

IDEAS FOR AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

33335

CHAPTER I - Aims of Psychological Warfare

A brief statement of the nature of total war <sup>of its</sup> ~~has~~ <sup>ation of</sup> presented new vulnerabilities, particularly <sup>more</sup> susceptible to psychological attack. A note on the way in which Psychological Warfare complements the actual military phase ~~and~~ ~~and~~ reduces the costs of physical combat. A briefly stated example or two of the successful use of Psychological Warfare either in this war or any previous one.

A brief statement of the general aims of war and the description of the aims of Psychological Warfare; namely, to undermine the enemy's will and capacity to resist. This very generally stated aim is more successfully treated if broken down into two subsidiary aims; namely, demoralization and encouragement or persuasion.

Demoralization may best be regarded as the end result of any few of the following psychological states.

1. Fear and anxiety
2. Terror
3. Hopelessness and defeatism
4. Distrust of
  - A. One's cause
  - B. Leaders
  - C. Ideas and issues
  - D. Information channels and propaganda
5. Home-sickness, concern about family, etc.
6. Horror of war
7. War weariness
8. Willingness to act subversively
9. Guilt feelings
10. Loss of individual integrity and self-respect
11. Antagonism toward or loss of faith in one's allies.
12. Sympathy for vassals, occupied peoples, etc.
13. Loss of fear of surrender and desertion
14. Loss of faith in associates, impression of demoralization
15. Fear of punishment, reprisal, retribution, etc.
16. False hopes
17. Apathy
18. All devices that may engender confusion such as
  - A. Hesitancy and oscillation
  - B. Deception
  - C. Sudden unexpected events
  - D. Expected events that do not take place
  - E. Crying wolf
  - F. False or misleading information
  - G. Changing signs
  - H. False orders
  - I. Too many signs to adjust to
  - J. Completely new, unprecedented situations.
  - K. Distraction

Encouragement and Persuasion (Techniques here should be divided in terms of those most applicable to neutrals and occupied peoples, on the one hand, and the enemy, on the other hand). A list of some of the psychological states to be produced follows:

1. Faith in our cause
2. The evil nature of the enemy cause.
3. Will to resist
4. Hope
5. Conviction of our strength
6. Post-war hopes
7. Honesty of our leaders
8. Memory of our previously given aid.
9. Acceptance of the accuracy of our information
10. Depend~~ence~~ upon us as their deliverers.

## CHAPTER II - *Media of Psychological Warfare*

I. AIMS (The major aims of U.S. psychological warfare in the target areas. The relatively specific objectives which psychological warfare hopes to achieve.)

II. AMMUNITION (Corresponds roughly to "The VII General Courses of Action" in the "Pattern for Psychological Warfare Plans." Gives the specific propaganda line, the specific operations desired, etc.)

III. WEAPONS (The specific acts and propaganda instruments which are to be ultimately used.)

### A. By the spoken word

1. Radio
  - a. Official broadcasts
  - b. Clandestine radio (including freedom stations, ghost voices, and jamming).
2. Persons
  - a. Open verbal contacts
    - (1) By diplomatic personnel
    - (2) By business personnel
    - (3) By newspaper correspondents
  - b. Via subversive agents (rumor, whispering campaigns).
3. Phonograph records

### B. By the printed word

1. Leaflets and pamphlets
  - a. Official propaganda publications
  - b. Anonymous clandestine publications
2. Labels and symbols, etc. (Distributed separately or on packaged goods, etc.)
3. Advertising in local publications
4. Books (inspirational novels, etc.)
5. Letters (chain letters, etc.)
6. Newspapers and news services

C. Graphics

1. Posters
2. Graphic leaflets
3. Photographs
4. Motion pictures (newsreels, documentaries, features)
5. Cartoons and comics
6. Post cards
7. Pyrotechnics
8. Sky writing

D. Psychological Warfare through acts

1. Physical sabotage
  - a. Communications
  - b. Against supply systems
2. Non-verbal moral sabotage
  - a. Bribery
  - b. Counterfeiting
    - (1) Currency
    - (2) Identification documents
    - (3) Ration books
    - (4) Orienting signs (street signs)
    - (5) Instructions
3. Creation of incidents
  - a. Riots and disturbances
  - b. Panics
  - c. False alarms
4. Dispersal of food, other commodities and services
5. Supplying psychological warfare equipment and instructions to sympathetic persons
  - a. Material for physical sabotage
  - b. Material for propaganda and moral sabotage
6. Non-verbal sounds (shrieking bombs, etc.)

IV. OPERATING UNITS

- A. Mass communications
  1. Radio broadcasting
  2. News agencies and the press
  3. Motion pictures
- B. Black market channels
  1. Financial black market
  2. Commodity black market
    - a. Supplying consumers goods
    - b. Supplying raw materials
  3. Political black market
    - a. Passports, permits, etc.
    - b. Smuggling of persons
- C. Combat propaganda agencies
- D. Underground organizations
  1. Agents
  2. Native underground

E. Diplomatic channels

F. Cultural channels

1. Religious organizations
2. Business contacts
3. Labor organizations
4. Professional groups (including educational)
5. Political organizations
6. Social and recreational channels (including music and the arts)
7. Other organizations such as for woman, youth groups, etc.

G. Postal channels

H. Air distribution

V. OPERATING AGENCIES

A. Office of Strategic Services

B. Office of War Information

C. State Department

D. Federal Bureau of Investigation

E. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs

F. Board of Economic Warfare

G. Army and Navy

H. Red Cross and other relief agencies

I. British Agencies

~~THE~~ TACTICS (The synchronization of all specific operations in time and space. Detailing the contingencies or actual dates for the initiation of the various operations, as well as for their cessation.)

CHAPTER III - TACTICS of Psychological Warfare

A. General-The successful operations of the propagandist are dependent upon his ability to adjust his efforts to the following: 1-The clear recognition of the aims (as stated in Chapter I) to be achieved; 2-His ability to make a reasonably accurate estimate of the morale of the people addressed in his propaganda, with particular attention to their vulnerabilities; 3-The choice of one or several media most appropriate in terms of the number of people that can be reached and the vividness with which

reached and the vividness with which the message can be delivered; 4-The organization of the contents of a particular message so as to take the best possible advantage of the first three of these considerations. It is suggested that the thought of the propagandist may best follow ~~this pattern~~. In every case, one should start with a clear-cut conception of the psychological states or attitudes to be ~~imparted~~. Obviously the same set of attitudes may be produced by various techniques and, conversely, different attitudes may be suggested by the same technique. The recognition of this does not destroy the usefulness of the pattern suggested above, but serves mainly to remind us of the abundant room for ingenuity. This ingenuity is best expressed by choosing ~~not~~ any one of the techniques available, ~~by application of~~ any single medium, or ~~by selection of~~ any one psychological state, <sup>but</sup> by the choice of several at the same time, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~organizing~~ <sup>incorporating</sup> them into a campaign mutually reinforcing each other. The technique now resembles the procedures of advertising and might even reasonably employ such a motive as curiosity to prepare one's audience for the next message. The factor of repetition can be handled without any loss of interest and attention in this fashion as well.

*Insert* → B. Specific Operations Plans — (the material on cards)

*Strategy* <sup>Class IV</sup> The person conducting psychological warfare should regard as part of his equipment a complete knowledge of all those situations which lend themselves to particular kinds of propaganda. He should have at his finger-tips a long list of special situations that lend themselves to the employment of any few of his techniques of encouragement or demoralization. This list must be so complete as to include also events unfavorable for the pursuit of his aims. In each case, however, he must know at once how the situation may be turned to his benefit in the realm of propaganda. A partial list of such situations is suggested below.

1. Victory
2. Defeat
3. Stalemate or inactivity
4. Speeches and statements of prominent figures
5. Economic developments, for example: rationing, production figures, etc.
6. Diplomatic developments
7. Political--domestic and international
8. Invasion--preliminary and during
9. Current operations--winning and losing
10. Meetings
11. Bombing--air-raids
12. Submarine warfare
13. Own weaknesses
14. Death and depositions

Some few ways in which the situations listed above may be exploited for propaganda purposes are suggested below.

1. Victory
  - A. Exploited with specific facts and figures of enemy losses, number of prisoners, etc.

- B. Consequences for future military action
- C. Proof of power
- D. Confute enemy propaganda
- E. Part of inevitable development.
- F. Enemy was at his best, but simply not good enough
- G. Wanton sacrifice of enemy lives
- H. Actual military gains in property, goods, etc.
- I. Rejoicing of liberated peoples

## 2. Defeat

A. Knowledge that defeat is decisive, it should be described as a strategic with-drawal, elastic defense, shortening our lines of supply, orderly withdrawal, cost to enemy, war of movement, decisive battle yet to come, increased vulnerability of enemy, lose battles but ~~lose~~ <sup>win</sup> the war.

B. With minor defeat when major victory is in the offing, publicize and exaggerate the defeat.

C. Where possible follow the democratic principles of offering nothing but the truth.

## 3. Stalemate

- A. Ideologies
- B. Threatening attack
- C. Destroy combative ~~spirit~~
- D. War weariness and home-sickness

## 4. Air Raids

- A. Blame civilian suffering on enemy graft
- B. Effectiveness
- C. Threats of **MORE**
- D. Mass migration
- E. Or small ~~stale~~ losses indicate enemy inferiority
- F. False air-raid warnings

## 5. Invasion

- A. War of nerves
- B. Confusion
- C. Panic
- D. The threat not simply of a second front but of multiple fronts.