

POLITICAL MANHOOD IN 2000's TURKEY: REPRESENTATIONS OF
DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES IN POLITICS

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
SELIN AKYÜZ

Department of Political Science
Ihsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

Ankara

May 2012

To Solmaz & Latif Akyüz

POLITICAL MANHOOD IN 2000's TURKEY: REPRESENTATIONS OF
DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES IN POLITICS

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

by

SELİN AKYUZ

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE
İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

May 2012

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assistant Professor Dr. Dilek Cindođlu
Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assistant Professor Dr. Saime Özçürümez-Bölükbaşı
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Professor Dr. Elisabeth Özdalga
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Assistant Professor Dr. Tore Fougner
Examining Committee Member

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

Associate Professor Dr. Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdađı
Examining Committee Member

Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

Professor Dr. Erdal Erel
Director

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL MANHOOD IN 2000's TURKEY: REPRESENTATIONS OF DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES IN POLITICS

Akyüz, Selin

Ph.D., Department of Political Science

Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindođlu

May, 2012

This dissertation mainly questions the constructions of different masculinities in politics in Turkey. It re-reads the different representations of political manhood with reference to the AKP, the CHP and the MHP between 2000 and 2008. In order to reveal the embeddedness of masculinities and politics, this dissertation analyzes not only gendered discourses of the given political parties but also their leaders, namely, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. With the guidance of Pierre Bourdieu's analytical tools, especially, on the basis of the congruent relation between habitus and the field, this dissertation questions different representations of masculinities and identifies typologies of masculinities, namely ; (1) Neo-Muslim, (2) Kemalist/Secular, and, (3) Nationalist. With reference to the patterns of masculinities in Turkish political culture, this study argues that the

gendered nature of the politics, in general, political parties in particular, use and reproduce dominant masculinist strategies. In politics as a field, leaders experience the praxis of being man rather than their ideological engagements; leftist, rightist or Islamist.

Keywords: gender, masculinities, political parties, AKP, CHP, MHP, Turkish politics, Kemalism, Islam, nationalism, Bourdieu

ÖZET

2000'LERİN TÜRKİYE'SİNDE SİYASİ ERKEKLİK: SİYASETTEKİ FARKLI ERKEKLİK TEMSİLLERİ

Akyüz, Selin

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doç. Dr. Dilek Cindođlu

Mayıs 2012

Bu tez temel olarak Türk siyasetindeki farklı erkeklik kurgularını sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, 2000 ile 2008 yılları arasında AKP, CHP ve MHP'ye referansla farklı siyasi erkeklik temsillerini yeniden okumaktadır. Siyaset ve erkeklik hallerinin iç içe geçmişliğini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlayan bu tez sadece adı geçen siyaseti partilerin değil, o partilerin liderlerinin de – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal, Devlet Bahçeli- cinsiyetlendirilmiş söylemlerini analiz etmektedir. Pierre Bourdieu'nün analitik araçları rehberliğinde, özellikle de habitus ve alan kavramlarının ilişkiselliđi temelinde bu tez farklı erkeklik temsillerini sorgularken erkekliklerin tipolojisinde çıkarmaktadır. Bu tipolojiler (1) Yeni Müslüman, (2) Kemalist/Laik, (3) Milliyetçi erkeklikler olarak sıralanabilir. Bu tez, Türk siyasi

kltrndeki farklı erkeklik tezahrleri ışıĖında genelde siyasetin zelde ise siyasi partilerin cinsiyetlendirilmiř yapılarının baskın eril stratejileri kullandıklarını ve yeniden rettiklerini savunmaktadır. Kısacası, bir alan olarak siyasette liderler saĖcı, solcu veya İslamcı olmaktan ok erkek olmanın pratiĖini daha ok yařamaktadırlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler: toplumsal cinsiyet, erkeklikler, siyasi partiler, AKP, CHP, MHP, Trk siyaseti, Kemalizm, İslam, milliyetilik, Bourdieu

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has been a long journey... During this journey I can honestly say that I have grown up. I have remembered so many times the famous quote of Nietzsche, “that which does not kill us makes us stronger”. That’s why, now, at the end of everything, I can say that I am stronger. Throughout this journey, I have never been alone and those who were there with me deserve more than this little acknowledgement part but at least mentioning their names will be a sign of my endless appreciation.

First, this dissertation would not have been complete without the intellectual and emotional support of my supervisor Assistant Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu. We have met each other in 2001 when I as an undergraduate student was taking Gender and Politics class and she was my professor. Since then, she has had faith in my academic potential and skills. She has encouraged me throughout the times I felt stressful and even in the darkest sides of the dissertation writing process. She has not only been an academic mentor but also a shoulder to cry on and I know she will always be there during the rest of my life.

I would also thank Dr. Jorgen Lorentzen who helped me a lot during the formulation of research questions and theoretical background at the beginning of the dissertation. Without him and also the researchers of the University of Oslo, Centre for Gender Studies, my academic visit to Oslo would not have been so beneficial.

I am also grateful to Associate Prof. Dr. Berrin Koyuncu-Lorasdađı who has supported me since the beginning of my academic career as a graduate student. Her valuable comments enlightened my way throughout the whole journey. Her support was remarkably important for not only my academic career but also my self-development.

I am also deeply grateful to Assistant Prof. Dr. Alev ınar and Assistant Prof. Dr. Nedim Karakayalı for providing significant comments that shaped the organization of the dissertation. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Özdalga, Assistant Prof. Dr. Saime Özçürümez-Bölükbaşı and Assistant Prof. Dr. Tore Fougner for their insightful comments and contributions. It is an honor for me that they accepted to be a part of this dissertation. This study has developed through their valuable inputs.

I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Metin Heper who has believed in me and inspired me in terms of the significance of working hard, strong will and discipline in the academia. I have benefited a lot from his deep experiences.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Nilgün Fehim Kennedy, Assistant Prof. Dr. Başak İnce and our department's angel Güvenay Kazancı for their endless support during my journey in the PhD programme. Moreover, my lovable colleagues and kindhearted friends Feyda, Pelin, Yasemin, Edip, Duygu, Murat and Sezen deserve my deepest appreciation as they "have suffered" with me in Bilkent and in other parts of Turkey. I shared great memories with them that made this journey such precious. In addition, my colleague Efe has been a very supportive friend during my visit to Oslo. We have discovered not only the city but also the academic life in a multicultural setting together.

During my journey, I owe a deep gratitude to my friends as well. Without their support, this dissertation would not be complete. First, the unforgettable company of my colleagues Senem and Nazlı mean a lot for me. Senem with her infinite patience held my hand any time I needed. When hope was lost she was there and gave me the support and care. Nazlı relentlessly reminded me that “*my sunny someday will come one day soon to me*”. I am grateful to her as a caring friend. Another special thanks go to Nil who was always there with her endless friendship. She brought joy and happiness into my life and tolerated all my complaints. And the team of my life... Füsün, Melis, Engin, Sinan, Derya, Levent, Sonat, Filiz, Herman, Özge and Altay encouraged me any time I felt disappointed since the day I knew them. They cheered me by saying “Finish your homework then we will go into a vacation!”. Thanks to their wonderful friendship as I have never felt alone. Last but not least, I would like to send my warmest love to Melike, Brigitte and Özlem. Although they were not here with me, I have always felt their support in the deepest part of my heart. No matter how distant they are they were always with me. Finally, I would also like to thank Evren who touched my life. I will never forget the day I got acceptance from the PhD program and I will keep his warmhearted smile.

Furthermore, there are also some places that I would like to mention. Not only the books I have read, the music I have listened but also the places I have been inspired me a lot. I would like to thank my study room at home and our office in Bilkent University. In addition Starbucks Koroğlu, Palet Filistin, Macaron d’Antionette and especially Altıparmak mansion provided me a suitable environment to study.

Lastly, the words are not enough to describe my gratitude to my family. Without the support of my mother and father, Solmaz and Latif Akyüz, I would not be who I am today. I have been nourished with their love and endless trust. My sisters Rengin and Sevgin are my other parts. We have grown up together and when I cried, they cried with me; when I laughed they laughed with me. Every sentiment has gained meaning with them. I also would like to thank my brother-in-laws, Taner and İbrahim who encouraged me with their trust. I am truly indebted to them. And, my little princes, my nephews, Efe and Emir brought happiness into my life and reminded me the power of pure love. They always put a smile on my face and brighten my eyes. Now with the support of my beloved ones, I am ready for a new beginning...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| ABSTRACT | iii |
| ÖZET | v |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | vii |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | xi |
| CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 1.1 The Background..... | 1 |
| 1.2 The Scope | 10 |
| 1.3 Methodological Framework..... | 16 |
| 1.4 The Organization of the Dissertation..... | 21 |
| CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 25 |
| 2.1 Defining the Boundaries between Sex and Gender | 25 |
| 2.2 Questioning Gender | 27 |
| 2.2.1 Feminist Studies | 28 |
| 2.2.2 Masculinity Studies | 30 |
| 2.3 Reading Bourdieu’s Main Concepts: Bonding Politics and Masculinities. 34 | |
| 2.3.1 Bourdieu’s Theory on Gender | 35 |
| 2.3.1.1 Body..... | 35 |
| 2.3.1.2 Habitus | 36 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 2.3.1.3 Field | 39 |
| 2.3.1.4 Capital | 39 |
| 2.3.1.5 Language..... | 40 |
| 2.3.2 The Relationship between Habitus and Field | 42 |
| 2.3.3 Dominance of Masculinity in the Political Realm..... | 46 |
| 2.3.4 Critiques on Bourdieu..... | 52 |
| CHAPTER III: DEFINING MASCULINITIES: TOWARDS DEVELOPING | |
| TYPOLOGIES OF MASCULINITIES IN TURKEY | |
| 3.1 Defining Masculinity/Masculinities | 57 |
| 3.2 Different Paths of Masculinities in Turkey | 66 |
| 3.2.1 Neo-Muslim Masculinities | 66 |
| 3.2.2 Kemalist/Secular Masculinities | 72 |
| 3.2.3 Nationalist Masculinities | 79 |
| CHAPTER IV: THE CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITIES: TRACING | |
| DIFFERENT PATHS OF MASCULINITIES IN TURKISH POLITICAL | |
| CULTURE..... | |
| 4.1 An Historical Analysis of Turkish Politics..... | 88 |
| 4.2 Tracing Different Paths of Masculinities in Turkish Political Culture..... | 94 |
| 4.2.1 The Strong State Tradition | 95 |
| 4.2.1.1 <i>Devlet Baba</i> | 97 |
| 4.2.2 Militarism | 100 |
| 4.2.2.1 Every Male (Turk) Is Born Soldier! | 101 |
| 4.2.3 Westernization..... | 105 |
| 4.2.3.1 <i>Mon Cher</i> vs. <i>Kabadayı</i> (Tough Uncle)..... | 106 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 4.2.4 The Secularist/Islamist Cleavage..... | 109 |
| 4.2.4.1 Kemalist/Modern vs. Muslim/Traditional Man..... | 110 |
| 4.2.5 The Domination of Leader..... | 113 |
| CHAPTER V: THE GENDERED POLITICAL PARTIES..... | 119 |
| 5.1 The State and Political Manhood..... | 120 |
| 5.2 The Gendered Political Parties | 125 |
| 5.3 Gender Discourse of the Official Documents of Political Parties | 131 |
| 5.3.1 The Program and Election Manifest of the AKP: A New Approach?..... | 133 |
| 5.3.2 The Program and Election Manifest of the CHP: A Libertarian Approach?..... | 138 |
| 5.3.3 The Program and Election Manifest of the MHP: A Traditional Approach?..... | 142 |
| 5.4 Re-situating Typologies of Masculinities in Turkey: Glorification of the Family and Traditional Gendered Order | 145 |
| CHAPTER VI: TURKISH POLITICAL MANHOOD: DIFFERENT HABITUS IN THE SAME FIELD | 152 |
| 6.1 Adapting Bourdieuan Perspective | 153 |
| 6.2 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: <i>Kabadayı</i> (Tough Uncle) of/for Everyone..... | 155 |
| 6.3 Deniz Baykal: The Guardian of Kemalism | 157 |
| 6.4 Devlet Bahçeli: <i>Devlet Baba</i> (Father) of the Father State | 159 |
| 6.5 Different Habitus in the Same Field | 161 |
| CHAPTER VII: REPRESENTATIONS OF DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES. 168 | |
| 7.1 Politics is Male | 171 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 7.2 Politician is Male | 176 |
| 7.2.1 The Other: Woman | 185 |
| 7.3 Ma(i)nly Political Parties: Neo-Muslim, Kemalist/Secular and Nationalist Masculinities Coalesce | 187 |
| CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION | 196 |
| SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 206 |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Background

This dissertation aims to analyze the construction of masculinities in Turkish politics. Having started from the embeddedness of politics and manhood, this study attempted to deconstruct some given arguments about the relationship between politics and masculinity. However, this mentioned relationship has been very critical and also lead to ask more questions: How does politics shape masculinity? How do the constructions of masculinity shape politics? Does politics play a significant role in the creation and maintenance of masculine identities? How masculinity is constructed in the realm of politics?

With this puzzle of questions, initially I ended up in a dead end. As politics, masculinity/masculinities, identities are loaded terms, it was hard to simplify and analytically think about them. Questioning the relationship of politics and masculinities from a naïve understanding has unconsciously been the first step: What is problematic from gender perspective is the lack of women in politics and men is the *privileged* one, so, the most important actor/actress of the study of gender in politics *should* be women. Women have been victimized in the realm of politics and

the increasing scholarly interest in underrepresentation of women in politics has supported this perspective of mine. Hence, *blaming* the patriarchal order and power networks that have maintained masculine domination was the easiest way. However, then, I realized that even as a PhD candidate in social sciences, I have approached the topic as self evident and underemphasized the relationality of gender.

In line with Bourdieu's notion of reflexivity, turning my objectifying gaze upon myself and becoming aware of hidden assumptions is very critical (Karakayalı, 2004: 352). In the framework of Bourdieu's conceptualization of "intellectualist bias" (Bourdieu et.al., 1991a), things are complicated and uncertain to deal with, hence Karakayalı argues, taking intellectualist bias in a sense that it "(...) operates by taking abstract rules or classifications in a society too literally, believing that people 'follow' them blindly in practice" is more plausible (2004: 362). Though my habitus, my social positioning, defines the boundaries of my analytical thinking, the sources of my bias can be diverse but, especially, my gender and social position as a researcher might have leading role. As a woman who was born in Izmir, last daughter of a family of three children, and a researcher who has *gender lens* since graduate studies, I realized that I have devalued the divergent effects of culture and power relationships. Remembering Moghadam's vital argument that emphasizes gender and sexuality as two pillars of non-Western cultures, and also her conception of "[C]ulture masks more than it reveals" has opened the door of my critical analytical thinking (Moghadam, 1994: 22).

In this context, so as to destabilize self-evident argumentations, I have first widened my horizon and try to see the big picture.

True: Turkey is a land of military coups, repressive policies, violations of human rights – but also a land whose cultural pluralism ill suits that picture. Land of the world's biggest

shopping malls, tallest hotels, gaudiest shop windows, but also inaccessible villages, deserted farmlands, and cities ringed by shanty towns. (...) Land of people proud that their Republic recognized the legal rights of women as its founding, but who feel constantly threatened by femininity. (...) Land of strong religious communities where people expect the army to protect them against religion's threat; of people who boast of a great empire's legacy yet lost their ties to that of cultural inheritance long ago. (Gürbilek, 2011: 1-2)

In the framework of the paragraph above, Turkey can be considered as a land of contradictions, especially from the perspective of ambivalences created by Kemalist modernization project and also polarities crystallized by 1980s. As the literature on Turkish politics proves students of Turkish politics analyze the history of Turkish politics and its effects on today's political and cultural climate with lenses that focus on secularizing Kemalist reforms and its from above characteristics or 1980s as a turning point in cultural life "(...) whose effects endured after military had gone" (Gürbilek, 2011: 4).

From the perspective of turning points, it is vital to examine modernization efforts firstly. Modernization efforts started during late Ottoman period when the Empire weakened and reforms in political and militaristic fields were inevitable. Tanzimat Reform era (1839- 1871) as a turning and starting point for the modernization have witnessed not only structural changes but also cultural reforms (Zürcher, 2004; Mardin, 1983; Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Significantly, gender and family issues demarcated the frontier line for the reforms (Göle, 1997; Duben and Behar, 1991). As Duben and Behar (1991) analyze, family as the basic unity symbolized the flaws and crises in daily lives. Such crises in values touched firstly male elites as the patriarch in the family and also in the Empire. However, efforts of modernization accompanied by the guide of the West deepen its effects towards the late Ottoman period and the gap among Westernized, not-Westernized and over-

Westernized increased (Bilgin, 2004). For Bilgin (2004), from a symbolic perspective, the West was considered as a woman and over-Westernization meant feminization. Hence, *modern* man of that period labeled as *dandy* who was seen as a departure from virile masculine and, in parallel way, feminized image (Brummett, 2000). Considering as effeminate was one of the primary threats to masculine identity and has situated masculinity to its prior place within the networks of society. Such a dynamic process left its footprints into everyday lives as well. In this perspective, it can be argued that although structural changes have had very significant effects on functioning of a given society, cultural reforms have challenged the way people used to think, perceive and act. Hence, reforms on people's mind can be considered as an attempt to challenge un/conscious internalization of people.

The significance of symbolic changes is the reason behind why Turkish modernity has been examined within the delicate balance between traditional and modern. Turkey entered into a new period with the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Mustafa Kemal and his friends initiated institutional, social and cultural reforms so as to modernize the country. In line with this, Keyman (2006) argues that the Kemalist modernization can be considered as an attempt to combine societal and cultural modernization and its recent crisis with the emergence of alternative claims of modernity constitute the background of fragmentation. While some analyses of modernization processes have concentrated on its effects on state tradition (Heper 1985), some have put emphasis on its effects on religion (Sayarı, 1984; Yavuz, 2009) or rapid urban transformation (Keleş, 1985; Nalbantoğlu 1997) while others concentrated on shifts within society (Mardin, 1985, Kasaba, 1997; Keyman, 2006). In addition, gender focus studies (Kadioğlu, 1980; Kandiyoti, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1997; Parla, 1998; Y. Arat, 1998) examine the multifaceted process with a gender lens and

try to scrutinize micro level's changes effects on macro changes. With the interplay between micro and macro changes, typologies were simultaneously constructed through gendered identities. Dichotomies of the reforms were not only reified in identities like traditional/modern; urban/villager but also typologies as dandies, *kabadayı* (tough uncle), girl/women of the Republic have been constructed. This pattern has continued its survival with shifts and/or breaks and shaped the contours of Turkish political culture from the very beginning.

Not only the Ottoman times and early Republican period, but also the last decades of the 20th century were very significant for Turkey as well. In post World War I period, Turkey allied with the West against Communist threat. Especially defending the regime has been major concern for politicians and military officers (Yavuz, 2009: 28). This period on insecurities has started to reinforce the guardian role of the military. In 1945, transition to multi party politics occurred in Turkey and for Yavuz (2009) such a transition flourished the tensions between state elites and military officers while the CHP, that has had guarding role of Kemalism, did not have enough power. However, military's symbolic position has never decreased while war conditions, World War II and Cold War, enhanced its power. Such an empowerment resulted in three military interventions (1960, 1971 and 1980). Military intervened into politics in the name of restoration of order and has fulfilled its duty as the guardian of the regime (Cizre, 1993; Heper, 2005).

Post-1980 period is another crucial period for Turkish politics. This period "(...) was dominated by the politics of identity and the search for individual wealth, along with the introduction of a new political language about privatization, human rights and civil society" (Yavuz, 2009: 29). The potent change that took place in Turkey, has created social and cultural transformations, especially on gendered

identities. The revival of Islamic political identity coincided with this period. Gürbilek (2011) defines this period as “return of the repressed”. The repressed Islamist tone in institutional and individual level has awakened.

In this context, Turgut Özal introduced measures to ease restrictions on Islamic practices and beliefs during his six years as prime minister. For Jenkins,

(...) he appears to have been content to continue to regulate society through secular laws while simultaneously coloring society itself – including culture, identity, and the public space- with an increasingly Islamic hue; or, from the perspective of his more pious supporters, enabling society’s true colors to emerge from beneath its Kemalist veneer. (2008: 149)

In the framework of Kemalists’ ignorance of religion as constructing “social ethos”, Islamists’ alternative way has not been welcomed (Mardin 1983: 156). Mustafa Kemal’s reforms did not challenge Islam but the traditional value system that had come to be associated with religion (Jenkins, 2008: 101). In line with Norris and Inglehart, “economic growth, socio-economic equality and human development result in long term changes in existential security, leading to the erosion of religious values, beliefs and practices.” (2004: 2). Hence, traditional value system has become coated with religious legitimacy. Although the reforms of Kemalism did not aim “(...) to disestablish religion but rather to create a set of institutions and a legal system to control, use and reinvent Islam, if necessary, for the furtherance of national and state interests.” (Yavuz, 2009: 38). The task of the state was to organize social and political life in accordance with Kemalist principles and, in line, alternative tones, namely Islamist rhetoric, was not tolerated.

The liberalistic atmosphere of post-1980 period has provided suitable ground for the construction of alternative identities. From the perspective of gender, the construction of Islamist identities represented a challenge to the old order. For

Bilgin, new Islamist identities, represented “(...) a new form that combines both established gender patterns and modern styles” (2004: 193). Hence, while they were adapting modern necessities of the era, they did not divorce from traditional heritages. The reflections of this period of change and also the antagonism between Islamists and Kemalists manifest themselves in identities. Hence, while the paradigmatic changes in political and social life in Turkey have created a shift in discourses, it has also deepened the dualistic nature of Turkish politics. In the framework of continuities, shifts and breaks, in other words, the imbalances or fragmentations are clues for “(...) cultural negotiations of engendered modernity” (Bilgin, 2004: 75). In order to reveal new insights and deconstruct traditional roots, it is significant to analyze the cultural repertoire of Turkish politics and also the codes of gendered practices in general, masculinities in particular. In addition, on the basis of the decisiveness of micro aspects of a given culture, culturally loaded concepts that have shaped everyday life discourses have not been ignored. These concepts, statements, sayings are clues for *cultural negotiations of engendered daily lives*. For instance, in Turkish, power as a noun (*iktidar*) has two meanings. One is the common one, shared with other languages, but the other has a connotation of sexuality in that its negation, being powerless, means a man’s having erectile dysfunction. This usage is embedded into daily conversations and commonly used. In the framework of this example, it can be argued that power encapsulates masculine ideals and such usage stigmatizes males as unmanly in a way by not properly performing its *sexual role as he is supposed to*. The usages of *adam olmak* (being man/men), *adam gibi davranmak* (behaving like men/man) are also very common and can be listed as the examples of gendered language. Both usages define a set of the norms of hegemonic masculinity – toughness, integrity,

appositeness – and expect men to behave accordingly. Hence, an ideal manhood has been inculcated into the language, everyday lives and culture. Political domain is the most popular site that enshrines this embeddedness and, accordingly, politicians promote a form of hegemonic masculinity that “(...) deploys norms of manhood to justify dominant authority.” (Kann, 1998: 28).

With this background, this dissertation aims to mainly destabilize the embeddedness of politics and masculinity. Behind this relationship, there are hierarchical gender relations that encapsulate power struggles. That’s why analyses of patriarchal relations and oppression of women are based on power imbalances within a given society. In this line, this dissertation aims to think beyond the boundaries. With the need to think of gender in general, masculinities in particular not as a singular sex role but as a multiple configurations, this study takes masculinities not as a genetic role set but rather as a network of practices, discourses, symbols and meanings. Such a dynamic approach enables the writer to discuss in a more reproductive way and the reader to comprehend the picture as a whole. Hence, this dissertation mainly question whether men from different backgrounds experience the praxis of being men rather than disposing of their deep leftist, rightist, Islamist or nationalist background. By revealing the codes of gendered field of politics, this dissertation aims to fill an important gap in the literature on masculinities in Turkey.

Men and masculinities and its embeddedness in politics are an area that has been almost untouched in the Turkish context. While there are some important studies in the Western literature that analyze in depth man and masculinities in specific country contexts (e.g. Nye, 1993; Foyster, 1999; Robertson and Suzuki, 2002; McCormack, 2007), in Turkey there are very few studies. In recent years, there is an increased interest in the studies focusing on the construction of masculinities.

The studies that scrutinized modernization efforts and the construction of masculinities generally focus the perspective of men and their supremacy and/or *victimized* status.¹ Studies on masculine rituals and their significance in daily lives are also important for grasping the cultural background for understanding masculinized power relations.² There have also been a significant number of dissertations on men and masculinities.³ For example, the dissertation of Elif Bilgin analyzes the Turkish experience of modernity through the discourses of masculinities, with specific focus on the secularist/Islamist dichotomy, while the very recent study of Serpil Sancar, *Masculinity: Impossible Power* (2009), analyzes the construction of masculinity and power relations. She investigates the construction of masculinity in the family and daily life from an economic perspective, drawing on data from sixty in-depth interviews with both uneducated and educated men. The number of journal articles and book chapters on men and masculinities in Turkey has also been increasing.⁴ The research presented in this dissertation attempts to analyze the construction of masculinities in relation to Turkish political culture and political parties. Moreover, none of these analyze manhood and the construction of masculinity in politics as a field through investigating the leaders of political parties. For the field of political party analysis, such research on the identity side remains quite unresearched, too. Some studies do focus on the ideological space of political parties from the perspective of party leaders (Heper and Landau, 1991; Rubin and Heper, 2002; Heper and Sayarı, 2002), while there are also a number of empirical

¹ See Koyuncu & Onur 2004; Saraçgil 2005.

² See Acıman 2008; Selek 2008.

³ Akyüz 2005; Kundakçı 2007

⁴ Toplum Bilim, V: 101; Birikim, V: 240; Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce V: 9.

studies on voter preferences that examine the ideological positions of parties (Özbudun, 1976; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000). However, a study that analyzes men and masculinities in political parties is absent.

As the intertwined relation of masculinity and politics, namely its embeddedness, does not offer so many spaces to penetrate into, this dissertation aims to fill the gap in the literature by incorporating *the man question* into the Turkish political context. In addition, this dissertation will contribute to the literature by incorporating the man question with the guidance of Bourdieuan analytical tools. His perspective and way of analyzing will offer a more dynamic way of discussing representations of different masculinities.

1.2. The Scope

The main goal of this section is drawing the boundaries of the analysis of the construction of masculinities in Turkish political parties, namely the AKP (Justice and Development Party – *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*), the CHP (Republican People’s Party – *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), and, the MHP (Nationalist Action Party – *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*).

Firstly, as it has been mentioned before, though there are number of gender studies about the role of women, her significance in nation building projects, participation in politics; however there are relatively few studies that focuses on the location of men and the constructions of man and masculinities in Turkey. Additionally, this dissertation is also significant in terms of focusing on an arena that has been missed, namely the construction of manhood in politics. As it has been mentioned before, there are very few studies that touch man and masculinities in

Turkey as a case. Moreover, none of the studies analyze manhood and construction of masculinity in politics through political parties. Although the PhD dissertation of Elif Bilgin analyzes the Kemalist and Islamist masculinities in early Republican era, there is not a comprehensive study that traces different paths of masculinities in relatively current Turkish political life.

For the field of research on political party, as a study on identity of the political parties is quite untouched and especially a study that analyzes men and masculinities in political parties is absent. Therefore, this dissertation addresses this gap in the literature with its emphasis on the issue of masculinity(ies), femininity(ies), politics, and political parties.

This study examines Turkish political parties so as to reveal the patterns behind the construction of masculinities. As Turkish politics has generally been considered as “party politics”, political parties are the main unit of analysis of this dissertation (Frey, 1965 cited in Z. Arat, 2008). Political parties are important political machineries and serve as “mediators and communication channels between the state apparatus and the public at large”, in addition, “(...) they act as the main vehicle of political participation” in representative democracies (Z. Arat, 2008: 7). For Arat (2008), the role of political parties in formulating policies so as to win elections make them the key players in shaping discourse of the country. In line, in Turkey, political parties are the main actors in functioning of politics. The powerful role of political parties started to be burgeon with the foundation of the Republic in 1923 that situated the CHP as the main political organization of the Kemalist reform era and such a strong role has substantiated itself with transition to multi party politics in 1945. Özbudun argues that political parties in Turkey have been the most institutionalized political entities and overwhelming presence of leaders has been

common characteristics of Turkish political parties (1996: 136-137). The domination of leaders which has not allowed room to intra party democracy serve as developing personalistic style of leadership.

Research Questions: This dissertation analyzes the construction of masculinities in Turkish politics with specific focus on political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP between 2000 and 2008. So as to reveal the codes behind the embeddedness of masculinities and politics, it will deconstruct not only gender perspective of the parties but also analyze the leaders –Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal, Devlet Bahçeli- discourses on masculinities. This study will also have the chance to compare their different construction of masculinities with reference to their habitus. Turkish political culture and the codes of Turkish masculinities will not be underemphasized as they constitute the main pillars for the analysis of Turkish political manhood. Therefore, in this line mainly this dissertation is a gendered study of political men in Turkey and the main research questions are as follows:

- (1) How does politics shape masculinities in Turkey?
- (2) How does masculinities shape politics in Turkey?
- (3) What are the different representations of masculinities?
- (4) How does different habitus produce different constructions of masculinities in the field of Turkish politics?

Selection of parties: In Turkish political setting, mainly three political stances have historically shaped the whole discourse. Sayarı (2002) mentions that there are three principal blocs; namely centre-right, centre-left, extreme right consist of

Islamist and nationalist sides. However, in current political atmosphere, it is hard to apply this schema.

First, for the AKP, while the roots of the party have Islamist tone, the party positions itself as centre-right party. Leading cadre of the party declared that they were not Muslim democrats but conservative democrats (Heper, 2003). The aim of the party to represent a new political perception, discourse, method and culture is articulated under the political identity as follows: “(...) a political identity that we express as conservative democracy represents a very significant approach not only for Turkey but also for world politics.”⁵. In addition, in the framework of the construction of masculinities, the AKP and its model of neo-Muslim masculinities is very critical to be questioned.

Secondly, the CHP predominantly represents centre-left votes. Despite heavy criticism from liberal socialist interest groups, the CHP defines itself as social democrat party. Although, the party has experienced declines and started to be known as “the party of congresses, political struggles, and internal strife”, its deep rooted institutions make the CHP a very crucial actor in Turkish politics (Ayata, 2002). For the construction of masculinities, the party and its Kemalist/Secular mode of masculinities has also great significance.

Thirdly, the MHP represents a significant tradition of Turkish political life. As a nationalist deep-rooted party, it represents strong nationalist discourse of the Turkish political climate. The MHP echoes nationalist discourse inclusive from

⁵ From the speech delivered by the party leader R. Tayyip Erdoğan in the International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy, on 10. January.2004.
<http://www.akparti.org.tr/siyasivehukuk/dokuman/ing.%20başbakan%20konuşma%20UMDS.doc>

moderate to rigid tones (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002; Heper and İnce, 2006). The party is also very critical as it represents nationalist masculinities.

Finally, it is also significant to mention the reason behind the absence of some political parties within the scope of this dissertation. Some centre-right parties, such as the ANAP (Motherland Party), the DYP (True Path Party), and centre-left party, namely the DSP (Democratic Left Party) have been away from office for a period of time. Hence, their influence has decreased in terms of shaping political atmosphere. Moreover, although the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) represents another deep rooted political stance in Turkey, as a pro-Kurdish political party, an analysis of this party requires a different approach that integrates gender and ethnicity intersection.⁶ In other words, if the BDP is taken into consideration, other variants, such as ethnicity, regionalism, are needed to be analyzed as loaded conceptualization, will be beyond the scope of this study.

In this framework, based on the hegemony of leaders in conducting party politics and representing three prominent political parties in Turkish politics, this dissertation will mainly analyze the construction of masculinities of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the leader of the AKP, Deniz Baykal as the leader of the CHP, and Devlet Bahçeli as the leader of the MHP.

Research Time Framework: These newspapers and other secondary data including party programs and election manifests between 2000 and 2008 will be re-read and re-analyzed. Mainly, the reason behind of choosing this period lies in its significance in terms of Turkish political life. Secondly, as Sayarı (2002) mentions,

⁶ For a detailed analysis of gender and Kurdish ethnicity, see Altınay 2004.

there has been the transition from coalition government to a single-party majority rule. A newly formed political party, the AKP, has become the major actor of Turkish politics. Additionally, as has been mentioned, in the Turkish political arena that had been shaped by strong state traditions, political parties are left to their own devices in the political sphere. The role of military as a stabilizing factor started to diminish in a political atmosphere marked by the consolidation of democracy and the membership to the EU. Thirdly, the sharp rise of the AKP is another significant factor that needs to be deeply analyzed. Such a major party, with a National Outlook background in its grassroots, is at the center of Turkish politics with a charismatic leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Finally, the analysis covers years between 2000 and 2008 that two national elections held in Turkey. As it is discussed in the literature⁷, rhetorical strategies that favor gendered hierarchy and images of manhood are used in campaigns. Election times are marked by increase in gendered rhetorics as the atmosphere of election requires *men's issues*. “Most obviously, the electoral playing field is dominated by men.” (Carroll and Fox, 2010: 2). Especially, as elections are described in terms of metaphors and analogies drawn for masculine domains of battlefields and hence requires the strategy to damage the opponent. In addition, not only the rhetoric but also behaviors of candidates are loaded in gendered terms. General perception asks dominant and assertive qualities. Therefore, so as to reach general public, politicians strategize about how to present themselves to voters (Carroll and Fox, 2010). In this perspective, it can be argued that during election times, gender matters. Hence, the structural changes in Turkish politics, the sharp

⁷ See Svendsen, 2007; Carroll and Fox, 2010

rise of the AKP and two national elections are the main determining factors for the research time period of the dissertation.

1.3 Methodological Framework

The dissertation will mainly use the method of discourse analysis that is extensively used by scholars of cultural and feminist studies. This method attempts to reveal the hidden meanings within a text and argues that every text is shaped within a discourse and discursive practices. As such it is nurtured by a deconstructive reading.

In order to have a clearer picture about discourse analysis, it is relevant to mention that this method is a type of content analysis. Researchers in many fields, including anthropology, information studies, management, political science, psychology, and sociology have utilized content analysis. The range and procedures of content analysis is enormous, and its varieties include discourse analysis, ethnographic analysis, rhetorical analysis, and narrative semiotics (White and Marsh, 2006: 23).

Deconstruction is an additional term that refers to the examination of texts (Reinharz, 1992: 148). Deconstructionist rereading is a tool “(...) to display the ways in which what appears to be amalgamated whole is in fact made up of distinct clusters of meanings” (Bilgin, 2004: 46). In the framework of this dissertation, for example, deconstructionist rereading will enable the writer and/or reader to analyze the construction of masculinities through separating it into its constituent parts.

At this point, the key word for the method of this dissertation is discourse. The simplest definition of discourse is “(...) a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002:

1). Newspapers, books, and journal articles can be read through critical lenses and studied as texts. As Reinhartz mentions “(...) these products stem from every aspect of human life including relatively private worlds, high culture, popular culture and organizational life. The only limit to what can be considered as a cultural artifact is the researcher’s imagination” (1992: 146). Therefore, it can be said that every meaning-producing *thing* in a given society is potentially an object of analysis; the scholar chooses his/her subject among these in accordance with what the social and political atmospheres highlight as important in generating meaning. In addition, the scholar chooses the subject of inquiry with a critical approach to taken for granted and also accumulated knowledge. As this knowledge is shaped by culturally specific and contingent representations of the world, researcher aims to reread the text and maintain specific social patterns.

Another significant approach that is valuable to discuss is critical discourse analysis. Norman Fairclough is the leading scholar who places emphasis on active role of discourse and also intertextuality. Fairclough defines intertextuality as “(...) how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts.” (Fairclough, 2003: 17). Hence, it refers to the condition that all communicative events are based on earlier events. Especially from the perspective of what is said and unsaid, critical discourse analysis puts emphasis on a text’s influence on history. The analysis of established meanings and both the analysis of what text says and what text silences is the tool for examining multifaceted social patterns. Hence, focusing on patterns of masculinity will not lead us to isolate social contexts. In Fairclough’s book with Chouliaraki (1999), Bourdieu’s concept of field is discussed. As field is a domain that is shaped by a specific social logic, actors of the field struggle to attain same aim and position themselves accordingly. For instance, in

politics as a field, politicians compete to gain power and they are positioned in terms of their relative strength. Therefore, the discourses within the field of politics can be considered as “resources for differentiation” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 15). Moreover, the writers aptly argue that “[i]deologies are discursive constructions” and add that “[w]e may say that the discourse of one practice colonises that of another, or that the latter appropriates the former, depending on how power relations are expressed as relations between practices and discourses.” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 26-27). Hence, discourses, ideologies, power relations are interconnected and “uncovering the social mechanisms” requires a dynamic rereading (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 51).

Having defined these essential points about the framework of analysis, it is valuable to mention about how this method will be employed in this study. Political parties are the main unit of analysis. The AKP, the CHP and the MHP’s, in general, their leaders, in particular, will be examined in terms of the construction of masculinities. The given political parties programs and election manifests will be re-read through a critical lens that focuses on some tentative questions and/or conceptualizations on the construction of patterns of masculinity and patterns of womanhood as they are relational, mutually constructed concepts. These party programs and elections manifests were re-read with a specific focus on gender. The part on women and family were analyzed in depth.

In addition to parties’ publications, this dissertation also analyzes the newspapers *Hürriyet*, *Zaman*, and *Cumhuriyet*. First, the newspapers are chosen according to their different stances on politics. *Hürriyet* (Liberal), *Cumhuriyet* (Kemalist/Secularist) and *Zaman* (Political Islam) are deep-rooted newspapers that each has a long established circle of readers.

As Ware mentions party programs are a party's public face, so they only reflect the surface of political group's beliefs. So, to analyze the party, one must question the discursive side of the group's beliefs. Hence, in this perspective, the leaders' sayings and their declarations in public sphere are significant as well.

On the basis of the main elements of Turkish political culture that are discussed in coming chapters, three newspapers scanned on the first stage with key words of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. The second step was to scan chosen news with key words of man (*erkek/adam*), woman (*kadın/kız*), being man (*erkek/adam olmak*). At this step, culturally loaded terms, statements were not detached from the analysis and they were categorized accordingly. For instance, being man (*adam olmak*) is a popular expression in Turkish. It refers to individual who behave accordingly to norms widely accepted by others. Hence, an individual who act, think, behave gendered in masculine. In parallel to the expression of being man (*adam olmak*), there is also the saying of like man (*adam gibi*). Like being man, this saying is used as an adjective to culturally accepted practices that are considered as true and also valuable. Another culturally loaded term is tough man (*kabadayı*). Tough man denotes to a traditional virile image.⁸ In addition, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has generally been criticized and/or appreciated with his manner of talking, behaving. Hence, the significance of tough uncle lies behind in its traditional role and also its reification with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another expression that is important for the scope of this dissertation is the relationship between man/coward (*erkek/ürkek*). The beginning of this expression dates back to 1999 when the MHP and the FP (Virtue Party) disputed over testing manhood and cowardice. This debate

⁸ The particular significance of tough uncle (*kabadayı*) will be elaborated in next chapters in detail.

which has turned out to be a cliché in political cultural discourse has reproduced itself later on again. For instance, when Hlyya Avşar, a very famous Turkish actress/singer, described Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “coward cat” after the interview conducted with him, got reaction.⁹ The politicians of the AKP criticized Hlyya Avşar and mentioned that “We used to see him as a lion”.¹⁰ Therefore, man/coward discourse has a very important role in popular discourse and such expressions are vital so as to capture how the cultural/political/social discourse is gendered. In sum, it can be argued that whole material, party programs, election manifests, newspapers were analyzed by not detaching it from Turkish political cultural discourse, e.g. metaphors, allegories, expressions.

While the data were analyzed besides the culturally loaded expressions, sayings, any declarations of the leaders about their family, social life, etc. were considered valuable to be analyzed as they contain clues about their habitus. As a family and social life are important determinants of a person’s background, leaders’ declarations about their family were considered as valuable. During analysis all signifiers that effect discursive practices, e.g. personal information, social settings, cultural codes, were taken into consideration.

In summary, the most significant questions that guide the reading and also the analysis can be listed as:

- (1) Are there expressions that are ideologically contested?
- (2) What metaphors are used?
- (3) Is there rewording or overwording?

⁹ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/10105079.asp>

¹⁰ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=10114213>

- (4) Does the material imply something about how men in concern position themselves?
- (5) How do the men in concern position their family?
- (6) How do the men in concern say about other men?
- (7) Do dilemmas arise about any issue concerning gender?

In conclusion, this study examines the leaders of Turkish political parties with a special lens on their personal histories, namely the classificatory elements of their habitus by not detaching it from social setting. Therefore, divergent personal histories of the leaders are not the sole unit of analysis. Turkish political background in general, and Turkish political culture in particular, will be scrutinized in line with the hypotheses of the study.

1.4 The Organization of the Dissertation

It is possible to divide this dissertation into three parts. The first part introduces the background and the theoretical terrain that this study is based on. This part starts with Chapter 2. This chapter will first define sex and gender as starting point. It will then introduce the scope of feminist studies and then the trajectory of masculinity studies. This discussion is followed by the introduction of Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical framework. Chapter 2 will discuss Pierre Bourdieu as his theoretical conceptualizations offer the outline for the theoretical terrain of this dissertation. Bourdieu's theory on gender and the decisive elements of his theory, mainly, body, habitus, language, field, and, capital will be defined. The chapter will also highlight the congruent relation between habitus and the field. The chapter will examine the notion of masculine domination and the concept of nobility as the

background of Bourdieu's theory and its specificity within the scope of this dissertation. Chapter 2 finally states the critiques on Bourdieu.

Chapter 3 discusses men and masculinities in general. It first tries to touch the discussions around defining masculinity/masculinities and then focuses more on the masculinities in Turkey and tries to define different paths of masculinities in Turkey. Neo-Muslim masculinities with reference to the AKP, Kemalist/Secular masculinities with reference to the CHP and Nationalist masculinities with reference to the MHP will be discussed towards developing typologies of masculinities in Turkey.

Chapter 4 aims to trace different paths of masculinities with specific focus on Turkish political culture. It first briefly analyzes Turkish politics from the period when modernization efforts has been increased. Turkish modernization project will be discussed with focus on Ottoman heritages and its emphasis on the detachment from the past. The gender perspective of the Kemalist reforms will constitute the main part of the discussion. The construction of gendered identities in general, masculinities in particular will be analyzed in a detailed way. The second part of the chapter will outline different paths of masculinities in Turkish political culture. Five main parameters of the Turkish political culture are chosen in line with the literature and they have been discussed with a specific reference to the construction of masculinities. These parameters are identified as (1) strong state tradition; (2) militarism; (3) Westernization; (4) Secularists /Islamists cleavage; and finally (5) domination of leaders will be elaborated in accordance with the codes of Turkish masculinities as (1) *Devlet Baba*, (2) Every male (Turk) is born soldier, (3) *Mon Cher* vs. *Kabadayı* (Tough Uncle), and (4) Kemalist/Modern vs. Muslim Traditional Man. Hence, it re-situates Turkish manhood in the political cultural codes.

Chapter 5 constitutes this dissertation's analytical discussion part through political parties. This chapter will analyze gendered structure of the Turkish political parties. Then it will first examine gender discourse of the official party documents, namely, party programs and election manifests. It will question the AKP's official documents from the perspective of whether or not it offers a new approach. Secondly, it will examine the CHP's documents by scrutinizing its liberal approach. Thirdly, the official party documents of the MHP will be analyzed and its deep rooted nationalist approach's traces will be followed. This chapter finally re-situates typologies of masculinities in Turkey, and, in this framework it will discuss how the traditional gender order and the glorification of the family have been reified.

Chapter 6 analyzes Turkish political manhood and mainly questions the role of the different habitus in field of politics. It will first adapt Bourdieuan perspective into the analysis of the construction of political manhood in Turkish political parties with a specific lens through their leaders. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP, will be elaborated with a focus on his *kabadayı* (tough uncle) manner of doing politics will be scrutinized. The leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, and his stance in Turkish political life will be examined as he acts like the guardian of Kemalism. Devlet Bahçeli's, the leader of the MHP, manner of conducting politics will be analyzed with a specific focus on his fatherhood role.

Chapter 7 is the final part of the analytical discussion of the dissertation. This part will examine political parties and their leaders' constructions of different masculinities and their representations in the field of politics. It will re-read the data collected from the newspapers with a lens that reveal explicit and/or hidden codes of masculinities. First the AKP and its leader's neo-Muslim masculinities, secondly the CHP and its leader's Kemalist/Secular masculinities and finally the MHP and its

leader's nationalist masculinities will be elaborated. These three different representations of masculinities will be scrutinized from the perspective of how the understandings of (1) politics is male, (2) politician is male are incorporated into their discourses.

Chapter 8 is the concluding part that discusses the framework of the dissertation and its strengths. It will also open alternative ways for the discussions in the field of Turkish politics and constructions of masculinities.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL TERRAIN

The pioneering efforts by feminist scholars to *make women visible*, both in the traditional curriculum of political science, sociology, anthropology and in the newly established interdisciplinary field of women's studies, have been signs of success as well as signs of transformation of traditional methods of inquiry into human life. Gender is one of the axes around which social life is organized and can be considered as a lens through which we can see the familiar in a different way. All current work on women/femininities and men/masculinities proceed from this insight about the centrality of gender in social, political and individual life. Gender is a social reality and a frame of understanding in the construction of this dissertation. This study is not primarily concerned with gender relations; it is concerned with gendered discourses/constructions/meanings. Therefore, defining sex and gender is a valuable place to start.

2.1. Defining the Boundaries between Sex and Gender

The questions raised by earlier advocates of feminism put the “nature versus nurture debate” at the forefront. Simone de Beauvoir, in her illuminating book *The*

Second Sex (1952), highlights that civilization as a whole has produced the female other while woman is not determined by her body and/or hormones but rather within social, economic context in which her body is situated. Woman's physical appearance does not constitute a criterion for woman's social, political, or economic position; it is the society that produces a suitable *role* for women. These roles, namely gender roles, specify the ways in which men and women are expected to behave, think, and even feel.

To put it simply "Sex refers to the biological apparatus, the male and female – our chromosomal, chemical, and anatomical organization. Gender refers to the meanings that are attached to those differences within a culture." (Kimmel and Aronson, 2003: xvi). It can be argued that, sex is male and female; gender is masculinity and femininity. Gender is perceived and reflected, as well as internalized, and acts and behaviors are assigned by society in accordance with what is supposed to be *normal* for each sex. They are the expression and product of structures of social practice, whereby objective structures (division of labor and power relations) and subjective characteristics (patterns of behaviors and thoughts) correspond with each other (Connell, 2002; Bourdieu, 2001). This understanding of gender considers the term as a constantly shifting product of society and the relation between each of them as relational and hierarchical. Ever since classical Greece, "gender has been understood as a series of binary polarities" (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 22). For instance, so as to have a definition of masculinity as strong, rational, and competent, it is *necessary* to see femininity as fragile, emotional and incompetent.¹¹ In the framework of this alterity - otherness, one's status as an

outsider - it can be said that the differences between and across categories of man and woman can easily turn into ideological fictions, and thus politicized (Whitehead and Barrett, 2001: 23).¹² Hence, within this framework for the conceptualization of gender in this dissertation, now, taking a closer look at the evolution of feminist theory and how feminist scholars question the issue of gender before analyzing masculinity studies.

2.2. Questioning Gender

Questioning of the notion of gender began with the search for a response to enormous change that had overtaken women's lives with the growth of industrial capitalism and research on gender differences and the socialization of women started during mid-20th century (Carrigan et al., 1985: 554). As a concept that had developed during 1930s, the notion of role was applied to gender with Talcott Parson's classical formulation of sex role theory (Carrigan et al., 1985: 555). Parsons questioned socialization and structures, and he rejected arguments involving the biological differences between man and woman. However, his arguments were based on normative standard cases. For instance, he points out that "(...) the masculine personality tends more to the predominance of instrumental interests, needs and functions, (...) while feminine personality tends more to the *primacy* of expressive

¹¹ For a detailed analysis, see: Bordo, S. (1993) *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and the Body*. Berkeley: University of California. She discusses how the image of woman as gentle, domestic, or sensitive is necessary to sustain an image of man as cool, strong, or rational.

¹² For detailed information about the embodiment of differences and normalization, see Silverman, K. (1992) *Male Subjectivity at the Margins*. New York: Routledge. Moreover, some works highlight how masculine gender performance applies to women's lives. See Holberstam, Judith. 1998. *Female Masculinity*. London: Duke University Press.

interests, needs and functions” (Parsons and Bares, 1953: 101). This mentioned issue of primacy preoccupied intellectual arena throughout the 1970s.

Feminist theory throughout the 1970s was preoccupied with this mentioned “issue of primacy” (Adkins and Skeggs, 2004). The problem of primacy emerged as a question of whether subordination on the basis of sex was the most urgent problem facing women. It was clear that the answer and/or the solution to this problem could be eradicated only by transforming deep-rooted social structures and relations (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993).

2.2.1. Feminist Studies

The first sustained Western feminist theoretical work was Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792). “Wollstonecraft pointed the direction for later feminism by arguing that biological sex differences were entirely irrelevant to granting political rights.” (Jaggar and Rottenberg, 1993: 117). Thus, women’s social inequality is the result, not the justification, of apparent inferiority. In addition, for the early feminist thinkers, the reason behind this result is the women’s inferior education (Jaggar and Rottenberg, 1993). In this perspective, early feminist thinkers questioned social and political inequalities and they criticized the domination of men and, also, promoted the ideals of equality.

“Liberal feminists favor gender equality in the sense of equal opportunities for men and women - a sense continuous with the classical liberal interpretation of equality-” (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993: 117). Liberal feminists are specifically concerned with the issue of equal opportunities and the line between public and private spheres. For them, enhancing the status of women and also improving their

educational prospects requires a reordering of domestic life. Hence, a reform in public life simultaneously transforms private life and the roles of women within. As Carol Pateman mentions, public and private dichotomy is central to almost all feminist writings, and “it is ultimately what the feminist movement is about” (1989: 118).

While liberal feminists put special emphasis on equal opportunities, Marxist feminists reject the conservative notion of an essentialist and biologically determined human nature. Marxists also challenge the liberal assumption that equality of opportunity can only be possible under capitalism where a small class of people, the capitalist class, controls the productive resources of the society and exploits the labor of the working class (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993). Therefore, they claim that the existence of class-based society is the original cause of women’s subordination.

While the mentioned deep-rooted feminist theoretical approaches point out different targets for gender inequality, radical feminists object to opportunity and class reductionism of earlier feminists. For radical feminists women’s subordination as a widespread form of domination is a primary concern as it is deeply established in individual psyches and social practices. Shulamith Firestone’s *The Dialectic of Sex* (1970) offered courageous propositions to the academic debate on women’s subordination. She does not regard sex as unchangeable. Firestone (1970) argued that related to advanced technology, it seems possible to compensate for biological inequalities by permitting extrauterine reproduction, namely test-tube babies. However, Firestone reduces women and men to the biological categories of female and male as the book’s key assumption is that “(...) women necessarily suffer from fundamentally oppressive biological condition but biology in itself is neither oppressive nor liberating” (Pateman, 1989: 126). Therefore, such a Hobbesian

reduction of individuals to their natural state leads theoretical discussions to a dead-end. Developing a perspective that takes account of social relations, everyday life and institutions, and, in parallel, constructing the liaison between micro and macro politics are necessary.

These three mainstream feminist approaches not only enrich the academic curriculum, but they also lead scholars to question *silences* or established social norms. “There is silence about the part of the story which reveals that the social contract is a fraternal pact that constitutes civil society as a patriarchal or masculine order.” (Pateman, 1989: 33). Hence, as questioning silences is necessary, this dissertation will try to understand the background of masculine order and will help to expose other unquestioned dynamics that perform within politics. Examining masculinity studies and comprehending its inquiry will enable us to map how to deconstruct hidden or in a way taken for granted conceptualizations.

2.2.2 Masculinity Studies

The area of masculinity studies started to develop in the 1970s. The prominent terms of this early wave of masculinity studies were simply coalesced around the terms of restrictions, disadvantages, and general penalties attached to being a man (Connell 2001; 2005; Kimmel et. al., 2005). This period’s students of gender, in general, and masculinity, in particular, criticized the traditional masculine-value system. They questioned how the traditional system has victimized men, or in other words, they mostly scrutinized how men have been oppressed by their roles. Hence, during 1970s, the literature on men and masculinity was focused on men’s liberation (Adams and Savran, 2002). Moreover, gay liberation movements, at the

end of 1960s, heightened their political significance and acted as catalyst to the first wave of masculinity studies (Adams and Savran, 2002). Due to these developments, masculinity was no longer taken as a monolithic entity and patriarchy attaining a universal status as the single cause of the oppression of women started to be questioned. “What is to be a man?” had become a significant question, and critiques and analyses of masculinity appeared from several research areas (Carrigan et al., 1985: 551). This generation challenged the unexamined ideology that old models had reproduced domination of men over women by highlighting the significance of masculine dominance over feminine traits. Moreover, the question of how some aspects of men’s lives and experiences are constrained has been scrutinized. For Victor Seidler, men needed to take seriously what men felt and thought about themselves (1997:3). These first writings were a kind of a request to voice their experiences in their own terms. In addition, this first wave of masculinity studies has analyzed and tried to change institutionalized masculine roles in patriarchal institutions (Adams and Savran, 2002: 5). Some of the major books published in this period are *Male Machine* by Marc Feigen Fasteau (1974); *Liberated Man* by Warren Farrell (1974)¹³; *The Forty Nine Percent Majority* by Deborah David and Robert Brannon (1976).¹⁴

¹³ These two books highlight how some aspects of men’s lives and experiences are constrained and mentioned the costs to men’s health, both physically and psychologically. For detailed information, see Carrigan et al., 1985; Hearn, 2000; Kimmel and Aronson, 2003.

¹⁴ This book analyzes the meanings of masculinity in USA by adopting a feminist inspired prism. It points out not only costs but also privileges of being men in USA. For detailed information, see Carrigan et al., 1985; Hearn, 2000; Kimmel and Aronson, 2003.

The second wave of masculinity studies applies to 1980s. This period is also called as mythopoetic men's movement.¹⁵ In 1981, Joseph Pleck's book, *Myth of Masculinity*, criticized sex role theory and attempted to replace it.¹⁶ Pleck reviewed the constituent elements of sex role and argued that certain implicit assumptions have long dominated scientific and popular thinking about sex roles, and he outlined his sex-role strain mentioning that these roles are constraining (Pleck, 1981). For Pleck, the male sex role model is incapable of describing men's experiences (Kimmel and Aronson, 2003). Pleck's book can be easily considered as the first move toward redefining or, namely, revisiting of sex role framework. Sex role literature started to focus on attitudes and the process of internalization of these roles. Especially, the critics from psychoanalysis put emphasis on the naïve understanding of simple social learning and conformity to the rules (Carrigan et al., 1985: 556).¹⁷ The effects of the expansion in the literature and increasing critics were accompanied with the Gay Liberation (Carrigan et. al., 1985: 557). This movement was concerned with the critics of the political structure of sexuality and their arguments led to strengthen a more dynamic approach. With this background, a marked acceleration of concern and curiosity has started in the field of masculinity during the late 1980s.

During the 1980s, the most significant turn in the field was the shift of focus to the notion of masculinities. Scholars have tended to agree that there is a need to

¹⁵ Robert Bly's *Iron John: A Book About Men* (1990) can be considered as the bible of this movement. It was a widespread movement both on ritual process and textual phenomenon. This movement was considered as a moment when men were finally answering the claims of the women's movement. For Bly, men believed that they have been emasculated by feminism and effeminizing culture. For detailed analysis of the mythopoetic men's movement, see: Kimmel, Micheal. (1995). *The Politics of Manhood- Profeminist Men Respond to the Mythopoetic Men's Movement (And the Mythopoetic Leaders Answer)*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

¹⁶ Pleck, Joseph (1981). *The Myth of Masculinity*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

¹⁷ For details of this genre of critics, see: Stock, J., Johnston, M. (1980). *Sex Roles*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

think of masculinity not as a singular sex role but as multiple, contextual constructions. Race, ethnicity, and religion were integrated into the content of the literature. In other words, it has been recognized that a dominant form of masculinity exists in relation to marginalized (men of color, gay men, working class men, etc.) forms of masculinities (Connell, 1987).¹⁸ Robert W. Connell's notion of hegemonic masculinity has been a challenging point that has still been criticized and analyzed in masculinity studies literature.

Connell has introduced the discussion about different forms of masculinity. For Connell, hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women (1987: 183). Connell points out that there are processes that create hegemony, subordination, complicity, and marginalization among masculinities (Connell, 1995). In this perspective, for Connell, “[h]egemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice that embodies the currently accepted solution to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy,” and he adds that it is contrasted with subordinated masculinities (Connell, 1995: 77). Although Connell's definition of masculinity is an illuminating one, the definition and background of masculinity/masculinities is critical to be discussed and next chapter will focus on the issue of defining masculinity/masculinities in detail and will draw the lines for this dissertation. Now, it is significant to shift the focus to another angle of theoretical framework, namely Bourdieuan perspective. Pierre Bourdieu's analyses on gendered identity constructions will complete the theoretical background.

¹⁸ The year 1987 was a significant year. Key stones of the literature were published in this given year. See *The Making of Masculinities* by Harry Brod; *Changing Men* by Michael Kimmel; *The Gender of Oppression* by Jeff Hearn; *Gender and Power* by Robert Connell.

2.3. Reading Bourdieu's Main Concepts

Pierre Bourdieu is a leading French sociologist and philosopher whose works have been very influential in not only sociology but also in other fields of social sciences. Bourdieu's works contribute to social sciences through offering a conceptual framework for a multilevel research and also presenting an outline for "tackling issues of reflexivity in the research process." (Özbilgin and Tatlı, 2005: 855).

Bourdieu takes reflexivity as a critical aspect of any social research that transcends the duality between objectivity and subjectivity as a unique way to unveil social reality hidden by presumptions. Bourdieu explains that

[t]he knowledge we shall call phenomenological sets out to make explicit the truth of primary experience of the social world, i.e. (...) the unquestioning apprehension of the social world which by definition, does not reflect on itself and excludes the question of the conditions of its possibility. The knowledge we shall term objectivist constructs the objective relations (e.g. economic or linguistic) which structure practice and representations of practice, i.e. in particular primary knowledge, practical and tacit, of the familiar world. This construction presupposes a break with primary knowledge, whose tacitly assumed presuppositions give the social world its *self-evident and natural character*. (...) finally it is only by means of a second break, which is needed in order to grasp the limits of objectivist knowledge - an inevitable moment in scientific knowledge - and to bring to light the theory of theory and the theory of practice inscribed in this mode of knowledge that we can integrate the gains from it in to an adequate science of practice. (1977: 3, *italics mine*)

Hence, what Bourdieu emphasizes is to go beyond the familiar conceptions of the world. Especially, for an analysis of the most apparent, most familiar and self-evident conceptualizations and relationships, his theoretical agenda will be very helpful. Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and capital will be beneficiary for a

multilayered analysis of the social world in general, Turkish political manhood in particular.

I will analyze mainly Pierre Bourdieu's sociology on gender, especially masculine domination. Having an outline of significant theorists' conceptualizations of power and body, namely Foucault and Butler, this section will focus on Bourdieu's schemata on understanding gendered dimensions of power and identity.

The rich complexity of Bourdieu's conceptual world offers a valuable sketch for understanding the dynamic construction of manhood. By using Bourdieu's conceptualizations, such as body, habitus, and field, how men from different backgrounds experience the praxis of being men rather than disposing of their deep leftist, rightist, Islamist, or nationalist background will be under scrutiny. The concepts of Bourdieu will be used to illuminate the construction of manhood and/or masculinities, and how politics construct masculinities through masculine domination strategies that have been reproduced by practices.

2.3.1. Bourdieu's Theory on Gender

2.3.1.1 Body

To Bourdieu, gendered dialectic is structured through hierarchical relations of difference. The main site of this difference is body. Power relations are inculcated upon the body, and the body is the main site of the naturalized gender identity. According to Bourdieu, "the body is the site of incorporated history" (1991: 13). The body as the source of individuals' practices and perceptions reproduce that incorporated history. The embodied "social programming of perception is applied to

body” and it also constructs the difference between biological sexes (Bourdieu 2001: 11). For Bourdieu, the anatomical difference between the sex organs can thus appear as “the natural justification of the socially constructed differences between the *genders*” (2001:11, original italics). The social constructions of masculinity and femininity are actually written on the body, which Bourdieu calls “*bodily hexis*” (Bourdieu, 1990). It is an embodiment process as a product of composition of volumes of capital that can be carried by the body and also the habitus and the field (Adkins and Skeggs, 2004: 22). Bourdieu uses gender within his whole theoretical scheme and argues that gender is hidden under the surface of categories. Therefore, analyzing gender is very critical.

The importance of *bodily hexis* can be seen in the differing ways that men and women behave in the social world. A related concept is “*le sens pratique*” (practical sense) (Bourdieu, 1990). This can be defined as the sense of how to act and respond in the course of daily lives. As there is an active relation between subject and the world, “*ars inveniendi*,” *le sens pratique*” orients the body and gives a sense of what is appropriate or not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 122). All these significant notions, “*bodily hexis*”, “*le sens pratique*”, and “*ars inveniendi*” direct us to the notion of *habitus*.

2.3.1.2. Habitus

Habitus is one of the most significant concepts in Bourdieu’s theoretical world. Bourdieu defines habitus as a constitutive element of the whole schemata of perception, thought, and action (1989:14).

Habitus is the durable organization of one's body and its deployment in the world. It is found in our posture, and our way of walking, speaking, eating and laughing; it is found in every way we use our body. Habitus is both a system whereby people organize their own behavior and a system through which people perceive and appreciate the behavior of others (Allan, 2011: 172)

As a dynamic theory of embodiment, Bourdieu's conceptualization permits differentiation. He argues that "through the lasting experience of social position" (Bourdieu, 1990: 131). In this line, habitus produces practices and also representations (Bourdieu, 1989). In this line, it can be argued that all the networks of practices and representations mediate an individual's actions and external conditions as well. One's own habitus contains classificatory elements necessary to determine his/her social space. "Habitus thus implies a sense of one's place and also a sense of the place of the others" (Bourdieu, 1989:19). Bourdieu clarifies his argument with an example:

For example, we say of a piece of clothing, a piece of furniture, or a book: 'that looks pretty bourgeois' or 'that's intellectual'. What are the social conditions of possibility of such a judgment? First, it presupposes that taste (or habitus) as a system of schemes of classification, is objectively referred, via the social conditionings that produced it, to a social condition: agents classify themselves (...) by choosing, in conformity with their taste. (...) They choose (...) goods that occupy a position in this space homologous to the position they occupy in social space. (Bourdieu, 1989: 19)

This example shows that habitus has a differentiating dimension. An individual distances herself/himself from others. Here distance does not refer to isolation; rather, it has a connotation of positioning. An individual positions herself/himself in parallel with his/her early socialization experiences. As habitus results from early socialization experiences in which external structures are internalized, "it involves an unconscious calculation of what is possible/impossible" and suitable/non-suitable for herself/himself (Swartz, 1997: 106). Hence, habitus

works below the level of conscious thought, and its embeddedness gives habitus its specific power.

It is also the reason that different individuals have different tastes. In this perspective, even the ways of speaking is a manifestation of the socially structured character of habitus. For Bourdieu, it is an aspect that he calls as “articulatory style” (1991: 17). Individuals articulate their habitus at an unconscious level. For Allan, education influences the kind of language we use to think, and he mentions that “the more formal education we receive, the more complex are the words and syntactical elements of our language. Because we don’t just think *with* language, we think *in* language.” (2011: 175, *original italics*). Therefore, in this perspective, it can be argued that individuals are already “predisposed to act in certain ways, to pursue certain goals” and also to speak in certain ways (Bourdieu, 1991:17)

“On one level, habitus can be read as Bourdieu’s attempt to conceptualize culture as practice; on another level, it associates practice with habit”, and both readings offer a dynamic way of theorizing (Swartz, 1997: 115). Especially if habitus and *le sens pratique* are essentially lived categories, theoretical space is opened for explaining the elements of variability in conduct of everyday life. For McNay, it also offers the potential creativity “(...) inherent in even the most routine reproduction” of gender identity (1999: 103). Hence, a performative reiteration continuously (re)produces the constructions of gendered identities and the field draws the boundaries that habitus “(...) engenders a potentially infinite number of pattern of behavior, thought and expression” (McNay, 1999: 100).

2.3.1.3. Field

Although habitus generates a suitable analytical ground to examine different pathways of the constructions of masculinities, it is not the sole analytical tool for scrutinizing the constructions of political manhood and the way they overlap. Field (*champ*) is another tool, and is mainly defined through relationships, and hence, field is constantly changing. For Allan “(...) fields are delineated spaces wherein ‘the game’ is played” (2011: 176). A field’s parameters are defined by networks or sets of connections. As a key concept in Bourdieu’s theory, it defines the structure of the social setting in which habitus operates.

Since individuals are the products of particular histories which endure in the habitus, their actions can never be analyzed adequately as the outcome of conscious calculation. Rather practices should be seen as the product of an encounter between a habitus and a field which are, to varying degrees, ‘compatible’ or ‘congruent’, with one another. (Bourdieu, 1991: 17)

This congruent relationship between habitus and field will be discussed in coming parts of this chapter.

2.3.1.4. Capital

Another key concept in Bourdieu’s theory is capital. Bourdieu distances the notion of capital from its Marxian tradition and extends the meaning to all forms of power. He conceptualizes resources as capital when they function as a “social relation of power” (1989; 1990; 1991; 1992). In *Logic of Practice*, he remarks that capital is a kind of “energy of social physics that can exist in a variety of forms and under certain conditions and exchange rates can interconvert from one into another.” (1990: 122). Economic capital is simply money and income. Social capital is social

networks, group membership, and acquaintances. Cultural capital is cultural goods and services including education credentials, aesthetic preferences, etc. Finally, symbolic capital is mainly the prestige that agents possess, and it is very negotiable. All these different kinds of capital determine the relative positioning of the individual. It is a kind of “(...) ensemble of cultivated dispositions that are internalized by the individual through socialization and that constitute schemes of appreciation and understanding” (Swartz, 1997: 76). The categorizing of political parties’ leaders according to their different kinds of capital will be elaborated on in detail in the next parts.

2.3.1.5. Language

As it has been mentioned below, language is a very significant analytical tool while discussing identity constructions. In addition to habitus that constitutes a force revealing the codes behind “every speech act and, more generally, every action”, the other force is the linguistic market (Bourdieu, 1991: 37). Linguistic market is “(...) a system of relations of force which impose themselves as a system of specific sanctions and specific censorship, and thereby help fashion linguistic production by determining the price of linguistic products” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 145). The linguistic market is a place of exchange and, like in any other market, individuals seek profit. Hence, in politics as a field, the linguistic market is constructed through the different discourses and symbols that are *valued*. For instance, in the case of the framework of this dissertation, it is manhood or the degree of manhood that is valued in the linguistic market of Turkish politics as a field.

Another aspect of the language in the framework of this dissertation lies in its relation with symbolic capital. Although the notion of capital and its different forms is discussed in detail in this chapter, now it is valuable to examine this relationship.

From a Bourdieuan perspective, in a given market, the accumulation of capital, whether economic, social, symbolic or cultural, is a determining force. In politics as a field, and in its market, this is especially so of social, cultural and symbolic capital. Of these, symbolic capital and symbolic violence are particularly determining. For Bourdieu, the way language is used to inflict symbolic violence is critical. In politics as a field, there is a struggle for symbolic power that depends upon symbolic capital as something that agents and politicians, bring to the field. For Bourdieu, symbolic capital is “a recognized power” that is shaped accordingly to the conditions of a given institution (Bourdieu, 1991: 72). As he says,

[A]uthorized language, its rhetoric, syntax, vocabulary and even pronunciation, (...) exists purely to underline the authority of its author and the trust he demands. (...) [S]tyle is an element of the mechanism (...) through which language aims to produce and impose the representation of its own importance and thereby to ensure its own credibility. (Bourdieu, 1991: 76)

Fairclough and Chouliaraki take a similar line, arguing that “(...) the style of the language or the linguistic aspect of symbolic capital has two characteristics: one is the capacity to constitute the given; and the other is the capacity to do so in a legitimized style which gives credibility” (1999:102). If this approach is applied to politics as a field, the politicians’ struggles for symbolic power manifest themselves as linguistic styles that constitute the given as meaning priority to manhood; and this given legitimacy in turn lends credibility. Hence, in the linguistic market, the emphasis on manhood is consciously or unconsciously, yet also simultaneously, constructed. The normative characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, such as

honesty, bravery, responsibility etc., offer a standard for the linguistic market of politics as a field. This dissertation adopts this framework in order to analyze the speeches of the three leaders from three complementary perspectives: habitus, forms of capital, and the use of language.

Firstly, regarding habitus, language is a medium of power. For Bourdieu, when individuals use language in particular ways, they deploy their accumulated linguistic resources and implicitly adapt their words to the market that is their audience (Bourdieu, 1991). Hence, while analyzing the construction of the manhood of the political parties' leaders, it is essential to question their speeches and reveal the ways in which their linguistic techniques vary or not. Secondly, as every leader has a different habitus, and accordingly has a different accumulation of various types of capital, they wittingly and/or unwittingly place an emphasis on manhood because it is fashionable and/or legitimate in the linguistic market. In politics as a field, or as a space of positions, in any speech act there is an encounter between different forces. This is the point at which habitus, the accumulation of capital and the field articulate, leading to "a language game in which certain ends are pursued with certain discursive resources according to established guidelines" (Hanks, 2005: 73).

The following section will try to elaborate the congruent relation between habitus and field that constitutes one of the basic corners of this dissertation theoretical and analytical frame.

2.3.2. The Relation between Habitus and Field

In Bourdieu's argument, field denotes areas of reproduction of services, goods, knowledge or status. Fields are the social settings that habitus operates and

they are organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital (Swartz, 1997: 117). While Bourdieu and Wacquant define field as a network or a configuration, of objective relations between positions, they designate to a matrix of institutions or organizations (1992: 97). Bourdieu applies his “metatheory of field” to many studies including studies of social-class lifestyles, higher education institutions, religion, literature, etc. (Swartz, 1997: 118). In his book about Bourdieu, Swartz analyzes Bourdieu’s applications of field and summarizes the determining characteristics of field as (1) arenas of struggle for legitimation; (2) structured spaces of dominant and subordinate positions based on types and amounts of capital; (3) imposing on actors some specific forms of struggle; (4) structured to a significant extent by their own internal mechanisms of development (1997: 122-126).

Before examining Turkish politics as a field and, especially, the construction of masculinities in the structured spaces within the framework of this dissertation, it is worthwhile to stress the reasons behind borrowing Bourdieu’s metatheory of field and applying it to politics.

First, the principal field in Bourdieu’s work is the field of power. Power functions and struggles throughout all fields (Bourdieu, 1989; 1991; 1992). Hence, defining politics as an arena of power relations is clear. Politics is a complex area of struggles that forces agents to occupy a position with the ultimate aim of having legitimation. As a multidimensional power network, consisting of political parties, elections, and institutions within the limits of the law, the agents in politics dominate or subordinate each other according to their capital, namely economic, cultural, social, and symbolic. The relationship between field and capital is also significant. Fields are related to capitals and/or accumulation of capitals.

The people, groups, and organizations that fill the different objective positions are hierarchically distributed in the field, initially through the overall volume of all capitals they possess and secondly by the relative weight of the two particular kinds of capital, symbolic and cultural. (Allan, 2011: 177)

Especially, from the perspective of symbolic capital, the prestige of an individual is relational and cause to perceive and appreciate certain patterns of conduct. For instance, in politics, one of the determinants of the level of the respect is being elected or being in power hence at this point to be in power is a form of symbolic capital, running the office is recognized as a legitimate indicator of individual worth. The level of prestige or respect can be gained through the election process is one of the determinant that define the hierarchical distribution of the field. The results of the elections somehow define the dominant and subordinated positions. In this dissertation, the accumulation of leaders' capitals, and especially their education credentials, aesthetic preferences, linguistic styles, and prestige, will be challenging decisive factors in their construction of political manhood.

For Bourdieu, another vital relationship lies in the one between field and habitus. On the one hand, conditions of field structure habitus, and on the other hand, habitus is constitutive of the field (Bourdieu, 1992:127). The former indicates the structuring of different habitus by the governing characteristics of field, such as arena of struggle or the structured area of dominant and subordinated positions with the ultimate aim of legitimacy with its own internal mechanisms. The latter signifies a cognitive construction that habitus shapes the field as different positioning contour the sets of connections, networks. Applying this congruent relationship to Turkey or to the construction of masculinities in Turkish politics is very challenging. It can be argued that this simplified formula does not fully denote the case in Turkish politics.

It can be argued that characteristics of the field structure habitus. As habitus comprise the whole schemata of perception, thought and action, it is unconsciously in individuals' posture. Especially, from the perspective of language, as a signifier of habitus, individuals are predisposed to speak in certain ways. Another key concept here is linguistic market. It imposes individuals a certain system that is fashionable or valuable. Hence, if politics is taken as a field, what is valued in the linguistic market is manhood. Turning back to congruent relationship between habitus and field, on the other hand, it is not possible to stress that habitus is totally constitutive of the field in Turkish politics. It can be argued that different habitus could not reveal their diversity within the field of politics. The field of politics or the dynamics within its structure affects exposing of different habitus of gendered identities, in general, masculinities in particular. Although politics as a field permits differentiation within the construction of gender identity when Turkish political parties and their leaders, in particular, is analyzed, despite their different positioning, their masculine domination strategies and practices seem similar.

As the argument of TESEV's report on nationalism in Turkey (2007) put forward that men from left or right wing politics or Islamists are experiencing being men rather than being leftist, rightist or Islamist, different socialization experiences cultivated in an unconscious level with a capacity of determining one's positioning are repressed by dominant features of the politics as a field.

In *Distinction* (1984), Bourdieu clarifies the entire network of relationships in one formula:

[(Habitus) (Capital)] + Field = Practice (cited in Swartz, 1997: 141)

Here, habitus and capital connote to the accumulation of past and also its reflections to today while field refers to conditions of present. Practice is the total outcome of the whole.

Hence, my analysis of political parties' leaders is an analysis of practice that involves the examination of the dynamics within the construction of the field where they occur, and also the habitus of the agents brought to the field. Their interrelationship is the analytical tool of the dissertation and provides the key steps for scrutinizing the construction of masculinities in politics in Turkey. In this part, it is valuable to deeply analyze the construction of masculinities, masculine domination, and codes of masculinities in Bourdieu's theoretical framework.

2.3.3. Dominance of Masculinity in the Political Realm

From 1980s, Bourdieu's writings include brief gender analyses, but, for feminist critics, Bourdieu paid insufficient attention to gender (Mottier, 2002; Fowler, 2003; Adkins and Skeggs, 2004). Bourdieu, himself being aware of the insufficient attention, presented his book *Masculine Domination* as "(...) the opportunity to clarify, support and correct my previous arguments on the same subject" (2001: vii). *Masculine Domination* is a very important source, not only for sociology and Bourdieu's theoretical world but also for the students of gender studies, especially masculinities studies. Throughout the book, he analyzes the historical mechanisms of the relative dehistoricization of the structure of the sexual division. His earlier ethnographic analysis of gender divisions in Kabyle society, as a "(...) living reservoir of Mediterranean cultural tradition, provides a potent instrument for disclosing the symbolic structures of the androcentric unconscious

which survives in the men and women of our own societies.” (2001: back cover). In the book, Bourdieu enables the reader to examine the historical mechanisms responsible for the *eternalization of the gender order* and its corresponding principles (2001: viii). The first and second chapters of the book analyze the ways in which bodies and gendered identities are socially constructed. The final part analyzes the strength of the gender order and also its reproduction strategies.

For Bourdieu, social identity is first made from sexual identity, and he conceptualizes gender primarily in terms of sexual difference (2001). Although the distinction between sex and gender has been the subject of much debate within feminist theory, Bourdieu’s definition of gender, in his own words, as “sexually characterized habitus” does not suggest that he ignores the importance of power and the enduring process of gendered identity construction (2001: 3). To Bourdieu, it is through the body that the child learns to experience wider structural features and within the family, a social artifact; it is reproduced and operates as a central site of normalization. For Bourdieu, there is no instinctual or necessary biological base for such masculine domination. There is a pejorative attribution of nature to women and the honorific award of culture to men (Fowler, 2003). These critical ascriptions “(...) legitimate a relationship of domination by embedding it in a biological nature that is itself a naturalized construction” (Bourdieu, 2001: 23). He names the labeling of nature as the main reason behind masculine domination. If the sexual relation appears as a social relation of domination, this is because it is constructed through the fundamental principle of division between the active male and the passive female, and because this principle creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire - male desire being the desire for possession and/or eroticized domination, as

eroticized subordination or even, in the limiting case, as the eroticized recognition of domination (Bourdieu, 2001: 21). As he stresses that:

Masculine domination finds one of its strongest supports in the misrecognition which results from the application to the dominant of categories engendered in the very relationship of domination, and which can lead to that extreme form of *amor fati*, love of the dominant and of his domination, *a libido dominantis* (desire for the dominant) which implies renunciation of personal exercise of *libido dominandi* (the desire to dominate) (2001:80, original italics)

This theory of *libido dominandi* supports his theory of honor. Historically, male honor has been marked by men's bodily bearing of arms and militaristic roles. Starting with representations of the body, it is culminated in representations and also profound transformation of bodies. For Bourdieu, as it is mentioned before, bodies are the objective foundations of the difference (2001).

In the book, Bourdieu analyzes masculine domination as a paradigmatic form of symbolic violence – “a kind of gentle, invisible, and pervasive violence which is exercised through cognition and misrecognition, knowledge and sentiment, often with the unwitting consent of the dominated” (2001: back cover). Symbolic violence, an imperceptible version that is invisible even to its victims, is exerted for the most part through purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling. (2001: 2). It is recognized by both the dominant and the dominated. It can be a language, a lifestyle, or a way of acting or thinking, and more generally, it can be a bodily property, such as skin color. For the writer, the acts of recognition of the frontier between the dominant and the dominated

(...) that are triggered by the magic of symbolic power and through which the dominated, often unwittingly, sometimes unwillingly, contribute to their domination by tacitly accepting the limits imposed, often take the form of *bodily emotions* – shame,

humiliation, timidity, anxiety, guilt – or *passions* and *sentiments*-love, admiration, respect. (Bourdieu, 2001: 38, original italics)

Bourdieu continues to define symbolic power while he criticizes Butler with regard to naming, and he states that “[t]he work of symbolic construction is far more than a strictly performative operation of naming which orients and structure representations, starting with representations of the body” (2001: 23). These emotions stemming from symbolic power are more powerful when they are visible manifestations such as blushing, clumsiness, and anger.

Having a sketch of his analysis of masculine domination through the unconscious schemes of perception and appreciation, his ideas on the relationship between masculinity and nobility are valuable to mention.

First, it is significant to begin with the definition of manliness for Bourdieu. He simply describes a person with manliness as “(...) someone who feels the need to rise to the challenge of the opportunities available to him to increase his honour by pursuing glory and distinction in the public sphere” (2001: 51). Masculine values are aroused by virile games and by an understanding of femininity as a source of weakness. Manliness must be validated by other men and women, and he gives the example of military milieu that includes so many tests of manliness towards the reinforcement of male solidarity (2001: 52). The sexually hierarchized world presents an environment that “(...) one has only to think of all the situations in which to make men kill, torture or rape, the will to dominate, exploit or oppress has relied on the ‘manly’ fear of being excluded from the world of men without weakness” (Bourdieu, 2001: 53). Therefore, as has been mentioned, manliness is a relational construct, and it is continuously being constructed with/for other men and for women. Men are inclined to enter into this daily challenge, and, as Bourdieu

highlights, they are more willing to “(...) enter into social games most favorable to the development of manliness – politics, business, science, etc.” (2001: 56). While women perform so-called feminine dispositions inculcated by family and the social-order network, men respond to “countless imperceptible calls to order,” too (Bourdieu, 2001: 59). According to this “order,” female activities are condemned to remain invisible, which means that women’s jobs are considered unqualified or do not get the hierarchical title corresponding to their real work. Women “were not recognized as performing the same trade (*métier*) as their male colleagues, from whom they are separated by a simple curtain, although they perform the same labor” (Bourdieu, 2001: 60). At this point, he compares masculinity and nobility. As the nobility had to evade working life in order to retain their noble status, men have to be virile and dominating; otherwise, they risk shame (Bourdieu, 2001: 50). While he equates men with nobility and women with the exploited, he mentions that “both are prisoners and insidiously victims of the dominant representation” (Bourdieu, 2001: 49). As he writes in *Masculine Domination*,

Nobility, or the point of honour, in the sense of the set of dispositions regarded as noble (physical and moral courage, generosity, magnanimity, etc.), is the product of a social labor of domination and inculcation at the end of which a social identity instituted by one of the invisible demarcation lines laid down by the social world and known and recognized by all inscribes itself in a biological nature and becomes habitus, embodied social law (Bourdieu, 2001: 50)

According to Bourdieu, under the arbitrary order of the sexes, women cannot be naturally noble; “to succeed completely in holding a position, a woman would need to possess not only what is explicitly demanded by the job description, but also a whole set of properties which the male occupants *normally* bring to the job.” (Bourdieu, 2001: 62, original italics). Such a *natural authority* of men under the

arbitrary order is inscribed in their body and also in their dispositions. In such a system, men's works were considered superior, and it still maintains its value. The definition of excellence has been charged with masculine implications, and according to Bourdieu, it is universally recognized. Gender hierarchies are embedded in the very nature of both the human body and social system. He names the condition as "paradox of doxa" (Bourdieu, 2001: 133). He questions why the order of the world is broadly respected even by those who are most disadvantaged by it. He answers with "dehistoricization or eternalization of sexual difference" (Bourdieu, 2001: 133). The historical mechanisms have accomplished their functions, and sexual division both as objectification in the physical and social order and as embodiment in gendered dispositions serves as an organizing principle. The elements of the constancy of structure are all embodied in the repertoire of political subjects. In the same way, "masculine domination is embodied in language, texts, knowledge, policies, human practices and in notions of that which constitutes the legitimate political subject" (Dillabough, 2004: 495).

It can be argued that Bourdieu's contribution was designed to articulate the conditions upon which the subject might be seen to be reconstituted. He exposed the structures of domination and attempted to show how all social subjects come to embody such structures in social practices (Dillabough, 2004). Bourdieu aimed to discuss the reproduction and reconfiguration of cultural meaning across time. Therefore, in his rationale, history, nature, and culture are inseparable from the study of self and study of society at large. Individuals neutralize the mechanisms through which history is continuously turned into nature. This process of naturalization ended in eternalization of embedded constructions.

In summary, Bourdieu's theory of gender builds on the significance of practices as a total outcome of habitus and capital, and the conditions of field on the basis of historical and cultural roots. For Bourdieu, although there is not a biological basis for masculine domination, the honorific award of culture to men legitimate relationships of domination. While Bourdieu highlights the misrecognition resulting from the application of dominant categories engendered in relation to dominance, he mentions that virile games are aroused by masculine values that are symbolically accepted as dominant. Gendered hierarchies are inculcated into the social order, and this resulted in "dehistoricization of sexual difference" (Bourdieu, 2001). In this perspective, this dissertation discusses gendered hierarchies in politics by revealing the codes of Turkish masculinity, and questions practices of political parties' leaders by emphasizing their different habitus. This perspective contributes to read different political discourses and understand the dynamics of gendered hierarchies embedded within the parameters of the field of politics in Turkey.

The final part of this chapter will mention the critiques on Bourdieu so as to clarify the milestones in his theoretical schema.

2.3.4. Critiques on Bourdieu

While Bourdieu's theory has been applauded by gender and social and cultural studies theorists, his structural constructivism has also been criticized for its lack of subjectivity, agency, and overemphasis on social power. Michel Foucault and Judith Butler are two of the main theorists on the construction of subject and gendered identity. From a social constructivist perspective, they questioned the subjectification, the power relations, and the significance of body. They examined

very basically how the notion of power is determinant on gendered identity construction.

As previously mentioned, Foucault's work on discipline shows how the body is not a natural entity but is socially produced through *the regimes of power*. In his later works, his focus shifted from technologies of domination to technologies of self. According to Foucault's intellectual project, identity is not simply imposition from above, but it is also actively determined by individuals. Foucault names this process "a practice of liberty" (1982). According to Foucault, "this process of subjectification involves not only bodily subjection but also a relatively autonomous form of self-construction" (cited in McNay, 2000: 166). In this perspective, gender identity is not one-sided and fixed but also contains reflexive elements. Sexual identity construction is "fully amenable to a process of self-stylization" (McNay, 1999: 97). It is clear that considering sexuality as embedded in inculcated bodily predispositions underestimates reflexive elements in identity formation. In this perspective, it is valuable to apply Butler's critiques to Bourdieu's sociology in terms of lack of agency.

Judith Butler highlights the open-ended nature of the formation of gender identity. Performativity, as the key concept of Butler's theoretical agenda, emphasizes the instability in gendered identity formation. Therefore, the construction of gendered identity is a continuing process that individuals re-perform their gendered roles. Bourdieu's theory's socio-linguistic implications have been attacked by Butler as being conservative and underemphasizing agency (Fowler, 2003: 476). According to Mottier, the unlimited reproduction of habitus leads Bourdieu to argue that masculine domination perpetuates itself, but at the same time his theory underemphasizes agency (2002: 354). From Bourdieu's perspective, the subject is

generated by the perceptions and dispositions of the habitus; “(...) he gives us few theoretical tools for conceptualizing active practices of self-fashioning and resistance to the structures of power” (Mottier, 2002: 354). In line with this critique, McNay (2000) also stresses that Bourdieu neglects subjectivity. However, it is valuable to mention that Bourdieu does not clearly define the source of dynamism within the development of language.

For Bourdieu (1991), “(...) language emerges in public only in marginal areas such as pubs and cafés” and he argues that “(...) it is not enough to speak performatively since social authorization is also necessary” (cited in Fowler 2003). Social power is a prerequisite for the writer. For Bourdieu, Butler puts forward “an idealist constructivism” (Fowler, 2000: 15). In an article that examines the critiques of Bourdieu and Butler, Lovell states that “(...) gender change for Butler, he [Bourdieu] argues, is much like putting on a new set of clothes, since she ignores the way gender is objectified and reified, both through conditioned bodily responses and social institutions.” (Lovell, 2000: 31). Bourdieu’s conceptualization of gender, especially performances and/or performativity, indicates both the power of social institutions that the authority of performances is derived from and also the habitus. Hence, in Bourdieu’s formulation, it is not easy to adopt freedom, but on the other hand, there is space for self-stylization as he formulates in practices as a result of habitus. Adkins and Skeggs aptly argue that while Butler’s emphasis is on the surface level of the symbolic, what she calls naming, for Bourdieu, “gender is hidden under the surface of categories” (2004:23). Hence, on the basis of Foucault’s understanding of subjectification and Butler’s emphasis on performativity, this dissertation will argue in support of Bourdieu’s theory on gender.

In Bourdieu's theoretical framework, both the personal histories, that have continuously been re-constructed and social power, namely the means of authority, encounter. This dynamic and also mutual relationship of habitus and social power manifest itself in the continuities and discontinuities in the field of politics. In Bourdieuan perspective, the hierarchy of power serves to structure and re-structure all other fields. Hence, politics as a field appears to meet not only the dynamism of gendered power relations but also how does it reproduce and legitimize itself with different networks. Therefore, this dissertation put its theoretical basis on the triumvirate of Butler, Foucault and, mainly, Bourdieu. Bourdieu's scheme as the main feet of the theoretical triumvirate helps to bring habitus into a central place in the studies of political manhood. As "(...) embodied potentialities of the habitus are only ever realized in the context of a specific field"; the relationship between habitus and field is valuable to discuss in politics (McNay, 1999: 109).

To summarize, this study analyzes the different constructions of masculinities in Turkish politics in general, Turkish political parties, namely, the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, in particular. It attempts to deconstruct some self-evident conceptualizations like politics is male dominated, politics is a virile area. As this study aims to think beyond boundaries, it will analyze such embedded relationships with the guidance of Bourdieuan dynamic analytical tools. It discusses Turkish politics as a field that agents, namely leaders, position themselves and act accordingly to their habitus and accumulation of capitals. Therefore, while discussing how political men from different backgrounds experience the praxis of being men, Bourdieuan framework will enable not only the writer but also the reader to acknowledge different positioning and practices. Having the basic corners of the

theoretical framework, the next chapter will define masculinities and will try to develop typologies of different masculinities in Turkish political arena.

CHAPTER III

DEFINING MASCULINITIES: TOWARDS DEVELOPING TYPOLOGIES OF MASCULINITIES IN TURKEY

3.1. Defining Masculinity/Masculinities

Literature on gender generally begins with reviewing the evidence of the existence of fundamental physical differences between sexes. Such a search for biological basis is really misguided for studies on gender in general, men and masculinities in particular. On the other hand, psychoanalytical analyses of gender identity and male identity start from Sigmund Freud's classical account that focus on pre-Oedipal stages and center on boy's relation with his mother. For feminist psychoanalyst Nancy Chodorow, "femininity is associated in both sexes with feelings of powerlessness and is experienced as a backward state to be transcended" (1989: 34). In addition, for her, until another theory that explains unconscious mental processes, conflicts, sexuality, and/or relations of gender, "(...) we had best take psychoanalysis for what it does include and tell us." (1989: 4). Although psychoanalytic approach has offered a new perspective on gender analyses, another

paradigm that captures diversity explains gender constructions is more embracing in the framework of this dissertation, namely *doing* perspective.

“Role theory as the name suggests, is founded upon a theatrical or dramatical metaphor in which all social behavior is viewed as a kind of performance. (...) Most people, for most of the time, behave in ways which are socially prescribed.” (Edley and Wetherell, 1995: 71). Although sex role theory has been criticized by its emphasis on stereotypical roles, it can be considered as an important step towards new paradigms that underline *doing gender* and *performative* perspectives.

Understanding how individuals *do masculinities*, the performative elements of identity required to be visible. This argument highlights two vital notions in the literature of masculinities, namely, doing gender and performative actions. West and Zimmerman’s *doing gender approach* was fundamentally a critique of role theory based on the understanding of gender as something that “people do rather than they are” (West and Zimmerman, 1987).

Toward the beginning of the 1990s, gender’s adjectival understanding left its place to *doing gender* perspective. An understanding of gender as something that individuals *do* rather than they *are* encourages that gender is fundamentally about social interactions and relationships *performed* in everyday life. It simultaneously (re)produces, sustains and legitimates social meanings accorded to gender. For West and Zimmerman (1987), gender is not only a role or display, but it is also a master identity that cuts across situations.

Another angle that highlights the significance of doing gender is about performative actions. Judith Butler, a leading scholar of Queer theory¹⁹, stresses the

performative aspect of gender construction. According to Butler, gender construction is based on performative actions (Butler, 1990). In her work, *Gender Trouble* (1990), Butler points out that gender is created by repeated performances, like ways of walking, rather than arising from biology, and that the two sexes are not biological facts but social categories. Butler mentions that gender is performative in that it “inevitably unfolds as a series of performed operations that render complex meanings about standards that individuals cannot escape” and she adds that “(...) naming of sex is –an act of domination and compulsion– a means of forcing us to accept the idea of the masculine and feminine as an inevitable binary opposition” (1990: 115). For Butler, both sex and gender are normative and also expressions of power. In this perspective, it is valuable to discuss the notion of power and to question how it is determinant in the construction of gendered and masculinized identities. Especially, Foucauldian understanding is very decisive to capture the significance of power and/or power struggles.

Foucault’s definition of power is critical to the understanding of social construction of gender since the notions of power and oppression are central. Foucault’s schema for power flows through a network of disciplinary institutions. Norms and standards are key words for his conceptualizations. Through institutions (school, family, religion, law, etc.) norms are replicated, and they determine social relations and create subject positions. Disciplinary systems are not the only institutions; processes also help to replicate and enforce power. During the conduct of everyday life, which Connell names as “reproductive arena”, an individual

¹⁹ Queer theory is a challenge to the “obvious categories (man, woman, Jew, femme), oppositions (man vs. woman, heterosexual vs. homosexual), or equations (gender = sex) upon which conventional notions of sexuality and identity rely.” For detailed information see Hennesy, Rosemary. “Queer Theory: A Review of the differences Special Issue and Wittig’s *The Straight Mind*.” *Signs*, 18, no: 4, pp. 964-979.

subjugates her/himself with a stereotypical gender position (1995: 71). In his essay, “The Subject and Power,” Foucault outlines the significance of self-subjectification and power relations, and states that “(...) it applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches himself to his identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects”.²⁰ Hence, in Foucauldian understanding, power is not a substance; it is “(...) the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” (Foucault, 1978: 93). Therefore, here, we encounter the importance of social contexts and cultural meanings. The significance of social contexts and meanings is their intelligibility. According to Foucault, something is intelligible if it “(...) is capable of being understood or grasped. For humans, for something to be possible, it must be understood; thus intelligibility sets the parameters for possibility.” (Alan, 2011: 382). In addition to intelligibility, Foucault explains that things are possible within a historic, cultural context as well. At this point, language is also another determinant as it sets the boundaries for what is possible to know, think, and feel. Hence, our knowledge is a function of the historical period and culture we live in, and it can thus be argued that individuals live within the boundaries of cultural intelligibility. For Butler, sex qualifies “body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility” (1993:2). Therefore, Butler’s discussion of the construction of *sex* and also *the sexes* offers a helpful analysis of the operation of power at the level of cultural meanings.

²⁰ See Foucault, Michel, (1983). “The Subject and Power”, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus (eds.) (with a interview with Foucault), 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 212.

For Butler (1993), sex as a cultural phenomenon is constructed on a cultural discourse about sexuality. In a given culture if that heterosexist discourse is hegemonic, the meanings attached to concepts such as masculinity and femininity will reflect that heterosexism. Masculine and feminine identities take place within structured relations of power. This web of power constitutes hegemonic gender divisions and heterosexual arrangements. In this perspective, Butler's analysis of the operation of power can be easily taken as a continuity of Foucauldian perspective.

Questioning the operation of power and the importance of its dynamics within a given culture highlights social constructionism. Gender itself is an institution that structures social relationships and upholds rules and patterns of expectations that individuals learn how to comply with as natural / common sense (Barrett, 2001: 78). In line with this perspective, the relationship between individual practices and larger social structures is recursive and mutually constructing each other.

In this framework, the concept of masculinities, then, is not a genetic role set; rather it is embedded within a whole network of practices, symbols, discourses, and ideologies. Upon this theoretical background, it is clear that defining masculinity is critical. Without falling into the trap of normative definitions, it is very critical to define or at least to understand the defining characteristics of masculinity within a social and historical context. As the concept of masculinity has iconic significance and it is used in variety of frameworks in different time periods. In the framework of historical context, it is significant to underline that "What might be considered appropriate male behavior in one historical period, in another may be thought inappropriate or even antithetical?" (Edley and Wetherell, 1995: 135).

In addition, wide variety of usage within different time and place may lead scholars to use masculinity as shorthand. In this line, Hearn lists some of these frameworks as psychological characteristics; gendered experiences; gender identity; sex role socialization; power analysis; and/or institutional practices and underlines the problematic of using these frameworks as shorthand for a wide range of phenomena and, problematically, as a primary cause of other social effects (1996: 203). Therefore, before following Hearn's advice, to put the notion of men to the contextual background and to use it more precisely, boundaries of the definitions should be discussed more.

To begin with essentialist definitions can be helpful as they offer stereotypes. Essentialist definition just picks up a feature and tries to define the core of the masculine (Connell, 1995: 68). The terms masculine and feminine are beyond categorical sex and, in this perspective, both the essentialist way of thinking and positivist social scientist underemphasizes the complexity of the context. Therefore, essentialist definitions lack the influence of the whole web of conditions that construct masculinity or what it means to be male. For Connell, Freud also flirted with such a definition as he equated masculinity with activity in contrast to feminine passivity (1995: 68). Moreover, although normative definitions offer a standard question that can help to define the notion, namely, "What men ought to be?", this way of conceptualization lacks the significance of different personalities (Connell, 1995: 70). It can be argued that normative definitions do not offer grips on masculinity on subjective level.

Another approach is the semiotic approach that defines masculinity through the system of symbolic differences (Connell, 2000). However, this approach still has problems, especially in cultural analysis due to grappling with "the full range of

issues of masculinity” (Connell, 1995: 70). In addition, for Hearn, “(...) the overemphasis on masculinity and a neglect of social relations between women and men can lead to a redefinition of men as victims of historical, cultural and gendered processes, to which men are bound” (1996: 203). This exclusionary tendency renders women or men invisible as they are *both* participants in discourses, processes, and constructions. At this point, it is significant to stress that masculinity and femininity are “(...) relational categories that are neither separable nor fixed” (Weedon, 1987: 73). For an analysis of gender and also any topic of inquiry that problematizes gender, it is not possible to understand any categories – masculinity and femininity– without reference to both genders. In this line, Koyuncu and Onur highlight that women and femininity constitute only one dimension of gender studies, but gender should be taken as relational constructs and masculinity should be added to the field (2004:31). Mainstream Western and also Turkish academics have not been blind to women’s concerns and her status in the society (participation in politics, violence, etc.); however, Turkish scholars have neglected *the privileged men* and the relationality of men and women. Therefore, upon this theoretical concern, in order to have a full picture of gender and its role in whole structure of society and state and also in everyday life, in a particular society, it is very crucial to *include* masculinity and the construction of manhood (Kimmel, 1993; Connell, 2001). In this perspective, for Connell (2001: 43) the position of woman, as an actress in the patriarchal network, has encouraged not only feminist movements but also studies; research on that point and this leads to the neglecting of men’s studies.²¹

²¹ So, it is clear that, in Turkey, in gender studies, the privileged one became invisible or “victim” (Onur & Koyuncu, 2004). In the case of Turkey, the academic study on gender has focused on women, too (Kandiyoti, 1987; Ayata, 1995; Arat, 1998; Durakbaşa, 1999; Berktaş, 2004; Göle, 2004; Cindoğlu & Toktaş, 2006).

For Connell, “(...) rather than attempting to define masculinity as an object (a natural character type, a behavioral average, a norm) we need to focus on the processes and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives.” (1995: 71). Taking masculinity as a process also offers the understanding of masculinity as a multifaceted project that takes place in everyday conduct of life.

For a critical analysis of masculinity in discursive practices, it seems plausible to move to the discussion to *the discourses of masculinities*. Hearn (1992; 1996), with this new way to define or to conceptualize masculinities, highlights the importance of the different constructions of masculinities; this means that the constructions are diverse.

By 1980s, increasing critics in the literature were followed by the Gay Liberation Movement. This movement was concerned with the critics of the political structure of sexuality and their arguments led to strengthen a more dynamic approach. In this framework, an acceleration of curiosity has started in the field of masculinity during the late 1980s and research on men and masculinities had entered a new stage.²²

The most significant turn in the field was considered as the shift of focus to the notion of masculinities. As it is mentioned before, this shift has certified that there is a need to think of masculinity as multiple, contextual configurations. With the integration of race, ethnicity and religion into the content of the literature marked the beginning of a new understanding. Working men, men of color, and gay men were all observed as departing in significant ways from traditional definitions of

²² Key stones of the literature were published in 1987. See *The Making of Masculinities* by Harry Brod; *Changing Men* by Micheal Kimmel; *The Gender of Oppression* by Jeff Hearn; *Gender and Power* by Robert Connell.

masculinity. Therefore, as Kimmel and Aronson mention, “we understand that we cannot speak of masculinity as a singular term but masculinities.” (2003: xxii). Scholars have not only acknowledged the complexity of the term but also started to scrutinize the diversity.

“Factors of class, labor market relations, ethnicity and sexuality, as well as individual experience and relations with family and peers, are centrally implicated in the formation of men’s identities” (Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Webb, 2000: 7). There has been a growing literature on multiple masculinities and also “attempts to tie discursive dimensions to social practices and histories” has increased (Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Webb, 2000: 8). Limiting the scope of the studies prevented students of gender studies to inhabit dynamic and also differentiated realms rather than to adhere into stereotypes and memorized geographies. Hence, it can be argued that not only individual agency but also group constructions of masculinities should be added to the field.

In this framework, as this dissertation problematizes the construction of masculinities in Turkey, it will be a *brave* step to make typologies of masculinities in Turkish political arena. On the basis of moving the discussion into discourses of masculinities, this dissertation will try to formulate a typology of masculinities in Turkish politics. Turkish political background and the milestones of Turkish political life will underline the corners of this typology. It means this typology takes its roots from the main Turkish political paradigms namely, Islam, secularism and nationalism and grows out of political challenges and antagonisms.

3.2. Different Paths of Masculinities in Turkey

3.2.1. Neo-Muslim Masculinities

Turkey is a 99% Muslim country and Islam as official religion has been a very determining element of Turkish political history.

Since Ottoman times “Islam provided the source of legitimacy, the unity of state and religion, and a source of identity. Islam was not only the basis of the state; it symbolized the unity of Turkish society, provided a cognitive map of action and meaning, a repository of memory and also a sense of authority.” (Yavuz, 2009: 17). Therefore, Islam by providing a cognitive map, it has shaped social and political culture. In this framework, it is not surprising that Mustafa Kemal and Kemalist elites attacked Islam’s primacy as they aimed to create a new nation with a new source of legitimacy. In this line, analysts of Turkish modernization have observed that the Kemalist project was monolithic, and its top-down manner restricted its potential to capture all social dynamics, particularly the role of Islam. According to Mardin, the Kemalists were unable to see the cultural potential of religion; they could not provide a “social ethos” for the replacement of religious culture in reaching the masses (Mardin, 1983: 156). Secularizing reforms of Mustafa Kemal and his friends aimed to control and also undermine religion by reforms. Thus, Turkish secularism, as primary principle of Kemalism, simultaneously positioned itself against Islam. Kemalist and /or secular regulations undermined “Islamic presence in the cultural and social spheres (...) through new alphabet, dress, calendar and official rest days” (Yavuz, 2009: 26). In this perspective, it can be argued that the most significant transformation was experienced in daily lives. The new set of symbols was affected gendered identities. New women and men of the modern Republic were

the models towards not only Western world but also to the citizens of the newly born nation as well. For instance, Atatürk introduced *fez* in 1925 as a part of these transformative reforms. The *fez* as a religious symbol was replaced by hat. This law on Clothing (1925) was a very critical step from the constructions of modern identities in general, masculinities in particular. With the aim of modernizing masculine body and empower his role as Republican father, Islam and his strong role within the society was undermined. In addition from the perspective of body, a way of politics was conducted as well. It has always been through women's body, namely veiling issue, some implications has been experienced and these repercussions undercut Islamic constructions of masculinities. Throughout Turkish political history, gendered politicization of Islam has been read through women and her barriers. However, it is not only secular norms that situate Muslim women as other, but Islamic masculinities position women as inferior and affirm their masculine control as literature on Islamic masculinities proposes.

As gender constructions have been considered worthy of scrutiny, understanding femininity has been the first task of the students of Islam with a gender lens. Muslim women's oppression, the question of hijab, Islamic discourses, and its relation with gender relations received scholarly attention most.²³ Muslim men, although they are relationally the other part of the gender relations, had relatively little attention until recent times in Western academia. The books, encyclopedia chapters, and articles problematize the great complexity, variety, and

²³ Toward the end of 1980's the studies on Muslim women started to increase. Fatna Sabbah's *Women in Muslim Unconscious* (1984) was one of the first books that analyzes Islamic legal and erotic discourses imprint on female body. Fatima Mernissi's well-known study named *The Veil and the Male Elite* (1987) questions the Hadits that are manipulated by male elite for their own sake. Another known analysis is written by Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam* (1992). Ahmed gives a well organized historical trajectory of Islamic discourses from ancient world to present.

difference of male identities in Islamic societies. Generally, all these academic works begin their analysis with the problematic notion of Islamic masculinity.

For Gerami (2005), Islamic society is a totalizing notion. The term “Islamic” offers an essentialist definition; however, there is no classification of what a Muslim man or woman is (Ouzgane, 2003; Gerami, 2005).

Islam defines a relatively small proportion of what actually takes place in the Islamic world, which numbers a billion people, and includes dozens of countries, societies, tradition, languages, and, of course, an infinite number of different experiences. It is simply false to try to trace all this back to something called Islam. (Said, 1997: xvi)

Following Said, it is apparent that such an Orientalist usage of the term Islamic limits the researcher, especially the ones in the West. Therefore, as masculinity constructions differ among Muslim men, it is plausible to discuss Muslim masculinities rather than masculinity in Islamic society. For Gerami (2005), cultures cannot be reduced into religion, and, therefore, gender identities are not reducible to Islamic femininity and masculinity. Although there is a universally recognized Muslim men stereotype, as bearded, gun-toting, bandana-wearing men with long robes, especially after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States’ World Trade Center, Muslim masculinities differ. The Qur’an contains numerous references to men in their capacity as believers in Allah. However, “schools of jurisprudence” interpret these references differently (Flood, 2007: 661). For instance, Tunisian men enjoy less legal power on their wives than their counterparts in Iran (Flood, 2007: 661).

In addition, for Gerami, the colonized culture also has an effect on the construction of masculinities. For him, colonial domination raised challenges to local masculinities, and therefore, men’s honor was threatened, and they were called upon

to protect it (Gerami, 2005: 450). At the time of Independence War and early Republican days Atatürk, a national hero of Turkish Republic, symbolized modern Turkish men. Such dominations led to emergence of national heroes who are symbolized as strong, more virile masculine character. For instance, Atatürk forged a national masculine image (Gerami, 2005: 451). Atatürk used to symbolize both progressive aspirations of newly born Republic and resistance within authenticity expressed in Islamic terms. As an iconic leader, he restored the prestige of Turkish men after the War of Independence. Another war-time masculine image is Shahid. They are young, virginal, pure poster men of Islamist masculinity who are institutionalized shahadat and its masculine prototypes after Iranian resistance to Iraqi invasion (Gerami, 2005: 452). Therefore, Muslim men's ethnicity, social, and economic situations are the primary factors in their gender constructions. In parallel to this, Turkish Muslim men's positioning should be elaborated with an analytic lens that consider social, economic, and also cultural dynamics together. While analyzing the constructions of masculinities in Turkey in politics, engaging in discussions of religious and cultural background is inevitable while attempting to define typologies. At this point, it is significant to put the boundaries of neo-Muslim masculinities in the framework of this dissertation.

This dissertation problematizes Muslim masculinities with respect to the AKP and the leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Very briefly, the AKP is an offspring of National Outlook²⁴ tradition but formed as a reformist wing of the FP (Virtue Party).²⁵ The AKP governs the country

²⁴ National Outlook tradition has been represented by the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP*), National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi- MSP*), Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi- RP*), Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi- SP*) line throughout a period of almost three decades . According to Özman and Coşar, the division between reformists and traditionalists was not alien to the National Outlook line and the first of such divisions within the National Outlook line was experienced in the

since its electoral victory in 2002. Throughout this period, the party has identified itself as conservative democrats. Although, in terms of party ideology, defining the AKP has been the subject of inquiries related to its genesis in political Islam but its Western outlook observers define the party as “new Islamism” (Cizre, 2008). In this line, it can be argued that the reasons behind the AKP’s transformations are “the effect of repression, EU conditionality within the framework of Copenhagen criteria and the emergence of a new generation” (Yavuz, 2009: 45). The party’s detachment from its National Outlook roots and new Muslim actors, namely effective NGOs, media, intellectuals, provided a new discourse for the AKP. For Yavuz, new forces and actors have found the fertile ground for political and social transformation during Turgut Özal period in post-1980s (Yavuz, 2009).

Özal’s neo-liberal economic policies enabled suppressed Islamic networks and spaces to spring. With the RP of Necmettin Erbakan, Islamic politics has got rise. The underlying motive behind Erbakan’s politics was religious. For Yıldız “WP was a protest movement; it successfully mobilized the reactions of those voters who saw themselves deprived by the privileged class of so called ‘White Turks’ ” (Yıldız, 2003: 188). The RP instrumentalized Islamic idioms in their campaigns and challenged Kemalist form of secularism. The party also emphasized the notion of *Islamic brotherhood* and used the mottos of “the coalescence of state and nation” and also “60 million are brothers of one another” (Yıldız, 2003: 188). Their intellectual agenda was based on the glorification of the Islam and its norms and also positioned the West as other. The political discourse of the FP (Virtue Party), that was opened

MSP congress in 1978. For detailed information; Özman, Aylin and Simten Coşar. “Centre-right politics in Turkey after the November 2002 general election: neo-liberalism with a Muslim face”. **Contemporary Politics**. Vol: 10, No: 1, March 2004, pp. 57-74.

²⁵ Coming chapters will elaborate more on the development of the party.

after the closure of the RP, was also based on the National Outlook tradition. Although the party became a sanctuary of the RP's politicians, it did not sustain the homogeneity within the party and separated into two, namely traditionalists and reformists. The AKP is the reformist wing of that separation. In this framework, Erdoğan and the AKP's aim has been to get "depoliticization of Islam through conservative democracy" (Yavuz, 2009: 129). The party has changed and also shifted the discourse on political Islam. Although Islam is still a critical element of the party, they do value Western norms such as democracy, civil society, human rights, neo-liberal economic policies as well. Erdoğan has always been in tune with pragmatic needs of Turkish society and also the world, both Western and Middle Eastern. Since the AKP governments, Turkey has integrated more with the processes of EU and globalization. Therefore, it can be argued that the AKP and especially Erdoğan has changed political discourse on Islam and it is plausible to discuss the AKP and Erdoğan construction of gendered identities in general, masculinities in particular as neo-Muslim. In parallel to Coşar and Yeğenoğlu's (2011) analysis that stresses out that the AKP's exemplifies a new mode of patriarchy, this dissertation takes this shift as a neo-Muslim pathways of masculinities. In addition, in line with the literature on Islamic masculinities as Islam is not a totalizing concept and as masculinities are socially constructed and diverse across time, defining the AKP as representative of neo-Muslim masculinities in Turkey offer an effective ground for analytic discussions.

3.2.2. Kemalist/Secular Masculinities

“No idea better epitomizes the ethos of modern Turkey than the doctrine of secularism” (Özdalga, 2012: 205). As Özdalga aptly argues secularism is the one principles that define Kemalist modernization project and also today’s Republican regime. In addition, secularism is also significant as it positioned itself in the opposition of Islam and/or practices of Islam in public sphere. As the definition of secularism simply encompasses the separation of Islam from politics or political sphere, Turkey has experienced a process of secularization that has affected whole networks of society as a whole. Modernity/modernization have interwoven with secularism/secularization and they offered a macro project. As this dissertation concerns with gendered identities, it focuses on micro aspects of this secularization that mirror itself in the construction of masculinities and femininities as well. Before, analyzing Kemalist/Secular masculinities and gendered identity formation of the early Republican era as the background, it is worth to point out how the words secular, Kemalist and modern have been used interchangeably.

During early Republican period, when Kemalist project attacked on religion and so as to constitute a modern state they aimed to establish secular norms and these norms automatically resulted in the erosion of Islam. As it has been mentioned in previous part, Kemalist modernization project did not achieve to encompass all the dynamics within the society and was unable to see the vital significance of religion (Mardin, 1983).

The governing ideology was Kemalist-statist. Repressed Islamic ideas and practices could not find ways to grow. Secularism was the unique “political settlement of controlling and reconstituting Islam in accordance with the needs of the state and the political elites who have controlled the Turkish state” (Yavuz, 2009:

144). The third military intervention in 1980 changed the whole political climate in Turkey. As it has been mentioned in previous section Özal's period enabled Islamic tones to grow. However, the political, social and economic climate that has existed since 1980 has made Islamist elements a part of politics as a party ideology and also as a source for the expression of dissatisfaction. From this perspective, it can be argued that the Kemalist/Islamist debate has formed the antagonistic fabric of Turkish political culture. As Navora-Yashin argues, "[the] culture of the state was the context for the secularist/Islamist conflict in late twentieth century Turkey. Secularism and Islamism competed in a public arena, both wearing different faces of the state" (2002: 7). The ambiguities molded in the tension between the traditional and modern have taken the form of antagonism between Islamist and secularist and also assigned the whole process of modernization and Kemalism into secularism. While secularism has been the basic principle of the Kemalist reforms, it has encapsulated all the ideas of modernity. These macro changes' reflections have echoed itself in daily lives or micro politics and ended up in labeling old norms as traditional and glorifying new ones as modern. Kemalist, secularist, modern have started to be used interchangeably as they have offered a whole discourse on the improvement of the state and the Turkish nation. Therefore, since the establishment of the Republic, Kemalist ideals of modernization are congregated into secularism and the politicians of the CHP, since Atatürk, are considered themselves as the guardian of the secular Republic. At this point it is plausible to discuss the background of Kemalist/secular masculinities in Turkey.

As it is discussed in the literature, all nation-state formation models have witnessed a woman centric transformation (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Mayar, 2000; Mostov, 2000). Woman was one of the symbols of the Kemalist modernization

project, while men, as the modernizing elites of the project, had the duty of opening the way to Westernization and reaching the level of *civilized* countries. As it has been mentioned before, while the studies of Kemalist project with a gender lens define secularist/Kemalist/modern women, they analyzed secular/Kemalist/modern men relatively less. Only in recent years there is an increased interest in the construction of masculinities. Other studies touch the issue of masculinities from their supremacy and/or *victimized* status.²⁶

From the perspective of secular man, the first and most important component was his role of leader or agent of modernization. This is not an alien thought for Turkish political culture. Since Ottoman times, men have been the leading absolute authority figure. Modernization efforts in Turkey started during late Ottoman era at a time when the basic characteristics that shaped the Ottoman Empire were its absolute authority and its hierarchical structure. As the absolute leaders of a powerful empire, the sultans established their own rule of governance. However, with the growth of Enlightenment philosophy in Europe, and also its increased military power, the sultans turned to the West, with the Tanzimat period in particular symbolizing their departure from the old order as the main dynamics and patterns characterizing the Ottoman Empire started to change. “The era was characterized by a hybrid fabric weaved of attempts to reconcile Islam with modernization, traditions with the pace of modernism and women’s emancipation with the existing gender requirements” (Bilgin, 2004: 111).

Ottoman male figure was powerful, authoritarian and sober. The sultan was the father of the community and had the divine authority to govern the Empire.

²⁶ See Koyuncu & Onur 2004; Saraçgil 2005.

That's why snob of the Tanzimat era have been considered as representing a departure from a solid Ottoman masculinity and also a threat to Ottoman communitarian conservatism (Kandiyoti, 1997; Bilgin, 2004; Saraçgil, 2005). Bilgin names this period the "fatherless society" as the lack of centralized hegemonic power and the pace of transformation made difficult to sustain the existing order (2005: 111). Jale Parla (1998), whose groundbreaking book examines the literature on Tanzimat, highlights how the Ottoman male elite and/or writers regarded themselves as *the father*, in turn responsible towards their public and/or readers who needed guidance. The fatherless home, expressed through novels where the novelist himself took on the role of paternal guide vis-a-vis a disoriented society, was one of the signifiers of the lack of paternal authority in society (Parla, 1998). In line with Bilgin's and Parla's arguments, for Kandiyoti (1994), generational tensions also corresponded to changes in the expression of hegemonic masculinity in Ottoman society. That is, "(...) men were using women's plight to bemoan their own disenfranchisement in the face of paternal autocracy, a disenfranchisement that was mirrored in the political arena by the absolutism of the Ottoman state" (Kandiyoti, 1997: 121).

In an era that was already characterized as entailing "de-masculinization", femininity became another a threat that rendered Turkish men effeminate, and there was a growing sense that women were getting out of hand (Bilgin, 2004: 111; Duben and Behar, 1991). However, the autonomy of the virile elite was not totally lost in that, as Kandiyoti (1997) reports, the Ottoman patrician had his counterpart in the *kabadayı* (tough uncle) who typically lived in the *mahalle* (local district) where there was a strong sense of communal identity. *Kabadayı of mahalle*, household and

family had an honor to be defended, so those tough uncles were the guarantors and protectors of the normative order.

Thus, studies of the literature of the cultural elite reveal that the work of this period mirrored an anxiety about the loss of a father figure who guided not only the reader but also the whole society, especially women. However, as the Ottoman Empire experienced an extended period of military conflict, including the First World War and, most importantly, the War of Independence, this changed the role of men, *dandies* who lost prestige. That is, the wars turned *dandies*, borrowing from Baudelaire, into soldiers. The rise of brave soldiers protecting the security of the Empire and, later, the Republic, altered the image of male bodies, while the virtues of femininity were absent during that period as they were considered “(...) ill suited for managing the modern state” (Htun, 2005: 165). Thus, this period re-glorified masculinity, and creating an idealized form of masculinity that still has heroic connotations present-day Turkey.

After the War of Independence, in addition to protect the country, men, “Kemalist fathers of the Republic”, should be equipped with the duty of civilizing the country (Kandiyoti, 1997). Despite their hidden role, men represented the cultural ideal of the project, but in a different perspective from their sisters. Men were in charge with modernizing women and society, and with providing welfare. More specifically, the borders of how the new women of the Republic should exist in society as modern individuals were defined by the male Kemalist/secularist elites.

Atatürk and his allies started this transformation with a dress code because traditional men could be clearly distinguished by their garments. Therefore, the elites passed the Law on Clothing (1925) that recommended wearing a “secularism uniform” of hat and tie which signified the new, modern Republican men’s

disengagement from traditional masculinity (Kandiyoti, 1998: 109). Wearing a hat and tie was also the symbol of the loyalty to the state and the Kemalist regime and also the symbol of the detachment from the religious norms. In addition to wearing a secularist uniform, having a healthy body also became very significant for the modern man of the Republic. Masculine bodies, as the bearer of the national reforms should be healthy, with specific reference to their role in promoting the economic welfare of the society and their militaristic power (Mayar, 2000; Mostov, 2000).

Men were the guarantors of the new order. They pioneered other in daily lives as well. One of the symbols of the modern daily life was new choices of recreation, such as going to balls and theaters, or doing sport. Men were supposed to accompany their sisters and wives because, as the head of the family, a Republican man had the duty to shape the women of the future, to guide his family members, especially his daughters, in accordance with Western life codes. As Kandiyoti (1997:123) puts it, “[m]en gave social birth to the new woman of the Republic.” In this respect, Atatürk’s adoption of a girl was also symbolically important.

It can be argued that the secular brothers of the new Republic established their own form of life by placing their sister as other (Berkday, 2003). Berkday argues that women became the subjects of the public sphere as the visible face of the modern Republic, but one that had to be guided by men’s reason, capabilities and abilities. Although such an empowerment of women was symbolic, their brothers still experienced a crisis of their hegemonic power and patriarchal supremacy, and felt a loss of authority (Akyüz, 2005). Because the men were unable to fully internalize the abstract project that was proposed within the ideals of Westernization, Republican modernization did not go beyond the rejection of traditional symbols. Instead, the modernist male elites of the early Republican period felt trapped between

the requirement to seem modern and a need to protect traditional values (Akyüz, 2005). However, this pretending to be modern, not only to his sisters but also to his other Western counterparts, made his boundaries become very insecure. This dilemma created a crisis of masculinity and led to the contradictory character of modernization efforts.

To sum up, early Republican fathers led the Kemalist modernization project with the guidance of the CHP cadre. Since that time secularism is the ethos of Kemalists and also a way of philosophy of life. Throughout Turkish politics, the electorate of the CHP has always identified itself with Atatürk and his ideals. The party identifies itself with centre left and social democracy. The authoritarian political style of the CHP as the ruling party of the early Republican period has transformed itself into an elitist tune (Ayata and Ayata, 2007: 212). The support of the CHP has generally come from educated, “secular middle class living in socioeconomically developed western provinces of Turkey” (Ayata and Ayata, 2007: 213). That is the reason behind why the CHP has been identified as the party of literate, modern, educated masses. Kemalist elites have created their own codes and also produced gender patterns in accordance with the ideal of civilizing nation; they have created secularism’s own masculine imagery (Bilgin, 2004: 174-176). For Bilgin, their use of “(...) gendered metaphors and cherished values” has proved to be long termed and also repetitive (Bilgin, 2004:176). Kemalists still insist upon saving the society from Islamic threat and by this way they attribute themselves a heroic role. In this perspective, it can also be argued that unlike Islamist politics, Kemalists have not shifted their discourse. While Islamist political parties have reconstituted their politics according to national and international politics, the CHP constitutes a contrast. For Turan, the CHP “has represented elitist modernism moderated by social

democratic rhetoric” and has shown inability to adapt to the changing nature of the global politics (Turan, 2006: 559). Therefore, deep rooted Kemalist discourse and its patterns of masculinities are still alive. In other words, Kemalist cultural, social and political imagery of men and women still depict old norms as Kemalists still insist upon *saving society* and, hence, they attribute themselves a heroic role.

3.2.3. Nationalist Masculinities

“Nationalism in fact is the common ground of nationalist, conservative, Islamist, and Kemalist-Republican discourses and manifests itself as the real Turkish fundamentalism.” (Bora, 2011: 62). As Bora aptly argues nationalism is one of the most critical defining parameters of Turkish society. Since the Independence movement, nationalism as a main color has endured its powerful role (Keyman, 2011; Mardin, 2011). This part discusses how nationalist discourses have affected the construction of masculinities and how masculine ideals have served to popularize nationalism. It especially analyzes nationalist masculinities with reference to the MHP as the party identifies itself directly with nationalist ideologies.

After World War I, with the liberation of the state from the occupational forces, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the leader of the Turkish independence movement. This resistance against both the Ottoman monarchy and imperialist forces ended in the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. After the establishment of the new Republic, major transformations started to shape a new political order and a modern nation-state capable of reaching and surpassing contemporary Western civilization. The West was thus accepted as the model, and modernization efforts

were equated with Westernization. In addition, the notion of civilization encompassed the idea of progress, and an ideal to realize, as Atatürk put it:

There are a variety of countries, but there is only one civilization. If our bodies are in the East, our mentality is oriented toward the West. We want to modernize our country. All our efforts are directed toward the building of a modern, therefore Western, state in Turkey. (cited in Çınar, 2005: 5)

As is clear from Atatürk's words, the West was considered as the absolute measure of reaching a modern nation's level of civilization. For the Kemalists, their modernization project entailed creating a modern nation and accepting the reformation of the past political, social and cultural order, including reshaping the role of the religious communities. That is, "Turkey (...) was made in the image of Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime" (Ahmad, 1993: ix). The Kemalist modernization project aimed to make a clear rupture from the Ottoman past. When Mustafa Kemal and his friends started to implement their secularism project, the Turkish nation, the main source of national identity, did not exist. Therefore, it was necessary to erase the Ottoman past and create new political, social and cultural foundations. However, the Ottoman legacy was unavoidable for any of its successors, so the Kemalist project can also be considered as the continuation of the Ottoman modernization struggles, but with different characteristics.

The strong state tradition and elitist character of the ruling class, together with traditional values constituted the heritage and also the setting of the new Turkish political culture. As the project aimed to transform the value system and replace it with Western values, such as Enlightenment philosophy and secularity, the significance of religion was undervalued by the secularist elites as it has been mentioned before. Instead, the Kemalist project constructed the Ottoman past as

other, for which it has been criticized as it marginalized the life worlds of traditional people (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Although the field of meanings and practices that was constituted during early Republican times has shifted through time, it remains connected to the paradoxical character of the Kemalist project. The interrelationship between the past and the present can not be underemphasized as the landscape is same. All norms, codes and also discursive practices originate from and in return contribute to the same landscape. Although, it would be “(...) misleading to blame modernization” process, it is plausible to mention that its deep-rooted characteristics preoccupied society throughout the history (Keyder, 1997). Especially “intertwined relation between nationalism and modernity” has affected the political culture in Turkey (Kadıoğlu and Keyman, 2011: xvii). For instance, in the framework of identity construction, the discourses on men and women, and/or their traditional gender roles contribute to the not only maintenance but also transformation as the language of modernity has transformed into the language of modernity.

According to Çınar, “modernity may refer to a lifestyle, a culture, a discourse, a historical epoch, a movement, a project, a mind-set, an intellectual trend, to capitalism, industrialization, democracy, constitutionalism, or secularism” (2005:1). Therefore, the representations of newly formed identities and their visibility include significant clues to the nature of those identities. Kemalist reforms presented a project of modernity that aimed at building a new society based on new principles of Western ideals and scientific rationality. In order to establish a homogenous state as most projects of nationalism begin with, the Kemalist elites aimed to transform identities. That active process of creating and reconstructing included the transformation of the identities as an important medium of the nation-building

process because, during modernization period of any country, they become the visible face of that country. Given this, it is valuable to present Nira Yuval Davis' analysis about the relationship among nation-building processes, nationalisms and gender.

Nira Yuval Davis (2003) argues that the construction of nationhood involves specific notions of both manhood and womanhood, and that this gendering of the identities. Davis examines the contribution of gender relations to key dimensions of nationalist projects - the nation's reproduction, its culture and citizenship - as well as to national conflicts and wars, exploring the contested relations between feminism and nationalism. Like Yuval Davis, Kandiyoti (1997) also stresses the importance of identity formation in the nation building process. "Gendering the modern" was a crucial part of the Kemalist modernization project (Kandiyoti, 1997). Women especially have always been considered as symbols of the nation: "Women are heroines and symbols of virtue, fertility, strength and continuity" (Mostov, 2000: 91), implying that women's traditional or biological roles are glorified in the general context of the nation. In Turkey's case, the nation's progress was equated with the emancipation of woman in that the Kemalist secularist elites considered new, modern Turkish women as essential actors in the modernization project.

The women of the Republic were to internalize the desirable national image of mother and wife, and desexualized members of the community (Mostov, 2000: 103). Specifically, the "emancipated but unliberated women" of the Republic were desexualized by the usage of kinship idioms for to facilitate the sexually neutral character of *modern* interactions, especially in public life (Kandiyoti, 1987).

The family was another site of the new regulatory discourse. A child-centered conjugal family was the signifier of both modernity and nationalistic social

responsibility (Duben and Behar, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1991). In addition, to be married was also a signifier of safe terrain within the modernization efforts. While marital etiquette was already the marker of Islamic regulation of the body, it was now encroached on by the new discourse, in which the pattern of domesticity was Western originated and was a driving force (Kandiyoti, 1997).

This *new and unfamiliar* atmosphere in the newly formed Turkish Republic exposed some contradictions for Kemalist project. The modernizing gaze, that is the gaze of the early modernizers, tried to impose the reforms not only in the political and institutional spheres but also in the cultural sphere. However, their nationalistic moralism underestimated the significance of micro politics, and the reproductions and reconstitutions of femininities and masculinities that favored the continuation of male-dominated hierarchies. Saktanber (2002) notes how the reforms positioned both men and women as “obedient/grateful”, but also how men and women responded differently to the reforms. That is, the West was not only considered for the emancipatory potential of the modern, but also as being a foundation for the dangers of excessive individualism (Kandiyoti, 1997: 115). For instance, modernization efforts were considered a threat to men’s patriarchal supremacy, and the male intelligentsia and elites experienced a crisis of masculinity as their sisters become their equal counterparts in both political and cultural life. In other words, while the reforms opened the way for gender equity, the outputs of this change were taken by men as a threat to their supremacy. In a geography where men historically benefited from the gender/power frame in both political institutions and social life, this threat coming from modern life styles to their normalized hierarchy destabilized their network of meanings of their traditional lives. Thus, the tension between the traditional and the modern coincided with this reform period. The modernists defined

themselves through the Kemalist project, while the traditionalists located themselves in the stable ground of the old order and also religious norms. However, despite the critical role that male elites have experienced, they were the reification of the national honor as the founding fathers of the new Republic.

As there is a close relationship between nationhood and manhood, Turkish experience of nation state formation has undergone an active gender politics around masculine themes. Nagel argues that the culture of nationalism was constructed to emphasize masculine themes, such as honor, patriotism, bravery and duty (Nagel, 1998; 2005). As Cynthia Enloe argues, “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (2000: 45). In parallel to this, masculinity studies that analyze the role of gender in nationalist movements have always highlighted the symbolic role of men as the real agent who should protect the honor and freedom of the homeland. Thus, the revolutionary, talented, brave and honest men of the Turkish Republic had to show that they were the guarantors and also the protectors of the society (Saraçgil, 2005: 205). This understanding of saving and preserving have been the marks of modern Turkey’s nation-state tradition and has endured until current times (Bora, 2011: 57).

Contemporary Turkey’s socio-cultural atmosphere and its reflections on political sphere have verified that there are plural sites where “(...) different constructions of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.”(Özkırımlı, 2011: 86). In Turkey there is not a single nationalism but discourses of nationalisms. Bora’s study on plural discourses of Turkish nationalisms (Bora 2003; 2011) presents that there are four main discourses, namely, official Kemalist nationalism; left-wing Kemalist nationalism; pro-Western nationalism; racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism (2011:62-63). The first discourse is the main paradigm of Kemalist project and it is

the official nationalism of the nation-state for Bora and the military is the “personified symbol of nationalism” (2011: 64). The second discourse represents the secular reaction and Bora defines as “Kemalist *Ulusçuluk*”²⁷ and adds that “Kemalist movement has embraced nationalism during last years with the realization that it could serve to popularize secularism” (2011: 65). The third discourse springs from modernist-Westernist idea and emphasizes economic perspective with respect to catching up modern life styles (2011: 70). The final discourse that this dissertation deals with is Pan-Turkist Radical Nationalism that has departed from “patriotic line of Atatürk nationalism” and reified more on idealist (*Ülkücü*) movement of the MHP. The idealist movement is the ideological basis of the party and acts as the defender of Turkism and supporter of the state (Bora, 2011: 74). Although the party drew closer to the center after its heroic leader Alparslan Türkeş’ death, the party with its new leader Devlet Bahçeli is the agent of this discourse in Turkish politics. The party glorifies the masculine themes such as honor, patriotism and situates itself as the protector and guardian of the country. As Nagel argues “(...) nationalist policies are masculinist enterprise” and “the real actors” in this enterprise are men “who are defending their freedom, their honor, their homeland and their women” (Nagel, 1998: 244). Heroic masculine image of the party is gray wolves (*bozkurtlar*) and they have to protect female wolves (*asena*). Gray wolf is the totem of original Turkism and it is the symbol of the party (Bora, 2011). In addition, the MHP has always been identified as traditionally virile party or the party of men and as the culture of nationalism is constructed to emphasize masculine themes, it is vital to analyze reflections of nationalist masculinities in Turkish politics. Although approximately

²⁷ The term *Ulusçuluk* refers to nationalism but the writer equates the concept with modernization and also secularization in a Kemalist vein (Bora 2003, 2011)

all political parties flirt with the idea of nationalism²⁸, this typology of different pathways of masculinities analyze nationalist masculinities with a special focus on the MHP.

In conclusion, this dissertation aims to address different expressions of masculinities in Turkish politics. In this framework, I have identified typologies of different pathways of masculinities and tried to understand different masculinities in Turkish politics as a field between 2000 and 2009. Masculinities that are discussed within this framework are reflecting political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, constructions of masculinities are traced. The next chapter will elaborate more on Turkish politics and especially the encounters of the elements of Turkish political culture and codes of Turkish masculinities.

²⁸ In contemporary Turkey, the CHP always use Atatürk nationalism, the symbols of nation state such as anthem, flag, Atatürk but especially the party mobilizes its nationalist reaction against the rise of Islamis and/or political Islam (Bora 2003; 2011; Özkırımlı 2011). On the other hand, the AKP plays with nationalist reactions and “AKP’s discourse is not situated beyond or outside teh nationalist parameters” (Özkırımlı, 2011: 97). In addition, Koyuncu-Lorasdağı argues that Islam and nationalism have had an instrumental relationship in Turkey and she identifies this relation as “instrumental pious nationalism” (2011)

CHAPTER IV

THE CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITIES: TRACING DIFFERENT PATHS OF MASCULINITIES IN TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE

This chapter analyzes different paths of masculinities in Turkish political culture. First it examines the roots of recent Turkish politics with a special focus on the Kemalist modernization project and the construction of masculinities since Ottoman times until 2008 in Turkey. Following the historical background, the chapter will examine the main characteristics of current Turkish political culture, by tracing different codes of masculinities as each element of Turkish political culture has significant implications for the construction of Turkish masculinities. At this point it is critical to stress that this dissertation problematizes the different constructions of masculinities in Turkish politics as a field, hence, a brief analysis of Turkish politics with a gender lens will provide the background for the analysis.

4.1. An Historical Analysis of Turkish Politics

One who wants to analyze Turkish politics should start with modernization project. Modernization has always been an issue actively discussed by a significant number of scholars, including sociologists, political scientists, and economists. Turkey represents a crucial case as a consequence of its geographical position, with its long history of Westernization efforts, starting with Ottoman reforms and continuing through the Republican period.

Westernization in the Turkish context has been generally analyzed in the light of the delicate balance between the traditional and the modern. That is to say, in order to achieve a homogenous modern nation-state, early Republican reformers tried to reconcile the traditional and the modern through the construction of gendered identities, namely new man and woman, but by not eroding deep rooted traditional face of Turkish nation. Turkey's adoption of Western norms, styles and institutions in many areas of social, cultural and political life has been criticized as "a patriarchal and anti-democratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of the people in Turkey" (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 1997: 4). On the other hand, the reforms were not limited with social life; institutional changes were taken place as well.

Zürcher analyzes Kemalist reforms in three categories, namely, institutional, symbolic, and social (Zürcher, 2004: 194). In the institutional context, law, state and education systems were reformed through major secularizing policies. The Sultanate, Caliphate were abolished; *Şeriat* was abandoned; Swiss civil code was adopted. The second field that Zürcher mentions is symbolic area (2004). Attempts of secularization mainly attacked symbolic identifications with Islam. For instance, the religious clothing of imams was restricted; official weekly holiday days were

changed from Friday to Sunday etc. Kemalist elites' aim was to substitute religious symbols with those that are labeled as modern and/or Western. According to Kemalist elites not only deep rooted heritage from the Ottoman Empire but also the powerful existence of religious groups caused erosions of the secularist reforms, however, with the ideal of Westernization or adopting Western civilization, reformist elites were unable to see the cultural potential of religion. For Mardin, elites were not able to provide a "social ethos" that could substitute religion (Mardin, 1983: 156). It can be argued that, this lack of social ethos ended in ambivalent characteristics of the modernization. As the third field of secularization, for Zürcher (2004), social life, encompasses transition of society from a religious and/or traditional order into a new, modern way of life, has constructed the past as other. This process included the erosion of old social codes and patterns and that is the reason behind the conceptualization of Turkish experience as a project nourished from its from above characteristics. While Kemalist elites did not intended to eradicate traditional face of Turkish nation, the reforms challenged their old value system. What is old was equated with what is religious and traditional hence, the new sought to cover the refusal of old codes. At this point, it can be argued that reformers ignored the tensions between modernity and tradition; rather, as Ayşe Kadioğlu notes, "they tried to manifest the compatibility between Islamic culture and Western civilization" (Kadioğlu, 1980: 180). The norms of the Turkish society, including those governing social institutions, were simultaneously integrated with a religious system. Hence, norms that govern a traditional society embraced religious prescriptions as well and undermining the significance of traditional and religious bonds ended in ambivalences between traditional and modern. In the literature, critiques of Turkish

modernization emphasize its failure that undermined the significance of the normative order in Ottoman-Turkish society (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997: 4).

After the War of Independence, the nation- building project, especially the reforms in societal and symbolic fields, engaged in transforming Turkish society or Ottoman past and the (re)construction of identities was a constitutive part of Kemalist modernization. The reflections of the past can be found in individuals, so, status and also appearance of citizens would symbolize a break-off from the old order. The new citizens of the Republic were therefore *gendered* by the state through top-down reforms, with men and women being imagined in a Westernized framework in an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991).

This gendering of the identities of the new citizens of the Republic was made with a view to create the new women and men of the Turkish Republic. However, the top-down manner and the characteristics of nation-building process in Turkey ended in Turkish modernization developing contradictions. The project aimed to construct homogenous identities, and their arena was the public sphere, with the visibility of the people as modern citizens of the new Republic being a crucial element. In particular, as in many nation-building processes, gender identities became a crucial visible face of Turkish modernization, and also a symbol of the new nation. Şerif Mardin (1997), from his analysis of the literature on Turkish modernization, finds too much emphasis on macro models and too little interest in micro aspects of social change. If Mardin’s critique is valid, it implies that only by reintegrating everyday life as a central dynamic of the practice of modernity in Turkey, we will be able to move beyond the shortcoming of existing historical analyses (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Therefore, integrating micro aspects of social transformation will enable the writer and the reader to capture multifaceted networks of the processes. Within the

framework of this study, the societal and cultural consequences of Turkey's elite-driven modernization have greater significance, because the Kemalist transformation, especially at symbolic and societal levels, can be seen as the main source of today's political atmosphere and also current confrontations in the social and cultural spheres (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997).

Kemalist modernization project's concentration on social and cultural spheres is not coincidental as the Ottoman Empire's modernizing efforts had targeted these spheres, during Tanzimat era. When the Ottoman Empire had become weakened and fallen behind other regional forces in terms of military strength and economic wealth, the Sultan did not limited the reforms to economic, military and institutional fields. The reforms had revolutionary cultural implications although these were opposed and were unable to achieve popular acceptance (Zürcher, 2004: 66). That is, within this era, modernization started to become a cultural project. Then, in post war of Independence period, Kemalists' aim of erasing the old/traditional/Islamic Ottoman past and creating a new/modern/secular Republic had social and cultural foundations. As it has been mentioned before, modernizing elites' intended to transform value system and replace it with a modern one with modern citizens. As a part of this commitment, many reforms targeted identities. Firstly, the emancipation of women were indeed initiated: women gained the right to vote and to be electoral candidates; Turkish civil law was adopted in place of religious law; the Girl's Institute, established in 1928, guided women towards the task of modernization by applying the methods of Taylorism to housekeeping (Y. Arat, 1997: 100). On the other hand, women's activism was restrained. To give two examples, first, the Republican Women's Party, established in 1923, was closed down because of fears it would deflect attention away from the soon to be founded Republican People's Party (Y.

Arat, 1997). Then, in 1935, when the Turkish Women's Federation issued a declaration against rising Nazi threat, the modernizing elite were displeased, which resulted in the closure of the Federation. “The Republican fathers who initiated these reforms believed they knew the best interests of their polity and these corresponded to the best interests of women in the polity” (Y. Arat, 1997: 99).

Although it is true that Turkish women gained some progressive rights, their role in the new order was a revised one as they continued their traditional roles even while playing new public roles. The state itself encouraged the increasing involvement of elite, educated women in public life, while other women were expected to contribute to the modernization process by becoming *modern* Republican housewives and mothers, raising modern girls and boys for the newly-formed republic. As Kandiyoti (1987) puts it, “[t]he emancipated but not liberated women” of the republic became the marker of the frontiers between the public and private spheres.

According to another significant student of Turkish politics, Nilüfer Göle, this frontier was significantly affected by modernization: “Kemalist feminism, with its sights set on public visibility and social mixing of the sexes is creating a radical reappraisal of what are considered the private and public spheres” (1997: 86). Women designated the new borders between public/private, with the domestic arena becoming the terrain on which the private was being both constructed and contested. That is, the role of women in the private sphere was also being reshaped so that not only their modern look in the public sphere and daily life, but also their roles as a mother and wife were being delicately redrawn by their fathers and brothers as it has been mentioned in previous parts. Therefore, Kemalist modernization project’s

cultural reforms indicate so many clues about historical background for a researcher who has gender lens.

The historical background discussed so far provides a basis on which to build a schema to frame the main issue that this dissertation will problematize: namely, the different construction of manhood in Turkish political life. That is, clues towards an analysis of multiple constructions of masculinity in modern Turkey can be found in the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the modernization efforts of the new Republic. As the multiple constructions of masculinities cannot be isolated from the political culture, it was vital to outline the general climate that defines the Turkish political atmosphere. Then, after the literature review, I identified five main pillars of Turkish political culture. These are (1) the strong state tradition; (2) militarism; (3) Westernization; (4) the secularist / Islamist cleavage; (5) the domination of political leaders. These five pillars were identified in accordance with the scope of this dissertation as they all have reflections on the different constructions of masculinities.

Culture is a dynamic symbolic system and provides a new theoretical vocabulary for analyzing culture in a given society. For Geertz (1973), culture refers to “webs of significance”, and its analysis is not an experimental science in search of laws, but an interpretive one in search of meaning. His theoretical formulation aims to explain how symbols or meanings embodied and enacted in discourses that generate experiential realities.

In line with Geertz, I would argue that culture, as a constitutive sphere for identity formation, is public as significant symbols and their meanings are created and maintained in the course of social interactions. Therefore, it is valuable to scrutinize both macro and micro politics, throughout Turkish political history. Both

macro and micro politics concerning with the state and its institutions and micro politics of everyday lives enable the researcher “(...) to analyze people and the state, not as an opposition, but as the same domain” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 2). Hence, analyzing modern Turkey’s main institutional and political heritages complements the study of the dynamics of everyday lives. Especially an analysis that focuses on the encounters enables the analysis being more comprehensive.

The next section will trace different paths of masculinities throughout Turkish political trajectory in accordance with their reflections on the constructions of masculinities in Turkish politics. It can be argued that above mentioned five pillars of Turkish political culture have shaped the general climate hence, they provide a vocabulary for the analysis of different constructions of masculinities.

4.2. Tracing Different Paths of Masculinities in Turkish Political Culture

As it has been mentioned before, all three different constructions of masculinities, namely (1) neo-Muslim; (2) Kemalist/secular; (3) nationalist, derive their roots and also reproduce within the same cultural pool but in a different way. The elements of Turkish political culture have been very influential in relation to their reproductive texture in sociopolitical life and they have had creative and transformative potentialities. The elements of political culture simultaneously reproduce some codes and offer a suitable ground. Therefore, the next section will not only elaborate on the five pillars of Turkish political culture but also it will discuss the codes of Turkish masculinities in an interconnected way. It will incorporate the pillars of Turkish political culture into the construction of masculinities that are attached to historical memory. This will enable the reader to

understand, not only the blueprints of Turkish masculinities but also the characteristics of Turkish politics as a field where the “game is played” (Allan, 2011: 176).

4.2.1. The Strong State Tradition

Since Ottoman times, Turkish politics has always been characterized by its strong state tradition (Heper, 1992; Barkey, 2000). Consequently, the Republic of Turkey inherited a strong, centralized and highly bureaucratic state from the Ottoman Empire, which is still one of the critical characteristics that define Turkish politics. Heper stresses that the “state reflects a notion of public interest” in Turkish politics (1992: 3). For Heper (1992) because the evolution of state took place by making social groups politically impotent rather than politically influential. Therefore, in Turkey, the power has become concentrated in the state rather than other political units, primarily political parties. The final perspective on Turkish political culture elaborates on the issue of the domination of political parties by their leaders.

Regarding the historical/social/political background of the Turkish Republic, it can be argued that the political culture built around the powerfulness of the state. Since the Ottoman Empire, when land was owned by the patriarchal state and people were organized into nations (*millet*) and the notion of potent state has epitomized not only the Ottoman rule but also the Republican regime that was based on its strong state principles for fostering solidarity. According to Carol Delaney, both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism were based on the idea of unity and brotherhood provided by Islam and *vatan* (homeland) (1994: 180). Therefore, it can be argued that the notion of the father state epitomized Turkish historical memory.

In addition, another angle of the strong state tradition or enduring Kemalist/statist understanding is its reflections on strong bureaucratic institutions. Since Ottoman rule a centralized system has dominated society. “In the Ottoman Empire, the political realm was, in fact, identical with a huge Sultanic monor.” and Kemalist aimed to transform this personal rule into a legal-rational one (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 146). However, the system has preserved its highly coordinated, regulated agencies and continuously emphasized on loyalty to the statist rule. Especially during the early Republican period, as Heper argues “(...) the bureaucratic elite considered themselves as guardians of the Republican norms, or Atatürkian principles.” (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 148). Moreover, what is worth to mention in the framework of this dissertation is about how they position themselves in the politics as a field. Bureaucrats in Turkey have always considered themselves as more educated, sophisticated, self-disciplined in contrast to politicians. The reflection of this understanding in the contemporary constructions of masculinities in politics as a field is Western-oriented bureaucrats that position themselves in a superior position. These bureaucrats are the educated, urban elites of Ankara, especially *Çankaya*. *Çankaya* is an upper class district in Ankara that presidential palace is located. The district symbolizes the Republic as the civil servants and high ranked bureaucrats reside. Generally state offices, ministries, consulates, and government offices are located in *Çankaya* and that’s why it symbolizes the secular/modern/Kemalist state. Hence, *Çankaya* and its male elites represent contemporary founding fathers of the state.

4.2.1.1. *Devlet Baba* (Father State)

Since early Republican period, Turkey with a political culture that idolizes founding fathers has been an arena of men's politics. The modernization project of the Kemalists emphasized the elite and male efforts at enlightening the country. While the discourses of modernization redefined the role of women, they simultaneously idealized the fathers of the country. Throughout the Kemalist modernization project, men represented the cultural ideal charged with the task of modernizing women and society, as well as the duty of providing welfare. The borders of how the new women of the Republic would exist in society were drawn up by the Kemalist fathers. Changing the dress code was one of the first reforms, as it signified the eradication of religious codes and also the visibility of the new men. The law on Clothing (1925) suggested wearing a hat and a tie, symbolizing the country's disengagement of a traditional and religious masculinity and, also, in the same vein, loyalty to the newly formed Republic. Another expectation of the modern Turkish man was to possess a healthy masculine body as the bearer of national reforms. As the culture of nationalism was constructed to emphasize masculine themes, such as honor, patriotism, bravery and duty, the revolutionary men of the Republic also had to demonstrate that they were the protectors of society. Furthermore, going to events such as balls and plays were considered as symbols of the modern daily life.

According to Altan-Olcay, the nation-building project of the Kemalist elites pointed to the patriarchal regulation of society. She adds that "(...) the state defined itself as the founding father with the ultimate responsibility to elevate daughters, who gratefully obeyed the definition of modernity and their predetermined roles in it" (2009:176). Similarly, Rittersberger and Kalaycıoğlu argue that the aim of the

Turkish nation state project “(...) was to create a state taking over responsibilities from the family” (1998: 78). However, this attempt did not ignore the traditional centrality of the family because family and kin networks provided alternative means of social control (Rittersberger and Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 78). The Turkish experience of nation state formation, it can be argued, thus duplicated the traditional role of fathers, in which the state as authoritarian father had the responsibility to control the citizen, while the father, as male household head, had the duty to modernize other members of his family. As Rittersberger and Kalaycıoğlu put it, “[i]n Turkey, the patriarchal state corresponds to the patriarchal family. The patriarch, (...) being assured of his absolute authority position inside the family, remains mostly outside the personal spheres of the family members, as long as they do not question the existing order” (1998: 78).

Hence, since the establishment of the Republic, the role of the father has been constituted as both leader of the family and the country. The notion of *devlet baba* (father state) is a product of this glorification of the relation between manhood and the state. The Turkish model has attempted to construct a new national culture and citizens, with the image of civilian manhood being tightly woven into the fabric of patriotic citizenship. This overlapping and mutually constitutive discourse has developed over the years to become a prevailing cultural element in Turkish society: the father state protects individuals; it has the duty of providing welfare and offering solutions in cases of emergency, and has the right to demand obedience. Another image that is interwoven into Turkish political culture is that of the ‘motherland’ (*ana vatan*). Motherland is a generalized medium of nurture under the control of the state.

Femininity has always been associated with the earth and women are defined by their physical and nurturing qualities which come to define their social role (Delaney, 1994: 184). According to Carol Delaney,

Baba (father) and *ana* (mother) are defined by their culturally perceived roles in procreation. These words, (...), are not merely labels attached to male and female parents but are also meaningful terms that are differentially coded and hierarchically ordered as is clear when used in the phrases ‘to father’ vs. ‘to mother’. Thus understanding their meaning and role may help to understand their significance when they are deployed as *Devlet Baba* (Father State) and *Anavatan* (Motherland). (1994: 183)

In Delaney’s theory of procreation, while men are believed to be the generative agents, women are believed to be the fertile agents. In short, symbolically, women are soil and men provide the seed to reproduce. That is, although women are necessary agents for procreation, men are associated with divine creativity and “partake of its power and authority” (Delaney, 1994: 184). Hence, procreation is an arena for naturalizing divine power, and such notions about procreation lie behind the rhetoric used in different contexts. For instance, Delaney explains Turkey’s laws on citizenship in terms of this rhetoric. According to the Turkish constitution of 1982, the child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk, but only a child with a Turkish father is a citizen. Hence, she argues, citizenship does not coincide with nationality and citizenship is not gender neutral (Delaney, 1994: 188). She also investigates the meaning of *ail* (family) in Turkish, noting that the concept refers to wife and children, implying that “(...) only men have families; women are part of one” (1994: 188). Further examples intrinsic in Turkish social codes can be added. Atatürk’s language reform, the usage of Latin letters, the introduction of *anadil* (*mother tongue*) as the medium of expression but it was *atasöz* (*proverbs*) that gave shape and distinctiveness to it (Delaney, 1994: 190). Therefore, in line with

Delaney's arguments, it can be argued that gendered expressions that signal the unequal position of women and men in Turkey are inherent in the cultural codes. The link between symbolization and representations should be understood in terms of larger cultural systems, so what is important is the potential of these concepts to affect the way people think about men and women. That is, the choice of words and conceptualizations reinforce traditional meanings of gender.

4.2.2. Militarism

The military has played a crucial role in Turkish politics since early Republican times, and military officers in Turkey have taken power into their own hands on directly three different occasions (1960-1961; 1971-1973; 1980-1983). That is, they intervened in democratic politics which was supposed to be pursued by political parties. The guardian role of the military has shaped a political culture, mythologizing a benign political role for the armed forces in national politics (Cizre, 1993). According to Heper (2005), military officers attempted to implement a rational democracy for Turkey in terms of finding the best policies and promoting the general interest. However, today, due to changes in both domestic and global factors, the role of the military has changed, as in the post-1999 period, Turkey has made steady and significant progress from a rational towards a liberal democracy (Heper, 2005). While in the past, due to military interventions or the threat of interventions, political parties were deinstitutionalized and rendered apolitical, since the 2000's the military has no longer been the ultimate stabilizing force filling the vacuum when the system goes into crisis. In terms of its relationship with this new situation, "the military is committed to the present political order, regardless of the degree to which

that order is or is not democratic, and it apparently inspires confidence among those who benefit from the status quo.” (Tessler and Altinoğlu, 2004: 44). In Turkey, the nation has been considered by many to be indivisible from its military described in significant myths. “Every male (Turk) is born soldier!” is the most apparent reification of this symbol.

4.2.2.1. Every Male (Turk) Is Born Soldier!

According to Delaney, “[t]he very conception of the nation and the discourse of nationalism is itself an inherently gendered discourse” and militarism is one of the essential elements of that discourse (Delaney, 1994: 191). Militarism is also critically constitutive for the construction of Turkish masculinities.

Enloe notes that “masculinity has been intimately tied to militarism, yet the two sets of ideas are not inseparable” (2000: 235). In this perspective, militarism is a multifaceted network of metaphors and symbols that provide a sense of manliness. The internalized understanding that ‘*every (male) Turk is born a soldier*’ illustrates one historically constructed reality. The “myth of the military-nation” is constitutive of Turkish culture, and a highly gendered discourse that has important implications (Altnay, 2004). According to Altnay (2004), in Turkey, this myth has become intertwined with the ideology of nationalism and also the understandings of gender, especially since 1923.

During the formation of the new Republic, the Kemalist elites passed the Military Service Law of 1927 (Altnay, 2004: 77). According to this law, compulsory military service applied to all male citizens. According to Altnay, this creation of a gendered citizenship through compulsory conscription “(...) created a source of

gender difference that was *defined and administered by the state* (original italics)” (2004: 34). Such political differentiation also naturalizes a cultural differentiation between men and women, as Altınay correctly argues. Recognizing military service as the access to citizenship, and also to real manhood emphasizes the gender difference. That is, military service has been not only considered as a service to state but it also defines proper masculinity (Altınay, 2004: 82).

Hence, to join the army and be a soldier is a marker of being a real man in Turkish culture. For instance, farewell to a new soldier recruit for military service is an important event. Family, friends and relatives accompany the soldier to the bus station or airport. A convoy of relatives in cars follows behind the car carrying the new soldier in the passenger seat, “waving Turkish flags and chanting nationalist songs” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 117). For many young men, going to the army is the most honorable event of their lives, especially for uneducated men, generally from shantytowns. Being a soldier “gives them the sort of communal respect, show of affection, and high regard of the kind they in no way otherwise could hope to obtain in their young adult lives” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 118). This farewell ceremony for soldiers is a site of public celebration of the Turkish military. The greatness of the country and loyalty to the motherland is expressed through the language and symbols of glorification. In these ceremonies, the whole experience can be considered as a “show of veneration for the state” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 119).

In addition to being a soldier, the notion of martyrdom glorifies dead soldiers, the brave men who died for the sake of the nation.²⁹ However, *Mehmetçik*, the

²⁹ The state recognizes two kinds of martyr. One is a martyr of duty that defines a soldier who died in an accident while on duty. Their families cannot obtain all the rights of martyrdom. The other is a martyr of terrorism that defines a soldier who died during a terrorist attack. The families of these soldiers receive salaries, housing and job assistance. Inherited from Turkish history, the traditionally

unknown soldier, is also idolized, even if he does not die for the country. Military service that is a precursor to manhood and also to marriage and to serious employments is inseparable from the interplay between masculinity, nationalism, citizenship and soldiering. The formula is very simple: Being a man is confirmed by soldiering and being a soldier verifies not only your civic responsibility but also your patriotism. Therefore, military service is very significant and also loaded for the construction of masculine identity in Turkey.

In another study, Selek (2008) analyzes the intimate relationship between military service and being a man in Turkey. Selek analyzes different men from various social backgrounds, and concludes that military service is constitutive in Turkish men's identity formation, and that it is a naturalized process. In parallel with this view, for Altınay (2004), military service is significant as it is also

(...) naturalizing male participation in the military as protectors of their families and of the nation. By defining national pride through masculine pride in the practice of military service, nation-state builders have simultaneously culturalized, masculinized and militarized an emerging political process. (2004: 6)

Since the establishment of the Republic, the significance of the military, especially soldiers, has increased to become the symbol of the birth of the new nation or independence. Hence, being a brave soldier and protecting the nation have significant implications for the blueprints of Turkish masculinity. That is, being brave like a soldier is one the key codes that Turkish men are entitled to. Accordingly, in the field of politics, politicians, and leaders in particular, should also have the characteristics of a real man, namely to have completed military service and

symbolic representation of women as mothers is embedded in Turkish nationalist narratives. In that sense, especially, being the mother of a martyr is something socially and religiously honorable. For a detailed analysis of the mothers of martyrs, see Gedik, Esra. 2008. "Ideological Ambivalence of Motherhood in the Case of 'Mothers of Martyrs' in Turkey". Unpublished MA Thesis. Middle East Technical University.

to be courageous while protecting the country. As military officers were the guardians of the newly formed Republic after the War of Independence, they became the first generation of the political elites. These founding fathers' control of resources and the processes that sustained their control started to shape Turkish political manhood. Hence, the characteristics of a statesman started to be matched with the characteristics of a soldier.

Atatürk and his image of father of all Turks have enriched such a stereotype. Atatürk's heroic role as the founder of the state has fostered legitimized male control over resources as a commander and statesman. In addition, Bilgin highlights "(...) the paternal face and paternal gaze" of Atatürk (2004: 171). According to Bilgin (2004), Atatürk's face in posters, busts personify the nation he created and also the victory behind it, and, simultaneously, Turkish citizens remind his authority in so many instances during the conduct of everyday life. Such an iconography does not only personify the war and victory but also institutionalize masculinized authority. Masculine role that Atatürk represents is also constitutive for valuing Western images. Atatürk as the leader of the reforms in early Republican period symbolized also the new nation. He introduced and applied reforms as a leader. For instance, he himself introduced the hat as a replacement for *fez* in 1925. He was the first who used a surname after the adoption of Surname Law in 1934. He started to use the surname of Atatürk, meaning the father of Turks. Therefore, enriched with the image of Atatürk, modernization offered a repertoire reifying strong collection between military and virile manhood.

4.2.3. Westernization

Westernization is another critical perspective in terms of Turkish political background. According to the World Values Survey, which uses data from several countries from Western Europe and several other societies showing the values of young and old, as well as different rates of economic growth, there is a significant relationship between democratization and political culture. This leads Esmer (1999), who coordinated the survey in Turkey, to draw attention to the need to examine the normative orientations of ordinary citizens so as to understand fully the nature and functioning of a political system. Hence, it is crucial to understand the conceptualizations and orientations of Turkish citizens about democratization, or European Union (EU) membership in particular. Since the 1999 Helsinki decisions, Turkey has felt itself obliged to further liberalize and democratize itself. As Barkey (2000) notes, even the strong state tradition of Turkey has been challenged with the potential accession to European Union (EU). Therefore, the political picture of Turkey has started to change with (1) the decreasing role of the military since the 2000's; (2) the increasing role of political parties as they are left relatively free to interpret and also apply democracy in the political arena.

Research conducted by Cindoğlu et al. (2007) indicates that Turkey's EU accession process has enjoyed a high rate of support from different segments of Turkish society in the past decade as a result of the hopes and expectations that different segments of the society had from the EU. Within this, the issue of gender equity is critical in terms of the relationship of gender equality to democratization and also EU membership. As Norris and Inglehart (2002) argue "(...) the most basic cultural fault line (...) involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization

and (...) these issues have important implications for democracy'. In terms of the analysis of gender equity it is problematic to make overgeneralizations about a society. Therefore, it is significant to examine the background and embedded patterns from a more dynamic approach.

4.2.3.1. *Mon Cher* vs. *Kabadayı* (Tough Uncle)

Modernization or Westernization in today's Turkish political atmosphere has provided a framework for Turkish political history and has affected its political culture. Westernization in the Turkish context has generally been analyzed in the light of the delicate balance between the traditional and the modern. What is modern is equal to what is Western or European, especially in everyday life, Westernization, Europeanization and also even democratization are still being used interchangeably. These conceptualizations exclude what is traditional, Islamic, and Ottoman. Turkish experience of nation-state building exemplifies these antagonisms and the history of modernization in Turkey offered a slippery ground for identities. As mentioned before, in the late Ottoman period, the Empire weakened in terms of military strength and economic wealth. The Tanzimat reform era (1839-1871) was a turning point, as the reforms were not limited to just the economic, military, and institutional fields. Rather, the era was also characterized by attempts to emancipate gendered identities from the existing order. Thus the *dandy*³⁰ of that era can be considered as a departure from solid Ottoman masculinity, and also a threat to Ottoman conservatism (Kandiyoti, 1997; Bilgin, 2004). He imitated his Western counterparts, but his

³⁰ Dandies of the era were characterized by their hyper-fashionability and their embodiment of modern decadence.

identity was defined within the boundaries of dichotomies like traditional/modern or à la Franga/à la Turca, although modernization efforts distanced him from traditional norms and rules. Following this period, the First World War and the War of Independence especially that marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the new Republic restored the lost prestige of Turkish men by rendering their de-masculinized bodies into soldiers.

In contrast to dandies, who had de-masculinized behaviors and bodies, another key masculine stereotype is the *kabadayı* (tough uncle). They were the protectors of the *mahalle* (household) and the normative order. Kandiyoti discusses the importance of the *kabadayı* in the *mahalle*, noting that

[t]he *kabadayı* ensured that the women of the quarter were protected (...). They were mostly uneducated but could be artisans practicing their trade, and they were generally respectable members of the community. (...) [T]he masculinities they implied were the guarantors and protectors of a normative order that was at once stifling and reassuring, constraining yet deeply familiar. (1997: 121-122)

Such a strong and hyper-masculine figure has become embedded in popular and political culture as well. For example, in present-day Turkey, many people define Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a *kabadayı*. As a result of his authoritarian personality, and also the neighborhood, *Kasımpaşa*, that he grew up in, there is a popular perception of him as the “heroic leader who resists against all odds.” (Yavuz, 2009: 119). While his way of behaving is criticized by his opponents, his followers appreciate him. The Turkish political arena has witnessed many debates around this subject, which are evaluated in detail in the next chapter. For now, this brief outline of Erdoğan’s hyper-masculine personality provides further evidence of the dichotomies of gendered identity constructions. To sum up, in Turkey, gendered

identities have been molded on the tension between being *alaturca/alafranga*, *dandy/kabadayı*, traditional/modern or Islamist/secular.

In today's social/political/cultural atmosphere, the power interplay between dandies and *kabadayı*, namely the symbols of modern decadence and the significance of traditions, has found its counterpart in the struggle between *mon cher* and *kabadayı* (tough uncle). An output of this struggle in the socio-political and historical continuum is the rift between Tayyip Erdoğan and "*mon cher*". As mentioned before, in Turkey, bureaucrats are considering themselves as the guardians of the Atatürkian principles. West oriented diplomats' way of conducting politics is named as *mon cher* style in populist discourse. This understanding of elitist bureaucrats has been dubbed by Erdoğan after the Davos crisis³¹. According to this discourse, bureaucrats and diplomats who are overly pro-Western are snobbish like *züppe* (dandy) but more importantly their *a la Franga* style determines them most. Aras in her study that discusses the rift between Prime Minister and diplomats argues that

[T]wo main reasons come to mind. To begin there is the perceived class differences between diplomats and the right-wing political parties (such as nationalist and Islamic movements) which have their roots in and represent mostly the rural areas and the urban working class and which view the diplomats as an elitist group that looks down on the common citizen. (...) The second source is ideological. Several retired and serving ambassadors are wary of the AKP government since its leadership comes from the Islamic political movement." (2010: 47)

These bureaucrats are neither *züppe* nor *kabadayı*. They represent a break in this continuum. They are in a sense *a la Franga*, or in other words overly pro-Western, but on the other hand, they are like *kabadayı* but the ones who protect the

³¹ Prime Minister Erdoğan left the stage at World Economic Forum after a debate on Gaza with Israeli President Shimon Peres. Erdoğan interrupted Peres' talk by saying "One minute!" and this attitude created a diplomatic crisis.

country from external and especially internal threats. Although their understanding of threat differs from their Ottoman and early Republican counterparts, they consider themselves as the guardian of the secular system. Hence, they are still patriarchal but in a different way. Other than *kabadayi* of the populist discourse who is strictly connected to the traditional values, *mon chers* are considered as “(...) disconnected from traditions of the nation” (Aras, 2011: 47).

4.2.4. The Secularist/Islamist Cleavage

The relationship between Islamic identity and Western modernity is a crucial one in Turkey, since, although Turkish politicians of the early Republican period tried to reconcile the religious and/or traditional and the secular and/or modern, the enduring power conflict between the secular modernist and Islamist elites in Turkey has become a major characteristic of Turkish political history. During Ottoman times, Islam prescribed people’s way of living, and the codes of Islam were highly interwoven into everyday life practices. Hence, the first aim of modernizing policy makers was to eliminate these old codes: “they sought to manoeuvre religion out of public life” (Onar, 2007: 10). The landscape of Turkish politics was taken as problematic with Westernization and contrary to Kemalist principles, thereby requiring measures for the “cleansing of Islam” (Keyman, 2003). The period of modernization can thus be characterized by its attempts to emancipate gendered identities from the existing order. At this point, it is also worth mentioning that the traditional order referred to the Islamic way of life. Related to their persistence over centuries, traditional customs and practices have “(...) become coated with a veneer of religious legitimacy to the extent that they are regarded as Islamic.” (Jenkins,

2008: 6). For the Kemalist elites, modernization could only be achieved with a shift to the modern and this simultaneously embrace erasing religious codes and *familiar boundaries*. Transforming the country through eliminating the “stereotypes of Turks as backward and uncivilized” lead to changing boundaries (Onar, 2007). However, during this modernization period, the atmosphere was such that each new concept and phenomenon was considered as threat, so changes in gendered identities were not institutionalized easily. Due to the paradoxical characteristics of the modernization process in Turkey, it resulted in ambivalences and contradictions. However, despite this aim of cleansing Islam of founding fathers, in the 1980s, Islam reappeared, with analysts of Turkish politics agreeing that the climate during the last quarter of the 1990s made Islamist discourse a part of politics once again. The Islamist RP (Welfare Party) in particular, became the body through which Islam’s engagement in politics was realized. For Gülalp, this development represented a “crisis of modernization” (2001: 440) that had a significant influence on identity politics. Specifically, the rise of Islamist discourse has become reified in the construction of identities in general, and of femininities and masculinities in particular with the rise of the AKP.

4.2.4.1. Kemalist/Modern vs. Muslim/Traditional Man

Currently, as a result of widespread social changes and the effects of globalization, the boundaries of masculinity and femininity are being redrawn as multiplicities of identities. In terms of masculinities, Turkish society itself has fabricated new forms of masculinities through its interaction with global images and identities. Class, ethnicity and, most importantly, religion have also been integrated

as determining dynamics into the construction of new masculinities. The power interplay between hegemonic masculinity and other masculinities has developed on a slippery ground shaped by the heritages and also ambivalences of Turkish culture, and currently the secularist/Islamist cleavage.

While traditional man is symbolized by the *kabadayı* of the early Republican times, his opponent is secular/modern man. Modernity and secularism have been considered a threat to Turkish men and to their patriarchal supremacy. The reproductions and reconstitutions of masculinities have always favored male dominated hierarchies, so new forms of masculinities were taken as a threat to the sober Turkish masculine image.

Body politics is another aspect of such a power conflict. In a political climate in which religiosity is considered as a part of political liberty, the importance of body politics has increased in a parallel way, especially concerning the veiling issue. Veiling has always been an arena of political contestation in Turkish politics because it is not only an issue of women's autonomy and agency, but restrictions on veiling undercut the Islamic construction of masculinity (Çınar, 2005; Vojdik, 2010). Hegemonic masculinities regulate female bodies and construct themselves as dominant. For Çınar, controlling women's bodies simultaneously "legitimizes (hegemonic masculinities') power and authority to intervene with regard to bodies, construct the national subject, and dictate the boundaries of the public and private spheres" (2005: 59).

The construction of masculinities offers a critical lens for examining the veiling issue and its relationship to political power and the state. The debate over women and their bodies in Turkish history "(...) reveals how masculinities construct gender within a range of power, through the regulation of women's bodies" (Vojdik,

2010: 664). Since the beginning of the modernization efforts of the early Republican period, women's clothing has been a subject of reform. The newly founded state promoted the proliferation of the images of Westernized women in the public sphere, but also introduced some measures involving women's status in society (Çınar, 2005). Until the 1950s, the headscarf was not an element of political controversy in Turkey. In a paradoxical way, while the Turkish state constituted its secularism through the unveiling of the female body, the Islamist elite of the 1990s have constituted their Islamism by re-veiling the female body (Çınar, 2005).

“The politicizing of Islam empowers and encourages Muslims to return to the historical scene with their own ethics and aesthetics” (Göle, 1997: 87). This process gave birth to the struggle around veiling as the most visible symbol of Islamization. This quest for the Islamic self is a modern movement for Göle: “The re-elaboration of an Islamic self via political empowerment implicitly addresses the impact of modernization, which has penetrated the most intimate spheres of everyday life from definitions of self to gender relations and ethical values” (Göle, 1997: 81). This pursuit of an authentic way of being engendered a critical awareness of both the traditional way of practicing Islam and of contemporary forms of Western modernity. Body politics is thus significant in revealing the new consciousness of the Islamic self as it resists secularism because the body has become the signifier of the resistance of contemporary Islamists to secularism (Göle, 1997: 89). Within Turkey, both hegemonic masculinities and Islamic masculinities have used the veiling debate to represent their competing ideologies. This debate is one of the sites of contestation in which these competing masculinities negotiate. “This local struggle for a hegemonic masculinity constructs local gender relations, yet it is also part of the

historical and contemporary struggle between the West and Islam” (Vojdik, 2010: 684).

In this perspective, veiling is one of the most important signs that authority and power perform in female bodies, and discussions on veiling offer crucial clues about the parties’ different positions, their conceptualizations of maleness, and the competing legitimacies as the veil signals the presence of an alternative hegemonic political project.

In contemporary Turkey, the dualistic political discourse was triggered by this antagonism. Such an atmosphere has not only affected macro politics, but it has also and very importantly impacted on the micro politics of everyday lives. As all the shifts and continuities cannot be isolated from gendered identity constructions, masculinities and femininities have become penetrated by discursive practices. For instance, as mentioned before, one of the reflections of Muslim/traditional man is neo-Muslim masculinities that this dissertation problematizes. As it is discussed in the literature with the AKP, there is a shift in the discursive practices of Islamist tradition. The AKP represents neo-Muslim masculinities with a fine tuning of Muslim/traditional man. In parallel to this, the CHP represents Kemalist/secular masculinities with a fine tuning of Kemalist/modern man. Therefore, these two political parties represent competing masculinities in Turkish political atmosphere cherished by political cultural elements.

4.2.5. The Domination of Leaders

The above mentioned relationship between state and father also become visible in the hyper-importance of another dominant male figure in Turkish politics,

namely, party leaders. The leaders' personal attributes have become more important than the parties' public office. As Sayarı mentions, “[t]he importance of leaders in shaping political outcomes in Turkey stems largely, though not exclusively, from the near absolute control that they exercise over party organizations.” (2002: 3). The high degree of personalism in Turkish political parties has created leaders that are the dominant decision-makers in Turkish political parties (Rubin and Heper, 2002; Özbudun, 2000; Sayarı, 2002). The authoritarian or oligarchic structure of party organizations is a critical characteristic of Turkish political parties it that has led to political parties being reduced into one single figure. “While Turkey is a graveyard of political parties, political leaders rarely retire and hardly die. This is very much the outcome of the personality centric aspect of Turkish political culture. Thus, political leaders are more significant than ideologies or party programmes” (Yavuz, 2009: 118). Turkish politics is an arena for their personalities rather than party ideologies, and Turkish political history has witnessed many significant leaders whose role surpassed their parties. That is also the reason behind that this dissertation problematizes not only gendered discourses of political parties but also their leaders.

For instance, Süleyman Demirel, who is popularly known as *baba (father)*, served as the leader of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi, AP*) and True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP*) when he also served as Prime Minister and President of the Turkish Republic. During his long tenure in office, a combination of his popularity and his nepotism allowed him to retain control over his party members (Heper 2002: 224). According to Heper, Demirel had both charisma and also strong personal ties with party members, and this leadership style facilitated his success in politics (2002: 225).

Bülent Ecevit is another significant figure in Turkish politics. He has served as the leader of the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP*). He has also served as prime minister several times from 1970 until 2002, before he died in 2006. "Ecevit's leadership style combined elements of organizational control, ideology, rhetoric and policy" (Tachau, 2002: 114). In 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus "(...) propelled Ecevit to unprecedented heights of popularity" and since then he has been referred to as *Karaoğlan*, a folk figure evoking heroic images of social justice and glory. As an acquainted male image who protects the country, Ecevit gained popularity among Turkish citizens. At that time, he enjoyed a great deal of sympathy, and party slogans like 'Ecevit is our hope' and 'Populist Ecevit' reinforced this image of *Karaoğlan* (Tachau, 2002: 114).

Another critical leader figure in recent Republican history is Tansu Çiller. She was the first woman to head a major Turkish political party, and also the first female Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic. For Ümit Cizre, "[w]hat made her accession extraordinary was that she was not only the first woman elected to the leadership of a political party in Turkey, but to a *right-wing* party, where the top cadres were always occupied by male politicians" (2002a: 89). Following Demirel's *baba* (father) figure, she became the *ana* (mother) figure of the Turkish centre right electorate with her conservative stance. This *ana* figure represents the traditional image of womanhood in Turkey and "(...) within itself the implied positive qualities commonly linked with motherhood, she could portray herself and her politics as self-sacrificial, modest, altruistic, and having the purest motives, including an unselfish concern for the nation" (Cizre, 2002b: 207). In addition to the *ana* (mother) figure, she also used the *bacı* (sister) symbol, which is another culturally important term for

women in Turkey. She also cultivated her feminine image of women in politics by taking care of her dresses.

She was not the Kemalist woman professional or politician caricatured in forbidding, dark-colored, two-piece suits which underplayed one's sex. She did wear suits with long skirts, but they were always feminine, chic, and complemented with fancy, striking scarves. She created a smooth, pleasing image with the pale, pastel colors she chose for her suits and lipsticks. (Y. Arat, 2009: 13)

She did not hesitate to use her femininity and mother role in conducting politics. Especially, the mother theme was a rhetorical strategy that she used to justify her strength and power. For instance, in 1995, in a television channel, she rationalized her stance towards Kurdish problem by saying that "I have turned into a hawk like a mother whose son had been killed" (cited in Arat, 2009: 16). She tried to legitimize her position with gendered codes. Her reference to mother as a female challenge masculinized authority but, on the other hand, using the metaphor of hawk is in line with gendered roles within political world related to hawk's ferocious character. As a hunting bird, hawk or, especially, being like a hawk is a common usage in Turkish language for courageous man. Hence, ironically, it can be argued that she expanded signs of authority (Y. Arat, 2009: 17). In this perspective, it also valuable to mention that while associating herself with traditional gender roles, she also used her gender as a strategic tool to gain advantage over her male rivals. While she gained the sympathy of women by her femininity and with her efforts to survive in a masculine arena, on the other hand, she behaved in a masculinized tone as well. "Çiller also wished to give the impression that she had such man-like attributes as courage, endurance, determination, and militarism" (Y. Arat 2009: 207). Her "(...) hawkish political gestures and dismissal of women's issues" can be taken as examples of her man-like image (Y. Arat, 2009: 13). Çiller's "sultan like" leadership

style, meaning its personalistic and authoritarian nature, can be considered as a milestone in Turkish politics (Cizre, 2002a: 96). In Turkey, like its counterparts, the representation of women in politics is relatively low and “the few women who do break through, such as Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher, do so by their exceptional use of men’s networks, not women’s” (Connell, 1995: 204). In line with Connell’s argument, in Çiller’s case it was “(...) Demirel who personally recruited Çiller to the DYP” (Cizre, 2002b: 199). Although she entered into politics with a big fanfare, her political opportunism, and her decision to form a coalition government with the Islam oriented Welfare Party (RP) decreased her popularity among the electorate.

In sum, although she has challenged the image of politician, especially, prime minister, her man-like style has fostered gendered character of politician and way of conducting politics. Especially, from a perspective of leadership, she has cultivated male coding of authority. Being the sole actor of a given political party, maintaining tight control over their party, leaders in Turkey, even women, enjoy with internalized gender of politics. In short, politics in Turkey is men’s politics and an analysis of the AKP, CHP and MHP’s leaders will enable us to reveal the codes of Turkish political manhood.

In conclusion, five main outlooks that have been identified, namely, the strong state tradition, militarism, Westernization, secularist/Islamist cleavage and domination of leaders, can not be isolated from an analysis of the construction of gendered identities in Turkish politics. These outlooks have also been imbued with codes of Turkish masculinities. The notion of father state, the hegemony of leaders, the rivalry between tough uncles and *mon cher* and also the deep rooted antagonism between Islamists and secularists have been bourgeoned from the root of culture. In

the basis of how politics as a field ossifies the codes of Turkish masculinities, the next chapter will analyze political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, and their gendered discourse.

CHAPTER V

THE GENDERED POLITICAL PARTIES

The analysis of gender has lead scholars to unsettle the established conventions; especially it has challenged the boundaries of the politics and the political. Significantly, in the study of gender, re-reading self evident conceptualizations and phenomenon opened the ways to capture how it is implicated in structures of power. From the perspective of embeddedness of power and the construction of masculinities, questioning masculinized arrangements promote an alternative way. As state is generally assumed as the main site of masculinized hierarchy, an examination of gender of the state enables both the reader and the writer to comprehend the interplay of gender relations and state dynamics better. Especially, in a country that strong state is a historically determinant factor and an element of political culture, gendered traditions within state are vital. In addition, the strong role of the state “hinders the making of effective civil society” and this situation situates political parties as the main political institution in political arena in Turkey (Heper, 1992: 189). As mentioned before political parties are relatively left alone to function in the political sphere. Therefore, one who is intended to analyze the different pathways of masculinities in politics as a field in Turkey and their

encounters, political parties constitute the main unit of analysis. Its institutional structure and its discourses will shed light on the construction of gendered identities in general, masculinities in particular. Hence, this chapter will first analyze the state and political manhood and it will define the interplay among politics, gender and power. While discussing the gendered state in depth, it will examine the close relationship between the state and political parties in Turkey. The second part of the chapter will examine political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, official documents with a lens focusing on gendered discourses.

5.1 The State and Political Manhood

A researcher starting from a Marxist perspective of the state will probably reveal a puzzle about its machinery: that it is a machine of repression that enables the ruling class to ensure domination over the proletariat. For example, as Althusser points out, the state is first of all what Marxists call the “state apparatus” and “(...) the state has no meaning except as a function of state power” (1994: 108). Althusser’s important term, Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), offers a vital perspective for the analytical framework to be used here. For him, there are religious, educational, family, legal, political, trade-union, communication and cultural ISAs (1994: 110). These are different to the ‘State Apparatus’, which itself is not plural and, most importantly, functions through violence and direct intervention as a repressive force. ISAs, however, also function through ideology, so how they function is important. Especially in everyday life, both the State Apparatus and ISAs may function cooperatively to discipline and/or subject individuals (1994: 117). According to Althusser, this process of “interpellation”, of naming and subjugating

individuals is “[n]ourished by a myriad of ISAs that runs from absolute manipulation to patriarchal pliability with each enjoying a certain degree of autonomy, gender roles comprise a tapestry of teachings” (Bilgin, 2004: 26). Both men and women are subject to these teachings, and are also required to perform accordingly as deemed.

From this perspective, this dissertation aims, by destabilizing the idea of maleness, to re-read and re-analyze two central assumptions about politics in modern Turkey: (1) that the state is virile; (2) that politics and manhood are embedded. As a first step to achieving this aim it is necessary to critically analyze relations between the state and gender, and, also between politics and gender.

A generally accepted hypothesis about the state and gender is that modern states are *inherently* male dominated. However, there are also some critiques of this view in the literature. For instance, for Vickers, “if women achieve citizenship when men do, and if when they help create founding discourses, and achieve an earlier and higher ‘presence’ in state and political institutions, the resulting democracy will be more ‘women friendly’” (2006:2). She adds that “less militarized democracies often are more open to women’s participation” (2006: 3). Women’s early integration and participation in institutions simultaneously increases their presence in them. In line with Vickers’ argument, Helga Hernes (1987) also highlights the women-friendliness of modern states. She portrays women-friendliness as a deepening of democracy concerning state policies. Using these arguments that challenge the idea of the state as a masculinized hierarchy, allows one to develop new hypotheses that lead to new questions. However, as this dissertation does not focus on the degree to which the Turkish state is women friendly, it will mainly be organized around consideration of the leaders of various political parties and scrutiny of the discourses of masculinities related to them. The dissertation will mainly focus on the relation between politics

and masculinity by not ignoring the *other* gender and its significance in the whole network of power located in state apparatuses. In this, it follows Nagel, who argues that

(...) to limit the examination of gender in politics to an investigation of women only, as much contemporary research has tended to do, is *to miss a major, perhaps the major, way in which gender shapes politics* - through men and their interests, their notions of manliness, and the articulation of masculine micro (everyday) and macro (politics) cultures (Nagel, 2005: 397, original italics)

Hence, it is essential to re-analyze the relationship between politics and masculinities from a critical perspective. From the perspective that ‘the personal is political’, it is valuable to re-read the political from a gender perspective because gender is fundamental to the practice of politics. It is notable how systematically the political sphere has been identified historically with men and masculinities, making it necessary to ask the same questions as McCormack (2007:1): “Why have men traditionally been associated with the public political domain and what implications [does] this have for gender relations as a whole?” As MacCormack points out, although the term ‘public’ itself is gender-neutral, it has nevertheless been associated with a range of highly emotive moral values that were gendered in the masculine. For example, ‘public spirit’, ‘virtue’ and ‘service’ have all placed political action firmly within 19th century expectations of what it means to be a man (McCormack, 2007: 3), and political historians, have taken the dominance of men as *given* where politics is concerned. Hence, both the argument that gender is political, and the association of the political domain with masculinities highlight the usefulness of establishing the concept of masculinities in the study of politics. This study will use a dynamic approach to politics that embraces power relations, discourses and everyday life.

In this dissertation, politics will be considered within the framework of Bourdieu's understanding of field. For Bourdieu, "(...) a field may be defined as a *network*, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, (...), in the structure of the distribution of species of power" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97). Politics is a multilayered network and an arena of competing relations for positions or simply, gaining power. Agents position themselves according to the rules of the field because the field impose rule of conduct. Hence, politics impose regulatory codes to its agents, namely politicians, and they behave accordingly to have authority and to be in power. The struggles of power are classificatory ones and position agents. According to Bourdieu field or the conditions of it pushes habitus in an adaptive way (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 102). The agents or politicians in the field of politics confirm to the rules and on the basis of the relationship between field and habitus, it can be argued that habitus and the field harmonically construct each other. Habitus adapts itself to the conditions required. However, on the other hand, it is critical to witness such a harmonious partnership in politics as a field in the framework of the construction of masculine identities. This dissertation problematizes this and it will be discussed within the context of Turkish political history in following chapters.

Before moving into a discussion of the construction of different masculinities in Turkish politics as a field, the debate to follow here will adopt the same approach as Connell, namely, that a framework for theorizing the interplay of gender relations and political dynamics is necessary. As politics is fundamentally concerned with explaining the operation of power, the cultural turn has enabled researchers to criticize its subtler operations, namely subjective manifestations of power

(MacCormack, 2007: 24). Men's gendered experiences of the political arena are critical here, and a gendered study of political men may take many forms. As already mentioned, the dominance of men politically has been considered as a given, so deconstructing the notion of manhood in the political sphere is of great value.

Although masculinities may take many forms in any given society, for Connell, only one model is hegemonic, culturally dominant and instrumental in perpetuating the society itself. Nevertheless, alternative models should not be underemphasized (Connell, 1993). Connell helps us to understand the link between the political and the power of the state, and the place of gender in a society when social contexts are constructed within unequal power relations. Therefore, being aware that masculinity is not *there*, but that it is in-between, above or behind structures, it seems plausible to see the relationships between masculinity and politics as not static and being constantly renegotiated (McCormack, 2007: 19).

With the awareness of the bottlenecks of defining masculinity and examining gendered power relations or manifestations of power, this dissertation takes a dynamic approach. If power is something productive and multiple, and gender's construction is being shaped in whole discourses of gendered meanings and performances, taking masculinities just as the result of a patriarchal social structure will be misleading. The active process of gendering the political constitutes particular ways of conceptualizing society, thereby facilitating the exercise of political power. Hence, gender studies can be helpful to reveal subjective manifestations of power. MacCormack argues that politics is commonly conducted through gendered processes of interaction, networking and interpersonal relationships (2007). Thus, conceptualizations of masculinity are actively created and fostered through processes of inculcating common values and behaviours,

constructing power relationships, or negotiating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Hence, political masculinities that power relations play crucial role is the notion that this dissertation is concerned with. This will also enable us to understand the changing ways in which the political self is conceived of in terms of gender.

5.2 The Gendered Political Parties

Bourdieu recognizes that naturalized gender hierarchies inculcate the superiority of some characteristics as masculine and also symbolically dominant. He therefore emphasizes that perceived dichotomies are gendered. Similarly, Hawkesworth argues that gender symbolism generates a logic in which rationality, competence and leadership are coded as masculine. She adds that the gendered understanding of power is embedded in “(...) structures of belief, that constitute the identities and aspirations of gendered political agents” (2005: 150). That is, not only discourses and symbols, but also the political cultures of a given country have cooperatively worked to establish practices that shape the gendered nature of the politics and the political. Having presented the dynamics of Turkish political culture in detail in the previous chapter, it is now necessary to discuss how the functioning of the state situates gender hierarchies, especially in a country where the strong state tradition is a determining factor of political culture and political parties are main machineries.

To begin with, regarding the relation between the state and gender, there are no clear boundaries to discuss the theoretical framework. Connell, in his work “*The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal*” (1990), addresses this problem and tries to explore the main ways of thinking about the relationship

between gender and the state. To move beyond the limits, Connell starts by recognizing that “gender is collective phenomenon, an aspect of social institutions as well as an aspect of personal life, and therefore internal as well as external to the state” (Connell, 1990: 509). Hence, as both gender and the state are broad terms, analyzing the relation between gender and the state is not easy. Connell takes gender as a “domain of human practice” while he takes the state as a “set of institutions currently subject to coordination” (Connell, 1990: 509-510). After outlining the main theories of the state, namely, the liberal tradition and Marxist theory, Connell argues that it is liberal feminism that has brought gender and, more importantly, the argument that “the state is gendered” into the literature (Connell, 1990: 513). For Connell, the idea of male state nuanced in two ways. The first is the conceptualization of the state as “the hireling or messenger boy of patriarchy” (Connell, 1990: 516). That is, following the argument of liberal feminism that the state is gendered, Connell claims that state is not neutral in its treatment of women. The second nuance for Connell (1990) is the elaboration of the state as an oppressor of the patriarchal power structure, an argument that relates to Mies’ comment about the state being “the general patriarch” (Mies, 1998). For Mies, just as the father is the individual patriarch of the family, so the state imposes rules and redresses inequalities among a country’s citizens. The latter argument, in particular, leads to challenging discussions which Connell uses to define the key pillars of his theoretical framework.

The first one is that “[t]he state is constituted within gender relations as the central institutionalization of gendered power” (Connell, 1990: 519). This pillar takes the state to be the main organizer of gender power relations, and also analyzes the state as a reification of these power relations. This discussion is generally linked to

history, specifically the question of origins. The origins argument about patriarchy claims that “archaic states were organized in the form of patriarchy, (...) promoted patriarchal family forms,” while patriarchal forms of power has been recreated in practice (Connell, 1990: 520). In the 19th century, hegemonic masculinity was displaced by a masculine domination organized around themes of rationality (Connell, 1990: 521). For Connell, such a bureaucratization of the state system was closely linked to an emerging distinction between the public and private spheres (1990).

The second pillar follows the first one in suggesting that the state, as the bearer of gender, is a gender regime (Connell, 1990: 523). For example, a common pattern is the gender division of labor, which indicates a masculinized state apparatus. That is, while men predominate within the state directorate (politics, bureaucracy, and judiciary) and the coercive apparatus (military, police), women prevail in human service state employment (e.g. teaching, nursing). Another component of the gender regime is the structure of power that denotes a gendered hierarchy. Connell emphasizes the significance of the bureaucracy as an organization of power within and/or without the state (Connell, 1990: 525). For him, the bureaucracy is a fundamental functioning system of the state that also involves personal networks and contacts. He argues that this system is “(...) socially organized on gender lines, with the enormous majority of elected officials being men” (Connell, 1990: 526).

The third component is the structure of *cathexis*, which mainly concerns the emotional component of the gender regime of the state. As has mentioned before, for instance, the culture of nationalism has been constructed to emphasize masculinized themes such as honor, patriotism. Hence, within the framework of this dissertation, a

gender patterning of emotion within the conduct of politics is crucial. “There was almost no recognition of gender in this [political authority] literature, though it can now be re-read as a discourse about masculinity and the ways men can be attached to political leaders” (Connell, 1990: 526). Hence, as the patriarchal structure of *cathexis* should not be underestimated within the framework of the gendered nature of the state, political activities around this cathexis, that are simultaneously reconstructed, should be scrutinized. Overall, Connell’s work offers an important paradigm for investigating the gendered nature of the state as a central institutionalization of power and a regulator of gendered hierarchy. This approach makes it clear that scrutinizing the exercise of gendered power relations is an important aid for understanding the dynamics of political manhood.

In addition to Connell’s analysis, it is also useful to draw on Lene Hansen’s arguments concerning the state and the gender ontology, epistemology and methodology of rationalist, standpoint and poststructuralist feminisms. She argues that all these approaches have a ‘concern’ with the way in which the state affects gender (Hansen, 2010). Her analysis of these three main approaches to gender focuses on the discipline of international relations. For rationalist feminism, the state is a utilitarian actor concerned with its own survival, so that “(...) gender is a variable that may impact state behavior or inverting the question where the state type or foreign policy might impact men and women differently” (Hansen, 2010: 20). For standpoint feminism, the state is a patriarchal organ that can be primarily critiqued regarding the historical separation of the public and private spheres (2010: 21). Unlike the first approach, standpoint feminism shifts the focus from an abstract conceptualization of the state to a concern with living men or, more especially, women. As Hansen mentions, standpoint feminism argues that women are impacted

by economic and security structures within and across countries (2010: 22). Finally, in contrast to standpoint feminism, post-structuralist feminism does not support the understanding that there is a concrete living female subject. Instead, it concerns itself with the significance of lived experience as texts and discourses (Hansen, 2010: 24). It can thus be argued that post-structuralist feminists follow Butler's view of gender as performative, in that post-structuralist feminists' main question is: 'How do discourses construct subjects?' Although this dissertation assumes an understanding of the mutual relation between subjects and discourses, the question of post-structuralist feminists is still relevant in terms of its emphasis on lived experience. In addition, they emphasize that the public / private distinction has had critical impacts on both women's and men's political, economic and cultural identity constructions. For them, "(...) the expectation of how the proper public person acts and reasons is one that concurs with the masculinity assumptions previously reserved for men" (Hansen, 2010: 23). The constructions that locate 'fragile', 'irrational' women in the private sphere and 'rational', 'decisive' and 'strong' men in the public sphere thereby legitimize particular actions of individuals. According to Hawkesworth, gender symbolism privileges men by generating "a logic of appropriate behavior that shapes the individual's self-understanding" (2005: 149). As this logic is embedded in routines and discourses, gendered power normalizes male dominance.

In Turkey, state is the main agent of the politics and it can be argued that in Turkey the stateness is being reproduced within political parties. State power is operationalizing in the conduct of political parties' way of doing politics. While one intends to deconstruct the conduct of politics and also the agent of this multilayered network in Turkey, he/she encounters with political parties and their leaders. As mentioned before, in Turkey there is a high level of domination of leaders in doing

politics. Moreover, in the framework of this dissertation, it is very valuable to discuss the negotiations of the state with political parties. As they constitute the main agents of the politics, their positioning towards the state is also very critical while discussing different pathways of masculinities in Turkey.

In short, Connell and Hansen's frameworks and supporting arguments, which enable us to analyze the different ways that manhood and its normative characteristics are attached to political leaders, and, also the ways by which the discourses of Turkish political culture construct subjects, are central to this dissertation.

In this line, this dissertation attempts to discuss the different pathways of masculinities in Turkish politics as a field. Its methodological framework has two main parts. The first part will examine official party documents and will discuss not only gendered rhetoric of them but also how these documents enshrine the family as the central unit of society. The second part, the next chapter, will deconstruct the leaders' speeches, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli, collected from the newspapers, *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, and *Zaman* between 2000 and 2009. This time frame is significant as it covers two elections that gendered rhetorical strategies peak and also it mainly depicts a *new period* in Turkish political atmosphere with the rising democratization discourse and the governance of the AKP symbolizing "*the return of the repressed*" (Gürbilek, 2010:78).

The analysis of the official party documents will present the institutional structure that gendered feminine and masculine actors operate. Hence, it is valuable to start with a brief analysis of political parties that will be followed by a discussion on political party programs and election manifests so as to reveal institutionalized discourse on gender.

5.3 Gender Discourse of the Official Documents of Political Parties

Parties, as important political machinery, are significant institutions that exercise power within the state. In addition, parties are political institutions that seek influence in a state and usually consist of more than a single interest in the society (Ware, 2003). Political parties are different from pressure groups and civil societal organizations; they work within the state since the centrality of the state is the object of party activity (Ware, 2003: 6). For Robert Michels, in addition to political parties' centrality in politics, studying them constitutes a vital branch of science as it "(...) occupies an intermediate field between the social, the philosophic-psychological and historical disciplines" (Michels, 1962: 6). Political parties have great importance in Turkish political history, too. The role of political parties in Turkey cannot be detached from the whole discourse of Turkish politics if we are to understand to what extent or whether the party politics had an impact on understanding the dynamics of politics in Turkey. Therefore, re-reading the construction of politics through political parties will be very beneficial for analyzing the relation between manhood and politics. Moreover, taking political parties as the focus of the study allows comparing the ways in which different ideologies employ images of men and masculinities.

Firstly, in line with Ware (2003:17), "it is not surprising that a comparative study of political parties should begin by considering parties as organizations that have or purport to have an ideology". Therefore, this dissertation aimed firstly making ideological differentiation and then, analyzing parties' different constructions of manhood. However, first, the limits of making such a classification among political parties seem apparent. For Ware, the answers to the questions of "Is there just a single ideological spectrum or many? Is there, another dimension, for instance, relating to lifestyle or personal values?" are not clear and dependent to society

(Ware, 2003). For the writer, examining only programmes of political parties without examining its doctrines, ethos, current position (in power or opposition) gives a limited understanding. Therefore, in the framework of this dissertation, the programmes of the political parties are analyzed to reflect their official discourse but they do not constitute the sole data. Election manifests are also significant for one to comprehend any given political parties' stance. As election times are very critical in terms of parties' positioning towards their opponents, election manifests reflect the current discourse and also position of the party as well. Hence, both party programmes and election manifests have the potentiality to reflect the political culture within the party itself. In addition, while examining the construction of manhood in political parties, the dissertation also, in a parallel way, analyzes or has the chance to compare different parties' construction of masculinities with different background. By this way, it will question one of the argument of TESEV's report on nationalism in Turkey that stresses out that men from left or right wing politics or Islamist are experiencing being men rather than being leftist, rightist or Islamist (Kentel, Ahıska and Genç, 2007: 264).

The information on political parties' discourse on gender, and masculinities in particular, were gathered through critical discourse analyses of party programs and election manifests of 2002 and 2007. The programs of the AKP, CHP and MHP examined with specific focus on men and women. Analyzing the gender discourse of political parties' programs offered how political parties construct men and women and helped to identify the significance of family as the central unit within Turkish society.

On the basis of political parties' vital role in Turkish politics, party programs and election manifests serve as barometer to examine political elite discourse on

gender. Firstly, when the programs and manifests were analyzed with specific focus on women, the data reports that although women's role and her rights are perceived and/or acknowledged, traditional family structures and intra-family division of labor remain its primacy.

5.3.1 The Program and Election Manifest of the AKP: A New Approach?

The AKP was formed in August 2001 after the closure of the FP (Virtue Party). The FP's dissident reformist wing was the founding members of the AKP. At this point the party can be viewed as an offspring of the National Outlook tradition.

There is a general understanding that the results of the 3 November 2002 general election opened a new period in Turkish politics with the AKP's important success as a newly established party. According to Heper (2003), the AKP is an outcome of the discontent felt by the members of the religiously oriented political parties in terms of the discourse and the praxis of those parties. Additionally, different from the MNP-SP line, the AKP's cadre declared that they were not Muslim democrats but 'conservative democrats'. The AKP's aim is to identify itself as a holder of a fresh starting point in the general framework of Turkish politics. They aim to represent a new political perception, discourse, method and culture. This is articulated under their political identity as follows: "(...) a political identity that we express as conservative democracy represents a very significant approach not only for Turkey, but also for world politics"³².

³² From the speech delivered by the party leader R. Tayyip Erdoğan in the International Symposium on Conservatism and Democracy, on 10. January.2004.
<http://www.akparti.org.tr/siyasivehukuk/dokuman/ing.%20başbakan%20konuşma%20UMDS.doc>
Retrieved on December, 17, 2009.

The AKP's responsiveness to contemporary global order and its pro-European Union stance has been interpreted as the source of its positioning towards Islam. The AKP is also argued to be on centre right with its emphasis on democracy and de-emphasis on Islam (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 68). On the other hand, Kalaycıoğlu in his study on psychological ties between the parties and voters, mentions that "(...) economic satisfaction and political Islam emerge as important sources" in determining the AKP (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008: 308). Hence, although the party de-emphasizes Islam and refers to Western values such as democracy, human rights, effective civil society, Islam is a critical element of defining the party, at least for the voters. Kalaycıoğlu's research indicates that "(...) those who identify closely with and systematically vote for the party do seem to be children of those parents who formerly identified with one of the National Outlook parties (the MSP, the RP, the FP) (2008: 309). Yet, the AKP that ruled Turkey since 2002 election as the main party in power and consolidated its power with the 2007 elections, is a very significant actor of Turkish political life and despite its reformist discourse, Islam continue to play a significant role. Having the clues about the party, now, it is valuable to examine the party program with a gender lens.

First, from the perspective of the state, it is valuable to mention that official statist discourse since the establishment of Republic positioned Islam as the other, but especially, the post-1990 period challenged the old understandings. Islamist activist's stance "(...) challenged the preconceived attributes that the secular establishment projected to Islamism, and they negotiated with ingenuity what Islam can entail in a secular democratic polity" (Y.Arat, 2005: 1-2). The AKP and its political discourse can be considered as the reification of this negotiation with the state. On the other hand, the AKP presents a new version of gender politics as Coşar

and Yeğenoğlu name as “neoliberal-conservative patriarchy” (2011: 560). This new mode “borrows from Islamic patriarchy” but also challenges the old parameters by its transformation in the women’s movement (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 560). However, the party still advocates a conservative approach towards social order and family (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011). Hence, this part critically analyzes the stance of the AKP towards gendered politics and questions the clues of neo-Muslim masculinities within the whole discourse of the party.

When the program of the AKP is analyzed, it has a progressive approach towards women’s empowerment and it promises to improve condition of women in every aspect of social life. But, traditional understanding of gender has not been fully eliminated. The program pledges to take measures against violence and gain international standards on rights and freedoms of women. However, despite the egalitarian tone, the program highlights women’s role in the family.

In the party program of the AKP, it is stated that

Dealing with the women’s every kind of problem that accumulated because of the negligence over the years is a subject that our party prioritizes not only because they constitute half of our society but also because, above all, they are individuals and are primarily effective on raising healthy generations.³³

While they state the significance of the issue of women is highlighted, it is taken firstly from motherhood aspect. The focus on motherhood is repeating in the program of the AKP as follows “Efforts that will ensure the housewives to gain social security will be carried out. New areas of employment will be created

³³ Kadınlar sadece toplumumuzun yarısını oluşturdukları için değil, her şeyden önce birey ve sağlıklı nesillerin yetiştirilmesinde birinci derecede etkin oldukları için, yılların ihmali sonucu biriken her türlü sorunlarıyla ilgilenilmesi, partimizin öncelik verdiği bir konudur. (AKP Party program, 2009: 28)

protecting the dignity of the domestic labor in the meantime.”³⁴. Another example is that “Improvements will be made on social security and working conditions taking the women’s responsibilities regarding professional life, children and family into consideration.”³⁵. Hence, in the framework of the preceding quotes from the AKP program it can be argued that women’s primary domain is home and child care is her main responsibility. While it acknowledges the empowerment of women and women’s participation into public domain, namely working in a paid job, the document does not ignore to glorify traditional division of labor.

The election manifest of 2002 outlines women’s status from two contrasting perspectives. One is affirming the need to empower women’s status in society. As Coşar and Yeğenoğlu argue “(...) the party has liberally engaged in dialogue with the women movement” (2011: 557). The reform in the Turkish Penal Code (2004) and the amendment to the Law on Municipalities (2005)³⁶ are some of the AKP gender-sensitive policies. Stating that “Preventing violence against women, sexual and economic abuse and supporting and protecting the women in need will be among our primary policies”³⁷ manifest the party’s awareness towards women’s position in society and this sentence is followed by “Preventive and educational efforts will be made for women and their families in the regions where women suicides and honor

³⁴ Ev kadınlarının sosyal güvence kazanmasını sağlayacak çalışmalar gerçekleştirilecektir. Ev içi emeğin saygınlığı korunarak kadınlar için yeni istihdam alanları oluşturulacaktır. (AKP Party Program, 2009: 29)

³⁵ Kadınların çalışma hayatı, çocuk ve aile sorumlulukları dikkate alınarak sosyal güvenlik ve çalışma koşullarında iyileştirmeler yapılacaktır. (AKP Party program, 2009:29)

³⁶ This law “obliges municipalities with more than 50000 inhabitants to open women’s shelters” (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 562)

³⁷ Kadına yönelik şiddetin, cinsel ve ekonomik istismarın önlenmesi, muhtaç durumdaki kadınların desteklenmesi ve korunması, öncelikli politikalarımız arasında yer alacaktır. (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76)

killings are seen often”³⁸. Hence, the AKP’s official document acknowledges the primacy of women and her status in society. However, on the other hand, the other theme that is prominent is the emphasis on traditional gender roles and women’s roles in family. It is stated that

Despite our women share the burden of life together with the men, they haven’t got the status they deserve. Our PARTY will consider this situation in every policy it will implement. Giving our women the social status to shoulder the social responsibility with the men will be our goal.³⁹

The sentence is followed by mentioning the background of this importance as “Our PARTY gives importance to resolving the problems of the women in order to raise healthy generations and ensure happiness in family”⁴⁰

The election manifest of 2007 marks the continuity in the party’s discourse on women. “The AKP government pursued family-centered policies in order to solve the problems of the women, children, aged and handicapped.”⁴¹. This statement exemplifies the AKP’s traditional stance towards the significance of family. Their promises in the case of being elected cover the reforms for the increasing status of the family as well. “Family Life Education will be generalized inside formal and non-formal education institution programs with the purpose of supporting on such issues as spouse selection, starting a family, having a baby, responsible parenting,

³⁸ Kadın intiharlarının, töre ve namus cinayetlerinin sık görüldüğü yörelerde kadınlara ve ailelerine yönelik önleyici ve eğitici çalışmalar yapılacaktır. . (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76)

³⁹ Kadınlarımız hayatın yükünü erkeklerle birlikte paylaşmalarına rağmen, hak ettikleri statüye kavuşamamışlardır. PARTİMİZ, uygulayacağı tüm politikalarda bu durumu göz önünde bulunduracaktır. Kadınlarımızın, erkeklerle birlikte toplumsal sorumluluğu yüklenecek statüye kavuşturulması temel hedefimiz olacaktır. . (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76)

⁴⁰ PARTİMİZ, sağlıklı nesillerin yetiştirilmesi ve ailede mutluluğun sağlanması için kadın sorunlarının giderilmesine önem vermektedir. . (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76)

⁴¹ AK Parti iktidarı, kadınlar, çocuklar, yaşlılar ve engellilerin sorunlarını çözmek için aile merkezli politikalar izlemiştir. (AKP Election manifest, 2007: 70)

family relations and domestic economy.”⁴². Therefore, it can be argued that the AKP’s discourse on women’s issues and gender equality demonstrate how traditional gender order is entrenched within the discourse of the party. In addition, although there is no reference to patriarchal order of the society, acknowledging traditional order encompasses indirect reference to the family and internalized gendered hierarchies.

Family is the basis of the society and an important institution that play a part in creation of social solidarity. Road to social happiness, solidarity, peace, love and respect passes through family. It is clear that we owe our survival to our sturdy family structure to a great extent despite all the adverseness and economic problems.⁴³

As child-centered family is a very significant element of early Republican nationalist discourse, there is a continuous trend on glorifying family. Emphasizing women’s role as care giver circuitously accentuates male’s protective role, or in other words, traditional gender roles within the family.

5.3.2 The Program and Election Manifest of the CHP: A Libertarian Approach?

This party, the CHP, represents center left of Turkish party families (Ware, 2003). The CHP, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as a very vital actor of Turkish political history, was the ruling political organization of Turkey during early Republican Period, 1923-1945. Under the leadership of this party, Kemalist elites

⁴² Eş seçimi, ailenin kurulması, çocuk sahibi olma, sorumluluk sahibi ebeveynlik, aile ilişkileri ve ev ekonomisi gibi konularda destek sağlamak amacıyla Aile Yaşam Eğitimi örgün ve yaygın eğitim kurumlarının programları içerisinde yaygınlaştırılacaktır. (AKP Election manifest, 2007: 74)

⁴³ Aile, toplumun temeli ve toplumsal dayanışmanın oluşmasında rol oynayan önemli bir kurumdur. Toplumsal mutluluk, dayanışma, barış, sevgi ve saygının yolu aileden geçer. Yaşanan bütün olumsuzluklara ve ekonomik sıkıntılara rağmen toplum olarak ayakta duruşumuzu büyük çapta sağlam aile yapımıza borçlu olduğumuz açıktır. (AKP Party program, 2009: 29)

conducted their modernization project that put great emphasis on the position of women. The images of new, modern, Kemalist, Turkish women were the signifiers of the newly founded Republic of Turkey (Kandiyoti 1987; Berktaş 2004; Göle 2004). In addition to women, men, the hidden side of the iceberg, were also important agents of the modernization project. Despite their hidden role, they were the cultural ideal of the mentioned project. They are the ones who are charged with modernizing the women and society, and also providing welfare. The borders of how the women exist in society as a modern individual are drawn by men. Men as a partner, husband or father gave social birth to the new women of the Republic. The significance of this modernization period lies in its strong attachment to the party even in current political atmosphere. Individuals who have voted for the CHP are children of parents who identified with the CHP in the past; hence, “(...) parental influence emerges as the most salient determinant of identification with the CHP.” (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008: 310). Especially, for the CHP, the sayings of ‘This is the party of my family’ or ‘We have voted for the CHP for years’ is very common in daily life conversation. Another determinant is laicism/secularism, especially, Kemalism. The effect of Atatürk as the founder of the party, and the commitment to the ideals of Kemalism have influenced voters as well. ‘We have always voted for *the party of Atatürk*’ is another common saying among the electorate of the CHP. In this framework, it is worth to mention that the CHP represent the core of the Kemalism’s statist ideology and Kemalist gender policies can be read with reference to state feminism (Tekeli, 1986; White, 2003; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011). Since Republican times, Kemalist women have bargained with patriarchal norms (Kandiyoti, 1988). Until 1980, Republican patriarchy hegemonised discourse on women and gender equity and emancipation of women has been voiced through

Kemalism (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011). After 1980, feminism started to flourish, especially with the rise of Islamist activists. In this context, another determinant is political Islam. In a political environment that political Islam of the AKP has been considered as a threat to Kemalist ideas, not only politicians of the CHP but also voters' perception of the party as the guardian of the Republican norms has an impact on determination of party identification. Such a guardianship role has been considered as the legacy of Kemalism and this role epitomizes Kemalist/secular masculinities. It can be argued that the nostalgia on Kemalist/secular state reveals the deep-rooted codes of masculinities as long as the threat of Islam survives.

In addition to modernization legacy, the CHP, as a representative of center-left, is an important actor of Turkish political life. Although, the party has experienced declines and started to be known as “the party of congresses, political struggles and internal strife”, its deep rooted institutions, traditions make the CHP a very crucial actor in Turkish politics (Ayata, 2002). In addition, the analysis of the CHP in terms of the construction of masculinity vis a vis femininity, seems one of the best fields of examination because in line with Michels' argument (1962), the CHP have been expected to have, in theory, as a leftist party, more liberal and democratic stance towards women and her participation in politics. However, as the statistics show it is the CHP that has the least numbers of women candidates in 2007 general elections. Therefore, it seems that the analysis of the CHP can “(...) furnish an unprejudiced analytical answer to questions” (Michels, 1962:51).

When the official party documents of the CHP were analyzed the first expectation is about party's egalitarian approach on gender. However, a critical analysis reveals the traditional codes imbued within the party.

The party program of the CHP states that “There can not be a democratic, developed, healthy and modern country without ensuring equality of women and men.”⁴⁴. Such an egalitarian approach is apparent in the program. The program states one of the principles of the party as follows:

It is the society where the women have the same rights and opportunities that the men have in administration, politics, professional life, education, law, universal rights and freedoms and in all other fields; live freely, away from every kind of social and physical pressure. It is the structural regulations that do positive discrimination in favor of the women when necessary in order to ensure this.⁴⁵

Although the preceding statement has a more equal perspective on gender equity, another article in the program reminds the close relationship between women and family very quickly. “Statutory provisions that take place in various laws and include discrimination against women or lack in protection of family will be changed.”⁴⁶.

The election manifest of 2002 and 2007 underlines the significance of gender equity for a democratic society and state that “Equality of women and men is an undisputable human right and an indispensable pre-condition of democracy.”⁴⁷. There is clear continuity about the social and political equality of men and women. The

⁴⁴ Kadın-erkek eşitliği sağlanmadan demokratik, kalkınmış, sağlıklı ve modern bir ülke olunamaz. (CHP Party program, 2009: 55)

⁴⁵ Kadının, yönetimde, siyasette, çalışma yaşamında, eğitimde, hukukta, evrensel hak ve özgürlüklerde ve diğer tüm alanlarda erkeklerle eşit haklara ve olanaklara, sahip olduğu, her türlü toplumsal ve fiziki baskıdan uzak, özgürce yaşadığı toplumdur. Bunu sağlamak için gerektiğinde kadının lehine pozitif ayrımcılık yapan yapısal düzenlemelerdir. (CHP Party program, 2009: 23)

⁴⁶ Çeşitli kanunlarda yer alan ve kadınlara karşı ayrımcılık anlayışı içeren veya aileyi korumada yetersiz kalan yasa hükümleri değiştirilecektir. (CHP Party program, 2009: 56)

⁴⁷ Kadın-erkek eşitliği tartışılmaz bir insan hakkı ve demokrasinin vazgeçilmez önkoşuludur. (CHP Election manifest, 2002: 53)

election manifest of 2007 states that “The women will have their rights: Turkish women will obtain their rights in economy, education, politics and they will find their identity.”⁴⁸. On the other hand, despite the official party program’s democratic stance towards women’s issues and gender equity, the election manifests differ on their approach to division of labor within family.

The election manifest of 2002 states that “We will eliminate the young people’s economic dependency to their mother’s and father’s purses for their education”⁴⁹. On the other hand, the election manifest of 2007 ignores women’s economic independence or her economic role within the family and puts that “We will save the university student from depending on his father’s purse”⁵⁰. While, election manifest of 2002 and 2007 do not differ in terms of their whole discourse, such a break about the women’s empowerment is critical. Therefore, it can be argued that the CHP recognizes an egalitarian system by emphasizing democratic rules but the party does not internalize women’s empowerment especially her presence in working life.

5.3.3 The Program and Election Manifest of the MHP: A Traditional Approach?

The MHP is the party that represents the Turkish nationalist ideology in Turkey. Although the party started to move towards the center with the leadership of

⁴⁸ Kadınlar haklarını alacak: Türk kadını, ekonomide, eğitimde, siyasette haklarına kavuşacak, kimliğini bulacak. (CHP Election Manifest, 2007: 63)

⁴⁹ Gençlerin eğitimlerini anne ve babalarının cüzdanına bağlı olmaktan kurtaracağız. (CHP Election Manifest, 2002: 47)

⁵⁰ Üniversite öğrencisini babasının cüzdanına bağlı olmaktan kurtaracağız. (CHP Election Manifest, 2007: 55)

Devlet Bahçeli in 1997, after the death of their founding leader Alparslan Türkeş, the party still represents nationalist or far right outlook. According to Çınar and Arıkan, “(...) the MHP’s version of nationalism is predicated on an ambiguous definition oscillating between a cultural and an ethnic definition of the nation.” (2002: 25). However, compared to other political parties in centre, the MHP advocates a particularistic version of nationalism that is hostile to diverse ethnic groups.

The first far right party of Turkish political history was *Millet Partisi* (Nation Party- MP) that was founded in 1948. After its closure, *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* (Republican Peasant Farmer’s Nation Party- CKMP) was founded in 1948. With the belief of state corporatism and an organic, homogenized nation under strong state control, the CKMP incorporated Turkish nationalism with specific reference to religion (Çınar and Arıkan 2002; İnce and Heper 2006). In 1965, Türkeş elected as party leader and in 1967 he was declared as great leader- *başbuğ*. The name of the party was changed into the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party- MHP) in 1969. Although the party remained its marginal stance in Turkish politics, it had always received a certain degree of votes. After the military intervention of 1980, the party was closed until 1993. In 1997, Türkeş died and Bahçeli as an “uncertain figure” of the politics came to the scene (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 30). Bahçeli and the leading elites of the party rebuild the support and trust both in the party and country. Voters’ support for the party doubled in the end of 1990’s and this led to Turkish people to consider the party as an alternative to other political parties not as a marginal option. Unlike Türkeş’s partisan leadership, his moderate stance and positive image affected the party’s policies. He could abandon several party

gestures and symbols (moustaches⁵¹, special *Ülkücü* greeting⁵²) despite the powerful principles and doctrines of *Ülkü Ocakları*. Hence, it can be argued that the MHP has experienced a considerable evolution.

In terms of the gender discourse of the party, it is valuable to mention that programs of the far right nationalist parties subscribe to traditional gender roles. In the framework of this dissertation, the party represents nationalist masculinities. It is hypothesized that the MHP is a virile party that gives emphasis to *male wolfs* who should protect the country and perform masculine duties such as protecting honor of *asena*⁵³ and showing bravery. All these virile conceptualizations are historically embedded within party. It glorifies men as the protector and emphasizes women's role within the family and the need to take a protective approach to women (Arat, 2010: 27).

The MHP is a nationalist right-wing party and it is not surprising that the party has a traditional discourse on gender. The party with its deep rooted tradition has developed an approach that enshrines the nostalgia on "Turkist nationalism" idolizing Turkish nation (Özkırımlı, 2011: 97).

The official documents of the party subscribe to traditional gender roles and emphasize women's role within the family. In the party program, it is stated that "Educational levels of the women will be increased and their social statuses will be strengthened by ensuring their participation more in development process,

⁵¹ The MHP mustache has a particular style and it is characterized by two ends extending downwards. It is different than conservative style of mustache that is called *badem*. This mustache is small and neatly trimmed.

⁵² *Ülkücü* greeting is particular by its style. It is simply touching the sides of the head instead of cheeks.

⁵³ *Asena* is the female wolf in Turkic mythology that is commonly used in the MHP's political rhetoric.

professional life and decision making mechanisms.”⁵⁴. This statement exemplifies a developmental approach on women’s issues but both in the programme and election manifests it is motherhood and family that are dignified. “Family institution is of great importance in protecting and maintaining national and moral values and passing them on to the next generations and also solidifying solidarity.”⁵⁵

The party programme reifies nationalistic and traditional approach on gender. The role of the family especially in raising children is taken as the foundation of society, and, in this line, the boundaries of women’s traditional sphere are not open to be challenged. The place of women is bounded with family. The election manifest of 2002 states that “We believe in the necessity of preventing the elements that weaken the family and its social functions by protecting the women and their rights and in the necessity of gaining women’s respectable status in society.”⁵⁶ The election manifest of 2007 replicates this approach. “An infrastructure will be built regarding preventing the elements that weaken the family and its social functions, the women taking a place in society by protecting the women and their rights.”⁵⁷

5.4. Re-situating Typologies of Masculinities in Turkey: Glorification of the Family and Traditional Gender Order

⁵⁴ Kadınların eğitim düzeyleri yükseltilecek, kalkınma sürecinde, iş hayatında ve karar alma mekanizmalarında daha fazla rol almaları sağlanarak toplumsal konumları güçlendirilecektir. (MHP Party Program, 2009: 61)

⁵⁵ Millî ve manevî değerlerin korunması, yaşatılması ve gelecek kuşaklara aktarılmasında millî bütünlüğün ve dayanışmanın pekiştirilmesinde aile kurumu büyük önem arz etmektedir. (MHP Party Program, 2009: 61)

⁵⁶ Aileyi ve sosyal fonksiyonlarını zayıflatıcı unsurların önlenmesi, kadının ve haklarının korunarak toplumda saygın bir yer edinmesi gerektiğine inanıyoruz. (MHP Election manifest, 2002: 61)

⁵⁷ Aileyi ve sosyal fonksiyonlarını zayıflatıcı unsurların önlenmesi, kadının ve haklarının korunarak toplumda toplumda saygın bir yer edinmesine ilişkin altyapı oluşturulacaktır. (MHP Election manifest, 2007: 103)

The general argument about the state is that it is the regulator of gendered hierarchy. Turkey, as a case manifests the predomination of men within state directorate, coercive apparatus with high percentage of men in offices. In addition, as it is discussed in the literature that, the system or the division of labor within the state has organized on gendered lines. Men dominate in infrastructural and coercive apparatuses of the state. Especially, in political parties, it is men's politics and such domination is reified in official documents of the political parties as the main agent in politics as a field in Turkey. Men are expected to be the patriarch and women are expected to be housewife/mother. The traditional gender order has manifested itself within the borders of traditional family and its values. Especially, an analysis of political parties' official documents and election manifests offered clues for revealing the different pathways of masculinities. However, although three political parties represent different political ideologies and approaches, they all do emphasize family and traditional gender roles, namely, breadwinner male and housewives/mothers female. As the typology of the masculinities in Turkey hypothesized the AKP represent a new approach in the gendered conduct and discourse of the politics. Despite its deep rooted Islamist background, the AKP splits apart from its *old brothers* and characterizes a new approach. This new approach or Coşar and Yeğenoğlu's definition of "neoliberal conservative patriarchy" tunes itself with neo-Muslim masculinities. While they engaged in a dialogue with women's movement, which opened ways for women to voice and also encouraged women's representation in politics, they have also been persistent with the perception of women within the family as mother/housewife. On the other hand, the CHP representing a left wing party does not consistently advocate a liberal approach towards gender. They constitute Kemalist/secular mode of masculinities as

iconographic founding fathers who do know the best for the society. Finally, the MHP represent the deep rooted tradition of male gray wolfs who should protect society and women. They have idealized women as mothers as well. Therefore, as it is clear from their official documents, all three political parties glorify family and also women within the family.

The family has a traditional and historical role in Turkey. Since Ottoman times, family has had a significant role in terms of the solidarity of the community and “(...) joint family cultural system prevailed” (Duben and Behar, 1991: 10). As a Muslim society, Islam ruled the family and formed a background to the regulation of the Ottoman Muslims’ domestic life (Vergin, 1985: 572). Conformity with the Islamic provisions, Ottoman family structure, namely extended family, positioned men as the head of the family. The system derived from Islamic law and its practices such as gender segregation, polygamy positioned women in a subordinate and men in a dominant situation. Hence, for the aim of creating new nation, a modern Turkey, Republican reforms aimed to break Islamic heritage especially those in daily life and private domain. For Zürcher, so as to achieve *complete* modernity, Kemalists aimed *complete* secularization of the family (2001: 181, italics mine).

As family and traditional and/or old gendered division of labor are considered critical not because of reflecting Islamic way of life but also being the micro unit of the society, has been the main target of the Kemalist reforms. “The Ottoman family was seen as the microcosm of the society at large” and has been taken as the mirror that reflected the flaws in social and cultural life (Bilgin, 2003: 94). It can be argued that reforms were encapsulated in reformation of family life. Through abolition of religious marriage and polygamy in 1926 by the new code of Turkish civil law, the first step was taken. In addition, for the empowerment of women’s status, the young

Republic constituted “(...) a critical juncture for gender roles, which were mainly assigned as part of the nation building process.” (Çavdar, 2010: 349). Although there was no law or regulation banning women’s traditional clothing, Kemalist elites indirectly challenged old norms within the family, in particular and the society in general and they promoted education and labor market participation.⁵⁸ As it is has discussed in previous parts, women were the carriers of the modernization project and “[w]omen as homemakers and as mothers, who would raise the future generations of citizens according to the ideals of the state, were to disseminate the values of the Republic and construct the modern family” (Toktaş and Cindoğlu, 2006: 738). Therefore, it can be argued that while such provisions empowered her role in society, it also reproduced her traditional gender roles and confined her in private sphere. Although visibility of women in public sphere was significant for Kemalist elites, “(...) there were cultural values that associated women’s roles primarily with the domestic sphere and which did not tolerate women’s participation in the public sphere” (Toktaş and Cindoğlu, 2006: 738). Hence, patriarchal structure within family “(...) has been buffeted by the successive transformations undergone by Turkish society” but it did not really turned “(...) the relationships between spouses upside down” (Vergin, 1985: 573). The deep family culture or a culture that glorifies family and its maintenance has prevailed. Despite the increase in economic dependence and socio-cultural reforms, there has been no reduction in the interpersonal relations between relatives, in other words, contrary to the Western model, in Turkey, a loosening of ties as a result of change has not been witnessed (Vergin, 1985). As family and its significance within the socio-cultural and economic

⁵⁸ For discussions on absence of ban on women’s clothing see Y. Arat, 2005; Z. Arat, 1994

codes of Turkey is beyond the topic of this dissertation, it was critical to mention it here.

To sum up, when leading Turkish political parties' official documents were analyzed, it has been found that their discourses manifest the deep rooted traditional gender order. For Bourdieu, masculine domination is the eternalization of gender order and it is also naturalized and embedded into processes and networks (Bourdieu, 2001: 23). Within the field of politics the agents unwittingly accept the limits of their realm and such official documents reflect the reification of self evident networks. Although, all parties have relatively egalitarian approaches, they all define women predominantly in the private realm and within family. Women's societal roles and idealization of family continue to be major themes. Every political party glorifies family and the traditional division of labor. Both the AKP and the MHP stress the issue of woman under the heading of *woman and family*. The CHP, as a centre left party, does not classify women and emancipation of women under the heading of family. Although both the AKP and the MHP are historically more conservative parties, especially the AKP's traditional stance is critical when compared to its commitment to democratization. Çavdar, in her study that examines Islamist moderation and the resilience of gender, discusses the case of the AKP and mentions that

While women seem to be encouraged to participate in public life, their traditional roles within the family are contradictorily prioritized and even encouraged. Therefore the JDP's (Justice and Development Party) own policies constantly undermine the discourse that more women should participate in public life (2010: 350)

Çavdar links such a paradox to the historic legacy inherited from the Islamist movement. Hence, in this framework, Norris and Inglehart aptly argue that the real

gulf separating Muslim societies from their Western counterparts is the values concerning gender equity (2003). For the writers, “(...) the values separating these [Western and Islamic] cultures have much more to do with eros than demos” (Norris and Inglehart, 2003: 65). Hence, the core clash between the West and Islam is not over political values but it concerns gender equity and sexual liberalization. In line with this argument, not only the AKP but also the CHP has paradoxical stance towards gender equity. Despite its centre left positioning that endorses an egalitarian approach on gender, the party has not internalized gender equity and women’s empowerment as the statement of “We will save the university student from depending on his father’s purse” approves. It can be argued that only the MHP *meets the expectations* as a nationalist party subscribe to traditional gender roles under a protective approach. Women’s roles in the making and also maintenance of nations as mothers have enshrined in the official party documents of the MHP, and hence, it indirectly positions men as the head of the family to protect women and promotes patriarchal family forms. As nationalism and masculinity is embedded, as it has been discussed in previous chapters, “[i]t is therefore no surprise that the culture and ideology of hegemonic masculinity go hand in hand with the culture and ideology of hegemonic nationalism” (Nagel, 1998: 249).

To conclude, despite the different ideological stances of the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, the boundaries drawn for women and, relationally men, mark the traditional discourse that preserves its deep-rooted place in Turkish political culture. With Bourdieuan lens, it can be argued that historical mechanisms’ structuring of political subjects’ repertoire manifest itself in the reification of the traditional gender roles. As official documents of the political parties substantiate such a reification of traditional gender roles and its continuity despite the breaks and shifts in discourses,

it also has standardized gendered hierarchies and also gives rise to what Bourdieu (2001) calls legitimation and authorization. Accordingly, the next chapter will analyze three leaders' accumulation of capitals or habitus with reference to their positioning in the field. Bourdieuan perspective will enable to comprehend multifaceted networks within the parameters of the encounter between habitus and politics as field in Turkey.

CHAPTER VI

TURKISH POLITICAL MANHOOD: DIFFERENT HABITUS IN THE SAME FIELD

After the analysis of the macro perspectives, namely the state and political culture, in this part I will elaborate on the leaders, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli.

This chapter will employ Pierre Bourdieu's theory and conceptualizations in two ways: (1) as an analytical tool to scrutinize the construction of masculinities, specifically political manhood in Turkish political parties; and (2) as a guide to discuss masculinities while examining whether or not different ideologies refer to different masculine performances in Turkish politics, in which masculine domination has been associated with the public, political and militaristic domain.

Before engaging into a discussion that uses Bourdieu's theory on gendered identity construction to analyze the gendered nature of Turkish politics, it is worthwhile starting with a preliminary question: How does gender operate as a system of oppression? As masculinity is not *there*, but rather is in-between, above or behind structures, and as politics can be considered as a *naturally* virile area, the construction of masculinities in politics is a very significant and controversial issue.

It can be argued that the act of politics has always been masculinized as it has been dominated by the masculine. In other words, by being associated with a range of masculine values loaded with strong emotions, such as bravery, honour, pride and strength, the nature of politics is gendered in the masculine. While politics has been systematically equated with men and masculinities, the private sphere has been coupled with women and their duties in the private sphere, such as caring and sensitiveness. Within the field of politics, that is, the dominance of men has been taken as *given*. In examining this unambiguous and unexplored area of study, this dissertation argues that Bourdieu's questioning of masculinity offers a valid analytical framework that includes the original use of conceptualizations such as *field, habitus, and embeddedness of historical roots*.

6.1. Adapting Bourdieuan Perspective

Before moving onto the discussion itself, it is helpful to give some introductory analysis about the party leaders introduced in the previous chapter, and a justification for why this dissertation attempts to introduce Bourdieu's conceptualizations as an analytical tool.

Turning first to Bourdieu, his concept of habitus expresses both the way in which individuals become *themselves* and also the ways in which those individuals engage in various practices. Habitus is thus a "durable" yet also "transposable" value that remains with individuals across contexts (Bourdieu: 1991). When an individual confronts a situation and he/she generates an idea with reference to his/her perception, this results into an action. Hence, the social world, as a field of struggles, is a mobile one in which one can occupy any position. An individual's social position

is therefore multidimensional, and his/her preferences distance himself/herself from other groups of people. For Bourdieu, class fractions reveal themselves only at the economic level, so they are static (1991, 2001). However, for him, while divisions are definite, positioning and capital are something active. He therefore extends his original notion by defining four sub-groups of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic. Economic capital, basically income and wealth, is strongly related to one's positioning. Inherited family wealth, property and savings are obvious examples of individual economic capital. Economic capital, though, cannot be separated from other forms of capital. Social capital, for instance, is essentially the aggregation of acquaintances and social networks. For Bourdieu, in addition to relations and recognition, all social ties may produce a network that allows a dynamic accumulation of one's self to develop other opportunities. Symbolic capital depends on the negotiable prestige and honour of an individual, so its value may vary and change according to the symbolic value assigned by others to the object. It exists in collaboration with other forms of capitals. Finally, cultural capital refers to an individual's socially valued experiences, accumulated knowledge, and aesthetic preferences. This is also closely linked to the notion of habitus. As one's habitus can be revealed through one's reactions, posture and language, one can transform or preserve it according to one's social position. It is the capacity to differentiate and appreciate, hence ended in individual's preferences. According to Bourdieu, "life styles are systematic products of habitus" (Bourdieu, 1984:170), meaning that habitus is the reflection of cultural capital on choices and tastes. The institutionalized form of cultural capital is the formal certificate, such as the degree or diploma. Therefore, all embodied perceptions, ideas and actions can be transformed into a certificate which then defines an individual's social positioning.

In short, according to Bourdieu's theory, an individual's positioning is related to their possession of various combinations of capital. Bourdieu especially highlights the significance of social origin and education for the investment in one's self. Therefore, the personal histories of political party leaders are very significant as they contain important factors in the analysis of how the habitus of each leader determines his construction of political manhood. Accordingly, a brief analysis of the three political party leaders – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli, specifically in terms of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital – is valuable at this part.

6.2. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: *Kabadayı* (Tough Uncle) of/for Everyone

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, born in 1954, grew up in a conservative family. His father was a captain in the state maritime agency and his mother was a housewife (Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 160). His primary school religion teacher had a strong influence on his future education. As Recep Tayyip was very successful in his lessons, he advised him to continue his education in a *İmam Hatip School* – a vocational school to train government employed imams - that was located on the opposite side of the Golden Horn from Erdoğan's home suburb of Kasımpaşa (Dündar, 2007).⁵⁹ The *İmam Hatip* made a very strong impression on Erdoğan's life. About those years he once mentioned that

I owe everything to the Imam Hatip School I attended. My life was predestined in that school. I learned there patriotism, love for

⁵⁹ Can Dündar's documentary on political party leaders constituted a very useful source for the dissertation. Dündar prepared this documentary series for NTV before the 2007 national election. The whole series is available at www.candundar.com.tr.

fellow human beings, service for the country, worship of God, environmental sciences, a spirit of solidarity, and wishing for others what I want for me. (cited in Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 163)

After graduating from high school, he obtained his BA degree from Marmara University Faculty of Economics and Commercial Sciences in 1981. During his undergraduate education, he was a football player. In addition, he became actively involved in politics, too. He was a member of National Turkish Student's Union (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*), and also attended the seminars held by the National View Association (*Milli Görüş Teşkilatı*). This association was a branch of the National Order Party (MNP-*Milli Nizam Partisi*) and the National Salvation Party (MSP- *Milli Selamet Partisi*). In 1976, he became head of the MSP Beyoğlu Youth Branch, and later head of the Istanbul Youth Branch of the same party. While his active engagement with politics continued, he married Emine Gülbaran, who met him through her membership of the Idealist Women's Association – an Islamist organization founded by Şule Yüksel Şenler, an important journalist in the Islamist milieu. Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once mentioned that “I have never fallen in love”, Emine Erdoğan claimed that “I felt something that I had not felt until that moment” (Dündar, 2007). In 1984, he became the head of Welfare Party (RP - *Refah Partisi*) Beyoğlu District Branch. As a very active figure of the party in 1986, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was chosen as the RP's candidate for Beyoğlu mayoralty. After losing that election, in 1994, the RP nominated him as the candidate for Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor. His success in that election represents a milestone in his political career. He served as mayor for four years before his famous speech in Siirt (1997) ended his mayoralty. In that public speech that denounced the closure of his party, reciting some lines of Ziya Gökalp's poem: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers”.

These lines were considered as an attack to Kemalist regime by the courts and he was sentenced to a ten-month prison term, of which he served 4 months. After that speculative interlude, Erdoğan returned to play a significant role in the Innovators (*Yenilikçiler*) movement in the Virtue Party (FP - Fazilet Partisi), and this process ended in the opening of the Justice and Development Party (AKP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). The national elections that were held in 2002 resulted in a victory for this party and Erdoğan became Prime Minister. Since 2002, he has continued to act as Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic following two further general elections victories.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a very influential political figure in contemporary Turkey. His manner of acting and talking differ him from his counterparts. His aggressiveness in the conduct of politics has been legitimized by public due to his *Kasımpaşalılık* (Kasımpaşa origin) and *kabadayılık* (toughness). Erdoğan has utilized this in two perspectives. First, he is tough uncle, protector and guardian of everyone as he is representative of a powerful, brave man that embraces everyone. Second, he is there for everyone as the Prime Minister and he aims to respond every single need from every segments of the society.

6.3. Deniz Baykal: The Guardian of Kemalism

Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP until May 2010, was born in 1938. His father was an administrative officer in the Turkish State Liquor and Tobacco Monopoly (TEKEL) and his mother was a housewife. His father especially was a strong Kemalist. Baykal went to primary, secondary and high school in Antalya after his family moved there in 1944. He was a successful student, especially in English

and literature. With the motivation of his father, he spent each summer in a different city performing different jobs, before continuing his education in Ankara University Faculty of Law. After graduating, he went to the University of Columbia as a research fellow and finished his PhD in Ankara in 1963. After the military intervention in 1960, he became research assistant in the Law Faculty. Both during his undergraduate and graduate years, he was active in politics, participating in protest marches against the ruling the Justice Party's (AP - *Adalet Partisi*) populist policies, and being the one who wrote the protestors' public declarations. After returning from his research fellowship, he also completed his solicitor's practice under the supervision of a politician, Turan Güneş, one of the leading figures of the new centre-left movement within the CHP during post-1965 period. During this intensive period, he married his girlfriend, Olcay Vural. Although the parents of Olcay had some reservations about their relationship, they married in a seaside town. Baykal once said about their marriage: "We went to Akçakoca together and decided to get married there. Then, we arranged every document in the quickest way. Our witnesses were officers from the municipality. We were wearing very casual clothes" (Dündar, 2007). After the CHP's electoral defeat in 1965 by the AP, the party reached a turning point. Baykal prepared a report on the elections that proposed some ways forward for the party. This report gained him distinction, especially among the leading cadres, and in 1973 Bülent Ecevit nominated him as a parliamentary candidate to represent Antalya. Therefore, he resigned from the university to become an official member of the party. He acted as Minister of the Finance until the 1977 elections, and as Minister of Energy until the 1980 military coup. He was arrested in the post-1980 period and he was among a number of leading politicians sent to internal exile in Zincirbozan by the National Security Council (MGK - *Milli*

Güvenlik Kurulu). After the Zincirbozan period, he became a member of another leftist party, the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP - *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*), acting, until 1992, as the SHP's Secretary General. In 1992, the CHP was reformed and Baykal was elected as leader of the party. Following various intra-party crises and an election defeat, he resigned from his post in 1999. In 2001, he was re-elected as the party's leader, and served until 2010. On this occasion criticism of his private life after an alleged sex tape scandal involving a female party member – Nesrin Baytok – was leaked to the media played a major role in his resignation.

Deniz Baykal is a very significant leader in his deep rooted political career. He has always devoted to Atatürkian principles as he has often positioned himself as the guardian of Kemalist state by being the leader of the CHP. As an academician, lawyer and especially, son of an administrative officer, he has devoted to Kemalist road and he has positioned as the leader of the Kemalist reactions towards the rise of Islam or namely the AKP. He has always idealized the role of responsible, well-equipped administrative officer of the Kemalist/statist regime.

6.4 Devlet Bahçeli: *Devlet Baba* (Father) of the Father State

Devlet Bahçeli, born in 1948, is the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP - *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*). Bahçeli comes from a large and well-respected Fettahlıoğlu family (Heper & İnce, 2006; Dündar, 2007), which is a Turcoman family having strong ties among its members. This close-knit family has had a significant impact on the course of his life. He went to primary school in Osmaniye, before attending the Private Çukurova Secondary School as a boarding student with his older brother, who has had a great importance in Bahçeli's life. His father was

wealthy enough to give him the opportunity to continue his education in Istanbul, and he graduated from the Private Ata High School under the supervision of his relatives who lived in the city. During his studentship, his literature teacher became a particularly influential figure. This was Suna Toral, who first introduced *Ülkücülük* – the tone of the MHP’s ideological basis understood as the ideal of serving one’s state – to Bahçeli’s newly shaping intellectual worldview (Dündar, 2007). After graduating from high school, he went to Ankara Academy of Economics and Commercial Sciences – known today as Gazi University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences. His first active political involvement, with the Republican Peasants’ Party (CKMP- *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*), coincided with his junior years in the university. He attended a seminar series held by Alparslan Türkeş, the heroic leader of the nationalists, and also met with a politically active youth group, the *Ülkücüler*, who founded the *Ülkü Ocakları* – the union of idealist militant groups. After his graduation in 1971, he started his academic career as a research assistant in the same faculty of the university, from which he gained his PhD. Although he has always been an introverted person, he formed very close relations with his students, and also with the young political activists of the *Ülkü Ocakları*. For example, he distributed his fellowship salary among needy students at the university (Heper & İnce, 2006: 875). He became known as *Devlet Ağabey* (older brother Devlet) or *Devlet Baba* (father Devlet) to everyone in his circle. As both brother and father are terms used to express high reputation, it implies that he was a very respected person and academician. During his academic career, he also acted as the president of the Association of Assistants of Academia and Applied Schools (ÜNAY), and also the Association of Idealist (*Ülkücü*) Financiers and Economists (ÜMİD-BİR). The 1980 military coup seriously affected the MHP, with many

members being given prison sentences. In 1987, just after the end of the political ban on pre-coup parties, Bahçeli resigned from his post in Gazi University upon an invitation from Türkeş to serve as Secretary General of the Nationalist Labor Party (MÇP - Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi). Bahçeli became the man behind the scenes, a very influential but less known face of the Party. In 1993, when the name of the MÇP changed back to the MHP, Bahçeli was actively involved in the process. While acting as an advisor of Türkeş, he also, however, became one of those pursuing a new political orientation against the party's leader. After the death of Türkeş, the *Başbuğ* or Great Leader of the MHP, in 1997, Bahçeli was chosen to replace him. It is argued that his leadership has made a difference to the MHP's electoral performance (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002; Heper and İnce, 2006). "Devlet Bahçeli's credibility and the new positive image he brought to the MHP's leadership was not only a result of his academic background or his personal image. Since he replaced Türkeş in 1997, he has shown a consistent devotion to the renewal of the party" (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 32). He has devoted himself to the nationalist movement, in general, the success of the party, in particular. According to the list of Bahçeli's priorities, "(...) the country comes first, the Party second and his personal political fortune third" (Dündar, 2007). It can be argued that's why he has never married, instead living an isolated private life with his sister as a protective brother.

6.5 Different Habitus in the Same Field

Having provided some important details of the three leaders' personal backgrounds, the next section aims to position them in Bourdieuan terms, by considering their accumulation of various forms of capital, their habitus.

As outlined in the earlier section, economic capital, a kind that is directly convertible into money, is the first important factor that shapes one's positioning in life. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Deniz Baykal both originate from middle class families, while Devlet Bahçeli came from a higher social status, as his father was a rich merchant. While Baykal's father was a strong Kemalist administrative officer who had fought in World War I, Erdoğan's father was a conservative and religious figure who was working as a civil servant (captain) , suggesting that these two leaders followed their respective father's ideological orientation. On the other hand, although Bahçeli grew up in a family that supported the CHP, he became influenced by strong nationalist thought of his teachers in high school and university. Thus, it can be argued that the three leaders' ideological differences have been shaped during their early socialization, though from differing influences.

Turning to cultural capital, i.e. education, cultural credentials and aesthetic preferences, three leaders show significant differences. From analysis of their different family backgrounds, education and overall socialization, it is possible to derive some hints about the determinants of their cultural capital. As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan grew up in a small, lower middle class district, *Kasımpaşa*, his manner of talking and behaving appears to have been influenced by that environment, well known for its particular form of masculinity – the tough man, *kabadayı*. In terms of his private life, he made an arranged marriage, an old but still living custom in conservative circles. However, what is critical about his marriage is also about the way that they have met in a political meeting of the party. Both were there with political motivations and this political ground has opened the way for their marriage. Despite their socialization in a close circle, during Erdoğan's political career, his family has been publicly visible. Although this life style especially expensive and

huge wedding ceremonies, private education of his children in overseas and property holdings has been criticized by Kemalist and also Islamist circles, he and his whole family are still conducting their family life publicly.

In terms of his preferences in his daily life, his mode of dress has changed since the AKP became the ruling political party. Specifically, he looks much more *modern* than he did during the 1990's when he was Mayor of Istanbul with his modern colorful ties and brand name sunglasses etc. In addition, unlike old customed Islamists who were labelled as *takunyalı*⁶⁰ (those who wear bath clog) referring to their practices of Islam openly and publicly, Erdoğan has never been associated with *takunya* (bath clog) in the media. In spite of his background as a semi-professional football player, as a very masculine and competitive sport, today, he does not stand out as demonstrating any sportsmanlike characteristics except the games that he hosts.

Regarding Erdoğan's social capital, the Nakhsibandi religious order is important. As the initiative for the establishment of the National Order Party (MNP – *Milli Nizam Partisi*), the Nakshibandi order has been very influential in Erdoğan's personal history. For example, when he started his political career, he regularly attended the Iskenderpasha seminary of Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku (Heper and Toktaş, 2003). Wealthy Islamic businessmen are also well-known aspects of the inner circle of Erdoğan.

There are several recent incidents that can be given as the examples to indicate the nature of accumulation of the capital to Erdoğan's political actions. The first concerns his reprimand, applauded in some circles, of Israeli President Shimon

⁶⁰Takunya is a bath clog for ablution. Men are wearing these before the act of washing parts of their body using water for ritual prayers. Therefore, it has an Islamic connotation.

Peres during the 2009 World Economic Forum Summit in Davos. It has been considered that this angry exchange is in line with the image of his temperament as the *Kasımpaşalı delikanlı* – the tough man from Kasımpaşa. Moreover, after this rift between Erdoğan and Israeli President, he has been criticized by not conducting foreign policy in a proper way, namely *mon cher style*. He refused and mentioned that he is not like them. He has flirted with *Kasımpaşalılık* in a pragmatic way.

In a similar way, while Erdoğan’s harsh reprimands of other politicians, and from time to time his use of slang language, are not generally regarded as strange or odd, however, Deniz Baykal’s attempts to use similar language are regarded as inappropriate to his secular/Kemalist image. At one point, Baykal himself reacted to this, saying “If *kahvehane* [low class coffee house] culture is positively regarded, I would not let him take over the *kahvehane*. If it is a talent then I can do it as well”⁶¹. This outburst and the critical reactions to it, raise an additional question of why such manifestation of anger is not regarded as appropriate for Baykal, but is for Erdoğan. The answer can perhaps be found in consideration of the sources of Baykal’s capital.

Growing up in a strongly Kemalist family, Deniz Baykal was nurtured in a secular/modernist environment. Then, as a young college student, he attended the seminar series organized by two leftist political magazines, *Varlık* and *Ulus*, and, as already mentioned, he was one of the students who marched against the Democrat Party’s populist regime in 1960. After finishing his PhD at the University of Ankara Faculty of Political Sciences *Mülkiye* - a very deep-rooted politically leftist faculty - he started his political life as a deputy of the CHP in 1973. Until the recent sex tape scandal, he was CHP party leader since 1996. In terms of cultural capital, Baykal can

⁶¹ <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=3722562>

be categorized as having a less popular image than Erdoğan. For example, his wife, Olcay Baykal, is not a publicly visible woman, just like his other family members. Neither are the Baykal's children publicly visible faces. Only during national holidays and national election days they appear in the media. Although Baykal did not follow any sports career in the past, he does generally run and swim but not playing a *virile game* that includes struggle and completion as Erdoğan did. In terms of social capital, his close friends are unknown, although he generally appears to be with his colleagues from the CHP. During his career, he has always paid attention to behave accordingly to his image with the responsibility of being the leader of Atatürk's party or the guardian of the Kemalist regime.

Devlet Bahçeli is the least known of the three leaders. In particular, there is very little information about his private life. He grew up in a crowded family before, like Baykal, experiencing university years that coincided with his active participation in political circles, strong nationalist ones in the case of Bahçeli. After gaining his PhD in Economics and working as a scholar until 1982, he started to involve himself more actively in politics as a member of the Nationalist Labor Party. He then abandoned his academic career and became involved in the nationalist *Ülkü Ocakları* very actively. In 1997, he became the leader of the MHP after the death of the party's previous leader Alparslan Türkeş. As already mentioned, his private life is a puzzle. It is only known that he is single and lives with his elder sister. He has never been media-oriented. About the mystery of his private life, he said that "Just like the nationalist line, I am also very straight. There is no color" (Dündar, 2007).

Hence, analyzing personal histories of political party leaders is in line with questioning how have the practices of being men been affected by their different habitus. As the three leaders have been socialized in diverse environments and have

developed different ideological stances, and in parallel, they have different positioning; they have experienced the practices of being men in a multilayered manner. In a Bourdieuan framework, what is practiced is the accumulation of habitus and different kinds of capitals within the field. Therefore, the mutual relation between habitus as a whole and the field shapes individuals' practices. In this perspective, it is hypothesized that despite their different habitus in the same field, all leaders have reproduced masculine hierarchy. The struggle for power, or in other words male rivalry, is the main motive behind the construction of masculine identities and “[u]nlike ideologies that appeal to men’s minds, hegemonic masculinity taps into the deepest recesses of men’s psychosexual, social, and political identities.” (Kann, 1998: 28).

As it is discussed in the previous chapters, in a political environment that is based on traditional gendered hierarchy enshrined by a glorified masculine imagery, masculinities are shaped and shaping. In parallel, habitus are structured and structuring. Hence, the tapings of hegemonic masculinity are embedded into the dynamic structuring of habitus including political identities. Although, Erdoğan, Baykal and Bahçeli have experienced different paths of masculinities with different accumulation of capitals, they all “(...) identify, stigmatize, punish ‘subordinated’ or ‘marginal’ masculinities.” (Kann, 1998: 28). All these different positioning or habitus can be read as different paths that were followed. However, the conditions of the field, namely politics, structure their habitus. In other words, they all play with masculinities, and in the end, they reproduce masculinist strategies in politics.

For instance, all leaders have grown up in different social settings. They do differ a lot in terms of their social circles as well. Their different socialization experiences have ended in different accumulation of capitals. In other words, they

have nourished from ideologically different political circles that carry them to the power positions that they have. Another difference that provides us clues about their habitus is about the way they got married. Unlike the traditional way that Erdoğan couple got married, Baykal couple married in an unconventional way by eloping to Akçakoca, small town by the sea. While Erdoğan couple followed the traditional way of finding their mates through a fellow colleague⁶², Baykal couple met and dated in college when her father had some reservations about this marriage due to his career in university, they eloped in a modern way and had civil marriage, not a conventional wedding ceremony. On the other hand, Bahçeli is still single and lives with his first family as the head of household.

This chapter has demonstrated how the three leaders have different personal backgrounds that have led to differences in the kinds of Bourdieuan capital that they have accumulated and habitus that refer to lifestyles. To complete the analysis of the reproduction of masculinities in Turkey's current political atmosphere, one should also take into account how different paths of masculinities are represented.

Accordingly, the next chapter will analyze Turkish political manhood in general, different paths of masculinities in particular with reference to leaders' speeches.

⁶² For details see: <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=225963>

CHAPTER VII

REPRESENTATIONS OF DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES

After the analysis of official party documents, namely party programmes and election manifests, and also leaders' different paths of masculinities, this part discusses the construction of political manhood in politics as field through the discourses of the leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. How politics and masculinities construct each other through masculine domination strategies will be revealed in this final part of the analysis. It also follows Bourdieu's argumentation that argues "(...) practices should be seen as the product of an encounter between habitus and a field which are, to varying degrees, compatible or congruent with one another." (Bourdieu, 1991: 17).

This chapter will mainly be achieved by expanding on Bora and Tol's approach. Bora and Tol (2009) analyze the construction of masculinity in Turkish political culture and the impacts of this discourse on various contemporary conceptualizations, specifically politics, power and leadership. Bora and Tol consider politics in three ways. Firstly, they view it as an arena, *er meydanı*, for leaders to prove their manliness by having to struggle with other political parties. This idiom is highly internalized by populist discourse. Secondly, they view politics as a kind of

test of courage in which men, the main actors of politics, should be courageous and brave, rather than being fragile or sensitive like women. Thirdly, they view politics as a realm in which every individual is male (Bora and Tol, 2009). Analyzing these arguments in depth, while taking gender to be “sexually characterized habitus”, can reveal how specific behaviors of appropriately feminine and masculine actors influence the political (Bourdieu, 2001: 104).

This chapter deconstructs the party leader speeches in order to examine the construction of gender in general and masculinities in particular, through three Turkish political parties, the AKP, the CHP and the MHP. To investigate the gendered nature of Turkish politics, the three mainstream daily newspapers (Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman) are re-read through a critical lens that focuses on five determining characteristics of Turkish political life introduced in earlier chapters: the strong state tradition, militarism, Westernization, the secularist / Islamist cleavage and domination by party leaders, so as to reveal the different pathways of Turkish political manhood, namely neo-Muslim, Kemalist/secular and nationalist. This study, re-reads the data making use of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, investigates the construction of political manhood in Turkey from the perspective of how do masculinities shape politics and how politics shape masculinities does. This not only enables the reader to examine the strong relationships between politics and masculinities, but also the congruent relationship with habitus and field. This dissertation primarily questions the role of the different personal histories, habitus, of the three party leaders on their construction of masculinities, and argues that these leaders practice more the praxis of being men rather than being leftist, rightist or Islamist, in line with the arguments of TESEV’s

report on nationalism in Turkey (Kentel et al., 2007: 264). In this line, as mentioned before, language is an important signifier.

In previous chapters, it is hypothesized that what is valued in the linguistic market of politics is manhood. In other words, the “recognized power”, or symbolic capital, is shaped by the relative priority given to manhood and is legitimized by its credibility (Bourdieu, 1991). As individuals deploy their linguistic resources, it is critical to analyze the ways in which their linguistic techniques vary or not. Therefore, in the framework of this dissertation, not only the embeddedness of politics and masculinities is revealed but also how does the agent, namely the politician, position himself in the field is deconstructed.

“Men make up 82.5% of members of national parliaments worldwide, and a higher proportion of cabinets” (Parpart and Zalewski, 2008: xi). Such a percentage supports the argument that the political landscape has always been a men’s world. Thus Enloe defines politics as a “men’s club” (Enloe, 1989:6), as the arena of politics has overwhelmingly been populated by men and dominated by masculine aspirations.

According to Zalewski and Parpart (2008), masculinity is associated with certain practices and discourses. Following Butler’s argument of performativity, Zalewski and Parpart claim that some performances of gender produce and also are produced, and that “(...) metaphors act as motors of discourse which work to frame and naturalize masculinist assumptions” (2008: 10). That is, metaphors and assumptions reinforce the relation between masculinity and power. This naturalization also contributes “(...) to the ongoing struggle to maintain gender hierarchies” (Parpart, 1998:203), by which certain qualities, such as aggression, rationality, bravery are valued as power enhancing and get defined as masculine.

This understanding offers a very dominating narrative of masculinity, or in other words, the rhetorical work of exclusion. While men are identified as the dominating one, women are recognized as the other. A discursive strategy operates in which the masculine/feminine dichotomy is constitutive of the public/private dichotomy (Zalewski and Parpart, 1998: 2008).

Connell (1990) describes hegemonic masculinity as culturally idealized forms of masculine character linking male identity with traits such as physical toughness and competitiveness, and elevating these above other stereotypical gender or sexuality traits. Idealized forms of masculinity become hegemonic when they become unnoticed in a culture (Fahey, 2007: 134). The taken-for-grantedness of hegemonic masculinity consistently naturalizes the superiority of masculine characteristics. For Connell, a masculine politics, which concerns the making of gendered power, can take many forms (1995, 2005). For him, it is “the capacity of certain men to control social resources through gender processes” (Connell, 2005: 205). While Connell highlights the kinds of practices in which conceptions of masculinity are embedded and masculinity politics has a structural basis, this dissertation specifically defines political manhood as practices through which masculinities are constructed in politics as a field.

The next part will examine three leaders’ political manhood with a lens that scrutinizes different paths of masculinities.

7.1 Politics is Male

Men, the main actor of politics, should, according to his *nature*, be courageous and brave, rather than fragile or sensitive like women. In addition,

conducting politics is an act of bravery. In other words, men, as the natural protector of the country, *should* act in a domineering fashion, and they *should* perform their job in a way that properly pertains to be a *real* man. In Turkish politics, the speeches of political leaders illustrate very well how politics is combined with male codes, and how this is simultaneously associated with positively valued qualities. From early Republican times, conducting politics has been coupled with defending country as an honorable duty. “[V]irtue and masculinity were intimately bound up with the concept of honor” (Dickerman and Walker, 2000: 385). This connotation of honor has also been dependent on the evaluation of performance. A man could lose honor by violating norms, or through acts of cowardice.

The most memorable example in Turkey of such an equation of politics and manhood dates back to the end of 1999, in the debate between the MHP and the FP concerning virility and cowardice. During the parliamentary budget plenary sessions, whilst challenging a MHP parliamentarian, one FP parliamentarian said, “We will test your manhood and cowardice in the matter of the rise of civil servants wages.” The MHP parliamentarian responded, “We can prove this anywhere you want.” This debate on manhood and cowardice occupied the media’s agenda for a long time, showing how politics as a field of proving manhood once again reasserted its position in the public mind.

In a similar way, one ANAP deputy, Selçuk Pehlivanoglu, claimed, “The MHP pretends to be a strong man in Anatolia but keeps silent in Ankara,” before adding, “The DSP says it is the honorable one but never subscribes to a document on behalf of the nation.” He also described the MHP as “A man in Anatolia; a coward

in Ankara,” and the DSP as “Pretending to be honorable but never performing.”⁶³ Thus, being courageous and honorable are two of the most widely shared themes in Turkish politics. As markers of being *good politicians*, such qualifications are taken-for-granted norms. For instance, “Prime Minister Erdoğan quoted from the famous philosopher Plato, mentioning that ‘cowards have never built a triumphal monument’. In the opening speech of the AKP camp in Kızılcahamam, he explained they [the AKP] do not do fearful politics.”⁶⁴ As Erdoğan’s words exemplify, in masculine politics, cowards are not able to conduct such an important job, and their politics are courageous, as they ought to be.

A statement by the MHP leader, Bahçeli, also underlines how politics itself is a man’s job, or should be: “Those who tell us [Why didn’t you hang Apo?], criticizing us for being timid and cowardly politicians, should take a look at the past and see who first used the term manly politics. Now they seek the power to rule by singing a couple of songs and talking poorly.”⁶⁵

⁶³ ANAP’lı Pehlivanoglu, MHP için, "Anadolu’da erkeklik taslayıp Ankara’da çıtı çıkmayan" DSP için de, "Namusluyum diyerek millet adına hiçbir şeyin altına imza atmayan" ibarelerini kullandı. Selçuk Pehlivanoglu, isim vermeden eleştirdiği hükümet ortaklarından MHP için, "Anadolu’da erkek, Ankara’da ürkek", DSP için de, "namusluyum diyerek icraat yapmayan" tanımlamalarını kullandı.(24.12.2000)from <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2000/12/24/politika/politikadevam.htm>

⁶⁴ Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan, ünlü filozof Eflatun’dan alıntı yaparak, “Korkaklar hiçbir zaman zafer anıtı dikememişlerdir” diyerek, Kızılcahamam’daki AK Parti kampının açılışında, korkak siyaset yapmadıklarını anlattı. (22.11.2009) from <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=13011484>

⁶⁵ Bahçeli: “Bize (Apo’yu neden asamadınız?) diyenler, bizi ürkek ve korkak politikacı olarak eleştirenler, geçmişe bir baksınlar erkek politika kelimesini ilk kullanan kim olmuştur. Şimdi iki şarkı bir söz, söyleyerek iktidara talip oluyorlar.” (27.10.2002) from <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/10/27/politika/butun.htm>

As the statement of Bahçeli shows he is proud that *his party* is the first that used the term manly politics. The MHP, embracing radical nationalism in Bora's typology, resorts a rigid approach when manly causes are at stake.

As mentioned before, not only politics itself, but also the environment of politics is male. Masculinizing the whole atmosphere of politics verifies also how the relation between masculinity and politics is currently intertwined. In Turkey, the debate around the field of men (*er meydanı*) is repeatedly reproduced by politicians. In order to test their opponents' degree of manliness and strength, leaders use the metaphor of the field of men. This field of men is also a describer of a very deep rooted tradition of oil wrestling in Turkey, where wrestling is an ancestral sport, represented primarily by the annual *Kırkpınar* tournaments, and one of the most virile games through which wrestlers test their strengths. Therefore, it is interesting that, in the popular imagination, politics has been equated with such an arena of struggle. Confronting the rival by inviting him to the *er meydanı*, that is the field of contest for men, is very common in Turkish political culture. For instance, Prime Minister Erdoğan once said of his opponents:

These people have got stuck on some stuff, some snot that they made themselves. That's why they go around telling the same old story from dawn until dusk. They've been on stage muttering 'election' for four and a half years. We've just held an election, just wait and see. Now, we're holding an election. The field of men will be set up on the 22nd of July. The wrestler and the dishonest one will be easily distinguished.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Erdoğan: "Bunlar takılmışlar bazı şeylere, takılmışlar kendi elleriyle yaptıkları bazı öcülere, sabah akşam aynı teraneyi söyleyip geziyorlar. 4,5 yıldır seçim, seçim diye ortadalar. Daha seçimi yeni yaptık, durun bakalım. İşte şimdi seçime gidiyoruz. Er meydanı 22 Temmuz'da kurulacak. Kim pehlivan, kim dürüst değil görülecek". (17.05.2007) from <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=540852>

This statement of Erdoğan shows that the politician is a wrestler who struggles in the field of men.

Such an invitation to the field never remains unnoticed by other politicians. Especially during times of heightened propaganda, the call for a test of manhood becomes a very common rhetoric. Obviously, men constitute the vast majority of the candidates for office and it can be argued that “men dominate the electoral playing field.” (Carroll and Fox, 2010:2). In addition, not only the candidates but also other significant actors during elections, namely, strategists, consultants, media experts are mostly men and beyond this dominance, the language of the election is gendered in masculine themes as well (Carroll and Fox, 2010: 2). Discourses during elections generally comprise metaphors drawn from traditionally masculine domains embedded in a given culture. In parallel, the leaders are also expected to act in accordance with normative masculine traits. “[O]ur expectations about the qualities, appearance, and behavior of candidates also are highly gendered. We want our leaders to be tough, dominant, and assertive – qualities much more associated with masculinity.” (Carroll and Fox, 2010: 3).

To give an example for the gendered nature and atmosphere of the elections, before the national elections of 2007, Deniz Baykal challenged Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by inviting him to a public debate. At that time, the debate between two leaders caused the tension to escalate. Baykal also published a newspaper advertisement in which there is an illustration of a television program with a bench, as if the program’s title is “Field of Men”. In this studio, there is an empty chair next to Baykal’s seat. The advertisement’s slogan was “I am here. Where are you?”⁶⁷

Erdoğan did not accept Baykal's call so there was no television debate. However, two years later, before the local elections, Erdoğan challenged other leaders in the same way, mentioning that "I struggled in this way. I invited them to the battleground; here is the field of men. Let them appear in the field. Since I was 18, I have been in the political arena; this is how I understood and performed in this way."⁶⁸ Here, Erdoğan gives reference to his past. He argues that what he learnt in the Islamist political environment has become a habit of performance.

The relation between politics and man as its essential actor presents itself in a multi dimensional way. It not only underlines how the field of politics is or should be masculine, but also how does the masculinist necessity justify its means and ends. Such a masculinist necessity manifests itself in the male body, namely the male politician.

7.2 The Politician is Male

Politics is a multi layered frame for a researcher and, in line with Bourdieu, its actors are products of an encounter. In this dissertation, while the focus is on the meaning structures that coalesce around masculinities, like the field of men, hidden discourses are also significant.

⁶⁷ CHP Genel Başkanı Deniz Baykal, birçok konuşmasında Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a yönelik yaptığı "televizyonda tartışma" çağrısını, bu kez gazete ilanı ile dile getirdi. Gazetelere verilen ilanda, Baykal'ın yanında bulunan koltuk boş bırakılırken "Er Meydanı", "Ben buradayım, sen nerdesin" sloganı dikkat çekti. Başbakan Erdoğan'ın ise bu isteğe ne yanıt vereceği şimdiden merak konusu oldu. (16.07.2007) from <http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/0707/16/w/c0503.html>

⁶⁸ Erdoğan: Mücadeleyi de böyle verdim. Buyursunlar meydana, er meydanı burada. Çıksınlar meydana. 18 yaşından bu yana siyaset meydanında bunu böyle anladım, böyle yaptım. (12.08.2009) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=12265921>

Reading a text comprises a multitude of layers, so from this perspective the data was re-read through a critical lens to probe the multifaceted cultural constructs in order to decipher different masculinities and their constructions. Within the framework of assumption that the field of politics is male, its actors are bound by the laws of this game. In other words, the politician is gendered in masculine.

One of the most gendered depictions of politics is its male subject. Politics as a field entails an interweaving of men's power with a diverse range of representations. As Hooper (2001) argues, the area of politics reflects a world of men in which political men influence domestic and international affairs through their masculinist practices that embrace the symbolic links between masculinity and power. Such a transmission of power reproduces a gendered hierarchy. The patterns of male authority are thereby legitimized within the field of politics, and masculine power positions itself in politics in line with the dichotomy between public and private. Through the public and private boundaries, life is divided into a number of highly gendered spheres. "Gender divisions and inequalities depend to a great extent on the segregation of social life into separate spheres for men and women, so that gender differences can be constructed and the lives of difference visible" (Hooper, 2001: 91).

While the private sphere inscribes a feminized realm, the public one is a masculinized arena. The private sphere represents the realms of families and individuals, while the public sphere includes the public and political dimensions. Hence, two gendered arguments combine, namely that the public is a male realm, and, accordingly, politics is men's job. The outputs of such a gendered categorization are reified, not only in discursive practices, but also in social practices. Women with their traditional supporting roles remain outside the "traditional remit" of the political

world (Hooper, 2001: 92). Therefore, this gendered space reinforces associations that are crucial to masculinism, or simply masculinity and power.

Turkish politics is also a site where masculinities are produced, reinforced and negotiated. The leaders of political parties use masculinist strategies, drawing on associations between manhood, sincerity, bravery and virility.

Politics not only defines but also constructs masculinities. In politics as a field, bodies are identified in ways that subjugate them and their identities are constructed through displays and performative acts. For example, Devlet Bahçeli, in his speech before the national elections of 22th July, mentioned that “Our 12 women, in total 70 deputy candidates, will work with the enthusiasm of *Ulubatlı Hasan*⁶⁹ [Hasan of Ulubat] who planted the flag during the siege of the city [Istanbul]”.⁷⁰ This sentence is a good illustration of how the political subject is masculinized, and also heroized, to the extent that even women should perform masculinist practices like men.

Another example of such a clear gendering of the political subject is another dispute between Tayyip Erdoğan and Deniz Baykal. In this instance, Erdoğan challenged Baykal by asking

It’s neither a feast nor a festival, so one would ask to a man where is it coming from now? They started this one year ago. It didn’t work so they had a break for some time. You told people that you were loyal to the laws and the constitution. What happened now? Why are you being disloyal now? Where’s your respect for Turkish

⁶⁹ *Ulubatlı Hasan* (Hasan of Ulubat) is a legendary Turkish martyr. At the successful siege of Istanbul, *Ulubatlı Hasan* was among the first who climbed the walls of Istanbul, who, when he reached the top, planted the flag of the Ottoman Empire and defended it until other soldiers arrived. Thus he is a very heroic figure for Ottoman-Turkish history. For detailed information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulubatl%C4%B1_Hasan retrieved on 19 September 2011.

⁷⁰ MHP’nin İstanbul’daki 12’si kadın 70 milletvekili adayı 22 Temmuz seçimlerine, kentın fethinde surlara Türk bayrağını diken Ulubatlı Hasan ruhuyla çalışacak. (18.06.2007) from <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6728319>

Grand National Assembly (TGNA)? Where's your loyalty to democratic parliamentary system? Where's your commitment to democracy? What happened? ⁷¹

In this saying, there is a dispute around previous promises of Baykal. Erdoğan's strategy is to intimidate Baykal in an acceptable way within the field of politics where masculinist challenges are legitimate. In this game, the subject who has the right to ask and challenge is masculine. Man is the natural power holder and these "symbolic associations have implications for the way men and women are imagined to be" (Yanagisako and Delaney, 1994: 3).

Another example of the etiquette of virility between politicians took place during the presidential elections in 2006. The President, as the head of the state, enclosed the gendered symbolism that lies in the notion of President as caretaker, protector of the people or simply the leader of the father state in Turkey. Svendsen (2007) defines this gendering of the presidential post as "paternal Presidentialism". "The gendered symbolism of the presidency makes it difficult for voters to imagine a woman in the office" (Svendsen, 2007: 104). Images of the caring man or the genteel patriarch serve as an effective rhetorical framework for the concentration of masculine traits in politics. In contrast to female caring, male caring, or the caring of the breadwinner in the family, is more independent. As Svendsen notes, "the President as an all-knowing father and citizens as dependants who need to be cared for" is a deep-rooted rhetorical tool (Svendsen, 2007: 104). Such a gendered construction of the presidential position is embedded into Turkish political cultural

⁷¹ Erdoğan Baykal'ı eleştirirken şöyle der: "Bayram değil, seyran değil, nereden çıktı bu iş? Sorarlar adama, "Ta bir sene önce bu işe başladılar. Baktılar tutmadı bir ara verdiler. Hani siz yasalara sadıktınız, hani siz anayasaya sadıktınız, ne oldu, şimdi niye sadakatinizi ayaklar altına alıyorsunuz, hani siz TBMM'ye saygılıydınız, hani siz demokratik parlamenter sisteme sadıktınız, hani siz demokrasi bağımlıydınız, ne oldu?" (14.12.2006) from <http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/cumhuriyet2006/0612/14/t/c0514.html+adama+sorarlar>.

rhetoric as well. Thus, during the last presidential elections, Baykal criticized the process, claiming that “I couldn’t promote any man that I want as President of the Republic. I expended a lot of effort to achieve this. What about you [Erdoğan]? Were you able to make someone you want to be President of the Republic? What’s the outcome? Is it fine?”⁷²

At that time, due to speculation that Erdoğan would propose himself as a candidate for the presidency, Devlet Bahçeli challenged Erdoğan: “I won’t be a man, if I don’t drag you [Erdoğan] down from the Presidency by Parliament’s decision and sue you to the Supreme Court.”⁷³ Such a confrontation reveals that the most important political success test in Turkey is through manhood. In this perspective, it can be argued that ideal gender imaginary in politics as a field compromises the configuration of masculine practices that are widely accepted.

Two of the most significant characteristics of Turkish political men are their sincerity and virility. These two characteristics are also the most widely used rhetorical strategies of the leaders. Erdoğan once said to Baykal, “Do not whine – be brave”.⁷⁴ Whining is certainly not a feature inscribed into political men. Rather, the hegemonic form of masculinity in politics entails the ability and capacity to be decisive and tough. These characteristics make a politician a virile man. Erdoğan has repeatedly confronted Baykal in his speeches and use of the expression of the virile

⁷² Baykal: İstedğim adamı cumhurbaşkanı yapamazdım. Ben onu yapmak için çaba harcadım. Yaptın mı istediğin adamı? Ne oldu? İyi oldu mu? (27.12.2006) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=5685758>

⁷³ Bahçeli: “Seni (Erdoğan) Meclis kararıyla Cumhurbaşkanlığı’ndan indirip, Yüce Divan’a vermezsem adam değilim.” (10.07.2006) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=4724783>

⁷⁴ CHP Lideri Deniz Baykal’a yönelik “Mızıkçılık yapmayacaksın, delikanlı olacaksın” diyen Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a (...). (12.04.2007) from <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6320395>

man: “I tell Mr. Baykal that my nation will make only a virile man a Prime Minister.”⁷⁵ Baykal has also responded in that way, once mentioning for example that “You’re in office, but you have not become a complete man yet. Whatever you do, you can never be a man,” continuing to say that “You are a plunder, you are an impostor, and hence your name is Erdoğan.”⁷⁶ Here, there are two critical points to be discussed. The first one is that confrontation in politics is achieved through the testing of manhood. This is the most legitimate way of challenging opponents. For success in politics or, in other words, achieving power and eventual hegemony, the political subject seeks to establish his masculine performance through crediting or discrediting his manhood. The second critical point concerns the list of required qualifications. Being honest and decisive are preconditions for being man. Otherwise, the politician faces being named as *unmanly*. “Giving men the stamp unmanly could be seen as a part of the same process that subordinates women and legitimizes male power and authority” (cited in Svendsen, 2007: 31). Thus, such a list of positive ideals for male behaviors challenges not only women but also men.

Another popular discourse on manhood in Turkey is *kabadayı*. As it is discussed before, *kabadayı* symbolizes traditional conservatist masculine image and also the protector of the order according to his own sense of justice. This hyper masculine figure manifests itself in Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership. Related to rough neighborhood that he socialized in, namely *Kasımpaşa*, many people consider

⁷⁵ “Ama ben Sayın Baykal'a şunu söylüyorum; benim milletim adam gibi adamı başbakan yapar.” dedi. (01.03.2009) from <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=820624>

⁷⁶CHP Genel Başkanı Baykal, Sinop'ta Başbakan Erdoğan'a sert eleştiriler yöneltti. Erdoğan'ı maganda üslubuyla konuşmakla suçlayan Baykal, “Sen iktidar olmuşsun ama adam olamamışsın. Bundan sonra kırk fırın ekmek de yesen olamazsın” dedi. Erdoğan'a “Senin işin talan, gücün yalandolan, adın da Erdoğan” diye seslenen Baykal, yolsuzluk ve yoksulluğun katlanarak arttığını söyledi. (01.03.2009)from <http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/0903/01/w/c0113.html>

him as *kabadayı*. His aggressive way of talking has also been legitimized as a signifier of his *Kasımpaşalılık* (being from *Kasımpaşa*). Yavuz mentions that

A *kabadayı* is an identity based on reputation, authority and honor. It is normally a male and respected authority figure in his neighborhood. His authority is not derived from his knowledge, kinship lineage or state power, but rather from the existing cultural code. A *kabadayı* is respected as a protector of the weak, needy and oppressed against a formal or informal power structure. (2009: 119)

Therefore, such an authority legitimizes itself in politics as a protective paternal figure. The courage, strength and also self-confidence are characteristics of *kabadayı* who represent a leader figure resisting against dangers and protects needy ones. Erdoğan's background justifies his aggressiveness and his *natural* characteristics of being courageous, strong man have political ramifications as well.

Kabadayı manner of Erdoğan is a theme of dispute in Turkish politics. Baykal has criticized Erdoğan's way of talking and behaving so many times. For instance, Baykal said that

It is wrong to approach the President's attitude in an obstinate manner, reacting and turning it into an occasion of political hostility, and to challenge him. I advise them to quit such behavior immediately. It is not appropriate to do politics on delicate issues with a *kabadayı* tone. We do have respect for the President; however, we believe that the step taken by Turkey towards democratization should be finalized.⁷⁷

On the other hand, Baykal also challenges Erdoğan with test of toughness and also reproduces the rhetoric on *kabadayı*. Once, he mentioned that

The seat you have sought now is yours. We, as members of the parliament from the CHP are all ready for support. Bring in the

⁷⁷ Baykal, "Cumhurbaşkanı'nın tavrına karşı bir inatlaşma, tepki gösterme, siyasi husumet vesilesi haline getirme, meydan okuma yaklaşımları yanlıştır. Öyle yapmaktan bir an önce vazgeçmelerini öneriyorum. Kabadayı üslubuyla hassas konularda siyaset yapmak doğru değil. Cumhurbaşkanına saygımız var ama, Türkiye'nin demokratikleşme doğrultusunda atılmış olduğu adımın sonuçlandırılması gerektiğine inanıyoruz" dedi. (23.12.2002) from <http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/cumhuriyet2002/0212/23/t/c0515.html+kabaday%FD>

files... You can call the previous period to account, but you should bring yourself to account too. Don't let your account fall into previous periods. One day you will be brought to account. But do not wait for it, be brave, be *kabadayı*.⁷⁸

Inviting Erdoğan to be brave and behave accordingly reproduce the relationship between politician and toughness. While criticizing such a way of conducting politics, Baykal also flirts with this rhetoric. Once, he stated that “If this coffee house culture is to be approved, I shall not let go of this coffee house. If this is a merit, then we shall do it too.”⁸⁰. Hence being *kabadayı* is a merit for a *real politician*. All defining characteristics of *kabadayı* can easily be legitimized in politics as a field. In line with Bourdieu, an emphasis on manhood is fashionable in the linguistic market and the speeches of leaders illustrate how masculine and/or masculinized the field of politics by positioning men as the patriarch and women as other.

Another discourse around manhood or the characteristics attached to being a good politician is *delikanlılık*⁸¹ (young manhood). As it is discussed above, politicians reproduce the significance of *delikanlılık* in politics in Turkey. Cevdet Selvi, the Vice President of the CHP, said that “A *delikanlı* (young man) wouldn't get somewhere by hiding, and does not take advantage of the situation, he would be brave” in response to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's saying “Be *delikanlı*”

⁷⁸ Baykal: “Dokunulmazlıkların kaldırılması talebini yineleyen Baykal, “İstedığınız koltuk elinizde. CHP milletvekilleri olarak hepimiz destek vermeye hazırız. Getirin dosyaları... Geçmiş dönemin hesabını sor da, sen kendi hesabını da ver. Hesabınız geçmiş döneme sarkmasın. Gün olur sen de hesap verirsin. Ama bekleme, cesur ol, kabadayı ol.” (05.09.2005) from <http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/cumhuriyet2005/0509/05/t/c0414.html+kabadayı%FD>

⁸⁰ Baykal, “Eğer bir kahvehane kültürü olumlu görülüyorsa, kahvehaneyi ona bırakmam. Marifetse o zaman biz de yaparız.” (31.12.2005) from <http://hursiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=3722562>

⁸¹ *Delikanlı* (young man) is a term that refers to male adolescent who is supposed to and also has potential to be aggressive, enthusiastic, fearless. It is a positive characteristics attached to young men.

(young man) towards the CHP⁸². In addition, he adds that as Hürriyet reported: “A *delikanlı* would not sell off the State that he is responsible of to anybody. It is not possible to call a Prime Minister a *delikanlı* if he is tongue-tied while his soldiers were put a sack over their heads. A *delikanlı* Prime Minister never lies people. He would never disrespects to people. A *delikanlı* person would never purchase a ship to his son while the youth in that country is unemployed. A *delikanlı* would not send his children to school with someone else’s money. You might be a militant or a tough uncle; however, while you come to head of the state you should pay attention to your words and never disrespect anyone.”⁸³ Selvi refers to the honesty, straightness, chivalry as characteristics of a *delikanlı* or a proper person- man, for the conduct of politics. While such a gendered understanding assembles men, it also excludes women. As these examples from Turkish politics and its legitimized language depict the *natural* features of being men, it has political ramifications for both genders. From this perspective, it can be argued that political power functions in gendered terms, with the main issue being the naturalized gendered hierarchy and it’s contribution to the production of the political subject in general, and political manhood in particular.

⁸² CHP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Cevdet Selvi, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın, CHP'ye yönelik 'Delikanlı ol' şeklindeki sözlerine karşılık, "Delikanlı adam, saklanarak, gizlenerek, bir yerden fırsat yakalayıp bir yere gelmek için istemez. Başta söyler" dedi. (12.04.2007) from <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=526944>

⁸³ “Delikanlı adam, sorumlu olduğu ülkeyi kimseye kayıtsız şartsız teslim etmez. Askerinin başına çuval geçirildiği zaman, dut yemiş bülbül gibi kalan bir başbakana delikanlı demek mümkün değil. Delikanlı başbakan, halkın yüzüne baka baka yalan söylemez. Mağdur insanların yüzüne hakaret etmez. Delikanlı adam, ülkenin gençleri işsizken, kendi çocuğunu gemi sahibi yapmaz. Delikanlı adam, çocuklarını başkasının parasıyla okutmaz. Geçmişte militan, külhanbeyi olabilirsin ama ülke yönetimine geldiğinde üslubuna bakacaksın, kimseye hakaret etmeyeceksin.” (12.04.2007) from <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6320395>

7.2.1. The Other: Woman

Although this dissertation does not aim to analyze the lack of women's representation in politics, in general, and in Turkey, in particular, on the basis of the relationality of gender, it is necessary to point out that women are the *quintessence other* of politics as a field.

Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, women have been at the center stage of politics. As the carrier of the Kemalist modernization project, "(...) women were given the responsibility to endorse and represent both the traditions that were deemed worthy of preservation as well as the transformation that the Westernizing state propelled" (Y. Arat, 1998: 3). The first concrete step of women's involvement into politics was taken by Nezihe Muhittin and her colleagues. They attempted to establish the Women's Public Party in 1923 (Tekeli, 1998: 341). However, this attempt was blocked by the male political elites, so that the women's efforts ended in the establishment of the Turkish Women's Association, which had some impact on gender awareness. The second significant step towards women's emancipation was taken in 1934 when suffrage was granted to women. This political right extended women's relationship to the state as citizens. However, as mentioned previously, the borders of women's activism were set by the state's founding fathers, and those parameters defined by men were limiting so that "[w]omen would aspire to be equal to men in the public realm and perpetuate their inequality in the private realm." (Y. Arat, 1998: 4). On the other hand, compared to previous times, women had the opportunity to penetrate various areas in public life, but politics was generally one of the least popular sites of women's representation.

Not only during the single party period, but also afterwards, women's representation in politics has remained low. After the transition to multi party

politics, women's organizations were oriented towards philanthropic goals (Çakır, 1996: 751). As Çakır (1996) reports, even women's associations established in the 1970s with left-wing agendas did not address gender equality as their counterparts in the West did. Then, in 1980, the military intervention suspended party politics for three years. Ironically, however, this military repression "(...) gave way to identity politics which allowed women to address their problems by focusing on gender oppression", and there has been an increase in the awareness and also reference to women's issues (Z. Arat, 2008: 14). While the traditional gender roles of women and their duties in the private realm have continued to preserve their primary place, the post-1980 period has led to a new understanding concerning women's employment. "The principle of equal pay for equal work which is mentioned only in four political party programs issued in the 1960s and 1970s becomes a common reference in programs adopted in the 1990s and later" (Z. Arat, 2008: 16). It is clear, therefore, that there has been a pattern of change towards a more equal understanding. However, it is also worth to re-mention that most political party programs also announce their strong commitment to preserve traditional family structures and the gendered division of labor. As Z. Arat notes, "practically in all party programmes, including the contemporary ones family is espoused and enshrined as the central unit of society and culture" (2008: 12).

In this framework of analyzing the *quintessence other* of the field of politics, it is valuable to emphasize the significance of veiling as a site of manifestation of gendered power relations. As this dissertation does not aim to analyze veiling, this issue reifies masculinist construction of gender within the field of politics.

Through regulation of women's bodies, politicians instrumentally *use* veiling issue. The main point about this discussion is that not only secularists but also

Islamists strategically use women's body and position her as dependant. Especially, as Vojdik argues, the antagonistic nature of Islamists and secularists position veiled women as "a proxy" (2010: 664). For the author, the main question is that "how do women respond to the gendered relations of power constructed by competing masculinities?" (Vojdik, 2010: 664). Hence, veiling as an ideologically loaded issue embraces not only questions regarding femininities but also masculinities. In the framework of this study, the above mentioned question is out of scope and focus of another study but its projections is significant as it is a contestation arena for competing masculinities.

7.3. Ma(i)nly Political Parties: Neo-Muslim, Kemalist/Secular and Nationalist Masculinities Coalesce

The projects discussed throughout the dissertation, namely power, nation-state, nationalism, militarism, Kemalism, can be described as masculinist projects "involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities" (Nagel, 1998: 243). As Nagel aptly argues as it is discussed in previous parts,

This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the making and unmaking of states: as citizens, as members of the nation, as activists, as leaders. It is to say that the scripts in which these roles are embedded are written primarily by men, for men, and about men, and that women are, by design, supporting actors whose roles reflect masculinist notions of femininity and of women's proper place. (1998: 243)

Man as the main actor, founding father, guardian soldier shapes not only macro but also micro politics. The associations of masculinities and the political

domain have generally taken for granted and the domination of men in politics has been eternalized. Not only men's gendered experiences but also the normative conceptualizations of masculinities are actively created and re-created in an active process. Bravery, courage, virility, strength, honor, toughness are the mostly embedded characteristics attached to being male politician, accordingly define the contours of political manhood. In this line, this study followed the usefulness of establishing the concept of masculinities in the study of politics so as not to miss the main actor and the "(...) *way in which gender shapes politics* – through men and their interests, their notions of manliness, and the articulation of masculine micro (everyday) and macro (politics) cultures." (Nagel, 2005: 397, original italics).

This dissertation re-reads and re-analyzes the most apparent, most familiar and most evident conceptualizations with the guidance of Bourdieu's analytical tools. Bourdieu's agenda has been very helpful to capture the ways in which masculinized norms shapes the conduct of politics and engender politician.

First, Bourdieu's notion of field offered a dynamic paradigm for defining politics. Field as the arena where "(...) the game is played" draws the boundaries that habitus operates. In this dissertation, Turkish politics examined as a field, or arena of struggles for legitimation structured by dominant and subordinate positions. The agents, namely politicians, occupy a position with the aim of having legitimation. Politicians are hierarchically positioned in the field through the overall volume of all capitals they possess, especially through the relative weight of cultural and symbolic capital. From the perspective of symbolic capital, prestige that can be obtained by being elected situates politicians. For instance, the results of elections positioned Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister while it positioned Deniz Baykal and

Devlet Bahçeli as oppositional leaders. Hence, the results of elections define the prestige of leaders by its relatively high weight over other forms of capitals.

Another aspect of symbolic capital is symbolic violence and symbolic violence operates in the usage of language. As it has been mentioned before, linguistic market of politics places the emphasis on manhood. In this line, Bourdieu (1991) argues that, the socially constructed dispositions of the linguistic habitus involve its own legitimized system:

The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language. (1991: 45)

This state language becomes a norm and it legitimizes itself. For Bourdieu, it is reproduced by institutions and agents as well. From this perspective, it can be argued that language exists within legitimized borders and it is the “oral production of habitus” (Bourdieu, 1991: 46). In politics as a field, that “oral production of habitus” coalesces and forms a strategic discourse that values manhood. Hence, not only the field itself and its agents but also the language is structured and structuring, or in other words, reproduces gendered hierarchy. For instance, the idiom of *er kişi* (man/male person) is often used by the leaders. Erdoğan once said “When somebody dies –referring to Muslim funeral rituals-, he won’t be treated as Prime Minister or President, he will be treated as a male person. However, they don’t understand.”⁸⁴ Such a gendered usage is very common in Turkish language. This *choice* from the linguistic market can be considered as a way of privileging manhood by signifying it.

⁸⁴ Erdoğan: Kimse musalla taşına yatırılırken Cumhurbaşkanı ya da başbakan niyetine yatırılmıyor. Er kişi niyetine yatırılıyor. Ama onlar bizi anlamıyorlar. (24.07.2007) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=6391764>

Another common usage is *adam olmak* (being/becoming men). In Turkish, *olmak* (being/becoming) represents a process, or in other words, the achievement of a status of maturity. That is, only a mature person, who is also male, is qualified to be a citizen and thereby perform politics. This is another legitimized way of naturalizing masculine citizen. Devlet Bahçeli, in one of his speeches, pointed out that, “Now, we all have a conviction that we can never be a man. We can never achieve and never become successful. For this, we need some kind of support.”⁸⁵ This sentence exemplifies not only the superior and/or ideal position of being man but also draws boundaries for being a man. An appropriate level of support is necessary for being man and performing civic responsibilities. Hence, the accumulation of capitals is decisive factor in the constructions of political manhood as the encounter of language and symbolic capital depicts.

The accumulation of leaders’ capitals contours their construction of political manhood as it reflects their habitus. The practices are outcome of varying accumulation of capitals that shape habitus within the field. It can be argued that in the basis of their congruent relationship, politics and masculine themes nourish each other but despite the different positioning of the leaders, the outcome as practice coalesces. In other words, in the politics as a field, all leaders have different accumulation of capitals and in line different positioning related to their habitus as they have different posture, way of talking, behaving, greetings etc. However, despite these differences, they use or reproduce masculinist strategies in the same way. For instance, for Bourdieu, the ways of speaking is a manifestation of the

⁸⁵ Bahçeli: “Şimdi, hepimizde bir kompleks var, "Biz adam olmayız. Biz birşeyi başaramayız. Biz şunları gerçekleştiremeyiz. Bunlar için bir takım desteklere ihtiyacımız var.” (27.09.2002) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=100258>

socially structured character of habitus. The difference between Erdoğan's aggressive ways of talking and Bahçeli's quiet way of talking can be given as an appropriate example to two different ways of talking. Related to their different habitus, their ways of talking unconsciously position them in the field of politics but both practice of being men or strategically use and, in parallel, reproduce the advantage of being men in the field of politics. While Erdoğan has been criticized for being improper by acting aggressively, Bahçeli's calmness has won recognition, especially, in the framework of the party's changing image.

In his book *Masculine Domination* (2001) Bourdieu mentions that on the basis of "labeling of nature", men predominate women and "(...) need to increase his honor by pursuing glory in the public sphere" (2001: 51). Masculine politician plays virile games and responds to "countless imperceptible calls to order" (Bourdieu, 2001: 59). Such an unconscious positioning situates him near to his manly brothers while excluding feminine traits.

At this point, while analyzing different constructions of political manhood in Turkey, engaging different pathways of masculinities is inevitable. From the perspective of neo-Muslim masculinities, for the accumulation of capitals and accordingly, for the habitus of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Islam plays a decisive role. The conservative family that he has grown up, the education that he gained in *Imam Hatip School* and his engagement with deep-rooted Nakshibandi order has shaped his habitus. Although, he and the AKP rejects being Islamist, his positioning has fed from the Islamist appeal. In line with neo-Muslim masculinities, both the leader and the top cadres of the AKP flirt with a fine tuning of Islam and/or Islamist past. As Özkırımlı argues, the AKP is situated within the parameters of nationalist discourse and he adds that

[t]his can be seen in the nationalist language employed by the leaders of the movement (especially Prime Minister Erdoğan), the nationalist symbolism they fall back upon, and their National Outlook background. But a more fundamental indicator of this movement's symbiotic relationship with nationalism is that it has to a great extent shed its elements advocating Islamic unity (*ummah*). (2011: 97)

Although, the discourse of the party is nationalist, it is different than official nationalism and that's why they clash between each other. The statement of Erdoğan about the "99 percent Muslimness of Turkey" that he repetitively makes proves this reference to *ummah*. Erdoğan once mentioned that "who respects to the EU process, respects to the activities carried out in the EU member states. Because, I wonder whether in which member states do have the application that exist in Turkey in where 99% of the population is Muslim."⁸⁶ This reference to the unity of Muslim and its importance in the international politics is not rare in the discourse of the AKP. Another example is that "However, there are approximately 30 ethnic elements in Turkey. You usually write this fact, as well, the religion is a kind of cement in Turkey in where 99% of Turkish people are Muslim."⁸⁷ This statement of Erdoğan that defines religion as the cement that unifies people of the nation-state has been criticized by secularists. For Kemalist/secularist who positions themselves as the guardian of the Atatürkist reforms, religion, or Islam, could not provide the cement to unify the nation. Men as the founding fathers of the nation-state, have equipped with protecting the state with their highly educated, sophisticated manners in a *mon*

⁸⁶Erdoğan, "AB sürecine kim saygı duyuyorsa, AB üyesi ülkelerdeki icraatlara da saygı duysunlar. Çünkü yüzde 99'u Müslüman olan Türkiye'deki bu uygulama, AB üyesi ülkelere acaba hangisinde var?(13.11.2005)from <http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=228512&keyfield=4DC3BC736CC3BC6D616E204572646FC49F616E>

⁸⁷Erdoğan: Ama Türkiye'de ise 30'a yakın etnik unsur var. Bunu her zaman sizler de yazıyorsunuz, yüzde 99'u Müslüman bir ülke Türkiye'de din bir çimentodur." (11.12.2005) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3634007>

cher style towards any threat, especially Islamic fundamentalism. That can be considered as the reason behind Deniz Baykal's continuous references to Atatürk. Once, he stated that "Protect Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, secular and democratic Republic by your votes."⁸⁸. Moreover, Baykal once discussed the empowerment of women in Turkish politics and mentioned that "We should pave the way for women in politics. The basis of increasing the female efficiency doesn't exist in our parties. However, the structure of the CHP is very suitable for that basis, because we are a social democrat party. Social democracy is female, as well. We see the world with a lens of women. We, the social democrats, don't have a supercilious, adamant and challenging understanding. The women are an uncommitted force and now they should become active and make the radical change. Thus, the determinant forces will be disengaged. Our social democracy draws its strength from Anatolian renaissance, from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and contemporary social democracy"⁸⁹ In this speech, Baykal clearly mentions the roots of the CHP and puts emphasis on social democracy. He defines social democracy as feminine, and his party as gender sensitive. However, at the end of the speech, he also gives reference to the unique father of the state, Atatürk. In this perspective, it can be argued that the paradoxical

⁸⁸ "Vereceğiniz oyla Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'e, laik, demokratik cumhuriyete sahip çıkın." (30.10.2002) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=106626>

⁸⁹ Baykal dün CHP kadın kolları il başkanlarının düzenlediği toplantıda, yeni solu şöyle tanımladı: "Siyasette kadınların önünü açmak bize düşer. Kadın etkinliğini arttırmanın altyapısı henüz partilerimizde mevcut değil. Ama CHP'nin yapısı bunun için çok uygundur. Çünkü biz sosyal demokrat bir partiyiz. Sosyal demokrasi de feminendir. Dünyaya kadının bakış açısıyla bakar. Biz sosyal demokratlar olarak tepeden bakan, astığım astık, kestiğim kestik diyen, meydan okuyan maço bir anlayışa sahip değiliz. Kadın, siyasetimizin ihtiyat kuvveti olarak beklemektedir ve artık devreye girerek köklü değişimi gerçekleştirmelidir. Böylece haksız yere bugün belirleyici durumda olan güçler devreden çıkacaktır." "Sosyal demokrasimiz Anadolu rönesansından, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ten ve çağdaş sosyal demokrasiden güç alır." (16.01.2001) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-217217>

nature of Kemalist form of patriarchy glorifies founding fathers and Republican guardians and also reproduces traditional gendered hierarchy.

Finally, the MHP with its nationalist masculinist discourse nourishes masculine themes and idols. For instance, as it has mentioned before, grey wolves are significant symbols of the Turkish ancestral past. “On the last day of General Assembly of Victory, after Devlet Bahçeli took place in protocol tribune, the exit of Turks from Ergenekon was animated. The demonstration called “the Grey Wolves from Ergenekon to 2000s” was carried out by 18 riders. Bahçeli mentioned that ‘We need more (deputies) in order to adopt our program by ourselves just like the gray wolves’”⁹⁰ As it is clear from the speech, they identify themselves with gray wolves that immortalize heroic Turkic past. They also use this rhetorical discourse for threatening the others. “The grey wolves will breath down the AKP’s neck. You will pay the price. You will definitely pay for supporting separatism and the lives of martyrs”⁹¹ This statement gives reference to gray wolves as the protector of the sytem and also as a means of threat towards the AKP. Nationalism and its emotions have always nourished masculine themes and, in this way, it can be argued that, especially in nationalist politics, it is hard to “(...) distinguish as either nationalistic or masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to

⁹⁰ Zafer Kurultayı'nın son günü, Devlet Bahçeli'nin protokol tribününde yerini almasından sonra, Türklerin Ergenekon'dan çıkışı canlandırıldı. “Ergenekon'dan 2000'e Bozkurtlar” adı verilen gösteriyi, 18 atlı gerçekleştirdi. MHP Genel Başkanı Devlet Bahçeli, partisinin Sivas mitinginde yaptığı konuşmada, yeni Meclis'te daha fazla MHP'li milletvekiline ihtiyaç bulunduğunu söyledi. Bahçeli, “Kendi programımızı kendi başımıza bir bozkurt gibi uygulayabilmek için daha çoğuna ihtiyacımız var.” diye konuştu. (15.10.2002) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=103593>

⁹¹ AKP hükümetinin kaçmaya hazırlandığını, ancak hesap vermeden kaçamayacaklarını söyleyen Devlet Bahçeli, “Bozkurtların nefesi AKP'nin ensesinde olacak. Tek tek hesap vereceksiniz, bedel ödeyeceksiniz. Bölücülüğe verilen cesaretin, canların ve şehitlerin hesabını mutlaka vereceksiniz” diye konuştu.(...) (06.08.2006) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=4878505>

manliness” (Nagel, 1998: 252). The field as a continuous test of manliness glorifies masculine and/or masculinized themes such as bravery, duty, strength. Another commonly used reference to manhood among the MHP parliamentarians is about soldiering. In every congress of the party, party members support their leaders by saying “We are the soldiers of Alparslan Türkeş. *Devlet* (state) will head the State.”⁹² “*Devlet* (state) will head the state” has been a very popular discourse since Bahçeli rule the party. Here, the reference to state and the emphasis put on soldiering manifest the significant symbols of the nationalist discourse. The unity of the nation and soldiers protecting it are important male figures for the solidarity of the state and the leader of the MHP should lead this movement. Such an understanding promotes the nationalist typology of manhood with an emphasis on the unity of the nation-state and potent politician who can conduct this honorary duty.

To sum up, it can be argued that, in line with Bilgin’s assumption, Islamist, Kemalist, secularist, conservative, modernist discourses originate from and also contribute to the same political culture and are nourished by common cultural pool (Bilgin, 2004: 182).

⁹² (...) Salon dışında bir grup partili "Biz Alparslan Türkeş'in askerleriyiz" sloganları atarak "tekbir" getirirken, içeride de "Devletin başına Devlet gelecek", "Başbuğ ölmedi kalbimizde yaşıyor" şeklinde sloganlar atıldı. (05.11.2000) from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-195481>

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Analyzing gendered field is full of paradoxes as it covers an examination of multilayered dynamics. In this line, for the gendered field of politics in general, political parties in particular, this dissertation followed a dynamic route with a lens reading through internalized discursive practices and rooted institutional culture. Especially, going beyond the limits of the *familiar* examination of gender, namely an analysis of femininities, has been a challenging experience while I attempted not to miss “the major” actor in the study of politics (Nagel 1998: 2005).

The active gender politics has shaped and also been shaped through men and the normative notions of masculinities. Hence, scrutinizing the embedded notions of politics and manhood has commenced with two questions: “How does politics shape the construction of masculinity?” and “How does the construction of masculinity shape politics?” In line with this, both the construction of masculinities and politics itself first implicated a key conception: power.

As a loaded notion, power is very critical in understanding social construction of gender. *Natural* ways in which differentials of power are embedded in culture constitute crucial domains for identities. In line with Foucault’s understanding, as it is discussed in Chapter 2, power flows through a network of disciplinary institutions,

namely school, family, religion, law, etc. Norms that are replicated establish social relations and construct subject positions or identities. To put it clearly, power shapes the determinants that are imposed upon the individuals. These determinations bring the rules of conduct in a given area and become formative as well.

First, on the basis of how broad the scope of defining the political and manhood, this dissertation has used a dynamic definition of the political. With the acceptance of the whole web of conditions, this study focused on processes and relationships through which men conduct gendered lives. Therefore, to strengthen the approach while it did not ignore essentialist definitions' normative characteristics of manhood, it also concerned with multiple constructions of masculinities. In this framework, this study defines political manhood as men's gendered experiences of political world.

Secondly, with the awareness of bottlenecks of defining masculinity and examining gendered relations of power, this study emphasizes a relational approach. On the basis of relationality of gender, it was clearly significant to scrutinize the *processes* of inculcating common values and behaviors and also negotiating the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

At this point Bourdieu's analysis of gender has come into prominence. Bourdieu's conceptualizations have used as an analytical tool to examine the construction of masculinities in Turkish political parties. While politics has been traditionally and systematically equated with men and masculinities and dominance of men has been taken as given, it was significant to capture different relationships, processes and discourses or in other words to incorporate the subjective manifestations of power in Turkish socio-political and cultural atmosphere. Herein, Bourdieu's theory has allowed a more comprehensive reading of experiences and

practices. Bourdieu has offered an alternative methodological account to comprehend social reality. His way of bridging the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity has offered a relational mode of thinking that “(...) unmasks social reality and its many inflections, which are merely concealed behind a veil of commonsense understandings and discourses.” (Özbilgin and Tatlı, 2005: 859).

Bourdieu mainly argues that a “spontaneous knowledge” of the social world may lead to internalization of “everyday notions” (Karakayalı, 2004: 353). Hence, breaking the most self-evident relationships has offered a more active approach and, most importantly, it has opened the way for focusing on the relationships among practices, habitus, capital and field. Politics exposes the notion of power that is entrenched into the construction of masculinities. Politics, and the competing dynamics within, feed power or in other words the struggles for power. At this point, what is significant to consider is the nested relationship between politics and manhood, and, a gendered study of political men may take many forms

In this framework, this dissertation first developed typologies of masculinities in Turkish politics as a field. (1) Neo-Muslim; (2) Kemalist/Secular; (3) nationalist masculinities were drawn to understand multiple constructions of masculinities with reference to the AKP, the CHP and the MHP. In order to move into a discussion of discourses of masculinities, drawing typologies constituted a crucial step for a cognitive map that defines the relationships between main Turkish political paradigms and masculinities.

As a second step, so as to comprehend local dynamics, Turkish political culture has been analyzed. As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkish political background from modernization project to today’s political atmosphere has been examined with a lens of gender and five main pillars of Turkish political culture were identified,

namely, (1) the strong state tradition; (2) militarism; (3) Westernization; (4) the secularist / Islamist cleavage; (5) the domination of political leaders. In addition, Chapter 4 traced different paths of masculinities in Turkish political culture by questioning deep-rooted patterns of Turkish masculinities. (1) Father State (*Devlet Baba*); (2) Every (male) Turk is born a soldier; (3) *Mon Cher* vs. *Kabadayı* (Tough Uncle); (4) Muslim/Traditional versus Secular/Modern Man, were examined in parallel with the main pillars of Turkish political culture. Hereby, Chapter 4 shaped the boundaries of the field and the main reference points to understand Turkish politics and its culture.

To begin with, modernity has always been a reference point for Turkish politics. Modernization, or Westernization in Turkish political atmosphere, has provided a blueprint for Turkish political history and has strongly affected its political culture. The formation of Turkey as a nation-state was considered as an act of nation-building and a social engineering project, within which the re-construction of the identities were crucial parts. In particular, from the perspective of gendered identities, the new citizens of the Republic were feminized and masculinized by the state through transformative reforms. Although women have been the subject of several studies on the effects of modernization reforms on identities in Turkey, the effects on men has remained hidden. However, throughout the Kemalist modernization project, men were the cultural ideal, charged with the task of modernizing women and society, as well as with the duty of providing welfare. Changing the dress code was one of the first reforms, as it signified the visibility of the new men. The law on Clothing (1925) suggested wearing a hat and a tie, thereby symbolizing both the disengagement from traditional masculinity and loyalty to the newly formed Republic. In addition, the modern Turkish man was expected to

possess a healthy masculine body as the bearer of national reforms. As the new culture of nationalism was constructed to emphasize supposedly masculine attributes, such as honour, patriotism, bravery and duty, the revolutionary men of the Republic would have to demonstrate that they were the protectors of society. Meanwhile, attending new kinds of entertainment, such as balls and theatres, were considered as the symbols of performing the modern daily life. Therefore, men were situated as protectors of order, and also mentor to guide citizens.

Throughout the years, characteristics attached to modernity have become constitutive reference point for the construction of masculinities in Turkey. Kemalist/secular masculinities have consolidated their domain of practice and closed the doors for alternative constructions of masculinities. However, Islamist discursive formation started to be ossified in construction of identities in post-1980 and it has situated its own masculinities. Although Islamist reflections on gender has been generally revealed through women and their bodies, based on the relationality of gender, men and their construction of identity has also been affected. For instance, the reason behind the issue of veiling has become the most visible are of contestation on women and her body.

In the 2000s, however, the boundaries of masculinity in Turkey are being redefined by a multiplicity of identities, related to widespread social changes and effects of globalization. Although some stereotypes of Turkish masculinity, such as *kabadayı* (tough uncle), *Mehmetçik* (soldier), *father of the father state* remained ossified within popular culture, Turkish society itself has nevertheless fabricated new forms of masculinities through its interaction with global images and identities. Class, ethnicity and, most importantly, religion have been integrated as influential factors in the new construction of masculinities. The resulting interplay of power

between the hegemonic masculinity and these other masculinities has taken place on a slippery ground shaped by the heritages of Turkish culture and, currently, secularist/Islamist cleavages. The emergence of alternative ideals has led to the destabilization of traditional patriarchy, and, the instability of gendered relationship has disrupted the pre-established norms. Especially, neo-Muslim masculinities represented a shift in the field where Kemalist/secular masculinities have predominated. Moreover, strong nationalist emotions have always fed masculine themes and constructions of masculinities in parallel. Nationalist ideals in line with nationalist masculinities have always served to popularize and also reinforce ideas of bravery, duty, courage. The imperceptible calls to nationalist themes of masculinities were flourished in any ground necessitating solidarity of the nation and its *father*.

Hence, since political culture is a constitutive sphere for identity formation, the meanings, symbols and ideals spontaneously draw the boundaries for an analysis of the construction of Turkish political manhood. Having the main corners of Turkish political culture and the its traces within typologies of masculinities, Chapter 5 mentions that the political parties in Turkey – the AKP, the CHP and the MHP- reflect the historical gender order and reify their traditional stance in party programs and election manifests. Although the parties under concern represent different positions, they glorify family and, in parallel, confine women into private realm while situating men as protector. Therefore, it is argued that party programs and election manifests mirror the gendered nature of political parties.

In line with the main contours drawn by political culture and in parallel by being associated with a range of highly emotive masculine values, such as bravery, honour, pride and strength, it can be argued that the nature of politics is gendered in masculine. This self evident conceptualization was deconstructed with Bourdieu's

analytical methodological way, in other words, by adopting his notions into the analysis. As it discussed in Chapter 6, Bourdieu's theoretical schemata offered to capture the ways of dynamic positioning of the political parties, in general, the leaders, in particular. The leaders, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli, and their personal histories were analyzed with reference to their accumulation of capitals and habitus in line.

In this context, habitus was the main theoretical apparatus for this dissertation as it is the accumulation of dispositions. As a broad and inclusive term, habitus denotes to an individual's multidimensional social position. Individual's preferences position himself/herself. "Individuals use strategies to transform, allocate, and distribute their volume of capital among different forms, which, in turn, determine the boundaries of their agency – that is, the sphere of their active action and voluntarism- within the habitus and the field they are acting in." (Özbilgin and Tatlı, 2005: 864). Therefore, habitus, capital and field collaboratively effect individual's positioning and this is an unconscious accumulation process. The field in which the positions are taken is an arena of production, and, in the framework of this study, the relation between habitus and the field was critical for the writer.

For Bourdieu, the conditions of field structure habitus, and on the other hand, habitus is constitutive of the field (Bourdieu, 1992: 127). In a relational context, the governing characteristics of the field structure habitus. As field is the social setting that habitus operates, the field of politics adjusts habitus by defining power positions; hence, habitus is submitted to the rules of the field. On the other hand, in the field of politics different habitus could not reveal their diversity as the practices of political manhood have promoted a form of hegemonic masculinity that justifies dominant authority. In this line, if this is a dynamic relationship, the changing patterns are

supposed to be reflected in the functioning of the field. In addition, practice is the total outcome of habitus and accumulation of capitals in the field. However, the analysis of the leaders' personal histories expose that despite their different accumulation of capital, or in other words, being rightist, leftist, nationalist, Islamist, they experience the praxis of being men.

To sum up, in the Chapter 7 that analyzed the ways in which politics and also politician is gendered in Turkish politics, it is concluded that masculinist domination strategies were used as a rhetorical tool. Despite continuities and discontinuities in the field, the changing ways in which the political self is conceived of in terms of gender and, also, the gendered processes of interaction fostered through inculcating common values, ended up in the construction of manhood as dominant. The patriarchal arrangements have constituted deep structure of ma(i)nly political interactions.

Although for some readers, this topic of inquiry can be considered as monolithic on the basis of its discussions on *self evident* conceptualizations, the originality of this study lies behind its *way* of questioning. Bourdieu's analytical tools provided the writer not to be lost in the puzzle of questions and, also more significantly, taken for granted conceptualizations. Habitus, field and capital offered to capture the constantly changing nature of gendered relations and strategic positioning in politics.

In addition this study can also be taken as a fresh encounter for Bourdieuan analysis and Turkish politics. Bourdieuan dynamic perspective has opened the ways for understanding the hidden, self-evident conceptualizations about the embeddedness of masculinities and politics. Moreover, in the framework of "the congruent relation between habitus and field", in Turkish politics as a field different

habitus could not reveal their diversity. The different constructions of masculinities coalesce in the conduct of politics. Despite their different backgrounds and positioning, a similar form of masculinity has justified itself and political parties, in general, the leaders, in particular, have un/consciously reproduced this dominant authority. Therefore, Turkish politics and the discourses of political parties as a case pose a critical ground for the relation of habitus and field that illustrate the integrity of traditional roots in a non-Western society.

This study can also be considered as a valuable step for further studies in Turkey, especially, if one's aim to go beyond the limits of political culture, namely the dichotomies and antagonisms. As Kandiyoti aptly argues "(...) a moratorium should be declared on focusing on the binaries of religious vs. secular, western vs. non-western or global vs. local in favor of more rigorous institutional analysis that will give a better understanding of the politics of gender. This will require detailed attention to fluid networks of influence at the global, national and local levels and engagement with a multiplicity of actors, interests and practices." (Kandiyoti, 2011: 10). As the elements of political culture, its antagonisms and the whole networks of discourses, symbols, and ideals depict that deep rooted masculinities left no room for alternative masculinities.

Although Turkey is experiencing an engagement with new networks and actors, the continuous reference to old, deep-rooted dualisms left no suitable ground for the flourishing of new masculine identities. For instance, although gay movements are challenging traditional discourses, it is still discussed in the framework of the reasons behind the rise of gay identities as opposed to heterosexuality, not the discourses of homosexuality. Hence, this dissertation can be

considered as a step towards new areas of studies analyzing the multiple discourses of masculinities that challenge longstanding traditions.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adkins, Lisa, and Beverley, Skeggs (eds.) 2004. *Feminism after Bourdieu*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Ahmad, Feroz. 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Akdogan, Yalçın. 2003. *Muhafazakar Demokrasi*. Ankara : AK Parti Yayınları.
- Akyüz, Selin. 2005. "Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Erkek İmgesinin Kurgulanışı: Akbaba Dergisi Örneğinden Bir Karikatür İncelemesi." Unpublished Master's thesis. Ankara: Hacettepe University.
- Allan, Kenneth. 2011. *Contemporary Social and Sociological Theory: Visualizing Social Worlds*. California: Sage.
- Altan- Olcay, Özlem. 2009. "Gendered Projects of National Identity Formation: The Case of Turkey," *National Identities* 11(2): 165-186.
- Althusser, Louis. 1994. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation." In Slavoj Zizek, ed., *Mapping Ideology*. New York: Verso, 100-140.
- Altınay, Ayşegül. 2004. *The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender and Education in Turkey*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York.
- Altıparmak, Nil. 2010. "Questioning the Rhetorical Shift: The Republican People's Party (CHP) Under Leadership Transition from Deniz Baykal to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu." Unpublished Master's Thesis. London: London School of Economics.

- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and NY: Verso.
- Aras, Damla. 2010. "Turkey's Ambassadors vs. Erdoğan," *The Middle East Quarterly* 28(1): 47-57
- Arat, Yeşim. 1997. "The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity*. Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 95-112.
- , Yeşim. 2002. "Süleyman Demirel: National Will and Beyond" In Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds., *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 87-106.
- Arat, Zehra. 1999. *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Woman*. London: St. Martin's Press.
- , Zehra. 2008. "Political Parties Gender Discourse and Women's Rights: The Case of Turkey" Paper presented at 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, March 26-29.
- Ayan, Pelin. 2009. "Theorizing Authoritarian Party Structure: The Case of Turkey." Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Ankara: Bilkent University.
- Ayata, Ayşe Güneş. 1995. "Women's Political Participation in Politics in Turkey." In Şirin Tekeli, ed., *Women in Modern Turkish Society*. London: Zed Books, 235-249.
- , Ayşe Güneş. 2002. "The Republican People's Party." In Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds., *Political Parties in Turkey*. London: Frank Cass, 102-122.
- , Ayşe Güneş, and Sencer Ayata. 2007. "The Center Left Parties in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 8(2): 230-232.
- Barkey, Henri. 2000. "The Struggles of a Strong State." *Journal of International Affairs* 54(1): 87-105.

- Beckwith, Karen. 2005. "A Common Language of Gender?," *Politics and Gender* 1(1):128-137.
- Berkday, Fatmagül. 2003. *Tarihin Cinsiyeti* (Gender of the History). İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- , Fatmagül. 2004. "Doğu ile Batı'nın Birleştiği Yer: Kadın İmgesinin Kurgulanışı" (Where East and West Meets: The Construction of the Image of Woman). *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 3 Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 275-285.
- Bilgin, Elif. 2004. "An Analysis of Turkish Modernity Through Discourses of Masculinities." Unpublished PhD. thesis. Ankara: METU.
- Bora, Tanıl, and Ulaş Tol. 2009. "Siyasal Düşünce ve Erkek Dili" (Political Thinking and Language of the Masculine) *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 9 Donemler ve Zihniyetler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 825-836
- , Tanıl. 2011. "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey." In Ayşe Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman, eds., *Symbiotic Antagonism: Competing Nationalism in Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 57-81.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Richard Nice, trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- , Pierre. 1989. "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory* 7(1): 14-25.
- , Pierre. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Richard Nice, trans. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- , Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. John B. Thompson, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- , Pierre, Jean-Claude Chamboredon, and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1991. *The Craft of Sociology: Epistemological Preliminaries*. New York: Walter de Gruyter.

- , Pierre, and Louis Wacquant. 1992. *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- , Pierre. 2001. *Masculine Domination*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bozdoğan, Sibel, and Reşat Kasaba. 1997. "Introduction." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity*. Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 3-15.
- Burns, Nancy. 2005. "Finding Gender," *Politics and Gender* 1(1):137-141.
- Butler, Judith. 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge.
- , Judith. 1993. *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex*. London: Routledge.
- Carrigan, Tim and et al. 1985. "Toward A New Sociology of Masculinity" *Theory and Society* 14(5): 551-604.
- Carroll, Susan J., and Richard Logan Fox. 2010. *Gender and Elections*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Chodorow, Nancy. 1989. *Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie, and Norman Fairclough. 1999. *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Cindoğlu, Dilek and Şule Toktaş. 2006. "Modernization and Gender: A Study of Girls Technical Education in Turkey since 1927," *Women's History Review* 15(5): 737-749.
- , Dilek and et al. 2007. "An Action Research Report on the Rising Democracy Discourse in 2000's Turkey: Does Eros Contour the Demos?," *Women's Studies International Forum* 30(6): 465-473.

- Cizre, Ümit. 1993. *AP- Ordu İlişkileri* (Justice Party – Military Relations). İstanbul: İletişim.
- , Ümit. 1997. *Müktedirlerin Siyaseti: Merkez Sağ, Ordu, İslamcılık* (The Politics of the Competent: Centre Right, Military, Islam). İstanbul: İletişim.
- , Ümit. 2002. "From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party." In Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds., *Political Parties in Turkey*. London: Frank Cass, 82-101.
- , Ümit, and Erinç Yeldan. 2005. "The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises," *Review of International Political Economy* 12(3): 387-408.
- , Ümit (ed.) 2008. *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party*. London: Routledge.
- Cockburn, Cynthia. 2010. "Militarism and War." In Laura Shepherd, ed., *Gender Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relations*. London: Routledge, 105-115.
- Connell, Robert William. 1987. *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- , Robert William. 1994. "The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal." In Lorraine Radtke and Henderikus J. Stam, eds., *Power/Gender: Social Relations in Theory and Practice*. London: Sage, 136-173.
- , Robert William. 2002. "Studying Men and Masculinity," *Resources for Feminist Research* 29(1-2): 43-56.
- , Robert William. 2005. "Globalization, Imperialism and Masculinities." In Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and Robert William Connell, eds., *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*. California: Sage, 71-89.
- , Robert William. 2005. *Masculinities*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- Çarkoğlu, Ali, and Toprak, Binnaz (eds.) 2000. *Türkiye'de Din, Toplum, Siyaset* (Religion, Society, Politics in Turkey). İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.
- Coşar, Simten, and Aylin Özman. 2004. "Centre-right politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Elections: Neoliberalism with a Muslim Face," *Contemporary Politics* 10(1): 57-74.
- , Simten, and Metin Yeğenoğlu. 2011. "New Grounds for Patriarchy in Turkey? Gender Policy in the Age of AKP," *South European Society and Politics* 16(4): 555-573.
- Çınar, Alev, and Burak Arıkan. 2002. "The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalist?." In Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds., *Political Parties in Turkey*. London: Frank Cass, 25-40.
- , Alev. 2005. *Modernity, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places and Time*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Delaney, Carol. 1995. "Father State, Motherland and The Birth of Modern Turkey." In Suzuki Yanagisako and Carol Delaney, eds., *Naturalising Power: Essays In Feminist Cultural Analysis*. New York: Routledge,
- Dillabough, Jo-Anne. 2004. "Class, Culture and the 'predicaments of Masculine Domination': Encountering Pierre Bourdieu," *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 25(4): 489-506.
- Duben, Alan, and Cem Behar. 1991. *İstanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Durakbaşa, Ayşe. 1999. "Kemalism As Identity Politics in Turkey." In Zehra Arat, ed., *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Women*. USA: Palgrave, 139-156.
- Edley, Nigel, and Margaret Wetherell. 1995. *Men in Perspective: Practice, Power and Identity*. London: Prentice Hall.
- Elias, Juanita. 2007. "Introduction: Hegemonic Masculinities in International Politics," *Men and Masculinities* 10(4): 383-388.

- Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*. California: University of California Press.
- Fahey, Anna Cornelia. 2007. "French and the Feminine: Hegemonic Masculinity and the Emasculation of John Kerry in the 2004 Presidential Race," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 24(2): 132-150.
- Fairclough, Norma. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- , Norma. 2003. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. New York: Routledge.
- Flood, Michael. 2007. "Violence, Men as Victims of." In Michael Flood, Judith Kegan Gardiner, Bob Pease and Keith Pringle, eds., *The International Encyclopedia of Men and Masculinities*. New York: Routledge.
- Foucault, Michel. 1978. *The History of Sexuality*. New York: Random House.
- , Michel. 1982. "The Subject and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8(4): 777-795.
- , Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*. Colin Gordon, ed. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foyster, Elizabet. 1999. *Manhood in Early Modern England*. England: Longman Publishing Group.
- Fowler, Bridget (ed.) 2000. *Reading Bourdieu on Society and Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- , Bridget. 2003. "Reading Pierre Bourdieu's Masculine Domination: Notes towards an Intersectional Analysis of Gender, Culture and Class" *Cultural Studies* 33(3): 363-374.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1974. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

- Gerami, Shahin. 2005. "Islamist Masculinity and Muslim Masculinities." In Michael Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and Robert William Connell, eds., *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*. California:Sage, 448-457.
- Ghousoub, Mai, and Siclair-Webb, Emma (eds.) 2000. *Imagined Masculinities: Male Identity and Culture in the Modern Middle East*. London: Saqi Books.
- Göle, Nilüfer. 1997. "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity*. Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 81-95.
- , Nilüfer. 2004. "Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavram Üzerine" (Alternative Modernity: On the Concept). *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 3 Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Gürbilek, Nurdan. 2011. *The New Cultural Climate in Turkey: Living in a Shop Window*. London: Zed Books.
- Hanks, William. 2005. "Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34: 67-83.
- Hawkesworth, Mary. 2005. "Engendering Political Science: An Immodest Proposal," *Politics and Gender* 1(1):141-156.
- Hearn, Jeff. 1992. *Men in the Public Eye: The Construction and Deconstruction of Public Men and Public Patriarchies*. London: Routledge.
- , Jeff. 1996. Is Masculinity Dead? A Critic of the Concept of Masculinity/ Masculinities. In Mairtin Mac an Ghaill, ed., *Understanding Masculinities, Social Relations and Cultural Arenas*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 202-217.
- Heper, Metin. 1985. "The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative and Historical Perspective," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 27: 86 110.
- , Metin and Landau, Jacob M. (eds.) 1991. *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

- , Metin. 1992. "Extremely Strong State and Democracy: Turkey in Comparative and Historical Perspective." In Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah, ed., *Democracy and Modernity*. Leiden: E.J.Brill, 142-169.
- , Metin and Selçuk Sancar. 1998. Is Legal-Rational Bureaucracy a Pre-requisite for Rational Productive Bureaucracy?: The Case of Turkey. *Administration and Society* 80(2): 143-166.
- , Metin, Sayarı, Sabri (eds.) 2002. *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- , Metin, 2003. "The Victory of Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *Mediterranean Politics* 8(1): 127-134.
- , Metin and Şule Toktaş. 2003. "Islam, Democracy, and Modernity in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan," *Muslim World* 93(2): 157-185.
- , Metin. 2005. "The European Union and Turkish Military and Democracy," *South European Society and Politics* 10(1): 33-44.
- , Metin, and Başak Ince. 2006. "Devlet Bahçeli and 'Far Right' Politics in Turkey, 1999-2002," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42(6): 873-888.
- Hooper, Charlotte. 2001. *Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations and Gender Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Htun, Mala. 2005. "What It Means to Study Gender and the State," *Politics and Gender* 1(1):157-166.
- Jaggar, Alison, and Paula Rothenberg. 1993. *Feminist Frameworks: Alternative Theoretical Accounts of the Relations between Women and Men* (3rd ed.). USA: McGraw-Hill Book
- Jenkins, Gareth. 2008. *Political Islam in Turkey: Running West, Heading East?*. New York: Palgrave and Macmillan.

- Jenkins, Richard. 1992. *Pierre Bourdieu*. London: Routledge.
- Jorgensen, Marianne and Louise Phillips. 2002. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage.
- Kalaycıođlu, Ersin. 2008. "Attitudinal Orientation to Party Organizations in Turkey in the 2000s," *Turkish Studies* 9(2): 297-316.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1987. "Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case," *Feminist Studies* 13(2): 317-338.
- , Deniz. 1994. "The Paradoxes of Masculinity: Some Thoughts on Segregated Societies." In Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne, eds., *Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies*. London: Routledge, 197-213.
- , Deniz. 1996. *Gendering The Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- , Deniz. 1997. "Gendering the Modern: On Missing Dimensions in the Study of Turkish Modernity." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity*. Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 113-132.
- , Deniz. 2011. "Disentangling Religion and Politics Whither Gender Equality?," *IDS Bulletin* 42(1): 10-14.
- Kaplan, Sefa. 2007. *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Geleceđi Etkileyecek Siyasi Liderler* (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Political Leaders Who Will Influence the Future). İstanbul: Dođan Kitapçılık.
- Karakayalı, Nedim. 2004. "Reading Bourdieu with Adorno: The Limits of Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology," *Sociology* 38(2): 351-368.
- Kentel, Ferhat, Meltem Ahıska, and Fırat Genç. 2007. *Milletin Bölünmez Bütünlüğü* (Indivisible Integrity of the Nation). İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.

- Keyder, Çağlar. 1997. "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity*. Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 37-52.
- Keyman, Fuat. 2006. "Turkey between Europe and Asia." In Gerard Delanty, ed., *Europe and Asia Beyond East and West*. Routledge: Oxon, 203-214.
- Keyman, Fuat. 2011. "Nationalism in Turkey: Modernity, State and Identity." In Ayşe Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman, eds., *Symbiotic Antagonism: Competing Nationalism in Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 10-32.
- Kimmel, Michael. 1993. "Invisible Masculinity," *Society* 30(6): 28-35.
- , Michael, and Amy Aronson. 2003. *Men and Masculinities: A Social, Cultural and Historical Encyclopedia*. California: ABC-Clio Press.
- , Michael. 2005. "Globalization and Its Mal(e)contents: The Gendered Moral and Political Economy of Terrorism." In Michael Kimmel, Jeff Hearn, Robert William Connell, eds., *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*. California: Sage, 414-431.
- , Michael, Jeff Hearn, and Robert William Connell. 2005. *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*. USA: Sage Publications.
- Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, Berrin. 2011. On the Question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey: Sources and Discourses. In Ayşe Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman, eds., *Symbiotic Antagonism: Competing Nationalism in Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 133-161.
- Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Kundakçı, Fatma Seda. 2007. "İktidar, Ataerkillik ve Erkeklik: Ankara Örneğinde Erkek Akademisyenler Üzerine Bir Çalışma" (Power, Patriarchy and Masculinity: A Study on Male Academicians in the Case of Ankara) Unpublished Master's Thesis. Ankara: Hacettepe University.

- Mardin, Şerif. 1983. "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey" In J. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Processes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- , Şerif. 1997. "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science." In Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity*. Washington D.C.: University of Washington Press, 64-81.
- , Şerif. 2011. Turkish Nationalism: From a System of Classification to a System Of Solidarity. In Ayşe Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman, eds., *Symbiotic Antagonism: Competing Nationalism in Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Mayar, Tamar. 2000. "From Zero To Hero: Masculinity in Jewish Nationalism" In Tamar Mayar ed., *Gender Ironies of the Nation*. New York: Routledge, 283-308.
- Mostov, Julie. 2000. "Sexing the Nation/Desexing the Body: Politics of National Identity in the Former Yugoslavia" " In Tamar Mayar ed., *Gender Ironies of the Nation*. New York: Routledge, 89-112.
- McCormack, Matthew (ed.) 2007. *Public Men: Political Masculinities in Modern Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McNay, Lois. 1999. "Gender, Habitus and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and Limits of Reflexivity," *Theory, Culture and Society* 16(1): 95-117.
- Michels, Robert. 1962. *Political Parties*. London: The Free Press.
- Mottier, Véronique. 2002. "Masculine Domination: Gender and Power in Bourdieu's Writings," *Feminist Theory* 3(3): 345-349.
- Nagel, Joane. 2005. "Nation." In Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and Robert William Connell, eds., *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*. California:Sage, 397-413.
- Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2002. *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey*. Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press.

- Noris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2002. "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis," *Comparative Sociology* 3(4): 235-263.
- Nye, Robert. 1993. *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Onar, Nora. 2007. "Freedom of Religion vs. Secularism? Universal Rights, Turkish Islamism, and the Headscarf." Ramses Working Paper 8(07). Oxford: University of Oxford.
- Onur, Hilal, and Berrin Koyuncu. 2004. "Hegemonik Erkekliğin Görünmeyen Yüzü: Sosyalizasyon Sürecinde Erkeklik Oluşumları ve Krizleri Üzerine Düşünceler," (Invisible Face of the Hegemonic Masculinity: Thoughts on Crises and Constructions of Masculinities During Socialization Process). *Toplum ve Bilim*. 101: 31-49.
- Ouzgane, Lahoucine. (ed.) 2003. *Islamic Masculinities*. London: Zed Books.
- Özbilgin, Mustafa and Ahu Tatlı. 2005. "Book Review Essay: Understanding Bourdieu's Contribution to Organization and Management Studies," *The Academy of Management Review* 30(4): 855-869.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 1976. *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Özbudun, Ergun. 2000. "Parties and Party System." In Ergun Özbudun, ed., *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 73-103.
- Özdalga, Elisabeth. 2012. "Secularism." In, Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds., "The Routledge Handbook of Modern Turkey." London and New York: Routledge, in press.
- Özkırımlı, Umut. 2011. The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey: Actors, Discourses, and the Struggle for Hegemony. In Ayşe Kadioğlu and E. Fuat Keyman, eds., *Symbiotic Antagonism: Competing Nationalism in Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 82-102.

- Özyürek, Esra. 2006. *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Pirim, Oktay. 2007. *Deniz Baykal: Geleceği Etkileyecek Siyasi Liderler* (Deniz Baykal: Political Leaders Who Will Influence the Future). İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık.
- Reinharz, Shulamit. 1992. *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Rittersberger-Kılıç, Helga, and Sibel Kalaycıoğlu. 1998. "Nation State and the Individual: Alternative Strategies of Consent from Below," *Asian and African Studies* 7:69-79.
- Roberson, James, and Suzuki, Nobue (eds.) 2002. *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa*. New York: Routledge.
- Roper, Michael, and John Tosh. 1991. "Introduction: Historians and the Politics of Masculinity." In Michael Roper and John Tosh, eds., *Manful Assertions: Masculinities in Britain Since 1800*. London: Routledge, 1-25.
- Rubin, Barry, and Heper, Metin (eds.) 2002. *Political parties in Turkey*. London: Frank Cass.
- Said, Edward. 1997. *Covering Islam*. New York: Random House.
- Saktanber, Ayşe. 2002. *Living Islam: Women, Religion and the Politicization of Culture in Turkey*. London: I. B. Tauris.
- Sancar, Serpil. 2009. *Erkeklik: İmkansız İktidar* (Masculinity: Impossible Power). İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Saraçgil, Ayşe. 2005. *Bukalemun Erkek* (Chamaeleon Man). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Sayarı, Sabri. 2002. "The Changing Party System." In Sayarı, Sabri, ed., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*. London: Lynne Rienner.

- Segal, Lynne. 1990. *Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men*. London: Virago Press.
- Seidler, Victor. 1994. *Unreasonable Men: Masculinity and Social Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Seidler, Victor. 1997. *Man Enough: Embodying Masculinities*. London: Sage.
- Selek, Pınar. 2008. *Sürüne Sürüne Erkek Olmak*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Sinclair-Webb, Emma. 2000. "Our Bülent is Now A Commando." In Mai Ghousoub and Emma Sinclair-Webb, eds., *Imagined Masculinities: Male Identity and Culture in the Modern Middle East*. London: Saqi Books, 65-92.
- Swartz, David. 1997. *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thompson, Elizabeth. 2003. "Public and Private in Middle Eastern Women's History," *Journal of Women's History* 15(1): 52-69.
- Turan, İlter. 2006. "Old Soldiers Never Die: The Republican People's Party of Turkey," *South European Society and Politics*. 11(3/4): 559-578.
- Vickers, Jill. 1994. Notes Toward a Political Theory of Sex and Power. In Lorraine Radtke and Henderikus J. Stam, eds., *Power/Gender: Social Relations in Theory and Practice*. London: Sage.
- Walsh, Eileen. 2009. "Representations of Race and Gender in Mainstream Media Coverage of the 2008 Democratic Primary," *Journal of African American Studies* 13:121-130.
- Ware, Alan. 2003. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Weedon, Chris. 1987. *Feminist Practice and Post Structuralist Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

West, Candace, and Don H. Zimmerman. 1987. "Doing Gender," *Gender and Society* 1(2): 125-151.

White, Marilyn Domas, and Emily Marsh. 2006. "Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology," *Library Trends* 55(1): 22-45.

Whitehead, Stephen, and Barret, Frank J. (eds.) 2001. *The Masculinities Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers

Yavuz, Hakan M. 2009. *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yanagisako, Sylvia, and Delaney, Carol (eds.) 1994. *Naturalizing Power: Essays in Feminist Cultural Analysis*. New York: Routledge.

Yıldız, Ahmet. 2003. "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook," *The Muslim World* 93(2): 187- 209.

Yuval-Davis, Nira., 1997. *Gender and Nation*. London: Sage Publications.

For Political Parties

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, *Parti Programı*. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from <http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi>.

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *Parti Programı*. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=70

Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, *Parti Programı*. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from http://www.mhp.org.tr/mhp_parti_programi.php

AKP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/akp2002-1.html>

AKP 2007 Seçim Bildirgesi. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from http://www.yayed.org.tr/resimler/ekler/718499c1c8ce67_ek.doc

CHP 2002 Seçim Bildirgesi. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/bildirge/chp2002-1.html>

- CHP 2007 Seçim Bildirgesi. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=74
- MHP 2002 Seçim Beyannameesi. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from http://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/beyanname/mhp/mhp_beyannameesi.html
- MHP 2007 Seçim Beyannameesi. Retrieved December 17, 2009 from http://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/beyanname/mhp/mhp_beyannameesi.html