past outshine those of today.
- Among Jewish respondents, the level of trust ("to a large extent" or "to some extent") in public figures and institutions is as follows (in descending order): IDF, President of Israel, Supreme Court, police, government, Knesset, Prime Minister, media, Chief Rabbinate, and political parties. Among Arabs, the order is different: Supreme Court, media, police, religious leaders, political parties, President of Israel, Knesset, IDF, government, and Prime Minister.
- A majority of Jewish respondents believe that the balance of power among Knesset parties faithfully represents the views of the public, but only a minority of Arabs share this opinion.
- A majority of the total sample (55.3%) agree with the statement that there are genuine differences between the political parties in Israel. Likewise, a majority of the public (58.1%) feel that it matters which party they vote for—a substantial increase over last year's findings.
- A majority of Jewish respondents favor reducing the number of parties, but only 47.8% of the Arabs surveyed support such a move.
- The prevailing opinion—among both Jews and Arabs (45.1% and 41.3%, respectively)—is that decisions made by a government or Knesset elected in free elections are democratic, even if they contradict basic democratic values such as minority rights.

- On the question of whether crucial decisions on matters of peace and security should require a Jewish majority, the bulk of the Jewish respondents (66.7%) answered positively, while a solid majority of Arabs (79.5%) responded in the negative. However, looking at this question over the years, we found a decline in the proportion of Jews calling for a Jewish majority in such cases. Among respondents at the center of the political spectrum (Yesh Atid and Hatnua), roughly one half support this position; and on the left (Meretz and Hadash), only a minority.
- As for whether crucial decisions on social and economic issues should also require a Jewish majority, the bulk of the Jewish respondents answered in the affirmative. Here too, we found that the Jewish majority who are willing to exclude Arabs from decision making is smaller than that recorded in 2011.
- A majority of Jewish respondents think that soldiers do not have the right to refuse to serve in the West Bank based on opposition to the occupation (62.8%), or the right to refuse an order to evacuate settlements based on opposition to a Knesset or government decision (50.9%). A majority of Arab respondents support the right to refuse in both cases.

Chapter 3:
Source of Authority: Religion or State?

One of the pivotal issues in Israeli public discourse over the years, whether directly or indirectly, has been the balance (or lack thereof) between the two parts of Israel's formal definition as a Jewish and democratic state—a complex topic with far-reaching implications. Accordingly, each year we revisit the question of which of these components—the democratic or the Jewish—is more important to the public, or whether the combined version is a truer reflection of their preferences.

Jewish or democratic?

Question 4

Appendix 1, p. 139
Appendix 2, p. 160

We posed the question (to the Jewish sample only): "Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Which part of this definition is more important to you personally?" As shown in Figure 27, the most frequent response (37%) is that the two components are equally important; however, the difference between this category and the two others (the Jewish part is more important – 32.3%; the democratic part is more important – 29.2%) is not great. Thus, it would be fair to state that at present, the Jewish public in Israel is in fact divided into three virtually equal groups: those who prefer the dual definition of "Jewish and democratic"; those who favor the Jewish element; and those who favor the democratic.

This is momentous news. For the first time in our surveys, the definition of "Jewish and democratic" does not show a significant margin of preference over the other choices. As always, however, we must be cautious in drawing conclusions based on one survey alone. As indicated in Figure 28, this three-way balance is the outcome of a persistent trend over the few years we have been posing this question—from a clear preference for "Jewish and democratic" to a shift away from this combination by considerable portions of the Israeli Jewish public. In 2010, the percentage favoring this option was roughly one half (48.1%). It dipped slightly in 2011, to 46.1%, and fell further in 2012, to a total of 41.9%. This year, as stated, it stands at only 37%. At the same time, support for the "democratic" component has largely been on the rise: from 17% in 2010, to 22.9% in 2011, 21.8% in 2012, and a record (for our surveys) of 29.2% this year.

Figure 27: Jewish or democratic state: Which part is more important to you? (Jewish sample; percent)



Among the possible explanations for this finding is that the Jewish public is shifting toward a specific preference at either end of the spectrum—"Jewish" or "democratic," rather than "Jewish and democratic" as in the past. This is partly because the theoretical and practical problems with the combined definition are coming to light, time and again, in various contexts. This represents an important (and fascinating) finding. If it is corroborated by other surveys and different polling methods, it will presumably have major political implications.

We analyzed this question based on several variables, the first of which is religiosity.

As shown in Figure 29, there is an extremely strong correlation between level of religiosity and the responses on this question. The haredi and national religious/haredi-leumi respondents unequivocally prefer the "Jewish" element in the definition of the state (72.5% and 65.2%, respectively); the traditional religious are split more or less evenly between supporters of the "Jewish" and "Jewish and democratic" definitions (42.5% and 43.3%, respectively); the traditional non-religious clearly favor the combination of "Jewish and democratic" (53.6%); and the secular

prefer the "democratic" component (45%), followed by the dual definition of "Jewish and democratic" (37%). Only a minority of the secular respondents chose the "Jewish" element (16.2%).

Figure 28: Jewish or democratic state: Which part is more important to you? (Jewish sample; by year; percent)



When there is such a strong explanatory variable, there is no great need to look for additional ones, but we nonetheless broke down the responses by age. We found that the two youngest age groups favor the "Jewish" component of the definition (41.9% and 41.5%), and gave the lowest rating to the "democratic" element alone (23.3% and 18.9%). By contrast, the oldest groups prefer the dual definition of "Jewish and democratic" (42.6%, 40%, and 43.5%), followed by the "democratic" one. The "Jewish" aspect is last among their choices, suggesting a generational shift whose impact on the future character of the state is quite clear: if the present trend continues, and the preferences of the younger generation prevail, Israel may well become more Jewish and less democratic.

Figure 29: Jewish or democratic state: Which part is more important to you? (Jewish sample; by religiosity; percent)



From here, we moved on to respondents' preferences in the event of a conflict between democratic principles and Jewish religious law.

Democratic principles or religious law?

Question 15
Appendix 1, p. 150
Appendix 2, p. 171

In recent years, sizeable gaps have emerged between democratic solutions to various national problems and the solutions offered by prominent rabbis, the latter arguing that they represent a higher set of values, and as such, their counsel should be heeded. Accordingly, we asked the following (of Jewish respondents only): "In the event of a conflict between democracy and halakha (Jewish religious law), should preference be given to upholding democratic principles or adhering to the precepts of Jewish law?"

The most interesting finding in this context is that, despite the balance cited above on the question of preferences in defining the state, here the most frequent response (42.7%) was that

democratic principles should take precedence in the event of a conflict with religious precepts. Only a minority (28.2%) hold that the tenets of halakha should take priority. A total of 21.1% think that the circumstances of the situation should determine which of the two sets of values should prevail. It is noteworthy that a small group (2.1% of the Jewish sample) stated, on their own initiative, that there is no conflict between the principles of democracy and the precepts of halakha. According to a less optimistic interpretation of the data, if we combine those who believe that halakhic principles should be uppermost with those who state that it depends on the circumstances or that no conflict exists (a total of 51.4%), those for whom democratic principles are important without any stipulations or qualifications do not constitute a majority.

Figure 30: In cases of conflict, which should have priority: democratic principles or Jewish religious law? (Jewish sample; percent)



In examining the connection between level of religiosity and respondents' preferences in the event of a conflict as described above, we found that the dividing line on this issue runs between the secular and traditional non-religious groups, on the one hand (both of which give precedence to democratic principles, though in varying degrees: 67% and 39.1%, respectively), and the traditional religious, national religious/haredi-leumi, and haredim, who show a clear preference for the precepts of halakha, albeit here too in different proportions (45.7%, 57.1%, and 85%, respectively).

Figure 31: In cases of conflict, which should have priority: democratic principles or Jewish religious law? (Jewish sample; by religiosity; percent



With the same qualification that we raised earlier (namely, the differences stemming from the heavy demographic presence of religious and haredim in the younger age groups), we looked at the opinions of the various cohorts on this issue. We found that the share of respondents who hold that the precepts of halakha should always take precedence is highest in the two youngest age groups (43.8% and 37.6%, respectively), and lowest in the oldest age groups (18.4% and 10.9%, respectively). The opposite holds true with reference to those who hold that democratic principles should always prevail in the event of a conflict (24.6% and 32.1% versus 50.5% and 56.1%, respectively). This analysis strengthens the conclusion that we presented earlier: In the Jewish public today, the younger age groups are the ones who feel less committed to the democratic component, and who clearly give preference to the Jewish aspect of the state.

Breaking down the responses by education shows that a majority of those with a full academic degree (58.4%) feel that democratic principles should always take precedence, while respondents with a middling level of education assigned equal priority to both sets of principles—democratic and halakhic—and the less educated displayed a slightly greater tendency to favor the precepts of halakha (37.1%).

Next, we moved on to a question that is no less emotionally charged: the chances of Israel being both a democratic and a Jewish state.

Can Israel be both Jewish and democratic?

Question 21

Appendix 1, p. 153

Notwithstanding the above, the combination of "Jewish and democratic" still appears feasible to most Jewish respondents. We asked: "Do you believe that the State of Israel can simultaneously be both a Jewish state and a democratic state, in the fullest sense of the term?" While a clear majority of the Jewish respondents (74.8%) hold that such a combination is possible, only about one third (35.2%) of the Arab respondents share this view, with the majority feeling that such a combination is not attainable. In other words, the "Jewish and democratic" definition is espoused by the majority, but not by the largest minority in Israel.

Figure 32: Can Israel be both a Jewish and a democratic state? (by nationality; percent)



Ultimate authority for approving a peace treaty including withdrawal

Question 7
Appendix 1, p. 141

Since the subject comes up frequently in discussions of a possible peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that would entail major territorial concessions, the question arises of who is actually authorized to "approve" in principle (not necessarily legally or formally) an agreement that would involve withdrawal. We offered several possibilities, some of which reflect more strongly the democratic part of the definition of the state, and others, the Jewish one; or phrased differently, some place greater emphasis on formal authority while others focus more on various types of informal authority. The options given were: the Knesset; only Jewish citizens of Israel, by referendum; all citizens of Israel (both Jews and non-Jews), by referendum; or religious leaders/rabbis.

The findings offer much food for thought: among the Jews, the most frequent response (30.6%) is that the authority for such a decision should rest with Jewish citizens alone, via referendum, followed by—in almost equal measures—the Knesset (24.9%) and all citizens of Israel (24.7%). Only 9.1% of the Jewish respondents see religious leaders/rabbis as a source of authority for approving a peace treaty that includes withdrawal from territory and evacuation of settlements, meaning that many

who define themselves as national religious/haredi-leumi, and even haredi, do not invest the rabbis with this authority. A very small percentage (3.8%) assert that no individual or body has the authority to approve such a step.

Among Arab respondents, the distribution is very different: the most frequent response (45.2%) is that a decision of this type should be approved by all citizens of Israel, via referendum. Far down the scale are all the other choices, with small differences between them. Interestingly enough, 11% of the Arab respondents actually agree with the prevailing opinion among the Jews that the authority for such approval should lie only with Israel's Jewish citizens. The Knesset ranks last on this question in the eyes of the Arab respondents: only 9.7% see it as a source of authority in this case.

Figure 33: Who should have the final authority to approve a peace treaty that includes withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, and evacuation of settlements? (by nationality; percent)



Naturally, we broke down the responses of Jews by level of religiosity, yielding very interesting results: not a single group had a majority who entrusted decision-making authority on this issue to the Knesset. The secular group preferred the option of all citizens of Israel as the appropriate source of authority in this matter (36.1%). The traditional religious, traditional non-religious, and national religious/haredi-leumi groups saw Jewish citizens alone, via referendum, as the primary source of authority for approval of such a treaty (31.2%, 35.2%, and 40.7%, respectively), while the most common response among the haredim—the only group who indicated a different source of authority—was, as expected, religious leaders/rabbis (43.8%). However, here too, we are not speaking of a true majority. In other words, the national religious—and even the haredi-leumi public, whose opposition to a peace agreement that includes withdrawal from territory and evacuation of settlements is well known—are obviously emphasizing the political-democratic sphere and not the religious-halakhic one. It should be added that this group contains the highest proportion of respondents who believe that no one has the authority to approve withdrawal from territory and evacuation of settlements in exchange for a peace treaty.

Table 3.1 (percent)

	Knesset	Only Jewish citizens of Israel, by referendum	All citizens of Israel (Jews and non-Jews), by referendum	Religious leaders/ rabbis	No one has the authority to make such a decision
Secular	29.1	27.6	36.1	1.2	1.2
Traditional non-religious	28.4	31.2	24.8	0.9	2.8
Traditional religious	28.9	35.2	14.3	11.7	3.9
National religious / haredi-leumi	17.6	40.7	6.6	17.6	12.1
Haredi	6.3	31.1	3.8	43.8	6.3

A breakdown of Jewish responses by self-defined political orientation produces the following distribution:

Table 3.2 (percent)

	Knesset	Only Jewish citizens of Israel, by referendum	All citizens of Israel (Jews and non-Jews), by referendum	Religious leaders/ rabbis	No one has the authority to make such a decision
Right	18.0	38.8	13.1	15.9	9.0
Moderate right	22.4	39.1	19.5	9.8	2.9
Center	28.9	29.4	30.3	3.5	0.5
Moderate left	40	12.9	38.6	4.3	0
Left	37.9	10.4	43.9	3.0	1.5

As shown in Table 3.2, the respondents on the left and moderate left locate the source of authority primarily with all citizens of Israel by referendum, and with the Knesset. The center is divided almost evenly between all citizens of Israel, only Jewish citizens of Israel via referendum, and the Knesset. By contrast, the right and moderate right place their trust in the Jewish citizens of Israel as the source of authority for a decision on withdrawal from territory and evacuation of settlements in the context of a peace treaty. Here too, 9% on the right hold that no one has the authority to decide—a much higher proportion than in any other group. In any event, based on all the analyses presented above, the Knesset is, at best, the first among equals with regard to approving a withdrawal from territory and the evacuation of settlements, and is certainly not the prime source of authority in the eyes of the Israeli public.

Are the Jews the "chosen people"?

Question 18

Appendix 1, p. 152

The final question in this chapter, concerning the special status (or not) of the Jewish people, was presented to the Jewish respondents only. It is tied only indirectly to the subject of the source of authority, but is still interesting in our context, since it relates to the issue of fundamental equality between national groups and carries important political ramifications.

We asked: "To what extent do you believe that the Jews are the 'chosen people'?" As shown in Figure 34, roughly two thirds of the Jewish respondents (64.3%) believe "very strongly" or "quite strongly" that the Jews are indeed the chosen people, while one third (32.7%) do not share this view.

Figure 34: Do you believe that the Jews are the "chosen people"? (Jewish sample; percent)



Since some would argue that the belief in the chosenness of the Jews says nothing about their willingness to accept those who are not Jews in political matters, for example, we cross-referenced the responses to this question with those from the previous one (on the authority to approve a peace treaty in exchange for withdrawal and the evacuation of settlements). The results demonstrate a close connection between the two: those who see the Jews as the chosen people are less willing to grant a voice to non-Jews on this crucial issue; and vice versa—those who do not share this belief are more willing to include non-Jews in such a decision.

Table 3.3 (percent)

	Knesset	Only Jewish citizens of Israel, by referendum	All citizens of Israel (Jews and non-Jews), by referendum	Religious leaders/ rabbis	No one has the authority to make such a decision
Believe very strongly that the Jews are the chosen people	20.4	39.1	12.3	16.4	6.4
Believe quite strongly that the Jews are the chosen people	19.2	30.0	39.2	1.7	1.7
Don't believe so strongly that the Jews are the chosen people	35.5	25.2	28.9	3.7	0.9
Don't believe at all that the Jews are the chosen people	33.7	14.2	43.8	0.6	1.2

Of those who believe very strongly in the notion of the Jews as the chosen people, the greatest share (39.1%) support the idea of a referendum among Jews alone when the return of territories comes up for discussion in future. Among those who believe quite strongly that the Jews are the chosen people, the most common response regarding the authority to approve a withdrawal is a referendum involving all citizens of Israel. Those who do not believe so strongly in the notion of the Jews as the chosen people opted most frequently for the Knesset as the final authority (35.5%), while those who do not believe at all that the Jews are the chosen people came out clearly in favor of a referendum including all citizens of Israel (43.8%).

We broke down the responses to the "chosen people" question by level of religiosity. As expected, the findings show that the more religious the respondents, the greater their belief in the uniqueness of the Jewish people. The dividing line on this issue runs between the secular interviewees, of whom only a minority (though a sizeable one, at 42.2%) believe that the Jews are the chosen people, and all the other groups—where a majority ranging from solid to sweeping (between 75.4% and 96.2 %!) subscribe to this view.

We sought to clarify whether political orientation correlates to the same extent with the perception of the Jews as the chosen people. Here too, the link between the variables is direct and consistent, that is to say, the greater the rightward tilt of respondents on political/security issues, the greater their belief

in the uniqueness of the Jewish people. This association is even stronger than that of the religiosity variable: the disparity between the groups at either extreme in the context of religiosity is 54% (96.2% versus 42.2%), whereas the difference in terms of political orientation is 69% (86.9% versus 17.9%).

Table 3.4 (percent)

	Believe very strongly and quite strongly that the Jews are the chosen people
Right	86.9
Moderate right	72.2
Center	51.2
Moderate left	38.6
Left	17.9

We also examined if the variable of age correlated with the belief in the chosenness of the Jewish people. It emerged that there was a certain correspondence (though not as dramatic as above), namely, the older the respondent, the lesser the belief that the Jews are the chosen people. It is reasonable to assume that here too the link between age and religiosity plays a role.

Summary

In this chapter, we discussed questions related to Israel as a democratic and Jewish state, and the delicate political balancing act surrounding this issue.

- On the question of which part of the definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state is most important, responses among Jews were divided (with slight differences) among those who favored the "democratic" component (29.2%), the "Jewish" component (32.3%), and both of them equally (37%). Comparing the preferences through the years, we found that the combined "Jewish and democratic" definition is declining in popularity and the variance between preferences is growing.
- With regard to favoring democratic values or halakhic ones in the event of conflict between them, the prevailing response among Jewish respondents (42.7%) is that democratic values should take precedence. Only a minority (28.2%) would give priority to halakhic precepts in the event of a conflict.
- Notwithstanding the above, a majority of Jewish respondents (74.8%) think that Israel can be simultaneously both a Jewish and a democratic state; however, only a minority of Arabs take this view (35.2%).
- The most frequent response among Jewish respondents (30.6%) on the question of who should have the authority to approve a peace treaty that would include withdrawal from territories and the evacuation of settlements is that Jewish citizens of Israel should be the ones to decide. Those who identify with the left on political/security issues prefer a decision by all citizens of Israel, while those on the right favor a decision by Jewish citizens only. Among Arab respondents, the prevailing opinion is that all citizens of Israel should decide this issue through a referendum.
- Roughly two thirds (64.3%) of Jewish respondents consider the Jews to be the chosen people.

Chapter 4:
Citizens, the State, Politics, and Society

We chose to begin this chapter, for a change, not with opinions but with feelings: the sense of belonging to the state, and pride in being Israeli.

Feeling a part of the state and its problems

Question 2
Appendix 1, p. 138
Appendix 2, p. 159

In recent years, much has been said about the growing alienation from the state of large swathes of the Israeli public. To test whether there this perception of growing estrangement is supported empirically, we revisited the question: "To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?"

Figure 35: To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? (total sample; percent)



As Figure 35 indicates, a majority (60.6%) of the total sample still feel part of the state and its problems, though this plurality is not all that large. So is alienation from the state actually on the rise? A comparison of the total sample over time shows a steady downward trend in the sense of belonging to the state and involvement in its problems—from 78.2% in 2003 to 60.6% in 2013. (We will be discussing this issue in greater detail below.)

On this question, however, it is advisable to distinguish between the responses of Jews and Arabs, since for obvious reasons the differences between the groups are too great to justify a joint analysis as one sample. Thus, a total of two thirds (66.6%) of the Jewish respondents report feeling part of the state and its problems to a very large or a large extent. A further one-fifth (19.1%) feel a sense of belonging to some extent, while only 12.6% feel this way to a small or very small extent. Among the Arab interviewees, by contrast, only 28.2% feel connected to the state and its problems to a large or very large extent; an additional third (32.1%) feel this way to some extent; and a further third (34%) feel a part of the state to only a small or very small extent.

Figure 36: To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? (by nationality; percent)



The distribution of responses in the Jewish sample cannot be interpreted in more than one way: a clear majority feel part of the state and its problems, and only a small minority are

the exceptions to the rule, that is, they do not feel a sense of belonging. However, the distribution of responses among the Arab interviewees is certainly open to different interpretations. For example, a more optimistic approach would combine those who feel a sense of belonging to a large or very large extent with the third who report this feeling to some extent, for a total of slightly less than two thirds. According to this argument, given the fact that we are speaking of a state that defines itself as Zionist, whose symbols are exclusively Jewish and whose Arab residents do not enjoy recognition of their collective national rights, this is quite a high level of identification by a minority with the state in which it resides. Relating to the figure of 19.9%, this interpretation would argue that in fact only this percentage claim that they do not feel a sense of belonging.

A second, more pessimistic, reading would emphasize the fact that less than one third of the Arab sample state that they feel part of the state to a large or very large extent; hence, what we are seeing here is a grave civic problem of alienation from the state on the part of the largest national minority.

There are those who hold the younger generation responsible for the overall decline in the share who feel a strong connection to the State of Israel and its problems. For this reason, we explored whether young people feel less a part of the state and it problems than do older adults. And in fact, the sense of belonging among young Jews is definitely less than it is among the older age groups. We did not find a systematic correlation of this type among the Arab respondents, though the youngest age group feels the most estranged while the oldest group is the one that reports a stronger connection with the state.

Table 4.1 (percent)

		18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Feel part of the state and its problems to a large or very large extent	Jews	46.5	59.4	67.7	76.1	74.4	75.6
	Arabs	16.2	30.4	25.9	33.4	25.0	54.6

We tested the connection among the Jewish public between level of religiosity and sense of belonging to the state. As expected, the haredim feel part of the state and its problems to a lesser degree than the other groups.

Table 4.2 (percent)

	Secular	Traditional non-religious	Traditional religious	National religious/ haredi-leumi	Haredi
Feel part of the state and its problems to a large or very large extent	71.7	72.5	60.9	61.1	43.1

In addition, we wished to see whether, and in what way, self-identification with a stronger or weaker social group affects the sense of belonging to the state and its problems (in the Jewish sample). While the correlation is not systematic, it is clear from the figures that those who align themselves with the weakest group feel a part of the state and its troubles to a lesser extent (only 55.2%) than do the other groups within this variable.

Table 4.3 (percent)

	Self-identification with strong social group	Self-identification with somewhat strong social group	Self-identification with somewhat weak social group	Self-identification with weak social group
Feel part of the state and its problems to a large or very large extent	65.2	75.1	63.5	55.2

Pride in being Israeli

Question 3

Appendix 1, p. 138
Appendix 2, p. 160

From here, we moved on to a recurring question in the *Democracy Index*: "How proud are you to be an Israeli?"

As in past years, there is a profound disparity between the degree of pride in their Israeliness felt by Jews as opposed to Arabs: while a definite majority (83.3%) of Jews state that they are very proud or quite proud to be Israeli, only 39.8% of Arabs feel the same way.

We broke down the responses in the Jewish sample by self-identification with stronger or weaker social groups, and found that those who align themselves with the stronger groups are prouder to be Israeli than those who associate themselves with the weaker groups. Here too, the exception (with less pride in their Israeliness) proves to be those respondents who identify with the weaker social group, though even in this cohort there is a clear majority who are very proud or quite proud to be Israeli.

Figure 37: How proud are you to be an Israeli? (by nationality; percent)



Table 4.4 (percent)

	Self-identification with strong social group	Self-identification with somewhat strong social group	Self-identification with somewhat weak social group	Self-identification with weak social group
Very proud or quite proud to be Israeli	85.6	85.7	81.3	74.6

We wished to determine if there is a difference between the right and left political camps when it comes to sense of pride in being Israeli. It turns out that those on the left/moderate left are slightly less proud to be Israeli than are those affiliated with the center or the right/moderate right. The moderate left (77.1%) falls between the center (which is very close to the right-wing camps on this subject, with 86.1%), and the "hard-core" left, which displays the lowest level of pride in its Israeliness (59.1%).

Table 4.5 (percent)

	Right	Moderate right	Center	Moderate left	Left
Very proud or quite proud to be Israeli	87.3	89.7	86.1	77.1	59.1

And how does this relate to religiosity? As in the previous question (sense of belonging to the state), here too the haredim show the least amount of pride in being Israeli, though even in this group there is a clear majority (73.8%) who take pride in their Israeliness. The next group, second from the bottom, are the secular, with a "pride rating" of 80.9%, followed by the national religious/haredi-leumi, with 87.8%. Both traditional groups—the religious and the non-religious—show the most pride in being Israeli (90.5% and 91.8%, respectively).

Table 4.6 (percent)

	Secular	Traditional non-religious	Traditional religious	Orthodox/ haredi-leumi	Haredi
Very proud or quite proud to be Israeli	80.9	91.8	90.5	87.8	73.8

Are the young and old proud of being Israeli to the same extent, or is there a difference between the age groups? A (separate) breakdown of the Jewish and Arab responses did not show a systematic connection between age and degree of pride in being Israeli.

We moved on from here to explore how the public views the tensions between various groups in Israeli society.

High or low levels of tension?

Questions 16–17
Appendix 1, p. 150
Appendix 2, p. 171

The five focal points of social tension that we examined this year are between Mizrahim-Ashkenazim, right-left (on political/security issues), religious-secular, rich-poor, and Jews-Arabs.

In the total sample, the following percentages rate the tension levels in each of the groups as high (in descending order): Jews-Arabs (68%), rich-poor (57.9%), religious-secular (55.7%), right-left (50.5%), and Mizrahim-Ashkenazim (29%).

Based on these data, it is clear that Jewish-Arab tensions still top the list, though there has been a slight drop compared with last year in the percentage who rank tensions between them as high (total sample: 2012 – 70.6%; 2013 – 68%). (This difference is not statistically significant, so that we cannot know if it represents a genuine shift.) A slight dip (not statistically significant) was also recorded in the percentage who consider the tension level between religious and secular to be high (2012 – 59.7%; 2013 – 55.7%). And an even smaller change (obviously not statistically significant) was recorded in the assessment of tensions between right and left (from 51.8% who rated the level of tension as high in 2012 to 50.5% in 2013).

On the other hand, evidently due to the ongoing economic unrest, tensions between rich and poor rose from third place last year to second place (occupied last year by religious-secular tensions). From 55.7% in 2012 who described the level of tension between rich and poor as high, the percentage climbed slightly this year, to 57.9%. Likewise, there was an increase over last year (the only change that was statistically significant) in the proportion who rated Mizrahi-Ashkenazi tensions as high: in 2012, only 23.3% gave this assessment, as opposed to 29% this year.

With respect to Jewish-Arab tensions, interestingly enough a much smaller percentage of Arabs than of Jews rated them as high this year (47.4% versus 71.8%, respectively). In the other four focal points, by contrast, the Arab respondents showed a much greater tendency than the Jews to assess the tension levels as high. For example, Mizrahi-Ashkenazi tensions were rated as high by 38.1% of Arab respondents as opposed to 27.4% of Jews.

We moved on to examine perceptions of the tension level in the eyes of various groups. An especially important finding emerges from a breakdown of Jewish-Arab tensions by age in the Jewish sample, namely, the youngest respondents assess them as high to a significantly greater extent than the older ones. In the Arab sample, as stated, the share who define Jewish-Arab tensions as high is much smaller than the corresponding ranking in the Jewish sample, and we did not find consistent differences here between the age groups. The gap between Jews and Arabs on this point is most salient in the 45-54 age group.

Figure 38: Levels of tension between groups in Israeli society (total sample; percent)



Table 4.7 (percent)

		18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Describe level of tension between Jews and Arabs as high	Jews	83.2	76.2	75.3	72.9	56.5	63.8
	Arabs	43.2	57.4	50.0	22.7	66.7	36.4

From here, we moved on to the perception of tensions between rich and poor. First, we broke down the Jewish sample by self-identification with stronger or weaker social groups, finding small, inconsistent changes.

A breakdown of the total sample by income level yielded, as expected, differences between the groups, but not necessarily in the direction we might have assumed: among those with a below-average income, the share who defined rich-poor tensions as high (59.2%) is in fact less than that among the higher earners (average income – 65.7%; above-average income – 66%).

Figure 39: Comparison of tension ratings in 2012 and 2013 (high level; total sample; by year; percent)



As characterized by the respondents, the third highest level of tension was, as stated, between religious and secular Jews. Breaking down these results by religiosity (Jews), we discovered that the greatest share of interviewees who defined this tension as high were found among the haredim (62.8%) and the secular (62.5%), while the smallest share belonged to the traditional non-religious group (46.2%). Assessments of the level of religious-secular tension by national religious/haredi-leumi and traditional religious respondents were virtually identical (54.1% and 55.1%, respectively rated it as high).

Figure 40: Level of Jewish-Arab tensions (by nationality; percent)



Table 4.8 (percent)

	Secular	Traditional non-religious	Traditional religious	National religious/ haredi-leumi	Haredi
Describe level of tension between religious and secular as high	62.5	46.2	55.1	54.1	62.8

Next, we examined the tensions between left and right, which for many years headed the list of social-political tensions in Israel. Breaking down the responses by self-described location on the right, left, or center of the political spectrum, we found a correlation between political orientation and perceptions of tension between the camps. It turns out that left-right tensions

are seen as stronger by those at either end of the spectrum. Thus, those respondents who identify with the "hard-core" right are the most inclined to describe left-right tensions as high (68.6%), followed by the hard-core left (57.6%). Those in the political center are the least likely to rate them as high (44.1%).

Figure 41: Tension ratings between left and right (high level only; by political orientation; percent)



Lastly, we examined attitudes regarding the least severe locus of tension as ranked by the Jewish respondents: that between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim. We broke down the findings by religiosity, age, political orientation, and ethnic origin. In the latter category, immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and their children were the most inclined to rate Mizrahi-Ashkenazi tensions as high, while those born in Europe-America and their children were the least. Asian/African-born respondents and their children fell somewhere between the two.

Neighbors from other groups

Questions 24.1–24.7
Appendix 1, p. 154
Appendix 2, p. 173

On a more general level, we examined how inter-group tensions are reflected in everyday life, based on the openness to having members of another group as neighbors. As shown in Figure 42, the least desirable neighbors in the eyes of the Jewish respondents (of the choices we presented) are foreign workers (56.9% report that having them as neighbors would bother them), followed by an Arab family (47.6%); a homosexual couple (30.5%), haredim (20.8%), and someone who does not observe the Sabbath or holidays round off the list (10.3%). Least disturbing to Jewish respondents was the notion of living next to people who observe the Sabbath and holidays (5.7%). Of the possibilities presented, Arab interviewees indicated that it would bother them the most to live next to a homosexual couple (46.2%). Here too, a family of a different nationality stood in second place: 41.9% stated that it would bother them to live next to a Jewish family. Having foreign workers as neighbors is considered much less of a problem by the Arab respondents (30.8%).

Figure 42: It would bother me to have as neighbors . . . (Jewish sample; percent)



Figure 43: It would bother me to have as neighbors . . . (Arab sample; percent)



A comparison between Jews and Arabs shows that Jews would be more bothered by living next to Arabs than vice versa, though the differences are not great (47.6% versus 41.9%, respectively). A much greater disparity was found between the two groups with regard to foreign workers as neighbors: this would bother a majority of the Jews, but less than a third of the Arabs. By contrast, the prospect of having a homosexual couple as neighbors is much more disturbing to Arabs than it is to Jews.

We broke down the Jewish sample by religiosity to examine the differences in levels of tolerance for neighbors from other groups. As shown in Figure 44, the more religious the respondents, the more they were bothered (on average) by having certain groups as neighbors. The converse holds true as well: lower religiosity correlated with a higher level of tolerance for neighbors from a different group. In fact, among those who define themselves as secular, there is not a majority who report being bothered by having any of the groups as neighbors.

Figure 44: It would bother me to have as neighbors . . . (Jewish sample; by religiosity; percent)



Recently, there has been a great deal of media coverage of protests against the presence of foreign workers in disadvantaged neighborhoods, in particular in south Tel Aviv. Much has been reported about the disruption caused to Jewish residents of these neighborhoods, and the anger at having the foreign workers in their midst. We therefore broke down the level of subjective disturbance of the Jewish respondents by self-identification with stronger or weaker social groups. The results show differences, though not very large ones: a majority of both groups (that is, those who associate themselves with a weaker group and those who identify themselves with a stronger one) are reluctant to live next to foreign workers—though the chances of someone affiliated with the stronger groups living next to foreign workers are negligible, whereas this is a very real possibility for those associated with the weaker groups.

Table 4.9 (percent)

	Self-identification with weak group	Self-identification with somewhat weak group	Self-identification with somewhat strong group	Self-identification with strong group
Would be bothered by having foreign workers as neighbors	66.4	51.9	53.8	59.7

Jewish citizens should have more rights than non-Jews

Question 8.4
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 165

The first question in this grouping, asked of Jewish respondents only, was a general one—that is, it did not relate directly to the Arab minority. We examined whether the interviewees hold that Jewish citizens should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens. As shown in Figure 45, respondents were split on this question: 48.9% agree with the statement that Jewish citizens should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens (agree totally – 32.9%; agree somewhat – 16%), while a similar proportion (47.3%) do not agree with it (disagree totally – 32.5%; disagree somewhat – 14.8%).

Figure 45: Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens (Jewish sample; percent)



A comparison with the findings from the last time this question was asked (in 2009) shows a clear rise in the share who support granting additional rights to Jews (35.9% – 2009; 48.9% – 2013), along with a sharp drop in the proportion who disagree with this notion (62% – 2009; 47.3% – 2013). This represents a major shift in the balance between the camps—a finding that does not bode well for Israeli democracy.

We broke down the responses by religiosity, political orientation, and age. In the first two cases, we found sizeable and consistent differences. The third analysis, by age, did not yield systematic findings, but it too is interesting—and worrisome. The breakdown by religiosity revealed that of the religious groups, the haredim are the strongest supporters of granting more rights to Jewish citizens of the state (72.2%). The other groups, in descending order of religiosity and agreement with this position are: national religious/haredi-leumi – 63.3%; traditional religious – 62.7%; and traditional non-religious – 50.4%. Only among the secular is there no majority who support giving precedence to Jewish citizens (38.7%).

Figure 46: Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens (agree somewhat or totally; Jewish sample; by year; percent)



Table 4.10 (percent)

	Secular	Traditional non-religious	Traditional religious	national religious haredi-leumi	Haredi
Agree totally and somewhat that Jewish citizens should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	38.7	50.4	62.7	63.3	72.2

As expected, an analysis of the data based on self-described political orientation shows substantial differences between the left, center, and right: a majority in both right-wing groups favors more rights for Jews, while no such majority exists in the center or on the left.

Table 4.11 (percent)

	Left	Moderate left	Center	Moderate right	Right
Agree totally and somewhat that Jewish citizens should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	24.2	22.9	34.3	56.6	67.0

Analyzing the data by age shows that the youngest age group clearly agrees (65.4%), to a much greater extent than the others, with the granting of additional rights to Jews. Here too, this may be the result of a higher demographic representation of haredim and religious respondents in this age group. But once again, the young people's opinions point to a problematic situation democratically.

Table 4.12 (percent)

	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Agree totally and somewhat that Jewish citizens should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens	65.4	41.2	53.5	48.9	34.9	42.8

Government should encourage Arabs to emigrate

Question 13.4
Appendix 1, p. 147
Appendix 2, p. 169

We revisited this question after putting it aside in 2011 and 2012, asking Jewish respondents if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel. The findings here are a pleasant surprise in terms of democracy and coexistence. Compared with past surveys, this year saw a noticeable rise in the proportion of Jews who responded in the negative: those who do not think Arab emigration should be encouraged came to roughly one half of the sample, clearly outstripping those who favor encouraging Arabs to emigrate (disagree somewhat or totally – 49.8%; agree somewhat or totally – 43.8%). The second highest proportion opposed to this statement was recorded in the previous survey (in 2010), when the rate of those who disagreed was only 44.3%. In effect, we are seeing the reversal of a trend in all previous surveys on which this question was asked: those who disagree with the proposal that the government actively encourage emigration of Arabs from Israel now outnumber those who agree. But in order to claim that a real change of heart has occurred on this issue, we will have to wait for additional surveys.

Figure 47: The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate (Jewish sample; percent)



Figure 48: The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate (agree somewhat or totally; Jewish sample; by year; percent)



Breaking down the responses by age produces a troubling result, consistent with previous findings on the opinions of Jewish young people: as we learn from Table 4.13, support for encouraging Arab emigration shows a significant and consistent rise as the age group drops. In other words, the youngest age group is the most in favor of encouraging Arab emigration.

Table 4.13 (percent)

	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Agree totally and somewhat that the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel	57.7	50.6	46.2	43.0	35.4	28.0

Breaking down the responses by religiosity reveals that the haredim and the religious are the strongest supporters of government encouragement of Arab emigration. In the secular and traditional non-religious groups, only a minority (albeit a sizeable one) are in favor: haredim – 65%; national religious/haredi-leumi – 63%; traditional religious – 51.2%; traditional non-religious – 47.7%; and secular – 32.5%.

Interest in politics

Question 9
Appendix 1, p. 144
Appendix 2, p. 166

As in most of the Democracy Indexes since 2003, we posed the question: "How interested are you in politics?" This year as well, a majority of the Jewish respondents (71.8%) reported being somewhat or very interested in politics; by contrast, 59.6% of the Arab sample stated that they are only slightly or not at all interested in the subject.

A comparison of the level of interest through the years (in the total sample) points to a genuine shift since last year. Nonetheless, the share who expressed an interest in politics this year (66.1%) fell slightly below the multi-year average of 68.1%, which was affected by an upswing in 2011 following an all-time low in 2008.

As in the past, we broke down the responses of the Jewish sample based on several variables that we feel can affect the level of personal interest in politics, over and above the national interest discussed earlier. To start with, we analyzed the responses by age. Among the youngest age group, a majority declared that they are interested in politics to a large or to some extent (63.9%), though this majority is slightly smaller than the corresponding share in

the older cohorts (25–34: 70.3%; 35–44: 69%; 45–54: 73.6%; 55–64: 78.4%; 65+: 76.8%).

Figure 49: How interested are you in politics? (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Analyzing the results based on identification with stronger or weaker social groups shows that a majority in all the subgroups of this variable attest that they are interested in politics; however, the respondents who align themselves with a weak group (60.4%) constitute a smaller majority than those who associate themselves with a strong group (73.3%), a somewhat strong group (77.5%), or a somewhat weak group (73.6%).

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity shows that the degree of political interest is lowest among haredim (55%) and highest among the secular and traditional religious respondents (75.4% and 75.2%, respectively).

Figure 50: How interested are you in politics? (somewhat or very interested; total sample; by year; percent)



An analysis of the Jewish sample by voting patterns in the 2013 elections finds Meretz voters to be the most interested in politics (87.1%), with Shas voters at the bottom of the list (58%). In a similar vein, a breakdown of the results by political orientation indicates that those who locate themselves on the left of the political/security spectrum report a greater interest in politics than do those on the right, though we are speaking of a majority in all groups of this variable.

Can citizens influence government policy?

Question 10
Appendix 1, p. 145
Appendix 2, p. 167

This question too recurs almost every year in the *Democracy Index* survey. This year's figures show that both Jews and Arabs still view their potential influence as low: some 60% of each group feel that they can affect government policy only to a small extent or not at all. This sense of impotence is a major obstacle in a democratic system where the public is supposed to hold the power. Of particular interest is the finding that this feeling of powerlessness is shared by Jews and Arabs alike, despite the fact that we would expect the majority group to feel more influential than the minority.

Figure 51: Extent of influence on government policy (total sample; by nationality; percent)



Contrary (perhaps) to what is often heard in the media these last few years, the sense of civil influence (the "flip side" of feeling powerless to influence) is actually on the rise (as shown in Figure 52, which presents the findings through the years). At the same time, the share who feel that they can influence government policy to a small extent or not at all has fallen drastically from a high of 81.6% in 2009 to a low of 61.2% this year. One explanation is that citizens may be feeling more empowered to influence the government as a residual effect of the summer 2011 protests.

We broke down the responses based on several variables to identify where this sense of influence (or lack thereof) is centered. The first analysis was based on voting patterns in the 2013 Knesset elections, to see if those who voted for parties presently in the

coalition feel that they have more, less, or the same influence compared with those who voted for parties now sitting in the opposition. Contrary to expectations, the findings show that whether the party voted for is inside or outside the government has virtually no effect on its supporters' sense of influence. Thus, the share who state that their influence on the government is slight or non-existent among voters for Yesh Atid (57.5%) and Bayit Yehudi (56.2%), which are at the heart of the present coalition, is very similar to the share among those who voted Labor, which is in the opposition (56.2%). Among voters for two of the coalition parties—Hatnua (69.2%) and Likud-Yisrael Beitenu (63.4%)—the percentage who feel that they lack influence does not differ greatly from that of the Meretz and Hadash voters (64.1% and 60%, respectively), whose parties are in the opposition.

Figure 52: Extent of influence on government policy (to a small extent or not at all; total sample; by year; percent)



And what about political orientation? As with respondents' voting patterns, a consistent correlation was not found here between self-described location on the right, left or center of the political spectrum and perceived ability or inability to influence government policy. The same holds true of age: no clear, systematic connection was found between age and sense of influence.

We broke down the responses further, by self-identification with stronger or weaker social groups. Here, we actually found a very strong correlation with the sense of influence over government policy: more respondents aligned with the weak groups feel they have much less influence than do those identified with the strong groups; nonetheless, even among the latter, a majority feel that their influence is negligible or non-existent. Thus, the percentage who feel that they can influence government policy to a small extent or not at all among those who identify themselves with the weak and somewhat weak groups (70.2% and 67.3%, respectively) is, as expected, clearly higher than the corresponding share among those who locate themselves with the strong and somewhat strong groups (56% and 56.9%, respectively).

Table 4.14 (percent)

	Self-identification with strong group	Self-identification with somewhat strong group	Self-identification with somewhat weak group	Self-identification with weak group
Feel able to influence government policy to a small extent or not at all	56.0	56.9	67.3	70.2

Next, we examined to what extent the Israeli public has internalized such democratic values as freedom of expression, accepted norms of behavior, and tolerance.

Prohibiting harsh public criticism of the state

Question 8.1
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 164

Another recurring question that we posed this year is: "Do you agree or disagree that speakers should be prohibited from harshly criticizing the State of Israel in public?" A majority of the total sample (52.4%) agree that such a prohibition should be instated. Breaking down the results by nationality, we found that the percentage of Jews who support such a move (54.2%) is higher than that of Arabs, though a sizeable proportion of the

latter (42.5%) also favor imposing such a ban. That is, the findings suggest that in the Jewish sector, as well as the Arab one, the principle of freedom of speech has not been well internalized.

Figure 53: Harsh public criticism of the state should be prohibited (total sample and by nationality; percent)



A comparison with previous surveys shows some "backsliding" in the tolerance for public criticism of the state, compared with last year and in fact with every year but 2009. This year, 52.4% of the total sample favor a prohibition, as opposed to 48.6% last year. However, the record is still held by 2009, when 54.7% favored such a ban.

We moved on to examining the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of using violence to achieve political goals.

Figure 54: Harsh public criticism of the state should be prohibited (agree somewhat or totally; total sample; by year; percent)



Use of violence for political ends

Question 8.2
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 164

As we learn from Figure 55, a solid majority of both Jews and Arabs agree with the statement that violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances. The minority who do not hold this view—that is, who think it is acceptable to use violence for political goals—is slightly larger among Arabs (26.5%) than among Jews (22.1%). Either way, roughly a quarter of the respondents in both sectors are not repelled by the notion of employing force to achieve political objectives—a finding highly damaging to the democratic ethos of Israel, and one that represents a time bomb liable to explode during any political crisis.

This concern is magnified by the sharp drop compared with last year in opposition to the use of violence in political disputes—from 87.5% to 73.4%. This may be a one-time sampling error, but it is also possible that we are witnessing a real, and worrisome, development. Perhaps there is some small consolation in the fact that even today, after the decline in opposition, the majority still support the statement that one of the fundamental principles

of a democratic regime is the resolution of political differences through non-violent means. Yet the fact that a quarter of the sample nonetheless accept the legitimacy of violence as a political instrument is certainly cause for alarm.

Figure 55: Violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances (total sample and by nationality; percent)



Since it is commonly believed that young people are less repulsed than older adults by the use of violence, we broke down the responses to this question by age. Among Arab respondents, no systematic connection was found; but in the Jewish sample, the findings show that the youngest age group (followed closely by the oldest one) is the least deterred by the use of violence to achieve political goals.

Figure 56: Violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances (agree somewhat or totally; total sample; by year; percent)



Table 4.15 (percent)

	18–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Agree totally or somewhat that violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances.	68.7	78.2	77.9	72.8	79.2	69.6

Analyzing the responses to this question on the basis of political orientation and religiosity did not produce systematic connections between the variables.

Human and civil rights organizations harm the state

Question 8.6
Appendix 1, p. 142
Appendix 2, p. 166

To conclude, we addressed the recurring question of the impact of human rights and civil rights organizations.

We asked the interviewees if they agreed or disagreed with the statement that human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state. Among Jewish respondents, a majority (51.6%) agree

with this statement, while 36.4% disagree with it. The Arabs are split on this question, with 42.3% agreeing with it and 44.8% disagreeing. However, it is highly probable that the ideological meaning that Arabs attach to the notion of harming the state differs from that of Jews.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by self-described location on the right-left political/security spectrum indicates that in the center and right-wing camps the majority agree with the statement that human rights organizations cause harm to the state, in contrast to the left-wing camp, where only a minority feel this way.

Comparing the distribution of responses this year with the last time this question was posed (2010), we find that there has been no change over the last three years in the views of the public on this issue.

Figure 57: Human and civil rights organizations harm the state (agree somewhat or totally; Jewish sample; by political orientation; percent)



Summary

This chapter addressed citizens' sense of belonging to the state, tensions between the groups that make up Israeli society, interest in politics, perceived ability to influence government policy, and internalization of democratic values.

- When we examined the sense of belonging to the state on the basis of nationality, the findings showed that two thirds of the Jews (66.6%) feel part of the state and its problems to a large or very large extent, but only 28.2% of Arabs feel this way. The results through the years indicate a downward trend in the sense of belonging.
- A large majority are proud to be Israeli; however, there has been a decline over the years in the feeling of pride. In this context as well, the differences between Jews and Arabs are considerable: 41.7% of Arabs are not at all proud to be Israeli.
- A look at the major focal points of tension in Israeli society shows that friction between Jews and Arabs is considered to be the most severe, followed by (in descending order): tensions between rich and poor, religious and secular, right and left, and finally, Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. A greater share of respondents rated tensions between rich and poor as high this year in comparison with last year. Interestingly enough, Jewish-Arab tensions were considered severe by more Jewish respondents than by Arab ones.
- As for willingness to have members of "other" groups as neighbors, the findings show that for Jews the least desirable neighbors would be foreign workers, followed (in descending order) by an Arab family, a homosexual couple, haredim, people who do not observe the Sabbath and holidays, and finally, those who do observe the Sabbath and holidays. Among Arab respondents, the neighbors who would be the least welcome are a homosexual couple, followed (in descending order) by a Jewish family, and foreign workers.
- Roughly one half of the Jewish respondents agreed with the statement that Jews should enjoy more rights than non-Jews. This represents a substantial increase over the last time this question was posed.

- Nearly half the Jewish interviewees (46.8%) responded negatively to the question of whether the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel. The multi-year findings show a tilt toward opposing government encouragement for Arab emigration.
- A majority of the Arab respondents (59.6%) report being uninterested in politics, as opposed to the bulk of the Jewish interviewees, who do express such an interest (71.8%).
- Both Jews and Arabs see themselves as having little influence on government policy: some 60% in each group feel able to exert an influence to a small extent or not at all. But a multi-year comparison shows that the sense of influence has actually risen somewhat.
- A majority of Jews (54.2%) favor a prohibition on harsh public criticism of the state. Some 42.5% of Arabs also expressed support for such a ban.
- Opposition to the use of violence for political ends is strong in the total sample.
- A majority of Jews (51.6%) agree with the statement that human rights organizations are damaging to the state.

Chapter 5:
Israel 2013: An International Comparison (Democracy Indicators)

Explanation of indicators

Each year, research institutes around the world publish a number of international comparative indicators addressing a variety of structural, functional, and ethical aspects of democracy in different countries. These indexes (hereafter: democracy indicators), expressed in annual scores assigned to each country, represent these institutes' current assessments (each in its own area) of the specific and relative situations of dozens and even hundreds of countries. Most of the evaluations are based on a combination of figures from primary and secondary sources and on the judgment of experts in the respective countries. This chapter of the 2013 Israeli Democracy Index examines Israel's scores and the rankings derived from them, relative to other countries. This year, we relate to 13 democracy indicators, as shown in Table 5.1 (below). Since the indicators are calculated by different institutes, each has its own area of emphasis, though there may be some slight overlap between them.

Table 5.1: Democracy Indicators

Indicator	Institution	Description
1. Corruption Perceptions Index	Transparency International	Scale of 0–100 (100 = absence of corruption); assesses "the abuse of power for personal gain" based on a combination of 13 surveys from 10 research institutes; examines expert opinions on the extent of corruption in their own and other countries.
2. Functioning of government	Economist Intelligence Unit	Scale of 0–10 (10 = most effective functioning), based on a questionnaire compiled by experts in the field; assesses the extent of government autonomy in shaping and implementing policies.
3. Electoral process and pluralism	Economist Intelligence Unit	Scale of 0–10 (10 = freest elections), based on questionnaire compiled by experts; assesses the public's ability to change its decision makers through an institutionalized electoral system.
4. Military in politics	International Country Risk Guide	Scale of 0–6 (6 = no military intervention in politics); examines the army's subordination to the various branches of government.

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Indicator	Institution	Description
5. Political participation	Economist Intelligence Unit	Scale of 0–10 (10 = highest participation), based on a questionnaire compiled by experts; assesses the extent of citizens' participation in various political processes.
6. Voter turnout	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance	Scale of 0–100 (100 = full participation in elections), based on official figures of voter turnout per country.
7. Political culture	Economist Intelligence Unit	Scale of 0–10 (10 = most democratic political culture), based on a questionnaire by experts; assesses the extent to which a country's political culture is democratic.
8. Gender Inequality Index	Human Development Report	Scale of 0–1 (0 = full equality between men and women), based on expert assessments; examines (the absence of) discrimination between men and women and the implementation of equal rights for both genders, particularly in employment, politics and education.
9. Index of Economic Freedom	Heritage Foundation	Scale of 0–100 (100 = full economic freedom), based on expert assessments; examines extent of government intervention in the economy.
10. Freedom of the press	Freedom House	Scale of 0–100 (0 = full freedom of the press), based on expert assessments; gauges the freedom enjoyed by the print and broadcast media.
11. Civil liberties	Economist Intelligence Unit	Scale of 0–10 (10 = liberties fully upheld), based on questionnaire by experts; examines whether basic civil liberties are upheld.
12. Religious tensions	International Country Risk Guide	Scale of 0–6 (6 = absence of religious tensions); assesses the extent of tension between religious groups.
13. Ethnic tensions	International Country Risk Guide	Scale of 0-6 (6 = absence of ethnic tensions); assesses the severity of tensions based on nationality or language.

The democracy indicators are examined along two axes:

- qualitative: an assessment of Israel's democratic performance over the past year in comparison with other countries;
- historical: Israel's performance this year in comparison with previous years.

Countries we compared

Each institute has its own list of countries to which it relates in its indexes. As this report obviously cannot list all of the countries evaluated, we chose to limit the number of countries that we compared with Israel to 27. The first consideration in selecting the countries was geographic location, to ensure that different regions were adequately represented. In addition, we decided to include several countries that are not democratic but are located in proximity to Israel or share certain political features. We consider it important to position Israel not only in the family of classical democracies but also in the "Middle Eastern family" and the category of young democracies.

The updated list of countries by geographic location thus includes five countries in the Americas (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the United States, and Venezuela); nine in western and central Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom); three in Central and Eastern Europe that were formerly part of the Soviet Bloc (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia); six in the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey); and four in Asia and the Far East (China, India, Japan, and New Zealand).

In selecting the countries for comparison with Israel, we also based ourselves on the assessments of Freedom House, which provides annual estimates of the extent of freedom in 194 countries representing 14 world regions, classifying them into three categories: free, partly free and not free.[1] Our list of 27 countries, then, consists of 18 free countries (Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States); three partly free (Lebanon, Turkey and Venezuela); and six not free (China, Egypt, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Syria). Based on the criteria of Freedom House, Israel is defined as a free country.[2]

1 For further information, see the organization's website: www.freedomhouse.org. (All websites appearing in this report were last accessed in September 2013.)

2 According to other classifications of democracy (for example, that of Wolfgang Merkel), Israel is not a free country; rather, it belongs to the

2013 Democracy Indicators: Israel in comparison with other countries

Figure 58 shows Israel's rankings over the past year in comparison with 27 other countries (vertical axis) based on the 13 indicators studied (horizontal axis). First place on the horizontal axis denotes the highest level of democracy, while the 28th slot at the other end indicates the most flawed democracy. The countries are positioned on these axes in accordance with the annual score they received. It should be noted that Israel sometimes shares the same score with one or more countries, in which case they are represented graphically as a group filling an entire area of the scale rather than one slot. For example, in the indicator of political culture, Israel shares the same score with five other countries: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, and Spain. Thus all of them are positioned together in slots 9–14.

It is important to clarify that changes in scores and in ranking do not always correspond, since a country can receive the same score year after year but climb or drop in its ranking relative to other countries. This means that if the scores of the other countries rose, a country could be ranked lower on the comparative scale even if its scores remained the same, and conversely, if the scores of the other countries dropped, it could rise in the rankings even if there was no change in its democratic performance.

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category of "defective democracies." See Wolfgang Merkel, "Embedded and Defective Democracies: Where Does Israel Stand?" in Tamar S. Hermann (ed.), *By the People, For the People, Without the People? The Emergence of (Anti)Political Sentiment in Western Democracies and in Israel* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2012), pp. 183–225 (online only): www.idi.org.il/PublicationsCatalog/Documents/EB1/EB1.pdf

Figure 58: Israel's ranking in the democracy indicators – 2013



1. **Corruption Perceptions Index:** Israel (with a score of 60) is ranked slightly above the midpoint of the scale, in the 12th slot.
2. **Functioning of government:** Israel (score of 7.5) is positioned more or less at the midpoint of the scale, in places 8–13, along with Brazil, India, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
3. **Electoral process and pluralism:** With a score of 8.75, Israel is ranked below the midpoint of the scale, in places 18–19, together with Argentina.
4. **Military intervention in politics:** Israel (score of 2.5) ranks low on this indicator, in the 23rd position, between China and Turkey.
5. **Political participation:** Israel's score of 8.33 places it near the top of the scale (in third place), between New Zealand and Switzerland.
6. **Voter turnout:** In this indicator, Israel (with a score of 67.8) is ranked in tenth place, alongside Spain.
7. **Political culture:** Israel's score of 7.5 translates into the intermediate slots (9–14), alongside Italy, Belgium, Japan, Spain, and France.
8. **Gender Inequality Index:** With a score of 0.144, Israel ranks in the top third of the scale, in 12th place, between Greece and New Zealand.
9. **Index of Economic Freedom:** Israel (score of 66.9) is ranked in 14th place, near the middle of the scale.
10. **Freedom of the press:** Israel's score of 31 earns it the 13th position, at the midpoint of the rankings.
11. **Civil liberties:** Israel's score of 5.59 places it quite low in the rankings, in the 20th–21st slots, along with Lebanon.
12. **Religious tensions:** Israel (with a score of 2.5) is ranked at the bottom of the scale (25–28), along with India, Lebanon, and Egypt.
13. **Ethnic tensions:** Israel's score of 2 places it at the bottom of the scale (27th–28th positions), together with Turkey.

Israel 2013 versus Israel 2012

As in 2011 and 2012, Israel is ranked at or near the midpoint of the scale in most indicators. Its ranking in *The Economist* Intelligence Unit's indicator of political participation is noteworthy, but in three other indicators (military intervention in politics, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions, all drawn from the International Country Risk Guide), its position is not cause for celebration.

As for Israel's position relative to previous years, in one indicator—voter turnout—it rose in the rankings. Nonetheless, it was a modest rise stemming primarily from changes in the scores of other countries and not necessarily from an improvement in Israel's assessment. A downturn was recorded in two indicators: the Index of Economic Freedom, and the Gender Inequality Index (in which Israel actually registered a slight rise in its score; however due to the improved scores in the other countries to which it was compared, it dropped from 11th to 12th place). In the other indicators, there was virtually no change in Israel's standing in comparison with last year.

Table 5.2

	2013 ranking	2012 ranking	Change
Corruption Perceptions Index	12	11	=
Functioning of government*	8–13	9–13	=
Electoral process and pluralism	18–19	18–19	=
Military in politics	23	23–24	=
Political participation	3	3	=
Voter turnout	10	13**	▲
Political culture	9–14	9–14	=
Gender Inequality Index	12	11	▼
Index of Economic Freedom	14	13	▼
Freedom of the press	13	13–14	=
Civil liberties	20–21	20–21	=

→

→

	2013 ranking	2012 ranking	Change
Religious tensions	25–28	26–28	=
Ethnic tensions	27–28	27–28	=

▲ improvement in Israel's ranking compared with the previous assessment

= no change in Israel's ranking

▼ drop in Israel's ranking

* In two of the indicators (functioning of government and religious tensions), an additional country joined the group of states sharing a score with Israel; for this reason, we treated the results as "no change."

** Israel's ranking in the 2009 elections relative to the 26 countries studied (in this indicator, 26 countries were rated rather than 27).

To compare Israel's current performance with that of the previous year, we will be looking at the scores it received then and now in each of the 13 indicators. As shown in Table 5.3, Israel's scores dropped this year in two of the indicators (economic freedom and freedom of the press). In four other markers (corruption perceptions, voter turnout, gender inequality, and civil liberties), its ranking rose in comparison with 2012. No change was registered in the other seven indicators.

Table 5.3

Indicator	2013 score	2012 score	Scale	Change
Corruption Perceptions Index	60	58	0–100 (100 = absence of corruption)	▲
Functioning of government	7.5	7.5	0–10 (10 = most effective functioning)	=
Electoral process and pluralism	8.75	8.75	0–10 (10 = freest elections)	=
Military in politics	2.5	2.5	0–6 (6 = no military intervention in politics)	=
Political participation	8.33	8.33	0–10 (10 = highest participation)	=
Voter turnout	67.8	64.7*	0–100 (100 = full participation in elections)	▲
Political culture	7.5	7.5	0–10 (10 = most democratic political culture)	=

→

→

Indicator	2013 score	2012 score	Scale	Change
Gender Inequality Index	0.144	0.145	0–1 (0 = full equality between men and women)	▲
Index of Economic Freedom	66.9	67.8	0–100 (100 = full economic freedom)	▼
Freedom of the press	31	30	0–100 (0 = full freedom of the press	▼
Civil liberties	5.59	5.29	0–10 (10 = liberties fully upheld)	▲
Religious tensions	2.5	2.5	0–6 (6 = absence of religious tensions)	=
Ethnic tensions	2	2	0–6 (6 = absence of ethnic tensions)	=

* Voter turnout in 2009 elections

▲ improvement in Israel's score compared with the previous assessment

= no change in Israel's score

▼ drop in Israel's score

Breakdown of findings

- **Perception of corruption:** The organization considered to be a world leader in the battle against corruption of all kinds is Transparency International (TI).[3] Accordingly, we used the Corruption Perceptions Index developed by TI to examine this issue. The scores in this Index range from 0 to 100; the higher a country's score, the freer it is of corruption.

  As shown in Figure 59, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Norway attained the highest scores this year, while Venezuela, Syria, and Russia earned the lowest. Israel received a score of 60 in 2013, placing it in the 12th position.[4] This represents a slight improvement over last year's score of 58, raising Israel's ranking in comparison with the other 27 countries in our study.

3 In its latest Index, Transparency International elected to assign scores on a scale of 0–100, rather than 0–10 as in past years. For further information, see www.transparency.org

4 This assessment is based on six surveys conducted by five research institutes. It should be emphasized that in the organization's full index, Israel is situated in 30th place among the 179 countries examined; however, we are comparing Israel only with the 27 other countries selected for this year's Democracy Index.

Figure 59: Perception of corruption



- **Functioning of government:** This indicator—published by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) of the British publication *The Economist*—examines the extent of government autonomy in setting and implementing policy.[5] The rating is given on a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 denotes least effective government, and 10, most effective government).

  Israel's score this year was 7.5, which places it in positions 8–13 alongside Brazil, Britain, India, Spain, and the United States. Heading the list of countries with highly effective government are Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, while Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia are at the bottom of the scale (see Figure 60). Israel's current score is identical to last year's.

- **Electoral process and pluralism:** Another indicator published by the EIU assesses electoral process and pluralism based on an average of responses to 12 questions about the electoral system. The issues addressed include the extent to which elections are free and fair, whether citizens are free to form political parties, and whether opposition parties have a realistic chance of assuming power.[6] The scores range from 0 (least free elections) to 10 (freest elections).

  In this year's assessment of electoral process and pluralism (Figure 61), Israel scored 8.75, ranking it 18th–19th of the countries surveyed, along with Argentina. At the head of the list are New Zealand and Norway (with a score of 10), while China, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are in the bottom position (score: 0). Israel's present score and ranking are identical to those in the last two years.

5 For information on the topics and questions that form the basis of this indicator, see The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Standstill*: www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex12.

6 For a breakdown of the topics and questions addressed in this indicator, see EIU, *Democracy Index 2012* (note 5, above).

Figure 60: Functioning of government



Figure 61: Electoral process and pluralism



- **Military in politics:** One of the new indicators that we added this year relates to military intervention in politics. This indicator, developed by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and cited frequently in various publications,[7] assigns each country a score ranging from 0 to 6 (with 0 indicating the greatest degree of military intervention in politics, and 6, the absence of such intervention, i.e., the optimal situation in terms of democracy).

  In the current ICRG assessment of military intervention in politics (Figure 62), Israel scored relatively low (2.5), indicating greater military involvement; this placed it in the 23rd slot, between China and Syria. But note that in our figure, we reversed the scale for easier comprehension, meaning that a higher score signifies greater military involvement. Ten countries (including Canada, Norway, and New Zealand) were tied in the rankings for least military intervention in politics, while Venezuela and Egypt were found to have the greatest degree of intervention. Israel's score this year is identical to that in previous years.

- **Political participation:** The EIU indicator for political participation reflects the average score on nine questions based on such parameters as voter participation rate, extent of political party membership, and level of involvement in politics.[8] A score of 10 attests to a very high level of political participation, and 0, a very low one.

  As shown in Figure 63, Norway and New Zealand occupy the top positions on this scale, with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and China in the lowest slots. Israel received a high score of 8.33, ranking it near the top of the scale (in third place), between New Zealand and Switzerland.

7 For further information about this indicator, see http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx

8 For a detailed discussion of the methodology used, as well as the questions themselves, see EIU, *Democracy Index 2012* (note 5, above).

Figure 62: Military intervention in politics*



* For illustrative purposes, the scores are presented in reverse order, with a high score indicating greater military intervention in politics.

Figure 63: Political participation



- **Voter turnout:** One of the standard indicators for assessing the public's involvement in politics is the rate of voter turnout, a parameter studied by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).[9] The indicator is presented as a percentage, calculated by dividing the number of votes cast in an election by the number of eligible voters.[10] This indicator was last updated in 2009, which was an election year in Israel; thus the data presented below rate Israel today compared with its ranking four years ago.

  As shown in Figure 64, Israel is positioned in the top third of the scale (in 10th place, between Spain and Venezuela), with a score of 67.8%.[11] This represents an improvement over 2009, both in Israel's voter turnout rate (64.7%) and its ranking in comparison with the other countries (13th place). The highest voter turnout in the countries we examined this year was recorded in Belgium, Turkey, and Brazil, which is likely attributable to the compulsory voting system in these countries: citizens who do not vote are required to offer an explanation, and are subject to fines for not fulfilling their civic duty. At the bottom of the scale in this indicator are Switzerland, Hungary, and the United States.

9 IDEA is an international organization working to strengthen democracy worldwide, primarily in developing countries. For a detailed discussion, see the organization's website: www.idea.int

10 The voter turnout figures for each country are taken/derived/drawn from www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm

11 Out of 5,656,705 eligible voters, 3,833,646 cast their votes. For a breakdown of the results, see the website of Israel's Central Elections Committee: www.votes-19.gov.il/nationalresults

Figure 64: Voter turnout rate in most recent elections in 26 countries*



* The number in parentheses denotes the relevant election year (26 countries, rather than 27, were examined in this indicator).

** Countries that have compulsory voting by law, with varying degrees of enforcement.

- **Political culture:** This indicator, developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit, reflects the average score on eight questions based on such parameters as consensus regarding democratic values; military intervention in politics; overall support for democracy; and history of separation between religion and state.[12] A score of 10 indicates a civil society with a well-established democratic political culture, while 0 denotes countries whose values are not grounded on such a culture.

  As shown in Figure 65, the top three positions are filled by Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, while Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan occupy the bottom tier. Israel received a score of 7.5 this year, placing it in the 9th–14th positions together with Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, and Spain—the same ranking it held last year.

- **Gender inequality:** The Gender Inequality Index (GII), published annually as part of the United Nations Human Development Reports, reflects the presence or absence of discrimination between men and women.[13] The GII focuses on equal application of rights, primarily in the areas of employment, politics, and education. Scores range from 0 (full equality) to 1 (total absence of equality); however, to facilitate comprehension of the data for this indicator, we reversed the scale in the accompanying figure, so that a higher score denotes greater gender equality.

  Figure 66 illustrates Israel's ranking relative to other countries in the 2013 GII. As shown, the countries that ranked the highest in gender equality are Switzerland, Norway, and Germany. At the bottom of the scale are Saudi Arabia, India, and Egypt. Israel (with a score of 0.856) ranks 12th this year—a drop of one position from last year (this decline occurred despite a slight improvement in its score).

12 For a detailed discussion of the methodology used, along with the questions themselves, see EIU, *Democracy Index 2012* (note 5, above).

13 See *International Human Development Indicators*, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics

Figure 65: Political culture



Figure 66: Gender inequality*



* For illustrative purposes, the scores are presented in reverse order, such that a higher score indicates greater gender equality.

- **Economic freedom:** One of the most widely used annual indicators is the Index of Economic Freedom, developed by the Heritage Foundation and published in recent years in conjunction with *The Wall Street Journal*. Both these entities are avowed supporters of neoliberal principles, namely, a free market and minimal state intervention in production, trade, and services.[14] According to this view, any government intervention beyond what is absolutely necessary to maintain the economy impinges on basic democratic freedoms, in particular, property rights.[15] The Index of Economic Freedom is based on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 denoting a lack of economic freedom, and 100, full economic freedom.

  As shown in Figure 67, the countries with the greatest degree of economic freedom are New Zealand and Switzerland; at the opposite end of the scale are Venezuela, Argentina, and Russia, which are classified as lacking economic freedom. In 2013, Israel ranked 14th (with a score of 66.9), placing it between France and Hungary. This represents a slight decline in comparison with last year's score of 67.8 (13th place) and with the other countries surveyed.

- **Freedom of the press:** The annual freedom of the press index, developed by Freedom House and published since 1979, ranks the degree of freedom in the print and broadcast media in 197 countries and regions throughout the world.[16] The final weighted score for each country is calculated by combining the results of a survey compiled by experts. The scores range from 0 (full freedom of the press) to 100 (no

14 The Index is published each year at the beginning of January. For further information, see The Heritage Foundation, in partnership with *The Wall Street Journal, 2013 Index of Economic Freedom*, www.heritage.org/index

15 The score that each country receives is based on a combination of ten economic indicators: quantitative assessments of government trade policy, taxation system, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, foreign investment and cash flow, banking and financing, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and absence of economic corruption.

16 For a description of the organization, and its studies and publications, see Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2013*, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2013

freedom of the press), meaning that a lower score indicates a more robust democracy. Countries with scores of 0–30 are rated as having a free press; 31–60, a partly free press; and 61–100, no free press. Figure 68 shows the rankings based on scores received in May 2012. Note, however, that to facilitate comprehension of the data, here too we have intentionally reversed the graphic representation of the scale so that a higher score indicates greater freedom.

According to the findings, Norway, Belgium, and Switzerland enjoy the greatest freedom of the press and Syria, Saudi Arabia, and China, the least. Israel, with a score of 31, is ranked at the middle of the scale (in position 13), between Spain and Italy. Israel's score this year is lower than last year's (30), continuing a three-year trend of declining ratings (from a score of 29 in 2011). This is explained, or excused, by some as resulting from the complicated security conditions in which Israel's democracy must function.

- **Civil liberties:** The civil liberties indicator, compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, is based on an average of responses to 17 questions concerning issues including the existence of a free press; freedom of expression; freedom to protest; and freedom of association. The scale ranges from 0 (civil liberties not upheld) to 10 (civil liberties fully upheld). As shown in Figure 69, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway earned the highest scores, and Syria, China, and Saudi Arabia, the lowest. Israel's score of 5.59 remains unchanged from last year; yet it is a low grade, placing Israel in the bottom third of the ranking (positions 20–21), together with Lebanon.

- **Religious tensions:** Quantifying the extent of a country's social cleavages is an especially difficult task; consequently, only a few research institutes issue comparative data on this subject. The PRS Group, publishers of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), is perhaps the most prominent body to take on this formidable challenge.[17] The religious

17 The score assigned to each country is determined by an internal assessment conducted by a team of experts, based on reports by local and international journalists and on publications of international organizations. It should be noted, however, that the ICRG keeps its

tensions indicator developed by the ICRG assesses the tensions among a country's religious groups, which may be reflected in attempts to replace civil law with religious law; exclusion of certain religious groups from important political and social processes; suppression and coercion aimed at consolidating the hegemony of a particular religion, and the like. Religious tensions are measured on a scale of 0–6; the higher the score, the less the degree of religious tension, and vice versa.

Figure 70 displays the rankings of the countries included in this year's Democracy Index; of these, Egypt, India, Israel, and Lebanon received the lowest score (2.5), indicating high levels of religious tension, while six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) earned the highest score (6). Israel's score this year remains unchanged from 2012.[18]

- **Ethnic tensions:** The final democracy indicator included this year is that of ethnic tensions based on nationality or language, also compiled by the ICRG. The index measures seven categories on a scale of 0 to 6; the higher the score, the lesser the tensions stemming from nationality/language, and vice versa.

  Figure 71 shows the list of countries examined in 2013. Of these, Israel and Turkey received the lowest score (2), indicating the highest level of ethnic tension, while Argentina earned the highest rating (6). There was no change in Israel's score compared with the last several years.[19]

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questionnaire confidential and thus fails to fulfill the requirement of transparency in assessment. For further information, see The PRS Group, *International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)*, www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx

18 For additional discussion, see Asher Arian, Pazit Ben Nun, Shlomit Barnea, Raphael Ventura, and Michal Shamir, *The 2005 Israeli Democracy Index: On the Tenth Anniversary of the Assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2005).

19 For further discussion, see Arian et al., *2005 Israeli Democracy Index* (note 18, above).

Figure 67: Economic freedom



Figure 68: Freedom of the press*



* For illustrative purposes, the scores are presented in reverse order, such that a higher score indicates greater freedom of the press.

Figure 69: Civil liberties



Figure 70: Religious tensions



Figure 71: Ethnic tensions



Summary

- This chapter presents Israel's ranking in 13 indicators, all of them compiled by international research institutes. These indices assess the extent of democracy in select countries from a variety of perspectives.
- Israel is compared with 27 countries distributed by region and type of regime.
- The analysis in this chapter is based on two axes of comparison: Israel's ranking in relation to 27 other countries, and its scores this year compared with last year.
- The 13 indicators included in this year's analysis are: perception of corruption, functioning of government, electoral process and pluralism, military intervention in politics (a new indicator in the IDI Democracy Index), political participation, voter turnout (also a new indicator), political culture, gender inequality, economic freedom, freedom of the press, civil liberties, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions based on nationality and language.
- Israel is located this year near the midpoint of the scale in six indicators: perception of corruption, electoral process and pluralism, voter turnout, gender inequality, economic freedom, and freedom of the press. In most cases, Israel ranks below the states categorized as free and alongside those designated as partly free.
- Israel's standing is noteworthy in the following indicators: functioning of government, political participation, and political culture.
- By contrast, Israel is conspicuous for its poor ranking in the indicators of military intervention in politics, civil liberties, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions.
- A comparison between Israel's scores this year and in 2012 shows no far-reaching changes. In seven indicators, there was no change whatsoever: functioning of government, electoral process and pluralism, military intervention in politics, political participation, political culture, religious tensions, and ethnic tensions. Some improvement was noted in the scores for perception of corruption, voter turnout, gender inequality, and civil liberties, while a slight downturn was recorded in the indicators of economic freedom and freedom of the press.

Appendix 1: Democracy Survey 2013: Distribution of Responses (percent)

1. How would you assess Israel's overall situation today?

Discussion on p. 20

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very good	9.5	9.4	10.3
Quite good	25.7	27.3	17.3
So-so	41.1	43.1	30.8
Quite bad	9.8	9.0	14.1
Very bad	11.8	9.4	25.0
Don't know / refuse	2.1	1.8	2.5
Total	100	100	100

2. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems?

Discussion on p. 76

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
A very large extent	33.2	36.5	15.4
A large extent	27.4	30.1	12.8
Some extent	21.1	19.1	32.1
A small extent	9.4	8.5	14.1
A very small extent	6.6	4.1	19.9
Don't know / refuse	2.3	1.7	5.7
Total	100	100	100

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

Discussion on p. 79

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very proud	56.5	64.4	13.5
Quite proud	20.0	18.9	26.3
Not so proud	10.5	9.7	14.7
Not at all proud	10.7	5.0	41.7
Don't know / refuse	2.3	2.0	3.8
Total	100	100	100

4. Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Which part of this definition is more important to you personally?*

Discussion on p. 61

	Jews
Jewish	32.3
Democratic	29.2
Both are equally important	37.0
Neither is important	0.6
Don't know / refuse	0.9
Total	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

5. In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the functioning of Israeli democracy?

Discussion on p. 25

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very dissatisfied	14.3	10.6	34.4
Dissatisfied	32.4	32.1	33.8
Satisfied	43.5	47.9	19.7
Very satisfied	6.2	6.4	5.1
Don't know / refuse	3.6	3.0	7.0
Total	100	100	100

6. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions?

Discussion on p. 40

Total sample

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know/ refuse	Total
6.1 The political parties	9.1	28.6	30.9	26.2	5.2	100
6.2 The Prime Minister	19.6	28.9	22.8	26.1	2.6	100
6.3 The media	14.8	32.5	24.2	25.9	2.6	100
6.4 The Supreme Court	32.7	28.1	14.4	17.7	7.1	100
6.5 The police	20.6	38.4	19.8	18.3	2.9	100
6.6 The President of Israel	50.6	22.4	10.2	13.6	3.2	100
6.7 The Knesset	14.8	37.1	24.7	20.0	3.4	100
6.8 The army (IDF)	65.5	16.6	6.7	8.8	2.4	100
6.9 The government	17.5	36.5	21.6	20.8	3.6	100
6.10 The Chief Rabbinate	17.0	26.0	19.3	28.1	9.6	100

Jews

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know/ refuse	Total
6.1 The political parties	7.6	29.1	33.6	25.5	4.2	100
6.2 The Prime Minister	21.0	30.7	24.4	22.4	1.5	100
6.3 The media	13.5	33.7	25.1	26.0	1.7	100
6.4 The Supreme Court	34.5	28.2	13.6	16.5	7.2	100
6.5 The police	21.1	40.8	20.6	15.3	2.2	100
6.6 The President of Israel	56.0	22.7	9.8	8.9	2.6	100
6.7 The Knesset	15.1	39.4	26.1	17.1	2.3	100
6.8 The army (IDF)	74.5	16.4	5.5	2.7	0.9	100
6.9 The government	18.0	39.9	22.5	16.8	2.8	100
6.10 The Chief Rabbinate	16.8	26.2	19.5	27.7	9.8	100

Arabs

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know/ refuse	Total
6.1 The political parties	17.4	25.8	16.1	30.3	10.4	100
6.2 The Prime Minister	12.3	18.7	14.2	45.8	9.0	100
6.3 The media	21.8	26.3	19.2	25.6	7.1	100
6.4 The Supreme Court	22.6	27.1	18.7	24.5	7.1	100
6.5 The police	17.9	25.6	15.4	34.6	6.5	100
6.6 The President of Israel	21.2	20.5	12.2	39.1	7.0	100
6.7 The Knesset	13.5	25.0	17.3	35.9	8.3	100
6.8 The army (IDF)	16.8	18.1	13.5	41.9	9.7	100
6.9 The government	14.7	18.6	16.7	42.3	7.7	100
6.10 Religious leaders	18.1	25.2	18.1	30.3	8.3	100

7. Who should have the ultimate authority to approve a peace treaty that would include Israel's withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and the evacuation of settlements?

Discussion on p. 68

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
The Knesset	22.5	24.9	9.7
Only Jewish citizens of Israel, by referendum	27.6	30.6	11.0
All citizens of Israel (Jews and non-Jews), by referendum	27.9	24.7	45.2
Religious leaders / rabbis	9.1	9.1	9.0
No one has the authority to make such a decision (not read)	5.3	3.8	13.5
Don't know / refuse	7.6	6.9	11.6
Total	100	100	100

8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Discussion on pp. 35, 36, 49, 90, 100, 102, 104

Total Sample

		Agree totally	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree totally	Don't know/ refuse	Total
8.1	Speakers should be prohibited from harshly criticizing the State of Israel in public.	37.1	15.3	13.2	28.9	5.5	100
8.2	Violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances.	60.4	13.0	7.3	15.4	3.9	100
8.3	Overall, most members of the Knesset work hard and are doing a good job.	19.1	26.7	22.7	25.4	6.1	100
8.5	Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public.	44.5	24.3	12.5	12.8	5.9	100
8.6	Human rights and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state.	31.8	18.4	14.7	23.0	12.1	100
8.7	It would be better for Israel to have only a few large parties instead of the many parties it has today.	50.8	13.9	10.1	19.1	6.1	100

Jews

		Agree totally	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree totally	Don't know/ refuse	Total
8.1	Speakers should be prohibited from harshly criticizing the State of Israel in public.	38.6	15.6	13.9	26.8	5.1	100
8.2	Violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances.	63.3	11.3	6.9	15.2	3.3	100
8.3	Overall, most members of the Knesset work hard and are doing a good job.	19.2	27.2	22.1	26.1	5.4	100
8.4	Jewish citizens of Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens.	32.9	16.0	14.8	32.5	3.8	100
8.5	Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public.	46.9	24.6	11.6	12.2	4.7	100
8.6	Human rights and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state.	33.5	18.1	14.5	21.9	12.0	100
8.7	It would be better for Israel to have only a few large parties instead of the many parties it has today.	55.2	12.6	9.1	17.4	5.7	100

Arabs

		Agree totally	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree totally	Don't know/ refuse	Total
8.1	Speakers should be prohibited from harshly criticizing the State of Israel in public.	29.0	13.5	9.7	40.6	7.2	100
8.2	Violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances.	44.5	22.6	9.7	16.8	6.4	100
8.3	Overall, most members of the Knesset work hard and are doing a good job.	18.6	24.4	26.3	21.8	8.9	100
8.5	Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public.	32.1	23.1	17.3	16.0	11.5	100
8.6	Human rights and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state.	22.4	19.9	16.0	28.8	12.9	100
8.7	It would be better for Israel to have only a few large parties instead of the many parties it has today.	26.5	21.3	15.5	28.4	8.3	100

9. How interested are you in politics?

Discussion on p. 95

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Very interested	31.0	33.3	18.6
Somewhat interested	35.1	38.5	16.7
Slightly interested	20.9	18.7	32.7
Not at all interested	12.0	9.2	26.9
Don't know / refuse	1.0	0.3	5.1
Total	100	100	100

10. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy?

Discussion on p. 97

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
To a large extent	11.3	11.8	8.4
To some extent	23.7	23.7	23.9
To a small extent	28.0	29.0	22.6
Not at all	33.2	32.3	38.1
Don't know / refuse	3.8	3.2	7.0
Total	100	100	100

11. To what extent does the balance of power among the Knesset parties reflect the division of opinions in the general public?

Discussion on p. 44

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
To a large extent	24.7	27.8	8.3
To some extent	34.2	35.5	27.6
To a small extent	19.5	16.4	36.5
Not at all	10.4	9.5	15.4
Don't know / refuse	11.2	10.8	12.2
Total	100	100	100

12. To what extent are the following principles upheld in Israel? Discussion on p. 27

Total Sample

	Far too much	Too much	To a suitable degree	Too little	Far too little	Don't know/ refuse	Total
12.1 Freedom of religion	12.3	14.3	40.7	18.3	9.4	5.0	100
12.2 The right to live with dignity	7.0	9.0	37.1	29.2	12.6	5.1	100
12.3 Freedom of expression	18.8	18.4	40.3	13.6	4.8	4.1	100
12.4 Freedom of assembly	13.1	13.9	44.4	14.3	4.8	9.5	100

Jews

	Far too much	Too much	To a suitable degree	Too little	Far too little	Don't know/ refuse	Total
12.1 Freedom of religion	10.8	14.1	41.5	19.7	9.8	4.1	100
12.2 The right to live with dignity	5.1	8.4	36.8	32.2	13.0	4.5	100
12.3 Freedom of expression	19.3	19.3	40.9	12.9	4.5	3.1	100
12.4 Freedom of assembly	12.8	14.0	46.7	13.9	3.6	9.0	100

Arabs

	Far too much	Too much	To a suitable degree	Too little	Far too little	Don't know/ refuse	Total
12.1 Freedom of religion	20.6	15.5	36.8	11.0	7.1	9.0	100
12.2 The right to live with dignity	17.3	12.2	38.5	12.8	10.3	8.9	100
12.3 Freedom of expression	16.0	13.5	36.5	17.3	6.4	10.3	100
12.4 Freedom of assembly	14.8	13.5	32.3	16.8	11.6	11.0	100

13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Discussion on pp. 47, 48, 53, 55, 93

Total Sample

		Disagree totally	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree totally	Don't know / refuse	Total
13.1	Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.	26.4	11.3	17.9	40.3	4.1	100
13.2	Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority.	28.0	16.3	18.8	32.0	4.9	100
13.3	It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation.	41.9	16.2	17.4	19.7	4.8	100
13.5	There are no real differences between the political parties in Israel today.	37.0	18.3	20.4	17.7	6.6	100
13.6	Those who choose not to serve in the army should be denied the right to vote for or be elected to the Knesset.	36.4	15.4	14.0	28.0	6.2	100

Jews

		Disagree totally	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree totally	Don't know / refuse	Total
13.1	Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.	20.1	9.9	19.7	47.0	3.3	100
13.2	Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority.	23.4	15.7	19.5	37.4	4.0	100
13.3	It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation.	42.1	15.4	17.2	21.4	3.9	100
13.4	The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel.	34.0	15.8	16.3	27.5	6.4	100
13.5	There are no real differences between the political parties in Israel today.	37.4	17.8	21.1	17.6	6.1	100
13.6	Those who choose not to serve in the army should be denied the right to vote for or be elected to the Knesset.	35.0	14.6	14.3	31.2	4.9	100

Arabs

		Disagree totally	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree totally	Don't know / refuse	Total
13.1	Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.	60.3	19.2	8.3	3.8	8.4	100
13.2	Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority.	53.2	19.9	15.4	3.2	8.3	100
13.3	It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation.	41.0	20.5	18.6	10.9	9.0	100
13.5	There are no real differences between the political parties in Israel today.	34.8	21.3	16.8	18.7	8.4	100
13.6	Those who choose not to serve in the army should be denied the right to vote for or be elected to the Knesset.	44.2	19.9	12.2	10.9	12.8	100

14. All societies are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong to?

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Strong group	20.2	21.5	13.5
Somewhat strong group	34.5	35.7	27.7
Somewhat weak group	21.4	18.5	37.4
Weak group	15.2	15.9	11.6
Don't know / refuse	8.7	8.4	9.8
Total	100	100	100

15. In the event of a conflict between democracy and halakha (Jewish religious law), should preference be given to upholding democratic principles or adhering to the precepts of Jewish law?*

Discussion on p. 64

	Jews
It is preferable in all cases to uphold democratic principles	42.7
Sometimes one, sometimes the other, depending on circumstances	21.1
It is preferable in all cases to adhere to the precepts of Jewish religious law.	28.2
There is no fundamental contradiction between democratic principles and Jewish law (not read).	2.1
Don't know / refuse	5.9
Total	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

16. For many years, the following were considered to be the major points of tension in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between these groups today?

Discussion on p. 81

Total Sample

	High	Moderate	Low	None (not read)	Don't know / refuse	Total
16.1 Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	29.0	38.5	23.8	2.9	5.8	100
16.2 Between religious and secular	55.7	30.6	7.9	1.9	3.9	100
16.3 Between right and left (on political/security issues)	50.5	32.4	9.8	1.8	5.5	100
16.4 Between rich and poor	57.9	26.6	8.1	3.0	4.4	100
16.5 Between Jews and Arabs	68.0	23.8	3.2	1.3	3.7	100

Jews

	High	Moderate	Low	None (not read)	Don't know / refuse	Total
16.1 Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	27.4	38.7	26.8	3.1	4.0	100
16.2 Between religious and secular	58.7	29.2	8.5	1.3	2.3	100
16.3 Between right and left (on political/security issues)	52.6	31.6	10.2	1.2	4.4	100
16.4 Between rich and poor	61.6	24.1	8.5	2.6	3.2	100
16.5 Between Jews and Arabs	71.8	21.5	3.3	0.9	2.5	100

Arabs

	High	Moderate	Low	None (not read)	Don't know / refuse	Total
16.1 Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim	38.1	37.4	7.7	1.9	14.9	100
16.2 Between religious and secular	39.4	38.1	4.5	5.2	12.8	100
16.3 Between right and left (on political/security issues)	39.4	36.8	7.7	5.2	10.9	100
16.4 Between rich and poor	38.1	40.0	5.8	5.2	10.9	100
16.5 Between Jews and Arabs	47.4	36.5	2.6	3.2	10.3	100

17. And how would you rate the level of tension between haredim and national religious Jews?

Discussion on p. 81

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
High	35.8	38.3	22.6
Moderate	36.3	36.1	37.4
Low	14.1	12.7	21.9
None/There is no tension (not read)	1.8	1.4	3.9
Don't know / refuse	12.0	11.5	14.2
Total	100	100	100

18. To what extent do you believe that the Jews are the "Chosen People"?*

Discussion on p. 71

	Jews
Very strongly	50.1
Quite strongly	14.2
Not so strongly	12.7
Not at all	20.0
Don't know / refuse	3.0
Total	100

* Question posed to Jewish respondents only.

19. In your opinion, should the Conservative and Reform movements in Israel have equal standing with the Orthodox stream, for example with regard to conversion and marriage?*

	Jews
Definitely	25.5
I think so	24.9
I don't think so	14.9
Definitely not	19.9
Don't know / refuse	14.8
Total	100

* Question posed to Jewish respondents only.

20. Should the state deny funding to schools in the haredi educational system that do not teach a core curriculum (e.g., civics, mathematics, and English)?*

	Jews
Definitely	34.1
I think so	17.2
I don't think so	23.0
Definitely not	19.3
Don't know / refuse	6.4
Total	100

* Question posed to Jewish respondents only.

21. Do you believe that the State of Israel can simultaneously be both a Jewish state and a democratic state, in the fullest sense of the term?

Discussion on p. 67

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Definitely can	36.6	41.3	11.5
Think it can	31.9	33.5	23.7
Don't think it can	16.2	13.9	28.8
Definitely cannot	10.8	7.9	26.3
Don't know / refuse	4.5	3.4	9.7
Total	100	100	100

22. Do you believe that soldiers have the right to refuse to serve in the West Bank based on their opposition to the occupation?

Discussion on p. 55

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Definitely have	17.0	13.4	36.5
Think they have	18.8	18.0	23.1
Think they do not have	24.2	24.7	21.8
Definitely do not have	33.3	38.1	7.7
Don't know / refuse	6.7	5.8	10.9
Total	100	100	100

23. In your opinion, do soldiers have the right to refuse to participate in the evacuation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank based on their opposition to a government decision to evacuate?

Discussion on p. 58

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Definitely have	21.6	21.1	23.7
Think they have	22.4	20.6	32.1
Think they do not have	21.6	21.8	20.5
Definitely do not have	26.7	29.1	13.5
Don't know / refuse	7.7	7.4	10.2
Total	100	100	100

24. Would it bother you to have as your neighbor:

Discussion on p. 87

Total sample

	It would bother me	It would not bother me	Don't know / refuse	Total
24.5 Foreign workers	52.8	43.7	3.5	100
24.6 A homosexual couple	32.9	63.1	4.0	100

Jews

	It would bother me	It would not bother me	Don't know / refuse	Total
24.1 People who do not observe the Sabbath and holidays	10.3	88.8	0.9	100
24.2 Haredim	20.8	77.0	2.2	100
24.3 An Arab family	47.6	48.3	4.1	100
24.4 People who do observe the Sabbath and holidays	5.7	92.9	1.4	100
24.5 Foreign workers	56.9	40.3	2.8	100
24.6 A homosexual couple	30.5	66.1	3.4	100

Arabs

	It would bother me	It would not bother me	Don't know / refuse	Total
24.5 Foreign workers	30.8	62.2	7.0	100
24.6 A homosexual couple	46.2	46.8	7.0	100
24.7 A Jewish family	41.9	48.4	9.7	100

25. Which statement do you agree with more strongly?

Discussion on p. 52

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Decisions made by the government and Knesset, elected by the majority in free elections, are by definition democratic.	44.5	45.1	41.3
Decisions that conflict with such values as equality before the law, minority rights, and freedom of expression are not democratic, even if made by a government and Knesset elected by the majority in free elections.	34.9	34.8	35.5
Don't know / refuse	20.6	20.1	23.2
Total	100	100	100

26. Do you agree or disagree that we must narrow the gap between rich and poor in Israel, even if this means that most of us will have to pay higher taxes.

Discussion on p. 23

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Agree strongly	38.2	38.8	35.3
Agree somewhat	25.3	25.4	25.0
Disagree somewhat	15.5	15.4	16.0
Disagree strongly	14.9	15.5	11.5
Don't know / refuse	6.1	4.9	12.2
Total	100	100	100

27. Do you feel a sense of belonging to any of the streams of Judaism? If so, which one?*

	Jews
None of them	56.7
Orthodox	26.5
Conservative	3.2
Reform	4.0
Don't know / refuse	9.6
Total	100

* Question posed to Jewish respondents only.

28. Which is more important to you—that the State of Israel have a Jewish majority, or that the entire Land of Israel between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea be under Israeli sovereignty?*

	Jews
The State of Israel should have a Jewish majority.	61.9
The entire Land of Israel between the Jordan and the Mediterranean should be under Israeli sovereignty.	21.0
Both are equally important (not read)	7.1
Neither is important (not read)	2.7
Don't know / refuse	7.3
Total	100

* Question posed to Jewish respondents only.

29. There has been talk recently about "a new politics." In your view, what is the most important aspect of this development? (Open-ended question)

Discussion on p. 30

30. In your opinion, do the results of the recent Knesset elections reflect a new politics?

Discussion on p. 31

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
They definitely do	22.3	21.5	27.1
I think they do	28.9	31.4	14.8
I think they don't	17.7	15.3	31.0
They definitely don't	15.4	15.9	12.9
Don't know / refuse	15.7	15.9	14.2
Total	100	100	100

31. How much, if at all, were the recent election results affected by the summer of 2011 protests?

Discussion on p. 32

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
To a very large extent	17.0	17.9	12.2
To a large extent	27.3	28.6	20.5
To a small extent	27.5	27.3	28.8
Not at all	17.1	16.4	21.2
Don't know / refuse	11.1	9.8	17.3
Total	100	100	100

32. In your opinion, to what extent is each of these groups willing to compromise on issues important to them in order to reach a basic consensus that would allow everyone to live here together?

Total sample

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know/ refuse	Total
32.1 Arab citizens of Israel	19.8	24.6	19.2	26.9	9.5	100
32.2 Jewish citizens of Israel	29.7	36.7	15.6	9.1	8.9	100
32.3 Religious Jews	15.9	26.0	22.3	25.2	10.6	100
32.4 Right-wing Jews	18.3	26.2	23.7	20.3	11.5	100
32.5 Secular Jews	33.8	35.4	13.0	6.7	11.1	100
32.6 Left-wing Jews	36.3	24.6	14.6	13.0	11.5	100

Jews

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know/ refuse	Total
32.1 Arab citizens of Israel	15.2	24.3	21.1	30.6	8.8	100
32.2 Jewish citizens of Israel	30.0	37.1	16.4	8.2	8.3	100
32.3 Religious Jews	14.7	26.1	23.3	25.9	10.0	100
32.4 Right-wing Jews	17.3	26.6	25.3	19.7	11.1	100
32.5 Secular Jews	35.1	35.9	12.8	5.9	10.3	100
32.6 Left-wing Jews	36.9	23.3	15.0	13.9	10.9	100

Arabs

	To a large extent	To some extent	To a small extent	Not at all	Don't know/ refuse	Total
32.1 Arab citizens of Israel	44.9	26.3	9.0	7.1	12.7	100
32.2 Jewish citizens of Israel	26.5	34.8	11.6	14.2	12.9	100
32.3 Religious Jews	22.6	25.8	16.8	21.3	13.5	100
32.4 Right-wing Jews	23.7	23.7	15.4	23.7	13.5	100
32.5 Secular Jews	26.8	32.5	14.0	10.8	15.9	100
32.6 Left-wing Jews	32.9	31.6	12.9	8.4	14.2	100

33. When you compare Israeli politicians today with what you know or remember about Israeli politicians of the past, are today's better, worse, or the same?

Discussion on p. 37

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
Better	12.6	13.3	9.0
The same	31.4	32.1	27.6
Worse	44.4	43.2	50.6
Don't know / refuse	11.6	11.4	12.8
Total	100	100	100

34. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?*

	Disagree totally	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree totally	Don't know / refuse	Total
34.1 Arabic should no longer be an official language of the State of Israel.	51.7	14.0	10.0	17.9	6.4	100
34.2 The government of Israel should encourage only Jews to establish new communities.	27.1	14.0	17.5	34.0	7.4	100
34.3 Legislation and judicial interpretation in Israel should be based on the Jewish legal system.	28.0	11.5	16.4	33.5	10.6	100

* Question posed to Jewish respondents only.

Appendix 2: Distribution of 2013 Survey Results Compared with Previous Years[1] (percent)

1. How would you assess Israel's overall situation today? Discussion on p. 20

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Very good	2.5	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.2	5.3	4.3	5.8	6.4	9.5	9.5
Quite good	8.6	11.1	16.5	19.4	11.4	23.1	26.9	33.9	21.4	28.6	25.7
So-so	26.1	32.9	37.5	38.2	34.3	35.7	38.4	35.2	41.0	40.5	41.1
Quite bad	24.3	22.7	16.8	18.4	25.0	16.1	17.1	13.8	16.0	11.4	9.8
Very bad	38.5	30.6	25.8	20.4	25.2	18.2	12.2	9.8	13.7	8.6	11.8
Don't know / refuse	–	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.6	1.1	1.5	1.5	1.4	2.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

2. To what extent do you feel part of the State of Israel and its problems? Discussion on p. 76

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
A very large extent	52.0	45.3	43.6	35.3	28.0	28.1	32.3	33.5	39.6	35.5	33.2
A large extent	26.2	27.4	29.0	33.6	30.3	27.0	31.4	30.8	29.9	29.6	27.4
Some extent	12.7	16.8	14.4	20.5	25.3	27.6	23.6	22.0	18.2	20.8	21.1
A small extent	5.3	6.1	4.4	7.3	9.5	9.8	7.3	7.8	5.5	7.9	9.4
A very small extent	3.5	3.6	3.0	3.1	5.7	6.2	4.7	4.8	6.7	4.7	6.6
Don't know / refuse	0.3	0.8	5.6	0.2	1.2	1.3	0.7	1.1	0.1	1.5	2.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

1 General comments:

- The comparative analysis presents the distribution of the results of the entire sample (with the exception of questions asked of Jews only), including the category "don't know / refuse."
- The wording of the questions and possible responses is based on the 2013 Democracy Survey; in cases where the wording of a question or response differed from past Democracy Surveys, or a particular response category did not appear in a given year, this is mentioned in a footnote beneath the relevant table.
- N/A (not applicable) indicates that the question was not asked that year.

3. How proud are you to be an Israeli?

Discussion on p. 79

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Very proud	57.6	48.8	52.1	55.6	46.6	53.0	50.4	56.2	58.1	57.6	56.5
Quite proud	26.1	28.4	26.7	29.7	28.7	25.1	27.3	23.1	24.6	23.8	20.0
Not so proud	9.2	13.7	12.8	8.5	13.9	13.2	12.7	12.7	8.8	9.8	10.5
Not at all proud	6.9	7.5	7.3	5.6	9.3	6.9	8.0	5.9	7.2	6.8	10.7
Don't know / refuse	0.2	1.6	1.1	0.6	1.5	1.8	1.6	2.1	1.3	2.0	2.3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

4. Israel is defined as both a Jewish and a democratic state. Which part of this definition is more important to you personally?*

Discussion on p. 61

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Jewish	32.4	29.5	34.3	32.3
Democratic	17.0	22.9	21.8	29.2
Both are equally important	48.1	46.1	41.9	37.0
Neither is important	1.7	1.0	0.5	0.6
Don't know / refuse	0.8	0.5	1.5	0.9
Total	100	100	100	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

5. In general, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the functioning of Israeli democracy?

Discussion on p. 25

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Very dissatisfied	11.1	14.7	12.6	14.5	17.9	14.7	17.4	16.5	11.9	N/A	14.3
Dissatisfied	37.5	39.6	37.5	39.1	47.2	40.7	42.7	44.8	33.5		32.4
Satisfied	47.8	41.5	45.7	43.1	30.8	38.3	34.9	32.8	47.3		43.5
Very satisfied	3.0	3.4	3.2	2.9	1.9	3.6	2.7	3.6	5.0		6.2
Don't know / refuse	0.6	0.8	1.0	0.4	2.2	2.7	2.3	2.3	2.3		3.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100

6. To what extent do you trust each of the following individuals or institutions? Discussion on p. 40

Political parties

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	34.0	37.8	50.3	41.3	44.1	46.9	35.4	32.6	28.3	31.5	26.2
To a small extent	33.4	34.0	31.6	35.9	32.5	36.1	39.9	39.3	32.7	30.5	30.9
To some extent	28.0	22.8	15.5	19.2	17.5	13.5	16.9	19.8	31.9	28.7	28.6
To a large extent	4.3	3.8	2.1	3.2	3.1	1.8	2.7	4.0	3.7	5.4	9.1
Don't know / refuse	0.3	1.6	0.5	0.4	2.8	1.7	5.1	4.3	3.4	3.9	5.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Prime minister

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	25.6	31.3	38.1	32.6	46.7	55.1	33.9	35.3	25.3	22.8	26.1
To a small extent	21.4	23.4	22.6	23.9	30.5	26.8	29.2	24.8	24.0	18.7	22.8
To some extent	33.2	31.7	25.7	28.0	16.7	13.3	25.8	27.8	33.3	36.7	28.9
To a large extent	19.6	12.8	13.1	13.5	3.7	3.5	8.0	10.7	16.3	19.7	19.6
Don't know / refuse	0.2	0.8	0.5	2.0	2.4	1.3	3.1	1.7	1.1	2.1	2.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Media

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	28.1	23.8	24.3	28.9	26.5	30.4	30.3	34.5	24.4	25.7	25.9
To a small extent	23.3	24.8	25.2	27.0	27.3	31.9	34.1	30.3	22.8	26.1	24.2
To some extent	36.8	36.3	35.0	32.6	31.9	28.7	26.7	24.1	37.4	32.3	32.5
To a large extent	11.8	14.7	15.1	11.4	12.5	8.3	7.8	9.7	14.4	14.0	14.8
Don't know / refuse	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	1.8	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.9	2.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Supreme Court

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	16.0	11.4	22.3	15.5	18.4	25.2	23.2	21.6	13.6	10.7	17.7
To a small extent	13.8	9.1	16.3	15.6	19.1	23.7	17.3	22.0	13.0	12.3	14.4
To some extent	30.4	27.4	28.6	29.0	28.7	29.1	28.1	27.9	27.3	30.5	28.1
To a large extent	39.4	49.0	31.4	37.5	29.2	18.3	23.1	23.8	41.4	42.9	32.7
Don't know / refuse	0.4	3.1	1.4	2.4	4.6	3.7	8.3	4.7	4.7	3.6	7.1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Police

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	14.9	15.5	19.1	28.7	30.3	35.6	30.3	23.2	20.5	15.8	18.3
To a small extent	18.6	18.3	24.6	26.8	27.1	31.1	27.7	33.5	21.8	21.3	19.8
To some extent	41.6	41.8	36.2	30.7	28.3	23.1	27.2	29.8	38.2	40.0	38.4
To a large extent	24.8	23.6	19.5	12.5	11.9	8.4	10.4	11.5	17.9	20.9	20.6
Don't know / refuse	0.1	0.8	0.6	1.3	2.4	1.8	4.4	2.0	1.6	2.0	2.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

President of Israel

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	16.1	12.3	17.6	15.3	54.2	29.6	21.8	14.6	10.8	9.3	13.6
To a small extent	15.6	12.9	16.9	16.9	20.0	22.4	15.9	14.3	9.8	9.6	10.2
To some extent	36.1	33.7	29.4	30.3	14.9	24.1	27.4	25.7	21.8	22.5	22.4
To a large extent	31.4	35.5	34.7	33.5	5.6	21.6	30.2	42.3	56.0	56.1	50.6
Don't know / refuse	0.8	5.6	1.4	4.0	5.3	2.3	4.7	3.1	1.6	2.5	3.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Knesset

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	19.5	24.4	42.2	33.0	32.0	36.2	29.5	25.8	19.7	18.2	20.0
To a small extent	28.6	28.6	33.5	33.7	33.2	33.9	31.4	34.8	27.3	26.1	24.7
To some extent	38.2	37.3	20.0	25.3	26.0	22.9	27.1	27.6	43.3	38.4	37.1
To a large extent	13.1	8.5	4.0	7.4	6.2	5.5	8.6	8.8	8.3	14.3	14.8
Don't know / refuse	0.6	1.2	0.3	0.6	2.6	1.5	3.4	3.0	1.4	3.0	3.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The army (IDF)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	8.8	6.8	8.9	11.2	10.6	13.9	11.3	10.7	7.2	7.1	8.8
To a small extent	7.6	7.1	7.6	9.6	14.8	15.2	7.5	8.1	5.8	5.8	6.7
To some extent	23.4	25.1	27.2	24.9	28.8	26.2	22.8	18.7	17.0	20.2	16.6
To a large extent	59.8	59.8	55.7	53.5	43.7	43.9	56.4	60.3	68.8	65.0	65.5
Don't know / refuse	0.4	1.2	0.6	0.8	2.1	0.8	1.9	2.2	1.2	1.9	2.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Government

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	19.9	27.7	26.6	31.2	37.2	41.4	30.7	30.5	22.3	18.0	20.8
To a small extent	25.4	30.8	30.5	28.8	30.2	32.2	35.4	35.1	25.6	22.5	21.6
To some extent	40.8	35.3	30.3	29.6	23.6	20.1	24.9	26.4	41.1	41.3	36.5
To a large extent	13.8	4.4	12.1	9.1	6.6	5.0	6.1	6.3	9.9	15.5	17.5
Don't know / refuse	0.1	1.8	0.5	1.3	2.4	1.3	2.9	1.7	1.1	2.7	3.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Chief Rabbinate*

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Not at all	35.4	28.0	36.7	N/A	N/A	N/A	32.0	N/A	24.8	N/A	28.1
To a small extent	20.8	15.1	24.4				25.9		16.9		19.3
To some extent	27.1	21.8	20.1				21.1		23.8		26.0
To a large extent	14.9	14.0	16.4				10.7		24.4		17.0
Don't know / refuse	1.8	21.1	2.4				10.3		10.1		9.6
Total	100	100	100				100		100		100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Discussion on p. 100

8.1 Speakers should be prohibited from harshly criticizing the State of Israel in public.

	2007*	2008*	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	19.5	15.8	23.0	N/A	22.4	32.4	28.9
Disagree somewhat	24.4	24.7	18.0		23.6	15.1	13.2
Not sure	18.5	19.8	N/A		N/A	N/A	N/A
Agree somewhat	21.8	21.5	19.3		23.3	19.8	15.3
Agree totally	12.0	12.4	35.4		27.5	28.8	37.1
Don't know / refuse	3.9	5.7	4.6		3.4	3.9	5.5
Total	100	100	100		100	100	100

* In 2007 and 2008, five response categories were presented (as opposed to other years, when four choices were given). Accordingly, the middle category of "not sure" in Figure 54 was divided proportionally between those who agreed and those who disagreed with this statement.

8.2 Violence must never be used for political ends under any circumstances.* Discussion on p. 102

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	7.3	13.6	9.6	8.1	12.5	27.1	13.2	16.5	18.1	7.5	15.4
Disagree somewhat	10.3	8.4	8.5	9.3	13.0	11.2	12.5	12.9	12.3	3.8	7.3
Agree somewhat	25.1	11.1	17.5	14.1	22.0	19.4	14.2	15.3	14.8	10.9	13.0
Agree totally	56.7	65.6	63.3	67.5	49.4	40.5	56.8	51.8	53.6	76.6	60.4
Don't know / refuse	0.6	1.3	1.1	1.0	3.1	1.8	3.3	3.5	1.2	1.2	3.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* Up to and including the 2011 *Democracy Index*, the wording of the question was: "It is never justified to use violence" rather than "Violence must never be used."

8.3 Overall, most members of Knesset work hard and are doing a good job. Discussion on p. 35

	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	27.8	31.6	25.4
Disagree somewhat	35.3	30.2	22.7
Agree somewhat	28.7	26.3	26.7
Agree totally	4.4	7.6	19.1
Don't know / refuse	3.8	4.3	6.1
Total	100	100	100

8.4 Jewish citizens in Israel should have more rights than non-Jewish citizens.* Discussion on p. 90

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree	42.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	32.5
Disagree somewhat	19.4				14.8
Agree somewhat	15.3				16.0
Agree totally	20.6				32.9
Don't know / refuse	2.1				3.8
Total	100				100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

8.5 Politicians look out more for their own interests than for those of the public.* Discussion on p. 36

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012**	2013
Own interests	52.8	48.2	N/A	63.6	65.3	49.8	48.5	49.1	70.6	78.1	68.8
Interests of public	14.5	15.3		10.2	14.1	23.4	28.4	26.4	11.6	18.5	25.3
Don't know / refuse / Not sure / To a similar extent	32.7	36.5		26.2	20.6	26.8	23.1	24.5	17.8	3.4	5.9
Total	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* – Up to and including 2008, the wording was "the people who run the country" or "the leaders" as opposed to "the politicians."

– Instead of "[the interests] of the public," the wording was "the interests of the public that elected them," "the (general) public," and "the state as a whole."

– The number of possible responses has also varied over the years between three, four, and five. This year, all the options were combined in Figure 12 into "own interests" and "interests of the public" to arrive at a total of 100%.

– To create a comparative figure from the various wordings of the question and answers, responses other than "own interests" and "interests of the public" (such as "to a similar extent," "not sure," and "don't know/refuse") were divided up proportionally between "own interests" and "interests of the public."

** Beginning in 2012, the middle category of "not sure" was discarded. Those who gave this response in previous years were grouped together in this table with "don't know/refuse."

8.6 Human and civil rights organizations, such as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and B'Tselem, cause damage to the state.

Discussion on p. 104

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	18.7	N/A	N/A	23.0
Disagree somewhat	20.8			14.7
Agree somewhat	24.8			18.4
Agree totally	25.5			31.8
Don't know / refuse	10.2			12.1
Total	100			100

8.7 It would be better for Israel to have only a few large parties instead of the many parties it has today.

Discussion on p. 49

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	14.1	N/A	N/A	19.1
Disagree somewhat	19.6			10.1
Not sure	15.7			N/A
Agree somewhat	23.8			13.9
Agree totally	23.3			50.8
Don't know / refuse	3.5			6.1
Total	100			100

9. How interested are you in politics?

Discussion on p. 95

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	36.3	28.6	28.9	35.7	N/A	22.6	28.9	23.3	37.7	28.4	31.0
To some extent	39.8	38.5	41.5	36.5		33.4	37.2	38.3	39.1	38.3	35.1
To a small extent	17.5	23.3	18.1	18.2		25.6	22.0	24.9	16.0	21.1	20.9
Not at all	6.0	9.4	11.4	7.8		16.6	11.3	12.9	7.1	12.0	12.0
Don't know / refuse	0.4	0.2	0.1	1.8		1.8	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.2	1.0
Total	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100

10. To what extent are you and your friends able to influence government policy? Discussion on p. 97

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	4.6	3.8	7.4	6.1	5.7	3.1	3.9	2.9	7.3	9.5	11.3
To some extent	15.2	13.8	23.4	21.3	17.1	15.4	12.4	16.1	21.1	25.4	23.7
To a small extent	40.1	32.4	32.3	36.5	30.6	31.2	31.6	31.5	35.3	34.9	28.0
Not at all	39.7	35.6	35.6	35.8	43.9	45.6	50.0	46.5	35.3	27.8	33.2
Don't know / refuse	0.4	14.4	1.3	0.3	2.7	4.7	2.1	3.0	1.0	2.4	3.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

11. To what extent does the balance of power among Knesset parties reflect the division of opinions in the general public? Discussion on p. 44

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	20.5	N/A	15.4	15.3	15.1	14.5	N/A	N/A	26.0	N/A	24.7
To some extent	45.6		43.6	43.7	35.2	38.0			33.3		34.2
To a small extent	23.7		27.5	25.6	27.8	27.4			25.0		19.5
Not at all	8.7		10.8	11.8	12.1	12.0			8.5		10.4
Don't know / refuse	1.5		2.7	3.6	9.8	8.1			7.2		11.2
Total	100		100	100	100	100			100		100

12. To what extent are the following principles upheld in Israel? Discussion on p. 27

12.1 Freedom of religion

	2003*	2004*	2005	2006*	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Far too much	33.9	51.1		40.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	14.5	N/A	N/A	12.3
Too much	40.1	27.5		35.2				13.8			14.3
To a suitable degree	–	–		–				40.6			40.7
Too little	17.4	15.5		17.9				20.5			18.3
Far too little	8.4	4.7		6.7				7.3			9.4
Don't know / refuse	0.2	1.2		0.2				3.3			5.0
Total	100	100		100				100			100

* In 2003, 2004 and 2006, only these four response categories were presented: "to a large extent," "to some extent," "to a small extent," and "not at all."

12.3 Freedom of expression

	2003*	2004*	2005	2006*	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Far too much	39.7	56.1		37.1			13.5	16.9			18.8
Too much	41.6	28.3		38.0			21.2	21.1			18.4
To a suitable degree	–	–		–			46.1	40.8			40.3
Too little	13.5	11.4	N/A	17.6	N/A	N/A	12.1	14.1	N/A	N/A	13.6
Far too little	5.0	2.8		6.9			5.0	4.3			4.8
Don't know / refuse	0.3	1.5		0.4			2.1	2.8			4.1
Total	100	100		100			100	100			100

* In 2003, 2004 and 2006, only these four response categories were presented: "to a large extent," "to some extent," "to a small extent," and "not at all."

13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

13.1 Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.* Discussion on p. 52

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	8.2	5.5	13.2	10.0	12.4	16.3	5.8	4.6	9.5		20.0
Disagree somewhat	14.5	9.7	17.8	12.7	17.4	19.5	10.6	9.0	10.8		9.9
Agree somewhat	38.6	28.2	34.3	34.2	36.2	30.9	33.8	29.3	25.2	N/A	19.7
Agree totally	38.0	53.6	32.9	41.8	29.1	27.7	45.4	53.6	52.6		47.0
Don't know / refuse	0.7	3.0	1.8	1.3	4.9	5.6	4.4	3.5	1.9		3.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

13.2 Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, economy or society should be made by a Jewish majority.* Discussion on p. 53

	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	13.1		23.4
Disagree somewhat	16.1		15.7
Agree somewhat	27.2	N/A	19.5
Agree totally	42.3		37.4
Don't know / refuse	1.3		4.0
Total	100		100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

13.3 It doesn't matter which party you vote for; it won't change the situation. Discussion on p. 48

	2003*	2004*	2005	2006*	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	19.9	26.2		26.5			31.7	28.0		33.9	41.9
Disagree somewhat	34.3	30.1		23.6			16.1	19.9		17.2	16.2
Not sure	11.8	10.8	N/A	13.3	N/A	N/A	–	–	N/A	–	–
Agree somewhat	23.1	16.8		19.3			19.7	20.8		20.2	17.4
Agree totally	10.8	15.7		16.9			29.2	28.0		22.6	19.7
Don't know / refuse	0.1	0.4	–	0.4	–	–	3.3	3.3		6.1	4.8
Total	100	100		100			100	100		100	100

* In 2003, 2004 and 2006, there were five response categories, worded slightly differently: "disagree strongly," "disagree," "not sure," "agree," "agree strongly."
In Figure 20, the middle category of "not sure" was divided proportionally between those who agreed and those who disagreed for purposes of comparison with later years.

13.4 The government should encourage Arabs to emigrate from Israel.* Discussion on p. 93

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	27.4	27.5	27.2	25.8	27.2	26.9	24.9	25.2			34.0
Disagree somewhat	15.3	12.1	14.4	12.2	15.8	15.6	16.8	19.1			15.8
Agree somewhat	24.1	18.2	18.5	18.3	18.8	18.7	20.2	19.2	N/A	N/A	16.3
Agree totally	32.5	39.2	37.7	41.8	33.7	35.8	33.4	31.5			27.5
Don't know / refuse	0.7	3.0	2.2	1.9	4.5	3.0	4.7	5.0			6.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

13.5 There are no real differences between the political parties in Israel today. Discussion on p. 47

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	25.6	11.1		37.0
Disagree somewhat	22.7	26.3		18.3
(Not sure)	–	16.9		–
Agree somewhat	23.2	27.6	N/A	20.4
Agree totally	23.6	15.3		17.7
Don't know / refuse	4.9	2.8		6.6
Total	100	100		100

13.6 Those who choose not to serve in the army should be denied the right to vote for or be elected to the Knesset.

	2010*	2011	2012	2013
Disagree totally	52.3	N/A	N/A	36.4
Disagree somewhat				15.4
Agree somewhat	39.0			14.0
Agree totally				28.0
Don't know / refuse	8.7			6.2
Total	100			100

* In 2010, there were only two response categories: agree / disagree.

14. All societies are divided into stronger and weaker groups. Which group in Israel society do you feel you belong to?

	2012	2013
Strong group	21.1	20.2
Somewhat strong group	43.8	34.5
Somewhat weak group	17.3	21.4
Weak group	11.7	15.2
Don't know / refuse	6.1	8.7
Total	100	100

15. In the event of a conflict between democracy and halakha (Jewish religious law), should preference be given to upholding democratic principles or adhering to the tenets of Jewish law?*

Discussion on p. 64

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
It is preferable in all cases to uphold democratic principles.	42.4	47.9	55.4	45.1					49.7		42.7
Sometimes one, sometimes the other, depending on circumstances.	34.1	23.6	20.8	25.1					26.5		21.1
It is preferable in all cases to adhere to the precepts of Jewish religious law.	23.2	27.4	23.0	29.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	21.0	N/A	28.2
There is no fundamental contradiction between democratic principles and Jewish law.									N/A		2.1
Don't know / refuse	0.3	1.1	0.8	0.5					2.8		5.9
Total	100	100	100	100					100		100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

16. For many years, the following were considered to be the major points of tension in Israeli society. How would you characterize the level of tension between these groups today?

Discussion on p. 81

16.1 Between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim

	2012	2013
High	23.3	29.0
Moderate*	42.6	38.5
Low	30.3	23.8
None	N/A	2.9
Don't know / refuse	3.8	5.8
Total	100	100

*In 2012: "so-so."

16.2 Between religious and secular

	2012	2013
High	59.7	55.7
Moderate*	28.9	30.6
Low	9.5	7.9
None	N/A	1.9
Don't know / refuse	1.9	3.9
Total	100	100

*In 2012: "so-so."

16.3 Between right and left (on political/security issues)

	2012	2013
High	51.8	50.5
Moderate*	33.3	32.4
Low	10.5	9.8
None	N/A	1.8
Don't know / refuse	4.4	5.5
Total	100	100

*In 2012: "so-so."

16.4 Between rich and poor

	2012	2013
High	55.7	57.9
Moderate*	29.4	26.6
Low	11.9	8.1
None	N/A	3.0
Don't know / refuse	3.0	4.4
Total	100	100

*In 2012: "so-so."

16.5 Between Jews and Arabs

	2012	2013
High	70.6	68.0
Moderate*	21.8	23.8
Low	5.5	3.2
None	N/A	1.3
Don't know / refuse	2.1	3.7
Total	100	100

*In 2012: "so-so."

24. Would it bother you to have as your neighbor:

Discussion on p. 87

24.1 People who do not observe the Sabbath and holidays*

	2010	2011	2012	2013
It would bother me	9.6	N/A	N/A	10.3
I don't care	23.6			–
It would not bother me	65.2			88.8
Don't know / refuse	1.6			0.9
Total	100			100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

24.2 Haredi Jews*

	2010	2011	2012	2013
It would bother me	22.6	N/A	N/A	20.8
I don't care	23.0			–
It would not bother me	52.2			77.0
Don't know / refuse	2.2			2.2
Total	100			100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

24.3 An Arab family*

	2010	2011	2012	2013
It would bother me	44.8	N/A	N/A	47.6
I don't care	16.8			–
It would not bother me	35.5			48.3
Don't know / refuse	2.9			4.1
Total	100			100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

24.7 A Jewish family*

	2010	2011	2012	2013
It would bother me	48.6	N/A	N/A	41.9
I don't care	32.2			–
It would not bother me	16.9			48.4
Don't know / refuse	2.3			9.7
Total	100			100

*This question was posed to Arab respondents only.

24.5 Foreign workers*

	2010	2011	2012	2013
It would bother me	39.1	N/A	N/A	52.8
I don't care	21.9			–
It would not bother me	36.2			43.7
Don't know / refuse	2.8			3.5
Total	100			100

* This question was posed to all respondents.

24.6 A homosexual couple*

	2010	2011	2012	2013
It would bother me	34.8	N/A	N/A	32.9
I don't care	20.6			–
It would not bother me	41.9			63.1
Don't know / refuse	2.7			4.0
Total	100			100

* This question was posed to all respondents.

32. In your opinion, to what extent is each of these groups willing to compromise on issues important to them in order to reach a basic consensus that would allow everyone to live here together?

32.1 Arab citizens of Israel

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	15.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	19.8
To some extent	26.7						24.6
To a small extent	26.8						19.2
Not at all	24.5						26.9
Don't know / refuse	6.7						9.5
Total	100						100

32.2 Jewish citizens of Israel

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	22.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	29.7
To some extent	44.1						36.7
To a small extent	20.9						15.6
Not at all	7.1						9.1
Don't know / refuse	5.6						8.9
Total	100						100

32.3 Religious Jews

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	14.0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	15.9
To some extent	27.1						26.0
To a small extent	29.8						22.3
Not at all	20.3						25.2
Don't know / refuse	8.8						10.6
Total	100						100

32.4 Right-wing Jews

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	12.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	18.3
To some extent	29.3						26.1
To a small extent	27.9						23.7
Not at all	19.5						20.3
Don't know / refuse	10.8						11.6
Total	100						100

32.5 Secular Jews

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	21.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	33.8
To some extent	46.7						35.4
To a small extent	18.6						13.0
Not at all	4.9						6.7
Don't know / refuse	8.4						11.1
Total	100						100

32.6 Left-wing Jews

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
To a large extent	30.2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	36.3
To some extent	30.8						24.6
To a small extent	19.0						14.6
Not at all	7.9						13.0
Don't know / refuse	12.1						11.5
Total	100						100

33. When you compare Israeli politicians today with what you know or remember about Israeli politicians of the past, are today's better, worse, or the same? Discussion on p. 37

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Better	3.5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	12.6
The same	23.5					31.4
Worse	66.4					44.4
Don't know / refuse	6.6					11.6
Total	100					100

Appendix 3:
Sociodemographic Breakdown of Total Sample
(percent)

Sex	2013 sample
Male	48.5
Female	51.5
Total	100
Age	
18–24	16.8
25–34	21.2
35–44	18.5
45–54	15.0
55–64	13.6
65+	14.9
Total	100
Education	
Elementary or partial high school	9.6
Full high school without matriculation certificate	10.9
Full high school with matriculation certificate	24.8
Post-secondary (teachers' college, nursing school, practical engineering college, yeshiva)	10.7
Partial college/university	7.9
Full academic degree, B.A. or higher	29.2
Did not respond	6.9
Total	100
Monthly household income	
Below average	37.4
Average	23.1
Above average	22.7
Did not respond	16.8
Total	100

→

Nationality	
Jews and others[1]	84.4
Arabs	15.6
Total	100
Religion (Arabs)	
Muslim	72.4
Christian	7.6
Druze	5.8
Other (no religion) / did not respond	14.2
Total	100
Ethnic origin (Jews, by birthplace of respondent; Israeli-born, by birthplace of the father)[2]	
Israel-Israel	29.5
Europe-America	27.8
Israeli-born: Europe-America	19.0
Asia-Africa	5.9
Israeli-born: Asia-Africa	12.4
Don't know / refuse	5.4
Total	100
Length of residence in Israel (Jews)[3]	
Native-born or long-time residents (arrived before 1990)	81.8
Immigrants (from 1990 onward)	18.2
Total	100

1 As defined by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the category of "others" consists of non-Arab Christians or "no religion"; 2.6% of the respondents in the "Jews and others" category identified themselves in this way.

2 Respondents born in the CIS/Former Soviet Union, and Israeli-born respondents whose father was born there, are included in this table under "Europe-America" and "Israeli-born: Europe-America," respectively. Comparing our 2013 sample (based on place of birth and father's ethnic origin) with figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics, we find a somewhat smaller proportion of Asian/African-born respondents and their Israeli-born descendants, and a slightly larger proportion of European/American-born respondents and their Israeli-born descendants, and of second-generation Israeli-born.

3 There was a slight preponderance in our sample of immigrants from the CIS/Former Soviet Union.

Appendix 4:
Distribution of Variables (by self-definition)
(percent)

Table 1: Religiosity*

Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)	9.4
Haredi-leumi (national ultra-Orthodox)	1.8
National religious	9.0
Traditional religious	15.1
Traditional non-religious	13.0
Secular	49.1
Other (listed as "no religion" or non-Arab Christian)	2.6
Total	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

Table 1a: Identification with branches of Judaism*

I don't feel like I belong to any branch	56.7
I feel that I belong to the Orthodox branch	26.5
I feel that I belong to the Conservative branch	3.2
I feel that I belong to the Reform branch	4.0
Don't know / refuse	9.6
Total	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

Table 2: Right-to-left spectrum (on political/security issues)*

Right	29.1
Moderate right	20.7
Center	23.9
Moderate left	8.3
Left	7.8
Don't know / refuse	10.2
Total	100

* This question was posed to Jewish respondents only.

Table 2a: Political camp and religiosity*

Political camp	Haredi	Haredi-leumi	National religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular	Other	Total
Right	14.3	3.3	20.8	20.4	10.6	29.0	1.6	100
Moderate right	9.7	2.9	8.6	25.7	14.9	36.6	1.6	100
Center	5.9	0.5	4.9	9.4	18.2	60.1	1.0	100
Moderate left	4.4	0	0	5.9	2.9	85.3	1.5	100
Left	3.0	0	0	6.1	6.1	74.2	10.6	100

* The analysis applies to Jewish respondents only.

Table 3: Self-definition on economic issues

(from 1 = strongly in favor of government intervention in the economy, to 5 = strongly in favor of a free market, without government intervention in socioeconomic issues)

	Total sample	Jews	Arabs
1 – Social democracy: strongly in favor of robust government intervention in socioeconomic issues	26.2	27.3	19.7
2	10.6	11.3	6.9
3	38.6	40.7	27.6
4	11.2	9.4	21.1
5 – Free market: strongly in favor of non-intervention by government in socioeconomic issues	10.0	11.3	3.0
Don't know / refuse	3.4	0	21.7
Total	100	100	100

Table 4: Identification with stronger/weaker group in Israeli society (total sample)

	2013	2012
Strong group	20.2	21.1
Somewhat strong group	34.5	43.8
Somewhat weak group	21.4	17.3
Weak group	15.3	11.7
Don't know / refuse	8.6	6.1
Total	100	100

A majority of the Israeli public (54.7%) identify themselves with the two strongest groups; however, there has been a significant drop in this rating compared with last year (in 2012, 64.9% felt a sense of belonging with the stronger groups). For the most part, the decline occurred in the group that aligns itself with the "somewhat strong" group. By contrast, the share of those who identify themselves with the "somewhat weak" and "weak" groups rose from 29% in 2012 to 36.7% in 2013.

Table 4a: Breakdown of identification with weak/strong social groups by sociodemographic and sociopolitical characteristics (total sample)

	Strong group	Somewhat strong	Somewhat weak	Weak group	Don't know / refuse	Total
Total sample	20.2	34.5	21.4	15.3	8.6	100
Nationality						
Jews	21.5	35.7	18.5	15.9	8.4	100
Arabs	13.5	27.7	37.4	11.6	9.8	100
Length of residence in Israel (Jews)						
Immigrants (from 1990 onward)	15.3	23.3	21.5	34.4	5.5	100
Native-born or long-time residents (arrived before 1990)	22.8	38.7	17.8	11.5	9.2	100
Age						
18–24	25.0	36.3	22.6	8.9	7.2	100
25–34	17.9	33.5	27.8	11.8	9.0	100
35–44	25.5	29.3	19.6	17.9	7.7	100
45–54	20.5	35.8	15.2	21.2	7.3	100
55–64	14.0	34.6	20.6	16.2	14.6	100
65+	16.2	39.2	19.6	17.6	7.4	100
Sex						
Female	19.6	35.2	21.6	16.0	7.6	100
Male	20.8	33.8	21.0	14.6	9.8	100
Education						
Up to high school without matriculation	18.6	28.9	25.0	18.1	9.4	100
Full high school or post-secondary with partial academic degree	21.9	34.6	21.9	14.5	7.1	100
Full academic degree	20.5	40.1	16.8	15.4	7.2	100

→

Family income						
Much below average	17.8	19.7	26.9	32.2	3.4	100
Slightly below average	15.8	38.2	29.7	12.7	3.6	100
Average	17.3	38.1	22.5	10.4	11.7	100
Slightly above average	26.2	45.2	19.0	6.3	3.3	100
Much above average	35.4	34.3	9.1	14.1	7.1	100
Political orientation (Jews)						
Right	25.3	32.2	16.7	17.1	8.7	100
Moderate right	17.8	39.7	21.8	15.5	5.2	100
Center	19.9	38.3	18.9	12.4	10.5	100
Moderate left	20.3	44.9	15.9	8.7	10.2	100
Left-wing	28.4	37.3	17.9	11.9	4.5	100
Religiosity (Jews)						
Secular	19.8	35.2	17.6	18.6	8.8	100
Traditional non-religious	24.5	40.0	17.3	9.1	9.1	100
Traditional religious	26.8	33.9	19.7	11.8	7.8	100
National religious	20.8	48.1	16.9	10.4	3.8	100
Haredi-leumi	33.3	40.0	13.3	6.7	6.7	100
Haredi	15.2	25.3	29.1	21.5	8.9	100
Ethnic origin (Jews)						
Israeli-born; father born in Israel	28.5	31.3	21.3	11.2	7.7	100
Israeli-born; father born in Asia-Africa	24.0	34.6	16.3	17.3	7.8	100
Israeli-born; father born in Europe-America	20.0	46.9	15.0	9.4	8.7	100
Born in Asia-Africa	16.0	38.0	24.0	14.0	8.0	100
Born in Europe-America, (long-time residents, not incl. immigrants from 1990 onward)*	13.8	42.5	13.8	18.4	11.5	100

* We elected to present long-time residents born in Europe-America separately from immigrants of the same origin, since their feelings on this issue are different.

- The share of those who feel that they belong to the two stronger groups in Israeli society is greater among Jews than Arabs; among long-time residents compared with immigrants from 1990 onward; and among very young people (18–24) as opposed to the other age groups.
- This sense of belonging to the two stronger groups rises in tandem with an increase in income and educational level.
- The ethnic group that aligns itself to the greatest degree with the stronger members of Israeli society are Israeli-born Ashkenazim (i.e., of European/American origin), followed by other Israeli-born populations: second-generation Israelis, and descendants of fathers of Asian-African origin. The highest share of self-identification with the weaker group was found among long-time, foreign-born residents of Israel—of Ashkenazi and Mizrahi origin in equal measure.
- In the 2013 Survey, no differences were found between men and women in self-identification with the stronger or weaker groups.
- In terms of political views, a slightly higher share of those who locate themselves on the left of the spectrum feel a sense of belonging to the stronger groups, compared with those who align themselves with the center or the right.
- As for religiosity, the two populations that show the greatest inclination to align themselves with the stronger groups in Israeli society are the national religious and the haredi-leumi (national) groups. The haredim identify themselves with the weaker echelons to a greater extent than do the other groups, followed by the secular population.

Table 4b: Share who identify themselves with the two stronger groups, by religiosity and political orientation – 2013 versus 2012 (percent)

	2013	2012
Religiosity (Jews)		
Secular	55.0	71.9
Traditional non-religious	65.5	62.9
Traditional religious	60.7	67.3
National religious	68.9	68.6
Haredi-leumi	73.3	83.3
Haredi	40.5	60.0
Political orientation (Jews)		
Right	57.0	71.7
Center	58.2	70.2
Left	66.2	72.9

We examined the correlation between self-identification with the stronger or weaker group in Israeli society and voting patterns in the last election (2013), as presented in the following figure:

Figure 72: Self-identification with stronger or weaker group by voting pattern in 2013 Knesset elections (total sample; percent)



The first category includes the parties whose voters feel the greatest sense of belonging to the strong or somewhat strong groups in Israel society: Bayit Yehudi (75.4%) and Yesh Atid (68.1%). It is reasonable to assume that the sense of power of these voters stems from both the political strength of their chosen parties following the election and their own socioeconomic status.

In the second highest category of voters who self-identify with the stronger groups are those who voted for Meretz and Labor: although the results of the 19th Knesset elections were certainly not favorable for them, and they remained in the Opposition, they nonetheless enjoy the highest socioeconomic status in Israel.

The third category, in which only slightly more than half the voters associate themselves with the stronger groups, includes Shas (54.4%) and Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu (52.6%). This finding is surprising given that we are speaking not only of the dominant ruling party (Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu) but of the party that was a member of most of the recent

governments (Shas). A possible explanation for the voters' feelings about their place on the strong-weak continuum is the loss of political power by both these parties in the last elections coupled with the socioeconomic status of most of these voters.

In the fourth category are those parties where only a minority of the voters associate themselves with the stronger groups, and whose position was noticeably weakened in the last elections: Kadima, United Torah Judaism (UTJ), and the Arab parties (Hadash, Balad, and Raam-Taal). The positioning of the Kadima voters—less than half (45.5%) of whom align themselves with the stronger groups—can be explained by the weakening of their parties. A majority (54.2%) of UTJ voters, like most of the voters for the Arab parties (54.2%), identify themselves with the weaker groups, owing to a combination of lower socioeconomic status and a sense of ongoing political exclusion (Arabs) or their removal from the coalition (UTJ).

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