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SUDAN DARFUR REGION'S CRISIS:
FORMULA FOR ULTIMATE
SOLUTION

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Introduction

Africa projects the image of a continent where life is nasty, brutish and short. This is not unconnected to the trends in the politics of most states in post-colonial Africa. The persistence of violent conflicts in Africa has, over the years, been a major threat to human security and sustainable development. The litany and mirage of armed conflicts in Africa has had a destructive impact on both human and material resources. According to Olukoshi (2002), some eight million Africans were believed in 1993, for example, to have become refugees and about 40 million became internally displaced due to war, drought and conflict.[1] The continent has experienced massive population displacement as a result of senseless violence and instabilities.

Assessing the African security situation, Salim Ahmed Salim observed that endemic conflict in many parts of Africa have led to severe human suffering and the destruction of property and infrastructure. These conflicts not only generate millions of refugees and internally displaced persons but also subject generations of young Africans to violence, hatred and destruction.[2] The extreme humanitarian crisis caused by such conflicts has forced various segments of the African population to live under precarious conditions.

One of such conflicts in Africa is the Sudan Darfur Region's conflict. Sudan has witnessed series of conflicts and wars since gaining independence from Anglo-Egypt on January 1, 1956. The paper examines the underlying factors that have made Sudan to be in perpetual conflict situations and the factors responsible for the outbreak of hostilities in the Darfur Region of the country. The conflict which has gained international attention has not abated despite all efforts by the international community to see to the end of the crisis. The paper after x-raying the conflict proffers some suggestions towards the resolution of the conflict.

The paper is divided in to four chapters. Chapter one deals with the history of Sudan, her people and factors that have been responsible for the incessant crises in the country. This will give us an insight in to the Darfur crisis, which is the main focus of this paper. Chapter two looks at the Darfur conflict and the causative factors responsible for the conflict. Chapter three deals with the efforts made so far in resolving the conflict and

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1   Adebayo Olukoshi: 'Governing the African Development Process: The Challenges of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)', public lecture delivered at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Kofo Abayomi, Lagos, Nigeria, July 9, 2002, p.3.

2   Salim A. Salim: 'The Challenge of the OAU on the Eve of the Millennium' lecture to the German Society of Foreign Relations published in: Resolving Conflicts, OAU Conflict Management Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 5, August September, 1996, p.4.

the reasons for their failure; while chapter four proffers the formula for ultimate solution of the conflict.

CHAPTER ONE: SUDAN IN HISTORY

(MAP OF SUDAN)

Sudan, in northeast Africa, is the largest country on the continent, measuring about one-fourth the size of the United States. Its neighbors are Chad and the Central African Republic on the west, Egypt and Libya on the north, Ethiopia and Eritrea on the east, and

Kenya, Uganda, and Democratic Republic of the Congo on the south. The Red Sea washes about 500 mi of the eastern coast. It is traversed from north to south by the Nile, all of whose great tributaries are partly or entirely within its borders.[3]

What is now northern Sudan was in ancient times the kingdom of Nubia, which came under Egyptian rule after 2600 B.C. An Egyptian and Nubian civilization called Kush flourished until A.D. 350. Missionaries converted the region to Christianity in the 6th century, but an influx of Muslim Arabs, who had already conquered Egypt, eventually controlled the area and replaced Christianity with Islam. During the 1500s a people called the Funj conquered much of Sudan, and several other black African groups settled in the south, including the Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, and Azande. Egyptians again conquered Sudan in 1874, and after Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, it took over Sudan in 1898, ruling the country in conjunction with Egypt. It was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan between 1898 and 1955. The 20th century saw the growth of Sudanese nationalism, and in 1953 Egypt and Britain granted Sudan self-government. Independence was proclaimed on Jan. 1, 1956. Since independence, Sudan has been ruled by a series of unstable parliamentary governments and military regimes. [4]

Population, Ethnic Composition and Economic Index

Population (2007 est.): 42,292,929 (growth rate: 2.5%); birth rate: 33.9/1000; infant mortality rate: 59.6/1000; life expectancy: 59.3; density per sq mi: 46

Capital (2003 est.): Khartoum, 5,717,300 (metro. area), 1,397,900 (city proper)

Largest cities: Omdurman, 2,103,900; Port Sudan, 450,400

Languages: Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English

Ethnicity/Race: Black 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, foreigners 2%, other 1%

Religions: Islam (Sunni) 70% (in north), Indigenous 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum)

Literacy Rate: 61% (2003 est.)

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[3] Infoplease.com: Sudan: History, Geography, Government and Culture (Retrieved 10th October,2007)

[4] Ibid

Economic summary: GDP/PPP (2005 est.): $84.93 billion; per capita $2,100. **Real growth rate:** 7.7%. **Inflation:** 11%. **Unemployment:** 18.7% (2002 est.). **Arable land:** 7%. **Agriculture:** cotton, groundnuts (peanuts), sorghum, millet, wheat, gum arabic, sugarcane, cassava (tapioca), mangos, papaya, bananas, sweet potatoes, sesame; sheep, livestock. **Labor force:** 11 million (1996 est.); agriculture 80%, industry and commerce 7%, government 13% (1998 est.). **Industries:** oil, cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling, shoes, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, armaments, automobile/light truck assembly. **Natural resources:** petroleum; small reserves of iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold, hydropower. **Exports:** $6.989 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.): oil and petroleum products; cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts, gum arabic, sugar. **Imports:** $5.028 billion f.o.b. (2005 est.): foodstuffs, manufactured goods, refinery and transport equipment, medicines and chemicals, textiles, wheat. **Major trading partners:** China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, India, Germany, Australia (2004). [5]

Historical Aspects of Sudanese Conflicts

The history of Sudan is a history of continued and unlimited violence. Yet, man, as a social being needs security and peace for life to be meaningful, for any meaningful development to occur, and for life to be enjoyed. Unfortunately, both variables have eluded Sudan since independence in 1956, and more especially since the declaration of Islamic law through out the country in 1983, by President Jafaru Nimeiri, and introduction of the Islamisation policy in 1989 by military dictator, General El-Bashir. According to Nwolise (2004) [6], the Sudanese crisis has remained the longest in Africa, and most neglected by the world has commenced in 1956, then fuelled by the hoisting of Islamic Sharia on the whole country including the Christian and Traditionalist South in 1989, and finally by the Darfur insurgency of February 2003. The chronicle of events, as shown below, has given an insight or sign-post to the Sudan (Darfur) crisis:

➢ 1898-1956: Sudan came under the Anglo-Egyptian control. But the South fought rebelliously to regain control and freedom.

➢ 1955: The Anya-Anya (military wing of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement-SSLM of Joseph Lagu) war commenced in the South, leading to political control being exerted over the region, a situation that further led to 17 years of North-South Conflict.

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[5]   Infoplease.com (op. cit)

[6]   Nwolise, O.B.C., ''The Sudan Crisis and Contemporary Peace Process'', being Text of Public Lecture delivered to the Foreign Relations Discussion Group, University of Ibadan, September 28, 2004.

- 1956: Independence came under the rule of National Unionist Party, but this did not end the North-South conflict.

- 1956-1969: Civil rule with strong opposition by the Sudan Communist Party agitating for democracy, sovereignty of Sudan from neo-colonial forces, and social progress.

- 1969: Military coup brought Jaffaru Nimeiri to power as President. His presidency moved politics away from pro-Eastern European Socialism to Islamic revivalism.

- 1975: Revival of the anya-nya war due to southern discontent.

- 1980: Oil was found in the South, and Nimeri reneged on the 1972 Accord signed in Addis Ababa to exploit the oil without restrictions, especially provisions that gave the South financial autonomy, and rights to collect all taxes of the central government in the South. Nimeri became dictatorial, created a new Province removing jurisdiction of the oil region from the south.

- 1983: President Nimeri introduced the Islamic law system in the whole Sudan including the Southern Christian and Traditionalist Region, in order to gain support from the important Muslim Brotherhood. In the same year, John Garang became the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) with an ideology on a united secular Sudan.

- 1986: Sadiq El-Mahdi was elected President of Sudan. The economy collapsed and war escalated in the South.

- 1989: War effects and famine led to the death of over 1,000,000 people.

- 1989 (June 30): Military coup that brought Omar El-Bashir in to power who began the Islamisation of the whole country including Southern Sudan. This exacerbated the war.

- 1991: The Sudan People's Liberation Movement gained control of the South under the leadership of John Garang.

- 1998: Severe famine worsened Sudan's problems. War situation could not allow humanitarian aid reach the hungry in the South.

- 1999-2002: Upstage of discrimination by the Arab controlled government against non-Arabs (Black Africans). Since 1999 international attention has been focused on evidence that slavery is widespread throughout Sudan. Arab raiders from the north of the country have enslaved thousands of southerners, who are black. The Dinka people have been the hardest-hit. Some sources point out that the raids intensified in the 1980s along with the civil war between north and south.

- July 2002: A cease-fire was declared between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in July 2002. During peace talks, which continued through 2003, the government agreed to a power-sharing government for six years, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination for the south. Fighting on both sides continued throughout the peace negotiations. In May 2004, a deal between the government and the SPLA was signed, ending 20 years of brutal civil war that resulted in the deaths of 2 million people.

- February 2003: Darfur conflict started with the rebel movements of SLA and JEM starting their rebellious acts against Khartoum.

- 2004 (January): Just as Sudan's civil war seemed to be coming to an end, another war intensified in the northwestern Darfur region. After the government quelled a rebellion in Darfur in Jan. 2004, it allowed pro-government militias called the Janjaweed to carry out massacres against black villagers and rebel groups in the region. These Arab militias, believed to have been armed by the government, have killed between 200,000 and 300,000 civilians and displaced more than 1 million. While the war in the south was fought against black Christians and animists, the Darfur conflict is being fought against black Muslims.

- 2006: The slaughter in Darfur escalated, and the Khartoum government remained defiantly indifferent to the international communities' calls to stop the violence. The 7,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers deployed to Darfur proved too small and ill equipped a force to prevent much of it.

- 2006 (May): A fragile peace deal was signed between the Sudanese government and the main Darfur rebel group; two smaller rebel groups, however, refused to sign. The UN reported that there has in fact been a dramatic upsurge in the violence since the agreement. The Sudanese government reneged on

essential elements of the accord, including the plan to disarm the militias and allow a UN peacekeeping force into the region to replace the modest AU force.

➤ In. Jan. 2007, Sudan and Darfur rebel groups agreed to a 60-day cease-fire, which was intended to lead to peace talks sponsored by the African Union.

➤ In July 2007, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to deploy as many as 26,000 peacekeepers from the African Union and the United Nations forces to help end the violence in Darfur.

Multi-faceted Dimensions of Sudan´s Crisis and the underlying factors responsible for Crisis

From the above, we can see that the conflicts in Sudan did not just start with Darfur conflict, which only began in February 2003. The complex conflict situation presents multi-faceted dimensions with the following factors identified as some of the fundamental causes of the conflict:

(i) The Berlin Conference of 1884 and Partition of Africa: It has been argued by several scholars that one of the main factors responsible for the unending inter-state

and intra-states wars in Africa was the effect of the 1884 Berlin Conference in which Western powers partitioned Africa amongst themselves and brought people who were not of the same ethnic group with different and diverse cultures and forced into nation states. One of such countries suffering from the effect of that partition is Sudan. Writing on the effect of the partition of Africa on the continent and its people, the World History Chronology observed as follows:

The Berlin Act was an important change in international affairs. It created the rules for "effective occupation" of conquered lands, ensuring that the division of Africa would take place without war among the European powers. Through the Berlin Act, the European powers justified dividing a continent among themselves without considering the desires of the indigenous peoples. While this appears extremely arrogant…………… The Berlin Conference is one of the most clear examples of the assumptions and preconceptions of this era, and its effects on Africa can still be seen today. The arbitrary boundaries the Europeans imposed

often divided an ethnic group and also brought enemies under the same government causing strife that still exists today.[7]

Sudan of course, is one of casualties of this abnormality as Black Africans who have nothing in common in terms of culture, language and ways of life were forced to live together by the partition with Arabs.

(ii)   British colonial policy of divide and rule: One of the factors that has been identified to be responsible for fuelling the crisis in Sudan is the British colonial policy of divide and rule tactics which intensified the traditional Afro-Arab dichotomy and laid the foundation for the politics of non-accommodation, which translated into overt interracial conflict after independence. Throughout the period of colonial occupation, British officials strictly segregated northern and southern Sudan, especially between 1925 and 1947. The principal motives according to Okereke (2005) "were to prevent the spread of Arab nationalism and curtail the wave of anti-colonialism".[8] Britain banned the teaching of Arabic and the use of Arabic names in the south. The activities of Christian missionaries were also banned in the north. These colonial policies widened the north-south or Black/Arab divide, heightening the resentment for the non-Muslim population in the south. This policy created serious gulfs between the Blacks and Arabs in the country and on gaining independence in 1956, resentment was further inflamed by the Arabisation campaigns of the northern-controlled government. These made it possible for the Arabs to occupy virtually all the senior civil service positions under the guise of 'Sudanisation'.[9]

(iii)   Power Struggles between Blacks and Arabs: From time, there has been power struggle between the Black and Arab Sudanese, with the Black Sudanese calling for Regional autonomy within Sudan since the conference in Juba, Southern Sudan in 1947.[10] Secession from the Sudan came to represent a major goal of Southern Liberation Movements, SSLM and SPLA, headed by Joseph Lagu and John Garang, respectively. Joseph Lagu gave the goal of the struggle of the southern people as:

> *"…….the rights of self-determination for our people….to determine its destiny, either to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous region or to have*

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7   World History Chronology: ''Africa South of the Sahara Chronology: The Berlin Conference 1884" in the Webcron Technology Project, retrieved October 23, 2007

8   Okereke C.Nna-Emeka: "The African Union and Conflict Resolution in Africa: Reflections on the Civil War in Sudan" in the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 31, Number 2, 2005, p.109.

9   Ibid, p.110

10   Ishaku Aliyu: "Self Determination and the Enigma of Unity in the Sudan: An Analysis of Contemporary Trends and Implications for Nigeria" in Nigeria Forum, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Vol.26, Nos.5-6, May-June 2005, P.175.

nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future with that of our African brothers in their states on our southern borders".[11]

(iv)   Lack of political will of the Sudanese Government to effectively implement policies of accommodation and national integration in a country of such an ethnically, racially, religiously and economically diverse population. This is pronounced or manifested in the constitution bequeathed to the country by the British colonial ruler of the country. According to Aliyu (2005), the unitary constitution inherited from the British was not successful "in integrating a country divided along cultural, religious and racial lines"[12]. This, coupled with bad leadership had made the problem to persist. According to Al-Karsani, "decades of bad governance, have been a primary cause of endemic conflict and human suffering".[13] Just like the previous governments before it, the government of El-Bashir (the current President of Sudan) has concluded 18 conferences, and peace meetings, it failed to implement these Agreements, or live up to the expectations of southern dissidents.[14]

(v)   Southern Sudan Strategic Resources Endowment: The Sudan's natural resources, which are strategically located in the south, are of critical importance to whoever controls in Khartoum. The Nile River, which is the mainstay of Sudan's economy, is located in the south. The location of the Upper Nile in southern Sudan is of immense significance to the Sudan as it provides a latent leverage on Egypt whose life wire is the Nile. It is therefore in the overall interest of the Sudanese state to remain a united country. More significantly too is that oil deposits have been found in the southern part which further enhances the region's significance for the entire country.

(vi)   The cold war phenomenon: The cold war between the Eastern and Western blocs contributed significantly to the war in the Sudan. What the cold war did was to obscure the central thrust of the conflict because of the ideological planks upon which both the government and the south legitimize their positions and appeal from either the US or the former Soviet Union.

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11   Joseph Lagu, in Ishaka Aliyu, 'Self-Determination and the Enigma of Unity in the Sudan: An Analysis of Contemporary Trends and Implications for Nigeria', Nigerian Forum Vol. 26, Nos. 5-6, May/June 2005, p.172
12   Ishaku Aliyu, op. cit.
13   Al-Karsani in Ishaku Aliyu, Ibid
14   Ibid

(vii)   The violent agitations against discrimination whose roots date back to 1956, but aggravated into full scale war by the declaration of Islamic law throughout the whole of Sudan by the military junta of El-Bashir in 1989. This declaration has faced stiff armed opposition from the Southern part of the country inhabited by Christians and traditional religionists. Despite the resentment from the Christians and traditional religionists over the introduction of the Sharia legal code to cover the entire country, the government in Khartoum was supported by Islamic fundamentalists who mounted pressure on the government to intensify political control and implement the Islamic legal code throughout the country.

(viii)   Proliferation of militant groups all over Sudan: Another factor that has been identified as contributing in escalating the war in Sudan is the proliferation of militant groups. Peter Moszynski notes that there are over 30 different armed militia groups with assorted weapons and arms operating around Sudan. The South African Institute for Strategic Studies observed that these peripheral players are fearful that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process will deepen their own marginalization. [15]

(ix)   The racial war (genocide) in the Darfur Region. Darfur is on the West side of Sudan, and is inhabited mainly by Muslims who are Black Africans. This is the region being wiped out by Arab militias (Janjaweed) and ably supported by the government in Khartoum. The Darfur war began in February 2003 when two armed opposition groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) rose against the Arab dominated government for discriminating against Black Africans.

What we have done in this chapter was to look at Sudan, her people, and some of the factors that have kept the country in perpetual conflict situation. We did so in order to give us a deeper understanding of the conflict in the Darfur Region, which is the main focus of the next chapter.

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15   Peter Moszynski, in: Jackson Mwalulu: 'Rocky Road to Final Peace', Africa Today: Voice of the Continent, vol 10, nos 8 &9, August/September, 2004, p.17

CHAPTER TWO: DARFUR REGION CRISIS

(MAP OF DARFUR REGION)

Darfur is a region in Western Sudan, the vast majority of whom are black and Muslim. It occupies one fifth of the area of Sudan comprising approximately 250,000 square kilometers. It is larger than Egypt and equals the area of France. It borders Libya to the

north-west, Chad to the west, and the Central African Republic to the south-west. It is home to 6 million people, and dozens of different ethnic groups. From a subsistence

point of view, they could be divided into livestock herders-who for the most part are Arabic speakers-and farmers-who are bilingual and perceived as Africans.[16] The most important divisions in terms of understanding the conflict in Darfur are between the sedentary farmers and the so-called "Arab" nomadic herders, ably backed by the government in Khartoum.

The Darfur Crisis

From the preceding chapter, we have seen that Sudan has been in protracted crises since attaining independence in 1956. One of the conflicts which is the focus of this chapter is the Darfur region conflict. At the heart of Sudan's crises is resistance to the marginalizing political and economic policies of the Islamist government in Khartoum, and the attendant desire for greater political autonomy and share in national wealth. The Darfur crisis, therefore, can not be divorced from these facts, as it began in February 2003 when two armed opposition groups: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Justice and Equity and Equity Movement (JEM) rose against the Arab-dominated government for discriminating against Black Africans. Rebels claimed years of political, economic and social marginalisation of the region and were made up of predominantly African sedentary tribes, such as Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit.[17]

After the government quelled a rebellion in Darfur in Jan. 2004, it allowed pro-government militias called the Janjaweed to carry out massacres against black villagers and rebel groups in the region. These Arab militias, believed to have been armed by the government, have killed between 200,000 and 300,000 civilians and displaced more than 1 million. While the war in the south was fought against black Christians and animists, the Darfur conflict is being fought against black Muslims.[18] Although the international community has reacted with alarm to the humanitarian disaster—unmistakably the world's worst—it has been ineffective in persuading the Sudanese government to rein in the Janjaweed. Despite the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) describing the killing as genocide, and despite a United Nations Security Council Resolution demanding that Sudan stop the Arab militias, the killing continued throughout 2005.

In 2006, the slaughter in Darfur escalated, and the Khartoum government remained defiantly indifferent to the international communities' calls to stop the violence. The

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[16]   Darfur Conflict: Its History, Nature and Development, accessed from http://www.sudanembassy.org/sudannewsletter/SudaNews.pdf
[17]   International Crisis Group: Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Sudan, accessed from www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id on November 11, 2007
[18]   Ibid

7,000 African Union (AU) peacekeepers deployed to Darfur proved too small and ill equipped a force to prevent much of it. A fragile peace deal in May 2006 was signed between the Sudanese government and the main Darfur rebel group; two smaller rebel groups, however, refused to sign. The United Nations (UN) reported that there has in fact been a dramatic upsurge in the violence since the agreement. The Sudanese government reneged on essential elements of the accord, including the plan to disarm the militias and allow a UN peacekeeping force into the region to replace the modest AU force. Khartoum eventually agreed to allow the modest AU force to remain in the country until the end of 2006, but rejected a hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force entering the country. In January 2007, Sudan and Darfur rebel groups agreed to a 60-day cease-fire, which was intended to lead to peace talks sponsored by the African Union. In July 2007, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to deploy as many as 26,000 peacekeepers from the African Union and the United Nations forces to help end the violence in Darfur.

The question now is that despite the effort, though belated, of the international community to see to an end to the crisis in the Darfur region, why is it that the effort has not yielded the desired result? We shall try to look at some of the factors responsible for the prolongation of the crisis.

Factors responsible for the Darfur Regions´s Crisis and its Prolongation

Several factors are responsible for the crisis in the Darfur region and for its prolongation. This ranges from political, economic, social marginalization and external influence, notably by prominent super powers, who are supporting the government in Khartoum, despite international upbraid and condemnation against it for its genocidal acts against the Black Africans in the Darfur region. The factors are discussed below:

(i)   Dispute over identity: the war in the Darfur region is fought over identity as a result of the policy of the government of Sudan to Arabise the Darfur people who are mainly Black Africans. It is known that people have gone into conflict when their collective ego, dignity or ethnic group is threatened. That of Darfur is no exception. Darfur has always had an uneasy relationship with the Khartoum-centred state because of its history. According to Douglas Johnson (2003), Darfur "was site of independent sultanates until the Turco-Egyptian conquest of the late 1870s, it rallied early to the Mahdiyya in the 1880s, and subsequently fostered a counter-Mahdiyya opposition when control from Omdurman became too oppressive. The sultanate briefly revived itself after the overthrow of the Mahdist state by Anglo-Egyptian forces, and maintained an independent existence until its final conquest and incorporation into the Sudan in

1916…….Overwhelmingly Muslim, Darfur is not predominantly Arab".[19] The need for a separate identity by the Black Africans in Darfur region induced the revolt against the Arabisation policy and the war in the region. The words of Mohammed Baraka Mohammed, a former Minister in Sudan's Parliament and a Darfurian, lay credence to this assertion. In his words, "These tribes are viewed with contempt such as my tribe, the Fur. When I was at school, I was beaten if I didn't speak Arabic even though my tribe has its own language. This and other forms of "forced Arabisation" suggests the disrespect with which we are viewed".[20]

(ii)   Support to militias groups by the Sudanese government: One of the reasons that has been advanced for why the conflict in the Darfur region has remained unresolved, despite international effort, is the fact that the Sudanese government has in the past three years continued to follow a policy of supporting ethnic militias, especially the Janjaweed, coordinating or tolerating attacks on civilians and permitting serious violations of international law to go unpunished-including attacks on African Union Forces and humanitarian aid workers and their convoys. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that the government in Khartoum "admits mobilizing "self defence militias" following rebel attacks, but denies any links to the Janjaweed, accused of trying to "cleanse" Black Africans from large swathes of territory"[21]. But to the contrary, many refugees from Darfur alleges that following air raids by government aircraft, the Janjaweed ride into villages on horses and camels, slaughtering men, raping women and stealing whatever they can find.[22] So, we can see from the reports that the support given to the ethnic militias by the government in Khartoum has emboldened them to continue in their nefarious acts.

(iii)   The continuing conflict and fragmentation of the rebel groups: At the commencement of the Darfur crisis in 2003, there were two main major rebel groups, namely the Sudan Liberation Army/ Movement (SLA/SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). As at today, there are over a dozen rebel groups who have splintered into a confusing array of competing factions, some of which have launched a surge of violence as disparate groups. For instance the SLA/SLM has broken into factions like SLM-Minni Minnawi Faction; SLM-Adel Wahid Faction; SLM Classic (Shafi) Faction; SLM Unity Faction of Abdallah Yehya. Other splinter groups of SLA/SLM are: Free Will;

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[19]   Douglas H. Johnson, "The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars", African Issues 2003, p.139
[20]   Mohammed Baraka Mohammed, Former Minister in Sudan's Parliament and a Darfurian made this statement during an interview he granted BBC News World Edition, accessed from The NE News Archives on 27 November, 2007
[21]   BBC News Africa: Sudan's Darfur Conflict, accessed on Internet on Thursday, 15 November 2007
[22]   Ibid

the Greater Sudan Liberation Movement/Army; and the National Movement for the Elimination of Marginalization.[23]

On the other hand, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is reputed to have fragmented into several disparate groups, of which the most significant is the National Movement for Reform and Development led by Jubril Abdel Karim Bari. Other splinter groups of JEM are: JEM Peace Wing; Field Revolutionary Command and Popular Forces Troops; and the National Redemption Front.[24] All this rebel groups have splinted along ethnic lines and their activities have really undermined the efforts of the international community to bring peace to Darfur, as the leaderships of most of them have shunned and refused to sign the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) aimed at bringing solution to the crisis. The existence of various rebel groups has made the Human Rights Watch to opine that "the continuing conflict and fragmentation of the rebel groups has also contributed to increasing lawlessness in parts of Darfur. This in turn has allowed bandits to flourish and rebels to attack aid convoys and kill civilians".[25] The fragmentation and the problem associated with it made Tunji Ajibade to comment that "the Darfur problem is almost intractable. In a war where the fighters are so fragmented that leadership is hardly discernible, talking peace or holding any group that breaks the peace after agreements have been reached accountable becomes a problem".[26] The same sentiment was shared by Jan Eliasson, United Nations Special Envoy to Darfur when he said that the fragmentation of the rebel groups has hampered every effort in terms of logistics and otherwise. In his words, "they are fragmenting further…….. "That is of course a great difficulty, not only politically but also physically and logistically". [27]

 (iv)   Failure to honour the terms of Darfur Peace Agreement by all parties to the conflict: The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 5, 2006 was meant to resolve the crisis between the rebel groups and the Khartoum government. But only a faction of SLA headed by Minni Minawi signed the DPA, with other rebel movements, JEM and the SLA faction lead by Abdulwahid Mohamed Nour, refusing to sign, thus putting the DPA on uncertain footing from the start. According to Human Rights Watch, rebel leaders rejected the DPA because it failed to sufficiently address key issues including a victim's compensation fund, power-sharing, rebel representation in government and the disarmament of the Janjaweed militias.[28] And

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23   BBC News Africa: Who Are Sudan's Darfur Rebels? accessed on Internet on Thursday, 15 November 2007
24   BBC News Africa, op. cit
25   Human Rights Watch: Crisis in Darfur accessed from http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05darfur8536-txt.htm on October 10
26   Tunji Ajibade in Nigerian Punch Newspaper, accessed in http://www.punchontheweb.com on 26 November, 2007
27   Jan Eliasson, UN Special Envoy to Darfur in "UN News Service", 8 June 2008 accessed from allAfrica_com
28   Ibid

ever since the DPA was signed, fighting in Darfur has increased between the government and "non-signatory" rebel groups. There has also been a surge in fighting among rebel factions (largely in North Darfur). The rebels who refused to sign the DPA continue to fight the government, which has launched an offensive against them, coordinated with militia and backed by aircraft. Up till now, the Janjaweed militias have not been disarmed, as they have continued with their attacks.

(v)   Foreign connection: Another factor that has been recognized in prolonging the Darfur crisis is the meddlesomeness of some foreign countries in the crisis. Some notable and powerful nations are supporting the government in Khartoum because of economic interest as a result of oil. In this category China and France have been named. Sudan is proven to have huge deposit of oil reserves which stood at 563 million barrels, more than twice the 2001 estimate. As of June 2004, crude oil production had risen to 345,000 barrels per day, up from 270,000 barrels per day just a year earlier.[29] As a result of the economic interests of China and France, both countries have blocked moves by the United Nations to impose sanctions on the government in Khartoum. France opposed UN sanctions and China abstains on Darfur UN vote. Explaining the motives behind the behavior of the two countries, Purple Avenger said …."the French would not jeopardize their claim to a $200B deal over a bunch of dirt poor folks…The Chinese are squishy on the genocide thing at the UN for the same reason O.I.L."[30] China, for instance, imports between 4-7 percent of its oil from Sudan and the Sudan oil projects is its most successful international oil endeavour.[31] Besides oil, another interest of the two members of the Security Council is the issue of arms sale. Purple Avenger explained the reason by saying that '' the French and Chinese are also looking to get "cozy" in weapons sales".[32]

Aside from the superpowers, Chad and Eritrea, neighbouring countries on the western and eastern sides of Sudan, respectively, are alleged to be supporting some of the rebel movements in terms of logistics and finances. The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) led by Jibril Abdel Karim Bari is said to have Chadian backing, as the leader once served as a military officer with the rank of Colonel in the Chadian President Idris Derby's republican guard.[33] The National Redemptional Front (NRF) was founded in mid-2006 with Eritrean backing.[34]

(vi)   The struggle over resources: One other factor which has remained constant and cited in the Darfur crisis is the struggle for the control of resources, most especially, land

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[29]   Purple Avenger: Darfur Explained: The Real Story? in http://purpleavenger.blogspot.com/2005/10/darfur-explained-real-story.html accessed 11 October, 2007
[30]   Ibid
[31]   Human Rights Watch: Crisis in Darfur, op.cit
[32]   Ibid
[33]   BBC News Africa: Who Are Sudan's Darfur Rebels?, op cit
[34]   Ibid

and water. Darfur is inhabited by six million people, drawn from some eighty different tribes and ethnic groups. From a subsistence point of view, they could be divided into livestock herders-who for the most part are Arabic speakers-and farmers-who are bilingual and perceived as Africans. Over the years, ecological and demographic transformation had a negative impact on inter-tribal relations where drought and desertification, according to Ambassador Khidir Haroun Ahmed (2005), "led to conflicts and often violence over scarce resources".[35] During the 1970s and 1980s these tribal conflicts became more intense and bloody, especially between the farmers and cattle herders who in search of water and pasture invaded agricultural land. Adding to the complexity of the situation is the increased migration of nomadic groups from Chad, Libya and other states. Tougher living conditions coupled with the absence of or diminishing tolerance resulted in more tension between the locals and the newcomers which led to violence with cross-border implications.[36] Environmentalist (Professor) Wangari Maathai who won the 2004 Nobel Peace Price said to the Washington Post on May 12, 2005 that: "Darfur is an example of a situation where a dire scarcity of natural resources is manipulated……..At its roots, it is a struggle over controlling an environment that can no longer support all the people who must live on it".[37] Also, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, alluded to the fact that environmental issue brought about by climate change was equally responsible for the Darfur crisis. In his words, "the slaughter in Darfur was triggered by global climate change and that more such conflicts may be on the horizon. The Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change... This suggests that the drying of sub-Saharan Africa derives, to some degree, from man-made global warming... It is no accident that the violence in Darfur erupted during the drought."[38] Commenting on the crisis and supporting the assertion that the craze and struggle for land as one of the factors for the Darfur crisis, Professor Makau Mutua said "In the case of Darfur in the Sudan, the Arab militias are clearly interested in the more productive land that is occupied by black Africans. And as a consequence, they are conducting this campaign of ethnic cleansing with a view to ridding the region of black Africans so that the land that is occupied by black Africans can now be occupied by Arabs."[39] The need to have access to land and other limited scarce resources in Darfur has made the inhabitants to continually wage wars against themselves.

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[35]   Ambassador Khidir Haroun Ahmed, Head Mission, Sudan Embassy, Washington, D.C., USA in "Darfur Conflict: Its History, Nature and Development", 2005, accessed from www.sudanembassy.org-
[36]   Ibid
[37]   Wangari, Maathai in Ambassador Khidir Haroun Ahmed, Head Mission, Sudan Embassy, Washington, D.C., USA in "Darfur Conflict: Its History, Nature and Development", 2005, accessed from www.sudanembassy.org-
[38]   Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General, United Nations, "Solution for Darfur Genocide: Stop Breathing" in Sudan's Darfur Crisis accessed from the website ofAfricaSpeaks.com on 16 November, 2007.
[39]   Makau Mutua, professor of law and Director of the Human Rights Center at the State University of New York in Buffalo, USA, on VOA NEWS.Com, 23 July, 2007, accessed on 27 November, 2007

(vii)   Fear of the Sudanese government of having to negotiate another power and wealth sharing agreement: It must be recalled that the government in Khartoum had to sign a peace agreement with the rebels of the Southern Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) under Dr. John Garang in 2003 to bring to an end the war between it and the SPLA. Under the Peace Agreement, the SPLA was integrated in to the government with Garang becoming the 2nd Vice-President. It has, therefore, been posited that Khartoum's decision to crush the Darfur rebellion could have stemmed from the fear of negotiating another power and wealth sharing deal after making concessions to southern SPLA rebels. According to Richard Cornwell, "It could be that they are genuinely fearful that the concessions that they have to the SPLA in the south, whether they intend to carry them out or not, has put them in jeopardy and they have to react in a stronger fashion".[40] There is evidence that officials in Khartoum view the Darfur rebel movement as a serious threat to their fifteen years hold on power. The government fear may not be far fetched as a senior military spokesman for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Omar Adam, said that changing the leadership in Khartoum is a goal all the rebel groups in Sudan share. In his words, ''We believe that the best way to solve the Sudanese conflict, whether in the west or the south or in the east, is regime change because the Khartoum government is responsible for what is going on in Sudan''.[41] That accounted for why the government is using the Janjaweed to prosecute the war on its behalf. According to observers, the government may have had little choice but to use the Janjaweed as a proxy army, as many men in the Sudanese army come from Darfur would likely not have been enthusiastic about attacking people in their region. The government has repeatedly accused the Darfur rebels, particularly the SLA, of having military ties with the southern rebels, and with neighbouring Eritrea, which has long supported another rebel group on Sudan's eastern border.[42]

(viii)   Failure of the Government of Sudan to accept international intervention: The Sudanese government has consistently frustrated the intervention of international bodies like the United Nations in the crisis. The body had wanted to send International Peacekeeping Force to help monitor the peace agreements and bring about peace in the country. The government of Sudan claimed that a UN force would violate its sovereignty and that the deployment of western troops would turn Sudan into "another Iraq".[43] It has accused the USA and UK of having a hidden agenda and colonial aspirations. Yet Sudan had already agreed to a UN force of 10,000 troops to monitor the peace agreement ending the twenty-one year civil war in southern Sudan, and almost 7,000 troops from Africa are already present in Darfur, so its long resistance to

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[40]   Richard Crownwell in "Darfur Crisis Has Complex Roots With No Immediate Solution" accessed from the News VOA.com on 16 November, 2007.
[41]   Omar Adam in "Darfur Crisis Has Complex Roots With No Immediate Solution" accessed from the News VOA.com on 16 November, 2007.
[42]   NewsVOA.com "Darfur Crisis Has Complex Roots With No Immediate Solution", 17 December, 2004
[43]   International Human Rights Watch "Crisis in Darfur", 5-4-2004

UN force in the region is amazing and puzzling. It has been argued that one reason for the Sudanese government's reluctance may be that it feared that a UN presence with UN Security Council backing would play a much stronger role in protecting civilians and demanding accountability (including by arresting alleged war criminals) and thereby hamper its own policy of "ethnic cleansing" in Darfur.[44]

Despite its declared readiness in accepting African Union (AU) troops in Darfur, the government of Sudan has placed many obstacles to smooth operations of African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Some examples would show, as Sudan has in the past obstructed other peacekeeping initiatives to the detriment of civilians in Darfur. In 2005 for instance, it prevented the delivery of 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers (APCs) to Darfur intended to help AMIS protect civilians, humanitarian workers, and its own troops. The APCs were eventually allowed in, but after an attack on AMIS left four troops dead. In the first quarter of 2007, Sudan blocked entry of six AMIS attack helicopters, agreeing to allow them in only after receiving assurances that they would not be used for "offensive" purposes. Also, Rebels and former rebels have attacked AMIS forces on several occasions and AMIS from entering their areas of control.[45]

(ix)   Insincerity of the National Congress Party (NCP) led government in Khartoum: The NCP led government in Khartoum has been accused of not being sincere to end the Darfur crisis. It is allegedly doing that in order to weaken opposition and strengthen its chances of holding power in elections 2009. It is also integrating Janjaweed irregulars into official security structures instead of disarming them. According to International Crisis Group (ICG), "The ruling party in Khartoum, the National Congress Party (NCP), is pursuing destructive policies in Darfur, while at the same time resisting key provisions in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the North-South war, thus triggering a crisis in that process. They are meant to ensure its survival in 2009 elections, not end the conflict, and they are jeopardising Sudan's peacemaking architecture. The NCP wants Darfur in chaos to limit the room for an opposition to emerge, while resettling key allies on cleared land and defying Security Council resolutions by integrating its Janjaweed irregulars into official security structures instead of disarming them".[46]

(x)   The rise in Arab-Arab Conflict: A new twist or dimension has open in the Darfur crisis which has helped in prolonging it and this is the rise in Arab-Arab conflict. Many Arab tribes in Darfur, particularly the camel herders, feel they have been used in recent years by the NCP and, now that the prospect of a stronger peacekeeping force is real, Khartoum intends to abandon them or sell them out. In the absence of a solution that

[44]   Ibid

[45]   Human Rights Watch, op. cit

[46]   International Crisis Group "Darfur's New Security Reality", Africa Report No. 134, 26 November, 2007, p.5

deals with their grievances, they believe they have only two choices: either continue fighting a proxy war, subjecting themselves to confrontation with the international community, or distance themselves from the NCP and engage with the international community. No matter their choice, all tribes are concerned about cementing their gains from the last years of war before the peacekeepers arrive. These gains include wealth in the form of expropriated land, military hardware and ammunition, vehicles, and political influence. They want their claims to occupied land legitimized, either through the establishment of new localities, or by being given an independent Native Administration recognized by local laws. They also demand payment: according to a senior Janjaweed militia commander in Nyala, the Arab tribes deserve to be rewarded for all they have done in fighting the rebellion. They believe that if there is a peace deal, development and reconstruction money will be directed only toward non-Arabs in Darfur, and the nomads, particularly the camel herders, will be sidelined.[47]

In its Report, the ICG gave a vivid and classical example of the situation in the following way:

"*The current fighting between Arab tribes is not neatly divided between those who supported the NCP's policies and those who did not. It occurs among all groups in a grab for land and power and is fuelled and worsened by Khartoum. An example is the fighting between the Targam and the Abbala Rizeigat, two groups that have actively supported the NCP. The small Targam tribe had been living on Fur land for 60 years and hoped to legitimise its claims through its peaceful relations with the Fur Native Administration but with the advent of the NCP counterinsurgency in 2003, it instead seized the opportunity to force the Fur out and cement its Nizara (chiefdom). To this end, it joined forces with certain Abbala – mainly the Um Jalul, Mahriya (both sub-clans of the Northern Rizeigat) and other small Arab groups such as the Taalba and Hotiya – who were also eager for this land. Together they attacked the Fur, committing atrocities around Kas, Nyala, and east Jebel Marra and producing massive displacement. With the prospect of the arrival of a more capable international force, the Targam and Abbala Rizeigat started fighting each other over land in the beginning of 2007. The Abbala Rizeigat, already more heavily armed by the NCP, were able to inflict serious damage on the Targam, forcing many into IDP camps. By April and May 2007, the Targam were accusing the NCP of backing the Abbala Rizeigat actions and of failing to provide any security or legal response when the fighting started. In early 2007, some Targam were even expressing a wish to join the insurgency in Darfur.*"[48] Thus we can see that Arab-Arab conflict has contributed in fuelling the Darfur conflict.

The points discussed above are some of the identified underlying factors responsible for the crisis in Darfur, and why it has been difficult resolving the crisis. Several attempts

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[47]   International Crisis Group, op. cit, pp. 10-11
[48]   International Crisis Group, op. cit, p. 11

have been made to resolve the crisis which has generated humanitarian crisis since its eruption. We now look at the efforts and why they have failed to elicit the desired result.

CHAPTER THREE: EFFORTS AT RESOLVING THE DARFUR'S CRISIS

The Darfur crisis has been classified as the worst crisis in recent time. Infact, the United Nations (UN) has dubbed it "the world's worst humanitarian disaster".[49] Since the beginning of the uprising in Darfur, the UN estimates that nearly 70,000 civilians have been killed and more than a million and half others displaced.[50] The war has created widespread famine as world aid groups are struggling to avert an even greater humanitarian disaster. Giving account of the current situation in its November 2007 Reports on the Darfur crisis, the International Crisis Group (ICG) said "Since the beginning of 2007, over 240,000 people have been newly displaced or re-displaced. Kidnapping and sexual assault of women by government forces and associated militias as well as rebel groups have continued. Humanitarian agencies, which have helped ensure the survival of over four million war-affected Darfurians, find themselves the direct target of violence. With attacks against them having risen by 150 per cent over the previous year, they have been forced to pull out of many areas and reduced to providing assistance via "in and out" operations in some areas, often by helicopter. Violence against them comes from all sides: government militias, non-signatory rebels, Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Miniwa (SLA/MM) forces and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) themselves. With the proliferation of rebel movements, it is difficult for humanitarian agencies to coordinate aid delivery; because of the insecurity, nearly half a million people are inaccessible to them."[51]

The international community has made several efforts at resolving the crisis using different conflict management and resolution strategies. But the crisis remains unsolved. We shall look at the different efforts and why they have failed.

(i)   Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA): The HCA was signed on 8 April, 2004 in N'djamena, Chad. It was under the auspices of the African Union (AU). The N'djamena agreement required the government to neutralize the armed militias. The agreement itself was badly flawed – neither comprehensive nor professionally negotiated. For example, there was no requirement for the combatants to submit orders of battle or their current positions, and monitoring was stretched far too thinly. Fighting still occurred between the government and the two insurgent groups, while the Janjaweed continued in its target of civilians. Government forces and the Janjaweed did not stop in their burning of villages after the ceasefire was signed, and the ethnic cleansing campaign persisted despite repeated high-level visits to the region. Despite

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[49]   News VOA.com "Darfur Crisis Has Complex Developments With No Immediate Solution", accessed on 16 November, 2007

[50]   Ibid

[51]   International Crisis Group, op. cit, p.9

the flaws and the inadequacy of the agreement, the political leadership of the regional body should be commended as it showed greater commitment at resolving the crisis. The newly created Peace and Security Council of the regional body made Darfur a test case of its ability to play a central role in preventing and resolving conflict across the continent.

(ii)   The Addis Ababa Negotiations: The political talks organised by the AU that opened on 15 July 2004 in Addis Ababa were a positive step despite the numerous problems they encountered. They were convened at short notice, and the joint delegation of senior SLA and JEM leaders that was expected never arrived, leaving only a small rebel team that put forward six preconditions for the government to fulfill before the insurgents would enter direct negotiations:

> a timetable for Janjaweed disarmament;
> creation of a commission of inquiry to establish accountability for war crimes;
> full and unfettered humanitarian access to Darfur;
> consultation on the venue for the next round of talks;
> release of all political detainees and prisoners of war; and,
> cessation of attacks on the rebels and the civilian population.[52]

These points were in line with commitments the government had already agreed to, either in the N'djamena ceasefire agreement or subsequent undertakings with the UN. However, calls for implementation of the ceasefire were complicated by that agreement's ambiguity. At the signing ceremony in N'djamena on 8 April 2004, President Idris Derby of Chad added at the last minute by hand at the insistence of the government delegation a clause for the cantonment of all rebel forces.[53] This was not included in the public versions of the document, nor was it   recognized by the rebels. The government delegation at Addis Ababa, however, repeatedly responded to JEM place their fighters in cantonments. It must, however, be emphasized that while demobilizing rebel forces is a necessary outcome of any successful talks, it is unlikely that it can be a starting point. This point was stressed by an SLA official "We adamantly refuse to canton our forces before political negotiations and before the government implements their commitments".[54] The talks closed after two days without direct meetings between the government and rebel delegations. Nonetheless, a foundation was laid.

(iii)   United Nations Security Council Resolution 1556: On 30 July, 2004, the UN passed a resolution imposing an arms ban on all non-state actors in Darfur. This equated the JEM and SLA insurgents with the Janjaweed. The resolution pledged

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[52]   Demands made by the rebels group before they will go into negotiations. See ICG Africa Report No. 83, 23 August, 2004, p.16
[53]   Ibid
[54]   International Crisis Group Africa, Report No. 83, op. cit p.10

support for the AU ceasefire team and political process, and urged the parties to resume political negotiations. The key point was Article 6, which specifically demanded that within 30 days the government satisfy its commitment to disarm the Janjaweed and hold accountable those Janjaweed responsible for human rights abuses and violations of international law. The resolution did not achieve its intended aim as it was too weak to influence Khartoum's calculations. This being that several members of the Council, according to the ICG, expressed concerns about interference with Sudanese sovereignty, and the United States, which introduced it, wanted a unanimous vote, the resolution represented the lowest common denominator.[55] The government of Sudan saw the resolution as a "declaration of war'' and threatened to fight any foreign military intervention.[56]

(iv)   Signing of Plan of Action: Less than a week after the Security Council resolution, on 5 August 2004, the Secretary General's special representative for Darfur signed a "Plan of Action" with the Government of Sudan. The Plan acknowledged that Khartoum would be unlikely to meet its commitments within 30 days, thus undermining any incentive the government had to implement the Security Council's demands and providing Council members with a rationale for not taking action when their deadline expires. The Plan provided that the government could prove its good faith by taking steps against the Janjaweed, setting up safe zones for the displaced and ordering its armed forces to respect the ceasefire. Essentially, the government did no more than repeat its earlier general commitments, while being put under no particular pressure to take immediately effective specific action. The Plan does not provide a solid set of benchmarks against which the Security Council can readily measure performance and take stronger remedial measures if dissatisfied; as such, it looks more like an escape route than a discipline upon the government and those in the Council reluctant to put more pressure upon it.

However, there are positive specific elements in the Plan of Action, namely the request to the AU Ceasefire Commission to monitor and report on the government's commitments. This expands the Commission's mandate and would seem to increase the likelihood of government compliance. But others are causes for concern, in particular the government's obligation to "identify and secure safe areas" for the internally displaced in Darfur. Khartoum has proven unwilling to provide security for the majority of displaced in the camps it controls. The new language could be used to justify forced relocation of IDPs as part of an effort to get them into "safe areas". Much greater clarity is needed on the timeline and specific delineation of these "safe areas", and the UN, AU and international partners must ensure that the process is fully transparent.

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[55]   Ibid
[56]   See Deutsche Press Agentur "Sudan army call UN Resolution declaration of war", 2nd August, 2004

(v)   February 2006 Tripoli Agreement: Libya has played a highly significant, albeit inconsistent, role in Darfur since the conflict began, culminating in its function as host of the peace talks. At various times it has shown a significant ability to influence all rebel groups and push them toward participation in a broader political process. Simultaneously it has given the NCP diplomatic cover to resist international pressure and efforts to strengthen the peacekeeping operation. The Tripoli agreement included a border monitoring mechanism, backed by Libyan military, but it never got off the ground and was seen by many internationals as simply an attempt by Libya to ward off a possible deployment of UN forces along its borders. Libya then tried to support a quadripartite monitoring mechanism including also Eritrean, Chadian and Sudanese observers. While there were reports earlier in the year of a small number of Eritrean and Libyan observers in Adre (Chad) and Geneina (Sudan), nothing substantial has come of this.   This effort did not succeed as ICG noted that "As elsewhere in Africa, Libyan actions have been motivated in part by Qaddafi's desire to be a powerful regional player and mediator but the proximity of the conflicts in Chad and Darfur and their domestic impact have triggered a more sustained effort than elsewhere".[57]

(vi)   Abuja Peace Talks: One of the various Abuja Talks aimed at resolving the Darfur's crisis was the Fifth Round Talks held from 10 June to 5 July 2005. The parties which included the GoS and rebel movements signed the Declaration of Principles on the political issues.[58] Another talk held in Abuja in respect of finding solution to the lingering Darfur conflict was the Sixth Session of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks held on 24 August, 2005, 15 September, 2005 and 17 September, 2005. It dwelled on negotiations on the substantive issues of power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements.[59] But all the Talks did not come out with the desired result as some of the rebel movements either pulled out or failed to associate with the outcome.

(vii)   The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA): The DPA signed under African Union (AU) auspices on 5 May 2006 between Sudan's government and the faction of the insurgent Sudan Liberation Army led by Minni Arkou Minawi (SLA/MM). The DPA consists of three protocols- power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements, as well as a chapter laying out the framework for a "Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation" (DDDC). The agreement followed more than two years of difficult negotiations between the government and the three rebel groups then, with the government of Nigeria facilitating. However, the DPA was still-born even before it could be put to use, as two of the three rebel movements- the SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW)

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[57]   International Crisis Group, op. cit., p.24
[58]   See http://www.africa.union.org/News/Press.Releases/Sept.05.20 Darfur-15-09.pdf ,accessed on 4 December, 2007
[59]   See African Union Mission in Sudan in www.africa-union.org/DARFUR/homedar.htm - accessed on 4 December, 2007

and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), did not accept it, and, therefore, were not signatories to it. Abdel Wahid, leader of SLA/AW, demanded more direct SLA participation in implementation of security arrangements and was also dissatisfied with the DPA's provisions for political representation and a victim's compensation fund. On the other hand, JEM maintained that the protocols on power and wealth sharing did not adequately address the conflict's root causes: the structural inequities between Sudan's centre and its periphery that led to the rebellion in 2003. Indeed, the DPA, according to the ICG, rather than resolving the conflict "compounded it by accelerating the break-up of the insurgency into smaller blocs along loose ethnic lines".[60]

Another reason that made DPA to fail was its lack of modalities and implementation guarantees for disarmament of the Janajweed militias and the voluntary and safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their villages. Its comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements required the parties to disarm themselves, a task usually left for peacekeepers, while requesting AMIS to verify and monitor the processes of their redeployment, assembly and disarmament. This required robust monitoring but AMIS had too few troops, with too little mobility and firepower and inadequate intelligence capabilities, to do it properly. Members of the AU mediation team and AMIS officials in Abuja admitted openly that AMIS as currently constituted cannot fulfill these tasks. Yet, the DPA contains no reference to a UN takeover of peacekeeping responsibilities. The ICG opined that the international community was in a hurry to package peace in the Darfur region without taken into cognizance some variables needed to achieve that. In its words, "In essence, there is a very real danger that the international community, in its eagerness to get a deal, has brokered one that is structurally weak. Without the good faith of the parties, particularly of the government, and without effective fulfillment by AMIS of its verification and patrolling roles, the DPA is destined to fail."[61]

The DPA also failed as neither the National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling party in Khartoum, nor the rebel movements wanted the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process to begin as prescribed in the DPA, because both viewed it as a threat. The NCP feared a comprehensive process might generate unity among Darfurians and endanger its survival strategy, as it has been using divide and rule tactics to survive. The rebels saw the process as potentially weakening their legitimacy as movements representing the interests of Darfur.

(viii) Peacekeeping Efforts by Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS): The Africa Mission in Sudan (AMIS) – initially the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) – was established by the African Union (AU) as a monitoring mission in April 2004 following the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2004 by the government of Sudan (GoS), and two rebel movements from the Darfur region, the Sudan Peoples Liberation

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[60] International Crisis Group: "Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement", Policy Briefing No. 39, June 20, 2006, p.1
[61] International Crisis Group, op. cit, p.4

Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). As an observer mission, AMIS comprised 80 military observers and a protection force of 600 troops. At the17th Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting in July 2004, the mission was enlarged to make provision for a staff of 3 320. On 20 October 2004, the AU Peace and Security Commission (PSC) further enhanced AMIS to include assistance for confidence building, protection of civilian and humanitarian operations and observance of all agreements signed since the N'djamena Agreement of 8 April.

The AU has, thereafter, gradually deployed 6 171 military personnel and 1 560 civilian police. AMIS's first phase of deployment ended on June 2005 and on 20 May 2005 its personnel had reached a total of 2 635, comprising 452 military observers, 1 732 troops, 40 CFC members/international support staff, 413 civilian police personnel and 12 members of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF). The second phase was supposed to have ended in August 2005 with deployment of 6 171 military personnel with an appropriate civilian component including up to 1 560 civilian police. The third phase, which was supposed to be decided in September 2005, is a follow-up mission and is projected to have 12 300 personnel. The Mission which was primarily charged with protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Janjaweed attacks in camps spread across Darfur is hampered by some weaknesses which included command and control, logistical support and operational practice.

Moreover, the mission is equally said to be facing some several critical challenges. The first challenge is the huge disparity between the numbers of personnel and the actual number on the ground. Second is the increasing violence by the Janjaweed against IDP camps and villages as happened on 28 September 2005 at the Aro Sharow IDP camp, and by the rebels against GoS and AMIS troops as happened on 8 October when SLA rebels killed three AU soldiers and two civilian drivers, and a JEM splinter faction detained 38 others. Third is the unraveling of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which is at greater risk following the death of the Southern SPLM

leader Dr. John Garang de Mabior. Indeed, the aftermath of his death saw large-scale violence that killed 130 people and injured hundreds across several cities of Sudan including the capital, Khartoum. And lastly, the deteriorating situation in Eastern Sudan has opened up another crisis with possibilities of large-scale atrocities.[62]

(ix) United Nations Resolution 1706: The Security Council vide resolution 1706 (2006) on August 31, 2006 decided to expand the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to include its deployment to Darfur, without prejudice to its existing mandate and operations, in order to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The Council invited the consent of the Sudanese Government of National Unity for that deployment, and called on Member

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[62]   See AMIS: African Mission in Sudan (Darfur), http://www.accord.org.za/ct/2005_4/t4_2005 accessed on 4 December, 2007

States to ensure an expeditious deployment. It requested the Secretary-General to arrange the rapid deployment of additional capabilities to enable UNMIS to deploy in Darfur.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council authorized UNMIS to use all necessary means as it deemed within its capabilities: to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; to ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, assessment and evaluation commission personnel; to prevent disruption of the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan; to protect civilians under threat of physical violence; and to seize or collect arms or related material whose presence in Darfur was in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by resolution 1556, and to dispose of such arms and related material as appropriate.[63]

The Council decided also that the mandate of UNMIS would be, among other things, to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the N'djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur, including by: monitoring and verifying the implementation by the parties to those agreements; observing and monitoring movement of armed groups and redeployment of forces in areas of UNMIS deployment by ground and aerial means; investigating violations of the Agreements and reporting them to the Cease-fire Commission; monitoring trans-border activities of armed groups along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African Republic; and ensuring an adequate human rights and gender presence, capacity and expertise within the Mission to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection and monitoring activities, including particular attention to the needs of women and children.[64]

(x)   The African Union (AU)/United Nations (UN) Hybrid Force for Darfur: The African Union (AU)/UN hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which is set to replace the AU's African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established by the Security Council in July 2007, will eventually comprise 19,555 military and 6,432 police personnel, making it one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in history. It is widely hoped that the hybrid force will be more effective in protecting civilians in Darfur than AMIS, which was made up of just 7,000 troops. The troops are expected from Burkina Faso, Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Other potential contributors are Bangladesh, Jordan, Nordic countries, Nepal, Netherlands and Thailand.[65] The force which is due to deploy in Darfur by December 31, 2007 at the latest is faced with logistics problems.

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[63]   See Council on Foreign Relations in http:www.cfr.org/publication/11406/ - Accessed on December 5, 2007
[64]   Ibid
[65]   IRIN Africa, "Sudan: Hybrid Force for Sudan sets up base" accessed from http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=75077

This has made UNAMID Force Commander, General Martin-Luther Agwai to call on the international community to do something. He said no country had yet donated any of the 24 helicopters required for the force to be able to work efficiently. He said that under such circumstances the mission faced "a Herculean task". Gen Agwai appealed to the international community to make up the shortfall. In his words, "If we want to see an end to the suffering in Darfur… this is now the time to stand up and be counted among the friends and do everything possible to help us have the resources that is required to assist and help the people."[66]

Speaking on the same issue of problem of logistics, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN's Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, warned that equipment issues risked undermining the credibility of the joint force from the outset. He said that the hybrid force lacked crucial elements including a ground unit, 18 transport helicopters and six helicopters for light tactical purposes. The inability to meet the needed logistics would not augur well to the mission in Darfur. He said "For the early phase of 2008, we need to have a force that is able to meet the test because we believe that that mission will be tested in early 2008".[67] Continuing he said, "If the force is not able to meet that test in a credible manner, then it will be very bad for our efforts in Darfur. The clock is ticking."[68]

(xi)   The October 2007 Sirte Libya Talks: The UN and African Union convened Darfur peace talks in Sirte, Libya on October 27, 2007. But all too predictably, no progress was recorded and prospects for future negotiations are unclear. There were many reasons for the failure in Sirte. Key rebel leaders did not show up, as various internal divisions persisted, including tensions between commanders on the ground and political leaders abroad. Many rebels also doubt the good faith and impartiality of the UN and AU, given the nature of their dealings with Khartoum. Issues of representation remain vexed, and Darfurians in the camps and civil society were largely unrepresented, ensuring that the voices of those suffering most would be unheard. Moreover, the choice of venue was disastrous. Libya's Muamar Gadaffi, who has for decades fomented violence on both sides of the Darfur/Chad border, poisoned the atmosphere early on, and gained instant notoriety for suggesting that the Darfur genocide was "a quarrel over a camel."[69] His further suggestion that the catastrophe in Darfur was merely a tribal issue and his consequent resistance to international protection efforts, played directly into Khartoum's negotiating hand. But the most disturbing consequence of the collapse of the Sirte talks was the boost it gave to Khartoum, which appeared with a full delegation, and

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[66]   General Martin-Luther Agwai in www.punchontheline.com, 26 November, 2007
[67]   Darfur: AU, UN Struggle To Assemble New Joint Force in www.punchontheline.com, 22 November, 2007
[68]   Ibid
[69]   Eric Reeves "Darfur Peace Talks in Libya Produce Only an Emboldened Khartoum", accessed from www.Sudanreeves.org/home/index.cfm7 action=cw_ on 5 December, 2007

proceeded to indulge in fulsome talk about being prepared to make peace. Knowing full well that there would be no adequate or coherent rebel representation, the regime clearly saw this as the perfect opportunity for a significant propaganda victory.

We have seen from the above, the various steps taken by the international community to resolve the Darfur crisis. All these have not worked because of impediments thrown at each step. Since they have failed to achieve the goal, it is necessary for the international community, notably the UN and AU, to evolve new strategy for the resolution of the Darfur's crisis. The evolvement of new strategies towards the resolution of the conflict is the main thrust of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: FORMULAR FOR ULMITATE SOLUTION

From the preceding chapter, we can see that there have been efforts made to bring peace to the Darfur region and resolve the crisis which has so brought about 70,000 deaths and more than a million and half others displaced. More concerted efforts should be made to resolve the crisis, as its resolution is significant because of a number of strategic reasons and importance of Sudan in Africa. First, the Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with about "one million square miles". Secondly, it is also the only country through which the River Nile, associated with the ancient civilization of Egypt, passes from its northern and southern parts. It, thus, has strategic relevance to the economy of its neighbours. Thirdly, it stands as the point of convergence between Arab and African civilizations.[70] This point was succinctly put by Ali Mazrui as he observed:

> *One could see the Sudan as a bridge between Arabic speaking and*
>
> *English speaking Africa, between Christian Africa and Muslim Africa,*
>
> *Between the Africa of a homogenized mass nation state of the future*
>
> *and Africa of the deep ethnic cleavage of the present, and finally between*
>
> *West Africa as a cultural unit and East Africa.[71]*

Thus, the resolution of the Sudan Darfur's crisis can serve as a litmus test for the prospect of unity among mutually exclusive social categories of peoples engaged in the prospect of nation-building in Africa. Evidence has shown that the people are weary and wants an ultimate solution of the crisis. According to Jan Eliasson, "There is a growing frustration, a growing weariness and tiredness for the situation. The tribal leaders, the leaders in the camps are very, very vocal and make very strongly the point that this conflict must come to an end".[72]

 It is on the basis of this fact, that this work proffers some suggestions for the ultimate solution of the crisis which will usher in peace, and put an end to the human suffering and misery being experienced by the civilian population in the region. The suggestions for the ultimate solutions, the focus of this chapter, are discussed below.

(i)   Addressing the land issue: Since it has been proven that access to land is one of the fundamental causes of the Darfur crisis, there is the need to address the issue frontally. The issue of land came about as a result of extended drought from the mid-

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[70]   Ishaya Aliyu, "Self Determination and the Enigma of Unity in the Sudan: An Analysis of Contemporary Trends and Implications for Nigeria" in Nigerian Forum, Vol. 26, Nos.5-6, NIIA, May/June, 2005, p.165

[71]   Ali Mazrui, in Ishaka Aliyu, Ibid

[72]   Jan Eliason, UN Special Envoy to Darfur, in UN News Service, June 8, 2007 accessed from allAfrica.com

1970s through the early 1980s, there were large population movements of pastoralists from Northern Darfur and Chad into the central farming belt, just at a time when the agricultural use of land was expanding and intensifying with Fur (one of the ethnic groups in Darfur region) and other agriculturalists selling to the internal market of the urban centers of Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan. As temporary movement merged into permanent settlement by pastoralists who had lost their livestock, conflicts developed between the immigrants and settled population. Therefore, there is the need to address the issue of land as articulated in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). According to ICG report, "The DPA already has created a mechanism, the Darfur Land Commission, to revise land tenure/use policies and rules, as well as to arbitrate land disputes. However, the negotiations should expand its power to incorporate a commission of inquiry with a clearly defined mandate and backed by laws enabling it to address land expropriation and augment the local courts and the land commission's arbitration function".[73] Commenting on the desirability to settle the land issue as a sine-qua-non to peace in Darfur, allAfrica.com opined that "A sustainable peace needs………to find a long-term settlement for land and power issues, including how to handle the historical land ownership system in Darfur, since it was a sultanate… ….and to find long-term solutions for the landless Arab tribes which have fuelled the Janjaweed".[74]

(ii)   Revisiting the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement: The only sustainable solution to the Darfur crisis is peace. The international community needs to support a single peace process that revisits the Darfur Peace Agreement in a meaningful way. Negotiations must be inclusive and the international community must avoid the deadline diplomacy which contributed to the failure of the 2006 agreement. The envisaged negotiations and dialogue should be widened to include groups such as women and Arab tribal groups, in order to avoid more fragmentation among parties to the conflict and the danger of new insurgencies. The reason why the various talks on the peace process have not succeeded is the exclusiveness of other relevant stakeholders. A displaced Dafurian local community leader, Al-Bashir Al-Nagi, told Reuters about his feelings and frustration when he said that they were not invited to the October 26 Talk in Sirte Libya. In his words, he said "There is no representative for us there. No one came and consulted us. If some of us were present at the talks it would help them succeed".[75] For leaving them out, he predicted that the planned talks are "not going to succeed. They will fail like the last ones."[76] Also, a Sheikh made a plea to the visiting British Foreign Office Minister for Africa, Mark Malloch Brown, during his (Brown's) visit to displaced

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[73]   International Crisis Group, "Darfur's New Security Reality", Crisis Group Africa Report No. 34, November 26, 2007, pp.25-26

[74]   http://www.allAfrica.com accessed on December 4, 2007

[75]   Punch On the Web, "Displaced Darfuris Seek Seat at Peace Talks", accessed from http://www.punchng.com on September 13, 2007

[76]   Ibid

persons camp in south Darfur on the need for them to be active participants in peace talks. The Sheikh told Brown "We would like to participate in the peace-building process".[77]

The ICG in its November 2007 Report also called for more participation in the peace talks process, alluding that for the process to succeed, it must include the full range of constituencies involved in the crisis, such as women and Arab tribes. David Mozersky, Crisis Group's Horn of Africa Project Director said "Incorporating broader and more representative voices can help remedy the uneven weight the peace process now gives the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and rebel factions".[78] Wangari Maathai also subscribe to the need to involve the people in the peace process. In her words,"You must not deal only with the symptoms you have to get to the root causes by promoting environmental rehabilitation and empowering people to do things for themselves. What is done for the people without involving them can not be sustained".[79] In order not jeopardize the outcome of peace talks and for the desired goal to be achieved, there is the need to make future talks all inclusive and in line with the 2006 DPA.

(iii)   Need to address the regional security issues: The Darfur conflict has not remained within its own borders and has become a great regional security issues. Northern and Southern Kordofan parts of Sudan have been increasingly affected. Chad and Central Africa Republic have felt the impact, with the former receiving the majority of the refugees. The AU/UN mediation has identified Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Egypt all as integral players with considerable influence over either rebel movements, the NCP or both, and thus critical to the success of any peace negotiations. They are also potential spoilers, and it has been a challenge for the mediation to balance their competing interests. It is necessary, therefore, for the international community to get firm commitment from the neighboring states to desist from their acts of fuelling the conflict through their support to either of the parties in the conflict. The support given to the rebel movements or the NCP has made the conflict not abate, as shown in this report:

Chad's involvement is linked exclusively to Darfur, where it has been supporting rebel groups, particularly the Zaghawa, since the conflict began. Eritrea has a history of support for Sudanese opposition groups, was intimately involved in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGAD) negotiations which led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and provided a base for the SPLA and NDA (rebel movements) throughout the 1990s. Since the CPA, it has helped various Darfur factions but has also improved relations with the NCP over the last year and a half, for example by brokering the Eastern Sudan peace process. It can frustrate any

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[77]   Ibid

[78]   David Mozersky in ICG New Report "Darfur's New Security Reality", November 26, 2007 accessed from http://www.cisisgroup.org

[79]   Wangari Maathai, 2004 Nobel Peace Prize winner in Washington Post, May 12, 2005

initiative it considers against its interests, as it has shown with several attempts to unify the Darfur rebels. Libya's Darfur involvement has been at times constructive, at times negative. It has alternated between helping the rebels and Khartoum, and in 2007 has become central to a more coordinated international approach, usually able to bring Chad along and at times Eritrea. Egypt is increasingly involved in Darfur, opening new channels to rebel factions while generally supporting the NCP with Western governments. It has serious concerns, related to Nile water implications, about the CPA's southern self determination referendum. [80]

Bringing these regional actors together is critical to any successful strategy. To this end the ICG has called for international cooperation on the issue arguing that, "Without intense international engagement and cooperation, the crisis will continue ravaging Darfur and destabilising the entire region".[81]

(iv)   Facilitating the expeditious deployment of AMIS and UNAMID: For the Darfur crisis to come to an end as envisioned by the international community, it is necessary and important to facilitate the expeditious deployment of AMIS and UNAMID and ensuring they can carry out their mandate unhindered, including having freedom of movement throughout Darfur. This is highly desirous as both AMIS and UNAMID since their formations have not been able to perform their expected roles because of the impediments put on their ways by the GoS and rebel movements. To this end, it is apt and necessary that good mechanisms are put in place to enable them carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently. The demand of the GoS to be informed about the deployment of AMIS and UNAMID troops is an impediment to their operations and mandates. This issue was brought to the fore by the head of UN peacekeeping operation. He said that Sudanese objections and delays were threatening the viability of the mission. Among other demands, Sudan wants advance notice of troop movements and to be able to shut down communications.[82]

(v)   Provision of Logistics to UNAMIS (Hybrid Force): As a corollary to the above, there is the need to provide logistics to UNAMIS to enable it discharge its mandate adequately. Lack of logistics, equipment and other wherewithal has hampered its operations. Equipment issues risked undermining the credibility of the joint force as it lacked crucial elements including a ground transport unit, 18 transport helicopters and six helicopters for light tactical purposes. This has made the Force Commander, General Martin Luther Agwai, to ask the international community to assist with the necessary resources. He said "If we want to see an end to the suffering in Darfur... this

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[80]   ICG, "A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan", Africa Report No. 130, July 26, 2007, p.15
[81]   Ibid
[82]   Darfur Mission 'Behind Schedule'-AU-UN Commander in http://www.DailyTrustonline.com, December 3, 2007

is now the time to stand up and be counted among the friends and do everything possible to help us have the resources that is required to assist and help the people."[83]

(vi)   Holding the GoS accountable to the act of genocide perpetuated against the people of Darfur: The suggestion is plausible as the GoS has not shown any seriousness in protecting the people of Darfur. President Omar Bashir of Sudan has not shown humane and honest disposition to the plight of the people of Darfur. He denied the UN increased participation geared towards bringing lasting peace to the region claiming that it was Sudan's internal matter. Yet he could not rescue a part of the people he was meant to govern from avoidable deaths. The issue of sovereignty of a nation or internal matter should not count when countries encroach on the basic rights of their citizens. When such happens, the UN and other international bodies must rush to defend such people. The Westphalian vocabulary of sovereignty should not be considered crucial any more because the world has changed drastically. Boutrous-Boutrous Ghali, former UN Secretary General, reflected on sovereignty by stating:

"Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of obsolete and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory has never matched reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world".[84]

Boutrous Ghali's rejection of the exclusiveness of sovereignty should be emphasized, especially when two conditions exist. First is when a state experiences chaos or breakdown of government. This situation will consequently lead to greater violence, and perhaps conflict with another state. Secondly, the sovereignty of a country could be violated when the state is practicing state-run terrorism and genocide against its citizens. Hitler's actions demonstrate an example of a situation in which state sovereignty should not be respected. Hitler came to power through democratic means. Once he consolidated his power, he engaged in ethnic cleansing. The holocaust, one of the shameful experiences of humankind, should always remind us that state-run terrorism against its citizens should not be tolerated. Should we wait in the name of sovereignty until another Hitler appears to awaken us to the dangers of closing our eyes to state torture? The answer is, NO!!! The international community should evolve a way of intervening and resolving the conflict using Boutrous Ghali's hypothesis.

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[83]   Ibid

[84]   Emad Mayer-Mruwat, "United Nations: Critiques & Reforms", Journal of Third World Studies, Spring 1998 in FindArticles.com accessed on November 11, 2007

(vii)   Reconciliation of the different ethnic groups in the Darfur region: For an amicable resolution of the Darfur's conflict, there is the need to embark on reconciliation of the different ethnic groups, women and other stakeholders in the Darfur crisis using the platform of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation. The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement called for the convening of a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation 60 days after its entry in force. This conference is designed to broaden buy-in and deal with underlying core issues such as land ownership and rights, but is also expected to discuss overarching issues like inter-communal reconciliation, the safe return of IDP's and refugees, traditional grazing routes and the broader relationship between pastoral and farming communities. Powerful constituencies that were left out during the DPA process or chose to opt out of it, such as the government backed militias (including the Janjaweed), many groups of Arab origin and the insurgents who refused to sign, would all expect to be fairly represented. The government and Darfur rebels have both attempted in the past to appropriate or manipulate communal reconciliation mechanisms for partisan use. The inclusion of their representatives in the preparatory committee for the Consultation (Article 473) greatly weakens the credibility of the process. The AU and the UN should strive to make the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation as inclusive and transparent a process as possible, including by guaranteeing women significant participation at all stages.

(viii)   Disarmament and Demobilization of the Janjaweed and other government supported militias: The Janjaweed and other government-supported militias remain the most pressing threat to security in Darfur, and civilians will not begin to feel safe until they are dealt with. The government has agreed in writing to identify, neutralize and disarm its proxy militias on five previous occasions and has been ordered to disarm them in multiple UN Security Council resolutions since July 2004. However, it continues to arm and recruit militias and support their operations even in the weeks since signing the DPA. Likewise, the government's support for the attempted coup in Chad on 13 April 2006 and its continued backing of Chadian rebels are clear indications that it still regards a military solution to the conflict as a viable option. This has made an observer to voice out to Crisis Group that "Why should we be impressed that the NCP has just committed to disarm the Janjaweed for the sixth time. Is there a new reason to believe they'll implement it this time"?[85] On the basis of the fear entertained by the people, a more robust disarmament and demobilization program to be supervised by the AU/UN Hybrid Force should be put in place to allay the fears and apprehension of the people. This recommendation is in tandem with the Resolution 60/223 adopted by the General Assembly on 24 March, 2006 on how to promote durable peace and sustainable

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[85] Darfur's Fragile Peace Agreement Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°39, 20 June 2006, p.4

development in Africa conflict zones. Resolution (13) calls upon "the United Nations system and invites Member States to assist African countries emerging from conflict in their efforts to restore security, provide for the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees, promote and monitor human rights and increase income-generating activities, especially for youth and demobilized ex-combatants".[86]

(ix)   Pressing for the establishment of a functioning ceasefire and of equal importance the revitalization of the moribund peace process: The international community should as a matter of fact press for the establishment of a functioning ceasefire and revitalization of the moribund peace process, as necessary new peace talks would be best served by freezing further efforts to apply the DPA's political and wealth-sharing provisions. The AU/UN mediation team should prepare by building international consensus, working to unify the rebel movements, broadening participation from key Darfur constituencies and drawing lessons learned from the mediation process on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Southern rebel movements and the NCP led government in Khartoum. For this to work, the ICG suggested that a new international approach should be applied on Khartoum by the U.S., China, other members of the UN Security Council and member states of the AU and UN. The new approach included:

- apply effective pressure on all sides – but particularly on the NCP – to abandon attempts to achieve a military victory;
- support the AU/UN mediation as the sole international forum for pursuing a peaceful Darfur settlement;
- develop consensus for a political strategy, including the application of punitive measures against those responsible;
- apply targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, to key NCP leaders who have already been identified by UN-sponsored investigations as responsible for atrocities in Darfur and encourage divestment campaigns;
- authorise through the Security Council a forensic accounting firm or a panel of experts to investigate the offshore accounts of the NCP and NCP-affiliated businesses so as to pave the way for economic sanctions against the regime's commercial entities, the main conduit for financing NCP-allied militias in Darfur;
- explore sanctions on aspects of Sudan's petroleum sector, the NCP's main source of revenue for waging war in Darfur, to include at least bars on investment and provision of technical equipment and expertise; and
- begin immediate planning for enforcing a no-fly zone over Darfur by French and U.S. assets in the region, with additional NATO support; obtaining consent of the Chad government to deploy a rapid-reaction force to that country's border with Sudan; and planning on a contingency basis for a non-consensual deployment to

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[86]   See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/223 of 24th March, 2006

Darfur if political and diplomatic efforts fail to change government policies, and the situation on the ground worsens.[87]

(x)   Avoiding same mistakes: The Darfur peace agreement failed because of hurried attempts to secure a deal and get UN peacekeepers in. They did not get a deal and they did not get UN peacekeepers. Instead security rapidly worsened in Darfur. Fragmented rebel factions targeted humanitarian groups to kit themselves out with vehicles, satellite telephones and other necessities to assert their presence in the battle for Darfur. The people who ended up worst off were the civilians, who found themselves deprived of humanitarian assistance for periods of time when aid agencies had to suspend operations. Many in humanitarian circles are concerned that the same mistake not be made again. If a majority of rebel factions can cement the ties that were nurtured in Arusha, Tanzania, and with the 11th December, 2007 meeting convened in Canada by the UN Special Envoy on Darfur, Jan Eliasson,[88] then peace may have a real chance in Darfur.

(xi)   Governing of Darfur by the UN: It has been proven at different times by various NGOs and international bodies that the GoS is neck deep in the Darfur conflict by supporting and arming the Janjaweed, thus abdicating in its responsibility of protecting the lives and well-being of all Sudanese. To this end, it is hereby suggested that Darfur Region should come under the administration of the United Nations as it was done in Kosovo during the Balkan war of the 90s. The administration of the Region by the UN would cease after elections and signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the GoS and the rebel movements. The war between Southern Sudan and Khartoum came to an end in 2003 after the signing of CPA.

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[87]   See ICG'S April 2007 Report focused on the Darfur Conflict and July 2007 Report on Building a Comprehensive Peace Throughout Sudan

[88]   Aljareezanews.com, 11 December, 2007

CONCLUSION

Sudan has never really known peace and stability since her independence in 1956 from Anglo-Egyptian tutelage. The country has been rocked by political squabbles and violence, military coups, and civil war. However, it is the Darfur war which began in February 2003 with its attendant feature of being the worst disaster in recent history, which placed Sudan on contemporary world's peace agenda.

In all the long period of her previous battles, the international community did not really show much concern, while the Khartoum committed national suicide and genocide against her own people. Now that the world has woken up from its very deep sleep, it is crucial for the peace process and security arrangement to be put in proper perspective, and prompt action taken to halt the carnage and human suffering, and restore lasting and durable peace in the country. The strategy to bring about that lasting is what this effort has addressed. This modest effort is committed to finding a lasting peace in Sudan's Darfur region, and it is our believe that the formula for peace postulated in this work will work if the belligerents really want a just and lasting peace in the Sudan. It is in our view that the formula/suggestions being proffered would lead to restoration of democracy, peace stability, national unity, Sudan's sovereignty, and social progress. The international community should rise in unison and come to the aid of the long suffering people of Sudan by putting an end to the act of genocide and ethnic cleansing going on there.

Appendix

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMIS- African Mission in Sudan

APCs- Armored Personnel Carriers

AU- African Union

BBC- British Broadcasting Commission

CFC- Ceasefire Commission

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDDC- Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation

DITF- Darfur Integrated Task Force

DPA- Darfur Peace Agreement

EU- European Union

GoS- Government of Sudan

HCA- Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement

ICG- International Crisis Group

IDPs- Internally Displaced Persons

IGAD- Intergovernmental Authority on Development

JEM- Justice and Equality Movement

NCP- National Congress Party

PSC- Peace and Security Commission

SLA- Sudan Liberation Army

SPLA-Sudan People's Liberation Army

SPLM -Sudan People's Liberation Movement

UK- United Kingdom

UNAMIS- United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNAMID- United Nations Mission in Darfur

USA- United States of America

UN- United Nations

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Editorial