# Annual Proceedings of the



Annual Meeting March 11-13, 1993 Orange Park, Florida

> Volume 1 June 1993

Editors of
Annual Proceedings
of the
Florida Conference of Historians
J. Clarke
Jacksonville University

Eric Thomas, asst. ed. Jacksonville University

Layout of the volume courtesy of Jacksonville University

Printing of the volume courtesy of
David Richards
and
Lake City Community College

## OFFICERS OF THE FLORIDA CONFERENCE OF HISTORIANS

President
Wayne Watters
St. Johns River Community College

President-Elect Virginia York Gulf Coast Community College

Past President
Owen Farley
Pensacola Junior College

Vice President
Joel York
St. Petersburg Community College, Clearwater

Permanent Secretary
David Mock
Tallahassee Community College

Permanent Treasurer
Will Benedicks
Tallahassee Community College

Local Arrangements Chair, 1993
Wayne Watters
St. Johns River Community College

Local Arrangements Chair, 1994 Virginia York Gulf Coast Community College

Local Arrangements Chair, 1995 Joel Finley St. Petersburg Community College, Clearwater

#### LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

This past March, the Florida College Teachers of History held its annual meeting at the Holiday Inn in Orange Park, Florida. At its Business Meeting, the conferees decided to change the name of our organization to "The Florida Conference of Historians" or, more pleasantly, "FCH." We also decided to publish annual proceedings starting with next year's meeting. At that point, knowing that I had a year to prepare, I volunteered to edit those proceedings. . . . Then it was decided to start with this year's meeting.

This decision began a confused scramble as presenters tried to whip their oral presentations into publishable shape. With little planning and working under tight time constraints, my job as editor has been particularly difficult. What are the "Rules of Engagement," as it were, of my position? I have aimed to limit my impact on the works included in this volume. I have tried to clean up the manuscripts essentially only where I thought necessary for clarity and, more frequently, for consistency of format and style throughout all the papers. In fairness to the authors, given the limited time, none has had a chance to comment on the changes I have inflicted upon their papers. I hope that they, and you, the readers, are satisfied.

I would like to thank Eric Thomas of Jacksonville University, for his capable assistance in this editing project.

Unfortunately, not all presenters were able to submit their papers for this first volume; we hope to do better next year. The 1993 program displayed a wide range of interests, and certainly augurs well for the future vitality of the FCH.

J. Calvitt Clarke III June 15, 1993

## FLORIDA COLLEGE TEACHERS OF HISTORY 1993 ANNUAL PROGRAM HOLIDAY INN, ORANGE PARK, FLORIDA

### HOSTED BY WAYNE WATTERS ST. JOHNS RIVER COMMUNITY COLLEGE

#### THURSDAY March 11

3:00-6:00 pm Registration

7:00-10:00 pm Informal reception

#### FRIDAY March 12

8:00-8:45 am Registration

8:45-9:00 am Conference Opening/Welcome

9:00-10:30 am Session IA

NEW WORLD ORDERS IN THE POST WAR WORLD:

WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II

CHAIR: Bill Martin, Florida Community College at Jacksonville

1. "An Anomaly Among Anomalies:" India's Entry into the League of Nations

Karl Schmidt, Florida State University

2. Arthur Vandenberg and the UN

Tom Campbell, Florida State University

3. The Truman Administration and NSC-68

Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College

9:00-10:30 am Session IB

THE DONS VERSUS THE ALDERMEN: THE BATTLE

BETWEEN TOWN AND GOWN

CHAIR: David M. Head, South Georgia College

1. The St. Scholastic Day Riot: Oxford After the Black Death Carol Miller, Tallahassee Community College

2. The Riots of Elizabethan Oxford

David Mock, Tallahassee Community College

11:00-12:00 am Business Meeting

12:00-1:00 pm Lunch

1:00-2:30 pm Session IIA
NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC RIVALRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD

CHAIR: Kyle Eidahl, Florida A&M University

 "Not as a People, but as Germans:" German and American Views on the Ethnic Impact of Imperialism Frank Baglione, Tallahassee Community College

2. Volcanic Islands: Ethnic Conflict in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka

John McTague, St. Leo College

3. Contemporary Eastern Europe in Historical Perspective: Another Look

Lynn Curtright, Tallahassee Community College

1:00-2:30 pm Session IIB

VIOLENCE AND REBELLION IN MODERN MEXICO

CHAIR: Glen Coston, Pensacola Junior College

 Resistance and Accommodation: The Working People of Guadalajara, Mexico, 1919-1929
 Burton Kirkwood, Florida State University

2. The Protection of American Lives and Property: The Sonora Crisis of 1915

Warrick Ridge Edwards, Tallahassee Community College

3:00-4:30 pm Session IIIA

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN FLORIDA CHAIR: Owen Farley, Pensacola Junior College

1. African-American Settlements in the Daytona Beach Area, 1866-1910

Leonard Lempell, Bethune-Cookman College

2. Social Relations in the Public Sector Workplace: The Tampa Firefighters, 1943-1979

Mark Wilkins, University of Florida

3:00-4:30 pm Session IIIB STUART ENGLAND

CHAIR: Janet Thompson, Tallahassee Community College

 The End of the Beginning: The Virginia Company of Plymouth and the Popham Colony, 1607-1608
 David M. Head, South Georgia College

2. A Bid for Land: The Duchess of Cleveland, the Earl of Essex and Phoenix Park
Rachelle Wadsworth, Florida State University

7:00 pm Banquet

SATURDAY, March 13 8:00-9:00 Continental Breakfast

9:00-10:30 am Session IVA
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN MODERN AMERICA
CHAIR: Neil Betten, Florida State University

1. Gwendolyn Sawyer Cherry: A Legislator Who Demanded to Spend a Night in Prison

Rod Waters, Florida State University

2. The Role of the Nixon Administration upon Black Higher

Education from 1968 to 1972

Keith Berry, Florida State University

 The 1967 Election in Jacksonville, Florida Abel Bartley, Florida State University

10:30-12:00 am Session VA
FORUM: THE ROLE OF AMERICA IN THE WORLD
Virginia York, Gulf Coast Community College
Joel Howell, Gulf Coast Community College

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

- "An Anomaly Among Anomalies:" India's Entry into the League of Nations
  by Karl J. Schmidt, Florida State University
  p. 1
- The Truman Administration and NSC-68 by Will Benedicks, Tallahassee Community College p. 14
- The St. Scholastic Day Riot: Oxford After the Black Death by Carol Miller, Tallahassee Community College p. 29
- The Riots of Elizabethan Oxford by David Mock, Tallahassee Community College p. 43
- "Not as a People, but as Germans:" German and American Views on the Ethnic Impact of Imperialism by Frank Baglione, Tallahassee Community College p. 53
- Volcanic Islands: Ethnic Conflict in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Sri Lanka
  by John McTague, St. Leo College
  p. 68
- The Protection of American Lives and Property: The Sonora Crisis of 1915 by Warrick Ridge Edwards, Tallahassee Community College p. 84

African-American Settlements in the Daytona Beach Area, 1866-1910 by Leonard Lempel, Bethune-Cookman College p. 108

The End of the Beginning: The Virginia Company of Plymouth and the Popham Colony, 1607-1608
by David M. Head, South Georgia College
p. 125

A Bid for Land: The Duchess of Cleveland, the Earl of Essex and Phoenix Park
by Rachelle Wadsworth, Florida State University
p. 139

The 1967 Election in Jacksonville, Florida by Abel Bartley, Florida State University p. 152

## "AN ANOMALY AMONG ANOMALIES" INDIA'S ENTRY INTO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Karl J. Schmidt Florida State University

On June 28, 1919, Edwin S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and H. H. Ganga Singh, the Maharaja of Bikaner, two of India's representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, signed the Treaty of Versailles, and in doing so they not only helped make peace with Germany but also entered India as a founding member of the League of Nations.\footnote{1} India's entry marked a dramatic change in its external status. As a non-sovereign colony of Great Britain, India's entry into the League would seem to be an odd thing indeed—a great trick played on the other countries represented at the Paris Peace Conference. It was not. Viewed in its historical context, India's membership was the product of a sequence of evolutionary events which began during the First World War and illustrated changing constitutional relationships within the British Empire.

The origins of India's membership in the League of Nations can be traced to a speech made by David Lloyd George, Britain's Prime Minister, to the House of Commons in December 1916. He proposed that an Imperial Conference, to be attended by British Dominions representatives, be held to discuss the war effort and further joint action. Sir Austen Chamberlain, then Secretary of State for India, claimed that India should also be represented at the Imperial Conference;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Versailles Protocol No. 2, June 28, 1919, British Documents on Foreign Affairs [hereafter cited as BDFA], ed. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 8, Doc. 5, 14.

he cited India's large contributions of men and matériel to Great Britain's war effort as the basis of that claim.<sup>2</sup>

For India, the opening of the Imperial Conference and the Imperial War Cabinet in late March 1917 became important turning points in the development of its status within the Empire. For the first time, India was represented not only by its Secretary of State but also by three other "assessors," two of whom were Indians. After several days of discussion at the Conference regarding the need for a postwar "readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire," Canada's Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, moved a resolution which claimed that the Dominions were entitled as a matter of right to consultation and participation in imperial foreign policy. One of India's delegates, Sir S. P. Sinha, stated that he supported the resolution but wished that it also include India. The Dominions agreed, and the resolution was accordingly altered and adopted.3 Granting this concession not only helped India, it also worked in the Dominions' favor. Observing that the stated objective of the Government of India was to move India toward self-government, the Dominions no doubt knew that, in their desire for greater autonomy within the British Empire, they could count on the support of India in the future.

In the fall of 1918, with the military situation in Europe finally favoring the Allies, the British War Cabinet began to discuss issues related to the conclusion of peace, including the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Minutes of 12th Meeting of War Cabinet, Dec. 20, 1916, PRO, CAB 23/1 (microfilm).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Canada, Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations [hereafter cited as DCER] (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1967), Vol. 1, 308-12.

League of Nations and the impending Peace Conference.<sup>4</sup> The War Cabinet subsequently recalled the Dominions and Indian representatives for consultation. Although India's representatives had been invited to discuss the peace preparations in London, it was not yet assured that they would actually be invited to attend the Peace Conference in Paris.

Meanwhile, British parliamentary elections were to take place later that month, and, in light of those impending elections, Lloyd George offered Montagu, the new Secretary of State for India and a Liberal M.P., incentives to ensure his continuing loyalties. Among these incentives were promises to back Indian constitutional reforms and to allow representatives of India to attend the Paris Peace Conference.<sup>5</sup>

When the Paris Peace Conference officially convened on January 18, 1919, the question of the status of the Dominions and India at the conference had not yet been settled. In early December, the French government had circulated a memorandum among the Allied Powers proposing a scheme of representation. At a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on December 31, 1918, the Australian Prime Minister, William H. Hughes, criticized the French scheme. He argued that, under the French proposals, the Dominions would receive less representation than most of the smaller Allied Powers, despite the former's larger contributions to the war. The other Dominions representatives agreed with Hughes. Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, felt that it would be "most unfortunate" if the British delegation were to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See Minutes of 481st and 496th Meeting of War Cabinet, Oct. 2 and Nov. 4, 1918, PRO, CAB 23/8 (microfilm).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Sir Algernon Rumbold, *Watershed in India: 1914-1922* (London: Athlone Press, 1979), 124; and Minutes of 41st Meeting of Imperial War Cabinet, Dec. 3, 1918, PRO, CAB 23/8 (microfilm).

comprised only of individuals from the British Isles. He then suggested that a panel system be devised whereby Dominion Prime Ministers could, on a rotational basis, be selected to sit on a delegation "representing the whole Empire at the Conference." Lloyd George agreed in principle to Borden's proposal but calculated that if Britain, the Dominions, and India were all fully represented at the plenary conference as Borden had earlier suggested, the British Empire would be represented by a total of twenty-three delegates. "In attempting to gain so full a representation," he warned, "we might run the risk of losing more than we gained." He agreed, however, to press the claims of the Dominions and India at the next meeting of the Allied leaders.

On January 12, 1919, the Allied leaders met as the Council of Ten to discuss the procedure to be adopted for the peace discussions. The Council agreed that each of the five Great Powers should have five representatives each, but some disagreement over the representation of other Powers ensued. Lloyd George suggested that the Dominions and India should be properly represented at the Peace Conference and that the best arrangement would be to reduce the smaller Allied Powers to two representatives each and then to place the Dominions and India on the same scale. The American president, Woodrow Wilson, agreed that two representatives would be sufficient for countries like Belgium and Greece, but he wondered if the Dominions and India could not be represented by "making the members of the British Delegation interchangeable." He feared that if the Dominions and India received separate representation, the smaller Powers would see them merely as additional British representatives and misinterpret this to mean that the Great Powers intended to run the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Minutes of 48th Meeting of Imperial War Cabinet, Dec. 31, 1918, PRO, CAB 23/8 (microfilm). See also Lord Derby's War Cabinet memorandum, GT 6568, PRO, CAB 24/72 (microfilm).

Peace Conference. Lloyd George retorted that the Great Powers had "run the war" and bluntly stated that the Dominions and India had sacrificed several hundreds of thousands of troops in battle--many more than any of the smaller Powers-and that to refuse to accord them separate representation would be resented. Wilson was still worried about the psychological effect of so many British Empire delegates, however, and, as a result, the negotiations over this issue dragged on for two more days.<sup>7</sup>

Fearing an impasse, later that week Wilson asked Lloyd George if he thought the Dominions and India would be satisfied with the following arrangement: two representatives each for Canada, Australia, and South Africa; one representative each for British India and the Indian States; and one representative for New Zealand. Lloyd George agreed that this seemed fair, and he said that he would inform the Dominions and India of the new proposal. The Dominions accepted the offer, but only grudgingly. India's representatives, however, were pleased by the offer. In being accorded two representatives, India had again gained a new status, taking "its place," as Montagu pointed out, "not below the Dominions, but among them, above New Zealand and Newfoundland." Once the question of representation had been settled, the Dominions and India concentrated on the business of helping make the peace. It was clear that the Great Powers were going to dominate most of the decision-making during the Peace Conference, but the Dominions and India each had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ten, Jan. 12, 1919, BDFA, Part 2, Series 1, Vol. 1, Doc. 48, 300-03; Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ten, Jan. 13, 1919, BDFA, Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 1, Doc. 50, 316-17.

an interest in the final settlement, ranging from the disposition of captured German colonies to the League of Nations.8

Organized interest in securing Dominion and Indian representation in the yet-to-be-created League of Nations predated the opening of the Paris Peace Conference, but all of the discussions held in London prior to the opening of the Peace Conference were more informative than deliberative and little of substance was accomplished. When the British Empire delegation arrived in Paris, the League idea had not evolved much beyond the proposals contained in the Cecil Draft and the position of the Dominions and India in the League was nebulous. The wording of the Cecil Draft did not permit the admission of any of the Dominions, and they claimed that to accept the document would be tantamount to renouncing all of the gains the Dominions had made at the Peace Conference thus far. Because the Cecil Draft was well on its way to becoming the official British statement on the League, the danger in complacency was that if the Dominions did not proclaim their dissatisfaction with the document, they might be excluded from the League altogether. In a strongly-worded memorandum circulated to the British Empire delegation, Borden criticized the Cecil Draft, and stated that the claim to membership of the League of Nations "the people of Canada will not forego. They would certainly and most unequivocally repudiate any acquiescence on the part of their representatives in its being ignored or denied."9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>British Empire Delegation minutes, No. 2, Jan. 20, 1919, BDFA, Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 3, Doc. 44, 332; Montagu to Chelmsford, Jan. 22, 1919, Edwin S. Montagu Papers, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collection [hereafter cited as OIOC], MSS EUR D 523/3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>See Minutes of 1st and 2nd Meeting of Committee on Position of Dominions and India in League of Nations, Jan. 1 and 3, 1919, DCER, Vol. 2, Docs. 22-23, 21-23; Doherty to Borden, Jan. 22, 1919, DCER, Vol. 2, Doc. 36, 35; and Sir Robert Borden, Memorandum on Draft Convention on

Meanwhile, as Borden carried on his battle for the inclusion of the Dominions as separate members in the League of Nations, Lord S. P. Sinha began his own fight for the inclusion of India in the League. He quickly prepared a memorandum for Montagu's use in which he argued that

If we look at the matter from the strict point of view of international law, the position of India is in no way different from that of the Dominions--not one of them is a Sovereign State, no one of them has 'foreign relations' independently of Great Britain and, according to the existing constitution, each of them is bound by declaration of war or peace by the parent State.

Sinha made several additional arguments in favor of India's inclusion in the League of Nations, among them that the Dominions and India had all been accorded the same right of representation at the Peace Conference; if one or all of the Dominions gained the right to join the League of Nations, he argued, then India should be accorded that right as well. Sinha also stated that the steady constitutional advance of India alongside the Dominions had "given keen satisfaction in India and helped enormously to ease the situation in that country." If the British government intended now at this late juncture to differentiate between India and the Dominions, Sinha declared, it would

be looked upon not only as a retrogression but a denial of privileges granted under the stress of war but withdrawn as soon as the pressure was removed. The political consequences of the exclusion of India would be deplor-

League of Nations, enclosure to Minister of Justice to Secretary, Committee on Position of Dominions and India in League of Nations, Jan. 27, 1919, DCER, Vol. 2, Doc. 47, 43-44; Lord Robert Cecil, Draft Convention on the League of Nations, Jan. 20, 1919, BDFA, Part 2, Ser. 1, Vol. 4, Doc. 27, 161.

able and would tend to undo much of the good effect recently produced. 10

Whereas Sinha had made legal and constitutional arguments in favor of India's inclusion in the League, his colleague on the Indian delegation, the Maharaja of Bikaner, favored a more emotional appeal and asked,

After having borne arms, together with other civilized nations, in a common cause while civilization and freedom hung in the balance and after having actually entered the portals of the peace temple, which is in itself a League of Nations, is India to be told to walk out as now no longer belonging to the civilized nations of the world?<sup>11</sup>

During the first week of February, the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference began its work on drafting the Covenant of the League. At the Commission's third meeting, held on February 5, the question of the wording of Article VI arose. Article VI dealt with the admission of members to the League of Nations and, for India, proved a sticking point. Woodrow Wilson proposed to amend Article VI by adding to the beginning of the second paragraph the phrase "Only self-governing States shall be admitted to membership in the League; Colonies enjoying full powers of self-government may be admitted...." This amendment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Minute by Sinha for S/S, Jan. 22, 1919, League of Nations files, Bundle E, File No. 6505, Records of the Office of the Private Secretary to the Maharaja of Bikaner, Shri Sadul Singhji Museum, Lallgarh Palace, Bikaner, Rajasthan, India [hereafter cited as Lallgarh Palace Archives].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Memorandum by Bikaner on India and the League of Nations, Feb. 2, 1919, ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Minutes of 3rd Meeting of League of Nations Commission, Feb. 5, 1919, *Papers of Woodrow Wilson* [hereafter cited as *PWW*], ed. Arthur S. Link, David W. Hirst, et al. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

was obviously intended, at least in part, to accommodate the British Dominions, but not India. Confronted with the prospect that India might be excluded from the League and apparently pledged by the Indian delegation to uphold their claims, Lord Cecil, a member of the League Commission, pressed Wilson for a decision on India's admission to the League of Nations. Mincing no words, he asked:

Does the President propose to admit India, or does he oppose her admission? It seems to me it should not be forgotten that during the war India mobilized a million men. (. . .) It is true that part of India is autocratically governed, yet it is willing to be so governed. And it cannot be denied that the greater part of India is democratically administered.

In reply, Wilson argued:

If we admit India, can we reject the Philippines? While we propose to grant the Filipinos their political freedom at the earliest practicable date, at present they are satisfied with their status, and I think it would be unwise to admit them to the League. . . . . 13

Whatever merit Cecil's arguments had, for Wilson and some of the other delegates on the Commission, the heart of the issue was still self-government. Earlier, Wilson had confided to Col. Edward House that he strongly objected to the inclusion of India in the League of Nations, because it was not self-governing. Wilson seemed unwilling to compromise on the issue of India, but Jan Smuts, the South African

<sup>1986),</sup> Vol. 54, 497.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Quoted in Stephen Bonsal, *Unfinished Business* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1944), 46, 157.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), 311.

defense minister, quietly offered him an acceptable way outone which would still preserve the President's stand on
principle. During the course of the debate on the definition of
"self-government," Smuts had astutely observed "that India
being one of the signatory Powers, would have automatically
a right to a delegate [in the League of Nations], therefore the
article would not apply to her, but to subject states or colonies
that might desire admittance to the League" in the future. In
the end, Wilson finally relented and declared that he had no
objection to India's admission to the League. 15

With Wilson's assurances on record, Cecil believed that, in the future, no argument would be made against India becoming an original signatory to the Covenant. Even if someone did make such an argument, he told Bikaner, as a last resort the British Empire delegation could always insist that India be included in the protocol. 16 Not content to let the matter rest there, Bikaner met with Cecil, Lord Balfour, and finally with President Wilson, to affirm their personal assurances in securing India's membership of the League of Nations. 17 Montagu was delighted that Bikaner had spoken with the U.S. president, and reported to Lord Chelmsford, the Viceroy, that the Maharaja had

covered himself with glory, gained the point, even bearding and obtaining the necessary answer from the great President Wilson himself! (. . .) The whole proceeding appears to have concluded by Bikaner displaying to the Big Five the tiger tattooed on his arm, which was inspect-

<sup>15</sup>Bonsal, Unfinished Business, 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Cecil to Bikaner, Feb. 14, 1919, League of Nations files, Bundle E, File No. 6505, Lallgarh Palace Archives.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Cypher telegram from Bikaner to Montagu, Feb. 17, 1919, ibid.

ed and approved not only by Clemenceau, but by Orlando and Wilson. Thus we make peace with Germany!<sup>18</sup>

Four months later, when the treaty was presented to the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference on June 28, 1919, India was expressly included as a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles and was named in the Annex of the Covenant of the League of Nations as an original member.

From the perspective of its critics, outside observers, and even supporters, India's entry into the League of Nations seemed a curious affair. How could India be admitted to an international organization, the purpose of which was to regulate the behavior of sovereign states, when India itself was a non-sovereign colony? The answer lies in the pressures and rhetoric of the war, in the actions of a few key individuals, and in dramatic changes in the structure of the British Empire.

First, when the war began, Indians overwhelmingly and enthusiastically supported Great Britain. Even ardent nationalists like Gandhi took an active part in the war effort. While the British government gratefully accepted Indian support, it soon became clear to them that some symbol of that gratitude had to be forthcoming, or else further Indian support for the war might stop.

Second, Allied rhetoric throughout the war was busy condemning the German government for its autocracy, repression, and general lack of principles. It would have seemed hypocritical for the British government, therefore, to stifle the desire of Indians for a say in the affairs of the Empire even as thousands of Indian soldiers died on the blood-soaked battlefields of northern France in the effort to help

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Private letter from Montagu to Chelmsford, Feb. 18, 1919, OIOC, MSS EUR D 523/3, 41.

"make the world safe for democracy." That was the first step. The second step, that of having a say in the affairs of the world, was a natural outgrowth of the first.

Third, a number of individuals played important roles in the advancement of India's external status. Whatever his motives. Austen Chamberlain deserves some credit for making the effort to obtain for Indians the right to help decide imperial policy. Montagu deserves even greater recognition because of his genuine sincerity in advancing India's status both at the Imperial Cabinet meetings of 1918 and at the Paris Peace Conference. Indeed, as later events would prove, Montagu expended the better part of his political capital with Lloyd George by pressing for India's claims. Some credit for the advance of India's status should also go to Sir Robert Borden. Although he was primarily concerned with the advancement of Canada's status within the Empire, his actions nonetheless made it easier for India's advocates to press their claims. Finally, Lord S. P. Sinha and H. H. Ganga Singh, the Maharaja of Bikaner, deserve recognition for their tireless efforts in promoting and increasing India's status. vigorous participation and politicking in the Imperial War Cabinet and at the Paris Peace Conference demonstrated to the skeptical and arrogant that Indians were fully capable of grappling with important issues logically, thoughtfully, and intelligently.

Finally, during the war, the Dominions increased their drive towards complete self-government, not just internally, but externally as well. Canada, as the oldest Dominion, led the way for the others in wresting from Great Britain that which it seemed reluctant to share: power over the Empire. As constitutional structures changed, so too did the status of the Dominions. This was most visible in external affairs, where the Dominions charted an independent course, while remaining at the same time within the orbit of the British Empire. When the Dominions signed the Treaty of Versailles

in 1919 and became members of the League of Nations, they became anomalies within the international system. This anomalous change in Dominion status also spilled over onto India, but because India was non-sovereign, the changes within the Empire affected it in a slightly different way. When India signed the Versailles treaty and consequently became a member of the League of Nations, it became in the words of David Hunter Miller, a U.S. legal expert at the Peace Conference, "an anomaly among anomalies." 19

\*\*\*

Karl J. Schmidt, who received his MA degree in International Affairs from Florida State University, is now a PhD candidate in Modern South Asian history at FSU with minor fields in Chinese history, Modern British history, and U. S. history. He has been researching in Britain, India, and Pakistan for his dissertation, "India's Role in the League of Nations, 1919-1939." He is the author of An Atlas of South Asian History (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe) which will be out in 1994.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), Vol. 1, 493.

### THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND NSC-68

## Will Benedicks Tallahassee Community College

The year 1949 witnessed the overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist government by the communist forces of Mao Tsetung and Soviet Russia's first atomic bomb detonation. These two events reinforced upon President Harry S Truman and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson certain conclusions they had reached concerning their foreign policy program. In April 1950, the National Security Council issued report number sixty-eight (NSC-68), a blueprint for rearmament and for a global policy of containing communism by force when deemed necessary by the Executive. In essence, NSC-68 reorganized American foreign policy following the administration's viewpoint, and became, in effect, a vehicle for their ideas.

That Russia was a monolithic giant moving toward world domination was one of the significant conclusions reached by the Truman administration in regard to United States foreign policy. The President and his advisors understood the Russian intention to be the spread of the Marxist doctrine by all means available: political, subversive, economic, and when deemed advantageous, military. Accordingly, this dynamic expansion of communism had at its root the need to eliminate the United States which, as the defender of world freedom, was the only major threat to the Kremlin's designs. Created on October 1, 1949, the communist People's Republic of China was regarded

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2: 1900 to the Present, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1978), 243.

as one more brick in the Kremlin foundation and was seen as a warning signal to America by the Truman administration.<sup>2</sup>

Russian expansion could have been viewed less seriously because of America's nuclear monopoly. On August 29, 1949, however, Soviet scientists detonated an atomic device, which radically altered America's military and diplomatic strategy. No longer would it be possible to trust the deterrent effect of a thinly dispersed conventional military force backed by nuclear capabilities.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Kremlin's intent to expand communism assumed a very real, imminent threat to America, and as such necessitated a radical reassessment of its foreign policy.

One segment of policy brought into immediate focus concerned America's nuclear diplomacy and capabilities. On the diplomatic level, the United States had enjoyed a nuclear monopoly and was trying to protect it through a call for international control with Russia of atomic weapons. According to Deputy Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk, this created a situation that resulted in considerable confusion on the issue.<sup>4</sup>

On the military level, a debate had been in progress among members of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on the development of a "super" weapon, the hydrogen bomb. The Soviet explosion added impetus to those lobbying for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Harold F. Gosness, Truman's Crises, A Political Biography of Harry S Truman (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 437.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Gaddis Smith, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. 16: Dean G. Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, Inc., 1972), 149-50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. 1: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 9.

weapon: so much so that by January 1950, the Atomic Energy Commissioners reversed their October 1949 position and called for the development of the hydrogen bomb. This was a change that Secretary of State Acheson readily accepted, in keeping with his foreign policy perspective.

A direct byproduct of Acheson's decision, but not the only reason for it, was the resignation on January 1, 1950 of George Kennan, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff. Kennan, who agreed with J. Robert Oppenheimer that the bomb should not be developed, argued against the administration's concept of Russia's wanting to expand communism at all costs. He believed that Russia was not prepared to go to war for expansion, and, consequently, there was no need to develop the bomb. Or if that was not feasible, Kennan, taking up Oppenheimer's suggestion, wished to use the threat of the bomb's development to coerce Russia to a nuclear limitation agreement. Kennan was unable to reach an accord with Secretary Acheson. The situation was rectified by Paul Nitze, a team player and supporter of administration policies, who succeeded Kennan as Director of Policy Planning.

Within one month of Nitze's appointment, President Truman, following the recommendations of a Special Committee on the Development of Thermonuclear Weapons, issued his January 31, 1950 directive instructing the AEC to "deter-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>George F. Kennan, "Is War with Russia Inevitable, Five Solid Arguments for Peace," *The Department of State Bulletin* 22 (Feb. 20, 1950): 267-71, 303.

Smith, American Secretaries, 154.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>D. C. Acheson and D. S. Mclellen, eds., Among Friends, Personal Letters of Dean Acheson (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1980), 157; Sam Postbrief, "Departure from Incrementalism in U.S. Strategic Planning: The Origins of NSC-68," Naval War College Review (Apr./May 1980): 34-57.

mine the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon . . . and the necessary ordinance and carrier program concurrently." The directive also stated that the President would, "indicate publicly the intention of this government to continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon." Most importantly, it declared,

That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a re-examination of our objectives in peace and war and the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear capability of the Soviet Union.<sup>8</sup>

The final result of this directive was "A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," dated April 14, 1950 and given the file number sixty-eight (NSC-68). As a document, the report detailed the basic purpose of the United States in opposing the Soviet Union's fundamental design for conquest. It further examined the economic growth, both actual and potential, of both nations with an emphasis on military capability. The report also compared American and Soviet atomic weaponry capability and their stockpiles. At the same time the document explored the question of atomic energy control. NSC-68 also assessed four possible courses of United States action based on its findings: continuing current policy with no increase in defense spending, returning to isolationism, fighting a war with Russia, or rapidly building political, economic, and military strength in the free world.9

Succinctly, the report described an aggressive Russia with designs on world domination that was marshalling all of its

<sup>\*</sup>Foreign Relations, 1: 111, 513.

<sup>\*</sup>Ibid., 234-92.

military and economic resources for the day when it must confront its main adversary, the United States. As a result, the United States was steadily losing the military and economic superiority it had enjoyed after World War II. Of the four options listed above, NSC-68 concluded that the only acceptable course of action open to the United States was a rapid buildup of political, economic, and military strength in the free world. This was the Truman administration's viewpoint re-echoed; a strong line must be drawn to contain communism. Thus, the report's recommendations were in exact agreement with President Truman's and Secretary of State Acheson's foreign policy. On As such, the NSC-68 report was considered almost perfect and was never truly open to reconsideration.

It is with this perspective that the draft review process for NSC-68 must be examined. Prior to its release, the administration received inputs on the draft summary from two source areas: the state-defense review group and certain assistant undersecretaries of state. Once the report was released, one major source area was consulted, the Ad-Hoc Committee of NSC-68.

The state defense review group consisted of a number of important officials. From the State Department: Paul H. Nitze, Director of Policy Planning Staff; R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant Secretary of State; Carlton Savage; George Butler; and Harry S. Schwartz, all members of the policy planning staff. The Defense Department members were: Major General Burns, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs; Major General Landon, Member of the Joint Chief of Staff Advisory Committee; Mr. Najeeb E.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1950 [hereafter cited as Public Papers, HST] (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1965), 2-11.

Halaby, Director Office of Military Affairs; and Mr. Robert Lebaron, Assistant to Secretary of Defense on Atomic Energy Affairs. The lone National Security Council representative to the review group was James S. Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.<sup>11</sup> The group conferred with six specialists during the review process.

These specialists all agreed in general with the draft summary of NSC-68. Perhaps that is why there is no significant difference between the draft copy they read and the report as it was issued in April! Another valid explanation is that the report reflected the views of the administration on foreign policy and, therefore, was not open to change in principle. Rather, the report was used by the administration as a sounding board for inputs into possible considerations in making NSC-68 more acceptable to both Congress and the public. 12

Via memoranda to Secretary of State Acheson, the administration next received inputs on a draft summary of NSC-68 from certain key undersecretaries.<sup>13</sup> The first was from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Llewellyn Thompson, who stated "The conclusions do not flow logically from analysis and some of the most important suggestions in the paper are not directly supported by the analysis." He also recognized the need to have a national policy with full support of the administration, Congress, and

<sup>11</sup> Foreign Relations, 1: 168-292.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 1: n.7, 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Ibid., 1: 210.

the public. He advised that "a board of commissioners" ought "to review the conclusions of NSC-68."14

John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, was the next to submit his opinion. He agreed with the report, subject to certain conditions. Mr. Hickerson believed that the principal allies of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, should be considered before a decision was reached. These nations should concur with the conclusions and match the efforts of the United States. If they did not, the United States should reexamine its position. Another major problem brought out by Hickerson was that the "development of an adequate political and economic framework for achievement of long range objectives" was not clearly spelled out.<sup>15</sup>

On April 4, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorpe, in his appraisal of the summary draft wrote:

One underlying assumption in the report is the U.S.S.R. is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States. In so far as the evidence in this report is concerned, I do not feel that this proposition is demonstrated, but rather the reverse. 16

From this perspective a reanalysis of the paper and its conclusions might have been in order. The administration, however, viewed the findings from a different direction: If the United States was capable of generating more economic

<sup>14</sup>Tbid., 1: 213-14.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 1: 216-17.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 1: 218-19.

strength than the report stated, then the country would be able to shoulder more easily the thirty-five to fifty billion dollar defense budget envisioned by it.<sup>17</sup>

In general agreement, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Raymond A. Hare, wrote that the report should take into account less tangible considerations which might temper the conclusions reached. Specifically, Mr. Hare speculated whether there might not be a point in Soviet expansion (China) beyond which the benefits to the Kremlin would turn to disadvantages. He also proposed making the cold war warmer by infusing into it ideological principles to give it meaning and create public support of the draft conclusions.<sup>18</sup>

This repeated concern for public support resulted in further administration campaigning. The period between March and June 1950 was laden with speeches by the President and his Secretary of State repeating the need for a bipartisan foreign policy and voicing concern over the communist threat to the country.<sup>19</sup>

However, a closer scrutiny of the concern over the communist threat of this period concludes that NSC-68 was one case where the threats to the national security of the United States were oversold.<sup>20</sup> With regard to the repeated calls for a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Postbrief, "Departure from Incrementalism," 49.

<sup>18</sup> Foreign Relations, 1: 220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Public Papers, HST., 11-275; Smith, American Secretaries, 161, 163, 165.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Postbrief, "Departure from Incrementalism," 51.

bipartisan approach to foreign policy, Secretary Acheson, reflecting in 1969 on the 1948 Congress, stated,

We were learning again, what everyone in the executive branch since Washington's day had learned, that to advise and consult with Congress is next to impossible... to devise a joint approach to a complicated and delicate matter of foreign policy is not within the range of normally available time and people.<sup>21</sup>

Senate Minority Leader Arthur Vandenberg, in a letter to a constituent, explained that the government policy concerning aspects of foreign policy was never bipartisan.<sup>22</sup> All of this indicates that the administration had to utilize all of its tools at hand to insure implementation of its foreign policy vehicle, NSC-68.

The United States Minister in Paris, Charles A. Bohlen, was a man of considerable importance to the administration in assessing Russian motives. A Russian specialist, Mr. Bohlen was returned to Washington in March to participate in preparation of the state-defense study. His assessment of the conclusions reached in NSC-68 was, "they were unchallengeable." But he believed the fundamental design of the Kremlin. world domination, was overstated. Such a premise, he contended, led to the conclusion that war is inevitable. Bohlen felt it would be more correct to state that the Soviet fundamental design was maintenance of the regime in the country and extension throughout the world to a degree possible without incurring risks to the internal regime. He felt there was too much emphasis on the atomic bomb, both militarily and politically. Furthermore, he asked for a detailed description of what would be needed in the political, economic, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Smith, American Secretaries, 148.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>A. H. Vandenberg, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), 453.

military fields to enhance the United States' chance of success in the cold war. He emphasized that conventional war strength, especially in defensive weapons, be the focus of the military buildup. This would reduce the risk of provocation, counter Soviet propaganda against United States offensive weapons, require smaller armies and consequently strain the economy less. On the issue of cost he was candid: there was no way the report's recommendations for huge increases in military spending would be adopted by Congress.<sup>23</sup>

Mr. Bohlen's call for a reduction in military expenditures was also the main tenet of Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barett, who proclaimed that the draft summary points to a gigantic armament race, a huge buildup of conventional arms that quickly become obsolescent, a greatly expanded military establishment in being. As a result, he continued,

A vast opposition among informed people . . . the public would rapidly tire of such an effort. In the absence of real and continuing crises a dictatorship can unquestionably out-last a democracy in a conventional arms race.

To counter this expected resistance he explained the need to time the announcement to the public of the program to coincide with the "right atmosphere," a full buildup of public awareness to the problem. He emphasized that not much time should pass between the public awareness and the setting forth of the government program to solve the problem.<sup>24</sup>

The concern voiced by the Assistant Secretaries centering on the necessary military budget was a point that Secretary Acheson agreed with. Yet, in his thinking a dichotomy existed: on one hand there was practically no expectation that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Foreign Relations, 1: 271-275.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 1: 225-26.

the spending levels would ever be approved. On the other, the word "afford" struck him as silly; the one thing no nation could afford was an insufficient defense. Therefore, it bordered on insanity for governments to adjust military requirements to the budget rather than the other way around. Secretary Acheson hoped a medium between these two extremes could be reached. So did President Truman, who believed that the defense program outlined in NSC-68, "definitely was not as large in scope as some people seemed to think." Nevertheless, Presidential concern over this issue was established in a series of speeches from early May to June in which he called for an increased military budget. 27

With Assistant Secretary Barett's memorandum, the administration had completed a review of the NSC-68 draft from two separate source areas, the review group of special consultants and certain key Assistant Secretaries in the State Department. It had received solid suggestions for policy rethinking in most areas and for taking a more flexible position. But on April 14, 1950, unaffected and unchanged by all of the criticisms, National Security Council Report number sixty-eight was released.

Two days prior, the President requested the NSC to provide him with further information on the implications of the conclusions of NSC-68. He was anxious that the Council give him "a clearer indication of the programs . . . including estimates of the probable cost." In particular, he wanted the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>David S. McClellan, Dean Acheson: State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976), 272; Smith, American Secretaries, 162.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>James I. Matray, "America's Reluctant Crusade: Truman's Commitment of Combat Troops in the Korean War," *Historian* (May 1980), 441.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Public Papers, HST, 297, 445, 453.

Council to consult the Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.<sup>28</sup> The Ad-Hoc Committee on NSC-68 was established on April 20, 1950. It would be the third area of input to the administration.

The administration, pleased with the Council's work on NSC-68, was looking to its implementation and wanted the Ad-Hoc Committee to provide helpful information. A perusal of the three main considerations of the Committee supports this thesis: timing, implications of NSC-68, and the formulation of the programs under NSC-68. The President and his staff were moving at an accelerated pace toward the establishment of their new foreign policy program. They soon would be jolted.<sup>29</sup>

On May 8, the Deputy Chief of the Bureau of the Budget, William F. Schaub, addressed a memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, James S. Lay, Jr. The memo, per the President's directive of April 12, contained the Bureau's comments on NSC-68. The general conclusion was:

No cause of action is without risks, but the risks in this proposed course are not adequately considered. The type of military program seemingly implied . . . most certainly raises serious questions. This is even more true of the document as a whole which appears basically, despite general statements in other directions, to point down the road of principal reliance on military force which can only grow in its demand over time, as well as scarcely fail to lose the cold war.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Foreign Relations, 1: 235.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Ibid., 1: 297.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Ibid., 1: 298-306.

On the same day, while trying to internalize the response of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Lay received the comments of the Council of Economic Advisors from Mr. Hamilton Q. Dearburn. The council raised three basic questions:

- 1. The adequacy of the intelligence data and analysis on which rested the conclusions as to the current status of, and trends in, the relative strength of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
- 2. The degree to which the policy conclusions of NSC-68 are best adopted to remedy the deficiencies disclosed by analysis.
- 3. The best programs, and their cost and economic considerations, for implementing these policy conclusions, or alternative policy conclusions.<sup>31</sup>

Later in the month, the National Security Resources Board detailed an estimate of all the costs needed to implement NSC-68. It would be extremely expensive, especially in light of the proposed impending military conflict with the Soviet Union.<sup>32</sup>

These reports finally resulted in a reaction within the administration. The Undersecretary Advisory Committee, composed of certain principal officers of the State Department, and used to provide high level guidance on major foreign policy problems, met on June 6. The committee opined that NSC-68,

should concentrate on the political, psychological and defensive mechanisms to prevent dropping of bombs and an outbreak of war. We must proceed with the assumption that we cannot do everything and should concentrate only on those things which set the above pattern. We must reject the idea that we are fighting a war tomorrow

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 1: 306-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Ibid., 1: 316-23.

because when planning is done with that assumption, the inevitable result will be to make that assumption come true.<sup>33</sup>

The Truman Administration realized that the political ideology expressed in NSC-68 might be too idealistic and started to move toward a more realistic, pragmatic solution of foreign policy issues. Whether the administration made this move to facilitate the passage of the policy package or because of an actual shift in their perceptions of alternate solutions of the problem they confronted will never be known.

On June 24, 1950 the communist forces of North Korea, with Stalin's approval, attacked across the 38th parallel invading South Korea--a nation the United States was committed to support. For the administration, American national security now seemed to demand the adaptation and rapid implementation of NSC-68. The Korean War confirmed the analysis and conclusions of NSC-68 and as a result provided a carte blanche for it. It is ironic that the very kind of aggression against which NSC-68 was designed to function would make possible its implementation. Or, as Secretary Acheson succinctly stated, "Korea moved a great many things from the realm of theory into the realm of actuality and urgency."

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 1: 323-24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Alan Cooperman, "Cold War," Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 14, 1993, 5A.

<sup>35</sup> Matray, "America's Reluctant Crusade," 454.

<sup>×</sup>Ibid.

Dr. Benedicks, a former president of the Florida Conference of Teachers of History and now the permanent treasurer of the FCH, in 1989 received his PhD from Florida State University in U. S. diplomatic history. He recently published an essay, "Building Better Bridges," in the Organization of American Historians' Newsletter. Dr. Benedicks has taught at Tallahassee Community College for nine years.

#### THE ST. SCHOLASTICA DAY RIOT OXFORD AFTER THE BLACK DEATH

## Carol M. Miller Tallahassee Community College

One of the worst riots in the history of Oxford began on February 10, 1355--St. Scholastica's Day. That day, a Tuesday, was a non-lecture day. Two of the scholars, Walter Spryngeheuse and Roger de Chesterfield, went for a drink at the Swyndolnestok Tavern. Neither was a fuzzy-cheeked adolescent--they both seem to have held benefices in the west of England, which no doubt they rarely saw. At any rate, these scholars did not like the wine they were served, and they complained to the taverner, John Croidon. "Snappish" words were exchanged. The scholars ended by throwing their wine in Croidon's face and beating him up.

Croidon rallied his family and friends, and the disturbance spread. Town bailiffs requested Spryngeheuse and Chesterfield to make amends, but they would not. The mayor, John

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Accounts of the riot are to be found in Charles Edward Mallet, History of the University of Oxford, Vol. 1 (New York: Longmans, Green, 1924-28); H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, Vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936); A History of the County of Oxforde, ed. Alan Crossley, Vol. 4, The City of Oxford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), in the Victoria History of the Counties of England; and in W. A. Pantin, "The St. Scholastica Day's Riot," in Oxford Life in Oxford Archives (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 99-106. There are certain variations in these sources which I have tried to harmonize in my account; in the interests of space, these differences are frequently left unnoted.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>A. B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, 3 vols. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957-1959), s.v. Spryngeheuse and Chesterton.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Anthony Wood, quoted in Rashdall, Universities of Europe, 96.

de Bereford, asked the Chancellor of the university, John Charlton, to arrest his wayward scholars. The mayor could not take action against them himself, because all university personnel were clerics and outside his jurisdiction. They were not arrested. Instead, the students rang the bell at St. Mary's, and two hundred of them rallied around Spryngeheuse and Chesterfield, who allegedly assaulted the mayor and others. The Chancellor fled the skirmish. A university account says that the students stood fast, and the laity withdrew. In this way, the first day of violence ended.

The next day, Wednesday, Mayor Bereford rode to Woodstock to lay a complaint before King Edward III, who chanced to be in residence there at the time. Chancellor Charlton began the day by ordering his scholars to keep the peace, but, according to town accounts, the scholars instead closed the gates, fired the town, robbed the homes of the Oxford people, and killed and wounded many. Townspeople responded by breaking into a disputation at the Augustinian friars' house. At dinner, when scholars went out to exercise in the fields, they were attacked with bows by 80 townsmen, who had sheltered in St. Giles Church. It seems that it was now that the first deaths of the riot occurred.

In the meanwhile, Bereford was allegedly rallying the people in the country west of Oxford with the help of Richard Forester and Robert Lardiner. Two thousand countryfolk came into town Wednesday afternoon, bearing a black banner as though the king were dead, crying, "slay, slay, havok,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>"Planctus universitatis," in *Collectanea*, 3rd series, ed. Montagu Burrows (Oxford: printed for the Oxford Historical Society at the Clarendon Press, 1896), 172.

havok, smite fast, give good knocks."<sup>5</sup> The scholars held them back until they had run out of weapons; that, at least, is how the university explained their retreat.<sup>6</sup> The laity pursued them, shouting "bycheson cum forth" as they sacked the scholars' halls.

Thursday morning, it was Chancellor Charlton who rode to the king at Woodstock. That day, while he was away, was the worst day of the riot. The townsmen and country people sacked another fourteen halls. Scholars were hurt and killed, and some were scalped in mockery of their clerical tonsure and were thrown bleeding and untended into prison. Halls were ransacked, and the property of their tenants, including books, clothes, and more exotic items, were carried away. Friars tried to calm the riot by forming a procession bearing a pyx with a consecrated host. The townspeople responded by attacking some scholars even as they clung to the pyx, and (according to university sources) throwing the host down. When it was all over, protected by Merton's walls, some of the scholar-residents of the halls remained. The rest of the university fled away from Oxford.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Ibid., 173; Pantin, "St. Scholastica," 100. Other documentary evidence is in J. E. T. Rogers, Oxford City Documents, Financial and Judicial, 1268-1665 (Oxford: printed for the Oxford Historical Society at the Clarendon Press, 1891), and in Medieval Archives of the University of Oxford, ed. H. E. Salter, Vol. 1 (Oxford: printed for the Oxford Historical Society at the Clarendon Press, 1917).

<sup>6&</sup>quot;Planctus," 173.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Mallet, History of the University of Oxford, 160.

Rashdall, Universities of Europe, 99.

When the riot had ended, King Edward appointed a commission of judges to investigate. Both town and university surrendered their charters into the king's hands, but the university soon got its charter back. To the king, the university was a source of clerks, famous for their learning, who contributed to the direction of the state. He felt that clerks and government must exist in a symbiotic relationship, for learning regulates military power, which would otherwise be a rudderless ship. He

Oxford's restored charter reconfirmed the rights and liberties of the university. Moreover, for the public good and to encourage them to return to Oxford, King Edward gave scholars and their servants immunity from prosecution for any felonies, robberies, arson, or trespass they had committed. 12 One thus inevitably infers that the university's people were not entirely blameless for the riot. In spite of all these concessions, students were still reluctant to return. In the summer, Edward had to repeat his assertions that the scholars would be protected, even if they had committed transgressions in those days of violence. He also had to assure students that they would be free to seek to recover their property. students and masters returned to Oxford from Stamford and the other places where they had fled. One consequence of all this is that until the 19th century, Oxford MAs had to swear at their inception not to lecture at Stamford, or anywhere else

Oxford City Documents, 267-68.

<sup>10</sup> Medieval Archives, 148.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 152.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 153.

except Oxford.<sup>13</sup> There would never be another dispersion, not if the university could help it.

The town did not fare so well at the king's hands. Unlike the university, the town had no standing as a provider of rudders for the state, and clearly it had been the aggressor, at least at the height of the riot. When Oxford received its charter back, and there is some question when it actually did recover its charter, 14 its privileges had been curtailed. Many of the responsibilities which once had pertained to town government would henceforth be assigned to the university. 15 A major acquisition was control of the assizes of bread and ale, a job which the university had previously shared with the The university would also keep streets clean and repaired, a job seemingly neglected when it had been left to The university would assess taxes not just for scholars, but for servants, bookmakers, illuminators, and other dependents associated with the university. Its powers in keeping the peace were extended, if necessary, by confiscating arms. Beyond these political losses, the town was fined £250, over and above the restitution of the goods stolen during the outbreak. John de Bereford, who was in prison at the time for his part in inciting the riot, was to be released on bail to oversee to the equitable levying and collecting of that sum. 16 Although the town as corporation suffered substantial losses, it is not clear that anyone was actually executed for the

<sup>13</sup>Oxford City Documents, 246.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 253-57.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>The university received its privileges back in a charter of June 27, 1355, contained in *University Archives*, 152-57.

<sup>16</sup> Medieval Archives, 159-60.

outrages. Bereford himself was out of prison by 1356 and died a prosperous and loyal son of the church.

The king punished the town of Oxford quickly: the Church, in the person of the Bishop of Lincoln, also struck promptly. Oxford was under an interdict for over a year. It was finally lifted in 1357.17 As penance, the mayor of Oxford and sixty-one other leading citizens were required to attend a Mass each year, on the anniversary of the riot, to pray for the souls of those killed. During the Mass, the citizens each offered a penny; 40p went to scholarships, and the rest to the curate of St. Mary's. A pence a day would feed a poor scholar in the fourteenth century. After the Reformation, the Mass became a homily, but the penance continued. Around 1800, one mayor became mulish about this tradition. He refused to pay his 40p, and the university sued him for 100 marks, which the university maintained was the original sum fined.18 Not until 1825 was the town released from this annual humiliation and allowed to forget that, while the laity had won the riot, the university had won the grim aftermath.

So run the accounts of the riot and its consequences. It is easy, very easy, to lose sight of how traumatic these three days must have been when the historian's sources are lengthy Latin jingles or Middle English exclamations. Archaic trappings of the sources obscure the deadliness of the violence; in terms of proportion of population involved, the St. Scholastica riot ranks with a modern urban American riot. Three days in 1355 would govern relations between Oxford University and Oxford town for centuries afterward. It seems worth-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Oxford City Documents, 259-67.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 247.

while, then, to ask just why matters should have come to such an impasse in 1355.

To most it seems clear enough. Medieval people generally, and students particularly, were violent. As one eminent historian of the medieval university remarked,

there is probably not a single yard of ground in any part of the classic High Street that lies between St. Martin and St. Mary's which has not, at one time or another, been stained with blood. There are historic battlefields on which less has been spilt.<sup>19</sup>

This may very well be true, but all that spilled gore was normally spilled by student fighting student, or some sort of combination of student and townsman attacking some other sort of combination. For instance, in 1306, two clerks and two lay people acting together began a tavern fight; they were led by a townsman.<sup>20</sup> Around twenty years before the St. Scholastica's riot, there had been a minor dispersion of the university after a riot between northern and southern nations within the university. Such outbreaks between north and south seem to have been endemic at medieval Oxford. regulations at Oxford halls have much to say about preventing fights, but the transgressions which are fined-bearing a knife unsheathed to dinner, or making disparaging remarks about another's place of origin, for instance--speak of the fear of violence between student and student, not between student and town.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Rashdall, quoted in Oxford Life, 102.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>J. I. Catto, "Citizens, Scholars, and Masters," in *The History of the University of Oxford*, Vol. 1, *The Early Oxford Schools*, ed. J. I. Catto (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 168.

Granted, townspeople had early learned to associate students with disorder. Like many modern universities, Oxford had its share of shady types who slept serenely during the day when they should have been attending lectures, only to sally forth at night to pick tavern fights or rob the luckless wayfarer. The problem was aggravated because, in the first years of the university's existence, all one had to do to claim to be a student was to shave a tonsure on the crown of his head.

This, however, is precisely why matriculation was required in 1231—that those claiming to be scholars should sign themselves on the rolls of a master who was to ensure their attendance at lectures and to superintend their behavior. This was an early attempt to provide control; later efforts depended more upon controlling students through their lodgings.

It is true that most students in fourteenth-century Oxford did not live in college. There were only six secular colleges in 1355, and these were primarily intended to give masters, not students, a place to live and study. Probably the number of students accommodated in colleges was well below 100.<sup>21</sup>

However, halls were common at this time. Halls began as cooperative housing: students pooled their resources and rented a house. The affairs of the hall were put in the hands of a principal, who saw first to financial arrangements-collecting rent from lodgers and then paying it to the hall's owner, often a local religious house. As hall life developed, the principal might take on responsibility for organizing communal life. Obviously, the degree of discipline maintained varied from hall to hall, and the halls suffered from the disadvantage of impermanence. Yet generally, halls were recognized as a way of exerting some control over Oxford

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Oxford Life in Oxford Archives, 104.

scholars.<sup>22</sup> The third housing choice, and the one least favored, was to rent a room in the home of a town resident. These people who lived apart in lodgings were known as "chamberdeacons" and frequently were pseudo-students. This living arrangement was officially frowned on, and in 1411 all students were required to live in either college or hall, thus eliminating the chamberdeacons.

Therefore, most students could be controlled in some way. either because they lived in college, because they lived under a principal, or because they lived under religious discipline, and roughly a fifth of the scholars were members of the regular clergy.23 It is worthwhile to emphasize these forms of discipline, because some still conceive of students as an entirely undisciplined adolescent rabble which routinely picked fights with sober burgesses. Actually, university employees, such as manciples, were a more likely source of disorder.24 Townsmen, too, were subject to corporate discipline through their guilds and through the mayor and his bailiffs. To repeat, when that discipline failed, violence was more likely a criminal clash between individuals than war between the two corporations of town and university. The normal state of affairs between university and town was one of peaceful codependency.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>On halls, see especially Catto, "Citizens, Scholars, and Masters," and Alan B. Cobban, *The Medieval English Universities: Oxford and Cambridge to 1500* (Aldershott: Scolar Press, 1988), 145-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Cobban, Medieval English Universities, 319.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Ibid., 343-44. It is perhaps worth noting that Bereford got his start working for the university: "Planctus," 171, and Catto, "Citizens, Scholars, and Masters," 160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Catto, "Citizens, Scholars, and Masters," 168.

A perhaps useful gauge of the magnitude of what happened on St. Scholastica's Day can be gained by comparing it with earlier town-gown conflicts. In 1248, one Scottish scholar was killed; the university suspended lectures. In 1298, a scholar and a citizen were killed; the perpetrators were excommunicated and the town was fined £200. Yet the traditional total of those killed in the 1355 riot was not two, but forty; it is certain that at least six scholars were killed, plus an unknown number of townspeople. What began on St. Scholastica's day, then, was far from being just another town-gown spat. It was in fact unprecedentedly bloody.

Several particular causes could be suggested to explain the abnormal ferocity of the riot. One theory is that the town Oxford blamed the university for its decline. Oxford had reached a peak, economically, about 1200, even as the university was taking shape. As one historian remarked, the university found Oxford a "busy, prosperous borough, and reduced it to a cluster of lodging houses." It is certainly true that Oxford's prosperity visibly declined after 1250. Properties were left vacant, and gardens replaced some structures. It seems unlikely that the university could be blamed for Oxford's depression, though. In fact, the university may have grown in Oxford in part to fill a vacuum left as the weaving industry left town, because there would have then been cheap lodgings available. In the fourteenth century, many lodgings were owned by religious houses, but prosperous townspeople frequently rented out halls as well.27 All of the town and much of the countryside could profit in some way or another by providing scholars and masters with their food, drink, and other supplies. If the university had not been there, Oxford's financial straits would have been desperate indeed.

<sup>26</sup>History of the County of Oxford, 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Catto, "Citizens, Scholars, and Masters," 159-61.

It is unlikely, then, that some townspeople did their best to extirpate the university in three giddy days, because they thought that would bring glory days back. The best explanation of the riot is the simple one--the riot began because scholars were displeased by the quality of the wine served them. The university was in the unhappy position of being captive in a seller's market. Like other medieval universities. Oxford had long made it a goal to control the price and quality of living in the town as much as possible. That included oversight of weights and measures in the market, specifications of the quality of goods sold there, and jurisdiction over breaches of the peace involving those associated with university. As early as 1214, the university, still wet behind the ears. was complaining about prices. The chancellor also claimed some jurisdiction over the morals of the people of Oxford, which in particular meant suppression of prostitution. This is why the university insisted on a separate women's prison in the early 14th century.

Even as the university pressed for more control of market conditions, prices were declining in the fourteenth century. The university's population declined too--a shrinking enrollment already apparent in the early 1300s. There was demographic and economic contraction, therefore, well before the Black Death hit. It is difficult to assess precisely the plague's effect on Oxford. A modern treatment concludes that about a third of the townspeople died.<sup>28</sup> I will assume that this significant population loss was accompanied by some psychological trauma and by abruptly worsening conditions in an economy that was already soft. The university may have been an obvious scapegoat to blame for hardships that were beyond anyone's control, and this may be why the country people were persuaded to join in. Country people, after all, would have cared nothing about a random beating of a townsman by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>History of the County of Oxford, 19.

scholars. Because rural people supplied the markets of Oxford, though, any sign of further intrusion in the market by the university, even if it was simply a case of students vehemently protesting bad wine, may have been considered as an act of war. In any event, it is a war the town lost, because all the riot accomplished was the complete transfer of market control to the university.

It may be worth noting that Cambridge had a town-gown riot during the Peasants' Revolt of 1381.<sup>29</sup> The anti-university crowds there aimed particularly at university charters granting special privileges. After peace had been restored by troops sent by the local bishop, the king transferred the assize of bread and ale and oversight of weights and measures to the university. Like Oxford, Cambridge was a captive market which defended itself with the king's special patronage.

Economic relationships were at the root of the violence, but another factor may have played a role as well. The king's charters speak of town and university, but Latin poems deriving from the university consistently speak of the townspeople not as townspeople, but as laity; the university is the One of Oxford's first charters, that awarded by a papal legate in 1214, clearly stated that the university was a special, privileged, clerical enclave within the town, and the members of the university were not to be subjected to lay jurisdiction. Oxford was much more ecclesiastical in character than Cambridge. While many of the university folk were clergy only in a minor sense, they had a corporate sense of clergyhood as opposed to the laity of the town, which is clearly apparent in university accounts of the riot. university accounts boast of the nobility of the students, even though in fact most students come from what we would call a middle class background. The lack of respect which the

<sup>29</sup> Cobban, Medieval English Universities, 264-67.

rioters showed for the host with which the friars tried to stop the violence, and the tonsures which the laity scalped into their victims, could be signs of the sort of anticlericalism which is the hallmark of European radicalism through the Reformation. That all clergy should be annihilated, from the Pope right down to the little students, is one of the items of a more extreme continental program.<sup>30</sup>

Oxford had nothing to match that ferocity, but it did provide fertile ground for the growth of Lollardy's cradle only a few decades after the St. Scholastica riot. While Lollards certainly were not in favor of annihilating the little students, they did condemn clerical privileges. In a time of financial difficulty, such as the mid-1300s, the university's dominant position as an ecclesiastical institution may have been all the more difficult to endure because of unformed skepticism about clerical privileges generally.

In 1955, on the 600th anniversary of the riot, Oxford gave an Honorary degree to the Mayor, and the Vice-Chancellor of the University was made an honorary freeman of the City. And so, 600 years later, the lion lay down with the lamb, as one Oxford scholar put it—though he then coyly remarked that he would not venture to say which was which.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Norman Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 121.

<sup>31</sup> Oxford Life in Oxford Archives, 99.

Professor Miller received her PhD from Cornell University in 1984. Her dissertation is entitled, "An Edition and Translation of Uthred of Boldon's Monastic Treatises." She taught two years at St. Thomas University in Miami before going to Tallahassee Community College, where she has taught the last four years.

#### THE RIOTS OF ELIZABETHAN OXFORD

### David B. Mock Tallahassee Community College

The legacy of the St. Scholastica's Day Riots of 1355 had a profound influence on the on-going relations between the town of Oxford and Oxford University. Emotions ran high-even 200 years after the 1355 riots, little of the animosity had abated.

The mutual hatred between town and university is understandable. By the late 1500s, the university had acquired a number of new rights and economic privileges which were increasingly resented by the townspeople, who felt they were unduly taxed at the expense of the university. Sixteenth-century Oxford was relatively small and poor. Its ninety acres was divided into four wards and nine parishes. The town's population was under six thousand. There are numerous reports of the impoverished nature of the town's citizens. The hostility of the townspeople angered the masters and students, who believed that their special rights and privileges were justified because of their unique position in society and because the 1355 settlement had resolved the town-gown relationship for all time.

Because of the pervasiveness of this animosity, town-gown quarrels were frequent and bitter in the Elizabethan period. Resolving these disputes was often the responsibility of the Privy Council, which was the principal administrative organ of the queen. Aware of the queen's sympathy for the univer-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>British Library, Lansdowne Manuscript, 11: 73; 45: 55, 64; 49: 56; 51: 53; 54: 3, 5-7, 9, 10; 84: 86-91, 96; 86: 32; Public Record Office State Papers Domestic 12/91, 186. Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University at the Clarendon Press, 1936), 3: 89-106.

sities, the Council consistently favored the university over the town. The university also benefitted from having a better legal position. As recently as 1528, King Henry VIII had granted the university an extensive charter which had regularized its economic privileges, increased its income, and expanded its authority over the town's guilds. In 1571, Parliament incorporated the universities and confirmed their privileges and franchises. Despite the clear legal position of the universities, the mayor and aldermen were unwilling to cooperate and recognize the special nature and privileged status of those working for and matriculating at the university.<sup>2</sup>

University privileges were extensive. It had custody over the assizes of bread, ale, and wine in the area surrounding the It regulated merchants and other townspeople through its licensing of alehouses and its regulating of baking and brewing activities. It controlled the quality and stamping of bread and set the market prices of foodstuffs for five miles around the university. It was responsible for supervising the various proclamations and regulations concerning the consumption of meat during Lent. Moreover, university officials were charged with regulating the moral climate of the town and thus could close plays and prohibit bear-baitings and other immoral activities. In addition to its responsibilities, the university had numerous privileges including exemption from impressment, military levies, and subsidies, and from delivering horses to the post. Additionally, scholars were subject neither to prosecution in common law courts, imprisonment for debt, nor for breaking the peace. This meant that, for all practical purposes, scholars could not be sued, arrested, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Simion S. Laurie, The Rise and Early Constitution of Universities (New York: D. Appleton, 1901), 124-31; Charles E. Mallet, A History of the University of Oxford, 2 vols. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), 1: 34, 162-67; 2: 104-9.

even harassed by local justices of the peace. Any disciplinary matters were the responsibility of the vice chancellor and the heads of the various colleges.<sup>3</sup>

The university's economic privileges placed it in direct conflict with the rights of those town residents who also enjoyed special privileges. The special status of the university particularly rankled the middling and lower classes who were burdened by taxes and levies. The privileged status of the university proved to be a source of almost constant friction, particularly because the growth of guilds and the special rights of guild members placed them in direct opposition to the traditional claims of the university. The university, for its part, disliked the seemingly endless attacks on its privileges.<sup>4</sup>

The Elizabethan Privy Council first became concerned about the issue of university privileges when it tried to resolve the town-gown conflict on a permanent basis in 1562. In July of that year, a justice of the peace arrested an Oxford student. When the mayor refused to release the student or surrender him to the vice chancellor, other students tried to free their classmate, and, when unsuccessful, they rioted. On this occasion, the Council supported the university and reminded the mayor of his annual oath not to provoke the students by arrogant words or illegal actions such as those he had recently undertaken. The Councilors additionally warned him not to infringe further upon the university's charter. But the Council also dispatched John Doyleye and Richard Fenges to investigate the riot and to bring the student ringleaders to London for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Mark H. Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition, 1552-1642 (Oxford: Oxford University at the Clarendon Press, 1959), 18-25; Rashdall, Universities, 3: 81; Mallet, History, 2: 108-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>BL Lansdowne MS 45: 64; Acts of the Privy Council, 19: 175, 318-20; 22: 181, 187.

interrogation. Subsequently the Councilors sent six students to Fleet Prison. Later in 1562 and again in 1564 before their internment in Fleet and Marshalsea, other rebellious students appeared before the Star Chamber, the Council sitting as a court of law.<sup>5</sup>

The town-gown controversy again erupted in the 1570s. In 1573, one William Noble complained to the Privy Council about riots and other illegal activities of students. Arguments in 1575 centered on the possession of land belonging to Magdalen College and the libel and defamation of character of one Adam Squier. In an unrelated case, representatives from the town and the university appeared before the Council in May 1575. Both sides produced charters and other evidence of their privileges, which the queen's attorney and solicitor general closely examined. In a point-by-point analysis, the Privy Councilors gave unqualified support to the university. They expressed their disapproval of the "great disquietnes" of the town and tried to resolve all of the disputed points in one The Council confirmed the exemptions of scholars' horses and those of their servants from service as post horses, required town officials to continue swearing their annual oath to support the university's charter and privileges, permitted the unlicensed sale of cotton and linen to scholars. allowed scholars to buy and sell openly without licenses, protected the legal status of students by declaring illegal all indictments and similar violations of the charter, and recognized the university's privilege with respect to its control over the assizes of ale, bread, and wine. The only apparent gain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Acts of the Privy Council, 7: 114, 118; 20: 63-65, 85-86.

by the town was a one time grant of £200 as restitution for damages caused by rioting students.<sup>6</sup>

The Council also reexamined the issue of the town's reimbursing the university 1,500 marks for a memorial for the students slain in 1355. The town successfully explained that, in lieu of paying the fine, it had received permission to hold an annual memorial mass for the souls of those killed in 1355. But, because Protestantism forbade the holding of a Catholic mass, the town had neither paid the fine nor held a mass for fifteen years. The Council decided that to fulfill its obligation the town needed only to support an annual sermon or communion service commemorating the slaughter and to have town officials pay "a penny a pece" to the university for a memorial. a practice that continued until 1825. The Council ordered copies of the resolutions posted prominently around the town and university within fourteen days. Councilors hoped that this detailed decision would end the quarrel. Such an expectation proved premature, however. Conflicts continued as town officials again challenged university privileges.7

The next year, in fact, the mayor wanted the university to contribute to a subsidy. But, when he appeared before the Privy Council and saw Henry VIII's charter which had exempted the university from subsidies, the mayor acknowledged his error and promised not to offend again. Yet the townspeople remained obstinate and non-juring. In May 1577, the Council ordered town officials to obey its orders and swear oaths to uphold the university charter. Otherwise they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Ibid., 8: 304-5, 334; cf. 8: 339-40, 376-86; Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge, 25-26; Robert O. Berndahl, British Universities and the State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>BL Lansdowne MS 33: 45; PRO SP 12/170; Acts of the Privy Council, 8: 376-86; 9: 338, 350, 352-53, 354-55; Mallet, History, 2: 109.

were to appear before the Council and justify their disobedience. In response, town authorities explained their reluctance For their part university officials remained to comply. unyielding and threatened to excommunicate the non-juring. Lord Burghley received a letter in 1581 from the university asking him to require the sheriff to force town fathers to take the mandatory oath. Apparently the letter had little effect, because three years later the Council again learned of further occasions when justices of the peace had been persecuting students. On this occasion, town officials reported that the Oxford students, masters, and even the vice chancellor were daily breaking town laws. The Council promptly investigated the allegations and confirmed the town's claims of improper behavior by the scholars. Nevertheless, the Council still defended the privileges and immunities of the university. And, the town was no more willing to take the oath than before. In fact, in 1585 the Oxford mayor disenfranchised town dignitaries who swore to uphold the university charter. This action may have involved the university's refusal to pay purveyance, a form of indirect taxation which permitted representatives of the crown to purchase foodstuffs at below market price. Regardless of its cause, university officials again asked Burghley for assistance in protecting the university from this expense.8

More than money was involved in the town-gown squabbles. A particularly interesting legal case concerned one John Waight, who enrolled in Oxford when a legal action appeared to be going against him. He apparently hoped that his enrollment would stay the anticipated judgment. When the Privy Councilors learned of the circumstances in the case, they expressed their belief that the chancellor and masters should "have better regard to the maintenance of their privileges" lest they lose them. The Council also asked the chancellor to

<sup>\*</sup>Acts of the Privy Council, 10: 259-60, 290-91.

investigate the circumstances surrounding the case and ordered all parties to appear before the justice of assize. Yet, when the plaintiff tried to serve Waight with writs of execution, the Council prohibited the chief justice from interfering with Waight until the justices had first rendered a verdict.<sup>9</sup>

The Council again protected Oxford University from a legal suit in 1587. On this occasion an Oxford scholar, one Thomas Hore, allegedly libeled Thomas Wriglesworth (or The plaintiff brought suit for £100,000 Wricklesworth). against Hore and the university. The university believed, however, that Wriglesworth's suit was primarily intended to attack the privileges guaranteed the university by its charter. Informed of the opinion of university officials, the Council asked Sir Walter Mildmay, a master of the rolls and Devonshire justice of the peace, to investigate the case. Mildmay confirmed the university's allegations, finding that Wriglesworth had brought suit "onelie of purpose to impeache and shake the ancyent Chartres of the Unyversytie." Mildmay's report in hand, the Council ordered Wriglesworth to stop all legal actions against Hore. It also directed the chief justice, who was hearing the case, to stop all legal proceedings so that the "said schollers, to the dyscontinewaunce of their studyes and expences, might not be derived from the Unyversitie to followe such frivolous actions commenced upon such small grouwnde and to so evill an ende."10

Two years later the Council again defended the Oxford charter. Sir Francis Knollys, lord lieutenant for Oxfordshire, asked the Council about his jurisdiction over scholars who resisted his authority and rioted, when he attempted to punish them for illegal hunting. Knollys believed that he had the

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 10: 264-65.

<sup>10</sup>PRO SP 12/184; Acts of the Privy Council, 15: 285-85; 18: 174-75.

prerogative to suppress the riots, but the Councilors disagreed. They again supported the university, deciding that the lord lieutenant had the right to stop disorders which threatened the state, but not minor ones such as those due to illegal hunting. The Council decided that if there were unlawful activities, they should be referred to the Chancellor common or the Star Chamber. In each of these instances where there was a conflict, the Privy Council consistently supported the rights of the university.<sup>11</sup>

Purveyance was again an issue in 1590. Despite the university's exemption from purveyance, the queen's purveyors assessed St. John's College in late 1589. An important question arising from this dispute concerned the area to be exempted from the assessment. According to its charter, an area of five miles around the university was exempt unless the monarch came within seven miles of the town. officials were uncertain, however, whether the distance was measured from the college or the town gates. complicating the situation were the claims of college tenants who believed that they too should be exempt. The Council decided ultimately in July 1590 that the five miles were to be measured per certam lineam in circuita from the town gates. Sir Henry Umpton was to mark the boundaries with stakes and inform constables and other officials not to levy purveyance on anyone living within that radius. 12

Throughout the Elizabethan period the Council's principal concerns with respect to the various town-gown controversies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Acts of the Privy Council, 18: 174-75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Parliament granted the universities exemption from purveyance by 2 & 3 Philip and Mary c. 1 (1555), Statutes of the Realm, 4 (1): 289-90; BL Lansdowne MS 45: 64; Acts of the Privy Council, 19: 175, 318-20; 22: 181, 187.

were, first, the maintenance of public order; and second, the protection of university rights and privileges. The Council preferred the position of the universities because they had a better legal case. Throughout the Elizabethan period the Council frequently expressed concern that university privileges be respected. One clear example of this concern came in 1585 when the Council ordered food sent to the starving poor of Oxford. Appended to its order was a statement that this action was not intended to infringe upon the privileges of the nearby university to set food prices. In addition, town officials were often called to London to explain their reluctance to acknowledge ancient university rights. Likewise, the Council chastised university officials on occasion, when they appeared to disregard the defense of their legal position and lose the privileges of their institution.13

The Council's major concern in the town-gown controversy was, however, the maintenance of public order. When necessary, it acted quickly to punish rioters and end disputes. The Council frequently expressed displeasure about the continual bickering between town and university officials whose actions provided poor examples to the common people. It restricted the activities of town and university officials in most instances to appearances between the Council and the courts while extracting promises to uphold earlier concessions. Despite the Councillors' repeated interventions, they were not successful in ending the quarrels on a permanent basis. Apparently it would take more than a reiteration of ancient agreements to bring peace to such a lengthy and bitter feud.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Acts of the Privy Council, 13: 86-87.

Dr. David B. Mock received his PhD in British history from Florida State University in 1983. He has taught history at Edison Community College in Ft. Myers, and in 1990 he joined the history faculty at Tallahassee Community College. He has edited History and Public Policy (1991), co-edited A Dictionary of Obituaries of Modern British Radicals (1989), and co-authored Educating Hand and Mind: A History of Vocational Education in Florida (1986). Currently he is working on a transcription and critical edition of A Deutifull Defence of the Lawfull Regiment of Weomen and an edition of Legacy of the West: Readings in the History of Western Civilization (under contract with HarperCollins). Dr. Mock served as president of the Florida College Teachers of History in 1988 through 1989 and currently is the permanent secretary of the Florida Conference of Historians.

# "NOT AS PEOPLE BUT AS GERMANS" GERMAN AND AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE ETHNIC IMPACT OF IMPERIALISM

#### Frank M. Baglione Tallahassee Community College

When the advocates of western imperialism marshalled their arguments for why their respective countries should engage in a policy of overseas expansion, their focus nearly always fell on the issue of nationality. Long before the thinkers analyzing imperialism became enthralled by the idea that it was an expression of the dominant economic system, long before it became evident that this imperialism would have little colonizing aspect, the writers urging a new effort of expansionism claimed that its true nature was to be found in the struggle for the survival of a people and their culture.

That at least was the case for imperialist writers in countries like Germany, which had not had colonial empires. No matter how satisfied they may have been with their country's position in the world, it was clear to these writers that in the coming century power and growth implied the ability to establish a global presence. To survive, they believed, a nation must expand. It must provide the land needed for its growing population and the opportunity for the vital spirit of its people to achieve its full potential. As A. P. Thornton wrote in his study of imperialism, "The only known road to survival, let alone security, takes the well-travelled imperialist route."

American imperialist writers used many of these same arguments. Although somewhat less haunted by the specter of national extinction, these writers were concerned that America

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>A. P. Thornton, *Doctrines of Imperialism* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), 15.

might not reach her full potential if she failed to expand overseas. And if not immediately threatened, these writers felt that America had a special obligation to continue the work of spreading the ideas and institutions peculiar to her people and Anglo-Saxon culture. Like all imperialist literature, the central idea is that the nation is but the vessel holding the precious linguistic, ethnic, and cultural elements that make up a people, and but the vehicle through which these elements can be spread across the globe.

The ground for the German imperialists had been prepared earlier by the work of two political economists, Friedrich List and Wilhelm Roscher. In their works, List and Roscher stressed the importance of colonies in the planning of national economic development. On this subject they had the advantage in their argument with free trade economists who had to face the paradox of the greatest free trade state, England, also being the possessor and chief benefactor of a huge colonial empire. But according to List, expansion was more than the key to economic resources and strength, it was also "an unalterable law of our nature, an instinct of humanity," and the true mission of a national power and intelligence which leads civilized nations to extend their power over peoples of less culture.2 List predicted that nations ignoring this law of and instinct of humanity would put in jeopardy their independence and political existence.3

Roscher addressed a second question of critical importance to German imperialists—emigration from the mother country. If such emigration could be organized through the acquisition of colonies, Roscher wrote, it would provide some "elbow

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy, trans. G. A. Matile, Vol. 2 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856), 71.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 199, 351.

room" for the people, as well as additional markets for manufactures and a supply of raw materials. England had enjoyed these advantages to the fullest extent, Roscher pointed out, while Germany had not, and he urged immediate action, or Germany would see the last appropriate areas for colonization occupied by other more resolute nations.<sup>4</sup>

These arguments appeared again in 1881 in Friedrich Fabri's book, Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien?, which spoke to the issue of national self-preservation.<sup>5</sup> Fabri, a leading member of the colonial societies springing up in Germany, wrote,

Every powerful state must have at its disposal room for expansion, room in which it can engage its surplus energies in such a way that they will later be channeled back to the mother country in a process of constant dynamic interchange. No state which has excluded itself from this law of expansion has ever been capable of maintaining its power and prosperity over a long period of time.<sup>6</sup>

Fabri's colleague in the colonial societies, Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, also published a book on German colonization containing the same message. He wrote that Germany must extend its enterprise, intelligence, capital, and labor to colonial areas. These areas must be won and held for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Wilhelm Roscher, *Principles of Political Economy*, trans. John J. Lalor, Vol. 2, 13th ed. (New York: H. Holt, 1878), 367-369.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Fabri was an important member of the Kolonialverein, Germany's largest colonial society. In 1880, he founded his own society, the West Deutsch Verein fur Kolonisation und Export.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Friedrich Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? Eine politisch-okonomische Betrachtung (Dritte Ausgabe, Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Berthes, 1884), 13.

German language and way of life. "By strengthening our national character abroad in this manner," he wrote, "we strengthen it at home as well, just as the English have done."

The work of these imperialist writers was aided by German nationalist historians, like Heinrich von Treitschke, whose lectures and written works increased the circulation of expansionist ideas. Treitschke, after seeing his passion for German unification realized, feared the new state's existence was threatened by its weakness in international affairs. He argued that Germany's continued existence as a great power would be determined by its ability to become an imperial power overseas. The colonial adventurer Carl Peters, another member of the colonial societies, also saw the connection between the unification movement and imperialism. "The German colonial movement," Peters said, "is the natural continuation of the German struggle for unity."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, *Deutsche Kolonialisation* (Hamburg: L. Friederischen, 1881), 54-55. Hubbe-Schleiden was the business manager for Fabri's West Deutsch Verein für Kolonisation und Export. Historian Mary Townsend describes him as the prophet of a new era for Germany characterized by an intensive, overgrown nationalism, and Woodruff D. Smith calls him the first well-known point of contact between colonial theory and the ideological conservatism represented by Paul Anton De Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. See, Mary Townsend, *Origins of Modern German Colonialism*, 1871-1885, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. 98, No. 1 (New York: Columbia University, 1921), 87; and Woodruff D. Smith, "The Ideology of German Colonialism 1848-1918" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972), 171-172.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politics*, trans. Blanche Dugdale and Torben Bebille (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Henry M. Blair, Jr., "Carl Peters and German Colonialism: A Study in the Ideas and Actions of Imperialism" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1968), 213.

The major area of concern for the German imperialists was German emigration. Just as the lack of political unity had caused a tremendous waste of German energy and productivity, Germany's lack of colonial possessions prevented her from making effective use of her procreative energies. The result was what the imperialists called a loss of racial elements-the loss of German nationals through emigration to other nations or to the colonies of other nations. Fabri regretted that this enormous wealth of labor, along with the products of that labor, were being lost to Germany, becoming instead an asset to other countries, in particular the United States. 10 In an analogy, Hubbe-Schleiden compared this emigration to the cuckoo bird which lays its eggs in the nests of strangers, 11 and Treitschke regretted what he saw as a debilitating loss of precious resources, that is, Germans, without the slightest compensating advantage to Germany. 12

The imperialists were alarmed by the massive loss of German emigrants for cultural reasons as well. Emigrants going to foreign areas would eventually lose their German language and nationality and become submerged among the peoples of the non-German country in which they had settled.<sup>13</sup> The solution, said Fabri, was to establish German colonies which would allow the emigrants to continue an active national and economic interchange with the mother country and retain their German language and nationality.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Fabri, Kolonien, 16.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Wilhelm Hubbe-Schleiden, Uberseeische Politik, Vol. 1 (Hamburg: L. Friederichsen, 1881), 127.

<sup>12</sup>Treitschke, Politics, 118, 120.

<sup>15</sup>Fabri, Kolonien, 26-27.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 27.

Peters' assessment was the same-Germans should go to German colonies where they would retain their national character. He believed that unless the loss of German emigrants was stemmed through the creation of German colonies, the future existence of the German nationality itself stood in question. The implication is quite clear. The survival of the group is conditioned on its ability to reproduce its forms in new areas. Without such growth, not even the original ethnic group can long survive.

The model for such a policy was, of course, England. The population of that little island, Treitschke noted, had sent off so many offshoots that there were millions of her people around the globe. Germany must do likewise, Treitschke thought, capturing new areas to nourish her increasing numbers and taking her share in the domination of the world by the white races. <sup>16</sup> Peters both admired and envied the example of the British Empire, which he described as the extension of the English state and nationality. Only by acquiring her own colonial empire would Germany be able to extend her national institutions and language and prevent the erosion of German culture and language among those who left to settle overseas. <sup>17</sup>

The British experience in America also allowed the imperialists to make the point that even when a colonizing country was forced to give up a large part of her colonial possessions, these still remained an enormous cultural, political, and economic advantage to her because of the ties of

<sup>15</sup>Blair, "Carl Peters," 20-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Treitschke, Politics, 231.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Blair, "Carl Peters," 17, 19-20.

a common language and culture. 18 Here the imperialists touched the essential question, which concerned not economics but the instinct for self-preservation. Natural increase within limited boundaries meant overpopulation, the solution to which could never be population control or emigration to non-Germanic areas for these limited the growth of a people and put them at a disadvantage with respect to cultures that were expanding. The only sound and moral solution to the dangers of overpopulation was colonization. As Treitschke noted, colonization was a natural form of increase that added to the strength of the mother country. Not even the separation of colonies was a worry, he said, "when we consider what the importance of even emancipated colonies is to the parent state. It is impossible to exaggerate the material and moral advantage of such a national increase. "19

What the imperialists wanted for Germany was natural increase and the expansion necessary for the survival of the parent language, culture, and nationality. Hubbe-Schleiden believed that a nation's existence was a result of, and was determined by, autonomous cultural activities, and that without the active development of culture, the existence of a nation over a long period of time was not possible.<sup>20</sup> He further asserted that the whole of humanity was continually striving toward the goal of culture and the development of civilization. To remain a vital part of humanity, nations must take part in this common striving. Those who did not participate in the development of civilization, or those who did not create new forms, were doomed, in Hubbe-Schleiden's words, "according

<sup>16</sup>Treitschke, Politics, 117.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 232.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Hubbe-Schleiden, Uberseeische Politik, 129-130.

to the common laws of nature and culture, to watch their own forms go down in ruin." He wrote,

The forms of a civilization which cannot become dominant must assimilate themselves to other forms or perish. The states of Europe which do not develop ever greater self-sufficiency through continuous cultural activity... will in time degenerate and disappear, being divided up among those of our race which have shown greater initiative.<sup>21</sup>

Peoples facing this awful truth of mortality, said Treitschke, could continue in existence by expanding, by setting their mark upon barbarous lands. Hubbe-Schleiden, anticipating the great struggles of the next century which this activity would cause, wrote that problems of overpopulation and food supply would cause the competition between peoples, this fight for the existence of nationalities, to reach an intensity far greater than anything we can imagine today. 23

The German imperialists felt confident that the Germanic race would be victorious in this battle and that Germanism would provide the future leadership and support for world civilization. If in the next century the richest parts of the earth were occupied by "Germanics" with a few Latins and ill-organized masses of Slavs, Hubbe-Schleiden wrote, then the European race, and thereby the cultural aristocracy of mankind, would have become Germanic. But whether some of these Germans would still actually be Germans, or whether they would think and speak as, say, Englishmen, he warned, would depend "on an aggressive national policy which would

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>22</sup>Treitschke, Politics, 115-116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Hubbe-Schleiden, Uberseeische Politik, 135.

provide for the existence of our descendants not as people but as Germans. \*\*24

Here was a significant statement—"not as people but as Germans." The fear of the German imperialists was that if Germany did not dominate in the areas settled by her emigrants, then these Germans would be submerged not only in the culture of their foreign hosts, but in their blood. They would become, from a ethnic point of view, mere people as opposed to Germans. And the more Germans were submerged in other nationalities, the weaker the entire German community would become.

Fabri made exactly that point, saying that cultural law imposed this simple choice—either absorb culturally inferior neighboring peoples or be absorbed by culturally stronger nationalities. "The colonial problem is in no way a question of political power . . . a means for extending Germany's political power in the world. The colonial question is cultural." Then Fabri gave voice to the fundamental imperialist impulse, that of self-preservation. The colonial question, he wrote, was an existential question, "and it is the right and duty of every state to seek its continued existence by utilizing the whole weight of its influence, and, where necessary, its might." <sup>26</sup>

Thus the German imperialists appealed to the most basic pattern of human behavior--the struggle for continued existence. This for the German imperialist writers was the meaning and purpose of imperialism.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 135-137.

<sup>25</sup> Fabri, Kolonien, 56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Ibid., 77.

The fact that America had been such an effective vehicle for the extension of English culture and language was as useful to the American imperialists as it was to the Germans. their case, however, the argument obviously was that this work should be continued. American imperialists dreamed of inheriting this work and making it their own civilizing mission. In 1885, historian John Fiske wrote that the Anglo-Saxon race had a genius for political organization that would eventually lead to Anglo-Saxon dominance in a united world.<sup>27</sup> Another academic, the political scientist John Burgess at Columbia, arrived at a similar conclusion in a work published in 1891, although he claimed that the entire Teutonic race, not just its Anglo-Saxon branch, possessed this genius for political organization. To fulfill its mission in the world, Burgess thought, the Teutonic peoples must have a colonial policy.<sup>28</sup> Josiah Strong, a Congregationalist minister, published a work which claimed the highest authority for this mission of Teutonic peoples. Strong believed he saw the hand of God "preparing in our Anglo-Saxon civilization the die with which to stamp the peoples of the earth."29

The best known of the American imperialists, Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U. S. naval officer, was also convinced that the United States must adopt a policy of colonization. He wrote:

The annexation, even of Hawaii, would be no mere sporadic effort, irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first fruit and a token that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>John Fiske, American Political Ideas (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1885), 101 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>John W. Burgess, *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1891), 45.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, rev. ed. (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1891), 214.

nation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life--that has been the happiness of those under its influence--beyond the borders which heretofore had sufficed for its activities.<sup>30</sup>

The United States was itself the best example of what the German imperialists had in mind when they spoke of the magnificent cultural and commercial benefits which accrued to the mother country from colonization. Through it the English had extended their civilization, language, and culture, and the Americans were well aware of what they represented in this process of expansion and what they, in turn, might accomplish.

The work which the English race had begun when it colonized North America, the imperialists believed, was destined to go on until every land that was not the seat of an older civilization would become English in its language, political habits, customs, traditions and, to a large extent, its blood. Powers like France and Germany, as they themselves already feared, would in this new order be, relatively speaking, a Holland or a Switzerland politically.<sup>31</sup> America, Fiske believed, was preparing to give the benefits of its political genius to the world, and he viewed what was occurring in Africa at the time as a process of development similar to that which had been followed in North America during the seventeenth century.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Fiske, Political Ideas, 143, 145.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Ibid., 140-141.

For the Americans, expansion was not only natural and necessary in a cultural sense, it seemed also to have a divine sanction. Mahan saw the direction of western expansion and wondered if it were not "the exhibition of a Personal Will, acting through all time, with purpose deliberate and constructive." Strong was more certain. To him it demonstrated that the Anglo-Saxon had been "divinely commissioned to be, in a peculiar sense, his brother's keeper."

This divine mission of imperialism had little to do with commercial fleets or coaling stations. Rather, the imperialists believed it signaled that the time had come for America to join England in nothing less than the struggle for human civilization. There were no more new worlds; soon all the unoccupied lands on earth would be taken. When this was accomplished, Strong wrote, then there would begin the final competition of the races.<sup>35</sup>

Mahan had already begun working on the strategy for the struggle--America would establish a Pacific fleet through which the sea power of the civilized world would be energized against a China which had burst her boundaries, while the armies of Europe defended civilization on the eastern front.<sup>36</sup> Once the battle had begun, Strong was certain of the result. He wrote:

<sup>33</sup> Pratt, Expansionists, 17.

MStrong, Our Country, 209.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 222. Strong felt that the Anglo-Saxons were being schooled for this final struggle and had developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress their institutions upon mankind. Because of this, the powerful Anglo-Saxon race would expand toward Mexico and South America, and into Africa and beyond.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>™</sup>Pratt, Expansionists, 16-17.

Is there any doubt that this race, unless devitalized by alcohol and tobacco, is destined to dispossess many weaker races, assimilate others, and mold the remainder, until in a very true sense it has AngloSaxonized mankind.<sup>37</sup>

Thus while the German imperialists might be planning to make the culture of the world Germanic, the Americans were preparing, probably a good deal more plausibly, to teach everyone English. However, to the extent that the Germans saw in this struggle among the races a victory for the Germanic world, they had a friend in the American Burgess. Burgess had spent a number of years studying in Germany and had become convinced that it was the Teutonic race that was uniquely qualified for the leadership of all humanity, something which Anglo-Saxons and Germans would share. This was an idea that the German imperialist Carl Peters had also flirted with, looking toward a type of joint Anglo-German world dominance.<sup>38</sup> Burgess also believed that the historical inevitability of this Anglo-German world dominance was not open to question. He felt that history was moving toward the subjugation of the barbarian races by the civilized. Because this was the case, Burgess was for having at it, directly and without remorse. He wrote:

There is no right to the status of barbarism. The civilized states have a claim upon the uncivilized populations, as well as a duty towards them, and that claim is that they shall become civilized. . . . If the barbarian populations resist the same, a l'outrance, then the civilized state may clear the territory of their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>Strong, Our Country, 255.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Peters believed that England and Germany, as the two chief representatives of the Germanic race, could in collaboration become the sole masters of the world. See, Blair, "Carl Peters," 18, 25, 26n.

presence. . . . [The state] should not be troubled in its conscience about the morality of this policy when it becomes manifestly necessary. It violates thereby no rights in these populations which are not petty and trifling in comparison with its translucent right and duty to establish political and legal order everywhere.<sup>39</sup>

Burgess called humanitarian objections to such a policy "weak sentimentality." The political subjugation and attachment of primitive peoples were as truly a part of history as was the national organization of states, Burgess believed. Morality, where it applied, was on the side of the superior group imposing its cultural forms on the inferior. He wrote,

The morality of a policy which insists upon the common use of a common language and upon the establishment of homogeneous institutions and laws cannot be successfully disputed. Under certain circumstances the exercise of force to secure these ends is not only justifiable but commendable, and not only commendable but morally obligatory.<sup>41</sup>

Fiske's estimation of the situation was not unlike that of Burgess'. To Fiske, the only question posed by the spread of civilization was not if subject peoples should be pushed aside, but whether the "barbarians can maintain their foothold upon the earth at all." Thus in a sense, American imperialist policy, had these writers been directing it, would have

<sup>39</sup> Burgess, Political Science, 46.

Mbid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 42

<sup>42</sup>Fiske, Political Ideas, 115.

followed the pattern established in the extension of Anglo-Saxon culture in North America.

It is clear, therefore, that the arguments put forward to justify a policy of imperial expansion centered on the impact the engagement or non-engagement in imperialist activity would have on a people's culture. Imperialism would insure a continuation of the linguistic, ethnic, and cultural attributes of a people, while the failure of a people to expand would mark them and their culture for decline and ultimate destruction.

\*\*\*

Frank M. Baglione received his PhD in modern European history from Tufts University in 1981. His dissertation was entitled, "Mysticism and Domination: Theories of Self-Preservation, Extension, and Racial Superiority in German Imperialist Ideology." He has contributed several essays on twentieth century German and French writers to the volume, Twentieth Century Thinkers. Dr. Baglione has taught history at Tallahassee Community College since 1991.

## VOLCANIC ISLANDS: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CYPRUS, AND SRI LANKA

John J. McTague St. Leo College

The breakup of the Soviet Union into fifteen ethnically-based states and the violence that has accompanied the disintegration of Yugoslavia have sparked a revival of interest in the study of ethnic conflict in the modern world. These conflicts have been endemic in the twentieth century, especially since the end of the Second World War.

Particularly striking are the number of instances of such conflict which have taken place in former British colonies. There have been the unsuccessful Biafran rebellion in Nigeria, the Quebec separatist movement in Canada, the partition of Pakistan from India and later of Bangladesh from Pakistan, and the current movement of Sikhs in the Punjab to secede from India. This paper will examine ethnic separatism in three other former British colonies, all of them islands widely separated from one another: Ireland, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. Although one is in Western Europe, another in the Middle East, and the third in South Asia, they have a good deal in common, primarily the ethnic conflicts that each has endured since the 1960s.

But before looking in detail at these three islands, let us try to define what we are talking about. If the problems we are describing result from the presence of two or more ethnic groups within the borders of a single state, what constitutes an ethnic group? Its characteristics are a common myth of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>An excellent survey of this topic can be found in Charles William Maynes, "Containing Ethnic Conflict," *Foreign Policy* 90 (Spring 1993), 3-21.

descent, a shared history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.<sup>2</sup> Ethnonationalism occurs when "the sentiment of an ethnic minority in a state... propels the group to unify and identify itself as having the capacity for self-government," and this frequently leads to ethnic separatism, defined as "a movement by members of an ethnic group to gain autonomy over their own destiny, with the formation of a separate state as the major option."<sup>3</sup>

Ethnonationalism and ethnic separatism exist on all three islands we are discussing here, for each is populated primarily by two ethnic groups, one of which comprises an overwhelming majority. Ireland as a whole (including Ulster) is 77 percent Catholic with a Protestant minority of 22 percent, but Northern Ireland by itself reverses that proportion, with 63 percent Protestants and 36 percent Catholics. Cyprus has a Greek majority of 79 percent and a Turkish minority of 19 percent, while Sri Lanka is 74 percent Sinhalese and 19 percent Tamil, with a third group, Muslims, comprising 6 percent. Competition between the majority and minority groups has been the dominant factor in the history of each island since World War II, as will be illustrated by a brief sketch of the historical background of the three islands.

Ireland's proximity to Great Britain (Belfast is only twenty miles from the Scottish coast) has been of enormous significance to its history. The English began interfering in Ireland as far back as the twelfth century, and had effectively conquered it by the early 1600s. They then began a policy which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (New York, 1987), 22-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Frederick L. Shiels, Ethnic Separatism and World Politics (Lanham, MD, 1984), 4.

had momentous consequences; they brought large numbers of English and Scottish Protestant immigrants to settle what at the time was the most rebellious province on the island--Ulster. In time, so many arrived that these Protestants became a majority in that part of Ireland, though vastly outnumbered on the island as a whole. As expected, they remained staunchly loyal to the Crown, helping to put down Irish rebellions in the 1640s and again in 1690. And they dominated Ireland from that time until the twentieth century, maintaining their supremacy over the Catholic population via the British government, which viewed these transplants as the only trustworthy group on the island.

When the Catholic majority began clamoring for home rule and then independence in the years before World War I, a crisis arose for the Ulster Protestants. Independence would have resulted in Catholic domination, a situation they considered intolerable. Consequently, Protestants demanded a partition that would keep Ulster within the United Kingdom, and they even threatened rebellion if they were forced into a united Ireland.

The British government, placed in the uncomfortable position of abandoning a people who were loyal to the Crown, accepted their arguments, and so in 1922, when Ireland was given its independence, the north was partitioned from it. It remained in the U.K. but was given its own government as well, with a Parliament at Stormont. Ulster was the only part of the U.K. to have such an arrangement. The Stormont government was established on a one-man-one-vote principle, which meant that the Protestants, with a two-to-one majority, totally controlled politics. As a result, Catholics continued to suffer the same discrimination in the north that they had endured for centuries island-wide.

They suffered in silence for the most part until the late 1960s when, inspired by the American Civil Rights Move-

ment, they began their own marches and demonstrations. Protestants reacted violently; the Irish Republican Army came to the aid of the Catholics; and, with Stormont unable to maintain order, the British Army was called in. After three years of near civil war, the Stormont government was suspended in 1972, and since then the province has been ruled directly from London, although this is regarded as a temporary measure. All subsequent attempts at a solution have been vetoed by one side or the other, but at least London and Dublin have shown a measure of cooperation since their 1985 Hillsborough Agreement.<sup>4</sup>

Like Ireland, Cyprus is dwarfed by a large neighbor. Only forty miles south of Turkey, its earliest inhabitants were Greeks, who have always made up the bulk of its population. The Turkish Ottoman Empire conquered the island in 1571, and in the subsequent three hundred years Turkish immigrants made numerous settlements there.

Primarily interested in Cyprus' strategic location, in 1878 the British took over. No serious ethnic problems developed until the 1950s, when the Greeks, who outnumbered Turks four to one, began demanding union (enosis) with Greece. The Turkish minority, totally unassimilated with their island neighbors, responded by asking for partition so they could join their mother country. A 1960 agreement between Britain, Greece, and Turkey rejected both demands and instead granted Cyprus independence, under a constitution protecting minority

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Information on Ireland for this and later discussion is drawn from Anthony Kenny, The Road to Hillsborough (Oxford, 1986); Katherine O. See, First World Nationalisms (Chicago, 1986); Denis Barritt and Charles Cater, The Northern Ireland Problem (Oxford, 1972); Edward Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (London, 1983); Alan J. Ward, ed., Northern Ireland: Living with the Crisis (New York, 1987); Michael MacDonald, Political Violence in Northern Ireland (Oxford, 1986); and Sarah Nelson, Ulster's Uncertain Defenders (Belfast, 1984).

group rights and mandating a Turkish vice-president and a certain number of Turkish legislators and administrators.

The Greek majority accepted this agreement under duress, and their first president, Greek Orthodox Archbishop Makarios, openly proclaimed enosis as his eventual goal. When he attempted to modify the constitution in 1963, violence broke out. It ended only through U.N. intervention. A second outbreak took place four years later, which again required a U.N. settlement.

Conflict did not again explode until 1974. In the summer of that year, the Greek junta in Athens staged a coup to overthrow Makarios, who by then had abandoned enosis, and replaced him with a former guerrilla fighter. Turkey, refusing to stand idle while enosis was in the winds, launched an invasion of the island and captured the northern 40 percent before heeding a U.N. cease-fire. Most Turks on the island then migrated to the north, while Greeks in that sector were expelled, thereby effectively partitioning Cyprus into two separate, ethnically-pure regions. The two sides then began negotiations for a settlement, but in 1983 the north declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which has been recognized only by Turkey. Despite that, the Turks remain open to reunification, but only under a federal system which would grant them considerable autonomy. Negotiations under U.N. auspices have been going on for years but have borne no fruit so far.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Information on Cyprus for this and later discussion is drawn from Stavros Panteli, A New History of Cyprus (London, 1984); John Koumoulides, Cyprus in Transition, 1960-1985 (London, 1986); John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus (London, 1986); Christopher Hitchens, Cyprus (London, 1984); Anita Walker, "Enosis in Cyprus: Dhali, a Case Study," Middle East Journal vol. 38, no. 3, 474-94; and R. R. Denktash, The Cyprus Triangle (London, 1982).

Like the other two islands, Sri Lanka, lying only forty miles southeast of India, sits in the shadow of a larger country. Its majority group, the Sinhalese, came from the subcontinent about two thousand years ago while Tamil settlers, also from India, date back almost a thousand years. The Tamils, who were Hindu, took over the northern part of the island, while the Buddhist Sinhalese dominated the remainder. Sri Lanka, called Ceylon by Europeans, was never unified until conquered by foreigners, first the Portuguese, then the Dutch, and finally in 1796 by the British.

Despite unification, the two groups remained totally distinct and separate, as in Ireland and Cyprus, so when independence came in 1948 the potential for ethnic violence was great. The Sinhalese, with a three-to-one majority, took over the government under a constitution devoid of protection for minority rights. But problems did not develop until 1956, when a newly elected Sinhalese nationalist government proclaimed Sinhalese the only official language, replacing English in that regard. Tamil protests led to mutual violence, which escalated for two years until settled by a compromise.

But rising Sinhalese nationalism caused continued discrimination against Tamils, and communal riots broke out again in the late 1970s. Then in 1983, after large-scale massacres of Tamils, a major rebellion began in the north which has continued to the present day. Although several Tamil groups have been involved, the most important has been the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who demand an independent Tamil state (Eelam) in the northern and eastern parts of the island.

By 1987, the Tigers were receiving aid and training from their fellow Tamils in south India, and the government in New Delhi was pressuring Columbo to improve its treatment of the rebels. This pressure led to a stunning agreement in July of that year, by which the Indian Army was invited by Sri Lanka to enter the north to disarm the Tamils in return for a promise to create a federal system, which would give the Tamils considerable autonomy. The strategy was that, assured that New Delhi would guarantee that the Sinhalese would keep their side of the bargain, the Tamils would lay down their arms.

Unfortunately, it did not work out that way. While most Tamil groups cooperated, the Tigers did not, and India spent two and half frustrating years in an unsuccessful attempt to crush them. Meanwhile, most Sinhalese resented the Indian presence as interference in their affairs and finally got India to withdraw in the spring of 1990. And while Columbo did try to implement the federal power-sharing scheme, the island remains in turmoil with the LTTE in de facto control of the north.<sup>6</sup>

Now let us examine the similarities among the three. All are islands of relatively small size, which gives them a geographic unity based on natural borders. In each case, however, the ethnic composition of each island has fragmented that unity. All three have an ethnic group who regard themselves as the "native inhabitants" and who also happen to comprise the overwhelming majority. The Irish Catholics (77 percent), Greeks (79 percent) and Sinhalese (74 percent), while possibly not the original inhabitants of their islands, have lived there for at least two thousand years and easily predate any other groups currently in residence. Therefore,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Information on Sri Lanka for this and later discussion is drawn from Satchi Ponnambalam, Sri Lanka: National Conflict and the Tamil Liberation Struggle (London, 1983); Y. Pisadasa, Sri Lanka; The Holocaust and After (London, 1984); James Manor, ed., Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis (London, 1984); S. J. Tambiah, Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy: Sri Lanka (Chicago, 1986); C. R. deSilva, Sri Lanka: A History (New Delhi, 1987); and C. Manogaram, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (Honolulu, 1987).

they regard Ireland, Cyprus and Sri Lanka as belonging to them and to them alone.

On the other hand, the minorities on each island are of more recent origin. Protestants (22 percent) began settling Ireland in the early 1600s, while Turks (19 percent) arrived in Cyprus a few years earlier. Of the three, the Tamils (19 percent) have lived on their island the longest, their settlements going back to the early years of the millennium. And all three came as conquerors, although the Tamils only took over the northern part of Sri Lanka, unlike the English Protestants and the Turks, who ruled all of Ireland and Cyprus. These conquests definitely created resentment, for as conqueror and conquered, there was a natural tendency not to intermingle, especially because the victorious group was a minority that could easily have disappeared if it failed to maintain its distinct identity.

But there are numerous other reasons keeping these groups apart. Religion, an obvious element separating the sides in Ireland, also plays a role on the other two islands. Cyprus, the Greeks are overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox, while the Turks are Muslim. And because the conquest occurred at a time when the Turks were considered a major threat to Christian Europe, religious antagonism has been strong on the island from the beginning, even though some Greek Cypriots converted to Islam. On Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese are Buddhists and believe that their island is sacred to their religion. The Tamils, on the other hand, are Hindus, and, although the two religions do not have a history of conflict in Asia, violence is more of a problem on Sri Lanka, because of several major shrines in the central highlands.

National origin is often listed as a source of conflict, but this difference is more imagined than real except on Cyprus. While it is true that the Irish are of Celtic background compared to the English who have heavy doses of AngloSaxon and Norman blood, a high percentage of the settlers in Ulster were Scotsmen, who are also Celtic. In Sri Lanka, both Sinhalese and Tamils originated in India, although the former group likes to claim that they came from north India and are therefore Aryan as opposed to the Dravidian Tamils from the southern part of the subcontinent. Only in Cyprus are the ethnic distinctions truly meaningful, for Greeks and Turks really did come from separate origins.

Language is another source of trouble that bears mention. In both Cyprus and Sri Lanka it is a divisive element, because Greeks-Turks and Sinhalese-Tamils each have their own tongue, which few members of the other group have managed to learn. In both countries, the language used in intercommunal discourse is usually English, because it was the official language in colonial days and is generally understood by the educated classes of both majority and minority groups. In Ireland, however, English is the first language of both Protestants and Catholics, despite the efforts of the Irish Republic to revive the native language, Gaelic; therefore, language in Ireland does not contribute to the conflict, as it does on the other two islands.

We have seen that in varying degrees facts of conquest, religion, national origin, and language serve to separate the groups on each island. Adding to this complexity, both majority and minority groups feel quite insecure on all three islands. It is understandable that the Protestants, Turks and Tamils, each of whom makes up roughly 20 percent of the population of their islands, should not feel comfortable, but the Catholic, Greek and Sinhalese comprise approximately 75 percent majorities and still demonstrate great insecurity.

The major reason for this majority ite insecurity is that each minority has a "big brother," a powerful country that feels a kinship to the minority and regards itself as their protector. In each case that big brother has interfered on the island in

favor of the minority despite the opposition of the majority group.

In Ireland, the British have intervened continuously since the twelfth century, and on the eve of the Irish people's greatest triumph, the achievement of independence, Britain spoiled it by partitioning Ulster to preserve Protestant dominance. It is the continued British presence there that has prevented the Irish Republic from retaking the province and reunifying the island.

In Cyprus, Turkey was one of the guarantors of the 1960 treaty that gave the island its independence, and it had the right to intervene if the Turkish minority was endangered. The Ankara government threatened to do so twice in the 1960s and finally carried out this threat in 1974 after the anti-Makarios coup. Since then it has been the Turkish army that has ensured the continued existence of the regime that controls the northern 40 percent of the island. As with Ulster, Northern Cyprus exists on the insistence of its big brother.

As for Sri Lanka, it is only recently that foreign interference has complicated its ethnic relations. The state of Tamil Nadu in southeastern India contains many millions of people who are ethnically related to the Tamils of the island, and they took a strong interest in the rebellion that broke out in 1983. Within a short time, the LTTE was establishing bases in the state of Tamil Nadu, which provided LTTE with supplies. Because Tamil Nadu is a powerful state in India's federal system, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi could not afford to ignore the issue, and so he attempted to mediate the conflict in Sri Lanka several times without success.

Then in the summer of 1987, with Columbo launching a major offensive to crush the Tamil rebellion, protest in India reached such levels that Gandhi sent humanitarian aid to the Jaffna peninsula, center of the revolt. This bold action jolted

President J. R. Jayewardene into realizing that the conflict could not be resolved without India's involvement. As a consequence, he invited the Indian Army to serve as peace-keepers. But two years later, New Delhi acceded to Sri Lanka's request to withdraw, even though the task of pacifying the Tamil areas had not been completed. And since Gandhi's assassination in May 1991, widely attributed to the Tigers, anti-LTTE sentiment has been so virulent that aid from Tamil Nadu has been almost entirely eliminated.<sup>7</sup>

Another strong similarity is that partition, which is the ultimate goal of ethnic separatists, has either been accomplished or is the stated objective of the minority groups on all three islands. In Ireland, of course, the creation of Northern Ireland is a classic example of ethnic partition, enacted to protect the Protestant minority from Catholic rule. In Cyprus, partition has been in effect between Greeks and Turks since 1974, although the permanence of this situation is in doubt. And in Sri Lanka, the creation of a Tamil state in the northern and eastern provinces (Eelam) is the stated goal of most Tamil groups, although there is evidence that those who are more moderate than the Tigers would settle for less.

Why has partition been held out as the magic solution? Largely because the minority groups claim that they suffer massive discrimination at the hands of the majority. But while that accusation may be true in the cases of Cyprus and Sri Lanka, there is little evidence of it in Ireland, possibly because of lack of opportunity. Until 1922, Britain ruled all the island, denying Catholics the chance to control their own

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Bryan Pfaffenberger, "Sri Lanka in 1987: Indian Intervention and the Resurgence of the JVP," Asian Survey 28 (Feb. 1988): 137-47; Marshall R. Singer, "Sri Lanka in 1990: The Ethnic Strife Continues," Asian Survey 31 (Feb. 1991): 140-5; and India Today, Jan. 31, 1992, 151; Feb. 15, 1992, 67; Feb. 29, 1992, 69; Mar. 15, 1992, 147.

destinies. Since the partition, the north has been dominated by Protestants with little Catholic input. In the Irish Republic, Protestants comprise a mere 5 percent of the population but, although the Catholic Church does exert strong influence on the government, there have been few complaints of religious discrimination.

The other two islands, however, are a different story. In Cyprus, the Greek majority preferred enosis to independence and Makarios, who felt the same way, tried to revise the constitution to reduce Turkish safeguards. Also, a pro-enosis guerrilla group (EOKA-B) operated on the island with tacit government cooperation. Turkish fears of being annexed to Greece were soundly based, and the 1974 coup was so blatant that Ankara was able to respond aggressively--with an invasion--without being punished by the world community.

In Sri Lanka, the Tamils did not even have the constitutional protection that had been given to the Turks. While the constitution guaranteed individual rights, it contained no safeguards for the Tamils as a group. Consequently, with the rise of Sinhalese nationalism after the 1950s, Tamils have seen Sinhalese made the sole national language, Buddhism given a special status in the country, official anti-Tamil discrimination sanctioned in university admissions, and Sinhalese colonization of the Tamil homelands in the north and east sponsored by the government. Additionally, the so-called Indian Tamils, who arrived in the 1800s to work on plantations in the central highlands, have been denied citizenship since independence. Sinhalese nationalism stresses the belief that the island is their only homeland, while the Tamils can

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>"The extent to which a state thus institutionalizes GROUP rights as distinct from, and in addition to, individual rights is perhaps the main differentiating factor of ethnic policies." Robert Wirsing, Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives (New York, 1981), 348.

always return to India; thus it does not tolerate minority group rights.

Still another question is the treatment the minority has given the majority when the opportunity has presented itself. Since partition has been carried out in Ireland and Cyprus, we have two examples to consider. Neither is encouraging.

In Ulster, the British set up a devolved Parliament at Stormont, based strictly on the principle of majority rule. Because Protestants have consistently had a two-to-one majority, they have totally dominated this government, with little input from Catholics. The result has been widespread anti-Catholic discrimination in local government, housing, and employment. This discrimination has begun to be lessened since the imposition of direct rule in 1972. The irony is that Protestants demanded partition, because they feared mistreatment in a united Ireland, but they have carried out the same policies in Ulster that they claimed Catholics would implement.

In Cyprus, the Turks have been even more blatant. They have expelled most Greeks, about 200,000, from the north of the island and have confiscated farms, homes and even churches, while importing Turks from the mainland to replace the lost population. They clearly intend Northern Cyprus to be an ethnically pure Turkish area.

The Tamils in Sri Lanka have only lately had much opportunity to demonstrate how they would govern, because the Tigers now control the Jaffna peninsula. There they have perpetrated atrocities against Sinhalese and even those Tamils who have cooperated with the government or the Indian Army, although in fairness the record of their opponents is scarcely any better. The eastern province, which all Tamil groups insist should be part of Eelam, contains large numbers of Sinhalese (25 percent) and Muslims (32 percent); there the

Tigers have recently been conducting a murderous war against the Muslims, who generally prefer Sinhalese rule.

What of the future? None of the three islands is in a satisfactory situation now. While only Sri Lanka is currently in a crisis, both Northern Ireland and Cyprus could explode at any time. Protestant-Catholic tension is just below the surface as events of the past decade have shown. And the Greeks still fume over the Turkish invasion and the 200,000 refugees it created, while the Turkish sector is not economically viable on its own. Partition alone has not proved to be the answer on either of these islands, nor will it likely provide a satisfactory solution in Sri Lanka, given that it would create a Tamilmajority state with Sinhalese and Muslim minorities. What is the answer then?

For both Cyprus and Sri Lanka, it would appear that a decentralized federal system might be the best solution. Realistically, neither island is large enough to support two separate states and each would be far stronger economically if Both Northern Cyprus and Tamil Eelam would be dominated by their big brothers, Turkey and India, a status which has already clearly emerged. In fact, each might end up being annexed, rather than remain independent but weak. If this were to happen, they would follow the Ulster example in its relationship to Great Britain. However, that would only increase the paranoia of the Greek Cypriots and Sinhalese, who already fear Turkey and India. Moreover, it would seem that neither Turkish Cypriots nor Tamils desire annexation. In 1983, the Turks chose to declare independence rather than taksim, union with the mother country, and since then they have accepted the principle of reunification as long as it is based on a federal system with considerable autonomy. The major roadblocks to a settlement are lack of agreement over the right of return for the 200,000 Greeks expelled from the north after 1974, and the fate of 50,000 Turkish immigrants

from the mainland along with the Turkish army currently on the island.<sup>9</sup>

Any solution in Sri Lanka appears further away, for the LTTE has vowed to settle for nothing less than independence; but with their aid from India almost eliminated, they have been slowly losing ground throughout 1992 in their war with the Sri Lankan army. Therefore, out of necessity, they may be forced to come around to the idea of a federal system. Further complicating the situation is that President Ramasinge Premadasa has sworn never to accept a decentralized government on the island, a stand strongly supported by the Sinhalese population. Clearly, both sides will have to make major concessions if peace is ever to come to Sri Lanka. 10

In Ireland partition is likely to remain the norm for the foreseeable future. It was effected fifty years earlier than the partition of Cyprus and has been internationally recognized, while the other has not been. Even the mention of Irish reunification outrages many Protestants, and both London and Dublin agreed at Hillsborough in 1985 that such could not take place until a majority in Ulster desire it. Britain's immediate goal is to restore Northern Ireland's self-government but in a Protestant-Catholic power-sharing arrangement that would render past discrimination less likely to be repeated. Such is the aim of the talks that began in 1992, but they are bound to be slow and laborious. However, the mere fact that Protestant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>New York Times, Aug. 5, 1991, A4; Aug. 26, 1992, A12; Time, Aug. 31, 1992, 51; Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 11 (Dec. 1992-Jan. 1993), 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>India Today, Apr. 15, 1992, 28-9; May 31, 1992, 44-5; July 31, 1992, 22-6; and *Economist*, Nov. 21-27, 1992, 43-4; Dec. 5-11, 1992, 32-3.

and Catholic leaders of the province are talking together is a positive step, albeit a small one.<sup>11</sup>

As in Yugoslavia, long-simmering ethnic feuds have caused enormous bloodshed and suffering on these three islands in the past twenty-five years. Only a willingness to compromise will bring peace to Ireland, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka. On the latter two islands, such compromise will likely result in a single state but with a federal system that will give Turks and Tamils a strong measure of self-determination in their own affairs. In Ireland it will mean acceptance for a considerable time of the partition, but creation of a new government in the north that will give Catholics a share of power commensurate with their population.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>The talks—which were held with representatives of four Ulster political parties, two Protestant, one Catholic and one intercommunal—adjourned in November, 1992 after six months. No progress was made and no date for a second round has been announced. "Policy Statement by Sec. of State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew," Dec. 4, 1992, British Information Services, New York.

## THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES AND PROPERTY THE SONORA CRISIS OF 1915

## Warrick Ridge Edwards Tallahassee Community College

Woodrow Wilson entered office suspicious of material interests and opposed to economic exploitation both at home and abroad. Those sentiments would be reflected, in turn, in his highly personal response to the massive and ongoing Foreign concessionaires, he would Mexican Revolution. charge, some of them American, had monopolized the most productive lands in the Mexican Republic, ruthlessly exploited its resources, and reduced its population to a mean and hopeless peonage. The Mexican people, he asserted, were "entitled to attempt their liberty from such influences." And while there had in fact been many "serious wrongs" against the persons and property of Americans and other foreigners in Mexico since the onset of revolution, the government of the United States should in no way attempt to suppress that struggle. Indeed, he declared that he would do "everything in [his] power" to prevent it. "I am," he concluded, "more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men and pitiful women than in any property rights whatsoever. Mistakes I have no doubt made in this perplexing business, but not in purpose or object."

There were, of course, many who differed with that assertion. Both within and without the administration, there was great consternation over the president's indiscriminate indictment of American and other foreign investors in Mexico. As it became evident that he himself had no intention of

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 6 vols. (New York, 1925-27), 2: 284-86, 340 (hereafter cited as PPWW).

providing truly effective protection for their properties or for the lives of those many foreigners still resident in the republic, that concern would turn to dismay and indignation. Within the administration itself there was strong, even bitter disagreement with the president's position. To be sure, both Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels shared their chief's suspicion of, and antipathy toward, the foreign investor in Mexico and would vigorously support his policy.<sup>2</sup> But few of their colleagues, at any level of government, could reconcile themselves to the president's position. Indeed, the principal opposition to that policy would come from within Bryan's own department and to a somewhat lesser degree from high-ranking naval officers stationed in Mexican waters.

Robert Lansing, department counselor and subsequently secretary of state in his own right, was much distressed at the president's disregard for American property rights in Mexico and even more so at the apparent abandonment of his countrymen resident therein. In fact, he was inclined to intervene forcefully on their behalf.<sup>3</sup> Lansing, Josephus Daniels would observe, "held to the old diplomacy that encouraged exploitation of small countries by American industrial captains. . . ." He was a disciple of [Elihu] Root, "a Big Stick-Dollar Diplomacy" advocate who "just naturally believed that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Richard Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton, NJ, 1973), 382-83; David Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico (Madison, WI, 1960), 10-12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Clifford Trow, "Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919," Journal of American History 58 (June 1971), 57, 66; Richard M. Abrams, "United States Intervention Abroad: The First Quarter Century," American Historical Review 79 (Feb. 1974), 93; Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1944), 439.

strong ought to rule." And so too, in varying degree, were assistant secretaries William Phillips and Frank Lyon Polk, counselor Chandler P. Anderson, and Boaz Long and Leon J. Canova, the chief and assistant chief respectively of the department's Division of Latin American Affairs. Together, then, those officials would do all in their power to protect American lives and property below the border. And they would go to great lengths indeed.

From early 1915 on, they would deliberately subvert presidential Mexican policy, collude with Mexican reactionaries and the representatives of large American interests in Mexico, and, in conjunction with those elements, seek to substitute and implement an aggressive policy of their own making aimed at frustrating the revolution and imposing a sort of Platt Amendment protectorate over the whole of the Mexican Republic.<sup>6</sup> Rapidly deteriorating conditions in that country in the spring of 1915 would provide them with the first of several opportunities to realize those objectives.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Warrick R. Edwards, "United States-Mexican Relations, 1913-1916: Revolution, Oil, and Intervention," (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1971), 258-70, 277-81, 500-503; P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 245-46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Trow, "Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919," 46-72; Emily Rosenberg, "Economic Pressures in Anglo-American Diplomacy in Mexico," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 17 (May 1975): 125, 133-34. For specific examples, see Long to Lansing, July 8, 1916, National Archives, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, File number 812.00/20688 (hereafter cited as DS followed by file number); and Canova to Lansing, Feb. 14, 1916, Papers of Frank Lyon Polk, Yale University Library.

By late May of that year, the government in Washington was under intense and mounting pressure both to relieve the foreign community in Mexico and to stop the confiscation and destruction of foreign property there. Appalled at the seemingly endless slaughter and devastation in the neighboring republic and encouraged by interventionist elements within the administration itself, the president on June 2 addressed a stern and ominous warning to the contending factional leaders. They must halt the fighting in their country "within a very short time," he insisted, or the government of the United States would itself be "constrained" to do it for them. Failure to comply, it was clear, would be to invite massive armed intervention.

Suddenly relations between the United States and Mexico had entered a new and highly sensitive phase. And until it passed, almost any serious confrontation between the government in Washington and either of the warring factions in Mexico would likely culminate in a general Mexican-American conflict.

Although there existed at the time a number of points of contention between the government of the United States and one or the other of the several factional leaders, none was more apt to lead to an explosive confrontation than was the failure of Mexican authorities to provide effective protection to the large foreign colony in the Yaqui Valley of southern Sonora. In imminent danger of annihilation either by the rebellious Yaqui tribesmen or by xenophobic Mexican soldiers, the several hundred American and other foreign settlers in that district would remain highly vulnerable throughout that critical period in Mexican-American relations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>New York Times, June 3, 1915.

Despite his threat of June 2, for Woodrow Wilson, anxious to avoid further armed intervention below the border, the situation in Lower Sonora constituted a most serious and vexatious dilemma. Should Mexican authorities continue to deny effective protection to the colony, a massacre of major proportions was all but certain to occur. And that, in turn, was bound to provoke at least regional American armed intervention and very likely war as well. Should, however, the government in Washington seek to employ American troops in defense of the settlements, a clash with local Mexican forces was virtually a foregone conclusion. And, again, war would most likely follow. Either way, it seemed, the continuing crisis in Lower Sonora threatened to precipitate precisely the sort of sanguinary confrontation that the president so desperately hoped to avert. And interventionist elements, both within and without the administration, would seek to turn it to their advantage.

The largest of the American concerns located in the troubled district and the focal point of Washington's interest there was the Los Angeles-based Richardson Construction Company. That firm, in turn, was the operating subsidiary of the Yaqui Delta Land and Water Company, a holding company capitalized at twelve million dollars and tightly controlled by the New York financiers John Hays Hammond and Harry Payne Whitney. By 1910, the Richardson interests had purchased from the Mexican government some 1,200,000 acres in and around the fertile Yaqui Valley and had been awarded virtually unlimited use of the waters of the Yaqui River. In return for those rights the company was committed to construct and operate extensive irrigation works in the valley and to foster regional development through the sale of reclaimed land and water to Mexican and foreign colonists. Until Yaqui raids and revolutionary disorder halted all

construction in the valley, the company had enjoyed considerable success in fulfilling its contractual obligations.<sup>8</sup>

The underlying cause of unrest in that district was the expulsion of the Yaqui Nation from its traditional homeland in the valley and the disposal of its lands to other parties. Constituting approximately a sixth of the state's population. the Yaquis of Sonora were too numerous to subjugate.9 When, in 1910, revolution swept the republic, they would seek to avail themselves of the turmoil to throw off Mexican rule forever. Determined to recover their ancestral lands and to establish an independent Yaqui republic, the tribesmen allied themselves with first one faction and then another in resolute pursuit of those objectives. In a relatively short time, they had amassed a sizeable arsenal of modern weapons, earned a reputation as the finest fighting men in Mexico, and acquired a position of considerable power and influence in the Mexican northwest. Yet, despite repeated promises to the contrary, their lands, including the coveted Yaqui Valley, remained in

<sup>\*</sup>John Hays Hammond, The Autobiography of John Hays Hammond, 2 vols. (New York, 1935), 2: 741-46; Herbert A. Sibbett, "Facts and Documents Relative to the Development of the Yaqui Valley and Particularly to Davis Richardson," n.d., Compania Constructora Richardson, S. A. Papers, University of Arizona Library; Testimony of Frederic N. Watriss, United States Senate, "Investigation of Mexican Affairs," Preliminary Report and Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Document No. 285, 2 vols., 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, 1920), 1: 426-435.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Edward H. Spicer, Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico and the United States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson, AZ, 1962), 68-81; Evelyn Hu-Dehart, "Development and Rural Rebellion: Pacification of the Yaquis in the Late Porfiriato," Hispanic-American Historical Review 54 (Feb. 1974), 76-93.

other hands. Out of patience and distrustful of all Mexican factions, a large portion of the Yaqui Nation, the so-called wild or broncho Yaquis, rose in open revolt against all Mexican authority. Well-armed, clandestinely supported by their ostensibly pacified or manso kinsmen, and most capably led by the chieftains Luis Espinosa and Juan Jose Sibalaume, they sought to drive Mexicans and foreigners alike from the Yaqui Valley and from all other tribal lands. They would very nearly succeed in that endeavor.

By the beginning of 1915, the Yaqui rebellion in Sonora had assumed crisis proportions. Villista governor Jose Maria Maytorena, dependent upon a local garrison composed in large part of manso mercenaries, was unable to quell the uprising. Yaqui soldiers in Mexican employ could not be counted upon to serve against their rebellious kinsmen. Indeed, some smuggled arms and ammunition to the insurgents, and not a few of them covertly joined the bronchos in operations against their common oppressor. Thus by the spring of 1915, when raiding spread southward into the Yaqui Valley, state authorities were all but powerless to stop it.<sup>12</sup> The colonists were on their own.

Early in May, an estimated 500 raiders struck hard at the foreign settlements in Lower Sonora. Emerging from their stronghold in the nearby Sierra de Bacatete, they forded the Yaqui River, rode across the valley, and suddenly fell upon the colonists in the southern tier of farms and ranches.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Susan M. Deeds, "Jose Maria Maytorena and the Mexican Revolution in Sonora," (Part 1), Arizona and the West 18 (Spr. 1976): 34-36; General Frederick Funston to the Adjutant General, May 19, 1915, DS 812.00/15074.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Ibid.; Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 82-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Frederick Simpich (consul at Nogales) to Bryan, May 14, 1915, DS 312.11/6008.

Several Americans and a large number of Mexicans were killed, and for some days thereafter those who escaped were engaged in a fierce struggle for survival.<sup>13</sup> Eventually the Yaquis themselves broke off the attack. But they would return, they warned, and soon; and when they did, they would kill every Mexican and American who remained.<sup>14</sup> Terrified, the colonists turned in desperation to Washington. The governor, they declared, could not or would not protect them. Their only hope lay in United States marines.<sup>15</sup>

Alarmed at the prospect of a general massacre of Americans in Sonora and appalled at the probable effect of such an outrage on subsequent Mexican-American relations, Secretary Bryan reluctantly requested the dispatch of United States warships to the Yaqui delta. Accordingly, Admiral Thomas B. Howard was instructed to proceed at once to the Gulf of California to investigate the disturbance ashore. In the meantime, the cruiser Raleigh dropped anchor off Tobari Bay. And there it would remain, its crew at the ready to take off the settlers, until the crisis in the valley had passed. 17

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Charles F. O'Brien to Bryan, May 12, 1915, DS 312.11/5950; Harry Grigsby to George C. Singletary, May 26, 1915, DS 312.11/6208; Herbert A. Sibbett to Bryan, June 10, 1915, DS 312.11/6152; Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1915.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Sibbett to Lansing, June 10, 1915, DS 312.11/6152; Commander T. P. Magruder (U.S.S. RALEIGH) to Josephus Daniels, May 26, 1915, DS 812.00/15204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>O'Brien to Bryan, May 12, 1915, DS 312.11/5950; W. E. Richardson to Bryan, May 14, 1915, DS 312.11/5963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Bryan to Daniels, May 13, 1915, DS 312.11/5950; Los Angeles Times, May 15, 16, 1915.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

The settlers, however, were by no means prepared to withdraw. Heavily invested in the colonization venture, they would fight if necessary to protect their holdings. And they both expected and demanded that the government in Washington assist them. Established around the station of Esperanza, some 30 miles inland from the sea, they derived no comfort whatsoever from the warship at Tobari Bay. It was marines they wanted, and they wanted them stationed permanently in the valley. 18

Accordingly, early in June, H. A. Sibbett, vice-president and general manager of the Richardson Construction Company, travelled to Washington to appeal in person to officials of the Department of State. In Leon J. Canova, the department's acknowledged authority on Mexican affairs, he found an interested and enthusiastic supporter.<sup>19</sup>

Canova, of course, sympathized strongly with American investors in Mexico, but he was moved by other considerations as well. Closely associated with leaders of the Mexican exile community and at the moment deeply involved in counterrevolutionary intrigue, Canova was the most aggressively interventionist of all administration officials. A persistent advocate of American domination of Mexico, he welcomed any development which might bring about an imposed settlement of the civil war and the establishment of an American protectorate over the republic.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, it was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>O'Brien to Bryan, May 12, 1915, DS 312.11/5950; Richardson to Bryan, May 14, 1915, DS 312.11/5963.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Frederic N. Watriss to William Phillips, June 10, 1915, DS 312.11/6189; Sibbett to Lansing, June 16, 1915, DS 312.11/6312½.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 182; Rosenberg, "Economic Pressures in Anglo-American Diplomacy In Mexico," 125, 133-34; Canova to Lansing, Feb. 14, 1916, Polk Papers.

Canova who was in large part responsible for the recent hardening of the president's policy toward that country. 21 He would do what he could, then, for the Richardson interests and for the other American investors in Sonora, and should his efforts ultimately precipitate a major regional intervention and a new Mexican-American confrontation, then so much the better. Admiral Howard would show him the way.

On June 3, Admiral Howard reported that the Indians had recrossed the river in force and were at the moment laying waste to the last vestiges of settlement in the southern portion of the valley. The colonists, supported by some fifty of Maytorena's soldiers, had refused to withdraw. Instead, they had ignored the governor's advice to depart the valley and had rejected his every offer of an escort to the sea. Their stubbornness had rendered the matter of their protection a most difficult and vexatious problem, the admiral complained, and under his present orders there was little he could do to assist them.<sup>22</sup>

It had been suggested by the colonists, he continued, as well as by a number of his subordinate commanders, that the only effective solution to the problem at hand was the establishment of a permanent American garrison in the Yaqui Valley. He could not, however, in good conscience endorse that proposal. He was willing enough to risk his men to save American lives, Howard declared, but he objected strongly to sacrificing them "for the purpose of protecting property." And there would be losses, he assured his superiors. A

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Edwards, "United States-Mexican Relations, 1913-1916," 235-56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Howard to Daniels, June 3, 1915, DS 312.11/5804½A; Howard to Daniels, Papers of Josephus Daniels, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Container 109, File: "Special Correspondence, Woodrow Wilson Correspondence with JD."

campaign against the broncho Yaquis would be similar to the earlier Apache campaigns but considerably more difficult. Not only would the marines be operating in unfamiliar territory, but in an area in which the Mexican population too was strongly antagonistic to Americans. Unquestionably, a clash with the broncho Yaquis would be a costly and ugly affair.<sup>23</sup>

Howard was also much concerned over possible Mexican reaction to so blatant a violation of national sovereignty. In view of the president's recent warning to the several factional leaders, occupation of the Yaqui Valley might well be misconstrued as the first phase of massive American intervention. That, in turn, could well mean war. All things considered, the admiral opposed occupation of the valley. Should, however, the administration still choose to adopt such a course, considerably more than the 500 troops requested by the colonists would be required. It would take "at least a regiment," he believed, "with field and machine guns" to secure the settlements from attack. Unlike his fellow officers, Howard had the highest regard for the prowess of the Yaqui soldier. He had no illusions of a quick and easy victory over so formidable a foe.

Personally, the admiral preferred to respond to the Indian menace by strengthening the naval patrol off the Yaqui delta and by extending to subordinate commanders there discretionary authority to employ their forces ashore.<sup>25</sup> Yet even that limited response would in the event of new raids on the settlements most assuredly end in armed intervention. Sooner

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Ibid.; Lansing to Wilson, June 12, 1915, DS 312.11/58041/2A.

or later, through their own intransigence, the colonists would find themselves faced with imminent annihilation. When that critical moment arrived, it would be difficult indeed for Howard or any other American commander to turn a deaf ear to their pleas. Almost certainly, if the admiral had his way, the colonists would have their marines anyway. And Canova and his colleagues, theretofore frustrated for want of an immediate rationale for intervention, would at last have the crisis they sought.

Canova, of course, grasped the situation at once, and in advising his superiors on Mexican matters, he appears to have given the strongest possible endorsement to Howard's recommendations. Certainly Sibbett was much impressed with Canova's performance and came away from the Department of State convinced that he was doing all that was possible to protect American lives and property in Sonora.<sup>26</sup>

While the agent for the Richardson interests continued to work through the Division of Latin American Affairs, his associates elsewhere sought the assistance of still other influential officials. From his offices in New York, Frederic N. Watriss, president of the Yaqui Delta Land and Water Company and spokesman for the Hammond-Whitney group, addressed a fraternal appeal to fellow Harvard alumnus, Assistant Secretary of State William Phillips. Moving quickly to the point, Watriss revealed to "Brother Phillips" that the principal investor in the Yaqui Valley enterprise was none other than Harry Payne Whitney. It had occurred to him, Watriss explained, that "in view of the services, material and otherwise, which Whitney and his Father before him [had] always rendered to the Democratic Party," that knowledge in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Watriss to Phillips, June 10, 1915, DS 312.11/6189; Sibbett to Lansing, June 16, 1915, DS 312.11/6312½.

turn "might stimulate the Department to some further effort" on behalf of the Whitney interests in Mexico.<sup>27</sup>

Duly impressed, Phillips immediately consulted Canova. Forwarding Watriss's letter to the Latin American Division, he inquired of his subordinate whether the department was indeed doing all that it might on behalf of the party in question. It most certainly was, Canova replied. In fact, he had just discussed the matter with the secretary of state, who, in turn, was even then preparing to bring it to the attention of the president himself. Satisfied, Phillips took no further action. Having conveyed his information to those persons best able to use it to advantage, he would await the results of Lansing's report to the president before advising his correspondent in New York.

The following day, June 12, while Yaqui raiders again swept through the valley, Lansing did advise the president on the situation in Lower Sonora. The Indians there, he related, had stated their intent to "wipe out" the entire American colony. Local Mexican authorities could not, or would not, afford the settlements adequate protection, and the colonists themselves could not be induced to leave. It was a most serious and perplexing dilemma, he implied, and unless some precautionary measures were taken by the administration itself, "the loss of many American lives [might] be expected." Admiral Howard, he continued, had recommended maintaining an expeditionary force in the Gulf of California. Once in place, such a force could be used to great advantage to protect the lives of American and other foreign colonists in the area. In the event of a "positive emergency," several hundred

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Watriss to Phillips, June 10, 1915, DS 312.11/6189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Phillips, to Canova, June 11, 1915, Ibid.; Canova to Phillips, June 11, 1915, Ibid.

marines might be rushed inland to relieve the settlements and, if necessary, to escort the colonists to the sea. Meanwhile, he suggested, the admiral might send a wireless team, disguised as civilians, into the American colony. It was imperative, he explained, that the naval patrol offshore be advised instantly should the Yaquis again descend upon the settlements. Under the circumstances, the secretary concluded, Howard's plan seemed "the only safe action," and it was evident that he himself strongly endorsed it.<sup>29</sup> Canova, it would appear, had done his work well.

So, too, had Lansing. Clearly impressed with the urgency of the situation, the president replied within hours. It was obvious, he tersely informed the secretary, that the course recommended by Howard was "necessary." Accordingly, Lansing was to meet with the secretary of the navy and to coordinate with him both the "disposition of forces" and the issue of the equipment proposed. On the following day, accompanied by an undoubtedly jubilant Canova, the secretary complied. 31

The outgrowth of the conference of June 15 was the adoption by the Department of State of a self-proclaimed "vigorous policy" for the protection of American lives and property in the Yaqui Valley. 32 Accordingly, in a strongly-worded communique to the governor of Sonora, Lansing insisted that he dispatch additional troops to the valley and take whatever measures were necessary to secure the settle-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Lansing to Wilson, June 12, 1915, DS 312.11/58041/2A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Wilson to Lansing, June 14, 1915, DS 312.11/58051/2.

<sup>31</sup> Memorandum, June 15, 1915, Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>New York Times, June 17, 1915.

ments there from attack. Failure to do so, Lansing warned, would leave the United States no choice but to land an expeditionary force in the Yaqui delta.<sup>33</sup>

Nor was the secretary bluffing. On June 16, Admiral Howard was ordered to proceed at once to the port of Guaymas. Accompanying him aboard the cruiser *Colorado* was an expeditionary force composed of 600 marines and bluejackets. The flagship was to be joined at Guaymas by the cruisers *Raleigh*, *Chattanooga*, and *New Orleans*, with a combined complement of 1100 men. The decision to go ashore and to advance to the relief of the settlements was left solely to Howard's discretion. It was understood, however, that the admiral was not to disembark his forces unless conditions around Esperanza rendered such action "absolutely necessary." <sup>34</sup>

While Admiral Howard prepared to sail for Guaymas, William Phillips drafted a belated reply to his classmate in New York. In a surprisingly candid discussion of a highly sensitive matter, the assistant secretary disclosed in detail administration plans for coping with the anticipated Yaqui strikes in the valley. Both he and his colleagues, he explained to Watriss, were convinced that a naval demonstration off Guaymas would in itself be sufficient to "spur" state authorities to defend the American colony. Should, however, the governor still refuse to cooperate and a genuine emergency arise, United States naval forces would most certainly intervene. Under no circumstances, he implied, were officials in Washington prepared to permit the massacre of their countrymen in Sonora. Yet intervention would undoubtedly engender

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.; Tucson Citizen, June 16, 17, 1915.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Ibid.; Daniels to Howard, June 18, 1915, Daniels Papers, Container 537, File: "Mexico, 1915-1917."

the most bitter animosity toward the Americans in the valley. Consequently, Phillips explained, should Howard be forced to land his marines, officials in Washington would expect the colonists to withdraw voluntarily from the country and to remain away for whatever length of time it took to restore order in that portion of the republic. And they would expect Watriss and his associates to encourage this action.<sup>35</sup>

"Brother Watriss," however, would do nothing of the sort. With some half-million dollars worth of rice, wheat, and other crops approaching maturity on company lands alone, he and other investors in the Richardson project had an immense stake in the forthcoming harvest. And all would be lost should the settlers withdraw from the valley. Even brief neglect of the project's irrigation works would likely result in extensive crop failure. Yaqui raiders would do the rest: what they failed to carry off for their own use, they would most assuredly put to the torch. Watriss, then, had no intention of encouraging evacuation of the valley. On the contrary, he would do all in his power to prevent it. Secretary Phillips, inadvertently it would seem, had considerably strengthened his hand.

For weeks the colonists had been on the verge of abandoning the settlements. Shaken by the deaths of their comrades, appalled at the prospect of still greater raids to come, and despairing of effective protection from either Maytorena or the government in Washington, more than a few of them had already quit the country. Those who remained behind experienced the most acute anxiety. The sure knowledge that sooner or later they must face a major Yaqui offensive-isolated, poorly armed, and, upon the resumption of hostilities, cut off from escape by sea--was profoundly demoraliz-

<sup>35</sup>Phillips to Watriss, June 16, 1915, DS 312.11/6189.

ing.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, a visitor to the valley reported, the settlers there were all but paralyzed by fear, "afraid to do anything, even to protect themselves."<sup>37</sup> Unquestionably, then, many among them were contemplating withdrawal. There is, in fact, every indication that had administration officials firmly resisted external pressures to act on behalf of the colony, most if not all of the Americans there would soon have departed the valley. As a consequence, the recurring crises in that district, at the moment the most serious threat to peace between the neighboring republics, would have ceased. Phillips' correspondence with Watriss had drastically altered that situation.

In seeking to reassure the Hammond-Whitney group, the assistant secretary dispelled whatever doubts existed in the minds of investors and settlers alike regarding the administration's commitment to protect American interests in Sonora. The government, he implied, not only acknowledged the legitimacy of the American presence in the valley but was prepared to uphold it as well.<sup>38</sup> It had no intention of abandoning the colony to its fate. Whether the settlers agreed to leave the valley or not, in the event of a genuine emergency, they could count on the fleet marines.<sup>39</sup> And in disclosing that bit of privileged information, Phillips irreparably subverted presidential policy in the matter.

Heartened immeasurably by what they assumed to be an official pledge of emergency relief, a determined majority of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Simpich to Bryan , May 21, 1915, DS 312.11/6051.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>B. F. Brunk to Lansing, June 21, 1915, DS 312.11/6202; *Tucson Citizen*, June 22, 1915.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>Phillips to Watriss, June 16, 1915, DS 312.11/6189.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

the colonists resolved to stay on in the valley. From what point on, even temporary evacuation was all but out of the question. While the colonists themselves began preparations for the anticipated Yaqui offensive, their associates in the United States moved at once to exploit what they perceived as a new and more receptive mood in Washington. Not content with assurances of protection for their people in the valley, they sought guarantees for their property as well. For months thereafter they would petition vigorously for the establishment of a permanent American garrison at Esperanza.

Maytorena, meanwhile, had finally responded to Lansing's ultimatum. With some 5000 armed Yaquis raiding at will over the greater part of the state, he could ill afford to spare a large body of troops to garrison Esperanza. Nonetheless, doubtless because of the forcefulness of the American demand, the governor grudgingly agreed to send token reinforcements to the valley.<sup>41</sup>

On June 18, General Sosa and 150 men entrained at Guaymas for Esperanza. They never reached their destination. Yaquis attacked the train within sight of the settlement, killing and wounding most of its occupants and forcing the survivors to retreat in panic up the line. Under the circumstances, the *New York Times* solemnly concluded, the "only hope" for the Americans in Lower Sonora was intervention by Howard's marines.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>Sibbett to Lansing, June 16, 1915, DS 312.11/6312½; Tucson Citizen, June 22, 28, 1915.

<sup>41</sup> New York Times, June 19, 22, 1915.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Simpich to Lansing, June 20, 1915, DS 312.11/6200; Tucson Citizen, June 20, 1915; New York Times, June 22, 1915.

Officials in Washington concurred. At Lansing's behest the commander of the *Raleigh*, whose vessel again stood off Tobari Bay, was instructed to rush a heliograph team inland to Esperanza. The moment the colonists were threatened, word was to be flashed to the cruiser. With or without Maytorena's approval, American forces would move at once to the rescue.<sup>43</sup>

Similar instructions were conveyed to Howard at Guaymas. The admiral was to proceed immediately to Tobari Bay. In the event of an attack on the settlements, he was to relieve the colonists there and escort them safely to the coast. Under no circumstances, however, was he to linger in the Yaqui Valley. A prolonged occupation of Mexican territory, it was feared, could have the most serious consequences.<sup>44</sup>

And, indeed, they had cause for concern. On June 19, Maytorena announced that 1000 men would be sent to the Yaqui Valley to defend the foreign settlements. Those same men, however, had been ordered to resist with every means at their command any attempt to land American troops on Mexican soil. Then, on June 21, Admiral Howard met at Guaymas with General Leyva, commander-in-chief of Mexican forces in southern Sonora. State authorities, the general conceded, sympathized with the American dilemma and could understand the necessity of dispatching a relief expedition to the valley. The Mexican people, however, would unquestionably "misunderstand" such a move and deeply resent it. Moreover, Leyva warned, even minimal American interven-

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>Ibid.; *Tucson Citizen*, June 22, 1915; Daniels to Howard, June 18, 1915, Daniels Papers, Container 537, File: "Mexico, 1915-1917."

<sup>45</sup> Tucson Citizen, June 19, 1915; New York Times, June 20, 1915.

tion in that district would provoke still more of the Yaqui Nation to take up arms against the foreign community in Lower Sonora. And there would be "trouble" for Americans "all along the coast."

The following day, a worried Howard conferred once again with the general. Communications with the colonists had been restored, he learned, and General Sosa with a large body of troops was even then moving into the valley. For the moment, it seemed, the colony was secure.

But Leyva's mood had turned decidedly hostile. The colonists, he asserted, should leave the state at once, and he expressed impatience and indignation at their persistent refusal to do so. Their very presence on Mexican soil, he suggested, had become a serious provocation; indeed, it was the principal cause of unrest in his district. Ultimately, he feared, it would lead to a most serious Mexican-American confrontation.

General Sosa's command, composed in large part of manso Yaquis, was undisciplined and antagonistic toward Americans and could not be depended upon to defend the settlements. Sooner or later, then, Leyva believed, Howard would be forced to intervene. When he did, the general warned, Sosa's troops and, by implication, those of his own command would vigorously resist.<sup>47</sup> It would, of course, be most difficult to contain such a conflict once hostilities had begun. Under the circumstances, it could go badly indeed for the hundreds of American citizens scattered throughout the State of Sonora and especially so for the colonists at Esperanza. There was little, however, that Howard could do to placate the general or to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>Ibid., June 23, 1915; Howard to Daniels, June 21, 1915, Daniels Papers, Container 537, File: "Mexico, 1915-1917."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>New York Times, June 23, 1915.

otherwise reduce tension. He had his orders, and on June 23 he proceeded to Tobari Bay. There he waited, poised to intervene.

The colonists, meanwhile, continued to spurn their own government's advice to withdraw from the valley. Instead, they reiterated their demand that American troops be sent out to protect them. 48 On June 24, George C. Singletary, president of the Sonora Land and Investment Company, wired Lansing directly to complain bitterly of the lack of support from Washington and to warn of still another grave threat to the lives and property of his countrymen in Yaqui territory. General Sosa's troops, he had learned, were themselves preying upon American and other foreign inhabitants of the valley. Far from affording protection, the soldiers constituted a most serious menace to every foreigner there. Immediately upon entering the valley, they had descended upon outlying settlements, looting private homes, abusing their residents, and drawing their weapons on those persons bold enough to protest. His employees there, Singletary feared, "were in as great danger for their lives" from the Mexicans as they were from the broncho Yaquis. The administration, he angrily asserted, was obligated to protect the Americans in the valley, and he insisted that it do so at once. Failure to provide that protection, he feared, would result in death for the lot of them.49

In the meantime, the Americans in the valley would look to their own defense. By the time that Howard arrived off Tobari Bay, the colonists had sent all but a few of their dependents out of the country, barricaded their homes, and begun preparations for a lengthy siege. Of the original 300 or

<sup>&</sup>quot;Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Singletary to Lansing, June 24, 1915, DS 312.11/6224.

more American settlers in the valley, only some 100 remained. But those who stayed on were by then adequately armed, situated in strong defensive positions, and supported by a sizeable number of German and Mexican colonists. Moreover, they were all aware of the Raleigh's continued presence offshore and, since Phillips' indiscretion, of the true nature of her mission as well. They chose, then, to gamble, and the Raleigh was their trump card. They would stay on in the valley regardless of the odds against them. 50

Clearly, by late spring of 1915, the foreign settlements in Lower Sonora had become more than a mere embarrassment to Mexican and American officials; indeed, they constituted a most serious liability to Washington and to the two Mexican factions as well. So long as they remained, intervention and a major Mexican-American conflict might occur at any time. That fact, in turn, was a matter of acute concern to the president of the United States. Despite his recent threat to impose order throughout the neighboring republic, Woodrow Wilson entertained the most serious misgivings over again intervening below the border. Too, by late June, administration officials had learned of an as yet, ill-defined German scheme to provoke a general war between the United States Already, then, the president had begun to and Mexico. reassess his position with regard to a dictated settlement of the Mexican civil war and to restrain his more aggressive subordinates from any act that might provoke an armed confrontation with Mexico.

Thus when Admiral Howard, dismayed at the recent turn of events in the Yaqui Valley, suddenly reversed his position and called for American occupation of the settlements, Wilson

<sup>50</sup> Tucson Citizen, June 22, 1915; New York Times, June 23, 1915.

himself acted at once to veto the plan.<sup>51</sup> He thought such a move "unwise," he advised the secretary of the navy, and so too, in retrospect, Lansing's proposal to send a wireless team to the colony. Indeed, he concluded, upon reviewing the overall situation in Mexico, he believed it best to revert to the "original plan of merely offering to bring [the] settlers out."52 "Mexico," he would remark some months later, "believes that we want to possess her. . . . " And she was justified in that belief by the attempts of certain American investors "to exploit her privileges and possessions." For his part, he declared, he would not "serve the ambitions" of those gentlemen.<sup>53</sup> Under no circumstances, it is clear, was the president prepared to employ American troops to secure the property of the likes of Hammond, Watriss, and Whitney, archetypes, in his mind, of the avaricious and exploitative concessionaires that he had denounced from the earliest days of his administration.

Josephus Daniels, of course, wholeheartedly concurred. Adamantly opposed to further intervention in Mexico on any grounds, the secretary had been appalled at the extension of discretionary authority to Admiral Howard.<sup>54</sup> Unquestionably, then, he was delighted with the president's decision and lost no time in transmitting it to the admiral at Tobari Bay.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Wilson to Daniels, June 28, 1915, Daniels Papers, Box 109, File: "Special Correspondence, Woodrow Wilson Correspondence with JD."

<sup>≌</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> PPWW. 2: 231.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico, 10-12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Daniels to Wilson, June 28, 1915, Daniels Papers, Box 109, File: "Special Correspondence, Woodrow Wilson Correspondence with JD."

For the moment, at least, the drift toward United States armed intervention in Sonora had been arrested.

\*\*\*

Dr. Warrick R. Edwards received his PhD from Louisiana State University in United States history with a concentration in foreign relations and economic history. His dissertation was "United States-Mexican Relations, 1913-1916: Revolution, Oil, and Intervention." He has taught at Louisiana State University, Newberry College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and Central Florida Community College; he has been affiliated with Tallahassee Community College since 1991. Dr. Edwards is a co-author of the forthcoming *Politics and the Penitentiary*, a study on the political economy of the Mississippi penal system.

## AFRICAN AMERICAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE DAYTONA BEACH AREA 1866-1910

## Leonard Lempel Bethune-Cookman College

Daytona Beach is located in eastern Volusia County, Florida, about 100 miles south of Jacksonville. The site of several sugar plantations at the opening of the nineteenth century, the region was largely abandoned and the plantations burned during the Second Seminole War in the 1830s. The population of Volusia County in 1860 was only 1,158--861 white and 297 black--with most located in the western part in settlements along the St. Johns River.

After the Civil War, East Volusia County witnessed a large influx of people as a result of two major efforts to colonize the freedmen. Such efforts were made possible by the Homestead Act of 1866, which enabled freedmen to acquire government lands in Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida. About 3,000 blacks purchased homesteads in Florida, more than in any other state. In all, an estimated four to five thousand freedmen came to Florida in 1866 and 1867, with about 1,600 of them settling in East Volusia County.<sup>2</sup>

In January 1867, General Ralph Ely brought about 1,000 freedmen in three steamboats from Charleston, South Carolina to homesteads west of Mosquito Inlet, now known as Ponce Inlet. Although Ely had elicited help from the Bureau of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>John M. Hawks, *The Florida Gazetteer* (New Orleans: Bronze Pen Stfan Book and Job Office, 1871), 96.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Joe M. Richardson, *The Negro in the Reconstruction of Florida, 1865-1977* (1965; reprint, Tampa: Trend House, 1973), 75; Jerrell H. Shofner, *Nor is it Over Yet: Florida in the Era of Reconstruction, 1863-1877* (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1974), 125.

Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, better known as the Freedmen's Bureau, preparations were inadequate. Most of the land secured was of poor quality, and there were insufficient food, building supplies, tools, and other necessities for survival on the Florida frontier. In addition, there is evidence that Ely illegally sold supplies that were supposed to be distributed to the freedmen, and he charged each freedman \$10.00 for the trip and allowed his clerk to assess them \$.75. When the colony failed, none had their money returned.

Ely may have been counting on the support of another colony of freedmen already in the vicinity of Mosquito Inlet at the beginning of 1867. That colony was organized by the physician, John Milton Hawks. Hawks, an abolitionist from New Hampshire, served as medical officer for a black regiment during the Civil War, spending most of his time treating black soldiers in the South Carolina Sea Islands. In October of 1865, shortly after the war had ended, Hawks and several other Union officers of black regiments formed the Florida Land and Lumber Company which was designed "to secure homesteads for freedmen and others, and to furnish a profitable investment for capital."

Although Hawks truly wanted to help the freedmen, he also hoped to profit by using their labor for his Florida lumbering operations. In the fall of 1866 several hundred freedmen, mostly former Union soldiers from Hawks' regiment and their families, accompanied Hawks and the other officers of the Florida Land and Lumber Company to Mosqui-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Hawks, Florida Gazetteer, 88; Shofner, Nor is it Over Yet, 71-72; Charles Hopkins to General John T. Sprague, Feb. 27, 1867, U.S. Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (hereafter cited as BRFAL), Record Group 105, National Archives, Washington, DC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Hawks, Florida Gazetteer, 127.

to Inlet. The majority of the freedmen settled on homesteads north of Spruce Creek and near Dunlawton, northwest of the inlet. A large saw mill was built on the east bank of the Halifax River. Hawks named his settlement Port Orange. The first Port Orange Post Office was established in 1867, located in what is now the town of Ponce Inlet. Later that year it was moved across the river, and the next year, 1868, it was moved a few miles north to within the boundaries of modern day Port Orange.<sup>5</sup>

Right from the start the Hawks colony ran into trouble. Many of the freedmen had difficulty sustaining themselves on the sandy soil, and the necessary seed and other means of support were in short supply. Because the mill was to supply the lumber for building homes, delays in getting the mill running meant the settlers had to make do with crude huts. The saw mill machinery was damaged, perhaps during shipment through the inlet, requiring costly repairs. Hawks later admitted that the mill purchased was three times larger than what was needed. The arrival of 1,000 poorly supplied freedmen brought by General Ely placed additional strains on the fledgling colony. Adding to the difficulties of the freedmen was the alleged fraud perpetrated by a Freedmen's Bureau agent, S. C. Osborn, who was accused of selling rations to the freedmen. Osborn later resigned. With all of the company's property mortgaged, the fate of the Florida Land and Lumber Company was sealed when its treasurer, G.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>J. M. Hawks to F. W. Osborn, Dec. 14, 1865, BRFAL, Record Group 105, National Archives; Hawks, *Florida Gazetteer*, 128; Pleasant Daniel Gold, *History of Volusia County Florida* (DeLand, FL: E. O. Painter Printing Co., 1927), 96-97.

A. Purdie, absconded with the money borrowed to complete the mill.<sup>6</sup>

With the failure of the Florida Land and Lumber Company, most freedmen left the area, finding work on white-owned farms and plantations or moving to other parts of the state and region. W. J. Purman, a Special Agent with the Freedmen's Bureau, reported in April of 1867 that only 142 adults and 109 children remained in the colony, with many of these planning to leave soon because of the dreadful conditions. He also described the plight of the colony's remaining freedmen:

These people are now suffering for the nec\*essities of life. Their condition is pitiable, and their wants and anguish appeal not only to sympathy, but to feelings of humanity. Strong men with tears come begging for anything to appease the hunger of their families. They are willing to go any distance to labor and do go fifty and sixty miles to earn a morsel to keep starvation off from day to day. Most of them have not seen any meal for weeks, living entirely on coutee, palmetto-cabbage and fish.<sup>7</sup>

However, some black homesteaders remained in the area and a few prospered. There were 316 blacks in Volusia County in 1870, with only 83 living in the eastern part of the county. Fifty-three lived in Port Orange, 26 lived in Sand Point, and four lived in New Smyrna. Forty-one of Volusia's blacks owned real estate, all but one of whom possessed property worth \$100 or more. Nine of the 41 lived in Port

<sup>&</sup>quot;Hawks, Florida Gazetteer, 128; Letters from S. C. Osborn, BRFAL, Selected Florida Records, Letters Received, Sept. 9, 1867, Sept. 26, 1867, Oct. 23, 1867 (microfilm, P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville, FL).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>W. J. Purman to E. C. Woodruff, Apr. 13, 1867, BRFAL, Record Group 105, National Archives.

Orange. Almost all of those blacks owning real estate lived with families or extended families. In all, 182 of the county's 316 blacks lived on land they or a fellow black (usually a family member) owned.<sup>8</sup>

One of the most prosperous was Henry Tolliver, whose homestead was located in the northeast portion of Port Orange. In 1870, Tolliver produced 100 bushels of Indian corn, 3 bales of cotton, 10 bushels of peas and beans, and 150 bushels of sweet potatoes from his eight acres of land. Also, his home mill manufactured 250 gallons of molasses, and his wife made and sold clothing, bringing in additional income. Adjoining Tolliver's homestead was that of Alexander Watson, also a black Civil War veteran and member of Hawks' colony. In 1887, Hawks claimed that Watson's homestead was worth \$4,000. Several other remaining freedmen from the colony also prospered. In addition to Tolliver and Watson, Hawks identified six from the original colony who owned orange groves worth between \$2,000 and \$6,000.9

Hawks' wife, Esther Hill Hawks, also played an important role in the freedmen colony of Port Orange. A staunch abolitionist and physician like her husband, Esther Hawks administered to freedmen in the Sea Islands, Charleston, and Jacksonville during the Civil War. She was also a teacher, and, while under contract with the Freedmen's Aid Society, established a racially integrated school in Jacksonville during the Federal occupation of that city in 1864. This was the first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of 1870, unpublished population schedules of Volusia County, Florida (microfilm, Volusia Public Library, DeLand, FL).

Michael G. Schene, Hopes, Dreams, and Promises: A History of Volusia County, Florida (Daytona Beach, FL: News-Journal Corporation, 1976), 77; John M. Hawks, The East Coast of Florida: A Descriptive Narrative (Lynn, MA: Lewis and Winship Publishers, 1887), 71-72.

integrated school in the state and probably in the South. Esther Hawks arrived in Port Orange, Florida, in November of 1866, joining her husband and hundreds of freedmen who had recently arrived. Almost immediately she started teaching freedmen, their families, and local white children as well.<sup>10</sup>

Esther Hawks' activities in Port Orange are preserved in a series of letters which capture the adventure of pioneer life in Florida, as well as the hopes and aspirations of the freedmen and their white allies. Shortly after arriving in Port Orange, in a letter dated December 26, 1866, she reported:

Our mode of life is of the most primitive kind; our comforts few. . . . Since opening school, the people are far more contented, and families living at a distance are moving nearer, so as to avail themselves of it. The school-building is not completed yet, so we still gather about a big fire out of doors. With their books and slates, and eager faces,—the elders on benches and the young ones squatting in the sand, with their teacher, on the side of the fire most sheltered from the smoke,—it makes a picture not devoid of interest if we may judge by the number of visitors it draws. Most of these men were with us in the army; and I do not find one who has been a soldier unable to read. 11

## About eleven months later Hawks wrote again:

My school flourishes, and the pupils are making good progress. Out of twenty-five, I have an average attendance of twenty-two; of these, eight are white, two

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Gerald Schwartz, ed., A Woman Doctor's Civil War: Esther Hill Hawks' Diary (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1984, 1989), 20, 81-82, 252.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>E. H. Hawks to Mrs. Cheney, Dec. 26, 1866, in *The Freedmen's Record* (Feb. 1867), 22-23.

mulattoes, and fifteen full blacks; so far we have had no discords; the children playing together as harmoniously as kittens.<sup>12</sup>

Not all of Esther Hawks' teaching experiences went quite so smoothly. In October 1867, she wrote:

I reopened school on the first of the month. . . . School will be small this month, owing to its being planting season, and there is still some considerable sickness in our midst. I have only an average of twenty children this week, and but four of them white. . . . I shall have the children from one or two families at least, who have been very bitter in their remarks against "mixing white children with the niggers in schools." I am hopeful that the time is rapidly approaching in this State when such prejudices will be overcome by a more liberal spirit. New England principles are settling all over the State, and in due time such seed will bear precious fruit. 13

The situation did not improve, however. As the freedmen's colony disbanded, Esther Hawks attempted to hold classes in the interior so as to be closer to her prospective pupils. But this also brought her closer to hostile native whites who generally despised schools for the freedmen, especially integrated ones. The final blow came in January of 1869, when a new schoolhouse fell victim to arson. The next

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>E. H. Hawks to Mrs. Cheney, Nov. 19, 1867, in ibid., (Dec. 1867), 190.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>E. H. Hawks to Mrs. Cheney, Oct. 11, 1867, in ibid., (Dec. 1867), 190.

year Esther Hawks returned to New England and resumed her medical practice.<sup>14</sup>

Of those freedmen who stayed near the original colony, several congregated in the northeast corner of Port Orange, probably on land owned by Henry and Anna Tolliver, in what became known as Freemanville.15 The black hamlet acquired its name from the Freeman family. During the 1870s, George Freeman from Georgia married Emma Overstreet, perhaps the stepdaughter of Henry and Hannah Tolliver. The census of 1880 shows George and Emma Freeman and their three children living next to the Tolliver family, and Anthony and Margaret Freeman and their two children also living adjacent to the Tollivers. Margaret Freeman may have been the Tolliver's daughter. At any rate, it seems as if the Freeman and Tolliver families were entwined by marriage, and the numerous progeny of the Freeman families (George and Emma Freeman had 15 children) boosted the population of the black hamlet.16

Freemanville grew during the 1880s as black workers poured into the area to work on the East Coast Railroad, which lies adjacent to Freemanville. During its heyday in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>E. H. Hawks to Mrs. Chency, Jan. 18, 1869, in ibid., (Feb. 1869), 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Ellwood C. and Helen Nance, eds., *The East Coast of Florida: A History, 1500-1961* (Delray Beach, FL: Southern Publishing Co., 1962), 1: 246. Nance and Nance claim that Freemanville is located on land owned by William Allan, a white farmer. However, several sources point to Freemanville being located on Tolliver's land: the Volusia County Census of 1880, John M. Hawks' precise description of the Tolliver homestead's location (*Florida Gazetteer*, 126), and an 1883 map of the area which labels Tolliver's land.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Census of 1870, Volusia County; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of 1880, unpublished population schedules of Volusia County, Florida (microfilm, Volusia Public Library, Daytona Beach, FL).

1920s, Freemanville boasted two churches and a two-room schoolhouse with 65 pupils, two teachers, and a principal. Thereafter, Freemanville's population steadily declined, with many of its residents moving north to the rapidly growing city of Daytona Beach. Freemanville's school closed in the 1950s. However, Mt. Moriah Baptist Church, built in 1911 and enlarged in 1925, is used today by the few families that still reside in Freemanville.<sup>17</sup>

The Daytona community was established in the early 1870s, and as was the case with Port Orange to the south. John M. Hawks and freedmen played an important role in its beginnings. With the failure of his Florida Land and Lumber Company, Hawks turned his attention to land promotion. In 1870 in a Jacksonville hotel, he met Mathias Day, an entrepreneur from Ohio. Hawks escorted Day and his friends down the Halifax River on his boat, and shortly thereafter Day purchased land along the Halifax for \$1,200. convinced his cousin Calvin Day and fourteen other men from his home town of Mansfield, Ohio, to join in starting a settlement, which became known as Daytona. Though Day returned to Ohio after his land was repossessed in 1872, Daytona continued growing, having seventy residents by 1875. Most of these early residents were Northerners, but a few were freedmen who had left the failed colony a few miles to the south in hopes of finding employment in the more promising Daytona settlement.18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>K. W. Goodman, "Freemanville: What Happened to Its Citizens?", *Daytona Beach Morning Journal*, Nov. 20, 1978, section D; Emma Senk, telephone conversation with author, Feb. 2, 1993.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Schene, Hopes, Dreams, and Promises, 100; James W. Button, Blacks and Social Change: Impact of the Civil Rights Movement in Southern Communities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 82.

The next year, 1876, Daytona's 26 eligible voters chose to incorporate the town. Among these town fathers were two black men, Thaddeus Goodin and John Tolliver, son of Henry Tolliver. John Tolliver played an important role in Daytona's early years, building much of Ridgewood Avenue which later became Route 1. Consistently underbidding other contractors, between 1879 and 1886 he was awarded contracts by the town council to build the road. His largest road construction project came in 1881, when the town council accepted his bid of \$150 to "open" a portion of Ridgewood Avenue. Another contractor had offered to do the same work for \$250.19

Daytona's population grew rapidly in the early and mid 1880s, largely due to the burgeoning citrus industry in the region and to the increasing popularity of Daytona as a winter resort. Daytona had just 319 residents in 1880, 25 percent of whom were black. By 1886, the town's population had grown to over 1,200. In that year, 130 white and 35 black children were attending school. Also, there were four white churches and two black churches, as well as five white and two black Sunday schools.

During the late 1880s and 1890s, Daytona continued to grow, though much more slowly, reaching 1,690 in population by 1900. Devastating freezes in 1886 and 1894 through 1895, which caused many orange growers to leave the county, undoubtedly slowed Daytona's growth as well. But the freezes may have led large numbers of black farm workers from the countryside to seek employment in Daytona, where extensive railroad construction was underway. A narrow gauge railroad, the St. Johns and Halifax, connected Daytona with the Florida interior in 1886, and in 1888 Henry Flagler began building a standard gauge railroad through the town. African Americans,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Minutes of Meetings of Daytona City Council\* (handwritten, bound volume, July 26, 1876 through June 19, 1893), 1, 61, 79, 92, 170, 181.

accounting for 25 percent of Daytona's population in 1880, comprised 45 percent of the population by 1900 and 52 percent by 1910.<sup>20</sup>

Although most other Southern black communities witnessed increased white hostility during the 1880s and 1890s, Daytona enjoyed a relatively moderate racial climate during those years. The majority of Daytona's early settlers were from former abolitionist strongholds of the North: Ohio, New York, Michigan, and Massachusetts. Republicans, who controlled Florida's government during Reconstruction, remained dominant in eastern Volusia County well into the 1880s. In his book, *The East Coast of Florida* (1887), John Hawks wrote that

the spirit of the white citizens of East Florida toward colored people in general, is so much more just and fair, that for such citizens to emigrate from South Carolina to this region is like escaping from slavery to a land of freedom.<sup>21</sup>

Consistent with Hawks' observation was the continued participation of Daytona's African Americans in politics during the late nineteenth century. Although a poll tax requirement and other state laws designed to disfranchise African Americans prevented most blacks from voting in Daytona after 1889, several of the city's African Americans continued to vote after that year. In 1890, Joseph C. Coombs, one of Daytona's prominent early black residents, missed being elected to the city commission by only one vote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Hawks, The East Coast of Florida, 61, 62, 64; T. E. Fitzgerald, Volusia County, Past and Present (Daytona Beach, FL: The Observer Press, 1937), 191; Schene, Hopes, Dreams, and Promises, 101; Button, Blacks and Social Change, 82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Hawks, The East Coast of Florida, 72.

Coombs, a freedman, was in charge of the dining room of the Palmetto House, Daytona's first hotel, from 1874 to 1894. In 1898, Joseph Brook Hankerson, a respected black barber, was elected to the city council.<sup>22</sup>

Despite the relatively high level of racial tolerance in Daytona during the late nineteenth century, segregation prevailed. But while blacks and whites attended separate churches and schools and generally lived in different parts of town, segregation was neither codified nor rigidly enforced. Several of Daytona's more prominent African Americans who owned homes and shops in the center of town had white neighbors. For example, Joseph Coombs lived on Ridgewood Avenue, across from Delos A. Blodgett, a Michigan lumber baron; and Joseph Hankerson's barber shop was on South Beach Street, across from the exclusive Yacht Club. Also, as late as 1920 blacks were able to share the beach with whites.<sup>23</sup>

At the dawn of the twentieth century Daytona's rapidly growing black population was concentrated in two adjacent neighborhoods, Midway and Waycross. A directory of Daytona and the Peninsula, written around 1900, includes the following description of Daytona's black community:

Here we see colored men, women and children at every step decently clad, healthy in look and well behaved. Within a mile are their houses on the west side of the railroad, Midway and Waycross, both promising settlements. Midway is quite a new settlement, having a good church building, etc. Waycross

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>"Daytona City Council Minutes" (July 24, 1890), 308; *Daytona Beach Evening News*, Aug. 8, 1967.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>lanthe Bond Hebel, "Daytona Beach, Florida's Racial History" (unpublished manuscript, 1966), 1.

has a population of 300, two good, large well built churches, a public school and kindergarten, drug store, grocery store, a Masonic and Odd Fellows lodge. . . . These attempts of our colored brethren are a success and speak for themselves. Among the inhabitants are to be found a fair number of capable blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, and teamsters. There is abundant proof that it is a fairly industrious population, self supporting.<sup>24</sup>

The kindergarten referred to in the directory was established by the Palmetto Club, a civic, cultural, and philanthropic organization of women founded in 1894. In 1899, it established two kindergartens, one in Waycross and one in Midway, for black children whose mothers worked. Many of the Palmetto Club members were the wives of wealthy Northern visitors who wintered in Daytona and its environs at the turn of the century. These affluent tourists did more than just pump money into the local economy. Howard Thurman, the renowned black theologian who grew up in Daytona during the early 1900s, observed:

The Rockefellers, the Gambles, the Whites, and many other old rich families . . . employed local people, black and white, as servants and household retainers, while their chauffeurs and personal maids usually traveled with them, returning north at the end of winter. The tempering influence of these northern families made contact between the races less abrasive than it might have been otherwise. 26

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Daytona and Peninsula, Map, Guide, Directory (1900?), 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Daytona Morning Journal, Nov. 7, 1916.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Howard Thurman, With Head and Heart (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 9.

In spite of the tempering influence of Northerners, Daytona's color line became increasing rigid during the early twentieth century. Anthony Stevens, a black resident of Daytona at the turn of the century, remarked:

At that time [1902] I didn't notice any significant signs of segregation, but when I left to work in New York and returned to Daytona in 1906 I noticed very significant signs of separation of the black and white community. Everywhere were signs, "colored" - "white."<sup>27</sup>

Black political influence also waned during the early 1900s. Although African Americans continued to vote, increasingly that vote was controlled by the local political machine. Whites dominated the machine, but some black leaders cooperated, helping to deliver the African American vote to the machine candidates. Reportedly, several black leaders became wealthy by assisting in this fashion.<sup>28</sup>

By 1910, a third black neighborhood, Newtown, had joined Waycross and Midway. Howard Thurman speaks of the separate worlds occupied by black and white Daytonans:

The three neighborhoods formed a closely knit community of black people, surrounded by a white world. Daytona Beach (not Daytona) itself and Sea Breeze were exclusive tourist areas, located across the Halifax River from Daytona. I could work in Sea Breeze and Daytona Beach, but I was not allowed to spend the night there, nor could I be seen there after dark without being threatened. During those years, we were permitted to enjoy the beaches and to swim in the ocean-even these were later to be limited to whites only--but these areas were absolutely off limits after dark. The white community in Daytona itself was "downtown,"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Anthony Mark Stevens, interview by Joseph E. Taylor, Aug. 28, 1976.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Button, Blacks and Social Change, 82-83.

no place for loitering. Our freedom of movement was carefully circumscribed, a fact so accepted that it was taken for granted. But in Waycross, Midway, and Newtown we were secure and at home, free to move and go about our business as we pleased. Thus, white and black worlds were separated by a wall of quiet hostility and overt suspicion.<sup>29</sup>

Into this milieu entered Mary McLeod Bethune in 1904. Attracted to the area by the large, poor, and unschooled population of blacks, Mrs. Bethune started the Daytona Educational and Industrial Training School for Negro Girls. The school at first consisted of a two-story frame building owned by John Williams, a black carpenter. The rent was \$11.00 per month, but Mrs. Bethune only had \$1.50 to offer as down payment. On October 4, 1904, the school opened with just five little girls whose parents agreed to pay \$.50 a week for tuition. These girls were given domestic and industrial training under the crudest of conditions. Bethune scavenged the city dump heaps and refuse piles of resort hotels for supplies and clothing for her students. Packing crates and boxes were used as furniture, upturned baskets served as chairs, and the little girls slept on a castoff double bed with a mattress of donated corn sacks that Mrs. Bethune had sewn together and stuffed with Spanish moss. Groceries consisted of donations from generous neighbors or were purchased from the proceeds of sweet potato pies baked by Mrs. Bethune and sold to black railroad workers.30

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Thurman, With Head and Heart, 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Rackham Holt, Mary McLeod Bethune (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1964), 59-61; Ianthe Bond Hebel, ed., Centennial History of Volusia County, Florida, 1854-1954 (Daytona Beach, FL: College Publishing Co., 1955), 57.

The school grew rapidly and moved to the only available location, the city dump. Selling her famous sweet potato pies, Bethune was able to obtain the \$5.00 down payment for the property. Mrs. Bethune impressed several wealthy white vacationers and winter residents with her strong will, spirit of sacrifice, and ambitions for her school. They, in turn, provided the financial resources that enabled the school to develop. From its humble beginnings, the school became a junior college in 1923 and a four year college in 1943. It acquired its current name, Bethune-Cookman College, and coeducational status in 1923 by merging with the Cookman Institute of Jacksonville, a school for African American boys.<sup>31</sup>

Besides gaining the support of white moderates, Mrs. Bethune inspired Daytona's blacks. Howard Thurman tells of Bethune's impact:

Very often she would come to our church, usually on the fifth Sunday night, and she would talk of her dreams for Negro youth. . . . Sometimes we attended her Sunday afternoon temperance meetings. The most memorable aspect of those Sunday afternoons was the lack of segregation in the seating arrangements. Many tourists attended, sitting wherever there were empty seats. There was no special section for white people. In the first decade of the century, Mrs. Bethune provided a unique leadership, involved in all the problems of Negro life in town, and at times she was the spokesperson on behalf of the entire Negro community. . . . The very presence of the school, and the inner strength and authority of Mrs. Bethune, gave

<sup>31</sup> Hebel, Centennial History, 58.

boys like me a view of the possibilities to be realized in some distant future.<sup>32</sup>

Bethune's school was an oasis of integration and tolerance in an increasingly segregated and intolerant city during the early 1900s. Moreover, the school was a training ground for black leaders and political activists. After all, Bethune's forte was political action, and in 1936 President Roosevelt appointed her director of the National Youth Administration's Office of Minority Affairs. Thus, Mrs. Bethune became the highest ranking African American administrator in the federal government during the New Deal years.<sup>33</sup> Although Jim Crow ruled Daytona during the early twentieth century, Mary McLeod Bethune and her school laid the foundation for the second Reconstruction of the post World War II era.

\*\*\*

Dr. Leonard Lempel received his MA and PhD degrees in social science from Syracuse University in 1974 and 1979 respectively. His dissertation was entitled "The Mulatto in United States Race Relations, 1800-1940." Currently he is researching the development of eastern Volusia County in Florida, a subject on which he has presented a number of papers. He has written "An Interdisciplinary Approach to World Hunger," National Social Science Journal 1 (Spr. 1989): 41-53. Dr. Lempel has taught at Bethune-Cookman College since 1980.

Thurman, With Head and Heart, 23.

<sup>33</sup> Holt, Mary McLeod Bethune, 194-195, 292.

## THE END OF THE BEGINNING: THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF PLYMOUTH AND THE POPHAM COLONY, 1607-1608

David M. Head South Georgia College

Everyone knows about Captain James Smith and Jamestown, England's first colony founded in 1607, and for most Americans New England history begins in 1620 with the Pilgrims stepping ashore at Plymouth Rock.

Yet a long succession of English voyages to New England predated the Jamestown colony, and at the very moment Jamestown was taking root, an English colony in Maine was founded and abandoned in 1607 and 1608. This was what might be called England's last failure, the Virginia Company of Plymouth and the Popham Colony in modern Maine. In this paper, I would like to recover the episode from obscurity and to offer some reflections on why the Popham colony failed while Jamestown succeeded. To be fair, the subject is not an unstudied one; the Popham colony is at least mentioned in most detailed studies of English colonization, and many of the surviving primary materials on the period have been collected in various forms. However, a modern study of the Plymouth Company is lacking, and most of the work on the subject forms a small part of books on broader topics. 2

<sup>&#</sup>x27;See David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn, eds., The English New England Voyages, 1602-1608 (London, 1983).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans and the Making of New England, 1500-1643 (New York, 1982); K. R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge, 1984).

English exploration of New England goes back to the fifteenth century. On his first voyage in 1497, John Cabot sailed along the American coast southward from Newfoundland and, a year later, may have reached Florida. English fishermen followed Cabot to North America in the following decades, but for most of the sixteenth century English efforts in the Western Hemisphere were limited to voyages of piracy against the Spanish Caribbean or unsuccessful efforts to find a northwest passage. No serious English attempt to colonize was made before Sir Humphrey Gilbert's disastrous effort to set up a trading post, a tax office for non-English fishermen. and a base for anti-Spanish piracy at St. John's, Newfoundland, in 1583. Gilbert abandoned his colony in September 1583 and was lost at sea on the return voyage. Gilbert's failure was at least partially due to bad weather, but also owed a good bit to Sir Humphrey's incompetence--Queen Elizabeth commented that he was "as a man noted of not good happ by sea. "5

Despite a few other scattered acts of reconnoiter and piracy along the New England coast in the 1590s, no colonies were attempted during the closing years of the sixteenth century. The Anglo-Spanish war that followed the attack of the Spanish Armada tied up ships and men and made any transatlantic voyage a dangerous one. Only the far north, as remote as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History* Vol. 1: *The Settlements* (New Haven and London, 1934), 34.

<sup>4</sup>K. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 194-97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>David B. Quinn, ed., The Voyages and Colonizing Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert (London, 1940), 339.

<sup>6</sup>K. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 304-07.

possible from the Spanish stronghold in the Caribbean, seemed available for English activities.

English interest in New England was spurred by the realization around 1600 that the French, long active as fishermen and fur traders along the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, were becoming a serious threat to English claims. In 1597, Charles Leigh, with two ships financed by the city of London, was repulsed when he tried to displace French and Basque fishermen from the mouth of the St. Lawrence. Increased French activity meant that England had to move forward on colonial projects of her own or risk losing the entire area to her rivals.

In the spring of 1602, an expedition was sent out by the earl of Southampton and a group of London investors. The bark Concord, commanded by Bartholomew Gosnold, carried a crew of around thirty-two, including twenty colonists. After six weeks of trading with the Indians, Gosnold departed without establishing a settlement. The published accounts of the voyage tried to paint the best possible picture of the area, but there were hints of problems with the Indians, including an incident in which four Englishmen were attacked while looking for "Crabbes, Lobsters, Turtles & c.," and another occasion when Indians stole some iron implements from Gosnold's camp. Gosnold picked out a site for a settlement and built a fort on what he called "Elizabeth's Isle," (probably Cuttyhunk Island, west of Martha's Vineyard), but the settlers,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 3.

<sup>\*</sup>Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 86-88. Archer's narrative, in Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 112-38, makes the intent to settle very clear. Brereton's account, in ibid., 139-203, is much more of a promotional tract with long passages on the enticing flora and fauna of the New England coast.

concerned about skimpy rations and relations with the Indians, refused to stay, and so the fort was abandoned and all returned to England by the end of July.<sup>9</sup>

The backers of Gosnold's voyage had not received a license from Sir Walter Ralegh, whose 1584 patent for settlement was still in force. Gosnold had gathered a cargo of what he thought was sassafras, considered a cure for syphilis and thus much in demand in pox-plagued England. When Ralegh heard of Gosnold's efforts to sell his cargo, he wrote to Sir Robert Cecil demanding that the sassafras be impounded. 10 Ralegh had second thoughts on the matter, though, and not only granted an ex post facto license to Gosnold but also gave permission for a follow-up expedition. In April 1603, Martin Pring set out from Bristol with two ships. Making land along the Maine coast, perhaps at Penobscot Bay, Pring sailed south to Cape Cod, trading with the Indians and gathering more supposed sassafras. Distrusting the natives after Gosnold's experience, Pring brought along two large mastiffs, "of whom the Indians were more afraid, then of twentie of our men. . . . And when we would be rid of the Sauages company wee would let loose the Mastiues, and suddenly with out-cryes they would flee away."11

Perhaps Pring's loads of sassafras glutted the market, for there were no further voyages to New England for almost two years after his return. Part of the delay was political; Elizabeth I had died on March 24, 1603 just as Pring was setting out, and the accession of James I and Ralegh's arrest on

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Archer's narrative, in Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 127-38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Ralegh to Cecil, Aug. 21, 1602, in ibid., 205-07.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Pring's narrative, in ibid., 214-28; quote, 221.

treason charges seem to have set all Virginia projects back for a time. Yet, interest in settlement of the northeast coast persisted, and in 1604-5, a group of English Catholics led by Sir Thomas Arundel, brother-in-law to the earl of Southampton, approached King James for permission to settle a Catholic colony in northern Virginia. James raised no objection, and so in March 1605 Captain George Weymouth set sail from London in the Archangel with a crew of twenty-nine men. J

Weymouth sailed along the Maine coast between Penobscot Bay and the Kennebec River, setting up a cross on an island near its mouth. From James Rosier's account of the voyage, it is clear that it was a reconnaissance for a site for a Catholic colony. Relations with the Indians were uneasy, in part because the English refused repeated invitations to come to the village of the local chief, Bashaba, for trade. Not content with charting the coast, Weymouth kidnapped five Indians before returning to England.<sup>14</sup>

Exactly what Arundel intended is not clear, for by the time Weymouth returned in late July, the political situation had changed. Arundel was now out of the picture, and other Catholics, led by Sir John Zouche, were seeking backing for a New England colony. Westcountry Protestants were also taking an interest in the project, including Sir Fernando Gorges, the governor of Plymouth fort in whose charge Weymouth's Indians had been left, and Sir John Popham, Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench. Other westcoun-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>K. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 308-09; Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 231-311.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>See James Rosier's *True Relation*, in Quinn and Quinn, eds., *New England Voyages*, 251-311.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Ibid., 283-84; Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 90-91.

try men involved included John and Ralegh Gilbert, the sons of Sir Humphrey, and Thomas Hanham, recorder of Plymouth and grandson of Sir John Popham. Meanwhile, a group of London gentlemen led by Sir Thomas Smythe, a wealthy merchant, had taken notice of the Pring and Weymouth voyages and were showing interest in American colonization.<sup>15</sup>

These bigger political fish soon squeezed out Zouche's group. Sir John hired ships and men and gathered supplies for a voyage in the spring of 1606, but was never allowed to sail. By the time the necessary licenses were granted to Zouche in August, the season was too late for the venture and the initiative had passed to his rivals' hands.16 In late 1605, a group of gentlemen and merchants of London and Plymouth had petitioned the king for a charter for colonization in Virginia. This charter, granted on April 10, 1606, created two companies in one, known formally as the "First Colonie" and "Second Colonie" of Virginia. The first group, led by Smythe and the London interests, became known as the "Virginia Company of London;" the second group came mainly from Plymouth, Exeter and Bristol, and came to be called the "Virginia Company of Plymouth." The groups were granted exclusive rights under the English crown to settle any lands in America between 34° and 45° "not nowe actuallie possessed by anie Christian Prince or people"--meaning the French and the Spanish. The London group was given the southern part of Virginia, while the Plymouth group was granted the northern. Although the areas of the two companies overlapped between the mouth of the Hudson River and the upper Chesapeake Bay, neither group seems to have been

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>K. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 310-11; C. Andrews, Colonial Period, 1: 80-81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 312-19.

concerned, as each already had a well formed idea of where they hoped to settle.<sup>17</sup>

The council appointed to oversee the companies was mainly composed of government officers and lawyers from London; the only westcountry men were Sir John Popham's son Francis, Sir Fernando Gorges, and Thomas James of Bristol. The membership of the council caused an immediate outcry, and the city fathers of Exeter and Bristol flatly refused to subscribe to the joint stock to fund the company. The London merchants were also unhappy with their representatives. Only after the king agreed to add to the council new members, nominated by the London and Plymouth interests, did the local leaders offer full subscriptions to the enterprise. <sup>18</sup>

Even while these details were being ironed out, the two groups began moving forward with colonization. The Plymouth company mounted the first expedition, hiring Henry Challons and the ship *Richard* to transport to the coast of Maine twenty-nine men and two of the Indians Gorges had gotten from Weymouth. Challons set sail in August 1606 with instructions to establish a fort at "Pamma Quidda in Mayaushon," or Pemaquid, within the territory of Bashaba, the Abnaki Indian leader of the area the natives called Mawooshen.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>C. Andrews, Colonial Period, 1: 80-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 379-90.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Ibid., 341, 355-56; David B. Quinn, North America from the Earliest Discovery to the First Settlements: The Norse Voyages to 1612 (New York, 1978), 403.

Challons never made it to America. Taking the southern Atlantic route from the Azores to the Caribbean, he was captured by the Spanish off the coast of Florida. A supply ship, commanded by Martin Pring and Thomas Hanham, was sent out in October with supplies for Challons' colony. Pring and Hanham reached Pemaquid and found no trace of Challons, but ended up making an extensive survey of the coast. Upon their return to England late in the year, Pring and Hanham delivered a glowing report of the area's potential to Gorges and Popham, with the result that, despite the loss of the Richard and the expenses of the 1606 exploration, the Plymouth company leaders decided to go forward with another effort to establish a settlement.

The earlier raising of a joint stock for the Challons and Pring/Hanham voyages had met with only reluctant support from Exeter and Bristol. Now the leadership of the enterprise and the funding to support it passed to the Popham family. Sir John Popham put up £1000 toward the 1607 voyage, and, with his son Sir Francis serving as treasurer of the "Second Companie," the effort to plant a colony in Maine became largely a Popham venture. Even Sir Fernando Gorges, who had been a driving force behind the charter and the Challons and Pring/Hanham expeditions, later denied supplying anything more than his advice to Sir John and Sir Francis.<sup>22</sup> As a result, the 1607-08 expedition turned out to be badly organized and inadequately funded, and, when the Popham

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 356-75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Quinn, North America to 1612, 403; C. Andrews, Colonial Period, 1: 90-91. The full accounts of these voyages are found in Samuel Purchas, Purchas his Pilgrimes (1614), Vol. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 376 and ff., esp. 385, n.2. See also K. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 327.

leadership failed, the company was left disorganized and shortly afterward collapsed.

In May 1607, the Plymouth company's next expedition, bearing around 120 men, set out for the coast of Maine. The Gifte of God belonged to Sir John Popham and was commanded by George Popham, either a cousin or a nephew of the Chief Justice. A second ship, the Mary and John, was commanded by Ralegh Gilbert, son of Sir Humphrey and nephew of Sir Walter Ralegh. In addition to the English sailors and colonists, another of Weymouth's Abnaki Indians. Skidwarres, was sent to interpret between the settlers and the Indian sagamore Bashaba. After an uneventful crossing, the ships reached the mouth of the Kennebec River (or Sagadahoc, its Abnaki name) on August 7, finding Weymouth's cross still standing. Choosing a site on an island near the river's mouth, the colonists began work on a fort. While George Popham directed work on Fort Saint George, Ralegh Gilbert explored along the coast and up the rivers seeking trade with the Indians.23

Skidwarres, far from assisting the English, insisted on returning to his people, and, rather than assuring them that the colonists had come in friendship, he seems to have warned the Abnaki not to trust the English. As a result, relations with the Indians were frosty from the outset, and if the promoters had hoped to obtain supplies from the Abnaki and to trade with them for furs, these hopes were dashed before the year was out. Gilbert had several hostile encounters with the natives, including at least one Indian attempt to kidnap an Englishman. On another occasion, an Abnaki grabbed the slow match used to fire the English muskets and threw it into the water, effectively disarming Gilbert's men until a new fire could be struck. By December, the Indians had grown so distrustful

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>C. Andrews, Colonial Period, 1: 91-92.

that trade broke down altogether, with the natives "exceeding subtill and conninge, concealing from vs the places, wheare they have the commodities wee seeke for." Part of the problem, which the English did not understand, was that it was the wrong season for the fur trade. The Indians took furs in the late winter, dressed them, and were ready to trade in spring. In the fall they had no good furs to offer except those used for clothing and blankets, which the Abnaki were unwilling to trade, no matter what the English might offer.<sup>24</sup>

From the beginning, there was tension between Popham and Gilbert. According to Sir Fernando Gorges, who knew the principals involved, the colonists divided into "childish factions, [led by] ignorant timerous, and ambitiouse persons, [which] hath bred an vnstable resolution, and a generall confusion, in all theyr affayres." Popham, Gorges noted,

is an honest man, but ould [he was fifty-three], and of an vnwildy body, and timorously fearfull to offende, or contest with others that will or do oppose him, but otherwayes a discreete carefull man. Captayne Gilberte [who was twenty-three] is . . . desirous of supremasy, and rule, a loose life, prompte to sensuality, litle zeale in Religion, humerouse, head-stronge, and of small judgement and experiense.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Gorges to Salisbury, Feb. 7, 1608, in Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 455-56; William Strachey, The Historie of Travell Into Virginia Britania (1612), ed. Louis B. Wright and Virginia Freund (London, 1953), 170-71. See also Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 50-84, for information on trading seasons.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Gorges to Salisbury, Dec. 3, 1607, in Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 450.

Gilbert disrupted things by challenging Popham's authority, claiming that, as son of Sir Humphrey, he was the lawful patentee of Virginia and the rightful leader of the colony.<sup>26</sup>

On October 6, 1607, the Mary and John returned to England to obtain supplies. Early in December, because of icing in the river which threatened to damage the ship, the Gifte of God followed, carrying not only a cargo of masts, but also bringing back about half of the colonists. George Popham sent James I a fulsome letter, claiming that the Indians greatly admired the king and were enthusiastically embracing Christianity. Popham wrote that,

So fare as relates to commerce, all the natives constantly affirm that in these parts there are nutmegs, mace, and cinnamon, besides pitch, Brazil wood, cochineal and ambergris, with many other products of great importance and value, and these, too, in the greatest abundance.

Echoing Verrazano's tale of a nearby arm of the Pacific Ocean, Popham assured the king that the natives reported that a great sea lay no more than seven days' journey west of the fort, "which cannot be any other than the Southern Ocean, reaching to the regions of China which unquestionably cannot be far from these parts."<sup>27</sup> Either Popham was a fool (and if so, he had plenty of company among early English explorers) or he hoped that the king was, for even the slightest acquaintance with the New England coast would have been sufficient to realize that tropical spices would not be found among the pine barrens. Most likely Popham realized that things were not going well, and he was trying to shore up support for continuation of a thoroughly disappointing venture.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 449-52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Alexander Brown, The Genesis of the United States (Boston, 1890), 145-46.

The remaining forty-five settlers suffered through a harsh New England winter punctuated by a series of disasters. At some point the storehouse and several of the fifteen buildings at Fort Saint George burned, and, in February, George Popham died, 28 leaving Ralegh Gilbert in charge. Despite Gorges' low opinion of him, Gilbert held the colony together, and, by the time supply ships reached the fort in the late summer of 1608, he had collected some furs from the Indians to send home. 29

But the relief ships also brought news that undermined morale in the colony. Sir John Popham had died in June 1607, and he had been followed by Ralegh Gilbert's brother, Sir John, in July 1608. Although the ships brought supplies for another winter, the colonists were far from enthusiastic about facing more of the harsh weather of coastal Maine. When Ralegh Gilbert announced his decision to return to England to claim his inheritance, [with] "the feare that all other winters would proue like this first, the Companie by no means would staie any longer in the Country... wherefore they all embarqued in that this new arrived shippe... and sett saile for England." 30

What went wrong at Fort Saint George? The surviving records offer little hint. Was it a lack of leadership, as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Interestingly, Popham seems to have been the *only* colonist in Maine to die from natural causes. Unlike Jamestown, where people died like flies, the seemingly harsher climate of New England was in fact far healthier than that of the Cheasapeake. This seems to have evaded notice at the time, perhaps because colonial promoters like Gorges and Smythe were interested in profits and considered colonists a disposable commodity.

<sup>29</sup>C. Andrews, Colonial Period, 1: 93.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Quinn and Quinn, eds., New England Voyages, 415 (journal of Captain John Davies of the Mary and John).

Gorges and other contemporaries argued? Or the harsh-but actually healthy--climate? Or was there more trouble with the Indians than the English would admit? A French sailor, Pierre Biard, visiting the site of the Popham colony in 1611, was told that the local Indians had been friendly to Popham, but that others, farther up the coast, had befriended Gilbert. rivalry, Biard thought, accounted for the trade problems the English had encountered. When Popham died, the local Abnaki became openly hostile to Gilbert and attacked the fort several times, killing eleven colonists shortly before the colony was abandoned. None of this is mentioned in Gorges' letters or the sketchy accounts of the colony published by Samuel There is no way of knowing if the story is even But, at the least, it reflects a considerable degree of native hostility to the English colonial efforts-and one which promoters like Gorges would have been very reluctant to admit.31

The major reasons for the demise of the Popham colony seem to have been at the English end. The death of Sir John Popham deprived the Plymouth Company of its most capable supporter. American history texts usually overlook the English side of North American colonization. Captain John Smith, however heroic his role, was only in Jamestown for two years. The long-term survival of the colony owed more to the financial support of the London Company and the leadership of Sir Thomas Smythe than to Captain Smith's gallantry. After Popham's death, the Plymouth Company became a rudderless ship and, without effective direction, the company quickly fell apart.

The moral of the story of the Popham colony--and of English North American colonization in general--may be that, in the early stages, colonies were delicate creatures, kept alive

<sup>31</sup> Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 93-94.

only by the support of the mother country. The beginnings of the Popham colony were at least as auspicious—and much less lethal—than those of Jamestown. With extensive and expensive English support, Jamestown (barely) hung on and slowly took root. Lacking the same degree of English support, the Popham colony collapsed. The difference between success and failure was as much a matter of luck as of ability. Had their roles been reversed, John Smith probably could not have saved Fort Saint George once Sir John Popham died, and Ralegh Gilbert perhaps would have been the savior of Jamestown. The story of the Popham colony is a reminder of how precarious early English colonization was. In understanding the failures, we may learn more about the successes and come to appreciate the fine line between the two in the early seventeenth century.

\*\*\*

In 1978, Dr. Head received his PhD from Florida State University in Tudor/Stuart England. He wrote his dissertation on Thomas Howard, third duke of Norfolk and uncle of two of Henry VIII's wives. He has published an article on Henry VIII's Scottish policy in *Historical Review* (1982) and another on the Tudor law of treason in *Sixteenth Century Journal* (1982). Dr. Head has been teaching at South Georgia College since 1990.

## A BID FOR LAND THE DUCHESS OF CLEVELAND, THE EARL OF ESSEX AND PHOENIX PARK

Rachelle Wadsworth Florida State University

The restoration of Charles II once again brought the glitter of a lavish court to England. Courtiers, returning to the fold of Stuart favor, often vied for attention and scrambled for any rewards to be forthcoming from the restored "Merry King." But Charles II frequently was too financially strapped himself to offer much, if any compensation and, indeed, looked to other sources for aggrandizement. One such source, both readily available and conveniently distant, was the emerald kingdom of Ireland. Through the governing of his lords lieutenant stationed in Dublin, Charles was able to secure extra revenue for his Privy Purse, as well as a means for supplying rewards and favors to his favorites. Most lords lieutenant blithely followed this policy, turning a blind eye to the avaricious designs of social-climbing politicians and insecure mistresses, both of whom filled the Restoration court.

However, not all Irish governors stood for such tactics, and some even put up a fight. One singular case occurred in 1673; singular, because over the course of seven months, what began as a skirmish snowballed into a major campaign with drawn battle lines and changing alliances. The incident involved a struggle between Barbara Palmer, newly created Duchess of Cleveland, and Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex, a man known for his staunch loyalty and capabilities. These two could not have existed any farther from each other on any scale.

The Duchess of Cleveland was a royal mistress of long standing. She had captured Charles' attention as early as 1559, while he was still in Holland, and she still in her first marriage. When the king was finally restored to the throne, Barbara Palmer chose a prominent position at court. At first, the king was extravagantly generous toward her, but it soon became clear such beneficence proved detrimental. With the king as her protector, Barbara was able to indulge both her lavish tastes and her love of gambling.

By 1666, Charles was paying out over £30,000 just to clear her debts. Still, it seemed as if Barbara could not be curtailed. Gifts to her and her own extravagances remarkably increased once she was able to arrange for her personal friend, Baptist May, to be named Keeper of the Privy Purse.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, afterward, she quite openly referred to Charles' funds whenever the occasion arose. During the summer of 1667, a London goldsmith noted that when Palmer visited his shop, she told her maid to "make a note for this and for that to the Privy-purse for money."<sup>3</sup> While Charles turned his affections temporarily to a number of other women, Palmer continued in the lifestyle to which she had not only grown accustomed, but demanded.

The king, often in financial straits, began to reap the benefits to be found in Ireland. While his Land Settlement rewarded those who had been displaced during the Interregnum, a vast number of lands were still available for use, especially as a source for quit-rents and patronage. For a number of years, Charles was able to bolster his income from Irish revenues, regardless of the state of Irish accounts.

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Lewis Melville, *The Windsor Beauties* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1928), 64.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Samuel Pepys, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 7: 404.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Ibid., 8: 324.

However, in April 1672 all of this changed when Charles appointed Arthur Capel, first Earl of Essex, as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The post came as a surprise to Essex, who had recently returned from a successful ambassadorship to Denmark, and who was highly regarded by Charles as an honest, capable administrator. Given the uses made of Ireland, Charles' reasons for choosing him as lord lieutenant are intriguing.<sup>4</sup>

Essex arrived in Dublin in August 1672 and immediately began organizing the revenue. The Irish system, like its English equivalent, was one where feudal land tenures and the court of wardships had been abolished. To replace these profits, an internal excise revenue, known as the Civil List, was established by Parliament to be held in perpetuity for Charles and his successors. Additionally, Ireland also awarded customs and external excise revenues to the monarch in perpetuity. This differed from the English system, where such revenues were given only for the duration of Charles' reign. Payments totaling £80,000 were to be made to Charles by 1675, but this did not include an additional secret payment of £10,000 to Charles' Privy Purse.

Essex tried to untangle the financial situation as best he could, though he had to continually go up against the Earl of Danby, then Lord Treasurer, and his minion Viscount Ranelagh, who controlled Ireland's purse strings. Essex had only been in office a few years, when he remarked to Sir John Temple, "there are so many projects on Foot to employ the Irish money for uses here" that "I very much fear the streights that poor kingdome will bee brought into may be even

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>British Library, Harleian MSS 2043, fol. 151v.

insupportable."<sup>5</sup> While Essex tried to sort out the numerous money problems, Charles continued to use Ireland as a source for court patronage. Although Essex protested royal grants to courtiers from the beginning, he was forced to acquiesce on occasion, for example, when an estate was bestowed on the Duke of Monmouth.<sup>6</sup>

In early 1672, Barbara Palmer was created the Duchess of Cleveland. By this time, she had amassed an impressive income. In addition to her pension of £10,000 a year, she also received more than £10,000 additionally from beer and ale excise taxes, as well as £5,000 a year from Post Office revenues. Still, it was not enough. She insisted on a grant of Irish lands to bolster her income, and she petitioned Charles for it. The object of her design centered on Phoenix Park.

The Park consisted of 2,000 wooded acres, complete with bridal path and deer park. Attached to Dublin Castle, it was the only recreational site for nobility, and seemed the ideal site for Cleveland to build another manor house. That it was also worth over £20,000 did not hinder its appeal either. She had wanted the park for some time, but had never been able to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Essex to Sir John Temple, Jan. 22, 1676, Essex Papers, ed. Clement E. Pike, 2: 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Robert Leigh to Williamson, Nov. 7, 1674, Calendar State Papers, Domestic Series (hereafter cited as CSPD), (1674-75), 404.

Melville, Windsor Beauties, 97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Essex to Shaftesbury, Mar. 8, 1673; Apr. 12, 1673; May 4, 1673, Essex Papers, ed. Osmund Airy, 1: 59, 71, 82.

secure it. With a new lord lieutenant in office, she now stood a better chance at achieving her goal.<sup>9</sup>

With Cleveland's strained expenditures, no one at court was terribly surprised when she turned her attentions to Ireland. Many had done it before her, and many would follow after. Most at court had some small holding in Ireland, for Charles was quick and ready to bestow grants rather than strain his Privy Purse. The question was more what she would receive than how she would secure it. For example, Robert Leigh of Dublin inquired of Sir Joseph Williamson, "if it be not a greater secret there . . . let me know what grant Lady Cleveland has lately obtained in this kingdom." 10

In October 1672, the first inklings of Cleveland's design began to present themselves to Essex. In a letter to Secretary of State Arlington, he stated that he had been told a letter was enroute on behalf of the Duchess. He continued, "if I am rightly informed, it will be of no advantage to her." The letter appears never to have arrived, for on February 26, 1673, Charles issued a warrant to the Solicitor-General to prepare a grant of Phoenix Park to Cleveland and her heirs, "in trust for the sole and separate use of the said Duchess, without rendering any rent or account for the same." 12

Essex, however, knew nothing of either the king's promise or the grant until almost two weeks later. In a routine

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Allen Andrews, The Royal Whore, Barbara Villiers, Countess of Castlemaine (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Co., 1970), 196.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Robert Leigh to Williamson, Aug. 27, 1672, CSPD (1672), 528.

<sup>11</sup> Essex to Arlington, Oct. 29, 1672, CSPD (1672-73), 98.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Warrant to the Solicitor-General of England, Feb. 26, 1673, ibid., 617.

business letter from Arlington, the secretary of state mentioned the grant almost as an afterthought. Following on the heels of this news, Essex heard from friends in England, who offered advice to leave well enough alone and allow the grant to pass. This was something Essex could not do. But if the king did not think the matter important enough to notify his own lord lieutenant, why did Essex throw down the gauntlet of challenge?

Essex himself felt called upon to not only defend his position as lord lieutenant, but also to defend those who would succeed him. Dublin Castle, as he put it, was "one of the most incommodious dwellings that I ever came in." Dark and drafty, the citadel did not offer many creature comforts, and the Park offered a singular diversion. Indeed, Essex remarked that without it, "a man must live like a Pris'ner." Essex was a proper English gentleman, fond of his horse and hunt, both of which could only be found within the confines of Phoenix Park. When news came of the proposed grant, he wrote to Arlington that during his post as lord lieutenant, "I scarce know any one thing that would make me more incapable to serve his Majesty as I ought than the consenting this grant."

By the beginning of April 1673, the Duchess and Essex were clearly on opposing sides of quickly drawn battle lines. Essex was in many ways handicapped. His position in Dublin effectively removed him from the inner workings of Whitehall, whereas Cleveland was readily able to call upon her supporters, including Charles. However, the lord lieutenant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Essex to Shaftesbury, Mar. 8, 1673, Essex Papers, 1: 59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Essex to Francis Godolphin, Mar. 7, 1673, ibid., 58.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Essex to Arlington, Apr. 12, 1673, CSPD (1673), 138.

refused to be deterred. He had many friends and colleagues within the Council, as well as within Charles' inner circle, and he now called upon these relationships to his advantage. While the Duchess continued her plans for securing the park and the funds it would bring, Essex launched a concerted letter writing crusade to thwart her.

The plan seemed simple enough: write to key members of the Council to persuade Charles to disallow the grant. This was not an easy task, for the king often prided himself on being able to keep his promises. Essex first appealed to Lord Arlington, one of the most powerful men in the realm. But in this situation, Arlington had his own interests to look after. His only daughter was betrothed to the Duchess' and Charles' son, and as such Arlington was not in any position to gainsay Cleveland. After receiving a letter from Essex in early April, Arlington replied,

I assure myself you will give [the king] no contradiction, but... my humble advice to you is to consent yourself with what His Majesty has verbally been pleased to declare in this matter, which I am confident is abundantly sufficient in your behalfe. 16

Essex chose not to heed this particular brand of advice, and he issued more letters to Council members such as Lord Clifford, Francis Godolphin, and the Earl of Shaftesbury. To the latter, Essex wrote on April 12, exactly one week after receiving the dubious advice of Arlington, that

more doe I think myself engaged (if possible) to obstruct the passing of that Grant . . . for I need not mind your Lordship of a late saying of a wise man and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Arlington to Essex, Apr. 5, 1673, Essex Papers, 1: 70.

a great Minister--That Magistrates, as well as Merchants, are supported by reputation.<sup>17</sup>
Perhaps the same could be said for mistresses as well.

While relating to the Councilors and friends the importance of Phoenix Park, Essex also included derogatory remarks about the land: while the acreage was fine indeed for a public park, it was not suitable for one such as Cleveland wanted. The lord lieutenant managed to inform Arlington, who was sure to report to the Duchess, that

whoever put the Duchess upon begging this Park were not her friends in it, for I am sure her Grace could have asked nothing here that would have given a more general discontent, nor is there anything so unfit for the King to give. 18

For several weeks, Essex waited for news from Whitehall regarding the Phoenix, but while there was certainly talk and speculation rampant in the court, no news was forthcoming. In the interim, colleagues, or perhaps enemies depending on the point of view, seemed to have taken great delight in informing Essex of a previous occasion when Cleveland had desired Irish lands and had been denied.

When James, Duke of Ormond, had been lord lieutenant from 1661 to 1669, Cleveland had pursued a grant not only for Phoenix Park, but for other lands as well. When Ormond refused to acknowledge the grant, Cleveland was incensed enough to call for a public hanging! When Ormond later returned to England after completing his tenure, she continually railed at him and the two remained bitter enemies through-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Essex to Shaftesbury, Apr. 12, 1673, ibid., 71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Essex to Arlington, Apr. 12,1673, CSPD (1673), 139.

out their lives.<sup>19</sup> Courtiers who remembered the spectacle were confident that history was about to repeat itself, with the English Whore going up against yet another lord lieutenant.

But Essex was not Ormond. Throughout the month of April 1673, he continued his pleas to save the park, but he never once exchanged any letters or words with the Duchess herself. Both parties relayed messages through Councilors or the ever-present Arlington, and both seemed content for this to remain so. Not once did Essex's enthusiasm, or his obsession, wane.

By the beginning of May, a full month after hearing of the proposed grant, Essex finally appealed to the king himself. His language, once reserved and conciliatory, turned vehement and vituperative, however humbly said. It seemed his patience had reached an end, and maybe he hoped Charles' had as well, for he warned that, "upon the whole, I find all the Nobility and Gentry in this Country so disgusted at the probability of this Parke being given away . . . that I cannot advise the doing of so unpopular a thing." If Cleveland insisted on having Irish lands, Essex suggested that "it will not be difficult to find out concealed Lands of as good a value."

This was the olive branch and the compromise that Charles could accept. By the end of May, the king had relinquished the grant of Phoenix Park, but he also insisted on suitable compensation for the Duchess. Although Essex had won his small victory, he followed through with his suggestion, though he did so with a noticeable lack of alacrity. In a letter to Arlington, dated May 27, Essex vowed "to use my utmost

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Andrews, Royal Whore, 196-97.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Essex to Charles II, Essex Papers, 1: 81.

endeavours to accommodate the Duchess of Cleveland, and that as speedily as may be. \*21

However, lands did not seem to present themselves for Cleveland's approval, and while she steadily ran through her income, no Irish bonuses of land revenues made it into her purse. By mid-September 1673, Essex was still assuring Arlington that without a doubt, he would send within a month's time a "Particular to my Lady Duchess of Cleveland of lands worth her acceptance." Whether or not Essex was being deliberately evasive is difficult to gauge. Land grants to mistresses fell quite low on the list of the lord lieutenant's responsibilities, at least so long as Phoenix Park was not endangered. Essex prided himself on being an honest, decent administrator, who refused to countenance grudges. However, anyone in his position would have liked to say the same.

One thing does stand out through the entire scenario. While Essex had effectively blocked Cleveland's ownership of the Phoenix, the Duchess never sought any reprisals against him. Given the prior incident with Ormond, Whitehall had every reason to expect another confrontation and had eagerly awaited further grist for the gossip mills. But this did not come to pass, and Essex, for all intents and purposes, sought to placate Cleveland with another Irish tidbit.

While Essex had reported in September the likelihood of finding suitable lands, two more months passed before any could be found. In the end, the decision became moot. On November 15, 1673, Lord Conway reported to him that the "Duchess of Cleveland is with child, by Moulgrave, and in no

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Essex to Arlington, May 27, 1673, CSPD (1673), 303.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Essex to Arlington, Sept. 13, 1673, Essex Papers, 1: 122.

favor with King."<sup>23</sup> With no one to beleaguer the point, the search for lands was dropped, and Essex continued to focus his attention on matters of state. The Duchess remained silent, and a number of other Irish lands were spared.

Though the bid for Phoenix Park seemed concluded, it is interesting to note the state of affairs which followed in its wake. The struggle with Cleveland had made Essex cautious and resistant to any further grants. Indeed, one courtier remarked in 1675, that the lord lieutenant was unwilling to pass any grants at all, much to the general dismay of White-hall.<sup>24</sup> The integrity of Ireland was something Essex felt strongly about, and his altercation with Cleveland had only intensified it.

As for the Duchess, she continued to be extravagant and expensive, though she never fully acknowledged that Phoenix Park was beyond her reach. In 1679, she still made a bid for it, though she was again refused. Ironically, that same year, Essex served as First Commissioner of the Treasury, and Charles offered him and the other commissioners, "fair warning to look to themselves, for [Cleveland] would have a bout with them for money, having lately lost £20,000 in money and jewels in one night at play." This could hardly have come as any surprise to Essex, though he refused to pay out the sum because Charles was already financially strapped.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Conway to Essex, Nov. 15, 1673, ibid., 140.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Robert Leigh to Williamson, Feb. 20, 1675, CSPD (1675), 600.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Henry Coventry to Ormond, Nov. 22, 1679, Historical Manuscripts Commission (hereafter cited as HMC), Ormond MSS, N. S. 5: 241.

HMC, Buccleuch MSS, 1: 331.

This refusal became one of the leading reasons for his later resignation.<sup>27</sup>

Essex's lord lieutenancy of Ireland has been marked as one of the more capable, and honorable administrations, though it was often difficult for him to fight so many different agendas at once. The Duchess of Cleveland was only one of many to seek Irish rewards. Charles increased, rather than decreased his patronage, and used Ireland's assets to the point where Essex considered his treatment of Ireland as "nothing better than the flinging the reward, upon the death of a deer, among a pack of hounds where everyone pulls and tears what he can for himself."<sup>28</sup>

However, in the end, Essex had been able to protect Phoenix Park not only for himself but for future lords lieutenant. Some years later, the Park was enlarged by 1,000 acres, adding to the prestige of Dublin castle and the nobility as well. As the Duchess of Cleveland fell from prominence, and the lord lieutenancy passed again to the Duke of Ormond, the brief struggle for Phoenix Park in the spring of 1673 was soon forgotten. However, Essex often looked back fondly on the Park and the role he played in protecting it; and the Duchess perhaps gnashed her teeth for the bid of land she could never obtain.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Andrews, Royal Whore, 253.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex, Essex Letters Written in the Year 1675 (Dublin, 1773), 334.

Rachelle Wadsworth is a graduate student at Florida State University, where her major field of study is Tudor/Stuart England. At present, she is working on her dissertation, "The Trials of Office: Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex and Restoration Politics," which she hopes to defend in 1993.

## THE 1967 ELECTION IN JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

Abel A. Bartley Florida State University

The 1967 election forever changed the face of government in Jacksonville, Florida. By demonstrating the disgust residents had with the corruption and inept leadership governing the city, it set the stage for the tremendous growth and prosperity the city experienced during the next two decades. It paved the way for the controversial change from separate city and county governments to a consolidated city-county system. Recognizing their political power and leadership, it introduced African American and female officials into government. The election provided the city with newly elected leaders who represented a myriad of cultural, ethnic, and educational backgrounds which brought credence to the new council. The election restored citizens' confidence in the local government and the electoral process.

Surrounded in controversy, 1967 will always be remembered as an explosive year. The nation faced unrest in nearly every corner; for example, labor battled management, and students protested against the policies of the federal government. Throughout the United States, there were a number of racial incidents which seemed to signal a turn in the Civil Rights Movement. Young African Americans were abandoning Dr. Martin Luther King's message of nonviolence and were beginning to follow radical leaders who advocated violence as a means of pressuring authorities to speed up the process. Amid riots and protests, chaos seemed everywhere, including Jacksonville. The African American community remained locked in a struggle with local officials for their legitimate civil rights. A number of minor incidents were recorded in the city.

In the mid-1960s, President Lyndon Johnson began his much publicized war on poverty. He drafted local governments to be a party in the war. This strained their budgets, as they began to accept more and more responsibility for their citizens. Cities responded by increasing the tax burden which drove many Whites to flee the urban core and move to the suburbs.

Jacksonville had to adjust to the changing economic realities. The needs of the citizens were not being met. Few people had faith in the system or those chosen to run it. The leaders, corrupt and unaccountable, were stealing money from the city while hiding behind a veil of racial purity. According to Frank Hampton, a long time resident of Jacksonville and a strong African American activist, the White leaders would say, "Yeah, we're corrupt, but at least were are not Black."

As the city's economic conditions continued to deteriorate, the economic base crumbled even while residents were demanding more services. Residents began to flee the city and took with them the needed tax base. In 1950, there were 204,514 people in Jacksonville, and the city had an annual budget of \$23,901,506. By 1965, the budget had nearly quadrupled to \$94,686,766, while the population had declined slightly to 198,000. The per capita cost of government had risen from \$116 to \$479.2 Increasing the tax burden did not solve the problem. By the mid-1960s the residents were already paying the highest taxes in the city's history. Many of the residents were looking for some kind of relief. As the 1967 election approached, the city faced bankruptcy.

Frank Hampton, interview, Jacksonville, FL, Oct. 29, 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Florida Times-Union, Aug. 8, 1967.

Along with the racial and financial situations, the city was dealing with a political crisis. In 1965, ten local officials were indicted by a grand jury for fraud and misconduct. The indictments stemmed from a sweetheart deal between local officials and the owner of Finger Hut, a successful local business. The leaders were using taxpayers' money to buy products from the store at inflated prices. The store owner in turn gave them kickbacks. This is one example of the fraud and abuse practiced by the leaders.<sup>3</sup> In another two, the city purchased a fleet of new Pontiac Bonnevilles at full retail price, and it purchased \$70,000 worth of large concrete frogs to decorate the parks and playgrounds.<sup>4</sup>

The 1967 election offered citizens a chance to reform the governmental system and to bring in accountable leaders. According to local historian Barbara Walch, the 1967 election represented the city's determination to reform the governmental process. To many in the White community, however, governmental reform and African American representation were intertwined.<sup>5</sup>

Undoubtedly, the African American community had the most interest in the 1967 election. They hoped that finally after years of being ignored, they could elect officials who would address their concerns. No African American had held power in Jacksonville since 1907, when George Moss was appointed to the city council. By 1967, they made up nearly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Hans Tanzler, interview, Jacksonville, FL, Nov. 14, 1990.

<sup>4&</sup>quot;Metro has Another Fling," Business Week (Mar. 29, 1969), 161.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Barbara Walch, Black Voices: The Growth and Contributions of Sallye Mathis and Mary Singleton in Florida Government (Jacksonville, FL: By the Author, 1990), 98.

45 percent of the city's population.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, many African Americans had grown tired of the struggle. They faced multiplied frustrations exacerbated by government ineffectiveness. They were paying high taxes and were receiving little to no governmental services. Yet, the shift in the Civil Rights Movement did not dim their hopes of forging a strong, united city with the election.<sup>7</sup>

Elcee Lucas and other African Americans had battled for years to get an African American elected to local government. They had registered voters, organized rallies and drafted candidates to run for office. Their efforts had yielded little fruit. Time and again, African Americans had run for office only to discover they could not defeat the White power structure dedicated to resisting African American participation.

By 1967, however, attitudes seemed to be changing. The local newspaper, *The Florida Times-Union*, in reporting on the results from a study done by the Gallop Poll in 1967, stated that "Prejudice against Negroes has also shown a marked decline over recent years." And Jacksonville did seem poised to elect its first two African American elected officials. The paper may have been preparing the residents for the inevitable.

In the shadow the indictments had left over nearly every incumbent councilman, there were nineteen elected posts up for vote in 1967. Most of these had candidates who were running for office for the first time. There were a number of people who hoped to take advantage of the political upheaval

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Elcee Lucas, interview, Nov. 4, 1990.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>\*</sup>Florida Times-Union, June 6, 1967.

to be elected to office, including Republicans who had not held power in Jacksonville since Reconstruction.

Four well-qualified African Americans chose to enter the race as candidates for seats on the council. Two of them were retired female teachers, who were very active in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Sallye Mathis had recently been widowed. If she won her primaries, in the general election she presumably would face John Forsythe, a Republican, who had defeated her husband just one year before.

Mary Singleton, the other African American female candidate, was running from a ward which had been vacated by one of the indicted councilmen. Her ward had a large number of Whites who opposed African American leadership in the city--and she needed many of those White votes to win the election.<sup>10</sup>

The two African American men running for office were John Thomas and Sam Jones. They each wanted to take advantage of the political chaos. Thomas, a recent college graduate, worked as a probation officer, while Jones had recently retired from a local business. Both men emphasized their dedication to change the existing system and to represent all of the people in Jacksonville.

The mayor's race held the most interest for the city's residents. Five men were competing for the chief executive's job. Two were Republicans and three were Democrats. The two Republicans were Wayne Cummings, a physical therapist, and Dr. William Hembree, a dentist. Both campaigned on the

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Ibid., June 7, 1967.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

idea that Jacksonville should give the Republicans a chance to run government. Both offered a conservative approach, promising a reduction in city spending, and honesty and accountability in government. They reminded residents that the Democrats had gotten the city into its mess, and asserted that only the Republicans could save it. The GOP, however, could not realistically have expected to win. There were only 3,413 registered Republicans in Jacksonville.<sup>11</sup>

The three Democratic candidates for mayor differed greatly in style and program. Louis Ritter, the incumbent mayor, ran on his record of metropolitan improvements. He reminded the voters of the millions of investment dollars he had brought to the city. Hans Tanzler campaigned on the theme of honesty and efficiency. John P. King, a criminal court clerk, campaigned on the idea of being tough enough to clean up government.

Louis Ritter, the front runner, seemed untainted by the corruption which had plagued his administration. He down-played the corruption, choosing instead to campaign on the issue of changing the governmental structure to increase revenues. He promised to get tough on law breakers and to ensure more accountability in spending. Hans Tanzler, the other leading candidate, had served as an appointed circuit judge. He had done an excellent job during his two tenures on the bench and had a reputation as a strict disciplinarian with good administrative skills and a record of tough criminal prosecution.

Tanzler originally had refused to enter the race because he did not want to run against his friend, Louis Ritter, who had

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., May 23, 1967.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., June 6, 1967.

assured him that he had not been a part of the corruption associated with his administration and that he had opposed the conflict of interest from the beginning. Ritter had promised Tanzler that he would do whatever it might take to clean up city politics.<sup>13</sup>

Tanzler accepted his friend's story until late one night. An elderly woman from the district that he had grown up in telephoned him. The woman asked him to accompany her to a recently built park in her neighborhood to see how Mayor Ritter was spending city funds. Tanzler visited the park, and to his amazement he saw ceramic frogs instead of basketball rims and tennis courts. Mayor Ritter had purchased \$70,000 worth of ceramic frogs from his friend Buddy Tate to decorate the city's parks. Tate had so inflated the price of the frogs that the mayor did not have enough money to buy equipment for the parks. The next day, the woman took Tanzler to a store where the same frogs were on sale for half the price the city had paid. Tanzler became convinced that his friend had misled him.<sup>14</sup>

The next day he entered the mayor's race and immediately began accusing his friend of improprieties. He hired a television crew to shoot a commercial, in which he stood by one of the park's ceramic frogs to show voters how Ritter was spending their money. He charged the mayor with being a party to the corruption and warned that if Ritter were reelected, the fraud and abuse would continue.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Tanzler, interview.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Tbid.

The mayor's race quickly became a two-man race. Both Ritter and Tanzler ran dirty campaigns. Ritter refused to pronounce Tanzler's name correctly, intentionally using the Germanic pronunciation. He then hinted that Tanzler's German background might signal some antisemitic feelings. He also questioned why Tanzler would leave a job which paid him \$19,000 a year for one which would pay only \$16,500.16 He suggested that Tanzler might be jealous for having missed out on the corruption. He also accused Tanzler of conspiring with Governor Claude Kirk to wait until after the election to replace Tanzler on the bench in case he lost the election. Tanzler remained on the offensive from the beginning by accusing his friend of being a crook. Whoever won the Democratic primary would surely win the general election. And both were determined to win.

The first primary was held on May 23, 1967. No one knew it then, but race and weather would play a major role. Louis Ritter was the consummate machine politician. He had made a number of improvements in the African American community for which he hoped to get its full support. No clouds could be seen in the sky on May 23. The good weather encouraged a strong turnout, which helped boost Mayor Louis Ritter to a victory. He received 16,803 votes of which 10,795 came from the twenty-nine African American precincts. There were 28,294 registered African American voters, and 14,471 voted in the first primary. Ritter received 74 percent of the African American vote. Tanzler, who ran as a progressive wanting to end machine politics, received only 2,572 votes. 17

<sup>16</sup>Florida Times-Union, May 16, 1967.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Ibid., May 24, 1967.

Louis Ritter could thank the African American community for his victory. One African American political activist explained this vote,

Louis Ritter seemed more approachable than Tanzler. Ritter was the devil we knew, while Tanzler was an unknown commodity. We ate and drank with Ritter. We could trust him because he needed us and we needed him.<sup>18</sup>

The African American community knew of Ritter's commitment to their cause. They were not sure what to expect from Tanzler. If the pattern of the first election held, then the African American community could elect the mayor.

In the city council races, only two of the African American candidates remained after the first primary. Both received strong victories. Mary Singleton now faced William E. Thompson in a run-off election, to be held on June 6, while Sallye Mathis faced Barney Cobb. For Mathis to win, she would have to convince a large portion of White voters in her ward to vote for her. Cobb immediately tried to turn the election into a referendum on the race issue, warning that, if residents of his district voted against Whites, they were risking establishing African American control of the city. If Mathis won her election, she would become the first African American elected to the city council in Jacksonville, because she faced no Republican opposition in the general election. This primary run-off actually had the real potential of producing two African American elected officials, because, if she won, Mary Singleton would face only a weak Republican opponent in the general election.

As the June 6 election approached, most people were concentrating on the Mayor's race. The two candidates once again began their mutual assaults. Tanzler accused Ritter of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Josh Williams, interview, Tallahassee, FL, Sept. 24, 1992.

running a political machine and exploiting the African American vote. He also accused Ritter of ducking the issues and ignoring the financial plight of the city. Ritter accused Tanzler of being a Johnny-come-lately who had no interest in running the city, but only in creating his own system of fraud.

In contrast to May 23, June 6 started out as a cloudy day; it rained from the early morning until late in the afternoon. The severest rains, with thunder and lightning, fell on the African American community and kept many African American voters away from the polls.

Meanwhile, the White community understood the impending precedent. They did not want the African American community to have the power to dictate politics in the city. White voters voted en masse trying to prevent the African American community electing the mayor. Some 43,172 voted in the June 6th run-off election, compared to 40,311 who had voted on May 23.<sup>19</sup> The increased numbers came from the White precincts, where Ritter did not do well. He even lost in his home precinct, 157 to 292, and he did even worse in Tanzler's precinct, 146 to 639. Tanzler won the bitterly contested election, 21,853 votes to 20,470.<sup>20</sup> The White community had rallied and had given Tanzler the victory. They had rejected the idea of allowing the African American community to elect a mayor.

In the city council races, a much brighter picture emerged for the African American community. Sallye Mathis defeated Barney Cobb in a hard-fought election. In the end, the voters decided to go with the better qualified Mathis as opposed to the racist Cobb. The politics of race had failed him. After

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Florida Times-Union, June 7, 1967.

his defeat he stated, "I am thankful for all the white voters who got out and supported me. I just hope the city of Jacksonville doesn't let the Negroes run the city."<sup>21</sup> He went on to warn that safeguards had to be established to prevent African American domination of city politics.

Mary Singleton had a much easier time, receiving the highest vote count of all of the candidates, and she faced no Republican opposition in the general election. This meant that, in effect, Jacksonville had elected its first African Americans to office. Jacksonville, in fact, had set two milestones at once: Singleton was assured of being the first female ever elected to the council.

Sallye Mathis and Hans Tanzler still had to face the June 20 general election before they could claim victory. Mathis faced Theodore Forsythe, who had run unsuccessfully before for office. He knew that there were large numbers of Whites in his district, and he hoped to pull off the only Republican victory. However, he did not turn the election into a race issue, and he ran a surprisingly clean campaign. Tanzler faced William Hembree in the general election. This time he ran a clean campaign, not attacking Hembree but focusing on the issues.

The June 6 election turned out to be uneventful. Tanzler, as expected, won his election. In the council elections, Forsythe took an early lead. However, after the polls closed and the first twenty precincts had reported, Mathis pulled within 100 votes. Before long, Mathis overtook her opponent and established a commanding lead. Although Forsythe ended up making the strongest showing of all the Republican candidates, he lost the election with 14,528 votes to Mathis'

<sup>21</sup> Tbid.

19,416.<sup>22</sup> Jacksonville had its first two elected African American candidates and also its first two female council members.

The significance of the election was noted far beyond the borders of the city. The *New York Times* praised the city for electing its first two African Americans. One article stated,

In a city bearing the scars of racial riots two Negro women were elected yesterday to the Jacksonville city council. Sallye Mathis one of the victors said, "This means that all our people now will be represented in the government."<sup>23</sup>

The 1967 election signaled the end of politics as usual for Jacksonville. Armed with a new council and a new mayor, the city went about trying to solve its financial and political problems. Citizens hoped the election and the subsequent change in governmental structure would give them the needed power and influence to change radically the way the city did business. Looking back on the election Hans Tanzler has said, "If there was a theme in that election it was we have to get those bums out." He feels that the 1967 council was the best council ever to serve Jacksonville--its members served for altruistic and not personal reasons. 25

Race and weather were two unwitting allies in the 1967 election. Jacksonville has long recovered from the racial violence of the past and has built a strong working relationship

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Ibid., June 21, 1967.

<sup>23</sup> New York Times, June 22, 1967.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Tanzler, interview.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

between the races. The city has improved its financial situation and is now in the process of developing long-term solutions to financial problems. African Americans have been sitting on the city council since 1967. They can thank Sallye Mathis and Mary Singleton for breaking the ground which has led to their successes. The election of 1967 saved the city from bankruptcy and restored the citizens' confidence in the system.

\*\*\*

Abel Bartley is currently a PhD candidate at Florida State University in urban history. He is now writing his dissertation on the social, political, and economic history of the African American community of Jacksonville from 1940 to 1967.