The Protocol


Organization should be conducted by “groups” of 18-35 voters, though the actual number used initially should hover around twenty-five. This allows ten more “slots” for later entries, but still no more than thirty-five.

Thirty-five” seems to be a number used by the American IRS as a maximum number of members for certain types of corporate and partnership entities. It is thought that the number was chosen as one in which each in the group could easily remember the face of and thus recognize all others.

The number should be used here as it has accepted legal precedence and is a number that clearly fits its purpose.

As groups are formed, each might communicate via a website setup for the purpose by “one” interested but non-partisan civic group. It will only be for communication between groups. No politics or discussion here of any kind except for that concerning organization.

Each area (let's use a “city” here) will be divided up by roadway boundaries (streets & highways). “groups” of voters will be exclusively taken from “areas” in which they reside, areas that are delineated by these natural boundaries.

This is important as no one living outside a groups area must be allowed in the group. This is for purposes of a more secure voter ID.

Each area of the city should then be divided via roadways into approximately 300-1,000 voters. This should provide some ten to thirty-five groups per area. A little more or less here should be adequate.

Though not absolutely necessary, anyone initiating a group could place an orange cloth in a conspicuous place on their property. This is to provide information and direction to those interested but are without Internet. A temporary website might also be started for the “single” purpose of organization.

As group membership increases to three or more, consider going door to door and asking people nearby who are voters to participate. A two-sided “handout” explaining the basic concept and expectations of the potential voter would be a nice touch here.

At twenty-five members you should consider your group formed until later. At that time others who didn't want to participate initially may begin to sense the groundswell. They then may fill the empty ten slots, but no more than thirty-five total.

Try to encourage as best you can, a balanced membership of political views based on known political partisanship. It's not absolute, but a good portion of the major parties and at least one or two of the minor parties should do.

A group composed of essentially one party must not be allowed. The rationale for this is “credibility”. Many political views suggests opposing views watchfully checking each other. It further indicates a general motivation arising from the people, rather than one of narrow partisanship. In this case, “perception” cannot be overstated.


It may be important that each “not” know the last name of the voter for privacy reasons. You might ask for their first and middle name and for proof of their eligibility to vote.

That proof may be in the form of a government issued voter or ID card. Provide them with a device that shields their last name. The device could easily be made of card stock and “Scotch” tape.

This will be your permanent group. Once formed the group should gather at at convenient place. A home, a park or a private room might do. Please no talk of politics, simply meet and greet each other.

A “sticky” tag with the voters first and middle name (plus possibly a pseudonym) should be provided and worn on the chest for ease of view. Assign them a number between one and thirty-five that will be their permanent seating number later on, possibly based on the order in which they enter the group.

The purpose of all this is to come to “know” these people on site. By doing so you are solving one of the largest and seemingly unsolvable problems of remedying vote fraud, “Voter Identification”.

By coming to “know” those in your group, you are emphatically answering the questions: How do I know that the person who is claiming to be a voter here; 1) is legally eligible to vote 2) isn't voting a second time using another's name 3) isn't voting using the name of a deceased person 4) isn't a person who has surreptitiously entered our group for ill purpose.

At this meeting a persons voter ID is checked again. If it possesses a voter ID #, that number, first and middle name and address is taken. You must “know” that the person is eligible to vote and be able to recognize them by sight.

Further, a facial picture and a persons “index” finger print is taken. This last point is important as the index print is a way by which each in the group may be “absolutely” ID'd if necessary. It is a print that will probably only be known to the group, as governments usually require only a thumb print. (more on that later)

At this point all the info is combined, including facial and index fingerprint pictures. All the info is then printed out using a color ink-jet printer of reasonable quality. Each voter/verifier receives a copy.

Note: All conducted at this meeting must result in an information sheet being generated, copied and received by all at that meeting. If for any reason this cannot be done, the meeting must be conducted again until it is. As members are added the process must be repeated.

Remember, you are basically “witnessing” the forming of your group “at that particular point in time”. Later, in a court, this could become crucial. Make certain it doesn't!

Dot the “I's” - cross the “T's”! - If nothing else, your attention to detail here should impress those in your group with the importance of what's being done, not to mention a court of law nor the court of public opinion.

Note: There probably will be members of groups who for various reasons may not be able to attend the R-Vva. A “proxy” vote for these people, witnessed by several members, then sealed in an envelope and retained by the secretary is a possibility. However, this also opens the possibility that a voter might surreptitiously vote a second time elsewhere. Though unlikely and something that should be easily caught by any vigilant group, you should expect any such mole-hill to grow to the size of mountains in a court of law by opposition intent on denigrating an R-Vva.

A possibility that might solve this and other problems, is to use one of these new fingerprint scanners on all who enter the group. Then develop an entire database accessible by all groups. This database might also include a facial photo of anyone who wants to vote but cannot be present. The prints of these people could then be broadcast to all, yet still maintain anonymity. Indeed, something like this might be used as an adjunct to this protocol to further secure a verifiers ID. But if used, be sure to mull it over carefully and document all your actions or changes.


Vote verification is analogous to voting. Except that in this case you're simply stating how you voted previously.

Verification must take place on a day in which all members of “all” groups can come together in one location. Probably a Sunday or Saturday. The process should go quickly. If it begins at One o'clock you should be done by Four.

The process should be conducted in a local sports stadium or something of equivalence. It should be one in which the bleachers “rise” at an angle so that one person may be seen and “photographed” by verifiers in bleachers from across the field.

In the stands there might be as many as two hundred areas set aside of equal spacing. Each will be occupied by five groups of up to thirty-five voter/verifiers, for a total of as many as 175.

Each group will move into a makeshift cordoned off area where they will choose from a box of randomly mixed-up ballots. Their number being the same number as there are members in the group.

After having chosen their uniquely numbered, 2 page (carbon copy) ballot, they then mark their ballot on clipboards setup for the purpose. The clipboards might have a cardboard “shield” on their edges, so that no one is able to view the others choice.

The voter should then mark their ballot (in the margins) with an arbitrary group of “squiggly” lines, circles, crosses, numbers, letters etc. These must all be whatever “randomly” comes to mind, but in no case should be over (or near) an actual vote box or mark.

These lines constitute a “unique” identifier marked on only the original and the copy. In case of any question as to the authenticity of that “copy” only the person who created it, the verifier, possesses the original as absolute “proof” of ownership.

The verifier then “might” thumb print the back of both copies. This is for voter verification by government, if government can/does tie the voters ID/thumb print to their vote. This is of course discretionary. It is however solid evidence that the voter did indeed vote in the election being tested.

The verifier would then tear off and retain the top copy (the original), then double fold the remaining copy and seal it with one of those 1 inch “sticky” paper dots, all of the same color. They then would drop it into a collection box.

The collection box ballots would be immediately drawn one by one (preferably by a child) and each ballot would be placed on one or two boards marked (examples) “yes” and “no”, "candidates name" or "referendum number" etc.

The idea is for all ballots marked the same, to wind up in the same place to eliminate any possibility of a miscount by a member.

Each verifier would then visually verify that their vote appears precisely the way it was marked. If not, the process is halted until the anomaly is cleared up. Then it restarts.

Each in the group then counts"all" the votes to ensure they are the same number of votes as there are members in their group. They each take a picture of all ballots, all in one photo.

By a draw of numbers, a “foreperson” is chosen who tallies the votes-(That person is the“go to”person through completion of the R-Vva.) If all agree with the tally they then scribe that tally on a white board measuring 3 feet by 1.5 feet. There should also be the ID number of the group, the day and the time, all written quite legibly.

The numbers should be large, easily read numbers made using an indelible, waterproof, smudge proof Marks-A-Lot type marker or quick-dry paint. The group then takes pictures of the foreperson (face showing) holding the marked white board standing next to the ballots, again all in one picture.

The votes are then gathered, bound, placed into a sealed envelope and becomes the possession of a previously selected “secretary” who receives and transmits all business of the group. That secretary only “acts” by group vote.

Once done the group moves to the outside of the verification area and the next group moves in to do the same as the previous. Each group on the outside observes and “witnesses” all other groups as they go through the process. At ten minutes per group, verification of all five groups could be done in less than one hour.


Once all groups have voted and verified, the selected “forepersons” of each group proceeds to a predetermined seat on the opposite side of the field with their white board. There should be an equal number of seats occupied per row for ease of counting.

In the center should be a large easily read white board of very large dimensions showing the date, time, the vote (ballot measure, candidates race etc.). At a predetermined time all forepeople hold their white boards above their heads angling them directly toward viewers across the field.

This should reveal their faces and their tallies so that assembled voter -verifiers, directly across from and/or high up in the stands, may again visually verify the tally is correct, then take pictures/movies of the entire procedure.

Note: Even if conducted in daylight, the lights of the stadium should be on as an adjunct to available lighting. This should obviate the need for “flash” on some cameras, a feature that could hinder a quality photograph by others. Flash on all cameras should be turned off during this time.

Further, the area in which forepeople are seated might best be at the base of the stadium. This area is closer to those taking photos and it may also afford a more suitable view“angle”. Previous experimentation is called for here.

A group of ten or more “alternate forepersons” selected from ten or more separate regions of the city together take one picture. That picture is taken from one hi-quality video camera that broadcasts via wi-fi a “hi-quality” photo of all forepersons holding their boards in an easily read fashion.

Note : This picture is “not” to be a picture taken and then broadcast via wi-fi. It must be a picture received in real-time from the same wi-fi “feed” as received by all others.

Anyone within a distance of 100 meters should be able to pick up and copy the feed on their cellphones, tablets or computers and verify the particular white board of their individual group.

Tally the total numbers of groups. Do the math and verify the compilation. If even one compilation is off, investigate and rectify the anomaly. If all compilations are the same, consider the results irrefutable. At this point the verification phase is complete.


The final photo is then uploaded to a previously created website by the nine alternates. It is then further verified by all interested parties via the Internet

The final tally of all votes of the city is simply a compilation of each, individual area. Each group must verify that their own tally gets properly posted to the final tally correctly. Then verify that the complete tally has been summed correctly.

Should there be any anomalies the issue should be brought first to the foreperson of the group, who with other forepersons will investigate, solve and rectify the problem if need be.

Note : The photo on each website “alone” becomes the final tally “instrument” of each stage of the entire process. Each  previously verified tally is only supportive of the successive tally until the “final tally” is established. That final tally is the ultimate “instrument”. To obviate tampering it should be a photo, a “screenshot” or even a pdf file.

Security here is of utmost importance as the final “file”, as well as the server itself are the two most likely points of attack. Secure them, then guard them.

The best IT people you can find should be consulted. If they keep your system secure, it should be quite a feather in their hat (and their resume'). Employ several of them, each operating as independent advisors. You might consider a cash prize (or even a parade) for the best system.

At this point the R-Vva is completed. Congratulations! You are now a people in genuine control of your country. Use it wisely.


None of this protocol is carved in stone. While everything presented here has its reason, there may be problems or special circumstances that require change.

A mock R-Vva should be taken for a “test drive”. Try ten or more groups at a local stadium. Run through the entire protocol. Identify problems, then fix them.

Make lists of all required for the day of the R-Vva. Have all that's required at the ready days in advance, including law enforcement officials, emergency staff and don't forget the porta-poties.

You should operate with a sense of priority. There may well be “suggestions” for the change of things that are relatively minor as compared to the highest priority. That priority being, “anything” that could be attackable in a court of law or the court of public opinion. An example of this is in order here.

Prior to 1875 in the U.S. the vote was conducted “viva voce” , or by voice vote. It was a vote in which “verification” was implicit. Then the “Secret Ballot” was introduced which ended the ability to verify the vote's transaction. The plausible rationale offered for the change was that it “prevented” vote buying and selling.

This was dubious at best and malevolently deceitful at worst, as the absentee-ballot (then called the “soldier vote”) had been introduced over a decade before, during the Civil War. It was a vote (and still is) that practically “invites” vote buying and selling, as it can be conducted on a kitchen table or in a back ally, well away from the watchful eyes to be found at a polling place.

This was a flimsy excuse for something that, by itself (secrecy), has made real election reform impossible. Some people demanded it then and some still demand it now. People whose agendas and/or intellectual capacity are questionable.

Watch out for these people, there is much at stake here. In this case, “deceitful” or just plain “dumb” can lead to the same wretched place. Your only defense is to have well thought out rationale, for all action or change.


R-Vva places the power & responsibility with you. It is a solution that is now completely in your hands. It's your baby. You own it! Use it wisely. Treat it with care and it will return to you the most important things a free person can possibly possess. A vote, a country and above all, freedom!

View the companion article on R-Vva:

A Note From The Author

I do hope this helps you, indeed that it helps us all. It has been a labor of love & hate for me. Sleepless nights trying to find ways around this enigma called “vote fraud”. But, if you'll use R-Vva and it results in a return of true freedom, then of course it will all be worth it. Remember, there is always hope, where there are people who refuse to quit. Good on ya'/mac



1) This essay may contain entirely new concepts regarding "vote verification" that may constitute intellectual property of a patentable nature. The author hereby reserves all rights and;

2) All intellectual property/patent rights that may be upheld or otherwise accrue to the author (owner) are hereby relinquished to the Public Domain.

© M. J. Sperry - November 3, 2014
All rights to this work are released to the Public Domain, but only if reprinted in its entirety including disclaimers. Please distribute widely.

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