

A Review of New Developments in Policing in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area

Melanie Lue Dugmore

Occasional Paper Series 2003

Published by the Institute of Criminology
University of Cape Town
Funded by The Ford Foundation

ISBN: 0-799202175-9

**Policing Project
Institute of Criminology**

A decade of local policing reform has seen important shifts in policing policy and operational dynamics. In South Africa too the policing landscape has become more densely populated. The increasing diversification of policing agencies - above, beyond and below the state - have propelled issues relating to the 'governance of security' to the forefront of policing debates. During the course of 2002 the Policing Project, based at the Institute of Criminology, embarked on a number of research initiatives. As a research group we aimed at a critical assessment of selected aspects of the evolving system of policing in South Africa. This Occasional Paper brings one facet of the pluralisation and diversification of policing agencies to light. In "*A Review of New Developments in Policing in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area*", Melanie Dugmore considers the legal mandate, organisational structure and operational priorities of the recently established Municipal Police Services in the Cape Metropole. By way of conclusion, she also outlines some of the challenges confronting this agency within the broader policing matrix of the Western Cape.

Elrena van der Spuy
Co-ordinator: Policing Project

A REVIEW OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICING IN THE CAPE TOWN METROPOLITAN AREA

*Melanie Dugmore**

1. INTRODUCTION

Whilst Government struggles with new strategies and policies to fight crime in South Africa, “private security”¹ initiatives continue to grow. The reform of the South African Police Service (SAPS) necessarily dominated the policing agenda following 1994, but failed to achieve significant results in the fight against crime. Attempts to inculcate a new approach to policing through the adoption of community policing philosophies have, it can be argued, also produced negligible results. The private sector and communities have in response assumed the responsibility and opportunity, embarking on crime-fighting initiatives of their own, in some instances in partnership with Government. According to research as many as half of South Africa’s citizenry rely on neighbourhood watch schemes for protection.² The private security industry, seeing opportunities for new markets, has expanded its conventional functions, such as guarding, to crime prevention and extended its client base. The R17 billion industry now consists of 5 000 registered companies nationally.

This paper provides some insight into the changing policing landscape by reviewing some of the new initiatives in the fight against crime in the metropolitan area of Cape Town (similar initiatives exist in other major cities in South Africa). The extension of the policing mandate to local government through the establishment of the municipal police services (MPS) in the City of Cape Town is examined and the challenges facing the Service are explored. The implications of a municipal police service and its relationship with other State Departments and organs such as the Department of Community Safety and South African Police Service are also examined. In addition the paper examines the growth of private security initiatives by reviewing the Community Patrol Officer Scheme and emergence of City Improvement Districts. In examining the changing policing landscape, the paper highlights some of the problems and challenges facing these new initiatives as well as the policy issues confronting Government. The primary objective of this paper is to provide a basis for further analysis and debate on policing in the Cape Metropolitan area.

* This study was undertaken under the auspices of the Policing Project, Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town in the first half of 2002. The contribution of the Project Co-ordinators, Elrena van der Spuy and Wilfried Schärf, as well as other members of the Project, to developing the ideas encapsulated in this paper are hereby acknowledged.

¹ The dominant modes being paid private policing and citizen-initiated vigilante activity. See Shearing and Kempa (2001) p.2.

² *Sunday Argus*, May 5 2002 p.5.

2. RESEARCH METHOD

The data utilised in this paper has been collected on the basis of in-depth interviews and an analysis of relevant documentary material. Interviews were conducted with five representatives from improvement districts; two officials and one consultant from the City of Cape Town; the Chief Executive Officer of the City Community Patrol Board, and two officials from the Department of Community Safety. Documentary material was sourced through the City of Cape Town, Department of Community Safety and the Crime Information Analysis Centre. The author's prior involvement in the local government and policing environment greatly assisted in securing access to individuals and information.³

3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES – THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN

The most significant development in local government has been the restructuring of local municipal councils. Following local government elections on 5 December 2000, the metropolitan area of Cape Town⁴ i.e. the new City of Cape Town (hereafter referred to as the City) was established, comprising of the former municipalities of Cape Town, South Peninsula, Helderberg, Tygerberg, Oostenberg and Blaauwberg and the Cape Metropolitan Council. With a population of 3.2 million⁵ the metropolitan area accounts for 11% of South Africa's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and represents 75% of the Western Cape economy.

³ Special thanks to the following people who made themselves available for interviews and provided valuable insight: Representatives from City and Business Improvement Districts: Phillip Hortsman, Anthony Davies, Kristina Davidson, Machteld van Kemp, Frank Johnson. Officials of the City of Cape Town: Mark Sangster (Executive Head of Cape Town City Police Services), Paul Williamson (Planning and Economic Development Services). Heather Tager of the City Community Patrol Board. Sulaiman Isaacs and Ronel Schoeman from the Department of Community Safety. Alan Dolby - consultant to City of Cape Town. The author gratefully acknowledges the receipt of crime statistics from the Crime Information Analysis Centre, and demographic data from the Economic and Planning Departments of the City of Cape Town.

⁴ As prescribed by the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, No. 117 of 1998.

⁵ Fanaroff, Bernie. Report to the Cape Town Unicity Commission on the Scope of a proposed project to develop a comprehensive safety and security strategy for the Unicity [Cape Town: Resolve Crime and Security Solutions. 2000].

3.1 The Cape Town City Police Service

Featuring high on the City's list of strategic priorities is the issue of community safety. The establishment of a municipal police service, the Cape Town City Police Service (hereafter referred to as the CPS) was approved by Council resolution on 30 May 2001. In terms of the legal requirements⁶ the application and business plan relating to the establishment of the CPS was submitted to the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) responsible for Community Safety in the Province on 30 August 2001. The CPS commenced operations on 1 December 2001.⁷

The Executive Head of the CPS is also responsible for all former traffic, law enforcement, security and safer cities departments.

3.11 CPS Strategies for 2002/3

By law the CPS is required to prepare an Annual Police Plan that sets out its programme of action for the year. The Annual Police Plan for 2002/2003 (hereafter referred to as the Plan) identifies six strategies including the establishment of the CPS, which is now a reality. These are:

a. Securing the Central Business District (CBD)

Central to its strategy to secure the CBD is the control and expansion of the City's Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV). The CCTV system was established in 1999 by the City of Cape Town together with Business Against Crime as a managing partner but now falls under the complete control of the City. There are currently two control rooms, one in the CBD and another in the N1 City area. Seventy-two cameras were initially installed at a cost of R8.5 million in the inner central city area, which since its installation in 2000 has proved to be a great success in reducing crime. An additional seven to ten cameras are to be installed in the inner city on the station deck and an additional eight in the inner city to increase public transport safety.

The CCTV system central control room (or Strategic Surveillance Unit (SSU) as it is now known) in the CBD is supported by a mobile response team that responds to calls from the SSU. This unit consists of 16 City Law Enforcement officers and 16 Community Patrol Officers (CPOs).

Another component of the strategy to secure the CBD is the Community Patrol Officers Scheme. A total of 210 CPOs sponsored by both the private sector and the City are deployed in the CBD.

⁶ Enabling legislation: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996, section 206(7); South African Police Service Amendment Act, No. 68 of 1995, section 64; and regulations published in Government Notice No. R710, Government Gazette No. 20142 (11 June 1999).

⁷ Western Cape Provincial Gazette No. 5786, dated 2 November 2001.

b. Promoting Investment in the CBD

The formation of the Central City Improvement District (CCID) in November 2000 is seen as key to promoting new relationships between property owners and the City. The aim of the CCID is to ensure an environment conducive to business and the promotion of investment in the City. Central to this objective is the reduction of crime. The Cape Town Convention Centre, which opens officially in July 2003, is also seen as a key development in promoting economic growth and tourism in the City.

c. Optimal Utilisation of the City's Existing Law Enforcement and Traffic Services

Business improvement initiatives are highlighted as critical to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of existing resources. The Plan notes a number of initiatives embarked upon by the former City of Cape Town. These include the extension of the card type parking meters, which required the updating of the old coin-type meter to a more modernised card system. These were introduced in December 2000 in the CBD area in response to the loss of millions of Rands in parking revenue by the City as a result of the vandalism of and theft from meters. Another project is the outsourcing of the tow-wagon function and the introduction of the auto-lift system for illegally parked vehicles. This project has assisted in addressing illegal parking within the City. Automated hand-held ticketing devices that reduce the time to issue a traffic fine from 2.5 minutes to 30 seconds will continue to be rolled out. These devices enable the officer to link into the CIVITAS Contravention System immediately, thereby facilitating the downloading of accurate information and the immediate processing of fines. This electronic system has reduced the paper backlog and scope for human error created by the manual system of capturing information. Finally, the outsourcing of the management of public parking areas in the City has reduced the strain of having Traffic Officers on duty in parking areas, as well as increasing revenue for the City.

d. The Establishment of Municipal Courts

The first dedicated municipal court was established in January 2000 the City Hall as a result of a co-operative agreement between the then City of Cape Town and the Department of Justice. In terms of this arrangement the City has provided the premises as well as prosecutorial, security and administrative staff. The Department of Justice has assisted in making a magistrate available to hear matters. The aim of the court is to ensure that municipal matters receive attention and to alleviate pressure on criminal courts. Until this court is optimally utilised there are no plans to establish more courts.

e. The By-law Review Process

The review and standardisation of existing by-laws in the Unicity is currently in progress. The City is still relying on by-laws dating back to the Regional Services Council, and is now faced with the problem of by-laws not being standardised even within the geographical areas of former municipalities. For example the former City of Cape Town By-laws are divided up according to old boundaries. The former Black Local Authority, Ikapa Administration, had its own set of by-laws (albeit negligible), the Regional Service Council areas others. In addition, the absence of by-laws in certain areas, particularly informal settlements, has resulted in a lack of by-law enforcement in these areas.

f. Alternative Sentencing

Due to the overcrowding of prisons and the inability of many offenders to pay fines, the City is exploring alternative sentencing solutions with the Department of Justice.

3.1.2 Objectives and Priorities of the CPS for 2002/3

Key priorities identified in the Plan are the concentration of visible policing in urban renewal areas and the targeting of specific crimes. The CPS has committed itself to deploying 60% of resources in urban renewal areas (i.e. Khayelitsha, Mitchells Plain, Manenberg, Hanover Park, Bonteheuwel, Elsies' River and Nyanga East) and 40% in high-risk areas. The following stations have been identified as priority stations within the metropolitan area:

Presidential police stations: Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain

Crack-down stations: West metropole - Nyanga, Mitchells Plain, Guguletu, Cape Town, Woodstock, Athlone, Manenberg, Langa, Steenberg and Philippi. East metropole - Elsies River, Strand, Somerset West, Parow, Atlantis, Ravensmead, Bellville, Khayelitsha, Kraaifontein, Bishop Lavis and Kuilsriver.

The Plan cites the primary objective of the CPS for the 2002/3 financial years as firstly, the targeting of social disorder through the combating of alcohol and substance abuse and secondly, the finalisation of previous law enforcement actions. The abuse of alcohol and related substances is seen as a major factor contributing to crime (most notably domestic violence, assault, robbery and rape), fatal accidents and pedestrian deaths. The non-payment of fines and a culture of lawlessness reflected in disobedience to traffic laws and municipal by-laws are also seen as major contributors to the culture of lawlessness in communities. Adopting a zero tolerance approach to crime by pursuing even petty crimes the City hopes to address this and recover R210 million owed in outstanding fines.⁸

3.1.3 Service Delivery and Deployment Strategy of the CPS


3.1.3.1 Service Delivery Model

a. Geographical Areas

In an attempt to ensure joint planning and operations with the SAPS, the CPS has opted for a geographical division of the metropolitan area into an East and West metropole similar to the SAPS model. Each metropole has been divided into two service districts, which are further sub-divided into eight divisions (consisting of between five and eight precincts that are consistent with that of the SAPS).

⁸ *Cape Argus* Wednesday June 5 2002 p.18.

b. Organogram and Rank Structure of City Police Services



The rank structure of uniform members is as follows:
 Divisional Commander, Assistant Divisional Commander, Precinct
 Commander, Sergeant and Constable.

c. Social Crime Prevention

CPS operations will be supported by social crime prevention programmes. To achieve this, the City is in the process of establishing a Social Crime Prevention Centre. This Centre incorporates the former Safer Cities programmes of the former City of Cape Town and Cape Metropolitan Council. The Social Crime Prevention Centre will be responsible for intervention programmes, directed at the causes of crime for example poverty, unemployment, dysfunctional communities and families, drug and alcohol abuse, and domestic violence. The Centre will also be responsible for gathering information on crime, evaluation of information and dissemination to relevant role players. To facilitate this, a research component will be established to carry out research and conduct, monitor and implement safety audits. The Centre will also be responsible for the co-ordination of activities between other government departments and non-governmental organisations.

d. Specialist Units

The following specialist units will be established to provide specialised skills and support:

- An Equestrian Unit will be established during April 2003 under the CPS for deployment in the inner City, along the Atlantic seaboard, and for public order policing.
- A Tactical Response Unit will be trained by the SAPS in special weapons and tactics commencing in September 2002.
- An Alcohol Abuse Unit that will focus on educational programmes; the enforcement of drunken driving and by-laws relating to drinking in public; and supporting SAPS operations aimed at illegal shebeens, is also proposed.
- A Tracing and Recovery Unit will focus on recovery of unpaid traffic and by-law fines.
- A Freeway Unit will provide a 24-hour freeway service and will be deployed in primarily urban renewal areas and on metropolitan routes.
- A Public Transport Unit (Transit Police) is proposed to address the issue of public safety on public transportation. The City is considering the use of reservists to boost its staff complement.

e. Extension of CCTV network

In addition to the cameras in the CBD, the following networks have and will be rolled out:

- In November 2001 17 cameras were rolled out along Klipfontein and Duinefontein Roads and the suburb of Manenberg at a cost of R8 million. This roll out, it is suggested, has assisted in curbing gangster activity, drug-related incidents and improved road management safety in the area.
- On the 15 December 2000 a 15-camera network extending between the Grandwest Casino Complex along Vanguard Drive and the N2 freeway was initiated to address public safety. This network is now linked to the City's central control room.⁹
- A 12-camera pilot system for the N2 and Durban Road corridor has been installed at a cost of R3.5 million, initially for the primary purpose of traffic management. This system will also be used for crime surveillance.
- Seven cameras will be rolled out in the Bonteheuwel area with the primary purpose of crime surveillance.
- Ten additional cameras will be rolled out in 2002/3 financial year in Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha respectively for the primary purpose of crime surveillance.

The central control room (SSU) provides interaction with City Law Enforcement and the SAPS through radio contact. The unit is operated on a 24-hour basis and is controlled by approximately 90 control room operators (54 in the inner city control room and approximately 36 in the N1 City control centre). The control room operators are private security personnel contracted by the City. Eight members of City Law Enforcement form the core of the supervisory staff. There is a supervisor on duty at all times. The SAPS have also made one member available for deployment in the SSU. The primary purpose of supervisory staff and SAPS presence is to ensure effective communication with SAPS and law enforcement units.

⁹ The City acquired this network at a cost of R5.5million.

3.1.3.2 Deployment Strategy

The deployment of CPS personnel was determined in consultation with the SAPS and after consideration of the Cape Urban Renewal Areas.¹⁰ Crime statistics, particularly priority crimes, were key in identifying areas to which personnel were deployed. All recruits are required to perform two months' orientation and field training prior to their final deployment.

CPS members have and will be deployed to the following areas:

- First Intake: Deployed - 27 December 2001
 - 20 Khayelitsha, Mitchells Plain, Manenberg, Guguletu, Nyanga, Philippi and Greater Athlone area
 - 18 to Central Cape Town area and Sea Point
 - 80 used in staff exchanges to existing law enforcement departments.

- Second Intake: 7 July 2002- (320)
 - 40 Hanover and Philippi
 - 80 Elsies River, Bishop Lavis, Bonteheuwel and Ravensmead
 - 10 Sea Point
 - 10 Central City
 - 30 Bellville/ Parow
 - 40 (15-Woodstock, 5-Rondebosch, 15-Claremont, 5-Wynberg)
 - 70 Intervention Unit
 - 20 Macassar, Strand, Somerset West
 - 20 Atlantis

- Third Intake: December 2002 (150)
 - 35 Khayelitsha
 - 15 Mitchells Plain
 - 60 Grassy Park, Steenberg, Diep River, Kirstenhof, Muizenberg
 - 40 Kraaifontein and Kuilsriver

3.1.3.3 Performance to date (May 2002)

The CPS have issued 50 000 notifications for traffic and municipal by-law infringements valued at R10 million. 553 arrests have been made for the following offences:

¹⁰ The Department of Community Safety in the Province has identified the following areas as urban renewal areas: Mitchells Plain, Khayelitsha, Manenberg, Hanover Park, Bonteheuwel, Elsies River and Nyanga East.

Table 1: Arrests by the Cape Town City Police Service (CPS)

Breakdown of all arrests by CPS for period 27 December 2001 to 28 May 2002¹¹	
Drunk in Public	57
Possession of dagga/mandrax	92
Theft	30
Possession of illegal weapon	21
Discharge of weapon	06
Possession of stolen vehicle	10
Illegal Immigrant	01
House breaking	23
Theft from vehicle	03
Shop lifting	12
Urinating in public	02
Robbery	11
Attempted Murder	04
Non payment of maintenance	02
Theft of firearm	01
Theft of cables	01
Child abuse	01
Reckless driving	61
Anti social behaviour	32
Possession of stolen goods	40
Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm	23
Rape	10
Domestic violence	04
Murder	1
Other	93
TOTAL	553

3.2 Challenges facing the CPS

3.2.1 Service Delivery Challenges

Section 64(E) of the South African Police Services Amendment Act (hereafter referred to as the Act), sets out the functions of a municipal police service as: traffic policing; policing of municipal by-laws and regulations; and the prevention of crime. In the absence of specifying priorities for the service. All three functions are deemed to be weighted equally. This poses a challenge for the CPS. Currently traffic functions account for approximately 50% of the workload of the CPS. Concern has also been expressed that officers from the Municipal Traffic Departments hold key supervisory positions in the new service and that this will result in traffic functions taking precedence over other operational matters. A further concern is the reluctance of traffic officials and members of the SAPS to enforce municipal by-laws, which are often viewed as petty. This problem is compounded by the absence of standard by-laws applicable across the Unicity.

¹¹ *Die Burger* Thursday 6 June 2002.

A further challenge facing the Service is the application of its crime prevention function. The Annual Plan sets out the approach of the CPS to crime prevention and what needs to be done, relying heavily on interpretations from the National Crime Prevention Strategy and White Paper on Safety and Security. The challenge facing the Service is threefold. First, it needs to ensure a co-ordinated effort with its other partners i.e. the SAPS and other criminal justice institutions. Secondly, it must establish mechanisms to interface with the public. In this regard it must define its role and responsibility in structures such as Community Police and Safety Forums, improvement districts, neighbourhood watch and other community initiatives. Finally, it needs to ensure a commitment from within Council. Council departments need to realign their business to support crime prevention initiatives. Critical to the success of these, is the development of appropriate mechanisms to monitor compliance and to co-ordinate programmes within the Council.

3.2.2 Financial Limitations

The CPS was established at great speed, primarily due to political pressure. The Democratic Alliance, which assumed power as the largest political coalition in the City after the 5 December 2000 elections, campaigned for the establishment of a municipal police service as a central feature of its political manifesto. The lack of a full financial assessment and the fact that most Council funds were already committed for the first financial year, resulted in the haphazard allocation of funds for the CPS. The CPS commenced operations with a capital budget of R5 million and a R35 million operating budget. For the year 2002/3 the budget reflected a shortfall of R15 million on its capital budget and R18 million on its operating budget. Budget limitations have impacted on the provision of equipment for new recruits and the ability to deploy personnel, and could undermine the efficacy of enforcement strategies.

3.2.3 Integration of Law Enforcement Services and Staff Resistance

Cape Town, unlike its Durban and Johannesburg counterparts, opted for the establishment of an entirely new service rather than applying section 64(Q)(2) of the Act. This Section makes provision for the immediate appointment of a traffic officer in the employ of the municipality as a member of the MPS, even though the person may not comply with training requirements (on the proviso that the person undertakes the required course by the 1st October 2003). The Cape Town approach requires existing law enforcement personnel in both Traffic and Law Enforcement Departments to apply for positions in the new service and undergo training immediately. The advantages of this approach were that it allowed for the creation of an entirely new service and facilitated the creation of a new culture and ethos. Furthermore, because joining the CPS is voluntary, labour disputes have been minimised and staff morale is high in the CPS.

This approach has, however, not been without its problems. Despite attempts to conduct information sessions for staff, both trade unions (IMATU and SAMWU) were concerned about the impact of the new service on existing staff. This dispute has culminated in SAMWU launching a legal challenge to the process in terms of section 78 of the Municipal Systems Act. This dispute is still unresolved. A further disadvantage of this approach is that existing Law Enforcement Departments continue to run parallel to the CPS. It is anticipated that a full integration of all personnel into the CPS will be completed by 2010. Currently staff are not compelled to join the CPS but may apply voluntarily and are required to satisfy the minimum entry requirements, being a matric, a driver license and the absence of a criminal record. The movement of personnel across has to date been slow. Most staff members are reluctant to assume new functions and are resistant to change. The incentives of better salaries and state of the art equipment have had little effect. Whilst joint operations are conducted between all three sections i.e. Traffic, Law Enforcement and the CPS, rivalry between the different groupings is evident particularly in the case of some Traffic personnel who appear resentful of the CPS. The prioritisation of the CPS in terms of budget allocations and recruitment has impacted negatively on other law enforcement and traffic departments. All promotional posts and vacancies are frozen in these departments to allow for the expansion of the CPS complement. This has resulted in low staff morale in Traffic and Law Enforcement departments of the City.

The parallel existence of Traffic and Law Enforcement sections and the CPS in certain areas has resulted in duplication and is confusing for the public. It is envisaged that those members who do not opt to join the CPS or who cannot due to their inability to satisfy the minimum entry requirements will be incorporated into Specialist Enforcement Teams (SETS) and Mobile Enforcement Teams (METS).

The traffic, law enforcement and security personnel complement and budgets of the former municipal councils provide some indication of the scope of this integration process. See Table 2 for information on 2000/2001 financial year.¹²

Table 2: Former MLCs Law Enforcement Departments

Municipality	Law Enforcement and Security		Traffic	
	Personnel	Budget	Personnel	Budget
Blaauwberg	18	R2.7m	42	R7.3m
Cape Town	340	R37.9m	366	R79m
Cape Metro	68	R11m	-	-
Helderberg	29	See Traffic	31	R9.2m
Oostenberg	10	R2.2m	31	R10.3m
South Peninsula	61	R9.6m	105	R29m
Tygerberg	195	R12.4m	263	R35.4m
TOTAL	721	R75.8m	838	R170.2m

In an attempt to expedite the movement of existing personnel to the CPS, bridging courses have been introduced for traffic officers at the Provincial Philippi Training College. Law enforcement staff may also undertake traffic training at the City's training college before embarking on the CPS bridging course at the Philippi Training College. By July 2002, 110 traffic officers had completed the bridging course and were in the process of moving across to the CPS, 100 law enforcement officers had to date applied to undergo the six-month training course.

3.2.4 The Optimal use of the CCTV System (SSU)

The SSU has proved successful as an instrument of crime detection in the central city, and its usefulness as a traffic management tool is growing. However, from its inception concern has been expressed as to whether it is being used optimally. The cameras are a valuable tool for Council Departments and could be utilised for detecting problems as diverse as defective robots, faulty street lights and refuse collection. In relation to by-law and traffic enforcement, concerns relate to the ability of control room operators to detect and issue fines for such offences. Currently, control room operators are private security personnel who have been trained to operate equipment, they are however not certified law enforcement or traffic officers. Furthermore, the fact that they do not have peace officer status inhibits their ability to issue fines. The lack of powers and operational experience of the control officers is also regarded as a serious impediment to their ability to detect violations. City officials have, however, justified the use of contract security personnel for two reasons; first budget considerations, since contract security is more cost effective and secondly, the withdrawal of 90 members of the City Police/Traffic or Law Enforcement to perform this function will have a

¹² Officials who provided this information indicated that the figures have been subject to some change as a result of budget adjustments and vacancies in the case of personnel.

detrimental impact on ground operations. In an attempt to address this problem, the City has ensured the presence of supervisors from both City Law Enforcement and SAPS personnel at all times. In addition contract security personnel have been given additional training.

Another limitation of the SSU is that it is located separately from existing Law Enforcement and Traffic control rooms thereby minimising its potential as deployment and communication tool. In an attempt to address this, the CPS Control Room is currently located at the SSU. It is anticipated that on final development of new police headquarters (5 years from now) the CCTV operations centre, freeway management system and radio control room will be centralised.

3.2.5 Limitations of the Criminal Justice System

The success of the Municipal Court has also been limited by its ability to deal effectively with by-law violations. The primary challenge facing the criminal justice system in this instance is dealing with child and indigent offenders. The prevalence of street children and homeless persons as well as a large proportion of unemployed persons who violate by-laws either through circumstance, for example sleeping and urinating on the street or engaging in anti-social behaviour, poses a challenge for law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers often view arresting these offenders as a waste of time (issuing of fines is not an option). The lack of lock-up facilities and places of safety for children often result in juvenile offenders being released on their own recognisance or to shelter facilities that cannot detain children and therefore cannot guarantee their reappearance in court. In the case of homeless adults, the courts have the dilemma of sending petty offenders to overcrowded prisons where they will be held for long periods of time before making a court appearance.

With constant public pressure particularly in business district areas, law enforcement personnel are often rendered ineffective. This is compounded by the inaccessibility and poor performance of departments such as social welfare who are primarily responsible for children and indigent people.

Attempts to co-ordinate initiatives between the City and Province to deal with the issue of street children and homelessness have yet to bear fruit. Options such as alternative sentencing in the case of petty offences and programmes to manage the homeless situation, such as one-stop assessment centres for street children and indigent adults in need of special care, need to become a reality.

3.2.6 Relationship between the CPS and Provincial Minister of Community Safety

The powers of the Minister of Community Safety in the Province (here after referred to as the Minister) in relation to the MPS are as follows:

- Section 64A of the Act sets out the role of the Minister in relation to the establishment of the MPS. The Minister after consultation with relevant members of the Provincial Cabinet and National Commissioner is responsible for approval of the establishment of the Service.
- Section 64J(2)(c) enables the Minister to direct the Civilian Oversight Committee (established to oversee the functions of the MPS) to perform functions necessary for oversight of the service.
- Section 64K(1) requires the Provincial Commissioner to consult with the Minister when establishing co-ordinating committees, which will co-ordinate operations between the SAPS and MPS.
- Section 64M(1) makes provision for the National Minister of Police to direct the Minister to intervene in an instance where the MPS has failed to maintain national standards. In such an instance the Provincial Minister has a wide range of functions as set out in Section 64N of the Act. These include obtaining information and documents under the control of the MPS or municipality, entering any building under the control of the MPS or municipality, getting assistance from any member of the MPS or municipality. The Minister may also issue notice to the Municipal Council to conform to national standards and in the event of failure to do so, to appoint (after consultation with other members of the Provincial cabinet and Premier) an official of the provincial government as administrator of the MPS. The Minister may further take such steps deemed necessary to ensure compliance with conditions and national standards. The official appointed has full powers to perform all duties of the executive head of the MPS on instruction of the Provincial Minister.
- The role of the Provincial Minister in relation to approval of policing plans of the MPS is however unclear. Section 64C(2)(g) of the Act requires the Executive Head of the MPS to develop a plan before the end of each financial year that sets out the priorities and objectives of the MPS. In so far as the plan relates to the prevention of crime, the plan must be developed in co-operation with the SAPS. To give effect to this section the regulations relating to the establishment of the

MPS require the Executive Head of the MPS to submit the plan to the Provincial Commissioner of SAPS and the Minister responsible for Transport and Traffic. The Provincial Commissioner is required to issue the MPS with a certificate approving or disapproving of the plan (in the latter instance setting out reasons). Similarly, the Minister responsible for Traffic must submit comments to the Executive Head of the MPS in so far as the plan relates to traffic policing services (all within 30 days). Implicit in the wording of the regulations is that the Minister may comment on the plan on in relation to Traffic Policing matters and therefore by implication not other aspects. The regulations and Act are also silent as to what the Provincial Commissioner or Minister remedies are in the event of the Executive Head not conforming with comments provided on the plan or in the event of no certificate of approval being issued. The CPS has interpreted the Act and regulations as giving the Municipal Council the ultimate authority to approve of the plan irrespective of the Minister or Provincial Commissioner's approval.

The political landscape of the Province currently makes this relationship between the Province and the City, and the above legal issues more complicated. Currently the Democratic Alliance, which consists of members of the Democratic Party and New National Party, control the majority of seats in the Council. The Province however, is governed by a coalition between the NNP and ANC. How this relationship and interface is managed by the Executive Head of the CPS, the Minister, Council and Provincial Commissioner will be critical in the final instance for service delivery.

3.2.7 Relationship with the SAPS

The success of policing in the metropolitan area and the province as a whole is predicated not only on good co-operation, but joint planning and a synergy of operations between local government law enforcement agencies and the SAPS. The Act facilitates this through the creation of co-ordinating committees and requiring that the Executive Head of the MPS consult the Provincial Commissioner when preparing its Annual Police Plan (as discussed above).

The CPS currently reports a healthy working relationship with the SAPS both on ground and management level. The CPS also participates in existing co-ordinating committees with the SAPS and has through the geographical organisation of its structure ensured alignment with SAPS divisions. Whether this will translates into joint strategic planning and a synergy of policing operations will ultimately be reflected in the impact on crime.

4. WESTERN CAPE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY SAFETY

The Provincial Department of Community Safety comprises of a staff complement of close to 500 members and controls a budget of R118 million for 2002/3.¹³ In addition to providing support and management services to the office of the Minister, the Department is involved in a number of crime prevention programmes. In terms of its civilian oversight function¹⁴ the Department is responsible for the monitoring of policy implementation in the SAPS. This is achieved primarily through inspections of police stations. To facilitate its policy advice functions the department analyses crime statistics in order to interpret crime trends and investigate remedies. The operational support functions of the Department include supporting the CPS and the Chrysalis¹⁵ programs. Social Crime Prevention programs include Community Police Forum (CPF) assistance, the Hands Off Our Children Campaign (HOOC)¹⁶ and Project SAFE.¹⁷ The Department is also responsible for co-ordinating inter-departmental meetings, the establishment of trauma rooms at police stations,¹⁸ youth programs, training of neighbourhood watches, the Cape Renewal Strategy,¹⁹ the Truancy Reduction Project and working with Community Safety Forums. Traffic Management functions include co-ordination of different role players and overseeing traffic related matters. The Department also participates in a number of projects with other provincial departments.

¹³ This amounts to a 10.47% increase from previous budgets with a further allocation of R8.4 million for 2003/4 and R8.820 million for 2004/5.

¹⁴ The establishment of a Crime Information Centre to analyse data from police stations and crime statistics is a key tool for ensuring monitoring of the SAPS and service delivery.

¹⁵ The Chrysalis programme was initiated in June 2000 as a result of concern that perpetrators of crime are primarily men between the ages of 16 and 20. The programme seeks to provide an alternative to the life of crime by offering a training that equips participants with life-skills to assist them in finding employment. Each course consists of 130 participants and lasts for a period of three months. Trainees are required to remain in contact with the programme to ensure follow-up and monitoring, and are required to perform three weeks' community service at end of the course. To date 890 individuals have been trained. The Project is managed by a Trust and receives financial aid from the Province.

¹⁶ The campaign aims to co-ordinate government activities and to support state support strictures and includes a public education campaign to educate the public about these crimes.

¹⁷ This project focuses on issues of domestic violence and abuse.

¹⁸ Trauma rooms are being set up at police stations to treat victims of sexual violence and abuse before they are referred to hospital. The rooms are staffed by professional counsellors. The Department aims to equip with every police station in the province with a trauma room by the end of 2002.

¹⁹ This project involves the initiation of social crime prevention and law enforcement projects in urban renewal areas and the facilitation and development of co-ordinating structures in the community.

4.1 The Role of the Province in relation to Municipal Police Services

The Provincial Department of Community Safety (hereafter referred to as the Department), has provided the facilities and training for training of municipal police officers for all municipalities in the Province. The Department has spent R21 million in the 2001/2 financial year and allocated a further R31 million for 2002/2003.

The most significant advantage of the Provincial management of municipal police training is that a consistent standard of training is being provided throughout the Province. In addition, the advantage of not using an existing institution has insured that no one service would dominate the training. An entirely new curriculum has been developed by an independent consultant and training instructors are permanent employees of the Provincial Department.

4.2 Strategic Vision of the Minister of Community Safety

The new political alliance between the New National Party (NNP) and the African National Congress (ANC) brought about substantial changes to the Provincial Cabinet on the 5 December 2001. The former Minister of Safety and Security a member of the Democratic Party (DP) was replaced by an ANC Minister who brought with him a new strategic vision for the Department and policing in general.²⁰ The new vision of the Minister is laid out in a Strategic Plan (hereafter referred to as the Plan). The key tenets of the Plan are interdepartmental and intergovernmental co-ordination and an emphasis on the need to align objectives, business plans and priorities of all departments. The Plan sets out criteria and targets to ensure business plans (particularly that of the SAPS over which the Ministry has a monitoring brief) are practical, measurable and capable of evaluation. In addition the Plan stresses the need for a people-orientated and problem-solving approach.

The Plan argues for a focused approach and identifies the following key areas and strategies:

- Serious Violent Crime

The factors contributing to the high incidents of serious violent crime such as alcohol abuse, domestic violence, availability of weapons, gangsterism and drugs are identified as key to a crime prevention strategy. Homicide is identified as one key project, which will be personally championed by the Minister. The priority areas identified are Khayelitsha, Nyanga, Mitchells Plain, Elsies River and Philippi East.

²⁰ Mr Hennie Bester (DP) was replaced by Mr Leonard Ramatlakane (ANC).

- Policing

The Plan recognises the need to look at the police themselves. The need to realign policing resources to priority areas; to improve service delivery through setting service improvement targets and deadlines and monitoring these; and the transformation and re-orientation of staff, are set out as key performance areas for the Provincial Commissioner.

- By-law Enforcement

In the realm of local government, the Plan emphasises the need for the enforcement of municipal by-laws. In this regard the Department will be required to strengthen its relationship with the CPS to ensure alignment of priorities and programmes.

- Anti-Gang Strategy

This strategy highlights the need for co-ordination of all role-players in the criminal justice system and civil society sectors to ensure an integrated approach to addressing gangsterism and the criminal economy.

- Drugs

The Strategy to deal with drugs involves a targeted police approach to deal with known drug cartels as well as intervention programmes aimed at prevention.

- Women and Children

The Strategy to deal with violence against women and children identifies the factors making women and children vulnerable to crime and stresses the need to address risk factors. The Plan argues for the targeting of known offenders, the development of early warning systems to detect incidents of abuse, and public education.

- Shebeens

The strategy to deal with illegal shebeens is predicated on the role of alcohol in violent crime. An integrated and targeted approach which advocates targeted policing operations against illegal operators and those shebeens owned by gangsters, is key to this strategy.

- Children at Risk

A key preventive focus of the Plan is the recognition of the need to reduce the risk of children becoming offenders. The Plan highlights the need for recreational facilities and educational support services. It also stresses the need to target the availability of drugs and alcohol, to deal with truancy and to address gangsterism.

The success of these strategies is predicated on interdepartmental co-ordination and co-operation. The Plan sets out a process for the alignment of business plans and co-ordinating mechanisms.

4.3 Challenges Facing the Ministry of Community Safety

The Provincial Ministry, in order to realise its new strategic vision, will be required to prioritise and align existing projects of the Department in terms of this Strategic Plan. In addition the Ministry also faces a further challenge of ensuring consistency in the priorities and modus operandi (particularly deployment of resources and personnel) of the Provincial SAPS and the CPS.

5. SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES WESTERN CAPE

The South African Police Services (SAPS) Western Cape Provincial organisational structure consists of one provincial commissioner and four deputy provincial commissioners. The Deputy Commissioner responsible for Auxiliary Functions is responsible for legal services, logistics, financial services, administration services and communication services. The Deputy Commissioner Operational Support Services is responsible for crime prevention, human resource management, spiritual services and management services. The Deputy Commissioner Operational Services is responsible for operational co-ordination, operational response and evaluation services. A fourth deputy provincial commissioner has recently been appointed and is responsible for detective services and crime intelligence. The current Annual Provincial Budget is R223 709 000.00, the budgets for East and West metropolises are R46 459 457.00 and R45 044 474.00 respectively.

5.1 SAPS Priorities for 2002/3

The 2002/3 South African Police Services Operational Plan for the Western Cape (hereafter referred to as the Operational Plan) sets out the operational strategies as crime management, crime prevention, detective and specialised units, operational response, operational co-ordination and crime intelligence. Priority areas identified are Mitchells Plain, Kuils River, Khayelitsha, Cape Town Central, Worcester, Nyanga, Kraaifontein, Delft, Paarl and Bishop Lavis.

Operational priorities are listed as:

- Priority 1: Serious Violent Crimes: murder, all robberies, and firearm related crimes.
- Priority 2: Organised Crime: drug related crimes, commercial crimes, theft of motor vehicles and marine related crimes.
- Priority 3: Crime against women and children: all assaults, rape, child abuse and contraventions of the Domestic Violence Act.

Priority 4: Improvement of basic service delivery to all communities.

5.2 Resource Allocation in the City of Cape Town

The ratio of police officer to civilian in the Western Cape is 1: 452.²¹ The resource allocation of vehicles and personnel in the Province is as follows:²²

Table 3: SAPS Provincial Resource Allocation²³

Area	Personnel	Vehicles
West metropole	3511	505
East metropole	2933	476
Boland	2669	544
Southern Cape	1740	333

The Metropolitan area of Cape Town consists primarily of the East and West Police Metropolises and consists of a total of 52 police stations (22 in the East Metro and 30 in the West). The human resource allocation per police station, population served and land space is set out below:

Table 4: SAPS East and West Metro Police Station Demographics and Resource Allocation

Police Station	Area	Population Served ²⁴	Land Space Km ² ²⁵	Human Resource ²⁶	Vehicles ²⁷
Athlone	West	7125	11.8474392	101	17
Atlantis	East	81582	252.6452191	103	22
Bellville	East	61569	32.94665366	135	29
Bellville South ²⁸	East	25385	9.827776565	56	11
Bishop Lavis	East	120503	29.853157	122	23
Bothasig ²⁹	East	29545	10.49717884	30	5
Brakenfell	East	26663	26.54602408	53	13
Camps Bay	West	5679	11.48007604	25	7
Cape Town Central	West	41105	45.22704334	304	51
Claremont	West	34920	21.71194921	70	19
Delft ³⁰	East	99926	17.00129992	115	29
Diep River	West	35575	15.54331653	48	12
Durbanville	East	50671	196.5416167	52	14

²¹ SAPS Operational Plan 2002/2003 March 2002.

²² Information provided by the Ministry of Community Safety, August 2002.

²³ These figures exclude provincial and special unit resources that account for 1073 vehicles and 774 personnel.

²⁴ Population estimates for 2001 provided by the City of Cape Town.

²⁵ Provided by the City of Cape Town.

²⁶ Actual numbers of uniformed members provided by the Minister of Community Safety, August 2002.

²⁷ Actual number of vehicles provided by Ministry of Community Safety August 2002.

²⁸ Excluding Delft.

²⁹ Including Edgemoed, Richwood and Bothasig.

³⁰ Including Belhar.

Elsies River	East	75790	19.97697424	124	23
Fish Hoek	West	22047	35.96737791	43	8
Goodwood ³¹	East	50271	15.41382064	77	13
Gordons Bay	East	10200	111.9965146	32	8
Grassy Park	West	105865	24.18952951	80	18
Guguletu	West	126165	7.298635155	133	27
Hout Bay	West	22457	44.72990363	32	8
Kensington	West	29186	6.300863632	39	11
Khayelitsha	East	300075 ³²	43.15573656	261	44
Kirstenhof	West	30219	43.68040404	45	11

Police Station	Area	Population Served ³³	Land Km2 ³⁴	Space	Human Resource ³⁵	Vehicles ³⁶
Kraaifontein	East	114608	73.2836844		120	29
Kuilsriver	East	172033	89.68151514		212	36
Langa	West	52003	3.44700404		69	11
Lansdowne	West	53119	11.91371038		52	14
Macassar	East	34764	20.05618994		48	10
Maitland	West	14924	8.241286983		57	10
Manenberg	West	87028	9.495612344		64	18
Melkbosstrand	East	8976	93.91308388		28	6
Milnerton ³⁷	East	40822	30.97867853		76	18
Mitchellsplain ³⁸	West	296785	45.839044596		295Mplain 25 Strandfontein	60 7
Mowbray	West	13046	3.938239107		38	9
Muizenberg	West	31416	32.16309128		44	9
Nyanga	West	128646	17.80846605		160	35
Ocean View	West	23242	27.9959283		29	8
Parow	East	54179	20.57334721		106	21
Philippi	West	50917	39.012216437		74	14
Pinelands	West	20075	11.82237184		43	8
Ravensmead	East	63752	8.2506596613		76	19
Rondebosch	West	20307	5.583316229		45	11
Sea Point	West	26049	7.526888938		72	17
Simons Town	West	8701	147.9092693		23	4
Somerset West	East	47731	170.0922029		82	18
Steenberg	West	75068	9.448754421		79	16
Strand	East	61234	20.21394921		78	17
Table Bay Harbour	West	0	3.285736025		40	9
Table View	East	34035	68.72037347		56	15
Woodstock	West	31461	8.823927086		87	19
Wynberg	West	31763	17.70084096		119	14
Tygerberg	East	N/a	N/a		27	5

³¹ Including Edgemoed.

³² The estimate of the SAPS Annual Police Plan 2002/3 of between 800 000 and R1million is more realistic.

³³ Population estimates for 2001 provided by the City of Cape Town.

³⁴ Provided by the City of Cape Town.

³⁵ Actual numbers of uniformed members provided by the Minister of Community Safety, August 2002.

³⁶ Actual number of vehicles provided by the Ministry of Community Safety, August 2002.

³⁷ Excluding Bothasig and Richwood (now part of Bothasig).

³⁸ Including. Strandfontein.

Mortuary					
Cape Town Airport	East	N/a	N/a	19	3
Internal Inv	East	N/a	N/a	14	7
Auction Unit	East	N/a	N/a	21	2
Area Office	East	N/a	N/a	124	48
Area Office	West	N/a	N/a	154	*
Dog Unit	West	N/a	N/a	72	*
Mortuary	West	N/a	N/a	44	*
Commuter Unit	West	N/a	N/a	37	*
Internal Investigation Unit	West			17	*
TOTAL		3471198	2034.529997	4906	971

* not available

5.3 Crime in the City of Cape Town

The SAPS crime statistics for the period January to September 2001 provide a picture of what crime looks like in the metropolitan area of Cape Town in proportion to National and Western Cape Provincial totals. The Western Cape accounts for 9% of the South African population,³⁹ whilst the Cape Town metropolitan area accounts for approximately 7.1% of the South African population and 61.8% of the Western Cape Population.⁴⁰

Table 5: Population and land surface of RSA, Western Cape and Metropolitan area of Cape Town

RSA population	Western Cape population	Metro population	RSA Land Surface Sq km	West Cape Surface Sq Km	Metro Land Surface sq Km
44,560 644	4 445 264	4 445 264	1 223 201	138 932	2393
%	9.9% of RSA population	7.1% of RSA Population 61.8% of Western Cape population	%	11.3% of RSA land surface	0.19% of RSA land surface and 1.7% of Western Cape land surface.

³⁹ Utilising figures provided by the SAPS Website for South African population of 44 560 644.

⁴⁰ Utilising figures provided by the SAPS Western Cape Annual Report for 2001/2002; Western Cape population 4 445 264 and East and West Metropole police areas population 2 747 295.

Table 6: Crime in South Africa per Police Area: January to September 2001

Crime category	National	Western Cape	East Metro	West Metro	Total for Cape Metro
Murder	15054	2385	761	794	1555
Attempted murder	21207	2819	962	1189	2151
Robbery with aggravated circumstances	87610	9743	3596	5129	8725
Other robbery	65766	10919	3299	5445	8744
Public violence	607	158	31	68	99
Illegal strikes	28	0	0	0	0
Rape and attempted rape	37711	4626	1565	1216	2781
Intercourse with a girl under the prescribed age and/or female imbecile	371	97	17	26	43
Indecent assault	5060	1575	484	502	986
Cruelty towards and ill-treatment of children (excluding sexual offences, assault and murder)	1813	495	152	95	247
Kidnapping	3521	399	163	160	323
Abduction	2225	397	152	152	304
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	188961	25858	7427	5191	12618
Common assault	182110	34028	9597	8005	17602
Burglary and attempted burglary: business premises	67279	12689	3465	3748	7213
Burglary and attempted burglary: residential premises	223045	41163	12848	13566	26414
Stock-theft	30668	1451	88	31	119
Shoplifting	49661	8300	1997	3225	5222
Theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles	74281	9335	3433	4815	8248
Theft out of or from motor vehicles	151277	38819	10780	19905	30685
Theft not mentioned elsewhere	426065	73507	23463	25335	48798
Arson	6657	648	187	164	351
Malicious damage to property	103495	20124	5704	6445	12149
All fraud, forgeries, misappropriations, embezzlements, etc	46600	6743	2142	2815	4957
Drug related crime	36756	9758	2013	3406	5419
Driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs	18774	3541	907	1008	1915
Illegal possession of firearms and ammunition	11264	1651	519	842	1361
Explosives act	88	3	0	1	1
Carjacking (accounted for under robbery with aggravating circumstances)	11186	547	182	349	531
Hijacking of trucks (accounted for under robbery with aggravating circumstances)	2843	140	42	94	136
Robbery of cash in transit (accounted for under robbery with aggravating circumstances)	111	9	3	3	
Bank robbery (accounted for under robbery with aggravating circumstances)	325	39	11	21	32

An analysis of crime committed in the Cape Metropolitan in comparison to national figures provides a useful indicator of crime trends in the Metro.

Table 7: Percentage of National Crime Committed in the East and West Metropole i.e. Cape Metropolitan Area

Crime category	% of National Crime Committed in Cape Metropolitan Area
Murder	10.3%
Attempted murder	10.1%
Robbery with aggravated circumstances	9.9%
Other robbery	13.2%
Rape and attempted rape	7.3%
Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm	6.6%
Common assault	9.6%
Burglary and attempted burglary: business premises	10.7%
Burglary and attempted burglary: residential premises	11.8%
Theft of motor vehicles and motorcycles	11.1%
Theft out of or from motor vehicles	20.2%

An examination of the top ten police stations recording the highest crime statistics for the period January to September 2001 for specified crimes provides a more detailed picture.

Table 8: Number of Murders at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Nyanga	265	West
Khayelitsha	249	East
Guguletu	104	West
Mitchells Plain	95	West
Kuils River	98	East
Kraaifontein	82	East
Bishop Lavis	53	East
Manenberg	52	West
Langa	44	West
Delft	39	East

Table 9: Number of Attempted Murders at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Mitchells Plain	261	West
Nyanga	206	West
Khayelitsha	170	East
Elsies River	129	East
Manenberg	127	West
Kuils River	117	East
Guguletu	113	West
Philippi	100	West
Bishop Lavis	96	East
Kraaifontein	67	East

Table 10: Incidents of Robbery with aggravated circumstances i.e. with a weapon

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Nyanga	914	West
Khayelitsha	904	East
Mitchells Plain	474	West
Guguletu	461	West
Kuils River	278	East
Bishop Lavis	197	East
Delft	192	East
Athlone	166	West
Elsies River	165	East
Cape Town Central	157	West
Langa	150	West

Table 11: Other Robbery at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Cape Town Central	1060	West
Mitchells Plain	821	West
Khayelitsha	633	East
Kuils River	421	East
Nyanga	399	West
Guguletu	350	West
Woodstock	398	West
Bishop Lavis	324	East
Manenberg	297	West
Kraaifontein	263	East

Table 12: Rape and Attempted Rape: 0 to 17 Years of Age at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Khayelitsha	187	East
Kuils River	114	East
Nyanga	103	West
Guguletu	66	West
Mitchells Plain	64	West
Kraaifontein	62	East
Delft	57	East
Bishop Lavis	50	East
Elsies	33	East
Manenberg	29	West

Table 13: Rape and Attempted Rape: 18 Years and Older at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Khayelitsha	200	East
Nyanga	140	West
Kuils River	116	East
Mitchells Plain	93	West
Guguletu	83	West
Delft	64	East
Kraaifontein	62	East
Elsies River	50	East
Cape Town Central	38	West
Bishop Lavis	36	East

Table 14: Assault with Intent to do Grievous Bodily Harm at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Khayelitsha	1840	East
Kuils River	1163	East
Nyanga	927	West
Guguletu	737	West
Kraaifontein	681	East
Delft	608	East
Mitchells Plain	542	West
Elsies River	459	East
Ravensmead	446	East
Langa	402	West

Table 15: Common Assault at Select Stations

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Mitchells Plain	1885	West
Kuils River	1516	East
Delft	900	East
Elsies River	820	East
Kraaifontein	771	East
Khayelitsha	703	East
Cape Town Central	606	West
Manenberg	517	West
Nyanga	419	West
Guguletu	392	West

Table 16: Burglary and Attempted Burglary (Business Premises)

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Kuils River	432	East
Cape Town Central	427	West
Mitchells Plain	340	West
Bellville	332	East
Milnerton	308	East
Woodstock	307	West
Maitland	281	West
Bishop Lavis	237	East
Elsies River	235	East
Parow	223	East

Table 17: Burglary and Attempted Burglary (Residential Premises)

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Kuils River	1972	East
Mitchells Plain	1545	West
Khayelitsha	1003	East
Kraaifontein	982	East
Grassy Park	840	West
Somerset West	767	East
Claremont	751	West
Bellville	730	East
Delft	722	East
Lansdowne	716	West

Table 18: Theft of Motor Vehicles and Cycles

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Cape Town Central	676	West
Mitchells Plain	460	West
Bellville	410	East
Claremont	369	West
Parow	339	East
Goodwood	300	East
Woodstock	291	West
Sea Point	290	West
Kuils River	275	East
Rondebosch	206	West

Table 19: Theft out of Motor Vehicles and Cycles

POLICE STATION	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS	METRO AREA
Cape Town Central	3235	West
Claremont	1737	West
Mitchells Plain	1603	West
Sea Point	1436	West
Bellville	1136	East
Kuils River	1065	East
Woodstock	1044	West
Athlone	966	West
Rondebosch	831	West
Lansdowne	815	West

5.4 Challenges facing the SAPS in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area

The issue of deployment of SAPS resources particularly personnel remains critical. The table above provides a useful insight into some of the resources of each police station, i.e. the number of personnel, the population serviced by the police station, land space of the police station's area of jurisdiction and vehicle complement. This information read in conjunction with crime statistics is a useful starting point in analysing the question of resource allocation and equity. More detailed information is however required to inform the allocation of resources. Personnel figures for example, in themselves are not a sufficient indicator of capacity at a station. The quality of personnel namely, the competency of the individual in terms literacy, levels of training and skill i.e. whether s/he is a driver are relevant.

The 2002/3 police plan does not represent a dramatic shift from previous plans. Whether there will be an improvement in performance, it is suggested, will be dependent on range of external factors. Some of these have been discussed, namely the impact of the new Minister on Community Safety's strategic plan, the level of co-operation and the synergy between the SAPS, CPS and Department of Community Safety.

6. COMMUNITY PATROL OFFICER SCHEME

The Community Patrol Officer Scheme was established in 1995 as a Section 21 company with the primary purpose of providing visible policing in the CBD of Cape Town. The agreement between the City Community Patrol Board (CCPB), Western Cape Provincial Government and National Department of Safety and Security limits the Board's employment of community patrol officers to 770. CPOs are trained and equipped by the SAPS. They all have police reservist status and fall under the SAPS in terms of operational control and disciplinary matters. The CCPB, however, as employer is by law responsible for all labour relations matters. The current cost of a CPO is approximately, R3707 (incl. vat); salaries range from R2200 for constables to R3900 for a captain (these exclude special allowances). The Province, in addition to training and equipping the CPOs, contributes a further R20 million in indemnity insurance. The annual budget of the CCPB for 2001/2 was in the region of R19.2 million. Recruits currently undergo a 3-month training programme at a SAPS college, before qualifying.

6.1 CPO Deployment

Of the 702 CPOs currently employed by the Board, 338 are sponsored by the City, 50 by Metrorail and 315 by the private sector.

6.2 Performance of CPOs

The arrest record of the CPOs has been impressive. A sample of the arrest record for CPOs for the period January to December 2001 is indicative of their performance:

Atlantis	212
Cape town	4209
Claremont	569
Delft/Belhar	182
Guguletu	525
Hout Bay	168
Kensington	112
Khayelitsha	104
Kraaifontein	159
Kuils River	303
Langa	238
Manenberg	955
Mitchells' Plain	976
Nyanga	179
Phillipi	121
Wynberg	570

6.3 The Future of the City Community Patrol Board (CCPB)

Following discussions between the National and Provincial Departments of Safety and Security and the Board, the CPO Scheme will terminate in June 2003. The primary argument behind the termination of this initiative is that it was always intended as an interim measure pending the establishment of a municipal police service. Response to pending cessation of the project is mixed. Whilst many police stations have become dependent on the additional personpower and have welcomed the initiative, others have complained about the difficulty of managing CPOs. Whilst all CPOs are required to report to police stations prior to their deployment whether to a transport interchange or to private business, conflict often occurs in trying to manage the demands of the sponsor with those of the SAPS (see 6 below for additional comments).

Whilst the obvious home for CPOs is the municipal police service only 47 CPOs meet the entrance criteria for CPS.⁴¹ To date 40 CPOs have joined the CPS. In an attempt to address the issue of job security for CPOs, the Department of Community Safety together with the Department of Education and CCPB extended assistance to CPOs to obtain matric certification and drivers license qualifications. The response has however been poor.

⁴¹ At inception of the Scheme there was no minimum certificate requirement for CPOs. Recruits with prior police experience were often employed even in instances where they did not have a standard 8 or matric. The minimum requirement of matric was introduced in 2002.

6.4 Challenges facing the City Community Patrol Board (CCPB)

The cessation of the Scheme as currently planned will create a vacuum in the SAPS, City Law Enforcement and private sector initiatives, which have become dependent on this additional personpower. Whilst the CCPB is still engaging National and Provincial authorities on this matter, at this point it is unlikely that there will be a dramatic change of position. The major challenge facing the CCPB is the issue of jobs for CPOs currently still in its employ.

7. IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS

7.1 Background

The concept of improvement districts has been imported to South African following successful initiatives in the United States and the United Kingdom. Motivated by the recognition of the lack of capacity in municipalities to maintain services at levels desired by business/land owners, a top-up levy is introduced on municipal rates that is paid to a company managed by landowners to source additional services.

In Cape Town discussions began as early as 1996 initiated by South African Property Associations and the Chamber of Commerce. These discussions culminated in the promulgation of a by-law by the City of Cape Town: by-law for the Establishment of City Improvement Districts.⁴² Similar by-laws were promulgated in South Peninsula Municipality⁴³ and the City of Tygerberg.⁴⁴ The by-laws of each Municipality are similar; the most distinguishing feature is the terminology used to describe the improvement district. Cape Town refers to City Improvement Districts, Tygerberg to Community Improvement Districts and South Peninsula to Municipal Improvement Districts. Another distinguishing feature is the mechanism for collection of the top-up levy. Cape Town refers to a levy for services collected from rates, South Peninsula and Tygerberg refers to a surcharge on fees for services. The implication is that in the case of Cape Town the levy is automatically paid to the improvement district, whereas in the case of Tygerberg and South Peninsula only those fees collected from rate payers is paid to the improvement district and only after the City has collected all fees due to itself.

The by-laws provide guidelines and stipulate criteria for the formation of an improvement district. It is essential that no fewer than 50% of ratepayers in the geographical area of the intended improvement district agree to the

⁴² PN 116/1999 Provincial Gazette 5337, dated 26 March 1999, amended PN 511/2000 29 September 2000.

⁴³ South Peninsula Municipality By-law for the Establishment of Municipal Improvement Districts, Provincial Gazette 5434, dated 10 March 2000.

⁴⁴ City of Tygerberg: By-law for the Establishment of Community Improvement Districts Provincial Notice 557/2000, dated 13 October 2000, amended under Provincial Notice 659, dated 1 December 2000.

establishment of the improvement district. The improvement district is managed by a management body that is responsible for the administration of the affairs of the district, the provision of top-up services and accountability to the City.

7.2 Improvement Districts in the Cape Metropolitan Area

7.2.1 Central Cape Town Improvement District (CCID)

The CCID was established on 1st November 2000⁴⁵ following initiatives by the Cape Town Partnership⁴⁶ to develop, promote and manage Cape Town as a world-class destination for investment and business. It is estimated that 240 000 people commute to the central city each working day, and that 29.5% of the economic turnover of the metro is generated in the central city area. The area of jurisdiction of the CCID is primarily the inner city area with the majority of ratepayers coming from the commercial sector. The levy instituted is 9.5% of the rates base and yields an annual budget of R13 million; 13.5% of which is allocated to management services, 51% to security services, 20% to cleansing services and 11% to marketing.

The CCID employs four precinct managers that are responsible for management of operations at street level including monitoring and liaison, and a CID Manger who is responsible for co-ordination of services.

a. Security Services⁴⁷

The main focus of the CCID security operation is the reduction of crime and to address anti-social behaviour (which is seen as a major inhibitor of the free use of public space). The CID security complement consists of CPOs and private security officers. The CCID sponsors 103 CPOs that are deployed as follows: 60 CPOs are on duty during daylight hours; 15 CPOs are allocated to special projects, 'hot spots' and to assist retailers in dealing with shoplifters; 20 CPOs are on duty in the evening; eight CPOs are deployed in Hertz cars to provide a seven-day, 24-hour mobile service. In addition, 47 private security officers are deployed in and around the CBD: 15 are deployed in the East City area, eight are utilised for horse patrols for purposes of crime prevention and crowd control, 18 perform foot patrols, and six are drivers (teamed up with CPOs) in the Hertz patrol vehicles.

The CCID attends weekly meetings of the Crime Prevention Forum at the Caledon Square Police Station. The aim of the forum is to improve

⁴⁵ The boundaries of the CCID were extended on 1 July 2001 to include the East City.

⁴⁶ A collaboration of representatives from the private sector, Provincial and Local Governments.

⁴⁷ The CCID is currently in the process of reviewing its management structure and security plan.

communication between different role-players. Representatives from the Traffic and Law Enforcement Departments of the City, the City Police, CCTV, private security contractors and NGOs participate in this forum.

The CCID relationship with the City is governed by a Minimum Service Level Agreement that stipulates the nature of the service, the frequency with which it will be rendered and number of personnel allocated to the area in the case of law enforcement. In terms of law enforcement, the City has committed itself to the deployment of 32 officers (16 City law enforcement officers and 16 CPOs sponsored by the City) for the primary purpose of responding to CCTV cameras in the inner City.⁴⁸ In addition the Agreement stipulates that a further 24 traffic officials will be deployed in the area. According to the CCID, it has been difficult to measure the level of compliance with the Agreement in the case of law enforcement and in particular with traffic officials.

b. Impact on Crime

The CCID argues that security initiatives have contributed to a reduction of crime by 40% in the first six months of operation. During 2001 CPOs made a total of 4295 arrests, 810 of which related to priority crimes. Anti-social behaviour accounting for a large proportion; 1050 for drunkenness, 185 for drinking in public and 759 for unruly behaviour in the City.

The results of a public survey initiated by the Cape Town Partnership and City of Cape in February 2002 supports the view that perceptions of safety and security have improved in the City.

Table 21: Public Response CCID

	2001		2002	
	Average Response	Business Sector Response	Average Response	Business Sector Response
Acceptable	16.7%	9.3%	52.2%	61.9%
Unacceptable	52.6%	75.4%	23.6%	10.6%

c. Successes and Limitations of Security Arrangements

- Communication

The lack of a single communication line for the public is viewed as one of the major security concerns of the CCID. This results in complaints not being channelled to the appropriate agency, resulting in delays and poor response to complaints.

⁴⁸ This unit is however not restricted to the City and responds to complaints in the broader City Bowl area.

- CPOs

According to the CCID the CPOs have proved successful in reducing crime particularly at the inception of the project. Furthermore, they have been critical in addressing the lack of adequate police deployment in the City. However, the following concerns were raised:

- The limited organisational structure of the CCPB and its ability to manage the large component of CPOs.
- The lack of sufficient command and control over CPOs. This is compounded by the complex relationship between the CCPB as employer, the SAPS as operational controller and the client/sponsor. This has contributed to discipline problems.
- Poor integration of CPOs with SAPS and other law enforcement agencies.
- Lack of understanding and willingness of CPOs to enforce Municipal by-laws.
- Lack of training for CPOs on issues facing CBDs.
- Lack of continuous training and upgrading on skills for CPOs.
- Absence of evaluation mechanisms.
- Poor interaction of CPOs with public, retailer and property owners.

- Private Security

The CCID was positive about the role of private security contractors. Citing the example of dealing with adult, intoxicated individuals, it noted that private security officers were more willing to deal with this problem than members of the SAPS or CPOs. Furthermore, there is greater flexibility in dealing with private contractors than with the bureaucracies of the City and the SAPS. The main limitation of private security is however, the lack of sufficient powers to enforce Municipal by-laws. This has also impacted on the success of the parking attendants employed by the CCID to manage parking spaces. Parking attendants cannot issue fines due to their lack of peace officer status, and therefore have to rely on the availability of traffic officers for enforcement.

- SAPS

Some of the concerns raised in relation to the SAPS were:

- The lack of resources to support the CPOs or public need.
- Disjointed communication between SAPS, CCID and other law enforcement agencies.
- Poor co-ordination between SAPS and City Law Enforcement Departments in terms of information sharing and operations which often resulted in duplication of efforts.

- Department of Justice

The poor prosecution rate of offenders particularly in the cases of petty crimes and juvenile offenders was seen as major problem with the Courts.

- The City

Co-operation between Council Departments and the CCID has improved over time but the lack of consultation between City Law Enforcement Departments and CCID in relation to security matters was seen as a problem.

d. Challenges facing the CCID

The major law enforcement challenges facing the CCID are by-law violations, anti-social infringements and petty crime. The problem of homelessness, poor response from social services, and the lack of enforcement of by-laws by the SAPS and CPOs are seen as contributing factors. According to the SAPS approximately 50% of crime committed on the streets is by juvenile offenders. This is viewed as a conservative estimate by the CCID. In addition, the absence of facilities for children is seen as a major problem in dealing with street children. The possibility of establishing an Assessment Centre modelled on the Claremont Improvement District's Clarrie Care Centre is being investigated.

7.2.2 Extension of Inner City Footprint – Greenpoint and Oranjekloof

The inner city footprint under the CCID was further extended with the establishment of the Greenpoint and Oranjekloof Improvement Districts.

The Greenpoint Improvement District was established on 1 July 2001 and operates on a levy of 13%. It has employed 14 CPOS as the core of its security operations. The area is one-third residential and two-thirds commercial.

The Oranjekloof Improvement District was established in February 2002 and operates on a levy of 13%, employing ten CPOS. The area is 60% residential and 40% commercial.

7.2.3 Wynberg CID

The Wynberg Improvement District (WID) was established in August 2000 and assumed operations in October 2002. Operating on a levy of 13.5% and an annual budget of R1 million, the WID spends approximately 25% of its budget on security, 30% on cleansing and the remainder on administration and salaries.

a. Security Services

The WID employs three contract municipal law enforcement officers and four CPOs. The City has deployed two traffic officers and two law enforcement officers; the Province has sponsored four additional CPOs in the area. An additional six CPOs sponsored by the City are deployed exclusively at the transport interchange.

The WID established an operations room in July 2001 at its premises that serves as a meeting and co-ordination point for security operations in the area. Security personnel work a 12-hour shift from 07h00 to 19h00. In the evenings a City law enforcement officer is on duty in Ottery until 22h00. Night operations are scheduled on a needs basis in conjunction with the SAPS.

b. Impact on Crime

The main problems experienced in the WID relate to general theft, shoplifting, ATM fraud, the sale and smoking of dagga and shebeening. Occasional problems are experienced when gang-related cases are heard at the Wynberg Magistrate Court, which erupt in violence. It is estimated that homeless people contribute to only 4% of crime in the area.

c. Successes and Limitations of Security Arrangements

The WID views the success of the relationship with law enforcement and the impact on crime as primarily the result of the correct combination of skills. Law enforcement personnel provide experience and capacity to deal with Municipal by-law violations and CPOs are equipped to deal with crime. A further reason for success is the good working relationship between all parties. The establishment of the operational centre has been instrumental in this regard as it provides a meeting point for all parties and facilitates deployment and planning.

- Private Security Industry

The WID has an informal relationship with the security industry in the area and is in the process of setting up regular monthly meetings with representatives of security companies utilised in the area.

Some of the reasons cited for not contracting security personnel were as follows:

- There is greater respect and compliance by the public for a law enforcement officer or CPO than a private security officer.
- The powers of security officers are limited.
- Law enforcement personnel are fully trained, employed and managed by the City. The concern expressed about private security industry is that personnel are recruited without the same level of scrutiny as institutions like City and the SAPS, and receive minimal training.

- SAPS

The WID attends Joint Station meetings at the Wynberg police station every two weeks. Whilst the SAPS are viewed as being 'open' to the WID, there is room for improvement in the relationship between the SAPS and WID.

- Homelessness

The management of the WID has approached the issue of homelessness in a positive manner by managing the problem rather than trying to eliminate it. Enforcement strategies include a zero tolerance approach to legal infringements and focuses on ensuring street people conform to acceptable standards of behaviour. The provision of toilet facilities, storage facilities for street peoples belongings, demarcated sleeping areas and ablution facilities have assisted in managing the situation.

The WID also employs one field worker whose primary responsibility is liaison between street people and the WID. This initiative has resulted in a good relationship with street people and law enforcement personnel, and facilitates early detection of new persons on the street thereby enabling early interventions to re-integrate new comers back into their communities.⁴⁹ It is estimated that there are 50 homeless persons in the WID area.

The WID has been instrumental in initiatives aimed at addressing homelessness in the area and participates in the integrated working group and service provider forum together with representatives from the City, NGOs, faith groups and other role- players.

- Criminal Justice System

The poor prosecution rate, and dismissal of petty crime cases even in the case of habitual offenders were seen as a problematic both for law enforcement strategies and reduction of crime.

d. Challenges facing the WID

One of the major challenges facing the WID is the proposed cessation of the CPO scheme and introduction of City Police to replace municipal law enforcement. CPOs are central to the security strategy of the WID. To date no discussions have been held with the City on possible alternatives to this arrangement.

⁴⁹ Where possible street people are also provided with return tickets to their homes (funds are made available by the WID or NGOs).

7.2.4 Claremont City Improvement District

The Claremont City Improvement District (CIDC) commenced operations on 1 December 2000. Operating on a levy of 9%, 49% of the budget is allocated to security. Corporate and commercial property owners form 85% of the ratepayer base.

a. Security Arrangements

The CIDC utilises a private contract security company. 22 officers provide a 24-hour cover, 18 on duty during the day and eight at night.

b. Impact on Crime

The CIDC estimates that crime has reduced by 35 to 40% since inception of patrols.

c. Successes and Limitations of Security Arrangements

- Private Security

The lack of peace officer status of the private security officers is recognised as a limitation on the effectiveness of contract security. The absence of sufficient Council support particularly in relation to the availability of municipal law enforcement is a serious limitation on the ability of the CIDC to address by-law related matters. To address this problem attempts have been made to provide the security officers with additional training.

Reasons cited by the CIDC for not utilising CPOs were the poor management of CPOs and lack of discipline.

- Homeless People Initiatives

The CIDC has initiated the establishment of an Assessment Centre⁵⁰ for street children. The primary purpose of the centre is to redirect street children to appropriate rehabilitation programmes and where possible to facilitate their return home. The Centre has become a model for other improvement districts.

- Relationship with the City

The CIDC is in the process of negotiating with the City regarding limitations of the current Minimum Service Level Agreement particularly in relation to the provision of City Law Enforcement.

- Relationship with the SAPS

⁵⁰ Clarrie Care Centre

There is currently no formal relationship between the CIDC and SAPS.

d. Challenges facing the CIDC

The primary challenge facing the CIDC is the legal issue of the use of the levy to pay for contracted private security. The vetoing of this arrangement by the City will result in the CIDC having to review its use of private security.

7.2.5 Fish Hoek

The Fish Hoek Municipal Improvement District (FHMID) commenced operations in January 2001 following initiatives by local property owners and the Chamber of Commerce. The levy instituted by the FHMID is 0.0028 cents of rates yielding a budget in the region of R12 000.00 a month. One hundred and fourteen property owners fall within the improvement district area. The FHMID pays for services of a manager (part-time) and gardening service, in addition to security. Sixty six percent of the budget is allocated to security services.

a. Security Arrangements

The FHMID opted for the use of a private security company that provides patrols from 8h00 to 20h00 daily. Three security officers are deployed on bicycle and linked by radio to a response vehicle, which provides back up.

During season (December to March) six casual law enforcement personnel are deployed in the area, three of which are dedicated to the CBD. Two CPOs sponsored by the City, are deployed at the local interchange between hours of 6h00 and 18h00. The relationship with Municipal Law Enforcement has not been easy according to the FHMID. The lack of staff and over-extended personnel has resulted in a poor presence of law enforcement in the area.

b. Impact on Crime

According to the FHMID crime has decreased in the area since the inception of the project. The excellent co-operation facilitated by a vibrant GOCOC (Ground Operation Coordinating Committee) and the services of the Emergency Call Centre (initiated prior to the FHMID and run by volunteers), which operates as a central call centre for the public from 6h00 to 22h00, have also been instrumental in this regard.

The main problems experienced in the area are shoplifting, vagrancy related anti-social behaviour and occasionally, armed robbery.

c. Successes and Limitations of Security Arrangements

- Private Security

The FHMID reports a good relationship between itself and the private security company. One of the major reasons for this is the ongoing monitoring of the company. The private security officers report daily to the SAPS at the beginning of each shift. In addition they are set a target to consult with ten businesses daily and have a book in which they record comments. At the end of the shift the security company reports to the CID manager who signs off the occurrence book. Another contributing factor to this good working relationship is the accessibility of the private security company. It is based in the same locality and secondly it provides a dedicated liaison person at management level with whom the FHMID can communicate at all times.

The reasons advanced for the choice of private security as opposed to CPOs were firstly, concern that the FHMID would have no control over CPOs and that the SAPS would utilise the CPOs for other functions. Secondly, the impending phasing out of the CPO scheme. Finally, the use of private security is the most cost-effective alternative. Recognising the limitations of the private security option particularly in relation to the lack of powers and peace officer status, the FHMID has been negotiating with the security company to train security officers as police reservists.

- SAPS

The successful operation of the local GOCOC on which all parties participate i.e. Neighbourhood Watch, private security, Metrorail, local CPF and City Law Enforcement, has been instrumental in a good working relationship between the FHMID and the SAPS. In addition the area boasts a functional CPF.

- City

The FHMID reports a poor relationship with the City, a major complaint being passed from "pillar to post".

- Homelessness

Problems experienced with homelessness relate primarily to adults and to a lesser extent with street children. When available Municipal Law Enforcement have been effective in dealing with street children often taking them home, social workers however, are rarely available. The absence of a lock-up facility for street children involved in crime, or a shelter in the area has exacerbated the problem.

The FHMID participates in the Goodhope Street Peoples Forum and is investigating options of establishing an assessment centre in the area.

d. Challenges facing the FHMID

Like other improvement districts utilising contract security the FHMID will have to explore options should the City preclude the use of levies for private security contractors. In the absence of any discussion or ultimatum by the City the FHMID is continuing with the present arrangement. A further challenge facing the FHMID is dealing with the homeless issue. Lack of funds have inhibited the ability of the FHMID to establish facilities. The NGO and faith sectors have been approached to assist with funding.

7.2.6 Muizenberg Municipal Improvement District (MID)

The MID was established in April 2001 and register in November 2001. Prior to this (from January 2001) donations from certain members of the community were utilised to contract a private security company (the Mountain Men) and pay for administrative services. The catalyst for the organisation of this community arose out of spiralling crime and gangsterism in the area. Community organisation culminated in marches to the local SAPS police station organised by the Village Action Group in conjunction to the MID committee (which was established in April 2000).

The MID covers an area of 380 properties 20% of which are business and 80% residential. The MID levy is 13%. Approximately 60 % of the budget is allocated to security, and 40 % to salaries and administration. Due to problems with Council's debt collection process and administration the cleansing component is operating at 30% of the proposed level.

a. Security Arrangements

The MID has contracted the services of the Mountain Men, a private security company, which originated in the Lakeside area. The Mountain Men, whilst a registered security company, is unlike any of its counterparts. Personnel are deployed on the mountain using binoculars to perform surveillance and are equipped with police radios and cell phones to enable them to communicate with patrol teams on the ground. The unconventional modus operandi has proved extremely successful. The company, in addition to patrolling (often in plain clothes), performs an investigative function as well. Boasting a substantial database of individuals and incidents in the area with information including digital photographs, the Mountain Men work closely with the SAPS, often compiling their own dockets.

The success of this arrangement according to the MID is based on the commitment of personnel and an information-driven approach. The Mountain Men consist primarily of former police officers and all members are police reservist.

b. Impact on Crime

The main problems experienced in the area ranged from residential and business burglaries, theft of and from motor vehicles and muggings particularly at night. Since the inception of operations by the Mountain Men the area has recorded a substantial reduction in crime. This initiative coupled with investigations against gangs, programmes to deal with derelict buildings and absentee landlords are seen as major contributors to the rejuvenation of the area and reduction of crime.

It is estimated that the Mountain Men arrest record is in the region of 30 a month, 70% of which are drinking-related violations and 30% other crimes.

The large refugee community has been a source of controversy in the community with certain parties arguing that they are contributing to the violation of By-laws on account of unemployment and concomitant poverty. Most refugees are housed in rented accommodation often in overcrowded conditions. The high rate of unemployment and fact that the majority of refugees are men, it is argued, has resulted in problems such as shebeening, prostitution and anti-social behaviour.

c. Successes and Limitations of Security Arrangements

- SAPS

Concerns around the conduct of the SAPS, ranging from collusion with gangsters to corruption, culminated in the community mobilising and lobbying for the removal of the station commissioner. This development together with the rejuvenation of the CPF has helped improve the relationship with the SAPS.

- The City

The lack of after-hours by-law enforcement and poor management of beach areas and public amenities by the City is cited as a major problem.

- Homelessness

Problems of homelessness relate primarily to adults resident in the local park. The high incidence of alcohol consumption is a major contributing factor to the anti-social behaviour of this group. This is exacerbated by the absence of a shelter in the area.

d. Challenges facing the MID

One of the major challenges facing the MID is financial. Due to the prevalence of absentee landlords and neglected buildings (although this trend is being reversed through interventions by the City and the MID), the collection of rates and service fees by the City is far from optimal. This has a

negative impacting on the contribution received by the MID from the City. A further concern facing the MID is the possibility of restrictions by the City on the use of the levy for private security. The possibility of alternative arrangements such as the use of municipal police are viewed negatively due to high cost and lack of control in terms of management and deployment.

7.2.7 Parow

The Tygerberg Administration is currently in the process of negotiating the establishment of a Community Improvement District in Parow.

7.3 Concerns and Challenges facing Improvement Districts

7.3.1 Legal Challenges

The City has been provided with legal opinion on the issue of the by-law for the Establishment of Municipal Improvement Districts. The most controversial aspect relates to the delegation by the City of its crime prevention (security) function i.e. the use of the top up levy to contract private security, which is regarded as *ultra vires*. The City has not taken decisive action with regard to this issue but advised improvement districts to consult prior to renewing contracts with private security providers.

The question of the legality of this arrangement has prompted some debate as to what alternatives are available. Whilst the CPS would provide all services, i.e. by-law and traffic enforcement and crime prevention, the cost of a City Police officer is extremely high compared to that of a private security officer or CPO. One suggestion has been the possible use of CPS reservists who can be paid some form of an allowance, which will operate in a similar manner as the SAPS reservists. This issue however, has not been fully investigated by either the City or the improvement districts.

7.3.2 The Scope of the Improvement District – the Question of Residential Areas

The submission of applications by residential areas to form improvement districts has prompted the City to review the initial purpose of establishing improvement districts. It has been argued that the primary purpose of an improvement district is to support a business district area, which first requires a range of services to be topped up, and secondly, which benefits not just landowners but the community at large. The rationale being that the improvement of services will benefit all that utilise the area; employees, commuters and tourists. Furthermore, the improvement of services will boost the local economy and create more jobs benefiting society as a whole. In the case of residential areas, interest groups seeking the creation of an improvement district are primarily concerned about security and crime. The

challenge presented to the City is whether it should be facilitating (through the collection of levies and management of the relationship) the creation of improvement districts in residential areas for the primary purpose of improving security.

The main disadvantage of the City regulating these residential initiatives is the strain on Council resources. The number of residential initiatives could be vast, impacting on administrative and personpower resources. Furthermore, because these areas are often more affluent, Council resources will be deployed in these areas and poorer more disadvantaged areas may receive less attention. The disadvantage of no form of regulation however, is that these initiatives could very easily result in 'laager communities', or communities taking extreme steps to address crime problems in their area, which may be illegal or have serious policy implications. This is evident in the case of neighbourhood watch initiatives that in some instances were being exploited by certain groupings and whose members were acting illegally. This prompted an intervention by the Provincial Government to provide basic training and a registration process for associations, thereby ensuring compliance to certain standards and behaviour.

Many residential areas have opted for voluntary subscriptions, which are managed by a Section 21 company, or through their local civic association or neighbourhood watch. These subscriptions are utilised to contract the services of local security companies to provide patrols in an effort to curb crime. In most areas where these initiatives have been operating police have welcomed the additional assistance and have good working relationships with the private security companies.

8. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY

The growing use of private security raises critical policy issues. The concerns arising from the concept of security for sale are explored by Shearing and Kempa.⁵¹ First they note that "security for sale" means that only those who can afford it can have it. Paid security companies pursue the priorities and interests of their clients, resulting in security becoming a commodity. Secondly, private security is not accountable to Government, and can often operate on the border of acceptable legal conduct. Similarly, vigilante initiatives in certain instances assume judicial responsibility when dishing out punishment, often violating basic human rights. If not managed properly, they argue, private security can and has already in some instances reinvented the mentalities, structures and practices of Apartheid. Initiatives, such as gated communities that emerged in the 1990s and continue to grow; malls and private shopping centres, which take on the form of mini cities, provide proprietors with legal rights to defend ownership. In many instances this amounts to the removal of undesirable conduct that interferes with the security necessary for profit-making. Persons who engage in certain behaviour or by

⁵¹ Shearing and Kempa, op. cit., p. 2

appearance pose a threat are denied access, removed or have their freedom of movement limited. The danger Shearing and Kempa argue is that private policing in these mass private spaces often takes on a nuanced mode or racism, with the poor, most often black, being excluded from these spaces.

Despite these concerns, the authors argue that private security does have a positive and critical role to play. The state can no longer assume exclusive responsibility for safety and security and state agencies, they argue, are not capable of or best placed to do so. The challenge for Government is to ensure that the activity of paid private and vigilante forms of security are appropriately directed, and civic and voluntary policing initiatives are amplified. Legal modes of regulation, it is argued, are insufficient and inappropriate. First, the emphasis on regulation of independent private security companies often excludes informal initiatives. Secondly, attempts to monitor conduct from a centralised, accountable body are also difficult. The authors suggest that government utilise the resources of local agencies and structures to monitor such initiatives, and further that the state shape the use of private security towards democratic outcomes by facilitating access to security. In order to achieve this they argue the state must firstly define principles for what policing is intended to accomplish, secondly, develop suitable mechanism for holding participants accountable and thirdly, facilitate access for all citizens to the private security market, where necessary providing funding.

This approach requires a fundamental shift from seeing the role of the state as provider of security through the institution of the police to “facilitating access to the outcome of security for all of its citizens.”⁵²

9. CONCLUSION

The City of Cape Town faces a number of critical challenges and opportunities for governance and particularly, safety and security. The establishment of the long awaited Municipal Police Service in the Cape Metropolitan area has changed the policing landscape. First, the CPS has an onerous task of living up to public expectations. In the face of the perceived poor performance by the SAPS this burden is not an easy one given the limitations and challenges facing the service itself. The issue of integration of existing law enforcement personnel and limited budgets have impacted on the number officers currently in the CPS and therefore its deployment strategy. Secondly, the vacuum soon to be created by the cessation of the Community Patrol Officer Scheme will place an additional burden on the CPS. Thirdly, the responsibility of crime prevention is however not the exclusive mandate of the CPS. In this regard it is critical that the City ensure a realignment of business to incorporate the philosophy of crime prevention and to ensure social crime prevention programmes in relevant community and municipal services.

⁵² Shearing and Kempa, op.cit., p. 14

The implications of the establishment of the CPS for the SAPS are numerous. Most significant is the need for both agencies to define roles and responsibilities, particularly in relation to the shared core function of crime prevention. How the SAPS relationship with the CPS evolves will be critical for public safety. Whether the SAPS relates to the MPS as junior partner to whom it can delegate functions, or whether it sees the CPS as a valuable ally to augment its strategies and resources will soon be evident.

The necessary interface between the City and the Ministry of Community Safety in the province highlights the need for co-operative governance. The Provincial Ministry of Community Safety and its functionary the Department have a critical role in ensuring synergy in strategy and operations between themselves, the CPS and the SAPS, particularly around issues of deployment of resources and priorities.

The Community Patrol Officer Scheme, despite its problems has played a valuable role in providing visible policing at local level when and where the SAPS were unable to do so. In addition they have supplemented dwindling police resources and have in certain areas become crucial to the functioning of police stations. Ironically it has been local government that has footed this bill. The private sector has also capitalised on the availability of “rent-a-cop” with business employing CPOs to protect their businesses. Certain improvement districts have also utilised CPOs to provide top-up security services. The flexibility of the CPO scheme has been its major success but also its downfall. The main problems outlined have been the difficulty of managing a relationship where there are so many players: the SAPS as operational controller, the Board as employer and the sponsor as client. The use of CPS officers in improvement districts may provide a solution but the issue of cost and how this relationship will be managed needs further investigation.

The improvement districts initiative has raised a number of policy questions that the City needs to address urgently in a comprehensive policy on improvement districts. In addition there is a need to standardise and improve the by-laws governing improvement districts throughout the Unicity, and to clarify the City’s role in relation to residential and private security initiatives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fanaroff, Bernie 2000. Report to the Cape Town Unicity Commission on the Scope of a proposed project to develop a comprehensive safety and security strategy for the Unicity. Cape Town: Resolve Crime and Security Solutions.

Rauch, J. Shaw, M. & Louw, A. 2001. *Municipal Policing in South Africa*. ISS Monograph Series No. 67, Institute for Security Studies.

Kempa, M. & Shearing, C. 2001. 'Crime and Policing in Transition: Comparative Perspectives' in *Crime and policing in transitional societies*. South African Institute of International Affairs, 30 August –1 September 2000. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stifting.

City of Cape Town

Sangster, M. 2002 'The Establishment of a Municipal Police Service for the City of Cape Town as a Component of the City's Safety Strategy – Challenges and Successes achieved'. Paper Delivered at the Municipal Police Seminar held at the Philippi College, Cape Town, 20-23 May 2002.

Cape Town City Police 2002. *Annual Police Plan* July 2002- June 2003.

Business Plan for A Comprehensive Community Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy for the City of Cape Town. 2001, February. Commissioned by the Unicity Commission, Cape Town.

South African Police Services

South African Police Service Western Cape Annual Report 2001/2002-09-20

South African Police Service Operational Plan Western Cape 2002/2003

South African Police Service Western Cape Annual Report 2000/2001

South African Legislation

South African Police Services Amendment Act No 83 of 1998

Local Government: Municipal Structures Act No. 117 of 1998

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996

South African Police Service Act No 68 of 1995

Regulations governing the establishment of Municipal Police Services
published in Government Notice No R710, Government Gazette No. 20142
(11 June 1999)

By-Laws

City of Cape Town Bylaw for the Establishment of City Improvement Districts
PN 116/1999 Provincial Gazette 5337 dated 26 March 1999 amended PN
511/2000 29 September 2000

South Peninsula Municipality By Law for the Establishment of Municipal
Improvement Districts Provincial Gazette 5434 dated 10 March 2000

City of Tygerberg: By Law for the Establishment of Community Improvement
Districts Provincial Notice 557/2000 dated 13 October 2000 amended under
Provincial Notice 659 dated 1 December 2000

Web Sites

<<http://www.cityofcapetown>>

< <http://www.saps.org.za>>