

Genocide v. Civil Conflict:
Comparing Coverage of the Darfur Crisis in the New York Times
and the People's Daily

Brian Frederick

Global Media
Prof. Bella Mody
May 9, 2005

Abstract

The human rights crisis in Darfur, in Western Sudan, grows worse with every passing day. At least 300,000 are believed dead at this point, with over two million displaced. Some have called the situation genocide. This paper examines how two different major newspapers have framed the conflict—the *New York Times* and the *People's Daily*, China's official newspaper. The *Times* has tended to consider the crisis to be genocide, while the *People's Daily* has framed the situation as an internal conflict. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, these frames were uncovered by examining the types of stories in each paper, the emotional intensity of the stories, who the newspaper blames for the conflict, and what sources are used in each article. The two general positions on the crisis by each newspaper reflect the larger foreign policy interests of their respective governments.

Introduction

The situation in Darfur grows worse by the day. And with this sort of crisis, almost everyone agrees that the most important part of remedying the situation is through increased media coverage. Media coverage can have a vital and immediate impact on the situation. Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian major general who led U.N. peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, proclaimed that a “reporter with a line to the West was worth a battalion on the ground” (Power, 2002, p. 355).

Our primary research question is this: How do various media outlets frame the situation in Darfur? This is a difficult question to answer because the situation itself is complex. Can we consider the situation to be genocide? The United Nations has investigated and said that what is occurring does not rise to the level of genocide. Still, others argue that it is genocide and the U.N. is reticent to label the situation genocide because then it will be compelled to stop the genocide. Should we just consider the atrocities to be mass killings? Crimes against humanity? Ethnic cleansing? Or are all the atrocities just part of civil war?

I do not wish to argue that one particular view of the situation is correct. Rather, I wish to examine what frames are available to the media, which ones the media used—in particular, the *New York Times* and the *People’s Daily*—as well as the influences behind those decisions to frame the situation a certain way and the potential impacts of the frames.

The Reality of the Darfur Crisis

For more than two years, what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis has been worsening in the Darfur region of Sudan. This is not the first humanitarian crisis to occur in the Sudan. A similar situation has accompanied the decades-long civil war in southern Sudan between the Arab-led government of Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLM). That civil war has led to some 2 million deaths and 4.5 million displaced persons ("Report of the International Commission," 2005, p. 19). The catastrophe in Darfur has received international attention, however, because of the rapidity of the deteriorating conditions. In just two years, as of January 2005, estimates have put the total number of deaths from malnutrition, disease and violence at 207,288, though the number might well exceed 300,000 ("Darfur: The failure," 2005).

Sudan has been mired in civil conflict since it became independent of Britain in 1956. In fact, much of Sudan's political instability can be traced to British-Egyptian colonial rule. The British kept the north and the south of Sudan separate until 1947, before eventually ceding authority to the northern Arab elite in 1956. Since that time, the government has fluctuated between democracies and military rule. The current military government acquired power in a bloodless coup in 1989. Since the country gained independence, the south has revolted against the north. The most recent civil war between the north and south began in 1983 when southern troops attacked government troops as a reaction to the north's attempts to control newly discovered oil in the south ("Conflict history," 2004).

Peace talks, which regained momentum in 2002, between the SPLM and the Sudanese government had the indirect effect of instigating the Darfurian rebel movements, made up primarily of African tribes, such as Fur, Zaghawa and Massleit (“Conflict history,” 2004). These tribes had long complained of governmental inequity in resolving conflicts between the African farming communities of the Darfur region and migrating Arab nomads (“Targeting the Fur,” 2005, p. 6). These primarily land-based conflicts had worsened in recent years because of drought. The fact that the government was addressing southern demands, while ignoring the problems in Darfur led to the first large-scale revolts by Dafurian rebels in 2003. The rebels launched a “spectacular” attack on a military airfield, destroying several aircraft and kidnapping an air force general, which prompted the government’s first major counteroffensive in April, 2003 (Straus, 2005).

The Islamist, Khartoum-based government’s response to the rebels was to mobilize militias to combat the rebels—government troops were limited given the large area of the country, as well as the need for troops in the south. These militias were recruited along ethnic lines. According to Human Rights Watch and the U.N., the government issued a public call to arms to defend against the rebels, but refused to arm the Fur and other tribes who had volunteered. This may have been because the government feared arming those who might be sympathetic to the rebels. Rather, the government armed Arab recruits and held secret meetings with key leaders of Arab tribes in the region (“Targeting the Fur”, 2005, p. 7). As HRW points out, not all Arab ethnic groups joined the cause, and some Arabs have fought on the side of the rebels. Still, “for some of the smaller nomadic tribes...particularly those without a dar, including those

groups who recently migrated to Darfur from neighboring Chad, joining the militias provided an opportunity to gain loot and access to fertile land and water resources” (ibid). These militias have become known as the Janjaweed, local slang for outlaws.

The mass killings and forced displacement in the Darfur region have primarily been attributed to the Janjaweed, though rebel groups have also been accused of atrocities, though to a lesser degree. The Sudanese government has denied arming the Janjaweed, instead shifting the focus to the armed rebels and vowing to disarm citizens following the “annihilation” of the rebellion. In December 2003, Sudanese president Omar el Bashir implied that Eritrea, Sudan’s neighbor was responsible for arming the rebels, whom he called “hirelings, traitors, agents and renegades whom the enemies of the Sudan employed for carrying out their plots against the country” (“Sudanese president,” 2003).

Meanwhile, Janjaweed leaders have admitted that the militia forces and Sudanese army forces often attack together (Straus, 2005). These attacks often fall under what could be considered a “scorched-earth” policy. First, government aircraft bomb villages before the militia attack. There is no evidence that any warnings have been issued prior to these attacks, which destroy villages and displace civilians. As of September 2004, a U.S. official reported that 574 villages had been destroyed and another 157 damaged since mid-2003 (ibid). And while, for instance, in the Shattya area of Darfur, most of the Fur villages were destroyed and depopulated, the U.N. Commission passed through several “Arab” villages still standing and “well functioning” (“Darfur: The Failure,” 2005, p. 17).

The primary victims of the scorched-earth campaign are civilians. “The majority of the attacks have occurred in villages where the rebels did not have an armed presence; Khartoum’s strategy seems to be to punish the rebels’ presumed base of support—civilians—so as to prevent future rebel recruitment” (Straus, 2005). Civilians in these villages are forced to flee to other parts of Sudan and into Chad. Even then, internally displaced persons (IDPs) can fall victim to violence, as was the case within the (now-abandoned) U.N. “safe areas” (“Darfur: The failure,” 2005). So far, nearly 2 million people have been displaced (Straus, 2005). The U.N. considers the large numbers of destroyed villages and displaced facts as “irrefutable facts.”

Those who remain in villages, are not swift/strong enough to elude attackers, or are caught in sweeps, are often killed, including women and children. Human Rights Watch interviews with victims repeatedly describe mass executions, torture, children being murdered, and young girls and women being raped. One survivor described one of these mass executions. He was among a group of arrested men taken in army trucks to a valley a few miles from Deleig. “Then they lined us up, made us kneel down and bend our heads—and shot us from behind. I was left for dead...The executioners were army soldiers and Janjaweed, operating together” (“Darfur: The failure,” 2005, p. 12). It should also be noted that the U.N. Commission has found the military to be responsible for a large number of civilian deaths from “indiscriminate air attacks” (“Report of the International Commission,” 2005, p. 77).

For its part, the government has argued numerous positions since the crisis began. It has argued that the conflicts are primarily tribal and thus, any solution should involve a tribal reconciliation process (“Darfur: The failure,” 2005). It has argued that it has not

armed the Janjaweed and that disarmament of the Janjaweed can only occur with similar disarmament of rebels. It has argued that the problem is the result of foreign influences, including the United States. It has even denied the problem exists. A (Sudanese) presidential commission of inquiry concluded that “incidents of rape and sexual abuses took place in the various states of Darfur but it has not been proven to the commission that there was systematic and widespread abuse that would constitute a crime against humanity” (“Targeting the Fur,” 2005, p. 14). The government has even condoned the actions of the militias. On April 24, 2004, the Sudanese Foreign Minister stated: “The government may have turned a blind eye toward the militias... This is true. Because those militias are targeting the rebellion” (“Sudan minister,” 2004).

The Sudanese government appears to be intentionally offering mixed messages, as the International Crisis Group explains:

Khartoum’s strategy in Darfur is one of organised chaos. It has played a game of cat and mouse with the UN and the international community at large, promising much but delivering little, while attempting to conceal that it was its own counter-insurgency strategy that exacerbated the tribal elements and polarised the ethnic divide in the region. (“Darfur: The failure,” 2005)

While the number of atrocities and humanitarian crimes committed by the Janjaweed and Sudanese government far outweighs those committed by the rebels, the U.N. Commission has found evidence of the latter. Further, like the Sudanese government, the rebels have denied any responsibility for such crimes. To compare, the Commission identified fourteen (14) members of the Janjaweed “suspected of having committed an international crime under the notion of joint criminal enterprise,” while also identifying six (6) members of the Sudanese central government, eight (8) members

of local governments, and three (3) rebels, suspected of similar crimes (“Report of the International Commission,” 2005, p. 138).

Whether these suspected criminals will ever face justice remains to be seen. So far, the response of the international community has been mixed. President Bush and the United States have called the situation “genocide” while countries like China have denied the problem is anything more than a “civil conflict.” The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) found that genocide had not occurred.

Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare. (p. 4)

The commission also noted that some individuals might have acted with genocidal intent and that though the crimes aren’t necessarily genocide, the crimes may be just as serious as genocide. Still, no outside action has been taken to prevent such crimes from occurring and the situation shows no signs of improving. The UN Commission’s failure to find genocide seemed to stall the momentum toward ending the crisis. Meanwhile, new rebel groups are starting to emerge, which is complicating peace talks between the two main rebel groups—the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—and the government. For instance, the National Movement for Reconstruction/Reform and Development (NMRD) emerged in 2004 and on June 6 of that year, “issued a manifesto stating that it was not party to the ceasefire agreement concluded between the government and the SLM/A and the JEM in April, and

that it was going to fight against the government” (“Report of the International Commission,” p. 40).

Framing

Given the reality on the ground in Darfur as presented by human rights monitoring groups, the U.N. Commission, and other observers, the media have to make decisions about how to present that reality—what to include and what not to include, what to emphasize and what not to emphasize. This is known as framing. Gitlin (1980) describes frames as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (p. 6). According to Gitlin, these principles determine how the journalists produce news and how media audiences consume news.

Iyengar (1991) distinguishes between *episodic* frames and *thematic* frames. Episodic frames refer to “only a passing parade of specific events” without reference to a broader context (p. 140). Thematic frames rely on the broader context, as opposed to just isolated events. Episodic frames focus on the actions and actors in specific situations, while thematic frames focus on larger societal, political or cultural forces. Neuman, Just and Crigler (as cited in Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, and Trammell, 2005) argue that episodic frames are less meaningful to the reader.

It would be interesting to examine whether the media in different parts of the world adopted the framing of the Darfur crisis as “genocide.” Further, we can examine whether the media use primarily episodic frames, thematic frames or a mix of both. Episodic frames in coverage of the Darfur crisis would focus on the conduct of the

conflict or the latest news from peace talks. Thematic frames would tend to focus on the causes of the crisis, assigning responsibility for the crisis, determining who should act to remedy the crisis or urging action, and might situate the conflict within larger geopolitical analysis. Framing the crisis as genocide is a type of thematic framing, as genocide is a complex issue that demands a discussion of the aforementioned issues and demands collective action. Framing the crisis as civil war or a civil conflict would allow the media to use more episodic frames, as civil war does not always demand in-depth analysis or a sense of collective responsibility/action.

Genocide Frame

Before we can examine how the media frames genocide, we need to understand what genocide is. The word genocide was actually created during World War II by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew who made international acceptance of the word (and thus, eradication of the act) his life work. In one of his first published definitions of the word, he wrote that genocide meant “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (as cited in Power, 2002). Lemkin’s word was not readily adopted.

From the start, although Lemkin did not intend for genocide to encapsulate Hitler’s Final Solution, “the link between Hitler’s Final Solution and Lemkin’s hybrid term would cause endless confusion for policymakers and ordinary people who assumed that genocide occurred only where the perpetrator of atrocity could be shown, like Hitler, to possess an intent to exterminate every last member of an ethnic, national, or religious

group” (Power, 2003, p. 43). Others argued that Lemkin’s definition wouldn’t have made a difference to Hitler or his victims (p. 44). Still, Lemkin lobbied hard for a treaty banning the crime, which eventually resulted in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which defined genocide as

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- A. Killing members of the group
- B. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- C. Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- D. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- E. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (As cited in Power, 2002.)

Although the U.N. proposed this treaty in 1948, it was not ratified by the United States until October of 1988. One of the primary objections to the treaty was the potential application of the international treaty to American citizens. This has always been a fear of the U.S. government and was the main reason why the Bush administration opposed sending Sudanese war crimes suspects to the International Criminal Court in the Hague. In this case, administration officials worried that American soldiers guilty of human rights abuses in Iraqi prisons might be tried in the Hague. However, in a somewhat stunning change of policy, the U.S. removed its objections. On March 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council voted to send suspects to the ICC, while the U.S., China, Brazil and Algeria abstained.

Still, there were other problems with the genocide treaty that have endured. As Power (2002) points out, the definition suffers from a “numbers problem.” How many people have to be killed or displaced in order to constitute genocide? If there is a designated number, perpetrators could kill up until one shy of that number. If there is not

designated number, could someone be accused of genocide because they had the intention of killing all the members of one group, even if they only managed to kill a few? Opponents of U.S. action in Iraq, Cambodia, and Bosnia, have used the numbers problem to deny genocide was under way (p. 66). Also, this definition does not include political groups. The Khmer Rouge, for instance, killed millions for political reasons, but does this mean they didn't commit genocide? Finally, the definition does not seem to take into account whether the victims were complicit in their demise, turned away, or took up arms against their perpetrators.

The situation in Darfur appears to illustrate the inherent definitional problems of genocide. On a legal level, it should first be noted that the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (2005) examined the evidence and found that the situation did not amount to genocide. The Commission determined that the various tribes that have been the object of attacks and killings “do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack them belong” (p. 129). This is because they speak the same language (Arabic) and practice the same religion (Muslim), in addition to the “high measure of intermarriage” that makes them physically indistinguishable (ibid). However, because the participants themselves, in many cases, perceive an ethnic distinction, the Commission agrees that “the tribes who were victims of attacks and killing subjectively make up a protected group” (p. 130).

The primary reason for the Commission's determination that the crisis does not amount to genocide is the apparent lack of “genocidal intent.”

Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole

or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare. (p. 132)

The Commission did not rule out the possibility that certain members of the militia or government officials may have genocidal intent. Further, the Commission said that crimes against humanity or large-scale war crimes “may be no less serious and heinous than genocide” and have so far gone unpunished (p. 132). Thus, it would appear that nations and international organizations can put too much emphasis on the strict definition of genocide. Because the U.N. Commission did not declare the Darfur situation to be genocide, the U.N. is not obligated to intervene in the situation. China, in particular, has used this finding as an excuse to ignore the crisis.

Even putting the legal definitions of genocide aside, there are still problems with using the word to refer to the Darfur situation. Referring to the situation as genocide in popular discourse tends to oversimplify the situation. All sides are committing crimes against humanity, albeit to a much lesser extent by the rebels. Second, genocide seems to connote the Holocaust to most people. And the situation in Darfur is far different from the Holocaust. Third, the word genocide has been overextended in its application to issues such as “abortion, interracial adoption, and lack of government funding for AIDS treatment and research” (Valentino, 2004, p. 10). Finally, the word itself may have cultural limitations, as it was created in English only 60 years ago. This is an issue that warrants further examination.

Given these problems with the (legal, as well as popular) definition of genocide, Valentino (2004) argues that “mass killing” is a better term to address crises such as Darfur. He defines mass killing as “the intentional killing of a massive number of

noncombatants” and defines “massive number” as “50,000 intentional deaths over the course of five or fewer years” (p. 10). We may never be able to definitively establish whether the situation in Darfur amounts to genocide, but we can certainly agree that there is evidence of mass killing. (This term does not appear in the coverage of Darfur by the *New York Times* or the *People’s Daily*.)

Still, despite these problems, the word genocide and the Genocide Convention are of great significance in the geopolitical arena. For the first time since the Genocide Convention passed, a U.S. president has labeled a current situation as genocide. In the past, U.S. leaders have been careful not to label such situations as genocide. Labeling a situation as genocide would compel the U.S. to do something. A secret discussion paper on the Rwanda crisis, prepared by an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and dated May 1, 1994, illustrates the Clinton administration’s awareness of the implications—and drawbacks—of labeling the Rwanda crisis as genocide.

1. Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international investigation of human rights abuses and possible violations of the genocide convention. *Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’* (as cited in Power, 2002, p. 359).

Power (2002) argues that there is no political risk to not labeling such crises as genocide. No political leader has ever suffered from not doing anything about genocide. (The international community has also consistently looked away.) In the cases of Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, etc., Power argues that U.S. leaders had two goals: to avoid engagement in conflicts that posed little threat to American interests, and to contain the political costs associated with allowing genocide (p. 508). In order to achieve the second goal, they consistently avoided the use of the term genocide, while playing up the

ambiguity of the situation and the jeopardy of U.S. action. However, the Bush administration has chosen to label the situation as genocide.

Is Bush taking a political risk? Power (2002) argues that the U.S. record on genocide “is not one of failure,” but rather one of “success.” In other words, U.S. leaders have been successful at working the system—“an illusion of continual deliberation, complex activity, and intense concern”—to maximize political gains while avoiding the political fallout (p. 508). Bush appears to be even more adept at working this system. By following the lead of Congress, he appears to be pleasing his Christian conservative base by labeling the situation as genocide, while apparently doing very little about the situation. Bush reaped the political points from initially addressing the crisis and then hedged his political risks by continuing to not address the crisis.

Let us review how the U.S. government came to determine the crisis was genocide. First, on July 22, 2004, the U.S. Congress passed resolutions calling the Darfur crisis and urging President Bush to call the situation “by its rightful name” and work within the international community to end the crisis (“Congress declares,” 2004). Next, following a State Department investigation into the crisis, on September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell declared the situation was genocide and urged the U.N. to take action. “When we reviewed the evidence compiled by our team,” Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “we concluded—I concluded—that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility, and that genocide may still be occurring” (“Powell says”, 2004). The White House followed Powell’s testimony with a statement from President Bush that

urged the international community to “work with us to prevent and suppress acts of genocide” (ibid).

The Bush administration appears to be reversing its position on the Darfur crisis, however. *Times* editorialist Nicholas Kristof claims to have a memo from the White House to congressional leaders urging them to delete provisions about Darfur from the Darfur Accountability Act (Kristof, 2005). Kristof claims Bush hasn’t even mentioned the name Darfur since January 10, 2005. The bill in question, the Darfur Accountability Act, would reaffirm the view of the U.S. Congress that the crisis in Darfur amounts to genocide. According to New Jersey Senator Jon Corzine, one of the bill’s two sponsors, “the bill calls for a battery of measures aimed at ending the Darfur genocide, restoring normalcy to life for hundreds of thousands of displaced Muslims, and for the criminal prosecution of those responsible for these crimes against humanity” (“Corzine, Brownback,” 2005). Further, given that Corzine is a democrat and the bill’s other sponsor, Sam Brownback, is a republican senator, the bill appears to have bipartisan support. The Bush administration’s latest efforts to downplay the Darfur crisis may be due to the administration’s interest in normalizing relations with Sudan. Such a move may be oil-related (see Power, 2004).

New York Times

The *New York Times* is the “newspaper of record” in the United States. It is widely regarded as the nation’s most influential newspaper. Weiss (1974) studied the reading habits of the nation’s business and political leaders and found that the *Times* “comes closest to being the national newspaper of the elite” (p. 5). Weiss concluded that

the *Times* and other media shape public policy. The *Times* also helps shape what other news media report (Carragee, 2003).

The importance of an independent press in the United States has been established in legal and popular discourse since the nation's inception. To many people, the *New York Times* represents such an "independent press." However, critics have argued that the *Times* and other media still serve the interests of corporate America, and thus, the foreign policy interests of the U.S. government. (The *Times* does have its critics from the right, such as Timeswatch.org, which claims its mission is "documenting and exposing the liberal agenda of the *New York Times*.) McChesney (1999) argues that the *Times* is "stridently procapitalist" and has a "strong internal bias toward reflecting elite opinion" (p. 298). Indeed, the boards of the five largest newspaper corporations—*New York Times*, Washington Post, Times-Mirror, Gannett, and Knight-Ridder—have directors who also serve on the boards of Fortune 1000 firms. Further, some of these firms have members from different media firms, establishing a direct link between the different media giants (p. 29).

Chomsky and Herman's (1988) discussion of the role of the U.S. media in ignoring those matters that run counter to the interests of "established power" seems especially relevant in the case of the Darfur crisis. To illustrate their point that the media basically serve as propagandists for the U.S. government, Chomsky and Herman use the example of the genocides that occurred in Cambodia and East Timor. They claim the U.S. media talked "freely" about the situation in Cambodia while "suppressing" information on the same basic situation in East Timor. Chomsky and Herman argue that the U.S. media exaggerated the actual death toll from Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia in

what became “a propaganda campaign at a level of deceit of astonishing proportions” (p. 281). The authors claim that the U.S. media ignored State Department reports that found that “deaths from all causes might have been in the ‘tens if not hundreds of thousands,’ largely from disease, malnutrition and ‘brutal, rapid change,’ not ‘mass genocide’ (p. 283). Their point is to argue that the U.S. media sensationalized the brutal rule of the Marxist Pol Pot while ignoring the secret U.S. bombing campaign (and ground invasion) in Cambodia in the years leading up to Pol Pot’s seizure of power. Between March 1969 and August 1973, the United States dropped 540,000 tons of bombs onto Cambodia, which killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced many more (Power, 2002, p. 94). However, a review of *The New York Times* coverage of Cambodia seems to refute Chomsky and Edwards’ argument. Coverage of Cambodia was far greater between 1970 and 1975 than in the years following the Khmer Rouge takeover. Between 1970 and 1975, the *Times* and the *Washington Post* published more than 700 stories on Cambodia each year. Following the KR takeover, coverage plummeted. In 1976 and 1977, when the KR genocide was occurring, the two papers only published a combined 126 stories and 118 stories, respectively (Power, 2002, p. 110). This is partially explained by the inaccessibility of western journalists during the KR’s reign.

Chomsky and Herman (1988) point to a July 9, 1975 *New York Times* editorial that accused the KR of “genocidal policies” and “barbarous cruelty” that was comparable to the “Soviet extermination of the Kulaks or with the Gulag Archipelago” as evidence of the U.S. media exaggerating the atrocities of the KR regime, while Chomsky and Edwards (mistakenly) claim the death toll was only in the thousands. Regardless of the number of dead at the time of the editorial, as Power (2002) points out, “the same

editorial board that called on the United States to break the silence did not itself speak again on the subject for another three years” (p. 111). The editorial boards were also noticeably silent during the Rwandan genocide. “At the height of the war in Bosnia, the op-ed pages of America’s newspapers had roared with indignation; during the three-month genocide in Rwanda, they were silent, ignorant, and prone fatalistically to accept the futility of outside intervention” (p. 374).

Still, Power (2002) argues that the best information on genocide has often appeared in U.S. newspapers.

Back in 1915, when communications were primitive, the *New York Times* managed to publish 145 stories about the Turkish massacre of Armenians. Nearly eighty years later, the same paper reported just four days after the beginning of the Rwanda genocide that ‘tens of thousands’ of Rwandans had already been murdered. It devoted more column inches to the horrors of Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 than it did to any other single foreign story. (p. 505)

Thus, it would appear that while the major U.S. newspapers such as the *New York Times* have devoted space to covering at least some of the century’s worst humanitarian crises, it has been inconsistent in such coverage, especially with regards to editorial opinion. On some occasions, editorials have demanded immediate U.S. action to end the crises, while at other times they have preached international cooperation first. And in some cases, they have remained silent.

As far as the *New York Times* coverage of the Darfur crisis is concerned, while the rest of the media coverage has been “disappointingly weak,” the *New York Times* and the Washington Post have emerged as “leaders” in “persistent, on-the-ground coverage” (Ricchiardi, 2005, 3). In the *Times*, there have been a total of 128 articles with “substantial coverage” in a two-year period. This is more than what was devoted to Rwanda, but far less than the coverage devoted to Kosovo. The *Times*’ leading

proponent of U.S. action in Darfur has been Nicholas Kristof, an editorialist who has visited the region at least three times. During the period from January 1, 2003, to February 28, 2005, Kristof wrote thirteen editorials specifically addressing the crisis in Sudan, which he has labeled “genocide” from the beginning.

Kristof’s first editorial on March 27, 2004, begins:

For decades, whenever the topic of genocide has come up, the refrain has been, ‘Never again.’... Yet right now, the government of Sudan is engaging in genocide against three large African tribes in its Darfur region here. Some 1,000 people are being killed a week, tribeswomen are being systematically raped, 700,000 people have been driven from their homes, and Sudan’s Army is even bombing the survivors. (“Will we,” 2004)

Kristof often compares Darfur to the great genocides of our times. Kristof alone accounts for 22% (47 out of 215) of the uses of the word genocide in the *Times* articles in our sample. He often relies on emotionally intense descriptions of the victims in Darfur.

Ms. Khattar's children have nightmares, their screams at night mixing with the yelps of jackals, and she worries that she will lose them to hunger or disease. But her plight pales beside that of Hatum Atraman Bashir, a 35-year-old woman who is pregnant with the baby of one of the 20 Janjaweed raiders who murdered her husband and then gang-raped her. (“Magboula’s brush,” 2004)

Finally, Kristof has been unwavering in his demand that the U.S. must take some sort of action to resolve the Darfur crisis, rather than relying on others.

...President Bush’s policy is to chide Sudan and send aid. That’s much better than nothing and has led Sudan to kill fewer children and to kill more humanely: Sudan now mostly allows kids in Darfur like Abdelrahim to die of starvation, instead of heaving them onto bonfires. But fundamentally, U.S. policy seems to be to ‘manage’ the genocide rather than to act decisively to stop it. (“He ain’t,” 2004)

While Kristof has been calling for immediate action, other editorial columns in the pages of the *Times* have stressed caution in taking action. Sam Dealey’s August 8,

2004 editorial argues that critics of the Sudanese government have oversimplified the situation and there is no easy solution.

As despicable as Sudan's regime is, the international community may wish to restrain from setting early deadlines for intervention. Such deadlines only encourage rebel intransigence in pursuing peace deals, as last month's unsuccessful talks in Ethiopia proved. With outside action threatened, there is little incentive for the rebels to negotiate a lasting cease-fire. (Dealey, 2004)

In some cases, the *Times* prints the opinions of public and political figures. With regards to the Darfur crisis, one notable editorial was written by Romeo Dallaire, who was the Canadian general in command of the United Nations forces in Rwanda.

Dallaire's experiences allow him to offer an even more specific solution to the crisis.

Sudan is a huge country with a harsh terrain and a population unlikely to welcome outside intervention. Still, I believe that a mixture of mobile African Union troops supported by NATO soldiers equipped with helicopters, remotely piloted vehicles, night-vision devices and long-range special forces could protect Darfur's displaced people in their camps and remaining villages, and eliminate or incarcerate the Janjaweed. (Dallaire, 2004)

Given the differences of opinion on the best way to proceed in Darfur, it is hard to argue that the *Times* has a uniform position on the crisis, at least as compared to the *People's Daily*. However, it is clear that covering the crisis appears to be a priority, at least compared to other U.S. media, in spite of the obstacles put up by the Sudanese government. Early in 2004, the Sudanese essentially quit granting visas to journalists and aid workers. They later granted a few visas, but only after long and tedious processes. And journalists were never really allowed into the most troubled villages (Ricchiardi, 2005). Still, the "persistent" coverage of Darfur in the *New York Times* has been noticed by other media, as well as political leaders. A July 3, 2004 editorial in the (Portland) *Oregonian* proclaimed that "loud, relentless barking by *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof could be what saves tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands,

of Sudanese lives” and that “Kristof’s work, and public reactions to it, have begun to galvanize diplomats and politicians” (“This watchdog,” 2004).

It should be noted that in its coverage of the Darfur crisis, the U.S. media has largely ignored the 1998 launch of cruise missiles into Khartoum. On August 20, 1998, in light of attacks on East African embassies, the U.S. (via cruise missiles) attacked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan linked to Al Qaeda, including the Al Shifa factory in northern Khartoum that the Clinton administration claimed was producing VX gas and other chemical weapons. While the U.S. government has never admitted that it made a mistake, it did “unfreeze” the assets of the owner of the factory (believed to have been linked to Osama bin Laden), thus signaling to outsiders, including the Sudanese government, that the attack was a mistake. Later *New York Times* coverage of the attack focused on the strength of the evidence and dissension within the State Department before the attacks over whether the attacks should be carried out (see “Question of evidence,” 1999). (The attack also came three days after President Clinton’s televised admission that he had indeed had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.) In addition to the one watchman that was killed in the attack and the ten others who were wounded, the Sudanese government and critics (including Chomsky) have argued that the loss of the pharmaceutical factory led to numerous deaths because of the lack of drugs available to fight disease, specifically, malaria (Bovard, 2004). Although the *Times* has been critical of the attack in general and has occasionally mentioned the U.S. criticism of Sudan as a suspected terrorist haven, it should be noted that the *Times* has not examined how the 1998 attack relates to the Darfur crisis.

People's Daily

The *People's Daily* is the “mouthpiece” of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As a result, we can assume that messages contained in the *People's Daily* generally represent the views of the Chinese government. Guoguang (1994) claims that the *People's Daily* “is central to understanding the Chinese propaganda state, as well as elite politics” (p. 195). The newspaper, which is controlled by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, has been shown to use discursive strategies that frame the events to “legitimize and defend the policies formulated by the regimes in power” (Fang, 2001, p. 611).

All the articles in the *People's Daily* are expected to tow the party line, but especially the editorials. In some cases, these editorials come directly from the CCP.

...Editorials are the most important type of commentary in the *People's Daily*. They necessarily present the opinions of the newspaper and the top elite. They are usually produced directly on command from the top leaders, and they are often revised and censored by the leaders themselves. (Guoguang, 1994, p. 196)

Commentaries usually originate in the state-party Centre and eventually make their way to the pages of the *People's Daily* via what Guoguang (1994) calls the “command communication” model, which stems from Leninist organizational principles (p. 195). By empirically studying the way these commentaries have been formulated over the years, Guoguang comes to the conclusion that newspaper editors have been given increasing freedom over the years to “circumvent, resist and defy the system for drafting commentaries, that is, at the only stage when they can play an active role in the process” (p. 208). He claims that the traditional “pouring” pattern of drafting commentaries, which describes the top-down information flow, is giving way to the “birdcage” method, where the cage is a “leader’s general idea, rather than a concrete

instruction” and commentators “can select among ideas from the speeches, directives and documents of the central leadership, as birds flying within a cage” (p. 201). And the birdcage method is even starting to give way to the “kite flying” method, where an “editorial topic is settled on by a commentator himself, rather than by his bosses” and “it can ‘fly in the sky,’ a much larger space than a cage, with just a string in the hands of the party” (p. 203).

It is unknown which method accounts for the few editorials on the Darfur crisis that have appeared in the *People’s Daily*. All of the editorials are unsigned, which has always been the case in the *People’s Daily*. We have no way of knowing whether the CCP had a direct hand in these editorials or more of an indirect one.

Given this context, let us closely examine one of the editorials, entitled “Sudan’s sovereignty should be respected.” There should be no doubt about the point of the editorial. Given China’s ties to the Sudanese government, it is not surprising that the editorial focuses on the Sudanese government, with words in quotes from the Sudanese government. There is no mention of the rebels—in fact, the word rebel itself is not even used in the entire editorial. The only mention of the refugees is curiously as an “army of refugees,” which perhaps subtly assigns responsibility to or politicizes the refugees. To be fair, the editorial does mention the “Arab militias accused of slaughtering thousands of African farmers in a brutal campaign to drive them out.” The overall position is best laid out in the editorial’s conclusion:

Sudan is a sovereign country. Its demand and desire to solve its internal affairs should be fully respected...The Sudanese government’s ongoing efforts to rein in the Arab militias demonstrate its determination and ability to cope with its own problems...China’s abstention, which not only shows its understanding of some countries’ eagerness to end the violence in Sudan but also its respect for the

African nation's desire to be its own master, is another sign of mature diplomacy in the international arena. ("Sudan's sovereignty," 2004)

Why would the Chinese government be supportive of the Sudanese government in the crisis? In a word, oil. China's own domestic reserves are declining and given the enormous industrialization of the country, it needs foreign sources of oil. (A headline from the *People's Daily* on April 22, 2002 reads "China to Step Up Overseas Oil Exploitation.") The Sudanese project, run by the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) is China's largest foreign oil project. China claims it brought in 10,000 workers to finish the project by June 30, 1999, and some within the oil industry believe these workers may have been prisoners ("China's involvement," 2003). China also claims the Sudanese army had to protect the Chinese workers from rebel attacks, which may serve as a justification for dealing arms to the Sudanese government. China is one of, if not the biggest, arms dealers to Sudan and has been for a long time. However, because of the civil war and the credit offered because of potential for oil revenues, Chinese weapons deliveries to Sudan—which have included ammunition, tanks, helicopters and fighter aircraft—have increased over the last fifteen years (ibid.).

Hypotheses and Research Questions

Prior research on genocide, news framing, and the relationships between the *New York Times* and the U.S. government and the *People's Daily* and the Chinese government suggested the following research questions and hypotheses:

Research Question 1: What are the difference between the framing of Darfur by the New York Times and the People's Daily as a whole?

Research Question 2: What aspects of the reality of the Darfur conflict were not covered by each medium?

Hypothesis 1: The *New York Times* will be more likely to refer to the crisis as genocide.

Hypothesis 2: There will be more thematic frames present in the *New York Times* coverage of the crisis.

Method

The study utilizes a mix of quantitative content analysis and qualitative textual analysis to answer the above research questions and hypotheses.

This study is part of a larger group project comparing international coverage of the Darfur crisis. The project examines “substantial coverage of Darfur” in several media from January 1, 2003, to February 28, 2005. First, any article with “Darfur” in the headline, lead sentence, or body text was retrieved. In the case of the *New York Times*, this was done via Lexis-Nexis. In the case of the *People’s Daily*, the search engine on the newspaper’s (English) website was used. Second, articles that did not devote at least 50% of paragraphs to the crisis were considered “peripheral” coverage and were not included in the sample. The unit of analysis is each individual article that comprises “substantial coverage.”

The *New York Times* and the *People’s Daily* were chosen because of their status as their respective countries’ “newspaper of record.” In the case of the *People’s Daily*, it is the official newspaper of record. The English version of the *People’s Daily* was used for consistency with key words, such as “genocide.” Future research will examine the Chinese versions of the *People’s Daily*.

Coding Categories

Each article was coded for a number of variables. Those variables relevant to the present study included the average length of articles, the frequency of different types of articles, the frequency of sources of news used, the average number of graphics used, the subjects of dominant graphics, the frequency of use of different terms, the frequency of focal frames, the frequency with which particular causes for the crisis are mentioned, the frequency with which particular groups are blamed for the crisis, the frequency with which particular groups are named as responsible for ending the crisis, the frequency with which particular players in the conflict are quoted, and the perceived emotional intensity of different types of articles.

Focal frames were determined based on the code that matches the “dominant focus of the majority of content” in each article. The three frames were causes, conduct and remedies. *Causes* referred to any historical and present-day causes of the crisis. *Conduct* referred to the nature, status, process and conduct of the crisis, in other words, what is happening “on the ground,” though this does not include specific efforts to end the crisis. Any efforts, negotiations, peace talks, proposed changes, aid from governments and NGOs, or mentions of international courts were considered *remedies*. Also, articles could be coded with any combination of these three focal frames, such as *causes and remedies*.

Emotional intensity refers to the tone of the article. Rather than coding for positive-negative-neutral, we decided to measure the emotional intensity of each article. This is because when covering a humanitarian crisis such as the Darfur, it is unlikely that the media would be “positive” or “negative” in their tone. These terms often convey

support/lack of support. Such an operationalization fails because of the nature of the Darfur crisis. Surely no media are supportive of the crisis. They may (and do) differ on how to remedy the situation, but that is measured by the *EndCrisis* variable. Instead, because it is assumed that everyone at least agrees that mass killings, rape and forced displacement are bad—whether they wish to make an effort to stop it or not—the emotional intensity variable measures how bad they portray the situation to be.

An article that was coded as *high* spends at least half of its length on describing conditions on the ground in Darfur, including descriptions of “atrocities” committed against civilians; has frequent (more than 3) uses of words such as “genocide, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian crisis, growing disaster, rape” that indicate atrocities; has photos of victims/refugees that add weight to the report; quotes sources that spend time on the humanitarian needs of the refugees; includes quotes from refugees where they describe the events they witnessed.

An article that was coded as *medium* provides some description of events and atrocities, but few (1-3 occurrences) of words such as “genocide, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian crisis, rape” in the report; photos are of leaders or non-dramatic events; spends less than half of the article describing the situation; includes quotes that question the veracity of reports even if there are high intensity descriptions from survivors; refers to government policies rather than graphic details of local conditions.

An article that was coded as *low* recites numbers with no descriptive context; reports on policies; discusses negotiations or peace talks with no description of conditions on the ground in Darfur; characterizes Darfur as an internal dispute or a regional conflict that the Sudanese government is moving to control; covers officials as they tour areas

(not the conflict itself); covers a press event that discusses what is occurring or denies that it is as bad as media reports indicate. Describes the situation with words such as conflict, uprising, rebellion, not words such as “genocide, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian crisis, rape.”

Results

While the *People’s Daily* published more articles on Darfur in 26 months (141) than the *New York Times* (126), the *Times* devoted twice as many words to the crisis (Table I). As predicted, the *New York Times* was more likely to frame their Darfur coverage thematically—specifically, as genocide. Their coverage tended to utilize more news features and editorials (Table II). Just over half of the articles in the *Times* were *hard news* articles (54%), while *news feature* and *news analysis* articles accounted for 22% and 17% respectively. News feature and news analysis articles tend to be framed more thematically—news features because they usually examine the causes and remedies of a situation, and editorials (news analysis) because they usually demand action.

The *Times* was more likely to use the words genocide and ethnic cleansing, in headlines and in the articles themselves (Table III). The word genocide was used an average of 1.71 times per article. Ethnic cleansing was used .23 times per article.

No one focal frame was dominant in the *Times’* coverage—many of their articles framed the conflict in terms of *conduct*, many in terms of *remedies*, and some were framed as *conduct and remedies* or *causes, conduct and remedies* (Table IV). Thirty-three percent (33%) of the articles focused on *conduct*. These articles tended to be feature stories that focused on the plight of the refugees. Twenty-six percent (26%) of the

articles focused on *remedies*. These usually referred to peace talks or international intervention. Nineteen percent (19%) of the articles referred to *conduct and remedies*. Fourteen percent (14%) of the articles combined *causes, conduct and remedies*. Only two articles (2%) primarily focused on the causes of the conflict.

The *Times* was more likely to attribute blame to the Janjaweed, the Sudanese government or both (Table V). By framing the crisis as genocide, they are implying that only one group is to blame, as the *blame* variable illustrates. Sixty-three percent (63%) of the *Times* articles blamed the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed or both. Twenty-two (22%) of the articles attributed no blame for the crisis and fourteen percent (14%) of the articles blamed all domestic groups. No articles blamed the rebels for the crisis.

Finally, nearly half of the *Times* articles were of *high* emotional intensity (Table VII). It is assumed that the higher the emotional intensity, the more likely readers will feel compelled to take action. Forty-five percent (45%) of the articles were of *high* emotional intensity. Twenty-six percent (26%) were of *medium* emotional intensity. Twenty-nine percent (29%) of the articles were of *low* emotional intensity.

On the other hand, the *People's Daily*, as expected, framed their Darfur coverage episodically. Their coverage consisted almost entirely of hard news (Table II). Ninety-five percent (95%) of the articles on Darfur were *hard news*. Hard news articles tend to be more episodic because they usually focus on immediate news instead of examining the larger context of the story. There were no news features and only three (2%) editorials on Darfur.

The *People's Daily* was less likely to use the words genocide, ethnic cleansing or oil (Table III). The word *genocide* only appeared an average of .26 times per article.

Ethnic cleansing only appeared .06 times per article. And despite the fact that China's largest foreign oil project is in Sudan, the word *oil/petroleum* only appeared .12 times per article.

Nearly half the articles were framed in terms of *remedies* (Table IV). These articles usually referred to the latest peace talks, the U.N. inquiry or diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. Forty-five percent (45%) of the articles were focused on *remedies*. Eleven percent of the articles (11%) focused on the *conduct* of the crisis and twenty-five percent (25%) of the articles were focused on *conduct and remedies*. Thirteen percent (13%) combined *causes, conduct and remedies*. However, no articles focused exclusively on the *causes* of the conflict, indicating the tendency to frame the crisis episodically.

The *People's Daily* attributed blame to the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed, or both, but was nearly as likely to blame multiple domestic groups, including the rebels (Table V). Most (46%) of the articles attributed blame to the crisis. Twenty-six percent (26%) of the articles blamed the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed, or both, while twenty-three percent (23%) of the articles blamed multiple domestic groups. Finally, eight articles (6%) of the articles blamed the rebels for the crisis. Thus, twenty-nine percent (29%) of the articles implied some blame on the rebels, helping to frame the conflict as a civil one, as opposed to one side massacring the other.

Most of the articles in the *People's Daily* were of *low* emotional intensity (Table VII), implying a detachment with the conflict. Seventy-five percent (75%) of the articles were of *low* intensity, twenty percent (20%) were of *medium* intensity, and only five percent (5%) of the articles were of *high* intensity.

One area where the two newspapers seemed to frame the crisis similarly was with regards to the primary cause of the crisis (Table VIII). Here primary means the first reason listed in any article, even if there are multiple reasons in the article. It is assumed that the first cause listed connotes greater significance because of its prominence in the article. Both newspapers tended not to list any cause of the crisis in their articles—sixty-one percent (61%) of the *New York Times* articles and seventy percent (70%) of the *People's Daily* articles listed no cause. If the articles did mention a cause, they usually attributed it to *independence*—twenty-two percent (22%) of the *Times* articles and sixteen percent (16%) of the *People's Daily* articles listed independence as the primary cause. It seems that both papers use the point where the rebels took up arms against Khartoum as the moment the crisis started, and thus the primary cause. If any articles looked beyond the moment of revolt, they tended to frame the cause as rooted in disputes over environmental resources or underlying ethnic tensions.

Finally, one important variable that may help explain the overall framing of the crisis in each individual paper is the *sources* variable (Table IX). It is assumed that when sources are directly quoted within an article, their words carry extra weight. By measuring which sources are being used and how often, we can hope to gain insight into whose perspectives are influencing the journalists and the media audiences. The *New York Times* relied primarily on U.N. sources (30% of the articles had direct quotes), followed by U.S. sources (31%), Sudanese government sources (27%), Darfur citizens or refugees (23%), and human rights monitors and NGO sources (20%). Meanwhile, the *People's Daily* relied primarily on Sudanese government sources (38%) and to a lesser extent, U.N. sources (25%). While the *New York Times* appears to be more balanced in

its use of a variety of sources, what is notable with regards to the *People's Daily* is whose voices are not heard. The *People's Daily* virtually ignores the voices of the Darfur citizens or refugees (only one article directly quotes a Darfur citizen) and the voices of human rights groups or aid organizations (only six articles). This would seem to have the effect of eliminating the potential for *People's Daily* audiences to gain some sort of emotional attachment to the reality of the situation on the ground in Darfur. Instead, the *People's Daily* just relies on Sudanese and U.N. sources, neither of which truly present the plight of the victims of the crisis. The *New York Times* often quotes the victims of the crisis in their own words.

Conclusion

Coverage of the Darfur crisis in the *New York Times* has been much more “sensational” because of its use of thematic framing, specifically framing the situation as genocide. The *Times* frequently uses pictures and feature stories on the victims of the crisis, including graphic descriptions of their individual tales of rape and murder. Further, the relentless campaigning of columnist Nicholas Kristof to do something about the crisis has probably had an effect on *Times* audiences, including those in power. Kristof’s first description of the crisis as genocide on March 27, 2004 (“Will We Say ‘Never Again’ Yet Again?”) and subsequent editorials may very well have influenced the U.S. Congress, which passed resolutions on Darfur on July 22, 2004 urging President Bush to call the situation genocide. The *Times* coverage has also influenced the Darfur coverage of other U.S. media (see Oregonian, July 3, 2004, “This Watchdog Barked”).

On the other hand, the *New York Times* does not really delve into the issue of how oil figures into the larger geopolitics of the Darfur crisis. Several countries have oil interests in Sudan, and the U.S. appears to be seeking to establish similar relations. Further, the *Times* does not really situate the Darfur crisis in the context of the history of U.S.-Sudanese relations. The paper never examines whether any U.S. policies—most notably the 1998 cruise missile strike—have had any direct or indirect effects on the crisis. If, as some critics have claimed, the U.S. actually destroyed a pharmaceutical factory, can any of the deaths in Darfur be attributed to the lack of adequate medicine?

The *People's Daily* also fails to devote any substantial coverage to the issue of oil and how it relates to the crisis, despite (because of) the fact that China's largest foreign oil project is in Sudan. Further, the *People's Daily* has never mentioned the fact that the Chinese government sells arms to the Sudanese government.

As the *People's Daily* is the “mouthpiece” of the Chinese government, coverage of the crisis directly reflects Chinese foreign interests. Because of the established ties with the Sudanese government—including arms and oil trade—the Chinese government has been willing to ignore the Darfur crisis and to frame the crisis as one of civil conflict that should be solved internally. Coverage in the *People's Daily* has thus been “detached.” There have been no interviews with refugees or “sensational” reports of the death and destruction in Darfur. Most of the interviews in news articles are with Sudanese government officials in Khartoum. The only time the paper ever refers to genocide is to say that the U.N. Commission found no evidence of genocide.

As previously mentioned, the Bush administration has apparently been backing off its stance that the Darfur crisis is genocide and has been encouraging the U.S. Congress not to sanction the Sudanese government. This has happened following the dates of the study, so it would be interesting to see if coverage in the *New York Times* has changed, as well, especially if the U.S. does end up “normalizing” relations with the Sudanese government. Future research of the *People’s Daily* should examine the newspaper’s coverage of Darfur in the Chinese version. The English version of the paper is obviously geared toward a Western audience, so it would be interesting to see how the paper frames the crisis to its own citizens.

References

- Bovard, J. (2004). Sudan: Don't forget the past follies. In *LewRockwell.com*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from <http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig4/bovard5.html>.
- Carragee, K.M. (2003). Evaluating polysemy: An analysis of The New York Times' coverage of the end of the cold war. *Political Communication*, 20, 287-308.
- China's involvement in Sudan: Arms and oil. (2003). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/26.htm>.
- Chomsky, N., and Herman, E. (1988). *Manufacturing consent*. New York: Pantheon.
- Conflict history: Sudan. (2004). *International Crisis Group*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&l=1&t=1&c_country=101.
- Congress declares Sudan atrocities are 'genocide.' (2004, July 23). *Associated Press*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Corzine, Brownback renew call to end genocide in Darfur, introduce Darfur Accountability Act. (2005, March 2). *Press Office of Senator Corzine*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from <http://corzine.senate.gov>.
- Dallaire, R. (2004, October 4). Looking at Darfur, seeing Rwanda. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Darfur: The failure to protect. (2005). *International Crisis Group*. Nairobi/Brussels.
- Dealey, S. (2004, August 8). Misreading the truth in Sudan. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Dimitrova, D., Kaid, L., Williams, A., and Trammell, K. (2005). War on the web: The immediate news farming of Gulf War II. *Press/Politics*, 10 (1), 22-44.
- Fang, Y. (2001). Reporting the same events? *Discourse & Society*, 12 (5), pp. 585-613.
- Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: Mass media and unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley: University Press.
- Guoguang, W. (1994). Command communication: The politics of editorial formulation in the People's Daily. *China Quarterly*, 137, pp. 194-112.
- Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Kristof, N. (2005, May 3). Day 113 of the president's silence. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Kristof, N. (2004, October 20). He ain't heavy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Kristof, N. (2004, June 23). Magboula's brush with death. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Kristof, N. (2004, March 27). Will we say 'never again' yet again? *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- McChesney, R. (1999). *Rich media, poor democracy*. New York: The New Press.
- Neuman, W., Just, M., and Crigler, A. (1992). *Common knowledge: News and the construction of political meaning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Powell says rapes and killings in Sudan are genocide. (2004, September 10). *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Power, S. (2002). *A problem from hell*. New York: Perennial.
- Power, S. (2004, August 30). Dying in Darfur. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic database.
- Question of evidence: A special report. (1999, October 27) *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic Search Premier.
- Report of the international commission of inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General*. (2005). Geneva.
- Ricchiardi, S. (2005). Déjà vu. *American Journalism Review*, 27 (1), pp. 34-41. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from Academic Search Premier database.
- Straus, S. (2005). Darfur and the genocide debate. *Foreign Affairs*, 84 (1). Retrieved May 5, 2005, from Academic Search Premier database.
- Sudan minister hails U.N. rights vote. (2004, April 24). *Associated Press*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/2004/0424hails.htm>.
- Sudanese president vows to annihilate Darfur rebels. (2003, December 31). *Agence France Presse*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis database.
- Sudan's sovereignty should be respected. (2004, August 4). *People's Daily*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn>.

Targeting the Fur: Mass killings in Darfur. (2005). *Human Rights Watch*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from <http://hrw.org/backgrounders/africa/darfur0105/>.

This watchdog barked. (2004, July 3). *The Oregonian*. Retrieved on May 5, 2005, from LexisNexis Academic Search Premier.

Valentino, B. (2004). *Final solutions: Mass killing and genocide in the twentieth century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Weiss, C. (1974). What America's leaders read. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 38, 1-22.

Table I: Article Lengths

New York Times	$66/126 = .52$ < 700 words	$60/126 = .48$ > 700 words
People's Daily	$134/141 = .95$ < 700 words	$7/141 = .05$ > 700 words

Table II: Types of Stories

	New York Times	People's Daily
Hard News	$68/126 = .54$	$134/141 = .95$
News Feature	$28/126 = .22$	$0/141$
Analysis	$21/126 = .17$	$3/141 = .02$

Table III: Keywords in Text

	New York Times	People's Daily
Genocide	1.71 times per article	.26 times per article
Ethnic Cleansing	.23	.06
Oil/Petroleum	.2	.12

Table IV: Focal Frames

	New York Times	People's Daily
Causes	2/126= .02	0/141
Conduct	42/126= .33	16/141= .11
Remedies	33/126= .26	64/141= .45
Con+Rem	24/126= .19	35/131= .25
All three	18/126= .14	18/141= .13

Table V: Who's to Blame?

	New York Times	People's Daily
None	28/126 = .22	65/141 = .46
Sudan, Janja or Sud+Janja	80/126 = .63	35/141 = .25
Domestic	18/126 = .14	32/141 = .23
Rebels	0	8/141 = .06

Table VI: Who's Responsible for Ending the Crisis?

	New York Times	People's Daily
None	$67/126 = .53$	$40/141 = .28$
Sudan govt	$23/126 = .18$	$40/141 = .28$
Domestic	$3/126 = .02$	$31/141 = .22$
Foreign	$13/126 = .10$	$0/141$
Combined	$16/126 = .13$	$27/141 = .19$

Table VII: Emotional Intensity

	New York Times	People's Daily
Low	$36/126 = .29$	$106/141 = .75$
Medium	$33/126 = .26$	$28/141 = .20$
High	$57/126 = .45$	$7/141 = .05$

Table VIII: Primary Cause of the Crisis

	New York Times	People's Daily
None	$77/126 = .61$	$99/141 = .70$
Independence	$28/126 = .22$	$22/141 = .16$
Environ. Resources	$9/126 = .07$	$7/141 = .05$
Ethnic	$5/126 = .04$	$9/141 = .06$

Table IX: Quoted Sources

	New York Times	People's Daily
Sudan	34/126 = .27	54/141 = .38
Darfur	29/126 = .23	1/141 = .01
Monitors + NGOs	25/126 = .2	6/141 = .04
UN	45/126 = .36	35/141 = .25
USA	39/126 = .31	12/141 = .09
Foreign	1/126 = .01	9/141 = .06