

affection and love of justice, exists and can be comprehended only in relation to, and dependent upon, its moral value. Psychology, the science of consciousness, should acquire a high consciousness of itself. This would not be only an elegant detail in the department of erudition but an actual ennoblement of the mind and of humanity. When psychology shall have advanced to the true and complete idea of itself it will raise to the loftiest heights all culture and life. Even ethics will gain thereby. Abandoned forever will be the petty etymological peripatetic conception that ethics is the science of customs. As soon as people comprehend that the mind is everything and that everything is in the mind, that the mind is not a means but an end, is not a part of a certain totality, but what has hitherto been conceived as the all is only an effect and a part of mind; we will comprehend that there is no goodness outside of the mind, and we shall easily come to recognize in ethics the science of character and of duty. Every question, every social and political problem should be solved in view of the rights and the finality of the mind. Government, property and customs will be for the mind. The mind has too long been subordinated to its own creations.

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NON-ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC.

Mr. Charles S. S. Peirce adds the following explanation to his comment on non-Aristotelian logic, published on page 45 of the present number of *The Monist*.

"It does not seem to me to have been a lunatic study. On the contrary, perhaps if I had pursued it further, it might have drawn my attention to features of logic that had been overlooked. However, I came to the conclusion that it was not worth my while to pursue that line of thought further. In order to show what sort of false hypotheses they were that I traced out to their consequences, I will mention that one of them was that instead of the form of necessary inference being, as it is, that from A being in a certain relation to B, and B in the same relation to C, it necessarily follows that A is in the same relation to C, I supposed, in one case, that the nature of Reason were such that the fundamental form of inference was, A is in a certain relation to B and B in the same relation to C, whence it necessarily follows that C is in the same relation to A; and I followed out various other similar modifications of logic."

We deny "that from A being in a certain relation to B, and B in the same relation to C, it necessarily follows that A is in the

same relation to C." The statement is not a necessary inference according to the established rules of logic, nor could it be considered Aristotelian.

If A stands in the relation of cousin to B, and B stands in the same relation to C, it does *not* necessarily follow that A is a cousin to C. Or take another instance. If A has a relation to B such as lying 5 feet below B, and B has the same relation to C, it does not follow that A lies 5 feet below C.

We do not venture to discuss the non-Aristotelian substitute, because we are not sure to have grasped the meaning which Mr. Peirce intends to convey.

We will further add that we never used the word "lunatic" in connection with non-Aristotelian logic, nor would we say that it will not be "worth looking into" the theory of a non-Aristotelian logic "notwithstanding its falsity."

P. C.