

Political Opinion polling in Spain and Portugal.

José Ignacio WERT

1. Foreword.

This chapter deals with the development of political opinion polling in Spain and Portugal.

There is one substantial common factor influencing the history of public (and, more specifically, *politica*) opinion polling in Spain and Portugal, the two Iberian countries, namely the fact that both arrived to democracy quite late as compared with the majority of the European countries.

Although the path to democracy was rather different in either country, the final outcome has been quite similar. In both cases, after initial turbulences, a fully fledged democratic system has been put into place, and runs quite smoothly since the early eighties.

Therefore in both countries, we find a somewhat shared peculiar *pre-history* of opinion polling, under authoritarian rule, and also a quite parallel *history* of full development in the late 70's and early 80's *pari passu* with the democratic blossom.

We will devote most of our attention to the developments in the 80's and 90's to account for the *mature* public opinion market in both countries. For those more interested in the *pre-historic* aspects of opinion polling, during the long years of authoritarian rules that prevailed in Spain and Portugal till the mid 70's, there are clear references in the works by Juan Antonio Giner (1983) and Rafael López Pintor (1982) for Spain. No similar historical account has been made to my knowledge on the Portuguese case.

We will deal separately with the developments in Spain and Portugal, in two different sections of this chapter.

2. Political polling in Spain.

2.1. A brief summary of antecedents: the early stages of public opinion polling before democracy.

Public opinion polling in a scientific context has been carried out in Spain on a non regular basis from the mid 60's, still when the Francoist authoritarian system was strongly in place. The main influences affecting this occasional developments were (a) the progressive opening of the political Regime to external influences, (b) the development of a technocratic elite familiar with the use of polling for a diversity of purposes in political and social life, and (c) the work of a group of professionals both in the academic and private sectors, many of them educated in the United States, who *imported* the basic techniques of empirical social sciences and, specifically, survey research.

Juan Antonio Giner (1982) labels the period running from 1958 (when Spain gave up the isolationist policy initially fostered by the Franco Regime) to 1976 (the immediate aftermath of Franco's death) as the *"take-off"* of opinion polling. He documents the developments in both the private, academic, and public sectors during those years. Something could be added to his excellent account, namely the fact that restrictions to political polling created a somewhat dual situation. While those restrictions preempted the development of a *grown up* political polling tradition, survey research for commercial and other social purposes developed very much along the same lines than in the other European countries.

Therefore, by Franco's death, and once restrictions to freedom of the press were removed, development in the polling landscape took place in very short time, since most of the methodological ground and the logistic capabilities were already in place.

A word must be said on the founding –in 1963- of the *Instituto de la Opinión Pública*, a public agency in the Ministry of Information and Tourism whose main responsibility was to conduct public opinion polls on a variety of subjects of public interest. During the democratic Transition, in 1977, the *Instituto* was re-named as *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS) as an agency devoted to provide the Government with opinion polling data and, in more general terms, to foster empirical social research (López Pintor, 1982). The agency was put under Parliamentary control in the late 80's. Through most of its existence, CIS has been a reliable and sound provider of first class opinion polling in Spain. Now, the impresssive data bank accumulated over more than 30 years is open to researchers and public at large, and embodies the most important source for social and political opinion research in Spain.

2.2. Polling in freedom: Opinion polling in 1977 and 1979.

When the first democratic Elections were called upon for June the 15th 1977, a number of survey polls had already been published on the Spanish newspapers trying to provide some anticipation on what the outcome of those first Elections could be. Taking into account that the underlying political process (and, specially the build up of parties) was a quite sudden phenomenon -with a lot of coalition building, names changing, and leaders positioning in a very short time span- it is no surprise that most of the prognostics did in fact had little to see with the actual results. In the eves of election dates, when the grid of competing parties became something real and not only virtual, and all relevant faces were allocated to the newly established parties, polls became more relevant.

It is noteworthy that no specific regulation had been enforced as for publication of polls. Hence, major newspapers (*ABC*, *El País*, *La Vanguardia* and *Ya*) and press agencies

(*Europa Press*) were able to release data almost on Election eve. As a whole, 12 different surveys, conducted by seven different research agencies were released by the media in the six weeks before the Election. All in all, they basically anticipated major trends of the results (Giner, 1982; Monzón and Rospir, 1992), though some of them got wrong the winner, something not all that strange as the plurality between the first (*UCD*, a centrist party) and the second one (*PSOE*, a socialist party) was less than four percent points.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Polls were not a major issue for argument in the eve or after the 1977 Election. It can also be said that they did not play a major role in a process where everything was new, and probably there was not even enough familiarity (among journalists and the public) with this instrument.

Things were clearly different when, after the approval and popular ratification of a new democratic Constitution, elections were called for to be held in March 1979. Uncertainty about the results fostered the interest in polls. The largest poll, conducted by *SOFEMASA* and released by *El País* four days before the Election forecasted a lead of the Socialists by 2 points margin against the then ruling party, the centrist *UCD*, and a very poor showing of the rightist *Coalición Democrática*. Subsequently, two other papers leaning for the governing *UCD* (*Ya* and *Diario 16*) released a poll conducted by a phantom French agency whose results showed a 3 points margin of *UCD* ahead of the Socialists. The actual results came in fact very close to this latest poll... which had never existed, as it was disclosed later (Ramírez, 1979).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Both the Socialists and the Rightists were in anger in the aftermath of the Election (Giner, 1982), assuming that this fake survey had a tremendous impact in last moment voters decisions (what was not probably the case).

Anyhow, as a consequence, the Socialists supported an initiative of the rightist *Coalición Democrática* to introduce new legislation along the path of the French 1977 example (Giner, 1983, López Pintor, 1982). The core content of that law has been included in the General Electoral Law (*Ley Orgánica de Régimen Electoral General*, approved in 1986) and is enforced since then, with not very substantial changes (Wert, 1994).

Basically, the regulation includes two different contents. The *guarantee norms* that require, during electoral periods, that every political poll released by media include necessarily a number of technical specifications as well as the precise text of questions asked, the percent of respondents for each response category, and some others. Those specifications basically comply with most of the self-regulation Codes (WAPOR, AAPOR, ESOMAR) and, apart from the fact that it is extremely dubious if law enforcement is more effective than self regulation, they do not deserve any major criticism.

The other content, the *veto norm*, forbids any publication of political polls during the 5 days prior to any Election and, in my opinion, is extremely open to criticism from various viewpoints (Wert, 1994 and 1996). To take just one, it can be said that from a legal viewpoint, the veto of publication could result in violation of the constitutional provision that guarantees freedom of speech and the right of access to objective information to all Spanish citizens (article 20 of the Spanish Constitution). Unfortunately, there has not been till now consensus enough to carry forward a constitutional claim against this regulation. With few exceptions everybody seems to be happy with this veto. Quite cynically, some argue that this veto provides some quiet days at the end of the electoral campaign to politicians, while it also allows some argument to pollsters just in case their forecasts differ from actual results (last minute changes). But, trying to get the good side of it, it is fair to say that, as it happens with desperate situations, this could had been considerably worse: the initial draft fostered by *Coalición Democrática* in 1980 intended to forbid the publication of preelectoral polls during the whole of the campaign (Wert and López Pintor, 1989).

2.3. Polling under regulation: political opinion polling from 1980 onwards

After the enforcement of the new regulation on political opinion polling in electoral periods, passed in 1980, five general elections (1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1996) and a very large number of *second order* elections (local, regional, European) have taken place in Spain.

A succinct explanation on the political context of that time seems necessary. After a successful democratic Transition from 1976 to 1980, the deepest menace to the consolidation of democracy came in February 1981. An attempted *putsch* took place in Spain, started by the seizing of Congress and the taking as hostages of the whole Government and all MP's by a group of armed policemen (*Guardia Civil*) under the command of Lt. Col. Antonio Tejero, and followed by the proclamation of *état de siège* in Valencia by Lt. General Miláns del Bosch. Now, almost 20 years after that bizarre episode, it is clear that there was not any *historical* viability for such an attempt, for which, as polls immediately showed (López Pintor, 1994), there was not any public opinion support.

The somewhat unexpected consequence of that process was a very deep political realignment. *UCD*, the party that had been in government during the Transition process, collapsed completely in the early elections called for October 1982, being replaced by the Socialist Party of Felipe González, under whose outstanding leadership the party remained in power till 1996. *UCD* was not only replaced by the Socialists in government, but also by another party in opposition. While the Socialists got almost 50% of the popular vote, and over 60% of seats in Congress, the second party was the rightist *Alianza Popular*, till then an almost marginal force, that got over 25% of the votes and over 30% of the seats. *UCD*, on its side, did miserably (it fell from 35 to 7% and from 168 seats to 12 in Congress), and shortly after disappeared from the scene.

Such an unbalanced system, one of *hegemonic party* in Sartori's terms (1976), remained basically unchanged for a quite long period, till the beginnings of the 90's. In general elections held in 1986 and 1989, the Socialists won again absolute majorities, though in a less overwhelming way. Nevertheless, the main opposition party, *Alianza Popular*, rebranded as *Partido Popular* in 1989, did not improve its share of the vote, remaining at the 25% level. The losses of the Socialists were basically for the profit of a new (and ephemeral) centrist party, *CDS*, headed by former *UCD* leader Adolfo Suárez, and the Communists, running from 1986 onwards under the softer flag of *Izquierda Unida* (United Left).

After deep recession in the early 90's, evidence of political corruption, and, as a consequence, deterioration of the leadership of Felipe González, the 1993 General Elections appeared for the first time since 1982 as competitive ones. The "re-invention" of the rightist *Partido Popular* under the renewed leadership of José María Aznar, with a more centrist lean and platform, let it position itself as a credible opponent to the Socialists. Eventually, in a highly emotional final rush, Felipe González managed to secure a fourth victory to his party, but very far from absolute majority, with only a four points lead against the *Partido Popular* (38% vs. 34%). Although the Socialists had the support in Parliament of the moderate nationalist parties from Catalonia and the Basque Country, new political scandals and a series of defeats in mid term elections forced González to call early elections for March of 1996. Aznar, heading the *Partido Popular*, won by a very narrow margin (less than 1.5 percent) and, again with the support of the moderate Nationalists, was able to be elected as Prime Minister in the Spring of 1996.

This political context has clear reflections in the history of political opinion polling. This account of the political situation that has prevailed in Spain during the last two decades is relevant to explain how the political opinion polling has evolved along this same period. During most of this time, the years spanning from 1982 to 1993, electoral competition was very limited. The distance between the first (*PSOE*) and the second electoral force (*AP*, rebranded as *PP* in 1989) was of 21.4 percent points in 1982, 17.8 in 1986, and 13.7 in

1989. In all three cases *PSOE* secured an absolute majority with a plurality of 97, 81, and 71 seats over their main opponents in a Chamber of 350 seats. This suggests that there was no room for uncertainty, and that the *prophetic* role of political polling was, in a sense, redundant.

In the days following the attempted *putsch* of 1981, opinion surveys became an extremely relevant piece of information to assess the public support for it (which was close to none), as well as the eventual political consequences of the situation in terms of political realignment (that, in turn, seemed very deep). López Pintor (1994) points out the fact that *"A very scarce minority thought that, after having failed, the putsch would mean a weakening of democracy. Most thought that the putsch would finally make democracy stronger. This opinion reflects better than many other indicators the reasons of PSOE victory in Elections one and a half year later"* (pages 582-583).

The increased weakness of ailing UCD government of Calvo-Sotelo (in 1981-82) made it clear for a decisive part of the voters that only *PSOE* would have the political resources to secure democratic control of the political power. In those months, polls, conducted by public *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)* and private agencies, showed growing electoral support for the Socialists. By early 1982 it became evident that only *PSOE* could win the elections due for 1983. The decision of calling an early Election for October 1982 was not the consequence of any forecast of better performance for the governing party, but merely the mechanical response to the fact that out of 168 *UCD* MP's elected in 1979, less than 100 were still under the party flag in the summer of 1982. The remaining had crossed lines both left and rightward in different splinting episodes.

Therefore, uncertainty was very limited in the eve of 1982 Election. All polls forecasted *PSOE* victory and even exaggerated it somewhat (Monzón and Rospir, 1992). Since projections were aligned with the political meaning of the Election, there were no major criticisms afterwards, although some of the projections could have deserved it. For instance, in one of the largest polls published in the Spanish media before the Election

(with a sample exceeding 6,000) the sum of deviations in the forecast for the two main parties is over 8 percent points. Deviations of much lesser numerical importance were perceived as unacceptable in the Elections of 1993 and 1996. The political significance of those lesser deviations was, nevertheless, much more important.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Opinion polling did play a much major role in one of the most decisive affairs of that time, namely, the Referendum on the Spanish membership of NATO that took place on March 1986. Spain had joined NATO by the end of the UCD period, and the Socialists opposed strongly it by then, engaging themselves in the calling of a Referendum if they would win the Election to promote withdrawal from the organisation.

In 1985 Spain joined the Common Market, and the leadership of PSOE properly understood that there was an obvious link between that affiliation and NATO membership. But instead of giving up the promise of that Referendum, Felipe González decided to call that Referendum... to promote the permanence of Spain inside NATO. It was a paramount *tour de force* against, on the one side, an uneducated majority who was rather instinctively against any military alliance, and, on the other side, against the political opposition. While at the left of the Socialists (and also at the left faction of the Socialists themselves) there was fierce opposition to NATO, at their right, this was seen as an occasion to erode the electoral strength of the Socialists. Quite paradoxically, the leaders of the pro NATO *Coalición Popular*, were actively campaigning for the abstention at the Referendum.

Polls conducted after 1981 showed a very strong plurality of those opposed to NATO membership (in the verge of 50-60%, against 10-20% in favour) (CIS, 1987). All published polls, with no exception, anticipated a victory of the *NO* by a significant margin (ranging from 5 to over 15 points). Meanwhile, *CIS*, the public polling agency, whose polls on the subject were not released during the campaign, was able to provide a quite different

picture. Carefully dealing with the subtleties involved in the dilemma (the political context, the wording of the question), polls conducted by *CIS* reflected very clearly the changing dynamics of decision making. After a poll conducted on the very eve of the Referendum, they gave an extremely precise forecast (CIS, 1987; López Pintor, 1994). The final outcome, with a turnout of 60% of eligible voters, was 59,4% for *YES* against 40,6% for *NO*. This outcome had long lasting consequences: it reinforced the leadership of Felipe González and weakened the Opposition, giving additional ground to the hegemony enjoyed by the Socialists along the decade.

After the success of the Referendum, Elections were anticipated some months to benefit from the *halo effect* of the unexpected victory of Felipe González. Albeit the political atmosphere provided a very limited uncertainty, polling was quite numerous. Twelve different research agencies (more than ever before) published surveys before the Election. Large samples were used in some of them: 10 of the polls published exceeded 5.000 interviews. Accuracy was considerably better than before: average deviations for the 2 major competing parties were below 2 points (Wert and López Pintor, 1989; Monzón and Rospir, 1992).

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The main innovation brought about by this Election in terms of political polling was the fact that an exit poll was conducted for the first time in Spain commissioned by the national television and radio services, *Radio Television Española*. Quick counts and even exit polls had been conducted before on behalf of political parties and the electoral administration but none of them had been released before. This first experience turned to be a considerable *fiasco*, with a remarkable deviation in seats distribution: *PSOE* was allocated 15% more seats than those finally captured by the Socialists, while *Coalición Popular* was even more grossly underestimated, 20% below their actual level.

The differences in estimative accuracy between preelectoral polling and exit poll in the 1986 Election can be explained. From 1982 till 1993, opinion polls in Spain have shown a very consistent pattern of deviation. In virtually all samples, *PSOE* voters were overrepresented by 10-15%, while *Coalición Popular* (and later *Partido Popular*) voters were underrepresented by 40-20%. Unending discussions between academics and poll's practitioners did not come up with any robust evidence on the fabric of that bias, be it a sampling bias or a declarative bias.

Probably, the phenomenon contained both ingredients: there was a sampling bias insofar as voters of *Coalición Popular* were harder to reach than those of *PSOE*, and there was also a declarative bias, since *Coalición Popular* was seen as too far right, suffering from some legitimacy gap for long years (Wert, 1996). But, at the end of the day, polling practitioners learned to tackle quite efficiently with the problem by basically weighting samples according to the actual electoral share of parties in the previous election. This elementary and straightforward strategy proved to work quite well for years. Only after the crisis of the *PSOE* at the beginnings of the 90's the weighting began to be less efficient. But, coming back to exit poll of 1986, there was not any weighting applied to raw answers of voters, and the answers reproduced, to a lesser extent, the same bias found in preelectoral polling. Quite obviously, this suggests that declarative bias has had real importance along that period.

Next electoral occasion, the early Election held in October 1989, was, probably, the *quietest* one from the viewpoint of opinion polling. Although the political balance had become somewhat more complicated, with a relative weakening of *PSOE*, again uncertainty was very limited: victory of the Socialists was taken for granted and the only apparent question was if they would keep absolute majority in Parliament, although it seemed impossible any kind of alternative coalition build-up against them.

Ten different research agencies conducted polls for the media, and the results were almost as accurate as they had been three years before. Average deviations were a little

bit larger than in the precedent occasion (mainly because the *Partido Popular*, under a new leadership, was underestimated, while the centrist *CDS* was generally overestimated), but they had little impact in the seats distribution forecasted. Finally, *PSOE* got exactly half of the seats in Parliament and *PP* did better than expected, while the centrists had a disappointing result. Exit polls were also very accurate in this occasion, with practitioners having learnt from the 1986 experience (Monzón and Rospir, 1992).

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

By the end of the 80's politics in Spain at the level of national competition was described as a *pond*, to mean the quietness of the waters over which the Socialists dominated the political landscape through most of the decade. But things changed at the beginnings of the 90's. A local Election in 1991, widely won by the Socialists, gave a warning on what was going on. Although at the national level the Socialists kept still a 13 points lead over the *Partido Popular*, there was significant erosion of their urban share of vote. In fact, the Right captured the local government in places like Madrid, Valencia or Seville, that had till then always been governed by the Socialists.

In the immediate aftermath of the 92 Celebrations (The Olympic Games in Barcelona and the *Expo* in Seville) it became evident that the economy was in deep recession. Added to this, the *Filesa affair*, the creation of a sophisticated holding whose aim was to channel private –and suspicious- funds to the Socialists, was unveiled. The approval ratings of government went dramatically down, and the popularity of Felipe González was also seriously eroded. Moreover, internal climate in the Socialist Party was more than stormy, when its left faction, headed by former Vice-president Alfonso Guerra, felt growingly marginalised from the inner decision making circles. Under these circumstances, Premier González decided to call Elections for June the 6th, 4 months earlier than due.

For the first time in more than one decade, Elections had a competitive flavour. Series from the *CIS* showed the advantage of the Socialists narrowing from month to month, and

when the Elections were called something like a *too close to call* situation predominated in polls.

This had a clear impact, first, in the number of polls commissioned and released by the media, more numerous than ever. According to our files, considering only the daily newspapers of national (or almost) circulation, 22 polls were published from the moment of the calling to the last day in which publication was allowed. They were conducted by 8 different research agencies.

Sample sizes ranged from a minimum of 1,000 to a maximum of 15,000. Face-to-face fieldwork clearly predominated (14 out of the 22 were face-to face) but, for the first time in Spanish tradition of electoral polling, there was a substantial number of polls conducted via telephone (mainly CATI). It is noteworthy that households' telephone penetration was by 1993 under the threshold of 90%, conventionally admitted as the minimum penetration to ensure reliability of political polls.

All in all, this process had a bad impact on the social credit of political polling in Spain (Wert, 1996). Probably, an overexaggerated one. The final outcome of the Election was a *hung Parliament*, where the *Socialists* with 38.5% of the votes got 159 seats (the majority is of 176 seats); *PP* with 34.6% of the votes got 141 seats, the Communists and allies of *IU* with 9.6% got 17 seats, and the Nationalists from Catalonia (*CiU*) with 4.9% got 17 seats.

As for last pre-election polls, published seven days prior to the Elections due to legal ban on publishing five days before the election, they were more accurate (or less inaccurate) in their forecasts than the image that has prevailed afterwards. *PP* was forecasted to have between 33.0 and 35.6%, i.e., between an underestimation of 1.8 and an overestimation of 0.8. Deviations were larger with regards to *PSOE* from 32.1 to 35.0, i.e., an underestimation ranging from 6.7 to 3.8, exceeding the standard error, while *IU* was solely overestimated from 0.5 to 1.8.

It is quite clear that most of the deviation with regards to PSOE was due to the combined effect of last minute mobilization and also transfer from IU (whose leader, Julio Anguita, suffered a heart attack at the beginnings of the campaign). But it is probably fair to say that the forecast of an even game between PP and PSOE that was published by all agencies on Sunday the 30th of May reflected better than any other forecast the *real* situation at that date. Moreover, when a very important debate on TV took place after the surveys were published with a huge audience (it was the largest TV audience of that year in Spain), and polls conducted the day after showed a large victory of Felipe González over José María Aznar. The impact of that debate on undecided voters was probably determinant (Gunther, Montero and Wert, 1999). The evil fate of political polls on that occasion was heavily influenced by the publication ban. But the general climate after the Election was a very critical one towards polls. As it was summarized by *The Times* newspaper "...for the opinion pollsters, Spain's national election was another night of unmitigated gloom" (Henn, 1998).

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

But, contrary to Frank Sinatra phrase, *the worse was yet to come*. From the very aftermath of 1993 Elections, the political situation further deteriorated. New cases of corruption were disclosed, involving fraud and bribery by very top Government officials (among whom, such notorious ones as the Governor of the *Banco de España* and the Director of the National Police). Moreover, the *GAL* affair, was disclosed. *GAL* had been an antiterrorist illegal squad, active from 1983 to 1986, that claimed authorship of nearly 50 violent actions, causing death to 29, whose avowed aim was to counterattack the terrorist activities of violent Basque terrorists of *ETA*. Investigation by well known Justice Baltasar Garzón (who had resigned a seat in Parliament he had won in 1993 as the *second* to Felipe González in the Socialists' lists) and others at the antiterrorist Court led to evidence incriminating former Minister of Interior, José Barrionuevo, and a bunch of top National Security officers in the murders of *GAL*. As a matter of fact they were all found guilty and

sentenced to long prison punishments in 1998, of which they were pardoned by the *PP* Government shortly after.

The Socialist government experienced a dramatic ordeal during the first half of 1994. Economy was still quite weak, it seemed that everyday had a new scandal to bring, and bilateral opposition to Government by *PP* at the right and *IU* at the left was fiercer than ever. In European Elections of June that year, the *PP* won –for the first time since 1982 the Socialists were defeated at a national level electoral process- by a 10 points margin, while the Communists and their allies at *IU* went as high as 14%, a historical record for the Communists in Spain. Polls did perform quite well: all published ones forecasted the victory of *PP* and most of them anticipated its true dimensions. They were also quite numerous, taking into consideration the political lack of importance of European Elections *per se*. Probably, the explanation is that, under such hot political conditions, the *test* dimension of that process generated more interest in polling than the Election deserved in itself.

One year later, in May 1995, a more *substantive* electoral process, Local Elections in the whole of Spain and Regional Elections in 13 out of the 17 Regions of Spain, all called for the same day, provided a second test about the strength of the *winds of change* that were blowing across the political landscape. The shift of power thereafter was quite impressive: the *PP* secured the Government of virtually all major cities of Spain with the sole exception of cities of Catalonia, and they also captured a clear majority of Regional governments at stake, some of them, like Asturias or Valencia, traditional strongholds of the Socialists who had ruled the Regions for over a decade.

But the results, especially as compared with the precedent of 1994 and the forecast of the polls conducted before the Elections, gave some warnings that most pollsters (including this author) were not smart enough to appropriately read. A more comprehensive understanding of those results would have reinforced the interpretative *caveats* in the face of next General Election.

For, indeed, the victory of *PP* was not the sole factor to pay attention to in those results. The margin of *PP* over the Socialists at the national level in the Local Elections was 5 percent points, roughly half the advantage of the European Election, but with a higher turnout (60% at the European Elections; 70% at the Local Elections). A clear majority of those polls that forecasted national results at the Local Elections anticipated a significantly wider gap between *PP* and the Socialists (most of them on the verge of 7 to 9 points). This deviation was paid very little attention to, since the political outcome was spectacular in terms of the amount of institutional power transferred from the Socialists to *PP*. But the unadverted signs of the Election were providing a cue to understand the underlying public opinion process.

Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (1984) coined the theory of the *spiral of silence* to describe that situation in which supporters of one party are significantly less vocal than supporters of other parties. This was the case with a substantial proportion of *PSOE* supporters during these years. Pressures coming from the opinion climate were very heavy against the Socialists. But this climate was very effective on the surface, at the level of the *social skin* –to use again Noelle-Neumann concepts- although it did not reach the deeper levels of political identity, the roots of political sense of belongingness and identification. So, a number of voters of the Socialists began to fade in the polls, giving the impression that the Socialists were trailing largely behind the *PP* (apparent advantage of *PP* was on the verge of 10 percent points in 1995 and the beginnings of 1996), and that the Election of 1996 would be a non competitive one, with an expected large victory of *PP*, getting absolute majority or an almost equivalent situation.

After the calling of Elections, 18 polls were published in daily newspapers and weekly magazines. They were conducted by seven different research organisations. Sample sizes ranged from a minimum of 1,000 interviews to a maximum of 15,000. 10 were face-to-face surveys, 6 were telephone surveys, and 2 of them –jointly conducted by two different

research agencies- were half face-to-face and half telephone. Nearly 100,000 interviews were used in these polls, giving a quite large average sample size over 5,000 interviews.

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Although there are some differences between the diverse polls published, the global outcome was perceived as catastrophic. To some extent, it was. Outcome of the election, with a 78% turnout, was 38.9% for *PP* (156 seats, 20 short of majority), 37.7% for *PSOE* (141 seats) , 10.5% for *IU* (21 seats) and 11.9% for others (32 seats). Polls forecasted between 39 and 44% for *PP*, with an average of 41%, not all that bad in itself; for *PSOE* the forecast was between 32 and 35%, with an average of 33%, considerably worse. Obviously, *IU* was overestimated, ranging from 11 to 13%. But the crucial factor affecting the overall negative impression was the translation into seats of the overestimated distance between *PP* and *PSOE*. For that distance was forecasted between 4 and 12 percent points, with an average of 8.4 percent points. And, moreover, that plurality in vote, when translated into seats, provided quite a different picture from the one that actually prevailed: the average forecast was of 170 seats for *PP*, 125 for *PSOE*, and some 25 for *IU*.

It is hard to exaggerate the impact on media and, hence, on public opinion at large of this episode. Apart from the objective ground for disappointment that media had, it seems that, to some extent, polls did work as a sort of *escape goat* for the different types of frustrations that the electoral turnout created in a variety of publics. In the weeks following the Election, polls (or, properly speaking, pollsters) were accused of manipulation, fraud and technical incompetence.

Quite often, accusations were not only technically inconsistent, but also logically contradictory. Media leaning to the right said that polls had contributed to create the impression of a completely decided victory of *PP* and provoked an excess of confidence on voters that led some of them to be de-mobilized. Media leaning to the left said, on their

side, that the image created by polls had demobilized voters of the left that would have gone to the polling offices if they had felt any flavour of uncertainty. Both indeed forgot that turnout was unusually high (over 78%, a peak for Spanish standards) making it quite unlikely that the effect was to demobilize anyone. Probably, the most extreme point was made by one economic newspaper. After a booming march in the weeks preceeding the Election, the stock market went abruptly down when the figures of the Election suggested a very weak Government. In that context, the economic newspaper *Cinco Días* proposed that a suit should be filed against the research agencies, because of their “responsibilities” (*sic*) in the fall of the stock market.

But probably more important than the reaction of media and politicians (who also contributed in some cases to the ritual of execration of pollsters) is the reaction of the professional bodies in the situation. After a first moment of astonishment, that fostered some hasty interpretations by practitionners who felt particularly bad about the social rejection of their work, a more parsimonious approach was taken, very much along the same lines taken by the Market Research Society in the United Kingdom after the 1992 *fiasco*. In Spain, the industry association, *ANEIMO*, set up a working group (of which the author was appointed as *Rapporteur*) that produced a comprehensive report by October that same year. The report (*ANEIMO*, 1997) considers three different families of factors: (a) factors linked to the opinion climate, (b) factors linked to sampling and data collection technical problems, and (c) factors linked to the analytical devices used to forecast vote share and seats distribution.

As for the first area under consideration, those factors that do not involve directly problems in the technical conception or execution of the polls, the report stresses the importance of last minute change that was impossible to identify due to the ban on publication. Three different factors were identified: late mobilization of *PSOE* voters, shift towards *PSOE* of undecided voters, and, last but not least, the eventual effect of polls themselves creating among some voters the fear of too large a victory of *PP*.

As for the problems affecting sampling and data collection, a number of, at least, *dubious* practices were identified. Using relatively uncontrolled quota to select the respondent, not having enough control of sociodemographic distribution of refusals and don't answers, scarce weighting according to variables others than past vote, and use of a mixture of face-to-face together with telephone in the same survey were clearly identified as factors possibly contributing to statistical weakness of the polls.

Finally, the working group stated that analysis had been also particularly weak in this occasion. Specifically, a mechanical weighting of the raw data according to past vote could have reinforced the bias of the forecast in this case, taking into account that the opinion climate was affecting both dimensions. Also, the working group identified a particularly weak (and ill explained) system to forecast seats, when, quite obviously, the statistical ground was not robust enough to allow for it.

It goes without saying that this analysis, produced half a year after the election, had a much lesser media impact than the impact the forecasts' *débâcle* had had before. But, at least, it was instrumental in providing the professionals with arguments to explain such a misfortunate event.

After that episode, Regional, Local and European Elections have taken place, mostly in 1999. Most polls related with these processes have been very accurate, as it has always been the case with *second order* Elections. Nevertheless, again the General Elections of 2000 opened the gate to a new controversy.

Elections took place in March 12. Over the preceeding months, virtually all polls were showing a lead by PP, with PSOE trailing behind by a margin of 4 to 6 points. Five weeks before the Elections, once they have been called, the Socialists reached an agreement with *Izquierda Unida*, the Communists-led coalition, to join forces in the Senate race in a limited number of provinces, where, according to electoral antecedents, their aggregated force would give them a majority (Senate is elected according to majority rule). That

agreement turned to be a major issue for discussion, though its scope and practical implications were really very minor. As a matter of fact (Wert, 2000b) in terms of its electoral returns it was an unmitigated disaster: in none of the 29 provinces did the candidates of the left win majority. Shortly after, it appeared that the impact of such agreement, if any, was a deterioration of electoral perspectives for both Socialists and Communists. Instead, PP runned a clever campaign, powerfully fostered by the favorable winds of economy and the improvement of employment, while the Socialists were unable to counterattack, or to have any control of the electoral agenda that was clearly dominated by the Government's party. The last polls released showed a much more comfortable margin for the PP than the very narrow one that was the outcome of the 1996 Election.

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

Nevertheless, as Table 8 shows, all polls fell short of the true dimensions of PP victory in terms both of plurality with regard to PSOE (10.5 percent points, as compared with an average of 4.2 in the polls) and seats allocation (absolute majority for the PP, with a margin of 63 seats over the PSOE).

What happened? Basically, the explanation lies in the events of 1993 and, mostly, 1996. In both occasions, polls were underestimating the *last minute mobilization* of undecided voters who finally went for the Socialists. Therefore, in adjusting raw data, pollsters did anticipate that in the final week (once the *black out* period had started) things would evolve in a similar way. They did not: demobilized center-left voters stayed at home on Election day (turnout was 10 percent points lower than in 1996). As some tracking studies were continuing after the start of the *black out* period, it became evident that things would go different this time: over the last 10 days before the Election the gap between the two main parties remained stable. Some pollsters (like the author: Wert, 2000a) were even able to anticipate the absolute majority of PP... but only in foreign media.

Although there was some dispute in the aftermath of the Election, the impact was considerably less than in 1996. Explanations of the pollsters were well accepted, since they were quite straightforward and understandable, under the light of precedent occasions.

2.4. The Polling industry in Spain today: an overview.

After this historical review of political polling performance in Spain along almost two decades, I will summarize very briefly the current status of professional political polling in Spain by the end of the XX Century.

Apart from the sporadic political opinion polling that could be conducted by academics using University resources, in Spain most political polling is conducted either by public institutions or by private professional research agencies.

As it has been explained above, the *CIS* is the main public institution whose mission is to carry out public opinion research on a variety of fields of public concern. Its research budget is over 6 million €, of which over 80% is used to pay for research conducted via their own resources (an extensive face-to-face fieldwork force and large DP capabilities) and the remaining resources are allocated to commission research from private agencies and analysis from academics. A public opinion barometer, conducted monthly over a representative sample of 2,500 adults is a standard of reference for media, specially when, quarterly, it includes a voting intention projection. Apart from this, *CIS* usually conducts quite large pre-electoral surveys, also very influential. But strict political polling only accounts for less than 20% of all polling activities carried out by *CIS*.

As for the private sector, there are some quite well known research agencies, with stable links with newspapers and other media, that conduct opinion polling, some of them on a time series bases. The longest established of those regular cooperation ventures is the

quarterly barometer *DEMOSCOPIA-EL PAÍS*, running from 1986. More recently, *SIGMA DOS-EL MUNDO* and *OPINA-LA VANGUARDIA* have also established regular (quarterly) surveys. Less systematically, other research firms have significant political polling media impact. The most notorious are *ECO-IPSOS* (working for *ABC* in preelectoral research and the most active in exit polls for the public TV channels), *Metra 6*, and *Gallup*. As it can be seen in the pages above, the number of different research agencies conducting political opinion polls in electoral occasions have been decreasing over the years, contrariwise to the increasing number of research agencies active in the country (now nearly 200). Probably we can interpret this as the consequence of growing specialization of political polling inside the wider context of market and opinion research.

The political polling market can be estimated to be worth around 22 to 24 million € per year, as an average, although there are, obviously, quite clear differences from year to year according to the kind of Elections to be held in it (since 1993, in Spain we have had Elections of one kind or another every year, and this is likely to continue). This market represents between 9 and 10% of the total opinion and market research turnover in Spain.

Clients are mostly media, political parties, and public agencies. One third each is probably the best guess about its share, although there are not public releases on this research expenditure, except for the part of electoral expenses of the parties that, according to the Electoral Law are subject to public audit. These opinion polling expenses represent, for the two major parties, less than 5% of their total campaign expenditure.

All in all, the political opinion market is growing in Spain, although at a lower pace than other segments of opinion and market research. Although media pay considerable attention to polling news, there are relatively few stable links between media and research agencies, and also, most media have not a consistent policy on the use of public opinion polling. The prospects for the future are not very clear. They will depend, apart from many other factors, such as the technological change, and, specifically, the ICT and Internet

revolution, from the evolution in the public perception of the accuracy of polls in the coming Elections.

3. Political polling in Portugal

3.1. Antecedents.

Modern Portugal was given birth in the dawn of April 25 1974, when Army officers of diverse political leanings, from moderate liberals to Marxist revolutionaries, started the *Carnations' Revolution* to overthrow the longest authoritarian Regime in Western Europe, the *Estado Novo* that had been founded by Oliveira Salazar in the 20's and that, without any formal breakdown, turned into the *Estado Corporativo* headed by Marcelo Caetano in the 60's.

This old Regime was a typical example of the conservative-authoritarian paradigm (González Hernández, 1999). As such, one of its characteristics was restraint of freedom of speech, while another was absence of truly competitive Electoral processes. As in Spain during the Franco Regime, in Portugal there were also some Elections. But, as it has been said, they were *elections without choice* (Schmitter, 1977). The percent of adult population entitled to vote and actually participating in those processes hardly went beyond 10% in the Elections to National Assembly held from 1934 to 1973.

Under the Authoritarian regime, Portugal was a backward society, quite isolated from mainland Europe, with a very substantial lag in terms not only of wealth, but also of education and cultural development. It goes without saying that this was not a particularly stimulating *humus* for the blossoming of opinion polling, that was virtually a non existent activity during the Salazar-Caetano Regime.

The early stages of the Revolution, the period running from 1974 to 1976 were quite uncertain from many viewpoints. It was not at all clear that a Westernlike democracy would be the final outcome of the process. The place of the Army in the political system, the internal feuds inside the Army, with a very vocal Marxist faction trying to transform Portugal into a soviet Republic, the problematic build-up of parties both in center left and center right, the political reaccomodation of the elite that had been with the old regime... were in the center of political debate, amidst a complicated decolonization process with the coming back to Portugal mainland of hundreds of thousands who had for long been living in the ancient colonies (*retornados*).

As a consequence of the leftist and populist rhetoric of those times, the first Electoral Law, under which Elections have been held until after the Constitutional reform of 1982, forbid any publication of polls during the whole electoral period, i.e., from the very moment of the calling of Elections. This publication *veto*, enforced in this extreme way till the mid 80's, and only somewhat milded till the early 90's, has been a factor of paramount importance in the moulding of a political polling tradition in Portugal.

Because, indeed, this ban on publication did not preempted any role of political opinion polling in the electoral process, but rather made of it a matter of privileged information, rumor and innuendo.

The polling activities were undertaken by parties, industry associations, multinational companies and other actors interested in the electoral dynamics. They generated a lot of gossip, they were frequently object of manipulation, alteration, and interested interpretation. Occasionally, even they almost provoked diplomatic clashes, like the one the author was –unwillingly- participating in.

When in 1979, the two center-right parties, *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD) and *Centro Democrático Social* (CDS), joined forces in the *Aliança Democrática* (AD) they asked to the UCD –then governing in Spain- for some electoral know-how cooperation. A number of

consultants in areas of political strategy, communication and polling were assigned. Among them, it was the author, with the mission to conduct a series of polls. When rumor spread in Lisbon about the presence of Spanish consultants cooperating with the AD, the Socialists leader, Mario Soares, reacted by saying that contribution (and, specially, in the polling area) was a proof of the undercover "*imperialist ambition*" of the Spanish, facilitated by the leaders of AD.

This situation notwithstanding, a development of the political polling took place in Portugal from the mid 70's to the mid 80's when the publication ban was partially lifted. University professors and private researchers started diverse and sporadic research operations. The main private research agencies in the field of public opinion, like *Norma*, *Euroexpansao*, *Metris*, and *Euroteste* have been founded in the 70's and early 80's. Reputed specialists like Mario Bacalhau, Luis Valente or José Vidal de Oliveira conducted reference surveys in those years (Bacalhau, 1979).

3.2. Polling in modern Portugal: the recent developments.

The first step of *normalisation* of Portugal with regards to political polling only takes place with the reform of the Constitution in 1976, that changes the absolute publication ban that had prevailed from the origin of the Revolution to a more limited 30 days ban. This still very abusive system was changed, following also, like was the case in Spain, the model of the French law. The publication of polls falls now under the regulation of Law 31/91 (*Lei das Sondagens*). It forbids publication in the 7 days prior to Election day and in the Elections' day itself, and establishes a fining system for those who do not respect the publication ban. The National Electoral Commission (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) is responsible for these fines, while the High Authority for Communications (*Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social*) keeps the discipline in other aspects of publication (as full technical description, text of the questions, percent of DK/DA, and so on).

During the years along which it has been possible to publish political polls in electoral periods, Portugal has gone through three General Elections (1991, 1995 and 1999). One of them has been won by the *PSD* (1991) with absolute majority, while the other two were won by the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista, PS*) a few seats short of that majority.

The record in forecast in these occasions can deserve mixed judgements, taking into account the lack of a tradition, and some structural weaknesses of the research agencies in this particular field. Generally speaking, they show a systematic bias of overestimation of the opposition parties, of which some examples could be presented.

In 1991, 16 different surveys have been released by newspapers and weekly magazines, conducted by 5 different research institutes. Sample sizes ranged from a minimum of 500 to a maximum of almost 6,000. One of those using larger samples (over 5,000) was in fact the only one that got wrong the winner, giving a slim advantage to the *PS*, that was instead trailing behind the *PSD* by a margin of over 20 points.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

When the actual plurality of *PSD* was 50.6% all polls (with the above mentioned exception) forecasted between 39 and 47%, i.e., underestimated its electoral strength by 6 to 20%; instead, the *PS* actually captured 29.1% of the votes, but was forecasted between 27% (just one case of underestimation) and 38% (nearly 30% of overestimation). Instead of a 20 points margin between the first and second parties, polls on average forecasted a 9 points margin (Calafate, 1995).

In 1995 after a long period of hegemony of *PSD* under the leadership of Anibal Cavaco Silva, there was a clear political turning point. The number of polls published increased throughout the electoral period and the very last day before the publication ban seven different polls were published or released (Calafate, 1995). All of them forecasted the victory of *PS* but differed largely on the margin, from less than 1 percent point to 18

points. The average difference between *PS* and *PSD* was 7 points, quite close to the actual results. Nevertheless, there was much more criticism afterwards than it was in 1991 (Lima, 1995; Vidal, 1995). Particularly, there was a bitter dispute that mixed up technical arguments on the usefulness of weighting according to past vote, with political arguments on who was behind any particular poll and how polls were used to influence the political battle (González Hernández, 1999).

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

The Elections in 1999 had a very limited flavour of uncertainty. The victory of *PS* headed by António Guterres, a moderate Socialist who had succeeded in making Portugal fulfill the conditions to join the Euro countries, was taken for granted by most, and the only question mark regarded if that victory would or not be by an absolute majority.

There were six polls released by different media on the last day before the publication ban was enforced. All forecasted a substantial margin of the *PS* over their main rivals of *PSD* and most included as a possibility the absolute majority. Indeed, the Socialists fell only 6 seats short of that majority. After the Election, no major controversy took place about the polls and their accuracy.

Next occasion came in 1996, with a Presidential Election in which Socialist Jorge Sampaio and conservative Cavaco Silva fought a fierce electoral race. As shown in Table 11, and with the single exception of one poll conducted by *Universidad Católica*, polls tended to overestimate the lead of Sampaio, but none of them got it wrong.

TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

Forecasts on Legislative Elections in 1999, whose results were extremely similar to those of 1995, showed again the same pattern: slight overestimation of the winning Socialists (and the margin over the *PSD*), but, all in all, a quite accurate picture of the outcome.

Some of the polls got wrong one aspect of the political outcome, since the overestimation of the Socialist lead meant also a forecast of an absolute majority in Parliament of which they finally fell slightly short. Table 12 shows these forecasts.

TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE

And, to come to an end, the last episode regards the Presidential Election of 2001. Socialist Jorge Sampaio, running for his second term, won by a very wide margin over his main opponent, conservative Ferreira do Amaral. Polls projected –again- an even wider margin, but this had no consequences at all. Obviously in these kind of contests -with no uncertainty at all- the role played by the polls is seen as less important.

TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE

3.3. The Polling industry in Portugal.

Today, Portugal has a mature political opinion industry. *Euroteste*, *Universidad Católica*, and *Ipsos* are the most known players that specialize in political polling. Although there is not any official estimate of the global turnover, it can be in the region of 3 million € as a yearly average.

Data gathering has been traditionally face to face, though, with a substantial increase in telephone households' equipment in the late 90's (now over 80% at the national level) telephone is being increasingly used for these purposes.

No specialized public institution has responsibilities in polling, but, instead, some Universities, among which the very notorious *Universidad Catolica*, are very active in this area.

Prospects are good for the coming years. Increased openness of the Portuguese economy and society, fully integrated in the European Union, fosters the entry of multinational groups in market and opinion research. Some of the research agencies more active in political polling are in fact affiliates of leading opinion research groups like *Ipsos*, *Inra* or *Taylor Nelson Sofres*. An increased level of professionalism, the progressive entry of new tools and techniques for data gathering and analysis, and also an increased interest in the press and the media at large in political surveys should create opportunity for further development in the years to come.

TABLES

TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED POLLS 1977

Research agency	Consulta	Sofemasa	Consulta	Sofemasa	Consulta	Metra-Seis	Alef	Metra-Seis	Sofemasa	Ana	Ana	Icsa-Gallup	Real Results
Published by	Cambio 16	El País	ABC	El País	Cambio 16	Diario 16	Cuadernos	La Vanguardia	El País	Europa Press	Europa Press	Ya	
Date of publication	8 may	10 may	15 may	24 may	5 june	9 june	11 june	10 june	12 june	12 june	14 june	14 june	
Centro Democrático	12	19.0	14	20.1	10	40.5	33.7	34.4	30.2	30.0	31.4	25.6	34.34
PSOE	13	12.4	14	13.4	12	20.7	20.0	24.2	24.0	20.7	26.0	28.9	29.12
Alianza Popular	6	4.5	6	5.7	4	8.3	11.3	4.9	8.2	11.3	9.5	5.7	8.02
Partido Comunista	7	5.0	4	5.8	4	7.8	10.8	9.7	7.2	7.1	8.1	5.8	9.12
PSP-Unidad Socialista	4	5.1	4	3.9	4	6.1	8.0	6.8	4.8	6.2	6.6	4.8	4.33
Fed. Demo. Cristiana	--	1.0	4	3.0	2	5.6	11.4	3.1	2.3	5.0	5.1	3.9	1.38
Alianza SD	--	0.3	--	1.7	2	--	--	--	0.9	2.3	--	0.6	0.72
Alianza 18 Julio	1	0.2	--	0.7	1	--	1.8	--	0.6	--	--	0.5	0.35
Izquierda Radical (FDI-CUP-FUT-TRAB)	2	0.8	--	1.4	--	3.5	3.0	--	--	(sólo FDI)	--	--	1.47
NS/NC	49	28.4	43	25.7	56	--	--	--	11.2	--	--	--	--
Catalonia													
Pacte Democràtic	1	--	--	--	--	3.1	--	--	1.3	2.3	1.7	2.4	2.85
Esquerra-FDI	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.6	--	--	--	0.78
Unió DC	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.3	--	--
Basque Country													
PNV	2	1.4	--	1.6	--	1.4	--	--	0.9	1.3	--	1.8	1.65
Euzkadiko Ezquerria	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.4	--	--	--
Voters	73	85.1	--	85.2	78	76.8	--	83.1	91.7	--	--	80	78
Abstention	7	4.5	--	5.6	8	23.2	--	--	3.6	--	--	--	21.6
Undecided	20	10.4	--	9.2	14	--	--	--	4.7	--	--	--	--
Technique	Survey	Survey	Survey	Survey	Survey	Survey	Prospective	Survey	Survey	Survey	Survey	Survey	
Sample size	1.500	1.595	¿?	1.638	1.494	1.700	¿?	¿?	15.875	5.100	1.285	1.200	

Source: Adapted from Monzón and Rospir (1992)

TABLE 2
VOTING FORECASTS IN 1979

Research Agency	Sofemasa	Sofema sa	Promoción y Publicidad
Date	30-31/1/79	19-21/2/79	17-21/2/79
Published by	El País (6/2/79)	El País (27/2/79)	Diario 16 (27/2/79)
Unión de Centro Democrático	18.4	27.7	33.1
Partido Socialista Obrero Español	21.0	29.5	31.9
Partido Comunista de España	5.9	9.3	8.2
Coalición Democrática	2.3	5.3	6.3
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	1.2	1.4	1.6
Convergencia i Unió	--	1.5	2.2
Euskadiko Ezkerra	0.2	0.9	0.5
Herri Batasuna	0.4	0.9	0.5
Unión Nacional	1.1	1.9	1.1
Partido Socialista de Andalucía	1.5	0.9	1.0
Partido del Trabajo de España	0.4	0.9	1.0
Bloque Nacional Popular Gallego	0.8	0.5	--
Unión del Pueblo Canario	--	0.4	--
Partido Aragonés Regionalista	-	0.2	--
Others	5.7	2.9	5.8
Abstention	8.8	--	--
Undecided	32.3	15.8	7.8
N	(2.385)	(1.869)	(1.817)

Source: Adapted from Monzón and Rospir (1992)

TABLE 3
ELECTIONS 1982
A PREELECTORAL TRACKING (*)

Date of publication	24-September		8-October		22-October			
	Voting intention	Forecast	Voting intention	Forecast	Voting intention	Forecast	Actual results	Deviation
PSOE	31.1	51.3	27.4	45.9	29.1	49.2	47.2	+2.0
AP	7.2	13.0	9.5	16.3	9.6	18.2	25.8	-7.6
UCD	7.8	10.7	4.2	10.6	3.9	9.5	6.1	+3.4
CDS	1.7	5.2	3.0	8.4	2.4	5.9	2.8	+3.1
PCE	5.3	6.0	4.1	5.8	5.5	7.8	3.2	+4.6
Otros	7.0	14.0	7.0	13.0				
Undecided	45.0		45.2		44.8			
Fieldwork	20-IX		4-X		11-X		28-II	

(*) Conduced by *Alef*

Source: Adapted from Monzón and Rospir (1992)

TABLE 4
VOTING FORECASTS IN 1986

Research agency	Date of fieldwork	Publication (1986)	N	PSOE	CP	CDS	PRD	IU	UC	CiU	ERC	PNV	EE	HB	Others
Emopública	23-25.4	Cambio 16 (5.5)	1.200	44	27.7	6.5	6.0	7.4	--	3.0	0.2	0.8	1.0	0.9	6.3
Typol	24-4/10-5	ABC (3.6)	5.000	43.5	28.6	5.8	9.7 ¹	3.9	--	--	0.4	2.1	0.9	0.9	4.2
Perfiles	--	ABC (25.5)	--	42	23.4	3.5	11.4	4.1	--	3.9	0.4	1.9	0.3	0.6	8.5
Perfiles	--	ABC (3.6)	4.265	40.2	23.1	2.8	12.8 ¹	5.3	--	--	0.4	2.0	0.3	0.5	8.0
Sigma-Dos	10-14.5	Actualidad ((9.6)	1.111	38.4	25.8	7.2	4.9	8.4	--	4.5	--	1.9	0.4	1.0	7.8
Demoscopia	24-27.5	El país (1.6)	5.200	46	24	8	1	6	--	6	0.3	3	0.7	1	3
Sigma-Dos	30.5-2.6	Actualidad (16.6)	1.111	38.5	26.5	8.7	4.7	6.6	--	4.9	--	1.9	0.4	1.0	4.0
Line-Staff	29.5-7.6	La Vanguardia ² (16.6)	8.871	39.3	23.7	11.1	10.1	7.6	--	5.4	--	1.8	--	--	-- ²
Line-Staff	29.5-7.6	La Vanguardia ³ (16.6)	8.871	45	19.2	14	9	5.5	--	5.7	--	1.9	--	--	-- ³
Iope-Etmar	3-7.6	El Periódico (15.6)	7.209	42.4	24.1	11.7	2.8	4.9	2.0	4.7	0.6	1.7	0.5	1.1	3.5
Gallup	2-9.6	Ya (15.6)	6.046	40	24	9	5	6	2	6	1	2	1	1	3
Demoscopia	5-8.6	El País (15.6)	5.200	41	24	11	3	6	--	0.3	6	1	3	0.7	1.4
Emopública	5-11.6	Diario 16 (15.6)	6.081	48.0	23.6	11.1	5.8 ¹	5.3	1.2	--	1.2	1.7	1.0	1.3	--
Emopública	5-11.6	Cambio 16 (23.6)	6.081	45.5	23.0	10.8	2.2	5.5	--	4.0	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.9	5.6
Aresco	11-13.6	ABC (16.6)	2.505	39.9	28.7	9.0	3.2	7.4	1.3	4.5	0.3	1.8	0.4	1.0	2.5
Telemarket (PRD)	--	ABC (16.6)	--	39.1	22.2	5.4	9.7	5	--	5.2	--	2.5	--	--	10.9
ECO (SER)	--	ABC (16.6)	--	40.2	26.3	9.6	3.7	6	--	4.8	--	1.8	--	--	7.6
Actual results (% on valid votes cast)				43.41	25.50	9.08	0.95	4.35	1.07	4.95	0.41	1.51	0.52	1.13	4.87

1 PRD- CiU

2 Weighted according to ideology

3 Weighted according to leader's evaluation

Source: Adapted from Monzón and Rospir (1992)

TABLE 5

ELECTIONS OCTOBER 1989

RESEARCH AGENCY	Fieldwork dates (1989)	Publication (1989)	N	PSOE	PP	CDS	IU	CiU	PNV	HB	EE	EA	Others
Sigma-Dos	2-3.9	Tiempo (11.9)	800	39.0-41.0	23.0-25.0	8.5-9.5	6.5-7.5	4.5-5.0	1.0-1.2	1.0-2.0	0.5-0.8	0.8-1.1	1.5-2.0
Inst. Opina	7-11.9	La Vanguardia (15.9)	2.800	41.0	24.0	9.0	8.8	4.8	2.0	--	1	1	9.4
Sigma-Dos	6	Tiempo (16.9)	--	44.35	26.15	9.16	4.66	5.05	1.04	1.15	0.53	--	0.47
Sigma-Dos	7-8.9	Tiempo (16.9)	800	38.0-39.0	22.5-24.0	10.0-11.0	8.0-9.0	4.5-4.7	1.0-1.1	1.0-1.1	0.7	0.6	1.2-1.3
Dym	29-30.8	Cambio 16 (18.9)	1.000	40.6	25.1	9.2	6.4	5.2	1.4	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.5
ICP-Research	16-19.9	Diario 16 (24.9)	1.600	38.2	20.2	9.1	10.0	4.7	1.3	1.4	--	--	1.9
Metra-Seis	19-22.9	El Independiente (1.10)	13.950	38.2	22.3	9.2	8.0	5.0	1.3	1.0	0.6	0.5	1.3
CIS	23-27.9	El País (6.10)	2.500	38.0	12.0	7.0	7.0	--	--	--	--	--	--
Demoscopia	25-30.9	El País (8.10)	6.200	42.1	23.8	7.3	8.7	4.6	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.3	1.1
Gruppo	30-1.10	Ya (8.10)	1.500	38.3	24.1	9.0	7.4	4.7	1.1	1.1	0.7	0.7	1.2
Gruppo	16-17.10	Ya (22.10)	1.500	40.1	23.6	9.3	7.5	4.8	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.6	1.2
Demoscopia	9-15.10	El País (22.10)	6.200	41.6	22.8	9.1	8.0	5.0	1.5	1.0	0.7	0.4	1.2
ICP-Research	16-19.10	Diario 16 (22.10)	9.524	40.5	19.1	8.5	10.3	4.9	1.4	1.2	0.5	--	1.5
Sigma-Dos	16-17.10	El Mundo (23.10)	8.400	39.2	24.2	10.3	8.0	4.9	1.4	1.1	0.6	0.5	1.2
Inst. Opina	16-17-18.9	La Vanguardia (23.10)	3.262	41.5	25.0	7.8	6.5	4.5	1.9	--	0.8	1.0	11

Source: Adapted from Monzón and Rospir (1992)

TABLE 6
VOTING FORECASTS
1993

RESEARCH AGENCY	INTER GALLUP		SIGMA-DOS		VOX PÚBLICA		I.OPINA		ICP/RESEARCH		SIGMA DOS		ICP/RESEARCH		SIGMA DOS		GRUPPO	
Published by	YA		EL MUNDO		EL PERIÓDICO de Catalunya		LA VANGUARDIA		DIARIO16		EL MUNDO		DIARIO16		EL MUNDO		ABC	
Date	18 april		18 april		18 april		25 april		26 april		8 may		10 may		16 may		15 may	
Forecast	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Esc.	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats
PP	35.3		35.8	145-158	32.6	138-149	36.0	138-146	33.4	-	-	139-148	33.0	-	35.3	134-142	35.1	-
PSOE	35.3		34.4	131-143	36.0	145-160	35.5	138-142	34.2	-	-	142-152	33.5	-	34.8	147-155	34.1	-
IU	11.9		12.1	24-30	10.7	24-26	11.0	27-30	13.4	-	-	26-27	10.6	-	12.4	25-28	12.9	-
CIU	4.3		5.0	18-19	3.5	17-18	5.5	17-19	5.2	-	-	16-17	4.2	-	5.0	17-20	4.9	-
CDS	2.5		1.1		1.7	-	1.0	0	2.8	-	-	-	2.9	-	1.4	-	2.0	
PNV	-		1.6	6-7	1.0	5-6	1.2	4-6	1.1	-	-	6-7	1.0	-	1.5	6-7	1.5	-
CC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	1-3	0.5	-
HB	-	-	1.1	3-4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3-4	-	-	1.0	2-4	1.1	-
ERC	-	-	0.7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1-2	-	-	0.7	1	0.6	-
EA	-	-	0.7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	0.7	1-2	0.8	-
UV	-	-	0.5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0-1	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-
PAP (Pacheco)			0.4	1								1	-	-	0.3	1	0.3	
PA	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.3	-
BNG	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.2	-
OTHERS	10.6	-	5.7	2	7.9	7	9.8	9-16	8.6	-	-	2-3	12.8	-	6.3		5.2	-
NS/NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Voters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Abstention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undecided	-	-	17.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Data colection/ Sample size	Face to face/1003		Face to face/8200		Telephone/6200		Telephone/2006		Face to face/1000		Face to face/2200		Face to face/1000		Face to face/10200		Face to face/5000	

Source: Own elaboration

TABLE 6 (ctd.)
VOTING FORECASTS
1993

RESEARCH AGENCY	I.OPINA		DEMOSCOPIA		VOX PUBLICA		ABACO		ICP-RESEARCH		SIGMA DOS		ICP-RESEARCH		I.OPINA		GALLUP	
Published by	LA VANGUARDIA		EL PAÍS		LA GACETA de los negocios		El Correo Español del Pueblo Vasco		DIARIO16		EL MUNDO		DIARIO 16		LA VANGUARDIA		YA	
Date	16 mayo		16 mayo		21 mayo		23 mayo		21 mayo		23 mayo		27 mayo		30 mayo		30 mayo	
Forecast	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.	%	Esc.
PP	35.7	143-147	35.5	-	30.7	130-143	21.5	162	33.0	-	35.2	144-153	32.8	141-149	35.6	144-148	33.0	140-147
PSOE	36.6	147-152	36.6	-	35.0	139-150	19.9	126	35.0	-	34.0	134-143	33.5	137-145	35.0	142-146	32.1	134-139
IU	10.1	21-22	11.2	-	10.1	19-27	7.2	24	10.7	-	12.6	26-29	10.6	19-24	11.4	24-25	10.6	23
CIU	5.1	18-19	4.9	-	5.6	18-20	-	19	5.1	-	5.0	18-19	5.1	17-19	5.0	18-19	5.6	21
CDS	2.0	0-1	1.4	-	2.4	0-2	1.6	1	3.1	-	1.5	-	3.0	1-2	2.1	0-1	2.6	--
PNV	1.4	5-6	1.1	-	1.5	6-8	-	5	1.3	-	1.5	6-7	1.3	7-8	1.3	6-7	1.4	8
CC	-		0.4	-	0.9	3-5	-	1	-	-	0.5	2-3	-	3-4	-	-	0.8	4
HB	-		0.8	-	0.9	2-4	-	4	-	-	1.0	3-4	-	3-4	-	-	1.0	4-5
ERC	-		0.7	-	0.6	1	-	1	-	-	0.6	1-2	-	1-2	0.9	0-1	0.7	1
EA	-		0.4	-	0.6	1-2	-	3	-	-	0.7	1-2	-	0-1	-	-	0.5	1
UV	-		0.6	-	0.7	2	-	1	-	-	0.5	1	-	0-1	-	-	0.9	2
PAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	1	-	-	--	-	0.5	2
PA	-		-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
BNG	-		-	-	0.9	0-1	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	0-1	-	-	--	--
OTHERS	9.1	10-11	3.3	-	4.5	5	14.0	2	9.6	-	5.6	-	11.5	3	8.7	9-10	10.5	2
NS/NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Voters	-	-	78	-	78.5	-	74.6	-	75.7	-	-	-	76.5	-	-	--	70.2	--
Abstention	-	-	-	-	-		25.4	-	24.3	-	-	-	23.5	-	--	--	29.8	--
Undecided	-	-	-	-	21.5		10.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Data collection	Telephone		Face to face		Telephone		Face to face		Face to face		Face to face		Face to face		Telephone		Telephone	
Sample size	2000		2500		6415		15000		1000		3000		10000		2000		6050	

TABLE 6 (ctd.)
VOTING FORECASTS
1993

Research agency	VOX PÚBLICA		SIGMA DOS		DEMOSCOPIA		ACTUAL RESULTS	
Published by	El Periódico de Catalunya		EL MUNDO		EL PAÍS			
Date	30 may		30 may		30 may		6 JUNE	
Forecast	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	SEATS
PP	32.5	134-151	35.9	147-155	34.8	141-155	34.76	141
PSOE	34.5	133-152	34.6	132-141	34.5	135-151	38.78	159
IU	10.1	19-24	11.4	25-28	10.7	20-22	9.55	18
CIU	5.5	19-21	4.9	17-19	5.0	18-20	4.94	17
CDS	2.3	0-1	1.4	--	2.4	0-1	--	--
PNV	1.5	6-7	1.3	5-6	1.4	6	1.24	5
CC	1.0	4-6	0.6	3	0.7	1	0.88	4
HB	1.1	3-4	1.0	3-4	0.8	2-3	0.88	2
ERC	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	0.80	1
EA	0.7	1-3	0.8	2-3	0.5	2	0.55	1
UV	0.9	2-3	0.5	1	0.6	2	0.48	1
PAP	0.5	1	0.3	1	-	-	--	-
PA	0.7	--	0.5	-	-	-	--	-
BNG	0.5	1-2	0.3	-	0.5	-	--	-
OTHERS	7.5	--	5.6	1	6.9		--	1 (PAR)
DK/DA	--	--	-	-			--	-
Voters	74.8		-	-	73	-	70.78	--
Abstention	--		-	-	27	-	29.22	--
Undecided	25.2		-	-	-	-		--
Data collection	Telephone		Face to face		Face to face			
Sample size	8148		13200		11000			

Source: Own ellaboration

TABLE 7
VOTING FORECAST 1996

Research agency	SIGMA DOS & VOX PÚBLICA		Inter GALLUP ESPAÑA		SIGMA DOS & VOX PÚBLICA		DEMOSCOPIA		I.OPINA		SIGMA DOS		SIGMA DOS & VOX PÚBLICA		Inter GALLUP ESPAÑA		SIGMA DOS	
Published by	EL MUNDO		EL CORRERO de Andalucía		EL MUNDO		EL PAÍS		LA VANGUARDIA		EL MUNDO		EL MUNDO		EL CORREO de Andalucía		EL MUNDO	
Date	25 Dec.95		7 Jan		7 Jan		14 Jan		14 Jan		14 Jan		27 Jan		4 February		11 February	
Forecast	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Esc.
PP	40.2	165-173	39	-	40.3	165-173	40.5	-	39.5	155-165	40.6	167-174	41.4	-	38.8	-	41.8	-
PSOE	31.5	115-120	32.7	-	31.2	115-120	33.8	-	34.0	135-140	30.9	115-120	31.4	-	34.5	-	31.5	-
IU	13.3	29-30	12.9	-	13.1	29-30	12.2	-	11.0	19-21	13.0	27-30	12.6	-	12.4	-	11.9	-
CIU	4.7	16-17	4.6	-	4.6	16-17	4.5	-	4.5	14-16	4.4	15-17	4.0	-	5.0	-	4.2	-
PNV	1.2	5	0.9	-	1.2	5	1.1	-	1.5	4-5	1.3	5	1.4	-	1.3	-	1.3	-
CC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-
HB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	-
ERC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-
EA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	-
UV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-
PA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BNG	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	-	-	-	-
OTROS	-	10-12	9.9	-	9.6	10-15	7.9	-	9.0	-	-	11-14	5.8	-	8.7	-	-	-
NS/NC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Voters	-	-	77	-	-	-	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	77	-	-	-
Abstention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undecided	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Data collection	Face to face		Face to face		Face to face		Face to face		Telephone		Face to face		Face to face/ Telephone		Face to face		Face to face	
Sample size	1000		2.031		1.000		2.500		1500		1000		11.000		2010		1000	

Source: Own elaboration

TABLE 7 (ctd.)
VOTING FORECAST 1996

Research agency	DEMOSCOPIA		I.OPINA		TABULA V		METRA-SEIS (Colpisa)		VOX PÚBLICA		SIGMA DOS y VOX PÚBLICA		I. OPINA		DEMOSCOPIA		TÁBULA V	
Published by	EL PAIS		LA VANGUARDIA		ABC		YA		EL PERÍODICO de CATALUÑA		EL MUNDO		LA VANGUARDIA		EL PAÍS		ABC	
Date	11 February		11 February		11 February		19 February		20 February		24 February		25 February		25 February		25 February	
Forecast	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Esc.
PP	41.7	-	40.5	-	39-41	168-172	41-42	170-175	41.2	165-175	-	170-179	41	160-170	42.4	170-178	44.1	180
PSOE	32.6	-	34.0	-	28-31.5	108-123	32-33	120-128	33.5	119-129	-	113-123	35	135-145	33.4	118-128	32.5	123
IU	12.8	-	11.0	-	13.5-15	24-35	12	23-29	11.7	18-27	-	25-29	10.5	19-21	12.3	24-27	12.8	24
CIU	4.5	-	4.5	-	4.8-5	15-17	4	14	4.5	14-16	-	14-15	4.5	14-15	4.2	13-15	4.2	13
PNV	1.3	-	1.5	-	1.1	5-6		5	1.3	5	-	6-7	1.5	5-6	1.1	5-6	0.8	4
CC	-	-	-	-	1	3		3	0.7	2-3	-	2-3	--	--	0.8	3	--	--
HB	-	-	-	-	0.9	2		2	0.7	2	-	2	--	--	0.5	2	--	--
ERC	-	-	1.0	-	0.5	1		1	0.9	1-2	-	1	1.0	1-2	0.9	1	--	--
EA	-	-	-	-	0.5	1		1	0.5	1-2	-	1	--	--	0.4	1	--	--
UV	-	-	-	-	0.6	1		0-1	0.4	0-1	-	1	-	-	0.3	--	--	--
PA	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	0-1	--	--
BNG	-	-	-	-	0.7	1		1-2	0.6	1	-	-	-	-	0.6	1	--	--
OTROS	7.1	-	-	-	-	-		-	2.5	-	-	-	6.5	6	2.5	--	5.6	6
NS/NC	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Voters	80	-	-	-	-	-	79.5	-	84	-	-	-	-	-	80	--	--	--
Abstention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Undecided	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--	--	--
Data collection	Face to face		Telephone		Face to face		Telephone		Telephone		Face to face/ Telephone		Telephone		Face to face		Face to face	
Sample size	3.500		1185		4.503		7.566		12.069		12.990		2.369		3.500		3.035	

Source: Own elaboration

TABLE 7 (ctd.)
VOTING FORECAST 1996

Research agency	METRA-SEIS		ACTUAL RESULTS	
Published by...	YA			
Date	25 February		3 March	
Forecast	%	Seats	%	SEATS
PP	41.7	173-181	38.55	156
PSOE	32.2	116-130	37.48	141
IU	11.9	20-27	10.58	21
CiU	4.2	14-16	4.61	16
PNV	1.3	5-6	1.28	5
CC	0.7	3	0.89	4
HB	0.7	1-2	0.73	2
ERC	0.8	1-2	0.67	1
EA	0.5	1	0.46	1
UV	0.3	0-1	0.37	1
PA	0.5	0-1	0.54	-
BNG	0.7	1-2	0.88	2
OTROS	4.5	--	1.6	--
NS/NC	--	--	--	--
Voters	77-79	--	77.66	
Abstention	--	--	22.34	
Undecided	--	--		
Data collection	Telephone			
Sample size	15.000			

Source: Own ellaboration

TABLE 8
VOTING FORECASTS 2000

Research agency	DEMOSCOPIA		I.OPINA		ECO-IPSOS		SIGMA 2		VOX PUBLICA		SONDAXE		METRA SEIS		CIS		ACTUAL RESULTS	
Published by	EL PAIS		LA VANGUARDIA		ABC		EL MUNDO		EL PERÍODICO de CATALUÑA		DIARIO 16		CRUPO CORREO		---		--	
Date	5 March		5 March		5 March		5 March		5 March		5 March		5 March		3 March		12 March	
Forecast	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Esc.
PP	41.7	165-171	41.8	166-170	40.5	158-164	41.9	164-168	41.7	165-170	42.1	163-170	41.5	162-170	41.6	163-168	44.5	183
PSOE	37.1	131-139	37.2	136-140	36.7	138-144	37.3	137-143	37.6	135-140	37.4	136-143	36.7	134-142	36.6	138-143	34.1	125
IU	7.3	9-13	8.0	12-14	7.3	9-12	6.5	9-11	7.5	9-12	8.1	11-14	8.0	12-13	7.4	9-11	5.4	8
CiU	4.1	14-15	4.2	14-15	4.3	15-16	4.5	16	4.2	13-14	4.3	13-15	4.4	15-16	4.1	14-15	4.1	15
PNV	1.4	6-7	1.3	6	1.4	6-7	1.7	6-7	1.6	7-8	1.6	7	1.4	7	1.3	7	1.5	7
CC	1.0	3-4	1.0	4	1.0	4	0.9	4	1.2	4-5	1.1	3	NA	4-5	0.8	3-4	1.1	4
BNG	1.3	4-5	1.0	3	1.2	4-5	1.3	3-5	1.7	4-5	1.4	3-5	NA	4-5	1.1	4-5	1.3	3
OTHERS	6.1	3-5		1-3	7.6	-	6.0	-	4.5	-	4.0	2-6	8.0	1-4	6.3	3-5	8.0	5

Source: Own elaboration

TABLE 9
VOTING FORECASTS 1991

Published by	Date	Research agency	Sample size	PSD	PS	CDU	CDS
Semanário	14/9	Norma	942	45.0	37.3	11.2	3.5
	20/7	Norma	949	43.7	32.9	12.4	6.5
Público	27/9	Euroteste	2.500	47.3	35.5	8.5	4.1
	19/9	Euroteste	1.210	47.3	37.3	8.1	4.6
	19/7	Euroteste	900	45.1	34.5	10.2	5.2
Independente	20/9	Euroteste	910	45.6	35.5	10.0	4.4
	16/8	Euroteste	900	45.1	34.5	10.2	5.2
Expresso/TSF	28/9	Euroexpansao	805	41.6	31.1	8.9	5.9
	21/9	Euroexpansao	5.965	44.2	35.8	7.9	5.2
	24/8	Euro/Marktest	5.222	35.3	36.8	8.7	4.9
O Jornal	27/9	Pluriteste	500	41.2	34.7	8.4	8.1
	16/8	Pluriteste	500	39.2	26.6	6.2	6.0
JN	28/9	Euroteste	1.193	46.0	37.0	9.7	3.9
	4/8	Euroteste	910	47.5	37.8	12.3	8.2
DN	27/9	Marktest	2.110	43.1	32.8	7.8	4.6
	5/7	Marketst	1.256	39.0	33.9	8.3	7.3

Source: Adapted from Calafate (1995)

TABLE 10
VOTING FORECAST 1995

Published by	Date	Research agency	PSD	PS	CDU	CDS/PP
Público/RR/TVI	23/9	U. Católica	35	40	9	10
DN/TSF/RTP	23/9	Euroteste	35	39	9	10
Expresso	23/9	Euroexpansao	32.7	44.5	11.5	6.9
JN	23/9	Ipsos	29	34	8	8.5
Independente	22/9	Metris	29	34	9	8
Semanario	23/9	Compta	40	41	10	7.5
Visao	21/9	Marktest	31	49	6	7
Actual results			34.1	43.8	8.6	9.1

Source: Adapted from Calafate (1995)

TABLE 11
VOTING FORECASTS
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1996

<i>CANDIDATES</i>	<i>Actual results</i>	<i>Católica</i>	<i>Metris</i>	<i>Euroexpan são</i>	<i>Euroteste</i>
Sampaio	53,8%	52,1%	57,1%	57,7%	57,5%
Cavaco Silva	46,2%	47,9%	42,9%	42,3%	42,5%

Source: Own ellaboration based on data furnished by Prof. Magalhaes

TABLE 12
VOTING FORECASTS
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 1999

	<i>Actual results</i>	<i>Católica</i>	<i>Euroexpansã o</i>	<i>Marktest</i>	<i>SIC/Visão</i>
PS	44,0%	47,2%	47,0%	46,0%	49,4%
PSD	32,3%	30,0%	30,5%	31,0%	32,8%
CDU	9,0%	7,9%	5,5%	11,0%	7,0%
CDS-PP	8,4%	7,2%	7,5%	5,0%	6,0%
BE	2,5%	2,8%	2,0%	2,8%	1,0%

Source: Own elaboration based on data furnished by Prof. Magalhaes

TABLE 13
VOTING FORECASTS
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2001

<i>CANDIDATES</i>	<i>Actual results</i>	<i>Católica</i>	<i>Euroexpansão*</i>	<i>SIC/Visão</i>
Sampaio	55,8%	63,5%	64,8%	67,6%
Ferreira do Amaral	34,5%	29,1%	31,9%	27,6%
António Abreu	5,1%	2,4%	1,2%	1,5%
Fernando Rosas	3,0%	2,7%	1,7%	2,2%
Garcia Pereira	1,6%	2,2%	0,4%	0,9%

Source: Own elaboration based on data furnished by Prof. Magalhaes

REFERENCES

ANEIMO (1997): *"Resumen de las conclusiones del Grupo de Trabajo para el estudio de las encuestas electorales"*, mimeo.

Bacalhau, Mario (1979): *Os portugueses e a política, quatro anos depois do 25 de abril: sondagem a opiniao publica*, Lisboa, Editorial Meseta.

Calafate, Rui (1995): "No reino das sondagens", *Semanário*, 29.09.95, page 9.

CIS, (1987): *Actitudes de los españoles ante la OTAN*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

Giner, Juan Antonio (1983): "Political Opinion Polling in Spain" in Worcester, Robert M.: *Political Opinion Polling: An International Review*, London, McMillan.

González Hernández, Juan Carlos (1999): *Desarrollo político y consolidación democrática en Portugal*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

Gunther, R.; Montero, J.R.; and Wert, J.I. (1999): *The Media and Politics in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy*, Working Papers, 176, Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona.

Henn, Matt (1998): *Opinion Polls and Volatile Electorates. Problems and Issues in Polling European Societies*, Ashgate, Aldershot.

Lima, José António (1995): "Sondagens, previsões e totoloto", *Expresso*, 29.09.95.

López Pintor, Rafael (1982): *La opinión pública española del autoritarismo a la democracia*, Madrid, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

- (1994): "Tendencias en la evolución de la opinión pública y el desarrollo de una cultura política democrática" in Juárez, M. (ed.) *Informe Sociológico sobre la situación social en España. Sociedad para todos en el año 2000*, Madrid, Fundación Foessa.

Monzón, Cándido and Rospir, Juan Ignacio (1992): "Las encuestas electorales" in Muñoz Alonso, A., Monzón, C., Rospir, J.I. y Dader J.L. *Opinión pública y comunicación política*, Madrid, Eudema.

Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1984): *The Spiral of Silence. Public Opinion –Our Social Skin*, The University of Chicago Press, London.

Ramírez, Pedro J. (1979): *Así se ganaron las elecciones 1979*, Madrid, Prensa Española.

Sartori, Giovanni (1976): *Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis I*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (Mass.).

Schmitter, Phillipe (1977): "Les elections sans choix en Portugal" in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, vol. 27, 1, Paris.

Vidal de Oliveira, José: "A polémica das sondagens", *Expresso*, 12.10.95.

Wert, José Ignacio and López Pintor, Rafael (1989): "Polls and Politics: An Empirical History of Misunderstanding", in *Seminar on Opinion Polls* (book of papers), ESOMAR-WAPOR, Amsterdam.

Wert, José Ignacio (1994): "Perspectivas de reforma del régimen electoral: campañas, medios de comunicación y encuestas electorales" in Montero, José Ramón; Gunther,

Richard; Wert, José Ignacio; Santamaría, Julián; Abad, Miguel Ángel: *La reforma del régimen electoral*, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.

- (1996): *Carta abierta a un incrédulo sobre las encuestas y su muy disputado crédito*, Barcelona, Península.
- (2000a): 'Las encuestas de 12-M: Una explicación', *El País*, 14 de marzo de 2000, pág. 28.
- (2000b): 'Entre la lluvia y el diluvio: Empezando a analizar el 12M', *Claves de Razón Práctica*, abril, 2000.

Worcester, Robert M. (1983):): "Political Opinion Polling in Great Britain" in Worcester, Robert M.: *Political Opinion Polling: An International Review*, London, McMillan.