

1014 KOŁODZIEJCZYK, Dariusz. *The Ottoman survey register of Podolia (ca.1681). Defter-i Mufassal-i Eyalet-i Kamanıçe.* Cambridge (USA): Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2004 (Studies in Ottoman Documents pertaining to Ukraine and the Black Sea Countries, 3). 2 vols. 679;362pp.

Kamanıçe

MADRID
SONRA BİRER BÜYÜK

R456 Podole pod panowaniem tureckim: Ejalet Kamieniecki 1672-1699. By Kołodziejczyk, D. Warsaw, 1994.

Bues, A. *Südost-Forschungen*, 54 (1995), p.582 (G)

Dariusz Kotodziejczyk

Kamanica

Dariusz Kotodziejczyk

Ejalet

Kamieniecki

02 ARA 2006

MADY YALIN AMIETAN
SONHA GELER DOKUMAN

Podole
pod panowaniem tureckim
Ejalet Kamieniecki
1672-1699



Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane
przez Komitet Badań Naukowych



Oficyna Wydawnicza POLCZEK
Polskiego Czerwonego Krzyża
Warszawa 1994

Podolia under the Ottoman rule. *Eyalet-i Kamanica* 1672-1699
[Summary]

The aim of this work is to present the history of Kam'janec' Podil's'kyj (Polish, *Kamieniec Podolski*, Turkish, *Kamanica*), a fortress and a city of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (present-day Ukraine), which was conquered by the Ottomans in 1672 and formed an Islamic bulwark in Eastern Europe until the Karlowitz treaty of 1699. In 1672-1699 the city was the center of a regular Ottoman province (*eyalet*) of Podolia and enabled strengthening the Ottoman control over Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, Crimean Tatars, and - last but not least - the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Polish participation in the relief of Vienna (1683) can be better understood only if studied together with the problem of Kam'janec'.

In the introduction the author addresses certain reasons of the hitherto existing stereotypes about the Ottoman Empire. Then he describes the most interesting Ottoman sources used in this monograph, and presents several problems concerning their language, script, transcription, and chronology.

The first part serves a Polish reader as a general directory of the Ottoman Empire. The author reminds the history of the formation of Ottoman provinces, their administration, bureaucracy, and garrisons. Then he reminds the long discussion about the „Ottoman feudalism” and the institution of *timar*. At the end some new tendencies in Ottoman studies are referred to. The importance of a „dynamization” of the Ottoman history is also stressed.

The second part presents a detailed chronology of events in Podolia in 1672-1699 placed in a general background of the Polish-Ottoman relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the situation in Eastern Europe after 1667, and the internal Ottoman problems, which the Köprülü viziers had to deal with. Many hitherto unpublished sources, such as both Polish and Turkish letters and diaries, spies' and prisoners' reports, travellers relations, and day-books of the Polish hetman Stanislaw Jablonowski are presented here. The Ottoman chronicles of Silahdar, Rasid, Defterdar Mehmed, Abdi, and Haci Ali are collated with Polish and other Christian reports.

According to the author, neither economic, nor demographic, nor political reasons should account for the war of 1672. Contrary to common views, Podolia was not a rich province, at least not during the second half of the seventeenth century. Since the fifteenth century the Polish economy had been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe. Cheap transport was possible only because of great rivers that flowed north. Meanwhile, all the rivers in Podolia flowed in the „wrong” direction - towards the Black Sea. Italian projects for exporting Ukrainian products through the Black Sea had already failed in the sixteenth century. Traditionally, only the Ottomans were accused of blocking these attempts, but it was the Polish Senate that decided not to open the Dniester trade because of the fear that this would show the Turkish galleys the

way to Poland; it was more prudent to leave the Ukrainian borderland undeveloped rather than to tempt the Ottomans. These fears are better understood if we remember that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with a population three times smaller, had a state budget about thirty times smaller than that of the Ottoman Empire.

The same reasons that led to the underdevelopment of Podolia under Poland-Lithuania could have enabled its development as a base within the Ottoman Black Sea system for provisioning Constantinople. To achieve this, however, intensive colonisation and settlement were necessary. Yet, from the end of the sixteenth century, the demographic pressure within the Ottoman Empire itself declined sharply. It was unlikely that the Ottomans, having failed to colonize the Hungarian plain and the shores of the Black Sea in Bucak and Yedisan, would succeed in colonizing even more remote Podolia.

Political factors should have also prevented the Ottomans from attacking Poland in 1672. This attack seemingly contradicted the traditional Ottoman northern policy in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The main concern of this policy was to preserve equilibrium between the main rivals, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. In 1667, after the cataclysms of *Xmel'nye'kyj's* uprising and the wars against Sweden, Russia and Transylvania, the Commonwealth was forced to cede Smolensk and a great part of Eastern Ukraine, including Kiev, to Russia. Polish historians consider this date a turning point in the relations between the two states. Given these circumstances, an Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth could only strengthen Russia.

This war was, in addition, very unpopular among the Ottoman soldiers. Poland was considered a remote and cold country; it did not offer great spoils and could not even feed the invading army. The road through the Balkans and Moldavia was long and exhausting. Poor systems of communication excluded any greater Ottoman territorial gain in Eastern Europe. Paul Kennedy's term of „strategical overextension” is applicable not only to the Hungarian and Persian limitations on Ottoman growth, but also to the Polish-Ukrainian limitations. It was not accidental that almost all the Ottoman-Polish truces were signed at the end of October. The Turks preferred to be home by *ruz-i Kasım* (5 November), the day when peasants paid the second installment of the *timar* and other taxes. If one considers that one month was necessary for assembling troops, at least one month was needed to reach the Polish border, and at least one month more to return home, the time available for effective campaigning was very limited.

The real reason why the great Ottoman statesmen, Ahmed Köprülü, decided to attack Poland, seems to be the Cossack question. From the „classical” point of view, the Cossack raids on the Black Sea were considered a just revenge made by a desperate Ukrainian population in reaction to the Tatar raids. These „revenge” however, were usually directed not against the Tatars but against the rich Turkish towns and villages on the Black Sea. Whereas the Tatars primarily sacked Ukrainian towns and villages that were of lesser economic importance

Fot. Alamy Photo

Podole
pod panowaniem tureckim
Ejalet Kamieniecki
1672-1699



Wydanie publikacji dofinansowane
przez Komitet Badań Naukowych



Oficina Wydawnicza POLCZEK
Polskiego Czerwonego Krzyża
Warszawa 1994

111
11 33

Podolia under the Ottoman rule. *Eyalet-i Kamanice* 1672-1699
[Summary]

The aim of this work is to present the history of Kam"janec' Podil's'kyj (Polish, *Kamieniec Podolski*, Turkish, *Kamanice*), a fortress and a city of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (present-day Ukraine), which was conquered by the Ottomans in 1672 and formed an Islamic bulwark in Eastern Europe until the Karlowitz treaty of 1699. In 1672-1699 the city was the center of a regular Ottoman province (*eyalet*) of Podolia and enabled strengthening the Ottoman control over Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, Crimean Tatars, and - last but not least - the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Polish participation in the relief of Vienna (1683) can be better understood only if studied together with the problem of Kam"janec'.

In the introduction the author addresses certain reasons of the hitherto existing stereotypes about the Ottoman Empire. Then he describes the most interesting Ottoman sources used in this monograph, and presents several problems concerning their language, script, transcription, and chronology.

The first part serves a Polish reader as a general directory of the Ottoman Empire. The author reminds the history of the formation of Ottoman provinces, their administration, bureaucracy, and garrisons. Then he reminds the long discussion about the „Ottoman feudalism” and the institution of *timar*. At the end some new tendencies in Ottoman studies are referred to. The importance of a „dynamization” of the Ottoman history is also stressed.

The second part presents a detailed chronology of events in Podolia in 1672-1699 placed in a general background of the Polish-Ottoman relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the situation in Eastern Europe after 1667, and the internal Ottoman problems, which the Köprülü viziers had to deal with. Many hitherto unpublished sources, such as both Polish and Turkish letters and diaries, spies' and prisoners' reports, travellers relations, and day-books of the Polish hetman Stanisław Jabłonowski are presented here. The Ottoman chronicles of Silahdar, Raşid, Defterdar Mehmed, Abdi, and Hacı Ali are collated with Polish and other Christian reports.

According to the author, neither economic, nor demographic, nor political reasons should account for the war of 1672. Contrary to common views, Podolia was not a rich province, at least not during the second half of the seventeenth century. Since the fifteenth century the Polish economy had been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe. Cheap transport was possible only because of great rivers that flowed north. Meanwhile, all the rivers in Podolia flowed in the „wrong” direction - towards the Black Sea. Italian projects for exporting Ukrainian products through the Black Sea had already failed in the sixteenth century. Traditionally, only the Ottomans were accused of blocking these attempts, but it was the Polish Senate that decided not to open the Dniester trade because of the fear that this would show the Turkish galleys the

way to Poland; it was more prudent to leave the Ukrainian borderland undeveloped rather than to tempt the Ottomans. These fears are better understood if we remember that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with a population three times smaller, had a state budget about thirty times smaller than that of the Ottoman Empire.

The same reasons that led to the underdevelopment of Podolia under Poland-Lithuania could have enabled its development as a base within the Ottoman Black Sea system for provisioning Constantinople. To achieve this, however, intensive colonisation and settlement were necessary. Yet, from the end of the sixteenth century, the demographic pressure within the Ottoman Empire itself declined sharply. It was unlikely that the Ottomans, having failed to colonize the Hungarian plain and the shores of the Black Sea in Bucak and Yedisan, would succeed in colonizing even more remote Podolia.

Political factors should have also prevented the Ottomans from attacking Poland in 1672. This attack seemingly contradicted the traditional Ottoman northern policy in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The main concern of this policy was to preserve equilibrium between the main rivals, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. In 1667, after the cataclysms of Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising and the wars against Sweden, Russia and Transylvania, the Commonwealth was forced to cede Smolensk and a great part of Eastern Ukraine, including Kiev, to Russia. Polish historians consider this date a turning point in the relations between the two states. Given these circumstances, an Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth could only strengthen Russia.

This war was, in addition, very unpopular among the Ottoman soldiers. Poland was considered a remote and cold country; it did not offer great spoils and could not even feed the invading army. The road through the Balkans and Moldavia was long and exhausting. Poor systems of communication excluded any greater Ottoman territorial gain in Eastern Europe. Paul Kennedy's term of „strategical overextension” is applicable not only to the Hungarian and Persian limitations on Ottoman growth, but also to the Polish-Ukrainian limitations. It was not accidental that almost all the Ottoman-Polish truces were signed at the end of October. The Turks preferred to be home by *ruz-i Kasım* (5 November), the day when peasants paid the second installment of the *timar* and other taxes. If one considers that one month was necessary for assembling troops, at least one month was needed to reach the Polish border, and at least one month more to return home, the time available for effective campaigning was very limited.

The real reason why the great Ottoman statesmen, Ahmed Köprülü, decided to attack Poland, seems to be the Cossack question. From the „classical” point of view, the Cossack raids on the Black Sea were considered a just revenge made by a desperate Ukrainian population in reaction to the Tatar raids. These „revengees” however, were usually directed not against the Tatars but against the rich Turkish towns and villages on the Black Sea. Whereas the Tatars primarily sacked Ukrainian towns and villages that were of lesser economic importance

gyrics to various patrons elsewhere. Nevertheless, he travelled to Kh̄ārazm, and visited Rayy, Nishāpūr and Ṭabaristān, a journey which, he himself says, took no less than three years. The resentment of local patrons, the death of a son by drowning and the loss of a brother, physical sufferings, especially dry scab (*djarab*), ophthalmia, and tooth-ache, are the other autobiographical details which he mentions in his *diwān*. Kamāl devoted a large part of his work to the praise of the leaders of two patrician families of Iṣfahān, the Shāfi'ī Āl-i Khudjiand and the Ḥanafī Āl-i Šāfid. Among other patrons to whom he dedicated panegyrics are: 'Alā al-Dīn Tekish (568/1172-596/1199) and Sultan Djalāl al-Dīn [q.v.] (617/1280-628/1230) of the Kh̄ārazmshāhs [q.v.], Atābak Sa'd b. Zangī (ca. 594/1198-623/1226) and his son. Abū Bakr (623/1226-658/1260) of the Salghurids, and Ḥusām al-Dawla Ardashīr (d. 602/1205) and his son Sharaf al-Mulūk Ḥasan (d. 602/1205) of the Ispahbads of Ṭabaristān. He also wrote mystical odes in honour of the well-known Shihāb al-Dīn 'Umar-i Suhrawardī [q.v.] (d. 632/1234), to whom he is said to have paid homage as a devotee (*murīd*). He apparently did not meet the *shaykh*, but certainly received letters from him since a unique copy of at least one letter has survived (see MDAT, 14). Dawlat Shāh tells us that toward the end of his days, Kamāl adopted an ascetic life and retired to a hermitage situated outside Iṣfahān, where he was tortured and killed by the Mongols. According to Dawlat Shāh, this happened in 635/1237-8. Other sources give 628/1230-1 and 639/1241-2, both improbable.

As a panegyrist Kamāl is admired and imitated by no less a poet than Ḥāfiz. His poetry is polished and rich in original ideas. The honorific title *Khallāk al-Ma'ānī* (Creator of Subtle Ideas), by which he is mentioned in some *tadhkiras*, does not occur earlier than Djāmī and Dawlat Shāh; it refers to the fertility of his imagination and his fine poetic figures, for which even the uncompromising Shams-i Kayyā praised him (*al-Mu'djam*, ed. Tehran Univ., 360). He also wrote *ghazals*, quatrains, satires and obscene verses, in all of which the social conditions of his troubled time are mirrored. A short satirical *mathnawī*, a Persian letter addressed to an unknown friend, and an Arabic pamphlet dealing with the bow (*Risālat al-Kaws*), are among his other works.

Bibliography: For recent works published in Persia, including the literature of the *tadhkiras*, see: A. Khayyām-Pūr, *Farhang-i Sukhanvarān-i Iran*, Ṭabriz 1340 S., 487-8; Kamāl al-Dīn Ismā'il's *Kulliyāt* has been lithographed in Bombay 1307. A new edition of the *Diwān-i Khallāk al-Ma'ānī Abū'l-Faql Kamāl al-Dīn Ismā'il Iṣfahānī* has recently been published by H. Baḥr al-'Ulūmī, Tehran 1349 S. See also: *The hundred love songs of Kamāl Ad-Din of Iṣfahan*, tr. by L. Gray and rendered in English verse by Ethel W. Mumford, London 1930. The whole text of the *Risālat al-Kaws* is given in the *Maḥāli' al-Budūr* of 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. 'Abd Allāh al-Bahā'ī, 1299, ii, 167-72; H. Ritter, in *Philologica*, vii, no. 20, in *Isl.*, xxi, ascribes to him a *mathnawī* on mystical love which is not to be found in the published *diwāns*. Further references are in: C. Rieu, *Cat. of Pers. Ms. in the B.M.*, ii, 850-51; H. Ethé, *Neupersische Litteratur*, in *Gr.I.Ph.*, ii, 269; Browne, ii, 540-42; A. J. Arberry, *Classical Persian Literature*, 1958, 244-8; J. Rypka, *History of Iranian Literature*, Dordrecht 1968, 214; idem in the *Cambridge History of Iran*, v, 585-6.

(A. H. ZARRINKOOB)

KAMĀL AL-DĪN SHĪR 'ALĪ [see BANNĀ'Ī].

KAMĀL KHUDJANDĪ (KAMĀL AL-DĪN MAS'ŪD), Persian lyric poet and mystic, was born in Khudjiand (Transoxania), later settled in Tabriz, where he lived the rest of his life and, according to Kh̄āndamīr, died in 803/1400-1. Kamāl Khudjiandī's modest *diwān* contains short, exquisite *ghazals* of five to seven verses with love, *Lebenslust* and frustration as central themes, and permeated with a deep pantheistic mysticism reminiscent of the school of Ibn al-'Arabī and Djalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. True to the tradition of the great Persian mystics, he never condescended to write panegyrics on potentates, and was often critical of the 'ulamā' (even in his capacity as *Shaykh al-Islām*) and the temporal authorities. Ḥāfiz held Khudjiandī in high esteem and exchanged poems with him. Revered and much visited by the people, the shrine of *Shaykh* Kamāl was long regarded as a sanctuary.

Bibliography: *Diwān*, ed. Dawlatābādī Dawlat-Shāh, *Tadhkira al-Shu'arā'*, 325; Kh̄āndamīr, *Ḥabīb al-Siyar*, iii, 90; Riḍā Kūh Khān, *Madima' al-fuṣṣahā'*, ii, 29; H. Ethé, *Gr. I Ph.*, ii, 304; Südi, *Sharh-i Ḥāfiz*, Bülāk, ed. 3, 84; Browne, iii, 320-30; J. Rypka, *History of Iranian Literature*, Dordrecht 1968, 262-3; I. S. Braginskij, *Zam Studium des Schaffens Kamol Hudschandis*, in *Akten des XXIV. int. Or.-Kongr.*, (München, 1957) Wiesbaden 1959, 499-505; idem, *Očerki iz istorii turksskoy literaturi*, in *O tvorčestve Kamola Khodžandi*, 239-61; A. Pagliaro-A. Bausani, *Storia d. letteratura Persiana*, 464, 469. (M. SHAKI)

KAMĀL PASHA ZĀDE [see KEMĀL PASHA ZĀDE].

KAMĀNĪÇA [see MALĀHĪ].

KAMĀNĪÇA (KAMIENIEC, KAMENETZ PODOLSKI), a fortress town of the Ukraine, situated in the region known as Podolia. Kamānīça rose to prominence as a stronghold guarding the southern border of Lithuania and (after 1432) of Poland against the incursions of the Tatars. It was important, too, as a station on the commercial route extending from the Black Sea and Moldavia to Poland and the Baltic. The fortress occupied a position of great strength on a high spur of rock, a little above the confluence of the River Smotric with the River Dnestr (cf. Dupont, 29, who describes it as "le boulevard de la chrétienté dans cette partie de l'Europe"). Ottoman forces appeared before Kamānīça in 1042/1633 (*Fedhlike*, ii, 160). Not until the Polish-Ottoman conflict of 1083-7/1672-6, however, did the town become subject to the Turks, falling to the Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprülü in the first year of the war (1083/1672). Kamānīça was not destined to remain for long under Ottoman rule, being returned to Poland in 1107/1699 at the Peace of Karlowitz which brought to an end the War of the Sacra Liga (1684-99). The town passed into the hands of Russia at the time of the Second Partition of Poland in 1793. In 1918, at the end of World War I, it reverted to Poland once more, but since 1945 it has been included in the U.S.S.R.

Bibliography: Ḥājidjī Khānfa, *Fedhlike*, Istanbul 1286-7, ii, 160; Rāshid, *Ta'rikh*, Istanbul 1282, i, 266 ff.; Silāhdār, *Ta'rikh*, Istanbul 1282, i, 586 ff.; Yūsuf Nābī, *Ta'rikh-i Kamānīça*, Istanbul 1281; Ewliyā Çelebi, *Seyāhat-nāme*, v, Istanbul 1315, 128 ff.; *Acta Ioannis Sobieski*, ed. Fr. Kluczycki, ii/1, Cracow 1881, 1060 ff.; S. Makowiecki, *Relacya o upadku Kamienica r. 1672*, in *Przegląd Powszechny*, ix (Cracow 1886); G. Górski, *Wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Turcją w latach 1672 i 1673*, Warsaw 1890; J. Pajewski, *Buńczuk i Koncert. Z*

T.C.
ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TARİH ANABİLİM DALI (YENİÇAĞ TARİHİ)

173850

KAMANİÇE SEFERİNİN
LOJİSTİK HAZIRLIKLARI

DOKTORA TEZİ

MADDE YAYINLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

23 TEM 2008

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Yaşar YÜCEL

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Dem. No:	173850
Tas. No:	956.073 TÜR.K

Jüri Üyeleri

Adı Soyadı

Prof. Dr. Mahmut ŞAKİROĞLU

Prof. Dr. Özer ERGENÇ

Prof. Dr. Mehdi İLHAN

Yard. Doç. Dr. A. Latif ARMAĞAN

İmza

.....
.....
.....
.....

Teslim Tarihi:.....

Bu suretle, Sultan Ahmed ilk defa olarak kardeşi Mustafa'yı hayatta bırakmış ve saltanat babadan oğula değil, ekberiyet kaidesine yâni hânedânın en yaşlısına âit bir hak olarak kabul edilmişti. Buna göre, artık şehzâdeler eyâletlere gönderilmeyip, Saray'da ayrı bir dâirede ikamet etmeleri, sakal bırakmamaları, evlâd sâhibi olmamaları⁹¹ kaidesi ortaya konulmuştur. Bu usule göre, şehzâdelerin çocukları doğduktan sonra değil, doğmadan önce ölüme mahkûm oluyorlardı. Netekim Saray'da şehzâdelerden hamile kalan kadınlar, o vakitlerde, iptidai ve geni' usûllerle çocuklarını düşürüyor ve ekseriya o bî-çareler de bu yüzden hayatlarını kaybediyorlardı⁹².

Sultan Mustafa'nın iclâsını biraderzâdelerinin küçük olmaları ile açıklayan Osmanlı rivâyetine karşı, bazı batı kaynaklarında iki nokta-i nazara rastlanmaktadır :

1. Sultan Mustafa'nın tahta çıkarılması, Sultan Ahmed'in vasiyetinden dolaydır.

2. Bu, I. Ahmed'in karısı Mahpeyker Kösem Sultan'ın işidir. Çünkü, Veliahd Osman, Kösem'in ortağı olan Mahfiruz Sultan'ın oğludur. Şehzâde Murad ve İbrahim, Kösem sultanın çocuklarıdır. Bu takdirde Osman padişah olursa, küçük kardeşini öldürmesi muhtemeldir. Bunun için her şeyden önce I. Ahmed'in çocuklarından hiçbirini iclâs ettirmeyip kardeşi Mustafa'yı tahta çıkarmak lâzımdı. Bu hâle göre, I. Mustafa saltanatını ve hayatını yengesine borçludur. Fakat ne çâre ki Mustafa'nın akli dengesi bozuk olduğundan, üç aydan birkaç gün fazla süren saltanatına son verilmiş ve yerine II. Osman tahta geçirilmişti (1027-1031 = 1618-1622).

II. Osman'ın altı kardeşi vardı. Bir müddet bunların hayatına dokunmadı. Fakat Lehistan seferine giderken, bu kardeşlerin en büyüğü olan ve başka bir vâlideden doğan şehzâde Mehmed hakkında, saltanat kanununu uygulamak istedi. Fakat devrin Şeyhülislâmı Es'ad Efendi, bu husûsda hiçbir fetvâ vermedi. Bu hâle göre, kardeş katlini ulemânın dahi desteklemediği anlaşılmaktadır⁹³.

91 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayic el-Vukuat*, İstanbul 1327, c. 2, s. 35.

92 Mehmed Zeki Pâkalın, *Maktul Şehzâdeler*, s. 303.

93 Hammer, İstanbul 1333, c. VIII, s. 198; Ahmed Mumcu, *aynı eser*, Ankara 1963, s. 199.

Tarih Dergisi, c. 32, 1979 İstanbul, s. 281-300

Dergi / Kitap
Kütüphanede Mevcuttur

KAMANİÇE MUHAFIZLARININ ÇEKTIĞI

Orhan Şaik Gökyay

Yenme olsun, yenilme olsun, tarihler, savaşların ayrıntıları üzerinde pek durmazlar. Bu savaşları yönetmiş olan kumandanların anılarında da, bunlar bir kumanda tepesinden görüldüğü biçimde, bir bakıma kuşbakışı bir görüşle değerlendirilmektedir. Er, onbaşı, çavuş gibi ateşin doğrudan içinde olanların anılarından yoksunuzdur. Oysa bunlar, bir savaşın ondan sonraki kuşaklara anlatılacak asıl hikâyeleridir. Bunlar, kahramanlıkları, olağan-üstü olayları, sıkıntıları, savaşı yapanların maneviyatını tanımak yönünden değer biçilmez bir kaynaktır. Yazık ki bunlar sözde kalmakta, yazıya geçmemektedir. Bu yüzden de, yaratıcısı bütün bir millet olan bu destanlar, sonra sonra birer ad olup çıkmaktadır; unutulup gitmektedir.

Aşağıda metnini verdiğimiz *'Hasbihâl-i Asâkir-i pürmelâl der Taraf-ı Kal'a-i Kamanîçe'*ye bu düşünce ile bir yer veriyoruz. Orada anlatılanın daha iyi anlaşılması için de, Kamanîçe Kalesini, onun nasıl alındığını, alındıktan sonra daha bir yıl geçmeden onun çevresinde yeni bir meydan savaşının sonundaki bozgunu, kendi kaynaklarımıza dayanarak vermek istiyoruz.

I.

KAMANİÇE KALESİ

Kamanîçe, XVII. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun bir parçası olan Podolya eyaletine bağlı, yukarı Turla (Dinyester) Suyu kuzeyinde bir Lehistan şehri ve kalesidir. Aynı biçim-

That ambassador was Sir Giacomo Soranzo, one of the authors of the letter discussed here. As to his companion, Giovanni Correr, he was elected as bailiff on February 6, 1575⁸. His mission was an extremely delicate and difficult one, his main task being to achieve the keeping of the clauses in the treaty signed two years earlier. The two diplomats probably left for their destination in early summer and were in Doupnitsa on the 7th of July. At least on the second leg of their journey the envoys of the maritime republic quite explicitly preferred to travel by land. One should not forget that, after the Battle of Lepanto, the Adriatic was simply teeming with pirates, with Turkish corsairs roaming the south and using the Albanian ports as their hideouts and the north rife with Uskoks — Christian refugees from Dalmatia and Bosnia who continued the resistance against the Turks after the Holy League signed the peace treaty with the Porte. I would like to recall here that, for example, at the end of the 16th century the entire population of Senia made their living by piracy, and that with the blessing of the local Dominican and Franciscan friars. As I have already mentioned, the letter discussed in this article provides indirect information about the land routes on the Balkans, although it rather confirms what we already know about the roads most frequented by merchant caravans and West European envoy missions on their way to Constantinople. M. Soranzo and M. Correr obviously entered Bulgarian territory by the Skopje or Kossovo road which branched from the so-called Toplicki route (Trebine-Foca-Novi Pazar-Niš where it joined the main route from Central Europe to Constantinople through Sofia, Plovdiv and Adrianople). The Skopje road branched at Novi Pazar and reached Sofia through the Rogozina Mountain, Pristina, Skopje, Kumanovo, Kyustendil and Doupnitsa; or joined the road to Constantinople through Samokov, Kosteneč and Momin Prohod pass. Our travellers arrived in Constantinople on the 22nd of July (according to the first report they dispatched from the chancellery of the bailiff, one that has also been preserved in the Venetian Archives), i.e. the trip from Doupnitsa to Constantinople lasted 15 days. As one can see from the note on the back, their letter took just as long to arrive in Venice — it was received on the 22nd of July.

Nor is there anything new about the report of the poverty in Bulgarian territories that other travellers of the time have mentioned also. Thus, only three years later, Stephen Gerlach tried to find an explanation of that fact by the assumption that the peasants did not produce more than was necessary for their own needs because they were afraid their harvests would be confiscated. I must say that I consider much more solid the arguments of Augene Guislain Bouzbeque⁹ who thought that it was mostly the lands near the major roads that were arid and poor for they were subjected to constant raids.

This is what a first reading can glean from the letter in question, although I think that it is more important to the hints it provides about the other documents connected with that trip that could be studied. There is no doubt that the whole archival series of the *Dispacci Constantinopoli* („Dispatches from Constantinople“) in the Senate fund of the Venetian Archives is well worth a more comprehensive study. The other documents connected with the journey of Giacomo Soranzo and Giovanni Correr to the court of Sultan Murad III are equally interesting, particularly the materials from the Correr Museum in Venice filed under the press-mark of *Turchia-b.3.7*¹⁰. These materials should probably be the object of a future study as a potential source of information about the Balkans in the last quarter of the 16th century.

⁸ The minutes have also been preserved there — Segretario alle voci, reg. 5, c.196v.

⁹ Цветкова, Б. Френски пътешественици за Балканите. София, 1975, 15-18.

¹⁰ Part of these documents have been published by Fracasso, L. Diario del viaggio da Venezia a Constantinopoli fatto da m. Jacopo Soranzo ambasciatore straordinario al sultano Murad III in compagnia di m. Giovanni Correr bailo. Venezia, 1856. (Quoted after Migliardi O'Riordan, G. Op. cit., p. 118).

Comptes rendus

THE EUROPEAN SOUTHEAST TOWARDS THE END OF A CRUCIAL CENTURY AS SEEN BY POLISH OTTOMANISTS (Kolodziejczyk, D. Podole pod panowaniem tureckim. Ejalet Kamieniecki — 1672 — 1699. Warszawa, Polceck, 1994. 265 p.)

Following a successful military campaign in the autumn of 1672 the Ottomans forced the Polish-Lithuanian king to sign the Peace Treaty of Buczacz. According to the provisions of the treaty the entire Podolya, together with the fortress of Kamniec, passed into Turkish hands. Being engaged in the continuing contention between the king and the gentry represented by the Great Hetman Jan Sobieski, Rzeczpospolita was caught absolutely unprepared for the war and suffered one of its greatest territorial losses. A sequence of similar losses from the second half of the seventeenth century through to the end of the eighteenth century mark the gradual decline of United Polish — Lithuanian state. After 1672 Kamniec (today Kamniec Podolski, Ukraine) became the westernmost bastion of the Ottomans in Europe and a centre of a new administrative territorial unit — *eyalet*. At the border of two ages in Ottoman history — of a continuous territorial growth, followed by a gradual exhaustion of inner resources for expansion, the *eyalet* of Kamniec turned into a junction of extremely important from a strategic, economic and demographic point of view processes.

The news of the fall of Podolya in the hands of the Ottomans caused serious anxiety among the neighbouring Christian states. The need for a well-documented study of this period is undoubtedly determined both by the intricacies of the diplomatic complex which is to be analysed, and by the fact that political events in the region were of direct concern for the important centres of European politics. Moscow began an intensive preparation for defence of the Ukrainian lands to the east of Dnieper. The conquest of Podolya and Kamniec and the change in the correlation of powers in Southeastern Europe affected the bilateral Russo — Polish relations for decades to come as well as the entire complex of diplomatic and military actions of the Christian powers towards the end of the century. The events were followed with a heightened attention not only in the *Posolski Prikaz* in Moscow, but also by the Cossacks of hetman Petar Doroszenko, and the boyars in neighbouring Moldavia. The problem of the

control over the Danubian area, particularly important for the trading traffic, had never stopped drawing the attention of the Habsburgs as well.

The decades in question are better known in historiographic tradition as the years of the consecutive unsuccessful siege of Vienna, the formation of a powerful anti-Ottoman coalition and the disastrous for the Ottomans Peace Treaty of Karlowitz, and against the backdrop of all these the deeds of the famous Pole Jan Sobieski stand out. The monograph of the young Polish Ottomanist Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, *Podolya under the Ottoman Rule. The Eyalet of Kamniec — 1672 — 1699*, provides the specialists with a different angle in the analysis of this period, and with a text full of interesting details and ideas at that.

D. Kolodziejczyk brings to our attention the result of an interesting and well-documented research. In the *Introduction* he stresses the fact that it is difficult to understand the origin and the character of early European capitalism without a good knowledge of the role of Western economic expansion into the Levant, the trading contacts between Europe and the East. The focus of his attention in this respect is, no doubt, an important scholarly purpose — Podolya is a centre of trading routes and a field where political ambitions of neighbouring European powers were manifested. However, the author is driven not only by the aim to illuminate local history. His interests are turned towards the Ottoman Empire at the end of the seventeenth century, which in itself enriches the author's accents and saturates the study with more or less new elements of the complex picture of historical processes during that period.

The monograph is based upon archival sources from the Başbakanlık Arşivi in Istanbul (*a muvasal defter* of 1681/1682), from the Polish Archive of Ancient Acts at the Library of Adam Czartoriski, Ottoman narrative sources and other. The author has also drawn materials from the manuscript collection of the Library of Suleymaniye, as well as published sources by other authors. The monograph is richly illustrated.

Anadolu'da Tarihi Yollar ve Şehirler Semineri (21 Mayıs 2001)

Bildirileri, İstanbul 2002, s. 133-154. İSAM 91513

KAMANİÇE SEFERİ VE SEFER GÜZERGÂHI

Mehmet İNBAŞI*

Bu çalışmada, Sultan IV. Mehmet (1648-1687) zamanında Lehistan'a yapılan ve Kamanîçe Seferi olarak da isimlendirilen seferde, ordunun geçmiş olduğu menziller, oturma yerleri ve sefer yolu hakkında bilgi verilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Kaynaklar

Kamanîçe seferi ile ilgili olarak hem arşiv belgelerinde hem de kaynaklarda önemli bilgiler vardır. Başbakanlık Arşivi'nde Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler ile Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi'nde Kamanîçe Seferi ile ilgili menzil ve masraf defterleri bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca Hacı Ali Efendi'nin Tarih-i Kamanîçe, Yusuf Nâbi'nin Fetihnâme-i Kamanîçe, Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa'nın Vekâyinâme, Silahtar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa'nın Silahtar Tarihi, Mehmed Raşid Efendi'nin Tarih-i Râşid, Defterdâr Mehmed Paşa'nın Zübde-i Vekâyiât, İsâ-zâde Tarihi vb. gibi devrin olaylarını anlatan pek çok kaynak bulunmaktadır. Bunlar içerisinde hiç şüphesiz en önemli olanları tamamen Kamanîçe Seferi ile ilgili olan, Hacı Ali ile Yusuf Nâbi'nin eserleridir. Özellikle Hacı Ali Efendi'nin eserinde, sefer çok detaylı olarak ele alınmış ve gün gün varılan menziller kaydedilmiştir. Yusuf Nâbi'nin Farsça terkiplerin ağırlıklı olduğu eserinde ise, yine çok önemli bilgiler bulunmaktadır. Vekâyinâme, Silahtar Tarihi ve Raşid Tarihi'nde de yine olaylar günlük olarak verilmiştir.

* Yrd. Doç. Dr., Atatürk Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü

YEDİTEPE YAYINLARI

Yeditepe Yayınevi: 10
İnceleme Araştırma Dizisi: 06

Dizgi-Mizampaj
Hülya Aşkın

Kapak
Medine Efe

Baskı
Şenyıldız Matbaası

ISBN 975-6480-10-6

İşleme Adresi:
Yeditepe Yayınevi
Çatalçeşme Sokak
Defne Han No: 27/12
31140 Cağaloğlu İstanbul

Tel: (0212) 528 47 53
Faks: (0212) 512 33 78

İstanbul 2004

Ukrayna'da Osmanlılar

Kamanıçe Seferi ve Organizasyonu (1672)

MEHMET İNBAŞI

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphane	
Dem. No:	96831
Tas. No:	976.093 1/10/04

İstanbul 2004

13 0 TEMMUZ 2004

A 12

Harvard Ukrainian Studies,

vol: XVI / number 1/2, June 1992

s. 87-101

MALD. ...
SONRA HELEN DOKÜMAN

28 HAZ 2006

110266 - Kamanice

Ottoman Podillja: The *Eyalet* of Kam''janec', 1672-1699

DARIUSZ KOŁODZIEJCZYK

Dariusz Kowoczejeik

In October 1672 the Ottoman *dragoman* Panaioti congratulated the French ambassador in Istanbul on the fortunate conjunction that provided two great monarchs—Mehmed IV and Louis XIV—with their respective successes in Poland and the Netherlands.¹ Thanks to Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel, *Pan Wołodyjowski*, the history of the loss of Kam''janec'-Podil's'kyi (Turkish, Kamanice; Polish, Kamieniec Podolski) to the Ottomans has become part of Poland's popular history. Unfortunately, the later period has been completely neglected and the stereotypes about the "barbarian night" survive even today. And, in spite of Halil Inalcik's assertions that the Black Sea and Cossack question is basic to the understanding of seventeenth-century Ottoman history,² very little has been done from the Turkish side to clear up this chapter of Ahmed Köprülü's³ foreign policy.

To begin with, we should consider the economic, demographic, and political factors that might have had some bearing on the Ottoman decision to attack the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth:

Economy: Contrary to common views, Podillja was not a rich province, at least not during the second half of the seventeenth century. All the rivers in Podillja flowed in the "wrong" direction—toward the Black Sea. Since the fifteenth century the economy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe. Michael Postan has estimated that the land transport costs between the Midlands and London may have been higher than the water transport costs between Warsaw and London.⁴ This cheap transport was possible only because of the great Polish rivers that flowed north. The Italian projects for exporting Ukrainian products through the Black Sea had already failed in

¹ A. Galland, *Journal... pendant son séjour à Constantinople (1672-1673)*, ed. Ch. Schefer, vol. 1 (Paris, 1881), p. 225.

² See H. Inalcik, "The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire," in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 1A (Cambridge, 1970), p. 350.

³ The household of Köprülü had remained in power since 1656. Its founder, Mehmed Köprülü, was succeeded in the post of grand vizier by his son, Fazıl Ahmed (1661-1676), and then by his protégé and son-in-law, Kara Mustafa (1676-1683).

⁴ M. Postan, "The Trade of Medieval Europe: The North," in *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, vol. 2, *Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1987), p. 196.

Kamanice
- Savaş

XVII. YÜZYIL SEFER ORGANİZASYONUNDA SAĞLIK HİZMETLERİNİN SUNUMUNA İLİŞKİN BİR ARAŞTIRMA (1672 Tarihli Kamanice Seferi Örneği)

*Mustafa Nuri Türkmen**

Bu konu 1672 tarihli Kamanice Seferi göz önüne alınarak hazırlanmıştır. Bildiriyi sunmakta ki amacımız, Osmanlı ordusunda sefer esnasında sağlık hizmetlerinin ne şekilde sunulduğu, sağlık kadrolarının hangi sınıflardan oluştuğu ve bunların hangi yollarla finanse edildiği gibi sorulara cevap bulmaya çalışmaktır. Bu sorulara cevap olmak üzere elimizdeki Kamanice Seferi muhasebe defterlerindeki tayinat listeleri verilerinden hareketle bazı neticelere ulaşmaya çalıştık. Özellikle veri tabanımızı Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler serisinin 1970 numaralı mufassal muhasebe defterinin kayıtları oluşturmuştur.

Osmanlı Ordusu sefere çıktığında bünyesinde sadece askeri birimleri veya askeri idareciler kadrosunu barındırmazdı. Aynı zamanda devlet yönetimini yürüten asker veya sivil karakterli bütün devlet memurları da orduyla beraber hareket ederdi. Merkezde onların boşalttıkları makamlara vekilleri atanırdı. Dolayısıyla sefer hali bir nevi devlet teşkilatının araziye çıkmış şeklidir. Böyle olunca normal zamanda, sağlık hizmetleri kimin sorumluluk ve denetimi altında ise seferde de onun denetimi altında olacağı açıktır.

Belgelerde genellikle "Ser Etibbâ-i Hâssa" ismiyle anılan Hekimbaşı; ilmîye sınıfına mensup olup, sarayın bîrun ricalinden sayılırdı¹. Özellikle padişahın hasta olmamasına dikkat ederek bir anlamda koruyucu hekimlik görevini yürütür, yemeklerde dahi yanından ayrılmaz, her nereye gitse yanında bulunurdu. Aynı zamanda padişaha sağlık konularında danışmanlık yapar, ilaçların dışında onlara kuvvet verici, iştah açıcı çeşitli şuruplar hazırlardı².

Ulufelerini aylık olarak almanın yanında kendilerine Tekfurdağı arpalığı verilirdi. Zaman zaman ilâve olarak Aydın ve Gelibolu arpalıkları da eklenirdi. Sefere katıldığında ise menzil tayinatı alırdı³.

Hekimbaşı ülkedeki tüm hekimlerin, Ser Cerrâha bağlı cerrâhların ve Ser Kehhâle bağlı kehhâllerin (göz doktoru) sorumluluğunu taşımaktaydı. Dolayısıyla ordudaki sağlık hizmetlerinin baş sorumlusu adından da anlaşılacağı gibi Hekimbaşıydı. Ordu tabiplerinin belirlenmesi⁴, askeri teşkilat için gerekli hammadde alımı, ilaç yapımı ve gerekli yerlere dağıtımının en yetkili kişisiydi⁵.

Konumuz olan 1672 tarihli Kamanice Seferinde Hekimbaşının Hayatîzâde Mustafa Fevzi Efendi⁶ olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu sefere dair düzenlenmiş defterlerde Ser Etibbâ-i Hâssa olarak Mustafa Efendi'nin adı geçmektedir⁷. Kendisine 26 kişilik yardımcı grup eşlik etmektedir. Yine aynı kayıtlardan hizmetlileriyle birlikte ekmek, hayvanları için ise arpa tayinatı verildiği anlaşılmaktadır⁸. Kapukulu'nun yani Yeniçeri, Cebeci, Topçu; Toparabacı, Humbaracı ve Altı Bölük halkı denilen ocakların her sınıfının kendi hekimleri ve onların da başında bir baş hekim vardı⁹. Bu tabipler defterlerde "Etibba-i hassa gayr-ı ez Ser etibbâ", yani Hekimbaşı haricindeki hâssa tabipler şeklinde geçmektedir. Eldeki verilerden sayılarının 18 olduğu anlaşılıyor¹⁰. XVII. yüzyılın ortalarında Etibbâ-i hassa 14 Müslüman ve 4 Yahudi olmak üzere 18 kişidir¹¹ ki bu bizim verilerimizle paralellik arz

* Ankara Üniversitesi, D.T.C.F. Tarih Bölümü, Ankara/TÜRKİYE. e-mail: mnturkmen@yahoo.com

D. 96
D. 1154

16 MAYIS 1994

Dergi / Kitap
Kütüphanede Mevcut

Osmanlı Araştırmaları, XIII, İstanbul-1993,
s. 91-98.

THE DEFTER-I MUFASSAL OF KAMANİÇE FROM CA. 1681 -AN
EXAMPLE OF LATE OTTOMAN TAHRİR. RELIABILITY,
FUNCTION, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLICATION.

Dariusz Kolodziejczyk

In October 1672 the Ottoman dragoman Panaioti congratulated the French ambassador in Istanbul on the fortunate conjunction that provided two great monarchs -Mehmed IV and Louis XIV- with their respective successes in Poland and in the Netherlands.⁽¹⁾ Thanks to the novel written by Henryk Siemkiewicz (*also author of Quo vadis*), the history of the loss of Kam'janec' (Pol. Kamieniec Podolski) is well known to every Polish child. Unfortunately the later period was completely neglected and the stereotypes about the "barbarian night" survived until today. The multiethnic and multireligious province of Podolia was the only part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to fall under the direct rule of the Porte. It must be said that after 20 years of wars and recent partition of the Ukraine between Poland and Russia in 1667 many Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants greeted the Ottomans with hope. This is confirmed in the Ottoman chronicles of Hacı Ali and Silahdar, and in Polish sources as well.⁽²⁾ The traditional Ottoman policy of supporting the Orthodox Ukrainian peasants against Polish Catholic nobles and the so-called *millet* policy towards Armenian and Jewish merchants had the result that only the Polish Catholic community could be considered as totally opposed to the new rulers.

1. A. Galland, *Journal... pendant son séjour a Constantinople / 1672-1673*, ed. Ch. Schefer, v.1, Paris 1881, p. 225.

2. Hacı Ali, *Fethnâme-i Kamanîçe*, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lala İsmail 304, f. 101 a; *Silahdar tarihi*, v.1, p. 610; compare: Copia di relatione venuta dalla Corte di Polonia: [the Turks] "*dichiaratosi di trattare male la solta nobilita e bene la gente rustica*", in: J. Wolinski, "Materiały do dziejów wojny polskoturckiej 1672-1676" (*Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*, X, part 1, 1964, p.260)

فاتح، خلیل پاشایی قالدیرمقله، دونمه لره، تورکک غیریسنه بویوک منصب قاپولری آچدی. سرایده، آوردوده تورکلره بر قالمادی. ادبیات عجم انه کچدی، اداره توره دیلره قالدی. بر عجم اوغلی اولان مورخ سعدالدین افندی تورکلری، تورکلکی تحقیردن چکنمدی.

فاتح، دونمه لردن محمود پاشایی صدارته کتیرمش ایدی. بو آدم عالم وایش آدمی ایدی. فاتح بلغراد اوکنده بوزولدی، صدراعظمی بوسنه هر سکی آلدی. پادشاه بوکا قیزدی. نهایت اعدامی ایچون آرادینی وسیله بی بولدی. فاتح اوغلی مصطفی وفات ایتش. محمود پاشاده اوند، اما دقت ایدلم اوند وخصوصی عالنده، آرقه سنه ماتم البسه می کیمه دن کورولش، ایشته بوندن دولای هان اعدام اولنیور. بونده یدی قله یه کوندرمه یه لزوم یوق، چونکه صدراعظم نهایت پادشاهک بر قولی در. حتی بونی زاراللی محمود پاشاده سویلیور: «بن اولورسه صاغ اولسون پادشاهز، یوز آلتون غیب ایدر» دیور. ایشته پادشاهلرک ایستکلری آداملرا.

فقط تره سنده عصر لرجه معنوی صدراعظمق ایدن، باب عالی یه ویریله جک عرض حالار بر کیجه تره سنده قالان محمود پاشادن، بر قاج پادشاهه صدارت ایدن ونهایت جلوس کونی تلاشله نصلسه انه وارد یغندن دولای ندامتله بر مجذوبه، اوچنجی مراد طرفندن قتل ایتدیریلن صوقوللودن صوکره، ایلری موققلره صوغان یز لر، قالایی قوز لر، اوکوز محمد لر، ملاق محمد لر، طابانی یاصیلر، دال طابانلر، دها بیلم نه ایدوکی بللی اولمایانلر ویا دها دوغریسی بک بللی اولانلر چیقایلر.

بو حال هان صوک زمانلره قادار سوردی. حتی عبدالحمید دورنده آنادولی یه بر تفتیش هیئت ایله کیدن مشهور یکی کوی بلدییه رئیس ماناس، عودتنده صدراعظم سعید پاشایی کورمش، وانک سوائی اوزرینه:

«آنادولو، مأمورلر یوزندن خراب اولویور!» دیمه سی اوزرینه: «نه یاپلم، زرده بولالم، اولان بولر!» جوانی آلتجه، ماناس ده: «افندی باری لاغایی اولانلری اولسون دیکشدریکز!» دیمش.

نجیب عاصم

Veled Çelebi.

— Kamanîçe

«قنچه» فریادنامہ سی

کو پرلی زاده فؤاد بک افندی یه

«قنچه» قلمه سنک فتیحی مناسبتیله ولایاته یازیلان طونانما فرمانی «تورک بوردی» نک (۱۹) نجی نومروسیله نشر ایله مشدک. ینه او نسخه ده ذات عالیکزک تذکره لرک اهل ایله دیکی و فقط بو کونکی تورکیلرک چوق علاقه دار اولدینی تورک شاعر لرندن - عاشق حسن حقنده بک مهم، بک قیمتلی بیر مقاله کز وار ایدی. عاشق حسن او قادار خوشمه کتدی که، کندیسنی او قادار تام تورک بولدم که، تعریفدن عاجزم. عاشق غازیمزک متقاعد حیاتی بیله غبطه بنخشادر. قارپوز تارلاسی، قارپوزی بیله نوعی ذاته مخصوص.

فقط اک غریبی؛ بنده کزک بو نسخه ایچین یازه جیم (قنچه) دن منظوم فریاد نامه نک ناظمی ده (حسن) دکیلمی. شعری کوره جکسیکز که سیزک نشر ایتدی ککز درجه ده متوسط بیر شعر در. بونی بالطبع بو نسخه ده نشر ایلده جکز. بو بابده ذات علیا کزده، بنده کزده فکر لری می یازه جیمز. بنده کزده باشقه بیر عاشق داها وار: عاشق مصطفی. اونک ده تورک وزنده حماسی شعر لری وار. هله، بک قدیم بیر بکتاشی مشرب ذاتک، بغدادک ایرانه کچمه سی اوزرینه بیر شعری وار که نفاسدندر. یرده: «آمان امداد دیو آغلار بلیرغاد» دییه بیر فریاد نامه واردر. شمیدیلک (قنچه) شعری یازمغه باشلا یورم.

K

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

21 Eylül 2014

Kamanice

Kamanice (in Ottoman orthography, Qamānīçe; Ukr. Kam'yanets' Podil's'kij; Pol. Kamieniec Podolski) is a town in the Podolia region of present-day Ukraine, which traces its origins to a medieval Ruthenian fort that was conquered by the Mongols in the mid-thirteenth century. After the internal crisis in the Golden Horde in the mid-1300s, it became the centre of a principality ruled by a Lithuanian dynasty and a bone of contention between Lithuania and Poland. From the fourteenth century, the town was a major commercial centre, inhabited by Ruthenians, Poles, Armenians, and other ethno-religious groups. Its Kipchak-speaking Armenian populace maintained regular contact with Armenian diasporas in the Middle East.

The town was incorporated into the Polish realm in 1430 and became the centre of the palatinate of Podolia. It was the largest fortress on Poland's southeastern frontier and was considered the main bulwark against the Tatars and Ottoman Turks. The Popes repeatedly authorized the Polish kings to use the "Peter's-pence"

(medieval dues paid to the Papacy) to maintain Kamieniec's defences. Besides its strong fortifications, the town's very location—on a bluff above the deep gorge of the Smotrč River—discouraged potential invaders. Further defences were added in the early seventeenth century, including the so-called New Castle. In 1043/1633, Abaza Mehmed (Ābāza Mehmed) Paşa (d. 1044/1634), the Ottoman governor of Özü (Očakiv), advanced on Kamieniec but did not attack it. The Porte dissociated itself from this incident, and Abaza Mehmed was later executed.

Developments in military art rendered the town's fortifications obsolete by the second half of the seventeenth century, and in 1083/1672, forces of the Ottoman army headed by Sultan Mehmed (Mehmed) IV (r. 1058–99/1648–87), which were commanded by Grand Vizier Ahmed (Aḥmed) Köprülü (d. 1087/1676), captured Kamieniec easily. With the Treaty of Buczacz (Ukr. Bučač, 1083/1672), the town, now called Kamanice, became the centre of a new Ottoman *eyalet* (*eyālet*, province) and the seat of a *beylerbeyi* (*beğlerbeği*, governor). The Ottomans converted several churches into mosques,