

QUESTIONS

1. What are the two types of attributions that people make to explain behavior? Are the two types mutually exclusive – that is, can people make both types about the same behavior?
2. In general, how do the attributions of actors differ from those of observers? In line with this, should people assign more stable personality traits to themselves or to others?
3. What is the role of salience and perceptual focus on the actor-observer effect? By perspective, does Jones mean just visual perspective?
4. How does the personality trait of self-monitoring influence the attributions of actors? How might it affect the attributions of observers?
5. In a sense, psychologists are the ultimate observers. How might this influence the types of theories that they propose?

Reading 4: Contemporary

Like Goes with Like: The Role of Representativeness in Erroneous and Pseudoscientific Beliefs

Thomas Gilovich and Kenneth Savitsky

The reading we have chosen to represent contemporary research on social cognition may at first seem an odd choice because the kinds of thought processes being explained are not very social. Unlike the previous reading, which sought to understand how we make sense of other people's behavior in social situation, this next reading seeks to understand such diverse but wholly unsocial issues as why people are so often fooled by unproved claims of New Age medicine and why highly trained medical doctors resist or accept theories of disease for very illogical reasons. That social psychologists are writing about non-social cognition demonstrates how far research on social cognition has come and how important it now is. No longer are thought processes about social situations seen as being but one part of human cognition; instead more and more psychologists have come to believe that the basic thought processes about social and non-social problems are the same.

One important basic thought process identified by social psychology is the use of heuristics. Heuristics are mental short cuts or generalizations. Like all generalizations they are frequently right but sometimes wrong. One such heuristic, known as the representative heuristic, can be summarized by the familiar expression, "if something looks like a duck and walks like a duck then it is a duck." You can probably see that this heuristic will often lead to sensible decisions. But as the authors of this next reading show, it can also lead to some spectacularly insensible decisions. Social psychologists Thomas Gilovich and Kenneth Savitsky review first how use of the representative heuristic can lead to mistakes in social decisions, for example in deciding what sort of job a person has based on a few facts about their background. They then review how this same heuristic can lead to mistakes in a wide range of non-social decisions.

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It was in 1983, at an infectious-disease conference in Brussels, that Barry Marshall, an internal-medicine resident from Perth, Australia, first staked his startling claim. He argued that the peptic ulcer, a painful crater in the lining of the stomach or duodenum, was not caused by a stressful lifestyle as everyone had thought. Instead, the malady that afflicts millions of adults in the United States alone was caused by a simple bacterium, and thus

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could be cured using antibiotics (Hunter 1993; Monmaney 1993; Peterson 1991; Wandycz 1993).

Although subsequent investigations have sustained Marshall's claim (e.g., Hentschel et al. 1993), his colleagues initially were highly skeptical. Martin Blaser, director of the Division of Infectious Diseases at the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, described Marshall's thesis as "the most preposterous thing I'd ever heard" (Monmaney 1993).

What made the idea so preposterous? Why were the experts so resistant to Marshall's suggestions? There were undoubtedly many reasons. For one, the claim contradicted what most physicians, psychiatrists, and psychologists knew (or thought they knew): Ulcers were caused by stress. As one author noted, "No physical ailment has ever been more closely tied to psychological turbulence" (Monmaney 1993, p. 64). In addition, science is necessarily and appropriately a rather conservative enterprise. Although insight, creativity, and even leaps of faith are vital to the endeavor, sound empirical evidence is the true coin of the realm. Much of the medical establishment's hesitation doubtless stemmed from the same healthy skepticism that readers of the SKEPTICAL INQUIRER have learned to treasure. After all, Marshall's results at the time were suggestive at best – no cause-effect relationship had yet been established.

But there may have been a third reason for the reluctance to embrace Marshall's contention, a reason we explore in this article. The belief that ulcers derive from stress is particularly seductive – for physicians and laypersons alike – because it flows from a general tendency of human judgment, a tendency to employ what psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have called the "representativeness heuristic" (Kahneman and Tversky 1972, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1982). Indeed, we believe that judgment by representativeness plays a role in a host of erroneous beliefs, from beliefs about health and the human body to handwriting analysis and astrology (Gilovich 1991). We consider a sample of these beliefs in this article.

THE REPRESENTATIVENESS HEURISTIC

Representativeness is but one of a number of heuristics that people use to render complex problems manageable. Heuristics are often described as judgmental shortcuts that generally get us where we need to go – and quickly – but at the cost of occasionally sending us off course. Kahneman and Tversky liken them to perceptual cues, which generally enable us to perceive the world accurately, but occasionally give rise to misperception and illusion. Consider their example of using clarity as a cue for distance. The clarity of an object is one cue people use to decide how far away it is. The cue typically works well because the farther away something is, the less distinct it appears. On a particularly clear day, however, objects can appear closer than they are, and on hazy days, they can appear farther away. In some circumstances, then, this normally accurate cue can lead to error.

Representativeness works much the same way. The representativeness heuristic involves a reflexive tendency to assess the similarity of objects and events along salient dimensions and to organize them on the basis of one overarching rule: "Like goes with like." Among other things, the representativeness heuristic reflects the belief that a member of a given category ought to resemble the category prototype, and that an effect ought to resemble the cause that produced it. Thus, the representativeness heuristic is often used to assess whether a given instance belongs to a particular category, such as whether an individual is likely to be an accountant or a comedian. It is also used in assigning causes to effects, as when deciding whether a meal of spicy food caused a case of heartburn or determining whether an assassination was the product of a conspiracy.

Note that judgment by representativeness often works well. Instances often resemble their category prototypes and causes frequently resemble their effects. Members of various occupational groups, for example, frequently do resemble the group prototype. Likewise, "big" effects (such as the development of the atomic bomb) are often brought about by "big" causes (such as the Manhattan Project).

Still, the representativeness heuristic is only that – a heuristic or shortcut. As with all shortcuts, the representativeness heuristic should be used with caution. Although it can help us to make some judgments with accuracy and ease, it can also lead us astray. Not all members fit the category prototype. Some comedians are shy or taciturn, and some accountants are wild and crazy. And although causes are frequently representative of their effects, this relationship does not always hold: Tiny viruses give rise to devastating epidemics like malaria or AIDS; and splitting the nucleus of an atom releases an awesome amount of energy. In some cases, then, representativeness yields inaccuracy and error. Or even superstition. A nice example is provided by craps shooters, who roll the dice gently to coax a low number, and more vigorously to encourage a high one (Hanslin 1967). A small effect (low number) requires a small cause (gentle roll), and a big effect (high number) requires a big cause (vigorous roll).

How might the belief in a stress-ulcer link derive from the conviction that like goes with like? Because the burning feeling of an ulcerated stomach is not unlike the gut-wrenching, stomach-churning feeling of extreme stress (albeit more severe), the link seems natural: Stress is a representative cause of an ulcer.¹ But as Marshall suggested (and subsequent research has borne out), the link may be overblown. Stress alone does not appear to cause ulcers (Glavin and Szabo 1992; Soll 1990).

¹ Some theories of the link between stress and ulcers are even more tinged with representativeness. Since the symptoms of an ulcer manifest themselves in the stomach, the cause "should" involve something that is highly characteristic of the stomach as well, such as hunger and nourishment. Thus, one theorist asserts, "The critical factor in the development of ulcers is the frustration associated with the wish to receive love – when this wish is rejected, it is converted into a wish to be fed," leading ultimately "to an ulcer." Echoing such ideas, James Masterson writes in his book *The Search for the Real Self* that ulcers affect those who are "hungering for emotional supplies that were lost in childhood or that were never sufficient to nourish the real self" (both quoted in Monmaney 1993).

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND THE CONJUNCTION FALLACY

One of the most compelling demonstrations of how the representativeness heuristic can interfere with sound judgment comes from a much-discussed experiment in which participants were asked to consider the following description (Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 1983):

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.

Now, based on the above description, rank the following statements about Linda, from most to least likely:

- a. Linda is an insurance salesperson.
- b. Linda is a bank teller.
- c. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

If you are like most people, you probably thought it was more likely that “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement” than that “Linda is a bank teller.” It is easy to see why: A feminist bank teller is much more representative of the description of Linda than is “just” a bank teller. It reflects the political activism, social-consciousness, and left-of-center politics implied in the description.

It makes sense, but it cannot be. The category “bank teller” subsumes the category “is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.” The latter therefore cannot be more likely than the former. Anyone who is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement is automatically also a bank teller. Indeed, even if one thinks it is impossible for someone with Linda’s description to be solely a bank teller (that is, one who is not a feminist), being a bank teller is still as likely as being both. This error is referred to as the “conjunction fallacy” because the probability of two events co-occurring (i.e., their conjunction) can never exceed the individual probability of either of the constituents (Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 1983; Dawes and Mulford 1993).

Such is the logic of the situation. The psychology we bring to bear on it is something else. If we start with an unrepresentative outcome (being a bank teller) and then add a representative element (being active in the feminist movement), we create a description that is at once more psychologically compelling but objectively less likely. The rules of representativeness do not follow the laws of probability. A detailed description can seem compelling precisely because of the very details that, objectively speaking, actually make it less likely. Thus, someone may be less concerned about dying during a trip to the Middle East than about dying in a terrorist attack while there, even though the probability of death due to a *particular* cause is obviously lower than the probability of death due to the set of all possible causes. Likewise, the probability of global economic collapse can seem remote until one sketches a detailed scenario in which such a collapse follows, say, the destruction of the oil fields in the Persian Gulf. Once again, the additional details make

the outcome less likely at the same time that they make it more psychologically compelling.

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND CAUSAL JUDGMENTS

Most of the empirical research on the representativeness heuristic is similar to the work on the conjunction fallacy in that the judgments people make are compared to a normative standard – in this case, to the laws of probability. The deleterious effect of judgment by representativeness is thereby established by the failure to meet such a standard. Previous work conducted in this fashion has shown, for example, that judgment by representativeness leads people to commit the “gambler’s fallacy,” to overestimate the reliability of small samples of data, and to be insufficiently “regressive” in making predictions under conditions of uncertainty.

The ulcer example with which we began this article does not have this property of being obviously at variance with a clear-cut normative standard. The same is true of nearly all examples of the impact of representativeness on causal judgments: It can be difficult to establish with certainty that a judgmental error has been made. Partly for this reason, there has been less empirical research on representativeness and causal judgments than on other areas, such as representativeness and the conjunction fallacy. This is not because representativeness is thought to have little impact on causal judgments, but because without a clear-cut normative standard it is simply more difficult to conduct research in this domain. The research that has been conducted, furthermore, is more suggestive than definitive. Nonetheless, the suggestive evidence is rather striking, and it points to the possibility that representativeness may exert at least as much influence over causal judgments as it does over other, more exhaustively researched types of judgments. To see how much, we discuss some examples of representativeness-thinking in medicine, in pseudoscientific systems, and in psychoanalysis.

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND MEDICAL BELIEFS

One area in which the impact of representativeness on causal judgments is particularly striking is the domain of health and medicine. Historically, people have often assumed that the symptoms of a disease should resemble either its cause or its cure (or both). In ancient Chinese medicine, for example, people with vision problems were fed ground bat in the mistaken belief that bats had particularly keen vision and that some of this ability might be transferred to the recipient (Deutsch 1977). ...

Representative-thinking continues to abound in modern “alternative” medicine, a pursuit that appears to be gaining in perceived legitimacy (Cowley, King, Hager, and Rosenberg 1995). An investigation by Congress into health fraud and quackery noted several examples of what appear to be interventions inspired by the superficial appeal of

representativeness (U.S. Congress House Subcommittee on Health and Long-Term Care 1984). In one set of suggested treatments, patients are encouraged to eat raw organ concentrates corresponding to the dysfunctional body part: e.g., brain concentrates for mental disorders, heart concentrates for cardiac conditions, and raw stomach lining for ulcers. Similarly, the fingerprints of representativeness are all over the practice of “rebirthing,” a New Age therapeutic technique in which individuals attempt to reenact their own births in an effort to correct personality defects caused by having been born in an “unnatural” fashion (Ward 1994). One person who was born breech (i.e., feet first) underwent the rebirthing procedure to cure his sense that his life was always going in the wrong direction and that he could never seem to get things “the right way round.” Another, born Caesarian, sought the treatment because of a lifelong difficulty with seeing things to completion, and always relying on others to finish tasks for her. As one author quipped, “God knows what damage forceps might inflict... a lifelong neurosis that you’re being dragged where you don’t want to go.” (Ward 1994, p. 90).

A more rigorous examination of the kind of erroneous beliefs about health and the human body that can arise from the appeal of representativeness has dealt with the adage, “You are what you eat.” Just how far do people take this idea? In certain respects, the saying is undeniably true: Bodies are composed to a large extent of the molecules that were once ingested as food. Quite literally, we are what we have eaten. Indeed, there are times when we take on the character of what we ingest: People gain weight by eating fatty foods, and a person’s skin can acquire an orange tint from the carotene found in carrots and tomatoes. But the notion that we develop the characteristics of the food we eat sometimes goes beyond such examples to almost magical extremes. The Hua of Papua New Guinea, for example, believe that individuals will grow quickly if they eat rapidly growing food (Meigs 1984, cited by Nemeroff and Rozin 1989).

But what about a more “scientifically minded” population? Psychologists Carol Nemeroff and Paul Rozin (1989) asked college students to consider a hypothetical culture known as the “Chandorans,” who hunt wild boar and marine turtles. Some of the students learned that the Chandorans hunt turtles for their shells, and wild boar for their meat. The others heard the opposite: The tribe hunts turtles for their meat, and boar for their tusks.

After reading one of the two descriptions of the Chandorans, the students were asked to rate the tribe members on numerous characteristics. Their responses reflected a belief that the characteristics of the food that was eaten would “rub off” onto the tribe members. Boar-eaters were thought to be more aggressive and irritable than their counterparts – and more likely to have beards! The turtle-eaters were thought to live longer and be better swimmers.

However educated a person may be (the participants in Nemeroff and Rozin’s experiment were University of Pennsylvania undergraduates), it can be difficult to get beyond the assumption that like goes with like. In this case, it leads to the belief that individuals tend to acquire the attributes of the food they ingest. Simple representativeness.

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC BELIEFS

A core tenet of astrology is that an individual’s personality is influenced by the astrological sign under which he or she was born (Huntley 1990). A glance at the personality types associated with the various astrological signs reveals an uncanny concordance between the supposed personality of someone with a particular sign and the characteristics associated with the sign’s namesake (Huntley 1990; Howe 1970; Zusne and Jones 1982). Those born under the sign of the goat (Capricorn) are said to be tenacious, hardworking, and stubborn; whereas those born under the lion (Leo) are proud, forceful leaders. Likewise, those born under the sign of Cancer (the crab) share with their namesake a tendency to appear hard on the outside; while inside their “shells” they are soft and vulnerable. One treatment of astrology goes so far as to suggest that, like the crab, those born under the sign of Cancer tend to be “deeply attached to their homes” (Read et al. 1978).

What is the origin of these associations? They are not empirically derived, as they have been shown time and time again to lack validity (e.g., Carlson 1985; Dean 1987; for reviews see Abell 1981; Schick and Vaughn 1995; Zusne and Jones 1982). Instead, they are conceptually driven by simple, representativeness-based assessments of the personalities that should be associated with various astrological signs. After all, who is more likely to be retiring and modest than a Virgo (the virgin)? Who better to be well-balanced, harmonious, and fair than a Libra (the scales)? By taking advantage of people’s reflexive associations, the system gains plausibility among those disinclined to dig deeper.

And it doesn’t stop there. Consider another elaborate “scientific” system designed to assess the “secrets” of an individual’s personality – graphology, or handwriting analysis. Corporations pay graphologists sizable fees to help screen job applicants by developing personality profiles of those who apply for jobs (Neter and Ben-Shakhar 1989). Graphologists are also called upon to provide “expert” testimony in trial proceedings, and to help the Secret Service determine if any real danger is posed by threatening letters to government officials (Scanlon and Mauro 1992). How much stock can we put in the work of handwriting analysts?

Unlike astrology, graphology is not worthless. It has been, and continues to be, the subject of careful empirical investigation (Nevo 1986), and it has been shown that people’s handwriting can reveal certain things about them. Particularly shaky writing can be a clue that an individual suffers from some neurological disorder that causes hand tremors; whether a person is male or female is often apparent from his or her writing. In general, however, what handwriting analysis can determine most reliably tends to be things that can be more reliably ascertained through other means. As for the “secrets” of an individual’s personality, graphology has yet to show that it is any better than astrology.

This has not done much to diminish the popularity of handwriting analysis, however. One reason for this is that graphologists, like astrologers, gain some surface plausibility or “face validity” for their claims by exploring the tendency for people to employ the representative heuristic. Many of their claims have a superficial “sensible” quality, rarely

violating the principle that like goes with like. Consider, for instance, the “zonal theory” of graphology, which divides a person’s handwriting into the upper, middle, and lower regions. A person’s “intellectual,” “practical,” and “instinctual” qualities supposedly correspond to the different regions (Basil 1989). Can you guess which is which? Could our “lower” instincts be reflected anywhere other than the lower region, or our “higher” intellect anywhere other than the top?

The list of such representativeness-based “connections” goes on and on. Handwriting slants to the left? The person must be holding something back, repressing his or her true emotions. Slants to the right? The person gets carried away by his or her feelings. A signature placed far below a paragraph suggests that the individual wishes to distance himself or herself from what was written (Scanlon and Mauro 1992). Handwriting that stays close to the left margin belongs to individuals attached to the past, whereas writing that hugs the right margin comes from those oriented toward the future.

What is ironic is that the very mechanism that many graphologists rely upon to argue for the persuasive value of their endeavor – that the character of the handwriting resembles the character of the person – is what ultimately betrays them: They call it “common sense;” we call it judgment by representativeness.

REPRESENTATIVENESS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Two prominent social psychologists, Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, have argued that “the enormous popularity of Freudian theory probably lies in the fact that, unlike all its competitors among contemporary views, it encourages the layperson to do what comes naturally in causal explanation, that is, to use the representativeness heuristic” (Nisbett and Ross 1980, p. 244). Although this claim would be difficult to put to empirical test, there can be little doubt that much of the interpretation of symbols that lies at the core of psychoanalytic theory is driven by representativeness. Consider the interpretation of dreams, in which the images a client reports from his or her dreams are considered indicative of underlying motives. An infinite number of potential relationships exist between dream content and underlying psychodynamics, and it is interesting that virtually all of the “meaningful” ones identified by psychodynamically oriented clinicians are ones in which there is an obvious fit or resemblance between the reported image and inner dynamics. A man who dreams of a snake or a cigar is thought to be troubled by his penis or his sexuality. People who dream of policemen are thought to be concerned about their fathers or authority figures. Knowledge of the representativeness heuristic compels one to wonder whether such connections reflect something important about the psyche of the client, or whether they exist primarily in the mind of the therapist.

One area of psychodynamic theorizing in which the validity of such superficially plausible relationships has been tested and found wanting is the use of projective tests. The most widely known projective test is the Rorschach, in which clients report what they “see” in ambiguous blotches of ink on cards. As in all projective tests, the idea is that in responding to such an unstructured stimulus, a person must “project,” and thus

reveal, some of his or her inner dynamics. Countless studies, however, have failed to produce evidence that the test is valid – that is, that the assessments made about people on the basis of the test correspond to the psychopathological conditions from which they suffer (Burros 1978).²

The research notwithstanding, clinicians frequently report the Rorschach to be extremely helpful in clinical practice. Might representativeness contribute to this paradox of strongly held beliefs coexisting with the absence of any real relationship? You be the judge. A person who interprets the whole Rorschach card, and not its specific details, is considered by clinicians to suffer from a need to form a “big picture,” and a tendency toward grandiosity, even paranoia. In contrast, a person who refers only to a small detail of the ink blots is considered to have an obsessive personality – someone who attends to detail at the expense of the more important holistic aspects (Dawes 1994). Once again, systematic research has failed to find evidence for these relationships, but the sense of representativeness gives them some superficial plausibility.

CONCLUSION

We have described numerous erroneous beliefs that appear to derive from the overuse of the representativeness heuristic. Many of them arise in domains in which the reach for solutions to important problems exceeds our grasp – such as the attempt to uncover (via astrology or handwriting analysis) simple cues to the complexities of human motivation and personality. In such domains in which no simple solutions exist, and yet the need or desire for such solutions remains strong, people often let down their guard. Dubious cause-effect links are then uncritically accepted because they satisfy the principles of like goes with like.

Representativeness can also have the opposite effect, inhibiting belief in valid claims that violate the expectation of resemblance. People initially scoffed at Walter Reed’s suggestions that malaria was carried by the mosquito. From a representativeness standpoint, it is easy to see why: The cause (a tiny mosquito) is not at all representative of the result (a devastating disease). Reed’s claim violated the notion that big effects should have big causes, and thus was difficult to accept (Nisbett and Ross 1980). Although skepticism is a vital component of critical thought, it should not be based on an excessive adherence to the principle that like goes with like.

Indeed, it is often those discoveries that violate the expected resemblance between cause and effect that are ultimately hailed as significant breakthroughs, as with the discovery of *Helicobacter pylori*, as the ulcer-causing bacterium is now named. As one

² Actually, a nonprojective use of the Rorschach, called the Exner System, has been shown to have some validity (Exner 1986). The system is based on the fact that some of the inkblots *do* look like various objects, and a person’s responses are scored for the number and proportion that fail to reflect this correspondence. Unlike the usual Rorschach procedure, which is subjectively scored, the Exner system is a standardized test.

author put it, "The discovery of *Helicobacter* is no crummy little shift. It's a mindblower – tangible, reproducible, unexpected, and, yes, revolutionary. Just the fact that a bug causes peptic ulcers, long considered the cardinal example of a psychosomatic illness, is a spear in the breast of New Age medicine" (Monmaney 1993, p. 68). Given these stakes, one might be advised to avoid an overreliance on the shortcut of representativeness, and instead to devote the extra effort needed to make accurate judgments and decisions. (But not too much effort – you wouldn't want to give yourself an ulcer).

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QUESTIONS

1. In the conjunction problem that described a woman named Linda, why is it incorrect to say that the most likely of the three statements about her is that she is a bank teller who is also a feminist?

2. How can representative thinking explain the popularity of the New Age rebirthing technique? What is the role of salience and perceptual focus on the actor-observer effect? By perspective, does Jones mean just visual perspective?
3. This article cites many examples from medicine. Why do the authors believe that medical doctors (and clinical psychologists too) often fall prey to the representative heuristic despite their extensive training in the logic-based scientific method?
4. Recent medical studies found a people's blood serum cholesterol will increase more if they eat foods high in saturated fat than if they eat foods high in cholesterol. Will the representative heuristic make such a finding easier or more difficult for people to believe?
5. The authors argue that astrology is so widely believed in part because the symbols that represent each sign match the presumed characteristics of such people. Can you think of a way to test this hypothesis?

PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND STEREOTYPES: PERCEIVING AND UNDERSTANDING GROUPS

Reading 5: Classic

The Robber's Cave Experiment: Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation

Muzafer Sherif, O.J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William E. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif

The hallmark of social psychology, what separates it from other areas of psychology, is a focus on social groups. For example, some of the earliest research in social psychology investigated the dynamics of individuals when interacting with other group members. On a different level of analysis, social psychologists are also concerned with how entire groups behave when interacting with other groups. Moving to this broader level of analysis enables social psychologists to study intergroup conflict.

The study of intergroup conflict is a complicated matter. Just as the dynamics within two groups are never exactly alike, the dynamics between two groups are also never exactly alike. Not satisfied with simply describing conflict between two particular groups, social psychologist Muzafer Sherif wanted to find the universals of intergroup conflict. To this end, he decided to create two new groups and carefully observe the dynamics of each: first in isolation of each other, later in situations designed to foster hostility between the groups, and finally in situations designed to foster cooperation and to eliminate hostility between the groups. Sherif hoped the results would be the discovery of universal principles for fostering better intergroup relations.

Most social psychologists today believe that Sherif was successful. The following is an overview of his now famous Robber's Cave study outlining the concept of superordinate goals, and how they can be used to reduce tension between any two antagonistic groups.

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A. THE PRESENT APPROACH

The word "group" in the phrase "intergroup relations" is not a superfluous label. If our claim is the study of relations between two or more groups or the investigation of intergroup attitudes, we have to bring into the picture the properties of the groups and

Source: Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. E., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). *The Robber's Cave experiment: Intergroup conflict and cooperation*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange. Copyright © 1988 by Wesleyan University Press. Reprinted by permission of University Press of New England.