A Process Oriented View of
Conflict Psychology

By Stanford Siver

We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.
— Einstein

This paper explores concepts in the psychology of peace, conflict, and violence with particular focus on the relationship between intrapersonal experience and conflict. There is a relationship between social dynamics, the political atmosphere, inter personal experience, intrapersonal experience, and personal action. The course looks primarily at psychological dynamics in large scale conflict and terrorism, and explores the field of political psychology.

It is not only difficult, but dangerous to presume that clear boundaries exist between the personal and the political in conflict. At the beginning of the recent Israeli/Palestinian *intifada*, 200 Israeli psychotherapists published a petition in the Israeli press calling attention to the "enormous and potentially irreversible post-traumatic emotional damage caused on both sides, and calling for an immediate return to the negotiating table in order to stop the vicious cycle of mutual violence and bloodshed." (Berman, 2003) Soon after publication the petition was attacked by a right-wing psychiatrist who accused the petitioners of unethically confusing professional and political matters thereby undermining the psychic strength of the population.

Many conflicts, large scale and small, are said to be identity conflicts. Conflicts wherein an individual's sense of identity and self worth, and that of zir culture, zir ancestor's, or zir sub-group are challenged. "Much of what is now labeled racism, sexism, etc., is actually not triggered by a difference in color, gender, or other such trait, but rather by a perception that the target lacks the protection of rank. It is rankism". (breakingranks.net, 2004)

Robert Fuller, former president of Oberlin College, maintains that the consequences, both subtle and brutal, of rankism impact all aspects of our lives, ". . . the reason so many students—regardless of color—withhold their hearts and minds from learning can be traced to the fact that their top priority and constant concern is to shield themselves from the rankism that permeates

education from kindergarten to graduate school" (2003, p. 2). These effects are not limited to educational settings.

> Rankism erodes the will to learn, distorts personal relationships, taxes economic productivity, and stokes ethnic hatred. It is the cause of dysfunctionality, and sometimes even violence, in families, schools, and the workplace. Like racism and sexism, rankism must be named and identified and then negotiated out of all our social institutions. (R. W. Fuller, 2003, p. 3)

That negotiation is a complex process. Rankisms cannot be merely legislated away by an authoritarian system, although legislative efforts can help because they introduce and solidify a third-party socio-cultural role that is watching, judging, and may take action. Nor is rankism only a large scale social dynamic. The model of rank can be used to explain various aspects of behavior in any interpersonal relationship or conflict. In general someone with less rank than another in a given moment may feel downed, disrespected, and powerless. However, becoming aware of this can give the downed person access to other forms of power, such as psychological, spiritual, or counter-social rank through which zie is able to find access to greater power—although this isn't necessarily conscious and may not momentarily relieve the feeling of powerlessness (Siver, 2004, p. 37). Momentary and systemic rank and power differences are a matter of great suffering and debate:

> Power matters. In Fact, it's more or less all that matters [from this one viewpoint], and it is important for those who temporarily lack it to realize this so they can set about building a countervailing power. It is only as those subordinated by a particular consensus organize and gain power commensurate with that of their

oppressors that the prevailing consensus unravels and the pretext for exploitation is

disallowed. (R. W. Fuller, 2003, p. 6)

Behind the levels and concerns of rank and power lie a complex realm of experience,

emotions, and somatic responses, reactions, and feelings. Fuller maintains that rankism is

invariably an assault on dignity, which is a convenient but one sided way to summarize the

experience of being marginalized (2003, p. 8). He proposes a meritocracy wherein rank is

bestowed purely on the basis of earned merit within a relevant field:

> Merit has no significance, and therefore should carry no weight, beyond the
>
> precise realm where in it is assessed. . . . Unequal opportunity and unfairness are
>
> incompatible with democratic ideals. The indignities of rankism, no less than those
>
> of racism and sexism, are inefficient, cruel, and self-defeating. They have no place
>
> in democracy's future. . . . Authority can be democratized without being
>
> undermined. Democracies, which succeeded in circumscribing rank in national
>
> government, led the world in the last century. The nations that are most successful
>
> in removing rankism from business, education, and their international relations will
>
> lead in the next. (2003, p. 9-11)

This line of thinking acknowledges that there are differences in ability, merit, and, thus,

rank and does not propose an idealistic impulsive effort to abolish rank. However, Fuller assumes

that ". . . as long as people use rank acquired in one setting to secure power for themselves in

another, contests for recognition will be unfair" (2003, p. 25). Behind this line of thinking there is a

high ideal for a world wherein all people would only used their own earned rank, and only within

the "appropriate" field wherein the rank was earned, to gain access to power and other resources.

"Recognition is not about whether we are a somebody or a nobody, but rather about whether we feel we're taken for a somebody or a nobody" (2003, p. 50).

I was crossing the street in front of my apartment this morning and a man came from behind a building carrying a large bundle of cardboard over to a garbage truck. I noticed that he appeared to be in his fifties and I caught myself feeling thankful that I've been fortunate enough to find resources so that I don't have to do that sort of work. Then I noticed another man following him. He wasn't carrying anything and was slightly older and walked with the very slow, short steps of someone in a great deal of pain. I paused so that he could pass in front of me. I was smiling at him as he looked up and noticed me and noticed that I'd paused and I saw him smile gently and nod his head slowly. It is moments like this when I notice that I manage to recognize someone and support and value them for their innate dignity, as well as the moments when I fail, that make me agree, for the most part, with Fuller.

I've made an informal study of rank signals between drivers and pedestrians at intersections for years. Who goes first often depends on social rank. In urban white neighborhoods, black women will often refuse to walk in front of a car driven by a white man yet, as a white male pedestrian I can cross the street with little concern that I will not be seen. Things change in black neighborhoods where a black woman is far less likely to refuse to cross in front of me, in fact, is far more likely, from my own informal observations, to walk purposely in front of me, and I have learned to be far more cautious in my own crossings.

These stories are anecdotal and yet they tell a story, a story which we all have seen versions of through our own perceptions and awareness. What is missing may be a framework from which to use that awareness to further enrich relationships, rather than to fuel conflict. The example of my noticing rank issues through the interactions at pedestrian crossing is almost ludicrously trivial

compared to war and terrorism, and yet, it is may be our collective dismissal of the initial, foundational signals and issues of marginalization and oppression that allows the unchecked escalation into oppression and dominance. Be it in interpersonal or global dynamics, in spousal or casual relationships, our framework, beliefs systems (conscious or implied), and metaphors for conflict, relationships, and social dynamics do much to shape our own conflict psychology and the course of our lives. Fuller maintains that "You can't put war out of business with peace alone; after a while, that will prove boring and the war party will regain its hold. But you *can* displace war by offering people a 'better game.' That game is the activist one of mutual recognition." (2003, p. 128) What are the games and metaphors of conflict?

The formal, classical western study of the psychology of conflict began, as did formal, classical western psychology, with the work of Sigmund Freud.

> It is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement—that they seek power, success and wealth for themselves and admire them in others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life. And yet, in making any general judgement [sic] of this sort, we are in danger of forgetting how variegated the human world and its mental life are. There are a few men [and women] from whom their contemporaries do not withhold admiration, although their greatness rests on attributes and Achievements which are completely foreign to the aims and ideals of the multitude. One might easily be induced to suppose that it is after all only a minority which appreciates these great men, while the large majority cares nothing for them. But things are probably not as simple as that, thanks to the discrepancies between people's thoughts and their actions, and to the diversity of their wishful impulses. (Freud & trans. Strachey, 1961, p. 11)

While conflict resolution and the psychology of conflict are relatively new areas of scholarship, Arlene Audergon, a process oriented conflict facilitator, recognizes the there have always been experts in the field:

> The field of conflict resolution may be relatively small, but there have always been people—political leaders and warlords—who are expert in their understanding of psychological dynamics of conflict. There are those who know how loyalty and righteousness can polarize communities and lead us to acts of genocide in the name of justice. There are those who use their understanding of human nature to develop torture methods that stretch the boundaries of endurance, and to design terror tactics to dominate their own nation or neighbours. There are those who know how our need to stop the pain of historical trauma can be turned into a deadly replay of the nightmare. There are those who understand how our longing to sense the divine and a bond with humanity can fan nationalism and violence. These (fellow) 'experts' calculate that our naivety and even our urge to awaken can be knitted into war. (2005, p. xv)

As there have always been experts, so too there have always been those who propose simplistic panaceas that fail to address the breadth of complexity of conflict, the nature of humanness, and that do not work. Freud offers one such example by analyzing the biblical edict to love they neighbor as thyself:

> The commandment "Love thy neighbour as thyself," is the strongest defence against human aggressiveness and an excellent example of the unpsychological proceedings of the cultural super-ego. The commandment is impossible to fulfil; such an enormous inflation of love can only lower its value, not get rid of the

difficulty. Civilization pays no attention to all this; it merely admonishes us that the harder it is to obey the precept the more meritorious it is to do so. But anyone who follows such a precept in present-day civilization only puts himself at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the person who disregards it. What a potent obstacle to civilization aggressiveness must be, if the defence against it can cause as much unhappiness as aggressiveness itself! (Freud & trans. Strachey, 1961, p. 90)

And yet, despite Freud's dismissal of love as a panacea, it is one of the driving dynamics behind war, as much as it would be so in support of peace:

The link between psychological dynamics and violent conflict is such a vast topic. We often consider our psychology, however, as a kind of excuse for war, a reason to be hopeless or to feel that there is nothing we can do about it. People often say: 'Isn't that just human nature to be aggressive and violent?' The more I study the dynamics of violent conflict, the more I see that the raw material of war is largely made up of qualities that we highly cherish – our loyalty, love, devotion to community, urge to protect the vulnerable, and outrage at atrocity and pain, and our search for meaning that transcends the limits of our personal life and death. (Audergon, 2005, p. xvii)

Nick Totton, psychotherapist, facilitator, and editor of *Psychotherapy and Politics International,* has done much to shape our understanding of the relationship between power, politics, and so-called psychotherapeutic issues:

Why do people seek power over each other? Are power-seeking and aggressivity innate human traits, or are they conditioned by a particular cultural or individual circumstances? Answers tend to imply a particular political alignment—

with some exceptions, the right believes in innate aggression while the left believes

that a non-aggressive society is possible. We can also distinguish between creative

and destructive forms of power and aggression (Perls 1955; Steiner 1981). Many

styles of therapeutic groupwork have explored conflict and ways to work creatively

with it—for example Tavistock-influenced methods, and Arnold Mindell's

Worldwork.

Closely linked with questions of power and aggression are questions of

sexism and racism. Although these phenomena clearly have causes in the external

world—economic and social factors which favour their development—most of us

would agree that there are also important *internal* causes involved, that sexist and/or

racist attitudes serve a psychological function for those who hold them as well as,

perhaps, a political function for the dominant class. (Totton, 2000, p. 88)

We often look to our leaders, to great people like Joan of Arc, Winston Churchill,

Mohandas Gandhi, John F. Kennedy, or Nelson Mandela for leadership. There is an assumption

that these people know what to do and that with the right persuasion and effective use of the

media, that people will follow. Political media analysts often record extremely high correlations

between media messages and popular political opinion. Indeed, look at the recent events in the US

wherein a massive media campaign, fueled by the "chosen trauma" of 9-11, resulted in

overwhelming support for the assaults against Afghanistan and Iraq. Network, chaos, and process

theories and practical examples are increasingly demonstrating that these effects are short lived.

Hindu-Muslim violence in India erupted as soon as Gandhi died. The cooling effects of Dr. King's

leadership did not survive him. Even Nelson Mandela's substantial eldership may not create a

change in South Africa that will survive him. Nelson Mandela often receives a standing ovation

when he speaks publicly in South Africa as he did at the funeral of his friend, colleague, and mentor Walter Sisulu in 2003. President Mugabe of Zimbabwe also received a standing ovation from the black South Africans at that funeral and again at President Thabo Mbeki's inauguration ceremony in Pretoria in April 2004 (South African Press Association, 2004b). "Of the foreigners [present at the inauguration], Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe was perhaps the most enthusiastically welcomed, with the crowd starting to clap and whistle even before his arrival was officially announced" (South African Press Association, 2004a).

Why? Because he stood up against the white colonialists in Zimbabwe, nationalized their business and farms, and threw them out of the country. This spirit of racial hatred runs deep in South Africa, as evidenced by Mugabe's standing ovations. One white South African psychotherapist and social activists reports:

> There is a lot of dissent against the ANC [African National Congress]. In some ways it's a pity that more conflict wasn't allowed to happen. There is so much feeling in South Africa which hasn't had a chance to be expressed. And the whole world looks at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and thinks how great. But there was only a certain kind of horror that has been allowed to come forward. Only the grossest atrocities against people's bodies. So there is all kinds of stuff that hasn't been expressed yet. One of the reasons that I listen to kwaito[1] is that it speaks a strong language about what's it's like to be young and black in South Africa today.

---

[1] Just as many of the influences on hip hop come from the streets of New York and California, kwaito is known as the musical voice of young, black, urban South Africa. Like hip hop, . . . kwaito is not just music. It is an expression and a validation of a way of life—the way South Africans dress, talk and dance. It is a street style as lifestyle, where the music reflects life in the townships, much the same way hip hop mimics life in the American ghetto. (Swink, 2003)

There's all kinds of feelings around the place where the past and the present and the future are meeting. There's a lot of envy, but there's also a lot of pride. I'm looking at a newspaper advertisement for a beer. There's a young man saying "I hate being black" and then it says, "I'm not someone else's black. I'm my own black and I love being black." And then there's the sales pitch, "Refresh your soul."

There is still so much anger with black people in so many ways that hasn't found a place for public expression. The politicians do a little and the new black middle class are doing well, but the people haven't yet gotten their hands on any economic change.

Powerful leadership has the effect of gaining momentary consensus but of stopping a deeper dialogue, which then remains incomplete. This has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout the world as great leaders have managed to gain the consensus of the people and their enemies for peace and negotiated and signed peace accords—only to see violence re-commence at the first spark. It has been said that African peace accords are signed only at the beginning of the rainy season when it is too miserable to fight and the roads too muddy for transporting the combatants or when both sides need time to buy more bullets.

Clearly, Mandela brings something far more lofty to the table than this, but such signals as evidenced by the reception given President Mugabe indicate that there is a powerful secondary process of racial hatred which is momentarily held at bay by Mandela's charisma and the romanticism of his life and struggles. He is no less able to garner the consensus of his people than Hitler or Saddam Hussein were, although obviously to very different ends.

Since the goals of these two leaders were so different why make this comparison? Because it demonstrates that the people and the underlying social dynamic haven't changed. Whether people make war because their leaders beat the drums, or make peace because their leaders carry olive branches is psychologically equivalent. It's the same thing. In short, there is nobody home psychologically. "What good fortune for those in power that people do not think."

Plato argued for a race of philosopher Kings (1997). James Madison thought it impossible (Hamilton, Madison, Jay, & Hamilton, 1999). Buckminster Fuller thought it imperative (1981) and not only for the Kings but for everyone in order to ensure our continued fitness for survival as a species. Process work see this as a high dream, and one which might actually not be desirable as such uniformity of function (if not of outcome—how often do philosophers agree?) runs counter to chaos theory and the need for diversity. In a world filled with Saddam Hussein's and Mother Teresa's, one perhaps more interesting and sustainable approach is to continually struggle to bring awareness to the various roles and tensions between them through dialogue. "Information and reflection on the psychology of war are needed in public dialogue, so that we do not stand by, unaware of our involvement, responsibility and the possibility that we can make a difference" (Audergon, 2005, p. xvii).

Terrorism

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (US Department of Justice, 2005). Further definition of exactly what constitutes terrorism or who constitutes a terrorist is difficult because of a broad range of diversity amongst the acts, the players, and political views. One person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. To the British, George Washington was a terrorist;

to the Americans, a romantic hero fighting the mammoth British empire. To others, many of the acts of the US or other governments constitutes state-sponsored terrorism whether or not it is directed against combatants because of the massive disparity in military capacity, economic power, and socio-political dominance.

In his acceptance speech for the Morton Deutsch Conflict Resolution Award at the 110th Convention of the American Psychological Association: Peace Division (48); Chicago, 25 August 2002, Johan Galtung,[2] considered by many to be the father of the conflict resolution field, offered the following definition of terrorism (non-state) and state terrorism (state):

· Use violence for political ends, conflict termination;

· Also hit/harm/hurt people not directly involved in struggle;

· Are designed to spread panic/terror to bring about capitulation;

· Have an element of surprise in the choice of who, where, when;

· Make perpetrators unavailable for retaliation/incapacitation.

This applies equally well to most military campaigns: war is continuation of politics by other means; of course there will be intended or unintended "collateral damage"; the intention is to bring about capitulation; only a fool would reveal tactics in advance; and since feudal chivalry only a super-fool sees putting one's own life at risk as the condition for taking Other's life [sic]. (Galtung, 2002)

However defined, terrorism is often a symbolic act intended to influence an audience. It is "political theatre" (Post, 2004, p. 123). Post's analysis of terrorism tends to be fairly conservative

---

[2] Galtung established the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo in 1959. IPRI was the first institute of its kind to make a mark in the academic world. Galtung was IPRI's Director for 10 years.

and does not include a discussion of economic and political domination as state terrorism, although he does discuss state terrorism wherein governments use its resources against its own citizenry to counter political opposition, such as was done recently in Zimbabwe when Supreme Court justices were forced to resign under threat of violence after making decisions that threatened President Mugabe's single party dominance, and such as was done in Seattle during the WTO conference in 2000.

According to analysis conducted by the Public Policy Office of the American Psychological Association, the cause of terrorism is rooted in a threat to one's psychological security:

> From the perspective of Terror Management Theory (TMT), aggression, human conflict, and war are rooted, at least in part, in the threat to psychological security posed by those with different beliefs and values that implicitly threaten protection from anxiety provided by one's own beliefs and values. Although economic, military, and other concerns certainly play an important role in international conflict, it is the ideological threat posed by a worldview different from one's own that rouses the passions necessary for people to risk their own lives in an attempt to destroy those who pose such psychological threats. According to this view, therefore, terrorist violence is rooted in the failure of a culture to meet the psychological and physical needs of its members, and the displacement of the fear and anger that results from this thwarting of needs onto a more powerful culture whose beliefs and values pose a threat to one's own cultural worldview.

> A large number of experiments, conducted in nine different countries, have found that (1) reminders of mortality increase the tendency to apply stereotypes and view others in simple closed-minded ways; (2) prejudice and intergroup

hostility is heightened by conditions that undermine one's self-esteem and faith in one's own cultural worldview; (3) the tendency to respond negatively toward those different from oneself can be reduced and sometimes eliminated by values from one's culture that promote tolerance and respect for others; (4) because people use their affiliation with close others and members of their culture to assuage their existential fears, such individuals are especially influential in influencing attitudes, values, and behavior tendencies. (APA, 2005)

This research suggests that communication and dialogue campaigns can be effective in countering terrorism providing they are related to real world perceptions and the terrorist's core cultural values. The dialogue often happens organically by way of a feedback loop between terrorists and their constituents. For example, in 1998 the Real IRA (a splinter group of the Provisional IRA) killed twenty-nine people in a bombing. The reaction was so intense that the Real IRA apologized and thereafter adopted nonviolent tactics (Post, 2004, p. 126). The signal from the people, in this case, is radically different that the situation in Israel/Palestine, wherein there is virtually no reaction from the greater Palestinian community indicating their lack of support for suicide bombings. I traveled in Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank in June 2003 and April 2004, working with group and meeting with peace workers, therapists, and average citizens. During that time there were several instances of Palestinian suicide bombings and Israel military precursors and reactions but there was virtually no Palestinian reaction against the terrorism of suicide bombings, and very little Jewish reaction against the terrorism of Israeli tactics and policies, and very little discussion between the two groups.

Various groups of peacebuilders are working to bring people together. The tendency in such gatherings is generally to build relationships, focus on amplification of positive peaceful

interactions between people, and lay a foundation for an experience of shared common humanity. This sort of work is greatly needed and very useful. However, it focuses on the essence of an experience of shared humanity and marginalizes the actual differences in consensus reality and dreamland (the level of dream figures, synchronicities, and archetypal experiences). This practice is consistent with the sharp division between good and evil characteristic of the Abrahamic traditions—Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.

Despite the death of Yasser Arafat the situation between Israeli and Palestine and promises of a peace accord between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbashas, the situation has not changed greatly. Following a suicide bombing on February 26th, Sharon stated that, "There will not be any diplomatic progress, I repeat, no diplomatic progress, until the Palestinians take vigorous action" (The New York Times, 2005, p. 1). Sharon had an opportunity to take a softer stance supporting the new Palestinian government's efforts at working towards finding peaceful solutions, negotiating with their various factions, and policing their own dissidents.

> Ardent practitioners of these faiths, committed to the literal word of God, are able to find ample justification in their texts for militant aggressive defense of their beliefs. When "Truth" is conveyed by an authoritarian religious leader, such as Khomeini or Osama bin Laden (who, in fact, has no religious credentials), all doubt is relieved for the true believer. It provides justification for the rigid moralistic conscience to attach the nonbeliever. It can justify aggression to the point of killing. (Post, 2004, p. 126)

Such authoritarian and charismatic leaders provide external support for personal violent tendencies and a socially acceptable channel for its expression. In this sense, viewing the situations

symbolically, following Osama bin Laden is no different than following Gandhi—the locus of authority is outside of oneself and only one role is being supported, integrated, and expressed.

The best documented research suggests that terrorists are not pathologically disturbed. "Nor does a comparative study reveal a particular psychological type, a particular personality constellation, a uniform terrorist mind" (Post, 2004,p. 128). In fact, terrorist organizations tend to avoid working with disturbed individuals because they are a security risk and not easily controlled (Post, 2004; Post, Ruby, & Shaw, 2002; Vassiliou, 1995). Terrorist are, rather, occupying a social role, albeit a highly polarized and on-sided role. Johan Galtung sees the polarization in the following terms (which includes a not so subtle rebuff of the United States:

- Fundamentalism (DMA), religious or ideological is:

  - Dualist, the world is divided into US(A) and THEY, no neutrals;

  - Manichean, our party is Good, their party is Evil; and

  - Armageddon, there can be only one outcome, the final battle.

Known as polarization, the DMA-syndrome is found in many conflicts.

Fundamentalism is permanent pre-polarization. (Galtung, 2002)

While not pathological, *per se*, there is evidence that there are strong tendencies for certain personality characteristics to be predominant amongst terrorists. Post characterizes them as action-oriented, aggressive, reactive individuals, who tend to have fragmented or violent family backgrounds, and who are seeking excitement and have a tendency towards externalization and splitting—psychological mechanisms often correlated with narcissistic and borderline personality disorders. "Such individuals find the polarizing, absolutist rhetoric of terrorism extremely attractive." (2004, p. 129) Many of the terrorists interviewed by researchers have reported that belonging to the group was the first they felt a sense of belonging, empowerment, and significance.

"When a group has a disproportionate number of individuals with fragmented psychosocial identities with a strong need to stroke out against the cause of their failure, extremely powerful forces result." (Post, 2004, p. 133) Galtung disagrees but sees the pathology as being a collective phenomenon:

> There is also the CGT-syndrome well known in harder varieties of the three Abrahamitic religions, Judaism/Christianity/Islam:
>
> · Chosenness, a Chosen People under God, A Promised/Sacred Land;
>
> · Glory, a glorious past and/or future;
>
> · Trauma, a people under permanent PTSD
>
> DMA, combined with narcissism (C, G) and paranoia (T), is a deep collective pathology, intolerable at the personal level, but recognized as devotion and patriotism, at the collective level. Wahhabism, state religion of Saudi Arabia, and Puritanism, civic religion of the USA, qualify. Their joint Armageddon, fall 2001. (Galtung, 2002)

Projecting one's own shadow on the Other is common but not yet a sign of psychological pathology. However, Galtung maintains that the unopposed verbal outpourings of one-sided beliefs, carefully selected data, and aggressive policy with no mention or consideration of the importance of deeper considered self-reflection of one's own shadow is not only brain-washing propaganda but itself pathological (Galtung, 2002, p. 4-5). In US public policy discussion the terms terrorism and fundamentalism only apply to the Other. US exceptionalism and entitlement is so much a part of the US self-image that it becomes a truism. Galtung maintains that all six DMA-CGT criteria are satisfied:

- · The strong you-are-either-for-us-or-against-us division.

- · The very frequent use of the epithet "evil", out "to get us."

- · The inevitability of a final, decisive battle to "crush" them.

- · The unheard of crime of hitting the sacred land.

- · "The world/USA will never be the same" (like invulnerable).

- · 9/11 trauma as uniqueness, like <u>shoa</u> [sic][3] something new in history. (2002)

Galtung indirectly expresses a role theory when he remarks that "Bush and Bin Laden then become Osama Bush and George bin Laden" (2002).

Amnesia and the Collective Unconscious

Just as identity is inseparable from group feedback,

so all behavior is interdependent.

—Thomas Cooper

Cornell West's examination of ontological rootlessness, and what the classical American pragmatic philosopher Josiah Royce called communities of memory and hope, point to a disconnection that is often assumed to be a contemporary phenomenon (West, 2004). However, Plato warned that

> discovery of the alphabet will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves... You give your disciples not truth but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear omniscient and will generally know nothing; they

---

[3]   Probably a transcription error. *Shoah* is the Hebrew term for the holocaust.

will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality. (Plato,

quoted in (Cooper, 1998))

What is this stuff that the modern literate learners' souls have forgotten? A more

contemporary sage, Mamoudou Konyate, a Mali shaman speaks to that which is missing in literate

cultures:

Other people use writing to record the past, but this invention has killed the

faculty of memory among them. They do not feel the past anymore, for writing

lacks the warmth of the human voice. With them, everybody thinks he knows,

whereas learning should be a secret. The prophets did not write and their words

have been all the more vivid as a result. What paltry learning is that which is

congealed in dumb books. (Konyate, quoted in (Cooper, 1998))

This is perhaps an extreme view and there certainly may be other opinions. However,

remember that this is a Mali shaman, an indigenous elder, who must be trying to understand what

it is that has made mainstream western culture so lacking in relatedness to the earth, the

environment, and to others.

Freud wrote of a collectively psychotic humanity, a concept that Carl Jung further

developed in 1934 writing:

A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal.

I call it the personal unconscious. But this personal unconscious rests upon a

deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal

acquisition but is inborn. This deeper layer I call the *collective unconscious...* It is,

in other words, identical in all men [and women] and thus constitutes a common

psychic substrate of a suprapersonal nature which is present in every one of us. (Jung, 1968)

This collective unconscious has a field effect wherein people react in response to something that is not only beyond their personal psychology, but is also outside of awareness. Freud wrote:

> If we consider mankind as a whole and substitute it for a single individual, we discover that it too has developed delusions which are inaccessible to logical criticism and which contradict reality. If, in spite of this, they (the delusions) are able to exert an extraordinary power over men [or women], investigation leads us to the same explanations as in the case of the single individual. They owe their power to the element of *historical truth* which they have brought up from the repression of the forgotten and primeval past. (Freud, 1964, p. 257)

Seeking to understand six hundred year discrepancies between Egyptian and Israeli records and ancient accounts of celestial and terrestrial traumas, a psychoanalyst, Immanuel Velikovsky, argued that humanity acts like an amnesia victim seeking to repress traumatic experience (Velikovsky, 1982). Velikovsky saw humanity as conveniently remembering its progress after devolution but not remembering the disturbing catastrophes it had suffered or the losses to culture or consciousness. In other words, humanity is unaware of its collective amnesia and its collective unconscious. The consequences of this lack of awareness may explain the willingness by some to attack their enemies, rather than to try and find more related solutions to the conflicts.

Galtung maintains that the lack of awareness is not merely a case of collective amnesia but is fueled by systemic efforts to keep information from public awareness.

Equally or more significant [than US exceptionalism and projection] is the total absence of mention [in public policy debate] of the terrorism exercised by the USA on other countries, like the 67 cases of intervention since 1945 alone. Twelve million deaths, about equally divided between overt action (Pentagon) and covert action (CIA), are practically speaking unknown to most Americans, and made invisible even by US research in international relations; with the notable exception of Chalmers Johnson's admirable book Blowback, quoting CIA as seeing terrorism partly as an "unintended consequence" of past US action. (Galtung, 2002, p. 4)

Islamic fundamentalism is one of the unintended consequences of US action. However, there are other venues of religious fundamentalism and violence, such as the assaults against abortion clinics in the US.

Killing for God is a particularly complex form of terrorism because the locus of authority is not only outside of the individual and outside of the terrorist organization, it is outside of humanity—authority to kill is presumably granted directly by God. Christian Crusaders acting under the authority of God and Pope Urban II slaughtered Jews and Muslims beginning in 1095 in response to rumors of Turkish atrocities committed against Christian pilgrims. Countless masses of people were tortured and killed during the burning times of the various inquisitions of Medieval Europe. Right wing Christians have killed countless people of color, gays, and women's health clinic workers in the US, all in the name of God. Jewish settlers in late 1940's vacated what they later maintained was the unoccupied land of Palestine through mass executions in the name of God and Zion. And more recently, Islamic terrorism has become a wide spread phenomenon in part as a reaction against Israeli excesses and Western political, economic, and military domination.

Some say the Koran is basically a book of love. Others say it is filled with violent proclamations such as,

> Fight ye the chiefs of unfaith ... Will
>
> Ye not fight people who violated their
>
> Oaths, plotted to expel the messenger, and
>
> Were the first to attack you? Nay, it is Allah
>
> Whom ye should more justly fear;
>
> If ye believe. Fight them and Allah will
>
> punish them by your hands.
>
> Koran (9:12-14)

Some, primarily the Sufis, say that Jihad, or holy war, is an internal struggle for moral purity, awareness, and connection with Allah. One senior Sufi, who some refer to as the Sufi pope, Sidi Shaykh Muhammad al-Jamal ar-Rafai'i as-Shaduli, says clearly and emphatically that "only Allah can kill" (Sidi, 2004). The conflicting interpretations have helped fuel tensions between Christians and Muslims for over a thousand years. In one recent courageous and creative attempt to address this misunderstanding, a Yemeni Judge, Hamoud al-Hitar, challenged convicted, imprisoned al-Qaeda terrorists to debate him in a Koranic duel: "If you can convince us that your ideas are justified by the Koran, then we will join you in your struggle," Hitar told the militants, "but if we succeed in convincing you of our ideas, then you must agree to renounce violence" (Brandon, 2005). Western antiterrorism experts warned that this high-stakes gamble would end in disaster but two years later, three hundred and sixty-four young men have been released because of dialoguing with Judge al-Hitar and none of them have left Yemen to fight anywhere else.

Speaking of the Koranic dialogues with former Yemeni terrorists, Faris Sanabani, a former adviser to President Abdullah Saleh and editor-in-chief of the Yemen Observer, a weekly English-language newspaper said,

> It's only logical to tackle these people through their brains and heart. If you beat these people up they become more stubborn. If you hit them, they will enjoy the pain and find something good in it—it is a part of their ideology. Instead, what we must do is erase what they have been taught and explain to them that terrorism will only harm Yemenis' jobs and prospects. Once they understand this they become fighters for freedom and democracy, and fighters for the true Islam. (Brandon, 2005)

Some freed militants were reportedly so transformed that they led the army to secret hidden weapons caches, assisted the Yemeni security services in locating Islamic militants, and provided the intelligence that led to the assassination of Abu Ali al Harithi, Al Qaeda's top commander in Yemen, in a US air-strike. (Brandon, 2005)

According to Alan Godlas, a Sufi and professor of Islamic studies at the University of Georgia, the International Security Program of the Nixon Center held a conference in Washington DC on October 24, 2003 to discuss ways to promote Sufism as a possible antidote to Islamic extremism (Godlas, 2004; The Nixon Center, 2004). This translates into an attempt to get people involved in a deeper level of dialogue, self reflection, and an inner (vs. external) Jihad.[4]

The view that terrorists are not crazy, pathological monsters is making some headway in the social policy debate in DC. Harlan Ullman, a senior associate at Washington's Center for Strategic

---

[4] The inner Jihad refers to fighting one's inner demons and infidels, striving to be closer to God through inner purity, rather than killing external infidels through violence.

and International Studies, is the principal author of Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Published in 1996, Ullman's book laid out a new approach to warfare tailored to that era's shrinking military budgets. Instead of overwhelming the enemy with troop strength—as called for in the Gulf War doctrine formulated by Colin Powell, whom Ullman taught at the National War College—Ullman proposed that the United States destroy enemy morale with a concentrated series of strikes at many different kinds of targets. Disoriented by the resulting havoc, the enemy would quickly be "shocked" and "awed" into surrender, and casualties would be kept to a minimum (Ullman, 1996). After reading Brandon's article on Koranic dialogue in Yemen while participating in a roundtable discussion on nonviolent approaches to ending Islamic terrorism, Ullman recently published an article in the Washington Times in which he presented a view that Osama bin Laden should be taken as a rational thinker with clear goals and tactics who could be invited to dialogue (Ullman, 2005).

> Suppose, . . . Osama bin Laden's reasons and strategy for confronting the United States were fully rational and that he was not a crazed fanatic as many assume? After all, he helped drive the Soviets from Afghanistan, ultimately leading to the great collapse.
>
> And further, suppose the case put forth by the White House and uncritically endorsed by both sides of the aisle in Congress, that bin Laden was simply out to destroy America and all that it stood for because of hatred of our values, society and embrace of liberty and freedom was as flawed as the conclusion Saddam Hussein possessed WMD. Would that revelation change our policies and induce us to deal with al Qaeda and the threat of radical Islam differently?

. . . . careful review of bin Laden's pronouncements and statements reveal a remarkably consistent message. Bin Laden has detailed a list of grievances against the United States. These reflect attitudes widely accepted throughout the Arab and Muslim world as to why American policy is disliked and opposed even by so-called moderates. From them arise major demands, including: the end of U.S. aid to Israel; the elimination of the Jewish state and replacement with an Islamic Palestinian one; withdrawal of Western forces from Muslim territory; restoration of Muslim control over energy; replacement of U.S. protected Muslim regimes that do not govern according to Islam; and the end of U.S. support in the oppression of Muslims by Russian, Chinese, Indian and other governments. (Ullman, 2005)

This line of thinking runs counter to the traditional policy discussion wherein the conception of the Other maintains that they have no motivation beyond evil. This traditional conception goes beyond dehumanization to "verminization" (Galtung, 2002, p. 7) and is necessarily to maintain public support for US policies which have clear economic benefits to US interests alone. The position that those who do not support this policy position are anti-American, naive, or at worst a part of a cover-up, has catastrophic consequences and eliminates the possibility of dialogue and rational, considered action. Ullman maintains that the US should considered bin Laden as a rational thinker with clear goals and tactics, which is surprisingly one-sided as it does not also consider the emotional and irrational forces that may be motivating bin Laden. Bin Laden has detailed a list of grievances against the United States that can be seen to be other than extreme, isolated views, for which there is broad popular support, having a certain linearity. But bin Laden has also drafted *fatwa* (religious directives) for Muslims to kill all Americans and found compliant Iman's to endorse them. Bin Laden's more rational views reflect attitudes widely accepted

throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Days after 9/11 bin Laden released a statement that

mentioned the 80 years of Arab humiliation since Sykes/Picot.[5]

Figure 1: Sykes-Picot Agreement (FirstWorldWar.com, 2000)

Johan Galtung details the historical and psychological justification for bin Laden's

positions.

> Motivation is part of explanation, and explanation is not justification. Much
> of Hitler's success can be explained in terms of Versailles humiliation; nothing can
> justify what he did. *Tout comprendre est tout pardonner* is false. But without

---

[5]   The Sykes-Picot agreement is a secret understanding concluded in May 1916, during World
War I, between Great Britain and France, with the assent of Russia, for the dismemberment of
the Ottoman Empire. The agreement led to the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,
and Palestine into various French and British-administered areas. The agreement took its name
from its negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Georges Picot of France. Some historians
have pointed out that the agreement conflicted with pledges already given by the British to the
Hashimite leader Husayn ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, who was about to lead an Arab revolt in the

explanation we cannot remove possible causes, like on 9/12 announcing the withdrawal of US bases in Saudi Arabia and the recognition of Palestine as a state. No explanation, no rationality. Darkness. (Galtung, 2002, p. 7-8)

Some days after September 11 CNN had a program where a psychologist gave advice to parents with children asking difficult questions. Thus, one young boy had asked "What have we done to make them hate us so much that they do such things?" A mature question, very different from the answer: "You could tell your child that there are good people in the world, and evil - -" That boy had arrived at the Piaget stage of reciprocity, seeing the action of Other at least partly as influenced by the action of Self (and vice versa), as opposed to the autism/absolutism of the adult psychologist, seeing evil action by Other as essentialist, uninfluenced by anything Self can do. That exonerates Self, and provides a good sleeping pillow for consciences that are probably sluggish in advance. Makes one wonder about the certification rules for psychologists.

Reciprocity does not only mean Self-searching, what have I done wrong, and just as importantly, what is the good I should have done to elicit different behavior in Other. It also means Other-searching, asking Other what he wants Self to do, or not to do, and suggesting to Other things he could do and not do. But all that presupposes dialogue, and dialogue presupposes coming together directly (Larry King Live, calling on George Bush and Osama bin Laden to discuss precisely the questions above) or indirectly (inviting both of them to dialogues with

Hejaz against the Ottoman rulers on the understanding that the Arabs would eventually receive a much more important share of the territory won. (BBC, 2001)

four wise persons, like Carter-Gorbachev-Mandela-Robinson. (Galtung, 2002, p. 10)

The main privilege of belong to a mainstream group is not having to be self-reflective, self-searching, and not having to consider other views and experiences as being relevant. Western mainstream media from President Bush down to local tv and newsprint tend to present a mostly coherent view that the US position is congruent, justifiable, and right.

> The main privilege of belonging to a mainstream group is not having to be aware of how one excludes the minority. . . Social institutions including the media, education, government, corporate institutions, and advertising promote the values, culture, and images of white, middle-class America, effectively annihilating the reality of those who are not part of that culture. This centrality, dominance, and ethnocentricity of the mainstream is a privilege that makes others resentful. Working with social conflict means educating the mainstream about its privilege. (Summers, 1994, P. 62)

This view, from a social psychologist, suggests that, while great advances have been made to determine the causes of conflict, to address poverty, and to promote development, that the root cause of a great deal of conflict will remain hidden from public debate and awareness for some time unless further shifts occur. Fortunately, it isn't only acts of terror that are speaking to the need for these shifts.

Political Trauma

Nothing that I can do will change the structure of the universe.
But maybe, by raising my voice, I can help in the greatest of all causes
goodwill among men and peace on earth.
— Einstein

Political trauma, that being trauma caused through acts of war, terrorism, and political marginalization or aggression, is especially complex but it isn't only an individual psychological issue. The individual psychological effects alter the course of history as much as the changes in group dynamics. Political trauma often tends to silence people further exacerbating the political situation by destroying a feedback mechanism.

> Although trauma is usually examined as an individual experience, it is a collective dynamic. Whole communities are traumatized and dynamics of trauma involve all of us and affect the course of history. An orientation to understanding trauma is needed that is at once personal, communal, and political. . . . understanding the dynamics of trauma is essential for facilitators of conflict resolution in zones of conflict and for post-war reconciliation and community building. . . . In addition to international tribunals and truth commissions, there is a need for community forums throughout society to work with issues of accountability and collective trauma concerning past and current conflicts. Trauma is also relevant to such issues as understanding dynamics of revenge, the silence accompanying atrocity, and historical revisionism. (Audergon, 2004, p. 16)

One recent example is the atrocities committed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. These events clearly traumatized individual prisoners but too they have had profound impact on world opinion, on Arab perspective of US actions, and provide additional impetus for the Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda to continue their anti-democratic/anti-US struggle.

> In understanding the full range of meanings generated by Abu Ghraib, however, one important perspective needs to be included: how the events appear to

ordinary Arab citizens. For them, the horrors inflicted in the prison are not

primarily about the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers. They are, rather,

about *autocratic power structures that have controlled, humiliated, and ultimately*

dehumanised Arab citizens for most of the past century of modern statehood

[emphasis added]—whether those powers were European colonial administrations,

indigenous Arab elites, occupying Israeli forces, or the current Anglo-American

managers of Iraq. As such, a comprehensive and honest analysis of the Abu Ghraib

scandal should address a wider set of issues than has so far been the case in the

international media and political institutions. (Khouri, 2004)

Leadership

When, exactly, in the course of human events does the leader affect the march of history

has long been the subject of scholarly debate. Historians often portray history as an unfolding of

events as a consequence of historical forces in which leaders were as much the pawns of fate as

nations. In1943 Sidney Hook distinguished between two kinds of acts of leadership: eventful and

event making. Eventful acts being acts made at a powerful crossroads in history, and event making

acts being the creation of powerful crossroads in history. Similarly, the early literature in political

science was concerned with the interplay of power and political events were considered the result

of political forces. The role of leadership was reduced by political scientists to that of a mere

functionary until 1977 when Glen Paige published *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership*

(Paige, 1977).

One of the early successes of political psychology, while singularly important in its own

right, reduced various leaders to mere functionaries as demonstrated by the following case, which

occurred at the end of World War II. At that time US policy makers had limited experience with

psychological advice but benefited from anthropologist Ruth Benedict's recommendation that the United States allow Japanese Emperor Hirohito to remain on the throne, if only in a ceremonial capacity.

> She accurately perceived that to depose and perhaps even execute the emperor would completely humiliate the Japanese and deprive them of symbolic identity as a people. The German experience after World War I had shown that a people suffering complete humiliation—the thorough loss of dignity and self-respect—may seek revenge against the authors of the loss. By following Benedict's advice, the United States laid the groundwork for its current strong alliance with Japan, a relationship that has flourished despite the U.S. nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Montville & Davidson, 1981, p. 146)

Political and social psychology have made great advances since WWII. Analysts now consider that decisions are made on several highly subjective levels, each of which must be considered. From the outer level, which sees a nation as a rational actor, it made no sense that the Soviet Union was placing offensive missiles in Cuba because they had made no attempt to camouflage the installation. Therefore they were assumed to be defensive despite the fact that U2 imagery revealed them to be identical to other offensive missile installations in the USSR. The second level considers that "nations" do not make decisions, competing bureaucracy's do, and often inefficiently, hence the failure to camouflage the installations. In the third level, the overall bureaucracy acts through a senior policy making group and group dynamics must be considered. As President Kennedy and his staff were approaching a consensus to initiate a Naval blockage, Adlai Stevenson proposed to offer the Soviets a way to "win" and save face by proposing that the Soviet removal of the weapons in Cuba would be matched by the removal of our (outmoded)

offensive missiles in Turkey? A General ridiculed Stevenson as being a "weak and cowardly old man," and it then became virtually impossible for anyone in the group to seriously consider his proposal. At the fourth level decisions are made by individuals and analysis considers them both as rational decisions makers and as individuals who are driven by emotion and irrational forces. A fifth level of analysis considers personality and individual political behavior. (Post, 2004, p. 16-7)

The father of political psychology, Harold Lasswell, proposed the following equation: p}d}r=P (1930, p. 75). This defines *homo politicus*, the power seeker, P, in which p displaces his or her personal needs (d) onto public policy and rationalizes it (r) as being in the public interest. This model parallels Freudian thinking and maintains that the political power seeker is compensating for feeling of low self-esteem and inferiority. Analysis suggests this model fits certain leadership, such as Idi Amin and Saddam Hussein, particularly well (Post, 2004, 2003).

However, efforts to educate the mainstream have lagged. Also, think tanks and large institutions such as the US government, the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, and the policy analysts who drive them, find it easier to focus on quantitative and impersonal measures for perhaps the same reasons that Carl Jung remarked, "One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making the darkness conscious. This procedure, however, is disagreeable, and therefore not very popular" (Jung, 1968). Martin Luther King, Jr.'s thinking parallels this sentiment when he, speaking of the tragedy of injustice, wrote:

> History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but ... groups are more immoral than individuals. We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given; it must be demanded by the oppressed. (1986, p. 292)

Further, he poses that there is a need for the work accomplished by the role of the terrorist, but calls for it to be accomplished nonviolently.

> Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, we must see the need of having nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men to rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. (King, 1986, p. 291)

One view places the burden of nonviolence on the social change agent, while others would ask the mainstream, its leaders, and its agents, to listen more carefully so that the need for the change agent to "turn up the volume" will not be felt. However, as C.G. Jung observed, this procedure is disagreeable and therefore not very popular.

In the preface for her book "War Hotel," Arlene Audergon (a process oriented conflict resolution facilitator, trauma healer, therapist, actor, producer, writer, and teacher), writes,

> The War Hotel is about how our psychology is used as fuel for violent conflict. We are active and complicit. We get outraged and we go silent. Throughout history there have been 'experts' who know how to use human nature to divide communities and carry out atrocities. The manipulation of our psychology to create violent conflict is deeply disturbing. Yet there's something profoundly hopeful here. If we are the players in violent conflict, our awareness can make a difference. (2005, p. ix)

Audergon essentially maintains that it is not only leaders who are active participants but everyone of us as well. Whereas Plato focused on the role of philosopher-kings and Socrates, like

the early political scientists, focused on power, Mindell maintains that leadership is a role that is fluid and often moves amongst various participants in a given field of interaction (1992). This is not to say that individual psychology is not also important. Considering the following: Johan Galtung proposes a clear example of a US alternative response to 9/11 that could have been championed by President Bushy. This liberal scenario is one-sided, perhaps farcically so, and yet it is entirely possible that a charismatic American leader could have succeeded in garnering public support for this approach:

> Americans; the attack yesterday on two buildings, killing thousands, was atrocious, totally unacceptable. They have to be captured and brought to justice by an appropriate international court, with a clear UN mandate.

> However, my address tonight goes beyond this. I have come to the conclusion that there have been and are serious flaws in our foreign policy, however well intended. We create enemies through our insensitivity to the basic needs of the peoples around the world, including their religious sensitivities. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the necessary steps will be taken to

> · Withdraw our military bases from Saudi Arabia,

> · Recognize Palestine as a state, details can follow later,

> · Enter into dialogue with Iraq to identify solvable conflicts,[6]

> · Accept President Khatami's invitation for the same with Iran,

> · Pull out militarily and economically from Afghanistan,

> · Stop our military interventions and reconcile with the victims.

---

[6] Despite Saddam Hussein's many atrocities there remains a certain rational linearity to his acts.

That same evening 1.3 billion Muslims would embrace America; and the few terrorists left would have no water in which to swim. The speech would cost half an hours work to write, ten minutes to deliver; as opposed to, say $60 billion for the Afghanistan operation ($50 billion for Yugoslavia in 1999, plus much more later) and so on [plus the cost of the Iraq war and reconstruction and the escalating overt and hidden costs of increased homeland security and the war on terrorism]. So, what are the psychological/political costs? (2002, p. 10)

From a liberal perspective there is something entirely hopeful about this scenario. Why wasn't it adopted? What is it that we are not prepared to pay, psychologically and politically, to embrace this line of thinking? The shadow of the end of US dominance is a ghost, an unspeakable possibility in public debate. Galtung furthers:

The allegiance of the Arab/Muslim masses and their government he [President Bush] lost with Afghanistan. The allegiance of the conscious Western people he lost right after. The sense of no goal beyond crushing[7] made him lose the Western governments and other allies. The US population, stunned and stifled, is also on its slow way down. A substantial portion of the rest of the world will follow.

Maybe that is all to the good. Empires do not last forever. Maybe this will also liberate the creative US people, deprived of democracy when most needed, to create a better America, without, for instance, 35% illiteracy in its capital. An America that could join the world like one nation and state among others, equal before the law, equal to each other, facing the problems of the world. (2002, p. 13)

---

[7] Galtung's assumption parallels the assumption of terrorist's irrationality and the projection of pathology and evil. Bush's goals may actually be clear and entirely rational, however covert.

In effect, the "average" US citizen actively or tacitly supports the acts and policies that maintain US dominance out of fear. This too is an act of leadership. Political philosopher Robert Tucker also saw leadership as a role. In *Politics as Leadership*, Tucker detailed the importance of what he called "nonconstituted leaders" (leaders without a consensus reality title such as president or prime minister) (1981). Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and Mohandas K. Gandhi, for example, had no formal political authority. Audergon maintains that the forces of war operates inside of us as well. All the world is a stage, and we need to get to know our parts:

> When we imagine that our psychology is separate from politics, we support violent conflict. In fact a central assumption of war makers is that this expertise will remain their private turf. The less aware we are of how our individual and collective psychology shapes us, the more malleable we are. If we believe in and agree with this central assumption that we will remain unaware, we are in effect those 'war makers.' Most people believe that forces of war operate out-side them. To deal with these forces more creatively, rather than only being swept along, we need to get to know our part. (2005, p. xv)

Conclusion

The range of what we think and do
is limited by what we fail to notice.
And because we fail to notice that we fail to notice,
there is little we can do to change,
until we notice how failing to notice
shapes our thoughts and deeds.
~ R.D. Laing

R.D. Laing's statement, made in a psychotherapeutic environment, speaks to large scale conflict as well. The range of our options are limited by our awareness. However fortunately or

unfortunately, leadership, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution are not yet dominated by awareness based paradigms. While there are those who argue compellingly for the benefits of such a shift, the world is till struggling with these issues in what can be called non awareness-based paradigms of leadership and conflict resolution. As Gandhi believed that individuals have a right to perceive and live in their own manner, so too there is something "right" and something that needs to be supported about the current state of leadership and conflict resolution. But also there is something akin to a spiritual process, a psychological growth path, and the evolution of human consciousness in the background. Consider the follow from one of the leading practitioners of an awareness based conflict resolution paradigm:

Public awareness is also a psychological and spiritual matter—a process of discovering as individuals and collectively what makes us respond and what makes us silent. We are each unique in how we perceive and contribute to this world. We are also each limited and stretch the boundaries of our identities as we meet challenges and grapple with the unknown. Gandhi believed that individuals have a right to perceive and live in their unique manner, and at the same time can dissolve the notion of 'self ' and 'other' by attaining identification with humanity and all of creation. Gandhi's political leadership came from the notion that spirituality and politics were identical. He saw our internal and external worlds as part of a single pattern. Politics was a spiritual activity and all true spirituality culminated in politics. Chuang Tzu, an ancient Chinese philosopher, recognized that the same patterns emerge inside us and within the world, and inner development and leadership could therefore not be separated. Arny Mindell's notion of 'deep democracy' suggests that society needs dialogue and interaction that includes not only our

political positions, but also our deepest rifts and the emotions of history, as well as access to the underlying creativity that precedes our polarizations of conflict. Awareness of how we identify and what we consider 'other', in both our inner and our outer worlds, allows us to facilitate conflict, rather than only be sunk in it.

So, to recognize our part in violent conflict and to find alternatives, public awareness involves getting informed, developing freedom of thought, and a psychological and spiritual process of becoming aware of the inner and outer dimensions of conflict.

Although some political leaders and warlords have exploited the psychological and spiritual dynamics of conflict for the purpose of power and profit, at the expense of unspeakable tragedy, the responsibility and the possibility to 'profit' from our awareness of these dynamics lie with all of us. (Audergon, 2005, p. xviii)

These ideas of awareness based paradigms are far removed from our current systems of governance, leadership, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. Ambassador John McDonald says, "Governments don't even understand me when I talk about that [awareness based conflict resolution work]. We work with the people. We work with the heart. We look at the root causes of the conflict. We look at the hate and the fear and the lies that separate." (McDonald, 2002) What does it take for this to change?

Mainstream efforts include the proposed US Department of Peace, which has yet to gain widespread support in Congress (Congressmen Kucinich, 2003), a parallel effort in the EU government, and the UN Agenda for Peace. The UN Agenda for Peace, which former UN General Secretary Boutros-Boutros Ghali developed in '92, is the most powerful U.N. document

since the charter. It lays out the next fifty years for the world in terms of the way we collectively are attempting to deal with conflict. The four parts are preventive diplomacy, peace making, peace keeping, and post conflict resolution. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan now has more than a dozen special representatives at the Under Secretary General level.

Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy chair, Ambassador McDonald, reports that,

> The whole process of preventive diplomacy has been ignored by the world. I have been working for at least five years to try to get the state department to put in an office on preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Now the one step forward that has been made, this was launched by a group of about forty non-governmental organizations, including our own, and we put together a document which was presented to the foreign ministers in 1999 in Tokyo. On how the G8 could develop and focus on conflict prevention. And finally at the Okinawa G8 meeting in 2000, they came out with a document, which recommends action, so the G8 at the senior, at the top level, heads of state, has formally in their reports favored an emphasis on conflict prevention and on conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy. (McDonald, 2002)

The State Department finally has responded by creating the office of Conflict Mitigation and Management underneath the Office of Transition Initiate at USAID. Similarly, the World Bank how has an office of conflict resolution. The mainstream world is slowly creeping towards an awareness based paradigm. One difference, however, is that conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and deeper democracy and consensus building are still viewed as being the choice of last resort turned to only to stop violence, which means that people don't really value the experience of others or

think about the rank issues involved in dominance and conflict. Arnold Mindell, a conflict facilitator and theorist says:

> Democracy is a terrific idea. I think most, many of us think that (democracy meaning that people have equal rights and that the citizens have power—*demos kratos*) people have power and not just the big dudes at the top, whoever those dudes and dudettes might be. It's just, as you know, consensual reality that usually focused on. Which means folks don't think about being on top of somebody else, you know rank and all that.
>
> . . . for democracy to work it has to be more than a consensual concept. And that's easier to say than it is to do because to do what I'm saying, in other words I'm implying that democracy has to be an inner experience, almost a spiritual experience or a psychological experience, depending upon what you call that. But that would mean you are aware that one part of you is ruling at a given moment and another part of you is at its mercy, and you use your awareness to let the one that is at its mercy eventually also have some voice in yourself. In the grandest sense of making a more peaceful world, without some form of innerwork, you just can't do it. And we know it because we have more democracy than ever and we have as much war as we've ever had. (Mindell, 2005)

Works Cited

APA. (2005). Combating Terrorism: Responses From the Behavioral Sciences. Retrieved 1 Mar 2005, from http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/svignetteterror2.html#lying

Audergon, A. (2004). Collective Trauma: The Nightmare of History. Psychotherapy and Politics International, 2(1), 16-31.

Audergon, A. (2005). War Hotel: Psychological Dynamics in Violent Conflict. London: Whurr.

BBC. (2001, 29 Nov 2001). The Sykes-Picot agreement. Retrieved 2 Mar 2005, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_do cuments/1681362.stm

Berman, E., Ph.D. (2003). Israeli Psychotherapists and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Psychotherapy and Politics International,, 1(1) 1–16,, http://www.whurr.co.uk/.

Brandon, J. (2005). Koranic duels ease terror. Retrieved 10 Feb 2005, Christian Science Monitor, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0204/p01s04-wome.htm

breakingranks.net. (2004). Retrieved 22 Jan 2005, from http://www.breakingranks.net/

Congressmen Kucinich. (2003). Department of Peace HR 1673 in 108th Congress, from http://www.dopcampaign.org/read_bill.htm

Cooper, T. W. (1998). A Time Before Deception. Sante Fe, NM: Clear Light Publishers.

FirstWorldWar.com. (2000). The Skyes-Picot Agreement of 1916. Retrieved 2 Mar 2005, from http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/graphics/sykespicot.jpg

Freud, S. (1964). Construction in Analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed.), Standard Edition of the Complete

Psychological Works (Vol. XXII). London: Hogarth Press.

Freud, S., & trans. Strachey, J. (1961). Civilization and Its Discontents. NY: Norton & Co., Inc.

Fuller, R. B. (1981). Critical Path. NYC: St. Martin's Press.

Fuller, R. W. (2003). Somebodies and Nobodies: Overcoming the Abuse of Rank. Gabriola Island, BC, Canada: New Society Pub.

Galtung, J. (2002, 25 Aug 2002). Exiting from the Terrorism-State Terrorism Vicious Cycle: Some Psychological Conditions. Paper presented at the 110th Convention of the American Psychological Association: Peace Division.

Godlas, A. (2004). Private conversation. Washington, DC.

Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., & Hamilton, J. C. (1999). The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States : A Collection of Essays. DC: Regnery Publishing.

Hook, S. (1943). The Hero in History: A Study in Limitations and Possibility. New York: John Day.

Jung, C. G. (1968). Collected Works of C.G. Jung: The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (Vol. IX). London: Taylor & Francis Books Ltd.

Khouri, R. (2004). Priority: Abu Ghraib in the Arab Mirror. Retrieved 12 Jan 2005, 2005, from http://www.opendemocracy.com/debates/article-8-112-2166.jsp

King, M. L., Jr. (1986). A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr. (paperback ed. ed.). NYC: HarperCollins.

Lasswell, H. (1930). Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McDonald, A. J. (2002). Interviewed by Stanford Siver. Arlington, VA. 25 Nov 2002: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy.

Mindell, A. (1992). The Leader as Martial Artist: An Introduction to Deep Democracy (1st ed.). San Francisco: Harper San Francisco.

Mindell, A. (2005). Interviewed by Stanford Siver. Portland, OR. 18 Feb 2005.

Montville, J. V., & Davidson, W. D. (1981). Foreign Policy According to Freud. Foreign Policy, Winter 1981-82, 145-157.

Paige, G. D. (1977). The Scientific Study of Political Leadership. Detroit: Free Pr.

Plato. (1997). Plato Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Post, J. M. (2004). Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Post, J. M. (Ed.). (2003). The psychological assessment of political leaders: with profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Post, J. M., Ruby, K. G., & Shaw, E. D. (2002). The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25(2), 73-100.

Sidi, S. M. a.-J. a.-R. i. a.-S. (2004). Lecture on sufi energy healing. Portland, Oregon.

Siver, S. (2004). Inner Work of Spiritual Warriorship. The Union Institute and University, Cincinnati.

South African Press Association. (2004a, 27 Apr 2004). "As Africans we will solve our problems". Mail & Guardian, p. 1.

South African Press Association. (2004b, 27 Apr 2004). Mandela, Mugabe cheered at Union Buildings. Mail & Guardian, p. 1.

Summers, G. (1994). Conflict: Gateway to Community. Process Oriented Conflict Resolution. Union Institute, Cincinnati.

Swink, S. (2003, 7 January 2003). Kwaito: much more than music, from http://www.southafrica.info/what_happening/news/features/kwaitomental.htm

The New York Times. (2005, 27 Feb 2005). Sharon urges militant clampdown, p. 1.

The Nixon Center. (2004). Understanding Sufism and its Potential Role in US Policy. Retrieved 27 Feb 2005, from http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Sufism.pdf

Totton, N. (2000). Psychotherapy and Politics. London: Sage Publications.

Tucker, R. (1981). Politics as Leadership. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.

Ullman, H. (1996). Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance. Washington,D C: National Defense University Press http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201996/Shock%20and%20Awe%20-%20Dec%2096/index.html.

Ullman, H. (2005, 16 Feb 2005). A Rational Terrorist. Washington Times, pp. http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/hullman.htm.

US Department of Justice. (2005). Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). Retrieved 2 Mar 2005, from http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/international/global_crime.html

Vassiliou, A. (1995). Listen or Die: The Terrorist as a Role. The Union Institute, Cincinnati.

Velikovsky, I. (1982). Mankind in Amnesia. London: Sidgiwk & Jackson.

West, C. (2004). Democracy Matters: Winning the fight Against Imperialism. NY: Penguin Press.