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*International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), 3-43.

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# Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power

Stephen M. Walt

The question "what causes alignment?" is a central issue in debates on American foreign policy, and the choices that are made often turn on which hypotheses of alliance formation are endorsed. In general, those who believe that American security is fragile most often assume that Soviet allies are reliable and America's are prone to defect, while those who believe it is robust tend to view American allies as stronger and more reliable than those of the U.S.S.R. These divergent beliefs clash over a variety of specific issues. For example, should the U.S. increase its commitment to NATO, to prevent the growth of Soviet military power from leading to the "Finlandization" of Europe? Alternatively, should the U.S. do less in the expectation that its allies will do more? Should the U.S. oppose leftist regimes in the developing world because their domestic ideology will lead them to ally with the Soviet Union, or can a policy of accommodating radical nationalist regimes lead to good relations with them? Can Soviet or American military aid create reliable proxies in the Third World? Is it worth the effort and expense? Each of these questions carries important implications for American national security policy, and the answers ultimately turn upon which hypotheses of alliance formation are believed to be most valid.

Despite the obvious importance of understanding how states select their partners, most scholarly research on alliances has ignored or obscured these questions.<sup>1</sup> This article is intended to correct these omissions by outlining

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I would like to thank Robert Art, George Breslauer, Lynn Eden, Charles Glaser, Lori Gronich, Fen Hampson, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Oye, Glenn Snyder, Jack Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg, and Kenneth Waltz for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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1. For representative examples of typical scholarly efforts, consult: Robert Rood and Patrick McGowan, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (September 1975); George T. Duncan and Randolph Siverson, "Flexibility of Alliance Partner Choice in Multipolar Systems," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1982); R.P.Y. Li and W.R. Thompson, "The Stochastic Process of Alliance Formation Behavior," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (December 1978). More traditional

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*International Security*, Spring 1985 (Vol. 9, No. 4) 0162-2889/85/040003-41 \$02.50/0  
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some of the most important hypotheses of alliance formation, and by exploring the policy implications of each. The first section explores the competing propositions that states either balance against strong or threatening states or, alternatively, that they "bandwagon" with them. I shall also consider the sharply different foreign and defense policies that each proposition implies. The second section develops the contrasting hypotheses that ideological or cultural similarities can either bind states together or drive them apart. The third section examines the ability of states to create allies or proxies by military and economic aid, propaganda, or political penetration. Finally, the last section demonstrates how these hypotheses, taken together, can explain the current structure of world power, and suggests what they imply for American national security policy.

*Balancing Versus Bandwagoning: Alliances as a Response to Threat*

Alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats, yet there is sharp disagreement as to what that response will be. When entering an alliance, states may either *balance* (ally in opposition to the principal source of danger) or *bandwagon* (ally with the state that poses the major threat).<sup>2</sup> These contrasting hypotheses depict very different worlds, and the policies that follow from each are equally distinct. In the simplest terms, if balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because aggressors will face combined opposition. Status quo states should therefore avoid provoking countervailing coalitions by eschewing threatening foreign and defense policies. But if bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, then security is scarce because aggression is rewarded. A more belligerent foreign

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works on alliances are: George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), and Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Useful summaries of the literature on alliances may be found in: Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1973), Chapter 1 and Appendix C; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer, "Alliance, Capabilities, and War," *Political Science Annual*, Vol. 4 (1974); Philip Burgess and David Moore, "Inter-nation Alliances: An Inventory and Appraisal of Propositions," *Political Science Annual*, Vol. 3 (1973); and Michael Don Ward, "Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics," *Monograph Series in International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Denver: University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies, 1982).

2. My use of the terms "balancing" and "bandwagoning" follows that of Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Arnold Wolfers uses a similar terminology in his essay "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 122-124.

policy and a more capable military establishment are the logical policy choices.

Although both of these hypotheses have been examined by scholars and embraced by statesmen, important details have been neglected. Accordingly, I shall first present each hypothesis in its simplest (and most common) form, and then indicate how they should be revised. That task accomplished, I shall then consider which hypothesis describes the dominant tendency in international politics.

#### BALANCING BEHAVIOR

The proposition that states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers lies at the heart of traditional balance of power theory.<sup>3</sup> According to this hypothesis, states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat. States will choose to balance for two main reasons.

First, states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong. To ally *with* the dominant power means placing one's trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can.<sup>4</sup> As Winston Churchill explained Britain's traditional alliance policy:

For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent. . . . it would have been easy . . . and tempting to join with the stronger and

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3. For impressive analyses of the classical writings on the balance of power, see: Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1955), Part I; F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), Part I; Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962), Chapters 2 and 3; Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 96–104 and *passim*; and Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966). For modern versions of the theory, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Chapter 6; Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957); and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), Part IV.

4. As Vattel wrote several centuries ago: "The surest means of preserving this balance of power would be to bring it about that no State should be much superior to the others . . . but this could not be realized without injustice and violence. . . . [It] is simpler, easier, and more just . . . to form alliances in order to make a stand against a very powerful sovereign and prevent him from dominating." Quoted in Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, pp. 61–62.

share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, . . . and thus defeated the Continental military tyrant whoever he was. . . .<sup>5</sup>

In the same way, Henry Kissinger advocated *rapprochement* with China rather than the Soviet Union because he believed that, in a triangular relationship, it was better to align with the weaker side.<sup>6</sup>

Second, joining the more vulnerable side increases the new member's influence, because the weaker side has greater need for assistance. Joining the stronger side, by contrast, reduces the new member's influence (because it adds relatively less to the coalition) and leaves it vulnerable to the whims of its new partners. Alignment with the weaker side is thus the preferred choice.<sup>7</sup>

The appeal of balance of power theory as an explanation for alliance formation is unsurprising, given the numerous examples of states joining together to resist a threatening state or coalition.<sup>8</sup> Yet despite the powerful evidence that history provides in support of this hypothesis, it is often suggested that the opposite response is more likely, that states will prefer to ally with the strongest power. Who argues that bandwagoning is the dominant tendency in international politics, and why do they think so?

#### BANDWAGONING BEHAVIOR

The belief that states will tend to ally *with* rather than against the dominant side is surprisingly common. According to one scholar,

[In international politics] momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement. The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon collects those on the sidelines.<sup>9</sup>

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5. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Volume I, The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 207–208.

6. Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 178.

7. In the words of Kenneth Waltz: "Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking." See his *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127.

8. This theme is explored in Ludwig Dehio, *The Precarious Balance* (New York: Vintage, 1965); Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*; and Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*.

9. W. Scott Thompson, "The Communist International System," *Orbis*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 1977), p. 843.

Scholars are not alone in this conception. For example, the German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's famous "risk theory" implied such a view. By building a great battle fleet, Tirpitz argued, Germany could force England into neutrality or alliance with it by posing a threat to England's vital maritime supremacy.<sup>10</sup> More recently, American officials have repeatedly embraced the bandwagoning hypothesis in justifying American foreign policy commitments. John F. Kennedy claimed that, "if the United States were to falter, the whole world . . . would inevitably begin to move toward the Communist bloc."<sup>11</sup> Although the *rapprochement* with China showed his own willingness to balance, Henry Kissinger also revealed his belief that most states tend to bandwagon by suggesting that "if leaders around the world . . . assume that the U.S. lacked either the forces or the will . . . they will accommodate themselves to the dominant trend."<sup>12</sup> And Ronald Reagan has endorsed the same beliefs in his claim that "if we cannot defend ourselves [in Central America] . . . then we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere . . . our credibility will collapse and our alliances will crumble."<sup>13</sup>

Statements like these reveal a common theme: states are attracted to strength. The more powerful you are and the more clearly this is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with you. By contrast, a decline in relative position will lead one's allies to opt for neutrality at best or to defect to the other side at worst.

What is the logic behind the bandwagoning hypothesis? Two distinct motives can be identified. First, bandwagoning may be adopted as a form of

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10. See William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 434-435; and Gordon L. Craig, *Germany: 1866-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 303-314. This view was not confined to military circles in Germany. In February 1914, Secretary of State Jagow predicted that Britain would remain neutral in the event of a Continental war, expressing the widespread view that drove German policy prior to World War I. As he told the German Ambassador in London: "We have not built our fleet in vain, and in my opinion, people in England will seriously ask themselves whether it will be just that simple and without danger to play the role of France's guardian angel against us." Quoted in Imanuel Geiss, *July 1914* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), pp. 24-25.

11. Quoted in Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 217.

12. Quoted in Committee on International Relations, "The Soviet Union and the Third World: Watershed in Great Power Policy?," U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 157-158.

13. "President Reagan's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Central America," *The New York Times*, April 28, 1983, p. A-12. In the same speech, Reagan also said, "if Central America were to fall, what would the consequences be for our position in Asia and Europe and for alliances such as NATO. . . . Which ally, which friend would trust us then?"

appeasement. By aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the spoils of victory. Mussolini's declaration of war on France and Russia's entry into the war against Japan in 1945 illustrate this type of bandwagoning, as do Italian and Rumanian alliance choices in World War I.<sup>14</sup> By joining what they believed was the stronger side, each hoped to make territorial gains at the end of the fighting.

Stalin's decision to ally with Hitler in 1939 illustrates *both* motives nicely. The Nazi-Soviet Pact led to the dismemberment of Poland and may have deflected Hitler's ambitions westward. Stalin was thus able to gain both time and territory by bandwagoning with Hitler.<sup>15</sup> In general, however, these two motives for bandwagoning are quite different. In the first, bandwagoning is chosen for *defensive* reasons, as a means of maintaining independence in the face of a potential threat. In the second, a bandwagoning state chooses the leading side for *offensive* reasons, in order to acquire territory. Regardless of the specific motive, however, bandwagoning behavior stands in sharp contrast to the predictions of balance of power theory. The two hypotheses thus offer mutually exclusive explanations for how states will make their alliance choices.

#### DIFFERENT SOURCES OF THREAT

Balancing and bandwagoning are usually framed solely in terms of power. Balancing is alignment with the weaker side; bandwagoning means to choose the stronger.<sup>16</sup> This view is seriously flawed, however, because it ignores the other factors that statesmen will consider when identifying potential threats and prospective allies. Although power is an important factor in their calculations, it is not the only one. Rather than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most

14. See Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), pp. 234-235, 246-250; Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 394-398; and A.J.P. Taylor, *The First World War* (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), pp. 88-90, 153.

15. See Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, pp. 276-277; Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (London: Pelican Books, 1966), pp. 437-443; and Joachim Fest, *Hitler* (New York: Vintage, 1974), pp. 583-584, 592-593.

16. The preeminent example of balance of power theory focusing exclusively on the distribution of capabilities is Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Chapter 6. For examples of theorists who acknowledge that other factors can be important, see Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, pp. 25, 45-47, 60-62.

threatening power. For example, states may *balance* by allying with other strong states, if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons. Thus the coalitions that defeated Germany in World Wars I and II were vastly superior in total resources, but united by their common recognition that German expansionism posed the greater danger.<sup>17</sup> Because balancing and bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats, it is important to consider all the factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose. I shall therefore discuss the impact of: 1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3) offensive capability; and 4) offensive intentions.

AGGREGATE POWER. The greater a state's total resources (i.e., population, industrial and military capability, technological prowess, etc.), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others. Recognizing this, Walter Lippmann and George Kennan defined the aim of American grand strategy to be preventing any single state from controlling the combined resources of industrial Eurasia, and they advocated U.S. intervention on whichever side was weaker when this prospect emerged.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, Lord Grey, British Foreign Secretary in 1914, justified British intervention against the Dual Alliance by saying:

To stand aside would mean the domination of Germany; the subordination of France and Russia; the isolation of Britain, . . . and ultimately Germany would wield the whole power of the continent.<sup>19</sup>

In the same way, Castlereagh's aim to create a "just distribution of the forces in Europe" reveals his own concern for the distribution of aggregate power, as does Bismarck's dictum that "in a system of five great powers, the goal

17. In World War I, the alliance of Great Britain, France, and Russia controlled 27.9 percent of world industrial production, while Germany and Austria together controlled only 19.2 percent. With Russia out of the war but the United States joining Britain and France, the percentage opposing the Dual Alliance reached 51.7 percent, an advantage of more than 2 to 1. In World War II, the defense expenditures of the U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union exceeded those of Germany by roughly 4.5 to 1. Even allowing for Germany's control of Europe and the need to fight Japan, the Grand Alliance possessed an enormous advantage in latent capabilities. Thus balancing against *power* was not the sole explanation for these alliances. For these and other statistics on the relative power in these two wars, see: Paul M. Kennedy, "The First World War and the International Power System," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 7-40; and *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 309-315.

18. For a summary of these ideas, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 25-88. Kennan's own thoughts are found in his *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (New York: New American Library, 1951), p. 10. Lippmann's still compelling analysis is found in his *The Cold War: A Study of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1947).

19. Quoted in Bernadotte Schmitt, *The Coming of the War in 1914* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968), Vol. 2, p. 115.



must always be to be in a group of three or more."<sup>20</sup> The overall power that states can wield is thus an important component of the threat they can pose to others.

If power can be threatening, however, it can also be prized. States with great power have the capacity either to punish enemies or reward friends. By itself, therefore, another state's aggregate power may be a motive for either balancing or bandwagoning.

PROXIMATE POWER. States will also align in response to threats from proximate power. Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.<sup>21</sup> For example, the British Foreign Office explained why Britain was especially sensitive to German naval expansion by saying:

If the British press pays more attention to the increase of Germany's naval power than to a similar movement in Brazil . . . this is no doubt due to the proximity of the German coasts and the remoteness of Brazil.<sup>22</sup>

As with aggregate power, proximate threats can produce either a balancing or a bandwagoning response. When proximate threats trigger a balancing response, alliance networks that resemble checkerboards are the likely result. Students of diplomatic history have long been told that "neighbors of neighbors are friends," and the tendency for encircling states to align against a central power has been known since Kautilya's writings in the 4th century.<sup>23</sup> Examples include: France and Russia against Wilhelmine Germany; France

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20. Castlereagh's policy is described in Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1946), pp. 205–206. Bismarck's statement is quoted in William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1950), p. 197.

21. See Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 20 (1976). For a discussion of the relationship between power and distance, see Kenneth A. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 229–230, 245–247. For an interesting practical critique, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Fall 1968).

22. Quoted in Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 421.

23. Kautilya's analysis ran as follows: "The king who is situated anywhere immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy. The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy is termed the friend (of the conqueror). . . . In front of the conqueror and close to the enemy, there happened to be situated kings such as the conqueror's friend, next to him the enemy's friend, and next to the last the conqueror's friend's friend, and next, the enemy's friend's friend." See "Arthashastra" (Science of Politics), in Paul A. Seabury, ed., *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), p. 8.

and the "Little Entente" in the 1930s; the Soviet Union and Vietnam against China and Cambodia in the 1970s; the U.S.S.R. and India against the U.S. and Pakistan presently; and the tacit alignment between Iran and Syria against Iraq and its various Arab supporters. When a threat from proximate power leads to bandwagoning, by contrast, the familiar phenomenon of a "sphere of influence" is created. Small states bordering a great power may be so vulnerable that they choose to bandwagon rather than balance, especially if their powerful neighbor has demonstrated its ability to compel obedience. Thus Finland, whose name has become synonymous with bandwagoning, chose to do so only after losing two major wars against the Soviet Union within a five-year period.

**OFFENSIVE POWER.** All else being equal, states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either militarily weak or capable only of defending.<sup>24</sup> Once again, the effects of this factor vary. On the one hand, the immediate threat that such capabilities pose may lead states to balance by allying with others.<sup>25</sup> Tirpitz's "risk strategy" backfired for precisely this reason. England viewed the German battle fleet as a potent offensive threat, and redoubled its own naval efforts while reinforcing its ties with France and Russia.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, when offensive power permits rapid conquest, vulnerable states may see little hope in resisting. Balancing may seem unwise because one's allies may not be able to provide assistance quickly enough. This is another reason why "spheres of influence" may form: states bordering those with large offensive capabilities (and who are far from potential allies) may be forced to bandwagon because balancing alliances are simply not viable.<sup>27</sup>

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24. The best discussions of the implications of offense and defense are: Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978); Stephen W. Van Evera, "Causes of War" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1984); and George H. Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977).

25. See Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*, pp. 3-5; Raymond J. Sontag, *European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1933), pp. 4-5; Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," p. 189; and Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, pp. 105-106.

26. As Imanuel Geiss notes: "Finding an agreement with Britain along German lines without a substantial naval agreement thus amounted to squaring the circle." See his *German Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 131. See also Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, pp. 416-423.

27. Thus alliance formation becomes more frenetic when the offense is believed to have the advantage: great powers will balance more vigorously while weak states seek protection by bandwagoning more frequently. A world of tight alliances and few neutral states is the likely result.

OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS. Finally, states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them. As I noted earlier, Nazi Germany provoked an overwhelming coalition against itself because it combined substantial power with extremely offensive ambitions. Indeed, even states with rather modest capabilities may trigger a balancing response if they are perceived as especially aggressive. Thus Libya under Colonel Qaddafi has prompted Egypt, Israel, France, the U.S., Chad, and the Sudan to coordinate political and military responses in order to defend against Libyan activities.<sup>28</sup>

Perceptions of intent play an especially crucial role in alliance choices. In addition to the factors already mentioned, for example, changing perceptions of German aims helped create the Triple Entente. Whereas Bismarck had followed a careful policy of defending the status quo after 1870, the expansionist ambitions of his successors provoked steadily increasing alarm among the other European powers.<sup>29</sup> Although the growth of German power played a major role, the importance of German intentions should not be ignored. This is nicely revealed by Eyre Crowe's famous 1907 memorandum defining British policy towards Germany. The analysis is all the more striking because Crowe obviously has few objections to the growth of German power *per se*:

It cannot for a moment be questioned that the mere existence and healthy activity of a powerful Germany is an undoubted blessing for all. . . . *So long, then, as Germany competes for an intellectual and moral leadership of the world in reliance on its own natural advantages and energies* England cannot but admire. . . . [So] long as Germany's action does not overstep the line of legitimate protection of existing rights it can always count upon the sympathy and good will, and even the moral support of England. . . . It would be of real advantage if the determination not to bar Germany's legitimate and peaceful expansion were made as patent and pronounced as authoritatively as possible, provided that care was taken at the same time to make it quite clear that *this benevolent attitude will give way to determined opposition at the first sign of British or allied interests being adversely affected.*<sup>30</sup>

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28. For a discussion of Libya's international position, see Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong Into Confrontation?," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 13-41.

29. See Craig, *Germany: 1866-1945*, pp. 101, 242-247, and Chapter 10; Geiss, *German Foreign Policy*, pp. 66-68; and Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, Chapters 14 and 20.

30. "Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907," in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914* (London: British Foreign Office, 1928), Volume 3, pp. 403 and *passim* (emphasis added). See also G.W. Monger, *The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1963), pp. 313-315.

In short, Britain will oppose Germany only if Germany seeks to expand through conquest. Intentions, not power, are crucial.

When a state is believed to be unalterably aggressive, others are unlikely to bandwagon. After all, if an aggressor's intentions are impossible to change, then balancing with others is the best way to avoid becoming a victim. Thus Prime Minister de Broqueville of Belgium rejected the German ultimatum of August 2, 1914 by saying:

If die we must, better death with honor. We have no other choice. Our submission would serve no end . . . if Germany is victorious, Belgium, *whatever her attitude*, will be annexed to the Reich.<sup>31</sup>

In short, the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing coalition.

By refining the basic hypotheses to consider several sources of threat, we gain a more complete picture of the factors that statesmen will consider when making alliance choices. However, one cannot say a priori which sources of threat will be most important in any given case, only that all of them are likely to play a role. The next step is to consider which—balancing or bandwagoning—is the dominant tendency in international affairs.

#### THE IMPLICATIONS OF BALANCING AND BANDWAGONING

The two hypotheses I have just elaborated paint starkly contrasting pictures of international politics. Resolving the question of which picture is more accurate is especially important because the two hypotheses imply very different policy prescriptions. What are the worlds that each depicts, and what policies are implied?

If balancing is the dominant tendency, then threatening states will provoke others to align against them. Because those who seek to dominate others will attract widespread opposition, status quo states can take a relatively sanguine view of threats. Credibility is less important in a balancing world because one's allies will resist threatening states out of their own self-interest, not because they expect others to do it for them. Thus the fear that allies will defect declines. Moreover, if balancing is the norm *and* if statesmen understand this tendency, aggression is discouraged because those who contemplate it will anticipate resistance.

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31. Quoted in Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War in 1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Volume 3, p. 458 (emphasis added).

In a balancing world, policies that demonstrate restraint and benevolence are best. Strong states may be valued as allies because they have much to offer their partners, but they must take particular care to avoid appearing aggressive. Foreign and defense policies that minimize the threat one poses to others make the most sense in such a world.

By contrast, a bandwagoning world is much more competitive. If states tend to ally with the strongest and most threatening state, then great powers will be rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially dangerous. International rivalries will be more intense, because a single defeat may signal the decline of one side and the ascendancy of the other. This is especially alarming in a bandwagoning world, because additional defections and a further decline in the loser's position are to be expected. Moreover, if statesmen believe that bandwagoning is widespread, they will be more inclined to use force to resolve international disputes. This is because they will both fear the gains that others may make by demonstrating *their* power or resolve, and because they will assume that others will be unlikely to balance against them.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, misperceiving the relative propensity to balance or bandwagon is dangerous, because the policies that are appropriate for one situation will backfire *completely* in the other. If statesmen follow the balancing prescription in a bandwagoning world, their moderate responses and relaxed view of threats will encourage their allies to defect, leaving them isolated against an overwhelming coalition. Conversely, following the bandwagoning prescription (employing power and threats frequently) in a world of balancers will merely lead others to oppose you more and more vigorously.<sup>33</sup>

These concerns are not just theoretical. In the 1930s, France failed to recognize that its allies in the "Little Entente" were prone to bandwagon, a

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32. Thus both Napoleon and Hitler underestimated the costs of aggression by assuming their potential enemies would bandwagon. After Munich, for example, Hitler dismissed the likelihood he would be opposed by claiming that the leaders of France and Britain were "little worms." Napoleon apparently believed that "England cannot reasonably make war on us unaided," and assumed that England would remain pacified after the Peace of Amiens. On these points, see Fest, *Hitler*, pp. 594-595; Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 45; and Geoffrey Bruun, *Europe and the French Imperium* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1938), p. 118. Because Hitler and Napoleon believed in a bandwagoning world, they were unwisely eager to go to war.

33. This situation is analogous to Robert Jervis's distinction between the spiral model and the deterrence model. The former calls for appeasement, the latter for opposition to a suspected aggressor. Balancing and bandwagoning are the alliance equivalents of deterring and appeasing. See Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chapter 3.

tendency that French military and diplomatic policies reinforced. By contrast, Soviet attempts to intimidate Turkey after World War II backfired by provoking a greater U.S. commitment in the area and by cementing Turkey's interest in a formal alliance with the West.<sup>34</sup> Likewise, the self-encircling bellicosity of Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan reflected the assumption, prevalent in both states, that bandwagoning was the dominant tendency in international affairs.

#### WHY BALANCING IS MORE COMMON THAN BANDWAGONING

Which of these two worlds most resembles reality? Which hypothesis describes the dominant tendency in international politics? Although statesmen frequently justify their actions by invoking the bandwagoning hypothesis, history provides little evidence for this assertion. On the contrary, balance of power theorists from Ranke forward have persistently and persuasively shown that states facing an external threat overwhelmingly prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon with it. This is primarily because an alignment that preserves most of a state's freedom of action is preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon. Because intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong states will remain benevolent.

The overwhelming tendency for states to balance rather than bandwagon defeated the hegemonic aspirations of Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and Germany under Wilhelm II and Hitler. Where the bandwagoning hypothesis predicts that these potential hegemons should have attracted more and more support as they expanded, the actual response of the powers that they threatened was precisely the opposite. The more clearly any one state sought to dominate the rest, the more reliably the others combined to counter the threat.<sup>35</sup>

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34. The French attempt to contain Germany after World War I was undermined both by the Locarno Treaty (which guaranteed the French border with Germany but failed to provide similar guarantees for its allies) and by the French adoption of a defensive military doctrine, which made it impossible for it come to the aid of its allies. See Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (New York: Vintage, 1980), pp. 111–112; and Richard D. Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 264–265. For the effects of Soviet pressure on Turkey, see: George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 134–138; and Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 355–378.

35. See Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War," unpublished ms., 1984. (An extensively revised version of this paper will be published in *World Politics*, April 1985.)

Nor is this tendency confined to Europe, as a few examples will illustrate. The American defeat in Indochina, rather than inviting bandwagoning throughout Southeast Asia, brought renewed cooperation among the ASEAN states and permitted the traditional animosity between China and Vietnam to burst forth anew. In the 1950s, the long-standing rivalry between the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite dynasties in Iraq and Jordan gave way to the "King's Alliance" when Nasser's Egypt emerged as the dominant power in the region. The desire to balance against regional threats has also inspired most Middle Eastern states to align with one or the other superpower, just as the superpower rivalry itself made the Soviet Union and the United States willing to support these regional clients.<sup>36</sup> In the same way, the threat from revolutionary Iran has provoked the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia. Whatever one may think of the *efficacy* of these various arrangements, the *tendency* that they illustrate is striking.<sup>37</sup> Even in widely different contexts, the strong tendency for states to balance when making alliance choices is confirmed.

Scholars or statesmen who argue the opposite view—whether in the guise of "Finlandization," the "domino theory," or other variations on bandwagoning logic—are placing themselves in direct opposition to the most widely accepted theory in the field of international relations. Just as clearly, their predictions about expected state behavior are contrary to most of international history. The effects of this disregard for evidence are severe: 1) such views exaggerate American insecurity by portraying U.S. allies as excessively prone to defect; 2) they distort American security priorities by inflating the perceived benefits of large military forces and "get-tough" policies; and 3) they make it easier for allies to "free-ride," by encouraging the U.S. to do too much. Thus the U.S. pays a high price for its failure to appreciate the dominant tendency for others to balance. Indeed, the erroneous fear that bandwagoning was likely has probably been the principal intellectual error underlying the most counterproductive excesses in postwar American foreign policy.

This is not to say that bandwagoning never occurs. Three conditions may increase somewhat the generally low tendency for states to bandwagon. First,

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36. For evidence and analysis on this point, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Origins of Alliances" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1983), especially Chapter 6.

37. See Mahnaz Zehra Ispahani, "Alone Together: Regional Security Arrangements in Southern Africa and the Arabian Gulf," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 152–175.

especially weak states will be more likely to bandwagon, both because they are more vulnerable to pressure and because the capabilities they can add to either side are unlikely to make much difference. Because they can do little to affect the outcome, they are more likely to opt for the winning side.<sup>38</sup> Thus King Leopold of Belgium and Urho Kekkonen of Finland justified their own alliance policies with reference to the special vulnerabilities of small states bordering upon great powers.<sup>39</sup> A further deduction is that weak states may balance against other weak states, but may be relatively more likely to bandwagon when confronted by a great power.

Second, weak states are more likely to bandwagon when allies are simply unavailable. Even weak states may be persuaded to balance when they are confident of allied support; in its absence, however, accommodation with the threatening power may be the only viable alternative. Thus a further prerequisite for effective balancing behavior is an active system of diplomatic communication, permitting potential allies to recognize their shared interests and coordinate their responses.<sup>40</sup> If weak states see no possibility of external assistance, accommodation through alignment with the threatening power may be chosen as a last resort. Thus the first Shah of Iran took the British withdrawal from Kandahar in 1881 as a signal to bandwagon with Russia. As he told the British representative, all he had received from Britain was "good advice and honeyed words—nothing else."<sup>41</sup> Finland's foreign policy suggests the same lesson. Finland's bandwagoning alliance with the Soviet Union after World War II was encouraged by the fact that Finland's *balancing*

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38. See Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 11.

39. As King Leopold explained Belgian neutrality after World War I, "an alliance, even if purely defensive, does not lead to the goal [of security], for no matter how prompt the help of an ally might be, it would not come until after the invader's attack which will be overwhelming. . . ." Quoted in Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, pp. 111–112. Kekkonen of Finland argued for accommodation with the U.S.S.R. by saying: "A small state cannot stand forever armed to the teeth . . . the first to be overrun by the enemy, and devoid of political importance to lend any significance to its word when decisions over war and peace are being taken. . . ." See Urho Kekkonen, *A President's View*, trans. Gregory Coogan (London: Heinemann, 1982), pp. 42–43.

40. One reason for Rome's durable hegemony in the ancient world was the fact that its various opponents lacked the diplomatic means to coordinate opposition against Rome effectively. See Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 192, 199–200. When a workable diplomatic system was established in the Renaissance, prospects for European hegemony declined drastically. On this point, see Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, p. 16; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 106 and Chapter 7; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), Chapters 13–16; and Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), Chapter 1.

41. Quoted in C.J. Lowe, *The Reluctant Imperialists* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 85.



alliance with Nazi Germany during the war had alienated the potential allies it might have sought against Soviet pressure.<sup>42</sup>

This means that a concern for credibility is not entirely mistaken. Those who argue for American isolation ignore the possibility that weak states might be forced to bandwagon with other powers, were the prospect of American support eliminated entirely. Yet the opposite error is more common: the exaggerated fear that bandwagoning is likely leads the U.S. to squander resources in strategically meaningless conflicts (e.g., Vietnam) in order to reassure allies who are likely to remain loyal in any event.

Taken together, these two factors help explain why great powers are occasionally able to create spheres of influence. Although strong neighbors will balance, small and weak states in close proximity to a great power are the most likely candidates for bandwagoning. Because they will be the first victims of an attack, because potential allies may be scarce or distant, and because they lack the capabilities to stand alone or alter the balance significantly, accommodating a neighboring great power may occasionally make more sense.

Such circumstances, however, are rare; and such alliances will decay when the disparities that produce them erode.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, even if weak states do bandwagon on occasion, their decisions will have little impact on the global balance of power. For the states that matter, balancing is the rule: they will join forces against the threats posed by the power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions of others.

Of course, statesmen do not live by threat assessments alone. It is therefore necessary to consider another influential hypothesis: that ideological solidarity provides a powerful force for alignment.

*"Birds of a Feather Flocking Together" (and Flying Apart): Ideology and Alliance Formation*

"Ideological solidarity" (to use Hans Morgenthau's term) refers to alliances that result between states sharing political, cultural, or other traits. According

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42. See Fred Singleton, "The Myth of Finlandisation," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring 1981), especially pp. 276-278. Singleton points out that the Western allies approved the 1944 armistice between Finland and the U.S.S.R. (which established Soviet predominance there) in 1947.

43. This seems to be true both in Latin America and Eastern Europe. As the relative power of both superpowers has declined, the ability of states in their respective spheres to defy the

to this hypothesis, the more similar two or more states are, the more likely they are to ally. Although most scholars believe that this is at best a secondary explanation for alliances,<sup>44</sup> the belief that ideological affinities are crucial often appears in the rhetoric of statesmen seeking to justify alignment with one side or opposition to another. Thus Samora Machel of Mozambique explained his close relationship with the U.S.S.R. by describing the two states as "natural socialist allies."<sup>45</sup> Lord Palmerston of Britain, despite his assertion that England had "no permanent friends . . . only permanent interests," also believed in the natural affinity of democracies. In a statement that also reveals a belief that weak states will bandwagon, Palmerston said:

Our policy ought now to be to form a Western confederacy of free states as a counterpoise to the Eastern League of arbitrary governments. England, France, Spain, and Portugal . . . will form a political and moral power in Europe. . . . We shall be on the advance, they on the decline, and all the smaller planets in Europe will have a natural tendency to gravitate towards our system.<sup>46</sup>

More recently, John Foster Dulles justified American support for Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee by proclaiming that these leaders "were Christian gentlemen . . . who have suffered for their faith."<sup>47</sup> In the same spirit, Ronald Reagan has praised the fact that the U.S. and its allies have "rediscovered their democratic values," values that "unite us in a stewardship of peace and freedom with our allies and friends."<sup>48</sup> And throughout the Cold War, American opposition to leftist movements in the Third World has been based on

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hegemonic power has increased. Obviously, this tendency is more pronounced in the Western Hemisphere than in Eastern Europe, because geography makes it easier for the Soviets to enforce their control.

44. For scholarly discussions that question the importance of ideology in alliance formation, see: Edwin Fedder, "The Concept of Alliance," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (1968), p. 86; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 183-184; Ernst B. Haas and Allen Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 167-168; Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 20; and Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of International Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1957), p. 158.

45. Quoted in Committee on International Relations, "The Soviet Union and the Third World," pp. 46-48. Under pressure from South Africa, Machel has recently moderated his pro-Soviet stance.

46. Quoted in Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1951), Vol. 1, p. 390.

47. Quoted in Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 77-78.

48. "State of the Union Message," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1983.

the belief that such regimes were naturally inclined towards alignment with the Soviet Union because they shared similar ideological traits.<sup>49</sup>

What is the logic behind such beliefs? Several possibilities can be identified. First, alignment with similar states may be viewed as a way of defending one's own political principles. After all, if statesmen believe their own system is inherently good, then protecting states with a similar system must be considered good as well. Second, states with similar traits may fear each other less, because they will find it harder to imagine an inherently "good" state deciding to attack them. Third, alignment with similar states may enhance the legitimacy of a weak regime, by demonstrating that it is part of a large popular movement.<sup>50</sup> Fourth, the ideology itself may prescribe alignment, as Marxism-Leninism explicitly does.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to logic, there are many examples to support this hypothesis. Australia fought Germany in both World Wars, despite the fact that Germany posed no direct threat to it. According to one account, the colonies' loyalty to Great Britain was "not one of all to one but all to all, to the British ideal and way of life wherever it was to be found."<sup>52</sup> In the 19th century, the "Holy Alliance" that followed Napoleon's defeat and Bismarck's "League of the Three Emperors" united similar states in opposition to alternative systems, although considerations of power and security played an important role as well.<sup>53</sup> The same could also be said for the Treaty of Munchengrätz in 1833 and the Quadruple Alliance of 1834, which divided Europe neatly along ideological lines (notwithstanding important rifts within the two coalitions).<sup>54</sup>

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49. See Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution* (New York: Meridian, 1968); Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye, "After the Fall: U.S. Policy Toward Radical Regimes," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1983); and Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 96, 136-144, 175-182, 284-288.

50. On this point see Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, p. 37.

51. For a discussion of the centralizing character of Marxism-Leninism and a general history of the World Communist Movement, see Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

52. See James A. Williamson, *Great Britain and the Commonwealth* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1965), pp. 180-181.

53. The "Holy Alliance" began with a declaration by the principal European sovereigns to refrain from using force against each other. By 1820, England had withdrawn over the issue of intervention against liberal movements, leaving Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Prussia in an alliance against the threat of liberal revolution. See Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 242-243, 245-251, and Chapter 16. On the League of Three Emperors, see Geiss, *German Foreign Policy*, pp. 29-30; and Craig, *Germany: 1866-1945*, pp. 103-104.

54. See Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, Vol. 1, pp. 386-410; and Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*, pp. 215-217.

Two issues remain. First, we must consider an alternative hypothesis: that certain ideological types promote conflict among similar states rather than cooperation. Second, we should ask how large a role ideology plays in alliance formation, and what factors either increase or decrease its significance.

“BIRDS OF A FEATHER FLYING APART”: DIVISIVE IDEOLOGIES

Although a common ideology can help create effective alliances, certain types of ideology are more likely to produce conflict than cooperation among adherents. When the ideology calls for the members to form a centralized hierarchical movement obeying a single authoritative leadership, the likelihood of conflict is increased. This somewhat paradoxical result occurs for several reasons.

First, because the ideology is a source of legitimacy for each member regime, each must at a minimum affirm its universal validity. But when the ideology calls for a single leader, then all regimes save the one that emerges on top will find their autonomy threatened *by the other members of the same movement*.<sup>55</sup>

Second, because the authority of the leadership rests on its interpretation of the common ideology, ideological quarrels are quite likely. They are also likely to be intense, because rival factions can defend their own interpretation only by portraying rivals as traitors or heretics.

The history of international Communism provides a striking example of these dynamics. According to an authoritative Soviet source, “ideological cohesion on the basis of Marxism–Leninism is the foundation of [Communist] international cohesion.”<sup>56</sup> But as a number of scholars have shown, the cohesion of the Communist International lasted only as long as foreign Communist Parties were dependent on Moscow’s support. Once self-sufficient Communist states emerged, the unchallenged role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a thing of the past.<sup>57</sup> Since World War II,

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55. Richard Lowenthal, “Factors of Unity and Factors of Conflict,” *The Annals*, Vol. 349 (1963), p. 107; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 178; Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, pp. 170–171; and Fedder, “The Concept of Alliance,” p. 83.

56. V.V. Zagladin, *The World Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 465.

57. See Lowenthal, *World Communism*, pp. 234–235, 247–252, 256; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 51–58; and Franz Borkenau, *World Communism: A History of the Communist International* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971), pp. 196–207.

rivalries between Communist states have been among the world's most virulent quarrels. The "natural" cohesion of the movement was guaranteed only in Eastern Europe, and there only by force.

The history of Pan-Arabism provides an even more striking illustration. Despite the many attempts to translate the Arab world's common ethnic character and ideological vision into workable political cohesion, the ideology of Pan-Arabism has led to repeated rivalries.<sup>58</sup> And the more serious the commitment to unity, the more intense the conflict. Thus the bitterest rivalries in the Arab world took place between Nasser (the leading Pan-Arab figure) and the transnational, explicitly Pan-Arab Ba'ath party. And the Ba'ath Party itself eventually split into rival Syrian and Iraqi factions in 1966, a schism that persists to this day.<sup>59</sup>

The explanation for these rivalries lies in the contradictory premises of Pan-Arab ideology. Although support for Arab unity was an important component of regime legitimacy after 1955,<sup>60</sup> implementation of the ideal threatened the existence of each separate regime. If unity were ever achieved, all elites save the one that emerged on top would be eliminated. The various attempts at formal union thus quickly became struggles for power, in which the ideology was used to justify extreme measures against rivals.<sup>61</sup> As one member of the Ba'ath explained: "the rupture [of the United Arab Republic] . . . was caused by a certain Egyptian hegemonic view of the union."<sup>62</sup> After the split, Nasser himself seemed to recognize the fundamental contradiction:

58. For analyses of the various rifts between the Arabs, see: Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abdel Nasser and His Rivals* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Nadav Safran, "Arab Politics: Peace and War," *Orbis*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer 1974); and *From War to War* (New York: Dial Press, 1969), Chapter 2; and Walt, "The Origins of Alliances," Chapter 7.

59. For discussions of the split within the Ba'ath Party, see: John F. Devlin, *The Ba'ath Party* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1968), pp. 313–315; and Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria Under the Ba'ath, 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis* (New York: Halsted Press, 1974), pp. 207–208.

60. For a discussion of the role of Pan-Arabism in the legitimacy formula of Arab regimes, see Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), Chapter 2 and p. 242.

61. As the Egyptian National Charter stated: "Egypt is bound to spread its mission and put the principles upon which it rests at the disposal of all the Arabs, disregarding the worn-out notion that in doing so it is interfering in other people's affairs." Quoted in Adeed Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World* (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 35. "Spreading its mission" involved military intervention in the Yemeni civil war, assassination attempts against other Arab leaders, support for Nasserist groups in other countries, and continuous propaganda over Radio Cairo.

62. Quoted in Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press, 1971), p. 343. Emphasis added.

Nowadays the concept of union is itself in crisis. . . . This kind of multiplicity of nationalist activities seems to lead us to clashes. . . . While every Arab country boasts a [revolutionary] party . . . union seems utterly impossible. True political opposition would generate into regionalism, with Syria at odds with Egypt, Iraq at odds with Syria, and so forth.<sup>63</sup>

By contrast, Anwar Sadat's success in achieving effective Arab cooperation between 1971 and 1975 was due both to the fact that he lacked the stature to lead a unity movement and the fact that he viewed effective alliances as more important to Egypt than formal unity.<sup>64</sup>

Significantly, these problems do not afflict either democracies or monarchies when they ally with a similar state. Both types of states rest upon bases of legitimacy that do not extend beyond their borders. For democracies, it is popular support as expressed through elections. For monarchies, it is the traditional or "divine" right of kings. Because the ruling principles of a monarchical or democratic regime grant legitimacy over one's own domain *but imply no such authority over the domain of others*, alliances between monarchies or between democracies are not torn by ideological conflicts. Moreover, their interest in collaborating to oppose alternative ideologies that *do* threaten their legitimacy provides a further incentive for allying together.<sup>65</sup> Thus it is not surprising that the monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia joined forces to guard against Nasser's Egypt, or that Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary allied together against liberal movements in the 1820s.<sup>66</sup> And, as Michael

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63. Gamal 'Abdel Nasser, "Speech on the 11th Anniversary of the July 23 Revolution," *Arab Political Documents 1963* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1964), pp. 333 and *passim*.

64. For Sadat's views and useful analyses, see: Raphael Israeli, ed., *The Public Diary of President Sadat* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), Volume 1, pp. 369, 403; Kerr, *Arab Cold War*, p. 129; Hudson, *Arab Politics*, pp. 248-249; Mohamed Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (July 1978), p. 720, and *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975), pp. 133-134; Raymond J. Baker, *Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser and Sadat* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 126; and Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 360-373.

65. Of course, liberalism can pose a threat to monarchical systems. We would therefore not expect to find monarchies and democracies cooperating as a result of ideological solidarity, except against regimes that they both found even more repugnant or dangerous.

66. For a discussion of the Saudi-Jordanian alliance, see: David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981), pp. 194-195; Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 288; and "Chronology," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1963), p. 117. On the Holy Alliance in the 1820s, see: William L. Langer, *Political and Social Upheaval: 1832-1852* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969), pp. 290-295; and Walter Alison Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe* (London: Longmans, Green, 1920), pp. 202-203, 208-209, and *passim*. This is merely a variation on the general tendency for states to balance against significant threats.

Doyle has shown, the extraordinary absence of warfare between democratic or republican regimes suggests that their domestic orders help to reduce conflicts between them as well.<sup>67</sup>

#### THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGICAL SOLIDARITY

Is ideological solidarity an important cause of alliances? Under what conditions does it play a greater or lesser role? These questions are difficult because ideology is but one factor among many. Nonetheless, several conclusions can be stated with confidence.

First, states are more likely to follow their ideological preferences when they are already fairly secure. When faced by great danger, one takes whatever allies one can get. Winston Churchill captured this in his famous statement that "if Hitler invaded Hell, I should at least make a favorable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons," a sentiment that Franklin D. Roosevelt shared.<sup>68</sup> These reactions may be compared with earlier British and American policies. In the 1920s, Germany's weakness made it possible for Britain, France, and the United States to treat the Soviet Union with disdain, a revulsion based largely on ideology and echoed by the Soviets. Only when Nazi Germany began to pose a significant threat did these ideological preferences lose their power.<sup>69</sup> In other words, security considerations take precedence over ideological preferences, and ideologically based alliances are unlikely to survive when more pragmatic interests intrude.

Several interesting implications follow from this conclusion. In particular, those factors which tend to make states more secure should increase the importance of ideological considerations in alliance choices. If Kenneth Waltz is correct that bipolar worlds are the most stable, then the impact of ideology may increase because all states are more secure. Not only will the bipolar rivalry encourage both superpowers to support third parties freely (giving third parties the option to choose the ideologically most compatible side), but the caution that bipolarity imposes on superpower conduct may permit most other states to follow ideological preferences rather than security re-

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67. Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 17, Nos. 3 and 4 (Summer/Fall 1983).

68. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Volume III, The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 370.

69. See John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History* (New York: John Wiley, 1978), Chapters 4 and 5.

quirements.<sup>70</sup> Bipolarity may also be a permissive cause of neutralism, as third parties will be more confident both that the superpowers will restrain each other and that at least one of them will be available if a great power ally is needed. Thus Prince Sihanouk, while proclaiming Cambodia to be neutral, also stated that “in the event of a Viet Minh invasion we will count on the aid . . . of the United States.”<sup>71</sup>

Furthermore, other factors that make defense easy and conquest difficult should render ideological considerations more important. Thus a permissive cause of the ideological alliances of the 1820s and 1830s may have been the condition of defense dominance that resulted from the small standing armies that the European states preferred at that time.<sup>72</sup> In the same way, the existence of nuclear weapons, by inhibiting warfare among the great powers, may make ideology somewhat more important now than previously. Because nuclear weapons make it more difficult for great powers to threaten weaker states (and give them incentives to moderate the conduct of others as well), third parties both need formal alliances less and can pay greater attention to ideological factors when choosing alliance partners. As Nasser pointed out in rejecting American requests to join the Baghdad Pact: “there would be no [Soviet] aggression . . . for the simple reason that . . . nuclear weapons have changed the whole art of war, and rendered any foreign aggression a remote possibility.”<sup>73</sup>

A second conclusion is that the apparent importance of ideology can be exaggerated by the perceptions of statesmen and the policies that they adopt as a result. If statesmen *believe* that ideology determines international alignments, they will view similar states as potential friends and dissimilar ones

70. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964); and *Theory of International Politics*, Chapter 8; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, System Structure, and Decisionmaking in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 419–429; and Herbert Dinerstein, “The Transformation of Alliance Systems,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1965), p. 596.

71. Quoted in Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, p. 247. Gamal Nasser expressed a similar view by saying that “Egypt’s great strength lies in the rival interests of America and Russia in the Middle East area . . . each of the superpowers will protect her from the other.” Quoted in Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (London: Constable, 1972), p. 271.

72. On this point, see: Osgood and Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice*, pp. 52–53, 78–81; Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System*, pp. 73–76; Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 178–184; and Stanislaw Andreski, *Military Organization and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 68–69.

73. Quoted in Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Postwar Arab Politics 1945–1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 188.



as potential enemies. Reacting positively towards the former and harshly towards the latter will encourage good relations with one and drive the others to cling together more tightly in opposition. The hypothesis thus becomes self-fulfilling, and the result is then used to prove that the original belief was correct. Thus American beliefs in a Communist "monolith" led the U.S. to behave in ways that may have made the alliance of the Soviet Union and other leftist forces far more cohesive than it would otherwise have been. As the behavior of Yugoslavia, China, and Zimbabwe suggests, the *apparent* importance of ideology in determining Cold War alignments may be less the result of "natural" Marxist solidarity than the naïve American assumption that this was the case.

Third, the importance of ideology may also be exaggerated by taking the rhetoric of statesmen too seriously. For both internal and external reasons, statesmen are likely to emphasize this factor when discussing national commitments. Not only does this help convince adversaries that the alliance is a viable one, but domestic support will be enhanced if the public believes that one's allies share its goals and values. The whitewashing that Joseph Stalin received during World War II (in which the former tyrant became the paternal "Uncle Joe") provides a superb example, as does Vice President Bush's commendation of Phillippine President Ferdinand Marcos's commitment to democracy.<sup>74</sup> Thus the tendency for "birds of a feather to flock together" will be overstated if we look solely at the rhetoric of national leaders.

In sum, although ideology does play a role in alliance choices, it is usually a subordinate one. Moreover, despite the pervasive fear that Marxist regimes form natural allies, reality may actually be just the opposite. The more seriously such regimes pursue the Leninist imperative to follow an international vanguard, the more likely they are to quarrel among themselves. What solidarity does exist is only enhanced by the American perception that such ideologies pose a threat that must be met by relentless opposition. This is not to say that ideological factors play no role in the cohesion of America's opponents, only that we have generally failed to exploit the inevitable tensions to the fullest. Worse than that, we have acted in ways that give them few incentives to cooperate with us, and many reasons not to.

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74. See Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy: 1932-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 296-298. On the general tendency for allies to exaggerate their level of agreement, see Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968), p. 463.

*The Instruments of Alliance Formation: "Bribery" and Penetration*

States seeking allies will employ specific policy instruments to attract others to their side. The use of such instruments (or the interpretation placed on their use by others) rests upon implicit hypotheses about the relative effectiveness of such tactics. The most important of these hypotheses concerns the instruments of "bribery" and penetration. What are these hypotheses, and how seriously should we take them?

"INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY": FOREIGN AID AND ALLIANCE FORMATION

According to this hypothesis, the provision of economic or military assistance will create effective allies, either by demonstrating one's own favorable intentions, by evoking a sense of gratitude, or because the recipient will become dependent on the donor. Simply stated, the hypothesis is: the more aid, the tighter the resulting alliance. This hypothesis lies at the heart of most economic and military assistance programs, as well as American concern over Soviet arms shipments to various Third World countries. For example, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Fred C. Iklé has warned that Soviet arms assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua threatens to turn Central America into "another Eastern Europe," just as earlier U.S. officials saw Soviet military aid to other areas as a reliable tool of influence.<sup>75</sup> Via the same logic, Undersecretary of State James Buckley has suggested that increasing American arms transfers will help "revitalize American alliances."<sup>76</sup> Regardless of the context, the argument is the same: the provision of military or economic assistance is believed to give suppliers significant leverage over the recipient.

The belief that such sidepayments play a role in alliance formation is not without some justification. Throughout history, states have often offered material inducements to attract allies. Louis XIV purchased English neutrality during his campaign for hegemony in Europe by dispensing subsidies to the impoverished court of James II.<sup>77</sup> In World War I, Britain and France obtained the support of various Arab leaders by promising them territory after the war and by providing a gold subsidy immediately. Similar promises brought Italy into the war as well.<sup>78</sup> Historians generally agree that French loans to

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75. *The New York Times*, March 15, 1983.

76. "Arms Transfers and the National Interest," *Current Policy* #279, May 21, 1981, Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1981), p. 2.

77. See John Wolf, *The Emergence of the Great Powers* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 18, 26, 103.

78. See Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, p. 81; Howard M. Sachar, *The Emergence*

Russia played a role in encouraging the Franco-Russian alliance of 1892.<sup>79</sup> Sidepayments are thus frequently part of the process of alliance formation.

To conclude that they are the principal cause of alignment or a powerful tool of influence, however, is erroneous. The simplistic notion that "aid creates allies" ignores the fact that military or economic assistance is offered and accepted only when both parties feel it is in their interest to do so. In other words, offering or accepting aid is one way that states with different capabilities can respond to a common threat. Thus a large aid relationship is more often the *result* of alignment than a *cause* of it. For example, no one would claim that the Grand Alliance in World War II was "caused" by American Lend-Lease aid to Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Rather, Lend-Lease was a means by which American industrial productivity could be applied more effectively against the common enemy.<sup>80</sup> Yet those who now argue that Soviet or American military aid can create reliable proxies are in effect making just such a claim: they are focusing solely on the means by which an alliance is implemented, and ignoring the common interests that inspired the relationship in the first place.

Accordingly, it is more appropriate to consider the conditions under which the use of military or economic assistance will have powerful *independent* effects on the recipient's conduct. If we are worried about Soviet military assistance, for example, we want to know if and when this will enable Moscow to direct recipients for its own purposes. The question thus becomes: when does "bribery" give suppliers effective political leverage? The answer is: not very often. This is true for several reasons.<sup>81</sup>

First, unless the supplier is the only available source of economic or military aid, leverage will be limited because the recipient can always obtain it else-

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of the Middle East: 1914-1924 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 125-130, 136; Bernadotte Schmitt and Harold M. Vedeler, *The World in the Crucible: 1914-1918* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 92-94.

79. Jacob Viner, "International Finance and Balance of Power Diplomacy, 1881-1914," in Viner, *International Economics: Studies* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952); George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 342-346; and Fritz Stern, *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the German Empire* (New York: Vintage, 1979), pp. 439-447.

80. See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Chapter 1; and William H. McNeill, *America, Britain, and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 137-155 and *passim*.

81. There is an extensive literature on the sources and conditions of economic leverage. I have found the following works especially helpful: Ariel Levite and Athanassios Platias, "Evaluating Small States' Dependence on Arms Imports: An Alternative Perspective" (Ithaca: Cornell Peace Studies Program, 1983); Albert O. Hirschman's classic *State Power and the Structure of International*

where. With two superpowers capable of providing assistance, client states can usually threaten to shift suppliers if their interests are not being served.<sup>82</sup>

Second, because recipients are usually weaker than suppliers, they will bargain harder because they have more at stake. At the same time, suppliers will be reluctant to cut off supplies if they feel it will leave their allies vulnerable. This limits their effective leverage still further.

Third, the more important the recipient is to the donor, the more aid it is likely to receive. But if a recipient is that important, then the donor will be even more reluctant to pressure it too severely. This tendency will be increased by the fact that the provision of aid also commits the donor's own prestige. The client's threats to realign if its interests are not served will be all the more effective once its patron has already invested heavily. If the recipient decides to realign or suffers a defeat, the patron's own prestige is likely to suffer.<sup>83</sup> A supplier's ability to enforce obedience by restricting supplies thus declines even more. In fact, large aid programs, far from providing suppliers with effective leverage, may actually indicate that the client has successfully manipulated the patron into providing ever-increasing amounts of support.

Finally, the provision of aid can be self-defeating, because it strengthens the recipient's position and thus reduces the need to follow its patron's wishes. As Henry Kissinger described the bargaining process with Israel during his "step-by-step" diplomacy:

I ask [Israeli Prime Minister] Rabin to make concessions, and he says he can't because Israel is weak. So I give him more arms, and he says he doesn't need to make concessions because Israel is strong.<sup>84</sup>

*Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), especially pp. 29-40; James A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978); Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), and "Is International Coercion Waning or Rising?," *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 92-110; and Steven E. Miller, "Arms and Impotence: Arms Transfers and Superpower Influence" (paper delivered at the IISS Young Scholars Conference in Bellagio, Italy, 1979).

82. For example, Jordan was able to obtain a variety of advanced weaponry (e.g., tanks and surface-to-air missiles) from the United States by threatening to turn to the Soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and again in 1975-76. In the same way, Nasser persuaded a reluctant Soviet leadership to send air defense troops and equipment to Egypt during the War of Attrition by threatening to resign in favor of a pro-American president.

83. During the October War, for example, Henry Kissinger reportedly argued that the United States "could not permit Soviet clients to defeat a traditional [American] friend." See his *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), p. 468.

84. Quoted in Edward R.F. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger* (Pleasantville: Reader's Digest Press, 1976), p. 199.

For all these reasons, the provision of military or economic assistance is likely to be a rather weak tool of superpower influence. The historical record supports this conclusion. Not only have superpower clients demonstrated a remarkable ability to defy their patrons on important issues,<sup>85</sup> but earlier great powers derived equally evanescent benefits. Although Britain financed and equipped the coalition that defeated Napoleon, for example, it found its allies to be an unruly coalition in which British leverage was at best erratic.<sup>86</sup>

In sum, the common assertion that Soviet or American military assistance will create reliable proxies is misleading at best and wrongheaded at worst, because the hypothesis that "bribery" can create reliable allies does not take the context within which aid is provided into account. Rather than being a tool through which the great powers gain reliable allies, the provision of aid is a means by which recipients can deal with their own problems through external assistance. Obviously, a large aid program does indicate that the states involved share certain common interests. Thus Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union all oppose U.S. intervention in Central America, just as Saudi Arabia and the United States fear Soviet meddling in the Middle East. But it is wrong to conclude that recipients become Soviet (or, for that matter, American) minions, because aid can provide substantial leverage only over the most helpless (and therefore inconsequential) recipients. Foreign aid can make an existing alliance more effective, but it rarely creates one in the absence of shared political interests.

#### PENETRATION

The last hypothesis concerns the effects of political penetration, defined as the covert or indirect manipulation of one state's political system by another. This may take many forms: 1) public officials whose loyalties are divided may use their positions to move one state closer to another; 2) lobbying organizations may be used to alter policy decisions and public perceptions regarding a potential ally; or 3) foreign propaganda may be used to sway elite and mass attitudes. This hypothesis predicts that alliances can be readily formed by manipulating foreign governments through these indirect means.

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85. For an analysis of the historical record, see Walt, "The Origins of Alliances," Chapter 8. See also Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, Number 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 161–182.

86. See Robert Sherwig, *Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 311–313, 350–355.

Although penetration has received relatively little attention in recent scholarly research,<sup>87</sup> examples are easy to find. The Turkish decision to ally with Germany in World War I was due in part to the influence of Liman von Sanders, a German officer commanding the Turkish Army in Constantinople.<sup>88</sup> During the war itself, Britain conducted an effective propaganda campaign in the United States, which played a significant role in the U.S. decision to enter.<sup>89</sup> During the 1950s, the "China Lobby" exerted a substantial influence over American policy in the Far East by manipulating public opinion and influential American officials.<sup>90</sup> Finally, the belief that penetration may be an effective tool of alliance-building has inspired the political indoctrination programs that accompanied American military training for various developing countries, not to mention American concern over similar Soviet educational and military assistance programs.<sup>91</sup>

The circumstances in which penetration will have a significant effect, however, are limited. First, it is more likely to succeed in open societies, where influential elites are more accessible to foreign ideas. Second, if the effort to penetrate is viewed by the target state as subversive or illegitimate, it is likely to react by moving away from the state seeking to enhance its influence and the penetration will therefore be counterproductive. This possibility implies that penetration will be safest (i.e., have the best chance of success) when there are already strong incentives for the two states to align, so that the activities to encourage the alliance via penetration will not appear as dangerous. Of course, this implies that penetration is at best serving to supplement the incentives for alignment that already exist.

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87. Exceptions include: K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), Chapter 8; Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration* (New York: Random House, 1965); Nicholas O. Berry, "The Management of Foreign Penetration," *Orbis*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1973); and Knorr, *The Power of Nations*.

88. Schmitt and Vedeler, *The World in the Crucible*, pp. 98–102; A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848–1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 508–511, 533–534.

89. See Horace C. Peterson, *Propaganda for War: The British Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914–1918* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1939).

90. See Ross Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); and Stanley Bachrack, *The Committee for One Million* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

91. Miles D. Wolpin, "External Political Socialization as a Source of Conservative Military Behavior in the Third World," in Kenneth Fidel, ed., *Militarism in Developing Countries* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1975); Anthony Cordesman, "U.S. and Soviet Competition in Arms Exports and Military Assistance," *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1981, pp. 66–67; and U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (Washington, 1983), pp. 86–90.

In addition, to infer that penetration plays a strong causal role in contemporary international alliances is to reverse the likely causal relationship between the decision to ally and the development of extensive contacts between two states. As with foreign aid, a large military or educational training program is one *effect* of good political relations, but it is rarely an independent *cause*.<sup>92</sup>

Several examples will illustrate these considerations. The ethnic lobbies that affect American alliance policy are effective precisely because: 1) they are operating within an open political system; 2) their aims are limited to a narrow range of issues; and 3) their actions are viewed as consistent with the interest group traditions of American politics. Thus the likelihood of a counterproductive backlash is reduced. Recognizing this, the Chairman of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee has commented: "unless you can always translate this in terms of what's in America's interest, you're lost."<sup>93</sup> By contrast, several accounts report that Soviet interference in Egypt's internal affairs was instrumental in Sadat's decision to expel his Russian advisors in 1972. Similar events have apparently taken place in Syria and Iraq, albeit with less severe repercussions.<sup>94</sup>

Thus where penetration does contribute to an alliance, it will be where the *means* are perceived as legitimate and where tangible incentives for alignment already exist, so that the campaign will be viewed as less intrusive and the relevant targets will be inclined to view the message favorably. But this means that penetration is unlikely to do more than reinforce existing pressures for

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92. Thus the Soviet military presence in Egypt and Syria soared after the Six Day War, at the request of the two host countries. Similarly, the number of Jordanians receiving military training in the U.S. tripled after the Jordan Crisis in 1970. Prior political alignments and changing external circumstances determine the level of contact between influential elites, not the reverse.

93. Quoted in "Lobbying and the Middle East," *Congressional Quarterly*, August 22, 1981, p. 1529. See also Charles McC. Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 5 (Summer 1981), pp. 975-998; Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), Chapter 2; and I.L. Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981).

94. On the Soviet expulsion from Egypt, see: Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 195-196; Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 230-231; and Steven David, "The Realignment of Third World Regimes from One Superpower to the Other: Ethiopia's Mengistu, Somalia's Siad, and Egypt's Sadat" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1980), pp. 297-299, 319-320, 328-329. On the tensions caused by Soviet interference within Syria, see *Middle East Record 1969-70* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1977), pp. 427-429, 431-432. In 1978, Iraq executed 21 Communists discovered forming cells in the armed forces. See Francis Fukuyama, *The Soviet Union and Iraq*, Research Note N-1524-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1980), pp. 56-61.

alignment. In short, penetration may preserve or enhance an existing alliance, but it rarely creates one by itself.

Finally, the cases where penetration has had a strong independent effect reinforce these conclusions. Penetration will be most effective when the central authority of the target state is extremely weak. In such circumstances, penetration may provide a foreign power with de facto control. For example, the Warsaw Pact presence in South Yemen has enabled the U.S.S.R. to protect the alliance by ensuring that pro-Soviet factions remain in power. This was demonstrated in 1978, when Cuban and East German forces supported a violent coup ousting a moderate faction led by Rubay Ali.<sup>95</sup> Similar events seem to have occurred in Afghanistan as well. Of course, states that are this vulnerable to outside interference are rarely important players on the international stage. As with foreign aid, therefore, penetration is by itself most useful for acquiring allies that don't really matter very much, or in cementing ties between states whose interests are already highly compatible.

*Conclusion: Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*

The analysis above may be summarized as follows. First, states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them. Threats, in turn, are the product of several different sources. Second, ideology is a weaker cause of alliance formation, and ideological movements that strive for tight central authority are more likely to lead to conflict than cooperation. Third, the instruments of "bribery" and penetration are by themselves weak determinants of alignment; they make existing alliances more effective, but rarely create them in the absence of common interests.

These propositions tell us a great deal about America's global position and the optimal strategies for maintaining it. To demonstrate this, I shall conclude by considering the following question: what explains the current balance of world power between the Soviet and American alliance systems? In other words, why have third parties aligned with one or the other superpower? I make two claims. First, in contrast to the prevailing American wisdom, the present balance greatly favors the United States and its allies. Second, this favorable *imbalance* of power can be explained by the central propositions

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95. See J.B. Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf, and the West* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 470-473; Laurie A. Mylroie, *The Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*, Research Note N-2052-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1983); and *Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1977-78* (London: Holmes and Meier, 1979), pp. 655-660, 662-666.



advanced in this essay. To support these claims, I shall first offer a rough assessment of the present balance. I shall then show how these hypotheses provide a persuasive explanation of this situation, and draw out several important policy implications from these results.

#### THE PRESENT (IM)BALANCE OF WORLD POWER

Measuring the power of states or coalitions precisely is complicated and difficult. Fortunately, a detailed "net assessment" is not necessary here. A rough but reliable comparison of the Soviet and American alliance systems can be obtained by considering the following items: population, gross national product (GNP), size of armed forces, and defense expenditure.<sup>96</sup> I have categorized alliance members either by the existence of a formal security treaty or by the presence of a significant level of security cooperation between the ally and the superpower in question. The Soviet system thus includes the Warsaw Pact and Moscow's principal regional clients; the American system includes NATO, Japan, and the other regional powers with obvious and longstanding ties to the U.S. The current distribution of capabilities between these two systems is shown in Table 1.

Not only does the American alliance system outnumber that of the Soviet Union, but these figures reveal a striking Western advantage in overall resources. Moreover, the disparity is especially pronounced on the indicators

**Table 1. Ratios of Capabilities Between the American and Soviet Alliance Networks**

Coalitions	Population	GNP	Size of Armed Forces	Defense \$
U.S. + Allies				
U.S.S.R. + Allies	2.25	3.26	0.99	1.17
U.S. + Allies + PRC				
U.S.S.R. + Allies + India	1.81	3.30	1.32	1.30
U.S. + Allies + PRC				
U.S.S.R. + Allies	4.08	3.52	1.49	1.32

Note: See Appendices for the data used to prepare this table.

96. On the problems of estimating national power, see: Knorr, *The Power of Nations*, Chapters 3 and 4; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962); Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Part 3; and Ray S. Cline, *World Power Assessment 1977: A Calculus of Strategic Drift* (Washington: Georgetown, 1978).

that reflect latent power. Significantly, the worst case for the U.S.S.R.—China allied with the U.S. and India neutral—is probably the most likely case as well. The Soviets face a ratio of more than 3:1 in population and GNP, to say nothing of their technological disadvantages.<sup>97</sup> The gap is smaller in terms of *mobilized* power, because the Soviets and their allies have sought to compensate for their relative weakness by devoting a larger percentage of GNP to defense. Despite this disproportionate effort, the Soviet alliance system still trails the U.S. and its allies by a considerable margin on these items as well.

At first glance, this result would seem to contradict the assertion that states choose alliance partners in order to balance against the strongest. Focusing solely on aggregate power would lead us to expect more states to ally with the Soviet Union, in order to prevent the United States from using its superior overall resources in harmful ways. Judging from the preponderance of aggregate power favoring the West, many states appear to have “bandwagoned” rather than balanced by aligning with the U.S. This is even more striking when one remembers that the United States was overwhelmingly the world’s most powerful country in the immediate postwar period, yet was able to bring most of the other industrial powers into alignment with rather than against it.<sup>98</sup>

This apparent anomaly can be resolved by considering the central propositions developed above. In particular, we should recall that states balance against *threats*, of which aggregate power is only one component. By considering the effects of each separate source of threat, as well as the less important but still significant effects of ideology, a persuasive account of the current structure of world power can be obtained. Let us consider each element in turn.

First, not to belabor the obvious, the Soviet–American rivalry is itself determined by the tendency for states to balance against aggregate power.

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97. According to the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in 1982 the U.S. led the U.S.S.R. in 15 out of 23 basic technology areas, with 6 even, and with the U.S.S.R. ahead in 2. In deployed military systems, U.S. technology was superior in 12, even in 11, and inferior in 6. See Statement by the Hon. Richard E. Delauer, U.S. House of Representatives, “The FY1983 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition,” 97th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. II-21 and II-22.

98. In 1950, the United States produced approximately 40 percent of Gross World Product, while the Soviet Union managed only 13.5 percent. American naval and air power were far superior, and the U.S. had a clear advantage in deliverable atomic weaponry.

Because each is the other's greatest potential threat, the two superpowers devote their primary attention to the actions of the other. For the Soviets, this is an especially daunting prospect. The rigid logic of bipolarity has locked them into a competition with history's wealthiest and most technologically advanced society. Even before we consider the allies that each superpower has attracted, it is clear that the Soviet Union begins from a relatively weaker position.

Second, the effects of proximity help explain why the alliance choices of other important states make the Soviet situation even worse. Because the Soviet Union is the largest power on the Eurasian land mass, it poses a significant threat to the many states on or near its borders. As a result, Soviet relations with neighboring countries are generally either imperial or hostile: those countries are either under *de facto* Soviet control or allied with the U.S. Although geographic proximity may in some cases make it easier for the Soviet Union to use military power against its neighbors, this situation also provides the independent states of Eurasia with a powerful incentive to seek allies elsewhere to deter such an attempt or to defeat it should it occur.

The United States, by contrast, has only two countries on its borders. Neither is especially powerful.<sup>99</sup> Because American policy towards both has been benign in recent years (and because their own weakness and isolation from potential allies makes resistance futile), both have chosen to bandwagon with the U.S. Even more important, the United States is separated by two oceans from the other vital centers of world power. For the medium powers of Western Europe and Asia, the U.S. is the perfect ally. It is sufficiently powerful to contribute substantially to their defense, it is driven by its own concerns to oppose Soviet expansion, and yet it is sufficiently distant from those allies so that it does not itself pose a significant threat. Thus the United States is *geographically* isolated but *politically* popular, while the Soviet Union is *politically* isolated as a consequence of *geographic proximity*. More than any other factor, geography explains why so many of the world's significant powers have chosen to ally with the U.S.<sup>100</sup>

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99. Were Canada and Mexico to ally against the U.S., they would trail in GNP by seven to one and in population by almost 2.5 to one.

100. This analysis stands many familiar notions of geopolitics on their heads. For example, Halford Mackinder suggested that Russia gained great advantages from its geographic position at the center of the world "Heartland." The implications of alliance theory are that while this may provide some military advantages, it also greatly increases the number of potential enemies the centrally placed power will face. For analyses of Mackinder's ideas, see Robert E. Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy* (New York: Perga-

Third, the Soviet response to this situation is both predictable and self-defeating. Faced with an encircling coalition of far greater overall resources, the Soviets have responded by devoting considerable efforts to defense. For this and other reasons, their force posture and military doctrine emphasize offensive capabilities and operations. In the event of war, the Soviet Union aims to fight an offensive battle of conquest rather than a defensive battle on its borders, regardless of how the war actually begins. This *offensive* capability, however, merely reinforces the cohesion of the alliance that already opposes them, because it increases the level of threat that Soviet neighbors perceive.<sup>101</sup>

Fourth, the final source of threat—perceived intentions—works against the U.S.S.R. as well. Actions like the invasion of Afghanistan, periodic interventions in Eastern Europe, support for terrorist organizations and revolutionary movements abroad, all reinforce global opposition to the Soviet Union. Although these actions may attract the support of radical forces around the globe, they have also increased the already strong tendency for the world's wealthiest and most stable regimes to ally together for mutual defense.<sup>102</sup>

Significantly, these factors have been largely reversed in the Third World, which explains why the Soviets have done better there while the U.S. has done worse. The Soviet capacity for global power projection has been and remains distinctly inferior to that of the United States, and the U.S.S.R. has generally adopted a much more favorable attitude towards the aspirations of the non-aligned movement and revolutionary forces throughout the world.<sup>103</sup>

mon, 1982), Chapter 6; and Paul M. Kennedy, "Mahan Versus Mackinder: Two Views on Naval Strategy," in his *Strategy and Diplomacy: Collected Essays* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983).

101. According to the IJSS, the U.S.S.R. now leads the world in total defense spending. On the offensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, see: Benjamin Lambeth, *How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine*, Rand Paper P-5939 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1978); and Jack L. Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146.

102. Recent examples of balancing behavior by the West include: the *rapprochement* with China in the 1970s; the modernization of Norwegian coastal and air defenses and the pre-positioning of equipment for a U.S. marine battalion in Norway itself; the NATO decision and deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe; the 1976 agreement for an annual 3 percent real increase in alliance spending; and continued discussions for coordinated action in areas outside of NATO. These responses habitually fall short of American desires, a phenomenon still best explained by the theory of collective goods. On the latter point, see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser's classic "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (1966); and Robert J. Art, "Fixing Transatlantic Bridges," *Foreign Policy*, Number 46 (Spring 1982), pp. 69-70.

103. See Andrew Marshall, "Sources of Soviet Power: The Military Potential in the 1980s," in Christoph Bertram, ed., *Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1980), pp. 65-66; Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), Chapter 5.

By contrast, the United States denounced neutralism as immoral, was usually hostile to leftist nationalist movements, and employed its considerable military capabilities against a variety of developing countries on several occasions.<sup>104</sup> Thus where Soviet power and perceived intentions threatened the developed world but not the former colonies, American power and American actions did just the opposite. U.S. interventionism in the developing world drove more Third World regimes to the Soviet side than it attracted to its own, and undermined relations with its other allies as well. Thus the same factors that explain America's close ties with the industrial states of Eurasia also account for its relatively poorer standing throughout much of the rest of the world.<sup>105</sup>

Fifth, these tendencies are reinforced by the effects of ideology. The *divisive* character of Soviet Marxism–Leninism—an ideology calling for the authoritative leadership of the Socialist system by Moscow—contributes to Soviet isolation. Indeed, every Communist state that has been physically able to establish an independent position from Moscow has done so, at the price of a severe quarrel with the U.S.S.R. Ideological disagreements are not the only source of intra-Communist conflicts, but they have clearly exacerbated these relations.

America's democratic system provides an advantage here as well. As I described in the second section, democratic regimes enjoy unusually good relations because these systems do not tend to engage in ideological disputes with one another. Moreover, the world's democracies are wealthy, technologically advanced, and militarily capable, while most Marxist states (and especially those in the developing world) are economically weak. As a result, the American alliance system is both impressive in its capabilities and unusually cohesive, especially by historical standards.<sup>106</sup>

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104. See Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution*; and Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: The Use of American Military Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978).

105. Predictably, as Soviet military activity in the Third World has grown, the popularity of the Soviet Union among these developing countries has declined. For the basic trends since the beginning of the Cold War, the best source is still: Center for Defense Information, "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum: Myth or Menace?," *The Defense Monitor*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1980).

106. Despite the perennial predictions of NATO's impending collapse, it is still remarkable that a coalition of fifteen nations has endured for more than thirty years. For a pessimistic view of the future, see Eliot A. Cohen, "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982–83), pp. 325–343. For more optimistic visions, see: Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca, "Theatre Nuclear Forces: Public Opinion in Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 98, No. 2 (Summer 1983); and Richard Eichenberg, "The Myth of Hollanditis," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 1983), pp. 143–159.

Finally, neither bribery nor penetration is likely to alter this situation very much. The provision of economic and military assistance will not sway the policies of Western Europe or Japan, and the U.S.S.R. has already shown its inability to provide competitive economic benefits to the developing world.<sup>107</sup> Although the Soviets can and do provide large amounts of military equipment, their "proxies" have shown a striking ability to follow their own interests rather than those of the U.S.S.R. Similarly, Soviet efforts to penetrate the West have failed to unravel Western cohesion significantly, and their attempts to create a network of loyal Third World allies through subversion or educational assistance has provided few tangible benefits save in a small number of rather backward and weak countries. Indeed, the U.S. and its allies retain the dominant position in providing economic assistance and in educating emerging Third World elites.<sup>108</sup> In any case, the durable forces of nationalism are likely to limit the overall importance of these instruments as independent causes of alignment, for the reasons already noted.

America's global position is thus doubly reassuring. Not only is it the leading member of an anti-Soviet coalition possessing superior latent and mobilized capabilities, but this alliance is bound together by many durable and powerful forces. The current balance of world power, viewed in light of these ideas, is likely to be extremely stable. The task of American foreign and defense policy is to exploit these fundamental tendencies to the fullest. This can best be accomplished by the following steps.

First, because balancing is the dominant tendency in international politics, the United States should worry less about its allies defecting and worry more about how it provokes opposition through misplaced belligerence. As the balancing hypothesis implies, the less threatening the U.S. appears, the more popular it is likely to be. This means that intervention in peripheral areas for the sake of "credibility" should usually be rejected. Instead, a policy of appeasement in the Third World is often the more promising approach. By patiently and persistently demonstrating that American power is directed by benevolent rather than aggressive intentions, the likelihood that others will embrace the Soviet Union is reduced. Even if they occasionally do, it will

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107. See Committee on International Relations, "The Soviet Union and the Third World," pp. 170 and *passim*; and Henry Bienen, "Soviet Political Relations with Africa," *International Security*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 153-173. Significantly, less than 1 percent of all global development assistance comes from the U.S.S.R. See the Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist LDCs: 1979 and 1954-1979*, pp. 8-9.

108. On this point, see: CIA, *Communist Aid Activities*, p. 9; and Committee on International Relations, "The Soviet Union and the Third World," pp. 82-90.

have little effect on America's overall position. Given the tendency for states to balance, America's other allies will be more likely to do more.

Second, the present U.S. military program should be revised. It is based on two related errors: 1) that the Soviet buildup has brought significant political advantages; and 2) that a unilateral U.S. response will preserve its own commitments efficiently. Although the Western Alliance suffers from important military deficiencies, they are more the result of spending money unwisely than in spending too little. Moreover, a major U.S. buildup is hardly likely to spur its allies to greater efforts. Via the logic of balancing, they are far more likely to free-ride. Thus the Carter Administration's efforts to fashion a more equitable and efficient NATO defense program made far more sense than the Reagan Administration's attempts to solve Western military deficiencies by spending more and more American dollars. The U.S. can expect its allies to do more against their common foes if those allies were less confident that the U.S. was trying to do it all.

Third, America's knee-jerk opposition to leftist forces in the developing world should be abandoned. Not only is ideology generally a weak force for alignment, but the Marxist doctrines that Americans are so fearful of are as likely to lead to intra-Communist conflict as they are to produce unity. The examples of Mao, Tito, Togliatti, Mugabe, Berlinguer, Carillo, and Pol Pot all demolish the myth of Marxist solidarity, a fact that has somehow escaped the grasp of those responsible for American foreign policy. As George Kennan's original formulation of containment prescribed, the U.S. should seek to exploit these divisions, not work to reinforce the fragile unity of leftist regimes by its own actions.<sup>109</sup>

Fourth, the U.S. should reject the simplistic assumption that Soviet arms recipients are reliable agents of the Kremlin. Providing large arms shipments did not give the Soviet Union reliable influence in Yugoslavia, Egypt, Indonesia, Somalia, China, or Zimbabwe, to name but a few examples. At the same time, the U.S. should recognize that its own aid policies will not provide it with much leverage either. After all, Israel, the country that is probably most dependent on American support, is also one of the more independent in its behavior. Aid may strengthen allies whose political aims parallel our own, but it hardly creates reliable satellites. By exaggerating the effectiveness of this instrument, U.S. leaders exaggerate the size of the Soviet bloc and

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109. See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Chapter 2; and Oye and Feinberg, "After the Fall."

ignore the possibility of weaning clients away from Moscow through appropriate political incentives. The U.S. is also likely to provide its own allies with too much, in the mistaken view that this will cement their allegiance and enhance American control.

The arguments advanced in this paper do not mean that the American alliance network is indestructible, that isolationism is preferable, or that Western defense capabilities could not be improved.<sup>110</sup> What they do mean is that Americans could hardly ask for much more. The principal causes of alliance formation work to America's advantage, and isolate the Soviet Union from virtually all of the world's strategically significant states. If Americans recognize this fact, the task of formulating appropriate national security policies should be greatly simplified. Even more important, the policies that emerge will reinforce—rather than undermine—the considerable advantages the United States already enjoys.

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110. For analyses of the military problems facing the West along with various solutions, see: Barry R. Posen and Stephen W. Van Evera, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment," *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 3–45; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Forces, Part II* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1982); William W. Kaufmann, "Non-nuclear Deterrence," in John Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds., *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984); Asa Clark et al., *The Defense Reform Debate* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Report of the European Security Study, *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983); and Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984–85), pp. 47–88.



**Appendix 1. The Balance of World Power: The Soviet Alliance Network (All Data 1982)**

Country	Population (millions)	GNP (\$ m)	# in Armed Forces (1000s)	Defense \$ (\$ m)
U.S.S.R.	270.0	1715000	4400	257000
Bulgaria	8.9	37451	175	3761
Czechoslovakia	15.4	147065	213	7634
East Germany	16.7	175522	233	10236
Hungary	10.7	69111	112	3108
Poland	36.2	186823	429	13494
Rumania	22.5	104827	237	4793
Afghanistan	14.2	2900	30	165
Angola	7.4	7634	47	90
Cuba	9.8	21971	230	1109
Ethiopia	30.6	4635	250	455
Iraq	14.0	25177	450	11689
North Korea	18.7	16200	710	3500
Laos	3.6	320	57	30
Libya	3.3	23986	55	2800
Mongolia	1.7	1100	36	113
Mozambique	12.7	4786	20	163
Nicaragua	2.7	2515	75	169
Syria	9.4	17583	290	2528
Vietnam	55.8	7750	1000	1000
P.D.R. Yemen	2.0	956	23	120
Finland	4.8	51232	36	897
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>571.1</b>	<b>2624544</b>	<b>9108</b>	<b>324854</b>
% of World Total	12.4	19.3	33.1	39.7
India	715.1	178141	1120	6223
<b>TOTAL WITH INDIA</b>	<b>1286.2</b>	<b>2802685</b>	<b>10228</b>	<b>331077</b>
% of World Total (with India)	27.8	20.6	37.0	40.5

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982* (Washington: April 1984).

**Appendix 2. The Balance of World Power: The American Alliance Network**

Country	Population (millions)	GNP (\$ m)	# in Armed Forces (1000s)	Defense \$ (\$ m)
United States	232.1	3071400	2108	196345
Belgium	9.9	101721	85	3507
Canada	24.6	276706	82	6139
China (Taiwan)	18.5	50583	504	3660
Denmark	5.1	61192	31	1575
Egypt	44.6	29375	447	2395
France	54.4	607429	485	25612
West Germany	61.6	720485	480	24351
Greece	9.8	40209	186	2782
Italy	56.3	374162	391	9778
Japan	118.4	1226951	241	12159
South Korea	40.7	69539	600	4783
Netherlands	14.3	146305	108	4755
Norway	4.1	58521	37	1823
Spain	38.0	197175	353	4123
Turkey	48.1	65252	638	3375
United Kingdom	56.0	531606	322	27368
Thailand	49.7	38695	241	1562
Australia	15.1	180057	73	4415
Philippines	51.8	41830	155	1033
New Zealand	3.1	25817	13	543
Brazil	128.3	295648	460	1850
Saudi Arabia	10.1	16118	55	24754
Somalia	6.1	1985	54	160
Israel	3.9	22917	180	5838
Jordan	3.3	4615	65	984
Mexico	73.8	243677	145	1261
Pakistan	92.1	33598	478	2033
Portugal	10.0	24522	68	900
TOTAL	1283.8	8558090	9085	379863
% of World Total	27.7	62.8	33.0	46.5
P.R. China	1044.8	698000	4490	49500
TOTAL WITH P.R.C.	2328.6	9256090	13575	429363
% of World Total	50.4	67.9	49.3	52.5