

Islamic Education in Pakistan: Second Year Report
A Preliminary Draft
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Introduction

Pakistan it was that first drew the attention of the world to the madrassas – Islam’s most enduring institution for the reproduction of a class of the custodians of Islamic learned tradition – and Pakistan it is that continues to hit the international headlines implicating these madrassas in radical religiopolitical rhetoric, sectarian violence, militancy, and even outright terrorism. As I write these lines (July 5th 2007), the showdown between the Pakistan security forces and the two fire-brand administrators of Lal Masjid and Hafsa Female Madrassa, Maulana Abdul Aziz and his brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi -- along with their more than five thousand male and female students – is about to reach its (anti)climax. Commentators on TV channels are asking the same question again and again: how come that these thousands of young men and women who had come to the Lal Masjid complex and its affiliated madrassas for learning the teachings of the Quran and Hadith have turned into moral vigilantes terrorizing the Islamabad neighborhoods with their moral crusade -- setting fire to the music, videos and DVD stores, punishing women on charges of illicit sex, establishing their own courts to dispense “Islamic justice,” kidnapping police officials in broad day light, snatching weapons from the law enforcement agents, and raiding a massage parlor and kidnapping nine of its Chinese female employees? For several weeks in March and April of 2007, people in Pakistan watched the female students of Hafsa Madrassa, covered in head-to-toe burqas, on their TV screens, occupying a children’s library, carrying long bamboo sticks and Kalashnikovs, screaming slogans of jihad, and threatening to undertake “fidayeen” (suicide) attacks if the security forces try to forcibly dislodge them from the library.

Is the Lal Masjid/Hafsa Madrassa an isolated phenomenon or does it represent, in microcosm, a larger trend in Pakistan society that seems to have overwhelmed the nation’s Islamic religious institutions and has engendered a process that some have described as the “Talibanization of Pakistan?” It is true that the Lal Masjid/Hafsa Madrassa episode was atypical in the sense that no such incident has ever happened in, or about, any other male or female madrassa in Pakistan; and yet the events surrounding the origin and development of this now world-known madrassa are indicative of (a) the way the state in Pakistan has used religious institutions both for its domestic political expediencies as well as for its regional adventures, and (b) of the

blowback that these policies of the state has spurred for its own writ and for the image of the country as a hotbed of religious extremism. Lal Masjid/Hafsa Madrassa may not – and we believe do not – represent the entire socioreligious complex of Islam in Pakistan, but it has certainly become a metaphor for what could happen on a larger scale if serious attention is not paid to the political and socioeconomic factors that give rise to such developments.

This second year report on the state of Islamic education in Pakistan and its socioreligious and political correlates is intended to examine these questions as well as other issues that have assumed enormous significance in recent years with regard to the role of madrassas in contemporary Pakistan. The first year report on the state of Islamic education in Pakistan was intended as a baseline survey of the variety of Islamic schools with special emphasis on the madrassa education. The report critically analyzed the characteristics of the madrassas, including their pedagogic orientation, courses of studies, textbooks, organizational structure, student and teacher profiles, and trends in enrollment. The report also described the various state efforts to reform Islamic education in Pakistan, including the recent reform efforts by the government of President Pervaiz Musharraf, and responses to these efforts by religious educational institutions.

This second year report on Islamic education in Pakistan, while building on the findings of the previous report, focuses on: (a) the role of the madrassas and the ulama in Pakistan's political process; (b) the role of madrassas and their leaders in sectarianism, militancy and regional conflicts; (c) the female madrassas and the recent controversies associated with the Hafsa Women Madrassa in Islamabad; (d) recent trends in madrassa funding; (e) the scope and the current status of the madrassa reforms of President Musharraf; and (f) the views, attitudes and relationship of the madrassa ulama and other religious groups towards globalization, democracy, pluralism, the role and status of women in a Muslim society, and the rights of religious minorities.

Ulama and Politics: Sectarianism, Radicalism, and Militancy

The role of the madrassa ulama in the politics of Muslim South Asia has been competently documented by Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Francis Robinson, Barbara Metcalf, and Ziaul Hasan Faruqi, among others. The ulama's political activism in the early history of Pakistan, especially in the politics of the constitution making during the 1950s and 1960s, has also been thoroughly analyzed by Keith Callarad, Leonard Binder and Freeland K. Abbott. Qasim Zaman's recent book is a work of fine and nuanced scholarship on the role of the ulama in contemporary Pakistan.

The role of the madrassa ulama up until the mid-1960s, however, was more like that of a pressure group trying to influence public policy, rather than as contenders for political power. The ulama-based political parties became prominent and active in national politics only during the later half of the Ayub Khan regime, although both the Deoband-oriented Jamiyat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) and the Brelvi-oriented Jamiyat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) had been formally launched soon after the establishment of Pakistan. One can identify at least three major factors that prompted the ulama to step into the national political arena with greater enthusiasm and vigor in the mid-1960s: one, the anti-clerical and modernist policies of President Ayub Khan, especially the introduction of the Muslim family laws reforms that directly, and adversely, affected their power and privileges; two, the rise of the revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) that tended not only to challenge their long standing monopoly on Islamic religious discourse but also threatened to trespass on their social constituencies through its political activism; and three, a rapidly growing economy as a result of Ayub Khan's developmental policies that created new and expanded avenues for financial support in the mercantile capital sector for the ulama and their religiopolitical activities.

Main Ulama-based Political Groups

The madrassa-based ulama are organized in three main religious political parties: Jamiyat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI) of the Deoband School; Jamiyat Ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) of the Brelvi School; and Markazi Jamiyat Ulama-e-Ahl-e-Hadith (MJUAH). The JUI, headed by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani of Deoband, was organized as a splinter group of the Jamiyat Ulama-e-Hind (JUH), a pro- Indian National Congress group of Deobandi ulama that opposed the establishment of Pakistan. It played an important role in popularizing the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan among the Muslim masses, especially in Muslim Bengal and Assam. After independence, the JUI was part of a broader coalition of the ulama and the JI that campaigned vigorously for the writing of an Islamic constitution for the new nation. But unlike the JI which called for comprehensive reforms in political, economic and social spheres, the JUI's vision of an Islamic state was constituted primarily of the introduction of Shariah in personal law matters and some legally recognized advisory role of the ulama in legislative affairs.

Established in 1948, the JUP mostly operated as a religious organization devoted to propagating its sufi-oriented Islam with emphasis on celebrating Islamic religious festivals (especially the birthday of the Prophet), annual commemorations of saints and pirs, devotional practices, and on polemical engagements with the Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith. As long as the leadership of the JUP remained in Punjab – the first President being Allama Ahmad Saeed Kazmi of Madrassa Arabiya Anwaul Uloom, Multan – it was dominated by the prominent pir and mashaikh (spiritual leaders)

families of the province and did not play any active role in politics. It was only when the leadership came in the hands of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani of Karachi in the early 1970s that the JUP emerged as one of the major religiopolitical parties in Pakistan. The JUP obtained the largest number of popular votes among all religious parties in the 1970 elections. The party later split into three main factions: JUP (Noorani Group); JUP (Niazi Group); and JUP (Fazl Karim Group).

The MJUAH, headed currently by Professor Sajid Mir, is the largest religiopolitical organization of Ahl-e-Hadith in Pakistan that represents the Salafi-Wahhabi school of thought. The organization also supervises the federation of the country's Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas, Wafaq-ul- Madaris Salafiya. The MJUAH traces its roots to the Salafi movement of the late 19th century India that defined a distinct theological-doctrinal sectarian orientation for Ahl-e-Hadith – strict and uncompromising adherence to the concept of Tawhid (unity of God), obedience to the Sunnah of the Prophet, rejection of the legal authority of the classical jurists, and vehement opposition to the folk and populist practices associated with sufi Islam. The MJUAH acted mostly as a sectarian group until the 1980s when, during the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, it became active in politics. The immediate backdrop of this shift from sectarian activities to politics was the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 that prompted the Saudis to encourage (and support financially) their doctrinal cousins in Ahl-e-Hadith to counter the growing influence of Imam Khomeini's ideas among the Sunni population in Pakistan. Allama Ehsan Ilahi Zaheer, the then President of the MJUAH became the most ardent critic and campaigner against the Iranian revolution and the Shias during the 1980s.¹ The MJUAH came to be divided first in two, and later, into several splinter groups on sectarian, personal and political grounds.² Maulana Mueenuddin Lakhvi, based in Okara in Punjab who sided with the military government and was also appointed member of the nominated Federal Majlis-e-Shura

¹ Allama Ehsan Ilahi Zaheer wrote several books and pamphlets against Imam Khomeini and Shias, arguing that Shias are not Muslims. His anti-Shia books were translated into English, Arabic and several other Islamic languages by the Saudi government and distributed widely by their embassies throughout the Muslim World. When Allama Zaheer became the victim of a bomb blast in Lahore during a public rally in the late 1980s – blamed on Shia militants -- the Saudi government sent a chartered airplane to bring him to Riyadh for treatment. He didn't survive and was buried in Saudi Arabia.

² There are reports that a major cause of factionalism among the Ahl-e-Hadith leaders in the 1980s and 1990s was the constant haggling on the distribution of the Saudi funds. The Saudis wanted to deal directly with only a few outlets and expected their funds to be allocated to all the Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas and organizations. This, of course, didn't happen and, naturally, created a great deal of bad blood among the heads of organizations and madrassas that didn't receive a "fair share" (Interview with a senior Ahl-e-Hadith leader and head of a madrasa in Karachi, 5 January 2007).

In the mid-1991, this author saw a glossy booklet in the hands of an Ahl-e-Hadith leader, meant to be delivered to the Saudi embassy in Islamabad, with pictures and press clippings of his rallies in support of Saudi Arabia against Saddam Hussain in the 1st Gulf War. The booklet also contained a list of names of several other prominent Ahl-e-Hadith leaders who didn't come out publicly in support of Saudi Arabia despite being longstanding beneficiaries of its generosity.

by Zia-ul-Haq, organized his faction by the name of Jamiyat Ahl-e-Hadis. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of several other factions – religious, political, Jihadi and Tablighi – but the mainstream Ahl-e-Hadis activists are still organized in two main groups: MJUAH (Professor Sajid Mir Group) that forms a part of the MMA, and MJUAH, headed by Allama Ehsan Ilahi Zaheer’s son, Ibtesam Ilahi Zaheer, an engineer by profession.

From Madrassas to Politics -- and to Militancy

Although the leaders of the JUI, from the Urdu-speaking Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani to the Punjabi-speaking Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti, came primarily from the Deobandi madrassas, they were very particular about separating their political activities from their roles as madrassa teachers. The same was true about Allama Ahmad Saeed Kazmi of the JUP and the leaders of the MJUAH. These were the times when the madrassa elders would not allow the students even to read the daily newspapers. They jealously guarded their educational institutions from the influence of the outside world, including the world of politics – even their own politics. The founder of one of the most prominent Karachi madrassas of the Deoband School, who himself was not averse to politics, is reported to have once remarked: “We want to produce students who would not even know their way from the madrassa to the bazaar.”

Then how it was that the madrassa students who were not supposed to know their way even to bazaar ended up as foot soldiers of major political upheavals, as a vanguard of violent anti-Shia sectarianism, as vigilante enforcers of Shariah in the bazaars and streets of the tribal areas -- and even in the capital city of Islamabad -- and as Jihadi warriors in Afghanistan and Kashmir? The answer to this question lies, primarily, not in what was happening *inside* the madrassas but rather what was happening *outside* the madrassas. Having said that, however, it is also important to note that the madrassa ulama were, in fact, an integral part of the developments that were taking place in the “outside” world of domestic and regional politics. The logic of both the electoral and agitational politics now required that they mobilize their core constituency of the madrassa students in order to assert their political power more effectively. At the same time, an equally important logic was dictated by their newly formed alliance with the Pakistan military establishment both for reasons of ideological affinity as well as domestic and regional strategic goals.³ Thus, both for

³ The now well-known Mullah-Military alliance originated in the early phase of the Zia regime when the religious political parties and the ulama joined hands with the military regime to eliminate the influence of the then left-of-the-center Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who was later hanged by Zia in 1979. But the alliance later came to be formalized into active collaboration between the military and the religious groups, especially the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jamiyat Ulama-e-Islam and the Ahl-

their own political reasons, and for “reasons of the state,” the ulama and the madrassas, especially from the late 1970s, emerged as important part of Pakistan’s political landscape. And once the political ulama decided to do away with the long-cherished tradition of keeping their students away from the political arena, all bets were off; there was nothing in the “outside” that couldn’t be brought “inside.”

The JUI Politics and the Deobandi Madrassas Network

In the case of the JUI, it was only after the transfer of the leadership, first to Hindko speaking, fire brand Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi in the late 1960s, and then to the Pashto-speaking Maulana Mufti Mahmud of Dera Ismail Khan in the post-1971 period that the madrassa students were mobilized as foot soldiers of JUI’s political activism, although the foundations for their use as political asset had already been laid during the 1970 elections in which the Deobandi madrassas played significant role in the NWFP and the Pashtoon areas of Baluchistan. The first major foray of the madrassa students in national politics was their participation in the 1974 Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad) Movement launched by the religious parties to demand that the Ahmadis be declared as non-Muslims. The madrassa students, joined by the college and university students affiliated with the student’s wing of the JI, organized street demonstrations against, and social and economic boycott of, the Ahmadis for several weeks that subsequently forced the secular government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to amend the constitution, declaring the Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This spectacular success of the anti-Ahmadi movement was the first major demonstration of the street power of the madrassa students.

Earlier, in 1973, Mufti Mahmud of the JUI was elected as the Chief Minister of the NWFP in a coalition government with the secular, Pashtoon nationalist National Awami Party (NAP) of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the son of the famous Pashtoon leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. It was a moment of great joy and pride for the madrassa students and teachers to see one of their own occupying the government house in the capital city of Peshawar and issuing orders to the high ranking, Western-educated civil servants. This was the first time since the beginning of the electoral politics in 1935 in British India that a madrassa-educated religious leader had assumed political power through democratic process. The JUI was also a partner in power with the NAP in Baluchistan where it had emerged as the second largest group in the provincial legislature. In both provincial governments, the JUI nominated the cabinet ministers from amongst the mosque imams and madrassa teachers to the utter

e-Hadith groups, during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s and the Kashmir jihad of the 1990s; See, Mumtaz Ahmad, “The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the Military and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan,” *The Middle East Journal*,

amazement of the bureaucracy trained in the British civil service tradition. Mufti Mahmud handled his position as the head of the government of the NWFP with apparent ease and great dexterity and, with the exception of a few symbolic Islamic measures, did not disturb the entrenched legal-administrative structures of the province left by the British. Maulana Mufti Mahmud enjoyed considerable respect among politicians of all colors for his integrity, political acumen and consensus building. His son Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who succeeded him as the chief of the JUI after his death, however, is known more as a consummate politician – pragmatist, deal maker and a good judge of the direction in which the political wind is blowing at a given time.⁴

Surprisingly, the otherwise strict and puritanical Deobandi ulama of the JUI had no religious qualms about forming an electoral alliance and, subsequently, coalition governments with the avowedly secular party like the NAP in the 1970s. Earlier, a large faction of the JUI had also supported the secular-left political formation, the Pakistan People’s Party of Mr. Bhutto with its election platform that justified socialism in the name of Islam. What was equally unthinkable in earlier times was the JUI’s willingness in the late 1970s – and then again in 2002 -- to join their arch sectarian rivals (the Brelvis of the JUP, the Ahl-e-Hadith of the MJUAH and the Shias of Tehrik-e-Ja’afriya), and also their arch ideological adversaries of the Jamaat-e-Islami, in various political alliances spread over almost three decades of Pakistani politics. Thus, contrary to the popular perception of the ulama’s ideological rigidity, their career in Pakistan politics clearly shows their willingness to work and form alliances with political groups of all ideological and doctrinal persuasions.

The Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement of the Ulama and Gen. Zia’s Islamization

Another occasion of the full-blast participation of the madrassa students in agitational politics came in 1977 when the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) -- a coalition of religious and secular parties -- launched the Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement (NAM) to oust Mr. Bhutto from power. Both the JUI and the JUP under the leadership of Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, respectively, mobilized the madrassa students of their respective denominations for massive political protests and marches against the alleged rigging of 1977 elections by Mr. Bhutto. This was probably the first time that the madrassa students from the Deobandi, Brelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith groups were marching side by side with the

⁴ While Mufti Mahmud’s personal integrity was widely acknowledged as above board, his son and successor Maulana Fazlur Rahman has acquired the nickname of “Maulana Diesel” for the petrol and diesel distribution concessions that he is alleged to have obtained from different regimes.

college and university students of the Jamaat-e-Islami for a common goal of removing Mr. Bhutto from power – and establishing an Islamic government. The movement so paralyzed the civilian law enforcement agencies and unnerved the government that Mr. Bhutto was forced to call upon the army to impose “limited martial law” in major urban centers to help restore law and order. General Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief of the Army, however, had his own plans: seeing Mr. Bhutto as entirely dependent on the military for his political survival, the general decided to take the matters in his own hands and declared martial law, appointing himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, putting Mr. Bhutto in jail, and dismissing the central and provincial governments and the elected assemblies. Thus began the decade long alliance between the Islamic parties and the military regime of General Zia that oversaw the execution of Mr. Bhutto; the cooptation of the ulama and the JI in General Zia’s cabinet and in the nominated Majlis-e-Shura (Consultative Assembly); the promulgation of a series of Islamic penal and procedural laws; the introduction of the compulsory collection of Zakat that entailed thousands of local level Zakat committees under the leadership of the village imams and khatibs to manage and distribute the Zakat funds to the needy; the establishment of the Federal Shariah Court with ulama as its judges to pronounce the Islamicity of laws and the judgments of the lower courts; and, more importantly, the participation of the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Deobandi madrassas ulama in the new “Great Game” in Central Asia sponsored by the United States and the Pakistan military to help the Afghan Mujahedeen drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. This Afghan jihad of the 1980s became the symbol of the institutionalized links between the Islamic parties and the Pakistan military – popularly known as “the asli (original) MMA” (Mulla-Military Alliance) -- that were later carried to the next jihad in Kashmir after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.

The JUI Madrassas and the Afghan Jihad

Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Maulana Samiul Haq of Darul Uloom Haqqaniya of Akora Khatak, who now heads his own faction of the JUI, were both great champions of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. While the JI supported Gulbedin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, the JUI backed the Mujahedeen groups headed by the orthodox ulama of Deobandi persuasion. The JUI-affiliated madrassas in the NWFP played a crucial role in mobilizing popular support for the jihad and also in providing recruits to the Peshawar-based Afghan Muhahideen groups. In collaboration with the Afghan Mujahedeen groups, the JUI-affiliated madrassas ulama established hundreds of elementary and middle level madrassas in the Afghan refugee camps spread all over the Pak-Afghan border from the NWFP to Baluchistan. Interestingly, most of the fund for these madrassas came from the United Nations refugee agencies, international NGOs, the United States, and the Gulf countries “for the education of Afghan refugee

children.”⁵ The Lal Masjid and the madrassa complex that was founded by Maulana Abdullah, who was very close to President General Ziaul Haq, was part of the larger efforts of the Zia government to motivate and train the foot soldiers for the Afghan jihad. The JI also soon joined this “educational movement” and opened its own variety of madrassas for the Afghan refugees with funds pouring from the Arab donors. It was this network of madrassas, mostly along the Pak-Afghan borders – and not the established Pakistani madrassas – that doubled as training camps for the Jihadi warriors both during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and after their withdrawal.⁶ When several of these madrassas were closed after the end of the Afghan jihad because of the withdrawal of funds by their original sponsors – the ISI, Pakistan-based Mujahideen groups, Pakistani religious parties, Saudis, Americans, private Arab donors – most of the Afghan and Pakistani students of these make-shift madrassas from the tribal areas swarmed to the Deobandi madrassas in the settled areas of the NWFP and Karachi, thus carrying their jihadi ideology and training in militancy to the mainstream Pakistani madrassas as well.

Later, in 1994, Fazlur Rahman and Samiul Haq emerged as the main Pakistani sponsors of the Taliban; both claim to have sent thousands of their Afghan and tribal area madrassa students to join the Taliban movement.⁷ Fazlur Rahman, who was appointed by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto as the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of Pakistan National Assembly, is reported to have worked closely with the ISI to supply fresh recruits for the Taliban army from the Deobandi madrassas in the NWFP and Baluchistan. He was also instrumental in coordinating the recognition

⁵ Columbia University professor Mahmud Mamdani quotes a senior Pakistani intelligence officer who was directing the Afghan jihad on behalf of the Pakistani ISI that in four years of the jihad in the early 1980s over 2,500 new madrassas were established by the US-ISI-Mujahideen troika where the enrollment stood at 225, 000. According to the same source, about 80, 000 jihadis were trained in these “madrassas” from 43 Muslim countries. See, Mahmud Mamdani, *Good Muslims, Bad Muslims: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror*, New York, Pantheon, 2004.

⁶ Most media – and even scholarly – writings on the madrassas and militancy in Pakistan do not seem to make the distinction between the well-established Pakistani madrassas that supported the Afghan Jihad – and which didn’t? – and the hundreds of make-shift madrassas in and around the Afghan refugee camps that were established in the early 1980s, not only to educate the Afghan refugee youth but also to provide them with military training to assure continuous supply of fresh troops for the Mujahedeen groups. After the Soviet withdrawal and the internecine struggle for power among the former Mujahedeen groups and war lords, these madrassas became the springboard for the emergence of the Taliban movement.

⁷ Maulana Samiul Haq of the Haqqaniya Madrassa in Akora Khatak (Peshawar) has been the most popular interlocutor with the Western journalists and scholars on the questions of madrassas, militancy, and the Taliban. A pilgrimage to Haqqaniya Madrassa has become an obligatory ritual for foreign scholars and journalists. The Maulana, in turn, relishes in his international fame (or notoriety, depending on the point of view) and has learnt to say things that his foreign visitors want to listen. The problem, however, is that his hyperboles and exaggerated claims are often reported without verification and then come to be accepted as truths. He has told many Western journalists, for example, that Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban government, was a graduate of his madrassa. The fact of the matter is that Mullah Omar never set foot in the Haqqaniya Madrassa; he was conferred an honorary degree (Sanad) by the madrassa in absentia, and that too only after he assumed the office of the Amir-ul-Momenin of Afghanistan.

of the Taliban government in Kabul by the Benazir Bhutto government. Samiul Haq's Darul Uloom Haqqaniya madrassa, that had always hosted a large number of its students from across the border in Afghanistan, became the most important recruiting station for the Taliban. Darul Uloom Sarhad, a Deobandi madrassa in Peshawar with more than 80% of its students from Afghanistan, was another major recruitment center first for the Mujahedeen and later for the Taliban in the mid-1990s. Similarly, Jamia Uloom-e-Islamiya of Binnori Town, Karachi, another major Deobandi madrassa with a large contingent of Pashtoon students, became the ideological pillar of the Taliban movement that encouraged Muslims through sermons, publications and fatwas to support the Taliban against their domestic and foreign enemies.⁸ Maulana Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, the chief mufti of Jamia Uloom-e-Islamiya and an ethnic Pashtoon himself, wrote popular books on jihad and issued fatwas in favor of the Taliban and against the American forces invading Afghanistan in the wake of the events of 9/11.⁹ Maulana Fazlur Rahman also continued to support the Taliban and to oppose the American invasion of Afghanistan, going as far as to declare in 2002 that all Americans, including American civilians, had now become "legitimate targets" for Muslims to attack, but later toned down his rhetoric, perhaps not to embarrass President Pervaiz Musharraf too much.

Even those Deobandi madrassas that were not that intimately connected with the JUI politics, were, nevertheless, supportive of the Afghan jihad and encouraged their students to join the Mujahedeen groups fighting against the Soviets. For example, Darul Uloom of Karachi, founded by Maulana Mufti Muhammad Shafi, one of the most outstanding Deobandi scholars of Pakistan, also extended its moral and religious capital to support the Afghan jihad. Maulana Taqi Usmani of Darul Uloom, who was later nominated as a judge of the Federal Shariah Court by General Ziaul Haq, used his moral influence among the followers of his renowned father— not only in Pakistan but also in Bangladesh -- to garner support for the Mujahedeen.¹⁰

⁸ A recent International Crisis Group report describes the Binnori Town madrassa as "the fountainhead of Deobandi militancy countrywide." See, International Crisis Group, Report No. 130, *Pakistan: Karachi's Madrassas and Violent Extremism*, 29 March 2007, p. 7.

⁹ Mufti Shamzai was considered so close to the Taliban leadership that in October 2001 he was made part of the official delegation sent by President Musharraf to Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban government, to persuade him to hand over Osama bin Laden to forestall the American invasion after the events of 9/11. Mufti Shamezai was killed in a mysterious bomb blast in Karachi in 2004.

¹⁰ Maulana Taqi Usmani later accompanied the Afghan and Arab Mujahedeen to the battle fronts to witness the jihad from close quarters and stayed at the forward positions of the Mujahedeen's war against the Soviets for several days. See his, *Jihad-e-Afghanistan*, Darul Isha'at, Karachi, 1992.

The Ulama and the Politics of MMA

The greatest breakthrough for the JUI under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman came in 2002 when it formed the Mutehhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an election alliance consisting of the JUI, the Jamaat-e-Islami and four other religious parties, including those of the Brelvis, Ahl-e-Hadith and Shias. In the October 2002 elections, the MMA emerged as the third largest block in the National Assembly and the largest group in the provincial assembly of the NWFP. In Baluchistan, the MMA won the plurality of seats in the legislature. By contesting elections as a united group under the banner of MMA, the constituent parties were able to obtain the largest number of popular votes ever polled for religious parties in the history of Pakistan elections. Their share of seats in the national and provincial assemblies was also the largest so far.

Besides the fact that both JUI and JI were better organized in the NWFP and had benefited enormously in terms of strengthening their political influence in the Pushtoon belt during the Afghan jihad, two extraneous factors also helped the MMA in winning considerable support in the elections, especially in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The first was the widespread anti-American feelings in Pakistan caused by the US invasion of Afghanistan and the buildup to the imminent invasion of another Muslim nation, Iraq. The aggressively anti-American rhetoric of the religious parties resonated more fully with the electorate, especially in the frontier province, than the ambivalent attitude of the mainstream political parties. The second, and related, factor was the popular sympathy for the people of Afghanistan who were being subjected to constant aerial bombing by the US forces. Most Pakistanis did not necessarily subscribe to the Taliban ideas and practices, but were, nevertheless, sympathetic to their plight, especially after the gruesome treatment of the captured Taliban supporters by the US-supported Northern Alliance. Thus, both anti-Americanism and sympathy for the defeated Taliban helped the MMA in mobilizing the Pushtoon votes. It is in this sense that some observers have described the rise of MMA as "Bush's gift to Pakistan."¹¹

There have also been widespread reports in the Pakistani media, especially in the English language press, that the MMA received clandestine support from the military intelligence agencies before and during the elections. It is possible that the military regime might have encouraged their contacts in the religious parties to form a united front in order to compete more effectively against the PPP and the PML (N). It is no secret that the Pakistan military as an institution has a long history of working with the religious political groups of various colors and persuasions, both for domestic political reasons and for advancing its foreign policy goals. It is also no secret that the

¹¹ M. B. Naqvi, *The News*, 22 Dec. 2003.

intelligence complex within the military establishment is not a monolithic entity and that various agencies are known to have been operating at cross-purposes with each other. It is possible that a faction of the ISI, or even Musharraf himself, wanted a degree of political clout for the MMA either to strike a better bargain with Washington for himself and for Pakistan, or to use the MMA as an alibi to ward off the persistent pressures from the U.S. to "do more" in crushing the extremists and apprehending the Taliban elements. If the ISI played the "good cop-bad cop" game with Washington as well as with the religious leaders, either on ideological grounds or as a part of an "assignment," the MMA also played the same "good cop-bad cop" game with the military regime with its own cards: the accommodationism of Maulana Fazlur Rahman (JUI) and the rejectionism of Qazi Hussain Ahmad (JI).

The MMA formed the government in the NWFP, consisting primarily of the two main parties of the alliance, the JUI and the JI. In Baluchistan, the MMA – in this case mostly the JUI – formed a coalition government with the ruling Muslim League (Q) with the blessings of President Musharraf. As in the previous JUI-NAP governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan in the 1970s, majority of the JUI-nominated cabinet ministers in the two provincial governments in 2002 were also drawn from the madrassa graduates.¹² Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who was elected from his home district of Dera Ismail Khan, was later officially designated as the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, with all the perks and privileges accorded to the holder of that position in the parliamentary system.¹³ It is no wonder, then, that Maulana Fazlur Rahman played the most critical role in persuading his colleagues in the MMA, especially the outspoken Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI who was initially unwilling to make any deal with the military regime, to endorse the government-sponsored 17th amendment to the constitution, legitimizing the presidency of General Musharraf and allowing him to retain his position as the Chief of the Army as well.

The news of the unexpected victory of the MMA in October 2002 elections, both in the national parliament and in the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan assemblies was received with considerable apprehension by many who feared a potentially inordinate influence of religious parties in Pakistan's domestic politics and foreign affairs, especially in the wake of post 9-11 developments on Pakistan's northern frontiers.

¹² Interestingly, the JUI nominated Mr. Akram Durrani, who was a businessman and even didn't have a beard, as the Chief Minister of the NWFP; it was the JI that objected to appointing a Chief Minister of an Islamic alliance government who shaved his beard. Mr. Durrani obliged and grew beard before taking oath of his office.

¹³ The opposition Pakistan People's Party, that claimed to be the second largest group in the National Assembly, accused the government of favoring the MMA as a "loyal opposition" that was willing to make a deal with President Musharraf in legitimizing his regime.

MMA's victory was described as a watershed in the history of Pakistan; an indication that "Pakistan as a whole {was} becoming more extremist"¹⁴; and as a clear sign of the rise on political scene of "crafty and committed stalwarts of the MMA who are bent on extracting their pound of flesh in the shape of the wide-ranging Islamic measures nationwide."¹⁵ It was also surmised that "It is just a matter of time now before Islamicists take over the whole of Pakistan,"¹⁶ and that "Islamic religious forces will now rule the roost."¹⁷ A prominent Pakistani political columnist, Abbas Rashid was quoted as saying that "Today they {Islamic fundamentalists} take the Frontier. Tomorrow, who knows?"¹⁸

There was also a near consensus among most Western observers that the electoral success of the MMA in the N.W.F.P. would block the manhunt of the Al-Qaeda cadres in the tribal dominated regions because of the MMA's well-known anti-American and pro-Taliban rhetoric. It was suggested that MMA leaders will use their large voting block in the N.W.F.P. and in the national parliament to force Musharraf to pull back his cooperation with Washington. The Sunday Herald of Glasgow, describing the MMA as "a coalition of pro-Al-Qaeda fundamentalists," boldly predicted the end of Pakistan's cooperation with the U.S. in its war on terrorism. The International Crises Group (ICG) report, prepared by its Pakistan expert Samina Ahmed went as far as to suggest that after the election victory in the NWFP, the supporters of the MMA's component parties might "take up arms against U.S. forces in Afghanistan."¹⁹

As for the doomsday scenarios of the prospective Talibanization of Pakistan under the MMA rule and the predictions that "Pakistan is now set on a path of religious

¹⁴ Gretchen Peters, "Pakistan tilts towards extremism?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15 October 2002.

¹⁵ Irfan Husain, "From drama to farce," *Dawn*, 7 June 2003.

¹⁶ (Nick Meo, "Promise of a Puritanical Regime," *The Sunday Herald*, Glasgow, 30 October 2005.

¹⁷ Ashfaq Ahmed, "True democracy still a distant dream," *Gulf News*, 16 October 2002).

¹⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, 15 October 2002.

¹⁹ *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Asia Report no. 49, International Crisis Group, 20 March 2003.

Among all the writings on madrassas, sectarianism, religious politics and militancy in Pakistan, the ICG reports seem to be most sensational and unreliable, both in terms of facts and analyses. The present author, during the past several years's of his extensive field work in and about madrassas and religious organizations, has found numerous instances of factual errors, inaccuracies, unsubstantiated claims and exaggerated statements in their various reports on Pakistan. With the exception of government documents and news stories reported in the press, most of their sources are heavily biased and rely on anecdotal evidence. Also, highly opinionated statements of selected informants are reproduced uncritically and conclusions are drawn based on certain preconceived notions about the madrassas without any empirically verifiable data. It seems that the ICG reports on madrassas and militancy are driven primarily by a pre-determined policy agenda, rather than by standard social science research considerations.

extremism," one has only to look at the so-called "Islamization" measures introduced by the MMA government in the NWFP during the past three years. Banning of music on public buses, ban on illegal drinking and gambling -- already illegal in Pakistan since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's last-ditch Islamization measures of 1977 --, prohibiting public dancing by women, ban on indecent cinema posters and displays on billboards, may remind one of the more blatant suppression of "un-Islamic" cultural expressions, and may also horrify Pakistan's elite, but they are far from what was boldly predicted as the "Talibanization" of Pakistan's society. The MMA leadership, including Maulana Fazlur Rahman, who was the self-proclaimed theological patron of the Taliban, is on record having dissociated himself from the harsh measures and the strictly literal interpretation of Shariah by the Taliban regime. The JI, the second most important component of the MMA, was opposed to the Taliban from the very beginning and supported Gulbedin Hikmatyar against the Taliban.²⁰

There are, however, two major pieces of Islamic legislation that the ulama of the MMA introduced in the NWFP legislature as a fulfillment of their election platform: one was the Shariah Bill that the MMA was able to pass, and the other was the Hisba (Ombudsman) bill that backfired on constitutional grounds. As for the Shariah Bill, it does not go any further than the original Shariah Bill passed by the Nawaz Sharif government earlier. It is rich in pious intentions and platitudes but poor in substance and administrative effectiveness. In fact, compared to what the Benazir Bhutto government was willing to offer to Maulana Sufi Muhammad of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat, the MMA Shariah Bill seems quite lightweight and muted. But more importantly, the Shariah Bill remains inoperative in view of its main provisions that fall under the federal jurisdiction. The fate of the Hisba bill, on the other hand, is proof enough that nothing more can come about in the way of Islamization in the NWFP in the future. With the Hisba bill, the MMA tried to test its limits and was told by the powers that be -- the federal executive authorities as well as the Supreme Court of Pakistan -- that it could go only so far but no further.

One must also remember that it is not the MMA that is trying to transform what was originally a relatively liberal population of the NWFP into a conservative lot; MMA was successful in the NWFP because a more conservative electorate had voted it into power and wanted the religious alliance to respond to their cultural concerns. As one observer noted in October 2002, the majority of the people in the province "are already so conservative that the MMA will have considerable trouble finding much real vice

²⁰ It is reported that the Taliban had banned the entry of the JI Chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad in Afghanistan after they came to power because of the JI's support of Hikmatyar during his year-long war against the Taliban.

to suppress except for a bit of secret drinking and gambling.”²¹

On the question of the MMA’s becoming a major impediment in Musharraf’s cooperation with Washington in hunting down the Al-Qaeda suspects and the Taliban supporters in the tribal regions of the NWFP, the arrest of more than 750 terrorist suspects and more than 350 operations by the Pakistani military with a strength close to about 80,000 troops in the tribal areas, clearly demonstrate the fallacy of those who were eager to put the MMA in the same basket with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and were predicting that the MMA will take up arms against the US on Pak-Afghan borders. True that the MMA opposed the US invasion of Afghanistan, but so did the overwhelming majority of people in Pakistan, whether religious, liberals, or secularists. It is also true that the MMA leadership has been critical of President Musharraf’s cooperation with the US in its war on terror, and especially of the use of Pakistani troops in military operations in the tribal regions. But rhetoric aside, according to both the US government sources and the Pakistan military command, there has never been a single instance in which the MMA created any obstacles for either the US or Pakistani forces during their operations in the tribal areas. The MMA government and its political leaders would, of course, make considerable political noises to placate their constituency but would always use the plausible alibi of the federal jurisdiction in the tribal region to keep out of the way of the Pakistan military operating there. In fact, the MMA chief minister of the NWFP, Mr. Akram Durrani, in several meetings with US officials in Peshawar and Washington, is reported to have assured them that the MMA government will “stay out” of what was happening on the borders with Afghanistan. The official policy of the MMA is that instead of military actions that cause a great deal of civilian casualties and are likely to create long term political disaffection among the tribal people against the Pakistani state, the problem of cross-border infiltration by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sympathizers should be solved through political negotiations with the local tribal chiefs.

Since the 2002 elections, the MMA has emerged as the sole spokesman of political Islam in Pakistan. It is true that, in a generic sense, political Islam in Pakistan was synonymous with the JI in the past, while the primary identity, as well as the composition, of the other components of the MMA remained fervently sectarian. However, the JI-JUI-JUP-TI alliance has elevated all the components of the MMA as the authentic voice of political Islam in Pakistan. The point is that despite the recent emergence of some alternative Islamic voices/organizations -- Dr. Israr Ahmad, Javed Ahmad Ghamdi, Tahirul Qaudri --the MMA's appropriation of Islamist discourse

²¹ Nick Meo, “Promise of a Puritanical Regime,” op.cit.

remains largely uncontested. The JUI's longstanding links with the Deoband school and the Jamiyat Ulama-e-Hind in India and with the ulama associated with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the JI's ideological kinship and political affinity with the Islamic movements in South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere have given a supra-national political character to the MMA, an aspect not lost on international actors who are concerned with developments in the regions neighboring Pakistan.

MMA's monopoly over Islamic discourse remains uncontested not necessarily because of its ideological authenticity or its intellectual strengths, but because the alternatives offered so far, both by the state and the advocates of Islamic liberalism and "moderate" Islam, are even more decrepit and witless. The half hearted and almost insouciant formulation of the alternative state ideology of "enlightened moderation" being preached by President Musharraf remains (a) poorly articulated and (b) internally contradictory. The idea that a mixture of liberalism in cultural sphere, neo-liberalism in economic sphere and authoritarianism in political sphere will make a potent potion of enlightened moderation seems patently untenable. "Moderate" Islam remains tainted with suspicions of foreign sponsorship, and liberal Islam, as Professor Fazlur Rahman pointed out a quarter century ago, lacks a systematic and coherent methodology to reinterpret Islam and offer an "authentic" Islamic alternative to both the traditionalist and revivalist formulations.

Deobandis and the Anti-Shia Sectarianism

Although the JUI as an organization and its leadership have always distanced themselves from the Shia-Sunni sectarian violence that has plagued the country since the mid-1980s and has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Muslims from both sides, the two of the most notorious Sunni sectarian outfits – Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), founded by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi of district Jhang in Punjab in 1985, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), founded by his followers as an underground group to avenge his assassination in 1990, allegedly at the hands of Shia activists – are the direct offshoots of the JUI-Deobandi madrassas nexus. The SSP was formally banned by the government in January 2002 but the organization remains intact in terms of its national and regional leadership and its local cells around the country. The SSP had its origins in the Deobandi madrassas of Punjab but the LJ consisted mainly of lay young Sunni Muslims who were fired up by the anti-Shia inflammatory rhetoric of the sectarian minded Deobandi ulama of SSP and of the Sawad-e-Azam Ahl-e-Sunnat movement launched by Maulana Asfandyar and Maulana Salimullah of Karachi. Both the SSP and LJ have been implicated in the target assassination of dozens of

prominent Shia leaders in several cities of Punjab, Karachi, Quetta, and the northern areas and also in the killing of the Iranian military cadets under training in Pakistan in the 1990s. The SSP is probably the well-organized sectarian outfit in Pakistan, with its 74 district and 225 tehsil (sub-district) level branches and hundreds of secret cells.

The organization has its roots in some of the most prominent Deobandi madrassas in the country. A recent study lists 38 major Deobandi madrassas that act as centers of the organization's activities and serve as its local secretariats.²² Several well-known Deobandi madrassas in Jhang, Faisalabad, Karachi, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Multan, Gujranwala, Lahore and Dera Ghazi Khan are also widely known to be sympathetic to the sectarian ideology and activities of the SSP and reported to have helped the organization in recruiting their students for its operations.²³

When Maulana Azam Tariq, the new head of the SSP after the assassination of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was elected as a member of the National Assembly from Jhang -- surprisingly with the support of the PPP's Ms. Benazir Bhutto -- he tried to organize his group as a political party and, with the blessings of some prominent Deobandi ulama, distanced himself from the violent past of the organization. He said he would rid the SSP from its terrorist image and work for "peace and order in the country."²⁴ This moderate posture of the new leadership created a split in the organization and gave rise to at least six new splinter groups that claimed their loyalty to the original mission of the SSP as laid out by its founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Among them the most well-organized and most committed to outright violence was Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, but others such as Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Al-Farooq, Allah-o-Akbar, Tanzimul Haq, and Al-Badar Federation were equally committed to continue their "jihad" against the Shias.

With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s and the general sympathy that it aroused among the Pakistani Deobandi establishment, the links between the anti-Shia militant organizations in Pakistan and the various Deobandi Jihadi outfits operating in Afghanistan and the Indian-controlled Kashmir became further strengthened. Very soon, the lines between the Deobandi sectarian groups fighting against the Shias and the Deobandi Jihadi groups fighting in Afghanistan and Kashmir were effectively blurred. The Taliban-controlled Afghanistan not only became a safe haven for many of the SSP and LJ activists who would take shelter there

²² Muhammad Ali Rana, *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*, Lahore, Mashal, 2005, pp. 200-201.

²³ Interview with a senior Punjab Police officer, Islamabad, 23 May 2007.

²⁴ Quoted in *Monthly Herald*, Karachi, September 2001.

after their violent anti-Shia operations in Pakistan to avoid arrest by the Pakistan law enforcement authorities, but it also allowed them to establish their training camps near the Pakistan border areas.²⁵ The Jamia Uloom-e-Islamiya of Binnori Town in Karachi became an ideological center of sectarian violence against the Shias – and other Jihadi groups as well – and, subsequently, itself became a target of retaliations by the Shia militant groups. Several of its prominent teachers, including Mufti Shamzai and Maulana Yusuf Ludhehanvi, the ideological father of the Kashmir-centered militant group Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) founded by a former student and teacher of Binnori Town madrassa Maulana Masud Azhar,²⁶ were assassinated in bomb blasts.

During the entire period of the violent sectarian strife between the Sunni groups such as SSP and LJ on the one hand, and the Shia Sipah-e-Muhammad and the Imamiya Students Organization, on the other, the political leadership of the JUI always distanced itself from its Deobandi sectarian fanatics and called for inter-sectarian harmony. The JUI was part of the Quomi Yakjehati Council (National Unity Council) that was formed by Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI to bring all religious groups together, Shias and Sunnis, to work for sectarian peace and harmony. Despite this public posture of supporting sectarian harmony, however, most Deobandi ulama, and especially those associated with the Binnori Town Madrassa of Karachi, and Darul Uloom Haqqaniya of Akora Khatak, remained sympathetic to the anti-Shia activism of the SSP. We have already mentioned how some prominent Deobandi madrassas served as local branches and secretariats of sectarian organizations. In fact, without an active participation of Deobandi madrassas neither the SSP nor its splinter groups could have operated with that much effectiveness and impunity. But more than the madrassas, however, it was the network of Deobandi-controlled mosques in Karachi, central and southern Punjab, and in the northern areas of the NWFP that became the

²⁵ For example, those of the SSP activists who tried to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998 near Raiwind, Lahore, escaped to Afghanistan. Despite Pakistan government's protestations, the Taliban refused to extradite the SSP suspects to Pakistan for trial.

²⁶ Maulana Masud Azhar was arrested by the Indian authorities in Srinagar on charges of illegal entry into the Indian Kashmir and instigating attacks against the Indian troops. Some of his followers highjacked an Indian airliner's domestic flight to Kabul in December 1999, killed one of its passengers, and threatened to blow up the entire plane if Maulana Masud Azhar was not released immediately. After a few days of negotiations, Masud Azhar was released by India and was handed over to the Taliban authorities in exchange for the safety of the remaining passengers. Masud Azhar, who was earlier an activist of Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HM), headed by the Afghan war veteran Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil, established his own organization Jaish-e-Muhammad (JM) after his release, reportedly with the blessings of both the elders of the Binnori Town madrassas and the ISI, to continue his jihad to liberate Kashmir from India. Jaish-e-Muhammad was later implicated in several violent activities in Pakistan, including attacks on Shia establishments and also in the two assassination attempts on President Musharraf. Muhammad Amir Rana gives a list of at least of 24 major Deobandi madrassas in Sindh, Punjab and the NWFP that provide material and manpower support to Masud Azhar's Jaish-e-Muhammad; See, *A to Z of Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan*, p.232.

breeding ground of anti-Shia rhetoric – and violence -- where the imams and khatibs of these mosques made hateful speeches against the Shias and incited their congregations to take action against “the enemies of the companions of the Prophet.” A Punjab government report in 2003 identified about 300 Deobandi mosques in the province where the Friday prayer sermons invariably were focused on “the Shia menace.”²⁷

The Politics of the JUP Ulama: Reluctant Jihadis, Ardent Sectarians

In the case of the Brelvi JUP that started its career primarily as a sectarian outfit to counter the influence of the more puritanical Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith groups (which the Brelvis always branded as “Wahhabis”), the transition to active politics came with the leadership of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani of Karachi and Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi of Punjab. Even then, however, the Brelvi madrassa students remained focused mainly on their sectarian polemics against the “Wahhabis” and did not play any significant role in the political fortunes of the JUP. Neither Maulana Niazi nor Maulana Noorani had as much hold over the Brelvi madrassas as that of the JUI leadership on the Deobandi establishment. Majority of the prominent Brelvi madrassas in Punjab were headed by nonpolitical ulama who would not let their students become political activists. Unlike the Deobandi madrassas that were integrally linked with the JUI, the Brelvi madrassas were linked together more in their sectarian solidarity rather than in their collective affiliation with the JUP. It is rather surprising that while the overwhelming majority of Pakistani Muslims would identify themselves with the Brelvi religious beliefs and practices, the JUP failed to mobilize this religious capital for its political gains. Its political following remained confined to Karachi and Hyderabad in Sindh and in a few pockets of Punjab.²⁸ What further deprived the JUP of the potential support from the Brelvi madrassas was factionalism within the party: the JUP leadership split into several factions during the Zia regime, both on political and personal grounds. In 2006, there were four different factions operating under the name of the JUP, while Allama Tahirul Qaudri, a popular Brelvi preacher with a large following in Punjab, formed his own political party by the name of Pakistan Awami Tehreek.

The JUP acquired national political prominence mostly under the leadership of its charismatic Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani who played an important role in the 1977 anti-Bhutto PNA agitation, also known as the Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement. Maulana

²⁷ Interview with a senior police official of the Government of Punjab, 23 May 2007.

²⁸ It is important to note that the JUP polled the highest number of votes in West Pakistan among all religious parties in the 1970 elections.

Noorani remained a harsh critic of the military regime of General Ziaul Haq, although four of the senior leaders of his party were co-opted by the regime as federal and provincial cabinet ministers. Maulana Noorani was also instrumental in articulating his party's platform that was quite progressive in terms of affirming the party's commitment to democratic political process, free elections, civil liberties and the rule of law, freedom of the press, women's and minorities' rights, and independent judiciary. On all these issues, the JUP position was much more liberal than those of the JL, JUI and JUAH. Maulana Noorani's personal charisma and his consensus building approach to politics earned him great respect across the political spectrum; it is no wonder that after the October 1988 elections, the united opposition alliance of all the religious and centrist political parties nominated him as their joint candidate for the prime ministership against Benazir Bhutto.

The JUP and the Brelvi madrassas did not play any significant role in the Afghan jihad. They have also remained detached from the Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict that has primarily involved the Deobandis and the Ahl-e-Hadith from the Sunni side. In fact, the Brelvis ulama, madrassas and organizations were the only ones among all the religious groups in Pakistan that stayed away from radicalism, militancy and jihadism until very late in the game, and that too for sectarian reasons. The JUP publicly supported the jihad in Afghanistan but it was more concerned about the growing political power of the Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadith and the JL, all three riding on the crest of the Afghan jihad and awash in foreign funds pouring from the Middle East for the Afghan refugees and the jihadi efforts. More importantly, they were also concerned about the growing influence of the Salafi-Wahhabi ideas in the wake of the Saudi involvement in, and funding of, the Afghan jihad. The Deobandi-Salafi-Wahhabi troika seemed to threaten the Islamic legitimacy of their Sufi-oriented and more populist religious beliefs and practices more than the distant Communists in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the JUP, under the leadership of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, was willing to cross the sectarian lines in the interest of the larger unity of all Islamic groups when it joined the MMA during the 2002 elections.

Although the JUP and its affiliated Brelvi organizations remained aloof from the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, they finally decided to join the second jihad in Kashmir a couple of years before the Kargil operation in the summer of 1999. What prompted them to join the Kashmir jihad was not primarily their concern for the liberation of the occupied Kashmir but a more serious and urgent concern that both the Deobandi and the Ahl-e-Hadith jihadis operating in Kashmir were using "jihad to propagate their false creed in Kashmir and {were} even setting fire to tombs of saints under this

pretext and {were} trying to take over {Brelvi} mosques.”²⁹ Although the JUP as an organization was not directly involved, several prominent Brelvi ulama and a few Brelvi madrassas in Punjab and Azad Kashmir – mostly in Mirpur and Kotli – were active in organizing the jihadi groups such as the Sunni Jihad Council, Lashkar-e-Islam (later named as Islamic Front), Tehrik-e-Jihad Jammu-o-Kashmir, Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Lashkar-e-Mustafa and Ababil-e-Mujahidin. Except the Sunni Jihad Council that developed some military links with its Brelvi counterparts in the Indian Kashmir, the other Brelvi jihadi outfits didn’t have much following, resources, or volunteers to make their mark on the jihadi front. All of them seem to have withered away after the Pakistan government’s crack down on Kashmiri jihadi organizations since 2002.

The most important aspect of the Brelvi ulama’s and the JUP’s politics was their sectarian war against the Deobandis – and, to a lesser extent, against the Ahl-e-Hadith – in Karachi and elsewhere in the country. It is here that the JUP-affiliated organizations and madrassas challenged the growing sectarian militancy of Deobandis and fought back with true religious zeal. The real battlefield was Karachi and the war was the “war of mosques.” The JUP affiliated ulama established several organizations in Karachi and Punjab to reclaim the “large number of mosques that were forcibly taken over by the followers of false creeds from the Ahl-e-Sunnat (Brelvis).” The largest and well-organized of such organizations was Sunni Tehreek that was founded by Muhammad Saleem Quadri, a rickshaw driver, in 1990 to “protect the interests of Ahl-e-Sunnat; recover the Ahl-e-Sunnat mosques; and protect the Ahl-e-Sunnat from distortions of faith.” The Sunni Tehreek was welcomed in almost all Brelvi madrassas and mosques as a “true and fearless guardian” of the interests of Ahl-e-Sunnat at a time when the “followers of the false creed” – Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith -- were seen as dominating the religiopolitical landscape of the country. The Sunni Tehreek fought pitched battles in Karachi, Hyderabad, Sahiwal and Nawabshah with the Deobandi activists of Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi on the control of disputed mosques. In one such confrontation, 17 activists of Sunni Tehreek were killed and 47 were seriously injured.³⁰ Saleem Quadri himself was assassinated by the Sipah-e-Sahaba activists in May 2001 along with five of his

²⁹ Statement by Saeed Raza Bukhari, Military Commander of the Sunni Jihad Council (later merged with the Indian Kashmir-based organization Al-Barq (Lightening), *Monthly Dawat-e-Tanzimul Islam*, Gujranwala (Pakistan), March 1999. Allama Pir Muhammad Saeed Ahmad Mujadadi, who founded the Sunni Jihad Council in 1997 in a Brelvi madrassa, also said that “the time has come for the Brelvis to participate in the Kashmir jihad to counter the influence of Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith.” *Ibid*.

There were also reports the Pakistan intelligence agencies “incharge” of the Kashmir operations wanted to bring the Brelvis on board for two main reasons: one, to emphasize that the cause of the Kashmir jihad was shared by all schools of religious thought and sects; and two, to counterbalance the increasing domination of the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith jihadis in Kashmir affairs.

³⁰ Muhammad Amir Rana, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-374.

colleagues. The organization continued to operate in Sindh and Punjab under the leadership of Abbas Qari but could not match the power and strength of its Deobandi adversaries that seemed to have deeper roots in the madrassas and mosques throughout the country. The Sunni Tehreek and its sister organization Sunni Council were later dealt a fatal blow when, in 2005, all of their senior leaders were killed by a bomb blast during a public rally in Karachi while they were offering their evening ritual prayer.

Ahl-e-Hadith: Politics and Militancy

The Ahl-e-Hadith organizations were similarly focused on maintaining and defending their doctrinal particularism against the frequent polemical attacks from both the Deobandis and the Brelvis; in fact, they were the most apolitical group among all the religious organizations up until the 1979 Iranian revolution. It was only then that a dominant faction of the Markazi Jamiyat Ahl-e-Hadith, headed by Allama Ehsan Ilahi Zaheer of Lahore, became a Pakistani proxy of the struggle for religious influence and political clout between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the wake of Imam Khomeini's revolution. The Saudis were deeply concerned about the popularity of Islamic revolutionary message of Imam Khomeini in Muslim South Asia, as elsewhere in the Muslim World, and saw this as a vehicle for strengthening Iran's regional influence and spreading Shi'ism. Ahl-e-Hadith, popularly known as the doctrinal cousins of the Wahhabis, were, therefore, their natural allies. Allama Ehsan Ilahi Zaheer became the most fervent anti-Shia crusader in Pakistan and, in fact, set the stage for subsequent, and more violent, anti-Shia sectarian campaign of the Deoband-affiliated Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. His fiery speeches in public rallies and in Ahl-e-Hadith gatherings and madrassas were instrumental in awakening a new sense of doctrinal solidarity among the Ahl-e-Hadith community, the smallest in terms of following in Pakistan. The JUAH also launched the Ahl-e-Hadith Youth Force, based mostly in Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas of Punjab, to act as "a naked sword against the false sects."³¹ However, not all Ahl-e-Hadith ulama and madrassas were comfortable with the aggressive sectarian stance that Allama Zaheer and some others had chosen to take in the early 1980s: Maulana Muhammad Madani, the Vice-President of Markazi Jamiyat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith and leaders of the Karachi-based Jamiyat Ghuraba - e-Ahl-e-Hadith openly distanced themselves not only from the combative sectarianism of the JUAH but also, later, from such jihadi Ahl-e-Hadith groups as Jamaat al-Da'wa-wal-Irshad and Lashkar-e-Taiba of Professor Muhammad Saeed.

³¹ Quoted in Muhammad Amir Rana, op. cit., p. 305.

While during the 1980s most Ahl-e-Hadith organizations and madrassas remained busy in anti-Shia polemics, the early 1990s saw the emergence of Ahl-e-Hadith jihadi organizations, of which most important and internationally well-known are Jamaat Al-Da'wa (JD) and its armed wing, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) both founded by a professor of Islamic Studies at the prestigious Engineering University in Lahore. From its first major operation in the Indian Kashmir in August 1992 until it was officially banned by the government of Pakistan in January 2002, LT came to be seen as the most militant of all the jihadi organizations operating on both sides of the control line between Indian and Pakistani administered Kashmir. It is reported to have played a critical role in the Kargil operation of 1999 that brought the two South Asian nuclear powers to the brink of war that was only averted by the American mediation. But its most daring adventures were the attacks on the Red Fort in the heart of the Indian capital Delhi (December 2000) and at the Srinagar airport (January 201) that escalated the India-Pakistan tension to new heights.

There are several important aspects of the developments associated with the JD and LT that are still shrouded in mystery. First, both organizations seemed to have emerged out of nowhere, ostensibly from within the Ahl-e-Hadith ranks but without the blessings or participation of the mainstream Ahl-e-Hadith organizations and madrassas. Second, the very short time in which LT was able to assemble thousands of trained volunteers, organize hundreds of recruiting centers throughout the country, and collect hundreds of millions of rupees surprised even the established jihadi organizations such as Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkatul Mujahideen. Third, while in 1996 the JD and LT leadership declared the Taliban as a group of "misguided people," obviously because of their Deobandi orientation, by 2000 several of the military training camps of LT were located in the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Fourth, the concept of all out jihad propounded by JD and LT – jihad against the Indian occupation of Kashmir, jihad to "conquer India," jihad to liberate Bosnia and Chechnya, jihad to help Somalia to gain its independence from foreign forces, jihad to establish Muslim states in Thailand and Philippines, and jihad to eliminate "the Zionist entity" and liberate Palestine – was alien to all the mainstream Ahl-e-Hadith organizations and was, in fact, denounced by many Ahl-e-Hadith leaders.³²

³² JD and LT also believe that jihad as armed struggle, under present circumstances, has become "*farz-e-'ain*," that is, obligatory for all Muslims. Jamiyat Ghuraba-e-Ahl-e-Hadith maintains that the jihad we need to wage today is against "ignorance" and un-Islamic practices. The most devastating criticism of the "jihad industry" came from Maulana Muhammad Madani, the Vice-President of the Markazi Jamiyat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith (MJA) who wrote in 1995 in the Monthly *Sirat-e-Mustaqeem*, the official organ of the organization: "Some people are engaged in jihad on a commercial basis; it is a fairly lucrative trade.... Certain people are trading on the names of Shaheeds [martyrs] by selling weapons and coffins for their own gains. Those who did not possess a broken bicycle once, now own a Pajero. Those who filled their stomachs with lentils now eat roast chicken. What a good means of making money this is!" Quoted in Muhammad Amir Rana, op. cit., p.298. The editor of the fortnightly organ of the MJA, Al-Hadith (12 January 2001) went as far as to describe LT as a "group of gangsters," "terrorists," and "criminals" who subsist on "handouts of [intelligence] agencies."

It is on the basis of these unanswered questions that many students of recent Islamic developments in Pakistan believe that JD and LT were, in fact, only a part of the larger jihadi network that was put together by the Pakistani official agencies during the 1980s for Afghanistan and then in the 1990s for Kashmir. While the LT was banned after the U.S. State Department declared it a terrorist organization, JD continued to operate with its more than 200 Model Schools for boys and girls, 11 madrassas, and two science colleges throughout the country.

Interestingly, however, the madrassas operating under JD are not affiliated with the mainstream Ahl-e-Hadith Wafaq and teach a curriculum that deviates considerably from the one taught in all other Ahl-e-Hadith madrassas. It includes the study of more than 50 books and tracts published by JD in support of its jihad ideology, stories of early wars and conquests in the history of Islam, the legends of major combats of the companions of the Prophet and famous Muslim generals, and reports of the “brutalities” of the Indian forces in the occupied Kashmir. The teachers in the JD madrassas – a la Mao Ze-Dong’s cultural re-education of the intellectuals – were required, until early 2002, to undergo military training and actually participate in the Kashmir jihad before they would qualify to teach.

Madrassa Funding

Islamic education in the pre-colonial Muslim India was funded through four primary sources: the Muslim rulers who provided generous funds from the state treasury for the upkeep of the madrassas; the court-affiliated Muslim nobility who competed with each other in their patronage of Islamic learning; Muslim religious endowments and shrines that regarded Islamic education as an integral part of their mission; and the community at large that contributed zakat and sadaka for the madrassas as religious obligation.³³

With the downfall of the Muslim political power in India, the decline of the economic fortunes of the Muslim nobility, and the impoverishment of the religious endowments in the wake of the colonial land settlement schemes, Islamic education came under considerable financial stress. While the Muslim peasants in rural areas continued to

³³ Islamic education was often described by the ulama as “*fardh-e-kifaya*” (collective obligation that must be performed by a group of people on behalf of the entire community) and, therefore, worthy of moral and material support. See, Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, *Aghlaatul Awam*, Kutub Khana Rashidiya, Hathhazari, Chittagong, 1995, pp. 29-30

support Islamic educational efforts, mostly by sharing a portion of their agricultural produce with madrassa students and teachers, the loss of court patronage was only compensated several decades later with the rise of the Muslim petty bourgeoisie and the merchant capital. The Muslim princely states of Hyderabad, Junagarah, Bhopal, and Bahawalpur, among others, and a few nawab families in the United Province and Bengal that survived the colonial onslaught continued to patronize the madrassas until the end of the British Raj.

Most new madrassas that were established in Pakistan after independence were in fact transplants of the madrassas from Northern India and East Punjab and were supported by the refugees from these areas.³⁴ Major new madrassas of Karachi – Darul Uloom, Korangi, for example -- were supported by generous donations from the Karachi-based prominent business and industrial families through the good offices of some ulama who were well-connected with the Karachi business elite. In Punjab and the NWFP, the overwhelming majority of the madrassas of all schools of thought depended mostly on small shopkeepers and retail businessmen in the urban areas and on medium-size landowners and farmers in the rural sector. In both cases, however, the contributions made to the madrassas were in the form of zakat and sadaka payments and other religious charities. In addition, several madrassas in Sindh and Punjab were affiliated with religious endowments and shrines that guaranteed their regular financial support.

The only scholarly work available on religious endowments and zakat is Jamal Malik's *Colonization of Islam*, published in 1998.³⁵ Similar studies for the 1990s and after 9/11 would do much to clear the picture about the political economy of traditional Islamic education in Pakistan. Numerous reports and policy research papers published after 9/11 have also failed to devote adequate attention and ask correct questions regarding the economy of the madrassas. This scarcity of good research on the financial aspects of the madrassa sector is the cause of much confusion and gross generalizations based on anecdotal evidence and selected case studies. Documenting the economy of the religious sector in Pakistan has also been one of the difficult tasks confronting the Government of Pakistan which is one of the reasons the government is reluctant in undertaking any reforms in the madrassa sector that

³⁴ Some prominent Deobandi and Brelvi madrassas in Lahore and Multan, for example, "migrated" to Pakistan lock, stock and barrel, along with their back-home constituencies of support.

³⁵ Jamal Malik, *Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of traditional Institutions in Pakistan*, New Delhi: Manohar, 1998. Malik's work focuses on the Islamization process under Zia ul-Haq (d.1989) and the state's attempt after 1947 to regulate the religious endowments (Awqaf) and zakat funds. The study includes empirical data on the total zakat funds given to madrassas conforming to the Government's guidelines for the distribution of zakat funds.

involves financial obligations on its part. To date, both the registered and non-registered madrassas continue to safeguard their economic independence zealously, and rather effectively. However, despite the lack of accurate figures, the madrassa administrators pride themselves in maintaining their accounting books in a highly transparent manner. As Masooda Bano writes, "Continuing with the Deobandi [and Brelvi or Ahl-e-Hadith] tradition on relying on contributions in cash and kind from the ordinary public, the madrasa maintains a receipt system for all kind of donations, which include zakah, sadaqa, khayrat."³⁶ Every penny that is contributed is documented in the books, according to the administrators. This does not mean, however, that all madrassas are ready to open these books for the government scrutiny, although external audit is a requirement that they have to meet in order to maintain their tax-exempt status.

According to our interviews and a survey of a sample of 35 small, medium and large madrassas in Punjab, with lodging, food, and salary of teachers, the annual budget of a small-sized madrassa averages around Rs. 100,000 (about \$ 1,700), while for a well-established, large madrassa the budget may exceed well over Rs. 10 million (about \$ 170,000). Tariq Rahman reports that the annual budget of the Jamia Salfia of Faisalabad, a Ahl-e-Hadith madrassa which has about 700 students, is Rs. 40, 00,000 (about \$ 670,000). Another madrassa, this time a Brelvi one, gave roughly the same figure for the same number of students."³⁷ Over 15, 000 madrassas disburse salaries to 83, 637 teachers across the country and provide education to 16, 11, 795 students.³⁸ Recently the government offered to give funds to madrassas interested in adding modern subjects and government approved new textbooks into their curriculum. In 2001-2002, all such willing madrassas received a sum of Rs.1, 654, 000 (about \$ 27,560).

Ever since the Zakat Regulation Act of 1980, the government took zakat collection under its wings, and has, over the years, given a portion of it to some madrassas, mostly Deobandis and Brelvis. This may no longer be the case after 9/11 for most of the Deobandi madrassas in the NWFP and Punjab that were either suspected of encouraging sectarianism or sympathizing with the Taliban. According to an International Crisis Group report, madrassas "collect over Rs. 70 billion (around U.S. \$1.1 billion) from resident Pakistanis."³⁹ This is confirmed by another report that

³⁶ Masooda Bano, "Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan." *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18 1 (2007): 60

³⁷ Tariq Rahman, "Madrassas: The Potential for violence in Pakistan?" *Criterion*, 22 (2007):78.

³⁸ Data of Madaris affiliated with various Wafaqs/Tanzeemat ss provided by the Wafaqs/Tanzeemat. The figure contradicts the 2005 census which estimates the number of teachers at 55,210 and the students at 15, 18,298.

³⁹ *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism, and the Military*, ICG Asia Report No 36, Islamabad.

suggests that “While only a tiny percentage of Pakistanis actually pay their income tax, all practicing Muslims – more than three quarters of the population- pay zakat, 2.5% of personal income that must be devoted toward alms. Zakat produces almost 70 billion rupees (\$1.16 billion) a year in private philanthropy.”⁴⁰ In contrast, the government collection of zakat is not more than Rs. 4.5 billion per year, out of which only a tenth goes to madrassas.⁴¹

Masooda Bano has briefly, but insightfully, touched upon the subject of economic background of madrassah students. In her group interviews at Jami’at al-’Ulum in Rawalpindi, she found that that “The imam, teachers, and especially the students were keen to reject the perception that most madrasa students are from very low income families, who cannot afford proper care for the children and so leave them at the madrasa to be fed and educated.”⁴² In her research, Masooda found that majority of the students came from middle-income households and rural landowning families. Her study aims to dispel the notion that madrassahs cater only to the underclass. This necessarily shows an alternative in the way madrassahs can be seen on the financial spectrum of the Pakistan’s economy, and most importantly, suggests that the madrassah economy is very much demand driven. Similarly, in responding to a question in our questionnaire asking how students came to study at their madrassah, almost all the students described their choice as a conscious decision. A number of earlier reports also seem to confirm this view. However, Tariq Rahman, on the contrary, in his field research “observed that many students, upon probing, confessed that their parents had admitted them in the madrassas because they could not afford to feed them and educate them in the government schools.”⁴³ More studies on the issue of rational choice in madrassah education will certainly yield important insights and clarity about funding patterns. It is correct to assume that the madrassahs play a pivotal role in providing for the poor, but this does not negate the view that madrassah education is also very much demand driven, individuals and families who want for their sons the best religious education madrassahs can offer. In fact, people send their children to government schools because they do not have a choice.

Madrassahs are able to establish, spread and consolidate primarily due to voluntary donations made by individuals. This is one of the main reasons for their

⁴⁰ http://www.commonlanguageproject.net/articles/Madrassa_Stonehill.htm

⁴¹ ICG Report, No.36, 14.

⁴² Masooda Bano, “Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan.” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18 1 (2007): 56.

⁴³ Tariq Rahman, “Madrassas: The Potential for violence in Pakistan?”, *Criterion* 2 2 (2007):79.

success and autonomous character. The best and the most prominent madrassahs pride themselves on accepting very little, if any, funding from Pakistani government or for that matter foreign governments. Even if funds are accepted due to any reason from external organizations, the ulama state that it must and should be without any strings attached. According to the ulama, the financial strength of madrassahs is due to the donations of ordinary citizens, from fruit-sellers to wealthy industrialists residing in cities across Pakistan, "Madrassas in Pakistan are generally financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar business and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them."⁴⁴ Giving in the name of God is an act of worship in Islam. Furthermore, madrassah scholars and administrators enjoys high esteem among the citizens in the areas visited by the researchers, and as Masooda's fieldwork indicates that "donors make it clear that the visibility of the work, reputation built over time, social networks, and competence and commitment of the imam, are critical factors in persuading an individual to support a particular madrasa".⁴⁵ Some of the residents, living near a madrassah, prefer to give charity to their local mosque or madrassah rather than the government. Because the community knows the teachers of the madrassah in their locality very well, their "act of giving" imparts a certain sense of complicity with the pious ulama and a surety that their funds will be put to use appropriately. The government, on other hand, lacks such legitimacy.

In addition to local funding, madrassahs receive large amounts of financing from charity organizations based outside the country. Saudi Arabia tops the list for financing madrassahs that comply with Wahabi Islam. Sectarian groups like Lashkar-i Tayaba seem to thrive on money coming from the U.K. Much of this is based on speculation and perhaps exaggerated since the "war on terror" launched by U.S.A and U.K. It is claimed, that much of funding is received through informal channels, hence there is no way of determining actual figures. Madrassah administrators on the other hand deny that external sources exceed the amount collected internally.

Islam and Globalization

Unlike Bangladesh where the ulama seem to have a better appreciation of the impact of economic globalization as represented by the growth of the export-oriented garment industry, foreign aid, and the influx of international development agencies and the NGOs, the Pakistani ulama's views on globalization are informed primarily by what it represents in its cultural manifestations – life styles, dress, music, the role of women, TV, DVDs, and bill boards with suggestive pictures and messages. Very

⁴⁴ Tariq Rahman, "Madrassas: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan?" *Criterion* 2 2 (2007): 78.

⁴⁵ Bano, "Deobandi", 61

few of the madrassa ulama in Pakistan were willing to engage in a sustained discussion on the economics of globalization and how it affected Pakistan or the Islamic World. They were, nevertheless, convinced, based, perhaps, on their readings from the Urdu press, that globalization (*'alamgiriya*t) was another Western ploy for the subjugation of the Islamic World. Some linked the globalization movement to the "Jewish conspiracy" in order to control the resources of Muslim societies and to subvert their traditional cultures with the "collaboration of the local, westernized elite." The "Western control of the Arab oil resources" and the US invasion of Iraq were frequently mentioned by the ulama in their discussion on globalization.

What was most disturbing about globalization for the ulama, however, was its cultural dimension. From jeans to KFC and MacDonald, from the NGOs to the women's movement, and from the modern shopping malls to the music and DVD outlets, all of these are seen as "rotten fruits" (*gandhey phal*) of globalization. The ulama lamented the increasing household use of the Satellite and cable TV channels, especially the Indian and Western channels that were described as "spreading immorality (*bad-ikhlaqi*) and lewdness (*bay-hayai*) in society. They were also critical of the local private TV channels, especially the GEO TV that carried the Voice of America telecasts and "spread the American culture and American propaganda for the sake of dollars." As one Deobandi 'alim put it, "Our youth that should be trained to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam (*dushmanan-e-Islam*) are now being trained how to dance and sing (*naach gaana*)."

But there are aspects of globalization and its concomitants that have benefited the Islamic forces in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim World. The traditional Islamist political formations such as the Jamaat-e-Islami – and even some of the Jihadi and madrassa-based groups -- have used the social vacuum created by the "retreat of the state" along neoliberal lines to intervene heavily in social welfare and educational activities. The Pakistani state's abdication of the role of a traditional welfare state allowed the Islamist and neo-Islamist forces to establish self-help societies, interest-free micro-credit facilities, free book banks for poor students, and free clinics. The most spectacular example of this was provided after the massive earthquake of 2005 in the NWFP and Kashmir when both the Islamist and Jihadi organizations were able to reach the most difficult mountainous terrains and established camps for relief operations with funds collected from both local supporters and global networks. The Islamic organizations' relief and rehabilitation work in the affected areas far surpassed the efforts of both the government and the secular NGOs.

Another area in which the religious groups of all colors seem to have taken enormous advantage of the neoliberal policies of the state in the era of globalization is the

privatization of schools and colleges that were taken over by the public sector during the Bhutto era in 1972. Today several Muslim NGOs, most notably Dr. Farhat Hashmi's al-Huda network, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Markaz Al-Dawa-wal-Irshad, and Dr. Tahirul Qaudri's Minhajul Quran, are running thousands of elementary and secondary schools and scores of colleges, universities and medical, business and law schools throughout the country. Interestingly, not all of these new educational facilities created by the religious organizations and their fellow-travelers are free or low-cost; many of them are now competing with the most highly-regarded English-medium elite private schools both in terms of their facilities and quality of education as well as in exorbitant tuition fees. These educational institutions are advertised as providing high quality modern education with an Islamic orientation. In addition to running hundreds of traditional madrassas and a modern Women university, the Jamaat-e-Islami, responding to the growing local and global market for business executives, is also running a highly successful graduate level program for business leadership training. It is instructive to note, however, that unlike their counterparts in the Brelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith groups, the Deoband ulama have not shown any interest in the general education sector and have remained exclusively focused on the madrassas. For them, establishing general schools, even with an Islamic orientation, would be tantamount to acknowledging the inadequacy of the traditional madrassa system.

Among the Islamist groups, the Jamaat-e-Islami has developed the most effective network of Islamic NGOs with links to supporters and patrons in the Arab world and in the West. Its links with the Arab world go back to the 1950s when the works of the Jamaat's founder Sayyid Abul 'Ala Maududi were translated into Arabic and were widely disseminated in the Arab world through the efforts of its ideological counterpart, the Muslim Brotherhood. These links were further strengthened by the patronage of the Jamaat by the Saudi government as well as by the Saudi-sponsored Islamic organizations in the context of what the late Malcolm Kerr described as the "Arab Cold War" between the secular nationalist forces of the Arab world led by Gamal Abdul Nasser on the one hand, and the royalist-Islamic forces led by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, on the other. It was through these long-established ideological links and personal contacts that the Jamaat was able to raise millions of dollars throughout the 1980s and 1990s from the official, semi-official and private sources in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and U.A.E. for causes such as the Afghan jihad, Bosnia and Kashmir.

In addition to this, there was another global outreach of the Jamaat that proved enormously useful for both the dissemination of its ideology as well as for the funding of its political projects: migration of South Asian Muslims to the oil producing

countries of the Gulf and to the Western Europe and North America. The Jamaat supporters and workers who came to North America as students and to Europe and the Gulf states as “guest workers” soon became the ideological outposts of its global network of affiliated organizations. It was precisely this large scale skilled and semi-skilled labor migration from South Asian Muslim societies to the West and to the Gulf that also further strengthened the Jamaat’s links with the exiled or émigré leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf, Europe and North America.

The ulama also have not been far behind the Jamaat-e-Islami to benefit from this aspect of globalization. Both the Deobandi and Brelvi ulama have established their own international networks of mosques and madrassas in the West, especially in Britain, thanks to their followers and students in the Pakistani expatriate community. The Islamic religious periodicals published by the madrassas frequently carry reports of the ulama’s international travels for da’wa purposes – and, of course, for fund raising. Dubai, Jeddah, London, Manchester and Copenhagen, Cape Town and Hong Kong have become as much popular stops in the ulama’s itineraries as, say, are Lahore, Peshawar, Multan and Karachi. Interestingly, this global outreach of the Deobandi and Brelvi ulama of Pakistan has not been without its homeland baggage: the South Asian ethnic press in Britain is often laced with stories of sectarian conflicts generated by the visits of these globe trotting Deobandi and Brelvi ulama from Pakistan.

Despite their severe critique of the cultural aspects of globalization, the ulama have, nevertheless, most enthusiastically appropriated the modern technologies of cultural dissemination that are often associated with the processes of globalization. All of the different types of Islamic currents in Pakistan are increasingly using the instruments of modern communications technology, in particular the new private TV channels, as well as the most sophisticated versions of mobile phones, DVDs and internet, to advance their objectives. The private TV channels in Pakistan are giving almost equal time to the views of the madrasa ulama and to the liberal and reformist Islamic viewpoints. The programs such as “Alim online,” with their live, instant fatwas by the “TV ‘ulama”, and sometimes by lay Islamic scholars, have given rise to a new type of studio-based religious authority. The exclusively Islamic religious channels, Q TV and Peace TV, with their 24 hour airing of highly popular religious talks by the ulama and lay Islamic scholars, recitations from the Quran, devotional songs and other religious programs, have become most popular channels, especially among the middle and lower middle class Muslim families in South Asia as well as in the West. Many of the ulama who had earlier declared viewing of TV as un-Islamic are now almost permanent fixtures in several religious programs on public and private channels.

The most visible use of economic globalization's IT revolution and the transnational linkages that it has produced is manifested in the Islamic websites and the audio/visual material produced by the various religious groups, including the ulama, although the Ji and Dr. Tahirul-Qaudri's Minhajul Quran and Dr. Farhat Hashmi's Al-Huda have been far ahead of the ulama. Several large madrassas and ulama organizations operate their own websites that carry reports on recent religious and political controversies, speeches and statements of their leaders, religious decrees, and the situation in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Iraq and Palestine. There is probably no other aspect of globalization that has benefited the religious groups more than the internet and the web technology that facilitates easy, cost-effective, and instant communication. When the Pakistan government blocked the Lal Masjid website operated from Islamabad in the wake of the female Hafsa madrassa controversy in late March 2007, the website reappeared the very next day operated by their international circuit. The Pakistani Ahl-e-Hadith have also used this technology to establish links with the international Salafi groups.

Their "e-following," especially of Farhat Hashmi's, since she taps into a conservative female Muslim audience which hitherto has not had such a charismatic and confident female preacher-leader, is immense, and their websites are elaborate and comprehensive, covering a wide range of religious, social, ethical, and, in Qaudri's case, political issues. Qaudri's tapes and CDs and DVDs rose to popularity in Pakistan and then spread to among the South Asian Muslim diasporas, while for Hashmi it was the reverse. The neo-Islamists' greater reliance on multimedia, satellite TV channels and the internet for da'wa and recruitment purposes is quite a leap from the Jamaat-e-Islami's and Tablighi Jamaat's method of personal, face-to-face contacts.

As far as the global Islamists, they have simply tapped into a worldwide "jihadist movement" which is using all the instruments of the post-modern technological age to accomplish their "spectacular" acts which rely on the elevation of images and the spectacle. As Faisal Devji points out, the thrust of their war has essentially become ethical, rather than calculative and political. Their acts of suicide terror do not seem to be part of some rational strategy in achieving some short- or even medium-term political end, but to simply engage in their jihadist behavior, very often lone acts of terror or violence, to demonstrate an ethical imperative of acting, regardless of whether there is any socio-political gain or not. The global jihadists rely on Muslim satellite TV like al-Jazira, alternative and "leftwing" websites on the internet, as well as on cell phones to relay the vivid images of the sufferings of Iraqis and other Muslims under foreign occupations and of the "appropriate" Islamic punishments, including beheading, meted out to their adversaries.

6. Is there evidence of an analytically distinct Muslim process of globalization and is it weakened or strengthened by its relationship to economic globalization?

The particular forms of globalization that are in evidence today and their concomitant undermining of the theory of a rigid Westphalian political order, at least at a discursive and ideological level, engender a possibility and a space for the re-articulation of a global "Islamicate civil society" that transcends national-cultural boundaries. The emergence of a large Muslim diaspora, particularly in Europe and America, one that is often subjected to collective racism and Islamophobia – across ethnic and national lines – also contributes to a reinvigorated subjectivity, that is, identification with the "global ummah." The increasing number of Muslim advocacy groups in the West and numerous media outlets aid this budding collective consciousness. One can make a case, therefore, that a distinct Muslim globalization is taking place, at least at the level of subjectivity, if not at the level of materiality, which is no doubt facilitated by the worldwide phenomena of globalization, precisely because the latent character of the elements of traditional Muslim discourse about the ummah and the Caliphate, etc. can now manifest itself in far more tangible ways – international Islamic conferences, internet discussion groups, rapid mobilization of world-wide Muslim reaction on issues of concerns to Muslims, whether is the Salman Rushdie affair, the Danish cartoon incident, or Abu Ghraib, the universalization of Islamic religious authority (Yusuf al-Qardhawi is an obvious case, as discussed by Peter yesterday), the global Muslim relief network, and even the world-wide mobilization and recruitments for jihad somewhere – in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, or wherever the action is.

While economic globalization clearly continues to polarize Muslim societies internally and exacerbates the social and economic crises therein, its cultural effects of engendering not only a collective Muslim consciousness but also of opening up new possibilities for Muslim visionaries, Islamists or otherwise, are perhaps its most significant byproducts. The discourse which not only de-centers the West in terms of how the global political-economic order is now perceived, but also opens up space for the emergence of "counter-hegemonic" ideologies and movements, including an Islamist project -- howsoever diverse and contradictory it may be -- that is advanced as an alternative vision for Muslim societies, does in fact propel a distinctly "Muslim process of globalization."

Anti-Americanism among the Religious Groups

Anti-American sentiments among the madrassa ulama in Pakistan are quite widespread – as they are in the larger society. From Deobandi to Brelvi to Ahl-e-Hadith to Shia madrassas, there were hardly any madrassa teachers or students who had anything positive to say about the United States. Contrary to the general perception in the West, however, these sentiments have nothing to do with the traditional madrassa curriculum that is totally devoid of any political content.

Anti-Americanism among the madrassa ulama, first and foremost, is a by-product of their overall view of the West as a God-less, materialistic and hedonistic civilization of which America has come to symbolize as the representative par excellence. The anti-colonial struggle of the Deoband ulama during the British rule in India further strengthened their dislike of all things Western. Nevertheless, these anti-Western sentiments among the ulama remained largely diffused, latent, and unarticulated in their political discourse and actions until the 1990s. Several domestic, regional and international developments since the early 1990s seem to have contributed to the transformation of this latent anti-Westernism into an open war – mostly of words, but not infrequently of deeds -- against the West and the United States. Among the domestic factors, the ulama often mention the U.S. abandonment of Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, the U.S. opposition to the Pakistan's nuclear program while condoning similar programs of India and Israel, and the U.S. refusal to side with Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. During the Afghan jihad, however, the attitudes toward the United States changed perceptibly among the ulama when Washington was seen as an important ally in the war against the Soviet forces occupying a neighboring Muslim country. The ulama of the Deoband School, either directly or through their proxies in the Afghan mujahideen organizations based in Peshawar, collaborated fully with the network of regional and international forces put together by the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the American CIA to fight the Soviets

Abbreviations

AH	Ahl-e-Hadith
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiyat Ulama-e-Islam
JUH	Jamiyat Ulama-e-Hind
JUAH	Jamiyat Ulama-e-Ahl-e-Hadith
JUP	Jamiyat Ulama-e-Pakistan
KNM	Khatm-e-Nabuwwat Movement
MMA	Mutehhida Majlis-e-'Amal
NMM	Nizam-e-Mustafa Movement
TJ	Tablighi Jamaat
NAP Party)	National Awami Party (now Awami National
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance