



Department of Defense MANUAL

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USD(AT&L)

SUBJECT: Joint Services Weapon Safety Review (JSWSR) Process

References: See Enclosure 1

1. PURPOSE. In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5134.01 (Reference (a)), this manual implements policy established in Interim DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02 (Reference (b)) and DoDI 5000.69 (Reference (c)), assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for managing the JSWSR Process for weapons, weapon systems, ammunition, and any items containing explosives and energetic materials (referred to collectively in this manual as “weapons”) intended to be used by two or more DoD Components.

2. APPLICABILITY. This manual applies to OSD, the Military Departments (MILDEPs), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this manual as the “DoD Components”).

3. POLICY. It is DoD policy in accordance with Reference (c) to:

a. Conduct safety reviews for joint weapon systems through the collaborative meetings of the Services’ weapon safety boards.

b. Conduct JSWSR for joint weapon systems. These joint reviews include the Services’ existing weapon, fuze, ignition system, and software review boards working collaboratively to provide one set of joint weapon safety findings for a joint system.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.

5. PROCEDURES. See Enclosure 3.

6. **RELEASABILITY. Cleared for public release.** This manual is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>.

7. **EFFECTIVE DATE.** This manual:

a. Is effective July 30, 2014.

b. Will expire effective July 30, 2024 if it hasn't been reissued or cancelled in accordance with DoDI 5025.01 (Reference (d)).



Alan Shaffer
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering

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ENCLOSURE 1

REFERENCES

- (a) DoD Directive 5134.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)),” December 9, 2005, as amended
- (b) Interim DoD Instruction 5000.02, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” November 25, 2013
- (c) DoD Instruction 5000.69, “DoD Joint Services Weapon and Laser System Safety Review Processes,” November 9, 2011
- (d) DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Issuances Program,” June 6, 2014
- (e) DoD Directive 5000.71, “Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs,” August 24, 2012
- (f) Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01H, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System,” January 10, 2012
- (g) Department of Defense Preparation Guide, “Preparation Guide for the Joint Services Weapon Safety Review Safety Data Package,” June 2014¹
- (h) Military Standard MIL-STD-882E, “Department of Defense Standard Practice: System Safety,” May 11, 2012
- (i) Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” current edition
- (j) Title 10, United States Code

¹ Available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/pg/guidance.html#systemsafety>.

ENCLOSURE 2

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)). The USD(AT&L) oversees implementation of this manual during all phases of the weapon system life cycle, as defined in Reference (b).

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING (ASD(R&E)). Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the ASD(R&E) develops policy and provides guidance for JSWSRs in accordance with Reference (c), and monitors and reviews implementation of these policies to ensure effectiveness throughout the DoD.

3. DoD COMPONENT HEADS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEVELOPING AND ACQUIRING WEAPON SYSTEMS. The DoD Component heads responsible for developing and acquiring weapons systems:

a. Direct incorporation of joint safety requirements in weapon systems throughout the total system life cycle, from requirements development through disposal, when the system is intended to be used by two or more DoD Components.

b. Plan, program, and budget for safety reviews of the joint weapons under their cognizance.

c. Ensure that acquisition, operational, and support activities comply with joint safety requirements.

d. Integrate joint safety design, test, and review activities among the DoD Components when a weapon system is intended to be used by two or more DoD Components.

4. SECRETARIES OF THE MILDEPs. The Secretaries of the MILDEPs:

a. Ensure processes are in place to support the JSWSRs.

b. Ensure risks resulting from the systems engineering process are accepted by the appropriate acquisition authorities before fielding the system to the warfighters in compliance with Reference (b).


ENCLOSURE 3

JSWSR PROCESS

1. INTRODUCTION TO THE JSWSR PROCESS

a. Requirements for JSWSRs. In accordance with the requirements of Reference (c), weapons that will be used by two or more DoD Components will require a JSWSR. Figure 1 provides a notional depiction of the JSWSR process. A relative progression of time occurs from the top of the figure to the bottom. Events found in any column located on the same horizontal plane occur in the same time frame. The time scale provides the reader with an understanding of the processes' relative time frame.

Figure 1. JSWSR Process



Legend	
LSSRC	Lead Service Safety Review Coordinator
SSL	System Safety Lead
SSRC	Service Safety Review Coordinator
SDP	Safety Data Package
PM	Program Manager
WSRA	Weapon System Review Authority

b. Scope

(1) JSWSRs will be conducted:

(a) For weapons designated as joint Service weapons, including weapons resulting from a joint urgent operational need (JUON) or joint emergent operational need (JEON) in accordance with DoD Directive 5000.71 (Reference (e)). For new weapons, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) documents will reflect the joint weapon safety requirements in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01H (Reference (f)).

(b) For weapons that are not under the purview of JCIDS, but two or more (multi) Services are using or are expected to use the weapons.

(c) For joint weapons when changes potentially affect the safety of the weapon. For all system changes (e.g., technology refreshment, component replacements or upgrades, energetics replacements or upgrades, and software updates or upgrades), only the changed component(s) and any additional system components where the safety of the component is affected by the change, will require a JSWSR. However, the impact of the change or upgrade at the system level will be addressed at the JSWSR, including any changes in user scenarios, as a result of the upgrade. In the case of legacy system improvement or upgrade, where appropriate and pertinent, previously completed tests and technical information may be used in the development of the JSWSR SDP Preparation Guide (Reference (g)). The PM should consult with the LSSRC for technical content guidance.

(d) At the request of the program executive officer or PM.

(e) When the WSRA of the lead Service for the system acquisition invites one or more of the other Services to participate in a JSWSR when special circumstances or issues regarding the handling, transportation, or storage in joint operating environments are present.

(2) The conduct of the JSWSR for joint weapons will be concurrent with the existing Service weapon safety review. These JSWSRs include the Services' existing weapon review boards and the fuze, ignition system, and software safety review authorities who work collaboratively to provide one set of joint weapon safety findings for a joint weapon system.

(3) Weapons acquired or modified in response to a documented JUON, JEON, or DoD Component-specific urgent operational need will take precedence over other JSWSRs.

2. OBJECTIVE. Consistent with the requirements of References (b) and (c), this manual provides details for conducting JSWSRs. The JSWSR process is a collaborative process for weapons used by two or more DoD Components, and is conducted in conjunction with, **not** in addition to, the existing Service-specific weapon safety review processes.

3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE JSWSR PROCESS

a. JSWSR Boards. The Air Force Nonnuclear Munitions Safety Board (NNMSB), the Air Force Directed Energy Weapon Certification Board (DEWCB), the Army Weapon System Safety Review Board (AWSSRB) and the Navy Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board (WSESRB) will be referred to collectively in this manual as the “JSWSR Boards.”

b. WSRA. The Chair of the Air Force NNMSB, the Chair of the Air Force DEWCB, the Chair of the AWSSRB, and the Chair of the Navy WSESRB will be referred to collectively in this manual as the WSRA. The WSRA will designate SSRCs who will be responsible for coordination of the JSWSR process, as outlined in this enclosure. The WSRA is assigned responsibility to maintain and update the SDP, using a configuration control process, for the material found at the URL identified in paragraph 4d of this enclosure.

c. SSRC. The SSRC is designated by each Service’s WSRA and serves as the primary point of contact (POC) to assist or work with the LSSRC to facilitate coordinated JSWSRs of weapons within the MILDEPs. The SSRCs provide their Service requirements on safety analyses and test requirements, scheduling of reviews, and resources required by the safety organizations to the LSSRC. The duties and involvement of the respective SSRCs may differ depending on the requirements of individual MILDEPs and their normal system of assuring weapon safety. The SSRC may designate a technical representative(s) to assist and serve as the SSRC’s technical POC for particular actions relating to JSWSRs.

d. LSSRC. The LSSRC is designated as the SSRC from the MILDEPs assigned as the lead for the weapon acquisition effort. The LSSRC is the liaison between the WSRA and the PM for conduct of the JSWSRs. The LSSRC, after initial review of the planned acquisition program and the appropriate safety data and after consulting with the JSWSR Boards, advises the SSL regarding the type of JSWSRs required. When a determination is made by the LSSRC that the program is not joint and does not have a joint interest, the Service conducts a standalone safety review in accordance with their DoD Component review requirements and is not required to conduct a JSWSR. The duties of the LSSRC include coordination among the other Services’ SSRCs and the PM’s SSL for:

- (1) SDP content.
- (2) Coordinating JSWSRs and distributing SDPs.
- (3) Coordinating conduct of the JSWSRs.
- (4) Drafting of, and coordinating signatures on, JSWSR correspondences to the acquisition PM.
- (5) Monitoring closure of findings from JSWSRs.
- (6) Scheduling JSWSR meetings on behalf of the WSRA.

e. SSL. The SSL is the acquisition PM's system safety representative and is normally the chair of the program System Safety Working Group (SSWG). The SSL, on behalf of the PM, has overall responsibility for the execution of the System Safety Program (SSP). The PM's SSL is responsible for many activities during the JSWSR process. Specifically, the SSL must:

- (1) Develop a proposed approach to meet the Services' safety requirements.
- (2) Coordinate with the LSSRC to determine the types of reviews required.
- (3) Develop a schedule that facilitates completion of safety tasks (including tests and reviews).
- (4) Coordinate with the LSSRC to identify JSWSR requirements, including the SDP requirements.
- (5) Identify the resources required to conduct and complete safety program tasks, including JSWSRs.

f. Joint Services- Fuze and Ignition System Safety Authorities (JS-FISSA). The JS-FISSA review process is facilitated by a joint meeting of the Services' existing fuze and ignition system safety review boards and panels. The boards and panels are represented by each MILDEP. The JS-FISSA functions as a review authority under the direction of the JSWSR Boards for fuze and ignition system safety.

g. Joint Services- Software Safety Authorities (JS-SSA). The JS-SSA review process is facilitated by a joint meeting of the Services' existing software system safety review boards and panels. The boards and panels are represented by each MILDEP. The JS-SSA functions as a review authority under the direction of the JSWSR Boards for software safety.

4. PROCESS AND PROCEDURES FOR A JSWSR

a. Initiating a JSWSR. The process starts when the PM's (or PM-equivalent if not yet a formal acquisition program) designated SSL initiates dialogue with the LSSRC. The LSSRC will determine whether a JSWSR is required. The LSSRC will contact the other SSRCs who will, in turn, coordinate with their respective JSWSR Boards to determine the JSWSR review type. SSRC contact information is found in section 1 of Reference (g), and the most up-to-date information is found at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/pg/guidance.html#systemsafety>.


(1) JSWSRs should be held as acquisition programs progress in their design and approach milestone decisions. JSWSRs are required before equipment fielding and operational use. To maximize effectiveness of this process, programs may schedule these reviews in conjunction with:

- (a) Post Milestone A.

- (b) Preliminary Design Review (PDR).
- (c) Milestone B.
- (d) Critical Design Review (CDR).
- (e) Milestone C.
- (f) Flight testing, shipboard testing, user testing, including early user assessments or evaluation, and any other event in which the user will be involved.
- (g) Full Rate Production (FRP) Decision.
- (h) Product improvements or engineering change proposal implementation that affects the safety of the weapon.

(2) Figure 2 provides a notional depiction when safety reviews and safety activities are recommended to be held in support of a joint weapon. Military Standard MIL-STD-882E (Reference (h)) tasks can be selectively applied to accommodate a tailored system safety effort.

Figure 2. Notional Schedule for Joint Safety Reviews



(3) JSWSR Boards frequently rely on specialized review authorities as input into the reviews. These authorities hold their own meetings, as applicable, and their findings are provided to the JSWSR Boards. The LSSRC will determine if JS-FISSA or JS-SSA meetings will be required. SDP requirements for these reviews are found in Reference (g), and the most up-to-date SDP template information is found at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/pg/guidance.html#systemsafety>.

b. Types of JSWSRs. The type and date of review will be determined by the LSSRC in coordination with the SSL and the other services' SSRs. Criteria that affect the type of review include complexity of system, urgency for completion, and security classification.

(1) JSWSR. JSWSR meetings are conducted in person with chairpersons and representatives from each of the JSWSR Boards.

(2) Virtual JSWSR. A JSWSR may be conducted via video teleconference or telephone with chairpersons and representatives from each of the JSWSR Boards.

(3) Correspondence Review. A JSWSR may be performed by correspondence. The SDP is distributed to the JSWSR members for review.

c. Integrating Services' Joint Weapon Safety Criteria. The SSL, in coordination with the LSSRC, is responsible for integrating safety criteria from the JSWSR Boards. The boards may convey Service-unique operational environments. The LSSRC will coordinate and forward the safety criteria to the program's SSL. These criteria form the basis for the SSP and SDP for presentation to the JSWSR boards.

d. SDP. An SDP should be developed using Reference (g). The SDP should have the PM's concurrence before submission to the JSWSR Boards via the LSSRC.


e. Data Submission and JSWSR Response Timeline

(1) JSWSR. The acquisition program seeking a safety decision from the JSWSR Boards will provide an SDP at least 45 days before the review date. The SSL must provide a slide presentation electronically 2 weeks before the review date that adequately summarizes the data provided in the SDP pertinent to the safety decision being sought. The LSSRC distributes the SDP to the respective SSRCs for their subsequent distribution to their respective Boards' members. Representatives from the JSWSR Boards will participate and provide comments to the LSSRC before or on the review date. A draft copy of the JSWSR correspondences will be provided the day of the review and official correspondence will promptly follow for JSWSRs. The LSSRC compiles the draft JSWSR correspondence and submits the draft JSWSR correspondence to the SSRCs for concurrence and signature by their Service Boards' chairpersons. Figure 3 depicts a notional JSWSR process timeline.

(2) Virtual JSWSR. The acquisition program seeking a safety decision from the JSWSR Boards will provide an SDP at least 45 days before the review date. The SSL must provide a slide presentation electronically 2 weeks before the review date that adequately summarizes the data provided in the SDP pertinent to the safety decision being sought. The LSSRC distributes the SDP and slide presentation to the respective SSRCs for their subsequent distribution to their respective Boards' members. Representatives from the JSWSR Boards will participate telephonically and provide comments via email to the LSSRC before or on the review date. A draft copy of the JSWSR correspondences will be provided the day of the review and official correspondence will promptly follow for virtual reviews. The LSSRC compiles the draft JSWSR correspondence and submits the draft JSWSR correspondence to the SSRCs for concurrence and signature by their Service Boards' chairpersons.

(3) Correspondence Review. The acquisition program seeking a safety decision from the JSWSR Boards will provide an SDP. The LSSRC distributes the SDP to the respective SSRCs for their subsequent distribution to their respective Boards' members for review. The SSRCs collect feedback and findings from their respective Boards' members and provide them to the LSSRC. The LSSRC compiles the JSWSR correspondence and submits the JSWSR correspondence to the SSRCs for concurrence and signature by their Service Boards' chairpersons, which will be provided within 45 days after the receipt of the SDP.

Figure 3. Notional JSWSR Process Timeline



f. Request for JSWSR. To initiate a JSWSR, the PM or Deputy PM, must submit a letter to the chairperson of the lead Service safety board via the LSSRC requesting a JSWSR of their weapon.

(1) The request letter should state, as applicable:

- (a) The nomenclature and Service designator (e.g., National Stock Number or DoD identification code) of the system, item, or items submitted for review, if available.
- (b) Software version numbers associated with the system or item.
- (c) The purpose of the review.
- (d) Clearly identified unique information handling or security restrictions.
- (e) Any time-sensitive restrictions or urgencies associated with the system or item being submitted for review.

(2) The SSL and LSSRC will coordinate, using Reference (g), with the JSWSR Boards and organizations, to determine the content of the SDP. Guidance on the required content of system SDPs for joint Service weapon acquisition programs is found in Reference (g). The LSSRC, in coordination with the SSL, will arrange the schedule and location of the JSWSR.

The PM (and SSL) will provide the SDP; the LSSRC will send the SDP to each Service SSRC. The SSRCs will distribute the SDP to required Service offices and individuals assigned to review the SDP before the JSWSR.

g. JSWSR Procedures. JSWSRs are co-chaired by the WSRAs or designated representative.

(1) Presenting to the JSWSR Boards. The PM or their designated representative will be given nominally a 2-hour time period to present the technical detail supporting their safety request to the JSWSR Boards during either a JSWSR or virtual JSWSR. The slide presentation must adequately summarize the data provided in the SDP and SSP that is relevant to the safety request.

(2) Documentation of JSWSRs. JSWSRs (in-person, virtual, or correspondence reviews) must be documented in a written set of findings and recommendations. The findings and recommendations must maintain the integrity of each safety board, and consequently, unique Service safety board positions will be recorded in these Joint findings and recommendations. JSWSR correspondence will be jointly signed by the WSRAs or designated representatives. A draft copy of the JSWSR findings and recommendations will be provided the day of the review and official correspondence including the findings and recommendations will promptly follow for JSWSRs and virtual reviews (draft correspondence will not be provided for correspondence reviews). The correspondence must document collaborative findings and recommendations and include the rationale used to support these findings that were agreed upon by the JSWSR Boards.

h. Risk Acceptance. Each DoD Component PM involved must acknowledge and make risk acceptance decisions at their appropriate levels of authority, as directed in Reference (b).

5. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING CRITERIA AND FINDINGS

a. Resolving Conflicting Weapon Safety Criteria. If the SSL, in coordination with the LSSRC, confirms that applicable safety criteria are conflicting, then the LSSRC will request collaboration among the respective Boards' members to resolve the conflict. In cases in which safety criteria conflicts cannot be resolved at that level, the PM may request a meeting of the WSRAs to resolve the matter.

b. Resolving Conflicting JSWSR Findings. The LSSRC and the SSL will coordinate with the members of the JSWSR Boards to determine closure of any weapon safety related JSWSR findings. If the LSSRC determines there are conflicts with the closure of the findings, then the LSSRC will request collaboration among the WSRAs. In cases in which conflicts with the closure of the findings cannot be closed through collaboration, the PM may request a meeting of the WSRAs.

c. Risk Acceptance. In the event resolution cannot be reached, each chairperson of the Service's Safety Review Board will articulate the risk and operational limitations, if any, associated with not meeting the safety criteria for Service-unique operational environments or the finding(s) in question. The PM, in coordination with the SSL, will then present the issue to

the appropriate risk acceptance authority within the affected Services' acquisition organizations. If potential risks or operational limitations are accepted by the appropriate acquisition authority(ies) in compliance with Reference (b), the PM will document any restrictions or limitations on the use, handling, transporting, or storing of the weapon aboard platforms (e.g., aircraft, vehicles, ships, submarines) or at shore facilities, bases, or posts within each respective Service. Copies of the risk acceptance document(s), including any limitations, will be provided to the JSWSR Boards.

6. FUNDING RESPONSIBILITIES. The acquisition PM is responsible for budgeting for and funding the labor and travel, as required, for:

a. JSWSR Activities. These activities may include, but are not limited to, labor and travel for JSWSR participants. The PM must coordinate with the Chairs or Executive Secretariats of the respective Service Safety Board that will perform the safety review regarding funding responsibilities.

b. Safety Engineering Support. Each SSRC will submit funding requirements in the format required by the PM. As required, the PM will directly fund each Service's designated organization(s) that will perform the safety review.

GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASD(R&E)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
AWSSRB	Army Weapon System Safety Review Board
CDR	Critical Design Review
DEWCB	Directed Energy Weapons Certification Board
DoDI	DoD Instruction
FOC	Full Operational Capability
FRP	Full Rate Production
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JEON	joint emergent operational need
JS-FISSA	Joint Services-Fuze and Ignition System Safety Authorities
JS-SSA	Joint Services-Software Safety Authorities
JSWSR	Joint Services Weapon Safety Review
JUON	Joint Urgent Operational Need
LSSRC	lead service safety review coordinator
MILDEP	Military Department
MIL-STD	Military Standard
NNMSB	Nonnuclear Munitions Safety Board
NSN	National stock number
PDR	Preliminary Design Review
PESHE	programmatic environmental, safety, and health evaluation
PM	program manager
POC	point of contact
SAR	safety assessment report
SDP	safety data package
SSL	system safety lead
SSP	System Safety Program
SSRC	service safety review coordinator
SSWG	System Safety Working Group
USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

WSESRB Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board
WSRA Weapon Safety Review Authority

PART II. DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this manual.

directed energy weapon. Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 (Reference (i)).

JSWSR. A safety review that is conducted in a joint, collaborative manner by the Services' existing weapon safety review boards and authorities that will result in one set of joint Service safety findings.

joint weapon. Includes all weapons, as defined in this manual, with a joint potential designator of Joint Requirements Oversight Council interest, joint integration, and joint information, including weapons that are used, handled, transported, or stored by two or more Military Services.

laser. A device that emits light of typically narrow spectral content that exhibits a high degree of spatial coherence. The spatial and temporal coherence of laser light allows it to be manipulated in ways not possible with incoherent light sources (e.g., standard light bulbs, fluorescent lights). Laser light is most often generated in either gaseous or solid state media, using electrical, optical, or chemical energy to drive the light emission. Lasers are used in military applications in such general areas as pointers, range finders, target designators, guidance systems, directed energy weapons, etc. Laser beams can maintain collimation for long distances with minimal diffraction and can be focused to very small spot sizes using high quality optical systems.

LSSRC. The person designated as the SSRC from the MILDEP assigned the lead for the weapon acquisition effort.

SSRC. An individual designated by a MILDEP or Service or by the United States Special Operations Command. The function of the SSRC is to serve as the primary POC to assist or work with the LSSRC to facilitate coordinated joint safety reviews of weapon systems, munitions, and laser systems within the MILDEPs and Services.

SSL. The acquisition PM's system safety representative and is normally the chair of the program SSWG. The SSL has overall responsibility for the execution of the SSP.

weapon. Military munitions, as defined in section 101(e)(4) of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (j)), and directed energy weapons, electromagnetic rail guns, together with associated firing, launching, and controlling systems, to include safety critical software. As used in this manual, the term "weapon" does not include nuclear weapons; space launch vehicles; and the

non-weapon related aspects of vehicles or platforms, such as engines, transmissions, chassis components, from which military munitions, directed energy weapons, or rail guns are fired or launched.