

The 1941 Galician Deportation and the Kamenets-Podolsk Massacre: A Prologue to the Hungarian Holocaust

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The German attack against the Soviet Union, beginning on June 22, 1941, presented an unparalleled opportunity for the Hungarian government to deport Jews from Hungary to Galicia during a six-week period in the summer of 1941. The deportations of 22,000 Jews culminated in an unprecedented bloodbath in Kamenets-Podolsk at the end of August, when most of the deportees were slaughtered. This massacre represented an important milestone in the course of destruction, both as the first mass killing of this scale, and as the opening of a new stage in the planned destruction of European Jewry.

Mass murder is the tragic hallmark of the twentieth century: against the background of Europe's relatively peaceful period for many decades after 1815, the first half of the 1900s seemed like a sharp drop into an unprecedented moral abyss. Even if we discount the carnage of World War I and the Stalinist purges, we have to contend with an estimated fifty-five million deaths during World War II.¹ Within this number, the centrality of the Holocaust, with its nearly six million Jewish victims, is indisputable. Given the exceedingly broad range of massacres and other atrocities that this number entails, we will limit ourselves here to consideration of the mass deportation of 22,000 variously labeled "undesired foreigners," "stateless refugees," or "aliens" from Hungary proper and the newly annexed territories on its periphery to Galicia during a six-week period in the summer of 1941.² The subsequent murder of the majority of these deportees in the vicinity of Kamenets-Podolsk may not seem significant when compared to the murder of one-and-a-half million Jews in the Ukraine between 1941 and 1943. The Western Ukrainian city of Kamenets-Podolsk, with Jews comprising sixty percent of its prewar population, might be described as a featureless former garrison town except for the impressively massive fortress overlooking the Smotrych

River. Yet, the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre claimed some 23,600 victims, among them an estimated 16,000 Hungarian deportees, and came to symbolize the entire wave of deportations from Hungary.

While many scholars have dedicated a page or two to the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre, in-depth studies of the subject have been conducted mainly by those from Hungary itself. Arthur Geyer and Tamás Majsai, for example, can be considered trailblazers in bringing attention to the massacre. Geyer's article "Az első magyarországi deportálás" (The First Hungarian Deportation), published in 1961, was the earliest analysis of the subject.³ Tamás Majsai's more comprehensive study, "A körösmezei zsidódeportálás 1941-ben" (The 1941 Deportation of Jews from Körösmező), was based on extensive archival research as well as on material collected from survivors.⁴ Both works were published during the Communist period, when Jewish themes, particularly those related to the Holocaust, were treated as taboo. The two papers therefore appeared in religious-themed publications with limited circulation. They did not reach a wide audience, and did not significantly influence the scholarly community in Hungary.

The first English-language treatment of the massacre at Kamenets-Podolsk, authored by Randolph Braham, appeared in *Yad Vashem Studies* in 1973.⁵ Another important work was a 2001 German-language article by Klaus-Michael Mallmann, who was able to tap into materials held in German military archives.⁶ In Hungary itself, the topic of the Holocaust became a major moral and political theme in public discourse soon after the fall of Communism. Among the works that directly questioned the role and responsibility of the Hungarian authorities in the tragedy of the 22,000 deportees, Zoltán Szirtes' 1996 book *Temetetlen halottaink, 1941: Körösmező, Kamenyec-Podolszk* (Our Unburied Dead: 1941. Körösmező, Kamenets-Podolsk) was the earliest.⁷ Judit Fejes in 1997 and Mária Ormos in 2000 contributed key works exploring the activities of one of the central characters of the deportation, Government Commissioner of Carpatho-Ruthenia Miklós Kozma.⁸ The history of the National Central Alien Control Authority is the focus of Kinga Frojimovics' impressive 2007 book "*I Have Been a Stranger in a Strange Land*": *The Hungarian State and Jewish Refugees in Hungary, 1933–1945*.⁹

There are compelling reasons for this level of scholarly attention: this deportation of Hungarian Jews, and the subsequent mass killing, introduced certain "firsts" in the annals of the Holocaust. One is struck immediately by the number of victims. To use Richard Breitman's phrase, the "action against Hungarian Jews exiled to the Ukraine dwarfed all previous killings in the South . . . Through the end of August 1941, Kamenets-Podolsk represented the largest single Nazi liquidation of Jews."¹⁰ This was the first instance, as several historians have remarked, in which the number of people murdered reached five digits. Equally important, the killings signified a transition to a new stage in the annihilation, from randomized massacres to fulfillment of a political agenda. That is, the course of destruction shifted from the "experimental" to the "intentional" phase. The events at Kamenets-Podolsk introduced for the first time the

concept of “total” annihilation: men, women, and children were systematically murdered, and the mechanism of destruction clearly advanced. The massacre also signified an internationalization of the process: the target of removal and annihilation now included not only local citizens of the conquered territories, but also Hungarians, Romanians, and refugees from across Europe.¹¹ Hungarian authorities, in clear contravention of international norms, were expelling refugees who had been accorded asylum. At the same time, the Hungarians’ dragnet captured Hungarian citizens as well, setting an ominous precedent for a country’s removal of its own citizens; the relocations were neither coordinated with nor approved by the German authorities occupying Galicia.

Finally, awareness of the series of deportations spread almost instantaneously not only to Jewish communities in Galicia and within Hungary, but also to the British, American, and Soviet governments, and, somewhat later, to the American press. High-level Hungarian military personnel kept the American embassy especially well supplied with timely information about this turn of events in the East. A July 17, 1941 missive from U.S. Ambassador Herbert C. Pell reported the “transfer [of a] large number of Polish Jews now in Hungary to an area in Galicia now occupied by Hungarian troops.” The U.S. State Department thus had immediate knowledge of the mass relocation. By July 27, the ambassador was able to fine-tune this information by noting that the group of expellees included Hungarian citizens and refugees from Western Europe.¹² In describing the enormity of the crime, as well as its unprecedented sweep, the ambassador captured the early stages of the process of annihilation that would come to be known as “the Holocaust by bullets.”¹³

To understand fully the circumstances of the 1941 expulsion of Jews from Hungary, and the deportees’ subsequent fate, we need to examine psychological, political, and personal factors. This study employs an interdisciplinary approach based on previously unavailable documentary and archival sources from the United States, Israel, Hungary, and Ukraine. Our objective is to add depth, texture, and nuance to this story by exploring overlapping narratives, integrating historical sources with personal perspectives, and giving a voice to perpetrators, bystanders, and victims.

The Anatomy of Genocide


The cross-border transfer of 22,000 persons cannot in itself be viewed as remarkable or out of the ordinary, at least not in the context of Hungarian or even European history during World War II. While the term “ethnic cleansing” is a relatively modern expression, the idea, however, is not. Huge demographic shifts, sometimes accompanied by mass death, were symptomatic of—even the hallmark of—both Soviet and Nazi designs.¹⁴ Following the Nazi example, Germany’s allies—Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary—all engaged in some form of exchange or forced relocation of entire populations. Thus, the expulsion of Jews from Hungary against the background of ongoing “demographic realignments,” no matter how euphemistically we may term it, cannot be viewed as exceptional given the prevailing ideologies of that

time.¹⁵ Indeed, the possibility of the removal of large groups of people, specifically Jews, from the periphery of the country to Galicia, had been an integral part of the national discourse between the two world wars. The idea permeated the intellectual fabric of society. As this discourse progressed, a clear differentiation emerged between Jews from the “old Hungary” and those who had emigrated from Galicia into Hungary’s border region, and who were referred to by the derogatory term, “Galicianers.”¹⁶ The ruling elite continually reinforced the differing perceptions of the two groups. In the mid-1920s one of the leading figures in Hungarian politics summed up this view in a parliamentary speech: “The respect that we feel toward the old and patriotic Jewry cannot stop us from stating that the first- and second-generation immigrant Galician Jews have brought to us a proletarian dictatorship.”¹⁷

By the late 1930s, with the radicalization of Hungarian politics, this issue increasingly became the political hobby-horse of the extreme right. The preoccupation with “foreign Jews” was further exacerbated by the addition of 330,000 Jews to the population as new territories were acquired between 1938 and 1941. At the end of 1940, Prime Minister Pál Teleki challenged Hungarian Jews to “choose between Hungary and their co-religionists, who are foreign to us and who infiltrated into the country.”¹⁸ One of the unfortunate by-products of the emphasis on the cultural and “patriotic” differences between the “old” and “Galicianer” Jews, perceived or real, was the creation of a split within the Jewish community itself. A poignant example of this split is the comment by Dr. Lajos Láng, a noted Jewish financier, during a heated debate in the Upper Chamber of the Parliament concerning further economic restrictions on Hungarian Jews. Representing the assimilated segment of Hungarian Jewry, Láng rejected the planned anti-Jewish law by stating that “it stigmatizes us, who have resided in this country for the past three hundred years, speak Hungarian, think Hungarian, and have nothing in common with the so-called ‘Eastern,’ caftan-wearing Jews.”¹⁹

The deportation itself was not planned in a political vacuum, and it did not lack precedent. An equally comprehensive transfer of Serbs and Jews from the southern region of Hungary (Délvidék), in the former Yugoslav areas of Baranja and Bačka, to German-occupied Serbia had already taken place beginning in April 1941. While there were obvious differences between the two forced movements in terms of motivation and rationale, the “southern” population transfer served as a model for the Galicia action in the minds of the Hungarian military and political leadership.

Following the German attack on Yugoslavia in early 1941, Hungary joined in the occupation of lands that until late 1918 had belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. With its plan to expel all residents who had moved into the area after 1918, the newly installed Hungarian administration initiated a policy of reversing the “Yugoslavization,” for lack of a better term, of the 1920s and 1930s. On April 21, 1941, Lt. Gen. Elemér Gorondy-Novák, commander of the Third Hungarian Army,





Galicia and surrounding regions, August 1941.

ordered a sweeping cleansing campaign targeting mainly Serbs and Jews. In the course of this Hungarian military action, authorities interned several thousand Serbian settlers and “other persons,” mainly Jews, who were considered suspect in terms of their “national loyalty.” Internment centers were set up near major transport routes—for example alongside the Tisza and Danube Rivers, as well as by the Subotica-Noví Sad rail line—so that the transfers into German-occupied Serbia could be carried out quickly. Not surprisingly, the German administration in Serbia vehemently opposed these Hungarian initiatives. German resistance was compounded by the incoming waves of thousands of Serbs and Jews, the result of “ethnic cleansing” by the Ustaša (Croatian Revolutionary Movement) in Croatia. Despite the German refusal, Hungarian military units succeeded in pushing thousands of “unwanted elements” across the border from the southern region into Serbia.²⁰

Thus, the eviction of Serbs and Jews in the southern tier several months earlier served as a model for the implementation of a “population transfer” of Jews to Galicia in the summer of 1941. Not only were the conditions and modus operandi of the two population transfers alike in many ways, but the military situations were also somewhat similar. The German attack against the Soviet Union, commencing on June 22, 1941, was joined by Hungarian forces several days later. On June 30, 1941, the Hungarian forces, designated as Kárpát-Csoport (Carpathian Group), crossed the Soviet border and rapidly reached the Dniester River—a line crucial for the fate of many of the deported. By July 10, the Hungarian Rapid Deployment Force (Gyors Hadtest) embedded within the Carpathian Group had occupied Kamenets-Podolsk. This presented an unparalleled opportunity for the subsequent and unprecedented mass murder in Galicia of Hungarian Jews.

As we have noted, the overwhelming majority of the expelled Hungarian Jews were concentrated in the ghetto of Kamenets-Podolsk together with their Romanian and local co-religionists, and all of them were murdered at the end of August 1941. The fact that among the total number murdered there were two thousand Romanian Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina is not as well known, however. These Jews had either escaped originally with the Red Army or been forced across the Dniester River by Romanian forces under Gen. Ion Antonescu. Because of its strategic location, Kamenets-Podolsk became, in the words of Christopher Browning, “the destination of mass deportation by Romanian and Hungarian authorities, before the formal transfer of the city to the [German] civil administration on September 1.”²¹ The massacres began on August 27, following a fateful meeting of German military and civilian authorities on August 25 in Vinnitsa. The action, carried out by the Stabskompanie (staff company) of Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln, Higher SS and Police Leader (Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer) of the region, aided by Order Police Battalion 320 as well as Ukrainian auxiliaries, would claim the lives of an estimated 16,000 Hungarian, 2,000 Romanian, and 4,000 to 5,000 local Jews. It appears likely that Hungarian military units stationed in the vicinity were also involved, though this is not

fully documented. We know with certainty that Hungarian soldiers, Jewish forced labor personnel, and others were eyewitnesses to the carnage. These witnesses provided detailed reports to government officials, affected families, and even the American embassy in Budapest.²² According to an operational report that Jeckeln sent directly to Himmler, the 23,600 victims, mainly Jews, had been murdered within three days. Among them were the 16,000 Jews and their Christian family members deported from Hungary.²³

One of the most striking aspects of the atrocity was the fact that, as eyewitnesses reported, the perpetrators made no effort to conceal their deeds from the local population. Also, and in contradiction to the testimonies that members of Order Police Battalion 320 (who served mainly as cordon personnel) gave during their postwar trial, the mass murder in Kamenets-Podolsk was in no way smooth, tidy, or “sanitized.” The victims were reassured that they were being relocated or “returned home,” but then were marched several kilometers to an area marked by four huge craters—the remnants of colossal explosions of former Red Army munitions depots. After being forced to undress, the victims were felled by submachine-gun fire at the edge of these mass graves. While some were killed instantly, many were only wounded, and some jumped into the pits alive. A 1944 Soviet medical report from the village of Plebanówka in the Tarnopol region not far from Kamenets-Podolsk supports this account. Upon opening the mass graves, investigators found that “thirty-five percent of the victims had been shot dead on the spot. Fifty percent of the people were



Jewish labor battalion, Kamenets-Podolsk (near Dniester River), 1941. Courtesy of Memorial de la Shoah.

injured, and fifteen percent were buried alive.”²⁴ For survivors and eyewitnesses it was hard to convey in words the immediate aftermath of the carnage. A Ukrainian woman who was 8 years old at the time recalled that “the Germans brought in horses to tramp down the soil. At night, we heard the moans of the wounded who were buried alive . . . The earth quivered.” Returning Hungarian soldiers and personnel from the forced labor companies reported that the “earth moved up and down over the graves for days.”²⁵

Although the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre is undeniably the defining moment of this tragedy, it is only part of the general storyline. Several thousand other deportees were dispersed by fate and the whims of Hungarian military authorities, who dumped them in towns and shtetls across a wide swath of Eastern Galicia. The overwhelming majority of the deportees perished with their local co-religionists in various *Aktionen*. Through a combination of resourcefulness and luck, between two and three thousand survivors were able to return through the Carpathian Mountains; many bribed Hungarian military personnel and some received aid from local Ukrainians.

In tracing the path of the deportees across Galicia, we can identify additional milestones in their destruction. Closer examination might lead to an alteration of the estimated number of those relocated or killed. For example, based on the testimonies of several survivors, and supported by the findings of the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission investigation of Nazi atrocities in 1944 in the area of Oryny, we might place the number of Jews from Hungary killed on August 25, 1941 at around three to four hundred. Local Jews were unharmed; the target of the extermination was specifically the Hungarian Jews.²⁶ Equally noteworthy was the “Blutsonntag” massacre that took place in the Jewish cemetery of Stanyslaviv (Stanisławów/Stanislaw/Stanislaw) on October 12, 1941. More than 10,000 Jews, including 2,000 Hungarian Jews, perished on that day—as it happened, on the last day of the Jewish festival of Sukkoth (Hoshana Rabbah). SS-Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Hans Krüger orchestrated the massacre, aided by Ukrainian collaborators and Reserve Police Battalion 133. Notably, Krüger had at his disposal a Volksdeutsche unit, recruited from Hungary, that routinely participated in exterminations.²⁷ The second wave of slaughter and deportation to Bełżec from Stanyslaviv took place on March 31, 1942 (the eve of Passover 5702), finishing off the last remnant of the Hungarian refugees. The few who had been able to survive until then had taken refuge in an unfinished building, Rudolf’s Mill, next to the Stanyslaviv ghetto. They were the first to be killed in this Aktion.²⁸

A fourth large-scale extermination action, parallel in time if not in scope with that in Stanyslaviv, was perpetrated by units under the command of SS-Obersturmführer (First Lieutenant) Peter Leideritz on October 11–12, 1941 in Kolomyia (Kolomyja/Kolomea). Several thousand Jews, including Hungarian exiles, were murdered. Based on meticulous German record-keeping, we can add to these numbers the March 1942 transport to Bełżec—and ensuing gassing—of 6,000 Jews, including 1,000 Hungarian

Jews from Kolomyia and Stanyslaviv. As late as August 26–27, 1942, transports to Bełżec “included many Hungarian Jews” from Czortkiv (Czortków) as well.²⁹

Often, German authorities specifically targeted foreign nationals. For Kolomyia and Czortkiv, this meant that Hungarian, Austrian, Czech, Slovak, and German Jews, presumably transported from Hungary, were slated for extermination.³⁰ No less significant were the many smaller-scale extermination operations, the victims of which numbered “merely” in the hundreds, in almost every corner of Galicia. As a direct response to the influx of a large number of Jews from Hungary, the German authorities set a policy goal of rendering the border zone between Hungary and Ukraine *judenfrei*. Nazi policy was further reinforced by repeated appeals from Hungarian policy-makers who were concerned about the potential return of these deportees. One of the central characters in the Hungarian efforts, and a key initiator of the deportation itself, was Dr. Ámon Pásztóy, a somewhat nondescript apparatchik in the Ministry of the Interior. As the head of the Public Safety Department in that ministry, he had the ability to set immigration policies with far-reaching consequences. As one of his memoranda testifies, he had direct access to Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy, who also retained the portfolio of foreign minister. In a message labeled “Urgent,” Pásztóy approached Bárdossy with a request to set up lines of communications with German authorities with the aim of “establishing a twenty- to thirty-kilometer-wide ‘Jew-free’ zone parallel with the Hungarian border.”³¹

The practical outcome of establishing such a zone could only be mass-murder. During the trial of Hans Krüger and Order Police Battalion 133, the number of people executed in Nadwórna (Nadwirna) in October 6, 1941 was placed at around two thousand. Besides serving as a “dry run” for the much larger Stanyslaviv mass murder a week later, this event marked the actual beginning of the “Final Solution” in the Generalgouvernement.³² A local survivor, who was ordered to cover the mass graves eight months after the murders in Nadwórna, noted that “strewn all over [were] torn prayer books . . . some in Hungarian translation; most likely the Hungarian Jews (there were several hundred of them) who had lost their lives there, had brought these prayer books from Hungary.”³³ According to another testimony, the destruction of the Jewish community of Delatyn (Deliatyn)—by the Border Police (Grenzpolizei-Post) in Tatarów, assisted by Ukrainian auxiliaries—involved the shooting of 1,950 Jews. In both cases, a sizeable number of Hungarian victims were among the murdered. Similar massacres were perpetrated in Żabie (Zhabie), Zabłotów (Zabolotiv), Jaremcze (Iaremche), Skala, and Buczacz (Buchach). Equally precise statistics were recorded by local survivors from the same area: “2,088 Jews had been shot [in Kosów (Kosiv)] during the preceding two days, including 149 refugees from Hungary.” The date was October 18, 1941. Elsewhere, the witness reports that the “first *Aktion* in Horodenka occurred on December 4, 1941. Half of the Jewish population of 4,000 were shot, as were 400 Jewish refugees from Hungary and Romania.”³⁴

Christopher Browning's words come to mind as an apt summation: "the large-scale massacres were concentrated in the southern region of the district and were carried out above all by just two of the Security Police branch offices—Stanisławów and Kołomyja."³⁵ Hans Krüger and Peter Leideritz, competing ferociously with each other in the business of mass-extirpation, headed these offices.

The Evolution of a State Policy

How and why did these Jews from Hungary proper and the newly acquired territories—a semi-circle extending from the southern part of former Upper Hungary in the North (Felvidék), through Carpatho-Ruthenia in the East, and down to Transylvania in the Southeast—end up in Galicia in the first place, and what precipitated their demise? Corollary to these problems, a recurring question in the minds of many scholars is how a country with a highly developed legal system, a functional parliamentary structure, and a proudly stated and emphasized "values system" that was "solidly anchored in Christian values," could perpetrate such an action. Obviously there are no easy answers.

Primary responsibility for the development and implementation of the expulsion policy can be placed on the National Central Alien Control Authority (Külföldieket Ellenőrző Országos Központi Hatóság, or KEOKH). Modeled on its Swiss counterpart, KEOKH was established in 1930 as a semi-autonomous department within the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior. As such, it was entrusted by the government with managing affairs related to the various categories of foreigners residing in Hungary, and to do so by registering, monitoring, and regulating their stay in the country. In addition to dealing with administrative matters, KEOKH had the authority to issue ministerial decrees setting policies based on governmental directives. For implementation of these decrees, it also had law enforcement powers: it had authority to mobilize metropolitan police forces, border police, and the state gendarmerie for periodical round-up, internment, and expulsion of unwanted foreigners.³⁶ The department exercised this authority mainly against Jews. For example, a large-scale raid was conducted in November 1935 in five eastern counties for the purpose of arresting Jews who had no residence permits. Two years later, the raid was replicated in Budapest—to the consternation and protest of Jewish organizations in the Hungarian capital. This Jewish protest reached even Miklós Horthy, the head of state, who reassured the Jewish leaders by asserting that the action was aimed against "Eastern-Galician" Jews only, and that no danger should befall their assimilated co-religionists.³⁷ The immediate consequence of these raids and arrests by KEOKH was the establishment of a network of internment camps in the late 1930s. Significantly, the sweeps also demonstrated the feasibility of the seemingly radical concept of deporting thousands of people on the spur of the moment.

The wartime expulsion program was set in motion by a "strictly confidential" decree issued by KEOKH on July 12, 1941. The order instructed commanders of the

main police stations across the country to register all “undesirable strangers and foreign citizens . . . [as they] are to be expelled from the country.”³⁸ The instructions were vague and did not clearly stipulate either the nationality (ethnicity) or religion of those to be registered. Subsequent memoranda were more pointed and direct in specifying the arrest of “Polish and Russian” Jews who lacked Hungarian citizenship and/or whose citizenship was in question, regardless of whether they had an approved residency permit. During the lead-up to the “relocations,” Hungarian authorities deceptively promised the intended transferees a “bright future,” with employment opportunities in agriculture and accommodations in abandoned villages and towns of the newly “liberated” territories. The instructions to the police commanders directed that these people be transferred from the recently annexed territories of the southern part of former Upper Hungary, Carpatho-Ruthenia, and Northern Transylvania, as well as from internment camps in Hungary proper and Budapest itself, by train to Körösmező (Yasinia), a small town in the Carpathian Mountains along the former Ukrainian border.³⁹ From this collection point, the Hungarian military transferred them to various locations across southeastern Galicia, leaving them at the mercy of Ukrainian militias and German SS companies.

In reality, KEOKH did not introduce the idea of mass relocations, but rather provided a framework and an official stamp of approval for them. The germination of a scheme for an ambitious and audacious population transfer was conceived far away



Hungarian military personnel and gendarmes (one with rifle) oversee the deportation of Jews from Körösmező, Carpatho-Ruthenia, 1941. Courtesy of Memorial de la Shoah.

from Budapest, in Carpatho-Ruthenia (modern Transcarpathia in Ukraine). Located on the eastern periphery of Hungary, the region was home to a patchwork of ethnicities and religions in which Hungarians constituted only a minority. It had a large, very poor Jewish population that was deeply religious and not fully assimilated—at least in comparison with their co-religionists in Budapest. Contemporary census data put the percentage of Jews in the general population of this area at around 14.2 percent—much higher than the 5 percent in Hungary proper. Also, this province and adjacent counties in Northern Transylvania made up perhaps the most economically backward and impoverished region of Hungary.

Before KEOKH issued its July 12 directive, the government commissioner for Carpatho-Ruthenia, Miklós Kozma, had made an almost unilateral resolution to “cleanse” the province of Jews. Horthy had appointed Kozma to the post as his plenipotentiary in 1940, giving him power to make decisions outside the normal governmental channels.⁴⁰ The government commissioner had drafted plans for the deportations even before KEOKH issued its first official decree on the matter. The string of pronouncements he issued in early 1941 reflected the prevailing views held by a majority of the ruling class regarding the “foreign” Jews: in a letter about the Jewish population of his province, he mused: “We would be happy if we could force them to emigrate, but presently this is impossible.”⁴¹ The remedy for the endemic mismanagement of the economy, and the subsequent deepening of the region’s poverty, as the Office of the Government Commissioner saw it, lay in the resolution of the perennial “Jewish Question.” In more precise terms, Kozma advocated the transfer of economic resources from the Jewish community, the only middle class in the region, to the Hungarian-Christian segment of the population. In the last few days of June 1941, he announced: “We will see in the future a definite improvement because those groups that are not comfortable due to political or racial reasons in Carpatho-Ruthenia will have the opportunity to return soon to places where they could entertain hopes for a better existence and find a homeland more suitable to their allegiance.”⁴² In hindsight, it appears that these words were clear warning of the impending deportation of Jews.

The military onslaught against the Soviet Union and the rapid conquest of Galicia suddenly opened a window of opportunity for the transfer of these “undesirable elements.” In light of the flurry of communications and meetings in June 1941, it seems likely that Hungarian military and political leaders were aware of the impending German attack and grasped its usefulness for solving Carpatho-Ruthenia’s “Jewish Problem.” As early as June 7, Kozma communicated his views about the urgency of the expulsion to the prime minister. His increased activity is also reflected in a series of follow-up meetings he held with the minister of the interior on June 10, the prime minister on June 14, and Miklós Horthy on June 21.

Kozma signaled the opening of the implementation phase of the deportation in unambiguous terms on July 10, 1941, when he presented the impending removal to

the prime minister as a *fait accompli*: “Next week I will put across the border non-Hungarian citizens, Galician refugees, conspicuous Ukrainian agitators, and Gypsies. I have consulted on the details with [Minister of National Defense Károly] Bartha, Lt. Gen. [Ferenc] Szombathelyi [commander of the Carpathian Group], and the commander of the army corps in Debrecen.”⁴³ Perhaps not coincidentally, this was also the day that the Hungarian military occupied Kamenets-Podolsk. A subsequent memo from Kozma, dated July 12, 1941, provides instructions for the handling of property left by the deported Jews, and already speaks of them in the past tense.⁴⁴

The surviving documentation on cooperation between the government commissioner and Hungarian military authorities in the deportation is not extensive; even so, there can be little doubt that the military leadership was deeply involved in both the planning and the implementation. As early as July 7, 1941, Army Chief of Staff Colonel General Henrik Werth instructed Lt. General Szombathelyi to communicate with the office of the Government Commissioner for Carpatho-Ruthenia about operational details. That the chief of staff was privy to the unfolding plans for deportation can also be gleaned from a July 9 directive to the Carpathian Group. Transmitted by Lt. Gen. László Dezső, one of the most staunchly pro-Nazi officers on the General Staff, it recommends “the expansion of [the corps’] military control of the occupied territory for the maximum possible length of time for the transport of captured military hardware, food, gasoline, and rubber as fast as possible and, also, for the transfer of undesirable populations such as Jews and Ukrainians.”⁴⁵

Strong anti-Jewish sentiment pervaded the civil service across the eastern counties as well: local officials undertook initiatives for forced or voluntary relocation as early as the fall of 1940.⁴⁶ These actions were rather limited in comparison to the planned expulsion carried out in the summer of 1941. However, during that summer, even prior to the KEOKH decree, we find evidence of independent attempts by regional officials to promote “voluntary” emigration from the eastern border region. On July 8, 1941, the sub-prefect (*alispán*) of Máramaros County in Northern Transylvania, Dr. Gábor Ajtay, issued a statement urging local residents to return to their birthplace [Galicia], where they could earn a living in agriculture. To complete this rosy picture, the sub-prefect also noted that assistance would be forthcoming:

Strictest enforcement of the anti-Jewish laws, which will commence shortly, will endanger the economic basis of the local Jews. Due to the fact that a large part of Galicia is occupied by the Hungarian army, I urge the Jewish residents of the district, especially those who would like to relocate to Galicia, to fill out the proper forms with the authorities appointed for this purpose. . . . I want to point out to all those interested in this idea that the relocation will be centrally organized and carried out, this being made possible by virtue of the fact that most of the population of the captured territories has either retreated with the Russians or were exiled by them. Therefore no great difficulties are to be anticipated in relocating the Jews to a new life. The welfare of the Jews themselves

dictates their putting an end to their anchorless status in the district, by giving it up and opening a new life on Galician territory, with the aid of the authorities.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, the sub-prefect did not specify the type of assistance or who would provide it. But, based on the timing and content of this and similar announcements, it seems likely that Gábor Ajtay and other mid-level officials in the border region had received an advance notice directly from the government commissioner calling for the removal of Jews from the periphery. However, these officials were neither sufficiently empowered nor capable on their own of implementing independent policy for such a large-scale expulsion.

The original documents and scholarly works strongly suggest that Government Commissioner for Carpatho-Ruthenia Miklós Kozma initiated the deportation. He received logistical assistance and, more important, “governmental legitimacy” through directives and decrees issued by KEOKH. It seems highly plausible that KEOKH, in turn, broadened the scope of the expulsion by taking advantage of the impending opportunity to add thousands of Jewish refugees from internment camps as well as residents of Budapest itself to the number of deportees. It is difficult to say whether this “demographic expansion” was pre-planned or was the result of a KEOKH decision on the spur of the moment. No surviving documents shed light on this thorny question. We do know, however, that the deportation from Carpatho-Ruthenia started before or around July 12, and that the emptying of internment camps took place around July 23—a lag of more than ten days. On the other hand, the removal of Jews directly from Budapest occurred only in early August.⁴⁸

The question of how much the highest echelons of the Hungarian government knew or approved of this scheme might seem to be moot, but historical judgment is called for. No “official” removal order by the Council of Ministers has surfaced. Again, we have to rely on Kozma’s sparse notes from a meeting with the Council of Ministers on June 16, 1941, in which the only thing that remained to be resolved was the financial arrangements for the deportation.⁴⁹ An admission by the minister of the interior, Ferenc Keresztes Fischer, during a parliamentary debate adds another piece to this puzzle. On November 26, 1941, Fischer publicly assumed responsibility for the deportation, stating: “As soon as our troops advanced in Galicia sufficiently to transfer Jews there, I issued an order for the Galician Jews . . . to be transferred to their native land.”⁵⁰ Whether this declaration was political posturing or an admission of responsibility from a relatively moderate politician, who also singlehandedly halted the deportation on August 8, 1941, may not be relevant. We are able to reconstruct, though, a relatively coherent picture from contemporary documents and trial testimonies after the war. They provide convincing evidence that governmental authorities at the highest levels were aware of and approved the deportation. American diplomatic documents, for example, show that the prime minister knew about and was aware of the fate of the deported. Mária Ormos’ finely crafted account, based on Kozma’s

notes, supports the government commissioner's claim that he was instrumental in moving the idea of expulsion forward. At the same time, it underlines governmental complicity in this action.⁵¹

Implementation of an Idea

Speed and efficiency in arresting, transporting, and concentrating the Jews from all across the southern part of former Upper Hungary, Carpatho-Ruthenia, Northern Transylvania, Hungary proper, and Budapest itself demanded close cooperation between civilian authorities, military forces, and various branches of law enforcement. On the local and "operational" level, execution of the plan translated into brutal and often capricious actions, in clear contravention of Hungarian law and international conventions. This infringement is easily discernable in the demographics of the persons swept up in this dragnet. The group included Jews whose families had lived in Hungary for generations but had not obtained citizenship, Jews whose citizenship approval was in process, stateless refugees from various countries overrun by Nazi Germany, and even Jews who were full Hungarian citizens. Finally, a sizeable number of Christians were deported with their Jewish spouses or parents.⁵²

We learn from American diplomatic despatches that the emptying of various internment camps in Hungary proper began on July 23rd, and involved refugees from Poland, Austria, Germany, the Czech Protectorate, and even France. Most of these Jews had come from countries that had ceased to exist as independent states. The American ambassador pointed out to the Hungarian prime-minister in no uncertain terms that their transfer conflicted with international law: "The deportation decree was extended to Jewish refugees from Germany, Vienna, and Prague [and] this would appear to be a distinct violation of the right for asylum which is generally granted by sovereign countries to refugees."⁵³ An equally vexing issue, about which we have little information, is the fate of the many non-Jewish family members, among them spouses and children, who accompanied their Jewish loved ones to Galicia.

While KEOKH provided lists of potential deportees, local authorities, as well as the military, interpreted the directive as they saw fit. This inconsistency not only reveals the weakness in lines of authority and communication between the leadership of the country and second-tier administrators, but also points to high levels of corruption. The story of Gabriel Drimer, who was arrested in Dombó in Carpatho-Ruthenia, exposes the arbitrariness with which local lists were compiled. Drimer's family was put on the list of deportees at the request of a Christian family who coveted the family's successful bakery. Only by the intervention of a sympathetic deputy police prefect, who removed them from the list, were they able to stay in Dombó—if only for the short term.⁵⁴

Even more poignant was the fact that the expulsion included a large number of people who possessed Hungarian citizenship, and/or had served their country with distinction during World War I. The testimony of a survivor whose father presented

his medal of heroism with accompanying documents to the commandant of the Körösmező transit camp is instructive. With the documents in hand, the Jewish World War I veteran appealed to the commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Orbán. Orbán responded: “The Royal Hungarian Army has no need for a dirty Jew,” and tore up the documents in front of the shocked family. The eyewitness, a young girl at the time of the incident, saw her father “visibly shrink from the power of these words. . . . His whole world was collapsing around him.” Her father died in Galicia soon after this encounter.⁵⁵

Even if we discount, for a moment, the virulent antisemitism within the upper echelons of the military, we can say that the 1941 actions were characterized by incompetence, a lack of oversight, inadequate advance planning, and a large degree of brutality. While there were some minor variations, archival sources and testimonies paint a uniform picture of the methods of collection and transportation of Jews across the border. The testimony of Albert Fein, a survivor from Munkács, conveys the general outlines of the harrowing experience. It began with a knock on the door at five o’clock in the morning. Deportees were given half an hour to pack a suitcase, and were allowed to take with them only 30 pengő (\$6 USD).⁵⁶ The hasty departures made it impossible for those affected to obtain care for animals left behind, or to give a house key to a family member or a friend. While authorities in some localities issued regulations concerning the distribution of the property of the dispossessed, in reality what occurred was uncontrolled plunder. Another deportee, 12-year-old Marion Samuel from Dúlháza in the southern part of former Upper Hungary, provided an additional, more personal dimension to this tragedy. As her family was led away to the train station, some Christian neighbors, whose daughter was a close friend of Marion’s, unashamedly inquired if they could take the latter’s bedroom furniture.⁵⁷

The transfer process itself was just as traumatic. According to some Hungarian and German estimates, the Royal Hungarian Army, with the help of the Gendarmerie, removed approximately one thousand persons per day. The American ambassador put the number of expellees at two thousand a day. Contemporary accounts and survivors’ testimonies paint a picture of confusion, carelessness, and lack of direction. Exacerbating the situation was the attitude of the soldiers, not to mention that of the feared Gendarmerie. Both groups were accused of robbing the deportees of their valuables either at the departure point or upon arrival at some obscure location in Galicia. Survivor Moshe Deutsch recalls that upon his transport’s arrival in Kamenets-Podolsk the accompanying gendarmes “commanded us to raise our hands as they searched our pockets and robbed us of our money, coins, and watches.” The destinations of relocations were indeed obscure; in almost all instances, the decision was left in the hands of commanding officers or even low-ranking soldiers. Groups were left in fields, forests, or villages and told “anyone who dares to turn back will receive a bullet to his head.”⁵⁸ A member of a motorized company, upon meeting a group of deportees in Skala, remarked that the Jews were dumped alongside the road “because no direction or

instructions had been provided for the trucks, and the soldiers got tired of transporting them. . . . The only thing remaining for them is the ditch by the road. At last this tolerated them.”⁵⁹ As the only survivor from a large family deported from Uglya, a small village in Carpatho-Ruthenia, a young boy recalled the bewilderment of hundreds of people upon being unceremoniously deserted on a road next to a forest late in the evening. The military trucks simply turned around and left the Jews to their own fate. This fate was not pretty: the deportees marched forward without any discernable destination, and were at every moment vulnerable to attacks by the armed Ukrainian militias roaming the countryside. These militias, springing up during the first chaotic weeks of the occupation, perpetrated unspeakable horrors on the deportees—including robbery, rape, and murder—that challenged the imagination of even seasoned military men.⁶⁰ The expellees’ route led through side roads and forests, with stops in Thuste (Tovste), Borszczów (Borshchiv), Skala, Orynyn, all the way to Tarnopol (Ternopil’), then back to Orynyn. When the expellees arrived, an SS detachment machine-gunned the entire group of several hundred Jews in a field, killing all save several youngsters—among them the eyewitness—who were able to run away.⁶¹

Yizker-bikher, or memorial books, also describe the trials of the deportees. The arrival of a group in Stanyslaviv is described by a resident of the city: “The refugees were in a dreadful situation: broken, worn-out, frail, hungry, ill, and destitute, since they had been plundered en route by the Hungarian and Ukrainian population.” A Jewish country doctor from Thuste, who was trusted and somewhat protected by the Ukrainian population, encountered in a small village “300 Hungarian Jews—women, children, and elderly people.” The group was facing an agitated peasant population, but the doctor was able to prevent an escalation of the conflict into violence. In sorting out the situation, the doctor learned that “Hungarian soldiers [had] unloaded the Jews in the village, told them that it was theirs—houses, fields, and all—and left in gales of laughter.”⁶²

As often is the case with Hungarian state and military policies during the war years, official Hungarian approaches to local Jewish communities in Galicia as well as to the deportees were rife with contradictions. On the one hand, the Hungarian General Staff, and especially its chief, Colonel-General Henrik Werth—one of the architects of the deportation—were by all signs staunchly pro-Nazi and antisemitic. Werth’s successor, Colonel General Ferenc Szombathelyi, later said of the General Staff: “[It] was Nazi-oriented to its core in its political outlook. . . . High-ranking officers and generals around me were in every respect pro-German.”⁶³ We know from surviving correspondence that by August 19, 1941, Werth had contacted the regent (Horthy) directly, bypassing even the prime minister. He advocated the exploitation of the military situation to implement an action much more comprehensive than the Galicia deportation: the transfer of all non-Hungarian persons, singling out “Romanians, Ukrainians, and the entire Jewish community.”⁶⁴ It was by all measures an ambitious proposal, aiming to displace nearly eight million people.

On the other hand, Hungarian troops on the ground played a much more nuanced role. In some instances they became involved in the process of murder; in others, they protected Hungarian expellees from marauding Ukrainian militias.⁶⁵ Overall, the six weeks of Hungarian rule over a large area of south and east Galicia provided a sense of security for local Jewish communities in the face of the rampant anti-Jewish sentiments and violent tendencies of the local population. This was in stark opposition to German policies that encouraged anti-Jewish pogroms under their jurisdiction. Native Jews, remembering nostalgically the benign Habsburg period, viewed the entrance of the Hungarian soldiers with relief. A Galician survivor from Kolomyia recalls an almost idyllic moment of the Hungarian occupation: “one beautiful summer evening, soldiers and officers were sitting on the lawn around bonfires. . . . One soldier picked up a violin and began to play a hauntingly sad melody. . . . From the balcony where I was standing, I could see men crying. Tears began to run down my own cheeks.”⁶⁶ This charming scene was all too brief, however.

In fact, Hungarian actions at the local level often led to confrontations with German military personnel. German operational reports filtering back to military headquarters in Berlin, and also to the German Foreign Office, reflect this. In some reports, the Hungarian army is depicted as outrightly “pro-Jewish.” A July 15, 1941 report to Berlin clearly pointed a finger at the Hungarian military, which, it claimed, “intervened immediately [when] actions against the Jews were carried out by the [Ukrainian] militia.”⁶⁷ A major point of conflict was the influx of thousands of Hungarian Jews whom the Hungarians had relocated over a four- to five-week period. An August 25, 1941 German operational situation report clearly indicates that there was an exchange of communications between the two sides over the return of the expelled Jews to Hungary. A Hungarian governmental memorandum, dated two months later, indirectly underscored this exchange by adding that deported Jews who had been able to return to Hungary could not be handed back across the border to the German-occupied side again, but should be interned in Hungarian camps.⁶⁸

Thus it appears that the deportation was neither coordinated with, nor approved by, the German military establishment or the political leadership in occupied Ukraine. The simultaneous expulsion of Romanian Jews in the southern sector, reaching all the way to Kamenets-Podolsk and farther north, further complicated German military planning.⁶⁹ This set the tone for some awkward encounters between the two allies. Almost simultaneously with the mass murder in Kamenets-Podolsk, a German operational report noted: “Members of the 10th Hungarian Pursuit Battalion have expelled more than 1,000 Hungarian Jews over the Dniester to Galicia. Einsatzgruppe Tarnopol promptly pushed them back.”⁷⁰ In fact, however, these Jews had not been allowed across the border into Hungary. The majority had ended up in towns close to the Carpathian Mountains, a circumstance that may have delayed their destruction. A Hungarian officer encountered these unfortunates in Tatarów, close to the border. On October 1941 he wrote in his diary that “as the Germans found these wandering

masses inconvenient, they drove them back to the line of the Carpathians.”⁷¹ In a similar vein, German officials often supplied the refugees, who were trying desperately to re-enter Hungary, with travel documents. They had two obvious motivations for doing so: they wished to be rid of this crowd of refugees, and in many cases they received bribes from the local Jewish community.

One of the immediate sticking points between the two allies concerned the Hungarians’ unwillingness to cooperate directly in the implementation of genocide—at least in their own sector of occupation. In Zhitomir, for instance, the Hungarian military put an end to an anti-Jewish action by a Ukrainian militia on July 15, 1941.⁷² A similar incident occurred at almost the same time, closer to the Hungarian border. After Ukrainians imprisoned a large group of Jews in the village of Richka, the Hungarian military commander “immediately had the Jews released. In response, the Ukrainians complained to the Germans that the Hungarians were supporting the Jews The upshot was that the Germans replaced the Hungarians with military police of their own.”⁷³

The experience of General Szombathelyi, commander of the invading Carpathian Group—and as of September, chief of staff—also sheds light on the convoluted relationships among the occupying Hungarians, the Poles, the Ukrainians, the Germans, and the Jews in the area. In his memoir, Szombathelyi cryptically remarked on his role in saving two hundred Jews from Kolomyia “who were to be executed, from the hands of the Gestapo, in spite of the vehement German protestation.”⁷⁴ This encounter, which appears to have taken place around July 15 or 16, 1941, soon became the material of legend among the Jews of southern Galicia. According to circulating stories, a Hungarian general stepped in to save Jews who were in the process of digging their own grave. The perpetrator of this aborted massacre, the above-mentioned SS-Obersturmführer Peter Leideritz, had been transferred from Stanyslaviv to Kolomyia just prior to this date for the explicit purpose of overseeing the extermination of the local Jews. In the words of a survivor from the area, in order to intimidate the local Jews, the Gestapo “gathered about 200 Jews and moved them to Diatkavche [another source identified it as Korolówka] near Kolomyia, where they were ordered to dig their own graves. As they did so, a Hungarian general happened to pass by. He questioned the German murderers, stopped the work, and sent the Jews back to Kolomyia, where they were released.”⁷⁵ Perhaps this incident can be explained as a territorial issue: the main headquarters of the Hungarian forces was located at this time in Kolomyia. Based on the recollections of officers on Szombathelyi’s staff, though, an element of compassion on the part of the Hungarian general is also discernible. In the diary of Pál Lieszkovszky, a subordinate of Szombathelyi’s, the wife of one of the victims “prostrated herself, embracing and kissing [Lieszkovszky’s] boots” and beseeching him to secure the group’s release. Upon hearing Lieszkovszky’s report, the general promptly dispatched a Hungarian detachment to see to the release of the prisoners.⁷⁶

In retrospect, it may seem implausible that a powerful Hungarian general would have interacted with an SS first lieutenant. But Peter Leideritz, the chief of the Security Police in Kolomyia, was no ordinary SS officer. Although he commanded a security detail of only twenty-five men in Kolomyia, augmented by a guard force of twenty Volksdeutsche and 100 Ukrainian militia members (Hilfspolizei or Hipo), he was empowered to borrow men from nearby border units as well as from Reserve Police Battalion 133, which had been involved in the murder of Jews in Stanyslaviv. Leideritz's genocidal activities targeted thousands of Hungarian deportees sheltered temporarily in towns and villages throughout southern Galicia. He lost no time in establishing himself as one of the most ruthless and competitive mass murderers of the time. He was also known for his policy of billing the various Jewish communities for the expenses involved in the ongoing slaughter of their people. After the mass killing of more than two thousand Jews in Horodenka, including the 400 Hungarian and Romanian deportees, "Leideritz went to the Jewish Council [Judenrat] and presented it with a bill for his expenses—gasoline, bullets, wear and tear on the cars, etc.—in the sizeable sum of 10,000 zlotys, payable within ten hours."⁷⁷

General Szombathelyi's actions are enlightening because they betray his genuine disagreement with the General Staff over the magnitude and rationale of the deportation. On July 14, he warned his superiors about the futility of the operation, especially in light of the fact that no consultative channels with the German military authorities had been opened.⁷⁸ As for the soldiers on the ground, responses were mixed. Officers occasionally extended protection against the marauding Ukrainian militias to the defenseless, wandering deportees. Yet, at the same time, we encounter in the chronicles of the occupation an official policy, at the highest levels, that promoted devastation. On September 23 and 27, 1941, the new commander of the Carpathian Group, Col. Ferenc Farkas, issued a series of orders forbidding military personnel to offer any assistance to the deportees. The prohibition included the transfer of letters and money between the refugees and their relatives in Hungary proper. More important to the Jews' fate, though, was a directive originating from the office of the chief of staff of the Carpathian Group aiming to prevent the smuggling of Jews back into Hungary with military and other official staff. The language here is even more uncompromising: "My order is to implement the strictest measures for the prevention of such practices and enact the most draconian punishments for those who are guilty of them."⁷⁹ The powerful language of this directive reflected the authorities' concern about what must have been a widespread phenomenon. Survivors' testimonies and postwar military court documents note that some Hungarians in the armed forces helped Jews, either for monetary gain, from humanitarian impulses, or both.⁸⁰

The "strictest measures" mentioned by the chief of staff included the executions of those who attempted to cross the border. Hungarian Jews who succeeded in re-entering Hungary or Galician Jews escaping from extermination in the ghettos of Galicia were routinely handed back to German authorities, who subsequently

executed them. In other cases, the Hungarian military transported them to Kolomyia. This policy did not spare non-Jews who had been deported with their Jewish spouses. A memorandum from the office of the government commissioner of Carpatho-Ruthenia, addressed to both the prime minister and the minister of the interior, laid out the official policy by stating that “the return of foreign citizens and their *Christian family members who left voluntarily with them* . . . is out of the question” (emphasis added).⁸¹ Survivor Albert Fein reports that, after escaping from the killing pits of Kamenets-Podolsk, he managed to return to Hungary with papers identifying him as a Christian. The papers were signed by both German and Hungarian military authorities; nevertheless, Fein was summarily expelled again and shipped back to Kolomyia.⁸²

To understand the inescapable ramifications of this policy, we need to review the situation on both sides of the border. Following repeated Hungarian requests, German security police reinforced the border area. Following the directive of his superior, SS-Obersturmbannführer (Col.) Helmut Tanzmann, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Krüger established several border police stations in Tatarów and at the Wyszaków Pass. At the same time, Tanzmann ordered that “all Galician Jews who had been captured by Hungarian border guards while attempting to flee, and were sent back over the border, should be shot.”⁸³

Can we conclude with any degree of confidence that the Royal Hungarian Army was involved in any systematic way in the extermination? Based on circumstantial evidence and the recollections of survivors, it seems that both the gendarmerie and military units joined the Germans in their random killings of Jews—on both sides of the border. Several sources independently report atrocities along the Dniester River: “large groups were driven into the Dniester to hasten their crossing the river. [This was instigated] by Hungarian soldiers who followed the orders of their officers. Only a few [of the Jews] succeeded [in crossing].” A Hungarian surnamed Simon, an officer of a sapper unit from the town of Győr, appears often in documents and in survivors’ testimonies as the initiator of these atrocities. The same sources also mention the hundreds of dead bodies of men, women, and children floating around the bridges of the Dniester.⁸⁴

Miklós Kozma, one of the architects of the 1941 round-up and mass removal, offered his “confession” to a confidant shortly before his death from a massive heart attack on November 7, 1941: “A million secrets out there. . . . During the nights, not every day, but the murdered bodies litter the forest. . . . The act itself is on our conscience. Do you understand? We are the ones who are killing them.”⁸⁵ The confession was not just a delusional declaration of guilt by an ill person near death, as Maria Ormos has suggested. Rather, it was an acknowledgement of the ongoing murders of Jews in Carpatho-Ruthenia. No one was better informed about events in the area than the government commissioner.

The question of Hungarian complicity in the murders of escapees on the Galician side of the border is somewhat more difficult to unravel. Because this area was a military zone, no civilian oversight could be exerted over the military and relatively little information filtered back to the civilian authorities inside Hungary. Nevertheless, through various clandestine channels, the fate of transported Hungarian Jews became well known in Budapest. Minister of the Interior Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, who had a reputation for personal decency, was informed directly by the representatives of major Hungarian Jewish organizations about the sufferings of the deportees, the hostile attitude of local Ukrainians at the various destinations, and the mass killings of Jews there.⁸⁶ His decision to halt some of the deportation actions on August 8, 1941 saved thousands of lives. Since he had no authority beyond the borders, this did not help those who were already in Galicia. Yet, as the minister of the interior, he was aware of the border situation and Tanzmann's directive. He acted decisively again in October 28, 1942 by forbidding Hungarian officials to hand over returning refugees, noting that "Jews put over to Galicia from Körösmező are usually shot by the occupying authorities."⁸⁷

From this cryptic comment, it is difficult to say who these "occupying authorities" were: Hungarian military forces positioned on the Galician side of the border also exercised control over the area. The statement of a Hungarian survivor may shed light on the issue. This young girl and her mother were captured by a Hungarian unit along with a group of escaped Galician Jews on the Hungarian side of the border. The Hungarians sent the whole group across the border, and imprisoned them there. The Galician Jews by that time had no illusions about their fate. However, the mother and daughter, upon overhearing the guards' detailed discussion in Hungarian about the impending execution of the entire group, were able to escape with the help of the Galician Jews.⁸⁸ We can only conjecture as to whether the latter were executed thereafter.

The voice of a simple soldier provides a perspective different from Kozma's or the young Jewish survivor's. Béla Somló, a member of the motorized battalion of the Carpathian Group, writing in his journal on July 23, 1941, stated that he was stunned by the sight of a haggard, exhausted, and pitiful group of Jews, most of them from Budapest, settling down along a ditch in a street in Skala. While the women tended to the children, the "men sat on the ground with vacant stares looking into the distance." A family with a 15-year-old daughter attracted his attention. The father, a furrier by trade, was born in Budapest and could speak only Hungarian. During the night, policemen loaded them onto trucks and, without provisions, transported them under military guard across Galicia. In recalling his conversations with them at that time, this Hungarian soldier reveals that he was profoundly affected: "Although I tried to forget, the most shocking moment was my meeting these Jews. . . . It is impossible to comprehend a reality that so clearly confounds human logic, human compassion, and our own humanity—our way of life." Upon meeting them three weeks later in Ivanovce,



Jewish deportees, Skala, July 23, 1941. Photographed by Béla Somló; courtesy Hadtörténelmi Levéltár (Hungarian Military Archives).

he wrote: “Our everyday conduct and actions have created an irreconcilable conflict with our innermost feelings . . . And in our minds, each one of us struggles with the silent question: If this can happen at home with our own families, what are we doing here?”⁸⁹

The Question of Responsibility

The musings of this young soldier are a fitting epilogue for this study: Béla Somló succinctly and powerfully captures the moral and ethical challenges of the deportation and the subsequent mass killings in 1941. With few exceptions, the Hungarian leadership appears not to have grappled with moral imperatives of this kind before embarking on their course of action. Their decisions cannot be explained away as reactions to German political pressure; by the same token, demographic and economic pressures, real or imagined, cannot justify the dispatch of 22,000 people to their deaths. The four thousand highly acculturated and assimilated Jews taken from Budapest and internment camps were the obvious minority within the displaced population. The majority of the victims, coming from Upper Hungary, Carpatho-Ruthenia, and Transylvania, while considered backward compared to their co-religionists from cosmopolitan Budapest, were perhaps the most “assimilable” group within Hungary’s ethnic *mélange* of Hungarians, Romanians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Germans, and Jews.

The majority of these Jews were solidly middle-class and urban. Moreover, as Nathaniel Katzburg comments: “Carpatho-Ruthenia was the only eastern region where a sizeable Jewish proletariat lived.”⁹⁰ Thus, countering the notion that Hungarian Jews outside Budapest resisted assimilation, contemporary statistics show that among all minorities, the Jews in the “periphery” were also the most ardent supporters of the government’s Magyarization drive. According to the 1941 census, they overwhelmingly identified themselves as Hungarians. Their children attended Hungarian schools in Carpatho-Ruthenia and elsewhere in much higher numbers than other minorities did. In spite of the acute backwardness and poverty of Carpatho-Ruthenia, they constituted an emerging and relatively well-educated middle-class.⁹¹

This picture starkly contrasted with the common perception of Hungarian Jews outside the capital as “backward and religiously deeply Orthodox”—a perception widespread among the ruling elite, a large segment of the general public, and even the assimilated Jewish community inside Hungary. Given the rapid rise of antisemitism in the political arena, some leaders may have seen the 1941 deportation as a politically expedient way to neutralize the extreme right wing. However, in trying to find a more comprehensive explanation we might also add to the complex socio-political context a strain of antisemitism that was fueled by economic opportunism. Since in Carpatho-Ruthenia the local Ruthenian population was mainly rural and extremely poor, the authorities could expropriate nothing from them other than land. The Jewish middle class was therefore a “ripe” target.⁹²

The 1941 deportation came on the heels of three pieces of anti-Jewish legislation, passed during the period 1938–1941, aimed to curtail, if not wholly eliminate, Jewish involvement in Hungarian economic life. Wishful thinking about an organized emigration from Carpatho-Ruthenia, voluntary or forced, was a common staple of the political discourse of the 1930s. By 1941 policy makers had come to the realization that with the closing of the borders all across Europe they could not provide a viable solution to the perennial “Jewish Question.” Thus, the mass expulsion of Jews in 1941 was based in part on an “economic” rationale and went hand-in-hand with full-scale plunder.⁹³ A meticulously drafted July 25, 1941 memorandum from the Office of the Government Commissioner of Carpatho-Ruthenia lends credence to this view. The memorandum lists the names of nearly 200 Jewish residents of the border region of southern Carpatho-Ruthenia who were to be deported. Not surprisingly, the list dispenses entirely with the pretext of deporting alien, stateless persons, or “Polish or Russian Jews,” containing only affluent merchants and manufacturers. The memo promulgates complete removal of the Jews from the region, making it a “Jew-free” zone. The document’s author does not bother to hide his underlying motives and rationale for cleansing the region: “We have to expel the repugnant Jews who only exploit visitors to this area We need to get rid of the parasitic Jews so that all

economic benefits and opportunities of this border region could be transferred into the hands of Christians.”⁹⁴

As far as we know, neither Government Commissioner Kozma, nor Chief of Staff Werth, nor pro-German Prime Minister László Bárdossy, nor anyone else in the Hungarian political or military leadership engaged in the kind of reflection that the young soldier Béla Somló did. During his trial after the war, Bárdossy accepted responsibility for the 1941 deportation, but refused to recognize any further culpability. In some way this underlines Ambassador Pell’s assessment of the prime minister. In a report to the British ambassador in Lisbon, he characterized Bárdossy as a “very cultivated man with a great deal of diplomatic experience but extremely weak.”⁹⁵ We may interject, of course, that Bárdossy’s guilt did not lie in his acquiescence in the deportation of thousands with unforeseeable consequences. The expulsion was obviously politically driven and expedient, and even welcomed by the general public in the charged atmosphere of Hungary at that time. Rather, his culpability may be rooted in his awareness and eventual cover-up of the atrocities. The most damning point could be that, despite warnings by concerned observers, Jewish communal leaders, civic organizations, and even the American ambassador (to whom he lied outright), he gave his unambiguous endorsement to policies that led to atrocities—right up to his dismissal in March 1942.

Obviously, this was not a case of mere criminal incompetence. Again, Gen. Ferenc Szombathelyi’s sobering comments to the General Staff about the “Jewish Question” come to mind. His words, drafted in August 1941, reflect his ambivalence toward deportation and murder: “We achieved much more much earlier than the Germans [in terms of “Jewish policies”], but because we tried to emulate them, we did everything more idiotically. They drained the Jews, dispossessed them, while we want to beat them to death. . . .”⁹⁶

By all accounts, Szombathelyi was a competent professional soldier and not an antisemite. His ambivalence, though, prompts the question as to how so many people could have convinced themselves of the necessity of these actions with all their terrible consequences. This does not absolve him or anyone else in the leadership of accountability; his words also reveal that while many individuals had objections or reservations along this road to murder, in the end they implicated themselves in the crime of having served in a dysfunctional and morally corrupt regime.

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Notes

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1. Figure cited in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's *Holocaust Encyclopedia*, available online at <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007314> (accessed June 26, 2013).
2. Hungary annexed territories of the southern provinces of former Northern Hungary, Carpatho-Ruthenia, and Northern Transylvania (Erdély) between 1938 and 1941. Galicia is a historical region within Eastern Europe that presently straddles the Polish-Ukrainian border east of the Carpathian Mountains. Named after the medieval city of Halych, the area of *Galicia* was first mentioned in 1206 in a Hungarian historical chronicle. Galicia was controlled prior to 1918 by Austria-Hungary, between the two world wars by Poland, and briefly (in the eastern part of the province) by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941. Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
3. Arthur Geyer, "Az első magyarországi deportálás," *Új Élet Naptár*, (1960–1961): 75–82
4. Tamás Majsai, "A körösmezei zsidódeportálás 1941-ben," in *Ráday Gyűjtemény Évkönyve*, (1984–85), 4:59–86, 5:195–237.
5. Randolph L. Braham, "The Kamenets-Podolsk and Délvidék Massacre: Prelude to the Holocaust in Hungary," *Yad Vashem Studies* 9 (1973): 133–56.
6. Klaus-Michael Mallmann, "Der qualitative Sprung im Vernichtungsprozess: Der Massaker von Kamenetz-Podolsk Ende August 1941," *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung* 10 (2001): 239–64.
7. Zoltán Szirtes, "Temetetlen halottaink, 1941: Körösmező, Kamenyec Podolszk" (Budapest: Kopint-Datorg, 1996).
8. Judit Fejes, "Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941," in *The Holocaust in Hungary: Fifty Years Later*, ed. Randolph L. Braham and Attila Pók (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 306–27; Mária Ormos, *Egy Magyar Médiavezér: Kozma Miklós* (Budapest: Polgár, 2000).
9. Kinga Frojimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger in a Strange Land* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2007).

10. Richard Breitman, *Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned, What the British and Americans Knew* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 63–65.
11. Romanian authorities were reluctant to expel Jews from historical “Old Romania” but were less hesitant to do so in the newly re-conquered areas of Bukovina and Bessarabia. It is also noteworthy that the Hungarian and Romanian expulsions preceded the mass deportation of German Jews to the Eastern territories by several months.
12. Herbert C. Pell, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, addressed the telegram directly to the secretary of state. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), roll 12, 840.48, Refugees/2644. See also Pell’s communication with Cordell Hull about the deportations, “Expulsion of Jews from Subcarpathia,” August 7, 1941. Herbert Pell Papers, reel 8, no. 111/0029. The British secret service was able to decode the direct communications between Friedrich Jeckeln, who orchestrated the murder, and Heinrich Himmler, his direct superior. See Breitman, *Official Secrets*, 63–65; Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933–1945* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 150–51; and “Slaying of Jews in Galicia Depicted,” *New York Times*, October 26, 1941.
13. Father Patrick Desbois, *The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
14. Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
15. This Hungarian action pales in comparison to the enormity of Romanian atrocities, which involved the expulsion of hundreds of thousands from Bukovina and Bessarabia to Transnistria, and the brutal slaughter of tens of thousands of these, together with Ukrainian Jews, during the early years of the war.
16. Concern about the influx of Eastern Jews (*Ostjuden*) was voiced by Hungarian statesmen such as Count István Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth as early as the mid-nineteenth century. Nathaniel Katzburg, *Anti-Semitism in Hungary* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1969), 24–28, 30–32.
17. Speech by Count Kunó Klebelsberg (1875–1932), minister of education and religion in 1926. Lajos Szabolcsi, “Két emberöltő: Az Egyenlőség évtizedei (1881–1931),” in *Emlékezések, dokumentumok* (Budapest: MTA Judaisztikai Kutatócsoport, 1993), 376. See also Krisztián Ungváry, “Kitelepítés, lakosságcsere és a holokauszt egyes összefüggései,” in *A holokauszt Magyarországon európai perspektívában*, ed. Judit Molnár (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2005), 84–99.
18. Public Debate on December 3, 1940, quoted in Nathaniel Katzburg, *Zsidó Politika Magyarországon, 1919–1943* (Budapest: Bábel, 2002), 269. Teleki committed suicide on April 3, 1941, in protest against Hungary’s participation in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia.
19. The debate took place on April 17, 1939. Quoted in Katzburg, *Zsidó Politika*, 123–24. An assessment of how this was received among the public can be found in the recollection of Natan Blum, “Girush Yehudim netulai-ezrahut m’Hungaria l’Galicia b’shnat 1941,” *Yalkut Moreshet*, 43–44 (1987): 42.
20. Eniko A. Sajti, *Impériumváltások, revízió, kisebbség: Magyarok a Délvidéken, 1918–1947* (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 2004), 190–98. Aleksandar Kasas: *Madari u Vojvodini 1941–1946*, (Novi Sad: Filozofski Fakultet u Novom Sadu, 1996), 39. The expulsion of Serbs and Jews from Croatia was implemented by the Ustaša—the Croatian Revolutionary Movement.

21. Christopher R. Browning with contributions by Jürgen Matthäus, *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 291; see also Andrej Angrick, “The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy after the Attack on the Soviet Union, June 22, 1941,” *Yad Vashem Studies* 26 (1998): 218; and Albert Fein’s testimony of February 19, 2005, Voice/Vision: Holocaust Survivor Oral History Archive, University of Michigan-Dearborn.
22. My own family (G.E.) learned from a Hungarian soldier the precise details of the final fate of my two uncles. See also Éva Gábor, “Személyes Emlékek 70 Év Multán,” unpublished manuscript presented at a conference commemorating the 70th anniversary of the ‘Körösmezo-Kameniec-Podolsky’ Deportations, Budapest, John Wesley Theological College (JWTC), 12–13th October, 2011. See also “Testimony of Dezső Weiser,” *Hadtörténelmi Irattár és Levéltár* (Hungarian Military Archives, HIL), *Tanulmányok Gyűjteménye* (TGY, Collection of Essays), 2962. The American embassy, and the American press, were well informed about the tragic events taking place in Galicia. László Karsai, “1941: Augusztus 27–28,” *Élet és Irodalom* (September 11, 2009): 1–7; Christopher R. Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland, 1940–43* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), 73.
23. See the Operational Situation Report, USSR #80, reproduced in Yitzhak Arad, et al., eds., *The Einsatzgruppen Reports* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989), 129. Jeckeln was tried and executed in Riga in 1946 for crimes committed during the destruction of Latvian Jewry. At the time, the tribunal did not know about his role in the Kamenets-Podolsk massacre and others across Galicia. See G.H. Bennett, “Exploring the World of the Second- and Third-Tier Men in the Holocaust: The Interrogation of Friedrich Jeckeln, Engineer and Executioner,” *Liverpool Law Review* 32 (2011): 1–18.
24. Cited in B.F. Sabrin, ed. *Alliance for Murder: The Nazi-Ukrainian Nationalist Partnership in Genocide* (New York: Sarpedon, 1991), 278–79.
25. Conversations with Branislava Antonovna Kanarchuk, a 78-year-old whom I (G.E.) met next to the mass grave, where she was selling flowers (April 28, 2008; subsequently September 6, 2012 in Kamenets-Podolsk).
26. Tsvi Zelikovits Testimony, USC Shoah Foundation Oral History Archives #19436; Moshe Deutsch, “The Ghetto in Kaminitz-Podolsk,” in *Kaminitz-Podolsk & Its Environs*, ed. Abraham Rosen et al. (Tel Aviv: Organisation of Emigrants from Kaminitz-Podolsk and its Environs, 1965), 65–69; *Naziskiy Okupatsiyniy Regime na Hmelnitziny 1941–1944: Dokumenty i Materiali* (Kamenets Podolsk: Oyum, 2009), 201–203.
27. See Dieter Pohl, “Hans Krueger and the Murder of the Jews in the Stanisławów Region (Galicia),” *Yad Vashem Studies* 26 (1998): 249–50. Krüger also established a similar unit recruited from among Romanian Volksdeutsche.
28. “Stanislawów” *Pinkas Hakehillot Polin* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1989), 368–76. See also www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinkas_poland/pol2_00359.html (accessed May 17, 2013).
29. Robin O’Neil, “Belzec (Bełżec, Poland)” www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/belzec/bel004.html#n024 (accessed May 17, 2013); ed. Yeshayahu Austri-Dunn, ed., *Sefer Czortkov* (Memorial Book of Czortkow) (Tel Aviv: Irgun Yotzey Czortkow, 1967), 18–19.

30. A Kolomyia memorial book, *Sefer zikaron l'kehilat Kolomyia v'hasevivah*, ed. Dov Noy and Mordechai Shutzman (Tel Aviv: The Community of Kolomyia, 1972), 284, refers to the mass murder of foreign nationals, including more than two thousand Hungarian, Austrian, Czech, Slovak, and German Jews, presumably expelled from Hungary, between March 9 and March 16, 1942. Pnina Kaufman Blum describes her escape on the day of mass extermination of foreign nationals in Czortków in *Paamjim B'Shoah*. (Ra'anana: Docostory, 2006), 51–2.
31. Ámon Pásztóy to László Bárdossy, Sep. 16, 1941, Országos Levéltár (OL, Hungarian National Archives), K774–1941, 14.500/1941. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Miklós Kozma as the Government Commissioner for Carpatho-Ruthenia. Pásztóy was tried in a Hungarian court and executed in 1949.
32. Pohl, “Hans Krueger,” 11–12.
33. Israel Carmi, ed., *Sefer Nadworna* (Tel Aviv: Nadworna Community in Israel and America, 1975), 21.
34. See Jehoschua Gertner and Danek Gertner, *Home Is No More: The Destruction of the Jews of Kosov and Zabie*. (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2000), 86, 113; and Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution*, 349–50. See the testimony of Leslie Gordon during the trial of Adolf Eichmann, June 1, 1961, on the massacre of Hungarian Jews in Buczacz, available through the Nizkor Project: www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-062-04.html (accessed May 20, 2013).
35. Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution*, 352.
36. Frojimovics presents an excellent summation of the history, function, and policies of KEOKH in *I Have Been a Stranger in a Strange Land*, 23–33. See also Tamás Kovács' overview of the structure and place of the organization within the Ministry of the Interior in “A Belügyminisztérium Rendészeti és Karhatalmi Feladatai 1920 és 1944 Között,” in *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények*, vol. 10 (Pécs, 2009) available at www.pecshor.hu/periodika/2009/kovacs.pdf (accessed May 20, 2013).
37. On Horthy's authority as regent, see Lóránt Tilkovszky, “A zsidótörvények,” in Braham and Pók, *The Holocaust in Hungary: Fifty Years Later*, 123.
38. This decree for the registration of individuals whose citizenship was in question was issued on July 12, 1941. “Az ország területének elhagyására kötelezett külhonosok összeírása,” OL, 192/res/1941.VII/b. BM. L 149, file no. 107.
39. Carpatho-Ruthenia was incorporated into Hungary in 1939 as a semi-autonomous region and was administered by an appointed commissioner. While there are many variations for the name of this sliver of land sandwiched between Hungary and the Ukraine (now in modern-day Ukraine), the term Carpatho-Ruthenia is generally accepted.
40. “Government Commissioner” is not an exact translation for the Hungarian title Kormányzói Biztos. Kozma was appointed directly by Miklós Horthy as his Special Representative, governing the region largely independently and reporting directly to the regent. One detail that is crucial to our understanding of Kozma's decision-making is that he was the minister of interior during the period 1935–1937, when Jews who could not satisfactorily prove Hungarian citizenship were the targets of raids and arrests.

41. Miklós Kozma's note to Feilitsch Bertold at the beginning of 1941, OL, Record Group K 429, 36. cs., file 830, quoted in Mária Ormos, *Egy Magyar Médiavezér: Kozma Miklós* (Budapest: Polgár, 2000), 737.
42. Csilla Fedinec, *A Kárpátaljai Magyarország Történeti Kronológiája, 1918–1944* (Dunaszerdahely: Forum, 2002), 377.
43. Entry from Kozma's journal, OL, RG K 429, 38. file. 1653. sz., quoted in Ormos, *Egy Magyar Médiavezér*, 758.
44. The most comprehensive account of the deportation is Judit Fejes' article "On the History of Deportations from Carpatho-Ruthenia in 1941," in Braham and Pók, *The Holocaust in Hungary*, 311. See also Documents of Carpatho-Ruthenian Government Commissioner's Office, OL, Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztosának Hivatala, 646/41/elh. K774, file no. 1.
45. Directive from the chief of staff to the Carpathian Corps, July 9, 1941, Records of the Magyar Királyi Gyorshadtest, Kárpát Csoport (Royal Hungarian Carpathian Rapid Combat Group, HIL), box 1. Frojzimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger*, 104–107; Ormos, *Egy Magyar Médiavezér*, 753–67; Lt. Gen. László Dezső was executed on June 8, 1949 by the Hungarian government.
46. Col. Elemér Éder, commander of the city of Csíkszereda in Transylvania, arrested twenty-four Jewish families on November 8, 1940. Subsequently, the group was sent to the Romanian border. After Romanian authorities refused them, Hungarian authorities deported them to the Soviet Union. This arbitrary action was halted finally by the Ministry of Defense, which ordered the release of the remaining detainees. See Tamás Majsai, "The Deportation of Jews from Csíkszereda and Margit Slachta's Intervention on Their Behalf," in *Studies on the Holocaust in Hungary*, ed. Randolph L. Braham (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1990), 113–63.
47. Appeal by Dr. Gábor Ajtay, sub-prefect of Máramaros County in Northern Transylvania, to local Jewish residents. Cited in Fedinec, *A Kárpátaljai Magyarország*, 378. See also *Sefer Marmarosh: Me'a ve-shishim kehilot kedoshot be-yishuvan u-ve-hurbanan*, ed. S.Y. Gross and Y. Yosef Cohen, 2nd ed. (Tel Aviv: Beit Marmaros, 1996 [1983]), 93–112.
48. Testimony of László Zobel, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, #51784. Also, personal interview with László Zobel, September 22, 2012.
49. OL, K 429, 38. cs., file 1684. Quoted in Ormos, *Egy Magyar Médiavezér*, 757.
50. Records of the Hungarian National Assembly, *Képviselőházi Napló*, 1939–1944, vol. 12, p. 62, quoted in László Karsai, *Holokausz* (Budapest: Pannonica Kiadó, 2001), 230.
51. László Karsai's pioneering article about the American ambassador's communications with Bárdossy and the U.S. State Department provides incontrovertible proof that the prime minister knew of the situation in Galicia. See "1941: Augusztus 27–28," *Élet és Irodalom* (September 11, 2009):1–7. See also Ormos, *Egy Magyar Médiavezér*, 757–59; and Tamás Majsai, "A Magyar Holocaust Első Felvonása," in *Holocaust Emlék Könyv* (Budapest: TEDISZ, 2003), 304.
52. Livia Rothkirchen, "Hungary: An Asylum for the Refugees of Europe," *Yad Vashem Studies* 7 (1968): 127–68.
53. The memorandum from the American envoy to the prime minister is located in OL, K 63 85.cs.10.t.10/7 4808/pol. 1941.

54. Testimony of Gabriel Drimer, USC Shoah Foundation, Oral History Archives #10860.
55. Testimony of Yaffa Rosenthal, USC Shoah Foundation, Oral History Archives #16308. We could not verify the identity of Lieutenant Colonel Orbán. However, his virulent antisemitism has been noted by several sources. See Fejes, *On the History of Deportations*, 309nn23, 26.
56. Albert Fein testimony (February 19, 2005), Voice/Vision Holocaust Survivor Oral History Archive, University of Michigan-Dearborn. The Hungarian currency, the pengő, was in circulation until 1945. Its estimated value is based on Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vági, *Self-Financing Genocide* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), 25–26.
57. Dúlháza is located in Slovakia, close to Kosice. Interview with Marion Samuel, USC Shoah Foundation, Visual History Archives #40972.
58. Deutsch, “The Ghetto in Kaminitz-Podolsk,” 66. Similar accounts emerge repeatedly in survivors’ testimonies. See, e.g., Albert Fein’s testimony.
59. Somló Béla File, HIL, TGY 2811. Dr. Béla Somló was a driver in the IV/2 Transport Company attached to the Rapid Deployment Force. Pictures he took of the deportees provide a most haunting testimony to their plight. Nearly ninety percent of the drivers in the Royal Hungarian Army were Jewish and served in regular uniform. Traveling relatively freely across Galicia, they relayed vital and timely information about the fate of the deportees and that of the Galician Jewish communities.
60. These paramilitary forces were later incorporated as Ukrainian Auxiliary Police units into a militia attached to the German military and security forces. See Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000); and Richard Breitman, “Himmler’s Police Auxiliaries in the Occupied Soviet Territories,” *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual* 7 (1990): 23–39.
61. The boy was able to escape through the Carpathian Mountains back into Hungary after two years of wandering across Galicia. Testimony of Tsvi Zelikovits, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archives #19436. See also Frojimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger*, 128–35. Testimonies of survivors collected by Deportáltakat Gondozó Országos Bizottság (National Committee for Attending Deportees–DEGOB), located in the Hungarian Jewish Museum and Archives (Magyar Zsidó Múzeum és Levéltár) provide a comprehensive account of the horror inflicted on the deportees. See also *Naziskiy Okupatsiyniy Regime*, 201–203.
62. “Stanisławów,” in *Pinkas Hakehillot Polin*, 370. Baruch Milch, *Can Heaven Be Void?* ed. Shosh Milch-Avigal (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003), 80–81.
63. Gyula Vargyai, *Magyarország a Második Világháborúban* (Budapest: Korona, 2001), 203. See Ungváry, “Kitelepítés, lakosságcsere és a holokauszt egyes összefüggései,” 94. Werth played a proactive and cardinal role in involving Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union.
64. This memorandum signaled the fall of Werth, who was dismissed on August 31, 1941. Karsai, *Holokauszt*, 228. See Pál Pritz, *The War Crimes Trial of Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy* (New York: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, Columbia University Press, 2004), 40. Miklós Horthy, *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai* (The Secret Papers of

Miklós Horthy), ed. Miklós Szinai and László Szücs (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1962), 302–307.

65. The experience of László Zobel, whose group was saved by a Hungarian detachment and later almost killed by a Hungarian commander, is instructive. See testimony of László Zobel, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archives #51784.

66. Mila Sandberg-Mesner, *Light from the Shadows* (Montreal: Polish-Jewish Heritage Foundation, 2005). See also Krisztián Ungváry, “Hungarian Occupation Forces in the Ukraine 1941–1942: Historiographical Context,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 20 (2007): 81–120.

67. Operational Situation Report, USSR #23, (July 15, 1941), in Arad, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 26. See also Christopher R. Browning, *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), 73; and Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds. *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2010), 132–33.

68. The October 28, 1941 memorandum was issued by the Minister of Interior and was directed toward the administrative personnel of KEOKH. OL, K 744 no. 1078, B. 1941. Despite this tenuous agreement, however, Hungarian authorities continued to expel returning refugees.

69. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Harper, 1959), 870. On Romanian policies relating to the Jews, see Jean Ancel, “The German-Romanian Relationship and the Final Solution,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 19, no. 2 (2005): 252–75; Angrick, “The Escalation of German-Rumanian Anti-Jewish Policy,” 203–38.

70. Operational Situation Report, USSR #66 (August 28, 1941), in Arad, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 112.

71. Diary of Alajos Alapi Salamon, “Katona Naplóm, Orosz Föld, 1941,” HIL, TGY 3212. Perhaps the best work to date on Hungarian soldiers’ recollections was written by Judit Pihurik: “Hungarian Soldiers and Jews on the Eastern Front, 1941–1943” *Yad Vashem Studies* 35, no. 2 (2007): 71–102.

72. Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 199, 518–20; See also Ronald Headland, *Messages of Murder: A Study of Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941–1943* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1992), 132.

73. Gertner, *Home Is No More*, 72–73. Similar accounts were recorded for towns and villages across Galicia. See also Headland, *Messages of Murder*, 132–33.

74. Peter Gosztonyi, ed., *Szombathelyi Ferenc Visszaemlékezése, 1945* (Budapest, Zrinyi Kiadó, 1990), 40.

75. Several accounts corroborate this story. See *Sefer zikaron l'kehilat Kolomyia v'hasevivah*, 275–76; *Ir u-metim: Zablutow ha-melea ve-ha-hareva* (Tel Aviv: Association of Former Residents of Zablutow, 1949); “Extermination of the Jews of Kolomyia and District,” available at www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/galicia/gal002.html (accessed May 20, 2013).

76. The entire episode was described in detail by Col. Pál Lieszkovszky in his diary, HIL, TGY 2833, quoted in József Kaló, “Szombathelyi Ferenc és a galíciai deportálás,” *Magyar Napló* 8 (2008): 29. Another Hungarian contemporary source differs significantly from Lieszkovszky in

the details of the rescue, but puts the number of the victims at forty. See Col. Endre Siegler HIL, TGY 3255.

77. Gernter, *Home Is No More*, 114. Browning, *The Origins of the Final Solution*, 349–50. See also *Sefer zikaron l'kehilat Kolomyia*. Leideritz disappeared briefly after the war, only to surface in Germany in 1946. He was then extradited to Poland, where he was hanged in 1948. His wife, who actively participated in the killings, was also convicted, and died in prison.

78. Kaló provides a well-balanced portrait of Ferenc Szombathelyi and his views about the deportation to Galicia in “Szombathelyi Ferenc és a galíciai deportálás,” 27–32.

79. The order was issued in the name of the chief of staff of the Carpathian Group to the Hungarian military authorities in Galicia, on September 15, 1941. HIL, Kárpát Csoport, box 2.

80. László Zobel's testimony about his accidental rescue by a Hungarian counter-intelligence agent in Kolomyia is a case in point. Shoah Foundation Visual History Archive, USC, #51784. Another survivor was rescued by two non-Jewish peasants from his village in Carpatho-Ruthenia, who smuggled him and his family across the border. Testimony by Frida Landau, Shoah Foundation Visual History Archives, USC, #43849. See also the court proceedings against Lieutenant Béla Deák, who faced court-martial for smuggling Mária Bartal and her son, both Christians, over the border on October 21, 1941. The author (GE) found this file in a box containing material about Kamenets-Podolsk, in the Holokauszt Emlékközpont, Archivum (Archives of the Holocaust Memorial Center) in Budapest.

81. Memorandum from Miklós Kozma to the prime minister and the minister of interior, September 10, 1941, OL, Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztosának Hivatala (Office of the Government Commissioner of Carpatho-Ruthenia), K774, 646/1941.eln.sz. file 1 This policy was formulated by Ámon Pásztóy, head of KEOKH until July 1, 1941, and one of the most sinister figures behind the deportations.

82. See Albert Fein's testimony. The influx of desperate Jews escaping the mass murder to Hungary and Romania is well documented by the experience of Jehoschua Gertner, who was able to cross the border from Kosow to Tiszabogdány. See *Home Is No More*, 186–200.

83. Pohl, “Hans Krueger and the Murder of the Jews,” 247–48. Like many SS officers, Helmut Tanzmann, head of the Security Police in Lvov, had a doctoral degree in law. His role in the Belzec deportation and mass killings marked him as a major war criminal. After his capture by the British, he committed suicide in May 1946.

84. Somló Béla file, HIL, TGY 2811. See also the testimony of Leslie Gordon during the trial of Adolf Eichmann, June 1, 1961, on the massacre of Hungarian Jews in Buczacz. This was reinforced by László Zobel in his interview. Shoah Foundation Visual History Archives, USC, #51784. For more details about tragedies in the Dniester crossing, see DEGOB Collection, protocol no. 447, in the Hungarian Jewish Museum and Archives.

85. Maria Ormos masterfully conveys the tortuous inner struggle of Kozma with his conscience about the murder of the deported Jews. *Egy Média Vezér*, 766–77.

86. See Frojimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger*, 125; and Majsai, “A kőrösmezői zsidódeportálás 1941-ben,” 5:228–29.

87. Quoted in Frojimovics, *I Have Been a Stranger*, 141n269. Keresztes-Fischer's August 8, 1941 telegram to Kozma put a partial stop to the deportation. OL, K774, 1941.

88. Interview with Marion Samuel, USC Shoah Foundation Visual History Archives, #40972.
89. Somló Béla file, HIL, TGY 2811.
90. Katzburg, *Zsidó Politika Magyarországon*, 135.
91. Ágnes Ságvári presents an excellent analysis in, “Holokauszt Kárpatalján,” in *Tanulmányok a magyarországi holokauszt történetéből* (Budapest: Napvilág, 2002), 33–66.
92. Ságvári mentions that the Hungarian authorities confiscated the land of several thousand Ruthenians, and gave them less productive properties in return. “Holokauszt Kárpatalján,” 48–49.
93. Perhaps the most comprehensive work on the economic destruction of Hungarian Jewry during the Holocaust is that of Gábor Kádár and Zoltán Vágó, *Hullarablás: A Magyar Zsidók Gazdasági Megsemmisítése* (Budapest: Jaffa, 2005).
94. The memorandum originated in the Office of the Government Commissioner of Carpatho-Ruthenia. OL, K-774, Kárpátaljai Kormányzói Biztosának Hivatala, 646/41/el. Also quoted in Karsai, *Holokauszt*, 230.
95. Letter (undated) from Pell to the British ambassador in Portugal, in “Herbert Pell Papers,” Archives of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, roll 8, 0029, box 4.
96. Quoted in Káló, “Szombathelyi Ferenc és a galíciai deportálás,” 30. Szombathelyi was tried by a Yugoslavian court and executed in 1946.