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**A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY  
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA**

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**A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY  
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA**

**by**

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## **Dedication**

To my father.



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# **A CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT IN AMERICA**

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The humanistic psychology movement, formally established in 1962, sought to address broad questions of individual identity, expression, meaning and growth that had been largely neglected by post-war American cultural institutions in general and by the discipline of psychology in particular. By proposing a definition of mental health that went beyond the simple absence of illness, and by critiquing the American desire to reductively quantify even the nature of human existence, humanistic psychologists, including founders Abraham Maslow, Gordon Allport, Rollo May and Carl Rogers, offered a holistic, growth-driven theory of the self. They also attempted to formulate scientific methods that would be capable of adequately treating, rather than abstracting away, the complexity and subjectivity of the individual. Humanistic psychologists drew on the work of William James, and on the synthetic approach to the self and psyche that he described as “radical empiricism,” in an attempt to build upon dominant American psychological movements, namely psychoanalysis and behaviorism, which they perceived to have provided valuable, though incomplete, insights into human psychology.

In crafting humanistic methods, they also incorporated western European philosophies of holism, including phenomenology, existentialism and Gestalt. The movement they established produced enduring change in American psychology and American culture, though, for the most part, not in the ways the founders had envisioned. In the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s, humanistic psychology provided much of the vocabulary, and many of the techniques, of the human potential movement, of women's liberation groups, and of psychedelic users. It also laid the foundation for the person-centered approaches that developed in psychotherapy, social work, pastoral counseling, and academic psychology.

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## Introduction

In one of his many attempts to articulate and refine the goals of humanistic psychology, Abraham Maslow, then already a noted psychologist and founder of humanistic psychology, wrote in his journal on October 5, 1966: “How would I define humanistic psych in one sentence? A move away from knowledge of things & lifeless objects as basis for all philosophy, economics, science, politics, etc. (because this has failed to help with the basic human problems) *toward* a centering upon human needs & fulfillment & aspirations as the fundamental basis from which to derive all the social institutions, philosophy, ethics, etc. I might use also for more sophisticated & hep people that it is a resacralizing of science, society, the person, etc.”<sup>1</sup>

In a broad-brush way, Maslow captured the mission of the movement, which was to wrest psychology from those they felt had too narrowly defined human nature, experience and behavior. But, as in other articulations, Maslow’s description was incomplete, more evidence of the difficulty of condensing the purpose of the movement into a simple formulation.

The questions that Maslow hoped to answer were endemic to modern society and had been asked before in many ways. How can individuals maintain a sense of agency in an increasingly mechanized and technologized world? How can Americans achieve a sense of identity based on values distinct from the interests of both capitalism and Christianity (or other traditional religions)? What does it mean to be psychologically healthy, beyond not being mentally ill? And, how can unique and divergent individuals’ experiences be quantified and meaningfully compared? Maslow also explored questions that were more universal in their scope: How can individuals find meaning in their lives? And, from where can we derive values?

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<sup>1</sup> Abraham Maslow, October 5, 1966, *The Journals of A. H. Maslow* Vol. 2., ed. Lowry (Monterrey: Brooks/ Cole, 1979), 672.



By asking these questions publicly, and asking them in the 1960s in particular, humanistic psychologists like Maslow were responding to a deep cultural need. Confused by modernity, unsettled by World War II and its consequences, and alienated by technological change, many Americans found the positive and optimistic answers the movement provided compelling. This interest was evident in the humanistic psychology's broad popularity from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. It was demonstrated in high attendance rates at growth centers founded upon its theory, in widespread adoption of the techniques (like encounter groups and body work) that sprang from it, and in the permeation of American culture with the language of human potential and encounter.

Humanistic psychology, which was established in its organizational form in 1962, was intended—in the minds of its founders—as a “third force” within academic and professional psychology, meant to build on the insights of psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Signaling his intention to preserve the insights of the previous forces, rather than renounce them, Maslow described the movement as “epi-Freudian” and “epi-behavioristic,” as well as “epi-positivistic.” He explained that, “epi-Freudian means, or will mean from now on, building *upon* Freud. Not repudiating, not fighting, not either-or, no loyalties or counter-loyalties. Just taking for granted his clinical discoveries, psychodynamics, etc. insofar as they are true. *Using* them, building upon them the superstructure which they lack. This does *not* involve swallowing any of his mistakes.” “Epi-behaviorism” and “epi-positivism” signified, for Maslow, the grounding of humanistic psychology in the methods and traditions of science, as well as the attempt to fill in the gaps of prior theories. “I want to save this empirical, testing, checking, conservative emphasis,” Maslow wrote, “*But* also I want to build upon it, because a negative checking & continuousness amount to nothing in themselves—*worse* than nothing.” The movement Maslow envisioned would provide a more holistic conception of individual psychology, and would utilize scientific methods designed to capture the

fullness of human experience (rather than distilling experience into distinct elements of human behavior and cognition).<sup>2</sup>

Carl Rogers, another founder of humanistic psychology, shared Maslow's view. Describing his passion for science, Rogers wrote, "I have, deep within me, a feeling for science, for that relatively new invention in human history by which we have come to have a partial understanding of the awesome order in our physical and psychological universe. Consequently I value the concepts which are near and dear to the heart of the behavioral science."<sup>3</sup> But, he also argued for the necessity of balancing "hard" experimental science with consideration of complex subjective experience. "All knowledge," he wrote, "including all scientific knowledge, is a vast inverted pyramid resting on this tiny, personal subjective base."<sup>4</sup> The solution, according to Maslow, was to create a humanized psychological science, "a real superstructure, higher ceilings, a 3<sup>rd</sup> Force," which could "give behaviorism some worth & some usefulness."<sup>5</sup>

Maslow's "higher ceilings" were humanistic psychology's commitment to exploring human striving and achievement. This concept begins to get at what was so unique about humanistic psychology within the context of 1960s America; humanistic psychologists hoped to establish a theory of mental health and growth, and to advance from within the psychological profession an idea of human nature as inherently oriented towards positive ends. Based on his observations as a psychotherapist, Rogers noted that the motivation for development or growth "seems to be inherent in the organism, just as we find a similar tendency in the human animal to develop and mature physically, provided minimally satisfactory conditions."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Maslow, April 1, 1963, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 297-298.

<sup>3</sup> Carl R. Rogers, "Some Thoughts Regarding the Current Philosophy of the Behavioral Sciences," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1965), 184.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 186.

<sup>5</sup> Maslow, April 1, 1963, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 298.

<sup>6</sup> Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 60.

Humanistic psychologists also hoped to account for elements of human experience that couldn't be quantified through experimental investigation. In discussing the "resacralization" of human understanding, Maslow was expressing humanistic psychology's desire to reintroduce ineffable aspects of human experience to a field that had, out of professional necessity, excluded philosophical and metaphysical considerations.<sup>7</sup> Towards this goal, Maslow and his colleagues had to venture onto pretty shaky scientific ground, re-examining the entire practice of psychology at the root of its "prescientific" assumptions.<sup>8</sup>

In order to forge a prescientific theory of human growth and achievement, it was necessary to identify positive values, which, Maslow felt, could approximate "truth" through consistent refinement.<sup>9</sup> Rather than espousing psychology's goal of utter objectivity, he argued for the inextricable nature of human subjectivity, basing much of his "pre-science" on common sense theory and his own intuitions about values. His own studies of exceptional states, which explored the perceptions, experience and behavior of human beings at their best, relied heavily on Maslow's tentative guesses about universal human values.<sup>10</sup> Humanistic psychologist Sidney Jourard shared Maslow's interest in forging a positive psychology, arguing for the scientific possibilities in developing reliable criteria of optimum health. "To those who despair of the possibility of arriving at an agreed-upon concept of positive health, let me remind them that in implicit terms, at least, we all are agreed on many of the dimensions of positive health."<sup>11</sup> In his own work, psychologist Gordon Allport outlined what these "healthful processes" might include. Healthy, or "normal" individuals, he wrote, would possess "a guiding direction [...]"

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<sup>7</sup> William James, *Psychology* (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1963), 17.

<sup>8</sup> Maslow, October 8, 1964, *Journals* Vol. 1, 422.

<sup>9</sup> Maslow, November 5, 1961, *Journals* Vol. 1, 130.

<sup>10</sup> Abraham Maslow, "Self-Actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health," Reprinted in Richard J. Lowry, ed., *On Dominance, Self-Esteem and Self-Actualization: Germinal Papers of A. H. Maslow* (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1973), 177-202.

<sup>11</sup> Sidney M. Jourard, "Notes on the 'Quantification of Wellness,'" October 16, 1958 Sidney M. Jourard, "Quantification of Wellness," October 16, 1958, (Gardner Murphy Papers, Box 1076, Sidney M. Jourard Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 2.

integration, insight, ego-strength, with a capacity for necessary and effective repression.”<sup>12</sup>

## **THE ARC OF THE MOVEMENT**

This project specifically traces the first 20 years of humanistic psychology—a movement that was grounded in the specific frustrations and aspirations of several American scholars who found mid-century academic and professional psychology to be overly confining. They included Abraham Maslow, who provided much of the language of the movement and who proposed its defining theory, that of “self-actualization,” as well as an analysis of what he called “peak” functioning; Carl Rogers, whose client-centered approach transformed the psychotherapeutic relationship; Rollo May, who reformulated psychological inquiry in light of existential and phenomenological considerations; and Henry Murray and Gordon Allport, whose scathing critiques of the “positivism” of academic psychology suggested the need for a more humanistic approach. These scholars (and others) connected, in the 1950s, through informal channels, including a mailing list that Maslow assembled to share their work. They coalesced more formally, in 1962, through the founding of the American Association of Humanistic Psychology (AAHP).

In tracking the progression of the cultural, intellectual and psychological reform movement that Maslow and Rogers helped to found, this project inevitably comes into conversation with a number of diverse sources that, by drawing on a range of disciplines, have sought to place American psychology in a cultural context. Philip Rieff, for example, in *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, explored the religious, spiritual and sociological aspects of the therapeutic ethos that came to dominate America in the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, focusing specifically on the way in which the individual concerns of the “psychological man” displaced the more communal moral and social concerns of

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<sup>12</sup> Gordon Allport, “Psychiatry in Neurotic America” (notes), Harvard Law Forum, December 1, 1950 (Gordon W. Allport Papers, HUG 4118.50, Box 5, Law School Forum folder, Harvard University Archives), 7.

the prototypical American who proceeded him. Writing in the 1960s, Rieff identified the “psychological man,” explaining that “the kind of man I see emerging, as our culture fades into the next, resembles the one once called ‘spiritual’ — because such a man desires to preserve the inherited morality freed from its hard external crust of institutional discipline.”<sup>13</sup> This man, he argues, is the “supreme” individualist, “opposed in depth to earlier modes of self-salvation,” including: through identification with “communal purpose.”<sup>14</sup>

Christopher Lasch echoed Rieff’s concerns in the 1970s and 1980s, both in *The Minimal Self* and *The Culture of Narcissism*. Exploring psychology’s impact on the American individual, Lasch exposed what he perceived to be the pathological self-concern that pervaded American culture in the 1970s. The turn towards self-interest, according to Lasch, can best be explained as a sort of psychic retreat from the overwhelming insecurity produced by a political and economic system in crisis.<sup>15</sup> Displayed in mass consumption and mass culture, American narcissism, Lasch explains, indicates not a strong sense of self or a spirit of self-love, but a underlying emptiness better described as self-loathing.<sup>16</sup>

While humanistic psychology, with its strong self-focus, clearly enters into the conversation Rieff and Lasch initiate over the relevance of psychology to the American individual, it also resonates with works that seek to more broadly historicize the role of the psychological profession in 20<sup>th</sup> century cultural and political phenomena. In *The Romance of American Psychology*, for example, Ellen Herman chronicles the rise of the influence of psychologists in the American cultural consciousness, largely through events related to World War II. Herman links the ascendance of the psychological expert to

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<sup>13</sup> Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 2.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>15</sup> Christopher Lasch, *The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 16.

<sup>16</sup> Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 31.

specific uses of psychological professionals in the war effort, challenging the notion that psychology's presence in American is an ahistorical fact. "Psychology," writes Herman, "may have seeped into virtually every facet of existence, but that does not mean that it has always been there or that what experts say has always mattered as much as it matters today."<sup>17</sup> Herman's work helps to explain the ease with which the academic theory of humanistic psychology quickly produced a cultural movement, and later came to pervade American culture more broadly.

Providing a specific model for this project, Andrew Heinze's *Jews and the American Soul* effectively explores the impact of the psychological concerns of significant Jewish individuals on American culture and experience. Heinze opposes the "myth of Protestant Origins," detailing the ways in which conceptions of human nature as formulated by Jewish thinkers were formative in the 20<sup>th</sup> century American conception of self. He attributes to Jewish thinkers the authorship of key psychological terms, including the "the search for *identity*, the desire for *self-actualization*, the wish to avoid an *inferiority complex* and to stop *compensating* for inner weaknesses, *rationalizing* inner desires and *projecting* them onto others and the quest for the *I-Thou* relationship."<sup>18</sup> While Heinze explores a range of seminal figures, including Betty Friedan, Martin Buber and Rabbi Liebman, he also devotes specific attention to humanistic psychologists like Abraham Maslow.

This project has also been shaped by the literature of the history of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Examining the history of psychotherapy in America, Philip Cushman's *Constructing the Self, Constructing America* takes a hermeneutic approach to psychotherapy's role in self-construction. Cushman details the changes that dominant theories have produced in the experience of the average American, and captures

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<sup>17</sup> Ellen Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 5.

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Heinze, *Jews and the American Soul: Human Nature in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1-2.

effectively the way in which psychotherapeutic ideas have become inextricable from the notion of the “self” in America.<sup>19</sup>

Two collections, Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog’s *Inventing the Psychological* and Donald Freedhiem’s *History of Psychotherapy*, provide a diverse exposition of the impact of psychotherapy on American culture. Pfister and Schnog capture the pervasiveness of psychology in the experience of many Americans by exploring a range of topics, from literature and performance to gender and race.<sup>20</sup> Freedheim’s collection provides a model for situating specific psychological movements within their broader historical and cultural context.

The body of literature that traces the impact of psychoanalysis on American culture provides the most complete model for historicizing a psychological movement in a cultural context. Eli Zaretsky’s *Secrets of the Soul*, for example, explores the enduring cultural value and meaning of psychoanalysis. Zaretsky takes up Rieff’s notion of personal autonomy replacing moral autonomy, and traces, through the 1960s in particular, the conflict between psychoanalytic theory and women’s liberation and the New Left.<sup>21</sup>

Nathan Hale’s two volumes on Freud in America provide a broad and detailed view of the American cultural response to Freud’s theory, examining the ways that psychoanalysis contributed to the self-understanding of many Americans.<sup>22</sup> Hale explores the cultural function of psychoanalysis, specifically citing the manner in which it opposed Victorian standards of sexual morality that had grown oppressive and offered an

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<sup>19</sup> Philip Cushman, *Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural History of Psychotherapy* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1995).

<sup>20</sup> Joel Pfister and Nancy Schnog, *Inventing the Psychological: Toward a Cultural History of Emotional Life in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

<sup>21</sup> Eli Zaretsky, *Secrets of the Soul: A Social and Cultural History of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).

<sup>22</sup> Nathan G. Hale, Jr., *Freud and the Americans: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876-1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Nathan G. Hale, Jr. *Freud in America, Vol. 2, The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States: Freud and the Americans, 1917-1985* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

explanation for the rise of nervous disorders in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Tracing the historical arc of psychoanalysis, Hale looks at the popularization of Freud's ideas, focusing on specific eras in which they held the most sway (the 1920s through 1940s) and in which they fell out of favor (the 1960s). In explaining these shifts, he attends to the economic, political and cultural circumstances in America in various periods. For example, he explores the significance of the Great Depression, of World War II and of women's liberation. Hale's work, like Zaretsky's, exemplifies the depth with which scholars have examined the relationship between psychoanalysis and American culture; the field is rich, and any number of works could serve as comparably good examples.

Although this project is, no doubt, indebted to several other bodies of literature, including those related to the social movements with which humanistic psychology intersected, the final area I'll refer to is the relatively small body of work that exists on the history of humanistic psychology. Roy de Carvalho's *Founders of Humanistic Psychology* provides brief intellectual biographies of five founders of humanistic psychology—Abraham Maslow, Gordon Allport, Rollo May, Carl Rogers and James Bugental. Tracing the roots of their theories to the intellectual influences of the philosophies of existentialism, phenomenology and others and to the specific personal influences of colleagues like Kurt Lewin and Karen Horney, de Carvalho's work has provided a solid foundation for my own. De Carvalho's historical description of the humanistic psychology movement has also served as a framework for this project.<sup>23</sup>

Eugene Taylor's *Shadow Culture* has offered insight into the long American tradition in which humanistic psychology fits. Beginning with the First Great Awakening, Taylor identifies the continuous dialogue between psychology and spirituality that was exemplified in the work of William James. Identifying humanistic psychology as a form of "folk psychology," he identifies the diverse components of the movement, which

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<sup>23</sup> Roy Jose de Carvalho, *The Founders of Humanistic Psychology* (New York: Praeger, 1991).



include transpersonal psychology, experiential encounter and radical therapy.<sup>24</sup> Taylor holds up the Esalen Institute as exemplary of the “shadow culture” of the American visionary tradition.<sup>25</sup>

Work on the Esalen institute has been integral to this project. By effectively integrating 1960s American religious interests, countercultural practices, and psychological theory, historians of Esalen have illuminated the cultural events that sprang from the theories of humanistic psychologists. Walter Truett Anderson’s *Upstart Spring* and Jeffrey Kripal’s *Esalen* have provided thorough historical investigations, while capturing the complexity of the institute’s significance to the human potential movement, to the counterculture and to the 1960s more broadly. Kripal’s work in particular has helped me to situate figures like Maslow and Rogers in relation to the cultural manifestation of their theory. Both books have also offered a means of unraveling the personal significance of humanistic psychology to the figures who most passionately adopted its principles.<sup>26</sup>

Finally, this project is indebted to a number of seminal biographies that have broadened my perspective on the contributions of various psychologists to the movement. Robert Richardson’s biography of William James, in addition to providing essential information about the life and mind of James, served as a model for my work. Richardson expertly contextualizes James’ intellectual history in light of the culture of his time, as well as within the intellectual atmosphere in which he forged his theory. Identifying the contradictions in James’ own interests, Richardson captures the pluralism that defined the

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<sup>24</sup> Eugene Taylor, *Shadow Culture: Psychology and Spirituality in America from the Great Awakening to the New Age* (Washington, D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999), 274.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>26</sup> Walter Anderson, *Upstart Spring: Esalen and the American Awakening* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1983); Jeffrey Kripal, *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

New Psychology, tying it to the divided loyalties of the average modernist (torn between the forces of scientific and religious explanation).<sup>27</sup>

Specific biographies of the founders of humanistic psychology have provided the factual underpinnings for this project, and have helped me to interpret the theoretical contributions of humanistic psychologists within their proper context. Edward Hoffman's biography of Maslow places the creation of humanistic psychology within the context of Maslow's career. Documenting his shift from behaviorism, Hoffman explains the necessity, for Maslow, of proposing an alternative.<sup>28</sup> Howard Kirschenbaum's biography of Carl Rogers provides a comparable context for Rogers' theory, which (like Maslow's) predated the birth of humanistic psychology by nearly three decades.<sup>29</sup> Robert Abzug's biography of Rollo May, of which I read pieces in manuscript form, added depth to my understanding of the circumstances that surrounded the humanistic psychology movement and provided insight into the questions the founders faced. All three biographies were indispensable to my understanding of the individuals and the chronology of the movement.

By drawing on these diverse literatures, my project intertwines psychology with cultural studies and American history. Although, in the early 1960s, the humanistic psychology movement was novel, its aims reflected persistent historical themes in American psychology. Echoing 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century concerns, the founders grappled with the question of how to fuse a science of the self with religious and philosophical systems of meaning and practices of healing. In order to foreground the movement in this tradition, Chapter 1 traces earlier manifestations of these tensions in 19<sup>th</sup> century enterprises like Mesmerism, phrenology and Spiritualism. It also explores, at length, the "New Psychology" of William James, which crystallized one of the

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<sup>27</sup> Robert D. Richardson, *William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).

<sup>28</sup> Edward Hoffman, *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow* (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1988).

<sup>29</sup> Howard Kirschenbaum, *On Becoming Carl Rogers* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1979).

fundamental questions—how can psychology quantify complex, subjective experience using effective, inclusive science?—of the humanistic psychology endeavor.

From these bases, Chapter 2 describes the cultural and intellectual environment into which humanistic psychology was born. Mental health professionals, driven by competition and the pursuit of expertise, had by the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century grown increasingly divided on how to address cultural and individual needs. Rather than forging collaborative solutions, they had narrowed their conceptions of individuals to suit their unique niche (psychiatric approaches, for example, offered increasingly medicalized explanations of mental illness). Academic psychologists, too, were narrowly committed, in their case to a model of experimental behaviorism that had little use for subjectivity and introspection.

In contrast to American psychologists' commitment to behaviorism and experimentalism throughout the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Western European psychologists mined philosophies of holism for their relevance to individual psychology. Chapter 3 explores the migration of these philosophies to the U.S., a process that fueled the developing “humanistic” critique of academic and professional psychology in the 1940s and 1950s. Phenomenology, existentialism and Gestalt psychology traveled, first, through the translation of key philosophical texts and, later, through the relocation to America of leading European thinkers fleeing fascism. Future humanistic psychologists absorbed these influences through direct contact (as in the case of Maslow and May), as well as through a kind of cultural and intellectual osmosis.

The work of Rogers and Maslow in the 1950s paved the way for the formation of the humanistic psychology movement. Chapter 4 explores the theory, and the ideological stirrings in the minds of the founders, that led to the creation of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* in 1961 and AAHP in 1962. It also details the organization's early attempts to articulate its goals and to develop a positive program, a theme further explored through the work of Allport, Murray and Sidney Jourard in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 tracks the changes in the movement as it migrated from the east to the west coast and from academic institutions to private research institutes and experientially-based growth centers in the mid 1960s. Settling in California, where it met a countercultural interest in physical sensation, interpersonal encounter, and altered consciousness, the humanistic psychology movement produced the human potential movement. An entirely cultural outgrowth, the new movement was best exemplified by the Esalen Institute in Big Sur, California, which was founded on the ideas of humanistic psychologists but took a decidedly sensational, experiential turn.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 consider the attempts of humanistic psychologists to deal with the pressing cultural issues of the 1960s. Chapter 7 explores the intersection between the civil rights movement and humanistic psychology, and focuses specifically on the black-white encounter groups that grew from the movement and aimed to expiate interracial conflict using the encounter group techniques of the human potential movement. These groups demonstrated awareness, on the part of some human potential movement participants and some humanistic psychologists, of the significance of racial concerns, but also showed the limitations of the movements in terms of addressing racial conflict.

Chapter 8 examines the use of humanistic psychology as a justification and motivation for psychedelic drug use. Many humanistic psychologists were fascinated by the opportunities that psychedelic experimentation provided for studying alternative forms of consciousness. But, others were deeply ambivalent, identifying the threat that the practice posed to the movement. The more chaotic and dangerous elements of drug use ultimately fueled the growing public skepticism of humanistic psychology and the human potential movement.

Chapter 9 describes the relationship between humanistic psychology and the women's liberation movement. Feminists, like Betty Friedan, seized on the consonance between theories of humanistic psychology and women's goals of liberation and self-actualization, as did members of consciousness raising groups, in the late 1960s and early

1970s. At the same time, humanistic psychologists, the majority of whom were white and male, struggled with the necessity of prioritizing gender considerations.

By looking at the specific challenges that the humanistic psychology movement faced, Chapter 10 considers the difficulties of forging a humanistically-informed practice and theory while contending, on the one hand, with the cultural ferment of the 1960s and 1970s, and on the other hand with academic departments and professional organizations that were unsupportive of the movement's goals. Although external critique of the cultural outgrowths emerged in the media, the harshest criticisms tended to come from humanistic psychologists themselves, many of whom, by the mid-1970s, labored to remain committed to the struggling movement.

The final chapter traces the decline of interest in the movement that marked the late 1970s, and concludes in the early 1980s, when a conservative political ethos dampened what remained of the rebellious spirit of the 1960s. Rather than describing the movement's failure, however, the chapter details humanistic psychology's successful absorption into mainstream culture and psychotherapeutic practice. It also explores specific outgrowths of humanistic psychology in academic psychology, pastoral counseling and social work.

As a whole, this project seeks to establish the importance and enduring relevance of humanistic psychologists to American culture and American psychology. Regardless of the preliminary nature of their science and the cultural excesses with which they found themselves burdened, the difficult, honest questions they asked, including "What is the good life?" "How shall I believe?" "What can I believe in?," and "How shall I live?" represented a significant continuation and clarification of historical attempts to keep science human and to address the complex and conflictual nature of human existence.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Maslow, April 22, 1962, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 158-159.

## Chapter One: A Science of the Self

William James's career, which began in 1873, when he was hired as an instructor of physiology at Harvard, and ended with his death in 1910, spanned the birth and infancy of the "new psychology" in the United States.<sup>1</sup> The first American psychological laboratory was established at Johns Hopkins University in 1883; J. McKeen Cattell became the first professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania in 1888; and the American Psychological Association was established in 1892.<sup>2</sup> James's career developed simultaneously: he taught his first class devoted explicitly to the relationship between physiology and psychology in 1875 and published one of the first American psychology texts in 1890.<sup>3</sup>

The questions that haunted James—existential questions over the nature of the soul and the self, spiritual questions surrounding free will and the afterlife, and scientific questions of the feasibility of mental science—represented significant American concerns that would persist throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>4</sup> A catalyst in the separation of psychology from metaphysical and philosophical realms, James's psychology nevertheless reflects

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<sup>1</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 141. Although there are several thorough biographies of James, I have relied most heavily on Robert Richardson's 2006 intellectual biography. Other biographies I have consulted include: Gerald E. Myers, *William James: His Life and Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Linda Simon, *Genuine Reality: A Life of William James* (New York: Harcourt, 1998); and Gay Wilson Allen, *William James: A Biography* (New York: Viking Press, 1967).

<sup>2</sup> Duane P. Schultz, *A History of Modern Psychology*, (New York: Academic Press, 1969), 118. Though the date of the birth of psychology as an academic discipline is at issue, most link it to the creation of Wilhelm Wundt's psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany in 1880. This date represents a break from the religiously and morally informed psychology that preceded it. Rand B. Evans argues in "The Origins of American Academic Psychology," however, that academic psychology actually began decades earlier, as evidenced by the proliferation of psychology textbooks in the 1820s through the 1860s and in the inclusion of standard psychology courses even at the smallest colleges by the 1870s. Instead of marking the creation of a distinct discipline, Evans contends, the 1880s saw a dramatic shift in the philosophy and curriculum underlying academic psychology. "The Origins of American Academic Psychology," in Josef Brozek, ed. *Explorations in the History of Psychology in the United States* (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 1984), 48-56.

<sup>3</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 167-168. Although James signed a contract in 1878 to write *Principles of Psychology*, it took him 12 years to complete the project. In the meantime, James Dewey published the first American psychology text, *The New Psychology* in 1884. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Volumes 1 and 2 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890).

<sup>4</sup> Richardson, *William James*, xiv.

the entangled nature of psychic processes and the difficulty of isolating objective from subjective description of them. In *The Principles of Psychology*, James argues that “In order not to be unwieldy, every such science has to stick to its own arbitrarily-selected problems, and to ignore all others.”<sup>5</sup> Yet James’s work reflects his own difficulty in keeping questions of meaning and values distinct from psychology. Although he remained committed to the scientific paradigm he set forth in *Principles*, of describing and explaining “states of consciousness,” he selectively explored religious experience and belief, as well as noetic and mystical states, in an attempt to characterize ineffable subjective experience.<sup>6</sup>

The productive tension between the conscious and unconscious and the rational and irrational in James’s theory tapped into competing American desires. Even in periods of diminished religious authority, many Americans have manifested a keen interest in the soul and in spiritual understandings of the contours of the psyche.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, they have displayed a parallel reverence for scientific rationality, a reverence that’s exemplified in the significant role that science plays in the veneration of Founding Fathers like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson and that’s been consistently fueled by the centrality to the American narrative of technological and industrial growth.<sup>8</sup> In the tradition of the mental healers who had preceded him, James captured American interest by combining religious with scientific concerns.<sup>9</sup> By exploring irrational, subjective

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<sup>5</sup> William James, *Psychology*, 17.

<sup>6</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 412-415.; James’s writings on the intersection of religion and psychology include: William James, *The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1897); William James, *Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1898); William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1902).

<sup>7</sup> James G. Moseley, *A Cultural History of Religion in America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 139-141.; Mark Chaves, “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,” *Social Forces* Vol. 72, No. 3 March (1994), 749-774.

<sup>8</sup> Howard P. Segal, *Technological Utopianism in America* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 98-129.

<sup>9</sup> Peter Gay, *A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 21-30.

experience using the scientific method, he offered Americans a means to ease the conflict between their often competing interests.

William James's legacy to American psychology was, like his philosophy as a whole, thoroughly pluralistic.<sup>10</sup> It was at once humanistic, pragmatic, and radically empirical. It was sensitive to spiritual concerns and self-consciously scientific, interested in sickness and committed to health. As a whole, it was new, but its elements were rooted in European and American theories and practices from the centuries that preceded it.<sup>11</sup>

With James, numerous, powerful threads of psychological thought and practice converged, paused just long enough to crystallize a bit, and then progressed with a force that would profoundly influence not just the practice of professional psychology but the way that many Americans understand and talk about the self and the psyche. The present chapter will trace some of the threads that predicated James's career, while the subsequent chapters will explore the flowering of James's thought in divergent strands of 20<sup>th</sup> century American psychology and in particular in the mid-century movement that came to be known as humanistic psychology.

## **SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS OF PSYCHIATRY**

Despite forced bifurcations between religious and scientific approaches to mental illness, scarcely a theory existed, before the 20<sup>th</sup> century, that didn't, at least conceptually, incorporate elements of both. Likewise, even the treatment of mental illness, which was overtly oriented toward pathology, implicitly acknowledged human inclinations towards health.

Prior to the establishment of academic and professional psychology at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, administration of the psyche was confined to the medical specialty of psychiatry, which was most often practiced in asylums. The profession of Psychiatry was

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<sup>10</sup> Myers, *William James*, 325-326.

<sup>11</sup> Richardson discusses the complexity of Jamesian psychology, and the influences upon James, at length. Richardson, *William James*.



formalized in America with the founding of the Association of Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane in 1844, an early precursor to the American Psychiatric Association.<sup>12</sup> Benjamin Rush, a hospital-based Philadelphia physician and the officially acknowledged “father of American Psychiatry,” published the first American psychiatry textbook in 1812, in which he cited the brain as the basis of mental illness.<sup>13</sup> His biological emphasis, however, didn’t preclude a complementary vision of psychiatric treatment as “moral therapy,” and his work’s emphasis on strengthening patients’ self-control suggests the enmeshment of psychiatry, from its inception, in both religious and personal discourses.<sup>14</sup>

Nineteenth century psychiatric understandings were typically framed in physiological terms, often referring to the nervous system or to brain structures, but were heavily tinged with religious ideas. Explanations of mental illness ranged from the concept of “bad” humours or “bad” blood to the notion of satanic possession.<sup>15</sup> Likewise, some psychiatric treatments of the 19<sup>th</sup> century reflected puritan ideas of asceticism and redemption through suffering. Blood-letting, leaching and mercury poisoning were common treatments for mental illness until the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup> Asylum care

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<sup>12</sup> In 1894, the American Medico-Psychological Association was formed, which, in 1921 became the American Psychiatric Association, which exists today. For a complete history of the American Psychiatric Association, see: Walter E Baron, *The History and Influence of the American Psychiatric Association* (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1987).

<sup>13</sup> Roy Porter, *The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 384.; Edward Shorter, *A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1997), 15. Rush’s psychiatry text was: Benjamin Rush, *Observations and Inquiries upon the Diseases of the Mind* (Philadelphia: Kimber & Richardson, 1812).

<sup>14</sup> Shorter, *History of Psychiatry*, 15. Shorter opposes social-constructionist histories of psychiatry and argues for the objective validity of historical psychiatric practices, especially those that incorporated biological and proto-neuropsychiatric elements. Rather than apologizing for psychiatry’s more extreme “medical” treatments, he is apologetic for psychiatry’s period of interest in psychoanalysis, believing Freud to be a pseudo-scientist and dismissing, perhaps unfairly, the era of American interest in psychoanalysis as gaffe. His history has been most useful to me as a resource for factual, historical information.

<sup>15</sup> Charles Rosenberg, “The Therapeutic Perspective: Medical practice, Knowledge, and Identity in America, 1820-1885,” in *The Therapeutic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of American Medicine*, ed. Morris Vogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 3-22.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

tended to be comparably punishing.<sup>17</sup> In spite of Benjamin Rush's campaign for asylum reform in the 1780s, the greater proportion of asylums remained squalid and primitive. In the worst cases, mentally ill "sinners" were oppressively confined and often literally tied, with rope and chains, to the walls of cold, dark cells.<sup>18</sup>

The excesses of psychiatry, however, also mobilized opposition and fueled a number of reform movements throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Attempting to humanize and personalize treatment, some doctors developed a philosophy of mental illness as a product of physiological imbalance, and implemented treatment aimed at restoring "homeostasis" between the individual and the environment. Psychiatrists instructed individuals to alter food and water intake, climate, work and relationships to sustain psychological balance.<sup>19</sup>

Asylum reform of the 1840s, led by Dorothea Dix, embodied this holistic perspective, and was premised on the notion that everything from the architecture to the practices of the institution itself held curative power.<sup>20</sup> Striving for extremes of cleanliness, punctuality and precision, many asylums developed a moral mission to uplift the character of the mentally ill.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, governmental financial neglect, overcrowding, and understaffing caused many asylums to revert to programs of mere custodial care by the turn of the century, a situation that persisted until the Mental Hygiene movement adopted a moral mission of humane reform in 1909.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> From a 21<sup>st</sup>-century vantage point, many historical psychiatric practices appear thoroughly inhumane. Scholarly histories are apologetic and some interpret unpleasant psychiatric practices to be abusive exercises of power on the part of the medical professionals, intended to punish social deviance and secure doctors' cultural power and esteem. Examples of social-constructionist perspectives on psychiatry include: Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization; A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); Norma C. Ware and Mitchell G. Weiss, "Neurasthenia and the Social Construction of Psychiatric Knowledge," *Transcultural Psychiatry*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1994): 101-124.

<sup>18</sup> Francis Tiffany, *Life of Dorothea Lynde Dix* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1891), 61.

<sup>19</sup> Rosenberg, "Therapeutic Perspective," 5.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas J. Brown, *Dorothea Dix: New England Reformer* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 220.

<sup>21</sup> David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1971), 206-236.

<sup>22</sup> Norman Dain, *Clifford Beers: Advocate for the Insane* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), xvii-xviii.

Although emergent humanitarian movements reformed various aspects of psychiatric practice, tensions remained between what psychiatrists considered efficacious treatments and what critics perceived to be inhumane. Lesser known late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century treatments included malaria fever therapy, administered by subcutaneous injection or by mosquitoes, which were intended to cure syphilitic insanity through a course of 106 degree fevers, and insulin shock therapy, which brought patients to the brink of death and (ideally) back through 50-60 days spent in a coma.<sup>23</sup> American psychiatrists also performed cauterization of the clitoris (as women were more often perceived to be hysterical and insane), sterilization, and hydrotherapy, which involved either continuous baths or tight wrapping in wet sheets.<sup>24</sup> Critics of these somatic approaches to mental illness argue that whatever limited successes accompanied these therapies were likely attributable not to biology but, ironically, to the subjective experience of faith, the “hope to heal and be healed.”<sup>25</sup>

### THE PROBLEM OF COMPROMISE

Explicit compromises between scientific and spiritual approaches to mental illness tended to arouse the disdain and denunciation of both pure scientists and staunch religious figures. Among the many movements and theories that emerged to offer Americans a way to fuse their religious and scientific impulses, three in particular laid the

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<sup>23</sup> Joel Braslow, *Mental Ills and Bodily Cures Psychiatric Treatment in the First Half of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 96-98.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 39, 56, and 165-168.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 94.; Twentieth century treatments would continue to tread the boundary between inhumane treatment and efficacious medical practice. Prefrontal lobotomies, for example, which were widely popular in the US in the 1940s (in 1949 alone, 5,074 psychosurgeries were estimated to have been performed), appeared to decrease agitation in severely mentally ill patients, but also to significantly impair their memory and functioning. Lobotomies dropped off in the early 1950s, as critics highlighted the overuses/abuses of the treatment by practitioners like Walter Freeman. Comparably, electroconvulsive shock therapy (ECT) earned both praise and disdain. Although it was found to be beneficial in the treatment of major depression in the 1930s, many psychiatrists were reluctant to utilize a practice whose mechanisms were scarcely understood. At present, the majority of research suggests that the practice is both safe and efficacious. Shorter, *History of Psychiatry*, 207-229.; For contemporary reviews of the efficacy of ECT, see Max Fink, “Convulsive therapy: a review of the first 55 years,” *Journal of Affective Disorders*, Vol. 63, March (2001), 1-15.; Zigmond M. Lebensohn, “The History of Electroconvulsive Therapy in the United States and its Place in American Psychiatry: A Personal Memoir,” *Comprehensive Psychiatry*, Vol. 40, Issue 3 (1999): 173-181.

groundwork for “humanistic” psychological approaches in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Mesmerism, phrenology and spiritualism demonstrated the kinds of compromises that occupied the murky middle ground between science and religion. The magio-religious practice of Mesmerism, founded on Franz Mesmer’s speculative science of “animal magnetism,” typifies the kind of treatment that provoked both scientific and religious criticism.

Franz Mesmer, a French physician and self-identified empirical scientist, developed the theory of animal magnetism in 1774.<sup>26</sup> Mesmer described health as the free flow of fluid through thousands of channels in our bodies, and illness as the frustration of this flow. A crisis, which could be expedited by the influence of an individual possessing a high degree of animal magnetism, was required to remove the obstacles and restore the healthy flow. Mesmer’s valuation of the healing effects of the physician’s presence represented an early formulation of psychotherapy, and his actual practice laid the groundwork for the hypnotic trance that became widely popular in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>27</sup>

Many scientists, including the Viennese and Parisian physicians to whom Mesmer appealed, considered Mesmerism an “empirically elusive medium,” criticizing the dubiousness of the underlying physiological processes that produced trances and

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<sup>26</sup>Based on his experimentation on a young female patient (Fräulein Oesterline) with physical magnets, Mesmer concluded that his ability to heal various ailments was attributable, not to physical procedures, but to his own “animal magnetism,” which he described as a “universally distributed fluid,” flowing freely between the cosmos, animals and plants. He remarked that, “I used the most accredited remedies to counteract [her] different ailments, but only my attention, never losing sight of her, put me in a place to pull her away from the evident dangers of death.” Franz Mesmer, “Letter from F.M. Mesmer, Doctor of Medicine at Vienna, to A.M. Unzer, Doctor of Medicine, on the Medicinal Usage of the Magnet,” in *Mesmerism: A Translation of Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D.*, ed. and trans. George J. Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc, 1980), 23-29.

<sup>27</sup>In individual treatment, Mesmer sat opposite his patient, with his back to the north, his feet touching the patient’s feet, and his thumbs resting lightly on the “nerve plexes,” at the pit of the stomach. Mesmer made “passes,” moving his hands from the patient’s shoulders down the length of his arms. He then pressed his fingers beneath the patient’s diaphragm—the “hypochondria”—holding them there for hours if necessary. Patients often experienced strange sensations and some had convulsions, which he considered to be the “crises” that would bring about cure. Franz Mesmer, “Catechism on Animal Magnetism,” in *Mesmerism: A Translation of Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D.*, ed. and trans. George J. Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc, 1980), 81-86. For a fuller explication of Mesmerism, see Frank A. Pattie, *Mesmer and Animal Magnetism: A Chapter in the History of Medicine* (Hamilton, NY: Edmonston Publishing, Inc, 1994); and Robert Darnton, *Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

skeptical of the potential of enduring reform achieved in hypnotic states.<sup>28</sup> Mesmer wrote in 1779 on the reception of his theory: “I soon became aware that I was being accused of eccentricity, that I was being treated like a dogmatist, and that my tendency to quit the normal path of Medicine was being construed as a crime.”<sup>29</sup> Churchmen were equally disapproving of the practice of Mesmerism, referring to it as a “spectacular dissolution of spirit.”<sup>30</sup> While his careful notes, scientific methods, and medical practices placed him in the realm of naturalistic science, Mesmer’s suggestibility hypothesis appeared to invalidate some of the natural laws that scientists had come to accept and to negate the idea of free will that was implicit in most Protestant systems of belief.<sup>31</sup>

The controversial nature of Mesmer’s theory and practice, and its unique combination of spiritual and scientific elements, provoked lay interest, leading Mesmer to extend his individual treatments to groups and to “perform” his treatments in the 1780s.<sup>32</sup> Audiences were enthralled by the magical nature of the “cure,” equating spiritual qualities with an element of mystery as elusive as the causes of mental disturbance themselves. At the same time, they were appeased by the vague scientific theory that satisfied their rationalistic leanings.<sup>33</sup>

The embellished theatrical qualities of Mesmer’s performances, however, ultimately proved too much for the Viennese public to digest. Mesmer’s colorful robes, iron wands, and ponderings on telepathy and clairvoyance elicited a sense of the occult,

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<sup>28</sup> Donald Meyer, *The Positive Thinkers: Popular Religious Psychology from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman Vincent Peale and Ronald Reagan* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), 68.

<sup>29</sup> Franz Mesmer, “Dissertation on the Discover of Animal Magnetism,” In George J. Bloch, in *Mesmerism: A Translation of Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D.*, trans. George J. Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc, 1980), 43-80.

<sup>30</sup> Meyer, *Positive Thinkers*, 68.

<sup>31</sup> Ernest R. Hilgard, introduction to *A Translation of the Original Medical and Scientific Writings of F.A. Mesmer, M.D.*, ed. and trans. George J. Bloch (Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann, Inc.: 1980), xi-xxiii.

<sup>32</sup> In applying this treatment to groups, Mesmer devised a vessel, called a “baquet,” around which participants gathered. Metal rods extended from the vessel to the individuals, and hemp rope connected individuals to one another. Mesmer himself moved around the group and laid his hands on individuals who seemed to be nearing crisis. Mesmer, “Catechism on Animal Magnetism,” 81-86.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas Hardy Leahey, *A History of Psychology: Main Currents in Psychological Thought*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., (New York: Prentice Hall, 2003), 217.

discrediting any implication of legitimate science.<sup>34</sup> While most Americans never witnessed Mesmer's performances firsthand, they came to imagine them, by the 1780s, as more of a circus than a science.<sup>35</sup> What remained of Mesmer's ideas, after enthusiasm for his particular program waned, was an enduring interest in the mesmeric trance (also known as hypnosis).<sup>36</sup> William James used the terms mesmerism and hypnosis synonymously, and, himself, experimentally hypnotized Harvard students in March of 1886.<sup>37</sup>

Phrenology, the scientific theory that related localized brain functions to human behavior, occupied a comparable space in the American imagination. Originating with the work of Franz Joseph Gall in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, phrenology was popularized by Johann Gaspar Spurzheim when he began a speaking tour of the US in the 1820s. Spurzheim, in lectures and in print, departed from Gall's theory by deliberately excluding categories of brain faculties that were inherently evil, instead promoting a vision of human potential and perfectibility through the study of phrenology.<sup>38</sup>

American phrenology had wide appeal, and proved compelling even to serious thinkers.<sup>39</sup> The main channels for phrenological theory were lecture tours and European books in translation, which began to proliferate in the 1820s.<sup>40</sup> Popularizers, who often

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<sup>34</sup> Pressured by harsh critique and the abandonment of his followers, Mesmer disavowed the movement in 1784, though the movement abided in various forms. Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 216-217.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 216-217.

<sup>36</sup> In spite of a dearth of evidence for the usefulness of Mesmerism in ameliorating psychological conditions, scientists continued to pursue studies in this vein. Mesmer's successor James Braid abandoned the analogy of magnetism and the specifics of Mesmer's treatment in the 1840s, but the tenets of hypnosis—namely the power of suggestion—endured in Braid's practice of evoking a somnambulistic trance as an anesthetic. Jean Charcot resuscitated the psychiatric interest in hypnosis with his application of the treatment to hysteria in the 1880s. Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 218 and 293-295.; Meyer, *Positive Thinkers*, 68-69.

<sup>38</sup> John B. Davies, *Phrenology: Fad and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 8.

<sup>39</sup> One notable intellectual convert was Henry Ward Beecher, who despite his initial skepticism, enthusiastically subscribed to phrenology. Robert Abzug, *Cosmos Crumbling: American Reform and the Religious Imagination* (New York: Oxford, 1994), 167-168.

<sup>40</sup> Interest in phrenology peaked around 1838-1840 with the lecture tour of the world-famous phrenologist George Combe. Davies, *Phrenology*, 34.

lacked a scientific background, were able to evoke a sense of the theory's scientific bases in their appeals to academia and to the American lay public in general.<sup>41</sup>

Practical phrenology, a distinctively American outgrowth, diverged from the scientific bases of Gall's original theory more dramatically. The goal of applied practice was to "explain each man to himself," and the most common manifestation was the individual character reading, in which the bumps on individuals' skulls were examined in order to identify weak and strong character traits. Subjects were then counseled to compensate for deficient faculties and to diminish excessively strong characteristics by sheer force of will.<sup>42</sup> Combining religious themes of moral rectitude and self-improvement with a pioneering form of psychotherapy, phrenology concretized formerly elusive ideas of character and upheld a doctrine of self-improvement.<sup>43</sup> Also, by offering moral imperatives to compensate for genetic deficits, phrenology constructed a spiritual *and* scientific world view that rendered individual problems intelligible and manageable.<sup>44</sup>

Like phrenology, the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century movement that came to be known as Spiritualism promised answers—to questions of how to live and where to find meaning—that blended scientific and spiritual language and methods. Characterized by the belief that the dead could be contacted through a medium in order to provide worldly and spiritual guidance to the living, Spiritualism arose in 1848, when Kate and Margaret Fox

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<sup>41</sup> Founded on correlation studies of the physical appearance of individuals' skulls and personality traits, phrenology alleged that the brain was divided into 37 faculties which corresponded precisely with physical locations on the skull. The measurement of such locations could yield explanations of impairments in corresponding moral behaviors and personality characteristics, which could then be addressed as issues for reform. Phrenological readings were thought to reveal an individual's most prominent characteristics (in correspondence with the most developed areas of the brain, and thus the skull). Phrenologists could then make recommendations as to which areas should be 'cultivated' and which 'restrained.' Michael M. Sokal, "Practical Phrenology as Psychological Counseling in the 19th-Century United States," in *The Transformation of Psychology*, ed. Christopher D. Green, Marlene Shore and Thomas Teo (Washington, DC, American Psychological Association, 2001), 27.

<sup>42</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 338.

<sup>43</sup> Fowler advocated the slogan 'self-made or never made,' suggesting the extent to which phrenology relied on a concept of reformation in the service of individual transformation. Sokal, "Practical Phrenology," 34.

<sup>44</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 338.

of Hydesville, New York, reportedly contacted the spirit of a murdered peddler who communicated through loud, rapping noises.<sup>45</sup> Burgeoning in the “burned-over district” of upstate New York among Radical Quakers who first received the Foxes’ report, Spiritualism soon gained an American following, comprised mainly of “circles” of reformers and Radical protestants who gathered for organized séances. The gatherings tended to be solemn, well-ordered and formulaic affairs, characterized by dim lighting, prompt beginnings and endings, the circumscribed formation of a gender-mixed circle and the induction of a mesmeric or trance-state in the medium, followed by physical manifestations of the presence of spirits. The rigid execution of the séance ritual, combined with careful observation of the physical manifestations of spirits, were essential to Spiritualists’ belief in the objective bases of the practice and the harmonious coexistence of science and religion in their minds.<sup>46</sup> The founding of the American Society for Psychical Research in 1882, in which William James was a leading figure, and the Society for Psychical Research, launched in London the same year, testifies to the presumed scientific element of the mystical practice.<sup>47</sup>

Spiritualists subscribed to an “electric cosmology” that paralleled Mesmerists “magnetic cosmology.”<sup>48</sup> Essential to their worldview was the belief in a universally pervasive but invisible fluid, called “ether,” that entwined the human with the divine, and subjected the human to the influence of the spiritual. Through the scientific theory that grounded their spiritual belief, 19<sup>th</sup> century Spiritualists were able to reconcile their need for spiritual solace with the cultural thrust towards individualism and scientific materialism. Séance participants were instructed to infuse the collective circle with their individual beliefs, feelings and desires, and to look to the spiritual realm for ministration

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<sup>45</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 259

<sup>46</sup> Bret E. Carroll, *Spiritualism in Antebellum America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, 2.

<sup>47</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 259.

<sup>48</sup> Carroll, *Spiritualism*, 69.



of their damaged spirits.<sup>49</sup> They were uniquely able to receive “cosmic comfort” from a spiritual realm that they perceived to be thoroughly grounded in physical science.

Unlike the strictly medical psychiatric practices of bleeding, purging and mercury poisoning, which focused on the toxic elements of individuals, Spiritualists affirmed the positive value of the individual, highlighting the proximity of the human to the divine, opposing orthodox medicine (which viewed the individual as inevitably prone to disease) and orthodox religion (which viewed the individual as constitutionally predisposed to sin).<sup>50</sup> At the same time, Spiritualists affirmed personal experiences of powerlessness, encouraging individuals to turn over their own sense of power and control to the medium (who was herself giving over control to the trance state) and to the spirits who communicated spiritual truths.<sup>51</sup>

More mainstream religious practices began to display the subtle influence of psychological theory at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Some ministers appropriated the emerging notion of the unconscious, for example, linking spiritual, individual, and scientific worlds in a distinctively American form of romantic individualism.<sup>52</sup> Others evoked the emotionalism of the Second Great Awakening, infusing it with a social mission to be achieved through individual reform.<sup>53</sup>

Christian Science, for instance, explicitly connected mainstream Christianity with science’s potential for mental healing.<sup>54</sup> Founded by Mary Baker Eddy upon the publication of her book *Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures* in 1875, Christian Science, a form of what William James called “Mind Cure,” introduced a religious perspective that encouraged individual reform through will and action in the service of

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 132

<sup>50</sup> Ann Braude, *Radical Spirits: Spiritualism and Women's Rights in 19th Century America*, 145 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 1-9.

<sup>51</sup> Carroll, *Spiritualism*, 86.

<sup>52</sup> For a description of history of Christianity’s use of the concept of the unconscious, see Robert C. Fuller, *Americans and the Unconscious* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

<sup>53</sup> Robert William Fogel, *The Fourth Great Awakening & the Future of Egalitarianism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 25-35.

<sup>54</sup> Braude, *Radical Spirits*, 183.

mental health.<sup>55</sup> By invoking the suggestive power also characteristic of Mesmerism, Mind Cure aimed to mobilize the healing forces of the individual. Medicine, according to Eddy and others, was progressing too slowly—creating a gap between individual expectations and experience which had to be filled by placing faith in an ideology of mental reform.<sup>56</sup> Tapping into notions of human potential and perfectibility, Christian Science placed the power of cognitive change in the hands of the individual, elevating individuals' sense of agency beyond the productive capacity of science.

Enterprises like Christian Science reflected the awareness that Americans increasingly understood themselves in terms of both science and religion.<sup>57</sup> By holistically conceptualizing mental illness, in terms of both body and spirit, Christian Science also worked in conjunction with late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century humanitarian efforts to de-criminalize and de-stigmatize mental illness, giving individuals a means to understand their own psychological problems that was congruent with their meaning systems.<sup>58</sup>

The Emmanuel Movement, which began in 1906, was another attempt to holistically integrate religious and scientific elements into the treatment of the individual. Founded by the credentialed academics and well-respected rectors Elwood Worcester and Samuel McComb, the earliest manifestation of the Emmanuel movement was a weekly class for impoverished tuberculosis patients that combined medical advice and faith-based healing. This course became a model for later treatment programs designed to aid those suffering from everything from nervous disorders and physical maladies to alcohol addictions.<sup>59</sup> Operating on the belief that certain disorders had religious and medical

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<sup>55</sup> For the founding text of Christian Science, see: Mary Baker Glover (later Eddy), *Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures* (Boston: Christian Scientist Publishing Company, 1875).

<sup>56</sup> Meyer *Positive Thinkers*, 65.

<sup>57</sup> Braude, 183-184.

<sup>58</sup> For an exploration of the history of American approaches to psychopathology and their limitations, see Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider, *Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness to Sickness* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).

<sup>59</sup> Eric Caplan, *Mind Games: American Culture and the Birth of Psychotherapy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 117-125.

components, the program sanctioned the treatment of mental problems by medically informed ministers.<sup>60</sup>

Like the less grounded compromises of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Emmanuel Movement received its share of criticism from both scientists and religious figures.<sup>61</sup> Foreshadowing the professional conflict over psychotherapeutic credentials that would become an almost permanent part of the psychotherapeutic landscape in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, vociferous psychiatrists argued that the treatment of mental disorders rightfully belonged to the physician rather than to the clergyman, who lacked knowledge of the nervous system and the brain.<sup>62</sup>

Although movements attempting to marry religion and science in mental healing expanded, and often elevated, the roles of clergymen, they also inspired criticism from religious institutions. Religious opponents of the Emmanuel Movement scrutinized the instrumental use of religion and contended that the selective use of religious principles for therapeutic ends impoverished the gospel.<sup>63</sup> Most protestants had similarly castigated the Mind Cure movement and Spiritualism. In spite of these initial protests, though, religion would find it impossible to stay out of the therapeutic realm, particularly as 20<sup>th</sup> century psychology threatened to displace traditional religion.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> The Emmanuel Movement received a unique amount of press and public attention, attributable, in part, to the prolificacy of its founders. In response to the often exaggerated portrayals of the movement which appeared everywhere from *Good Housekeeping* to *Popular Science Monthly*, the founders launched a multi-year magazine campaign to provide accurate information and promote the movement. Worcester and McComb also held lectures and open forums at the Emmanuel Church in Boston regarding scientific theory and principles of psychology, philosophy, and mental hygiene. The plain language employed in the meetings helped foster public interest and awareness in psychotherapy and mental illness. Further, the public debate, which regarded matters like lay therapy, opened long-dormant questions of the scientific legitimacy and clinical efficacy of mental health treatment. Caplan, *Mind Games*, 117-127.

<sup>61</sup> Even early supporters of the movement, including James Jackson Putnam, were converted to the view that clergy were superceding physicians and reducing their prestige. In spite of Worcester and McComb's attempts to quell medical opposition to the movement, the debate soon gained public attention as psychiatrists asserted a jurisdictional claim over psychotherapy. The movement and the controversy it engendered eventually led to its public extinction; the last documented promotion of the movement was published in 1910. Caplan, *Mind Games*, 148.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 143.

<sup>64</sup> By the 1920s, many Protestant ministers could no longer resist the therapeutic tide. In response to the pervasive national fascination with psychology, self, and individual therapeutic reform, seminaries began to

Scientists found it comparably difficult to stay out of the religious realm in their explanations of mental illness. Their attempts to supplant early American concepts of the religious causes of mental afflictions were often superficially successful; lay people were increasingly persuaded by behavioral and biological elucidations of the psyche. But, as events of the subsequent century demonstrated, less quantifiable desires—for spiritual affirmation, for meaning and values, for recognition of subjectivity and consciousness—repeatedly and tenaciously asserted themselves.<sup>65</sup>

Although Freud made an explicit attempt to forego religious considerations, relying instead on an entirely scientific conception of the structure and development of the psyche, his critics and followers tried to account for the spiritual dimensions of human existence.<sup>66</sup> Carl Jung, for example, revised Freud's theory to include a "collective unconscious," a component of the psyche comprised of shared religious archetypes, or symbols. Jung also directly explored the link between psychology and religion in his later work, including *Psychology and Religion*, first published in English 1938.<sup>67</sup>

Freud had originally envisioned psychoanalysis as a potential replacement for religion and as an alternative conception of individual identity.<sup>68</sup> American psychologists, who increasingly perceived religious elements to threaten the explanatory integrity of objective theory, were compelled by Freudian theory in the teens and 1920s. Lay Americans, as well, were drawn to the way that the explicitly non-religious theory undermined oppressive Victorian and traditional religious standards of morality.<sup>69</sup>

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provide pastoral counseling. The integration of psychotherapy into religious duties persisted throughout the ensuing decades, yielding the development of Norman Vincent Peale's Religio-Psychiatric clinic in 1937, the Academy of Religion and Mental Health, a site of intensive clergy training, in 1954, and the American Foundation of Religion and Psychiatry in 1959. Meyer, *Positive Thinkers*, 216-252.

<sup>65</sup> Conrad and Schneider 1992, ix.

<sup>66</sup> See Freud's work on religion as illusion: Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (New York: Doubleday, 1928).

<sup>67</sup> For the English translation of Jung's work, see: C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press; London, 1938).

<sup>68</sup> Gay, *Godless Jew*, 3-21.

<sup>69</sup> Hale, *Freud and the Americans*, 17-23.

But Freud's theory could neither assuage individuals seeking a strongly religious nor a firmly scientific psychology. For many, Freud's scientific bases were inadequate.<sup>70</sup> He dismissed rigorous experimental methodology, and his scant scientific observations were made on the basis of very few case studies.<sup>71</sup> Further, his findings were difficult to replicate.<sup>72</sup> Detached from the academy, Freud's followers among academic psychologists, including Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Erik Erikson, and Harry Stack Sullivan, only grew less research-oriented in the 1920s and 1930s, many of them choosing to refine theoretical assertions rather than gather empirical support for the theories.<sup>73</sup>

Although Freud's ultimate impact on popular conceptions of the psyche and the self was vast—communities of psychoanalysts thrived into the 1930s and 1940s, and popular representations of Freudian theory appeared throughout the century—Freudian theory grew increasingly vulnerable to attack, both within and outside academic psychology.<sup>74</sup> Psychoanalysis seemed to disregard the historical and personal significance of the major foundational institutions that gave Americans meaning.<sup>75</sup> Science and religion, etched indelibly even in the minds of the founders of American psychology, proved to be cornerstones of America's cultural system of meaning that could not be ignored.

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<sup>70</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 313.; In opposition to historians who take seriously the impact of psychoanalysis on American psychiatry, Edward Shorter suggests that the influence of Freud's "unscientific" theory was short-lived—a "pause" in the history of psychiatry, and that the only value of psychoanalysis to American psychiatry was that it got psychiatrists out of asylums. Shorter, *History of Psychiatry*, 145.

<sup>71</sup> Karl Popper produced an early and influential critique of psychoanalysis as being unfalsifiable, and thus unscientific. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

<sup>72</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 313.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, 313.

<sup>74</sup> Hale, *Rise and Crisis*, 276-299; Philip S. Holzman, "Psychoanalysis: Is the Therapy Destroying the Science?" *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 33 (1985): 725-770.

<sup>75</sup> Gregory Zilboorg, "Psychoanalysis and Religion," *Pastoral Counseling* Vol. 10, No. 8 (1959): 41-48.

## COMPETING TENSIONS IN THE FOUNDERS OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY

Those who attempted to define the New Psychology as a purely scientific enterprise, disentangled from its philosophical and spiritual roots, neglected the experiences of its founders. Even William James, who attempted to establish psychology as a natural science, was plagued by religious and philosophical questions. A self-avowed pluralist, James felt that monism didn't do justice to the complexity of individual experience.<sup>76</sup> Instead his theory emphasized "process, growth, and an ever shifting frame of reference."<sup>77</sup> James's book *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, which described a wide variety of religious and psychological experiences, attempted to broaden psychological religious understanding more than to empirically limit the categories or narrow the analysis.<sup>78</sup>

Although James is credited with establishing the empiricist and experimentalist tradition that came to characterize American psychology, the brand of empiricism he advocated foreshadowed the holistic experimental methods of humanistic psychology.<sup>79</sup> Trained in the experimental tradition, James infused the New Psychology with a scientism grounded in physiology and a pragmatism that disarmed the more tenuous philosophical leanings of mentalism.<sup>80</sup> Throughout his work, though, he maintained a critique of the narrow and exclusive perspective of the laboratory approach that

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<sup>76</sup> Wayne Viney, Cheri L. King and Brett D. King, "William James on the Advantages of a Pluralistic Psychology," in *Reinterpreting the Legacy of William James*, ed. Margaret E. Donnelly (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), 92.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>78</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 251.

<sup>79</sup> James was more fully a "father" of American psychology than any other figure, in the sense that his work fully encompassed the disparate, and often competing, themes of the field of psychology as a whole. His vision of psychology incorporated the biological, physiological, spiritual, and individual. His influences include those of Swedenborgianism, pragmatism, transcendentalism, and existentialism. Modern theorists trace his impact within parapsychology, phenomenology, depth psychology, pastoral counseling, and the self-help movement. Eugene Taylor, "'The Case for a Uniquely American Jamesian Tradition in Psychology,'" in *Reinterpreting the Legacy of William James*, ed. Margaret Donnelly (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), 2-28.

<sup>80</sup> Taylor, "Case for Jamesian Tradition," 7.

humanistic psychologists, later in the century, would so clearly position themselves against.<sup>81</sup>

For James, the necessity of accounting for spiritual and philosophical dimensions of individual experience in his work sprung from the salience of these dimensions in his personal life. On multiple occasions, James' own struggles with philosophical questions actually induced psychological symptoms. James was eminently "neurasthenic" and, during one of his episodes of religious questioning and clinical depression, was so impaired as to be unable to rise from his bed for weeks.<sup>82</sup> James' personal experience solidified, for him, the connection between spiritual questions and the physiological experience of mental illness.

James was at once a positivist and a phenomenologist, distrustful of binary solutions and ever pursuing "productive paradoxes."<sup>83</sup> He possessed an ability to fruitfully integrate conflict, the complexity of which would drive many of his successors to reductionistic extremes.

The same religious, philosophical, and scientific tensions which granted fullness to James's work posed relatively insurmountable problems to the academic psychologists who followed him. G. Stanley Hall, James's student and the first American to receive a PhD in Clinical Psychology in 1878, was deeply conflicted, even confused, about his religious and scientific sensibilities. Hall took a stand against philosophically informed models of psychology, whose efforts in psychology, he believed, had been informed "not by the patient attitude of the scientist but by the speculative urge of the philosopher to grasp the whole of things."<sup>84</sup> His position was supported by younger experimentalists,

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<sup>81</sup> Margaret Donnelly, "Introduction," in *Reinterpreting the Legacy of William James*, ed. Margaret Donnelly (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), ix.

<sup>82</sup> Richardson, *William James*, 110.

<sup>83</sup> Gordon Allport, "William James and the Behavioral Sciences," remarks at the installation of the Ellen Emmet Rand portrait of William James in Harvard's William James Hall, November 5, 1965. (Gordon W. Allport papers, HUG 4.118.50, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>84</sup> Dorothy Ross, *G. Stanley Hall: The Psychologist as Prophet* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 233.

who desired to adhere strictly to the scientific method, eliminating all metaphysical and philosophical questions from consideration. Yet, he met his share of opponents, including colleagues like George Trumbull Ladd, whose recognition of philosophical questions infused his own empiricism.<sup>85</sup>

Ironically, Hall believed that religious “sentiment” could infuse psychological science, and that psychology, in turn, could transform religion. The “religious cant” with which he embellished his psychology disturbed even James.<sup>86</sup> Although his interest in religion was subtle in his earlier publications—it was one of many areas of interest, for example in *Adolescence*, which he published in 1904—Hall grew increasingly committed to developing a psychology of religion.<sup>87</sup> Demonstrating his specific interest in the psychology of Christianity, Hall published *Jesus, the Christ, in Light of Psychology* in 1917.<sup>88</sup> After James’ death in 1909, the turn-of-the-century younger generation of psychologists, ushered in on a tide of increasing commitment to experimental science, proved even more critical of Hall’s attempt to reconcile religious sentiment with the scientific world view. Never in moderation, Hall’s intensity tended to divide psychologists, whether solidifying their position for or against him.<sup>89</sup>

Hall brought to his science a demeanor more characteristic of religious fervor than pragmatic science. Rather than paving the way for productive philosophical and theoretical compromise or compelling an integrationist agenda, Hall’s pressing internal conflicts led him to sublimate spiritual questions in the pursuit of rigorous positivism.

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 313.; George Trumbull Ladd (1842–1921) was an American philosopher, schooled at Andover Theological Seminary, who taught at Yale and worked primarily in experimental psychology. He founded the psychology laboratory at Yale and wrote several books, including *Elements of Physiological Psychology* (1887) and *Knowledge, Life, and Reality* (1909).

<sup>86</sup> Ross, *G. Stanley Hall*, 264

<sup>87</sup> H. Vande Kemp. “G. Stanley Hall and the Clark School of Religious Psychology.” *American Psychologist*, 47 (1992): 290-298.; For Hall’s first edition of *Adolescence*, see: *Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1904).

<sup>88</sup> See: G. Stanley Hall, *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1917).

<sup>89</sup> Ross, *G. Stanley Hall*, 45.



Humanistic elements of Hall's theory include his belief in the natural human inclination towards growth and improvement and his concern for the possibility of abuse in psychological testing and quantification.<sup>90</sup> But he was also an avid proponent of adjustment (the measurement of psychological health by the extent to which an individual's cognitions and attitudes align with those of the wider culture), of severing philosophy from psychology, and of privileging biological over cultural factors. Instead of incorporating a topical consideration of spirituality into psychological inquiry, Hall tended to channel his spiritual passion into radical scientific pursuits, which he valued to be the "apex of civilization."<sup>91</sup> Often beginning carefully and critically, Hall often got carried away by his excitement over the implications of his theories, recklessly leading American psychology on a positivistic course.<sup>92</sup>

Although Hall personally displayed the irrepressibility of personal values and subjective perspective in scientific inquiry, he supported the suppression of subjectivity within psychological inquiry. Hall, like other American academic psychologists who were influenced by the popularity of Darwinism and the prestige of medicine, discarded the psychology of consciousness and introspection in favor of pragmatic functionalism. The supposed impartiality of the new methods, which concealed the individual interests and passions that drove them, predictably helped move psychology into a position of

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<sup>90</sup> Hall's biographer writes that, "He called himself an evolutionist, but he did not conceive of evolution as orderly change working either up or down--for him the direction was always upward." Lorine Pruette, *G. Stanley Hall: A Biography of a Mind* (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1926), 220.

<sup>91</sup> Ross, *G. Stanley Hall*, 13.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

professional respect and cultural authority.<sup>93</sup> The new experimental psychology, by dismissing pre-1880s psychology endeavors as mere “mental philosophy,” attempted to establish itself as a purely scientific enterprise, more capable of capturing the “truth” of human experience.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> David Ingleby, “Understanding ‘Mental Illness,’” in *Critical Psychiatry: Politics of Mental Health*, ed. David Ingleby (New York: Penguin, 1981), 28.

<sup>94</sup> James H. Capshaw, *Psychologists on the March: Science, Practice, and Professional Identity in American, 1929-1969* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3-4.

## Chapter Two: America's New Psychology

William James' psychology was at once atomistic and holistic. Modeled on German experimental psychology, it both declared itself a natural science and took as its subject matter the unquantifiable arenas of observed and lived experience and psychic commonalities and differences.<sup>1</sup> Rather than deriving intractable laws of human behavior, Jamesian psychology sought to encompass the full range of human experience.<sup>2</sup>

Many of the issues that were important to James are reflected in the work of 20<sup>th</sup> century psychologists, particularly in holistic branches of psychology like social work, pastoral counseling and postwar psychotherapy.<sup>3</sup> But 20<sup>th</sup> century American psychology was also influenced by pervasive American cultural currents that demanded practicality and scientific precision of psychological explanations. One historian describes 20<sup>th</sup> century American psychology as "rough, direct, highly practical, aggressively ambitious and self-assured."<sup>4</sup> Its dominant perspectives in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were positivism and behaviorism in its academic form, and medicalization and utilitarian categorization in its applied forms. These emphases fueled the tension between atomism and holism. On the one hand, the narrowing of their subject matter helped psychologists carve out their turf, distinguishing them from other professionals concerned with mental health.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the insistence on positivism and behaviorism as singular standards for psychology provoked a sustained critique of the mainstream of the profession from psychologists of other persuasions, who were concerned more with holistic and humanistic study of the psyche.

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<sup>1</sup> For an in-depth view of James's psychology, see: William James, *Principles of Psychology*.

<sup>2</sup> Richardson, *William James*, xiv; Mitchell Ash, "Psychology," in *The Cambridge History of Science: The Modern Social Sciences*, Vol. 7, ed. Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 260-262.

<sup>3</sup> Taylor, "Case for Jamesian Tradition," 3-5.

<sup>4</sup> Schultz, *History of Modern Psychology*, 102.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

The tension between atomism and holism also played out in the division between the academic study and clinical application of psychology. The generation of American psychologists who followed James rejected almost all philosophical speculation and turned from mentalist to exclusively physicalist explanations. Psychologists like Robert Mearns Yerkes (1876-1956), Edward Lee Thorndike (1874-1949), and John B. Watson (1878-1958) argued against the practice of psychology as a social science. They focused instead on physiology and behavioral study, and chose to align the emerging discipline with the natural sciences.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, those who worked with the mentally ill found themselves increasingly estranged from the scientific study of psychology, concerning themselves with the experience of their patients and looking toward more holistic attempts at cure.<sup>7</sup>

Changes in the American university system around the turn of the century hastened the split between academic and applied psychology, encouraging professors interested in psychology to define themselves as pure researchers.<sup>8</sup> Prior to 1880, the classical college was a one-curriculum system, with undifferentiated departments, which rewarded professors for the breadth rather than the depth of their knowledge, stressed the accumulation of factual knowledge, and tended to stifle creative thought and discourage scientific probing. It wasn't until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century that scientific research, formerly relegated to extra-academic spheres funded by the American government, found a home in American universities.<sup>9</sup>

In 1861, Yale University awarded the first American PhD, and in 1876 Johns Hopkins was established as the first American graduate school, marking the birth of the

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<sup>6</sup> John A. Mills, *Control: A History of Behavioral Psychology*, (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 9-10.

<sup>7</sup> For an overview of professional developments in clinical psychology, see: Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr. "A History of Clinical Psychology as a Profession in America (And a Glimpse at its Future)," *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology* 1 (2005): 1-30.

<sup>8</sup> Mills, *Control*, 26.

<sup>9</sup> Frank McAdams Albrecht, "The New Psychology in America, 1880-1895," (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1960), 59-61.

modern university, uniquely devoted to research and professional education. The new university consisted of differentiated disciplines and was modeled on European—particularly German—educational systems, in which scholars were free to guide their own scientific inquiry and were encouraged to display creativity in their pursuits.<sup>10</sup>

American psychology departments were also shaped by German models.<sup>11</sup> A number of the leading psychologists at the turn of the century—including G. Stanley Hall, James McKeen Cattell, and Lightner Witmer—had studied in the laboratory of Wilhelm Wundt, and others, including William James, had studied more broadly in Europe. Early American psychology took shape under the direct influence of European immigrants like Hugo Munsterberg and E. B. Titchener, who had been recruited to permanent posts at American universities for their expertise in scientific methods.<sup>12</sup>

By the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, psychology, which had been previously housed in departments of philosophy and physiology, ventured out on its own. The first doctorate in psychology was awarded to Joseph Jastrow, a student of G. Stanley Hall, at John Hopkins University in 1886. James McKeen Cattell became the first professor of Psychology at Penn in 1888. After the founding of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1892, distinct departments of psychology proliferated, invariably modeled on scientific foundations and devoted to the extrication of psychological study from metaphysical concerns. The APA was, from its inception, an association primarily geared towards the interests of the academic researcher rather than the clinical practitioner.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Louis D. Cohen, “The Academic Department,” in *History of Psychotherapy: A Century of Change*, ed. Donald K. Freedheim (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), 731-733. For an in-depth exploration of the American transition from the open university system, in which truth was broadly conceived, to the modern university system, in which “facts” and “values” were divided, see Julie A. Reuben, *The Making of the Modern University: Intellectual Transformation and the Marginalization of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

<sup>11</sup> Helmut E. Adler, “The European Influence on American Psychology: 1892 and 1942,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 727 (1) (1994): 113-120.

<sup>12</sup> Cohen, “Academic Department,” 734-736.

<sup>13</sup> Michael Sokal, “Origins and Early Years of the American Psychological Association: 1890 to 1906,” in *The American Psychological Association: A Historical Perspective*, ed. Rand B. Evans, Virginia Staudt Sexton, and Thomas C. Cadwallader (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), 43-71.

Although founding members of what became known as the “New Psychology,” like James, advocated a form of psychology broad enough to include mentalist and physicalist explanations, academicians increasingly relegated considerations of introspection and unconscious mental processes to applied spheres. The years 1911 and 1912, in particular, marked a major shift in the content of American psychological research: while proceedings from the APA conference of 1911 were dominated by broad-ranging discussions of consciousness, the subsequent year’s conference was comprised almost exclusively of physicalist studies focused on observed behavior.<sup>14</sup>

### **THE TRIUMPH OF BEHAVIORISM IN ACADEMIC PSYCHOLOGY**

In 1912, Max Meyer published a comprehensive theory of behaviorism in *The Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior*.<sup>15</sup> Meyer, a recent immigrant to America, was uniquely attuned to the places in which American psychology was likely to diverge from European, correctly anticipating the popular appeal of the theory.<sup>16</sup> But it was John B. Watson’s “behaviorist manifesto”—an article entitled “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It,” published in 1913—that marked the formal emergence of behaviorism as a school of American psychology.<sup>17</sup> In his manifesto, Watson proclaimed: “Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness.”<sup>18</sup> Watson believed that the field must leave behind mentalist emphases to secure its scientific status, arguing that psychology should “discard all reference to consciousness,” and that it “need

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<sup>14</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 388.

<sup>15</sup> For the original text, see: Max Meyer, *The Fundamental Laws of Human Behavior*. (Boston: R.G. Badger, 1912).

<sup>16</sup> Mills, *Behavioral Psychology*, 40.

<sup>17</sup> John B. Watson, “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views it,” *Psychological Review*, 20 (1913): 158-177, <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/views.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

no longer delude itself into thinking that it is making mental states the object of observation.”<sup>19</sup>

American interest in behavioral psychology spread rapidly and pervaded the field thoroughly, often perplexing European psychologists who lacked the same kind of cultural interest in pragmatic applications and didn’t share the reverence for objective experimental study.<sup>20</sup> European critics of behaviorism, namely psychologists Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) and Wolfgang Kohler (1887-1968), called on Gestalt Psychology for support, arguing for the necessity of mentalism in psychological study and for the role of perceived structures and relationships, rather than sensations, in constituting human consciousness.<sup>21</sup>

The rigidity of American subscription to behaviorist theory was experienced as oppressive by many, but particularly by immigrants schooled in a more philosophically informed, humanistic model of progress in which psychological theory would evolve through dialogue rather than achieve a final, scientifically-verifiable resting place. Jacoby, in *The Repression of Psychoanalysis*, argues that the insecurity of immigrants, who were traumatized by Fascism and were struggling with a new language and culture, compelled them to conform to rigid and isolationist theories of American psychology that held no place for the social and political ideas with which they’d infused their theories when still in Europe. He writes, “[t]he catastrophe of exile and their ineluctable Americanization buried their nonconformist theories, hopes, and commitments. In the end, they fit in, and succeeded by sacrificing their own identities.”<sup>22</sup> Many immigrants

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> For an overview of the rise of behaviorism in America, and its departures from its European antecedents, see W. M. O’Neil, “American Behaviorism: A Historical and Critical Analysis,” *Theory & Psychology* Vol. 5, No. 2 (1995): 285-305.

<sup>21</sup> Ash, “Psychology,” 262.

<sup>22</sup> Russell Jacoby, *The Repression of Psychoanalysis: Otto Fenichel and the Political Freudians* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 9. In spite of the pertinence of Jacoby’s critique, he narrowly considered political Freudianism (a rebellious adherence to the original principles of Freud’s theory) to be the one valid form of “unique” political action on the part of psychoanalysts. Neo-Freudian immigrants tended to incorporate more overt political and cultural critique into their theories than Freudians—whose environmental considerations extended to include mothers and fathers at most. Karen Horney and Erich

found the mandate for behaviorist study stultifying, and indicative of intellectual constraints and specialized notions of what should constitute and define a discipline that were incompatible with the subject of human psychology.<sup>23</sup>

Immigrant concerns echoed those of a minority of American psychologists who were disturbed by the rapidity with which psychology was becoming a “cult of empiricism,” in which “methodological imperatives [...] were proposed as perquisites for the establishment of rigor and objectivity within psychological science.”<sup>24</sup> American psychologists Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy and Lois Barclay Murphy, though dedicated to the scientific elements of psychology, grew increasingly dismayed in the 1930s and 1940s by the narrowing of the discipline of psychology, in American psychology departments, down to a reductionistic pursuit of “the objective truth” of psychological phenomena. Gordon Allport felt that, “just as chemical analysis of living tissues destroys life, rendering the mere chemical description inadequate as a description of the total reality, so the reduction of mental states to elements destroys that unity, that organization, which is mental life itself.”<sup>25</sup>

Empiricist emphases were not unfamiliar to European immigrants, who were well-versed in the structuralism that dominated European psychology. In fact, many immigrants who were grounded in phenomenological and Gestalt traditions held empiricism, which for them was a much more encompassing notion than it was for Americans, to be a primary and significant element of their theory and research. They were repelled, however, by the way that certain American behaviorists translated

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Fromm, for example, infused much of the European spirit of creative protest into their psychological work by expanding their Freudianism with questions about how culture and politics affect the individual.

<sup>23</sup> Michael M. Sokal, “The Gestalt Psychologists in Behaviorist America,” *American Historical Review* 89 (1984), 1242. Although Sokal acknowledges the extreme differences between behaviorism and Gestalt psychology and describes the struggles of European Gestalt psychologists within the American university system, he concludes that, on the whole, Gestalt psychologists, and their ideas, were well-received in behaviorist America. *Ibid.*, 1262-1263.

<sup>24</sup> Katherine Pandora, *Rebels within the Ranks: Psychologists' Critique of Scientific Authority and Democratic Realities in New Deal America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 9.

<sup>25</sup> Gordon Allport, as quoted in Pandora, 37.



empiricism into what, to the Europeans, seemed an extreme form of reductionism, and by the willingness of many to disregard human complexity in pursuit of distilled and comprehensible psychological phenomena.<sup>26</sup>

Both American critics and many immigrant psychologists found the criteria for behavioral study incompatible with the study of a subject matter as complex as human psychology. Leading second generation behaviorists like B. F. Skinner, however, dismissed this charge, defending the elimination of mental events from the study of psychology. He argued that “if we are to call anything oversimplified, it must be those mentalistic explanations, so readily invented on the spot, which are appealing because they seem so much simpler than the facts they are said to explain.”<sup>27</sup> Even if we were to conceive humans as akin to machines, Skinner averred, humans and the laws that governed them were infinitely more complex than the simple machines—like refrigerators—to which we were accustomed.<sup>28</sup>

Skinner affirmed Watson’s attempt to divorce psychology from mentalism, but took issue with Watson’s strategy. He criticized Watson’s effort to redefine the subject matter of psychology by attacking the introspective study of mental life. Skinner, who established himself as a behaviorist in the 1930s, argued in his 1974 book *About Behaviorism* that Watson should have instead proposed a new science, to be called “the experimental analysis of behavior.” Skinner defined Watson’s behaviorism as methodological behaviorism, a study which “could be said to ignore consciousness, feelings, and states of mind” and his own as radical behaviorism, a science that “does not thus ‘behead the organism’” or “sweep the problem of subjectivity under the rug.” Instead, Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporated consciousness by studying the role of autonomic stimulation in behavior.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>27</sup> Skinner, *About Behaviorism*, 254.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 263.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 241-242.

Skinner's claim that the study of human behavior would make man more understandable (he argued that behaviorism was intended to "dehomunculize" man, rather than "dehumanize" him) appealed to the American commitment to progress and mastery.<sup>30</sup> Practical applications of behaviorist theory, which emerged in personal and social realms in the 1940s, served both empirical and practical ends.<sup>31</sup> One historian traces American behaviorism's line of descent to turn-of-the-century Progressive reform, a movement influenced in turn by societal reform. This impulse was characterized by an inclination to optimize social betterment through objective findings.<sup>32</sup>

Methodological behaviorists like John B. Watson and Edward L. Thorndike, and radical behaviorists, or neobehaviorists, like Skinner, were actively engaged in empirical research, rather than social application.<sup>33</sup> Although Skinner theorized that a science of behavior could yield "the design and construction of a world which [frees man] from constraints and vastly extend[s] his range," he left the application of behavioral theory to practitioners and policy makers.<sup>34</sup> With different motivations and interests, practitioners found the greatest use for behaviorist theory in the application of mental testing.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, behaviorists tended to remain in the laboratory.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 263; Smith, "B. F. Skinner," 69.

<sup>31</sup> Most of the behaviorism that followed Thorndike's 1920s theories can be more accurately termed "neobehaviorist." The main distinguishing factor from the behaviorist theories that preceded his work and the neobehaviorist theories that followed was a difference in the comprehensiveness of their social theories. Though behaviorists believed that their theories would have direct social implications, they didn't produce comprehensive, empirically based investigations of these social consequences. In contrast, neobehaviorists produced more sophisticated and comprehensive theories of social implications. For more on the distinction between behaviorist and neobehaviorist theory, see Mills, *Control*, 83-102.

<sup>32</sup> Mills, *Control*, 23-24.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 3.; In addition to methodological behaviorists, who were concerned with experimentally producing behaviors that functionally related to mental constructs as a means to decode mental states, and radical behaviorists, who discussed the absolute parallel between the mental and physical and explained mental events in physicalist language, logical behaviorists argued that mental language could be translated into physicalist language, producing behaviors that functionally related to mental constructs as a means to decode mental states. Logical behaviorism, however, was largely absent from the American psychological scene in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For a deeper exposition of these distinctions see Mills, *Control*.

<sup>34</sup> Skinner, *About Behaviorism*, 263.

<sup>35</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 355.

## THE FRAGMENTATION OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

Applied psychology was, by its very definition, more “humanistic” than experimental academic study. Faced with real human problems and varied individual conflicts, practitioners were forced to confront the messiness of human experience that behaviorists tried to reduce and control. But this hardly meant that they agreed on how best to do it. Applied psychology grew in the interwar and postwar years exponentially faster than experimental psychology, but also witnessed greater philosophical and professional conflicts, which led to increased differentiation between, and specialization among, groups of psychologists.<sup>36</sup> While psychiatrists, psychotherapists, social workers, and pastoral counselors shared the common goals of easing personal and social dysfunction, they shared little consensus regarding treatment theory. The pressure to make their own specialty indispensable and to achieve professional supremacy accented their differences—by framing them in competitive terms that often undermined the respectability of neighboring professions. It also produced a host of uninvited consequences, which included the almost complete medicalization of psychiatry, the professionalization of psychology based on a scientist-practitioner model, and the marginalization of social workers and pastoral counselors.<sup>37</sup>

### Protecting the Medical Status of Psychiatry and Psychoanalysis

Psychiatrists, backed by the American Medical Association (AMA), laid the groundwork for the battles over exclusivity that would come to define psychotherapy. In addition to enforcing informal standards for the practice of reputable psychotherapeutic

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<sup>36</sup> Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (New York: Routledge, 1955), 6.

<sup>37</sup> For a consideration of the specific effects of professional differentiation in the mental health field, see Hale, *Freud and the Americans*; Hale, *Rise and Crisis*; E. Brooks Holifield, *A History of Pastoral Care in America: From Salvation to Self-Realization* (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1983).; Leslie Leighninger, *Social Work: Search for Identity* (New York, Greenwood Press, 1987); Mark S. Micale and Roy Porter, eds., *Discovering the History of Psychiatry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

practice, psychiatrists sought formal measures to protect their turf, limit competition and ensure the longevity of their profession.<sup>38</sup>

In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, psychiatrists either managed mental asylums or engaged in private practice where they treated the mentally ill.<sup>39</sup> Trained in medicine, they were schooled in biological theories of mental illness, attuned to physiological components of psychopathology, and aware of early neuropsychiatric theories of the role of the nervous system.<sup>40</sup> Influenced by the work of Emil Kraepelin, they performed the work of diagnosis, which at the turn of the century consisted of just a few categories of pathology, including Kraepelin's manic depression and dementia praecox.<sup>41</sup>

American psychiatrists, particularly those who practiced after Freud's visit in 1909, also performed psychotherapy, or "talk therapy," and advanced psychological theory.<sup>42</sup> Psychiatrists viewed psychoanalysis as a new opportunity for expanding their turf. Formerly lacking a cohesive theory of the psyche that could apply to mental health or illness, they found the explanatory framework of psychoanalysis, and the technique of talk therapy, to be highly marketable in the treatment of mental distress. Psychoanalysis also extended psychiatrists' clientele beyond severely impaired psychotics to the much larger pool of functional neurotics.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Nikolas Rose, "Psychiatry and the Discipline of Mental Health," in *The Power of Psychiatry*, ed. Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), 43-84.

<sup>39</sup> For histories of psychiatrists' roles in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century asylums, see Thomas G. Ebert, *A Social History of the Asylum: Mental Illness and Its Treatment in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century* (Lima, OH: Wyndam Hall Press, 1999). For a history of the asylum prior to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, see Rothman, *Discovery of the Asylum*.

<sup>40</sup> Shorter, *History of Psychiatry*, 69-71. Shorter opposes social-constructionist or "apologist" histories of psychiatry, instead arguing for the validity of historical psychiatric practices, especially those that incorporated biological and proto-neuropsychiatric elements. However, he is apologetic for psychiatry's period of interest in Freudian psychology, believing Freud to be a pseudo-scientist. His history has been most useful to me as a resource for factual, historical information.

<sup>41</sup> Emil Kraepelin, *Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia* (Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone, 1919), 1-2. Kraepelin divided psychosis into these two categories in the fourth German edition of his *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie* in 1893, translated in English as *Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia*.

<sup>42</sup> Hale, *Freud and the Americans*, xi-xii.

<sup>43</sup> Hale, *Rise and Crisis*, 57-73.

Freud's theory, which had been trickling into the US from the first years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, formally arrived with his visit to Clark University in 1909. But the lay popularity of psychoanalysis developed in the 1920s, when Freud's ideas appeared in national magazines and newspapers. The American public's understanding of psychoanalysis tended to be an eclectic mix of the theories of Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung and Alfred Adler, underlined by the scientific status of the psychiatric profession.<sup>44</sup>

Freud, unlike other medically trained psychoanalysts, ardently opposed the idea that medically trained individuals were inherently the most appropriate providers of therapy. In fact, he argued in 1929 that medical training is "almost the opposite" of what would prepare a person to be an effective psychoanalyst.<sup>45</sup> He wrote that the medical student's attention "has simply been focused upon facts which may be objectively ascertained, such as present themselves in astronomy, physics, and chemistry, and which must be understood properly and applied correctly, to achieve results."<sup>46</sup> By carving out an exclusive sphere in psychotherapeutic practice, psychiatrists fueled the illusion that psychological distress could be objectively comprehended and that treatment could be precisely applied (by medical experts).

The debate over lay analysis also forced psychologists, even those trained in psychoanalytic methods, out of the practice of psychoanalysis.<sup>47</sup> The result was a great deal of professional insecurity both for non-medically trained psychoanalysts (who were forced out of professional societies and denied work) and medically trained psychoanalysts (who had to carefully monitor their associations with non-medically trained psychoanalysts). It also created a rigid defensiveness within psychoanalytic societies that extended to inflexible requirements of professional and theoretical orthodoxy.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Hale, *Freud and the Americans*, 17-23.

<sup>45</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Questions of Lay Analysis* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1950), 142.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.

<sup>47</sup> Jack L. Rubins, *Karen Horney: Gentle Rebel of Psychoanalysis* (New York: The Dial Press, 1978), 260.

<sup>48</sup> Hale, *Rise and Crisis*, 25-37.

Psychologist Karen Horney's experience demonstrates the unavoidable insecurity that characterized even open-minded and creative psychiatrists. Horney, who was expelled in 1941 from the New York Psychoanalytic Society (NYPS) for "disturbing" students with her theoretical breaks from strict Freudianism, began the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (AAP) the same year. In her resignation letter to the New York Society, she wrote, "The Society has steadily deteriorated. Reverence for dogma has replaced free inquiry; academic freedom has been abrogated; students have been intimidated; scientific sessions have degenerated into political machinations."<sup>49</sup>

In 1943, however, succumbing to the pressure from key figures like William Silverberg, whom she respected and relied upon for professional sustenance, Horney allowed the new association to become punitively restrictive in its own right. She was compelled to support the withdrawal of training analyst privileges from her friend and colleague Erich Fromm out of the fear that his status as a lay analyst would imperil the association's relationship with New York Medical College.<sup>50</sup> Harry Stack Sullivan, who sided with Fromm, observed that "Personal and professional insecurity often find expression in distrust of the judgment if not the integrity of others, particularly colleagues who are actively discontented with somewhat useful things as they are, and insistent that something constructive can and should be done."<sup>51</sup> This insecurity combined with motives for profit and prestige tended to hinder the advancement of psychological theory

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<sup>49</sup> Karen Horney, Clara Thompson and others, in a letter to the New York Psychoanalytic Society, as quoted in Rubins, *Karen Horney*, 240.

<sup>50</sup> Rubins, *Karen Horney*, 260. Fromm, as a lay analyst—holding a PhD in sociology and trained in psychoanalysis in Berlin, but lacking medical training—remained on the outskirts of academic psychology and medical psychiatry throughout his career. Though he was invited to Columbia University as a visiting professor from 1935 to 1939, Fromm never held a permanent academic position in the US. Within Freudian psychoanalytic institutes, he held honorary and limited privileges. He was a member-at-large of the American Psychoanalytic Association and was unable to teach technical clinical courses at the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis. However, he helped to found the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and Psychology in 1945, and there became a training analyst. For more on Fromm's professional biography, see Rainer Funk, *Erich Fromm: The Courage to be Human* (New York: Continuum, 1982), 8-15.

<sup>51</sup> Harry Stack Sullivan as quoted in Helen Swick Perry, *Psychiatrist of America: The Life of Harry Stack Sullivan* (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1982), 287.

and practice. Sullivan repeatedly found himself the target of such distrust, first when the American Psychoanalytic Association split from the Washington School of Psychiatry, which was dominated by Sullivan, and later in his search for academic positions in medical schools.<sup>52</sup>

The fate of psychologists and psychiatrists whose credentials or beliefs differed from the status quo of professionals within their fields was often expulsion from mainstream universities and institutions. Alternative private institutions tended to be most hospitable to lay analysts and those who supported interdisciplinary collaboration. The advantage of affiliation with a private institution was that analysts were free from the rigid empirical and positivist constraints of psychology departments steeped in behaviorism or psychiatry departments devoted to medicalization. But the limited influence of these affiliations was a definite disadvantage.<sup>53</sup>

Meanwhile, the American Psychiatric Association pushed for even greater hegemony and professional control, intervening in the credentialing of members of neighboring professions. Even as psychologists fought internal battles for safeguards against “charlatanism” or “quackery,” psychiatrists oversaw them, dictating certification and licensure standards intended to regulate and standardize psychological practice. As reflected in the AMA’s 1951 recommendation that the American Psychiatric Association support “certification” but oppose “licensing” of psychologists, doctors demanded the appointment of psychiatrists to licensing boards for psychologists, and argued for required medical examinations of psychological patients.<sup>54</sup>

Pursuing the practice of diagnostic classification that had begun in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century with Emil Kraepelin, psychiatrists made a greater leap towards the medicalization of mental disorder in 1952, with the American Psychiatric Association’s publication of

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 287.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 385.

<sup>54</sup> “Joint Council Seeks Agreement with Medical Group on Licensing Legislation,” *The Bulletin of the New York State Psychological Association* Vol. 4, No. 3 (December, 1951): 3.

the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).<sup>55</sup> The manual gave psychiatrists another tool for perpetuating a cultural perception of the expertise required for proper diagnosis and treatment. Comprised of sixty concrete disorders, DSM-I named disorders and specified symptom criteria for diagnosis.<sup>56</sup> Although DSM critics pointed to the lack of empirical validity behind diagnostic categories, the introduction and widespread use of the DSM met the growing American need for a simplified and less stigmatized approach to mental illness.<sup>57</sup> If medical standards could be applied to mental distress, the diagnosis of mental illness could seem as straightforward as the diagnosis of a broken arm and the treatment as routine as the setting of a cast. The perceived ease of psychological diagnosis and treatment also helped normalize mental distress at an historical moment when Americans were searching for alternatives to religious elucidations of personal struggles.<sup>58</sup>

The medicalization of mental illness, as represented by the DSM, drastically altered cultural perceptions of mental distress. No longer intended solely for “lunatics,” psychiatric treatment became more accessible to the average American citizen and the stigma of diagnosis markedly diminished. The DSM also gave psychiatrists a new legitimacy, ushering them into the sphere of “medical science” and positioning them as experts on formerly elusive and thoroughly disturbing disorders.

The DSM was by no means exclusively a tool for cultural legitimacy of psychiatry. Instead, it was one of many sites where psychiatrists and psychologists overlapped in their professional roles.<sup>59</sup> Many psychologists embraced the new diagnostic categories and the medicalized concepts of mental distress they embodied, hoping that

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<sup>55</sup> *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1952).

<sup>56</sup> Paul Chodoff, “Psychiatric Diagnosis: A 60-Year Perspective,” *Psychiatric News* Vol. 40, No. 11 (June 3, 2005): 17.

<sup>57</sup> Alix Spiegel, “The Dictionary of Disorder: How one Man Revolutionized Psychiatry,” *The New Yorker*, January 3, 2005, <http://psychrights.org/articles/NewYorkeronDSM.htm>.

<sup>58</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 276.

<sup>59</sup> German E. Berrios, *The History of Mental Symptoms: Descriptive Psychopathology since the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-3.



such concepts would grant greater legitimacy to their own practices. Medicalization, though problematic in certain respects, offered a cultural esteem previously unknown to mental health professions. But it held potentially harmful consequences. Perpetuating the mental health field's drive for exclusivity, inculcating an aggrandized notion of professional expertise, and undermining any potential for harmony between professionals with similar goals but different methods, medicalization left in its wake a thoroughly fragmented field.<sup>60</sup>

### **The Creation of the Scientist-Practitioner and an Expanded Role for Psychologists**

Psychiatrists were not the only ones perpetuating the professional rifts between, and even within, mental health professions. Psychologists, who came to differentiate themselves through the acquisition of PhDs in psychology, also wanted an independent professional identity, and were threatened by those in neighboring disciplines—psychiatrists and social workers—who threatened to make their practice redundant and obsolete. There was no consensus, however, over how best to achieve the independence they desired.<sup>61</sup> Most psychologists focused on erecting certification standards that would make their profession more exclusive and on expanding applied psychology into realms that had been previously unclaimed (most notably, psychological testing).<sup>62</sup>

The American Association of Clinical Psychologists (AACP) was formed in 1917 with the intention of establishing and protecting clinical psychology as a service profession—able to administer psychological tests, offer vocational guidance, and help industries solve their personnel problems.<sup>63</sup> Members were particularly concerned with establishing a reputation for psychology independent of those who they had determined

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<sup>60</sup> Peter Conrad, *The Medicalization of Society: On the Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 146-164.

<sup>61</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 538-542.

<sup>62</sup> Samuel W. Fernberger, "The American Psychological Association: A Historical Summary, 1892-1930," *Psychological Bulletin* 29 (1932): 1-89, <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Fernberger/1932/history.htm>.

<sup>63</sup> Michael M. Sokal, "James McKeen Cattell and American Psychology in the 1920s" in *Explorations in the History of Psychology in the United States*, ed. Josef Brozek (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1984), 290.

were “pseudoscientists,” including psychiatric social workers and phrenologists.<sup>64</sup> Though many members of the American Psychological Association (APA) were antagonistic to clinicians, in part because they hoped to secure their *own* positions in the field, the AACP was absorbed as a division of APA in 1917.<sup>65</sup> Numerous conflicts ensued and the relationship was often tenuous, but the groups agreed to a set of certification standards for consulting psychologists in 1921. Although the certification standards remained in place for six years, only twenty-five consulting psychologists were certified, and the standards were largely ignored.<sup>66</sup>

To distinguish themselves from psychiatrists, who attempted to oversee their organizations and to co-opt their therapeutic duties, psychologists reconceptualized themselves as scientist-practitioners, merging practice with scientific investigation.<sup>67</sup> Graduate programs began to teach psychologists to be scientists first and practitioners of a craft second (an orientation which persists to this day) in order to differentiate their graduates from competitors in the field. Psychiatric training, in contrast, lacked the scientific element. Scientific training, however, ultimately only gave psychologists a small leg up in internal turf battles. Americans vested the field of medicine with so much implicit scientific authority that even when its practices had very little grounding in science—as in psychiatry’s case—the medical degree was granted an aura of much greater scientific standing than was the psychology PhD.<sup>68</sup>

Psychologists’ greatest success as scientist-practitioners was in establishing their sole reign over the domain of psychological testing, which proliferated between the first and second world wars. During this time, psychologists made remarkable strides in intelligence, aptitude, personality and projective testing. Intelligence testing, though it

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 290.

<sup>65</sup> Rand B. Evans, “Growing Pains: The American Psychological Association From 1903 to 1920,” in *The American Psychological Association: A Historical Perspective*, ed. Rand B. Evans, Virginia Staudt Sexton, and Thomas C. Cadwallader (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1992), 73-90.

<sup>66</sup> Sokal, “James McKeen Cattell” , 291.

<sup>67</sup> Leahey, *History of Psychology*, 447.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 447.

occurred before World War I, developed significantly during the first war, in particular with Robert Yerkes' creation of the Army Alpha and Army Beta tests—verbal and nonverbal tests designed to help place, advance, or eliminate military personnel. Out of the Army Alpha and the Army Beta grew numerous intelligence and aptitude tests, including the National Intelligence Test that was created in the 1920s and administered to approximately 7 million children.<sup>69</sup>

The interwar years also saw pioneering attempts in the creation of personality and projective tests. Robert Sessions Woodworth created the Personal Data Sheet, intended to determine predispositions of army recruits to psychoneurosis. Though the test was developed too late to prove useful in World War I, it laid the foundation for numerous personality inventories, including the popular Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (published in 1940) and the Thurstone Personality Schedule (published in 1930). Americans made use of the Rorschach Ink Blot test (developed in 1921 by Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach) and the Thematic Apperception Test (created by humanistic psychologist Henry Murray and his colleague Christianna Morgan in 1935).<sup>70</sup>

Recognizing the potential for professional legitimation and a broadened sphere of influence, psychology, like psychiatry, was also more than willing to serve as a tool for the American government during World War II. In their new role of scientist-practitioner, even humanistic psychologists like Henry Murray, Carl Rogers, and Gordon Allport found themselves performing psychological testing in the military, matching military personnel to positions best suited to their personality. Professionals who had been considered mere technicians prior to the war were suddenly considered expert consultants, uniquely qualified to provide structure and organization to the military and to

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<sup>69</sup> For a thorough history of the early development of professional psychology in America, see Fernberger, "American Psychological Association."

<sup>70</sup> For a firmer grounding in the history of psychological testing in America, see: Philip H. Dubois, *A History of Psychological Testing* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970); Robert J. Gregory, *Psychological Testing: History, Principles, and Applications*, 5<sup>th</sup> Edition (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2006); Herman, *The Romance of American Psychology*; and Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

advise the government on war strategy.<sup>71</sup> The American government's new esteem for psychology was demonstrated in their employment of Henry Murray, who was commissioned to compose a psychological profile of Adolf Hitler, intended to enlighten military strategists on the character of the "megalomaniac" they were combating. Murray described Hitler as counteractive, masochistic, and a "hive of secret neurotic compunctions and feminine sentimentalities."<sup>72</sup> Carl Rogers also became involved in the war effort: he published *Counseling with Returned Servicemen* with John Wallen in 1946, applying his client-centered technique to the challenge of treating "shell-shocked" soldiers returning from World War II.<sup>73</sup>

The government continued to utilize psychologists and to promote their cultural status after WWII as well. Faced with legions of "shell-shocked" or "battle-fatigued" soldiers experiencing what would soon be diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder, the US government thought it wise to promote the role of psychotherapy as a panacea for all forms of mental suffering. In 1945, the government commissioned director John Huston, then a Captain in the US Army's Signal Corp-based film unit, to produce a documentary film touting the efficacy of therapy for soldiers. *Let There be Light*, completed in 1946, followed 75 emotionally troubled soldiers who enter Mason General psychiatric hospital in New Jersey, receive treatment, and by the end of their time at the hospital (and the end of the film) demonstrate remarkable recoveries.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*, 17-25.

<sup>72</sup> Henry A. Murray, "Psychological Profile of Adolf Hitler: With Predictions of His Future Behavior and Suggestions for Dealing with Him Now and After Germany's Surrender," (paper prepared for the wartime Office of Strategic Services, 1943) (1943 OSS Archives, DD247.H5 M87), [http://www.paperlessarchives.com/adolf\\_hitler\\_oss\\_-\\_cia\\_files.html](http://www.paperlessarchives.com/adolf_hitler_oss_-_cia_files.html); Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*.

<sup>73</sup> For the original text, see: Carl R. Rogers and John L. Wallen, *Counseling with Returned Servicemen* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946).

<sup>74</sup> *Let Their Be Light*, directed by John Huston, Edgewood State Hospital, Commack, Long Island (New York: US Army Pictorial Services, Released December, 1980). Just as a scientized vision of psychology was endorsed, a medicalized depiction of psychiatry was promoted in the film. The intentionality with which the psychiatrists in the film administer the program of treatment reflects the extreme faith in rationality that characterized the propagandized vision of psychology in the 1940s. Carefully balanced in administering a combination of group therapy, hypnosis, and individual psychotherapy, the psychiatrists perpetuate the medicalized interpretation of mental distress, equating the therapist with the medical expert

Other films of the forties reinforced the narrative of psychotherapy as a scientifically precise tool of mental adjustment, suggesting Hollywood's complicity in the cultural construction of psychotherapy. Films like Curtis Bernhardt's *Conflict* (1945), Robert Siodmak's *The Dark Mirror* (1946), Robert Stevenson's *Dishonored Lady* (1947) and Curtis Bernhardt's *Possessed* (1947) conflated psychologists and psychiatrists with detectives, portraying omniscient therapists/ detectives whose keen psychological insights enable them to solve crimes. As inaccurate as the image of the super-sleuth or the omniscient soothsayer may have been, the mysticism and implicit authority surrounding it were compelling to doctors and patients alike.<sup>75</sup>

In an immediate and practical respect, the government's elevation of psychological experts was extremely propitious for the field. Despite the inaccuracy of popular depictions—which distorted the reality of recovery, suggesting that individual problems were easily and consistently remediated through the simple administration of psychotherapy—the media attention the field received only reinforced the status of the thriving profession.

The growth of psychology was a self-perpetuating cycle. A field supersaturated with practitioners prior to the war, psychology was thirsty for new professionals after the war. The *New York Times* estimated a need for as many as 27,000 new clinical psychologists in 1949.<sup>76</sup> Large foundations reacted to this perceived need with an infusion of funding into the training of new psychologists. The Rockefeller Foundation

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who inherently knows just how much of each treatment to administer. The nearly flawless results further support the wisdom of the specialists in the program. By the end of the film the soldiers were in high spirits and playing baseball (i.e. restored to fully functioning Americans).

The film was intended to combat the prejudices that suffering veterans were facing from employers by demonstrating the ease with which psychological problems could be eliminated (in the film most patients were completely cured in three weeks time), but, upon the completion of the film, the government refused to distribute it for fear that the connection between mental distress and military service would reflect badly on the military and that the film would compromise doctor-patient confidentiality for those involved. It didn't screen at all until 1981 at the Cannes Film Festival. Krin Gabbard and Glen O. Gabbard, *Psychiatry and the Cinema* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 73; Vincent Canby, "Let There Be Light: John Huston vs. the Army," *New York Times*, January 16, 1981, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07EFDF153BF935A25752C0A967948260>.

<sup>75</sup> Gabbard and Gabbard, *Psychiatry and the Cinema*, 44-83.

<sup>76</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 262.

and other charitable trusts infused university departments and research centers with monies that would facilitate the growth of the field. In 1946, Congress responded by passing the National Mental Health Act, which appropriated greater government support for psychological research and education and created the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which would be a center for psychological research and would receive considerable government funding in the years to come.<sup>77</sup>

Research funds for psychology flowed from American confidence in the value of psychology's "scientific" basis.<sup>78</sup> But the individuation of psychology from psychiatry was incomplete. Both maintained a stake in psychotherapeutic practice and both, through the construction of newly rigorous certification standards and requirements, fought to expand their realms and to specialize professionally. The fuzziness of the distinction, and the conflation of the two professions that was common in the cultural consciousness, was to persist throughout the century.<sup>79</sup>

### **Social Roles for Social Workers**

The profession of social work, which emerged from charitable movements of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (including settlement houses), sought a broader role in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>80</sup> Initially engaged in casework that was devoted almost exclusively to vocational and domestic rehabilitation of the mentally ill and infirm, social workers struggled in the early decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to reinvision their "identity" at the same time that they borrowed roles and theories from psychology. Lacking a unique knowledge base, social

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 262

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 262.

<sup>79</sup> Rose, *Psychiatry and Mental Health*, 227-228. Confusion of the two fields persists into the present, see Karen Franklin, "Dr. Phil Controversy Highlights Public Confusion over Psychology," January 10, 2008, <http://forensicpsychologist.blogspot.com/2008/01/dr-phil-controversy-highlights-public.html>.

<sup>80</sup> Barbara Levy Simon, *The Empowerment Tradition in American Social Work: A History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 60-62.

workers sought to tailor psychological theory, including Freudianism, to their unique needs as a profession.<sup>81</sup>

As with psychology and psychiatry, increasing the exclusivity of professional standards served as a tool to heighten the field's esteem. Social work established official professional standards in July of 1929, three years after the founding of the American Association of Social Workers (AASW). By 1930, a more flexible credentialing standard that looked at experience, general education, and apprenticeship was replaced by a standard that used specialized professional education as the primary criterion for membership.<sup>82</sup>

Unfortunately, the newly rigorous standards, which had appealed to the majority of social workers when they were adopted, were poorly suited to the unique situation that 1930s America presented. The Depression years produced a soaring demand for social services soon after the more rigorous standard had begun to produce a contracting supply of actual social workers. Many academic programs responded to the changing market by increasing their enrollment and offering part-time programs, yet academic requirements continued to perpetuate a narrow professional monopoly.<sup>83</sup>

The depression years also intensified the debate about whether social work should take a stronger social and cultural role.<sup>84</sup> Within psychology, theorists like Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Gordon Allport, who highlighted the applicability of social and cultural forces to individual psychology, generally failed to consider the reverse; the potential influence that individuals could have on social and cultural forces. Social work deviated from psychology in this respect. Mainly employed by public agencies and supported by government funds, social workers had more firsthand knowledge of the

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<sup>81</sup> Leighninger, *Social Work*, 16.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-16.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>84</sup> Mimi Abramovitz, "Social Work and Social Reform: An Arena of Struggle," *Social Work* Vol. 43 (1998):

<http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=HJXfCBIF2yFBr4j2MkcGf1gvRL3bDthRngKznp73dmJnh1YKkJh5!1617678779?docId=5001394525>.

mechanisms of social inequality and dependence, and more belief in the possibility of remedying them, than psychologists or psychiatrists did.

Internal divisions over the emerging identity of social work ultimately prevented the field, however, from engaging in meaningful involvement in the development of new public programs. A 1930s AASW survey showed that more than two-thirds of respondents believed that social agencies shouldn't take an active part in any political activity.<sup>85</sup> For most members, establishing professional prestige was AASW's primary objective; they felt that any political stance other than utter neutrality would compromise the association's legitimacy. Consequently, social workers strategically passed up opportunities presented during the depression and World War II to gain a larger role in social planning and service.<sup>86</sup>

Social work seized the opportunity to move into the expanded realm of psychology by working to construct a unified professional identity through the 1940s. By 1952, the American Association of Schools of Social Work (AASW), which had made graduate education the criteria for recognition as a social worker, and the National Association of Schools of Social Administration (NASSA), an organization committed to encouraging undergraduate education for social work, agreed to merge into one entity, signifying their newly acknowledged common goals and the solidified professional foundation of social work. Subsequently, social work, like psychology, gained status by merging science with practice, attracting research funding from benefactors like the Russell Sage Foundation.<sup>87</sup>

Tensions remained high between social work and neighboring fields, despite the infusion of funds and the increased demand for mental health services. Feeling

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<sup>85</sup> Leighninger, *Social Work*, 56.

<sup>86</sup> Robert L. Schneider and F. Ellen Netting, "Influencing Social Policy in a Time of Devolution: Upholding Social Work's Great Tradition," *Social Work* Vol. 44 (1999): <http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5001284491>.

<sup>87</sup> The Russell Sage Foundation was founded in 1907 with the intention of pioneering reform in social welfare. Since World War II, the foundation has been focused on strengthening the social science to spur informed social policy. Leighninger, *Social Work*, 162-163.



threatened, psychologists often sought to discredit social workers, who had grown progressively psychoanalytic after World War II.<sup>88</sup> Instead of moving in the direction of social and community welfare, which was by definition under their umbrella, social workers sought to translate psychological theory into practice, an attempt that had contemporaneous parallels in psychology, psychiatry, and pastoral counseling. Instead of differentiating themselves, social workers threw themselves into the ring, positioning themselves in direct competition for psychotherapeutic primacy.<sup>89</sup>

Despite continued tensions within the field over the social role of the profession, social work continued to grow. From 1930 to 1960, ASSW membership increased more than fivefold and the association expanded to contain 6 separate sub-organizations for medical, psychiatric, school, group, research, and community organization practitioners.<sup>90</sup> Social work's growth preserved its position, but its failure to expand into social and cultural realms or to produce novel theories granted to psychology and psychiatry, by default, greater intellectual and theoretical influence in the coming decades.

## **PSYCHOLOGY IN THE RELIGIOUS REALM**

Faced in the 1940s with America's dwindling liberal protestant religious sentiment, protestant ministers perceived an opportunity to increase their relevance in the newly popular psychological sphere and threw themselves in the ring with psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers.<sup>91</sup> What began with a small group of ministers attempting to construct a program of professional psychotherapeutic training in the 1920s soon burgeoned into a profusion of clinical seminars and training programs designed for

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid., 152.

<sup>89</sup> The orientation of social work towards psychotherapy and away from community action persists into the present. W. B. Jacobson, "Beyond Therapy: Bringing Social Work Back to Human Services Reform," *Social Work* Vol. 46, No. 1, January 1 (2001): 51-61.

<sup>90</sup> Leighninger, *Social Work*, 185.

<sup>91</sup> Sydney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 955-956.

ministers. Ministers also found a niche in popular psychological realms, combining religious and psychological ideas in the medium of self-help literature and sermons.<sup>92</sup>

Like social work, pastoral counselors entered the psychological realm in the 1920s and 1930s, guided largely by a paradigm of social adjustment. But in contrast to social workers, whose client-base was insecure and whose primacy was contested by the numerous talented psychiatrists and psychologists who saturated the field, pastoral counselors entered the realm with a predetermined and pre-secured clientele—their parishioners.<sup>93</sup>

Protestant ministers first dabbled in psychological matters with the introduction of counseling techniques and theory into their sermons. In the 1920s, Harry Emerson Fosdick—outspoken liberal Baptist minister and New Yorker—was the prototypical psychologized minister, persuading liberal clergy of the efficacy of using pastoral speaking as a form of counseling.<sup>94</sup> The positive response of Protestant ministers to the idea of combining theological and psychological theory was evinced by the publication of Karl Stolz’s *Pastoral Psychology* in 1932 and *The Church and Psychotherapy* in 1943, which collectively argued that pastors must become central in facilitating the adjustment of parishioners to the demands of modern life.<sup>95</sup> Following on its heels, Charles Holman’s 1936 publication of *The Cure of Souls* attempted to offer “a sort of guide book” for the integration of pastoral counseling into ministry.<sup>96</sup>

One historian writes that, “[t]he pastoral theologians of the 1930s did a considerable amount of stumbling around, but they laid the foundations for a postwar renaissance that would have surprised even them.”<sup>97</sup> With the theoretical foundations that

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<sup>92</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 231-234.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 228-231.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, 219.

<sup>95</sup> Karl Ruf Stolz, *The Church and Psychotherapy* (Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943), 98-123. See also: Karl Ruf Stolz, *Pastoral Psychology* (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1932).

<sup>96</sup> For the original text, see: Charles Thomas Holman, *The Cure of Souls: A Socio-Psychological Approach*, xii (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).

<sup>97</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 221.

many theologians had advanced prior to the war, universities and seminaries were in a good position to fly into action immediately following the war. Harvard led the charge by establishing a curriculum in pastoral care in 1944.<sup>98</sup> Clinical educators were in high demand, and seminaries competed over those qualified to lead clinical training programs. By the 1950s, there were 117 centers for pastoral education, affiliated with more than 40 theological schools, that provided clinical experience to students.<sup>99</sup>

In addition to foreseeing the need for clinical training, many theologians actually anticipated some of the trends that would challenge, in post-war popular psychology, the dominance of the adjustment-oriented theories of the 1930s. For example, Richard Cabot and Russell Dicks, both members of the Boston Movement—a branch of the original Council for Clinical Training of Theological Students—espoused principles of growth and insight-oriented therapy in *The Art of Ministering to the Sick*, which they published in 1936.<sup>100</sup> Exploring the notion of instinctual individual growth (which would be further developed by humanistic psychologists in subsequent decades), Cabot argued that ministers were responsible for finding individual strengths, what he termed an individual's "growing edge," and creating an environment hospitable to growth and development. Anticipating the client-centered theory of Carl Rogers that would hold sway over pastoral counseling for decades, Cabot focused on the necessity of listening on the part of the minister, and on empowering the patient's self-discovery rather than directing it.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> For an historical exploration of the impact of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy on Christian ministry, see: Allison Stokes, *Ministry after Freud* (Plymouth, MA: Pilgrim Press, 1985).

<sup>99</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 271.

<sup>100</sup> The Council for the Clinical Training of Theological Students split into two antagonistic groups, one in New York and one in Boston, in 1932. Cabot mediated between the two groups for a few years until he was removed from the presidency of the New York group in 1935. The groups divided both on theoretical issues, including beliefs about the nature of the self, and personal issues, personality conflicts among members. In 1938, the Boston group renamed itself "New England Theological Schools Committee on Clinical Training", and the New York contingent became "The Council for Clinical Training." Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 232-239.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 237-242.

After the war, pastoral counselors responded quickly to the shift in the dominant psychological climate. According to one historian, pastoral counselors “began to speak a new language after World War II.”<sup>102</sup> This language included humanistic concepts like “empathy,” “self-awareness,” and “self-realization,” and tied pastoral counselors more intimately to the cultural interests of the time.

Authors like Norman Vincent Peale popularized an insight-based association of psychology and religion in the popular consciousness. Proposing a notion of applied Christianity that expanded religious responsibility into the realm of mental health, *The Power of Positive Thinking*—published in 1952—enjoined ministers to gain training in psychological technique. Peale’s popular message met mixed reception.<sup>103</sup> The book’s success demonstrated the appeal of the conflation between psychology and religion. It also demonstrated the desire Americans felt for a reformulated psychological theory that would offer optimism and encourage health. Yet within theological circles, Peale’s popularization of pastoral counseling diminished its significance. Many counselors didn’t want to be associated with mass market positive thinkers whose use of psychological theory was selective and reductionistic. Faced with mainstream appeal, pastoral theologians felt protective of their doctrine. While ministers could certainly benefit from psychological training, the wholehearted espousal of psychological principles seemed to diminish the significance of the religious aspect—making it seem utilitarian.<sup>104</sup>

The controversy over Peale’s book epitomized the problems implicit in forging a hybrid formulation of psychological science and religious theory. Replete with testimonials from unnamed “experts” and unidentified references to psychological “facts,” Peale’s book tended to anger those with a commitment to psychological science.<sup>105</sup> At the same time, Peale incensed religious critics, who felt that his brand of

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 259.

<sup>103</sup> See: Norman Vincent Peale, *The Power of Positive Thinking* (New York: Ballantine Books, Reissue 1996).

<sup>104</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 267.

<sup>105</sup> R. C. Murphy, Jr., “Think Right: Reverend Peale's Panacea,” *The Nation*, May 7, 1955, 398-400.

Christianity represented a diluted form of theology created more for the mass market than for the religiously attuned. Practicing in the wake of the Emmanuel movement, which had garnered wide attention and interest, but which had inspired the criticism of those made anxious by the blurring of theology and therapy, even lesser known pastoral counselors faced significant criticism.<sup>106</sup>

Despite opposition, the postwar popularity of psychology ensured that pastoral counseling would maintain a stake in turf battles. Acknowledging Americans' deeply ingrained religious sensibility, pastoral counselors were able to distinguish themselves from psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, and to renew their relevance to parishioners whose ideas of psychological healing had long been connected to concepts of religious ministry.<sup>107</sup>

### **FOMENTING DISSENT**

The overpowering absorption of academic psychology with behaviorism, psychiatry and psychoanalysis with medicalization, and applied psychology, social work and pastoral counseling with professional differentiation served to carve out specialized realms of practice that often precluded holistic approaches to patients' problems. The narrowness with which professionals were compelled to define their sphere of influence also created a climate generally oppressive to dissenting perspectives.<sup>108</sup> For some, however, professional narrowness intensified the urgency of dissent, ensuring that those with differing perspectives not grow too complacent. Humanistic and holistic critiques punctuated even the early decades of modern American psychology.

Several theorists, for example, were wary of the mental health fields' neglect of the social and cultural context of individual experience. Aware that "sick" cultures would produce "sick" individuals, critics sought to integrate an analysis of social and cultural

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<sup>106</sup> Caplan, *Mind Games*, 145-146.

<sup>107</sup> Holifield, *History of Pastoral Care*, 175-184.

<sup>108</sup> Jacoby, *Repression of Psychoanalysis*, 14-19.

experiences into the diagnosis and treatment of mentally distressed individuals.<sup>109</sup> Primary among these theorists were Karen Horney in psychoanalysis, Erich Fromm in psychology/ psychotherapy and Harry Stack Sullivan in psychiatry. Though all three were well respected, aspects of their theories met with strong resistance in their respective disciplines.

Karen Horney, referred to by her biographer as the “gentle rebel of psychoanalysis,” advanced one of the first feminist critiques of Freudian theory, and in so doing acknowledged the influence of social and cultural forces on the creation of psychological turmoil and in its expression in the form of disorders.<sup>110</sup> Unsatisfied with the purely mentalist analysis of disorder that characterized much of psychoanalytic theory, Horney grounded anxiety in cultural (as well as individual) drives—for affection, power, prestige—and looked to culture to provide understanding of the possible modes of expression for thwarted desires.<sup>111</sup> Horney prioritized “self-realization,” arguing for the value of personal conflict in the achievement of higher forms of mental health. *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time*, published in 1937, *Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis*, published in 1948, and *Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization*, published in 1950, represented Horney’s combined interest in health and growth psychology and in the social context of individual experience.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Richard H. Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 114. Pells argues that although theorists like Horney and Sullivan argued for the contextualization of individuals within their social and cultural milieus, they ultimately endorsed an adaptational psychology, which favored “socially acceptable” behaviors over “personally disruptive” approaches.

<sup>110</sup> Rubins, *Karen Horney*, xii.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 199-207. For an example of Horney’s integration of cultural factors into the study of individual psychology, see: Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937).

<sup>112</sup> For examples of Horney’s work, see: Karen Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis* (London: Kegan Paul, 1948).; and Karen Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth: The Struggle Toward Self-Realization* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1950). As compared to other medically trained psychoanalysts, Horney was unconventional in her influences. Her greatest influence was likely theologian Paul Tillich, from whom she absorbed a greater attention to culture, an interest in the role of historical development, and a prioritization of the actualization of one’s potential. Other significant influences for

Like Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan criticized the overly intrapsychic emphases of mainstream psychological theory. He prioritized instead the value of interpersonal relationships in the formation of mental health. This perspective, in combination with his adherence to fundamental aspects of Freudian theory, ultimately worked against his academic aspirations. This was exemplified in his 1939 offer from Georgetown University to serve as professor and chair of their new department of psychiatry. Upon hearing of Sullivan's interest in charting new directions for the department, which included forays into psychoanalysis, Georgetown rescinded the offer.<sup>113</sup> While psychiatrists had relatively more latitude than psychologists in considering non-empirical theory, they were still singularly accountable to the medical model.

Sullivan continued, however, to make his interest in interdisciplinary integration plain. Though trained medically, Sullivan argued, "I think it would be a very difficult proposition to show wherein psychiatry is more of a medical than social science."<sup>114</sup> Attempting to preserve the context of psychological problems, Sullivan attempted to join its study with those in other disciplines. In particular, Sullivan continued to focus on collaboration between sociology, anthropology and psychiatry, as he had at The University of Chicago in the 1920s and continued to do at Yale—with Edward Sapir's cooperation—in the 1940s. Sullivan was also seminal in establishing in 1938 the "first significant interdisciplinary journal in America," *The Journal of Psychiatry*.<sup>115</sup>

Like Sullivan, Erich Fromm attempted to push psychology into social and cultural realms. However, Fromm, a lay psychoanalyst trained as a psychologist, was more explicitly political, advancing theories that attacked directly the structures of both Soviet

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Horney included psychologist Wilhelm Reich, from whom Horney derived an interest in the total personality structure, and, of course, lay analyst Erich Fromm, from whom Horney drew ideas about the role of culture. Horney's American publications met with mixed reception: *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* tended to be well received by cultural anthropologists, but evoked criticism from psychoanalysts, most of whom criticized her deviation from orthodox Freudian theory. Rubins, Karen Horney, 198-200.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 385.

<sup>114</sup> Harry Stack Sullivan (1930) as quoted in Perry, *Psychiatrist of America*, 258.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 299-300.

communism and Western capitalism. Beginning with his publication of *Escape from Freedom* in 1941, Fromm analyzed interpersonal style in the context of a modern democratic system that offers individuals freedom *from* negative strictures, like fascism and dictatorship, but doesn't provide them with a positively formulated notion of freedom *for* something. In *The Sane Society*, published in 1955, Fromm further politicized his psychological theory by articulating an altered form of classical Marxist theory that was infused with a strong valuation of personal freedom.<sup>116</sup>

Fromm contended that capitalism was dehumanizing and alienating and that legal definitions of freedom often obscured a lack of existential and emotional freedom. He developed an interdisciplinary approach to psychological theory—one that integrated social theory, economics, ethics, and anthropology and provided a blueprint for future humanistic critiques.<sup>117</sup>

In the face of professional alienation, scholars like Fromm maintained a discursive critique of the isolationist psychological scholarship of the 1930s and 1940s. These pioneering critiques paved the way for a more organized movement against dominant paradigms in the 1950s and 1960s. The snowballing critiques of Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, and others created more impetus for the emergence of a more formal humanistic psychology.

American cultural conditions in the 1950s broadened psychology's sphere of influence, producing a popular demand for psychotherapies that could treat the problems of average Americans (not just those of the more pathological cases).<sup>118</sup> Psychologists'

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<sup>116</sup> According to Fromm, this approach agreed with Freud's notion of the necessity of freedom from societal repression, though he framed it more optimistically than Freud, in referring to self-realization. His psychoanalytic practice, which he maintained throughout the 1940s and 1950s, took a comparably politically critical approach, focusing on connections between political liberation and self-realization. Daniel Burston, *The Legacy of Erich Fromm* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 164-186.

<sup>117</sup> Fromm denied his role as a precursor to the formalized humanistic psychology that later emerged and distinguished himself from humanistic psychologists like Rollo May, who did not consider themselves Freudian. *Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>118</sup> Herman, *Romance of American Psychology*, 238-239.



realm of utility and influence widened at the very moment that the national psyche was feeling most bruised. Numerous historians have explored the angst and distress that lurked beneath the prosperity of the 1950s.<sup>119</sup> One historian wrote, “In only one place do the twin themes of outward prosperity and inward dread come together, and that is in the figures for tranquilizer sales.” Sales rose from \$2.2 million in 1955, the year the popular sedative Miltown was introduced, to \$150 million by 1957.<sup>120</sup> Psychiatrists and psychologists promised not just temporary sedation but also greater self-understanding which would “logically” lead to increased satisfaction. In this vein, they had more to offer than social workers who were, at this point, merely seeking to emulate them. They could not, however, offer spiritual assistance, a “cure for sick souls,” or a system of meaning that would help reconstruct what the experiences of war, depression and modernity had so thoroughly undermined.<sup>121</sup>

Much of the post-war popular psychological literature suggested the American interest in a positive form of psychology, but still located the problems within individuals and maintained adjustment-oriented emphases. In 1948, the bestseller list included such self-help titles as Dale Carnegie’s *How to Stop Worrying and Start Living* (#2), Joshua Liebman’s *Peace of Mind* (#3), and Norman Vincent Peale’s *A Guide to Confident Living* (#9).<sup>122</sup> These titles suggest the ways in which Americans located sources of distress and anxiety within themselves, rather than within society, and sought positive ways to channel or ameliorate these inner conflicts.

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<sup>119</sup> Good examples of those who offered historical theories on the pervasive psychological distress of the 1950s include David Riesman, Nathanial Glazer and Reuel Denney, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New York: Anchor Books, 1953) and Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd* (New York: Vintage, 1962).

<sup>120</sup> Jay Stevens, *Storming Heaven: LSD and the American Dream* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 91.

<sup>121</sup> Jerome and Julia Frank explore the necessity of a system of healing that is socially sanctioned, and contains religio-magical and scientific elements. Such an approach, they argue, mobilizes an individual’s internal healing forces. Jerome Frank and Julia Frank, *Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study of Psychotherapy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 2-6.

<sup>122</sup> “Bestseller Lists: 1950-1995,” <http://www.caderbooks.com/bestintro.html>.

The broadened psychological arena and the persistence of the American need for psychological affirmation created a space for the emergence of a theory of humanistic psychology. Although the dominant ideas of experimentalism and radical behaviorism were fairly entrenched in academic psychology departments, popular interest ensured that a positive, humanistic psychology would receive a hearing.

### Chapter Three: Intellectual Roots of Humanistic Psychology

Abraham Maslow, a principal player in what would become the humanistic psychology movement, described his introduction to behaviorism as “an explosion of excitement.” Coming from the man who later founded a school of psychology that directly opposed behaviorism, the statement is a bit surprising. Yet, as is the case with many belief systems, behaviorism’s most persuasive opponents tended to be those who had, at one time, most whole-heartedly subscribed to it. Maslow encountered behaviorism in the late 1920s, when he was young and impressionable, and became fully engaged in the romance that many novice psychology students initially develop with their subject matter.<sup>1</sup> “Bertha [Maslow’s new bride] came to pick me up at New York’s 42nd Street library,” he remembered, “and I was dancing down Fifth Avenue with exuberance. I embarrassed her, but I was so excited about Watson’s behaviorist program. It was beautiful. I was confident that here was a real road to travel: solving one problem after another and changing the world.”<sup>2</sup>

Maslow’s exuberance soon landed him, in the early 1930s, in Harry Harlow’s laboratory at the University of Wisconsin studying learning in primates. In line with the dominant behaviorism of the time, Harlow’s research was both experimental and observational. It was also comparative, attempting to make generalizations about humans based on evolutionary deductions about related primates.<sup>3</sup> Harlow and Maslow co-authored an article in 1932 which appeared in the *Journal of Comparative Psychology* and was titled, “Delayed Reaction Test on Primates from the Lemur to the Orangutan.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Maslow received his BA in 1930, his MA in 1931, and his PhD in 1934, all from the psychology department at University of Wisconsin. Roy Jose de Carvalho, "Abraham H. Maslow (1908-1970): An Intellectual Biography," *Thought* 66: 260 (1991): 33-50.

<sup>2</sup> Edward Hoffman and Abraham Maslow. “Overcoming Evil: An Interview with Abraham Maslow, Founder of Humanistic psychology,” *Psychology Today* (1962, reprinted January, 1992), 4, <http://psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-19920101-000038.html>.

<sup>3</sup> For an exploration of the applications of Harlow’s work to humans, see: Deborah Blum, *Love at Goon Park: Harry Harlow and the Science of Affection* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2002).

<sup>4</sup> Harry Harlow, and Harold Uehling, “Delayed Reaction Tests on Primates from the Lemur to the

Continuing to study with Harlow, and intent on basing his career on monkey research, Maslow performed further observational studies on Harlow's monkeys related to food preferences. He ultimately wrote a dissertation on sexual behavior and social dominance in monkeys.<sup>5</sup> Although Maslow hesitated to apply his findings to humans, the dissertation had been inspired, in part, by his discovery of Freudian and Adlerian theory in 1933, and his research, in turn, sparked his interest in exploring the idea that sexual behavior in humans was directly related to social power.<sup>6</sup>

As his reading of Freud and Adler demonstrated, Maslow continued reading deeply in areas other than experimental psychology. He also studied embryology, read Ludwig von Bertalanffy's articulation of systems theory, immersed himself in Bertrand Russell and English philosophy in general, and then fell in love with Alfred North Whitehead's vitalism and Henri Bergson's process philosophy. According to Maslow, "Their writings destroyed behaviorism for me without my recognizing it."<sup>7</sup> Still unaware of the ideological change overtaking him, Maslow decided to study human sexuality at Columbia under behaviorist E.L. Thorndike, an educational psychologist whose work focused on animal behavior and associationism in learning processes. He also settled in New York at the same time that many impressive European theorists, including Erich Fromm, Karen Horney and Alfred Adler, were illuminating the New York intellectual scene with their expansive cultural and social theories.<sup>8</sup>

Maslow had found the fuel for the fire that his reading had ignited. Maslow later credited Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer, in particular, with catalyzing his shift towards a more humanistic form of psychology. In a 1962 discussion with students at the

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Orangutan," *Journal of Comparative Psychology* 13 (1932): 313-343.

<sup>5</sup> Maslow published several articles from this work, including, but not limited to: Abraham Maslow, "Appetites & Hungers in Animal Motivation," *Journal of Comparative Psychology* 20 (1932): 75-83; Abraham Maslow, "Self-esteem (Dominance-feeling) and Sexuality in Women," *Journal of Social Psychology* 16 (1932): 259-294.

<sup>6</sup> Hoffman, *The Right to be Human*, 49-62.

<sup>7</sup> Hoffman and Maslow, "Interview," 6.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

New School in New York, Maslow explained that his true education “began when I came from the Midwest, as an experimental psychologist, to the seminars of Max Wertheimer, who all alone [at the New School] formed the best psychology department in the world.”<sup>9</sup> In 1942, Maslow attended Wertheimer’s course “Being and Doing,” where he began to rethink the methodology of his comparative research, which failed to consider uniquely human values, and which didn’t recognize the need for balancing the study of psychopathology with studies of healthy individuals.<sup>10</sup>

Maslow’s personal experiences began to add flesh to the skeletal structure of the humanistic theory he was mentally constructing. Throughout his studies and research pursuits, Maslow maintained a passionate investment in his family, never putting his work before them. It was through his family, in fact, that he experienced his first peak experience (defined in his own theory as a life-changing moment of self-transcendence). He explained, “When my first baby was born, that was the thunderclap that settled things. I looked at this tiny, mysterious thing and felt so stupid. I felt small, weak, and feeble. I’d say that anyone who’s had a baby couldn’t be a behaviorist.”<sup>11</sup>

During the same time that Maslow was peaking, he was experiencing a comparably strong negative reaction to the devastation wrought by World War II. Maslow described the sudden and overwhelming reaction he felt on a day soon after Pearl Harbor was bombed:

I was driving home and my car was stopped by a poor, pathetic parade. Boy Scouts and old uniforms and a flag and someone playing a flute off-key. As I watched, the tears began to run down my face. I felt we didn’t understand—not Hitler, nor the Germans, nor Stalin, nor the Communists. We didn’t understand any of them. I felt that if we could understand, then we could make progress. [...] That moment changed my whole life. Since then, I’ve devoted myself to developing a theory of human nature that could be tested by experiment and research. I wanted to prove that humans are capable of something grander than

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<sup>9</sup> Maslow as quoted in Mildred Hardeman, “Dialogue with Abraham Maslow,” in *Politics and Innocence: A Humanistic Debate*, ed. Thomas Greening (San Francisco: Saybrook Publishers, 1986), 75.

<sup>10</sup> Brett King and Michael Wertheimer, *Max Wertheimer & Gestalt Theory* (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2005), 300; Hoffman, *The Right to Be Human*, 92.

<sup>11</sup> Hoffman and Maslow, “Interview,” 6.

war, prejudice, and hatred. I wanted to make science consider all the people: the best specimen of mankind I could find.<sup>12</sup>

Over the next decade, Maslow integrated the influences from his reading in organismic theory and process philosophy with the knowledge he gained from his immigrant professors and peers in New York and with his own uniquely passionate and optimistic philosophy of life.<sup>13</sup> Maslow's humanistic theory coalesced in the 1950s under the influence of Kurt Goldstein, a German neurologist and psychiatrist best known for his holistic theory of the organism. Maslow met Goldstein while serving as the chair of Brandeis's psychology department. Extending Goldstein's preliminary ideas on self-actualization, Maslow developed a theory that would serve as a foundation for humanistic psychology in the decades to follow.<sup>14</sup>

Abraham Maslow's intellectual development is testament to the idiosyncrasies of his own psyche and intellect, but also to the significance of the historical moment at which the theorists who were to found humanistic psychology were developing their ideologies. The group that Maslow encountered in New York, which also included Czech psychologist Max Wertheimer and German Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka, was no ordinary set of scholars. Much of Central Europe's intellectual talent had fled fascism and come to America, infusing places like New York's New School for Social Research with vital energy. For many psychologists, the influx of European thought coincided with a growing awareness of the limits of the behaviorist paradigm.<sup>15</sup>

## **EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL ROOTS: PHENOMENOLOGY**

To begin to unravel the intellectual bases for humanistic psychology, it is useful to explore the Central European roots of the philosophical and psychological concept of holism. Ideas of holism, the concept that organisms are defined by a unitary existence

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<sup>12</sup> Hoffman and Maslow, "Interview," 5.

<sup>13</sup> de Carvalho, "Abraham H. Maslow," 43.

<sup>14</sup> Maslow's concept of self-actualization was first proposed in the paper: Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 370-396.

<sup>15</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 1.

that is greater than the sum of its parts, echo through the “classical modern era” and are manifest in a range of philosophies.<sup>16</sup> The privileging of subjective, conscious experience that arose from these holistic philosophical approaches infused, in particular, the discipline of phenomenological psychology that emerged in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>17</sup>

Phenomenology, the study of the subjective experience of consciousness, was defined by the premise of intentionality, or the belief that individual experiences are always directed towards an object that the individual deems meaningful.<sup>18</sup> This concept of human striving was exemplified in the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

Edmund Husserl, the so-called “father” of phenomenology, advanced a philosophy that began with the intuitive experience of phenomena, as perceived with conscious awareness, and attempted to extract the essential features of subjective experiences in the hope of a fuller comprehension of being.<sup>19</sup> Husserl’s first statement of phenomenology appeared in 1900, with the publication of *Logical Investigations*, in which he argues for the necessity of a phenomenology that “has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of human or

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<sup>16</sup> Andrew Brook and Paul Rayment, "The Unity of Consciousness", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2006 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/consciousness-unity/>.

<sup>17</sup> David Woodruff Smith, "Phenomenology," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2005 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/phenomenology/>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Phenomenology was broad, and Husserl himself reportedly passed through three stages of sub-theoretical orientation to the philosophy. Weckowicz refers to Husserl’s first phase as descriptive phenomenology (what he also terms “prephenomenology”), second phase as transcendental phenomenology, and third phase as the radicalization of his transcendental phenomenology. Although Husserl’s phenomenology progressed through three stages, his transcendental phenomenology, stage two, proved most influential on the application of phenomenology to psychology and psychiatry and later to the practice of humanistic psychology. Thaddeus E. Weckowicz, "The Impact of Phenomenological and Existential Philosophies on Psychiatry and Psychotherapy." In *Humanistic Psychology: Concepts and Criticisms*, ed. Joseph R. Royce, and Leendert P. Mos (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), 57.

animal experiments in the phenomenal world that we posit as empirical fact.”<sup>20</sup> Stemming from the school of Franz Brentano, Husserl’s phenomenology combined qualitative with quantitative methods to produce a contextualized inquiry into specific phenomena—phenomena which would elude rigid experimental inquiry by virtue of their very complexity. For example, to study the phenomena of love, a phenomenologist would first seek a subjective description of an individual’s experience of love. He would then interpret the experience by drawing on relevant contextual features, including an individual’s past experiences, present environment, etc. Finally, he would analyze the “form” of the experience, quantifying elements common to numerous individuals’ experience of love.<sup>21</sup>

Husserl defined phenomenology in direct opposition to the dominant psychologism of his time.<sup>22</sup> Psychologism, a term first originating in 19<sup>th</sup> century Germany, was meant to designate the practice of solving problems with objective psychological science.<sup>23</sup> John Stuart Mill’s *System of Logic*, published in 1843, inspired 19<sup>th</sup> century psychologism. In this book, Mills argued for a science of reasoning, and a prescriptive art of reasoning based on that science.<sup>24</sup> Psychologism held that logic

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<sup>20</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vols. 1 and 2, Second Edition, trans. and ed. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001), 166. The first edition was published as *Logische Untersuchungen* (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1900-01).

<sup>21</sup> Smith, “Phenomenology.”

<sup>22</sup> Herbert Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction,” in *Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy*, ed. John Wild (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 7.

<sup>23</sup> The term “psychologism” was originally meant to refer to the solving of mathematical problems using psychology. Psychologism was defended most notably by Jakob Friedrich Fries and Friedrich Eduard Beneke. Historian David Leary points out that Kant’s critique of rational psychology, and thus of what would be termed “psychologism,” preceded Husserl’s critique, but that Fries, Herbart, and Beneke revised this critique in spite of Kant’s intention in favor of “scientific psychology.” David Leary, “The Philosophical Development of the Conception of Psychology in Germany, 1780-1850,” *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 14 (1978), 113-121. For a good history of psychologism, see Martin Kusch, *Psychologism* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

<sup>24</sup> Martin Kusch, “Psychologism”, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2007 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/psychologism/>. Although Kusch credits Mills with inspiring psychologism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, he presents contradictory evidence as to whether Mills own views actually aligned with a psychologistic perspective.



dictated certain laws of human psychology, and that these laws were objectively true and testable. To deduce these laws, psychologism relied on the scientific method.<sup>25</sup>

Husserl resisted psychologism's contention that knowledge and ideas were reducible to empirical facts, claiming that this kind of objectification was overly skeptical. <sup>26</sup> Consciousness, instead, had to be separated from empirical reality, thus preserving meaning and the possibility of knowledge. Rather than viewing consciousness as "stuff" of which the mind is comprised, Husserl saw it as a process by which an individual becomes, by interacting with objects in the world. Consciousness, then, was a process of continual creation.<sup>27</sup>

Scientific psychological methods employed by psychological researchers, Husserl argued, could never appropriately capture their subjects. According to psychologist C.E. Spearman, Husserl felt that trying "to cope with psychological problems by means of experiments was like trying to unravel lace with a pitchfork."<sup>28</sup> Husserl was not arguing for the elimination of the empirical elements of psychology, however. He sought only to reenvision the dominant scientific methods currently in practice by broadening the psychological realm of inquiry. Rather than advocating empiricism, which held that psychological knowledge could only be gained through the description of pure sensory experience, Husserl argued for a "radical empiricism" that would supplement the information gained by the study of sensory experience with contextual information, including prior experiences and common forms of experience.<sup>29</sup>

In 1927, Martin Heidegger published *Being and Time*, extending the ideas of Husserl, who had served as his mentor in 1916 and whom he had succeeded as chair at

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<sup>25</sup> Leary, "Psychology in Germany," 113-121.

<sup>26</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 91.

<sup>27</sup> Weckowicz, "Impact on Psychiatry and Psychotherapy," 55.

<sup>28</sup> Spearman as quoted Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry*, " 35.

<sup>29</sup> Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, *A Short History of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford, 1996), 247-251.

the University of Freiburg.<sup>30</sup> Like Husserl, Heidegger focused on the fullness of conscious experience, on the dynamism involved in the *process* of existing, and on the relevance of context in understanding the individual. Heidegger's phenomenology, though, was more relational. While Husserl emphasized perceived experience and the role of subjectivity, Heidegger was more interested in the experience of existing in relation to others and to material objects.<sup>31</sup>

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger proposed the concept of *Dasein*, a state of being in which one is capable of recursively comprehending the ontological and authentic nature of one's own Being. Heidegger perceived man, as the possessor of both an ontological and ontic awareness, to be uniquely required to grapple with his own existential predicament. His theory helped create a bridge, albeit a largely unacknowledged one, between phenomenological methods and existential ideas.<sup>32</sup>

## EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Existential phenomenology, one of many diverse strains of Husserlian theory that emerged in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was focused on the concrete experience of human existence, and specifically on the experience of free will. Rooted in Heidegger's emphasis on the meaning of Being, in *Being in Time*, existential phenomenological approaches were adopted by French philosophers, most notably Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in the 1930s and 1940s. Touching on the theme of the meaning of being in the novel *Nausea* in 1936, Sartre grappled more explicitly with existential phenomenology in *Being and Nothingness*, published in 1943, in which he explored concepts of intentionality and freedom of choice.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Smith, "Phenomenology." See, Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); originally published as *Sein und Zeit* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1927).

<sup>31</sup> Spiegelberg, "Phenomenology," 21.

<sup>32</sup> Spiegelberg, "Phenomenology," 20-21.

<sup>33</sup> Smith, "Phenomenology." For English translations of Sartre see: Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions Paperback, 1959). Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).

In 1945, Merleau-Ponty published *Phenomenology of Perception*, which integrated phenomenological thought with experimental psychology by considering the bodily experience of amputees. He wrote, “To have a phantom arm is to remain open to all the actions of which the arm alone is capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed before mutilation. The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living creature, to be involved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to them.”<sup>34</sup> Merleau-Ponty explored the indivisibility of consciousness from the body and from the world, constructing being as a truly context-bound experience.<sup>35</sup>

The union of existentialist phenomenology and psychology had several conduits, including Merleau-Ponty, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss applied Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein* to psychotherapy, advocating a holistic approach to human experience and a quest for essence and authenticity that recognized the “problem of being,” the temporality of human existence, and the challenges of self-positioning in relation to the anguish of modern society.<sup>36</sup> Binswanger applied Heidegger’s theory of being-in-the-world in his phenomenological anthropology (termed *daseinsanalyse*). His was one of the first applications of Heidegger’s ideas to actual individuals rather than abstract categories of being, and it extended the notion of *Dasein* to the contextualized individual, defined by his existential relatedness to others. Boss, who had philosophically allied himself with the teachings of Heidegger, continued the practice of *daseinsanalyse* after Binswanger’s death in 1966.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (reprint, London: Routledge, 1992), 81-82.

<sup>35</sup> Bernard Flynn, "Maurice Merleau-Ponty", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2004 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/merleau-ponty/>.

<sup>36</sup> After the death of Binswanger, who was considered the “father of existential psychology,” Boss became the representative of *daseinsanalyse*, a direct application of Heidegger’s *dasein*. Weckowicz, “Impact on Psychiatry and Psychotherapy,” 61.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 60-61.

Existential philosophy served more as a foundation for conceptualizing patients' humanness than as a specific approach to psychotherapy.<sup>38</sup> Boss, who was skeptical about the assumptions that medicine and psychology made about human beings, argued in his *Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology* (1979), for instance, for a more holistic understanding of the experience of patients, and of their own attitude towards being.<sup>39</sup>

A psychotherapeutic approach informed by existential phenomenology provided, in particular, a sensitivity to the darker side of human existence, to patients' experience of anxiety, guilt and fear related to their own mortality.<sup>40</sup> Although existential approaches to psychotherapy varied widely, they tended to incorporate at least some notion of the darker side of human existence. Some existentialists were explicitly concerned with a concept of evil, and many emphasized the catalytic and unrelenting presence of the reality of death.<sup>41</sup> Existential phenomenologists united in their conception of an irreducible consciousness that existed only and always in the world.<sup>42</sup>

## EXISTENTIALISM

Existential ideas as applied to psychology also made their way into American psychology through theorists like Viktor Frankl, who had experienced the rise of fascism and the horrors of death in the concentration camps of Auschwitz, Kaufering, and Türkheim. Frankl, an Austrian psychiatrist imprisoned from 1944 to 1945, witnessed the creation of meaning and the persistence of optimism in individuals facing the deaths of themselves and their loved ones. Frankl himself, by remaining, during and after his internment, focused on the memory of his wife and on the creation of his theory of

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<sup>38</sup> Anonymous, "Psychiatry and Being," *Time*, December 29, 1958, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,894046-4,00.html>.

<sup>39</sup> For the translated text, see Medard Boss, *Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology*, trans. Stephen Conway and Anne Cleaves (New York: J. Aronson, 1983).

<sup>40</sup> "Psychiatry and Being," 1958.

<sup>41</sup> James Bugental, "Foreword," in *Existential-Phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology: Exploring the Breadth of Human Experience*, ed. Ronald Valle and Steen Halling (New York, Plenum Press, 1989), x.

<sup>42</sup> Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology*, 9.

logotherapy (which he was finally able to put on paper after his release), concluded that the strength of the conscious ability to construct meaning was what differentiated individuals who survived inhuman obstacles more than anything else.<sup>43</sup> Thus he proclaimed the “will to meaning” to be primary among successful human characteristics; instead of imagining that suffering could be avoided, Frankl identified the catalyzing power of horrific pain to push individuals to transcendent levels of individual existence.<sup>44</sup> Quoting Nietzsche, Frankl asserted, “He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how.”<sup>45</sup>

Viktor Frankl applied existential theory to therapy through his practices of ontoanalysis (a form of existential therapy that focuses on uncovering hidden meaning in everyday actions and experiences) and logotherapy (a type of therapy focused on “will to meaning”). According to Rollo May, existentialism was most basically concerned with ontology, or the science of being, where being was understood as the points of balance that individuals negotiated between a deep fear of non-existence and meaninglessness and a positive drive to explore existential freedom and possibility. Frankl’s ontoanalysis and logotherapy aimed at uncovering meaning in even the most minute of objects and events, enabling individuals—many of whom had been entirely stripped of existential freedom—to reanimate their existences. This constructive approach infused psychotherapy with a dialogue of meaning and values that had been absent in psychoanalysis, and increased the perceived relevance of existentialism to psychology.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Viktor Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), 104.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>45</sup> Viktor Frankl, *The Doctor and The Soul: From Psychotherapy to Logotherapy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 54.

<sup>46</sup> Rollo May, “Introduction,” in *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology*, ed. Rollo May (New York: Basic Books, 1950), 12.

## AMERICAN RESISTANCE

“So subtle was the spread of existential thinking in psychotherapy that for a quarter-century it made no mark in the English-speaking world,” wrote a reporter for *Time Magazine* in 1958.<sup>47</sup> For the most part, American psychologists were resistant to the tenets of existentialism and to the incorporation of them into their practice. When Rollo May’s seminal collection *Existence* appeared, in 1958, to challenge the dominant conceptual frameworks, May himself articulated the inevitable resistance that Americans would present. “It requires no brilliance [...] to predict that this approach will encounter a good deal of resistance in this country, despite the fact that it has been rapidly growing in importance in Europe and is now reported by some observers to be the dominant movement on the continent.”<sup>48</sup> May ascribed this resistance in part to the “still-Victorian” nature of the United States, but also to the narrowly scientific approach of American psychology.<sup>49</sup> May argued that widespread subscription to behaviorism, combined with the “Lockean” or pragmatic tradition of American psychology, further inhibited their adoption of new paradigms that would probe beyond technique.<sup>50</sup>

Americans wrongly assumed that phenomenology implied a disavowal of science, thus counterpositioning philosophy and scientific inquiry in a forced antagonism. May argued that the existential-phenomenological movement in psychiatry and psychology had arisen “precisely out of a passion to be not less but more empirical.”<sup>51</sup> By empirical, May meant that it would depend on observable evidence or consequences. Taking Binswanger as an example, May argued that scholarship and practice that attempted to erect a bridge between psychiatry and phenomenology was “anything but anti-

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<sup>47</sup> “Psychiatry and Being,” 1958.

<sup>48</sup> May, “Introduction,” 7.

<sup>49</sup> Scientism, the idea that natural science has authority over all other interpretations, was often used pejoratively to indicate the inappropriateness of prioritizing the scientific method over all other approaches to the study of man. Gregory R. Peterson, “Demarcation and the Scientific Fallacy,” *Journal of Religion and Science* 38: 4 (2003): 751-761.

<sup>50</sup> May, “Introduction,” 8-9.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

scientific.”<sup>52</sup> Binswanger had advocated phenomenology for the fullness with which it treated data, the meaning of which had been previously obscured and hidden by narrow naturalistic methods.<sup>53</sup>

## **GESTALT THEORY**

Gestalt Psychology, which formally emerged in Germany in 1912 and peaked in popularity in America in the 1950s (and again in the late 1960s with Fritz Perls’ application of its principles), provided another lens through which to holistically conceive of the human subject. Gestalt Psychology had in common with existentialism a comprehensive approach to individuals that opposed more reductionistic theory and took into account subjective experience, the ascription of meaning and values to ideas and objects, and a consideration of the individual’s present circumstances. Also like existentialism, Gestalt’s appeal in America trailed behind its European counterpart, in part because of the predominance of behaviorism and in many cases due to the delay in translation of key writing. Yet Gestalt differed from existentialism by undertaking naturalistic (as opposed to laboratory) experimentation aimed at understanding phenomena as a product of total consciousness. Many Gestalt studies involved observation of people in natural environments, without minimal experimenter interference.<sup>54</sup>

Max Wertheimer laid the foundation for Gestalt psychology in his 1912 article “Experimental Studies on the Seeing of Motion,” in which he advanced a theory of apparent motion, focused on holistic human visual perception, in which the parts of an image were automatically incorporated into an understanding of the whole. Impressed by the psychical phenomena behind visual perception, Wertheimer wrote, “One sees motion [...] One does not merely see that the object is now some place else than before, and so

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<sup>52</sup> Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 195.

<sup>53</sup> May, “Introduction,” 8.

<sup>54</sup> Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 67-72.

knows that it has moved [...] rather one {actually} sees the motion.”<sup>55</sup> In 1935, Wölfgang Kohler and Kurt Koffka, both younger peers of Wertheimer who, like Wertheimer, worked under Karl Stumpf at the University of Berlin, expanded on Wertheimer’s theory of holistic perception by integrating comparable observational studies with experimental investigation (using the scientific method).<sup>56</sup>

Gestalt offered a place for value and subjective experience in a field that had been dominated by positivistic structuralists (in Europe) and behaviorists (in America). Beginning with phenomenological methods, Gestaltists initiated scientific inquiry by collecting data through the direct report of experience, then moving to qualitative, and finally quantitative, demonstration and experiment. Through these methods, Gestalt psychologists attempted to preserve the human fullness of their subjects and to stay connected with the phenomena they were investigating. For example, as in the case of Wertheimer’s methods, when individuals were presented with a visual picture on a stroboscope, the experimenter noted not only their subjective visual perceptions, but their “subjective behaviors,” including eye movement and “posture of attention.”<sup>57</sup> Implicit in this revision to structuralist experimentation was a Gestalt critique of the methods that scientific psychologists employed to explore phenomena, which often dismissed contextually relevant factors.<sup>58</sup>

Gestalt theory supplied to American psychologists pieces of the puzzle of a reconceptualized American psychology. Psychological science, which—according to critics—had become reductionistic, positivistic and erroneously devoted towards scientific objectivity, needed to more fully consider the human subject. At the same time that American behaviorist E.B Titchener warned researchers, “Facts are all important.

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<sup>55</sup> Max Wertheimer, “Experimental Studies in the Seeing of Motion,” in *Classics in Psychology*, ed. Thorne Shipley (reprint, New York: Philosophical Library, 1961), 1032.

<sup>56</sup> King and Wertheimer, *Max Wertheimer*, 3. Koffka developed his theory of Gestalt psychology in: Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (1922; reprint, London: Routledge, 1999).

<sup>57</sup> Wertheimer, “Experimental Studies,” 1037.

<sup>58</sup> Molly Harrower, “Preface” in Mary Henle, *Kurt Koffka: An Unwitting Self-Portrait* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1983), iii.



Carry your theories lightly,” critics yearned for a revitalization of theory, a reintroduction of human complexity and the preservation of the romance and beauty that characterized human life.<sup>59</sup> For these critics, German scientists provided a model.

Gestalt psychology was one flowering of a long tradition of holistic European theory. Romanticism, for example, in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century had attuned philosophers, artists and writers to the primacy of the individual will and the importance of subjectivity.<sup>60</sup> Holistic concerns reached far beyond the arts, appearing as well in the natural sciences. In the field of biology, for example, scientist Hans Driesch sought to reanimate vitalism in 1905, and embryologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy proposed nonvitalistic approaches to holistic consideration of living processes.<sup>61</sup> Influenced by Kant’s notion that causal categories of human reason were inadequate paradigms for viewing living processes, scientists like von Bertalanffy and others attempted to recognize the teleological purposiveness of organisms and to oppose atomistic approaches by considering the role of discrete processes in total organismic functioning.<sup>62</sup>

Though theories of modern holism emerged in Germany at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they encountered periods of unique appeal that seemed to coincide with bouts of cultural insecurity. Although Hans Driesch could have been characterized as a vitalist as early as the 1890s, his lectures and work gained the most recognition in the troubled 1920s, when he was president of the Society for Psychical Research and published *The*

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<sup>59</sup> E.B Titchener as quoted in K. M. Dallenbach, “The Place of Theory in Science,” *Psychological Review* 60 (1953): 35.

<sup>60</sup> “Romanticism,” *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Simon Blackburn. Oxford University Press, 1996. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. University of Texas - Austin. 27 January 2008, <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e2082>.

<sup>61</sup> Anne Harrington, *Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), xvi. Vitalism asserts that the life of an organism is partially self-determining and that life processes are not explicable by the laws of physiochemical laws. Hans Driesch published his main work on vitalism in 1905. See: Hans Driesch, *The History and Theory of Vitalism* (London: Macmillan, 1914).

<sup>62</sup> Harrington, “Reenchanted Science,” xvi-xvii.

*Crisis in Psychology*, and his early works continued to be translated into the 1930s.<sup>63</sup> Bertalanffy's theories received considerable attention— in part for the timeliness and context of their emergence—in inter-war Vienna during the late 1920s and early 1930s. According to historian Anne Harrington, holistic theories like Gestalt garnered the widest European intellectual enthusiasm in and around Germany after World War I. Defeated in war, fragmented by class, and polarized politically, German intellectuals demonstrated a radical affinity for restorative science that could help make sense of the ruin and resurrect for them even a fraction of the culture's former grandeur.<sup>64</sup>

### **GESTALT CROSSES THE ATLANTIC**

For the most part, Gestalt psychology was unpalatable in the American academic climate of the time, which was saturated in behaviorism. In 1935, George W. Hartmann, a rising public intellectual, published *Gestalt Psychology: A Survey of Facts and Principles*, in which he detailed the barriers to the American acceptance of Gestalt psychology. He cited the first as the obstacles that translation and interpretation of German writings presented; these obstacles were particularly relevant because of the highly “technical nature of the field.” Second, Hartmann referred to the dissolution of intellectual networks wrought by the rise of fascism. Finally, he identified the high intellectual pitch of Gestalt psychology, which would make it more difficult to translate for public consumption than behaviorism was.<sup>65</sup>

Gestalt psychology, like existential phenomenology, appealed mainly to a minority of American academic psychologists and practitioners who, at mid-century, were dissatisfied with the limited approach of behavioristic science. American proponents were compelled by its pragmatic explanatory framework and its dynamism.

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<sup>63</sup> For the original source, see Hans Driesch, *Crisis in Psychology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1925).

<sup>64</sup> Harrington, *Reenchanted Science*, xx.

<sup>65</sup> George Wilfried Hartmann, *Gestalt Psychology: A Survey of Facts and Principles* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1935), v.

Gestalt psychology offered psychologists the opportunity to work within the existing framework of scientific psychology, but also enabled them to extend scientific investigation to encompass subjective experiences, values and beliefs, and philosophical frameworks.<sup>66</sup>

The implications of an applied Gestalt psychology offered a democratic promise. By affirming the value and uniqueness of individuals and emphasizing the significance of personal context and experience, Gestalt psychology opposed psychological theories that privileged superior specimens (particularly those who excelled in tests of intelligence and cognitive capability). Wertheimer himself was a staunch democratic socialist who combated institutional hierarchy and elitism. Gestalt also offered a response to modernity, by reifying the importance of the individual and the primacy of experience in an age that increasingly privileged technology and scientific laws.<sup>67</sup>

Gestalt psychology also assuaged American pragmatists by invoking the experimental method in the pursuit of basic philosophical questions.<sup>68</sup> “This was the good news of Gestalt theory—,” wrote Harrington, “it showed that the scientific study of mind and consciousness, no less than of the physical world, could reconnect with the dynamic, whole-processes that people cared about because such processes corresponded to their lived experiences.”<sup>69</sup>

Fleeing political unrest, several Gestalt psychologists immigrated to the US, and by way of lectures and published work, directly transmitted their ideas to American psychologists. Kurt Koffka, for example, was a major conduit for Gestalt theory. In 1922, he published *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, the first formal exposition of Gestalt theory for American psychologists. In *Principles*, he proposed an integrative psychology which opposed simple, “materialistic” systems of the past that attempted to interpret the

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<sup>66</sup> Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 9.

<sup>67</sup> Harrington, *Reenchanted Science*, 112-114.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 119.

whole through “the contribution of one part.” The Gestalt psychology he described integrated “quantity and quality” (the quantitative measurement of mental functions and the qualitative evaluation of their relations to other functions), “order” (the intentional and evaluative “arrangement” of mental events) and “significance” (the subjective valuing of experience).

Of the three elements, he perceived “significance” to be the most problematic in terms of American acceptance, though the most appealing to Germans. He wrote: “In America the climate is chiefly practical; the here and now, the immediate present with its needs, holds the centre of the state, thereby relegating the problems essential to German mentality to the realm of the useless and non-existing. In science this attitudes makes for positivism, an overvaluation of mere facts and an undervaluation of very abstract speculations, a high regard for science, accurate and earthbound, and an aversion, sometimes bordering on contempt for metaphysics that tries to escape from the welter of mere facts into a loftier realm of ideas and ideals.”<sup>70</sup>

Despite his apparent disdain for American science, Koffka traveled to the US in 1924, serving as a visiting professor at Cornell University and lecturing. He maintained intellectual connections with Wertheimer and Kohler through his returns to Europe for lectures and through Kohler’s sabbatical year spent teaching at Clark University, also in 1924-25. In 1927, Koffka permanently settled in the US, accepting a professorship at Smith College, in Northampton, Massachusetts.<sup>71</sup>

In 1933, Max Wertheimer, the father of Gestalt psychology, accepted the invitation of Alvin Johnson, enterprising president of the New School for Social Research (which was termed “the University in Exile” during the wave of European immigration), to teach in the graduate division of the college. This division had been freshly established, the same year, as a refuge for scholars who had been dismissed from their

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<sup>70</sup> Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (1922; reprint, London: Routledge, 1999), 13-18, quotation from 18.

<sup>71</sup> King and Wertheimer, *Max Wertheimer*, 233-237.

teaching positions under totalitarian regimes. Wertheimer, sensing the growing unease in Germany, accepted the invitation and thirteen days later received word from the University of Frankfurt, where he was a full professor, that he had been terminated from his professorial chair, because he was Jewish.<sup>72</sup> Wertheimer, however, never received in the United States anything like the recognition he had earned in Germany, due in part to the scarcity in America of his published writings.<sup>73</sup>

In contrast, Wolfgang Kohler, who immigrated to the US in 1935, met with a surprising amount of professional success. Kohler, Director of the Psychological Institute at the University of Berlin from 1920 to 1935, had worked with Wertheimer and Koffka to form a Gestalt forum. While Wertheimer and Koffka (both Jewish) fled to the US in search of political asylum, Kohler remained in Berlin but maintained his connection to them through his three sabbaticals to American Universities. Although Kohler was not Jewish himself, he was forced to flee Nazism in 1935 after publishing an article in a Berlin newspaper which was critical of the Nazi government. In America, Kohler was employed at Swarthmore College and later Dartmouth College.<sup>74</sup>

Kohler's work epitomized the marriage of the concrete experimental and the abstract philosophical that Gestalt theory provided. He had based his dynamic model of human behavior on his research with problem-solving in chimpanzees. In contrast to the reigning model of stimulus-response, Kohler found that chimpanzee behavior was not so mechanistic. These animals, instead, were capable of insight and able to actively organize perceptions.<sup>75</sup> Having provided his chimpanzees many tests requiring problem-solving behavior—for example, using a stick to reach a target—Kohler observed his most advanced chimpanzee (Sultan) assisting a peer in solving a problem. "Sultan's behavior,"

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<sup>72</sup> Harrington, *Reenchanted Science*, 129.

<sup>73</sup> King and Wertheimer, *Max Wertheimer*, 241

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 249.

<sup>75</sup> For a first-hand look at Kohler's theory of Gestalt psychology, and his opposition to behaviorist psychology, see: Wolfgang Kohler, *Gestalt Psychology: An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology* (New York: Liverwright Publishing Corporation, 1970).

he wrote, “shows no trace of ‘altruism,’ but, though he takes no part in the procedure, we feel his complete comprehension of it, and his imperative impulse to do *something* towards the solution which remains so long undiscovered.”<sup>76</sup>

Kohler’s maintenance of his commitment to experimental methods facilitated his transition from life as a preeminent academic in Germany—where his theories were more or less in favor—to life as a successful American academician in the context of a strong behaviorist current. Evidence of Kohler’s positive reception in the US was his election to the presidency of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1959.<sup>77</sup>

Due to the rapid influx of European intellectuals like Koffka, Wertheimer and Kohler, New York City became, according to Maslow, “the center of the psychological universe.”<sup>78</sup> The common struggles with the horrors of Nazism united the new immigrants personally and often intellectually. The result was a melting pot of German theory that sometimes glossed over the once nuanced distinctions between theorists. Gestalt psychologists united with phenomenologists, recognizing their common and complementary elements and often dismissing their differences. Wolfgang Kohler’s 1959 APA Presidential Address presented Gestalt theory as a tide of relief that overcame German psychologists. Kohler claimed, “It was not only the stimulating newness of our enterprise which inspired us. There was also a great wave of relief—as though we were escaping from a prison. The prison was psychology as taught in the universities when we were still students.”<sup>79</sup>

German Jewish intellectuals from disparate disciplines united personally and intellectually within the forced camaraderie of their oppression. Often psychically damaged by the oppression and violence of the National Socialist regime, many of them discovered a compensatory interest in morality, ethics, and relatedness. According to

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<sup>76</sup> Wolfgang Kohler, “The Mentality of Apes: The Making of Implements,” in Thorne Shipley, ed. *Classics in Psychology* (repr., New York: Philosophical Library, 1961), 1124.

<sup>77</sup> Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 67.

<sup>78</sup> Abraham Maslow as quoted in King and Wertheimer, *Max Wertheimer*, 300.

<sup>79</sup> Spiegelberg, “Phenomenology,” 67.

historian Andrew Heinze, “new ideas about fragility and divisibility of the psyche developed alongside new anxiety about ethnic fragility and divisibility of nations.”<sup>80</sup> This experience clearly stretched beyond Gestalt psychology. It was evident in Alfred Adler’s intensified social commitment and interest in altruism, which followed his experience with fascism, and in the lesser-known theory of Richard Cabot, who, after working with Jewish mental patients, attempted to generalize his ideas of treating the ‘whole man’ to the regeneration of American democracy.<sup>81</sup>

Although many American universities and colleges were hospitable to the new influx of European talent, they tended to be squeezed for funding, and were often forced by the Great Depression to cut, rather than to expand, faculty. Some scholars got lucky, as in the case of Kurt Lewin, who fled the Nazis to Cornell University in 1933, when the department of Home Economics offered him a two-year visiting professorship. Though Cornell was unable to extend the contract, which had been hastily thrown together with foundation funds, he subsequently received a three-year appointment at the University of Iowa, also financed by foundation funds. Fortunately for Lewin, Iowa was able to extend his appointment beyond the three years, as by that point the University’s financial situation had improved somewhat.<sup>82</sup>

A more common case, though, was that of psychologist Karl Buhler, who, having turned down a position at Harvard in the 1920s, was unable to secure permanent employment upon his return in 1938. After Buhler had been taken into protective custody by the Nazis for six weeks, he and his wife Charlotte fled Germany on foot and soon returned to the United States, seeking employment. By this time, available positions were virtually nonexistent, particularly for a psychologist whose theory directly opposed

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<sup>80</sup> Heinze, *Jews and the American Soul*, 24.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 21-23.

<sup>82</sup> For a comprehensive biography of Lewin, see: Alfred J. Marrow, *The Practical Theorist: The Life and Work of Kurt Lewin* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

behaviorism. Buhler spent the remainder of his life moving from one minor position to another.<sup>83</sup>

Buhler's work was largely dismissed by American psychologists. His theory reflected elements of Gestalt, sharing common elements with the work of his wife, psychologist Charlotte Buhler, who would become actively involved in humanistic psychology. Buhler espoused a situational model of action—one that was dynamic and that valued the individual as an agent in shaping her environment—and focused on areas of action that included creativity, inventiveness and transcendence of individuality.<sup>84</sup> Many of his ideas were irreconcilable with behaviorist conceptions of the human subject.

Even psychologists who were institutionally supported in the U.S. were adversely affected by strongly behaviorist departments that resisted their ideas. Kurt Lewin, for example, initially experienced only a modicum of the recognition in the U.S. that he had garnered in Germany. Lewin's first book, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, received only limited scholarly attention and several negative reviews.<sup>85</sup>

Lewin proclaimed himself to have moved beyond the Gestalt psychology he had encountered as a doctoral student at the University of Berlin, but remained indebted to the influence of Gestaltists.<sup>86</sup> The holistic and experience-oriented nature of Lewin's theories testifies to this debt. Many of Lewin's concepts—such as “vector,” “valence,” “life space,” “field theory,” and “tension system”—became indispensable parts of American psychology.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> King and Wertheimer, *Max Wertheimer*, 29-40.

<sup>84</sup> J. F. Bugental, H. J. Wegrocki, G. Murphy, H. Thomae, G. W. Allport, R. Ekstein and P. L. Garvin, “Symposium on Karl Bühler's contributions to psychology,” *Journal of General Psychology* 75 (October, 1966): 181-219.

<sup>85</sup> In Lewin's first book, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality*, he expresses his debts to the teaching of Wertheimer and the theoretical collaboration of Kohler. See: Kurt Lewin, *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935); “The fundamental ideas of Gestalt theory,” he wrote, “are the foundation of all our investigations in the field of will, of affect, and of the personality.” Lewin as quoted in Marrow, *Practical Theorist*, 79.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.



Of the German émigrés, Kurt Goldstein was the most seminal in introducing Gestalt principles to American psychology. Beginning not as a psychological theorist but as an eminent neurologist, Goldstein's most shaping experience occurred in the 1920s at the Institute for Research into the Consequences of Brain Injuries, where he treated soldiers who had incurred brain injury during World-War I. In the course of his neuropsychological work, Goldstein was impressed by the resiliency of the soldiers he treated. The manner in which they reorganized their functioning, compensating for deficits by developing strengths in other areas, suggested to Goldstein an intrinsic tendency towards wholeness in humans. Their continual striving, which entailed a certain amount of anxiety and vulnerability, demonstrated what he perceived as their inherent actualizing tendencies.<sup>88</sup>

In 1935, Goldstein immigrated to New York City. Outside of a circle of sympathetic scholars, which included fellow exiles like Wertheimer, Koffka, Kohler and Horney and American psychologists like Gordon Allport and Abraham Maslow, Goldstein's reputation was greatly diminished. But in the last decades of his life (which ended in 1965), he continued to pursue the theoretical implications of his previous work. He remained concerned, in particular, with a distinction he had laid out between "abstract capacity" and "concrete capacity"—the abstract attitude was the ability to arrange experience into logical wholes and the concrete capacity was the ability to pragmatically compartmentalize experience into logical categories. He found that the abstract attitude was often suppressed at the expense of routine life. In the 1950s, he explored more relational ideas of wholeness, including those of "encounter" and "communion," and expanded on his idea of self-actualization, positing that it always occurred in relation to others.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Harrington, *Reenchanted Science*, 145-151.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 146-170.

## ABSORBING THE EXILES

The relationships between interested American psychologists and prominent European émigrés tended to be a reciprocal, hermeneutic one. Rather than simply importing their theories and influences intact to America, many European émigrés remained open to the influence of the American academic scene and to the reactions of their American students. Lewin's biographer argued that his students were drawn to him in part because of his practical appeal in considering "life problems"—his theories "were tools to attack everyday human problems" at a cultural moment when such tools were scarce. In turn, Lewin's students "led Lewin, in chicken-and-egg fashion, to place increasing emphasis on experimental studies of how and what-for of individual and social change-studies which later were consummated as 'action research' and 'group dynamics.'"<sup>90</sup>

Despite arguments, like those of Russell Jacoby in *The Repression of Psychoanalysis*, that blame the American climate for suppression of the fervor and originality of immigrant theory, immigrant theorists brought a dynamic depth and a philosophical expansiveness to psychological theories that would oppose the status quo in most academic departments in the 1930s and 1940s.<sup>91</sup> They did this, in part, by crossing disciplinary lines.

Holistic theories of the person, as transmitted through Gestalt psychologists, were complemented by the theories of exiled theologians whose work reached the U.S. around the same time.<sup>92</sup> The theories of Martin Buber and Paul Tillich, in particular, informed psychological dialogues in the 1930s and beyond.

In 1923 Austrian philosopher Martin Buber proposed the philosophy of dialogue, which encompassed his theories of the "I-thou" relationship, characterized by genuine encounter, openness, and mutuality, and the "I-it" relationship, defined by its absence of

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<sup>90</sup> Marrow, *Practical Theorist*, 87.

<sup>91</sup> Heinze, *Jews and the American Soul*, 5-7.

<sup>92</sup> Harrington, *Reenchanted Science*, 159.

“I-thou” qualities. For Buber, the “I-thou” relationship included the relation of man to the world and of man to God. It focused on the idea of genuine, authentic encounter and the ultimate truth contained in experience.<sup>93</sup>

Like many of his Jewish intellectual peers, Buber was forced to flee his post under National Socialist rule, abandoning his professorship in Jewish and Religious History at the University of Frankfurt and seeking refuge in Palestine where he continued his intellectual pursuits and invested his energy in teaching. Nonetheless, Buber directly influenced American theory through the extensive lecture tours he undertook after World War II in the U.S. and England and through the publication of *I & Thou* in 1923, translated into English in 1937.<sup>94</sup>

In 1933, Paul Tillich, a Protestant theologian, immigrated to the U.S. after losing his position in Frankfurt, due to his opposition to Nazism. His work incorporated existential philosophy with theological themes, focusing heavily on the concept of relation. Tillich’s most celebrated book, 1952’s *The Courage to Be*, outlined his existentialist views and appealed widely because of its interpretation of the existential roots of everyday anxiety and experience.<sup>95</sup>

Tillich was seminal in the transmission of existentialist ideas to America.<sup>96</sup> Having met Rollo May in 1933 while May was pursuing his Bachelor’s of Divinity at Union Theological Seminary, Tillich encouraged him to push deeper in his quest for the philosophical underpinnings of psychological problems. May came to adopt Tillich’s belief in the significance of individual struggles for meaning in the face of uncertainty and mortality, endorsing in particular his concept of “essence” as the infinite ground of being, which contrasted with the finite ground of “existence.”<sup>97</sup> These themes were

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 275-276.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 275-280. For Buber’s own explanation of his theory, see: Martin Buber, *I & Thou*, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937).

<sup>95</sup> Rollo May, *Existence: a New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1958), 17.

<sup>96</sup> Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology*, 145.

<sup>97</sup> May, *Existence*, 17.

apparent in May's 1949 doctoral thesis, *The Meaning of Anxiety*, in which he argued that humans possess an underlying non-neurotic anxiety related to their rational fear of their own mortality. When repressed, this existential anxiety blocks individual potentialities, producing an "ultramodern" form of neurotic anxiety. It was the duty of psychotherapists, he felt, to be aware of this "normal form of anxiety, rather than pathologizing it, and thus perpetuating to blockage."<sup>98</sup> The themes appeared again in May's essays in the 1958 volume *Existence*.

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<sup>98</sup> "Psychiatry and Being" 1958, 5.

## Chapter Four: The Foundation and Founding of Humanistic Psychology

In 1909, William James identified the need for a humanistic psychology, one that employed phenomenological methods to capture subjective experience. He asserted: “The world of concrete personal experience [...] is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, painful and perplexed. The world to which your philosophy professor introduces you is simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of real life are absent from it...”<sup>1</sup> The psychology which James envisioned, by broadening the realm of empirical inquiry, sought to capture the complexity of experience rather than its distillation by combining Swedenborgian and transcendentalist philosophies with James’ own brand of pragmatism, religion, and empiricism. These diverse elements suggest not only the complexity and contradictions of James’s psyche—one that was plagued by religious and existential angst and often paralyzed by neurasthenia—but also of the science through which he tried to preserve this complexity.<sup>2</sup>

The foundation of humanistic psychology as it emerged in the 1940s and 1950s was as pluralistic as William James himself. It was essentially a hybrid of numerous sympathetic influences that joined the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, the existentialism of Kierkegaard, Frankl and Binswanger, the vitalism of Goldstein, the holism of Wertheimer, Koffka and Kohler, the pragmatism of John Dewey and James, and the social and cultural emphases of Fromm, Horney and Sullivan.<sup>3</sup> Its founders shared a dissatisfaction with the prevailing scientific reductionism, a desire to consider individuals in their social and cultural contexts, a concern for the values and meaning that

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<sup>1</sup> William James, 1909 as quoted in Donnelly, *William James*, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Frank Parajes, “William James: Our Father Who Begat Us,” in *Educational Psychology: A Century of Contributions*, ed. Barry J. Zimmerman (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003), 43-49.

<sup>3</sup> Arthur Warmouth, “Humanistic Psychology and Humanistic Social Science,” *Humanity and Society* 22, no. 3 (1998).

individuals ascribed to their pursuits, and a recognition of the irreducible subjectivity of the individual as psychological subject.<sup>4</sup>

## THE FOUNDATIONAL WORK OF ABRAHAM MASLOW AND CARL ROGERS

The work of Abraham Maslow in the 1940s and 1950s epitomized the concerns of the humanistic psychology he would formally found in 1962. While serving as a post-doctoral fellow for E. L. Thorndike from 1935-1946, Maslow began to diverge from his comparative research with primates, taking up, instead, the study of sexual dominance, self-esteem and motivation in college women.<sup>5</sup> Then, after connecting with Adler, Fromm, Horney, Goldstein, Wertheimer, and Koffka in the years between 1935 and 1940, Maslow again reoriented his work towards the formation of a more holistic theory of human psychology that would incorporate realms as diverse as religion, work, marriage and biology.<sup>6</sup> In 1943, he published “A Theory of Human Motivation,” which served as a basis for the book, *Motivation and Personality*, published in 1954.<sup>7</sup>

In “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Maslow proposed his notion of the hierarchy of needs. The basic thrust of Maslow’s theory was that humans are innately motivated to reach their fullest potential, but to do so they had to ascend through a series of “prepotent” needs; one set of needs, said Maslow, must be fulfilled in order for an individual to focus on the next set of needs. The first four levels of Maslow’s hierarchy were comprised of basic needs, beginning with physiological needs, which include those for water, air, food, sleep, etc. Once the basic needs were met, an individual would strive to meet what Maslow called “safety” and “security” needs, including the need for

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<sup>4</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 17-32.

<sup>5</sup> Hoffman, *The Right to Be Human*, 70-85.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 87 and 129; Influenced by anthropologist Ruth Benedict, Maslow also studied anthropological psychology between 1933 and 1937, taking several trips to observe the Blackfoot Indians in Canada. Ibid., 111-128.

<sup>7</sup> Citing the influences on his theory, Maslow stated, “This theory is, I think, in the functionalist tradition of James and Dewey, and is fused with the holism of Wertheimer, Goldstein, and Gestalt Psychology, and with the dynamism of Freud and Adler. This fusion or synthesis may arbitrarily be called a ‘general-dynamic’ theory.” Maslow, “Theory of Human Motivation,” 370-383, quotation from 372; For the book that this theory produced, see: Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (1954; reprint, New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

structure and order. The third level of the pyramid was comprised of “love” and “belonging” needs, and the fourth, “esteem” needs. If the attainment of any one of these basic needs was thwarted, an individual would fixate on that particular level, and possibly never reach the very highest needs—the attainment of which Maslow characterized as “self-actualization.” Maslow wrote, “This term, first coined by Kurt Goldstein, is being used in this paper in a much more specific and limited fashion. It refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.”<sup>8</sup>

Maslow’s theory departed markedly from previous work he had published. It was entirely theoretical, and made no reference to any experimental research that would support his hypothesis. But it by no means represented an abandonment of his value of experimental research. Maslow conceived his theory as a starting point for future research; it provided a testable theory of human motivation. In the paper itself, he warned: “The present theory then must be considered to be a suggested program or framework for future research and must stand or fall, not so much on facts available or evidence presented, as upon researches to be done, researches suggested perhaps, by the questions raised in this paper.”<sup>9</sup>

In 1950, Maslow pursued further the theme of self-actualization in his paper, “Self-actualizing People: A Study of Psychological Health.” In this study, Maslow identified 13 traits of “healthy” individuals who had reached the peak of the hierarchy of needs. He selected as his subjects both historical figures and his own contemporaries whom he perceived to be fully using their “talents, capacities and potentialities,” and who were relatively free from psychopathology. Among the historical figures he included were Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson, Albert Einstein, Eleanor Roosevelt, Jane

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<sup>8</sup> Maslow, "Theory of Human Motivation," 370-383, quotation from 383..

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 372.

Addams, William James and Spinoza. Their common qualities, which he inferred mainly from his own impressions, included “more efficient perceptions of reality and more comfortable relations with it,” “continued freshness of appreciation” of the “basic goods of life,” a “philosophical, unhostile sense of humor,” “creativeness,” acceptance of self and others, a need for privacy, esthetic sensitivity, a democratic outlook, involvement in a cause or mission outside oneself, and frequent transcendent experiences.<sup>10</sup>

As in his theory of motivation, Maslow emphasized the need for experimental research to follow, qualifying his hypothesis as preliminary at best. He wrote: “I consider the problem of psychological health to be so pressing that *any* leads, *any* bits of data, however moot, are endowed with a certain temporary value. This kind of research is in principle so difficult—involving as it does lifting oneself by one’s axiological bootstraps—that, if we were to wait for conventionally reliable data, we should have to wait forever.”<sup>11</sup>

Still, Maslow recognized that he was going out on a limb with the theory. He later commented on the “anxiety, conflict, and self-doubt” that plagued him in his marked departure from accepted experimental practice. He wrote in 1970: “My study of self-actualizing persons [...] was a great gamble, doggedly pursuing an intuitive conviction and, in the process, defying some of the basic canons of scientific method and of philosophical criticism. These were, after all, rules which I myself had believed and accepted, and I was very much aware that I was skating on thin ice.”<sup>12</sup>

In 1954, Maslow published *Motivation and Personality*, a book that pursued in greater depth the themes he had briefly outlined in 1943, and included his 1950 study of self-actualized persons. Exploring the themes of “higher” and “lower needs,” of instincts and of health, the book was entirely oriented toward a holistic conception of the individual. “Holism,” Maslow wrote, “is obviously true—after all, the cosmos is one and

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<sup>10</sup> Maslow, “Self-Actualizing People,” 177-202.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 177-178.

<sup>12</sup> Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, xxii.



interrelated, etc.—and yet the holistic outlook has a hard time being implemented and being used as it should be, as a way of looking at the world.”<sup>13</sup>

The publication of *Motivation and Personality* served to broadcast Maslow’s theory to a wider audience than any academic journal could have captured. Maslow himself was pleased with the results, remarking, in January of 1961, at his pleasure in the royalties and in the still-increasing sales.<sup>14</sup> The book also aligned his theory with parallel developments in psychotherapy. He praised psychotherapy as “need-gratification via interpersonal relations,” and described the psychotherapeutic relationship as “good human relations.”<sup>15</sup> He also called for increased experimental study of psychotherapy, referring to it as “an unworked gold mine.”<sup>16</sup>

Maslow’s inclusion of psychotherapy alluded to developments in therapeutic practice that paralleled his own interests. In 1942, Carl Rogers had published the pioneering book, *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, in which he forged a humanized conception of “client-centered” practice. Rogers, who at the time of the book’s publication was a full professor of psychology at Ohio State, had been trained in liberal protestant theology at the Union Theological Seminary before switching to Columbia’s doctoral program in clinical psychology in 1926.<sup>17</sup> Rogers’ work, in the 1930s, was oriented to personality adjustment, social work, and children’s welfare, but turned to the study of therapeutic practice in the 1940s. The emphasis of his work in the 1940s and beyond was on the importance of the attitude of the therapist; he specifically outlined a model of therapy in which the counselor valued his client unconditionally and engaged fully and openly in the therapeutic process.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid., xi.

<sup>14</sup> Maslow, October 10, 1961, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 123.

<sup>15</sup> Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 244.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 241.

<sup>17</sup> Kirschenbaum, *On Becoming Carl Rogers*, 52-54.

<sup>18</sup> For a complete bibliography of Carl Rogers, see: <http://www.nrogers.com/carlrogersbiblio.html> or de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 183-200.

Rogers hoped to demystify therapy, providing concrete examples of his own therapeutic ideals and literally walking the reader through the therapeutic process. In *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, his chapter, “Characteristic Steps in the Therapeutic Process,” includes sub-sections that range from “The Client Comes in For Help” and “The Situation is Defined” to “Increased Independence” and “The Decreasing Need for Help.”<sup>19</sup> In the final section of the book, Rogers included the first-ever verbatim published therapeutic case, the case of “Herbert Bryan” as presented in eight interviews.<sup>20</sup> To foster growth, Rogers wrote, it was necessary for a therapist to be warm, responsive, “permissive in regard to expression of feeling, structured, and non-coercive.”<sup>21</sup>

In 1951 *Client-Centered Therapy* extended the themes of *Counseling and Psychotherapy*. In the introduction, Rogers wrote: “This book is, I believe, about life, as life vividly reveals itself in the therapeutic process—with its blind power and its tremendous capacity for destruction, but with its overbalancing thrust toward growth, if the opportunity for growth is provided. But the book is also about my colleagues and me as we undertake the beginnings of scientific analysis of this living, emotional experience [...] though science is slow and fumbling, it represents the best road we know to truth, even in so delicately intricate an area as that of human relationships.”<sup>22</sup>

Rogers then proceeded to describe the process of individual growth, blending his theoretical ideas about the role of the therapist with excerpts from therapy sessions and supporting research. Through his exposition of the goals of therapy, he also argued for a concept of human nature that had much in common with Maslow’s own conception. If provided the right conditions for growth, including an atmosphere of acceptance and respect, he argued, individuals would inherently strive for health.<sup>23</sup> He referred to this

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<sup>19</sup> Carl Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), 30-44.

<sup>20</sup> Carl Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy: It’s Current Practice, Implications and Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 13.

<sup>21</sup> Rogers, *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, 85-87.

<sup>22</sup> Rogers *Client-Centered Therapy*, xi.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 276.

process as organismic “valuing” or “sensing,” suggesting that individuals know what is good for them and innately strive to attain it.<sup>24</sup>

In the 1950s, Rogers continued to publish widely on the topic of client-centered therapy. His articles displayed specifically his developing interest in psychological health and striving. For example, a 1955 article, entitled “Facilitation of Personal Growth,” explored the conditions necessary for an individual to seize upon his full potential.<sup>25</sup> His articles also highlighted his growing disconnection from the methods in which he was trained. Reflecting on his 1955 article, “Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question,” Rogers wrote in 1961 that the origin of his conflict was “between the logical positivism in which I was educated, for which I had a deep respect, and the subjectively oriented existential thinking which was taking root in me because it seemed to fit so well with my therapeutic experience.”<sup>26</sup>

Rogers didn’t read existential philosophy until the 1950s, when, at the urging of his University of Chicago students, he delved into the work of Kierkegaard and Buber, but when he finally had direct exposure to their existential philosophy, he responded to their “deep insights and convictions which beautifully express views I have held but never been able to formulate.”<sup>27</sup> Rogers’ reorientation culminated, in 1961, in the publication of *On Becoming a Person*, a collection of the articles Rogers published between 1951 and 1961 intended for the “intelligent layman,” rather than the professional psychological audience to which his previous work had been directed.<sup>28</sup>

## THE JOURNAL OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Maslow’s 1950s articles, like Rogers’ articles, reflected his new orientation toward personal growth and human motivation. They focused on topics like deficiency

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>25</sup> Carl R. Rogers, “Facilitation of Personal Growth.” *The School Counselor* 2, no. 1 (January 1955).

<sup>26</sup> Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 199. For the complete article, see: Carl Rogers, “Persons or Science? A Philosophical Question,” *American Psychologist* 10, no. 7 (1955): 267–78.

<sup>27</sup> Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 199.

<sup>28</sup> Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, vii.

and growth motivation, power relationships and personal development, and normality, health and values. As prolific as ever, Maslow published 27 articles in the 1950s (he had published 21 and 23 in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively).<sup>29</sup> He found it increasingly difficult, however, to publish his theory in mainstream journals.<sup>30</sup> While in previous decades his work appeared consistently in top journals, like the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, the *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, and the *Psychological Review*, his work in the 1950s appeared, with a few exceptions, in journals like *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* and *Dialectica* (published out of the University of Liege).<sup>31</sup>

By the late 1950s, Maslow had left Brooklyn College, where he had taught from 1937 to 1951, and had accepted a prestigious academic position as chair of the psychology department at Brandeis.<sup>32</sup> From his new post, Maslow drafted a mailing list of 175 individuals he knew to be sympathetic to his critique of psychology and his vision of a growth-oriented alternative. In the mid to late 1950s, the list helped Maslow to intellectually unite a nationally dispersed group of “Creativeness, Self, Being and Growth People,” who shared a common frustration with the direction in which American psychology was headed. The list included scholars like Gordon Allport, Kurt Goldstein, Lewis Mumford, Carl Rogers and Paul Tillich, some of whom would become primary in the movement Maslow was angling to establish.<sup>33</sup>

The mailing list helped to broadcast theory and research within a “kind of Committee of Correspondence and Interchange.”<sup>34</sup> And the rapid growth of the list and

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<sup>29</sup> For a complete bibliography of Maslow’s work, see the website created by the Archives of the History of Psychology: “Abraham H. Maslow: Books, Articles, Audio/ Visual and his Personal Papers,” <http://www.maslow.com/index.html>.

<sup>30</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 7.

<sup>31</sup> “Maslow: Books, Articles, Audio/ Visual and his Personal Papers.”

<sup>32</sup> Hoffman, *The Right to Be Human*, 199.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 208-209.

<sup>34</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, Viii. This channel of dialogue was particularly significant to psychologists whose ideas had too long been silenced. In the introduction to the first issue of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, editor Anthony Sutich wrote that, “In this country “official organizations, policies, and journals have been rather inhospitable, to say the least, to the publication of findings along the broadly stated lines of [humanistic] scientific inquiry. As a consequence, a rapidly

the interest it provoked soon necessitated the creation of a journal to formalize the intellectual exchange. After turning down an offer from the editor of the *American Journal of Individual Psychology* to incorporate his growth-oriented perspective into the Adlerian emphasis of that journal, Maslow began to organize the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* (JHP) in 1957. In July of that year, he assigned the editorship to Anthony Sutich, a largely self-taught psychologist who'd been corresponding with Maslow throughout the '50s.<sup>35</sup> The two originally intended to name the journal the *Journal of Ortho-psychology*, presumably in reference to the corrective or revisionary nature of its content, but when the Orthopsychiatric Association opposed the title, they discarded the idea. Maslow suggested other titles, like *Psychological Growth, Being and Becoming*, and *Personality Development*. And Sutich and Maslow also discussed the titles *Existence*, *Third Force*, and *Self-Psychology*. They eventually agreed to name the journal the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, however, upon a suggestion from Maslow's son-in-law, then a psychology student at Brandeis.<sup>36</sup>

Maslow's decision may have been too impulsive. The name of the journal, and later of the association, posed problems for humanistic psychologists and detracted from the movement's intent. Harvard-based personality psychologist Gordon Allport expressed concern over the "perils of labelism" and worried that the label "humanistic psychology" implied "humanism without any scientific constraints," whereas the movement that Allport hoped for was one that "might be said to have the outlook of humanism, but the

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increasing number of important contributions have neither been published nor are they otherwise readily available. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, I-VII.

<sup>35</sup> Anthony Sutich, a largely self-taught psychologist crippled from severe progressive arthritis since childhood, was wildly enthusiastic about the "new frontier" of humanistic psychology. Maslow, who had been introduced to Sutich in 1949 by a mutual friend, identified Sutich's commitment to humanistic psychology through Sutich's publications on values, ethics, and semantics and through their intermittent correspondence in the 1950s. Early on, Maslow affectionately referred to Sutich as "the boss of the new enterprise" and later solicited his support in the founding of the American Association of Humanistic Psychology. de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 9.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-15.

constraints of science.”<sup>37</sup> “Label not good,” he wrote, but it was too late. The name soon came to cover the coalescing movement, and the confusion that Allport had feared, between “humanists” and “humanistic psychologists,” plagued the movement from the outset.<sup>38</sup>

The new journal, and the movement, were also hindered by a lack of funding. The first meager infusion came from Sutich’s personal savings and donations from friends. Brandeis University, whose president initially refused to offer support of any kind, eventually agreed to sponsor the journal, but he refused to fund it. Supporters rallied for the journal’s success; even before the first issue was published in the spring of 1961, Sutich received numerous manuscripts and expressions of interest. A host of psychological luminaries agreed to serve on the journal’s board of directors, most notably Kurt Goldstein, Aldous Huxley—who had conceived the term “human potentialities”—Lewis Mumford, *Lonely Crowd* author David Reisman, Erich Fromm and soon-to-be central figures in the movement like Rollo May, Abe Maslow, Carl Rogers and Charlotte Buhler. After the first publication, the praise from subscribers (initially the members of Maslow’s mailing list) and the continued submissions convinced Sutich that an association would be required to organize the growing list of “humanistic psychologists.”<sup>39</sup>

Early issues of the Journal of Humanistic Psychology indicate the tight, insider-oriented nature of JHP. Maslow published an article in virtually every issue (11 of the first 15). Charlotte Buhler’s articles were featured in 7 of the first 18 issues. Other frequent appearances were made by James Bugental, whose articles appeared in 5 of the first 13 issues and whose column “Persons behind Ideas” ran from the 4<sup>th</sup> through 6<sup>th</sup> volumes (the column was later written by James Fadiman); Henry Winthrop, whose

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<sup>37</sup> Gordon Allport, notes, “Conference on Humanistic Psychology: Old Saybrook, Conn- Nov 27-29,” November 30, 1964, (Papers of Gordon W. Allport, HUG 4118.50, box 4, Humanistic Psychology Conference folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>38</sup> Eugene Taylor, interview by author, September 29, 2005.

<sup>39</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 7-15.

articles appeared in 5 of the first 7 issues and whose book reviews appeared in all but one of the first 13 issues; and Sidney Jourard, who published 5 articles in the first 19 issues of the journal. The most commonly occurring topics in the first decade of the journal involved the role of ideals and principles in the psychological conception of the self; individual striving for health and self-actualization; transcendence or peak experiences (spiritual or mystical experiences in which one is at one's best); and creativity. Early issues of the journal also demonstrated nascent avenues of interest for humanistic psychology. For example, "sensitivity training," a form of group therapy involving open and direct communication, first appeared in the Spring 1963 issue of the journal in two separate articles.<sup>40</sup>

### **THE FORMATION OF AAHP**

Connections established through Maslow's mailing list, and stirring around the publication of JHP, enabled Maslow to realize his ambition to form an association. In 1962, the American Association of Humanistic Psychology (AAHP) was established at the first of a series of conferences sponsored by Sonoma State College, and James Bugental was named president pro tem. The founding meeting of the association occurred in the summer of 1963, in Philadelphia, and attracted 75 participants. The meeting was professionally significant in establishing the themes of the new organization, which were broadly oriented around ideas of personal growth and the infusion of values into the supposedly value-free realms of empirical psychology. But even more powerful was the meeting's personal significance to its participants, who, according to Sutich, felt that they had created a new "belonging group," delivering them from professional and intellectual isolation and frustration.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Cumulative Contents, 1961-1990, *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. 30 No. 4, Fall 1990, 70-112. For examples of early explorations of sensitivity training, see: James V. Clark, "Authentic Interaction and Personal Growth in Sensitivity Training Groups," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring (1963): 1-13.; J.F.T. Bugental and Robert Tannebaum, "Sensitivity Training as Being Motivation," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring (1963): 76-85.

<sup>41</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 7-15.

Humanistic psychology grew quickly; the second meeting of AAHP, held in Los Angeles in September of 1964, boasted double the attendance of the first.<sup>42</sup> Its continued success, however, depended on a clearer articulation of its goals and on dramatic cultural changes (already afoot) that would better align public perception with its message.

Maslow continued to be seminal in articulating the theory of humanistic psychology.<sup>43</sup> His 1962 collection of his essays and addresses, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, helped to disseminate his ideas. The book became extremely popular, selling over 200,000 copies before the trade edition came out in 1968.<sup>44</sup> Building on the theory of motivation he advanced in *Motivation and Personality*, *Toward a Psychology of Being* contained essays in which he reflected his existentialist bent, demarcating the highest level of the hierarchy of needs the “Being-realm” or “B-realm,” and speaking of the values that an individual possessed when in that realm as “B-values.”

The B-values were thoroughly holistic; he enumerated them as the need for wholeness, perfection, completion, justice, aliveness, richness, simplicity, beauty, goodness, uniqueness, effortlessness, truth, honesty, reality and self-sufficiency.<sup>45</sup> According to Maslow, only self-actualized individuals possessed B-values, all others were motivated by D-values (or deficiency-values), which were oriented to basic necessities that they lacked.<sup>46</sup>

*Toward a Psychology of Being* also brought to a much broader audience Maslow’s theory of peak experiences, which he had published in a professional journal in 1959.<sup>47</sup> Maslow defined peak experiences to participants in his research as “the most

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<sup>42</sup> “A Chronology of AHP’s Annual Conferences,” [www.ahpweb.org/aboutahp/ahpcronology.html](http://www.ahpweb.org/aboutahp/ahpcronology.html).

<sup>43</sup> Edward Hoffman, “Abraham Maslow: A Biographical Sketch,” in *Future Visions: The Unpublished Papers of Abraham Maslow* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), 12.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>45</sup> Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1968), 83.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 82-83.

<sup>47</sup> For the original articles, see: Maslow, Abraham “Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences” *Journal of Genetic Psychology* 94 (1959): 43-46.



wonderful experience or experiences in your life; happiest moments, ecstatic moments, moments of rapture.”<sup>48</sup>

During a peak experience, he wrote, individuals feel more integrated “unified, whole, all-of a piece.” They are “more able to fuse with the world.” For example, “the appreciator *becomes* the music (and it becomes *him*) or the painting, or the dance.” Peakers feel themselves to be at the height of their powers; they experience a sense of “effortlessness and ease of functioning”; they feel free of blocks and inhibitions, they feel more spontaneous and expressive, more “freely flowering outward”; and they feel “more of a pure psyche and less a thing-of-the world living under the laws of the world.” Peakers also feel more creative, connected to the present, unique, and grateful.<sup>49</sup>

A peak experience, he wrote, is short and fleeting. “Certainly I know this now about peak, the great joys.” Maslow wrote in his journal in 1964, “They would kill us if they lasted too long or came too often. (Supposing a great orgasm lasted for 15 minutes instead of 10 or 15 seconds! The organism couldn’t stand it. Surely the heart would collapse. [...]) To have a peak means *not* to fear flooding. One can ‘take it,’ One can give up control, self-consciousness.”<sup>50</sup>

Maslow’s notion of peak garnered widespread attention, foreshadowing the popular interest that the humanistic psychology movement would attract. In response to his professional paper alone, approximately 50 people wrote Maslow unsolicited accounts of their own peak experiences.<sup>51</sup>

#### **THE OLD SAYBROOK CONFERENCE OF 1964**

Maslow’s ideas were enough to ground a theory, but not enough to make a movement. He openly expressed this awareness in communications with sympathetic

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<sup>48</sup> Abraham Maslow, “Cognition of the Peak Experiences,” in Maslow, *Psychology of Being*, 83.

<sup>49</sup> Maslow, *Psychology of Being*, 103-114

<sup>50</sup> Maslow, November 24, 1964, *Journals* Vol. 1, 435.

<sup>51</sup> Kirschenbaum, *On Becoming Carl Rogers*, 258.

scholars and in the *Journal*.<sup>52</sup> The momentum of his preliminary efforts, however, finally coalesced on November 28<sup>th</sup>, 1964, when the main players in humanistic psychology first convened to collectively identify the movement's theory and goals. In the quaint Connecticut coastal town of Old Saybrook, the new American Association for Humanistic Psychology held its first invitational conference. Humanistic psychology lynch pins like Carl Rogers, Abe Maslow, Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy, Henry Murray, Floyd Matson, James Bugental, Clark Moustakas, Sydney Jourard and Miles Vich attended. Two women participated—Charlotte Buhler (then a practicing psychologist in California) and Norma Rosenquist (first organizational secretary for AAHP). The Old Saybrook conference has been repeatedly described, by its participants and by scholars of the movement, as a landmark moment in humanistic psychology, sparking a “revolution” that “opened doors to new fields like Creativity research; others which had been systemically shut to psychology, such as consciousness and self-exploration; other doors to European existential-phenomenology, and still others to Eastern philosophical traditions.”<sup>53</sup>

The conference spanned from Friday the 28<sup>th</sup> to Sunday the 30<sup>th</sup> 1964 and laid the intellectual foundations for humanistic psychology. The events of the weekend were academic in tone and nature, consisting exclusively of the civilized presentation of academic papers and lively discussions that bore little resemblance to the radically experiential gatherings that would take place under heading of Humanistic Psychology in the years that followed.<sup>54</sup>

The bulk of the papers presented during the weekend respectfully (and strategically) placed humanistic psychology within the domain of scientific psychology, stressing that humanistic psychology theory would extend and enrich the findings of experimental psychology, rather than negate them. The conference insisted on a firm

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<sup>52</sup> Maslow, August 30, 1962, *Journals* Vol. 1, 189-190.

<sup>53</sup> “The Old Saybrook Conference” <http://www.westga.edu/~psydept/os2/history.html>.

<sup>54</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 10.

scientific grounding, and tried to pre-empt accusations that it was too strictly humanistic by including papers that explicitly emphasized natural rather than social science.<sup>55</sup>

Rene Dubos represented the natural sciences with his presentation of his *American Scientist* article “Humanistic Biology.”<sup>56</sup> Dubos urged biological sciences, which “have been immensely successful in describing elementary structures and processes of the body machine” to attend to the study of living as experience as well. He contended that rather than losing “contact with the humanities because it has become too ‘scientific’ and as a consequence no longer deals with the problems peculiar to the humanness of man,” biology was not scientific enough. A truly scientific biology would, according to Dubos, consider the totality of human reality, rather than “neglecting the study of a large variety of man’s responses.”<sup>57</sup>

Edward Shoben, presenter of “Psychology: Natural science or humanistic discipline?” argued against the limitations of a natural science definition of psychology, but he also emphasized the necessity of augmenting the present empirical approach, rather than discarding it. “Psychology’s great opportunity lies not in discarding its sturdily expanding methodological apparatus, but in informing it with the humanistic vision, the quest for an even fuller statement of the ‘law for man’ as against the ‘law for thing.’”<sup>58</sup>

George Kelly’s paper, “The Threat of Aggression,” further explored the idea of rehumanizing the scientific enterprise—not a purely academic concern at a conference happening only two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war—arguing that the boldness of the scientifically-minded experimenter must not be replaced with a negative form of aggression hiding behind a mask of humanism:

The humanistic psychologist’s dilemma—how to protect human audacity from human audacity without stifling human audacity—finds another kind of solution

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<sup>56</sup>Rene Dubos, “Humanistic Biology,” *American Scientist* Vol 53 (1965): 4-19, <http://www.westga.edu/~psydept/os2/os1/dubos.htm>.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Edward Shoben, “Psychology: Natural science or humanistic discipline?” *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Special Issue, Fall (1965): 218.

when we manage to step outside the stimulus-response solipsism. It is the hostile, and not necessarily the aggressive enterprise, that must be guarded against. The aggressive effort to understand man, or to experiment with ways of accomplishing psychological feats never before achieved, is not intrinsically destructive. It may, of course, be hazardous. It does become destructive, however, when one tries to make it appear that disconfirming events did not actually arise, or that what failed to occur actually happened. And this, in turn, is generated by the notion that we ought always to be right before we commit ourselves, a notion that later makes it very hard to concede our mistakes, or to revise our construction of the world when our heavily invested anticipations fail to materialize.<sup>59</sup>

At Saybrook, Carl Rogers was both sympathetic to the seductiveness of positivistic science and insistent on the evaluation of the values behind it. "I love the precision and the elegance," he admitted. But he also advanced a new notion of scientific integrity that involved questioning "the presuppositions which underlie our whole field of work and its relation to life and living." Opposing the notion that philosophical considerations were an irrelevant aspect of psychology's past, he asked: "How do we know? What is 'true'? What are the identifying characteristics of a scientist? What is science? What is the special nature of behavioral science?"<sup>60</sup>

The danger of overlooking these questions, from the perspective of humanistic psychologists, was that psychologists would unwittingly reproduce and reinforce the American cultural tendency to try to fulfill human needs with impersonal technological invention. According to Maslow, "Our orthodox conception of science (as mechanistic and ahuman) seems to me one local part-manifestation or expression of the larger, more inclusive *Weltanschauung* of mechanization and dehumanization of which it is a part."<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> George Kelly, "The Threat of Aggression," *The Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. V, No. 2, Fall (1965): 201.

<sup>60</sup> Carl Rogers, "Some Thoughts," 182-183.

<sup>61</sup> Abraham Maslow, "Humanistic Science and Transcendent Experiences," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Special Issue, Fall (1965): 219..

## Chapter Five: Building a Movement

Despite the conservatism of the 1950s and early 1960s, and the monopoly that behaviorism held over the institutions of academic psychology, participants in the Old Saybrook conference were optimistic about their enterprise. They knew that their ambitions to reform science and psychology were grand, but they shared a confidence that American culture was, beneath the surface, readying itself for such a shift in attitudes.<sup>1</sup> Maslow spoke of the “rapidly developing” counter-philosophy emerging, in pockets throughout the intellectual world, in opposition to the prevalent positivism. He wrote:

It might be called a rediscovery of man, of human capacities, and of needs-aspirations. These humanly-based values are being restored to politics, to industry, to religion, and also to the psychological and social sciences. This is true also for the non-human and impersonal sciences which have been going through a convulsion of what might be called rehumanization. At first, they began by rejecting teleology (human purpose) from the physical universe, which was reasonable enough. But then they wound up by rejecting human purposes in human beings. Now this begins to change.<sup>2</sup>

Gordon Allport, in his personal notes on the Old Saybrook conference, expressed his optimism for the fledgling association. He observed the “overwhelming enthusiasm” of his colleagues at the conference and identified humanistic psychology as “not a school, or a person, or a theory of Personality, but a ground swell.” More than a decade before, Allport had identified the existence of a “healthy and contrary trend in America.” In particular, Allport pointed to the liberalizing of philosophies of child-rearing; to more holistic, humane treatment of workers in the industrial economy; and to the popularity of therapy as evidence of a growing belief that a “person must settle his own destiny” and that life presented an endless series of opportunities for the realization of growth. Humanistic psychology embraced Allport’s imperative of advocating wholeness and

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<sup>1</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 10; Maslow, December 17, 1962, *Journals* Vol 1, 340.

<sup>2</sup> Maslow, “Humanistic Science and Transcendent Experiences.”

attempt to actualize his contention that “A MINORITY OF DEMOCRATIC WHOLE MEN can I believe, withstand a MAJORITY OF TOTALITARIAN HALF-MEN.”<sup>3</sup>

In his 1955 introduction to *Becoming*, Allport identified the increasing power of psychological theory to address the pressing cultural questions of the time—including those related to race and gender relations, industry and education. He noted that everyone seemed to be speaking the language of psychology, from the “common man” who “now talks in the language of Freud and reads an ever mounting output of books in popular psychology,” to the leaders of industry and the scholars in adjacent disciplines, including anthropology, sociology and political science.<sup>4</sup>

Allport’s own work, consistently oriented toward the uniqueness of the individual and her attempts at harmonious existence in the social sphere, explored a range of timely cultural interests, including racial prejudice and religious experience. In 1946, he published the book *Controlling Group Prejudice*, covering a topic he again took up in 1948 in the pamphlet *ABC’s of Scapegoating* and in 1954 with *The Nature of Prejudice*. Exploring American prejudice against Jews, and later against blacks and Roman Catholics, Allport theorized the polar concepts of “the prejudiced personality,” and “the tolerant personality.”<sup>5</sup> The tolerant personality, which Allport paralleled with the “democratic” and “productive” personality, was characterized most often by liberal political views, “slightly” higher intelligence, greater tolerance for ambiguity and higher levels of empathy.<sup>6</sup>

Allport continued to refine his notions of the “tolerant” or “mature” personality in his 1950 book *The Individual and his Religion*. Mature religious sentiment, according to

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<sup>3</sup> Gordon Allport, “Psychiatry in Neurotic America” (notes), Harvard Law Forum, December 1, 1950 (Gordon W. Allport Papers).

<sup>4</sup> Gordon W. Allport, *Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 1.

<sup>5</sup> For Allport’s work on prejudice, see: Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954); Gordon Allport, *ABC’s of Scapegoating* (New York, Anti-defamation League of B’nai B’rith, 1948).

<sup>6</sup> Allport, *Nature of Prejudice*, 425-440.

Allport, was characteristic of the person whose approach to religion is dynamic, open-minded, and able to encompass contradiction.<sup>7</sup> Reflecting his own liberal political philosophy and a desire to forge a psychology of “health,” Allport’s theories reflected a countercurrent in American culture that opposed inflexible systems of the past.

The cultural changes of the 1950s and 1960s, and in particular the *Brown v. Board of education* decision that was issued the same year *The Nature of Prejudice* was released, suggested to Allport that America was ready to receive a theory of humanistic psychology. But, like his fellow participants at the Old Saybrook Conference of 1964, he was also realistic about the challenges that humanistic psychology would face. In his notes from the conference, he wrote that “all of us [...] sense significant pattern, maybe few central qualities.”<sup>8</sup> The loose configuration of theories comprising humanistic psychology would make it difficult to win adherents and to effectively oppose existing theories. The very intention of humanistic psychology—to capture humans in their complexity—further infused the movement with an intrinsic amount of unknowability and abstraction.

The method that Allport identified as having led psychology to its then current, reductionistic state was also, he recognized, a conceptual advantage for mainstream psychology: he wrote that “success comes by exclusion,” by limiting the important questions to those that can be answered without introducing too many variables. Allport noted that unlike the totality of the psyche—which humanistic psychology took as its object of study—“fragments are manageable.”<sup>9</sup> To illustrate this difference he listed examples of questions that science was able to effectively answer because of their simplicity:

What’s the cause of typhoid? Find it

What’s the cause of yellow fever?

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<sup>7</sup> Gordon W. Allport, *The Individual and his Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 58.

<sup>8</sup> Allport, “Conference on Humanistic Psychology” (notes), Nov. 30, 1964.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

What's the cause of polio?

What happens when you frustrate a rat?

What happens when the eye adapts to the dark?

What happens when conflicting images are presented to two eyes?<sup>10</sup>

The trend toward reduction—in philosophy, literary criticism, and psychology's learning theory and treatment of mental illness—was a problem for Allport. But he also recognized its potency, and he wondered how humanistic psychology would oppose this powerful tide, which had already absorbed the mainstream of psychology. "This approach (enormously fruitful)," he wrote, "tends to leave Nature and Human Nature as a pile of debris (*disjecta membra*)."<sup>11</sup> Thus the mission of humanistic psychology became, for Allport, not one of slight modification to an otherwise functional science, but of resuscitation and resurrection: "Rehumanization of impersonal science" and "rediscovery of man."<sup>12</sup>

Maslow too was preoccupied by the balancing act the movement must do between its ambitions and its reliance on tradition, referring to humanistic psychology as a "third force." In 1968, he wrote: "I interpret this third psychology to include the first and second psychologies [...] I am Freudian and I am behavioristic and I am humanistic."<sup>13</sup> In the preface to the second edition of *Motivation and Personality*, he stressed "the profoundly holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the analytic-dissecting-atomistic-Newtonian approach of the behaviorisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis."<sup>14</sup> He claimed that though he accepted the "empirical and experimental spirit" of behaviorism and the "depth-probing" of psychoanalysis, he rejected their *images* of man.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Gordon Allport, "Conference on Humanistic Psychology," notes, November 30, 1964 (Allport Papers, HUG 4118.50, Box 4, Humanistic Conference Folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Abraham Maslow, *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 4.

<sup>14</sup> Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, ix.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, ix-x.



## THE MUDDLED EXERCISE OF DEFINITION

In order to define their movement, humanistic psychologists felt compelled to first define what humanistic psychology opposed, invariably incorporating a critique of the inadequacy of the then current academic psychology. Director of the Harvard Psychological Clinic Henry Murray, for example, who had vocally critiqued academic psychology for decades, established himself as an oppositional academician even before his appearance on Maslow's original mailing list and his participation in the Old Saybrook conference. In 1935, he published a paper in the *Archives of Neurology* entitled "Psychology and the University," in which he offered an extensive critique of the failings of academic psychology.<sup>16</sup>

"If psychology is defined as the science which describes people and explains why they perceive, feel, think and act as they do, then, properly speaking, no science of the kind exists." He referred to psychologists as "encrusted specialists," from whose "web of activity consideration of man as a human being has somehow escaped." Attacking academic psychology specifically, he argued that researchers had contributed nothing more than "unusable truths."<sup>17</sup>

Murray's dissatisfaction produced an inevitable antagonism between himself and Harvard's psychology department.<sup>18</sup> Of this conflict, he wrote, "Harvard as an environment for a social scientist is not nourishing-it is out of the main current of events, it is a vast impersonal factory with no sense of vocation, it is indifferent to or opposed to the social sciences."<sup>19</sup> "Psychology is young," wrote Murray, "Harvard does not like

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<sup>16</sup> Henry Murray, "Psychology and the University," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 34, October (1935), 803-817. Quotations are from Murray's archival manuscript. Henry Murray, "Psychology and the University" (manuscript) (Henry A. Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.20 Psychology and the University, 1930-1950 folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ian A. M. Nicholson, *Inventing Personality: Gordon Allport and the Science of Selfhood* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), 184.

<sup>19</sup> Murray, "Psychology and the University," Murray Papers.

anything that is young [and] cannot prove itself to the 4<sup>th</sup> decimal place.”<sup>20</sup> By 1936, statements like these, in combination with his unconventional scientific practices, earned Murray a good deal of departmental disapproval, spurring colleagues to advocate his termination.<sup>21</sup>

Fortunately, Gordon Allport’s “scientific capital” enabled him to effectively protect the position of Murray, whose interests in psychoanalysis and case studies offended the department’s scientific sensibilities and whose forthright critique of experimental psychology infuriated his peers.<sup>22</sup> Murray’s approach to directing Harvard’s Psychological Clinic, which he had taken over in 1927, reflected an holistic approach to mental health and personality that aligned with Allport’s interests. It offered, according to Allport, a “much needed antidote to the prevailing barbarism of mental tests and statistical psychology.”<sup>23</sup>

Although Murray spent the rest of his career in the psychology department at Harvard, with a brief absence during World War II, Murray’s personal notes in the 1950s indicate a persistent, almost compulsive, engagement with weighing the pros and cons of psychology. The notes include the following list of “unfortunate characteristics of psychology/ psychoanalysis”:

1. reductive analysis

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<sup>20</sup> Murray, “State of American Psychology,” (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.20, Psychology and the University, Murray Notes on Harvard’s Antipathy to the Social Sciences folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>21</sup> Nicholson, *Inventing Personality*, 184.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 184-186.; Forest G. Robinson, *Love’s Story Told: A Life of Henry A. Murray* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 226. In 1936, as Murray’s third 3-year contract came up for renewal, various members of Harvard’s psychology department, including the well-known Karl Lashley, argued to terminate his appointment. Lashley vehemently objected to Murray’s brand of psychology and felt that his presence “constituted an impediment to the ‘attempt to evolve a more exact science through an objective and biological approach.’ Allport, however garnered letters of support for Murray’s work from nationally acclaimed psychologists and, through his participation on a committee designed to evaluate Murray’s contribution to the University, was able to persuade Harvard President James B. Conant that dismissing him would destroy the humanistic tradition in psychology at Harvard. Murray was invited to stay on with a 5 year contract to run the clinic.”<sup>22</sup> Lashley as quoted in Nicholson, *Inventing Personality*, 18.

<sup>23</sup> Gordon Allport as quoted in Nicholson, *Inventing Personality*, 186.

2. illness-oriented, enemy-oriented, wrong-oriented, infection-oriented, distress-oriented- not joy (hope, goodness) oriented- except to punishment, no disvaluation
3. easier to see what is bad than what is good (or the absence of what is good)
4. no synthesis, no words for synthesis
5. abstains from evaluations of values of other modes of living
6. accentuation of patients' narcissism, geocentrism
7. training has made them insensitive to values
8. in wisdom there is sorrow.
9. Psychoanalysts- generally speaking- are against culture (parents) most support patient
10. problem of identity in consequence of narcissism- lack of sociophilia
11. psychoanalysts- put aside religion as an illusion- have no substitute (self is substitute)<sup>24</sup>

Murray's justifications of psychology's strengths were fewer and less passionate.

He details the "Advantage of psychology" as follows:

A way of looking at things- detachment, objectivity, impartiality, free from predispositions, fixed evaluations. Can look at repellant, criminal, delinquent, abnormal behavior without condemning it- also can look at other cultures, then own culture and own subculture and own family and own friends and self and finally psychology itself and its efforts<sup>25</sup>

The consequence of psychology's failures, for Murray, was the reduction of people into derogatory terms and unsynthesized aspects. He felt that the broad-scale intentional manipulation of individuals through psychology, as in the application of psychology to advertising or political action, demonstrated the potential dangers inherent in all forms of psychology. Murray wrote:

We have known for several years that applications of the physical and biological sciences are capable of doing man the maximal amount of physical harm, capable

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<sup>24</sup> Henry Murray, notes, (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.41 Conference Reports and Papers, early 1960's, Box 2, "Psychology: advantages, values, disadvantage" folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

indeed of extinguishing all life on this planet. Now we must face one more stern fact, namely, that applications of the social sciences are capable of doing man the maximal amount of psychological harm.<sup>26</sup>

Even when psychology wasn't a tool of social manipulation, argued Murray, its purported "value-free" approach to individuals was actually an abdication of responsibility; it unwittingly advocated an acceptance of dominant American values, and therefore constituted an "adjustment" psychology.<sup>27</sup>

While mainstream psychologists had been quick to describe illness using specific criteria and categories, they had effectively avoided defining optimum health in a similar fashion. By default, health was the absence of recognized symptoms of illness. In negatively defining health, psychologists passively accepted dominant cultural values, uncritically neglecting the economic or political motivations that had contributed to them. "Unhealthy" people were inevitably sometimes individuals whose lack of internal alignment with external cultural values caused them distress. Psychology, then, became complicit in the pathologization of social and cultural deviance.<sup>28</sup>

Psychologist Sidney Jourard argued that the categorization of mental illness also promoted an "all or none principle (i.e., one is either healthy or pathological) rather than providing a continuum along which people can be ranged."<sup>29</sup> This awkward perspective ignored "average" or "normal" experience (which encompassed an expected level of conflict or struggle) in favor of an ideal. The distressed—even the mildly distressed—were swept into the category of illness, while the "healthy" comprised an imaginary ideal that didn't exist.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Henry Murray, notes, *Psychology and the University* (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.20, Psychology and the University, Notes folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Gordon Allport, "Psychiatry in Neurotic America," (notes), Harvard Law Forum, December 1, 1950., Allport Papers.

<sup>29</sup> Sidney M. Jourard, "Concept of Healthy Personality" (working paper) (Gardner Murphy Papers, Box 1076, Sidney M. Jourard folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 1.

<sup>30</sup> Sidney Jourard, *Personal Adjustment: An Approach through the Study of Healthy Personality* (New York: McMillan, 1958), vii-ix.

The danger of a psychology that would presume to define illness without first defining health was that it would advocate a set of values unintentionally, and therefore irresponsibly. This critique mirrored a parallel discourse in the field of psychiatry. In 1960, Thomas Szasz had published the *The Myth of Mental Illness*, inspiring the anti-psychiatry movement that formed towards the end of the decade. Although Szasz didn't consider himself "anti-psychiatry," he argued against the conception of mental distress as "mental disease," proposing instead a notion of mental distress as "problems in living." He also explored the ways in which diagnosis served as a tool of social power for psychiatrists, allowing them to perpetuate an unquestioned set of assumptions and values in their practice.<sup>31</sup>

Determined not to reproduce the status quo, humanistic psychologists vowed to account for the subjective values and assumptions with which they would infuse their own work. In September of 1966, Maslow optimistically wrote:

The new *Zeitgeist* is value-full (value-directed, value-vectorial), human-need & metaneed centered (or based), moving toward basic-need gratification & metaneed metagrati­fication—that is, toward full-humanness, Self-Actualization, psychological health, full-functioning human fulfillment, i.e., *toward* human perfection as the limit & as the direction.<sup>32</sup>

Humanistic psychologists understood that in order to responsibly and positively define mental illness and mental *health*, it was necessary to account for their own values, a practice that had been largely absent from psychological pursuits aimed at utter objectivity. It was also necessary to oppose earlier concepts of mental health that were defined primarily by a set of assumptions and the absence of symptoms.<sup>33</sup>

## **HEALTH/ GROWTH AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE ABSENCE OF SYMPTOMS**

Although the Old Saybrook meeting represented an official collective attempt to articulate a theory of humanistic psychology, individual attempts to define humanistic

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<sup>31</sup> Thomas S. Szasz, "The Myth of Mental Illness," *American Psychologist*, XV, February (1960): 113-115.

<sup>32</sup> Maslow, September 20, 1966, *Journals* Vol. 1, 668.

<sup>33</sup> Sidney M. Jourard, "Quantification of Wellness," October 16, 1958, (Maslow Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 1.

concepts preceded the conference and continued—with a new rigor—after the conference ended. In 1958, Sidney Jourard had written that “a positive applied science of organismic health or wellness has thus far been handicapped by absence of explicit criteria of optima. We have avoided stating our values and ideals for man because it seems like such an unscientific thing to do.”<sup>34</sup> Humanistic psychologists were eager to correct this situation. To do so, it was necessary to be recognized as legitimate scientists, advancing methods that were not only empirical, but *more* empirical than those of behavioral psychology (in that they considered *all* relevant data, rather than dismissing information that could potentially confound clear understanding). Rather than focusing too narrowly on psychological variables, humanistic psychologists wished to push through the murkiness and complexity of human phenomena to arrive at greater clarity. Identifying “true” values of human nature required forays into the gray areas of individual beliefs and guiding philosophies.<sup>35</sup>

For humanistic psychologists, advancing a “value-full” approach to psychology meant forging a new vision of science. Of this challenge, Maslow wrote:

Science has to be redefined & expanded to manage *all* human questions, including values = Taoistic, experiential, holistic science.... And because it is arrogant it (scientism) also has regarded all of this knowledge as really not knowledge, or not respectable, scientific knowledge, the only kind worth having. “It’s unscientific” = exile.<sup>36</sup>

Each of the early humanistic psychologists had his or her own ways of describing his or her preferences, but they shared an approach to human values that the more theoretically inclined of them would identify as a hermeneutic one. By putting forth ideas about human values that “seemed” true, humanistic psychologists hoped to then catalyze a dialogue that would encompass a series of theoretical revisions, propelling the definition of “true” values ever closer to validity.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>35</sup> Maslow, December 16, 1961, *Journals* Vol. 1, 241.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 239.

<sup>37</sup> Maslow, November 5, 1961, *Journals* Vol 1, 130.

The best illustration of this hermeneutic approach to human inquiry, and the subject on which humanistic psychologists have been boldest, came in their assertion of the values of “health.” Abraham Maslow and Sidney Jourard, in particular, worked on elaborating and giving substance to the concept of health. Jourard, a clinical psychologist and a tenured professor at the University of Florida, had begun in the 1950s to articulate a concept of psychological health, which culminated in 1958 with his publication of *Personal Adjustment: An Approach through the Study of Healthy Personality*. In this book, as in subsequent work, Jourard recognized the subjective territory into which he needed to travel in order to quantify health, but saw it as the mirror image of the process that had resulted, within mainstream psychology, in ostensibly “objective” “scientific,” categories and definitions for understanding illness.<sup>38</sup>

Jourard established a scale of health that considered areas like family relationships, eating and drinking habits, and workplace dynamics, and he evaluated individuals on a 5-point scale of fulfillment of each component of health. In establishing this scale, Jourard argued that, “we needn’t be that blind, because already we have some intelligent guesses about some of the determiners of optimum, ongoing, ‘wellness-yielding’ personality.”<sup>39</sup> Heretically, Jourard argued that his own experience as a thinking, feeling, observing person had qualified him to make some preliminary guesses about what would constitute “true” health. His survey, designed to quantify “wellness,” demonstrated these initial guesses: on a scale of marital health, he included the following spectrum from illness to health:

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<sup>38</sup> Jourard, *Personal Adjustment*, 1-6. Jourard published several significant texts in humanistic psychology in the 1960s and 1970s. These included *The Transparent Self*, published in 1964, *Disclosing Man to Himself*, published in 1968, *Self-disclosure*, published in 1971, and *Health Personality*, published in the year of his death—1974. For a full bibliography of his professional publications, see: Anne C. Richards, Tiparat Schumrum and Lisa C. Sheehan-Hicks, “Chronological Bibliography of the Professional Publications of Sidney M. Jourard, <http://www.jourard.com/sidbib.htm>.

<sup>39</sup> Sidney M. Jourard, “Notes on the Quantification of Wellness,” Prepared for meeting of the Subcommittee on the Quantification of Wellness of the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, Washington, DC, November 18, 1958 (Murphy Papers, Box 1076, Sidney Jourard folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 4.

- (1) Feels a complete failure as a spouse. Gets no satisfactions out of being a spouse.
- (2) Can perform marital role with borderline adequacy, gets no enjoyment out of it.
- (3) Adequate as a spouse, gets more satisfactions than frustrations out of it.
- (4) Adequate as a spouse, gets positive satisfaction out of it.
- (5) Adequate as a spouse, the relationship is growing.<sup>40</sup>

Jourard's assessment of the "ideal" state of marriage portrays his implicit values of health: it reveals not a static state of achievement, but a dynamic state of continuous progress.

Maslow's theories of health, articulated first in his 1950 study of self-actualizers and revised in the remaining decades of his life, entailed a comparable amount of intuitive evaluation. Boldly identifying individuals whom he perceived to have achieved the highest degrees of health and studying the qualities they exhibited, Maslow took a great scientific risk. In 1965, he wrote, "We have learned much from self-actualizing, highly healthy people. They have higher ceilings. They can see further. And they can see in a more inclusive and more integrating way. They seem to find it less necessary to dichotomize things into either-ors."<sup>41</sup>

Among the characteristics Maslow identified in the healthy personality were the tendency to be reality-centered, autonomous, accepting of self and others, unhostile in humor, humble and respectful. He also identified the higher order nature of the needs healthy people expressed; they demonstrated the need for a sense of truth, goodness, beauty, unity, aliveness, uniqueness, completion, justice and order, simplicity, playfulness and meaningfulness.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>41</sup> Maslow, "Humanistic Science and Transcendent Experiences," 219 - 227.

<sup>42</sup> Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 83.



Espousing Maslow's methods, Henry Murray highlighted the necessity of developing a theory of health and of the values with which to evaluate health. In his personal notes from the 1960s, he wrote:

In general, it might be said that there is a deficiency, if not a total absence, of concepts and theories representative of human beings at their best, or of the best human beings judged by any standards one might name. Take any concrete example—Gandhi, Winston Churchill, Einstein, or John F. Kennedy—and we must admit, I believe, that none of the concepts or theories that are current in our discipline would be capable of representing in what respects these men deserved to be admired and venerated by millions of people to the extent that they have been.”<sup>43</sup>

Although Maslow and Murray agreed on the need to quantify the components of health, neither was willing, or able, to do the hard work of performing the scientific research necessary toward that goal. Maslow, as a pioneer in the field, expected others to scientifically test his theories, and was inevitably disappointed. He was perplexed as to why people didn't replicate his self-actualization research. “They spend so much time on so much crap. Why not some time on something critically important?” he asked. “I just don't understand it. My motivation theory was published 20 years ago, & in all that time nobody repeated it, or tested it, or really analyzed it or criticized. They just used it, swallowed it whole with only the most minor modifications.”<sup>44</sup>

## REORIENTING NOTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE

Primary to humanistic psychology's theoretical orientation, and its articulation of human values, was its interpretation of human nature as something positive, a novel perspective in American psychology which drew on the older ideas of romanticism and vitalism. Implicit in this quest was their notion that human beings possessed a characteristic “nature” that was independent of childhood experiences (as psychoanalysts assumed) and environmental conditions (as behaviorists argued).<sup>45</sup> Though humanistic

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<sup>43</sup> Henry Murray, (personal notes), undated, (Murray Papers, HUGFP 97.45.16, Personality Papers, Humanistic Psychology Folder, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>44</sup> Maslow, August 30, 1965, *Journals* Vol. 1, 189-190.

<sup>45</sup> de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 138-141.

psychologists tended to subscribe to Freud's concept of the unconscious, they refused to define id impulses as "dark" and expanded these desires to include those for creation, inspiration, humor and love.<sup>46</sup> Charlotte Buhler identified the "basic tendencies" implicit in human nature. Buhler, who had immigrated to the U.S. with her husband Karl Buhler in 1938 and become a founding member of the humanistic psychology movement at Old Saybrook and president of AHP from 1965-1966, cited four human tendencies:

1. satisfying one's needs (for love, sex, ego, and recognition)
2. making self-limiting adaptations (by fitting in, belonging, and remaining secure)
3. moving toward creative expansion (through self-expression and creative accomplishments)
4. upholding and restoring the inner order (by being true to one's conscience and values)<sup>47</sup>

Like most fundamental concepts of humanistic psychology, the movement's delineation of a concept of human nature implied a direct critique of the psychological approaches that preceded it. Psychological science had been conceived of "in the West as a technique for the ransacking of nature, as applied to man."<sup>48</sup> For behaviorists (as humanistic psychologists characterized them), humans were born "blank slates," who would be constituted by the results of a lifelong series of stimulus-response situations. For psychoanalysts, humans were born all id; their instincts for sex, food and sleep were closer to primordial urges than to a distinctly human form of nature. Humanistic psychology, in contrast, saw human nature as driven to all things good: creative invention, positive social interactions, love and peace. Only an obstructed or frustrated nature would cease to seek growth and positive self-expression.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>47</sup> Bruce Wochholz, "40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Perspective on ahpweb.org." *AHP Perspective*, August/September (2003): 6-9. (Original source not cited).

<sup>48</sup> Shoben, "Psychology: Natural Science or Humanistic Discipline?" 210 - 218.

<sup>49</sup> Christopher Anaastoo, "Cognitive Science and Technological Culture: A Humanistic Response," in *The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research and Practice*, ed. Kirk J.

## INDIVIDUALISM

If humanistic psychology's view of human nature was expressly positive, it was also extremely individually focused. Humanistic psychologists, especially in their early formulations of their theory, rarely spoke of altruism, environmental responsibility or interdependency. Instead they focused on themes like self-expression, individual growth, individual happiness and truth.<sup>50</sup>

The concept of individualism was a visible theme of humanistic psychology as early as the Old Saybrook Conference. J. F. T Bugental wrote in his notes from the conference of the goal of "helping the individual person to have a greater measure of awareness and, therefore, *control* of his own experience; this is the key point; not control of others or by others; rather self-modulation."<sup>51</sup>

As the 1960s protest movements got underway, humanistic psychology's emphasis on autonomy and independence took on new dimensions. In some cases, humanistic psychologists literally supplied the rhetoric used by dissidents.<sup>52</sup> Maslow's own words suggested an element of protest; he wrote that health entailed "transcendence of the environment, independent of it, able to stand against it, to fight it, to neglect it, or to turn one's back on it, to refuse it or adapt to it."<sup>53</sup> Individualism, in fact, pervaded Maslow's theories. The healthy, fully grown person, "certainly is characterized by his transcendence of other people's opinions," he wrote. In his "Study of Healthy Personality," he determined that healthy people were "autonomous, ruled by the laws of their own inner character rather than the rules of society."<sup>54</sup>

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Schneider, James F. T. Bugental and J. Fraser Pierson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 213-226.

<sup>50</sup> Cumulative Contents, 1961-1990, *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Vol. 30 No. 4, Fall 1990, 70-112; Representative article titles include: "Health as Transcendence of Environment," "The Sense of Self" and "Mental Health and Selective Detachment from Culture."

<sup>51</sup> J. F. T. Bugental, "Introduction." *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Special Issue, Fall (1965).

<sup>52</sup> Examples of this phenomenon include the use of Maslow's concepts by Betty Friedan, in *The Feminine Mystique*, and by Roger's ideas in the encounter group movement. Both will be taken up in later chapters.

<sup>53</sup> Abraham Maslow, "A Study of Healthy Personality" (undated working paper) (Maslow Papers, M1077, Manuscripts Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 3.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

Maslow's words evoke the subtle alienations and discontent that were typical of other manifestations of the 1950s—the beat movement, the attraction of the rebels without a cause played in the movies by James Dean and Marlon Brando, the increasing self-confidence of civil rights activists—that erupted in the glorified individualism that characterized the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>55</sup> George Leonard, reporter and editor for *Look Magazine*, wrote that the “60s began with all the pundits still commenting on the dullness of the times.” It appeared to be an “age of apathy and conformism”—an extension of the 1950s.<sup>56</sup> The picture quickly changed.

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<sup>55</sup> Richard Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s & 1950s* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 205-206. For a critique of the individualistic, or “narcissistic,” orientation of Americans in the 1960s and 1970s, see: Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism*.

<sup>56</sup> George Leonard, *Walking on the Edge of the World* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), 9.

## Chapter Six: The Outgrowths of Humanistic Psychology: Esalen, Human Potential, and The Founding of Division 32

In the first decade of the movement, humanistic psychologists produced a wealth of published work, advancing and testing their fledgling theories. In addition to publishing three books (*Toward a Psychology of Being* in 1962, *Religions, Values and Peak-Experiences* in 1964 and *Eupsychian Management: A Journal* in 1965), Maslow published more than 50 articles before his death in 1970.

Rogers was also prolific, producing 6 books between 1962 and 1972, as well as over 50 articles. In contrast to Maslow, however, Rogers continued to perform experimental research. In 1962, for example, he completed a study of psychotherapy with schizophrenics.<sup>1</sup> And, after leaving the University of Wisconsin—where Rogers had served as a professor of psychology from 1957 to 1963—to take a position at the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute in La Jolla, California, he performed extensive research on the efficacy of his client-centered approach and on group psychotherapy.<sup>2</sup> Even before the humanistic psychology movement formally began, Maslow had remarked on his respect for Rogers' experimental discipline. Contrasting Rogers to Fromm, whom Maslow criticized for his lack of empiricism, Maslow wrote, "My respect for Rogers grows & grows because of his researches."<sup>3</sup>

However, the work of humanistic psychologists that received the most attention during the 1960s was *not* the experimental studies they published in academic journals. Rather it was books that popularized basic theories of humanistic psychology for the lay reader. Rollo May's books, for example, including *The Art of Counseling* (1965), *Psychology and the Human Dilemma* (1967) and *Love and Will* (1969), were among the best-selling books in popular psychology during the time. In a 9-page article written in

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<sup>1</sup> Roy Jose de Carvalho, "Chronological Bibliographies," in de Carvalho, *Founders of Humanistic Psychology*, 159-216.

<sup>2</sup> Kirschenbaum, *On Becoming Carl Rogers*, 319-394.

<sup>3</sup> Maslow, August 21, 1961, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 113.

1971, a *New York Times* reporter documented the sales of *Love and Will*, in its first year and half, as in excess of 135,000 copies, and wrote that it was “fast becoming the source book for post-Freudian man.”<sup>4</sup>

The general trend of popular interest in the more or less ungrounded theory of humanistic psychologists reflected the alignment between humanistic psychology’s message and cultural currents of the 1960s. It also diminished the immediate necessity of performing experimental studies that would have effectively tested humanistic psychologists’ theories.<sup>5</sup>

The humanistic psychology movement became so popular, in fact, that the founders had to fight against their own glorification. In 1966, Maslow wrote: “I have rejected all demands to be pope (e.g., for the Horneyans or the humanists, etc.) [...] or to accept pure disciples (*students*, yes) & prick suckers who pledge total & exclusive devotion, & have always felt slightly repelled by the offer, & have tended to withdraw my prick from these people, get impersonal, detached, aloof—or lecture at them about being independent. [...] But I am a leader in a *higher* & better sense, which allows autonomy for the other, if he can take it.”<sup>6</sup> Clinging to their ideals, humanistic psychologists like Maslow faced the challenges and struggles associated with the adoption of their principles by popular culture, including the inevitable distortion of much of their theory.<sup>7</sup>

The human potential movement was a cultural phenomenon, rooted in the humanistic psychology movement. But, no easy distinction between humanistic psychology and human potential exists. Humanistic psychology *inspired* the human

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<sup>4</sup> David Dempsey, “Love and Will and Rollo May,” *New York Times*; March 28, 1971, SM29. In 1974, “Love and Will” again appeared in the *New York Times*, on a list of books that had received “uncommonly large print orders”—an estimated 400,000 copies—in the past month. “Paperback Best Sellers,” *New York Times*, March 10, 1974, 379.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Farson, “The Technology of Humanism,” *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 18, no. 2 (1978): 5-7.

<sup>6</sup> Maslow, July 11, 1966, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 746.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 746.

potential movement, was *inspired by* the human potential movement, and was frequently confused *with* and *by* developments in the human potential movement.<sup>8</sup> But, while humanistic psychology was largely comprised of academic and professional psychologists who hoped to revolutionize the field, the human potential movement defined a generation of seekers, many rooted in California, who hoped to reconceptualize their lives and their culture in positive, secular terms, grounded in an inherently healthful conception of human nature.<sup>9</sup>

## CALIFORNIA

Humanistic psychologists' theories were applied quite literally on the California coast in the mid 1960s in the form of human potential. Across the state, "growth-centers" proliferated, drawing visitors seeking self-actualization and personal growth. Offering weekend or week-long programs, these retreat centers employed a variety of techniques ranging from encounter groups (or t-groups) to workshops on yoga and meditation. The success of these centers reified the popular perception of California's experiential openness, which was premised, in part, on the rapid social and technological changes that characterized the region.<sup>10</sup>

California's physical environment contributed to the state's perceived revolutionary potential. The sunshine suggested optimism and possibility, obscuring the land's propensity for natural disaster. The dramatic coastline and alternately peaceful and forceful Pacific Ocean offered further symbolic potential. Nowhere were these

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<sup>8</sup> George Leonard, interview by author, Mill Valley, 27 April 2005. Confusion regarding the difference between humanistic psychology and the human potential movement would persist and would grow increasingly problematic as the human potential movement came to ignore its more intellectual roots. An article by a reporter at AHP's 13th annual conference, for example, used the title "Breaking Free from the Human Potential Movement" and included the sentence: "Humanistic psychology—the human potential movement—is getting more, not less, complex," reflecting his assumption that the two were indivisible. Mike Moore, "Breaking Free from the Human Potential Movement," *Mountain Gazette*, October, 1975, 17-23.

<sup>9</sup> Leonard, interview, 27 April 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Walter Anderson, interview by author, San Francisco, 26 April 2005.

tensions better captured than at the nation's premier growth center, the Esalen Institute.<sup>11</sup> One journalist described the intense physical beauty of Esalen's environs, noting that, "the mountains along the coast could have been shot like foam from an aerosol can. They rush, bubbly, frothy, looping madly down the coast, lightly decked with green or frosty gray cover, high above the surf. Giant rocks, broken, lie scattered in the boiling white water. From the rocks, the ocean backs way, way out to the flat horizon in successively darker bands of blue. I have never seen country so strong, so broad-shouldered, and I whipped through it on a road hung halfway between water and sky, on perilous cliffs, spanning gigantic gorges, rushing through sudden strands of sweet-smelling eucalyptus and towering redwoods."<sup>12</sup>

The convergence of the sublime natural environment with the social and self-transcendence sought by human potential participants harkened back to the traditions of early American pioneers and transcendentalists like Thoreau. "While one may need as-yet-undiscovered drugs to imagine how Thoreau would have reacted to the hugging, shouting and acid-dropping at Big Sur," wrote a journalist, "his quest at Walden Pond is certainly one fountainhead of the Esalen Hot Springs experiment."<sup>13</sup>

Early in the 1960s, California received national attention as a site of exaggerated promise for American culture. George Leonard wrote, "If the United States was a laboratory of social and cultural change, California was that part of the lab where the most advanced experimentation was taking place."<sup>14</sup> The media latched onto California's revolutionary potential. *Look* Magazine launched a California issue in September 25 of 1962, and *Life* Magazine followed with their own California issue a month later. The cover of *Look's* California issue proclaimed that "Tomorrow's Hopes and Tomorrow's

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<sup>11</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 47. Esalen was originally called the Big Sur Hot Springs. The institute changed its name in 1964 to the Esalen Institute. *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>12</sup> Richard Atcheson, "Big Sur: Coming to my Senses," *Holiday*, 43, March (1968): 22.

<sup>13</sup> Jeffrey Klein, "Esalen Slides Off the Cliff: Encountering the Newest Wave in the Human Potential Movement," *Mother Jones*, December (1979): 26-45, quotation from 30.

<sup>14</sup> George Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 80.



Headaches are here today in our soon-to be Largest State.” Articles referred to California as a “Promised Land for Millions of Migrating Americans” and as the harbinger of “The Way-Out Way of Life.” According to one historian, California was the answer to the American’s new surplus of leisure time, uniquely attuned to individual quests for sensation and stimulation: “Everything was bigger, newer, better, faster, shinier in California; it was the jewel in the technocracy’s crown.”<sup>15</sup>

California also embodied productive tensions, a simultaneous threat and a promise, that fueled an ethos of energy and change. Americans, still true to their sense of pioneerism and to their traditional Puritan roots, found the rapid change and cultural flux of California simultaneously exciting and frightening—“a window to the future, good and bad.”<sup>16</sup> Those who witnessed student protests in Berkeley, race riots in Watts, or drug culture in Haight-Ashbury would certainly attest that California was not comprised solely of starry-eyed youth with flowers in their hair. The Haight, for example was often a site more of dissolution and confusion than of harmony and goodwill. One historian wrote that the “madness of the place, the shouts, the chasing, the gunning bikes, the chaotic, occasional screams of girls running has convinced people that the Haight is a rare species of insane organization.”<sup>17</sup> Joan Didion, in her 1961 essay “Slouching Towards Bethlehem,” described San Francisco as a site of “social hemorrhaging.”<sup>18</sup>

In the broader cultural perception of California, however, the promise did tend to outweigh the threat. Early in the decade, idealistic self-seeking Americans were not the only ones who tried their fortunes in California: the federal government channeled forty-two percent of all government funds for research and development into the state in the spring of 1962.<sup>19</sup> California seemed to possess a surplus of great minds, capable of

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<sup>15</sup> Jay Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, x.

<sup>16</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 80..

<sup>17</sup> Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, xii.

<sup>18</sup> Joan Didion, *Slouching Towards Bethlehem* (New York, The Noonday Press, 1961), 85.

<sup>19</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 80.

leading America towards great things. As late as 1965, the mass media described the state more as a center of conformity than as a site of revolution.<sup>20</sup>

The perceived conformity of the early sixties was a holdover from the fifties, and by the late 1960s, everyone from college students to women and racial minorities would have a dissent to offer. America was racist, sexist, imperialistic, and consumeristic. Particularly in Northern California, dissent took forms ranging from organized and peaceful protests to riots and the adoption of non-conformist lifestyles. Events of the late 1960s, like the assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King in 1965 and 1968, raised the stakes and further fueled the protest that had ignited.<sup>21</sup>

Just as growth centers were being established all along the California coast and the human potential movement was being named and established, humanistic psychologists were feeling the pull towards California. In 1967, Maslow wrote:

It dawned on me again that I feel closer to so many of the California people than to my friends & acquaintances here (in the Northeast). I'd always thought this was the accident of nearness & distance. But now it occurs to me that these are all T-group people, & it makes a difference. They're more direct, honest, candid, undefended, open, feedbacky, etc.. And so I actually *do* justly & correctly feel more intimate with them than I do with non-T-group people here.<sup>22</sup>

Early adherents to humanistic psychology had a California base, reflected both in the opening of its first office in 1965 in San Francisco and in the demographics of its members. The office itself came to be the site of numerous groups and early experiential activity for members who lived nearby.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> In fact, a reporter for *Time Magazine*, as late as 1965, described a generation of conformists. Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, ix.

<sup>21</sup> For one, of many, good cultural histories of the 1960s, see the collection of essays in: David Farber, ed. *The 60s: From Memory to History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). In addition, Todd Gitlin's *The Sixties* provides a unique perspective on the decade, by blending memoir with historical fact. Gitlin, *The Sixties*.

<sup>22</sup> Maslow, July 9, 1967, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 775.

<sup>23</sup> The office, inhabited by director John Levy, doubled as his office for San Francisco Venture, an organization devoted to psycho-spiritually oriented groups and programs with and for the residents of the "ghetto area" in which it was located. John Levy, interview by author, phone, 30 September 2005.

Seminal AHP members, including Carl Rogers, Rollo May, George Leonard, Jackie Doyle and eventually Abe Maslow, were lured from the East towards this mecca of experimentation and progressive thought. Rogers moved to California in 1964, Maslow in 1969, and May in 1975. Eight of AHP's first 25 conferences took place in California, and the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, though originally sponsored by Brandeis, was published out of California.<sup>24</sup>

The west coast localization represented a literal break from the northeastern and Midwestern universities at which the ideals of humanistic psychology were first conceptualized. Figuratively, the move to California suggested a new zeitgeist; a stronger connection to the rebellious energy of the 1960s; and a cultural fructification of what began as an academically and professionally based movement.<sup>25</sup>

While the geographic concentration of humanistic psychologists in California facilitated the exchange of ideas and enabled frequent contact between AHP members, it also blurred the boundaries of the movement and diluted the seriousness of its intentions. The healthy and productive components of California culture were difficult to keep separate from the more threatening elements. Humanistic psychology—established to oppose reductionistic elements of dominant psychologies and to promote health—quickly became identified, through the human potential movement and the activities of its members, with more destructive movements like LSD and anti-establishment counter-cultures. All types of revolutionary energy tended to blend under the common aegis of change. Vietnam War protesters, anti-establishment youth, LSD users, and other activists were joined by the electric charge of reform and the idyllic vision of future possibility.<sup>26</sup> Not surprisingly, the realm carved out by humanistic psychology and human potential

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<sup>24</sup> "A Chronology of AHP's Annual Conferences," <http://ahpweb.org/aboutahp/ahpcronology.html>.

<sup>25</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 2.

<sup>26</sup> Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, vii-xvii. For another good source on the historical significance of the revolutionary change of the 1960s, see: Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counterculture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969).

lured fellow protestors against traditional mores and the perceived oppression of cultural conditions.<sup>27</sup>

The prime catalyst in the initial conflation of humanistic psychology with the human potential movement was the Esalen Institute—originally called Big Sur Hot Springs. Established in 1962, the same year as AHP, Esalen founders Michael Murphy and Richard (Dick) Price based their practices, in part, on the theory of Maslow and Rogers.<sup>28</sup> Extracting humanistic psychology’s emphases on growth, self-actualization, and realization of potential, Esalen began to hold a variety of workshops ranging from weekend retreats to corporate trainings. Throughout Esalen’s early years, humanistic psychology had a strong presence at Esalen.<sup>29</sup> In addition to the lectures they gave and the workshops they conducted, humanistic psychologists’ ideas were circulated by Murphy himself, who assigned the books of humanistic psychologists to staff members.<sup>30</sup> Thousands seeking self-actualization and growth flocked to Esalen in an effort to find a “eupsychian” space—aimed at spiritual, physical and emotional renewal—apart from America’s ever-accelerating technological progress and material abundance.

## THE FOUNDATIONS OF ESALEN

Esalen was created by Michael Murphy and Dick Price with two complementary sets of interests: those of the Esalen Center for Theory and Research (CTR), a research center devoted to methodical humanistic inquiry and theory production, and those of the Esalen “Institute,” committed to the person-centered application of the principles of humanistic psychology. The earliest years of Esalen represented the period in which humanistic psychology and the human potential movement were most aligned. Esalen seminars in the early 1960s were cerebral and fairly academic. Many incorporated lists of

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<sup>27</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 145-147.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>29</sup> J. F. T. Bugental, Anthony Sutich, Rollo May, Carl Rogers, Gardner Murphy, Richard Farson, Virginia Satir, Sidney Jourard, Clark Moustakas, and Abraham Maslow all led seminars at Esalen in the mid 1960s. Big Sur Hot Spring and Esalen Seminar brochures.

<sup>30</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 135-137.

requisite reading that spanned philosophy, eastern and western religion, evolutionary theory, and, of course, psychology. Esalen's first public offering came in the form of a series of programs entitled "The Human Potentiality."<sup>31</sup>

The Esalen Institute was more personally the "Frankenstein" of Dick Price, while the Esalen CTR better represented the style and interests of Michael Murphy. Price was an extroverted Stanford graduate, a recovering mental patient, and the son of wealthy Midwesterners whose oppressive contradictory religious interests he rejected. Michael Murphy was an introverted Stanford graduate, an aspiring "mystic," and the son of wealthy Californians (who actually owned the Hot Springs property). The two, who had been Stanford classmates, connected in San Francisco while living at the Cultural Integration Fellowship meditation center. In addition to their shared Stanford background and affluent families, they shared interests in Eastern philosophy and meditation, having studied under common teachers Alan Watts (for whom a building at Esalen was named in 1968), Frederic Spiegelberg (whose Stanford class first aroused Murphy's interest in Aurobindo) and Haridas Chaudhuri (the founder of the Cultural Integration center).<sup>32</sup>

Both Price and Murphy had rejected their parents' rigid expectations and developed their own personal philosophies in protest. Murphy had fled to India in search of mystical experience, while Price had landed in treatment at The Institute of Living in Hartford, Connecticut, where he received a battery of gruesome shock treatments. Murphy's hopes for Esalen included a desire to extend his mystical and intellectual curiosity to others. Price hoped, with Esalen, to help develop an alternative to the mainstream psychiatric establishments where he'd received such inhumane treatment.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 439.; Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 68-72

<sup>32</sup> Price's father had abandoned his mother's orthodox Judaism and was nonpracticing, while his mother—somewhat late in life—decided to baptize the children and join the Episcopalian church to protect the family from the anti-Semitic orientation of their exclusive Chicago neighborhood. Barclay James Erickson, "The Only Way Out is In," in *On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture*, ed. Jeffrey Kripal and Glenn W. Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 134-143.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 150-152.

Price was interested in Esalen as a “proving ground” for applying the insights of humanistic psychology to diagnosibly mentally ill and severely struggling individuals.<sup>34</sup> Esalen, however, proved far more efficacious for those with average problems. This lesson played out in painful ways, including several suicides in 1968 and 1969 that were products, in part, of Esalen’s inability to provide comprehensive services to the severely disturbed.<sup>35</sup> Group leaders tended to overlook the danger of sending psychologically fragile individuals home, once stripped of their familiar defenses by the intense confrontations that often occurred in groups.<sup>36</sup>

Price himself experienced his second psychotic episode in 1968, while at Esalen. He initially sought refuge at a “blowout center,” where friends and colleagues tried to help him recover, but, when that didn’t work, was committed to St. Agnew’s Hospital for professional intervention.<sup>37</sup> There he was able to regain his stability and return to Esalen. His experience suggested that the comprehensiveness and the security of a hospital were better suited to the seriously ill than the permissiveness of Esalen.<sup>38</sup>

While Murphy’s aims for Esalen overlapped with Price’s in their common emphasis on creating an environment most hospitable to individual development and exploration, Murphy’s intellectualism and spiritual leanings dictated that he form a more personally and physically distant relationship to the Institute. Always ill at ease with the experiential elements of the Institute, Murphy felt a stronger affinity for the CTR.<sup>39</sup> One historian noted that scholars, however, paid “little or no attention “ to CTR, nor to

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<sup>34</sup> In his journalistic coverage of the 13<sup>th</sup> annual AHP convention for the *Mountain Gazette*, Mike Moore describes Esalen as the “proving ground for experiments in the new therapy: encounter, Gestalt, meditation, the healing baths, and the sensuous massage—all that we called ‘touchie-feelie’ a few years ago.” See, Moore, “Breaking Free,” 17-23.

<sup>35</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 199-202.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 247.

<sup>37</sup> Erickson, “The Only Way Out Is In,” 152.

<sup>38</sup> After Price’s recovery, he became an enmeshed on-site manager at Esalen, making himself ever available to struggling individuals and considering the Institute his home. *Ibid.*, 154-158.

<sup>39</sup> Ann Taves, “Michael Murphy and the History of Supernormal Human Attributes,” in *On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture*, ed. Kripal and Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 226.

“Michael Murphy as a thinker or the place of his research agenda within a larger intellectual frame of reference.”<sup>40</sup> The historical fate of Murphy’s intellectual theories and the research they inspired has paralleled the fate of the academic underpinnings of humanistic psychology; they failed to capture the cultural imagination with even a portion of the force inspired by the sensationalist, experiential and therapeutic elements of the human potential movement.

Despite his preference for the CTR, Michael Murphy was also significantly involved in shaping the development of the Esalen Institute. His greatest impact on the Institute derived from his deeply spiritual interests. At the time of Esalen’s founding, Murphy had recently returned from a 16 month retreat to Sri Aurobindo’s ashram in Pondicherry, India, where he had engaged in a “hermeneutic mysticism” with Aurobindo’s ideas.<sup>41</sup> In the early Esalen years, Murphy meditated 8 hours a day and sought existential understanding through spiritual and mystical routes.<sup>42</sup>

Murphy’s commitment to steering Esalen in a spiritual direction was evident in his choice of seminarians who used yoga and tantra and represented Eastern influences. These seminars were vastly popular, and their themes pervaded Esalen so thoroughly that scholars like Jeffrey Kripal, author of *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion*, later interpreted Esalen as one of the great modern religious centers of 20<sup>th</sup> century America.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 224.

<sup>41</sup> At the time of Murphy’s trip, Sri Aurobindo had been dead 5 years, but his spiritual partner and successor the “Mother” Mirra Alfassa remained at the ashram. Murphy, however, had direct connection with Aurobindo’s ideas through his writing in *The Life Divine*. According to Kripal, Murphy experienced the religious dimensions of the text he studied in a “classically mystical epistemological structure.” Jeffrey Kripal, “Reading Aurobindo from Stanford to Pondicherry” in *On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture*, ed. Jeffrey Kripal and Glenn Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 108.

<sup>42</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 119.

<sup>43</sup> Kripal, “Reading Aurobindo from Stanford to Pondicherry” 2005, 99-131. For thorough history of Esalen, see Kripal, *Esalen*.

## ESALEN'S *BECOMING*

While Murphy and Price were attempting to mold Esalen in their image, the Institute was beginning to develop a life of its own. The two opposed hierarchical power relationships on principle, making it impossible for either to impose their own vision on the experiences of others. They were also committed to a process dialogue that incorporated disparate viewpoints and varied personal styles. Murphy's interest in inclusiveness, in particular, made him exceptionally welcoming of anyone with an enthusiastic desire to lead a seminar. Maslow reportedly quipped that, "if Satan himself would have showed up at Esalen, Mike would have invited him to lead a seminar."<sup>44</sup>

The first seminars at Esalen in 1962 failed to suggest the divergent directions the institute would quickly take. Instead, they represented the diverse and complementary interests of the founders and the strength of their initial influence. The first seminars were:

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| September 22-23: | "The Expanding Vision," led by Willis Harman <sup>45</sup>   |
| October 6-7:     | "Individual and Cultural definitions of Rationality," Joe K. Adams and Gregory Bateson <sup>46</sup> |
| October 26:      | "Art and Religion," Special Lecture by Gerald Heard <sup>47</sup>                                    |
| November 3-4:    | "Drug-Induced Mysticism," Paul Kurtz and Myron Stolaroff <sup>48</sup>                               |

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<sup>44</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 4.; Kripal, *Esalen*, 98-102, quotation from 99.

<sup>45</sup> Harman was a Stanford professor of engineering who had branched out into multidisciplinary study. The seminar was intended to explore conceptual changes in psychology. The seminar included a complete book list of recommended readings in interdisciplinary psychological speculation. Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 68.

<sup>46</sup> Joe Adams was a practicing psychologist in Palo Alto, and Gregory Bateson was an Ethnologist at the Veteran's Administration Hospital in Palo Alto. "The Human Potentiality: A Seminar Series," (brochure), Big Sur Hot Springs, Fall 1962.

<sup>47</sup> Gerald Heard, best friend of Aldous Huxley, had immigrated with Huxley to the US in 1937. From 1942, he oversaw Trabucco College, a progressive/ visionary experiment in the study of comparative religion. He continued to write and publish extensively in both fiction and non-fiction into the 1960s. Timothy Miller, "Notes on the Prehistory of the Human Potential Movement: The Vedanta Society and Gerald Heard's Trabuco College," in Kripal and Shuck, *On the Edge*, 86-90.

<sup>48</sup> Kurtz was a psychologist, and Stolaroff was a Russian-born inventor and industrialist. Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 72.



December 1-2: Panel Discussion (on human potential) by Joe Adams, Willis W. Harmon, Paul S. Kurtz and Myron J. Stolaroff<sup>49</sup>

The 1962 seminars were largely cerebral, thrilling for the participants because of the intellectual daring but conducted in the traditions of academic discussion. In the first seminar, participants sat in wooden chairs listening to a Stanford professor lecture on new possibilities for human experience. Adams and Batson offered a seminar that was comparably well-reasoned and intellectual, but more revolutionarily suggestive, arguing for the subjectivity of social belief systems and the relativity of defined reality.<sup>50</sup>

The topic of the second-to-last seminar of 1962, “Drug-Induced Mysticism,” suggested the impending Dionysian turn of Esalen. Delivered about a year before LSD experimentation fully hit America, the seminar considered the possibilities for psychedelic expansion of consciousness. Kurtz and Stolaroff piqued participants’ interest and nudged them towards their own experimentation.<sup>51</sup>

In 1963, the programs shifted towards various experiential practices that came to define Esalen. Encounter groups proved to be popular, as did “gestalt” therapy and body work. Seminars grew more topically diverse as well. In 1963, Alan Watts and Ansel Adams co-led a seminar on photography. Watts conducted “A Trip with Ken Kesey,” and Dick Alpert and Timothy Leary, advocates of the experimental use of LSD, led “The Ecstatic Experience,” based on their book *Psychedelic Experience*.<sup>52</sup> Parapsychology aroused interest at Esalen as well, propelling the growth center in an even less academic/intellectual and more mystical/ spiritual direction.

Humanistic psychologists continued to represent themselves in the ranks of Esalen seminarians. In 1963, for example, Anthony Sutich presented a seminar on “Humanistic Psychology.” Visits from Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, and Carl Rogers followed. At this point, the new focus of Esalen appeared entirely compatible with the

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<sup>49</sup> “The Human Potentiality: A Seminar Series,” (brochure), Big Sur Hot Springs, Fall 1962.

<sup>50</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 70-71.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 72.

<sup>52</sup> “The Human Potentiality: A Seminar Series,” (brochure), Big Sur Hot Springs, Winter-Spring, 1963.

goals of Humanistic Psychology. Maslow himself reportedly declared Big Sur “potentially the most important educational institution in the world,” and led several seminars during his many trips to Esalen.<sup>53</sup> Despite his continued admiration for Murphy, however, Maslow’s ambivalence about the intrusion of countercultural values into the spirit and practice of Esalen increased in the final years of his life. In April of 1968, Maslow wrote: “Too many shits at Esalen, too many selfish, narcissistic, noncaring types. I think I’ll be detaching myself from it more & more.”<sup>54</sup> And in August of 1968, he noted that his “Esalen critique file gets fatter & fatter.”<sup>55</sup>

### THE ASCENDANCE OF ENCOUNTER

The introduction of encounter groups, a concept derived from the training groups (t-groups) pioneered at the National Training Laboratories (NTL) in Bethel, Maine, was a key development in the intensification of Esalen’s experiential elements. Bill Schutz, who soon emerged as a prominent figure at Esalen, brought a distilled form of NTL’s concept with him to Esalen in 1965, augmenting the boldly confrontational and deeply personal elements that had been most popular with NTL participants.<sup>56</sup> NTL’s “training groups” or t-groups required small groups of participants to work together over extended periods of time (usually 10-40 hours total and sometimes throughout a two-week residential program), analyzing and discussing their experiences, feelings, perceptions, and behaviors.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Maslow as quoted by George Leonard, “Encounters at the Mind’s Edge,” *Esquire*, June, 1985, 314.

<sup>54</sup> Maslow, April 6, 1968, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 953.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, August 18, 1968, 981.

<sup>56</sup> NTL’s mission, established in 1947, primarily concerned itself with the study and application of group work as a social “technology.” NTL hoped “to advance, through improved theories and practices of human relations education, the productivity and quality of human relations in all areas of social life.” H. A. Thalen, for the Committee, “Proposed Bylaws of the National Training Laboratories,” November 27, 1955 (NTL Papers, M226, NTL Historical Documents Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>57</sup> NTL Institute Bulletin V2NO2, “What is Sensitivity Training?,” April 1968 (NTL Papers, M223, NTL Special Reports folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology); Focused on will and intention, the organization was premised on the idea that a sense of control over one’s destiny was integral to realization of one’s “human potential.” By connecting individuals more fully to the social experience of their work and improving their group and individual functioning, NTL intended to facilitate self-actualization. Evelyn Hooker, “Theory Session 1: The Meaning of Laboratory Training,” June 27, 1955

Although the groups were explicitly concerned with individual experience and striving, NTL was guided by an interest in corporate leadership that used personal change to improve business functioning. Maslow, who spent some time at NTL in the late 60s, wrote that NTL, “mostly focuses on organization, group dynamics, watching form and process [...] But this is in direct contradiction to the fact that most people are interested in it as a therapeutic and a growth experience on the personal side.”<sup>58</sup> When Schutz imported NTL’s t-groups to Esalen in 1965, he constructed them mainly in terms of this personal side, using the process of group interaction more as a tool for self-analysis and awareness than as a method for group change. For this reason, these revised t-groups, known as encounter groups, became wildly and overpoweringly popular at Esalen, displacing some of the more balanced elements of the Institute.<sup>59</sup>

Popular accounts of the transformative power of Esalen’s encounter groups contributed to the sense of mystery and intrigue that surrounded the institute. Leo Litwak’s 1968 article for the *New York Times Sunday Magazine*, for example, was typical. It began with Litwak as a skeptic, armed with “all kinds of tricks for avoiding encounter.”<sup>60</sup> It ended with his transformation: “Our group gathered in a tight circle, hugging and kissing, and I found myself hugging everyone, behaving like the idiots I had noticed on first arriving at Esalen.”<sup>61</sup>

Litwak’s narrative, and others like it, fueled the cultural fascination with Esalen’s “supernatural” powers and with the charisma of gurus like Schutz, who infused the workshop that Litwak attended with his extremely confrontational style and his unorthodox emphasis on touching (in Litwak’s case, the encounter group climaxed in a

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(NTL Papers, M227, NTL in Group Development folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>58</sup> A. H. Maslow, “Journal Notes on The T-Groups,” June 16, 1968 Bethel, Maine (Maslow Papers, M449.3, T Groups Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>59</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 152-156.

<sup>60</sup> Leo Litwak, “A Trip to Esalen Institute - Joy is the Prize,” in *Best Magazine Articles: 1968* ed. Gerald Walker (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1968), 133.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 27-31, quotation from 27.

heated arm wrestling match between the writer and a sullen teenager to whom he'd taken an immediate dislike).<sup>62</sup>

The reputation of group leaders like Schutz and Fritz Perls attracted participants to Esalen, detracting from the Institute's more intellectual emphases. Esalen proved uniquely susceptible to the overpowering personalities of group leaders, despite the fact that early in the development of Esalen, Murphy and Price had attempted to lay down ground rules to prevent such usurpation of the tone and direction of the Institute. The rules stated that "No one captures the flag," meaning that "no individual, however charismatic, would be allowed to dominate the culture, and, that "We hold our dogmas lightly," meaning that all religious dogma would be treated as essentially psychological and never taken literally.<sup>63</sup> Ironically, the anti-hierarchical power structure prevented enforcement of these imperatives.

Fritz Perls, who arrived at Esalen on Christmas of 1963 and, more or less, stayed until 1969, was an eccentric and extravagant figure, whose personality inevitably colored the tone of Esalen.<sup>64</sup> Perls' wife Laura once described him as "a mixture of a prophet and a bum."<sup>65</sup> He embraced the role; at times wearing long white robes, at others wearing long, flowing multi-colored shirts and sandals.<sup>66</sup>

Perls led his first encounter groups at Esalen in February of 1964, billing them as a form of "Gestalt Therapy," and describing their goals as expanding the "scope of awareness," connecting the individual to the environment, and "ending the subject object split."<sup>67</sup> Perls' groups utilized the concept of a "hot-seat," a position in which the seated

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 27-31, quotation from 27.

<sup>63</sup> Kripal and Shuck, *On the Edge of the Future*, 6.

<sup>64</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 158-159.

<sup>65</sup> Laura Perls as quoted in Kripal, *Esalen*, 161.

<sup>66</sup> Robert Shilkret, interview by author, South Hadley, MA, 17 September 2005. Professor Robert Shilkret of Mt. Holyoke College remembers Perls' appearance in 1966 as "very California." Addressing a crowd at Boston University's student center, Perls arrived unreasonably late and spoke for a very short time, in spite of the high (\$5) cost of admission. Perls announced, "Maybe some of those here tonight are somewhat disappointed.... That's right. And now you're learning."

<sup>67</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 1959; "Seminars," (brochure) Big Sur Hot Springs, Winter-Spring, 1964.

individual received his full attention, serving also as a public spectacle for the groups. Another empty chair was set beside the seated individual and served as an object of projection (it became the victim's mother, father, spouse, etc. as needed). In the words of one Esalen historian, Perls then proceeded to "take the person apart by noticing and commenting on every defense mechanism, every body posture, every quiver of the voice or eyes." Instead of allowing group members to interact with the hot-seated individual, Perls assumed full control while the group watched on in silence and, often, awe, as Perls brutally took apart his subject, measuring his success in tears. By deconstructing the individual, Perls hoped to reintegrate the "fractured" person in order to create an all new "gestalt," or whole person. For many, the drama, humiliation, and attention were irresistible, inspiring many to come to Esalen just to work with Perls.<sup>68</sup>

Perls quickly ascended as the "star" of Esalen. According to one historian, after the conformity and pervasive insecurity of the 1950s, Perls' themes of "the primacy of emotion, the grounding of experience in embodiment, the quest for meaning, the centrality of relationship, the authoritativeness of self-experience, the validation of self-expression, the key role of desire in human process, and the reclamation and celebration of erotic passion" held a distinct appeal to Americans."<sup>69</sup> At the same time, he offended and angered his peers at this institute and subverted the influence of the founders. Some of Perls' favorite sayings directly opposed Murphy's vision of Esalen. Perls was proudly anti-intellectual and claimed to hate philosophical discourse, calling it "mind-fucking" or "elephant shit," "for its size and importance." He was "equitable enough," wrote Esalen chronicler Jeffrey Kripal, "to spread this kind of fecal talk around, dubbing small talk 'chickenshit' and rationalizations 'bullshit.'"<sup>70</sup> According to humanistic psychologist

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<sup>68</sup> Jeffrey Kripal, "The Roar of Awakening: The Founding of Esalen and the Early Brochures," in *The Enlightenment of the Body: A Nonordinary History of Esalen* (manuscript), 5.

<sup>69</sup> Gordon Wheeler, "Spirit and Shadow: Esalen and the Gestalt Model," in *On the Edge of the Future: Esalen and the Evolution of American Culture*, ed. by Jeffrey Kripal, and Glenn W. Shuck (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 173-174.

<sup>70</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 163.

Maureen O'Hara, Perls felt that if it was intellectual, it was shit, hence his other mantra, "Lose your mind and come to your senses."<sup>71</sup>

Perls also ridiculed Murphy's commitment to meditation, deeming it "neither shitting nor getting off the pot." He opposed the presence of 'mystics and occultists' at Esalen, dismissing their brand of enlightenment as frivolous. However, Perls himself often experienced a quasi-mystical sense of illumination, both through his groups and through his experimentation with psychedelics.<sup>72</sup> Perls so strongly advocated the use of LSD that he sometimes rejected students who had never taken the drug.<sup>73</sup>

Perls justified his techniques as a product of "Gestalt psychology," a perspective he described in *Gestalt Therapy* in 1951, *Gestalt Therapy Verbatim* in 1969, and *The Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to Therapy*, which was published posthumously in 1973.<sup>74</sup> His introduction to *The Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to Therapy* captures the vision of Gestalt psychology Perls advocated. Attempting to shrug off "professional jargon" and psychological complexity, Perls explained: "The basic premise of Gestalt psychology is that human nature is organized into patterns or wholes, that it is experienced by the individual in these terms, and that it can only be understood as a function of the patterns or wholes of which it is made."<sup>75</sup> Although he located the foundations of his practice in German Gestalt psychology, the connection was general rather than specific.<sup>76</sup>

For thousands of Americans, "Gestalt psychology" was reduced to Perls' interpretive techniques, to the exclusion of the more comprehensive and empirically

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<sup>71</sup> Maureen O'Hara, interview by author, San Francisco, 29 April 2005.

<sup>72</sup> Michael Murphy, "Afterword," in Kripal and Shuck, *On the Edge of the Future*, 308.

<sup>73</sup> Jeffrey Kripal, "Esalen Goes to the City: The San Francisco Center (1967-1975)," in *Esalen: America and the Religion of No Religion*, originally *The Enlightenment of the Body: A Nonordinary History of Esalen*. 2005 (Manuscript), 12.

<sup>74</sup> For Perls' first book on Gestalt, see: Frederick Perls, Ralph E. Hefferline and Paul Goodman, *Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality* (New York: Dell, 1951).

<sup>75</sup> Frederick Perls, *The Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to Therapy* (Ben Lomond, CA: Science and Behavior Books, 1973) 3-4.

<sup>76</sup> Petruska Clarkson and Jennifer Mackewn, *Fritz Perls* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 142.

validated bases of Gestalt theory as originated in Europe during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>77</sup> One critic, in attempting to distinguish Gestalt therapy from what he termed “Perls-ism,” noted that Perls’ Gestalt therapy was more accurately a “biological-hedonistic existentialism.” He specifically identified three aspects of Perls theory and practice, which were not a part of proper Gestalt therapy, specifically his anti-intellectual attitude, his view of maturity as “hedonistic isolation,” and his “unsupportive stance as a therapist.”<sup>78</sup> Those versed in the Gestalt model also recognized the incompleteness of Perls’ brand of Gestalt, which was a “come to your senses” approach, absent of the political and philosophical components that defined the approaches of Gestalt psychologists like Paul Goodman.<sup>79</sup> Perls’ most purely, and perhaps only truly, Gestalt principles were his focus on the “here and now,” present needs and beliefs as syntheses of past experiences, the immediacy of self-expression, and the contention that all perception was interpretation.<sup>80</sup>

Perls’ Gestalt was a psychology of rebellion, a somewhat chaotic rejection of dominant interpretations of reality, including behaviorist and psychoanalytic conceptions, and a constructivist liberation of perception. If all reality was filtered and spontaneously constructed “on the fly,” individuals needed to learn to attend to the present and to throw off the past-oriented techniques of psychoanalysis, which privileged childhood experience in self-understanding. Perls’ Gestalt deviated from psychoanalysis in its rejection of the idea of an inherent conflict between individual nature and human society and its reclamation of the value of expressing aggression and experiencing desire.<sup>81</sup> Yet, for all of its departures from Freudianism, Perls repeatedly evoked psychoanalytic

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 142.

<sup>78</sup> J. Dublin, “Existential-Gestalt therapy and/versus “Perls-ism,” in *The Growing Edge of Gestalt Therapy*, ed. Edward W. L. Smith (New York : Brunner/Mazel, 1976), 141-145.

<sup>79</sup> Wheeler, “Spirit and Shadow,” 182.

<sup>80</sup> Even the concept of the “here and now,” however became distorted in popular perception., Perls was often misinterpreted as having a total disregard for the past. More accurately, however, he advocated viewing the past within the “changed conditions” of the present. As a self-identified Freudian, Perls still saw great value exploring past experiences. Clarkson and Mckewn, *Fritz Perls*, 95.; Kripal, *Esalen*, 159.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 159.

principles in both his writing and his groups, reflective of the residue of Freudianism that circulated through Esalen.<sup>82</sup>

Even as Perls' groups became extraordinarily popular, his personality, and sense of entitlement, became problematic to those trying to run Esalen. Perls acted the role of a guru, "an institution within the institute."<sup>83</sup> His programs were listed separately, and he lived in a private residence at Esalen, an odd round house with a grass-covered roof that he had extracted from Murphy by promising to pay for it (a promise he didn't keep).<sup>84</sup> In the vein of what many of his colleagues at Esalen identified as one of the most toxic themes of American culture, Fritz cared only about himself and urged others to do the same. This attitude was evident in his Gestalt "prayer,":

I do my thing and you do your thing.

I am not in this world to live up to your expectations,

And you are not in this world to live up to mine.

You are you, and I am I, and if by chance we find each other, it's beautiful.

If not, it can't be helped.<sup>85</sup>

Perls was also infamous for his sexual seduction of female participants and his proselytization of sexual promiscuity. One of his female patients recalled, "He told me I should fuck around. It was really a crazy thing to tell me. He created problems I didn't really want. I'm 'supposed' to fuck around because my therapist tells me that."<sup>86</sup> Perls' philosophy of the "here and now" at times detracted from consideration of the inevitable social consequences of individual action. In his notes on this type of encounter, Maslow wrote that there is more to learn than "to give honest feedback and expect honest

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<sup>82</sup> Jeffrey Kripal remarked in a personal communication that he was surprised to find how many psychoanalytic ideas pervaded Esalen workshops.

<sup>83</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 133.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 132-133.

<sup>85</sup> Frederick Perls, *Gestalt Therapy Verbatim*, ed. John O. Stevens (Lafayette, CA: Real People Press, 1969), 4.

<sup>86</sup> Anonymous patient as quoted in David Allyn, *Make Love, Not War: The Sexual Revolution: An Unfettered History* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 2000), 204.



feedback, to be authentic and candid and the like. With the wrong sort of people, this automatically leads to getting clobbered or to getting defeated rather than achieving anything.”<sup>87</sup> Perls thought Maslow, in turn, was a “a sugar-coated Nazi ... [who] pandered to a happy world of optimism that did not in fact exist.”<sup>88</sup>

More threatening to Perls than Maslow, who was only an occasional presence at Esalen, was Bill Schutz. Schutz came to Esalen in 1965 and inherited the supervision of Esalen’s 9-month residential program from psychologist Virginia Satir. Schutz encouraged the group to do all kinds of things that “the culture would not approve of,” which typically involved getting nude as quickly as possible.<sup>89</sup> Perls referred to Schutz’s team of encounter group leaders as his “circus”; Schutz called Perls’ workshops “the Flying Circus.”<sup>90</sup>

According to George Leonard, Bill Schutz was “the great conquistador,” a physically dominating presence. With an ego comparable to Perls’, he would challenge others to “break him,” expose his vulnerability and bring him to tears. As far as Leonard knew, this was never accomplished. His model for encounter was the “more openness, the better,” and his success was judged by his ability to bring his residents to tears that would quickly produce a feeling of transcendence.<sup>91</sup>

Schutz’s method of compelling catharsis provided an appealing form of instant gratification and release, and his groups became nationally acclaimed. His book *Joy: Expanding Human Awareness* went through five printings, and his unorthodox techniques, his frankness with talk show hosts, and his encouragement of the audience to emulate his candor earned him many television appearances in 1968—as a guest for Johnny Carson, Phil Donahue, David Suskind, Dick Cavett, and Merv Griffin.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Abraham Maslow, Notes on T-groups, (unpublished paper) (Maslow Papers, M449.3, T Groups folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology, 7).

<sup>88</sup> Perls as quoted in Kripal, *Esalen*, 157.

<sup>89</sup> Leonard, interview by author, phone, 5 April 2006.

<sup>90</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 167.

<sup>91</sup> Leonard, interview, April 5, 2006.

<sup>92</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 301.

Unsurprisingly, Schutz and Perls ran groups that were more alike than they were different. George Leonard, who had attended one of Schutz's early groups, found it "wonderful" but "destructive." The group began with each participant screaming and pounding the floor. The participants, all couples in this case, were then asked to tell three secrets to their spouses that would threaten their relationships. Leonard recalls that a war bride from England confessed that she had never wanted to get married, and had hated every minute of it. A husband confessed that he had been sleeping with his wife's best friend; she responded by hitting him violently and repeatedly, then crying and claiming that he was a "shit" but that she loved him anyway. Other tactics Schutz employed to encourage the experience of strong emotion included making faces, Indian hand wrestling, and growling. According to Leonard, these were all "quick fixes" that wore off soon after the retreats ended. The woman who had hit her husband, for example, divorced him 6 months later.<sup>93</sup>

Instead of pretending problems and emotions didn't exist, Schutz advocated exaggerating them. Participants were driven to extremes and sometimes pushed beyond their limits. Those who weren't blinded by the sheer ecstasy of the process were apt to feel angry and used, upon returning to a life full of problems that hadn't been solved. "Many of our programs," said Murphy, "were kind of the sledgehammer approach to human growth. [...]. There were encounter groups there where the darkest and the dirtiest things you could dig up from your own psyche or accuse someone else of was being tossed around. People were saying things to one another that thirty years later they haven't forgiven one another for."<sup>94</sup>

The founders of Humanistic Psychology, like the founders of Esalen, frequently expressed frustration with the excesses of the encounter group movement. In 1969,

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<sup>93</sup> Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006.

<sup>94</sup> Scott London, "The Mysterious Powers of Body and Mind: An Interview with Michael Murphy," (1996), Interview adapted from the radio series *Inside & Out*, Santa Barbara CA, <http://www.scottlondon.com/interviews/murphy.html>.

Maslow wrote, “Too many shits at Esalen, too many selfish, narcissistic, noncaring types. I think I’ll be detaching myself from it more & more.”<sup>95</sup> May expressed a similar dissatisfaction, describing, in 1971, his avoidance of encounter groups and his temporary resignation from AHP as protest.<sup>96</sup> But, in spite of their criticisms, humanistic psychologists didn’t give up on the potential value of encounter groups.<sup>97</sup>

Nor did the founders perceive the divergent directions of Esalen as indicative of failure. They were committed to a democratic ideal, which would reliably promote the interests of the majority. Murphy eventually “came to see Esalen’s growth away from his original vision as something organic, natural and necessary.”<sup>98</sup>

Leaders like Murphy, Leonard and Price were at least as excited by the dramatic turns Esalen took as they were dismayed. Humanistic psychologists, who watched AHP move in the same direction as the human potential movement, tended to agree. “You had to be present at the time to understand the tremendous [though chaotic] energy of the movement,” explained former AHP director John Levy. Levy, nostalgic for the excitement of the times, didn’t regret the strongly experiential turn in the least. “It was what people wanted.”<sup>99</sup>

AHP’s mid-sixties turn towards the experiential mirrored the early transformation of Esalen. AAHP conventions began to include Esalen-type encounters and often included the Esalen gurus. As AHP membership rose, new members were drawn to the organization not with the intention of revising psychoanalysis and behaviorism, opposing the reductivist empiricism of academic psychology, or resurrecting psychology’s philosophical ancestry, but with the objective of becoming involved in the process of experiential transformation. Most new members, in fact, were not academic psychologists, and some, as in the case of George Leonard and John Vasconcelles (later a

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<sup>95</sup> Maslow, April 6, 1969, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 953.

<sup>96</sup> Dempsey, “Love and Will.”

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Kripal “Reading Aurobindo,” 126.

<sup>99</sup> John Levy, interview.

California State assemblyman), were not psychologists. They were drawn to AHP because it seemed to be on the cusp of the countercultural revolution; it seemed a site of novel psychological freedom and emotional expression, and also offered a new vision of society.<sup>100</sup>

The extent of AHP's turn to the experiential could easily be overstated. Founding theorists like Maslow, Rogers and Allport stuck with the movement and continued to infuse it with their new ideas. Those who disavowed it for its experiential turn (May and Murray in particular) ultimately returned, unable to find a parallel to the movement's good intentions elsewhere.

### **THE FOUNDING OF DIVISION 32 AND CONTINUED PROGRESS IN HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY**

While the founders of AHP continued to generate theory, members of AHP, perhaps distracted by the experiential emphases, were hard-pressed to test it. In May of 1966, Maslow rued the lack of scientific progress in humanistic psychology. In a journal entry, he wrote:

There are so very few people doing humanistic work (defined as for the benefit of mankind & its improvement) that this partially explains the lack of research. Not enough time. Not enough people. [...]The positivists have so much taken over APA & the elementary texts & graduate education that AAHP is not even known to most, & my kind of work is shoved into a corner where I'm a hero to a few & unknown, neglected, despised by most, or simply not defined as a "scientific psychologist."<sup>101</sup>

Feeling alienated from mainstream psychology, Maslow was being overly cynical about his lack of esteem in the field. As a testimony to the professional interest that his work had generated, he was elected to the presidency of the APA in 1967. He was shocked, having felt thoroughly rejected by the association to the point of fantasizing about being thrown out. He described his self-doubt in his journal: "As I felt the research impulse drain out of me, I guess I must have felt that the right to call myself a

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<sup>100</sup> Leonard, interview, 27 April 2005.

<sup>101</sup> Maslow, May 2, 1966, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 620.

psychologist was also draining out of me, & in several kinds of situations I've felt inadequate, not sufficiently trained, etc.”<sup>102</sup>

The recognition was a boon to humanistic psychology. Maslow noted the advantages for AAHP, “for adding weight & prestige to my causes, for having a guaranteed hearing for anything I want to say.”<sup>103</sup> It also supplied humanistic psychologists with the momentum they needed to carve out their own territory in APA.<sup>104</sup>

In 1971 Don Gibbons, an Association of Humanistic Psychology (AHP) member and psychology professor at West Georgia College, gathered enough signatures (the required 1% of APA members) to found a division of humanistic psychology within APA. His intention was for the new division to serve as a bridge between AHP and APA, representing the interests of many individuals who had membership in both organizations. Belief in the wisdom of this union, however, was not uniform; certain members, including Mike Arons, argued that the creation of another organization of humanistic psychology would “dilute” the movement.<sup>105</sup>

The first organizational meeting of the new division was held on September 4, 1971, and was attended by 57 individuals and chaired by psychologist Albert Ellis. Membership of the division soared in the first few years, reaching a peak of 1,150 members in 1977, and increasingly including an international contingent. This early success earned the division two seats on APA's Council of Representatives.<sup>106</sup>

In 1974, the division formed an affiliation with *JHP* and a journal called *Interpersonal Development*, ensuring that its members would have a forum for their

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<sup>102</sup> Maslow, May 9, 1966, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 730.

<sup>103</sup> Maslow, July 8, 1966, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 740.

<sup>104</sup> The American Association of Humanistic Psychology voted to change its name to the Association of Humanistic Psychology in August of 1969, out of respect to increasingly evident international interest. The change was officially filed with the State of California in December of 1969. Bonnie Davenport, AHP member services, e-mail message to author, Feb 2, 2007.

<sup>105</sup> C. Aanstoos, I. Serlin and T. Greening. “History of Division 32 (Humanistic Psychology) of the American Psychological Association.” In *Unification through Division: Histories of the Divisions of the American Psychological Association*, edited by D. Dewsbury. Vol. V (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000), <http://www.apa.org/divisions/div32/history.html>, 9-10.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-15.

theory and researches.<sup>107</sup> But cultural and professional interest in humanistic psychology was already reaching its peak. And humanistic psychologists were spread increasingly thin, divided between academics and practice, cultural movements and individual concerns, and theory and science. By the end of the decade, humanistic psychologists would witness a new cultural conservatism that would further impede many of their hopes for the movement.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 22.

## Chapter Seven: Racial Confrontation

In spite of its liberal emphases and utopian aspirations, humanistic psychology demonstrated a blindness to certain pressing social concerns. In the case of civil rights, for example, the humanistic psychology movement mimicked the short-sightedness of larger organizations, like the American Psychological Association (APA), which attended the needs of black members, and the larger cultural crises they represented, only when forced to do so.

In 1969, at the annual convention of the APA, 24 black graduate student members of the newly formed Black Students Psychological Association (BSPA), fed up with the organization's inattentiveness to the concerns of black students and psychologists, demanded that the APA council respond to their requests. Standing shoulder-to-shoulder in front of the council, the students asked that more black students be recruited to undergraduate and graduate programs in psychology, that blacks receive better representation in the APA, that black students be offered socially relevant experience in programs designed to benefit the black community, and that the credibility of the black power movement be recognized.<sup>1</sup>

This organized protest of black students was typical of the increased pressure facing professional organizations in the late 1960s. The American Sociological Association, for example, faced a comparable "disruption" at their own annual convention, also in 1969.<sup>2</sup> In these organizations, as in most professional and academic organizations of the 1960s, blacks were grossly underrepresented and generally

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<sup>1</sup> Bryce Nelson, "Psychologists: Searching for Social Relevance at APA Meeting," *Science*, New Series, Vol. 165, No. 3898 (Sep. 12, 1969), 1101-1104; David B. Baker, "The Challenge of Change: Formation of the Association of Black Psychologists," in *Handbook of Psychology*, ed. Irving B. Weiner (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2003), 492-494.

<sup>2</sup> Nelson, "Psychologists," 1101; Ida Harper Simpson and Richard L. Simpson, "The Transformation of the American Sociological Association," *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Special Issue: "What's Wrong with Sociology?" (June, 1994): 259-278.

unrecognized.<sup>3</sup> But, with a virulent drive for organized protest in the air, even associations with few black members began to feel internal pressure towards the inevitable confrontation of racial issues.

Though few in number, black students had grown, over the course of the 1960s, increasingly organized and self-assured in their sense of mission.<sup>4</sup> The cataclysmic civil rights activities of the 1950s, including the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision of 1954, the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955, and the University of Alabama riots in 1956, erupted in the form of further protests and riots in the 1960s, infusing racial issues with a sense of undeniable urgency.<sup>5</sup> Beginning with the freedom rides of 1960, the establishment of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) the same year, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1961, the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the subsequent formation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) designed to enforce it, Civil Rights swept through the decade on a swift tide of activity and change.<sup>6</sup> In 1964, even the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAAC) was preparing to investigate the Ku Klux Klan.<sup>7</sup>

The response of the APA to the challenge from black graduate students was decidedly mixed. Milton J. Rosenberg, University of Chicago professor and council member, told the students that “the council was ‘beyond racism’ and was tired of the

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<sup>3</sup> Lauren Wispe et al. reported that between 1920 and 1966, 25 of the nation’s largest PhD programs in psychology granted over 10,000 doctoral degrees, with only 93 going to blacks. L. Wispe, J. Awkard, M. Hoffman, P. Ash, L. H. Hicks, and J. Porter, “The Negro Psychologist in America,” *American Psychologist*, Vol. 24 No. 2 (1969): 142-150.

<sup>4</sup> Clayborne Carson, *In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 153.

<sup>5</sup> Numerous sources describe the primacy of racial issues in America in the 1960s. For examples, see August Meier, John Bracey Jr., Elliott Rudwick, eds., *Black Protest in the Sixties* (New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, 1991); Rhoda Blumberg, *Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984); and Gene Roberts and Hank Klibanoff, *The Race Beat: The Press, the Civil Rights Struggle, and the Awakening of a Nation* (New York: Knopf, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> For a contextualization of the 1960s civil rights activity within the events of the 1950s, see Aldon D. Morris, *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: The Free Press, 1984).

<sup>7</sup> Lewis M. Killian, *The Impossible Revolution: Phase 2: Black Power and the American Dream* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1968), 85.



‘make it hot for whitey routine.’”<sup>8</sup> In frustration, APA president George Miller asked, “How can we keep [psychology] a science if we try to solve everybody’s goddamn problems?”<sup>9</sup> Other psychologists were more sympathetic to the demands of the black students, but doubtful about their relevance to the mission of the APA. University of Texas professor Sigmund Koch expressed his remorse that, “psychology has no answers in respect of the problems [black students] are concerned about.”<sup>10</sup>

These sentiments were typical of psychologists in response to the clash between disciplinary interests and social concerns. They were also common to liberals in other professions, who felt that, though they naturally supported equal rights, racial equality was irrelevant to their professional priorities. Many blacks judged the compromised efforts of predominantly liberal professional organizations towards racial integration to be insufficient and even insulting.<sup>11</sup>

The evolution of the sentiments of eminent black psychologist Kenneth Clark, from hope and faith in integration to cynicism and anger, paralleled the trajectory of the civil rights movement as a whole. In 1952, Clark had testified in *Briggs v. Elliott*, one of the four cases which—in combination—formed *Brown v. Board of Education*.<sup>12</sup> Drawing on the doll studies that he and his wife Mamie Clark had performed on racial prejudice in children in segregated and unsegregated schools, Clark’s testimony spoke to the necessity

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<sup>8</sup> Milton J. Rosenberg, as quoted in Nelson, “Psychologists,” 1101.

<sup>9</sup> George Miller, as quoted in Nelson, “Psychologists,” 1103.

<sup>10</sup> Sigmund Koch, as quoted in Nelson, “Psychologists,” 1103-1104.

<sup>11</sup> Several sources refer to the phenomenon of racial tokenism, a practice in which “token” blacks are included in an organization, or in which racial issues are paid superficial attention as a token of an organization’s commitment to diversity. Yolanda Niemann describes the psychological effects of such tokenism, which include isolation, exaggeration of difference, and general distress in Yolanda Niemann, “The Psychology of Tokenism: Psychosocial Realities of Faculty of Color,” in *Handbook of Racial and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, ed. Guillermo Bernal, Joseph E. Trimble, Ann Kathleen Burlew and Frederick T. L. Leong (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 100-101. Also, several scholars cite racial tokenism as a catalyst is the black power movement. See Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) and Lewis Killian, *Impossible Revolution*.

<sup>12</sup> L. T. Benjamin, Jr. and E. M. Crouse, “The American Psychological Association’s Response to *Brown v. Board of Education*: The Case of Kenneth B. Clark,” *American Psychologist*, 57 (2002): 38-50.

of desegregating schools to eliminate racism.<sup>13</sup> By the mid-1960s, however, his patience had waned as he looked in vain for progress on integration. In 1965 he wrote: “I am tired of civil rights. Maybe I should develop some ideas concerning the enormous waste of human intelligence sacrificed to the struggle for racial justice in America at this period of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. How long can our nation continue the tremendous wastage of human intellectual resources demanded by racism?”<sup>14</sup>

By the late 1960s, many blacks, disappointed with the slow pace of cultural change, had abandoned the goal of total racial integration. Sociologist Lewis Killian wrote in 1968 that, “in practice integration had turned out to mean the token integration of a minority of qualified blacks into what remained a white man’s society.”<sup>15</sup> As one scholar wrote, many blacks were characterized by, “the experience of bitter disappointment, disgust, and despair over the pace, scope and quality of social change [and] the prolonged and direct encounter of certain civil rights workers—especially those connected with SNCC and CORE—with the grim and aching realities, the dark and brute actions and deceptions of certain sections of the deep South.”<sup>16</sup>

Some blacks openly abandoned integrationist efforts, arguing that all black coalitions would be better able to fully devote themselves to the expedient amelioration of racial inequality.<sup>17</sup> Frustrated with the limited impact of the organization and seeking a novel strategy, SNCC expelled its white members in 1966 and supplanted its

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<sup>13</sup> The Clark doll studies suggested that black children with low self-esteem tended to prefer white dolls. The findings were published as three articles: K. B. Clark and M. K. Clark, “The Development of Consciousness of Self and the Emergence of Racial Identification in Negro Preschool Children,” *Journal of Social Psychology*, 10 (1939): 591-599; K. B. Clark and M. K. Clark, “Segregation as a Factor in the Racial Identification of Negro Pre-school Children: A Preliminary Report,” *Journal of Experimental Education*, 8, (1939): 161-163.; K. B. Clark and M. K. Clark, “Skin Color as a Factor in Racial Identification of Negro Preschool Children. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 11 (1940): 159-169.

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Clark to Herbert Kelman, January 7, 1965, as quoted in Wade E. Pickren and Henry Tomes, “The Legacy of Kenneth B. Clark to the APA: The Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility for Psychology,” *American Psychologist*, (February, 2002): 51.

<sup>15</sup> Killian, *Impossible Revolution*, 129.

<sup>16</sup> Samuel Dubois Cook. “The Tragic Myth of Black Power,” *New South*, 21, Summer (1969), 59.

<sup>17</sup> Charles V. Hamilton, “An Advocate of Black Power Defines It,” in *Black Power: The Radical Response to White America*, ed. Thomas Wagstaff (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1968), 124-137.

integrationist platform with a black power agenda. SNCC's position paper on this decision defends the action by arguing that the intimidating influence of whites had created an "unrealistic" racial atmosphere. SNCC enjoined whites to form their own coalitions in support of racial equality, but justified their exclusive policies as necessary to force social change.<sup>18</sup>

### **APPLYING HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY'S THEORY TO RACE**

Throughout the 1960s, humanistic psychologists' support for civil rights had been largely ideological. As a politically liberal movement, humanistic psychologists were in favor of equal rights and sympathetic to the plight of blacks in America.<sup>19</sup> But, like the frustrated council members of the 1969 APA meeting, many humanistic psychologists felt that meaningfully addressing racial, or even political, concerns was beyond their capabilities.<sup>20</sup>

Humanistic psychologists who prioritized racial action, locating the psychological *within* the realm of the cultural and political, were the rare exceptions. George Leonard, senior editor of *Look* magazine from 1953 to 1970 and AHP president from 1979 to 1980, was one such exception—a follower of humanistic psychology who firmly believed in the relevance of human potential to the plight of blacks and in the necessity for the movement to act on it.<sup>21</sup> Born in Atlanta in 1923, Leonard had firsthand exposure to the racism of the deep South. He had seen the horrors of black tenant farming during his summers in Monroe, Georgia, and considered the practice to be "probably worse than

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<sup>18</sup> SNCC Position Paper (1966), "Who is the Real Villain—Uncle Tom or Simon Legree?" in *Black Power: The Radical Response to White America*, ed. Thomas Wagstaff (Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1968), 111-118.

<sup>19</sup> George Leonard, interview by author, phone, 18 April 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Joyce Milton argues that humanistic psychologists were overly naïve and idealistic when it came to political concerns. She implicates both Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers in the accusation. Her criticism, though, must be taken in the context of her general disapproval of the Humanistic Psychology Movement and of the negative bias she projects throughout her book. See: Joyce Milton, *The Road to Malpsychia: Humanistic Psychology and Our Discontents* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003). The remarks of Virginia Satir, Stanley Krippner and Price Cobbs (detailed later in this chapter), however, suggest that many humanistic psychologists were realistic about the limitations of their theory.

<sup>21</sup> Leonard was also anomalous in that he was not a psychologist and was not actually a member of AHP, though he served as its president from 1979-1980. Leonard, interview, 18 April 2006.

slavery.”<sup>22</sup> His discomfort with the elusive presence of “a shadowy population of blacks” in the small town, who “moved apologetically through the streets on their way to work” incited in Leonard a commitment to racial reform that shaped his journalistic career.<sup>23</sup> By 1953, when he moved to California, Leonard was “one of those fervent rarities, a white Southern integrationist.”<sup>24</sup> As a senior editor for a major national magazine, he created special issues on Civil Rights, reporting the confrontation over integration at the University of Mississippi himself.<sup>25</sup>

Leonard had been drawn into the orbit of humanistic psychology through his introduction to Esalen co-founder Michael Murphy on February 2, 1965.<sup>26</sup> The two, introduced by a mutual friend, instantly connected, partially on the basis of their concern for the systematic denial of the ability of oppressed Americans to reach their highest potential. Two weeks later, they spent three nights at George Leonard’s house brainstorming ways to extend civil rights and to aid individuals, in general, in achieving self-realization. Inspired by the ideas of humanistic psychologists like Abraham Maslow, they articulated a vision for a cultural movement, which they named “human potential.”<sup>27</sup>

Although neither Leonard nor Murphy were humanistic psychologists, they acted as messengers for the transmission of the theories of humanistic psychology to the wider culture. The Esalen Institute, which had become a site of intense cultural interest, served as their stage for attempts to directly apply humanistic psychology to the daily lives of individuals. Leonard immediately began to envision ways to get blacks to Esalen, where they could experience the personal transformation he felt they so deeply needed. This transformation, he hoped, would be a crucial step in the eradication of racial inequality in America. Murphy and co-founder Dick Price agreed that greater racial diversity and the

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<sup>22</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 161; Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 161.

<sup>24</sup> Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006.

<sup>25</sup> *Look* was a weekly national magazine, published in Des Moines, Iowa from 1937 to 1971.

<sup>26</sup> Michael Murphy and George Leonard were introduced by brain researcher Lois Delattre at her home in Telegraph Hill. Leonard, interview, 18 April 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

consequent inclusion of varied perspectives would enrich the experience of all participants. The consistent lack of diversity at seminars had perplexed and sometimes disturbed them. Still, neither had taken action to target seminars and workshops specifically to blacks.<sup>28</sup>

In 1967, Leonard proposed to Dr. Price Cobbs, his friend and neighbor, that they create a series of black-white encounter groups, which he intended to operate in the manner of a traditional group, but with mixed race participants and pointed honesty about concerns, emotions, and beliefs related to race. Cobbs, a black psychiatrist whom Leonard had interviewed for a *Look* piece on the experience of moving into an all-white San Francisco neighborhood, was reluctant to join in Leonard's grandiose attempts to achieve interracial harmony, and he secretly feared that Leonard's interest was driven by textbook white liberal guilt. He was compelled, however, by what he perceived as Leonard's genuine commitment to racial issues.<sup>29</sup>

Cobbs was also reluctant to get involved specifically in Esalen.<sup>30</sup> Unlike many blacks, Cobbs had actually heard of Esalen but "identified it as a playground of middle-class white dilettantes."<sup>31</sup> Yet, as anyone who has spoken to Leonard even briefly knows, Leonard was persuasive, and his enthusiasm infectious. Leonard explained to him that the traditional ways weren't working. Explaining his motivation for bringing interracial encounter to Esalen, he later wrote that, "black-power militants screamed their hurt, anger, and hatred. By revealing themselves and voicing the truth, they begged for encounter. White leaders responded with conventional language, cautious words. How could there be understanding without self-revelation? Didn't the whites feel outrage, fear, repressed prejudice? The measured, judicious response seemed a lie."<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid.; Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Price Cobbs, interview by author, San Francisco, 23 June 2005.

<sup>30</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 266.

<sup>31</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 162.

<sup>32</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 265.

Cobbs “shared this sentiment” and agreed to work with Leonard. Even after committing to run the group, however, he considered canceling it in favor of attending a black power workshop on the East Coast. His wife urged him to honor his commitment.<sup>33</sup>

The first black-white encounter group, co-led by Leonard and Cobbs, was titled “Racial Confrontation as a Transcendental Experience” and was held at Esalen from July 21-23 of 1967. It was advertised in the Esalen brochure with the following description:

Racial segregation exists among people with divided selves. A person who is alien to some part of himself is invariably separated from anyone who represents that alien part. The historic effort to integrate black man and white has involved us all in a vast working out of our divided human nature.

Racial confrontation can be an example for all kinds of human encounter. When it goes deep enough—past superficial niceties and role-playing—it can be a vehicle for transcendental experience. Price Cobbs, a Negro psychiatrist from San Francisco, and George Leonard, a white journalist and author born and raised in Georgia, will conduct a marathon group encounter between races. The group will try to get past the roles and attitudes that divide its participants, so that they may encounter at a level beyond race.<sup>34</sup>

While the group was large (35 participants) and racially mixed, it replicated the class composition of previous groups, largely drawing from the upper-middle class. It was also unbalanced in its ratio of whites to blacks and of black men to black women (more whites and black *men*). Most participants were California psychologists and educators.<sup>35</sup> The only anomalous participant was a young black man who worked for the highway department and had been repairing roads at Esalen. The man had noticed a flyer posted about the workshop and was struck by its inclusion of race and by the novelty of this as compared to the many flyers he’d seen posted that had never mentioned race.<sup>36</sup>

Structured in the traditional Esalen manner, the black-white encounter group was a full weekend marathon event, meaning neither the participants nor the leaders could sleep. Unlike other sessions, it took a while to break the ice. Price Cobbs remembers that

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<sup>33</sup> Price Cobbs, *My American Life: From Rage to Entitlement* (New York: Atria, 2006), 191.

<sup>34</sup> Esalen Seminars Brochure, Summer 1967.

<sup>35</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 162-163.

<sup>36</sup> Cobbs, interview, 23 June 2005.

during the first overnight marathon session, exhaustion set in before fruitful discussion.<sup>37</sup> According to Cobbs, the black participants began by challenging each other. There was a lot of name calling, of “Uncle Tom” accusations, and implications that certain blacks were either not black enough or not appropriately black. One light-skinned black woman called a darker skinned black man “a dirty little nigger” when he described his interest in sleeping with a white woman in the group.<sup>38</sup>

Black participants’ anger towards each other soon turned to expressions of anger towards the white members of the group. “What do you know about having your kids called ‘nigger’ and there’s nothing you can do about it?” shouted the group’s one black woman to a white woman. “When’s your kid ever been spit on because he was black?”<sup>39</sup> Black participants exposed what they perceived to be the archetype of the “white good-guy liberal,” an individual who defined himself against racism but replicated the subtle dynamics of racism with his ignorance of black reality.<sup>40</sup> In accessing this resentment, black participants tapped into a seemingly limitless font of anger and frustration, the “black rage,” about which Cobbs would later write.<sup>41</sup>

In the early hours of the morning, Cobbs and Leonard began to give up hope. The anger continued, now mixed with bitterness and desolation. “Everything, it seemed, had failed,” wrote Esalen chronicler Walter Anderson, “the weekend was a failure, the people themselves were failures, and the prospects for tearing down the barriers between races were nil.”<sup>42</sup> Sometime after the sun rose, a transformation occurred. Emotionally

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Cobbs, *My American Life*, 196.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 196.

<sup>40</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 163.

<sup>41</sup> In 1968, with William Grier, Cobbs published *Black Rage*, defining anger as a driving force in black Americans’ psychology. The book marked an integrationist attempt to counter the nationalist trend in the black movement. While the book was generally well-received, its use of damage imagery to explain black pathology and rage was construed by black nationalists as a demeaning attempt to elicit white sympathy. William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, *Black Rage* (New York: Basic Books, 1968); Daryl Michael Scott, *Contempt and Pity: Social Pity and the Image of the Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 103.

<sup>42</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 163.

overwrought, a white woman began to cry, claiming that she only dated black men because she had given up on white men. Her despair and desolation were powerful enough to invoke the sympathy of both the white and black participants, leading them to tearful hugging and emotional reconciliation.<sup>43</sup>

To Leonard, the moment of tearful recognition testified that the group had worked its magic, unleashing an emotional catharsis that represented a new level of emotional understanding between individual participants and suggesting the possibilities for broader interracial understanding in the culture. Leonard was euphoric; the group had been saved.

Cobbs also left the group optimistic, but without dreams of reconciliation or even resolution. Cobbs wrote in his 2006 memoir, “The participants at this first black/white confrontation group learned so much about one another that weekend that few, if any of them, went home unaffected. Many friendships were formed. Some of the participants came away offended and upset. A few seemed shell-shocked.”<sup>44</sup>

Cobbs’ primary impression was of the common black experience of anger and frustration and the common white experience of prejudice and ignorance, and encouraging others to see “the truth of black rage” became his primary interest. For this reason, he immediately heightened his commitment to encounter groups, deciding to venture to Big Sur on weekends for modified versions of the same experience.<sup>45</sup>

In the flush of preliminary success, Leonard saw the black-white encounter group as a model for how broad social change would occur.<sup>46</sup> To heal a culture that harbored deep racial tensions, it was necessary first to recognize them and then to exorcise them through mutual understanding. But like Murphy, who was always skeptical of encounter,

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 163.

<sup>44</sup> Cobbs, *My American Life*, 197.

<sup>45</sup> Cobbs, interview, 23 June 2005.

<sup>46</sup> Leonard hoped to extend the lessons of black-white encounter to the highest echelons of American society. He expediently drafted a letter to the president, enjoining Richard Nixon himself to participate in a series of black-white encounter groups to be hypothetically held at the White House. The letter itself contained several signatures, including those of top leaders of the Martin Luther King administration, but was never answered by the White House. Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 323-324.



Cobbs had practical concerns about the ability of encounter groups to elicit enduring and pervasive change in cultural attitudes.

Whatever potential encounter groups may have held for ameliorating race relations, he felt, was compromised by conducting them at Esalen.<sup>47</sup> Esalen's reputation as an "upper middle-class utopia" was likely off-putting to most blacks.<sup>48</sup> The breathtaking location alone—the cliffside views, the sulphur infused hot springs, and the rolling hills of organic gardens—suggested a level of luxury and self-indulgence that was estranged from the daily experience of prejudice and struggle familiar even to middle class blacks, and was unimaginable to the majority of blacks who lived in the thrall of rural or urban poverty..<sup>49</sup>

The sexual ethos of Esalen, too, smacked of the white leisure classes.<sup>50</sup> Esalen's baths were clothing-optional during the day and entirely nude at night, and sexual promiscuity (sex between visitors or between visitors and staff) was rampant. These facts were widely publicized by the media. To many, nudity as a form of protest was a bit frivolous, particularly in comparison to civil rights, the war in Vietnam so costly to minority communities, and women's liberation. It also ran counter to the strong influence of the black church.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Cobbs, interview.

<sup>48</sup> Daryl Scott writes that by the 1960s, "The lower class was becoming increasingly synonymous with black." Scott, *Contempt and Pity*, 144.

<sup>49</sup> Historian David Allyn argues that the "unprecedented prosperity" during which adults came of age in the late sixties was responsible for their ability to "put aside practical concerns about the future in order to savor life's pleasures and live according to their ideals." David Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 80. Further, writer Roger Kimball identifies the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 70s to be fixed to the middle class, in part because of the easier access the middle-class had to new forms of birth control, like the pill. Roger Kimball, *The Long March: How the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s Changed America* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), 147.

<sup>50</sup> Historian David Allyn locates much of the impetus for nudity and toplessness (particularly in the form of topless bars, increasingly revealing swimwear, and nude bathing) in the ennui of the middle class in the early 1960s. Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 28.

<sup>51</sup> From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, nudity was mainly being used as a symbolic form of protest in high-culture mediums, namely avant-guard theater on and off-Broadway. These displays were intended more as an attack on bourgeois morality than as a defense of civil liberties. Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 124.

When confronted with open nudity at Esalen, black men must have been at least a little wary.<sup>52</sup> Several historians have documented the care with which certain black men held themselves to standards of sexual morality, in the face of entrenched cultural myths that had constructed them as hypersexual predators.<sup>53</sup> Cobbs' initial reaction to Esalen reflected his perception of the threatening nature of sexual impropriety at Esalen. "Oh God," Cobbs thought, "what have I gotten myself into? Me, a conventional young black professional, raised to be respectable. The visions of long-haired hippies swimming nude made me wonder what my mother would have thought about us being there."<sup>54</sup>

Cobbs was also particularly concerned about the geographic limitations of hosting black-white encounter in Big Sur, viewing the inaccessibility as an obstacle to the realization of meaningful social change from the groups.<sup>55</sup> Big Sur was a 150 mile trip from San Francisco on the Pacific Coast Highway, a narrow and serpentine roadway comprised of treacherous hairpin curves and uniquely susceptible to adverse weather conditions, flooding, and falling rocks (like the one that would eventually kill founder Dick Price).<sup>56</sup>

When Murphy proposed opening a city location to attract wider community attention and enable urban individuals to attend the groups, both Cobbs and Leonard were in full agreement. Murphy imagined that, "if George Leonard and Price Cobbs could pull off a marathon racial encounter workshop at Esalen advertised as 'Racial Confrontation as Transcendental Experience' (a title which 'came more from my reckless enthusiasm than from [Cobb's] considered judgment,' [...] then the San Francisco Center could think

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<sup>52</sup> David Allyn describes the heated nature of sexual stereotypes for black men in the late 1960s. He claims that black nationalists tended to exploit, rather than challenge stereotypes, only heightening the tensions surrounding black male sexuality in white culture. Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 91.

<sup>53</sup> Several sources discuss the myth of black male hypersexuality and the black male response to the existence of the myth. See: Beth Day, "The Hidden Fear," in *The Black Male in America*, ed. Doris Y. Wilkinson and Ronald L. Taylor (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1977), 193-206; Grier and Cobbs, *Black Rage*; Bell Hooks, *We Real Cool: Black Men and Masculinity* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

<sup>54</sup> Cobbs, *My American Life*, 192.

<sup>55</sup> Cobbs, interview.

<sup>56</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 15.

bigger and sponsor four consecutive racial encounter workshops in the summer of 1968.”<sup>57</sup>

Esalen officially opened a San Francisco extension in 1967. The new location, modeled closely on the original in terms of workshops and seminars, was initially a great success, attracting attendance in excess of ten thousand in the first two months of operation.<sup>58</sup> The inaugural event for the center was held on February 6, 1966 at San Francisco’s Grace Cathedral. George Leonard offered a grandiose introduction to Abraham Maslow’s lecture “The Farther Reaches of Human Nature.” With little advertising, the event managed to attract 2,000 people.<sup>59</sup>

Murphy, who became primarily responsible for the San Francisco extension while Price stayed on at Big Sur, brought to the project the same serious intentions that he had infused into the original Institute. Among the list of speakers invited to open the institute was B. F. Skinner, a behaviorist whose theory posed significant challenges to humanistic psychology.<sup>60</sup> The new center also honored its intentions to address race issues meaningfully, offering four racial confrontation workshops in the summer encounter series of 1968. The registration form explained that:

Open racial confrontation is at last a reality, but it has brought bloodshed and death, terror and polarization. Rather than fear a confrontation, we must welcome and embrace it. For only in direct and honest encounter can white racism and black self-hatred be discarded. This series of Racial Confrontations is to allow for bloodless riots where the most dreaded thoughts and emotions may be expressed, where self-delusions that limit can be stripped away. Only when such confrontation has occurred can man expand his blackness and whiteness into creative humanness.<sup>61</sup>

Unfortunately, attendance began to drop off after the initial surge of interest. The racial encounter groups were poorly attended by blacks, and reflected the same middle-

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<sup>57</sup> Michael Murphy, as quoted in Kripal, “Esalen Goes to the City,” 2.

<sup>58</sup> Litwak, “A Trip to Esalen,” 126.

<sup>59</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 186.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.

<sup>61</sup> “Esalen Encounter Groups, Summer Series 1968: Four Racial Confrontation Workshops,” registration forms.

class bias of the initial Big Sur Group.<sup>62</sup> Viewing the San Francisco extension as secondary to that of the Big Sur branch, Esalen leaders seem to have failed to devote the necessary resources to outreach for the center.

The San Francisco office was plagued by internal tensions as well. Faced with staff whose commitment to racial issues differed dramatically from one person to the next, the extension proved as vulnerable to the dividing potential of racial conflict as any other organization. These tensions were most aptly demonstrated in 1969, when an argument erupted between Ron Brown, a black graduate student at the San Francisco wing, and Bill Smith, an administrator. The argument quickly devolved into shouting and several things Smith said, including his threat to call the police, struck Brown as being racially loaded. Michael Murphy, George Leonard and Price Cobbs met with the two to try to ease the conflict, but to no avail. As was typical, Murphy backed away from the confrontation, angering Leonard and Cobbs. Brown later said of Murphy that he “just never understood the racial part of it.”<sup>63</sup> This insensitivity drove Cobbs away from Esalen; he never again ran a group there. Leonard, too, kept his distance from Murphy for a while and Murphy himself lost some of his evangelical zeal for Esalen’s mission.<sup>64</sup>

The San Francisco extension, which had lost money from the start, soon began to tax the Big Sur facility.<sup>65</sup> In the 1972 catalogue, Esalen reported in the news section that the San Francisco extension lost \$125,822 in 1971. In the same catalogue, the San Francisco facility began to co-sponsor their programs with the Gestalt Institute of San Francisco.<sup>66</sup> Eventually, around 1973, the facility’s treasurer recommended to Murphy that the extension close. Whether this financial necessity stemmed from a lack of public interest or organizational mismanagement is a matter of some contention, but the outcome validated the idea that the San Francisco Esalen never experienced the wild

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<sup>62</sup> Leonard, interview, 27 April 2005.

<sup>63</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 198.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 198.

<sup>65</sup> David Price, email to author, April 25, 2006.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

popularity of the Big Sur Esalen. “Perhaps Esalen needed that deep black Big Sur soil to thrive,” remarked George Leonard, in retrospect.<sup>67</sup> Leonard’s statement suggests the otherworldly quality of the Big Sur Esalen; it was hospitable to the lofty goals of spiritual seekers, but ill-suited to the weighty, urban social issues of the time.<sup>68</sup>

#### **BEYOND ESALEN: HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGISTS RESPOND TO RACE**

Despite his limited first-hand involvement with racial action, Carl Rogers harbored high hopes for the integrationist potential of black-white encounter groups. He facilitated a few groups and celebrated the results: “the outcomes are a gut-level experiential learning [about] racist attitudes on the part of whites, and a rare opportunity on the part of blacks.”<sup>69</sup> For blacks, he felt that the “bitterness and rage which exists” could be expressed productively, easing the burden of misunderstanding and isolation. Rogers touted the outcome of racial encounter as, “[t]he surprising result [...that blacks and whites] tend to become persons to each other and can talk openly and freely with-out reference to stereotypes or color.”<sup>70</sup> Rogers never immersed himself in race-based encounter groups, viewing them more as a side project that intermittently might receive attention.

Rogers’ perspective was not atypical of members of humanistic psychology, who tended to express initial excitement about the potential of encounter groups, but later to become distracted by the numerous aspects of humanistic psychology that competed for

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<sup>67</sup> Leonard, interview, 18 April 2006.

<sup>68</sup> Cobbs’ personal activism strayed quickly from the facilitation of black-white encounter, which he only led for a couple years. After publishing the *Black Rage* in 1968, he found himself in wide demand from corporations who sought assistance in addressing the complications of blacks moving into professional positions. By the early 1970s, Cobbs decided that his time could be best spent consulting for nation-wide corporations, in an effort to increase their sensitivity to racial issues, and he abandoned both his private psychiatric practice and his involvement in encounter groups. He continued to publish books including *Cracking the Corporate Code* in 2003. Price Cobbs and Judith Tumock, *Cracking the Corporate Code: The Revealing Success Stories of 32 African-American Executives* (New York: American Management Association, 2003).

<sup>69</sup> Carl Rogers, “Some Social Issues Which Concern Me,” in *Politics and Innocence: A Humanistic Debate*, ed. Thomas Greening (San Francisco: Saybrook Publishers, 1986), 23-32.

<sup>70</sup> Carl Rogers, “On no Longer Being Ashamed of America,” *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Fall (1972), 48.

their attention.<sup>71</sup> He was concerned about social injustice but not willing to subordinate other concerns in favor of activism. More extreme reactions came from humanistic psychologists, like Virginia Satir, who failed to recognize any obligation that humanistic psychologists might have to pressing political issues of the time. Satir, when confronted about her lack of political consciousness replied, “I want to change the family and their interactions. I want to change the communications and I even want to change the way therapists see dynamics and interactions. But I like the world as it is otherwise.”<sup>72</sup> The brand of humanistic psychology that Satir practiced implied an extreme personal focus that would ultimately make humanistic psychology vulnerable to attack.

By contrast, Maslow was particularly sensitive to the natural affinity between the goals of humanistic psychology and black liberation movements, but he tended to blame blacks for their lack of attention to the relevance of humanistic psychology. Maslow wrote:

One sad thing about the whole business is that you can interpret one aspect [...] of the Negro rebellion as reaching out for this very humanistic entranced personal ethic and philosophy. They reach out for it as if it didn't exist. And yet it does exist. They just don't know about it. You could call it in a way an answer to their prayers, to their demands. In principle it is something which should satisfy them, because it's a system of values which involves a reconstruction of science as a means of discovering and uncovering values (rather than it being value-free). Not only that, but it includes the beginnings of a strategy in tactics of reaching there. That is, a theory of education, including a philosophy of education including both means and ends of education.<sup>73</sup>

Implicit in Maslow's statement was an awareness that the goals of humanistic psychology, which prioritized the capacity for choice, for freedom, and for self-development, were inherently complementary to the objectives of civil rights. Absent,

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<sup>71</sup> Maureen O'Hara, interview, 29 April 2005.

<sup>72</sup> Virginia Satir, interview by Judith Goodman, November 1977 (Virginia Satir Collection, HPA Mss 45, Box 5: 36, Humanistic Psychology Archives, Department of Special Collections, Donald C. Davidson Library, University of California, Santa Barbara).

<sup>73</sup> Abraham Maslow, “The Unnoticed Revolution 2,” February 5, 1969 (Maslow Papers, Box 414, Lectures (AHAP) folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

however, is an admission of humanistic psychology's responsibility in the failure to connect with blacks.

Though most humanistic psychologists professed their unrestrained support for improving race relations, the reality was that few were willing to or interested in taking race relations to the forefront of their professional lives. Not one article in the first 2 decades of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* (JHP) explored racial issues.<sup>74</sup>

This combination of personal interest and lack of professional attention tended to come across as racial tokenism; humanistic psychologists were willing to espouse racial equality but not work for it. The critique blacks lodged against whites in humanistic psychology paralleled the critique of white liberals in civil rights coalitions. As sociologist Lewis Killian wrote in 1968, "Much of white support for black rights appears to be lip-service, an approval of rights without a corresponding commitment to do anything to grant them."<sup>75</sup>

In his relatively brief interaction with humanistic psychology, Price Cobbs had identified this racial tokenism. When he would raise issues regarding racial dynamics and concerns, other members would often respond by saying, "let's just be human." Cobbs felt deeply that just saying "I'm liberal and I'm for you wasn't enough," but that was all that many humanistic psychologists were willing to offer.<sup>76</sup>

Stanley Krippner corroborates this view of humanistic psychology's limitations in terms of exploring race. Because they felt that race was a social construct, humanistic psychologists believed that a revisionist perspective based on common humanity would erase the societal distinctions between blacks and whites.<sup>77</sup> Krippner felt that whether dangerously naïve or just overly idealistic, humanistic psychologists tended to minimize and even ignore the pervasive nature of the racial prejudice with which the culture was

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<sup>74</sup> Cumulative Contents, 1961-1990, *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*.

<sup>75</sup> Killian, *The Impossible Revolution*, 78.

<sup>76</sup> Cobbs, interview.

<sup>77</sup> Stanley Krippner, interview by author, San Francisco, 24 June 2005.

saturated. Further, they tended to alienate racial minorities by homogenizing human experience, ignoring the individual struggles and psychological scars characteristic of minorities living in a racially divided culture.<sup>78</sup>

Those who stuck with human potential and humanistic psychology and maintained a commitment to racial issues faced ongoing disappointment. Esalen never attracted the racial diversity that Murphy aspired to, nor did AHP produce a very racially diverse membership. As Natalie Rogers, daughter of Carl Rogers, asserted of AHP, “Race issues just never made it.”<sup>79</sup> At best, humanistic psychology offered blacks a viable ideological frame for the improvement of their cultural condition. But as a movement, it failed to adequately distinguish itself from psychology as a whole. For blacks, this was an enormous liability.

### **BLACK RESISTANCE TO THE BROADER FIELD OF PSYCHOLOGY**

Any notion humanistic psychologists had of appealing to blacks was also frustrated by the historical relationship between blacks and psychology. While humanistic psychology diverged dramatically from psychological schools that had relied on medical and scientific power to control and manipulate individuals, it also possessed similarities to the movements that preceded it. For one, it was a largely white movement, led by scholars who had very little first-hand knowledge of black experience. Also, it was largely inaccessible. Seeking therapy from humanistic psychologists required money and knowledge about where to seek treatment. While its theories had begun to seep into the broader culture, as a therapeutic tool it remained the province of an overwhelmingly white cultural elite.

Many blacks undoubtedly also associated humanistic psychology with the larger field of psychology. Blacks’ historical distrust of psychiatry and psychology derived from their association with the American medical establishment’s history of racism. In the

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview by author, phone, 2 Sept 2005.



past, doctors had hypothesized that the black brain was “smaller and less developed” than the white brain, thus explaining why blacks were “not capable of managing a high degree of civilization.”<sup>80</sup> They had also targeted genetic predisposition in some racial stocks as an explanation for mental inferiority in blacks.<sup>81</sup>

The medical establishment’s racism had been demonstrated in practice as well as in theory. The Tuskegee Syphilis study was the final straw for many blacks who had come to perceive American medical institutions as threatening and authoritarian. Beginning in 1932, government researchers conducted a long-term study (initially intended to extend for 6 months) of the effects of syphilis on a group of black men in Alabama. The study continued for 40 years, during which time participants were not informed of their diagnosis, but were told they had “bad blood,” a vernacular term used to describe a variety of ailments.<sup>82</sup> Participants were also denied penicillin, which had become an acceptable and effective form of treatment as early as 1945. In July of 1972, the Associated Press broke the story, making it public knowledge that 399 syphilitic black men had gone untreated, and many had died, for the purposes of an ad hoc government study that lacked a documented protocol.<sup>83</sup>

Though the field of psychology mostly hadn’t demonstrated such overtly racist practices, psychologists may have inadvertently perpetuated racial injustices by reinforcing cultural beliefs that had proved detrimental to blacks. Psychoanalysis and broader drive theories, for example, constructed pathological behavior as a product of a flawed psyche, locating the source of pathology within the individual and, in effect, blaming the victim. In all likelihood, accepting the psychotherapeutic paradigm would have exacerbated the “sense [in blacks] that something inside themselves prevented them

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<sup>80</sup> Alvin F. Poussaint and Amy Alexander, *Lay My Burden Down: Unraveling Suicide and the Mental Health Crisis among African-Americans* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 64.

<sup>81</sup> For a comprehensive look at historical racial research, see: William H. Tucker, *The Science and Politics of Racial Research* (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996).

<sup>82</sup> Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study,” <http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/tuskegee/time.htm>.

<sup>83</sup> James H. Jones, *Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment* (New York, The Free Press, 1981), 204.

from struggling effectively to realize their full psychosocial potential.”<sup>84</sup> Drive-theory also helped to “reinforce what can be referred to as nativist themes by declaring that human differences resulted from causes within people rather than environmental forces in society. Therefore the ‘plight’ of blackness, including the so-called culture and cycle of poverty, were blamed on inherent inadequacies of blacks themselves.”<sup>85</sup>

The theory of environmental conditioning, dominant in the behaviorist climate of 1940s and ’50s psychology, further reinforced psychology’s inclination to “blame the victim” by locating the sources of emotional and behavioral problems within individuals. Environmental conditioning explained mental distress and pathological behavior as direct products of an unhealthy environment, which may have included the family atmosphere or the social situation. Such behavioral theories had the potential to blame black families for the distress of black children, rather than evaluating the broader culture that had produced the inequality.

Even as drive-theory tended toward psychological determinism, environmental conditioning theory suggested environmental determinism. In both cases, the individual will was denied, leaving the “subject” passive at best and inherently psychologically pathological at worst.<sup>86</sup> Humanistic psychology, of course, hoped to correct the errors of both psychoanalysis and behaviorism in denying individual subjectivity and disempowering will, offering a theory that, it was believed, would inherently align better with black interests. In many cases, however, blacks had no interest in looking to psychology, even in alternative formulation, for answers.

For many blacks, seeking assistance from psychological institutions (which were often associated with the larger evils of medicine and government) was a practice

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<sup>84</sup> Adelbert Jenkins, “A Humanistic Approach to Black Psychology,” in *Black Psychology*, ed. Reginald L. Jones (Berkeley: Cobb & Henry, 1991), 92.

<sup>85</sup> Robert V. Guthrie, “The Psychology of African Americans: An Historical Perspective,” in *Black Psychology*, ed. Reginald L. Jones (Berkeley: Cobb & Henry, 1991), 36.

<sup>86</sup> Jenkins, “Humanistic Approach to Black Psychology,” 101.

incompatible with their cultural and religious beliefs.<sup>87</sup> The horrific experience of surviving slavery had instilled in many blacks a sense that they were capable of and expected to endure “superhuman” levels of psychological and physical suffering. Problems in daily life or relationships, including the experience of anxiety or depression, appeared nominal in comparison to the obstacles which their ancestors had overcome. As Alvin Poussaint, Harvard Medical school professor of psychiatry and eminent writer on black psychology wrote (with co-author Amy Alexander), “[the] overarching message found in much of the spiritual and secular music-and even some poetry and literature created by blacks over the century placed an emphasis on a need for ‘keeping on’ despite incredible psychic and physical difficulties.”<sup>88</sup>

Poussaint and Alexander argued that the cultural mentality of “staying strong” may have prevented blacks from admitting mental distress. This idea was perpetuated in church, where ministers delivered a “host of messages designed to shore [blacks] up under difficult circumstances.”<sup>89</sup> Among these were values of chastity and sexual inhibition that would prove incompatible with the liberal sexual ethos of a liberationist movement like humanistic psychology. Self-denial and self-sacrifice had become central to a respectable black identity. “The Christian faith claimed by most African-Americans,” wrote psychologist Alvin Poussaint and scholar Amy Alexander, “has historically upheld the philosophy of ‘bearing up’ at any cost under the pain of slavery and the long-lasting effects of discrimination.” Further, Christianity offered the concept of a healing God to which believers could pray for the abatement of mental distress. Trust in religious solutions often precluded the possibility for reliance on a psychological “expert” whose motives were invariably less trust-inspiring than those of God, religious figures, and fellow church members.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Poussaint and Alexander, *Lay My Burden Down*, 105.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 101-110, quotation from 105.

Unfortunately, with whites as the cause of much their distress, blacks hesitated to turn to predominantly white institutions for help. Poussaint and Alexander argued that the indoctrination of the idea of blacks' superhuman strength has been a, "a potent mixture of fatalism and stoicism."<sup>91</sup> Black men have suffered the highest levels of suicide of any American demographic and "however much blacks avoid the mental health care community, they are more likely than whites to be diagnosed with serious illnesses should they be evaluated by clinicians."<sup>92</sup>

Black psychologist and University of Michigan professor Adelbert Jenkins felt that humanistic psychology could help. He argued that humanistic psychology reformulated notions of mental distress and of human nature in ways that would address blacks' resistance to psychotherapy. Mental distress was, according to humanistic psychologists, not internally derived but a product of an environmental resistance to human potential through the frustration of healthy individual strivings. Individuals, however, were not powerless to rise above environmental oppression. On the contrary, they were inherently healthy, growth-oriented individuals who, given the opportunity, would maximize their potential. This formulation implied that American society was still on the hook for the hindering obstacles they had heaped on blacks (in the form of discrimination and oppression), but that blacks had not been irreparably damaged and would continue to seek greater heights of self-realization.<sup>93</sup>

In theory, humanistic psychology espoused a more balanced perspective on the location of mental distress, implicating the individuals' broader environment and social relationships in individual struggle. In practice, though, humanistic psychologists relied on an individual-centered agenda, treating the self as referential rather than sociocentric and treating group goals as subordinate to individual goals. For blacks, argued Jenkins, the problem may not have been that they did not know *how* to grow as individuals, but

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>93</sup> Jenkins, 79-81.

that these opportunities may have been blocked.<sup>94</sup> Humanistic psychology failed to consider the kind of group organization necessary to elicit broad-scale cultural change; without this level of action, efforts at individual self-actualization seemed futile and ineffectual.<sup>95</sup>

The timing for humanistic psychology's connection with blacks, also, seemed to be all wrong. Until the early 60s, around the time of the release of the Moynihan Report, liberal social scientists' reliance on damage imagery was strong. In spite of their positive intentions to eliminate racism by eliciting white sympathy, blacks often felt acutely suspicious of attempts to address their "pathology," which tended to be overemphasized. It wasn't until the mid 1970s, when humanistic psychology's cultural power had already begun to decline, that the social sciences began to represent the black psyche in non-pathological ways.<sup>96</sup>

In addition to being hesitant to look to psychology for any form of support, blacks in the late 1960s were reluctant to unite with a predominantly white movement. Though some clinicians attempted, in the 1960s, to "re-examine the language of mental health and redefine what constituted normal black behavior, marking the onset of a politicization of black health issues," these efforts received little attention from blacks at the time. Not only were blacks estranged from the American mental health profession, but they were, at the time, alienated from white coalitions in general, favoring black-centered movements in which they could exercise more control.<sup>97</sup>

Leonard recalls that it became more and more difficult to recruit blacks for participation in encounter groups, as they came to represent assimilation into a white

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<sup>94</sup> B. Lerner, *Therapy in the Ghetto: Political Impotence and Personal Disintegration* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 33.

<sup>95</sup> Adelbert H. Jenkins, "Humanistic Psychology and Multiculturalism: A Review and Reflection," *The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research and Practice* eds. Kirk J. Schneider, James F. T. Bugental and J. Fraser Pierson 37-45 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 37.

<sup>96</sup> Scott, *Contempt and Pity*, 183.

<sup>97</sup> Poussaint and Alexander, *Lay My Burden Down*, 74-75.

power structure.<sup>98</sup> While humanistic psychology sought to negate racial differences with humanistic understanding, black power offered both recognition of the unique experiences of racial minorities and compensation for previous wrongs they had endured. Prioritizing black equality and citizenship, blacks refused to enter into a paternalistic relationship with humanistic psychology, just as they increasingly refused to accept direct help from white-centered institutions and movements broadly.<sup>99</sup>

In spite of the paucity of black interest, Esalen's black-white encounter groups continued for several years, both in Big Sur and at Esalen's San Francisco extension. But by the early 1970s, the human potential movement and humanistic psychology were even less ambitious on the racial front. At AHP's 1979 convention, a mere 6 of the approximately 1,500 participants at the convention were blacks.. Carl Rogers was quoted as saying, "It's unfortunate, and we hope to change that," in response.<sup>100</sup> The time for humanistic psychology to truly embrace racial concerns had, of course, passed.

Even if blacks didn't venture to Esalen, however, they couldn't avoid the impact of humanistic psychology entirely. The language of self-actualization and self-awareness became a major theme in popular culture, appearing in films, television, and self-help literature. Humanistic psychologists' ideas were further transmitted through universities, which blacks attended in greater numbers after the introduction of affirmative action.<sup>101</sup> Many universities offered classes in humanistic psychology, and some even offered encounter groups.

Humanistic psychology also entered workplaces, through sensitivity training and seminars on group dynamics. The increase, following the 1964 Civil Rights Act, of black

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<sup>98</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 343.

<sup>99</sup> Jenkins, "Humanistic Approach to Black Psychology," 184.

<sup>100</sup> Carl Rogers, as quoted in David J. Remick, "Swinging Convention Enlivens Princeton." *New York Times*, September 2, 1979, NJ13.

<sup>101</sup> Johnson's Executive Order 11246 enforced affirmative action, which had been mandated in Kennedy's Executive Order 10925, and mandated that projects financed with federal funds "take affirmative action" to ensure that hiring and employment practices are free of racial bias. Executive Order No. 11246, September 28, 1965, 12319 <http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/thelaw/eo-11246.html>.

representation in the work force, and in management positions specifically, made blacks much more likely to encounter directly humanistic psychology's theory in the form of NTL-type groups.<sup>102</sup> Through this exposure, certain blacks did identify the compatibility of their liberationist perspective with that of humanistic psychology. Many others remained cynical about a movement that was unable to prioritize racial concerns.

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<sup>102</sup> Some blacks even became directly involved with institutes like the National Training Laboratories (NTL) and, in this capacity, were able to push their needs to the forefront. In response to their experiences at NTL's summer institute in Bethel, Maine, black workshop participants caucused at NTL in the summer of 1968 to formulate a set of demands aimed at making the Institute more relevant and responsive to Blacks. NTL, in turn agreed to respond to these demands by "increasing the direct relevance of NTL programming to the demands of the urban situation," "increasing the number of Blacks in both professional and nonprofessional roles in the Institute central office and summer staffs," to include more Black and minority participants in laboratories, and to create programs directly geared to the unique experience of Blacks in the workplace. NTL Bulletin October 1968, V2 NO 4.

## Chapter Eight: The Psychedelic Experience

In the 1960s and early 1970s, humanistic psychologists were drawn to the psychological potential of psychedelic drugs. Touted for their supposed spiritual properties, drugs like LSD produced in users everything from a feeling of temporary transcendence to the (at least temporary) experience of a complete reorganization of perception and meaning.<sup>1</sup> Many humanistic psychologists identified the consonance between their own goals—of self-actualization, expanded self and transpersonal awareness, and intensified experience—and the qualities of psychedelic experience.<sup>2</sup>

Reports of psychedelic experience evoked, in particular, Maslow's notion of peak experiences. In *The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience*, a thirty-six year old assistant professor of English was quoted describing his experience with psychedelics. "What I experienced was essentially, and with few exceptions, the usual content of experience but that, of everything there was MORE."

Writing under the influence of the drug, he noted that he was able to sense, think, and feel MORE. Of objects, he saw *more* color, detail and form. Of his own emotions, he felt more intensity, more depth, more comprehensiveness. He felt that his mind was able to contain more. "Awareness has MORE levels, is many-dimensional." He also felt a sense of MORE time, MORE unity with people and things, more self-knowledge, and more alternatives.<sup>3</sup>

Maslow himself noted a similar sense of amplification when describing peaks. During a peak experience, he wrote, individuals feel more integrated "unified, whole, all-of a piece." They are "more able to fuse with the world." For example, "the appreciator *becomes* the music (and it becomes *him*) or the painting, or the dance." Peakers, he wrote,

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Masters and Jean Huston, *The Varieties of Psychedelic Experience: The Classic Guide to the Effects of LSD on the Human Psyche*, (Rochester, Vermont: Park Street Press, 1966), 7-12.

<sup>2</sup> Stanley Krippner, interview.

<sup>3</sup> Masters and Huston, *Psycheldelic Experience*, 7-12.



feel themselves to be at the height of their powers; they experience a sense of “effortlessness and ease of functioning”; they feel free of blocks and inhibitions, they feel more spontaneous and expressive, more “freely flowering outward”; and they feel “more of a pure psyche and less a thing-of-the world living under the laws of the world.” Peakers also feel more creative, connected to the present, unique, and grateful.<sup>4</sup>

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL INTEREST IN PSYCHEDELICS

Psychedelics began to receive mainstream interest when, in 1943, Swiss chemist Albert Hoffman discovered the hallucinogenic effects of a compound he had discovered 5 years earlier. Upon accidentally ingesting Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), Hoffman achieved a “remarkable experience,” in which he perceived an “uninterrupted stream of fantastic pictures, extraordinary shapes with intense kaleidoscopic play of colors.”<sup>5</sup> Compelled by the experience and enthusiastic about its therapeutic potential, as “medicine for the soul,” Hoffman continued experimental research on the drug throughout the 1950s.<sup>6</sup>

In America, first-hand information about other kinds of psychedelic experiences came primarily from those who traveled to locations like Southern Mexico, where psychedelic mushrooms were used in tribal rituals.<sup>7</sup> R. Gordon Wasson, for example, was a New York banker who traveled to Southern Mexico in 1955 to sample psilocybin mushrooms with the Mixteco Indians of the region. He published an account of his experience in *Life Magazine* in June of 1957, describing his own hallucinogenic experience, as well as the native perception of the shamanistic properties of the mushrooms. He wrote, “The Indians believe that the mushrooms hold the key to what we

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<sup>4</sup> Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 103-114.

<sup>5</sup> Albert Hofmann, *LSD: My Problem Child* (Saline, MI: McNaughton & Gunn: 1979), 47.

<sup>6</sup> Craig S. Smith, “Nearly 100, LSD’s Father Ponders His ‘Problem Child,’” *The New York Times*, January 7, 2006, [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/international/europe/07hoffman.html?\\_r=1&oref=slogin](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/international/europe/07hoffman.html?_r=1&oref=slogin).

<sup>7</sup> Hofmann, *LSD*, 24-25.

call extrasensory perception.” At the conclusion of the article, Wasson expressed both an anthropological and scientific interest in properties of mushrooms.<sup>8</sup>

In 1960, psychologist Timothy Leary traveled to Mexico, for his first experience with psychedelic mushroom inebriation. Of the experience, Leary later wrote, “ I was first drugged out of my mind in Cuernavaca, August 1960. I ate seven of the Sacred Mushrooms of Mexico and discovered that beauty, revelation, sensuality, the cellular history of the past, God, the Devil—all lie inside my body, outside my mind.”<sup>9</sup>

Despite the largely sensationalistic attention that LSD research received in the 1950s, medical researchers, like those at Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, studied the compound’s potential as a serotonin blocker, to treat migraines and prevent allergic-inflammatory processes.<sup>10</sup> The earliest psychiatric research on LSD, performed in Europe and the US, used the compound for mental relaxation in the recovery of repressed memories and to achieve a better understanding of psychosis.<sup>11</sup> Other experimental uses included the treatment of schizophrenia and alcoholism.<sup>12</sup> Significant research on the treatment of alcoholics occurred between 1954 and 1960, when Humphrey Osmond and Abram Hoffer treated approximately 2000 alcoholics under carefully controlled conditions, reporting that 40% to 45% of the alcoholics who were treated with LSD had not returned to drinking after a year.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> R. Gordon Wasson, “Seeking the Magic Mushroom,” *Life*, June 10 (1957), <http://www.imaginaria.org/wasson/life.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> Timothy Leary, *High Priest* (Berkeley, CA: Ronin Publishing, 1995), 12.

<sup>10</sup> Hofmann, *LSD*, 27.

<sup>11</sup> For examples of this research see: Harold A. Abramson, “Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy with LSD,” in *The Use of LSD in Psychotherapy*, ed. Harold A. Abramson, M.D. (Madison, NJ: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1960), 25-80; Arthur L. Chandler and Mortimer A. Hartman. “Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) as a Facilitating Agent in Psychotherapy,” *Archives of General Psychiatry* 2 (1960): 286-299.; and Humphrey Osmond, “A Review of the Clinical Effects of Psychotomimetic Agents,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 66(3) (1957): 418-434.

<sup>12</sup> For more on the research performed in the 50s with schizophrenics and alcoholics, see: Edward Baker, “LSD Psychotherapy; LSD Psycho-Exploration: Three Reports,” in *The Use of LSD in Psychotherapy and Alcoholism*, ed. Harold A. Abramson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), 191-207; Humphrey Osmond and John Smythies, “Schizophrenia: A New Approach,” *Journal of Mental Science* 98, April (1952): 309-315.

<sup>13</sup> Janice Hopkins Tanne, “Obituary for Humphrey Osmond,” *BMJ*, 328 (2004): 713; Abram Hoffer, “Treatment of Alcoholism with Psychedelic Therapy,” in *Psychedelics: The Uses and Implications of*

Meanwhile, the concept of LSD inebriation and the benefits of recreational drugs were transmitted to the public through popular reports in magazines and literature.<sup>14</sup> Reporters published first-person accounts of LSD experimentation in popular magazines, as in the case of Sidney Katz who published “My Twelve Hours as a Madman” in *MacLean’s* in 1953.<sup>15</sup> Also, fictional authors like Aldous Huxley romanticized LSD use, constructing it as a tool for consciousness-expansion, pleasure, and religious awakening.<sup>16</sup>

In 1962, Huxley published an account of what he perceived to be the transcendent elements of psychedelic experience in his novel *Island*. He wrote:

Even if it doesn’t refer to anything outside itself, it’s still the most important thing that ever happened to you. Like music, only incomparably more so. And if you give the experience a chance, if you’re prepared to go along with it, the results are incomparably more therapeutic and transforming. So maybe the whole thing does happen inside one’s skull. Maybe it is private and there’s no unitive knowledge of anything but one’s own physiology. Who cares? The fact remains that the experience can open one’s eyes and make one blessed and transform one’s whole life.<sup>17</sup>

Huxley’s accounts suggested the enormous potential of psychedelic drugs, and laid the foundations for a popular movement of LSD use.<sup>18</sup>

In the fall of 1960, Timothy Leary, a lecturer in Psychology at Harvard, founded the first psilocybin laboratory in the United States, with the support and participation of psychologist Henry Murray and assistant professor of education and psychology Richard Alpert. The explicit goal of the laboratory was to explore the potential psychological

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*Hallucinogenic Drugs*, ed. Bernard Aaronson & Humphrey Osmond (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1970), 357-366.

<sup>14</sup> Hofmann, *LSD*, 11-12.

<sup>15</sup> Sidney Katz, “My Twelve Hours as a Madman,” *MacLean’s* Oct. 1, 1953, 9-11, 46-55.

<sup>16</sup> Huxley published two books in the mid-fifties that explored psychedelic use: Aldous Huxley, *Doors of Perception* (New York: Harper, 1964). and Aldous Huxley, *Heaven and Hell* (New York: Harper, 1956).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

<sup>18</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 141-144.

benefits of psychedelics, particularly in the realms of emotional and creative expression, and to pursue the effects of psychedelic inebriation.<sup>19</sup>

The early results of Leary's research were promising. In his first study, in which 175 participants from all walks of life ingested psilocybin, Leary reported that more than half had reached new heights of self-understanding, an equally high percentage felt the experience had permanently improved their lives, and 90 percent wanted to repeat the experience.<sup>20</sup> Subsequently, Leary conducted the Concord Prison Experiment, in which psilocybin therapy was administered to prisoners. Improvements in the mental health and morale of participants were so marked that Leary was invited to Washington to explore the possibility of a national psilocybin program that would extend throughout the penal system.<sup>21</sup>

#### **HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY'S INTEREST IN PSYCHEDELICS**

Many of humanistic psychology's leaders favored and even participated in psychedelic experimentation. Stanley Krippner, then an assistant professor of clinical psychology at Kent State, was enthusiastic about the possibilities of LSD and was eager to try it himself. <sup>22</sup> Gratefully accepting an invitation from Leary to participate in LSD experimentation at Harvard in April of 1962, Krippner traveled to Cambridge for the experience. He was so motivated to take the drug that he appeared for the session despite the fact that he had been violently ill from food poisoning the night before and had to be assisted to Leary's lab by a friend.<sup>23</sup> His nausea abated the moment the drug took effect.

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<sup>19</sup> Hofmann, *LSD*, 94-95.

<sup>20</sup> Prior to Leary's research, various studies had established the safety and psychotherapeutic promise of psychedelics. In mid-1960, researcher Sidney Cohen established the feasibility of psychedelic experimentation with his large-scale study of side effects. He documented an incidence of psychotic episodes, as occurring in approximately 1.8 per thousand cases, attempted suicides as 1.2 per thousand and successful suicides as .4 per thousand. Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, 173.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 138-158.

<sup>22</sup> Stanley Krippner, "Dancing with the Trickster: Notes for a Transpersonal Autobiography," <http://www.stanleykrippner.com/papers/autobiogood.htm>.

<sup>23</sup> Krippner, interview.

Krippner was not disappointed by the new heights of consciousness he soared to in the course of the trip. Describing his kaleidoscopic visions, Krippner wrote:

A spiral of numbers, letters, and words blew away in a cyclone, stripping me of the verbal and numerical symbols by which I had constructed my world.[...] The recordings of Beethoven and Mussorgsky had never sounded better, and I seemed to be surrounded by chords and tones. The clock on the mantel seemed to be a work from a Cellini studio. I visualized delicate Persian miniatures and arabesques. I was in the court of Kublai Khan; inside a Buckminster Fuller geodesic dome; at Versailles with Benjamin Franklin; and danced flamenco with gypsies in Spain, one of whom threw roses into the air which exploded like firecrackers. I was with Thomas Jefferson at Monticello; I watched Edgar Allen Poe write poetry in Baltimore.<sup>24</sup>

Feeling that he had encountered the “ground of being,” Krippner described the experience as both religious and transpersonal, concluding that LSD had a useful function in giving individuals a “road map” to expanded consciousness and self-exploration.<sup>25</sup>

Other humanistic psychologists, including Rollo May, expressed a more intellectual interest in LSD experimentation. On September 18, 1965, May congratulated colleague Charles Dahlberg for getting a grant to study LSD with psychotherapy patients. May wrote: “I am interested, beyond the clinical phenomena as such, in the underlying meaning of the changes of consciousness that take place. I would like very much to observe what light LSD throws on the nature and function of consciousness.”<sup>26</sup>

Abraham Maslow was more conflicted about psychedelic experimentation. He believed that psychedelics offered an experimental opportunity to study higher realms of human consciousness.<sup>27</sup> But, he also perceived that they held destructive potential—particularly when used recreationally.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Krippner, “Dancing with the Trickster.”

<sup>25</sup> Krippner, interview.

<sup>26</sup> Rollo May to Chares C. Dahlberg, New York, September 18, 1965 (Rollo May Papers, HPA Mss 45, Box 12:9 Answered Correspondance 1964-1965 folder, Humanistic Psychology Archives).

<sup>27</sup> Abraham Maslow, *Religions, Values and Peak Experiences* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), 27.

<sup>28</sup> Maslow, February 3, 1965, *Journals*, Vol.1, 452.

Maslow was concerned that peak experiences achieved exclusively through psychedelic use were less meaningful than those that occurred spontaneously, but not arbitrarily, after an individual had done the long, hard work of self-exploration. He formulated his critique of psychedelic peaks in much the same way that Dietrich Bonhoeffer—the German Lutheran theologian—described the idea of “cheap grace”; it was unearned and undeserved. “Cheap grace,” wrote Bonhoeffer in 1937, “means grace sold on the market like cheapjacks’ wares [...] Cheap grace is the grace we bestow on ourselves.”<sup>29</sup> Psychedelic experiences could, of course, be literally purchased. And, unlike the peaks achieved from the arduous activities that Maslow describes (childbirth, for instance), drug-induced peaks were not the product of striving, process, or work of any kind.<sup>30</sup>

In an unpublished paper entitled “Drugs—Critique,” Maslow described the ideal peak experience as akin to “costly grace,” one that, because it was “earned,” would promote self-confidence, pride in one’s powers, and a sense of achievement. He drew a parallel to the way that earning money would be “health-fostering,” whereas receiving unearned money would be “sickness-fostering.”<sup>31</sup>

“Even if the drugs were not harmful psychologically,” Maslow wrote, “I think they can be harmful spiritually, characterologically, etc. I think it’s clearly better to work for your blessings, instead of to buy them. I think an unearned Paradise becomes worthless.”<sup>32</sup> Maslow’s strongest objections to the LSD culture stemmed from “essentially moral reasons—something like should we build an escalator to the top of Mt.

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<sup>29</sup> Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 43-44. First published in 1937 in the German *Nachfolge*.

<sup>30</sup> Maslow, “Drugs—Critique,” November 29, 1966 (Maslow Papers, M 449.7, LSD (drugs) folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Maslow, Letter to Paula Gordon, May 11, 1966, (Maslow Papers, M 397, Miscellaneous Correspondence folder, Maslow Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

Everest or should we put more automobile roads through the wilderness or should we make life easier in general...”<sup>33</sup>

### **A BURGEONING CRITIQUE OF PSYCHEDELIC USE**

Beginning with modest claims about the clinical efficacy of psychedelic use, Timothy Leary grew increasingly convinced of the power of LSD to catalyze a mystical or religious experience.<sup>34</sup> He reported in 1963 that in his research at Harvard, 40-90 percent of people taking psilocybin and LSD reported a religious experience. He claimed that the experience could produce a “changed man and a changed life.”<sup>35</sup>

Leary’s ideas were ideally situated to appeal to the emerging human potential movement, which had been interested in psychedelics from its inception. The first round of Esalen seminars, held in 1962, included a seminar on drug-induced mysticism, led by Myron Stolaroff and Paul Kurtz. In early 1963, another version of the seminar, then titled “Religion and Drug-induced Mysticism” was held. And, in the summer of 1963, Paul Kurtz led a “post-psychedelic seminar” for those who had experimented with LSD and wanted to discuss their experiences. Leary himself finally ventured to lead a seminar at Esalen in 1964 with his former Harvard colleague Richard Alpert. The seminar, led first as a weekend seminar from October 30 to November 1 and then as a 5-day seminar from November 1-6, received the following description in Esalen’s catalogue:

A weekend discussion of the ecstatic experience, with and without psychedelic drugs, the role of the intentional community and various meditation techniques in fostering it, and its relation to the conceptualizing function. The workshop will extend these discussions and invite direct experience through non-chemical means. No Drugs will be used.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Maslow, Letter to Rabbi Zalman Schachter, October 24, 1963 (Maslow Papers, M 449.7, LSD (drugs) folder, Maslow Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>34</sup> In April of 1962, Leary performed an experiment in which he claimed to have induced a “religious experience” in 20 Harvard divinity students. Robert Greenfield, *Timothy Leary: A Biography*, (Orlando, Harcourt, 2006), 180-184.

<sup>35</sup> Emma Harrison, “A Mind-Drug Link to Religion Seen,” *New York Times*, August 31, 1963, ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 - 2003), 28.

<sup>36</sup> “Seminars at Big Sur Hot Springs,” *Catalogue*, 1964-1965.

The intellectual discussions of the potential of psychedelics fueled enthusiasm for actual use at Esalen. Murphy and Price attempted to prevent uncontrolled drug experimentation at Esalen, but residents and visitors largely disregarded their opposition.<sup>37</sup> The most they were able to accomplish in terms of control was the elimination of drug use from meetings and the limitation of experimentation to the rented rooms of participants (a domain protected under state law).<sup>38</sup> “We put a bulletin up on the board that anybody found dealing drugs or having drug trips was going to be evicted instantly since it was against the law,” said Murphy. “But, we knew, of course, that these people with that particular look on their face, some of whom couldn’t walk very well, were under the influence of something other than beer or wine.”<sup>39</sup>

The rampant drug use at Esalen was unsettling to figures like Maslow, who questioned the wisdom of rampant LSD inebriation. Maslow also took issue with Leary’s claims about the potential of LSD. He acknowledged the potential of psychedelics to yield insights which remained as truths after the immediate experience had ended (he judged a ‘truth’ by its “remaining stable, permanent & nonvanishing”), but he doubted the transformative power of the average experience of psychedelic use.<sup>40</sup>

Even supporters and users of LSD expressed doubts about the enduring value of psychedelic trips. The day after an LSD trip, writer Arthur Koestler told Leary, “This is wonderful, no doubt... But it is fake, ersatz. Instant mysticism... there’s no wisdom there. I solved the secret of the universe last night, but this morning I forgot what it was.”<sup>41</sup>

Alan Ginsberg, the famous beat poet, fueled public interest in LSD by writing several poems, including “Lysergic Acid,” and “Mescaline,” which extolled the drug’s

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<sup>37</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 132-143; Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 108.

<sup>38</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 269.

<sup>39</sup> Scott London, “The Mysterious Powers of Body and Mind.”

<sup>40</sup> Maslow, December 24, 1961, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 242.

<sup>41</sup> Martin A. Lee and Bruce Schlain, *Acid Dreams: The Complete Social History of LSD: The CIA, the Sixties, and Beyond* (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 81.



virtues and romanticized the trips. His 1969 poem, “Graffiti 12th Cubicle Men’s Room Syracuse Airport” contained the following lines:

Man, I’m really stoned out of my skull really O-Zoned-good old LSD the colors in here are so nice really fine colors and the floor tile is really outasight if you haven’t tried it you ought to since it is the only way to really get your head together by first getting it apart LSD Forever.<sup>42</sup>

Even Ginsberg, however, later said that in retrospect, “we were probably too proselytizing.”<sup>43</sup>

Others were less generous than Ginsberg in their analysis of Leary’s aims. Even fellow LSD researchers, like Humphrey Osmond and Albert Hoffman, opposed Leary’s contention that the mass distribution of LSD would save the human race and bring global peace and criticized his simplistic political vision.<sup>44</sup> Those who weren’t transformed by LSD to the point of prosyletization grew disenchanted with Leary’s aims. His laboratory, which had once attempted to perform scientific experiments, had become a supplier, critics said, for a “semipermanent cocktail party” full of entranced intellectuals who thought they had discovered the panacea for a sick society.<sup>45</sup>

Maslow, who had been a colleague and friend of both Leary and Alpert, was deeply ambivalent about Leary’s work, defending his unorthodox experimental methods but criticizing what he deemed “the Leary technique.”<sup>46</sup> The “Leary technique,” Maslow wrote in his journal in 1964, “is a denial of the very principle itself of stages of knowledge for which appropriate stages of personality development are necessary.”<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Alan Ginsberg, “Graffiti 12<sup>th</sup> Cubicle Men’s Room Syracuse Airport,” November 11, 1969, *Collected Poems 1947-1997* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1988), 535.

<sup>43</sup> Lee and Schlain, *Acid Dreams*, 81.

<sup>44</sup> Greenfield, *Timothy Leary*, 124.

<sup>45</sup> Lee and Schlain, *Acid Dreams*, 81.

<sup>46</sup> In spite of his doubts, Maslow remained committed to Leary and Alpert’s right to conduct research on psychedelics. In July of 1965, Maslow flew to Washington, DC to testify on behalf of Richard Alpert when his experimental methods were called into question by the Ethics Board of the American Psychological Association. Maslow defended Alpert’s right to engage in unorthodox scientific methods, and argued that there was potential value in psychedelic experimentation. Maslow, July 16, 1965, *Journals* Vol. 1, 527.

<sup>47</sup> Maslow, December 10, 1964, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 440.

Partially as a response to his grandiose declamations about LSD and the negative publicity they provoked, Harvard dismissed Leary in 1963, shortly after the FDA's pronouncement that LSD had become too powerful and its results too chaotic, and that the agency would seek to legislate non-controlled uses.<sup>48</sup> At this point the FDA didn't want to end scientific experimentation, but wanted to prevent abuse.<sup>49</sup> The same was true of Harvard, which continued to support controlled experimentation with LSD. As late as 1966, research came out of Harvard supporting the idea that mystical experiences from LSD could be therapeutically useful in treating personality and behavioral disorders.<sup>50</sup>

### THE MEDIA'S NEGATIVE ATTENTION

Media attention to psychedelic experience starting in 1962 was consistently sensational, and reflected the fear that drug use corrupted youth and undermined American establishments.<sup>51</sup> One typical article, published in the *New York Times* in 1964, described psychedelic drug use with a barely veiled anxiety and contempt:

Students feel that these drugs increase their perceptiveness and sensitivity, bring out latent talents and inspire a feeling of extraordinary togetherness among the group which is enjoying the "drug experience." Of course, the drug generally provides only the briefest of delusional respites. But some of it leads to hopeless addiction or months of insanity.<sup>52</sup>

After his dismissal from Harvard, Leary's own actions and statements provided additional fodder for reporters. In 1966, he founded his own religion, the League of Spiritual Discovery, which was oriented around the sacramental use of LSD, peyote, and marijuana. In one of many public appearances (at a press conference in the New York Advertising Club), Leary announced, "We have a blueprint and we're going to change

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<sup>48</sup> Leary describes the reason for his dismissal from Harvard as due, in part, to the politically risky nature of his research. Timothy Leary, "Testimony of Timothy Leary in the Chicago Seven Trial," <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/Leary.html>.

<sup>49</sup> Psychedelic use was legally limited to experimental settings in 1963, and possession became illegal in 1966. Lee and Schlain, *Acid Dreams*, 92 and 131.

<sup>50</sup> John Osmundsen, "Harvard Study sees Benefit in Use of Mind Drugs," *New York Times*, May 15, 1965.

<sup>51</sup> Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, 273-275.

<sup>52</sup> Graham B. Blaine, Jr., "Moral Questions Stir Campuses: Sex, Drugs and Psychoses Posing New Problems," *New York Times*, January 16, 1964.

society in the next 10 years.”<sup>53</sup> Leary planned to test in the courts the constitutional rights of members of the new religion “to use the drugs in their ‘shrines’ at home.” He also grandly asserted that, “Like every great religion of the past [...] we seek to find the divinity within and to express this revelation in a life of glorification and worship of God. These ancient goals we define in the metaphor of the present—turn-on, tune-in and drop-out.”<sup>54</sup>

Leary’s non-conformist rhetoric aligned, at least superficially, with Maslow’s understanding of the place in society of self-actualized individuals, who display a “resistance to acculturation” and a “certain inner detachment from the culture” coupled with an extreme sense of autonomy.<sup>55</sup> In Maslow’s studies of self-actualizers in the early 1950s, he had observed among them a general lack of conformity to cultural norms.<sup>56</sup> He concluded that “lack of conformity may not signify emotional immaturity, but rather truly superior social functioning.”<sup>57</sup>

But Maslow drew a sharp distinction between nonconformist self-actualizers and most other kinds of non-conformists (like psychedelic users or participants in various 1960s’ countercultures). He described self-actualizers as able to function effectively *within* the wider culture, notwithstanding their criticisms of it. He found that they have generally “settled down to...an accepting, calm, good-humored, everyday effort to improve the culture, usually from within, rather than to reject it and fight it from without.”<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Leary as quoted in Robert E. Dallos, “Dr. Leary Starts New ‘Religion’ With ‘Sacramental’ Use of LSD,” *New York Times*, September 20, 1966.

<sup>54</sup> Leary as quoted by Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, 326. According to Leary, “‘Turn-on means to go beyond your secular tribal mind to contact the many levels of divine energy which lie within your consciousness; tune in means to express and to communicate your new revelations in visible acts of glorification, gratitude and beauty; drop out means to detach yourself harmoniously, tenderly and gracefully from your worldly commitments until your entire life is dedicated to worship and search.” Ibid., 326.

<sup>55</sup> Maslow, December 20, 1960, *Journal*, Vol. 1, 82.

<sup>56</sup> Abraham Maslow, “Resistance to Enculturation,” *Journal of Social Issues*, 7 (1951): 26-29.

<sup>57</sup> Hoffman, *The Right to be Human*, 192.

<sup>58</sup> Abraham Maslow as quoted in Hoffman, *The Right to be Human*, 192.

In stark contrast was Leary's notion of "dropping out." In 1965, in *The Politics of Ecstasy*, Leary wrote: "Quit school. Quit your job. Don't vote. Do not waste conscious thinking on TV-studio games. Political choices are meaningless."<sup>59</sup> In addition to encouraging frequent use of psychedelics, he suggested that drop-outs should form their own "cults."<sup>60</sup>

In the mid-1960s, Leary's irreverent attitude toward American institutions generated continued media interest. The media often focused on the questionable legality of his activities, portraying him as threatening to the moral order of the nation.<sup>61</sup> Of the Dutchess County trial of Leary in 1966, a *New York Times* reporter wrote, "The jurors are trying to determine whether the Foundation [Leary's communal living experiment] has been promoting LSD experimentation through the country, impairing the morality of children and running a disorderly house."<sup>62</sup> Critics sensed but couldn't always articulate the threat that Leary posed, and often pathologized even the slightest aberrations from "normal" behavior. Media depictions latched onto the metaphor, and the actuality, of filth as a way to convey the moral disorder and taint that drug users embodied. *Look* magazine described the archetypal hippie pad as "a filthy litter strewn swarming dope fortress that was a great deal less savory and sanitary than a sewer."<sup>63</sup>

Media attention to LSD only escalated over the course of the decade. Historian Jay Stevens wrote that, "scarcely a week went by that this curious creature [LSD] wasn't in the news columns, either raping or murdering or committing suicide in stories that were usually anonymous, uncheckable, and bizarre."<sup>64</sup> Local papers transmitted the

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<sup>59</sup> Timothy Leary, *Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out* (First published as *Politics of Ecstasy*) (Oakland, CA: Ronin Publishing, 1965), 6.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>61</sup> William Borders, "LSD Psychologist Arrested Again; Dr. Leary, the ex-Harvard Teacher, Seized in Raid on Dutchess Mansion NEW NARCOTICS CHARGE Sheriff Reports Finding Bit of Marijuana Among the 30 Persons and 64 Rooms," *New York Times*, April 18, 1966.

<sup>62</sup> Special to the *New York Times*, "Jury Inquiry Balked by Aide of Dr. Leary," *New York Times*, July 16, 1966, 20.

<sup>63</sup> Stevens, *Storming Heaven*, 337.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 274.

mistaken idea that so many people were driven psychotic from LSD local emergency rooms were being overwhelmed. The media descriptions grossly distorted the reality of LSD-related problems; LSD-related narcotic arrests actually represented a minor percentage of national narcotics arrests in the 1960s, and LSD-related accidents were far more rare than accidents related to the abuse of other narcotics (alcohol in particular).<sup>65</sup>

By mid-1966, governors were competing to enact anti-LSD legislation, and Congress soon passed federal legislation banning the drug. In October, possession was deemed illegal in every state. With the enactment of such laws, open-ended research came to an end, and researchers encountered obstacles to completing even the funded projects that were underway. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals even recalled all the LSD it had distributed.<sup>66</sup>

The black market that resulted from the change in legal status ensured a steady supply of LSD, and the now illegal status of the drug, combined with its continued use and availability, resulted in an even greater public anxiety about the danger that LSD use posed to American institutions.<sup>67</sup> Government figures construed drug use as an act of political rebellion that undermined the protective structures of government. President Lyndon Johnson, in his 1968 State of the Union address, highlighted his concern over the advancing cultural interest in drug use, promising to put measures in place to stop it.<sup>68</sup> In July of 1969, President Nixon asked congress for more money for enforcement, heavier penalties for violations involving LSD, and the federal authority to break into residences unannounced to seize drug evidence quickly. Nixon also reported that juvenile arrests involving use of drugs rose almost 800% between 1960 and 1967.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 273-275.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 279.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 285.

<sup>68</sup> Lyndon B. Johnson, "Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union," January 17, 1968, <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680117.asp>.

<sup>69</sup> "Untitled," *New York Times*, July 15, 1969, Tuesday, Page 1, Column 8.

## THE THREAT TO THE HUMAN POTENTIAL MOVEMENT

Esalen, as a concrete outpost of the human potential movement, was particularly vulnerable both to the excessive scrutiny of the media and to the real excesses of psychedelic users. During the summer of 1967, stoned and tripped-out hippies descended upon the grounds of Esalen, camping out just to be near the already mythologized retreat. These squatters damaged Esalen's standing in the community, inspiring one local restaurant owner to refuse to serve "hippies" and "beatniks," and obscured the respectability of its goals.<sup>70</sup> According to Murphy, the squatters infused the air with a "drunken mysticism that undermined every discipline we set for the place."<sup>71</sup>

The intrusion of psychedelic users, who tended to lack commitment to the goals of human potential and who sought little more than a safe haven where they could "drop out" of American culture, deeply troubled Esalen leaders, who found themselves trapped in their own anti-hierarchical and thoroughly democratic philosophies.<sup>72</sup> In 1968, Leonard and Murphy experienced a profound dismay with some outgrowths of human potential, even expressing urges to disown the whole movement. They "quickly learned that just as it was much easier to change the world than to change it the way [they] planned, it was much easier to name a movement than to unname it."<sup>73</sup>

The problems at Esalen were emblematic of what was happening at other growth centers across the country. In the late 1960s, an often destructive permissiveness seemed to be the rule at many of these retreats. Maslow wrote:

At times it seems as though the Growth Centers and revolutionary youth both agree on discarding the worth and value of rationality. They seem to overemphasize the senses and emotions, and they exaggerate the number of people who are 'up tight' in the United States and who need release from inhibitions without considering that many people need more inhibitions rather than less (impulse disorders, psychopaths, immature, feeble-minded, and so forth). They often tend to be too exclusively Dionysian, regarding logic, science,

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<sup>70</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 145-146, quote from 145.

<sup>71</sup> Murphy as quoted in Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 207.

<sup>72</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 132-134.

<sup>73</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 302.

education, and the like as imprisonment, with feeling and sensory experience, rather than knowledge, as the well-spring of their motivations. They stress impulsive expressiveness, mistaking it for healthy spontaneity. They agree in mistrusting power and authority, defining them both in an extremely low way (i.e., as dominating, and not recognizing that authority and power can be humanistic and transcendent). They believe that if one lifts the restraints and allows absolute freedom that only good will result, which means (implies) an unfounded faith in basic human goodness and an implied belief that evil comes only from social restraints and inhibitions. They do not have enough respect for the profound instinctive needs of safety, security, law, order, keeping the peace; and they do not realize that without these needs, freedom is impossible. They think of power as evil, not realizing that they must temper, restrain, and control the forces of inhumanity and chaos within the human soul.<sup>74</sup>

Maslow's criticism of psychedelic extremists stemmed, in part, from the distance between his personal experience and the experiences of the rebellious human potentialists. Maslow—like Rogers—was, above all, an academic psychologist and a staid husband and father: his interest in experiential rebellion was largely intellectual.<sup>75</sup> But his aversion was not just temperamental; it reflected a thoughtful assessment of the pitfalls of psychedelic use. In 1965, he expressed concern over what Mike Murphy and LSD researcher Sidney Cohen reported as the outcome of excessive psychedelic use. According to Murphy, Maslow wrote, “the beatniks dry up & atrophy intellectually after a few years of “seeking experiences” (i.e., not thinking or working) & become sad & disconnected.”<sup>76</sup> He feared that their unprogrammatic approach to revolution was inevitably self-defeating; “these idiots,” he wrote, “have defined radicalism as fighting *against*.”<sup>77</sup>

## **PARALLELS WITH OPEN SEXUAL EXPRESSION**

In accounts of the humanistic psychology and human potential movements, the media often integrated inflated accounts of nudity, sexual experimentation and rampant

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<sup>74</sup> Abraham Maslow, “Politics,” in *Politics and Innocence: A Humanistic Debate*, ed. Tom Greening (San Francisco: Saybrook Publishers, 1986), 80.

<sup>75</sup> Maslow, May 9, 1968, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 920.

<sup>76</sup> Maslow, April 22-23, 1965, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 608.

<sup>77</sup> Maslow, April 28, 1965, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 612.

drug experimentation. Leary himself linked LSD use to sexuality in a 1966 interview with *Playboy*, in which he claimed that a woman could have several hundred orgasms during a properly administered LSD trip.<sup>78</sup>

Because nudity and open sexuality were only minor components in the human potential movement, any media attention inherently exaggerated its significance. Carl Rogers stated, “I don’t suppose that 1/100th of one percent of groups in practice place any emphasis on nudity.”<sup>79</sup> This reality seemed inconsequential to reporters. In 1968, for instance, *Life* magazine illustrated Jane Howard’s 18-page article on the human potential movement with photographs of a nude marathon in Los Angeles that was neither led by core members of the movement nor connected to Esalen in any way.<sup>80</sup>

Whether or not they approved of open nudity, most leaders of HP were dismayed by the disproportionate emphasis the media had placed on it. George Leonard writes that “the original idea of a human potential movement had nothing whatever to do with nudity. Mike Murphy, in fact, had always been opposed to mixed nude bathing, which had been initiated by early guests of Esalen [...]”<sup>81</sup> Murphy and Dick Price fought for a year before determining that nude bathing at Esalen was beyond their control.<sup>82</sup>

Film representations of the human potential movement mocked the liberal extremes found at Esalen. In Paul Mazursky’s film *Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice*, a couple’s relationship and friendships quickly fall prey to the destructive consequences of “open marriage” after they learned and adopted the concept at a weekend retreat at Esalen.<sup>83</sup> Director Bill Persky’s film “Serial” also parodied the human potential

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<sup>78</sup> Timothy Leary, “An Interview with Timothy Leary,” *Playboy*, Vol 13, No. 9 (1966), 94.

<sup>79</sup> Carl Rogers, “A Conversation with Carl Rogers,” Part 1, *Speculation TV Series with Keith Berwick*, 1969 (HPA Mss 32, V0145/UM, Carl R. Rogers Collection, Humanistic Psychology Archives, University of California Santa Barbara).

<sup>80</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge* 301.; Jane Howard, “Inhibitions Thrown to the Gentle Winds: A New Movement to Unlock the Potential of What People Could Be—But Aren’t,” *Life* 65 No. 2, July 12, 1968, 48-65.

<sup>81</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 301.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 301.

<sup>83</sup> *Bob & Carol & Ted & Alice*, directed by Paul Mazursky (Los Angeles: Columbia Pictures, Released January 16, 1970).



movement by portraying couples who treated sex like a commodity, engaging in it compulsively to fill their inner voids.<sup>84</sup>

As with the media representations of psychedelic use, the problem with the dominant portrayals of the sexual behavior associated with the human potential movement was not that it was fabricated, but that it was reductionistic. Humanistic psychologists rarely systematically opposed experimentations with either drugs or sex, but often opposed the abuses and the reduction of a complex theoretical and experiential movement to these types of behaviors.

Maslow, in fact, ideologically supported nudist experimentation. In his correspondence with Paul Bindrim (a California psychologist who had been sanctioned by the APA for his nude marathon groups), Maslow expressed his support for experimental and exploratory nudity. “I must say that I consider the taboos on nudity to be entirely a matter of folkways and customs rather than a matter of ethical or moral principle in any cross-cultural sense,” he wrote.<sup>85</sup> Yet Maslow also recommended discretion, sensitivity, and appropriate conservativeness in the execution of such nudist experimentation, perhaps to guard against reactions like the one articulated in a letter sent to Maslow, in February of 1968, from a veteran of one of Bindrim’s nude groups, who “came away from Bindrim’s nude group feeling dirty and sick at heart.”<sup>86</sup> Aware of the complexity of the issues, Maslow viewed this renunciation as a singular case and continued to support Bindrim’s work, evaluating him to have been “properly conservative in [all] respects.”<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> *Serial*, directed by Bill Perskey (Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures, Released March 28, 1980).

The film was based on the popular novel: Cyra McFadden, *The Serial: A Year in the Life of Marin County* (New York: New American Library, 1978).

<sup>85</sup> Maslow, Letter to Paul Bindrim, Feb 13, 1968 (Maslow Papers, M445, Nudity folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>86</sup> Anonymous, Letter to Abraham Maslow, February, 1968, (Maslow Papers, M445, Nudity folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>87</sup> Maslow, Letter to Paul Bindrim.

Maslow was also concerned with the danger of people mistaking the thrill of socially forbidden nudity, sexual exploration, and drug use for vital self-transformation. According to Maslow, the danger of extreme behavior was that impulsivity was allowed to masquerade as spontaneity, and onanistic or egocentric love was able to pose as deep “I-thou” love.<sup>88</sup> Rather than indicating transcendence of social mores and achievement of new heights of human experience, such dramatic behavior suggested an interpersonal and spiritual desperation and bankruptcy. “When all hope has been lost for attaining relation by an imaginative grasp of the other, then all that is left is touching, feeling, being cradled, rocked, being in the nude together, and ultimately intercourse.”<sup>89</sup>

### THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES

The cautious line that Maslow and others advocated, between open exploration and thoughtful moderation, was often too difficult for Esalen participants to tread. And the thrill of sexual and drug-induced stimulation seduced many participants into singular pursuits of these ends. As a direct effect of the rampant drug use, Esalen suffered a series of misfortunes. In 1968, Lois Delattre, a graduate of Esalen’s first residential program and an administrative employee of the San Francisco office, experimented with MDA, a psychedelic drug of the amphetamine group. She died within hours.<sup>90</sup> Delattre’s death was devastating to the Esalen staff, who had known her well. Many blamed Esalen for her misfortune.<sup>91</sup>

This event began to chip away at Esalen’s sense of security and utopian invulnerability. Closely following Delattre’s accidental death were the suicides of Marcia Price and Judith Gold (a shooting and a drowning in the baths respectively). The deaths

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<sup>88</sup> Abraham Maslow, “Esalen Crit.: Memorandum,” March 20, 1970 (Maslow Papers, M435, Esalen Crit. Folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>89</sup> Abraham Maslow, “ESALEN CRIT. Ryckoff, Irving M. Review—Encounter- Over the Counter, Clark Moustakas’ Individuality and Encounter,” (Maslow Papers, M435, Esalen Crit. folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>90</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 181. Delattre was also a mutual friend of Murphy and Leonard and had originally introduced them.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

shook the Esalen community, causing them to seriously question what Esalen had become. Most critics targeted reckless encounter groups, like those led by Fritz Perls. In fact, a tape was released after Marcia Price's death that showed Perls mocking her suicide threats.<sup>92</sup>

Leaders like Perls, whom Murphy had trouble controlling (in part because Murphy was opposed to the idea of controlling), were capable of extreme harm to individual participants and to the larger mission of the human potential movement. In addition to displaying questionable therapeutic ethics, Perls perpetuated the negative reputation of Esalen by forcing all the raciest elements of the movement to the forefront. Perls was also somewhat of a sexual predator, infamous for making sexual advances on vulnerable group members and for goading individuals into behavioral extremes.<sup>93</sup>

Although the AHP wasn't as concretely vulnerable to the behavior of its members, it suffered by association with the Human Potential movement and from the sensationalistic media attention it received. It also, like the founders of Esalen, opposed the type of power relationships that could have enforced discipline over its identity, and therefore prevented members from taking the movement in directions which were in opposition to its founding principles.<sup>94</sup> Such a nebulous foundation wasn't sufficient to establish boundaries between self-development and self-indulgence.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 199-202.

<sup>93</sup> Kripal, *Esalen*, 157-165.

<sup>94</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 254.

<sup>95</sup> Adrienne Aron, "Maslow's Other Child," in *Politics and Innocence: A Humanistic Debate*, ed. Thomas Greening (San Francisco: Saybrook Publishers, 1986), 96-111.

Humanistic psychology's ethic of toleration led to internal division within the movement.<sup>96</sup> More significantly, however, it diminished the potential of the movement to produce direct and systematic social and ideological change. Instead, humanistic psychologists would have to settle for the more subtle and pervasive cultural change that the compromised movement would produce.

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<sup>96</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 254.

## Chapter Nine: Encountering Women's Liberation

In 1984, Natalie Rogers, who was Carl Rogers' daughter and a humanistic psychologist in her own right, chaired a panel on Women in AHP at the annual convention. She expressed her ongoing anger with AHP. "I feel like a child who is angry with her parents," she said.<sup>1</sup> For Rogers, as for most women engaged in feminist struggles, this statement had a literal and figurative meaning. She *was* angry with her father, a founder of AHP, who in the midst of his theorizing about the importance of facilitating individual strivings toward self-actualization had neglected to recognize the severely obstructed nature of his own daughter's potential (whose identity, she felt, had been entirely subordinated to those of her husband and children). She was also angry with AHP, an organization whose goals appeared so harmonious with those of feminism but whose practices had fallen so short in supporting women. At the 1984 conference, Rogers observed that 90 percent of the speakers at the convention were men, though participation figures favored women. According to Rogers, the convention included 6 all-male panels and 10 panels in which there was 1 woman and 2-5 men. She found it ironic that a panel entitled "Designing the AHP Future" was an all-male panel. These figures were a scant improvement on the AHP conferences of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>2</sup>

For many humanistic psychologists, feminism was a family issue, rooted in their own domestic struggles. Like Rogers, who was forced to grapple with the criticism of his daughter, Rollo May was confronted by several influential woman in his life (most notably his second wife Ingrid) about the necessity of increasing his sensitivity to gender issues. According to Stanley Krippner, May had always written exclusively for men, and had failed to consider the unique circumstances and psychological reality of women.<sup>3</sup> By

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<sup>1</sup> "Women in AHP" Audio Tape of Panel Proceedings, AHP Annual Convention, 1984, Boston, MA, provided to the author by Natalie Rogers.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Krippner, interview.

the time Krippner saw May speak at Sonoma State College in 1966, he was struggling to incorporate women in his analyses. At this point he was even trying to employ non-gendered pronouns. The 1967 publication of May's *Psychology and the Human Dilemma* also testifies to May's newfound sensitivity to gender issues: his introduction bears the footnote "Some of these essays were written before the time when we began to realize that 'man' did not embrace 'woman' ..."4

### CULTURAL CHANGES AND THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE

Feminist concerns crept into the purview of humanistic psychologists in much the same way that they had entered the wider cultural consciousness. In the 1950s, with the post-war U.S. focused on a domestic ideal of femininity (reflected in advertising rhetoric and in women's declining professional employment), feminist concerns manifested themselves as an inchoate sense of dissatisfaction. 5 In 1956, a writer for *Time Magazine* observed:

If there is such a thing as a 'suburban syndrome,' it might take this form: the wife, having worked before marriage or at least having been educated and socially conditioned toward the idea that work (preferably some kind of intellectual work in an office, among men) carries prestige, may get depressed being 'just a housewife.' Even if she avoids that her humiliation still seeks an outlet. This may take various forms: in destructive gossip about other women, in raising hell at the PTA, in becoming a dominating mother [...] In her disgruntlement, she can work as much damage to the lives of her husband and children (and her own life) as if she were a career woman, and indeed sometimes more.6

Early forms of protest were subtle: beginning in 1957, women began having fewer children and marrying later, and more women in the middle classes were attending

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<sup>4</sup> Rollo May, *Psychology and the Human Dilemma* (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1967), ix.

<sup>5</sup> Leila J. Rupp and Verta Taylor, *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement, 1945 to the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 16. Elaine Tyler May cites McCarthyism, in particular, as contributing to the reassertion of the domestic ideal, as non-conforming women tended to be viewed with suspicion. Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 13.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Coughlan, "Changing Roles in Modern Marriage," *Life*, December 24, 1956, 108-118, quotation from 110.

college.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, cultural conditions were ripening for a feminist resurgence. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the sexual liberation movement gave women new freedoms.<sup>8</sup> As early as 1953, scientists began to study and publish on women's sexuality: in 1953, Alfred Kinsey published *Sexual Behavior and the Human Female* (a bestseller), and in 1966 William Masters and Virginia Johnson published their laboratory studies of human sexual response, debunking myths about female sexuality and facilitating open conversation about female sexual concerns.<sup>9</sup> By 1962, the birth control pill became widely accessible: a reported 1,187,000 American women were using it for family planning.<sup>10</sup> Literary censorship began to lift as well. Books like Helen Gurley Brown *Sex and the Single Girl* (an instant bestseller) helped to normalize a more open, less inhibited idea of female sexuality.<sup>11</sup>

In 1963, Betty Friedan offered American women a lens through which to identify their latent dissatisfaction with their roles as housewives. In her bestselling book *The Feminine Mystique*, Friedan argued: "the core of the problem for women today is not sexual but a problem of identity—a stunting or evasion of growth that is permitted by the

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<sup>7</sup> Olive Banks, *Faces of Feminism: A Study of Feminism as a Social Movement* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 210.

<sup>8</sup> For an overview of the sexual revolution in America, see: Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*. For more a more pointed history of birth control in America, see: Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (New York: Penguin, 1976). For an overview of research on women's sexuality, beginning with the groundbreaking studies of Alfred Kinsey in the 1950s and William Masters and Virginia Johnson in the 1960s, see: Kristine M. Baber and Katherine R. Allen, *Women and Families: Feminist Reconstructions* (New York: Guilford Press, 1992), 61-66.

<sup>9</sup> Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 168-170. The Kinsey reports and the work of Masters and Johnson were published as: Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy and Clyde E. Martin, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1948); Institute for Sex Research, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (Philadelphia, Saunders, 1953); and William H. Masters and Virginia E. Johnson, *Human Sexual Response* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

<sup>10</sup> Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 34.

<sup>11</sup> Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 10-14; For the original novel, see: Helen Gurley Brown, *Sex and the Single Girl* (New York: Giant Cardinal, 1962); Allyn also describes how Brown's book served as a guide for young women negotiating the waters of sexual experimentation, and it spawned other nonfiction books offering advice for sexually active young women. The advice in Joan Garrity's 1969 *The Way to Become the Sensuous Woman*, published under the pen name "J," explicitly offered itself as a set of instructions which women could use to construct bold new sexual identities. Other manual-style books that followed included Dr. David Reuben's book *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex (But Were Afraid to Ask)*, published in 1969, and Alex Comfort's bestseller *The Joy of Sex: A Gourmet Guide to Love Making*, published in 1972.

feminine mystique.”<sup>12</sup> For Friedan, the “feminine mystique” was the damaging myth that the only path to fulfillment for an American woman was through the role of housewife-mother.<sup>13</sup>

Friedan drew heavily on psychological theory to inform her conception of women’s problems.<sup>14</sup> In fact, she credited humanistic psychology, at least in part, with her reconsideration of the female role. Specifically citing Maslow’s work, Friedan attempted to demonstrate the humanistic, unselfish nature of women’s strivings. She described Maslow’s finding that the higher the dominance or strength of self in a woman, the less she was self-centered and the more her concern was directed outward to other people and to worldly concerns. In contrast, Maslow argued that women who were more conventionally feminine were more focused on themselves and their own inferiorities.<sup>15</sup> Focused on self-actualization, potentiality, and self-awareness, Friedan’s language throughout the book evokes Maslow’s theories.

Friedan, who had been trained as a Freudian at the University of California-Berkeley, came to oppose both Freudianism and behaviorism, considering both of them to be an impediment to self-actualization.<sup>16</sup> Friedan wrote that “for years, psychiatrists have tried to ‘cure’ their patients’ conflicts by fitting them into the culture. But adjustment to a culture that does not permit the realization of one’s entire being is not a cure at all, according to the new psychological thinkers.”<sup>17</sup> What Friedan desired was a theory which, in the image of her memoir-style book, would advance a vision of an

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<sup>12</sup> Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Norton, 1963), 77.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>14</sup> Friedan, however, was wary of forging too close a bond between psychology and the political interests of the women’s liberation movement. As a former labor union activist, she was conscious of the need to place women’s problems in the context of society and economy, and as a psychology graduate student, she had always been careful to keep politics out of her psychology. Friedan’s motivation for leaving her graduate program, for example, had been her prioritization of the heated struggles occurring in the public arena. Daniel Horowitz, *Betty Friedan and the Making of the Feminine Mystique* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998), 84 and 99.

<sup>15</sup> Friedan, *Feminine Mystique*, 319.

<sup>16</sup> Horowitz, *Betty Friedan*, 46.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 311.



improved culture and society through its analysis of highly personal and individual experiences.<sup>18</sup>

*The Feminine Mystique*, while hardly responsible for the events of the 1960s that ensued, gave voice to a set of concerns and anxieties that had been building for years and that would, over the next few decades, change the shape of gender relations in America. Friedan received a flood of responses to the book—some from barely literate women and some written in crayon, that demonstrated the personal resonance of Friedan’s argument with American women.<sup>19</sup>

### CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING

In the mid 1960s, increased legislative attention to women’s issues combined with persistent inequality to heighten the urgency of feminist concerns. Despite the passage of Title VII in 1965, which made it illegal to discriminate against women in hiring and promotions, the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (also in 1965), and the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966, women remained politically and culturally subordinate to men. President Kennedy’s record on female appointments was worse than those of his four immediate predecessors and dramatic pay differentials persisted between men and women, suggesting the ineffectuality of the EEOC.<sup>20</sup> Women were also poorly represented in the House and Senate: in 1966, 10 of 435 members of the House of Representatives and 2 of 100 U.S. senators were women.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ironically, Friedan’s representation of her own experience in *The Feminine Mystique* was somewhat inauthentic and contrived, in that she had not been the naïve housewife whose visions were clouded by the feminine mystique, but a political individual whose activist experiences in the 40s and 50s yielded to her poignant cultural analyses in the early 60s. For more on this see Horowitz, *Betty Friedan*.

<sup>19</sup> Ruth Rosen, *The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement changed America* (New York: Viking, 2000), 6

<sup>20</sup> Kathleen C. Berkeley, *The Women’s Liberation Movement in America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 19-20.

<sup>21</sup> “Women in Congress,” Society and Culture Almanac, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0801429.html>.

The inadequate government support signaled the need for individual action on the part of women. Organization began from the classes where it had resided throughout feminism's dormancy in the 1930s through 1960s in secular groups of elite, mainly educated, primarily white women. In 1966 the National Organization for Women was formed by twenty-eight women and men who attended the Third National Conference of the Commission on the Status of Women. The founders included Betty Friedan, the organization's first president, and the Reverend Pauli Murray (the first African-American woman Episcopal priest), who jointly drafted the organization's statement of purpose, establishing NOW's commitment to gaining equal participation for women in all domains of society.<sup>22</sup>

The rise of consciousness raising (CR) groups, which bore a striking resemblance to encounter groups, marked the convergence of women's domestic and political discontent. CR groups, fueled in part by the framing ideology of humanistic psychology, as advocated by Friedan in *The Feminine Mystique*, began at the grass-roots level, lacking formal structure and organization. Feminist Anita Shreve explained that CR was the "political reinterpretation of one's personal life." Its purpose was to "awaken the latent consciousness [...] that all women have about [their] oppression."<sup>23</sup> The embodiment of the renowned motto, "the personal is political," CR groups sought to convince women that what they had previously perceived as personal problems were actually social problems that required social rather than personal solutions.

CR groups originated somewhat organically, as groups of radical women began to form "rap sessions" or "bitch sessions" in which they vented their frustrations about their personal struggles. These radical left groups resembled the Maoist Chinese practice that had been utilized in the Chinese revolution ("speak pains to recall pains") and was later

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<sup>22</sup> Barbara Sinclair Deckard, *The Women's Movement: Political, Socioeconomic, and Psychological Issues* (New York: Harper & Roe, 1979), 345-348.

<sup>23</sup> Anita Shreve, *Women Together, Women Alone: The Legacy of the Consciousness-Raising Movement* (New York: Viking, 1989), 83.

used in the Civil Rights movement in America (within SNCC, for instance, under the slogan “tell it like it is”).<sup>24</sup> Concerned with matters of growth, fulfillment and striving, women gathered in a politicized encounter group style to discuss issues that had formerly been silenced by a culture whose dominant ideology rejected them.<sup>25</sup>

CR groups consisted of the collective sharing of private experiences of oppression by men, ranging from marital struggles to incidences of sexual violence.<sup>26</sup> “The process is simple,” wrote one feminist, “Women come together in small groups to share personal experiences, problems and feelings. From this public sharing comes the realization that what was thought to be individual is in fact common; that what was thought to be a personal problem has a social cause and political solution.”<sup>27</sup>

Although CR groups originated with leftist activists, they spread more broadly through word of mouth to middle class women with divergent political interests.<sup>28</sup> By 1970, CR groups were active in every American city, uniting women over discussions of their cultural victimization, sexual experiences, and innermost desires.<sup>29</sup> In 1973 alone, over 100,000 people nationwide reported membership in a consciousness raising group.<sup>30</sup> Typical groups remained, for the most part, limited to white women of the middle class, who were more likely to have leisure time to devote to the groups, the suburban lifestyles that fueled their discontent, and the college experiences that gave some intellectual form to their feminist inclinations.<sup>31</sup>

Consciousness-raising relied on the same epiphanic experience that encounter groups so esteemed. Anita Shreve wrote, “The heart of the matter, say the women, was

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>26</sup> Harriet G. Lerner, *The Dance of Deception: A Guide to Authenticity and Truth-Telling in Women's Relationships* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 61-62.

<sup>27</sup> Jo Freeman, *The Politics of Women's Liberation* (New York: David McKay, 1975), 118.

<sup>28</sup> Shreve, *Women Together*, 198.

<sup>29</sup> The first formal introduction of CR by the Women's movement occurred in 1968 at the first national women's liberation conference in Chicago, in which 200 women from 37 states and Canada met to discuss feminist concerns. Shreve, *Women Together*, 6.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 12.

‘the click’ —the light bulb going off, the eye-popping realization, the knockout punch. It was the sudden comprehension, in one powerful instant, of what sexism exactly meant, how it had colored one’s own life, the way all women were in this together.”<sup>32</sup> But while encounter groups viewed the epiphany as the goal, CR conceived the revelatory moment as an invaluable tool which would facilitate personal and political action. Feminist Kathie Sarachild argued that the purpose of CR had always been “social transformation as opposed to self-transformation.”<sup>33</sup> Proponents of CR made every effort to differentiate it from therapy, maintaining that CR groups analyzed male supremacy and conceptualized ways to defeat it.

Not everyone bought this explanation. Like encounter groups, CR groups were mocked as being “trivial,” “nonpolitical,” and were deemed “hen parties,” even by other members of the radical left. Betty Friedan referred to CR groups as “navel-gazing.”<sup>34</sup> Some perceived the self-absorption that they associated with CR to be extremely threatening. Like drug experimentation, which caused people to “tune out,” and encounter groups, which obscured social and political concerns with personal catharsis, it was feared that CR participants might “retreat from action into self-indulgent personalism.”<sup>35</sup> Proponents of CR argued that the effect would render contrary results; that women would become *more committed* to resisting the system. But the debate persisted, creating fissures within feminist organizations.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>33</sup> Kathie Sarachild as quoted in Alice Echols, *Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 87.

<sup>34</sup> Echols, *Daring to be Bad*, 87.

<sup>35</sup> Shreve, *Women Together*, 86.

<sup>36</sup> Eventually, the controversy was enough to split the New York Radical Women, an early feminist group which began in 1967, into those in favor and those against CR groups. In 1969, the feminist group Redstockings became the new home for CR group advocates and actively promoted and advocated the use of CR. Those who opposed CR mostly did so on the basis of their personal, rather than overtly political, emphases. CR opponents, who frequently defined themselves as socialist feminists, formed the Women’s International Terrorist Conspiracy from Hell (WITCH), when the New York Radical Women dissolved. Echols, *Daring to be Bad*, 86.

CR advocates viewed groups as a “valuable tool, indeed, *essential* tool, that would, in turn, give individual women tools with which to go forward in their own lives.”<sup>37</sup> This instrumental view contrasted with the increasingly popular practice of encounter groups, whose intensity of expression became a desired end in itself.

In contrast to encounter groups, CR groups implicitly accounted for group-level forces, wove the political into the personal, and offered a sustaining form of intimacy and support which guided women through significant changes. Also, unlike encounter groups, CR groups remained responsive to changes in the culture, changing as the political climate changed, as career opportunities expanded, and as the priorities of the women’s movement shifted.<sup>38</sup> In retrospect, CR groups may have unknowingly drawn on the more moderate and salubrious tenets of humanistic psychology, while many encounter groups exacerbated the excesses and oversights.

#### **THE 1970S: WOMEN’S LIBERATION SEEPS IN**

For the relatively conservative founders of humanistic psychology (all middle class, white males in fairly traditional marriages), the goals of women’s liberation in the 1970s were more palatable than those of the related sexual revolution, which was more sensationally in evidence at growth centers like Esalen. While sexual revolution in the 1960s had manifested in the general relaxation of sexual taboos among the mainstream culture, sexual revolution in the 1970s was characterized more by countercultural experimentation with these relaxed standards. No longer focused on the inadequacies and hypocrisies of the more traditional conceptions of female sexuality, the sexual revolution of the 1970s demonstrated a more libertine, radical emphasis on sexual experimentation, represented in things like pornography, private clubs for group sex, aggressive promiscuity, and open marriage.<sup>39</sup> Concerned with such behavioral excesses, Maslow

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<sup>37</sup> Shreve, *Women Together*, 10.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>39</sup> Allyn, *Make Love, Not War*, 4-8.

seized on a friend's explanation. He wrote, "Remember, not only are they children at Esalen, but they're in a permanent state of childhood."

Entangled in the frenetic changes of the 1960s, it took humanistic psychologists a while to separate the legitimate critiques of traditional practices from the more eccentric displays of protest. As such, they were slow to recognize the ways in which specific attention to women's concerns was relevant and significant to AHP. "All of psychology was dragged kicking and screaming through every liberation movement," said humanistic psychologist Richard Farson, "It was embarrassing how far behind the curve we were."<sup>40</sup> Farson recalls sitting on a stage at a conference, in 1966, when the meaning of the feminist movement first overtook him. The conference, entitled "Quo Vadis, Today's Woman?", was led by four men, including John Mack Carter, editor-in-chief and publisher of the *Ladies Home Journal*, who preached to a crowd of approximately 2,000 women about their position in American culture.<sup>41</sup> The irony of the fact that four men would purport to know more about women's experience than the 2,000 women who were listening to them overcame Farson. From then on, he began to talk and write about women's liberation.<sup>42</sup> His first article on the subject, "The Rage of Women," was published in 1969 in *Look Magazine*.<sup>43</sup> This publication was one of several articulated statements of the significance of women's liberation that finally penetrated the consciousness of humanistic psychology in the last few years of the 1960s. "That's how slow it was to emerge," claimed Farson, "unbelievably slow."<sup>44</sup>

By the 1970s, the women's liberation movement was so widespread that scarcely a man, particularly a white, middle class man, existed who didn't have a wife, daughter or friend committed to the cause. In 1971, NOW had over 150 chapters and from 5,000 to 10,000 members. By 1972, it had grown to about 30,000 members. Even outside of

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<sup>40</sup> Richard Farson, interview by author, phone, 5 October 2005.

<sup>41</sup> "Quo Vadis?" is Latin for "Where are you going?"

<sup>42</sup> Farson, interview.

<sup>43</sup> Richard E. Farson, "The Rage of Women," *Look*, December 16, 1969, Vol 33, No 25, 21-23.

<sup>44</sup> Farson, interview.

activist organizations, women's liberation had gained widespread ideological support. A 1972 poll, commissioned by Virginia Slims cigarettes (a company that sought to exploit feminist inclinations to sell cigarettes), showed that 48 percent of women supported efforts to strengthen and alter women's status in America, while 36 percent opposed it. These figures had increased from 40 percent and 42 percent respectively in the year prior. Evaluations of the effectiveness of women's organizations had also risen from 34 percent in 1971 to 43 percent in 1972. Political opposition to the women's movement grew increasingly hesitant. Sensitive to this new political imperative, Congress passed a series of women's rights legislation from 1972-1974.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the advancing general support that the Virginia Slims poll suggested, it also found that support had dipped among black women, who were still embroiled in the struggle for civil rights and perhaps, like members of SNCC, found women's issues "bourgeois," diverting attention from primary problems like race.<sup>46</sup> Barbara Emerson wrote "I'm an African-American woman in that order [...] Now I realize full well that lots of women see their gender, or see, feel, think their gender first and then their race. It doesn't happen to come to me that way."<sup>47</sup> Emerson spoke for many black women, whose oppression as blacks was generally more tangible than their oppression as women. Women were, after all, loved and respected (within limits) by men.

It was through this love and respect for the women in their lives that the founders of humanistic psychology began to prioritize women's issues. Carl Rogers' increasing sensitivity to gender issues was hastened by personal experience. In 1968, his daughter, who had been a "feisty" child and adolescent but who had "disappeared" into herself during her twenty year marriage, announced that she was divorcing a man whom both her parents strongly favored. Motivated by his strong desire for growth and understanding,

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<sup>45</sup> Deckard, *Women's Movement*, 350.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 350.

<sup>47</sup> Barbara Emerson as quoted in Marlene LeGates, *In Their Time: A History of Feminism in Western Society* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 2.

Rogers struggled to understand his daughter's perspective, and he listened to her openly. Her experience was certainly one that a humanistic psychologist could appreciate; she felt that her intellect and the wholeness of her being were suppressed by the marriage. The validity of her experience was undeniable to her father, and it began to inform his clinical interactions with women.<sup>48</sup>

Once feminism was in full force, Carl Rogers and other AHP leaders found its critiques increasingly unavoidable. Natalie Rogers remembers an invited lecture that her father gave at Harvard in the early 1970s, where a woman spoke up at the end to criticize his gendered use of pronouns throughout his speech. In Natalie Rogers's opinion, her father gave a "wrong answer" and she and her colleagues from Greenhouse, a growth center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, confronted him about it later.

Once he was attuned to these dynamics, Carl Rogers himself began to "get it."<sup>49</sup> His 1977 publication of *Carl Rogers on Personal Power* begins with "a special note." "I have been greatly perplexed by the pronoun problem, or, more exactly, the 'he-she' issue," he writes. "I am totally in sympathy with the view that women are subtly demeaned by the use of the masculine pronoun when speaking in general of a member of the human species."<sup>50</sup> He resolves this problem in the book by alternating between chapters in his use of masculine and feminine pronouns.

The changes in Carl Rogers went beyond his written and spoken words. He assimilated more gendered notions into his clinical practice and group work as well. He began in simple ways, like noticing that four or five men had spoken in a row and encouraging a woman to speak. He recognized the ways that groups served as a

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<sup>48</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview.

<sup>49</sup> Maureen O'Hara and Gillian Proctor, "An Interview with Dr. Maureen O'Hara: A Pioneer Person-Centred Therapist and Feminist Reflects on 30 Years of Process and Progress," in *Encountering Feminism: Intersections between feminism and the person-centred approach*, eds. Gillian Proctor and Mary Beth Napier (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 2004), 61-62.

<sup>50</sup> Carl Rogers, *Carl Rogers on Personal Power* (New York: Doubleday, 1977), ix.



microcosm of the culture, and he began to tackle group forces that influenced the behavior of individual women in his sessions.<sup>51</sup>

The transformation even penetrated his fairly traditional marriage to Helen Rogers, a woman who had been an ideal faculty wife, furthering her husband's career with her competence and interpersonal ease and often subordinating her own passions for painting, reading, and traveling to her husband's needs. As Helen lay on her death bed, nearly paralyzed by arthritis, Rogers wrote,"[...] she is giving up the old model of being the supportive wife. This change brings her in touch with her anger at me and at society for giving her that socially approved role."<sup>52</sup> Fortunately, Helen's daughter Natalie and granddaughter Frances would not wait so long to embrace this anger. In fact, they later co-led feminist workshops for mothers and daughters.<sup>53</sup>

Maslow, like Carl Rogers, was married to a woman who never challenged his more traditional notions of women. Bertha Maslow raised their two daughters, fostered her husband's career, and never worked outside the home. Unsurprisingly, Maslow believed that women were more suited to growing relationally, through their experiences with husbands and children,<sup>54</sup> But, he also recognized the costs of forcing women into a role that was purely relational, with no room for self-development, writing that "self-actualization was hardly possible at all for women in our society."<sup>55</sup> His journals suggest his persistent interest in, and conflicts with, the women's liberation movement. On January 8, 1963, Maslow wrote in his journal, "Read Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique* right thru, finished at 5 A.M. A passionate book,--I was swept along unintentionally [...] It's very impressive & I'm glad I helped her. [...] One thing I'm sure of: she *tends* to dichotomize being a female only from being a general human being. Often she disavows

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<sup>51</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview.

<sup>52</sup> Carl Rogers as quoted in Milton, *Road to Malpsychia*, 158.

<sup>53</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview.

<sup>54</sup> Milton, *Road to Malpsychia*, 210.

<sup>55</sup> Friedan, *Feminine Mystique*, 322. Maslow did, however, include a few women in his list of self-actualized individuals: he claimed that Jane Adams, Eleanor Roosevelt and Ruth Benedict (anthropologist and former mentor to Maslow) had achieved self-actualization.

this & criticizes others for doing it, & yet she falls into it herself. Or, better said, she doesn't really think hierarchically. [...] Humanness is postpotent to femaleness (*I think!* Now, after reading her book, I'm less sure of this.[...])"<sup>56</sup>

Maslow had been interested in women's psychology, and sexuality, since his work with Harlow in the 1930s. In his 1939 paper, "Dominance, Personality and Social Behavior in Women," Maslow anticipated 1960s feminists, highlighting common desires for work, assertiveness and growth.<sup>57</sup> The significant number of well-marked and highlighted magazine and newspaper articles in his collected papers of the 1950s and 1960s also suggests the persistence of his interest in the changing roles of women.<sup>58</sup>

### **AHP ADDRESSES WOMEN**

Despite their traditional backgrounds, and to their credit, the founders were more open-minded than most, consistently listening attentively, if not always comprehendingly, to the concerns of their female patients, colleagues, family members, friends, and intellectuals and activists like Friedan. They supported the inclusion of women in AHP and in positions of leadership, but were often predictably insensitive to the unique issues which accompanied these transitions.<sup>59</sup>

Feminist considerations were often perceived as irrelevant to the goals of humanistic psychology. At worst, they were perceived as antipathetic to the ideals of group unity and universal understanding, and feminists themselves were often perceived by male humanistic psychologists as threatening. Maureen O'Hara claims, "Many of the men at [Center for Studies of the Person] could not understand why there was any necessity for a women's group. They saw it as hostile, and I suppose it was. I mean there

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<sup>56</sup> Maslow, January 8, 1963, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 218.

<sup>57</sup> Abraham Maslow, "Dominance, Personality and Social Behavior in Women," *Journal of Social Psychology* 10, February (1939): 3-39.

<sup>58</sup> Evidence of his persistent interest in feminism can also be found in his journals, as well as in his archival files (he often clipped and saved magazine articles related to feminism). For examples, see: Maslow, December 27, 1967 and March 22, 1969, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 837 and 1139.

<sup>59</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview.

were times when it was really bitter, and part of the bitterness had to do with the absolute denial on the part of men of the fact that women's situation was any different from theirs.”<sup>60</sup> Natalie Rogers remembers that “you really had to get in their faces to get them to listen.”<sup>61</sup> This resistance only exacerbated the animosity many women felt towards the men who, at least in their minds, represented the male power structure of the country. Rogers remembers herself as “very confrontative, outspoken, and angry.” In her intensity and vociferousness about women's concerns, she claims, “I scared the shit out of you.”<sup>62</sup>

The building frustration of women within and without AHP arose, in part, from the failure of humanistic psychology to adequately consider anything beyond the distinct individual. In this, the leaders of humanistic psychology demonstrated a blind spot to forces that existed at the group level. Rogers, for instance, genuinely believed that if you properly nurtured the subjectivity of an individual, gender was irrelevant, and only slowly began to recognize that something was missing from his Person-Centered Approach (PCA) writings.<sup>63</sup> White males, feminist critics felt, could afford to focus solely on individuals, being free of cultural oppression and discrimination. Women, however, had to attend to more pressing material and political deficits before they could have the luxury of self-focus.<sup>64</sup> They would have to fulfill their more basic needs before examining, in the Maslovian sense, their “being” needs.

The loudest feminist-oriented voices in the ears of the founders undoubtedly came from the women in AHP, who expressed a natural allegiance to feminist principles. No longer the male-dominated movement that it was in the 1950s, women seeped into the power structures slowly, then quickly. At the inaugural meeting of the Association of Humanistic Psychology in Old Saybrook in 1964, Charlotte Buhler was the only female psychologist, and Norma Rosenquist (later Lyman), the first organizational secretary of

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<sup>60</sup> O'Hara and Proctor, “Interview,” 60.

<sup>61</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Natalie Rogers, interview.

<sup>64</sup> O'Hara, interview by author.

AHP, was the only other female participant. Shifts in AHP leadership reflected the organizations responsiveness to the increasing status of women. Prior to 1976, 3 of 14 AHP presidents—Charlotte Buhler, Norma Lyman, and Eleanor Criswell—were women. Yet from 1976 to 2005, AHP had 13 female presidents and 16 male presidents.<sup>65</sup>

In contrast, the leadership of APA's division 32 (Humanistic Psychology) remained male-dominated. Considered the more intellectual of the organizations, Division 32 was created to transmit principles of humanistic psychology to professional and academic psychology. Meanwhile, AHP was viewed as the more experiential organization, and perhaps, because of assumptions about women's nature, a more appropriate site for female leadership. As of 2001, women comprised only 16.6 percent of officer positions in Division 32, though 30.1 percent of the members were women.<sup>66</sup>

Female membership consistently increased in the early years of AHP. Ilene Serlin, former president of AHP, wrote that "The world of humanistic psychology was a favorable environment for women."<sup>67</sup> Arising in the same era and under the same cultural circumstances as women's liberation, humanistic psychology demonstrated many parallels. "Much of humanistic thought," claimed Serlin, "especially in regard to the centrality of personal experience and holistic and tacit ways of knowing, has much in common with feminist theories of intersubjectivity, personal knowledge, and the importance of finding one's own voice."<sup>68</sup> Many female members recognized the complementary nature of feminism and humanistic psychology and participated in both movements.

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<sup>65</sup> Twice there were female and male co-presidents. Female presidents post-1976 include; Jean Houston, Jacquelin Doyle, Virginia Satir, Peggy Taylor, Lonnie Barbach, Frances Vaughan, Elizabeth Campbell, Maureen O'Hara, Sandy Friedman, Ann Weiser Cornell, MA Bjarkman, Jocelyn Olivier, and Katy Brant. Ilene Serlin, "Humanistic Psychology and Women: A Critical-Historical Perspective," in *A Handbook of Humanistic Psychology*, ed. Kirk J. Schneider, James F. T. Bugental, and J. Fraser Pierson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 30, <http://www.westga.edu/~psydept/os2/papers/serlin3.htm>.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 30.

AHP members represented the varying levels of commitment to the women's liberation movement.<sup>69</sup> Jackie Doyle, for example, was a resident at Esalen who went on to co-found Greenhouse, a growth center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the hopes of incorporating feminist ideas into groups. Greenhouse held some of the first women's groups in humanistic psychology, dedicated to the goals of overthrowing sexist stereotypes and incorporating the precepts of liberation into women's lives. Doyle, however, felt most comfortable with a mainstream notion of feminism and resisted more radical expressions. When Gloria Steinem and others invited her to a summer gathering in New Hampshire, Doyle was put off by the militancy of the women's ideas, which displayed a "lesbian flare." She never integrated their ideas or connected with these women. Doyle, however, continued to encourage students and group participants to consider their attitudes about gender and to re-envision their roles as women.<sup>70</sup>

Female group leaders, like Natalie Rogers and Maria Bowen tended to be more intuitive in their inclusion of a feminist perspective in groups. They often made observational comments about visibly gendered group dynamics; for example, pointing out when a woman had been interrupted or men were dominating the conversation.<sup>71</sup>

Maureen O'Hara, a relative latecomer to humanistic psychology in 1970, initially rejected a feminist analysis, feeling that the common humanistic psychology perspective—characteristic of Carl Rogers, with whom she worked closely—"was already big enough to allow space for a subjectivity that was both essentially human *and* gendered."<sup>72</sup> She soon realized that the conversations that were occurring were absent a recognition of female subjectivity. Without a level playing field, she realized, treating everyone the same way meant privileging the white male. In order to recognize women's

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<sup>69</sup> The differences in female humanistic psychologists often reflected the fragmented nature of the women's liberation movement in general. American feminism still displayed factions of members who either supported equal rights or protective legislation for women (as it had when suffrage was attained in the 20s). LeGates, *In Their Time*, 300.

<sup>70</sup> Jackie Doyle, interview by author, Tiberon, 28 April 2005.

<sup>71</sup> O'Hara, interview by author.

<sup>72</sup> O'Hara and Proctor, "Interview," 60.

distinctiveness, it was important to acknowledge the gendered world in which their subjectivity had developed, “against a historical context which has denied their subjectivity.”<sup>73</sup>

In the wake of her efflorescent feminism, O’Hara began to believe that several essential characteristics of women were ignored by the humanistic psychology. O’Hara came to believe that women were more relationally oriented and that viewing the life course as a journey from dependence to independence could prove inhibitory to women’s potential. She noticed that in groups, women were more inclined to make statements like “we’ve been thinking,” which would often be admonished by group leaders with the imperative to “think for yourself.” The expectation that health was equated with independence and autonomy ignored the reality of women’s relational concept of self. In order to foster women’s self-actualization, it was necessary for facilitators to recognize the range of possibilities for the experience of self and relationships.<sup>74</sup> O’Hara’s essentialist perspective likely would have been ill-received by feminists who argued that, given the present differentials in social expectations and societal respect for men and women, our perception of immutable differences between genders could only “reflect our prejudices.”<sup>75</sup> In the meantime though, feminists like O’Hara and Rogers addressed women’s needs in the context of the culture in which they generated and experienced them.

Second wave feminists diverged on the question of whether or not to attend to gender differences, like those described by O’Hara, or to promote a policy of total equality, which disregarded any notion of essential difference, perceiving difference as socially constructed and thus remediable. Essentialists either would have found (if they had gained exposure to it) or did find (in the case of those with psychological interests)

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>75</sup> Naomi Weisstein, “Psychology Constructs the Female,” in *Woman in Sexist Society: Studies in Power and Powerlessness*, ed. Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran (New York: New American Library, 1971), 144.

humanistic psychology to be more synonymous with stereotypically female ways of knowing than male ways of knowing.<sup>76</sup>

Although humanistic psychology earned itself feminist supporters, who were willing to address their critiques from within the movement, it also provoked outside feminist critiques, which were reliably the harshest. A paper by Carolyn Morell, for example, targeted Rollo May's bestselling *Love and Will* as being "unintentionally sexist," with implications that justified the existing power relationship between men and women and contributed to women's dissatisfaction and dehumanization. The paper further argued that May's book reinforced the patriarchy by being written for a male reader, making statements—like "If you called a lady 'sexy,'"—in which the *you* could only sensically be male, or lesbian. Morell also accuses the sexual enlightenment May advocates as being superficial, invoking changes in expression but not in power.<sup>77</sup>

May's response, which was published as an article in the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, was typical of the ambivalent way in which the movement grappled with feminism. Initially, May grudgingly conceded that his analysis "does suffer from unintentional sex prejudices. So does practically every other book written by a man (and most of them by women) [...] whether the author is Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers or anyone else." He also noted that he (and Maslow and Rogers) are "emphatic" supporters of the feminist movement. A paragraph later, May expressed his intention to rewrite certain sections and to continue to struggle with the "man-woman issue." In the spirit of humanistic psychologists, May wrote, "One can learn," and thanks Morell for her "help" in the revision of his book.<sup>78</sup>

Implicit in Morell's critique of May was the argument that the white male perspective wouldn't intuitively account for the unique position of women. She

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<sup>76</sup> Deckard, *The Women's Movement*, 386.

<sup>77</sup> Carolyn Morell, "Rollo May's *Love and Will*: A Feminist Critique," undated (May Papers, HPA Mss 46, Humanistic Psychology Archives), 11.

<sup>78</sup> Rollo May, "Response to Morell's 'Love and Will' A Feminist Critique," 1973 (May Papers, HPA Mss 46, Box 151: 18, Archives of Humanistic Psychology), 11.

repeatedly described May's errors as "unintentional" and "unconscious," suggesting that the white male paradigm is itself the problem. Morell's allegations were representative of the bulk of feminist critique of humanistic psychology, which revolved around the contention that humanistic theory arose from the experience of alienated, urban, white men of European descent who, according to one scholar, privileged "the sole self-evolving individual on a solitary and heroic journey of self-discovery [...] characterized by subduing nature, overcoming matter, transcending the body, promoting individuation, differentiation, and abstraction."<sup>79</sup> While the claim that humanistic psychology had "forgotten the body" was arguable, the emphasis on traditional masculine ideals of autonomy, agency, and self-sufficiency were inescapable.

Certainly, the relationship between feminists and humanistic psychology was complex. At the same time that humanistic psychology (or more accurately, certain representatives of it) offended female sensibilities, it also advanced a theory that was in line with women's liberation. Cultural historian Joyce Milton credits Maslow, through his influence on Friedan, with shaping the entire women's liberation movement. Maslow's model of self-actualization, she argues, became the dominant view in female psychology (a role that endures to the present).<sup>80</sup> Likewise, *The Feminine Mystique* impressed humanistic psychologists by highlighting the parallels between feminist liberation and self-actualization and striving. Stanley Krippner, for example, reports that the book "changed his life" and his entire outlook on women.<sup>81</sup>

For the most part, women were able to accept the imperfect recognition that humanistic psychology was able to offer and to appropriate as their own the empowering philosophy of humanistic psychology. In 1975, a writer for the *Mountain Gazette* reported that "the Women were probably the most important thing going on at the AHP conference. They seemed to be a step away from power there; or maybe they already

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<sup>79</sup> Serlin, "Humanistic Psychology and Women," 29.

<sup>80</sup> Milton, *Road to Malpsychia*, 210.

<sup>81</sup> Krippner, interview.



have it. I had a murky view of strong, attractive and self-possessed women and meek, powerless men.”<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Mike Moore, “Breaking Free,” 23.

## Chapter Ten: Fragmentation of the Movement

In *The New York Times*' coverage of AHP's 1970 annual convention, journalist Robert Reinhold described the scene of the Miami Beach's Orante Deauville Hotel, where the conference was held. He wrote, "800 people sprawled out on the floor of the main ballroom [...] silently touching each other with their eyes closed."<sup>1</sup>

A few months later, another reporter described the same convention in an article on Rollo May. He wrote: "May seldom participates in encounter sessions, and at the Miami Beach convention, when he was caught in a group that celebrated its ecstasy by jumping up and down, he simply jumped his way to the door and out of the room." He went on to describe the ultimate inescapability of AHP's "acting-out techniques," explaining that May was later forced to participate in a "toe-touching orgy" and a "trust march through the hotel."<sup>2</sup>

Both journalists were fascinated by the sensational qualities of the conventions, and by the tension with the intellectual ideas that lay behind them. Probing the conference leaders for their opinions on the hedonistic overtones of commonly practiced experiential techniques, Reinhold exposed the growing internal critique of the movement's anti-intellectualism. He described conference chairmen Lawrence Solomon's concern over the "increasing slippage" between humanistic psychology's ideals and the intrusion of anarchic and "anti-intellectual" tendencies into the movement. Also, quoting humanistic psychologist and UCLA business school professor Fred Massarik, Reinhold wrote: "There is much concern with turn-on [...] But it should not interfere with the think-on."<sup>3</sup>

More fair than most, however, Reinhold also conceded that AHP's "leadership remains solidly academic and many do not even take part in encounter groups. Having

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Reinhold, "Humanistic Psychology Shows Its Force," *New York Times*, September 4, 1970, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Dempsey, "Love and Will."

<sup>3</sup> Reinhold, "Humanistic Psychology," 13.

respectability as a protest movement, the group seems now to be groping for a positive program.”<sup>4</sup>

Even in the 1960s, establishing this positive program had been difficult for the founders to achieve. Constrained by the narrow definition of science at the mainstream universities at which they were employed, they tended to feel unsupported intellectually and financially. As early as 1959, Maslow wrote, “Very pleasant to be a big shot but doesn’t do my Brandeis salary much good. Nor can I get my papers published. Nor do grad students do my work for me.”<sup>5</sup> In 1962, he wrote, in a tirade against the rigid expectations of mainstream psychology departments and of the APA, “In a way, ‘science’ is anticreative. It is an organization, with division of labor, with fixed rules, a body of knowledge. But the creative person is on the fringes, where ignorance is, *not where knowledge is.*”<sup>6</sup>

Maslow felt most appreciated outside of psychology departments. In 1961, he spent a sabbatical semester at a privately-funded institute, the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (WBSI) in La Jolla, California, where engineer-entrepreneur Andy Kay funded his fellowship.<sup>7</sup> The following year, he accepted another invitation from Kay to spend the summer consulting for his corporation, Non-Linear Systems, a plant at which workers assembled digital voltmeters (instruments for measuring the electric potential difference between two points in an electric circuit). Maslow was paid handsomely to visit the plant once a week, collecting his perceptions of management techniques and employee satisfaction and applying his theory of motivation in recommendations for increasing employee satisfaction.<sup>8</sup> Despite the benefits of the job, however, Maslow returned to his position at Brandeis in the fall of 1962. In 1969, Maslow finally left Brandeis, accepting an offer from an administrative corporation called Saga that was too

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>5</sup> Maslow, April 16, 1959, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 52.

<sup>6</sup> Maslow, July 7, 1962, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 180.

<sup>7</sup> Hoffman, *The Right to be Human*, 261-263.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 267-270.

good to refuse. The corporation offered him a 2-4 year commitment, a new car, a generous salary, and a private office with a secretary. In exchange, Maslow was only expected to work on his own writing and scholarly work; he had no duties at the company.<sup>9</sup>

Rogers had been comparably motivated to leave academia. Having accepted a research position at the University of Wisconsin in 1957, he spent the next several years in increasing conflict with his colleagues. In January of 1963, Rogers sent a memorandum to the faculty, indicating his inclination to leave the university and describing his dissatisfaction with the department's "fixed policies and philosophy." Chief among his concerns was the extent to which graduate students were mistreated; he argued that the faculty created a threatening environment for them, often focused on their potential failure and rarely attentive to their creative and original ideas."<sup>10</sup>

The same year, Rogers received an offer from WBSI. Though he had turned down offers like this before, Rogers began to rethink his position. He wrote, "What was a university, at this stage in my career, offering me? I realized in my research it offered no particular help; in anything educational, I was forced to fit my beliefs into a totally alien mold; in stimulation, there was little from my colleagues because we were so far apart in thinking and in goals."<sup>11</sup>

Compelled by the absence of "bureaucratic entanglements," the "stimulation of a thoroughly congenial interdisciplinary group," and the superiority of the group's educational model, Rogers left Wisconsin for WBSI in 1964.<sup>12</sup> Among his senior colleagues would be Lawrence Solomon, a humanistic psychologist who insisted on the necessity of upholding the intellectual standards of humanistic psychology, and Sigmund

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 315-416.

<sup>10</sup> Carl Rogers as quoted in Kirschenbaum, *On Becoming Carl Rogers*, 291.

<sup>11</sup> Carl Rogers as quoted in Kirschenbaum, Ibid., 316-317.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 317-318.

Koch, who had developed his famous critique of mainstream psychology while executing the US government's assessment of psychology's first fifty years.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to offering exceptional peer support, WBSI provided a hospitable environment for innovation and creativity in research, and thus for the execution of truly humanistic science. In a letter to his friends in 1963, Rogers wrote of WBSI, "It offers the complete and untrammelled freedom for creative thought of which every scholar dreams. I will have no obligation except to be a creative contributor to a new, congenial, pioneering organization."<sup>14</sup> WBSI director Richard Farson wrote that WBSI's "independence enabled it to avoid the limiting effects of the politics of knowledge that dominate establishment institutions, often closing down the investigation of unconventional thinking."<sup>15</sup> Independent research institutes also freed researchers from rigid expectations about consistent and measured contributions to their fields. Farson wrote that even beyond the impossibility of exercising "groundbreaking creativity" within universities, the sheer size of universities was a major impediment to the production of novel theory, as "scale is the enemy of innovation."<sup>16</sup> Rogers agreed and explained to his friends that "this new emphasis in psychology—a humanistic, person-centered trend—has not had a chance to flower in University departments."<sup>17</sup>

In spite of the significant advantages of affiliation with independent research institutes like WBSI, however, the disadvantages were also numerous. The biggest problem was that they further estranged innovative thought from mainstream academia, thus reducing its ability to affect meaningful change in the field. The maintenance of university affiliation at least kept humanistic psychologists balanced, requiring that they

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<sup>13</sup> Farson, interview.

<sup>14</sup> Carl Rogers to Friends, July 22, 1963 (Allport Papers, HUG 4118.10, Box 46, Folder Ro-Rz, Harvard University Archives).

<sup>15</sup> Richard Farson, "The Case for Independent Institutes," *Voice*, April 18, 2005.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Carl Rogers to Friends, July 22, 1963.

attempt to affect change from within the system (the key to the influence of scholars like William James and Gordon Allport).<sup>18</sup>

Private research institutes also gave license to researchers to disregard even the more valid constraints of academic psychology. Without institutionally imposed standards for the content and methodology of scientific experimentation, researchers took more liberties. Some went to extremes in this regard. Stanley Krippner, for example, was compelled by the powerful pull of the experiential, transcendental and transpersonal. Krippner, who had earned his PhD from Northwestern in 1961 and taught and directed a child study center at Kent State for several years, transferred to the Maimonides Medical Center Dream Laboratory in 1964.<sup>19</sup> He soon located himself on the outskirts even of humanistic psychology, pursuing investigations of parapsychology and telepathy.<sup>20</sup>

#### **ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM**

The rise of private institutions willing to fund humanistic psychologists was, in large part, evidence of the widespread cultural interest in the theory of humanistic psychology and in experiential applications of the theory. But, the movement's popularity tended to gloss over the complexity of its flaws. The shrewdest and most piercing criticisms of humanistic psychology came, not from academic psychologists or media representatives, but from humanistic psychologists themselves. Keenly aware of the contradictions within the movement and of the ways in which it had strayed from the original goals of its founders, many humanistic psychologists waged an ideological battle to remain loyal to the movement that, even in diminished form, best aligned with their intellectual and personal interests.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Kirschenbaum, *On Becoming Carl Rogers*, 316.

<sup>19</sup> Krippner, interview; Stanley Krippner "Curriculum Vitae," <http://www.stanleykrippner.com/papers/VITAE.2003.htm>.

<sup>20</sup> Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006.

<sup>21</sup> Farson, interview.

Although most dissatisfaction with humanistic psychology developed after the human potential movement obscured its more intellectual emphases, several scholars harbored reservations about humanistic psychology from the movement's inception. Henry Murray shared ideological ground with humanistic psychology, but also experienced marked disappointment with its early development.<sup>22</sup> He was particularly disturbed by the proceedings of the 1964 AHP conference at Wesleyan University. Murray certainly respected figures like Maslow, May and Rogers, but found the self-proclaimed 'third force' in psychology "at once strident and confused." Murray's concern over the movement's ambiguity reflected his own questions as to humanistic psychology's potential to affect meaningful change within mainstream psychology, and as to his own ability to contribute meaningfully to the movement. For one, he found its guiding vision and dimensions difficult to articulate. For this reason, he determined his own contributions to the 1964 conference unworthy of publication.<sup>23</sup>

Murray's early conflicts about the viability of humanistic psychology were the exception, and most humanistic psychologists displayed an unqualified enthusiasm during the early phases of the movement's development.<sup>24</sup> By the early 1970s, however, many humanistic psychologists agreed with Murray. At the height of the human potential movement, with which humanistic psychologists were intimately entwined, few could disagree that humanistic psychology lacked pragmatic, scholarly bases. Whether this foundation had always been tenuous, as Murray suggests, or whether it had eroded in the strong current of enthusiasm for experiential exploration, the association's annual meetings and journal publications reflected the emphasis they had come to place on experiential technique. Representative article titles, for example, in the early 1970s

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<sup>22</sup> Nina Murray, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 3 January 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Robinson, *Love's Story Told*, 354.

<sup>24</sup> Richard, interview.

included *Identity Formation within Groups*, *The Image of Man Implicit in Encounter Group Theory*, and *Encountering Encounter Groups*.<sup>25</sup>

In his remarks to the Association of Humanistic Psychology in 1981, Rollo May rued the fact that the organization was “formed by scholars,” but “taken over by hippies.”<sup>26</sup> Like California, he suggested, the land where humanistic psychology had come of age and the font of endless idealistic revolutionary energy, humanistic psychology was “full of illusions” and in flight from reality.<sup>27</sup>

Many humanistic psychology scholars, including some who saw significant value in encounter, had tried to prevent the subversion of the scholarly work of humanistic psychology by the experiential work of encounter. Maslow, for example, who died suddenly of a heart attack on June 8, 1970, had often reflected on the necessity of balancing experiential elements with good theory and experimental researches.<sup>28</sup> But, fifteen years into the movement, scholars still pleaded for attention to the movement’s serious goals. “So far,” wrote Richard Farson in 1978, “most of us simply haven’t done the hard work of making a humanistic psychology.”<sup>29</sup> With regret, he asserted that, “Humanism as a psychology does not compare to behaviorism in scale, scholarship, or scientific discipline.”<sup>30</sup>

Farson, in a letter to fellow members of AHP, also asked whether AHP wanted to be a “cult” or an association (of shared interests, values and beliefs). Humanistic psychology’s “bad science,” Farson argued, had made it cultish, as had its “tendency to reduce concepts to jargon,” its lack of intellectual dialogue, its “smugness about the superiority of [its] group beliefs,” and its unwillingness to consider conflicting

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<sup>25</sup> Cumulative Contents, 1961-1990, *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 70-112; titles from 79-81.

Encounter groups were by no means the sole, or even dominant, focus of JHP articles in the early 1970s. I emphasize them only to convey JHP’s increasing interest in the topic.

<sup>26</sup> Rollo May, “Remarks to AHP,” January 29, 1981 (May Papers, HPA Mss 46, Box 155: 8, Speeches for H. Psych-My Speeches to AHP, Humanistic Psychology Archives).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Maslow, August 30, 1962, *Journals* Vol. 1, 189-190.

<sup>29</sup> Farson, “Technology of Humanism,” 6.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 5.



evidence.<sup>31</sup> Rollo May corroborated this criticism, noting that “an aura of self-righteousness hangs over our movement.” Its very language, he observed, was replete with words that, in compensation for the movement’s relative powerlessness, projected an overly strong sense of personal power (he took, for example, the basic term “self-actualization”).<sup>32</sup> The pervasive adoption of the group language fueled the cultish tendencies of the movement, producing a chorus of agreement, in which members uncritically touted the humanistic message. Conflict was construed as “unproductive” and “un-humanistic.”<sup>33</sup>

The *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, intended to be the intellectual bedrock of the movement, was perceived by many to reflect the same shortcomings as the larger movement—an inattentiveness to science, an uncritical air of self-promotion, and an espousal of overly simplistic solutions. AHP member and Harvard business school professor Tony Athos, in conversation with Rollo May, described the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* as “intellectually fly weight,” and identified the “tendency in our group not to want to think too hard.”<sup>34</sup>

In 1971, Rollo May had articulated his sense that AHP seemed to be turning into a “circus.” May cited the sensationalist bent of the meeting titles at the AHP convention as evidence of the trivialization of the movement’s larger concerns. May argued that the title “Childbirth for the Joy of It” reflected a “general aura of irresponsibility that ran through the whole program,” and ignored the pressing issue of overpopulation while carelessly treating babies as “playthings.” The title “Should a Therapist Go to Bed with His Patient?” which was predictably picked up by *The New York Times*, engendered

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<sup>31</sup> Richard Farson to the Members of AHP, undated, (Association of Humanistic Psychology Papers, HPA MSS1, Theory Conference, Association of Humanistic Psychology Archives).

<sup>32</sup> Rollo May to Fred Massarik, Melanie Allen and John Levy, 6 November 1971 (Association for Humanistic Psychology Papers, H9, Correspondence: Rollo May folder, May Papers, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>33</sup> Farson, interview.

<sup>34</sup> “Rollo May and Tony Athos in Conversation,” (typed manuscript, undated) (Association of Humanistic Psychology Papers, H25, Theory Conference folder, Humanistic Psychology Archives).

impressions of the movement that had “practically nothing to do with humanistic psychology.” He invoked the phrase Erik Erikson had used in reference to hippies: “They play with symbols that people die for.”<sup>35</sup>

In addition to condemning the “huckster” titles, May feared that humanistic psychologists had gone too far in opposing the nature of academic psychology. May argued that humanistic psychology’s antagonism toward APA had endangered the “humanistic” basis of *humanistic* psychology. “Our tendency in our reaction against APA has been an anti-intellectual one and we have tended to leave out the thinking, reflecting, historical man and put in only the feeling, touching man in the ‘now’.”<sup>36</sup>

### **LACK OF BALANCE**

The valorization of experience at the expense of intellect resulted from the unchecked enthusiasm and passionate protest spirit of most humanistic psychologists. Charged by the 1960s ethos of rebellion and intoxicated by the freedom they gained by departing from mainstream psychology, humanistic psychologists disavowed pragmatic methodology.<sup>37</sup> One historian referred to the massive “inductive leaps” of associated theorists as partially responsible for the movement’s shortcomings. Too often, he argued, humanistic psychologists began with a theoretical premise and jumped to an application of it, without being able to answer for the steps in between.<sup>38</sup> George Leonard offered a prime example of this type of leap. After the first successful black-white encounter group, he moved facilely to the notion that bringing the groups to the White House would revolutionize America.<sup>39</sup>

Many humanistic psychologists ended up looking more like unthinking zealots than like intellectuals. Their evangelistic promotion of encounter groups was responsible

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<sup>35</sup> May to Massarik, Allen and Levy, 6 November 1971.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Farson, interview.

<sup>38</sup> Eugene Taylor (historian), interview by author, Cambridge, MA, 18 September 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 323-324.

for much of this sense of zealotry. “Like the behaviorists of the sixties,” wrote Farson, “we have become obsessed with our new technology, which, to my mind, fragments people as much as do the approaches of those whom we criticized.”<sup>40</sup> Although encounter groups could be a beneficial component of individual experience and the *process* of change, promoters treated them like a panacea. Sole emphasis on encounter was reductionistic, not holistic, betraying the purposes that humanistic psychologists had theoretically articulated. Farson wrote: “In the final analysis, we humanists and behaviorists seem to have the same enemies: Utopian zealotry, obsession with technology, the need to reform people, ideologically bound narrowness, feelings of self-importance, the arrogance of insecurity, linearity of thought, a tendency toward reductionism, desperate responses to impotence, and fundamentally, the self-deception made necessary by the discrepancy between our theories and our lives.”<sup>41</sup>

Encounter groups had other liabilities, as well. The emotional drama that the groups contained tended to be addictive, further perpetuating participants’ lack of balance. “There were a bunch of people at Esalen and other places who really thought if we turned the screw a little more, if tears really showed that we were experiencing something deep, then vomiting or screaming would be even better.”<sup>42</sup> Even participants who were by nature pragmatic and intelligent willingly scrapped their logic in favor of the powerful subjective experience of epiphany.

Identifying the one-sidedness of the encounter group movement’s emphasis on “sensationalism and excitements,” one critic expressed concern that the movement was unwittingly opiating the masses and maintaining the status quo. The escapist nature of episodic seminars lacked both an integrative quality that would carry over to real life, he argued, and a value orientation that included a sense of social purpose and context.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Richard Farson, “The Technology of Humanism,” 5-35, quotation from 7.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>42</sup> Farson, interview.

<sup>43</sup> Bernard G. Rosenthal, “The Nature and Development of the Encounter Group Movement,” (Maslow Papers, M449.30 Esalen Crit. folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology), 12.

By exalting all forms of experience and “revelation” equally, humanistic psychologists were unable to differentiate and evaluate types of sensations, feelings and interpersonal practices. “It is here the encounter movement reveals its affective promiscuity and valuative limbo-or possibly nihilism,” wrote humanistic psychologist Bernard Rosenthal, who was then a professor at the Illinois Institute of Technology, “For it is ready for all experience, all states of being, and all explorations of sensation.”<sup>44</sup>

Where founding humanistic psychologists had envisioned growth, expanding awareness and self-actualization as life-long processes, encounter groups implicitly endorsed a briefer, cheaper, and more revelatory type of enlightenment.<sup>45</sup> Rosenthal identified the “brief diet of uninhibitedness” that encounter groups provided and the paradigm of epiphany that was unlikely to result in enduring change. In much the same way that drugs offered a transitory sense of enlightenment and transcendence, encounter groups offered an unintegrated intensity that was largely incapable of impacting an individual’s daily sense of health.<sup>46</sup>

### **SELF-ABSORPTION**

At their worst, encounter groups tapped into the more poisonous strains of American individualism, encouraging a narcissistic self-focus to the exclusion of social and political concerns. Unfortunately, humanistic psychologists did little to push back against this tendency. Often they were complicit in perpetuating it. “Early in the euphoric year of 1966, at my first Esalen seminar,” wrote George Leonard, “I had made a statement that now haunted me, ‘Fuck history’.” The audience “exploded with approving laughter” and the sound bite was repeatedly played on public radio. “If that cry was taken as simply a warning against inertia in the face of precedent, it might have had some merit.

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>45</sup> Maslow, September 19, 1967, *Journals*, Vol. 1, 287.

<sup>46</sup> Rosenthal, “Nature and Development,” 14.

But to the extent that it would be taken as permission to ignore the lessons of the past, it had to rank among the dumbest things I had ever said.”<sup>47</sup>

The media’s obsession with Leonard’s comment spoke to the allegation that the movement lacked political awareness. According to Rosenthal, “The concern with feeling for itself without reference to purpose, direction, values enhanced, public policy sustained, social organizations supported, way of life abetted, and image of man subserved is one of the characteristics of this movement.”<sup>48</sup>

Worse than the contention that humanistic psychologists failed to prioritize social issues, however, was the charge that the theory of humanistic psychology actually fueled political inaction. Specifically targeting the human potential movement, critics argued that the personal epiphanies attained through encounter groups placated individuals and allowed them to maintain the status quo.<sup>49</sup> “By diverting the desperation and resentment engendered by the prevailing socio-cultural system to innocuous transient satisfactions,” wrote one critic, the human potential movement “has prevented the confrontation and attack on the very issues that have spurred dehumanization [...] By encouraging temporary self-actualization at episodic seminars and on weekends, it has artificially and falsely transformed the humanistic impulse and value-orientation into a non-authentic process in a closed-chamber environment and thus given a rather illusory view of its nature and power.”<sup>50</sup>

#### **ATTEMPTS TO REVITALIZE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY**

Faced with an expanding sense of dissatisfaction and disorder, humanistic psychologists increasingly felt the need to get their own house in order before they could consider the larger problems facing American psychology or American culture. Movement leaders, like Rollo May, had at various points indulged their frustration with

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<sup>47</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 369.

<sup>48</sup> Rosenthal, “Nature and Development,” 20.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 16-17.

AHP's "anti-intellectualism," resigning from the movement "in protest."<sup>51</sup> Even Maslow, who didn't live to witness the increasingly experiential focus of AHP in the 1970s, had foreseen the potentially destructive direction of the movement. In 1969 he wrote, "This is starting to get all confused. Just the way I am these days about 3<sup>rd</sup> Force psychology, Esalen, et. al.—conflicted."<sup>52</sup>

Unfortunately, advocates for the maintenance, or re-invigoration, of intellectualism in AHP were underwhelmed by the response to their pleas. In an undated letter from Richard Farson to members of AHP, Farson warned that the issues that caused many members of AHP to leave still had not been "sufficiently aired." Like May, Farson pointed to the anti-humanistic practice of evading complexity, arguing that conflict and self-criticism and self-examination were critical to the productive and healthy evolution of an organization. In the spirit of the interdisciplinary views that had produced humanistic psychology, he advocated broadening the AHP to encompass questions of political action and social change.<sup>53</sup>

Farson contended that the most pressing problem facing AHP was its association with counter-cultural revolution. "Is AHP to be, as its name implies," he asked, "an Association for Humanistic psychology, devoted to the open-minded yet clear-thinking exploration of the nature of human existence and the possibilities of human growth, or is it to be an association dedicated to promulgating the faith that a certain kind of large-scale change is now taking place (or is about to take place) in American society and/or the world?" For Farson, answering in favor of the former was the only way to distinguish AHP from a "cult."<sup>54</sup>

Farson further argued for the necessity and productive potential of internal conflict. He implied that the association should be conceived in much the same way that

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<sup>51</sup> Dempsey, "Love and Will."

<sup>52</sup> Maslow, March 3, 1969, *Journals*, Vol. 2, 949.

<sup>53</sup> Richard Farson to the Members of AHP, undated.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

humanistic psychology conceived of individuals. In order to reinvigorate the movement, it was necessary for humanistic psychology members to openly voice and debate their concerns about AHP, seeking new directions and heightening understanding.<sup>55</sup>

Other members of AHP acknowledged the validity of May and Farson's criticism and, in response, organized a theory conference designed to return humanistic psychology to its intellectual roots and to promulgate theory that would propel the organization in healthy directions. The conference had the additional conciliatory effect of reuniting estranged humanistic psychology drop-outs, like Rollo May and Henry Murray, whose membership was contingent upon a more serious consideration of the association's theoretical underpinnings.<sup>56</sup>

### **THE AHP THEORY CONFERENCE OF 1975**

On April 4<sup>th</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup>, 1975, twenty-four AHP members assembled in Tucson, Arizona for the AHP theory conference.<sup>57</sup> Each participant submitted a position paper in which they focused on their specific concerns about AHP. Position paper titles included UC Santa Cruz social psychologist Brewster Smith's "Prefaces to a Discussion of Humanism and Science in Humanistic Psychology" and humanistic psychology textbook author Melanie Allen's "Keeping the System Open."<sup>58</sup> Most participants echoed Farson's

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Rollo May, Opening Remarks, "Edited Theory Conference Transcript," Tucson, Arizona, April 4-6, 1975, ed. Rick Gilbert (May Papers, HPA MSS46, Box 155:9, Humanistic Psychology Archives), 5.

<sup>57</sup> Participants included; Melanie Allen, Anthony Athos, Gregory Bateson, Kenneth Benne, James Bugental, Arthur Deikman, Joan Grof, Stan Grof, Charles Hampden-Turner, Willis Harman, Stanley Krippner, Norma Lyman, Fred Massarik, Floyd Matson, Rollo May, Claudio Naranjo, John Perry, Carl Rogers, Jonas Salk, Frank Severin, Elizabeth Simpson, Brewster Smith, Huston Smith, and Nora Weckler. Rick Gilbert, ed., "Edited Theory Conference Transcript."

<sup>58</sup> Brewster Smith "Prefaces to a Discussion of Humanism and Science in Humanistic Psychology: Position Paper for the Conference on Theory in Humanistic Psychology and Melanie Allen, "Toward a Theory of Humanistic Psychology: Keeping the System Open," April 4-6, 1975 (Association for Humanistic Psychology Archives, Box H 13, AHP Theory Conference folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology). Brewster Smith provided an important link between humanistic psychology and mainstream psychology. He served as APA president in 1978, and was the third humanistic psychologist to be president of APA (the first being Rogers in 1947 and the second being Maslow in 1968). Melanie Allen, a close friend and associate of Charlotte Buhler, published *Introduction to Humanistic Psychology* in 1972. Her participation in AHP dropped off shortly after the theory meeting. Tom Greening, email to author, February 10, 2008; APA Past Presidents, <http://www.apa.org/about/paspres.html>; Charlotte Malachowski Buhler and Melanie Allen, *Introduction to Humanistic Psychology* (Belmont, CA: Brooks Cole, 1972).

concern about the necessity of reinvigorating humanistic psychology's investment in scientific exploration and voiced their dismay over the current state of imbalance between experiential and theoretical emphases.<sup>59</sup>

Brewster Smith's comments represented a common sentiment. He wrote, "I feel close affinity with some of the founders of AHP. But I am also put off by much, both theoretical and practical, that goes on in the name of humanistic psychology. As a psychologist, I continue to identify with the goals of scientific psychology that ask for evidence, and I hope to contribute toward a cumulative, self-corrective discipline that, insofar as it participates in the social process of science, also has reason to believe that it can take advantage of the last legitimate refuge of Progress."<sup>60</sup>

Charles Hampden-Turner, who had been the president of AHP in 1974 and who was then engaged in research on the application of social science to human rights as a fellow at the Wright Institute in Berkeley, likened the negotiation of the scientific and the experiential to "Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis." "In the strenuousness of our objections," he wrote, "we have rushed pell mell to the opposite ends of each polarity to try and build a systematic theory out of feelings, ambiguity, openness, softness, depth and involvement, etc."<sup>61</sup>

The humanistic psychology that participants reenvisioned included a "systematization of subjective experience," an "open, participating inquiry," a moral, value-directed inquiry, and a unified view of human experience that would balance subjective and objective inquiry.<sup>62</sup> "I prefer not to call what we seek a new subjectivity,"

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<sup>59</sup> Rick Gilbert, ed., "Edited Theory Conference Transcript."

<sup>60</sup> Smith, "Prefaces to a Discussion of Humanism and Science in Humanistic Psychology," Archives of the History of American Psychology.

<sup>61</sup> Charles Hampden-Turner "Sailing Between Scylla and Charybdis or The Equal and Opposite Cop-Out," Theory Conference, Box H25, Association of Humanistic Psychology Archives; In 1971, Hampden-Turner published *Radical Man*, a key book that related humanistic psychology to human behavior in the realms of business and politics. See: Charles Hampden-Turner, *Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development* (New York: Doubleday, 1971).

<sup>62</sup> Willis Harman, "Notes on a Theory of Humanistic Psychology," (Association for Humanistic Psychology Archives, Box H 13, AHP Theory Conference folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).



May explained, “for that puts us in the same old dilemma. We make the same mistake then that the people who are devoted to objectivity make, except we use the opposite word. We need to find a dimension in the human being below pure subjectivity and pure objectivity.”<sup>63</sup>

For May, the need to address the theoretical shortcomings of the movement preceded the need to strengthen the movement’s scientific bases. He opened the conference with some remarks on AHP’s history and the origins of the gathering, highlighting the fact that humanistic psychology had begun as a protest against behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Even in the face of rapid growth, however, humanistic psychology persisted almost singularly as a protest movement, making its lack of substance increasingly evident. “But if humanistic psychology is only a protest,” said May, “we can be sure that its demise will be assured.” In order to redeem its value, May felt, humanistic psychology needed to stand on its own, advancing valuable theory and research that was sensitive to the complexity and holism of human experience.<sup>64</sup>

May had become so dismayed by humanistic psychology’s inadequacies that he had left the organization for several years. He justified this break from AHP in terms of his discomfort with the “predominantly emotional and body therapy,” which he found essentially anti-intellectual. He also likened himself to Henry Murray, who had dropped out of the movement due to its characteristic anti-intellectualism. Yet May’s time away from the movement convinced him of the necessity of humanistic psychology’s existence: “if we didn’t have such an organization called humanistic psychology, it would be necessary that we found one and call it the same name.” Thus May excused humanistic psychology for the awkwardness of its infancy and adolescence, and returned determined to work toward an “adequate theory.”<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Rollo May, Opening Remarks, “Edited Theory Conference Transcript.”

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 3-5.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 2.

May maintained that there were invaluable components of humanistic psychology that needed to be preserved and fostered. Humanistic psychology was, he felt, in tune with what people valued: how to live, how to make love, how to get along with people—concepts that were “simply thrown to the wolves by modern, academic psychology.”<sup>66</sup> An appropriate theory would, he believed, represent a balance between the principles of science and the human problems of living. He criticized humanistic psychologists who privileged subjectivity over scientific principles, arguing that they were no better than modern academic psychologists who were singularly devoted to objectivity.<sup>67</sup>

Others expressed their concern over what Floyd Matson, professor of American Studies at the University of Hawaii and author of several books relating American culture and politics to humanistic psychology, identified as the perception of humanistic psychology’s “social irrelevance” and sought to distance the movement from the human potential movement, recognizing the threatening elements of the conflation. “Humanistic psychology has long been afflicted with the stigma of hedonistic self-indulgence, the image of social irrelevance,” argued Matson. “No doubt this labeling has been grossly unfair—a plain case of mistaken identity resulting from the popular equation of humanistic psychology with the amorphous ‘human potential movement’.”<sup>68</sup>

The conference itself suffered from the weaknesses it was convened to address. “I don’t like psychoanalysis any better than this gathering does, but it does have some blood in it,” said Gregory Bateson, “and I feel that this gathering is losing blood.”<sup>69</sup> Concerns about increasing the depth and complexity of humanistic inquiry were repeatedly met with the question, “but how do you *feel*?”<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>68</sup> Floyd Matson, “Notes Toward a Theory...,” (Association for Humanistic Psychology Archives, Box H 13, AHP Theory Conference folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology). Matson’s key books during the time include: Floyd Matson, *The Broken Image* (Braziller: New York., 1964); Floyd Matson, ed. *Being, Becoming and Behavior: The Psychological Sciences* (New York: Braziller, 1967); and Floyd Matson, *The Idea of Man* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1976).

<sup>69</sup> Gregory Bateson, “Theory Conference Transcript,” 19.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

Tony Athos observed that too often the “beautiful questions,” those that required deeper probing, were responded to with a “crummy useful answer.” By responding too quickly and using the language of humanistic psychology formulaically, “you lose something marvelous in the question, so that you just leap from insight to action and technique, and we don’t accumulate anything, refine our actions, or improve our techniques. We skip what reason can give us because of what it appears to take away from our vision and insights.” May whole-heartedly agreed, recapitulating Athos’ question as “Why does the answer impoverish the problem? And I think it is because we never push our answer deep enough.”<sup>71</sup>

Certain members did take the opportunity afforded by the theory conference to wrangle over the deeper questions of humanistic psychology that had grown increasingly pale. May and Rogers took up the issue that had long bifurcated them: the question of whether it was reasonable to assume that individuals were inherently good and inherently motivated toward positive growth. “This is why I’m very concerned about our tendency to break our arms patting ourselves on the back, saying we are self-actualized, we are happy, we are people of peak experiences,” said May. “With all due respect to a man I love very much, namely Maslow, I don’t think self-actualization is in our bones[...] We will come out of our fox holes shooting. All of these aspects of life which are horrifying we cannot put aside.”<sup>72</sup>

Others recognized the arbitrary nature of presuming man’s inherent goodness, advocating the assumption nonetheless. Brewster Smith defended humanistic psychology’s assumption of man’s goodness, “Well, my starting point would really be with Nietzsche,” he explained, “who said, ‘Man is not either good nor evil, but we will make man good.’ He is expressing a positive commitment to make man good.”<sup>73</sup> Carl Rogers corroborated this view, “when Rollo thinks I have held ‘man is by nature good,’”

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<sup>71</sup> “Rollo May and Tony Athos in Conversation.”

<sup>72</sup> May, “Theory Conference Transcript,” 46.

<sup>73</sup> Smith, “Theory Conference Transcript,” 47.

he said, “I don’t think I have ever said that; I certainly haven’t said it in the last 10 or 15 years. What I’ve tried to say is that when a certain definable psychological climate is provided, the person tends to move in the direction of becoming a socially constructive organism.”<sup>74</sup>

Reactions to the success of the theory conference were mixed. Carl Rogers expressed his regrets about the theory conference to the attendees in a memo entitled “RE: A Disappointment.” “In the wholly intellectual directions we took,” he wrote, “we could not have been sharply distinguished from traditional psychologists. So we made ‘progress,’ instead of making progress.”<sup>75</sup> He regretted perpetuating the intellectual focus and wished they had devoted more time to the feelings of the participants.

Most participants either disagreed with Rogers’ comments or qualifiedly acknowledged them, still recognizing the necessity of what had transpired at the conference. Tony Athos disagreed outright with Rogers’ criticism, while Fred Massarik agreed that “there was no time for the wide range of experiencing which goes beyond intellect,” while arguing that there had been an inevitable need for choice and focus in the face of limited time.<sup>76</sup>

Richard Farson, who had played the roles of Rogers’ student, research assistant, and boss, regarded the anti-intellectual comments of Rogers, in retrospect, with perplexity and frustration. “I don’t know why he did that,” Farson claimed, “He was very interested in systematic personality theory.” Farson remembers a discussion he had moderated between Gregory Bateson, well-known anthropologist and committed humanistic psychologist, and Rogers. Bateson, who was a “real intellectual heavyweight,” participated in what became a theoretical debate, until Rogers cut it off at

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<sup>74</sup> Carl Rogers, “Theory Conference Transcript,” 64-65.

<sup>75</sup> Carl Rogers to Members of the AHP Theory Conference, (memo) (Association for Humanistic Psychology Archives, Box H 13, AHP Theory Conference folder, Archives of the History of American Psychology).

<sup>76</sup> Fred Massarik to Carl Rogers, 27 May 1975 (Rogers Papers, HPA MSS 32, Humanistic Psychology Archives).

the pass, suggesting that Bateson talk about his feelings. Farson remembers the embarrassment he felt over Rogers' comment, ashamed that he would bow out of the real intellectual course that the discussion was taking. For Farson, the event represented a latent anti-intellectual streak in Rogers, as well as Rogers' relative inability to learn from his colleagues, including Rollo May, who was also an "intellectual heavyweight," and whom Farson perceived to be ahead of Rogers in many respects. "Rogers always learned a lot from his students," explains Farson, but often struggled with his colleagues.<sup>77</sup>

Farson's awareness of Rogers' weaknesses existed beside his enormous amount of respect for him. In characterizing, and complementing, him, Farson wrote, "It is Rogers' style to let go of ideas, to share them, to avoid ownership, to prevent them from becoming dogmatized and identified solely with him."<sup>78</sup> One consequence of this perspective, and of Rogers' general anti-authoritarian orientation, was that people continued to take his ideas in directions he hadn't intended. Farson explained that "Rogers' work has been corrupted over the years by practitioners who have discovered the technique but not the philosophy."<sup>79</sup>

### **THE EXTREMES OF AHP**

Just as the disruptive and sensationalistic styles of Esalen leaders like Perls and Schutz diluted the more gentle influences of leaders like Carl Rogers, fad therapies like the Erhard Seminar Training (est) overshadowed more reasonable approaches that better represented the interests of the organization.<sup>80</sup> Est, conceived of and performed by Werner Erhard, distorted the original "humanistic" conceptions of group work in favor of group indoctrination, replete with bullying and insults waged by the seminar leader.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Farson, interview.

<sup>78</sup> Richard Farson, "Carl Rogers: Quiet Revolutionary," in Richard I. Evans, ed., *Carl Rogers: The Man and his Ideas* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1975), xx.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., xli.

<sup>80</sup> Dempsey, "Love and Will."

<sup>81</sup> Leonard, interview, 5 April 2006.

Erhard attached himself to humanistic psychology, where he found a wealth of participants eager for transformation and several leaders whose ethic of toleration prevented his exclusion. In August of 1975, Erhard appeared at the best-attended annual convention in AHP's history (there were approximately 2,500 participants) in Estes Park, Colorado. For many, including hungry journalists, Erhard's presence represented AHP's implicit endorsement of his methods. But Rollo May spoke out publicly against Erhard's methods, calling them "anti-humanistic" and asking why he had even been invited. George Leonard and others only politely tried to distance themselves from the "Henry Ford of Human Potential." "We certainly don't endorse 'est' by having him here," remarked Leonard.<sup>82</sup>

A typical "est" experience involved systematic demoralization and aggressive behavioral reconditioning. Participants typically paid \$250 for the training, and spent 15 hours over the course of two weekends in a large auditorium (with as many as 250 participants).<sup>83</sup> The goal for participants was to "dismantle" their value systems, belief structures, and notions of right and wrong and good and evil that had "been screwing up [their] lives over all these years." But what the sessions generally amounted to was the experience of being condescended to, ordered around, and assaulted with obscenities. According to Peter Marin, who reported on human potential techniques for *Harper's*, "[est] is a mixture of ideas and techniques borrowed from the behavioral sciences, Eastern Philosophy, the traditional American classroom, Marine boot camp and modern brainwashing methods."<sup>84</sup> To another journalist, Erhard's methods appeared, "to be little more than scientology without the tin-cans and all the sci-fi horseshit that Hubbard indulges in."<sup>85</sup> In comparison to the cultishness of "est", the journalist found encounter

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<sup>82</sup> Moore, "Breaking Free," 21.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>84</sup> Peter Marin, "The New Narcissism," *Harper's*, October 1975, 45-56, quotation from 46.

<sup>85</sup> Moore, "Breaking Free," 21.

groups to be harmless. He wrote, “they had a kind of innocence to them. They were at their worst merely boring or silly.”<sup>86</sup>

But participants at Estes Park didn’t stop at encounter groups. In the course of the conference, a group of humanistic psychologists that included Stanley Krippner ascended a nearby mountain top at sunrise to attempt telepathic communication with a group of researchers in Bogota, Columbia. They built a fire, gathered in a circle, and attempted to first connect mentally with one another, then with the earth, and, finally, with the group in Bogota through their connection with the earth. They each threw a coin from the *I Ching* into the circle to transmit a message to Bogota, which was then interpreted by the Bogota researchers using their own *I Ching*.<sup>87</sup>

In spite of these unorthodox practices, *Mountain Gazette* reporter Mike Moore wrote that, though he had attended the conference “with a fistful of prejudgments, hellbent on writing a frolicsome satire” and expecting to be “touched, felt, or laid,” he instead spent the week in intellectual reverie. He described Rollo May’s talk on personal mythology as having made “Jung and Spengler and even Kierkegaard come alive and dance.”<sup>88</sup> Moore’s experience demonstrated the complicated relationship between the intellectual and experiential elements of AHP, one that was tenable only as long as the American public maintained an interest in its diverse perspectives and practices.

## **DECLINING PARTICIPATION IN AHP**

The excitement of the Estes Park conference marked the peak of cultural and professional interest in the Association of Humanistic Psychology. After 1975, AHP participation began to decline. In 1976 and 1977, the annual conference attracted about 2000 participants (down from 2500 in 1975), then 1600 in 1978, 1700 in 1979. Then in

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>87</sup> Jean Millay, *Multi-Dimensional Mind: Remote Viewing in Hyperspace* (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1999), 95-99.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 18-19.

1980, the year of Ronald Reagan's election, 1000 participants attended.<sup>89</sup> Explaining the comparable decline of interest in Division 32, humanistic psychologists Christopher M. Aanstoos, Ilene Serlin and Tom Greening blamed the "new socio-cultural conservatism" of the Reagan era, "for which the term 'humanistic' meant something sinister."<sup>90</sup> They also recognized the diminishment of "lay interest" in the organization, which returned the organization to an association of professionals.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> AHP Web, "A Chronology of AHP's Annual Conferences," <http://ahpweb.org/aboutahp/ahpcronology.html>.

<sup>90</sup> Aanstoos, Serlin and Greening, "History of Division 32," 22.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.



## Chapter Eleven: The Residue of Humanistic Psychology

In 1985, a journalist for *The New York Times* wrote that although, “in its heyday, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Esalen was a cultural landmark, the point at the continent’s edge from which a stream of new ideas and methods emanated ... the encounter group movement, for which Esalen was a mecca, is moribund today.”<sup>1</sup> The author described the “graying” Esalen of the 1980s as faced with the possibility of a “lasting irrelevance.” Most growth centers modeled on Esalen, of which there were over a hundred at the Movement’s peak, had closed, and a mere decade later there were no more than a handful.<sup>2</sup> The terms “human potential movement” and “humanistic psychology” also receded from popular magazines and newspapers.

Aware of declining cultural interest, Esalen attempted to broaden its significance in the 1980s through a renewed intellectual seriousness and a series of programs and exchanges that were “more scholarly and more socially aware.”<sup>3</sup> As of 1985, Esalen offered 500 seminars per year, drawing about 4,000 total participants.<sup>4</sup> Michael Murphy, described in a 1995 *New York Times* article as a “somewhat marginalized figure in a movement hungry for charismatic leaders and best-selling authors,” remained vital and continued to refine Esalen’s program, to publish on human potential, and to advance new theories.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Daniel Goleman, “Esalen Wrestles with a Staid Present,” *New York Times*, December 10 (1985) Section C; Page 1, Column 1; Science.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>3</sup> The most notable of Esalen’s 1980s ventures was a Soviet-American exchange program, based on a model of citizens’ diplomacy and a desire to forge open communication between the nations. Kripal, *Esalen*, 331-338.

<sup>4</sup> Goleman “Esalen Wrestles,” 1.

<sup>5</sup> Bob Morris, “Divine Reinvention,” *New York Times*, March 2 (1995). Murphy’s latest theory, forged with long-time collaborator George Leonard, is that of Integral Transformative Practice (ITP). ITP offers a

Humanistic psychology pressed on, as well. Although conference attendance declined and humanistic psychology courses became scarce, hundreds of practitioners continued to define themselves as “humanistic psychologists,” defending the significance and enduring relevance of their theory and principles. As of 2008, humanistic psychology still boasts an active association (with frequent, if not annual, conferences), and Division 32 maintains an energetic list serve.<sup>6</sup>

The work of humanistic psychologists has continued outside of the spotlight. Employed almost exclusively by private institutes, most notably the Saybrook Institute (which was founded in 1970 by AHP as the Humanistic Psychology Institute, but later changed its name to heighten its mainstream appeal), humanistic psychologists expanded their interests and advanced their theory in the 1980s.<sup>7</sup> Chief among the emergent interests of members was the study of spiritual and mystical states of consciousness, which was dubbed “transpersonal” psychology.<sup>8</sup>

In numerous ways, both the humanistic psychology and human potential movements were enduringly, though subtly, successful. Humanistic psychology has succeeded through the very process that rendered it culturally insignificant, the process of absorption into the mainstream. The greatest testaments to humanistic psychology’s enduring significance are the ways in which American mental health professionals have

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theory and program for personal and societal change that seeks to integrate the mind, body and social consciousness. Integral Transformative Practice Homepage, <http://www.itp-international.org>.

<sup>6</sup> Tom Greening, email to author, February 3, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Aanstoos, Serlin and Greening, “History of Division 32,” 22.; The Saybrook Institute, now the Saybrook Graduate School and Research Center, has not kept records of the years of the name changes. Saybrook Institute receptionist, personal communication by author, February 12, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> D. H. Lajoie and S. I. Shapiro, “Definitions of Transpersonal Psychology: The First Twenty-Three Years,” *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology*, Vol. 24 79-98 (1992): 91.; Towards the end of Maslow’s career, he developed an interest in transpersonal psychology, which he termed the Fourth Force, or theory Z, and helped Anthony Sutich to found a journal in 1969. Transpersonal psychology further diverged from humanistic psychology in 1984, when its adherents attempted, but failed, to form a separate division of APA, but the interests and activities of transpersonal psychologists remained closely aligned. Maslow, September 19, 1967, *Journals*, Vol.2, 827.; Aanstoos, Serlin and Greening, “History of Division 32,” 2000, 23-25.

adopted the leading concepts of prominent humanistic psychologists; the way that mainstream psychological theory has subtly replicated its values and reproduced its goals; and the way that the American vernacular has integrated its language and ideas.<sup>9</sup>

### **THE MENTAL HEALTH FIELDS' INCORPORATION OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY'S THEORY**

Humanistic psychology's influence on mental health practice has been considerable. The client-centered approach (now referred to as person-centered counseling), for example, has come to dominate psychotherapy, social work interventions and pastoral counseling.<sup>10</sup> Contemporary therapeutic interventions tend to be non-directive, privileging the meaningful subjective input from "clients" and relying on their active involvement in the counseling process. They also reflect strains of Carl Rogers' theories of empathic understanding, present-orientation, and self-direction.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, a personalized and humanized concept of professionalism has come to define modern therapeutic interactions. Grounded in humanistic psychologists' view of patients as fully human participants in the therapeutic process, this approach has supplanted concepts of professionalism from psychoanalysts and behaviorists that relied heavily on hierarchical distinctions, experimental control, and notions of a value-free, objective science in their interactions with patients and study participants.<sup>12</sup>

In terms of specific influence, Rogers' client-centered theory is most often credited for having had tremendous influence over the style and content of social work interventions. This theory has been seminal in the establishment of the "core conditions"

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<sup>9</sup> Farson, interview. by author, October 5, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Farson, "Carl Rogers, Quiet Revolutionary," In R. I. Evans, Ed., *Carl Rogers: The Man and his Ideas*. (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1975), xxx.

<sup>11</sup> Howard Kirschenbaum, "Introduction," in Howard Kirschenbaum and Valerie Land Henderson, eds. *The Carl Rogers Reader* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989, xi-xii.

<sup>12</sup> A. Weick, C. Rapp, W. P. Sullivan, and W. Kisthardt, "A Strengths Perspective for Social Work Practice," *Social Work*, 34 (1989): 350-354.

of effective social work practice, which include empathy, warmth, and genuineness on the part of the therapist.<sup>13</sup> His theory and approach have informed everything from the standard social work interview, intended to establish an effective therapeutic relationship based on affirmation of the client's worth and dignity, to the content of longer-term interventions, which regards as their cornerstone the therapist's continued encouragement of and positive regard for the client.<sup>14</sup>

Rogers' theory also made an indelible mark on pastoral counseling. In a turn from moralism and in opposition to mass culture, pastoral theologians have adopted a Rogerian "ethic of self-realization which defined growth as the primary ethical good," elevating individual growth over competing priorities.<sup>15</sup> Rogers' 1942 publication of *Counseling and Psychotherapy* became a standard text in theological seminaries, and his techniques proved a staple in seminary training, effective even in a brief introductory format.<sup>16</sup>

While Rogers may have had a greater impact on the mental health fields than his fellow founders of the movement, he was certainly not the only humanistic psychologist to provoke theoretical change in therapeutic realms. Maslow's theory, for example, has encouraged psychologists to consider the positive aspects of human nature, as evidenced in the strengths and health of clients. George Leonard wrote, "Abraham Maslow has done more to change our view of human nature and human possibilities than has any other American psychologist of the past fifty years. His influence, both direct and indirect, continues to grow, especially in the fields of health,

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<sup>13</sup> R. R. Greene, "The social work interview: Legacy of Carl Rogers and Sigmund Freud," In Greene, R. R., Ed., *Human Behavior Theory: A Diversity Framework*, ed. R.R. Greene (New York: Aldine De Gruyler, 1994), 40-41.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 37-47.

<sup>15</sup> Holifield, *Pastoral Counseling*, 277.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 295-299.; LeRoy Aden, "On Carl Rogers' Becoming," *Theology Today* Vol. 36, No. 4 January (1980), <http://theologytoday.ptsem.edu/jan1980/v36-4-criticscorner2.htm>.

education, and management theory, and in the personal and social lives of millions of Americans.”<sup>17</sup>

Rollo May’s theory has also been widely applied within counseling. Considered to be the “Father of American Existential Psychology,” May attuned psychotherapists and lay readers to the productive value of anxiety and conflict.<sup>18</sup> This orientation was most visibly adopted in the encounter group movement, which encouraged an individual’s raw confrontation with her fears and conflicts, and in the movement’s remnants in individual psychotherapy. May’s ideas have also had a strong impact on the practice of psychology. In particular, his exploration of empathy in *The Art of Counseling* directed psychotherapists and pastors towards the idea.<sup>19</sup> Also, his consideration of the social responsibility of the therapist, as expressed in 1978 in *Psychology and the Human Dilemma*, influences psychologists to reconsider their role in the cultural problems of their time, by instigating a dialogue that persists to the present.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to informing a contemporary conceptualization of counseling, the techniques of humanistic psychology laid a foundation for individual practices outside of the psychotherapeutic realm. Body work, like yoga and meditation, for example, has its roots in the holistic approaches of humanistic psychology and the Human Potential Movement.<sup>21</sup> Built in part on the Rogerian ideas of “organismic wholeness” and the

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<sup>17</sup> Leonard, *Walking on the Edge*, 326.

<sup>18</sup> James F. T. Bugental, “Rollo May (1909-1994),” *American Psychologist*, Vol. 51, No.4 (1996): 418.

<sup>19</sup> Holifield, *Pastoral Counseling*, 297; May’s ideas of empathy were most clearly articulated in Rollo May, *The Art of Counseling* (Nashville : Abington Press, 1939).

<sup>20</sup> Rollo May, *Psychology and the Human Dilemma*, x. For a more contemporary exploration of the problems May considers, see James Hillman and Michael Ventura, *We’ve Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy and the World Keeps Getting Worse* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993).

<sup>21</sup> Eugene I. Taylor and Frederick Martin, “Humanistic Psychology at the Crossroads,” *The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research and Practice*, eds. Kirk J. Schneider, James F. T. Bugental and J. Fraser Pierson (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 23. Taylor and Martin argued that when humanistic psychology was “absorbed into the psychotherapeutic counterculture,” it “fractionated” into 3 unintegrated streams, all of which existed outside of academia. These included mediation and altered states of consciousness (which became transpersonal psychology); body work and

Maslowian idea of self-actualization, these practices incorporate mind, body, and spirit in the service of healing. In valuing an active therapeutic process, emotional integration and self-awareness, body work has also integrated the guiding principles of active participation, transcendence, and present-orientation.<sup>22</sup>

Many of humanistic psychology's principles and techniques blended seamlessly with dominant American practice. As historian Christopher Lasch wrote of Carl Rogers specifically, his "approach to therapy [...] was 'as American as apple pie,'" citing specifically the ways it tapped into American ideas of free will, human perfectibility and rational control.<sup>23</sup>

## **OUTGROWTHS WITHIN PSYCHOLOGY**

The emergence of positive psychology, a field that emerged in 1998 and quickly gained adherents in the U.S. and around the world, may be the best evidence of humanistic psychology's enduring academic relevance.<sup>24</sup> It's also, however, a good example of the ways in which scholarship based in experimental research has adamantly dissociated itself from the Humanistic Psychology Movement.

Positive psychology, articulated by Martin Seligman and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi in 2000 as "the study of strength and virtue," combined the interests of

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group dynamics (which included the encounter groups and corporate interests); and human science (which consisted of political psychology and cultural criticism). The authors attributed this division to Maslow and Sutich's prioritization of the spiritual and their subsequent decision, in 1969 to transfer their loyalties to Transpersonal Psychology.

<sup>22</sup> Gordon Wheeler, "Spirit and Shadow," Esalen and the Gestalt Model," Kripal and Shuck, *Edge of the Future*, 173-174.

<sup>23</sup> Christopher Lasch, *The Minimal Self*, 211.

<sup>24</sup> James Pawelski, "The Promise of Positive Psychology for the Assessment of Character" *The Journal of College and Character*, Vol. 2 (2007), <http://www.collegevalues.org/articles.cfm?a=1&id=1141>.

Seligman first described "positive psychology" in his 1998 presidential address to the APA. Martin E.P. Seligman, 1998. "The President's Address," APA 1998 Annual Report at [www.positivepsychology.org/aparep98.htm](http://www.positivepsychology.org/aparep98.htm).

humanistic psychology and the scientific goals of academic psychology.<sup>25</sup> Seeking to operationalize virtues, values, and strengths in a way that would allow for their empirical identification and measurement, positive psychologists agreed with humanistic psychologists' rejection of a pathology-oriented discipline—which was focused on weakness and damage—and following humanistic psychologists in attempting to expand psychological study to realms of well-being, contentment, and optimism.<sup>26</sup>

The similarities between humanistic psychology and positive psychology are numerous. Comparing Seligman to Maslow, one scholar notes the shared desire to “create an optimistic psychology, one that sees the human personality as more than just a collection of neuroses and tics.”<sup>27</sup> In opposition to mainstream psychology's post-World War II focus on pathology, Seligman directed an initiative towards “the empirical study of flourishing individuals and thriving communities.”<sup>28</sup> Seligman's theoretical basis for such work was strongly reminiscent of Maslow's contributions. For example, in developing a ““manual of the sanities,”” the Values in Action (VIA) Classification of Strengths manual, Seligman, with Christopher Peterson, identified virtuous character traits that replicated Maslow's being values (b-values), and included wisdom, transcendence, temperance and justice.<sup>29</sup>

Yet despite their extensive similarities, positive psychologists have conspicuously failed to acknowledge the tradition of humanistic psychology that preceded it by nearly four decades. In fact, when confronted directly with this apparent

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<sup>25</sup> Martin E. P. Seligman, and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi. 2000. “Positive Psychology: An Introduction.” In *American Psychologist* 55.1 (2000): 7.

<sup>26</sup> Martin E. P. Seligman, “Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy,” in Shane J. Lopez and C.R. Snyder, eds. *Positive Psychological Assessment: A Handbook of Models and Measures*, ed. Shane J. Lopez and C.R. Snyder (Washington, DC : American Psychological Association, 2003), 3.

<sup>27</sup> Milton, *Road to Malpsychia*, 288.

<sup>28</sup> Pawelski, “The Promise of Positive Psychology.”

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.; Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman, *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification* (London: Oxford University Press, 2004), [positivepsychology.org/taxonomy.htm](http://positivepsychology.org/taxonomy.htm).

debt, positive psychologists have disavowed any connection. Martin Seligman, in particular, has distanced his theory from those of the founders of humanistic psychology and belittled the movement's impact.<sup>30</sup>

For Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, an essential component to the program for a positive psychology is a commitment to the scientific method, which they presume humanistic psychologists to have lacked. In an implicit critique of humanistic psychology, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi explained that, "in this quest for what is best, positive psychology does not rely on wishful thinking, faith, self-deception, fads, or hand-waving; it tries to adapt what is best in the scientific method to the unique problems that human behavior presents to those who wish to understand it in all its complexity."<sup>31</sup>

Reducing humanistic psychology to its least scholarly elements, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi wrote in 2000 that, "one legacy of the humanism of the 1960s is prominently displayed in any large bookstore: The 'psychology' section contains at least 10 shelves on crystal healing, aromatherapy, and reaching the inner child for every self-shelf of books that tries to uphold some scholarly standard."<sup>32</sup> Statements like these earned the ire of humanistic psychologists and generated a flood of letters to the *American Psychologist* demanding that the founders of positive psychology acknowledge the obvious origins of their ideas in the humanistic psychology movement. One respondent wrote, "It was 99.6% pure rejection of their so-called ancestors (even purer than Ivory soap!)"<sup>33</sup>

Regardless of the justifiable indignation of humanistic psychologists, positive psychologists, seeking to forge empirically testable theories within the boundaries of

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<sup>30</sup> Milton, *Road to Malpsychia*, 288-289.

<sup>31</sup> Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology," 7.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 7

<sup>33</sup> Stewart Shapiro, "Illogical Positivism," *American Psychologist*, January (2001): 82.



scholarly respectability, couldn't risk being associated with a movement that had become disassociated from academic psychology. Tactfully responding to humanistic psychologists' allegations, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi wrote, "We do not wish [...] to blur the boundaries completely between the positive psychology we hope to see emerge and these worthy traditions. We are, unblushingly, *scientists* first."<sup>34</sup>

In addition to seeking to evade association with the perception of humanistic psychology's unscientific bases, the founders of positive psychology have tried to distance themselves from the movement's reputation as overly individualistic and encouraging of narcissism. Instead, positive psychologists have been pragmatic, advocating the inculcation of specific skills to overcome negative thought patterns and to act in socially harmonious ways.<sup>35</sup> Positive psychologists have also sought to move beyond the study of inner-oriented virtues, extending their study to civic virtues, which include altruism, responsibility, nurturance, tolerance, civility, work ethic, and moderation.<sup>36</sup>

## **OUTGROWTHS IN SOCIAL WORK**

In the 1980s and 1990s, the proliferation of social work theory that reflected themes of self-actualization, striving, and health-seeking suggested the congeniality of humanistic psychologists' theory to the profession. Specific social work approaches that incorporated these themes included "solution focused therapy," a form of brief therapy that is thoroughly client-directed and present-focused, and "assets-based community development," a method of identifying and employing a community's strength to sustain

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<sup>34</sup> Martin E. P. Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, "Reply to Comments," *American Psychologist* 56, (2001): 89.

<sup>35</sup> Milton, *Road to Malpsychia*, 289.

<sup>36</sup> Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, "Positive Psychology," 5.

its development<sup>37</sup> Another approach, the “strengths” perspective, even more tangibly reflects many of the goals of the founders of humanistic psychology.<sup>38</sup>

Based on theoretical and ethical objections to an illness-orientation and the hierarchical therapist-client distinctions found in some sectors of the field, the strengths perspective construes healing as an innate capability and values the social worker primarily as a catalyst in the client’s self-determined change.<sup>39</sup> It takes as its goal the identification of individual, family and community strengths, primarily in realms of dialogue and communication, membership, resilience, healing and wholeness.<sup>40</sup> The strengths perspective’s elevation of inborn individual drives towards health, rather than illness-oriented explanations of individual pathology, echoes the priorities both of humanistic psychology and of positive psychology.

But, like positive psychologists, advocates of the strengths perspective have made only scant reference to their intellectual predecessors in humanistic psychology. In fact, they claim that the emergence of therapeutic perspectives explicitly oriented toward applying a positive view of clients’ innate potential is a fairly recent phenomenon.<sup>41</sup> While strengths perspective advocates haven’t directly criticized humanistic psychology or expressed a need for ideological distance from the movement, the discrepancies between the movements are implicit in their theory. The consideration of social-political forces, for example, is primary among the priorities of strengths perspective social

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<sup>37</sup> Bill O’Connell, *Solution-Focused Therapy* (London: Sage Publications, 1998), 1.; Karen Cristensen and David Levinson, eds., *Encyclopedia of Community: From Village to the Virtual World* (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 262-263.

<sup>38</sup> For a good description of the strengths perspective, see: Dennis Saleebey, “Introduction: Power in the People” In,” in Saleebey, D., ed. *The Strengths Perspective in Social Work Practice*, ed. D. Saleebey, second edition , 3-20 (New York: Longman, 1997)., 3-20.

<sup>39</sup> Ann Weick, (1983), “Issues in Overturning a Medical Model of Social Work Practice,” *Social Work*, 28, (1983): 467-471.

<sup>40</sup> Saleebey, “Introduction,” 8-9

<sup>41</sup> Weick “Issues in Overturning,” 467.

workers, most of whom would take issue with the assumption of humanistic psychologists that social change is a direct result of self-actualization. “Problem-based assessments,” argue strengths perspective advocates, “encourage individualistic rather than social-environmental explanations of human problems.”<sup>42</sup>

### **ABSORPTION WITHIN WIDER CULTURE**

Of his friend, colleague and mentor, Richard Farson wrote in 1975, “[Carl] Rogers has always been a bit puzzled that he is taken more seriously in other fields than he is in his own field of psychology. Professionals from education, religion, nursing, medicine, psychiatry, law, business, government, public health, law enforcement, race relations, social work—the list goes on and on—all came to feel that here, finally was an approach which enabled them to succeed on the previously neglected human dimensions of their jobs, to reach the people for whom they felt responsible but were often unable to help.” Farson went on to detail the Rogers’ accomplishments, among them making psychology “the business of normal people” and convincing others of the innate human potential for growth and creativity. By prioritizing subjective experience and the value of the present, Rogers, along with other humanistic psychologists, offered an empowering vision of human nature that emancipated individuals, and groups, from the confines of more pathology-oriented psychological approaches.<sup>43</sup>

The greatest success of the Humanistic Psychology movement has also been the most elusive. The cultural residue of the ideas of humanistic psychologists, as transmitted through the human potential movement, spans from the personal to the institutional. In American “therapy culture,” the language of psychology is pervasive: ideas of self, growth, health, and relation and the theories of psychology inform personal and

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<sup>42</sup> Weick et al., “Strengths Perspective,” 351.

<sup>43</sup> Farson, “Carl Rogers,” xxx-xxxvi, quotation from xxx.

institutional practices of encouraging health, satisfaction and productivity.<sup>44</sup> As it did in the 1960s, the language of humanistic psychology provides the justification for the experiential applications associated with it. For example, contemporary practices of yoga are often explained in terms of growth, holism and self-actualization.<sup>45</sup>

Humanistic psychologists' theories and techniques have also, for better or worse, informed human management by corporations.<sup>46</sup> Most employees of major corporations have encountered the techniques of humanistic psychologists, in one form or another. These applications, ranging from employee retreats to seminars on sensitivity training, derive directly from the work of humanistic psychologists like Maslow and research institutions like NTL.<sup>47</sup> Of this legacy, some humanistic psychologists are proud, interpreting this application to be evidence of the humanization of business that resulted from the movement.<sup>48</sup> But others question the motives of corporations in employing humanistic psychology principles and techniques within management strategies.<sup>49</sup>

"The history of our work," wrote Farson, "is dotted with [...] examples of our unwittingly serving the interests of the more powerful against the less powerful." As in

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<sup>44</sup> Peggy Rosenthal, *Words and Values: Some Leading Words and Where they Lead Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 37-38.

<sup>45</sup> For an example of the use of the language as applied to the practice of yoga: B. K. S. Iyengar, John J. Evans and Douglas Abrams, "Light on Life: The Yoga Way Journey to Wholeness, Inner Peace and Ultimate Freedom," (New York: Rodale Books, 2005), xii.

<sup>46</sup> For a good overview of the impact of humanistic psychology in the workplace, and the research associated with it, see: Alfonso Montuori and Ronald Purser, "Humanistic Psychology in the Workplace," in <sup>46</sup> For a good overview of the impact of humanistic psychology in the workplace, and the research associated with it, see: Alfonso Montuori and Ronald Purser, "Humanistic Psychology in the Workplace," in Kirk J. Schneider, James F.T. Bugental & J Fraser Pierson, eds., *The Handbook of Humanistic Psychology: Leading Edges in Theory, Research, and Practice*, ed. Kirk J. Schneider, James F.T. Bugental, and J. Fraser Pierson (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2001).

<sup>47</sup> Maslow's ideas on the application of humanistic psychology theory to management were first published in *Eupsychian Management: A Journal* (Homewood, Illinois: R.D. Irwin, 1965) as a collection of journal entries and later in 1998, by his daughter, in 1998, as Abraham Maslow, *Maslow on Management* (New York: Wiley, 1998).

<sup>48</sup> Isaac Prilleltensky, "Humanistic Psychology, Human Welfare and the Social Order," *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*, 13 (4) (1992),: 319.

<sup>49</sup> Farson, "Technology of Humanism," 21.

the case of union leaders, who “intuitively knew that ‘communication’ cools out the oppressed worker, making it possible for management to maintain something approximating the status quo,” Farson argued that the leaders of corporations identified the potential efficacy of utilizing the language and techniques of humanistic psychology in promoting worker satisfaction and increasing productivity.<sup>50</sup> Another scholar suggests that in valorizing the use of humanistic psychology theory by corporations, humanistic psychologists confused a first order change with a second order change, that is, they mistook a mere change of form for a more radical change of structure.<sup>51</sup>

In the 1980s and 1990s, humanistic psychologists became more modest in their goals, and began to recognize that adoption of their perspective was more complex than they had once believed.<sup>52</sup> Meanwhile, participation in AHP and Division 32 continued to decline, and conferences became more infrequent (the last reported attendance figure was approximately 400 participants in AHP’s 1996 conference—down from 2500 in 1975).<sup>53</sup> However, both organizations optimistically persisted, as did the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*. Disconnected from academia and estranged from the cultural spotlight, humanistic psychologists more diligently focused on developing their research and reconceptualizing their future.<sup>54</sup>

Humanistic psychologists’ enthusiasm for their work has remained great.<sup>55</sup> And, in response to changed cultural conditions, some have predicted a resurgence of interest in the theories of humanistic psychologists.<sup>56</sup> Even without a renaissance, the founding concepts and criticisms of humanistic psychology remain relevant. And in a field driven

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>51</sup> Prilleltensky, “Humanistic Psychology,” 319.

<sup>52</sup> Anderson, *Upstart Spring*, 296; Walter Anderson, interview. by author, San Francisco, April 25, 2005.

<sup>53</sup> “A Chronology of AHP’s Annual Conferences,” <http://ahpweb.org/aboutahp/ahpcronology.html>.

<sup>54</sup> Taylor and Martin, “Humanistic Psychology at Crossroads,” 24.

<sup>55</sup> Maureen O’Hara, interview. by author, San Francisco, April 25, 2005.

<sup>56</sup> Taylor and Martin, “Humanistic Psychology at Crossroads,” 26.

by pathology, the popularity of contemporary theories like positive psychology and the strengths perspective suggest the nagging sense, on the part of mental health professionals, that a psychological orientation towards illness and a cultural orientation towards technological efficiency neglects a significant part of human psychology.

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- Let Their Be Light*. Directed by John Huston. Edgewood State Hospital, Commack, Long Island, New York: US Army Pictorial Services. Released December, 1980. Video.
- Serial*. Directed by Bill Perskey. Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures. Released March 28, 1980.

## **Vita**

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