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It is the duty of communists to master and remake nature. Kim Il Sung, 1981.²

INTRODUCTION: LANDSCAPE: AS A LEGIBLE REPOSITORY OF MEANING

There are reported to be twenty different kinds of Kim Il Sung badge but no-one in the west has yet been able to decipher the hidden code. The landscape of north Korea may seem similarly impenetrable in its coded symbolism. Nonetheless, it is hoped that an attempted reading can yield insights which will help reduce the aura of exotic otherness that for decades has surrounded the regime and its approach to the material world.

In a previous discussion of culture and nature in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), I argued that the interaction of humans and their physical environment creates a continuously changing humanised landscape in the world and a naturalised landscape of the mind.³ Such a dialectical relationship has had deep significance for the political thinkers of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Their 'juche' philosophy has been a fundamental factor in shaping the state view of nature, which in turn can be said to have 'produced' its environment as a reflection of that society. In this chapter, I will follow the post-structuralist literature in which the analytical focus has shifted away from any notion of deep structures towards the contemplation of mythologies and the problematisation of second order conferred or assumed 'naturalised' concepts.⁴ Here landscapes are seen as concretised representations of discourse and continuing participants in that discourse. Their meanings are open to reinterpretation and are therefore unstable. Their impact may be recursive.

The post-structuralist interpretation of landscape history is also the study of history through landscape. It sees landscape as a key constitutive element in the articulation of social and environmental relationships.⁵

The landscape ... is one of the central elements in a cultural system, for as an ordered assemblage of objects, a text, it acts as a signifying system through which a social system is communicated, reproduced, and explored.⁶

Even the most humble, innocuous-looking landscape carries with it cultural meaning, sometimes clearly visible but often encoded in a form that is consumed less by immediate experience than by an intellectual osmosis which feeds into and is filtered by the subconscious.⁷ The humanised landscape, being a cultural artefact, acts as an important record of ontology and praxis, a palimpsest on which the handwriting may be difficult to decipher due to erasures and superimpositions. Much of this text may have been composed in a vocabulary and with a grammar that may be archaic. Only some components of this are still recognisable as relic landscape features which are perhaps no longer functional in conveying their originally intended meaning. Such a text comprises fragments of a cultural autobiography, reflecting the dominant, and sometimes the idiosyncratic, values and belief systems of successive social discourses.

My task in this chapter is to add some pages to the interpretive dictionary of the north Korean landscape. The nature of the evidence available to me has amounted to a collage of fragments, an intertextual multilogue of muffled voices in a kind of séance with the living.⁹ My ouija board has thrown up four themes which I found useful as heuristic categories. These are power frozen in planned space; the naturalisation process implicit in monumental landscapes; the authorship of history and derived heritage landscapes; and the recreation of

nature in an ideological mould. The urban landscape of Pyongyang and the reclaimed/irrigated fields of the west coast are used by way of example.

PLANNED POWER-SPACE

The WPK has appreciated the strength and subtlety of spatial dominance for nearly fifty years. It was Kim Il Sung who argued that, 'to build Pyongyang well is of great political significance'.¹⁰ He also suggested in 1987, in the vein of what Derek Gregory calls the 'world-as-exhibition',¹¹ that:

Pyongyang must be a model for the whole country in all the ideological, technical and cultural spheres, so that it can give foreign visitors a complete picture of the development of our country.¹²

The 'year zero' of 1953 was a hinge point in Korean history. The fortunes of battle had swept back and forth and the dislocation of life was compounded by an uprooting of populations and flows and counter-flows of political refugees.¹³ About three million Koreans died, mainly in the north.¹⁴ Pyongyang was effectively obliterated by blanket bombing by the UN forces.¹⁵ The DPRK claims that 400,000 bombs were dropped, destroying all public buildings and 65,000 houses and shops.¹⁶

In a curious sense this was an advantage for the WPK government for three reasons. First, they were able to claim the moral high ground of the victim, a propaganda gift which was used as a means of encouraging a population that had suffered from various forms of oppression for fifty years. Secondly, in the rebuilding of the city – a veritable phoenix rising from the ashes of war – they were able to demonstrate their ability to organise and achieve an impressive result. Third, the planners had a tabula rasa on which to write, without the usual complications of property boundaries which hamper reconstruction under capitalism. The calligraphy adopted could therefore be according to the socialist copybook. The opportunity of such a fresh start was not lost on Kim Il Sung. For him:

A good lay-out of a road network is very important in city construction. We can say that a road is an index of the civilization of a country ...¹⁷

The elimination of all historic structure and function in Pyongyang created a timeless space on to which could be projected an ideological simulation of the authorities' choosing. Thus, the physical plan of the city¹⁸ was archetypically modernist in its standardised block design, a sort of flesh-on-the-bones of a system of wide and penetrating boulevards.¹⁹ While military and processional considerations were no doubt in the planners' minds, these streets nevertheless appear extravagant to the western eye. They appear to be a symbolic rather than a functional form of articulation, with very little traffic and no prospect of an increase in private vehicle ownership in the short term. But they are effective as dividing edges between residential districts whose populations are thereby separated and less likely to mix and interact. They are psychological moats without a drawbridge, produced according to Foucault's notion of spatialised discipline.

According to Foucault, power and knowledge have an intimate relationship, a 'correlative constitution'.²⁰ Power is everywhere, not least in spatial organisation where the need for surveillance inscribes a structure of hierarchical domination and dependence. Landscape is conceived in, and is reproductive of, these power relations. Its constitutive significance is

partly through observation and control. In the case of the DPRK, the observation is by the state and the control is exercised by an all-embracing planning system.

Discipline may be achieved through a number of mechanisms. In Foucault's carceral society planners are enjoined to employ the:

principle of elementary location or 'partitioning' ... [to] avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions... Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation ...²¹

The post war town plan of Pyongyang is a copy-book example of this thinking at every scale, from the layout of its major routeways to local neighbourhood micro-space. Even the balance between private and public space seems to have been carefully calculated to manufacture an aura of exposure.

Power's message is invariably confused – deliberately so; dissimulation is necessarily part of any message of power. Thus space indeed 'speaks' – but it does not tell all. Above all, it prohibits. Its mode of existence, its practical 'reality' (including its form) differs from the reality ... of something written, such as a book. Space is at once result and cause, product and producer; it is also a stake, the locus of projects and actions deployed as part of specific strategies ... Activity in space is restricted by that space; space 'decides' what activity may occur, but even this 'decision' has limits placed upon it. Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order – and hence also a certain disorder ...²²

In this light we should not be surprised by reports that only hand-picked loyalists are qualified to live in Pyongyang. Even negotiating the six-mile radius of heavily armed military checkpoints is daunting and all outside influence is filtered and 'purified'. The city itself is neat and clean, or aseptic and lifeless, depending on one's viewpoint. It is an arena of panoptical surveillance, with police women on traffic duty at every intersection and plain clothes officials rumoured to be on every street. Even the home environment is monitored: groups of five families have their own allotted 'propagandist'.

Recent extensions to the city illustrate the importance placed by the authorities on showcase, purposeful and highly controlled planning. A good example is Kwangbok (Liberation) Street which is 100 metres wide and six kilometres long (Figure 1). Its 260 high-rise blocks of flats, prefabricated to a standardised design as recommended for the 'ideal communist city', house 25,000 families, each with between 110 and 180 square metres of floor space.²³ It was built with the help of Russian engineers in anticipation of the DPRK's participation in the 1988 Olympic Games which were eventually staged in south Korea. Completing Kwangbok Street was the biggest construction project in the history of north Korea.²⁴ It was finally ready to receive the delegates attending the 13th World Youth Festival of Youth and Students in 1989. The second stage was under way in 1991.²⁵

Tongil (Unification) Street was begun in 1990 and four sections were completed in two years at 'Pyongyang Speed' under the personal guidance of Kim Jong Il.²⁶ Two hundred thousand workers and soldiers are reported to have been involved in its construction. Fifty thousand

families have been housed in 290 high-rise buildings of up to thirty stories.²⁷ The street is 120m wide, designed more for effect than for the relief of traffic jams.²⁸




Figure 1. Central Pyongyang

Kwangbok and Tongil Streets both have the feel of a planner's model realised without compromise. Their vertical lines and uncluttered spaces suggest a purity of modernism that has been very difficult to achieve in other parts of the world. Here is modernism 'as it ought to be', designed with enthusiasm on a blank sheet emptied by war and ideology. Underneath these streets runs the Pyongyang metro, the rapid transit system inaugurated in 1974. Very reminiscent of its Moscow equivalent, the metro is filled with chandeliers and polished marble, a fantasy land where commuters have one of their few visual aesthetic experiences in the form of state-commissioned murals and mosaics.²⁹ The metro doubles as a nuclear fallout shelter, a dual signifier.

IDEOLOGY AND NATURALISATION IN MONUMENTAL LANDSCAPES

In this section I explore further the exercise of power in and through landscape. This may be a collective, unconscious discourse in the accent of vernacular culture, or a hegemonic imposition of elite ideas, or a tension between the two.³⁰ Thus, Korean landscapes north and south of the Demilitarised Zone have common features drawn from millennia of evolving culture and social attitudes. Their differences lie in the political separation of half a century.

First, the landscape is often the site of the subtle inculcation of ideas and behaviours.³¹ The recipients may be unaware of this because of many years of repetitions which come to be

accepted unquestioningly as 'normal'. On a shorter temporal scale, planning restricts action and people's lifestyles may be constrained or substantially changed. Sack describes this aspect of planning:

By the use of scientific planning we may arrive at the position of having our actions mimic our conceptions of scientific behaviour long before we have a scientific theory of human behaviour.³²

Secondly, landscapes may also appear to have a moral or normative function, since 'they speak to notions of how the world should be, or more accurately how it should appear to be'.³³ This may be ideologically prescriptive or achieved through a socio-economic process such as status emulation. Pace Foucault, the agency of individuals (such as the Kims) may be crucial here, especially as representatives of a wider interest.³⁴

Above all, landscapes have a crucial function in what has been called the process of 'naturalisation' whereby the familiar becomes the normative. Duncan explains:

It is 'cultural amnesia' which allows the landscape to act as such a powerful ideological tool. By becoming part of the everyday, the taken-for-granted, the objective, and the natural, the landscape masks the artifice and ideological nature of its form and content. Its history as a social construction is unexamined. It is, therefore, as unwittingly read as it is unwillingly written.³⁵

Our search for meaning in the townscapes of the DPRK is assisted by the iconographic insights of Roland Barthes into the significance of the Eiffel Tower. He saw it as a unifying symbol for the city of Paris, a depthless signifier which absorbed and reflected symbolism.³⁶ In Pyongyang, the construction of heroic monuments, mainly to the hero Kim Il Sung, was a feature of the twenty years of his personality cult. They have a physical presence which is more deliberately authoritative and certainly less 'innocent' than the Eiffel Tower. In the words of Lefebvre:

Monumentality ... embodies and imposes a clearly intelligible message ... yet it hides a good deal more: being political, military, and ultimately fascist in character. monumental buildings mask the will to power and the arbitrariness of power beneath signs and surfaces which claim to express collective will and collective thought.³⁷

The Tower of the Juche Idea, for instance, was finished in 1982 to celebrate the seventieth birthday of Kim Il Sung and every aspect of its construction is dripping with significance.³⁸ Its height of 170 metres was designed to exceed the Washington Monument (at 169.2 metres high), just as the Arch of Triumph is slightly larger than the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, on which it is modelled.³⁹ The Juche Tower is faced with 70 tiers (one for each year of Kim's then age) of 25,550 stones (one for each day). On one facade of a pedestal which is fifteen metres long by four metres high (Kim was born on 15 April) there is a poem in twelve stanzas (his birth year was 1912) praising his immortal revolutionary feats and benevolence. Finally, a 'shrine' at the base preserves the congratulatory plaques from juche study groups in seventy countries.⁴⁰

The assertive extravagance of such symbolic monuments has become part of the real way of life in Pyongyang. They are intended as the essential furniture of statehood and identity, to be absorbed and accepted unquestioningly by the people. Visits are part of the school curriculum

and families are encouraged to return at regular intervals. In July 1994 it was noticeable from the television pictures that the mass mourning of the Great Leader's demise was articulated in the streets of Pyongyang around these nodal points in the fabric of the city. Gigantic and oppressive monumentality is hardly new in the socialist world but it has been refined and personalised to an extraordinary extent in the DPRK.⁴¹

HISTORY AND HERITAGE

The importance of preserving historical sites and artefacts in perpetuating *juche* ideology was recognised by the WPK, as the following statement by Kim Il Sung demonstrates:

With the help of the historical remains and relics we must clearly show the people, the new emerging generation in particular, the brilliant cultural tradition left by our ancestors and their patriotic spirit in courageously fighting back the foreign invaders. It is therefore important to restore all the historical remains which were ravaged by the Japanese imperialists and so unearth and restore (those monuments which are still left unheeded. If in future we unearth and restore all the historical remains in this place to their original state and demonstrate the fine cultural traditions of our nation. Mount Taesong will become not only a good cultural recreation ground for the working people but also an excellent place to fill the people with national pride and patriotic spirit.⁴²

Landscape is a powerful medium of manipulation, both in the process of its evolution and in the present as a database of historical images, myths, traditions, relics. The selection of these elements for con/preservation is ideologically and very often politically charged. Heritage may be fake history but it is often of more significance than the real past in shaping the future.⁴³ It may be consumed as highly significant by those who live in societies where people are familiar with the latent messages of embedded signs, or as pastiche or textual collage where the gaze is not one of contemplation.⁴⁴ Foucault again:

Memory is actually a very important factor in struggle ... if one controls people's memories, one controls their dynamism. ... It is vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it what it must contain.⁴⁵

The importance of heritage for the WPK is further shown by their stress upon archaeological sites which 'prove' that Korea has a long and proud history of independence from foreign domination. It is also evident by their reconstruction of revolutionary sites that celebrate heroic exploits and achievements in the Fatherland Liberation War and the Korean War.⁴⁶ The latter are commonly juxtaposed with leisure parks to encourage a dual use of free time. In a sense this is an extension of a general principle because it could be argued that the whole landscape of the DPRK is a realm of hyper-reality, a theme park to the memory of the recently deceased Great Leader.⁴⁷

On the outskirts of Pyongyang is Mangyongdae (modestly described as the cradle of world revolution), the birthplace of the late President Kim who lived there until the age of thirteen when he is said to have begun his revolutionary activity.⁴⁸ Here, the family compound, with two small, thatched huts and a grain store, is preserved with some household artefacts. However, the crude restoration has eliminated any true sense of his initial poverty. Thus, the contradiction is inevitable in the mind of the visitor between the supposedly humble origins of Kim and the later deification which sought to glorify every aspect of his life. This jewel of

the nation's 'heritage', now out of context amid the green lawns of a public park, has been ripped from its mundane rural setting and placed in safe and sanitised surroundings. The site is complemented by an adjacent fun fair with white-knuckle rides, monorail and boating lakes. Here we have what Allon White called the 'social reproduction of seriousness' in which learning and fun are linked to a joint purpose.⁴⁹ In a similar vein of the juxtaposition of reverential and the recreational, is the Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery on Chujak Peak of Pyongyang's Mount Taesong. First built in 1975 to accommodate the assembled remains of a select élite of fighters, it was expensively remodelled and expanded in 1985.⁵⁰ The 30-hectare site, on a terraced and landscaped hillside, is entered through monumental gates 19 metres high and 56 metres wide, up 348 steps.⁵¹ There are 110 copper busts on individual pedestals, including those of Kim's younger brother and his first wife, flanked by a large flag of red granite. Eerie music plays as parties of school children parade around the cemetery. Newlyweds are said to make this site their first destination after the marriage ceremony. Again, the cemetery is only one element of a larger complex. Taesongsan Pleasure Ground has a large zoo, botanical garden and fun fair.

The best account of war memorials has been written by Mayo.⁵² He finds monuments with either sacred or non-sacred sentiment, the former having a distinct, spiritual meaning amid chaos.⁵³ For Mayo:

the commemoration of war reshapes how a society views its political history. The good can be made to appear belter, and the bad can be presented in its best light. ... As time passes, later generations of citizens may accept these memorials as valid assessments of war memory whether they are accurate or not.⁵⁴

War memorials then, are a means of naturalising history. They are a statement, an assertion, a challenge. In north Korea, where there is no interpretive debate, the Martyrs' Cemetery is a good example of authoritarian landscape.

The spectacle-isation of such places in Pyongyang was a feature of the 1970s and 1980s, what one might parody as 'the cultural logic of late socialism'.⁵⁵ The surreal content of heritage and leisure sites is paralleled on a larger, heroic scale in the extravagance of the city plan which has emerged as a self-conscious epic. The consumers of landscape are obedient and willing participants, yet they live in a 'framed' space in which everyone is an outsider.⁵⁶

THE RHETORIC OF RECLAMATION

The proactive essence of the *juche* philosophy is clearly shown in what Cosgrove calls the 'rhetoric of reclamation'.⁵⁷ Here we see the WPK at its most self-confident, applying the instructions of the Great and Dear Leaders to remake nature and thereby release its 'slumbering powers'.⁵⁸ In particular, the constraints of an unfavourable physical environment have encouraged irrigation and the reclamation of marsh, swamp, woodland and sloping land in order to boost food production.⁵⁹ Perhaps the north Koreans' biggest achievement in remaking nature has been their outstanding record in irrigation. So far about 1.4 million hectares of arable land has been watered, representing about 70 per cent of the total. This has been achieved by the planning of a complex system of 1700 reservoirs fed by 25,800 pumping stations and 40,000 kilometres of major irrigation canals. The reservoirs are often on high ground and store water pumped up from rivers such as the Taedong, Chongchon and Amnok. Hydroelectric power is generated when these waters are released under gravity flow.

Of particular importance in the recent expansion of the irrigated area was the construction of the West Sea Barrage near Nampo. This stretches eight kilometres across the mouth of the Taedong River and ponds back the fresh water of the river to create a large lake. Apart from irrigation purposes, this water also serves domestic and industrial needs. The temperature increase of 1°C in the river is reported to have encouraged fish and favourably changed the micro-climate of riverain farms. It is not unreasonable to assume that unreported, negative ecological implications may result from the change in hydrological regime.

Water pumped from the ponded Taedong will be used to irrigate 340,000 hectares via 800 kilometres of canal. In 1990, a 132-kilometre waterway was completed from the barrage to Sinchon, Kangryong and Ongjin and a change was made in the hydrological regime of the River Chaeryong. This reversed its flow due to the higher level of the River Taedong, facilitating the movement of water southwards.⁶⁰ April 1992 saw the opening of a major trunk canal from the barrage 70 kilometres south westwards to Unryul (irrigating 4300 hectares of reclaimed tideland) and Yulli Reservoir in Kwail County.⁶¹

Another strong policy direction towards nature modification has been the frequently restated priority of coastal reclamation. The Gulf of Korea on the west coast is relatively shallow. The 50-metre isobath is 70 kilometres offshore at the mouth of the River Taedong and large areas of 'tideland' are potentially reclaimable for agriculture. Most of this lies in the long arc of coast between Nampo and the River Amnok. During the Fatherland Liberation War a team of geographers from Kim Il Sung University was given the task of surveying the west coast for potentially reclaimable land.⁶² They reported that 150,000 hectares were available. This figure was later increased by the politicians.

By 1978 over 30000 hectares of tidal flats were said to have been reclaimed.⁶³ In 1980, the new General Bureau of Tideland Reclamation was given a target for the 1980s of 300,000 hectares of reclamation.⁶⁴ In 1983, The Great Leader increased this to 300,000 hectares to be achieved by 1987 or 1988, with an additional 200-300,000 hectares thereafter.⁶⁵ This was very ambitious considering that the Dutch, perhaps the most successful drainage engineers in history, reclaimed only 165,000 hectares of agricultural land in the Zuyderzee between 1927 and 1968.⁶⁶

Reclamation projects have proved very expensive of labour and other resources. Precisely how expensive is not clear because it seems that proper costings were not prepared⁶⁷ There has also been some political fall-out since it would appear that not all officials have shared the party line about the priority of reclamation, as the following observation by Kim Il Sung demonstrates:

A long time ago I gave the June 3rd Cooperative Farm in Onchon County, South Pyongan Province, the task of mechanising farm work and using chemicals widely so that each farmer could lend three hectares of tideland paddy fields. But this task has not yet been implemented. The senior officials of the South Pyongan Provincial Party Committee have not even visited the farm. This is a grave error. The chief secretary ... must be well aware of the task we gave and must make strenuous efforts to carry it out. But he does not seem concerned about how the task is being implemented. He is putting on airs, cooped up in his office.⁶⁸

CONCLUSION

Our metaphorical treatment of the landscape as text in this chapter has relied upon a hermeneutic view of the world as mediated by human experience.⁶⁹ Such an approach identifies systems of socially constructed and reproduced meanings which help us to understand and appreciate the relationships among people and between society and nature.⁷⁰ It has sought to give a flavour of selected aspects of such interpretations. We have seen the WPK's interpretation of the landscape as single-minded: one might almost say from a single mind. The result is an outcome or a by-product of socialism but also a key medium through which the society has been transformed. The confrontation with nature has informed the Korean version of socialism which remains as confident as ever of its ability to shape the world according to its ideology.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Janet Townsend, Mike Crang, Diana Pritchard and members of the Anglo-Indian Seminar in Mussoorie for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The responsibility for the views expressed remains mine.
2. Quoted in *Korea Today* 7 (1981), p. 43.
3. P. J. Atkins, 'The Dialectics of Environment and Culture: Kimilsungism and the North Korean Landscape', in A. Mukherjee and V. K. Agnihotri (eds), *Environment and Development: Views from the East and the West* (New Delhi: Concept, 1993), pp. 309-32.
4. J. S. Duncan, and N. G. Duncan. 'Ideology and Bliss: Roland Barthes and the Secret Histories of Landscape', in T. J. Barnes and J. S. Duncan (eds), *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 18-37.
5. D. B. Cosgrove, *Social Formation and Symbolic Landscape* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).
6. J. S. Duncan, *The City as Text: the Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyian Kingdom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 17.
7. P. K Lewis, 'Axioms for reading the Landscape: some Guides to the American Scene', in Meinig, D.W. (ed.), *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays* (New Haven: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 11-32.
8. Lewis (1979), *op. cit.*
9. I have been heavily influenced by the impressions of one brief visit to the DPRK in 1991 when I saw the landscape as the guest of the Juche Academy. Dethroning the authorial voice of the WPK has not been possible, not least because I had no access to the subaltern voices of the streets.
10. Kim Il Sung. 'On the Ten Major Tasks of Pyongyang City', speech delivered at a plenary meeting of Pyongyang City Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 26 June in *Works*, vol. 19 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984), p. 295.
11. See Chapter 1 in D. Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
12. Kim Il Sung, 'Pyongyang City must be an Example for the Whole Country in all Spheres of Politics, the Economy and Culture', 1974, in *Works*, vol. 29 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987), p. 172.
13. C. Macdonald, 'So Terrible a Liberation – the UN Occupation of North Korea', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 23, no. 2 (1991), pp. 3-19.
14. A. Foster-Carter, *Korea's Coming Reunification: another East Asian Superpower?* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1992), p. 9.
15. Destruction was therefore far worse than that wrought in Beijing by Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution. M. S. Samuels and C. M. Samuels, 'Beijing and the power of place in modern China', in J. A. Agnew and J. S. Duncan (eds), *The Power of Place: Bringing*

together *Geographical and Sociological Imaginations* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 202-27.

16. Anon., *Do you know about Korea? 100 Questions and Answers* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1989), p. 140.

17. Kim Il Sung, 'On Mapping Out the Master Plan for the Postwar Reconstruction of Pyongyang': talk with city planners, 21 January 1951, in *Works*, vol. 6 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), p. 234.

18. Anon., *Glorious Forty Years of Creation, vol. II: July 1953-October 1966* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1989), p. 16; A. Schinz and E. Dene, 'Pyongyang - Ancient and Modern - the Capital of North Korea', *Geojournal* 22 (1990), pp. 121-36.

19. In this regard Pyongyang is similar to cities such as Bucharest. G. Church, 'Bucharest: Revolution in the Townscape Art', in R. A. French, and F. E. I. Hamilton (eds), *The Socialist City: Spatial Structure and Urban Policy* (Chichester: Wiley, 1979), pp. 493-506.

20. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), p. 27. For a critique of Foucault's theory of power see J. G. Merquior, *Foucault* 2nd edn (London: Fontana, 1991), ch. 8.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

22. H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 142-3.

23. A. Gutnov, A. Baburov, G. Djumenton, S. Kharitinova, I. Lezava and A. Sadovskij, *The Ideal Communist City* (New York: Braziller, 1971).

24. B.C. Koh, 'North Korea in 1988: the Fortieth Anniversary', *Asian Survey* 29 (1989), pp. 39-45.

25. *Korea Today* 7 (1991), pp. 28-9.

26. Other major streets include: Chollima Street, stage 1 completed 1970, stage 2 in the 1980s, housing for 3500; Ragwon Street, finished 1975, for 3000 families; Munsu Street, which was ready in 1983, accommodating 17,000 families at an average of 100 square metres of floor space each; Changgwang Street, opened in 1985, for 4000 families, at 150 square metres; An Sang Street, completed 1987, for 5000 families, at 120 square metres.

27. BBC Monitoring, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 3 Far East, Weekly Economic Report, Third Series FE/WO 219, A/6 (1992); BBC Monitoring, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 3 Far East, Daily Report, Third Series, FE/1506, B/8 (1992).

28. *Korea Today* 12 (1990), p. 5; *Korea Today* 1 (1991), pp. 18-19; *Korea Today* 2 (1991), p. 7. Section five was completed in 1993. *Korea Today* 10 (1993), pp. 28-9.

29. Anon., *Pyongyang Metro* (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980); Anon., *Pyongyang Metro* (Pyongyang: Korea Pictorial, 1988).

30. D. E. Cosgrove and P. Jackson, 'New Directions in Cultural Geography', *Area* 19 (1987), pp. 95-101; S. Daniels, 'Marxism, Culture and the Duplicity of Landscape', in R. Peet and N. Thrift (eds), *New Models in Geography: the Political Economy Perspective* (London: Unwin Hyman 1989), pp. 196-220.

31. J. S. Duncan and N. G. Duncan '(Re)reading the Landscape', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 6 (1988), pp. 117-26.

32. R. D. Sack, *Conceptions of Space in Social Thought: a Geographic Perspective* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

33. D. E. Cosgrove, 'Power and Place in the Venetian Territories', in J. A. Agnew and J. S. Duncan (eds), *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Sociological Imaginations* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 104.

34. M.S. Samuels, 'The Biography of Landscape: Cause and Culpability', D. W. Meinig (ed.), *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays* (New Haven: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 51-88.

35. Duncan (1990), *op. cit.*

36. R. Barthes, *The Eiffel Tower and other Mythologies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1979).
37. Lefebvre (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 143.
38. S. Y. Choe, 'The Tower of the Juche Idea – a Great Monument', *Korea Today* 11 (1982), pp. 30-2.
39. Anon., 'Arch of Triumph', *Korea Today* 6 (1990), p. 43.
40. Other impressive stage props are the Grand Monument on Mansu Hill, a bronze figure of Kim Il Sung erected to commemorate his sixtieth birthday in 1972, which at about 20 metres must be one of the largest statues in the world; the 1961 Chollima Statue of the legendary flying horse which was to be the symbol of the Korean equivalent of the Great Leap Forward; the monument to the Potong River Improvement Project on Ponghwa Hill (1971); the monument to Fallen Soldiers of the People's Army (1959) on Haebang Hill; and the Liberation Tower (1946) and Friendship Tower (1959) both on Moran Hill in recognition of the services respectively of Soviet and Chinese soldiers who fought in the Fatherland Liberation War and the Korean War.
41. Monumental landscapes are of course common in the west also, such as in Washington DC, but in Pyongyang the density and sheer size of such props on the theatrical set is astonishing for a small city in a poor country.
42. Kim Il Sung, 'On Properly Preserving Historical Remains and Relics', talk with the teachers and students of Kim Il Sung University, 30 April 1958, in *Works*, vol. 12 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1983), pp. 196-7.
43. R. Hewison, *The Heritage Industry* (London: Methuen, 1987).
44. J. Urry, *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (London: Sage, 1990).
45. Foucault, quoted in Duncan (1990) *op. cit.*, p. 22.
46. Outside Pyongyang there are monuments to victorious battles against the Japanese at Pochonbo, Hyesan City, Ryanggang Province (1967); and on Lake Samji (1971). Sites of other revolutionary activity are preserved at Ponghwa, remembering Kim Hyong Jik; Chilgol, the birthplace of Kim Il Sung's mother, Kang Ban Sok; Wangjaesan, the site of an important revolutionary gathering in 1933; a bivouac on Chong Hill, the site of the crossing of Amnok River in 1939; the secret camps on Mount Paektu; and Chonsung, where the Great Leader lived between 1951-53.
47. The economic effort which has been expended on landscape modification must represent a high proportion of gross domestic product. The human effort has also been intensive.
48. Anon., 'Mangyongdae – Holy Place of Revolution', *Korea Today* 12 (1981), pp. 53-1.
49. A. White, *Carnival, Hysteria, and Writing: Collected Essays and Autobiography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). I am grateful to Mike Crang for this reference.
50. Anon., *The Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery* (Pyongyang: Korea Pictorial, 1989)
51. *Korea Today* 4 (1986).
52. J. M. Mayo, *War Memorials as Political Landscape: the American Experience and Beyond* (New York: Praeger, 1988).
53. On sacred space see also Y. F. Tuan, 'Sacred Space: Explorations of an Idea', in K. Butzer (ed.), *Dimensions of human geography*, Geography Department University of Chicago, *Research Paper* 186 (1978), pp. 84-99.
54. Mayo (1988) *op. cit.*, p. 249.
55. D. Ley and H. Olds, 'Landscape as Spectacle: the World's Fairs and the Culture of Heroic Consumption', *Society and Space* 6 (1988), pp. 191-212. Apologies to F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of late capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).
56. Cosgrove (1989), *op. cit.*, p. 104.

57. D. E. Cosgrove, *The Palladian Landscape: Geographical Change and its Cultural Representations in Sixteenth Century Italy* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992).
58. A. Schmidt, *The Concept of Nature in Marx* (London: New Left Books, 1971), p. 77; P. J. Atkins, 'The Great and the Dear: North Korea towards the Millennium', IBG Conference, Royal Holloway, University of London (1993).
59. P. J. Atkins, 'Development North Korean Style', *Geography Review* vol. 6, no. 3 (1993), pp. 39-41. For a fuller account of rural landscape modification see Atkins (1993) *op. cit.*
60. Y. G. Son, 'Along the New Waterway of the West Coast Granary', *Korea Today* 9 (1990), pp. 23-4; *Korea Today* 10 (1990), p. 30.
61. BBC Monitoring, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part 3 Far East, Weekly Economic Report, Third Series, FE/W0230, A/8 (1992).
62. Kim Il Sung, 'On Accelerating the Reclamation of Tideland and Increasing the Fertility of Fields', speech delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 2 April 1983, in *Works*, vol. 37 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1991), pp. 368-95.
63. Kim Il Sung, 'On some Measures for the Reclamation of Tideland in a Well Defined Framework', in *Works*, vol. 23 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), pp. 60-6.
64. Kim Il Sung, 'Let the Entire Party, the Whole Country and all the People carry out the Great Project for the Transformation of Nature to Reclaim Tidal Flats and other New Land', speech delivered at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Sixth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 5 October 1981, in *Works*, vol. 36 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1990), pp. 233-52; J. R. Cho, 'Great Plan for Tideland Reclamation', *Korea Today* 10 (1984), pp. 58-9.
65. Kim Il Sung, 'On certain tasks involved in improving the management of agriculture and increased agricultural production, 1983, in *ibid.*, *Works*, vol. 37, p. 324.
66. A total of roughly 600,000 hectares have been reclaimed in the Netherlands since AD 1100.
67. Kim Il Sung, 'On accelerating the reclamation of tideland and increasing the fertility of fields', speech delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, 2 April 1983, in *ibid.*, *Works*, vol. 37, p. 380.
68. Kim Il Sung, 'On the wide-scale reclamation of tidal flats and their cultivation', speech at a consultative meeting of agricultural officials 3 April 1978, in *Works*, vol. 33 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1988), pp. 151-2.
69. D. Gregory, *Ideology, Science and Human Geography* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp. 59-63 and 144-6; R. J. Johnston, D. Gregory and D. M. Smith (eds), *The Dictionary of Human Geography* 3rd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 244-6.
70. R. J. Johnston, *Geography and Geographers: Anglo-American Human Geography since 1945* 4th edn (London: Arnold, 1991), pp. 32-3. For Barnes and Duncan 'text is an appropriate trope to use in analysing landscapes because it conveys the inherent instability of meaning, fragmentation or absence of integrity, lack of authorial control, polyvocality and irresolvable social contradictions that often characterise them', T. J. Barnes and J. S. Duncan (eds), *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 7.