



Detecting Data Leaks in SAP - The Next Level of Static Code Analysis





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- Founder of Virtual Forge (Heidelberg), responsible for Research & Development
- SAP Security Researcher, active since 2003
 - Received Credits from SAP for more than 20 reported 0-day Vulnerabilities
- Speaker at international Conferences
 - **SAP TechEd** 2004 (USA & Europe) / 2005 (USA) / 2006 (USA), DSAG 2009
 - **BlackHat** 2011 (Europe), **Hack in the Box** 2011 (Europe)
 - **Troopers** 2011, 2012, 2013, **RSA** 2012 (USA)
- Co-Author of „Sichere ABAP Programmierung“ (SAP Press)
- Training Class WDESA3 @ SAP University



- 1. What is a Data Leak?**
- 2. Conventional Data Leak Prevention (DLP)**
- 3. Conventional Static Code Analysis (SCA)**
- 4. Data Leaks in SAP Systems**
- 5. Static Data Leak Prevention (S-DLP)**
- 6. Summary**

What is a Data Leak?



~~Data Leak Records~~

Discography

Artists

Downloads

Contact

Data Leak Records

We're a house/techno recordlabel based in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, releasing melancholia for the dancefloor.

Check out our free tunes & dj-sets at the download section!

For bookings contact www.octopus-agents.nl

<http://dataleak.org/>

...embarrassing to others



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“Dude...you have data leakage.”

<http://www.adexchanger.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/data-leakage-gag.jpg>




The daydreams of cat herders...

<http://simonhunt.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/cats3.jpg?w=595>

and troublesome, even in the future



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<http://cdn.memegenerator.net/instances/400x/29782239.jpg>



“... In data leakage incidents, sensitive data is disclosed to unauthorized personnel either by malicious **intent** or inadvertent **mistake**.”

(December 2012)


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_loss_prevention_software

Conventional Data Leak Prevention (DLP)

(1) Network: "Data in Motion"



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


- Monitor network egress/exit points
 - Multiple sensors required
 - Sensors must understand communication protocols

(2) Endpoint: “Data in use”



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


- Monitor Endpoints
 - Sensor required for every endpoint
 - Many endpoints can't be monitored

(3) Endpoint: "Data at Rest"



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- Monitor critical Files
 - Apply tags to files
 - Does not work on DB content



- DLP Solutions observe **Data**
- Their strength depends on
 - Data Analysis Capabilities (Heuristics)
 - What is „13.12.1982“ ?
 - The Date of an Order?
 - The Date of a Log Entry?
 - Someone's Birthday?
 - Pervasiveness
 - All relevant Network Points must be monitored
 - All relevant Protocols must be covered
 - We already learned: Not all Devices can be covered



Pro's

- They provide results
- Independent of Software in use

Con's

- High Complexity in Deployment
 - Many Sensors, many Protocols to cover, continuous Operation required
- DLP is a „last Line of Defense“ Approach
 - If the Solution fails, the Data is gone
- Heuristic produces false positives and negatives
 - Scrambled Data can't be analyzed
- Users operating the DLP Solution may see critical Data
 - Raises additional Issues

Conventional Static Code Analysis (SCA)



- SCA Solutions analyze Code for Defects without running it
- Various Issue-detection Algorithms
 - Pattern Tests (simple)
 - Semantic Tests
 - Business Logic Tests
 - Control Flow Tests
 - Data Flow Tests
 - ...
- Can detect
 - Injection Flaws (SQL Inj, OS Cmd Inj, ...)
 - XSS, CSRF
 - Authorization Flaws
 - ...



```
REPORT ZFT.
```

```
DATA lv_bname TYPE xubname.
```

```
SELECT bname FROM usr02 INTO lv_bname
```

```
    WHERE aname = sy-uname CLIENT SPECIFIED.
```

```
    WRITE lv_bname.
```

```
ENDSELECT.
```

Detect if Database Access is cross-Client



```
REPORT ZFT.  
CALL FUNCTION 'SECURITY_CHECK_INPUT' EXPORTING  
    code      = lv_input  
EXCEPTIONS  
    empty     = 1  
    tainted   = 0  
    OTHERS    = 2.  
  
IF sy-subrc NE 0.  
    EXIT.  
ENDIF.
```

Detect broken exception handling



```
REPORT ZFT.
```

```
SELECT SINGLE VKORG FROM T001W INTO T001W-VKORG  
WHERE WERKS = '2342'.
```

Detect hard-coded Plant



```
REPORT ZFT.
```

```
EXPORT (fields) TO SHARED MEMORY indx(xy) ID co_bufid.
```

```
...
```

```
DELETE FROM SHARED MEMORY indx(xy) ID co_bufid.
```

Check if SAP Shared Memory is released **after** use

Control Flow (Example #2)



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```
REPORT ZFT.
```


```
AUTHORITY-CHECK OBJECT 'S_TCODE'  
                  ID      'TCD'  
                  FIELD  'SE38'.
```

```
IF sy-subrc IS INITIAL.
```

```
    CALL TRANSACTION 'SE38'.
```

```
ENDIF.
```

Assure that authorization is checked **before** a transaction is called







```
REPORT ZFT.
```

```
DATA lv_cmd TYPE string.
```

 PARAMETERS `os_option` TYPE string.

 CONCATENATE `ls -` `os_option` INTO `lv_cmd`.

 CALL 'SYSTEM' ID 'COMMAND' FIELD `lv_cmd`.



Check, if Input is passed to a dangerous command



Pro's

- White Box Approach: All Functionality can be checked
- Proactive: Analysis takes place **before** productive Use
- SCA finds (inadvertent) Security and Quality Defects

Con's

- Certain Behavior is hard to emulate statically
- Compiled Code might behave differently
- Data Leaks not in Scope

Data Leaks in SAP Systems

Case #1 – SAP Standard (1)



```
FUNCTION search_bank_address_extended .  
* "-----  
* ""Lokale Schnittstelle:  
* "  IMPORTING  
* "    VALUE (I_BANKS) LIKE  BNKA-BANKS  
* "    VALUE (I_BANKL) LIKE  BNKA-BANKL OPTIONAL  
* "    VALUE (I_BANKA) LIKE  BNKA-BANKA OPTIONAL  
* "    VALUE (I_ORT01) LIKE  BNKA-ORT01 OPTIONAL  
* "    VALUE (I_BNKLZ) LIKE  BNKA-BNKLZ OPTIONAL  
* "    VALUE (I_SWIFT) LIKE  BNKA-SWIFT OPTIONAL  
* "    VALUE (I_BRNCH) LIKE  BNKA-BRNCH OPTIONAL  
* "    VALUE (I_STRAS) LIKE  BNKA-STRAS OPTIONAL  
* "  TABLES  
* "    ET_BNKA STRUCTURE  BNKA  
* "    ET_RETURN STRUCTURE  BAPIRET2 OPTIONAL  
* "  ...
```

INPUT

OUTPUT

Case #1 – SAP Standard (2)



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```
FUNCTION search_bank_address_extended .
```

```
...
```

```
SELECT * FROM bnka INTO TABLE et_bnka
```



OUTPUT

```
WHERE banks EQ i_banks
```

```
AND bankl LIKE i_bankl
```

```
AND banka LIKE i_banka
```

```
AND stras LIKE i_stras
```

```
AND ort01 LIKE i_ort01
```

```
AND swift LIKE i_swift
```

```
AND bnklz LIKE i_bnklz
```

```
AND brnch LIKE i_brnch.
```



INPUT

- Table **bnka** is the Bank Master Record of an SAP System
- User controls entire WHERE condition (based on LIKE)
- The FUNCTION can be invoked remotely (e.g. via SOAP)



VF Advisory: **SAP-LOSS-01**

SAP Note: 1684539

Fixed: June 2012

CVSS Base Score: 3.5

CVSS Base Vector: AV:N/AC:M/AU:S/C:P/I:N/A:N

Case #2 – Customer Code (1)



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```
FUNCTION z_get_PA0002_data .  
*"_-----"  
*"*"Lokale Schnittstelle:  
*"  IMPORTING  
*"    VALUE(I_PERNR)  LIKE  PA0002-PERNR  
*"    VALUE(I_PERID) LIKE  PA0002-PERID  
*"  EXPORTING  
*"    VALUE(E_ERRMSG) TYPE  CHAR200  
*"  TABLES  
*"    ET_PA0002      STRUCTURE  PA0002
```

INPUT

OUTPUT

...


Case #2 – Customer Code (2)



```
FUNCTION z_get_PA0002_data .  
...  
SELECT * FROM pa0002 INTO lt_pa0002 WHERE PERNR = i_pernr.  
" Plausibility check  
IF lt_pa0002-perid <> i_perid.  
    CONCATENATE `PERNR and PERID don't match. PERNR ` i_pernr  
                ` corresponds to PERID ` lt_pa0002-perid  
                `, not to PERID ` i_perid  
    INTO e_errmsg.  
EXIT.  
ENDIF.
```

- Column **perid** in table **pa0002** contains the Social Security Number
- User controls entire WHERE condition (based on input parameter)
- The FUNCTION can be invoked remotely (e.g. via SOAP)

Static Data Leak Prevention (S-DLP)



What would it take, to statically detect Data Leaks in (SAP) Software?

1. Need to reliably (!) identify critical Data (“Assets”)
2. Need to identify Data Transfers to the Outside (“Exits”)
3. Need to identify Data Flow from Assets to Exits



SAP

- All Business Data is stored in the SAP Database

ABAP

- Integrated platform-independent SQL Standard: Open SQL
 - Access to DB Tables is easy to detect / parse
- Thousands of well-known database tables in SAP Standard
 - All critical Tables / Columns are well known

Challenge 1 taken:

Need to reliably identify “Assets”



ABAP

- A limited Number of Commands cause Data Exits
 - Easy to resolve
- A large Number of API functions cause Data Exits
 - A diligent but routine piece of work (ongoing)


Challenge 2 taken:

Need to identify Data Transfers to “Exits”

Inverse Data Flow Analysis ?



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


- Classic Data Flow Analysis is an “Outside-in” Approach
- We need an „Inside-out“ Approach

We need Asset Flow Analysis



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Data Flow Analysis

- Modifications to Input alter Impact of Findings
 - E.g. Escaping, Pre-/Postfixing

Asset Flow Analysis

- Modifications to Assets alter Impact of Findings
 - E.g. Substrings

Challenge 3 taken:

Need to provide Asset Flow Analysis



Pro's

- S-DLP Concept works
- Proactive: Analysis takes place **before** productive Use
- White Box Approach: All Functionality can be checked
- Almost no false Positives, since Data Source and Meaning is known
- No Sensors required (on Network or Clients)
- All Exit-points of an Application are covered, regardless of Protocol
- If Leaks are detected, critical Data is not disclosed to an Auditor
- Even scrambled Data can be analyzed
- Analysis only required, if Application Code changes

Con's

- Currently restricted to SAP (ABAP) Systems
- Currently only monitors Database Content

Summary



- Static Data Leak Prevention is possible
 - Prototype exists for ABAP Code
- Static Analysis Approach allows “Proactive Prevention”
- S-DLP is easy to deploy and easy to maintain
- More Research required to evolve S-DLP



Links

SAP Security Advisories researched by Virtual Forge
<http://www.codeprofilers.com/index.php/advisories.html>

Organizations



BIZEC – Business Security Initiative
<http://www.bizec.org>

Literature



Sichere ABAP-Programmierung
(SAP PRESS, 372 S., 2009)
*Andreas Wiegenslein, Markus Schumacher,
Sebastian Schinzel, Frederik Weidemann*



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Questions?



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