

Leninist Nationality Policy: Solution to the “National Question”?

Walker Connor

Nationalism in the Writings of Marx

The most fundamental tenets of classical Marxist ideology would seemingly mandate a clear, transitory, and relatively unimportant role for ethnic nationalism. There is an evident conflict between a fundamental division of mankind horizontally into economic classes and the division of men vertically into nations. In turning Hegel’s dialectic “right way up,” Marx explicitly repudiated nationalism (that is, the “idea” of the nation striving to manifest itself through its cultural and institutional contributions) as the principal vehicle of history in favour of socio-economic classes. The nation and nationalism became relegated to the superstructure. The nation was explained as an historically evolved phenomenon which comes into existence only with the demise of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. Prior to the capitalist stage there were human groupings, such as tribes, clans, and peoples,¹ but it was the new economic relations required by changes in the mode of production which created nations.² Nationalism was merely a device of the bourgeoisie for identifying their own class interests as the interests of the entire people. It attempted to dampen the class consciousness of the proletariat (1) by obscuring the conflicting class interests within each nation and (2) by evoking rivalry among the proletariat of various nations. Because of its association with a specific economic stage, nationalism could be progressive or reactionary, depending upon the level of society. At a feudal or semi-feudal stage, it is progressive, but at a stage of developed capitalism it is counter-revolutionary.

To this point the Marxist position is unambiguous, consistent, and given unequivocal support by contemporary Marxists of rather diverse stamps.³ More obscure, however, is the question of what happens to nations in the post-capitalist period. Marx and Engels made clear in the *Manifesto* that

the nation would survive the revolution at least for a time:

The struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. . . . Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

But since the nation is part of the superstructure and the product of specific productive forces and relations, will it not, as the state, wither away in the post-capitalist period? If so, does its termination merely mean the end of national antagonisms or does it mean the end of all national distinctions, including such cultural singularities as language? Phrased differently, does the socialist revolution presage total assimilation?

On this issue Marx proved a poor guide. His statements are obtuse, and subject to diverse interpretation. The key passage appeared in the *Manifesto*:

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in condition of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.

The most common interpretation of this passage is that Marx and Engels meant that *all* national differences faced extermination. But the absence of the word *all* has also permitted another interpretation which holds that the authors of the *Manifesto* foresaw only “the abolition of sharp economic and social differences, economic isolation, invidious distinctions, political rivalries, wars and exploitation of one nation by another but . . . not the complete disappearance of all distinctions whatever.”⁴ The fact that most states, communist and noncommunist alike, are multinational units causes the matter to be of great importance, but Marx and Engels’ ambiguity on this point is reflected even today in the general vagueness which surrounds the national policies of contemporary communist governments.

Marx’s failure to spell out the future of nations in greater detail is symptomatic of the fact that his interest in nations was at best peripheral. This is also illustrated by his careless use of terms. Nowhere does he undertake a systematic definition of a nation. The term is employed at various times as synonymous with (1) country or state, (2) the ruling class of a country, and (3) society. His lack of avid curiosity concerning the nation is accountable in part to his reaction to Hegelian thought, to his own cosmopolitan background and proclivities, and to the fact that he lived during an early phase of the era of nationalism, when the breadth and depth of its

appeal were not yet fully manifest. But his lack of interest was also due to a basic misreading of the nature of nationalism. His emphasis on economic forces caused him to slight the importance of cultural and historical elements, thereby badly underestimating the magnetic pull exerted by the ethnic group. Since the nation was to Marx essentially an economic unit, the question of national consciousness was reduced by him to economic ties. This led him to believe that small minorities should be considered, and did in fact consider themselves to be, members of the large nation to whom they were economically wedded. Regardless of dissimilarities in language, mores, and traditions, membership in the nation was determined simply by ties to the economic unit.⁵

Marx's emphasis upon economic considerations also heavily influenced his attitude toward questions involving national liberation movements. He was not a proponent of national independence in the abstract. His bias toward economic considerations caused him to support or renounce national aspirations, depending upon whether or not they were consonant with economic progress. He defended overseas colonialism on the ground that it offered areas such as India the most efficacious means for advancing to a higher economic stage. Moreover, not a believer in the innate worth of the nation, Marx would not attempt to breathe the national idea into industrially backward people (whom he termed "people without history"), but would prefer to see them attached to more progressive societies. He was most apt to support independence for large nations such as the Poles, while denying it to nations such as the Czechs which were adjudged too small to permit the growth of a modern economy. But beyond the question of size and regardless of the potentiality for developing a modern economy, Marx ultimately judged each national movement in terms of its impact upon the global, revolutionary movement. He was prepared to deny support to large movements and to grant it to small, if such seeming inconsistencies served grand strategy. Thus, Pan-Slavism was repudiated by Marx because he feared it would prove advantageous to czarism, which Marx considered the archetype of reaction. Conversely, despite its small size and despite his own earlier objections, Marx became an ardent proponent of independence for the Irish nation because he believed that the issue was diverting class antagonisms from their proper target. The English proletariat and the Irish workers within England were at loggerheads over the independence question. Proletarian solidarity therefore required support for Irish independence, although it is interesting that Marx believed that once independence had been achieved and emotions cooled, economic self-interest would lead the Irish to seek a form of reunion (probably along federal lines) with Britain. At least in this instance, Marx had been forced to recognize national consciousness as a more powerful motivation than class consciousness. In this situation, strategy took precedence over ideology.

In summary, Marx's approach to nationalism was characterized by a tendency to underestimate its force and, indeed, to misunderstand its nature. His legacy on the national issue included the theory of the nation's relation to economic stages and the assertion that national distinctions were necessarily vanishing, a process which would be accelerated following the socialist victory. That legacy also included a number of precedents for supporting national movements deemed progressive, but only if the movements were also consonant with the larger interests of the global movement. National movements were not to be treated in isolation, but viewed against this larger backdrop. Alliances with otherwise unprogressive nationalist movements were condoned if strategically wise.⁶ But while condoning such alliances with nationalism and while acknowledging, as earlier mentioned, that the proletariat for a time must "constitute itself the nation" thereby becoming "national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word," Marx maintained that the leadership of the communist movement is differentiated precisely by its non-nationalistic outlook:

The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.⁷

A final important element of Marx's legacy to his successors was the slogan which later played a vital role in the rise to power of the communist parties of Russia, China, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam, and which continues to be an important element in the strategy of all four states. In 1865, a half-century before Wilson became associated with it, "the right of self-determination" was proclaimed in a public document drafted by Marx.⁸

A *right* of self-determination of nations must by definition constitute a prerogative shared equally by all nations, and subsequent endorsements of the principle by both the First and Second Internationals made this interpretation explicit.⁹ Yet, as noted, both Marx and Engels in practice were highly selective in extending their support for independence movements, and it is evident, therefore, that self-determination was conceived by them not as a principle, but as a slogan which could be used to weaken enemies and attract allies. Toward the end of his career, Marx, while continuing to underestimate nationalism, had come to sense that identifying with it might prove useful. The underlying lack of interest in the concept of self-determination, however, is manifest in the failure of the communist leadership to detail precisely what it meant by self-determination of nations despite the slogan's periodic endorsement over several decades.

Nationalism in Lenin's Pre-Revolutionary Strategy

This oversight led to a number of acrimonious disputes within the movement in the period immediately prior to World War I. The issue was of particular import to those most concerned with the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe, and included such notables as Rosa Luxemburg, Otto Bauer, and Karl Renner. However, it was Lenin and, to a lesser degree and under his direction, Stalin, who gave definition to the meaning and the role of Marxist self-determination. The program of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, which had been drafted by Lenin and endorsed at the 2nd Congress in 1903, contained, in addition to guarantees of equal rights to all nationalities (including certain linguistic rights), "the right of self-determination for all nations comprising the State."¹⁰ But another decade elapsed before Lenin's important writings on the subject began to appear.

One point that Lenin consistently made clear in his writings and statements was that self-determination included the right of political secession. Indeed, most of his references to self-determination virtually equate the two.¹¹ However, he appears to have agreed with the more comprehensive definition, set forth by Stalin in 1913, which includes but is not limited to secession.

The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.¹²

But is not the doctrine of political independence for all nations inconsonant with Marx's insistence upon the need for large states? Not to Lenin, because he was certain that few small nations would act against their economic self-interest. And, in the event that they did, they would soon perceive the wisdom of requesting reunion. In Lenin's words: "To defend this right [to secession] does in no way mean encouraging the formation of small states, but, to the contrary, it leads to a freer, . . . wider formation of larger states—a phenomenon more advantageous for the masses and more in accord with economic development."¹³ It may appear paradoxical to espouse a principle in order to frustrate it, but the basis for Lenin's conviction on this point is essential to an understanding of Marxist national policy.

Throughout his life, Lenin was convinced that the only way to defeat nationalism was by use of the carrot, never the stick. He conceived of nationalism in purely negative terms, that is, it was the response of a people to oppression and prejudice (whether real or imagined). Thus the dialectic: by conceding all, or rather, by seeming to concede all to nationalism,

one in fact was promoting cosmopolitanism. With specific regard to self-determination, this meant that the best way to avoid or to dissipate a grassroots demand for independence was to proffer that independence. Phrased differently, support for the slogan of self-determination, rather than acting as a stimulant to nationalism, would prove to be an antidote.¹⁴

But what if Lenin proved wrong, and a number of nations should elect to withdraw from Russia at the time of the Revolution? Was Lenin prepared to permit secession? Lenin's position remained unclear. On the one hand, he often employed Finland as an example of a nation which might secede, and he did not appear to consider such a limited loss objectionable. As noted, however, just as Marx in the case of Ireland, Lenin thought that the proletariat of a small unit such as Finland would soon perceive that it was to their economic advantage to achieve reunion. Moreover, there are a few hints that Lenin would view any post-revolutionary attempt at secession as counterrevolutionary. When asked directly how he would respond to a situation in which a non-proletarian leadership was in charge of a border nation, Lenin's evasiveness hinted at something less than resignation: "What shall happen when the reactionaries are in the majority? . . . This is one of those questions of which it is said that seven fools ask more than ten wise men can answer."¹⁵ On another occasion, his comments on Marx's position on the Irish question appeared to preclude any post-revolutionary nationalist movements: "If capitalism had been overthrown in England as quickly as Marx at first expected, there would *have been no room* for a bourgeois-democratic national movement."¹⁶

In any event, Lenin left his options open by making explicit that the communists need not support each liberation movement.¹⁷ Lenin thus made a distinction between the abstract right of self-determination, which is enjoyed by all nations, and the right to exercise that right, which evidently is not.¹⁸ Though supporting the right of self-determination, "we are not obliged to support 'every' struggle for independence or 'every' republic or anti-clerical movement."¹⁹ The question of support in a specific instance was left to the communist party and,²⁰ just as strongly as Marx, Lenin insisted that members of the communist party not be tainted by nationalism. He demanded, for example, that members whose nationality coincided with that of the dominant group in a multinational state must support the right of secession, while those of the minority nations must insist on the right to union.²¹ By thus insisting on proletarian cosmopolitanism within the party, Lenin insured that the communist position on self-determination (in practice rather than in principle) would be guided by Marxist strategy rather than by ethnicity.

What of those nations who remained within the multinational state? The victorious communists would introduce the policy of "national equality," guaranteeing to the members of each nation the right to use their own

language and to an education in that language. These guarantees were contained in the 1903 Programme, and they were reasserted in 1913 by Stalin in "Marxism and the National Question." Stalin also set forth as essential a system of regional autonomy "for such crystallized units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and so forth," while explicitly denying it to smaller nations such as the Latvians.²² In some instances autonomous borders would reflect ethnic distribution; in others (for example, the Caucasus and smaller or less nationally conscious groups) they would not. The following year (1914), in a private letter Lenin made clear that he had already devised the basic content of what subsequently became official Soviet national policy, although he also demonstrated something substantially less than ardour for the policy's merit.

In order to struggle against the stupidity of the cultural-national autonomists, the fraction must introduce into the Duma a draft law on the equality of nations and the definition of the rights of national minorities. I propose that we draw up such a project:

The general situation of equal rights—the division of the country into autonomous and self-governing territorial units according—among other things—to nationality (the local population determines the boundaries, the general parliament confirms them)—the limits of the administration of the autonomous districts and regions, as well as the self-governing units;—the illegalization of any departure from equality of nations in the decisions of autonomous districts, zemstvos, etc.; general school councils democratically elected etc., freedom and equality of languages—the choice of languages by the municipal institutions, etc. The protection of minorities: the right to a proportional share of the expenditures for school buildings (gratis) for students of "alien" (non-Russian) nationalities, for "alien" teachers, for "alien" departments in museums and libraries, theaters and the like; the right of each citizen to seek redress (before a court) for any departure from the corresponding equality of rights, for any "trampling upon" the rights of national minorities; a census of population every five years in the multi-national districts, a ten-year census in the country as a whole, etc. . . .²³

Lenin's lack of ardour for his own program of promoting national equality and cultural autonomy was a reflection of his conviction that such a policy was merely the prerequisite for a higher stage. Interspersed throughout his writings are references to "the inevitable merging of nations," their ultimate "fusion," "amalgamation," or "assimilation."²⁴ Consonant with Marx's position on the vanishing of national differences, Lenin viewed the movement toward assimilation as both progressive and inevitable.

But if one desires ultimate assimilation, is he not working at cross-

purposes when he encourages the use of local languages and creates national schools? Doesn't such an approach strengthen the nationalism of the various ethnic groups? Again, as in the case of self-determination, Lenin thought not, and essentially for the same reason. Since the bitterness and mistrust which the minorities felt toward the Russians was due to a superior-to-inferior relationship long practiced by the latter, these negative attitudes, which constitute the major barrier to assimilation, must be exorcised by a period of national equality, characterized by a pandering to some of the more apparent manifestations of national diversity such as language. Since he considered nationalism to be the mental product of past oppression, Lenin believed that attempts to eradicate it by force could only have the unintended effect of strengthening it. His emphasis is ever on the voluntary nature of assimilation.²⁵ Although once in power he was to condone the use of force to nullify political secession, he remained convinced to the end that a frontal attack upon nationalism was improper strategy.²⁶

Even if his assumptions proved incorrect, Lenin's temporary concessions to national diversity were probably not viewed by him as dangerous because of the presence of the Communist Party. It is significant that the tract in which he defined the central role and organizational principle of the Party preceded by a year his inclusion of cultural concessions in the Programme of 1903. His insistence upon party members strictly observing international proletarian discipline has been mentioned. Even more important was his explicit rejection of any form of federalism or autonomy within the Party, and his insistence upon democratic centralism. One reason specified for his rejection of any form of decentralization (and this was also a major reason for the support he received on the issue of party organization) was to prevent the formation of ethnic poles of power within the party apparatus.²⁷ In Lenin's words: "We Social-Democrats are opposed to *all* nationalism and advocate democratic centralism."²⁸ Since the power to make all major decisions rested with the Party, such a highly centralized organization was the best insurance that regional autonomy could never pose a serious threat.²⁹

It would be in the higher echelons of the Party that the general content of educational curricula and of the communications media would be designed. To Lenin the key element was not the language but the message. To grant the use of local languages while maintaining control of content was to surrender little. Moreover, broadcasting, writing, or lecturing in the native language tended to overcome ethnic resentment and suspicion, thereby rendering the audience more susceptible to Party direction, including direction toward national amalgamation. Stalin's famous shorthand for this policy was "national in form, socialist in content."

As a guide to actual policy, then, there are three prescriptions in Lenin's national policy. (1) Prior to the assumption of power, promise the right

of self-determination (secession), while offering a policy of national equality and regional cultural autonomy to those nations who wish to remain. (2) Following the assumption of power, terminate the right of self-determination within the state and begin the dialectical process of assimilation via regional cultural autonomy. (3) Keep the Party free of any taint of nationalism.

Post-Revolutionary Practice

Lenin's injunction to uphold the right of all national groups to self-determination, expressly including the right of separation, need not long detain us. However, it might be noted in passing that such promises played a major role in the rise to power of the Soviet, Yugoslav, Chinese, and Vietnamese communist parties.³⁰ The Leninist strategy of pledging respect for self-determination, including secession, has therefore paid handsome dividends to Marxist-Leninist parties in their quest for power. Far less effective, however, has been Lenin's scheme for ridding the state of national antagonisms following a successful revolution. It will be recalled that he envisaged a dialectical approach. Homogenization was to be achieved by passing through a period of cultural pluralism, during which the more overt manifestations of each nation's uniqueness were to be nurtured by the state. This seemingly incongruous synthesis was possible because during the period of cultural pluralism (which, with time, would come to be known as the period of "the flourishing of the nations") all of the state's vast, multifaceted apparatus for shaping the consciousness of its citizens were to disseminate the messages of scientific Marxism.

The keystone of Leninist national policy for a post-revolutionary situation was therefore a plenary distinction between form and substance. While the former assumes a national coloration during the period of the flourishing of the nations, the latter must remain unerringly socialist at all times. Faithful compliance with both aspects of this policy ("national in form, socialist in content") is expected to cause a "coming together" of the nations until a final "fusion" or "merging" of the nations into a uniform whole occurs.

The guiding slogan for the period of national flourishing is that "all nations are equal" and the inclusion of it, or a near equivalent, in the constitutions of Marxist-Leninist states has become *de rigueur*.³¹ In turn, the policy of national equality contains three subcategories: (1) cultural equality (particularly the right to employ one's own language), (2) economic equality, and (3) political equality (predicated upon a system of territorial autonomy for all compact national groups). But although Marxist-Leninist governments pay public obeisance to Leninist national policy in all of its aspects, the record of carry-over from avowal to practice has been an extremely spotty one. For example, within only four Marxist-Leninist states (the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) do internal borders and institutions reflect any concession to Lenin's prescription con-

cerning the granting of territorial autonomy. In 1968 Rumania dropped the single autonomous region that it had accorded a segment of its Hungarian minority. And Vietnam also demonstrated something less than unquestioning faith in the wisdom of Lenin's legacy on the national question when it summarily dissolved its autonomous regions in 1975, the same year as the surrender of South Vietnam. The propagandistic value of the autonomous regions having evaporated with victory, autonomy (though always devoid of real content) was immediately perceived as having outlived its usefulness.

Even in the case of those few states that confer special territorial status upon their national groups, the diverse manner in which they have done so invalidates the assertion that all nations are equal under Marxist-Leninism. There are great variations among states. For example, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and, since 1968, Czechoslovakia are self-proclaimed federations composed of "republics"; within China, which remains adamantly unitary in form as well as substance, groups cannot aspire to republic status. Moreover, while the Constitution of the Soviet Union concedes to its union republics the theoretical right of secession, such a right is denied by the constitutions of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. And thus, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, etc. are not accorded the same right of separation ostensibly granted to Latvians, Ukrainians, Georgians, *et al.*

Variations also exist in the treatment accorded individual nations within a single state. Within the Soviet Union, for example, while certain groups are accorded a union republic (the only level of organization with the theoretical right to secede), others are assigned the progressively lower status of autonomous republic, autonomous region, or autonomous area. And some important groups are permitted no autonomous status whatsoever. Similarly, within Czechoslovakia, only the Czechs and Slovaks are accorded a republic or, for that matter, any other form of autonomous status; the large, territorially compact Hungarian minority is denied an autonomous organ, and the large gypsy element is not even extended recognition as a distinct people in the census. Within Yugoslavia, the Albanians are granted only an autonomous province (a subsidiary part of the Serbian Republic), while the substantially less numerous Montenegrins are awarded their own republic. Within China, there is no autonomous region (China's most prestigious level of autonomous unit) named after the Yi, Miao, or Manchu, although all three peoples are more numerous than the Mongols, who can nevertheless point to a Mongolian Autonomous Region.

The discrepancies in treatment accorded various groups with regard to political equality extend to the spheres of cultural and economic equality as well. Within the Soviet Union, for example, the number of years of education in which instruction is available in one's own language exhibits sharp differentials. As one descends from the level of the union republics through the autonomous republics and autonomous regions to the

autonomous areas, the opportunity for instruction in the language of the titular nation correspondingly diminishes. Thus, whereas people with a union republic are able to complete both primary and secondary education (a total of ten years) in their own language, most groups with only an autonomous republic enjoy the possibility of but seven years of instruction in their own language, a few are limited to only four years, and one group (the Karelians) has no native language schools whatsoever. Within China also, certain minorities, such as the Manchu, are without instruction in their mother tongue. As to Vietnam, even during the period when autonomous regions were permitted to exist, only four of thirty-seven officially recognized minorities were given any schooling in their own language, and for these four exceptions all instruction above the fourth year was conducted in the Vietnamese language. Somewhat similarly, within the Soviet Union and China, the language of the dominant group (Russian and Mandarin Chinese respectively) monopolizes nearly all instruction beyond the secondary level.

So too with regard to economic equality. Income levels vary substantially among groups. In the case of the oldest Marxist-Leninist state, for example, the *per capita* product of the wealthiest union republic within the Soviet Union is more than two-and-one-third times that of the poorest.³² We conclude, therefore, that George Orwell's all too often paraphrased epigram concerning the nature of equality under Marxist-Leninism most aptly applies to nations: all are equal but some are more equal than others.

Marxist-Leninist governments have therefore either ignored Lenin's prescriptions on the national question or have applied them most unevenly. Moreover, even those governments that have imperfectly implemented Lenin's formula for solving the national question have demonstrated broadly held skepticism concerning its wisdom, by simultaneously introducing risk-reducing policies. The major hedging devices that have been employed can be grouped under (1) language policy, (2) the recruitment and purging of elites, and (3) the redistribution and gerrymandering of national groups. Here limitations on space mandate that we limit ourselves to the briefest outline.³³

Language

In the area of linguistic policy, Marxist-Leninist states have exhibited an evolutionary, three-stage pattern. (1) *Pluralism*: The first stage is characterized by official preoccupation with encouraging (some of) the individual languages. Any official pressure to learn the state's dominant language is muted or indirect. (2) *Bilingualism*: This stage is characterized by growing overt pressure to learn the state's dominant language, culminating in making this step mandatory. In the case of the Soviet Union, for example, study of the Russian language became compulsory in 1938. (3) *Monolingualism*:

This final stage, though nowhere yet achieved, is heralded by pressures for making the dominant tongue the sole language of instruction and the sole official language.³⁴

These stages overlap and reinforce one another and are often pursued concomitantly. Moreover, their evolutionary nature need not be reflected in chronological evolution. In this realm of linguistic policy, governments have been known to push forward or retreat precipitously in response to community forces. During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, for example, pressures were exerted immediately to enthrone Mandarin as the sole language of China. But following the demise of each of these programs, policy reverted abruptly to the stage of “the flowering of the nations.” But despite such irregular patterns, it is evident that the ostensible encouragement of national languages has come to be tempered in practice by the encouragement of bilingualism, and, further, by psychological and other inducements to adopt the state’s principal language as one’s own.

The techniques employed to ensure this progression toward unilingualism are numerous and diverse. The following are but a few of the more important: (1) Schools with instruction conducted in the state’s dominant tongue are created everywhere, whereas those conducting instruction in any other language are limited solely to the appropriate autonomous unit. Thus, the many people living outside of their titular unit (or those without such a unit) have no opportunity to attend their “own” schools. (2) Even if living within their autonomous unit, parents are encouraged to send their children to the school conducting instruction in the state’s dominant language, because fluency in that language is one key to social mobility. (3) Whenever possible, minority-language schools are merged with dominant-language schools, and the number of courses offered in the minority language is subsequently progressively curtailed. (4) Those desirous of an education conducted in their own language increasingly find this realizable, if at all, only at the lower levels. Higher education is customarily restricted to instruction in the dominant language. For those who wish to continue their education, this is a persuasive reason to attend the dominant-language schools from the outset, so as to be better prepared for later training. (5) Monopoly over the publishing industry permits the government to determine the number and the nature of publications to be allocated each language. In many cases, the entire literature of a discipline is monopolized by the dominant language, thus demanding great fluency in that language on the part of anyone desiring to pursue research in the field. (6) Examinations, interviews, and other such prerequisites for entering a profession are also apt to be conducted solely in the dominant language. (7) Minority languages are themselves brought to resemble more closely the dominant language by impregnating the former with vocabulary and grammatical forms drawn from the latter,

as well as by requiring that all minority languages be written in the script of the dominant language.³⁵

The desire of any government, Marxist-Leninist or otherwise, to promote unilingualism is quite understandable. Polylingualism offers numerous impediments to economic efficiency and state integration. The point, however, is that Marxist-Leninist governments have been promoting linguistic assimilation, while maintaining the guise of orthodoxy with regard to Leninist national policy and the promotion of the flourishing of national forms.³⁶ Nor is this the extent of the apostasy. Departing from Lenin's notion of language as pure form, his successors have viewed it as a major determinant of primary group-identity. A move toward linguistic assimilation is perceived as a move toward psychological assimilation. As succinctly stated in a Vietnamese publication: "The fate of the language of a people is always linked to the destiny of that people."³⁷ Or, as phrased in a Soviet publication: "Groups of people who have changed their language in the course of time usually also change their ethnic (national) identity."³⁸ A Soviet scholar echoes: "If linguistic and ethnic affiliation do not coincide, the result is inevitably a change in one's national awareness."³⁹ Official avowals of their Leninist orthodoxy to the contrary, the actions of Marxist-Leninist governments and the writings of their theorists betray a conviction that language is much more than just form.

The Recruitment and Purging of Elites

None of the Marxist-Leninist states have honored the notion of national in form with regard to cadres. As made explicit in the 1961 program of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, the "continuous exchange of trained personnel among nations" is a fixture of official policy. This departure from the Leninist scheme is a surprising one. As a blueprint for nurturing Marxism within a single, integrated, multinational structure, Leninist national policy would seemingly mandate that the visible central organs of authority reflect the ethnonational complexity of the entire population, while the more localized visible power-structures reflect the unique national coloration of the immediately surrounding populace. In particular, one would expect that the visible elite within an ethnically delineated autonomous unit would risk undermining the very *raison d'être* of such administrative units, namely, to convince each national group that it has its own, truly autonomous political organization, if the elite were drawn from outside the indigenous group. Yet, the governments have felt that the need to resort to such a hedging device outweighs such a risk. The resulting dilemma faced the Chinese Communist Party shortly after its assumption of power. Even while in the midst of a propaganda campaign whose slogan was that territorial autonomy would make each national group "the master of his home," governmental spokesmen concomitantly insisted that Han Chinese cadres

were to be permanent members of that household. "If it is considered that by assuming control of one's own homeland . . . there is no need for the support of the Han people and cadres—then it will be an obvious mistake which must be prevented . . ."40

The cutting edge of such a cadre policy is somewhat blunted by the practice of assigning members of the local national group to positions of great visibility and little power. Meanwhile, members of the state's dominant ethnic element tend to hold the key positions of power, particularly those responsible for internal security. Thus, in all Marxist-Leninist states the dominant group is customarily disproportionately represented in the upper echelons of the military; combined with the practice of assigning minority personnel serving in the military outside of their homelands, this procedure minimizes any danger of the homeland serving as a focus for a secessionist movement. Both aspects of this military personnel policy came to the fore in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s, when angry Croatian spokesmen pointed out (1) that only 15 percent of all Croatian recruits were performing their military service within Croatia (despite an earlier wrung concession promising that 25 percent would so serve), and (2) that Serbs and Montenegrins, though together accounting for only 43 percent of the population, represented 85 percent of all army officers. A somewhat similar if less dramatic situation prevailed in Czechoslovakia, wherein the Slovaks (30 percent of the population) accounted for only 20 percent of all military officers and for an even smaller percentage of people at the higher echelons of the Ministry of Defence.⁴¹ And in the case of the Soviet Union, one study indicated that all of the commanders-in-chief of the country's military districts were Russian.⁴² Similar considerations help determine the national composition of the police of both the overt and secret variety.⁴³

Staffing key slots with non-indigenous personnel is only one aspect of a cadre policy aimed at nullifying any potential nationalist threat. Another is the periodic purging of leaders, who have been drawn from the local group, for alleged nationalist deviations. Still another practice is the placing of primary responsibility for the monitoring of cadre policy on the local scene in the person of a non-indigene, whose primary loyalty to the center is further ensured by limiting the duration of his assignment in the locale.⁴⁴ *In toto*, such practices add up to an impressive system of hedges, but they also represent a sharp departure from the Leninist notion of territorial autonomy.

Gerrymandering and Population Redistribution

Governments have traditionally attempted to blur ethnic divisions within their territory. Certainly, they have seldom exalted them. By contrast, Lenin's plan for dividing the territory into autonomous units would highlight and institutionalize ethnonational divisions. His rationale was that

the giving to territorially compact people their own administrative division would blunt, if not sate, the titular people's desire for political independence. The guiding rule for such a scheme was one people, one autonomous unit. But as a result of gerrymandering and population redistribution, the ethnic homogeneity of the ostensibly ethnically delineated constituent units within Marxist-Leninist states has been severely compromised.

From the beginning the Soviets demonstrated a flair for gerrymandering. In some cases, borders were drawn in a manner that divided a people, while, in other cases, borders were drawn so as to incorporate alien groups. In the Central Asia area, for example, the authorities feared that excessively large and unmanageable groups might evolve in the shape of a Bukharan, Turkic, or Muslim national group. Therefore, after a short interlude during which the Soviets consolidated their power, the region's political borders were drawn so as to divide the inhabitants into a number of units and thus encourage a sense of separate national identity on the part of the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks, all peoples whose sense of national consciousness at that time was in a very inchoate state. By contrast, in the Caucasus, the authorities were confronted with the Armenians and the Georgians, each of whom had a developed sense of national consciousness that had already manifested itself in separatist movements. This situation was therefore met with the opposite stratagem of grouping these two peoples, along with the Azerbaidzhani, in a single Transcaucasian Federated Republic, a solution that prevailed until 1936. Moreover, when this unit dissolved into three union republics, there was little attempt to draw their borders in the closest possible conformity to ethnic distributions. In particular, territories in which Armenians predominated were made part of the Azerbaidzhani and Georgian Republics.⁴⁵

Some appreciation of the extent of the gerrymandering engaged in at the time of creating the autonomous units within the Soviet Union can be gleaned from the following data. In nine of the twenty-seven union and autonomous republics whose name in each case implied the predominance of a single national group, the titular group did not in fact even account for a majority of the population. In no case did its proportion reach 90 percent, and the median proportion it represented was less than two-thirds.⁴⁶ In addition, there were three autonomous republics whose ethnic heterogeneity was at least suggested by their official designations, each of which contained the names of two ethnic groups.⁴⁷ The title of yet another autonomous republic made no mention of any ethnonational group; its highly heterogeneous population was grouped under the name of the region, Dagestan. Thus, the theory of Leninist national policy to the contrary, most people, including those purportedly assigned their own unit, found themselves sharing an autonomous unit with large numbers of aliens.

Almost equally injurious to the principle of one nation, one autonomous unit were the large numbers of people left outside of the unit bearing their designation. In three of the twenty-seven previously mentioned cases, *a majority of the group's members remained outside*. In half of the cases, less than 80 percent of the membership resided within the confines of the unit bearing their national name.⁴⁸ Recalling that residence within one's own autonomous unit would become a prerequisite for schooling conducted in one's native language, the impact of this gerrymandering upon the rate of acculturation must have been marked.

Subsequent redistribution of population within the Soviet Union has further vitiated the principle of ethnonational autonomy. Particularly pronounced has been the impact of migrations by the state's dominant group. Since 1917, there has been a dramatic influx of Russians into all non-traditionally Russian homelands. As of 1979, Russian accounted for more than 7 percent of the population of each of the Union Republics other than Armenia. The range was from 2.3 percent in the case of Armenia to 40.8 percent in the case of Kazakhstan, with a mean of 16.7 percent and a median of 12.3 percent. The penetration was more dramatic yet with regard to the autonomous republics within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The percentage of Russians within these sixteen republics ranged from 14.7 percent to 73.5 percent with a mean of 45 percent and a median of 44.1 percent. In five of the sixteen autonomous republics, the Russians constituted an absolute majority, and, in four others, they were the largest single ethnonational group.

The overall results of gerrymandering and population redistribution upon the ethnic homogeneity of the republics has been enormous. With regard to the fourteen non-Russian union republics, the titular group typically accounts for less than two-thirds of the republic's population (a mean of 64.6 percent and a median of 68.6). In no case does it account for 90 percent of the entire population, and in two cases it fails to account for a majority.⁴⁹ Again, even more striking is the case of the autonomous republics within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In only two of the sixteen cases does a single, non-Russian people account for a majority of the population.

The ethnic homogeneity of China's autonomous units has been similarly diluted. The centrally ordered migration of millions of Han Chinese into the hinterlands has been combined with extensive gerrymandering to render the titular national groups a certain minority in four of the country's five autonomous regions (China's most prestigious level of autonomy) and a most probable minority in the other. Furthermore, these same policies were carried over to the next lower level of administrative unit, the autonomous district. In only eight of the twenty-nine districts existing in 1965, did the titular group represent a majority of the population. In two others,

the titular group was reported to account for precisely fifty percent. This left nineteen of the twenty-nine districts in which the titular element was a minority. Moreover, five of the eight cases where the titular group was in a majority were districts principally populated by Tibetans. All five districts were part of a contiguous Tibetan homeland and should logically have been made part of an enlarged Tibetan autonomous region. They too were therefore a reflection of a hedging against the principle of ethnic autonomy, rather than an honoring of it. Moreover, in one of the three remaining possible examples of honoring the principle, the dominant group (56.3 percent of the population) had to share the ethnic designation of the district with another people, though the latter accounted for only 2 percent of the population. Thus, out of thirty-four autonomous regions and districts within China, we are reduced to two that could possibly be said to reflect Lenin's plan to grant territorial autonomy to concentrated peoples. In one of these, the titular group represented a bare majority (56.4 percent) and in the other 81.4 percent. Neither would therefore qualify as ethnically homogeneous.

Yugoslavia too bears the imprint of intense gerrymandering. Here, however, the intent was somewhat different. Elsewhere, gerrymandering had been employed as a means of neutralizing or undermining nationalistic inclinations on the part of minorities. This was a goal of Yugoslavian authorities as well. But, in addition, the authorities were anxious to diminish the relative strength of the state's largest ethnic element. Inter-ethnic animosities, particularly those between Serb and Croat, had been the cancer of prewar Yugoslavia. In large part because of their numerical advantage, Serbs had tended to dominate the state, and the allegation of Serbian hegemony had been a rallying cry for Croatian nationalists. Parcelling the Serbs out among several autonomous units would reduce the advantage of numbers and thereby assuage the fears and jealousies of numerically smaller groups, most particularly the Croats. At the same time, those Serbs who found themselves outside the Serbian republic would serve the same protective function relative to minority nationalism as do the Russians and Han Chinese who live in minority areas within their respective states. Particularly important in this regard was the decision to permit the return to their prewar homes of large numbers of Serbs who had fled Croatia to avoid genocide at the hands of the Croats during World War

In addition to weakening the concentration of Serbs by apportioning them among a number of republics, the Serbian community was further fractured through the creation of two autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic (the only republic to be so subdivided). The two provinces were purportedly created to extend recognition to the Albanian and Hungarian minority respectively, and the borders of these two provinces should therefore have closely followed the delineation between Serb and non-Serb. In

each case, however, the territory was expanded beyond that populated by the minority in a manner that *needlessly* incorporated large numbers of Serbs. In the case of one of the provinces, so many Serbs were incorporated that they became a powerful majority, thus questioning the ostensible rationale for the province.

The overall impact of the original delineation of republican borders upon the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia's six major constituent units proved to be a profound one. In one case, the result was the absence of a majority ethnic group. Only in two republics did the titular group account for 90 percent of the population, and subsequent migration has reduced the titular group's percentage in one of these republics from 90.7 percent to 67.2 percent. Today, with a single exception, minority peoples account for at least 20 percent of each republic's population.

Similar practices have been employed within Czechoslovakia (against the Hungarians), Rumania, and Vietnam. Authorities in the last named state appear particularly intent to bring about immediate dilution of minorities. Despite earlier promises to the contrary, the country's current five-year plan calls for the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of hill tribesmen in lowland communities and the moving of millions of Vietnamese into the traditional homelands of the minorities. Here as elsewhere, dilution, rather than autonomy for compact groups, has proven to be the rule.

To recapitulate briefly: The communist parties of all Marxist-Leninist states are committed in principle to Leninist national policy. In practice, however, only a few have introduced the policy's *sine qua non* of a system of territorial autonomy. Those few have manifested a fundamental skepticism concerning the wisdom of Lenin's policy, by encumbering it with a series of hedging devices. Thus hedged, the practices of states with regard to their national question differ dramatically from the practices prescribed by Lenin. Lenin's prescription for manipulating the national aspirations of minorities within a revolutionary or pre-revolutionary situation remains in the Marxist-Leninist arsenal of proven weaponry. Despite much lip-service to the contrary, Lenin's prescriptions for taming nationalism in a post-revolutionary situation fail to achieve their intended results.

Notes

- 1 The word *nationality* is also used in Marxist literature to denote a people who have never progressed beyond a semi-feudal stage and are therefore not a nation. See, for example, I. Groshev, *A Fraternal Family of Nations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967, p. 6: "Before the formation of nations there were various small communities, such as clans, tribes and nationalities."
- 2 As set forth in the *Manifesto*: "The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and

has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together in one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class interest, one frontier and one customs tariff."

- 3 See, for example, the accepted Soviet Union position in Groshev, pp. 6–7. "The nation, as a new form of community, emerged when feudalism disintegrated to be superceded by capitalism. . . . Nations appear and develop as a result of the elimination of feudalism and the rise of capitalism, which establishes economic links and forms a home market, thus evolving a common economic life which unites the separate parts of a nation into a single whole." For the Chinese position, see Chang Chih-i, "A Discussion of the National Question in the Chinese Revolution and of Actual Nationalities Policy (Draft)" translated by George Moseley, *The Party and the National Question* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p. 35: "It is recognized in Marxist Leninism that 'nations are historically determined. . . , having been formed at the time of the collapse of feudalism and the rise of capitalism.' We endorse this thesis." (Mr. Chang's article was written in 1956.)
- 4 S. Bloom, *The World of Nations; A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 26. For a generally concurring opinion, see R. Rosdolsky, "Worker and Fatherland: A Note on a Passage in the Communist Manifesto," *Science and Society*, XXIX, No. 3 (Summer 1965).
- 5 See Bloom, p. 20.
- 6 In a report delivered at the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party on April 23, 1923, Stalin favorably quoted Lenin: "Marx had no doubt as to the subordinate position of the national question as compared with the 'labor question.'" J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York: International Publishers, 1942), p. 159.
- 7 *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Part II. Translation approved and annotated by Frederick Engels in 1888.
- 8 The expression appeared as part of the Proclamation on the Polish Question endorsed by the London Conference of the First International. The Proclamation noted "the need for annulling Russian influence in Europe, through enforcing the right of self-determination, and through the reconstituting of Poland upon democratic and social foundations." Cited G. Stelkoff, *History of the First International* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), p. 85.
- 9 See, for example, J. Brauthal, *History of the International. Vol. I: 1864–1914* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1967), p. 331, where the author notes that Marx drafted the Programme for the Geneva Conference of the First International held the following year (1866), in which "the right of self-determination, 'the right of every people' in Marx's words, was demanded." See also the Programme of the Second International as endorsed at the London Conference of 1896: "The Congress declares that it upholds the full right of self-determination of all nations . . ." Cited in S. Shaheen, *The Communist Theory of National Self-Determination* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1956), p. 26.
- 10 The pertinent sections can be found in Robert Conquest, *Soviet Nationalities*

- Policy in Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 16. The First Congress had also proclaimed “the right of national self-determination.” See Shaheen, p. 17.
- 11 See, for example, V.I. Lenin, *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Selected Writings* (New York: International Publishers, 1951), p. 14 for his comment in the “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” written in 1914: “It means that ‘self-determination of nations’ in the program of the Marxists cannot, from a historical-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, political independence, the formation of the national state.” See, also, his comment in “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Thesis),” written in 1916 (*Ibid.*, p. 73): “Victorious socialism must . . . given effect to the right of the oppressed people to self-determination, i.e., the right to free political secession.”
 - 12 Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
 - 13 Cited in Alfred Low, *Lenin on the Question of Nationality* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1950), p. 68.
 - 14 This is apparently what Lenin meant in 1914 when he stated that while recognizing “the right of self-determination, to secession, seems to ‘concede’ the maximum to nationalism (in reality the recognition of all nations to self-determination implies the recognition of the maximum of democracy and the minimum of nationalism) . . .” Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 46. See also his comments of the following year on page 72: “We demand the freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, . . . not because we dream of our own economically atomized world, not because we cherish the ideal of small states, but on the contrary because we are for large states and for a coming closer, even a fusion of nations . . .” And his 1916 comment on page 76: “The more closely the democratic system of state approximates to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the strivings for secession be in practice.” See also Groshev, p. 33 for Lenin’s comment: “recognition of the right to secession *reduces* the danger of the ‘disintegration of the state.’”
 - 15 Low, p. 99.
 - 16 Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 51. Emphasis added.
 - 17 See, for example, his 1916 statement: “The various demands of democracy, including self-determination, are not absolute, but a *small* part of the general democratic (now: general Socialist) *world* movement. Possibly in individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so it must be rejected.” Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 104. On another occasion, when referring to self-determination, he noted “the necessity of subordinating the struggle for this demand, as well as for all the fundamental demands of political democracy, to the immediate revolutionary mass struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois governments and for the achievement of socialism.” Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
 - 18 *Ibid.*, p. 23. “. . . the proletariat confines itself, so to say, to the negative demand for the recognition of the *right* to self-determination, without undertaking to *give anything at the expense of another nation.*”
 - 19 Stated by Lenin in 1916 (Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 111). See also Stalin’s comments in 1913: “Social Democrats, while fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the Tartars, or against national cultural autonomy for the Caucasian nations;

- for both, while not contrary to the rights of these nations, are contrary 'to the precise meaning of the program,' to the interests of the Caucasian proletariat." Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
- 20 "The question of the *right* of nations to self-determination, i.e., the guarantee by the constitution of the state of an absolutely democratic method of deciding the question of secession, must now be confused with the question of the *expediency* of this or that nation's seceding. The Social Democratic Party must decide the latter question in *each separate case from the point of view* of the interests of social development as a whole, and the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism." Cited in Bertram Wolfe, *Three who Made a Revolution*, 4th rev. ed. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 589–90.
- 21 See the quotation of Lenin in Low, p. 86: "A Social Democrat belonging to a small nation must place the weight of his agitation on . . . 'voluntary amalgamation' of nations. He may, *without violating his duties as an internationalist*, be in favour *either* of the political states X,Y, Z, etc. But in all cases he must fight *against* small-nation narrow mindedness, insularity and aloofness, he must fight for the recognition of the whole and the general and for the subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general."
- 22 Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 64. The insistence on regional autonomy was a rebuff to the position of the Jewish Bund, Bauer, and Renner, which maintained that each ethnic group should be granted autonomy without regard to geography.
- 23 Cited in Wolfe, p. 585.
- 24 "We are for large states and for a coming closer, even a fusion of nations. 24." Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 72. "The aim of socialism is . . . not only to bring the nations closer to each other, but also to merge them." *Ibid.*, p. 76. "The proletariat supports everything which contributes to the elimination of national differences, . . . everything which makes the relations of the nationalities to each other increasingly more intimate, everything which leads to the amalgamation of nations . . . the amalgamation of all nationalities in a higher union." Cited in Low, pp. 115–116. A Ukrainian Social Democrat was castigated for rejecting "the interests of union, of amalgamation and assimilation of the proletariat of two nations for a passing success of the Ukrainian national cause." *Ibid.*, p. 61.
- 25 See, for example, his private letter of 1913, cited in Wolfe, p. 584, in which Lenin opined that the adoption of Russian by non-Russians "would be of still greater progressive significant if there were no *compulsion* to use it." See also Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 103. "All this will until the state withers away, be the basis for a rich cultured life, the guarantee of an acceleration of the voluntary establishment of intimacy between and amalgamation of nations."
- 26 One of Lenin's last acts was a letter criticizing the oppressive policy of Stalin toward Georgians as counter-productive. It is reprinted in Conquest, pp. 146–147.
- 27 Cited in Groshev, p. 34.
- 28 Stalin was later (1917) to underline the pivotal role of a party devoid of national proclivities in Leninist national policy. "Thus our views of the national question reduce themselves to the following propositions: (a) the recognition of the right of peoples to secession; (b) regional autonomy for peoples which remain within the given state; (c) specific laws guaranteeing freedom of development

- for national minorities; (d) a single, indivisible proletarian collective body, a single party, for the proletarians of all the nationalities in the given state.” From “Report on the National Question” in Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
- 29 For details, see Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 45–171.
- 30 The two exceptions are North Korea and Cuba. The governments of these states do not deny the validity of Leninist national policy, but rather deny its pertinence to their state on the ground that their populations do not contain any minorities. The claim is essentially valid in the case of North Korea. However, in the case of Cuba, this position conveniently ignores the platform of the Cuban Communist Party during the 1920s and 30s, when it was committed to a separate Black Republic to be carved from Cuban territory.
- 31 Table A.15 in Zev Katz, *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 452.
- 32 For greater detail, see Chapter 9, *Reinforcements for the Forms* in Connor, pp. 254–387.
- 33 All three stages are discernible during the first fifteen years of Tito’s reign. However, stout resistance to pressures for rapid assimilation resulted in a major retreat during the 1960s, and it may be that the Yugoslavian leadership has dropped the aim of linguistic assimilation.
- 34 Thus today on neither side of the Sino-Soviet border do publications appear in the Arabic script traditionally used by the various Turkic peoples. Those on the Soviet side have been forced to accept the Cyrillic script, while those on Chinese soil have been forced to accept a Chinese phonetic script called *p’in-yin*. The Chinese script serves a two-fold purpose: it renders the people of the border area somewhat immune from written propaganda materials emanating from the Soviet Union and still makes it easier for these people to learn to speak Chinese than would be the case were they to adopt the pictographic, non-phonetic system of written characters traditionally used by the Chinese.
- 35 Lenin had believed that strict adherence to the notion of national flourishing would ultimately lead to the *voluntary* adoption of a single language. It will be recalled that in 1913 he opined that the adoption of Russian by all peoples of the USSR would be “progressive” if “there were no compulsion to use it.” See above, footnote 25.
- 36 Dang Thai Mai, “The Vietnamese Language, an Eloquent Expression of Our National Vitality” in *Vietnamese and Teaching in D.R.V.N. Universities* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1968), p. 64.
- 37 A Chinese editorial in the *Peking Review* [17 (July 19, 1974), p. 19], caustically cited this from the Soviet publication, *The Handbook of World Population*. The identical quotation is cited from a different Soviet source by Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1968, p. 187.
- 38 A.I. Kholmogorov, *International Traits of Soviet Nations* (Moscow: “Mysl’” Publishing House, 1970). Translated in *Soviet Sociology*, XII, p. 5. For additional, Russian language source material expressing this same linkage between language and identity, see Robert Lewis, Richard Rowland, and Ralph Clem, *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 115 Kholmogorov (page 17) also makes clear that bilin-

- gualism is viewed as a step toward unilingualism.
- 39 *People's Daily*, September 9, 1953. Again in 1957, the Party was forced to remind the minorities that it had never promised to remove Han cadres from minority areas. See June Dreyer, *China's Forty Millions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 156.
 - 40 H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 482, 483.
 - 41 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The study of Ethnic Politics in the USSR," Prepared for the National Symposium, *The National Problem in the USSR and Eastern Europe under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, University of Detroit, October 3–4, 1975, p. 31.
 - 42 In Yugoslavia, Serbs and Montenegrins (43 percent of the population) accounted for 70 percent of all higher personnel in the Ministry of the Interior in 1971. See David Dyker, "Yugoslavia: Unity out of Diversity?" in *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, ed. Archie Brown and Jack Gray (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1977), p. 88.
 - 43 For an intriguing study of this practice in the USSR, see John Miller, "Cadre Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies*. XXIX (January 1977), pp. 3–36.
 - 44 The Nagorno-Karabak Autonomous Region was, for example, made part of Azerbaijan although Armenians accounted for more than 80 percent of the population. Subsequent demands for its union with Armenia have been met with purges. See Ann Sheehy, *Recent Events in Abkhazia Mirror the Complexities of National Relations in the USSR*, RL 141/78, Radio Liberty Research (June 26, 1978).
 - 45 Derived from data principally found in Table 9 of Ralph Clem, *Population Change and Nationality in the Soviet Union, 1926–1970*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation submitted to Columbia University, 1975. Excludes three autonomous republics for which data were not available.
 - 46 The name of one of the three (the Karelio-Finnish ASSR) was subsequently changed to the Karelian ASSR. However, the lack of reality that may exist behind the ethnonational designations of administrative units was here presented in the sharpest relief, for at the time of the unit's creation less than one percent of the population was Finnish. Moreover the Karelians were themselves but a fraction (less than one-fourth) of the total population.
 - 47 From data in Table 5 in Clem, *op. cit.* Needless to say, not all of the excluded people lived in immediately adjacent territory, and there are many, therefore, who could not have been included in the appropriate ethnic unit. But, as noted above in the case of the Armenians, large numbers, who were in contiguous territory, were excluded. With specific regard to the country's second largest ethnic element (the Ukrainians), the borders of their republic could have been broadened to include many more of them.
 - 48 These figures reflect the 1979 census. The 1959 census figures would have reflected greater ethnic heterogeneity, for in nine of fourteen republics the titular nation increased its percentage of the population. This development was not due to a slackening of Russian in-migration, for there was a net in-migration in

twelve of the fourteen cases. The principal explanation is that differences in the natural increase of Russians and non-Russians were so substantial as to more than offset the increase in Russians due to in-migration. A secondary factor was the tendency of some non-Russians (particularly the Armenians) to relocate in their ethnic homeland.

- 49 The policy of sending young Chinese into the hinterland antedates the Cultural Revolution, but it received a huge impetus during that period. It is estimated that more than 16 million people were ordered to “go west young man” between 1968 and 1978, and that 10 million of these remained there as of late 1978. (See the *New York Times*, December 5, 1978.) There were later indications that many of these youths would be permitted to return.