The Evolution of Insurgency and its Impact on Conventional Armed Forces

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Abstract:

Better known as guerrilla warfare during the 19th and early 20th century, insurgency was employed by indigenous groups from defeated armies in opposition to foreign or colonial occupation. This form of asymmetric warfare is not outmoded and has since evolved under emerging ideological, political and economic imperatives. The 11 September 2001 attacks, 2003 Bali bombings and 7 July 2005 London bombings are clear evidence of its continued existence and development. This article explores the evolution of insurgency and the challenges conventional armed forces, including the Singapore Armed Forces, will need to prepare for when combating insurgency.

Keywords: Insurgency; Guerrilla Warfare; Counter-Insurgency; Information Warfare and Operations

INTRODUCTION

Guerrilla and insurgent movements have fought foreign occupation forces throughout history.[1] The Fabian Strategy applied by the Roman Republic against Hannibal in the Second Punic War of the third century BC can be considered an early example of guerrilla tactics. During the Peninsular War of 1812, the British provided aid to the Spanish guerrillas, tying down tens of thousands of French troops. Encouraged by the spontaneous mass resistance against Napoleon in Spain, the British backed the guerrillas because it cost them much less than equipping British soldiers to face the French in conventional warfare.[2] The Peninsular War was one of the most successful partisan wars in history and was where the term "guerrilla" was first used in its modern context. The forces of the Afrikaner Republics in the Second Boer War from 1899 to 1902 in South Africa employed guerrilla tactics extensively after being defeated by British Army and eventually regained their capitals of Pretoria and Bloemfontein. After the military failure of the Easter Rising in 1916, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) also resorted to guerrilla tactics during the Irish War of Independence from 1919 to 1921. These conflicts document the presence of insurgencies throughout the history of warfare.

Better known as guerrilla warfare during the 19th and early 20th century, insurgency was employed by indigenous groups from defeated armies in opposition to foreign or colonial occupation.[3] Today, this form of asymmetric warfare has not become outmoded and has instead evolved under emerging ideological, political and economic imperatives. The 11 September 2001 attacks (9/11), 2003 Bali bombings and 7 July 2005 London bombings are clear evidence of its continued existence and development.

Insurgency or guerrilla operations have been a constant threat since the dawn of human warfare. Nevertheless, most modern armed forces cannot credibly claim to have attained any clear victory over these evolving asymmetric threats. Militaries are still largely structured and organised for large-scale, high-intensity warfare. They mainly operate in a linear fashion and focus on defeating their adversaries through the destruction of military assets and capabilities. Traditional command and control, force structures, fighting tactics, techniques, leadership, doctrines and training are inadequate for combating irregular modes of low-intensity conflict, such as harassment, ambushes, sabotages and surprise attacks conducted by insurgents or irregular small combat units.

OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE – IS INSURGENCY JUST ANOTHER FORM OF GUERRILLA WARFARE?

In the early 19th century, guerrilla warfare was mainly defined by hit and run tactics adopted when a conventional army had been defeated or depleted of resources. The full potential of irregular modes of conflict remained unexplored. Eventually, guerrilla warfare became truly revolutionary in both intent and practice with social, economic, psychological and (especially) political elements grafted onto traditional irregular military tactics in order to radically alter the structure of a state by force. Weak and minority dissident groups sought power through a combination of subversion, propaganda and military action. Gradually, the term insurgency was used to refer to modern revolutionary guerrilla warfare employed strategically to achieve a particular political or ideological end.

The transition from guerrilla warfare to insurgency occurs when there is an intention to bring about political change through a political-military strategy of organised coercion and subversion and the attempt to mobilise a mass political base. While insurgents might routinely employ terrorism or intimidation in tactical terms, they have rarely done so at the strategic level. Consequently, it can be argued that terrorist groups, even if motivated by a similar ideology as insurgent groups, tend to employ terrorism indiscriminately and as a political demonstration without the intention of taking over the state apparatus or an attempt to arouse popular support.[4]

Emerging ideological, political and economical imperatives coupled with new identity politics and non-state actors are constantly challenging traditional political systems through intrastate, low-intensity conflict. According to a 1997 article in *The Economist*, "the continuing proliferation of insurgent organisations to date suggests that insurgency is still widely perceived as an effective means of achieving desired political power and influence, or of bringing a cause to the notice of an international or national community. The end of European decolonisation and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the motivational impulse for state actors to engage in high-intensity conflict between the late 1940s and the early 1990s."[5]

The ability of a small insurgency to exploit a minimal level of discontent and act as a catalyst for insurrection without consciously building a mass political support infrastructure is a characteristic of urban guerrilla groups inspired by theorists such as Marighela and Guillen in Latin America in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[6] The Maoist model of insurgency, however, suggests that insurgencies will ultimately succeed if they are capable of organising a sufficient mass political support infrastructure to sustain a prolonged conflict.[7] One reason for the prolongation of conflict in the Maoist model of insurgency is that the ultimate aim was always to eventually build a conventional army capable of undertaking moderate military operations in the final phase of conflict. Building a conventional army, as Mao and the North Vietnamese did,[8] and the mass political support infrastructure to sustain it was viewed as the key essence of insurgent success during the Vietnam War in the 1970s. The commonality between the Maoist model of insurgency and the one inspired by Marighela and Guillen is the use of combat power, albeit of a different scale level, against conventional military adversaries to achieve the desired end states.

The insurgency in Iraq that has developed since Operation Iraqi Freedom is more complex. Hashim writes that "the Sunnis and other variety of groups

Viet Cong Fighters in the Vietnam War

are united by 'negative' goals in opposition to the US and Coalition forces' presence. Some groups seek the former status quo in which the Sunni minority have exercised power since the Ottoman period. Others are clearly restoration groups drawn from the former regime: the Baa'th Party, the paramilitary Fida'iyn, and the Republican Guard."[9] Other groups are anti-Saddam nationalist groups with no desire to see Saddam restored but who resent the US and Western presence. Driven by a common desire to wear down their adversaries' power, the insurgents mainly employed asymmetric methods against US and Coalition forces over a protracted period.

Insurgency has existed for as long as the powerful have frustrated the weak to the point of violence. With no other valid options, the weak turn to protracted, asymmetric violence and psychological warfare. In some models, particularly the one developed by Mao Zedong, asymmetric methods are used to remedy an imbalance in conventional military power. Once parity has been achieved, conventional warfare will be used to secure victory.[10] In other examples, insurgents seek to attain their objectives directly by wearing down the dominant power. Guerrilla warfare and insurgency employ similar methods to achieve the same desired end state; the weak avoid defeat by prolonging the conflict, hopefully changing the balance of power and giving themselves a chance to grow in strength.

THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY

Weaker military armed forces are expected to continue seeking asymmetries as this allows them to confront superior opponents. The basic objectives of insurgent operations are to wear down the enemy over a protracted war, erode his morale, disrupt his lines of communication and weaken his forces. Emphasising mobility, swift advances and withdrawals, and the rapid concentration and dispersal of forces, insurgents constantly harass enemy units and conduct continuous counter-attacks to dislocate the enemy. Declining to engage in frontal assaults and confrontations, the insurgents favour flank and rear attacks, using favourable terrain to their advantage.

It is likely that insurgency will continue to evolve through advances in technology and ideology.

Insurgency will also continue to attract non-state actors as they are not bound by internationally accepted standards of conduct. Insurgents will always seek to redefine the operating environment and create asymmetric conditions by quickly changing the nature of the conflict and employing capabilities which their stronger military adversaries are least prepared for.

It is likely that insurgency will continue to evolve through advances in technology and ideology. The sense of resentment and an inability to ameliorate these through legitimate political means will result in its persistence.[11] Changes or discontinuities will eventually affect the pattern of insurgency. Some of the significant changes or discontinuities are as follows:

The Meaning of Sanctuary

As there remain few geographically remote areas outside government control where insurgencies can gestate, the initial stages of development tend to take place hidden in plain sight: in cities and other developed areas. The ongoing global trend towards urbanisation means that future insurgencies will tend to form and develop in cities rather than rural areas.[12] While this is necessary for survival, this dispersion will make it difficult for insurgent movements to concentrate enough power to seize control of a state. Beckett notes that the "Maoist People's War was effective because it was able to weaken the regime psychologically and politically, and then launch decisive military blows. Modern insurgents may never be able to develop enough military power to undertake conventional operations and thus have to rely more on psychological and political means. Widely dispersed, networked insurgencies are difficult to eradicate, but also less likely to gain victory than the more concentrated insurgencies prior to and during the 20th century."[13]

Diversification of Support

Unlike in the Cold War, today's insurgents cannot rely on external support. Insurgents therefore must devote extensive effort to fundraising and income generation. This increasingly leads them into

coalition with organised crime, possibly to the extent of becoming criminal organisations themselves. This diminishes their reliance on external sponsors and the support of the mass public. More than ever before, contemporary insurgents only need the passive acquiescence of the population rather than its active support. Extended global interconnectivity and information technology have facilitated the linkage of various insurgent movements and allied organisations, including criminal enterprises across regions and around the world. Coalitions and partnerships that would have been impossible during the Cold War are increasingly becoming a norm.

The evolution of insurgency is likely to continue. Insurgencies may become more networked, with no centralised command or strategy, held together only by a unifying objective. While this would make them even less effective in terms of seizing power or attaining other political goals, they would also become more survivable. Insurgencies may also develop connections or even alliances with legitimate political organizations sharing their resentment.[14] It is conceivable that insurgencies may also follow the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and turn into purely criminal organisations.

ARE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH INSURGENCY?

There have been countless counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts by armed forces throughout the history of human warfare. Many of such experiences have indicated that the traditional armed forces may not be properly structured, organised and trained to deal with insurgency. For instance, many British soldiers died during active service somewhere in the world in every year between 1945 and 1997, but their conventional warfighting experience was confined to 35 months of the Korean War, 10 days at Suez in 1956, 25 days of the land campaign in the Falklands in 1982, and 100 hours of land operations in the Gulf in 1991.[15] As a matter of fact, it was low-intensity conflict or insurgency that inflicted most of the British Armed Force's casualties during this span of 52 years.[16] Many conventional armed forces are not prepared to acknowledge and accept their unpreparedness for combating insurgency, continuing to believe that existing warfighting concepts and capabilities still

provide a level of security. Therefore, it is difficult to convince the military leadership that a major change in terms of force structure, operational methods and leadership styles is required to effectively manage threats that fall outside the conventional conflict spectrum.

When the British restricted Jewish immigration to the Middle East, Jewish Palestinian militants employed insurgent methods to bring in more Jewish refugees and turn the tide of British sentiment at home. Accordingly, "Jewish groups such as the Lehi the Irgn—many of whom had experience in the Warsaw Ghetto battles against the Nazis, fought British soldiers with insurgency tactics. The Jewish forces, composed of spontaneous groups of civilians working without formal military structure, fought the well-trained and experienced British, which had just emerged victorious from World War II. Some of these groups were amalgamated into the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and subsequently fought in the 1948 War of Independence."[17] The creation of the state of Israel was the result.

A major change in terms of force structure, operational methods and leadership styles is required to effectively manage threats that fall outside the conventional conflict spectrum.

Insurgencies tend not to follow regular patterns and generally go unrecognised in established and long-standing laws of conventional war. They are difficult to match with conventional military doctrines and capabilities as they deliberately aim to offset the strength and will of their adversaries. There is no established doctrine or strategy for dealing with insurgents and guerrillas. The French COIN experience in Algeria between 1956 and 1962 clearly indicates that the French Army was completely dislocated by insurgent tactics that the Algerian National Liberation Front (ANLF) adopted. French soldiers conducting COIN operations in the region were also generally insensitive to the local Islamic customs and culture. Furthermore, the brutal methods and systematic

Car Bombing in Iraq, 2005: As Coalition forces respond to a car bombing in South Baghdad, a second car bomb is detonated, targeting those responding to the initial incident.

torture of detainees during interrogation culminated in increasing international and domestic criticism of the French Armed Forces.[18] The French Armed Forces withdrew from Algeria by the end of 1962, defeated by insurgents.[19] The IDF also suffered initial setbacks for their failure to fully understand insurgency—in accordance with conventional offensive doctrine, they had adopted instant retaliation as a means of destroying those responsible for insurgent attacks and thinning out their ranks.

Insurgent threats are difficult to detect. Firstly, although analysis of frequency and intensity data may indicate the beginnings of insurgent activities, current information processing systems are not capable enough to make a significant contribution to the early detection of insurgency.[20] Secondly, no matter how extensive the intelligence network may be, information is usually acquired in small bits and pieces, like those of a jigsaw puzzle. To obtain a clear and accurate picture of the threat, the various pieces must be put together in a number of patterns collated through the continuous input of new information. In order to do this, the intelligence service must possess an information processing system capable of retrieving and rearranging that information in various patterns for further studies and evaluation—a daunting task indeed.[21]

Even if insurgent activity is detected, conventional armed forces still face a level-of-response dilemma. They find it difficult to respond in the most discriminate, proportionate and effective manner because insurgents are usually interspersed among the civilians, often using them as shields and bargaining chips to attract outside attention and intervention. The Iraqi insurgents have successfully employed such tactics against the US-led coalition in Iraqi, where "tactics included bombing of vehicles and human targets, suicide bombings, ambushes and traditional hit-and-run raids using civilians as shields. It was estimated that they have injured more than 18,000 coalition troops and killed over 3,900, including more than 2,000 US soldiers. To date, the US and the coalition forces in Iraq continued to face mounting challenges in detecting, determining and responding to insurgent movement, activities and threats. Sunni insurgents continued to establish influence control over the Al Anbar Governorate and Diyala Governorate, despite a series of existing coalition campaigns within the region."[22]

THE CHALLENGES OF INSURGENCY FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

Modern armed forces should recognise that insurgency leverages on hit-and-run opportunities rather than direct conflict. This represents the new paradigm for military operations in COIN.

Operations in Complex or Urban Terrain

Insurgents are expected to focus on urban areas or complex terrain to negate technological inferiority in surveillance and weapon systems and to seek sanctuary from stronger adversaries. Such environments degrade military weapon standoff capabilities and are manpower-intensive. They also complicate the application of firepower due to the need to avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties. It is estimated that 45% of the world's population currently resides in urban areas and it is projected that this percentage will increase to 60% within the next ten years.[23] Thus, it will become increasingly more difficult for armed forces to avoid COIN operations in an urban environment.

Information Warfare and Operations

Technology has given both modern armed forces and insurgents the opportunity to observe the battlefield with greater fidelity and resolution than ever before. Instead of engaging in direct conflict, insurgents will attempt to destroy their adversaries'

Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intel, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and platforms to gain an advantage in the information and psychological arenas.

Complex Relationships

Alliances and coalitions are already routine for any military operation in the world today. Partners from various armed forces will have differing views of end states and means, which requires compromise and tends to slow the pace of operations. This is particularly true in light of international economic interdependence and political engagement which require the armed forces to coordinate and work with allies, non-government organisations and other governmental agencies during COIN operations. Insurgents understand the weaknesses of coalitions and will seek to create alliances with nations who are more sympathetic to their cause. The presence of civilians, refugees and non-combatants within the military areas of operation also potentially confuses military forces and hampers their COIN operations. Insurgents inject multiple sources of motivation, ideology, interests, beliefs, or political affiliations to complicate military operations and breed civil unrest. Their presence forces militaries to consider the potential impact of civilian curfews, demonstrations, refugee camps, martial law, sabotage, information manipulation and civil affairs.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

A ROE is a directive issued from competent military authority which delineates the circumstances and limitations under which the armed force will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Insurgents will study these rules and attempt to exploit any indecisiveness by their adversaries.

Photographer's Mate 1st Class Michael Larson, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Navy_060325-N-6901L-048_U.S._ Army_soldiers_hand_out_maps_and_information_to_the_residents_of_Tarmiya_about_safe_routes_they_have_to_take_en- tering_or_leaving_their_town_because_of_ongoing_counter-insurgency_operations.

Tarmiya, Iraq (2006): US Army soldiers hand out maps and information to the residents of Tarmiya on safe routes to take when entering or leaving town due to ongoing counter-insurgency operations.

Media

Insurgents will seek to control the media and exploit it to its fullest potential. The pervasive media presence gives insurgents an open source of continuous news information and good situational awareness on their adversaries. Media coverage of military operations and real-time dissemination of information can dramatically sway international response and strategic interaction to the insurgents' advantage.

Asymmetry

Due to their inferior combat capabilities, insurgents will always attempt to exploit the weaknesses of their adversaries. Some of the asymmetric warfare tactics adopted by insurgents are deliberate, developed over time after a careful study of their adversaries. Others are developed spontaneously as opportunities present themselves. They combine multifaceted means with very flexible methods of operation. These asymmetries are harder to predict and are significantly more dangerous, complicating the future battlefield of COIN.

PREPARING THE SAF FOR COMBATING INSURGENCY

Like many other modern armed forces, the SAF does not have much experience in COIN operations. The SAF must be able to learn from the valuable lessons and experiences gathered from past COIN responses and brace itself for this evolving threat, focusing on its force organisation, training and leadership development.

Force Organisation

The enclosed urban environment and complex terrain will reduce the advantage in range and accuracy which advanced weaponry provides. The insurgents, deployed in depth and widely dispersed, often choose not to engage adversaries at long range but will let some forces pass into designated ambush areas before striking. Snipers may be teamed with systems to destroy high value targets. Remotely-detonated or "trip-fired" Claymore-type systems will be employed against dismounted infantry. Self-healing minefields and anti-helicopter mines are also emerging possibilities. Precision munitions are increasingly common: long range rocket artillery, potentially integrated with systems such as counter-fire radars and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) increases the potential for rapid, accurate and lethal deep strike capabilities. Urban battles have proven to be especially difficult when the enemy employs human shields. These are some of the prevailing challenges of COIN operations.

The SAF must be able to learn from the valuable lessons and experiences gathered from past COIN responses and brace itself for this evolving threat, focusing on its force organisation, training and leadership development.

The required force organisation for such an environment should comprise a full range of conventional mobile ground forces to allow greater flexibility with modularity and enhanced capabilities for direct action missions such as raids rather than mass engagements. Special Operations Forces (SOFs) or unconventional forces should also be configured for the purpose of containing civilians, refugees and non-combatants on the battlefield, and specialise in conducting strategic raids and COIN operations. The US and UK Special Operations Forces are both involved in COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the force structuring approach of their SOFs are different. The US expanded their SOF and made some of their Army Units more SOF-like. The British Special Air Service (SAS) has led the way in developing certain aspects of COIN, although the vast majority of its current doctrine was drawn from lessons learned by the British Army as a whole. The SAS are often on exercise or attachment with friendly countries to provide training in COIN. Along with the regular British Army and Royal Marines, the SAS has carried out most of the COIN operations since the World War II.[24]

Full Spectrum Training

The training of future combatants will need to do more than just impart conventional "soldiering skills." The training environment must replicate key

variables of the future operational environment with its wide spectrum of threats, and simulate insurgent methods of operation and asymmetrical end-states. Some of these situational variables include: operating in complex and urban terrain; dealing with civilians, refugees and non-combatant actors; managing multi-ethnic or fractured populations; containing internal and external information mechanisms; countering hostile Information Warfare (IW) attack capabilities; managing pervasive media presence; dealing with Private Voluntary Organisations (PVOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); containing a hostile population with the potential to resort to guerrilla-type activities; dealing with criminal organisations and drug trafficking elements; and counter-terrorism.

Combat in urban and complex terrain is likely to dominate future conflicts. Based on their many years of experience in COIN campaigns around the world, US and UK forces advocate that the principles of COIN are generally classified as: recognition of the political nature of the insurgency; establishment of a civil-military command and control structure with civilian supremacy; importance of intelligence and proper human intelligence gathering; splitting the insurgents from the population by propaganda and winning over hearts and minds; destroying the insurgents if opportunities present themselves; and political reforms to prevent recurrence. Their training scenarios incorporate the basic differences between the two types of conflict: while conventional war envisions the destruction of the main enemy forces and makes military goals paramount, COIN envisions the military acting in support of a civil authority and seeks to understand the political, social and economic (as well as military) aspects of the campaign.[25] The SAF must invest more resources and time into training for urban combat and build capabilities for COIN in such operating environments.

Leadership Development

SAF commanders must understand that clarity, accuracy and completeness of information concerning situation, events and context will determine the degree to which operational and strategic decision-makers get directly involved in tactical actions. Commanders must possess clear and concise communication skills and report contextually. They must also have a feel for the operating environment, battlefield calculus, political issues and civil-military relations (CMR). In Oman,[26] and other successful COIN campaigns such as Malaya during the 1960s, clear political objectives were articulated for the population and understood by the military leadership.[27] Coordination of civil and military effort was ensured through an established committee structure. A combination of physical and psychological security measures combined with political incentives successfully isolated the insurgents from the population, while minimum use of force by the military ensured that the armed forces did not alienate themselves from the general population. Moreover, the incentives offered had sufficient long-term promise in addressing political grievances to prevent any resurgence of discontent. Malaya and Oman remained politically stable under British governance during that era.[28]

SAF Commanders must also acknowledge the presence of non-combatant agencies and organisations on the modern battlefield. These third party actors may have humanitarian, political, economic, or demographic interests congruent to state and military interests; their presence will thus have an impact on the conduct of any military activities. These actors may, intentionally or otherwise, hinder military actions and add to the "fog of war." SAF Commanders must also seek to generate confidence, understanding and rapport with general society and the civilian leadership it serves. The media will provide the mechanism to perform that function and the commander or leader must not ignore it.

Insurgents will always attempt to stay below the threshold of clear aggression. Future SAF combat fighting tactics, techniques and procedures must thus embrace non-linear aggression insurgency patterns as well as traditional force-on-force conditions.

CONCLUSION

Insurgency is not an entirely new form of warfare but an evolution of guerrilla warfare. In the most basic sense, insurgents succeed by a direct or indirect strategy through which they erode the strength of the regime until they can confront it on equal terms, usually over a considerable period of time.

In the 21st century, modern armed forces should expect less high-intensity conflicts between conventional forces as protracted low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric warfare are fast becoming the norm. The SAF must progressively restructure and reorganise to meet this expanded spectrum of potential threats, which demands more flexible and innovative responses compared to conventional combat. The readiness of SAF for COIN will depend on the context and conditions of its training environment, which must reflect current realities and incorporate the methods and capabilities employed by potential insurgents. This will ensure that the SAF's force structure, doctrines and training will always remain relevant. ☯

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ENDNOTES

1. Guerrilla Warfare is defined as combat operation characterised by hit-and-run tactics conducted by irregular forces. These forces operate mainly as a military combat unit, attacking enemy military forces and seizing and holding territory occasionally. Typical guerrilla operations include harassment of the enemy, ambushes, raids, cutting lines of communication and surprise attacks. Insurgency is defined as a strategy adopted by weaker groups that cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by quick seizure of power. It is generally characterised by protracted, asymmetric and psychological warfare conducted in complex terrain (jungles, mountains and urban areas) to shield the insurgents from government retaliation and eventually alter the balance of power in their favour. They avoid direct combat, where they are the weakest, and focus on psychological and political, where they can usually operate on a more equal footing.

2. Gates, David, *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War* (Pimlico, 2002), 33-34

3. Beckett, Ian F. W., *Insurgency in Iraq: A Historical Perspective* (January 2005): 2.

4. Terrorism is defined as an activity rather than a type of war. Terrorism is "the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals ... its

aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim ... it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and publicity is an essential factor in terror strategy." Terrorism is a strategy that relies on acts of violence against civilians to achieve political intimidation. Common terrorist activities would include assassination, bombing, arson, robberies, hostage-taking, hijacking and chemical-biological attacks. See Ibid., 3.

5. "The Future of Warfare," *The Economist*, 8 March 1997, 15.

6. Marighel was the author of *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and also an active leader of Action for National Liberation (ALN). Guillen was an anarcho-syndicalist veteran of the Spanish Civil War and had a great influence over the Argentine Tacuara Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNRT) fugitives in Montevideo. He also wrote *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla*.

7. Beckett, *Insurgency in Iraq*, 3-4. For Mao's analysis of the concepts of aggressiveness, initiative, mobility and deception, and flexibility, see Mao Tse-Tung, *Basic Tactics*, trans. Stuart R. Schram (New York: Praeger 1966), 55-66, 83-89, 270; *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. I, 238-240; S*elected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. II, 85-87, 157-165, 170-174; Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 42-46, 98-105.

8. Mai Elliott, trans., "Part Three: Military Organisation and Activities," *Documents of an Elite Viet Cong Delta Unit*, ed. David W. P. Elliott (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1969), v, 63, 64; see also Truong Chinh, *The Resistance Will Win*, 181.

9. Ahmed Hashim, "The Sunni Insurgency in Iraq," Middle East Institute Policy Brief, 15 August 2003; Ahmed Hashim, "The Insurgency in Iraq," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14, no. 3 (2003): 21-22.

10. Mao Tse-Tung and Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Cassell, 1961), 31-32, 41-42.

11. Steven and Metz and Raymond A. Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualising Threat and Response* (Strategic Studies Institute US Army College, November 2004), 12.

12. Ibid., 12.

13. Ibid., 12. See also John Akehurst, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-75* (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1982); Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War* (London: William Kimber, 1996); and Peter Thwaites, *Muscat Command* (London: Pen & Sword, 1995).

14. Ibid., 13-14.

15. Beckett, *Insurgency in Iraq*, 1.

16. Charles Callwell, "Lessons to be Learnt from the Campaigns in which British Forces Have Been Employed Since the Year 1865," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* 31, no. 139 (1887-1888), 362. See also Caldwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd edition. (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1906).

17. Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (London: Nash Publishing, 1951); David Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-47* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 121-122.

18. Beckett, *Insurgency in Iraq*, 11.

19. Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972); John Talbott, *The War Without A Name* (New York: Faber and Faber, 1980); Martin Alexander, Martin Evans, and J. F. V. Keiger, eds., *The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); *Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies*, 159-168.

20. Conley, Michael C. and Schrock, Joann L., *Preliminary Survey of Insurgency in Urban Areas* (Washington: American University Special Operations Office, February 1965), 8.

21. Russel, Charles A. and Hildner, Robert E., "Intelligence and Information Processing in Counterinsurgency," *Air University Review,* July-August 1973.

22. Steven Metz, "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq," *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (2003-04): 25-36; Hashim, "Insurgency in Iraq," 1-22. Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Current Military Situation in Iraq* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 November 2003), http://www.csis.org/features/031114current.pdf, 14-15.

23. The figures and data are extracted from Steven Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

24. Marston, Daniel, "Force Structure for High- and Low-intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future," discussion paper for National Intelligence Council Workshop, "Changing Nature of Warfare," Washington D.C., 25 May 2004, 9.

25. Ibid., 8. This has been the chief role of the military as described by various COIN theorists, including Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations and Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010); Douglas Blaufarb, *The COIN Era*; Robert Komer, *Bureaucracy at War*; Peter Paret, *French COIN Warfare from Indo-China to Algeria*; John Nagl, *COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*.

26. British operations in Oman are an important case study for COIN. The British role in the area was significant but has always been downplayed. To this day, the role of the SAS is not advertised in Oman. For more information on the campaign, see Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War* (UK: HarperCollins, 2000); John Akehurst, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975* (Salisbury: Michael Russell Publishing Ltd, 1982); Kenneth Perkins, *A Fortunate Soldier* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988); Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, eds., *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency* (London: Croom Helm, 1985); and Thomas Mockaitis, *British COIN in the Post Imperial Age*.

27. High Commissioner Malaya (Federation), *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* (Malaya: Government Press, 1952); *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations* (Nairobi : Government Printer, 1954); *Keeping the Peace (Duties on Support of the Civil Power)* (London: War Office, 1957); *Land Operations Volume III: Counter-Revolutionary Operations,* 1969 and 1977 editions; and "Counter Insurgency Operations," *Army Field Manual 1* (2001). The current text devotes nearly 200 pages to insurgency and COIN. It discusses the past and ends by articulating the principles of British COIN.

28. Beckett, *Insurgency in Iraq*, 16.

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