THE RISE OF HOMO ISLAMICUS

AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IDENTITY MARKERS AND TERRORIST IDENTITY MARKERS AS THEY REVEAL THEMSELVES IN THE DISCURSIVE COHESION OF CONCEPTS 'TERRORISM' AND 'ISLAM' IN THE WASHINGTON POST 2001-2008

Anastassia Stolovitskaia

Submitted June 2008

Integrated Thesis

Department of English
Supervisor: Anne Fabricius

Department of Cultural Encounters
Supervisor: Birgitta Frello

The image originates from CBS NEWS homepage and is an addendum to the article from July 28, 2005 on Muslim scholars condemning terrorism. Link from 30.12.2007:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/28/national/main712548.shtml

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

"The Rise of Homo Islamicus. American Collective Identity Markers and Terrorist Identity Markers as They Reveal Themselves in the Discursive Cohesion of Concepts 'Terrorism' and 'Islam' in The Washington Post 2001-2008" af Anastassia Stolovitskaia er integreret speciale i Engelsk og Kultur- og Sprogmødestuder på Roskilde Universitetscenter fra juni 2008.

Specialet omhandler studiet af den diskursive kobling af begreberne 'Islam' og 'Terrorisme' på baggrund af elleve artikler fra *The Washington Post* i perioden 2001-2008 efter terrorangrebet 9-11. Der undersøges identitetskonstruktioner som skabes i diskursordener: dette gælder både konstruktionen af amerikansk kollektiv identitet og konstruktionen af 'den Anden' – Islam og Islamisk terrorist. Der defineres diskursmarkører der gør koblingen 'Islam' – 'terrorisme' mulig. De anvendte teorier tager udgangspunkt i Norman Faircloughs kritisk diskursanalyse og kritik af Orientalisme af Edward Said, suppleret af sikkerhedsteori (Ole Wæver og Barry Buzan) som forklarer konstruktioner af Andethed i de tilfælde hvor den fremstilles som eksistentiel trussel. Konklusionerne er rettet mod de konsekvenser som den nuværende diskurs bærer både for Islams rolle i diskursen om terrorisme, Orienten og for selve amerikanske identitet.

PREFACE

This thesis concludes my MA degree in English and Cultural Encounters at Roskilde University. It is a product of a fruitful study that has given me an academic space to take genuine interest in a plethora of disciplines, including linguistics, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies and politics – domestically and internationally. My theoretical background intertwines with practical endeavours which greatly intensified my interest in the aforementioned subjects. Among them is a six-month fellowship at the House of Representatives in Washington D.C. and several volunteer projects on facilitating intercultural and inter-religious dialogue in Denmark, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

As a Russian immigrant I have always been highly sensitive to the cultural discrepancies that reveal themselves in my communication with persons of other nationalities and origins. This in its turn has always made we wonder to what extent the aspects of language - of our speech and writing - actually 'contained' the world around us. The present paper is therefore also a study exploring the role of language in our outlook on the world.

References throughout the thesis are presented in the following manner: books, articles and events are referred to by the name of the author or an event and registered in the list of bibliography and events. Academic and literary sources that do not have direct relevance for the study, official documents and links to video files are generally referred to directly in footnotes. All electronic links are dated for the time of their validity.

Last but not least, I should use this opportunity to extend my gratitude to the people who supported me with their invaluable comments and timely encouragement throughout the research and writing process: Larissa Stolovitskaya, Human Shojaee and Danila Mouzytchenko.

Anastassia Stolovitskaia
Copenhagen, June 2008

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA

1.1.1 CURIOSITY TRIGGER

"I'm all for free speech, except when I disagree with it."
Stephen Colbert, American Comedian

The tragedy of 9/11 has always made me wonder how quickly a fairly well-outlined image of a terrorist enemy has been defined and redefined by the media and which consequences it lead to in the limelight of the 'war on terror'. But for me as a Russian citizen having lived 7 years in Western Europe, a relatively 'young Westerner', it has always been something distant: a tragedy of a solid scale but never something that touched me on a deeper personal level. However, the fear of an American is quite familiar to me as Russia, just like the US, is one of the countries that encountered the so-called Islamic terrorism first-hand. And even though I was not in Russia at the time of the attacks, I still kept a very strong emotional bond to my country of origin.

Apart from the numerous suicide bombings of the so-called Russian 'black widows' as well as metro- and residential building explosions allegedly conducted by Islamic terrorists in Russia's largest cities, the country has suffered from the two most devastating terrorist attacks in the most recent years. On October 23rd, 2002, 850 people in Moscow theatre were taken hostage for 4 days, leaving 174 dead, including children, in the final attack on the terrorists. This bloody event is colloquially known as the "Nord-Ost tragedy", named after the theatrical piece performed on the night of the tragedy. A Chechen separatist Movsar Baraev claimed responsibility for the act. Russia received deep emotional scars from watching, reading and hearing all about it in the media including the frustrating inability of the government to handle the case with the least number of victims.

The second largest recent terrorist attack in Russia known as 'The Beslan Terrorist Act' has shaken me to the core. On September 1st, 2004 over 30 Islamic terrorists took over 1300 people hostage, most of them children, on a solemn year-opening ceremony a public school in Beslan, North Ossetia. Hostages were held until September 3rd when the school was besieged by the military, leaving 350 dead –half of them children- and 500 injured. Once again, the events were covered in the media, and the images of the dead and injured children covered in blood shook the nation violently. I was no exception. However, it was not the act itself that was the major incentive for me to touch upon the topic of 'Islam' and 'terrorism' but rather the tumultuous public reaction to the disastrous events that realized itself in the unfathomable hate for anybody allegedly Muslim as well as elevation of the public debate on the issue.

Needless to say, the tragic school hostage-taking act in Beslan produced much fear, agony and pain. The debates after the tragedy have been as rigorous as ever and enormous hatred for Islam and Muslims in general emerged throughout the country. People of Muslim appearance were arrested and hunted down, the phenomenon being fully supported by the core population in the aftermath of the attack. One often heard of xenophobic acts of hate and violence against people who might have looked or acted Muslim again and again in the news. It might be inappropriate to call these events an inspiration for the present work but the mishandling of people of (allegedly) Muslim faith has definitely triggered my interest in the subject. The 'terrorism'-'Islam' paradigm has had its own rather violent ways of development in the Russian context. One could only imagine what might have happened if the events got translated into a global scale. The uncontrollable and chaotic fear of radical Islamic terrorism, turning finger-pointing at Islam into plausible accusations has triggered my contemplation of scenarios of the future. While having thoughts of possible similar developments on a global scale I came to think of whether the level of hate and fear is similar in the contexts of other nations, particularly those that have also directly suffered from the terrorist attacks conducted by Islamic fundamentalists. In my contemplation I naturally came across the context of the United States, a powerful Western actor serving as a policy example for the majority of the Western countries, as well as conducting policies in cooperation with them. Thus the US, and their handling of 'terror' and 'Islam' in the context of their nation fell immediately into the focus of my interest. It generated a genuine curiosity as to *how* Americans saw the cohesion of the two concepts, how this tie characterized them and which consequences it had.

The context of the United States is also particularly interesting because, to employ the official term, 'Islamic extremist terrorism' is at the top of the national security agenda. Furthermore, the USA has been of a particular interest to me as my field of study at the department of English. I have also taken a bias towards politics in my studies after serving a six-month fellowship in the US Congress in Washington, where I continued to concentrate and research on the topic of interest.

1.1.2 LIAISON OF 'TERROR' AND 'ISLAM' IN AMERICAN CONTEXT

When it comes to persuasion, nothing speaks louder than one's perception of images. Everything from TV montages and front page photographs to verbal images creating certain logical links with the target audience is of influence on the public opinion. US Department of State's homepage contains a link to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism which depicts a photographic image of a Muslim man holding a poster with "USA" on it, with vivid hatred in his eyes.[1] The image-and-word quiz is simple to interpret: the word 'counterterrorism' clearly corresponds with an image of a radical Muslim exposing negative feelings towards the USA. There is no word on the front page of the Internet site suggesting a verbal connection with Islam. The word 'terrorist' and its derivatives, however, are mentioned there several times. Besides, the image delivers its message, so the connection has vividly been established. According to George Lakoff, an eminent

---

[1] US Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Link from 6.06.2008: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

Berkeley scholar in cognitive linguistics, when making a statement, *"we make a choice of categories because we have some reason for focusing on certain properties and downplaying others."* (Lakoff, 1980:163)

The present work is an effort to quench a lingering curiosity that has brewed up for years, a desire to examine a link between a particular religion and its public image within particular community. 'Islam' and 'terrorism', or anything linguistically or associatively relevant to these concepts, are today's hot potato on the world's social and political scene. In American context, few are likely to deny the obvious cohesion. A survey conducted in the fall of 2007 by Luntz Maslansky Strategic Research for a non-profit Saga Foundation revealed that 73 percent of the poll participants believe that al Qaeda terrorist cells would target the United States of America within the next five years[2]. Furthermore, it does not seem to be an uncommon fear to the other Western countries, including European ones. The associative link pops out in the mind of a Westerner immediately and at times subconsciously. The two frequently go side by side, and it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that in major public discourses they have almost become each other's constituents. It is essential to point out that there are also public discourses that do not necessarily involve the combination of these two concepts. However, they are marginal in the mass media, and less apprehended than those that combine them. They rather lie on the periphery of the leading discourses on 'Islam' and 'terrorism'. They are less politicised, thus less widespread in the American context.

The recent public opinion polls serve as indicators for this statement. As of 2007, the majority of Americans still believe Islam is more likely to encourage violence, says one of the leading Washington 'fact tanks', the Pew Research Center.[3] What concerns me is the media texts that reveal the cohesion of the two concepts, namely 'Islam' and 'terrorism', and most importantly, *how* these concepts are intertwined. I am interested in the *process* itself, in the way the concepts are being constructed as components of each other, or rather how it happened that in many Americans' associative minds 'terrorism' and 'Islam' are often parts of one chain? I am not trying to test whether the cohesion of 'Islam' and 'terrorism' actually takes place or not; as I will demonstrate below, their intercourse is evident as the consequences of these discursive constructions are quite clear.

The cohesion of 'Islam' and 'terrorism' is not a new phenomenon on the American political scene. The image of Islam being alien and prone to violence has been lingering around for years, even at the times of the Cold War, when the image of the 'evil other' for America unquestionably belonged to the Soviet Union. Obviously, the recent event consolidating the cohesion between the two aforementioned concepts was September 11th, 2001, the date of the fatal attacks on the

---

[2] Saga Foundation – *The Language of Nuclear Terrorism.* Report conducted by Luntz, Maslansky Strategic Research in fall 2007, released on January 2, 2008. Link from 6.06.2008:
http://www.sagafoundation.org/uploaded/file/SagaLuntzSurveyfinal.pdf
[3] The Pew Research Center Public Expresses Mixed Views of Islam, Mormonism, September 25th, 2007

US. This was widely presented by the media and the Bush Administration[4] as nothing less than an attack on the Western values and the values of democracy.

A crescendo of shock and fear on a quiet September day spread across the world disturbed by the breaking news, which made reports on the European market downfall and on the upcoming New York fashion week suddenly unimportant. As many others, I was glued to the screen of the international CNN channel watching the last two plane crashes live and trying to make sense of what was happening.

Confusion would be the word describing the common reaction to the attacks. In nowadays societies people rely heavily on media for clues on how to understand and interpret information. But in this case even American media was utterly perplexed as to how to portray and interpret the shocking events. As a scholar of discourse on terrorism Richard Jackson put it, "*language itself appeared to collapse along with the Twin Towers.*" (Jackson, 2005:29) The CNN headline to the shocking footage in the first 5 minutes of the coverage claimed "*World Trade Center* Disaster"[5], while a couple of hours later it switched to "*America* under Attack". Please note that it was not the World Trade Center anymore, nor the Pentagon; the community in question suddenly became much bigger; it was *America.* As viewers were also trying to figure out how to interpret the events, the media turned the event into a case of a national and later international scale. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the media went along with the Administration's line of thought by expressing outrage, manufacturing confidence in Bush, and preparing the public for retribution. According to some sources the Administration restricted access to military sources, intimidated critics, admonished media against use of enemy messages, and enlisted Hollywood aid for its propaganda objectives.[6] Critical reports increased into 2002 but were fairly rare. The media's rather uncritical inaction right after 9/11 granted the Administration time to prepare a whole new enhanced strategy in combating the terrorist enemy with a number of initiatives, both on the home front and internationally.

The Bush Administration took immediate action. The increased awareness of Islamic terrorism in the US went well along the lines with the official 'war on terror', which was launched shortly after the 9/11 attacks. Within a few weeks after 9/11, on October 7, 2001 Afghanistan was attacked. 14,000 tons of bombs were dropped and between 2969 and 3413 civilians were killed. In March 2003 a second and much larger military front in the 'war on terrorism' – code-named "Operation Iraqi freedom" was launched, leaving America and Britain short of 100 soldiers in the initial assault. (Jackson, 2005:10)

Being partly a product of tense bilateral relations of the US and Iraq after the Gulf war, and partly a product of the aforementioned 'war on terror', the war in Iraq was justified on the grounds of

---

[4] Hereafter I will also use 'the Administration' to refer to the George W. Bush Administration
[5] Link to CNN coverage from 6.06.2008: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vfYQAPhjwzA&feature=related
[6] "Doubt foreclosed: U.S. Mainstream Media and September 11, 2001" by Oliver Boyd-Barrett in David Demers (ed.) "Terrorism, Globalization & Mass Communication." Washington: Marquette Books, 2003

alleged cooperation of the Iraqi regime with terrorist organizations as well as growing fear of Iraq providing these organizations with the allegedly existent weapons of mass destruction. The House Government Committee investigation revealed 29 misleading statements made by the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice concerning Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and links to Al Qaeda. [7] In fact, she claimed the following on NBC's *Meet the Press* on September 28, 2003:

"*No one has said that there is evidence that Saddam Hussein directed or controlled 9/11, but let's be very clear, he had ties to al-Qaeda, he had al-Qaeda operatives who had operated out of Baghdad.*"[8]

Iraq used to be listed by the USA as a State Sponsor of Terror. Neither the Iraqi connections with the terrorist organizations which were denied by The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, a bipartisan organization appointed by Congress in 2002[9], nor the existence of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq have proven to be the case.

Interestingly enough, the US official accusations of having ties with terrorist organizations were against most countries in the Middle East that have poor relations with the USA. Lebanon and Iran are on the top of that list. Lebanon has been accused of cooperation with Hezbollah, and Iran is said to be providing weapons to Hamas. The factual proof is still expected, and some of it has been documented by other governments. These charges are not as specious as the charges laid by the USA before the Iraq war. Still, it could be that the accusations by the US officials for these countries are just as void as the reasoning for the invasion of Iraq.

It is hardly a secret that the Administration sees Islamic terrorism as the biggest threat. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism report from September 2006 has clearly defined the 'principle terrorist enemy' to the USA, which is "*a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.*"[10]

In fact, the fear of this kind of terrorism is so high that the measures confronting it have been spread on the domain of civil liberties. In the light of the events on 9/11, this fear allowed the Administration to tighten the laws in the name of security. Not only did these laws culminate into something one could call the official Lynch Law, namely the arrest and preventive detention and transport without trials to clandestine locations of more than 1200 mainly Muslim suspects across America, but they also confined individual freedoms of American citizens. The most notorious of these, the USA Patriot Act, was adopted a few weeks after 9/11, on October 26, 2001. It increased

---

[7] Government Report Minority Office. The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq. Link from 6.06.2008: http://oversight.house.gov/IraqOnTheRecord/index.asp?Speaker=National+Security+Advisor+Condoleezza+Rice&Phrase=&Subject=&startDate_month=&startDate_day=&startDate_year=&endDate_month=&endDate_day=&endDate_year=&submit=Find+Statements
[8] Ibid.
[9] Link from 6.06.2008: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch10.htm
[10] Link from 6.06.2008: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionIII.html

powers for exercising government surveillance, electronic surveillance, wiretapping of individual's telephone conversations, nationwide search warrants and bank records, detention of immigrants without charge for up to one week as well as deportation of immigrants who raise money for suspected terrorist organizations. It also gave a power to the Secretary of State to designate a suspicious group as 'terrorist' on the basis of pure assumptions. (Jackson, 2005:13)

Violation of civil liberties is far from the only accusation that has been raised against the Administration. The fear of Islamic terrorism in the context of American policy also leaves practically no compromise for the freedom of human rights of the alleged suspects internationally. Places like Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp and clandestine detention camps in the third world countries leave no legal rights for the detainees to defend themselves. A few instances were scattered in the media about illegal rendition and torture of the alleged, and in many cases innocent, suspects of the Middle Eastern origin. One of these instances was detention of Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, mistaken for an Al-Qaeda terrorist suspect with the same name. He was held and tortured for five month without any legal assistance or a notice to his family.11 Rendition often turns into a process where all means are justified surpassing the frames of legality, and thus putting a victim beyond the law and setting a perpetrator above it. We are facing a strange paradox: the concept of rendition which is designed to protect security of the American citizen and bring the perpetrators to fair trial quite possibly may set these very citizens it is supposed to protect into a highly vulnerable position, into a legal vacuum where no law can help them once they are taken into custody, since the access to any kind of legal assistance is being cut off.[12]

According to *The Washington Post* and *USA Today* polls, the level of public support for the military action against Iraq stayed at a steady 57 - 58 percent between early August and late November of 2002 (Nikolaev, 2006:3). It would be hard to disagree with the fact that it takes a lot of effort to gain public support for an ungrounded war framed as a strike in the 'war on terror', and subsequently attack a regime in a Muslim country when the enemy, that is a 'terrorist', is obscure and unspecific. However, the power of discourse has done its deed: it personalized the enemy by pointing to an alleged mediator between the terrorists and the attacks on the United States on 9/11 – a leader of a predominantly Muslim country in the Gulf area, Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

There is no found evidence that the Iraqi government had direct ties with the so-called Islamic terrorism prior to the US invasion. These days, however, Islamic terrorism is flourishing on the Iraqi territories, when the news coverage of the insurgencies and suicide bombings in Iraq have almost become a sad everyday routine. In fact, many experts on terrorism claim that the war in Iraq was not the consequence of the Islamic terrorism, but rather a reason for its growth in the

---

[11] *War on Terror or War on Human Rights?* – Humanity in Action Report by Anastassia Stolovitskaia and Alissa King, July 2006. Link from 6.06.2008:
http://www.humanityinaction.org/docs/EU_Lantos_Reports_2006/War_on_Terror_or_War_on_Human_Rights.doc
[12] A Hollywood production "Rendition" by Gavin Hood, 2007, is an excellent theme on this subject, featuring illegal rendition and torture of an American born Egyptian chemical engineer on the grounds of pure assumption that he may have ties with one of the terrorists. The assumptions are based on his name's similarity with the terrorist name.

Middle Eastern region. According to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Robert L. Hutchings, who spoke to *The Washington Post* right after the publication of their 2005 report, "At the moment, Iraq is a magnet for international terrorist activity".[13] *Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*, the National Intelligence Estimate of April 2006, a document which is known for dealing with evaluating the impact of the present events on the future, concluded that *"The Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement."*[14]

Not only did the direct or indirect link of the concepts 'Islam' and 'terrorism' work as a tool in launching a war against a Muslim country, but the war itself, together with the acts of religious terrorism, has confirmed the obvious link of the two concepts in the minds of the increasing number of Westerners.

According to the Pew Research Center report of September 25th, 2007, public attitudes towards Muslims and Islam have grown increasingly negative in recent years. 35 percent of Americans who were polled currently express a negative view towards Islam. An obvious alienation of Islam has taken place in the mind of an American: the proportion of those who say that Islam has little or nothing in common with their own religion has increased substantially since 2005 (from 59 percent to 70 percent). Twice as many people use negative words as positive ones to describe their impressions of the Muslim religion (30 percent vs. 15 percent). The most frequently used negative word to describe Islam is "fanatic," with "radical" and "terror".

The same poll shows that the strongest influence on the public impressions of Muslims, particularly among those who express an unfavourable opinion of them, is composed of what people hear and read in the media. In 2001, 78 percent of the American public was following the terrorist attacks on the United States in the media with particular attention, 72 percent of which were especially interested in the identities of the terrorists standing behind the 9/11 attacks.[15]

What presents a particular interest for the present work is the fact that the number of people turning to newspapers for news on terrorism has increased considerably in the three months after September 2001, from 11 percent to 34 percent, stealing attention from the news coverage on television.[16] This is a curious turn and one may wonder whether newspaper material was considered to be more trustworthy or right to the point.

My personal interest lies in the sphere of a written journalistic text, which is mainly explained by the textual linguistic bias of my major and allows me to explore a field that has not received the same amount of researchers' attention as the visual and audio media. (Fowler, 1993:7-8)

---

[13] *Iraq New Terror Breeding* Ground, The Washington Post. Friday, January 14, 2005. Link from 6.06.2008: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7460-2005Jan13.html
[14] Link from 6.06.2008: http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf
[15] The Pew Research Center *Terrorism Transforms News Interest,* December 18th. 2001
[16] The Pew Research Center *Terror Coverage Boost News Media's Images,* November 28th. 2001

Last but not least, the liaison of 'Islam' and 'terrorism' itself is an easily inflammable matter and is an incredibly important issue to look at since the discursive and political consequences of it, as demonstrated above, are enormous and highly influential.

1.2 Approaching the Case

1.2.1 Outlining the Issue

As demonstrated above, certain coherence between the discursive practises concerning 'Islam' and 'terrorism' is undoubtedly taking place. The consequences of this coherence bear collateral effect not only for the Muslims or persons of the Middle Eastern origin but also for the Americans themselves: they generate an overly elevated level of fear for anything related to Islam or the Middle East, which in its turn negatively affects their own civil liberties and moral values. One of the latest examples of this cohesion is probably the scandalous matter in the Democratic presidential campaign 2008. The 2006 photo of Barack Obama wearing a traditional Somali dress with a turban on his official visit to Kenya generated turmoil, as the conservative media started to highlight one of his middle names, Hussein, creating a not-quite-vague allusion to the name of the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. The photograph publicised by Obama's ill-wishers was supposed to decrease the number of his supporters by dropping a hint that Obama had some affiliation to Islam.[17]

The actual message received might be slightly or totally modified than initially intended by the sender. However, communication, especially mass communication as in the media's case, always happens in familiar terms and cognitive constructions shared by the media sender and the media receiver. A prominent Berkeley linguist George Lakoff and his companion in cognitive linguistics Mark Johnson argue that receiving certain information, especially data of a political bias, requires that both the sender and the target audience share a common grounding in experience. One's experience, or conceptual system, emerges from one's *"constant successful functioning in our physical and cultural environment. Our categories of experience (…) are constantly being tested through ongoing successful functioning by all the members of our culture."* (Lakoff, 1980:180) Among other things this can be explained by such social phenomena as prejudice, stereotypes or particular language uses. Thereby, persons with different conceptual systems than our own may apprehend the world in a very different manner than we do. Following this logic, we understand a statement as being true in a given situation when our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of the situation closely enough. Professor of English and Linguistics at the University of East Anglia Roger Fowler[18] argues that this virtually implies that the text is co-

---

[17] '*Right Wing Plays Muslim Card Against Obama', San Francisco Chronicle,* Thursday, February 28, 2008. Link from 6.06.2008: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/02/28/MNKGVABG8.DTL

[18] Both Fairclough and Fowler have a similar view on the language as being a constructive tool for the world. Both of them are inspired by the functional linguistic theory developed by M.A.K. Halliday and his colleagues, stating that there is a connection between linguistic structure and social values. (cf. Halliday, M.A.K., *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. 1973, London: Edward Arnold)

produced by writer and reader on the basis of their more or less shared knowledge of the world, society and language itself. (Fowler, 1993:60) He signifies this shared knowledge as *'schema'* which permit external phenomena and other experience to be perceived as coherent and to be understood as significant. (*ibid.*) Values expressed by Americans in the mass media texts would probably not work in a context of an essentially different culture than American. They constitute a part of their collective identity, which I intend to reveal to some extent through their construction of the antagonist, or rather what Americans are *not*.

These *shared ways* of *representing* the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the social world as well as the 'mental world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth are what the primary theoretician applied in this work, Norman Fairclough, calls *discourses.* (cf. Fairclough, 2003: 124) In other terms, discourses are defined as particular ways of identifying the main 'themes' of the world from a particular point of view. (Fairclough, 2003:129) They are not just freely employed but are bound with certain rules and conventions; discourses are constrained by the *orders of discourse,* which create confinements as to what can be written, said or done. (cf. Fairclough, 1995a:12; Fairclough, 2001:25, Fairclough, 2003:24) Orders of discourse can be described as a sum of the discursive types that consist of discourses and genres[19] and are applied within a certain social institution or a social domain, e.g. a lecture, seminar, informal conversation or a court setting. Thus, there are several discourses within an order of discourse that produce speech and text.

The fact that certain types of discourses exist implies a certain degree of their repetition, which means in its turn that discourses are shared by groups of people. But the degree of their repetition varies greatly, creating a hierarchy of discourses. (Fairclough, 2003:124) The fact that the American discourse on terrorism is highly dominated by its cohesion to Islam presents it as one of the leading discourses on the social scene. Discourses can be represented as processes that are happening by themselves rather than being constructed by social agents. (Fairclough, 2003: 127) However, Fairclough argues that discourses are ideological tools, employed to maintain hegemony of the *social agents* in power, where *ideologies* are representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power. (Fairclough, 2003:9) Social agents that construct texts are bound by structural constraints on this process such as grammar, genre conventions and so on. The current thesis sets an aim of examining *what* constitutes, linguistically and thematically, the leading discourses on 'terrorism' and 'Islam'.

The deconstruction of the discourse according to Fairclough should be conducted by deploying the model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA is essentially a form of social research that is applied to answer the question of how *"existing societies provide people with the possibilities and recourses for rich and fulfilling lives, and how, on the other hand, they deny people these possibilities and recourses".* (Fairclough, 2003:202) Translated into the context of this thesis, it

---

[19] A *genre* is defined by Fairclough as a use of language associated with some particular social practice. (Fairclough, 1995b:56, 76)

may be formulated in the following way: how do the powerful social agents in the US supply the leading discourses on 'terrorism' and 'Islam' with their rhetorical power and suppress the influence of their alternatives? These findings are essential to determine the room for social change that would potentially reduce this power misbalance. Textual analysis is a part of CDA which is set to examine dialectical relationship between discourse and social practice[20].

A particular interest of this work is how the coherence of the two concepts expresses itself instrumentally on a textual level. The focus of this thesis lies on uncovering the characteristics of the discursive constructions that make the two concepts mutually compatible. Revealing the components of discursive constructions featuring the two concepts in question assists in uncovering characteristics of the actors sending a message. But more importantly, dismantling the discourse into smaller and larger components is essential for defining the alternatives to these discourses, and thus creating a more balanced view on the social practice in general.

I will thus be dealing with the media *mediation* of the social practice throughout the text, particularly 9/11. The concept of mediation is employed by Fairclough and signifies "*the 'movement of meaning' from one social practice to another, from one event to another, from one text to another.*" (Fairclough, 2003:30) However, I am more inclined to name the process what sociologist Simon Cottle calls *mediatization* – the term constructed to underline the media's active performative involvement and constitutive role. The idea is that the media is not only representing and describing the stories but also creates them and plays an active role in their interpretation. (Cottle, 2006:9)

On a more particular level I am interested in whether there have been changes in the discourse on terrorism throughout six years after September 11th, 2001 as well as the construction of the terrorist enemy, and how the latter concept correlates with the notion of Islam.

1.2.2 THE CONCEPTUAL SETTING: DISCOURSE AND IDENTITY

The concepts of discourse and identity are strikingly interconnected, the cohesion of the two taking root in their respective functions. As Fairclough and others argue, discourse, and language in particular, are not pure reflections of an independent objective world but its vital constituents. Language 'makes' rather than 'finds' (cf. Fairclough, 2003:8; Jackson, 2005: 24; Barker, 2001:29) It constitutes a vital tool that brings about changes to the world and social practice, and at the same time is constituted by social practices.[21] Discourses therefore both contribute to the shaping of social structures and are also shaped by them.

---

[20] Social practice according to Fairclough is the *non-discursive* constituent of the world.
[21] Fairclough sees language and social practice as mutual supplements in a dialectic relationship with each other. (cf. Fairclough, 2003:2) His approach to discourse and social practice has frequently been criticized for the lack of clear guidelines as to how to distinguish between respectively language and social practice, or the discursive and the non-discursive. Fairclough argued on a PhD conference in Copenhagen that this distinction should not be drawn sharply but rather used as an analytical tool to define the frames of discourse and what is beyond the discourse. It is rather Fairclough's way to describe the discourse through the rule of the contrary by introducing the concept of the non-discursive social practice, or in other words describing the discourse through what it is *not*.

If discourse is constitutive for, and constituted by, the social reality, the concept of identity as a social phenomenon is therefore constructed by language and social practice: it is not a universal entity described by the means of the language but rather a specific discursive construction that acquires its meaning through discursive and non-discursive articulation. According to the prominent scholar on identity Stewart Hall, there are no limits to identifying oneself as an individual or as a member of a group: the identification process can go on forever because the discourse is potentially endless. However, for anyone to take action on the basis of identity definition, these identities require a temporary closure of meaning. (Hall, 1993:136-137) The struggle for the hegemony of meaning goes on through the ideological function of discourses that attempt to temporarily fix the unfixable, namely, certain definitions of identity. Identity is therefore not about *being* but rather about *becoming*, constructed by the points of similarity and difference*,* and its processual dimension correlates with the formation of discourses that are also variable and interchangeable in their essence and power.

The selected object of the study – linguistic and social cohesion of 'terrorism' and 'Islam' reflected through text – is stipulated by the general patterns of identity formation, which in this case acquires a form of American collective identity. Identity is mutually constituent with the notion of *difference* as any identity is defined largely by what it is *not*. (Connolly, 2002:xiv) Any definition of 'the Self', whether it is a group or an individual, has to incorporate in itself the notion of 'the Other'[22] to be able to define itself. Jackson argues that American identity is made up of different communities, cultures, religions, language groups, classes and belief systems and that the maintenance of this unity demands a great effort. (Jackson, 2005:85) In the media world, establishing the identities of the 'good guys' and the 'bad guys' is essential to making the national story of America understandable to the wider public, while uncovering the identity of the American Self. (Jackson, 2005:59) Thus, we as individuals or a collective are antagonistically interdependent on 'the Others'. Some of them we frame as someone opposing to us due to irreconcilable differences created both by discourse and social practice. The postulate of 'the Otherness' as a pivotal element in 'the Self'-identity creation is essential for the present study, as this is the major reason to examine the construction of 'the Other', including the radical 'Other'.

The idiosyncrasies of a certain identity should be socially recognized. The social identity, or in this particular case the American collective identity, is reinforced by the creation of the ideology of consensus, which according to Fowler has *"political and ideological motives for conveying approval of a stable, familiar ideology. This is a linguistic practice."* (Fowler, 1993:49-50) Consensus assumes that, for a given grouping of people, it is a matter of fact that the interests of the whole population are undivided, held in common; and that the whole population acknowledges this 'fact' by subscribing to a certain set of beliefs. The curious matter about consensus is that it is entirely built on a set of beliefs or values, not facts. If the facts do not fit the

---

[22] The concepts of '*the Self*' and '*the Other*' with the capital letters will be employed hereafter to signify mutual counterparts necessary for the process of identity creation.

beliefs, Fowler argues, then *"apologists for consensus must make their language work hard to suggest that reality does fit in with belief."* (Fowler, 1993:50)

As a prominent scholar of nationalism Benedict Anderson argues, the formation of the nation states is deeply rooted in sharing the same printed language. (cf. Anderson, 2006:43-46) This postulate reaffirms the power of language in identity creation; group identity as well as an individual one. He believed that the fellow readers who were connected through print *"formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community."* (Anderson, 2006:44) A printed language product for Anderson is not only a book but to an even higher extent a newspaper that he calls an 'extreme form' of the book, a one-day bestseller, or *"a book sold on a colossal scale, but of ephemeral popularity."* (Anderson, 2006:34-35) Anderson saw a ritual in reading of the newspapers, which shaped a community:

"We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed between this hour and that, only this day. It is performed in silent privacy…Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion." (Anderson, 2006:35)

The concept in question for the present work is a notion of a collective identity as I intend to reveal some tendencies in the dynamics of being American. In this respect, a further clarification is required of what I understand as the 'American collective identity'. I have deliberately left out such identity indicators as national, cultural, social etc. as the nature of the present thesis hardly permits imposing these limitations on the collective identity formation that is examined here. There are several reasons for the choice of the term. First, the attribute 'collective' encompasses the cultural, the national and the social, which makes the term capacious enough to draw tendencies in any direction depending on the findings of this work. Secondly, the definition of the term is conditioned by the nature of the antagonist that is examined here – *an 'Islamic' terrorist enemy.* As some of the theoreticians on security applied in this work Ole Waever and Barry Buzan claim, international terrorism shares transnational qualities and penetrates through and around the state structure. (Buzan, Waever, 2003:466) Indeed, the terrorist enemy is projected as a threat common to the West in general, and some of the constructions applicable in the US might equally be applicable to Western Europeans, and therefore are not confined to the frames of the state or national identity but rather to identity of a *Westerner.* In this respect I rather share the focus of Buzan and Waever (2003) on regional security rather than national[23]. In other words, 'American collective identity' is a strategic concept designed to encompass the national, the cultural and the social without categorical confinements to any of those only as such.

---

[23] It should necessarily be noted though that I understand the concept of regions more geo-politically rather than geographically as Waever and Buzan do. Thus, they see the USA as the core-state of the North American region, whereas I am rather inclined to examine it as a core state of the West. (cf. Buzan, Waever, 2003:264). They do acknowledge the US to be a global power, however, their focus in *"Regions and Powers"* lies predominantly on the impact of the geographical proximity on securitization.

Any discursive practice, whether it is a text or an utterance, as an *action* like any other bringing about social changes in our beliefs, our attitudes, our values and knowledge, and inevitably, identity as well. As a famous proverb "a word spoken is past recalling" implies, any utterance or a text has its consequences of different levels of impact. According to this study's principal theoretician of discourse Norman Fairclough, texts can also *"start wars, contribute to changes in education, or change industrial relations and so forth."* (Fairclough, 2003:8) Thus, the leading discourses on 'Islam' and 'terrorism' can also have effect on American collective identity.

My goal is therefore to peel the leading discourses on 'terrorism' and 'Islam' in the US into layers and components, and to define the concept of 'the Otherness' through the cohesion of 'Islam' and 'terror' in order to see how these discourses affect American collective identity.

1.2.3 THESIS QUESTION

In the light of the aforementioned role of discourse on identity creation of 'the Self' and 'the Other', I intend to conduct textual analysis on the basis of the articles on 'Islam' and 'terrorism' in American press. My thesis problem domain has thus two dimensions: a *textual-linguistic* one, encompassing the textual and intertextual features of the selected material, and a *cultural-anthropological* one, which brings into focus the identity creation of the mutually constituent 'the Self' and 'the Other'. Thus, the main question addressed in this thesis can be drawn up very briefly in the following way:

> How do the components of the discourses featuring 'Islam' and 'terrorism' in the post-9/11 period affect, modify or maintain the notion of the terrorist enemy and the notion of American collective identity, respectively?

To preserve the continuity throughout the research the following auxiliary questions will be asked:

> - What discourses are drawn upon in texts featuring 'Islam' and 'terrorism'?
> - How does this cohesion reflect itself in linguistic patterns?
> - What are the trends in the discourses throughout 2001-2008?
> - How does the construction of 'the Other' reveal itself, and how does it affect the notion of 'the Self'?

The main question will be answered by undertaking the textual analysis of the articles in *The Washington Post* as well as by examining them through the prism of the theories on Orientalism and securitization.

1.3   CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Following this introductory first chapter, **Chapter 2** will reveal the methodological underpinnings regarding the selection of the empirical data and constructing the theoretical frame. **Chapter 3** is intended to refine and elaborate on the theories employed, featuring securitization and discourse analytical concepts, including an account for a concept of 'the Other' as well as a few contemplations on objectivity of a socio-constructivist researcher. **Chapter 4** will present the linguistic and thematic analysis of the articles as well as sum up the findings within the chosen temporal frame. **Chapter 5** will examine occurrence and patterns of Orientalistic thought, the antagonist presence of 'Us' and 'Them' – paradigm, and a creation of 'the Other' as a threat. The analysis will feature all of the empirical material involved and will focus on the found trends. In the concluding **Chapter 6** I will point out certain trends in the discursive constructions as well as reveal whether there has been a change in them over time. I will also present my contemplations on how the found results affect American collective identity as well as which consequences this may lead to.

2.0   METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL DATA

2.1   THE OBJECT OF STUDY AND THE EMPIRICAL MATERIAL

A subject of this scale obviously demands carefully thought-through considerations as to the selection of the empirical material and the analytical approach combined with considerable confinement in the topic researched. This chapter will feature selection elements of both the empirical terrain for the thesis and the theoretical frame.

The context of the news has a direct importance for analysing discourse. Being an ideological and social produce, manufacturing news is to a large degree influenced by the framework and concepts of the semiotic theory laid by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. The essence of the theory lies upon the belief that there exists a system of signs between a person and the world, which is a product of a society. These signs reveal themselves through codes, the primary code being language. These codes produce, structure and conceptualize the beliefs about the world. They are not 'naturally' there but are created through the use of these codes such as language, which also has a cognitive function as mentioned earlier. Thus, it is coded in a particular cultural, social and political context that a figure of an elephant can be a picture of an animal or a symbol of the Republican party, although they signify the same object. Thus, the same person may be a 'terrorist' or a 'criminal' but the distinction is made though the application of particular values and beliefs to the words and their context. News reflects, and in return shapes, the prevailing values of a society in a particular historical context. (Fowler, 1993:222) In other words, news is a part of the construction mechanism of our beliefs about the world through language, which makes the news a proper object for analysis.

2.1.1 THE WASHINGTON POST

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDIA BIAS

> *"Reality has a well-known liberal bias"*
> *Stephen Colbert, American Comedian*[24]

One of the largest and prominent American daily newspapers is chosen as a source of the empirical material for the study, namely, *The Washington Post*. Other newspapers are not included for the reason of consistency since different publishing houses might have different agendas, political bias and histories, which inevitably affect their coverage. With *The New York Times* being very liberally biased, and the *The Wall Street Journal* and *Los Angeles Times* leaning towards political conservatism, *The Washington Post* seems to be holding a relative balance within the press tug of war when it comes to striving towards relative political impartiality. That is not to say that *The Washington Post* is impartial but at least the effort towards their official "non-partisan" stand is quite apparent seen in the light of the other major mass media publishing houses.

Media bias is a vital factor to examine since its content is not just 'facts' about the world but rather, as Roger Fowler put it, 'ideas', 'beliefs', 'values' 'propositions', 'theories' and 'ideology'. (Fowler, 1993:1)

Defining the political bias of the newspaper is vital for a proper research as it is a crucial factor for which events are selected for reporting and how they are covered. According to the statistics of the Pew Research Center, almost nine in ten Americans believe members of the media are regularly influenced by their personal views when covering politics.[25] *The Washington Post* attempted to minimize the personal bias in coverage by forbidding its journalists to engage into political activity outside the office on their own time, or take part in any action that would tend to indicate or create bias on the part of the journalist. (Niven, 2002:123-124)

However, completely unbiased coverage is virtually impossible, since the inability to report all of the events requires careful selection of the preferred ones. The processes of selection and transformation are in their turn guided by reference, generally unconscious, to ideas and beliefs. (Fowler, 1993:2) Moreover, framing these events into a narrative makes coverage inevitably partisan. When examining American media texts for the presence of the 'Islam' and 'terrorism' cohesion it is essential to keep in mind that it is an area of foreign policy so the political rhetoric is just as essential to be taken into account. Traditionally American newspapers have been associated with political parties indulging the perspectives of their readers. (Jamieson, 2004:168)

---

[24] Stephen Colbert is American comedian and the host of *The Colbert Report.* The quote is taken from Stephen Colbert's *Speech to White House Correspondents' Dinner, April 30, 2006.*
[25] Pew Research Center, October 15, 2000. Link from 6.06.08:
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=29

In the context of *The Washington Post*, it is often a question of a political bias, liberal and conservative, which constitute the leading discourses on the two concepts of focus in the present work; each with its set of metaphors and rhetoric components. Another factor that produces influence could be personal beliefs and political affiliations of the owner of the publishing house and the journalists, as well as deadlines, settings and size requirements for pieces in the case of the press. Being aware of the possible political bias of a piece or its author serves as a compass for knowing the context for proper deconstruction of the discourse, recognizing the landscape for proper analysis and eventually, decoding the message sender's intentions.

The Washington Post traditionally positions itself as a political non-partisan media. However, it has faced claims from the liberal sources that it leans towards political conservatism.[26] On the other hand, there are allegations about *The Washington Post* having a liberal bias in their news articles and editorials.[27] Traditionally *The Washington Post* has endorsed both liberal politicians as a Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry in 2004, and Republicans such as Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich. Yet, generally it is a common belief that the newspaper has a slightly liberal bias. (Niven, 2002:11)

According to the findings of some researches on the media bias, it seems likely that American media's reporting in general is tilting towards the liberal political wing. One of the recent studies on American media bias by the political scientists Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo showed that all major media outlets tend to incline to the left, even the conservative ones such as the Wall Street Journal.[28] This is not the only study concluding the liberal tilt of the American media. Jim A. Kuypers' research from 2002, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues* based on the examination of 116 US newspapers including *The Washington Post*, showed that the media operates within a narrow range of centrally liberal beliefs. Far left wing-supporters, moderates and Republicans were generally on the periphery in the mass media's positive estimate and got less favorable coverage.[29]

However, one should not underestimate another sort of bias in the media when covering a conflict: a hunt for sensation. As the editor of the weekly magazine Newsweek political commentator John Meacham recently put it on *The Daily Show* with John Stewart, news stories are driven by conflict and not by ideology.[30] "*We are engaged in the story-telling business*", he claims, "*and if you tell the same story again and again, it gets kind of boring…If you look at the covers of Newsweek (…) and newspapers, check out how many marshal imageries are there? The*

[26] *Washington Post: As Usual Bowing to Conservative Power*, The Left Coaster, March 21, 2006. Link from 6.06.08:
http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/007162.php
[27] *Washington Post As Liberal As Ever*, Accuracy in Media website, April 11, 2000. Link from 6.06.08:
http://www.aim.org/media_monitor/A3078_0_2_0_C/
[28] *Media Bias Is Real, Finds UCLA Political Scientist*, UCLA Newsroom. 14.12.2005. Link from 6.06.08:
http://www.newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/Media-Bias-Is-Real-Finds-UCLA-6664.aspx?RelNum=6664
[29] Cf. Jim A. Kuypers "Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues", 2002, Greenwood Publishing Group
[30] Link to video from The Daily Show on 15.06.2008:
http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=148076&title=jon-meacham

war over this, the battle for that, the fight, "X" versus "Y" …because conflict is inherently interesting." Although his claim sounded perhaps too assertive, Meacham certainly did not reinvent the wheel with what he said. Scholars of Islam such as John Esposito and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad have confirmed that "*media has a propensity for the sensational and explosive deadlines.*" (Esposito, Haddad (ed.), 2000:12) Be it a desire for sensation or a political bias that defines a journalistic piece of text, bearing in mind an overall bias of each and every *article* along with the overall political inclinations of the publishing house is important for the analysis[31].

KEY FACTS ON THE WASHINGTON POST

The Washington Post has a great appeal for this study. The newspaper is versatile in terms of the issues and voices and possesses a diversified staff of journalists. It has existed since 1877 and is known for its saturation coverage of the workings on Capitol Hill as well as its reports of the government politics[32]. *The Washington Post* has a daily distribution in the East coast area and a weekly national edition. Most of its readers reside in the areas of the District of Columbia and in the suburbs of Maryland and Northern Virginia. On the scale of circulation numbers *The Washington Post* is the seventh largest daily in the US.[33] According to the Audit Bureau of Circulation, as of ultimo September 2007, the circulation numbers on a working day constitute 635,087, and on a Sunday 894,428.[34] In addition to paper distribution, *The Washington Post* has a quite popular online edition that reaches over 16 million active readers every month.[35]

2.1.2 ARTICLE SELECTION CRITERIA

The textual pieces examined in the study are mainly opinion-loaded editorials and op-eds as well as narratives based on interviews. These types of articles have their merits for the study as all of them are an excellent material to define the leading discourses with their politically correct terms and principal political agenda. Opinion pieces and editorials invite various interpretations and reveal dominant discourses. They perform a symbolic function as being a contrast to the rest of the newspaper sections that are allegedly 'facts' or 'reports'. And most importantly, they employ textual strategies that foreground the speech act or offering 'values' and 'beliefs'. (Fowler, 1993:208-209) They also contain a colourful language that appeals to the readers' emotional state and enables it to serve as an opinion maker. While editorials reflect an official opinion of someone from the editorial board, op-eds do not necessarily do so; it is rather an opinion piece of an outsider that does not always have affiliation to the paper itself.

To structure the process of article selection particular temporal benchmarks have been implemented to guide the study process. These benchmarks feature the events and anniversaries that triggered extra coverage and increased the number of published opinion pieces on terrorism. The temporal benchmarks can roughly be outlined in the following manner:

---

[31] This is especially relevant if the articles' bias *is* different from the one of the publishing house.
[32] This is why a political bias of the newspaper is the major factor to examine.
[33] Link from 6.06.08: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Washington_Post
[34] Link from 6.06.08: http://abcas3.accessabc.com/ecirc/newstitlesearchus.asp
[35] Link from 6.06.08: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/mediacenter/html/about_welcome.html

The first month after September 11th, 2001 featuring emotional accounts and immediate media estimate of the 9/11 events. The timeline for this benchmark is roughly **September 11 –October 14, 2001.**

Every anniversary for the 9/11 events until today throughout the six years in between, as well as the immediate dates around the anniversaries.

The 2004 US presidential race in **the upcoming weeks for the elections on November 2**, 2004, with the foreign policy being on top of the agenda, particularly the 'war on terrorism' and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The most significant terrorist attacks in Western Europe that triggered coverage and opinion pieces in *The Washington Post* such as **the Madrid Train Bombings on March 11, 2004** and **the London bombings on July 7, 2005**.

The recent editorials and opinion pieces on the subject, the last of them dated **January 30, 2008** chosen as a representative of the nowadays debate on Islamic terrorism.

I have deliberately left out the current 2008 presidential race as a benchmark, since the questions of foreign policy this time are giving way mostly to domestic issues such as economic debates, tax cuts, social issues and talks on immigration. Handling of the war in Iraq is high on the electoral agenda as well but it appears to be pretty remote from the general discourse on terrorism at this point of the campaign.

The search process itself was performed on the combination of each of the following words: 'Islam' and its lexical derivative 'Muslim' with 'terrorist' and 'terrorism'. The initial data collection resulted in as many as 1569 articles in *The Washington Post* featuring both 'Islam' and 'terrorism' in the time frame from September 2001 until January 2008. Thus, a careful multistage selection process needed to be implemented when searching for the empirical material. The study will be featuring eleven articles, one of them being section and outlook report, five – editorials and five op-eds. In the course of the selection, over 200 articles were examined for the material, each from 800 to 3500 words long. The number has been cut down to 42 articles that have been examined with greater scrutiny. The final selection of 11 articles was conducted out of this number for further analysis.

 The final number of the articles used as an empirical material was not defined in advance but settled in the process of research as being most representative of the temporal benchmark period to reveal the dynamics of the discourse throughout 2001-2008. The empirical material was sought

to be as diverse as possible in terms of genre (interview, narrative, etc.) and authors, who feature both *The Washington Post* staff writers and independent of the newspaper guests.

2.1.3 INTRODUCTION TO THE ARTICLES

The eleven articles chosen for closer examination in this work cover the period of seven years since 9/11 and are selected with consideration to the diversity of authors and genres. The following articles in chronological order have been chosen for the study:

---

1) *To War, Not to Court*, 12 September 2001, editorial by Charles Krauthammer, 815 words
2) *Terror in the Sky,* 14 September 2001, op-ed by the readers of the newspaper, 888 words
3) *Worse to Come,* 15 September 2001, editorial by William Raspberry, 736 words
4) *'You Never Imagine' A Hijacker Next Door,* 16 September 2001, a section by Joel Achenbach, 3125 words
5) *A Hatred Rooted In Failings,* 16 September 2001, outlook by Caryle Murphy, 1344 words
6) *Faith and Terror,* 11 October 2001, op-ed by Robert Malley, 864 words
7) *Our Crucible Year,* 8 September 2002, editorial by Jim Hoagland, 803 words
8) *A Confessed Bomber's Trail of Terror; Uzbek Details Life With Islamic Radicals, Turn Back to Violence*, 18 September 2003, a section by Peter Baker, 2566 words
9) *From Terrorism to Tolerance,* 6 October 2004, editorial by Jim Hoagland, 807 words
10) *Homegrown Hatred,* 16 July 2005, editorial by Colbert I. King, 767 words
11) *Jihad, Then and Now,* 30 January 2008, op-ed by Geneive Abdo, 982 words

---

I would like to comment on my choice of the articles, so I will quickly refer to each of them with respect to what attracted me in the material as a researcher. A majority of the articles I have chosen are from the two months following 9/11. They present certain interest not only because of their heightened emotional bias and value loaded collocations but also because they revived, reproduced and slightly modified the discourse on terrorism that had been formed in the years before 9/11[36]. The immediate post-9/11 discourse is intensified by a number of carefully reproduced components earlier known in the context of other threats, as well as ornamented by the 'new' elements. The components of the discourse on terrorism that characterize the initial post-9/11 period will be revealed in detail in the analysis section in Chapter 4. With time the tone of the articles, particularly on the anniversaries, gets less emotional and more solid concerning the categorical constructions such as the gap between 'Us' (Americans) and 'Them' (the villains of 'Islamic terrorism'). *The Washington Post* featured less and less articles on remembrance on the anniversary dates of 9/11 with time. Thus, in 2003, 18 articles featuring 'Islam' and 'terrorism' were published on and around the date of September 11, whereas 2005 anniversary had only 7

---

[36] This statement rests on the basis of the examination of the extensive research of a terrorist discourse scholars William Douglass and Joseba Zulaika, "*Terror and Taboo. The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism*", 1996, where he outlines the major characteristics of the discourse on 'terrorism' and 'Islam'. The argument is based on the fact that Douglass' and Zulaika's study was conducted five years prior to 9/11.

articles in the time span of one month around September 11. The year 2003 kicked off a great deal of public scepticism as the 'war on terrorism' and a less metaphorical war in Iraq failed to be successful and had a tightening effect on the civil rights in the US. The scepticism went on through the presidential campaign period in 2004 and culminated in 2005, when the newly re-elected Bush Administration failed to gain satisfactory results in the Iraq war.

I start with an overly patriotic editorial account of Charles Krauthammer "*To War, Not to Court*" from September 12, 2001, which is probably the first emotional reaction immediately after 9/11 in *The Washington Post.* Krauthammer's editorials are a perfect catch for the textual analysis as the author's style is not sparing eloquent superlatives, emotional expressions, and appeals. I would go as far as characterize his piece as the most emotional within the selected articles. Krauthammer revived the military rhetoric and desire for revenge, as well as positioned the enemy in a way which might characterize Americans in a curious manner.

September 14th, 2001, *"Terror in the Sky"* is a collection of the op-ed readers' accounts and sharing of their personal stories, which is essential for creating a collective feeling of victimhood. What caught my attention in particular was that the pieces that seemed to be unmediated and immediate in their composition due to a different genre than the first article, were carefully chosen with a clear support for the official rhetoric, e.g., with their calls for tightening security and going to war against those who disdain 'our' values.

"Worse to Come" from September 15, 2001, by William Raspberry is dwelling on the nature of the 'evil enemy' that Americans should prepare to fight. Raspberry carries on with the military rhetoric that Krauthammer kicked off three days prior to this editorial. However, the overall tone of the piece is less emotional, even though still mourning, but rather contemplative than superlative.

"'You Never Imagine' A Hijacker Next Door" is a section article from September 16, 2001 by *The Washington Post* staff writer Joel Achenbach, which is especially interesting in terms of genre as it gets as close to the fictional narrative as possible. Life stories of some 9/11 terrorists are presented to the reader in a didactic manner, the overall theme being understanding the nature of the enemy.

"A Hatred Rooted in Failings" from the same day is written by Caryle Murphy. It is immediately Muslim-friendly and educates a reader on the issues caused by the failed American international politics, which in their turn cause anti-American sentiments within the Muslim community worldwide. I have chosen this piece to show that an article overly critical of the official actions is still written according to the rules of the official discourse on terrorism and thus reproduces its elements.

"Faith and Terror" from October 11, 2001 by Robert Malley dwells on the nature of Islam as a religion and its alleged inclination to the extremism, revealing interesting textual elements in

terms of discursive constructions. Just as the previous article, it reinforces the dominant discourse on 'terrorism' and 'Islam'.

"Our Crucible Year" from September 8, 2002, is an anniversary editorial by Jim Hoagland. It is interesting because it reveals the dialectic of the discourse throughout the year from 9/11, describing the perpetrators' actions as suddenly mad and irrational in contrast to the earlier theories on enemy conspiracy.

"A Confessed Bomber's Trail of Terror; Uzbek Details Life With Islamic Radicals, Turn Back to Violence" from September 18, 2003 is a section article by Peter Baker which is another anniversary article written as a fictional narrative based on a personal story of a terrorist suspect. I chose this article to examine the development traits of the discourse in the period of the two years after the attacks.

"From Terrorism to Tolerance" from October 6, 2004 is an editorial by Jim Hoagland is chosen as an illustration of the discourse on 'Islam' and 'terrorism' one month before the presidential elections, with the 'war on terror' and American international politics being high on the political agenda. The article describes the conflict as global and highlights the dangerous threats of Wahhabism.

"Homegrown Hatred" from July 16, 2005 is an editorial by Colbert I. King chosen in the context of the recent London bombings which echoed pretty loudly in the American media. The tragic event turned attention to the George W. Bush's handling of the 'war on terror'. A clear emphasis is made on the globalism of the conflict ready to strike other Western nations.

Finally, *"Jihad, Then and Now",* is a book section account of two recent books written on 'terrorism' and 'Islam'. The piece from January 30, 2008 is composed by a researching fellow at The Century Foundation[37] Geneive Abdo and it presents an example of the recent literary discussions on 'Islam' and 'terrorism', reviving the question of whether terrorism is inherent in Islam.

2.2 THEORETICAL AND INVESTIGATIVE TOOLS AND METHODS

As it was mentioned in the first chapter, the current study is not conducted with the aim of revealing the "ultimate" truth about the cohesion of 'Islam' and 'terrorism'. The goal of this thesis is rather to scrutinize the discursive practices where the cohesion takes place. Similarly, there will be no contemplations on the "universal" core meaning of the terms '*Islam'* and study work is concerned with is which context these concepts are used in and how their meaning reveals itself

---

[37] *The Century Foundation* is a non-profit public policy research institution founded on the belief that the prosperity and security of the United States depends on a mix of effective government, open democracy, and free markets. The Foundation is headquartered in New York City and also has an office in Washington, D.C. Its staff, fellows, and authors produce books, reports, papers, pamphlets, and online publications.

within the contextual frame. I am interested in uncovering the components *within* the discourse, their patterns of co-occurrence and effects.

I will immerse myself in the discourses, where 'terrorism' and 'Islam' are parts of one whole and will try to examine whether there is consistency in building the associative ties between the two concepts. I will not cover all existing discourses on terrorism and Islam but only confine my attention to the discourses present in my empiric material.

This study provides an insight into the public opinion as it reflects itself in the press through editorials and op-eds. The fact that the media message, as some of the media scholars would argue[38], is digested differently than initially intended by the media actors should not be underestimated. However it should also be noted that the media hegemony is reproduced through the details of what social actors such as audience members do and say. (Couldry, 2000:4) This basic assumption suggests that media actors and the reading audience are highly interconnected and share a common frame of collective cultural values and beliefs that makes it possible for them to apprehend a particular discourse in a certain manner. The fact that the war on terrorism initially received a wide acceptance within the US society suggests that the media strategies promoting the legitimacy of this war successfully came through. Media embedded discourses, as any discourses by their function, bear ideological messages of the powerful actors in society. This work will omit the official Congressional or the White House rhetoric as its focus lies on exploring American collective attitudes. Those attitudes, however, may be affected by the political messages copied into the language of the press, so I will reserve my right to refer to the political rhetoric detected in the media texts.

2.2.1 RESEARCH TOOLS

Empirical material selection for the study has been conducted through the access to Factiva's electronic media database, with login information being available by the courtesy of the office during my Congressional fellowship on Capitol Hill. Factiva is a division of Dow Jones & Company, which provides business and research information and services for the business and education communities. Their products provide access to more than 10,000 sources, such as newspapers, journals, magazines, news and radio transcripts, from 152 countries in 22 languages, including more than 120 continuously updated newswires. Its search-based products provide searching by free-text as well as subject, publication, language and date range.

---

[38] Such as one of the most prominent scholars in sociology Stewart Hall who introduced a theory of Encoding/Decoding describing the media messages intended, or encoded, and perceived, or decoded. The dominant ideology is typically inscribed as the '*preferred reading*' in a media text, but that this is not automatically adopted by readers. The *social situations* of the audience may lead them to adopt different stances. '*Dominant*' readings are produced by those whose social situation favours the preferred reading; '*negotiated*' readings are produced by those who inflect the preferred reading to take account of their social position; and '*oppositional*' readings are produced by those whose social position puts them into direct conflict with the preferred reading. (cf. Hall, *"Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse"*, University of Birmingham, 1973)

Along with Factiva electronic tools I found Google Scholar and Google News searches very useful with respect to the academic literature search. They allow searches for periodicals and academic literature of relevance both by issues and timelines. It is also worth mentioning that I found Roskilde University's e-library very useful. It gives a whole new practice to the research routine thanks to the sorting tools it provides. One can both perform thematic searches for up-to-date literature (from 1999 onwards) and search for words and phrases throughout the book.

2.2.2 THEORETICAL FRAME

"For a linguist, to describe language without accounting for text is sterile; to describe text without relating it to language is vacuous."

M.A.K. Halliday

An important commentary on the theoretical frame chosen for this study is essential before any further theoretical considerations are revealed. Discourse analysis consolidates a multiple variety of ways and academic traditions: it is thus a method of both linguistic and social research. The modes to perform it in various academic traditions are, however, quite different: while textual analysis tends to disassemble a text into smaller linguistic units and peel it into components, the way of performing the discourse analysis widespread in social science is more of a aggregative nature, revealing trends and tendencies on a larger level than textual and more of philosophical nature.

There is a tendency among some scholars of social science not to give a valid credit to the role of linguistic constructions when analyzing discourse. (Fairclough, 2003:2-3) The working assumption in the present study is originally rooted in M.A.K. Halliday's *systemic functional grammar*[39] postulating that every linguistic formation has its aim, considering a multiple variety of ways to express a single thought. In other words, there must be a reason for framing a clause in a certain way rather than another which gives linguistic tokens an undeniable semiotic significance. Linguistic analysis is therefore not less important to the discourse analysis as the analysis of the social practice, or the chain of social practices, in question. Linguistic study of texts must therefore be viewed in terms of a contribution of smaller language units to the overall meaning of the text. On the basis of this assumption, Fairclough developed a co-called *textually oriented* discourse analysis, which examines text as ideological tool that shapes, and is shaped by, the sociocultural practice.[40] The significance of language is also underlined by Fairclough's assumption that the *use*

---

[39] *Systemic functional grammar* (SFL) is an approach developed in 1960s that views language as network of systems, or interrelated sets of options for making meaning. SFL is concerned primarily with the choices that are made available to speakers of a language by their grammatical systems. These choices are assumed to be meaningful and relate speakers' or writers' intentions to the concrete forms of a language. Traditionally the choices are viewed in terms of either the content or the structure of the language used. (cf. Halliday, 1994) Norman Fairclough who is a leading theoretician of discourse in this study, is strongly inspired by Halliday (Fairclough, 2003:5).
[40] This will be a subject of elaboration in 3.2.1 when components of a discursive event will be reviewed.

of the language is reality-constructing tool[41]: an utterance or text is a contributing element to the social reality, and the other way around. Thus, it is the social practice that is paramount in whether to name the same person a terrorist or a freedom fighter.

Although language is in focus in Fairclough's approach which I am using in the present work, it also draws from social theory and implies interpretative intertextual analysis of social events. Not to confuse the scholars of social science, it is therefore important to highlight that Fairclough's approach to discourse analysis is both deconstructing (textual and descriptive) and aggregative (intertextual and interpretative).

Last but not least, I would like to add that revealing certain linguistic features in textual analysis is not merely a mechanical causality. It is not so that particular features of texts automatically bring about particular changes in people's knowledge or particular social or political effects. (Fairclough, 2003:8) But this does not mean that the texts cannot have casual effects. I go along with Fairclough's beliefs that causal effects of texts do exist, even though lots of other contextual factors may affect their presence or absence, such as different interpretations of texts. (*ibid.*)

2.2.3 THE TWO THEORETICAL CONTINUA

The theoretical frame for the present work can roughly be divided into two mutually supportive and interconnected theoretical themes: **textual discourse analysis** and an ***'Us' versus 'Them' paradigm***. Both of them are larger entities than mere theories and may incorporate different approaches. This serves as a background for my choice of more than one theory or theoretical tools to cover each of the two theoretical themes mentioned. For that matter, and for the grounds of their consistency throughout all of the empirical material, I will call these two theoretical themes *continua.*

The discursive theme rests on the notion of discourse as a constitutive tool of our image of the world, along with the non-discursive elements. This role of discourse as a significant brick in one's outlook makes it a centre of my theoretical focus. To examine and uncover this socially constructive role of discourse I will be implementing tools and methods of textual analysis introduced by a prominent scholar from Lancaster University Norman Fairclough who makes an emphasis on a linguistic approach in the textual analysis. However, as Fairclough himself puts it, *"there is no such thing as a complete and definitive analysis of the text."* (Fairclough, 2003:14) Therefore the template that he suggests[42] is not regarded as a full and definitive analytical tool but will be accompanied by the findings and tools of other scholars of textual analysis according to the context and the theme of each and every article. The rule of the thumb will be implementing Fairclough's analytical template to the empirical texts while ornamenting it with the elements of research, findings and tendencies borrowed from the other scholars of discourse who adhere to the same scientific tradition, such as Richard Jackson, Roger Fowler, Joseba Zulaika and William

---

[41] This postulate is inspired by a French scholar of social science Michael Foucault.
[42] The analysis template developed by Fairclough will be mentioned in the discourse analysis chapter – Chapter 4 and will serve as a backbone for the analytical template for the article analysis.

Douglass.[43] The combination of the Faircloughian theory with these elements will make the theoretical analysis more holistic as I intend to complete the analysis with the components that I see as crucial for this particular empirical context. It must also be said that all of the aforementioned scholars of discourse share the same view on discourse and social reality as being mutually constructive, which makes a combination of their methods plausible.

The second theoretical theme, the *'Us' versus 'Them'* occurrence, is projected through the first continuum and expresses itself through the binary structure of language. This structure implies the existence of a direct opposite to any noun, adjective or verb in the language. (Jackson, 2005:21) If we translate this process to the level of concepts in the empirical material provided we will encounter an opposition of 'Us' and 'Them', or 'The Self' and 'The Other', which is expressed though the textual and intertextual elements and is reflected in, as well as shaped by, the social practice. Examining this dichotomy is paramount to explain certain developments in the present leading discourses on terrorism and identity dynamics. It will include an account of Orientalistic emergence of the image of 'The Other'. Securitization theory[44] developed by the Copenhagen school represented largely by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan will be used as a supporting theory to explain the necessity of reinforcing 'the Self'/'Other' dichotomy in the times of crisis. Since the field is controversial, complex and versatile, I chose not to focus on a particular theoretician but rather cover and trace different stages and paths of Orientalism, including modernization and dependency theories as well as cover the views of critical theoreticians within the field such as Edward Said and Richard Jackson. Finally, the securitization theory will show the discourses through the political prism and will assist me in explaining certain trends in the discourse on 'Islam' and 'terrorism'.

Bearing in mind the aforementioned theoretical themes containing principal trends for this thesis, two theoretical continua emerge:

> o   Discourse continuum expressed through the textual and intertextual analysis.
> o   Orientalistic[45] and securitization continuum based on *'Us' versus 'Them'* paradigm.

The discourse continuum is set to identify both major discourses going on in the media concerning the concepts of 'Islam' and 'terrorism' and trace the linguistic mechanisms that reveal the discourses. On top of this, the discourse continuum will assist me in revealing textual constructions of the language after 9/11, and examine how they have been modified in the leading discourses today.

---

[43] The elements borrowed from the aforementioned scholars can be anything from single analytical tools to different angles of discourses intrinsic to the media discourse on terrorism. For detailed description of how these elements are incorporated see the analytical chapter 4.

[44] Securitization theory is a theory on discursive process of a threat creation (cf. Buzan, 1998).

[45] *Orientalism* is defined by Edward Said as a manner of regularized (or 'Orientalized') writing, vision, and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Western representation of the East. (Said, 1995:2-3)

Orientalistic continuum will reveal elements in the texts, and between them, constitutive of the identities of 'the Self'/Americans and 'the Other'/terrorist. It will also feature securitization theory to explain the essential necessity for the creation of the radical 'Other'.

2.3 THESIS COMPOSITION

A few comments must be made about further composition of the work. Theoretical considerations within the two aforementioned continua will be elaborated on in chapter 3, which will also feature a discussion on a concept of fact or truth as well as some thoughts on the dilemma of objectivity from a researcher's and a journalist's standpoints. Further theoretical details will be incorporated into the analysis chapters themselves, chapters 4 and 5, to be demonstrated by the actual examples from the empirical material.

Chapter 4 will deal entirely with the textual analysis of the articles. The analysis, however, is such a space consuming endeavour that it can hardly be brought here in every detail while featuring all of the eleven articles analysed in the text. To preserve the continuity in the discourse examination throughout 2001-2008, all of the eleven articles must be analyzed for any tendencies to be revealed on the subject. I therefore chose to present the analysis of two articles in the report to demonstrate the nature of the analysis. The rest of the articles will be analysed in a similar manner but not feature in the report text. The discussion of the patterns and trends, however, will be based on the overall analysis of the articles included. The two articles chosen for analysis registered in the body of this work are the first article in the time span chosen (from September 12, 2001) and chronologically the last one on the list (from January 30, 2008). The choice is not only stipulated by the desire to contrast them to each other on the timeline but also by their immediate difference in genre, emotional intensity and style.

Chapter 5 will feature the overall analysis of the articles on the basis of *'Us'* versus *'Them'* opposition on an intertextual level. It will uncover various constructions of 'The Other' and their function.

Contemplations on how the found results may affect the elements in American cultural identity will be wrapping up the thesis.

3.0 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Out of considerations for space, theory and analysis are partly merged in the present work. A few theoretical concepts, however, must be mentioned before the analysis takes place.

3.1 ORIENTALISM AND SECURITIZATION OF 'ISLAMIC TERRORISM'

3.1.1 "US" VERSUS "THEM" PARADIGM

The US official definition of a terrorist under the Federal Criminal Code is a badge of immorality and inhumanity. In Section 2331 of Chapter 113b[46], terrorism[47] is defined as *activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to "human life that… appear to be intended…to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or a government or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping*." This is far from a positive description for anyone exercising all of the above. Its combination with something as alien and as unknown to the traditionally Christian American society as *Islam* distances it even further from the identity concept of being American. Naturally, 'terrorist' in this context becomes a characteristic of 'the Other'; one's creed, one's president, oneself can hardly be a terrorist. (Douglass et al., 1996:13) This construction rests on the contrast of the two mutually opposing entities: the discursive creation of an external 'Other' reinforces the identity of the 'Self'. (Jackson, 2005:59) 'Islamic terrorism' in the discourses of interest for this study is therefore a virtual antagonist to anything that would collectively describe America – an embodiment of wildness and savagery that is so familiar to a broader public due to the existence of the Orientalist[48] conceptual constructions presenting the East as wild, static, savage and fanatical. (Douglass et al., 1996:149) Yet in pre-9/11 period Douglass and Zulaika noticed that the news on terrorism are framed according to a definite world view that opposes countries and cultures within a hierarchy of values in which "we" are at the top and the practitioners of terrorism are at the bottom (*ibid.*, p. 13) This conceptual development has had a very long history taking roots in the ancient Greek view of the East and Asia. (Said, 1995: 55-73) In the writings of philosophers, geographers and historians, and in work of playwrights and poets, the Greeks often contrasted themselves with Asians in rather stark and essentialized terms belonging to entirely different natures. (*ibid.*) Asian states were portrayed as tyrannical and enslaving with their absolute power, whereas the Greeks depicted themselves as "*a*

---

[46] Link from 15.06.08:
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/18/parts/i/chapters/113b/sections/section_2331.html
[47] The word 'terrorism' that was first used in the context of the French Revolution and had a solely positive meaning back then, has moved away from its original sense from describing the state policies to signify individual acts of often irrational destruction. It is also worth mentioning that it has acquired a morally condemning connotation. (Jackson, 2005:24)
[48] *Orientalism* according to Edward Said is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and 'the Occident'.

virtuous, modest people who treasured their liberty above else." (Lockman, 2004:13) The European scholars have applied a similar pattern of portrayal of the East and West extensively since the 15th century. Nowadays, the essence of a religious terrorist in the American mind is highly interdependent with other cultural domains such as behavioural categories, belief systems, and value orientations. According to Douglass and Zulaika, one cannot understand terrorism by looking at the concept alone, "*just as one cannot understand chess through knowing about only one of the pieces of the game.*" (Douglass, 1996:100)

The dichotomy of 'the West and the Rest' has had a long tradition in the history of human thought. These two entities have created, refined and defined each other over the last centuries. (Lockman, 2004:61) Islam has traditionally been a conceptual opposite of Christianity. (Said, 1995:260) Zachary Lockman, a scholar and a critic of Orientalistic thought, traces this dichotomy into our time, highlighting its mutation from *Islam versus Christendom* into *Islam versus the West*, where the West is a complex entity developed over time and Islam is a very distinct civilization belonging to a different historical context frozen in time. (*ibid.*, p.62) In this respect, a dichotomic textual analysis of which entity or concept is set off against the background of respectively 'Islam', 'the West', 'America', 'Christianity' applied to the selected material could prove to be extremely useful in uncovering the traces of Orientalistic thought.

Islam might always have been 'the Other' for the predominantly Christian world. However, in the times of the Middle Ages it was at least considered on the same scale as its European counterpart. The idea of Islam being *inherently* different from the Christian civilizations took root in the 19th century and on. It was then when the notion of *homo islamicus,* a fundamentally distinctive Islamic man with a more or less fixed mindset, totally opposed to the "Western" mentality, evolved. This idea gave birth to the notion of otherness in Islam as it was considered to be a coherent and distinct civilization of its own. As a consequence, many Orientalists assumed that the societal institutions in Islamic world bore the essence of its unchanging and static culture, its firmly set values and ideas, which could only be understood from studying texts from its classical period. So the tradition of studying the Muslim world as it *was* rather than what it *has become* rooted firmly in the minds of the scholars who saw this world as something unchangeable along the borders of time and place. (Lockman, 2005:76)

On the verge of the 20th century the fear of anything pan-Islamic was elevated in the colonial context to the extent that was easily comparable with the fear of the communist conspiracy from the Kremlin in the 1950s. (*ibid.*, p.91) In the middle of the 20th century one of the leading Orientalists Bernard Lewis has prolonged the archaic tradition of viewing Islam as monolithic and basically unchanging distinct civilization, and ignoring the local context. In the light of the Cold War he found it feasible to compare communism and Islam; both were static and collectivistic.[49]

---

[49] Cf. Bernard Lewis "What Went Wrong? Western Impact and the Middle Eastern Response" , 2001, Oxford University Press

Said argued that the notion of Islamic Orientalism would even widen the gap between the wholesale entities of 'Oriental' and 'Occidental'. (Said, 1995: 262-263) Islamic Orientalists described Islam as resistant to change and to mutual comprehension between East and West. The sentiment one gets from Orientalists is that they feared not so much the destruction of the Western civilization as the disappearance of the border between what is ascribed to the Western and the Eastern values. (*ibid.*)

MODERNIZATION THEORY

It was in the times of the Cold War when a curious development in the Orientalistic thought took place on the US scholarly scene in the early 1950s though the 1970s. This was the time when the classical period of Islam ceased to be the primary object of study being replaced by the contemporary state of the Muslim nations. This contemporary state was examined as a process to achieve modernity on a scale from a traditional society to a modern society like the US or Western Europe of the time. (cf. Lockman, 2004:133-138) The distinction took place in a Weberian tradition of contrasting "traditional" societies with "modern" ones.[50] Modernization theory thus embraced the belief in a unilinear process, provided that each contemporary society could be located somewhere on the scale of historical development ranging from tradition to modernity.[51] (*ibid.*) Naturally, such industrially developed nations as the US and Western Europe were the leading nations on the way to modernity while the Muslim nations were clearly backward. There was, thus, only one path to becoming modern – and that was becoming like the US and Western Europe of the 1950s. What the modernization theory and Orientalism had in common though, was their bipolar view of the world. Any possible impetus to move forward had to come from the outside of these societies, meaning it had to come from the West. (*ibid.*, p.136)

DEPENDENCY THEORY

A distinct critique and an alternative to the modernization theory emerged in the form of the dependency theory. One of the initiators of the thought, sociologist Andre Gunder Frank[52] argued that societies could not be examined in isolation with their cultures, social structures and political institutions as if they were independent. One had to see them as a part of one whole global system that has shaped them along the way. Frank offered an explanation to why the third world countries were poor through the employment of the Marxist notion of economic development. He argued that back in the 16th century Asia, Africa and Latin America got incorporated into the global economic system that was designed to drain recourses from them. They rejected modernization theory by claiming that neither Western Europe, nor the US have ever been like Pakistan or

---

[50] Max Weber in his "*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*" (1905) describes *traditional* societies as characterized by kinship, religious affiliation and occupation. Individual's role in a society was largely determined by the status of the family into which he or she was born. Religion and other forms of supernatural belief were culturally dominant, while political power was authoritarian and hierarchical, exercised by monarchs or the nobility. *Modern* societies were largely urban and industrial where rapid social change and economic growth were the norm.
[51] The most influential study of modernization is Daniel Lerner's "*The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*" first published in 1958. Other modernization theory scholars are David McClelland and a historian Walt Whitman Rostow.
[52] Cf. Andre Gunder Frank "Latin America. Underdevelopment or Revolution. Essays on the Development and the Immediate Enemy", 1975, N.Y. Monthly Review Press

Mexico; the poverty of today's underdeveloped countries was actually the outcome of a long history, not a result of their being stuck in some original "traditional" stage. The only way to break out of the state of poverty, Frank argued, was for the states to break the strings of this global economic order and become relatively self-contained. Both development theory and the modernization theory, although mutually opposed, bore one thing in common: they focused on a development process of an Eastern state rather than the classical period deep in its history, as Orientalism did.

ORIENTALISM AND EDWARD SAID

Edward W. Said was one of the harsh contemporary critics of Orientalistic thought. Palestinian of origin, he once used to be the voice of the Palestinian national rights and aspirations as an independent to the PLO's parliament, the Palestine National Council. It is his political engagement that led him to criticize the ways in which Arabs and Muslims were often depicted in the Western media. Being aware of his 'Orientalist' heritage, he called Orientalism a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient[53]. (Said, 1995:2-4) Said drew on the same Foucault tradition as Fairclough in his view of social reality, meaning that he did not believe it was possible to produce objective knowledge about the world. Instead he believed that what steered our notion of reality was a certain way of depicting it through a discourse. This is the feature that differed Said from the critics of Orientalism before him who believed that it was possible to produce accurate knowledge of the Middle East. (Lockman, 2004: 211)In his *Orientalism* (1979), Said criticized the approach of examining the Orient as something inherently different from the West. He argued that the false and romanticized images of Asia and the Middle East created over time in Western culture had served as an implicit justification for Europe and America's colonial and imperial conquest. (Said, 1995:284-285) Said traced the patterns of this distinct representation of the Orient ontologically from the times of the ancient Greeks to the Enlightenment and the 19th century thinkers like Karl Marx and Ernest Renan. His thesis is based on the postulate that Orientalism emerged as a coherent and highly influential *discourse* through the writings and doings of Western travellers, scientists, authors, artists, officials and pilgrims. (Said, 1995:202-203) It expresses itself through the recurring images of "the Arab" as irrational, menacing, untrustworthy, dishonest and barbaric – anything that the West is *not*. This discourse is so powerful, he argues, that even the scholars are often unable to recognize the fact that most of the scientific and fictional texts on the Orient take Europe as the norm, from which the "exotic", "inscrutable" Orient emerges. However, Said's criticism of essentializing applied as much to the Islamic fundamentalist claims as it did to the Western representation of the Orient. (Lockman, 2004:213) Said was not trying to deny the differences between the West and the East but was rather appealing for their nuanced representation free from the Western moulds that have shaped the contemporary discourse.

---

[53] *'The Orient'* is defined as a system of representations framed by political forces that brought the Orient into Western learning. The Orient exists for the West, and is constructed by and in relation to the West, making up an image of the inferior and alien 'Other' to the West.

The notion of contemporary Orientalism, as Said argues, rests on several dogmas. First, the absolute difference between the West, which is rational, developed, humane and superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, underdeveloped, inferior. Secondly, the Orient is eternal, uniform and incapable of defining itself. Last but not least, from the Western point of view, the Orient is either something to be feared or to be controlled. (Said, 1995:300-301)

The consequence of these constructions, as Said argues, is the appearance of a tradition due to the reality-creating function of discourse. This tradition is what Foucault would call a discourse, *"whose material presence and weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it."* (Said, 1995:94) This discourse, as Said clarifies, is not only a cultural matter but a distinct political doctrine created by the West which transformed itself *"from being textual and contemplative into being administrative, economic, and even military."* (Said, 1995: 204; 210)

3.1.2 CONSTRUCTING A THREAT

It can hardly be argued against the fact that in the West, Islam is interpreted as a threat against Western values and civilization. (Said, 1995:216) In our part of the world this assumption rests on the foundation that partly comes of the legacy of the antique Greek and Roman world, and partly of the Christian and Jewish tradition. (Simonsen, 2001:7) Historically, America has employed on a discourse of threat and danger on several occasions to maintain the integrity of the American nation as an 'imagined community'; the image of the radical 'Other' was shared along the historical trajectory by the 'red' Indians, the communist Soviet states in the 1950s, 'rogue states' like Libya, Panama, Iran, North Korea and Iraq, illegal immigrants from Haiti or Latin America. The discourse on the threat of Islamic terrorism, which Jackson ironically denominates the 'green scare', is another social fear that serves as a tool for maintaining the boundaries between 'the Self' and 'the Other'. (Jackson, 2005:114) These discourses, as he quite rightfully argues, are *"employed continually to 'write' American identity and to enforce a disciplined unity on the US."* (*ibid.*)

Generating threat is thus a powerful identity-creating tool as it is based on creating a consensus in the community. This consensus in its turn assumes that within a group, there is no difference or disunity in the interests and values of any of the population or an institution. (Fowler, 1993:49) Another function of a public threat-creation is defined by Jackson as distracting the public from the more complex social issues. (Jackson, 2005:117) Indeed, the death toll of uninsured Americans according to Families USA for 2006 shows shocking numbers – 22000.[54] It is more than seven times higher than the number of those who died in 9/11 attacks.[55] The fear of terrorists, although elevated to unreasonable scale, is a sure move for policy makers: every attack confirms the fear and gives space for implementing more preventive measures. Threat is a powerful political tool:

---

[54] Link from 15.06.2008: http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/uninsured/publications/dying-for-coverage.html
[55] 9/11 attacks killed 2,993 people including the hijackers.

terrorism is greatly feared in our society because the 'discourse of danger' is penetrating the public rhetoric. (Jackson, 2005:94)

Douglass and Zulaika rightfully urge to distinguish between a verbalization of a threat and an actual deed or occurrence. Threats are statements of purpose rather than empirical facts. *"A threat of a murder and an actual homicide are two divergent phenomena. Since threats refer to subjective intentions their objectivity rests upon the interpretation given to them."* (Douglass et.al., 1996:85) Hypothetically, anything can happen. Threat is thus not an entity that can be related to truth; it invites a great variety of heterogeneous interpretations which the threat creating actors draw upon.

DISCOURSE AND SECURITIZATION

The discourse on terror is designed to generate fear and constructs a notion of a threat through a speech act or text. One of the leading theories on the threat construction, the *securitization theory* developed by the Copenhagen school and their leading theoreticians Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, examines the process and aim of the elevation of fear. The traditional theories prior to it examined a threat as a neutral concept and saw it as a consequence of objective easily definable danger. Moreover, traditional ways of seeing security were studied through the lens of military security of a state, putting the political facet of threat out of the question.[56] A military threat was undoubtedly to be dealt with in a military way. What is groundbreaking about the securitization theory is that it is applicable to the threats *discursively* constructed, and thus not *only* obvious or real in a factual military sense of the word.[57] (Buzan et al., 1998:4) As Buzan and Waever argue, the issue of whether a certain object is in fact a 'threat' is not the focus of this theory; the focus is on *when* and *under what conditions who* securitizes *what* issue. (Buzan et al., 2003:71) They also argue that "security" is a self-referential object, since it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue, *"not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat."* (Buzan et al., 1998:24-25)

Waever outlined the basics of the theory in his article *Securitization and Desecuritization* (1995). He defined the process of securitization as a *speech act* where the existential threat is produced in relation to a *referent object* that is actualized and presented as highly problematic. Security action is normally taken on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity. The securitizing actors, who are normally state officials and in some cases of the present empirical material are journalists, construct a problem though various discourses to legitimize a certain move with the public. If the securitization has been successful and the public accepts the threat as 'real', the topic becomes a strong political tool for the securitizing actors to use. (Waever, 1995:54) The actors often advocate for their cause on the level of national security, which elevates the risk of being publicly criticized for their actions. In that case the actors redirect the discourse into something else which is widely

---

[56] It should be noted though, that in their latest work Buzan and Waever see a pattern in the US for securitizing all major new threats as military ones. (Buzan et al., 2003:298)

[57] As most theoreticians in this study, Buzan and Waever are inspired by Michael Foucault's postulate that a text or a speech act is a reality constructive tool. A threat, thus, acquires its existence when mentioned or written.

accepted by the public. (Waever, 1995:57) For example, calling the perpetrators of 9/11 criminals would have legitimized a legal punishment only and would hardly have given way to conducting the 'war on terror', which has only been possible through framing them as 'warriors' and 'terrorists'. According to Jackson, the current fear of terrorism did not begin with 9/11 but rather in the early 1980s when officials started to apply the term 'terrorism' to acts of violence that they had previously called hijackings, bombings, kidnappings and sabotage. (Jackson, 2005:95)

In contrast to the traditional approaches to the security studies, Buzan et al. distinguishes between five sectors[58] of security: an environmental, military, economic, political and a societal security. (cf. Buzan et al., 1998:vii) The latter is a special focus in this work as it deals with the issues of public identity. It appears when *"significant groups within a society feel threatened, feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves."* (Waever,1995:67) In the case of this study, the group that feels threatened is American society as a whole. Securitization is thus subject to cultural factors that might be unique to certain political contexts. Societal security is inevitably identity-constructing as it features threats to a group identifying itself as a 'we' – and thereby actually contributes to a construction of 'us'. (Buzan, 1998:120) Even though the societal sector is central for the present thesis, a political sector also has relevance to it. Typically, political security is about giving or denying recognition, support, or legitimacy. Its referent object is usually a sovereign state and a government will usually be a securitizing actor. (Buzan et al., 1998:142-146) Since the media rhetoric often repeats the rhetoric of the government as it will be demonstrated in the analysis section, the political sector has a secondary but still crucial relevance to the analysis.

Not any threat or vulnerability qualifies to count as a security issue; they have to meet a number of strictly defined requirements to do so. A successful securitization act involves a package of constructing an existential threat to the point of no return and defining a necessary way out; all that provided that the audience accepts the issue as a security issue (Buzan et al., 1998:5, 25-26, 32-33) It is thus a method that has moved out of normal politics and operates on the domain of the emergency politics where normal democratic rules are often avoided and the swiftness of action is presented as paramount. The further requirements are the status of the securitizing actor that has to have authority in position to the audience to perform the process and bringing out the attributes of a threat that are familiar to the public through other similar threats. In securitizing terrorism, the latter is normally done through the comparison to the World Was II or the communist USSR. According to Buzan and Waever, terrorism had primarily found high-politics expression by being packaged together with 'rogue states' and nuclear proliferation. (Buzan et al., 2003:297) Similarly, Jackson traces comparisons of the terrorist threat to the communist enemy of the McCarthy era: *"the construction of the numerous threats and dangers implies that the terrorists could do what the Soviet Union failed to achieve over forty years of trying: they want to turn America into pure Islamic state similar to Afghanistan under Taliban."* (Jackson, 2005:99)

---

[58] *Sectors* are defined as distinctive arenas of discourse in which variety of different values (sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability and so on) can be the focus of power struggles. (Buzan et al., 1998:196)

As Buzan and Waever frame it, the securitizing actor convinces the audience of the inevitability and therefore *"claims a right to use extraordinary means to break normal rules, for reasons of security."* (Buzan et al., 2003:71) The security arguments are generally about the future- that is about outlining what will happen if certain preventive measures are not employed. They usually come in two forms: (1) what will happen if suggested procedures will not be realized and (2) what will happen if they are realized. (Buzan et al., 1998:32) The methodological underpinnings of the theory do not include a *de-construction* of the discourse as Faircloughian method implies, but are set out to answer key questions of security analysis that are aimed at uncovering who securitizes what in the name of what.

How securitization is performed in the given context and what it does is the issue to be examined in Chapter 5.1.2

3.2 CONCEPTUAL SETTING FOR CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

As Fairclough argues along with colleague Lilie Chouliaraki, CDA begins with the notion that there exists a discourse-related problem in some part of social life. (Chouliaraki et al., 1999:60) To better understand the cohesion of the discourse and social reality as well as CDA's relevance for the two, dimensions of a discursive event need to be introduced.

3.2.1 TEXT, DISCOURSE PRACTICE AND SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICE

In his works Fairclough employs three concepts to identify the field of research for CDA. He argues that all three of them simultaneously constitute any discursive 'event'. (cf. Fairclough, 1998:4) These three dimensions are *text, discourse practice* and *socio-cultural practice* which I also call 'social reality'.

Text is a written or oral piece that a discourse practice is manifested through. *Discourse practices* according to Fairclough are the processes of production, distribution and interpretation of a text. And *sociocultural practice* is a sociocultural setting which the event is a part of. (Fairclough, 1995b:57) A term *practice* deserves a further comment. According to Fairclough and Chouliaraki it is defined as a habitualized way *"tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources (…) to act together in the world."* (Chouliaraki et al., 1999:21)

A text is analysed by the means of linguistic analysis with the major focus on vocabulary and semantics, the grammar of sentences and smaller units. Linguistic analysis is thus concerned with the meanings and forms of texts. These meanings are potentially heterogeneous, so texts are usually subject to multiple interpretations. (Fairclough, 1998:75) As mentioned above I am accepting Fairclough's working assumption that the difference in meaning will most likely result in the difference in form. (Fairclough, 1995b:57-58)

The main idea of these three components is that the discourse practice is *the mediator* between the textual and the sociocultural and contains the characteristics of the other two. Critical

Discourse Analysis therefore brings a variety of theories into dialogue: especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other. (Chouliaraki et al., 1999:16) This mediating function of discourse makes it the focus for the analysis in this study, since it serves as the 'glue' between language and social practice. Critical discourse analysis is essential to reveal the ways of representing an issue, from grammatical features to sociocultural factors concerning a practice described.

Text

Discourse
Practice

Socio-
cultural
Practice

Figure 1: Fairclough's representation of the three dimensions of discourse

Along with the three dimensions of analysing an event, Fairclough distinguishes between linguistic analysis and discourse analysis, the former being a part of the latter. Linguistic analysis, he argues, focuses on texts, while discourse analysis is concerned with sociocultural as well as discourse practices *and* texts. (Fairclough, 1995b:16-19)

Fairclough distinguishes further between the linguistic analysis and the intertextual analysis; the latter focusing on the borderline between text and discourse practice searching for the traces of discourse practice in a text. Linguistic analysis is descriptive, while intertextual analysis is more interpretative. *"Linguistic analysis is closer to what is 'there' on paper while intertextual analysis is at one remove in abstraction from it,"* Fairclough explains. (Fairclough, 1995b:61) Thus, the latter is more dependent on the sociocultural practices and is a vital link between a text and sociocultural practices. Both analyses will be performed in the present work.

3.2.2 POWER IN DISCOURSE AND MEDIA

> *"The myth of free speech, that anyone is 'free' to say what they like,
> is an amazingly powerful one, given the actuality of a plethora of
> constraints on access to various sorts of speech, and writing."*[59]
>
> *Norman Fairclough*

Long before 9/11Douglass and Zulaika (1996) conducted a study on the discourse of terrorism triggered by a curious question, namely, what the cultural premises and discursive strategies were that provided terrorism with its rhetorical power. Thus, discourse on terrorism was already on the track of domination seven years before the 9/11 attacks. Later they uncovered rhetorical mechanisms and metaphorical components of the discourses on terrorism that can easily be traced today. In Faircloughian terms, one could say that the current discourse on terrorism is an ideology[60] trigger.

Fairclough's CDA is based on a Marxist, and later Gramscian, notion of unequal power relations in a capitalist society as they reveal themselves in, and are constructed by, the hierarchy of discourses. Fairclough's belief is that discourses produce and reproduce inequality in social- and power relations. This is achieved through the power of discourse of being an ideological instrument. A prominent scholar of terrorism discourse Richard Jackson shares this view claiming that there is a two-way connection between the power of discourse and social and institutional domination. *"Discursive practices",* he claims, *"are never neutral and therefore contribute to the reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups."* (Jackson, 2005:24)

To conduct the war in Iraq the Bush Administration had to persuade the society that such venture is necessary for the government, though it required enormous funds and risk of lives of American citizens. However, Jackson claims, this requires a construction of "*a whole new language, a public narrative that manufactures approval and suppresses individual doubts.*" (Jackson, 2005:1) The language, he goes on, is composed in a favourable way for authorities and legitimises the current counter-terrorism approach, empowers the authorities and shield them from criticism, marginalizes protest (and alternative discourses) and enforces national unity by reifying a narrow concept of national identity (*ibid.*, p.2). Just as Fairclough (1998), Jackson believes that language and practice mutually reinforce and reconstruct each other. Thus, for instance, the notorious metaphor 'war on terror' is *"also a set of actual practices – wars, covert operations, agencies, institutions"*, carefully enriched by such elements as assumptions, beliefs, justifications and narratives. (Jackson, 2005:8) Fairclough argues too that the militarization of discourses is also a militarization of thought and social practice. (Fairclough, 1998:195)

---

[59] Norman Fairclough "Language and Power" 1998, p. 64, Longman, New York
[60] Ideologies according to Fairclough are propositions that generally figure as implicit assumptions in texts. (Fairclough, 1995b:14)

While the political power is often exercised by an alliance of capitalists and many professional workers (in Faircloughian terms- *the dominant bloc*), the institutional practices are a stronger ideological weapon, as people often draw upon them unconsciously. Both Fairclough and Jackson argue that institutional practices are dominant because of their discursively established assumptions that legitimize power relations. (Fairclough, 1998:33; Jackson, 2005:21) In fact, as Jackson argues, the political actors have a few ways of communicating their agenda to the population, the media being the primary and the major channel for the transmission of it. (Jackson, 2005:165) He also claims that three roles are reserved to the media:

- an agenda-setting role (determining the most important issues)
- a priming role (signalling and preparing the public to receive messages about those issues)
- an evaluative role (offering or implying solutions). (*ibid.*)

However, both news coverage and opinion pieces are heavily conditioned on the "news frames" that bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments. According to Oxford scholars of media Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman, the frames shape what a reader knows, understands, and believes about the world because they generally determine the content of news. (Jamieson, 2004:xii) Thus, frames largely include some things and exclude others, describing the way the information is arranged in news stories. They inform us on what is important and what the range of acceptable debate on a topic is. By choosing a common frame journalists shape public opinion. (*ibid.*, p. xiii) Scholar Robert Entman defined the following functions of the frames. (Entman, 1993:51-58) News frames:

- *define problems,* which is a general evaluation of costs and benefits of an action, usually in terms of common cultural values
- *diagnose causes,* which is identifying the forces creating a problem
  make moral judgements, which means evaluation of casual agents and their effects
- *suggest remedies,* which is suggesting a solution to the problems and predicting their effects.

To better understand the link of the governmental officials who form a leading discourse with the media world, it is vital to examine a typical process of news making. In our global communication age of instant access to information as well as rising competition between the publishing houses, journalist experience extra performance pressure. Their task is to provide a maximum account of events within the minimum period of time. Naturally, it is cheaper and faster for them to consult governmental information officers when working on a news story than make an independent research *ab inito.* Traditionally, the official sources are considered to be credible and reliable in the media world. As Jackson puts it, "*the media principle of 'objective reporting' requires consulting government officials."* (Jackson, 2005:168) He also argues that a climate of intimidation was created among the journalists to provide favourable coverage to the Administration's handling of the 'war on terrorism' with consequent threats to cut governmental official consulting if they fail to do so. The consequences of such state of affairs were clear: the media "*responded to*

the crisis with a great deal of patriotism, self-censorship and sensitivity to public opinion." (*ibid.*, p. 170) Jamieson and Waldman argue that the press has taken up a patriotic frame in covering the events of 9/11, taking the U.S. leaders for their word and automatically assessing their motives as honourable and overseeing the missteps. (Jamieson, 2004:xv)

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, reporters and the government were participating in the common endeavour to unify the citizenry, reassert the strength of democracy and America as well as memorizing the victims.

As a matter of fact, a number of studies on the terrorism discourse suggest that the media 'translate' the official discourse on terrorism into screens and pages in a pretty unmediated manner. (Jackson (2005), Brigitte Nacos (2007), Douglass and Zulaika (1996), Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2003)) Some of them, such as professor of communication at California State Polytechnic University Oliver Boyd-Barrett, would directly suggest that media has copied the administration's language word for word and "*manipulated history to eliminate information that might undermine public support for the Administration.*" (David Demers (ed.), 2003:18-20)

If the newsmakers inevitably draw on existing political discourses, does not it make them mediators of the dominant bloc's message to the public? Fairclough goes beyond this question and asks whether the social relations between journalists and audiences could be social relations between rulers and ruled rather than between journalists and audiences. (Fairclough, 2003:85) Fairclough's answer is 'yes'. The media discourse is particularly interesting since it mediates the power of the dominating bloc through systematic tendencies in the language. (Fairclough, 1998: 49-54) *"The reporter is projected as a figure of authority, someone who knows (has 'the facts'), and someone who has the right to tell."* (Fairclough, 1995(b):4)

If we take a closer look at the articles chosen for empirical material in this study, we encounter that some of the articles chosen from *The Washington Post*, and most of those examined by me in the given period, appear to be Muslim-friendly, including the op-eds composed by Muslim and Arab authors. The paradox is, however, that even when given the public voice, those Muslims still remain inherently powerless in comparison to the powerful officials, since the language they employ is the language constructed by the dominant bloc. This paradox was underlined by a scholar of media discourse Roger Fowler. (1991:126) The power relations, he argues, are permanently encoded into the discourse. In our case, for instance, Muslims themselves categorize themselves as 'Muslims' and 'Arabs' in contrast to the Western man following the lines of the familiar discourse. The implementation of another kind of language for this matter would seem to be 'inappropriate' and would be a cacophony for the readers' MR.

The overall concept of power of the *dominant bloc* is closely tied with the concept of hegemony, based on Marxist ideas and developed by Antonio Gramsci. This concept is central to understanding one discourse's ongoing domination over the other. Once set into function, the discourses maintain themselves through institutional practices, imposing the ideals of the

dominant bloc on the populace through education, publication and other forms of mediation. Gramsci's concept of hegemony primarily applied to social classes in a society. However, as I have noticed before, language reinforces practice, and vice versa, hence, these power relations can be translated on the hierarchy of discourses. (Fairclough, 1995a: 41) CDA is thus employed to uncover the underlying relations of dominance in the language of those who are responsible for the inequalities. Scholars who use this method therefore often choose the perspectives of the suppressed voices. A key aim of this study is thus to uncover the discursive practices used to maintain hegemony.

Last but not least, I will quote a London-based columnist who specializes in topics dealing with the future of Islam, Ziauddin Sardar, who truthfully predicted the importance of the informative power a couple of decades ago. "*In the next few decades,*" he argues, "*information technologies will become the basic tools for manipulation and control; access to information will become the decisive factor between those who will command real power and those who will simply be manipulated and made to serve as subject people.*" (Sardar, 1988:3) This quote essentially summarizes the power misbalance which is articulated in the CDA.

3.2.3 LINGUISTIC AND THEMATIC PARALLELS

 "*I'm feeling what my six million fellow American Muslims are feeling -- the fear that we too will be considered guilty in the eyes of America, if it turns out that the madmen behind this terrorism were Muslim.*"[61]   These were the words of Reshma Memon Yaqub, a journalist from Montgomery County, just two days after 9/11, in The Washington Post's op-ed. This fear of hers did not just come out of the blue. It emerged as a set of conceptual cohesion through her interpretation of the act of terrorism and anything that would associatively relate to it, which in the current case is 'Muslim'. A message is perceived through a particular interpretation. As Norman Fairclough methodically puts it,

"*You arrive at an interpretation through an active process of matching features of the utterance at various levels with representations you have stored in your long-term memory. These representations are prototypes for a very diverse collection of things – the shapes of words, the grammatical forms of sentences, the typical structure of a narrative, the properties of types of object and person, the expected sequence of events in a particular situation type, and so forth.*" (Fairclough, 1998: 11)

These prototypes, according to Fairclough, are to be called "members' resources", or MR for short. MR are socially determined and ideologically shaped. They can also be linguistic, which will have relevance to this study, and non-linguistic. Linguistic MR are social in the sense that whenever people speak or listen or write or read, they do so in ways which are determined socially and have social effects. The MR that people draw upon throughout text interpretation

---

[61] *I'm Not the Enemy,* The Washington Post. September 13, 2001. Op-ed by Reshma Memon Yaqub

processes are their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on. This is not to say that social realities are solely linguistically constructed; discourse analysis is just one way of exploring social reality. The latter also includes social interaction, relations of persons with their beliefs and attitudes and the material world itself. (Fairclough, 2003:25)

Textual analysis as a particular form of discourse analysis is dealing with productive and interpretative processes, which makes the media discourse specially interesting. As Fairclough frames it, the idiosyncrasy of the media discourse is its 'one-sidedness', especially in writing, where the division between producers and interpreters is very sharp. *"Media producers,* he says, *address an **ideal subject**, be it viewer, or listener, or reader."* (Fairclough, 1998:49) Thus, the media is shaping attitudes of Americans on a collective assumption of what unites them as Americans and what is, according to the media, in their best interest.

According to Fairclough, textual analysis is not to be reduced to linguistic analysis, although an emphasis on grammatical and semantic analysis is vital. It should also be accompanied by a so-called 'interdiscursive analysis' which examines texts in terms of the different discourses, genres and styles they draw upon and articulate together. (Fairclough, 2003:3)

To capture the nature of discourses, Fairclough argues, it is pivotal to examine more than one text for tendencies, since the hidden power of media discourse and the capacity of power-holders to exercise this power depend on systematic tendencies in news reporting and other media activities. "*A single text on its own is quite insignificant: the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the reader, and so forth.*" (Fairclough, 1998:54) To employ Jackson's colourful metaphor, it is essential to look at 'a forest rather than individual trees' to make sense of the terrain. (Jackson, 2005:153) My aim is to uncover these tendencies throughout a careful analysis of various types of texts produced over certain period of time. Thus, two parallels will be followed in the CDA of the articles, a linguistic, and a discursive (or thematic one). These two parallels reflect two facets of CDA: a de-constructional linguistic analysis and an aggregative analysis familiar to us more from the field of social science.

Linguistic parallel will deal with the grammatical, syntactic, morphological and lexical patterns in texts, whereas interdiscursive analysis will feature elements that characterize a text as a whole as well as position it in the light of other texts. To use a Faircloughian term, the linguistic parallel will deal with the *internal relationships* in the text. (Fairclough, 2003:36) A detailed template for linguistic analysis is described in chapter 4.1.1.

External relationships of a text will be examined in a **thematic parallel** of the analysis dealing with the text as an entity and looking at its larger components, for example in terms of discourses involved or assumptions made. The aim is also to position the text in a relationship with other texts on the issue, for instance occurrence of actual elements of other texts within a current text

such as quotations and reported speech, and the relationship of other texts within the order of discourse[62] with the text in question.

3.3 WRITING NEWS: TRUTH OR FICTION?

The nature of a journalistic text is inevitably selective: what is 'said' in a text is presented against the background of what is 'unsaid', but rather taken for granted. News reports are carefully knitted of a sequence of mutually related events, reducing their complexity to those events that have logically clear correlation with the story. As Fairclough frames it,

 "Producing news stories is more fundamentally a matter of construing what may be fragmentary and ill-defined happenings as distinct and separate events, including certain happenings and excluding others, as well as setting these constructed events into particular relations with each other. Making news is a heavily interpretative and constructive process, not simply a report of the 'facts'." (Fairclough, 2003:85)

What is implied here is that news making business is a game of Chinese whispers, where interpretation of the events and the creation of a narrative is a skill of the newsmakers[63]. On top of all this, it is hardly arguable that the tragic events of 9/11 did seem to be unreal. In fact, they constituted the merging of the imaginary or fictional and real worlds, plunging people into a state of disbelief. "*It was even more 'real' than a movie*", Jackson argues. (Jackson, 2005:30) Rose Dyson, a president of Rose Dyson and Associates, a media education consulting firm, conducted a critical research on the relevance of popular violent culture to the concept of Islamic terrorism. She counted as many as 270 or so terrorist films featuring Arabs as villains produced and distributed out of Hollywood in the last two decades alone. What worries Dyson the most is that these films "*promote the racism of the 1980s films in a kinder, gentler multicultural disguise*." (Dyson in Demers (ed.), 2003: 38) The effects of these films which are deeply rooted in most Americans' MR come out subconsciously in *force majeure* contexts such as 9/11.

Zulaika and Douglass who conducted a brilliant pre- 9/11 study on the discourse on terrorism share Fairclough's scepticism about the news narrative often merging with the genre of fiction. Their research in my view is an impeccable essay which is a pleasure to read. However, it is less 'text oriented' than Faircloughian work and more sociologically and philosophically biased than the current study. Still, they cover some interesting points which I will frequently incorporate in my work. The scholars initiate a whole discussion of the terrorism discourse as a genre and its relationship to the fictional. "*There is a blurring line*," they claim, *"between fact and fiction in ostensibly objective journalistic reporting. (…)Hence the novel's plot of intrigue and the journalist's political discourse collapse into the monolithic frame that we have labelled contemporary terrorism discourse."* (Douglass et al., 1996:48)

---

[62] Borrowed from Foucault, the concept of the *order of discourse* of some social domain signifies *"the totality of its discursive practices, and the relationships...between them."* (Fairclough, 1995a: 132).
[63] As I shall show later, the newsmakers interpretation is not unconditional.

However, this is where the inevitable question arises: how shall we define the 'truth', or a 'fact', or the true set of the events, in a socially-constructed environment? As it was mentioned earlier, in socio-constructivism there is no ultimate truth; there are rather "truths". Fairclough argues, that the relationship between the factual events and the events represented in the media is to be deduced from the mutual relationship of various texts on the same subject: "*Rather than comparing the truth about an event with how it is represented in particular texts, one can see it in terms of comparison between different representations of the same or broadly similar events.*" (Fairclough, 2003:135)

My problem with this statement is though that each of those different representations is another semi-fictional narrative based on highlighting certain events and downplaying, or simply excluding, others. I am more inclined to share the view of a prominent Berkeley scholar George Lakoff. Being a classic socio-constructivist, he argues that truth is a function of our conceptual system. In other words, we see statements true or false depending on our system of concepts which we apply to a situation or a statement. Truth is therefore always relative to our conceptual system. "*We are able to make true (or false) statements about the world because it is possible for our understanding of the situation in which the statement is made.*" (Lakoff, 1980:180) He goes on saying that our conceptual system is not only a product of our own experience but is an entity that is constantly being tested "*through ongoing successful functioning by all the members of our culture*" (*ibid.*, p. 180), which makes our MR that I have mentioned earlier, dependent on collective cultural assumptions about the state of affairs. The aforementioned fear of Reshma Memon Yaqub that the terrorists might be Muslim, is a product of her conceptual system, which is an amalgam of her own experience and collective subconscious 'endorsement' of the surrounding society.

What we deem to be a fact and which facts we deem to be significant involves making choices, which again means interpretation and judgement based on our outlook.

3.4 THE OBJECTIVITY AND BIAS DILEMMA

> *"Dispassionate objectivity is itself a passion, for the real and for the truth."*
> *Abraham Maslow, American Psychologist*

The three aforementioned theories building up the two continua are not entirely independent of each other. All of the theoreticians I have chosen to refer to within the aforementioned fields of study have one thing in common: their socioconstructivist scientific approach, which will prevail throughout the study. Thus, regarding the field of Orientalism[64] I will refer to Edward Said rather than, for example, a similarly prominent scholar Bernard Lewis who uses an essentialist approach to understanding cultural differences. I am well aware that this approach will give me poor

opportunities for criticism within the theories, since I am intentionally leaving out the theoreticians that do not take a socio-constructivist stand as I do in this work. However, sticking to the theoreticians that are useful for my study and leaving out the supporters of the 'essentialist' stand is also a sort of critical approach in itself.

Socioconstructivist stand allows me to put an extra emphasis on its processual dimension as it correlates with the processual dimension in my thesis question. This postulate rests on the assumption that sociocultural reality is seen as an ongoing, dynamic process and a major aim of socioconstructivism is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived social reality. This is exactly what I intend to do through revealing the components of the leading discourses. As Peter Manicas, Professor of Philosophy Emeritus from University of Hawaii put it, "*as with the natural sciences, the task of the social sciences is understanding how social mechanisms structure, but do not determine, outcomes.*" (Manicas, 2002:3)

When exploring the idea of truth George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argued that there was no such concept as an absolute objective truth but rather *truths*. The concept of the objective truth in their view was "*not only mistaken but socially and politically dangerous*." (Lakoff, Johnson, 1980:159)

It is hard to disagree with Lakoff's statement. Social constructivism, however, is not that unproblematic to the question of academic objectivity. According to a prominent scholar of post-modernism Pauline Marie Rosenau, the term "multiple realities" is popular with postmodernists to capture the different experiences that people have, but also to suggest that there is no privileged account of reality (Rosenau, 1992:80) Indeed, this presents a problem as any preference of one account over the other is a subjective action in itself. Since different realities are experienced differently, there is a problem of knowing which account should be more valid than the other. By adopting measurement or estimating values one automatically adopts particular moral or political stand, often being unaware of this.

In the scholarly world where objectivity is a value in itself, is it possible for a student of socially-constructed environment to be objective? No student is outside the context of social phenomena; there is always some kind of involvement in, or a connection to, the subject of research. There is always an agenda to test one's own assumptions and questions, which might easily be rooted in one's ethical values. Hence, there is no complete impartiality. According to Norman Fairclough, textual analysis is also inevitably selective: "*in any analysis, we choose to ask certain questions about social events and texts.*" (Fairclough, 2003:14) As much as scholars strive to be impartial along the lines of the tradition of academic research, they will always be biased in their selection of information, empirical material, supporting arguments and points to be tested. As Douglass and Zulaika put it, "*'terrorism'[65] possesses such great power that the terrorism writer must be*

---

[65] That is, the "discourse on terrorism" – my own explanatory note.

prepared to "be written" by the discourse. Any claim of neutrality for one's own writing appears most illusory when dealing with a topic that evokes such apocalyptic fears." (Douglass et al., 1996:61)

Thus, any claim of mine as a student of terrorism discourse to be academically objective and impartial would put me into a catch-22; first of all, even a claim of my own impartiality is a biased standpoint in itself. Secondly, considering the socio-constructivist stand that I am applying in this study, being impartial is virtually impossible. I am not dealing with strictly logical mathematical equations, I am examining concepts that are, or *could be,* understood and exercised differently in various cultural contexts, which I intend to show by deconstruction of their meaning.

Impartiality is, thus, out of the question. Of course, the social world consists of ethical and political values, which was recognized by the classical scholar of social science Max Weber (1978). These are, according to Weber, basic characteristics of human beings. Objectivity is though not the same as impartiality for Weber, as for him being objective implies simply to be aware of how one's values guide their actions. Considering Weberian understanding of objectivity and impartiality, I claim to be objective but not impartial. I am fully aware that my own personal democratic and liberal political beliefs will determine the nature of my analysis[66]. My own critical approach to the cohesion of 'Islam' and 'terrorism' makes it natural for me to choose Fairclough's critical discourse analysis method since it inherently is aimed at the critical approach to a given text.

Setting a desirable methodological frame would require a very careful and thought-through compilation of the empirical material, as I am actually defining the "field of action" for myself by choosing certain articles over others. In other words, I will play a decisive role in which discourses to focus on in the thesis, and I would do it by a careful and deliberate choice of the empirical material.

4.0 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

This Chapter will feature analysis of relevance for the *discourse continuum*. CDA is a two-faceted process which implies that textual analysis should be supported by the overall thematic analysis of the text. The reason the two levels of analysis are separated in the present work is for the easier overview.

The significance of the way the linguistic elements reveal themselves in text is rooted in structuralist beliefs such as, for instance, the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis[67]. Being more of a postulate

---

[66] The degree of influence of my beliefs and values as a person and a researcher will vary according to the context of the analysis and issues examined. What is crucial here, however, is to be able to be aware of, and to point out, the fact that it's one's own personal beliefs that might play in certain aspects of analysis.

[67] Cf. E. Sapir "Language", New York: Harvest Books, 1949; B.L.Whorf, ed. J.B. Carroll, "Language, Thought and Reality", Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956

than a theory due to the fact that it is impossible of empirical proof[68], it states that the grammatical features a person applies in her speech play a cognitive role in her outlook on the world. In other words, the linguistic entities, grammatical, phonological or syntactic, determine the nature of speaker's thought. Thus, a particular outlook on American identity characterized by the same shared language by its adherents is determined by the linguistic features shared by this community. The theory is not illegitimate, however, it generally argues that the social reality is purely discursively created, whereas I go along with Fairclough in believing that the process is rather mutual and two-way: discourse constructs the social reality and is reinforced by it as well. Thus, the emphasis on the importance of the linguistic features remains, with the aforementioned clarifications.

According to Fowler, part of the communicative ability of speakers or writers is the facility "*to recognize linguistic forms as appropriate to certain circumstances*". (Fowler, 1993:37) I will go along with Fowler's and Fairclough's working assumption, inspired by Halliday, that every single aspect of linguistic structure, whether grammatical, lexical, semantic, pragmatic or textual, can carry ideological significance. Furthermore, linguistic features of a text may on the longer run serve as characteristics of a particular discourse or order of discourse. Every linguistic feature therefore matters and is worth registering even though the purpose of noting it may be unclear at the beginning.

The structure of the analysis will be presented in a deductive manner. Thematic analysis will be placed in the report before the de-constructive linguistic analysis which deals with smaller units will take place. Such structure is partly rooted in the fact that the descriptive linguistic analysis is easier to comprehend when the reader is already presented with interpretations demonstrated in the thematic analysis.

4.1 ANALYTICAL TEMPLATES

As mentioned earlier, the assumption that language is an ideological tool is one of the basic working assumptions for the following analysis. Having admitted it, we may move to the specific features of a text to show how it operates by the medium of CDA. The below-mentioned templates do not represent absolute and definitive set of questions for analysis but rather present a guideline for the overall examination of texts.

4.1.1 THEMATIC ANALYSIS TEMPLATE

There are plenty of aspects to focus on in the thematic analysis of text. The present template will be tailored in accordance with the comparative purposes of the analysis. Thus, the amalgam of Faircloughian pattern with the features of analysis of the terrorist discourse scholar Richard Jackson will be applied, with the aim to compare the eleven texts examined in this work, and to reveal their discursive dynamics and idiosyncrasies.

---

[68] Cf. Roger Fowler, "Language in the News", 1993:4

The following guidelines are presented by Fairclough for the thematic analysis of the articles:

SOCIAL EVENTS (SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES)

What social practice or the network of social practices can the events be referred to, be seen as framed within?
What elements of represented social events are included or excluded, and which included elements are most salient?
How abstractly or concretely are social events represented?

DIFFERENCE AND EQUIVALENCE[69]

Fairclough distinguishes between five types of expressing the relations of *difference* in a text.[70] The question is which one of the following scenarios characterizes the orientation to difference in a text:

- an openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; an exploration of difference, as in 'dialogue' in the richest sense of the term
- an accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norms, power
- an attempt to resolve or overcome difference
- a bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity (logic of equivalence)
- a consensus, a normalization and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and over norms.

Fairclough does not seem to pay special attention to the question of equivalence as such. However, he argues in this regard that textual analysis should be sensitive to absences from it – the choices that were not made but might have been. (Fairclough, 1995b:18) This statement accentuates the importance of examining the occasions where differences have been omitted.

ASSUMPTIONS

What existential, propositional, or value assumptions are made?
Implications and assumptions play a vital role in shaping a 'common ground' by those who hold power and domination. A 'common ground' is defined as meanings which are "*shared and can be taken as given*" by a society. (Fairclough, 2003:55) There are three types of assumptions that are employed by the dominant bloc and that are characterized by certain linguistic components:

- Existential assumptions: assumptions about what exists.

---

[69] It should be noted that Fairclough does not pay particular attention to the opposite concept of difference – *equivalence*, which originally belongs to scholars Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Equivalence seems to be more of a 'given' in Fairclough's works, while he makes a solid accent on difference as an identity-creating tool (Chouliaraki et al., 1999:96) This might be supported by the fact that difference expresses itself *through* equivalence, which makes them virtually inseparable, and only signifies a coherence as one or another according to a context.
[70] The closer meaning of *difference* and *equivalence* will be touched upon in the linguistic analysis section.

- Propositional assumptions: what is or can be or will be the case
- Value assumptions: assumptions about what is good or desirable

DISCOURSES

What discourses are drawn upon in the text, and how are they textured together? Is there a significant mixing of discourses?

What are the features that characterize the discourses which are drawn upon in terms of vocabulary, collocations and metaphors?[71]

Discourses will be defined on the basis of the linguistic features that constitute them such as vocabulary, grammar, semantics, styles etc. Basically all of the above, including the issues to examine in a linguistic analytical template, can be indicators of a particular discourse. Since it is *not* a mechanical causality that certain features of the language affect the message in certain ways[72], the number and nature of discourses occurred will be dependent on a particular text.

4.1.2 LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS TEMPLATE

There is a reason for framing a point in a certain way considering the variety of other means to express an idea. These ways are not plain accidental alternatives; differences in expression carry ideological distinctions. (Fowler, 1993:4) Therefore it is crucial to give attention to all linguistic features in a text: grammatical, morphological, syntactic etc., to reveal potential linguistic patterns of a particular discourse.

Norman Fairclough created a schematic overview of the questions to be asked during the textual analysis. (cf. Fairclough, 2003:179-202) The following issues are to be addressed in the linguistic, or mirco-analysis, of the articles:

SEMANTIC/GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SENTENCES AND CLAUSES

What are the predominant semantic relations between sentences and clauses (casual –reason, consequence, purpose; conditional; temporal; additive; elaborative; contrastive/concessive)?

Are grammatical relations between clauses predominantly paratactic, hypotactic, or embedded?

Clauses are essential to examine as they roughly correspond to propositions, which are in their turn a part of a discourse. In many cases, a clause will consist of a single proposition. An important aspect to inspect is what is thematized[73] in a clause. (Fairclough, 1995b:104-105) Presuppositions, which are taken as 'given', are a part of *intertextuality*[74] as they refer to something that has been mentioned before in other texts. They also constitute an ideological tool as ideologies are often

---

[71] Although vocabulary issue is more of a linguistic parallel token it is chosen to be examined in a thematic analysis as it is closely connected with the values expressed by the authors, and therefore goes beyond the context of an article.
[72] Cf. Fairclough, 2003:8
[73] In other words, what is highlighted as the most relevant information in a clause.
[74] Intertextuality according to Fairclough is "the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth." (Fairclough, 1998:84)

embedded into implicit meanings of texts. (*ibid.*, p.107) Fairclough further argues that all utterances are constituted by snatches of others' utterances or texts, which makes texts inherently intertextual. (Fairclough, 1998:102)

EXCHANGES, SPEECH FUNCTIONS AND GRAMMATICAL MOOD

What are the predominant types of exchange (activity exchange, or knowledge exchange) and speech functions (statement, question, demand, offer)?
What types of statement are there (statements of fact, predictions, hypotheticals, evaluations)?
Are there metaphorical relations between exchanges, speech functions, or types of statement (for example, demands which appear as statements, evaluations which appear as factual statements)?

These questions help to identify the overall mood of the text and a potential level of warning.

MODALITY

What do authors commit themselves to in terms of truth (epistemic modalities)? Or in terms of obligation and necessity (deontic modalities)?
To what extent are modalities categorical (assertion, denial etc.), to what extent are they modalized (with explicit markers of modality)?
What levels of commitment are there (high, median, low) where modalities are modalized and what are the markers of modalization (modal verbs, modal adverbs, etc.)?

Author's commitment to the 'truth' in a text is reflected through the overt or covert beliefs expressed in it.

EVALUATION

To what values (in terms of what is desirable or undesirable) do authors commit themselves?
How are values realized – as evaluative statements, statements with deontic modalities, statements with affective mental processes, or assumed values?

INTERTEXTUALITY

Of relevant other texts/voices, which are included, which are significantly excluded?
Where other voices are included? Are they attributed?
Are attributed voiced directly reported (quoted), or indirectly reported?
How are other voices textured in relation to the authorial voice, and in relation to each other?

STYLES AND GENRES

What styles and genres are drawn upon in the text, and how are they textured together?
Is there a significant mixing of styles and genres? What are the features that characterize the styles and genres that are drawn upon (vocabulary, metaphor, modality and evaluation)?

Style in writing is one way to identify how the different identities are constructed in the discourse. Genres are about the enactment in terms of social relations. (Fairclough, 2003:159)

4.2 "To War, Not To Court"

815 words, 12 September 2001, editorial by Charles Krauthammer

Due to the space limitations of the present report I will only outline detailed textual analysis of the two out of eleven articles chosen to show the analysis process of the text[75]. The template will be applied to the rest of the articles as well but the present report will only feature trends and findings of the textual analysis of an overall material. I will start with the very first article, an editorial by Charles Krauthammer from September 12, 2001.

Krauthammer's piece contains an emotional reaction on behalf of Americans on the hijackings of 9/11, bringing out the sense of grief and the theme of unreasonable violence as well as strongly arguing for a counter-attack in its military sense. Diplomacy would be superfluous and ineffective and the only response that would do a justice would me a military attack on the perpetrators and the governments that favour them. 9/11 is projected here as an attack on American *essence* and *values*. The US politicians are criticized for their lack of appropriate action to prevent the events of 9/11 and a courtesy of an action is clearly given to the American public – action to argue for launching a military response.

4.2.1 Thematic Analysis

Social Events of the Article and the Logic of Difference and Equivalence

With 9/11 being the background social event of the article, a reader senses a definite call for a non-diplomatic military action as a response to the events, which is justified throughout the text. The events are framed in a military rhetoric, arguing for the necessity of the military strike as the only legitimate response to the act of war on Americans. As Jackson frames it, "*the act of naming things is always a highly charged process that can have serious political and social consequences."* (Jackson, 2005:23) The opening phrase of the article says it all: '*This is not crime. This is war'.* The relations of difference are clearly established: we are out of the criminal discourse; a reader is brought into a military domain. *'Justice'* is not appropriate anymore, *'destruction'* is necessary. The 'war' is differentiated here not with 'peace' but with 'justice'. Although the enemy is not "faceless and mysterious" anymore, the enemy here is abstract and remains impersonalized: it is *'radical Islam'*, with its embodiment in the face of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the governments of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.

To further justify the military action, the author attaches a geographical terrain to the enemy, claiming that *any country* that protects the terrorists is the enemy and needs to be attacked.

---

[75] For more details on presenting the analysis of the two articles as well as an explanation why these articles have been selected see Chapter 2.3

There is an interesting shift, however, from the *governments* to be attacked in the previous passage, to the *countries* to be attacked, creating a sense of hostility towards anything or anybody that relates to these countries in the mind of a reader.

The aforementioned controversy is not the only occurrence in the text. The definition of the enemy itself is full of contradictions. On the one hand, the enemy is inflicting *'**organized** terror'* on Americans, and, as the author puts it himself, *'to dismiss it as a bunch of cowards perpetrating **senseless** acts of violence is complacent **nonsense**.'* So the terrorists have carried out a plan which was arranged, formed and coordinated and which requires an unaffected spirit. On the other hand, the terrorists are driven by a *'**fanatical** ideology'* and they are *'**fanatical** suicide murderers',* *'**savagely**'* striking America. One of the antonyms of "fanatical" according to the Thesaurus dictionary, is "reasonable", suggesting that the author contradicts himself, dismissing the senselessness of the terrorists' actions, and later calling them fanatics.[76] This very occurrence is a great example of the hegemony of the Orientalistic discourse which will be drawn upon later in the thesis in the light of all of the empirical material. As Fairclough puts it, authors often draw upon dominating discourses and thus reproduce hegemony, consciously or unconsciously. (cf. Fairclough, 2003) As much as Krauthammer wants to show the coordination and organization of the terrorists' actions, he cannot help using the vocabulary of the dominating Orientalistic discourse, projecting radical Islam believers as savage and irrational.

As Jackson puts it, language initially has a binary structure such as there is a direct opposite to almost every noun, adjective or verb. (Jackson, 2005:21) His remark on the binary structure of concepts accentuates the significance of the two terms that are applied in the critical discourse analysis, namely, *equivalence* and *difference,* both being the basis for discursive relations. Every linguistic element is positioned on the range of differential propositions, on a certain scale of antonyms, which helps to maintain the meaning and practice, and thus creates the relations of *difference*. The logic of *equivalence* is on the contrary an effort to subvert the differences to make something identical by cancelling them.

Thus, an inclusive pronoun "we"/"us" is a clear example if the subversion of the differences signifying the logic of equivalence. "We" is identical with "Americans", cancelling any relations of difference when it comes to the class, race and gender. As for the logic of equivalence and difference, there are multiple examples of it in the text. Thus, when Krauthammer calls the terrorists "*fanatical suicide murderers",* the reader assumes that America (or the West, depending on the context) is allegedly 'rational' and 'innocent'. The relations of equivalence and difference are the dynamical forces in any discourse that help to maintain, and reproduce, the power relations. There is a strong accent on difference in the text, expressed through a conflict of values and a struggle of norms and power. There is no attempt to resolve or overcome this difference. On the contrary, the maintenance of differences is a must for the message to go through. There is no focus on solidarity or relation of equivalence in this context. For example, there is no appeal

---

[76] The synonyms and the antonyms for this particular analysis have been taken from The Online Thesaurus Dictionary. Link from 14.06.08: http://thesaurus.reference.com

that all of us are humans and fight is redundant; the aim of the text is to create a very sharp distinction into two polarized groups, to justify the defensive action.

Discourses

Several discourses are drawn upon in the text. Jackson distinguishes between several types of discourses characteristic of an official rhetoric on terrorism, which is often translated on the mass media text and which I will reveal here by using an example of Krauthammer's article.

Military Discourse

This discourse is probably the most salient one in the present text. It is expressed by a variety of words, collocations and metaphors, such as *'the deadliest attack', 'underground shelters', 'a formidable enemy', 'deadly, vicious warriors',* Americans are entitled as *'belligerents'*. The author makes it clear that 9/11 is not a criminal act against the government of the US, nor is it a crime against humanity, it is a war on American values. The main problem with constructing the attacks as 'war', Jackson argues, is that it gives the attacks a certain sense of legitimacy. The attackers are presented as warriors rather than terrorists or criminals. (Jackson, 2005: 60) The discourse could have been constructed in the same manner as the war on drugs or war on gender or racial inequality which demand legislative response. It could have been a different discourse if only 9/11 was named, for example, "the crime of the century". However, Krauthammer and his followers cast this logic aside framing the attackers as a military threat.

Other significant indicators of the military discourse are invocation of the pre-existing popular military narratives as analogies such as World War II (Pearl Harbour attack in particular) and the Cold War. Reference to the military strikes of the past is not a new issue to the official rhetoric either. According to Jackson, former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld called 9/11 "the first attack on our capital by a foreign enemy since the War of 1812." (Rumsfeld, September 27, 2001) (Jackson, 2005:41) The analogy to the American Revolution setting an end to the British domination over the US creates a parallel to the American struggle for independence. Comparing 9/11 to the greater historical narratives is an excellent way to give a greater meaning to the attacks as the historical contexts with certain interpretations for the past events are already created. So all an author needs to do is to establish a comparable link to them to frame the events of the present in a similar way. Krauthammer's text is not exclusion: both of the narratives are involved as well as analogies to the former enemies: the Nazi Germany and the Imperial Japan. For example, calling 9/11 *'the day of infamy'* has a direct reference to a similar construction made by President Roosevelt of December 7, 1941, the day Japan attacked Pearl Harbour as 'a date which will live in infamy'.

The parallel to the Cold War is particularly interesting, nearly setting an equality sign between communism and terrorism as similarly formidable enemies. Krauthammer deliberately mentions the beginning of the *'age of terrorism'* as an indicator of the *'post- Cold War era'.* Not only this parallel affects the present state of affairs but it equally attempts to rewrite the history of the Cold War comparing it to a one of our days' greater menaces – religious terrorism.

Disbelief, grievance and victimhood of America are the most salient indicators of this discourse which is overly present in Krauthammer's article. Jackson argues that one of the best ways to motivate people for war is to create a '*myth of exceptional grievance'* involving human emotions. (Jackson, 2005:35-36) In the present case it establishes America as a primary victim of unprecedented attacks through employment of a number of superlatives such as *'the deadliest attack on the United States'* and '*the single greatest massacre in American history'*, *'destroying the society of its enemies, the greatest of which is the United States'.* It could have been framed as a tragedy of an international scale but Krauthammer and his media colleagues translate the White House rhetoric of exceptional American victimhood in almost unmediated manner.

Alternative discourse could have caused a less violent response. Jackson suggests that expressing solidarity with the victims of terror in other countries could have created a global sense of unity in the face of terror. (Jackson, 2005: 37) However, the American uniqueness as a victim has been much easier to frame as it falls perfectly into another firmly established American myth – the myth of "American exceptionalism", which takes its definition from the French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville. The "City Upon the Hill", as Governor John Winthrop named America, and the "God's chosen nation", as other early Puritan settlers called it, is unique among other countries in a sort of morally superior sense, and is set on earth to serve as a model for the other states to strive for. *"The greatest power's on the globe"* unique role to bring civilization, or democracy, or liberty to the rest of the world by violence, if necessary, is widely accepted politically in the nation. Drawing upon the myth of American exceptionalism in the struggle against a regime is not a new formation in American orders of discourse. It has been used by American media in the Cold War period, highlighting the American values of personal and financial liberty, as opposed to the communist regime.

The invocation of the myth set America as a uniquely responsible for the war on terrorism in the world, just as it was with the fight against communism. Thus, the myth is frequently used to justify the existence and superiority of American values, even when the issue is America's role on the international political scene. American identity discourse which rests upon common values deserves a further comment.

One of the most notable features of Krauthammer's text is the belief that America was attacked as a *society* for its virtues rather than failings, which according to Jackson is another feature of the order of discourses on terrorism. (Jackson, 2005:54; Jamieson, 2004:152-153) Thus, America was attacked for its *'culture that "corrupts" Islamic youth'*, its *'military in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and the Persian Gulf'* and *'an economy and technology that dominate the world'*. All of the abovementioned describes America in a positive sense as the world's superpower, hardly questioning the legitimacy of American military presence in the Middle East.

Another myth dominating the terrorism discourse is traceable here – the myth of America being a peaceful nation. Having roots in the myth of American exceptionalism, America's collective values are set to promote humanity and civil rights not only of their own but of those beyond the borders of the nation. The reality is different: most Americans would be shocked to know that the US had been involved in 134 military interventions between 1890 and 2001, and following the end of the Cold War it was approximately two times per year. (Jackson. 2005: 77) These are, however, not just military interventions; these are 'value' interventions such as promotion of freedom. American 'reluctance' to go to war is expressed in Krauthammer's text in a following way: *'We sought this war no more than we sought war with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan or Cold War with the Soviet Union.'* The parallels suggest that the terrorist attacks were completely ungrounded, and that the attackers had no right to reasonable political grievances. The reasons for the attacks are rooted in the nature of the attackers themselves rather than in American international or domestic political deeds. The antagonism is thus presented as a value struggle, rather than the struggle of reciprocal measures.

The issue of America being presented as "innocent" requires a further comment. Krauthammer claims that *'until we* (Americans) *declare war in return, we will have thousands of more innocent victims'*. I find it appropriate to ask who is described to be innocent here. The 9/11 language implies that the Pentagon workers killed in Washington are also 'innocent', even though many of them are military personnel. These constructions leave no place for the terrorist motives other than them being 'jealous' of the American supremacy. As Douglass argues, if the terrorists' victims deserved punishment, or even death, actions against them would not be framed as 'terrorist', but rather as acts of justice. (Douglass et al., 1996:133) Even the US military interventions in the Middle East are mentioned here as something being good by default.

It has been mentioned that the discursive construction of 'the Other' is one half of the construction of 'the Self'. According to a prominent scholar of nationalism Benedict Anderson (2006) all members of a society must believe or 'imagine' they belong to a common community. This reinforcement of national identity requires a carefully outlined image of the 'Other'. The most notable characteristic of the terrorists is the fact that they are religious fanatics. However, the media translates the official rhetoric making a definite reference to the fact that the terrorists have nothing to do with mainstream Muslims, but rather placing them somewhere on a periphery between religion and their political motives. This is another way of condemning their agenda and deeds as immoral. Krauthammer's text is an excellent example of this discretion:

'Its (the enemy's) name is radical Islam. Not Islam as practiced peacefully by millions of the faithful around the world. But a specific fringe political movement, dedicated to imposing its fanatical ideology on its own societies and destroying the society of its enemies, the greatest of which is the United States.'

This difference is, however, potentially eliminated by the way the enemy political movement is framed: "radical Islam". The sheer presence of the word that denominates a religion in this

collocation creates certain MR in a reader's mind, psychologically causing a fear towards anything Islamic and Muslim. As the former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it on The Daily Show with John Stewart on February 26, 2008, it is extremely important to dispute the term "Islamic terrorism" because when people hear the collocation, the cohesion roots deeply 'echoes' in their minds.

Evangelical and Moral Discourse

There are elements from the Christian religious discourse in the article, in particular the elements of the vocabulary. The alleged terrorist *'martyrdom'* desire *'to bring the great American Satan to its knees'* places the terrorists' aim into the Evangelical context for the reader explaining the Muslim 'unholy' in familiar Christian terms. Thus, terrorists are individually or collectively marked as satanic and morally corrupt. Characterizing a terrorist as *'vicious'* is an attempt to personify something inherently evil. According to Jackson, the 'good' versus 'evil' antagonism leads towards a crusader or inquisitional mentality, where 'evil' is defined as anything that attempts to disrupt the American way of life. (Jackson, 2005:67) The discourse of 'vicious' and 'evil' is also closely linked to something immoral and godless.

Summary of Thematic Features of the Article

There is a variety of discourses in Krauthammer's article, the most salient of them being the military discourse revealing itself through the genre of argument[77]. However, there are other narratives incorporated into the article such as a myth on American exceptionalism as well as evangelical and moral discourse. The strategy of the message requires accentuation of differences for the identity creation. Finally, Krauthammer's article has a few cases of conceptual controversies that show how easily an author can be 'written' by the powerful discourse on terrorism, and in some cases, an Orientalistic discourse. The significance of the aforementioned features for the discourse in general will be discussed in chapter 4.4.

4.2.2 Linguistic Analysis

Semantic relations between sentences and clauses

The sentences in the text are simple at first sight as most of them are one-clause constructions. However, at a second glance they appear to be compound constructions disguised by a particular style of writing: a full stop after almost every clause characteristic of an oral public speech. Even when a rare contrastive conjunction *but* and an additive *and* occur in the text, they are mostly presented in separate sentences divided by a full stop. In the case with the composite sentences, the relationships between the clauses remain fairly *hypotactic[78]*, with one clause subordinate to the other, mostly for explanatory purposes to ensure that the reader gets the right message.

---

[77] Fairclough distinguishes between 3 types of genres (each of which can be seen as 'families' of many different specific genres): dialogue, argument, and narrative.

[78] *Hypotaxis* is the grammatical arrangement of functionally similar but "unequal" constructs, i.e., clauses playing an unequal role in a sentence.

There are also a few embedded clauses such as *'this is a fundamental distinction that can no longer be avoided'* or *'any country that harbors and protects him is our enemy'*.

The relationships between some of the clauses are largely contrastive, often connected by a stop and rarely by a conjunction. For example,

'This is not crime. This is war.'
'Franklin Roosevelt did not respond to Pearl Harbor by pledging to bring the commander of Japanese naval aviation to justice. He pledged to bring Japan to its knees.'

These omissions imply that the reader already knows and therefore complements the relations between clauses while reading the text. It is also characteristic of the language which may be used to make a printed medium suggest the presence of oral speech[79]. (Fowler, 1993:61-62) This style of writing is full of assumptions and implications that are to uncover by the reader. One of the features of this style in Krauthammer's text is a few occasions of what Fairclough calls 'minor clauses', which are 'grammatically incomplete', and in particular don't have verbs. (Fairclough, 2003:117):

'Organized terror has shown what it can do: execute the single greatest massacre in American history, shut down the greatest power on the globe and send its leaders into underground shelters. ***All this without even resorting to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction****.'*

'Its name is radical Islam. Not Islam as practiced peacefully by millions of the faithful around the world. But a specific fringe political movement...'

The question of activity/passivity is also an interesting matter to examine. It is usually claimed that actives and passives have the same propositional meaning, differing only in their position in the sentence. (Fowler, 1993:78) However, considering our working assumption there must be a reason why they have been formed into actives and passives. Thus, in the following examples of passivity, the passive form was chosen to give a sense of a global significance to the processes rather than their actors. In the following cases, who declared war is largely irrelevant; the story is reoriented so that it is now about the war rather than the perpetrators:

*'War **was** long ago **declared** on us.'*
*'But when war **was pressed** upon the greatest generation, it rose to the challenge.'*

MODALITY

According to Fairclough, modality means *"the speaker's judgment of the probabilities, or the obligations, involved in what he is saying"* (Fairclough, 2003:165) Generally there are recognized two types of modality: *epistemic* and *deontic*. The first type of these two shows the level of the

---

[79] Fairclough supports Fowler in this belief suggesting an overall tendency of conversationalism in the media, based on the media's role as a mediator between the public and official domain. (cf. Fairclough, 1995b)

author's commitment to the truth of the statement or rather refers to the way speakers communicate their doubts, certainties, and guesses, whether they do it though the modal verbs, through adverbs or other linguistic features. Deontic modality refers to the statements of how the world ought to be, according to certain norms, expectations, speaker's desire, etc. It usually features statements about action that would change the current state of affairs. Thus, epistemic modalities are about what the world is, while deontic modalities are about what the world should be.

Krauthammer's text contains eight explicit clauses with deontic modalities and barely any epistemic ones. It generally creates an impression of an author who has assumed a position of authority. The text is all about how the world should be while urging the reader to take action. These modalities have a high level of commitment. Some of these deontic modalities are:

*'The bombings of Sept. 11, 2001, **must** mark a turning point.'*
*'We no longer **have to** search for a name for the post-Cold War era.'*
*'For that you **need** skilled pilots seeking martyrdom.'*

There are also categorical modalities in the text, meaning those that are presented by something else than a modal verb, such as, for example:

'Until we declare war in return, we will have thousands of more innocent victims.' (meaning we ought to declare the war if we want to avoid more victims)
'To dismiss it as a bunch of cowards perpetrating senseless acts of violence is complacent nonsense.' (meaning we should see them as conspirators)

EXCHANGES, SPEECH FUNCTIONS AND GRAMMATICAL MOOD

Krauthammer's text is abundant with a so called activity exchange, which according to Fairclough is expressed through deontic modality. For example,

*'They are deadly, vicious warriors and **need to** be treated as such.'*
*'We **must** carry their war to them.'*

Speech functions are predominantly realized through the statements which often serve a function of a demand (1) or a warning (2) as well as questions, in some cases followed by an answer (3):

(1) *'An open act of war demands a military response, not a judicial one.'*
(2) *'Until we declare war in return, we will have thousands of more innocent victims.'*
(3) *'Which one was responsible? We will find out soon enough.'*
   'How do we know? Who else trains cadres of fanatical suicide murderers who go to their deaths joyfully?'

Most of the hypotheticals, predictions and evaluations are disguised into didactic statements of fact to increase the degree of persuasion, which makes the relations between speech functions highly metaphorical:

'We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era. It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.' (prediction)
'They are deadly, vicious warriors and need to be treated as such.' (evaluation)
'The terrorists cannot exist in a vacuum. They need a territorial base of sovereign protection' (hypothesis suggesting that there is a geographical terrain for the terrorists to justify the military response)

This metaphorical function of the clauses corresponds well with the genre of what Fairclough calls *'hortatory report'*, which carries a covert message to get people to act in a certain way on the basis of what things allegedly are. (Fairclough, 2003:96-99) The implications to get the reader to act in a certain way are transmitted through assumed and implicit values:

*'The heart of the beast – (…) with a **culture that "corrupts"** Islamic youth; with an **economy and technology** that dominate the world – is the United States'*

For example, the aforementioned sentence generally suggests that Islamic terrorists are overly against the American cultural way of life and generally against the US' technological progress.

ASSUMPTIONS

Assumptions are important in a text as they have a particular history. As Fairclough puts it, "*what is assumed has indeed been said or written elsewhere*" (Fairclough, 2003:40)

The idiosyncrasy of the present text is that propositional assumptions are presented metaphorically in the existential manner and supplied with such indicators as definite articles:

*'**the deadliest attack** on the United States in its history',*
'the single greatest massacre in American history'
*'organized terror (…) that shut down **the greatest power on the globe'**.*

Krauthammer's piece is filled with superlatives: the word *greatest* alone is used in the text four times.

This piece is also loaded with logical implications, which according to Fairclough are *"implicit meanings which can be logically inferred from features of language."* (Fairclough, 2003:60) Thus, the following sentence suggests that the diplomatic action against the terrorists is idle; a stronger force is needed to cope with them:

*'One of the reasons that there are terrorists out there capable and audacious enough to carry out the deadliest attack on the United States in its history is that, while they have declared war on us, we have in the past responded (with the exception of **a few useless** cruise missile attacks on **empty tents in the desert**) by issuing subpoenas.'*

'We sought this war no more than we sought war with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan or Cold War with the Soviet Union.'

This phrase suggests a logical implication along the lines with the great American Myth that America is innocent and peaceful, with non-provocative ways of political existence.

Intertextuality and Evaluation

The text contains a few references to other texts. There are two occurrences of direct reporting, one of them being a quoted clause of the former Secretary of State Colin Powell – '*bring those responsible to justice*', another one being a quoted phrase by the counsellor Karen Hughes, arguing for bringing the responsible for the attacks to '*swift justice*'. Both are related to the official claims and both of them are argued against in the text.

Fairclough argues, that in the case of reported speech it is essential to scrutinize its role. (Fairclough, 2003:51) In this case the reported speech sets its authors in a subordinate position by implying that their statements were false. The power relations are clearly rotated and the message comes through: do not trust the official rhetoric of diplomacy; appeal for military action is in the hands of a reader.

Krauthammer's piece in general is poor on dialogicality as it often features expressions in absolute terms. Being originally Bakhtin's term, *dialogicality* is a process which a discourse of language or culture undergoes when it becomes aware of competing definitions for the same things. Undialogized language is authoritative or absolute. The present text contains a certain level of dialogicality as it asks questions on behalf of the invisible interlocutor only to answer them in the text. For example,

'Military response against whom?'
'How do we know?'
'The question is: Will we?'

This makes the reader do the mental work, contributing to their sound ability for political judgment the way "we" make it.

There is also a more covert voice in the text, the voice of the perpetrators; Krauthammer indirectly speaks of America on behalf of the terrorists, assigning particular agenda through to their thinking:

*'They have a very specific aim: to avenge alleged **historical wrongs** and to bring **the great American satan** to its knees'*

*'Radical Islam…is a political movement, dedicated to imposing its fanatical ideology on its own societies and **destroying the society of its enemies, the greatest of which is the United States**.'*

*'**Israel**, too, is **an affront to radical Islam**, and thus **of course** must be eradicated.'*

There is a degree of irony in the last example creating a particularly solid image of the enemy in the mind of a reader.

It is curious to examine how impersonalized objects or concepts are disguised into active agents though the means of grammatical metaphor:

*'**The bombings of Sept. 11, 2001**, must mark a turning point.'*
*'**Organized terror** has shown what it can do.'*
*'Our **delicate sensibilities** have prevented us from pronouncing its name.'*

These subjects are in fact *affected participants.* Linguists generally label this active but inanimate role *force.* (Fowler, 1993:75)

Krauthammer's text is filled with evaluations grammatically represented by both evaluative statements (1) and through deontic modal verbs (2):

(1) *'**fanatical** ideology', 'They have a very specific aim: to avenge **alleged** historical wrongs'*
(2) *'there **should be** no talk of bringing these people to "swift justice"'* (meaning that the terrorist deserve a military rather than diplomatic action)

POWER DYNAMICS IN THE ARTICLE

It is highly notable that most of the verbs in the article related to the terrorist perpetrators are the action verbs of destructive nature such as *execute* (a massacre), *carry out* (an attack), *kill* (thousands of innocents), *destroy* (the society), *coordinate* (four hijackings).

There is also an obvious misbalance of the grammatical correlation of subjects and objects in sentences; in other words, agents and patients. Most of the times the pronoun 'we' occupies subject positions while automatically positioning Americans as an actor with authority.

It is interesting enough to examine categories which perpetrators are put into. They are *terrorists, a formidable enemy, deadly and vicious warriors, fanatical suicide murderers, skilled pilots seeking martyrdom.* When the position of the enemy is projected well enough as it is done in this context, the description of Americans is almost superfluous as it can be figured out by linguistic

oppositions. The image of Americans, however, is supported by such characteristics as *innocents, leaders, belligerents* – quite positive tags that put Americans on top in the hierarchy of power.

It is quite evident then, that 'we' (Americans) in the text appear to be active actors, while terrorists are put into a passive form. The latter group gets classified, categorized and ranked as scary determined destructors. The reason for these constructions is that the text uses institutional language which strongly encodes a power differential as if it were natural. It would take a self-conscious and bold shift for a journalist to shift this discourse into something else, and it may prove to be intolerable for the commercial nature of the press. (Fowler, 1993:134) But it is definitely not the agenda for Krauthammer whose intention to bring out the differences and underline implicit power relations.

Summary of the Linguistic Features of Krauthammer's Article

Although the article is a written piece it stylistically reminds of an oral speech with its compound clauses, including the minor clauses, separated by a full stop. The author's individuality and identity are largely irrelevant to the communicative situation. Even though it is impersonal in origin[80], it is very personal in style by the use of the incomplete sentences, questions and the incorporated voice of the alleged enemy. The style of an oral speech is easily recognizable with its compound sentences broken into simple ones. In selecting the required style, the journalist ceases to be an individual subject. He is now a writer. (Fowler, 1993:42) The article is a definite call for action in the genre of the hortatory report intensified by superlatives and a great number of deontic modalities expressed both my modal verbs and other linguistic features such as predictions and warnings. There are voices of other people in the text, including an 'invisible interlocutor' and the alleged terrorists themselves.

Fairclough argues that one way of defining the features of a particular discourse is to look at collocations and patterns of co-occurrence of words in texts (Fairclough, 2003:131) The article features a harsh distinction of the antonymic pronouns "we"/ "us" (20 uses) and "they" (5 uses) from the very beginning. The definition of what "we" stands for is uncovered in the article through the values expressed in the text but not through direct mentioning that it stands for the definition of Americans. As Fowler puts it, the consensual pronoun "we" is common to the newspaper editorials that claim to speak for 'the people'. But although this consensus sounds like a liberal, humane and generous theory of social action, it breeds divisive and alienating attitudes towards "them". (Fowler, 1993:16) In this article's case 'we' rather has a directive nature, meaning 'you'. "They" are defined by two categories in the article. The first category of "them" refers to the politicians Karen Hughes and Colin Powell, who advocate for a peaceful judicial approach to the terrorists. They are extensively argued against. The second "them" is described metaphorically as the 'radical Islam', including the use of generic personal names such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Osama bin Laden organization. Such grammatical metaphors are according to Fairclough are also indicators of a particular discourse. (Fairclough, 2003:131) There is also an occurrence of the

---

[80] An indicator of 'impersonality' being a collective pronoun "we" rather than the author's "I".

impersonal pronoun "you" in a didactic manner: *"You bring criminals to justice; you rain destruction on combatants"*.

4.3 "Jihad, Then and Now"

982 words, 30 January 2008, Style, Geneive Abdo

The author Geneive Abdo is a fellow at The Century Foundation and the author most recently of "Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11".

Geneive Abdo's article poses a question of radicalization's origin and chooses to examine it from a religious point of view inquiring whether there is anything inherently violent in Islamic tradition. She attempts to answer these questions through an overview of the two recent books on the issue: "The Jihad Next Door" by Dina Temple-Raston and "The First Muslims" by Asma Afsaruddin. Abdo's main thesis is bringing out the difference between Islam in its classical period and a so-called contemporary Islam. She is therefore highlighting Islam's dynamics through time touching upon questions of jihad and other traditionally non-negotiable topics of Islam. This article is a contrasting piece in comparison to Krauthammer's writing. Abdo is seeing Islamic recruits, the naïve young men, as victims rather than perpetrators as she communicates her point through the medium of the ideas from the books reviewed in the article. The overall tone of her article is generally democratic, much less emotive and didactic, and seems to be in favour of 'good' Muslims providing a sharp distinction between the 'real' adherents of Muslim religious beliefs and those 'misusing' it for the terrorist purposes. All in all, the article suggests some interesting findings in terms of textual analysis.

4.3.1 Thematic Analysis

Social Events of the Article and the Relationship of Difference and Equivalence

The sociocultural practice that serves as a background for the article is not represented as concretely here as in Krauthammer's case, where the object of referral was a concrete event – 9/11. It is rather appropriate to call it here a network of social practices that involve acts of terror conducted by radical Muslims. There is an underlying assumption traceable in several places in the text that it is the *young* Muslims in particular who are prone to fall into radicalism.

The author makes a clear distinction in establishing a difference between the Muslim society in the 'Dark Ages' and a *modern* Muslim society, highlighting the temporal dynamics of Islam contrary to the Orientalistic prejudice. The end of the article reveals the author's assumption that there *is* a difference between the lives of 'Muslims' today and the old static views on Islam.

Despite the fact that the author is rejecting the Orientalistic notion of Islam as a static religion homogenous in all parts of the Muslim world, she is still referring to the East and West as separate

entities of the world. She poses a question of where radicalism comes from and chooses to answer it by addressing the religion itself.

*'If Muslims living in dramatically different societies, in vastly different circumstances and conditions in **the East** and **West**, are similarly drawn to extremism, does this mean there is something inherently violent in the Islamic tradition?'*

The dichotomy of East and West transforms into 'the Islamic world' versus 'the West' at the end of the article, contrasting two different territorial entities based on respectively religion and geography:

*'Understanding how Muslims view their lives and their faith today is now critical to the relationship between **the Islamic world** and **the West**.'*

'The Islamic world' is thus projected as something antonymous to 'the West', with the notion of Islam being a characteristic which is alien to the 'western' values.

The dichotomy of the East versus West is also present in the collocation *'American-born Muslims'* who visited al-Qaeda training camp to learn about jihad. Despite the fact that the terrorist camp's teachings are presented as absurd and distorted in the book which the article is referring to, the collocation still names the recruits 'Muslims', which might create a certain logical cohesion between radicals and Muslims in general in the mind of a reader.

DISCOURSES

RELIGIOUS AND ORIENTALISTIC DISCOURSE

There is an undeniable presence of religious discourse in the article as it examines the question of whether violence is inherent in Islam by referring to Quranic quotes and a saying of Islamic philosopher Ibn Khadun. Concepts of religious discourse such as *'jihad'*, *'a devout Muslim'*, *'infidels'*, *'Quran'* are present in the article. The discourse also reveals itself through a slightly poetic language with archaic words present in several places in the article. Thus, expressions like Muslims were forbidden to retaliate against their *'pagan foes'* or Muslims being trapped *'in the Dark Ages'* create a logical cohesion to the old and historical domain characteristic of religious tenets and historical narratives. Despite the fact that the article's main idea is importance of examining Islam in its modern shape, the semantic reference of aforementioned words may indicate a presence of the traditional Orientalistic discourse depicting Islam as something frozen in time, static and traditional, demanding historically archaic language to be expressed in the appropriate manner.

POLITICAL DISCOURSE

Political discourse tied to the concept of Islam is featuring here too, however, marginally. Thus, an issue of an 'Islamic state' is touched upon briefly in the article as well as the question of Muslim

distinction between political and religious authority. The overall concept of *'radicalization'* examined in the article is politicizing Islam placing it as the frame for the violent means of communicating particular political stands. The aforementioned issues touched upon in the article are the reflections of the 'hot potatoes' of the discourse on Islam in the West. Whereas they might have not been issues for discussion in the Muslim community, they attract focus in the Western context such as in the two reviewed books written for Americans.

Military Discourse

Military discourse reveals itself several places in the article, all from the notorious metaphor *'war on terror'* designating the politics of the government, to describing the aims of the newly-radicals to become the *'warriors'* for al-Qaeda to *'fight'* the United States *'on the battlefield a world away'.* The military discourse merges with the religious one as it becomes incorporated into the quotes from religious texts featuring Muslim fight against their *'invaders'* that permits *'self-defence'* when necessary. The word *'jihad'* is also used in the military sense in the article in the collocation *'applying jihad to non-Muslim states'.* Jihad is thus, along the lines with the popular use in media, applied here as a military action against 'infidels'.

Identity Discourse: Good versus Bad Muslims

The identity dynamics is different here from the one in Krauthammer's article. The contrast of Muslims versus Americans here is present too, however, to a much lesser extent than in the first article. The United States is presented as a sworn enemy of the radicals several places in the article in the course of the reported speech of one of the book writers. America here is almost identical with 'the West', which echoes with the traditional Orientalistic division of East and West into two distinct civilizations. This is illustrated by several occurrences in the article, where the West and Americans appear to be almost interchangeable. Americans are presented as having minimal knowledge of Islam as they are *"organizing salons and reading groups and compiling book lists in hope of enlightening themselves about a faith that was completely alien to them six years ago"* as they try to understand the *'relationship between East and West'.* A much greater dichotomy is expressed in the article between 'good' and 'bad' Muslims, as the latter are presented in the best traditions of the Orientalistic notion as being fanatical and violent, '*luring'* the 'good ones' into believing that the US had to be fought as the Muslim enemy. The 'good' ones are projected as Muslims who live after a sophisticated notion of jihad as the means of self-defence applied only in times of crisis. This division is as sharp as the division of the traditional view on Islam and its modern state.

Power Dynamics in the Article

The favourable role in the article is granted by the author to the adherents of Islam who practice their faith sensibly, non-violently. It is given to the non-radical supporters of Islam who are so rarely given a voice in this discourse. Abdo is criticizing the all-dominating notion spread by the US government that any Muslim is capable of falling into radicalism through a sarcastic metaphor, describing the young men's confession of being in al-Qaeda camp *'a dream come true'* for the US government. The article encourages a reader to explore a new, modern notion of Islam in all its

dynamics while it simultaneously rejects the essentialist notion of the 'true Islam' and criticizes anyone who believes Islam to be immutable.

SUMMARY OF THEMATIC FEATURES OF THE ARTICLE

The overall style of the article features two contrasting images of Islam: the historically static notion of Islam characterized by the archaic metaphors and lexical entities and the *'modern'* notion of it refining the concept of *jihad.* This dichotomy remains throughout the article. To describe the Islam of 'the Dark Ages' the author employs the aforementioned historical, at times poetic, language, creating a metaphorical cohesion with the old and archaic, calling on the Orientalistic notion of Islam.

What is particularly interesting about this article is that the author chooses to refer to the verses from the Quran and religious tenets in order to find an answer for radicalism rather than see its roots in the socio-economic context. She therefore follows the popular demands of the Western discourse with its popular fear that Islam is the root of the radicals' hatred. The author hardly touches upon the reasons why the American society itself believes that the roots of radicalism might be found in the teachings of Islam. American society has little focus in the article and seems to be synonymous and interchangeable with 'the West'. The society in focus is non-violent Muslims, particularly young ones, who are the 'black sheep' of the terrorist discourse. Just as 'the Americans' are synonymous with 'the West' here, 'the East' is synonymous with 'the Islamic world', which shows that the concepts here are not taken out of the traditional conventions of Orientalistic thought.

Last but not least it is vital to mention the presence of the military discourse as an almost compulsory in combination with the terrorist discourse.

4.3.2 LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

SEMANTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SENTENCES AND CLAUSES

The article is abundant with grammatical indicators characteristic of a narrative. For instance, there are *temporal* relations between sentences and clauses as the dynamics of the reported events unfolds:

*'**Once** the men reach the al-Qaeda training camp, they become frightened and return to New York.'*
*'**When** faced with the harsh reality of living in the camp,(…) they abandoned their mission.'*

Despite the fact that most of the clauses in the text have largely hypotactic relations, with a few occurrences of the *embedded clauses,* the text is written in quite a 'colloquial' manner. The embedded clauses are found in the following examples:

'They were evidence (…) that the so-called war on terror was real.'
*'Her book should be required reading for any Muslim or non-Muslim **who mistakenly believes the faith is immutable.'***
*'Educated Americans across the country are organizing salons (…) in hope of enlightening themselves about a faith **that was completely alien to them six years ago.'***

The dominating clause relations in the text are temporal and additive. A few parentheticals are characteristic of the text, which is a common thing for a narrative:

*'Two new books attempt answers, **both historical and contemporary**, to these pressing questions.'*

'If *Muslims living in dramatically different societies, **in vastly different circumstances and conditions in the East and West,** are similarly drawn to extremism, does this mean there is something inherently violent in the Islamic tradition?'*

The latter example also presents a conditional clause expressed by a conjunction *'if'*. There are a few occasions of those in the text. What is special is their placement is that two occurrences where 'if' is present appear to be in questions that do not find an answer in the text and are designed to make a reader think on the issue. Another example is the following:

*'Do the Islamic sources advocate violence in certain circumstances, and **if** so, how have these texts been interpreted throughout history and how are they being interpreted in the modern world?'*

There is a single case of a 'minor clause', or grammatically incomplete clause, in the article lacking a participle 'being' in the highlighted clause:

*'The American-born Muslims admitted to having visited an al-Qaeda training camp in the spring of 2001, **their confessions a dream come true for the U.S. government**, according to Temple-Raston.'*

EXCHANGES, SPEECH FUNCTIONS AND GRAMMATICAL MOOD

Contrary to the Krauthammer's text, the predominant type of exchange here is knowledge exchange, as there are few cases of deontic modality in the text which is generally a marker of an activity exchange. There are no demands in the text but there is a single occurrence of an offer:

*'Her book **should be** required reading for any Muslim or non-Muslim who mistakenly believes the faith is immutable.'*

Metaphorical relations between types of statement are scarce, although there is a single occurrence of an evaluation disguised into the statement of fact:

*'But the greater challenge is to find sources as **well-researched** and **measured** as this book.'*

ASSUMPTIONS AND EVALUATION

An existential assumption in the text is rooted in the collocation *'young Muslims'* sometimes expressed as *'young men'* presented as a primary target group for the recruitment by the radicals. Another case of existential assumption in the article, which verges on the value assumption, is the idea that anyone who believes that faith is immutable is *'mistaken'*. The author is therefore advocating for a dynamic view of Islam, which has altered its shape in the modern world.

A few propositional assumptions are to be found in the text. Thus, in the conditional question posed in the beginning there is a proposition that Islam bears something *inherently violent'* in itself:

*'If Muslims living in dramatically different societies, in vastly different circumstances and conditions in the East and West, are similarly drawn to extremism, does this mean there is something **inherently violent** in the Islamic tradition?'*

Similarly, the author asks further in the text whether Islamic sources advocate violence in certain circumstances presenting it as a proposition or something to be tested.

Value assumptions are contained mostly in the attributes that the author applies. Thus, it is estimated by her that the Temple-Raston's book is *'breezy'* and *'well-written'* and Asma Afsaruddin's work is *'eloquent'* and *'cogent'*, which are all in all positive evaluations.

MODALITY

Since most of the speech presented in the article is an account of other texts, Abdo's level of commitment to the truth is impossible to examine. In the few cases where modality occurs, it generally corresponds to the commitment of the originator of the speech reported by Abdo. The modality in the text is thus more transparent in the context of the commitment level of the person whose speech is reported. Some of these persons are the two authors of the books referred to. The following examples illustrate the case.

Temple-Raston outlines how easily young men practicing their faith at a local mosque and leading mundane lives **can be** convinced, however briefly, that taking their faith to the next level **could be** achieved by becoming warriors for al-Qaeda.

Afsaruddin's goal in taking the reader through historical interpretations of jihad is that Islam, contrary to contemporary criticism, has never been frozen in time -- and **should not be**.

In these cases, it is nearly impossible to uncover whose level of commitment to the truth is in question, the author's or the originator's of the reported speech.

INTERTEXTUALITY

There are several cases of the reported speech, most of them being indirect cases. The text generally possesses a very high level of intertextuality as it is abundant with the accounts of the other texts to the extent when it is difficult to tell whether the voice belongs to Abdo or to the original author of the speech reported by Abdo. This designates the article more as a report in comparison to Krauthammer's editorial where his individuality was much more salient. The reporter's personality is not as visible here. One of the cases of confusion as to whose voice might be present, the author's or the originator's of what is reported, is the following example:

'They were evidence, according to the government, that the **so-called** *war on terror was real, and more important, that jihad had moved next door. '*

The sentence is a piece of the narrative attached to the contents of Temple-Raston's book. However, it is quite impossible to say who the ironic collocation *'so-called'* belongs to: Abdo, Temple-Raston who is the author of the book, or the government. All of the three voices are represented in the text.

There are also several degrees of the reported speech. Thus, the only two direct quotations in the text are the reported speech themselves, being respectively the quote from the Quran brought from Afsaruddin's book and a quote of the Islamic philosopher Ibn Khaldun from the same source.

The original texts in question, however, the two books reviewed, are not as relevant for the discourse analysis in this case as the way Abdo presents them and what information she chooses to pick out from them.

SUMMARY OF LINGUISTIC FEATURES OF THE ARTICLE

The piece's genre is largely homogenous and consists of a narrative genre as it sums up and reviews other stories. It is abundant with temporal relations between clauses characteristic of a narrative. The article is mostly written as a food for thought with lots of propositions, or hypotheticals, expressed as questions to be answered by the reader, rather than statements. The author is barely present in the article and at times it is hard to distinguish whose voice appears in a sentence: the author's or the originator's of the idea reported. The relations between clauses seem to be hardly metaphorical, just as the lexical metaphors are scarce in the text. The latter is generally being directly borrowed from the text of the reported speech rather than being Abdo's invention. A curious construction is the contrasting notion of *'the East'* and *'the West'* ornamented with the definite article *'the'.* The omittance of these articles could signify different geographical directions while their presence positions them as well-defined territorial and ideological entities that have earlier been constructed in other texts.

4.4 Summing Up Findings and Tendencies

4.4.1 Thematic Patterns and Trends 2001-2008

Social Events

The social event in focus remains the 9/11 in some of the articles of the initial period after the hijackings.[81] In the rest of the articles the point of reference appears to be more abstract; it is rather a network of social practices named 'Islamic terrorism' and all of the questions assisting the discourse on religious terrorism, such as what the roots of religious radicalism are. This issue in the material is reviewed from two different points of view. The first one addresses Muslim religious tenets and their interpretations in attempt to find explanation of the phenomenon of radicalism; the second one rejects religious origin of extremism, or mentions it marginally, and focuses on socio-economic situation of the radicals' countries of origin and the US political role on the world scene. Thus, there has been a movement from a concrete representation of 9/11 to a more abstract depiction of it examining its roots and consequences as an act of terror.

Difference and Equivalence

There are several instances of contrasts traced in the material examined. Most of them have something to do with the identity construction of the terrorists, as difference signifies identity markers to differentiate those who belong to the community from those who don't. (Jackson, 2005: 61) The difference patterns are the following:

'Good' versus 'Bad' Muslims [82]

This is one of the most common difference patterns in the material. Article 9, for instance, clearly distinguishes between *'Islamic fanatics'* with *'inhuman values'* and *'Muslims who honor tolerance and human dignity'.* According to Jackson, these elements are an echo of the official rhetoric, as there was a danger that the terrorists would be viewed as being representative of Muslims in general, which could initiate a global religious war. (Jackson, 2005:64)

From the religious perspective, it presents a fascinating construction which expresses the notion that the terrorists are 'traitors' to their own religion, that they have perverted its teachings. One may assume that this is another way of saying that terrorists are outside the moral community. However, the ties between Islam and terrorists are never cut off as the notion of radicalism never loses its bond to Islam in the material examined, except for one instance in article 7 that does not make any direct references to Islam as such and examines the cause for terrorism from the socio-political and Orientalistic point of view. The latter refers to the roots of radicalism inherent to the man of Oriental origin rather than a Muslim.

---

[81] 9/11 is presented as a concrete social event in the articles 1,2 and 4; other articles are referring to an abstract act of terrorism.
[82] This pattern is found in articles 2,5,8,9 and 11.

Muslims versus Arabs[83]

This occurrence is traced in article 3 from September 15, 2001, presented in the following manner:

'*It will get worse when we find ourselves looking at individual **Muslims and Arabs** (including **Muslim and Arab Americans**) as fit targets for our vengeance.*'

This is one of the rare distinctive constructions for the discourse on religious terrorism where the difference between Muslims and Arabs as separate groups - religion and ethnicity - is taken account of. This explanatory detail on the identity of the enemy is a single occurrence in the material. Even though the semantic cohesion of the two groups in the sentence unites them and creates a bridge between the two, the fact that they are mentioned as two different *groups* positions them as collectives *different* from each other.

Muslims versus terrorists

Another contrast involves separation of 'Muslims' from 'terrorists', such as in article 6 from October 11, 2001. However, the distinction is weakened by the claim that there is *'a **strand of Islam** that has opted for **violence**'* and that *'**violence** has donned the garb of **Islam**'.* These claims, voicing a coherence of a certain type of Islam with violence, put this distinction straight into the 'good' versus 'bad' Muslim slot, giving relative legitimacy to the ties of 'Islam' and 'violence'.

The 'Muslims versus terrorists' distinction is generally more characteristic of the initial articles (1-3), which strongly echo with the official rhetoric on the days right after 9/11, particularly the words of George W. Bush, outlining a few times that it is not the Muslims one is out there to fight, but the 'evil'. [84]

Arabs are the perpetrators rather than Muslims

This claim belongs to the authors who argue for the socioeconomic reasons for terror rather than religious, such as poverty and authoritarian conditions of the terrorists' countries of origin. Article 8 from September 18, 2003, that deliberately minimizes the number of clauses mentioning religion concentrating on poverty and socioeconomic conditions as a reason for terrorism, calls the recruiters *'**Arab** commanders'* and those working with Al Qaeda for *'**Arab** radicals'*. Even the protagonist in the article is quoted to use the 'Arab'-word: *""**The Arabs**, they mostly want to blow up U.S. embassies. They're mostly al Qaeda."*

---

[83] This pattern is found in article 3.
[84] This is one of George W. Bush's claims on Islam versus evil a few days following the attacks. This point has been repeated by the Administration over and over again in official speeches. *"The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war."* Remarks by George W. Bush at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., September 17, 2001

The opposite tendency, however, is stronger. Many of the articles, such as article 7, 10 and 11 omit the word 'Arab' wholly. Thus, article 9 reveals the 'Muslim' bias in enemy identification rather than 'Arab' one.

'*The next administration will need to pursue a revised strategy that puts **Muslim governments** and institutions on the front line of a **civil war within Islam** that the United States was drawn into on Sept. 11, 2001.*'

The noun phrase *'**Muslim** governments'* appears in the article several times, supplemented with a similar one, *'**Muslim** societies'*, that according to the article *'must now assume to cleanse themselves of fanatical fringe groups and ideologies'*. The emphasis in the article that marks a 2004 presidential race with terrorism being high on political agenda lies distinctively on Islam as the root for terrorism.

This difference is essential as discourse analysis focuses not only on what is *present* in the text but what the text *omits* in comparison to other texts. It is thus notable that there is a stronger emphasis on Muslims rather than Arabs in the texts on terrorism, even though the 'Arab' might not be mentioned in these texts at all. I also found this contrast worth mentioning against the background of the fact that some articles contain the word 'Arab'. Thus, article 2 features the collocation '*Arab Americans'* where Arabs are not described as 'Muslims' but as 'Arabs'. This implies that the reference to ethnicity is a safer move than a reference to the religion of Islam.

DISCOURSES

MILITARY DISCOURSE

This discourse is present in all of the articles examined, which points at an undeniable cohesion of the discourse on religious terrorism with the question of security. Familiar historical references, such as the instances of World War II and the Cold War, are employed, so constructing the discursive cohesion is superfluous – it metaphorically projects itself from the earlier historical events. Thus, reference to Pearl Harbor alone takes place in the first three articles immediately after the attack. Reference to the Cold War appears in articles 1 and 2.

Otherwise the military discourse expresses itself in a variety of ways. The articles written immediately after 9/11 contain a call for strengthening of the national defence system and reinvigorating U.S. Marshall program.[85] Most articles refer to 9/11 as a combat or a military intervention, article 4 naming it a *'combat in the Revolutionary War'*, which virtually gives terrorists a right to conduct their deeds from a military perspective. By calling the terrorists' deed

---

[85] Examples from article 2.

a *'mission'* and by claiming that Bin Laden has his *'base of operations',* the author of the article 4 makes a reference to them as military warriors turning their motives into a legitimate cause.

Military discourse is frequently metaphorically fusioned with the moral discourse. Thus, article 10 presents a row of negative qualities such as *'alienation, blind hatred and fanaticism'* that can *'explode… like firecrackers'.* Such merging creates an allusion to their transition into a human bomb and justifies the cause to fight the aforementioned qualities.

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE

These two discourses are often incorporated into each other and appear in nearly all of the articles. Religious discourse indicators usually appear in terms of semantics of the words applied in the article as well as the way the events are described. Thus, article 5 features a fact that a Roman Catholic priest was on one of the deadly planes on 9/11, which indirectly represents attack on Christianity as a Western and American value. Religious references are employed as hijackers are compared to demons: *'It takes a special kind of **demon** to destroy **life** and **liberty** without regard to human existence.*[86]*'* (article 2) Thus, terrorists are individually or collectively marked as satanic and morally corrupt.

Moral discourse appears here in terms of universal values such as 'life' and 'liberty' of human existence, highlighting the bestiality of terrorists. Article 4 features religious discourse through its archaic language in attempt to explain Bin Laden's tactics. According to the author of article 4, he assures *'his followers that they will ascend to heaven for killing the enemies of Islam…as martyrs'.* The image of a martyr is not only applied to 'Islamic jihadists' but also to American heroes calling them *'American martyrs'* for their *'moral strength and bravery'* as in article 7.

Terrorists are frequently called 'evil', which falls perfectly well as a Biblical term within the Christian usage for the Devil [87]. As Jackson claims, *"the language of evil moralises the conflict, transforming it into a cosmic struggle between the forces of goodness and light against the forces of darkness and evil."* (Jackson, 2005:66-69) Consequentially, it leads toward a crusader or inquisitional mentality. The rhetorical strategy employed most often is one of personification – creating a human version of supernatural evil, which is so skilfully done in article 4. The discourse of evil also suppresses questions about the terrorists' motivations for the attacks.

A mixture of discourses is a common matter. Thus, article's 2 *'may justice prevail'* concentrates both moral, religious and legal discourse. Jackson argues, that the just war narrative lies in the inherent religiosity of American society as protestant Christianity is in fact deeply embedded in American political and cultural life. (Jackson. 2005:122) A Muslim protagonist in article 8, recruited to commit acts of terror, is wondering *'how to answer him* (one of the victims) *on a Judgement Day'.* Through this religious metaphor the author creates an image of morally virtuous person trapped by the evil force of 'Islamic terrorism'.

---

[86] 'Demon' or 'evil' is defined here as anybody who tries to affect the lives of good Americans.
[87] The 'evil' or 'demonic' image of terrorists appears in articles 5, 6, 7.

This discourse appears mostly in two ways in the material: either to explain the causes of terror or to define the consequences of it and draft a plan for future action. Thus, the former is usually about the US's role on the world political scene, the support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being the most popular reference[88]. The recommendations for future actions appear in article 2 whose author argues for the review of immigration laws *'that allow nefarious individuals from hostile states entry into the United States'* as well as empowering *' law enforcement agencies with the authority to wiretap, eavesdrop, detain and question individuals suspected of plotting terrorist activities.'* The official rhetoric is directly translated here into the voice of a reader who wrote this letter, as both of the suggestions have been acted upon politically since then.

LEGAL DISCOURSE

This type of discourse is minimal in the material examined. It is either used in terms of the universal justice corresponding with the moral and religious domain, such as holding the terrorists *'accountable'* and performing '*retaliation and punishment'*[89]*,* or pushed into the background by the military discourse. Article 1 rejects the legitimacy of the legal discourse arguing for the military intervention. Article 4 mentioned 9/11 as *'the most spectacular crime in American history'*, immediately adding that it was *'a combat in a Revolutionary war'*, and thus dismissing the legitimacy of the legal discourse as well. The style of legal discourse is traced now and then, for instance in article 4:

 '*What happened in the coming minutes and hours on the four hijacked planes is still being **pieced together**, the **forensic evidence** largely **obliterated**.'*

Or in article 5, where the hijackers are named as *'a dangerous band of **outlaws'*.**

Legal discourse is one of the minor discourses in the material but it is definitely there and is worth mentioning. Most importantly, it yields its positions to a much more powerful military discourse, so it gets lost as the arguments for retaliation get louder.

FAMILY DISCOURSE

This type of discourse is especially characteristic of the articles published immediately after 9/11[90]. It is employed mostly in two ways. Firstly, to demonstrate that all of America has been a victim of the attacks as one big family and that its core values have been assaulted. Thus, article 3 features mourning of *'the loved ones'* and '*someone who knows someone who lost someone.'* Article 4 demonstrates the terrorists' ability to blend into the American way of life, mentioning that their children played with *'American kids in their neighborhoods'.* Secondly, it is a tool for demonstrating terrorist bestiality and fanaticism since not even a thought of a family or loved

---

[88] Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the US support of Israel as a reason for terrorism is mentioned in the articles 4 and 5.
[89] Examples are taken from article 5.
[90] Family discourse appears at most in articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8.

ones managed to stop them. In fact family discourse supplements moral discourse and creates a notion of unity in the American community making an accent on the unifier of the population – human feelings of loss and grief.

DISCOURSE OF THE 'NEW'

Discourse of the 'New' is traced evenly throughout the period in articles 3, 7, 5, 9 and 11, spanning in time from 2001 until 2008. According to Jackson, it is a *reflexive* discursive move which involves going back and linguistically remaking the original object or context into something new. (Jackson, 2005: 39) Thus, an example from article 9 demonstrates the global nature of the religious terror after 9/11, overly unique and different from previous terror attacks, which requires *new* means to deal with:

'…these strategic gains must be consolidated into a **new** approach that establishes the obvious: Not only Americans or Britons or Italians are threatened by the hatemongers and must act to defend themselves.'

Intimidation takes place with predictions in article 3 that '*the horror…will reach **new** levels'.* The discourse of the 'new', however, is also used in non-intimidating sense. Article 11 features a 'new' version of Islam that is contrary to the rigid and archaic interpretation of it and that is important for Westerners to comprehend. Similarly, the terrorist in article 8 gets a 'new' life, 'new' apartment, and a 'new' wife. However, even these domestic commodities do not stop him from committing terror.

The discourse of the 'new' echoes with the notion of America as God's chosen land – a new nation facing new challenges in the world in contrast with the 'old' Europe. (Jackson, 2005:149) This sense of being disconnected from history is powerfully echoed in American place names too: New Mexico, New England, New Jersey, New Hampshire, etc.

MEDICAL DISCOURSE

This discourse in conjunction with the terrorism discourse is used metaphorically, and corresponds well with the moral discourse. Thus, article 3 features a comparison of *'the terrorist cells'* with an '*anti-Western cancer in metastasis*' predicting its development into a *'malignant'* form. This kind of language is a frequent mark of a terrorist discourse, depicting terrorists as spawn, animals and parasites. (Jackson, 2005: 73)

DISCOURSE OF THE 'TERRORIST NEXT DOOR'

What is particularly notable throughout the material is the notion that terrorists are close, which essentially contributes to the notion of inevitability of new attacks. Thus, article 4 features the word 'neighbour' eleven times as well as a widely popular metaphor of a hijacker being *'next door'* three times. The same metaphor is traceable in one of the book names mentioned in article 11. It calls upon the diligence of Americans and a need for tighter security: Americans must join the fight to secure the "*home*land".

4.4.2 LINGUISTIC PATTERNS AND TRENDS 2001-2008

Revealing tendencies in linguistic analysis of the eleven articles must be seen as complementary to the discourses revealed in the thematic analysis. These tendencies reflect the features of the texts containing these discourses and thus, might be the features constitutive of the discourse on terrorism in general. Scholars might feel as if they are doing a puzzle blindfolded when searching for linguistic patterns as indicators of a particular discourse, as they mostly appear to make sense only at the end of the whole process, when tendencies are pointed out and organized into a coherent pattern.

Below are some of the tendencies in the material which might have effect on the discourse in general. The immediate post-9/11 texts, such as the articles 1-3 from 2001, are more or less homogenic in style and highly modalized. The modality expresses itself archetypically through modal verbs and there is a clear prevalence of deontic modality in the first three articles. It urges a call for action, and therefore is written in a genre of *hortatory report*.[91] Epistemic modality is also a favourite feature of the material, prevailing more or less constantly throughout the whole period examined evenly, in the first articles as well as in the last ones[92]. It ranges from the past forms of modality with respect to what *'could have been'* done to prevent the attacks (article 2), to pondering on the nature of who hijackers *'may'* be and what they *'could'* do (articles 2, 3, 4). Epistemic modality is equally projected both on the predictions of the future ('what could happen if we don't fight Islamic extremists') and on the present nature of things.

Relationships between clauses are largely hypotactic throughout the period examined; paratactic clauses prevail in the narrative stories such as article 4 and articles 8 and 11. Composite clauses, however, are often disguised into simple sentences, separated by a full stop, to create an illusion of informal speech popular in newspaper editorials. Minor clauses - another popular occasion in the articles - are employed for the same reason. Additive and elaborative relations are also popular with the narrative reports as they accumulate details about events.

In terms of exchange, knowledge exchange is predominant in the material examined, though not in the initial period, where activity exchange takes over setting a focus on narrative descriptions of what actually happened on 9/11[93]. Knowledge exchange with its statements about the world as it 'is' appears highly present in the articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 and 10. Since these articles are dated from September 16, 2001 until July 16, 2005, this could indicate that the media needed a period of at least three days up to several years after the social event of 9/11 to make sense of what was going on and how to interpret the events.

Exchanges are tightly connected with the activated and passivated types of verbs as they either focus on a process (activity) or event (knowledge about a social event). Passivated verbs are found practically in every article examined. However, activated verbs are found in the narratives that

---

[91] For example, in article 2 the modal verb *'need to'* urging for action has been used 7 times.
[92] Epistemic modality is found in articles 2-4, 8-9, 10
[93] Activity exchange is found in the articles 1,2 from 2001 and articles 8 and 10, from 2003 and 2005 respectively.

contain plenty of activity exchange[94]. Some of the passivated verbs are applied in order to focus on the process itself rather than its agents. For instance, example from article 4: *"Can Islamic Law be overhauled?"* does not indicate an active participant performing the 'overhauling'. Another example comes from article 2: *"Passengers are not interviewed".* The accent is not on the airport security staff that does the interviews but the absence of the practice itself. Passivated language, according to Fairclough, is an indicator of the influence on language of new capitalism[95] and neo-liberalism[96]. (Fairclough, 2003:12)

Questions are found in the nine of the eleven articles[97], with several occurrences within one piece. The questions are asked either on behalf of the author, or in direct or indirect speeches of the voices involved in the text such as a collective voice of Americans as a group victim (Article 3: *'Why do so many in the Muslim world consider us the enemy?'*) or individual Americans affected by 9/11 like the neighbours to the hijackers (Article 4: *'Why were these people holding meetings so late at night?'*). Their questions are mostly of *'why'*-nature presenting an attempt to understand the incentives of the 'Other'.

The presence of different voices brings us to the question of intertextuality, which ranges in level from minimal to high. One important contrast in reporting as Fairclough argues is *"between reports which are relatively 'faithful' to what is reported, quoting it (…) and those which are not."* (Fairclough, 2003:49) Article 10 presents an example of 'not' being 'faithful' to what was earlier said by the President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, which appears to be *'pretty much the same thing'* as Blair put it. The question of loyalty in reported speech also extends to what the author thinks about the reported piece of text. Some of them are presented negatively, only to be argued against, like the Middle East expert's William O. Beeman's quote in article 3. Bin Laden is being quoted too, directly, in article 4. Most of the direct quotes appear in narratives such as article 4, 8 and 11.

In terms of statements the articles are generally rich on hypotheticals which are found in almost every text (usually expressed by an *if*-clause), and abundant with evaluations and predictions. Evaluations are especially obvious in the first articles immediately after 9/11, when emotional tension is high and feelings of grief and fear are at their top. Predictions are characteristic of the articles that attempt to present answers to the question *why* 9/11 took place. They are predominant in articles 3 and 5 from 2001 and article 9 from 2004.

Fowler urges to pay special attention to the patterns in the noun phrases when examining characteristics of a discourse. He argues that they provide a set of stylistic 'templates'

---

[94] Articles with the most activity exchange and the least number of passivated verbs are the narratives 4, 8 and 10.
[95] New capitalism is characterized by the increasing power of organizations operating at increasingly global scales over individuals, which also affects linguistic practices. For example, impersonalizing the language. (Fairclough, 2003:75)
[96] Neo-liberalism is a concept borrowed from French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (cf. "The Essence of Neoliberalism." *Le Monde,1*998) that signifies political project for facilitating the re-structuring and re-scaling of social relations in accordance with the demands of an unrestrained global capitalism. (Fairclough, 2003:4).
[97] The only articles that do not contain questions are 6, 7 and 9.

homogenizing the discourse. (Fowler, 1993:171-173) Being used frequently they serve as an indicator of a particular discourse for a reader.

Noun phrases may be simple, consisting just of a noun (e.g., 'terror') or a determiner and a noun ('the terrorism') or complex, for example those accompanied by a modifier (an adjective). In this respect I would like to pay particular attention to the use of the word 'jihad'[98]. Out of the variety of ways to define the concept, most of the articles apply it as a military struggle or a literal fight against the 'infidels'. In the case of article 10 it is also used within the collocation *'violent jihad'*, which appears to be a tautology considering the definition of jihad as a matter for violent means unanimously used in the material examined. The only place where the distinction appears to be made from the popular definition is in article 6 claiming that jihad is not only the war against others but also an attempt to redeem oneself. However, this definition quickly disappears in the author's claims of Islam being prone to serving as a tool for violence.

Generally noun phrases lie on the verge of the linguistic and thematic analysis, just as the lexical features do, so they are also examined as the discursive markers in the thematic analysis of the texts.

On a morphological level one tendency is common for the articles involved: many of them are featuring the suffix '-ism' when it comes to describing the features of terror*ism.* Thus, words like 'Islamism', 'fanaticism', 'extremism', 'radicalism' are all characteristic of the 'enemy' ideology. No '-isms' describing the Western values are found in the material. The suffix generally denotes a distinctive system of beliefs, myth or doctrine that guides a social movement, institution, class or group. The fact that this morphological particle is used in the words describing opposing ideology might show the media's attempt to depict it as a deeply institutionalized and indoctrinated environment reluctant to alternatives or change.

It has not been a simple task to sum up linguistic features of such diversified material but the general patterns presented above might serve as linguistic indicators of a discourse on religious terrorism.

4.5   CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter features the main findings of the discourse analysis of the articles according to the guidelines outlined by Norman Fairclough. I have deliberately divided them into two templates, linguistic and thematic, to structure the findings and make the most salient of them visible throughout the chosen period of time. It is essential to admit though, that the analysis was purely textual, as the layout, the format of the page, possible colours and the graphics of the printed pieces have been largely ignored. These factors are of vital significance for the reader's interpretation. However, they require other semiotic media theories to be incorporated in the analysis, which is not the subject of the present work.

---

[98] The concept of 'jihad' appears in articles 1, 4, 6, 10 and 11.

It is also worth mentioning that there is no single procedure which, when applied to data, will automatically reveal something about it. There is no constant relationship between linguistic structure and its semiotic significance. (Fowler, 1993:90) Every case is individual and the list of grammatical or thematic features, be it modality or lexical cohesions, is selected for examination by an individual scholar according to the questions asked and material presented.

The two articles analyzed in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3 also feature Orientalistic analysis along with the discourse analysis. Orientalistic and identity construction analysis of all of the empirical material will take place in Chapter 5.0.

5.0 "US" VERSUS "THEM" OCCURRENCE

5.1 OVERALL TENDENCIES IN THE ARTICLES

5.1.1 CONFIGURING THE SELF AND THE OTHER

'Je est un autre.'[99]

Arthur Rimbaud, French poet

The process of identity construction discussed above suggested that discursive construction of 'the Other' is a half-way construction of the 'Self'. According to Said, the Western person only exists as a contract with 'the Orient other'. (cf. Said 1978) As mentioned before, this is achieved linguistically through the use of the binary opposites, meaning that every word can be contrasted with its antonym. At a culturally-political level the civilised Western world is contrasted with the violent and barbaric Eastern world, which I intend to show through the examples in the articles.

CONSTRUCTING 'THEM'

There is no doubt that 'the Muslim Other' as a type of the radical other exists and presents a threat. Article 5 from September 16, 2001 begins with the notion that the attackers were *'surely Muslims'*, elevating Islam and Muslims to a security issue:

*'…after the funerals and our military reprisals, our country still has to exist in **a world with 1 billion Muslims, about one-third of them in the Middle East**. And the same forces that helped create the **fanatics** who attacked us **will still be there**.'*

The sense of globalization and a harsh reality in this piece is clearly notable. According to Jackson, seeing 9/11 as an attack on globalisation and world economic progress is a part of the civilisation versus barbarism discourse. (Jackson, 2005: 51) In terms of globalization, a division into 'worlds'

---

[99] 'I is another.'

operates clearly in some of the articles. Thus, a seemingly anti-Orientalistic theme of article 6 takes advantage of such contrasting concepts as *'a Muslim world'* versus 'the West'. So does just as modern-Muslim-friendly article 11, that puts into contrast *'the Islamic world'* and *'the West'*[100]. According to Said, this division into two separate worlds was conceived of a political nature of Orientalism which promoted the difference between the familiar (the West, 'us') and the strange (the East, 'them'). (Said, 1995:43)

The emphasis is also put on the fact that 'the Others' are the extreme version of the *'ordinary men and women in the Muslim world'*[101] who consider America to be their enemy. Through this allusion a solid link is created between the terrorist radicals and the overall population of a segment of the world which is designated as 'Muslim', underlining the potential cohesion of the 'radical Other' with the 'regular Other'. Furthermore, the noun phrase 'Muslim world' creates a distinction of the major politicized religions, Christianity and Islam, presenting the two opposing entities, the Muslim world and the West, in terms of essential differences leading to the imminent 'clash of civilizations'[102]. What is particularly notable here is that the opposition of Islam is presented not to Christianity directly, but to 'the West' as such, merging the notions of the West and Christianity into one whole, or rather underlining the arguable secularity of the 'Western' concept in contrast with the highly religious 'Muslim world'.

It's been particularly challenging to collect the blocks that constitute a personified image of the enemy – an 'Islamic terrorist', even though its figure is fairly stereotypical. In the news making process, stereotypes[103] are the currency of negotiation. Striking events will reinforce a stereotype, and the other way around: the firmer the stereotype, the more likely are relevant events to become news. (Fowler, 1993:17) The first articles published immediately after 9/11 suggest that they are evil conspirators, fanatical zealots *'committed to dying in the effort to strike a heavy blow against their enemy'*[104] and *'nefarious' 'madmen'* with *'inhuman values'*[105] ,*' evil and irrational'*[106] who cannot be dealt with in terms of diplomacy; the only language they understand is the language of war.

What presents a particular discrepancy is the image of the 'irrational barbarian' as the classical Orientalistic characteristic of an Eastern man, as it is hardly reconciled with the terrorist image of

---

[100] The distinction is also noticed in article 10 where it is also argued that the U.S. is a part of the Western world.

[101] Example from article 3.

[102] 'The Clash of civilizations' is originally the term of political scientist Samuel P. Huntington who proposed a thesis of inevitability of global conflicts along the lines of religious and cultural identities which he defined into particular monolithic entities - civilizations. (cf. Huntington "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", 1998, Simon & Shuster). This highly provocative essentialist theory has been harshly criticized by Edward Said in his article "The Clash of Ignorance" from October 22, 2001. Link from 4.06.2008: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said ""The Clash of Civilizations" thesis is a gimmick like "The War of the Worlds," better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time." (Said, "The Clash of Ignorance")

[103] A stereotype is a socially constructed mental pigeon-hole into which events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and individuals comprehensible. Stereotypes are creative: they are categories projected on to the world in order to make sense of it. (Fowler, 1993:17)

[104] Example from article 3.

[105] Example from article 9.

[106] Example from article 7.

a conspirator being committed to his mission and highly task-oriented. And yet, this combination is present in many of the articles presented in the material. The presence of Orientalistic images in the media texts is so customary that even this discrepancy would hardly cause an immediate cacophony for the reader.

Article 4 is a great example of identity construction through the opposite. Nobody thought, as it is argued there, that the terrorists would turn out to be technologically savvy conspirators, indulging in the use of '*the Internet and the modern modes of the business travel*'. Such thinking must be the product of the traditional Orientalistic notion of an Eastern man presents him as an individual unfamiliar with the modern commodities of the world. They were *'polite and even shy'* and *'neat'*. There was nothing abnormal about them: they blended in like any other American. They even looked like typical businessmen, which is quite the opposite of the classical Orientalist image so often applied to a terrorist.[107] It is highly underlined throughout article 4 that the 'conspirators' were *'normal'* people:

*'There was one pronounced link between **the conspirators** and **the rest** of **American society**: Their children.'*

The noun phrase 'the rest' makes it clear that the author wants to highlight the fact that the conspirators were a part of the American society. However, this equivalence is not conducted with the positive intention. Here it is set to demonstrate the welcoming nature of Americans letting a Trojan horse on their land without any idea that they could be perpetrators. The nature of the latter is thus *essentially* different: they have not socialized enough with their neighbours and stayed together within their Muslim circle. Some of them even slept in twin beds.[108] The families of the 9/11 hijackers are depicted as someone inherently loyal to their traditions as they surprisingly threw a farewell party for the kids once to follow the custom of leaving a good impression upon going away no matter what. (*ibid.*)

So the radical 'Other' is said to have some particular characteristics: a conspirator blending into American way of life but deeply pious and essentially different. However, there is a tendency to generalizing, or blurring of the terrorist identity detectable some places in the material. It is claimed in article 4 that to American ears the names of the hijackers "*might seem like minor variations on a theme: Alhamzi, Al Suqami, Alghamdi, Alshehri, Alhaznawi, Alnami, Alomari, and so on*", justifying a possible confusion of the Americans hearing these names, which again groups them together as the attributes of the persons originating from an alien part of the world - the Middle East.

Evaluations of the perpetrators explicitly depict them as *inferior* to the Western man. Consider the following characteristic from article 4 by an airline pilot training one of the hijackers:

---

[107] Example from article 4.
[108] Example from article 4.

*'He just wasn't a good student with the dedication we see in **U.S. Air Force pilots** that train there or **European airline pilots**.'*

According to Said, the idea that European culture is a superior one in comparison to all non-European cultures is the root of Western hegemony over the Oriental backwardness. (Said, 1995:7) He also argues that it is America that has dominated the Orient since the World War II. (Said, 1995:4) However, his thesis about Americans having weaker emotional ties in their attitude towards the Orient than Europe is not necessarily true: the religious terrorism discourse in America at present seems to take greater amplitude than the European leading discourses that are more concerned with the notion of 'the Other' within the borders of their national lands resulting, for example, in a strong immigration discourse.

One personification strikes as being particularly observable throughout the material. It is the image of a *'young man'*, or a *'young Muslim', 'a listless teenager'* or a male in his twenties, as a terrorist.[109] Radicalism is thus presented as a dark force recruiting innocent youth. This 'young man' is a different and a more humane image of 'the Other' who is depicted as initially innocent and moral human being who got trapped into the world of radicalism and its pervert ideas. This image is sometimes completed by the eventual realization of the young man in question that the chosen path was essentially wrong, and his subsequent repentance takes place.[110]

Another notable feature of the discourse is that it is extremely gendered, reflecting male and female roles in a patriarchal way. This is a constant characteristic throughout all of the material, which is filled with stereotypically masculine roles, from terrorist perpetrators to the firefighters and police officers. The Muslim females are presented just as stereotypically in a role of an oppressed female as in the narrative articles 4 and 8.

There is also an image of another 'Other' - a non-radical 'Other' - a much less personified image of a 'good' Muslim who honours *'tolerance and human dignity'[111]*. This 'Muslim' is presented as a philanthropic and peaceful human in a global sense with all-loving attitude to all kinds and races, which is an idealized image throughout the material, as *none* of these Muslims are given a voice, directly or indirectly. This omittance represents an Orientalistic move as according to Said, the Western hegemony is governed by '*some version of truism'* that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the West does the job for *'the poor Orient'*. (Said, 1995:21-22)

Construction of 'the Other' is not only about personification of the alien. In the case of religious terrorism, it is just as much about constructing a notion of the other religion – Islam. Article 6 gives a detailed description of the nature of Islam as prone to violence in attempt to investigate why Islam has become '*a privileged channel of protest'*. It is argued here that one of the reasons for it is Islam's inclination to the fusion of the religious with the political. A similar tendency,

---

[109] The occurrence of a young man as a terrorist can be found in articles 4, 5, 6, 8 and 11.
[110] The realization-and-repentance pattern is traceable in articles 8 and 11.
[111] Example from article 9, but references appear also in articles 2, 3 and 11.

however, might just as well be traced in the American politics, perhaps even to a greater extent than in Europe, with its highly politicized debates on such morally religious issues as the right to abortion and gay marriage. The tradition for politicizing these issues has been present in the American politics for so long that we have almost stopped seeing it as elements of religion in the politics. It is also argued here that Islam turns traditional arguments on right and wrong into holy debates on 'good' and 'evil'. As demonstrated in the analysis above, American media tends to do exactly the same in their construction of the identity of 'the Other'. Moreover, it borrows this discourse from the official discourse of the Administration. It is further argued in the article that Islam's status as an oppressed religion long besieged by non-Muslims is *self-perceived.* It is not entirely wrong, as many scholars in the Middle East adopted the Western teachings on their region, consciously or unconsciously. However, Said skilfully argues that this image of Islam comes from the scholarly and literary traditions of the West. (Said, 1995: 16-19) The construction of Islam as 'the Other' here implies that conflicts happen because of the inherent nature of 'the Other', not of the doings of 'the Self'.

The struggle is described to be happening between the two world contesters. Linguistically, however, it is often omitted that there are two versions of reality in the controversy. The representation of the conflict tends to be predominantly flat and one-sided: America is often presented as a victim and the perpetrators of Middle Eastern origin as assaulters. They are argued to be '*mostly interested in their own power. They don't care who dies and who survives.*'[112] The conflict is thus presented as a power-struggle urging America to self-defence.

The notion of 'the Other' is thus a complex and multifaceted construction operating both on the level of personification of the alien and on the level of formation of the public view on alien concepts. This virtually implies that the notion of 'the Self' is just as multifaceted, since it often operates in contrasting terms from 'the Other'.

CONSTRUCTING 'US'

In times of crises like 9/11 an urge for unification of the nation is a natural but not an easy move to conduct in such a versatile community as American. American virtues are brought into the surface; drawbacks are carefully hidden. Those who died in the attacks, such as the fire-fighters doing the rescuing, are respectively described as victims and heroes, which is a common discursive reaction to death and tragedy. In the time where the unification is pivotal, even the nation's diversity is described as a common virtue: the process of creating equivalence of a difference.[113] It is notable that America, though a unique nation, is often mentioned as a part of the West. Article 4, for example, contains a paragraph describing Osama Bin Laden's aim as '*to cleanse the Muslim world of **Western** influences*' explaining his motifs by being enraged by American support of Israel and the presence of American soldiers-infidels- in Saudi Arabia. 'The Western influence' gradually turns into 'American' influence in the text. My estimate is that 'the West' in this context is employed to underline the global nature of terrorism meaning that no one is safe as it is a value

---

[112] Example from article 8.
[113] Example from article 2.

struggle rather than a territorial or a political one. The virtues of Americans are extracted from the images of the aforementioned 'Other'. Its core values according to the material are generosity, kindness, resourcefulness, diversity, bravery, sacrifice, welcoming nature, love and unity to be found within social circles and institutions. These are presented as values that terrorists are out to destroy out of hate for the only world's superpower.[114]

As a nation, America is depicted as an unquestionable leader both technologically in the field of modernization, and politically, restoring democratic 'order' in the third world countries including the Middle East. The American Exceptionalism myth is employed with the unification aim to convince the public that they are the ones to serve as example for the rest of the world.

Personification is an undoubtedly strong strategy in the unification process. There are lots of images of ordinary Americans in the material, especially present in the narratives.[115] These persons are Americans who lost someone in the tragedy of 9/11 and those who lived 'next door' to the hijackers. They are given a direct voice in the material as victims and heroes, welcoming by their nature and innocent by definition, as civilians in a military act that 9/11 has been designated. By framing them as civilians a discursive strategy is created, putting average Americans outside the frames of 9/11, thus eliminating a question of their responsibility for the government they have elected that might have politically created the circumstances for the attack.

All of the attributes of 'the Self' are symmetrically projected to the attributes of 'the Other' in the terrorist discourse. This paradigm operates with strong constructions of contrast, where no common characteristics with the radical 'Other' appear in the discourse. Alternative to this discourse could have been creating a bridge of equivalence to 'the Other', for example, presenting both 'the Self' and 'the Other' as representatives of human race where any violent action against someone related to other human beings is morally doomed. The differences between 'the Self' and 'the Other' are presented as essential in the material.

MODERNIZATION THEORY IN THE ARTICLES

The message of most of the articles is presented clearly: America was attacked because the attackers were totalitarian and expansionist, barbarians. The reasons for the attacks are therefore firmly rooted in the identity and nature of the attackers and not in concrete political grievances. As Jackson puts it, official discourse is so well translated into the media that it transforms the official message that America was attacked for its virtues rather than failings in an unmediated manner. (Jackson, 2005:54) Article 5 provides a good example on the issue, claiming that '*it is no coincidence that his recruits are coming mostly from countries where these factors breed frustration, anger and hate toward America. From Algeria to Egypt to Yemen, from Iraq to Pakistan, military or authoritarian governments -- many of them U.S. allies -- deny their citizens*

---

[114] Example from article 6.
[115] Examples found in articles 2 and 4.

basic freedoms...'[116] The underlying assumption here is that the core societies breeding terrorists are not developed enough democratically to control extremism.

In other words, the radicals and their Eastern countries of origin need to keep up with the technological progress of the West. It is 'them' who do not understand 'us', hardly the other way around: *'Its proponents, who seek to expand Islam throughout the world,* **display a woeful ignorance of life in the United States**, *reject moderate Islam's historical tolerance for other faiths and show no interest in the scientific mind-set that is* **at the root of the West's technological progress.'***(ibid.)*

It is the Middle Eastern region that is the source of the problems according to the article. A quote of a Jordanian teacher suggests that Islam has a long way to go to keep up with the technological revolution: *'I don't think we have succeeded yet in combining our modernization with the indispensable part of our life, which is Islam.'* (*ibid.*)

Similarly, article 9 describes Muslim growing propensity towards common human values as a *'progress over the moral and strategic blindness that prevailed in the region*[117] *on September 10, 2001.'* The word 'progress' is a marker of the modernization discourse that signifies a temporal process to achieve change.

DEPENDENCY THEORY IN THE ARTICLES

Dependency theory as an alternative to the modernization theory is often intertwined with globalization discourse, positioning the Middle East into a larger socioeconomic matrix. There are few occurrences of it in the material. However, it is vital to bring them out to show diversity of the discourse and present it as an alternative to the modernization theory. Thus, article 6, gives a reference to the negative consequences of the Middle East's position in the global socio-economic matrix, claiming that *'the influx of images and goods from the West may well create shared wants and desires, but not shared enjoyment.'* It is further argued that the rise of radical, anti-Western sentiment is a product of *'Westernization with conspicuous consumption and widening inequities; of economic injustice with faithlessness.'* It is added, however, that radicalism is just as much a product of *'faith* (Muslim, that is) *with social redemption and political salvation'*, which undermines the significance of the former arguments. This basically demonstrates the power for the Orientalistic discourse over its possible alternatives: even when they appear in the mainstream media they are frequently run over by more powerful and more hegemonic discourses.

The opposition of 'the Self' versus 'the Other' contains different equivalent facets attached to them. Thus, it is also an opposition of the present and the past as much as the opposition of rationalism versus faith. But these oppositions only exist in action and re-action to each other and shape each other's identity. What is posed as an issue here is that the image of the other is

---

[116] Example from article 5.
[117] In the Middle East – my addition.

mediated here through an American media discourse supported by particular highlights in social practice, suppressing or omitting alternative discourses altogether.

5.1.2 THE TERRORIST THREAT CONSTRUCTION

Creation of an external national threat is coherent with the creation and reinforcement of the image of 'the Other', as states typically construct the former by positing a rival state or an opposing ideology. (Jackson, 2005:116) Language is therefore designed to generate maximum fear of 'the Other', be it Islam or religious terrorists. Security according to Waever is a situation marked by the presence of a security problem *and* some adequate measure against it. (Waever, 1997:14) According to Waever et al., securitization is employed when *a referent object[118]* is presented by *securitizing actors[119]* as existentially threatened. The process of securitization contains two phases: the actors need to convince the public that preventive measures are necessary or the disaster is inevitable, so that they can implement the necessary changes provided that the public agrees to them.

The first three articles in the material, produced immediately after 9/11, contain the highest level of securitization effort. Thus, article 2 consists purely of the official rhetoric on security found in the following governmental politics designated 'the war on terror'. It is not presented as the words of an official but as an editorial written by American citizens. Here we find references both to poor airport security, which has been elevated internationally since the event, and a call for tighter immigration laws, which has frequently been a subject on the political agenda after 9/11. Article 2 spares no security measures no matter how they could affect individual freedoms: *'We need to empower law enforcement agencies with the authority to wiretap, eavesdrop, detain and question individuals suspected of plotting terrorist activities.'* Many initial articles underline a failure of American security system to detect such a disaster as 9/11[120] arguing for an improvement. Jackson claims that such language normalises both the preventive detention of thousands of suspected Muslims and the creation of informant-based systems such as the Responsible Cooperators' Program and the Terrorism Information and Prevention System Program. (Jackson. 2005:112) Calls for monitoring international monetary flow and strengthening national defence are also blocks of official discourse. It is arguable that the media plays a role of a *functional actor[121]*, while the *securitizing actors,* the government, are claiming that the national security – this time in its direct military sense – is threatened by the terrorists. Calls for foreign intervention are evident already two days after 9/11 in article 3, claiming that dramatic measures need to be implemented immediately, *'perhaps a raid into Afghanistan to capture bin Laden – pretty quickly'*. All the blocks fit into a securitization mould: a swift action is necessary if America is to survive. Article 7 sets national security on the frontline before any plausible explanation of why

---

[118] *Referent Objects* – things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.
[119] *Securitizing Actors* – actors who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened.
[120] Examples found in articles 2 and 4.
[121] *Functional Actors* according to Waever *et al.* are actors who affect the dynamics of a securitization process. Without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security. (Buzan et al., 1998:36)

the attacks took place: *'Americans have correctly focused less on trying to understand "why they hate us" than on justice and security.'*

The question of what is presented as a threat to the United States is particularly interesting. Article 3 suggests that the assaulter is not just Bin Laden but the whole 'cellular' terrorist world. It is clearly securitized, as we find arguments of the urgency of the counterstrike already in article 1, arguing for intervention into the countries responsible for breeding terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya. The whole region of the East seems to be securitized as the East is positioned against the West and Islam against Christianity. What is notable about the latter combination is that it is not always 'radical Islam' that is names to be a threat. The further we move away in time from 9/11 the more careless the journalists become about the use of 'Islam' in their texts. In the end the threat is presented more as 'Islam', and the adjective 'radical' is often forgotten.[122] Apocalyptic language of Armageddon is often employed into the texts with the most securitization effort. It creates an image that the terrorists try to kill not just thousands of innocent people but millions.[123] Successful securitization process grants the feeling of an inevitability of the attack and a constant fear where all means are justified. The result is that the public lives in constant fear of a threat the danger of another attack.

Another question of interest is what is presented as a referent object that is existentially threatened. The object of threat here is not just the territorial terrain of the US and its sovereignty but the essence of the nation with all its core values and strengths. Waever points out that whereas the referent object for a state is often its sovereignty, the nation's identity serves as a referent object for a nation. (Waever, 1997:18) My sentiment is that both the sovereignty and the identity are securitized here. Article 1 reveals that America was attacked for *'being the greatest power on the globe',* for its culture that *'"corrupts" Islamic youth',* for its economy and technology that dominate the world. American all-inclusive and diverse nature has been abused by the terrorists. Not only the values but the societal structure itself is subject to attack, such as American institutions.[124] The US core as a Western nation with its 'securitized' values was attacked.

The question of the securitizing actor is quite interesting to examine. It is certainly not the state or the nation that *acts.* Waever argues that some group (elite) acts *in the name of* state or nation *with reference to* the collectivity which should survive. (Waever, 1997:18) The actors are the Administrations and allies in their line of politics that translate their securitizing message through the media. This inevitably brings us back to the question of power[125], positioning media as a supportive medium for the actors to translate their message through. In this case, I see *The Washington Post* as a securitizing actor along with the Administration, as they pursue the same objectives with the same means (discursive constructions).

---

[122] While articles 1, 2 and 5 distinguish between the mainstream Islam and its radical version, articles 4, 6, 9 contain 'Islam' in its general sense in most of the contexts.
[123] Example from article 5.
[124] Example from article 4.
[125] See more in Chapter 3.2.2 – "Power in Discourse".

One can say for sure that the securitization process has been successful as all of the 'necessary' measures mentioned in the articles have been acted upon from the side of the government. They gained initial support from the public in the time of their conduct. The scepticism of the public spread out only a year after 9/11 as we so clearly can see from article 7. This is where the level of securitization began to decrease and the reduced degree of the threat was no longer justifying the means. From then on it has been impossible for the Administration to maintain the same level of securitization as right after 9/11. The securitization was reinforced again in the case of article 9 which was written after the invasion of Iraq. It argues for fighting the radical forces *outside* the US and a revised strategy for dealing with the 'Muslim governments' in the East. However, it has never gained the same level of public fear and support for the interventional measures as within a year after 9/11.

5.2   Concluding Remarks

Said's critique of Orientalistic thought is an excellent work. Yet there is a point of concern detected in his study regarding the use of respectively the Arabs and Islam (or 'Semitic' and 'Islamic'). These two are often interchangeable or go together in his work ('Arab or/and Muslim'). Even though he brings some remarks on Islamic Orientalism as such, Said does not elaborate much on the difference of 'Arab' and 'Muslim' in his analysis. I have attempted to pay a little extra attention to this dichotomy in my work, as separating the notions of ethnicity and faith is essential for the present study.

Securitization analysis is relevant to deconstruction of the discourse on threat. I do not wish to suggest that the terrorist threat is unreal. However, the emotive context of the threat of Islamic terrorism is certainly very high having resulted in extensive media reporting and the overall escalation of fear which Fowler would call *hysteria.* (cf. Fowler, 1993:148-150) The notable feature about hysteria is that, once established, it is self-sustained discursively, independently of its empirical context. A wave of fear can theoretically be snowballed to an enormous scale, which is crucial to take into account when dealing with any kind of discursively constructed threat. Last but not least, it is important to oppose the language of counter-terrorism not only because it creates fear but also because it damages public moral values: people are being violated, harassed, abused and killed.

To finish on a positive note, it is worth mentioning that at some point when a national threat loses its relevance, a *de-securitization* process happens. Different conflicts and contentions can create 'openings' and 'closures' in a discourse. Some media forms and journalism representations are capable of breaking the mould. They sometimes do so by humanizing the status of former 'Others', acknowledging their denied humanity. In such ways, former 'Others' can be symbolically rehabilitated, past stereotypes can be fractured and identities begin to reform. (Cottle, 2006:168)

6.0 CONCLUSION

6.1 DISCUSSING RESULTS AND REVEALING THE TRENDS

6.1.1 DISCOURSE DEVELOPMENT THROUGHOUT 2001-2008

The above analysis reveals some interesting trends in the material uncovering the changes in the terrorist discourse over time. The terrorist discourse had been a ready formation long before the dramatic events of 9/11 as earlier studies on terrorist discourse show.[126] The events of 9/11, however, intensified the earlier discursive formations and put it into a new context, argued by the government through the media to be dramatically different from the times before.

The initial period of 2001 is characterized by an increased use of the military rhetoric. It must be noted though that its occurrence is traceable in each of the articles. The initial period is defined by acceptance of the language of war by the media even before a congressional resolution had been passed. (Jamieson, 2004:137) The immediate press language after the attacks was typically described by something Jamieson calls "death of irony" and an intense endorsement of the president, both factors being characteristic of crisis coverage. (*ibid.*) What is notable here is the development of the military references in the discourse. The initial articles are filled with the World War II analogies, including the analogy between 9/11 and the Pearl Harbour events. A number of similarities include the surprise nature of assault, the way the attacks drew the US into the world conflict and the question of what the US could have done to prevent the attacks. (Jamieson, 2004:144) The Pearl Harbour analogies are mostly found in the coverage within the first 3-4 days from 9/11. They have later been suppressed because they suggested American unpreparedness to handle the attacks, which did not favour the Administration's positive representation so necessary for the nation's immediate unification.

It is arguable that the initial coverage of *The Washington Post* within a year from 9/11 has been coloured by a high level of loyalty to the official rhetoric while the anniversary articles starting from September 2002 and on have been more deviant from the official norm giving space to criticism of the official handling of the 'war on terror'. The controversy about the discourse on religious terrorism is in the fact that despite all of the media scepticism towards the politics of the government so clearly demonstrated in *The Washington Post*, the discursive constructions that were re-intensified in the post-9/11 period retained their leading positions within the hierarchy of discourses and secured their hegemony even more. Thus, even the Muslim-friendly texts operate in Orientalistic terms with discursive features so well-known from the familiar discourse on Orientalism. Orientalistic discourse turned out to be so powerful that, contrary to the coverage of 2001, later articles seemed to fall back into the Orientalistic mould at times linguistically

---

[126] One of these studies is a brilliantly written work of Douglass and Zulaika in 1996 (see bibliography for further details).

presenting Islam in general as a threat and the alien and dangerous 'Other', rather than depicting it as a radical branch of Islam as they so diligently did in the initial period.

The period from 2002 and on is also characterized by deeper attempts to explain the motifs of the terrorists, the dominant conclusion being their irrational hate of the American values and jealousy over its superiority. A less distinctive conclusion involves the US political and military intervention in the East and its support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. Whereas the period within one month from 9/11 is coloured by the careful representation of Islam and easily definable distinction of the mainstream Islam from its radical branch, the later articles (2004 and on) presented the 'Muslim world' and 'Islamic world' as largely interchangeable concepts. The overall discursive tendency after the year of 2001 and on is, paradoxically, a gradual return to an Orientalistic image of Islam as static, barbaric, unified and inflexible. These features are presented as inherent to Islam and Oriental man rather than the geographic and socio-economic terrain of the East.[127] Said argues that what appears in the West to be the emergence of, or return to, Islam is in fact a struggle in Islamic societies themselves over the definition of Islam. (Said, 1995:333) These inner discrepancies within various practices of Islam genuinely show that there is a dynamic flow in effort to reinterpret the archaic notion of Islam. Yet this process is presented in the American media as Islam's inability to tolerate other interpretations than that of its classical period.

A representation of the terrorist 'Other' has had a turbulent dynamics throughout the period. The initial articles within a year after 9/11 presented terrorist actions as carefully thought-through conspiracy. Only a year after their images began to gradually shift back into a well-established mould of an Orientalistic Eastern man; their irrational, fanatic actions were a much more salient characteristic than their conspiracy and the careful planning of the attacks. One may say that there are indications that the initial articles after the event, when the media has been utterly confused as to how to interpret the events, have been constructed mainly throughout the official rhetoric which instructed to depict hijackers as warriors-conspirators, while the later editorials have been written with minimum consultancy with the governmental officials and contained a greater number of images of fanatical barbarians when referring to the nature of the terrorists.

Said singled out a tendency in Orientalism to represent the 'Islamic terrorist' collectively. He argued that in newsreels and news photos, the Arab was always shown in large numbers and no individuality. (Said, 1995: 287) This idea is reflected in the material as there are no individual descriptions of the terrorists: they are somehow grouped together, either into a collective image or in a group of several individuals yet still remaining a *group*. Those who are presented in the articles in details are shown as inherently good-natured naïve young people caught by the evil radicals. This is a different, a more humane image of 'the Other', that still has something in common with the notion of 'the Self', allegedly the values of a moral human being and initial

---

[127] Consider the message of article 10 that states that Islamic terrorists are just as much the product of the West as of the East. The point of the article is that the level of hatred among the Islamic radicals is the same, regardless of their origin.

purity of the soul. The image of the radical 'Other' that is so carefully outlined in the first few days in *The Washington Post* after 9/11 contains absolutely no common features with 'the Self'.

Another notable tendency in the articles is that from 2005 until 2008 the notion that the authoritarian and undemocratic conditions of the terrorists' countries of origin could have shaped them as terrorists is fading away. Instead, a realization comes to mind that the terrorist hate and resentment is actually 'homegrown' in the West. Thus, the tendency to seek the reasons for terror within its own community rather than blaming it on the authoritarian governments of the East is growing stronger. This tendency is supported by a harsh media criticism of the politics of the Administration. This, however, does not remove focus from the allegedly inherently alien essence of the Eastern man and his Muslim faith as the cause for the terrorist actions. At the same time this discursive move nurtures the fear of the reader by implying that danger is 'next door' and that potential terrorists are among Americans, growing and living in the same conditions as Americans, and *still* feeling a hate that leads them to commit destructive actions. This notion is a definite contribution to what is presented as the essential differences between the Westerner and the Eastern person, underlining once again that the cause for terror lies deep inside the nature of the Easterner.

The discourse in general is characterized by its cumulative nature as it weaves together a range of other discourses, narratives and myths such as a heroic narrative of World War II and the Cold War, discourses on threat and fear such as those on the rogue states and their military dangers, enemy next door, myths of American Exceptionalism and innocence, religious and moral references, and imperial narratives of civilisation and barbarism. It is also characterized by the lack of transparency as one does not find much explanation on where the boundaries for the good and evil go, or why American politics on Israel is justified.

According to Jackson, the discourse can be considered successful when *"its words, language, assumptions and viewpoints are adopted and employed uncritically in political discourse by opposition politicians, the media, social institutions and ordinary citizens."* (Jackson, 2005:159) In these terms, the American media discourse on terrorism definitely had its effect. Moreover, it was not only accepted but keeps to be reflexively reproduced by all of the above. Another measure of the success is that it marginalized and suppressed alternative discourses and established itself as a primary language of the 'war on terror'.

In the Western study of the East, an already coded discourse dividing West and East takes over. The result is that it fails to take account of the fact that what unites us is that we are all citizens of the world and as Said put it, that we are all swimming in the same waters which are part of the ocean of history, *"Westerners and Muslims and others alike"*[128]. Other countries and people than its own seem to be designated as alien in the Orientalistic discourse, which virtually results into an inferior-superior representation of certain populations. And the stronger the cultural, political and

---

[128] "The Clash of Ignorance", Edward Said, *The Nation*, October 22, 2001. Link from 5.06.2008:
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said

religious differences – the higher the chances are to become a radical alien. This division is political, just as the concept of the public and national 'Self'. It makes a harsh division between Americans and Arabs, Christianity and Islam, East and West. But one should not underestimate the selectiveness of this very division. A dichotomy of, for instance, Christianity and Judaism, exists as a peripheral discourse hardly appearing in American media, and Israel as a cradle of Judaism is firmly positioned as the United States' political and spiritual ally in the discourse on religious terrorism examined in this study. Judaism is such a delicate matter that it is overly absent in the discourse on terrorism featuring only two mutually opposing entities – Islam and the West. Thus, the notion of the East in the discourse examined is a well-defined ideological entity with clear territorial boundaries that excludes Israel, spatially and ideologically. Even Huntington's notorious thesis on 'the clash of civilizations' excludes Israel as a solitary and separate civilization, which once again shows how political this division is.[129]

To sum up the developments in the discourse on religious terrorism throughout 2001-2008 according to the examined material, one may argue that the tendencies are rather disappointing, as the Orientalistic division into well-defined and firmly established concepts of the East and West take over a more nuanced official discourse that appears so vividly in the media in the first month after 9/11. This is not to say that the official discourse is a positive formation in comparison to the traditionally Orientalistic image of the world. The official discourse in this context appears to be rather a lesser of two evils, as it seemed to be much more nuanced in its presentation of Islam and Muslims than Orientalistic thinking. It is, however, still an evil, which needs a better alternative.

Western study of other nations and people should not be based on a politically designed hierarchy, which only hails the supremacy of the 'Self'. It should be built upon a genuine and curious aspiration for *learning* about other people, stripped as much as possible from the political biases shaped by the previous discourses and social practices.

6.1.2 Reflections on Empirical Data and Theoretical Approach

The discourse development tendencies revealed in this study are undoubtedly just tendencies in a massive, powerful and multifaceted discourse. Their frequency and transparency degree may vary in the actual order of discourse, which is impossible to determine on the basis on only eleven articles selected for the qualitative study. Yet the material presented a sufficient data to reveal these tendencies that might create a background for further study of the discourse on religious terrorism in the future.

The study has not been simple and unproblematic. In fact, I frequently stumbled over issues that triggered massive contemplations and demanded alternatives. One of the inner controversies that I had to deal with was the inability to frame the issues *outside* of the Orientalistic 'Us-versus-Them' terminology, and a virtual impossibility to step out of the discourse myself and to 'not

---

[129] Whether Huntington sees Israel as a domain of the West, or whether he is avoiding this inflammable and tabooed issue, is hard to tell.

being written' by it. It took a lot of struggle to finally realize that it was impossible and that I had to reconcile with the notion of framing issues in the terms that have created them. As a consolation in this regard, I often think of the witty way Said tackled this issue when he was confronted by a student accusing him of not being loyal enough to the Orient as he framed his beliefs using the originally Western Orientalist terminology apparatus. In response Said asked the inquirer why *he* was wearing a tie and a suit, which were elements of the Western way of life, having eventually bewildered the student.[130] One has to stick to the unwanted terms even when the intention is to deconstruct them to clear the space for their alternatives.

A reader of this study might create an opinion that it has been too critical and biased in its nature. There are two explanations to why this might be true. First, CDA is essentially a *critical* undertaking in itself. Secondly, it has been done strategically to fulfil the purpose of demonstrating the constructive mechanisms and the consequences of this discourse while opening up the space for alternatives. I see my purpose fulfilled, so the nature of the means towards the aim such as a strong bias is a secondary priority to me. What is important here is that I am aware of my rather critical bias.

6.2 IMPACTING THE AMERICAN SOCIAL IDENTITY

6.2.1 DEFINING THE SELF THROUGH THE RADICAL OTHER

Much has been said of 'the Other' created and represented in American national media discourse. It is, however, vital to acknowledge how this creation characterizes the American collective identity and which consequences it might bring. Terrorism has always been about communicating certain principles and standpoints in a violent way but it is curious to see the development of its semantics that has moved from designating originally a state violence into something symmetrically opposed to the politics of the (American) state. In accordance with the American myth, the country sees itself as an international agent set to guard the international security and be a frontrunner and an example to the rest of the world. It is, however, quite detached from the rest of the world too; take, for instance, American reluctance throughout the history to be a part of and collaborate with international security alliances, especially the United Nations Security Council, or launching a war against UN approval as well as repudiation of the United Nations Charter and its unwillingness to approve the reform of the UN Security Council in 2006 which was supposed to grant a greater role to the other member states.

American media discourse on religious terrorism is doing all to contrast the terrorist deeds with the official US politics. Yet there are individuals like American linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky who often argues that US intervention in foreign nations, particularly killing innocent

---

[130] "The Clash of Ignorance", Edward Said, *The Nation*, October 22, 2001. Link from 5.06.2008: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said

civilians in Afghanistan, is not the war against terrorism but the terrorism itself.[131] The terrorist seal is certainly an attribute of *'the Other'.* But this claim sets things into a different perspective and makes one wonder whether the controversy of the US and Islamists is a fight of two terrorist regimes against each other. Ironically enough, George W. Bush's call for the 'war on terror' seems to be an echo of Osama Bin Laden's war on the injustice: both disguise each other into an ultimate notion of evil and the only interaction they both seek with each other is mutual eradication.

American scholar, journalist and a political writer Paul Hollander who has paid special attention in his research to the nature of Anti-Americanism, claimed on that issue at a conference in Copenhagen that people tend to find the source of their problems *outside* themselves.[132] He also argued that Islamic Anti-Americanism is the most extreme form of it as it condemns such American features such as modernity, hedonism and secularism, which basically makes the Islamic movements the most accessible target for the US for the scapegoat role.

But what binds together people of the US in such a diverse racial, ethnic, cultural and political context? People are not divided by abstract values unless they carry a particular deeper emotional meaning for them. 9/11 brought out the deepest emotions in Americans, and *"triggered a broad surge in national feelings of pride, confidence and faith in America and many of the country's key institutions, according to a national survey."* (*The Washington Post,* Richard Morin "Poll: National Pride, Confidence Soar", October 25, 2001)

Political science scholar Stanley Renshon would argue that the glue keeping the nation together is patriotism. (Renshon, 2005:xviii) This study's material demonstrates that patriotism is achieved through outlining a net of the nation's similar values, identities and beliefs. These identities and values tend to be singular ('we are Americans rather than just carpenters, immigrants, black or white, etc.) but not stable. As mentioned earlier, the identity is unstable entity with a temporary fixation of their meaning, which is exactly what media is trying to do. All cultures have within them multiple and often conflicting discourses. In the US we find values of deep tolerance and multiculturalism; yet we also find racism and xenophobia. The latter, however, is not articulated in the discourse on Islamic terrorism. Therefore I call the identities outlined in this work singular and flat.

The concept of 'the Other' as a political tool makes unimaginable possible. As Jackson claims, the division into a superior and inferior people such as the one traceable in Orientalism is a continuation of the recent imperial attitudes, reinforced by Social Darwinism[133]. (Jackson, 2005:48)

---

[131] *The United States is a Leading Terrorist State,* An Interview with Noam Chomsky by David Barsamian, Monthly Review, November 2001. Link from 5.06.08: http://www.monthlyreview.org/1101chomsky.htm
[132] Paul Hollander on Anti-Americanism at a CEPOS conference on 7.03.2007, Copenhagen.
[133] *Social Darwinism* is a theory that draws upon Charles Darwin's thesis of natural selection, where competition between individual organisms drives biological revolutionary change where the fittest survives. Similarly, Social Darwinism translates this principle to the niche of ideas, groups and nations where the fittest drive evolution in social societies.

The disturbing Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal in 2004 is an example of the consequences of this thinking. It was a shameful case for the US since it perverted the fundamental identities established in the discourse; suddenly 'the Self' and 'the Other' swapped their roles: the American soldiers looked like the evil barbarians and the Iraqi suspects looked like the innocent victims. This is also an indication of a popular belief reinforced by these constructions that any human and reasonable interaction with the terrorist 'Other' is a violation of a taboo: contact with them is indecent and dialogue with them is useless as terrorists are, by definition, outside the pale of reason. So America is waiting; nothing else is left to do but wait for another terror attack.

The message of this study was to show that the constructions of the religious terrorism discourse in American media are corrupt, since they are immoralizing the American population itself allowing it to commit human rights abuses on the persons of Eastern origin domestically and internationally and infringe human rights liberties within their own society. The deeper this practice goes, the less space it leaves for alternatives. It is, therefore, essential to change it – for the sake of America itself.

6.3 SOME FINAL REMARKS

This study contains one of the seldom initiatives in the area to examine the *temporal* development of the discourse on terrorism in the media by the example of *The Washington Post.* Most of the previous studies on the discourse on terrorism have been conducted on the official rhetoric (such as Jackson; Douglass and Zulaika) and have not focused on temporal dynamics of the discourse simply revealing the most salient features of the discourse.

The current hegemony of the discourse on terrorism in the US is a major point of concern for this study. It must be disenchanted and reconstructed, also in terms of its power, so that the architects of the 'war on terror' stand before the world to explain their undertakings in political rather than terrorist terms. Simultaneously the terrorists would be stripped of their role as plausible actors in the matrix when the rhetoric of terrorism is turned down and American way of life gets *de-securitized*.

There are alternatives to this discourse. It could have been a new age of global cooperation on the crimes against humanity and multicultural tackling of the world poverty – a unifier instead of a divider.

Yet the terrorist discourse is not the only interest of the study. My major concern has been the misuse of Islam by the media as an attribute of the contemporary discourse on religious terrorism, which makes me wonder whether the international policy of the US is really a 'war on terror' or 'a war on Islam', a hostage trapped in a turmoil of gutter politics. Sadly, the conclusion is - both. Only a different mindset will instigate the change.

✧

FORMALITIES

RESUME 🇩🇰

Specialet tager udgangspunkt i en grundlæggende interesse af hvordan sproget fungerer som realitetskabende redskab og ideologisk instrument. Derudover trækker specialet på interessen i rollen af Islam som religion i amerikansk terrordiskurs og kollektive identitetskonstruktioner som diskursen indebærer.

Specialet omhandler studiet af den diskursive kobling af begreberne 'Islam' og 'Terrorisme' på baggrund af elleve artikler fra *The Washington Post* i perioden 2001-2008 efter terrorangrebet 9-11. Der undersøges identitetskonstruktioner som bliver udformet i diskursordener: dette gælder både konstruktionen af amerikansk kollektiv identitet og konstruktionen af 'den Anden' – Islam og 'Islamisk terrorist'. Der defineres diskursmarkører, både lingvistiske og tematiske, der gør koblingen 'Islam' – 'terrorisme' mulig og normativ. Der diskuteres løbende om mediernes rolle i diskurskonstruktionerne som sættes imod, og sammen med, Bush administrationens rolle i at skabe hegemoniske diskurser.

Den anvendte metode tager udgangspunkt i Norman Faircloughs kritisk diskursanalyse, hvor sproget betragtes som konstituerende, og konstitueret af realiteten. Det er det diskursive felt som forener sproget og realiteten og som er central objekt af dette studium. Der udføres *dekonstruktion* af diskurser for at finde frem til deres komponenter. Derudover laves der en opsamlende analyse af identitetskonstruktioner af "Selv" og den "Anden" ved brug af Edward Saids kritik af Orientalisme suppleret af sikkerhedsteori (Ole Wæver og Barry Buzan) som forklarer konstruktioner af Andethed i de tilfælde hvor den fremstilles som eksistentiel trussel.

Konklusionerne er rettet mod de konsekvenser som de nuværende konstruktioner bærer både for Islams rolle i diskursen om terrorisme, Orienten og for selve amerikanske kollektive identitet. Der vises hvor stor en indflydelse diskursen om Islam og terrorisme har på *The Washington Post*, samt hvor nemt man bliver 'indskrevet i diskurs' som journalist eller tekstforfatter. Man opererer med Orientalistiske konstruktioner selv i de tekster hvor man rent faktisk argumenterer for det modsatte synspunkt end orientalistisk. Der vises også hvordan man definerer "Selv" ved at konstruere en radikal "Anden" på Orientalistisk vis, hvilket legitimerer bestemte politiske strategier der i den sidste ende kan være skadelige for selve kollektive amerikanske identitet der i mange kontekster bliver fremstillet som arrogant og inhuman.

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict

    2006   *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London, New York: Verso

Barker, Christopher

    2001   *Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis.* London, Sage Publications Ltd.

Beck, Ulrich

    1992   *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity.* London: SAGE Publications Inc.

Brass, Paul R.

    1991   *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Theory and Comparison.* London: Sage Publications

Buzan, Barry; Wilde, Jaap; Waever, Ole

    1998   *Security. A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole

    2003   *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security.* Cambridge University Press

Campbell, David

    1998   *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* Manchester: Manchester University Press

Chouliaraki, Lilie; Fairclough Norman

    1999   *Discourse in Late Modernity. Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis.* Edinburgh University Press

Cohen, Anthony P. (ed.)

    1999   *Signifying Identities: Anthropological Perspectives on Boundaries and Contested Values.* London: Routledge

Cohen-Tanugi, Laurent

    2003   *An Alliance to Risk.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

Conley, Richard S. (ed.)

    2005   *Transforming the American Polity. The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism.* New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall

Connolly, William E.

    2002   *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.* University of Minnesota Press

Cottle, Simon

    2006   *Mediatized Conflicts.* McGraw-Hill Education

Couldry, Nick

    2000   *Place of Media Power.* Routledge

David Demers (ed.)

    2003   *Terrorism, Globalization & Mass Communication.* Washington: Marquette BookS

Douglass, William A.; Zulaika, Joseba;

    1996   *Terror and Taboo. The Follies, Fables, and Faces of Terrorism.* London: Routledge

Entman, Robert

    1993   *Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.* Journal of Communication, volume 43.

Esposito, John L.

    1991   *Islam. The Straight Path.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Esposito, John L.; Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (ed.)

    2000   *Muslims on the Americanization Path?* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Fairclough, Norman

 1995a   *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language.* London:
       Longman

 1995b   *Media Discourse.* London: Edward Arnold

 1998   *Discourse and Social Change.* UK: Polity Press

 2001   *Language and Power.* Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd.

 2003   *Analyzing Discourse. Textual Analysis for Social Researh.* Oxon:
       Routledge

Fowler, Roger

 1993   *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the British Press.*
       London: Routledge

Frello, Birgitta

 2002   *Identiteter på spil. Medierne og krigen i Kosovo.* Ph.D. thesis. Center
       fir European Cultural Studies, Department for Gender Studies.
       Aarhus University, Denmark.

Gellner, Ernest

 1997   *Nationalism.* London: Phoenix

Hall, Stuart

 1995   `*Fantasy, identity, politics'*, in E. Carter, J. Donald and J. Squites
       (ed.), Cultural Remix: Theories of Politics and the Popular.
       London: Lawrence & Wishart

Halliday, M.A.K

 1994   *An Introduction to Functional Grammar.* London: Edward
       Arnold.

Hansen, Birthe

 2003   *Overmagt. USA og Europa i det 21. Århundrede.* Gyldendal

Hjarpe, Jan

 1989   *Islam. En verden i bevægelse.* Skive: Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke

Jackson, Richard *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and*
    2005 *Counter-Terrorism.* Manchester: Manchester University Press

Jamieson, Kathleen Hall; Waldman Paul
    2004 *The Press Effect.* Oxford University Press

Jenkins, Richard
    2004 *Social Identity.* London and New York: Routledge

Kashmeri, Sarwar A.
    2007 *America and Europe After 9/11 and Iraq.* London: Praeger Security
        International

Kepel, Gilles
    2004 *The War for Muslim Minds. Islam and the West.* Cambridge, MA:
        Harvard University Press
    2005 *The Roots of Radical Islam.* London: SAQI

Laclau, Ernesto; Mouffe, Chantal
    1985 *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic*
        Politics. Verso Books

Lakoff, George
    1980 *Metaphors We Live By.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
    1996 *Moral Politics. What Conservatives Know that Liberals Don't.*
        Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Lewis, Bernard
    2002 *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the*
        Middle East. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson

Lockman, Zachary
    2004 *Contending Visions of the Middle East. The History and Politics of*
        Orientalism. New York: Cambridge University Press

A.L. MacFie(ed.)
    2000 *Orientalism. A Reader.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Manicas, Peter

    2002   *Realist Philosophy of Social Science.* West Nyack, NY, USA:
                     Cambridge University Press.

Nacos, Brigitte L.

    2007   *Mass- Mediated Terrorism. The Central Role of the Media in
                     Terrorism and Counterterrorism.* London: Rowman & Littlefield
                     Publishers, Inc.

Nikolaev, Alexander

    2006   *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War : The Global Media Debate.*
                     Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan

Niven, David

    2002   *Tilt?: The Search for Media Bias.* Greenwood Publishing Group,
                     Incorporated

Renshon, Stanley A.

    2005   *The 50% American. Immigration and National Identity in the Age of
                     Terror.* Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press

Rosenau, Pauline Marie

    1992   *Post-Modernism and The Social Sciences. Insights, Inroads, and
                     Intrusions.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Said, Edward W.

    1995   *Orientalism.* Penguin Books

Sardar, Ziauddin

    1988   *Information and the Muslim World. A Strategy for the Twenty-first
                     Century.* London: Mansell Publishing Ltd.

Silberstein, Sandra

    2002   *War of Words. Language, Politics and 9/11.* London and New York:
                     Routledge

Simonsen, Jørgen Bæk

    2001   *Det retfærdige samfund.* Viborg: Olesen Offset

Smith, Anthony D.

    2003   *Chosen People.* Oxford: Oxford University Press

Weber, Max

    1978   *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology.* California: University of California Press

Williams, Malcolm

    1999   *Science and Social Science: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge

Wodak, Ruth (ed.)

    2002   *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.* Sage Publications, Incorporated

Wæver, Ole

    1997   *Concepts of Security.* University of Copenhagen, Institute of Political Science

Ørsten, Mark, Kristensen, Nete Nørgaard

    2006   *Krigen i medierne, medierne i krig.* Frederiksberg: Forlaget Samfundslitteratur

Reports

Office of the Director of National Intelligence - *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate .Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States.* Released in April, 2006. Link from 30.12.2007: http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf

Pew Research Center - *Public Expresses Mixed Views of Islam, Mormonism.* Report released on September 25, 2007. Link from 13.11.2007: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=358

Pew Research Center - *Terrorism Transforms News Interest.* Report released on December 18, 2001. Link from 13.11.2007: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=146

Pew Research Center - *Terror Coverage Boost News Media's Images.* Report released on November 28th. 2001. Link from 13.11.2007: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=143

Saga Foundation – *The Language of Nuclear Terrorism.* Report conducted by Luntz, Maslansky Strategic Research in fall 2007, released on January 2, 2008. Link from 10.01.2008: http://www.sagafoundation.org/uploaded/file/SagaLuntzSurveyfinal.pdf

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States – *Complete 9/11 Commission Report*, Chapter 10. Link from 30.12.2007: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch10.htm

"War on Terror" or War on Human Rights? by Anastassia Stolovitskaia and Alissa King. A joint fellow report from the US Congress and European Union Parliament in Brussels for "Humanity in Action" from July, 2006. Link from 30.12.2007: http://www.humanityinaction.org/docs/EU_Lantos_Reports_2006/War_on_Terror_or_War_on_Human_Rights.doc

ARTICLES

I'm Not the Enemy, The Washington Post. September 13, 2001. Op-ed by Reshma
Memon Yaqub

Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground, The Washington Post. January 14, 2005. Link from
15.06.2008: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A7460-2005Jan13.html

Muslim Scholars Condemn Terror, CBS News, July 28, 2005. Link from 15.06.2008:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/07/28/national/main712
548.shtml

Nuclear Terrorism Top Fear, Survey Says, United Press International, January 4, 2008. Link
from 15.06.2008:
http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Emerging_Threats/Br
iefing/2008/01/04/nuclear_terrorism_top_fear_survey_says/234
2/

Securitization and desecuritization. Wæver, Ole. 1995, Columbia University Press. In
anthology *On security* by Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.)

The Clash of Ignorance, The Nation, October 22, 2001. Link from 12.06.2008:
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011022/said

EVENTS

18.12.2006	**"Islam and Terrorism"** **Academic debate day at Carsten Niebuhr's Institute of Arabic Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark**

- *"Islam and Terror"* by Joergen Baek-Simonsen, lecturer
- *" Liaisons Dangereuses. On Islam, Jihad, Terrorism and Other (mis)matches"* by Thomas Hoffmann, post.doc.
- *"Politics of Perspective. On Islam, Terrorism, Totalitarianism and Other Concepts"* by Rasmus Alenius Boserup, Ph.D. stip.
- *"Which Terrorist? Hamas and the World"* by Michael Irving Jensen, Ph.D.
- *"Which Islam? Personal Contemplations on Researching the Field"* by Jean Butler, Ph.D. stip.
- *"Democratic Resistance for the Islamic State. Subjectivity and Objectivity in Researching Iran "* by Rasmus Christian Elling, Ph.D. stip.
- *" Iran: Between the Nuclear Program and Terrorism. Researching and Reporting on the Political Topics"* by Claus Valling Pedersen, lecturer

30.01.2007	**"Why is There a Cohesion Between Islam and Terrorism?"** **a public debate at the Islamic- Christian Study Center (Copenhagen).** Featuring panelists:

- Lecturer Ghada Ghazal (Syria)
- Mediaresearcher Abid Gilani (Pakistan)
- Michael Irving-Jensen, Ph.D (Danmark)

7.03.2007	**"Anti- Americanism Now and Before"** **. A lunch symposium with Paul Hollander, Ph.D at CEPOS** (www.cepos.dk), Copenhagen

31.05.2007	**"The Road to Democracy from Dictatorship"** **An evening debate by Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke** (www.ms.dk) featuring

- Jørgen Elkit**,** Dr. Scient Pol.
- Frans Mikael Jansen**,** Secretary in MS.

APPENDIX: ANALYZED ARTICLES

ARTICLE 1

This is not crime. This is war. One of the reasons there are terrorists out there capable and audacious enough to carry out the deadliest attack on the United States in its history is that, while they have declared war on us, we have in the past responded (with the exception of a few useless cruise missile attacks on empty tents in the desert) by issuing subpoenas.

Secretary of State Colin Powell's first reaction to the day of infamy was to pledge to "bring those responsible to justice." This is exactly wrong. Franklin Roosevelt did not respond to Pearl Harbor by pledging to bring the commander of Japanese naval aviation to justice. He pledged to bring Japan to its knees.

You bring criminals to justice; you rain destruction on combatants. This is a fundamental distinction that can no longer be avoided. The bombings of Sept. 11, 2001, must mark a turning point. War was long ago declared on us. Until we declare war in return, we will have thousands of more innocent victims.

We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era. It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism. Organized terror has shown what it can do: execute the single greatest massacre in American history, shut down the greatest power on the globe and send its leaders into underground

shelters. All this, without even resorting to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

This is a formidable enemy. To dismiss it as a bunch of cowards perpetrating senseless acts of violence is complacent nonsense. People willing to kill thousands of innocents while they kill themselves are not cowards. They are deadly, vicious warriors and need to be treated as such. Nor are their acts of violence senseless. They have a very specific aim: to avenge alleged historical wrongs and to bring the great American satan to its knees.

Nor is the enemy faceless or mysterious. We do not know for sure who gave the final order but we know what movement it comes from. The enemy has identified itself in public and openly. Our delicate sensibilities have prevented us from pronouncing its name.

Its name is radical Islam. Not Islam as practiced peacefully by millions of the faithful around the world. But a specific fringe political movement, dedicated to imposing its fanatical ideology on its own societies and destroying the society of its enemies, the greatest of which is the United States.

Israel, too, is an affront to radical Islam, and thus of course must be eradicated. But it is the smallest of fish. The heart of the beast -- with its military in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and the Persian Gulf; with a culture that "corrupts" Islamic youth; with an economy and technology that dominate the world -- is the United States. That is why we were struck so savagely.

How do we know? Who else trains cadres of fanatical suicide murderers who go to their deaths joyfully? And the average terrorist does not coordinate four hijackings within one hour. Nor fly a plane into the tiny silhouette of a single building. For that you need skilled pilots seeking martyrdom. That is not a large pool to draw from.

These are the shock troops of the enemy. And the enemy has many branches. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Israel, the Osama bin Laden organization headquartered in Afghanistan, and various Arab "liberation fronts" based in Damascus. And then there are the governments: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya among them. Which one was responsible? We will find out soon enough.

But when we do, there should be no talk of bringing these people to "swift justice," as Karen Hughes dismayingly promised mid-afternoon yesterday. An open act of war demands a military response, not a judicial one.

Military response against whom? It is absurd to make war on the individuals who send these people. The terrorists cannot exist in a vacuum. They need a territorial base of sovereign protection. For 30 years we have avoided this truth. If bin Laden was behind this, then Afghanistan is our enemy. Any country that harbors and protects him is our enemy. We must carry their war to them.

We should seriously consider a congressional declaration of war. That convention seems quaint, unused since World War II. But there are two virtues to declaring war: It announces our seriousness both to our people and to the enemy, and it gives us certain rights as belligerents (of blockade, for example).

The "long peace" is over. We sought this war no more than we sought war with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan or Cold War with the Soviet Union. But when war was pressed upon the greatest generation, it rose to the challenge. Will we?

ARTICLE 2

Twelve years ago, my brother, J. P. Flynn, was murdered in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two years later, a presidential commission investigating the bombing informed us of the following: "The tragedy of Pan Am Flight 103 could have been prevented." Better airport security and a stronger response to terrorism could have saved my brother and the 269 other innocent victims. Unfortunately, we did not learn our lesson. Tuesday's tragedy was the result of a malicious act by terrorists. However, it was enabled by poor airport security and a weak U.S. policy on terrorism.

My family served on the President's Commission on Aviation Safety and Security that was put together in response to TWA 800. The commission made definitive recommendations -- and each of them was ignored because of inconvenience and cost to the airlines. Although we eliminated curbside check-in for international flights, it is pervasive on domestic flights, and Tuesday's attack planes were hijacked domestic flights. Although we ask who packed the bags before every flight, passengers are not interviewed with the same scrutiny as on international flights.

Finally, the commission strongly recommended that airports upgrade their bomb detection technology because X-rays have been proven not to work. Unfortunately, few airports upgraded, and the ancient X-ray technology is useless against most terrorist tactics.

BRIAN P. FLYNN

New York

*

I felt the impact two blocks away from the Pentagon. I was home watching reports of the World Trade Center attacks. I went down to the lobby of my building, then out to the street to find smoke coming from the Pentagon. I was heartbroken as I thought about those who might be hurt and that it was not over.

I am angry. I am hurt, and I feel the pain of fellow Americans everywhere for what happened Tuesday, Sept. 11, 2001. How can any individual or group commit what has been described as a "horrific act of terrorism"? It takes a special kind of demon to destroy life and liberty without regard for human existence.

I want to express my deep sorrow for the victims and their families, and I will continue to pray for all who have been affected by this tragedy. We have awakened to an unbearable grief, one that is unfathomable. May justice prevail.

ROCHELLE SOBERANIS

Arlington

110

*

This changes everything. It has become woefully apparent that, as a nation, we need to make major changes in the way we go about our business. Security must be heightened at airports, train and bus stations and ports, but we must go further than that.

We need a comprehensive review of our immigration laws that allow nefarious individuals from hostile states entry into the United States. We need to assess our foreign aid policy and tighten the screws on those who would support terrorism. We need to have a continuing counterterrorist effort that has as its primary purpose preemptive strikes.

We need to empower law enforcement agencies with the authority to wiretap, eavesdrop, detain and question individuals suspected of plotting terrorist activities. We need to monitor the international monetary flow of known terrorists, their organizations and host states to determine where the money comes from to finance these operations and where and by whom it is being deposited. We need to re-invigorate the U.S. sky marshal program. We need to have a sustained, coordinated anti-terrorist initiative involving all relevant federal law enforcement agencies.

Finally, we need to have a national defense that is poised to answer these attacks swiftly and expeditiously. A missile defense system may have made sense in the Cold War, but we won that fight without it. In short, it is time to change the way we perceive ourselves, monitor ourselves and protect ourselves, and the time to do that is now.

KIRK C. RASCOE

Valley Village, Calif.

*

President Bush emphatically stated, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them," and the rest of the country has taken this as its rallying cry to action. Unfortunately, this lack of distinction may be crossing over into the inclusion of millions of Arab Americans as the enemy, as addressed in the op-ed column "I'm Not the Enemy" [Sept. 13].

I have been shocked to hear offensive references about Arab Americans. Less offensive, though thoroughly annoying, is the common, basic and inappropriate use of the words Islam, Islamic and Muslim. They are not interchangeable, and the inappropriate use of them further demonstrates our lack of understanding of a religion followed by millions of people. Fear of foreign threats and widespread misunderstanding of an ethnic group should not lead to widespread fear of our neighbors and fellow Americans.

These events have often been compared to Pearl Harbor. If there is one lesson we should have learned from what happened after Pearl Harbor, it is that we cannot disregard our true American values to brand an ethnic group as traitorous.

Arab Americans should not have to prove their loyalty as so many Japanese Americans did during World War II. We should have learned from our mistakes already and celebrate the diversity of our American culture, which brings us greater strength as a nation.

DAVID INOUE

Washington

ARTICLE 3

It will get worse.

The horror of what we've seen on TV screens and read in our newspapers will reach new levels as we see more individual families dealing with the grim mechanics of death -- the coffins, the words that cannot truly comfort, the ceremonies of official mourning for lost loved ones.

It will get worse when we discover by what few degrees we are separated from the direct victims of the catastrophe -- when it turns out that virtually all of us know someone who knows someone who lost someone.

It will get worse when it begins to dawn on us how helpless we are to respond in any satisfying way to what happened on Tuesday. Reports now indicate that 50 men were directly involved in the slaughter and that 40 of them died along with their victims. Suppose we got our hands on the remaining 10, on Osama bin Laden himself and on 100 more besides. What could we conceivably do to them that bears any degree of proportionality to their offense against us? Our response to Pearl Harbor was proportional. Our response to this terrorism cannot be.

And yet we'll have to do something; we'll insist on it. We want blood. Maybe we deserve our blood revenge. But we'll want to be satisfied that we spill the right blood and that -- no matter how certain our leaders seem to be that bin Laden is the terrorist in chief -- can't be all that easy.

It will get worse when we find ourselves looking at individual Muslims and Arabs (including Muslim and Arab Americans) as fit targets for our vengeance. Even if we don't officially round them up, as we did with Japanese Americans in World War II, the unofficial acts of meanness and hatred against those who look like our blood enemies are likely to redound to our shame.

And the prospects of that sort of bigotry will increase if the authorities don't do something pretty dramatic -- perhaps a raid into Afghanistan to capture bin Laden? -- pretty quickly.

It will get worse when we discover that eliminating bin Laden doesn't eliminate the problem. Maybe he really is the evil and resourceful genius we've made him out to be. Maybe it takes a certain fiendish genius to be capable of seeing commercial jetliners as hideously effective bombs and of seeing such symbols as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (was it supposed to have been the White House?) as particularly effective targets.

But how much genius will it take the next time, remembering that the next time needn't involve trained airline pilots but only zealots committed to dying in the effort to strike a heavy blow against their enemy -- against us?

All of this raises two questions: Why do so many in the Muslim world -- not just the terrorists but quite ordinary men and women -- consider us their enemy? And is there anything at all reasonable for us to do about it?

I was not reassured by the answer suggested by William O. Beeman, a Middle East expert at Brown University, in a commentary he wrote a few days ago for the Pacific News Service.

Bin Laden, according to Beeman, is not so much an anti-American terrorist as a fierce defender of Islam determined to stop the United States from (in bin Laden's words) "occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places" -- including Jerusalem.

"Bin Laden will not cease his opposition until the United States leaves the region," Beeman wrote.

If that desire to have American (and other Western) interests completely out of the region is the reason behind the anti-American sentiment -- and if, as seems likely, that means curtailing America's support for Israel -- then it's hard to see how it can be appeased.

But if that sentiment is widespread, and if, as we keep hearing, the structure of the active terrorist organizations, including bin Laden's, is highly "cellular," the threat to the United States could well survive bin Laden.

"Cellular" has both an organizational and, as Beeman uses it, medical reference. The terrorist cells already scattered throughout the world are evidence of an anti-Western cancer in metastasis. The usual wartime responses are likely to render the cancer yet more aggressively malignant.

It will get worse.

ARTICLE 4

They were smart, technically proficient, and ambitious in their own peculiar way. They were comfortable with the Internet and the modern modes of business travel. They were the kind of people who could have succeeded in America if they hadn't wanted to destroy it.

Theirs was a soft, subtle presence in this country for many months, in some cases years. They didn't blend in, exactly, but they stayed out of trouble. One suspected ringleader, Mohamed Atta, got a ticket in April for driving without a license, and failed to show up for his court hearing, but police never followed up on a bench warrant for his arrest. Other than that his only slip-up came a couple of years ago in Germany, when he failed to return three rented videos ("Ace Ventura," "Vampires" and "Storm of the Century") and the movie rental company turned to a collection agency.

These conspirators didn't creep into the country in the dark of night. They were welcomed in daylight. At least some, if not all, arrived legally, with visas, though two were later put on a government "watch list" of suspected terrorists. One graduated from a prestigious flight school in Daytona Beach, Fla. They played by the rules well enough to obtain, in some cases, Social Security numbers, driver's licenses and frequent-flier accounts.

113

They tended to pay for things with wads of cash. At times they could be standoffish, and made people nervous. Neighbors sometimes had an uncomfortable feeling -- why didn't they talk more? Why did this man claim to have no home phone number? Why were these people holding meetings so late at night?

Even so, as the names of the suspected hijackers have been made public, you don't hear people saying they saw it coming. No one says, "We always thought that guy was a terrorist."

The failure of this country to detect a massive terrorist conspiracy in its midst -- at its flight schools, at the rental car counters, at the computer console of the Kinko's copy center, boarding commercial jets bound for the West Coast -- may take months to explain fully. Some familiar explanations will surface, from the bungling of intelligence-gathering agencies to the cultural fragmentation of a country where so many people are transient and so few know their neighbors.

But as the details of the conspiracy emerge, it is clear that the terrorists took great pains to conceal their plans and their identities. They listed nearby Mail Boxes Etc. outlets as home addresses. They moved every two or three months. They may have assumed the identities of others. They skittered across the surface of a large and diverse nation with hardly a snag.

They were young men, mostly, the youngest just 20. Some were loners. One told his landlord he hoped to find a Mexican bride; they made good wives, he thought. A few were married, with small children who played with American kids in their neighborhoods. They favored motels and apartments and rented homes in beachfront communities near the flight schools in Florida. Their locations -- Delray Beach, Vero Beach, Daytona Beach -- have been famous for retirees and race cars, never terrorists. At times they landed elsewhere: Phoenix, San Diego. One lived briefly just outside the Beltway, taking English classes and computer training at Tysons Corner.

"To me, they acted like normal human beings, nothing abnormal," said Henry George, who taught two suspected hijackers, Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi, in Dade County last year. "They were polite, maybe even shy."

Charles Lisa, who rented apartments to two of the men in South Florida, told the Miami Herald that they were the kind of young men you'd want to take to a baseball game. When they moved out, the landlord asked for a forwarding address. One of the men smiled and said, "I'll send you a postcard."

Without a Single Bullet

It was the most spectacular crime in American history. Although a body count is incomplete, it appears that the casualties in Tuesday's attack may exceed the 4,435 Americans officially listed as having died in combat in the Revolutionary War. The terrorists achieved their goal without firing a single bullet.

They may have used plastic knives and box cutters, the latter of which could have been assembled with razor blades in toiletry kits that passed easily through airport baggage scanners. But the key weapons were airplanes, once considered exotic, even physics-defying, but in the modern world as innocuous and familiar as sparrows. The terrorists turned them into guided missiles.

Fully loaded, ready for takeoff, the American Airlines Boeing 767-200 jet, serial number 22332, weighed 351,000 pounds. That would be the first bomb. Its fuel tank holds 20,450 gallons of jet fuel, which is similar to kerosene. At ideal conditions it can burn at 3,500 degrees. It's not as volatile as gasoline, but molecule for molecule it packs more punch. A single gallon can produce 125,000 BTUs of energy. What thousands of gallons can do when splashed on a skyscraper and ignited is now common knowledge.

For most Americans, the attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon came literally out of the blue. The enemy was invisible and inscrutable. No one claimed responsibility. People asked: Why had they done this? What did they want?

The U.S. government has said the prime suspect in the attack is Osama bin Laden, a radical Saudi multimillionaire who funds a worldwide network of terrorists. If he's responsible, Tuesday's attack is the continuation of a five-year-old war that hadn't fully consumed American attention until Tuesday.

Bin Laden wants to cleanse the Muslim world of Western influences and return it to an idealized state that he believes existed a thousand years ago. He's enraged by American support of Israel and the presence of American soldiers -- infidels -- on his home soil of Saudi Arabia. He declared war on the United States in 1996, and later issued a fatwa, or religious edict, that assures his followers that they will ascend to heaven for killing the enemies of Islam.

Terrorists linked to bin Laden have attacked American military barracks, warships and embassies. They bombed the World Trade Center in 1993. They have dreamed of increasingly elaborate operations. Bin Laden has said of Westerners, "They violate our land and occupy it and steal the Muslims' possessions, and when faced by resistance, they call it terrorism."

That's the general framework of the conspiracy that led to Tuesday's attack. The Americans surrounding the hijackers, living next door to them, giving them lessons at flight schools, didn't think they were terrorists. The hijackers didn't think so, either.

Dedicated to Their Mission

Many were Saudis. Their names, to American ears, might seem like minor variations on a theme: Alhamzi, Al Suqami, Alghamdi, Alshehri, Alhaznawi, Alnami, Alomari, and so on. The men changed the spelling of their names as they moved from place to place, increasing the difficulty of nailing down the true identities of the conspirators.

Officials believe that some received training in Afghanistan, bin Laden's base of operations. Others, officials suspect, were members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a radical Muslim group that's part of bin Laden's network. The officials believe that one conspirator, Khalid al-Midhar, is a Yemeni member of the Islamic Army of Yemen, another bin Laden affiliate.

There's no doubt that they were utterly dedicated to the mission. No one ratted out the group.

Among the 19 hijackers identified by authorities was Mohamed Atta, a globe-trotter, someone who was born in Egypt, received a degree at the Technical University in Hamburg, Germany, and most recently lived in the suburban Fort Lauderdale, Fla., community of Coral Springs. Atta is thought to have piloted American Airlines Flight 11, the first to slam into the World Trade Center.

A letter written by Atta, left in his luggage at Boston's Logan Airport, said he planned to kill himself so he could go to heaven as a martyr. It also contained a Saudi passport, an international driver's license, instructional videos for flying Boeing airliners and an Islamic prayer schedule.

Some reports have said the letter was dated 1996, adding to the evidence that the operation was years in the planning. In 1996 Atta was in Hamburg, believed to be a major European center of operations for followers of bin Laden. Atta wrote his university thesis on urban renewal -- how to improve a city. His thesis adviser, Dittmar Machule, described Atta as "a very nice young man: polite, very religious and with a highly developed critical faculty."

In Hamburg he lived with Marwan Al-Shehhi, 11 years his junior. Atta and Al-Shehhi would be largely inseparable for years to come -- until the day they boarded separate planes in Boston and hijacked them to New York City.

The chief federal prosecutor in Hamburg, Kay Nehm, said that Atta and Al-Shehhi had organized a terrorist cell in the city "with the aim of launching spectacular attacks on the institutions of the United States." Neighbors say the men hosted meetings late at night. Another man who lived in their apartment, they say, was Ziad Jarrahi, who was aboard the flight that crashed in Pennsylvania.

After coming to America, Atta and Al-Shehhi diligently pursued flight lessons. They turned first to Huffman Aviation, in Venice, Fla., where they paid a total of $38,000 for lessons. They rented a bedroom in a house nearby and slept in twin beds. Their landlords, Charles and Drucilla Voss, thought the men were arrogant, and could have been tidier. But they detected nothing sinister. "I just could not believe what the FBI confronted us with yesterday morning," said Drucilla Voss. "You could not believe they were in your house."

The men racked up 260 hours of pilot training but still didn't have any experience with something as technologically advanced as a commercial jetliner. They turned to SimCenter Inc., in the Dade County municipality of Opa-locka, which offers training on a Boeing 727 full-motion flight simulator. They took one three-hour course, then came back for another.

The conspirators apparently did their plotting face to face, in meetings late at night at rented homes. Some of the people associated with the group may still be at large. Authorities are looking for Amer Kamfar, who lived in Vero Beach with his wife and four children. He has an FAA license, with extensive qualifications as a pilot, flight engineer and mechanic. Neighbor Hank Habora said about two or three weeks ago Kamfar left Vero Beach in a hurry.

"They took all their stuff and put it out by the trash: clothes, furniture, pots and pans," he said.

There was one pronounced link between the conspirators and the rest of American society: Their children. They did not have to participate in the jihad. In Vero Beach, Lisa Dubose's 6-year-old son was best buddies with the son of a man named Abdulaziz Alomari -- who later boarded American Airlines Flight 11 with Atta.

The adult Alomaris didn't socialize much. A wave now and again. They spent time with another Muslim family -- clannish behavior that the American neighbors assumed was normal. Theirs was a nice home, rented for $1,400 a month.

The only problem with the Alomaris were the late-night meetings. Next-door neighbor Betty Egger said that as many as a dozen cars would be parked outside, some on her own lawn. It rattled her to see car headlights flashing through her windows at 2 in the morning.

Alomari told his landlord in August that the family would soon be moving back home, to Saudi Arabia. Then, just before Labor Day, something unusual happened: The Alomaris threw a party for all the neighborhood children. "They invited all the kids, even ones they'd never seen before," said neighbor Andrew Krease.

They served pizza and Happy Meals. Where they come from, Alomari's wife told the neighbors, it is customary to throw a party before moving -- to leave nice memories.

Across the country, the hijackers kept a similarly low profile. Two, Nawaq Alhamzi and Khalid Al-Midhar, lived at one point in Lemon Grove, a quiet residential neighborhood just east of San Diego, renting rooms from Abdussattar Shaikh, a retired English professor at San Diego State University and co-founder of San Diego's Islamic Center. The FBI identified Alhamzi and Al-Midhar as two of the five hijackers who crashed American Flight 77 into the Pentagon on Tuesday.

"They seemed like nice, normal people," neighbor Denise Adair said. "You never imagine that you have a hijacker living next door."

Another suspected hijacker, Hani Hanjour, believed to have been the pilot on the plane that hit the Pentagon, appears to have lived in Arizona for the past five years and received pilot training at CRM Airline Training Center in Scottsdale, Ariz., according to company official T. Gerald Chilton Jr. For three months in 1996 and in December 1997, Hanjour received private instruction to become a pilot of a single-engine aircraft.

But Hanjour, Chilton said, "never completed the course. He was not believed proficient enough to obtain a license." Then, he said, Hanjour called last year to get more training, this time on multi-engine planes. He was turned down.

"He just wasn't a good student with the dedication we see in U.S. Air Force pilots that train there or European airline pilots," Chilton said. "Not that he was rude or impolite. He was just described as a difficult student."

Many details of the plan remain unknown, but its execution began no later than Aug. 25, when the hijackers began buying plane tickets. In many cases they used Internet travel agencies, such as Travelocity.com. Money was apparently no object. Two of the men paid $4,500 each for one-way first-class tickets on United Airlines Flight 175 -- putting them close to the cockpit.

Why they picked Sept. 11 is unknown. Possibly they selected it because it was a Tuesday, a light day for cross-country travel. Fewer passengers would mean easier crowd control. The technology-savvy terrorists could easily have shopped for less-crowded flights by examining the airline Web sites.

On Aug. 26, Marwan Al-Shehhi and another man checked into the Panther Motel in Deerfield Beach, Fla., Room 12. They paid $500 in advance. The motel's owners, Diane and Richard Surma, noticed that the men didn't go to the beach, but rather preferred to spend their time around the motel's small swimming pool. A third man visited often. The impression they made was, as always, fairly innocuous: "They were very neat and very polite," said Richard Surma.

One day, the owners noticed that the men had used a towel to cover a picture of a woman in their room. The model wore a dress that exposed one of her shoulders.

When the men left on Sept. 9, Richard Surma looked through the trash. He found illustrated books on martial arts -- karate and jujitsu. There was a German-English dictionary and a box-cutter knife. There were FAA air traffic maps. And finally there were flight training textbooks, including information on flying Boeing passenger jets.

Last Friday night Atta, Al-Shehhi and a third man spent hours drinking and playing video games at Shuckums, a Hollywood, Fla., sports bar. Atta played video Trivial Pursuit and blackjack with great determination. "He looked nervous," manager Tony Amos said. "He kept putting dollars in and he was really focused."

Al-Shehhi and the other man had about five drinks each, he said -- Captain Morgan rum and Coke, and Stolichnaya vodka and orange juice. At one point they argued. "There were a lot of hand gestures and Al-Shehhi was definitely upset," Amos said.

The bartender feared that Al-Shehhi might leave without paying his $48 tab. The manager intervened, asking if there was a problem. Al-Shehhi, glaring, pulled out a wad of cash and said: "There is no money issue. I am an airline pilot."

The terrorists appear to have put greatest emphasis on Flight 11. Multiple hijackers on that plane had flight training. They also went out of their way to bypass security at Logan Airport. Officials believe that Atta and Alomari rented a car in Boston, drove to Portland, Maine, and took a room Monday night at the Comfort Inn south of town. They then flew on a short flight Tuesday morning from Portland to

Boston, changing to Flight 11. By going through security at the small airport in Portland -- at the groggy hour of 5:44 a.m. -- they avoided the tougher security checkpoint in Boston.

Roger Quirion and Vincent Meisner, making business trips to the West Coast, flew with Atta and Alomari on that first flight Tuesday. "They were joined at the hip," recalled Quirion. The two men struck him as clean-cut, wearing slacks, dress shoes and causal shirts, and carrying dark shoulder bags. Their hair was closely cropped. They had no facial hair. In short, they looked like typical businessmen. Unmenacing.

One of the hijackers took a seat in the fourth row. As Meisner passed to take the seat behind him, his luggage bumped the suspected hijacker's shoulder.

"Excuse me," Meisner said.

The man merely hunkered lower, putting his head down.

Meisner thought, "Well, he hasn't had his coffee yet, so I'll leave him alone."

When Atta and Alomari boarded Flight 11 in Boston they sat in the eighth row, across the aisle from David Angell, producer of the TV show "Frasier." Elsewhere on the plane were three more hijackers.

What happened in the coming minutes and hours on the four hijacked planes is still being pieced together, the forensic evidence largely obliterated. Cell phone accounts from passengers indicate that, on some planes at least, the hijackers stabbed members of the crew. Cockpit doors are supposed to be locked, but they are too flimsy to be much of an obstacle to determined men.

What's certain is that they had trained for this moment. They lacked the skills of real airline pilots, but they knew what they would see in the cockpit, what the console would look like, how it would feel to grab the control yoke of a jetliner. Atta and Al-Shehhi had spent most of their time on that flight simulator in Opa-locka working on one thing in particular: turning.

They didn't have to know how to land.

A Hatred Rooted In Failings
Caryle Murphy

The suicide bombers who drew us into a frightening new war last week were surely Muslims with a horribly twisted version of Islam. They obviously hated us.

President Bush declared that the terrorists -- said to be minions of the radical Islamic militant and Saudi Arabian fugitive Osama bin Laden -- had presented the United States with "an opportunity to do generations a favor, by coming together and whipping terrorism; hunting it down . . . and holding them accountable."

Retaliation and punishment are surely coming. And then what?

If the recent past is any indication, whatever the United States does next to battle this brand of terrorism will require an expertise that has not been evident in the years since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which claimed six lives. That incident has been followed by a steady stream of attacks -- carried out by terrorists known or suspected to have links to militant Islam -- on other American targets: a U.S. military base in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, in 1996, 19 dead; two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, 224 dead; the USS Cole in Yemen last year, 17 dead.

While it strains the national patience at a time like this, the first step in an effective anti-terrorism policy is to examine how such terrorists come to be and why they despise us so.

It is no secret that in the Middle East, Islam's birthplace, the faith is at a complex historical juncture that has left many Muslims frustrated and angry. Having spent many years living in the region and learning about Islam, I believe that three major factors have brought it to this point: authoritarian governments that have spawned extremist movements by failing to develop a civil society that permits dissent; the inability of modern interpretations of Islam to prevail over outdated, orthodox versions; and America's failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Clearly, these forces have not turned every Muslim into a kamikaze. But in recent decades, they have helped create a climate that produces a fanatically extremist minority. From his hideaways in Afghanistan, bin Laden is the mastermind of a dangerous band of outlaws and the suspected author of Tuesday's attacks. It is no coincidence that his recruits are coming mostly from countries where these factors breed frustration, anger and hate toward America.

From Algeria to Egypt to Yemen, from Iraq to Pakistan, military or authoritarian governments -- many of them U.S. allies -- deny their citizens basic freedoms. Even in the freest of these nations -- Egypt -- Hosni Mubarak has been president for 20 years, reelected by referendums with dubious results, usually in the 90 percent range.

As Rifaat Said, an Egyptian politician, once said, "Civil society is a very vague concept. It is composed of a parliament, of a free press, a free system of education, a free trade union, an independent

judicial system and so on. But in Egypt . . . all these elements are linked together in a key chain. And the key chain is in the pocket of the president."

Those who go too far in defying these authoritarian states face dire consequences, ranging from torture to years in prison with no trial. As a result, many young people have given up trying to change their governments.

But they have not given up thinking about Islam. Indeed, Islam is experiencing unprecedented intellectual and theological ferment. As a crowded, competitive, technology-driven 21st century begins, more Muslims than ever before are reexamining their faith in light of the political, economic and intellectual challenges of contemporary life. They are pondering hefty questions: How can Islam and democracy be wed? Who holds authority in Islam? Should Islamic law, or sharia, be overhauled? If intellectual freedom is a right, how far can a modern Muslim go in reinterpreting his faith without being called an apostate?

"There is a technological revolution. We need to be part of that," a teacher in Jordan once told me. "I don't think we have succeeded yet in combining our modernization with the indispensable part of our life, which is Islam."

The downside of this introspective ferment is that it has set off a raging fight within Islam. Secularists, moderate Muslims, orthodox thinkers and extremists are proffering competing versions of Islam. "One problem in the Muslim world is that Islam with all its cultural strength has no hierarchy to speak on its behalf," said Laith Kubba, founder of Islam21, a forum for liberal Muslims. "Today there are countless numbers of self-appointed authorities claiming they have an interpretation that is valid."

In many parts of the world, particularly in the West, moderate Muslim activists seeking to make their faith more relevant to modern life are gaining advantage. But in the Middle East, they remain the underdogs. Barred from organizing and staging public debates by authoritarian governments, they are hounded by their orthodox and extremist brethren, who respond to modernity by rejecting it.

The Taliban, Afghanistan's ruling Islamic movement, is the most radical example of this extremist orthodoxy, which is based on a literal reading of the Koran, Islam's holy book. Its proponents, who seek to expand Islam throughout the world, display a woeful ignorance of life in the United States, reject moderate Islam's historical tolerance for other faiths and show no interest in the scientific mind-set that is at the root of the West's technological progress.

In other Middle East countries, the forces of orthodoxy are less radical but problematic nonetheless. In Saudi Arabia, for example, which subscribes to a conservative and sometimes intolerant brand of Islam, Christians are banned from holding worship services.

Against this unsettled backdrop, the 50-year-old conflict between Israel and the Palestinians rages on. Seen through Muslim eyes, it is a conflict prolonged by America's bias toward Israel. Muslims do not comprehend, for example, how the United States, which gives Israel more than $3 billion annually, could not have stopped Israel from allowing more than 200,000 Jewish settlers -- half of them since the 1993 Oslo peace agreement -- to move into occupied territory Palestinians had envisioned as their homeland.

To many Americans, these issues may seem irrelevant in the face of the evil of last week -- evil that can never be excused. And those who lost loved ones do not want to hear explanations.

I understand those reactions, grounded in grief, only too well: My family was twice wounded in this national catastrophe. First, we got news that one of our closest friends, the Rev. Francis E. Grogan, was on United Airlines flight 175, which rammed into the south tower of the World Trade Center. The 76-year-old Roman Catholic priest, who was virtually a member of the family, was headed from Boston to Los Angeles to see his sister. Then we heard that Richard Keane, married to my cousin,

Judy Keane, for 31 years, and the father of five, has not called home since Tuesday. An insurance consultant, he was in a meeting on the 99th floor of the south tower.

I have to admit my head and my heart are battling each other. The hurt inflicted last week is testing my patience and my resolve to understand Islam. But after the funerals and our military reprisals, our country still has to exist in a world with 1 billion Muslims, about one-third of them in the Middle East. And the same forces that helped create the fanatics who attacked us will still be there.

If we want to avoid creating more terrorists, we must end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict quickly and in a way both sides see as fair. We must demand that authoritarian governments open up, and we must make a greater effort to engage and encourage those Muslims who promote moderate and modernist versions of Islam. That's an anti-terrorism program worthy of our lost loved ones.

Caryle Murphy covers religion for the Metro staff of The Post and was Cairo bureau chief from 1989 to 1994.

ARTICLE 6

The question of Islam is back, and in the United States at least, that generally has not been very good news for Muslims. American preoccupation with things Islamic is episodic, to say the least; it seems to take moments of extreme gravity -- the 1979 revolution in Iran and the ensuing hostage crisis; the horrendous terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon -- to awaken our dormant interest. Little wonder, then, that Islam has been at the receiving end of so much stereotyping -- depicted as intolerant, reactionary, fanatical and, when resisted, violent. Such caricature notions of Islam rarely are far from the surface.

So much of what is thought and said barely resists even cursory analysis. There is, of course, no Islamic monopoly on either violence or terrorism. One tends to forget -- perhaps because they rarely or only indirectly affected Americans -- that for long stretches of the 20th century, groups that resorted to terror could be found in Europe (the Baader Meinhof in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe in France), Latin America (the Shining Path in Peru; the Monteneros in Argentina), and other non-Muslim countries such as Sri Lanka and Japan. Indeed, earlier expressions of Palestinian terrorism were the province of secular, not religious, organizations.

Moreover, the notion of a monolithic Islam defies reality and common sense. It is shared by roughly a billion believers, spans several continents and dozens of societies. It encompasses a wide range of different, often contradictory, at times incompatible theories and practices. As a religious belief system, it enjoys more than enough latitude to justify openness to the outside world and seclusion from it; political conservatism and militancy; jihad as an effort to redeem oneself and jihad as a war against others.

And yet, a question looms. From suicide bombers in Israel to political murders in Egypt to indiscriminate and grisly assassinations in Algeria, a recurrent theme appears to be the persistence of a strand of Islam that has opted for religious violence. If the question is not why Islam begets

violence -- for it does not -- then it must be why violence has donned the garb of Islam, and why now.

My own research on Algeria -- home to some of the deadliest acts of terror of late -- suggests some clues. To begin, in so much of the Muslim world, the absence of democracy has caused a vacuum that Islamic militants alone were able to fill. While governments silenced all dissident political speech, Islam enjoyed the use of an inviolable space (the mosque) a tribune (the preacher's pulpit) and a sacred public language (religious discourse). Forms of public discontent thus have tended to take on religious accents.

And there has been plenty of discontent to go around. Its roots lie in political repression, economic dislocation and inequality, gaudy consumption rubbing elbows with desperate want, the alienation of the urban young, intellectuals and members of the middle class, threatened by the globalization of their domestic economy and yearning for the certainty and stability that seems so much a thing of the past. It is only one of the many paradoxes of globalization that it comes hand in hand with cultural disparity, not homogeneity; polarization, not consensus. For the influx of images and goods from the West may well create shared wants and desires, but not shared enjoyment.

Islam having thus become the privileged channel of protest, both its characteristics and the repressive conditions under which it has had to operate contributed to the radicalization of politics and, in some instances, to the resort to violence: Its moral language and its fusion of the political with the religious, which could turn earthly arguments about right and wrong into holy debates on good and evil; its classical imagery of warfare, conquest and martyrdom; its self-perceived status as an oppressed religion long besieged by non-Muslims (from the Crusades to colonialism to Western support for Israel to America's war against Iraq); the state's suppression of almost all forms of peaceful dissent. All this helped transform Islamic movements into vehicles of radical insurgency -- against repressive regional regimes; against the American superpower that backs them.

The rise of radical, anti-Western Islamism is the product of several mental associations, whether justified or not: of Westernization with conspicuous consumption and widening inequities; of economic injustice with faithlessness; of faith (Islamic, that is) with social redemption and political salvation.

There is a leap -- a colossal one -- from these feelings of hostility and even violence that exist among the many to the abhorrent mass-casualty terror carried out by the very few. The terrorist groups succeeded in laying hands on the resentment and the frustration; what they then choose to do with both is something hardly any of us can genuinely comprehend. There is no such thing as Islamic terrorism. There are Muslims who happen to be angry and terrorists who happen to be Muslim. That is a distinction that makes all the difference.

The writer, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of "The Call from Algeria: Revolution, Third Worldism, and the Turn to Islam".

ARTICLE 7

Americans are collectively drawing up a national balance sheet for the year that has passed since the terror attacks of last Sept. 11. Here are some strong new assets to list:

On this Sept. 11, Americans will be hunting al Qaeda instead of waiting in ignorance for that organization of criminal fanatics and its allies to strike at the United States. A continent's resources are now focused on identifying and destroying those who proudly proclaim they cannot be deterred or placated.

On this Sept. 11, Americans will honor fallen New York firefighters and police officers, the military and civilian workers who died at the Pentagon and those other ordinary people who did extraordinary things aboard a hijacked airliner over Pennsylvania a year ago. The moral strength and bravery of these American martyrs are a source of inspiration for the nation for years to come.

On this Sept. 11, Americans will be vigorously debating the limits on civil liberties that the war on terrorism demands. The Bush administration's proclivity for secrecy and its willingness to infringe the rights of American citizens are worrisome. But the strength and fairness of the pluralistic system that al Qaeda yearns to destroy are demonstrated in the strong principled backlash that has been provoked by the government's abuses. There is no room for complacency and no lack of serious economic and political problems for the country on this doleful first anniversary of a day of horror. This is still a time of testing, not a time of counting blessings. We have only begun to fight.

But at least we have begun. As a nation as well as a government, we have begun to speak about evil and about the irrational as major forces in world politics. Madmen with access to destructive technology, diplomatic pouches and passports, as well as easily transferable funds derived from oil, shape today's world as surely as scholarly and saintly Nobel Prize winners do. Neither group should be left unacknowledged.

Until now political correctness and the strength of post-colonial myths about the inviolability and omniscience of national sovereignty inhibited truth-telling about the inherent vulnerability of the human condition. But Sept. 11 has changed this too: It has compelled the United States to recognize and respond to the force of the irrational in world politics.

Circumstances demand, in fact, that Washington lead in combating movements that would gladly repeat that day of horror. The Sept. 11 attacks abruptly dragged the United States back onto the world stage in an unexpected front-line security role that now makes other nations uneasy.

The passage of a year has caused the victimization that many Americans still feel vividly to fade in the minds of many abroad. Instant sympathy for American suffering has, in much of the European press and even among world leaders, turned to lingering cynicism about American intentions. There is discomfort and reaction not only to President Bush's "axis of evil" declaration and his focus on Iraq, but even to Colin Powell's measured and appropriate denunciation last week in Johannesburg of

123

Robert Mugabe's willingness to drive Zimbabwe into starvation to satisfy his delusional ambitions. An African American secretary of state was snubbed, heckled and insulted in South Africa -- essentially for showing up and telling the truth.

A coalition of the corrupt and the coerced resists the stripping away of the myths that aid other countries in blaming their problems not on their own failings but on the stars or, more precisely, on the only remaining global superpower. To fight terrorism and the intolerance that underpins it, Americans must fight the myths as well. Osama bin Laden and the assassins he recruited used America as a prop for what Lee Harris, writing in this month's Policy Review magazine, correctly calls a "fantasy ideology." The Americans who died on Sept. 11 were mere abstractions to their killers in a mad dream that cannot be understood, explained or refuted in rational terms.

There is no strategic logic in al Qaeda's acts of terror other than immediate destruction, Harris notes, adding that there is "no political policy we could take that would change the attitude of our enemies -- short, perhaps, of a massive nationwide conversion to fundamentalist Islam."

In the long year after Sept. 11, Americans have correctly focused less on trying to understand "why they hate us" than on justice and security -- on limiting "their" ability to harm us. We have gone about that task in clumsy and imperfect fashion at times, and we have been insensitive to the security needs of others.

But we emerge from that crucible year stronger and more united as a nation, and more realistic about the nature of the dangerous world we inhabit.

ARTICLE 8

The order was simple: Blow up the U.S. Embassy.

As Azizbek Karimov tells it, he was given a satchel of explosives, thousands of dollars and a plan to hunt down Americans. If the embassy was too well protected, he was to blow up a hotel catering to foreigners. His Arab commanders wanted revenge. "Americans came to Afghanistan and killed our brothers," Karimov recalled them telling him at one point. "We have to pay them back."

Heading off with his package, Karimov opened one more small front in the war on the United States and its allies. In the end, he failed to kill any Americans, but by his admission he did set off two explosions in cities in Kyrgyzstan, home of a new U.S. military base, killing eight people and injuring many others. His career as a bomber ended this spring, in a pool of blood in a basement hide-out, as he tried to kill himself while Uzbek militiamen with police dogs charged down the stairs.

Karimov's story, as recounted in a prison interview as well as interviews with his family, his wife, relatives of his victims and the Uzbek and Kyrgyz investigators who captured him, offers a rare inside

124

look at the life of a foot soldier on the other side of the war on terrorism -- from training camps in Chechnya and Afghanistan back to his impoverished and repressed homeland in Central Asia.

By his account, it is a tale of a listless teenager from a broken home sucked into the world of Islamic terrorism by choice and circumstance, less out of ideology than inertia, dominated by others with stronger wills, pressured by demands to repay loans and eventually trapped by his own delusion and remorselessness.

"I had to do these things," he said, shrugging. "I saw everything with my own eyes, what an unfair world it is." The Islamic radicals he joined with had vowed to change that. "I used to believe them -- that they wanted to create an Islamic state so the whole world would be fair. But then I changed my mind because the whole conversation was just empty words. Mostly they were interested in their own power. They don't care who dies and who survives."

And his own guilt? He sat quietly for a moment. "Afterward you regret it," he said. "But you can't do anything about it."

Karimov still thinks of the one victim he actually met before setting off the bomb that killed him. He thinks about "how to answer him on Judgment Day."

And how will he? "I don't have an answer."

'I'm Asking Forgiveness'

Baby-faced and clean-shaven, wearing a T-shirt and casual slacks, Karimov seems younger than his 24 years, more the picture of a young Uzbek on the move in the modernizing capital of Tashkent than a terrorist trained in the arts of war. He betrays no outward sign of piety, mentioning religion only when asked and revealing only that he prays five times a day, as do most practicing Muslims.

For the last four months, he has sat in grim Uzbek prisons, places of frequent torture under the authoritarian government of President Islam Karimov, according to human rights organizations. But Aziz Karimov, who is not related to the president, insisted he had not been beaten and his admissions were not coerced. U.S. officials familiar with his case say they consider his confession to be credible.

In a prison conference room earlier this month, no signs of physical abuse were visible other than a scar on his right arm where family members said he cut himself in a suicide attempt to avoid capture in May. He spoke casually and confidently, showing no nervousness with an investigator present, and even joked that he was treated well enough in prison that he had gained weight.

"Nobody makes me do this," he said. "This is my word." Facing a possible death sentence, he said he chose confession -- and agreed to an interview request -- in hopes of winning leniency. "I'm asking forgiveness from the people of Uzbekistan and President Karimov."

Aziz Karimov was born and raised in Andijan, a Silk Road city of low-slung concrete houses and chaikhana tea stalls about 175 miles east of Tashkent in the Fergana Valley, a hotbed of Islamic sentiment in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence for Uzbekistan.

"He was such a nice boy," recalled an aunt, who declined to be identified by name. "I never thought" he would grow up to violence.

Aziz's parents divorced when he was 7, she said, and he became caught up in a family struggle that left him deeply scarred. As a teenager, he fell under the sway of her younger brother, his uncle, who took up religion. Aziz studied at a mosque later closed by authorities in 1995, according to investigators, and continued studies in an underground religious school.

125

About six years ago, his aunt said, Aziz followed the uncle, Adakham Karimov, to the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya, where according to investigators the teenager received about six months of training in guns and explosives at a camp near the border town of Khasavyurt in neighboring Dagestan.

The two Uzbeks returned home to Andijan for a time, but in March 1999 left for Afghanistan, then dominated by the Taliban. There they linked up with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group aiming for the violent overthrow of the government in Tashkent.

The aunt said that Aziz left behind at her house six bags that he said contained fertilizer; some men would pick them up within six weeks, he told her. Instead, after authorities learned of the men's involvement with the IMU, police came to the house and discovered what they called 1,200 pounds of explosives in the bags. Her husband and Aziz's father were arrested. Aziz's father later died in prison.

"What a bastard," the aunt said of Aziz, gesturing bitterly in the courtyard of her family home in Andijan. "I feel so angry with him. . . . We believed him, and my poor husband's in prison."

Training in Afghanistan

Aziz Karimov said he went to Afghanistan after his uncle, intending only to deliver Adakham's family to him, but soon became trapped there because the IMU took his passport and money. The IMU, headed by a former Soviet paratrooper named Juma Namangani, its military leader, and Tahir Yuldash, its political leader, was closely aligned with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terror network. Adakham Karimov served as Yuldash's deputy for finances and Aziz was schooled in computers, guns and grenades, and once even met bin Laden.

"They trained me how to use a weapon, how to treat people, how to commit terrorist acts, how to do everything," he recalled. "Our propaganda was teaching us how to kill all nonbelievers."

By his account, he was not among the more zealous students. "I didn't have ideology. I just listened to what people told me to do. I didn't have any opinions about [restoration of the Islamic] caliphate. They told me, 'Learn and you will fight against people.' It wasn't important to me. For the bosses sitting there, it was important to them."

Karimov spent most of his time in Afghanistan in the capital, Kabul, and the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, but by the summer of 2001, shortly before the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, he managed to leave for Pakistan, he said. He later traveled to Iran and eventually to Kyrgyzstan, where he settled back into civilian life.

Soon U.S. warplanes were raining bombs on his onetime compatriots in Afghanistan, demolishing the IMU, apparently killing Namangani and scattering the survivors. His uncle died a violent death, reportedly blown apart by an explosion.

Karimov tried to move on. He became a perfume seller, hawking beauty products, detergents, shampoo and other goods from a shipping container in the market in Osh, a border town near Uzbekistan.

He also met a 20-year-old woman with bright eyes and a shy smile of gold teeth. Within a week or so of meeting in August 2002, they were married. He never told her about his past and she did not press him. It did not occur to her to ask why he did not want to register their marriage with authorities or why he put their new apartment only in her name.

"For me, it didn't matter if he had been disabled or creepy," said his wife, Gulchekhra Khalimova, one of 11 children born to a family scorned because of its social roots. "It was important that I get married. They told me nobody would ever marry me, so I was ready to marry."

In Karimov, she found what she considered a kind soul. "He would never beat me, never. He would not even scold me."

Karimov said he had financed this new life by turning back to his old associates. Through the Internet, he had found other IMU veterans still working with Arab radicals linked to al Qaeda. They sent him about $7,000. He used this money to get married and buy the apartment in Osh for his new wife.

"That's how it all started," he said.

A Demand From Creditors

Karimov said his benefactors soon came calling and demanded that he enlist in operations in exchange for the money. One moved in with him. At the beginning of September 2002, he said, they summoned him to Istanbul, where they told him he was to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, or the Pinara-Bishkek Hotel, where foreigners often stayed.

In December, he went to Bishkek with a briefcase of explosives. But the embassy is in a remote location outside the center of town and protected with a series of reinforced fences. He could never have gotten close enough to blow it up, so he left and headed to an outdoor market where he left the explosives, he said. The next day, on Dec. 27, the briefcase exploded, killing seven people and injuring 20.

Karimov figured any explosion would satisfy his masters, but he was wrong. "The Arabs, they mostly want to blow up U.S. embassies. They're mostly al Qaeda." When he spoke with them after the market bombing, he said, "they were very, very angry. They said, 'You should have blown up the embassy. We didn't need any other missions.' "

At that point, Karimov said, he began to doubt his life with the radicals and started looking for ways out. But his retail business went bankrupt last spring, according to his wife. His onetime compatriots began pressing him for their money, he said, or to commit more bombings.

On May 8, he took a perfume box containing a grenade and crude timer and went to a Bakai Bank wire transfer outlet in Osh. After pretending to place an order, he left just before the grenade detonated, killing a cashier, the one victim he had met.

This time, however, there were witnesses. They knew him by an alias he had been using in town, Medetbek Taliyev, head of investigations for the Kyrgyz security service, said in an interview in Bishkek. "We found his address, and when we were about to detain him, he fled toward Uzbekistan."

Karimov's wife said he came home one day and said he had to go home because his mother was sick. They walked to the Uzbek border, then hitched a ride to Andijan, where they showed up at the aunt's door at dinnertime.

"He was shaking so much," the aunt recalled. "He was so pale." He said he needed forgiveness, without explaining. "We told him, 'You're young, you haven't done anything wrong, let's go ask for forgiveness,' " meaning he should turn himself in to authorities and beg for mercy. "And he said, 'No, I'm afraid.' "

Instead, he decided to kill himself. Khalimova said her new husband grabbed rat poison and swallowed a spoonful. She decided to do the same, without understanding why. "I said, 'If you take poison, I will take it as well.' " But she said the poison did little more than upset her stomach and blur her vision.

It did not take long for Uzbek authorities to find them. Alerted by Kyrgyz counterparts and apparently tipped by a member of Karimov's family, authorities soon stormed into the aunt's house in Andijan to search for the suspected bomber. Karimov was hiding with his wife under the boards of a bench in the basement. As they heard a barking dog, she said, he sliced his right arm at the elbow. "His blood was pumping like a fountain," she recalled. "My whole dress and arm were covered by his blood."

A Wife's Disbelief

Karimov today awaits judgment. A brother and another man have been arrested in Kyrgyzstan and face trial as well. Lt. Maksoud Mamanov, an Uzbek investigator, said Karimov has cooperated and could earn leniency for helping to persuade other IMU veterans to come home and renounce their past.

Back in Osh, the views on what to do with him are radically divided by just a few miles. At the family home of the bank clerk, Dilshat Aliyev, 27, there is no sentiment for mercy. "Let them shoot him down," said the victim's father, Shavket Aliyev, 64. "If they give him to me, I would cut him up slowly, piece by piece."

Not far away, just around the corner from Friendship Street, the confessed bomber's young wife only now seems to be coming to grips with the realization that he was not the man she thought he was. Khalimova has no money to go to see him, and no one had told her that he had admitted his guilt until a reporter arrived with the news.

"I don't believe it," she said. Then she covered her eyes as tears welled up. "He really said that?"

She talked about how kind he seemed, not someone who would harm another person. But then she acknowledged that he had never let her meet his friends, never told her he had been to Afghanistan. She learned about that later from his family, who told her his uncle had often hit him and in effect kept him hostage. She recalled that he had gone to Bishkek once or twice, but she had not heard of the bombing.

"If he did that," she asked, "how are they going to forgive him? I don't believe he did that."

She started to sob. She was pregnant and her husband was in prison. Told that he seemed to love her and that he had taken the terrorists' money to pay for their life together, she shook her head desperately.

"I didn't need any money. I only needed him. I only needed a family." She looked down and added softly: "If he loved me, he shouldn't have done this. He's made himself and all of us suffer so much."

ARTICLE 9

The struggle that most Americans call the war on terrorism will be won by Muslims and lost by Muslims at its now-distant end. The U.S. role must progressively shrink to shaping the battlefield for that contest rather than waging the war as an American-run enterprise.

This will be true whether Nov. 2 brings victory to George W. Bush or to John {grv} Kerry.

The next administration will need to pursue a revised strategy that puts Muslim governments and institutions on the front line of a civil war within Islam that the United States was drawn into on Sept. 11, 2001.

The mobilizing utility of the "war on terrorism" label has run its course. To continue to use it for rhetorical or organizational purposes would obscure the moral, political and social responsibilities that Muslim societies must now assume to cleanse themselves of fanatical fringe groups and ideologies.

Terrorism, it has been widely argued, is a tactic rather than an actual enemy.

Such sophistry obscures this essential point: Terrorism is a graphic expression of the intolerance that the Islamist fanatics preach, practice and -- most important -- demand that their co-religionists adopt to become observant Muslims. Terrorism is not just a tactic. It is also a statement of the inhuman values that motivate those who organize suicide bombings, hostage-taking and televised beheadings.

To the extent that any label can help, this must become a war for something. It must become a campaign for tolerance -- for the simple human decency involved in respecting and, when necessary, protecting the differing beliefs and identities of others.

Christianity and other religions are historically not strangers to using theological justification for holy warriors and sanctified atrocities. But in its latest manifestation, which dates roughly from the 1979 Iranian revolution, the struggle between Sunni and Shiite Muslims for domination of Islam has made that religion this era's most important and deadly religious battleground.

The related military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq -- the operational definition of the "war on terrorism" -- have had this clarifying effect: Muslim governments that for more than a quarter-century ignored or sought to profit from the spread of intolerance toward non-Muslims can no longer pursue those options with impunity. The intolerance they countenanced or actively encouraged has metastasized into an all-consuming ideology of religious hatred that now threatens them as well.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia can no longer callously export their extremists and the Wahhabist-inspired doctrine that animates them. Sudan and Yemen can no longer safely sell protection and material support to al Qaeda and its ilk. When the USS Cole was bombed in 2000, Yemeni authorities, aided by solicitous U.S. diplomats and policymakers, frustrated the original FBI investigation of the attack.

Now Yemen helps in the hunt for al Qaeda. A Yemeni court imposed death sentences on two of the Cole saboteurs last week. That is one measure of the change wrought in the brutal opening phase of the struggle to contain and eradicate the most virulent strains of intolerance.

But these strategic gains must be consolidated into a new approach that establishes the obvious: Not only Americans or Britons or Italians are threatened by the hatemongers and must act to defend themselves. The wave of kidnappings and theologically justified executions of hostages in Iraq may paradoxically help in this necessary effort.

When kidnappers demanded as ransom that the French government change a law about religious attire in schools that affected the country's large Muslim minority, the leaders of that community quickly rejected that interference with their rights and duties as French citizens. Last week British Muslims went on television to plead for the life of a British hostage. Muslim clerics in Turkey and Egypt have asked for the release of fellow nationals as an Islamic duty.

As small and halting as they may be, such reactions represent progress over the moral and strategic blindness that prevailed in the region on Sept. 10, 2001.

But it is not enough for French or British or Egyptian Muslims to plead for lives to be spared because they share the nationality or the religion of hostages. Only by pleading for the lives of fellow human beings of whatever nationality or religion, and by depriving the hostage-takers of any shred of religious justification, can Islamic leaders purge their community of this illness.

Launching a war against al Qaeda and other terrorism groups and their supporters was necessary. Pursuing it in its present form will not be sufficient, for President Bush or for President Kerry. The leadership in a broader struggle must inexorably pass to Muslims who honor tolerance and human dignity -- and who are willing to place themselves at risk to defend those values for all faiths and races.

ARTICLE 10

Two days after the terrorist attacks in London, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed to what he called terrorism's root causes: poverty, lack of democracy and the Middle East conflict. Blair said, "Where there is extremism, fanaticism or acute and appalling forms of poverty in one continent, the consequences no longer stay fixed in that continent, they spread to the rest of the world."

All of which may be true. President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have said pretty much the same thing. What any of that means as far as the London explosions are concerned is, however, another question.

Blair now knows, but apparently didn't suspect when he spoke last week, that three of the four alleged bombers were born and raised in an economically thriving democracy called Great Britain. The three men of Pakistani descent did not, by all accounts, lead lives steeped in economic desperation.

The fourth bomber also did not hail from the turbulent Middle East. He was, according to U.S. law enforcement officials, a Jamaica-born British citizen.

They were, however, Muslims. And the four men were so disaffected from their own country that they acquired explosives, blew themselves up and, in the process, killed at least 50 strangers while injuring 700 more.

The presence of suicide bombers in London on July 7 had nothing to do with porous borders, an influx of counterfeit asylum seekers or weaknesses in British deportation laws. The men on those three subway trains and double-decker bus had one thing in common besides their faith and their British citizenship: a rage within that caused them to turn themselves into human bombs.

That put them in league with suicide terrorists from Iraq to Israel. So what is the West, including the United States, really up against?

Poor economic conditions in Arab countries, as the Bush administration asserts endlessly, may be an incentive for terrorism. But what accounts for those home-grown supporters of terrorism in the United Kingdom? How do you explain Ali Al-Timimi, the Muslim spiritual leader across the Potomac River in Fairfax County who was sentenced this week to life in prison for inciting his followers to train for armed jihad against America?

Timimi, reports The Post, was born and raised in the Washington area. The place where he lectured -- Falls Church -- is hardly an economic backwater, nor is it known as a hotbed of anti-American radicalism.

Now, you may argue with the length of Timimi's sentence. You may even believe his conviction for urging a jihad that never happened goes too far. But Timimi doesn't command my attention. I want to know what motivated his followers in Virginia and the four dead bombers in England. Notwithstanding their access to higher living standards and modern education, the British bombers and some of Timimi's followers found violent jihad an attraction. Some of the men who attended a Sept. 16, 2001, meeting in Fairfax -- at which Timimi was reported to have told that "the time had come for them to go abroad and join the mujaheddin engaged in violent jihad in Afghanistan" -- actually left the United States for terrorist training camps. Ponder that.

This takes me back to a 2003 column in which I interviewed Jessica Stern, then a lecturer at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and author of "Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill."

Stern didn't think the Bush administration had a clear understanding of the religious extremists we are facing. Poverty in and of itself doesn't cause terrorism, she pointed out. To be sure, terrorist leaders recruit among the disenfranchised and target orphanages -- such as those in Pakistan -- as feeder schools for jihadist organizations.

The ranks of terrorist groups, however, also include young men and women from the middle class. The feelings they seem to share across the board, she said, had to do with humiliation, a desire for a clear identity, and a belief that they can control more through their deaths than through their lives. They have come to see murder-suicide and martyrdom as just rewards for avenging the harm done to their religion and to Muslims in other countries.

A misuse of Islam by terrorist leaders, to be sure. Murderers in the name of an extremist ideology? Yes. But -- and here's the lesson London learned that America cannot ignore -- alienation, blind hatred and fanaticism are not foreign imports. They can be homegrown. And just like firecrackers, they can explode.

Geneive Abdo is a fellow at the Century Foundation and the author most recently of "Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11"

THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR
The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror
By Dina Temple-Raston
PublicAffairs. 288 pp. $26

THE FIRST MUSLIMS
History and Memory
By Asma Afsaruddin
One World/Ballantine. 254 pp. Paperback, $19.95

Policymakers, pundits and scholars have long puzzled over what inspires young Muslims to take the great leap toward radicalization. If Muslims living in dramatically different societies, in vastly different circumstances and conditions in the East and West, are similarly drawn to extremism, does this mean there is something inherently violent in the Islamic tradition? Do modern Muslims interpret the tenets of their faith depending upon the political and social context in which they live, or are they trapped in the Dark Ages?

Two new books attempt answers, both historical and contemporary, to these pressing questions. "The Jihad Next Door," by Dina Temple-Raston, is a detailed account of Yemeni Americans in Lackawanna in Upstate New York, whose only desire was to become more devout. Now, most are serving jail time for convictions on various terrorism-related crimes. The American-born Muslims admitted to having visited an al-Qaeda training camp in the spring of 2001, their confessions a dream come true for the U.S. government, according to Temple-Raston. The FBI and the Justice Department cast them as the first sleeper cell on U.S. soil. They were evidence, according to the government, that the so-called war on terror was real, and more important, that jihad had moved next door.

In this breezy, well-written detective story, Temple-Raston, the FBI reporter for National Public Radio, chronicles their journey from Lackawanna to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Once the men reach the al-Qaeda training camp, they become frightened and return to New York. Temple-Raston's main point is that the Lackawanna six were victims. The jihad, she argues, existed only in their imaginations. When faced with the harsh reality of living in the camp, and ultimately engaging in violence against the United States, they abandoned their mission.

Temple-Raston outlines how easily young men practicing their faith at a local mosque and leading mundane lives can be convinced, however briefly, that taking their faith to the next level could be achieved by becoming warriors for al-Qaeda. A Muslim mentor in Lackawanna convinced the men through his teachings and regular study sessions that they lacked an understanding of true Islam. He coached them by analyzing verses in the Koran, and then lured them into believing that the ultimate

test of their piety was a commitment to fight the United States on the battlefield a world away, just as Muslims had fought their invaders centuries ago.

But Temple-Raston fails to analyze why young Muslims -- not only in Lackawanna but around the world -- are vulnerable to religious interpretations that lead them toward violence. Do the Islamic sources advocate violence in certain circumstances, and if so, how have these texts been interpreted throughout history and how are they being interpreted in the modern world?

In "The First Muslims," Asma Afsaruddin, a professor of Arabic and Islamic studies at the University of Notre Dame, offers an eloquent and cogent explanation of the historical roots and meanings of many key concepts relevant to today's discussion of contemporary Islam, including the role of jihad in the Islamic tradition. Through an exhaustive examination of medieval Arabic texts, Afsaruddin explains that from the time the Koran was revealed to the prophet Mohammad during what is known as the Meccan period, Muslims were forbidden to retaliate against their pagan foes.

Only after Mohammad established the first Muslim polity, Afsaruddin explains, was this Koranic verse revealed: "Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged. . . . For, if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques -- in all of which God's name is abundantly glorified -- would surely have been destroyed." Afsaruddin also notes that the Koran forbids Muslims to initiate hostilities but permits self-defense when necessary.

Years later, as Islam spread, Islamic jurists held differing views about applying jihad to non-Muslim states. Afsaruddin concludes that the interpretations of terms such as jihad differed depending upon the juristic thinking of the time, which was highly influenced by current events. By the 12th century, for example, jurists considered jihad to be in abeyance, to be revived only in times of crisis. Quoting the Islamic philosopher Ibn Khaldun, Afsaruddin writes that he characterized the changing notions of jihad as due to "a change in the character of the [Islamic] nation from warlike to the civilized stage."

Afsaruddin's goal in taking the reader through historical interpretations of jihad is that Islam, contrary to contemporary criticism, has never been frozen in time -- and should not be. Muslims have interpreted their faith through the ages based upon the social and political context in which they lived. She reiterates this point throughout "The First Muslims" in her discussion of other concepts, such as how Muslims define infidels and how they distinguish between political and religious authority, and what constitutes an Islamic state. Her book should be required reading for any Muslim or non-Muslim who mistakenly believes the faith is immutable.

Understanding how Muslims view their lives and their faith today is now critical to the relationship between the Islamic world and the West. Educated Americans across the country are organizing salons and reading groups and compiling book lists in hope of enlightening themselves about a faith that was completely alien to them six years ago. But the greater challenge is to find sources as well-researched and measured as this book.

✧