

Research report no. 78



Hassan Sayed Suliman

The Nationalist Movements in the Maghrib

A comparative approach

Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala

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The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
Uppsala 1987

ISSN 0080-6714
ISBN 91-7106-266-1

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Printed in Sweden by
Motala Grafiska
Motala 1987

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAN	Annual of North Africa
AML	Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty
CAM	Moroccan Action Committee
CCE	Committee of Co-ordination and Execution
CGTT	General Confederation of Tunisian Workers
CNRA	National Council of the Algerian Revolution
CNRS	National Centre for Scientific Research
CRESM	Centre for Research and Studies on Mediterranean Societies
CRUA	Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action
ENA	North-African Star
FLN	National Liberation Front
GPRA	Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
MNA	Algerian National Movement
MP	Popular Movement
MTLD	Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties
OAS	Organization of the Secret Army
PCA	Algerian Communist Party
PCF	French Communist Party
PCM	Moroccan Communist Party
PDI	Independence Democratic Party
PNR	National Reform Party
PPA	Algerian People's Party
PUM	Moroccan Unity Party
UDMA	Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto
UGCA	General Union of Algerian Merchants
UGEMA	General Union of Algerian Muslim Students
UGTA	General Union of Algerian Workers
UN	United Nations

P R E F A C E

This work on the Maghrib countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) is a continuation of M.Sc. and Ph.D. dissertations conducted at Aix-Marseilles University (France) during the period 1970-76. The Maghrib was treated mainly as a case study with regard to both colonial and post-colonial eras.

After many years of teaching the Maghrib in the University of Khartoum as well as in the University of Al-Ain in the United Arab Emirates, and given the scarcity of comparative studies on the Maghrib, the author estimates that it is now time to give more attention to the use of the comparative approach. The aim in this respect is to formulate new conclusions from the already accumulated data in the different case studies. The present work is an attempt in that direction.

As this work would not have been completed without the generous invitation of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in the Guest Researchers' Programme (May-August 1986), the author expresses his deep gratitude to the Director, Anders Hjort, all the staff members and the librarians for their very useful assistance and encouragement.

Uppsala, August 1986

Hassan Sayed Suliman

INTRODUCTION

The study of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib - Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco - is essential for the understanding of the contemporary political situations in this area. It is convenient to begin by defining the basic terms relating to the area and the subject matter of the study, i.e. the "Maghrib" on one hand, and the key concept of "nationalism" on the other hand. The purpose and scope of the study together with the methodology, plan and sources will then be considered. This introduction will be followed by a brief historical background of the Maghrib until the establishment of French colonization.

Definitions

It is always important, especially in the field of politics where opinions tend to differ, to define the area as well as the basic concepts of the subject not only objectively but also subjectively. Neutrality and impartiality are required in any scientific research but, at the same time, personal judgements and evaluations cannot be avoided and are also sometimes needed in order to take position in controversial issues.

The area known geographically as North Africa consists, for the author, of three neighbouring countries which lie north of the Sahara, all of which had been subjected to French domination before they obtained independence, i.e. Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, the last one had also been partly dominated by the Spanish in the north.

In fact the ancient Greeks gave the name "Libya" to the area north of the Sahara in order to distinguish its "white" inhabitants (the ancestors of the native "Berber" groups) from the "Ethiopians" or Negroes of the Sahara.¹ The Romans then used the terms "Africa" for the area nearly equivalent today to Tunisia, "Numidia" for what is now roughly the eastern half of Algeria, and "Mauritania" for western Algeria together with Morocco.²

Subsequently the Arabs who came from the East gave the name "Gazirat al-Maghrib" (the island of the occident) to all the area extending from the west of Egypt while they also used the more exact term "al-Maghrib al-agsa" (the extreme occident) to the Moroccan Far West.³ It should be noticed that the Arabs used the term "Gazirat al-Maghrib" in the same sense as the term "al-Gazirat al-Arabiya" as both areas are surrounded by water on several sides, which the term "Maghrib" was used to indicate the direction where the sun sets in contrast to the term "Mashrig" indicating the direction where the sun rises. This distinction later led to the division of the Arab countries into Mashrig and Maghrib. In fact the Arab geographers of the Middle Ages used the expression "Gazirat al-Maghrib" to designate the whole of area including Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.⁴

It seems, however, that the Arabs followed the Roman tradition which divided the Maghrib into three provinces: "Ifriqiya" for Tunisia and Constantine (in eastern Algeria), "al-Maghrib al-awsat" (Central Maghrib) for Algeria and eastern Morocco, and "al-Maghrib al-agsa" for Morocco beyond the Atlas.⁵ It is remarkable that the term "al-Maghrib" is used today to indicate the name of the actual state of Morocco whose European names (e.g. le Maroc in French) came from Marrakesh, the ancient capital of Morocco. But the term is also used in a wider sense to indicate the hope for unity as expressed by the terms "al-Maghrib al-kabir" (the grand Maghrib) and "al-Maghrib al-Arabi" (the Arab Maghrib) that should include Algeria Tunisia and Morocco and perhaps also Libya and Mauritania. The Maghrib will be confined in this comparative study to what is known as the former "French North Africa" consisting of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco which all have a heritage of common historical ties.

With regard to the term "nationalism", it should be noticed that it is a modern western concept dating back only as far as the nineteenth century. While it has a specific sense in western terminology as applied to the rise of the national state (or state-nation) in modern Europe, nationalism has a different sense in non-western countries of which Arab and Muslim worlds.

In fact a precise and a practical definition of the concept of nationalism is not easy as different writers have different definitions. Thus instead of trying to find a suitable definition, some elements have been suggested within the context of this concept which is derived from the word "nation" (which is from the latin term "natus" meaning birth). These elements are mainly the following: adhesion of a group of people to a common ethnic origin and to certain customs and traditions; existence of a common system of language or, more generally of communication; presence of a territorial unity where is a system of sovereignty exercised through certain institutions accepted by the people; sense of national identification with regard to the external world; and finally, existence of co-ordinated activities directed towards the realization of common goals. As the state, considered as a political entity, is constituted by the existence of a territory, a population and an authority or government while it is recognized by other states as being sovereign, it has thus common elements and ties with the nation. This situation led in Europe, with the separation of the church from the state, to the creation of small modern national states which replaced the great empires that strove for world domination.

This western concept of nationalism is not applicable to the countries of the "Third World", including the Maghrib, as these countries found themselves at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginnings of this century, under the European colonial domination. Consequently nationalism meant for these countries, at that stage, the struggle of their nations for independence from colonialism before proceeding, after independence, to the second stage related to state-building and nation-building. In Arab countries, the term "wataniyya" (from "watan" or homeland) is used for the first stage in order to indicate the struggle for the liberation of the homeland from foreign domination.

During this stage, nationalism is represented by the formation of "national" or "nationalist" movements with the goal of obtaining liberation and political independence from colonial domination. The second stage which begins after independence, is given the term "gawmiyya" (from "gawm" or a group of people with a specific identity) which shows the continuation of the struggle for the affirmation of the national unity, identity and personality.⁶ This stage is also related to the processes of decolonization in the different political, economic, social and cultural fields through the creation of new and original national institutions in order to replace the colonial institutions. The present study will concentrate on the first stage of nationalism in the Maghrib, i.e. the nationalist movements for independence in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria.

Purpose

The basic purpose of this study is to find in the last analysis an answer to the question: Why three different political systems (i.e a "constitutional monarchy" in Morocco, a "presidential" system in Tunisia and a "socialist" one-party system in Algeria) have emerged in the Maghrib after independence though all of these three countries of the Maghrib were under the same French domination for a long period?

The study of the three nationalist movements in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria attempts therefore to give us a satisfactory answer to the above question which is related to the contemporary political systems in the Maghrib. This study aims thus at giving us adequate information which is necessary to better our knowledge for the good understanding of the contemporary political systems in the Maghrib.

The main assumption of the present study can be summarized as follows: though the modern political nationalist movements in the Maghrib started from the same point (i.e. opposition to French colonial policies), they followed different courses and leaderships in the struggle for independence, and so they ended by different results in the construction of the new constitutional systems after independence. In order to test the validity of this assumption, this study will concentrate on the nationalist attitudes and reactions rather than on French colonial policies which are generally known today in the typology of colonialism as been related to direct rule, assimilation, integration and repression

This study of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib will also serve the purpose of realizing an original work of synthesis which attempts to make use of that rich literature of case studies already written on this subject. This effort of synthesis will give the reader a comprehensive but also a concise work which is hoped to be useful both for academic research and the general knowledge of the Maghrib.

Scope

It is clear that the subject chosen for this study is a very wide subject when it is judged from the fact that it includes the study of the nationalist movements in three countries and for a long period of time. The subject is also very wide if we take in consideration that huge amount of documentation that we have about the subject in three languages - French, English and Arabic.

Nevertheless this problem can be solved by applying certain limitations in the scope of this study. Firstly, as this is not a work on history, it will not deal with the descriptive chronology of events. Secondly, the study will concentrate on the basic data which is more relevant to the subject, thus avoiding as much as possible all unnecessary details. This involves an inevitable subjective selection of data from different sources but with the maximum possible impartiality. Lastly the selection of data will be limited to what is more appropriate to the comparative approach.

Methodology

The traditional inductive and deductive methods are still useful as instruments of research in social sciences. However, these methods are not enough for the modern scientific research and so they should be completed by modern techniques of research. The complementarity in the methods of research has proved to be of better scientific results than in the case of dependence on one method of research.

The comparative approach is going today an increasing importance in scientific research. Though the present study concentrates mainly on the comparative approach, it does not ignore other methods of research which are complementary to the comparative approach. In fact in addition to the traditional methods, the historical and analytical methods of research are also important for the comparative approach. Thus this study follows a comprehensive approach that goes beyond description to include different scientific methods that are relevant and useful to the comparative approach.

Plan

The present study is generally divided into three chapters, the first two deal with the basic data concerning the nationalist movements in the Maghrib while the last one treats this data in a comparative perspective. The year 1945 is considered as an important turning point in the evolution of the three nationalist movements in the Maghrib.

Chapter one concentrates on the beginnings of the nationalist movements in the three countries of the Maghrib since the beginning of this century till 1945. Each one of these countries - Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco respectively - will be treated separately so as to indicate the particularities of each case.

Chapter two deals with the evolution of these nationalist movements in each one of the three countries - Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria respectively -. This evolution begins in 1945 and goes on until the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 and Algeria in 1962. In all cases, more concentration will be made on the formation of political parties, the courses of action and especially the leadership of the nationalist movements.

Chapter three treats finally the three nationalist movements in a comparative perspective that will lead to the explanation concerning the

emergence of three different political systems in the Maghrib after independence. The comparison will consider both the similarities and the differences in the nationalist movements, but more stress will be put on the contrasts in order to show their evident role and influence on the independent Maghrib. The conclusion will touch briefly on the diversity of the first constitutional systems in the independent Maghrib as being the natural outcome of their nationalist movements.

Sources

A lot of material has been published on the nationalist movements in the Maghrib as case studies in different languages. The author has been able, during his stay in France from 1969 to 1976, to collect important data in French (from CRESM in Aix-en-Provence), together with more data in English and Arabic languages and he also visited the three countries of the Maghrib for field work. He also consulted the more recent data available in the library of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala.

This study uses both primary and secondary sources with preference and concentration on the primary sources whenever they are available. Because of the concise nature intended for this study, the footnotes will give the reader the necessary useful references for further research and consultation. A very important source of bibliography is the year book on North Africa (Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord) published in France since 1962 by the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS).

Brief historical background

The political history of the Maghrib can be divided into two stages, one before 1830 and the other after that date which marks the French occupation of Algiers. This latter stage is more relevant to us in this study, but a general survey of the former stage is also useful.

The known history of the Maghrib began with the Phoenicians, who came as traders from the seaports of Syria; Carthage became the most important of their trading posts as it played from the Tunisian coast a very important role in the history of the Maghrib.⁷ The sixty years Punic wars between Carthage and Rome (261-201 B.C.) ended with the Roman conquest of the Maghrib.⁸ During that period, the "Berbers" established three kingdoms and their great leader Masinissa tried to unify the whole region in one independent State.⁹ The Romans dominated the Maghrib for nearly four centuries until the invasion of the Vandals who came from Spain in the fifty century and dominated the Maghrib until the Byzantine "reconquista" in the sixth century.

The Vandal and Byzantine occupations are considered as representing only a "transitional period" between the Roman era and the Muslim conquest which began in the seventh century.¹⁰ The Muslim period is the longest and most important in the Maghrib. It began with the Arab conquest of "Africa" (Tunisia) in 647 and extended westward to Algeria, Morocco and Spain where Tarik ibn Ziad arrived in 711. His followers reached as far

as Poitiers in France in 732.¹¹ This marked later on the final victory of the Arabs and Islam in the Maghrib. Thus the Muslim Arab Orient (Mashrig) came to conquer the Berber Occident (Maghrib).

After the Arab conquest, the major event that influenced the social, economic and political conditions of the Maghrib was the influx of two Bedonin waves. One came from the eastern deserts - Bann Hilal or the Hilalians - and the other from western Sahara - al-Murabitun (the Almoravids). The Hilalians mingled with the pastoral Berber tribes and their language became prevalent, so the population of the Maghrib became gradually a mixed Arabs-Berber population. In the political field, new dynasties and kingdoms emerged in the Maghrib, notably the Idvissids in Morocco and the Aghlabids in Tunisia.¹² But in the tenth century, the Fatimid dynasty, which had its origin in the Shi'ism of the orient,¹³ came to dominate not only "Ifriqiya" or Tunisia but also Algeria and Morocco, thus forming the Fatimid empire in North Africa.¹⁴ With the decline of this empire, three dynasties of the Sanhoja Berbers shared the domination of the Maghrib in the middle of the eleventh century - the Zinid kingdom in Tunisia, the Hammadids in central Maghrib, and the Zenata in Morocco.

While the Hilalians disturbed, in the eleventh century, the established political order in the region by forcing the Zinids and Hammadids to move towards the coast,¹⁵ the Berber nomads of western Sahara, led by Yussif bin Tashfin, established, within only twenty years, a great empire around the new capital of Marrakesh: this was the Almoravid empire that included the western half of the Maghrib together with the whole of Muslim Spain.¹⁶ Later, in the middle of the thirteenth century, the Almoravid empire fell under the attacks of some Berber tribes of the Atlas mountains and was consequently replaced by a new dynasty - the Almohads (al-Muwahidun) - who conquered the whole of North Africa including Tripolitania (in Libya). This huge empire was able during the course of nearly two centuries to establish for the first time in this region, the unity of the Maghrib. But then the Maghrib was again divided into three Berber kingdoms, thus ending the era of the Berber empires - the moroccan kingdom of the Marinids in Fez, the kingdom of Abd al-Wadids around Tlemcen in Algeria, and the kingdom of the Hafsids in Tunisia and eastern Algeria.¹⁷ Also the Sa'adians, who came from Arabia around the twelfth century, established later on the "Sharifian" empire in Morocco and were finally replaced by the actual 'Alaonite dynasty'.¹⁸

The disintegration of the Maghrib in the fifteenth century opened the way for foreign invasions. In 1471 the Portuguese succeeded in consolidating their four "fronteiras" - centa, al-Kasr al-Seghir, Tangier and Arzila - and later took the whole Moroccan coast.¹⁹ On the other hand, the Spanish established themselves in the "presidios" of the Algerian and Tunisian coasts. In 1497, they occupied Melilla and began to expand their domination on the coasts of the Maghrib but failed because of Turkish intervention.

In fact the inhabitants of Algiers asked for the help of the Turkish corsair Arouj against the Spanish; Arouj made a victorious entry into Algiers in 1516.²⁰ His brother Khayr al-Din who succeeded him, became the founder of the regency of Algiers. The Turks then extended their domination over Tunisia in 1534, thus establishing the regency of Tunis which was also connected to the Ottoman empire. However, during the seventeenth century, the two military regencies of Algiers and Tunis gradually became more and more independent from the Ottoman empire.²¹ In Tunisia, the Husseinid dynasty established itself in 1705 and became increasingly later on a Tunisian dynasty.

As for Morocco, the situation was different. In fact Morocco succeeded in avoiding Turkish domination and in minimizing Portuguese occupation. Thus it remained independent of foreign influence and became a strong and rich state during the reigns of some of its rulers at the end of the sixteenth, the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. However, it also experienced some periods of anarchy because of certain rebellions Berber elements.²²

The year 1830 marked the starting point for French penetration into the Maghrib. The Polignac government in France decided on the expedition which took Algiers on 5th July 1830,²³ without any plan for conquest. Only as late as 1834, it was decided in France to keep the occupied territories in Algeria.²⁴ This decision was in fact mainly the result of the increasing organized local resistance led by "Emir" Abd al-Kader ibn Muhyi al-Din who declared a holy war from western and central Algeria against the Christian invaders until his surrender in December 1847, followed finally by the conquest of Kabylia in 1857. Already the constitution of 1848 of the Second Republic in France proclaimed Algeria as an integral part of French territories.

The policy of assimilation²⁵ was subsequently followed by the government of the Third Republic in France. The natives' reaction was embodied in the Algerian insurrection of 1871. In fact the Muslims of Algeria opposed also settler-colonialism and the establishment of French civil law meant for them the domination of the "colours" (settlers) from Christian Europe. Consequently, Mohi al-Din, the elder son of Emir Abd al-Kader, tried without success to revive the holy war against the French. However, and particularly in Kabylia, the insurrection gained force under the direction of the "bachagha" Mokrani who, together with his brothers, declared war in 1871 against the French in Algeria. The insurrection extended along the coast and reached the Sahara; it lasted for many months (March 1871-January 1872). The defeat of the insurgents assured the political victory of the colours over the natives after terrible repression. In 1881, a new revolt in South-Oranais, led by Ouled-Sidi-Sheikh, broke out following the assassination of Colonel Flatters. Again French repression was without mercy.²⁶

At the same time, France began its intervention in Tunisia in 1881 *using the form of a protectorate system. Consequently France concluded the treaty of Bardo in 1881 with the Bey of Tunis who was supposed to have "accepted" a temporary French occupation in order to ensure that order was maintained in Tunisia. The treaty also*

gave France the right to exercise control over Tunisia's foreign relations and to intervene in the measures to be taken for rebuilding the finances of the state. But the new convention concluded in 1883 at the Marsa declared, in its first article, the "accomplishment" of a protectorate system in Tunisia without any time limit.²⁷ This French intervention in Tunisia resulted in a violent reaction from the local tribes in the southern part of the country: the revolt led by Ali ibn Khalifa, lasted until 1910.

With regard to Morocco, it is necessary to point out that it was subjected to the competition and secret agreements between many European powers until France finally concluded the treaty of Fez in 1912 with "Muley" Hafidh who consequently abdicated in favour of Muley Yussif (1912-1927).²⁹ This treaty established the protectorate system in Morocco. Some years later, the war in the Rif broke out when the Rifians, led by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Krim caused a terrible defeat to the Spanish at Anonal in 1921. Consequently Abd al-Krim constituted the "Rifian republic" in February 1922. The French organized their military operations under the direction of Marshal Petin from August 1925 and in concert with the Spanish until May 1926 when Abd al-Krim was forced to surrender. But the final pacification in Morocco did not take place until 1934.³⁰

It is important finally to deduce some general remarks about the political history of the Maghrib. First, though the Maghrib was subjected to the domination of different successive civilizations throughout its long history, only the Arabo-Islamic civilization of the Mashrig succeeded in establishing a permanent influence on the region. Secondly, despite the different foreign invasions in the Maghrib, a good number of local and native dynasties and kingdoms were established in the region. Thirdly, the French domination on the Maghrib established a colony in Algeria and two protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco. These protectorates were erected because Tunisia and Morocco, unlike Algeria, had local political traditions of government as a popular system of authority had long existed in these two countries before the coming of the French. However, despite the efforts of General Lyantey (the first resident-general of France in Morocco) to make the protectorate system respected, this system resulted in direct French administration for both Tunisia and Morocco, thus bringing these two countries close to the type of colonial administration applied in Algeria. Lastly, there was a continuous agitation and violent reactions that took place from the part of the native population of the Maghrib against all foreign invasions since the time of the Phoenicians and until French colonization. While in Tunisia the first native resistance appeared to be of a limited nature, it marked, on the contrary a very important feature in the cases of Algeria and Morocco at the beginning of French colonization.

Notes

1. Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, Paris, Payot, 1964, vol. I, p. 9, and Roland Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, Penguin African Library, p. 53. The first reference is considered to be the best one written on the history of the Maghrib and it is translated into Arabic in Tunisia.
2. See R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, op. cit., p. 57, Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., pp. 136 and 143, and Roger Le Toumeau, Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane: 1920-1961, Paris, A. Colin, 2nd ed. 1962, p. 44.
3. Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., p. 9.
4. R. Le Toumeau, op. cit., p. 11.
5. Samir Amin, The Maghrib in the Modern World, translated from French by Michael Perl, Penguin books, 1970, p. 20.
6. See George Burdeau, L'Etat, Paris, ed. du Senil, 1970, p. 37. According to Professor Burdeau, the nation in the old countries of the occident has made the State while in the countries newly born out of decolonization, such as those of the African continent, it is the state which should make the nation.
7. See Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., pp. 63-100 and R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, op. cit., pp. 53-57. See also a summary of the history of the Maghrib in the article of R. Le Toumeau, "North Africa in Historical Perspective", in Current Problems in North Africa, Princeton University Conference, 1960. See also the publication of the CRESM, Introduction à l'Afrique du Nord contemporaine, Paris, CNRS, 1975, pp. 17-37.
8. There were three Punic wars: the first (261-241) ended with the withdrawal of Carthage from Sicily and other islands; the second (218-202) ended with the defeat of Hannibal; and the third (201) resulted in peace under severe conditions for Carthage.
9. Masinissa was the leader of the kingdom of Massyles which was in Algeria. See Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., pp. 95-100.
10. R. Le Toumeau, "North Africa in Historical Perspective", op. cit., p. 2.
11. See Robert Mantran, L'expansion Musulmane, VII-XII siècles, Paris, 1969.
12. See Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 45-57.
13. The Shi'a are the partisans of the fourth caliph Ali who was married to Fatima (Prophet Mohammad's daughter). They formed a religious sect with a political doctrine on the legitimate caliphate of Ali and his descendants. This doctrine is actually dominant in Iran under Khomeini's regime of the Islamic republic.

14. See Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., vol. II pp. 53-66
15. Ibid., pp. 74-75
16. R. Le Toumeau, "North Africa..." op. cit., p. 5. See on the Almoravid empire, Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., vol.II, pp. 77-91 and R. Oliver & J.D. Fage. op. cit., pp. 81-82.
17. On the Almohad empire, see Ch.-A, Julien, op, cit., vol. II, pp. 92-131 and R. Oliver & J.D. Fage, op. cit., pp. 83-84. On the division of this empire into three kingdoms, see also Ch.-A. Julien, pp. 132-193.
18. The 'Alaonits claim to be related to the descendants of al-Hassan, son of Ali and Fatima, and they come from Arabia Shortly after the establishment of the Sa'adian dynasty in Morocco. See on the Sa'adians and the 'Alaonits Julien's book, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 204-247.
19. See Ch.-A. Julien, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 199-201.
20. Arouj was one of the four corsairs generally known as the Barbarossa brothers. At that time the Spanish were established in the small rocky islets just off the city of Algiers, which consequently received its name "al-Jaza'ir" (the islands). See R. Le Toumeau, "North Africa...", op. cit., p. 7.
21. See Robert Mantran, Le Statut de l'Algérie, de la Tunisie et de la Tripolitanie dans l'Empire Ottoman, Cagliari, 1965.
For details of the two regencies, see also Ch.-A, Julien, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 250-302.
22. The administration of the Sharifian empire was divided into two parts: "bled al-Makhzen" (the central government) which was under the Sultan's authority in the protected towns, and "bled al-Siba" which was outside his control in the desert areas. See, on this empire, Eugene Aubin, Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui, Paris, 1913, ch. IX-XII.
23. For details of this expedition, see G. Esquer, Les commencements d'un Empire, la prise d'Alger (1830), Paris, 1930. See also Ch.-R. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, Paris, "Que sais-je?", 1969 and R. Aron, Les origines de la Guerre d'Algérie, Paris, 1962.
24. R. Le Toumeau, "North Africa...", op. cit., p. 9.
25. The policy of assimilation aimed mainly at changing Algerian Muslims into French citizens, i.e. they were to become subject to French culture and civil laws instead of Arab culture and Shari'a (islamic) law.
26. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 50. See, on the Algerian resistance, A.W. Palmer, A Dictionary of Modern History (1789-1945), Penguin books, 1962, pp. 128-129 and Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., pp. 40-41. One can also refer here to two books in Arabic: Abd-Allah Sharit and Mohamed al-Milli. Algeria in the Mirror of History, Constantine, 1965, pp. 173-213, and Salah al-Agad Arab Maghrib, Cairo, 3rd ed. 1969, pp. 104-140.

27. It should be noted that the treaty of Bardo (like the treaty of Fez concluded later in 1912) was considered by the Bey and the Tunisian nationalists to have been dictated or imposed upon them by force. All Arabic sources confirm this statement, It is also stated that Tunisia had, already had a constitutional experience before the establishment of the French protectorate: the security pact ('ahd al-aman) of September 1857 and the constitution (destour) of April 1861. See, for example, Al-Habib Thamer, This is Tunisia, in Arabic, Cairo, Arab Maghrib Bureau, no date, pp. 23-30 and Allal al-Fassi, the Arab Maghrib since the first World War, in Arabic, Cairo, 1955, pp. 6-7. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
28. See Al-Habib Thamer, op. cit., pp. 23-30.
29. Jean-Louis Miège, Le Maroc, Paris, "Que sais-je?" (439), pp. 40-41. One should remark that the same argument stated above with regard to the treaty of Bardo applies here in the case of the treaty of Fez from the nationalist point of view. However, the first resident-general of France in Morocco, General Lyantey, tried to define the legal status of the protectorate system as well as its temporary character with regard to its future evolution towards independence. See, in this respect, Lyantey's two books: Paroles d'Action, Paris, 1927 and Textes et Lettres (1912-1925), Paris, 4 vol., 1953-1957.
30. On the war of the Rif in Morocco, see R. Montagne, "Abd el-Krim", in Politique Etrangère, 1947 (3), pp. 301-324, L. Gabrielli, Abd el-Krim et les evenements du Rif, Casablanca, 1953, P. Fontaine, Abd el-Krim, origine de la rébellion Nord-africaine, Paris, 1952, and Le Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française, 1925 and 1926.

I RISE OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS TILL 1945: THE BEGINNINGS

The nationalist writers of the Maghrib consider the first violent resistance against French colonization, notably in the cases of Emir Abd al-Kader in Algeria and Emir Abd al-Krim in Morocco, as the starting point for the nationalist movements in the Maghrib. Many French writers, on the contrary, ignore this first resistance (which was inspired by strong religious sentiments in the direction of holy war against what were considered as "Christian invaders") and so they concentrate on the political movements after the beginning of this century. In fact this violent resistance can be considered to be the preliminary stage of the modern nationalist movements in the Maghrib where violence was also used by these movements at the decisive stage which preceded negotiations for independence. This chapter concentrates on the rise of the political nationalist movements in the Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan cases during the first phase which ends in 1945.

The Tunisian case

1. The Young Tunisian movement

The political form of the nationalist movement in Tunisia emerged particularly in urban areas at the beginning of this century. It was directed against direct French administration and the control of the command posts in the country by French officials. The most important personalities in this movement were initially Sheikh Mohammed al-Sanoussi, followed by Bechir Sfar who was considered to be the father of modern renaissance in Tunisia by the Tunisian youth: he established the Khalduniya school (in 1896) to continue the mission of the Sadigiya school of Khayr al-Din Pasha. The cultural movement in Tunisia was influenced by this modern tendency as well as by the traditional trend of al-Zaitonna.

In fact the "Young Tunisians", led by Ali Pash-Hamba, were inspired in their movement by the Young Turks of the Ottoman empire¹ and the Egyptian National Party at the time of Mustafa Kamil. In 1907, they formed the Young Tunisian Party and began consequently to publish a newspaper in French - Le Tunisien - which expressed from 1908 the hope that Tunisia would be granted a constitution.² From that time, the word "constitution" (destour in Arabic) became the basic slogan of the Tunisian nationalist movement. In 1909, Abd al-Aziz al-Tha'albi (of al-Zaitouna Islamic University of Tunis) began to participate in this movement and to publish an Arabic edition of the newspaper. It should be remarked that these first young nationalists of Tunisia emphasised the distinctive aspects of the Tunisian personality as opposed to the French.

The occasion for nationalist action came in 1911 with the Italian domination over Libya and the decision of the Municipality of Tunis to establish a civil statute for landed property on the burial-ground of al-Djellaz, which was the most important cemetery of Tunis. The result was an important uprising in the defence of Muslims and Islam.

In Tunis, a large riot occurred in November 1911 against the Italians and the French decision on the cemetery, which led to a large number of deaths and casualties. Le Tunisien was suspended and martial law was proclaimed, which continued until 1922. Then in February 1912, the Tunisians decided to boycott the tram-ways managed by an Italian company because of segregation of salaries between European and Tunisian employees. Consequently the leaders of the Tunisian nationalist movement were exiled. Ali Pach-Hamba passed the rest of his life in Turkey while al-Tha'albi went to Paris.

2. Al-Tha'albi and the constitutional movement

After the first World War, the Tunisian nationalists were incited by external factors³ to intensify their action. The liberation Committee of Tunisia and Algeria was then formed and presented a petition to the Conciliation Conference held in Paris in September 1918 and also to president Wilson in January 1919, claiming the rights of the peoples of the Maghrib. Moreover, al-Tha'albi presented a petition in the name of the Tunisian people to president Wilson in 1919 claiming the independence of Tunisia. He also published with his friends in Paris, in 1920, a book called La Tunisie martyre whose title alone was very suggestive.⁴

During that time, the nationalist inside Tunisia advanced their demand for a constitution (destour), transformed their movement into the Constitutional liberal Party and presented their claims to the Bey in June 1920.⁵ The Palace supported this movement and the Prince Mohammed Moncef, the elder son of the Bey, joined the "destourian" party. Al-Tha'albi, who came back to Tunisia, was arrested for conspiring against State security, but the "Destourians" succeeded in obtaining for him an amnesty and also to abolish martial law in 1922.

On the other hand, Bey Mohammed al-Nacer made, in April 1922, an ultimatum to the resident-general before the visit of the French President, asking him to adopt a programme of 18 points, which in fact reproduced the demands of the Destour Party (name given to the Constitutional Liberal Party). The French President replied by making promises which were not fulfilled. In 1923, the Bey al-Nacer died and al-Tha'albi left to the Arab-Muslim Orient where he stayed until 1937.

Inside Tunisia, at the end of 1924, a Tunisian memorandum was transmitted to the French government by a Destourian delegation which once more put forward the Tunisian claims.⁶ Also the Destourians participated in the formation of the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers (CGTT) and in the several strikes and demonstrations organized during the second half of 1924 in Tunis, Bizert, Sfax, Hammam-lif and Cape Bon. Then, disappointed for not having the complete support of the Communist Party in France, the Destourians began to speak in 1925 of negotiations "under the same care of the protectorate and the treaties".

External events, such as the war of the Rif in Morocco and the revolt of the Druze in Lebanon, awakened, however, the political sensibilities of the Tunisian population. Throughout 1925, scattered incidents occurred such as the demonstration of students against the inauguration of the statute of Cardinal Lavigeric at the entrance of Tunis.⁷

Following the publication of the two decrees called decrets sclerats (regulating the liberty of the press and defining crimes and political offences in Tunisia) in January 1926 by the resident-general, and the decision of the Destour Party to suspend its activities in order to "wait for better days", Tunisia experienced relative calm during the period between 1926 and 1931.⁸

3. The new generation of Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour Party

A new important stage in the Tunisian nationalist movement was marked by the return to Tunisia of some young Tunisians who had completed their studies in France. Habib Bourguiba, a university graduate in law and political science, was among this group. The occasion for action on the part of this group came since May 1930 with the Eucharistic congress, held at Carthage, the decision of the resident to celebrate fifty years of the protectorate regime in Tunisia, and lastly the question the naturalization (through assimilation) of Tunisians. Moreover, the Tunisians were in touch with events in the Arab countries, notably the progress of local nationalist movements and especially also the progress of radical nationalist ideas propagated from the Orient by Emir Shakib Arslan⁹ in connection with the Islamic revivalist reformist movement of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammed Abdu and Rashid Rida.

It is evident that in 1930, the connection or similarity between what was happening in Tunisia (the Eucharistic congress and naturalization) and the attitude of the Catholic Church in Morocco with regard to the "Berber question" (i.e. separation of the Arabs and Berbers in the application of laws) became obvious to many Tunisians. Consequently the young Tunisians, including Bourguiba, began their nationalist activities centred around a daily newspaper in French, La voix du Tunisien (the voice of the Tunisian). Moreover, the Muslim congress of Jerusalem, held in December 1931, with al-Tha'albi as a representative of North Africa declared among other decisions "the struggle to death against the naturalization of Muslims in the countries of Islam administered by France".¹⁰ Shortly after at Bizert, and then all through the year 1933 in other regions of Tunisia, demonstrations broke out in opposition to the burial of naturalized Tunisians (considered as renegades) in Muslim cemeteries. The Muslims feared that the French would attempt in Tunisia a policy of assimilation to which the country was strongly opposed.

A new development came when Bourguiba founded on the 1st of November 1932 a daily newspaper entitled L'Action Tunisienne which became the starting point for the organized nationalist activities of the new generation which had been educated in France and came in conflict with the old traditional generation. Since that date, Bourguiba worked to occupy without interruption the leading role in the nationalist movement whether he was free or under house arrest, in prison or in exile.¹¹ On 12 and 13 May 1933, the Destour Party held a national congress to discuss the conflict between the old and the new generations of the party and to restore the unity of the Destour. In this congress, Bourguiba put forward a programme in which he expressed once more the demands of the party for an elected parliament with universal suffrage and added: "The independence of Tunisia, completed by treaty of friendship and of union with the great French Republic, securing for France the interests of the whole foreign colony, will be the ideal of the Tunisian nationalist movement".¹²

In response to this new nationalist attitude, the resident-general took measures to restrict the nationalist press and to dissolve the Tunisian Constitutional Liberal Party, However it was in fact a result of the conflict between the old and young generations within the Destour Party - and not because of the resident's policy - that Bourguiba and his friends were led to create at Kasr Hellal in the Sahel a new party called the Neo-Destour on the 2nd of March 1934. The essential element in the party's programme was "the struggle in order to achieve the independence of Tunisia by opposing French imperialism and colonization which is responsible for the misery in which the country has been plunged".¹³

The new newspaper of the Neo-Destour was called L'Action (al-'Amal) and the new party was intransigent towards the resident-general. Consequently Bourguiba was arrested in September 1934 and deported to the borders of the Sahara at Borj-Le-boeuf where he stayed until the eve of the formation of the popular front in France in April 1936. During this period, the G.C.T.W. played an important role in the agitation which largely contributed to the new popularity of Bourguiba. In February 1936, serious troubles broke out in Moknine, Borgel, Sfax, Bizert and Tunis.¹⁴

4. "The first Franco-Tunisian experience" and 1938 crisis

The new resident in Tunisie - Armand Guillon - who was appointed in March 1936, formed a perfect contrast to his predecessor. With his appointment an era of relaxation and what Destourians called "the first Franco-Tunisian experience" began.¹⁵ Bourguiba several times put forward his party's programme and explained it, notably in a memorandum sent to Pierre Vienot¹⁶ in August 1936, in a public speech at Tunis and in many articles in L'Action. In fact the Neo-Destour hoped that France would react in Tunisia as it had done in Syria and as Britain had already done in Egypt. But Bourguiba admitted that the independence of Tunisia could not be immediately recognized as this would presume that public opinion was already prepared in France as well as in Tunisia, while this was not yet the case.

Consequently Bourguiba proposed a series of mesures for future development towards independence beginning with the abolition of the privileges given to the French in Tunisia. Moreover he demanded "the substitution of the actual despotic regime based on pleasure by a constitutional and democratic regime that permits people to participate in power, to take an active part in the making of laws and in the voting of the budget "and added:"The institution of universal suffrage and the extension of powers to the Grand Council in this sense could be the beginning of a deeper reform in the direction of the democratization of the regime".¹⁷

This marked generally the first stage of the "Franco-Tunisian" experience. However, the situation deteriorated in the second stage (Juli 1937 - March 1938) with the fall of the Ministry of Leon-Blum in France (June 1937) and the return of al-Tha'albi in Tunisia (Juli 1937) with the intention to rebuild the unity of the two Destours. Nevertheless, the age, the methods and the fundamental conceptions, all separated al-Tha'albi from Bourguiba and consequently the conflict between the two parties was inevitable.¹⁸

As for the nationalist action, strikes and serious incidents took place since March 1937 between the Tunisian workers and the forces of the police.¹⁹ Then the Destourians decided, in November, on a strike in solidarity with the victims of French repression in Algeria and Morocco. Bourguiba made a call for the struggle in an article published in L'Action under the title of "Unconsciousness or Cynicism" in which he wrote: "...A general counter-offensive in all the fronts... The country is decided for the struggle. It is also ready for all the sacrifices that this struggle entails...".²⁰ At the same time and on the occasion of the announcement of the budget for 1938, the Neo-Destour withdrew its confidence from the resident-general.

In fact political agitation extended in April 1938 to all parts of Tunisia and a general strike was held as well as a huge demonstration led by Mongi Slim and Ali Balhaouan, Many people were killed after the intervention of the police: 22 according to the residence and 200 according to Neo-Destourians. Then two thousand militants were arrested and martial law was proclaimed.²¹ Bourguiba and his companions were accused of conspiracy against the State security and were referred to a military justice.

Henceforth, Bourguiba and his companions, until their return to Tunis in 1943, would only know the different prisons in Tunisia and France, and finally Rome. The Tunisian nationalist movement once mere entered an era of underground activities. It was then that Bourguiba was given the title "Le Combattant Supreme", and during his absence, the main leader of the clandestine organization of the party was al-Habib Thamer. The most important activity of the party during this period consisted in the continuous demand for the liberation of prisoners and recall of the main points of the Destourian programme.²²

5. The role of the Bey Moncef during the Second World War

After the defect of France in 1940 at the hands of the Nazis, the Vichy government in France appointed Admiral Esteva as resident-general in Tunisia. Thamer asked the Bey to liberate the nationalist leaders imprisoned in France. Some actions of sabotage and popular demonstrations followed and the police arrested many nationalist including Thamer and al-Tayeh Slim, in January 1941.²³ The accession to the throne, in June 1942, of Bey Mohammed al-Moncef marked a third stage in the Tunisian nationalist movements (after the Young Tunisians and the establishment of the Neo-Destour). Moncef saved the nationalists, who found in him at that stage a nationalist leader in contrast with his predecessor the Bey Ahmed.

The Bey Moncef sent a memorandum, on 2 August 1942, to the resident-general for transmission to Vichy, in which he demanded important reforms. These included the institution of a consultative legislative council with a large representation of the Tunisian side, the accession of all Tunisians to all public posts, equality of treatment and salaries, compulsory education for all Tunisians with the teaching of Arabic in all academic establishments.²⁴ After the German landing of 1942 in Tunisia which became a battle-field for six months, the Bey Moncef addressed messages to president Roosevelt, Hitler and the king of Italy to toy and save his country from the sufferings of the war. Moreover he formed, in January 1943, a new government sympathetic

to the Allies with Mohammed Shenik as prime minister. This was the first time that a Tunisian government had been formed without the consent of the resident-general.²⁵

After the release of Thamer and Tayeh Slim, they launched in 1943 a new Neo-Destour paper called L'Ifriqiya al-Fatat (Young Africa) and also, shortly after, another paper called Ech-cha'ab (The People). The nationalist persistently demanded the return of prisoners who were released by the Germans and taken to Rome. Bourguiba, who was very well treated in Rome, was then subjected to all sorts of pressures,²⁶ but in his speech on the Rome radio station, he made in 1943 a call for union around the Bey Moncef and did not say a word in favour of the Axis powers.²⁷ After the liberation of Tunis, Bourguiba immediately made a call entitled "For a Franco-Tunisian bloc" directed against the Axis powers.²⁸ However if Bourguiba was tolerated, the Destour remained suspended and the Bey Moncef was deposed by order of General Girand and was sent to Laghonat in Southern Algeria. In fact by deposing the Bey Moncef, "the French unquestionably violated the treaty of 21 May 1881, discredited the dynasty and conferred to Moncef the glory of a martyr, Moncef stopped reigning: Moncefism was born".²⁹

One last important point to be mentioned in this phase before 1945 is the death of al-Tha'albi in October 1944, as this incident resulted in the regrouping of the different Tunisian political tendencies. A committee of the principal movements - Neo-Destourians, Old Destourians, Moncefists, grand bourgeois, teachers and students of the Grand Mosque (al-Zaitouna) - was formed on 30 October 1944 and it declared: "An important debate is established between the persons present and has arrived at a unanimous agreement limiting, given the circumstances, the demands of the people to the internal autonomy of the Tunisian nation (self-government) on a democratic basis of which the form will be determined by an assembly born out of national consultation", In November, the text demanding internal autonomy was brought into focus under the title "Manifesto of the Tunisian Front".³⁰

The Algerian case

1. The Young Algerians and Muslim political movements

After the end of the violent resistance of Emir Abd al-Kader and those who followed his steps (Bon Maza, Al-Mokrani and Bon 'Amama), some political and cultural movements emerged at the beginning of this century with the goal of safeguarding the Algerian identity.¹

In fact the Young Algerians who had graduated from French schools, attempted, in 1908, to obtain political equality with the French in Algeria. Before accepting compulsory military service, they also made in 1912 the following demands: the suppression of the code of the indigents (concerning the legal status of Muslims) and fiscal inequalities, the availability of education, an increase in the number of Muslim representatives in elected assemblies, and lastly French citizenship while maintaining Muslim personal status.² The young Algerians already expressed their ideas in two papers - Islam and Rashidi - published from 1910 in both Arabic and French.³

After the end of the first World War in 1919, Emir Khalid, a grandson of Emir Abd al-Kader, again took up the demand for equality with the French, but was finally exiled in 1924 to France and then to Damascus where he died in 1936.⁴ In fact Emir Khalid struggled from 1919 to 1924 for the revival of Islam and Arabism and also strongly advanced the demands of the Young Algerians in their opposition to colonial policies; he did not initiate the demand for the independence of Algeria as a nation.⁵ The Young Algerian movement which published several papers - Le Progrès, La Tribune and Le Trait d'Union (i.e. the Link) -, extended its audience in the 1930's through new leaders like Ferhat Abbas and Ben Jelloul. All hoped for the transformation of the "colony to a province".⁶

It is important to notice that the first Muslim political movement was born in metropolitan France in 1924 under the name of the North African Star (ENA) that grouped the north African workers in France. It was led from 1926 by Messali al-Haj who established a weekly paper - El-Oummah (the Nation) and made of the ENA a militant nationalist movement working for the independence of Algeria in the context of North Africa. It is in this sense that Messali al-Haj was considered by the Algerian nationalists as the father of the modern nationalist movement in Algeria.

Inside Algeria, two other political movements were born around 1930 and were different from each other and from the ENA: one reflected modern aspirations and the other attachment to the traditions, The latter was called Association of the Reformist 'Oulama of Algeria founded in Algiers in 1931 on the initiative of a religious notable of Constantine - Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis - who was influenced by the Arab orient and the modern Muslim reformism (of Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abdu).⁷ The former movement was represented by Ferhat Abbas and Ben Jelloul who established the Federation of the Elected Muslims of the "departement" of Constantine in 1934.

One must recall here the important dialogue of 1936 between Ferhat Abbas and Ben Badis. In reply to an article written by Ferhat Abbas and entitled "La France et moi" in which Ferhat Abbas decried the existence of an "Algerian nation", Ben Badis (who founded his paper Ech-Chihab in 1924) declared that the Muslim nation of Algeria "has its history..., its religions and linguistic unity, its culture, its traditions..."; it is "not France, cannot be France and does not want to be France...".⁸ Moreover, Ben Badis looked to the future of Algeria, saying: "Independence is a natural right for every people on earth...".⁹ His aim was thus independence but over the long term and after a certain stage of evolution during which the 'Oulama wanted to concentrate on the Algerian identity through the revival of Islamism and Arabism in Algeria. Ferhat Abbas was, on the contrary, in favour of total integration with France while maintaining his Muslim status. The Algerian communist Party (PCA) was affiliated to the French communist Party, but it became autonomous in 1935. Thus by this date, one should remark the existence in Algeria of three political formations - the 'Oulama, the Elected Muslims and the PCA - in addition to the ENA which was still established in France.

2. The Muslim Congress of 1936 and the formation of the PPA

The 'Oulama succeeded to present themselves in Algeria as the defenders of Algerian nationalism while the modernists of Ferhat Abbas and Ben Jelloul were disappointed by the French policies. Hence discussions began between these two groups and finally resulted, with the participation of the Algerian communists, in the first Algerian Muslim congress that gathered together in Algiers the representatives of the three groups on 7 June 1936. The congress produced a political charter whose text was entitled "Charter of the demands of the Algerian Muslim people" which insisted on the legal equality within the French context.¹⁰

In fact the text of the charter reflected a compromise between the different groups. It consisted of the demands of the Young Algerians, those of the 'Oulema and those of the Federation of the Elected Muslims. The text rejected "naturalization" through French citizenship. It also demanded the separation of religion and the state (so as to prevent the French authorities from intervening in Islamic affairs such as the appointment of imams of prayers), freedom of Arabic instruction and Arabic press, universal suffrage and unity of electoral college, stop of expropriations, and lastly equality of treatment with the Europeans.¹¹

It should be remarked that the three political organization in Algeria placed their confidence in the government of the Popular Front in France and in the project of Blum Viollette which granted the Algerian Muslim elite the French citizenship without the loss of Muslim personal status. But this project was strongly opposed by the French in Algeria, the members of parliament and the mayors of Algeria, and thus ended by failure and was never discussed by the French parliament.¹² The delegation of the Muslim congress came back from Paris only with the promise of the attribution of French citizenship to a limited category of Algerians. The second delegation as well as the second Muslim congress did not give better results. Hence the experience of the congress came to an end, and the Algerian nationalist movement had to take a new form in Algeria - the form of political parties.¹³

When the ENA was dissolved by the French authorities in January 1937, its leader Messali al-Haj created in March the Algerian's People's Party (PPA) and directed its activities (using a paper called Le Parlement Algerien) towards the independence of Algeria. In fact, despite the similarities in the statutes of the ENA and the PPA, the two organizations differed in two aspects: on one hand, the PPA declared itself officially as a party independent from the French communist Party to which the ENA had been connected and, on the other hand, the PPA restricted its field of activities only inside Algeria and not the whole of north Africa as Algeria alone, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, had the status of a colony which made it different from the other two cases.¹⁴

Messali al-Haj was arrested in 1937 and again in 1939, after the dissolution of party, along with many outstanding militants such as Ben Khedda, Khider and Lahonel. He was sentenced in 1939 to 16 years in prison, but he was liberated in 1943 after the intervention of the elected Algerians. However, he was arrested once more in 1944 and was exiled to black Africa where he stayed until his liberation in 1946.¹⁵

During this period, Ben Badis died in 1940 and was succeeded in the leadership of the Association of the 'Oulama by Sheikh Bechir al-Ibrahimi. Also the PCA was dissolved in 1939. In these conditions, Ferhat Abbas took the initiative to form a new political party with new perspectives for the future of Algeria.

3. Manifesto of the Algerian People

In April 1938, the council of the Federation of the Elected Muslim considered the creation of a mass party, and Ferhat Abbas took this idea to form the Algerian Popular Union (UPA). But this attempt failed and Ferhat Abbas launched another attempt in April 1940 when he addressed a letter to Marshal Pétin entitled "The Algeria of Tomorrow" which contained a programme proposing a project of agrarian reform, the development of education as well as some administrative reforms.¹⁶ But Marshal Pétin made only a vague reply to this programme four months later. In December 1942, Ferhat and his friends took the initiative of sending a "Message of the representatives of the Algerian Muslims to the responsible authorities" with copies to the French authorities and the representatives of the Allied powers - U.S.A and Britain. The message demanded the convening of a conference to determine "a political, economic and social statute for Algeria".¹⁷ But again the "authorities" did not welcome these demands.

In reply to the French attitude, Ferhat Abbas addressed, in February 1943, his famous text entitled "Algeria in face of world conflict: Manifesto of the Algerian People" in which he became more virulent. He said: "...The time has passed when a Muslim Algerian would not ask any other thing than to be a Muslim Algerian...; consequently the Algerian people demand henceforth...the condemnation and abolition of colonization...; the application throughout the country... of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves; the granting of a constitution proper to Algeria securing equality and public liberties; the immediate and effective participation of Muslim Algerians in the government of their country".¹⁸

In May 1943, these demands of the Manifesto were explained in a new document entitled "Project of Reforms following the Manifesto of the Muslim Algerian people" which was presented in June to General de Gaulle.¹⁹ This document demanded the guarantee of the integrity and the unity of the Algerian territory on one hand, and the recognition of the political autonomy of Algeria as a sovereign nation, on the other hand. It added that "the formation of this Algerian state does not exclude the organization with Morocco and Tunisia of a federation of North African States or a North African Union which appears to many people as the best formula for the future". In fact the programme of the Manifesto demanded in the short run, the recognition of Algeria as a "sovereign nation", the hand over to an Algerian government and, at the end of hostilities, the election of a constituent assembly by universal suffrage.²⁰

4. Ordinance of 7 March 1944 and the AML

This programme of the Manifesto was openly rejected by the new governor-general - General Catrouse - who had been appointed by the French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN) under the presidency of General de Gaulle in June 1943. General Catrouse proclaimed that "Algeria is an integral part of

France". The financial delegations which had been suspended in Algeria since 1939, were then restarted, but the Muslim delegates abstained. Hence General Catrouse appointed a commission for Muslim Reforms which prepared a report containing the outlines of the Ordinance of 7 March 1944. General de Gaulle, in his speech at Constantine in December 1943, already prepared public opinion for the promulgation of this ordinance.

In fact the ordinance of 7 March gave Muslims all the rights and duties of French citizens, offering them access to civil and military posts and widening their representation in the local assemblies from one-third to two-fifths.²¹ This meant that the promises of the Blum-Viollette project had been realized, but "it was too late". These measures were judged to be excessive by the French in Algeria and the French rightist parties, and insufficient by the Algerian nationalist organizations.

Henceforth, a direct struggle of influence began between the French reformers and the Algerian nationalists. Ferhat Abbas attempted to set up with the 'Oulama and the clandestine PPA of Messali al-Haj a united front. This was evidently the response to the ordinance of 7 March. It was also the origin, on 14 March 1944 at Setif, of the association of the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (AML) which had the declared goal of "making familiar the idea of an Algerian nation and the constitution in Algeria of an autonomous Republic federated to a renovated French Republic".²²

It is thus clear that Ferhat Abbas changed his original attitude in favour of integration to the idea of a republic in Algeria federated with France.²³ For a while, this new position marked a triumph for him and he was able to issue a weekly paper - Egalité - in September 1944. But this success only lasted for a short period as the Algerian nationalists continued their membership in their former organizations while the PPA criticized the federalist ideas of Ferhat Abbas.²⁴ In the difficult economic climate of 1944 which was marked by a rise in prices and black market scandals, the Algerian masses became more radical while the nationalist propaganda of the PPA called for an Algerian parliament and an Algerian government.²⁵

The opposition against the ordinance of 7 March had already been launched through a nationalist campaign. Tracts were distributed to the Algerian population carrying the order: "Boycott the vote in the French electoral body; do not register in the French electoral lists; if you are registered ex officio, do not vote". Sheikh Hadi Sanoussi, one of the leaders of the 'Oulama proclaimed that those who supported the ordinance and registered themselves in the first electoral body, "would be considered as infidels".²⁶ Moreover, the role of the press was equally important in this respect. Egalité supported the Manifesto but with reservations because of censorship. It also defended the religious action of the 'Oulama, demanded the release of Messali, condemned the elected Muslims who had taken a step backwards in the incidents of September 1943 - particularly Ben Jelloul -, and strongly criticized the administration and local agents as well as high officials.²⁷

This was briefly the situation in Algeria by the end of 1944: it was marked by political agitation and propaganda carried out generally within the limits of the association of the AML against the ordinance of 7 March.²⁸

This was in fact the beginning of the mobilization of the Algerian masses to obtain unity around a programme of specific political claims. However, this unity, especially in view of the struggle for independence, was not easy to achieve at that stage which was still marked by the existence of four political formations that remained separate until 1954.²⁹

The Moroccan case

1. A wakening of Moroccan nationalism and the "Berber dahir"

After the preliminary stage of the Moroccan nationalist movement as manifested in the war of the Rif, the movement was then revived politically (as the Moroccans lost hope in the application of self-government after the retirement of Lyantey in 1926) through the activities of the young educated Moroccans. In fact, during 1926 and 1930, there were two major tendencies or movements among young Moroccans. One tendency was a traditional religious movement inspired by the fagih (religious scholar) Mohammed ben L'arbi al-'Alaoni and influenced by the Salafiyya (from Salaf or ancestors) reformism of Al-Afghanie and Mohammed Abdu. The other tendency was a political movement inspired by the modern European culture that came through the French educational system.¹

The Islamic reformist movement was represented by 'Allal al-Fassi, a young student of the Parawiyine University of Fez, who secretly formed a politico-religious circle there. The second tendency directed towards modern culture, was represented by Ahmed Balafrej who founded the society of the Supporters of Truth in Rabat. It is remarkable that despite the apparent ideological and cultural contradiction between the two tendencies, they merged in one group by common national sentiments in 1927 while the occasion for their common national action came three years later.

On 16 May 1930, the government of the protectorate declared the so-called dahir berbère (i.e. Berber dahir or law)² concerning the organization of justice in Berber regions: Berber customs were to be subjected to civil law and not the Shari'a (Islamic) law. Consequently the first public demonstration took place in a mosque in Rabat, and the movement extended to Salé and Fez. Three leaders emerged from this opposition movement - 'Allal al-Fassi, Omar ben Abdel-Jalil and Mohammed bel-Hassan al-Onezzani.

In fact the affair of the "Berber dahir" was understood by the nationalists as a threat to the political and religious integrity of Morocco, and thus it aroused not only the political opposition of the Moroccan nationalist, but also caused an outcry throughout the Muslim world. With the major role of Emir Shakib Arslan in Geneva³, the Muslim world protested against the French policy of divide and rule in Morocco. The Moroccan nationalist attitude reflected, on the other hand, the rise of political consciousness among the Moroccan nationalists as well as the importance of the Islamic element in this first stage of the Moroccan nationalist political movement.⁴

2. The CAM and Plan of Moroccan Reforms

The affair of the "Berber dahir" gave momentum to the Moroccan nationalist activities in new forms both in France and in Morocco. Balafrej and Al-Onezzani played an important role during their stay as students in France.

In July 1932, the first issue of the Maghreb review appeared in Paris and published a cable addressed to Edonard Herriot (president of the Council) by the "population" of Fez. The telegram began as follows: "The Moroccan people being oppressed and tyrannized in the twentieth century, though it is under French protectorate...".⁵ Consequently the Moroccan nationalists formed the Moroccan Action committee (CAM) which established strong relations with the nationalists of the Spanish zone of Morocco. A weekly review - Al-'Amal al-Sha'abi (Popular Action) - published by the nationalists in Fez, also began to appear in French in August 1933. In the Spanish zone of Morocco, the nationalists published in Arabic two papers - Es-Salam (Peace) and El-Hayat (Life) in 1933 and 1934 respectively. The nationalists also engaged in some political activities in order to influence the popular masses particularly in Moroccan towns. But they sought above all to reach harmony and agreement with the Sultan: the idea of the festival of the throne, the deep affection shown to prince Hassan, the designation of the sovereign as "king" were all important factors. Still more important were the nationalist demonstrations during the visit of the Sultan to Fez in 1934.

The French authorities responded to these demonstrations by the suspension of all the organs of the nationalist press. Consequently the CAM addressed in December 1934, the "Plan of Moroccan Reforms" to the Sultan as well as to the government of the French republic and the resident-general in Morocco.⁶ In this plan, direct administration in Morocco was condemned and the protectorate government was described as "racial, partial, obscurantist, antiliberal, colonizing and assimilating". The plan proposed some political, juridical, social, economic and financial, and lastly other reforms.⁷ It ended with the nationalist demand: Suppress the "cross" from the Sharifian decorations. Briefly, the plan demanded that the treaty of Fez should be respected and insisted on the suppression of direct administrative and juridical unity of Morocco and the participation of the Moroccans in the exercise of power.

3. Formation of political parties and the Suppression of 1937

Anticipating the reactions of the French authorities to their plan of reforms, the nationalists continued, until the French elections of May 1936, their attempt to attract some elements of the popular masses to their cause, in particular school pupils. However the coming to power of the Popular Front in France did not signal a radical political change in policy with the replacement of the resident-general Peyrouton by General Nogués. In fact and as a result of the political activities of the nationalists who demanded the granting of "democratic liberties", three nationalist leaders - 'Allal al-Fassi, Al-Onezzani and Mohammed al-Yazidi - were arrested but released in December. Many demonstrations took place in November in Fez, Salé, Casablanca and Taza.

In January 1937, the publication of five nationalist papers was authorized. But from that time on, the nationalist movement was divided into two groups especially because of the personal rivalry between the two leaders, Al-Fassi and Al-Onezzani. Another split had occurred shortly before between the nationalists of the French zone and those of the Spanish zone after the coup d'état of General Franco (July 1936) in Spain.

Abd al-Khalig Torres, a nationalist leader in the Spanish zone, founded the National Reform Party (PNR) while his rival Mohammed Mekki Naciri established the Moroccan Unity Party (PUM) at the beginning of 1937 in Tetonan. This was also a case of personal rivalry as in the French zone because all these leaders and their parties were aiming at putting Morocco on the road to independence.

It should be remarked that the rapid growth of 'Allal al-Fassi's group, which concentrated on Islamism and Arabism, worried the authorities of the protectorate which thought that this group was making a "state" within the State. Hence the CAM was dissolved by a decree in March 1937, and the nationalists in their two groups contented themselves with sending telegrams of protest. Two clandestine political parties were formed by the nationalists as a result of the banning of the CAM - the National Party for the Realization of Reforms, founded secretly in April and then openly in July by 'Allal al-Fassi,⁸ and the Popular Movement (al-Haraka al-gaw-miyya) formed by Al-Onezzani.

The National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) of Al-Fassi was numerically the more important and embodied the traditionalist tendency,⁹ i.e. the Islamising and monarchist tendency, which later became, in 1944, the Istiglal (Independence) Party. The Popular Movement of Al-Onezzani adopted the modernist tendency in the sense of the republican spirit and western democratic conceptions, but it remained confined to a small circle in Casablanca and became later, in 1946, the Independence Democratic Party (PDI).¹⁰

Some bloody incidents then took place in Meknes as a result of the unequal distribution of water for irrigation with favouritism to European settlers leading in September 1937 to the death of thirteen persons and the wounding of about one hundred after the intervention of the police against the Moroccan crowd. Demonstrations consequently took place not only in towns but also in the country-side; this was the serious rebellion of October in Khemisset.¹¹ The National Party of Al-Fassi held a congress and strongly attacked the repressive policy of the resident-general. The National Party was then dissolved and three nationalist leaders - Al-Fassi, Omar ben Abdel Jalil and Ahmed Mekonar - were discreetly arrested in Fez which had been cut off from the outside world by troops "in order to avoid in advance the reactions of the population".¹² Demonstrations broke out in Port-Lyantey (Kenitra), Rabat, Salé, Casablanca, Oujda and Marrakesh. 'Allal al-Fassi was deported to Gabon, where he stayed for nine years,¹³ while Al-Onezzani was put under house-arrest, and Balafrej took refuge in Tangier.

4. The role of the Sultan during the Second World War

Morocco remained completely calm until 1940, and the French defeat by the Nazis did not change the situation. In fact since the declaration of the war, Morocco had taken sides with France. But German propaganda, strengthened by the presence of an armistice commission (first Italian and then German) as well as English propaganda which stood against the Vichy government in France and praised the liberalism of Great Britain in its empire while celebrating the Atlantic charter which opened new perspectives for the dependent peoples, all had their influence on the Moroccans.¹⁴

Moreover, the authorities of the protectorate had already decided to distribute unequal rations for Europeans and Moroccans. This was interpreted by the Moroccans as a discriminatory measure. Also French troops were seen as a defeated force in the eyes of the Moroccans after the Anglo-American disembarkation in North Africa, and especially after the American disembarkation in Morocco in November 1942.

In this new climate created by the second World War, a very important event took place in Morocco with the emancipation of the Sultan Ben Yussef who, for the first time, resisted General Nogués by refusing to accompany him to settle at Meknes instead of Rabat. Moreover, the Sultan made contact with the American president Roosevelt in January 1943.¹⁵ This indicates that the Sultan decided, in the absence of the nationalist leaders, to manifest himself as the defender of Moroccan sovereignty against French colonial policies, thus marking the beginning of the palace participation in the Moroccan nationalist movement.

In fact some external events also had their influence on the situation in Morocco. In Tunisia, the Bey Moncef played an important nationalist role until he was deposed and exiled while Bourguiba took a strong position in his favour from his prison in Rome. In Algeria, the Algerian Manifesto and the project of reforms were made known to the French authorities. Lastly, in November 1943, the French authorities met for the first time a strong nationalist opposition in Lebanon.

5. The "Declaration of independence" and the incidents of 1944

Being influenced by all these internal and external events that occurred during the second World War, the Moroccan nationalists began to think that it was time to take up a new radical position. Hence since December 1943, the two nationalist groups became united on the initiative of the palace and in the absence of their rival leaders (Al-Fassi and Al-Onezzani) while Ahmed Balafrej took over the leadership of the new movement. The result of this new political consciousness in the Moroccan nationalist movement was manifested by the "declaration of independence" of 11 January 1944. This declaration was entitled Manifesto of the Istiglal Party¹⁶ and was signed by fifty eight representatives of the party.

The text of this declaration of independence contained a strong condemnation of the protectorate and made recall for the unity of the Moroccan people. After recalling that Morocco had always been a free sovereign state, the Istiglal Party made advantage of the external transformations and the moral obligations assured by the Allies in the Atlantic charter in order to demand the reestablishment of the independence and the unity of Morocco as well as the installation of a democratic regime of constitutional monarchy based on consultation and similar to the Arabo-Muslim countries of the orient.¹⁷ The Sultan was given henceforth the title of "king", thus becoming King Mohammed V.

The Manifesto of independence was handed to the Sultan as well as to the French, English and American authorities. The Moroccans reacted immediately with great delight while the Sultan supported the nationalist demands and began to make the necessary contacts. Thus it is clear that the Moroccan

nationalist movement passed at this stage from the demand for reforms to the demand for independence. A new climate was created and was perhaps more favourable for negotiations, particularly with the arrival of the French commissioner of foreign affairs - Massighi - in Rabat on 28 January.¹⁸

Nevertheless the situation suddenly changed. On the evening of 28 January, the military security organ announced that they had discovered a conspiracy organized by the German agents, and consequently Ahmed Balafrej and Mohamed al-Yazidi were arrested in Rabat while two other nationalists, of whom Al-Hachimi al-Filali, were arrested in Fez. Paradoxically these four nationalist militants were neither condemned nor appeared before a military court.

As a result of this incident which reflected French repressive policies against the nationalists, the Moroccans, particularly in Rabat and Fez, reacted with violent acts against the French in Morocco. Again the Muslim town of Fez became the object of cruel repression by the authorities. The results of this repression were very tragic: the official estimations talked about forty dead and about a hundred wounded, but these figures were in fact very modest. Moreover, more than six hundred persons were arrested and about four hundred and fifty were convicted. In addition to this, the University of the Parawiyine was closed together with the Muslim colleges of Fez and Rabat for an indeterminate period. These measures resulted in provoking a deep feeling of hostility between Muslims and Europeans. The Istiglal Party declared in December 1944 that it would reject any French projects for reform considering them "as a poultice on a wooden leg".¹⁹

One can finally note that the Communist Party in Morocco was led by a Jewish lawyer - Leon Sultan - after the departure of General Nogués in June 1943, and it was named the Communist Party of Morocco (PCM). It supported the government repression in 1944, but then changed its attitude.²⁰ After the death of Leon Sultan in 1945, the policy of the PCM, under the direction of a Muslim Algerian - Ali Yata -, came closer to that of the Istiglal Party which had already reorganized itself after the crisis of 1944²¹, but the PCM failed in its attempt to constitute a national front of the opposition movements.²²

CONCLUSION

It should be remarked at first that all the three countries of the Maghrib experienced the preliminary stage of violent resistance based on religious sentiments. This stage lasted longer in the cases of Algeria and Morocco where some national political institutions were established by Emir Abd al-Kader and Emir Abd al-Krim who conducted a holy war against the French.

The political nationalist movements started at the beginning of this century in Tunisia and Algeria with the movements of the Young Tunisians and the Young Algerians who were in both cases influenced by the Young Turks movement of the Ottoman empire as both Tunisia and Algeria were Turkish regencies before the French domination, Morocco did not experience these movements because it was not subjected to Turkish rule as it had its own Sharifian empire. The young Moroccans concentrated mainly on establishing cultural circles in Fez and Rabat.

It should also be remarked that the Young Tunisians and the Young Algerians did not raise the same demands in their opposition to French policies: while the former called for the reestablishment of a "constitution" (destour) which characterized the Tunisian nationalist movement since that time, the latter concentrated on the demand of "equality" with the French. This difference can be explained by the fact that Algeria was considered as a colony or an integral part of France while Tunisia, which had a dynasty in power, was officially treated as a protectorate.

Another important remark concerning the beginnings of the nationalist movements is the existence of two major tendencies among the young nationalists: one is traditionalist (based on Islamic reformism and Arabism) and the other modernist (based on modern European culture). While these two tendencies were present in Morocco since the 1920's in the circles of 'Allal al-Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej respectively, they emerged more evidently in Tunisia - Al-Tha'albi and Bourguiba (Old Destour and Neo-Destour) - and in Algeria - Ben Badis and Ferhat Abbas (the 'Oulama and the Elected) in the 1930's. However, while this division was sharp in the cases of Tunisia and Algeria, it did not prevent the fusion and cooperation between the two tendencies in Morocco.

It should also be noted that with the exception of the early Tunisian nationalist activities of 1911 and especially those of the 1920's (including Destourians, workers and students) as well as the activities of Messali al-Haj who led the ENA in Paris from 1926, the 1930's marked in fact the first most important stage of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib. This importance resulted from the formation of political parties on one hand, and the conduct of more goal-oriented nationalist activities on the other hand. In Tunisia, the constitutional Liberal Party (Destour Party) of the 1920's was divided when the Neo-Destour was formed in 1934 by Bourguiba who gained popular support, Three years later, in 1937, the PPA was formed by Messali al-Haj in Algeria to replace the ENA while the two Moroccan parties of Al-Fassi and Al-Onezzani - the National Party and the Popular Movement respectively - were also established in 1937 to replace the CAM. All these parties directed their efforts towards the struggle for independence, This explains the violent repression inflicted by the French authorities on the nationalist movements and their leaders in the three countries of the Maghrib in 1937.

The period of the second World War, following the defeat of France in 1940, marked lastly the second important stage in the beginnings of the political nationalist movements in the Maghrib before 1945. This period witnessed the new prominent role played by the Bey Moncef in Tunisia, the Sultan Mohammed Ben Yussef in Morocco and Ferhat Abbas in Algeria. While Ferhat Abbas declared the Manifesto of the Algerian People and formed the association of the AML demanding an Algerian republic in a federation with France, the nationalists in Tunisia declared the Manifesto of the Tunisian Front demanding internal autonomy and the Moroccan nationalists raised their declaration of independence. It should be noted, however, that Algeria was distinguished by the existence of four political formations - the PPA, the 'Oulama, the Elected Muslims and the PCA - which remained separate before 1945.

Notes

The Tunisian case

1. On the Young Turks, see for example B. Lewis, The Emergence of modern Turkey, London, 1961; Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, Princeton University Press, 1959; S. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, Princeton University Press, 1961; V. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish nationalism, London, 1950.
2. It should be noted that Tunisia had already had a constitutional experience with the constitution of 1861. On the Young Tunisian Party, see Galal Yahiya, Arab Maghrib - the contemporary period and the liberation and independence movements (in Arabic), Cairo, 1966, pp. 169-175.
3. These factors were the anti-colonialism of the United States (i.e. Wilson's 14 points) and Soviet Russia (after 1917 revolution), the nationalist Egypt of Sa'ad Zagloul (1919 revolution), and the establishment of a local parliament and a government council in both Tripolinia Cyrenaica in Libya (June and November 1919 respectively).
4. This book, published in Paris in 1920, is generally attributed to Al-Tha'albi and Ahmed Sakka (for the French text). A brief analysis of it is given in Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, July-August 1920, pp. 226-231. See also R. Balek, La Tunisie après la guerre, Tunis, 1921 and Galal Yahiya, op. cit., pp. 349-352.
5. These claims were formulated by the leader of the party, Ahmed Essafi, and were eight in number, but a ninth was added later: institution of an elected assembly formed by Tunisians and French, formation of a government responsible before this assembly, separation of the three powers of government, access of all Tunisians to all administrative posts, equality of treatment and salaries of officials, establishment of elected municipalities, participation of Tunisians in buying land in equality with the French, freedom of the press, meetings and association, and finally, compulsory education.

See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 66 and Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique Française, September-October 1920, pp. 280-282.

6. The text of the memorandum is reproduced in H. Bourguiba's book in Arabic: Introduction to the history of the nationalist movement, Tunis, 1962, p. 55.
7. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 68-69.
8. Ibid., p. 69
Among the English books on the rise of Tunisian nationalism, one may cite Nicolas Ziadeh, Origins of Nationalism in Tunisia, Beirut, 1962.
9. Ibid., pp. 71-72. See also C. Kheirallah, Le mouvement jeune Tunisien, Tunis, 1957.
10. Ibid., p. 74.
11. Ibid., p. 75 See also H. Bourguiba, Le trente-troisième anniversaire de l'apparition de "L'Action Tunisienne", Tunis, 1966, pp. 13-49.
12. H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, Paris, 1954, p. 58.
13. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution Politique..., op. cit., p. 76.
The Neo-Destour had Mahmoud Materi as president and Habih Bourguiba as general secretary. On the divergences between the Neo-Destour and the Old Destour, see R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 76-77 and H. Bourguiba, the lesson of 30 years of struggle (in Arabic), Tunis, 1964, pp. 32-37.
14. Félix Garas, Bourguiba et la naissance d'une nation, Paris, 1956, p. 88.
15. See H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, op. cit., pp. 77-173.
16. Pierre Vienot was State secretary for foreign affairs in France and was also in charge of the affairs of the protectorates and mandates of the Levant.
17. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 79-80. See also H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, op. cit., pp. 88-92.
18. Al-Tha'albi published in September 1937 in the Old Destour's paper Al-Irada (the Will) a very critical manifesto in which he strongly condemned the Neo-Destour and its leaders, Three months after his return, al-Tha'albi lost the war of the two Destours, and the victory of Bourguiba confirmed the congress of Kasr Hellal.
19. F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 109-110.
20. H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
21. F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
22. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 90.

23. Ibid., p. 95. See also Ali al-Balhaonan, Revolutionary Tunisia (in Arabic), Tunis, no date, pp. 51-54. Al-Balhaonan speaks here of the harsh treatment to which the Tunisian prisoners were subjected.
24. Ibid., p. 98. See also Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, Paris, 1952, pp. 95-96.
25. Ibid., p. 102.
26. Ibid., p. 104 and F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 129-130.
27. See the text in H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, op. cit., pp. 182-184 and in Roger Stephane, La Tunisie de Bourguiba, Paris, 1958, pp. 5-7.
28. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 105-107. See also H. Bourguiba, the 7th of June 1943 (in Arabic), Tunis, 2nd ed., 1963 (speech broadcast on 7 June 1960).
29. Ibid., p. 105.
30. Ibid., p. 108.

The Algerian case

1. This is confirmed by the study of Abul Kasim Sa'ad Allah, The Algerian Nationalist Movement from 1900 to 1930 (in Arabic), Beirut, 1969 (Ph. D. thesis),
2. See Tabrizi Bensalah, La République Algérienne, Paris, 1979, pp. 55-56.
3. Ibid., p. 55.
4. Ibid, pp. 55-56 and Abd-Allah Sharit & Mohammed al-Milli, op. cit., pp. 221-234.
5. See Ch.-R. Ageron, Politiques coloniales au Maghreb, Paris, P.U.F., 1973, pp. 284-288.
6. Ch.-R. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
7. Tabrizi Bensalah, op. cit., p. 58. It should be noted that Mohammed Abdu visited Algeria towards 1903 and made contacts with the 'Oulama. See in this respect, A. Nadir, Le Mouvement réformiste Algérien, son rôle dans la formation de l'idéologie nationale, Paris, 1965, (Ph. D. thesis); I. Carret, L'Association des Oulama d'Algérie, Le réformisme en Islam, Alger, 1959; A. Merad, "L'enseignement de Muhammad Abduh aux Algériens (1903)", in Orient, 4^e trim., 1963, pp. 75-123. See also T. Melasno, "Les Mouvements politiques et la question culturelle en Algérie avant la libération", in Cahiers de la Méditerranée, University of Nice No. 26, June 1983, pp. 3-11
8. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., pp. 313-319, Tabrizi Bensalah, op. cit., pp. 59-60, and Salah al-A'gad, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

9. Ech - Chihab, June 1936, quoted in the above reference of R. Le Toumeau (p.319)
10. See the text in the same reference of R. Le Toumeau (p.326).
11. Tabrizi Bensalah, op. cit., pp. 60-61.
12. See, on this project, R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 329-333, R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 72-74, and Ch.-A. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie..., op. cit., pp. 90-91.
13. Tabrizi Bensalah, op. cit., p. 61.
14. Ibid., pp. 68-69. See also Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 326.
15. Ibid., p. 69
16. See J. Lacouture, Cing hommes et la France, Paris, 1961, pp. 278-283 and R. Le Tomeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 335-337.
17. Text in R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p.338.
18. Text in La Documentation Française - Notes et Etudes Documentaires, February 1943, pp. 5-9.
19. Ibid., pp. 10-11
20. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 82.
21. Ibid., p. 83, R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 345 and Ch.-A. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie..., op. cit., p. 93. See the text in La Documentation Française, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
22. Ch.-A. Ageron, op. cit., p. 93; Tabrizi Bensalah, op. cit., p. 65; Abd-Allah Sharit and Mohamed al-Milli, op. cit., p. 224.
23. Tabrizi Bensalah, op. cit., op. cit., p. 65.
24. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 84.
25. Ch.-A. Ageron, op. cit., p.93. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., p. 347.
26. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 84.
27. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 347.
28. See R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 95-99 and Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., pp. 299-300.
29. On can remind here that these four political formations were the PPA, the 'Oulama, the Elected Muslism and the PCA.
See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 328.

The Moroccan case

1. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 180; 'Allal al-Fassi, op. cit., p. 112; Stephane Bernard, Le Conflict Franco-Marocain, Bruxelles 1963, vol. 1, p. 41; and Mark I. Cohen & Lorna Hahn, Morocco - Old Land New Nation, London, Pall Mall Press, 1966, p. 41. See also Jacques Barque, Le Maghreb entre deux Guerres, Paris, 1962.
2. The term "dahir" means a law or a decree issued by the traditional Moroccan central government.
3. Emir Shakib Arslan was the head of the delegation of the Syro-Palestinian congress in Geneva and he held an inquiry in Tangier and Tetouan in northern Morocco.
4. Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 389.
5. Maghreb, August 1932.
6. The Plan of Moroccan Reforms was published in French in Paris - Plan de Réformes Marocaines, Paris, 1934, 134 pages. See on this plan, R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 189-192; S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 43; R. Rezzette, Les Partis politiques Marocains, Paris, 1955, p. 89; Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., pp. 391-392.
7. In the political field, the plan demanded the appointment of Moroccan ministers, a national council (composed of one third of representatives of Moroccan economic assemblies and two thirds of elected delegates, with legislative, economic and budgetary attributions) and elected municipalities composed only of Moroccans. Briefly, these reforms aimed at suppressing completely any French participation in the Moroccan political life while strictly limiting them to administrative affairs. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 190.
8. See 'Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa, Washington, 1954, p. 166. This is the English translation of the author's Arabic edition (the independence movements in Arab Maghrib) published in Cairo in 1948.
9. One should remark here that 'Allal al-Fassi was influenced by the reformist Salafiyya movement of Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abdu, and he published a number of books on the Shari'a on the basis of this reformism while he continued to be the leader of the Istiglal Party after independence.
10. S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 44.
11. R. Rezzette, op. cit., p. 10.
12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. See Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 395.

14. The Atlantic charter was the common declaration of the meeting, in August 1946 of the American president Roosevelt and the British prime minister Churchill. This charter stated that: "They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them". See Peace and War. United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, p. 718.
15. See E. Roosevelt, Mon père m'a dit (French translation from English), Paris, 1947, pp. 138-142, and Ch.-A Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., p. 342.
16. See the text in Parti de l'Istiglal, Documents 1944-46, Paris, 1946, 40 pages. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 208-209, and Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 401. A recent study on the Manifesto of independence is made by Drissi Alami, "Le Manifeste de l'indépendance: sublime continuité juridique", in Revue juridique, politique et économique du Maroc, Faculté des Sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales, Rabat, No 16, December 1984, pp. 49-74.
17. Drissi Alami, op. cit., p. 54. The author holds that the text of the Manifesto was prepared with direct collaboration of the Sultan Mohammed Ben Jussef (p. 50).
18. See the texts of the two speeches of Massigli and the Sultan in F. Taillard, Le nationalisme Marocain, Paris, 1947, pp. 24-27.
19. Parti de l'Istiglal, Mémoire au Sujet des réformes Marocaines, p. 8. See Ch.-A Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., p. 351. On the four mixed commissions of reforms (on general administration, education, justice and agriculture) formed by the resident-general in March 1944 and the plan of reforms of October 1944, see S. Bernard, op. cit., pp. 57-60, and R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 214-215.
20. See F. Taillard, op. cit., pp. 135-143.
21. On the organization of the Istiglal Party, see R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 216-217, and R. Rezette, op. cit., pp. 292-323.
22. See R. Rezette, op. cit., pp. 162-168.

II EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS TILL INDEPENDENCE: THE DECISIVE PHASE

The period before 1945 marked the beginnings of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib. This phase was essential as a basis for the decisive phase that started from 1945. The evolution of the nationalist movements in this latter phase was marked by different forms of nationalist struggle for independence. This struggle resulted, about one decade later, in the independence of the two protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956 while the colony of Algeria had to experience a revolutionary struggle in the 1950's in order to obtain its independence in 1962. As the Moroccan nationalists declared their demand for independence in 1944 while the Tunisian nationalist movement demanded internal autonomy and obtained independence after Morocco; it is convenient to follow the evolution of the nationalist movements in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria respectively.

In Morocco

1. The leading role of the Istiglal Party and the Sultan

The collusion between the Sultan and the main nationalist party - the Istiglal Party - was consolidated in 1945 when the Sultan charged three of his advisors including the fagih Mohammed ben Larby al-'Alaoni, to establish permanent contact with the Istiglal Party, and this marked a new phenomenon in the Moroccan nationalist movement.¹ The Sultan, affected by the nationalist demonstrations organized for him by the Istiglal Party during his stay in Marrakesh, announced, in the eve of the formation of the Arab League, the coming of great happy events particularly for Islam and Morocco and explained that he shared the same hopes with the people who were acclaiming him while demanding independence.² Also the Sultan continued his conflict with the resident-general until a new resident was nominated by General de Gaulle, in 1946, after the Sultan's visit to France where he was invited by the government.

The Istiglal Party which was led at that time by Mohammed al-Yazidi, addressed a memorandum to the new resident - Eric Labonne - about the grievances of the party against the regime.³ Labonne reacted to this by the liberation of political prisoners including Al-Fassi, Al-Onezzani and Balafrej. The resident also announced his goal to apply the reforms made in Tunisia for the participation of Moroccans with the French in the municipal, regional and governmental assemblies. But the Istiglal Party rejected publicly these reforms as they politically involved the principle of co-sovereignty, and a letter was sent to the Sultan accusing Labonne's plan to "consolidate the foundations of a colonialist policy which the experience of thirty four years had proved to be a failure".⁴

Hence the Sultan suspended the six dahirs which were to put Labonne's reforms in practice.⁵ Moreover, the Sultan who had the firm intention of ensuring the unity of Morocco, decided to visit Tangier, after it had been returned to the international regime. Despite the attempt of the French

authorities to stop this visit through the bloody incidents of Casablanca,⁶ the visit took place on the fixed date, and the Sultan delivered a very important speech in Tangier on 10 April 1947. He spoke about the brilliant future of Morocco, its rights, its attachment to Islam and to the Arab world - in particular to the Arab League-, and omitted the final phrase proposed by the resident as he addressed only a brief compliment to France.⁷ In fact the Sultan no longer wanted to reign, but he wanted to govern and, increasingly to emerge as the leader of the nationalist movement.⁸ He also wanted to strengthen Morocco's relations with the Arab League.

I should be mentioned here that the Arab League (founded in Cairo in 1945) had already organized the Congress of the Arab Maghrib held in Cairo from 15 to 22 February 1947. In this congress which ended by important decisions, the three countries of the Maghrib were represented. The decisions included five subjects of which the most important was the problem of the French and Spanish colonization of the Arab Maghrib. In this respect the congress declared the non-recognition of the protectorate treaties - considered as being imposed on Tunisia and Morocco - as well as the possession of any right to France in Algeria, thus demanding that these three countries should declare their independence and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Maghrib. The congress also rejected any adhesion to the French Union and decided finally to strengthen the struggle inside the Maghrib in order to obtain independence and the withdrawal of foreign troops. On the second subject, the congress agreed on the necessity of the unity of the nationalist movement in each one of the three countries of the Maghrib as well as on the strengthening of ties between the three movements. On the third subject, the congress set out the internal and external role of the Arab League in helping the Maghrib countries to obtain their independence. The fourth subject considered presenting the problem of the Maghrib in the United Nations and the formation (for a unified propaganda) of the Committee of Arab Maghrib composed of three sections: the Moroccan section of the Istiglal Party in collaboration with the Party of Reforms of the Spanish zone, the Tunisian section of the Neo-Destour Party, and the Algerian section of the Algerian People's Party. As for the last subject, the congress thanked the Sultan of Morocco and the caliph of the Spanish zone for their support for the nationalist movement, and expressed at the same time its support for the exiled Bey of Tunisia.⁹

2. The nationalist and General Juin

After the speech of Tangier, the French government decided to appoint a new resident - General Juin (the son of a French colon in Algeria) - who was chosen for a harsh policy which he followed from 1947 to 1951. Consequently, 'Allal al-Fassi, who made a visit of propaganda for the Moroccan case in France, went to Cairo in May 1947 where he continued his nationalist activities. These activities were characterized by three important elements: the consolidation of ties between Morocco and Egypt, the arrival of Emir Abd al-Krim, hero of the Rif who escaped from the ship that was taking him from Reunion to France, and finally the foundation of the Liberation Committee of the Maghrib in Cairo with Abd al-Krim and his brother as president and vice-president for life, Bourguiba as general secretary and Mohammed Ibn Abboud (Reform Party) as treasurer.¹⁰

Emir Abd al-Krim published a Manifesto in January 1948 signed by all the representatives of the main parties of the Maghrib: Old Destour, Neo-Destour, Algerian People's Party, the Istiglal Party, the Democratic Party of Independence, the National Reform Party and the Moroccan Unity Party. All these parties engaged in the struggle only for independence and would not accept any negotiations.

The manifesto also declared that the Maghrib would follow Islam as an integral part of the Arab world like other Arab countries.¹¹ The Liberation Committee of the Maghrib thus contributed to the new interest given by the Arab States to the North African issues: the formation of the Defence Committee for North Africa in Damascus and the Society for the Defence of the Maghrib in Beirut, but above all, the activities of the Arab League and the United Nations had been very helpful to the evolution of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib. In May 1948, the Liberation Committee of the Maghrib elected 'Allal al-Fassi as general-secretary and Habib Thamer from Tunisia as Treasurer.

Inside Morocco, General Juin insisted on his extreme attitudes as he aimed to confirm the provisions of the treaty of 1912, to consolidate the basis of power and respect for authority, to separate Morocco from the Arab Orient, resist the nationalist movement, create a Moroccan group to collaborate with the residence and finally to set up a new system of government and reforms in Morocco.¹²

In fact General Juin sought to impose on the Sultan, under the pretext of democratization, the dismantling of the treaty of Fez and its replacement by a regime of co-sovereignty under which the French would again have the upper hand.¹³ Moreover, he established a distinction between what he called moderate nationalists and extremists among the nationalist elements, and, of course, he only admitted the activities of the first group. Hence he accepted the publication of the papers of all parties but only under strict censorship. He also encouraged the formation of new political parties in favour of France¹⁴ and developed excellent relations with the old eminent Moroccan personalities like al-Glaoui - the Pasha of Marrakesh - and Sharif al-Kittani.¹⁵ Finally, he proposed political and administrative reforms for the reorganization of the Sharifian Makhzen (central government) with the intention of applying the principle of co-sovereignty.¹⁶

3. The Franco-Marocain crisis of 1950-51

An important conflict took place between the nationalists including the Sultan on one hand and General Juin on the other hand as a result of the latter's attitudes and policies opposed to the nationalists and the Sultan.¹⁷ The Sultan refused to sign the reforms proposed by the residence, and the deteriorating relations between the nationalists and General Juin led finally to the Franco-Marocain crisis of 1950-1951. Since July 1950, the second college of the Moroccan section in the Council of Government decided to abstain from taking its seats. The Sultan, who was invited to come to Paris, prepared two memorandums to the French government demanding in the second one the abolition of the protectorate.¹⁸ Also some Moroccan delegates in the council of government attacked the proposed budget of 1951 as serving only the interests of the French of Morocco.¹⁹

Finally, in the eve of his departure for Washington in January 1951, General Juin made an ultimatum to the Sultan asking him either to sign the proposed reforms and reject the Istiglal Party or to abdicate.²⁰ After his return, the Sultan replied that he could not condemn the Istiglal Party because he was above all parties. The crisis ended in February 1951 by forcing the Sultan through a so-called "Berber revolt" to condemn violence and "the methods of a certain party...", but the Istiglal Party was not mentioned in name.²¹ In fact the Sultan did not break official relations with the Istiglal Party and did not sign the suspended dahirs.

The consequences of this incident were very serious as the residence violated the treaty of Fez when it compelled the Moroccan sovereign to yield under the pressure of a local revolt orchestrated by the regime.²² The Moroccan nationalists responded by the formation in Tangier in April 1951, of a Moroccan National Front comprising the four parties of the French and Spanish zones. They committed themselves in the pact of Tangier to struggle for independence without any compromise, to support the Sultan, collaborate with the Arab League and to reject any alliance with the Moroccan communist Party.²³ 'Allal al-Fazzi called for the Afro-Asian solidarity and made a tour of the Arab countries in preparation for the presentation of the Moroccan problem to the United Nations.

The appointment of a new resident - General Guillaume - who also opposed the nationalists - did not change the situation in Morocco. The nationalists succeeded in influencing the people to abstain from the elections of the new council of government in November 1951. Some violent riots broke out in Casablanca during these elections. The Sultan demanded from France the concluding of "an agreement which would guarantee Morocco its full sovereignty and would establish its relations with France on a new basis".²⁴ He suggested in 1952, the establishment of a constitutional regime in Morocco compatible with the continuity of franco-Moroccan cooperation.²⁵

In December 1952, the General Union of the Confederated Trade Unions of Morocco, in Casablanca, strongly influenced by the Istiglal Party, decided to hold a strike to protest against the assassination in Tunisia of the Tunisian syndical leader - Ferhat Hached. A very important violent demonstration took place in Casablanca on the eve of the strike, but it was met by a very severe repression from the police forces ending by a drama for the Moroccan population.²⁶ The French authorities also exploited this situation to give a decisive blow to the Istiglal Party. However more than in 1944 and 1947, this repression gave more international support to the Moroccan problem as France was very strongly criticized in the General Assembly of the United Nations.²⁷

4. The crisis of 1953 and the deposition of the Sultan

The French authorities formed again in January 1953 the same coalition of high officials, eminent Moroccans and chiefs of religious groups, which had failed to achieve the deposition of the Sultan in 1951, with the firm intention of achieving this aim. In fact while the Sultan demanded immediate independence, the French authorities insisted on a municipal reform including the participation of the French of Morocco and also on "interdependence" between Morocco and France.²⁸ Hence the French authorities decided to depose the Sultan who rejected the policies and reforms proposed by these authorities.

According to the official version, Al-Glaoni and al-Kittani gathered 287 signatures demanding the dismissal of the Sultan and they declared the nomination of Mohammed ben Arafa in his place. Consequently trouble broke out after 16 August in many towns of Morocco. The French government decided to end the problem by authorizing the resident to discharge the Sultan since he refused to abdicate. The Sultan was exiled to Madagascar while Mohammed ben Arafa took his place.²⁹

This official version on the deposition of the Sultan was criticized in the nationalist literature³⁰ and even in France.³¹ The criticism put all the responsibility of the crisis of 1953 on France alone and explained the involvement of the French authorities in this regard. Moreover, it has been remarked that the official version ignored all the eminent personalities, the different social groups and the nationalists of the Istiglal Party who had declared their support for the Sultan. To this should be added the important role of the French press in Morocco against the French policies during the crisis. Briefly, France violated the treaty of Fez with regard to the Sharifian family, and the protectorate regime came to abandon its role as arbiter to take party, thus signing its condemnation.³²

As a result of the deposition of the Sultan, nationalist action took the violent form of urban terrorism and guerrilla without abandoning political activities. As the traditional leaders of the Istiglal Party were all in prison or exile, this action was carried out by some young leaders many of whom had emerged from the popular classes and were often motivated by the spirit of sacrifice.³³ Many attacks took place against the French and their collaborators; even Ben Arafa escaped twice an attempt on his life. This led in 1954 to counter-terrorism from the Europeans of Morocco against the Moroccan nationalists and some French considered to be sympathetic to them. The nationalists of the Spanish zone supported their brothers in the French zone and refused to recognize Ben Arafa; they sent arms and men in order to attack the French posts in the north.³⁴

At the same time, continuous troubles and demonstrations took place in 1954 demanding the return of the Sultan who declared in December 1954 from his exile, and in agreement with the nationalists, the formula of the council of the throne and the formation of a provisional government to negotiate with the French government a convention guaranteeing the integrity of Moroccan sovereignty, organizing the interdependence between Morocco and France and putting into action the reforms necessary for the transformation of Morocco into a modern country governed by a constitutional monarchy.³⁵ In fact the rise of the Algerian revolution and the proclamation of internal autonomy for Tunisia in 1954 had their great effect on the Moroccan nationalists who consequently intensified their actions around the problem of the throne.

5. From the riots of 1955 and the "second war of the Rif" to independence

The nationalists who mobilised the Moroccan masses in the villages and urban areas created an explosive situation for the new resident - Gilbert Grandval - in July 1955. Also the demonstrations in favour of the return of the Sultan continued in towns and Berber regions causing riots that ended by the death of many Moroccans and Europeans.³⁶ This finally led the French government to open negotiations with Moroccan delegations in August 1955 at Aix-les Bains.

The Moroccans nationalists won the first game in the final crisis when the French government prepared the departure of Ben Arafa for Tangier in October.

Consequently the nationalists began the second game by attacking two French posts in the Rif. These attacks were carried out by some elements of the "Army of Liberation" organized in the Rif by nationalists such as Dr. Al-Khatib. This Moroccan force was itself presented as part of the Army of Liberation of the Arab Maghrib, acting in liaison with the Algerian nationalists. This army declared that it would carry out a national insurrection against the French, encircle the posts in the Rif and the middle Atlas, and pursue the struggle until the total independence of Morocco and Algeria.³⁷ Also 'Allal al-Fassi called in Cairo for a declaration of war against France and announced that the rebellion of Algeria and Morocco was henceforth put under a common command. It should be noticed that, unlike the first war of the Rif, the second one took place under a situation of Franco-Spanish rivalry as the Spanish were supporting the Moroccan nationalists against the French since the deposition of the Sultan Ben Yussef.

Finally in October 1955, the council of the throne was formed of a prime minister - Haj Mohammed al-Mokri - and three members. Also Al-Glaoni, followed by Al-Kittani, changed their attitude and demanded the return of the Sultan, thus ending the traditionalists' opposition to Mohammed Ben Yussef. Consequently the way was open for the Sultan to come back to Morocco under the title of Mohammed V, given to him by the nationalists. The first negotiations between him and the French government ended by the common declaration of November 1955 at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, which foresaw further negotiations for "the accession of Morocco to the Status of an independent state united with France by permanent ties of interdependence".³⁸ In fact the Sultan and the nationalists concentrated on independence and interpreted the principale of "interdependence" as a consolidating element for independence and not a limitation on it,³⁹ while the French government considered the independence of Morocco as resulting from the conventions of interdependence with France. However, the further negotiations between the two sides finally ended in Paris by the common declaration of the independence of Morocco on 2 March 1956.⁴⁰

In Tunisia

1. The "congress of independence" of 1946

The demand for internal autonomy, made by the Tunisian nationalist movement by the end of 1944, distinguished the political scene in Tunisia in 1945 and above all, later became the basis for development towards independence. In February 1945, the "Committee of the Sixty" (representing the principal movements) confirmed this demand, becoming thus the "Manifesto of the Tunisian people".¹ The nationalists in Tunisia were convinced that they could obtain nothing from France through the normal means of friendly negotiations and they thus decided to appeal for foreign support which, in addition to internal pressure, would perhaps compel the French government to consider the Tunisian claims seriously.

The moment was favourable since the establishment in Cairo of the Arab League in March 1945. Bourguiba decided thus to go to Cairo to make contacts with the general secretary of the League, Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam. From there, he travelled extensively in order to make the legitimacy of the Tunisian case known to different governments and peoples.² Salah Ben Youssef took over the leadership of the Neo-Destour after the departure of Bourguiba, and the nationalist action began by a strike in Sfax in June 1946 under the direction of the General Union of Tunisian workers (UGTT).

A Tunisian National Front was formed in August and it grouped together all the opposition forces including communists. Hence the "Congress of Independence" of 23 August 1946 was held and was attended by all the major political movements. Only Salah Ferhat - leader of the Old Destour - and Salah ben Youssef had time to make their speeches against France before the intervention of the police. Salah ben Youssef had time to shout: "Are you unanimous in proclaiming the total independence of Tunisia?". The persons present all replied: "Independence! Independence!".³

It should be remarked that this national congress of 1946 issued a charter of great political importance. This charter reflected the development of nationalist consciousness in Tunisia; only about two years after the demand for international autonomy, the nationalist claimed independence. The charter contained serious accusations against France. Briefly, it declared that before 1881, Tunisia had been an independent State attached to the Ottoman empire by ties which were more religious than political; France had imposed a protectorate regime on Tunisia and overstepped the role defined by the treaty of Bardo; France had violated the treaties of the protectorate by deporting Bey Moncef and followed a misguided policy of naturalization, administration and economy which had resulted in a state of poverty as well as the absence of civil liberties among the Tunisians; France did not play its role as protector when Tunisia fell into the hands of the Axis powers, despite the support of the Tunisians for France during the war; the protectorate regime was only temporary according to the text of the treaty; colonization was condemned by the United Nations and even France admitted, with the other powers, the temporary character of any colonial regime. Because of all this, the charter came to the conclusion that the protectorate regime, which was political and economic, was not at all in conformity with the sovereignty and the vital interests of the Tunisian people and that this was an imperialist regime which had proved before the world its failure after an experience of sixty-five years. Thus the charter affirmed the absolute determination of the Tunisian people to obtain its full independence before joining as a sovereign State, the Arab League and the United Nations and participating in the Conference of Conciliation.⁴

The national congress of 1946 gave rise in consequence to popular agitation and the arrest of forty nationalists leading to further demonstration⁵ as well as protests coming particularly from the Arab world. To calm down the situation and avoid a general revolt, the resident-general freed the prisoners and announced new reforms in September, but the nationalists rejected these reforms as well as the project of the French Union. The Neo-Destour, which was leading the nationalists, declared in May 1947 two strikes, one on the sixty-sixth anniversary of the French protectorate in Tunisia and the other in protest against the deposition of the Bey Moncef. Also the nationalists refused the reforms introduced by the new resident Mons in July as they gave veto powers to the French in the new cabinet.¹⁶

The organized in Sfax a strike which, after the intervention of the police, left 29 dead and 57 wounded demonstrators. After this repression, the nationalists lost in September 1948 the Bey Moncef who died in exile as the French government refused to liberate him despite his sickness.

2. Bourguiba and the French reforms of 1951

In Cairo, Bourguiba participated in the Committee of Liberation of the Arab Maghrib as its secretary-general and wrote a letter to Ferhat Abbas calling for the formation of a North-African union,⁷ while he always considered continuing the dialogue with France. In November 1946, he gave the French ambassador in Cairo a note entitled "France in face of the Tunisian problem" in which he stated: "What Tunisia claims is the status of a sovereign State, attached to France by a treaty of alliance freely negotiated in order to guarantee to the latter its strategic, economic and cultural interests. An elected constituent assembly will give the country a modern democratic constitution...".⁸ Hence Bourguiba opted for the method of stages to realize the goal of the independence of Tunisia from France.⁹ He returned with these ideas to Tunisia in September 1949.

Bourguiba began his return by visiting the Bey Lamine, the sovereign of the country, and made a tour throughout Tunisia before he left to France, in April 1950, in order to explain his position to the French government and public opinion. He expressed this position in a press conference during which he stated the Tunisian claims in seven points which he had already made to the France-Press Agency: establishment of an executive as a depository of Tunisian sovereignty, constitution of a homogeneous government whose meetings would be presided over by the sovereign, abdication of the general secretariate, civil controllers and the French "gendarmierie", institution of elected municipalities with representation of French interests where French minorities existed, creation of a national assembly elected by universal suffrage which would formulate a democratic constitution determining relations between Tunisia and France.¹⁰ Bourguiba held that these structural reforms would guarantee the independence of Tunisia, but would also consolidate and strengthen the spirit of Franco-Tunisian cooperation which was a geographical reality.¹¹

The French government reacted by the appointment of a new resident - Périllier and on that occasion, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs - Robert Schuman - made on 10 June 1950 an important statement which was the origin of all the misunderstandings that followed. He declared: "M. Périllier, in his new post, will have the mission of leading Tunisia towards the full blooming of its wealth and to take it towards independence which is the final goal for all the territories within the French Union. It is important however to accept the necessary delay and if this undertaking succeeds, France, in the course of its long history, would have accomplished once more its civilizing mission".¹²

This declaration provoked different reactions. Bourguiba soon took advantage of this declaration by insisting on the word "independence" and consequently advocated the opening of negotiations between the Bey and the real representatives of the Tunisian people on one side, and the French government on the other side, in order to determine the contents and the stages to be followed.¹³ But it soon became clear that for the French government, it was

not at all a question of opening negotiations between governments as only some reforms were to be expected in the direction of internal autonomy and not independence. Hence a Tunisian ministry was formed with Mohammed Shenik (a former prime minister of the Bey Moncef) as prime minister while Salah ben Youssef, general secretary of the Neo-Destour, represented his party as minister of Justice. This cabinet had as mission to "negotiate in the name of His Highness the Bey the institutional modifications which, by successive stages, should lead Tunisia towards internal autonomy".¹⁴ Shenik declared that this internal autonomy would gradually be expanded in order to finally achieve the total sovereignty of Tunisia.¹⁵

As the French government was not ready to fulfil its promises, a workers' strike and some violent incidents took place.¹⁶ This led to negotiations and to the promulgation in February 1951 of six decrees concerning some reforms in the council of ministers, budget procedures and general administrative posts.¹⁷ But the nationalists were not satisfied by these reforms and the Bey Lamine supported their position. Nevertheless, the resident proposed a plan of municipal councils based on the principle of co-sovereignty which was again rejected by Bourguiba and the nationalists.¹⁸ Shenik made a memorandum demanding the establishment of Tunisian sovereignty, followed by the conclusion of agreements with France in the cultural, economic and strategic spheres and guaranteeing all the civil rights for the French in Tunisia.¹⁹

The French government insisted in its reply of December 1951 on the principle of co-sovereignty and no more on internal autonomy. Bourguiba, on his return from a long trip (Karachi, Calcutta, Jakarta, Bombay, Cairo, London, Stockholm, U.S.A., Rome and Istanbul) declared: "A page of the Tunisian history is turned, The reply of M. Schuman opens an era of repression and resistance with its inevitable train of tears, mourning and animosity". Thus the rupture between the two sides became a fact by the end of 1951 and so the second Franco-Tunisian experience ended in failure. The nationalists, then decided to appeal to the United Nations by sending a petition to the Security Council.²⁰ The Neo-Destour held a secret congress in which it confirmed the position of the nationalists for the independence of Tunisia and the conclusion of a treaty with France on the basis of equality.²¹

3. The repression of 1952 and the nationalist reactions

The appointment in January 1952 of the new resident de Hantecloque marked a era of repression. Because two Tunisian ministers (Ben Youssef and Badva) left to France the same day of his arrival at Tunis, he insisted that the Bey should dismiss Shenik's ministry. He then forbade the congress of the Neo-Destour and arrested Bourguiba, Mongi Slim and the principal leaders of the party.²² After the secret congress, Hadi Shaker, who presided over it, was also arrested with other members of the party whose weekly paper was seized,

This policy of de Hantecloque resulted in popular and bloody demonstrations that immediately began after 18 January. This agitation reached the South and extended all over Tunisia, notably in Tunis, Sousse, Hammamat and Mokrine.²³ The repression was very severe, particularly in Cape Bon, where the resident applied martial law and authorized a military operation during the last days of January.²⁴ The number of victims was greater and the

measures of repression were harsher than in 1938. Moreover, the agitation and the repression continued for a long period as the situation did not improve during the months of February and March. Moreover the Bey rejected the note of the French government of January 1952 and supported the position of the nationalists.²⁵

Consequently the Security Council accepted the Tunisian petition presented by fifteen African and Asian States. To make this recourse unnecessary, Bourguiba demanded from France to fix a reasonable date for the application of the principle of internal autonomy as did the British in the Sudan.²⁶ This became in fact the policy of Edgar Faure, the new president of the council in France. But his government was soon replaced by Pinay, who appeared less inclined to compromise. He gave all Latitude to de Hautecloque in order to "re-establish the favourable conditions for the restarting of dialogue".²⁷ This was the occasion for the resident to act to replace Shenik's ministry. As the Bey refused his demand, he decided to take action by force as he arrested Shenik and three ministers while the other two ministers in Paris left secretly to Egypt. A curfew was instituted in towns, martial law was revived and censorship was re-established while police powers were given to General Garbay.²⁸

Nationalist reactions against this new situation were swift. There was a general strike in Tunisia on 26 March and the day ended with several demonstration and the arrest of a large number of people. Moreover, a meeting was held on the same day under the presidency of Tahir ben 'Amar in the Chamber of commerce, where the representatives of different political, professional, economic and cultural associations were gathered. This meeting decided on the non-recognition of the status quo and the struggle in all demands and by all means, for the return of the legal ministry.²⁹ However, the resident forced the Bey to appoint Salah ed-Din Bacconshe as prime minister.³⁰ Strikes and demonstrations continued while Bacconshe had many difficulties to from his ministry which was not welcomed by the Tunisians.

The French government made a plan of reforms which was far from Tunisian claims and the Bey authorized his elder son, Prince Shadly, to make a declaration to the press criticizing strongly this plan of reforms as it recognized the principle of co-sovereignty.³¹ The Bey decided to consult the Tunisian people whose representatives in the different fields had already declared in a manifesto their total rejection of the plan of reforms.³² In ignoring the Bacconshe ministry, he convoked in August forty-two personalities including high-ranking religious officials, the two heads of the two orthodox schools, some representatives of the moderate bourgeoisie, Ferhat Hached - general secretary of the UGTT -, some journalists and a representative of each of the Old Destour, Neo-Destour and the Jewish communisty.

The commission of the "forty" as was called, strongly criticized the plan of reforms and the Bey, thus sent his negative reply to French government explaining that these reforms did not satisfy even the minimum claims of the Tunisian people and also of himself and that they did not represent a stage in the progress towards the internal autonomy promised officially to Tunisia by France.³³ Tunisian opinion almost unanimously approved the attitude of the Bey and his advisors and showed itself ready to support the struggle, more or less openly, as the only means of expression.

The United Nations discussed in October the Tunisian problem and expressed the hope that the two sides would continue negotiations without delay in view of the accession of the Tunisians to the capacity of administering their own affairs.³⁴ For the Tunisians, this was an incontestable moral victory. The methods of force and repression used by de Hautecloque were implicitly condemned.

4. Assassination of Ferhat Hached and insurrection of the "Fellagha"

In Tunis, however, the decision of the United Nations did not have the repercussion expected by the nationalists. People there were still under the shock provoked by the assassination of Ferhat Hached, murdered on 5 December 1952, and the repression that followed.³⁵ For fear of terrorist action, de Hautecloque hurried to arrest Ferhat Hached's assistant as well as a number of leaders of the Neo-Destour. He opposed the public funeral of Ferhat Hached and even refused to give his body to his family. Moreover he tried to obtain the approval of the Bey for the decrees of the reforms by giving him an ultimatum, but the Bey refused to seal the reform decrees until the French government forced him to do so.³⁶

Despite the nationalists' decision to abstain, the resident imposed the municipal elections in 1953. The result was massive abstention in the big towns while a wave of terrorism passed through the country. The "collaborators" with the French were executed one after another and some public buildings were subject to bomb attacks. All the repressive measures of the residence proved to be ineffective as the terrorists remained undiscovered.³⁷ The failure of the policy of de Hautecloque was thus evident.

The new government in France drew up a plan of reforms that was agreed upon by the Tunisian nationalists and many French deputies. This plan would later serve as the basis for the establishment of the Franco-Tunisian conventions. But for the moment, the situation in Tunisia did not improve. During the first days of the nomination of the new resident - Voizard -, the murder in September 1953 of Hadi Shaker, an important leader of the Neo-Destour and a tradesman, took place in circumstances similar to those of the assassination of Ferhat Hached. Voizard applied some liberal measures and made many contacts in the country except with the members of the Neo-Destour as he considered them as an insignificant group and a handful of agitators with no popular support. It is said that this was the reason for his failure.³⁸

Voizard's first initiative was the formation of a Tunisian government in March 1954. He chose Mohammed Salah Mzali as prime minister. The Neo-Destour refused to participate in Mzali's ministry while the resident declared seven decrees and a residential decision.³⁹ Again the nationalists rejected the new reforms as they saw in them a new affirmation of the principle of co-sovereignty. Hence the failure of Voizard was evident and it had already begun when he refused dialogue with the members of the Neo-Destour. The result was that the nationalists, convinced that an agreement was no longer possible through peaceful means, prepared themselves for a trial of force.

Consequently the insurrection of the "Fellagha", a movement whose origins went back to the crisis of Shenik's ministry in 1952, began to spread after the last reforms of 4 March 1954.⁴⁰ It also took on a political character

as it had been strengthened by nationalist propaganda, particularly that of the Neo-Destour. The "Fellagha" who called themselves "the Liberation army" constituted the major element of insecurity originally in rural areas but which eventually spread throughout the territory of Tunisia. To this was added urban terrorism and counter-terrorism which was openly organized. The situation in Tunisia became thus very dangerous as people established themselves in the guerrilla struggle, if not in the war,⁴¹ and this coincided with the French defeat in Dien-Bien-Phu in Indochina. Hence some French liberals in Tunisia asked the French government to engage dialogue with the Tunisian nationalists.⁴²

5. From internal autonomy to independence

This dramatic situation in Tunisia made necessary a change of policy on the part of the French government as Voizard had completely failed. This change came with the new government of Mendes-France who declared his intention to fulfil the promises already given to Tunisia by France and to re-start the dialogue between the two sides. Consequently Mzali submitted his resignation to the Bey and refused to act on current affairs before his successor took his place.

In July 1954, Mendes-France charged Savary to negotiate with Bourguiba the broad lines of an unofficial agreement. Meanwhile in Geneva, he engaged directly a dialogue with the Neo-Destour through Masmondi as an intermediary. Then he gained the approval of the council of ministers for the principle of a regime of internal autonomy for Tunisia and decided to go there while also appointing Boyer de Latour as resident-general. In the palace of Carthage, Mendes-France made a decisive speech in which he declared that the internal autonomy of the Tunisian State was recognized and that they intended to affirm it in principle and in action. He added that the Bey could form a cabinet responsible for negotiating with the French government the methods of application of internal autonomy.⁴³

Bourguiba considered the declaration of Carthage as the decisive stage on the way leading to the re-establishment of the total sovereignty of Tunisia. He added that independence would remain the ideal of the Tunisian people, but the course towards it would no longer have the character of a struggle between the Tunisian people and France. It would be carried out by some adjustments and arrangements between the two governments - French and Tunisian - in a spirit of mutual confidence and friendship.⁴⁴

In August 1954, a new Tunisian cabinet, presided over by an independent notable, Tahar ben 'Ammar, was formed and it consisted of ten Tunisian ministers of whom four were members of the Neo-Destour. Mongi Slim, Masmondi and Jellouli (independent) were made responsible for negotiations with France. These negotiations were officially opened at Carthage on 4 September and were continued in Paris. The French government wanted to end the problem of the "Fellagha", but the Tunisian government and the nationalists refused to condemn the military action that the "Fellagha" claimed to undertake, and this had a positive result for the Tunisians in the negotiations with France. Lastly the problem came to an end in December 1954 when the two sides agreed on the conditions of al-aman (safeconduct) given to the "Fellagha" in return of their weapons.⁴⁵

The Franco-Tunisian negotiations were delayed because the French tended to consider internal autonomy as an end in itself while the Tunisians saw in it a stage towards independence. Nevertheless, negotiations were continued and they ended by the conclusion of six conventions on 3 June 1955: a general convention, one on the status of persons, one on administrative and technical cooperation, a judicial convention, a cultural convention and an economic and financial convention.⁴⁶ Salah Ben Youssef who came back in September from Cairo where he had stayed for three years and adapted the cause of Arabism and total independence for all the Maghrib, rejected these conventions and found himself in clash with Bourguiba who became the president of the Neo-Destour Party.⁴⁷ The party's congress held in November at Sfax with the participation of the UGTT supported Bourguiba against Ben Joussef who then escaped outside Tunisia to avoid being arrested. As the congress showed the party's aspirations for democracy and socialism but also that empiricism which characterized the nationalist movement, it is said that the technicians of the Neo-Destour like that of the G.U.T.W. went willingly to seek lessons from Scandinavian democracies.⁴⁸

New negotiations were then undertaken between the French High commissioner and the Tunisian government to clarify many points of the conventions. In fact the situation in Morocco after the declaration of 6 November 1955, accelerated the evolution of Tunisia towards independence.⁴⁹ In February 1956, Bourguiba went to Paris in order to claim equality of treatment for Tunisia. Hence the final negotiations were opened on 29 February and they ended on 20 March 1956 with the signature of a Franco-Tunisian protocol in which the independence of Tunisia was solemnly recognized.⁵⁰

In Algeria

1. Uprising of Setif and the repression of 1945

At the beginning of 1945, the Algerian nationalists carried out intensive propaganda against registration in the French electoral lists in order to prove to France and to the world that Algeria no longer wanted integration. In February, the three concerned parties - the Elected, the 'Oulama and the PPA - agreed to constitute a national front with a central committee of six members and departmental committees of four members while Ferhat Abbas became the president of the provisional committee of Muslim Algeria. The congress of the AML held in Algiers in March, was evidently dominated by the PPA: it demanded the "immediate and unconditional" release of Messali, the "incontestable leader of the Algerian people", and also passed its motion for "an Algerian parliament and an Algerian government" without any ties with France.¹

The serious incidents of 8 May have been interpreted in different ways by some French and North African writers. While the former spoke of riots led by Algerian Muslims against the French in Setif and Guelma,² the latter refer, on the contrary, to a "colonial plot" against the new nationalist stance and to the massacre of innocent Muslim demonstrators who were celebrating the victory of the Allies in their own nationalist way by carrying flags.³

In any case, the incidents began by demonstrations organized by the General Confederation of Workers (CGT), in agreement with the governor-general, in order to celebrate the Labour Day in the major centres of Algeria. But in many places, the PPA exploited this occasion in order to manifest their demand for the release of Messali. The police intervened causing many casualties. The situation became calm all over Algeria except in the Constantinois where troubles broke out first in Setif and from there the insurrection extended to the mountainous areas between Bourgie and Jijalli. The situation was particularly serious in Guelma where the town was put under martial law.⁴ The French resorted to severe repression, and the consequences were very tragic.

The repression took three distinct forms: acts of war, summary executions and judicial repression. The first form was certainly the most murderous: not only the ground forces strove without mercy, but also the air-force bombed and used machine-gun fire while naval units bombarded the coastal regions. This inevitably affected a large number of innocent people and caused unnecessary damage. The exact number of summary executions was not known but was very considerable while about 2000 sentences were pronounced by military tribunals.⁵

It has been remarked that nothing of a similar kind had taken place before in Algeria since the insurrection of Al-Mokrani in 1871. The consequence in human losses was heavy: 97 killed and more than 100 wounded on the French side and a number of victims practically impossible to determine on the side of Muslims. The official estimates gave the number of about 1500 Algeriens killed while the nationalists advanced the number of 5000.⁶ It is important to note that the basic reason for the uprising of 1945, which also underlies the rebellion of 1954, lies in the inequalities of all sorts which were increasing between the Jewish and Christian communities (in minority) on one hand and the Muslim community (in majority) on the other hand.⁷ The harshness of the repression that followed can be explained by the sentiments of horror and vengeance but also by the fear of the French from a general uprising in Algeria as a result of the constant agitation by the PPA, the 'Oulama, Ferhat Abbas and the PCA.⁸ Messali was then exiled to middle Congo while Ferhat Abbas was put under house-arrest.

Nevertheless, despite the nationalist activities, one cannot affirm that they were responsible for the uprising of the Constantinois as the nationalists did not prepare for that uprising and did not favour the use of violence. Moreover, the "rioters" who used violence against the French, after the intervention of the police on 8 May, represented a small part of the Muslim population and their action was not approved by the political leaders, the notables and the mass of the Muslim population.⁹ In any case, the merciless repression, which cannot be justified in any way, had serious consequences for the future of Algeria as it played a determinant role in the initiation of the Algerian insurrection of November 1954.¹⁰

2. Experience of the constituent and legislative assemblies

The French government decided, after the incidents of 1945, to introduce administrative and political reforms in Algeria. In the political reform, the ordinance of 17 August 1945 gave Muslims in the second electorate the right to send a number of representatives to the parliament equal to that of the French in the first electorate.¹¹ Three political formations competed for the suffrage of Muslims in October elections for the first constituent assembly - the Communist Party, the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Federation of the Elected of Benjelloul. Despite the calls for abstention by the PPA and the AML, 54,48% of the registered Muslim electors participated in the vote. Of the thirteen seats, the Communists obtained two, the Socialists four and the Elected seven.¹²

In May 1946, Ferhat Abbas, who profited from an amnesty law voted earlier by the assembly, exposed his position in a weekly paper - Le Courrier Algèrien - under the title: "Call to French and Muslim Algerian Youth". In fact his programme remained the same as that of the Manifesto.¹³ He also reorganized his movement under the name of the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA). This new party, created in May 1946, was helped by its press organ - La République Algèrienne - to prepare itself actively for the elections of the second constituent assembly in June 1946. This time the main parties were the UDMA, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. The UDMA obtained alone 71,07% of the declared vote, eleven seats out of thirteen while the other two seats went to the Socialists. The UDMA appeared to be a "reformist and non-revolutionary party".¹⁴ Ferhat Abbas prepared a project for a statute of Algeria in the spirit of the Manifesto and his "call to the Youth", but this project did not have any success in the assembly.

Following the French constitution of 1946, new elections were to be held for the establishment of the first legislative assembly. This time the electoral map was modified by the release of Messali al-Haj one month before the elections. As the PPA was still officially banned, the Messalist candidates took the name of Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD) whose programme advocated the convocation of a sovereign constituent assembly and the evacuation of French troops from Algeria. Messali refused the proposal of the Communists addressed to Muslim parties for the constitution of an Algerian national front.¹⁵ Ferhat Abbas stated that his party abstained from November 1946 elections "in order to allow Messali al-Haj to confront French public opinion and its parliament" and because Messali "asked us to withdraw from the competition in order not to divide the nationalist forces. He affirmed that he was in a position to obtain independence for Algeria".¹⁶ Nevertheless, the electoral participation was less than 39%, and of the fifteen seats, the moderates obtained eight, the MTLD five and the communists two.¹⁷ One should add here that the candidature of Messali was rejected and two of his party's lists were not accepted for coming too late.¹⁸

3. The Statute of Algeria and the reactions

Following the French government's initial project for a statute of Algeria proclaimed in May 1947, the different political parties presented six other projects.¹⁹ The government project adopted a policy of progressive assimilation in which Algeria was considered as a territorial entity that was to be given its own statute and made an integral part of France within its overseas "departements".²⁰ Some moderate Muslim deputies proposed the formation of an Algerian constituent assembly in order to promulgate a constitution for Algeria within a maximum period of one year. Moreover, the ideology of the Manifesto of Ferhat Abbas completely replaced at this stage that of the Federation of the Elected which had prevailed before the war. In fact none of the projects explicitly aimed at independence for Algeria as even the Muslim projects foresaw for Algeria a status of an associated state in relation to France but with looser ties than those proposed in the Socialist and Communist projects.²¹ However, all these projects were put aside by the national assembly in favour of a government project known as the "statute of Algeria" which was passed in September 1947.

The statute defined Algeria as a group of "departements" given civil personality, financial autonomy and a particular organization fixed by the articles of the statute. In fact the most important part of this statute was the establishment of an Algerian assembly. Moreover the statute maintained a double character: on the one hand, it kept Algeria within the French republic and on the other hand, it stressed the Algerian personality. This was a compromise giving guarantees simultaneously to the Muslims, to the French of Algeria and to an important section of the metropolitan opinion which opposed the separation of Algeria from France. This was also considered as a transitional regime which would allow the different communities (shocked by the war and the incidents of 1945) to think together and perhaps come to a new understanding acceptable to the greatest number.²²

Nevertheless, the statute aroused general discontent even from the Europeans who rejected the progressive integration of the Muslim community.²³ The Muslims criticized the statute because it did not realize any of their desires as it did not include any means of attaining autonomy even within the French Union, Ferhat Abbas stated that the parliamentary members of the UDMA had resigned in order to express their protest against the passing of the statute. He added that the statute had been prepared only by the French and was the result of a compromise between the metropole and the French of Algeria.²⁴

For the application of the statute, the French government appointed a new governor-general - Naeglen - who was hostile to any dissidence. Elections for the Algerian assembly were postponed from January to April 1948. The only means by which the governor-general and the administration could use to block the entry of the nationalists into the assembly was electoral fraud which was manifest in three different stages: the choice of candidates (i.e. official candidatures), the voting process (e.g. through the arrest of candidates, suppression of press organs, prohibition of meetings, control of voting centres, filling of ballot boxes in advance) and the announcement of the results.²⁵ Consequently the following results of 1948

elections were announced by the administration: of sixty seats, forty-one went to the candidates of the administration, nine went to the MTLD, eight to the UDMA and two to independent socialists.²⁶

Despite protests from among certain non-Muslims members of the parliament, electoral fraud continued. Following the elections of February 1951 for the partial renewal of the Algerian assembly, only seven or eight of the sixty elected members represented the opposition to the regime. The elections of June 1951 to the French national assembly did not give any nationalist representation in parliament. Also in the elections of the Algerian assembly in February 1954, the same administrative procedures based on gerrymandering and fraud were used,²⁷ and this continued until the dissolution of the Algerian assembly in April 1956.

Consequently France was discredited in the eyes of Muslims. Ahmed Boumenjel declared: "We have arrived at the point where we have the right to doubt the French intelligence which did not stop to affirm the necessary promotion of the colonized man to a free man while accepting, without effective reaction, that the time of contempt (against Algerian Muslims) continues. It is this contempt that the whole issue is about...".²⁸ He also stated elsewhere: "One day, one will end up with a Muslim Algeria devoted to the oriental camp... A choice dictated by despair cannot be, inevitably, anything else but a choice against France".²⁹ For Ferhat Abbas: "Neither the Algerian people nor the nationalist parties were able to tolerate the policy of contempt. The dividing of the ways has come. By this practise, France has become separated from the Algerian people".³⁰ Hence, "there was no other solution except guns", declared Ferhat Abbas in 1953, "as the use of force began in Tunisia and Morocco".³³ It was thus remarked that "in the eyes of the nationalist parties, the legal process had failed so only violence remained".³²

4. The Algerian revolution of November 1954

The nationalist reaction in the direction of violence began from within the PPA/MTLD. At first emerged the "Special Organization" which was the original nucleus of the insurrection of 1954.³³ It was created in 1947 by A it Ahmed who had distanced himself from Messali al-Haj with the goal of initiating direct action. The new violent character of the movement was confirmed when Ben Bella attacked the post of Oran in 1949. However the organization was discovered in 1950. Ben Bella was arrested but he escaped before the trial and arrived in Cairo in 1953.³⁴ Lastly, the authoritative character of Messali al-Haj led in 1954 to the division of the MTLD into two opposite parties - the "Messalists" on the one hand and the "centralists" (led by Lahonel and Ben Khedda) on the other hand.

This division had for consequence the declaration of the Algerian revolution on the 1st of November 1954.³⁵ In fact a "third force" was born within the MTLD in order to unify the nationalist action: this was the Revolutionary Council for Unity and Action (CRUA) formed since March 1954 by nine men known as the "historical leaders of the revolution" - Ben Bella, A it Ahmed, Bondiaf, Bitat, Khider, Belkacem, Ben M'hidi, Didonche and Ben Boulaid.³⁶ The CRUA decided in July to establish the National Liberation Army (ALN) and the National Liberation Front (FLN) while

Algeria was divided into six war zones. In October the date of the declaration of the revolution was fixed. Subsequently the CRUA began to receive the moral and military support from Egypt of Nasser while the general situation in the Maghrib was in its favour because of the violence and terrorism in Tunisia and Morocco together with the social, economic and political malaise in Algeria.³⁷

Together with seventy violent attacks, essentially undertaken in the Aures region, a political proclamation was delivered from Cairo on the same day by the FLN. This proclamation which was addressed "to the Algerian people, to the militants of the national cause", declared that the people were united behind the watchwords of independence and action. It also proposed the opening of negotiations with France on the basis of the recognition of Algerian sovereignty as one and indivisible in exchange for the respect of French interests in Algeria.³⁸ The ALN also made a proclamation calling Muslims to help their brothers struggling for freedom side by side with the Moroccan and Tunisians combatants.

The French administration reacted by dissolving the MTLD and arresting its militants from both factions. Most of the "centralists" joined the FLN while Messali al-Haj (still under house-arrest in France) decided to form a new party - the Algerian National Movement (MNA) - which declared its intention of struggling for the independence of Algeria and claimed to represent the Algerian people. In fact, though Messali contested the action undertaken by the FLN, he also found himself compelled to resort to armed struggle which was directed as much against the FLN as against the French. The other political organizations - the UDMA, the 'Oulama and the Communists showed sympathy for the final goal of the FLN.

After the Afro-Asian conference held in April 1955 in Bandung where the representatives of the FLN were invited as observers, the FLN decided to carry out a new violent offensive in Algeria scheduled for 20 August, date of the second anniversary of the deposition of the Sultan of Morocco.³⁹ This led Benjelloul to call together all the elected Muslims of Algeria and passed a motion condemning the French repression and the policy of integration. He also declared that "the great majority of the population now adheres to the Algerian national idea".⁴⁰ This new attitude of the Elected led by Benjelloul also coincided with that of the PCA which was consequently dissolved in September.

During 1956, the FLN intensified its military and political activities. It gained incontestable political success by obtaining the adhesion of Ferhat Abbas and his group, the 'Oulama and the clandestine PCA, thus ending the existence of these political organizations. Also Lamine Debbaghine, who left the MTLD and joined the FLN, became the first president of the executive, thus causing the collapse of the support for Messali al-Haj in Algeria.⁴¹ Moreover, the FLN formed two secret trade unions- the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and the General Union of Algerian Merchants (UGCA). It also organized an open strike of Muslim students and schoolboys and formed the General Union of Algerian Muslim students (UGEMA).⁴²

With this political success of the FLN, an important document of the ALN was circulated giving the real aims of revolutionary struggle.⁴³ This was also followed by another important document issued by the secret congress of the FLN held on 20 August 1956 in al-Soummam on the initiative of Krim Belgacem and Ramdane Abbane and in the absence of the leaders of "the exterior". The congress took unanimously important decisions concerning the organization of the revolution and its general policy. This included a statute for the ALN, a political structure of the FLN in the form of two new organs . the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) and the Committee of Co-ordination and Execution (CCE) -, some general principles (collective leadership, priority of the political decision over the military and of the combatants of the interior over those of the exterior or the external delegation) and lastly a political platform. This platform described the Algerian revolution as a "struggle for the recognition of an Algerian state in the form of a social and democratic republic...". It also referred to the possibility of negotiations with France only on the basis of the recognition of the total independence of Algeria. The text also considered the future formation of a North-African federation, the internationalization of the Algerian problem and the neutrality of the Algerian revolution in world politics.⁴⁴

The FLN received political and military support from its independent neighbours Morocco and Tunisia. In October 1956, king Mohammed V received at Rabat five leaders of the FLN - Ben Bella, A it Ahmed, Boudiaf, Khider and Mustafa Lacheraf - in order to prepare with them an important diplomatic meeting in Tunis for the study of a project of confederation for the three states of the Maghrib as well as the ties that this confederation would be able to maintain with France.⁴⁵ However, France organized the seizure of the plane carrying the five leaders who were consequently arrested and sent to France where they had to stay until the independence of Algeria in 1962.

Following the entry in Algiers of the "leopard men" of the French paratroops who were engaged in the "battle of Algiers" against the FLN for about nine months in 1957, the CCE moved its headquarters from the capital to Tunis where it was bound to resume the contact with the external delegation presided by Tawfig al-Madani in Cairo. In fact Tunisia served both as a base for military operations and political action. In addition to its paper La Résistance Algèrienne, the FLN also published a daily information bulletin directed particularly to the embassies. Moreover, the CNRA held a meeting in Cairo⁴⁶ where the Afro-Asian solidarity congress was also held in December 1957. The FLN was given the seat of the vice-president of the "council of solidarity" together with USSR which declared the support of the eastern camp to the FLN.⁴⁷ Also the congress of Tangier held in April 1958 proclaimed the total support of the "brother parties" (the Istiglal Party and the Neo-Destour) in Morocco and Tunisia, to the FLN while Rabat and Tunis committed themselves to demand the evacuation of the French military bases from the two former French protectorates.

The French consequently reacted in 1958 by the so-called loi-cadre for Algeria,⁴⁸ the bombing of Saghiet Sidi Yussef (in the Tunisian border), the violent European action of 13 May in Algiers and lastly the return of General de Gaulle to power in France. This last event was of great

importance for the evolution of the Algerian revolution towards independence as General de Gaulle, who established the Fifth Republic in France, followed a new policy towards Algeria.

5. The FLN and General de Gaulle

It should be remarked that, unlike his predecessors, General de Gaulle was not a prisoner of the French colons in Algeria.⁴⁹ He came in June 1958 to proclaim on the forum of Algiers where he began by the famous statement "I have understood you", that he took notice the rallying of the Europeans to the idea of one electorate, but he did not explicitly approve the slogan of "integration" and he made a call for "reconciliation". The FLN immediately reacted from Tunis by a definite refusal of the speech of General de Gaulle being considered as still in line with the colonialist policy of France.⁵⁰

In fact the policy of General de Gaulle towards Algeria was not quite clear at that stage: while he proposed for the African colonies the choice between joining the French community or separation (i.e. independence), he asked the Algerians to vote for the referendum of the French constitution of 1958. The FLN considered this as a provocation and reacted by the formation of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in Tunis on 19 September 1958 with Ferhat Abbas as president, Krim Belgacem as vice-president and commanding chief of the armed forces, and Ahmed Bella (in prison) as vice-president. The GPRA was soon recognized by all the Arab countries. At the same time, the FLN declared a general offensive especially directed against metropolitan economy.

Soon after the referendum, General de Gaulle talked in October in Constantine about a plan for the economic and social evolution of Algeria⁵¹ and then called in Paris for "the peace of the brave men" in order to end the hostilities. The GPRA reacted by rejecting the plan of Constantine and by considering de Gaulle's offer of peace as a simple invitation for capitulation. It also considered the deputies of Algeria elected in September for the national assembly as being "elected from the French army" and so it refused any negotiations with France.⁵² Hence de Gaulle was finally led to declare his last formula for Algeria on 16 September 1959.

General de Gaulle declared in that formula the recognition of the right of Algeria for self-determination. Algeria had to choose one of three solutions: independence (described by de Gaulle as secession), direct union with France (i.e. integration though de Gaulle continued not to use the word) and autonomy in association with France.⁵³ The GPRA reacted favourably this time and added that the "free choice" of the Algerian people should not be exercised under the pressure of the French army and that it could only end by independence. It also declared being "ready to start negotiations with the French government in order to discuss the political and military conditions of the cease-fire as well as conditions and guarantees of the application of self-determination".⁵⁴

From 16 December 1959 to 18 January 1960, the CNRA was held in Tripoli. It published a declaration which considered the French government responsible for the delay of the opening of negotiations and affirmed at the same time the will of the Algerian people to struggle as long as war was imposed on it and as long as its objectives were not reached, but also declared that the CNRA was ready for negotiations on the basis of self-determination. Ferhat Abbas also made similar declarations⁵⁵ while General de Gaulle began in March to talk about "Algerian Algeria".⁵⁶ The organ of the FLN - El-Moudjahid - insisted on the struggle for national independence and stated that self-determination would result from the outcome of fighting.⁵⁷ The GPRA decided to accept foreign volunteers from all countries.⁵⁸

6. From negotiations to independence

Following General de Gaulle's speech in which he repeated his ideas of "Algerian Algeria" addressed to Algerian nationalists, the GPRA sent to Paris in June a delegation headed by Ahmed Boumenjel. The meetings between the two sides took place in Melun but ended without success.⁵⁹ The FLN wanted to negotiate on the basis of "equal to equal" while France only wanted to negotiate a cease-fire.⁶⁰ The GPRA consequently demanded the organization of a referendum in Algeria under the control of the UN while it extended its diplomatic activities in the world.⁶¹ The UN which discussed the Algerian problem at the end of 1960, recommended the organization of a referendum in Algeria under the auspices of the UN.

The referendum on a law of self-determination for Algeria took place in January 1961 in an atmosphere of bloody incidents and demonstrations in many places. A total of 69.09% of "yes" was obtained from the expressed suffrages in Algeria. The GPRA and the French government agreed on negotiations but they were delayed by the "putsch of Algiers" attempted in April by some retired French generals.⁶² The first negotiations held in Evian during May and June proved to be difficult because of disagreement on three essential points: the status of European minority, the status of the Sahara and the establishment of a common truce.

The conversations were, nevertheless, resumed in July in the castle of Lugrin, few kilometers from Evian. But again they stopped because of nationalist demonstrations and the affair of Bizert as president Bourguiba demanded from France the evacuation of its military base from Bizert.⁶³ The CNRA met in Tripoli from 9 to 27 August. The GPRA was henceforth composed of Ben Khedda as president and minister of Finance, Krim Belgacem as vice-president and minister of Interior, Ben Bella and Boudiaf as vice-presidents. Another declaration showed that the CNRA was willing to emphasize its influence over the Algerian masses and opened some perspectives, though still vague, on the Algeria of tomorrow being described as a modern nation with a socialist economy and a renovated culture. Lastly, the door was left open for negotiations with France but still on the basis of equality.⁶⁴ Ben Khedda represented the GPRA in the first non-allied countries conference held in Belgrade in September, and succeeded to obtain de jure recognition for the GPRA from many states including Yugoslavia.⁶⁵

General de Gaulle recognized the right of the future Algerian state to extended its sovereignty on the whole of the Sahara and also advocated the creation of an Algerian "provisional power". The U.N invited France and the GPRA to continue the dialogue. However the road towards the final agreements of Evian and the cease-fire was marked by the violent outbreak of the murderous European Organization of the Secret Army (OAS) that caused the death of a large number of persons.⁶⁶ France and the GPRA resumed in February 1962 their secret conversations in the Rousses where they prepared two texts concerning a military agreement for a cease-fire and a political protocol on the association between France and Algeria.

Finally official negotiations between the two sides began in March and ended by the famous agreements of Evian. A cease-fire in Algeria was declared while Ben Bella and his companions were released. Briefly, the agreements of Evian made of Algeria a sovereign state internally and externally with privileged relations with France. A provisional executive was established by the French government as a transitional power till the referendum of self-determination on 1st July 1962 when the Algerian chose independence, thus ending 132 years of French colonization in Algeria and a war of seven and half years that costed more than a million Algerian martyrs.

CONCLUSION

The period after 1945 was decisive for the evolution of the three countries of the Maghrib towards independence. While in 1945 the Moroccans stood for independence (after the famous "declaration of independence" of 1944) and the Tunisians demanded internal autonomy but soon changed this demand to independence in 1946, the PPA of Messali al-Haj made the explicit demand for the independence of Algeria, and the uprising and repression of 1945 had later on their great impact on the violent insurrection of 1954.

It should be remarked that the leaderships of the nationalist movements in the three cases of the Maghrib were different from each other. While in Morocco there was a clear collusion between the Sultan and the Istiglal Party, the political situation in Tunisia was dominated by the Neo-Destour under the leadership of Bourguiba, and the Bey did not have the same effective and prominent role as that of the Sultan of Morocco. The Algerian case was marked by the existence of four political formations inherited from the period before 1945 - the PPA, the 'Oulama, the UDMA (which replaced the Elected) and the PCA - while two political leaders - Messali al-Haj and Ferhat Abbas - were competing before the coming of the Algerian revolution of 1954 which gave rise to a new type of leadership described as "collective leadership".

Another important general remark is that among the different nationalist activities, the nationalists of the Maghrib practised and benefited from the external diplomatic activities. This took place since the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. One can recall here the congress of Arab Maghrib held in Cairo in 1947 and the formation of the Liberation committee of the Maghrib in which Emir Abd al-Krim, 'Allal al-Fassi, Bourguiba and

other leaders pursued their nationalist activities. To this should be added the important role of the Afro-Asian group since the conference of Bandoung in 1955 and also the role of the UN.

It should also be noticed that the French government proposed in the three cases of the Maghrib certain reforms which were rejected by the nationalists. These reforms aimed at keeping Algeria as an integral part of France (statute of Algeria in 1947 and General de Gaulle's reform of 1958) while they wanted to introduce a regime of co-sovereignty in the cases of Tunisia (1951 and 1954 reforms) and Morocco (General Juin's reforms leading to the 1950-51 crisis). At the same time, the French administration used the policy of repression against nationalist activities as well as against the leaders of the nationalist movements. The repression of 1945 is the striking example for Algeria while the same policy of repression was also used in the cases of Tunisia (during the residence of de Hauteclouque in 1952) and Morocco (during the residence of General Juin and Gaillaume leading to the deposition and exile of the Sultan in 1953).

The French policies of reform and repression consequently led to the rise of terrorism and violence in the three countries of the Maghrib. While this happened in Morocco with the deposition of the Sultan and gave rise to the "second war of the Rif" carried out in liaison with the FLN in Algeria, its origin in Tunisia went back to the deposition of Shenik's ministry and gave rise to the "Fellagha" movement in 1954. In Algeria, the formation of the "Special Organization" in 1947 was considered as the starting point for the emergence of the FLN in 1954 as a new force which declared the revolution and succeeded within two years to establish itself as the leader of the Algerian nationalist movement.

It should be remarked finally that this violence which took place in the three countries of the Maghrib and reached its maximum point in 1954-1955 can be considered as the direct decisive stage in the evolution of the Maghrib towards independence. While in the negotiations that followed the Tunisia of Bourguiba accepted as a tactic the application of its original claim for internal autonomy by successive stages leading to independence, Morocco and Algeria insisted on full independence. Though the French government wanted to delay the independence of Morocco and Tunisia through the concepts of "Independence within the interdependence" for Morocco and "internal autonomy for Tunisia, the two former protectorates obtained their independence respectively on 2 and 20 March 1956. The colony of Algeria, which was considered as an integral part of France, had to experience the statute of Algeria of 1947 and the loi-cadre of 1958 before it was given by General de Gaulle, in 1959, the right of self-determination which ended, after a war of seven and half years, by the independence of Algeria in 1962.

Notes

In Morocco

1. S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 53.
2. Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., p. 352.
3. Parti de L'Istiglal, "La crise marocaine", in Documents 1944-46, op. cit., pp. 27-36.
4. Text in Documentation Française, op. cit., 22 July 1946, pp. 39-40. See also R. Rezette, op. cit., p. 159, and Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements..., op. cit., pp. 254-259.
5. S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 79. See also Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 402.
6. Ibid., pp. 84-85 and Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., p. 360.
7. Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., pp. 263-264. See Bulletin d'Information du Maroc, No 6, 15 April 1947, p. 18.
8. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 223-224.
9. 'Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements..., (Arabic edition), op. cit., pp. 375-380. See also Cahiers de l'Orient contemporain, IX-X, (1st and 2nd trim 1947), pp. 56-57.
10. Ibid., pp. 392-412.
11. Ibid., pp. 408-411. See the text also in Cahiers de l'Orient contemporain, XIII (1st trim, 1948), pp. 7-8 and 27-29.
12. Ibid., pp. 413-414. See also S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 94.
13. S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 96.
14. See R. Rezette, op. cit., pp. 180-182
15. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 226.
16. Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., pp. 404-405. See also S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 101, R. Rezette, op. cit., pp. 41-45, and 'Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements..., (Arabic edition), op. cit., pp. 425-435.
17. See 'Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements..., op. cit., pp. 437-441 and S. Bernard, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
18. S. Bernard, op. cit., p. 106 and Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., p. 373.

19. Bulletin d'Information du Maroc, No 9, 20 December 1950, p. 157 and Salah al-'Agad, *op. cit.*, p. 406.
20. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 229.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 230. See also Marchal Juin, Mémoire, vol. II, pp. 201-203.
22. S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
23. Text in R. Rezette, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192.
24. Bulletin d'Information du Maroc, No 6, 20 November 1951, p. 112.
25. CH.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, *op. cit.*, pp. 387-388.
26. See the Moroccan French papers La Vigie Marocaine and Le Petit Marocain, 8 December 1952.
'Allal al-Fassi mentioned (in his book- The Independence Movements..., *op. cit.*, p. 129) that more than 4000 Marocains were killed.
27. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 234. See also Rom Landou, Moroccan drama, San Francisco, 1956, pp. 348-352 and 394.
28. S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 and 159.
29. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Direction d'Afrique-Levant), Note du 4 Septembre 1953, Paris, 1953. See on the official version: S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-185, R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 235, and R. Montagne, Révolution au Maroc, Paris, 1953, pp. 177-260.
30. 'Allal al-Fassi, Cairo Call (in Arabic), Rabat, 1959, from page 3, and also The Independence Movements..., *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.
31. See S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-207, Robert Barrat, Justice pour le Maroc, Paris, 1953, pp. 198-199, and Pierre Conal, Le Maroc en Révolution, Paris, 1956, p. 70.
32. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, pp. 236-238.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
34. S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-217. On terrorism in Morocco, see volume III of Bernard's book, from page 259,
35. Georges Izard, "Le Secret d'Antsirabé", Etudes Méditerranéennes, No 8, 1958, p. 61. For the text of the letter of the Sultan to the advocate Izard. See also L'Année Politique 1955, Paris, 1956, pp. 663-665 and the French paper Le Monde, 14 September 1955. See also S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 255. The term "Antsirabé" refers to the name of the residence of the Sultan during his exile in Madagascar.

36. Gilbert Grandval, Ma mission au Maroc, Paris, 1956, p. 80. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution Politique..., op. cit., p. 244 and S. Bernard, op. cit., pp. 303-305.
37. See P. Boyer de Latour, Vérités sur l'Afrique du Nord, Paris, 1956, pp. 169-185. The author replaced Gilbert Grandval as resident-general in Morocco (31 August - 11 November 1955) with a triple mission: voluntary retreat of Ben Arafa, constitution of a council of the throne and formation of a Moroccan government from all the political tendencies of the Moroccan opinion. See also Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 416.
38. Text in Le Monde, 8 November 1955 and P. Boyer de Latour, op. cit., pp. 189-190.
39. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 247-248, Mohammed V, Le Maroc à l'heure de l'Indépendance (1955-1957), Rabat, no date, pp. 23 and 25, and Le Monde, 18 and 19 November 1955.
40. The text was first published in Le Monde, 4-5 March 1956 and Revue de Presse, No 4, April 1956.

In Tunisia

1. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 150. See André Raymond, La Tunisie, Paris, coll. "Que sais-je?", 1961.
2. Ibid., pp. 151-156
3. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 111.
4. Text in Habib Thamer, op. cit., pp. 119-121. See 'Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements...., op. cit., pp. 89-92 (Arabic edition).
5. Ibid., p. 107.
6. F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
7. H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, op. cit., pp. 189-200.
8. Ibid., pp. 200-205. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 115-116.
9. Ibid., p. 216.
10. Ibid., pp. 229-230.
11. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 165.
12. Ibid., pp. 167-168. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 118.
13. Ibid., p. 168.

14. J. Rous, Tunisie...Attention, Paris, 1952, p. 108, F. Garas, op. cit., p. 169, and R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 119.
15. A. Balhaonan, op. cit., pp. 142-143,
16. See F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 169-171 and *ibid.*, p. 148.
17. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 119-120. See the texts in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 1440 (26 February 1951).
18. H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France, op. cit., pp. 274-275.
19. Text in A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 156-159 and J. Rous, op. cit., pp. 114-118.
20. See F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 180-181. See the text in J. Rous, op. cit., pp. 123-126 and A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 169-172.
21. Text of the congress in A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 182-184.
22. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 126
23. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 200.
24. See on the repression J. Rous, op. cit., pp. 127-149, F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 202-206, A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 179-215, and Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., pp. 375-376.
25. For the details, see A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 229-290. See also F. Garas, op. cit., p. 202 and A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 216-217, on the reply of the Bey to the French note.
26. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 201.
27. R. Le Toumeaum Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 126.
28. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 208.
29. A. Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 303-305.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-311. See also F. Garas, op. cit., p. 212.
31. Text in *ibid.*, pp. 274-277.
32. Text in *ibid.*, pp. 367-369.
33. Text of the "report of the Forty" in J. Rous, op. cit., pp. 185-200 and *ibid.*, pp. 398-410. Text of the letter of the Bey in La Documentation Francaise, op. cit., No 1680 and *ibid.*, pp. 411-414.
34. See F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 214.219.

35. For R. Le Toumeau, the circumstances of this affair had never been clarified (Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 130), while A. Balhaonane accused the terrorist French group, called "the red hand", of the assassination of Ferhat Hached in collaboration with the residence (pp. 417-466).
36. F. Garas, op. cit., 219-220. See also A, Balhaonane, op. cit., pp. 371-372 and 442.
37. Ibid., pp. 221-222.
38. Ibid., p. 226.
39. Text in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 1855 (30 March 1954). See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 132-133.
40. The "Fellagha" is a term used by the French for the Tunisian nationalists who adopted violent action and it literally means "highway robbers". See on the "Fellagha", F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 229-234, and P. Boyer de Latour, op. cit., pp. 82-84 and 88-94.
41. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 235. See also Simone Gros, La Politique de Carthage, Paris, 1958, pp. 4-7.
42. Ibid., p. 236. See also S. Gros, op. cit., pp. 22-23 and Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., pp. 379-380.
43. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 134. Text in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 088 (3 August 1954). See also S. Gros, op. cit., pp. 25-28.
44. F. Garas, op. cit., p. 225. See Le Monde, 3 August 1954.
45. Text in S. Gros, op. cit., pp. 50-51 and Année politique, 1954, p. 279.
46. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 135-136. Texts in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 2034 (18 June 1955). See also R. Pinto, "Les conventions den 3 Juni 1955", in Annuaire Français de droit international, I, 1955, pp. 53-66, N. Ladhari, Les conventions Franco-Tunisiens du 3 Juni 1955, Tunis, 1955, and Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., pp. 383-386.
47. See *ibid.*, pp. 137-138 and F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 275-276. See also La Revue de Presse (on the Maghrib and the Muslim world), No 24 (1 st November 1955), pp. 20-23.
48. F. Garas, op. cit., pp. 277-279.
49. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 139 and S. Gros, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
50. Text in Revue de Presse, No 4, April 1956.

In Algeria

1. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 347-348. Text in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 333, p. 12.
2. See R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 118-123.
3. Abd Allah Sharit and Mohammed al-Mili, op. cit., p. 225, 'Allal al-Fassi, The Independence Movements..., op. cit., pp. 29-32, and Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., pp. 333-334.
4. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 126.
5. See *ibid.*, p. 138; R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit. pp. 350-351, and Ch.-A. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., p. 303.
6. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 350. One can note here that the FLN later gave the figure 45 000 in El-Moudjahid, 5 May 1958, while the organ of the 'Oulama, El-Bassair, raised the number to 80 000. See R. Aron, op. cit., p. 139 and Salah al-'Agad, op. cit., p. 334.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 352-353. See Th. Opperman, op. cit., pp. 41-60.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 351-352.
9. See R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 145-147.
10. C.H. Farrod, La Révolution Algérienne, Paris, 1959, pp. 75-76 and R. Aron, op. cit., p. 147.
11. Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., p.94.
12. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 356 following La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 333, p. 14.
13. Text in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 333. See Ferhat 'Abbas, La nuit coloniale, Paris, 1962, pp. 160-162. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 357 and R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 250-251.
14. Th. Opperman, op. cit., p. 81.
15. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 359.
16. Ferhat 'Abbas, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
17. See La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 678, pp. 13-15.
18. Ferhat Abbas, op. cit., p. 173. Abbas described the elected moderates and communists as "prefabricated".

19. Text in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 684, 6 August 1947.
See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 360-362.
20. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 264.
21. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 361. The author noted in p. 360 that the communist project proposed to make Algeria an "associated territory" and not an "associated State" as also confirmed by R. Aron, op. cit., p. 265 and Ch.-A. Ageron, op. cit., p. 96.
22. See *ibid.*, pp. 362-364. Text of the Statute of Algeria in La Documentation Française, op. cit., No 738, 20 October 1947.
23. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 275.
24. Ferhat Abbas, op. cit., pp. 178-179.
25. R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 277-280. See also Ch.H. Farrod, op. cit. p. 80 and Opperman, op. cit., p.97.
26. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 365-366.
27. See R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 281-284 and Ch.-A Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, op. cit., pp. 326-333.
28. J. Laconture, op. cit., p. 306. See also *ibid.*, p. 386 and Ferhat Abbas, op. cit., p. 185.
29. Ahmed Boumendjel, L'Algérie unanime, p. 525, quoted by R. Aron, op. cit., p. 386.
30. Ferhat Abbas, op. cit., p. 185.
31. Ch.-A Ageron, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
32. R. Aron, op. cit., p. 287.
33. Claude Paillat, Dossier Secret de L'Algérie, Paris, 1962, pp. 13-14.
See also *ibid.*, pp. 312-213.
34. R. Aron, op. cit., pp. 312-313.
35. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 377 and *ibid.*, p. 314.
36. See the detailed study of Yves Courrière, La Guerre d'Algérie - Les fils de la Toussaint temps des Léopards and L'heure des Colonels.
See also S. Bromberger, Les Rebelles Algériens, Paris, 1958 and M.K. Clark, Algeria in turmoil, London, 1959.
37. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 379-383.

38. C. Paillat, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53. See the text in André Mandouze, La Révolution Algérienne per les textes, Paris, 1961, pp. 157-161.
39. Ch.-R. Ageron, *op. cit.*, p. 101. See also *ibid.*, pp. 183-184 and R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 399.
40. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, pp. 400-401. See also K. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189 and J. Soustelle, Aimé et Souffrante Algérie, Paris, 1956, pp. 132-135 and 142-151.
41. Ch.-R. Ageron, *op. cit.*, p. 103. See also C. Paillat, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-255.
42. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 409. See also A. Mandouze, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-125 and 133-135.
43. See C. Paillat, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-227.
44. On this congress and its text see *ibid.*, pp. 257-264; S. Bromberger, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-118; R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, pp. 413-415; A. Mandouze, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 29, 31, 89 and 139-141; J. Gillespie, Algeria, Rebellion and Revolution, London, 1960, pp. 131-142 and 177-181; Mohammed Bedjaoui, La Révolution Algérienne et le Droit, Bruscelles, 1961, pp. 48-112; and Salah al-'Agad, Politics and Society in the Arab Maghrib (in Arabic), Cairo, 1971, pp. 16-18.
45. C. Paillat, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
46. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 421. It can be noted here that the number of members in the CNRA was raised from 34 to 54 while that of the C.C.E. was also raised from five to nine members considered as ministers without governmental labels.
47. C. Paillat, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-475.
48. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., pp. 424-425 and Ch.-R. Ageron, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105. See also for the text and application, Th. Opperman, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-190 and 299-303. Le Toumeau remarked that in the loi-cadre, France promised the "respect of the Algerian personality" while at the same time kept Algeria as "an integral part of France". For Ageron, it seemed that the aim of this obscure law which divided Algeria into five "autonomous territories" and "departements", was to kill the Algerian nationalism by the rise of ethnic and provincial particularism; thus "divide and rule" was the motto of its authors.
49. Ch.-R. Ageron, *op. cit.*, p. 106. See on the policy of General de Gaulle Pierre Beyssade, La Guerre d'Algérie: 1954-1962. Paris, 1968, p. 18; R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 344; C. Paillat, *op. cit.*, p. 279; Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France from colonialism to cooperation, New York, Praeger, 1963, pp. 60-160; Salah al-'Agad, Politics and Society in the Maghrib, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23. See also the memories of Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d'Espoir - Le Renouveau (1958-1962), Paris, 1970, pp. 89-138.

- On the first speech of General de Gaulle in Algiers, see M.K. Clark, op. cit., pp. 416-417 and Th Opperman, op. cit., pp. 201-202. See also R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 429-430.
50. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 430. See also Revue de Presse, No 26, June 1958.
 51. Ibid., pp. 431-432 and Ch.-A. Ageron, op. cit., p. 107.
 52. Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., p. 107.
 53. Ibid., p. 108 and R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 436-437.
 54. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., p. 437. See the texts in Revue de Presse, No 38, October 1959 and A. Mandouze, op. cit., pp. 143-146.
 55. See A. Mandouze, op. cit., pp. 151 and 155. See also ibid., p. 440 and Revue de Presse, No 42, February 1960.
 56. Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., p. 109 and P. Beyssade, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
 57. El-Moudjahid, No 61, 16 March 1960. See A. Mandouze, op. cit., p. 154.
 58. Text quoted by Maurice Flory, "Algérie algérienne et Droit international" in Annuaire Français de Droit International, VI, 1960, p. 981.
 59. See ibid., pp. 991-995.
 60. P. Beyssade, op. cit., pp. 197-198.
 61. Ibid., pp. 209-210. See also M. Flory's article, op. cit., pp. 984-988.
 62. See P. Beyssade, op. cit., pp. 213-222 and Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., p. III. See also Charles de Gaulle, op. cit., pp. 111-118 and Le Procès des Généraux Challe and Zeller - Texte intégral des débats, Paris, 1961.
 63. Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., p. III. See M. Flory, "Conversations algériennes: Evian et Lugin", in Revue de l'Action Populaire, September-October 1961, pp. 973-979.
 64. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., op. cit., pp. 447-448. See Le Monde, 29 August 1961.
 65. Ibid., p. 448.
 66. Ch.-R. Ageron, op. cit., p. 112. See P. Beyssade, op. cit., 229-253.
 67. See the texts in Maurice Allais, L'Algérie d'Evian, Paris, 1962, pp. 299-325. and Le Monde diplomatique, No 96, April 1962, pp. 4-5.
 68. See Ch.-A. Ageron, op. cit., p. 113 and P. Beyssade, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

III THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The nationalist movements in the Maghrib before independence represent a stage of nationalism which is related to the struggle against French colonization. The struggle for independence and national sovereignty is marked by certain stages, objectives, tactics and leaderships which manifest general as well as specific characteristics of the three nationalist movements in the Maghrib. Before attempting to discuss the comparative perspective along these guiding lines, two general remarks can be mentioned as a background.

1. General remarks

The first remark concerns the juridical status of the three countries of the Maghrib in relation to the distinction between the terms "colony" and "protectorate". In Algeria, where the Turks had not formed an Algerian local ruling dynasty, the French established a colony in which Algeria was considered as an integral part of France few years after the seizure of Algiers in 1830. As in Tunisia, the Hussainid Turkish dynasty gradually became a Tunisian ruling dynasty while in Morocco the Sharifian dynasty had already established itself as an empire, the French erected a protectorate system in Tunisia (through the treaty of Bardo in 1881 and the convention of the Marsa in 1883) and in Morocco (through the treaty of Fez in 1912). However it should be noted that the two protectorates were different in the origin not only because Morocco was not subjected to Turkish domination but also because the treaty of Fez was preceded by international treaties with the competing European powers and because of the juridical conception of the protectorate system which was advanced by Lyantey, the first French resident-general in Morocco.

Nevertheless, despite the distinction made between the colony and the protectorate (in which the latter was considered as a temporary regime) and despite the liberal conception of Lyantey who went until saying in 1920: "there is reason to foresee that in a time more or less long, North Africa evolving vividly by its autonomous life, will separate from the metropole",¹ the practice followed by the French administration in Tunisia and Morocco put side by side the protectorate system and the colony because of the French policy of direct control and intervention in the local political, administrative and even cultural life.² The inevitable reaction to this situation was the rise of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib countries.

The second remark concerns the importance of the first violent reaction against foreign European domination - both French and Spanish in the case of Morocco. This reaction took the form of a military resistance inspired by religious sentiments under the leadership of some local chiefs notably Emir Abd al-Kader in Algeria and Emir Abd al-Krim in the Moroccan Rif. It should be recalled that the local population of the Maghrib had always been, throughout its long history, in revolt against foreign dominations.

The resistance against the French and Spanish dominations in the name of Islam shows that only the Islamic civilization that came with the Arabs in the seventh century, succeeded to have a permanent influence on the local population of the Maghrib which gradually became of Arabo-Berber composition especially in Morocco and Algeria. Islam became the distinguishing characteristic of the local population of the Maghrib in relation to Europeans. In fact the political nationalist movements of the modern Maghrib gave later on an important place to this first religious resistance being considered by the nationalist as the starting point in the struggle for independence.

Thus to be objective, one cannot exclude or ignore this first resistance in the study of the nationalist movements as in fact these movements have also used, before independence, violent means of resistance against French colonization side by side with political and diplomatic actions. This last violent resistance which resulted from French repressive policies, was the inevitable and ultimate stage in the evolution towards independence. It is thus necessary to consider the first violent resistance in the Maghrib against European domination as an important preliminary stage in the rise of the three nationalist movements. This resistance which ended by failure in the military field as it faced a more advanced European technology, was subsequently transformed into a political movement at the beginning of this century. This political movement followed certain stages, objectives, tactics and leaderships in the three countries of the Maghrib.

2. Stages

The period before 1945 marks three stages in the political nationalist movements. The first stage, which illustrates the beginning of national consciousness among the educated class in the Maghrib, is characterized by the cultural aspect. The second stage, which is more important, is connected with the formation of political parties. The third stage, which took place during the second World War, is marked by the new roles of Bey Moncef, the Sultan and Ferhat Abbas.

The period after 1945 has been decisive in the evolution of the nationalist movements towards independence and it can also be divided into three stages. The first stage marks the intensification of the political and diplomatic nationalist activities in the struggle for independence. This stage was succeeded, because of the failure of French reforms and because of French repressive policies, by a more decisive stage during which the nationalist followed or patronized violent means and even military actions against the French. This second stage led consequently to the last ultimate stage of negotiations which ended by the independence of the three countries of the Maghrib. It is clear thus that one can talk generally about six stages in the nationalist movements of the Maghrib countries before independence. It should be noted, however, that in this general outlook on the stages of the nationalist movements, one should not ignore the particularities or the specific features of each one of these movements.

The first stage is mainly characterized by the existence of two opposite cultural trends - one traditionalist (based on Islamic reformism and

Arabism as advanced by the Salafiyya movement of Al-Afghani and Mohammed Abdu) and the other modernist (based on modern European culture as transmitted by France). These two trends were preceded in the case of Tunisia and Algeria by the Young Tunisian and Algerian movements which were influenced by the Young Turks through the former Turkish regencies in Tunisia and Algeria, while in Morocco these two trends, which were represented respectively by 'Allal al-Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej, appeared around 1926, they clearly manifested themselves at the beginnings of the 1930's with Al-Tha'albi and Bourguiba in Tunisia, Ben Badis and Ferhat Abbas in Algeria. It should be noted, however, that while this division did not prevent Moroccan nationalists to cooperate and even to merge in one group for the nationalist action, the differences between the two trends were sharp in the cases of Tunisia and Algeria where the famous dialogue Ben Badis - Ferhat Abbas on the existence of the Algerian nation is an outstanding example.

The second stage in the nationalist movements is marked by the formation of political parties in the 1930's. While in Tunisia, the Constitutional Liberal Party (or Destour Party) of the Young Tunisians of the 1920's was divided in 1934 into the Old Destour and the Neo-Destour (of Bourguiba), the CAM of the two Moroccan trends was also divided (after its dissolution by the French administration in 1937) into the National Party and the Popular Movement formed respectively by Al-Fassi and Al-Onezzani. In Algeria, the ENA of Messali al-Haj (also dissolved) was replaced inside Algeria in 1937 by the PPA. It should be noted here that in the Algerian case, the PPA was not the only political organization as there were also three other political formations which emerged before 1945 and continued to exist until the declaration of the Algerian revolution of 1954 - the Association of the 'Oulama, the Federation of the Elected Muslim Algerians and the PCA.

The third stage of the second World War is distinguished by the emergence of the Bey Moncef in Tunisia and the Sultan in Morocco as nationalist leaders who began to play an important role in the nationalist movements in these two countries. While consequently the Bey Moncef was exiled in 1943 and died in exile in 1948, the Sultan was deposed and exiled later on in 1953 but returned to Morocco as a nationalist leader and monarch (Mohammed V) in 1955. In Algeria, Ferhat Abbas tended to play a new role in which he changed his ideas of integration in favour of an Algerian republic federated to France which he expressed in the Manifesto of the Algerian People and the formation of the association of the AML. This association became the UDMA and replaced the Federation of the Elected which thus became a weak organization under the leadership of Benjelloul.

The fourth stage is connected with the intensive political and diplomatic nationalist activities. In fact the origins of the political activities go back to the nationalist opposition against the "Berber dahir" of 1930 in Morocco and to the nationalist activities of Bourguiba and Messali al-Haj leading to the French repression of 1937 in the three countries of the Maghrib. This resulted in 1944 in the "declaration of independence" in Morocco, the formation of a Tunisian Front demanding internal autonomy and the publication of the Manifesto of Ferhat Abbas in Algeria. However, the intensive action came after 1945 and was helped by the establishment

of the Arab League in Cairo which became the centre of the nationalist leaders of the Maghrib for the diplomatic contacts with other countries as well as the UN.

In this fourth stage of intensive action, the Moroccan case is characterized by the collusion of the Sultan and the Istiglal Party: while the Moroccan nationalists rejected the French elections and reforms, the Sultan delivered his famous speech of Tangier in 1947 (declaring the attachment of Morocco to Islam and the Arab League) and refused to sign the decrees of reforms. This led to the French-Moroccan crisis of 1950-1951 which resulted in the formation of the Moroccan National Front in 1951, the tragedy of Casablanca followed by the repression of 1952 and finally the deposition of the Sultan and his exile in 1953. The Tunisian case is marked by the movement from the demand of internal autonomy to the demand of independence in 1946 leading to popular agitation and the rejection of French reforms. After the death of Bey Moncef, Bourguiba gained more popularity as the leader of the Tunisian nationalist movement and he adopted the goal of independence through successive states in collaboration with France, but the declaration of Robert Schuman in 1950 about the independence of Tunisia, resulted in a confusion which led to the rupture between the two sides. The Tunisians rejected the French reforms based on the principle of co-sovereignty while the French reacted by the deposition of Shenick's national government in 1952 and by severe repression following the assassination of the syndical leader Ferhat Hached. As for Algeria, the situation was different as two major events led to the declaration of the Algerian revolution in 1954 - the bloody incidents of May 1954 in Setif and the Constantinois where the French repression was without precedent, and the statute of Algeria of 1947 whose application was based on electoral fraud. In fact after the incidents of 1945 and seven years of electoral fraud, all the legal ways for profound reforms were closed in front of the Algerian nationalists while the governor-general neglected his role as arbiter by supporting the position of the French colons in Algeria. Hence the Algerian assembly (established by the statute) played an insignificant role (until it was dissolved in 1956). All this led finally to the division of the Messalist party - PPA/MTLD - in 1954 for the sake of a new radical action.

The fifth stage in nationalist movements is marked by the rise of terrorism and violence leading to military operations against the French in the three countries of the Maghrib. This evolution came as a result of the failure of French reforms and because of French repression against the nationalists and their leaders. While in Morocco the occasion of this violence came with the deposition of the Sultan, the so-called "Fellagha" in Tunisia conducted their violent action after the deposition of Shenik government and the failure of French reforms in 1953. In Algeria the division of the PPA/MTLD resulted in 1954 in the creation of the CRUA as a third force which wanted to reunite the party and to conduct a direct violent action for the independence of Algeria. The three new violent movements considered themselves as liberation armies while a war was declared in the Moroccan and Algerian cases where the "second war of the Rif" entered into military cooperation with the Algerian revolutionary ALN. The Algerian case is in fact distinguished by a revolutionary war of seven and half years during which the FLN was able to absorb all other

political formations and to lead, consequently, the Algerian nationalist movement towards independence. In all the three cases, this stage of violence and war produced positive diplomatic results from the Afro-Asian countries, the socialist and the UN. It also made great pressure on France which had to make in 1954 the difficult decision of giving partial independence to Morocco and Tunisia in order to concentrate its military efforts on Algeria alone, but even in Algeria, the revolutionary war of the FLN forced France, after the accession of General de Gaulle to power in 1958, to seek a peaceful solution to the Algerian problem.

The last stage is thus characterized by the decisive evolution towards that peaceful solution which aimed first at making better the deteriorating relations between France and the three Maghrib countries. This final evolution is marked by the conduct of negotiations and the conclusion of agreements at different levels. In fact France tried at this final stage to delay the independence of the two protectorates by insisting on the principle of co-sovereignty while also declaring the formula of "internal autonomy" for Tunisia and "independence within the interdependence" for Morocco. Thus the first negotiations between the two sides resulted, in June 1955, in the signature for Tunisia of six conventions (accepted by Bourguiba as a stage towards independence, but rejected by Ben Youssef who insisted on the full independence of the three Maghrib countries) and the declaration of Aix-les-Bains which gave Morocco the basis for the future declaration of Celle-Saint-Cloud of November 1955. While the final negotiations led by Mohammed V in Morocco ended by the declaration of independence on 2 March 1956, the situation in Tunisia was influenced by that of Morocco as the declaration of Celle-Saint-Cloud speeded, in the final negotiations, the evolution of Tunisia from internal autonomy to independence only eighteen days after the independence of Morocco.³

In Algeria, the situation was different because the French considered Algeria as par' of France, but the French policy began to change with the coming to power of General de Gaulle. This policy passed from the recognition of self-determination in 1959 through the concept of "Algerian Algeria" in 1960, the policy of "disengagement" which was hoped to lead to cooperation, the idea of the creation of a "provisional power" in Algeria together with the recognition of the Sahara as an integral part of Algeria in 1961, and finally the recognition of the independence of Algeria after the agreements of Evian and the referendum of self-determination in July 1962. The PGRA (formed in 1958) led the negotiations with France in Melun, Lugrin, Rousses and finally Evian where the negotiations came to an end and assured the cease-fire in Algeria.

3. Objectives

If it has been possible to generalize on the stages of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib, the case is difficult with regard to their objectives. In fact these objectives had different courses during the successive stages of the three nationalist movements as each movement had its own specific characteristics in that respect. It is important to take into consideration these particular distinguishing features of these movements.

In Tunisia, the nationalist movement is marked since the time of the Young Tunisians by the constitutional aspect, i.e. the demand of a constitution (destour) which was a way of defending national sovereignty. This constitutional demand led to the formation of the Destour Party from which emerged the Neo-Destour under the leadership of Bourguiba in 1934. This Neo-Destour is still the ruling party in the Tunisia under the same leadership of Bourguiba and with the same press organ L'Action. Another important aspect in the Tunisian nationalist movement was the participation of the trade unionist movement in the nationalist activities together with the Neo-Destour Party even before 1945. The assassination of Ferhat Hached shows the importance of the this workers' movement whose support to Bourguiba against Ben Youssef in the Congress of Sfax in 1955 was decisive in the struggle for political leadership in Tunisia on the eve of independence. It is important to remark here that the Tunisian syndical movement, like that of Morocco, is still independent and important in the politics of the country in the post-independence period whereas the Algerian trade unions remain subordinated to the FLN which began to create them in 1956.

The united Tunisian nationalist movement advanced first the demand of internal autonomy claimed by the Tunisian National Front in 1944. Though after two years only, and following the "declaration of independence" in Morocco, the Tunisian nationalists moved from the demand of internal autonomy to the demand of independence, this last demand had a particular sense in the mind of the leader of the Neo-Destour. In fact, Bourguiba considered independence as the ideal ultimate goal and adopted the method of stages to attain that goal in collaboration with France. Hence Bourguiba accepted in 1954 the French offer of Carthage relating to the application of internal autonomy in Tunisia and approved the six conventions of June 1955. Again the situation in Tunisia was influenced by that of Morocco as the declaration of Celle-Saint-Cloud included the recognition of independence for Morocco, thus giving Tunisian nationalists the right to insist on independence.

The Moroccan case, different from the Tunisian case, is characterized by the existence of a large "Berber" population which is nearly completely absent from Tunisia. The French government tried in 1930 through the "Berber dahir", to exploit this situation in order to apply its policy of "divide and rule" and also to exert pressure and even to depose the Sultan through a so-called "Berber revolt" organized by the French administration in Morocco in 1951 and 1953. However, the popularity of the Sultan after his collusion with the Istiglal Party gave him the opportunity to overcome the obstacles that attempted to prevent him from being the leader of the Moroccan nationalist movement.

The united Moroccan nationalist movement composed of the two parties of Al-Fassi and Al-Onezzani advanced publicly the demand of independence in January 1944, thus giving rise to the Independence (Istiglal) Party. This was followed by the collusion between the Sultan and the Istiglal Party with independence as a common objective. In fact, the Moroccan nationalist movement remained until the end as consistent and faithful to this objective. This was illustrated by the common position of the Istiglal Party and the Sultan against the French reforms of co-sovereignty consid-

ered as being incompatible with Moroccan sovereignty. This firm and militant position resulted not only in the exile of 'Allal al-Fassi to Gobon but also to the deposition and exile of the Sultan himself to Madagascar. It should be noted here that while Bourguiba was also arrested and exiled like Al-Fassi, the Bey Lamine was not subjected to the same fate because he did not play the same nationalist role of the Sultan. One can also recall that the Sultan, who became after his exile the arbiter of the French policy in Morocco, declared that he had accepted the French concept of "interdependence" in the sense of being a consolidating factor and not a limitation to the independence of Morocco.

As for Algeria, the situation was different from that of Tunisia and Morocco as Algeria was colonized by France early in 1830 and was subjected to an intensive policy of assimilation. Hence the Young Algerians led by Emir Khalid, a grandson of Emir Abd al-Kader, only demanded equality with the French of Algeria during the first World War. This first movement was followed by the Federation of the Elected Muslim Algerians of Ferhat Abbas and Benjelloul who supported the integration of Algeria with France in the 1930's. However, three other different tendencies and political formations existed in Algeria from that time till 1954. The strongest of these tendencies was originally established in France among the workers of the Maghrib countries: this was the ENA which was led in 1926 by Messali al-Haj with independence as a declared objective. But given the specificity of the Algerian case, Messali al-Haj formed the PPA in Algeria in 1937 with the same objective of independence. The other important tendency was that of the Association of the 'Oulama led by Ben Badis who insisted on the Algerian Muslim and Arab identity as different from France. The third tendency was that of the PCA which was closely affiliated to the PCF. In fact, the goal of independence was only publicly declared by the PPA which became the MTLD in 1946. Ferhat Abbas changed his attitude by that time as he demanded an Algerian republic federated to France.

It is thus from the PPA/MTLD that the Algerian revolutionary movement emerged in 1954 and it insisted on independence as the only legitimate objective of the Algerian people. Hence the Algerian nationalist movement is marked consistently from 1954 by the demand for independence without closing, however, the door for negotiations on the basis of the recognition of the Algerian national sovereignty. Consequently the FLN rejected in 1958 the loi-cadre of General de Gaulle who was then led to admit the right of self-determination for the Algerians. It should also be noted that the FLN succeeded in 1956 to absorb all the other political formations except the Messalists as Messali al-Haj insisted on the creation of a new party - the MNA - which fought the FLN as much as France. It also succeeded to obtain the support of the Arab countries and that of the Afro-Asian conference of Bandoung, to form trade unions and to hold its first important congress of al-Soumman. The formation in 1958 of the GPRA which was also recognized by the socialist camp, was another important step in the direction of the achievement of the FLN's objective of independence.

The Algerian case, like that of Morocco, remained thus (from 1954) consistent in the demand of independence but it adopted a more militant revolutionary position because of the specific situation of Algeria with regard to France. In other words, while the violent resistance in Morocco and

Tunisia was consolidating the major political action of the nationalists in their struggle for independence, the military action of the ALN in Algeria represented the major revolutionary action which was supported by the political and diplomatic actions of the FLN. One should also add that the FLN rejected any form of incomplete independence as well as any independence by stages: it insisted on the real or complete independence as an immediate objective.⁴

4. Tactics

It can generally be remarked that after the preliminary stage of violent resistance based on Islamic conceptions, the nationalist movements in the Maghrib conducted their activities on the three political, diplomatic and military levels. However, the tactics used by these movements were not always similar. The methods used in the political action consisted of the mobilization of Muslim population, the influence on the French political parties and public opinion, and lastly the conduct of negotiations. The diplomatic action was employed to obtain the support of other countries as well as regional and international organizations. Finally the military action was carried out in order to exercise a strong pressure on the French authorities in order to make them accept negotiations.

After the formation of political parties in the 1930's, the political action was then marked in the three nationalist movements by the establishment of national political fronts for the mobilization of the people. There were the Tunisian and Moroccan national fronts of 1944, the UDMA of Ferhat Abbas of 1946, and more important the FLN of 1954 in Algeria. The political action was also undertaken through the use of propaganda with the help of the press organs (authorized and clandestine), foreign radios (notably those of Arab countries - Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad), and lastly the traditional Arab way of oral transmission. One should add that the three nationalist movements attempted, moreover, to coordinate their political activities for a more general popular support. This took place through the congress of the Arab Maghrib in Cairo in February 1947, the Committee for the Liberation of the Maghrib which published its manifesto in January 1948 in view of the struggle for independence agreed upon and signed by the representatives of all the major political parties of the Maghrib.

The political action concerning the French public opinion both in France and the Maghrib was made by direct contacts in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco. (e.g. the personal contacts of Bourguiba and 'Allal al-Fassi) and through indirect or secret contacts in the case of Algeria as the French public opinion generally supported the total integration of Algeria with France. It has been remarked that the nationalists have succeeded to obtain some sympathies from the leaders of most of the political parties in France and that this was reflected in the formation of different Franco-Maghribian groups such as "Committee France-Maghrib" (created after the riots of Casablanca in 1952), "Christian Committee of Entente France-Islam", and "French Conscience" which was created in opposition to "France Presence".⁵

With regard to the tactics used by the nationalists in order to arrive to negotiations for independence, one should notice the existence of three different situations. The Tunisian case represented fidelity among the

nationalists of the Neo-Destour to the Bourguibian principle of the "small stages" which considered independence as an ideal that would be reached through successive stages in cooperation with France. In the Moroccan case, there was a constant nationalist insistence and pressure on the French side for the recognition of independence (which was demanded publicly in the declaration of independence of 1944) even before the opening of negotiations on the basis of "interdependence" proposed by France. Lastly, the Algerian case represented a more militant and revolutionary attitude among the nationalist of the FLN who insisted in the proclamation of November 1954 on the recognition of the Algerian nationality and sovereignty and also specified the conditions for negotiations. This firm position led to a war of independence that lasted more than seven years.

Thus three different nationalist tactics for independence were followed by the nationalists in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, and they can be described respectively as moderate, militant and revolutionary. In fact, the solid position of the Istiglal Party and the strong character of the Sultan (who had a good sense of political equilibrium) had a decisive role in the success of negotiations that led Morocco to independence, and this helped in speeding the movement of Tunisia from internal autonomy to independence. It can also be argued that Bourguiba succeeded through his tactic of the "small stages" which reflected his moderation and pragmatism, to win the confidence of the French side especially after his conflict with Ben Youssef who had a militant position with regard to independence. Bourguiba also suggested the use of his tactic in the case of Algeria. He declared in the United States in December 1956: "The fact that an Algerian state does not exist, that France has established itself on this territory more than a hundred years ago, that the European population exceed that which exist in Morocco and Tunisia, is not a justification for not recognizing the Algerian sovereignty. This does not mean that the constitution of a state should not follow stages, nor that the rights of the European population should not be fully recognized and protected".⁶ However, the Algerian nationalists rejected this tactic for a revolutionary one as they insisted from the beginning (in 1954) on the maximum (i.e. total independence) and wanted to negotiate with France from a position of power.

The diplomatic action was a common element in the three nationalist movements and it was also an important factor in the evolution of these movements towards independence. The creation of the Arab League in 1945 and the support of the independent Arab states marked the first diplomatic success from outside the Maghrib. One should recall here the activities of the nationalist leaders in Arab capitals especially Cairo where the Committee for the Liberation of the Maghrib, headed by Emir Abd al-Krim, was formed. The Egyptian government gave political asylum to Abd al-Krim despite French protests. Other Arab countries such as Libya also supplied very important material and military aid to the resistance movements in the Maghrib, and after the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, these two former protectorates participated actively and by all means in the support of the Algerian struggle for independence.

The three nationalist movements of the Maghrib also participated in the conference of Bandoung in 1955 and gained the diplomatic support of

independent African and Asian countries. The anti-colonial communist countries as well as the Americans expressed in principle their sympathies to the nationalist movements. Tunisia gained the sympathies of many countries after the long trip of Bourguiba while the Moroccan nationalist movement obtained the support of Spain which opposed the French repressive policies and refused to recognize Ben Arafat who replaced Sultan Ben Youssef after his exile. Also in the congress of solidarity of the Afro-Asian peoples held in Cairo in December 1957, the communist camp expressed its support to the Algerian revolution. In fact, the creation of the CRUA in Switzerland had already marked the internationalization of the Algerian problem. The FLN succeeded to win the sympathies of other countries through its participation in international meetings while the GPRA obtained the recognition of the Afro-Asian as well as communist countries. The delegation of the FLN led by Ferhat Abbas in 1960 to popular China and the USSR resulted in the de facto recognition of the GPRA by the USSR.

The diplomatic action in the UN also resulted in positive achievements for the nationalist movements. The Moroccan and Tunisian nationalists appealed to the UN for the discussion of their problems with France. In fact, from 1952, some resolutions were voted by the general assembly of the UN on Morocco and Tunisia despite French protests. One can give here the example of the Latin-American motion adopted in December 1952 for the resumption of negotiations between Tunisia and France "in view of the accession of Tunisians to the capacity of administering themselves".

In the case of Algeria, the juridical position of the FLN was consolidated by the five resolutions voted before the end of 1960 and notably the one of 19 December which needed only one vote in order to recommend a referendum in Algeria under the control of the UN. In fact the debate on this motion placed the GPRA on the same level as the French government. However, the UN soon decided to invite France and Algeria to continue the dialogue which finally led to the agreements of Evian. It can be noted here that General de Gaulle gave high consideration to the status of the UN and so conducted the Algerian policy in a realistic attitude which also took into consideration the reactions of the FLN. Thus the diplomatic action of the FLN succeeded in the internationalization of the Algerian problem as the GPRA obtained thirty-one recognitions in the eve of the agreements of Evian.

Finally, the military action, unlike the diplomatic action, was carried out by the nationalist movements in three different tactical levels. In Tunisia the "Fellagha" action was directed against the French in Tunisia through terrorist activities. Though this action of the "Fellagha" presented itself as a liberation army, it was closely subjected to the political action of the Neo-Destour. In fact the Neo-Destour did not condemn the violent action of the "Fellagha" as it was not easy for nationalists to condemn other members leading a resistance movement whose presence remained a card that could be used in case of the failure of negotiations.⁷ The national council of the Neo-Destour held in Tunis in 1954 adopted a motion in which it declared that "the question of the Fellagha should neither be dissociated from the general political problem nor be constituted as a particular problem, but must be considered in close relation with the political negotiations still in progress".⁸ Hence the conditions of safe-

conduct for the "Fellagha" were formulated in exchange of their arms and a common declaration issued by the resident-general and the council president Taher Ben 'Ammar stated that: "...2514 Fellagha have given up to the French and Tunisian authorities 1958 weapons...".⁹

In Morocco, the violent action was not only directed against the French in Morocco and the French troops, but also against the collaborators of the residence after the deposition of the Sultan. The example which can be given here is that of the two attempts against the life of Ben Arafa (in 1953 and 1954). In fact the militants of the Istiglal Party decided, after the deposition of the Sultan to split with their ancient chiefs in order to participate in the future army of liberation which was receiving volunteers from the whole political spectrum in Morocco.¹⁰ After the victory of the Moroccan nationalists in the first game that ended by the departure of Ben Arafa in October 1955, the militant nationalist began immediately the second game by attacking two French posts in the Rif.¹¹ These attacks were carried out by some elements of the "Army of Liberation" organized in the Rif by nationalists like Dr Khatib in order to conduct the "second war of the Rif". This Moroccan force was itself presented as part of the Army of Liberation of the Arab Maghrib, acting in liaison with the Algerian nationalists. The Army of Liberation declared that it would carry out a national insurrection against the French, encircle the posts of the Rif and the middle-Atlas, and pursue the struggle until the total independence of Morocco and Algeria.¹² This struggle was openly supported by the Istiglal Party whose leader "Allal al-Fassi called in Cairo for a declaration of war against France and announced that the rebellion in Algeria and Morocco was henceforth put under a common command. It has been remarked that this proclamation, which was part of the war of nerves and propaganda, had serious repercussions in Paris where it worried the official circles so much that the threat was practically impossible to avoid.¹³ The militant collusion between the Istiglal Party and the resistance movement in Morocco was thus more evident and effective than between the Neo-Destour and the "Fellagha" in Tunisia as it soon in Morocco to the return of the Sultan and the recognition of independence.

In Algeria, the revolutionary military action of 1954 was the decisive factor in the evolution of the political and diplomatic actions. The violent action in Algeria took the form of organized military attacks against French targets, but it was also carried out within the Muslim population in order to mobilize it behind the aims and leadership of the FLN. Hence, unlike the Tunisian and Moroccan cases, the whole Algerian nationalist movement was directed towards the conduct of a popular revolutionary war against French colonization in Algeria. Though this war succeeded to realize its objective of national independence in 1962, its inevitable result in human losses was very high and extremely tragic. It has been stated that the war of Algeria costed the French forces 25 000 persons who died in the fighting and 60 000 injured while the losses by accident rose nearly to 7 000 killed and 30 000 injured. The losses among the Algerians were more difficult to count. Some advanced the number of 141 000 rebels killed, but in considering the losses endured by the whole Muslim population, others went until raising the figure up to 800 000 casualties.¹⁴ To these figures, one should add the losses caused by terrorist attempts and crimes of war resulting in large numbers of casualties and missing persons. The Algerian nationalists talked about more than a million martyrs on the Algerian side.

The importance of the violent action as a decisive factor in the evolution of the Maghrib towards independence reminds us of the preliminary stage of violent resistance which was marked by a religious influence. In fact, the use by the Algerian revolution of the Islamic term al-moujahidin (literally combatants for the sake of God) raises here the question about the role of Islam in the national struggle for independence in the Maghrib. One can say that despite the existence of the modernist trend together with the traditionalist trend in the nationalist movements, all the nationalists of the three movements were strongly attached to their Islamic identity. Islam has played a very important role in the nationalist struggle for independence in the Maghrib.

In Tunisia the two trends of the nationalist movement were mainly separated by the age of their leaders and the methods of actions in the case between Al-Tha'albi and Bourguiba. Though Bourguiba represented the modernist trend related to the western culture, he received from his dominant party the title of "al-Moujahid al-akbar" (the Supreme combatant) which he adopted and is still using though in a secular sense. In Morocco, the two trends in the nationalist movement—represented by Al-Fassi and Al-Onezzani—were united by the same objective of independence and they opposed together the "Berber dahir" in order to defend the religious unity of Morocco. Moreover, the Moroccan nationalist movement which was led by the Sultan and the Istiglal Party of Al-Fassi, was looking upon the future of Morocco in the context of Islam and Arabism. In Algeria, the 'Oulama stood firmly for the Islamic and Arab character of Algeria against the French policies of integration and assimilation. Even Ferhat Abbas who defended in the 1930's the thesis of integration with France, did not want to lose his identity as a Muslim.

It should be remarked that none of the three nationalist movements in the Maghrib declared openly that Islam was the basis of the nationalist struggle for independence. The FLN, for example, declared in the proclamation of the Algerian revolution that it was not a war of religion but a struggle for liberty and national independence. Its objective and language were, according to the texts, political and not religious. However, with the integration of the 'Oulama to the FLN and the use of the title of al-Moujahidin for the fighters of the ALN and that of al-Moudjahid for its press organ, which is still existing, it has been remarked that this gave to the practice of the Algerian revolution an Islamic character that corresponded to the state of mind of many of the combatants of the FLN.¹⁵

In fact the presence of Islam in a Muslim community is indispensable for the life of individuals. If Islam did not play explicitly the fundamental role in the conduct of the nationalist movements in the Maghrib, this does not mean that it was completely absent from these movements. Islam was strongly present in the minds and the practices of the Muslim population in the Maghrib. At least it remained all the time as the essential factor that separated the Muslim community from the European non-Muslim community and it also mobilized the Muslim population to defend and liberate the land of Islam in the Maghrib from foreign domination. The Algerian revolution recognized after independence the role of Islam as an important factor in the Algerian personality and in the struggle for independence in Algeria.

Lastly, it may be argued that the nationalist leaders in the Maghrib did not openly declare Islam as the basis of the struggle for independence because they wanted to attract the Support of non-Muslim countries as well as international public opinion to their cause.

5. Leadership

Finally we come to the question of leadership of nationalist movements which remains, in the final analysis, the most important factor in the explanation of the existence of different political systems in the Maghrib after independence. The leaderships of the nationalist movements played in fact the principal role in the evolution of these movements towards independence as well as in the construction of the new political systems after independence. As these leaderships were different on the personal and ideological levels, the new political systems followed consequently different political models.

In Morocco, the Sultan Mohammed Ben Yusef emerged in the second World War as the incontestable leader of the Moroccan nationalist movement, and his position was further consolidated by his collusion with the Istiglal Party and his opposition to the French policies and reforms in Morocco. While the Sultan was the principal leader as head of state representing Moroccan sovereignty, 'Allal al-Fassi was the principal party leader in the Moroccan nationalist movement. Both leaders played a leading role in the nationalist movement and both were exiled. One can only recall here that the Sultan succeeded from his exile to influence the French policy in Morocco (e.g. through the formula of the council of the throne and the idea of a provisional government to conduct negotiations with France) while 'Allal al-Fassi made his famous call from Cairo for a declaration of war against France. The two leaders agreed, even before independence, on the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Morocco.

In Tunisia, Bourguiba - the leader of the Neo-Destour Party - emerged as the most important personality among his colleagues in the leadership of the nationalist movement. His direct contacts with the population in the different parts of Tunisia and his arrest and exile contributed largely to his popularity. Moreover, Bourguiba was not competed by the Bey Lamine as the latter did not play the same leading nationalist role of the Sultan of Morocco: Though the Bey acted at a certain period in favour of the nationalists, he finally prepared with the residence in 1954 the project of reforms which was rejected by the Tunisian nationalists. It can thus be argued that the Bey in Tunisia was practically outside the Tunisian nationalist movement. Hence Bourguiba became the incontestable leader of that movement and his conflict with Ben Youssef ended in his favour in the congress of Sfax in 1955.

In Algeria, the case was different because of the absence of a local Algerian government and the emergence of four political organizations even before 1945 till 1954. It can be argued, however, that Messali al-Haj and Ferhat Abbas emerged as the main personalities during this period. It is ironical to remark that Messali al-Haj who began as the "father of the modern Algerian nationalist movement" ended as a "traitor" in the eyes of the FLN while Ferhat Abbas who started as a supporter of integration with

France, joined the FLN and became one of its leaders and the first president of the GPRA. In any case, it should be noted that it was only after 1954 that the leadership of the Algerian nationalist movement began to be unified under the umbrella of the FLN which gave rise to a new type of leadership known as "collective leadership". In fact, the Algerian revolution of 1954 was declared by "nine historical leaders" while the principle of "collective leadership" was officially adopted in the congress of al-Soummam in 1956. Only Messali al-Haj was excluded from this new leadership in Algeria because he insisted to create his own movement - MNA - as a rival and enemy to the FLN. The FLN remained faithful to its principles and led the struggle for the independence of Algeria until the agreements of Evian in 1962.

This finally explains that the leaderships in the Maghrib were assured on the eve of independence by the Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef in Morocco, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia and the FLN in Algeria. One can remark in the social composition that while the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist movements were led respectively by the Moroccan "aristocracy" and the Tunisian "petite bourgeoisie" of the middle class, the Algerian nationalist movement represented from 1954 a popular insurrection that originated among the masses in the countryside. This can partly explain that the use of violence was more limited in Tunisia and Morocco than in Algeria where it represented the only possible alternative left in the Algerian context; it was patronized in the former two cases by the Neo-Destour and the Istiglal Party in order to consolidate their political position in the negotiations with France. This was especially more evident in the case of Tunisia than in the Moroccan case. However, it should be remarked that the masses in Tunisia and Morocco were not isolated from the nationalist movements as in fact the Muslim masses and organizations, notably trade unions, had actively participated in the nationalist movements in the Maghrib before independence.

Notes

1. Text quoted by M. Flory and R. Mantran, Les régimes politiques des pays arabes, Paris, P.U.F., 1968, p. 83. See also M. Flory, "La notion du Protectorat et son évolution en Afrique du Nord", in Revue Juridique et politique de l'Union française, No 4, 1954 and No 1, 1955.
2. See *ibid.*, pp. 84-85 and 111-112.
3. See V. Silvera, "De l'autonomie interne à l'indépendance de la Tunisie", in Revue juridique et politique de l'Union française, No 10 (4), October - December 1956, pp. 687-704.
4. El Moudjahid, No 14, 15/12/57 and A. Mandouze, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-41.
5. M. Flory and R. Mantran, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

6. P. Beyssade, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
7. F. Garas, *op. cit.*, p. 259.
8. S. Gros, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
9. See *ibid.*, pp. 50-59
10. See S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, vol. III, from page 259.
11. R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 245.
12. P. Boyer de Latour, *op. cit.*, p. 173; see also pp. 169-185.
13. S. Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-339.
14. P. Beyssade, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-256.
15. See R. Le Toumeau, Evolution politique..., *op. cit.*, p. 451.

CONCLUSION

In the last analysis which takes into consideration all the different factors (internal and external), the nationalist movements in the Maghrib have succeeded through a number of stages, objectives, tactics (including political, diplomatic and military actions) and leaderships to lead Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria to political and national independence. A period of six years separated the independence of the two former French protectorates (Tunisia and Morocco) from that of the former French colony of Algeria. If the French occupation of Algeria (1830) provoked the domination of its two neighbours - Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912) -, the Algerian revolution of 1954 put France in front of a difficult choice which ended by the independence of the two protectorates (1956) which eventually participated in the liberation and independence of Algeria (1962).

With the independence of the three countries of the Maghrib, the first phase of nationalism, i.e. the nationalist independence movements, came to end while the second phase immediately began. This second phase of nationalisms is connected with the processes of state-building and nation-building. This means that new political systems had to be established in the independent Maghrib to replace the colonial administration and to work for the preservation of national unity and sovereignty as well as for the construction of the grand Maghrib within the context of the Arab nation. Also the new political systems had to determine their ideological options in the different political, economic, social and cultural fields.

It is important to remark in conclusion that the new political constitutional systems that emerged in the Maghrib after independence were born out of the leaderships of their nationalist movements. As these leaderships were different in the context of their internal political and social environments and their future perspectives, they influenced the emergence of three constitutional systems which apparently looked as different from each other in the independent Maghrib.

In Tunisia, Bourguiba - the "supreme combatant" - did not find much difficulty in abolishing in 1957 the existing monarchy in order to establish a republic of a "presidential system" in the constitution of 1st June 1959, with the practice of a one-party system (i.e. the Neo-Destour Party). In Morocco, the Sultan Ben Youssef, henceforth Mohammed V, adopted in agreement with the Istiglal Party, the idea of a system of "constitutional monarchy" based on parliamentary democracy. This system was realized by his son Hassan II in the constitution of 7 December 1962 which insisted on the multi-party system. Finally in Algeria, the FLN adopted a socialist republic of one-party system (i.e. the FLN) on the basis of "popular democracy", and this was followed by Ben Bella in the constitution of 8 September 1963.

Finally, if the emergence of the three political constitutional systems in the independent Maghrib have been explained by the evolution of the nationalist movements and through their leaderships, it remains to be seen by further comparative studies the particular characteristics of these systems in relation to each other on the one hand, and in relation to the models of western political systems, on the other hand. It will also be interesting to see the evolution of these political systems in the independent Maghrib.

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ISSN 0080-6714
ISBN 91-7106-266-1