

**ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES**

Journal of the Department of Asian and African Studies  
University of Ljubljana – Faculty of Arts

**100 Years of Modern China: Social, Political  
and Cultural Changes**

Volume XVI, Issue 2  
Ljubljana, August 2012

ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES, Volume XVI, Issue 2, Ljubljana, August 2012

Editor-in-chief: Jana S. Rošker

Editors of the issue: Jana S. Rošker, Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik

Managing editor: Nataša Visočnik

Layout editor: Nataša Visočnik

Copy editor: Chikako Shigemori Bučar

Editorial Board: Andrej Bekeš, Jana S. Rošker, Chikako Shigemori Bučar, Andrej Ule, Mitja Saje, Maja Lavrač, Lin Mingchang, Wang Zouli, Ivana Buljan, Marina Kravtsova, Wolfgang Zeidl, Takemoto Takahashi, Yuriko Sunakawa, Wang Yi, Raul David Findeisen, Gou Chengyi, Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik, Tamara Ditrich, Nikolai Jeffs, Nataša Hrastnik, Nataša Visočnik, Luka Culiberg, Maja Veselič

All articles are peer-reviewed.

© University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, 2012.

All rights reserved.

Published by: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani/Ljubljana University Press, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana

For: Oddelek za azijske in afriške študije/Department of Asian and African Studies

For the publisher: Andrej Černe, Dean of Faculty of Arts

Ljubljana, 2012, First edition

Number printed: 200 copies

Graphic Design: Mare Kovačič

Printed by: Birografika Bori, d. o. o.

Price: 7,00 EUR

ISSN 1408-5429

This publication is indexed in the Cobiss database.

This journal is published three times per year.

Yearly subscription: 18 EUR,

(Account No.: 50100-603-40227)

Ref. No.: 001-033 ref. »Za revijo«

Address: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za azijske in afriške študije, Aškerčeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenija

tel.: +386 (0)1 24 11 450, +386 (0)24 11 444

faks: +386 (0)1 42 59 337

This journal is published with the support of the Slovene Book Agency (JAK).

CIP - Kataložni zapis o publikaciji  
Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica, Ljubljana

308(510)(082)  
821.581.09(082)

HUNDRED

100 years of modern China : social, political and cultural changes  
/ [editors of the issue Jana S. Rošker, Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik].  
- 1st ed. - Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete =  
Faculty of Arts, 2012. - (Asian and African Studies, ISSN 1408-  
5429 ; vol. 16, issue 2)

ISBN 978-961-237-519-5  
1. Gl. stv. nasl.  
262802432

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### *Dialogues with the West in Modern Literature*

Anna Simona MARGARITO

**Reflections of the West in Gu Cheng's Life and Poems**.....3-19

Giusi TAMBURELLO

**Baudelaire's Influence on Duo Duo's Poetry through Chen Jingrong,  
a Chinese Woman Poet Translating from French** .....21-46

Silvia CANUTI

**Christian Faith in Bing Xin's Early Life: Tradition and Western Values  
in the Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century China**.....47-64

### *Politics Reflected in the New Media*

Saša ISTENIČ

**The Role of the Media in Democratic Consolidation of Taiwan  
and Slovenia**.....67-77

Ming Hui YUAN

另類文化帝國主義:台灣女性流行雜誌視覺權力與現代衝突性—以國際  
中文版《VOGUE》為例

**Toward an Another Cultural Imperialism: The Visual Power and  
the Modern Conflicts on Taiwan's Female Magazine VOGUE** .....79-95

### *Cultural Transformations*

Ming-Te TU

禮的「俗化」與「宗教化」--以現代中國的婚禮與喪禮為例 台灣  
高雄師範大學 杜明德

**"Secularization" and "Religion" of Ceremony—Modern Chinese  
Wedding and Funeral** .....99-108

Guangqiu XU

**Chinese Anti-Western Nationalism, 2000-2010**.....109-134



# **Dialogues with the West in Modern Literature**



UDK: 821.581

COPYRIGHT@ ANNA SIMONA MARGARITO

## Reflections of the West in Gu Cheng's Life and Poems

Anna Simona MARGARITO\*

### Abstract

Gu Cheng (1957–1993), a prominent member of the “Misty Poets”, lived the last part of his life in the West as he was exiled in 1989. So he stayed abroad separated from his country and people and unable to cope with the western world. Western influences can be seen even in his early production (where we can see similarities with the works of J.H. Fabre) as well as in his last cycle of poems *Cheng (City)*, in which we can find the influence of T.S. Eliot.

**Keywords:** Misty poetry, Chinese modernism, nature, exile, annihilation

### Izvleček

Gu Cheng (1957–1993), znameniti član »Meglenih pesnikov«, je zadnji del svojega življenja – od leta 1989 naprej – preživel v eksilu na Zahodu. V tujini je bil ločen od svoje domovine in sonarodnjakov, po drugi strani pa ni bil sposoben shajati z zahodnim svetom. Zahodni vplivi pa so vidni že v njegovem zgodnjem opusu, v katerem lahko zaznamo podobnost z deli J.H. Fabreja, in tudi v zadnjem ciklusu njegovih pesmi z naslovom *Cheng (Mesto)*, v katerem je najti vpliv T.S. Eliota.

**Ključne besede:** Meglena poezija, kitajski modernizem, narava, eksil, izničenje

## 1 Introduction

In this essay I want to move between text analysis and biographical background to see how western influences can be traced back in Gu Cheng's poetry since his earliest production. So I discuss here those that I consider as the main references in

---

\* Anna Simona Margarito, PhD student, Università del Salento, Lecce, Italy. E-mail address: annasimona.margarito@tin.it

his early poetry and in the latest cycle. Namely they are: the French entomologist Jean Henri Fabre, for the first part of Gu Cheng's life and production, and the modernist writer T. S. Eliot in his latest cycle of poems called *Cheng 城 (City)*.

## 2 His Early Life and Production: the Influence of J. H. Fabre

Gu Cheng 顾城 is one of those authors whose life was deeply entangled with historical events. This is the reason why I consider as necessary, first, to sum up few main events of his biography, in order to better understand the profound meaning and high value of his poetry and the evident changes we can see in it.

Gu Cheng lived and worked between 1956 and 1993. Born in Beijing on September 24<sup>th</sup> 1956, his father, Gu Gong 顾工, was a well known journalist, intellectual and an editor of *Jiefangjun Bao* 解放军报 (*Journal of the People's Liberation Army*); his mother was an intellectual and scriptwriter. The family lived in Beijing 北京, in the Bei Hai 北海 district where the poet attended school but only for three years, that is, from 1963 to 1966, when the Cultural Revolution broke up and schools were closed (Li Xia 1999, 405).

He was a prodigy child, and as recorded in his anthology, he began writing poetry when he was 6 (as his earliest poem dates back to 1964<sup>1</sup>).

He belonged to an unfortunate generation of Chinese people born in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This generation was labelled by scholars as “unfortunate” because of the many traumatic events which characterized the period in which they lived starting from the Great Famine which affected China from 1959–61, followed by the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76. This generation also went through the end of the Maoist Period, towards the advent of Deng's Socialist Modernization (and made a first hand experience of the problems it involved) and last but not least witnessed the struggle for democracy and Tian'anmen Square (Massacre) in 1989.

In an interview in December 1992, answering the question: “Which were the books that influenced you initially?” Gu Cheng replied: “those of the French entomologist Fabre” (Li Xia 1999, 335). Henry Fabre was given the Nobel Prize in

---

<sup>1</sup> Some scholars suggested the hagiographic construction of the life of the poet as well as his life by his family. We can just mention this theory, because it is not something that we want to discuss here, as it is not relevant for this topic.

1910 for his study on insects. In many different occasions Gu Cheng stated that this book had an enduring influence on him throughout his life.

Just like Gu Cheng, who had to study almost as an autodidact because of the Cultural Revolution, Fabre had been largely an autodidact because of the poverty of his family.

Fabre used to work as a teacher in order to earn his living, and in my opinion, I think this job influenced his prose. While reading his pages, we can guess that he was quite skilled at communicating and knew how to keep the attention of the reader/listener. He knew how to create interest in a subject which was definitely not familiar nor easy. As a matter of fact, he was the first scientist to observe the habits of insects. As many critics underlined, he described the life of these little creatures as if he were writing a biography or a novel. The language he used is so colloquial and down to earth that it catches the reader's attention for its simplicity, never turning into triviality. His prose is colourful, sparkling with wit. This unusual language, (which combines a scientific subject with a literary style) later influenced authors like Proust and Hugo who called him the "Homer of insects" ("Living World" 2011).

It is not difficult to realize that such a language sounded very different from the language customarily used in scientific studies. When observing and then describing these little creatures in their natural environment, Fabre expressed his emotions, those of an admiring observer, of an enchanted child, more than those of a scientist. To me his accounts seem very similar to Phaedrus's fairy tales. I think so because Phaedrus describes insects' habits and acts as a little wonderful adventurer. This little world of wonders, so fascinating for Fabre's readers, is real and true and above all, natural ("Living World" 2011).

When the Red Guards went away after confiscating all the books in Gu Cheng's house, the young poet found by chance under an old newspaper, a copy of the *Souvernirs Entomologiques*. So Fabre turned him into a "passionate lover of insects" (Crippen 2005, 152). Besides this book, throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution, Gu Cheng had at his disposal also the *Cihai Dictionary* 辞海 and other few books. At this time of his life, the young poet had already begun writing poems. As I mentioned before, his first poems date back to 1964. The prodigy child used to dictate his lines to his sister as he did not know how to write at that time (Crippen 2005, 150), or to recite them to his father (Li Xia 1999, 231–2). His poems were "stories about pine-cones and rain drops; dialogues between

clouds and the earth; intimate chats of a ladybird with an ant” (Li Xia 1999, 231).  
Just to make a couple of examples, we can read:

**杨树<sup>2</sup>**

我失去了一只臂膀,  
就睁开了一只眼睛. (Gu Gong 1995, 7)

**Poplar**

Losing an arm,  
I open wide an eye. (Allen 2005, 1)<sup>3</sup>

**星月的来由**

树枝想去撕裂天空,  
但却只戳了几个微小的窟窿,  
它透出了天外的光亮,  
人们把它叫作月亮和星星. (Gu Gong 1995, 7)

**The Origins of the Moon and Stars**

Branches of trees try to shred the sky  
but succeed only in poking so many tiny holes,  
through which pierce lights from beyond the sky  
that people simply name Moon and Stars. (Poem by Gu Cheng)

In this early production, just like in Fabre, the language Gu Cheng uses is close to everyday language, basic, simple, linear for as much as the language of a child can be. But the influence of Fabre can be seen in the same attitude towards the world

---

<sup>2</sup> For all the poems quoted here, if not further specified, the original text is taken from: Gu Gong 顾工, *Gu Cheng shi quanbian 顾城诗全编 (Selected Poems of Gu Cheng)*, 1995.

<sup>3</sup> All the English translations of the poems and their English titles used in this paper, if not further specified, are taken from: Joseph R. Allen, *Sea of Dreams, the Selected Writings of Gu Cheng*, 2005.

he wants to depict in his poems. He looks around in the only way he knows, that is, like Fabre taught him to do. In these early poems he demonstrates the precise attention of the scientist mingled with the language and the vivid imagination of a poet. A keen observer of the surrounding reality, Gu reveals this world to the reader with a touch of wit and fantasy which is not constrained by the chains of maturity. Personally, I compare the Gu Cheng of these early poems to *Prometheus*, the titan who made the gift of knowledge, of all the human abilities and science to humanity. Just like Prometheus, he gives the reader an access to a new world made of poetry in reality which was present in nature but hidden to common people, as the poet is the only one who can clearly and best see this natural world through the lenses of his imagination. The universe depicted in these early poems is a universe seen through the eyes of a child who is discovering it little by little, piece by piece, and who is trying to understand this world and its rules using his intellect and his limited knowledge. In *The Origin of the Moon and the Stars* Gu Cheng is doing research. He is making his own personal hypothesis on how the moon and the stars came to be, like a scientist does. Obviously his hypotheses have no scientific value, though personally, I find it very interesting, and I find the words he uses as enchanting.

According to Gu Cheng's personal cosmogony, one day the tree branches, as if they were willing living creatures, decided to go and tear the sky maybe because they were curious to know what was hidden behind it. But unfortunately, they could only create little holes on it through which the light from behind the curtain of the sky fell. These little holes actually are what men now call "moon and stars". The language Gu Cheng uses here is so vivid that the reader has the impression of watching a movie instead of reading a poem. And I think it would be much easier to turn this poem into a short film than to translate it into any other language.

The poet acts like a new Doctor Frankenstein, as if he could imbue these little things with a new life, as if the little simple things of a human landscape or the ordinary natural phenomena got, through the lens of Gu Cheng's imagination, a different meaning and value, a new and more sparkling life. We can read the poem *Poplar*, just to make an example. In this short poem the natural phenomenon described is simple and quite common: a poplar tree, probably seen by the side of a road or in a public garden, loses a branch. This is an event that happens under our eyes if not regularly but normally and usually we do not even notice it. Let's see what happens through the eyes of the poet/explorer:

Losing an arm,

I open wide an eye. (Allen 2005, 1)

The poplar becomes a new living creature, its rebirth makes it act as a human or even as the insects described by Fabre. The poplar comes to life and suddenly develops arms, eyes, a body. In its green foliage, which becomes its face, a dark hole turns into an eye, and the miracle of life happens in two lines.

But the difference between Fabre, the entomologist and scientist, and Gu Cheng, the poet, lies in the fact that, as Tang Xiaodu observes (Li Xia 1999, 37), “When he regarded as heavenly enlightenment the glistening raindrops hanging from a pine cone, [...] he obviously seriously underestimated the organic nature of the scene before his eyes”.

In the poem by the title 美 *Mei* (*Beauty*) in 1969, Gu Cheng writes: 我所渴望的美, /是永恒与生命; (···) 生命的美, 千变万化, /却终为灰烬。 (Gu Gong 1995, 11) “The beauty I thirst for, is perpetual if compared to life; [...] the beauty of life, is constantly changing, /but in the end it becomes ashes”.<sup>4</sup>

Gu Cheng longs for beauty and perfection in life. In his poetry, at the beginning of his life, he looks for this perfection and finds it in nature. But later comes the discovery that real life and above all humans and society are not perfect, nor eternal. And this beauty would turn into ashes and dust.

The Cultural Revolution moved Gu Cheng to the real countryside to face nature which turns out to be completely different from the one depicted by Fabre. In 1969, when the poet was twelve, when his father and his family were sent by the government to raise pigs on the shores of Bo Hai, Gu Cheng says:

“With so many dear little companions, I gave up the city for the countryside”. [...] Our first night in the countryside was miserable: things scattered in the courtyard, on the road; the whole family stretched out on a mud-brick bed; everything completely still, black. It seemed like the world would never come back into being. We started learning to consider the earliest world invented by humanity—water, fire, light...

Goodbye J.H. Fabre. (Crippen 2005, 153)

His little wonderful world was deemed to crash under reality from the very beginning.

---

<sup>4</sup> The translation of these lines is mine.

And as if he was aware of this in 1969 just before leaving Beijing, Gu Cheng writes: “I am dreaming./ My dreams are shattering./ Dreams always forgive their destruction,/ but destruction never lets go of dreams.” And he adds “Sometimes a poem needs to be a little smarter than its writer.” (Crippen 2005, 153)

### 3 Maturity, Disillusionment and T.S. Eliot

In 1974 the family was allowed to return to Beijing, where the young Gu began to perform menial jobs and to publish the poems written during his exile.

In 1983 he married Xie Ye 谢烨 (Li Xia 1999, 254). In 1987, when he had already become an established poet, he was permitted to leave China for Europe and participated in readings in Bonn, Vienna, Paris, London, Oxford, Copenhagen, and many other places. From 1988 to 1989 he moved to Auckland and lived on Waiheke Island with his wife Xie Ye and their son Mu'er 木耳. But “Gu Cheng had fallen in love in Beijing with a girl by the name of Li Ying 李英” (Li Xia 1999, 252). In 1990 Li Ying, (whose nickname is Ying'er 英儿) went to live with the poet and his wife. From 1992 to 1993 the poet and Xie Ye stayed abroad again, more specifically they moved to Germany as Gu had a job there. In Berlin, Gu Cheng began to miss Ying'er. Xie Ye searched for her but Ying'er had eloped with another man. In September 1993 they returned to Waiheke.

In 1992, when Gu Cheng was in Germany, but probably already in 1991 (Li Xia 1999, 24), he worked on his last cycle of poems by the title *Cheng*. One of the main themes is the loss of his lover Ying'er, the others are, according to the poet, Beijing Lost and the events of June 4<sup>th</sup> 1989 (Li Xia 1999, 23).

Here, through this brief analysis of the last poems, I want to see how western literature influenced even the very last part of Gu Cheng's production.

Gu Gong, his father, states that the modernist features in Gu Cheng's poetry are the same response to a quite similar social and historical environment created in Europe after the two World Wars, and in China after ten years of destruction and war (Li Xia 1999, 58). So, according to Gu Gong, these similar conditions created a sort of common mood shared by the modernists in the West and the “searching generation” in China (Li Xia 1999, 58). This situation produced more or less, but originally in both cases, the same reactions. Gu Gong also states that

his son never read anything of Symbolism, Futurism, Expressionism, stream of consciousness, etc.

Actually, there are many assumptions of the hagiographic construction of the life of the poet by his family but I will not go further in this issue, as it is not the main point of this paper. My personal opinion is that, as certainly happened, Gu Cheng grew up in what his father effectively describes as a “cultural desert” and an “aesthetic wasteland” (Li Xia 1999, 58), but it is also reasonable to think that if not after the Cultural Revolution when the western culture flooded China, at least when living in the West, Gu Cheng read western authors in translation, and I think that the reflection of them and of their works can be seen even through the peculiarity and originality of his poems. To support this statement, here I briefly analyse his last poems, that is, the cycle *Cheng* written between 1992 and 1993. Because this work, in my opinion, shows many similarities with the poem *The Waste Land* by T.S. Eliot. We can also say that Eliot “arrived” in China in the 20s of the last century, and we can also mention that already in 1937 a translation of *The Waste Land* was published by Zhao Luorui 赵萝蕤.

*Cheng* is made up of 52 poems of different length and structure and was left unfinished. Through the power of his strong imagination, Gu Cheng is able to walk around Beijing even though he was living on another continent, to see things and places which did not exist anymore; he is able to “refurbish” or “rebuild” the gates pulled down, the bricks, the walls, the trees, in a moment, like a god with the power of his poetry and of his enchanting words. The city in which we follow him, reading these 52 poems, is not a pleasant place, the reader perceives a deep sense of uneasiness that is also suggested by the recurrent idea of death.

The first similarities between *The Waste Land* and the *Cheng* can be found on the first structural level of analysis. *The Waste Land* is a long poem divided into five sections of different length and structure (*Death by Water* is composed of 10 lines, while *The Fire Sermon* is made up of 138 lines), and the cycle *Cheng*, is made up of poems of different length and so that we can also consider it as a whole long poem. The shortest poem is 府右街 *Fu You Jie* which is composed of one single line and the longest is 甘家口 *Gan Jia Kou* with a total of 37 lines. Both *Cheng* and *The Waste Land* are characterized by division, by fragmentation. They have no apparent coherence, seemingly there is no unity. What strikes and disorientates the reader in both cases is this lack of a solid and precise structure, as

a reflection of the situations the poets see in the world these two works represent (Marinoni and Salmoiraghi 1992, 1008).

But there is, in fact, an underlying unity in these works. We perceive it when we find a number of recurring images scattered here and there in the poems, these are “little pieces”, “little bricks” which are words repeatedly used by the authors as to create a sort of a broken path that leads the reader towards the end of the works.

The images which are used and repeated are surprisingly similar in Eliot and in Gu Cheng, namely they are: water, a river, canals, a garden, the sea, money, the cold, snow, bricks and stones, and towers.

There are also other images, not recurrent but which are curiously present both in *The Waste Land* and in *Cheng*. I would like to mention these in brief: the game of chess, the act of fishing, furniture, a mirror, chairs, clothes, snow, ice and cold, a dog, silver and gold, money, someone who died, a suitcase, a woman’s hair, a bridge (London Bridge for Eliot and Marco Polo Bridge for Gu Cheng), boats, stones, temples, frost, nails, marble, stones, towers, winding roads, and grass.

I want also to highlight the fact that Eliot in *The Waste Land* quotes a children’s song: “London Bridge is falling down” and in Gu there are often linguistic references to the songs of the Cultural Revolution through the political diction used in the Maoist era (Li Xia 1999, 32), like in the poem:

人儿

到阳光里去

海有条尾巴

我们要学的事情挺多 (Gu Gong 1995, 861)

### **Little People**

Off to the sunshine

the sea has a tail

We still have so much to learn (Li Xia 1999, 32)

We can also hear the echo of the songs of the Maoist period even in *Baitashi* 白塔寺 (*White Pagoda Temple*) with “the Red Flag Ballad” (Allen 2005, 168).

*The Game of Chess* is the title of one of the section of *The Waste Land* in which Eliot deals with love. What Eliot depicts here is not true love but rather passion, lust (Sullivan 1973, 38). In *The Fire Sermon* we meet “the lowest of the dead”, two lovers acting mechanical actions. In Eliot (Eliot 1976, 251–2), even making love is reduced to something automatic not even pleasant if the woman thinks with a “half-formed thought” (Eliot 1976, 76), “well now that’s done: and I’m glad it’s over” (Eliot 1976, 76). True love is not possible in this land, even feelings are empty, arid, wasted, so that love turns out to be only sex and lust.

The theme of love is present also in *Cheng* through its absence, because, as I have said, the loss of his lover, Li Ying, is one of the three main themes of the cycle. The pronoun “you” in the poems refers to her (Li Xia 1999, 23). What I noticed first when reading the poems is the presence of sexual elements, or elements that are used in the Chinese literary tradition with sexual references like 花 *hua* (“flowers”) which also means “wounds”, the word 园 *yuan* (“garden”) and the image of 水 *shui* (“water”).

Gu Cheng, as Li Xia notices (Li Xia 1999, 61–75), lived on Waiheke Island in isolation. He was isolated in a foreign culture he was not interested in, and he was linguistically isolated because, despite his long residence abroad, he had always refused to learn another language because he was afraid of losing his Chinese identity, his Self. To this identity he was retained even by the presence of the two women. In his life and at home he wanted to recreate a kingdom of daughters, like the one presented in the novel *A Dream of Red Mansion*, and the lover’s elopement with another man caused the destruction of his dream world. According to Li Xia, this demonstrates how important the old China was to him and that he was incapable to leave it behind. It also tells us that his new life in the West was deemed to failure probably because of his incapability to combine his past world with his new present life. What struck Gu Cheng the most of Waiheke was its pristine nature, contrasting with cities characterized by material progress, including Berlin, where he was bored, homesick and longed for the nature of Waiheke (Li Xia 1999, 61–75).

*The Waste Land* apparently has no specific plot, if not for the five episodes (Marinoni and Salmoiraghi 1992, 1008). Even in *Cheng* there is no coherent plot, the only thing that most of the poems have in common is “the city”, Beijing. As there is no plot there is not even a coherent development in the actions or places described. The length of the poems is different. For example, 府右街 *Fu you jie* is

made up of one single line of 20 characters, though it is not the shortest poem, and the longest one is 甘家口 *Ganjiakou* with a total of 37 lines. We can make the same consideration for Eliot as the length of the five sections is quite variable and ranges from 10 lines of *Death by Water* to 138 lines of *The Fire Sermon*.

For Eliot as for Gu Cheng the length of the verses is not defined and fixed. As for the themes dealt in both of the works, there are also similarities.

Eliot wrote *The Waste Land* in 1922 and it belongs to the early stage of his production. The main themes dealt are: a strong link with the past and the sterility of modern life (Marinoni and Salmoiraghi 1992, 1008).

In the short prose he used as a preface to the cycle *Cheng*, he says: “In my dreams I often go back to Beijing, but it has nothing to do with the Beijing of today. It is a place that is heaven-sent just for me” (Allen 2005, 151). When Gu Cheng returned to Beijing from the countryside in 1974, he realized that his city had changed. Just to make an example, Taiping Lake (to which one of the poems is entitled and where the poet used to go when he skipped lessons), did not exist anymore because too many people had committed suicide there and it had been filled, and turned into a high hill (Li Xia 1999, 25). His city had changed because history and progress had turned it into something strange, something frightening, something destroyed and fragmented, and we can understand how meaningless and how “unbearable” it had become for the poet when we read his works.

Tang Xiaodu 唐晓渡 (Li Xia 1999, 41) remembers that in an interview in 1984 Gu Cheng stated that in his poetry “the city would disappear and what would appear in the end would be a tract of grazing land” (Li Xia 1999, 41). Still Tang Xiaodu records that, in his language, Gu Cheng opposes the “city” to the “grazing land”.

“The city” means narrow, confined spaces, mapped out roads, polluted air and souls wrapped in fashion garments; not only that, what is more important is that it symbolises the rule of machine power that is universal and omnipresent in the real world. This power has turned people into “cogs and screws”, numbers and passwords on both existential and cultural levels. For Gu Cheng, the “city” seemed to symbolise, in a concentrated manner, all the follies and evils of industrial civilisation. [...] The “grazing land” is the opposite. (Li Xia 1999, 41–2)

Still Tang Xiaodu writes that “he said ‘I’m not used to the city, I’m used to the countryside... where I was forged into shape’”. (Li Xia 1999, 42)

Nature has always been considered by the poet as an escape, as a refuge from a capitalistic society, but the natural elements present in the cycle are not idyllic at all. We can read the following poem, also included in the cycle *Cheng*, as an example:

十七

老虎身上过花厅 煤田里边打黄蜂  
猴啊猴啊打黄蜂  
煤田里边过花厅  
老虎身上打黄蜂 (Gu Gong 1995, 866)

17

Passing by the flower halls on the bodies of tigers  
in the coal fields beating wasps  
Monkey, oh monkey, beating wasps  
In the coal fields passing by flower halls  
Beating wasps on the bodies of tigers' (Allen 2005, 158-9)

These animals kill, run, die, and above all, what we notice is that they are not in their natural environment, they are in a coal mine or they move along a corridor. Dragonflies are captured by soldiers of the highest caliber (*Xiang lai jie* 象来街), winter birds become “trains” “calling” in *Xi Shi* 西市 (*West Market*), a “tiger walk back and forth along the road” (Allen 2005, 167) in *Hu fang qiao* 虎坊桥 (*Bridge at Tiger Workshop*), and chickens become genocidal picking each other in *Liu li qiao* 六里桥 (*Six Mile Bridge*). Here, at this point of his life, the poet can no longer find refuge in nature. As we can see from this poem, at the time of the cycle for Gu Cheng even Nature has been corrupted, and turned into something else, strange and puzzling. Even the characters living in *Cheng* are not represented as full people but only sketched and characterized simply through their function in the society. There are characters with no names (like *ni* 你 “you” referring to Ying'er, his young lover), or well known personalities like in the case of the reference to Chairman Mao, or general soldiers, or victims beaten or killed whose names are of no importance like the names of all others. Even in Eliot, apart from

the main ones, minor characters have very little connotations (Bradbrook 1965, 23).

Another similarity is that T.S. Eliot's poem is characterised by a series of images which seem to be ambiguous and connected only by association of ideas (Marinoni and Salmoiraghi 1992, 1008), he uses the stream of consciousness technique. The same thing can be said for Gu Cheng's cycle where we find a mixture of real and unreal elements. As we can read from the preface, the old city of his memory (which was different from the Beijing of the 70s and 80s where the author returned to live) overlaps with the most recent image of Beijing of the time of the Tian'anmen incident and with the city of Berlin where he lives when he writes the poems. Here is a part of the preface:

When I arrived in Germany it reminded me of the Beijing of my youth. [...] In my dreams I often go back to Beijing, but it has nothing to do with the Beijing of today. It is a place that is heaven-sent just for me. Peace Lake and China Gate are now gone; also gone are the bricks in the bright sunlight, the cinder road along the hillside, and the wild jujube trees. And yet, I still move around them, looking down on all below and on days to come. [...] I have written only half of the poems in this sequence "The City". Many gates have yet to be covered. (Allen 2005, 151)

The result is a sort of hallucination which takes him back into a city that does not exist anymore, looking for a girl who is no longer his lover, a sort of dreamlike travel which lasts 52 poems. When we follow him through the poems around the city, the only thing that actually reminds of the real Beijing are the titles given to the majority of the works. As Gu Cheng leads us in his wondering around this imaginary place which is beyond time and space, we become spectators of a series of actions which at times make no sense at all for the reader, as we can see in *Shoudu juchang* 首都剧场 (*The Capital Theatre*). This happens, I think, because these actions and facts make reference to personal events in the life of the poet, or are recollections of his past so that it is almost impossible to get to the real meaning without his help. In some cases, the notes or explanations given by the author to his friends and translators are available but in most of the other cases, we can only make conjectures, as in the case of the poem *Shoudu juchang* 首都剧场 of which I want to mention only two parts just to give an idea of what I mean:

## 首都剧场

星期六 她说 猫

过了三点 她说 猫

猫 猫

老虎不动 (Gu Gong 1995, 864)

## The Capital Theater

On Saturday she says kitty kitty

somewhat after three she says kitty kitty

kitty kitty kitty kitty

Tiger does not budge (Allen 2005, 157)

Gu Cheng's memories of the past are not linear, quite muddled, apparently following a confused and confusing stream of thought. There are also many linguistic difficulties in understanding the real meaning of the sentences, together with the apparent stream of thought. He also uses a sort of "stream of language", if we can borrow this term used by Gao Xingjian in another context (Gao and Yang 2001, 59). On one side there is the natural ambiguity of Chinese language which has no singular or plural, no gender, no accordance between nouns and adjectives, between a verb and a noun or a subject, there are no particular suffixes indicating the tense of the verb so that all these elements and their connection in the sentence are, as we can say, logically "suggested" so that someone said that Chinese is the ideal language for poetry.

Gu Cheng exploits all these characteristics of his native language rendering this disorientation, this lack of certain references, up to the point that he also avoids punctuation and makes use of enjambement so that translating these poems becomes quite complicated. Because of all the ambiguity thus created, it is difficult to render this ambiguity in a language so precise as the Italian language is.

The result of all the factors I have mentioned above is a sense of confusion, disorientation, lack of temporal and spatial references he creates in the reader. Described in the poems, we find some sort of actions which can be present or past

or both mixed together into consecutive stanzas as they overlap in the mind of the poet. For example:

知春亭

那么长的走廊 有粉笔

把手伸得高高的 (Gu Gong 1995, 875)

**Spring Pavillion**

A corridor so very long and chalk there

Reaching with my hand so high (Allen 2005, 164)

Making the final considerations about the many influences and references to western literature in Gu Cheng's poetry since his earliest works, I would like to use a consideration made by T.S. Eliot in a letter to *The Dial* written in 1922. Talking about Joyce and the way in which he re-uses myths, Eliot states that authors should not behave like "inventors" but just like "scientists", because they use someone else's discoveries to autonomously follow their own research activities (Crivelli 1993, 72). I think this could be particularly true in the case of Gu Cheng and here I make specific reference to many similarities with *The Waste Land*.

Gu probably used the material found in Eliot and turned it into something new, which took new shape and meaning as it was filtered through his personal experience, sensibility, language and, above all, his Chinese identity. There are many other things to say and many considerations to make, but I think it is interesting at this point to underline the personal development of the poet as it can be followed through these few works. He started out as a young entomologist, to become a fairy tale poet as underlined by Yibing Huang in his essay *The Ghost Enters the City: Gu Cheng's metamorphosis in the "New world"* (Lupke 2008, 123–43) and after the many vicissitudes of his life and his travels he ended out to be a man completely changed, destroyed, ruined as his old city was. In my opinion this is the *Gu Cheng* we can see in his final cycle. As we guess from the title which is clearly a pun on his first name (Li Xia 1999, 23), the real main theme of his latest cycle and the main protagonist of it is Gu Cheng himself, as the man beyond the poet. He tells us this man has been ruined by the world, by history and society, just like his hometown, the city of Beijing. The only main difference

between Gu Cheng and Eliot lays in the fact that in Eliot we can still see hope, whereas in Gu Cheng there is no hope, no helping hand to come and save him to rebuild something new. This utter destruction could only lead to annihilation. Gu Cheng killed himself on October 8<sup>th</sup> 1993 (Li Xia 1999, 406).

## 4 Conclusions

The relation between Gu Cheng and the West has always been difficult. Though he was not completely indifferent from western influences in his poetry, he was unable to get rid of the traditional Chinese values and culture. So, as an integral part of his identity, Beijing somehow represents himself. This can be seen in his early life and works, and even in his last cycle of poems *Cheng (City)*.

## References

- Allen, Joseph, ed. 2005. *Sea of Dreams, the Selected Writings of Gu Cheng*. New York: A New Directions Book.
- Bradbrook, Muriel Clara. 1965. *T.S. Eliot*. London: Longmans Green and Co.
- . 1962. *T.S. Eliot*. Translated by Elio Chinol. Milano: Mursia Editore.
- Crippen, Aaron, ed. 2005. *Nameless Flowers*. New York: George Braziller Inc.
- Crivelli, Renzo S. 1993. *Introduzione a T.S. Eliot (Introduction to T.S. Eliot)*. Bari: Editori Laterza.
- Eliot, T. S. 1932. *Selected Essays*. London: Faber and Faber.
- . 1968. *The Waste Land*. Edited by Charles Brian Cox and Arnold P. Hinchliffe. Glasgow: MacMillan and Co.
- . 1976. *The Waste Land*. Edited by Mario Melchionda. Milan: Mursia.
- . 1982. *La Terra Desolata (The Waste Land)*. Edited by Alessandro Serpieri. Milan: Rizzoli.
- Frye, Northrop. 1989. *T.S. Eliot*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Gao, Xinjang 高行健, and Yang, Lian 杨炼. 2001. *Il pane dell'esilio (The Bread of the Exile)*. Edited by Gianni Santamaria. Milano: Medusa.
- Gu, Gong 顾工. 1995. *Gu Cheng shi quanbian 顾城诗全编 (Selected Poems of Gu Cheng)*. Shanghai: Sanlian Shudian.
- Knoll, Robert Edwin. 1964. *Storm over The Waste Land*. Chicago: Scott Foresman and Co.

- Kubin, Wolfgang. 1999. "Fragments: Remembering Gu Cheng and Xie Ye." In *Essays, Interviews, Recollections and Unpublished Material of Gu Cheng, Twentieth-Century Poet*, edited by Li Xia, 247–70. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Li, Xia, ed. 1999. *Essays, Interviews, Recollections and Unpublished Material of Gu Cheng, Twentieth-Century Poet*. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- "Living World." *Manincor*. Accessed 12 September, 2011. <http://www.manincor.it/en/living-world.html>
- Lupke, Christopher, ed. 2008. *New Perspectives on Contemporary Chinese Poetry*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marinoni, Mingazzini Rosa, and Salmoiraghi, Luciana. 1992. *A Mirror of the Times*. Napoli: Morano editore.
- Maxwell, Desmond Ernest Stewart. 1969. *The Poetry of T.S. Eliot*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- "Poems by Gu Cheng." Translated by Gordon T. Osing and De-An Wu Swihart. Accessed 12 September, 2011. <http://www.shigeku.org/xlib/lingshidaohanshi/gucheng.htm>
- Sullivan, Sheila. ed. 1973. *Critics on T.S. Eliot*. Plymouth: George Allen and Unwin.



UDK: 82-1(510):82-1(44)

COPYRIGHT ©: GIUSI TAMBURELLO

## **Baudelaire's Influence on Duo Duo's Poetry through Chen Jingrong, a Chinese Woman Poet Translating from French**

Giusi TAMBURELLO\*

### **Abstract**

As a woman poet, Chen Jingrong's productions encompassed the whole 20<sup>th</sup> century: of particular interest are her poetry translations from the French language. Thanks to her translation work, valuable understanding of Charles Baudelaire's poetry was made available in China, which influenced the Chinese contemporary poet, Duo Duo, when he first started writing poetry during his youth. This paper tries to depict the importance of this contribution of Chen Jingrong and its effect on the process of renovation of the contemporary poetic scene in China.

**Keywords:** Chen Jingrong, Baudelaire, Duo Duo, contemporary Chinese poetry, translation

### **Izveček**

Opus kitajske pesnice Chen Jingrong zaobjema celotno 20. stoletje. Posebej zanimivi so njeni prevodi francoske poezije. Zahvaljujoč njenemu prevajalskemu delu je Kitajska spoznala poezijo Charlesa Baudelaira, ki je močno vplival na zgodnje mladostno ustvarjanje sodobnega pesnika Duo Duoja. Pričujoči članek poskuša prikazati pomen tega Chen Jingronginega doprinosa in njegov vpliv na proces prenove sodobne kitajske poezije.

**Ključne besede:** Chen Jingrong, Baudelaire, Duo Duo, sodobna kitajska poezija, prevodi

---

\* Giusi Tamburello, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Dipartimento di Scienze Filologiche e Linguistiche, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Palermo, Italy. E-mail address: giuseppa.tamburello@unipa.it

My special thanks to Sarah Scott and Brenda Beatty Epifani for their revising my English version.

## 1 Introduction

Charles Baudelaire's poetry has been known in China since the beginning of the last century. The absorption of aspects of Western cultures during the period of the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement of 1919 included the first approach to this French poet. He was mentioned for the first time in 1919 by Zhou Zuoren in the preface to his poem *Xiao he* 小河 (*Small River*), which appeared in *Xin qingnian* 新青年 (*New Youth*), where he wrote that it "was slightly similar to the prose poetry by Baudelaire" (Tan Guilin 2004, 1–2, 1).

While Zhou Zuoren simply recalls Baudelaire in his preface, in the years following, as Tan Guilin (2004) very well describes in his *History of Modern Chinese Literature*, other intellectuals focused on the Frenchman's poetry, among them Xu Zhimo 徐志摩. At that time, there were published translations of Baudelaire's poems, and comments on his poetry took into consideration specific aspects of his poetics.

Nine of Baudelaire's poems were translated by Chen Jingrong 陈敬容 from French into Chinese and they were published in July of 1957 in the magazine *Yiwen* 译文 (*Translations*).<sup>1</sup>

These poems made a deep impression on Duo Duo 多多<sup>2</sup> years later when he, as a young poet, read them. Duo Duo's innovative style of poetry makes use of very strong images, which I believe, may, to a certain extent, be associated with the influence of Baudelaire's poetry on him through the translations by Chen Jingrong.

The strong images that appear in Duo Duo's poems are strikingly different from the general search for harmony to be found in Chinese poetry. They seem to me a characteristic of Duo Duo's poetry. This characteristic that defines a kind of "deviation" from what could be expected by the reader is the "starting point" of my analysis following the theoretical approach described by Leo Spitzer.<sup>3</sup> I shall proceed through a close comparative reading of Baudelaire, Duo Duo and Cheng Jingrong in order to underline the elements that, in my opinion, bind the three

---

<sup>1</sup> The nine poems are collected under the title: 波德莱尔. 恶之花 *Bodelai'er. E zhi hua* (*Boudelaire. The Flowers of Evil*) (Chen Jingrong 1957, 132–43).

<sup>2</sup> Born in 1951 in Beijing, Duo Duo is one of the poets who have most deeply innovated contemporary Chinese poetry.

<sup>3</sup> Leo Spitzer (1887–1960) has described his stylistic approach to literary criticism in his works which I have read in Italian in the volume *Critica stilistica e semantica storica*, 1966.

poets from the point of view of poetic image. As their literary production is quite broad, I shall have to restrict my analysis to some specific poems.

In particular, I shall take into consideration the poem *Zaihui (Goodbye)* written by Duo Duo in 1972. The way the elements of time and space are developed in the poem, the poet's choice of words in his images, recall *Le crépuscule du soir (Dusk)* by Baudelaire, one of the nine poems by the French poet translated by Chen Jingrong.

The close reading of the poems, as I shall try to demonstrate, suggests a deep impact by Chen's translations on the poetic choices made by Duo Duo.

## 2 A Few Biographical Notes on Chen Jingrong

When Chen Jingrong's translations of Baudelaire's poems were published, one hundred years had passed since their first publication in France in *Les fleurs du mal (The Flowers of Evil)*. By that time, Chen Jingrong, whose biography shows a quite complicated life<sup>4</sup>, was 40 years old and the curator of *Yiwen (Translations)*. She was a fighter all her life. Before she was even 18, she attempted twice to run away from home to Beijing, a city which attracted her very much, so she could follow her teacher of English, Cao Baohua 草宝华, the great translator of Marxist-Leninist works. She eventually succeeded during the second attempt. In Beijing, she could not attend the university regularly because she did not have the necessary financial means. Whenever possible, she attended lessons at the Universities of Peking and Qinghua. She earned some money by copying the manuscripts of translations made by Cao. She continued to study English by herself, and also took French lessons with the French widow of a teacher at Peking University. During that time, Chen became acquainted with the lively intellectual scene of which Cao himself was a part, and she met He Qifang 何其芳, Bian Zhilin 卞之琳, and Ba Jin 巴金. In times of trouble, they were there to help her. The hectic political situation of China in those years of turmoil would not have made things any easier for Chen Jingrong. She frequently suffered from financial difficulties, at times living with her two daughters in temple ruins. Her private life was characterized by unlucky relationships. In spite of all these vicissitudes, her

---

<sup>4</sup> My research on Chen Jingrong includes a few papers published in recent years. A description of her biography which I refer to here can be found in the work *L'acqua nei versi di Chen Jingrong* (Tamburello 2009, 87–102).

poetic production was quite remarkable. She wrote, in fact, more than three hundred poems that were collected in various volumes, and also published volumes of prose, translations and essays.

### 3 The Atmosphere of the Time around Baudelaire's Poems

The publication of *Les fleurs du mal* on June 25<sup>th</sup> 1857, was followed just two months later by problems when the poems were considered to be an offence to public decency. This fact, perhaps, gives a suggestion of their novelty at the time.

A few days after their publication, in *Le Figaro*, Gustave Bourdin wrote "Ce livre est un hôpital ouvert à toutes les démenées de l'esprit [...] Rien ne peut justifier un homme de trente ans d'avoir donné la publicité du livre à de pareilles monstruosité"<sup>5</sup> (Baudelaire 1973, 317). French society of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century was not yet ready for the very peculiar approach to reality shown in Baudelaire's poems. Imagination is the basic element of Baudelaire poetics. When writing to Toussenel, at the beginning of 1856, he stated: "The poet is supremely intelligent, *intelligence par excellence*, because he acts through the imagination that is the most scientific of the faculties because it is the only one that includes the universal analogy."<sup>6</sup> (Rella 1990, 52).

Imagination is, therefore, what enables the poet to observe and catch reality in all aspects, without limitations. The poet can dig into the uncertainties of reality, its mistakes and dangers and still try to understand. A new kind of beauty arises, a beauty based on antinomy as the title itself of the collection, *Les fleurs du mal*, already suggests. (Rella 1990, 53)

Through the verses of Baudelaire, modernity somehow assaults the reader who is not yet ready to recognize it. In his dedication to Arsène Houssaye in *Le Spleen de Paris* (*The Spleen of Paris*), Baudelaire writes:

In this era of ambition, who among us has not dreamed of a poetic prose, musical without rhyme and without a steady pace, and flexible enough to adapt to broken lyrical movements of the soul, to the fluctuations in the fantasy, the jolts of consciousness? It is especially from the attendance of

---

<sup>5</sup> "This book is a hospital open to all the dementias of mind [...] Nothing can justify a man of thirty years of giving publicity to such monstrousities book." In this paper, English translations from the original language are mine.

<sup>6</sup> This translation from Italian is mine.

the huge cities and from the innumerable crossing of their relationships that this haunting ideal comes. You yourself, my dear friend, haven't you tried to translate into a song the shrill cry of the glassmaker and express into a lyrical prose all bleak suggestion that this call sends up to the attic through the thickest mists of the road? (Rella 1990, 53)

The observation of reality and the poet's interaction with it includes all aspects. According to Erich Auerbach, Baudelaire was the first poet "to give a sublime shape" to subjects of the classical aesthetic categories of "ridiculous", "low" and "grotesque" (Baudelaire 1987) whose definitions in this process cease to exist. Imagination can overcome the limits of definition and become a powerful means of perception and knowledge. Against the ease of Romantic art, Baudelaire counters with a mediated, conscious and voluntary art that makes the most intimate element of perception go through a continuous process of objectification which is visual, above all, but also olfactory, tactile and auditory (*L'Enciclopedia* UTET 2003, Vol.2, 732). The attention is driven again onto the poet as the only one capable of distinguishing the ties involved in the universe.

#### **4 Chen Jingrong Translating Baudelaire**

It is difficult to say why Chen chose to translate Baudelaire's poems. While she was translating them, China was undergoing major transformations that completely engulfed the Country. The 5<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan, which was going on, aimed at increasing industrial and agricultural production with the organization of communes. Private enterprises were undergoing the process of absorption into State-owned enterprises. The Constitution was approved. The Army was being modernized. On the international ground, new relations were being established with the Soviet Union. In addition, during the VIII Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) great developments of various production sectors had been confirmed, and the economical-financial crisis had begun following the decision to give priority to heavy industry. The leadership of the CCP was dealing with many conflicts that were to be expressed during the Hundred Flowers Campaign to be followed by the disastrous Great Leap Forward (Melis and Demarchi 1979).

The general situation which provides the background in which Chen's translations of the French poems developed seems to be echoed in the poetic choices that she made.

The nine poems that Chen translated are: *Le crépuscule du matin/Dawn* (朦胧的黎明, *Menglong de liming*), *Le crépuscule du soir/Dusk* (薄暮, *Bo mu*), *Le cygnet/The Swan* (天鹅, *Tian'e*), *La mort de pauvres/The Death of the Poor* (穷人的死, *Qiong ren de si*), *Sonnet d'automne/Autumn Sonnet* (秋, *Qiu*), *L'ennemi/The Enemy* (仇敌, *Choudi*), *Le flambeau vivant/The Living Torch* (不灭的火炬, *Bu mie de huoju*), *Spleen/Spleen-IV* (忧郁病, *Youyu bing*), *Harmonie du soir/The Harmony of Evening* (黄昏的和谐, *Huanghun de hexie*).<sup>7</sup> They are quite far from depicting a serene image of life.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the nine poems convey feelings of sadness, discomfort, ugliness, desperation without hope. In the poems she chose, hope is like the bat in *Spleen*, "S'en va battant les murs de son aile timide/Et se cognant la tête à des plafonds pourris"<sup>9</sup> (Baudelaire 1928, 137). The cities are described as being inhabited by prostitutes, shivering beggars, poor people to whom only death brings some consolation. Above them, the cycle of nature follows unchangingly with indifference while life remains unpredictable. The unpredictability of life generates a sense of helplessness which not even love can mitigate. In fact, love makes use of tools such as *crime* ("crime"), *horreur* ("horror") and *folie* ("madness") (*Sonnet d'automne*) (Baudelaire 1928, 121).

Whereas nature is characterized by indifference, the action of time is even more devastating as it *mange la vie* ("eats life") (*L'ennemi*) (Baudelaire 1928, 28). In the same poem, the Enemy, which is written with a capital "E", raises further concern and a sense of uncertainty as there is no clue who "l'obscur Ennemi qui nous ronge le cœur"<sup>10</sup> (*L'ennemi*) (Baudelaire 1928, 28) it could be.

A close reading of Chen's translation of Baudelaire's poems shows her attention to details. One example, among others is her translation of *Harmonie du*

---

<sup>7</sup> The English translations of the French titles and verses of Baudelaire's poems are from: Charles Baudelaire *The Flowers of Evil – A New Translation with Parallel French Text*, translated with notes by James McGowan, Oxford World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 1993.

<sup>8</sup> My research on Chen Jingrong includes a section which focuses on the inter-relationship between Chinese intellectuals and the West. In this paper, which is a further step in my research, the part that "reads" Baudelaire, Chen Jingrong and Duo Duo together refers to my article "Poesia e intelligenza – Baudelaire sbarca in Cina" (Tamburello 2004, 2–3), where the comparative reading is more detailed.

<sup>9</sup> "Batters the walls with her enfeebled wing/Striking her head against the rotting beams" (Baudelaire 1993, 149).

<sup>10</sup> "That dark Enemy who gnaws our hearts" (Baudelaire 1993, 29).

*soir*. Baudelaire's Alexandrine verses produce a very well organized rhythm that creates a kind of lullaby further stressed by the constant rhyming ABBA.

Due to the impossibility of re-creating this same rhyming in translation, it is one of the components that gets lost in translating between a Western language and Chinese. Chen<sup>11</sup> proposed a diffused rhyming that allows for the reproduction of a quiet lullaby rhythm as in the original. It is useful to observe: *yi yang* 一样 (“same”) and *hui dang* 回荡 (“to resound”) at the end of verses 2 and 3 in which not only the last vowel is the same but also the tone of the words, the IV tone for both. This artifice is also found in other verses of the poem. Together with the repetition of an entire verse along the poem, it draws attention to the rhythmic element. This is very important because, while emphasizing the melancholy of the waltz which it describes, it brings into action the innovative technique of Baudelaire in creating a poetic experience that calls on all the senses. In this specific case, it is possible in fact to “see” (the flower), to “smell” (the censer) and to “hear” (the waltz, the violin) in the poem.<sup>12</sup>

Chen seems to be well aware of this and works on the rhythm as well as on the words. We find *hua* 花 (“flower”), *xiang* 香 (“perfume”), *shengyin* 声音 (“sound”), and so on.

Chen's work goes further on a deeper level. The way she translates *s'est noyé*<sup>13</sup> (Baudelaire 1928, 89)<sup>14</sup> is by using the verb *chen* 沉 (“heavy, to sink”) that she uses recurrently, both as an attribute as well as a verb, conveying an idea of movement. Furthermore, in *Huanghun de hexie* she makes use of the word *xiang* 像 (“like/resembling”), to be found also in the translation she made of the other poems, which is fundamental in Baudelaire's poetics as a means of creating chains of associative references.<sup>15</sup>

We are perfectly aware of the problems that arise in the process of translating from one language into another. In some cases the problems are unavoidable, but,

<sup>11</sup> It is possible to refer to the nine poems by Baudelaire translated by Chen Jingrong by visiting: <http://www.douban.com/group/topic/5524404/>.

<sup>12</sup> The version of *Harmonie du soir* I refer to are Baudelaire's (1928, 89); Chen Jingrong (1957) or in Tan Guilin (2004), and Baudelaire (1993, 96).

<sup>13</sup> “Is drowning” (Baudelaire 1993, 97).

<sup>14</sup> I refer to the same sentence repeated in verses 12 and 15: “Le soleil s'est noyé dans son sang qui se fige/ The sun is drowning in its dark, congealing blood” (Baudelaire 1993, 97).

<sup>15</sup> Chen's translation work is extremely stimulating from the point of view of the theories of translation, but this topic should be developed in a different paper.

it is notable that Chen brings to completion the process of *trans-ducere* ("trans-lead"), of bringing into the Chinese culture a way of composing poetry that with Baudelaire, especially, results in a kind of combat between the reader and the text. This continuously grips the reader's attention by means of contents which are often unexpected, and by means of activating the senses. This is quite a step further on from the equilibrium produced in Chinese classical poetry, and yet another step further if considered against the background of a temporally nearer poetry that, based on the need to support the CCP policy, was required to praise the Party's steps forward as described in Chairman Mao's *Yan'an talks* of 1942 (Mao Tse-Tung 1942, 1–43).

## 5 Duo Duo's Poetry à la Baudelaire: *Zaihui*

When Duo Duo, one of the leading voices in the renewal of Chinese contemporary poetry, became acquainted with the Chinese translations of Baudelaire's poems by Chen Jingrong, he was a young man and China was in turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.

His first attempts at writing poetry were based on Song dynasty's *ci* ("poem") poems. He admits that he considered the act of writing *ci* far too difficult for him, and therefore an unachievable goal. Reading Baudelaire through Chen's translations turned out to be an experience that would lead Duo Duo towards a different way of approaching and understanding poetry.

Duo Duo indicates *Zaihui* 再会<sup>16</sup> as his first poem. He was born in 1951, and *Zaihui* was written in 1972. A parallel reading of this poem and the nine poems translated by Chen highlights many references to be found in terms of use of the words and also in terms of absorbed structural elements of the sentence, the use of *xiang* 像, to name only one. When extending the close reading to an analysis of the three authors together, the echoes throughout the different texts are quite impressive.<sup>17</sup> Here, it could be interesting to put forward an analysis that I have made<sup>18</sup> which shows, in my opinion, how in *Zaihui* Duo Duo was somehow

---

<sup>16</sup> My Italian translation of *Zaihui* can be found in Duo Duo, *Canto*, trans. Giusi Tamburello (1998, 9).

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed analysis of these aspects of Duo Duo's poem see the reference in footnote 8.

<sup>18</sup> See the reference in footnote 8.

practicing the future direction that he was to give to Chinese poetry by writing a poem, if I may say so, *à la Baudelaire*.

In order to illustrate what I have in mind, I shall take into consideration *Zaihui* in relation to *Le crépuscule du soir* (Baudelaire 1928, 177–8) because it seems to me that they have a parallel development. The two poems read as follows:

### **Le crépuscule du soir**

Voici le soir charmant, ami du criminel;  
Il vient comme un complice, à pas de loup; le ciel  
Se ferme lentement comme une grande alcôve,  
Et l'homme impatient se change en bête fauve.

O soir, aimable soir, désiré par celui  
Dont les bras, sans mentir, peuvent dire: Aujourd'hui  
Nous avons travaillé! — C'est le soir qui soulage  
Les esprits que dévore une douleur sauvage,  
Le savant obstiné dont le front s'alourdit,  
Et l'ouvrier courbé qui regagne son lit.  
Pendant des démons malsains dans l'atmosphère  
S'éveillent lourdement, comme des gens d'affaire,  
Et cognent en volant les volets et l'auvent.  
À travers les lueurs que tourmente le vent  
La Prostitution s'allume dans les rues;  
Comme une fourmilière elle ouvre ses issues;  
Partout elle se fraye un occulte chemin,  
Ainsi que l'ennemi qui tente un coup de main;  
Elle remue au sein de la cité de fange  
Comme un ver qui dérobe à l'Homme ce qu'il mange.  
On entend çà et là les cuisines siffler,  
Les théâtres glapir, les orchestres ronfler;  
Les tables d'hôte, dont le jeu fait les délices,

S'emplissent de catins et d'escrocs, leurs complices,  
Et les voleurs, qui n'ont ni trêve ni merci,  
Vont bientôt commencer leur travail, eux aussi,  
Et forcer doucement les portes et les caisses  
Pour vivre quelques jours et vêtir leurs maîtresses.

Recueille-toi, mon âme, en ce grave moment,  
Et ferme ton oreille à ce rugissement.  
C'est l'heure où les douleurs des malades s'aigrissent!  
La sombre Nuit les prend à la gorge; ils finissent  
Leur destinée et vont vers le gouffre commun;  
L'hôpital se remplit de leurs soupirs.—Plus d'un  
Ne viendra plus chercher la soupe parfumée,  
Au coin du feu, le soir, auprès d'une âme aimée.

Encore la plupart n'ont-ils jamais connu  
La douceur du foyer et n'ont jamais vécu! (Baudelaire 1928, 177–8)

### **Dusk**

Sweet evening comes, friend of the criminal,  
Like an accomplice with a light footfall;  
The sky shuts on itself as though a tomb,  
And man turns beast within his restless room.

O evening, night, so wished for by the one  
Whose honest, weary arms can say: We've done  
Our work today!— The night will bring relief  
To spirits who consume themselves with grief,  
The scholar who is bowed with heavy head,  
The broken worker falling into bed.

Meanwhile, corrupting demons of the air  
Slowly wake up like men of great affairs,  
And, flying, bump our shatters and our eaves.  
Against the glimmerings teased by the breeze  
Old Prostitution blazes in the streets;  
She opens out her nest-of-ants retreat;  
Everywhere she clears the secret routes,  
A stealthy force preparing for a coup;  
She moves within this city made of mud,  
A worm steals from man his daily food.  
One bears the hissing kitchens close at hand,  
The playhouse screech, the blaring of a band.  
The tables at the inns where gamesmen sport  
Are full of swindlers, sluts, and all their sort.  
Robbers who show no pity to their prey  
Get ready for their nightly work-a-day  
Of cracking safes and deftly forcing doors,  
To live a few days more and dress their whores.

Collect yourself, my soul, in this grave time,  
And shut out all this clamour from the slime.  
This the time of sick men's sharpest pain!  
Black night will grab their throats; they cry in vain,  
And finish out their fate in common grave;  
The hospital is filled with gasps. They have  
No further need to think of evenings' spent  
At fireside—the fragrant soup, the friend.

But most of them have never known the call  
Of friendly hearth, have never lived at all!  
(Baudelaire 1993, 193 and 195)

## 再会 (Zaihui)

前面是苍茫的原野  
乡间晚祷的钟声  
一下一下，落到荒凉的心上  
沉缓而且庄严  
和着徐徐降下的黄昏  
迷惘，难过的感情，在闪烁  
在苏醒它们星星点点的微光

阿门\_\_\_\_  
钟，仍在空阔辽远地送响  
徒然反省没有作错的一切  
泥土在脚下永远是纯朴的见证  
晚风吹拂起长长的披肩发  
那些伫立的人们，相对无语  
只一齐扭过身来，向着他，深  
[深地鞠了一躬 (Duo Duo 1998, 8)]

## Goodbye

Ahead is an expanse of wilderness  
in the countryside, the sound of the evening prayer bell  
stroke after stroke, it falls on the desolate heart  
heavy and solemn  
following the twilight which slowly fades  
perplexing, painful feelings, a gleam of uncertain light  
revive faint fragmented rays  
  
amen \_\_\_\_  
the bell sends its sound out into the open space, away it goes  
in vain questioning what was not wrong  
the earth beneath the feet is always an honest witness  
the evening breeze blows about the long hair on their shoulders  
those people long standing, facing each other without words  
all turn at once , towards him, bowing deeply

In both poems, the first part defines the space-time connotation. In French, we find the *ciel*, which transmits a sense of wideness, in the *soir charmante*. In Chinese, the image is an “immense”/cangmang 苍茫 “countryside”/yuanye 原野 during the “evening prayer”/wandao 晚祷.

At this point, a moment of pause follows during which a meditation is expressed. In French: “C’est le soir qui soulage/Les esprits que dévore une douleur sauvage//The night will bring relief/To spirits who consume themselves with grief”, then again: “Cependant des démons malsains dans l’atmosphère/ S’éveillent lourdement//Meanwhile, corrupting demons of the air/Slowly wake up”, and finally: “Elle remue au sein de la cité de fange/Comme un ver qui dérobe à l’Homme ce qu’il mange//She moves within this city made of mud,/A worm steals from man his daily food”. In Chinese, verses 5–7:

和着徐徐降下的黄昏  
迷惘，难过的感情，在闪烁  
在苏醒它们星星点点的微光

(following the twilight which slowly declines  
perplexity, painful feelings, a gleam of uncertain light  
revive their faint fragmented rays).

In both poems, the second part introduces the auditory element. In French: “On entend çà et là les cuisines siffler/Les théâtres glapir, les orchestres ronfler//One bears the hissing kitchens close at hand,/The playhouse screech, the blaring of a band.” In Chinese, verse 9:

钟，仍在空阔辽远地送响  
(the bell transmits sound into the open space, away).

Then, one more moment of meditation follows. In French: “Recueille-toi, mon âme, en ce grave moment,/Et ferme ton oreille à ce rugissement//Collect yourself, my soul, in this grave time,/And shut out all this clamour from the slime.” In Chinese, verses 10–11:

徒然反省没有作错的一切  
泥土在脚下永远是纯朴的见证

(vain questioning of what was not wrong  
the earth beneath your feet is always an honest witness).

The last meditation concludes the poem. In French: “Encore la plupart n’ont-ils jamais connu/La douceur du foyer et n’ont jamais vécu!//But most of them have never known the call/Of friendly hearth, have never lived at all!” In Chinese, verses 13–14:

那些伫立的人们，相对无语  
只一齐扭过身来，向着他，深深地鞠了一躬

(those people long standing, facing each other without words  
at once all turn toward him, making a deep bow).

Through this parallel reading, it would seem that Duo Duo is willing to test himself on a Baudelaire-like style. He arranges the poem along the same kind of divisions as the French poem, but, clearly, his motives are different. It seems as if he is trying to adapt a foreign “dress” to a Chinese “content”. But it is not entirely so because the text has been “contaminated” by words of a foreign reality: the evening prayer, the bell, the word “amen” (阿门 in the Chinese poem), the long hair on the shoulder.

If we then proceed to a further comparison, this time between *Zaihui* and *Bomu* 薄暮 (*Dusk*), with the translation of *Le crépuscule du soir* made by Chen Jingrong, compared to Duo Duo's poetry, we can see that the echo effect is more evident.

Here is Chen's version:

### 薄暮 (Dusk)

迷人的黄昏到了，它是罪恶的帮凶；  
像个同谋犯似的蹑足走来；天空  
犹如巨大的卧室慢慢合上，  
人，心烦意乱，野兽般疯狂。

呵，黄昏，可爱的黄昏，那些人期待你，  
因为他们敢于伸出手臂，诚实的

说：“我们又劳动了一天！”黄昏抚慰着  
那些被剧痛吞噬的心灵：

那孜孜不倦的沉思的学者，  
那重新找到卧床的腰瘦背痛的工人。  
这时，那些狠毒的恶魔，在四周  
昏昏沉沉的醒来，像忙碌的商人，  
飞跑去敲叩人家的屋檐和门窗。  
透过被风摇动的灯光，  
娼妓们又活跃在街上，  
像个蚂蚁窝，她们把所有的门户打开；  
到处给自己劈一条隐蔽的道路，  
就像是敌人偷偷的袭来，  
他们在污秽的城中蠕动，  
像尸虫在人体上偷取食物把自己供奉。  
这里那里，厨房在嘶嘶的响，  
剧场在喧嚣，乐队在呼噜，  
赌性方酣的客厅里  
挤满了荡妇，还有骗子——她们的同谋，  
那些小偷，既不肯罢手也没有慈悲，  
他们也就要开始他们的勾当，  
就要去轻轻扭开门窗和箱橱，  
为了吃喝几天，为了打扮他们的情妇。

在这庄严的时刻，我的灵魂，你沉思吧，  
掩住耳朵，别听他们的喧哗。  
这种时候，病人会更加痛苦难当，  
阴暗的黑夜捏紧了他们的喉咙；  
他们将结束自己的命运，走向那共同的深渊；  
病院里充满了他们的呻吟——不止一个  
将不复归来寻找那美味的羹汤，  
在黄昏，在炉边，在亲人身旁。

他们中间还有很多人，从来没有尝过  
家的甜蜜，从来就不曾生活过！（Douban）

Since every author has his/her original way of composing, the elements that will follow can only be a suggestion of influence, but they seem to me remarkable anyway.

The word *huanghun* 黄昏 (“dusk”) appears both in Chen’s translation and in Duo Duo’s poem.

The personification of an object, the *huanghun*, addressed with a *ta* 它 (“it”) of the object, but followed by *shi zui'e de bangxiong* 是罪恶的帮凶<sup>19</sup>, in verse 1, is to be found also in verses 6 and 7 of *Zaihui*: “*miwang, nanguo de ganqing, zai shanshuo/zai suxing tamen xingxing diandian de weiguang*/迷惘, 难过的感情, 在闪烁/在苏醒它们星星点点的微光//perplexing, painful feelings, a gleam of uncertain light/revive faint fragmented rays”.

In Chen's verse 5, we find: *naxie ren* 那些人 (“those people”). In verse 13 of *Zaihui*, we read: *naxie zhuli de renmen* 那些伫立的人们 (“those people long standing”).

The description of the movement caught in its actual happening as in the construction: *shen chu shoubei* 伸出手臂 (literally: “stretch their arms”) in verse 6 of Chen's translation, appears also in verse 14 of *Zaihui*: “*yiqi niu guo shen lai*—齐扭过身来//all turn at once, towards him, bowing deeply”.

In verse 8 of Chen's version, *jutong* 剧痛 (“intense pain”), as well as *chensi* 沉思 (“ponder, meditate”) in the following verse, bring in an atmosphere that is recognizable in *miwang, nanguo de ganqing* 迷惘, 难过的感情 (“perplexing, painful feelings, a gleam of uncertain light”) of verse 6 of *Zaihui*, without forgetting the specific weight of the word *chen* 沉 which has already been noted before in this paper.

Also the doubling of the adjective or the adverb, for instance, in verse 12 of Chen's version, *hunhun chenchen* 昏昏沉沉 (“murky, dazed”) is used very often by Duo Duo as he does it in verse 5 with *xuxu* 徐徐 (“slowly, gently”) and in verse 7 with *xingxing diandian* 星星点点 (“tiny spots, bits and pieces”) in *Zaihui*.

These are just a few observations concerning the possible influences of Baudelaire's poetry on Duo Duo's poetic style through the intermediation of Chen Jingrong's translations from the French language. Whether the above observations are grounded or not, I do not know. This opinion, according to Spitzer, can always be confused by a different starting point in the analysis. Nevertheless, in my perception, all three poems convey the same kind of mood, though each author makes his/her own stylistic choices.

---

<sup>19</sup> Literally: “it is the accomplice of evil”. (The translation is mine)

In the specific case of Duo Duo, no matter what his source of inspiration is to write *Zaihui*, the poem shows a shifting towards a “foreign” method of composition.

## 6 Referring to the West

If compared to some years ago, the amount of information that is available nowadays about China has increased to an astonishing degree. The idea of China as a country characterized by a “closed” culture has been broken into pieces. But even when recalling the idea of a “closed” culture, we should perhaps ask ourselves whether or not that idea was created by the West. If we think in fact, of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, for instance, China was hardly ever “far” from the West. It was difficult, if not impossible, for the West to “enter” China at will, but China was “absorbing” and “digesting” many aspects of the Western cultural essence. Marxism is just one of the possible examples.

In periods of deep historical transformations, Chinese intellectuals have referred to Western cultures out of a genuine curiosity, but have also been pushed in that direction by a desire for knowledge, a knowledge that could supply further means for change. In the beginning of the last century, for example, there were many ideas circulating around the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement of 1919 that derived from the West, and there were also many intellectuals who in those years were travelling back and forth from Europe, America, and also Japan, a country quite “exposed” to the West.

In fact, if we look at it more attentively, we could also say that during the whole of the 20<sup>th</sup> century China was interacting with the West, so it was far from being a “closed” culture. It might be better to say that, seen from the Western point of view, China was “closed” to the West, but from the Chinese point of view, China was studying, exploring, and making selections of what in the West was useful to her. Behind the apparent curtain of a “closed” culture, China was keeping a watchful and eager eye on the West.

In more recent times, during the Cultural Revolution (lasting with its aftermath from 1966 to 1976), and also afterwards, during the beginning of the post-Mao era (Chairman Mao passed away in September 1976), there was a new wave of interest towards the West. Although it was forbidden, foreign books were read during the Cultural Revolution, but not openly. Literature that was circulating was

found in underground circuits. The absorption of the West continued also during the Eighties when the Chinese narrative was represented by a very remarkable amount of works that found stimuli in postmodernism, in the magic realism from South-America or, for instance, in Freudian theories.

There is nevertheless, among others, a very peculiar characteristic that differentiates the interest towards the West manifested during the Cultural Revolution and during the 80s from that of the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. At that time, intellectuals would go abroad mostly to study, and they would spend enough time in the foreign country to learn the local language which, once they were back in China, would be used in many cases for translation. Their knowledge of foreign languages allowed them a first-hand approach to sources. The young intellectuals who, during the Cultural Revolution or after, did not attend university and went to the countryside, in most cases did not know a foreign language. They were approaching foreign books in what was already a product of a first cultural "digesting" process carried out by the translator.

This was also the way in which Duo Duo approached Baudelaire's poetry. He read, in fact, Chen Jingrong's translation and discovered a way to write poetry which had hitherto been unknown to him.

At that time, towards the end of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s, still immersed in the experience of the Cultural Revolution which had meant, for many young people, a radical break with anything that was recognizable as fundamental in Chinese culture—family, school, friends—many young people were searching for a means of somehow re-appropriating their culture. For some of them this was offered through poetry, which is and was the very essence of the Chinese culture.

According to Henry Y.H. Zhao (1994, 155–68), the long lasting survival of the Chinese culture is linked not with its hyper-stability, but rather with its capacity for re-orientating itself. In periods of chaos, the activity bound to the Continuity of Letters has the task not only of guaranteeing survival, but also of creating new opportunities for re-orientation. Zhao explains that in periods of re-orientation Chinese culture is confronted with what already exists, which is to say with pre-textuality, therefore literature of these periods can only be different from that of periods of stability. In periods of re-orientation, new codes of meaning are built on a criticism of pre-textuality, therefore, literature becomes strongly counter-cultural, and because of this it offers the possibility of re-orientation. According to Zhao, counter-culture should not be seen as successful or unsuccessful, but rather as a

necessary element that moves towards the creation of a possible path to follow when re-orientation is completed. From this it follows that the subversive power of counter-culture is felt only in a metaphorical sense.

Some of the young people sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution, having experienced the conflict between political discourse and personal suffering generated from its actuation, discovered themselves as poets and searched in poetry for a way to give voice to feelings and emotions that were new to them because they were produced by an unexpected turn of the political discourse. The slogans shouted during the Cultural Revolution could not express the sense of amazement that the very event produced in young people, who began working with poetic expressions at that time when they were just teenagers.

In his analysis of language and political discourse in contemporary China, Maurizio Marinelli writes:

This socio-psychological mechanism of imposition combined with emotional internalization of a prescribed unilateral form of expression demonstrated all its effectiveness during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During that period the alignment with the only authorized expressive code reached its climax (and also its point of no return) as is evident at the start in the case of the “docile bodies” of Chinese intellectuals. Language in China has been identified and widely used for decades as the most suitable tool to confine the possibility of expressing (and, although to a different extent, even experiencing) socially accepted perceptions within the limits prescribed by the “correct interpretation” of reality, a regulation which is strictly considered the prerogative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. At the individual level, the internalization of the lexical items, the set of categories, and the rules of combination codified by the formalized language have been imposed and considered the standard to prove and test the correctness of the individual’s political thought. From the point of view of the receiver, language functions both as the medium to externalize the consciousness of society, and to express the individual search for subjectivity. From this perspective, the master narrative of Chinese political language in the post-Mao era is the story of a progressive and unstoppable devolution, that I would term dematerialization of the collective psycho-emotional universe. (Marinelli 2003–2004, 147–8)

What Marinelli terms “dematerialization” is, in fact, the process that can be observed in the poetry written by the young poets towards the end of the Sixties, where their inspiration abandons the collective dimension and shifts to a subjective one. The enthusiastic atmosphere to be found in the poems of the 50s leaves room for an uncertainty which is newly felt.

This feeling that had completely disappeared from the poems, that for instance during the 50s had followed the affirmation of the CCP on the national political scene, reappears powerfully. The young poets searched for ways to express it. Each of them followed his/her inspiration and, later on, style.

## 7 Drawing on a Western Basis: Translation as Renovation Factor

Duo Duo, at first, experiments with the composition of *ci* poems in the Song style only to give up the attempt very soon. He finds their level too high to be reached. Nevertheless, it could be assumed that he is acquainted with the musicality given to the *ci* by the well defined rules of composition concerning the number of characters and the sequence of tones. Indeed, music is a very important factor in Duo Duo's poems. He has stated that, among the various kinds of poetry of the Chinese tradition, his poetry can be included in the category of poetry that has the character of song since for him the most beautiful sound to hear is the sound of a human voice singing, and above all the voice of a tenor (Duo Duo 1998, 148). And perhaps, his acquaintance with *ci* poems has also produced that kind of internal equilibrium of composition that is to be found in his poems and that is in direct line with his Chinese cultural tradition.

But what is it then that provokes Duo Duo's enthusiasm towards the translations made by Chen Jingrong of the poems of Baudelaire?

In a close reading of Duo Duo's poems of the 70s, his first poems and those of the following years, the reader is confronted with an overwhelming succession of images (Duo Duo 1998, 138–9). Somehow, each verse creates an image:

歌声，省略了革命的血腥

(the sound of chants ignores the smell of blood of the Revolution)<sup>20</sup>

教育和儿童被脏手扼住喉咙

(teaching and children were grabbed by the throat by dirty hands)<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> From *Dang renmin cong ganlao shang zhanqi* 当人民从干酪上站起 (*When People Rise from Cheese*), Duo Duo 1998, 10, v. 1.

<sup>21</sup> From *Zhong wei shui ming* 钟为谁鸣 (*For Whom the Bell Tolls*), Duo Duo 1998, 12, v. 3.

叶落到要去的路上

(leaves fall on the way to go)<sup>22</sup>

The list stretches on as each verse succeeds in creating an image. Therefore, while reading, it becomes possible to actually “see” Duo Duo’s poem. Furthermore, as explained before in *Zaihui*, Duo Duo’s poems also activate other senses.

It seems to me as if Duo Duo through Chen Jingrong’s translations captures some essential components of Baudelaire’s poetics, which is to say the relation of the poet with the image, his ability to stimulate the senses, and his different kind of appreciation of beauty.

This is what is remarkable in Duo Duo’s poetry as well. As a first attempt, we could say that *Zaihui* follows Baudelaire’s style very closely, but very soon Duo Duo will be mature in his own personal style. Searching for a means of expressing a new consciousness of the relationship between the individual and life, Duo Duo will make powerful use of the “discovery” he makes of Baudelaire’s poems to enrich the Chinese poetic language of images that grab the readers’ attention.

He obtains this result by means of describing disturbing images of which the following is just one possible example:

牲口被蒙上了野蛮的眼罩  
屁股上挂着发黑的尸体像肿大的鼓  
直到篱笆后面的牺牲也渐渐模糊

(the beasts of burden’s eyes have been cruelly covered  
swollen like drums, blackening corpses dangle from their buttocks  
until the sacrifice behind the fence gradually fades)<sup>23</sup>

By doing this, he creates a very strong interference with the elegance and sense of harmony of the contents intrinsic to Chinese poetry.

In addition, Duo Duo pushes this effect to the extreme by creating what I have defined as “logical inversions” (Duo Duo 1998, 140). He creates images that are unfamiliar to the reader because they break with his/her “logical” expectations. It is possible to observe a so-called “logical inversion” in the following example:

---

<sup>22</sup> From *Mizhou* 蜜周 (*Week of Honey*), Duo Duo 1998, 14, v. 1.

<sup>23</sup> From Duo Duo 1998, 10, v. 5–7.

当你又从末日向春天走来  
复活的路横着用旧的尸体

(when from Doomsday you walk back to the Spring  
on the road to resurrection lies your worn corpse)<sup>24</sup>

in which a very strong contrast is created between the idea of Doomsday and the action of walking back from it, and, what is more, towards Spring. To accentuate the “logical inversion”, the corpse lies on the road to Resurrection.

In *The Poet's Death*, another example is found:

灵魂的大门，在庄严地关闭  
送我加入迎娶生命的殒列

(the door of the soul, solemn closes  
it accompanies me to the ranks of those who follow the funeral  
to which it marries my life)<sup>25</sup>

After the first moment of disorientation, the reader is directed towards the search for a possible meaning behind the “logical inversion”. There are many examples of such a procedure in Duo Duo's poems and each time the inversion opens up a different realm of understanding. The reference to Doomsday, for instance, directs the reader towards another world. The action depicts the movement of walking away from that world, back towards the world of reality and towards something like Spring which might also suggest the idea of youth.

Duo Duo's “logical inversions” also suggest another element of interest which focuses mainly on a peculiar approach to the aspect of time. The way Duo Duo deals with time, its movement from a world of life to a world of death and back, seems to suggest more than one temporal dimension. This might be influenced by the concept of time in Chinese philosophy, or by discoveries in the contemporary world of physics, or even by the idea of *correspondances* as developed by Baudelaire. In any case, each of these possibilities suggests a problematic

---

<sup>24</sup> From *Zhi qingdi* 致情敌 (*To Love Rival*), (Duo Duo 1998, 22, v. 3–4)

<sup>25</sup> From *Shiren zhi si* 诗人之死 (*The Death of the Poet*), (Duo Duo 1998, 40, v. 14–15.)

approach to time as if to stress the problematic essence of the reality of that time, of which many young people in China, including Duo Duo, had direct experience with.

As in the best Chinese tradition, Duo Duo's early poems offer the chance to play the game of Chinese boxes, which like Russian matryoshka dolls, keep opening to another box of meaning, suggestion or thought. By getting back to the image, the macroscopic element of the influence of Baudelaire's poems on Duo Duo's, it is possible to observe one more element of interest.

In his *La Folie Baudelaire*, Roberto Calasso writes:

When photography appeared—and the world was preparing to reproduce itself indefinite times more than usual—ready to welcome it there was already a *concupiscentia oculorum* in which some people would recognize themselves with the immediate complicity of the perverse. “This sin is our sin [...] Never an eye was more eager than ours” Gautier explained. And Baudelaire's voice mingled with his: “very young, filled with painted or carved images, my eyes never got satiated, and I think that the world could end, *impavidum ferient*, before I become iconoclastic.” Instead, a small tribe of image worshippers was formed.

They explored the intricacies of big cities, immersing themselves in the “delights of chaos and immensity full of idols”.

The eagerness of the eyes, nourished by countless objects of art sifted and scrutinized, was a powerful stimulus for the prose of Baudelaire. He trained his pen to “fight against plastic representations.” And it was *Hypnerotomachia*, a “fight for love in a dream,” more than a war. Baudelaire was not passionate about inventing from scratch. He always needed to elaborate on pre-existing material, some ghost glimpsed in a gallery or in a book or on the street, as if writing was primarily a work of transposition of forms from one register to another. This method is how some of his perfect sentences were created, which are to be contemplated for a long time, and which let us quickly forget that they could be the description of a watercolour [...]. Very little can be captured of Baudelaire's by those who do not participate to some extent in his unique devotion, which is to the images he created. If a confession is to be understood literally, and with all of its consequences, it is stated in one sentence, *Mon cœur mis à nu*: “Glorify the worship of images (my great, my only, my primitive passion).” (Calasso 2008, 22–3)

The long quotation very densely focuses on the importance of images for Baudelaire, and allows me an attempt to provide another reason why Duo Duo was stimulated by Baudelaire's poetry to write poems in the same manner as he did. Somehow, the power of Baudelaire's images could work as an enhancement factor of the intrinsic nature of images of Chinese characters. The visual nature of Chinese characters is what gets immediately lost in translation. The visual nature of Chinese characters is that something which makes a Chinese person, when looking for instance at a made-up name created for a foreign person, exclaim: "Oh, what beautiful characters you have chosen!" As a foreigner, the person appreciates the compliment, but does not really understand it wholly. The nature of Chinese characters is visual since they keep their very root which was that of depicting reality, though nowadays in a simplified form which takes away part of the meaning's connections. Baudelaire's verses that so intensely draw on images might have offered Duo Duo the possibility of getting back to the essence of the Chinese characters' ability to depict the actual reality he was immersed in.

The translation made by Chen Jingrong, in its turn, presented Duo Duo with a ready-made product in which the immediate problematic aspects of the language had already been resolved and converted into a fluent Chinese language that could act as the bridge between the French poet and the young Duo Duo, who knew nothing of the French language.

The linguistic choices had already been made by Chen, and Duo Duo could absorb them at ease and pass them on to the next step of elaboration. One example, among others, concerns the word *chen* 沉 as alluded to earlier in this paper. To get back to *Zaihui* (Duo Duo 1998, 8), in verses 3 and 4 we read: "[...] 落到荒凉的欣赏/沉缓 [...] [...] falls on the bare heart/sinks [...]", where "falls" is represented by *luo* 落, and "sinks" by *chen* 沉. Both these verbs convey an idea of weight and gravity that also comes back in the value of *chen* 沉 as the attribute "heavy" that Duo Duo combines with *huan* 缓 that means "slow". In *Les crépuscule du matin* (*Dawn*) (Baudelaire 1928, 196), in verse 7 we read that the soul is to be found: "sous le poids du corps revêché et lourd//in the burden of the body's sway" (Baudelaire 1993, 211). To translate "lourd/heavy", Chen (1957, 134) chooses *chenzhong* 沉重 ("heavy") where the component *chen* 沉 ("heavy, to sink") is to be found again.

## 8 Conclusion

From the first publication of *Les fleurs du mal* in Paris in 1857 to the publication of Chen Jingrong's translation in 1957, a hundred years had passed. Some twenty years later, Duo Duo's first poem *Zaihui* came into existence, and he turned out to be among those who changed Chinese contemporary poetry by renovating it. It is not possible to understand Duo Duo's poetry and sources of inspiration without considering the contribution made by Chen Jingrong and her translations of Baudelaire directly from the French language into Chinese.

Much research still remains to be done in order to fully understand the interaction between the texts of these three intellectuals over a wide span of time, and their implications.

Whenever China needs the West, she gathers up a handful. The long cultural tradition of China allows her people to elaborate on these external contributions in an original way. Nevertheless, the work done by people like Chen Jingrong needs to be considered as a chapter apart. She is one of those who with their cultural engagement and passionate translation work paved the way for major transformation in the culture of China.

## References:

- Baudelaire, Charles. 1928. *Le fleurs du mal*. Paris: Payot.
- . 1973. *Le fleurs du mal*. Edited by Y. Florenne. Preface by M.J. Durry. Paris: Le livre de poche.
- . 1987. *I fiori del male*. Translated by Giovanni Raboni. Torino: Einaudi.
- . 1993. *The Flowers of Evil*. Translated by James McGowan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Calasso, Roberto. 2008. *La Folie Baudelaire*. Milan: Adelphi.
- Chen, Jingrong 陈敬容. 1957. “Bodelai'er. E zhi hua” 波德莱尔。恶之花 (“Baudelaire. Les fleurs du mal.”) *Yiwen* 译文: 132–43.
- “Douban.” Accessed July 27<sup>th</sup> 2012. <http://www.douban.com/group/topic/5524404/>.
- Duo, Duo. 1998. *Canto (Singing)*. Translated by Giusi Tamburello. Milan: Libri Scheiwiller.
- Edmond, Jacob. 2010. “The Flâneur in Exile.” *Comparative Literature* 62 (4): 376–98.

- L'enciclopedia UTET*. 2003. Vol. 2. Torino: Istituto Geografico De Agostini. Novara: Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso.
- Mao, Tse-Tung. 1942. "Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art." In *Mao Tse-Tung on Literature and Art*, 1–43. Peking: Foreign Language Press.
- Marinelli, Maurizio. 2003–2004. "The Desire for Power and the Annihilation of Emotions in Chinese Political Language." In *Ming Qing yanjiu*, edited by Paolo Santangelo, 143–59. Naples: Dipartimento di Studi Asiatici. Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale".
- Melis, Giorgio, and Demarchi, Franco, eds. 1979. *La Cina contemporanea (Contemporary China)*. Roma: Edizioni Paoline.
- Rella, Franco, ed. 1990. *Bellezza e verità (Beauty and Truth)*. Milan: Feltrinelli.
- Spitzer, Leo. 1966. *Critica stilistica e semantica storica (Stylistic Criticism and Historical Semantics)*. Bari: Editori Laterza.
- Tamburello, Giusi. 2004. "Poesia e intelligenza – Baudelaire sbarca in Cina." ("Poetry and Intelligence – Baudelaire Lands in China"). *Critica sociale, Cuore e Critica (Social Criticism, Heart and Criticism)*: 2–3.
- . 2009. "L'acqua nei versi di Chen Jingrong" ("Water as Described in Chen Jingrong's Poems"). In *L'acqua non è mai la stessa. Le acque nella tradizione culturale dell'Asia. Atti del Seminario* (Lecce, 18 aprile 2007), edited by Carolina Negri and Giusi Tamburello, 87–102. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore.
- Tan, Guilin 谭桂林. 2004. "Bodelai'er yu Zhongguo xiandai wenxue" 波德莱尔与中国现代文学 ("Baudelaire and Chinese Modern Literature"). In *Zhongguo xiandai wenxue shi* 中国现代文学史 (*History of Modern Chinese Literature*) 4: 1–2. Accessed February 19, 2012. <http://resource.jingpinke.com/details?uuid=ff808081-29587567-0129-58763ca7-55ab&objectId=oid:ff808081-29587567-0129-58763ca7-55ac>
- Zhao, Henry Y.H. 1994. "Sensing the Shift. New Wave Literature and Chinese Culture." In *Under-sky Underground Chinese Writings*, edited by Henry Y.H. Zhao and John Cayley, 155–68. London: Wellsleep.

UDK: 929 XIE W.:27

COPYRIGHT ©: SILVIA CANUTI

## **Christian Faith in Bing Xin's Early Life: Tradition and Western Values in the Early 20<sup>th</sup> Century China**

Silvia CANUTI\*

### **Abstract**

Among Chinese writers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Xie Wanying 谢婉莹 (1900–1999), known with her pen name Bing Xin 冰心, has been considered by literary critics as “the writer of love” and “the philosopher of love”. Nevertheless, this label seems to have ignored an element that could let us identify important conflicts within her works, that can be attributed to her contacts and relations with people and institutions linked to the Christian faith. Therefore, in the first period of Bing Xin's literary production (1920–1930), this peculiar aspect of Western culture, the Christian belief, seems to be for her the expression of a definitely alternative and unconventional way to achieve truth in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century China.

**Keywords:** Bing Xin 冰心, Western culture, Christian religion, tradition, poetry

### **Izvleček**

Xie Wanying 谢婉莹 (1900–1999), kitajsko književnica 20. stoletja, ki je znana pod psevdonimom Bing Xin 冰心, so literarni kritiki označevali kot »pesnico ljubezni« in »filozofinjo ljubezni«. Vendar ta oznaka ni upoštevala elementa, ki nam lahko omogoči vpogled v pomembne konflikte, vsebovane v njenih delih, in ki je povezan z njenimi odnosi z ljudmi in institucijami krščanske cerkve. V zgodnjem obdobju njenega literarnega ustvarjanja (1920–1930) je ta značilni vidik zahodne kulture, namreč krščanska vera, zanjo očitno predstavljal izraz nedvomno alternativnega in nekonvencionalnega iskanja resnice na Kitajskem v začetku 20. stoletja.

**Ključne besede:** Bing Xin 冰心, zahodna kultura, krščanska vera, tradicija, poezija

---

\* Silvia Canuti, PhD student, Università del Salento, Lecce, Italy. E-mail address: doppiaesse82@libero.it

## 1 Introduction

Bing Xin 冰心 (1900–1999), whose real name is Xie Wanying 谢婉莹, is one of the most important Chinese writers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century China and one of the main exponents of the Chinese women literature. With her literary activity, she covered the whole century, starting with composing poetry and going on through very different genres. Especially, her fame is strongly linked to short novels and prose for children, which represents her major literary work to which she devoted the most part of her life and which contributed to her great fame as a writer for children. Nevertheless, her first successful literary try is dated back to the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century and is represented by two collections of verses, *Fanxing* 繁星 (*Stars*) and *Chunshui* 春水 (*Spring Waters*), written in the form of short poems which seem to be notes of a stream of “scattered and fragmentary thoughts” (Bing Xin 1989, 88), belonging to the so-called “mini-poem” which had a great development and a strong influence on the Chinese New Poetry after the May Fourth Movement.

Her literary success and her great fame are confirmed by the words of critics, men of letters and politicians such as Hu Shi 胡适 and, years later, the premier Wen Jiabao 温家宝 who praised the artistic and human personality of Bing Xin. Hu Shi in a letter to Ms Grace Boynton, Bing Xin's English teacher at Yanjing University, states:

Most writers in *baihua* were searching for a style suitable to the new form and many of them were crude; some were vulgar. Miss Icy Heart<sup>1</sup> had been given a good grounding in the great Chinese poets; she had brought over into the new medium a delicacy and refinement which was at the same time fresh and direct...she carried on the traditional Chinese awareness of Nature and the use of the image in her technique, so she is at once simple and exquisite. (Boynton in Boynton 1989, 93)

while the premier Wen Jiabao used the following words to celebrate the writer after death, as the official website of the *Bing Xin Wenxueguan* 冰心文学馆 (*Bing Xin Literary Museum*) reports:

I remember a year when Bing Xin passed away. In the dark of the night I reached the Beijing Hospital to say farewell to the great woman. Her daughter gave me a notebook where I put my signature. I have always deeply admired

---

<sup>1</sup> Translation of the pen name Bing Xin, made up of two Chinese characters: *bing* (“ice” or “pure”) and *xin* (“heart”).

Bing Xin as a woman and appreciated her works so much. She had a strong personality but also a great heart full of love and capable of feeling and conveying deep emotions.<sup>2</sup>

## 2 The Value of *Fanxing* 繁星 and *Chunshui* 春水 in their Relation with the Christian Faith

Mao Dun 茅盾, in his article “Bingxin lun” 冰心论 (“Disussion on Bing Xin”) published on *Wenxue* 文学 (*Literature*) in 1934 elaborates a sort of accuse towards the writer, which over years has become a common and shared view on Bing Xin’s works, labelling them just as *tianzhen* 天真 (“simple and innocent”) and *hao xinchang* 好心肠 (“full of good feelings”) but devoid of social and political engagement:

Her innocence, her good feelings are certainly exquisite, but the interpretation of social life is completely absent! Maybe we think it is quite strange that during the period of the May Fourth Movement, the spread of pragmatism and scientific and positivistic thought have had no influence and left no trace on Bing Xin. [...] Among all the writers belonging to the May Fourth Movement, Bing Xin actually belongs to her own world, to herself. Her works don’t report society but just Bing Xin herself...Therefore we can say that her prose works and her long poems are much more valuable than the short poems in “Stars” and “Spring waters”. (Mao Dun in Fan Baiqun 2009, 222)

Therefore, according to Mao Dun, the reason why Bing Xin in her own works avoids any reference to social and political implications lies in values of her family and her childhood experience. He states: “Someone’s thought is determined by his/her own life experience while new thoughts coming from the outside world cannot germinate if they don’t meet an ‘appropriate soil’.” (Mao Dun in Fan Baiqun 2009, 216).

*Shiyi turang* 适宜土壤 (“the appropriate soil”) mentioned by Mao Dun reminds us the Parable of the Sower in Luke: 8 and allows us to explore and develop a special and interesting aspect of Bing Xin’s poetry and thought: the relation between Chinese Confucian tradition and the new values coming from the Christian West, very far from the Western pragmatic and positivistic thought that

---

<sup>2</sup> All the citations in English (if not further specified) have been translated by the author of this paper from the original in Chinese.

was spreading in China at the time of the May Fourth Movement. Actually, the intellectuals who started the May Fourth Movement and were the pioneers of the New Literature Movement moved from the idea that the real obstacle to the development of a new and modern culture in China was the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues in feudal ethical code. In order to reverse this old rule system, they promoted the new Western values such as independence, freedom, equality as the main values through which human rights can be respected. These new values, which intellectuals sum up in the three values coming from the French Revolution, *ziyou* 自由 (“freedom”), *pingdeng* 平等 (“equality”) and *bo'ai* 博爱 (“fraternity”), seem to be not very far from the ideals on the basis of Christian Faith (Tian Jing'ai 2004, 348–9). These particular analogies made several men of letters use words of praise towards Christian belief, such as Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1921) in an article entitled “Jidujiao yu zhonguoren” 基督教与中国人 (“The Christian Religion and Chinese People”) published in *Xin qingnian* 新青年 (*New Youth*), where he uses the following expression to refer to Jesus and His spirit of sacrifice and fraternity which represents the main aspect of the Democracy and Peace strongly pursued by intellectuals at the time of The May Fourth: “Jesus’ noble and great humanism, His ardent and deep feelings”.

Bing Xin herself writes:

成功的花。  
人们只惊慕她现时的明艳！  
然而当初她的芽儿，  
浸透了奋斗的泪泉，  
洒遍了牺牲的血雨。(Bing Xin 1923, 55)

Flower of the success.  
People, surprised, admire, beauty.  
It has now!  
But originally the sprout  
was soaked with tears of the fight,  
sprinkled everywhere, sacrifice, blood, tears.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> All the verses and poems in Chinese have been translated by the author of the paper.

Mao Dun with his statement about the “appropriate soil” argues that the reason why we can not find reference and praise to the modern and scientific knowledge in Bing Xin’s works has to be found in the inappropriate soil on which the seed of these “new thoughts” has fallen, that is Bing Xin’s traditional and conservative family. He states that “the so-called appropriate soil is just one person’s life experience” and in order to describe Bing Xin’s family he adds: “Bing Xin’s family wasn’t a quite modern family. [...] Her father was an elegant man and spent a pacific and still life. Bing Xin’s mother was a well-educated, gentle and kind woman” (Mao Dun in Fan Baiqun 2009, 216). If we consider Mao Dun’s words, we can simply conclude that Bing Xin’s works are just the results and fruits of her childhood and family experience, mainly based on love, especially on three kinds of love: *mu’ai* 母爱 (“maternal love”), *ziran zhi ai* 自然之爱 (“love for Nature”) and *ertong zhi ai* 儿童之爱 (“love for children”), which are considered the realization of what A Ying 阿英 in the article “Xie Bing Xin” 谢冰心 (“Xie Bing Xin”) published in 1931 first labelled as *ai de zhexue* 爱的哲学 (“philosophy of love”) (Li Yong 李勇 2004, 303). Nevertheless, when Bing Xin for the first and the last time tries to explain her thought about love in her novel *Wu* 悟 (*Realization*), she says:

Scientists’ sterile definitions let us know just how the layer is formed, how stars revolve, how frost and dew condense, how plants bloom and give fruits. Scientists just know the hows, but poets, philosophers, religious men, children, instead, know the whys! ... Scientists give sterile definitions and quietly decline their service; at the same time, instead, poets, philosophers, religious men and children smile, put their palms together, prostrate their selves and highly praising say: “Everything is just for ‘love’!” (Bing Xin 2007b, 105)

Through these words the religious belief comes to light and lets us consider that the refusal of Western scientific thought could be not just a result of a seed fallen on an inappropriate soil, but, a consequence of a much more complex thought coming from the Christian West, according to which only the Creator, the Father God, guards the secret of the natural world:

造物者呵！

谁能追踪你的笔意呢？

百千万幅图画

每晚窗外的落日。(Bing Xin 1923, 65)

Creator!

Who can follow the trace of your feelings?

Infinite drawings,

sunsets of every dusk behind the window.

Moreover, the elaboration of this religious thought moves and develops in Bing Xin's heart and mind independently from the soil on which it has fallen. In fact, though we have just read that Bing Xin's family was a quite conservative and traditional family based on maternal love and far from the new positivistic movements, through the biography of Bing Xin by Xiao Feng 肖风 (1987, 23) we know that, though Bing Xin entered the big world of literature through the reading of the Chinese traditional stories and novels, such as *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, her parents did not make their daughter miss the new, big foreign literature novels such as Lin Shu 林纾's translations of *David Copperfield* and *The Lady of the Camellias* (Zhang Wei 张伟 1986, 19), the foreign newspapers and, even the forbidden reformist and propaganda magazines which she read together with her classmates during lessons as she herself writes:

Then, our thirst of knowledge was at its height and we greedily devoured these periodicals outside our lessons or even hid them under our textbooks, openly stealing glances at them. If we hit upon some sentence which particularly pleased us we'd note it in a few "oblique" words or phrases in the margin of our notebooks. (Bing Xin 1982, 57)

Therefore, Bing Xin's interest in the modern thought and in the new challenge of last century appears clear and deep, so that it left an important influence on her human and professional life but, among all the possible ways to follow in search for Truth and Freedom, Bing Xin consciously chooses the one she considers the only one which can lead human beings to the real and full knowledge of the world, to the Truth that makes people free. This Truth acquires the real features of the Christian Truth when she writes:

真理，

在婴儿的沉默中

不在聪明人的辩论里。(Bing Xin 1923, 43)

Truth

lies in the silence of children,  
not in the dissertation of the wise man.

making a clear reference to a passage of the Gospel by Matthew 18: 1–5 when Jesus talks to his apostles: “Truly I tell you, unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever takes the lowly position of this child is the greatest in the kingdom of Heaven.”<sup>4</sup>

And the greatness of children and, as we can suppose, of a special child is stressed and made clearer:

万千的天使，  
要起来歌颂小孩子  
小孩子！  
他细小的身躯里，  
含着伟大的灵魂。(Bing Xin 1923, 35)

Myriads of angels  
raise songs of praise to the child;  
Little child!  
His thin body  
keeps the greatness of the spirit.

Therefore, just when intellectuals start to shout their need for change, ask loudly an emancipation from Chinese traditional culture, hoping for a modern culture capable of enlightening a whole nation (Idema and Haft 2000, 300), Bing Xin softly and closely tries to walk on a new path where the key of knowledge, the Truth, has to be found in the frailty and silence of a little child who becomes (*Fanxing* 74) *weida de shiren* 伟大的诗人 (“the great poet”), expressing at the same time the difficulty to make people realize it:

我的朋友！  
真理是什么，

---

<sup>4</sup> All the biblical passages have been taken from The Holy Bible, New International Version®, NIV®.

感谢你指示我；  
然而我的问题，  
不容人来解答。(Bing Xin 1923, 122)

My friend!  
What is Truth?  
I thank you because you guide me;  
but my question  
can't find answers in people.

Moreover, the close relation between Truth and God is stressed by an unequivocal statement by Bing Xin during the period spent at the Yanjing University: "Truth is just a character: 'love'." (Li Yong 2004, 305) If we consider what she says about God in a poem completely inspired by the Bible, entitled *Yeban* 夜半 (*Midnight*), when she writes:

上帝是爱的上帝，  
宇宙是爱的宇宙。  
上帝啊！我称谢你，  
因你训诲我，阿们。(Bing Xin 2007b, 113)

God is God of love,  
Universe is universe of love.  
God! I thank you,  
because you guide me, amen.

we can deduct what represents a crucial point in Bing Xin's religious faith, the identity God/Love and Love/Truth, so that it appears quite clearly that Truth is Love coming from God, so God Himself, as Bing Xin herself states in 1921 in her article "Ziyou zhenli fuwu" 自由——真理——服务 ("Freedom, Truth, Service") reported in the official website of the *Bing Xin Wenxueguan* 冰心文学馆 ("Bing Xin Literary Museum"): "耶稣基督说：'我就是道路，真理，生命。' 耶稣基督是宇宙间爱的结晶，所以他自己便是爱，便是真理。" / "Jesus says: 'I am the

way and the truth and the life.’ Jesus is the crystal of universal love, so He himself is Love, is Truth.”<sup>5</sup>

### 3 The Influence of Tradition in Bing Xin’s Doubts of Faith

The definition of Truth is, as we said above, a crucial aspect of Bing Xin’s faith and it becomes much more interesting to analyze if we take into account the strong and lasting doubts in the writer’s mind, whose presence and power she never denies, though she keeps on trusting God’s guide:

知识的海中，  
神秘的礁石上，  
处处闪烁着怀疑的灯光呢。  
感谢你指示我，  
生命的舟难行的路！（Bing Xin 1923, 77）

In the ocean of knowledge,  
on the stone of mystery,  
everywhere twinkles the flame of doubt.  
I thank you, my guide,  
who leads the boat of my life!

As we can note across the verses, doubts are constant and evident in the path to the Truth followed by Bing Xin so that sometimes they bring to light a strong tension and contradiction in her thoughts and feelings. Starting from an admission of a doubt of faith through a soft call to the individualism, as if the human being could live alone, without the love that comes from God and embraces other human beings and all the world around him/her:

空中的鸟！  
何必和笼里的同伴争噪呢？  
你自有你的天地。（Bing Xin 1923, 70）

---

<sup>5</sup> Translated by the author of this paper.

Bird of the sky!

Why do you chirp in the nest with yor mates?

You have your own world.

Bing Xin' doubts become deeper and deeper when she even denies the identity God/Truth by adopting a clear relativistic view through which the Truth is seen just as a personal point of view, so that each person has his/her own truth in which he/she believes:

青年人!

信你自己罢!

只有你自己是真实的,

也只有你能创造你自己。(Bing Xin 1923, 98)

Young man!

Trust yourself!

Only you have the truth,

And only you are the creator of yourself.

This contrasting view of the Truth, that is no longer directly linked to God's Love, is stressed by identifying the religious faith not as a guide but as a real danger that, after a period of illusion, makes the human mind lost and confused:

信仰将青年人

扶上“服从”的高塔以后,

便把“思想”的梯儿撤去了。(Bing Xin 1927, 67)

After the faith has helped young people

to climb the tall tower of “obedience”,

the steps of “thought” are just removed.

Therefore, by denying the faith as support, Bing Xi eventually seems to deny God as a powerful entity which we have to trust to save ourselves, replaced by a strong individualism and a relativistic truth that appear to be the only tools with which we are enlightened to understand life:

聪明人！

在这漠漠的世界上，

只能提着“自信”的灯儿

进行在黑暗里。(Bing Xin 1927, 90)

Wise man!

In this foggy world,

just carrying the lamp of “trusting yourself”

you can walk in the darkness.

This contrast of thoughts let a few critics define the Christian belief in Bing Xin (Tian Jing'ai 2004, 349–50) as *dute* 独特 (“peculiar”), *zarou* 杂柔 (“mixed”), *banbo* 斑驳 (“motley”) and *fei danchun* 非单纯 (“not pure”), also because it is said that she never entered a church, even when she was baptized, when Bing Xin together with her English teacher, the missionary Grace M. Boynton, went to a pastor to receive the baptism (Sheng Ying 2004, 279). Actually, she was baptised on December 8<sup>th</sup> 1921 and left an evidence of this conversion in a poem entitled *Tianying* 天婴 (*The Child from Heaven*) written on Christmas after she was baptized (Boynton 1926):

(三) (3)

马槽里可能睡眠？

静听着牧者宣报天音，

他是王子，

他是劳生；

他要奋斗，

他要牺牲。

Can you sleep in a manger?

In the quiet you can hear shepherds announcing

the God's will,

He is the king,

He is the servant;  
He will fight,  
He will sacrifice His life.

(五) (5)

奔赴看十字架，  
奔赴看荆棘冠，  
想一生何曾安顿？  
繁星在天，  
夜色深深——  
开始的负上罪担千钧。(Bing Xin 2007a, 126-7)

Hasten to see a cross,  
hasten to see a crown of thorns,  
Have you ever thought of a peaceful life?  
Myriads of stars in the sky,  
the night is deep:  
thousands of sins bear down on His shoulders.

At the beginning of 1921, Bing Xin began to write some short poems, then gathered them in the collection called *Shengshi* 圣诗 (*Holy Poems*) to which “Tianying” (“I’m Child from Heaven”) and “Yeban” (“Midnight”), mentioned before, belong and where all the poems appear to be related to some passages of the Bible (especially the Old Testament) that had left deep impressions on Bing Xin’s heart and mind not only for the majestic and solemn images in them, as she briefly states in the preface to the collection: “... the original meaning is extremely broad and profound and it is impossible to avoid a great loss.” (Bing Xin 2007b, 110) Therefore, we can say that the relation with Christian religion is very far from being “not pure”, but contrasts and doubts in the expression of faith could be related to a particular inner conflict with which Bing Xin lived at the time of the May Fourth, and it never left her, between new values coming from the West and Chinese Confucian and feudal tradition:

自然呵！

请你容我只问一句话，

一句郑重的话：

“我不曾错解了你么？” (Bing Xin 1923, 44)

Nature!

I ask you to answer just a question,

a crucial question:

“Have I ever misunderstood you?”

This particular, deep and inner tie with Chinese traditional culture appears in Bing Xin so difficult to break from. Among the poems of her early collections it seems as if she wants to remind her readers, and maybe herself, that she has never forgotten her roots and that those roots are still one of the main sources through which she feeds her own human and literary life, though this special tie makes her quite confused and lost. This aspect comes to light when she writes:

微雨的山门下，

石阶湿着——

只有独立的我

和缕缕的游云，

这也是“同参密藏”么？ (Bing Xin 1927, 83)

A drizzle under the gate of the temple

wets the stone steps.

I am alone

with the clouds swimming continuously,

even this one is the “search for the hidden truth”?

*Tongcan micang* 同参密藏 (“The search for the hidden truth”) is an inscription made by the emperor Qianlong 乾隆 (1711–1799) on the gate of the Temple of Reclining Buddha in Beijing on whose steps Bing Xin sits and falls into meditation, gazing at flooding clouds and asking herself what is indeed the Truth. Therefore, the image of an ancient temple linked to that of the emperor is a clear

sign of a tradition that occurs with all its power and its implications also when Bing Xin addresses *Lengyanjing* 楞严经 (“Surangama Sutra”), one of most important text in Mahayana Buddhism tradition, asking that the quick and overwhelming flood of strange thoughts finally stops: “这奔涌的心潮 / 只索倩《楞严》来壅塞了。”/“This so rapid stream of thoughts/ask Surangama Sutra to stop.”<sup>6</sup> (Bing Xin 1927, 139)

These verses sound like a request for help to the tradition that suddenly and surprisingly appears like the only and last hope to escape from an ocean of new and powerful thoughts and feelings that are puzzling the writer.

#### 4 Bing Xin's Special Relation with the Christian World

The relationship between Bing Xin and the Christian faith developed during the same years of the spread of the May Fourth Movement, through deep and lasting relationships with Christian educational institutions set and run by the major Christian missionaries in China, the Jesuits, especially those coming from the American Congregational Church. In 1914, in fact, she entered the American Congregational Bridgeman Academy, during a period of great development of Christian schools in China, before the birth of several anti-Christian movements which originated from the educational ideals of the “nationalistic school” at the beginning of 20s (Wang Chen Main 1994, 4:1, 83–102).

Therefore, Bing Xin at the age of 14 suddenly found herself involved in studying Bible and Christian thought and practicing religious activities. It was the first time she heard of Jesus, his love for human beings and his parables. In her article “Wo ru le Beiman zhongzhai” 我入了贝满中斋 (“I entered the Bridgeman Institute”, 1984), she firstly describes the unfamiliar situation in which she has to live and study but then she lingers over the great hearts of her classmates (all of them Christian), who soon become good friends, and her good score at religious subjects such as the Bible study.

After graduation, in 1918 she enrolled at Peking Union College for Women, where she studied physical sciences. A year later, after the outburst of the May Fourth Movement, as a secretary for the Student's Association of the Union College, she began to publish some short propaganda pieces in the periodical

---

<sup>6</sup> Translated by the author of this paper.

*Chenbao* 晨报 (*The Morning Paper*). The extent of her propaganda activities leads her to switch to the Department of Literature at Yanjing University, run by Christian Protestant missionaries and directly linked to Bridgeman Institute, where in 1923 she graduated with a B.A. in Literature. At Yanjing University she was a student of Ms Grace Boynton, a Christian missionary who taught English language and literature (Bing Xin 1989a, 85). The relationship between Bing Xin and her teacher soon developed into a friendship that lasted over thirty years and proved by some letters to her family by Ms Boynton in which she refers to Bing Xin as “my most promising student” and “my beloved little Chinese rose” (Boynton 1989, 92) and by some pages of Grace Boynton’s journals where in 1965 she wrote:

Early one evening, perhaps three months after I had begun teaching her, Icy Heart came to the tall double doors of my study... As she stood in the crack in the door, she spoke in a whisper: “Please, I need a friend, and please, don’t you laugh [at] me.” [...] Soon she came again, and this time she got up her courage to explain herself further. [...] She had been publishing verse for two years [but] she belonged to an official family...and modesty was very important to Miss Icy Heart. [...] She never appeared in public. [...] The few mixed classes already begun in Yenching were held at the Men’s College a safe distance away. There were times, however, when she needed an intermediary between herself and her public, and then I acted for her. (Boynton 1989, 94)

As we can read, the relationship with the missionary Grace Boynton seems to have developed into a real and authentic friendship, especially when in 1923, after graduation from Yanjing University, Bing Xin went to America to enrol in an M.A. program at Wellesley College. The Boynton family lived in Medford, not far from the College. So Bing Xin began a deep relationship also with Ms Boynton’s family to such an extent that the writer referred to Miss Boynton’s mother as her “second mother” and to Medford as her “second home” (Boynton 1989, 94). The friendship with this oversea Christian family became closer and closer so that Bing Xin continued to correspond with the Boyntons after she returned to China in 1926 and in 1929 she sent a copy of the wedding invitation to Ms Boynton’s aunt. Besides, we can find further proof of this deep friendship in some pages of Ms Boynton’s diary written between 1925–26 and in a photo taken on the day of Bing Xin’s marriage, June 15<sup>th</sup> 1929, where Ms Boynton and Leighton Stuart, then the President of Yanjing University, are the only foreigners. Then, the relationship between Bing Xin and her best friend Grace Boynton continued after Bing Xin’s graduation at Wellesley College when Ms Boynton started to translate into English

one of the first two collections of poems by Bing Xin, *Chunshui* 春水, becoming the first translator of Bing Xin's early works.

## 5 Conclusion

In 1929 Ms Boynton privately printed the translation and then decided to publish it “to bring a sample of what modern Chinese poetry had to offer to an English-speaking readership”, especially “to a gathering of fellow missionaries” (Boynton 1989, 96). So, Grace Boynton considers Bing Xin's poetry as “a sample of modern Chinese poetry”, a fruit of the May Fourth Movement both in the fragmentary style and in unconventional contents, though in a letter dated April 23, 1969, after she had been reached by a distressing rumour about the death of Bing Xin and her husband, she writes: “This was just one more tragedy brought about by the Red Guards who were intent on destroying everything connected with ‘the old culture’. Wanying [...] was a most exquisite product of traditional Chinese culture” (Boynton 1989, 97).

Nevertheless, this “product of traditional Chinese culture” is defined by her husband Wu Wenzao, during a talk to Bing Xin's father about their marriage, also reported by Charlotte Boynton (1989), as “the perfect combination of the loyalty, modesty and dignity of a Chinese lady and of the gaiety and freedom and self-confidence which she has learned from her contacts with the West”, while Zhang Wei<sup>7</sup> (1986, 19), in an interview to Bing Xin refers to her style as “a unique style which combines the grace and ingenuity seen in Chinese classics with the clarity and ease of Western literature” deeply influenced, we could reasonably add, by the answers she found in the values of Christian faith which, though in a constant inner struggle, she kept trusting.

## References

- Bing, Xin 冰心. 1923. *Fanxing* 繁星 (*Stars*). Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.  
———. 1927. *Chunshui* 春水 (*Spring Water*). Beijing: Xinchao she.

---

<sup>7</sup> Reporter of *Beijing Review*.

- . 1982. *Bing Xin lun chuanguo* 冰心论创作 (*Bing Xin on Writing*). Shanghai: Wenyi chubanshe.
- . 1984. “Wo ru le Beiman zhongzhai” 我入了贝满中斋 (“I Entered the Bridgeman Institute”). *Shouhuo* 收获 4.
- . 1989a. “Autobiographical Notes.” Translated by John Cayley. *Renditions* (autumn): 84–87.
- . 1989b. “How I Wrote *A Maze of Stars and Spring Water*.” Translated by John Cayley. *Renditions* (autumn 4): 88–91.
- . 2007a. *Bing Xin wenxuan: shige juan* 冰心文选: 诗歌卷 (*Selected Works by Bing Xin: Poems*), edited by Wang Binggen 王炳根. Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe.
- . 2007b. *Bing Xin wenxuan: xiaoshuo juan* 冰心文选: 小说卷 (*Selected Works by Bing Xin: Novels*), edited by Wang Binggen 王炳根. Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe.
- Bingxin.org. 冰心. 2011. *Mingjia lun Bing Xin* 名家论冰心 (*Famous People Talk about Bing Xin*). Accessed January 14, 2012. <http://www.bingxin.org/index1.htm>.
- Boynton, Charlotte. 1989. “Introduction to *Selections from Spring Water*”, by Grace Morrison Boynton. *Renditions* (autumn): 92–7.
- Boynton, Grace Morrison. 1926. “Yenchiao Diary (1925–26)”. 20 April 1926, fol.3, A-155, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College, Harvard University, Cambridge (MA).
- Fu, Xiaohong 傅晓红. 1999. *Bing Xin* 冰心 (*Bing Xin*). Nanjing: Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe.
- Idema, Wilt, and Haft, Lloyd. 2000. *Letteratura cinese (Chinese Literature)*. Translated by Monica Morzenti. Venice: Libreria Editrice Cafoscarina.
- Ji, Hong. 1994. “A study of American Christian High School in Beijing (1920–1941).” *American Studies in China* 1: 1–18.
- Li, Yong 李勇. 2004. “Ai de zongji” 爱的踪迹 (Traces of Love).” In *Bing Xin lunji* 冰心论集 (*Collection of Discussions on Bing Xin*), edited by Wang Binggen 王炳根, 3: 302–14. Fuzhou: Hailian wenyi chubanshe.
- Mao, Dun 茅盾. 2009. “Bing Xin lun” 冰心论 (“Discussion on Bing Xin”). In *Bing Xin Yanjiu Ziliao* 冰心研究资料 (*Critical Articles on Bing Xin*), edited by Fan Baiqun 范伯群, 208–24. Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe.
- Sheng, Ying 盛英. 2004. “Bing Xin he zongjiao wenhua” 冰心和宗教文化 (“Bing Xin and Religion”). In *Bing Xin lunji* 冰心论集 (*Collection of Discussions on Bing Xin*), edited by Wang Binggen 王炳根, 3: 278–301. Fuzhou: Hailian wenyi chubanshe.
- The Holy Bible*, New International Version®, NIV® Copyright © 1973, 1978, 1984, 2011 by Biblica, Inc.™ Used by permission.

- Tian, Jing'ai 田京霭. 2004. "Bing Xin zheli xiaoshi yu jidujiao" 哲理小诗与基督教 ("Bing Xin's Philosophical Mini-poems and Christian Religion"). In *Bing Xin lunji* 冰心论集 (*Collection of Discussions on Bing Xin*), edited by Wang Binggen 王炳根, 3: 346–57. Fuzhou: Hailian wenyi chuban she.
- Wang, Binggen 王炳根, ed. 2004. *Bing Xin lunji* 冰心论集 (*Collection of Discussions on Bing Xin*). Fuzhou: Haixia wenyi chuban she.
- Wang, Chen Main. 1994. "Seeking Balance between the Church and State: A Review of Christian Higher Education in China in the 1920s." *Journal of Intercultural Communication Studies* 4(1). Accessed July 2, 2010. <http://www.uri.edu/iaics/content/index.php>
- Xiao, Feng 肖风. 1987. *Bing Xin chuan* 冰心传 (*Bing Xin's Biography*). Beijing: Shiyue wenyi chuban she.
- Zhang, Wei. 1986. "Bing Xin: First Lady of Letters." *Beijing Review* (March, 3): 18–20.
- Zhuo, Ru 桌如. 1982. *Bing Xin de shengping he zaoqi chuanguo* 冰心的生平和早期创作 (*Bing Xin's Life and Early Works*). Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chuban she.
- . 1998. *Bing Xin chuan* 冰心传 (*Bing Xin's Biography*). Fuzhou: Haixia wenyi.

# **Politics Reflected in the New Media**



UDK: 32.019.5:(529)+(497.4)

COPYRIGHT ©: SAŠA ISTENIČ

## **The Role of Media in Democratic Consolidation of Taiwan and Slovenia**

Saša ISTENIČ\*

### **Abstract**

The importance of the media in democracies has long been recognized. The media has often been seen as a preliminary mechanism of democratization process. Over the past 20 years, both Taiwan and Slovenia have been undergoing profound political changes, transforming from authoritarianism to democracy. This research will be a modest attempt to portray the significant role that media has played in the two countries' democratization processes and draw some interesting parallels between them.

**Keywords:** media, democratization, press freedom, Slovenia, Taiwan

### **Izveček**

Pomembnost medijev v demokracijah je že dolgo priznana. Mediji so pogosto videni kot predhodni mehanizem procesa demokratizacije. V zadnjih dvajsetih letih sta tako Tajvan kot Slovenija prestali temeljite politične spremembe in prešli iz avtoritativnega režima k demokraciji. Pričujoča skromna raziskava bo poskusila prikazati bistveno vlogo, ki so jo mediji odigrali v procesih demokratizacije teh dveh dežel in načrtala nekaj zanimivih vzporednic med njima.

**Ključne besede:** mediji, demokratizacija, svoboda tiska, Slovenija, Tajvan

---

\* Saša Istenič, Assistant Professor, Department of Asian and African Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana; President, Taiwan Research Center. E-mail address: sasa@tajvan.si

## **1 Introduction**

Many authors have examined the complex relationship between the media and democracy from a variety of perspectives, both the impacts of politics on the media and vice versa, the influence of media on politics (see, among others, Baker 2002, Keane 1991, Lichtenberg 1990, Meyer and Hinchman 2002). Gunther and Mughan (2000) have conducted a very interesting comparative analysis to assess the media's contribution to the process of political change, particularly democratization, in several political systems that have been fundamentally transformed in the last two decades. Likewise, a number of authors attempted to examine the implications which the liberalization of a country's mass media environment has had upon Taiwan society. For instance, Berman (1992), Wei and Leung (1998), and Chen (1998) have all illuminated the integral role that the mass media have played in Taiwan's democratization process. However, the media environments of Slovenian and Taiwan have yet not been explored on a comparative basis. Since the two countries' recent liberalization and their comparable global-press-freedom indicators make it quite an interesting study, the author attempts to comparatively examine the interface between media and politics in Slovenia and Taiwan in order to illuminate some interesting parallels among them.

## **2 Slovenia: Brief Historical and Political Background**

The ancestors of the Slovenes were Slavs who migrated from the Carpathians to the present-day territory after the decline of the Roman Empire, and founded the oldest known Slavic state in 7<sup>th</sup> century, Carantania. During the 14<sup>th</sup> century, most of the Slovene territory was put under the Habsburg rule. During this time the Slovenes emerged as a nation and forged their own identity, despite the oppression and sustaining pressure to assimilate. Slovenia became one part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929) after the World War I, and a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the World War II. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its leader Marshal Josip Broz (Tito) struggled to lead Yugoslavia as a communist federative republic under the ideals of socialism. Upon the collapse of the East European communist governments by the end of 1989, Yugoslavia lost the strategic and political weight it had during the Cold War as well as any semblance

of unity. Slovenes were highly disappointed by the lack of political reforms and economic productivity within the Yugoslav federation.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, the Slovenian government was first in declaring sovereignty and deciding to move to a multi-party political system, a market economy, and participation in Western Europe's move towards closer integration. The declaration of an independent Slovenia on June 25, 1991 actuated the Yugoslav government to deploy the Serb-dominated federal army (Yugoslav People's Army) in an attempt to reassert control over the state border and block the Slovenian secession. The initiated war in Slovenia soon moved to Croatia (1991–95) and continued with particular ferocity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–95). The wars claimed heavy losses and left behind a terrible legacy of physical ruins and psychological devastation.

Slovenia has been largely successful in achieving a relatively complete post-war recovery. It is the first post-Yugoslav state which successfully joined the EU and NATO and the first transition country to graduate from the borrower status to become a donor partner at the World Bank and to join the group of 30 most developed countries in the world.<sup>2</sup> From January to June 2008, Slovenia was the first former communist bloc state to hold the EU's rotating presidency. In July 2010 Slovenia became a full member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

As concerns its political changes, Slovenia, since its independence, was generally ruled by center-left governments, of which the most important component was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDS). In the 2004 parliamentary elections, the center-right Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) unseated the LDS-led government for the first time since 1991, and Janez Janša became the prime minister. In the 2007 presidential elections, Danilo Türk, a law professor and former diplomat, won the runoff as an independent candidate with the backing of the Social Democrats (SD) and several other parties. SD leader Borut Pahor, who became the prime minister, formed a coalition government with three small parties: the center-left Zares, the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia, and the once powerful LDS. However, the current domestic political picture is not rosy. Since June 2011, Slovenian government has been facing a political crisis:

---

<sup>1</sup> Slovenia represented only 8 percent of the population and yet produced 20 percent of Yugoslavia's national products and 25 percent of its export, while paying around 4.5 times more in federal taxes. Thus, they perceived they had little economic future in the state of Yugoslavia (see Ferfila 1991, 23).

<sup>2</sup> Slovenia joined the World Bank in February 1993, NATO on March 29, 2004 and EU on May 1, 2004.

five ministers announced their resignations and this led to the fall of the government and the dissolution of parliament. The first early elections since independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 were held in December 2011. A new center-left party Positive Slovenia, headed by the mayor of Slovenia's capital, Zoran Jankovič, surprisingly won 29.5% of the vote against 25.9% for former premier Janša, the favourite to win. However, due to large differences in the programs of the parties, Jankovič failed to get a majority of legislators to support his nomination in the parliament. Instead, the five mostly centre-right parliamentary parties led by Janša's SDS, holding 50 seats in the 90-seat parliament, proposed Janša as the prime minister. Consequently, it was Janša who in February 2012 officially took office. However, tangible progress towards a lasting political settlement is yet to be made.

### 3 Slovenia's Media in the Early Democratization Process

The Slovenian media scene is very diverse and heterogeneous. Its beginnings can be traced back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the print media, daily newspapers and periodicals in the Slovene language, started publishing in growing numbers. The media has always played an important role in Slovenian politics. In early 1980s, in particular, the media took a significant part in Slovenia's democratization process by articulating Slovene national questions and thereby creating a vibrant atmosphere of intellectual expression. Most liberal and provocative at that time were the magazines *Nova revija* and *Mladina*, which were relentlessly testing the borders of press freedom. In 1988 *Mladina* published classified documents of the Yugoslav federal army and League of Communists Central Committee, which revealed Belgrade's plans to stop the Slovene liberalization process. Shortly after, two journalists (among them Janez Janša), the magazine's editor and a Slovene sergeant in the Yugoslav army were arrested for "betraying military secrets".<sup>3</sup> However, instead of a higher level of control on Slovenia, the Yugoslav army's authority had been diminished even further and only served to alienate the Slovenes from Yugoslavia. The *Mladina* trial became an important catalyst for the organisation of Slovene political movements and alternative political parties and also added strength to the idea that Slovenia should seek a greater degree of independence from the Yugoslav central authorities (Bukowski 1999, 82).

---

<sup>3</sup> The event has been referred to as the JBTZ trial, as it became known from the initials of the accused (Janša, Borštner, Tasič, Zavrl). See (Gow, 2000).

Likewise, media played a crucial role during the Slovenian independence war in 1991. The media worked united in communicating the truth and getting the word through about what was happening in Slovenia, striving to keep people up-to-date with recent developments in the war between Slovenia and the Yugoslav Army. Since it was unrealistic to expect Yugoslavia's only press agency Tanjug to provide fair and unbiased coverage of the events, the Slovene government worked fast in setting up the Slovenian Press Agency (STA). Arguably, without winning the media war and unveiling a different side of the story to the public, Slovenia would not come out of the war as a winner.<sup>4</sup>

#### 4 Taiwan's Media in the Early Democratization Process

Similar to Slovenia under an authoritarian party-state system, Taiwan's media during the period of martial law (1949–1987) were politically restrained and served almost only to supplement the established political system and social values. The privilege to publish newspapers was given only to those loyal to the then authoritarian Chinese Nationalist Party (known as the Guomindang or KMT). Therefore, the so-called "two big newspapers" the *United Daily* (*Lianhe Bao* 聯合報) and the *China Times* (*Zhongguo Shibao* 中國時報) and three television stations, Taiwan Television (*Taiwan Dianshi* 台灣電視), China Television (*Zhongguo Dianshi* 中國電視), and Chinese Television System (*Zhonghua Dianshi* 中華電視), together held more than a 90 percent share of the media market (Huang 2009, 4). Political forces "outside the party", the so called Dangwai group (*Dangwai* 黨外), could only voice their discontent through alternative and marginal media. Most influential earliest dissident magazines were the Taiwan Political Review (*Taiwan Zhenglun* 台灣政論), Free China (*Ziyou Zhongguo* 自由中國) and the Independent Evening Post (*Zili Wanbao* 自立晚報). However, confronting authorities often took its toll. Free China was forced to close in 1960 as it began to criticize the authoritarian rule and called for democratization while its editor-in-chief Lei Chen (*Lei Zhen* 雷震) and other opposition activists were charged with treason and jailed. The incident is one of the better known cases of the KMT government's suppression of press freedom during the martial law era. In the decades following the incident, little progress

---

<sup>4</sup> See an interview with Jelko Kacin, the then Minister of information (Žarkovič, 2011).

was made in media freedom: publications were banned and writers and publishers were sent to prison. Taiwan Political Review suffered a similar fate. However, the journals' ideas of democracy and freedom had a great influence on later Dangwai magazines such as *Formosa* (美麗島). As the political opposition increased in force in 1970s and gained traction with the wider public, the KMT government struggled to meet this domestic challenge and opted to initiate a liberalization process. As Huang writes, the Dangwai magazines had at least two major influences on the development of Taiwan politics and the media: they gave impetus to the rise of the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was founded in 1986 and gave names to its subsequent factions; they also influenced the journalistic style and attitude of Taiwan's mainstream media (Huang 2009, 6–7). Once the martial law and subsequently the ban on newspapers and magazines were lifted, Taiwan and its media have embarked on a new era. The KMT's monopoly on television and radio broadcasting was challenged by mushrooming underground stations, and its control had gradually lost impact. In 1993, the increasing pressure compelled the Government Information Office to grant licenses for new radio stations and liberalize the cable TV industry. The abolishment of the Publication Act in 1999 further eliminated government control of public media. Gradually, media limits were phased out. However, notwithstanding Taiwan's transition to democracy, performance of the media has been criticized even after the liberalization.

## 5 Taiwan's Media Today

Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan's media has been characterized first by freedom, and then intense commercialization, rapidly followed by fierce market competition. At present, Taiwan's media is comprised of over 200 TV channels, 170 radio stations, 2,000 newspapers and 7,000 magazines (GIO, 2011). Therefore, Taiwan's media competition is undeniably among the most intensive ones in the world.

As already pointed out, the KMT had a complete authority over Taiwan's media up to the early 1990s. However, the DPP's relations with the media have also raised some questions. In spite of its advocacy for media freedom, the DPP has also recurrently engaged in squabbles with the media. Similar to Slovenia, while in theory, political forces and parties have lost direct control of the media, in

practice however, all parties, and especially the ruling party at any given time have continued to seek to control the media. The KMT's domination over the media did not relinquish even after being voted out of power in 2000, whereas the DPP, while pledging to support the separation of political parties and media, in fact used governmental resources to manipulate the media, or even threatened them with judicial power.<sup>5</sup> As a result, for the sake of money, a number of media have tried to minimize criticism of government policies and exaggerated its achievements. In order to make an end to such interferences, the legislation that took effect in 2005 banned government agencies, the military and political parties from investing in or operating radio and television stations. Moreover, from the beginning of this year, the new amendment to the Budget Act strictly prohibits the practice of embedded advertisement by all government agencies, as well as by state-funded or state-run enterprises.

Regardless of being listed among those with freest media environments in Asia, Taiwanese media have often been criticized as politically biased, politicized and even more, as hampering further democratic consolidation. One concern is that partisanship is taken to extremes, leading some critics to argue that the media have degenerated into mouthpieces of political parties. For this reason, Taiwan's media have been labelled as “mad dogs” in a democratic society and have even been viewed as a threat to the legitimacy of Taiwan's democratic system (Magnier 2005; Huang 209, 2; and Hwang 2011). In addition to the implications of the political bickering between the pan-blue and the pan-green camps, most criticisms of Taiwan's media also entail the question of sensationalism and commercialism, and consequently, lack of objectivity and professionalism.

## 6 Slovenia's Media Today

Today there are about 1600 media outlets registered in Slovenia according to Slovenia's institute for market and media research (Mediana 2010). Among them, there are 79 TV channels, 95 radio stations and 1178 print media. The largest of these are the public service broadcaster Radio-Television Slovenia, the commercial broadcaster Pro Plus, and three print publications—*Delo*, *Dnevnik* and *Večer*—which, interestingly, are all the old newspapers from the communist times metamorphosed into the so-called nonpartisan independent newspapers amid the

---

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed list of some of the incidents between media and the ruling party, see Huang 2009, 14.

new media regulation and privatization in 1990. There is only one main news agency in Slovenia, Slovenian Press Agency (STA), which is an important source of information for smaller media.

In the last decade, Slovene media independence has been a point of contention between the center-right parties on one side and the center-left on the other, with journalists tilting towards either left or right. Notwithstanding the establishment of parliamentary democracy, market economy and completed privatization process in the 1990s, a large number of Slovenian media companies are still directly and indirectly owned and controlled by the state. Consequently, changes of the government are followed by transformation of media legislature and changes in media, ownership and editorial policy.<sup>6</sup> For instance, after a ruling coalition of right-wing parties was set in 2004 for the first time since 1992, alterations in media regulation have coincided with changes in media ownership. And, as soon as the left-wing government won the parliamentary elections in 2008, the debate on new changes of media laws and media regulation system was once again stirred up. Consequently, adoption of the new Act on Radio-Television Slovenia ensued, but days later the opposition parliamentary parties initiated a referendum, which was then held in December 2010. However, the voters rejected the Act and ended the debate over the status of the public broadcaster.<sup>7</sup>

Freedom of the press and other forms of public communication and expression are ensured by the Constitution and The Act on the Media provides rules and regulations for the entire media sphere. Since insulting public officials is prohibited by law, officials have the right to prosecute journalists whenever they feel defamed. Consequently, Slovene journalists have been under much of pressure from one or the other political side, frequently claiming that political reality is portrayed in a non-objective way or that their views are misrepresented. In recent years, there have been a number of reports of self-censorship and increasing government pressure on both media outlets and advertisers. Pressure comes from both political and business arena and the number of lawsuits against journalists in Slovenia has been on the rise. In the latest Report on the Freedom of the Press in Slovenia for 2010, the Association of Journalists and Commentators

---

<sup>6</sup> For a more thorough analysis of the changes of media ownership and the role of politics in media see the monitoring reports on the work of mass media in Slovenia by Media Watch series, available online at Mirovni inštitut.

<sup>7</sup> Only 14,8 percent of voters participated in the referendum on the act, which was voted down by a margin of 44,6 percent.

(ZNP) noted the increasing pressure exerted by the ruling power on the Slovenian media (The Association of Journalists and Commentators 2011). Criminal prosecutions against the journalists in order to suppress criticism of their work, as they argue, represent not only an attack on the freedom of the public word but also on the fundamental values of democracy. Journalists regard the lack of media pluralism as the key issue regarding the freedom of the press in Slovenia. Since the editorial policies of major Slovenian newspapers are all supported by the left-wing ruling parties, these can also exert influence through state-owned enterprises, which are the largest advertisers in the media. Therefore, journalists have repeatedly raised their voice in order to draw international attention to Slovenia's media environment.

## **7 Conclusion**

Two decades after the end of the martial law in Taiwan and two decades after Slovenia's independence, Taiwanese and Slovenian people enjoy fundamental rights of various kinds of freedom and civil liberties. In both countries, the media have created space for opposition parties, which in turn helped to institutionalize a culture where critical views are tolerated. Media freedom is an important link in democracy. International ratings of Slovenia's and Taiwan's media freedom have fluctuated over the years. At present, recognized as "free", they both share the 47<sup>th</sup> place in the global press freedom according to the survey conducted by Washington D.C.-based Freedom House.<sup>8</sup> Notably, upon the second change in the ruling parties of both countries, their ranking in the same survey has continuously declined until this year, when the rating moved both countries up one notch from the year before. Such fluctuations justly point out concerns over the two countries' media environment. Apparently, political factors in both countries have significant implications on the development of the media and freedom of the press, especially at sensitive times of political transition. Due to political pressure editors tempt to cut down on reports critical to the government on the one hand, to avoid potential lawsuits, and on the other, due to commercial concerns. In Slovenia and Taiwan in particular, the extreme political polarization had great implications on media quality. In other words, involvement in political struggles tarnished the media reputation. Since untrustworthy media cannot have a positive role in a country's

---

<sup>8</sup> See Freedom House (2011), "Freedom of the Press" surveys.

democratization process, calls for greater media self-regulation and accountability are growing louder over the recent years.

To sum up, the relationship between the media and democratization is an important yet a highly complex issue. This paper has illuminated an important role that media plays in explaining Slovenia's and Taiwan's contentious state of democracy and politics. On the one hand, the democratic system allows a high degree of press freedom as any opposition is granted a legal voice. On the other hand, the system also enables democracy to affect information content. For both Slovenia and Taiwan, two decades in the new democratic atmosphere have not been long enough for professional journalism to develop. In order to serve democracy, the media will need to increase transparency and implement certain control mechanisms to ensure uniform standards throughout the country's media sector.

## References

- Asante, Clement. 1997. *Press Freedom and Development: A Research Guide and Selected Bibliography*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- The Association of Journalists and Commentators. 2011. *Report on the Freedom of the Press in Slovenia for 2010*. Ljubljana. Accessed September 3, 2011. <http://www.znp.si/index.php/english-texts-mainmenu-27/236-report-on-the-freedom-of-the-press-in-slovenia-for-2010>
- Baker, C. Edwin. 2002. *Media, Markets, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berman, Daniel K. 1992. *Words like Coloured Glass: the Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratization Process*. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.
- Bukowski, Charles. 1999. "Slovenia's Transition to Democracy: Theory and Practice." *East European Quarterly* 33(1): 69.
- Chen, Shue Yun. 1998. "State, Media, and Democracy in Taiwan." *Media, Culture and Society* 20(1): 11–29.
- Ferfila, Bogomil. 1991. "Yugoslavia: Confederation of Disintegration?" *Problems of Communism* 40(4): 18–40.
- Freedom House. 2011. "Freedom of the Press." Washington D.C.: Freedom House. Accessed September 3, 2011. <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.
- Government Information Office (GIO). 2011. "The Republic of China Yearbook 2010." <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/15MassMedia.pdf>.

- Gow, James, and Carmichael, Cathie. 2000. *Slovenia and the Slovene: A Small State and the New Europe*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Gunther, Richard, and Mughan, Anthony, eds. 2000. *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Huang, Ching-Lung 黃清龍. 2009. "The Changing Roles of the Media in Taiwan's Democratization Process." The Brookings Institution CNAPS Working Paper. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1–20.
- Hwang, Jim. 2011. "The Battle Continues." *Taiwan Review*, August 1. Accessed August 2, 2011. <http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?ctNode=1446&xItem=171058&mp=1>.
- Keane, John. 1991. *The Media and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Lichtenberg, Judith, ed. 1990. *Democracy and the Mass Media: A Collection of Essays*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Magnier, Mark. 2005. "They Can't Handle the Truth." *Los Angeles Times*, February 28. Accessed September 14, 2011. <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/28/world/fg-hounds28>.
- Mediana. 2010. "Redna letna raziskava stanja medijskega pluralizma v Republiki Sloveniji v letu 2009 na področju slovenskih tiskanih, radijskih in televizijskih medijev ter elektronskih publikacij (Annual Research on the State of Media Pluralism in the Republic of Slovenia in the year 2009)." Accessed September 3, 2011. [http://www.mk.gov.si/fileadmin/mk.gov.si/pageuploads/Ministrstvo/raziskave-analize/mediji/MZK\\_pluralizem\\_29042010-POPRAVEK.pdf](http://www.mk.gov.si/fileadmin/mk.gov.si/pageuploads/Ministrstvo/raziskave-analize/mediji/MZK_pluralizem_29042010-POPRAVEK.pdf).
- Meyer, Thomas, and Hinchman, Lew. 2002. *Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Mirovni inštitut. 1998–2011. *Media Watch*. Ljubljana: Mirovni inštitut. Accessed September 3, 2011. <http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/>.
- Wei, Ran, and Leung, Louis. 1998. "A Cross-Societal Study on the Role of the Mass Media in Political Socialization in China and Taiwan." *Gazette* 60(5): 377–93.
- Žarkovič, Vesna. 2011. "Jelko Kacin—Interview." Government Communication Office. Accessed September 5, 2011. <http://www.twenty.si/first-20-years/overview/before-and-now/bold-and-united/>



UDK: 327.2:316.7

COPYRIGHT ©: MING HUI YUAN

## 另類文化帝國主義:台灣女性流行雜誌視覺權力與現代衝突性—以國際中文版《VOGUE》為例

### Toward an Another Cultural Imperialism: Visual Power and Modern Conflicts on Taiwan's Female Magazine VOGUE

Ming Hui YUAN\*

#### 摘要

1987年台灣報禁解除，政府新聞局對於雜誌的控管僅限於色情刊物。台灣女性消費者藉由其視域(the visual field)的力量，複製到觸域(the contact zone)的親身體驗，卻於其全球化的過程中，盡情擁抱歐美名牌精品，睥睨忽視其傳統服飾之存在性。此「國際中文版」的意涵，真有文化交流認知功用，抑或只是「哈日哈歐」的仿擬複製(simulation)? 本文所希冀的正是一個從「存有論」、「認識論」的角度思考自解嚴之後，台灣於另一文化帝國主義之下的視覺權力矛盾性，嘗試探索於建國百年之際，此叢爾小島女性追求視覺想像與身體自主之內在衝突。

**關鍵字:** 視覺權力, 現代衝突性, 國際中文版, 文化帝國主義, VOGUE

#### Izveček

Po odpravi nadzora nad časopisnimi licencami na Tajvanu leta 1987 je vladni urad za informiranje nadziral le pornografske publikacije. Tajvanske bralke so pri branju ženskih modnih revij »izrezale« vizualno polje s kontekstom kitajskega prevoda in ga »zlepile« s kontaktnim poljem osebnih izkušenj. Medtem ko so strastno prevzemale ameriške in evropske dizajnerske kolekcije, so brezbržno ignorirale obstoj tradicionalnih oblačil. Ali »kitajska mednarodna izdaja« tako razkriva kognitivno funkcijo kulturnih izmenjav ali gre

---

\* Min Hui Yuan 袁民慧, English Literature Department, National Kaohsiung Normal University, 國立高雄師範大學英文系. E-mail address: puffyy@gmail.com

le za manijo v posnemanju Japonske/Zahoda? Pričujoči članek z vidika ontologije in epistemologije proučuje protislovje vizualne moči v drugem kulturnem imperializmu Tajvana ter poskuša raziskati kulturne konflikte, vizualno predstavo in notranje konflikte bralk na otoku Formosa.

**Ključne besede: vizualna moč, moderni konflikti, kitajska mednarodna izdaja, kulturni imperializem, VOGUE**

「民國一百年，VOGUE 邀請六位華裔設計師：王陳彩霞，寶騰璜，張李玉菁，溫慶珠，陳季敏，Andrew GN，量身訂做服裝，在紅色的喜慶意象中，揭示着一個新時代的開始」。(Xu 許麗玉 2011, i)

## 1 前言

1980 年代冷戰結束，國際情勢由政治意識型態的敵對轉演成經濟活動的競爭與合作，全球「資本主義體系」的運行隨著遠距科技及交通運輸的流通，各國的傳媒產業也邁向私有化和自由市場經濟，跨國媒體集團利用市場全球化(globalization of market)的流通及手段，於全球各地獲取資產和資源、開放國外市場、提升產銷效率、克服進入市場的法規障礙，進而建立起自己的全球媒體王國(Gershon 1996, xx)。國際性雜誌進入台灣的濫觴，始於 1966 年美國《讀者文摘》(Reader's Digests)中文版，此兼具知性與人文的月刊於香港印刷，引進台灣，並於 1979~81 年在台設立分公司。

1987 年解嚴後，著眼於台灣視覺消費力的蠢蠢欲動，國際性媒體始全面進駐台灣傳媒產業。國際女性雜誌進入台灣傳媒模式約可分為授權台灣本地廠商、與台灣本地廠商合資設立台灣分公司、與台灣本地廠商合資成立新公司、或獨資在台設立分公司，而授權發行是國際中文版最常使用的方式(Luo 羅如芳 2005, ii)。國際中文版女性雜誌在 1990 年代陸續搶攻台灣女性閱聽人的市場，如美國 Hearst 旗下的《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》、《Harper's Bazaar 哈潑時尚》以及《VOGUE 時尚》，以及法國 Hachette Filipacchi Médias 的《ELLE 她》和《Marie Claire 美麗佳人》。而日系國際中文版的女性雜誌於 2000 年大舉來台。青文出版社分別和日本主婦之友社發行《Cawaii 卡娃衣少女流行誌》、《Mina 米娜。時尚》國際中文版，後又與講談社發行《With 与》國際中文版(Chen 2006, 3)。

國際中文版女性流行雜誌製刊將女性視為一特定閱聽人，內文多為國外雜誌原文翻譯成繁體中文，其廣告介紹的商品在台灣不易購得，但讀者可優先一窺國外趨勢，原文雜誌內容與國內流行報導/廣告的比例通常為五五比或四六比(羅如芳, 2005, ix)。國際中文版女性雜誌以女性讀者為主要訴求的國外風格流行時裝雜誌，在保持母國編排前提下，加入台灣或亞洲地區的流行訊息，以繁體中文版本呈現。創辦 VOGUE 等知名雜誌的美國 Condé Nast 集團創始人 Mr. Nast 就表述道：「創辦女性流行雜誌的主要任務，即為吸引成千上萬的女人女孩們消費於雜誌扉頁中所刊載之服飾商品」。女性流行雜誌作為製造商、設計師、廣告商、編輯群及消費者間大量傳閱的商業媒介，於眉目流轉之時締造全球性視覺饗宴及廣大商機。於此，女性雜誌本身就是一種廣告，每期的攝影編排、文字架構、人物專訪及商品廣告無不與商品的銷售數字緊緊相連。

在台銷售量極高的《VOGUE 風尚》由成立於 1909 年的美國 Condé Nast 公司，於 1996 年與台灣樺舍公司合資成立美商康泰納仕台灣分公司，授權發行《VOGUE 風尚》國際中文版。各期內容包含時髦趨勢、名人穿搭、秀場直擊和彩妝美髮等。閱聽人訴求對象為經濟獨立上班族女性以及獨具品味之貴婦顯要，許多特別專題所展示的服飾配件或廣告品項價格必須電洽，穿搭風格接近高級訂製禮服的奢華氛圍。本論文所選《VOGUE 風尚》國際中文版為研究版本，除雜誌超逾 15 年在台發行銷售的歷史，涵蓋較廣的成年女性閱聽人口之外，其每月美式風格服飾專題攝影於潛移默化下所造成台灣女性的視覺衝擊與後現代性，皆使作者思考 1987 年以降，台灣女性閱聽人藉由其視域閱讀(the visual field)的力量，複製到觸域消費(the contact zone)的親身體驗，卻於其全球化的過程中，盡情擁抱歐美名牌精品，睥睨忽視其傳統服飾之存在性。而台灣本地的攝影採編工作者是否也無需大刀闊斧的冒險精神，只需坐享跨國雜誌的響亮名聲，即可自封藝術/文化專業人士？國際中文版女性雜誌的當地化(localism)主要目標為母國文化趨勢融合當地民情與國情，以與市場上的讀者進行真正的溝通。但當此國際中文版的當地化不過是啟用為數較多的東方面孔模特兒，以繁體中文標的出本地可供消費地點與匯率，且為大多數是美國版(或日本版)雜誌內容的翻譯複製時，國際中文版溝通的強勢何在？「國際」的定義之於台灣女性讀者何在？我們好似只是運用本地書寫語言狂力推銷女性大眾哈日哈美的潛意識思維，國際中文版的大量發行史恰恰反應台灣讀者外語能力明顯貧弱。

羅蘭·巴特(Roland Barthes)於《流行體系》(*Système de la Mode*)中認為流行時尚是由攝影與文字所構成，通常被流行修辭指涉的『必須是女性，絕對的年輕……流行的婦女既是讀者的身分，同時又是她夢想成為的身分』(Barthes 1990, 331)。流行女性雜誌字裡行間充斥著「熱鬧喧囂、亮麗新潮、知性自我」等等字彙。女性雜誌的存亡與廣告銷售緊緊相連，雜誌的創刊本就仰賴於財團與廣告商的投資，時尚雜誌從來就不是流行的原創先鋒，即便編輯群和執行長總是信誓旦旦地自詡為文化預言大師，他們於視覺流轉之間製造出成功優雅的氛圍，而「失敗蒼老」的悲觀字眼在時尚雜誌中簡直如赤貧棄兒。

中英語言隔閡既已被翻譯小組解碼，佔雜誌三分之二重量，如夢似幻的廣告/時尚攝影才是女性雜誌要角。蘇珊·桑塔格(Susan Sontag)在《論攝影》(*On Photography*)中便提出：

資本主義社會需要一個以圖像為基礎的文化，因為圖像豐富了娛樂，圖像刺激了消費，圖像也撫平了階級、種族與性別之間的傷痛。  
(Sontag 2002, Li李昱宏 2008, 20)

時尚文化的起源與十四世紀中葉勃艮地宮庭，用較高尚流行的服飾，藉以區別男女性別的差異。在18世紀晚期至19世紀初期，凡事注重生活型態購物(lifestyle shopping)的雜誌開始被稱為女性雜誌(Chou周鄧懿貞 2006 xxx; Storey 1995, 234)。時尚廣義的定義是為某一特定時期，個體透過服裝、飾品控制當下的社會環境和表現其自身和社會的身份(Storey 1995, 234)，並由手法多元的圖像攝影殖民，產生具有商業利潤的持續進行式。十四世紀中葉以降用以流行服飾區分性別與階級的流行體系，於二十世紀初期由中產階級的投資集團，運用工業革命入侵全球諸國。維克多·柏根(Victor Burgin)認為攝影有別於電影或繪畫，成為一種較與人親近的傳遞媒介，在於攝影是「免費」的(Li李昱宏 2008, 20)。都市的公共廣告四面八方衝擊視覺接收度，或觀者只需花費薪資的百分之一，即可擁有數本最新的彩頁雜誌。廣告公司和商業集團擅長以小搏大的銷售策略，誘使觀者投資更多的精神與金錢，由視域(觀看廣告)到觸域(實際消費)的過程，滿足消費者無中生有的快感，進而獲得消費者的忠誠。消費者滿足慾望的另一目的，則是在追求與雜誌廣告所鼓吹的生活型態同步化，甚至必須超越同儕的風格品味，已達階級升格(或自認高人一等)的自戀，消費者於此循環過程中歷經的狂喜，有如藥癮

無法自拔，以身旁日常生活物品彰顯自我價值的拜物現象。視覺理論學者約翰·伯格 (John Berger) 認為此一資本理論為世俗化的基督教：激進，虔誠，卻又階級化。圖像攝影打破文字語言的厚牆，以色彩和線條製造人們共同的印記，這些廣告安慰了因陌生環境而焦躁不安的我們，催化信任度，拉扯與人之間的距離，造成閱聽人更多的內在衝突。

## 2 現代衝突性之一：知識之獲取

此其內在衝突的肇始其一為知識的獲取。以女性雜誌國際中文版為例，台灣女性閱聽人多由從大街小巷中的租書店和美髮沙龍「免費」觀看《VOGUE 風尚》，其對商品的認知，圖像記憶鮮明度遠遠超乎於文字理解。《VOGUE 風尚》每期內容中的美髮妝容的小步驟均以插畫或攝影圖解，這也可以解釋以圖片/攝影為導向的日系雜誌於 2000 年之時美系流行雜誌攻占台灣女性閱讀版圖時仍有利可圖——看準台灣擁有為數眾多的圖像族女性讀者，即使絕大多數台灣讀者的日本語程度及受教時數並不能與英語相比並論，有趣的是，日文航空原版雜誌的進口量和銷售數字卻遠優於歐美雜誌。美系雜誌國際中文版有鑑於當地化的需求，也趨於實用性高的圖像解說：單頁的攝影或插畫多達十張，為母國雜誌的五倍以上。而以視覺權力而論，大異於印歐語系的拼字系統，中國文字的發展史本自圖像(象形文字 characters)進化成筆劃系統，許多現代文字仍具有高度的圖像辨識度<sup>1</sup>。或許這也恰可說明以中文系統為母語的華人，知識的取得可幾乎仰賴圖像或符號的記憶，因為中文字的熟稔即為一套包含歷史概念的解碼(decode)過程：一字一密碼，一圖一符號。彩妝髮型step-by-step的圖像漫畫可於大腦語言區重新組織成條列式文字系統，若一幅攝影照片為符碼，其隱喻(metaphor)可以運用語言學指涉(signify)的概念解讀時，民族集體潛意識行為也加速了廣告的傳遞速度。這種高倍速率，往往會催促鶴立雞群的睥睨心態：某位女性若不在五月及時更換小碎花紋的楔型涼鞋，配上絲質飄逸長版寬褲，戴著黑色絲帶大草帽，就會被經「飽讀」大量攝影圖像並解碼的女性同儕視為「無法與時並進」、「社會文盲」或「土里土氣」<sup>2</sup>的實例。這些女性讀者甚至

<sup>1</sup> 例如：龜、馬、鳥、山……等等。

<sup>2</sup> 上述為較含蓄的說法，台灣一般慣用語使用「俗氣」，甚至單字「土」、「宅」（指足不出戶，不善社交或搭配服飾之男/女孩子）來形容打扮穿著不流行之人士。

認為自己的知識取得與合適裝扮能提升自信與智慧，以獲取更多的認同與視覺注目度(男性女性皆然)，進一步邁向更高階級的彼端。這些自認高人一等的讀者群只不過是花了點時間「識字」，卻轉化成不屑一顧的視覺傳遞，擴張階高，甚至將「不入流不時髦不上進」的男男女女視非我族類。蘇珊·桑塔格所提出攝影圖像可撫平「階級、種族與性別之間」的傷痛，在流行雜誌閱聽人的視覺權力中，是為杯水車薪。

### 3 現代衝突性之二: 攝影之禁

國際中文版大舉進攻台灣女性流行雜誌所導致的另一內在衝突為同行相忌。此一忌可分為編輯攝影之禁與女性讀者之妒。一槍斃命(One shot one kill)的潛在動機有數千種，但是攝影瞬間(take a shot)的終極目標，大約只有兩種：一是美化，源自於藝術；一是紀錄，源自於科學。蘇珊·桑塔格於“視域的英雄主義”一文中提及：

除了相機被用於記錄，或用來紀念社會儀式的情況外，觸動人們去拍照的，是尋找美……一個普遍的現象是，其目光曾經略過美的事物的人，往往會對沒有把它拍攝下來表示遺憾，相機在美化世界方面所扮演的角色，是如此成功，使得照片而非世界變成了美的事物的標準。  
(Sontag 2002, 139)

既然女性雜誌服飾攝影的原始動機與終極目的是使閱聽者藉由視覺觀看翻閱，進一步買帳消費，已達美化自我之實，那「衰老」與「醜陋」即為攝影之禁：因為此二項也絕對是女人之忌(taboo)。美感體驗透過視覺經驗需要持續的模仿，但是老醜卻不需要練習。些許時間、人情壓力、紫外線殺傷力和地心引力會將女人推移至面目可憎的邊緣，任何大量圖像閱讀都無法反轉青春美麗；而女性雜誌無需於攝影圖像中刺激其女性消費者的無奈，引起眾怒，損失金援。編輯群及攝影師只需提供華麗的衣飾、異國風情的渡假聖地、甜美年輕的女星模特兒，引導閱聽人無邊無際的美麗幻想便可。這種以青春無敵為號召的風格，看似美式主義，實則古典希臘主義：追求青春洋溢、個人獨立及英雄主義。希臘諸神的形象的力與美於藝術作品中展演流傳：神明群中最醜陋的火神(Mars)並非老氣橫秋之醜，只因他「是個瘸子」；美女海倫的美麗容顏僅止於史詩字裡行間中輪傳。不老神話挾美利堅合眾國的糖衣，包覆希臘式的完美主義，於女性流行雜誌間仿擬複製。同月份的

《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》、《Harper's Bazaar 哈潑時尚》、《VOGUE 時尚》，《ELLE 她》以及《Marie Claire 美麗佳人》的廣告和時裝搭配不過是依照讀者年齡趨勢略為調整，追求青春無限的母題恆久不變：攝影師們運用純白美國製棉上衣搭配刷淺藍色牛仔褲象徵舒適豪邁，卻無法開創絲質象牙白包袖及膝改良式旗袍搭配檀香扇表述年輕自信，只因為許多台灣女性認為美系服飾才能彰顯自我品味與國際觀，確認為歷史悠久的中華民族文化不值一顧。攝影師和編輯群得罪不起這些自認為是女主角女英雄(heroine)的廣大女性讀者，即便是犧牲雜誌獨特的思維聲音也在所不惜。流行時裝雜誌的功能不僅僅提供讀者一種複製青春的「楷模」，更主要的是把時裝設定為新神話來傳播。最弔詭的是，中國旗袍或台灣原住民注重經驗與美感的服飾於國際中文版雜誌報導中附之闕如。國際中文版的編輯群們欲重建一種新制序(New Order)，一種建立於美國觀點的一體性。詳盡而深入的提醒永保「美式青春」的極其必要，若忽視其祕訣，等同於衰老死亡，不學無術。在教育普及、傳媒四通八達的後現代台灣社會，年老色衰簡直為許多時裝雜誌讀者及編輯群的致命禁忌。

#### 4 現代衝突性之三：女性之妒—視域力量至觸域體驗

台灣的現代性與內在衝突也可於移民思維至身體觸域而發酵。漢人的台灣移民史可上述至三國時期，滿清盛世之時台灣仍為中國版圖，直至《馬關條約》簽訂(1895年四月)台灣、澎湖群島和滿州部份地區割讓與日本(Darwin 2011, 345)。為期五十年的日帝統制，於1925年光復後，為台灣人民自主的第一覺醒。1949年國民政府撤退來台，期間十大建設、土地改革，促成80年代的台灣經濟奇蹟，為第二覺醒，唯當時國民政府軍政時期，媒體資訊與旅遊範圍受限。爾後的1987年台灣解嚴至今，文化及硬體建設蓬勃發展，使其蕞爾小島人民不再視此地為反(中)共復(民)國之基地，而是應有自我民族國家意識的年輕島國，為第三覺醒。意識覺醒主張由內而外顯，表現於語言思想衣著上，台灣的日本矛盾情結現今仍廣植在年輕族群中。台灣新世代流行雜誌讀者即使是不諳日文，依舊比照日本時尚雜誌攝影複製穿著風格。而這種表現在商品消費上的「文化崇(東)洋」心態，可上溯到日本從明治維新(西元1876年起)開始長達百年的西化過程，即便歷經戰後蕭條，日本仍於1970-80年間創造了世界經濟奇蹟，進而帶動國際流行雜誌和商

品之消費。與日本地緣政治和族群較為接近的台灣，模仿引進日人的品味模式是快速有效的國際化方式。台灣被殖民的壓迫與歷史傷痕，卻於第三覺醒之後，急欲追隨前帝國主義殖民者的腳步，甚至緬懷日語教育所帶來的雙(多)語之便，以期能與全球接軌；而崇東洋之行即為崇西洋之實。

1970年代的留美風潮培養了以美式英語為思考邏輯的菁英學者，1997年的香港回歸大限更促使許多港台人士移民至美加諸國。台灣人民為擺脫赤化中國、古典用語及傳統衣飾的拘謹尷尬，急欲建立自我的新風格，而模仿超級強國的腔調和複製其輕鬆舒適的穿著，是最迅速簡便之方。1990年代美商授權的國際中文版恰恰投其所好-----許多女性讀者透過雜誌中攝影圖片發現了「美式青春」的力量。女孩們透過每期的時裝攝影進而模仿審視、發現自己、展現自己，進而確立自己旁人眼中的自我價值。台灣女性消費者藉由其視域(the visual field)的力量，複製到觸域(the contact zone)的親身體驗，而攝影為一聚焦，許多女性及以此認為模仿名流新貴穿著便能成為眾人視覺焦點。亞洲都市人口之密集，確定了雜誌、廣告乃至商品的發行、傳閱及銷售數字，視覺攝影圖像大量傳遞需要上百萬雙的肉眼交感作用。人口稀疏的山間農地，其視覺比較和身份想像幾乎無用武之地。

而此「名流新貴想像」的背後乃是一種「文化帝國想像」的投射，女性雜誌所刊出的時裝攝影，絕不可能是戴著棕黃斗笠，全身由青紅棉布包裹著密不透風，戴著灰黑口罩沿街兜售樂透彩券的六十歲老嫗，而是拜音樂或電影戲劇延伸為消費者和媒體所製造出的新貴名流。這些名流即使身穿牛仔短褲，也要有Calvin Klein墨鏡、Kate Spade手提包、Michael Kors<sup>3</sup>項鍊、吹彈可破的修長雙腿和手抱大眼小嘴的三歲娃兒為時髦配件。而國際中文版內文的形容詞雖可反映大眾流行文化所崇拜的希臘式精神，但文字敘述過程有時好比繪畫，過於冗長昂貴，還不如攝影師或是狗仔隊的「一觸即發」---one shot來的精準確實且幾乎不容置疑的快感。消費者因視覺鼓勵而最終擁有的不只是高價位精品，更是藉由這些舶來品而衍生歐洲歷史與傳統孕育出來的精緻文化想像：

---

<sup>3</sup> Calvin Klein, Kate Spade 及 Michael Kors 均為美國知名服裝/配件設計師。Calvin Klein 中譯為卡文·克萊，台灣由美商 Warnaco 台灣分公司繼曜昇國際於 2010 年 12 月 31 日結束代理後接手經營，而來自紐約的 Kate Spade 及 Michael Kors 相關商品目前台灣市場仍無正式代理商。台灣商務網, 陳信心 撰。("Li & Fung Limited")

「假名流新貴之名」的「名」牌效應，乃是美其名曰「假商品消費之實，形 精神消費之名」，突顯歐洲名牌背後經歷史洗禮的文化精髓，讓內在精神性的追求，超越單純的物質消費形式。(Zhang 張小虹 “假名牌、假理論、假全球化” 2002, 8)

攝影的本質是記錄和紀實。每一張照片都是拍攝者親身經歷的證明，時間和空間在瞬間被記錄，歷史在鏡頭面前成為照片的切片。所以攝影最根本的本質就在於其瞬間性，於按下快門的瞬間，賦予了攝影強大的力量。攝影另一理由之所以令人震懾難忘，其因人類由動作持續而促成的視覺暫留，進而了解宇宙運作的方式。但攝影的一瞬間卻凝結了流動的節奏，迫使觀者的視網膜及大腦暫停片刻，在停滯的異次元裡，觀者花了微秒瞠目結舌，進而反覆思考。桑塔格在《論攝影》的開篇就借用柏拉圖在《理想國》中的洞穴比喻，論述了攝影對傳統認識論的哲學挑戰。柏拉圖以降的哲學家們排斥對世界的圖像性描述，但攝影技術和其他複製手段的出現對這種哲學傳統提出異議。攝影作品有別其他紀錄形式，是因它提供了世界的真實片斷。桑塔格於開篇也提出攝影若是擁有持久的影響力，必因「它有能力在卑微、空洞、衰朽的事物中發現美」(Sontag 2002, 162)。若具有吸引力的美必須使觀者經由偷窺而達一瞬間的滿足，那其收集照片/圖像/雜誌行為，就是延續宇宙時間的死亡-----保存觀者中的美麗新世界。

女性雜誌讀者透過觀看流行時裝攝影獲取穿著典範以及社會身分認同知，並由圖像中獲得慾望與狂喜，隱含女性讀者的自戀，而非同性戀。以拉岡(Jacques Lacan)的鏡像階段理論(mirror stage)而言，此自戀進而感到歡愉，是一種「自我認知的勝利」(Li 李昱宏 2006, 58)。不同於羅蘭· 巴特對於流行修辭學的看法，科爾波夫斯基認為「女性從流行飾裝攝影的影像得知訊息，這種訊息的接收不需要文字的輔助」(Kolbowski, 150; Li 李昱宏 2006, 57):

女性從流行時裝攝影中尋找理想化的標準，因此當女性試裝時，她從鏡子裡所看見的並非純然的自我，而是流行時裝攝影中的他人，藉由流行時裝攝影，女性的自戀被深化，女性的狂喜也得以被延續。(Li 李昱宏, 2008, 60)

這種狂喜的延續之一為流行時裝雜誌大量複製與女性讀者的收購佔據，其二為女性讀者藉由視覺反射流行時裝攝影的模特兒，自戀於仿擬複製其穿著打扮便可美麗升級，但其內在衝突為：許多女性卻由流行雜誌的鏡像中發現「醜」，即自身的不完美，或非似於《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》中「柯夢女

郎」的標準美<sup>4</sup>。其熱切收購的自滿狂喜演變成自怨自艾，或藉由非必要的整形手術達成「如湯唯般的鵝蛋臉」。女性由視覺的狂喜驟轉至醫療過程的觸覺痛楚，更甚者為輕易嫉妒身材臉蛋神似「柯夢女郎」<sup>5</sup>的女性。自戀者必須經由不斷延續的觀看自身倒影而自溺於自戀，標榜以提升女性讀者美麗自信的國際中文版雜誌，卻因本地編輯群的視而不見及取材狹隘，反轉其雜誌延續女性自戀的目的，使雜誌轉化為令女性讀者大失所望的魔鏡。

而流行時裝攝影就是一個個經偷窺過後的符旨(signifier)。我們被大量的符旨資訊重重包圍，即認為可無所不曉。許多閱聽人熱切收購《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》或《VOGUE 時尚》即認為自可察覺流行脈動趨勢。流行體系想藉由攝影進行預言的功能，但其預言卻含衝突及限制。讀者於《VOGUE 時尚國際中文版》八月號得知此期流行時裝的主題為皮衣和皮草：「黑白對比色的搭配，熱鬧喧囂，若又是選擇皮草款式，相信絕對是讓人矚目的焦點」。這與八至十月平均溫度高達攝氏 26 度的亞熱帶台灣著衣常識背道而馳，任一娃兒都可指出模特兒穿戴了不合時宜的累贅。

《VOGUE 時尚國際中文版》八月號所介紹的時裝扉頁幾乎為美國版的授權翻印，忽視大部分亞洲女孩並非高挑豐腴翹臀的身材限制，卻又無法拍攝提供符合亞洲人身形的穿著，以至許多藉由雜誌仿擬穿著的女孩暴露自身缺點，或一味追求齊頭式的體重數字。尤其瘦身議題之於台灣女性為神話迷思，聽聞某女孩兒體重低於 40 公斤即便認知此女為美人兒胚符旨，忽略其骨架肌肉的先天條件，潛藏對於美的觀點過份狹隘的衝突。

## 5 流行時裝攝影之於美學的內在衝突

如果攝影本質分為三個範疇，「真」與「善」為紀實本質與技術純熟，那麼「美」才是整個流行產業所追逐的最終目的，而「真」是流行時裝最不在乎的面向。流行體系不過是「反映資本主義的虛幻場景與情節，即使是具

---

<sup>4</sup> 例如：台灣東森電視台購物專家斯容，現年 33 歲。她說：「當初因醜而自卑，鼓起勇氣去韓國整型，整型後，任何人誇我漂亮，我都覺得讚美並非真心，總認為別人暗自嘲笑我，看見喜歡的人也會躲起來，覺得他一定不喜歡我，我還是覺得自己很醜，很自卑。(Zhu Mei Fang 朱梅芳 2011)。

<sup>5</sup> 《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》國際中文版慣稱其女性讀者為「柯夢女郎」，直譯美國版的 Cosmo Girl，其中翻譯技巧特選「柯夢」，而非「苛孟」等字眼。筆者認為有取「南柯一夢」其幻境的巧妙。

有創意的藝術活動，也與真實並無相關，它是一種多重加工」(Li 李昱宏 2008, 46)。若流行時裝攝影並非追求真實的片段，而是在「卑微、空洞、衰朽的事物中發現美」，那麼，女性雜誌讀者熱切收購保存的流行時裝攝影是否具有藝術價值？

相較於繪畫師的構圖、打底到上色修飾的漫長過程，攝影師的創作是須臾之間的捕捉。攝影師無從安排或介入鏡頭前的景象推移，攝影師必須耐心等待美感時刻，並且當機立斷。大部分攝影師無法像繪畫師保有創作過程紀錄，攝影師幾乎無法於成品簽名，許多攝影圖片幾乎為無名氏。在人人皆可購買機械並自學成為攝影師的前提下，攝影師及其作品是否可展現獨特風格並稱之為藝術，向來爭議不斷。布列松 (Henri Cartier-Bresson) 認為：「當攝影師按下快門時，它其實是以相機描繪了現實。換言之，攝影師以相機作畫」(Li 李昱宏 2008, 53)。寇索夫(Max Kozloff)進一步認為繪畫與攝影最大的不同，是「繪畫以暗示的手法描繪事實，而攝影則將我們直接引領到事件發生的時空裡」(236)。攝影工業是由物理及化學自 1888 年發展演變至今，本就不在謬思女神的掌管範疇；法國象徵派詩人波特萊爾(Charles Baudelaire)認為攝影不過是繪畫的奴僕 (Li 李昱宏 2008, 60; Assouline, 58)，就因相機為一機械，因此出現於鏡頭內者皆不能偽造，也無法取代文學，這個特色使攝影與藝術絕緣。羅蘭·巴特(Roland Barthes)在《明室》中強調攝影是不具備美學上討論的空間的，取而代之的是以符號學及現象學的角度去剖析攝影。班雅明(Walter Benjamin)在《機械複製時代裡的藝術作品：邁向靈光消失的年代》(*The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*)中提及了攝影具有氛圍的概念：即攝影為一關於時間與空間的組合，是一種最容易複製的藝術。但是於大量複製後，原作獨特性喪失，氛圍已消斃。桑塔格(Sontag)則認為攝影具備科技影像的二元性-----既「揭露」又「美化」了現實-----同時觸動了藝術與道德之間的複雜張力(Chen 陳耀威 2010, 10)。

有趣的是，時裝攝影實為一團隊合作的成果體現於紙本發行。如果攝影師以機械代替繪畫技巧，無從干擾背景模特兒，那麼造型團隊和燈光師即可從快門交替的休息時間干擾/整理自然光投射和模特兒因氣候而蓬亂褪色的髮妝衣飾。攝影引領流行雜誌讀者到「事件發生的時空裡」，卻因場景模特兒的「偽造」而表現了一種超現實的「美學符號」-----即衣飾本體的布料車工色彩與身形凹凸有致的高挑女神，於地中海灰岩岸的白色遊艇啜飲氣

泡香檳-----暗示著奢華貴族「氛圍」的視覺概念，於每月或每季於網路、實體店面或者展覽會場大量揭露，此具時效性，一段時間之後又會以另一超現實超完美的狀態相互於閱聽人之間傳閱。如果攝影的本質為紀實，是毫無矯飾的複製了真實，那麼流行時裝攝影是明目張膽的幻術，是各路藝術人馬集體精心安排的超現實。弔詭在於，許多為時裝雜誌拍攝的明星模特兒卻由拍攝的歷史記錄了自己的成長紀實，而讀者見證了無可避免衰老的無奈<sup>6</sup>。流行時裝不過是一種無法紀實的偷窺，為視覺服務，卻想促使觀者付出更多的代價去自我實現圖像中所揭露「美化」後的超現實。

美化後的超現實時裝攝影為團隊合作的心血，但其中「缺乏獨一性」仍影響時裝攝影至今難登藝術殿堂，與畫作平起平坐，為主要衝突之一。之二為當代藝術家作品實則經過畫商、策展人、藝評家、收藏家、投資者甚至是藝術家本身聯合製造出來。而許多攝影師為自由創作者，並無公關團隊拔刀相助。而且藝評家的批評筆觸也極少專注於某位攝影師於某其時裝攝影專題的比較研究，大眾聚焦力隨之下降。之三為雜誌時裝攝影每期的概念皆會影響合作對象的選定，藝術家團隊流動頻繁影響攝影師及作品的藝術性，不利於公關公司針對某一藝術創作者的作品宣傳推廣。但誠如荷蘭CODE雜誌總編兼發行人 Peter van Rhoon 所言：「我們所居住的世界，品牌就是文化的一部分，而雜誌正反映這樣的世界」(Hachiga 蜂賀亨 2010, 27)。一本雜誌的初始概念、團隊企劃、合作採訪、紙張選擇到印刷成品的複雜流程，本身就是一門藝術。其每刊背後無數的攝影師、造型團隊、插畫師、記者編輯及廣告公關等，都是一群充滿熱情的藝術家。雜誌就是藝術家們發光發熱的舞台，也應該是一枚引發無數靈感的藝術炸彈，更應擁有自己獨特的聲音：「那怕只是翻閱個半小時，但是那半小時看到的每一件事情都是美麗的」(《Wallpaper》Jeremy Langmead, Hachiga 蜂賀亨 2010, 001~003)。包羅不同形式的美感呈現，時裝攝影/雜誌當然是一門藝術，且可以說是廣為傳閱的大眾另類藝術。若要談論到台灣國際中文版的時裝攝影特輯大多直接轉印美國版的內容，或不過是增添幾頁本地影視歌星於攝影棚內展示法國設計師的服飾，於國際性和原創性，幾乎難有藝術精神。台灣國際中文版的《VOGUE 風尚》或《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》無須因其品牌的國際名聲而綁手綁腳，卻可思考加入其他發行國版本的內頁。最重要的在於，利

---

<sup>6</sup> 例如：影星鞏俐相較於 1991 年主演的《菊豆》的年輕青澀，和 2011 年於「《VOGUE》坎城影展幕後花絮」的自信風采。(Vogue)

用原創的攝影圖像告知閱聽人本地藝術家及亞洲各國設計師的作品，或是東方藥草茶對於女性美容美體的選擇，以期台灣女性讀者在觀看美國文化的當下，也可對照亞洲趨勢的脈動，進一步了解台灣藝術團隊的發展。

## 6 另類文化帝國主義

品牌既為後現代文化的一部分，擁有廣大視覺操縱權力的國際中文版女性雜誌主宰了商品廣告分配以及閱聽人的思考視野。而雜誌本身就是一牢不可破的名牌，名牌名人加持品牌，乃是全球流通的象徵符號，此其符號揉和了階級高低，美感與否的流行價值，是否女性閱聽人即認為雜誌扉頁的攝影商品才稱上是「好品牌」？購買名牌穿戴，模仿名人穿搭才算是「既潮又酷，跟得上國際脈動」？當國際中文版女性雜誌視覺影像深植女性閱聽人的購物指標時，外在觸域的複製實踐便是為「不落人後」的馬拉松賽跑，若此競賽的金援有限，那麼閱聽人仍會以仿擬複製的模式「假冒」或「假借」發展視覺一致性的全球化運動：

因此談名牌仿冒品，不能只用「模擬」(mimesis)理論中原版/複製 (the original/the copy)的抽象辯證概念，還必須要從以「視域」(the visual field)為主的「複製」(copy) (貌形神似、惟妙惟肖的視覺外觀)，擴展到以「觸域」(the contact zone)為主的「體驗」(embodiment) (符號上身時的感官經驗、購買使用展示時的攻守戰術與心理情緒等)。(Zhang 張小虹 2002, 3-4)

流行時尚皆為「隱喻」的女人，而國際中文版雜誌和名牌仿冒品也以「實質」的女人為主要消費顧客群，充滿偽裝虛榮或角色扮演的負面文化聯想。矛盾的是，許多女性閱聽人渴求國際中文版雜誌中所介紹的商品，卻懼於在大庭廣眾或工作場所撞衫撞包；而國際中文版女性雜誌在女性閱聽人之間傳閱流轉，無《VOGUE 時尚》或《Cosmopolitan 柯夢波丹》山寨盜版版本出現在夜市或傳統書報攤販售，反而是雜誌內頁大量轉印美國版的拍攝風格，其商品/服飾「鏡像」與美國「鏡像」的迴射繞徑，鼓勵了台灣部分服飾業者大量仿擬製造美國攝影服飾色澤及版型，以低價於夜市或捷運商家滿足台灣女性消費者之觸域想像。「慾望形式的完全複製」為資本主義擴張與興盛的中心思想，國際女性雜誌不過是視覺催化劑，其真正實驗目標為購買人的觸覺的獨占性。人口稠密、工商發達之處，視覺權力轉化為觸覺佔有性也

大幅增加。語言差異必須藉由翻譯轉換，但是圖片卻可匹敵千言萬語，成為一種新的「國際符號」(Universal symbol) 是一種「無重力、離根、去物質化的抽象形式，進而創造出「品牌一連結的全球」(logo-linked globe)、「品牌的美麗新世界」(brand new world)。「雜誌」不過是「理念」，商品是「實踐」；「國際品牌」是「本尊」，而實體商品是「分身」。這種「慾望形式的完全複製」所欲彰顯的不僅只是「國體」的思想主體及國家邊界不斷被「跨國集團」的全球資本流轉所鞏固，更是「跨國集團」建立全球一統的後現代帝國主義的向心力(例如：利潤積累與市場形象、消費慾望的生產操控)，不斷因全球擴散的「凝視力」而快速累積。

## 7 小結

女性流行雜誌的攝影仍為具備視覺美學的價值，只是藝術性價值因人而異。攝影、電影等機械複製手段的發明和運用，徹底改變了文化藝術的生存狀態。如果抽離其攝影的複製手段，流行體系是否會被遺忘漠視？以帝國史觀而論，如果帝國主義的一統本質為血流成河，當現代文化藝術已經離不開影像力量的同時，台灣讀者的視覺想像與消費自主是否也遭強暴式的大屠殺？一觸即發的攝影本質(shoot, shot, shot)或許已取代帝國主義的火藥長槍，女性雜誌攝影既是反應現實(模特兒、服飾、拍攝空間及攝影團隊的存在)，卻也自成一個封閉的世界-----一個假藉消弭差異卻實帝國思想的集團所精心打造的影像世界、一個企圖取代現實世界，藉由射殺(shooting)進行預言的功能，使觀者誤認影像即是自我實像，導致影像擁有者錯認持有影像即為握有實際經驗的鏡像。這種後現代的文化帝國主義足以摧毀攝影的最高使命：如其他藝術形式，即為向人類解釋人；先行肢解了許多台灣女性雜誌讀者探索傳統服飾美感之可能-----好如許多女孩不願身著旗袍的主因之一，為「著旗袍就像酒家女或低階中國餐館服務小姐」-----爾後進而建構另一嶄新且絕對對政治正確的美式/另類新秩序。但也正因如此，恐於撞衫撞包的負面思想，或業者仿擬複製以圖大發市利，其「受制」全球名牌時尚意識與「反制」文化帝國中心主義的雙重弔詭，我們才得以藉由國際中文版所反射的鏡像，進而咀嚼思考文化融合以及整體同質性的詭譎與質變。

## Summary

Since 1987, when the restriction on newspaper licensing of Taiwan was disposed of, the Government Information Office has been controlling only the pornographic publication. According to the emeritus president of Cite Publishing House Zhan Hong-Zhi's estimation, nearly 6000 kinds of magazines have been distributed in Taiwan in 2004. Focusing on the abilities of visual consumption, world publishers introduced American or European fashion magazines to Taiwanese in the 1990's; the Chinese edition of fashion magazines set the target readers on females. The founder of Condé Nast Media Group, Condé Nast, stated once that the major purpose to distribute female fashion magazines is to attract billions of female readers consume items published in the pages. Being a powerful commercial medium among the manufacturers, designers, advertisers, editorial groups and consumers, female fashion magazines offer visual pleasures and create vast global business opportunities. Herein, female fashion magazine itself is a kind of advertisement: the photography of every issue, word choices, celebrity interviews and the commercial advertisement, invariably, are tightly linked to the sales figures.

This essay focuses on the visual powers and modern conflicts of Taiwan's VOGUE Traditional Chinese edition by adopting Zhang Xiao-Hong's globalization study and Susan Sontag's *On Photography*, in order to discuss the impacts on the alternative imperialism of Taiwan since 1987. Since recording the reality is the hard core in photography, an "epidemic system" identifies the personal experiences of photographers: time and space are recorded immediately by photos. Taiwanese female readers "cut" the visual field and "paste" the contact zone by reading female fashion magazines. With the Chinese translation contexts, they passionately embrace American or European designers' collections but apathetically ignore the existence of the traditional garments. This essay aims at the discussion of visual power contradiction from the angle of epistemology photography under yet another alternative imperialism in Taiwan. This aim prompts me to explore the cultural conflicts, visual imagination and interior impacts of female readers in Formosa.

## References

- Barthes, Roland. 1990. *The Fashion System*. Translated by Matthew Ward and Richard Howard. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Berger, John. 1973. *Ways of Seeing*. London: Penguin Books.
- Chen, Jo Chun 陳柔均. 2006. “國際中文版女性雜誌內容本地化策略研究之分析” (“The Content Domestication Strategies of International Chinese Edition of Taiwan’s Women Magazine”). 台北: 中華傳播協會 Chinese Communication Society.
- Chen, Yao Wei 陳耀威. 2010. “推薦序:記錄、美學、良知----桑塔格的論攝影” (“Recommendation: Record, Aesthetics and Conscience—On Susan Sontag’s *On Photography*”), by Susan Sontag, translated by Chen Yao Wei. 《論攝影》台北: 麥田.
- Chou, Deng Yi Zhen 周鄧懿貞. 2006. 《全球化下的台灣女性流行時尚雜誌研究》 (*A Study of Globalization of Taiwan’s Women’s Fashion Magazine*) Master diss. 世新大學新聞學研究所論文 Shin Hsin University.
- Darwin, John 約翰. 達爾文. 2011. 《帖木兒之後:1405~2000年全球帝國史》 (*After Tamerlane: The Rise & Fall of Global Empires, 1405–2000*). 黃中憲譯. 台北: 野人.
- Gershon, Richard A. 1996. *The Transnational Media Corporation: Global Message and Free Market Competition*. London: Routledge.
- Hachiga, Toru 蜂賀亨. 2010. 《世界創意雜誌嚴選》 (*From Magazine: A Collection of Design Fashion Culture Magazines All Around the World*). 詹慕如譯. 台北: 大家出版.
- Klein, Naomi. 2000. *No Logo*. London: Flamingo.
- Li, Yu Hung 李昱宏. 2008. 《冷靜的暗房》 (*Darkroom Still*). 台北: 書林.
- “Li & Fung Limited, Liz Claiborne Inc.” 與立豐達成長期採購代理協議. Accessed August 2011. <http://202.66.146.82/listco/hk/lifung/press/cp090223.pdf>
- Luo, Ru Fang 羅如芳. 2005. 《國際中文版女性雜誌之市場行銷策略分析》 (*Marketing Strategy Analysis on Women’s Magazine—Chinese Edition*) Master diss. 國立台灣師範大學大眾傳播研究所論文 National Taiwan Normal University.
- Mulvey, Laura. 1989. *Visual and Other Pleasures*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Sontag, Susan. 2002. *On Photography*. 1973, 1977; London: Penguin.
- 《VOGUE時尚國際中文版》 (VOGUE International Chinese Edition). 2011. 台北: 康泰納仕亞太有限公司, Accessed August 2011, 351–3. <http://www.vogue.com.tw/tag/index.asp?tkeyword=鞏俐>
- Xu, Li Yu 許麗玉. 2011. “桂綸鎂的6種火紅面貌” (“6 Glamorous Faces of Gui Lun Mei”), 《VOGUE時尚國際中文版》 January 2011.

- Xu, Yi Jun 徐宜君. 2003. 《跨國出版集團在台灣市場的進入模式》 (*The Entry Mode of Transnational Enterprise at Taiwan Market*). Master diss. 國立台灣師範大學大眾傳播研究所碩士論文 National Taiwan Normal University.
- Zhang, Qiao Hung 張小虹. 2007. 《假全球化》 (*Fake Globalization*). 台北: 聯合文學.
- . 2007. 《穿衣與不穿衣的城市》 (*Chuan Yi Yu Bu Chuan Yi De Cheng Sh*). 台北: 聯合文學.
- . 2001. 《絕對衣性戀》 (*Absolute Fetishism*). 台北: 時報.
- . “假名牌、假理論、假全球化” (“Fake Designers’ Brands, Fake Theory and Fake Globalization”). 2002. 《重訪東亞: 全球. 區域. 國家. 公民》。文化研究學會 2002年學會, 3–4.
- Zhang, Yi Man 張意曼. 2003. 《從國際化理論的角度來看國際雜誌進入台灣市場的策略以美國及香港雜誌為例》 (*The Internationalization of Transnational Magazines in Taiwan: An Examination on the Stage Theory*) Master diss. 國立交通大學傳播所碩士論文 National Chiao Tung University.
- Zhu, Mei Fang 朱梅芳. 2011. “脫光換自信, 整形斯容自覺還是醜” (“Tuo Guang Huan Zi Xin, Zheng Xing Si Rong Hai Shi Jue De Chou”). 中時電子報娛樂版. Accessed February 23, 2011. <http://showbiz.chinatimes.com/showbiz/110511/112011022300010.html>



# **Cultural Transformations**



UDK: 908(510)

COPYRIGHT ©: MING-TE TU

## 禮的「俗化」與「宗教化」--以現代中國的婚禮與喪禮為例 台灣 高雄師範大學 杜明德 “Secularization” and “Religion” of Ceremony—Modern Chinese Wedding and Funeral

杜明德 Ming-Te TU\*

### 摘要

中國號為「禮義之邦」，「禮」對於中國人、家族、歷史、文化、政治發展等各方面都有深遠的影響。在傳統中國，「禮」的內涵包括貴族的飲食、婚姻、喪葬、祭祀等；而其傳播的型態，則主要透過儒家三《禮》經典及儒者講授，屬於貴族之學。但「禮」做為一般人民生活的規範準則，很早就出現「俗化」的現象，此在近現代中國人的婚禮儀式中甚為明顯。從另一個角度而言，「禮」的起源，與宗教相關；而宗教理論也可以彌補「禮」在形上思想的不足，因此，「禮」也可能出現「宗教化」的現象，此在近現代中國人的喪葬儀式中亦甚為明顯。本文將針對這兩個現象加以探討。

**關鍵字：**禮、婚禮、喪禮、俗化、宗教化

### Izvleček

Na Kitajskem, ki je označena kot »dežela ritualov«, ima »li (ritual)« daljnosežen vpliv na zgodovino, kulturo, družino, politični razvoj in ostala področja. V tradicionalni Kitajski konotacija »lija« obsega aristokratsko prehrano, poroke, pogrebe, žrtvovanja itd., medtem ko vzorec širjenja, večinoma s pomočjo treh konfucijanskih klasikov »lija« in predavanj konfucijancev, pripada aristokratskemu učenju. Vendar kot splošni standard življenja običajnih prebivalcev »li« zelo zgodaj postane tudi sekularen pojem, kar je še posebej vidno v poročnih ceremonijah moderne Kitajske. Na drugi strani je izvor »lija« lahko

---

\* Ming-Te Tu 杜明德, PhD, Associate professor, National Kaohsiung Normal University, Taiwan, R.O.C. E-mail: t1710@nknuc.nknu.edu.tw

povezan z religijo; teorija religije pa lahko prispeva k metafizični misli »lija«, zatoj lahko »li« nastopa tudi kot »religiozen« pojav, kar je ravno tako najbolj opazno v pogrebnih ritualih moderne Kitajske. Pričujoči članek bo poskušal proučiti oba pojava.

**Gljučne besede:** Li (ritual), poročna ceremonija, pogrebni ritual, »sekularni« pojav, »religiozni« pojav

## 1 前言

儒家思想是中國文化的主流，其主要內容是以「仁」和「禮」所建構的倫理價值體系，「仁」是內在的核心，「禮」是外在的規範。「禮」的出現，應與先民的生活習俗與原始信仰相關，但儒家在構建「禮」的思想體系時，明顯的賦予「禮」的「階級化」與「道德化」色彩，使「禮」脫離質樸的民俗性與神秘的宗教性，從而形成貴族階級普遍接受的道德原則，轉而內以自省，外以應對，再用之以教化百姓，使能化民成俗。有趣的是，傳統的「禮」在近現代的發展中，卻又似乎出現了「俗化」與「宗教化」的回歸傾向，這之中的發展脈絡，是值得我們探討的問題。

## 2 「禮」與「俗」

美國人類學家Robert Redfield在1956年出版的《Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization》一書中，曾用「大傳統」（Great tradition）和「小傳統」（Little tradition）說明庶民社會中存在的兩種不同文化傳統。「大傳統」是由國家與住在城鎮的士紳與貴族們所掌握、書寫的文化傳統；「小傳統」則存在於鄉村之中，庶民藉由口傳等方式流傳的大眾文化傳統。「大傳統」與「小傳統」間藉由貴族與庶民這兩者的相互依存，乃構成整個常民社會的文化傳統。同樣的概念，也可以用來說明中國的「禮」與「俗」。「禮」原本只是日常群體生活中自然形成的行為規範，儒家的知識份子將之整理成書。但後來儒家的知識份子所成就的「禮」，漸漸不侷限於常民的生活規範，而融入了更多的道德觀念、社會觀念與政治意涵，擴充了「禮」的內涵與範圍，卻也逐漸形成了「禮」的「貴族化」傾向，只有受過儒家教育的知識份子可以制定、解釋、運用「禮」，禮制條文所針對的對象也是「士」以上的「貴族」，庶人只能遵循「禮」，而不能「議禮」，「禮」遂成為中國文化中的「大傳統」，而有很明顯的階級色彩。

《周禮·大司徒》言：「以俗教安，則民不偷。」鄭玄《注》曰：「俗，謂土地所生息也。偷，謂朝不謀夕。」賈公彥則《疏》云：「俗，謂人之生處，習學不同。若變其舊俗，則民不安，而為苟且；若依其舊俗化之，則民安其業，不為苟且。」說明「俗」是各地的人民，因著時間、空間等差異，而產生的不同的生活習慣。「俗」未必有文字記載，常常只是口耳相傳，有些「俗」的起源眾說紛紜，甚至根本不可考，使得即使是相鄰的地區，民俗也可能有差異。「俗」的型態多半很質樸，甚而可能有些粗野，但「俗」畢竟已經是大家習以為常的行為模式，屬於集體生活的規範，比較貼近庶民的人情處世，故對常民的行為仍有一定的約制力量，故而「俗」不能隨意變動，更不可以輕視忽略。

雖然「禮」主要是貴族仕紳的文化規範，「俗」主要是庶民百姓的生活形態，但兩者並非對立，而應是相互滲透，互相影響的。如上所述，「禮」的原始樣貌，原本也只是日常群體生活中自然形成的行為規範，後來再經過知識份子的制訂規範、充實內涵及廣泛運用，才成為階級化禮制的面貌，故可謂「禮」仍本之於「俗」。但「禮」透過政治、教化的力量，卻可以轉而影響、指導或控制了「俗」，形成「俗」向「禮」的轉化，使得「小傳統」將「大傳統」具象化與淺易化，架構成俗民社會生存的共同模式。受了「禮」影響的「俗」，漸漸脫離了原始的質樸與粗野，而產生符合士人理想的「禮化的俗」，即所謂的「禮俗」。「禮俗」對於人民的約制力量，可能還超越了「俗」，因為「禮俗」是上層菁英用來教化百姓的工具之一，使百姓可以啟發理性，引生自律。統治者可以用「禮」節「俗」，並以「禮俗」教化百姓的政治目的。

### 3 禮的「俗化」--以現代中國的婚禮為例

在傳統中國，「禮」受到知識份子、統治階層的肯定，並對百姓的「俗」產生了一定的影響力量。但近代以來，中國已逐漸從農業社會轉型為工商社會，在原來農業生活形態下孕育的「禮俗」，漸漸與現代社會有了距離。又因為社會結構的變遷，「士」不再擁有絕對的尊崇；傳統的「大家族式」生活模式，也漸漸被「小家庭」給取代，都使得原本支持傳統「禮俗」的基礎有了

轉變。「禮」與「俗」的關係，發生微妙的轉變，常民意識逐漸興起，貴族色彩逐漸淡化，「禮」的「俗化」於焉發生。

以婚禮為例，傳統中國的婚禮步驟，主要可以溯源自《儀禮·士昏禮》的「六禮」--「納采」、「問名」、「納吉」、「納徵」、「請期」、「親迎」，但後代踵事增華，婚禮儀節頗為繁複。朱子《家禮》將婚禮「六禮」併為「三禮」--「納采」、「納幣」、「親迎」，但在「親迎」之後，仍列有「主人禮賓」、「婦見舅姑、諸尊長」、「廟見」、「壻見婦之父母、親黨」等儀程。明成祖永樂年間，曾頒行朱子《家禮》於天下，明示以朱子《家禮》為庶民行日常禮儀依歸，滿清入主中國之後，積極漢化，於《家禮》也未有太多改易，故朱子《家禮》所制訂的婚禮範式，可以視為明、清兩代常民百姓遵用的婚姻禮俗。歸納傳統的婚姻禮俗，筆者以為有三個特色：

(一) 重家族：男女論婚需有「父母之命」，且整個儀式的過程之中，父母、親人，甚至是過世的祖先，都佔有很重要的角色，進而有「包辦婚」的現象，男女雙方的意願反而不受重視。

(二) 論婚財：婚禮儀程中，男方不斷向女方輸送財物，此或可以視為男方對女方的保障，或可以視為對女方的補償，但後來女方也講究向男方輸送嫁妝，雙方遂有「以利言婚」的現象。

(三) 男為主：此可以再分為兩個層面來說，其一為婚禮的主要步驟都是由男方主動的，即《禮記·郊特牲》及〈昏義〉所說的「男先於女」之義；其二，在父系社會下，男尊女卑，雖然傳統婚禮儀式中，不斷強調「合兩姓之好」、「男女親合」，實際上仍是以男方及其親族為重。

民國以後，社會風氣大開，婚姻自主風氣興起，男女講求自由戀愛，婚禮也自己安排，親族的色彩淡化，民初至今流行的結婚儀式，參用中西禮儀，更有別於中國舊式婚禮。也由於傳統婚禮儀節的規範性降低，使得原本就存在各地的婚俗蓬勃發展，堂而皇之的在婚禮中展現出來，且具有一定的約制力量。若統計《中華全國風俗志》（胡樸安，2011）的記載，1930年代中國各地存在的特殊婚俗有 20 幾種之多，若再加上《台灣舊慣習俗信仰》（鈴木清一郎，1984）對台灣地區婚俗的記載，現代中國的婚俗多達 30 種以上。中國幅員遼闊，種族多元，實際上保有的各地婚俗，可能還遠遠超過這些數字，這些婚俗部分有相似性，如「相親」、「提親」、「跨火盆」、「鬧洞房」、「回門」等，但大部分都保有很明顯的「區域性」及「變異性」

等民俗特色。而且這些繽紛多姿的婚姻習俗，多半發生在「親迎」當天，筆者以為可以分為五大類：

- (一) 難新郎：例如新郎至女方家迎娶新娘時，女方親友進行「攔門」，多方阻撓男方迎娶行列，但方式通常不會很激烈，眾人在嬉戲笑鬧聲中，男方最終還是能娶得美人歸。這類使新郎在親迎當日受到阻難的民俗，應與原始的「掠奪婚」(marriage by capture) 型態相關，男方既是前來掠奪，女方親友自然會想辦法抵抗，只是習俗演變至今，這些阻難的方式，多半都只有象徵性的意義，而不是真正的攔阻了。
- (二) 護新娘：此類民俗活動，在「親迎」過程中甚為常見。例如在浙江蕭山地區，在新娘登轎之前，先由一位老婦手拿一面鏡子，並點燃一支蠟燭，向轎內四處照射，俗稱「搜轎」，唯恐妖魔潛伏轎內，加害新娘。台灣地區則普遍存在新娘離家上車前及下車至夫家時，必須用八卦米篩或黑傘遮蔽的習俗，也是為了壓邪去晦，保護新娘。另外，當新娘臨近新郎家大廳門檻時，門檻前會擺著一個火爐，火爐之前放置一塊瓦片，新娘子在進門前要踏破瓦片、過火爐，也有破除邪穢的意思。
- (三) 戲新人：戲弄新人的民俗中，最普遍的應該就是「鬧洞房」。「鬧洞房」還可分為「文鬧」與「武鬧」，「文鬧」是以詩詞、歌謠等戲弄新人，或者說些有性暗示的謎語或笑話讓新人為難，又或者是請新人吃各種帶有吉祥意涵的食物，如饅頭、水餃、瓜果、湯圓等。「武鬧」則以肢體的碰觸為主，早期的「武鬧」民俗，多以碰觸新娘為樂，近來的「武鬧」則轉變以要求新人做出親密舉動為主，使新人感到羞澀不安，藉以嬉鬧。
- (四) 祈子嗣：「傳宗接代」是中國人結婚的重要目的，因此在婚姻的民俗中，有部分與「求子」相關。如相傳已久的「撒帳」，向新人身上撒放糖果、瓜子、鮮花等，以祈祝新人多子多孫，現代婚俗中，向新人身上投撒花瓣、彩帶，或許也可以視為這種傳統婚俗的轉變。
- (五) 求平安：婚禮是禮之本，有著家庭和諧、家族延續的重要意義，人們莫不希望婚禮的程序順利進行，新人的未來順利平安。因此在各地婚俗中，有許多活動與祈求平安相關，且這類的民俗活動，有許多都是以「諧音」的方式產生意義。

傳統儒家的婚禮，重視的是婚禮是「禮之本」、「禮之體」及世代交替、綿延不絕的重要意義，因此在各項婚禮的步驟中，特別強調其莊重、神聖、恭敬的意涵。但婚姻終究是人生大事，除了藉由一定的儀式以「過關」（rites of passage），親友們參與其中，使婚禮產生熱鬧的氣氛，並祈祝新人幸福快樂，也是人情之常。上述的婚俗活動，有些可以使新人增加互動，有些可以使雙方親友快速認識彼此，有些則是代表著親友們最虔誠的祝福，均有其實質上的意義，故只要不傷大雅，常常是與婚禮並存，甚而超越了婚禮，而成為民間成婚過程中不可或缺的儀式，婚禮中自然而然融合了這些婚俗，也就形成了「禮」向「俗」的轉化。

#### 4 「禮」與「宗教」

「禮」的起源，與原始的祭祀行為相關。先民們對於不可測知的力量抱持著敬畏之心，畢恭畢敬的加以祭祀，以祈求平安，既然是祭祀神鬼，當有一定的儀式，又需誠敬莊嚴，言行當受一定約束，有既定的儀式，又重言行的束縛，這些莊嚴的心理狀態、言行規範，就是「禮」在原始時期的質樸樣貌。但這種單純的祭祀活動，並沒有太多神秘奧妙，也不特別講求靈應感通。因此，禮的起源可以說是一種原始的祭祀迷信，與宗教相關，但卻不能直接認定「禮」起源於「宗教」。

儒家利用原始祭祀時的言行規範、心理狀態，並加以擴充應用範圍，以為人行事之準則，漸漸架構了「禮」。但儒家的知識份子最終強調的仍是現世關懷，代表理性主義的特別形式，透過人類行為，尋求對於天道、社會秩序及內在和諧的保證，強調生存於現實社會中的個人，如何自處及與他人相處。因此後來經過儒家的知識份子所發展的「禮」，也沒有神秘的宗教性。也就是說，「禮」在發展過程中，特別強調了道德倫理、政治運用，而產生了「去宗教化」的現象。因為儒家所發展的禮治文化，可以安排倫理名分以組織社會，也可以設為禮樂揖讓以涵養理性，相信自我的道德提升就可以使現世人生安穩，自然無須宗教外力以論出世慰藉。

## 5 禮的「宗教化」--以現代中國的喪禮為例

傳統中國喪禮，主要依《儀禮·士喪禮》、《儀禮·既夕禮》、《儀禮·士虞禮》、《儀禮·喪服》及《禮記·喪大記》、《禮記·奔喪》、《禮記·問喪》、《禮記·服問》、《禮記·喪服小記》、《禮記·三年問》諸篇所記，規範出「遷寢」、「廢床」、「易衣」、「屬纊」、「復」、「赴」、「撫衾」、「楔齒」、「綴足」、「沐浴」、「襲衣」、「飯含」、「為銘」、「設重」、「小斂」、「大斂」、「備明器」、「停殯」、「筮宅」、「卜日」、「出殯」、「反哭」、「虞祭」、「卒哭」與「祔祭」等幾項主要步驟。而綜觀傳統中國喪禮，我們可以借用《荀子·禮論》之說，歸納出幾項特色：

- (一) 事死如生：《荀子·禮論》說：「喪禮者，以生者飾死者也，大象其生以送其死也。故事死如生，事亡如存，終始一也。」受靈魂不滅思想的影響，認為死者雖然已經死亡，但仍如生人一樣需要奉養。
- (二) 以死教生：《荀子·禮論》亦言：「禮者，謹於治生死者也。生，人之始也；死，人之終也。終始俱善，人道畢矣。故君子敬始而慎終，終始如一，是君子之道，禮義之文也。」故傳統的中國喪葬禮俗必須傳承以死教生的價值意義，故從明確的禮數異等、身心安頓、情感宣洩、孝道傳承，均可見以死教生、人文化成的意涵。
- (三) 每動愈遠：《荀子·禮論》言：「喪禮之凡，變而飾，動而遠，久而平。」雖然中國的喪禮強調「慎終」，故事死如生，並妥善收藏、埋葬死者，但最終不能以死傷生，死者既然已經漸漸遠去，生者的情緒就必須慢慢平復，充分展現出中國傳統喪禮中的理性精神。

儒家的喪禮所展現出來的，主要是基於理性主義所形成的人文精神，因而落實在喪儀中，也較凸顯其家族的、道德的、社會的及現世的教化意義，符合中國社會的家族中心結構，故普遍被社會大眾接受。但正是因為這樣的人文、理性與重視現世，並不能真正解除人們心中對於死亡的原始恐懼、想像和疑問，「人死了之後，到哪裡去？」「死後的世界是怎麼樣的？」「生人與死者可以溝通聯繫嗎？」這些疑惑和想望，儒家的喪禮全無提及，卻恰好是大部分宗教都會討論的。也就是說，儒家喪禮對於來世及超自然界的論述不足，正好給了宗教化行為進入喪禮的空間。

中國民間的喪葬儀節，在魏晉以後就有與佛教、道教等科儀法事相結合的現象，主要是為亡者消災薦福，民眾在辦理喪事時，會請法師或道士來做法事或道場，為亡者誦經超度與消災解孽，如此一來，生者與亡者就有了聯繫，生者甚而可以為亡者多作一些法事，以消除生者的不安或遺憾，等於是擴大了原來喪禮傳統的內涵。雖然在喪禮中增加了一些新的祭祀或誦經活動，但並沒有破壞原有的儒家喪禮儀節，雙方正好可以相互增補或擴充，因此在民間頗為流行。直到近現代中國，傳統禮制的影響力下降，喪禮「宗教化」的趨向更為明顯，雖然因為各個地區宗教發展的差異性，儀式過程與內容會有些出入，不過大抵可以分為「開魂路」及「做功德」兩套法事系統。「開魂路」是指請法師或道士到家中設壇舉行法事，為亡者指靈開路、誦經超度、赦免罪過，使亡者得以開道行路，回歸陰間。「做功德」則是由佛教「做七」發展出來的宗教法事，喪家請法師或道士等宗教人員到家中舉行誦經、拜懺、放焰口、燒庫錢、打齋等儀式來超度死者亡魂，助其早日投生。在宗教上，道教與佛教雖然分立為二，但在喪葬儀式上，兩者沒有明顯的區隔，經常相互混同或合用，且在現代中國社會中，明顯與儒家喪禮結合，形成「儒、佛、道」三者會通的現象。在具體的儀式操作過程中，「儒、佛、道」三者具有可以轉換、互補的特性，形式雖然不同，但其內涵卻可以連續而相通，使人們在禮儀道德的層面可以顧及，也完成形上超自然的想望。傳統喪禮的「宗教化」於焉完成。

## 6 結語

「禮」雖然是中國傳統文化的精髓，但隨著現代化社會的來臨，也應該考慮人情之所需、事物之變革、人物之名分，而展現最適宜的作法。畢竟時代已經改變，傳統古禮若不與時俱進，終將被時代淘汰，而禮的「俗化」或「宗教化」，雖然未必能完全符應儒家學者的期待，其實應該是順應「禮」的發展而自然出現的，也符合制禮行禮的原則。

其次，本文雖分論婚禮的「俗化」與喪禮的「宗教化」，但實則兩者之間也有交融的現象。充分展現地方色彩的中國婚姻禮俗中，亦有宗教行為滲入；而受道教、佛教影響的中國喪葬儀節中，也因各地區的作法有所不同。是以不論是「俗化」或「宗教化」，只要是不傷大雅—不違背「禮」的內涵精神，都應是被中國社會所接受的，這也是我們應該留意的地方。

## Summary

Although “etiquette” is the essence of traditional culture in China, due to the development of modern society, its perspective should include the requirement of human sympathy, transformation of objects, and the role or duty associated with one’s title so that an appropriate manner can be well maintained. The times have changed and if the traditional etiquette cannot follow the steps of civilization, it will be eliminated. Contemporary Chinese weddings have become popularized and funerals religionized; however, they cannot completely meet the expectations of the Confucianists, but rather follow the development of etiquette, while conforming to the principles underlying the legislation and implementation of the rules of etiquette.

Furthermore, integration can be found in the phenomenon of popularized weddings and religionized funerals, fully making it obvious that religious behavior has combined with the local wedding ceremonies. Because of the influence of Taoism and Buddhism, local folklore characteristics can be seen in funeral rites. As a result, if the connotations of the etiquette are maintained, whether it is a popularized or religionized ceremony, such etiquette can still be accepted by the society.

## References

- Hu, Pu-An 胡樸安. 2011. 中華全國風俗志 (*The Records of Chinese Customs*). 上海: 科學技術文獻出版社.
- Hu, Shi 胡適. 1967. 中國古代哲學史 (*History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy*). 台北: 商務印書館.
- Huang, You-Zhi 黃有志. 1988. 我國傳統喪葬禮俗與當前台灣喪葬問題研究 (*The Study of China’s Traditional Funerary Rites and Taiwan Funeral*). 台北: 政治大學博士論文.
- Li, Feng-Mao 李豐楙. 1994. 道教與中國人的生命禮俗, 收錄於宗教與生命禮俗 (*Taoism and Chinese Life Rituals*). 台北: 靈鷲山般若文教基金會國際佛學研究中心.
- Redfield, Robert. 1956. *Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Suzuki, Seiichiro 鈴木清一郎. 1984. 台灣舊慣習俗信仰 (*Taiwan’s Traditional Customs and Religious*). 台北: 眾文圖書公司.

Ming-Te TU: “Secularization” and “Religion” of Ceremony

Qian, Mu 錢穆. 1970. 中國文化叢談 (*Essays of Chinese Culture*). 台北: 三民書局有限公司.

Zheng, Zhi-Ming 鄭志明. 2010. 中國殯葬禮儀學新論 (*The New View of the Chinese Funeral Rites*). 北京: 東方出版社.

UDK: 172.15(510):(4+9)

COPYRIGHT@GUANGQIU XU

## Chinese Anti-Western Nationalism, 2000–2010

Guangqiu XU\*

### Abstract

Anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese in the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, not the first global surge in recent years, reached a high in 2008. One could ask how and why those sentiments developed when the Western states claimed to present no threat to China at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The subject of Chinese nationalism have aroused increasing academic interest, and many books and articles have been published, but Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the first years of the new century has not yet become the object of adequate scholarly scrutiny. This article will trace the source of Chinese nationalism and examine the formation of such anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese people from 2000 to 2010.

**Keywords:** Nationalism, Anti-West, China

### Izveleček

Protizahodni občutki med Kitajci v prvem desetletju 21. stoletja, ki ne predstavlja prvega globalnega vzpona v zadnjih letih, so dosegli vrh leta 2008. Lahko bi se vprašali, kako in zakaj so se tovrstni občutki razvili, ko zahodne države zatrjujejo, da ne predstavljajo nobene grožnje Kitajski na prelomu 21. stoletja. Tema kitajskega nacionalizma je vzbudila naraščajoče zanimanje med akademiki, številne knjige in članki so bili že objavljeni, vendar kitajski antizahodni nacionalizem na začetku 21. stoletja še vedno ni postal predmet ustrezne akademske raziskave. Pričujoči članek bo sledil izvoru kitajskega nacionalizma ter raziskoval formacijo tovrstnih antizahodnih občutkov med Kitajci od leta 2000 do 2010.

**Ključne besede:** nacionalizem, anti-zahodni, Kitajska

---

\* Guangqiu Xu, Professor of History, Friends University, USA, Visiting Professor of Xi'an International Studies University, China. E-mail address: xu@friends.edu

## **1 Introduction**

The 2000s witness a surge of Chinese anti-West nationalism in the world. Many Chinese openly excoriated Western countries for considering China as competitor, constantly spying on China's territories, promoting prejudice against the Chinese, demonizing China, attempting to destabilize China's Olympic moment, promoting Tibetan independence, putting economic pressure on China, interfering with China's internal affairs in the name of human rights, and others. Anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese in the 2000s, not the first global surge in recent years, reached a high in 2008. Ahead of the Beijing Olympics, constant Western attacks against Beijing on such issues as the Darfur conflict, global warming, protests in Tibet, and human rights abuses increasingly enraged many Chinese. Inside China, large-scale anti-French demonstrations were seen in more than twenty cities after the disruption of the Olympic torch relay in Paris and French President Sarkozy's threat to shun the Olympic Games opening ceremony. Outside China, almost every pro-Tibetan protest was significantly overwhelmed by a greater pro-China protest all over the world. City streets and university campuses in many countries were filled with outraged Chinese demonstrators, waving red flags and chanting patriotic songs. One could ask how and why those sentiments develop when the Western states claim to present no threat to China at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The subject of Chinese nationalism have aroused increasing academic interest, and many books and articles have been published (Gries 2004; Guo 2004; Leibold 2007; Hughes 2006; Karl 2002; Wu 2007; Shen 2007; Wong 1989; Laitinen 1990; Friedman 1992; and Unger 1996), but Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s has not yet become the object of adequate scholarly scrutiny. This article will trace the source of Chinese nationalism and examine the formation of such anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese people from 2000 to 2010.

## **2 The Rise of New Anti-Western Nationalism**

Anti-Western sentiment in China was growing in the 1990s and reached a high point in May 1999 when thousands of demonstrators went to the streets in main cities to protest against NATO air force that had alleged to wrongly bomb China's embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia and took life three and wounded twenty Chinese. Demonstrators were in conflict with police at the American embassy in Beijing, destroying cars and windows. More than 170,000 people massed in front of the

U.S. consulate in Chengdu for several days following the bombing, and protesters set fire to the U.S. consul's residence in that city. Police in Guangzhou in South China warned Western residents to stay indoors. The U.S. and British governments issued travel advisories for their citizens in China, urging them to remain in their hotels or homes. Protests in front of the U.S. and British embassies were the biggest anti-West demonstrations in China since the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s (Xu 2001, 151–62).

A significant anti-Western backlash among the Chinese occurred in 2008 due to two major incidents. One is the alleged Western media bias, especially with regard to the March 2008 Tibet riots. The other is the 2008 demonstrations during the Olympic torch relay. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of many Chinese cities to denounce France and call for a boycott of French goods while hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese throughout the world were protesting against the Western media bias.

The anti-Western sentiment increased in 2009 when a book, *Unhappy China—The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges*, was published in March 2009 (“Unhappy China” 2009). Written by Song Qiang and other four authors, *Unhappy China*, a collection of essays, argues that China has been too respectful to the Western world which is still hostile toward China. This book is a continuation to the popular anti-Western book, *China Can Say No*, written by the same author, Song Qiang, as well as three others and published in 1996 (“On Sino-U.S. Relationships” 2009). This new book encourages the Chinese government to become more aggressive rather than to be inactive in dealing with the West. This hot-selling book is stimulating debate among Chinese about nationalism and China's position in the world. The authors contend that China needs to use its growing power and economic resources to set up its own position of dominance, claiming that the Chinese are most qualified to take the lead in the world in perspective of the human history, while the Westerners should be the second. After being released on March 13, this book became the bestseller on the list in China. The publisher claimed that it initially printed 270,000 copies, but 100,000 copies were sold just in the month after its publication (Hille 2009).

Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s was different from that in the 1990s. In the 1990s, anti-Western protests and complaints happened, by and large, mainly in mainland China. Most demonstrators and protestors did not use internet widely as a means for communication. In comparison to anti-Western nationalism

in China in the 1990s, Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s has two major characteristics.

First, the overseas Chinese played a more important role than the Chinese in mainland China. Prior to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, the international leg of the Olympic torch relay was subject to extensive protests mainly due to China's human rights record and Tibetan independence. Pro-Tibetan supporters aimed at the Olympic relay around the world. In London, for example, thirty-seven people were arrested when protestors clashed with police as the torch made its way through the city. In Paris, the relay was cut short and the torch was transported by bus after demonstrators interrupted the relay. Demonstrations also took place in Athens, Istanbul, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Canberra, Nagano, and Seoul between March and April 2008 ("Clashes Along Olympic" and "Olympic Torch" 2008).

The Chinese were enraged. The Paris protest triggered special rage among the Chinese around the world when a Chinese female athlete in a wheelchair had to safeguard the flame from hecklers. Overseas Chinese lost no time in arranging "pro-China" counter-protests at the torch march. Protesters targeting the Olympics torch relay to oppose the Beijing government encountered counter-demonstrations by forceful and exciting Chinese living and studying overseas in defence of the Beijing Olympics. The Chinese were also protesting Western media coverage of the recent rioting in Tibet while protecting the Olympic torch relay from attackers. Counter-demonstrations against Tibetan separatism and Western media prejudice created headlines and editorials in major cities as the torch made its way throughout the world. Large-scale counter-protests of overseas Chinese and foreign-based Chinese nationals became the largest in the later parts of the relay. For the first time since 1989, overseas Chinese have become worldwide reports when they voiced disapproval in great numbers against the West and showed their support for the Chinese government (MacArtney 2008; Anast 2008; "Argentine Torch"; "Anti-China Protest"; "Bangkok Relay"; "Rival Demonstrators"; and "San Francisco").

Second, Chinese anti-Western nationalism in the 2000s is distinguished from that in the 1990s because the Internet played a more important part in inciting and expressing anti-Western sentiments. In the rise of new Chinese nationalism in the 2000s, the Chinese used websites and online chat rooms to express their anti-Western sentiments. Chinese anti-Western feelings on the Internet are more

pronounced than the broader feelings of the Chinese on the streets throughout the world (Ford 2008). In the 2000s, there has been an increase in chauvinistic, racist attacks in China's online chat rooms presented in extreme language and aimed at the West. For example, when U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice was visiting Beijing in March 2005, many active Chinese participants in the online community of the Internet attacked her in China's online chat rooms (Liu 2005). An anti-French sentiment on Chinese web sites was rising in April 2008, including calls for economic embargo against all French manufactured products and goods immediately after President Nicolas Sarkozy openly claimed to boycott the Olympic Games ("Chinese Nationalism" 2008).

Some Chinese also launch cyber warfares against the Western media websites whenever they think there is a bias against the Chinese. Though CNN, the cable news network, is available only in diplomatic compounds, high-end condominiums, and major five-star hotels in China, Chinese are still able to read reports from CNN as well as the BBC and to watch videos on YouTube. During the 2008 Tibet demonstrations, although the Chinese government restricted foreign media coverage about the disturbances, many Chinese were able to watch Western media reporting, soon becoming very angry. The Chinese web users, instead of turning to civil turbulence, backed the Chinese government and condemned Western news coverage of Tibet, calling it incorrect and biased with anti-China attitude. Following CNN's allegedly biased reporting regarding the March 2008 unrest in Tibet, CNN became a particular target of anger. Its website was hacked and replaced with a page announcing that "Tibet was, is, and always will be a part of China." CNN workers were forced to leave their Beijing headquarters during that time and retreated to a neighbouring hotel after they were flooded by irritated calls, as well as some intimidating violence (Magnier 2008).

Some Chinese web users create websites to challenge Western media's reporting of China. Rao Jin, a 23-year old student, created an anti-CNN.com website, portraying Western media reporting as white superiority (Deng 2009; Mostous 2008). Considering that Western media news stories include falsifications, this website claimed that it was participating in "a struggle of resistance against Western hegemonic discourse". On the website, there is a slogan, "The World's Leader of Liars", and a photo that CNN ran on its website showing green security motor vehicle leaving behind an upturned car. On this photo, however, off to the right, the rock-throwing Tibetan protesters were cropped out. The website asks, "Your feeling about this manipulated photo?" The website also criticized several

other U.S., British, and German media for running shots of Nepalese police identified as Chinese battling rioters. The number of visitors to the anti-CNN.com website reached 100,000 only just one week after it was created on March 21 (Kwok 2008).

Chinese internet users, in China and overseas, claimed that some Western media sources had given dishonest reports about the Tibet riots in March 2008. They posted thousands of angry messages on websites and made strange crank calls to some Western media offices in Beijing. The Chinese internet users were more belligerent than those on the streets, as Tong Zeng, who facilitated the anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005, says that resentment about Tibet on the Internet was more articulated than wide-ranging emotion on the streets (Yardley, 2008).

### **3 The Sources of Anti-Western Nationalism**

The new type of anti-Western nationalism mainly comes from four sources: Chinese government's patriotism campaigns and anti-Western propaganda, the pride of Chinese people in their successful economic achievements, Western governments' policies toward Beijing, and Western media's bias against the Chinese.

#### **3.1 Official Propaganda Campaigns**

At the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Chinese government continues to preach patriotism—love of and loyalty to, or zealous support of, one's country. The Chinese leadership exploits patriotism for several reasons. First, as the orthodox ideology has waned drastically, if not completely, in Chinese political life, and many Chinese have lost their confidence in Communism and Marxism, the leadership finds that it has little alternative but to cultivate national pride and patriotism to hold the country together during its rapid, turbulent transformation. Patriotism may be both a great driving force to encourage the Chinese people to revitalize the nation and a banner under which to unify different ethnic groups. Second, Beijing's call for patriotism is designed to counteract regional decentralization, to divert attention from inequalities, such as the unequal distribution of wealth and the gap between the cities and countryside, to avoid civil unrest, and to shift public attention from domestic to international problems.

Before 2000, unfilled political slogans and boring teachings dominated traditional propaganda campaigns. Realizing that the traditional approach to propaganda has not attracted the public attention, particularly the youth, the Chinese leadership began to adopt new approaches to promote the patriotic education campaign (Wang 2008, 782–806). In October 2004, ten ministries of the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such as Ministry of Education and the Propaganda Department, jointly issued a statement, “Suggestions to Reinforce and Advance the Patriotic Education.” This official paper encourages government offices and education units to use a variety of educational methods, especially entertainment, as a means to promote patriotic education campaigns. They persuaded the Chinese to watch 100 chosen red films, read 100 chosen red books, and sing 100 chosen red songs, all of which focus on Chinese national humiliation in modern China. One of the 100 red books, titled *Mo Wang Guo Chi* (*Never Forget State Humiliation*), is on the list (*Mo Wang Guochi* 2002).

The Chinese government also began to build many museums and public monuments to promote patriotic education. The central government established 100 national-level demonstration bases for ideological reeducation while local governments began to found provincial-level and county-level patriotic education bases. Thus, several provinces spent more than 10 million Chinese Yuan yearly creating patriotic bases (“Zhongxunbu fuze” 2001). By 2006, five provinces or centrally administered municipalities—Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui—have established more than 400 provincial-level bases and nearly 2,000 county-level patriotic education bases. More than 10,000 memory sites were created, and visiting these memory sites is becoming a normal part of all schools’ set of courses (Wang 2006).

To urge more people to visit those patriotic education bases, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council started a red tourism campaign, a program to sponsor people to visit the former revolutionary bases and landmarks. In 2004, over 20 million tourists visited more than 150 major red tourism sites in thirteen provinces and municipalities (“China Boosts” 2005). The National Bureau of Tourism of China named 2005 “Year of Red Tourism” and published a list of 100 red tourism points so as to promote a campaign of “Education with Tourism”. From 2004 to 2007, more than 400 million Chinese people participated in the red tourism program, visiting such popular destinations as Chairman Mao Zedong’s

birthplace in Hunan province and the CCP's sacred place—Yanan in Shaanxi Province—the CCP's revolutionary capital before 1949 (“Red Tourism” 2007).

The Chinese leaders also use national and traditional holidays to pursue a campaign of patriotic education, such as the New Year, Spring Festival, Women's Day, Labour Day, Youth day, Children's Day, the CCP's Birthday, Army Day, and National Day. The patriotic subjects are especially emphasized during the holiday celebrations. Besides, the Chinese government annually organizes a series of activities to celebrate several important anniversaries of historical events. In 2005, for example, the Beijing government initiated a grand campaign to memorialize the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Anti-Japanese War all over China.

The Chinese leaders understand that to incite patriotism without any opponents is impossible, and that Chinese nationalism would not be sustained without an obvious rival. Beijing concentrates on China's humiliating past to stir up consciousness of suffering, underscoring the theme of disgrace on the Chinese brought by the West during the patriotic education campaigns. To heighten the traditional feeling of humiliation of a weak China, bullied by the West over the past 150 years, the Beijing government tries to convince the Chinese that China was a leading power in the world before 1839 and that the Chinese nation-state was declining and the Chinese were suffering significantly at the hands of Western powers from 1839 to 1949 because of Western powers' invasion, bringing humiliation upon the Chinese. For instance, in his speech at the 2001 Conference celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the founding of the CCP, the CCP leader Jiang Zemin, glorifying the chief achievements of the CCP, claimed that the modern Chinese history has shown that, without the CCP, New China would not have been born, and that it is the CCP which brings to an end the humiliation on the Chinese and secures China's national independence (“Jiang Zemin's Speech” 2001). Humiliation education campaign is to keep the nationalistic enthusiasm going in order to mobilize domestic support for the CCP.

The Beijing government also claims that today some Western powers that are hostile towards the Chinese are still posing a threat to China's integrity and independence. On March 2, 2009, for example, the Information Office of the State Council of China published a white paper entitled “Tibet's Democratic Reform in the Past Fifty Year”. The white paper asserts that “Western anti-China forces” in favour of the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama are guilty of disregarding historical facts concerning Tibet, and that the so-called Tibet issue is absolutely not an ethnic, religious nor

human rights issue; more exactly, it is the Western anti-China forces' endeavour to contain, split, and demonize China" ("Fifty Years" 2009).

China's media censorship itself is a factor in fostering anti-Western sentiment among the Chinese. Media in China always gives a one-sided view of the West. In international reporting, by means of choosy inclusion and exclusion, the press in China is very aggressive in promoting the anti-Western theme, which increases the suspicious of the Chinese towards the West. Stanley Rosen writes that the media censorship has helped cultivate "increasing suspicion and distrust" of the Western countries, the United States in particular, and justify the motivation for the Beijing government's "self-serving" policy (Rosen 2003, 97–118).

To build a politically, economically, and culturally unified China without Western influences which are regarded as threatening to the foundation of the Chinese government, Beijing promotes official propaganda on Chinese national humiliation and Western hostility toward China so as to urge the Chinese to wipe clean national humiliation and to increase Chinese's suspicions of the West. Under such situation, an average Chinese believes that China, once the world's greatest civilization, has fallen from grace and has suffered from poverty, Western domination, and numerous civil wars after the British defeated the Chinese during the Opium War of 1839–41.

Beijing's campaigns to incite profound sense of humiliation among the Chinese help foster anti-Western sentiments. In 2007, the Committee of 100, with assistance of Zogby International and Horizon Research Consultancy Group, published a report. According to the public opinion polls in this report, many Chinese still suspect the West's motives towards China, resulting basically from historical experiences and specifically the century of humiliation. The polls report writes, "Nearly half of the Chinese feel that the U.S. is trying to prevent their country from becoming a great power." ("Hope and Fear" 2007) After studying the emergence of new Chinese nationalism, Peter Gries concludes that anti-Western sentiment, once created and encouraged by the Beijing government, has been taken up by the Chinese new youths, and the popular nationalism profoundly rooted in an account of past humiliations at the hands of the West will have an impact on the 21<sup>st</sup> century China and the world (Gries 2004, 58).

### 3.2 Chinese Pride

At the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many people believe that the 21<sup>st</sup> century belongs to China because China has an economic miracle in the world with an annual GDP rate of approximately 10% in the past three decades. The global financial crisis in the late 2000s, the worst economic catastrophe since the Great Depression of the 1930s, resulted in the collapse of the large financial institutions, the failure of major businesses, and extensive declines in stock markets all over the world (“Three Top” 2009).

In contrast to the West, China’s economy is making significant progress. By 2010, China has surpassed Germany to become the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world, and China’s GDP became the world’s second largest economy after the United States, exceeding Japan’s. Today, China produces more cars, builds more miles of high-speed railroad, has more cell phone users, and constructs more wind power than any other countries in the world. In addition, China is moving from export dependency to development of a domestic market so as to reduce China’s economic reliance heavily on Western market. Many Chinese believe that China could become the world’s largest economy sometime as early as 2020. Economic success certainly resulted in rising of living standard. China’s economic miracle has enhanced Chinese people’s welfare. Chinese standard of living has increased drastically, especially from 2000 to 2010. Wages in many cities and towns have been rapidly rising, and thousands of hundreds of peasants moving from countryside to urban areas yearly make more money than they did ten years ago (Ren 2012).

More importantly, China’s economic wonder contributes to Chinese satisfaction and pride. China’s economic miracle encourages the Beijing government and Chinese scholars to make an effort to show the world, especially many Asian and Africa countries, that China’s political and economic system would be another pattern, instead of Western model (Western democracy and market economy), to achieve economic expansion. Today, many Chinese have a righteous pride in China’s progress, ridiculing the decline of the West, especially its financial and economic crisis. Many Chinese believe that the West needs China nowadays, especially its financial resources to solve the Western financial crisis. According to Xu, many Chinese assume that they are reclaiming their rightful place as an international powerhouse in the world, a position they have lost decades before and they have been denied for many years (Xu 2001, 151–62).

Some Chinese also suggest that China need to redefine the rule of the games in its own terms, and that China should be an alternative to the meddling power of the West. As a result, the Chinese people are becoming more nationalist at home and more vocal abroad, especially in dealing with the West. The Chinese nationalism built on self-confidence demands a change of the current international order at the turn of the twentieth-first century.

Economic nationalism is rising in the world, especially since the global financial crisis. China is developing large manufacturing industries and is the biggest exporter in the world, exporting an extensive range of commodities from clothing to electronics. In China, tens of millions of new job-seekers, including millions of peasants migrating from the country to cities, go into the market each year. Many Chinese think that, if the economy would not grow rapidly, the risk of social unrest would be huge, and that their country's survival would have to be based on an export-led and manufacturing-based economic strategy. Many Chinese hope to make money by exporting products to the world, developing overseas markets. The rise of China's economy increased the trade deficit of the West. For example, the U.S. trade deficit with China climbed to \$800 billion in 2010. China is the largest creditor nation in the world and owns approximately 20.8% of all foreign-owned U.S. Treasury securities (Wong 2010; Shamim 2010). The huge trade deficits cause Western countries to put increasing pressure on Beijing to open China's markets to Western goods and to stop governmental manipulation of its currency, since this makes China's exports to the West cheaper and the Western exports more expensive. The Western countries strongly criticize that Chinese manufacturing firms compete unfairly at the cost of Westerners' lost jobs due to the advantages of state support.

To many Chinese, the Western countries are trying to impose their goods on China and threaten China's new prosperity with harsh protectionism. The Chinese nationalism with the anti-Western sentiment is based on the Chinese frustration over China's inability to overcome the economic barriers set up by the Western countries. They are equally determined to guard their own national interests. Anti-Westernism is growing because of Western pressure on China's economy. The anti-Western sentiment is an expression of new self-confidence and nationalism, which is commensurate with China's growing economic power, in addition to its history, culture, and others. Dr. Robert Kuhn, an international investment banker and corporate strategist, is an adviser to the Beijing government for many years. Dr. Kuhn stated, "The pride of the Chinese people—pride in their

country, heritage, history; pride in their economic power, personal freedoms, and international importance. [...] pride is the primary guiding principle that energizes a great deal of what is happening in China today” (Kuhn 2010).

### 3.3 The Western Governments’ China Policies

The Chinese masses’ anti-Western feelings resulted from policy disagreements between the Beijing government and the Western governments. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the West is still regarding China as a competitor instead of a partner and taking tough policies toward China on such issues as freedom of South China Sea, Tibet, China’s human rights, and others. The U.S. government’s approach to the U.S. spy-plane collision is an example. In April 2001, a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 jet fighter. The Chinese plane split in half and crashed. The pilot parachuted out but was never seen again. The U.S. plane nearly crashed but was able to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island in Chinese territory. Chinese authorities took the crew of the U.S. spy plane into custody. At the beginning of this incident, Beijing took the assertive stance. It claimed that China’s sovereign airspace extends for 200 miles offshore and U.S. spy plane was in violation of its airspace, although most international agreements recognize only twelve miles. Tensions escalated, and each side blamed the other for the calamity. Beijing refused to release the crew until Washington issued a formal apology. The crew, however, was eventually released after American expressions of remorse over the loss of the pilot and aircraft (Kagan 2001).<sup>1</sup>

While lodging a protest against Washington, Beijing presented its report to the Chinese. Thus, anti-U.S. nationalism was rising in China. Many Chinese did not regard this clash as an isolated incident—simple violation of Chinese sovereignty, but as the latest in a long series of Western aggressions against the Chinese since the Opium War of 1839–41. Chinese public anger over the spy-plane collision raged, but there were no fierce anti-U.S. demonstrations on the streets in the Chinese cities, unlike the incident in May 1999 when violent attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities in China. This time Beijing did not condone any violence, censoring condemnations from discussions on the Internet and prevented the government-owned media from talking about this event. The Chinese were outraged, but their fury over this event faded eventually a year later when official

---

<sup>1</sup> For an analysis of the politics of apology in this context, see Gries 2002, 173–8.

press reported the mourners at the fallen pilot's funeral place in the city of Hangzhou (Pomfret 2001).

China's opposition to surveillance operations by an unarmed U.S. Navy surveillance vessel in waters off China is another case. In March 2009, an unarmed U.S. surveillance ship was hunting for Chinese submarines off China's Hainan Island, the site of a major Chinese navy base. The U.S. ship was in international waters but in China's exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea. The ship was swarmed by Chinese vessels that tried to block it and destroy its sonar system. At one point a Chinese ship approached within eight meters of the American spy ship and littered wreckage in its path so as to damage American ship's equipments. The U.S. Navy ship took action by turning its fire hoses on one of the Chinese ships. The incident was the most vulnerable military confrontation between China and the United States since the spy plane incident in 2001. It occurred just after both countries announced that they were considering a naval pact to avoid accidental confrontations at sea. Washington urged Beijing to observe international maritime rules while Beijing claimed that the United States had violated both the international and Chinese laws ("US Says China Harassed Naval Ship" 2009).

The March 8<sup>th</sup> confrontation reconfirms many Chinese's notion of foreign states bent on encroaching upon China. Many Chinese believe that it is a deliberate and provocative act, and that no people would be contented to see foreigners arrogantly carrying out spy actions directly in front of their country. Some Chinese claim that the U.S. government understood quite well that this would irritate China, but it just only did not mind. Wang Xiaodong, a nationalist scholar who contributed several chapters to the anti-Western book, *Unhappy China*, states that "If Obama wants to talk about world peace, not sending troops abroad, and so on, then what is the U.S. Navy doing in the South China Sea?" (Ramzy 2009)

Western governments' criticism on Beijing's Tibet policy causes much antagonism among the Chinese. The Western governments have long been a critic of China's Tibet policy and in favour of Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader. In October 2007, President Bush and the leaders of U.S. Congress bestowed the Congressional Gold Medal, the nation's highest civilian honour, upon the Dalai Lama, calling the exiled Tibetan religious leader a "warrior for peace" ("Dalai Lama's" 2007).

The tension between Beijing and the Western governments over this issue increased in March 2008. On March 14, rioters in Tibet set hundreds of fires and assaulted ethnic Han Chinese as well as Chinese Muslims. As the crackdown in Tibet began to unfold, the Dalai Lama expressed fears that “a lot of casualties may happen” as a result of the protests and appealed to the international community for help. Just one day after his appeal, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met the Dalai Lama in India on March 21, the first high-profile Western official to meet the Dalai Lama since protests in Tibet turned violent. At the meeting Pelosi called for an international investigation into the situation in Tibet and criticized China’s handling of the unrest in Tibet (“U.S. House Speaker” 2008). While addressing a crowd of thousands of Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, Pelosi called the crisis “a challenge to the conscience of the world” and called on “freedom-loving people” to denounce China (“Top US Politician” 2008). French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested he could boycott the opening ceremony of Olympic Games in August 2008 when he arrived in the United Kingdom for a two-day state visit, who urged British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to do the same. Sarkozy told reporters in southwest France “Our Chinese friends must understand the worldwide concern that there is about the question of Tibet, and I will adapt my response to the evolutions in the situation that will come” (“China Lashes Out” 2008) On April 8, as the arrival of the Olympic torch was met by Tibetans and Tibet activists in San Francisco, the U.S. House of Representatives was debating House Resolution 1077, introduced by Speaker Nancy Pelosi and nine members who made up a delegation that met with Dalai Lama in Dharamsala. This Resolution, criticizing China over “repression” in Tibet, called on China to end its crackdown in Tibet and for the Beijing government to enter into a results-based dialogue with the Dalai Lama. The next day, H.R. 1077 passed overwhelmingly by a vote of 413 to 1 (Tenzin 2008).

The Western government’s stands on the Tibet riots infuriate the Chinese. In Bajoria’s article, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, professor at the University of Michigan, says that the Chinese see these anti-Olympic protests as an indication that regardless of how much China strives to become a constructive player in the world, and that “many in the West will never accept that, [and] will seek to humiliate them.” (Bajoria, 2008) As a result, West-bashing was widespread among the Chinese throughout the world.

In major cities in China, angry protesters organized demonstrators in front of Carrefour shopping centers to encourage people to impose an embargo on French

products after protests in Paris. They used internet and mobile phones to condemn Carrefour Company of support Dalai Lama, but Carrefour CEO Jose-Luis Duran rejected such rumor. (“Anti-Carrefour Protests Spread” 2008; “Carrefour Faces China Boycott Bid”, 2008; and “Carrefour CEO Denies Backing Dalai Lama” 2008). “If Bush meets the Dalai Lama right now, or if the Congress does anything, the Chinese people might do something,” said Tong Zeng. Mr. Tong also spoke that Internet was fulfilled with enraged remarks about the latest conference between Nancy Pelosi and the Dalai Lama (“Chinese Nationalism Fuels Tibet Crackdown” 2008).

Zhang Quanyi, associate professor at the Zhejiang Wanli University in Ningbo, China, commented, “Western leaders have been aggressive in adding oil to the fire. French President Nikolas Sarkozy warned he might boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel also said she would not attend. The U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi even said the International Olympic Committee had made a mistake in awarding the 2008 Summer Olympics to China. China expressed strong indignation over this, saying it would encourage pro-independence forces” (Zhang 2008). Song Qiang, who contributed to both anti-Western books, *China Can Say No* and *Unhappy China*, wrote in the latest work that China should reduce the importance of Sino-French relations because of French President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader who Beijing claimed, was sponsoring independence in the restless Tibet area (Ramzy 2009).

Minxin Pei, a senior associate in the China program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also stated that “Chinese nationalism was actually partly a creation of Western imperialism” and that the Chinese feel very strongly about issues such as sovereignty and integrity of their territory because “they still have the historical memory of Western imperialism,” according to Bajoria’s article (Bajoria, 2008). Dr. Wenran Jiang, professor of political science at the University of Alberta in Canada, stated that overseas Chinese might appear to be rallying behind Beijing in response to the Olympic torch relay protests and the unrest in Tibet, and that “They see the Tibetan issue as there’s a perceived danger of separating Tibet out of China and this becomes not a issue with the Chinese government anymore, it’s just about sovereignty, about historical ties. I think that’s why, this time, emotion is very high.” (Kuhn, 2008)

Western politicians claim that their fire is directed at the Beijing government, but they do not understand the minds of the Chinese. Some Chinese believe that China needs changes and reforms, but they also accept as true that China cannot change overnight. Xiao Gongqin, history professor at Shanghai Normal University, said, “Outsiders should avoid pressuring China too much or it will return to radicalism [...] China will improve and enjoy more democratic rights, but it needs time.” (Magnier 2008) Although the Beijing government is not popular with all Chinese and many Chinese are opposed to its corruption and incompetence, they do not have any alternative. They still have only one government—Beijing represents their interests. Indeed, today the Chinese public has been overwhelmingly content with the direction in which their country is headed. In a spring 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 87% of Chinese say they are satisfied with the way things are going in their country, and 91% of Chinese characterize their country’s economic situation as good. (Bell 2011) To many Chinese, the West’s unfriendly attitude and policies toward Beijing are directed toward the Chinese people. The Western pressure on Beijing backfires by offending Chinese patriotic sensibilities.

### **3.4 Western Media’s Prejudice and Bias**

Western mainstream media helps contribute to anti-Western sentiments among the Chinese. Many Chinese people claim that Western media has showed not only anti-Beijing tendency but also a bias and prejudice against the Chinese people, which has spread wider since 2000. Many Chinese hold that Western media coverage of China is built on the Cold War theory, Western ideology, and national interest, and even white chauvinism, and that such biased information has segregated the Western public from the reality of China. Many Chinese consider that the West has become even more hostile toward China, and that the most evident example of this hostility is the way the Western media covers China. For example, Dr. Chen Yongsheng complains that Western media reports of China have displayed ignorance and prejudice, and that the reporting of China more generally is only stories about censorship, spoiled food products, human rights issues, dangerous toys, poisonous milk, and others. Dr. Chen claims that such bias reports only put fuel on the Chinese’s rejection to the West while stirring up their patriotic passion (Interview with Professor Chen Yongsheng, 2009).

Western media's attitude toward the 2008 Olympic is one case in point. Sports become a national passion. When China won the right to hold 2008 Olympics, the Chinese throughout the world exploded in delight, believing that this is the first time China holds the Games, and that China has finally been recognized as a rising state after a century of isolation and humiliation. Many Chinese hoped to use 2008 Olympic moment to demonstrate how China had become a modern and peaceful world power at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Many Chinese also thought that pride in Chinese athletes would unify the Chinese all over the world. Prior to the Beijing Olympic, however, some Western newspapers compared China's hosting of the Olympics to that of Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime. Ex-British Cabinet Minister Michael Portillo, who was Britain's defense secretary from 1995–97, likened the 2008 Beijing Olympics to the 1936 Berlin Games. In an editorial titled "Tibet: the West Can Use the Olympics as a Weapon against Beijing", published in the *Sunday Times* on March 22, 2008, Portillo cites the use of the Berlin Olympics as a "showcase for Nazism" to rebuke world leaders for disregarding China's poor human rights record. Portillo states, "The leadership must by now be wondering whether staging the Games in Beijing will bring the regime more accolades than brickbats". ("China Lashes Out At British Press")

CNN's anti-Chinese comments are another case. On the April 9, 2008, the CNN *Situation Room* asked for remarks on the U.S. China relationship, Jack Cafferty answered, "I think they're basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they've been for the last 50 years." ("The Situation Room" April 9, 2008) Angered by such a statement, the Legal Immigrant Association started an online petition calling for a formal apology because Cafferty's anti-Chinese comments had aggravated destructive attitudes held by some Americans toward the Chinese and Chinese Americans. On the April 14 broadcast of CNN's *Situation Room*, Cafferty defended his observation: "Last week, during a discussion of the controversy surrounding China's hosting of the Olympic Games, I said that the Chinese are basically the same bunch of goons and thugs they have been for the last 50 years. I was referring to the Chinese government, and not to Chinese people or to Chinese Americans." ("The Situation Room" April 14, 2008) CNN issued a controversial apology on the same day, to "anyone who has interpreted the comments to be causing offense", but many overseas Chinese, not satisfied with CNN's response, launched protests against CNN. On April 26, in front of CNN headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, several thousand Chinese American demonstrators picketed CNN's office. Demonstrators also protested in front of a

CNN office in San Francisco and its Hollywood office (Mostrous 2008), demanding that CNN fire Cafferty from the network (“Protesters Gather” 2008).

Western coverage of the March 2008 riots in Tibet is controversial. Some Chinese claimed that several Western media sources misreported and distorted the incident to tarnish China’s image. When running a cropped photo online, CNN removed a group of Tibetan protesters stoning a military vehicle. When many Chinese accused CNN of disseminating Western media bias, CNN insisted in a statement that its coverage was accurate but admitted to the cropping due to an editorial choice. (Kwok 2008) Several Western news organizations also mislabeled photographs of police officers beating pro-Tibet protesters in Nepal as being from China in their reports of the riots.

Western reports of the July 2009 riots in northwest China is also contentious. The July 2009 Ürümqi riots were a series of violent riots over several days that broke out on July 5, 2009 in Ürümqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in north-western China. On the first day’s rioting, about 1,000 Uyghurs began as a protest but escalated into violent assaults mainly on the Han Chinese people. People’s Armed Police were deployed to put down the riots. From the start, the *Financial Times* of London reported, “China’s bloodiest crackdown on protesters for 20 years reveals a government that is still more comfortable suppressing the symptoms of the country’s ethnic tensions than finding policies to solve the problems they cause.” (Editorial 2006) Many early reports of the riots incorrectly used a photo of a large number of People’s Armed Police squares to indicate the riots. Indeed, this picture was taken during the June 2009 Shishou riot in Hubei Province of China and was initially issued on June 26 by *Southern Metropolis Weekly*, a local government newspaper in Guangzhou. The image was also put on the website of *The Daily Telegraph*, a daily morning broadsheet newspaper circulated throughout the United Kingdom and internationally, but was eradicated the next day (“Posted Photos” 2009).

Many Chinese accused Western media of intentionally tarnishing China’s image by publishing false reports about the events in Tibet and Ürümqi, including mistakenly identifying scenes of police battling with protesters in Nepal as if it is taking place in Lhasa, and regarding People’s Armed Police square in Shishou as those in Ürümqi. The Chinese from around the world were infuriated by Western media’s prejudice and bias, and the wave of demonstrations as protests gained its strength in 2008. On March 29, in protest against German media’s biased and

distorted reports on the Tibet riots, about 120 Chinese people working and studying in Munich held a peaceful demonstration with placards bearing such slogans as “Listen to Different Voices” and “Freedom of the Press (Not Equal To) Incitement” in German and English. “The main purpose of these protests”, an organizer wrote, was “to urge the German media to stop their biased reports and also to attract the German public to our website to gain different perspectives and start the dialogue.” (“Protest in Silence”) On April 19, 1,300 people assembled outside BBC buildings in Manchester and London, protesting against what they described as Western media bias (“Anti-French” 2008). At the same time numerous Chinese Australians organized a large demonstration in Sydney, pronouncing support for Beijing and opposing what they saw as Western media bias. The demonstrators were carrying signs which read “Shame on Some Western Media”, “BBC CNN Lies too” and “Stop Media Distortion!”. During an interview, a demonstrator told the reporter of BBC, “I saw some news from CNN, from the BBC, some media (inaudible), and they are just lying.” (“Pro-China” 2008) Wang Xiaoping, a Chinese doctor in the city of Guangzhou in southern China complained in 2009, “The Western media’s coverage of China has always been prejudiced against the Chinese, seeing China through tainted glasses. The Western media’s arrogance toward China has blinded their vision, and the Western media is losing its credibility.” (Interview with Wang Xiaoping 2009) In 2008, a report was prepared by the Committee of 100 with the assistance of Zogby International and the Horizon Research Consultancy Group. Entitled “Hope and Fear”, the report outlined the results of opinion polls regarding Chinese and American attitudes towards each other. The report found that a significant proportion of the Chinese general public believe that the Western media portrays China inaccurately (“Hope and Fear” 2007).

Western media complain the less freedom of the press and media and internet censorship in China, which prevents them from securing first-hand information on Tibet. Some Chinese people may know little about Tibet’s different interpretation of its history, partly because China’s propaganda may reflect only the official version of events, castigating the Dalai Lama as a terrorist “jackal” and calling for a “people’s war” to fight separatism in Tibet. For many Chinese, Tibetans have been granted special subsidies and benefits from the Beijing government in the past fifty years because of their ethnic status, and the protests occurred as ingratitude after Beijing spending a lot of money building roads, a high-altitude railroad and other infrastructure for the Tibet people.

While Western media support Tibetans so as to help them win their freedom out of the control of the Chinese government, many Chinese people regard Tibet protesters as terrorists attacking the Han Chinese. Dr Seema Anand, a reader of international relations at Westminster University in London, said that many Chinese regarded the Tibetan protests “as an attack on their core identity”, and that “it’s not only an attack on the state, but an attack on what it means to be Chinese.” (“Chinese Nationalism” 2008) Many Chinese not only support the Beijing government but also encourage the Chinese leaders to take strong, quick actions to suppress the rioters in Tibet. Meng Huizhong, an office worker, expressed anger at what she saw as a tolerant government response to Tibet turbulence. Like many Chinese, Meng was horrified firstly by the violent Tibetan protests in Lhasa and then was appalled that the government had failed to initially extinguish the brutality. She said that “We couldn’t believe our government was being so weak and cowardly. [...] The Dalai Lama is trying to separate China, and it is not acceptable at all. We must crack down on the rioters.” (“Chinese Nationalism” 2008) Ms. Emily Parker, an assistant editorial features editor of *The Wall Street Journal*, commented on the Tibet riots in 2008, “In some cases, nationalists have accused Beijing of not defending Chinese interests strongly enough.” (Parker 2008)

It is obvious that the Chinese anti-Western sentiments not only result from official propaganda but also from the Chinese reactions provoked by the West. Da Wei, associate research professor of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, was a visiting associate at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in 2008. Wei points out, “This situation (Anti-Western nationalism) has greater implications than previous waves of nationalism. [...]. Rather, it is about the pride of China and the prejudice of the West.” (Da 2008) Ms. Emily Parker also writes, “Chinese nationalism is not just coming from the top down. [...] These nationalist outbursts may have been influenced by years of propaganda, but they are not always dictated from the top.” (Parker 2008)

#### **4 Conclusion**

There is a deep suspicion between the Chinese and Westerners. Chinese anti-Westernism expressing a strong resentment of Western political and economic dominance is nurtured by past humiliation and new self-confidence which is

matching with China's rapid economic power. As a rising state, the Chinese want to be treated equally and fairly by the Western countries and to have more voice in the international affairs while the West still sees China as the same "Communist China" as they did during the Cold War period and attempts not to recognize its recent successful accomplishments.

Chinese anti-Western sentiments are perhaps unavoidable because both China and the West have different ideologies, cultures, political and economic systems, and levels of development, as well as diverging interests. The West, worrying about the rising China that may not play by international rules, encourages Beijing to carry out political and social reforms. The Chinese leaders, having no intention to do along the Western lines, have responded with nationalistic grievance. The combination of Western countries' pressure on China and China's antagonism toward the West will continue to lead to Chinese anti-Western nationalism for a long time. However, the desire for Sino-Western cooperation still exists because both have common interest. If the West understands China's culture and history better and has the courage to shun its hegemonic imperatives, and if China reduces its anti-Western propaganda, Chinese anti-Western nationalism may gradually decrease.

## References

- Anast, Paul. 2008. "Demonstrators Disrupt Olympic Torch Lighting." *The Telegraph*, April 26. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582768/Demonstrators-disrupt-Olympic-torch-lighting.html>.
- "Anti-Carrefour Protests Spread." 2008. *China Economic Review*, April 21. Accessed February 3, 2012. [http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/dailybriefing/2008\\_04\\_21/Anti-Carrefour\\_protests\\_spread.html](http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/dailybriefing/2008_04_21/Anti-Carrefour_protests_spread.html)
- "Anti-China Protest Targets Olympic Torch Ceremony." 2008. *The New York Times*, April 3. Accessed February 4, 2012. [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03iht-3turkey-torch.11654200.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03iht-3turkey-torch.11654200.html?_r=1).
- "Anti-French Rallies Across China." 2008. *BBC News*, April 19. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7356107.stm>.
- "Argentine Torch Relay Unhindered." 2008. *BBC News*, November 4. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7343138.stm>.

- Bajoria, Jayshree. 2008. "Nationalism in China." April 23. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/china/nationalism-china/p16079>
- "Bangkok Relay for Olympic Torch." 2008. *BBC News*, April 19. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7355913.stm>.
- Bell, James. 2011. "Upbeat Chinese May Not Be Primed for a Jasmine Revolution." March 31. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1945/chinese-may-not-be-ready-for-revolution>.
- "Carrefour CEO Denies Backing Dalai Lama." 2008. *Forbes*, April 19. Accessed February 3, 2012. [http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/19/carrefour-china-duran-face-markets-cx\\_pm\\_0419autofacescan01.html](http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/19/carrefour-china-duran-face-markets-cx_pm_0419autofacescan01.html). "Carrefour Faces China Boycott Bid." 2008. *BBC New*, April 15. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7347918.stm>.
- "China Boosts 'Red Tourism' in Revolutionary Bases." 2005. *Xinhua News Agency*, February 22. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/120838.htm>.
- "China Lashes Out At British Press For Comparing Beijing Olympics to 1936 Nazi Berlin Games." 2008. March 26. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-546129/China-lashes-British-press-comparing-Beijing-Olympics-1936-Nazi-Berlin-Games.html#ixzz1fbx2CINd>.
- "Chinese Nationalism Fuels Tibet Crackdown." 2008. *The New York Times*, March 31. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/31/world/asia/31china.html?pagewanted=1>
- "Clashes Along Olympic Torch Route." 2008. *BBC News*, June 4. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7332942.stm>.
- Da, Wei. 2008. "China's Pride Versus Western Prejudice." May 2. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JE02Ad01.html>.
- "Dalai Lama's All Smiles as He Receives Congressional Gold Medal." 2007. *FOX News*, October 17. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,302744,00.html#ixzz1fcg8ZucK>
- Deng, Shasha. 2009. "Chinese Youth Feel Attached to Country, Aware of Social Issues." *Xinhua News*, May 24. Accessed January 30, 2012. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/24/content\\_11427089.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/24/content_11427089.htm).
- Editorial, "Beijing is Unwise to Play with Fire." 2006. *Financial Times*, July 6. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/394ddf06-6a53-11de-ad04-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ISMNBwfH>.
- "Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet." 2009. *China Daily*, March 2. Accessed January 30, 2012. [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/02/content\\_7527376.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/02/content_7527376.htm)
- Ford, Peter. 2008. "Chinese Vent anti-Western Fury Online." 2008. *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 17. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2008/0417/p01s01-woap.html>

- Friedman, Edward. 1992. *New National Identities in Post-Leninist Transformations: The Implications for China*. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press.
- Gries, Peter Hays. 2004. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Gries, Peter Hays, and Peng, Kaiping Peng 2002. "Culture Clash? Apologies East and West." *Journal of Contemporary China* 11(30): 173–8.
- Guo, Yingjie. 2004. *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: the Search for National Identity under Reform*. New York: Routledge.
- Hille, Kathrin. 2009. "China's Angry Youths' Are Novel Heroes." *Financial Times* (Beijing), March 27. Accessed January 30, 2012.  
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ce4216a-1af4-11de-8aa3-0000779fd2ac.html>.
- "Hope and Fear: Full report of C-100's Survey on American and Chinese Attitudes Toward Each Other." 2007. Accessed January 30, 2012.  
<http://www.survey.committee100.org/2007/files/C100SurveyFullReport.pdf>.
- Hughes, Christopher R. 2006. *Chinese Nationalism in a Global Era*. New York: Routledge.
- Interview with Professor Chen Yongsheng at the SunYat-sen University in Guangzhou on December 10, 2009.
- Interview with Wang Xiaoping in Guangzhou, December 12, 2009.
- Jiang Zemin's Speech. July 1, 2001. *Xinhua News Agency*. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010726/433654A.htm>
- Kagan, Robert, and Kristol, William. 2001. "A National Humiliation." *Weekly Standard* 6(30).
- Karl, Rebecca E. 2002. *Staging the World : Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Kuhn, Anthony. 2008. "Tibet Protests Stir Chinese Nationalism." 2008. *National Public Radio*, April 18. Accessed February 4, 2012.  
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89771222>
- Kuhn, Robert. 2010. "In China, Pride Is the Driver." January 4. Accessed February 3, 2012. [http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2010/gb2010014\\_784725.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2010/gb2010014_784725.htm)
- Kwok, Winghei. 2008. "CHINA: Bloggers battle Western Media Over Bias—Western Coverage of Tibetan Riots Sparks Nationalism among Chinese Netizens." *AsiaMedia*, March 28. UCLA Asia Institute. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=89599>.
- Laitinen, Kaoko. 1990. *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty*. London: Curzon Press.
- Leibold, James. 2007. *Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes Became Chinese*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Liu, Xiaobo. 2005. "Bufen Xinlang wangmin dui Laisi de zhongzu qishi." (Part of Chinese web users' racial comments on Rice). Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://bbs.comefromchina.com/forum79/thread335239.html>.
- MacArtney, Jane. *The Times Online*, April 27. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3697978.ece>
- Magnier, Mark. 2008. "West's Tibet 'Bias' Galls Many in China." *Los Angeles Times*, March 27. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-embattle27mar27,0,7466816.story?page=1>
- Mo Wang Guochi (Never Forget Our National Humiliation)*. 2002. Beijing: Haiyan chubanshe.
- Mostous, Alexi. 2008. "CNN Apologises to China over 'Thugs and Goons' Comments by Jack Cafferty." *The Times Online* (London), April 16. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article3756437.ece>.
- Mostrous, Alexi. 2008. "CNN Apologizes to China over 'Thugs and Goons' Comment by Jack Cafferty." *The Times*, April 16. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://www.timesplus.co.uk/tto/news/?login=false&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thetimes.co.uk%2Ftto%2Fnews%2Fworld%2F>
- "Olympic Torch Relay Cut Short Amid Paris Protests." 2008. *The Guardian*. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/07/france.olympicgames2008>.
- "On Sino-U.S. Relationships by the Authors of the Book, *China Can Say No*." September 8, 2009. Accessed September 15, 2012. [http://news.ifeng.com/special/60nianjiaguo/60biaozhirenwu/renwuziliao/200909/0908\\_7766\\_1340151.shtml](http://news.ifeng.com/special/60nianjiaguo/60biaozhirenwu/renwuziliao/200909/0908_7766_1340151.shtml)
- Parker, Emily. 2008. "The Roots of Chinese Nationalism." *Wall Street Journal*, April 1. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120701186550979029.html>
- Pomfret, John. 2001. "New Nationalism Drives Beijing." *Washington Post*, April 4.
- "Posted Photos Source of Western Media Gaffes." 2009. *South China Morning Post*, July 8: A4.
- "Pro-China Rally in Australia." 2008. *BBC News*, April 14. Accessed February 4, 2012. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid\\_7340000/newsid\\_7345600/7345670.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_7340000/newsid_7345600/7345670.stm).
- "Protest in Silence against Biased German Media." You Tube. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-nOeaHTuHYg>.
- "Protesters Gather At CNN: A China Commentary Draws An Angry Crowd To The L.A. Offices." 2008. *Los Angeles Times*, April 20. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/20/local/me-cnn20>.
- Ramzy, Austin. 2009. "A New Book Reveals Why China Is Unhappy." *Times*, March 20. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1886749,00>.

- “‘Red Tourism’ Booming in China.” 2007. *Reuters*, December 21.
- “Rival Demonstrators Face off in Canberra.” 2008. *ABC News*, April 24. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/04/24/2225921.htm>
- Rosen, Stanley. 2003. “Chinese Media and Youth: Attitudes toward Nationalism and Internationalism.” In *Chinese Media, Global Context*, edited by Chin-Chuan Lee, 97–118. New York: Routledge.
- “San Francisco Olympic Torch Run Moved Amid Protests.” 2008. *CBC News*, May 6. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/04/09/olympic-torch.html>.
- “Scuffles at South Korea Torch Leg.” 2008. *BBC News*, April 27. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7369471.stm>.
- Shamim, Adam. 2010. “China to Exceed U.S. by 2020, Standard Chartered Says.” *Bloomberg Business Week*, November 14. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-14/china-to-exceed-u-s-by-2020-standard-chartered-says.html>. Retrieved November 27, 2010.
- Shen, Simon. 2007. *Redefining Nationalism in Modern China: Sino-American Relations and the Emergence of Chinese Public Opinion in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tenzin, Yangdon. 2008. “US Congress Passes New Tibet Legislation, Condemns China’s Crackdown in Tibet.” April 9. <http://thesouloftibet.blogspot.com/2008/04/us-congress-passes-new-tibet.html>
- “The Situation Room.” 2008. *CNN*, April 9. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0804/09/sitroom.03.html>.
- “The Situation Room.” 2008. *CNN*, April 14. Accessed February 4, 2012. <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0804/14/sitroom.03.html>.
- “Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks Increase if Right Steps are not Taken.” 2009. February 13. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090213005161/en/Top-Economists-Agree-2009-Worst-Financial-Crisis>. [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615\\_economic\\_crisis\\_baily\\_elliott/0615\\_economic\\_crisis](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_economic_crisis).
- “Top US Politician Calls for Tibet Inquiry.” 2008. *The Guardians*, March 21. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/21/tibet.pelosi>.
- “U.S. House Speaker Critical of China Over Tibet.” 2008. *CNN*, March 20. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/03/21/tibet.dalai.lama/index.html?ref=werecommend>.
- Unger, J. ed. 1996. *Chinese Nationalism*. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- “Unhappy China.” *Economist Online*. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://economistonline.muogao.com/2009/03/unhappy-china.html>.

- Wang, Zheng. 2006. “The Power of History and Memory: National ‘Patriotic Education’ and China’s Conflict Behavior in Crises with the U.S., 1991–2001.” Ph.D. dissertation. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.
- Wang, Zheng. 2008. “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China.” *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 782–806.
- Wong, Edward. 2010. “China’s Export Economy Begins Turning Inward.” *The New York Times*, June 24. Accessed February 3, 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/world/asia/25china.html>.
- Wong, Young-tsu. 1989. *Search for Modern Nationalism, Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1939*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Wu, Xu. 2007. *Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolution, Characteristics, and Implications*. Place: Lexington Books, 2007.
- Xu, Guangqiu. 2001. “Anti-Western Nationalism in China, 1989–99.” *World Affairs* 163, Spring: 151–62.
- Yardley, Jim. 2008. “Nationalism at Core of China’s Reaction to Tibet Unrest.” *The International Herald Tribune*, March 31. Accessed January 30, 2012. <http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/1382>
- Zhang, Quanyi. 2008. “Dangers of Inflaming Chinese Nationalism.” *Up Asia*, April 12. Accessed February 3, 2012. [http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2008/04/12/dangers\\_of\\_inflaming\\_chinese\\_nationalism/8504/](http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2008/04/12/dangers_of_inflaming_chinese_nationalism/8504/)
- “Zhongxunbu fuze tongzhi tan dierpi aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi.” (“Cadre in Charge of the Department of Propaganda Talks about the Patriotic Education Bases.” 2001. *Jiefangjun Bao (The PLA Daily)*, June 13, Section 4.