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**IT'S THE ECONOMY !
U.S. FACILITIES ACCESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U. S. Facilities Access in Southeast Asia

by

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Abstract

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This paper is a review of U.S. policies governing facilities access in Southeast Asia as contained in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and U.S. Pacific Command Strategy. The various security strategies work in unison to achieve security in the Southeast Asia region. Access to facilities is essential should the U. S. need to rely on military force to ensure stability and maintain its national interests. There are numerous influences that could enhance the U.S. position in the region and there are some that could jeopardize the U.S. position. Some are controllable by the U.S. and others are not. The U.S. must take all the necessary steps to ensure that vital facilities will be available when needed. This paper recommends that the U.S. pursue a multilateral framework for access and that, if a multilateral agreement cannot be negotiated, the U.S. continue to pursue bilateral arrangements.

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"America must look to the East no less than to the West. Our security demands it. Americans fought three wars in Asia this century. Our prosperity requires it. More than two million American jobs depend upon trade with Asia. There, we are helping to shape an Asia-Pacific community of cooperation, not conflict."

President Bill Clinton
State of the Union Address
4 February 1997

INTRODUCTION

The Southeast Asia region is becoming more and more important to the economy of the United States (U.S.) at a time when our access to bases and facilities in that region is becoming more problematical and potentially we are reducing our long standing influence there. As these countries continue to grow and consume and produce an increasingly larger portion of world trade, the region will become ever more essential to the economies of all trading countries who will be vying for their attention.

The intent of this research paper is to review the various elements of national strategy to understand what U.S. policies are concerning access to bases and facilities and how those policies are being implemented. The national strategy and policies that will be reviewed are the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and the policies of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). This paper will also explore what actions are being taken to secure U.S. access rights and what impediments may exist that will affect the United States' ability to maintain a foothold in this dynamic and increasingly important region.

CURRENT U.S. POLICY

USPACOM is the unified military force responsible for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The mission of the USPACOM is to promote peace, deter aggression, respond to crises, and, if necessary, to fight and win to advance security and stability throughout the region.¹ In order to carry out the functions necessary for ensuring that this mission is met, USPACOM sets out a series of policies explaining its strategy to carry out its mission. These policies are a flow-down of a series of higher order policies set by the President, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The President's policies are formalized in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The SECDEF recently issued his policies in a report called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). From these reports, the CJCS promulgates his policies on how he intends to satisfy the President's and the SECDEF's policies. The CJCS's report is called the National Military Strategy (NMS).

This paper will compare USPACOM facilities access policies to the NSS, the QDR, and the NMS to determine if the USPACOM's policies are consistent with the higher order policies toward Southeast Asia. The analysis will take a top down approach beginning with the NSS. Possible alternatives will be discussed and recommendations for potential future efforts will be made. While the issue of access could be taken to include military to military interaction, port visitations, forward deployment and presence, or use of sea lanes, the intent of this paper is to focus on facilities access defined as physical access to real property, i.e., seaports, airfields, staging areas, and

other similar facilities. The various forms of engagement are a means to an end, that being physical access, which is essential for deterrence, crisis response, and warfighting.

The highest level strategy for the security of the U.S. is the NSS, the most recent version of which is the May 1997 publication, A National Security Strategy for a New Century. In part, the NSS states:

“Southeast Asia: Our strategic interest in Southeast Asia centers on developing regional and bilateral security and economic relationships that assist in conflict prevention and resolution and expand U.S. participation in the region's dynamic growth. Our policy combines two approaches: first, maintaining our increasingly productive relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam) especially our security dialogue under the ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum]; and second, pursuing bilateral objectives with ASEAN's individual members and other Southeast Asian nations, designed to prevent political or military instability, establish market-oriented economic reforms, resist the flow of heroin from Burma, and encourage democratic reforms and improvements in human rights practices. Our security aims in Southeast Asia are twofold: (1) maintaining robust security alliances with Canberra, Manila and Bangkok, as well as sustaining security access arrangements with Singapore and other ASEAN countries; and (2) healthy, pragmatic relations with a strong, cohesive ASEAN capable of supporting regional stability and prosperity.”²

The NSS specifically addresses the issue of access. While not targeted specifically at Southeast Asia, the NSS considers one of the strengths that give the U.S. the ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime is through its “ability to gain timely access to critical infrastructure overseas.”³

The QDR, issued in May 1997, states as its defense strategy goals “to maintain the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the U. S., with its values, institutions, and territory intact; to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and to provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its

people.”⁴ Like the NSS, the QDR does not specifically direct its policies at Southeast Asia, but its policies affect how the CJCS and USPACOM establish their policies. The policies set forth in the QDR which deal with facilities access are as follows:

- Be able to deal with asymmetric challenges that delay or deny access to critical facilities.⁵
- In times of crisis, use diplomatic actions in conjunction with military might as a force multiplier to form coalitions and to gain access to foreign bases and facilities.⁶

The NMS, issued in 1997, is based on the NSS and the QDR. It is the third level strategy for the security of the U.S. and it lists two primary objectives. These are to promote peace and stability and to defeat adversaries.⁷ The NMS lists two policies that specifically concern access:

- Two strategic concepts, overseas presence and power projection, entail access to infrastructures positioned in strategically located forward areas that facilitate rapid response to crises and force sustainment and ensure that sea lanes are open.⁸
- A military capability must be maintained that allows for forced entry which may be required to ensure that U.S. forces have access to foreign seaports, airfields, and other critical facilities.⁹

As USPACOM is the predominant U.S. warfighting organization in the Asia-Pacific region, the manner in which the command formulates and carries out its policies is essential to the ability of the U.S. to fulfill its overarching foreign policies. The following is a listing of the major elements of USPACOM’s policies for carrying out its mission in the Asia-Pacific region:¹⁰

- Promote peace and enhance the security in the Asia-Pacific region. This policy is accomplished either unilaterally or multilaterally by means of war or, if possible, through deterrence and conflict prevention. Joint and combined operations will be integrated into their capabilities, and force protection will be an important consideration.

- Ensure a high state of readiness of forces composed of well-trained people, modern and sustainable technology, and sound tactics.

- Develop and manage a communications system able to support the various missions.

- Maintain an intelligence network that is relevant, objective, current, and accessible.

- Ensure that the Asia-Pacific countries are aware of and understand USPACOM's activities and positions on relevant matters by instilling confidence building measures and reinforcing the U.S. resolve to remain involved in the region over the long term.

- Emphasize democratic principles.

- Ensure that the peacetime engagement of these countries consists of a credible forward presence, strong multilateral and bilateral relationships, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and military to military exercises.

- Be active in the interagency process to ensure that USPACOM's views get heard and ensure teamwork with the State and Commerce Departments, and other U.S. Government agencies.

The major difference between the various policies is that USPACOM's policies do not specifically address the need for access to foreign facilities. The NSS, QDR, and NMS do address this issue. While the access issue is not addressed in USPACOM's policies, Admiral Prueher does mention access in his address to Congress. He mentions that Thailand is the "model of access"¹¹ and that Australia has offered areas for training

during exercise Tandem Thrust 97.¹² He goes on to mention that access to the Philippines is temporarily unavailable until a Status of Forces Agreement can be put into place.¹³ In the testimony, he stressed that two of the goals of USPACOM are to maintain the good will and access that it has enjoyed for 50 years throughout the Pacific island nations.¹⁴

Good will and forms of engagement are very useful and may at some point lead to rights of access; however, they do not inevitably ensure access when needed. Also, such forms of access such as repair capability at commercial shipyards, while heightening fleet visibility, do not necessarily contribute significantly to operational effectiveness; access to land for activities such as ammunition storage and live fire training is what is important.¹⁵ Although Australia is a close ally and readily agrees to significant U.S. access, it is a long distance to any conflict that may arise in the Southeast Asia region and the use of the Philippines is questionable at best, at least for now.

USPACOM has approximately 304,000 military personnel assigned to carry out its mission. Of these, roughly 100,000 are forward deployed. The predominate military department represented is the Navy which deploys 215,000 Sailors and Marines, 196 ships, and 1,630 aircraft in the region. There are 42,000 Army Soldiers and civilians, and 44,000 Air Force Airmen and civilians with 375 aircraft.¹⁶ Admiral Prueher, during congressional testimony, stated that the security strategy being used in the Asia-Pacific region is working.¹⁷ He supports the QDR determination that the forces he has are adequate to face the challenges of maintaining stability in the region.¹⁸ The force structure may be adequate to support the policies laid out by USPACOM, but because of the lack of formal policy on the issue of access, I would question whether or not

USPACOM is actively pursuing this issue which has been addressed in the three higher echelon policy statements.

U.S. MILITARY ACCESS REQUIREMENTS

The U.S. is currently operating under a “places not bases” concept and probably for the foreseeable future will maintain that stance. According to Thomas McNaugher, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, “the U.S. Navy is the really strong power even without the Philippine bases.”¹⁹ He goes on to say that “it enables the US to focus power. The lesson of Desert Storm is that the US can project power without bases, and that is the basis of bilateral access.” McNaugher also states that the U.S. did not want a base structure in Singapore as it had in the Republic of the Philippines. According to McNaugher, the U.S. was looking for an “enhanced facilities access” that would allow pier space and facilitate maintenance of ships as well as provide access to airfields.²⁰ It also allows the USPACOM to “spread its presence more visibly throughout the region.”²¹

The reasons for this position are many fold. The political arena in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War has been such that the countries do not see the need for a major presence of U.S. forces in the area. This is especially true of the Republic of the Philippines. Former President Aquino was even quoted as saying the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines prior to World War II did not stop Japan from invading the country and may have even been the cause of the invasion.²² If the threat from China should grow, this could possibly change the minds of the leaders of these countries.²³

The costs associated with establishing and maintaining bases overseas has also affected the U.S. desire to continue footing the high bill that goes along with operating from permanent bases. The costs of establishing and maintaining permanent bases overseas stem not only from the costs associated with operating a base but also the requirement to have an increased force structure to man the base. While the U.S. policy and the realities of Southeast Asia politics lead to the conclusion that permanent bases are a thing of the past, the U.S. still needs to maintain the ability to "gain timely access to critical infrastructure overseas."²⁴

At present, USPACOM is primarily interested in maintaining seaports, airfields, and training areas.²⁵ Currently, access to available joint training areas is one of the biggest concerns being studied by USPACOM.²⁶ The study states that current joint training facilities are limited to the Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii and areas in and around the continental United States (CONUS). The study states several reasons for this. One is that there are no roll-off /roll-on capabilities deep in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) that are near the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC). Secondly, the U.S. has only a limited ability to sustain readiness on deployments which are deep in the region due to lack of permanent bases there. Thirdly, there are no permanent areas suitable for the conduct of joint training unless other countries are also engaged in that training exercise.

With this in mind, USPACOM is reviewing its training requirements to determine which countries meet its needs. USPACOM has narrowed the search for additional training space to Australia, Thailand, Republic of the Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. They intend to conduct further study on the use of facilities in the Republic of

the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Vietnam is another potential access area, but at this time more information is needed on what Vietnam could provide.

In summary, access is vital to the ability of USPACOM to carry out its assigned mission in support of the overall policies of the U.S. as laid out by the President. At this point, the U.S. is not looking for additional full-time bases but for the ability to gain access when necessary. That ability to gain access can be either through friendly use or, if need be, through forceful means.

INSTRUMENTS AND OTHER INFLUENCES SUPPORTING ACCESS AGREEMENTS

There are numerous means that can be used to influence an outcome of negotiations for access agreements. Forms of influence can be either diplomatic or military in nature. Some of the various means to influence the outcome are through military-to-military interactions, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and straight cash outlays. Straight cash outlays can be dispersed through such mediums as foreign aid, military aid such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), payment for base access or any number of other ways. One recently used vehicle for infusing money into a needy economy was through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was used extensively in Southeast Asia to help hold up the economies in several of those countries. However, not all sources of influence will work with all countries. Additionally, most of

these are financed through taxes and are therefore sensitive to changes in federal funding levels.

One of the most significant tools that the U.S. has in its arsenal is the ability to give friendly governments access to U.S. technology. The U.S. expends a considerable investment to gain and maintain a technological advantage over potential enemies. Those governments that keep close ties to the U.S. may be able to access this obvious advantage.

In addition to these means of promoting U.S. influence, the mere presence of U.S. forces in itself is a means to acquire access rights. A steady and continual presence in this region could make the difference whether the U.S. will remain a welcomed nation or whether the countries turn either inward or to another country or group of countries to provide their stability.

As mentioned above, while there are many tools which can be used to gain a foothold in negotiating access agreements, there are also some obstacles, some of which are may be insurmountable. These obstacles may involve historical issues, religious issues, political issues, or any number of past or present actions or inactions which affect the way the countries in Southeast Asia view the U.S. Some may be self-inflicted, as in the case of the sale of fighter aircraft to Indonesia, which was held up by Congress over humanitarian issues.

SOUTHEAST ASIA COUNTRY VIEWPOINTS AND CONCERNS

The departure of U.S. forces from Clark Air Force Base and the Naval base at Subic in the Republic of the Philippines after the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991 has been highly publicized and documented. The Philippine Senate had already doomed the bases to closure but the volcano sped the process up considerably. Since then, it has been an issue with many Southeast Asia countries as to whether or not the U.S. can maintain its ability to influence stability in the region. While the U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines are still operating under a mutual defense treaty, the reality is that we are doing very little in that endeavor due to lack of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The U.S. and Republic of the Philippines have been working on a Visiting Forces Agreement in lieu of a SOFA and recently the Republic of the Philippines has publicly announced that it will open the door to U.S. ship visits and training.²⁷ However, some sources say that it is questionable whether or not an agreement can be reached during the current Philippine Senate session.²⁸

After the downfall of former President Marcos in 1986, the presence of U.S. bases in the Republic of the Philippines became an issue due to growing Philippine nationalism. Some Filipinos associated the bases with U.S. support for Marcos because they provided funds and military aid for his regime. The Philippine constitution adopted in 1987 reflected this view. The preamble to the constitution states that the country "has the inherent right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty. Subject to existing international agreements, foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall be

forbidden in the Philippine national territory.”²⁹ Additionally, the constitution requires that any new treaty involving bases achieve a two-thirds vote in the Senate before it is passed. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines does not address facilities use. It should be noted, however, that the Republic of the Philippines government did grant use of its airports to the U.S. during the Kurd humanitarian effort in 1996-97, which means that there is at least the possibility of facilities access in that strategically-located country when the need arises.

Since the U.S. pulled out of its bases in the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore has quickly become one of the staunchest U.S. security partners in the region. They in fact filled the void for facilities access by suggesting that the U.S. military move into their facilities after departing from the Republic of the Philippines.³⁰ Operating under confidential Memorandums of Agreement, the U.S. has had considerable access to Singapore’s seaports and airfields. The seaport at Sembawang is home to U.S. Logistics Command, Pacific and is a principal point of supply for visiting ships, predominately for ships heading to or returning from deployments in the Arabian Gulf area. Paya Lebar airport is also a highly used facility which houses U.S. fighter planes and is a major stop for support aircraft. A large number of port calls are made to Singapore’s ports by fleet units, especially since the closure of the bases in the Philippines and disagreement over the implementation of a SOFA with that country.

Singapore, which is very politically stable, has not openly publicized its relationship with the U.S. military for fear of a backlash by its own population.³¹ Its recent decision and announcement regarding opening new port facilities in the year 2000 expressly for U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships may be a departure from that earlier position.

There is currently no IMET program with Singapore but there is a considerable FMS program between the U.S. and Singapore.³² Congress cut off IMET to Singapore in 1996. Singapore does have a significant training program with the U.S., however, and the Singapore Air Force leases a squadron of F-16 fighter aircraft and base access in the U.S. in addition to conducting helicopter training in the U.S.³³

Indonesia is a pivotal country due to its size and location. It is the world's largest Muslim country and encompasses several of the world's busiest and most crucial sea lanes, the most significant sea lane is the Malacca Strait. For this reason alone, the country is important to the U.S.

There has been much said about the human rights issues between the U.S. and Indonesia. Because of differences over these issues, there has been more than a little conflict between the two countries. Partly because of these differences, Indonesia pulled out of the IMET program, both enhanced and regular.^{34 35} Disagreement over the human rights issues have also led to the cancellation of an F-16 fighter plane purchase. In spite of all these problems, the U.S. still maintains a ship repair capability in Indonesia and, most importantly, an agreement to conduct training on Indonesia's Aircrew Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) Range is still in place. Port visits by U.S. Navy ships continue to be conducted in Bali and Jakarta. While there is no current action to establish additional access agreements with Indonesia, there has been an ongoing struggle to maintain current military liaisons.³⁶

Malaysia is also located in a very strategic position since its western coast borders the Malacca Strait. The U.S. currently has contracts with companies in Malaysia to repair ships and C-130 aircraft. Malaysia currently receives \$600,000 to \$750,000 a year in

IMET funds from the U.S. government. In order to stretch this budget, the Malaysians have been paying for travel and other expenses out of separate accounts in order to maximize the amount of training that they could get from U.S. military sources. With the current financial crisis, they may need to cut down on use of these other funds thereby reducing the training that they can afford.³⁷

Malaysia has mixed feelings about the presence of U.S. military forces. It wants a U.S. presence, but on the other hand it does not want an increase in that presence. It also professes to feel that there is more threat from the U.S. than China, as it sees the U.S. as a colonial power whereas China is not.³⁸ However, they feel that the most likely conflict will be with other ASEAN countries over the Spratly Islands or with either Singapore or Indonesia.³⁹

Thailand has been a very close ally to the U.S. over the years and is one of the two treaty partners with the U.S. in the region. While there is no SOFA with Thailand, U.S. forces are still stationed there and it is a prominent port of call for fleet units transiting that area. During the Vietnam war, upwards of 50 thousand U.S. military personnel were stationed in Thailand, and during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Thailand's flexibility was evident, as it provided the facilities needed by the coalition to achieve the surge capacity necessary to effectively prosecute the war effort. The largest U.S. forces military-to-military exercise, Cobra Gold, is conducted with Thailand and millions of dollars of prepositioned war reserves are currently maintained in that country. There is a danger, however, that access to seaport facilities could be jeopardized should Thailand proceed with commercializing more of its available port facilities.⁴⁰

Relations with Thailand were strained during the 1975 USS MAYAGUEZ incident when the U.S. used Thailand as a staging area for an assault on Cambodia after being told not to do so by the Thai government. The Thai government eventually forgave the U.S. for staging the assault force in Thailand during the USS MAYAGUEZ incident but it maintains strongly that the Thais have sovereign control of their lands and that the U.S. is just a visitor there. Relations were also strained as recently as 1994 when Thailand turned down a U.S. request to stage additional prepositioned war reserves in that country. The U.S. representative assigned the task of negotiating for the staging of prepositioned war reserves did not follow the correct channels in requesting Thailand's assistance and tried to force the issue. While that particular problem was due to the way in which the U.S. handled the situation and does not necessarily mean that Thailand is changing its position on the issue of supporting a U.S. presence, the Thais still have not allowed the U.S. to position additional war reserves in their country.

The U.S. engages Thailand through FMS, joint exercises, and an active IMET program which has paid off many fold since many of the officers that have received training through IMET also support democratization.⁴¹ Not all military equipment being purchased by Thailand is of U.S. origin, however. Thailand has recently purchased from Spain an aircraft carrier capable of carrying Harrier jump jets and helicopters. The addition of the aircraft carrier will give Thailand an offensive capability that they previously never possessed. Between 1975-1980, Thailand appeared to be aligning itself with China when there was concern of a U.S. pullout.⁴² Thailand's relationship with China has since cooled but recently stepped up when China agreed to stop selling arms to Burma.⁴³

The other countries, Laos, Burma, Brunei, and Vietnam, are of much smaller consequence to the U.S. in regards to facilities access at this time. Of these countries, Brunei is far and away the most active and pro U.S. In 1994, Brunei and the U.S. reached an agreement of understanding on defense cooperation. Elements of that agreement covered port visits by U.S. naval forces and bilateral exercises.⁴⁴ Within the last year, Brunei participated in the jungle warfare training of U.S. servicemen at military facilities in the Brunei jungles. Brunei strengthened its ties to the U.S. when it helped to fund the Nicaraguan Contras and, like Singapore, offered access privileges to U.S. forces when the bases in the Republic of the Philippines closed down.⁴⁵

One source of influence that could affect Brunei's ability to increase its military ties to the U.S. became evident during Operation Desert Storm. Brunei's Muslim Malay population heartily backed Iraq, hampering even the Sultan's bid to support the coalition cause.⁴⁶ Brunei did support a United Nations sponsored Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but stopped short of supporting the U.S.-led coalition action.

The U.S. has begun to discuss the possibility of conducting military to military exercises with Vietnam, but most dialogue has centered on recovering servicemembers' remains missing since the war. Laos has been offered IMET opportunities but has so far declined. There has been some engagement with Laos concerning the removal and destruction of unexploded ordnance left over from the Vietnam war, but most U.S. engagement with that country consists of humanitarian aid such as refurbishment of a military hospital and continued searches for missing servicemembers' remains.

Some individuals that believe that the Southeast Asian countries are in a major arms race much like the U.S. and the Soviet Union were engaged in during the Cold War.

They contend that as one country gets an additional capability the other country must get a counter capability to maintain equality. They also express an opinion that an arms buildup is an outgrowth of the Southeast Asian nations seeing the U.S. presence waning while China's and Japan's military forces are strengthening. Others make a case that the nations of the region really are not in an arms race but are merely updating their generally outdated and obsolete military equipment. These individuals assert that the countries have been doing this up until now because their economies were booming and the funds were available. Regardless of whether it is an arms race or just a modernization effort long since overdue, the growth in arms in the region is real and could lead to possible instability. However, due to the recent monetary crisis affecting most of the Southeast Asian nations, the arms purchases may be coming to a close, at least until the crisis is over and the markets are moving upward again.

OUTSIDE INFLUENCES

Most of the Southeast Asian countries desire continued U.S. involvement but, for the most part, the need for the level of U.S. military that was present during the Cold War has waned. The end of the Cold War has also changed the political climate in the region. When the Soviet Union and its allies were a force to be reckoned with, the Southeast Asian nations desired that the U.S. maintain a formidable military presence in the area. Today, with the major outside threats seen as coming from China or Japan, these countries do not want to antagonize the current peace and stability in the area by appearing to be backing and supporting a significant U.S. presence.

In recent years, China's foreign policies have changed from the previous ideological concept of the ASEAN countries as nothing more than the "running dogs of U.S. imperialism" to one that is more pragmatic and leans to an increasingly cooperative approach.⁴⁷ While the new leadership under Jiang Ziamin is opening itself up to the other Southeast Asian countries, there are still potential conflicts that bubble beneath the present peaceful surface. These issues for the most part surround the ownership of many of the numerous islands in the South China Sea and other areas. These areas of contention are predominately the Spratly and Paracel islands and the Vietnamese-Chinese border. In August 1995, China and the Republic of the Philippines reached an understanding that military means would not be used to resolve the situation. However, a Chinese report estimated that the Spratly Islands potentially hold ten billion tons of oil and that the area could become the next Middle East.⁴⁸ This could be a powerful incentive for China to enforce its claim of ownership of the islands and surrounding waters.

Samuel Wu and Bruce de Mesquita developed a model through which they determined that the reformers in the current Chinese government have a good chance to implement their agenda of policies that emphasize a more stable environment than previous administrations. Based on this model, they project that China will not rely on military force to settle differences.⁴⁹ Other sources tend to think that a new wave of nationalism may be spreading over China and that the leadership is gearing up militarily with an eye to asymmetrically confront the U.S. This could be an issue with the Southeast Asian countries and further fuel the arms buildup. It could also influence these countries to either side with the U.S. for security or play hands off to appear more neutral, thus

assuaging Chinese concerns. As with the other countries, China's primary interest in the Southeast Asia region is stability. However, the existing tensions cannot be forgotten since they have the capacity to flare at any time.

While less worried about Japan, the Southeast Asian countries are still concerned with a military buildup in that country. Japan undoubtedly has the technical knowledge and heavy industry assets to be able to ramp up quickly. This, combined with its dependency on raw resources for its existence, raises fears among the Southeast Asian countries that Japan could become a security threat.

While outside factors all affect the security issue, most of the Southeast Asian countries feel that other regional nations create the most immediate threat to peace and stability. This is an issue may be alleviated by multilateral agreements and partnerships such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While regional multilateral pacts have failed in the past, they may be more successful in the future, especially if the U.S. losses ground in the region due to political differences, trade friction, and force reductions leading to a reduced U.S. presence. Under these circumstances, the countries of Southeast Asia may be motivated to band together.⁵⁰ This could potentially end an already diminishing U.S. presence.⁵¹

CONCLUSIONS AND ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Facilities access could be a critical issue during any crisis. Prior to World War II the issue of base access to support the fleet in the Asia-Pacific region was given much consideration during war gaming exercises. Bases were essential to the campaigns

throughout World War II and during the Korean War and Vietnam War. Most recently they were an essential element to the success of Desert Storm. Japan and Australia, and to a lesser extent Thailand, are currently the only foreign countries in the region which allow the U.S. to stage war material. The U.S. - Japan agreement has been reemphasized with Japan through the new U.S. - Japan Security Cooperative Guidelines which authorize the U.S. increased access to bases and support in time of war or other crises.⁵² No such agreements are in place or being honored by the countries of Southeast Asia.

The need for access agreements was driven home when an attempt in 1994 to preposition warfighting material offshore Thailand was thwarted because that country refused to allow the U.S. access for staging purposes. Asian nations also witnessed the difficulties that the U.S. had in projecting power over long distances during the Gulf War.⁵³ This did not keep President Ramos of the Philippines from suggesting that keeping U.S. forces from gaining forward basing rights in ASEAN countries actually contributes to the stability by removing a potential provocation. He also expressed concern about the possible effects of the U.S. retreating into isolationism. Hence, because a security arrangement with the U.S. may be a two-edged sword, countries may be hesitant to enter into publicized access agreements while relative stability exists in the region.

The NSS and the NMS address the access issue and state that access is important to the U.S. ability to maintain stability throughout the world. USPACOM has stated that the inability to support the fleet deep within the region is due to lack of permanent facilities. However, there is little mention within the stated USPACOM security strategy of access

to foreign facilities. With the countries vacillating between support for U.S. forces and non-support, it would seem that this would be a major point of concern.

There are several courses of action that the U.S. could take in regard to facilities access. Regardless of what alternative is ultimately chosen, the U.S. must first determine if additional facilities access is required. If it is determined that additional facilities are not required for a future conflict, then the status quo could be maintained. However, if it is determined that additional facilities access may be necessary, the U.S. will need to address that issue and ascertain how to best satisfy that need. This will entail determining what kind of facilities would be needed, who could best fill that need, and how to go about getting it. Should the U.S. determine that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to establish facilities access agreements with various countries, there are several routes that could be taken. One is to negotiate bilateral agreements with individual countries and the second is to enter into multilateral agreements with a block of countries.

If the decision is to maintain the status quo, the U.S. must still take steps to ensure that its influence in the region does not slip. This will require that the U.S. keep an active dialogue and presence in the region. Current trends in U.S. spending are on the decline and could signal a corresponding decrease in U.S. involvement in the region. Political and values issues also tend to cloud the security issue. A secondary fallout of political responses must be weighed heavily to ensure that they will not have a negative impact on the U.S. presence and influence in the region. Should the U.S. continue with some of the current courses of action, it could potentially jeopardize the ability of the U.S. to gain access and assure stability in the future. Not only could it jeopardize access, it could lead

to these countries either banding together, essentially barring the U.S., or cause them to lean on another major power for their security. Either way the U.S. loses.

Should the U.S. determine that additional facilities access agreements are needed, either multilateral or bilateral agreements could be pursued. While multilateral agreements may be difficult to establish due to the fragmented concerns and animosity among the countries of the Southeast Asian region, it may well be in the best interest of the U.S. to try to establish access agreements via this route. Should these countries ever set a common goal and achieve a modicum of success in working together to establish a truly multilateral security agreement that has teeth, the U.S. must be able to capitalize on it and not get pushed out of the region. USPACOM states in its strategy that "multilateral relationships hold promise for future stability in the region."⁵⁴ The multilateral environment that USPACOM advocates leads to what former U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Richard Macke, called "shared regional confidence."⁵⁵

This concept is further related to concerns of the Philippines over bilateral negotiations between Vietnam and China in 1994 on how to deal with oil exploration near the Spratly Islands.⁵⁶ A peaceful way to deal with the Spratly Island issue had been multilaterally agreed to earlier among the ASEAN countries. Hence, any agreements for base access may best be negotiated multilaterally rather than bilaterally. This would be particularly true when dealing with a region such as Southeast Asia where the major countries are tied together in multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. A multilateral approach would ensure that all the actors are aware of what the agreements are and that no one country either gets the spoils or shoulders the burden. If a multilateral agreement route is pursued, the U.S. will have to weigh the effect that it will

have on other countries, especially China. China could view this as a threat to its security and economic development.

If the option of entering into a multilateral agreement is impossible, as several sources contend, then at a minimum the U.S. could attempt to negotiate bilateral agreements with those countries most agreeable with keeping the U.S. involved in the region and those who see a need for the U.S. to have access to facilities in the region. Bilateral agreements have a negative impact in that they immediately exclude one or more countries from whatever agreements are being made. The use of bilateral vice multilateral agreements tends to foster feelings of exclusion and suspicion which could potentially lead to an increased sense of insecurity and instability. However, bilateral agreements are generally easier to negotiate and may be the only means available to provide the facilities needed. This could enable the U.S. to maintain a foothold in the region from which it could possibly expand to other countries should the opportunity present itself. The use of bilateral agreements could also prove beneficial should there ever be dissension among the signers of a multilateral agreement in that new agreements would not necessarily have to be put in place.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The alternative of maintaining the status quo may be acceptable if no crisis develops that would necessitate the requirement for bases and other such facilities that may be needed to prosecute the conflict. Can the U.S., or its allies, afford to take that risk in view of the importance of that area to our economic well-being and the many factors

which could eventually lead to regional instability possibly resulting in armed conflict? Since the U.S. is dependent upon the other countries for access to these facilities, the answer depends on how much those countries want U.S. involvement. Unless they see a need, the U.S. may have no other alternative.

I believe that the U.S. should attempt to pursue facilities access agreements with the Southeast Asian countries on a multilateral basis, and, if that is not possible, then on a bilateral basis. I feel that if a multilateral agreement could be reached, it would have the impact of gelling the region and strengthening the U.S. position. I do not believe that China will see this as a threat given the historical background of the U.S. as a peacekeeper. China can ill afford to enter into any armed conflict and forfeit the economic and political strides that it has achieved.

At a minimum, the U.S. must maintain a strong forward presence in the area and maintain the agreements that it has. This will necessitate the Legislative and Executive branches working closely together and funding those tools that enable the U.S. to play a dominate role in the region and engage our friends. Also, the next round of wars may not provide the time or space the coalition was given in Desert Storm to amass the amount of troops and material that was assembled in that conflict. Therefore the U.S. and the Southeast Asian countries must come to some consensus on what facilities could potentially be needed based on various scenarios. These agreements may not be formally agreed upon, but at least they would allow the countries to move quickly. The U.S. and its friends can ill afford to be caught short in a crisis.

Word Count: 6,844

ENDNOTES

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- ³ *Ibid.*, 8.
- ⁴ Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997), Section III.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.
- ⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy (Washington D. C.: Department of Defense, 1997), 2.
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- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 8.
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- ³⁰ Ike Reed, U.S. Department of State, telephone interview by author, 23 December 1997.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Frank Bucholds, U.S. Department of State, telephone interview by author, 23 December 1997.

³⁵ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1996 (Washington D. C.: National Defense University, 1996), 102. Regular IMET is training established for foreign military personnel and Enhanced IMET was established in 1992 to allow for training of foreign civilians who have defense-related interests. Enhanced IMET is targeted to civilians from government agencies, legislatures, and non-government organizations.

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