INSTITUTE *for* STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Public Policy for European Muslims

Facts and Perceptions

BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE MEETING:

"Inclusive citizenship in Europe: Do we need new guidelines?"

Center for dialogues
Islamic World - U.S. - The West

SALZBURG GLOBAL SEMINAR

CEP

This paper was originally commissioned for a meeting 'Inclusive citizenship in Europe: Do we need new guidelines?' The meeting was held in Jable during the Slovenian Presidency of the EU in 2008 and built upon discussions begun at the conference on "Muslim Youth and Women in the West: Source of Concern or Source of Hope?" organized by New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West at the Salzburg Global Seminar on May 15-17, 2007. It was co-organized by The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West, The Salzburg Global Seminar and The Centre for European Perspective.

Acknowledgement: The author is grateful to Sasha Havlicek, Executive Director of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue; Mustapha Tlili, Founding Director, Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West, New York University; Edward Mortimer, Senior Vice-President & Chief Programme Officer Salzburg Global Seminar; and Spela Lamis, First Counsellor, Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for comments and directions on the content of this paper.

Designed and typeset by SoapBox, www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk

Environmentally printed by Quentin Press using vegetable inks, processless plate making and an alcohol-free printing process onto FSC certified board.

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"Inclusive citizenship in Europe: Do we need new guidelines?"

Jable, Slovenia, February 22, 2008

Prepared by Jytte Klausen, Professor of Comparative Politics at Brandeis University on behalf of co-organizers:

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue
The Centre for European Perspective
New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West
The Salzburg Global Seminar

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Policy Questions for Consideration

I. Is There a Need for Co-ordination and Mutual Assistance Between EU Member States in Developing Policy Towards Muslim Minorities?

One of the objectives of the Jable meeting is to decide whether it would be useful to develop some guidelines which could be used by EU member states – and perhaps by other Western countries – when they seek to define the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in such a way that Muslims, and other new minorities, feel included rather than excluded. General guidelines may provide a broader perspective for approaching problems related to Muslim minorities in Europe than that given by particular controversies or immediate issues. They would serve as an instrument of information sharing about which policies and approaches to consultation and cooperation between Muslim civic groups and local and national governments had been found to work, and which had not. They could function as a bank of ideas for solutions to practical problems.

Guidelines would have to leave due latitude for each country to apply them in its own way, taking account of its specific national context and policy traditions. It is not suggested that such guidelines would be more than a point of reference.

The object is emphatically not to treat Islam as a special case, still less to create special rights or obligations that would set Muslims apart from their fellow citizens. Rather, it is to ensure that Muslim points of view are taken into account in formulating a general approach, applicable to all. This can help to identify options for integration that recognize the specific needs and rights of Muslims as a religious minority, while also addressing, within a framework of equality, the urgent social problems faced by, and relating to, Muslim minorities.

If guidelines are to be useful, they must be the product of a genuine consultative process that includes a variety of voices from within the communities concerned. Better knowledge and new ideas are essential ingredients for better policies.

II. The Need for Better Data

New methodologies for gathering population figures are urgently needed. Consistent procedures for data collection across EU countries are to be preferred; because it is only with such information in hand that one can make cross-national comparisons and evaluate the effects of different policies and approaches to integration. In the absence of knowledge, speculation fills the gap.

Better statistics are required to address both real and perceived discrimination. When discrimination can be established as a consistent problem, legal measures are required. And when perceptions exceed actual discrimination or are related to complex issues derived from multiple socio-economic disadvantages and inequalities of opportunity, the different sources have to be explained and addressed.

It is sometimes argued that "counting by race" (or religion) is divisive, and, under the present circumstances of heightened attention to Muslims, conducive to stereotyping. The counter-argument is that, in the absence of knowledge, targeted policy-making is impossible and real issues of discrimination cannot be addressed. Privacy concerns are dealt with by a prohibition on the disclosure of household information. (See EU directive from 1995 on

the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 95/46/EC.)

Muslim advocacy groups strongly favor better data collection for the purpose of monitoring social attainment and discrimination. Religion and ethnic origin was included in the 2001 British Census as a voluntary question in response to lobbying by ethnic associations. In the recent consultations regarding the construction of the 2011 Census, British Muslim associations and professional groups have strongly supported making the questions mandatory reporting requirements.

III. Civic and Political Engagement: Whom to Consult and How?

Wide differences can be observed with respect to the inclusiveness of national political systems. About two dozen Muslims (23 by my count) are currently sitting in the national parliaments, with Holland, Germany, Denmark and Sweden having the largest representation. There are no elected Muslim members of the French National Assembly, but there are two senators. In the past few years, a number of ministers who are Muslims have been appointed. All but one are women. France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Britain have ministers of justice and integration who are Muslim.

"The current focus on treating 'Muslim problems' as problems of immigration or integration overlooks the fact that many Muslims are citizens and, as such, entitled to equal treatment by authorities, employers, and neighbors"

Few parliamentarians, if any, were elected based upon blocs of Muslim voters. In some cases, the election of Muslims has been facilitated by the concentration of immigrant voters in an electoral district, but in most cases ethnicity has played no role in their election or appointment. Muslim-only parties have been a dismal failure.

Political integration is contingent upon recruitment to candidacies for electoral offices, and inclusion into local, regional, and national party organizations. Party outreach must be stepped up to become more inclusive of Muslim political activists.

In addition, civic consultation procedures have to be designed in order to provide for the diverse representation of views. The inclusion of a broad range of actors in round-table discussion, such as that convened by the German government in the Islamkonferenz, can be helpful. It is not realistic to delegate the representation of a multiethnic religious minority to one cohesive associational structure.

Consultation and dialogue between Muslims and the state are important but so also is the development of horizontal avenues of dialogue both between Muslims and between different communities and faiths.

The current focus on treating "Muslim problems" as problems of immigration or integration overlooks the fact that many Muslims are citizens and, as such, entitled to equal treatment by authorities, employers and neighbors. Problems of discrimination range from socio-economic barriers to direct prejudice. The perception of such problems is invariable filtered though lenses of class, civil status and education. Civic education to correct such misperceptions is badly needed at all levels.

IV. Is There a Need to Bolster Municipal and Community Initiative?

Local authorities have a direct interest in supporting mosque construction and community initiatives because they are part of a collective self-help movement to improve community capacity and open the door to improvements in transparency and the management of community relations.

Socio-economic disadvantage among Muslims is a great problem for municipalities. When it comes to problems of residential segregation or urban decline, municipalities are often better at building community support for experimental strategies than are national governments. Mayors and local councilors have a direct interest in producing community improvement. Immigrant voters, and those from ethnic minorities, have more influence in local politics.

The shortage of funds that usually cripples local initiatives can be remedied by the creation of national pools of funds for municipal and regional social experiments. Realistic assessment policies for measuring results are needed, but it has to be recognized also that social change of the kind that is needed requires a decade-long perspective.

The consequences of a failure on the part of European governments and societies to address direct and indirect discrimination are already evident. The effects of marginalization will be magnified by the relative youth of the affected population and by residential segregation. The development of "Muslim ghettos" poses intractable

municipal problems. It is difficult to estimate how many people live in such ghettos, but current statistics would suggest perhaps 5 million Muslims in twenty to forty cities. Again, better data is needed to make an accurate prognosis.

Beyond municipal government, civil society organizations have an important role to play at local level: "people to people" initiatives that bring children and adults into more systematic contact with each other across community and faith lines (i.e. school exchanges and joint religious education programs) are an important vehicle for breaking down prejudice and fear and for constructing horizontal civic ties.

V. Religious Institution-building

Religious pluralism exists in Europe today on a new scale that European states have yet to come fully to terms with. Is it time therefore for Europeans to re-examine the twentieth-century "stability pacts" between church and state? New national conversations about religion and public policy cannot be avoided. Governments face a choice of funding Islam, or allowing foreign sponsors to continue to provide money for mosques, imams and religious instruction. Many Muslims object to paying zakat (religious tax) for the same reasons that many Christians now prefer governments to assume the responsibility for redistributing funds to different denominations: they want accountability, and do not care to be involved in mosque management, but want a decent imam to provide guidance when needed, and want their children to grow up with the faith.

Growing affluence supports the current mosque construction drive. Zoning rules and the granting of construction permits are issues that should be resolved with an eye to the importance of helping current mosque communities upgrade facilities and management. Muslim civic engagement is an asset for municipalities and inter-religious dialogue, even if in the short term increased conflict with neighbors ensues. European Muslims are becoming more affluent, but community saving will never suffice to pay regular salaries for imams or sustain the development of seminaries for imam education.

The institutional relationship between State and Faith varies widely across Europe and is a factor in determining the exact templates for "mainstreaming" religious education in Islam from primary school through to institutions of higher learning. No initiative is possible in the absence of a coordinated effort involving the theological faculties of current public universities and seminaries in the teaching of teachers.

VI. Balancing Gender Equality with Respect for Traditional Views of Family Life

Muslim women must be provided with protection against domestic violence and abuse, and with access to educational opportunity and employment that are compatible with childrearing and providing family care. Gender equality and the right to choose a lifestyle and family life are both important European values. Many religiously observant people – not only Muslims - make different lifestyle choices than the non-observant. If we, intentionally or unintentionally, force a choice between integration and tradition upon Muslim women and youth, the cost of integration becomes too high for many people.

Poor housing, lack of childcare and responsibility for older family members are important factors deterring immigrant women's workforce participation. Community-based social programs can alleviate dependency and isolation. Part-time employment, inexpensive childcare, and transport and other public services helped earlier generations of women to gain paid employment. The can do the same, in time, for women belonging to minority communities of immigrant origin.

VII. How can Muslims be Protected Against Discrimination and Islamophobia?

Perceptions of discrimination undermine trust and facilitate radicalization. Statistical evidence of disparities in pay, promotion and professional advancement is essential information for policy-making. Muslims are entitled to equal treatment by authorities, employers and neighbors. Attitude changes can be accomplished by different means. Equality of opportunity requires social policy support. The elimination of discrimination requires enforcement procedures geared to address inter-personal and systemic discrimination. The alarmingly high rate of negative feelings in European publics and the media about Muslims facilitate wildly exaggerated estimates of the impact of Muslim minorities on European society. The political climate affects how governments present proposals to address Muslims' problems. Often measures needed to provide Muslims with equal protection under existing laws are packaged as "antiterrorism" measures and proposals to support integration are framed as "antiradicalization" initiatives.

This approach allows the radicals to set the agenda. They represent only 10-20% of Europe's Muslim minorities, which generously estimated means between

1.5 and 2 million people. It is incumbent upon all participants in public debates to stem the hysteria.

Proposals to create guidelines for how the media discusses Muslims have encountered resistance and been characterized as censorship or "political correctness". Certainly, any attempt to impose rules on the media from the outside (as opposed to self-regulation) has to be avoided. In this matter, as in so many others, voluntary means may accomplish more.

Religious discrimination is poorly understood as a legal and practical concept in Europe, where most norms related to religious defamation have been framed in the context of the policing of anti-Semitism or blasphemous statements. Many, if not most, European states include prohibitions against blasphemy as part of the civil and/or criminal code, and many Muslims advocate the expansion of these laws to encompass all religions. But such an expansion of restrictions on free speech could easily rebound against Muslims, who might find themselves censored for statements about Christians or Jews. It is also unlikely to find support from the general public. It may well be better to follow the recommendation of the Council of Europe (Recommendation 1805 (2007)) and decriminalize blasphemy, using criminal law only to punish incitement of violence.[1] Similarly, legislation against "hate speech", like other restrictions on the freedom of expression, needs to be narrowly tailored to prevent incitement to violence, and equitably applied.

1 The resolution is available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/EREC1805.htm

BACKGROUND PAPER

Executive Summary

Policies for Muslims

Many problems affecting Muslims are common to other immigrant-origin groups. However, issues associated with religious observance, stereotyping and discrimination deriving from the international tensions attendant to the growth of the violent global jihadi movement are specific to Muslims. European governments and publics, both Muslim and non-Muslim, are concerned by the challenges of security and the threat of social polarization. Muslim families worry about losing their young to religious and political extremism, while international alliances between groups in Europe and in the Muslim World has introduced an international dimension. As such, the growing political and theological extremism in Europe is also a matter of practical political concern to the governments of Muslim countries.

The focus of this paper is on Muslim minorities in Western Europe. But it has to be kept in mind that the accession of Southern European countries, and eventually perhaps Turkey, will change the demographic picture. Long-established Muslim communities in the Balkans and Central Europe are not subject to the problems of immigration and legal status that affect some of Western Europe's immigrant Muslim minorities, but the legacy of communist suppression of religion nonetheless makes the creation of mosque communities an exercise in new institution-building.

Many of the problems described here – for instance, those involving legal status, the extension to Islam of legal frameworks for religious practice applying to other religions or anti-discrimination enforcement – cannot be resolved without national governmental initiative. Others, such as those concerning localized poverty and disadvantage flowing from residential segregation or initiatives needed to support Muslim women and families, are better left to partnerships between local government and civic associations or to private initiative. Others again are best resolved in the absence of direct government involvement: for example, voluntary guidelines for "best practices" in mosque management, or for ensuring fair and accurate treatment of Muslims in the media. And finally, there are desirable initiatives to which governments can lend moral support, such as inter-religious dialogues, inclusive consultation procedures, management apprenticeships or special fellowships for young people from impoverished immigrant backgrounds.

The paper does not address basic values or norms of citizenship, about which there a rein fact few disagreements between Muslims and the rest of the population. Its focus is on practical steps needed to promote equal opportunity and to remove grounds of resentment or suspicion between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.

The Shape and Status of Muslim Communities across Europe

A broadly agreed estimate is that there are about 15 million Muslims in Western Europe and about 7.5 million Muslims in Eastern and Central Europe (excluding Russia). Information about the size of Muslim populations is extrapolated from immigration statistics and, in the U.K., derived from the census. However, immigration statistics do not include children of citizens or converts and neither method includes illegal residents. The resulting uncertainty facilitates politically-motivated exaggeration of Muslim communities' impact on European public budgets and civic life, and presents a hindrance to targeted public policies and budgets.

Muslims are a minority group everywhere in the current European Union, ranging from about 12% in Bulgaria to 5-7% in France and the Netherlands, and 1-2% in most other countries. No single ethnic group is

dominant among Europe's Muslims. Overall, the most frequent country of origin is Turkey, but if Maghrebians are counted as one group, they constitute the largest ethnic group (about 4.5 million people).

The addition of millions of "old stock" Muslims from the Balkan candidate countries to Western Europe's immigrant Muslim populations will change the dynamic of European policy making in ways that are not yet apparent. The immigration of "third-country non-nationals" of Muslim origin to the new EU member states is also a source of shared concern.

Overall, "European Islam" is characterized by extraordinary ethnic diversity, which in practice works to encourage pluralism in representation and outlook.

Overall, "European Islam" is characterized by extraordinary ethnic diversity, which in practice works to encourage pluralism in representation and outlook. Western Europe's Muslims are increasingly native-born and are citizens. The relative share of Muslim minorities has stabilized as new immigration from non-Muslim countries has increased and fertility rates among native-born Muslims have declined. Fertility rates remain above average compared to the general population, however; coupled with the below-average median age of Muslims already legally residing in EU countries, this means that a youth "bulge" of native-born Muslims can be expected over the coming decades. Affluent and well-educated Muslims are more likely to be citizens. Citizenship rates vary widely across Western Europe, reflecting both legal difference in access to citizenship (naturalization and/or birth) and the age profile of the primary migration cohort. Immigrants who are dependent upon social assistance are usually disqualified from naturalization.

Non-nationals are subject to a range of legal disabilities that are particularly hurtful to native-born Muslims, who feel discrimination more acutely because they compare their progress in society to their non-Muslims peers and neighbors rather than to the experience "back home". Legal alienation retards economic and social integration, and channels political activism into trans-national organizations for émigrés and ethnic associations. Integration has to be regarded as a dynamic process of mutual adjustment; it cannot be effectively promoted as a one-way process for which naturalization is offered as a "reward".

The Relationship Between State and Faith in the Context of Citizenship

Current conflicts over the accommodation of Islam and Muslims are often described as "integration problems" but actually reflect the end of Muslims' self-perception as immigrants and real changes in status. Increasingly affluent and middle-class lifestyles drive demands for mosque reform and mosque construction to provide congregants with ownership of centers of religious education and prayer rooms.

Muslims are Europe's largest non-Christian religious minority. Support for the integration of religious law into formal institutions of state law is high only among South Asian Muslims. But support for mosque reform and the creation of recognized national Islamic institutions is much broader.

Existing national frameworks for the relationship between State and Faith vary from established national churches to selective recognition of denominations. The meaning of equal treatment varies greatly, but comprehensive changes are needed to provide Muslims with equal access to religious instruction, maintenance and construction of mosques, seminaries and theological higher education. European legal frameworks and expectations molded to the Christian templates of national churches and clerical self-governance are inappropriate for Muslim faith communities, since Islam is a non-denominational religion based upon congregational principles. Policy templates for integrating Muslim faith communities under the existing national umbrellas for legal recognition of religions have to balance the need for accountability against the accommodation of diversity.

European Muslims are also becoming more affluent, but community saving will never suffice to pay regular salaries for imams, support imam education and make mosque communities self-reliant. Governments face a choice of funding Islam or allowing foreign sponsors to continue to provide money for mosques and supply imams and religious instruction. The institutional relationship between State and Faith varies widely across Europe and is a factor in the determination of the exact templates for "mainstreaming" religious education in Islam from primary school through to institutions of higher learning.

Much can be, and is being, achieved on the local level. Collaboration between mosques and Muslim civic associations has spawned local initiatives in many European cities, generally aimed at improving mosque management and better preparing imams to engage in inter-religious dialogue and interaction with local authorities.

The Socio-economic Dimension of Citizenship

European Muslims are poor in disproportionate numbers. In France, 20% of people of Moroccan and Turkish origin live in poverty compared to a national average of 6.2%. Poverty and residential segregation are closely related. 50% of Moroccans and Algerians, and 40% of Turks and Tunisians in France live in social housing. Poor health and poor housing are prevalent among older Muslims in much higher rates than in the general population. Care for the older generation remains a significant burden on young families, particularly Muslim women. Similarly, Bangladeshis migrating to Britain often settled in tight communities, where high rates of poverty and early marriage, early childbirth, large families and tight family control are conducive to inter-generational socio-economic disadvantage.

High rates of residential segregation interact with population growth to make the impact of the "youth bulge" uneven across municipalities. Native-born Muslims of working age are a very small minority of the overall workforce (1% of total working-age population), but as the larger cohorts come of age, the ratio of young Muslim workers to non-Muslim workers will increase accordingly. Public policy must address the needs of young Muslim workers.

Anti-discrimination measures are needed to address the widespread perception that employment bias prevents young Muslims from succeeding professionally. Socio-economic hurdles—such as poor access to education, lack of mobility to look for work outside low-employment areas and inter-generational disadvantage—loom large as barriers to integration. A failure to provide educational and employment opportunity for the native-born generation who are part of the "youth bulge" will have life-long consequences for this generation's socio-economic status and will prolong the income gap between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Poverty after divorce and lack of eligibility for higher levels of social assistance linked to past or present employment are problems common to all poor women, but worse for Muslim women when linked to the concomitant alienation from family support. Honor crimes—forced marriages to repay family debts and murder of young people who refuse family control—are prevalent in well-defined immigrant sub-communities. Policing has to be attentive to the fact that the victims include both young men and women, and that these are family crimes.

Muslim women are vulnerable to a range of social problems associated with dependency. Single-earner families are more like to be poor and the failure to integrate young Muslim women into the work force will prolong gender inequality and overall income inequality over the long-term. Care solutions for children and the elderly must respect religious values and family values prevalent among Muslims. Coercive and punitive policies, such as the loss of legal residency in cases of divorce, are counter-productive to the goal of promoting gender equality.

Political Participation and Civic Engagement

Public opinion surveys show no contradiction between Muslim identity and civic engagement. Muslims are more concerned about socio-economic issues than any other issue. Like other immigrants, Muslims tend to be more optimistic about their personal prospects than the general population. Muslims' civic engagement is a source of new political leadership and an opportunity for mainstream political parties and civic associations.

Muslims perceive the mainstream parties to be generally hostile to Muslims' concerns and reluctant to support Muslims' political engagement. Political integration is contingent upon recruitment to candidacies for electoral offices and inclusion into local, regional and national party organizations.

The United Kingdom has the highest voter eligibility rate for immigrants and it is estimated that about one million Muslims were eligible to vote in the May 2005 parliamentary election. 70-76% of eligible Muslim voters went to the polls, a turnout rate considerably higher than that of the general voting population. Participation is considerably lower in other countries, mostly due to lack of eligibility. Muslims are on average inclined to more socially conservative attitudes than the general population. Most studies have shown that the relationship between social deprivation and recruitment to terrorism is ambiguous or non-existent. Radicalization ties in with the emergence of a new counter-culture among young Muslims. In practical terms, the link between holding politically extreme views and engaging in terrorist acts is contingent on social processes of recruitment into clandestine groups.

A significant minority of European Muslims supports the jihadi cause, at about 15-16% in France and the UK and 6% in Germany. Surveys also show high rates of disapproval among Muslims of terrorism and jihadi ideology, with 80-90% saying terrorism is never justified. Jihadism is a source of inter-generational conflict among

European Muslims and a cause of a deep political divide in Europe's Muslims communities.

European political leaders have issued repeated warnings about Muslims being a source of growing anti-Semitism in Europe. This appears to be true to some extent in Spain, Britain and Germany, where 60%, 47% and 44% of Muslims, respectively, tell pollsters they have an unfavorable view of Jews, but much less so in France, where the figure is only 28%. On the other hand, one out of every five Germans and Spaniards thinks Muslims are "fanatical" and "violent", while in France and Britain only about half the population think these negative traits generally apply to Muslims. In Britain, only 20% of the public admits to a generally unfavorable view of Muslims, while in France, Germany and Spain the comparable figures are, respectively, 35%, 54%, and 62%. The difficult (and now widely acknowledged) conclusion is that both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, while very unevenly distributed, are real problems in Europe, which both Muslims and non-Muslims need to address.

1. Introduction

Many problems experienced by Western Europe's Muslim minorities are identical to those experienced by other immigrant groups. However, Muslim perceptions are filtered through the lens of minority status and a heightened awareness of cultural conflict, both real and perceived. Controversies over Muslims and the integration of Islam also sometimes attribute problems that have little to do with Islam, such as the loss of social and economic competency associated with migration and ethno-cultural practices that many Europeans find foreign. There are, of course, problems particular to Muslims, for instance in connection with religious accommodation, discrimination and perceived conflicts between Muslims' customary norms and those of the majority. Finally, and perhaps above all, there are the issues associated with Islamist radicalism and extreme fundamentalism. This is what makes policy debates so urgent and so fraught.

The present paper outlines a series of issues that tend to be defined as particular to Muslims in Europe. The focus is primarily on Western Europe. But it has to be kept in mind that the accession of Southern European countries, and eventually perhaps Turkey, will change the demographic picture. Significant variations exist across Europe and within the Muslim minority populations, but I have attempted to paint a broad-brush picture, combining and pooling data from related but separate studies to summarize existing knowledge.*

Many of the problems described here cannot be resolved without national governmental initiative but others are better left to partnerships between local government and civic associations, or to private initiative. Issues attendant to legal status and citizenship, the extension of existing frameworks for religious exercise to fully and equally include Islam, and anti-discrimination enforcement require the involvement of governments even if legal changes are not required. Measures addressing localized poverty and disadvantage flowing from residential segregation, as well as initiatives needed to support Muslim women and families, are often best carried out in the form of "social laboratories" involving local and regional governments and Muslim community groups. Then there are issues, which are best resolved in the absence of direct government involvement. Voluntary guidelines for "best practice" in mosque management and for providing a fair and accurate portrayal in the media are examples of highly sensitive issues, where the direct involvement of governments will be regarded as intrinsically suspect for reasons of free speech and religious freedom. Finally there are desirable initiatives to which governments can lend moral support. Inter-religious dialogues, consultation procedures that are inclusive of Muslims, apprenticeships in management and special fellowships for youths from impoverished immigrant backgrounds, and many more private and civic initiatives are required to provide equal opportunities for Muslims.

The present paper aims to start a discussion about practical solutions addressed at the majority within Europe's Muslim minorities, who hope to integrate but currently find themselves trapped by discrimination and intractable disadvantage. It does not address the recent efforts on the part of a number of European governments to install basic values as the foundation of normative

* Readers should treat all figures cited as no more than best estimates, to be used, with caution, until something better comes along. The lack of cross-national work hampers generalization. The OECD publishes excellent statistics on migration but rarely with a focus on the influence of religion in shaping occupational patterns and social outcomes. Increasing numbers of Muslims are not migrants (defined as non-national residents) and therefore not included in immigration statistics. Traditional survey methodologies do not include a sufficient number of minority respondents to permit generalization. The 2002 and 2004 European Social Surveys included, when combined, a total of 280 Muslim women out of a total of 19,000 women. The Pew Foundation and the Gallup organization have devoted significant resources to the difficult task of doing surveys of the opinions of European Muslims. The two organizations often ask the same questions in several countries and also include non-Muslims as a control group, which means that we can draw comparisons between Muslims living in different countries and between European Muslims and non-Muslims.

citizenship. The Italian "Carta dei Valori" and Gordon Brown's initiatives on "Britishness" are examples.[2]

There are in fact few disagreements between Muslims and the majority population about what is required as a norm of citizenship: learning the language, respecting the law and national political institutions and accepting civic equality (Gallup World Poll 2007a; Mogahed and Nyiri 2007). The purpose of value discussion presumably is to marginalize the extremists and applies in equal measure to the jihadis who say democracy is "disallowed" for Muslims and the xenophobes who say Muslims cannot be democrats because of their faith. There is room for debates over values but the values underpinning the discussion in this paper are pragmatic. The focus is the practical steps needed to promote equal opportunity and to break that objective down to matters of procedure and targeted initiatives.

2 A survey organization found the public generally skeptical about the need to stress "inborn" values as the root of "Britishness" and found overwhelming support for learned national features: Speaking English, having citizenship and respecting the law and national political institutions, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4074801.stm The Italian official report is available at: http://www.governo.it/GovernoInforma/Dossier/decreto_carta_valori/index.html

2. The shape and status of Muslim communities across Europe

a. Demography: 'Old Stock' and 'New Stock' Muslims

There are about 15 million Muslims in Western Europe. This estimate has not changed in the past two years and if it was accurate in 2005 it is probably inaccurate now, or vice versa. Ceri Peach, a demographer, estimates the Muslim population to be about 7.5 million in Eastern and Central Europe, excluding Russia (Peach 2007, 7). Muslims in Eastern and Central Europe are descendants of Ottoman Muslims and have never migrated. Peach uses the labels "old stock" and "new stock" to distinguish between the two groups. Bulgaria, among the recent members of the European Union, has about one million Muslims or about 12% of its general population (CIA World Fact Book 2007).[3] Among the prospective European Union member states candidate and potential candidate countries, a few states are majority or plurality Muslim (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) or have significant Muslim minorities (Macedonia) but only Turkey's 70 million people would significant alter that fact that Muslims are a small minority in the European Union.

Demographic statistics are usually derived from the census or from population registers, which do not include information about residents' religion. Estimates of how many Muslims live in the West are instead extrapolated from immigration statistics and other surveys. Illegal residents and converts cannot be counted by these means. Another reason that immigration statistics—which count resident "foreigners"—have become increasingly unreliable is that the relative share of Muslim nationals to non-nationals has increased. Naturalized immigrants and their descendants, and immigrant-origin residents (the second generation) who acquire citizenship by birthright or naturalization are not "counted" by the present methods.

The reliance on immigration statistics to "count" Muslims implies a methodological leap between national origin and religious identity. Counts are adjusted to reflect the distribution between various faiths in the country of origin, but the Algerian immigrant residing in Lyon is nonetheless counted as Muslim irrespective of what she may think about her religion. We often discuss the need to count converts to Islam but little discussion is made of the implication of the substitution of immigrants for Muslims. An exception is the 2001 British census, which included an optional question of ethnicity and religion allowing British authorities to rely on self-reported religious identity for purposes of policy-making. The 2001 Census told us that there were 1.6 million Muslims in the United Kingdom, just shy of 3% of the population. The figure probably undercounts the current Muslim population in Britain by as much as 1/2 million because of subsequent population increases due to natural growth (fertility) and immigration (see Table 1).

It is often said that that there are 6 million Muslims in France, which would make 10% of the population Muslim. Patrick Simon, a French demographer, contends that 3.5 million is a more accurate estimate (5.8%). A compromise figure of 4.1 million (6.9%) is included in Table 1. Germany has 3.4 million Muslims, or about 4.1% of the general population. The Netherlands recently changed its method of calculation from extrapolating from immigration statistics to using a social survey and

3 Three potential European Union members account for most of the "old stock" Muslims in Peach's estimates: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

Table 1: The Muslim Population in Various Countries (in thousands)

Country	Number of People from Muslim Countries or estimated as Muslim Thousands	Year	Percentage of Population
France	4,150	1998	6.9%
Netherlands	850	2004	5.3%
UK	1,600	2001	2.8%
Germany	3,377	2004	4.1%
Italy	825	2003	1.4%
Belgium	355	2003	3.4%
Sweden	351	2003	3.9%
Denmark	250	2005	5.0%
Norway	73	2003	1.6%
Spain	485	2003	1.1%
Greece	370	1990s	3.7%
Europe (15)	12,000-15,000	1990s	3-3.2%
United States	1,100 -6,000	2000	+/-1.0%-2%

Sources: Center for Dialogues 2007: 106. Dutch and German figures adjusted to reflect recent re-counts.

found that the country had 850,000 Muslims rather than over 1 million as reported in 2006. This represents 5% of Dutch residents (CBS Webmagazine 2007). It is possible that a change to a more accurate methodology would produce lower counts in other countries as well (EUMC 2006: 27-29).

In 1950, there were perhaps 300,000 Muslims in Western Europe. Western Europe's Muslim population has doubled since the early 1990s. What records we have suggest that Italy went from about 150,000 Muslim residents at the start of the 1990s to nearly one million by 2000. Spain went from about 2,000 Muslims in 1990 to about 1/2 million a decade later. Recent estimates put the figure of Muslim residents in Spain much higher, at about one million. Germany and Denmark have experienced a near doubling of their Muslim residents roughly after 1985. Some countries missed the first post-1945 waves of immigration entirely (Spain, Italy), whereas others have had insignificant new immigration in recent years due to very restrictive policies (Denmark and the Netherlands). For this reason, the cross-national variation within the EU is significant regarding the Muslim population's primary countries of origin and cohort profiles on skills and social origin. The cross-national variations in the ratios of native-born Muslims to foreign-born and citizens to non-nationals reflect both differences in the timing of the main migration movements and national rules for access to citizenship.

The relative share of Muslims has stabilized in some countries, most perceptibly in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Migrants from the new European Union countries (Poland, Rumania) and from China and south-Saharan Africa have dominated the on-going migration wave (Migration Outlook: SOPEMI 2007: 40, 44).

b. Demography: Population Expansion

The lack of exact figures for the current Muslim population makes it difficult to estimate future population growth. Census information about residents' religious identity eliminates some guesswork but a trend among immigrant populations to adjust family size downward and among women to delay childbirth makes prediction difficult. Alarmist predictions make the assumption that immigrants maintain fertility rates at the level of their countries of origin, so that, for instance, Somali women in Western Europe will continue to have 6.68 children, like women in Somalia. One widely reported "factoid" is that by 2025 every third child in Europe will be born to a Muslim family. The prediction is based upon an assumption that there are currently 50 million Muslims in Europe. Another claim is that Europe will "be Muslim" by 2050.[4]

Estimates for future population growth result from cross-tabulation between immigration statistics and estimates of fertility rates in the various Muslim subpopulations' countries of origin. The difficulty is

4 Deutsche Welle reported the 2050 estimate as a "rumor" and promptly discredited it. It was nonetheless reported as a fact in many papers and websites, which all ignored the original disclaimer included in the source, see http://www.dwworld. de/dw/article/0,2144,2229744,00.html.

illustrated by the quick changes to current fertility rates. Fertility is declining among Muslim families in Europe, and also in several of the countries of origin. France's fertility rate (1.98) is currently higher than that of Turkey (1.89) and Algeria (1.86). Ireland and Algeria are ranked at exactly the same level, just slightly above Denmark (CIA World Fact Book 2007).

Presently, the median fertility rate among Muslims is above the European mean, but the trend converges to the European norm. The European norm is rising, not due to immigrants as is sometimes claimed in debates, but because some countries have reversed the earlier trends to declining fertility (Westoff and Frejka 2007). The Netherlands provide the most recently updated figures, which show that total fertility rates of 2.9 for Moroccans in 2005, 1.9 for Dutch residents of Turkish origin and a national average of 1.7. Muslims are a small minority, which means that their higher than average fertility rates have a very minor impact on the national average.

Still, even conservative estimates show that Europe is facing a "boomlet" of native-born young Muslims. If Muslims (and other immigrants) adopted the low fertility rates of other Europeans, the relative share of Muslims (defined by parental origin) will still increase relative to other population groups because of the low median age of the current Muslim population. For this reason alone, Muslims' natural growth rate is above that of the general population, even if conservative assumptions are made about new Muslim immigration and family-size.

The British 2000 census showed that 1/3 of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis were then under the age of 16, and more recent estimate claim that close to half of British Muslims are under the age of 30. Ceri Peach estimates that British Muslims may reach 10% of the population by 2050. Even this figure is uncertain because, as Peach also points out, the under 25 cohorts have remained stable at 5% of the general population, which is an increase from the 3% comprised by the 25+ cohorts.

Population "events" cast long shadows in demographic statistics, and the current "youth bulge" is a predictable consequence of the high rates of Muslim immigration from 1985 to 1995. In the absence of better data collection, the first accurate statistics for the size of the "youth bulge" are school enrollments. The "bulge" effect combines with high rates of residential segregation to create particular problems among school districts with high numbers of immigrant-origin and Muslim students, the so-called "majority-minority" schools. The phenomenon is well-known in the United States but has not been common in Europe's urban areas until recent years.

c. Pluralism: Ethnic Diversity

The ethnic diversity of Western Europe's Muslims reflects the diverse sources of migration. Most Muslims are immigrants or descendants of immigrants from South Asia or Turkey. Arabs are a minority, estimated at around 20% of all European Muslims, but they constitute the majority of Muslims in France. In some European countries no one ethnicity dominates. In others, one or two groups are dominant. In the United Kingdom about 800,000 Muslim immigrants have Pakistani roots and 300,000 originate from Bangladesh. Nearly 2 million of Germany's 3.5 million Muslims have a Turkish (or Turkish-Kurd) background. One million French Muslims are from Morocco, or are children of Moroccan immigrants, and 1.8 million are from Algeria, or are the children of Algerian immigrants. In the Netherlands 1/3 of Muslim immigrants are from Turkey and another 1/3 from Morocco. In Sweden, Iranians, Iraqis and Bosnians are the largest groups.

Origin is sometimes significant for the capacity to integrate. Language barriers are lower for migrants from former colonies with proficiency in the colonial language: French-speaking Algerians, English-speaking Pakistanis and Dutch-speaking Surinamese, for example. Turks, Somalis and Arabs living in non-French speaking Europe and Bosnians are at a relative disadvantage in this respect. Generational changes sometimes pit one generation against another on matters of language. Young Muslims speak English and German rather than Urdu and Turkish, meanwhile the older congregants cannot do without Urdu and Turkish.

Most of Europe's Muslims are Sunni but it is estimated that about 20% of Europe's Muslims belong to Muslim minority groups: Shia'h, Alevites (Turkish), Alawis (Syrian), Ismailis and minority sects like the Ahmadis, who like the Alevites are often not considered to be Muslim by other Muslims. Diversity has sociological and theological implications. Some of the practices that have enraged European publics—honor killings, forced marriages and patriarchal control—are ethnic practices and not attributable to Islam or all Muslims. Language and histories of different traditions and practices are also sources of differentiation. The diversity varies from city to city depending upon migration settlement patterns. Among Sunni Muslims, the various movements take different views of the meaning of religious law (Sufism, Wahhabism). A detailed study of mosques in Berlin found that 44 mosques were unaffiliated Sunni, which means they could be Sufi or Bosniac and many other things. 12 were associated with the Turkish government's Ministry for Religious Affairs, 9 were associated with Milli Görüs, also

Turkish but considered fundamentalist, 2 were Alevite and 2 belonged to the Ahmadiyya (Spielhaus and Färber 2007: 70). The Berlin mosque census shows the extraordinary ethnic and theological diversity of Europe's mosque communities. Diversity is a source of intra-Muslim conflict over representation and because different groups take different views on many issues also of political conflict.

d. Status: Citizenship/Civic Status

One problem associated with Europe-wide policies for Muslims is that the many European Union rules that cover immigrants from other European countries do not apply to a large segment of West European Muslims. Muslims who are not citizens of EU member states are considered "third country non-nationals." To take an example, presently EU

"As a consequence native-born but non-naturalized Western European Muslims are subject to a complicated matrix of legal alienation"

Directive 2004/58/EC guarantees the right of nationals from EU member states to continued residence upon divorce, but non-national Muslims are not covered by any of these guarantees. As a consequence native-born but non-naturalized Western European Muslims are subject to a complicated matrix of legal alienation. This will not be a problem for Balkan Muslims, if and when they join the European Union, because they will enjoy full status as citizens of a European Union member state. In the absence of national action to extend citizenship to native-born Western European Muslims, third country non-national Muslims will over the years become a minority particularly affected by legal disabilities within the minority comprised of European Muslims. The issue is particularly pertinent to countries that do not grant birth-right citizenship.

Most countries have eased restrictions on access to citizenship as part of their efforts to promote immigrant integration, although a few countries (Denmark, the Netherlands) have also made naturalization more difficult to obtain. France eliminated the automatic right to citizenship to native-born descendants of immigrants upon reaching the age of 18 in 1993 but restored it in 1998. Sweden started allowing dual citizenship in 2001. Belgium now grants birth-right citizenship to third generation descendants of immigrants and as a result 70% of Turkish-origin immigrant descendants and 60% of Moroccans have Belgian nationality (official statistics here cited from Karich 2007: 66). The United Kingdom and the Netherlands also allow dual citizenship and probably have the highest ratio of citizens among Muslims.

Germany liberalized naturalization rules in 2000 to allow native-born immigrants access to citizenship but surprisingly the number of naturalizations dropped between 2001 and 2005. The drop was steeper among Muslims than among other immigrant groups. Naturalizations picked up again slightly in 2006 but the number was still 55,000 lower than in 2001. The ratio of Muslims who became citizens dropped from 66% to 48% of all naturalizations between 2001 and 2005 (Statistische Bundesamt 2007). By my calculation the ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim naturalization dropped further to 38% in 2006. A probable reason is the introduction of citizenship tests with strict requirements for cultural assimilation, which have deterred Muslims from applying. Discretionary decisions made in the evaluation process play an important role in naturalization decisions and administrative changes that undercut the aim of the 2000 reform are another reason for the decline. Naturalization figures are usually reported annually ("flow" data) and the overall Muslim population is inferred from migration statistics ("stock" numbers), which makes it difficult to say precisely what percentage of German Muslims are citizens. A recent estimate is that over 1 million Muslims were naturalized between 1988 and 2005, which puts the overall ratio of nationals to non-nationals at 42%. (Muslims who became citizens before 1988 and converts are not included.)

New rules in Denmark aiming to reduce the number of naturalizations have cut naturalizations down to about 7,000 annually from a peak in 2000 of nearly 20,000 individuals. No information about people's religion is provided in the public lists but between half and two-thirds of the name on the lists are from the Islamic countries.

The relationship between legal status and poverty is unknown but the numbers we have suggest a strong association. In part, this is because more affluent individuals are able to meet the naturalization criteria but legal status also matters greatly for further social and economic advancement.

Citizenship is necessary for civic and political participation, and also for homeownership and entrepreneurship. Banking regulation are restrictive on lending to non-EU citizens. Public sector employment generally requires citizenship. New rules have been introduced in some countries requiring employers to

hire foreign nationals only if no competent national or EU-national job applicant can be found. Legal status is therefore a significant cause of social and civic inequality.

e. Status: Economic Welfare

The "bundling" of causes of disadvantage helps explain the concentrated pockets of poverty and immobility among certain groups, such as Turks in Berlin and Maghrebians in Paris' suburbs. Large numbers of Muslims are poor. In France, 20% of people of Moroccan and Turkish origin live in poverty compared to a national average of 6.2% (Karich 2007: 65). Poverty and residential segregation are closely related. 50% of Moroccans and Algerians, and 40% of Turks and Tunisians in France live in social housing (Choudhury 2007: 81). Poverty is often due to structural causes and the cumulative of effect of multiple sources of disadvantage. The geographical component— residential segregation, low growth—often makes it impossible to address the causes of poverty except through coordinated initiatives on the part of community groups, local governments and business, and national governments.

The different trajectories of Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims in Britain is an instructive example of the importance of contingency. Bangladeshi immigrants to the United Kingdom are mostly from the Sylhet. They arrived on average about twenty years later than Pakistani Muslims, and from less urban and less professional backgrounds. They settled in tight communities, where high rates of poverty and early marriage, early childbirth, large families and tight family control are conducive to inter-generational socio-economic disadvantage. Due to religious aversion to mortgages, many bought houses with family savings and unable to sell, remain trapped in economically depressed areas and public service conspire against mobility.

The persistence of inequality and sometimes crushing poverty in parts of Europe's large cities, where large numbers of Muslims live, should not blind us to the fact that upward mobility is also taking place. Muslims share many immigrants' problems but they also share the immigrants' optimism about better prospects, if not for themselves then for their children. British Muslims are the most optimistic about personal prospects, while French Muslims are less optimistic but still more optimistic than native-born Frenchmen and women about the future. Only German Muslims have a bleak outlook on their prospects (Gallup World Poll 2007a).

More recent migrants are better educated than earlier immigration cohorts, but they are subject to other restrictive rules regarding access to employment and residence restrictions tied to social benefits. Policy changes affecting recent cohort of immigrant often disallow employment until the completion of mandatory integration programs, which paradoxically have delayed integration into the workforce. The mandatory programs affect only recipients of social benefits and political refugees. Independently wealthy immigrants are exempt. Class differences related to location, education, origin and cohort-contingent legal and generational factors are an increasingly important source of differences in political aspirations, outlook and capacity for integration among European Muslims.

3. The relationship between state and faith in the context of citizenship

a. Islam in Europe: Observance

Current conflicts over the accommodation of Islam and Muslims are often described as "integration problems" but in actuality reflect the end of Muslims' self-perception as immigrants and real changes in status. Scholars have described the collective cognitive shift among Europe's Muslims as the end of "the myth of return" and the emergence of new hybrid identities, such as Pakistani-British-Muslims or an ethno-religious identity as European Muslims (Ballard 1994; Werbner 2002; Modood 2005). Islam is today the largest minority religious group in Europe. There are more Muslims than Catholics in the Protestant North, and more Muslims than Protestants in the predominantly Roman Catholic countries. Muslims consider the accommodation of religious practices an important issue but are on balance more concerned about unemployment (Pew Global Attitudes 2006 July).

Studies suggest that 3-4 million Muslims regularly attend prayers at mosques and twice as many consider themselves religiously observant. The estimates of attendance and religious practice vary widely and self-reported attendance probably exaggerates actual attendance, making it often difficult to gauge if real changes are taking place. The consensus view among researchers is that religious observance has increased. What that means for integration is even more unclear.

Islamic "fundamentalism" stresses the literal interpretation of scripture and is often regarded as synonymous with the aspiration to codify religious law and Saudi Arabian Wahhabism. In practice, it correlates with highly divergent political inclinations. Many "salafis" (Muslims who claim to be reviving the practice of the original Companions of the Prophet) are apolitical and consider the mix of religion and politics heretical. In Britain the Metropolitan Police and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have a number of highly placed salafist officials, who regard it is as their religious duty to combat terrorism. Some scholars argue that no relationship exists between theological "fundamentalism" and political extremism (Esposito and Mogahed 2007). A recent study of young Muslims in Amsterdam also concluded that religious orthodoxy does not automatically lead to political discontent and radical action, or vice versa (Slootman and Tillie 2006). In practice, however, the direct involvement of a number of high profile salafist mosques in the recruitment of volunteers for Jihad in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the involvement of individuals from missionary groups like the Tabligh in European terrorist conspiracies justify policy-makers' concern that salafism is a source of ideological "conditioning" for political extremism (CQ Global Researcher 2007).

Support for the integration of religious law into formal institutions of law is high only among South Asian Muslims, low among Maghrebians and practically non-existent among Muslims of Turkish origin. These differences are reflected in the different attitudes of French, German and British Muslims uncovered by opinion surveys on matters related to the use of religious law (Shariah) and the balance between civic and religious obligations. Caution is called for also in the interpretation of these findings. Observant Turks are hardly less concerned than observant Pakistanis about the Shariah in their private lives but regard religious law as a personal obligation, unconnected with the secular civil code.

A recent French survey published in La Croix, a Catholic newspaper, on January 16, 2008, showed that 71% of Muslims declared themselves "observant" and

33% "observant and practicing." 40% said they pray daily, compared to 31% in 1991 and 33% in 2001. Self-reported mosque attendance is up: 16% said they went to the mosque regularly in 1994 and the recent poll found 23% who said they did. It is often assumed that the increase is due to heightened religiosity among young people, but the recent French survey and other surveys do not support this claim.

A Dutch study from 1999 and 2002 found that about 90% of Moroccans and Turks considered themselves believers, but only 1/3 went to mosque and most of these only occasionally. Another French study showed that 22 percent of those from Muslim countries in Africa and from Turkey, said they attended mosque at least once a month, compared with 18 percent of their Catholic counterparts who claim to attend church at the same rate (Klausen 2005: 140-142; Brouard and Tiberj 2005: 30-35). Muslims who do not regularly attend Friday prayers still turn up at the mosque in large numbers on the two great Muslim holidays: Eid Al-Fitr (the end of Ramadan) and Eid Al-Adha (the feast of the sacrifice, held 70 days later).

Support for institutionalization is high. Faith Associations, an independent consultancy group, conducted a survey of 1,200 British mosques on behalf of an advisory board created by four Muslim associations, known as the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Body (MINAB) (Faith Associates 2006). 92% of the responding mosques and Islamic centers supported the creation of MINAB. Only 9% supported giving the board a regulatory oversight and enforcement power, but the survey found strong support for voluntary regulatory measures. 90% supported the regularization of employment and management practices, language training, training in inter-faith dialogue and the creation of diploma degrees in pastoral services and religious instruction.

There are many reasons for the support for mosque reform. Young Muslims, who seek to combine their faith with integration and upward mobility, are often uncomfortable with the local mosque. Intergenerational conflicts push young Muslims to seek their own version of Islam, which they often find on the Internet or in the form of radical groups.

Inter-marriage, not just between native-born converts and immigrant origin Muslim but also between Algerians and Turks, for example, is one factor driving the shift from the ethnic practices of the older generation to what is sometimes described as "European" Islam. Different programs are on offer under this heading. It is not for governments to endorse one or other of these. What they can do is to provide Muslims the same access to public resources given to other faith groups–subsidies for religious education, mosque construction, salaries for imams etc.

b. Imams and Mosques

European legal frameworks and expectations molded to the Christian templates of national churches and clerical self-governance are inappropriate for Muslim faith communities. Islam is a non-denominational religion based upon congregational principles. Islam has no global "church" hierarchy or religious authority and congregationalism is a theological principle and a social reality. Local mosque communities are autonomous and responsible for the management of the congregation, including the hiring of imams, election of managers etc. So long as a mosque council guarantees that it will provide an income for the imam, work permits have not usually been a problem. Muslim community elders tend to recruit from the villages that they came from. Clerical authority is based upon knowledge and respect rather than hierarchical authority. Mosque communities in Europe reflect the diverse ethno-linguistic heritages present among Europe's Muslims.

Muslims have very different views of who properly may represent them in matters of faith. A Pew Survey asked Muslims to reveal who they turned to for advice on matters of religion. The answers showed wide differences across Europe. It is hard to say exactly what is measured, but one probable interpretation is that the cross-European difference reflects broad ethno-cultural differences among the Muslims of different origin with respect to conceptions of religious authority. 25% of German Muslims but only 4% of British Muslims said they turned to national civic religious leaders. 70% of British Muslims turned to the local imam or other imams and religious institutions outside the country. Only 30% of German Muslims turned to such religious authorities. French Muslims also were relatively supportive of national civic leaders but close to twothirds preferred the imams or "outside" religious authorities (Pew 2006).

The "pooling" of mosque communities into municipal or national associations is the result of bottom-up efforts by "self-starter" mosque communities or local branches of international religious movements. Policy templates for how to integrate Muslim faith communities under the national umbrellas for the legal recognition of religions have to balance the need for accountability against the accommodation of diversity.

The current construction boom of mosques owes more to wealth accumulation than increased observance. There are 6,000 mosques in Western Europe. Few are purpose-built mosques but increased wealth in the mosque communities has in recent years led to an effort to build new mosques.

The construction movement fits with a growing sense of belonging and worth.

Currently, 2/3 of German mosques are located in rented space, frequently former factories or stores. It is generally agreed that there is no urgent need for additional mosques, but if as a thought experiment we assume that all mosque communities aspire to self-ownership of purpose-built mosques, Germany can expect about 1,500 new mosques to be constructed over the coming years. It is unlikely that every prayer space in Germany is about to be converted into a proper mosque, but the thought experiment does suggest that attention to the regularization of building permits and requirements for charitable status is urgently needed. This raises serious issues about the management of local politics (see Table 2).

The training of imams in theology and the delivery of pastoral services are issues that require national-level coordination and institutional investment in seminaries and theological faculties. The up-skilling of imams and the education of native-born Muslims who are fluent in the vernacular languages and have a professional orientation is a high priority. We have only inaccurate information about the number of imams practising in Western Europe. Many mosque communities rely on prayer leaders recruited from within the congregation, while others rely on imams recruited through the community elders' networks in the countries of origin.

A French security agency conducted a census of French imams, which identified over a thousand imams, about half working full-time. Only 45% are paid regularly and the rest are paid in kind or unpaid. Of those who are paid, Turkey supports 60, Algeria 80, and Morocco only two. Saudi Arabia pays the salaries of about a dozen imams who have graduated from Saudi Islamic universities but are not Saudis. Less than 20% of the imams are of French nationality, and the ones who have citizenship are mostly naturalized. Very few are French-born. Half of the imams are either of Moroccan or Algerian origin (Klausen 2005: 113-117). Over half of the imams were over fifty years old. One-third was found to speak French with ease, another third to speak it with some difficulty, and the rest not to speak it at all.

Fewer than 10% of the about 2,000 British imams have been trained in the U.K. A recent study based upon self-reported qualification found that 40% had no formal qualifications, and 17% a MA or a Ph.D. degree, which for the most part were obtained abroad. 1/3 reported a good grasp of English (Faith Associates 2007:26). So long as a mosque council guarantees that it will provide an income for the imam, work permits villages that they came from. Imams recruited in this way have often been educated in madrassas (traditional Muslim schools) and have few general education qualifications.

c. The State, Local Governments and Civic Society

Local and national initiatives are mutually dependent. The British Mosques and Imams National Advisory Body (MINAB) was created in 2006 after consultations between the government and Muslim associations in the wake of the attacks on the London Underground in July 2005. Four Muslim associations joined in the creation of the body, some with more hesitation than the others. The French government created the French Council for the Muslim Faith (CFCM) in 2003. In September 2006, the German government invited Muslim faith groups to participate in a roundtable dialogue seeking to create "improved religious and societal integration of the Muslim population in Germany", citing the Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble.[5] This Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK) led in turn to the creation in April 2007 of a national umbrella organization, the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (KRM). Its aim is to achieve official recognition of Islam so that Muslims in Germany can claim the associated legal

Table 2: Mosques and Prayer Spaces

Country	Estimated number of Mosques/prayer spaces	Ratio of Muslim Population to Mosques/prayer spaces
US	1,250	2,400
France	1,685	2,463
UK	1,669	959
Germany	2,300	1,304

Sources: Estimates from Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, p.83; and from the Salaam network, U.K.

5 More information is available on the Interior Ministry's webpage: http://www.bmi.bund.de/nn_882848/Internet/Navigation/DE/Themen/Deutsche__Islam__ Konferenz/deutscheIslamKonferenz__node.html__nnn=true

advantages, including the federal government's assistance in the collection and redistribution of a religious tax. There are similar initiatives in Spain and Italy (Jasch 2007).

Collaboration between mosques and Muslim civic associations has spawned local initiatives in many European cities. In Rotterdam, local associations collaborate to employ professional staff to assist denominational schools and mosques with zoning applications and all manners of paperwork with the city. The association Stichting Platform Islamitische Organisaties Rijnmond (www.SPIOR.nl) conforms to the usual principles for Dutch charitable groups. In Hamburg, twelve local mosque associations have joined to form a multi-ethnic municipal association. The association Rat der islamischen Gemeinschaften in Hamburg (www.schura-hamburg.de) has proved capable of sustaining country-wide initiatives in debate and dialogue. In Berlin, the Berlin Senate's representative for migration and integration worked together with a Muslim think-tank to create Islamforum (www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/islamforum). It is a city-wide initiative for debate among mosque communities over issues related to the role of mosque in society, women's role in mosque life, and other issues related to mosque life and pastoral services. Islamforum also runs a workshop for local imams who wish to become acquainted with city officials and social workers.

Carried out on a municipal level, these initiatives aim to improve mosque management and better prepare imams for inter-religious dialogue and interaction with local governments. Matters associated with youth and women's involvement in the mosque are widely regarded as related to generational changes in mosque management practices.

4. The Socio-Economic Dimension of Citizenship

a. Employment and Entrepreneurship

Structural unemployment and discrimination are different sources of socio-economic disadvantage, even if they are often experienced as the "same thing" by the victims. In most countries employment rates improve for immigrants who have been in the country for more than five years, except in Denmark and the Netherlands where even ten years of residence makes no difference. Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands have the lowest employment ratios for immigrant men and women compared to other European countries with significant immigrant populations (2004 figures). Germany has particularly low work force participation ratios in general, and once differences in general participation ratios are taken into consideration Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands have worse records than Germany with respect to the employment of immigrants (OECD 2007: 21, 22).

In the Netherlands, unemployment among Moroccans is 29% and it is 21% among Turks against a general unemployment rate of 9% (2006 figures). The UK 2001 census found 22% unemployment among Muslims compared to 11% among Christians. In Germany, Turkish nationals have an unemployment rate of 23% and comprise up to one third of all unemployed foreigners (Open Society Institute 2007:6).

The use of unemployment rates to measure socio-economic inequality among immigrants is highly problematic because some categories of immigrants are not declared fit for the labor market in the first place. Asylum seekers are not allowed to work in some countries. The new mandatory "introduction courses" (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark) disqualify immigrants from work force participation and also keep recent immigrants out of the statistics. In reality, actual unemployment is probably higher than the statistics suggest. The measurement problems related to the reliance on migration statistics to extrapolate demographic data for immigrants and their descendants loom large as a possible source of knowledge distortion, and it is probable that more accurate methodologies for monitoring Muslims' socio-economic status and attainment may provide a different picture.

Older migrants are overwhelmingly low-skilled and suffer from the transformation of European occupational structures. In France, 40-60% of Muslims men work in factories compared to about 20% of general population (Choudhury 2007: 80; Open Society Institute 2007: Table 18. Based upon 1999 census.). Older Muslims with no skills have few opportunities to enter the workforce and it makes little sense to concentrate employment training and other mobility-enhancing measures on this group. The first wave of Muslim migrants came to work in the industrial sector and when industrial jobs disappeared there were no other jobs for them. In 1970, 63% of migrants in Germany worked in textiles, construction or metal processing (OECD 2007: 13). Unemployment among Turkish nationals increased steadily until 1993, then stagnated until 2001, and increased again in the past five years (OECD 2007: 20). Immigrants are affected by general economic trends, but more so than the general population.

Young people of immigrant origin generally have double the rate of unemployment of young native-origin people. In France, unemployment among young people with Algerian or Moroccan parents is 40% compared to the 20% national youth unemployment rate (INSEE statistics cited from Open Society Institute 2007: 42). Muslim youth unemployment rates are generally double those of the national average in countries of high

unemployment and sometimes more than twice as high, as in Britain (OECD 2006: 73; The Washington Post, 13 August 2006).

Sweden is the only country that has higher participation rates among second generation non-nationals than the national average for employment of young workers (OECD 2007: 23). A probable explanation is that regional inequality, which usually works against immigrants, favors them in Sweden. Muslims are highly concentrated in Stockholm and the southern cities where growth is the highest.

Immigrant youth and recent immigrants often find employment in immigrant businesses. In the UK, "working for uncle" is a common phenomenon. But immigrant entrepreneurship has been slow to develop in Europe, and has in some countries (the UK) even declined in recent years. This may be good news, if the next generation has left small family businesses to enter salaried professional occupations. Turkish immigrant businesses in Germany have been 75% concentrated in food, sales, catering and often provided specialized services to the Turkish population, such as mortuaries, clothing stores, travel agencies, halal meat markets etc. The halal market is estimated to take up 10% of the French meat market (Karich 2007: 67).

Credit is only one of many obstacles to immigrant entrepreneurship. Certification requirements, mastership rules, zoning and collusive practices in trade associations are factors that militate against immigrant family businesses spreading beyond retail or taxi associations. Other obstacles to immigrant entrepreneurship include lacking availability of credit, restrictive trade association practices that discriminate against immigrants and the usual urban problems affecting neighborhoods where immigrants have their businesses.

b. Education

Education matters greatly for social mobility. The PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) studies have provided us with new information about the radically different performance scores of immigrant youths in Europe's different school systems. It is not the only measure and again we are compelled to use nationality as a proxy for ethno-religious identity, but it is the only method that allows us to compare educational systems. A reanalysis of the PISA scores, using controls for socio-economic disadvantage, found that if the impact of social inequality is abstracted, the "ethnic penalty" disappears in Denmark, Sweden and France but remains very high in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands (OECD 2007: 43). "Ethnic penalty" is a term used by researchers for the non-explained residual variation in attainment between native and non-native individuals in cohort studies (Berthoud 2000: 393). It was argued at the time of the first publication of the PISA scores that the problem was that immigrant children do not speak German or Dutch at home but, in fact, higher ratios of immigrant-origin students speak a second language at home in the countries that did a better job at schooling immigrant children: the UK (36%), Denmark (33%), Sweden (42%), France (23%). Early exposure to the national language matters more for student achievement than which language is spoken at home. Bilingualism is, as middle class families know, an asset, but may prove difficult for some children. Early school start and Kindergarten programs go a long way to help immigrant-origin children acquire early language proficiency.

In the UK, 75% of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children live in households below the poverty level, compared to 31% of all children. Concerted policy intervention works. Over the past five years Bangladeshi children have jumped from being the worst achievers in British schools to catching up with the general population and overtaking Pakistani-origin children. And this is despite continued poverty—50% of Bangladeshi children who receive school meals and are therefore classified as poor score well on the standardized secondary school test, the GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Examinations) (The Economist, October 25, 2007). The most recent statistics show that immigrant children—African, Pakistani and Bangladeshi—do better as measured by GCSE scores than native children in the 17 to 19 age cohort (scores available on-line from the Department for Children Schools and Families, 2007).

France starts schooling early and has universal pre-school, which helps immigrant students achieve early language proficiency. The three countries with particularly poor PISA scores have late school starts and favor half-day programs, with the result that 7-8 year-olds have spent considerably less time in the class rooms than students in the other systems. These differences reflect entrenched commitments to different family policies in the various countries, and it is unrealistic to expect general family policy to change to help immigrant (and Muslim) children. A more realistic option is to encourage voluntary and municipal-level efforts. The German state of Hesse started a voluntary "Head Start" program in 2002 for about 5,500 immigrant-origin students and the primary school scores for immigrant-origin students immediately picked up.

The US experience has been that the positive effect of "Head Start" programs wears off by middle school and high school, when other incentive structures matter greatly for student performance. The causes of poor degree attainment among ethnic and immigrant-origin youths are complex. A study from Turin (from the 1990s) showed that drop-out rates among immigrant youths (North African, Middle Eastern and Albanian) were 20% in middle-school and 25% in high school (CIDISS study, here cited from Open Society 2002:241).

"'Islamophobia' has entered the vocabulary but mutated from a fairly specific usage to denote 'dread and hatred of Islam' and 'fear or dislike of all or most Muslims'"

The creation of Muslim schools is sometimes presented as a solution for underachieving students. Britain has the most Muslim schools, but Holland and Denmark also have very liberal laws for public funding of private denominational schools. A primary concern is if private schools provide students with the general education qualifications required by national standards. By the mid-1990s, 15 to 30 Islamic schools were established in the U.K. with private funds, and in 1998, the Labour government approved funding for two state-supported Islamic schools. By 2006, the number had grown to seven. Faith schools—including 7,000 Christian and 36 Jewish schools—comprise about a third of the schools in the British public system (International Herald Tribune, 16 October 2006). Some of the schools are single-sex schools. In France, about 25% of all students attend private but publicly funded Catholic schools. Reportedly many Muslim girls now attend Catholic schools because the law against wearing religious symbols do not apply to Catholic schools, which have allowed the girls to wear the hijab.

The right to set up single-sex schools and Muslims schools matters greatly for religious parents, but it is important not to let the controversy over religious schools obscure the fact that the majority of Muslim youths will be educated in non-sectarian public schools. (For a strong argument for the importance of Muslim schools, see Open Society Institute 2005.)

c. Discrimination

The widespread perception of discrimination has a corrosive effect on the confidence of young educated Muslims and needs to be addressed by policy commitments to regular monitoring and effective remedial action. Government experts and economists often say that there is no or little evidence of discrimination. This is partly true because the "like-for-like" comparison in controlled econometric studies does not study what happens before employment. The tricky part for most Muslim youths is to get the high school diploma, get the professional qualifications and get to the job interview. In other words, because there are so few Muslim professionals and most are still young workers, the salience of direct pay discrimination is less important than other more intangible areas of discrimination. The more common experience of discrimination occurs in the context of a failure to get hired or to be promoted.

"Islamophobia" has entered the vocabulary but mutated from a fairly specific usage to denote "dread and hatred of Islam" and "fear or dislike of all or most Muslims" (Runnymede Trust 1997:1). Today the term is used to describe what are perceived as biased references to Islam or Muslims and sometimes refers to discrimination in general. In policy terms, discrimination is associated with employment practices that cause employers, intentionally or not, to fail to treat job applicants with equal qualifications equally. Discrimination is therefore not only inter-personal and a reflection of personal bias but it also includes formal or informal rules that work against Muslims. Workplace rules that disallow religious exercise are legally speaking usually defined as discrimination, but in some countries headscarf bans are by law imposed upon certain occupations and the negative consequences (direct or indirect) are not considered discrimination.

Macro-economic measures of the "ethnic penalty" are constructed in widely different ways. Evidence of direct discrimination—defined as discrimination by origin in comparisons of employees with equal qualifications (broadly defined)—is limited but studies have generally found inequalities attributable to ethnicity, race or religion to be noticeable but relatively small in comparison to other measures of inequality. A methodological problem is that econometric cohort studies comparing individuals with equal qualifications usually study ethnicity rather than religion, and the use of nationality as a proxy for "Muslim" works only in some cases, for example Turks in Germany and Maghrebians in France.

A comparison of immigrant origin and French high school graduates from 1998 found that 90% of the resulting inequality five years after graduation stems from discrimination broadly defined as differences related to background, residence and other inequalities rather than to Maghrebian origin alone. It should be noticed that the researchers found the ethnic penalty to be only 3-4% for immigrant-origin young men from Spain or Portugal but 9-12% for Maghrebians (Joseph and Lemiere 2005). A German study by the Federal Employment Agency found a 15% wage gap between native and foreign workers in the same occupations. Once statistical controls for differences in age and gender were made, the gap shrunk to 8% (here cited from OECD 2007: 51).

Perceptions of discrimination are a matter of cognition and, while Muslims sometimes perceive discrimination as religious, it may also be interpreted as ethnic or racialist. A survey conducted as part of the UK Home Office citizenship study found that 12% Pakistanis and 25% Bangladeshis reported racial discrimination as the reason they were denied a job in the last five years. Fewer people were willing to say that it was their faith that was the cause of discrimination. 9% of Pakistanis and 13% of Bangladeshis said their faith was a reason for denial of promotion (Choudhury 2007: 84).

People who are unemployed or have low expectations have little occasion to experience discrimination on the job. Professionals and university graduates are more likely to think they are victims of discrimination than recent immigrants with no skills and language proficiency. In a Danish survey, 44% of immigrants and refugees, mostly Muslim, who had professional education reported that they experienced discrimination against only 23% among those with little or no education (UgebrevetA4 2006). Advocacy groups often use double-blind methods to demonstrate purposeful discrimination. A BBC study (2004) sent out nearly identical job applications under six different identities to fifty employers and found that applicants with white-sounding names received an invitation to a job interview 23% of the time, while only 9% of the applicants with Muslim-sounding names were successful (The Guardian, July 2004[6]).

A young Muslim lawyer told the journalist, "We [Muslims] have to write a lot more applications than other people to simply get the same result". In France, it appears, many young Muslims are legally changing their names to more European sounding ones to facilitate employment.[6] Their perception is apparently accurate. A French researcher, who sent out identical CVs with various demographic profiles, received 75 offers of an interview and 10 rejections on behalf of the male white applicant. The fictional applicant with the Maghrebian name received 14 offers and 20 rejections.[7] Large numbers of educated Muslims believe that they are victims of discrimination in this way.

d. Role of Women

Complicated issues arise from the conflict between religious values and concern for women's equality. Employment is central to the European conception of autonomy, and it is therefore natural that Muslim women's integration be measured in terms of their labor market participation. It is all but forgotten that Europe's Christian Democratic parties fought against the feminist emphasis on employment as the key to women's equality.

The Scandinavian states, which extensively depend on public day care and encourage women's employment in the public and private service sectors, provide many more job opportunities for immigrant women than do the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. France and the UK are somewhere in the middle. It is also clear that making women work in low-skilled jobs in the service sector does not address issues of mobility and professional advancement. On that score, the UK does the best job for women, irrespective of childcare arrangements and public policy pushing women into the labor market.
Labor market activity rates are much higher for naturalized and native-born women than for non-nationals. In France, 52% of women of Moroccan origin are active if they have citizenship, while only 29% of non-citizens are (Karich 2007). The difference cannot be explained simply by legal status but a confluence of factors related to age and migration cohort effects. Older women are both less likely to be citizens and to have professional qualifications, for example.

In Germany and the Netherlands, part of the explanation for the low work force participation rates

6 A Le Monde article relays the experience of the judge Anne-Marie Lemarinier who has presided over many of these requests in the last two years: Mme Lemarinier knows them well, these files of French men and women of more or less remote foreign ancestry for whom a Muslim first name is an impediment to integration. Many tens of times per year, she hears the same tales of refusal for jobs or for renting an apartment when one is named Mohammed, Abdel or Tarek, and the obstacles that are removed as soon as they become Fred or Paul (Le Monde, 14 April 2007, here cited from Center for Dialogues 2007:148).

7 The Institut Montaigne produced a report based upon the study, available at http://www.institutmontaigne.org/groupe.php?id=9. The study was also discussed in the French Senate, see http://www.senat.fr/rap/l04-065/l04-0651.html.

among women is that many older women were never formally employed. Coming directly from Berber village or villages in Anatolia they have little or no work experience outside the home and the family. This applies in some cases also to women from the recent wave of migration. In France, women from sub-Saharan Africa join the labor market on average at the age of 45 (Open Society Institute 2007: 43).

We should be careful about drawing premature conclusions regarding Muslim women's low propensity for paid employment. The 2001 Census showed that 40% of Muslim women were engaged in home care against 13% for women as a whole, 15% for Hindus, and 13% for Sikhs (Peach 2007: 28). Overall, participation is very low but those numbers should not concern us as much as a failure on the part of younger and native-born women to "catch-up" with other women. We would expect a time lag before improvements in education translate into professional attainment. Nonetheless, low activity rates for women have consequences not just for women's equality but also for overall income inequality. One-earner households are much more likely to be poor than are two-earner households.

British Pakistani and Bangladeshi women's educational achievement and employment statistics have closed the gap with British Sikh and Indian performance scores in the past five years, but even as Bangladeshi women are doing well in school, still only about one-third of them work outside the family and when they work their average pay remains about 25% below average pay. As long as the Bangla preference for a traditional family holds, the Bangla family is more likely to remain poor. But it is also possible that Muslim families—or some Muslim families—choose to balance family and work in different ways from the majority population. Choice cannot and should not be constructed as discrimination.

Religious restrictions on women's contact with unrelated men play a role among some groups, notably Bangladeshi women in the UK, orthodox Turkish groups and some Somalis, Moroccans, and a few others. The ability to wear the hijab or the niqab (face veil) alleviates restrictions on contact, and clothing restrictions are in such cases a hindrance rather than a help to women's autonomy (on differences in Muslims' views of the two forms of dress as an obstacle to integration, see Mogahed and Nyiri 2007). The headscarf issue plays a role in Denmark, Germany and France. A French study reported that about 20% of employers expressed reluctance to put women with headscarves in front of customers. In Denmark courts have given employers permission to require that women do not wear the headscarf in situation were appearances matter—such as front office jobs and sales positions. In Sweden, the largest super market cooperative issued headscarves with its uniforms. Other supermarket chains have adopted the same policy.

"Cousin marriages", arranged marriages and forced marriages are the topic of a great deal of controversy. It has to be observed that among South Asian Muslims, young men and women sometimes defend the practice as the best way to find a compatible spouse. It is an ethnic and not a religious practice, and used also among Hindus. For public policy purposes the issue has to be forced marriages, which occur when a young person is pressured to marry someone selected by the family. Men are subject to compulsion as are women. Immigration procedures have in recent years been adjusted to make marriages with non-nationals residing outside the county practically impossible. Strict immigration control has in these cases become mixed up with family policy. It is desirable, from a Muslim and immigrant viewpoint, to separate the issues. Immigration rules that lead to a loss of legal residence in the case of divorce are a factor in trapping young people in unwanted marriages.

A different and difficult issue is the so-called "Shariah marriages", which are marriages that take place in accordance with Islamic religious law but without civil procedures. These are not legally binding marriages and therefore women who are divorced or put into polygamous situations by husbands who take second wives receive no protection from the legal system or from social services. The British Shariah Council warned already in 2004 about the presence of what they estimate to be about 4,000 men who used informal marriages to enter into polygamy. The women, they observed, are victims, because they cannot enforce child payment obligation on deserting husbands and cannot remarry if the husband refuses a religious divorce. (The Council is associated with the Muslim College in Ealing created by Sheik Zaki Badawi, who died in January 2006.) The Muslim Council of Britain has since tried to bring attention to the problem, which is similar to that associated with the so-called "chained" women in Orthodox Judaism who have found themselves unable to obtain religious divorces from rabbinical courts. The exact numbers are difficult to assess but it is probable that more women are affected by problems associated with discordant divorce procedures than those associated with forced marriages.

The women enter into these marriages voluntarily. Problems of coercion may be pertinent but they are associated with the husband's abuse of procedures to deny the women a proper divorce. Most observant Muslims marry in both civil and religious ceremonies. Islamic

marriage contracts sometimes take the form of legally drawn-up prenuptial agreements that are fully compatible with existing civil law. It is generally accepted that there must be a marriage contract and the woman be represented by a guardian, defined as someone who is male and a blood relative.

Issues arise both when civil marriages are not conducted and when women receive civil divorces but are refused religious ones. Among Salafists, the use of informal marriages is seen as a way to affirm the rejection of secular law. Informal marriages also play a role in the development of jihadi sub-cultures. A recent report from the Dutch counter-terrorism coordinator concluded that the members of the Hofstad network used "informal Islamic marriages to win support for their extremist violent Takfir ideology and to recruit women for violent Jihad" (NCTb 2006: 7). The practice adds to the counter-cultural aspect of the jihadi network as the marriages are generally conducted without parental consent and facilitate the sect-like aspects of the radical networks.

Some religious leaders advocate that the issue be addressed in the context of rules for formalizing imam's employment conditions and accreditation procedures. If imams have the capacity to conduct legally-binding marriages, they would be able to ascertain when the husbands are about to enter into polygamous marriages. Imams do not currently have the same legal immunities and obligations extended to the clergy in other faith communities. It is not clear that formalization of the imams' role will make a difference, as the abusive practices are a fringe issue.

Much attention is given in Europe to so-called honor crimes, which include forced marriage and murder of women who disobey patriarchal orders. Murder is a crime whatever the motivation, and ethnic or patriarchic pride are not ameliorating circumstances. The question is what can be done in terms of prevention. We have no reliable information about the prevalence of such crimes. Family violence and the murder of women by abusive fathers, husbands and exhusbands, or other relatives occur in above-average numbers in distinct social and ethno-religious groups and are not a "Muslim problem", except for statistical reasons. (Muslims outnumber other subpopulations with above-average incidences of domestic abuse.) In 2004, Scotland Yard announced an investigation into 104 murders committed over a ten year period, which were possibly honor killings (Dustin 2006, 17). The purpose was to identify the factors leading to such crimes with an eye to establishing preventive measures. Again, attention has to be paid to protecting sons as well as daughters. Effective policing of domestic violence in immigrant families can be a problem for a number of reasons. Women may be afraid of losing immigration status if they report such crimes. The police are often reluctant to intervene in family relations, particularly if it is perceived to be "normal" that such violence takes place. Language barriers are a problem. Local advocacy groups and community-based initiatives report that they are overwhelmed by demand and lack of funding. Accurate information about incidence rates of various forms of violence will help local governments deliver more adequate and targeted services.

Governments (Denmark and the Netherlands in particular) have addressed complaints about the subjugation of women in Muslim families by restricting family reunification rules to deter "arranged" marriages. Such rules restrict the selection of mates among immigrant families but do little to empower women in the immigrant communities. Power relations in the family and inequality stemming from lack of access to employment can ultimately only be addressed by providing women increased access to education and employment, and by allowing women to bridge work and education with religious or ethnic expectations and respect to care-taking and family-life.

5. Political participation and civic engagement

a. Political Engagement

Who represents Europe's Muslims? Muslims are represented in a multitude of ways and while there are some areas of agreement among Muslims, for example on what needs to be done to promote integration (Muslims need to learn the language, get a job and celebrate national holidays) there are also areas of significant and hardened disagreement. In these matters Muslims are not that different from the majority society, with one exception. The general society thinks Muslims should not participate in politics and should adjust their religious customs to national norms. Muslims, not surprisingly, think national norms should be adjusted to allow Muslims to practice their religion (Mogahed and Nyiri 2007).

Wide difference can be observed with respect to the inclusiveness of national political systems. About two dozen Muslims are currently sitting in the national parliaments, with Holland, Germany, Denmark and Sweden having the largest representation. There are no elected Muslim members of the French National Assembly, but there are two senators. In the past few years, a number of ministers who are Muslims have been appointed. All but one are women. France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Britain have ministers of justice and integration who are Muslim. Few parliamentarians, if any, were elected based upon blocs of Muslim voters. In some cases, the election of Muslims have been facilitated by the concentration of immigrant voters in an electoral district but in most cases ethnicity has played no role in their election or appointment. Muslim-only parties have been a dismal failure.

Political integration is contingent upon recruitment to candidacies for electoral offices, and inclusion into local, regional, and national party organizations. Party outreach must be stepped up to become more inclusive of Muslim political activists. Far too often Muslims' political loyalties are questioned and party leaders give in to temptations to score short-term gains with xenophobic voters by blaming Muslims for problems that are caused by the extremists or altogether not related to Islam or Muslims in general. Hostility to Muslims in national party organizations fuels the radicals' refrain the European political systems are Islamophobic and that democracy is "bad" for Muslims. Disenfranchisement—legal as well as practical—is a source of alienation, which may take many forms but is never desirable.

Muslims vote for candidates and parties who correspond to their preferences and mostly Muslim voters are concerned about socio-economic issues. Foreign policy became a primary source of voting choices only in the 2005 U.K. parliamentary elections. The United Kingdom has the highest voter eligibility rate for immigrants, who constitute about 6.6% of the general electorate. Immigrants from the Commonwealth countries are allowed to vote in Britain as soon as they establish residency in the U.K., and long-time permanent residents are allowed to participate in local elections in a few countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria and Belgium). It is estimated that about one million Muslims were eligible to vote in the May 2005 British parliamentary election and that 70-76% of eligible Muslim voters went to the polls compared to an average turnout of 62% of non-minority voters.[8]

8 Based upon a MORI survey on behalf of the British Electoral commission, see www.electoralcommission.org.uk/templates/search/document.cfm/13883. Last accessed January 6, 2008.

Participation is considerably lower in other countries, mostly due to lack of eligibility. In France, immigrants comprise about 2.7% of the electorate (based on census data which may underestimate the current rates of immigrant eligibility, here cited from Center for Dialogues 2007: 129). Among adult Dutch Muslims about half can vote. (The revision of Dutch population estimates puts this estimate and many others in doubt.) We do not know how many of the about 1 million naturalized German Muslims are under the voting age but it is usually said there are half a million Muslim voters in Germany. The figure seems to low in view of the recent changes to the naturalization statistics. Two Turkish political scientists, Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (2005), studied voting behavior among Turkish Muslims in France and Germany and found considerably higher turn-out rates among German Turks (60%) than among French Turks (40%). In Italy, Muslims, like other immigrants, are overwhelmingly non-citizens. Between 30,000 and 50,000 have been granted citizenship and can in theory vote. It is not known how many are of voting age.

b. Political Attitudes

Gallup asked Muslims in London, Berlin and Paris together with the general public in the UK, Germany and France to say if they had confidence in various government and democratic institutions, and found that on balance Muslims have at least as much and often even more confidence in elections, the judicial system, and even the media, than the general public. Seventy-three percent of Muslims in London said they were supportive of elections compared with sixty percent of the British general public. Only the military had greater support among non-Muslims than among Muslims. But London Muslims (78%) were more supportive of the police then the general public (69%). The support for the police was surprising in view of the frequent complaints by British Muslim lobby groups about "Islamophobic" policing. The police also had majority support among Muslims in Paris and Berlin, although Muslims in those two cites were less supportive than the general public (Gallup World Poll, 2007a). A survey of Amsterdammers, which included all religious groups, found Muslims to be slightly less trusting of city government than the general population (69% against 78%) but Jews were even less confident (Amsterdam Resident Monitor 2005, here cited from Slootman and Tillie 2006: 34).

A much-debated recent German study commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior and carried out by two criminologists found high rates of anti-democratic sentiment among Muslims. One aspect of this study that is useful for the present purpose asked questions designed to test for "law and order" attitudes, and found Muslims more supportive of tough policing and more censorious towards "smutty" TV and media morality than the average population (BMI 2007: 271). Eight percent of Muslims thought the police should be used against strikers compared to 5% of non-Muslim "natives". Asked if bad times call for a "strong leader" nearly 20% of Muslims and 13.5% of non-Muslims agreed. The study also found Muslims less supportive of the death penalty than non- Muslims (16% compared to 20%), which contradicts the argument that Muslims take their political cues from the Koran's punitive approach to crime. The questions used in the German study are in the tradition of studies of the "authoritarian personality", which were discredited when researchers found that one in four of Americans exhibited attitudes associated with what the researchers had classified as anti-democratic (see Janowitz and Marvick 1953: 190).

Muslims are on average inclined to more socially conservative attitudes than the general population. At present, however, socio-economic issues dominate as a source of political preferences and Muslims generally vote for left-centrist parties. The 2005 British parliamentary elections were the first and only instance of Muslims' voting preferences having been determined by foreign policy rather than socio-economic issues. The roughly 1/2 million Muslim voters who defected from Labour in that election because of opposition to the Iraq war are likely to return to Labour or turn to the Conservative Party in upcoming elections.

Questions have been raised about the compatibility between Muslims' religious observance and their capacity for civic loyalty. A Pew survey found that European Christians overwhelmingly self-identity as citizens of their country first and Christians second, while Muslims self-identify as Muslims first and citizens of their countries second (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006 July). Among British Muslims, 81% said they were Muslims first. In Spain and Germany, 69% and 66% respectively said "Muslims first". France was the exception with 42% putting civic identity first.

These and similar findings reported by other survey organization lead to allegations that Muslims lack civic allegiance. Caution is indicated, however. The disinclination to choose state over faith is not a "Muslim issue". Christians in the United States were nearly evenly split between those who put their faith first and those who

regarded themselves as citizens first. The 42% of American Christians, who chose their faith first matched closely with the 46% of French Muslims who put faith first. The Gallup World Poll (2007a) reframed the question to allow respondents to choose both faith and state, and found Muslims to express higher rates of civic allegiance than other groups.

"Increasingly, we are seeing jihadism in Europe becoming a new Muslim counter-culture that draws in women and converts and 'born again' Muslim men from all ethnic groups"

We should be careful about expecting religious minorities to choose between religion and state. Jews, like Muslims, are ethno-religious minorities first and communities of believers second. Religion, it should be noted, also plays a role for Christians' understandings of national identity. Europeans are less inclined to believe in God compared to Americans, where 90% say that they believe in God. However, even in Western Europe, the majority of people tell pollsters that they do believe in God.[9] The number of people who say they believe in God has increased in recent years. Since church attendance continues to decrease, a probable explanation is that Europeans increasingly embrace spirituality but not the established or recognized denominations.[10]

Muslim associations sometimes find common ground with other religious associations and lobbies on some issues, for instance abortion, gay rights and bio-ethics. When Iqbal Sacranie, who was then the The Muslim Council of Britain's (MCB) general secretary, was criticized for saying that same-sex relationships risked "damaging the foundations of society", he pointed to the split in the Anglican Church over gays and declared that Muslims would not be "bullied" into speaking against scripture (The Times January 5, 2006). MCB has steadfastly maintained that homosexuality is a sin and joined the Anglican and the Roman Catholic churches in opposing gay adoption rights. Religious conservatives speak for a segment of the Muslim population but by no means for all Muslims. When Rowan Williams, the Anglican archbishop, suggested that Shariah councils should be allowed legal recognition in the manner already granted rabbinical councils (the Shin Beth) and Anglican Ecclesiastical councils, one Muslim group, Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR), protested that the Archbishop was speaking for himself and social cohesion would hardly be helped by the application of Shariah Law within the British legal system.

c. Radicalism and the Development of a New Counter-culture

British and Dutch studies lead to the conclusion that radical Islam is a source of inter-generational conflict among Muslims and may also reflect deeper conflicts between the ethnic Islam of the immigrant generation and the native-born generation's desire for a more universal Muslim identity. Surveys have shown that young women are slightly over represented among the supporters, but few have been involved in conspiracies. Increasingly, we are seeing jihadism in Europe becoming a new Muslim counter-culture that draws in women and converts and "born again" Muslim men from all ethnic groups.

Radicalism can take several forms and were it not for the link to terrorism we would worry a great deal more about urban riots than religio-political radicalism. In France, follow-up reports on the 2005 riots indicated that 95 percent of the rioters were French citizens and two-thirds of them were from immigrant origin. What all the rioters had in common was youth, a high level of unemployment and limited prospects for socio-economic advancement (Beaud and Pauloux 2003).There is no evidence that Islam played any role in the riots in 2005 or the "follow-up" riots in fall 2007.

Most studies have shown that the relationship between social deprivation and recruitment to terrorism is ambiguous or non-existent. It is premature to conclude that alienation and radicalization are middle-class problems, in part because the definition of "middle-class" is unclear. Sufficient evidence nonetheless exists

9 The Eurobarometer Survey asked respondents to identify their faith. 70-90% of the respondents in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal described themselves as Catholic, as did 64% of the French and 40% of (West) Germans. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 60-80% described themselves as Protestant even though only about half the population described themselves as believers. "Non-believers" constitute a majority in the Netherlands (57%) and the former East Germany (68%). The data is based upon my own recalculation of Eurobarometer, Release 47.1, ICPSR 2089, variable 463.

10 Based upon the 1990-1991 World Values Survey, Mattei Dogan (2002) pronounced victory for the non-believers in Europe. Nonetheless, even in this survey 62% of the French said that they believed in God. The 1999 World Values Survey revealed a significant increase in believers, even in the more secular countries (Lambert 2004).

to conclude that the social anger expressed in riots and that expressed in Islamist political extremism have very different sources.

Radicalization ties in with the emergence of a new counter-culture among young Muslims. A recent British survey found that 13% of 16-24 year olds supported Al Qaeda and only two percent of the 45+ years old respondents did. Slightly more women than men expressed such support (Mirza et al. 2007: 62). The same survey also found that 37% of 16-24 year old British Muslims preferred Islamic state schools to integrated secular schools. Only 19% of respondents over 55 supported such schools. Half of the younger generation preferred to be governed by secular law, but 37% said they would prefer to live under the Shariah. In comparison, only 16% of the 45 and older generation said so. Astonishingly, over half of the respondents under 35 also expressed support for polygamy (Mirza et al 2007: 47).

The Dutch intelligence service (AIVD 2007) and the national security coordinator (NCTb 2006) undertook in collaboration with social scientists several studies of radicalization and terrorist recruitment. Radicalization in their definition includes the pursuit of far-reaching changes in society, which may imply threats to the continuity of the democratic legal order (aim), possibly by using undemocratic methods (means), and harm the functioning of social order (effect). Their conclusion was radicalization among young Dutch Muslims is an on-going process but radicalization does not lead to a commeasurable increase in the threat from domestic terrorism. Radicalization provides a recruiting ground for the international extremist networks, but in the absence of the direct management by such network young European radicals are generally not capable of organizing conspiracies.

Surveys provide slightly different estimations of the size of the radical subpopulation but point to the same conclusion: A significant minority of European Muslims supports the jihadi cause. Support among French Muslims for extremism has varied in different studies and is usually found to be about half of that found in Britain, although the Pew Study cited below found comparable support in the two countries. Support among German Muslims is considerably lower, around 6-7 percent (see Table 3).The results have been consistent across different surveys with a margin of allowance for minor variations (+/- 2-3%) depending upon the phrasing of the question.

Surveys show also high rates of disapproval among Muslims of terrorism and jihadi ideology. In April 2007, the Gallup World Poll asked both Muslims and non-Muslims if violence for a noble cause can be morally justified. They found that 81% of British Muslims thought that it is not justified and 88% said that attacks on civilians were not justifiable. The general public was more willing to entertain the idea that a noble cause could justify violence. Nearly thirty percent said that political violence could be justified albeit not against civilians (Gallup World Poll 2007b). The reason abstract questions yield similar answer patters from Muslims and non-Muslims is that mentioning Muslims or Islam triggers highly negative evaluation and attitudes in general public opinion irrespective of the context. It is not that Muslims change their view about the justification of violence in general but that the general population does (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).

Is difficult to translate information obtained through public opinion surveys into practical policy-making. Ambiguous population counts are one issue. To take an example, we know from opinion surveys that roughly 6% of Muslims sympathize with Al Qaeda, which means that the recent downward revision of the population figure for Muslims living in the Netherlands reduced the number of Muslim radicals by 9,000 people, from 60,000 to 51,000. Numbers aside, anger and terrorism are two different matters. Scholars have been unable to establish a clear correlation between social anger and radicalism and recruitment into clandestine groups.

d. Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism

European political leaders have issued repeated warnings about growing anti-Semitism in Europe. The Chief Rabbi in Britain, Sir Jonathan Sachs, warned at the start of 2006 of a "tsunami" of Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism

Table 3. Support for suicide terrorism

Country (Muslims only)	Often/sometimes justified	Rarely/never justified	Don't know
Great Britain	15	79	6
France	16	83	1
Germany	7	89	3
Spain	16	78	7

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, Europe's Muslims More Moderate. Released June 22, 2006.

propagated by radical Islamists and critics of Israel (Daily Mail (London), January 2, 2006). In June this year, Ronald Lauder, the president of the Jewish World Council, called upon the EU to do more to combat anti-Semitism (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 26, 2007). The archbishop of Paris said in February 2007 during an official visit to Israel that French Jews experienced a "pandemic of anti-Semitism" (Agence France Presse, February 12, 2007). Muslims, interestingly, often compare Islamophobia to anti-Semitism and say they are Europe's "new Jews". French Muslims are about as likely to take a favorable view of Jews as are Americans and other Europeans. A Pew study cited earlier from 2006 found that 71% of French Muslims and 74% of the general British public report that they have a positive opinion of Jews. Two out of every five Muslims in Britain and Germany took an unfavorable view of Jews, and Spanish Muslims are twice as likely to entertain anti-Semitic views as are French Muslims (Pew 2006 June: 12, 42; see Table 4). British Muslims also hold by far the more negative views of "Westerners" in general, with over two-thirds thinking that "Westerners" are "selfish" and "arrogant" according to a Pew survey (2006 June: 6, 10). The general public also holds Muslims in low regard.

If we accept that the surveys measure bias in a meaningful way, the difficult conclusion is that Europeans are as "Islamophobic" as Muslims are anti-Semitic. One out every five Germans and Spaniards thinks Muslims are "fanatical" and "violent". The French and the British publics are less hostile. Only about half the population think these negative traits generally apply to Muslims.

Table 4: "Do you have an unfavorable/very unfavorable view of X?" (in percentages)

	Muslims of Jews	General Public of Jews	General Public of Muslims	Muslims of Christians	General Public of Christians
Great Britain	47	7	20	16	5
France	28	13	35	8	13
Germany	44	22	54	24	17
Spain	60	39	62	12	15
US	-	5	24	-	5

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other: Europe's Muslims More Moderate, June 22, 2006

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