RELIGION, SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN ARABIA

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THE HIJAZ UNDER OTTOMAN CONTROL, 1840-1908

WILLIAM OCHSENWALD

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PREFACE

RELIGION WAS THE CHIEF MOTIVATING FORCE in the social, and perhaps in the political, history of western Arabia in the nineteenth century. Secularizing European reforms had little impact in the period between 1840, when Egypt withdrew from the Hijaz and the Ottomans reoccupied it, and 1908, when the future leader of the Arab Revolt of 1916 became amir of Mecca.

The first pupose of this book is to examine the social and political expressions of religion as seen in the region of Mecca, Jidda, and Medina in order to establish the shape of human experience in a setting dedicated to the transcendental. In this milieu where Islam originated, it was at its most intense, for much of life was determined by it. In a continuum based upon religious versus secular values in society, the Hijaz was at the religious end. Others have studied Middle Eastern societies dominated in the nineteenth century by secularizers and dedicated to the restriction of the place of religion in social activity and politics to a minor role. I hope to present a picture of a society and its political structures in a chronological setting and geographical area that was unique but that nevertheless can be useful for a deeper understanding of the Islamic faith in both the past and present.

Second, I hope to illuminate the nature of Ottoman imperial rule in its Arab provinces in the last decades of its existence and, in the process, shed some light on a major alternative to nationalism. The Ottoman Empire succumbed to secular, ethnic nationalism and to the armed might of the Entente Powers in World War I. Yet if nineteenth-century Middle Eastern history is seen solely as a prelude to the growth of twentieth-century nationalisms, the positive aspects of the Ottoman Empire may be ignored. In its central Arab lands, Ottoman provincial administration endured for four centuries despite increasing external attacks, decentralization, depopulation, and economic decay. Ottoman rule had supporters and provided some benefits. The other side of the coin of modern nationalism in the Middle East is the history of the prior successful functioning of Ottoman institutions. To understand either the final collapse of the empire or its long existence necessitates analyses of the empire with attention both to the failings and to the successes of Ottoman rule. To date, most studies of Ottoman history

that have dealt with provincial governments have not linked success with failure, or they have been so colored by nationalist prejudice as to be nearly useless.

Modern nationalism has been the major cause of two world wars and most of the extraordinary suffering and brutality that have afflicted the twentieth century. The pro-nationalist views of Arab, Turkish, and Western historians have denigrated Ottoman rule and, by implication, its anti-national policies and religious loyalties. However, once again in the Middle East the possibility of large political units being organized on religious rather than national lines is being raised. The lessons of the past may be useful to those engaged in analyzing this resurgence of Islam.

Although the Hijaz was both the birthplace of Arab political independence and the religious center of the Muslim world, its political history in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is nearly unknown. Trying to reconstruct the history of the Hijaz brings to mind the fable of the blind seers and the elephant: each perceives a different kind of being depending upon the information available to him. The rare Christian traveler who managed to evade local authorities saw the holy cities during the pilgrimage as religious centers; European consuls, who were restricted to Jidda, knew merchants engaged in international trade; chroniclers and later Arab nationalists concentrated on the rulers of Mecca from the point of view of their later leadership of the Arab Revolt in 1916. If the Hijaz in the modern period is to be properly understood, these facets must be combined and two missing ingredients added: the Ottoman part in Hijazi history and the religious, social, economic, and health aspects of the life of the Hijaz. It is, however, easier to prescribe such an approach than to follow it, particularly for a non-Muslim who is not able to visit Mecca and Medina. Also, though Ottoman records provide a rich source of information, they have been difficult of access and poorly organized until recently.

I have not yet been able to locate the court records of Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. Until these records are located, much of the social, legal, and economic history of the Hijaz must remain unknown. Nor have I been able to use the manuscripts by Arifi Bey cited by Ehud Toledano in his recent work on slavery. The Egyptian archives have not been consulted for this work; they undoubtedly will be found to have much useful material that may alter

many of the conclusions of this book. The information contained in the tables in chapters 3 and 5 was compiled from extremely scattered British and French consular reports; I have not found official Ottoman information on these subjects.

Despite these gaps, this book does, for the first time, examine the religion, society, and politics of the nineteenth-century Hijaz in their mutual interactions. At present, comparisons between the Hijaz and other Ottoman-Arab provinces in the nineteenth century are not likely, in most cases, to be productive because political history and social, economic, and religious historical studies have not been fully integrated. Charles Issawi's *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) provides an extremely valuable framework for beginning such comparisons. Unfortunately, this study was completed before Issawi's appeared.

The useful works of de Gaury, Uzuncharshili, and Al-Amr deal respectively with the political happenings, Ottoman-Hijazi relations, and the British role in the Hijaz. None of the authors examines religion in detail, and none integrates social and economic history with political history. Among other authors there has been an unfortunate tendency to generalize about the history of the Hijaz and to ignore the real changes taking place there in the relationship between religion and society. Edward Said has sarcastically, but accurately, summarized many of the secondary works dealing with the Hijaz:

> Arabia has been an especially privileged place for the Orientalist, not only because Muslims treat Arabia as Islam's *genius loci*, but also because the Hejaz appears historically as barren and retarded as it is geographically; the Arabian desert is thus considered to be a locale about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding the present. In the Hejaz you can speak about Muslims, modern Islam, and primitive Islam without bothering to make distinctions.[1]

Transliteration from Arabic and Ottoman poses many problems. Individuals' names and most terms are transliterated according to the system used in *Arabian Studies*, the 'ayn is not shown, and all diacritical marks are dropped. Modern Turkish spelling has been employed for Ottoman, except that "sh" and "ch" are used,

all "i"s are dotted, and the "o" and "u" are used for both types of Turkish "o" and "u." Authors' transliterations of their own names have been retained.

All foreign money has been stated in terms of its value in Ottoman money of the time. The Ottoman pound (T. L.) has been assumed to have been worth 100 kurush, although the actual worth varied. Conversion of dates has been made according to Faik Unat's *Hicri Tarihleri Milade Tarihe Chevirme Kilavuzu* (Ankara, 1974).

I wish to thank the editors and publishers of *Middle Eastern Studies* and *Arabian Studies* for permission to reprint here in a revised form articles that originally appeared in those journals.

A number of people have assisted me at various stages in the preparation of this work. Yusuf Ibish was particularly kind in allowing me to make copies of documents relating to the nineteenth-century pilgrimage. Saleh Muhammad al-Amr, Marwan Buheiry, David Burr, Laverne Kuhnke, Donald Lach, George Rentz, Rachel Simon, Richard Verdery, and R. Bayly Winder have been of help through discussions, references, and criticisms. The staffs of the Bashbakanlik Arshivi in Istanbul, the Public Record Office in London, and the French Foreign Ministry in Paris were generous in their time and assistance. My reading in the masterful works of Fernand Braudel has shaped this study in many ways.

A major debt of gratitude is owed to Daniel Bradburd and Larry Shumsky for reading this work in manuscript form and making many useful suggestions. George Hayhoe helped improve style and organization immensely thanks to his detailed comments.

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Many friends have provided me with the support so vital to such a long-term undertaking. Most important of all was Alan Dean, whose help and encouragement over the years has enabled me to finish this book, which I dedicate to him.

1. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, p. 235.

A + P	Great Britain, Parliament, *Accounts and Papers*
BBA	Bashbakanlik Arshivi, Istanbul
FJ	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale de 1793 à 1901, Djeddah
FJP	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique de l'Origine à 1871, Turquie, Djeddah
FO	Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London
FPM	Ministère des Affaires Etrangerès, Paris, Turquie, Politique intérieure, Arabie-Yemen, Pèlerinage de la Mecque
FY	Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Turquie, Politique intérieure, Arabie-Yemen

PART ONE

THE RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

INTRODUCTION
RELIGION, THE OTTOMANS, AND THE HIJAZ

IT IS NOW ARGUABLE that the single most important determining factor in the political and social history of the modern Middle East has been religion. Personal identity, political power, military effectiveness, the shape and content of social institutions, and the reactions of the Middle East to imperialism have all been greatly molded by religious values. Secularizing modernizers in much of the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries attempted to denigrate the social and political importance of religion and to limit its sphere of action to personal belief. The ruling elite's secularism concealed the opposition by the masses of the population to modernization conceived as the transformation of the Middle East on European models into secular nation states. However, beneath the reformism of the capital city bureaucrats and the new ethnic nationalism of the army officers, the peasantry, the nomads, and most of the townspeople continued to place a higher value upon the religious beliefs of preceding generations than upon the new imported ideas. On the other hand, the environment, the economy, and the desire for power continued to be factors in influencing events, as was the use of religion by the cynical to motivate the pious. Although religion formed and determined aspects of politics and society, politics was equally determined by *raison d'etat*, personal ambition, the idea of monarchy, and the desire for the conservation and perpetuation of the existing order.

To see if this actually was the case, it is necessary to test the centrality of religion in ultimately determining political actions and in shaping social attitudes and behavior. The history of the Ottoman Empire is particularly useful for this purpose, for that empire's politics was based upon a mixture of religion and dynastic loyalty. This state spanned parts of three continents and six hundred years of military victory and defeat, growth and decay, institutional innovation and rigidity. It began in the thirteenth century in western Anatolia as a frontier state whose legitimacy came from fighting Byzantine Christians in holy warfare. Eventually it led most of the western Turks and Arabs against the renascent power

of Christian Europe and conquered the Balkans for Islam. By the nineteenth century, however, its earlier flowering had ended, and it was no longer able successfully to defend Muslims from the incursions of Christian Great Britain, France, and Russia. More and more of the Middle East fell under the direct or indirect control of external powers. Sections of the Ottoman ruling elite decided in the early nineteenth century that to defeat the armies of the European states the empire must transorm its government and military so as to more closely resemble those of its enemies.

On balance, the military reforms of the Ottomans were unsuccessful, since the empire's provinces were conquered and finally, following World War I, its very existence was lost. Civil changes were equally unsatisfactory, for though the central power of the state over its provinces was increased, the loyalty of the provincial populations was increasingly lost as ethnic nationalism, political liberalism, and European intervention weakened the emotional ties that had bound the people to the Ottoman sultans.[1]

In the case of the Arabic-speaking lands, Ottoman rule had begun in the sixteenth century. Their distance from the agriculturally richer European provinces and from the imperial capital of Istanbul created a tendency toward decentralization and local autonomy. Among the Arab lands, the chief revenue-producing regions were Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The Hijaz in western Arabia was peripheral to the military and financial well-being of the state, but the religious prestige that accrued to the Ottomans from being the protectors of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was valuable to the dynasty. The annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina was sponsored and protected by the Ottoman central government and its provincial governors in Egypt and Syria. Insofar as the Ottoman sultans successfully portrayed themselves as the caliphs, or successors to the Prophet Muhammad, who had lived in Mecca and Medina, they depended for legitimacy upon possession of the Hijaz. Their authority within the Hijaz was reinforced by this claim, though they had little right to make it.

If there ever were a society that one would expect to be totally dependent upon religion, it was that of the Ottoman Hijaz. It had little agriculture, a precarious nomadic sector that lived outside the towns, and few natural resources. The extreme dryness of most of the region, the extraordinary heat and humidity along the coast, the bleakness of the mountain chain that runs inland parallel to the

coast and that separates it from the dry interior—all combined to produce a great local poverty and a marked dependence upon external help. The four principal towns of Medina, Mecca, its port of Jidda, and its summer resort of Taif found their livelihood in the pilgrimage. In all aspects of life, the Ottoman Hijaz presents an opportunity to examine what was an extreme case of the determinative role of religion in politics and society.

The most important aspect by far of the religious experience of mankind in the Hijaz, that of direct contact with God, lies outside the scope of this study. Both prophetic experiences and those subsequent generations who empathically venerated them through the worship of the divine have been the subjects of many studies by participants as well as outsiders. What has been missing has been a study of the secular consequences of the pilgrimage to Mecca. To study the political history and society of the Hijaz while not describing the holy places or the rituals of the pilgrimage may seem to trivialize Islam or to denigrate it by overly associating it with secular factors. However, religious experiences must take place in a concrete setting. Islam's validity was not necessarily affected by the actions of its believers at any specific time or place.

The consequences of political actions and social institutions for religion can be profound. If it should be shown in the case of the Hijaz that religion had little real impact upon politics and society or that politics and society determined the nature of religious expression, then it would be difficult to argue that religion was a strong and independent factor in geographical regions less obviously influenced by religion than the Hijaz.

HIJAZIS AND OTTOMANS

The central government of the Ottoman Empire, even after the conquest of the Arab provinces, remained primarily in the hands of Turkish-speaking Sunni Muslim men from Anatolia and Europe. In the Hijaz power was shared from the sixteenth century between Arab and Turkish Sunni Muslim men. The chief agents of the central government were the valis, or goverors, of Jidda and the qadis, or judges, of Mecca; the major Arab figures were the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who inherited the title sharif, and particularly their leader, who was given by the Ottomans the title of amir, or prince. The Hashimite family of sharifs who had ruled

Mecca for centuries before the Ottoman conquest thus continued to control it under Ottoman overlordship. A complex and ambiguous relationship emerged between the two principles upon which the Ottomans and the amirs relied for legitimacy. The Ottomans had a religious justification for possessing power insofar as they defended and expanded Islam and in their carrying out the holy law. The Hashimites' legitimacy was entirely religious. Descent from the Prophet Muhammad made them venerated and powerful, even though the Quran specifically stated that nobility in the eyes of God was dependent upon fearing God and not upon descent.[2]

The power balance between amir and vali fluctuated according to effective support from Istanbul; the absorption of the empire elsewhere; the personal weakness, strength, and longevity of the participants; popular support for the amir or vali; and the degree of dissent among the amir's family. Sheer historical experience also carried weight. As the centuries passed, it seemed inconceivable to the Hijazis that they could ever operate outside the Ottoman system of government; the Ottomans came to feel that their local rule was based upon the amirs. Therefore the Arab political elite operated within the constraints of the Ottoman way of life and themselves became, to a degree, Ottomanized in language and style of life. The Ottoman sultan and his vali wanted chiefly two things: an amir who could maintain order so as to protect the pilgrims and acknowledgment of Ottoman overlordship. If these were present, the Ottomans would financially and militarily support the prince of Mecca. In return, the amir desired chiefly local autonomy, presents, and protection from external attack. The sultan and amir displayed personal respect for each other's status; they exchanged mutual support.[3]

Within the Hijaz the amir had certain privileges. He possessed his own small force, composed of his household slaves, relatives, and hired free men. He held jurisdiction over certain legal matters, especially those cases where nomads and pilgrims were arrested in Mecca. The amir personally decided many cases. He received money and food from Istanbul and from Ottoman Egypt, and also owned agricultural lands in Wadi Fatimah, near Mecca, and in the Taif area. The amirs enjoyed such prestige that when some visitors passed in front of their residences, they dismounted so as to show respect. Most of the amirs had residences in Mecca, Taif, and, sometimes, Istanbul.

The staff of the amir fluctuated in numbers and in power, but

usually it was small. In addition to personal servants, there were secretaries for correspondence in Arabic and in Ottoman Turkish, military aides-de-camp, messengers, supervisors of storehouses, accounting clerks, flag bearers, musicians, and, most important, an administrative deputy who was a substitute for the amir during his absences from Mecca. In addition, the amir traditionally had powers of appointment to positions such as the market inspector (muhtasib), heads of the guilds, and neighborhood leaders. His influence was frequently dominant among the men of religion. The power of the amir, his local residence, and his familiarity with the inhabitants of the Hijaz made him the most popular political official in the region.[4]

Outwardly the amirs were loyal Ottomans, no matter how deep their inner doubts and opposition. Rebellions against Ottoman rule led by the amirs took place rarely, and then only on a few occasions when the Ottomans were replacing an amir with another member of the Hashimite family.

Every year when the sultan's order confirming the amir in office was read, the Ottoman notables of the Hijaz showed their respect for the amir as the most prestigious local person. The religious judges, jurisconsults, leaders of the pilgrimage from Damascus and from Cairo, and garrison commanders were led by the governor in this ceremony.[5] The vali presided over the symbols of the amir's authorization to rule locally, even though the vali was frequently struggling for power against the amir.

Istanbul had a way to exert pressure on the amirs short of deposing them. Prospective heirs to the amirate were often kept in Istanbul, where they were trained in Ottoman ways, used in government administration, and could easily be sent to Mecca to supplant the ruling amir. Sons of the ruling amirs were appointed to the chief reform councils of the empire. By 1886 there were five sons or grandsons of Amir Muhammad serving on the imperial Council of State. Their service on such bodies informed possible heirs about general policy while it gave the bureaucratic elite a chance to judge their abilities. The Hashimites in the capital lived on pensions and gifts from the sultan.

During the nineteenth century, the valis usually held less power than the amirs. Once the Egyptian occupation of the Hijaz was ended in 1840, the post of governor assumed its former subservient status, except when filled by unusually energetic and able men. The personal talents of the amir and vali were often more

responsible for changes in the balance of power than were alterations in Istanbul's policies on centralization or decentralization. The changes made by Ottoman reformers between 1840 and 1876 in the paper powers of the provincial governors mattered relatively little. The rapid rotation in office of the valis, and the general scarcity of competent and honest men to fill the office, mattered more.[6]

The most important power of the vali was his command of Ottoman military forces in the Hijaz and his ability to obtain reinforcements when needed. With the advent of artillery, limited military superiority over the nomads existed for the Ottomans. Also, the vali's recommendations to Istanbul concerning the deposition or retention of the reigning amir or the appointment of a new one were given great weight by the sultan. However, the long delays in receiving instructions from Istanbul caused by the distances involved lessened the vali's ability to act quickly.

The governor had the power to intervene in judicial cases only to a limited degree, e.g., he could order a prisoner freed, but he did not himself judge offenses. His power was similarly circumscribed in regard to finances; the Hijaz vilayet treasurer was responsible directly to Istanbul. The governor did supervise such institutions as the advisory councils, government warehouses, the market inspectorate, the police, the post and telegraph, the official press, and government hospitals—once these latter were established in the course of the nineteenth century. But happenings outside the towns and garrisoned villages, and particularly robberies and violence among the Bedouins, were left by the vali to the amir.

In the Hijaz the authority of the vali and of his master the Ottoman sultan was made possible by the lightness of Ottoman rule. There was practically no taxation except for customs duties on imports. Conscription into the Ottoman army did not exist; and, instead of making demands for money or men, the Ottomans provided gifts to the Hijaz. The townspeople of the holy cities, who received most of these gifts, were grateful. There were recitations of the Quran on behalf of the reigning sultan at the Prophet's tomb in the Medina Haram. The political desires of the townspeople coincided largely with those of the rulers—both wanted minimal government, gifts and money for the pious of the holy cities, the security of all from violence, the carrying out of holy law, and support for a religiously based society.These were given by the Ottomans to the townspeople; it was the nomads, who received

relatively less from the state, who objected to Ottoman sovereignty in the Hijaz.

The relationship between Ottomans and Arabs hinged on the religious importance of the Hijaz and, to a lesser degree, on its physical environment, especially its distance from Istanbul and lack of an agricultural base for taxation. Consequently, the impact of religion upon society and politics can be clearly seen in the Hijaz, after accounting for the role of the local setting. Religion as expressed in the pilgrimage and religious institutions crucially affected health, education, law, commerce, and social organizations. Indirectly, religion had a major impact, equal in weight to that of such other factors as personal ambition, upon political, military, and financial events.

1. Stanford and Ezel Shaw's *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* has the most useful general survey of Ottoman history.

2. Quran 49:13.

3. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century*, p. 244; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka: Die Stadt und ihre Herren*, p. 180; I. H. Uzuncharshili, *Mekke-i mukerreme emirleri*, pp. 22–34.

4. Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, p. 187; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, pp. 29–30.

5. For descriptions of the ceremony, see Muhammad al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 200; Ibrahim Rifat Pasha, *Mirat al-Haramayn*, 1:49–51.

6. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 140–41, 168–70. In the eighteenth century, the Ottomans had used the governor of Damascus, who was also usually the leader of the pilgrimage caravan, to supervise the amirs of Mecca, according to Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708–1758*, pp. 162–66. In the nineteenth century, this was not done.

CHAPTER 1
PEOPLE AND PLACES

IN THE LAST STAGE of effective Ottoman rule of the Hijaz, between 1840 and 1908, religion and politics operated within the constraints established by the geographical position and environment of the Hijaz.

The environment of the Hijaz was harsh and forbidding, both for its permanent inhabitants and for pilgrims. Inside the Hijaz province as defined by the Ottomans, heat and dryness posed severe problems for the economy. The concepts of time and the calendar were dominated by religious events and not seasonal and agricultural changes. Exactly how many people there were in the Hijaz was impossible to know, particularly because of the geographical mobility of the Bedouins and pilgrims, and also because of the inability of the Ottomans to conduct a census in Arabia.

The character of life in the holy cities differed sharply from that of the nomads. The richness of religious life; the facilities, amenities, and services available in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda; and a pride in local unique characteristics developed a separate and distinct style of living in the towns. Nomads had their own distinctive patterns of living, often directly contrary to those of the towns. Underneath all the sharp distinctions of town and desert and even more important than the limited economic base of the area was the tremendous force of religion, which had been since the seventh century as constant, continuous, and vital a factor for the Hijaz as climate.

The core of the Hijaz was defined by the Ottoman Empire as the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Their ports of Jidda and Yanbu and their outlying dependencies such as Taif, Tabuk, and Rabigh were also included. More distant areas were said to be in the Hijaz even when they were not under the actual control of the Ottomans. Parts of the western coast of the Red Sea were administratively attached to Mecca and Jidda. Suakin and Massawa were governed from the Hijaz, but their politics and social life were distinct from those of the Hijaz. The northernmost village of the Hijaz proper was said to be Aqaba, but throughout most of the nineteenth century, Aqaba and the shores of the Gulf of Aqaba were the concern



The Hijaz and Nearby Areas

of Egypt or Damascus. It was at al-Ula that the amirs of Mecca usually welcomed the pilgrimage caravans and the Hijaz effectively began. In the south, Ottoman and sharifial control fluctuated according to the power of local princes in Asir and Yemen. Usually Lit was inside the Hijaz; sometimes Qunfuda was included. South of Taif the amirs had a great deal of influence and, from time to time, real power among the local tribes. To the east, Ottoman power was extremely weak; the influence of the amir of Mecca extended only to Khaybar and sometimes to Taraba. A generous estimate was that the Ottoman Hijaz encompassed about 452,000 square kilometers, with a width of 400 kilometers and a north-south distance of 1,130. Within that area the Ottoman valis and amirs of Mecca had a certain sway, though it was unclear at any one time how much area they controlled or how effectual their control was.[1]

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

Life in the Hijaz was made difficult by a physical environment that presented a constant challenge to the peoples of the area. Heat, humidity, lack of rainfall, coral reefs, steep mountains, and wind patterns formed a constant background. The alternation of the pilgrimage, as the lunar and solar calendars interacted, meant that the key day of the pilgrimage and therefore the chief economic event of the year would sometimes fall in the summer and sometimes in the relatively cooler parts of the year. Especially before the advent of scheduled steamship service to Jidda, the seasonal fluctuations of the wind in the Red Sea also affected commerce and the economy.

The chief port of the Hijaz, Jidda, in addition to coral reefs and poor anchorages, was beset by a combination of heat and humidity that frequently made life there extremely uncomfortable. The average and maximum daytime temperatures in the shade were as follows: December–March, 24° and 30° Centigrade; March–May, 30° and 34°; June–September, 36° and 38°; October–November, 29° and 33°. On one day in Jidda in 1859, the temperature reached a scorching 55°; the same year the lowest recorded temperature in Jidda was 14°. Average humidity in April–June was about 60 percent. Jidda averaged only nine days of rain and

twenty-three millimeters of rainfall per year. On the other hand, occasionally there would be too much rainfall, which caused floods: in one incident fifty houses in Jidda were destroyed by heavy rainstorms.[2] At Yanbu, also on the Red Sea coast, similar conditions prevailed.

Inland temperatures were sometimes as high as those along the coast, but they were usually lower and the humidity less. The only known observations for Medina in the nineteenth century showed a range of 6° to 45°. At Taif the low temperature reached 0°. Al-Batanuni, an early twentieth-century traveler, asserted that the low temperatures at Tabuk and Madain Salih in the interior reached from −5° to 15°. Mecca ranged from 15° to 47°, with morning temperatures in February averaging 20°; the average high temperature for August was 41°.[3]

The impact of the climate of the Hijaz was felt by outside observers to be enervating, particularly in Jidda. Reduced energy, a high mortality rate from disease, a slow pace of society and business, and an alleged "Arab fatalism" were said by foreigners to be caused by the weather. On the other hand, the calmness and tranquillity of the town and the clear view of the stars in the sky inspired some Europeans to praise the nights, after the setting of the implacable sun. Since seaborne commerce was cheaper and less exposed to raids than caravans going overland through the heat and desert of the interior, people continued to live on the coast even though climatic conditions harshly affected the health and energy of residents.

Transportation and communication in the Hijaz were painfully slow by land or by sea. Foreigners felt themselves to be isolated and at the end of the world; Hijazis viewed the area as being the center of the Muslim world.

Transportation by ship was slowed by adverse winds, fear of running aground on coral reefs, and the desire to have a full cargo before sailing to the next port. Wind patterns in the northern Red Sea from May to November featured winds coming from the north-northwest. In the southern parts of the sea, the wind came from the south-southeast between October and May. Delays for sailing vessels were frequent during certain parts of the year. Delays also took place because captains of ships waited to accumulate cargoes and passengers rather than sailing on a fixed schedule. The Suez-Jidda

trip of 645 nautical miles averaged for sailing ships thirty to forty days because of these factors, and in one case even took fifty-eight days, although under happier circumstances it lasted far less time. Once steamships started to operate in the Red Sea, they reduced the time needed for traveling: the direct Jidda-Suez trip was only three days long.

The Ottoman government did little to help seafarers. The Jidda harbor was surveyed and mapped completely in 1876 by the British, not the Ottomans. Jidda's dangerous harbor was neither dredged nor adequately buoyed, even though the Ottoman grand vezir himself suggested the clearing of the small inner harbor channel in 1882. Security at sea was occasionally imperiled by pirates. If a ship anchored north of Jidda along the coast, payments to the local Bedouins were necessary to carry out trading.[4]

The roughness of the terrain and the lack of any suitable roads discouraged the use of carriages. There were only two carriages in Mecca and Medina in the 1880s. Instead, camels and donkeys were the beasts of burden for transporting merchandise, passengers, and messages.[5] The speed of camels varied greatly depending upon the load, type of camel, and availability of fodder, but Burton in the 1850s estimated that a caravan averaged only two miles per hour. The trip from Yanbu to Medina by fast camel took two days; by slow camel, four. Similarly, by the eastern desert path the Mecca to Medina transit varied from five to eleven days, or in some cases even more.

Inland communications were equally slow, though they increased in speed because of technological changes. The regular pilgrim caravan from Cairo to Mecca had taken about forty days. Mehmet Ali lessened this to twenty days by establishing a regular camel relay service. With the Jidda-Mecca telegraph in the 1860s, the Damascus-Medina telegraph of 1899–1902, and the Hijaz Railway in 1900–1908, a major savings in time took place. Letters to and from Istanbul, which often had been carried by caravans, were now conveyed more rapidly. Even when the telegraph was extended to the Hijaz, the rates charged discouraged its extensive use. The rate per word from Mecca to Damascus or Istanbul was sixteen kurush, and from Mecca to India it was thirty-one. The Jidda-Suez and Suez-Jidda mail was sent once a week in 1902 by Egyptian steamer. Mail went from Jidda to Mecca twice daily in the 1880s, but Mecca-Medina mail went only once every two weeks.

There were local Ottoman post offices in Mecca, Medina, Jidda, Taif, Yanbu, Tabuk, and al-Ula and an Egyptian post office in Jidda between 1865 and 1881. Letters were frequently lost in Mecca by the postal workers, who were too few in number to handle the flood of pilgrimage correspondence.

The Istanbul government recognized the slowness and difficulty of sending letters as early as 1868. Two cures were suggested: the establishment of a separate post office for handling mail from Mecca to Medina, and regular steamer service by the Ottomans along the coast so as to carry the mails. Nothing was actually done to secure these changes. No foreign post offices were opened. By 1909 the total mail carried by the Ottoman post office both for the Hijaz and Yemen was only 800,000 pieces, or about 1.5 percent of the mail of the entire Ottoman Empire.[6]

The construction of a telegraph line from Damascus south to the Hijaz linked Medina to a worldwide communications system, but not directly to Mecca, for the line was not finished. When the Hijaz Railroad was opened in 1908, Medina, again, was the only Hijazi town linked by railroad to the rest of the Ottoman system; Jidda and Mecca were intended to be joined to the Ottoman railways, but World War I and the opposition of the Bedouins prevented this from happening.

One result of the problems in transportation and communications was the establishment of branches of trading companies, with partners having full powers to decide local issues. A second result was the sharp division between Jidda, which was relatively in touch with the outside world, and Mecca, which was not. It was not only religion that kept Europeans along the coast, but also the concentration of import-export commerce in Jidda. The unattractive climate of Jidda was counterbalanced by the relative ease of transporting large cargoes by water and receiving letters and telegrams there. A third consequence of the transport and communications pattern was the extraordinary isolation of Medina from the rest of the Hijaz. The provisioning of Medina was subject to the irregular Yanbu caravans, which were frequently raided by nomads. Great fluctuations of prices took place since only about one-third of the grain consumed in Medina every day was grown locally. Some grain, as well as honey, sheep, and charcoal were purchased from Bedouins, but most food had to be brought from the Red Sea or from Syria. Medina had little to do with the political and

commercial life of the rest of the province. Fourth, the poor harbors along the eastern coast of the Red Sea meant that Jidda's, bad though it was, was the best available, and far superior to that of the chief port of Medina, Yanbu. Other Hijazi ports could not seriously challenge the dominance of Jidda.

TIME AND POPULATION

The climate and the terrain exerted a profound influence upon the life of the Hijazis, but religion determined the cycles of time according to which the settled peoples organized their year.

Muharram, the first month of the Muslim lunar year, saw the resumption of normal life after the pilgrimage; though some of the pilgrims were still present, most had left. Meccans moved back to their regular abodes and methods of living, and classes at the Meccan Haram resumed. Pilgrim agents who lived abroad departed to recruit new pilgrims for the Meccan guides. On 10 Muharram, the commemoration day of the martyrdom of the Imam al-Husayn ibn Ali in 680, the Kaba was opened. In Jidda after 1877, Shiites openly met to commemorate 10 Muharram, but they continued to meet secretly in Mecca. Feast days, holidays, processions, and visits to shrines took place in the months following according to the lunar calendar. Some of these occasions were celebrated solely by men and some solely by women. A saint's day celebration for men near Muna in Jumada al-Akhir, the sixth month, was used to vent quarrels between the partisans of various sections of Mecca. In Rajab, the seventh month, celebrations were held at the Sanusi convent near Mecca for Bedouins of the Harb and other tribes. Major religious events such as the journey of Muhammad to Paradise were celebrated by all, irrespective of sex or status.[7]

Permanent residents of Jidda, Mecca, or Medina usually visited the other two cities for pleasure, business, and religious purposes outside the pilgrimage months. Jiddawis and Meccans went to Medina to visit the Haram in Rajab and returned in the next month. The inside of the Kaba was opened for visitors on nine occasions before the pilgrims arrived. Shops were rented for six-month periods, beginning with 1 Muharram and with 1 Rajab.[8]

When the first pilgrims came to Jidda in Shaban, the eighth month, the year started to assume a different character. Ramadan, the month of fasting during the day, was still primarily a continua-

tion of the regular year; but by Shawwal, the tenth month, all minds and all energies were turned to the pilgrimage. Special courses of interest to pilgrims were given at the Haram. Pilgrims poured into Jidda in Dhu al-Qadah, the eleventh month. On the fourth day of Dhu al-Hijjah, the twelfth month, all government offices in Jidda closed and practically the whole town moved to Mecca to participate in the pilgrimage ceremonies.[9]

The number of Hijazis involved in the pilgrimage was rather small. Since no official census was ever taken in the Hijaz, estimates of population for the towns and region varied considerably. Although the numbers of houses were counted by visitors, the number of people in each house was indeterminate. Outside the pilgrimage season, the population of Jidda was roughly between 18,000 and 20,000. By the 1900s the population had grown somewhat, perhaps to as high as 30,000. Mecca, larger than Jidda, had a population in the first half of the nineteenth century of about 40,000. Later, it perhaps doubled to 80,000 people. Medina also grew, starting with about 18,000, and increasing by the 1900s to 40,000. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the three largest towns numbered about 75,000; by the end of the century, they included some 150,000 people.

The other towns and villages of the Hijaz were much smaller. Taif's population in the summer, when Meccans flocked to it for a vacation from the heat, reached about 8,000, but the permanent residents were far fewer. The port and oasis of Yanbu had 5,000 people or fewer. All of the townspeople together numbered some 85,000 in the period 1840–80 and about 160,000 in 1908. The number of villagers was perhaps somewhere in the vicinity of 50,000. The tribes were even more difficult to count because of their extreme mobility. Including Asir there were some 400,000, with a margin for error of 200,000 in either direction. An extremely uncertain population total for the Hijaz at the end of the nineteenth century would range from 400,000 to 800,000.[10] The total population of the Ottoman Empire in the 1890s was between 17,000,000 and 20,000,000; the Hijaz province had only about 3–4 percent of the total.

Mortality among the population of the towns was high even when epidemics of cholera were not taking place. Malaria in Jidda and Medina was the most frequent disease, but smallpox and deaths of infants immediately after birth also claimed many casual-

ties. Digestive and eye diseases, diarrhea, dysentery, and rheumatism were widespread. Birth control was often practiced, as was abortion. The populations of the towns had to be resupplied from the nomads or from abroad in order to retain their size.

THE ECONOMY

The overwhelming impression gained by visitors to the Hijaz was of a bleak desert, bleaker mountains, and widespread poverty among nomads and townspeople. The dryness of the interior, the infrequent rainfalls, the scarcity of wells, the absence of year-round rivers, and the scorching heat all seemed to imply that there was no agriculture in the area, and that the Hijazis apparently lived solely from the pilgrimage. Although this was true for the vast bulk of the Hijaz, there were sections where agriculture existed and still more where productive herding of domesticated animals was possible. Most of these districts were not seen by pilgrims, merchants, or foreign travelers, and so remained unknown.

There were small oases scattered throughout the Hijaz: Khaybar, Tayma, al-Ula, and Yanbu in the interior were some examples. The more productive regions were the Wadi Fatimah, between Mecca and Jidda, and the district around Taif and to the south of it. These areas and the oasis town of Medina had springwater in abundance. Dates, onions, radishes, grapes, lemons, bananas, honey, henna, wheat, barley, clover, pomegranates, and many other items were locally produced. Among these the dates were the most famous because of their variety and delicious taste. Certain crops and animals were not found locally: pigs were not raised because Islam forbade the eating of pork; coffee was imported from Yemen; little milk was available in the towns; beyond the coastal villages fish were usually not found in the diet; and apparently there were no oats grown in the Hijaz. Tobacco was a government monopoly; it was imported and not legally grown in the Hijaz.[11]

Animal husbandry was practiced by both Bedouins and villagers. When they had a surplus of animals, these would be sold to the townspeople. Camels and donkeys were also raised to be rented in the pilgrimage season, and sheep were sold to the pilgrims at Muna to be ritually slaughtered at the end of the ceremonies. Many were consumed on the spot; some were cut up and the meat dried for future eating; but most of the meat went to waste

since it was difficult to store it for a long time in an edible condition. Horses were in demand for export purposes as well as for tribal warfare and the Ottoman military. There was an annual horse fair after the pilgrimage in Mecca in the 1840s, though this may not have been continued in later decades. Arabian horses were famous around the world for their quality. The best stock came from Najd and not from the Hijaz. Camels were butchered for meat in the towns, as were the sheep. About ten to fifteen camels per day were killed for meat in Medina. Camels were also used by the townspeople for raising water from wells. In Jidda during the pilgrimage, seventy to eighty sheep were slaughtered per day for meat. Only two or three cows were consumed per month. At the time of the pilgrimage, hundreds of camels would arrive from Syria, central Arabia, and the Hijaz tribes for rental or sale to pilgrims. If they were not rented, their owners frequently would accompany them as cameleers for the pilgrims.[12]

Bedouins used income to purchase food, cloth, rifles, slaves, and coffee in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. In return the nomads sold to the townspeople camels, sheep, samn, butter, white cheese, and attar of roses.

Agriculture had a higher prestige than commerce for Medinans. Even though they made a lower profit per year on agricultural property compared with commerce, Medinans nevertheless invested heavily in agriculture. In Wadi Fatimah the richer cultivators were sharifs who were closely related to the ruling clan of Mecca, and the poorer farmers were members of a sedentary tribe. The amirs of Mecca themselves owned lands in the Taif region and in Wadi Fatimah.[13]

Most of the settled population of the Hijaz lived by occupations other than farming or herding. In the towns the range of jobs available was great, though most jobs ultimately depended on religion and the pilgrimage. Admission to certain types of labor was controlled by guilds; even more frequently an occupation was dictated by inheritance, for sons tended to follow in the same work that their fathers had performed. However, the great influx of pilgrims, who stayed in some cases for years and worked to support themselves, gave some flexibility to jobs.

The complexity of economic activity was indicated by the variety of trades and occupations: retail merchants, tailors, confectioners, goldsmiths, water-carriers, doorkeepers, interpreters,

pharmacists, preachers, coffee-makers, police, carpenters, undertakers, druggists, construction workers, blacksmiths, letter-writers, sandal-makers, Jidda customs house workers, prayer bead-manufacturers, ship-builders, coral processors, ship chandlers, seal-carvers, melon-sellers, and so on. In many cases, there was an overlapping of occupation and ethnic identity: peddlers tended to be Indians, Sudanese and Hadramawtis were the porters in Jidda, prostitutes were usually from Egypt, and many of the Meccan goldsmiths and silversmiths were from Najd. The most numerous occupation was that of pilgrim guide; in Mecca there were some 800 to 1,200. Of the British Indians in Jidda in 1891, forty-two were merchants, twenty pharmacists, fifteen traders, seven pilgrim brokers, six clerks, three tailors, three shopkeepers. The youngest of these was aged twenty-eight, the oldest sixty-eight, and all were men.[14]

The goods made by craftsmen, imported products brought into the towns, and the food grown in the villages were all sold by hawkers or in specialized markets. Blacksmiths and locksmiths could be found in the smiths' market, food-sellers in the "small" market in Mecca, slaves for sale in a special market, and so forth. The larger markets were roofed and had stalls or shops that opened off a common lane. Since most shops or businesses selling similar products were close together, comparative shopping for the consumer was easy. Propinquity also made guild supervision possible. Most prices were not marked; shopping involved protracted bargaining between seller and buyer, with each attempting to maximize his gain at the expense of the other.

One noticeable peculiarity of the Medina artisans was that they were few in number and usually from abroad. In Medina in 1815 if a carpenter was needed, it was necessary to send to Yanbu to get one. There was only one locksmith in the town, and there were no tanners, dyers, or jar-makers. When major repairs in buildings had to be undertaken, such as the reconstruction of the Medina Haram in 1848–60, skilled workers had to be sent from Egypt and Istanbul.[15]

Industrial manufacturing was largely absent from the Hijaz. Although a few pieces of steam-powered equipment existed, they were usually either out of operation or very small. There were no large weaving or cloth-making facilities. A Frenchman for a short time in the 1860s operated a steam-powered mill in Jidda. A similar enterprise managed by an Istanbul official in the 1890s in Jidda

suffered greatly from competition by cheap flour from Bombay. Still later, in the 1900s, a Greek Orthodox Ottoman ran a gasoline-powered mill for grinding grain in Jidda. Six wind-powered mills designed to raise water to ground level had been built in Jidda, but they had ceased working by 1890. There was one gasoline-powered flour mill in Mecca; it processed one and one-half tons of wheat per day in 1909. Other forms of European machinery were present in the Hijaz: a government printing press in Mecca; an ice factory; a water purification and desalinization plant in Jidda; after 1908, a Medina electric-generating facility that was used to illuminate the Haram and the Hijaz Railway station.[16] Most of these undertakings existed in Jidda, and nearly all of them were short-lived.

There were numerous reasons for the failure of manufacturing and power machinery in the Hijaz. First was the absence of natural resources, either mineral or animal. There was no known iron ore, coal, copper, oil, cotton, or flax, and very little wool; in the nineteenth century, gold was not yet known to exist in quantities in the Hijaz. The Ottoman government sent an exploring party to the east of Medina to look for metals and gems in 1879, but no important discoveries were made. There was also a decided shortage of skilled labor. Thanks to the pilgrimage, there were untrained workers in abundance; Hijazis worked on the Sudanese Suakin-Berber Railway in 1904, but only as unskilled laborers. A third reason was the lack of security for private property in the Hijaz. Wealth was subject to confiscation by the amir. Surplus profits were spent on expansion of firms outside the Hijaz; consumption of luxuries, such as lavish wedding celebrations; Meccan real estate for rental; and purchases of gold and jewels that could be easily hidden or transported as the need arose. A fourth problem was the competition of the already industrialized world or those regions such as India that were in the process of industrializing. After 1838 the Ottomans were unable to protect their domestic economy so as to encourage the growth of industry; even in such places as western Anatolia, where the prerequisites for industrialization existed to a much greater degree than in western Arabia, there was relatively little successful industrialization before World War I.

The existing class structure and even basic information on income and prices have not been systematically analyzed. In order to provide any light at all on these matters, it is necessary to rely upon scattered information and impressionistic accounts.[17]

A worker's income varied according to his skills, the availabil-

ity of labor, and the economic prosperity of the area as a whole. The information that an unskilled laborer in Mecca earned three kurush per day should be seen only as an indication of a general level of wages. A blacksmith or carpenter received about five kurush per day, plus his food. In 1853 at the Medina Haram, a muezzin earned nearly two kurush per day, a gardener the same, a carpenter eight, and a doorkeeper one plus board and clothing. A skilled gardener at Taif in 1880 made nearly four kurush per day, plus food, whereas an ordinary laborer received perhaps one kurush. In 1910 a gendarme received six kurush per day.[18]

When pilgrimage time came, prices doubled and shortages frequently occurred. Also, droughts and political disturbances could force prices higher. Pilgrims paid more because of a pattern of exploitative prices charged them. On the other hand, some prices were fixed, outside the pilgrimage season, by the muhtasib. There were muhtasibs in Jidda, Medina, Mecca, and Taif to supervise weights and measures and to inspect the markets for fraud. In Mecca the muhtasib helped set the price of bread, meat, and clarified butter. Occasionally the imperial government intervened to try to lower prices, as in the order from the grand vezir to the vali of the Hijaz in 1881 to lower the prices of wood and coal. Because so many goods came from abroad, prices reflected the cost of transportation over long distances. Charities sponsored by Indian rulers, Egypt, and Ottoman waqfs (charitable foundations) supplied some food and lodging to the destitute as well as food to officials and religious leaders.

The standard of living can also be seen in the consumption of meat. A chicken cost about five kurush, and one-half kilo of mutton cost two, in the non-pilgrimage parts of the year in Medina. In Jidda during the pilgrimage, a kilo of mutton cost more than four and one-half kurush. One reason for the relatively high cost of meat was that it could not be kept for long because of the heat. Bedouins reserved eating flesh for great occasions. When prolonged droughts took place, Bedouins were forced to eat their camels and sheep, thereby creating hardships for succeeding years when the herds would be small. Locusts devastated crops and pasturage, but they also provided a free source of food; they were roasted and eaten by Bedouins and even by Jiddawis in 1889.[19]

The food needed to keep a person alive was estimated to cost

between two and three kurush per day. When a temporary marriage was contracted, the amount paid to the wife for subsistence during the obligatory waiting period following dissolution of the relationship was about four kurush per day. But in addition to food, housing was also needed, and rents in Mecca were expensive. For a house or large apartment in a desirable area during the pilgrimage season, the cost was twenty-three to twenty-seven kurush per day; and a rented room in Medina was about eleven kurush per day.[20]

Transportation was also expensive for pilgrims. Rates were usually fixed by the amirs, with the result that they benefited mightily at the expense of the pilgrims. In 1887 the pilgrim going from Mecca to Medina by camel was assessed seven hundred kurush. Twenty-eight kurush were paid as tax to the Ottoman government, and the same to the head of the caravan and to the persons acting as hostages with the Bedouin tribes. Fourteen kurush were paid to the pilgrim broker, and the remaining balance to the owner of the camel. By contrast, the Mecca-Jidda-Yanbu-Medina trip by camel and steamer cost only about three hundred kurush. But there were fluctuations in expenses from year to year.[21]

The poor were extremely poor. Outright destitution was greatest among pilgrims, but most of the Bedouins were very poor in terms of material goods. The poverty of townspeople and pilgrims was lessened by donations of food from the imperial government. Social mobility existed, particularly for anyone in commerce, and the shortage of artisans meant that those who were skilled or able to learn a craft lived relatively well. Still, the lot of most Hijazis was one of relative deprivation compared with populations of more agriculturally abundant areas. The lightness of government taxation, the absence of conscription, and the spiritual rewards of living in or near the holy cities were perhaps some compensation for widespread poverty.

TOWNS AND VILLAGES

The life of poor and rich alike was determined to a great extent by their location in or near the three chief towns of Mecca, Jidda, and Medina. Although they were ruled by the Ottomans,

each town also had special characteristics created by its history, religious prestige, site, and economic function. Since nomads and villagers traded with the towns and many visited them for the pilgrimage, there was constant intermixture between the hinterland and urban society.

Mecca was an unwalled town, built in the midst of mountains and traversed by unpaved, irregular streets lined with multifloored dwellings. The three- and four-floor gray stone buildings were not often subjected to fires, but once a fire broke out, it burned without hindrance, since there was no fire department and little water to stop it. Dust from the streets coated people and buildings, and there were few trees or shrubs. Streets were unlit at night. Unused space existed in the town, though all the land near the Haram was fully utilized. By the 1840s most of the houses had become waqf property, but ownership and control was often legally somewhat uncertain.[22]

There were few large buildings other than the Haram itself, which was built around a central courtyard containing the Kaba. The Haram served as a gathering place, school, and center for social occasions of all sorts. In 1887 the town of Mecca also possessed the following large buildings: a government office building, two forts, a religious court, a telegraph and post office, two military barracks, two hospitals, and two bathhouses.

There were also an estimated 40 water fountains and public taps, 6,500 houses, 30 large stores, and 3,000 small shops. Other commercial and business establishments included 2 roofed markets, 1 pharmacy, 9 caravanserais for travelers, 80 small mills, 60 ovens that could be hired for baking, 8 potteries, 2 tanneries, and 95 coffeehouses. There were more than sixty small neighborhood mosques and a number of schools.[23] With the growth of population, new establishments were provided. By 1909, for instance, there were 4 pharmacies—3 more than in 1887. The town was divided into neighborhoods along ethnic and economic lines.

Although the history of Mecca was to a substantial degree the same as the history of the Hijaz, local environment helped create a somewhat separate pattern of social and political history in other towns and villages. For instance, the distance separating Mecca from Medina and the local features of Medina resulted in a differing political experience and differing basic characteristics.



Towns, Villages, and Tribes of the Hijaz

Medina in the eighteenth century had often been independent of Mecca and its amir. During the Wahhabi occupation, taxes were collected in Medina, though not in Mecca. The amir of Mecca after 1840 had a local representative and supervised the Bedouins, but he had little other power in Medina. By the 1900s Medina was separate from the Hijaz Vilayet and was placed directly under the central government, in whose hands it remained until it surrendered to the British and Arabs in early 1919.

One reason for the independence of Medina was its high walls, with towers, fortresses, and cannons, which enabled a relatively easy defense against the Bedouins. Medina also contained within itself water sources sufficient for the population and some local agriculture. An underground channel brought water from the nearby Ayn Zarqa spring. However, gardens lying outside the walls were tempting targets for nomadic raids. Suburbs lying outside the walls originally existed to provide services for camel caravans; eventually the suburbs became almost as extensive as the town. The cemetery where many of the early Muslims were buried also lay outside the town. New public buildings, such as the Hijaz Railway station, were put in the suburbs. More than four hundred gardens and date groves in the town and nearby were a source of entertainment and places for relaxation on holidays and after Friday noon prayers.

The character of the architecture in Medina was similar to that of Mecca. Multistoried, flat-roofed, gray, well-built houses with latticed balconies lined narrow, cool, unpaved streets. Stone, bricks, and palm wood were used to build houses. Since camels, donkeys, and horses were expensive, most people walked. The streets were, therefore, usually quite narrow.[24]

The religious and social center of the town was the Haram built around the tomb of the Prophet Muhammad. There were also ten large mosques and a number of religious schools and Sufi meetinghouses. Since civil government was often in the hands of the sheikh or leader of the Haram, the governor's residence built to the west of the Haram and the government office building were not always important in the life of the town.

There were fewer services and facilities in Medina than in Mecca. Medina had only 1 hospital, 18 ovens for baking bread, 26 coffeehouses, 2 baths, 10 small police stations, and 21 large public fountains. In 1853 there was only one physician. The chief market

was inside the walls. The city's trade was mostly with Egypt, India, and Syria. Other than dates, little of what was sold was locally produced. The grain and grocers' markets were outside the walls. There were more than nine hundred small stores.[25]

Since Medina was more isolated from the Red Sea coast than was Mecca and since the caravans linking Medina to Mecca were frequently attacked by Bedouins, Medina looked to Damascus almost as much as to Mecca for styles and ideas. Meccans considered Medina to be a holier and purer town than their own home city, and the manner of life in the towns differed. There were different methods in the two towns for drinking sherbet, wearing sandals, and tying turbans.

The most significant physical change in the town of Medina in the nineteenth century was the rebuilding of the Haram by Sultan Abdulmecid at a cost of about T. L. 750,000. Construction took twelve years and included not only extensive work in the Haram itself but also the razing of nearby houses.

The third large town, Jidda, had a location on the Red Sea that made it more open to change than was Medina. However, since the town was largely a way station of goods and pilgrims en route to Mecca, there was a tendency for little to be done by government that was permanent or expensive. From time to time, a reforming governor undertook improvements in the town. In 1867–69 stagnant pools were drained, new markets were built, dead animals were moved far out of the town, and the cisterns were cleaned; but other public services were few, and conditions of life were precarious and uncomfortable.

Jidda was as barren as Mecca, with extremely little vegetation inside the town's walls. The walls and fortifications were occasionally rebuilt or strengthened, but usually they were in a dilapidated condition. Gates were closed at sundown except during the month of Ramadan. Coral, a major building ingredient, even after it was dried in the sun deteriorated much faster than stone or brick. The houses tended to be airy, roomy, and large. They had shops on the ground floor with higher floors built over the street so as to gain additional room. They were decorated with elaborate wooden screens on windows and balconies, and with painted calligraphic and geometrical designs.

Outside the walls in nearby villages lived the semi-sedentary Bedouins and the poor. In the 1900s some new buildings were

also constructed beyond the walls close to the sea. Porters brought fruits, vegetables, and some other goods into the town from a market outside the wall.

The large structures in Jidda included the government customs house, quarantine facilities, post office, police stations, hospital, barracks, and the governor's office. Non-government buildings featured two caravanserais, the mansions of the Nasif clan and a few other notables, and five large mosques. There were also thirty smaller mosques, but only one pharmacy in 1888. Despite the heat and the humidity, there was surprisingly only one bath.[26]

Services were also relatively few. Charity and government provided nine public water fountains, but most apartments depended upon one of the three hundred or more cisterns for water. The water supply from nearby springs by an Ottoman aqueduct was often interrupted by cistern owners who objected to the competition for the sale of water. The sanitation systems of Mecca and Medina were poor, but that of Jidda was even worse. Cesspools were emptied into holes dug in front of the houses in the street, many people were buried in shallow graves inside the town, and animals were often left in the streets when they died.

The economic life of the town was dominated by the pilgrimage and its export-import trade. There were forty coffeehouses, forty-seven public ovens, and some nine hundred shops. Unlike Mecca and Medina, there were several public restaurants in Jidda. Also unlike the holy cities, there was no single, obvious center to the town's social life other than the central market. However, benches on Jidda's streets served as meeting places in the evenings and provided an opportunity for male socializing in the same way that the two Harams did in the larger towns.

Jidda and Mecca dominated the much smaller towns and villages in their areas. Wadi Fatimah's villages produced fruits and vegetables, henna, dates, wheat, and some meat animals from the thirty springs and gardens of their valley. Their produce was taken to Jidda and Mecca for sale. Taif was the summer capital: all the Meccans who could afford to do so took the eighteen hours needed to move to Taif to escape the oppressive heat of Mecca. The permanent inhabitants were mostly of the Thaqif tribe, along with some Indians and sharifs. Most of the gardens, many nearby villages, and the larger homes were owned by Meccan sharifs or men of religion (ulema). The two thousand or more people living

there had twelve large and small mosques, two hundred shops, nine ovens, a public bath, a barracks, and a fortress. The Ottomans and amirs of Mecca shared local authority, with justice and revenues divided. Although the town was protected by a wall, its poor condition and the closeness and strength of the nomads, as well as the extensive suburbs that had come into existence by the 1900s, made Taif difficult to defend.[27] Much of the time of the amirs of Mecca was spent on tribal politics in and near Taif so as to develop military alliances to protect the town.

The dependencies of Medina were more numerous and widespread, though smaller in population. Yanbu and Wajh had fortresses and garrisons, but were often dominated by the Juhaynah and Billi Bedouin tribes, respectively. Yanbu's water came from storage cisterns, and its food from an interior village, also called Yanbu, and from Egypt. Smugglers and sailors lived in quarters separate from the settled tribesmen and merchants who traded with Medina and Egypt. The total population was about four thousand. Wajh had only about one thousand people, and was a regional market for the Bedouins and the Sanusis in the 1880s. Wajh's exports were samn and wool.[28]

Ottoman control extended to two days' march to the east and northeast of Medina and along the caravan and pilgrimage routes linking Medina to al-Ula, Madain Salih, Tabuk, Maan, Amman, and Damascus. The walled Ottoman date palm oasis of al-Ula had a population of more than one thousand. It grew rapidly after 1907 with the construction of the Hijaz Railroad. Although both politically and militarily linked to Medina or to Hail, economically al-Ula was closer to Damascus and the Syrian pilgrimage. Tabuk was subservient to the Banu Atiyyah or to the Ottoman fortress guards; it usually lay outside the reach of the Hijaz government.[29]

THE BEDOUINS

The role of Bedouins in the Ottoman Hijaz and their involvement in the relationship between religion and the state was seen in their cohesion and location, their economic relationships with the towns, Ottoman payments to maintain public order, Bedouin activity during the pilgrimage, the military power of the nomads, and the political intervention of the towns in the internal affairs of the tribes.

The nomads of the Hijaz who lived outside the towns and vil-

lages have been the subjects of a detailed and splendid literature. Early Arabic poetry was essentially tribal; the great classics of poetry composed before Islam and in its early centuries were still studied in Arabic-speaking lands in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the greatest travel books in the English language have dealt with the nomads—the magic works of Burckhardt, Burton, Doughty, and Lawrence. However, since the relationships between religion, the state, and the nomads were not central to these earlier authors, a reexamination of the nomads may still be valuable.

The nomads were in many ways outside the Ottoman system, but in some areas there was an interaction. The social structures of the Bedouins had remarkably little to do with the peoples of the towns and villages. In a sense the townspeople and villagers were swimming in a Bedouin sea, but this had only military and economic importance and did not produce cultural, religious, and social results. There were obviously certain common factors linking the social groups. Bedouins, like townspeople, were Muslims, Sunnis, Arabic-speakers, pilgrims, consumers of imported goods, and providers of services for foreign pilgrims. But the inhabitants of the towns and the wanderers regarded each other with disdain and suspicion. The townspeople felt the nomads to be dangerous robbers who were irreligious, ignorant, uncouth, and barbaric. The nomads regarded the townsmen as defiled by their intermarriages with foreigners, unhealthy, effete, and cowardly. Enmity was greatest between the Ottoman armed forces and the nomads. Each defined public order and the nature of society in a way completely different from the other.

Hijazi tribes in the nineteenth century were difficult to describe with precision because of their organizational and geographical flexibility. Although all members were linked together in theory by descent from a common male ancestor, they frequently did not live close to each other, seldom gathered as a tribe, moved great distances to obtain pasturage, and had close relationships with lineages outside the tribe. There was no fixed pattern of hierarchical organization within most tribes; leadership was frequently vested in one family or clan, but the leader's followers were free to come and go. Only if the whole tribe felt threatened from outside might it unite, temporarily, under the command of the chief of the tribe. Nevertheless, in marriage, in the allotment of grazing lands and use of wells, and in raiding patterns there was a

clear sense among the nomads of the existence of tribes. Sometimes tribesmen pretended in front of Ottoman officials to have greater cohesion than was the case, solely in order to secure larger payments for their chief.

An exact delimitation of tribal territory was contrary to the basic ethos of the tribal system. Not only did the tribes wander, they also changed their grazing areas in response to the rainfall distribution of any given year. Although there was a core area, or dirah, that was considered the tribe's own, the fringes of tribal territory were variable, leading to numerous clashes with other tribes.

Including the Asir tribes, there were probably about 400,000 people in the tribes. Within this total, the larger tribes were the Harb, Juhaynah, Huwaytat, Utaybah, Thaqif, Ghamid, and Mutayr, with the Harb probably the largest tribe located entirely inside the Hijaz.

Most of the tribes were engaged in nomadic animal husbandry, principally the raising of camels, which provided milk and meat for the herders. There were a few semi-sedentary pastoralists who engaged in agriculture or who moved their flocks only a few times in the year. Not all tribes were camel-herders. The Zabid lived along the coast of the Red Sea, as did other tribes, and there they gained a livelihood by fishing, smuggling, slave dealing, and mother-of-pearl gathering. Some tribal groups provided services: the Ghamid tribe of Asir provided porters in Jidda, Mecca, and Taif during the pilgrimage season, and the Ghamid also raised tobacco, which was sold, illegally, in Mecca.[30]

The Bedouins consumed most of their herds' products directly, but some animals were sold to the townspeople. In return, the tribes bought a wide variety of goods from the towns, including grains, dates, cloth, weapons, lead for bullets, coffee, and sugar. The pilgrimage caravans provided a major source of income and a chance for trade. Salesmen went from the caravans to the tribes to sell goods, rejoining the pilgrims upon their departure from the Hijaz. As the distance increased from Damascus, which was the source of the goods, so did prices: biscuits cost seven times as much at Madain Salih as at Damascus. Insecurity also increased costs. Three or four safe return trips from Tabuk to Wajh on the coast would be enough to make a merchant wealthy.[31]

Trading, fishing, and selling dairy products to townspeople were secondary to the nomads' main concern, which was camel-

herding. Frequent intertribal raids and irregular rainfall meant that rapid changes in herd size, and therefore wealth, were likely. The Bedouins were constantly subject to the possibility of losing many or all of their animals in a raid. Since it was impossible to monopolize ownership of camels and since camels were the means of transportation used in the raids, the pattern of raids and counter-raids was endlessly repeated.[32]

The Bedouins were poor in terms of physical possessions and comforts—poor in their own eyes and by the stardards of settled society as well. They were periodically on the verge of starvation. Extremes of heat and cold, infrequent and unpredictable rainfall, diseases affecting both humanity and animals, constant raids—all these made the Bedouins poor. Yet passing directly through their midst were enormous riches in the form of pilgrim caravans and the commerce coming from the coast to the holy cities. The juxtaposition of poverty and wealth produced tensions, insecurity for the pilgrims and merchants, and opportunities for robbery by the Bedouins.

Some channels existed for nonviolent economic exchanges between the pilgrims and the tribesmen. Pilgrims hired nomads as guides and rented nomads' camels. Hijazi tribes rented camels chiefly for the Mecca-Medina, Jidda-Mecca, and Medina-Yanbu routes. Protection money was also paid to the tribes through whose territory the pilgrims and merchants passed. A delicately balanced symbiotic relationship came into existence between the caravans and the nomads. If the nomads attempted to take too much, the merchants would stop their trading, the numbers of pilgrims would decline, and the Ottoman government would intervene to maintain the pilgrimage. Yet if the Bedouin leaders asked for too little, their own restless tribesmen might seek new leaders, other tribes might intervene, and the Ottomans might conclude that the tribes posed so small a threat that payments could be decreased.[33]

Detailed records were kept by the Ottomans on payments made to the tribes, and in the first part of the nineteenth century, they indicate that the amounts paid were in the range of T. L. 35,000–40,000, including the value of grain. Some of this amount was stolen by those who administered the payments.

The Harb were the largest gainers from this money because they controlled the Jidda-Mecca, Mecca-Medina, and sometimes

the Medina-Yanbu paths. Among the major trade routes, only the area north of Medina was completely outside their control. In 1864/65 eighty-three Harbis received a total of 4,711 ardebs of wheat. By comparison, the Juhaynah, who controlled part of the Medina-Yanbu route, with thirty-six recipients, got only 513 ardebs of wheat. By 1880 the Harb were getting more; one subchief alone, the head of the Masruh section, which commanded the Medina routes, received T. L. 1,064. Amounts climbed even higher in the 1890s; in 1893/94 one Harb chieftain received T. L. 4,609 of the total T. L. 40,751 that was sent to the tribes. The Juhaynah remained second among the tribal groups. Their Amir Sharaf was given 44,616 okas of wheat in 1899/1900 and for the next three years; this was one-fifth of the total of all wheat then disbursed. By the late nineteenth century, total Ottoman expenditures on the Bedouins, direct or indirect, were as high as T. L. 70,000.[34]

Before 1908 payments worked reasonably well in stopping raids by the nomads against pilgrimage and commerce. Payments were made by Ottoman paymasters with the Syrian caravan or by the amir of Mecca's agent in Medina. This system broke down when payments were embezzled or delayed. The consequences of nonpayment could be evaded for one or two years, but eventually the tribes rose against the state, robbed travelers in their territory, and disrupted commerce until payments were resumed. Since the Ottomans, the amirs, the townspeople, and the tribes all needed the income they derived from the pilgrims, temporary agreements during the pilgrimage season were patched together; bitter quarrels could be resumed after the pilgrimage ended. Agreements were guaranteed by the giving of hostages. Every year about ten of the Harb stayed in Mecca as hostages for the safe return of the pilgrims from the Mecca-Medina-Mecca overland trip through Harb territory. If conditions became desperate, the amir sent the pilgrimage caravans by sea rather than by land, thus completely depriving the tribes between Mecca and Medina of their income; but of course the Jidda-Mecca and Yanbu-Medina tribes would still have to be paid. To a limited degree, the routes could be varied somewhat, thus changing the tribal areas traversed. However, the availability of wells and water usually dictated the choice of paths.

The economy of the tribes, the payments to them to allow the pilgrims to pass safely, and the very life of their members depended upon their military power. Unlike the monopolization of

violence in the hands of nation states in the twentieth century, in the Arabian deserts and mountains of the nineteenth century violence was at the disposal of any armed warrior, and nearly all adult males were armed. The limits placed on violence were those of tribal solidarity and the formal, though unwritten, rules of raiding enforced by peer group pressures.[35]

The question remains, How powerful were the tribes? In some places, under certain circumstances, they could defeat the organized armies of the Ottomans. If a large contingent of the Harb decided to hold the hilly region and narrow passes between Yanbu and Medina, it was almost impossible to dislodge them. In the desert the nomads were more able fighters than the Ottoman regulars; the Bedouins knew the desert, the location of the wells, the capacity of their animals, and were mobile enough to take advantage of the desert's vastnesses. Most importantly, the advantages to be gained by defeating the nomads were far less than the expenses of moving soldiers to the Hijaz, training and equipping them for desert warfare, and compensating for the inevitable casualties in men and matériel. Ottoman troops were unused to Arabian conditions and often died from disease.

Still, the Ottomans maintained a military superiority over the Bedouins in the Hijaz. This was in part because of the Bedouins' own weaknesses. The nomads seldom remained in the field for a long period of time. They could easily be divided by bribes and threats of force, and they did not possess the new technology developed by the Ottomans from the Europeans. Ottoman soldiers also were also more willing to hold a fixed position than were the Bedouins.

The delicate military balance between the nomads and the Ottomans resulted in an allocation of territory: the Bedouins were supreme in the deserts and the Ottomans in the towns and in most of the villages. When townspeople passed through the deserts in caravans, there was an interaction that was settled sometimes by cannons sent from Damascus and sometimes by gold sent from Istanbul.

The carrot was used along with the stick. The commanders of the Ottoman garrisons were ordered by the palace to treat the nomads carefully. According to Istanbul, friendly chieftains should be rewarded with medals and robes of honor, and tithes should not be collected from them. Appeals to loyalty to the amirate, the vi-

layet, and the empire should be made. The chieftains should be encouraged to participate in government, and their children should be sent to government schools at government expense. The key consideration was the safety of the pilgrimage; all measures designed to secure this were permissible.

A key element in any sort of reconciliation of the tribes to Ottoman rule was the amirate of Mecca. The amirs were held responsible by the Ottomans for the behavior of the tribes, and, as a result, the amirs acted as intermediaries between tribes and government. This was done by means of several channels. One was the marriage of the amirs or their relatives to a tribal chief's daughter: Amir Muhammad married a member of the paramount tribe of Asir. The amirs also appointed agents to deal with the tribes: there was an agent of the amir with the Shahran tribe in Wadi Bisha, and a sharif was appointed to deal with the Harb in 1905.

The amirs interfered in the tribes directly as well as indirectly, and the major opportunity to do so came when a new chief was to be chosen. Tribal leaders held their positions usually until they died, but there were instances, as in 1853, when the Ottomans tried to oust one chief and install another. The chief of the Ahamida section of the Harb, with 5,000 members living near Medina, was ordered replaced by Amir Abd al-Muttalib, who had killed the chief's nephew, and the vali agreed. The incumbent resisted his deposition, and in the ensuing battles he defeated the Ottoman candidate. The incumbent continued in office until 1872.

Usually the amirs could count on gaining temporary allies from among the tribes so as to mount a punitive raid, but these alliances were weakened by the very policy of divide and rule, which was the linchpin of the amirate's and empire's Bedouin policy. For although divided tribes were not able to mount a threat to Ottoman sovereignty, neither could they be used as a strong tool to restrain raids by their own subunits. Authority within the tribes was loose. With the Harb the opposite policy of strengthening tribal leadership seems to have been tried by the amirs, but with little success. The overlords among the Harb, even when backed by Ottoman grain and gold, restrained the raids of their followers only with the greatest difficulty. Since it was the Harb who were the aggressors, the amirs had to turn to the enemies of the Harb for military assistance. However, the interventions and military alliances of the amirs did stop the emergence of a tribal confederation

with aspirations to independence. It was only in the 1900s that the tribes played a major political role beyond the desert and the pilgrimage, when their interest in autonomy coincided with the same desire by the Amir Husayn. Both then opposed the construction of the Hijaz Railroad south of Medina to Mecca and Jidda.

The nomadic tribes lived in the harshest sections of the Hijaz, but life was difficult and precarious for the settled population as well. Poverty and isolation were largely the results of the forbidding climate and topography. Within this general environment, there were local differences with economic consequences that were crucial to the lives of the Hijazis, e.g., the dominance of Jidda over the other coastal towns because of its relatively better harbor and closeness to Mecca. But all of the Hijaz labored under the same need to import food because of agricultural poverty.

The nomads were largely independent of the towns. Some trading between townsman and Bedouin took place, but the key linkages between the two groups were related to religion. The religious prestige of the amir of Mecca allowed him to mediate between the Ottoman government and the tribes. Raiding pilgrims and gaining protection money from the Ottomans for the pilgrimage caravans provided the Bedouins with funds and goods to alleviate their poverty.

Religious values were the prime factor in the local economy because of the economic importance of the pilgrimage. Among town Hijazis, religion determined the sense of time and the calendar, and was a key factor because of the poor environment of the Hijaz. Religion was even more imporatnt than the geography, the economy, or the characteristics of the towns and Bedouins, for it was religion that made life worth living as well as possible in the harsh Hijaz.

1. Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanli Imparatorlugunun Guney Siyaseti Habesh Eyaleti*, pp. 96, 132, 249; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p. 58; Sharaf Abd al-Muhsin Al-Barakati, *Al-Rihlat al-Yamaniyyah*, pp. 9, 13, 104. In the eighteenth century, the northern limit of the Hijaz had sometimes been farther to the south, as pointed out by Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, p. 131.

2. France, Service Hydrographique de la Marine, *Mer Rouge et Golfe d'Aden*, pp. 3, 24; Great Britain, Parliament, *Accounts and Papers* (hereafter *A P*), 1862, 59:48–65; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale de 1793 à 1901 (hereafter FJ), Schnepp (Jidda) to ministry, 12 July 1866; Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office (hereafter FO), 195/2224, Husain (Jidda) to chargé, 12 November 1906.

3. Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, pp. 63, 314; Umar Rida Kahhalah, *Jughrafiyyah*

Shibh Jazirat al-Arab, p. 133; Mustafa Hami Bey, *Manafi al-Hujjaj*, pp. 47–50; Charles Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:527.

4. Bashbakanlik Arshivi, Istanbul (hereafter BBA), Ayniyat 1521, grand vezir to vali, 8 Safer 1300.

5. For a discussion of the reasons for the prevalence of camels over wheeled vehicles in the Middle East, see Richard Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel*.

6. BBA, Ayniyat 871, 9 Receb 1285, grand vezir to vali; Muhammad Bayram, *Safwat al-Itibar*, 5:20; Vedat Eldem, *Osmanli Imparatorlugunun Iktisadi Shartlari*, p. 175.

7. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 39–57.

8. Jacob Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage*, pp. 102–5; FO 195/2174, Hussein (Jidda) to O'Conor, 15 October 1904.

9. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 60–77; FO 195/1943, Hussein (Jidda) to Currie, 1 October 1896.

10. Justin McCarthy, "Ottoman Sources on Arabian Population," p. 118, accepts the extremely high Ottoman estimate of 2,500,000 Hijazis as reasonable, with a settled population of 240,000 in 1877. Also see Stanford Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831–1914"; and Kemal Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and Census of 1881/82–1893."

11. John Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 306–9, 357; Ameen Rihani, *Around the Coasts of Arabia*, p. 35; Al-Barakati, *Al-Rihlat al-Yamaniyyah*, pp. 85–86; A. Buez, *Une mission au Hedjaz, Arabie*, p. 21. Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, p. 377, is wrong in saying that Mecca had no agricultural hinterland at all.

12. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 283; FJ, Fresnel (Jidda) to ministry, 22 June 1847; FO 195/2174, Hussein (Jidda) to Devey, 28 January 1904; FJ, de Monbrun (Jidda) to ministry, 25 October 1856.

13. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 379; Buez, *Une mission*, pp. 14–15; Al-Barakati, *Al-Rihlat al-Yamaniyyah*, pp. 114–15.

14. W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures and Essays*, p. 537; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 4–6; Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:429; FO 195/2105, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 24 March 1901; FO 195/1730, Wood (Jidda) to ambassador, 28 April 1891; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 61.

15. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 146, 380–81; Richard Burton, *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah*, 2:9.

16. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 123; FJ, Dubreuill (Jidda) to ministry, 3 March 1869; *A + P*, 1887, 86:479–80; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, pp. 8–9 and 245–46; FJ, Hugonnet (Jidda) to ministry, 3 January 1890; A. J. Wavell, *A Modern Pilgrim in Mecca*, p. 150.

17. A systematic study along some of these lines has been done for some parts of the Ottoman Empire: see Donald Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture in Anatolia, 1876–1908."

18. Smith, *Lectures*, p. 562; Saleh Al-Amr, "The Hijaz under Ottoman Rule 1869–1914," p. 121 n. 1.

19. Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," p. 20; FO 195/2224, Hussein (Jidda) to O'Conor, 6 January 1906; Landau, *The Hejaz Railway*, p. 129; FO 195/2254, Monahan (Jidda) to O'Conor, 30 September 1907.

20. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 12, 124; Wavell, *A Modern Pilgrim*, p. 129; FO 685/2/2, Wood (Jidda) to India, 7 November 1888.

21. FO 685/2/2, Jago (Jidda) "Memorandum on Camel Hire," 11 April 1887; FO 685/2/2, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) "Report on the Pilgrimage, 1887"; FO 195/1847, Richards (Jidda) to Currie, 6 June 1894; FO 195/1943, Alban (Jidda) to Herbert, 11 June 1896.

22. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 104–7 and 151–54; Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, pp. 164–65.

23. Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1305*, pp. 137–38; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1306*, pp. 84–85.

24. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 323–24; BBA, Dahiliye 47044, n.d.; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:391–95 and 2:16.

25. Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 2:5; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1305*, pp. 188–89; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, pp. 254–56.

26. Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1305*, p. 213; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1306*, pp. 274–75; Eyyub Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 3:183.

27. Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1305*, p. 179; Eyyub Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 3:197; FO 195/2148, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 9 September 1903.

28. P. Adrien, "Quelques notes sur les quarantaines de la Mer Rouge"; Julius Euting, *Tagebuch einer Reise in Inner Arabien*, pp. 250–83; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1306*, p. 258.

29. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, pp. 113, 180–200; Euting, *Tagebuch*, pp. 218–21; William Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad*, pp. 136–37.

30. BBA, Yildiz 14.88/68.88.13, enclosure; Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 86; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 2:122; Kinahan Cornwallis, *Asir before World War I*, p. 45.

31. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, pp. 111, 252–53, 438, 454, 538.

32. Louise Sweet, "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin," 1:276; Michael Meeker, *Literature and Violence in North Arabia*, pp. 19, 26, 186; FO 195/2174, Hussein (Jidda) to O'Conor, 17 June 1904.

33. This argument owes a good deal to William McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples*, p. 99. The two chief differences between McNeill's discussion of oases and commerce and the Hijaz are that the Hijaz did not have entirely independent rulers and that the pilgrimage in some form was bound to continue because of external pressures.

34. FO 195/1482, Jago (Jidda) to Dufferin, 5 March 1884; BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 1223, enclosure 32, pp. 7–8; BBA, Shurayi Devlet 686, 21 Zilkade 1296; Yusuf Ibish collection of documents relating to the pilgrimage from Damascus to the Hijaz, document 30, 3 Rebiyulahir 1312.

35. Talal Asad, "The Beduin as a Military Force," p. 71; Sweet, "Camel Raiding," pp. 274–81.

CHAPTER 2
RELIGION

MANKIND WAS CREATED from soil brought to Mecca and Taif by angels who molded it and dried it into the shape of humanity. Eve, the mother of us all, was buried outside Jidda. Prayers offered to God were more valuable if made in the Hijaz. The water of the Zamzam well inside the Meccan Haram was considered to be so holy that some Indian Muslims threw themselves into it to be drowned. To be permitted to light the candles, sweep the floors, and wash the walls of the Kaba was a signal honor and blessing.[1] These and similar beliefs constituted for most of the population of the Hijaz an integral part of their religion. The sanctity attached to the Hijaz by Muslims outside the area, whether inspired by the awe attached to the place where the Quran was revealed or to these beliefs, also influenced the life of the people of the Hijaz.

Religion was everywhere. Many individuals were personally pious; some were ascetics. Nearly all adhered to the conventional usages of Islam. In ordinary speech, in social relationships, in law, and in other aspects of life, religion and religious values played a determining part. The secularization of society that had begun in Western Europe in the eighteenth century and the consequent tendency to restrict religion to personal theology and morality were opposed in Mecca and Medina, as in other holy cities such as Jerusalem and Rome. It was firmly believed that ultimate truth and contact with the transcendental had been given by God to the Prophet Muhammad in the form of the Quran in Mecca and Medina. The successors of the early Muslims saw around them in the nineteenth-century Hijaz the same places that had been sanctified by association with God's messenger in the seventh century. The progress of the lunar year through the calendar reminded people vividly of the earlier events. Near Mecca was Mount Arafat, sign of God's mercy to Abraham and thence to all mankind; in Mecca was the Kaba, cleansed by Muhammad of the abominations of idol worship; in Medina were the tombs of Muhammad and his companions and immediate successors. And above all there was the renewal every year of the rites associated with Muhammad's last pilgrimage, when tens of thousands of Muslims reenacted in and

near Mecca the rites of worship that God had enjoined upon all believers who could afford the journey.

A deep stratum of faith underlay religious forms, organizations, and officialdom. Both sides of religion—the formal and the personal, the social and the individual—were sincere, and both sides were necessary for the propagation and maintenance of revealed truth. The point of view of such European Christian travelers as W. Robertson Smith that religion in the Hijaz was organized hypocrisy with the goal of extracting money from the pilgrims was incorrect. There was too much evidence of personal morality, deep religious belief, and the social implementation of religious commandments to permit this facile prejudice to be seriously entertained. Among many possible examples of faith, a few may be cited here: public prayers led by the vali and the ulema for rain to end a long drought; the voluntary visits by Bedouin camel brokers to the Meccan Haram for prayers and religious lessons; the spirited defense of Islam by Ibrahim Abd al-Fattah, a Hijazi merchant and commercial court judge, when he was arrested by the British in the Sudan in 1885; and the participation in the pilgrimage rites by most of the Meccans and Jiddawis and many Medinans and tribesmen every year.[2] During the pilgrimage season, everything else came to a halt, partially because of the logistical problems of dealing with the pilgrims and the commercial fever of the merchants and guides, but also because of the absorption of the peoples of the Hijaz themselves in the grand religious event they organized and sponsored.

Certainly not everyone was constantly engaged in religious activity. There were those who defied contemporary standards of morality; there must have been some for whom public protestations of piety and participation in religious rites were hypocritical acts; and there undoubtedly was a sense of repletion and familiarity that induced many to regard the holy places with a feeling of proprietary complacency. But the level of faith and belief was high in the crowds of hurrying pilgrims, the ragged Bedouins swaying on camelback toward the holy cities, the villagers walking up the Wadi Fatimah toward Mecca, and the cosmopolitan townspeople of Mecca and Medina. Integral to these groups, and relying on their support and encouragement, there were the structures of religion—the varieties of religious experience, the mystical brotherhoods, the different ways in which religious orthodoxy was

enforced, the international linkages that kept Islam united, and the officials who managed the two Harams.

RELIGIOUS RITUAL AND LAW

There had grown up among Sunni Muslims four main schools of religious ritual and law: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali. Adherents of each school consulted muftis belonging to that school; among other things the admissibility of certain types of evidence, the rules of inheritance, and the leeway given the mufti to use his own judgment varied among the schools. The Ottoman Empire was officially Hanafi, whereas a majority of the population of the Hijaz was Shafii.

The Shafiis included most of the Bedouin tribes, many of the citizens of Medina, and the amirs of Mecca and the Hashimite clan from which they were drawn. The holy cities were mixed, but the Javanese were Shafii, and they constituted a large part of the Meccan population. On the other hand, the Harb tribe was Hanafi. The other two schools were poorly represented in the Hijaz, even though the founder of the Malikis was buried in Medina. The Ottoman central government sometimes did not appoint jurisconsults for those schools of law: Malikis in Medina petitioned Istanbul to appoint a mufti of their rite in 1867 so they could obtain legal opinions on inheritance. There were neither Hanbali preachers nor a Maliki imam (prayer leader) in Mecca in 1873–74. The Hanafi and Shafii leaders took precedence when there were representatives of the other two schools present; the Hanafi led public prayers and presided at major public religious ceremonies. The Hanafi qadi of Mecca regulated the four schools and any conflicts among them inside the Haram.[3]

The legal and ritual standing of Shii Muslims in the Hijaz was unclear. They were disliked and discriminated against by the Sunni majority. A few tribesmen near Medina, the poorest farmers of Medina, some of the butchers of Jidda, and the Persian pilgrim community were Shiis. How they regulated questions of religious law among themselves is unknown.

SUFISM

The legal schools and the split between Sunni and Shii were two ways in which Muslims differentiated themselves. A third was

whether a given Muslim followed the mystical path toward illumination and knowledge of God. Mystics and nonmystics were not antagonistic or even sharply differentiated by the nineteenth century. Membership in the brotherhoods gave the initiates contact with the brotherhood's spiritual past and its leaders who had possessed religious insights. Through contemplation, ascetic practices, compliance with the formal requirements of Islam, and the gradual freedom gained from concern with worldly cares and pleasures, the individual believer, with the leadership of the fully initiated, might himself come closer to the divine. Differences among the brotherhoods existed on questions of the proper mental and physical routines needed to lead the proselyte toward the truth and the light, and also on the spiritual linkages, going back to Muhammad and Ali, that brought the initiate into contact with the inheritors of inner spiritual power and knowledge. The rewards of comradeship and religious solidarity were reinforced by the spiritual abundance and security available from the leaders of the order. For the more advanced in the stages of ascent, there were rewards in coming closer to God.

The Sufis in the Hijaz were numerous and widespread. There were more than one hundred zawiyah chapel houses, known also as khanqahs or tekkes; unfortunately, the number of people who attended the prayer sessions in the zawiyahs and the number of members of the Sufi brotherhoods are unknown. Not all orders had zawiyahs, but all the larger ones did (see table 1).

The major brotherhoods in the Hijaz differed in their approach to spiritual issues, their political and public roles, their hierarchy, and their impact upon the population of the area. The Qadiri order enjoyed some autonomy in its Meccan zawiyahs. They were usually headed by non-Arabs and especially by Anatolian Turks. The Qadiri and other brotherhoods that had originated outside the Hijaz or that had widespread external organizations were not dependent solely upon the local political authorities. The Qadiri order also had its own funds provided from charitable foundations.

The leader of one of its Meccan zawiyahs, Muhammad ibn Ali Khamis, served as chief of its three zawiyahs when dealing with the head Sufi of Mecca; in Medina and Jidda, the zawiyahs were directly under the local Sufi sheikh. The same pattern existed for the other

TABLE 1

SUFI ZAWIYAHS

Sufi Brotherhood	Mecca	Medina	Jidda	Elsewhere	Total
Qadiri	3	Some	Some	...	3+
Khalwati	12	...	8	...	20
Khalwati-Sammani	...	1	4	...	5
Shadhili-Rashidi	3	1	...	...	4
Isawi	1	...	...	...	1
Darqawi	2	...	...	...	2
Darqawi-Rahmani	3	1	...	...	4
Nakshabandi	2	...	1	...	3
Badawi-Ahmadi	3	1	1	...	5
Baiyumi-Ahmadi	8	Some	6	Taif	14+
Dasuqi-Burhani	1	1	...	...	2
Tijani	2	...	...	Yanbu	3
Rifai	2	1	1	...	4
Sadi-Rifai	1	...	...	...	1
Mirghani	4	1	5	Taif	11
Siddiki	1	...	...	...	1
Kalandari	1	...	...	...	1
Sanusi	1	1	1	9	12
Uzbek	...	1	...	...	1
Totals	53	10+	27+	12	102+

SOURCE: Alfred Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmans du Hedjaz* (Paris, 1887), passim; BBA, Mecfis-i Vala 1270; BBA, Ayniyat 875, grand vezir to sheikh of the Haram, 17 Shaban 1294.

brotherhoods: if there were several zawiyahs, an intermediary was chosen to command them and represent them to the sheikh; if there were only one or two, the sheikh acted directly. Abd al-Karim Bantin, the leader of the Qadiris in 1884, after living in Indonesia and Singapore, spent eleven years in Mecca, where he maintained a large house with abundant hospitality for Qadiris. He led a simple life and got along well with the learned masters of formal Islam. He sought the inner meaning of ceremonies and rituals; especially moving were his prayer and remembrance services for the Prophet.

The Khalwatis, and especially the Sammaniyah branch, were strong in the Hijazi ports and in Yemen. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Samman (d. 1775) founded the branch in Mecca; it soon spread to Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Southeast Asia. Its members were mostly non-Hijazis. The Khalwatis were renowned for asceticism, secrecy, and emphasis upon teaching. There were at least

1,800 members in the Hijaz, and it was upon them that the order depended for money, since it had no pious foundations. In the 1880s its leaders in Jidda and in Mecca held the positions of head of the Sufis of those two towns and thereby conferred prestige upon the order. The Sammanis remained influential in Medina in the early twentieth century. Muhammad Abu al-Hasan al-Samman, the mayor of Medina in 1910, was a descendant of the branch's founder and was the local head of the Sammanis.

The Shadhilis were famous for their rationalistic approach to Islam. They included a number of philosophical mystics and recruited from the graduates of al-Azhar in Cairo. Ibrahim al-Rashidi (d. 1874/75) and Ali ibn Yaqub al-Murshidi of the Shadhilis both were harassed by the ulema of Mecca. The order was divided internally on many small doctrinal points.

The most famous member of the Darqawis was Muhammad Zafir al-Madani (d. 1911/12), an adviser to Sultan Abdulhamid II. In 1875 Muhammad, the son of a Medina Shadhili leader, predicted the accession of then Prince Abdulhamid, who subsequently employed him as an envoy in African Tripoli and as an agent among the brotherhoods in Istanbul. He was buried in a Shadhili zawiyah near the imperial palace of Yildiz. Another branch of the Darqawis secured a prominent adherent from outside the Hijaz: Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, the exiled leader of an anti-French rebellion in Algeria, became a Darqawi by 1868, thanks to the efforts of the Mecca zawiyah leader, Muhammad Abd al-Rahman al-Fasi (d. 1878). Abd al-Rahman's branch of the Darqawis spread throughout the Hijaz after it divided from the rest of the order in 1850, but its only branch outside the vilayet was in Massawa.

Another order founded in the Hijaz was the Alwanis, a group that was reformed by the Meccan Abd Allah ibn Salim al-Alwani (d. 1786/87). His grandson was in charge of the Meccan zawiyah in the 1880s. Muhammad Abd al-Rahman (d. 1878) founded a zawiyah in Mecca in 1857; his movement spread to the Sudan and the eastern Red Sea coast.

The social composition of the local Nakshabandi order was the reverse of the Darqawis. The Nakshabandis existed primarily outside the Hijaz. Local members were non-Arabs, and were organized into two separate Indian and Turkish groups. A leader of the Turkish Nakshabandis was Ibrahim Edhem (1829–1904), who had

been a Sufi sheikh in Istanbul as well as director of the Men's Industrial Trade School there. Ibrahim had been sent to Mecca to direct repairs to the Kaba, but he earned a living as a seal engraver. Pilgrims of all ethnic groups were supplied with food and clothes by the Nakshabandis. Feast days were celebrated, and prayer sessions and communal weekly meals took place. The Nakshabandis played a large role in Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamic movement and raised donations for the Hijaz Railroad.

The Baiyumis were founded by an Egyptian sharif who frequently visited the Hijaz in the eighteenth century and gained many Bedouin as well as Indian and Nubian recruits. Hijaz zawiyahs of this brotherhood became independent from Egypt during a struggle over the succession to the grand mastership in the early nineteenth century. As a result, the organization's leaders were appointed by the sheikh of the Sufis. The ascetic Baiyumis provided hostels for pilgrims. Unlike the Baiyumis, the section of the Tijani order in the Hijaz did not serve to unite Muslims of different ethnic or regional origins. The Tijani movement in Mecca split in 1886 between African blacks and Nubians under Sulayman Kabir, and Algerians and Tunisians under Sheikh Musa.

A more numerous brotherhood and perhaps the wealthiest was the Rifai, which owned many waqfs in Mecca and Medina, as well as being the beneficiary of funds from Istanbul. The imperial money was used for the construction of three new zawiyahs in the Hijaz.[4]

These brotherhoods and others like them showed the variety of approaches to Sufism open to the Hijazi Muslim of the nineteenth century. Depending upon his area of origin, language and desire for greater or less direct mystical experience, he could find a brotherhood suited to his preferences. Although the orders differed sharply in their material resources, numbers of followers, organizational independence, and access to Ottoman officialdom, there were also similarities among the brotherhoods. Many of the orders were founded outside the Hijaz, there was a distinct tendency toward fragmentation of the orders as new leaders or doctrinal differences emerged, and the local zawiyahs gained members from limited segments of society.

There were two prominent orders that originated locally and drew members from all of society—the Mirghanis and the Idrisi-

Sanusis. The Mirghanis, or Khatmis, were founded by Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Mirghani, a native of the Hijaz, born near Taif in 1793/94. He grew up in Mecca, where he studied religion before becoming a preacher in Egypt, the Sudan, and the Hijaz; he knew the mystic Ahmad ibn Idris (1760–1837) in Mecca. Muhammad's death is variously given as 1851 or 1853. The order adopted an ecstatic approach to Sufi knowledge, used its founder's writings as a basis for ceremonies of remembrance of God, and believed firmly in hereditary grace and hereditary mystical power. As a result, even while it was spreading rapidly throughout the Red Sea area, there was a heated controversy over the succession to leadership among the sons of Muhammad ibn Uthman and, later, their heirs.

The Meccan zawiyah that looked out onto the Haram was under the control of a grandson of the founder, Abd Allah al-Mahjub, in the 1880s. Abd Allah controlled several other zawiyahs, including at least one in Medina and one near Taif. He and his cousin Muhammad Uthman intervened on the side of the British during the war in the Sudan against the mahdi. Abd Allah's authority was weakened by the splitting from the brotherhood of believers in Yemen, Hadramawt, and the Sudan. Even in the Hijaz, there was a rival organization under the leadership of Ibrahim ibn Musa al-Ukhayli, who controlled at least two zawiyahs in Mecca and Jidda. Other Hijazi Mirghanis allied with the Shadhilis and Nakshabandis. Although the Mirghanis remained numerous in the Hijaz and the family was given Ottoman funds, they lost ground to the Sanusis locally. Mirghani influence was centered in the Sudan.

The Sanusis were founded by Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi (1791–1859), who, like the Mirghani founder, met Ahmad ibn Idris and became a follower of his after making the pilgrimage of 1830. Muhammad ibn Ali founded a zawiyah in Mecca in 1837 but was twice forced to go into exile because of accusations of heresy. By 1853 additional zawiyahs were founded in Mecca, Medina, Taif, Jidda, and numerous smaller places. The movement spread rapidly among the Bedouins; unfortunately there is no evidence to indicate what aspects of it appealed particularly to them. Perhaps it was the independence of the order, which was free from control either by the sharifs of Mecca or by the Ottoman government. As in Libya, where the movement eventually gained political power for part of

the twentieth century, so in the Hijaz the Sanusis founded settlements, organized caravans, extended their protection, created plantations with a slave militia, and grouped together the usually antipathetic Bedouins and villagers. In the towns the Sanusi zawiyahs helped pilgrims and also used their extensive funds for teaching. Two separate hierarchies supervised spiritual and financial matters, with an accountant and messengers under the control of the Sanusi's center at the oasis of Jaghbub in North Africa. The Hijazi leadership was semihereditary, but after 1859 the family of the founder lived in North Africa. Sultan Abdulhamid II desired to use the Sanusis to spread Ottoman power in Libya and the Sahara. However, the Sanusis in Arabia remained more independent of the Ottomans than other Sufi brotherhoods. The Sanusis incurred the enmity and suspicion of the amirs of Mecca because of their independence and because of their influence among the tribes.[5]

Despite their widespread following, the Sanusi order had little to do with the politics of the Hijaz or with the relations between the tribes and the government. The only known instance of intervention or mediation was in 1886 when the Sanusi leader in Yanbu opposed a rising by the villagers against the government over taxes. The local residents rejected his advice, revolted, killed some Ottoman soldiers, and suffered casualties of their own before the revolt was suppressed.[6]

REPRESSION AND INNOVATION

Although the Sufi brotherhoods had many followers in the Hijaz, their social power was small because their approach to life was apolitical and they tended toward the ascetic attitude of despising the material factors of life. Power in religion lay with the amirs of Mecca, the ulema, and the Ottoman government. The exercise of religious power was usually positive through the encouragement and regulation of such things as religious education, the pilgrimage, and charitable foundations.

There were some examples of the use of political power to enforce religious orthodoxy. A serious complaint to Istanbul was made by a special council in 1849 composed of the Meccan ulema; the vali; Ahmad ibn Zayni Dahlan, the Shafii mufti and head of the preachers and prayer leaders; all the other muftis of Mecca; the

head of the teachers; the deputy sheikh of the Meccan Haram; Hasan ibn Shahin, the deputy amir of Mecca; and Muhammad Imad al-Din, the qadi of Mecca. Several Indian Muslims were accused of leading the people into error by disavowing the four schools of religious law, opposing the miracles of the saints, and introducing innovations into religion. The Indians were said to have arrogated to themselves the right to interpret the bases of the faith. After hearing witnesses testify against the accused, the council decided to arrest them and exile them. The vali wanted to execute the Indians, for he argued that evil in religion was the greatest of evils in the world. Eventually he gave way to the council's opinion, and after gaining the approval of the Istanbul Council of Judicial Affairs and the sultan, they were sent to India. Very similar occurrences took place in 1874 and 1883 when Sunni Muslim Indians were exiled from Mecca for spreading what the Meccan ulema considered to be wrong beliefs. The Ottomans feared the coming of Wahhabi doctrines via India to the Hijaz. In 1885 the vali secretly obtained the papers and books of three Indian pilgrims who were suspected of Wahhabi ideas. In the next year, two more Indian pilgrim leaders who had recently become Ottoman citizens were arrested by the Ottomans. In their papers were printed proclamations by the Sudanese mahdi and works on Wahhabism. There was some agitation in Mecca for their release, but instead Istanbul ordered them deported to India.[7]

There were few cases of political suppression of religious dissent among non-Indians. One of the few concerned the Rashidi Sufis. The Rashidiyah had been founded by Ahmad ibn Idris's disciple Ibrahim al-Rashid, who disputed the claims of numerous other Sufi groups to be Ahmad's rightful heir. Ibrahim overcame the enmity caused by his rivals and was acquitted of charges of heresy in Mecca in 1856/57. With the aid of Indian Muslim gifts, he built a zawiyah there, where he died in 1874 and was succeeded by his nephew. Other instances occurred in the 1880s, a decade of political turmoil. A conflict over the leadership of the Nakshabandiyah in Mecca between Sulayman and Khalil ibn Yahya caused the first incident. Sulayman wrote a series of pamphlets said by the muftis and teachers at the Haram to be false and dangerous. Sulayman was imprisoned, his pamphlets were destroyed, and he apologized for his errors. Khalil's essays against Sulayman were among the first works printed in Mecca. A second incident was the execu-

tion of a Sudanese, probably the Shadhili leader Ali ibn Yaqub al-Murshidi, born in Mecca, who proclaimed himself the mahdi in a village between Jidda and Mecca in 1886. He gained a small following among some slaves, but was soon seized, condemned by a council of the ulema in Mecca, and executed by order of the vali.[8]

The failure of such religious reformers to secure a substantial following in the Hijaz indicates the overwhelming commitment of the people of the holy cities to the continuance of the existing forms of religion, although there were some instances of changes introduced from abroad, particularly in the Sufi brotherhoods.

More important, however, was the influence exerted by the Hijaz upon the rest of the Islamic world. Many Hijazi teachers of religion had disciples abroad, and Medina scholars had been important teachers as early as the eighteenth century. The mystic Ahmad ibn Idris lived in Mecca and Asir off and on from 1818 to his death in 1837. He was among the most influential Sufis of his generation, and his fame spread throughout the Islamic world through his disciples. Many contacts were made among pilgrims who met in Mecca or Medina, where they exchanged ideas and approaches to religious truth. An example was the spread of a stricter interpretation of the Quran among Southeast Asian Muslims as the students of Ahmad Katib (1855–1916), a Shafii law teacher in Mecca, returned to Sumatra and Malaya in the 1880s and 1890s. The Nakshabandiyah in Mecca were particularly active. They gained large numbers of followers in the Malaysian states and in the East Indies. Many Meccan and Medinan ulema also went to other parts of the Muslim lands to gain funds for themselves and their religious and charitable undertakings in the Hijaz.[9]

Muslims assumed that those living in proximity to holy places were pious and deserving of charity. One sharif who lived in Medina for three months of the year spent the rest of his time traveling to Istanbul, Bukhara, Kabul, and India. In his case, as in others, his claims to receive charity and gifts were endorsed by imperial letters of credence from the Ottoman sultan.[10]

Despite the large numbers of pilgrims coming to the Hijaz and the influence of some Hijazis abroad, Mecca and Medina were not the most important and influential cities of Islam in the nineteenth century. The relative poverty of the Hijaz, the shortness of most pilgrims' stays in the area, and the pressure for religious conformity lessened substantial changes and developments in theol-

ogy. Instead, Cairo, Istanbul, some of the Indian cities, and perhaps Riyadh led the way in the nineteenth century in the theological development of Sunni Islam. Mecca and Medina were important as refuges for conservative thinkers who wished to escape the changes taking place in cities such as Cairo.

OFFICIALDOM

Religious experiences in the Hijaz took place in social structures and institutions supervised by officials appointed by, or with the sanction of, the Ottoman and amirate authorities. These officials influenced the nature of religious life both for Hijazis and pilgrims. Since the officials were dependent for appointment, salaries, and promotion upon the Ottoman government, they were subject to direct government manipulation.

The chief religious officials were the amir and qadi of Mecca. Next in importance were the two sheikhs, or directors, of the Harams in Mecca and Medina. The Meccan position was formally merged with the governorship of the Hijaz after 1864.

In the case of Medina, the position of sheikh and that of Ottoman governor (muhafiz) of the city were often held jointly. In addition to the civil and police powers sometimes exercised by the sheikh, either in his own role or as governor, his responsibilities were to supervise and administer the complex of buildings, offices, and storehouses associated with the Haram. The sheikh of the Medina Haram held office for a short term, averaging two to three years. Exceptional longer terms in office occurred in the 1840s when Ottoman control was being reestablished after the end of the Egyptian occupation and again following the advent to power of Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1876 (see table 2).

Once he had found an official he could trust, Abdulhamid tended to retain the same person in office. However, even the Circassian army officer Osman, who was governor and sheikh for the longest term, was occasionally limited in his authority by the sultan. In 1899 and between 1902–4, four other people briefly served as governors of Medina, and Osman retained only the position of sheikh of the Haram. Eventually Osman resumed the governorship until the Revolution of 1908 ousted Hamidian personnel in the Hijaz.

TABLE 2

SHEIKHS OF THE MEDINA HARAM

Years in Office	Sheikh
1839–40	Osman
1841	Haci Ali
1841–45	Sherif
1845	Ashki
1846–50	Davud
1850–51	Sherif
1851–52	Haci Edhem
1852–55	Osman
1855–56	Arif
1856–58	Tosun
1858–61	Mustafa
1861–62	Ziver
1862–63	Emin
1863	Suleyman
1863–64	Hafiz
1864–67	Mehmet Vecihi
1867–70	Emin
1870	Osman
1871–74	Halet
1874–75	Mehmet
1875–77	Ali Sarim
1878–82	Halet
1882–1889	Adil
1889–91	Shevket
1891–1908	Osman

There were others who shared in the administration of the Harams. In Mecca and Medina, the need to provide guards who could with propriety supervise female pilgrims led to the use of eunuchs. Most of the eunuchs were black slaves from Africa who had been castrated there and who were trained as apprentices in Mecca or Medina. They enjoyed a high status, frequently having separate households and their own slaves, but technically they were slaves themselves and thus could not leave the Harams of their own free will. Many had chosen to go to Mecca or Medina from Istanbul, seeing in those places an opportunity for a pious retirement from the imperial court. The one hundred twenty eunuchs in Medina in 1853 were under the command of a former slave of Sultan Mahmud II's sister. There were about fifty eunuchs in the Meccan Haram throughout the nineteenth century. The calls to prayer were given by muezzins. In the days before loudspeakers,

this often was a hauntingly beautiful part of religious life and the daily routine of Muslims. There were about fifty paid muezzins in each of the Harams. Prayer leaders numbered nearly ninety for Medina, and there were about forty-five preachers. Hanafis were the most numerous, followed by Shafiis, Malikis, and Hanbalis. Prayers were recited for the ruling sultan and for deceased Muslims by more than one hundred people in Medina, who received payment for this service. In Mecca the Hanafis had forty-three paid and thirty-two volunteer preachers and prayer leaders, the Shafiis had twenty-five, the Malikis fifteen, and the Hanbalis only five.[11]

In addition to those who carried out the police and ceremonial religious functions, there were officials who provided services and who physically maintained the Harams: servants, doorkeepers, sweepers, candle-cleaners and -lighters, water-carriers, goldsmiths, and so on. Many of these posts were paid ones that rotated among the people of Medina so that all could share in the sanctity as well as the perquisites of office. Other posts were unpaid but remunerative in terms of prestige and gifts. The title of servant of the Haram was sometimes awarded by the amir of Mecca or by the sheikh of the Medina Haram for cash payment; the title of servant of the two Harams was proudly borne by the sultan himself. Perhaps three hundred people were permanently paid by the Meccan Haram, exclusive of fifty to one hundred teachers and two hundred guides. If one added unpaid volunteers, the number of employees would, at the minimum, have been doubled. Between four hundred and six hundred regular staff were paid at Medina, with as many more volunteers who received only small sums as their turns came in rotation. More than two thousand persons worked at both Harams.

The Haram workers were organized with a sheikh for each of the various occupations. The appointment of the sheikhs had to be approved by the Ottoman government.

Muftis were appointed directly by Istanbul for Mecca and Medina. As in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, in this position sons tended to follow fathers, and muftis held their offices for long terms. The most striking examples of continuity were the three members of the Barzanji family who held the Medina Shafii muftiship from 1852 to 1907 (possibly with a gap between 1897 and 1905), and the tenures of Abd al-Rahman ibn Abd Allah Sarraj and Salih Kamal as Hanafi muftis of Mecca from 1878 to 1906. Similar

tenure and family recruitment practices probably existed for other posts as well.

All of the men of religion in each town were collectively headed by a sheikh. The exact duties of this position, the ways in which it was filled, and its relations with Ottoman and amirate officials are unfortunately unknown. In Medina in 1881, the sheikh of the ulema was also the Hanafi mufti; but in Mecca at the same time, Dahlan, the Shafii mufti, held the post. The latter distributed some gifts that had been made to the whole ulema, appointed teachers at the Haram, and in general served as a link between the ulema and the government. He also chose from among the ulema those who would go abroad to collect charitable gifts. Dahlan's learning and forceful personality may have given him greater authority than his predecessors or successors held.

In addition to a chief of the ulema, there were potential rivals with the amirs of Mecca to lead the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad living in the Hijaz. In this area descendants of the Prophet Muhammad's grandsons Hasan and Husayn were differentiated; Hasanids were termed sharifs, and Husaynids, sayyids. Medina had a naqib al-ashraf, or head of the sharifs, from 1841 to 1862 and in 1902, and a naqib al-sadat, or head of the sayyids, for the whole of the nineteenth century after 1840. There was a naqib al-sadat in Mecca in 1842–53, 1857–71, 1881, and possibly at other times as well. The amir of Mecca headed the ashraf there, although Ishaq Efendi was called both naqib al-ashraf and naqib al-sadat in the 1840s and 1850s.

In other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the naqibs were mediators between local governments and their groups. They also served as intermediaries, passing information and advice upward to the politically powerful and demands for services and support downward. A similar function was exercised by the heads of the guilds, ulema, religious professions, and the Sufi brotherhoods. In the case of the Sufis, Mehmed Ali's Egyptian administration had introduced to the Hijaz the function of chief Sufi sheikh. This sheikh presided over Sufi public ceremonies, led special prayers in mosques, supervised pious foundations, and, when particularly powerful persons held the post, named the heads of the orders. The Ottoman restoration in 1840 kept the chief Sufi position and added a council of advisers. The sheikh lost some of his power as some

of the brotherhoods escaped his authority in the late nineteenth century. The central government itself also occasionally appointed heads of the Sufi brotherhoods independently of the sheikh.

The Shaybi family held their post of keykeeper of the Kaba by hereditary right. They traced their ancestry back to pre-Islamic times and claimed to have controlled admission to the Kaba ever since. During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government selected the new keykeeper from among the family, although rival factions of the Shaybi clan claimed the succession, particularly in the 1870s and 1880s. The leaders of the family were greatly respected, served on the administrative councils of the province, and received salaries and pensions from Istanbul. When the cloth covering of the Kaba was replaced, pieces of the old one were sold by the Shaybis to shops in Mecca for resale to pilgrims. The keykeeper also was given substantial presents by those admitted to the interior of the Kaba. After the Revolution of 1908, Hasan Shaybi was elected to the Ottoman Parliament from the Hijaz.[12]

FINANCES OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Religious structures, institutions, and individuals were supported financially in a variety of ways, but most of their money came in one form or another from the Ottoman government.

Pious foundations (waqfs) had been established throughout the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of aiding the holy cities. The income from these properties was collected by a treasury established especially for that purpose. In Egypt waqfs existed to pay for the renewal of the Kaba's covering, for sending grain to the Hijaz, and for the pilgrimage. There were also some pious foundations in the Hijaz. The Haseki Sultan charity kitchens were maintained in part from Egyptian funds and in part from the rent from thirty-four shops in Mecca. This waqf provided soup, bread, and rice every day to the poor and sick of Mecca. Sultans had endowed the Mahmudiye school in Medina with local waqf income, and the Harams also had local waqfs for their support. Amirs of Mecca gave money and property to such pious foundations. An example was the Amir Ghalib's waqf, which had an income in 1871 of T. L. 2,295. The mosques of Jidda had waqf property yielding about T. L. 7,500 per year in 1888. Private individuals also founded pious foundations,

for example, Mustafa Qadi, who endowed the Sanusi zawiyah in Jidda in the 1840s with all his money.[13]

Far more came directly from Istanbul through the imperial charities. The distribution of imperial charities in Medina was controlled by the muftis, the chief preacher, and the judge's clerk. The recipients included all the major religious officials and the Sufi leaders. When supplies of food or cash were not forthcoming, as in 1841, the officials petitioned Istanbul. One of many recipients was the Medina Shafii mufti, who, in addition to his monetary salary, monthly received wheat, butter, rice, sugar, coffee, and soap. The central government also supported institutions. Muhammad Jan (d. ca. 1850) had built in Jidda a Nakshabandiyah convent that provided food to the poor. In 1854 Istanbul agreed to give food and money to the zawiyah. There were about one hundred fifty lodgings in Mecca and fifty-nine in Medina that supplied room and board to the needy. The lodging houses received grain and meat from the imperial government. Even though the Ottoman Empire was short of money in the second half of the nineteenth century, funds were found for the restoration of buildings in the Hijaz. Both Harams were extensively repaired and renovated, despite the opposition of some Medina mystics who objected to any changes in the holy structure.[14]

Private sources of income included fees charged for such services as performing marriages, notarizing documents, rendering judgments outside regular court service, opening the Kaba or sections of the Harams outside regular hours, and so on. One ingenious device took advantage of the desire of pilgrims from the more distant Islamic lands to exchange their present names for Arabic ones: printed forms for this purpose were kept at the muftis' residences and a fee was charged for their signatures.[15]

The powers and status of the Muslim officialdom showed that the Hijaz was a Muslim land. Some Christians were permitted in Jidda and occasionally in the interior as travelers, but they were not allowed to visit the holy cities. In another sense the Hijaz was a Muslim land because of its deep piety, reinforced by religious structures. These were widespread and provided vehicles for forming and shaping religous identity, legal opinions, and mystical yearnings. Political structures provided religious groups with the means to repress what were considered heresies as well as the fi-

nancial support to maintain charities, the pilgrimage, the Harams, and the salaries of the chief religious figures. In return the men of religion did not usually challenge government power. Religious legitimacy was conferred on the Ottoman Empire as the protector of the holy places of Islam.

Conflict, tension, and change did exist, but only to a small degree in the religious life of the Hijaz. The Indian Wahhabis were outside the Hijazi spectrum of thought and were easily repressed. Orthodoxy and orthopraxy were popular. Potential challenges to the status quo could have come from the Sufis and local religious officials. However, the brotherhoods were limited in the political sphere by their own ideology and by the division of religious respect among the populace between the Sufi leaders and the sharifs of Mecca. The fragmentation of the Sufi orders along ethnic lines also weakened them. The most important Hijazi Sufi orders spread into Africa and found there a more congenial atmosphere for political influence. Roles as mediators and possessors of spiritual grace were also filled by the Hashimite sharifs of Mecca. Since the muftis and other religious officials were paid by the Ottomans, the possibility of their opposing imperial rule was slight.

The wide range of religious groups and institutions was outside the total control of the Ottoman political elite. The Ottomans tried to overcome this by bringing the various religious groups under their control through appointing the sheikhs who headed each of them. Ottoman control of employment at the Harams was also of far-reaching importance: the 2,000 employees of the Harams provided a major source of influence for the central government.

In short, the social institutions of religion were under the overarching control of the state, but the forms of those religious structures responded to the deepest beliefs and needs of the highly varied population of the nineteenth-century Hijaz. The Ottoman state supported religion and picked the leaders of religious institutions, but religious structures enjoyed a legitimacy, vitality, and authority independent of the empire. Through the pilgrimage religion greatly influenced all aspects of the social and political history of the Hijaz.

1. Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, pp. 127, 237.

2. Smith, *Lectures*, pp. 493, 547; FO 195/2224, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 16 January 1906; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Turquie, Politique intérieure, Arabie-Yemen

(hereafter FY), Malzag (Jidda) to ministry, 9 September 1907; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 199; Abd al-Qudus al-Ansari, *Tarikh Madinah Juddah*, pp. 282–83.

3. Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 2:6–7; Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, p. 159; Fuad Hamzah, *Qalb Jazirat al-Arab*, p. 97; BBA, Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to sheikh of the Medina Haram, 23 Muharrem 1284; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 261.

4. The foregoing discussion of Sufis is based on these sources: Alfred Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmans du Hedjaz*; John Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World*; Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad*, pp. 69–76; B. Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," pp. 146–48; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 206, 276–81; J. S. Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan*, pp. 200, 231.

5. Le Chatelier, *Confréries*, pp. 13–19, 226–42, 272–91; BBA, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi, 298156, 1911; FJP, Dorville (Jidda) to ministry, 2 September 1893; Al-Barakati, *Al-Rihlat al-Yamaniyyah*, p. 119; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 56; Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan*, pp. 215–17; Nicola Ziadeh, *Sanusiyah*, pp. 45–47, 62–71, 114–16, 121; Voll, *Islam*, pp. 78, 137.

6. Le Chatelier, *Confréries*, pp. 288–89.

7. Voll, *Islam*, p. 126; *Recueil de firmans impériaux ottomans*, p. 98; BBA, Meclis-i Vala 5405, 26 Shevval 1266; BBA, Ayniyat 871, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1290 and 14 Cemaziyelahir 1290; FO 195/1451, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Jago, 10 November 1883; FO 685/2/1, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Government of India, 12 October 1885; FO 685/2/1, Jago (Jidda) to Government of India, 15 February 1886.

8. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 177–79; Le Chatelier, *Confréries*, pp. 9, 97–99; FO 195/1547, Jago (Jidda) to Thornton, 17 May 1886.

9. Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 3:83; John Voll, "Muhammad Hayya al-Sindi and Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab"; Voll, *Islam*, pp. 78, 117; A. Hourani, "Shaikh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order," p. 100; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 241.

10. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:274; BBA, Ayniyat 1517, grand vezir to Sadiq Pasha, vali of Tunis, 4 Receb 1297; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:159. A similar phenomenon took place among the Moroccan marabouts who visited outlying regions and received gifts (Dale Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam*, pp. 169–70).

11. Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:371–74; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1303*, p. 185; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1305*, pp. 233–34; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1306*, pp. 302–5; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, pp. 101, 242; BBA, Ayniyat 872, grand vezir to amir and vali, 26 Safer 1290.

12. BBA, Ayniyat 875, grand vezir to amir and vali, 19 Shaban 1294; BBA, Shurayi Devlet 2874, 20 Shevval 1297; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 139.

13. Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 1:1039; *Recueil*, p. 41; BBA, Dahiliye 69888, 4 Rebiyulahir 1300; BBA, Ayniyat 871, 12 Cemaziyelahir 1288, 29 Zilhicce 1288, and 15 Receb 1289; BBA, Shurayi Devlet 5368, 21 Receb 1305.

14. BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2431, n.d., enclosure 12; BBA, Dahiliye 3887, 11 Receb 1259; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:374–75; BBA, Dahiliye 64975, 12 Rebiyulahir 1297; BBA, Meclis-i Vala 11868, 15 Rebiyulahir 1270; Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tezakir*, 2:15–17; Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 1:1039:40.

15. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 236–38.

CHAPTER 3
PILGRIMAGE AND HEALTH

ACCORDING TO MUSLIMS the pilgrimage is a reenactment of the Quranic story of Abraham. The willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son so as to carry out the will of God, the substitution of an animal sacrifice in the place of a human one through God's mercy, and the building of a house of God have been commemorated every year by millions of Muslims in the Hijaz and elsewhere. The prophet Muhammad revived and codified the correct procedures for pilgrims so that when they went on the pilgrimage to Mecca and nearby sites to meet their religious obligations a detailed set of rituals existed. After the death of Muhammad in 632 A.D., those sites in Mecca and Medina associated with his life and with the revelations that God had made to him were visited by the pilgrims.

The pilgrimage was the central link between religion and society in the Hijaz. Its social and collective importance was seen in the external behavior of the pilgrims, the institutions of the pilgrimage, and the impact of the pilgrims on Hijazi society. However, it should be remembered that the purpose of the pilgrims was to achieve personal, internal goals: for them the pilgrimage existed for spiritual and not material reasons.

Pilgrims came to the two holy cities by a number of different routes. Muslims living to the southeast, east, and southwest of the Hijaz usually traveled through the straits of Bab al-Mandab at the southern entrance to the Red Sea; those coming from areas lying to the north and northwest of Mecca and Medina arrived by sea via Suez. Land caravans were slow and dangerous.[1] Many were under the protection of Ottoman, Ottoman-Egyptian, and Central Arabian military escorts who guarded the pilgrims from attacks by Bedouins. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, a large majority of the pilgrims from outside the Arabian Peninsula came by sea rather than by land. The bulk of pilgrims consisted of Hijazis, plus people from relatively close areas such as Najd and Yemen.

The conditions under which pilgrimages were undertaken changed from year to year as the crucial pilgrimage days of 8 to 12 Dhu al-Hijjah according to the lunar religious calendar changed in

regard to the solar calendar. When the pilgrimage fell in December and there was a period of comparative coolness in the Hijaz, the pilgrims tended to be happier and healthier than when the holy days took place at the height of the heat in July. In the summer tremendous problems were added for the pilgrims.

Pilgrims received some assistance from the Ottoman sultan in his role of protector of Mecca and Medina and of the pilgrimage to these cities. The members of the Ottoman imperial court showed numerous signs of personal reverence for the pilgrimage in general and for deserving pilgrims in particular. The sultans traditionally celebrated the departure of a pilgrimage caravan from Istanbul with brilliant ceremonies. They sent guards to protect the pilgrims and occasional messengers with gifts, and they dedicated some of the tax resources of the Syrian provinces and Egypt to the pilgrimage. Drama, excitement, and danger surrounded the long trips of the two official Ottoman pilgrimage caravans from Damascus and Cairo to the Hijaz.[2]

Once the pilgrims entered the Hijaz, they were by no means guaranteed the attainment of their goals. Some past rulers had expressed personal piety and increased the safety of the pilgrims by accompanying the caravans themselves. Although none of the Ottoman sultans personally made the pilgrimage, they did make strenuous attempts to safeguard it. Nevertheless, there were occasions when the nomads succeeded in robbing and murdering pilgrims, most notably in 1757, when the Ottoman caravan was completely destroyed and a sister of the sultan killed. A lengthier interruption took place when the Wahhabi movement conquered Mecca and Medina and the official pilgrimage from the Ottoman Empire ceased. Even after Egypt reconquered the Hijaz for the Ottomans, there were interruptions caused by the military and political rivalry between Mehmet Ali and Sultan Mahmud II. In 1831–33 there were no official pilgrimage caravans from Syria, and from 1834 to 1840, while Syria was under Egyptian occupation, an officer of the army of Mehmet Ali led the caravans.[3]

Between 1840 and 1908, the leaders of the two pilgrimages exercised a good deal of independent authority in the Hijaz in order to permit them to transit the lands of the Bedouin tribes. The leaders' duties included dispensing the imperial payments to nomads so as to secure their permission to go through their territory;

supervising the military guards and provisions; helping to choose the routes to be followed by the pilgrims; and governing the conduct of the pilgrims in their caravans.

Despite the Quranic injunction promising a painful chastisement to those who barred the way to the pilgrimage, a number of foreign states stopped Muslim pilgrims from making the trip to the Hijaz, usually for health reasons. As the Ottomans pointed out, pilgrimages were sometimes banned in the years following the outbreak of disease when measures had already been taken to correct the health problems. Other barriers to the pilgrimage were politically or religiously inspired, as when the Sudanese ruler forbade the pilgrimage to the Hijaz on the grounds that his predecessor's tomb was a more suitable object for veneration.[4]

It was extremely difficult for contemporaries to estimate the numbers of pilgrims coming to Mecca. Arrivals by sea were counted by the British and French with relative ease, especially after the establishment of quarantine stations, but the numbers of pilgrims arriving by land were not so easily ascertained, as is evidenced by the absence of figures in table 3. Variations in estimates of numbers in attendance were sharp. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, there was a general increase in sea arrivals caused by the increased speed and ease of travel by steamship, and perhaps by increasing interest in Islam in South and Southeast Asia. When political and security conditions in the Hijaz were favorable for several years in a row, pilgrims came there in greater numbers, as in 1905–8 (see table 3). When the key day of the pilgrimage was expected to fall on a Friday, which was considered to be an auspicious day, the numbers of pilgrims rose, as in 1870 and 1893. Conversely, when political upheavals took place, attendance fell, as in 1859 following the massacre of 1858 and in 1881–83. The epidemics of the early and middle 1890s brought about a reduction in the numbers of pilgrims traveling to the Hijaz between 1897 and 1900.

Changes in the expenses incurred by pilgrims in the Hijaz did not substantially alter the attendance numbers. Although consuls objected vehemently to the imposition of new taxes and fees on pilgrims, such as the sanitary tax of ten kurush in 1872, most pilgrims paid without question. Even the more experienced pilgrims, who had made the trip before, were usually not aware that excessive prices for camel hire and shipping involved collusion by the amir of Mecca, the vali, and many merchants and pilgrim guides.

TABLE 3

NUMBERS OF PILGRIMS

Year	Sea Arrivals	Land Arrivals	Total at Arafat
1853	.....	.....	50,000
1854	.....	.....	60,000
1855	.....	.....	80,000
1856	.....	.....	125,000
1857	.....	.....	140,000
1858	.....	.....	160,000
1859	14,000	16,000	30,000
1860	24,000	49,000	73,000
1865	48,000	.....	90,000
1866	30,000	.....	60,000
1867	12,000	.....	70,000
1868	40,000	.....	85,000
1869	24,000	86,000	110,000
1870	41,000	159,000	200,000
1871	30,000	.....	125,000
1872	56,000	.....	110,000
1873	30,000	.....	90,000
1874	36,000	.....	166,000
1875	40,000	.....	160,000
1876	35,000	.....	140,000
1876/77	46,000	154,000	200,000
1877/78	30,000	.....	100,000
1879	43,000	.....	.....
1880	60,000	31,500	91,500
1881	38,000	.....	80,000
1882	26,000	44,000	70,000
1883	27,000	.....	60,000
1884	31,000	.....	70,000
1885	53,000	67,000	120,000
1886	42,000	.....	.....
1887	46,000	94,000	140,000
1888	55,000	.....	.....
1889	49,000	.....	.....
1890	44,000	.....	132,000
1891	46,000	.....	132,000
1892	27,000	.....	.....
1893	93,000	106,000	199,000
1894	47,000	.....	.....
1895	52,000	.....	.....
1896	57,000	.....	.....
1897	35,000	.....	.....
1898	33,000	.....	.....
1899	36,000	.....	.....
1900	35,000	.....	.....
1901	46,000	.....	.....
1902	53,000	.....	.....
1903	34,000	.....	.....
1904	67,000	.....	.....
1905	67,000	76,000	143,000
1906	108,000	.....	195,000
1907	91,000	.....	250,000
1908	68,000	105,000	173,000

SOURCE The above estimates were drawn from varying sources, chiefly French and British diplomatic records. Numbers should be taken as only very rough indications, particularly for the total at Arafat.

Costs to pilgrims arriving by sea included at least the prices charged them for the following items: passage to and from Jidda; passage by small boat to the Jidda quay; camel hire between the Hijazi towns; usually at least one day's rent in Jidda; fees to the guides and their agents in the various towns; rent in Mecca and in Medina; food and provisions while in the Hijaz, though many pilgrims brought some food with them; tips to workers and attendants at the Harams; purchase of mementos; exchange of currencies. Since many pilgrims did not know Arabic, they were dependent upon their guides, who assumed complete charge over all their spending, often to the financial advantage of the guides and their friends and relatives. The guides then handled the complicated relationships with camel brokers, the owners of rental property in Mecca, and so on. Since the cost of food and rent escalated sharply during the pilgrimage, pilgrims' costs were relatively high compared with the cost of living for Hijazis during the rest of the year. A fairly modest rate of expenditure in the 1890s, but one including the side trip to Medina, would entail the spending in one month of at least T. L. 12 in the Hijaz, exclusive of shipping. When there were 80,000 non-Hijazis present for the pilgrimage, they brought in at least T. L. 960,000 to the local economy.

The money available from such large numbers of travelers tempted Thomas Cook and Son, of Great Britain, to arrange all-inclusive pilgrimages from India between 1887 and 1893. They were able to gain the business of about one-third of Bombay-Jidda pilgrims, but ultimately abandoned the scheme because of local opposition in the Hijaz and because expenses were too high, profits too low, and the pilgrims too poor.

The poverty of pilgrims created considerable problems for the Hijaz. Many poor pilgrims walked to the Hijaz or to ports nearby, where they gradually earned enough for their passage. When they arrived in Jidda, they had no money at all. Other pilgrims had to sell their return tickets so as to obtain sufficient money for food and lodging. The Netherlands East Indies and Malayan authorities ultimately ended such problems for their pilgrims by forcing them to buy nonrefundable round-trip tickets in advance and to deposit surety money with their consuls on arrival in Jidda. India did not undertake a similar program, despite pleas from the Ottoman Empire to do so. Poor Indian and Sudanese pilgrims were the most

frequent beneficiaries of charity by steamship companies, the Ottoman government, local notables, and foreign states. Charity kitchens and hotels in the towns lessened the worst suffering, but the small amounts of money and space available for such purposes meant that many poor pilgrims died from starvation, malnutrition, and exposure; and many more had to work in the Hijaz and save money for years before they could return to their homes.[5]

The suffering of the poor pilgrims was perhaps alleviated somewhat by their belief that pains endured while on the pilgrimage were spiritually cleansing. Dying while on the pilgrimage was considered to be a benefit. Overcoming the difficulties posed by heat, hostile Bedouins, and the avarice of guides was essential so that the pilgrimage could be completed, but its true success was dependent more upon the individual's faith in the sanctity of the experience and the depth of his or her own participation in the inner meaning of the public ceremonies. A pilgrim must wish to face God as well as to meet the formal requirements of the pilgrimage.

At the opposite end of the status hierarchy from the poor were the prominent pilgrims who visited Mecca and Medina. Members of the ruling royal families in the Ottoman Empire, its Egyptian province, North Africa, Iran, and India came to the Hijaz between 1840 and 1908. The mother of Sultan Abdulmecid died in Jidda in 1873 and was buried near the reputed tomb of Eve. Rulers of Kanpur and Bhopal in India, Zanzibar, the Maldives, and Darfur made the pilgrimage. Istanbul was lavish with guards, ceremonies, medals, and hospitality to impress favorably these visiting dignitaries.[6]

The extreme heterogeneity of the pilgrims caused them and the local population many difficulties because of language and social differences, but the Shii religious minority posed a more basic challenge to the generally tolerant and egalitarian spirit of the pilgrimage. Shii ritual and doctrinal differences resulted in quarrels and tensions between Sunnis and Shiis, particularly in the Medina Haram. Mehmet Ali, of Egypt, had ordered the governor of Medina to enforce equal treatment for Shii pilgrims, including equal taxation and fees, during the 1830s. Disputes were to be settled by consultation with the leaders of the overland pilgrimage from Iran. After the restoration of Ottoman control in the Hijaz and the reestablishment of Saudi power in central Arabia, the Shii pilgrims once again had to pay special fees as protection money. Shii cara-

vans between Mecca and Medina paid T. L. 4 per pilgrim more to the nomads than did Sunnis. In Medina, Shii pilgrims had close relations with local Shiis there, the Nakhwalis, who provided guides and housing to the Iranians.[7]

HEALTH

The powerful religious imperatives behind the pilgrimage for Muslims, the motivation of the Ottoman Empire to secure legitimacy as protector of the pilgrimage, and the desire of the European states to stop the spread of disease conflicted in the latter nineteenth century. Supervision of the health of the pilgrims and quarantine to control their travel were the focal points for a clash between religion and secular concerns.

The growing interest of the Ottoman central government and Western European states in the pilgrimage's implications for health after the 1850s spurred a greater interest in the conditions of life and death in the Hijaz. During the bulk of the year, when large numbers of pilgrims were not present, this interest waned. In questions of health, religion dominated the Hijaz; religious attitudes and the passions of the pilgrims played a major role in determining types of government action to curtail outbreaks of disease.

The maintenance of good health conditions for the pilgrims took greater priority, in the minds of Ottoman and foreign officials, than care for the welfare of the inhabitants of Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. However, the local population indirectly benefited or suffered from the efforts of the Ottomans in the 1870s, followed by the increasingly serious measures taken by Great Britain in the 1880s and 1890s, to improve the lot of the pilgrims.

Sanitary and water conditions in Mecca and Jidda were so poor as to lower resistance against all diseases. When the pilgrims left Mecca in 1815, for instance, rubbish and filth covered the streets, there were dead camels left to fester on the outskirts of the town, and privies were emptied into holes in the streets in front of the houses and covered with dirt. There were no public sewers, effective quarantines, or street-cleaning arrangements. It was difficult and expensive to obtain uncontaminated drinking water in Jidda and in Mecca, but somewhat easier in Medina.[8]

It was the spread of cholera among the pilgrims going to the

Hijaz that first brought forth concern over communicable disease in the holy cities. Cholera brought death on a vast scale to the pilgrims and inhabitants of the Hijaz. Before 1831 the disease had not been known in the area. There were some rare outbreaks of bubonic plague in the early nineteenth century, but these were not as severe as the attacks that had devastated Ottoman port cities such as Izmir in the eighteenth century.

When cholera appeared for the first time, it caused deaths not only among the poor but also among the rich and powerful. The Ottoman-Egyptian governors of Jidda and Medina and the leader of the Egyptian pilgrimage were killed by the disease. In 1832 the villagers and Bedouins were severely affected. More than ten thousand people died in the Hijaz, and, as the disease spread to Egypt and Europe, thousands more were killed.

Despite new outbreaks of cholera in 1834, 1836–38, and 1846, and four attacks in the 1850s, remarkably little was done by anyone to stop the disease. By the prevailing health standards of the Ottoman central government, Mecca and Medina were not well treated. The vali of the Hijaz in admitting this to the grand vezir pointed out in 1848 that there were privies at only two gates of the Haram in Mecca and more were urgently needed, and that the streets needed to be swept and cleaned more regularly. Starting in 1844 the Ottomans had sent a physician and a pharmacist to Medina at government expense, and there were some inoculators at work among the Bedouins and in Mecca and Medina. Inoculators were sent after 1868 from Istanbul and Cairo to Jidda and Mecca, where they received the active support of the amirs, who encouraged Bedouin leaders to have their children vaccinated. Vaccinations continued to be given in Mecca until at least 1907 to counter smallpox. The Ottomans applied the quarantine rules devised by the 1851 Sanitary Conference of Paris. Casualties from cholera remained high—an estimated 10,000 died from it in Mecca alone in 1845/46. The repetitions of cholera outbreaks in the 1850s caused the amir to convoke a gathering of thirty-two religious leaders and notables to survey the religious practices and moral state of the population. He felt religious purity could help end the visitations of cholera, and many pilgrims believed that charity and pure living lessened the chances of disease.[9]

The crowning touch to the series of cholera epidemics that began in 1831 was the great catastrophe of 1865 when as many as

30,000 people died. Casualties were especially high among the Javanese pilgrims, nearly all of whom died. More than one-third of all the pilgrims from outside the Arabian Peninsula were killed by cholera that year. The casualties also included the wife, son, and daughter of the Ottoman vali, who was so desolated at their deaths that he asked to be recalled from the Hijaz. When the infected pilgrims arrived at Jidda, they were not helped in any way. There did not exist any surveillance on arrivals by sea, and there was no provisional quarantine, lazaret, hospital, pharmacy, or dispensary. A number of steps were taken by the Ottomans in response to the epidemic, however. Tanks were built at Mecca for water storage, burial pits for animal carcasses were dug at Muna, two sanitary committees were sent from Istanbul in 1866 to study the health of the Hijaz, and the streets of Jidda were thoroughly cleaned, in the process destroying parts of the bazaar despite the vehement protests of local merchants.[10]

There were no major epidemics in Jidda or Mecca in the later 1860s and most of the 1870s because of Ottoman measures. Physicians were sent to the military detachments stationed in the Hijaz. The pilgrimage houses and hostels were whitewashed, streets were cleaned, a hospital with a disinfecting service was set up, ambulances were provided for those who fell ill, and public assistance was organized for pilgrims who arrived in need. By 1878 the Hijaz Sanitary Commission assigned physicians to travel with the caravan from Syria, as well as to posts in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. The physicians accompanied the pilgrims in Mecca and Arafat. In 1878 at Muna, 158 cisterns were cleaned and filled with fresh water, 13 slaughtering pavilions were constructed, and 600 trenches were dug where human waste was deposited and covered with earth and quicklime. Laborers from the Sudan were organized into squads charged with policing the streets in the towns as well as tent campsites. Still, the vali continued to complain about the condition of the Medina hospital, which needed repairs and supplies.[11]

Despite local actions, international pressure after the sanitary conference held in Istanbul in 1865 led to new and stricter regulations in 1868 on pilgrim transport by sea. Britain rejected the proposal of its own consul in Jidda to have an international sanitary commission stationed permanently at Jidda on the grounds that representatives of Christian states dictating pilgrimage conditions in the Hijaz would be seen by Muslims as excessive interference in a Muslim holy territory.[12]

It was the cholera attack of 1877/78 that increased Ottoman intervention in public health among pilgrims. The normal Jidda death rate was 10 to 12 per day during the pilgrimage season, compared with 5 to 10 in the rest of the year. Now, on some days, 50 persons in Jidda and Mecca were dying from cholera. Between 24 December 1877 and 7 January 1878, 845 people died in Mecca and Jidda from cholera; 869 died from all other causes. Ottoman attempts to isolate Medina from contact with the outbreak in Mecca failed when a caravan of pilgrims forced its way into Medina. Measures taken as a result of the 1877–78 epidemic were of two types: ineffectual steps within the Hijaz and slightly more successful actions taken outside the region. The Jidda sanitary commission and the British consulate did little. New rules for pilgrimage ships adopted in 1880 by the Ottomans allowed sanitary authorities to examine ships, established minimum amounts of room for each pilgrim, forbade certain types of cargoes on pilgrim ships, and required the ships' owners to have a physician on board.[13]

The disease broke out again in Mecca in 1881. Between 15 September and 7 December, 2,425 people died of cholera. Casualties were especially heavy among the Javanese, whose living accommodations in Jidda and Mecca were overcrowded. Little was done initially because the vali, the amir, and the chief of police of Mecca were all in Taif, but soon very energetic measures were undertaken. The wells and cisterns at Arafat were cleaned, food shops were inspected, the streets of Mecca were cleaned, and offal was promptly buried. Nevertheless, cholera broke out again in Mecca during the chief days of the pilgrimage, and unburied corpses littered Muna and Mecca. Casualties were much higher than official figures indicated because they reflected only those burials that had been observed by the sanitary board. The villages around Mecca were also the scenes of great suffering. Egypt placed a strict quarantine on travelers from the Hijaz, and ten thousand pilgrims were crowded into quarantine facilities in Wajh in December. A few physicians were sent from Istanbul in response, but basically nothing changed.[14]

Local cures were known in 1881. In Muna there were no latrines and no ways to dispose of slaughtered animals. Water drunk by the pilgrims at Muna came mostly from rainwater, which, along with local garbage, flowed into collecting cisterns. Cleaner water was available from Ayn Zubayda, but it cost twice as much as the contaminated cistern water. A strong vali or amir who was con-

cerned about these problems could eliminate them, at least in the short run. Vali Osman Pasha in 1884 practically eliminated cholera by ordering the emptying of the water tanks at Muna before the pilgrimage, and thereby forcing pilgrims to buy water from Ayn Zubayda. He also employed sweepers, covered up the carcasses of dead animals, and built more latrines. His measures were continued in Mecca and Muna until at least 1889, but little was done in Jidda or Medina.[15] Apparently Muna had been the local source of trouble, for no substantial outbreaks of the disease took place again until 1890.

Local measures were supplemented by rigorous external quarantines, but certainly one or the other failed to function successfully; for in the six years from 1890 to 1895, there were four years of cholera epidemics in the Hijaz. The number of deaths caused by cholera and registered with local officials was greatest in 1893, when 9,577 died. Many deaths were not registered; estimates by physicians of the actual total cholera deaths ranged from 32,000 to 40,000, or about one-sixth of all those attending the pilgrimage ceremonies at Muna in 1893. At least 3,000 people died from cholera in each of the other epidemic years. The disease also struck outside the major towns: the villages of Wadi Fatimah were devastated, as were the Bedouins. Medina and Yanbu seem to have escaped the worst ravages of cholera, but there were attacks of smallpox at Medina, which spread to the rest of the Hijaz in 1895. The casualties alone do not indicate the full horrors of the time. Fear of contagious disease and the chaos created by the pilgrimage prevented much care being given to the sick. Those who died near Jidda, but outside its walls, were abandoned, and their bodies were devoured by dogs and birds of prey. The few private physicians and pharmacists were overwhelmed and, in some cases, provided assistance only when paid in advance. Fear of cholera in 1890 caused the amir to avoid the chief religious-political event of the year by absenting himself from the ceremonies at Muna.[16]

Spurred on by disaster, the Ottoman government undertook a number of actions to stop cholera and to reduce disease. In 1892/93 the sultan ordered T. L. 1,500 to be spent on cleaning the pilgrimage sites and the streets of the three towns. In 1894 Asaf Pasha arrived from Istanbul with T. L. 44,000 for new hospital construction in Mecca and Jidda. In 1895 a special medical mission from Istanbul arrived. However, medical services in Mecca and

Jidda remained understaffed, overworked, and poorly housed. The municipal council of Jidda and the sanitary inspector lacked money for the street-cleaning that they wished to do, so the kaimmakam raised funds on his own. In 1896 he personally inspected the quarters of the town for cleanliness and arrested those who did not work on the cleaning of their houses and streets. Still, the water system, which was the real cause of the spread of cholera, remained as before. Attempts to separate the ill from the healthy so as to stop the spread of various diseases generally failed, except upon occasion in Medina. Hundreds died from avoidable causes other than cholera: starvation among poor pilgrims was not even addressed by the special commissions sent from Istanbul.[17]

The most controversial proposals of the doctors for stopping disease, which were made in 1894, called for limiting the numbers of pilgrims per room, warned of the dangers of contamination from drinking water from the Zamzam well in the Haram, and emphasized the importance of disinfecting machines. These machines were installed in Mecca and Jidda, despite the violent opposition of the pilgrims and populace. In 1895 they helped bring about riots and the murder of the British medical vice-consul.

The most effective quarantine was the distance between Mecca and Medina, and between Medina and Damascus or Cairo. Physicians accompanying the pilgrims did sometimes stop the returning pilgrimage caravans if there were signs of disease, so as to prolong the time before reaching inhabited territory and thereby safeguard it from infection. The British and Egyptians had built an effective quarantine station at Tor in the Sinai Peninsula in 1877 to replace their station at Wajh, which had been opened in 1873. The Kamaran Island quarantine station received pilgrims as early as 1882, but its size and efficacy were greatly expanded after 1892.[18]

Quarantines were acceptable in principle to the Ottoman Empire, but it rejected what it considered any interference by international health organizations in its internal affairs; and the Ottomans were especially sensitive about interference with the religious duty of the pilgrimage. Despite Ottoman refusal to cooperate fully in the formal international structures of the quarantine system, the stations at Tor and Kamaran did function well in stopping the spread of disease.

Quarantines were further developed by the Ottomans as well

as by other countries during the 1900s. During the cholera attack of 1902, the empire stopped all passenger shipping to and from the Hijaz between 18 October and 11 November. There were major Ottoman lazarets built at Beirut, Izmir, and African Tripoli, and quarantine physicians were stationed at Aleppo, Jaffa, Gaza, and Syrian Tripoli. The efficacy of quarantines was limited by the small numbers of physicians available, especially in Jidda and Medina, and the reluctance of pilgrims to undergo quarantine because they feared that quarantines before the pilgrimage days might be so prolonged as to forestall their appearance in Muna, an eventuality that would make their pilgrimage void of its religious merit. As the Hijaz Railroad reached toward Medina in 1905–8, a new problem emerged. The increased speed of transportation in effect eliminated the *cordon sanitaire* provided by the desert against the spread of disease from Mecca to Damascus. Government railroad authorities set up a quarantine station first at Maan and then at Tabuk, which was to be financed by an extra fee on passengers' tickets.

Ottoman quarantine and medical efforts were supplemented by those of other countries. The British vice-consuls from the 1880s on were Muslim physicians who staffed a clinic and small dispensary and who made the pilgrimage in order to provide medical supervision for the pilgrims. France also sometimes stationed physicians at its Jidda consulate. The British in Egypt periodically imposed sanitary blockades against shipping bound to and from Hijazi ports. France forbade the pilgrimage from Algeria and Tunisia between 1896 and 1900 and again in 1903 because of fear of disease. The government of India stopped the pilgrimage in 1897–1900 because of bubonic plague then devastating India.

Since foreign governments imposed barriers to pilgrims leaving their homes when an epidemic was announced, local government officials, who depended upon the pilgrimage for extra income, had an incentive to conceal the existence of disease as long as possible. Conversely, European states and Egypt had a vital interest in ensuring the isolation of the Hijaz and better sanitation in the holy cities. Egypt was particularly strongly affected by disease spread by returning pilgrims in the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s.

Disease affected the poor foreign pilgrims more than the rich pilgrims or the native Hijazis. Deaths among Javanese, Indians, and Africans were higher than among other pilgrims; a larger number

of the poor pilgrims were from those areas. Since many of the pilgrims were elderly or infirm, death rates after they had endured the rigors of travel in the Hijaz were high even when major epidemics did not occur.

Between 1895 and 1907, there was only one major outbreak of cholera in the Hijaz, in 1902, and there were far fewer deaths than in the early 1890s. Only one other disease assumed epidemic scope in the years up to 1908: there was a major outbreak of the plague in 1896–98. This was probably part of the great wave of plague that spread out from China in the late 1870s and killed 10 million people. More than 1,400 died in the Hijaz. Otherwise the years following the great cholera epidemics were singularly free of communicable disease. However, Ottoman public and military hospitals continued to be completely insufficient and even dangerous to their patients.

Reaction to the ravages of disease was muted. Pilgrims seemed to be stupefied during the epidemic years; few even complained. Despite the calamities that befell them, people continued to arrive for the pilgrimage, though sometimes in reduced numbers. The immutable cycle of the pilgrimage took place with regularity and serenity even in the midst of disaster. Strong objections were made only to what were considered by the populace to be ill-founded steps by government to lessen the spread of disease. Particularly unpopular were quarantines, which severed merchants and pilgrims in Jidda from contact with Mecca, the examination of women for diseases by male physicians, the forced use of hospitals and lazarets, and the segregation of the ill from the healthy in them.

The government of the Ottoman Empire had the responsibility to administer the pilgrimage and to ensure the safety and security of the pilgrims while on Ottoman soil. This was done reasonably well, other than in the health area, considering the precarious military and financial condition of the empire. Treatment of the pilgrims by their guides and the prices paid by them for housing and other items were beyond the concerns of the Ottomans. Only under foreign pressure were flagrant extortions of the pilgrims by local officials, merchants, and guides sometimes alleviated. The chief variables causing greater or smaller numbers of pilgrims to come to Mecca—such as the Suez Canal, steamship technology, prosperity in the countries of origin, and the falling of

the pilgrimage's chief day on a Friday—were also outside the control of the Ottoman state.

The pilgrimage was the central event of the Hijazi year. It remained at the heart of the spiritual, economic, and demographic factors that set the parameters of political history. The pilgrimage was also a quintessentially Muslim and Ottoman-Arab institution, separated from the ever-increasing influence and power of the European Christian states. However, the inadvertent spread of disease from the Hijaz to the rest of the world caused Europeans and Egyptians to intervene in some aspects of the pilgrimage through the establishment of quarantine stations and through encouragement of the Ottoman Empire to improve sanitation and public health in the Hijaz.

As the numbers of pilgrims coming from areas ruled by European states increased in the later nineteenth century, European concern over health grew. Ironically, the single most unpopular aspect of European and reformist Ottoman activity in the Hijaz was in the area of health. The Ottoman government resisted European supervision of the international pilgrimage; the Hijazi townspeople and Bedouins resisted European quarantines, which isolated towns from each other, and sanitation measures that they felt were ineffectual and actually more dangerous than inactivity would have been.

Cholera epidemics in 1831, 1865, and in 1877/78 caused thousands of deaths. Improvements in the water supply and in the cleanliness of the towns and pilgrimage sites provided short-term remedies to the dreadful attacks of disease. The administration of Vali Osman Pasha in the 1880s demonstrated the dramatic possibilities for reform and change in health, as in so many other areas of life, and thereby made the epidemics of 1890–95 seem even worse because they could have been avoided. Stricter controls over steamships and quarantines by Ottomans and Europeans ultimately lessened the spread of disease outside the Hijaz, though little was done other than standard measures of cleaning to increase health locally. Still, the pilgrimages, signaling the great reaffirmation of spiritual truth and the spread of Islamic learning, continued largely unaltered, despite the ebb and flow of disease.

1. Actually traveling time between Damascus and Medina, for instance, was, with no interruptions, 334 hours by camel caravan; but pilgrimages took much longer in practice, when rests and visits to the shrines were included.

2. For a full discussion of the Ottoman pilgrimage, see Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, pp. 35–48; Jacques Jomier, *La Mahmal et la caravane égyptienne*, passim; René Tresse, *Le Pèlerinage syrien aux villes saintes de l'Islam*, passim.

3. Abdullah Ankawi, "The Pilgrimage to Mecca in Mamluk Times," p. 154.

4. FO 195/1583, Jago (Jidda) to White, 24 November 1887.

5. BBA, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi 285141, Amir Husayn to grand vezir, 28 Agustos 1326 Mali; Meclis-i Vukela Mazbatalari 172, 805, 4 Muharrem 1331.

6. BBA, Hususi Irade 50, 21 Zilhicce 1324. For a sprightly account of a pilgrimage by a visiting dignitary, see Shah Jahan Begam, *The Story of a Pilgrimage to Hijaz*.

7. FO 195/1193, Beyts (Jidda) to Layard, 5 February 1878; *Recueil*, p. 202; Abd al-Hamid El-Batrik, "Turkish and Egyptian Rule in Arabia, 1810–1841," p. 167; Hossein Kazem Zadeh, *Relation d'un pèlerinage à la Mecque en 1910–1911*, pp. 17–18.

8. Ahmed Chérif, *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque*, p. 61; McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples*, p. 141; Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 289, 416–18.

9. BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2457, grand vezir to sultan, 8 Shewal 1264.

10. FJ, de Sainte Marie (Jidda) to ministry, 20 December 1865; Adolphe d'Avril, *L'Arabie contemporaine*, p. 239; FJ, Dubreuill (Jidda) to ministry, 14 April 1867.

11. This information was provided by Laverne Kuhnke from an unpublished study of Egyptian health that the author kindly sent to me.

12. FJ, Schnepp (Jidda) to ministry, 9 February 1866; John Baldry, "The Ottoman Quarantine Station on Kamaran Island 1882–1914," pp. 21–26.

13. FO 195/1313, Burrell (Jidda) to Goschen, 8 August 1880; FO 84/1658, Dickson (Constantinople) to Layard, 18 February 1880.

14. FO 195/1375, Moncrieff (Jidda) to Dufferin, 8 October 1881; Firmin Duguet, *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque*, pp. 143–45; FO 685/1/3, "Report on the cholera of 1881"; BBA, Ayniyat 1519, grand vezir to vali, 24 Zilkade 1298.

15. FO 685/1/3, Abdur Razzack, "Report on the Haj, 1882," 24 December 1882; FO 195/1514, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Jago, 10 January 1885.

16. FJ, Labosse (Jidda) to ministry, 19 August 1890 and 21 July 1891; Duguet, *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque*, pp. 156–61, 297.

17. BBA, Hususi Irade 30, 10 Zilkade 1310 and 69, 21 Zilhicce 1310; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique de l'origine à 1871, Turquie, Djeddah (hereafter FJP), Bobot-Descoutures (Jidda) to ministry, 3 March 1894; FO 195/1894, Richards (Jidda) to Currie, 19 March 1895; FO 195/1943, Alban (Jidda) to Currie, 20 May 1896.

18. John Baldry, "Foreign Interventions and Occupations of Kamaran Island," p. 100; Baldry, "The Ottoman Quarantine Station," pp. 81–82; Duguet, *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque*, pp. 166–81.

CHAPTER 4
LEARNING AND LAW

ALTHOUGH WESTERN EUROPEAN SECULARISM had some impact on the pilgrimage's quarantine system, there was very little Western influence in education and law, which continued to be dominated by religion. Those secularizing changes that did take place were filtered through the Ottoman government, whose educational and legal reforms in the Hijaz affected only a relatively few people. The dominance of religion in law and education helped assure the men of religion of a continuing and vital role in society.

Cultural and legal values in the Hijaz revolved around religion. The preservation, enhancement, and propagation of values were in the hands of the men of religion. Even if a few participants in high culture did not hold religious positions, they still had been thoroughly exposed in their educational experiences to systems of thought and modes of expression permeated by Islam and Islamic values. Most of the relatively small number of Hijazis who attended schools were educated not in secular government schools but in private institutions where religious subjects predominated. Literature was generally imported. The little that was written in the Hijaz primarily concerned religion and religious law. However, the vast bulk of the population of the Hijaz found formal learning and law to be irrelevant since few could write or read. Many conflicts were resolved outside the formal judicial systems.

Formal education was limited to males. For most students it consisted of attendance at an elementary religious school where, in the space of five years, reading, writing, and religious knowledge were learned, particularly by means of memorization of parts of the Quran and Muslim rituals and rules for living. Given ability, perseverance, and financial support, the student then progressed to a madrasa, a higher religious school, for more specialized knowledge. Higher education had to be pursued outside the Hijaz unless one chose to study the religious sciences with the ulema at the Mecca or Medina Harams.

State financial support for education existed, but the total amount spent was small; more frequently education was privately funded. Occasionally Istanbul authorized repairs to school build-

ings, and it paid the salaries of some teachers. Funds for these purposes came in part from pious foundations' incomes at the disposal of the central government.

Money came from a mixture of private and public sources as well. A private school was begun in Mecca about 1874 by Muhammad Khalil Rahmat Allah (1818–90), who fled to Mecca from India. Thanks to a substantial donation from a Muslim woman living in Calcutta, he was able to open a school whose purpose was to provide both a religious and a scientific education for the children of long-term foreign residents of Mecca. Another Muslim Indian school in Mecca was started in 1879 by Abd al-Haqq Qari with funds from pilgrims, parents, India, and the khedive of Egypt. The al-Najah elementary religious school was opened in Jidda by two Egyptians and three Jiddawis; despite gifts it had to close for financial reasons in 1908. Muhammad Ali Zaynul Ali Rida also established two schools on his own, the first in Jidda in 1905 and the second in Mecca in 1912. A number of other schools were established in the holy cities for educational and religious reasons by both Ottoman officials and private individuals.[1]

Secular government schools, rushdiyes, were built in the Hijaz, but slowly and in small numbers. An elementary rushdiye was built in Jidda in 1874, partially with private funds. Medina's first rushdiye opened in 1876 and was moved to the Haram at the request of its sheikh in 1881. A Meccan rushdiye was opened in 1884. In 1901 Sultan Abdulhamid expanded the grade levels and hired teachers to give more advanced courses in the Medina school. Following the Revolution of 1908, more schools, including advanced and specialized institutions, were planned by the central government, but the plans were either abortive or short-lived.

The numbers of students attending each school and each type of school varied considerably. More than 150 students attended Abd al-Haqq's school, for instance, and by 1890 about the same number were at Rahmat Allah's. In the thirty or more elementary religious schools of Mecca, more than 1,000 students were enrolled, and about 300 attended such schools in Jidda and 300 in Medina. There were only twelve madrasas in Mecca and seventeen in Medina. Student attendance at the rushdiyes varied from a low of 22 in Jidda in 1900 to a high of 70 in Mecca in 1891. Many students also attended lectures at the Harams in Mecca and Medina.

Although there were few students in town schools compared

with the total school-age population, even fewer attended in the rest of the Hijaz. Four elementary religious schools existed in Taif in the 1880s and 1890s, and only two in the 1900s. A rushdiye was opened there in 1900. There were a few schools in Yanbu and Wajh, but not in any of the other villages. Thus the Wadi Fatimah peasantry, the agricultural population south of Taif, the fishing villages along the coast, and, most importantly, the nomadic tribes had no schools, though attempts were made to solve this problem. The energetic Vali Osman in the 1880s proposed special schools for Bedouin children in Mecca, but they were never built. Sultan Abdulhamid planned to have the children of Hijazi Bedouin chiefs attend his school for tribal leaders in Istanbul; there were five places reserved for Hijazi students there in the 1890s.[2]

Schoolteachers were poorly paid and were burdened with large numbers of students. In a rushdiye in Jidda in 1874, the salary per month was only T. L. 4; the religious primary school teachers received less. Salaries were supplemented by gifts from students and special fees. Religious schoolteachers gained income by taking additional students outside the classroom. Many of these teachers were primarily muftis and others engaged in the law, the administration of the Harams, and the pilgrimage, and only secondarily dependent upon their income as teachers. Class loads per teacher ranged from eight to forty-five, though in the latter case only calligraphy was being taught. In the religious schools and especially in the lectures in the Harams, where the religious classics were being expounded, class sizes were much larger. There were at least sixty teachers in the Meccan Haram and twelve or more in the Medinan Haram. Of this number perhaps one-half were Shafii, and most of the rest were Hanafi.[3]

The diversity of the teachers reflected the heterogeneity of the general society. In Jidda in the late nineteenth century, there were ten teachers who offered private lessons: a Shafii religious law specialist; a grammarian who also taught in the Lulu Mosque; a Hadramawti who taught primarily his own countrymen; a legal scholar, educated in Egypt, son of a Jiddan; an Egyptian Shafii who came to Jidda in 1889 after teaching in Medina; another Shafii law teacher who lived in a Sufi convent; an Algerian who taught theology; two graduates of al-Azhar in Cairo; and an Egyptian who specialized in teaching reading. The teachers at the Meccan and Medinan Harams came from equally diverse backgrounds: Malaya, Anatolia, North

Africa, India, and Egypt, but only a few from the Hijaz. Many came to one of the Haram schools as students and pilgrims and stayed on to become teachers. Some were graduates of al-Azhar: in 1902 there were seven Hijazis studying at al-Azhar. One of the more successful teaching careers was that of Ibn al-Talamidh al-Shinqiti, who taught Arabic. He was invited by the Vali Sherif Pasha's son to Istanbul, where he met Minister of Education Munif Pasha and then traveled on to Spain. Another, Abd Allah Zawawi, in addition to his teaching in the Mecca Haram, was also one of the principal merchants of Mecca, and served on the vali's advisory council. He headed the committee to restore the Ayn Zubaydah water sources in 1909–10. Amin ibn Hasan al-Madani al-Hulwani, another teacher at the Medina Haram, attended the 1883 congress of orientalists in Leiden.[4] The government schools were largely staffed by Anatolians who spoke Ottoman Turkish as their native language and for whom Arabic was an acquired second tongue, but a necessary one, for their appointments were contingent upon knowing it.

The knowledge presented to students differed according to their age and ability, but generally was based upon religion and language skills. In the rushdiye of Jidda in 1885, a student began with religion in his first year; in the second he undertook the study of the Persian and Ottoman Turkish languages; in the third he went on to study arithmetic, geography, history, and letter-writing. By 1909 students began with the Quran, Ottoman Turkish, mathematics, and handwriting; in the second year they undertook Arabic, Persian, more Ottoman Turkish, geography, mathematics, and drawing; third-year studies included the three languages that constituted the core of Ottoman Turkish, more geography and mathematics, accounting, French, and health; the fourth year was an intensified version of the third plus history and religion; in the fifth year architecture was added to the earlier subjects. Ottoman Turkish was especially promoted by the central government, which lamented the lack of knowledge of the basic rules of the language in the Hijaz. In the primary religious schools, teaching was less ambitious than in the rushdiyes, but perhaps was more realistic. The subjects taught were the Quran, reading and writing Arabic, and mathematics. In the upper religious schools, Arabic grammar, accounting, theology, and religious law were taught. One could spend as long as fourteen years in studying all subjects and all levels of courses at a madrasa, but most students of course spent far

less time. At the Meccan Haram, students from throughout the Islamic world and of varying ages pursued a wide range of courses, including studies of the Quran, the sayings of the Prophet, the unity of God, religious law, Arabic grammar, elocution, polite literature, logic, Sufism, astronomy, and mathematics. Courses were given both in the daytime and at night. Public lectures were open and free, but gifts to the instructor were customary. Lecturing was suspended during the pilgrimage season, when the pilgrims filled the Haram to overflowing.[5]

The Ottomans deplored the poor state of learning in the region and its result of very few Hijazis entering the administration of the Ottoman Empire. It was not necessary to be an ethnic Turk to join the Ottoman elite, but it was necessary to learn the Ottoman way of life and especially the Ottoman Turkish language, the tenets of Islam, and a set of values and customs expressed in a distinctively Ottoman style of conduct. Ottomans began state-supported schools to inculcate Ottoman values, and for precisely this reason most of the townspeople of the Hijaz did not send their boys to the state schools. Hijazis feared and disliked the new schools, which were seen as an attempt to Turkify children and take them into government and military service. This contrasted with the support of the rushdiyes in Ottoman Syria, where more were built and at an earlier period than in the Hijaz. One of the differences between the two areas that explains the greater degree of public support in Syria was the prevalence of foreign missionary schools in Syria and Palestine. Popular enthusiasm for government schools among Muslims may have been based upon opposition to missionaries. With no missionaries in the Hijaz, there was no reason for Muslims there to feel the same way.[6]

The new, wealthy, and pious group of merchants that emerged in Jidda and Mecca as a result of commercial growth in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the support of generous donors in the rest of the Muslim world, created madrasas to serve as an alternative to the rushdiyes. Many earlier madrasas had physically decayed or had been turned into hostels, refuges for the poor, or private residential property. People who sought a good education for their children either employed tutors if they could afford them or sent children abroad. Advanced studies had to be pursued elsewhere in any event, but only a handful went abroad and even fewer returned subsequently. There was a felt need

among the commercial townspeople for a new style of education, efficiently administered and more widely available.

The cultural attainments of Hijazis extended to areas beyond formal schooling and literature. In the cities builders constructed houses of some beauty; carpenters made intricate wooden screens with great skill; calligraphers copied and made decorations using the Quran. Although Hijazi Bedouin jewelry and the handicrafts of the towns have never been systematically studied, it is certainly possible that works of value comparable to those produced at the same time in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt may yet be found.

In addition to formal schooling, apprenticeship, and handicrafts, a new means of propagating knowledge and values emerged in nineteenth-century Hijaz—the printed word. In other parts of the Ottoman Empire such as Syria and Egypt, the introduction of relatively cheap, accessible, and lively newspapers and the expansion of literacy brought about a new educational medium, with widespread social, cultural, and political consequences in the late nineteenth century. In the Hijaz, which had been deficient even in copyists compared with cultural centers such as Cairo and Istanbul, the new medium and its various messages might have been expected to have particularly widespread results. It did not. There were, of course, some changes: students in the Meccan Haram started to buy printed editions of the texts that were being analyzed in lectures; the laborious task of taking the lecturer's dictation of the text, therefore, was avoided. Butrus al-Bustani's Arabic encyclopedia was read in the Hijaz and even in the interior of Najd. Newspapers from abroad were read in the Hijaz. The short-lived but influential periodical edited by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani al-Asadabadi in 1884, *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, was sent to the Hijaz, but far fewer copies were read there than in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas Beirut received 114 copies, Damascus 23, Cairo 152, and even Suez eleven, Mecca received only five copies and Medina two. There was no record of any subscribers in Jidda. Newspapers were sometimes banned, press censorship within the Ottoman Empire was strict, and the Ottomans attempted to keep out hostile newspapers published abroad.[7] Newspapers favoring the policies of the Ottoman government, such as Beirut's *Thamarat al-Funun*, also circulated in the Hijaz.

There was only one printing press in the Hijaz. It was established in Mecca in 1883 by the government, and by 1886 it em-

ployed twenty-two people. The vilayet press, unlike many other provincial presses, did not publish an official journal before 1908, but it did issue yearbooks in 1883/84, 1885/86, 1887/88, 1888/89, and 1891/92. The yearbooks were similar to those published by other provincial governments. Published usually in Ottoman Turkish, they contained a wealth of information on the Ottoman officialdom of the Hijaz, its ranks, salaries, and hierarchy; the Ottoman view of the history, topography, and nature of the Hijaz; and a sketch of the history of the empire as a whole and the Hijaz in particular. The usefulness of the yearbooks for Hijazis and foreigners was limited by the perfunctory manner in which information was revised as the years went by and the unreality of official views on such matters as relations with the Bedouins or the role of the amir versus the vali.

The government press in the Hijaz published in Arabic and in Malay, with type fonts from Europe. More than thirty works were published in Arabic, twelve in Malay, and several in Ottoman Turkish. Perhaps the most notable works were the religious and historical books by Ahmad ibn Zayni Dahlan. More religious books appeared than works dealing with any other subject, but the list of publications included books on medicine, law, language, and history.* No translations from Western European languages were published. In this way the Hijaz differed sharply from Egypt and Lebanon, where translation was widespread.

The Hijaz had its own writers who wrote outside European styles and ideas, but within the classical Islamic literary genres. Most popular were the biographers of the Prophet Muhammad and religious writers in general. They continued in the mode of writing of the highly influential eighteenth-century scholars who had studied the sayings of the Prophet, though with less importance for the rest of the Muslim world.

One of the few authors who wrote both on religion and political history was the Shafii mufti of Mecca from 1871 to 1886, Ahmad ibn Zayni Dahlan. He was born in 1826 in Mecca and died in 1886 in Medina. Dahlan's *Taqrib al-usul* discussed al-Ghazali and the works of such mystics as Ibn Arabi, as well as containing many sayings of the Prophet with explanations of their meaning. The *Duwal al-Islamiyyah* was a collection of lists of Islamic rulers, with dates of their rules. Dahlan also wrote works on particular points of theology. His chronicle of Hijazi history, *Khulasat al-kalam*, has been

a valuable source for all subsequent studies of the Hijaz. However, during his lifetime only six copies of the *Khulasat al-kalam* were made, and the most recent events he discussed were omitted from the copies because of the political sensitivity of the subjects. Dahlan opposed Muhammad Hasab Allah when the latter attacked smoking as sinful and also when he maintained that the Prophet Muhammad's close relatives who died as unbelievers were pagans and therefore not deserving of veneration. Hasab Allah was exiled temporarily from Mecca, largely at the behest of Dahlan. C. Snouck Hurgronje, the Netherlands orientalist who posed as a Muslim and lived in Mecca in the 1880s, knew Dahlan well. Dahlan's disciple and aide, Muhammad Said Ba Basil, carried on his work and his approach after Dahlan's death.[9]

There were other religious writers in a variety of fields. One of the most prominent was the political and religious polemicist Muhammad Khalil Rahmat Allah, whose school in Mecca has already been mentioned. He was born in Meerut, India, in 1818, and after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 fled to Mecca, where he died in 1890. He wrote thirteen works on religion; his trip to Istanbul in 1884 earned him a pension from the sultan. Perhaps his most famous work was *Izhar al-Haqq*, which was an anti-Christian theological tract. It was translated into Ottoman Turkish, Urdu, Gujarati, English, and French, and gained the favorable notice of the sultan. Manuscripts on the sayings of the Prophet and on religious law were written by two Medinans—Muhammad Ali ibn Zahir al-Watri (1845–1904/5) and Muhammad al-Zahiri (1842/43–1910/11). The latter was born a Bedouin and became a settled man of religion. Uthman ibn Abd al-Salam al-Daghistani (1852/53–1907/8), the Hanafi mufti of Medina for fifteen years, collected and published his religious opinions in two volumes. Arabic logic and sayings of the Prophet were discussed in books by Yusuf Osmanoglu Harputli (d. 1875/76), a Hanafi teacher in the Mahmudiyyah madrasa in Medina. Religious law was analyzed by the Hadramawti Ahmad ibn Ali Ba Sabrin, who lived in Jidda. Among books on mysticism were the work of the Algerian Abd Allah ibn Ghanim al-Najai (d. 1879), and an Arabic translation of Ahmad Sirhindi's writings on Sufism by the Kazan Tatar Muhammad Murad al-Manzalawi (d. ca. 1916) who had settled in Mecca. The high value placed on poetry in Arabic-speaking societies was reflected in the relatively large number of poets, including those who wrote court poetry for the amirs of

Mecca. Mahmud Safwat al-Saati (1825–80) began his career as court poet in Mecca, but lived the latter part of his life in Istanbul and Cairo. Ibrahim ibn Hasan al-Uskubi (1847/48–1912/13) was the table companion and poet of the Amir Awn al-Rafiq. Al-Uskubi, who was born in Medina, had traveled widely and was fluent in Ottoman Turkish, Persian, and Urdu. His political odes caused his imprisonment after 1908. Most of the poetry was apparently written in the spare time of the authors, for they had careers in the bureaucracy, commerce, and mystical organizations. An example was Anwar ibn Mustafa Ishqi (1848–1917/18), who came from a prominent Medina ulema family. He became inspector of the marketplace in 1885/86 and mayor after 1908.[10]

Indeed, there were many genres of writing that were absent from the Hijaz: the new European novels, short stories, and plays; historical romances; new epic poetry. The genres of literature that were translated, imitated, and then adapted by writers in Beirut, Istanbul, and Cairo in the second half of the nineteenth century were missing in the Hijaz. In view of the conservatism of the Hijaz, this was not surprising; but with the exception of Dahlan and some of the tribal poetry, works written in the customary genres were also seemingly undistinguished in quality. On the other hand, little of Hijazi literature has yet been closely and critically examined. Certainly some vivid poetry was written, as in the lines by the Medinan Abd al-Jalil Barradah (ca. 1827–1908/9):

> It pleases me to spend
> Nights in searching for
> Knowledge and perfection,
> By the lamp with the weak wick,
> Until I drink knowledge like al-Ghazali.[11]

A major Hijazi intellectual revival was started among the students in the new schools founded in Jidda and Mecca in the 1900s, but they reached fruition only in the more serene years of the 1930s and 1940s.

Ironically, the most famous work written about the Hijaz was the fictional book by Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakabi, published in Egypt, whose title *Umm al-Qura* (Mother of Cities), referred to Mecca, where the action of the book supposedly took place. In fact the representatives of all the Muslims of the world who were said

to have assembled there secretly to plan a reformation of the Islamic world never met. Mecca had been chosen as the site by al-Kawakabi because of its religious importance, isolation from foreigners, geographical centrality, and the faith and knowledge of its inhabitants.[12]

Both handwritten and printed works were available for reading in libraries, which were established as acts of piety by wealthy donors who provided their means of support as well as the books and manuscripts to be housed in them. Ahmed Arif Hikmet, qadi of Medina and Ottoman sheyhulislam (1846–54), created the largest and most important public library in the Hijaz in 1853/54. Property in Anatolia and Macedonia provided the revenue; Arif provided 7,000 volumes. There were eighteen mosque libraries as well as six large private ones with an estimated total of 50,000 works. Religious books had been sent to the Haram libraries by the Ottoman sultans as gifts. A collection of Sultan Abdulhamid I (r. 1774–89) of more than 6,000 books and manuscripts was housed in Medina. Sultan Abdulmecid (r. 1839–61) provided volumes for a Meccan library. The most notable library in Jidda was that of the Nasif family; there were more than 3,000 volumes in it by the 1920s.[13]

The answer to the primary question concerning literary high culture in the Hijaz remains unclear: what did the literate in general think? Their attitudes toward life and death, religion, the new political and scientific ideas of the Western Europeans, and Ottoman social and political developments are largely unknown. Some Hijazis, such as the Maliki mufti of Mecca in 1894, still believed in alchemy and omens. On the other hand, the importation of a large telescope from London at a cost of T. L. 2,200 by the Amir Awn al-Rafiq in 1899 showed an awareness of new technology. Knowledge was fragmented. The range of opinion can be suggested if one considers the probable points of view of a Bedouin of the interior, an Ottoman army official trained in Western science and languages in Istanbul, a widely traveled Indian Muslim merchant, and an Arab shopkeeper catering to heat-weary pilgrims. The exceedingly varied ideas to be found among members of such social groups resulted in the failure of unifying secular concepts such as nationalism. There was, however, a concern for all factors relating to the pilgrimage, which promoted a certain curiosity about the

rest of the world. Jiddawis in particular closely followed the press for items about foreign countries that might increase or decrease the number of pilgrims.

LAW

The law was one of the many areas in which religion, the state, and social values were intertwined. In determining the proper sources of law, the procedures for deriving judgments, and the judicial process, religion and political power sometimes clashed and sometimes cooperated.

The diversity of educational experiences was matched by a wide variety of legal and arbitration systems. The most notable problem was in the allocation of legal cases between the amir of Mecca, who was the most prestigious local political-religious authority, and the qadi of Mecca, who was the representative of the political and religious power of the Ottoman Empire. Considering the turbulent population, the massive influx of foreign pilgrims, and the relative Ottoman military weakness, the legal systems of the Hijaz functioned with a remarkable degree of success and popular support.

In dividing legal cases between the amir and the qadi, Bedouin disputes and all cases involving sharifs, whether occurring in Mecca, in nearby villages, or in the desert, were to be resolved by the amir. All other individuals besides nomads and sharifs were supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman court system. In fact, the allocation of cases was much more complex than this neat division implies. Tribesmen in Medina and Jidda were tried by Ottoman courts. Pilgrims from outside the Ottoman Empire and resident foreigners were tried in consular courts or in Ottoman courts with consular observers. Some individuals went back and forth from one set of courts to another.

A series of examples indicates the nature of the problems of jurisdiction over nomads. In July 1859 a member of the Awf section of the Harb killed a soldier in Rabigh. The suspect was arrested, sent to Mecca, convicted, and sentenced to death. His tribe then besieged the Rabigh fortress and raided the town. When reinforcements of 400 troops were sent to the Ottoman garrison, the Awf went to the mountains to await their next chance for revenge. A remarkably similar incident in 1876 took place when the governor

of Medina arrested an Awf chieftain for the murder of a Medinan; the death of the accused in prison led the Awf to besiege Medina. The governor was defeated in pitched battle, but the dispute was successfully mediated by Umar Nasif, of Jidda. Another chief of the Harb died in a sharifial prison in Mecca in 1904; as a result, his followers would not negotiate a safe passage for caravans for the next two years. In order to stop feuding in the Wadi Fatimah, the amir arrested a prominent local sharif, held him in the amirate's own jail, and then had him executed by being stabbed to death in public.

Sources of justice were numerous: personal, arbitration, tribal, Quranic, Ottoman commercial legal codes, military, and foreign. Personal justice was meted out by the amir, vali, or tribal leaders, although in the case of the first two, captial punishment had to be approved by the sultan. Arbitration was a favorite device throughout the Hijaz to avoid the formal courts and involved the settling of disputes by referring them to an impartial person who rendered a judgment voluntarily accepted by the parties involved. Tribesmen and townspeople alike used arbitration; even the consuls occasionally employed it. Tribal customary law based on the principle of compensation for injuries was applied by Bedouin chiefs.

Religious law was ultimately based on the Quran, the sayings and practice of the Prophet Muhammad, and extrapolations therefrom. Religious law was applied in the Ottoman court system, and in some cases by the amir. The Ottoman judges and deputy judges were trained in religious law. Ottoman commerical law was transformed in the nineteenth century by Europeanizing reformers. It was applied by separate courts and only to those areas of conduct that were specifically governed by the new decrees. Military justice pertained to those serving in the Ottoman armed forces. Foreigners and foreign protégés were frequently covered by their own laws; extraterritorial rights had been granted citizens of foreign states by a series of capitulatory treaties. The special status of foreigners was jealously guarded and expanded by foreign consulates.

The chief judges of Mecca and Medina occupied high positions in the Ottoman legal hierarchy, but although their salaries and status were high, their actual power in the Hijaz was small. The great distance from Istanbul made the judges' positions unenvia-

ble. Generally the posts were rotated often, the qadis serving for only one or two years. The judge of Mecca supervised all criminal and police cases in Mecca as well as those involving personal status. He nominated the qadi of Jidda and received two-thirds of the latter's fees, leaving only one-third of the fees and no salary for that individual. Other deputies of the Meccan qadi were appointed for Taif, Rabigh, Lit, and Qunfuda. The Medinan qadi had deputies in Yanbu, Wajh, Diba, and Khaybar. Until 1895 deputy judges were Hijazis; after 1895 they were selected from among the graduates of the religious legal school of Istanbul. Although most commercial cases arising in Jidda were judged in its commercial court in the 1890s, in the 1900s this was changed so that the Jidda qadi handled nearly all cases in the appeals courts. The court of first instance dealt only with matters involving slaves, and the commercial court proper had very little business. It was only with the reforms following the revolution of 1908 that a court of first instance was begun in Mecca. Since the Hanafi school of legal precedents was official in the Ottoman Empire, the Hanafi muftis were the chief advisers to the qadis, even though a majority of the Hijazis were Shafiis.

Meccans and Medinans sought the opinions of the muftis on a number of legal and moral questions. Muftis issued judgments on such topics as usury, vaccination, new styles of clothing, and petroleum lamps in mosques.

The limits on the importance of the religious judges can be seen in murder cases. A trial by the qadi or by his deputy was followed by a review by a council of officials and notables. The local review council in Mecca was somewhat secular, since it was composed of prominent merchants, a mufti, the deputy qadi, the naqib al-sadat, the deputy amir, and the vali. Its membership was changeable, and in some cases it was ignored by the Ottoman authorities. A conviction was referred to Istanbul, where the court's records were examined in the office of the chief mufti of the empire, who was also the head of the religious hierarchy; then the decision was sent to the sultan. Consideration in Istanbul of murder convictions in the Hijaz was by no means perfunctory. There were several instances of requests for more information and occasionally reversals of, or changes in, sentences imposed in the Hijaz.

Procedures differed according to the status of the victim and that of the suspected killer. In 1857 a Bedouin murderer met his victim's brother in Medina and was killed by the latter, who

promptly took refuge with the qadi of Mecca from the relatives and friends of the Bedouin. The Bedouin's friends were refused immediate vengeance by the Ottoman authorities. As a result, the Bedouins began a riot that ultimately led to a crisis in Bedouin-Ottoman relations in the area. In 1869 a soldier in Yanbu murdered a civilian, perhaps with provocation. He was tried by a local civil government court, the decision was examined by a council, and the case went to the civil and religious authorities in Istanbul. He was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in Jidda. In a third case, two of the Medina Haram's eunuchs killed a slave, but they were given a reduced sentence of five, rather than fifteen, years. There were few murders reported in the Hijaz. A six-year sample, arbitrarily selected from the records of the grand vezir for 1867–73, showed only eleven murders, but there probably were other unreported violent deaths and retribution murders that did not take place in areas under Ottoman control.[14]

When local Ottoman townspeople died, their property was divided according to Quranic injunctions, with recourse to a qadi or mufti if necessary. The situation for foreign pilgrims was different. The Ottomans claimed that the special religious status of Mecca meant unclaimed property of deceased foreigners should immediately go to the public treasury; the capitulations to foreign states did not apply there. Some groups in practice established communal treasuries for the effects of their deceased members, as did the Tatars and the Tunisians. In other cases the local authorities simply refused to send the value of the property overseas to heirs. It took an order from the grand vezir to pry loose T. L. 986 from the vali and qadi of Mecca in 1846 for a French Algerian family.[15] Many times the pilgrims were so poor that they left practically nothing when they died. Generally estates ultimately did make their way back to heirs abroad, despite Ottoman religious and legal claims for special status.

Living foreigners posed even more problems for Ottoman justice than those who died in the Hijaz because the valis claimed the independence of the Hijaz from the capitulations that gave special privileges to foreigners and their consuls elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. It was argued in 1864, for instance, that permanent inhabitants of Mecca could not be extradited, even though they were citizens of foreign states. When an extradition demand by the Jidda consuls was made, it would be sent to Istanbul, and no action

was taken by the vali pending a response from the central government. An angry letter by the British consul in 1864 pointed out that Great Britain had more Muslim subjects than any other sovereign state, not excepting the Ottoman Empire, and therefore to argue for exemptions from extradition on religious grounds was ridiculous. He said that Muslim Indians living in the holy cities were still under British protection. Another problem was the determination of nationality in an era when formal concepts of passports and citizenship were spreading from Europe to the rest of the world. The Ottoman Law on Nationality of 1869 said that anyone living in Ottoman territory would be considered an Ottoman subject unless evidence of being a foreign subject was produced. Resident communities of foreigners then had to choose whether to be considered Ottomans and, if not, to secure evidence to the contrary. Apparently only a few of the many Indian Muslims in Mecca chose to become Ottomans, but their status remained a subject for debate between the British and the Ottomans for decades. British claims to protect Afghans in the Ottoman Empire were rejected by the Hijaz vali in 1890 on orders from the ministry of the interior; instead, they were treated as Ottomans.[16]

Christian and Muslim foreigners operated under legal restrictions in the Hijaz. They could not own immovable property there after 1867, even though it became possible for them to buy property elsewhere in the empire in 1865. The only way around this restriction was to convert property into a pious foundation and then make a foreign Muslim its administrator.

Even more complex was the question of who had jurisdiction when cases involved both Ottoman citizens and foreigners. The Ottomans in 1860 felt that they should try such cases, according to Ottoman law and in Ottoman courts, although consular observers would be allowed. British and French opposition was based on allegations of the use of torture on witnesses, local prejudice against foreigners, extensive bribery, and ignorant judges. All parties rejected the use of mixed courts in which some judges would be Ottomans and some Europeans. In Jidda the foreign consuls wanted all Ottoman-foreigner trials to be handled entirely by the consuls, but this was rejected by the consuls' own embassies in Istanbul. However, in the 1880s and afterward, if the consuls did not approve of a sentence against one of their nationals, they would neither enforce it nor allow the Ottomans to enforce it. Also,

foreign consuls' influence was felt in the commercial court of Jidda, where the assessors of damages were often foreign subjects.

Two cases involving Muslim foreigners and Ottoman justice show how law was actually applied. The first concerned Mustafa Tilimsani, a French Algerian, who was robbed by Said Mukhtar, a Persian, in 1876. In the Hijaz, Persians were tried by regular Ottoman courts and did not enjoy extraterritoriality in criminal cases. Mukhtar was tried in Jidda by a panel of judges that included the local qadi, a police official, and three Jidda notables. The French consul and a Persian observer were present. The case hinged on the testimony of Tilimsani's wife, who testified while behind a grille, so that she could be heard but not seen. Mukhtar was acquitted. Another case involved Hajj Abd al-Aziz, a British Indian merchant and the local agent of the Indian state of Bhopal, who was accused of stealing money from an estate of which he was trustee. His accusers were the Maliki mufti of Mecca, the head of the preachers of Mecca, and numerous other Meccans. When he was ordered to produce the accounts of the trust before the Mecca tribunal, he refused. As a result, he was threatened by the chief of police, who pointed out that his shop and home were in Mecca, beyone the reach of British protection. His subsequent arrest was approved both by the vali and by the amir. The vali told Abd al-Aziz that since he was a Muslim he should be ashamed to want to transfer the case to a foreign consulate. Ultimately the case became moot because Bhopal selected another person to handle its charities in Mecca and Abd al-Aziz left. However, even the strong-minded Vali Osman Pasha eventually admitted the right of intervention by the British on behalf of Indian Muslims living in Mecca.[17]

Punishment by religious courts tended to be more lenient than tribal justice and more strict than consular courts. Punishment for such crimes as burglary and forgery consisted of flogging and short prison sentences. Kidnapping, in one case at least, was punished by only six months in jail. The harsh justice administered by the tribal sheikh was tempered by the alternatives of the blood feud, raid, and exile from the tribe. Ottoman political prisoners were usually given freedom to move about in the city of their confinement, with the notable exception of Ahmed Midhat Pasha at Taif, who was treated harshly in the 1880s on orders from the sultan. Those punished by consular courts were usually given very

light sentences. In cases of grave crimes, they were frequently sent to their country of origin for trial. The amir's court sentenced offenders to its own prisons in Mecca and Jidda. Mob violence led to severe unofficial punishments. An example took place in Medina in 1884 when a female slave killed a free Muslim woman. The slave was turned over by the governor of Medina to a mob that demanded immediate vengeance rather than a trial. As a result, the slave was stoned to death.

Foreigners often accused Ottoman judges of corruption, favoritism, and accepting political interference in the courts. Muslims were allegedly treated more favorably than Christians. The low salaries and infrequency of payment of Ottoman bureaucrats did cause occasional bribe-taking. Honesty and fairness by judges usually went unmentioned by foreigners. A rare exception was Mehmet Cemaluddin Harputli, qadi of Mecca in 1905–6, who was praised by the consuls. He had earlier worked for the Ottoman education council and subsequently became qadi of Egypt.[18]

The extreme heterogeneity of justice and education in the Hijaz reflected an underlying social diversity. Tribesmen, Arab townspeople, Ottoman soldiers, and foreign Muslim merchants had strongly differing views on who should judge their controversies and on what their children should be taught.

Most people in the Hijaz learned to do things outside any school. Those who went to schools primarily received a religious education. Children were also educated by parents, relatives, and peers by example and by moral precept. Most Hijazis did not feel any need to know about the world beyond their own vicinity, except in the realm of religious knowledge, where learning was by definition a moral good, and in the areas affecting the pilgrimage.

Differences in learning and law were somewhat lessened by a shared stratum of faith and common identity as Muslims living in a holy land. Religion also provided the foundation for law and learning. Some secularization in education and law along European lines took place, especially in Jidda and in the Ottoman state schools; but most Hijazis, and particularly the Bedouins and Medinans, remained unaffected. The most substantial impact of foreigners came in commerce, not in learning or law.

1. M. J. Young and A. A. Dohaish, "An Unpublished Educational Document from the Hijaz (A. H. 1299)," p. 133; A. A. Powell, "Maulana Rahmat Allah Kairawani and Muslim-Christian Controversy in India in the Mid-19th Century," pp. 46, 64; Muhammad al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim fi Makkah wa al-Madinah*, pp. 53, 84–85; Carlo Nallino, *L'Arabia Saudiana*, p. 127.

2. Al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim*, pp. 90–91; FO 195/2148, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 10 June 1903; BBA, Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to amir and vali, 9 Zilkade 1285; Yildiz 14.88/68.88.13; Bayram Kodaman, "II. Abdulhamid ve ashiret mektebi," p. 258; FO 195/2254, Husain in Monahan (Jidda) to O'Conor, 26 April 1907.

3. BBA, Ayniyat 875, 18 Cemaziyelevvel 1291; Al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim*, pp. 11, 70; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 60; BBA, Dahiliye 73827, 8 Muharrem 1302; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 173, 184; Ibrahim Rifat, *Mirat*, pp. 102–6.

4. Al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim*, pp. 86–89; Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History*, pp. 116–17; FO 685/3/1, Jidda to Bombay, 31 October 1891; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 26; Bayard Dodge, *Al-Azhar*, p. 164.

5. FO 195/1514, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to White, 15 September 1885; BBA, Dahiliye 67085, 9 Ramazan 1298; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 59; Young, "An Unpublished Document," p. 133; Al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim*, pp. 12–17, 31–33; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 187, 210–11.

6. Al-Ansari, *Tarikh*, p. 152; Al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim*, p. 33; Max Gross, "Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus, 1860–1909," pp. 123–24, 353–62.

7. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 213; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 192; Homa Pakdaman, *Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*, pp. 100–101; Caesar Farah, "Censorship and Freedom of Expression in Ottoman Syria and Egypt."

8. Muhammad al-Shamikh, *Al-Sihafah fi al-Hijaz*, pp. 13–15; Hurgronge, *Mekka*, pp. 258, 286–87; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1303*, pp. 202–4; Al-Shamikh, *Al-Talim*, pp. 17–19.

9. Ahmad Dahlan, *Taqrib al-usul*; Ahmad Dahlan, *Duwal al-Islamiyyah*; Ahmad Dahlan, *Khulasat al-kalam fi bayan umara al-balad al-haram*; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 164, 175–76.

10. FJP, de Lostalot (Jidda) to ministry, 5 March 1884; Young, "An Unpublished Document," pp. 133–34; FO 195/1585, Jago (Jidda) to White, 5 May 1887; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 173; Abd al-Salam Hafiz, *Al-Madinat al-Munawwarah fi al-Tarikh*, pp. 154–56, 158–60; Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order," p. 145; C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 2:812, 815; Powell, "Maulana," pp. 62–64. Also see the study of eighteenth-century Hijazi religious thinking in John Voll, "Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs," pp. 264–67.

11. My translation from Hafiz, *Al-Madinat al-Munawwarah*, p. 155.

12. Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, *Umm al-Qura*.

13. Otto Spies, "Die Bibliotheken des Hidschas," pp. 87–95; BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2449, 7 Safer 1262, grand vezir to sultan and 2453, 25 Cemaziyelevvel 1264, grand vezir to sultan; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, pp. 58–59, 255.

14. BBA, Ayniyat 872, grand vezir to vali, 9 Rebiyulahir 1286; Ayniyat 872, grand vezir to Medina governor, 12 Rebiyulahir 1289; FJP, Emerat (Jidda) to ministry, 2 May 1857; BBA, Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye 330, 9 Cemaziyelevvel 1289; Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi 314609.

15. Ferman from the sultan to Mehmet Ali Pasha, 1838, in *Recueil*, p. 204; FJ, Flory (Jidda) to ministry, 7 March 1847; FO 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to vali, 15 April 1864.

16. FO 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to vali, 15 April 1864; FO 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to Bulwer, 26 April 1864, and vali to Stanley, 7 April 1864; FO 195/1610, Vali Safvet Pasha to Wood, 1 and 2 December 1888; FO 195/1689, Wood (Jidda) to ambassador, 28 February 1890.

17. FJP, Bertrand (Jidda) to ministry, 4 October 1876; FO 195/1451, Moncrieff (Jidda) to Dufferin, 22 February and 22 April 1883.

18. FJP, Hugonnet (Jidda) to ministry, 31 January 1890; FJ, Beillard (Jidda) to ministry, 3 January 1856; FO 195/879, Stanley (Jidda) to Bulwer, 20 April 1864; FO 195/2198, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 7 December 1905.

CHAPTER 5
COMMERCE

ALTHOUGH SECULARIZING REFORMS in law and education affected relatively few Hijazis, new patterns of commerce did impinge substantially upon the lives of the Muslim Ottoman merchants of Jidda and the pilgrims as they did upon most parts of the Middle East. Christian Europeans and Muslims under European protection competed for economic influence. Innovations in the pilgrimage brought about primarily by Europeans, such as regular steamship service and the construction of the Suez Canal, substantially affected the merchant community. The commercial role of India and Great Britain as trading partners of the Hijaz increased in the nineteenth century. However, some continuity was provided because the base of the Hijazi economy continued to be the pilgrimage to Mecca; religion and religious activity were crucial to the economy. When the numbers and wealth of the pilgrims rose or fell, the economy of Hijazi towns and tribes rose or fell in turn. The pilgrims frequently brought merchandise for sale in order to defray the cost of their trip; they also were the largest and richest consumers. The future was judged by Hijazi merchants according to their predictions of the next year's pilgrims.

Because of the poor agriculture in the Hijaz, society was dominated by the sharifs, officeholders, large-scale importers of goods, pilgrim guides, and those receiving pensions from the Ottoman government. These were the wealthiest members of society rather than the agricultural landlords. However, the extreme ethnic diversity of the commercial elite meant that they did not coalesce with the chief religious families to form a common front to wrest local political power from the amirs of Mecca. Since the Ottoman government in Istanbul played a major role in providing food to the Hijaz for religious reasons and the Ottomans supported the amirate, a possible alliance between the central government and the merchants was also averted. Individual merchants were co-opted into the ruling groups as advisers to the vali and the amir.

Because of the religious status of the Hijaz and its consequences for Hijazi society, political power and economic-commercial influence were separate. Wealthy individuals in the

commercial elite could and did secure special treatment for themselves from government, but they did not seek political power. Nevertheless, there was a close and complex relationship between the commerce of the Hijaz and its government, hinging on the pilgrimage.

One example of the government's interaction with commerce was in the area of the medium of exchange. Throughout the Hijaz, Ottoman money was legal tender, but it was not the sole currency used in commercial exchange. Instead, there was a wide variety of coins and paper money, including those of India, Great Britain, Egypt, France, Russia, Spain, Mexico, and other countries. Because of this diversity and a shortage of coins, the exchange rate between currencies was important. As pilgrims arrived, they brought coins from their various home countries; this money was then used to pay for the enormous imports needed to support the pilgrims as well as the people of the Hijaz. From city to city, the exchange rate of the Ottoman pound in terms of the Ottoman kurush and the exchange values of foreign coins varied depending upon supply and demand. Values of foreign coins in the Hijaz changed when the pilgrimage was completed and most of the pilgrims had departed. Coins of all sorts became more valuable because they became scarcer after the pilgrims, who had brought them to the country, had left.

Commercial frustrations, fluctuations, and crises were also frequent because of several other causes: the absence of large banks in the Hijaz, the frequent refusal of merchants to accept bills of exchange, a shortage of coins, the Bedouins' insistence on using the silver Maria Theresa thaler, and Ottoman government attempts to regulate coinage. Often merchants were hampered rather than helped by the means of exchange. When efforts to standardize weights and measures failed, as they did in the Ottoman Empire, the more difficult task of providing a reliable and regular money supply was beyond the institutional ability of the Ottoman government in the Hijaz.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

The centrality of the pilgrimage to the Hijazi economy and the increasing role of Christian Europe and British India in it can be seen in the imports and exports of the Hijaz.

TABLE 4

VALUE OF JIDDA IMPORTS AND EXPORTS TO THE NEAREST T.L. 1,000

Year	Imports	Exports	Total
1855	702	442	1,144
1856	781	431	1,212
1857	906	469	1,375
1859	1,091	618	1,709
1859–60	1,079	610	1,689
1861	2,220	199	2,419
1863–64	1,798	910	2,708
1868	1,700	1,000	2,700
1876	2,020	618	2,638
1878	2,003	1,034	3,037
1879	1,845	469	2,314
1880–81	1,867	324	2,192
1883	912	73	985
1885	739	130	869
1886	.....	132	.....
1887	.....	80	.....
1890	508	36	544
1891	473	31	504
1892	623	34	657
1893	630	24	654
1894	771	23	794
1895	722	31	753
1896	762	25	787
1897	709	21	730
1899	806	28	834
1900	828	35	863
1901	872	42	914
1902	943	46	989
1903	1,081	25	1,106
1904	1,546	28	1,574
1905	2,494	43	2,537
1906	1,886	79	1,965
1907	2,166	41	2,207
1908	2,297	57	2,354

As with all numbers from nineteenth-century Hijaz, estimated amounts of imports and exports need to be viewed with great skepticism. Customs officials underreported imports so as to conceal bribery and theft. Another reason why the official totals were too low was that records did not include Ottoman-owned vessels. Many vessels paid customs duties at Ottoman ports other than Jidda. Commerce by land was not included in trade figures. Nevertheless, it is possible to see a clear and steady increase in imports and a modest increase in exports from 1855 to the late 1870s (see table 4). After 1882 exports fell remarkably and remained at a low level. Imports decreased sharply in the 1880s and then remained

relatively constant until 1903 when they began a steady rise until World War I.

Export and import fluctuations were caused by a number of factors, some of which were religious. Short-run, nonrepetitive causes of change included political disturbances that discouraged pilgrims, as in the slavery and succession struggle in Mecca in 1856, the massacre and bombardments of Jidda in 1858, and the quarrels between the vali and the amir in 1880–82. Financial panics, diseases, or unusual prosperity in the Hijaz or in any of the main pilgrimage countries such as India or Egypt could also affect Hijazi commerce. Some wars hurt Red Sea shipping, especially the Mahdist-British-Egyptian struggles of the 1880s and 1890s.

Good harvests or failures of crops, abroad or locally, affected prices in the Hijaz, and a drought in the Hijaz in 1903 necessitated the importing of sheep from the Sudan. Another example of harvests changing prices was the simultaneous failure of the Yemen harvest and the decline in Indian rice production in 1896–99, which brought about a 20 percent increase in the price of rice in the Hijaz. When the number of pilgrims fell because of bad harvests abroad, the price of agricultural goods in the Hijaz would rise precisely when Hijazis could least afford it.

The crucial short-run, repetitive variable was the number of pilgrims who came to the Hijaz. For example, the pilgrims brought with them about T. L. 1,100,000 in 1885 and T. L. 2,600,000 in 1901 for their expenses.[1] These large sums fueled all aspects of the economy. When the chief pilgrimage day was to fall on a Friday, which was considered especially propitious, many more Muslims went on the pilgrimage than normally would be expected. Therefore in those years, imports were unusually high.

Long-range fluctuations in commerce were caused primarily by changing currents in world trade. Increased shipping between Europe and South and East Asia tended to go through the Red Sea. Intermediate stops between Aden and Suez were necessary for obtaining coal, and Jidda therefore benefited. However, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 hurt the trade of Jidda severely. As the number of steamships in the Red Sea increased and they could more easily go to small ports, so Jidda's role as an entrepôt for transshipment of goods practically disappeared. Exports drastically decreased. Another reason for the decline of Jidda was improved steamship technology that eliminated the need for an intermediate

stop for coaling in the Red Sea. Ships tended to call only at the ports of Aden and Suez.[2]

The canal, changed technology, and the political events of the early 1880s in the Hijaz led to a marked decline in commerce that did not begin to recover until 1903. In the early 1880s, a series of quarantines against Jidda by major pilgrim countries, the decline in the slave trade, and the fighting in the Sudan combined to create a commercial crisis that, with the impact of the canal finally taking full effect, ruined Jidda's trade and therefore that of the Hijaz. The causes of the increase in exports starting in 1903 have not yet been fully determined, however.

Britain and British India dominated imports and exports after the decline of the coffee trade, which had been largely under Muslim Ottoman control earlier. The planting of coffee outside Arabia, especially in the Western Hemisphere in the eighteenth century, decreased the importance of Yemen coffee and, therefore, Jidda as an exporter of it. After 1875 the value of coffee imported into, and reexported from, Jidda rapidly declined and stayed quite low, with only a slight increase in the years after 1903. Political events in Yemen, including the Ottoman attempt to reimpose direct rule there, adversely affected Yemeni production and sales of coffee. The decline in the export of coffee from Jidda was also caused by direct sales of coffee in Yemeni ports to Ottoman and foreign purchasers. In 1883 most coffee in the Hijaz came from Java; only about one-fourth was from Yemen. In 1892 three-fourths of the coffee in the Hijaz was from India and the remainder from Yemen.[3]

British and Anglo-Indian dominance of the Jidda marketplace (see table 5) continued basically unaltered from the 1840s to 1908. In 1864 and 1878, Britain provided 46 percent of the imports measured by value, Austria was second with 32 and 30 percent, and France was a weak third with 16 and 17 percent. India exported to the Hijaz great quantities of cloth, wheat, and rice. India's importance was seen as early as 1855, when with Britain it provided nearly all the cotton and silk manufactured cloth imported at Jidda. In 1892–95 the peak of Indian imports was reached: they made up more than one-half of all imports. India sent especially large quantities of wheat, flour, and rice in those years.[4] However, from 1894 to 1910, India sent only 38 percent of the average value of imports, or about T. L. 451,000 per year. Thus the relative position of India in the Hijaz declined slightly after the middle 1890s but remained

TABLE 5

VALUE OF THE CHIEF JIDDA IMPORTS
TO THE NEAREST T.L. 1,000

Year	Cotton Goods	Rice	Wheat	Sugar	Barley
1855	265	...	...	...	...
1861	272	119	...	50	...
1864	...	228	...	...	...
1875	396	158	62	125	...
1876	273	209	13	...	4
1877-78	303	149	23	...	3
1885	...	165	...	...	...
1890	...	...	96	22	...
1891	...	175	44	12	27
1892	112	...	...	...	...
1892-93	...	138	68	19	10
1893	144	146	78	37	9
1894	196	...	...	...	...
1895	173	...	...	...	...
1896	175	...	...	57	12
1897	146	...	...	41	1
1900	196	109	326	43	...
1892-95*	...	130	65	61	8
1894-1910*	211	222	128	82	48

* Averaged for these years.

high. British goods replaced Indian manufactures in some cases, especially piece goods. In this later period, India kept on average 30 percent of the piece-goods market, more than 90 percent of the rice, and one-half of the wheat and wheat flour imports.

Wheat, barley, and rice also came from Egypt and Iraq. Egypt supplied most of the Hijaz's sugar. Imported dates came from Basra and Musqat. Although India and Great Britain provided most manufactured cloth, some also came from Egypt and other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Iran sent the Hijaz tobacco and carpets, and wood, which was largely used for houses, came from Singapore. Glass was listed for the first time as an import in 1895; it was used for new houses built in the European fashion.

The imported commodities did not include products that could be used for light or heavy manufacturing, agricultural implements, drugs, and most types of metals and chemicals. Armaments of any sort were specifically forbidden to be imported. Nevertheless, large numbers of handguns and rifles were smuggled into the Hijaz, especially for the Bedouins. Cotton goods and rice were the two major imports. Although a good deal of silk was also imported, most of it was reexported rather than used locally. Clothing was

usually made from cotton. The chief food was rice; wheat was less often eaten. Barley was imported almost exclusively for the Ottoman government's army animals.

Ironically, in view of the subsequent history of Arabia as a petroleum exporter, the Hijaz imported petroleum products from the United States and Russia during the nineteenth century. In 1875, 1,000 4 cwt. barrels, worth about T. L. 9,000, were landed at Jidda, and by 1891 imports were up to T. L. 17,000, mostly from the United States. The United States steamship *India* delivered to Jidda in 1892–93 petroleum valued at T. L. 13,200,[5] and from 1894 to 1910 petroleum products worth an average of T. L. 22,000 were imported every year at Jidda.

Exports from the Hijaz were consistently low in value. Exports, as opposed to reexports, were worth only a very small amount of money; between 1894 and 1910, they averaged only 3 percent of imports. Salt, slaves, pearls, coffee, and cloth were sent by caravan and ship from Jidda, but in most cases they originally had been purchased elsewhere. The chief Hijazi exports were henna, gum and resinous products, beeswax, shells (including mother-of-pearl), and hides.

By the late nineteenth century, mother-of-pearl, shells, and pearls had become the chief exports: they were worth T. L. 154,000 in 1876, and T. L. 115,000 in 1879. In 1886 there were 300 boats in the Red Sea engaged in harvesting mother-of-pearl, which yielded T. L. 34,000. After 1902 the mother-of-pearl trade in Jidda was ruined by the government's increased taxes.

Animals were exported from the Hijaz, but their export was occasionally stopped by the local authorities, who feared meat shortages. The export of sheep was forbidden in 1884 and at other times because of scarcity in the Hijaz, as well as the Ottoman desire to stop trade with the Mahdist forces in the Sudan.

Specie exports in 1902–4 were estimated to be about T. L. 850,000 per year, with at least one-half going to India. Some bullion was sent to officials of the Ottoman government as bribes, but most of the money sent from the Hijaz was used to pay for imports.

SHIPPING

The most important change in shipping after 1840 was the introduction of steamships, owned mostly by European Christian states or businesses, and the decline in the number of sailing ves-

sels, owned mostly by Muslims from the Red Sea area. The number of steamships rose remarkably after 1869 when the Suez Canal opened. Most of the available cargo space and passenger rooms came to be in steamships, not in the numerous, usually small, sailing vessels that still called at Jidda.

Jidda had been an important ship-building center and home port for shipowners and crews for all of the Red Sea. Amir Ghalib in the early nineteenth century had sent some of his own ships to India. More than two hundred fifty merchantmen were then based at Jidda. In the 1850s about six ships were built per year there. They were two-masted, sometimes weighed as much as eighty tons, and were made from Malabar teakwood. Since losses caused by the dangerous coral reefs and shifting wind patterns of the Red Sea were frequent, new construction was needed to replace old or destroyed vessels.[6]

In the 1880s and 1890s, Jidda merchants owned ten 600–1,000-ton sailing ships that ventured as far away as Zanzibar, India, and Singapore. Small ships of 15 to 100 tons were engaged in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf trade, and between 200 and 400 of these ships operated out of Jidda. In the 1900s there were also 210 lighters, 65 coasters, and 21 fishing vessels at Jidda.[7] But new construction at Jidda had declined to only two or three sailing ships per year. Increasingly, local ships were used only for the shipment of goods from deepwater ships anchored offshore to the quays at the harbor and for the transport of pilgrims in the Red Sea region.

This change was brought about by steamships, the first of which in the Red Sea was the *Hugh Lindsay* of India, which traveled from Bombay to Suez via Aden and possibly Jidda in 1830. In 1837 a regular monthly mail service was established for the same route. Steamships had two major advantages over sailing ships in the Red Sea: they could ignore the prevailing wind patterns and because of their easier maneuverability they could come closer to reefs. On the other hand, they were dependent upon supplies of imported coal. All large vessels, both steam and sail, had to anchor as much as four miles from the Jidda harbor because of the coral reefs, and cargoes were brought ashore by lighters manned by Jiddawis. As the number of steamers increased, they took over cargo routes and pilgrim transport from sailing vessels. Steamers began to venture even into the small, dangerous harbors of Lit and Qunfuda in the 1900s.

Among the steamers coming to Jidda, more were from Britain

TABLE 6

STEAM VESSELS AT JIDDA

Year	U.K. and Indian	Egyptian	Total (including others)	Tons (thousands)
1859	...	...	34	...
1863–64	...	...	35	...
1864	...	...	38	79
1875	85	52	205	179
1876	104	56	220	188
1877	101	58	205	179
1878	124	53	218	194
1879	116	80	241	213
1880	132	116	328	295
1881	128	69	251	246
1881–82	104	96	263	398
1883	75	67	190	192
1884	78	57	216	...
1890	83	65	207	247
1894	102	66	269	314
1895	97	54	258	332
1896	...	...	313	372
1897	...	...	240	299
1898	106	57	224	253
1899	105	44	191	232
1900	128	8	170	211
1901	158	2	268	354
1902	154	15	...	331
1903	198	9	299	418
1904	235	8	334	473
1905	248	0	343	475
1906	268	0	350	552
1907	233	0	319	492
1908	207	0	275	440

and India than from any other country(see table 6), as was also the case in the Yemen port of Hudayda. From 1880 to 1904, the British and Indians carried from 40 to 60 percent of the tonnage per year. Other countries were far behind, except for Egypt. Even before the Suez Canal was opened, the commerce of Jidda had been oriented largely toward India. The first French merchantman in Jidda since the 1820s docked in 1848. There were few German ships in Jidda; in 1900–1905 only two visited the Hijaz. Germany was actively expanding its economic influence and activity in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, but not in the Hijaz.

The Ottomans and Egyptians attempted to overcome the European lead in steamship shipping to the Hijaz, and a company owned by Egyptians began regular scheduled stops at Jidda in 1858. In 1863/64 the company sent ships twice per month to Jidda.

An Ottoman imperial order established the steamship company's right to serve the ports of the Red Sea. In return the company was obliged to transport grain for the holy cities at a reduced rate. Scheduled Egyptian passenger service, which included carrying the mails, lasted at least until 1899. The Ottoman government subsidized an Austrian run from Trieste to Istanbul to Hudayda, with a stop at Jidda, and Austrian ships were also hired by the Ottomans to take grain from Basra to the Hijaz.[8]

The Ottoman Empire attempted to encourage the expansion and economic success of Ottoman-flag shipping. Whenever possible, contracts to transport grain were given to Ottoman ships, and the Imperial Ottoman Steamship Company operated an Istanbul-Red Sea route by 1887. With the pilgrimage of 1894, the Ottomans began Jidda-to-Bombay operations in direct competition with British steamers, but this service was suspended in 1896. Though the nominal Ottoman agent in Jidda was the merchant Zaynal Ali Rida, the de facto agent was Admiral Sami Pasha, of the Ottoman Red Sea fleet. The admiral applied pressure on merchants and pilgrims to use Ottoman shipping.[9]

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

Unofficial and official Ottoman intervention in commerce chiefly affected the pilgrimage and resulted in the exploitation of pilgrims for the personal gain of the ruling and commercial elite. The shipping consortium coordinated by the valis and the amirs, the rigging of prices for services and goods sold to pilgrims, and the limitation of competition among pilgrim guides and brokers were all examples of the interaction of the ruling elite with the separate merchant elite.

There was a long and deep involvement of local Ottoman officials in restricting competition and fixing prices for transporting pilgrims. Competition in transporting pilgrims was limited in 1883 by the formation of a shipping pool that set prices and divided the resulting profits among its members. The founders of the pool were J. S. Oswald and his partner Hassan Johar; Umar al-Saqqaf; P. N. Van der Chys, the Jidda agent for the Ocean Steamship Company, who was in partnership with an aide of the British consul; and J. A. Kruyt, the Netherlands consul. This group promised to pay the amir for every pilgrim transported to the Straits of Malacca and

Java by them; in return, the amir ruled that pilgrim guides should be Ottoman citizens. He was able to apply enough pressure upon Ottoman guides to bring them all into the scheme. The amir also was able to stop the departure of pilgrims from Mecca to Jidda if they did not book passage with the pool members: the pilgrim brokers and the cameleers would not guide or transport these pilgrims against the amir's wishes. As a result, ticket prices doubled. The extra profits were allocated as follows: 25 percent to the amir, 40 percent to the guides and brokers, and 35 percent to the individual members of the pool.[10]

The arrangement of 1883 lasted until 1888, when the amir became too greedy and attempted to extend the pool's monopoly on shipping Javanese and Malayan pilgrims to those pilgrims going to India. The chief pilgrim guide was instructed that no Indian pilgrim could leave Mecca for Jidda without having already booked in Mecca his return passage to India with a member of the pool, and the price for a ticket was increased by 60 percent. Unfortunately for the success of this plan, two key people were left out of the pool—Vali Nafiz Pasha and J. S. Oswald. The latter had left the Javanese pool earlier and had even tried to break its monopoly. He now accused the British consulate of indirectly supporting both pools, and, as a result, the consul had to act particularly vigorously to show that he opposed the actions of his former aide. On 23 August 1889, the vali arrested the Indian pilgrim brokers in Mecca. According to the vali, the other ringleaders in the Indian pool were Umar Nasif and Abd Allah Banaja. Nafiz Pasha abolished the position of chief guide for the Javanese pilgrims and wiped out the monopoly. Van der Chys, by then the consul for Sweden and Norway, promptly committed suicide, and his company collapsed. However, the apparent victory of the vali was short-lived. The enraged amir, acting through friends in Istanbul, secured the sultan's dismissal of Nafiz. Following this, the old ring was reconstituted with al-Saqqaf, Nasif, Abd Allah Arab, and the former clerk of Van der Chys, C. R. Robinson, now the agent of the Ocean Steamship Company. The new pool was less greedy; prices for the Javanese were lowered, and some pilgrims were occasionally farmed out to other companies.[11]

In 1893 Knowles and Company, of Batavia, through the liberal use of bribes to the amir, temporarily ousted the pool and secured its own monopoly on Javanese pilgrims. Because of cholera, the

detention of pilgrims in Mecca after the end of the pilgrimage so as to force them to buy tickets from Knowles seemed particularly offensive to the British. Nevertheless, the vali and the amir kept the pilgrims in Mecca. Knowles had so few ships that, even if pilgrims wished to use their services, it was difficult for all to do so quickly. Finally on 30 July 1893, under pressure from the British, the vali issued a proclamation saying that passage was unrestricted and any pilgrim could book with any shipping line. The local agent of Knowles was arrested by the new kaimmakam of Jidda and was tried by the Netherlands in Java. But all this did not deter the amir from extracting T. L. 2,000 from the Javanese and Malay pilgrims before permitting them to leave Mecca. The vali rejected the accusations of the consuls by pointing out that the pool had been in operation for ten years. He implied two questions in his letter to the British consul: Why had the consuls not protested before this? Could it have been self-interest on their part?[12]

In this fashion there began a bitter contest between the British consulate in Jidda, acting on behalf of the Malay pilgrims, and the vali and amir of Mecca, acting on behalf of the pool and themselves. Initially, the vali and the amir won, for despite the posting of a proclamation from the sultan, dated 7 April 1894, that called for complete freedom of choice in shipping, the pool continued for Javanese, Malay, and Indian pilgrims. The new vali, Hasan Hilmi, received more than T. L. 2,000 as his payoff. With this sum he sent presents and bribes to Istanbul officials so they would overlook the pool. Hasan's chief protector in Istanbul and a friend of the amir as well was Ali, a chamberlain of the sultan. Even though the British consul in Jidda recommended the dismissal of Amir Awn al-Rafiq, and the British ambassador exerted pressure on the grand vezir to secure a change in the shipping pool, nothing happened. The vali responded to complaints by saying that the pool was now customary and therefore allowable. The amir received T. L. 5,500 from the pool's profits in 1894.[13]

After the murder of the British vice-consul Abdur Razzack in 1895 and the consequent search for his murderers had died down in 1896, the struggle between the vali and the amir versus the British ended. The pool of merchants and their official friends had won. The new British consul, Devey, said that the pool was acceptable because pilgrims were not fleeced any more than a tourist would be elsewhere in the world; and since there were no taxes

in the Hijaz, the pool profits took their place. Also, the arrangement made life simpler for the shipping companies.

All was tranquil, except for outraged cries from mulcted pilgrims, until 1899, when a new pool for pilgrims bound north from Jidda was formed. The members, in addition to the vali, were Gallimberti, the Austrian vice-consul; the Ottoman state line; the Egyptian steamship company; the kaimmakam of Jidda, Celal Bey; C. R. Robinson; and the Ottoman sanitary inspector of Jidda. Higher prices for tickets charged by the pool led to a profit of T.L. 6,600. However, Gallimberti stole the vali's share of the money and left the Hijaz. In the same year, the Straits government required pilgrims to purchase their round-trip tickets in advance before leaving for the Hijaz. The Ocean Steamship Company then could no longer use the amir's pressure on Malay pilgrims. In order to recoup his losses, the amir sought new sources of money, and attempted to force some of the Malays and Indians to go to Medina rather than leave the Hijaz, so as to collect part of the caravan expenses for himself. The British embassy persuaded the grand vezir and the sultan to order the amir to let the pilgrims leave Mecca for Jidda.[14] After 1899 the pools both to the south and to the north operated successfully except for the Indian pilgrims.

Two steamship lines stubbornly insisted on competing for the pilgrims bound to India. Between 1901 and 1905, Fadl Arab, the agent for Esaji Tajbhoy of the Shah Line, fought Zaynal Ali Rida of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company over the Jidda-Bombay route. As a result, ticket costs fell by 80 percent, and in 1905 both competitors also started carrying northbound passengers from Yanbu to the Mediterranean at reduced rates. The vali hypocritically announced that he had just discovered the existence of monopolists who were overcharging pilgrims. He then fixed prices for tickets at a higher level than the two companies were charging! The result of his action was the restoration of the northern pool and a profit of T. L. 6,000 per year from the shipping rings.[15]

In addition to shipping, government officials of the Hijaz attempted to create another source of income for themselves by regulating the land pilgrimage. The pilgrims were obliged to pay more and frequently had to take the most dangerous route available so as to enrich the amir, the vali, and their agents. The sea journey usually was quicker than that by land—five days versus

twelve—cost only one-half as much, and was less dangerous. On a number of occasions, the amirs sought to divert the pilgrims from going the Mecca-Jidda-Yanbu-Medina route and return by sea because the amirs wanted to collect special fees from pilgrims traveling by land. If the pilgrims or their consuls objected, the valis replied that pilgrims were free to go to Medina by land or by sea, and imperial decrees were obtained promising this, but in fact pressure was applied in favor of the all-land rather than the sea route. One example, taken from many, occurred during the pilgrimage of 1894 when only one-eighth of the pilgrims were allowed to go by sea and the rest proceeded from Mecca to Medina by land. Each pilgrim paid from one-third to one-half of the camel rental fee into the pockets of the amir and vali.

The central government did little to curb the excesses of the valis and amirs. It did not make any long-lasting changes in the pilgrimage or in the system of guides and brokers. A commission was sent to the Hijaz by the sultan in 1896 to investigate the conditions for pilgrims in the area. Among its responsibilities were discovering why rental prices for camels were so high and ordering them lowered, stopping the taking of extra money for the Mecca-Medina journey, and ending the fees paid to the chief guides. The commission was ordered to distribute a proclamation assuring the pilgrims that the sultan-caliph wanted to stop all exploitation of pilgrims, particularly by reducing camel rental prices.[16] The proclamation was distributed, but none of its goals was realized.

Certainly the same system of pilgrim guides continued despite repeated official condemnations of it. Chief guides, who were appointed by the amirs, supervised all pilgrims coming to Mecca from a certain geographical region, and a guide often went to a region in order to encourage the devout to make the pilgrimage. Rewards were great for the guides, both in terms of money and prestige. At the same time, the possibilities for abuse of their positions were equally great. Even though the sultan had abolished the position of chief guide in March 1894, by June the amir had appointed a chief guide for the Javanese and Malays and one for the Indians in return for gifts from them. Vali Hasan Hilmi Pasha dismissed Hasan Daud, the chief of the Indian guides, because of suspicion that Hasan was diverting the camel hire money. With the help of the highly influential Jidda notable Umar Nasif, Hasan was back in business in Mecca by 1896. Unfortunately for Hasan, he

now had ranged against him the British consulate, the vali, the vilayet treasurer, and the kaimmakam of Jidda. Despite these enemies, he remained a close adviser to the amir at least to 1899.

The vociferous opposition of consuls to the exploitation of the pilgrims by the Hijazi authorities took place alongside frequent cooperation among merchants irrespective of their Christian European, foreign Muslim, or Ottoman Muslim identities. In light of the pious purpose of pilgrims' visits to the Hijaz, their mulcting in the latter nineteenth century by the shipping pool and by guides was a crass exploitation of religion for personal gain. Although these practices were contrary to the regard and esteem for pilgrims felt in most parts of the Islamic world, little was done by the central or local government to stop the exactions that benefited directly the amir and vali, and indirectly, through bribes, Istanbul as well.

THE MERCHANTS OF THE HIJAZ

Western European Christian states had a technological, military, and industrial superiority over the Ottoman Empire. This superiority led to the indigenous Ottoman commercial elite's displacement by European Christian merchants and their protégés. This took place first in international trading and then increasingly in the commerce between port cities and their hinterlands. Although there were some exceptions, as in Lebanon, in general this pattern existed throughout the Ottoman Empire by the late nineteenth century.[17] Because of religious prejudice and social sanctions against non-Muslims in the Hijaz, a reversal of the pattern of European commercial dominance might well have taken place there. Local Muslim Ottoman merchants had seemingly a guaranteed monopoly on local trade in and to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. What took place was that European protégés became increasingly important, especially in Jidda.

Most long-distance maritime trade in the eighteenth century was in the hands of Gujerati Indian Muslims. As the British gained control of more and more of South Asia, the Indian Muslim merchants living in the Hijaz came under British protection.

The rule of Mehmet Ali established in the Hijaz from 1813 to 1840 the system of state monopolies that he built in Egypt and stopped discriminatory measures against Christians trading in the Red Sea. The private sector of the Hijazi economy was dominated

by merchants from India, the Maghrib, and the Hadramawt. The two greatest merchants in Jidda in the early nineteenth century were Muslims from the Maghrib. Under Mehmet Ali's rule, most merchants in the Hijaz became Ottoman subjects.

The Red Sea was more frequented by Western merchants in the 1850s. Greeks and a smattering of Muslims under European protection went to Jidda in the early 1850s, and the first branch of a Western European commercial house was begun in 1853. By 1856 one European company controlled one-quarter of all Red Sea trade, discounting notes drawn on Cairo at only 5 percent.[18] Most trading, however, in the middle of the nineteenth century remained in the hands of Muslims. Competition between Muslims from the Hadramawt and the non-Muslims helped cause the Jidda massacre of 1858, which will be discussed in chapter 8.

Despite the dramatic intervention of the British and the French, and the subsequent severe punishment by the Ottomans of the murderers of foreign merchants and diplomats, very little changed after 1858. The Hadramawtis and Muslim Indians continued to dominate trade and also continued to live in an uneasy peace with each other. Muslims protected by the European states came to have more freedom of action after 1858, a development that created, according to the vali of the Hijaz in 1861, a new organization for commerce that was not understood by the people of the area. Bills drawn on London were discounted by the 1860s, but there were very few European merchants or Muslims with direct ties to European houses in Jidda. International trade was still centered on India.

The second amirate of Abd al-Muttalib exacerbated the underlying tension between European-protected merchants and Ottomans even though the basic balance of the merchant community was not changed. Abd al-Muttalib was opposed by foreign merchants. By 1883 there was only one British merchant and a few Maltese and Greeks in Jidda. France had only three subjects in Jidda but also protected some Greeks. The Indian Muslim community constituted the vast bulk of foreign merchants. In the 1890s they controlled perhaps one-half of the trade of the city. There were thirty large international wholesalers and sixty retailers there, but only four were European firms. By 1904 a few more Europeans had been added, and one of their firms, Gellatly, Hankey, and Company, was more active.

The credit situation in the Hijaz improved somewhat. The Ottoman government ruled in 1852 that 24 percent interest per year was exorbitant; 15 percent should be the maximum allowable.[19] Bills of exchange were drawn on local merchants, but there were no banks. Merchants sometimes loaned money and took mortgages as guarantees of repayment. Large sums were routinely shipped, especially from Mecca to Medina. Bedouin raids and natural disasters at sea frequently caused merchants severe losses that were uncovered by any insurance.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, there were two large European merchant houses. The largest was Myrialaki and Company, which had numerous offices in India, Western Europe, Egypt, and Anatolia. In the Red Sea region, their main offices were at Hudayda, with subagencies in Mecca, Wajh, Yanbu, Suakin, and Massawa. C. A. Osborne, a British resident of Jidda between 1883 and 1904, was local agent for Gellatly, Reuters, and Lloyd's, and was also consular agent for Italy from time to time. Gellatly, Hankey undertook a wide range of services as shippers, brokers, coal importers, marine insurers, bankers, and representatives of the Régie Ottomane and the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Osborne generously helped poor pilgrims return to their homelands, and for this he received a medal from the Ottoman government.

There were more European-protected Muslim merchants than Europeans. Faraj Yusr owned vessels of forty to eighty tons that flew the British flag and carried cargoes throughout the Red Sea and to Musqat. Another leading member of the Jidda merchant elite was Zaynal Ali Rida. He was probably born in Ahwaz in 1837, although he claimed that he was born in Aden. He became an Indian subject in Calcutta in 1873 and was registered as such with the British consulate in Jidda in 1874. The Persian consulate, however, maintained between 1879 and 1891 that he was a subject of Persia. During a long stay in Bombay, 1848–63, he became prosperous; during his life in the Hijaz, he became very wealthy. He married the daughter of Umar Nasif, one of the chief Ottoman merchants of Jidda. Zaynal's riches came in large part from acting as the agent for shipping companies. His descendants have subsequently played a prominent role in the post-Ottoman Hijaz. Zaynal himself was famous for his charities, especially his gifts to education. His grandnephew became one of the Hijaz's representatives to the imperial parliament. Other European-protected merchants were not as successful as Yusr and Zaynal, however.[20]

Ottoman Muslim merchants in Jidda were dominated by two extensive families: the Nasifs and the Banajas. Abd Allah Nasif was the chief agent of, and representative for, the amirate in Jidda before and during the massacre of 1858; in that year he was already elderly. He was succeeded by Umar Nasif (1822–1908), perhaps as early as 1873, as the amir's agent in Jidda. Because of Umar's service, his membership in the administrative council, and his donations to the building of the rushdiye in Jidda, he was honored by the sultan. The death of Amir Husayn and the appointment of Abd al-Muttalib, Umar's enemy, temporarily weakened his governmental influence. There were, however, sources of income for him outside government. Umar owned water storage tanks in Jidda, and he participated in the shipping pool of brokers and agents. Even the energetic Vali Osman Pasha, who was convinced of Umar's complicity in a Bedouin uprising, failed to destroy him. Osman condemned Umar to fifteen years in jail and confiscated all his wealth, but Umar received an imperial pardon thanks to a protector at court, Ahmad Asad. Umar found it expedient to go to Istanbul until Awn al-Rafiq became amir, when Umar once again was restored as the amirate's agent in Jidda. Umar kept this lucrative post, acting as the amir's banker, as well as entertaining amirs, valis, and distinguished visitors in his mansion, until at least 1905. His descendants were famous for their learning as well as their wealth. Muhammad Nasif (b. 1884) memorized the Quran, then studied religion in Mecca, Medina, and Jidda. He became the Jidda agent for the amirs in the 1900s and a major merchant.[21]

The Banaja clan was originally from the Hadramawt. Yusuf Banaja had been one of the major merchants in Jidda before 1858. He loaned large amounts of money to the provincial government and employed agents in Istanbul and Cairo. He was deeply implicated in the massacre of 1858, tried and convicted, and exiled to Crete, where he died. His three sons all became Jidda merchants. Muhammad, the most prominent of them, was an agent for several British and Indian firms and for the sultan of Zanzibar. Although Muhammad attempted to gain British protection in 1879 on the grounds that he and his family were from Shihr and Mukalla, this was refused by the British. After his death in 1891, his brother Abd Allah became the head of the family, and by 1906 Abd Allah was the most important Ottoman merchant and shipper in Jidda. Another brother, Abd al-Rahman, was Vali Ratib Pasha's private banker and was therefore arrested during the Revolution of 1908 when an

investigation was launched into the vali's personal finances. Abd al-Rahman subsequently became minister of finance in 1916 in the independent government of the Hijaz.[22]

Less prominent Ottoman merchants still flourished in the late nineteenth century. Two smaller merchant houses in Jidda were the Badwilan [Ba Duwaylan?] and the Ba Jubayr. The Badwilans had branches in Asir and Qunfuda, and exported clarified butter and skins in the 1900s. The Ba Jubayrs were in Asir, Qunfuda, Aden, and Jizan and had twenty small ships. The Hazzazis were originally from Fez. Muhammad Hazzazi served in the army of Mehmet Ali Pasha, and later became the supervisor of the Jidda prison. His two sons, Hasan and Abd al-Qadir, were prosperous Jidda merchants. Hasan was the Jidda agent for Amir Abd al-Muttalib and, therefore, the enemy of Umar Nasif. His descendants were also merchants in Jidda.[23]

Merchants in Mecca and Medina had somewhat similar experiences as those in Jidda, though there were no Europeans and fewer European protégés there. The widespread interests of Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Rahman Bassam provide one example. He was a Wahhabi who usually lived in central Arabia, but he also owned a house in Mecca in the 1870s. He engaged in Jidda shipping, caravans between Jidda and the holy cities, and money-lending; and he was critical of Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. Khalaf ibn Nabal rose from being a poor Bedouin to become one of Medina's wealthier merchants, even though he was illiterate. He accumulated substantial sums by acting as an intermediary between town and tribe, and sold clothing and coffee to the nomads and bought clarified butter, which he sold in Medina or Jidda. He owned 300 camels in the 1870s and had twice been to Egypt. He considered the Rashidis in Hail to be his masters. A similar though less successful career was that of Muhammad al-Najumi, of Medina and Khaybar. Since his mother was of the Harb tribe, he gained easy access to them for trading. His father was a Kurdish military contractor. Among Muhammad's numerous careers were soldier in the Ottoman army, cotton goods merchant in Medina, livestock dealer, slave merchant, sweeper in the Medina Haram, garden worker, and gunsmith. Many of the merchants, even the smaller ones, ventured far afield from the Hijaz, going to Egypt, the Sudan, Yemen, Aden, the Hadramawt, Iraq, and India.[24] Certainly the image of Hijazis as ignorant and isolated from the world was not correct in regard to

merchants. Irrespective of their nationality, the merchants were well informed about international events affecting the numbers of prospective pilgrims and trading companies abroad.

The environment of the Hijaz set limits to the growth of commerce and, to a degree, influenced its nature. Poor agricultural conditions meant that large imports of food were necessary for the townspeople, Bedouins, and pilgrims, and these imports were paid for by exporting gold and silver received from pilgrims and by the charities of Istanbul and Cairo. Commerce was hindered by the slowness and precariousness of transportation and communications. Since the Hijaz was dependent upon pilgrims and imports for its welfare and sustenance, external changes over which local leaders could have little influence set the level of economic activity. Little was done by the Ottoman government in the Hijaz to improve commercial conditions. There was a steady decline in exports from the Hijaz and a failure to increase local production for export. Foreign imports were consumed and were not used for production of goods. Even the coins used in most commerical transactions were imported from outside the Ottoman Empire.

The rigors of the environment and the prohibition of Christians from the holy cities might have enabled the Hijazis to resist the worldwide European domination of capital and commerce. However, new factors such as improved steamship technology, the Suez Canal, and the growing power of European navies helped maintain and expand British and Indian economic influence in Jidda. The Suez Canal injured Jidda's role as an entrepôt for the Red Sea trade. New steamships did not have to coal at Jidda. In addition, trade with India and Europe was such a large proportion of total commerce that those Muslim merchants who had cultural affinities or economic links with foreigners could act as brokers and economic mediators between Ottoman-Arab society and the powerful imperial European states. Hijazi commercial ties with India were so great that the earliest Ottoman representatives in Calcutta and Bombay were Hijazis appointed on the recommendation of the Hijaz vali.[25] Local government officials reinforced the dominance of commerce by foreigners by entering into restriction of competition, as in the shipping pool that favored the existing, larger firms. As a result, the Muslim protégés of European Christian states increased their control over the most important aspects of Hijazi commerce between 1840 and 1908.

1. FJ, Guès (Jidda) to ministry, 10 November 1901; *A + P*, 1886, 65:305–10.

2. R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule 1839–1967*, p. 178, discusses changes in steamship technology; Robert Landen, *Oman since 1856*, pp. 82–83, says that Masqat was also affected by steamers in a similar way, thus losing its role as an entrepôt for the Gulf.

3. Charles Huber, *Journal d'un voyage en Arabie (1883–1884)*, p. 756; *A P*, 1893–94, 97:373–80; comparative data on Yemen is drawn from information kindly provided by Marwan Buheiry.

4. FJ, Lucciana (Jidda) to ministry, 2 July 1879; *A + P*, 1895, 100:903–7; 1897, 94:119–23; 1898, 99:209–20; 1899, 103:99–104; 1903, 79:14, 76–80; 1906, 128:890–95; 1908, 117:115–21; 1912–13, 100:526–30.

5. *A + P*, 1876, 76:1654–74; *A + P*, 1894, 88:485–96.

6. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 21–22; *A + P*, 1862, 59:48–65.

7. Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1301*, p. 277; *A + P*, 1898, 94:209–20; *A + P*, 1906, 128:881–88.

8. FJ, Rousseau, (Jidda) to ministry, 4 June 1860; Ghada Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa under Egyptian Rule 1865–1885*, pp. 24–25; BBA, Muhimme-i Misir 15, p. 48.

9. BBA, Meclis-i Vala 22429, enclosure 13, 17 Safer 1280; FO 685/3/1, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to India, 14 October 1894; FO 195/1943, Alban (Jidda) to Herbert, 27 June 1896.

10. FO 195/1805, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to ambassador, 25 August 1893; FO 195/2061, Hussein (Jidda) to O'Conor, 5 May 1899.

11. FO 195/1653, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Wood, 15 May and 27 August 1889; FO 195/1689, Wood (Jidda) to ambassador, 2 April 1890; FO 195/1805, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to ambassador, 25 August 1893.

12. FO 195/1805, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to ambassador, 25 August 1893.

13. FO 195/ 1847, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to Currie, 12 July 1894, 13 August, 21 August, 24 August, and 8 October 1894.

14. FO 195/2061, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 6 December 1899; FJ, Guès (Jidda) to ministry, 9 December 1899; FO 195/2061, Hussein (Jidda) to embassy, 29 April and 17 June 1899.

15. FO 195/2148, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 8 May 1903; FO 195/2224, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 17 February 1906; FO 195/2286, Monahan (Jidda) to Constantinople, 8 May 1908.

16. BBA, Dahiliye Irade 1313-Sh-17.

17. For the Christian traders in Lebanon, see Charles Issawi, "British Trade and the Rise of Beirut 1830–1860," p. 98.

18. India Office, G 17/22, petition dated 14 September 1851; Charles Didier, *Séjour chez le Grand-Chérif de la Mekke*, pp. 160–61; FJP, Beillard (Jidda) to ministry, 27 January 1856.

19. BBA, Meclis-i Vala 9047, enclosure 1, Shaban 1268. The Ottomans allowed up to 10 percent interest in Egypt in the seventeenth century (Galal El-Nahal, *The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 41).

20. FO 685/1/1, Stanley (Jidda) to Colquohon, 18 February 1863; H. St. J. B. Philby, *Forty Years in the Wilderness*, p. 119; Nallino, *L'Arabia Saudiana*, p. 127; FO 195/2254, Husain (Jidda) to O'Conor, 20 February 1907; FO 195/1943, Alban (Jidda) to Currie, 22 March 1896.

21. BBA, Ayniyat 875, 11 Ramazan 1291; FO 195/1514, Jago (Jidda) to Granville, 5 March 1885; FO 195/2083, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 25 January 1900; Nallino, *L'Arabia Saudiana*, p. 137; Al-Ansari, *Tarikh*, p. 262; J. R. L. Carter, *Leading Merchant Families of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 34–35. For a highly critical yet poorly informed view of Umar Nasif, see Smith, *Lectures*, pp. 488–90.

22. FO 195/1251, Zohrab (Jidda) to Layard, 29 December 1879; BBA, Meclis-i Vala 15540.

23. Cornwallis, *Asir*, pp. 90, 94; FJ, Buez (Jidda) to ministry, 12 December 1875.

24. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:157–59, 314–15, 378, 415, and 512; FO 195/2174, Hussein (Jidda) to O'Conor, 17 June 1904; Gervais Courtellement, *Mon voyage à la Mecque*, p. 42.

25. Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 385 n. 138.

CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

FOREIGN OBSERVERS of the Middle East in the nineteenth century constantly commented on the relative paucity of voluntary corporative organizations and the resultant fragmentation of Middle Eastern cities and societies. However, this picture of a highly discrete social milieu was warped because foreigners often ignored certain types of social groupings that did actually exist. It was true that if one searched for economic class consciousness, for professional societies based on accomplishment, and for self-governing communes, they were not present in the Hijaz. But guilds and neighborhoods, slavery, status-differentiated hierarchies, families, tribes, and Sufi brotherhoods did exist. They not only existed, but in many cases they formed a basis for identity, willingness to sacrifice, and rules for living.

Social groups had an organizational and value structure similar to that of religious organizations. Status and such social institutions as slavery depended to a considerable degree upon religious factors. Social groups were often controlled by the amirs of Mecca, whose authority was religious and political. However, though most social groupings depended ultimately on religious values and the pilgrimage, they were organized on nonreligious lines.[1]

GUILDS

Many townspeople belonged to guilds, producers' groups organized according to skills or crafts. Guilds controlled admission to trades, the type and quality of goods, and regulated competition.

In the Hijaz most guilds provided services for the pilgrims and made goods to sell to pilgrims. There were guilds for guides, pilgrim brokers, muezzins, boatmen in Jidda, Zamzam water-sellers, camel-hirers, jewelers and goldsmiths, bakers, sellers of prayer beads, barbers, butchers, masons, porters, and hawkers of goods. In a sense import and export merchants also had a guild; there were in Mecca, Jidda, and Medina chief merchants, who were appointed by the grand vezir on the recommendation of the vali.[2]

Guild heads held positions because of leadership abilities

and status independent of personal piety. Sometimes they were influenced substantially by the amirs of Mecca, whose position in turn depended upon religious legitimacy. In the case of the pilgrim guide guild, which was the largest and certainly the most important of the guilds in Mecca, each ethnic group had its own guides, brokers, and deputy guild heads. The chief leaders of the guild were controlled by the amirs, who sent them robes of honor as a sign of official nomination. In at least one case, the amir forced an internal reorganization of the guide guild. The 230 guides working in the Mecca Haram elected a council of sixteen that selected its own head in the 1880s.

Other guild heads also had extensive powers. The sheikh of the jewelers approved major sales, supervised prices, and arbitrated differences between sellers and buyers. The chief of the Zamzam guild, whose post was hereditary, oversaw admission to the guild, although joining also required a license from the amir.

Occasionally the leaders of the guilds played a decisive role in fixing prices for pilgrims. The sheikh of the porters of Jidda, who was appointed by the Ottoman authorities, had a particularly crucial position because of the centrality of Jidda for the pilgrimage by sea and the monopoly enjoyed by his workers in the port. Once he and his followers had agreed on the rates to be charged by the porters, as in 1866, they then secured the approval of the merchants, the kaimmakam, and the Jidda town council. A similar deal was arranged in 1886, whereby the sheikh received one-third of all the porters' incomes. This procedure seems to have worked until 1896 when the kaimmakam replaced the chief of the porters' guild and appointed a new person in his place. Subsequently the fixed rate disappeared and endless bickering over charges ensued.

Perhaps the most intriguing example of the role of the guilds took place in 1865 in Jidda, when Kaimmakam Nuri manipulated the cost of wheat and flour for his own benefit. The bakers' guild approached the French consul with complaints about forced sales and high prices. Some of the local sympathizers of the kaimmakam, acting on his behalf, attempted unsuccessfully to bribe the guild to drop these complaints. Ultimately, because of the guild and the consul, the vali fired Nuri. Subsequently, there were no more instances of Jidda kaimmakams acting as merchants for their own interests.

NEIGHBORHOODS

All three major towns were divided by their inhabitants into neighborhoods, or quarters, by criteria other than religion. The neighborhoods were named after the chief landmark of the area, usually a gate in the town wall, a topographical feature, or a mosque, market, square, or profession concentrated in the region. Jidda was so small that it had only three quarters, with the notables concentrated in one district. Unfortunately, little is known about the forty or so neighborhoods of Medina. Mecca provides the most information about social organizations by neighborhoods.

The definition, and indeed the concept, of a quarter changed from person to person and from year to year. Neighborhoods were especially poorly delimited in Mecca because the city had no walls to serve as fixed boundaries. Unlike many other Middle Eastern cities, Meccan neighborhoods were not physically delineated by gates that were closed at night to provide security. Some Meccans identified marketplaces as quarters of the city; others divided the city differently. Since the concept was largely informal, there was no sure way of listing the neighborhoods. Nevertheless, until the enormous growth of the city following the oil boom of the 1950s took place, there were about twenty neighborhoods that were generally agreed by most Meccans to be separate entities.

The townspeople chose their neighborhood for a number of reasons. In many cases they inherited a dwelling place, but voluntary choice in housing was more usual. In other places, such as a village like al-Ula, a common ancestor, whether real or alleged, provided a basis for neighborhood cohesion. Freed slaves and strangers were adopted into kinship and quarter. In Khaybar, a village of 1,000, there were three such groupings of relatives. Mecca, though, was too large to allow such a pattern. Instead, some quarters were based on occupations, such as the transporters of goods, who lived in Jirwal, Yemeni merchants in Masfalah, potters in Suq al-Layl, carpenters in Ghazzah. Others were based on ethnic groups or points of origin. The Bedouins tended to live in Jirwal and Mu'abidah, Persians in Shamiyyah and Shab Ali, Afghans in Sulaymaniyyah, Anatolian pilgrims in Bab al-Umrah, Takruris and freed slaves in a small settlement south of town, and so forth. There was some differentiation by wealth and status; those quarters closest to

the Haram tended to be most desired for living accommodations, especially by the transient pilgrims and by Ottoman officials. The richest merchants and ulema were concentrated in Shamiyyah and Qararah. Wealthier sharifs lived in Shab Ali and Shab al-Mawlid. At the opposite end of the status ladder, the poor were especially located in those areas where disliked occupations also clustered. Some examples were prostitutes and undertakers in Khandarisah, clothes-dying and milling in Shab Amr, and charcoal production in Suq al-Sughayr. Emptied petrol tins were used to construct housing for a small village of poor people near Mecca—an early example of a *bidonville*.[3]

The neighborhood people tended to identify with each other. When people from the Meccan quarters made the pilgrimage to Medina, the caravan was divided into contingents by quarters. Parties and outings were given by districts. The defense of Jidda against external attack included plans for the quarters to mobilize men to defend separate sections of the city's walls. Perhaps the most extreme example of loyalty to the neighborhood was fighting between youths from different quarters of Mecca. Sulaymaniyyah and Shamiyyah quarters would fight, with quarterstaves in the case of the adults, and with stones in the case of the youths. Such small riots were usually not political, but rather were caused by personal clashes. The most extreme case was in 1881, when political turbulence associated with the new Amir Abd al-Muttalib created an atmosphere conducive to social upheaval. For three days two neighborhoods battled each other using handguns, and the amir did nothing. At the end of the fighting, there were fifteen dead and fifty wounded. Most battles, however, were considerably less bloody. One reason for this was the necessity either to carry on feuds indefinitely or to reconcile them by the payment of blood money.[4]

The quarters were semiofficially recognized by the Ottoman government. In at least a few instances, the government used the sheikhs as intermediaries to the population and as alternatives to the ulema. The vali of Mecca placed a young Indian girl under the protection of a neighborhood sheikh while the legality of her marriage was being discussed. The local sheikh was supposed to report deaths and suspected cases of communicable disease to the sanitary officials.

SLAVERY

Slavery was considered by most Middle Easterners and most Hijazi Muslims to be natural, inevitable, and necessary. The Prophet Muhammad had recommended mercy, justice, and charity toward slaves. Enfranchisement was a positive moral act, but the institution of slavery itself was not opposed by the religious. Changes in attitudes toward slavery resulting from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and the humanitarian movement of the nineteenth century led the European countries, particularly Great Britain, to seek to abolish the slave trade outside Europe, including the Middle East.

In the case of the Hijaz, most slaves were kidnapped or purchased in Africa and then transported across the Red Sea. The most notable instances of brutal treatment took place while the slaves were being captured and taken to the African coast.

Once the slaves reached Jidda, they were sold to one of three major groups of buyers: pilgrims, Hijazis, and administrators of the Harams. Pilgrims bought slaves partially as investments: the hope was that the slave could be sold for more than the pilgrim's expenses when he returned home. Hijazis chiefly wanted servants for work in the home, though some slaves were used for manual, artisanal, and agricultural labor. In some cases slaves were concubines. The overseers of the Harams sought slave eunuchs, and many of the staff of the Harams were eunuchs removed from Istanbul because of their age or as a form of polite exile.

The restoration of Ottoman control to the Hijaz in 1841 did not immediately affect the status of slavery in the province, but in 1855 the slave trade became a major issue. Vali Kamil Pasha tried to carry out the orders of the central government to stop the importation and sale of slaves, but Amir Abd al-Muttalib, fearing that orders for his deposition were soon to be announced, favored the popular view that slavery and the slave trade were both permissible and necessary. Abd al-Muttalib linked his own retention in office to the suppression of the anti-slave trade decree; his opponents, the backers of Sharif Muhammad ibn Awn, supported the vali and the imperial government. The vali ordered the public reading of the order closing the slave markets and forbidding the importing of slaves. In Mecca the ulema forced the qadi to declare the sultan's

order void, on the grounds that it was contrary to holy law. Widespread rioting broke out, and houses belonging to French and British protégés were looted. The ulema of Mecca demanded the removal of the qadi and Ottoman soldiers from Mecca, complete freedom for the institution of slavery, and the permanent expulsion of the consuls and all Christians from the Hijaz. The vali agreed, for the moment, to the first demand, but he denied the others.[5]

The Meccan ulema did not act in a vacuum. They were secretly supported by the amir from Taif, and publicly were joined by some sharifs and sheikhs of Mecca's neighborhoods. The head of the ulema, in addressing the notables of Mecca, called for a jihad, or holy war, against Christians and idolaters. Abd al-Muttalib asked the Bedouins to rise in the name of Muhammad and Islam, since the sultan had become like a Christian. Thus the slavery controversy openly assumed what had been its basic character from the start—a battle for political power expressed in religious terms. Further evidence of this could be found in the relative peacefulness of opposition to the Ottoman orders on the slave trade in Medina, where the deposition of the amir was not a problem.[6]

To assure the inhabitants of the Hijaz that slave-owning itself was not under attack, the Ottoman chief religious jurisconsult wrote a letter to the qadi of Mecca in which he argued that the just holding of property (i.e., slaves) was permissible. The alliance with Great Britain and France, the chief opponents of slavery, was needed in the Crimean War to crush the Russian enemy, and, therefore, it too was permitted. With the capture of Abd al-Muttalib in 1856, the Ottomans ended the rebellion that ostensibly was begun on the slave trade issue.[7]

Since after 1855 the slave trade continued to be openly conducted in Jidda, Istanbul repeatedly ordered the Hijaz vali and his subordinates to end the African slave trade. Orders to this effect were sent in 1857, 1859, 1862, 1865, and 1880. In 1859 the acting British vice-consul, Polat, transmitted the grand vezir's letter on the slave trade to the vali directly. A general decree outlawed the slave trade in 1871.

As a result of these orders, the open landing of slaves at Jidda and their public sale were abandoned in favor of secret landings and private sales. Those slaves that were still brought into the Hijaz were landed at small villages, marched to Jidda or Mecca, and sold.

There were slave sales nearly every morning in Jidda, even though the slave market was officially abolished in 1874. Ottoman government officials, Indian Muslims, and even Europeans continued to buy personal slaves. Some slaves were exported to Syria by the returning pilgrimage caravans; others, provided with false letters of enfranchisement, were transported by ship to Suez and beyond to Istanbul.

In the first phase of the slavery controversy, from 1855 to 1877, the European states and the central Ottoman government failed to stop the slave trade in the Red Sea. There were a number of reasons for this failure. Perhaps the most important was that the motives that impelled the central government to its position did not act upon the Hijaz with equal weight. Sometimes officials would enforce the imperial orders, as when the kaimmakam of Jidda seized eighty-five slaves coming from Massawa and returned them to Africa in 1865. But more often government officials collaborated with the slave traders.[8]

The second phase of the slavery dispute involved a direct confrontation between the slave traders and purchasers on the one hand and the British consuls on the other, with the valis in the awkward position of intermediaries. A new treaty against slavery in 1877 opened the period, and the anti-consul incident of 1895 closed it. Eventually external events in Egypt and the Sudan decreased the slave trade significantly. In 1877 the Egyptian and British governments agreed to ban the slave trade on the high seas. If an Egyptian ship suspected of carrying slaves refused to stop, British ships were free to use force to search it for contraband slaves.

Slavery and the slave trade enjoyed popular and elite support, partially because they were sanctioned by the ulema. In one case in order to get freed slaves out of Jidda, the Ottoman garrison took the extreme step of boring a hole in the wall of their barracks that faced the sea, so that the slaves could leave the town directly and would not have to be taken through Jidda's streets. If the public saw the freed slaves, the authorities feared a riot would result. After this, four additonal companies of troops were sent to Jidda to increase the small force there. The new vali, Nashid Pasha, arrested the Jidda chief of police, fired the kaimmakam, and closed the slave market at Mecca. No slaves were landed on the Hijaz coast between May 1879 and March 1880. Freed slaves were provided with work in the Hijaz if they did not wish to return to Africa. The

slave was first registered as free; he was then hired by private citizens who provided a bond and guaranteed to treat him as a free servant and to pay him a monthly salary.[9]

The newly reappointed Amir Abd al-Muttalib did nothing in the early 1880s to oppose Ottoman policy on the slave trade, even though he had led the pro-slave trade riots in the middle 1850s. In private Abd al-Muttalib favored slavery; he was also strongly anti-British and anti-Christian. During his tenure, the British consulate secured the freedom of at least thirty-five slaves, reconciled slaves and their masters in twenty other cases, and arranged the transfer of a slave to a new owner several times. The liberated slaves had worked in a number of types of jobs as water-carriers, doorkeepers, pearl divers, makers of straw mats, masons, carriers of heavy goods in the port, and personal slaves of Bedouins or townspeople. In some of the instances of reconciliation, the slave returned to his master on condition that he be paid wages for his work.[10]

As a result of the activism displayed by the consuls and the Indian navy, the number of slaves imported decreased, slaves in the Hijaz were treated better, and the employment of free servants became more widespread. The fighting in the Sudan between the Mahdists and the Egyptian administration cut the roads and drastically reduced the number of slaves sent from the Sudan to Jidda. The British blockade of the Sudanese coast after 1886 and the occupation of the slave-exporting ports also reduced the slave trade. However, Ethiopian slaves captured by the Sudanese were sent in large numbers to Arabia in 1888. The Hijaz vali tried to stop the flood of slaves in the late 1880s. When he learned of the arrangement between the Jidda customs chief and the chief of police splitting a bribe for every slave sold, the open sale of slaves was forbidden and the slave market closed. Similarly, the Jidda kaimmakam freed fifty-eight newly landed slaves and arrested three slave dealers. But a group of notables threatened civil war and the intervention of the Bedouin tribes if the order was not rescinded, and since Istanbul refused to support the kaimmakam, the order closing the slave market was repealed and the market was reopened.[11]

The 1890s saw a further decrease in the slave trade throughout the Ottoman Empire. The British conquest of the Sudan closed a major source of slaves, as did European expansion into Eritrea and Somalia. In 1894 only about five hundred slaves were brought into the Hijaz. Most of these slaves were females; some were eunuchs.

As the supply of new slaves decreased, prices rose. Some Arab Muslim children and women in Yemen were enslaved in the 1890s and 1900s and sold in Jidda and Mecca. Many slaves, including runaways from owners, were legally manumitted by the Ottoman authorities, pilgrims, and the British. On rare occasions eunuchs were still purchased locally to be sent to the imperial palace.[12]

The Ottoman administration in the Hijaz upheld the rights of slaves and freed slaves in accordance with Muslim and Ottoman law. The murderer of a slave girl was sentenced to fourteen years in jail. There was a good deal of freedom for many slaves despite their servile status.

Private ownership of slaves continued to be religiously sanctioned, legal, and widespread even though the slave trade was curbed. The status of the thousands of slaves owned by the townspeople, villagers, and Bedouins was not substantially affected by measures directed against the slave trade. Freed slaves could rise in social status and even become wealthy, but most remained poor. The institution of slavery and the condition of most slaves remained in 1908 as it had been in 1840, although the number of slaves imported fell drastically.

STATUS

Slaves were at the bottom of the complex Hijazi town social organization, which was based on status and on a status-arranged hierarchy of groups. In allocating status, religious position was not the key factor for all groups, but it did decisively influence the situation of sharifs, Haram workers, Shiis, and women. The status of other members of the elite, ethnic groups, and nomads was determined basically by nonreligious factors. Government pensions and salaries and private wealth were important in determining status. Common religious purposes were in the background of Hijazi society, and personal piety was greatly admired and respected.

At the top of society in Mecca and Taif were the sharifs. As direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and co-rulers of the region, they commanded both awe and obedience. Other descendants of the Prophet and of early leaders of Islam also existed, but they enjoyed a lesser status. Still, the family that provided the doorkeepers of the Kaba could trace its descent and duties to pre-Islamic days, and it was highly regarded in Mecca. Other old families, especially in Medina, were proud of their ancestry, but many were poor. These families possessed not only family pride, they also re-

ceived subsidies from the imperial government and from private individuals because of the religious prestige of their ancestors.

In Mecca and Medina, some members of the upper classes were associated with the two Harams as officials and recipients of gifts. The upper classes in Mecca and Medina also gained income from agriculture and from urban rental property. In Jidda the upper status groups consisted of merchants and officeholders in the Ottoman government. The actual political ruling elite consisted of Ottoman officials, but because they were usually only temporary residents and because of the disdain with which they were regarded by local elites, they had only a grudging public acknowledgment of their status. Indeed, the great pride felt by Meccans and Medinans in being residents of the two holiest Muslim towns made them feel that all outsiders were inferior.[13]

The order of ranking of the recipients of imperial charity indicated their social status. In Medina the muftis, chief preacher, and deputy judge chose the families that were entitled to charity, the number of persons eligible, and the amount. The men of religion and teachers were the highest class; then followed the prayer leaders and preachers, descendants of the Prophet, men learned in law and the teachers of reading, the notables, those born in Medina, and those resident in the holy city though born elsewhere. Pensions were given not only to the men of religion and officials but also to their children. Payments were inheritable and divisible among the descendants of the original recipient. In the eight years for which information is available in the late nineteenth century, more than 319,000 okas of barley and 3,000,000 of wheat were distributed in Medina. A small number of people received a large part of these amounts. In most years 20 percent of the people received more than 50 percent of the grain. The most extreme example was the 8 people from a total of 228 recipients who received one-third of all wheat in 1902. Although initially many of those receiving grain were exiles or retired officials from Istanbul, some local Sufis, teachers, and students were also named.[14]

Those who were in the middle-status groups were most of the pilgrim brokers, some wholesale and retail merchants, the actual (as opposed to the honorific) servants of the two Harams, shopkeepers, small proprietors of real estate and renters of flats, heads of religious brotherhoods, teachers, and so on. Lower-ranking military officers and government clerks were also in this group.

The lower-status occupations usually did not include people

directly associated with religion or the pilgrimage. Such occupations did include boatmen and builders in Jidda, peasants and porters in Medina, street sweepers and funeral workers in Mecca, and such. Below these people were the very poor, either slaves or those who had no regular job of any type. The poorest pilgrims frequently had no money by the end of their stay or had arrived penniless after paying for their transport to the Hijaz. They depended upon charity and lived in appalling conditions. Frequently they were clustered around places where they thought they might obtain assistance, such as the Mecca Haram or the Jidda consulates.

In addition to occupation, there were several external, visible signs of status. Foremost was attire. During the holy days, all pilgrims were dressed in the same style of clothing and were thus indistinguishable except by sex. During the rest of the year, the style of the clothing, the colors, the modes of wearing turbans, and the quality of cloth and decorations frequently indicated status. On official occasions medals that had been awarded by the sultan were worn. Since there were many sent by Istanbul to the Hijaz for private as well as public figures, the award of honors by the imperial government was a widespread sign of distinction. Male Meccans, especially the descendants of the Prophet, had distinctive facial scars, and could thus be distinguished at a glance from non-Meccans. Skin color was not usually a guide to status. Although it was true that black slaves cost less than white, it was also the case that interracial marriage and concubinage frequently resulted in the children of the wealthy and notable being of varying skin colors and features. A mesalliance in marriage was related to ancestry and ethnicity rather than to color; of course, in many instances there was an overlapping of these categories. For the daughter of a sharif to marry anyone who was not of that religiously prestigious lineage was considered to be a loss of status for her and for her family; if she married a non-Arab, the loss of prestige would be even greater, no matter what the color of his skin.[15]

Religion did determine status for the very few Jews and Christians in Jidda, and for the Shii Muslims, all of whom were held to be of very low status. The Shiis of Medina were agricultural workers and butchers, and claimed to be descended from the Abbasid side of the Prophet's family. They married among themselves, had their own teachers and clerics, were buried in their own cemetery, tended to be poor, and in general were considered a group apart from, and inferior to, the rest of the Medinans. Persian Shii pilgrims

had to pay more for services than did Sunnis and were frequently insulted for their beliefs. There does not seem to have been any noticeable mistreatment of Wahhabis, Ibadis, or other pilgrims belonging to minority sects within Islam.

Ethnicity and language were strong links among people, though they were not associated with European concepts of national identity. There was a tendency for ethnic and language groups to live together in the major towns. The most numerous foreign communities were the Indians, Javanese, South Arabians, and Turks. Larger communities were able to maintain some of the customs of their homelands. The Indians preserved their own languages, dress, and social mores longer than other ethnic groups. Some Indians even wrote Arabic in Hindi characters. Male Indians resident in the Hijaz often returned to India to secure brides and then brought them back to Arabia. Indian women in Medina frequently did not wear veils. Ethnicity in many cases overlapped with occupation. A particular accent in Arabic differentiated Javanese from other groups, as did clothing and customs. Indians and Javanese, as well as Turks and even Syrian Arabs, were ridiculed by the Meccans for their Arabic accents and their poor command of Arabic, despite being fellow Sunni Muslims.

Women were a group with low status. Men held the view that Islam supported and ordained this situation. So little was said about their lives that it is almost impossible to tell whether the actual status of women corresponded to the publicly stated views of men about them. Supposedly women were more restricted in their freedom of movement than men, had no role whatsoever in public questions, and in general were completely subservient to males. However, some exceptions to this pattern are known. Nafisah bint Abd Allah Khalifah, the spirited wife of Ibrahim Awliya, refused to join Ibrahim in Bombay, where he was then living, and sued him for support and repayment of a debt in the Medina qadi's court in 1883. Then there was the wife of Zayn, a pilgrim guide from West Sumatra, who in actuality transacted most of his business, mixed with men freely, and displayed great energy. There is also some evidence that family financial matters were transacted jointly by husband and wife.[16] The seclusion of women in towns, the great value placed on privacy, the domination of economic and political life by men, and the fear of loss of family status if women committed adultery, all kept the roles of most women in society tightly restricted.

Another way in which social groups ranked themselves was by moral behavior. Those who were most law-observing and pious were respectable; those who broke religious commandments, laws, and customs were not.[17]

Sexual behavior was crucial in establishing claims to religious respectability. Sexual relations during the pilgrimage days were forbidden, but before and after that time pilgrims could have sex without forfeiting the benefits of the pilgrimage. Most men making the pilgrimage were not accompanied by their wives. The Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans had prostitutes among them in the early nineteenth century, but with the Wahhabi seizure of the Hijaz, prostitution disappeared. In the 1810s there were prostitutes in one of the quarters of Mecca. Homosexuality was also present. Conditions differed among the three cities in the 1850s: in Jidda alcohol and prostitutes were openly available; in Mecca and Medina there were no prostitutes, but some alcohol was secretly drunk by Ottoman officers. In the 1870s in Medina, there was card-playing, alcohol, the use of drugs—all originating with, but not restricted to, the Ottoman soldiery. Although in 1884 there were public brothels in Jidda featuring both males and females, prostitutes were later sent outside Mecca and Jidda and forced to live away from the central areas of the towns. In 1902 drummers, singers, and dancing girls accompanied the pilgrims to Muna. Even marriages sometimes were somewhat transitory in the Hijaz; the rapid coming and going of so many people encouraged a similar rapidity of change in personal relationships. The assemblage of thousands of persons unfamiliar with the area who traveled with substantial sums of money also encouraged thieves, who were numerous during the pilgrimage season.[18]

One social group considered itself to be outside the moral and social status hierarchy of the towns. For the Bedouins of the Hijaz, all the townspeople, with the exception of some religious figures, were equally deserving of contempt for their soft lives, cowardice, failure to preserve Bedouin standards of purity in lineage, and differing codes of behavior. The views of the townspeople were usually just as antipathetic toward the Bedouins, whom they considered to be riotous, ignorant, poor, and savage. However, there were some groups between these two extremes. They consisted of villagers who preserved tribal organization, as in the fishing villages south of Jidda, and the few Bedouins who actually settled in towns.

Given the extraordinarily diverse social groups and values indicated above, one might well ask how towns existed at all. The differences and enmities created, or at least reinforced, by these factors might well have led to constant tension and disputes. There were many causes for the relative social tranquillity of the towns. Ottoman military forces ultimately ensured the existing political and economic system irrespective of the wishes of the local population. An overarching unity of purpose, beyond all economic, ethnic, neighborhood, sexual, and status differences, was achieved through the pilgrimage and religious fervor that permeated Mecca and, to a lesser degree, Jidda and Medina. The Muslim faith was a common bond that united Hijazis: its public rituals stimulated a sense of common identity. There was a great deal of intermingling of people in legal and educational institutions, in arranging large-scale commerce, and in handling the floods of pilgrims who inundated the Hijaz annually. A widespread knowledge of languages furthered this process. Nevertheless, there was a social mosaic in the towns that involved the separation of most groups from each other in important ways.

The categories of social organization were overlapping: the residents of neighborhoods, members of guilds, ethnic minorities, and the various status group members in actuality found themselves belonging to several categories at the same time. Certain divisions, especially voluntary corporative organizations such as ideological or professional associations, did not exist as such in the Hijaz. The consequences of this absence were momentous. If, as Hisham Sharabi has argued, professionals, Westernized students, and journalists in other parts of the Middle East helped lead to a desire for Western, secularizing reforms, their absence in the Hijaz explains the absence of such a desire there.[19] Instead, religious values and occupations often helped influence which kinds of social organizations would flourish and gave their structures legitimacy, as in the case of slavery.

1. For a thorough recent discussion of a nineteenth-century Middle Eastern town and one that explores many of these concepts at greater length, see Alixa Naff, "A Social History of Zahle."

2. BBA, Ayniyat 871, 25 Receb 1289; Dahiliye 72225, 8 Rebiyulevvel 1301; Ayniyat 875, grand vezir to vali, Gurre-i Zilhicce 1293.

3. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 1:527 and 2:152–53; Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 109–30; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 4–7, 199; Al-Batanuni, *Al-Rihlat al-Hijaziyyah*, p. 40; Courtellement, *Mon voyage*, p. 116.

4. Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 106; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 8–9, 60; Tamisier, *Voyage en Arabie*, 1:117; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:152–53, 2:18; Didier, *Séjour*, p. 123; FO 195/1375, Zohrab (Jidda) to Goschen, 28 May 1881; FJP, Malpertuy (Jidda) to ministry, 27 May 1881. For similar phenomena in south Arabia, see Robert Serjeant, "Wards and Quarters of Towns in South-West Arabia," pp. 43–45.

5. Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:101, 117–19; FO 195/375, Page (Jidda) to Cumberbatch, 13 November 1855; FJP, Outrey (Jidda) to ministry, 4 November 1855; Ehud Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression, 1840–1890*, pp. 129–35.

6. Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:103–6, 111–13; FO 195/375, Page (Jidda) to Cumberbatch, 23 November 1855; Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," p. 59; FJP, Beillard (Jidda) to ministry, 7 December 1855.

7. Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:134–35.

8. *Recueil*, pp. 268–70; FJ, de Sainte Marie (Jidda) to ministry, 10 April 1865 and 4 June 1867.

9. FO 84/1544, Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 24 March 1879, 1 May, 7 May 1879; FO 195/1251, Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 3 May and 4 June 1879; FO 195/1251, Zohrab (Jidda) to Layard, 27 June 1879; Toledano, *Ottoman Slave Trade*, pp. 228–30; FO 84/1571, Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 13 March 1880.

10. FO 84/1642, Moncrieff (Jidda) to Granville, 12 January 1883.

11. FO 84/1849, Jago (Jidda) to Foreign Office, 9 July 1887; FO 84/1720, Jago (Jidda) to Wyndham, 10 February 1885; FJP, Wathled (Jidda) to ministry, 29 October, 10 December 1888, and 12 April 1889; FO 84/1903, Wood (Jidda) to Salisbury, 23 October 1888; Toledano, *Ottoman Slave Trade*, pp. 239–40.

12. FO 195/1730, Ata Mohammad (Hudayda) to Wood, 10 July 1891; FO 84/2227, Wood (Jidda) to Foreign Office, 23 January 1892; FO 195/2027, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 12 September 1898; FO 195/2198, Devey (Jidda) to Constantinople, 12 February 1905.

13. Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 187; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 2:7–8; Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, p. 202.

14. BBA, Hususi Irade 1322-R-172, 26 Rebiyulahir 1322, enclosure 2, defter.

15. Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 2:233; Albert Le Boulicault, *Au pays des mystères*, pp. 75–76; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 284; Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 182–87.

16. FO 685/2/1, Gonne (Bombay) to Jidda, 9 January 1883; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, pp. 36, 91, 289; Smith, *Lectures*, p. 564.

17. For a consideration of the social implications of morality for Middle Eastern cities, although in an earlier time, see Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 105–7, 170–83.

18. Jomier, *La Mahmal*, pp. 145–46; Burckhardt, *Travels in Arabia*, pp. 197–98; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 2:19, 233, 270; Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, p. 193; FO 195/1251, Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 13 November 1879; Courtellemont, *Mon voyage*, p. 134; FO 195/1514, Jago (Jidda) to Wyndham, 20 March 1885; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 89.

19. Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West*, pp. 4–11, 88–89.

PART TWO
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HIJAZ

CHAPTER 7
RESTORATION AND REBELLION, 1840-1858

BETWEEN 1840 AND 1908, the religious-political basis of the central Ottoman state was substantially affected by selective borrowing from secularizing Western Europe. However, in the Hijaz secularization of politics did not take place. When the Ottomans attempted secular reforms that were locally felt to be antireligious, such as the banning of the slave trade in 1855 and the favoring of foreign merchants in 1858, riots and rebellions broke out as a result.

Such nonreligious factors as personal ambition, family rivalries, and *raison d'ètat* played a major role in the nineteenth-century politics of the Hijaz after the Ottoman restoration of 1840, but they were part of a pattern of politics that had existed earlier and were not innovations from Europe. The importance of religion to politics was especially seen in the financial aid of the Ottomans to the Hijaz, the prestige of the amir of Mecca as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, the dual administration of the amir and the vali in Mecca, and the enmity felt toward merchants who were Christians or Christian protégés.

A version of Islam and a ruling dynasty new to the Hijaz had replaced the Ottoman religious-political system when the Wahhabis under the leadership of the House of Saud conquered the province in the first decade of the 1800s. The Ottoman pilgrimage was interrupted, and the empire felt its religious legitimacy and prestige to be so damaged that a major counterattack was urgently needed to regain the Hijaz. By the orders of the sultan, Mehmet Ali, the independently-minded Ottoman governor of Egypt, conquered the holy cities, defeated the Wahhabis in their homeland of Najd, and ruled the Hijaz nominally on behalf of the Ottomans from 1811 to 1840.

Neither Saudi nor Egyptian administrations basically changed the Hijaz. It is true that in 1827 Mehmet Ali ousted the Dhawu Zayd clan of the Hashimite family, which had provided the amirs of Mecca since 1718, and installed as the new amir of Mecca Muhammad ibn Abd al-Muin ibn Awn, of the Dhawu Awn Hashimite clan. The leader of the Dhawu Zayd, Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib (b. ca.

1794), fled to Istanbul. Mehmed Ali's control of the Hijaz subsequently became so firm that in 1836 Amir Muhammad was detained in Egypt and the Hijaz was governed by secular Egyptian appointees with no amir in Mecca. However, few Hijazis viewed favorably such Egyptian interference with the amirate, just as earlier few had become Wahhabis under Saudi control of Mecca and Medina. The failure of both Saudis and Egyptians to create new institutions that could flourish in the region, the social diversity of the towns, the general opposition to all religious and political innovation, a vested interest in maintaining ties with the Ottoman treasury, the religious esteem felt for the amirs, and the overriding concern with pilgrimage affairs rather than with political power made the restoration of Ottoman and Hashimite power both possible and welcome to most of the population of the Hijaz.

The political system of the Hijaz was changed as a result of the intervention of most of the European powers on the side of the Ottomans against Mehmet Ali, who was forced to give up his empire outside the Nile River valley, though he was allowed to stay as the Ottoman governor of Egypt. The Egyptian forces left Yemen in May, and they left Najd in September 1840. On 2 August 1840 Mehmet Ali wrote Muhammad ibn Awn, then still a prisoner in Cairo, that he had full authority in the Hijaz as amir from that date forward. Amir Muhammad returned to Mecca, where he oversaw the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces and the restoration of the amirate under Ottoman overlordship.

RESTORATION, 1840–54

The Ottoman restoration in the Arab lands took place under a new sultan, Abdulmecid (r. 1839–61), and a new order. The military superiority of the European powers had become so clear by then that the reforms of the Tanzimat, aimed at achieving Europeanization, including secularization, began in earnest. Changes that had started in most of the Arab lands during the Egyptian occupation were modified or expanded by returning Ottoman governors and generals. In the Hijaz, however, the restoration was precisely that—the reinstallation of an *ancien régime* based on shared power, religious legitimacy, and minimal expenditure of imperial resources.

Muhammad ibn Awn was reconfirmed by the sultan as amir of Mecca, perhaps because his imprisonment by Mehmet Ali in Egypt had cleared him in Ottoman eyes from the guilt of previous insubordinations. At any rate, the sultan did not appoint Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib to be amir, though he was kept in Istanbul in readiness to supplant Muhammad should circumstances warrant it. The former sheikh of the Medina Haram, Osman, who had served in that post under both Egyptians and Ottomans, was named governor of the whole province. An Ottoman was named sheikh of the Medina Haram and governor of the city. Ahmet Izzet became kaimmakam of Jidda and sheikh of the Mecca Haram at the nomination of the sultan.

Upon arriving in April 1841, Vali Osman asked Istanbul for more men, arms, and ships so that Ottoman control could be enforced. He was able to assume power only gradually. The official resumption from the Egyptians of Ottoman financial responsibility for the Hijaz finally came on 1 September 1841.[1]

During the interval before full Ottoman restoration, the amir expanded his authority to the maximum. He quelled the tribes between Mecca and Medina and regained control over the region south of Taif toward Bisha, in Asir. It was only with the arrival of 2,000 Ottoman troops in late 1841 that the balance of power began tilting toward the central authority. In 1842, in accord with orders from the sultan, the chief fortress of Mecca was turned over to an Ottoman garrison by the amir. The vali then built a small fort on Mount Hindi in Mecca to serve as an additional safeguard.

A proposed investigation by Istanbul into the whole government and military of the Hijaz was discussed in all the chief organs of state. The Ottomans decided to leave things as they were, since the townspeople and Bedouins were tranquil under the supervision of the amir. The only areas of difficulty were recurring financial troubles; the water system of Mecca, which needed repairs; and the administration of the outlying regions of the vilayet—Asir, Ghamid, Zahran, Qunfuda, Massawa, and relations with Najd. The vali controlled the army, the customs of Jidda, and little else; the rest of the administration of the towns was in the hands of the amir. In 1844 responsibilities were again allocated: the vali and amir were jointly put in charge of security on the roads, the Bedouins, and the administration of the holy cities. Justice for most Meccans, the distribution of imperial honors, and the reading of the imperial

order appointing the amir were solely up to the vali. Conflict between the two leaders was to be resolved by joint agreement.[2] Thus Istanbul created fertile grounds for rivalry, misunderstanding, and confusion in administration by refusing to clearly specify tasks for each person, but the empire obtained the religious prestige of the amir as an adjunct to Ottoman power in the Hijaz.

Until 1845 there was surprising tranquillity as the power-sharing arrangement between governor and amir functioned satisfactorily. The amir relied upon information gained from tribal sources, reports from his sons on conditions in Istanbul after they returned from a visit there, and regular correspondence with the French consuls about European developments. The populace credited the amir for the pilgrimages of those years that were relatively problem-free. Since he was responsible for the ceremonies and relations with the Bedouins, this seemed reasonable. Amir Muhammad did everything he could during this peaceful time to groom his son Abd Allah for eventual succession to the amirate. Abd Allah traveled to Istanbul, led the Egyptian and Syrian caravans back from Mecca to Medina, and was named deputy governor of Mecca. In 1844 the amir secured the exile to Egypt of Ali ibn Ghalib, a potential rival to Abd Allah.

Vali Osman, on the other hand, faced a series of nearly intractable problems centering on finances. A military revolt in 1842 for back pay was quickly suppressed, but the corruption of the vali's advisers and the growing expenses of the military made it impossible to meet all the vilayet's obligations. However, the crisis that brought about the downfall of Osman emerged from a different problem—stormy relations with the nomads.

Rumi, a leader of the Harb tribe, revolted in 1844 to secure payment of debts owed him by the Ottomans, but he was then paid by the vali and a public reception for him at Jidda was designed to show that peace now existed. At a later feast, Rumi, his three brothers and all their followers were killed, and their heads were exhibited at Mecca to show the results of opposing the empire, as well as the foolhardiness of trusting the protestations made by Ottoman governors. The Harb rose against the Ottomans, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the amir of Mecca mediated the dispute and ended it.

Since Amir Muhammad felt he was responsible for negotiations with the nomads, he was antagonized by Osman's methods

as well as his general policies. A further problem ensued when disturbances in Asir led to a withdrawal of Ottoman forces to Taif in 1845. Istanbul received complaints against the vali made by the amir, the sheikh of the Medina Haram, and Mehmet Ali of Egypt. Osman had done his own cause harm by complaining about the poor state of the fortresses and the paucity of supplies precisely when these areas had already been dealt with by the central government. The grand vezir decided to dismiss the vali, but before this could happen, Osman died in Jidda on 25 June 1845. At nearly the same time, the grand vezir was contemplating the replacement of Muhammad by Abd al-Muttalib as amir, but finally rejected the move as being too much of a change when added to the replacement of the vali.[3] The new vali was Sherif, the governor of Medina and sheikh of the Haram there; Osman had held the same posts in his own earlier career. Troop riots were suppressed, and more troops were sent to the Hijaz. The first crisis of the restoration subsided rapidly.

The amir managed the pilgrimages successfully in the 1840s, though there were some complaints about the arbitrary fixing of camel-hire prices. Relations with foreigners were also amicable, at least by comparison with the stormy years that followed. Minor attacks upon the foreign consuls in Jidda took place in 1846 and 1851, and in 1849 the Ottoman government ordered the vali to apologize for the confiscation of an Indian ship.[4] Vali Osman's two immediate successors were both dismissed by Istanbul; they were so weak and incapable that the amir and his son Abd Allah managed most public questions.

The end of the decade's peace and tranquillity came because of a Bedouin uprising in the north and Ottoman expansion in the east and south. Medina was besieged by the tribes. Military detachments were sent from Jidda, but eventually it became necessary to pay the tribes to bring about their withdrawal. As a result, troops were ordered to the Hijaz from Syria, the Meccan garrison was expanded, and the central government became concerned about the authority of the amir. The amir had been quite successful in a campaign against the Saudis in Qasim. It was true that he had not installed his protégé Khalid ibn Saud (d. 1865) in place of the ruling Saudi prince, but Muhammad had secured from the Saudis recognition of Ottoman sovereignty and payment of tribute. Next, the Ottomans obtained Muhammad's help in 1849 for the reconquest

of coastal Yemen. With a relatively small force numbering 4,200, the expedition was successful, in large part because of the cooperation of Asiri tribes gained by the amir's tact and influence. Abd Allah, the son of Amir Muhammad, became the governor of the coastal region for the Ottomans.[5]

It might be thought that these successes would have been sufficient to ensure continued Ottoman backing of the Amir Muhammad. In fact, however, he was dismissed, arrested, and exiled to Istanbul in the middle of 1851. A number of theories have been put forth to explain his dismissal: an Ottoman desire to have a weak amir, intrigues against him in Istanbul by competitors for the amirate, rivalry with the vali, his own intrigues with the Bedouins. Certainly Muhammad had persecuted the sons of the late Amir Yahya in Mecca. Abd al-Muttalib, the leader of their clan in Istanbul, intrigued strongly and continually for the amirate. A number of meetings had been held in Istanbul by the chief reform councils to discuss Muhammad's tenure. They concluded that the position of the amirate depended upon historical justification and that a division of authority between the amir and the vali was justified both historically and in terms of current expediency. However, the rights of the amirs did not detract from the absolute right of power over the Hijaz inhering in the caliphate that they believed to be held by the Ottoman sultans. The reason to dismiss the current amir was not his theoretical power but rather his inability to maintain law and order in the Hijaz. Also, Amir Muhammad, who was, after all, an Egyptian appointee originally, had exceeded his authority and had claimed excessive power. To a certain degree, it was admitted, his power had been justified by the difficult circumstances of the 1840s, but now there was no longer any reason for the situation to continue. Abd al-Muttalib should be appointed, Muhammad arrested, and troops sent to the Hijaz to ensure that all went smoothly. The arguments of Agah Pasha, vali of the Hijaz, against Muhammad carried particular weight.[6]

The Amir Muhammad was arrested with no resistance. The succession to the amirate was equally smooth: Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib, who had long been in Istanbul, had the support of the influential British ambassador, Stratford Canning (1786–1880), as well as that of the sultan. Abd al-Muttalib was appointed amir of Mecca officially on 4 July 1851. His cousin Mansur acted for him in Taif and Mecca until his arrival in the Hijaz.

When the Ottoman Empire entered the Crimean War against Russia in 1854 with Britain and France as allies, Ottoman weakness became clearer as most of its troops were withdrawn from the Arab lands to Anatolia. Local conflicts and particularly the continual quarrels between the Amir Abd al-Muttalib and the valis exacerbated political tension. An attempt to implement the new imperial regulations requiring advisory councils in local government led to riots and disturbances in Mecca in 1853. The very first item to appear before a new Tanzimat council in Istanbul, the Meclis-i Mahsus, in November 1853 was a general examination of the Hijaz and the appointment of Kamil Pasha as the new vali after the resignation of his predecessor. But things were no better for the new vali—no sooner had Kamil arrived than Abd al-Muttalib fired off a letter of complaint against him to Istanbul.[7]

The natural tensions between amir and vali were made much worse by the pressures exerted upon the vali by the central government to conciliate Great Britain and France, the empire's allies in the war. The vali lost status because of the need to appease the Christians but still had sufficient military force at his disposal to keep control. For two years running, the amir absented himself from the pilgrimage by going to Taif, so as to avoid having to deal in any way with Vali Kamil. According to the account given by Kamil to the French consul, the grounds for this enmity were that the amir had ordered some Bedouins executed without gaining the sultan's approval, the amir's friends were protected against justice, and the amir was inciting the population against the empire by accusing it of being pro-Christian. At the same time, the amir allegedly was illegally taking large sums of money from the local treasury. As a result, neither soldiers nor government employees had been paid in twenty-two months, and the Bedouins and the pious in the holy cities were not receiving their payments from the sultan. The crowning touch was the murder of Ishaq Efendi, the head of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca and a sympathizer with the former amir, by orders of Abd al-Muttalib. Vali Kamil wrote to Istanbul asking for the deposition of the amir.[8]

REBELLIONS, 1855–58

The rebellions of 1855 and 1858 were caused in part by local rivalries for power, but a major factor involved was the detestation

felt by the Muslim Hijazis for innovations desired by Christian Europe and the rising position of European protégés in commerce. Similar causes were behind the massacres and fighting in Damascus and Lebanon in 1860. This mixture of political and religious motivation was first seen in the Hijaz in 1855, when the question of changing the amir became involved with the new issue of abolishment of the slave trade, as desired by the British. The merchants of Jidda who wanted to keep the slave trade viewed Abd al-Muttalib as an ally against anti-Islamic innovation. According to a letter from the merchants to the amir, abolition of the slave trade was a prelude to interference in holy law, religious customs, relations between men and women, marriage with nonbelievers, and unconventional clothing for women. When the amir received this letter, he is said to have remarked to the head of the ulema of Mecca, "One can not carry out this duty" (i.e., the duty of stopping the importing of slaves).[9]

Istanbul sent Reshid Pasha, a member of the imperial military council, to investigate the political situation in the Hijaz under cover of a mission to conduct a military review. He landed in Jidda one day before the last ship full of legally imported slaves arrived. A large-scale protest ensued in early November 1855; it was led by the Meccan ulema and sharifs. Fighting in Mecca took place between the rioters and the Ottoman garrison and police, and the houses of Ottoman officials were sacked. Turkish merchants and their families were assembled for protection in the house of Sharif Abd Allah ibn Nasir, the son-in-law of the former Amir Muhammad, who also protected the Haram from looting.[10]

In the meantime, the vali rejected the rioters' demands. The amir gathered 2,000 Bedouins at Arafat, and the Ottomans strengthened the Jidda and Mecca fortresses. The Ottomans concluded that the amir was secretly in collusion with the rioters, especially after one of the amir's agents conferred with the sheikhs of the Meccan neighborhoods. In mid-November the vali, with the approval of Reshid Pasha, announced the appointment of the Sharif Muhammad as amir for a second term.

Some skirmishing took place between Abd al-Muttalib's Bedouins and the Ottoman regulars, but since the Ottoman garrison of 700 men had retained control of the chief Meccan fortress, there was little doubt of their ultimate victory. There was also a large

garrison of 2,000 troops in Jidda. Abd al-Muttalib's resistance was further weakened by a lack of money, though he had sections of the Utaybah, the Hudhayl, and some of the Asir tribes, totalling perhaps 6,000 men. On the other hand, Abd Allah ibn Nasir, the deputy for the new amir (who had not yet arrived in the Hijaz), commanded regular Ottoman cavalry and artillery, the Bisha guards of the amirate, and tribesmen from the Hudhayl. Reshid Pasha entered Mecca with reinforcements on 13 December, read the ferman investing Muhammad as amir, and appealed to the ulema, sharifs, nomads, and quarter leaders to support the Ottoman state. A night curfew was enforced, and the caravan routes were reopened. Abd al-Muttalib returned to Taif, where the outnumbered Ottoman garrison had surrendered to the Bedouins. Small skirmishes were interspersed with two large pitched battles in February and April 1856 that were inconclusive. The new amir arrived in Jidda on 13 April. He then went to Mecca and to Taif, distributed money at large, and promised amnesty to the tribes, who finally deserted Abd al-Muttalib and thus ensured Ottoman victory. Taif fell to the amir and the Ottomans on 22 May. Abd al-Muttalib was at last captured and brought to Mecca on 15 June 1856 after seven months of leading a rebellion against the imperial orders, though not against the legitimacy of the state.[11]

Since Istanbul blamed the vali for the length of the insurrection, he was replaced in August. The new vali was Mahmud Pasha, former military commander of Mecca and current vali of Yemen. This veteran of Arabian service was a military man who knew nothing of Europe, but who had been active and energetic in the Yemen.

The most profound consequence of the 1855–56 crisis was the heightening of anti-Ottoman resentment among the supporters of Abd al-Muttalib, since he and his clan were discredited in the eyes of the Ottomans. The pro–Abd al-Muttalib faction in the Hijaz included the slave merchants of Jidda and Mecca, the members of his clan of the Hashimites, most of the southern nomads, and all who disliked the Ottomans. This resentment was fully expressed two years later in the massacre of Europeans at Jidda and the consequent conflict between the merchants of that city and the British. For the next twenty years, the Ottomans chose amirs from among Muhammad's relatives and not from those of Abd al-Muttalib.

The association of the men of religion of Mecca with the failed uprising weakened them while at the same time prompting many of them to support Ottoman rule as inevitable even when they opposed its policies. Abd al-Muttalib was unable to raise revolt in the towns, although the subservience of the Ottomans to the British on the slave trade question was extremely unpopular there. Abandonment of old social institutions, such as the slave trade, was not liked but neither was it regarded as an occasion for all-out insurrection. Only the tribes, who were ever ready to oppose authority, rose for Abd al-Muttalib and his interpretation of Islam.

The following two years were not particularly quiet. The Amir Muhammad was elderly, and increasingly administration was transferred into the hands of Ali, his twenty-three-year-old second son. Abd Allah, the eldest, was in Istanbul, where he was being groomed to be the next amir. Ali's mismanagement of the 1857 pilgrimage compelled the pilgrims to take a longer and drier route because a better one was controlled by hostile tribesmen. The dilemma of the pilgrims was compounded by a full-scale fight between the Medinans and nomads that arose over a blood feud. Ali refused to aid Medina when the vali requested him to do so. Instead, the ethnic groups in Medina founded a civil guard and threatened to expel from the city anyone refusing to swear an oath of membership in the guard.

The vali also caused problems by his inactivity and his appointments of men poorly equipped for the duties he gave them. The collector of customs at Jidda was the vali's nephew; he was a young man new to the Hijaz, and he did not know Arabic. The vali named his follower Shams Ali as governor of Medina, where he was responsible for the continuing trouble with the Bedouins. Only the arrival of twenty barges of grain in Yanbu ended the Medina fighting. Political tensions were compounded by commercial ones: the Hadramawti merchants of Jidda, supported by the vali, undertook a boycott of the two British shipping companies there; and the military, the basis of order, was not being paid. Sometimes they did not even get their rations on time and had to resort to begging in the streets of Mecca.[12]

The arrival of Namik Pasha in October 1857 as the new vali brought not only promises of new policies but also of more money to local government. His arrival in Mecca ended a demonstration

by 1,200 unpaid troops at the Haram. New troops also arrived to replace soldiers whose terms of service had ended. But the death of the Amir Muhammad on 28 March 1858 ended any chance of quietly reforming the conditions of the Hijaz.

The events of 1858 represented the high-water mark of Christian intervention in the Hijaz before World War I. They also raise in an acute form the issue of economic versus religious and political causes for major happenings.

Resentment against Christians had increased during the 1850s even though England and France were the allies of the Ottomans. The Christians' greater status in the eyes of the central government was perceived in the Hijaz as a blow to Islam. What was worse was that Ottoman officials themselves were trying to Europeanize the empire in response to European pressure.

In the 1850s Christians or Muslim protégés had played an increased role in Red Sea commerce. Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim, was the chief merchant of Jidda and probably the richest person there, with a capital of between T. L. 132,000 and 165,000. He was a banker for the Hijaz Vilayet and was on such good terms with the British that he acted as vice-consul occasionally.[13]

The chief European commercial house was Toma Sava and Company. It was a branch of the Cairo-based firm of Toma Myrialaki, A. D'Antonio, and Company, which had been trading in the Red Sea for at least twenty years. By 1856 it was estimated that about one-quarter of all Red Sea commerce was in their hands. Toma Sava had branch offices in Mecca, Qusayr, Wajh, Yanbu, Suakin, Massawa, and Aden. Some Hadrami merchants, the Banaja family, and the muhtasib of Jidda quarreled with them in 1856. The Muhtasib Abd Allah led a boycott directed against Toma Sava; it was ended only by the intervention of the local authorities.

The extent of foreign commerce in Jidda may be seen in shipping statistics. In 1855 twenty-four British flag vessels came to Jidda. By 1858 there were twenty-two in Jidda harbor on one day during the pilgrimage and thirty more in the Red Sea enroute to Suez.[14]

In a small town like Jidda, with 15,000 or fewer people, the resident foreign community was highly noticeable. Several incidents in preceding years had revealed the strength of the tensions between the foreign communities and the people of Jidda. An Ot-

toman soldier tried to murder the British vice-consul in 1856. The British and the Jidda Muslims blamed each other for mutually offensive enterprises. On 15 May 1858, Muslim merchants complained to the kaimmakam of Jidda that a shooting had just taken place in a shop selling liquor, and the vali ordered all such shops closed. The scandal of liquor sales in the center of the Muslim world was matched, in Christian eyes, by the scandal of a flourishing slave trade conducted between the African coast and Jidda.

The communal tensions between Hijazi Muslims, foreign Muslims, and Christians were exacerbated by the fear of technological and economic change. In 1856 an Egyptian-owned steamship line was chartered to begin regular operations in the Red Sea. More passengers and freight used the Red Sea route to Egypt and the Mediterranean from India in the 1850s than in the 1840s. As the Suez Canal came closer to reality, it became clear that the area would witness an increasing European presence. Shipowners, crews, and stevedores from Yemen and the Hadramawt feared they would lose jobs and money.

Politically, the instability of the later 1850s had heightened tension along with economic changes. The Amir Muhammad's son Ali served as acting amir pending the arrival of his brother Abd Allah, the successor to their father. Since Abd Allah did not come to the Hijaz until 28 October, there was a period of seven months when the amirate was filled only by a deputy who necessarily lacked the full authority and power of the post. Moreover, the adherents of the former Amir Abd al-Muttalib were still present and numerous.

The valis of Jidda, who led the other half of the dual sharifial-Ottoman power structure, had caused problems in the 1850s. From 1850 to 1858, there were five valis. Lacking knowledge of the unique political circumstances of the country, they no sooner became familiar with the Hijaz than they were dismissed. Frequently they inherited in the bureaucracy their predecessors' mistakes. When Mehmed Namik Pasha, a former commander of the Ottoman army in Syria, arrived in Jidda as the new vali on 20 October 1857, he found that the post of muhtasib already had been filled by Vali Mahmud Pasha.

The muhtasib was second in rank in Jidda only to the kaimmakam. A certain Abd Allah had held the post up to 1854 when he was dismissed for fraud in government shipping contracts. He sup-

ported Amir Abd al-Muttalib in 1855, and was said to have had a hand in the Mecca rioting. Vali Kamil Pasha exiled him for his alleged plan to lead a massacre of Christians. In October 1856 Vali Mahmud Pasha reappointed him as muhtasib of Jidda. Abd Allah had close contacts with the Hadrami merchants and was also the holder of the salt extraction monopoly for the Red Sea region in 1856.[15]

On 15 June 1858, a massacre of Europeans and European protégés took place in Jidda. The immediate cause was a dispute involving the contested nationality of the *Irani*, a ship then in Jidda harbor. According to British sources, the half-owner of the vessel, Salih Jawhar, was an Anglo-Indian subject and the ship was British. In 1858 Salih was called to account for his supervision of the financial interests of his nephews. Fearing adverse action by the acting vice-consul, Faraj Yusr, who was a personal enemy, Salih claimed he was an Ottoman citizen. He secured the permission of the Ottomans to change the ship's registration and to allow it to fly the Ottoman flag. The case went to the qadi of Jidda, who ruled in Salih's favor although Faraj Yusr argued that the Ottomans had no jurisdiction. According to British law, if someone tried to change the nationality of a British ship in order to escape legal action the ship could be confiscated. Stephen Page, the vice-consul, and Captain William Pullen of H.M.S. *Cyclops* informed the vali that the *Irani* accordingly had been seized. The Ottoman flag was lowered and the British flag once again raised.[16]

Ottoman and Arab accounts present a version of the *Irani* dispute that differs from that of the British. According to the vali, the ship was placed under the British flag after first having flown the Ottoman flag. Salih Jawhar was a Jidda merchant and therefore an Ottoman. In granting his request for permission to change registration and to raise the Ottoman flag, the vali felt that the kaimmakam had been perfectly correct. Since Salih was an Ottoman and owned half of the ship, it seemed natural to count it as Ottoman. A council of Jidda notables who made a careful investigation of the *Irani* case came to the same conclusion in their report to the vali, although they conceded that Salih did have foreign travel papers. The Ottoman flag, it was alleged, was trampled upon by the sailors who lowered it and raised the British flag on the *Irani* on 15 June.[17]

The evening of that day, twenty-two people were murdered in Jidda; twenty-one were Christian foreigners or foreign protégés.

They included the British vice-consul and the French consul and his wife. Other Christians under European protection managed to escape temporarily only to be killed later; a few were sheltered by friendly local inhabitants. Although the house of Faraj Yusr was attacked, he and his family escaped harm and were rescued by his neighbor, Abd Allah Nasif, the Jidda agent of the amirs of Mecca. Ahmet Aga, the chief of the government storehouses, protected two of the Christians from death. The bodies of the victims were dragged naked through the streets and then cast into pits.[18] The murderers were urged on by a crowd of women.

One survivor described his experiences vividly to the British consul at Cairo. Sottiri Moldovano had fainted from fear at the time of the massacre. All the people who had been around him were killed or robbed, but he escaped unharmed and managed to reach the qadi of Jidda. At first the qadi wanted him killed, but when Moldovano converted to Islam, the qadi protected him. He was then sent through the streets of Jidda to the kaimmakam's with a guard of soldiers to protect him from the people. When the qadi learned that Moldovano intended to board the *Cyclops* he accused him of intending apostasy, but Moldovano still managed to reach the ship.[19]

Captain Pullen offered on the morning after the massacre to assist the kaimmakam in putting down the rioting. Not only was his assistance not accepted, but the boats of the *Cyclops* were fired upon by the crowd. The Ottoman garrison at Jidda was too small to be of much use. Of its usual complement of 100, some had been withdrawn to Mecca for the pilgrimage, and guards were needed at the gates of Jidda to protect them against the Bedouins. The head of the garrison refused to send his men into the streets or to interfere in any way.

The vali heard of the killings when he was in Mecca making plans for the pilgrimage. Namik Pasha's first reaction was to send a letter threatening punishment to the notables of Jidda if peace was not immediately restored. A council was held in Mecca by order of the vali to deliberate on the next steps. The assembled notables are said to have suggested mobilizing the Bedouins, sinking the British ship, and defying the European powers. This plan was vehemently opposed by the vali, who pointed out that the Christians could attack any of the other cities of Islam in response; besides, a hundred ships could take the place of the *Cyclops*. Won over by

his arguments, the council approved the vali's caution in a report to the sultan.[20]

The vali then left for Jidda with more troops. Namik sent fifteen Christians who had been sheltered in the town to the *Cyclops*, and then turned to reestablishing order in the streets. Finally his attention was given to the stream of messages coming from Captain Pullen and the still unsettled issue of the *Irani*. Referring to the joint sacrifices so recently made by Ottoman, British, and French forces in the Crimean War, Pullen demanded the vali's help in going to the consulates to make a complete investigation of damages. The vali arranged for this, but the British deputation was maltreated in the streets. The *Irani* remained in Jidda harbor under Ottoman control pending a final decision on its legal status. This victory for the Ottoman side of the dispute may have had a decisive effect in achieving quiet in Jidda. The *Cyclops* left Jidda for Suez with many refugees aboard as well as a courier with messages from the vali to Istanbul. After ordering that an investigation of the whole incident be conducted by the kaimmakam, the vali left for Mecca, where pilgrimage preparations were under way.

The British foreign secretary ordered Pullen to go to Jidda and obtain summary punishment of the murderers, by use of force if necessary. The British threatened the Ottomans with the seizure of Jidda if justice was not speedily obtained. By 26 July the sultan's emissary had full powers, and Ottoman troops were on the way to the Hijaz. A policy of Anglo-Franco-Ottoman cooperation was approved by all parties; however, the British Admiralty was not informed of this until 7 August.[21]

In the meantime, the energetic Pullen had returned from Suez to Jidda with his orders to secure the execution of the murderers. The vali and the acting amir had a conference with him on 22 July. They pointed out to Pullen that although the murderers were known, all death sentences in the empire had to be confirmed by the sultan. Therefore they could not carry out the executions until the arrival of orders from Istanbul. Pullen assumed this to be what he considered typical Ottoman procrastination. He delivered a thirty-six-hour ultimatum to the kaimmakam on the twenty-third, and forbade ships to leave Jidda harbor. Two days later he began to bombard Jidda. By the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, there were at least seven known deaths caused by the bombardment. Jiddawis fled to nearby villages, the desert, the mountains, and Mecca. Pul-

len issued a proclamation in which he promised that as soon as the assassins were executed the bombardment would cease; until then the town and ships in the harbor would continue to be under fire.[22]

The vali explained in a report to the grand vezir that the bombardment was the result of Pullen's rashness, not Ottoman lethargy or reluctance to execute Muslims who had killed Christians. Investigation of the murders had been delayed because of the pilgrimage, when everyone was in Mecca. Even though witnesses had been interviewed, there was not enough evidence to successfully try the guilty before the court. Namik Pasha had pointed out to Pullen that he would be bombarding the pilgrims as they returned from Mecca to Jidda. Despite this plea the British ship fired more than one hundred cannon shots into the town of Jidda.[23] The Ottoman fort and batteries at Jidda were not hit, and in return they did not shoot at the attacking British ship.

At length Pullen did consent to a temporary cessation of fire so that the pilgrims could leave Jidda. During this pause Namik arrested those who were accused of the murders, and they were tried and found guilty. The cease-fire was prolonged, but just as Pullen was about to resume the bombardment on 5 August, Ismail Pasha, the Ottoman officer sent from Istanbul, arrived in Jidda.

Ismail read his instructions from the sultan to the vali, came to an agreement with Pullen about the executions, and thus ended the threat of bombardment. The next day, 6 August, eleven men were publicly executed. Following this there was an exchange of salutes to the Ottoman and British flags to indicate the establishment of peaceful relations.

In the ensuing five months, many aspects of the massacre and subsequent bombardment were resolved. While a search for his replacement went on in Istanbul, the sultan ordered Vali Namik Pasha to improve security. The British ambassador apologized to the Ottomans for the bombardment of Jidda, and said that Pullen's impetuosity was the cause. Ismail Pasha left Jidda for Istanbul on 6 September with prisoners accused of complicity. Even the vexatious *Irani* case was finally settled. On 2 November it was taken to Bombay and an Anglo-Indian court.[24]

There remained, however, the question of whether those who were really guilty of the murders had been punished. Three separate investigations of the massacre were conducted in Jidda by the leading notables and government officials of the town. The report of the first, on 20 June, purported to describe the *Irani* dispute, the

way in which the riot broke out, and its suppression. A second council began its sessions on the following day. By 15 July it had interviewed eyewitnesses to the murders and established the guilt of sixteen individuals. It also began to draw up a list of damages. The third report in early October recounted still more interrogations of Jiddawis and sought to discover the ringleaders of the rioters. There served on all three councils the kaimmakam of Jidda, Ibrahim Aga; the religious judge, Abd al-Qadir; the naqib al-sadat, Abd Allah ibn Ahmad Baharun; and the chief Ottoman merchant of Jidda, Abd al-Ghaffar. The other leading merchants of Jidda who were on all three councils were Umar ibn Abd Allah Ba Darb, Yusuf ibn Ahmad Banaja, and Salim Ali Sultan. In addition, Abd Allah Nasif served on two of the councils; and Ahmet Aga, director of the government storehouses, Said ibn Husayn al-Amudi, the leader of the Hadrami community, and Faraj Yusr signed at least one of the reports.[25]

The first two reports resulted in the arrest and conviction of sixteen people, mostly from the lower class of Jidda. They included two sailors, two pilots, three artisans, a bead-maker, and a slave. Ottoman eyewitnesses and the foreigners who had escaped agreed that these persons were among those guilty. It seemed unlikely, though, that they would have undertaken the massacre without approval from higher authority. The rioting was selective; it did not spill over against any of the notables except Faraj Yusr.

As early as 25 June, Pullen, on the basis of talks with survivors, accused some of Jidda's leading notables of complicity. Their report of 20 June was an elaborate cover-up hiding their own guilt. By late July when Pullen had returned to Jidda with orders to ensure that the murderers would be punished, he included among the guilty the names of the muhtasib, the chief merchant, the sharif's agent, and the qadi. The vali indignantly denied that they had had anything to do with the case. Although the vali did not have firsthand evidence, he said that the kaimmakam's assertion of their innocence was sufficient. Pullen ultimately agreed that Nasif was innocent; the others, according to the refugees in Cairo, were guilty of inciting the rioters. Pullen thought the kaimmakam's testimony was worthless since he himself had been one of the chief instigators. His testimony could not exonerate the muhtasib and the chief merchant, for instance, because they had actually led the attacks against the consulates.[26]

Bulwer, the British ambassador, agreed with Pullen. The Brit-

ish threatened to have their naval forces at Jidda take strong action so as to obtain justice. The only way the Ottomans could avoid this was to appoint an independent commissioner who would join British and French commissioners in Jidda. Sitting together, they were to investigate all aspects of the case independently of the Hijaz vilayet administration.

Said Hamdi Pasha left for Jidda as the sultan's agent on the commission. A fourth investigation was undertaken, with those who had signed the reports of the first three being the chief targets. By January 1859 the commissioners concluded that the rising had been planned. The religious judge, the naqib al-sadat, and the Hadrami leader confessed and then accused the muhtasib, who in turn implicated the kaimmakam. On the day of the massacre, they said, Muhtasib Abd Allah, acting in the name of the kaimmakam and with his knowledge, ordered Said al-Amudi to rouse the Hadramis. They were armed and led to the customs area at the port. There a council consisting of the three chiefs and Abd Allah Baharun, Abd-al-Ghaffar, Yusuf Banaja, Umar Ba Darb, Said Baghlaf, Bakri al-Shami, and Salih Jawhar, of the *Irani*, met to discuss the massacre. Even though they all knew what was planned, none of those present did anything to prevent it. Other guilty persons included a colonel of artillery who refused to rescue a European who was killed in front of his barracks; the qadi, who supposedly encouraged the killing of Christians who had converted to Islam; and an Ottoman officer who refused to defend the British consulate. The report called for death for the main instigators, life imprisonment for those present at the council, and five years in prison for the qadi and the officers.[27] Although the vali was guilty of negligence, he was only to be removed from his post. It took the threat of a new bombardment of Jidda made by the French commissioner to force the vali to agree to execute the muhtasib and al-Amudi.

On 12 January 1859, the muhtasib and the leader of the Hadramis were publicly executed. The kaimmakam was removed from office, taken to Istanbul, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The others who had been present at the council on 15 June as well as the qadi and Baghlaf were exiled from Jidda and were to be in prison or under supervision in Istanbul.[28]

Compensation was hard to calculate because the records that were needed had been destroyed. After Ottoman delays in Jidda and Istanbul, the British reduced their claims to T. L. 139,150. The

other commissioners rejected Hamdi Pasha's attempt to introduce the issue of compensation for the Ottoman victims of Pullen's bombardment of Jidda. In 1860 the Ottoman government agreed to pay T. L. 315,360 in settlement of all French and British claims. Disputes about individual claims lingered on for years afterward.[29]

The immediate consequences of the massacre of 1858 were spectacularly obvious in the bombardment of Jidda and the subsequent international investigation that led to the punishment of the massacre's instigators. However, the long-term political, commercial, and religious results of the massacre were at first glance almost nominal. The consuls were reestablished, with the new British vice-consul Stanley moving into the executed muhtasib's house for good measure. Namik Pasha was finally replaced as vali in early 1859 by Ali Pasha. In rapid order a new kaimmakam of Jidda, vilayet treasurer, and qadi of Jidda were appointed. The kaimmakam's selection had formerly been made by the vali; now it was to be made directly by Istanbul as a guarantee of his increased independence, responsibility, and prestige. This arrangement, however, lasted only two years; the vali was dismissed in 1861–62. He had spent most of his two years in Mecca rather than in Jidda. Not only was the kaimmakam who had been appointed in 1858 ousted in 1861, but the new vali was authorized to choose his replacement. The instability in the Ottoman bureaucracy was not matched in the amirate. Amir Abd Allah was building the power that would eventually result in a long and relatively peaceful reign; however, in the early 1860s he had only begun to do so. The political situation in the Hijaz resembled that existing before the death of Amir Muhammad in March 1858: the balance between amir and vali was unchanged.

The massacre caused little harm to the commerce of Jidda. The total of exports and imports in 1859 was about 25 percent higher than in 1857, and most shipping continued to be British. Some of the same firms disrupted in 1858 reestablished their agencies in Jidda. Luca Paleologo were there again, though in a difficult financial position because of severe competition in the early 1860s. Faraj Yusr remained one of the principal merchants of Jidda. His ships regularly sailed under the British flag to Suez, Hudayda, and Musqat. However, in February 1861 he lost his position as chief banker to the vilayet. The cause was not his pro-British role in 1858 but rather what was considered by Istanbul to be the excessive

commissions on money loaned to the vilayet. Steamship service to Jidda continued in the early 1860s but became very irregular because the Egytians lost money on Red Sea operations. Foreign commerce and merchants and the new steamboat service seemed to be unaffected by the massacre. Unfortunately it is not known whether the small Hadrami shippers and sailors really lost anything as a result of the 1858 incident. It has been suggested that they started the massacre in fear of commercial destruction, but if their interests were truly damaged, that fact was not recorded.[30]

What would seem to be the most obvious result of the massacre was the death, exile, and imprisonment of the notables of Jidda. Even this judicial process that seemed so final in January 1859 was, however, subject to change. Four of the exiles died abroad. Abd al-Qadir, Umar Ba Darb, Said Baghlaf, Bakri al-Shami, and Salih Jawhar eventually returned to the Hijaz. The last three named came to Jidda in 1866, but they were ordered to live in Mecca or in Taif. Salih Jawhar returned to India. The other returned men enjoyed great popularity in Jidda and in Mecca. Popular opinion in Mecca had declared the muhtasib and al-Amudi to be martyrs for the faith when they had been executed in 1859.[31] Abd Allah Baharun was on the administrative council of Jidda in 1879.

It is in the relationship between Christians and Muslims that the events of 1858 had their greatest impact. The great Indian mutiny was being crushed in early 1858. The 1860 uprisings against Christians and Jews in Damascus and Lebanon were two years away. In all these cases, an initial deep religious resentment was intensified by political and economic rivalry between elite Muslim or Druze circles against foreigners and their protégés. Violence by Muslims was followed by even greater retributive violence by the European powers. The idea of successful, direct, violent destruction of the Europeans was tried and discredited. With the partial exception of an incident in 1895, there were no similar riots, murders, or large-scale anti-foreign incidents in Jidda after 1858. The memory of the Jidda bombardment was widespread, and Charles Doughty found it one of his chief protections in 1877 as he explored the northern Hijaz.[32]

Even though with the opening of the Suez Canal foreign influence increased, it did so in peace. For many Muslims the possibility of eventual Christian incursions inland and the growing economic strength of Christian protégés on the coast remained a source of

fear. The events of 1855 and 1858 demonstrated that the Ottoman government would suppress religious opposition to change and that under the pressure of Europe outright resistance would be severely punished. At the same time, the restoration from 1840 to 1855 and subsequent tranquillity between 1859 and 1882 showed that the religious bases for politics and society remained as acceptable to Hijazis as they had been before the Wahhabi and Egyptian incursions.

1. BBA, Meclis-i Vala 540, 6 Shevval 1257; Muhammad Sabry, *L'Empire égyptien sous Ismail et l'ingérence anglo-française (1863–1879)*, p. 536; El-Batrik, "Turkish and Egyptian Rule," pp. 251–52; BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2430, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1258; R. Ebeid and M. Young, "An Unpublished Letter from Ali Pasha," p. 59.

2. BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2430, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1258; BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2436, Enclosure 2, vali's report, 17 Shevval 1260.

3. BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2441, grand vezir to sultan, 11 Receb 1261; Mesail-i Muhimme 2436, grand vezir to sultan, 17 Shevval 1260; Mesail-i Muhimme 2442, grand vezir to sultan, 24 Receb 1261.

4. Eyyub Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 1:772–73; India Office, L/P S/9, 14, Grand Vezir Mustafa Reshid to vali, 18 August 1849; FJ, Flory (Jidda) to ministry, 7 March 1846.

5. Tresse, *Le Pèlerinage*, pp. 52, 100–101, 139; d'Avril, *L'Arabie contemporaine*, p. 70; FJ, Fresnel (Jidda) to ministry, 31 July 1847; John Baldry, "Al-Yaman and the Turkish Occupation, 1849–1914," pp. 156–62.

6. BBA, Dahiliye 14284.

7. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 98, 22 Safer 1271; Meclis-i Mahsus 1, 9 Safer 1270, especially enclosures 8, 11, 13, and 24; Dahiliye 19421, 26 Zilkade 1270, enclosure from the amir.

8. FJP, Outrey (Jidda) to ministry, 30 June 1855; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, pp. 130–31; Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:104–5.

9. Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:103.

10. Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:106–17; FO 195/375, Page (Jidda) to Cumberbatch, 13 November 1855.

11. Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 1:121–48; FO 195/375, Page (Jidda) to Cumberbatch, 23 and 24 November 1855; Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, pp. 167–68; FJP, Outrey (Jidda) to ministry, 4, 9, and 16 November 1855.

12. FO 195/375, Page (Jidda) to de Redcliffe, 27 October 1856; FJ, de Monbrun (Jidda) to ministry, 19 January 1857; FJP, Emerat (Jidda) to ministry, 26 March 1858.

13. BBA, Dahiliye 19768, Maliye to grand vezir, 7 Safer 1271; Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:47; FO 195/375, kaimmakam of Jidda to Page, 4 November 1856; Didier, *Séjour*, pp. 160–61.

14. FO 881/848, Pullen to Admiralty, 25 June 1858; FO 685/1/1, Stanley (Jidda) to Colquohon, 22 February 1861.

15. FO 195/375, Page (Jidda) to de Redcliffe, 27 October 1856 and 16 January 1857.

16. FO 881/848, Pulen to Admiralty, 19 and 25 June 1858; FO 195/579, Deposition of Nicholas Sabbidi, 30 July 1858; FO 195/579, Pullen to vali of the Hijaz, 15 June 1858.

17. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 532/1, enclosures 8 and 9, 13 Zilkade 1274, 7 Zilkade 1274; Dahlan, *Khulasat*, p. 321.

18. FO 195/579, Myrialaki and Co. to Walne, 12 August 1858; FO 881/848, Emerat

(Jidda) to Walewski, and Bulwer (Constantinople) to Malmesbury, 27 July 1858; FO 881/848, Walne to Malmesbury, 16 March 1859; FJP, Emerat (Jidda) to ministry, n.d.

19. FO 195/579, Deposition of S. Moldovano, 12 August 1858.

20. Dahlan, *Khulasat*, pp. 321–22.

21. FO 881/848, Malmesbury to Admiralty, 11 July 1858; Bulwer to Malmesbury, 26 July 1858.

22. FO 881/848, Pullen to Namik Pasha, 25 July 1858; BBA, Hariciye 8566, enclosure 10, Pullen to kaimmakam of Jidda, 23 July 1858; FO 881/848, Henry Calvert (Alexandria) to Green, 8 August 1858; FO 881/848, Pullen, "Proclamation," 26 July 1858.

23. BBA, Hariciye 8566, enclosure 1, Namik Pasha to grand vezir, 27 Zilkade 1274.

24. Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p. 137; FO 881/848, Bulwer to Mahmud Pasha, 7 September 1858; BBA, Hariciye 8566, enclosure 12, Mahmud Pasha to Ottoman ambassador in London, 22 September 1858; FO 881/848, Cruttenden to Pullen, 12 September 1858.

25. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 532/1, enclosure 9, 7 Zilkade 1274; BBA, Hariciye 8566, enclosure 11, 2 Zilhicce 1274. Abd al-Ghaffar, Banaja, and Ba Darb had played a part in beginning the antislavery legislation furor in Mecca in 1855.

26. FO 881/848, Namik, to Pullen, 2 August 1858; FO 881/848, Ayrton to Green, 29 July 1858.

27. FO 881/848, "Report," 1 January 1859 in Walne (Jidda) to Malmesbury, 2 January 1859; Dahlan, *Khulasat*, p. 322.

28. Gerald de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p. 252; BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 532/1, enclosure 1, 6 Zilhicce 1275.

29. FO 195/580, Ayrton to Walne, 23 September 1859; FO 195/580, Hamdi Pasha to Walne, 9 March 1859; FO 195/580, Ayrton to Bulwer, 2 January 1861.

30. See de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, p. 250, for speculation on this point.

31. FO 195/879, de Gaspary (Jidda) to de Moustier, 24 August 1866; FO 881/848, Walne (Jidda) to Malmesbury, 19 January 1859.

32. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 1:208; 2:104, 520.

CHAPTER 8
THE TRANQUIL AMIRATE, 1859–1882

POLITICAL POWER AND LEADERSHIP in the Hijaz between 1859 and 1882 was primarily in the hands of the amirs of Mecca. They relied for the continuation of their power upon their religious prestige and the support of the Hijazis and the central Ottoman government that ensued from it. The political consequences of power in the hands of the amirs were able administration in Mecca, relative security in the desert compared with either the preceding or succeeding periods, the expansion of Ottoman power with the help of the amirs to other parts of Arabia, and the failure of the central government to change local administration in the Hijaz. Severe political, military, and financial strains on Istanbul in the 1870s had few results for the amirs, whose power was not greatly challenged until after 1882.

The tempest of 1858 in Jidda was followed by gradually subsiding waves leading eventually to a period of relative tranquillity. In the context of the Ottoman empire, the 1860s were also calm, at least by comparison with the storms to come in the 1870s. The credit of the empire was pledged to finance costly programs of military modernization, and civil government was supposedly reformed by decrees of the Tanzimat councils. The financial, military, and political bases of the state were not transformed but merely changed to a minor degree. As a result, the increasing challenges posed by foreign powers and domestic liberals were not satisfactorily met. The budgetary crisis of the 1870s helped weaken the power of the Ottoman valis with respect to the amirs. The program of military modernization improved the fleet in Istanbul and perhaps the army along the Danube, but had little discernible impact in the Hijaz. Although civil government was reorganized on paper in provinces such as Syria, most of the changes specifically excluded Arabia from their application.

Abd Allah ibn Muhammad (r. 1858–77) ruled as amir with increasing determination and ability. The new amir, born in 1822, had grown up in a Hijaz dominated by the Egyptians, who had made his father's first period as amir ineffectual. However, Abd Allah had seen the way in which Muhammad had transformed the

amirate back into a powerful position after 1840. Abd Allah had occasionally acted as his father's deputy in Mecca; he also had lived in Istanbul long enough to gain a detailed knowledge of the imperial political process. He was a patron of the ulema and himself a student of the Quran, Islamic law, and the sayings of the Prophet. These religious distinctions were bolstered by his status as a holder of the Ottoman rank of Vezir, his marriage with the Aid family of Asir, and his good knowledge of the three most valued languages among the Ottomans—Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. After 1873–74 Abd Allah's health was undermined by acute sciatica that forced him to travel only by carriage and also caused him to live in great pain.

THE NOMADS AND INTERNAL SECURITY

The basic life of the Hijaz—the pilgrimage, international commerce, the supply of food from abroad, the brotherhoods, and so on—quietly flourished under Abd Allah's leadership. But the nomads grew restless in periods of relative tranquillity.

The imperial military forces in the Hijaz were able to maintain Ottoman authority and sovereignty in the towns and some of the villages, but often not in the countryside. When Mehmed Ali, of Egypt, had controlled the area, he had had a garrison of 20,000 men in the Hijaz; under the Ottomans the total of all regular army units seldom reached as high as 8,000 and was usually about 6,000. Yet the Ottomans felt it was impossible to impose conscription in the Hijaz so as to raise troops locally.

The chief problem facing the Ottoman military was that of limited resources. Istanbul did not wish to spend the money or divert the manpower to the Hijaz that would be needed to subdue the tribes; it did, however, strongly desire to keep control over the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. A large majority of the troops were garrisoned in Mecca, Medina, Jidda, and Taif. Some were stationed in forts on the paths going between these places, and only a few troops lived in the small desert oases.

Mecca had the largest contingent of troops, in part because of its religious importance, but also because it was relatively open to nomadic penetration since it had no walls. The size of the Mecca garrison was increased during the pilgrimage season when outlying detachments from Taif and Jidda were brought to the city; dur-

ing the exceedingly hot summers, if there was no pilgrimage, most of the garrison joined the government in summering in cooler Taif. The Mecca-Taif troops numbered about 3,000.

Medina and Jidda were both walled cities, though their walls were not particularly well-designed to resist artillery fire. Still, the gates could be closed, and the walls served as effective barriers against a sudden *coup de main* by nomads. Plans to strengthen Medina's fortifications were discussed in 1878, but inconclusively; by the 1900s extant photographs indicate somewhat dilapidated walls, towers, and battlements that nevertheless seemed serviceable. Medina from the 1840s to the 1870s had a small garrison of only about 1,000 men; in the later phase of Ottoman control, it averaged about 2,000–3,000. Jidda was protected not only by sea and land walls but also by the Ottoman navy. However, its position on the coast made it vulnerable, as the bombardment of 1858 had demonstrated. In 1879 the walls of Jidda were strengthened, but the chief concern of the Ottoman authorities was not the nearly hopeless task of securing Jidda from a British naval attack but rather of maintaining law and order in the town itself. In Jidda the influence of the consulates and the privileges of their protégés were bitterly resented. Despite periodic complaints by the consuls, the Jidda garrison was usually small, fewer than 800 men.

The numbers by themselves, however, do not tell the whole story, for the Ottomans had troops of differing quality with differing abilities to fight, and they moved these troops frequently in order to deal with pressing problems in one area or another of the empire. In the first thirty years after Ottoman occupation of the Hijaz, as was the case in Ottoman Syria as well, many troops were irregulars who were recruited, trained, and led in the casual fashion that had dominated the Ottoman army before the reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II at the beginning of the nineteenth century. They were mercenaries, not conscripts, and the detachments consisted of members of one ethnic group.

The predominant section of the army in the Hijaz became the regular infantry. The scarcity of cavalry, whether horse- or camel-borne, caused a major problem when the army tried to fight the highly mobile nomads. In the 1890s and 1900s, an attempt would be made to overcome this problem by mounting infantry on mules that could also be used for transport. Mobile artillery was also introduced, and by 1908 in the major towns and forts, there were four

batteries of 6 new guns each, along with 150 old immobile fortress guns. Medical and supply services were lamentably poor. In particular, the extremely high death rate among Anatolian recruits caused by diseases was widely commented upon by foreign observers. Moreover, the small detachments along the Red Sea coast at places like Aqaba, Yanbu, Rabigh, and Lit or at the forts on the pilgrimage routes were isolated, deprived of supplies, and undermanned. The reason for the relative scarcity of cavalry, artillery, and supply services was a simple one—money. Infantry was cheaper on its own, even though largely ineffectual outside towns in the circumstances operative in the Hijaz.

The police also helped support Ottoman power in the towns, but they were few in number and low in prestige compared with the army. In the entire province, there were only 300 police in 1883; 60 of those were in Jidda. More were sent to the Hijaz in times of stress.[1] In light of the security problems posed by the pilgrimage, the police and army were still too few. However, crises in Istanbul, wars in Europe, problems in such provinces as Yemen and Macedonia, and the financial stringency following Ottoman state bankruptcy limited the availability of troops.

Plans for military reforms had been mooted on several occasions. A report by an investigator sent to Mecca in 1844 recommended that more troops be sent to the area, that the military be reformed, and that the growing influence of the British be opposed. There was an increase in the number of troops in the middle 1840s. The several administrative changes that took place then in the command hierarchy to which the Hijaz military reported had no discernible consequences; whether orders and supplies were filtered through Baghdad, Sana or Damascus ultimately made no difference. Istanbul ran the army. It was Istanbul that in the 1860s suppressed the Albanian bashibozuk irregulars because of their insubordination; the problem then became finding replacements for them. Particularly pressing, according to reports from the Hijaz, was the need to gain more mobility through the addition of at least 1,000 cavalry.[2] In the 1880s a large and costly military construction plan that included barracks, repairs to forts, and military hospitals was inaugurated by Vali Osman Pasha. None of the suggested or implemented reforms led to a substantial change in the strength of the Ottoman armed forces.

The Ottoman common soldier in the Hijaz not only had to

face a harsh and unfamiliar climate, hostile nomads, and bands of robbers, he also was treated poorly by his own government. Soldiers were kept under arms beyond their term of duty, and many were not paid on time. Funds were embezzled by military leaders who overreported the size of their commands; an example was the Medina garrison in 1856 that had listed on the payrolls 1,100 men, but had only 410 present. The soldiers in Medina were paid in paper currency that was locally worth only 40 percent of its face value. Provisions for the troops in the 1850s were raised by forced contributions. When the troops protested about pay, the governors bought rice from dealers, with a kickback to them and to the governor, and the soldiers were given the rice in lieu of money; then the soldiers, in order to raise cash to purchase necessities, had to sell the rice back to the original dealers at a substantial loss. By the 1870s the impending imperial bankruptcy made conditions worse. Supply contracts for the Medina garrison were not let in 1872 because there was no money to pay the contractors. The ministry of war knew of the shortages in the Hijaz but could do little about them.[3]

A possible cause for weakness in the Ottoman armed forces might have been language and ethnic differences, but there is no evidence to indicate that any serious conflicts arose for such reasons. There is no doubt at all, however, that the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea was a source of worry to Istanbul. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman navy had provided a firm basis for ruling the Hijaz and most of the rest of the coasts on both sides of the Red Sea. The decay of the military power of the empire, the loss of effective control over Egypt in the eighteenth century, and the growing technological superiority of Western Europe in naval armament left the coasts open to both indigenous rebellions and western imperialism. The British conquest of Aden in 1839 and Egyptian expansion into the Red Sea in the 1810s and 1830s and again in the 1860s indicated the reduced status of Ottoman naval power.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 facilitated the movement of European, Egyptian, and Ottoman troop carriers and warships. It was extremely unlikely that the Ottomans expected to gain naval superiority over the Indian navy, especially after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Instead, they aimed at a sufficient naval presence to protect the Hijaz against attacks by minor powers.

They wanted a navy that could stop smuggling and piracy, and a quantity of shipping great enough to move and supply the garrisons along the eastern coast of the Red Sea. These limited goals were met only in part.

In the 1860s in the Hijaz, there was only one Ottoman corvette, which was used for the health commission's inspection of pilgrim vessels. In the 1870s the naval contingent based at Jidda gained the lofty distinciton of an admiral as commander for the Red Sea, but he still had only one ship permanently under his command. This vessel, a gunboat, was used against slave and arms runners after the importation of arms was forbidden by imperial order in 1875. In 1883 two corvettes arrived, and in 1888 two more steam corvettes swelled the fleet to five corvettes and one gunboat. These numbers were somewhat deceptive, however, for most of the ships simply sat in Jidda harbor and were not used. Transport and supply of the army was carried out reasonably well, especially when money was available to hire civilian ships.

If the navy was of only limited utility, the land forces under the control of the amirs were much more valuable. By 1859 the amir controlled 2,200 men: 500 Ottoman regulars; 1,150 Bedouins; 150 sharifs and guards; 150 from the Meccan quarters; and 250 Bishas. Bishas were recruited from Wadi Bisha, in Asir, from freed slaves, and from among blacks in the Hijaz. They were used for guard duty on the caravan routes, especially those between Jidda and Mecca and between Mecca and Taif. The Bishas were paid by, and were directly under the command of, the amirs. A similar group, the Aqil, also known as Ageyl, were located in Medina and were mostly recruited from central Arabia; they acted as cavalry guards and messengers on the Medina-Yanbu and Medina-Mecca paths. Some of the Aqil served in the pilgrimage route forts north of Medina, garrisons paid by the vilayet of Syria. The Aqil in Medina numbered from 150 to 200 men. It is unclear whether they were under the authority of the amir of Mecca or the governor of Medina, but more probably the latter.[4]

The amirate was on good terms with most of the tribes to the south and east of Mecca, where there were relatively few pilgrims passing through nomad territory. It was usually able to recruit tribes from these regions to attack their mutual enemies among the tribes to the north of Mecca. Ottoman military support and the countervailing weight of tribal rivalries were needed by the amirs

to exert force, although the amirate generally relied on religious prestige and political and financial maneuvering to achieve its goals.

The alternative was to have increased dramatically the garrisons, a step that would have been both futile and even more expensive than tribal subsidies. By bribes, manipulation of tribal factions, limited raids during the cooler parts of the year, short-term troop movements, and the prestige and abilities of the amirs, the Ottomans had sufficient influence even in the tribal regions for their own purposes.

But an incident in Rabigh in 1859 involving the murder of an Ottoman soldier by a Harb tribesman created a major and continuing difficulty. The paths between Yanbu and Medina were effectively closed, even for the new sheikh of the Haram, Mustafa Pasha Ishkodrali. The Juhaynah nomads were unable to get Mustafa through the hostile Harb Bedouins. Reinforcements to Yanbu, an escort of 2,000 soldiers for Mustafa, mediation by the amir—all failed to assuage the Harb, who demanded blood money and payment of back subsidies before ceasing their raids. It was only in April 1864, following the payment of T. L. 10,900, that the amir secured a real peace in the north.[5]

Part of the reason for the ineffectuality of the Ottoman troops lay in problems of supply. The military storehouses were short of grain, fodder, and matériel of all sorts, and the troops were seldom paid. A mutiny for back pay took place in Taif in 1860 but failed when loyal troops supported the local commander. The leaders of the mutiny sought refuge with the amir, but he turned them over to the army. Although funds were soon found to pay them, the obedience of the troops to their commanders was a matter of concern, especially to the foreign consuls, who were worried about the spreading of the massacres of 1860 in Syria to the Hijaz. Reinforcements under the command of the vali's son were sent to Jidda. The governor of Jidda assured the consuls that "this town is in the possession of the Sublime Porte, that in it are soldiers to guard it, and that by force of the [Ottoman] authority no one can molest another, much less attack a Consulate."[6]

Istanbul realized there were too few troops in the Hijaz to provide minimal safety, especially in the Medina region, and therefore ordered more forces sent with the next pilgrimage. Whether it was because of the additional troops or perhaps merely the settlement

of the Harb dispute, there was relative peace on the main caravan routes for the next dozen years, from 1865 to 1877.

In fact the only major problem in internal security in the central part of the Hijaz took place in Mecca, not in the desert. On 26 April 1871, a stabbing in a market was investigated by an Ottoman policeman, who attempted to bring the instigator of the attack to the nearest government offices. The policeman was attacked, the inhabitants of a neighborhood turned out in force, stores closed, and several soldiers were wounded. A general strike by the bazaar merchants ensued. The uproar was ended by the amir, who personally visited the areas concerned and restored peace. Subsequently a special tribunal was formed. It was composed of the amir as chairman, the vali, the chief judge, the muftis, and the major ulema. More than fifty people were found guilty of violence; some were executed, others were exiled, and a few were imprisoned.[7]

The visits of three prominent leaders of Muslim resistance to Western imperialism seem to have had minimal impact upon the political situation of the Hijaz. Abd al-Qadir, the head of the anti-French uprisings in Algeria, made the pilgrimage in 1864. Shamil, who had led the Caucasian Muslims' fight against Russia, died in Medina during the pilgrimage of 1871. Furthermore, Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani" (or al-Asadabadi) may have visited Mecca sometime between 1861 and 1865, and again in 1871.[8] Jamal al-Din was the foremost ideologist of Pan-Islam in the world. Although these visits were too brief to make an impact upon the Hijaz, their mere occurrence indicates the attractive power of the pilgrimage to draw Muslims from great distances to the region.

OTTOMAN EXPANSION

Neither the presence of incendiary leaders nor strained relations with the tribes was enough to seriously disturb the peace of the somnolent 1860s. However, expansion outside the central Hijaz did become a major activity. The areas of Asir, Najd, Massawa, and Suakin, which had been under the control or influence of the Hijaz, became the focal points for the practical testing of military vigor. A policy of expansionism in the Red Sea was adopted by the Ottomans because expansion elsewhere was at an end, the amirate helped them in this purpose, and they thought these areas were threatened by the European powers and by Egypt. As early as 1849,

the vali and the amir had expressed their concern over possible foreign aggression in the Red Sea area.

Muhammad ibn Aid had detached the Ghamid, Bisha, and Zahran regions of Asir from the Hijaz in 1863. In 1864–65 the amir of Mecca successfully commanded in person a mixed Ottoman-nomad force of 4,300 in the reconquest of northern Asir for himself and for the empire, despite the appalling heat of summer, when the fighting took place. Egypt assisted the effort by providing steamships for transport and 4,200 of its own troops. Muhammad ibn Aid soon seized back the disputed territories following the end of the fighting. The Amir Abd Allah again requested aid from Egypt and received a military mission; this caused the Ottomans to become suspicious of the amir, since they feared the expansion of Egyptian influence in the Red Sea. Abd Allah was able in 1865 to retake Jizan and Abu Arish.[9]

The opening of the Suez Canal and threats to Hudayda brought about a large commitment of Ottoman troops in 1870. In two years all of Asir and Yemen were absorbed. The Ottomans used 15,000 troops to conquer Asir. After the death of Muhammad ibn Aid in 1871, the Asiri resistance collapsed. In April 1872 Sana, in Yemen, fell to the Ottomans. At nearly the same time, the vali of Baghdad and reform leader Midhat Pasha conquered the northwestern coastal region of the Persian Gulf for the Ottomans.

The second area of Ottoman expansion outward from the Hijaz was into central Arabia, the region lying between Hofuf and the Hijaz. Since the departure of Egyptian troops from Najd, the contacts of the Saudi dynasty with the Hijaz had been limited. Khalid ibn Saud (ca. 1811–57) had been installed by Egypt as their agent in Najd. From 1841 to his death, he lived in the Hijaz as a refugee and received a pension from the Ottomans. He was a constant intriguer against his relatives who ruled as amirs in Riyadh. At times he was joined by other Saudi exiles who sought assistance from the Ottomans or from the amirs of Mecca. The only time Khalid received any concrete aid was in 1847 when an Ottoman-sharifial force of 1,000 invaded Qasim for about three months. After negotiations the amir of Mecca was promised in vague terms a renewal of the tribute and was sent substantial presents by the Saudi leader; the Hijazis then withdrew. Although some of the tribute was occasionally paid, as in 1855, most of it was never seen in Mecca. As a result, Wahhabi pilgrims were sometimes not permitted to make the pilgrimage.[10]

The other part of Arabia that witnessed Ottoman expansion was the northern Hijaz, but here the amir of Mecca played no part. Small pilgrimage fortresses had been under Ottoman control continuously since the sixteenth century. Now some additional villages were taken for brief periods. Khaybar was seized from the Rashidis of Hail by a party of soldiers from Medina in 1874 with the support of the local Wuld Ali nomads. The fortress was repaired, taxes were levied, gates were installed, a local garrison was established, and a military governor was appointed. Jawf was held for one year before the Ottoman garrison there mutinied for back pay. These attacks against the Rashidis failed. By the late 1870s, the Rashidis, the amirs, and the Ottomans were once again on fairly good terms. The Rashidis maintained an agent at Jidda to protect their interests. They saw the Ottomans as a balancing force against the Saudis, who, although weak from internal quarrels, posed the major threat to Rashidi dominance of Qasim and Najd.

Massawa and Suakin on the western shore of the Red Sea played a part in the expansion of Egyptian authority and influence beyond the borders of the vilayet of Egypt. Ismail, viceroy of Egypt from 1863 to 1879, sought to gain an African empire in the Sudan, upper Egypt, and along the shores of the Red Sea as well as influence in western Arabia. Egypt began to rival the Ottomans in aiding the amirs of Mecca.

Even before Ismail's ambitions prompted overt interest in the Hijaz, his two predecessors, Abbas (r. 1848–54) and Said (r. 1854–63), had had a considerable personal involvement in the Hijaz. Abbas visited the Hijaz in November–December 1848 just before becoming governor of Egypt, and his mother made the pilgrimage in 1850. Egypt maintained an agent in Jidda from at least 1850. Said toured Medina, Wajh, and Yanbu in 1861, though he did not go to Mecca. The vali and amir met him in Medina, and the amir, with the knowledge and approval of Istanbul, accompanied him back to Egypt.

Egyptian military interest in the Hijaz increased in the 1850s and 1860s. At the time of Said's trip, the Egyptian army officer, mapmaker, and photographer Muhammad Sadiq Bey had embarked on the first thorough exploration of the coastal regions of the northwestern shore of the Red Sea from Aqaba to Yanbu. Small Egyptian garrisons manned the fortresses there that protected Egyptian pilgrims making their way toward Medina. Some Egyptian troops

were sent by request of the Ottomans to the Hijaz, Asir, and Yemen. Abbas sent troops to Jidda in 1853. Conditions of service were so bad that mutinies occurred in the 1850s. Said sent 500 troops during the Jidda massacre. By 1859 there were 1,800 Egyptian soldiers in the Hijaz; they acted as the police force of Jidda until their withdrawal in 1861. From 1863 to 1866, Egyptian forces in Taif and Jidda operated in support of the Ottoman campaign in Asir, but Ismail refused Amir Abd Allah's request for more help in 1867, even though the amirs of his clan were on good terms with the house of Mehmet Ali in Egypt.[11]

The Suez Canal was said both by the Egyptians and by the canal company to be an asset to Ottoman rule of the Hijaz rather than a threat. Ferdinand de Lesseps, its engineer and guiding spirit, sent a copy of his book on the canal to the amir of Mecca. Said Pasha, of Egypt, argued in it that when the canal was opened the provisioning of the Hijaz would become easier and so would the sending of troops from Anatolia to Arabia. The lessening of the burdens of the pilgrims would also redound to the benefit of the sultan-caliph.[12]

Ismail was especially interested in obtaining the ports of Suakin and Massawa from the Hijaz. This issue had been raised in 1842–43 when Istanbul rejected the Egyptian claim to administer the coast opposite Suakin; taxes and customs duties then went to Jidda. But from 1846 to 1849, both Suakin and Massawa were leased to Mehmet Ali, who appointed governors there, though upon his death they reverted to the Hijaz. Egypt probably wanted them to stop refugees from the Sudan from going there. A telegraph line reached Suakin in 1859, regular steamship visits started in the 1860s, and some reforms were initiated. In 1865 Ismail regained control over the two towns from Jidda on condition that he stop the slave trade and pay T. L. 37,500 to the Hijaz in lieu of the lost taxes, customs revenues, and salt monopoly profits. The payment was only one-twentieth of the yearly tribute Egypt paid Istanbul every year after 1866. The amir and the vali of the Hijaz were consoled for their loss of territory by a bribe of 5,000 ardebs of wheat from Egypt.[13] Thus the two Ottoman Hijazi possessions opening onto the continent of Africa were lost forever, for when Egypt was occupied by Britain, the posts fell into her hands and never came under Ottoman control again.

British interest in the Red Sea was growing, or at least the amir

and grand vezir thought so. At the suggestion of the amir, the Ottoman grand vezir ordered the Basra docks in 1868 to send a warship to the Red Sea so as to counter the British presence there. Even before the opening of the canal in 1869, the Ottomans were reasserting their old claims on the Red Sea's western coast. In southern Arabia the Ottomans sent a warship to Shihr and Mukalla in 1867 at the request of a group of local notables to the amir of Mecca. The Ottomans then claimed sovereignty there, but this claim was opposed by Britain. However, despite these incidents, Ottoman and British expansion in Africa and Arabia seldom involved the Hijaz except through the slave trade. Foreign policy concerned chiefly the vali and Istanbul, not the amir.

ADMINISTRATION

In the 1860s and 1870s, the rapid turnover in the governorship of the Hijaz decreased the power of the valis with respect to the amir. While Abd Allah was amir continuously during the nineteen years from 1858 to 1877, there were nine valis. The first of these, Kutahyali Ali Pasha, had been vali of Syria, was a vezir, and held the Hijaz post until 1861. His successor, Hakkipashazade Ahmet Izzet, had had some experience in Yemen and returned there after serving in the Hijaz. Mehmet Vecihi Pasha (1864–67) died at Taif. His successor, after an eight-month gap, was Mehmet Muammar, who had been a member of the Istanbul Meclis-i Vala and was primarily a military figure. He commanded the Hijaz forces directly in the field. After the short regime of Hurshid Pasha, who had served in Edirne, Izmir, and Istanbul, Kasim (1871–72) succeeded. He had considerable experience in the Hijaz as governor of Medina and also of Jidda. Mehmet Reshid (1872–73) formerly had held the post of vali of African Tripoli. The next vali, Shirvanizade Mehmet Rushdi, had been grand vezir as well as vali of Damascus. His impact on the Hijaz was minimal, for he died after being there only one and one-half months. Vali Takiyuddin Pasha had been governor of Baghdad. From 1864 on the valis had the title of sheikh of the Meccan Haram as well as that of governor.

The governorship of the Hijaz, like many other provincial governorships, was viewed as a kind of exile for losers in the game of political intrigue in Istanbul. Real power was in the hands of the amir. Those who sought to become grand vezir attempted to re-

move potential rivals by having them appointed vali of the Hijaz. In the 1860s provincial governorships throughout the empire became less important; instead, consulates, reformers, and the army gained in power.

The elderly Mehmet Vecihi as vali in 1864–67 delegated power to his son, who proceeded to auction off the highest posts; even the kaimmakam of Jidda had to pay for his post. Vecihi's personal weakness contrasted with his formal strength: he had also been appointed sheikh of the Medina and Mecca Harams. He was the only vali in the nineteenth century to hold all three posts simultaneously. But nothing was done to consolidate or coordinate Ottoman power in the Hijaz. Vali Muammar resigned in disgust in 1870 because all effective power was in the hands of the amir. The new vali was ordered by Istanbul to live in Jidda so as to decrease controversy with the amir. Since Abd Allah seldom visited Jidda, far preferring to live in Taif and Mecca, this might have worked; but the pilgrimage, the presence of government offices and workers in Mecca, and the extraordinarily unattractive combination of heat and humidity in Jidda made it an impracticable idea.

The appointment of Kasim Pasha as vali in late 1871 might have made a very substantial difference if he had stayed as governor. He had served in two other crucial positions as governor first of Medina, then of Jidda, and he had the energy and military ability to play an active role. Kasim had benefited from a general personnel change following the death of Grand Vezir Ali Pasha on 7 September 1871, a change that opened the way for him at least to gain control of the local Ottoman machinery of government. Unfortunately for him, Istanbul's mania for shuffling personnel during the later reform period led to yet another change in the status of the vilayet and, in the process, a new vali. Amir Abd Allah remained secure in his power, therefore.

In the appointment of the kaimmakam of Jidda, the valis played a decisive role after 1861. After the 1858 massacre, the former system whereby the vali selected the kaimmakam had been abolished. Instead the new kaimmakam, Suleyman Bey, was appointed directly by Istanbul. The European consuls felt that this method of selection would certainly improve the quality of the kaimmakams; it would also enhance the role of the Europeans in the selection process, since they enjoyed greater influence in the central government than in Mecca, the seat of the vilayet and the

amir. However, in September 1861 the central government changed back to the previous system. Suleyman, who had been liked by the consuls, was dismissed. The new kaimmakam was to be appointed by the vali; however, in the 1860s the advice of the British and French consuls was still solicited. Their intervention in 1867 persuaded the vali to keep in office the then current governor of Jidda rather than replace him with someone from the vali's own staff. In the sixteen years between 1861 and 1876, there were at least eleven regular or temporary appointees to the post of kaimmakam, thereby weakening this post and comparatively strengthening the amirate's influence in Jidda.

The third most prestigious position in Ottoman administration, that of the sheikh of the Haram of Medina, also was often changed. Between 1858 and 1877, there were eleven sheikhs, who usually served as governors of the town of Medina. The longest term in office was four years, but most sheikhs served only one year. In June 1862 the manner in which the new sheikh was selected illustrated the general pattern of appointments. The incumbent died in Medina, and on the following day, a council met there to recommend his deputy for the promotion. The council sent petitions for this purpose to Istanbul; they were signed by the qadi, muftis, head of the preachers, the deputy naqib al-ashraf, and other leaders, as well as by sixty descendants of the Prophet and seventy prayer leaders and preachers. All this did little good, for Istanbul appointed another person to the post. However, the same year, when the naqib al-sadat of Medina died, a similar council, followed by petitions to Istanbul, was successful in securing the appointment for a local candidate.[14]

Perhaps the chief difference between the two situations was the intervention in the later case by the amir of Mecca on behalf of the petitioners. Certainly the amir's opinion, as well as that of the vali, was solicited by the grand vezir in 1869 when replacement of the sheikh of the Haram was being considered because of complaints received against him. In 1874 Amir Abd Allah's complaints against Halet Pasha, the Sheikh of the Haram, resulted in the latter's dismissal.

The demands placed upon the sheikh were also considered in appointments; the Ottomans felt that the Medina job demanded someone more conversant with local administration than a person to be appointed as kaimmakam of Jidda. The latter position was

viewed as being concerned primarily with Yemen and foreigners. The only external concern for the Medina sheikh was relations with Najd and Hail, and these were minimal compared with Jidda's external affairs, though diplomacy and tact were necessary in dealing with the Bedouins. Two military men who were appointed to the combined posts of sheikh and governor of Medina in the 1870s were so ineffectual with the tribes that they were rapidly dismissed.

Factors that affected all Ottomans from the humblest storehouse clerk to the amir himself were the financial crisis of the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s and the resulting pressure on individuals to compensate for delayed or reduced salaries by taking bribes. Special "donations" by employees to the state were not really voluntary; as they mounted and as salaries became ever more in arrears, pressure to solicit bribes grew.

Although the bankruptcy of the empire also signaled the bankruptcy of the Tanzimat, in its more flourishing days that series of administrative reforms imposed by Istanbul officialdom did have some impact upon the provinces, even those in distant Arabia. The most revolutionary change on the imperial level was the theoretical equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law; this had no importance in the all-Muslim Hijaz. Second was the steady encroachment of the central government upon the more distant provinces. Most provinces came to have one of the following positions: they were under effective control of Istanbul, as in Syria; they left the imperial system altogether, as in Rumania; they achieved some autonomy, as in Lebanon, but remained under the over-all control of the state. The Hijaz fell into the third category because of the semiautonomous power of the amirs of Mecca. Another change in the Tanzimat period came in the increase in the efficiency and power of the state. This was not visible in the Hijaz, although the conquest of nearby Yemen demonstrated the potentialities inherent in the new Ottoman strength of the 1860s.

Istanbul's never-ending debate about the ideal amount of power to be given to the provincial governor versus the power to be retained by the central ministries meant little to the Ottoman officials of the Hijaz up to 1868, when the Provincial Reform Law of 1864 and the Law of Vilayets of 1867 finally came partially into effect locally. The reorganization of the Ottoman bureaucracy and administrative divisions of the Hijaz into a new-style vilayet began in 1868 and ended only in 1873.

Reorganization raised the complex issues of the linkage of Medina and Yemen to the Hijaz, the status of the holy law, and the relationship between the amir and Istanbul. When debate began in 1868, the vali objected to instituting the new reforms also on the grounds of added expense. The central government's treasury department wanted to make it clear that Yemen would be separate for tax purposes, and, revealingly, it wanted the same status for Medina—perhaps because it hoped eventually to institute taxes there. Istanbul officials also pointed out that police duties were presently divided between the amir and the vali, and to specify the allocation of responsibility might be difficult. Still, it was decided to go ahead with the changes. When the grand vezir wrote the vali and the amir about this, he told them that the council of state had concurred. He also assured them that the first order of business was still the maintenance of security by the police and that the second was financial probity. In other areas instructions could be carried out in accordance with circumstances. Religious law was to be applied as formerly, but a civil criminal court was to be established. The civil and financial aspects of administration in Medina were to be taken away from the sheikh of the Haram and turned over to a governor responsible to the Hijaz vali. The first governor was to be Kasim Pasha, who had had experience with the nomads while serving on the staff of the army in Damascus. He also was to have command of the military around and in Medina. The sheikh of the Haram would retain jurisdiction only over religious matters and the Haram itself. Some aspects of Yemen's government might still be handled by Mecca. A new and more elaborate financial organization was to be set up in Mecca, and a council (later known as the Meclis-i Idare-i Liva Medine) would be established to advise the vali about affairs in Medina.[15] After the adoption of these changes, there ensued a general rearrangement of personnel in the top positions.

The actual consequences of the provincial reorganization were small. After one year the offices of sheikh of the Haram and governor of Medina were once again held by one individual. There was no discernible increase in the power of the valis with respect to the amirs, the tribes, or anyone else. Financial changes may have had some marginal impact in terms of efficiency, but money was in such short supply that government was hamstrung no matter how efficient its bureaucrats were. Yemen did gain a separate

administration, but Qunfuda, Lit, and parts of Asir remained in the Hijaz Vilayet. An advisory council (Meclis-i Vilayet) was formed in Mecca for the vilayet as a whole, and a local council (Meclis-i Idare-i Liva Cidde) was established in Jidda in 1873, but they seem to have done nothing up to the turbulent years of the 1880s.

PROVINCIAL FINANCES

Money, as always, was a major concern of government. The financial relations of the Ottomans with the Hijaz were central to the existence of the people of the area as well as their attitude toward the amir and vali. From the local point of view, subsidies from the central government to Mecca and Medina showed that the Ottoman Empire was the economic support of the chief religious sites of Islam. The Ottomans sent food for the subsistence of the Hijazis and for the thousands of pilgrims who came to the Hijaz every year. In return the Ottoman sultan gained religious prestige.

The Ottomans had made of the Hijaz the most privileged province in the empire. It enjoyed internal autonomy and a low rate of taxation, and was the recipient of subsidies not only from the Ottoman government but also from Egypt, Indian Muslim states, and Muslim private citizens throughout the world.

The support extended to the Hijaz varied somewhat as the financial fortunes of the empire changed. The empire was reasonably solvent through the 1840s and 1850s, but it began increasingly to borrow money from Europe to finance military reforms. Between 1854 and 1908, the Ottomans borrowed T. L. 297,000,000. In the 1870s the empire went bankrupt. It was only with the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in the 1880s that order returned to Ottoman finances, although steady deficits continued. Abdulhamid II's financial goals were the repayment of the debt in order to attain financial freedom and the building of an economic infrastructure that would help productive capacity grow. An expanding military consumed about 40 percent of the budget, and little was left for provincial administration.[16]

The Hijaz was perpetually short of funds. Local revenues were inadequate to cover local expenditures; usually the deficits were two-thirds of the total expenditures of the province. Even with the strictest economies, the Hijaz was dependent upon the central government for subsidies to maintain local administration, though the

sums involved were relatively small. In the year of greatest expenditures, only about T. L. 236,500 were spent on all aspects of government, including the military and gifts to Bedouins. Local revenue averaged about T. L. 55,000. By comparison, Egypt's tribute to the Ottomans was T. L. 400,000; after 1866 it was T. L. 750,000. The revenue of Cyprus, perhaps more comparable in number of inhabitants, was T. L. 211,370 in 1868/69.[17]

The sources of income locally available were limited by the religious, political, and economic position the province occupied in the empire. Even if the central government had wanted to collect large amounts of taxes, it would have been difficult to do so. The Hijaz was too poor, too distant, and too accustomed to near-autonomy to submit to taxation. Hijazis paid taxes through the disguised form of higher prices for goods taxed on entry to the Hijaz by sea. At the Jidda customs house, more than two hundred men were usually at work.

Although customs revenues were by far the largest source of revenue, there were other taxes as well. Mehmet Ali had created before 1840 a levy of 7 percent on livestock and 10 percent on agricultural yields; the money was split equally between the government, the amir, and the tax collectors. These taxes were retained for the Mecca and Taif areas, but they raised only about T. L. 500–1,000 per year, depending upon the power of the amirs for collection.

Every year the vali faced the problem of securing the money needed to balance his expenditures (see table 7). When the changeover to Ottoman administration occurred in 1841/42, the financial and grain contributions of Egypt to the Hijaz once again became an issue. Mehmet Ali had annually sent T. L. 40,000 or the equivalent in grain as a gift. He had, however, suppressed the waqf income from Egypt for the holy cities and had taken all the Jidda customs revenues rather than dividing them with the amirs of Mecca as had formerly been done. In 1841/42 he withheld the subsidy despite protests from Vali Osman Pasha. Actual receipts for 1841/42 were as follows: (1) Jidda customs, T. L. 52,480; (2) other local sources, 1,235; (3) Istanbul treasury, 22,550; (4) Egypt, 28,465; (5) grain from Egypt on hand in the Hijaz, 14,280. The total, even if Egypt's missing contribution was soon to arrive, would still be far short of expenditures. Short-term one-time measures were taken to raise about T. L. 35,000, but the remaining deficit had to

TABLE 7

TOTAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FOR THE HIJAZ IN OTTOMAN POUNDS

Year	Local Revenue	Expenditure	Deficit
1841/42	53,715	171,805	118,090
1842/43	45,000	171,894	110,945
1845	64,955	140,950	75,995
1846/47	35,000	189,630	154,630
1850/51	67,090	227,545	160,455
1851/52	33,345	228,145	194,800
1852/53	36,945	209,400	172,455
1853/54	31,315	182,530	151,215
1855/56	20,000	250,000	230,000
1859/60	86,015	.....	.....
1860/61	96,275	.....	.....
1861/62	42,565	192,450	149,885
1862/63	68,035	236,485	168,450
1863/64	71,730	.....	.....
1864/65	.....	212,100	.....
1865/66	83,230	208,860	125,630
1866/67	90,000	210,000	120,000
1869/70	80,000	.....	.....
1871/72	55,095	241,110	186,015
1872/73	.....	205,700	.....

SOURCES: BBA, Meclis-i Vala 504; Dahiliye 3548; Meclis-i Vala 4889; Meclis-i Vala 2948; Meclis-i Vala 6334; Dahiliye 17876; Meclis-i Mahsus 1; Misir Defter 592, enclosure 26; Meclis-i Vala 18661; Meclis-i Mahsus 1120; Meclis-i Vala 24702; Meclis-i Vala 22429, enclosure 22; Dahiliye 37893; Dahiliye 45412; Mesail-i Muhimme 2430; FJ, de Monbrey (Jidda) to ministry, 21 October 1856; Yildiz 18.525/213.128.25; Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to vali, 3 Shaban 1289.

be met by Istanbul.[18] The burden of the deficit fell on groups that frequently had to wait years to receive the money that was due them.

The records of the local revenues for 1852/53 showed the results of separating the Yemen ports' revenues from the Hijaz. That year a severe drop in revenue naturally resulted. Over five-sevenths of what revenue was left came from the customs of Jidda, Suakin, and Massawa. Another important source of local revenue was the tribute of T. L. 2,300 paid by Najd to the Hijaz in recognition of nominal Ottoman sovereignty. Zakat (alms taxes) receipts were only T. L. 1,030. The Istanbul treasury in 1851/52 also paid Egypt for the shipment of wheat and barley. In 1852–54 the Ottoman military treasury supplied T. L. 100,000, and Egypt, an equal sum, for grain to be sent to the Hijaz.[19]

The need for cash led the valis to borrow money from local merchants, for it was difficult to transfer funds from Istanbul to Mecca. Payments were months and sometimes years in arrears,

with the threat of an audit awaiting the vali who manipulated his accounts. The defterdar of the provincial administration possessed independence of action and a separate channel of communication with Istanbul. The risky business of providing credit could be undertaken only by merchants who had capital such that delays in payment would not ruin their other businesses.

More preferable than relying on one person to provide credit was a consortium of lenders who could share the risks and who also could apply more pressure on the vali in the event of an altercation than could one man. Faraj Yusr, an Indian Muslim, was the chief merchant of Jidda in the 1850s. He and the vali were involved in profitable joint business undertakings. Yusr and another local merchant, Salim Sultan, lent the province T. L. 8,000 in 1853/54, and in 1854/55 Yusr advanced T. L. 21,500 more to the vali for the payment of soldiers and military expenses to be repaid by drafts on Istanbul. In 1855/56 Yusr was asked for the large sum of T. L. 72,505. Yusr's profit on exchange was estimated at 18 percent. On a loan of T. L. 20,000 to the amir for military operations, Yusr wanted a 2 percent commission plus a favorable rate of exchange. In Istanbul, Yusr's agents allegedly bribed the minister of the treasury. The profitability of most of the loans was high; a 5 percent profit seems to have been the minimum expected.[20]

The year 1862/63 may be taken as an example of the financial situation of the Hijaz province in the 1860s. Local revenue came chiefly from the Jidda customs, which yielded a profit of T. L. 30,000, and those of Yemen, which also provided T. L. 30,000. The customs of Massawa and Suakin declined to only T. L. 665. Although the Najd's tribute was listed as a source of income, it was not paid that year. Egypt continued to be the chief source of payments. Every year T. L. 100,000 from the Egyptian tribute was used for the purchase of grain for the Hijaz. When grain was sent from Iraq rather than Egypt, part of the now-free money was sent to Jidda for current operating expenses.[21]

A juggling act began in the middle 1860s with elaborate switching of surpluses, or what was hoped would be surpluses, from one province to another. Thus the Hijaz deficit of 1865/66 was met by issuing drafts on Baghdad. In 1867/68 the central government owed the Hijaz T. L. 70,000; by 1874 the debt had mounted to T. L. 88,000. The grand vezir promised the vali that he would receive all the money owed plus coverage for the current

deficit by telegraphed drafts on the Syrian and Baghdad vilayets. In 1875–77 the bottom fell out with bankruptcy. The income of the Ottoman Hijaz was reduced, although economic and fiscal conditions there did not become as catastrophic as they were in Ottoman Syria at the same time.

By far the largest single expenditure of the Hijaz provincial government in the 1860s was the cost of the military (see table 8), but the central imperial government spent more on the pilgrimage caravans' expenses and gifts to the holy cities. Since security and sovereignty were the Ottomans' chief political goals, the primacy of the military was understandable. And since the chief benefit the Hijazis returned to the Ottomans was the public acknowledgment of the piety and generosity of the ruler and state, gifts to prominent religious individuals also were important.

Expenditures on the army took many forms. In 1851/52 T. L. 132,940, more than one-half of all spending, was for the military. However, at least throughout the 1850s, the military budget was artificially inflated by T. L. 20,000: the expenses of one regiment were billed to the Hijaz, even though it was stationed in Istanbul, because the other regiments of that division were in the Hijaz. The level of spending on the military remained at more than one-half of vilayet expenditures in the 1880s.

The cost of protecting the overland pilgrimage caravans from Damascus was large. Every year there were official receptions for

TABLE 8

EXPENDITURES OF THE JIDDA EYALET, 1862/63, IN OTTOMAN POUNDS

Category	In Medina	In Mecca
Amir, sharifs, and others	80	26,880
Servants of the Haram	.....	390
Residents of Mecca and Medina	3,910	3,085
Civil servants	2,530	21,040
Military	50,580	84,810
Grain and transport	12,130	1,300
Living and travel expenses	3,915	10,075
Bedouins	760	.....
Miscellaneous	2,000	13,000
Total	75,905	160,580
(Grand total 236,485)		

SOURCE: BBA, Meclis-i Vala 22429, encl. 14. All figures have been rounded to the nearest pound.

the arrival and departure of the caravans, and camels were rented by the government from the nomads for the escorts of the caravans. When disputes with the Bedouins of these regions arose, military spending was increased. Twenty-five thousand Ottoman pounds was added to the military's share of the Medina budget for 1863/64 after there were problems with the Bedouins who controlled the pilgrim routes leading to Medina.[22]

Annual spending by the central government on the pilgrimage and allied expenses in the 1880s included donations, gifts, and pensions to the sharifs, sayyids, and the ulema worth T. L. 17,776. Wheat, barley, beans, and lentils distributed in the holy cities and Jidda cost T. L. 25,558. The sums spent on food, gifts, and the pilgrimage were in addition to the regular budgetary amounts sent to the province. Of the total allocated by Istanbul, T.L. 29,000 to 35,000 was spent in Mecca and Medina. The chief group receiving money was the officialdom of the two Harams. Charity to the poor and religious education were given only T. L. 8,470. Hospitals, Sufi brotherhoods, the ulema outside the Harams, and those who prayed on behalf of the royal family were paid T.L. 4,480.

The sources of these funds were primarily the central government's treasury and a special waqf treasury in Istanbul. Waqfs for the benefit of the holy cities had been established by the Ottoman dynasty and others throughout the empire. Waqfs donated by former sultans, and those whose income was allocated specifically to the Hijaz, were supplemented by funds from the imperial treasury, the sultan's private treasury, the treasury of the holy cities per se, and drafts written on the Syrian vilayet.

The Egyptian government sent every year with the Cairo-Mecca pilgrimage caravan a new covering for the Kaba that cost more than T. L. 5,000. Guards for the caravans, fortresses in the northern Hijaz (up to the 1890s when they reverted to the Ottomans), and gifts to the sharifs, the inhabitants of the holy cities, and the Bedouins cost Egypt at least an additional T. L. 9,000. Egyptian charities in Mecca and Medina received more than T. L. 3,500. Much of the cost was borne by Egyptian waqfs especially established for these purposes. Nearly every family in Mecca and Medina received some benefit from Egypt, including in many cases direct pensions.[23]

In addition to the regular donations from Istanbul and Cairo,

there were gifts from other areas and on special occasions from the Ottomans. Tunisia, various religious brotherhoods, central Asian rulers, and prominent pilgrims supplied funds. Indian Muslims were generous toward the Hijaz: money was given for famine relief, schools, the Hijaz Railroad, Quran recitations, physicians to attend indigent pilgrims, and hostels. When natural disasters took place, as the flood in Mecca in 1861 or the drought of 1886–89, the Ottoman central government sent money or food.

Imperial charity in the Hijaz was also channeled in part through gifts to named individuals. The descendants of the Prophet, imams, preachers, managers of charitable institutions, servants of the Harams, and those who prayed in the holy cities were eligible for the most. Those who held no office but simply were born in Medina and in Mecca received less, and those who were settled foreigners living in the cities received still less. Former government officeholders received pensions when they retired to the Hijaz.

False names sometimes were entered on the registers. Recipients sold their rights to agents in Istanbul who tried to collect money when they were not entitled to it. Formerly, five years of residence in the holy cities had been a prerequisite to claiming to be a settled inhabitant and thus eligible for gifts, but in 1881/82 newly arrived Central Asians were presenting certificates of settled status. To reform these practices, the central government established new procedures for giving money. Forms had to be produced in person in the Hijaz in order to collect money. The following groups were forbidden to receive subsidies: employees of the Hijaz treasury, small children, slaves, servants, merchants, and those living for less than five years in Mecca or Medina. Across-the-board reductions were also made. Actual distribution of the money for Mecca was made by the amir, the supervisor of the Haram, the chief judge of Mecca, and the agent of the central government in charge of imperial charities. In Medina the chief judge, the supervisor of the Haram, the charities clerk, and the local agent of the amir supervised the distribution of the presents.[24]

Expenditures on public works were low, sporadic, and concentrated on projects for the rebuilding of mosques, strengthening the military, and improving the water supply. A shortage of skilled local artisans throughout the period made it necessary to import

them from Egypt, which increased expenses. In the first years after the Ottoman return to the Hijaz, the major program undertaken was the renovation of the Medina Haram. A succession of engineers supervised the repairs under the guidance of the governors of Medina from the late 1840s to 1860. One of the gates of the city was also rebuilt.

The main public works projects concerned water. The great heat of the Hijaz and the extreme fluctuations in demand for water caused by the pilgrimage made a guaranteed and healthy water system essential. Unfortunately, rainfall was scarce and erratic. Underground springs, well-maintained transmission pipelines from them to the towns, and clean storage tanks to keep the water for years were the key elements in government action to help the Hijazis and pilgrims.

About one-half of Mecca's water came from the spring Ayn Zubaydah through conduits to the taps of Mecca. The Ayn Zubaydah water system had received an extension in 1846, when a new well was added. The chief source of water for Medina was repaired in 1867 at a cost of T. L. 5,600. Medina was relatively better supplied than Mecca because of the wells that made possible irrigated agriculture and the smaller population of the town. The water flow into Mecca decreased because of failure to keep the conduits repaired and cleaned. In 1878 the generous Abd al-Rahman Sarraj, the Hanafi mufti of Mecca, employed Indian pilgrims and Bedouins as laborers to restore the water system. After the restoration, in order to obtain a greater supply of water, the sultan created a commission, headed initially by Sarraj, to supervise substantial alterations to Ayn Zubaydah.

The commission raised the money for the proposed changes from the donations of rich Muslims in the Hijaz, Egypt, and India: at least T. L. 24,000 was given. The commission did not ask for money from the Ottoman treasury because of the financial dilemma of the empire at that time. Many aspects of the water system were improved: conduits were repaired, and water from the nearby wadis was brought to Mecca by building new underground pipes, diversionary canals were dug, and new reservoirs and water taps were built throughout the city. In the middle 1880s, a large reservoir was built at Muna; it had a steam pump to lift water onto the pilgrimage mount itself.[25]

The water supply to Jidda was in deplorable condition through most of the nineteenth century. During the Wahhabi occupation of the Hijaz, the water channels from Wadi Fatimah had been severed, and apparently they were not rebuilt for some time. Jidda depended upon rainwater stored in privately owned cisterns and water brought in by camels. Thus in 1869, even though there was no rain that year, the stored water could be drunk after it was filtered. Obviously it was in the interest of the cistern owners to stop the repair and construction of aqueducts. Proposals by a Cairo-based, Christian-owned company to build an aqueduct were rejected by the amir and the vali in 1880. Nevertheless, in 1886–87 water was brought from seven miles away through earthenware pipes to Jidda. Later, the government brought in the water from another spring; the cost was paid by local townspeople.[26]

Salaries to government employees also constituted a major type of expenditure. The total number of employees of the Hijaz Ottoman government in 1871/72 from the vali to a coffee-maker in Medina (but excluding the police and army), was about one hundred seventy. They shared T. L. 32,140, with a wide gap between the vali and a water-carrier, who was paid under T. L. 10 per year. Intermediate ranks included clerks who received between T. L. 50 and 100, a translator with T. L. 60, and teachers in Mecca, who were paid T. L. 150 each. Religious-legal figures such as the deputy judges of Mecca and Medina had only T. L. 150 per year in salary. The Hanafi mufti of Mecca was paid the suprisingly low sum of T. L. 30.

At the top of the hierarchy stood the vali and the treasurer and their staffs, whose salaries were supplemented by grain allotments. Halet Pasha, the head of the Medina Haram, received T. L. 2,400 per year in 1882, but also got about 7,200 okas of wheat and 16,200 of barley per year.

Ascertaining the income of the amirs of Mecca was a most difficult task. The Hashimite family, including the ruling amirs, possessed land, animals, and villages in Mecca, Wadi Fatimah, and Taif. They were also the beneficiaries of waqfs and received pensions from the empire, although the amirate had since 1841 lost any share of the Jidda customs revenues.

Estimates of the income of the amirate varied widely for the later nineteenth century. Unofficial sources of money, such as a

share in the camel rentals or in the shipping price-fixing ring, were other sources of income besides salary.

IMPERIAL TURMOIL AND ITS LOCAL IMPACT, 1877–82

From 1875 to 1882, the Islamic world and the Ottoman state experienced severe political crises. Egypt and Tunisia were occupied by Britain and France, and the Egyptian Sudan rebelled under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad, who claimed to be the mahdi. The Ottoman Empire fought a disastrous war with Russia, lost a great deal of its richest territory in Europe, suffered from the bankruptcy of 1875, and saw three sultans come to power in rapid succession. Also, the state experimented with a constitutional monarchy, only to return to autocracy. In the Hijaz three amirs held power and there was a high degree of change in government personnel. The tranquillity of 1859 to 1877 was challenged; but the amirs retained the upper hand, and there was no immediate threat to their authority.

The imperial crises affected the Hijaz through the inability of Istanbul to send money to pay bureaucrats, soldiers, and the tribes. Even though a returning high-ranking pilgrim reported to the grand vezir in 1876 that the Hijaz needed to make improvements in health, in the maintenance of the two Harams, and in storing wheat, the central govenment simply ordered the vali to do these things without providing any money for them. Instead, the imperial government in December 1876 asked the Hijaz to provide money to it. The appeal for donations was said to be necessary to save Islam and the state from the Russians, and to secure the sultanate and the community (millet) from danger. Printed acknowledgments were to be given to those who donated; it was expected that the rich would contribute the greatest sums. By May 1877 the Hijaz had sent in T. L. 8,200, slightly more than its quota. At the same time, the vali wrote to complain that state expenses had not been met in nearly two fiscal years.[27] Surprisingly enough, no large-scale insurrections broke out, though raids by the Bedouins increased; those few soldiers still in the Hijaz continued to fight when asked to do so.

The war with Russia in 1877 even led the Hijaz authorities with no success to attempt to recruit volunteers for the Ottoman

army. Other Arab provinces provided large numbers of troops for the war, and the ulema at the Kaba and elsewhere prayed for the victory of Ottoman arms.

Coincidental with financial crisis and military threat were the political changes of 1876–78. The former amir Abd al-Muttalib was present at the War Ministry building in Istanbul in May 1876 when the oath of allegiance to the new Sultan Murad V was taken after the deposition of Sultan Abdulaziz. The subsequent removal of Murad in favor of Abdulhamid II in August had no immediate repercussions in the Hijaz. Of considerably greater local interest were the two successful pilgrimages of late 1876 and late 1877, when the numbers of pilgrims were high and their health was good.

When the news of the Amir Abd Allah's death was received in Istanbul on 8 July 1877, the question of his successor was easily resolved. Abd Allah's brother Husayn (b. ca. 1839/40), who was a member of the Council of State, was recommended by the vali of the Hijaz and approved by Sultan Abdulhamid. A new vali, Halet Pasha, was appointed. Awn al-Rafiq, brother both to Abd Allah and to Husayn, had served as acting amir; upon the arrival of Husayn, he went to Istanbul, where he gained the rank of vezir and joined the Council of State. Thus, in short order an heir apparent to the amirate, a new amir, and a new vali had been selected. Also, investigations into the conduct of the governors of Yanbu and the sheikh of the Haram of Medina were ordered by the grand vezir. Certainly the administrative hierarchy in Istanbul was not incapacitated by the extraordinary strains it was undergoing—it was still quite able to make rapid choices.

The three years of Amir Husayn's rule were notable for their quietness. Imperial developments and particularly the suppression of parliament and the suspension of the constitution were greeted with complete apathy in the Hijaz. Husayn retained the custom of large public audiences at which the conduct of public business took place. He was personally in touch with, and favorable toward, the ideas of the new Arabic-speaking intelligentsia being formed in Beirut. Some public works were carried out, most notably the paving of part of the trail between Mecca and Taif, and others were planned.

Vali Nashid Pasha, the former governor of Damascus and of

Aleppo, arrived in Jidda in 1879, made the pilgrimage, and began actively to make changes in the port of Jidda. The municipality acted together with the foreign merchants of the town to institute a new tax on imported goods; the proceeds of this were used to build a sea wall, tear down old houses in the quarantine grounds, and construct public latrines. Istanbul gave the vali the freedom to move the administration from Mecca to Jidda as circumstances warranted.

On 15 March 1880, Amir Husayn died in Jidda after being stabbed by Khurasani Fakhr al-Din, an Afghani, whose reasons for the murder were unknown. It has been suggested that the assassination was inspired by Sultan Abdulhamid II because of the amir's reputation for favoring Great Britain.[28] There is, however, no evidence of imperial involvement in the assassination.

When the British consul was asked by the vali to write the ambassador in Istanbul to oppose the choice of Abd al-Muttalib as successor to Husayn, Consul Zohrab did so, but for reasons of his own in addition to those of the vali. Zohrab feared that Abd al-Muttalib was fanatical in religion, capricious, and anti-British. The British ambassador did oppose Abd al-Muttalib, but with consequences that were opposite to those intended. It seems likely that one of the chief motives for Abdulhamid's support of Abd al-Muttalib was precisely the British opposition to him. In addition, the sultan wanted to change those groups supported by the Tanzimat leaders, such as the Awn clan of the amirs, in favor of the Zayd side of the Hashimite family, to which Abd al-Muttalib belonged.[29] The grand vezir and the sultan's chief advisers also favored Abd al-Muttalib, despite his role in the rising of 1855. By balancing the strength of the Zayd and Awn clans of the Hashimites, the central government increased its power.

The aged and irascible Abd al-Muttalib returned to the Hijaz in May 1880 after long years of exile. He immeidately had to deal with a vali who had opposed his selection as amir. Vali Nashid Pasha was uncooperative; he refused to lend troops to Abd al-Muttalib for the repression of the Bedouins. The amir appealed to Istanbul for the dismissal of the vali and threatened to resign if Nashid was not fired. In October 1880 he was replaced as vali by Safvet Pasha, who was a friend of the amir, but who was also a military man of wide experience who had already been vali elsewhere eleven times.

Abd al-Muttalib rapidly alienated a wide variety of individuals and groups in the Hijaz. In addition to the followers of the Awn clan of the Hashimites, who were natural enemies of any member of the Zayd clan, the amir antagonized the new vali, the merchants of Jidda and Mecca, and the foreign consuls. Safvet refused to allow the Awn clan to be completely crushed, and he objected to persecution of the Jidda merchant Umar Nasif. After one year Safvet was ousted and replaced nominally by Ahmet Izzet, of Erzincan, who had been vali in 1852–53 and who was now perhaps ninety years old. Real leadership among the Ottomans was in the hands of the new commander of the troops, Osman Nuri (1840–98), a personal favorite of the sultan, who became vali six months later. Osman Nuri was determined to gain power from the amir and for the first time to establish the direct rule of Istanbul in the Hijaz. The Jidda merchants and the consuls were upset by Bedouin raids on the Jidda-Mecca and Mecca-Taif routes, arbitrary confiscations of property, forced gifts, arrests and beating of individuals the amir considered to be enemies, and the transfer of patronage from those formerly enjoying it to new agents for the amirate. The new business manager of the amir was Muhammad Jabir al-Yamani, former treasurer of the Hudayda customs, who had been dismissed from that post for stealing. Some of the sheikhs of the pilgrim guides were dismissed and new, pro-amir individuals who gave substantial gifts to him were appointed in their places. Anyone who criticized Abd al-Muttalib was harshly punished. The Hanafi mufti of Mecca resigned in protest against the amir's actions. Umar Shaybi, the keykeeper of the Kaba, was arrested by the amir and held prisoner. The governor of Yanbu, who had held that post for twenty years,was abruptly dismissed.[30] Since the tribes did not receive their promised payments, they too began to turn against Abd al-Muttalib. Taif was besieged by the Bedouins in early 1881; famine prices were charged for food in its markets. The amir suspected his Hashimite enemies of stirring up these troubles against him, but his own greed, rigidity, tactlessness, and haste were the chief causes of his difficulties.

On the other hand, Abd al-Muttalib did have some supporters. His own relatives formed a self-interested group of backers. His son Hashim was the chief leader of the administration for the first six months after the amir's return to Mecca. Hashim's highhanded diversion of water from Ayn Zubaydah at the expense of the pil-

grims alienated many of the devout. Still, his death in January 1881 deprived Abd al-Muttalib of an able assistant. Newly appointed Ottoman officials were initially pro-amir. Increases in civil rank, medals, and robes of honor were obtained from Istanbul for the amir's friends, followers, and Bedouin allies. The consuls in Jidda underestimated his popularity because they knew only his enemies; the friends the amir made among the Bedouins by his generosity and among townsmen by his piety and anti-European attitudes did not live in Jidda.

The decisive factor in Abd al-Muttalib's second reign was his failure to maintain security on the pilgrimage and commercial routes. He and Izzet, the new vali, had been ordered by Istanbul to make peace, order, and caring for the pilgrims their top priorities. The grand vezir was worried about the 1880 attacks on the Jidda-Mecca road. Quarrels among the tribes and with the amir kept breaking out. As security lessened, food supplies in Mecca decreased. The Hijaz cholera epidemics of the early 1880s also adversely affected the economy. When Osman was named vali in July 1882, his orders were not specifically aimed at the amir: Istanbul was more worried about the Sanusis, the political prisoners kept at Taif, cholera, and the penetration of British influence among the nomads. But Osman soon ordered Abd al-Muttalib to restrict his authority to Mecca. The vali wanted the amir to give up contact with the nomads, and all judicial and appointive powers, leaving him only with the responsibility for the organization of the pilgrimage. Sultan Abdulhamid approved this radical change, revoking as well all monopolies in food and goods possessed by the amir. The vali reinforced the garrisons and sought religious support by ordering the destruction of all liquor in Jidda. Bottles were broken and poured into the sea to cheers—while the French consul vehemently objected.[31]

The crowning touch was rumors that the amir was ambitious for the caliphate, was acting in cooperation with the British, and favored the release of the Taif political prisoners. Even though there was no authentic evidence that these were true, there had been some suggestions made outside the Hijaz along these lines, and the imperial palace accepted the rumors as distinctly possible. Abd al-Muttalib was quietly arrested by the vali in September 1882 and moved to Taif and then to Muna, where he died in 1886. The

amir's popularity with the Meccans was of no value to him in his moment of need. Unlike 1855–56, when he raised the tribes in rebellion, this time he was obliged to accept the imperial order of dismissal as permanent.

Under Abd al-Muttalib and his two predecessors, the amirate provided relatively able leadership to the Hijaz. The storms that so severely affected the central Ottoman lands had little impact in the distant Hijaz. Ottoman aid to the Hijaz was large in comparison with locally raised funds, and the Hijaz was clearly dependent on the central government. Most of the money spent in the province was used for supporting military forces that could provide backing for the valis. Another large category of aid went to the religious hierarchy in the holy cities. Pilgrims to Mecca and Medina provided the greatest source of income for the Hijazis, but the gifts and subventions from the empire and Egypt were next in importance. Other than customs fees, there were practically no taxes; the area was too poor to pay its own way.

Amir Abd Allah in particular helped establish tranquillity in Mecca and Jidda as well as the desert. With his help the Ottomans even extended their power beyond its normal sway in Arabia. The religious prestige of the amirate and the personal ability of the amirs were the primary causes of the successes achieved in this period. However, the deposition of Abd al-Muttalib opened the way to a secular challenge by the central government to the amirate.

1. FO 195/1451, Moncrieff (Jidda) to Granville, 10 August 1883; BBA, Shurayi Devlet 5563, 23 Rebiyulevvel 1306.

2. BBA, Mesail-i Muhimme 2437, 24 Shevval 1260, especially enclosures 14 and 33; Shurayi Devlet 609, 16 Zilhicce 1285; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p. 137; Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:170.

3. Burton, *Personal Narrative*, 1:393; Didier, *Séjour*, pp. 151–54; FO 195/375, Cole (Jidda) to Hardy, 12 April 1854; FJ, de Monbrun (Jidda) to ministry, 25 October 1856; FJP, Beillard (Jidda) to ministry, 12 March 1856; BBA, Dahiliye 45412, enclosure 5, 29 Muharrem 1289; Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to Jidda, Selh Cemaziyelahir 1289.

4. BBA, Dahiliye 9887, 16 Zilkade 1264; Dahiliye 10418, 28 Safer 1265; FJP, Rousseau (Jidda) to ministry, 1 November 1859; Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2:191–92, 545; FO 195/2083, Devey (Jidda) to O'Conor, 7 July 1900; Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, pp. 200, 202; Al-Amr, "Hijaz," pp. 111–12.

5. FJ, Rousseau (Jidda) to ministry, 6 July 1859; BBA, Dahiliye 29631, vali and amir to

grand vezir, 19 Rebiyulevvel 1276; FJP, Monge (Jidda) to ministry, 14 November 1861; FJ, Pellisier (Jidda) to ministry, 5 February and 10 April 1864.

6. FO 195/681, kaimmakam of Jidda to Stanley, 11 May 1861.

7. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 1698, 16 Rebiyulahir 1288; Dahlan, *Khulasat*, p. 325; BBA, Ayniyat 871, 23 Cemaziyelevvel 1288 and 15 Muharrem 1289.

8. Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 'al-Afghani'*, pp. 32, 80.

9. FJ, de Sainte-Marie (Jidda) to ministry, 12 August and 24 October 1865; Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," pp. 172–73; Baldry, "Al-Yaman," pp. 166–68; FO 195/879, Calvert (Jidda) to Colquohon, 19 June 1865.

10. R. Bayly Winder, *Saudi Arabia in the 19th Century*, pp. 140, 165, 179–81; d'Avril, *L'Arabie*, pp. 26–27; FJP, Outrey (Jidda) to ministry, 30 August 1855.

11. Ali Muharak, *Al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyyat al-Jadidah*, 12:84–85; Dahlan, *Khulasat*, p. 324; BBA, Misir Defteri 723, 6 Ramazan 1277; Mustafa Amer, "An Egyptian Explorer in Arabia in the 19th Century."

12. Ferdinand de Lesseps, *Question du Canal de Suez*, pp. 80–82 and holographic dedication, by the author.

13. Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820–1881*, pp. 74, 84–87, 99; Sabry, *L'Empire égyptien*, p. 388; Shawqi al-Jamal, *Siyasah Misr fi al-Bahr al-Ahmar*, pp. 47–48; Orhonlu, *Osmanli*, pp. 147–48, 158–59; Talhami, *Stakin*, pp. 21–28.

14. BBA, Dahiliye 33404, 18 Muharrem 1279; Dahiliye 33936, 3 Cemaziyelahir 1279.

15. BBA, Meclis-i Vala 1514, 9 Zilhicce 1285; Ayniyat 871, 29 Zilhicce 1285; Meclis-i Mahsus 1587, 12 and 28 Zilkade 1286, and 25 Rebiyulahir 1287. The advisory councils in the Hijaz resembled those established in other provinces, but they seem to have done little except formalize already existing ties between local elites and Ottoman officials.

16. Stanford Shaw, "Ottoman Expenditures and Budgets in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries."

17. For a more detailed examination of the finances of the Ottoman Hijaz in the nineteenth century, see William Ochsenwald, "Ottoman Subsidies to the Hijaz, 1877–1886," and William Ochsenwald, "The Financial Basis of Ottoman Rule in the Hijaz, 1840–1877."

18. BBA, Meclis-i Vala 504; Mesail-i Muhimme 2430, 19 Cemaziyelahir 1258; Dahiliye 3548.

19. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 1, enclosure 28; Dahiliye 14696; Dahiliye 24863. Winder, *Saudi Arabia*, pp. 179–82, says that the payment of T. L. 2,300 by the Saudis to the Hijaz was not made in 1846, leading to the campaign of the amir in Najd that year. Muhammad ibn Awn then secured the money, but there were partial defaults in 1850 and 1854/55.

20. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 736; Cevdet, *Tezakir*, 2:93–95.

21. BBA, Meclis-i Vala 22429, enclosures 22, 29, 52.

22. BBA, Misir Defteri 592; Tresse, *Le Pèlerinage*, p. 54; d'Avril, *L'Arabie contemporaine*, pp. 84–85; BBA, Yildiz 18.553/11.93.33, enclosure 2.

23. Jomier, *La Mahmal*, pp. 162–63; Ibrahim Rifat, *Mirat*, 2:309–61; J. Deny, *Sommaire des Archives Turques du Caire*, pp. 140–41, 410–11; Muhammad Sadiq, *Dalil al-Hajj*, pp. 3–4.

24. Eyyub Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 1:699, 706; BBA, Ayniyat 872, grand vezir to amir and vali, 21 Zilkade 1289; Hurgronje, *Mekka*, p. 173; *Recueil*, pp. 64, 102; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p.. 41–42.

25. Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 1:747–52; BBA, Ayniyat 871, grand vezir to vali, 7 and 20 Zilhicce 1284.

26. FJ, Dubreuill (Jidda) to ministry, 15 February 1869; FO 685/1/3, Netherlands minister in London to Foreign Office, 2 February 1880; Frank Clemow, *Les Eaux de Djeddah*, pp. 3–10.

27. BBA, Ayniyat 875, grand vezir to vali, 13 Rebiyulahir 1293, 27 Zilkade 1293 and 8 Cemaziyalahir 1294.

28. Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," pp. 253–54; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p. 149; Butrus Abu-Man-

neh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca (1880–1900)," pp. 4–6. On the other hand, there is no doubt Abdulhamid was suspicious of the amir; for evidence on this point, see the letter from the sultan's chief secretary to the grand vezir in Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p. 139.

29. BBA, Yildiz 30.114.51.78, vali to Istanbul, 18 Rebiyulevvel 1297 [?]; FO 195/1313, Zohrab (Jidda) to Salisbury, 17 March 1880; Uzuncharshili, *Mekke*, p. 136; Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca," p. 7.

30. BBA, Yildiz 31.995.103.88, instructions to Ahmet Izzet Pasha; Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, pp. 175–78, 195; Dahlan, *Khulasat*, p. 328; FO 195/1314, Zohrab (Jidda) to Goschen, 22 December 1880; FJP, Mardrus (Jidda) to ministry, 16 August 1880.

31. BBA, Yildiz 31.995.103.88, instructions to the vali and amir; Yildiz 12.112/3.112.6, instructions to Osman, 27 Zilkade 1298; FJP, de Lostalot (Jidda) to ministry, 12 September 1882; Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca," pp. 9–11.

CHAPTER 9
COMPROMISE CHALLENGED, ESTABLISHED AND THREATENED ANEW, 1883-1908

THE OTTOMAN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, in the 1880s and 1890s, sought desperately to save itself from the threats posed by the military superiority and expansionism of the European powers and the ideology of secular nationalism that was rapidly spreading among the empire's ethnic groups. Two tools used by Sultan Abdulhamid II to meet these dangers were autocracy and Pan-Islam. Abdulhamid believed that the centralization of all power over provincial governments in his own hands, plus the legitimacy derived from an emotional bonding of the empire's and the world's Muslims, might save his dynasty and the state. The construction of the pilgrim Hijaz Railroad between 1900 and 1908 illustrates these goals and methods: the technological modernization, which had an ostensible religious goal, actually was designed to link together Syria and the Hijaz and thereby bring under central control all of western Arabia and southern Syria.

For the religiously based authority of the amirate of Mecca, the sultan's policies represented a new threat. When Ottoman power was directly imposed in the Hijaz, as in the governorship of Osman Pasha in the 1880s, the amirate was inevitably weakened. Ironically, the Pan-Islamic movement and its concrete expression, the Hijaz Railroad, also were a challenge to the political power of religion in the Hijaz. Pan-Islam and centralization were incompatible with the power-sharing compromise between amir and vali that for so long had been the basis of the Hijazi-Ottoman political order. Between the two challenges by the centralizing government of Istanbul in the 1880s and the 1900s, the old compromise was reestablished in governing Mecca, but such issues as popular opposition to health measures and rising dissatisfaction among the nomads caused major problems in Jidda and on the desert routes.

The political importance of Awn al-Rafiq (b. ca. 1836), the third son of the Amir Muhammad to become amir, was initially severely limited by the ambitious, energetic, and able Vali Osman, who had supported Awn al-Rafiq's brother for the amirate.

The first challenge to face both amir and vali in 1883 came from the Bedouins. Payments to the tribes were in arrears, and the Harb were attacking caravans, telegraph poles, and villages close to Jidda. The Jiddawis feared a possible revolt by their own poor, and leading people in each quarter of Jidda organized to watch for suspicious actions among the populace. There was fighting in the streets of Mecca and, briefly, in Jidda by Bedouins who allegedly feared government and foreign action against slaveholding and in favor of quarantine measures. Although these were in some degree the real causes of the uprisings, intertribal feuding and the failure to pay tribal subsidies probably played a larger role. The amir led a detachment of Ottoman regulars and the Utaybah against the Harb at Asfan, where he forced the tribes to stop these actions. In return, payments were resumed to the tribes, some of the backlog owed them was paid, and Harb prisoners were released. The head of the Wadi Fatimah communities reconciled the amir with the Harb.

Although Osman had been remarkably inactive in ending the fighting, he persuaded Istanbul to dismiss other officials in the Ottoman administration and leave him in command. The kaimmakam of Jidda was ousted at the suggestion of the War Ministry, which viewed him as inefficient and an alarmist. Umar Nasif was dismissed and then arrested by Osman on the unlikely accusation of complicity with the Harb. Nasif's real guilt lay in being a strong supporter of the amir, whom the vali was determined to limit to an ineffectual role.[1] However, Sayyid Safi remained in Medina as an independent agent of the sultan, reporting directly to Istanbul on government in the northern Hijaz.

Vali Osman now assumed more and more power in his own hands. He became sheikh of the Meccan Haram in 1884, so as to centralize authority over the ulema. Some Meccan notables were exiled; even though Umar Nasif was ultimately pardoned by the vali at the order of Istanbul, the notables were cowed by their harsh treatment. The vali retained control of the police and the military, increased his influence with the tribes, and even the foreign consuls were unable to force him to act against his wishes. When the French explorer Charles Huber was murdered in the desert near Rabigh by his two guides in 1884, the French consul insisted to no avail that the vali immediately arrest the murderers. Osman promised to catch them, but he rejected what he considered to be the

consul's meddling in the internal affairs of the Hijaz. Although the famous Tayma stele that was in Huber's baggage was ultimately recovered, his murderers were never punished.

Another murder of a prominent individual in the Hijaz took place in response to Istanbul's orders. Midhat Pasha (1822–84), a prominent Ottoman reformer, had been arrested by order of the sultan and imprisoned in Taif in 1881. Midhat was accompanied by a suite of liberals who opposed the resumption of autocratic power by the sultan. The prisoners were closely guarded. They were not permitted to make the pilgrimage, and any hint of sympathy for them was reported to Istanbul, with harsh consequences for the official foolish enough to have displayed it. A military aide of the sultan, Omer Bey, was made commandant of Taif, and the sultan personally followed any news of the prisoners. His extreme fear and dislike of the Tanzimat reformers and of Great Britain made him receptive to rumors of British plots to free Midhat, though such plots did not actually exist.

In 1884 Midhat was strangled, probably at the order of the sultan. Vali Osman participated in a charade designed to conceal the method of his death by conducting a superficial investigation of the incident that was designed to show Midhat had died naturally. Secretly Midhat's body was removed from Taif to Istanbul.[2] In this fashion there died in the Hijaz the leading figure of Ottoman political and administrative reform in the nineteenth century; Midhat was exiled to, and died in, the province that had been affected least by his own reforms. Vali Osman's indirect part in the death of Midhat was rewarded by the sultan's continuing support despite numerous complaints received from Osman's enemies.

Vali Osman Pasha brought about changes in the methods of paying troops in the early 1880s. In late 1880 about two hundred fifty men had downed their arms and demonstrated at the Prophet's tomb in Medina because their terms of duty had expired and they had no pay. The money for back pay and new troops from Syria were soon sent, and by 1884 the army was receiving its current pay on time and in full, thanks to Osman.

Osman's accomplishments for the empire earned him the opposition of notables who had vested interests in the maintenance of local autonomy. The vali managed to limit the impact of the British occupation of Egypt and the mahdist uprising in the Sudan. Recurring trouble with the Harb nomads was balanced by Osman's

alliance with the Utaybah. Substantial public works were undertaken: provincial yearbooks were printed, repairs of the Haram in Mecca were made, the Jidda-Mecca and Jidda-Suakin telegraphs were opened in 1882, and the walls of Yanbu were rebuilt. In the first years of his administration, Osman repaired and expanded the Daudiyyah school, widened the Ibrahim Gate, and improved the Ali Gate in Mecca. The path from the Ibrahim Gate to the Kaba was widened and renewed. Osman moved the library that had been established by Sultan Abdulmecid in 1845/46. Government buildings were constructed everywhere in the province: four new barracks, eighteen small army guardhouses, a government school in Jidda, an office building in Mecca, and several military hospitals. The water system of Mecca was rebuilt, repaired, and expanded, though largely with private funds. Osman began to gain power over outlying regions of the province, and he protested Egyptian control of the northern Hijaz. Mecca and Jidda obtained grain reserves sufficient to last two years; however, Medina remained subject to possible food blackmail by the tribes controlling the routes leading inland from the coast. Grain for the soldiers and Bedouins there was in short supply by 1886.[3]

So great was the authority of Osman by 1885 that he could dispose of all his enemies. The kaimmakam of Jidda for the previous two years, Said Fehmi Bey, who had been reporting criticism of Osman to Istanbul directly in cipher, was arrested and dismissed. The Arab guards of the amir, including those who had been used to guard the Jidda-Mecca route, were disarmed and disbanded; Ottoman soldiers replaced them. Robbers were summarily shot, blockhouses were built, and the head of one bandit, a sharif, was displayed at Mecca. Robberies decreased dramatically. The amir's legal jurisdiction was narrowed by the vali.

Osman then proposed the establishment of a local municipal organization in Mecca with two sheikhs and an imam for each quarter. This served as a rallying point for his opponents, who began public protests. Placards appeared calling for the dismissal or murder of the vali on the grounds that he intended the new officials to conduct a census preparatory to the introduction of taxation and conscription in the holy city. The amir, scenting the possibility of getting rid of his rival, finally openly opposed the vali. Awn al-Rafiq accompanied the returning pilgrims to Medina in 1886 and announced there that he would not return to Mecca until

either he or Osman was dismissed. The amir was accompanied by members of his family, many notables and merchants, the Shafii mufti of Mecca, and a number of the ulema. Even though Osman enjoyed the protection of the head of the Istanbul palace eunuchs, he could not overcome this public split. The amir used to telling effect the recurrence of trouble with the Harb, who, according to the amir, were not being paid by the vali; a petition by notables alleging that the vali engaged in torture and did not pay their salaries; and the influence of Sheikh Ahmad Asad, the amir's father-in-law, who was a religious adviser to the sultan.[4] Osman was reassigned to the governorship of the Aleppo Vilayet, a transfer that was in fact a promotion. The amir returned triumphant to Mecca, and centralizing reform seemed to be at an end in the Hijaz.

Mecca and Jidda were in turmoil, but Medina remained relatively calm in the 1880s. From 1878 to 1889, there were only two sheikhs of the Medina Haram and only four governors of the city. In the same period, Jidda had eight kaimmakams. Their rapid ouster was due in part to their perpetual opposition to the valis. Several also fell because their patrons in Istanbul were dismissed, and the appalling climate of Jidda claimed two victims through death from illness. The prior experience of the kaimmakams usually was in the European or Anatolian provinces and not in the Arab lands. Although consultative councils were created for the vilayet and for the major towns in the 1870s, they had small influence in government. When pressed by demands from external sources, such as the Jidda consulates, the valis in the Hijaz as in Syria used the new councils as a means of delaying distasteful decisions or spreading responsibility among a wide group of people. No real changes that outlasted Osman Pasha took place in the administration of the smaller towns, villages, or tribes.

Amir Awn al-Rafiq adopted a new style of dress and behavior. He substituted relatively plain attire for the gaudy dress of his predecessors, and he tended to transact business in private meetings rather than in the public receptions that had been used for that purpose earlier. Awn al-Rafiq was able to convey an image of pious perspicacity while instituting his own control over more and more of the political process in the Hijaz. Beneath the superficial changes he introduced, there was the deeper reality of a return to the old compromise of the amir and vali governing the Hijaz together.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER, 1886–95

Amir Awn al-Rafiq eliminated or weakened his enemies and evolved by the 1890s a comfortable working relationship with the sultan and his representative, the vali, in the Hijaz. Awn al-Rafiq used the pilgrimage and his religious status to gain enough money to bribe officials, nomads, and notables. Though his position was by no means completely secure, he could manage to defuse any incident. He kept control through his power of appointment and recommendation to the chief religious, social, and economic positions in Mecca. At the same time, he had become so unpopular by his death in 1905 because of his extortions that the suspicious sultan did not have to worry about him as a rival for the caliphate. The amir's performance in those areas crucial to the Hijazis and to the Ottomans was at least minimally satisfactory: security was maintained; the tribes were frequently on the verge of insurrection but were not usually actual dangers; the pilgrimages took place with little trouble, except for increasing cholera epidemics in the early 1890s; and Islam remained dominant in all aspects of life in the towns. The amir's authority rested on a religious base, but the pious were apparently not severely shocked by the large-scale bribery, fraud, and extortion of the pilgrims practiced by him.

In December 1886 the amir was delighted by the dismissal of Vali Osman Nuri. From then until Ahmet Ratib Pasha became governor for the second time in July 1895, there were seven intervening governorships, or about one vali per year. Obviously, in the short time available to them, the valis were not able successfully to challenge the amir Awn al-Rafiq, who had held his post since 1882.

The first of these valis, Huseyin Cemil, former governor of Aleppo, resigned because of ill health after only five months in the Hijaz. The next, Safvet, who had been vali once before, lasted an even shorter time. Nafiz Pasha arrived in 1889 with explicit instructions from the sultan to prepare plans for increasing the military and naval readiness of the Hijaz against foreign attack. Nafiz was informed that the problems of the Sudan across the Red Sea were dangerous for the Hijaz, but even more pressing was the failure in the past to pay the troops and to discharge them at the end of their terms of service. The only local internal political difficulty might come, it was expected, from the sharifs. Nafiz was ordered to observe their activities secretly and report to Istanbul. In addition, he

was required to care for the pilgrims and particularly to provide camels for them at a fixed price. The religious significance of the Hijaz to the sultan was greatly stressed.[5] Upon his arrival in Mecca, the vali began to carry out these instructions by stopping the exactions by the amir upon the pilgrims. In response, the amir incited the Bedouins to cut the Jidda-Mecca and Mecca-Medina routes. Then the vali offended the ulema and nomads by emphasizing his commitment to the sultan's orders against the slave trade. And the unfortunate governor also inherited the problems caused by two years of drought. He forbade the export of animals, but, overwhelmed by the burden of his duties, he finally sought refuge in Taif, leaving the qadi of Mecca to administer the vilayet as his deputy.

With the next vali, Ismail Hakki, came the rains. This auspicious beginning for the former Ottoman minister of commerce was continued by a policy of caution and of dependence upon Istanbul for detailed orders before undertaking any action. As a result, Hakki lasted longer than his immediate predecessors, but the Hijaz rapidly fell into near anarchy as the tribes undertook raids against the caravan routes. In despair at this, Hakki asked for his own replacement by the former vali Osman Nuri.

While the valis came and went, the amir was consolidating his own influence. By remorseless mulcting of the pilgrims, he gained large sums to be used for securing and extending his authority. One of the first examples of his maneuvering was the Quran scandal of 1882. Osman Bey, the first secretary of the sultan, who was also related to the amir by marriage, owned a printing press in Istanbul. Osman sold Awn al-Rafiq 10,000 Qurans for T. L. 2,500, and the amir forced each Javanese pilgrim to buy one from him until the Netherlands consul stopped him. The bookstores of Mecca were compelled to buy quantities of the Qurans at inflated prices. In 1888 Umar Nasif, the amir's Jidda agent, desired to repeat this arrangement but in a more elaborate fashion. He purchased 10,000 more Qurans from Osman Bey and distributed them to the pilgrim guides, who in turn required their pilgrims, even those who were illiterate, to buy a copy at three times the current price for printed Qurans. The profits were then divided among the amir, the vali, the guides, and Nasif.[6]

Another device to raise money came with the selection of a route for the major pilgrim caravans between Mecca and Medina

that would most profit the amir. Every year there was a discussion among the Syrian pilgrimage leaders coming from the north and among the pilgrims who were in Mecca who wanted to go to Medina about the land routes and the desirability of traveling by sea instead of by land. Sometimes Istanbul, the vali of Damascus, and the Hijaz leadership were consulted: in 1894 and 1895, the Hanafi and Shafii muftis of Medina, the governor of the city, several officials of the Haram, and the Syrian caravan leaders determined the route.[7] On several occasions the amir tried to force the pilgrims to go by land rather than by sea because he had a financial stake in the rental of camels by the nomads to the pilgrims. Since the purely land route was longer, more dangerous, and more costly, the pilgrims and their consuls usually tried to arrange for the Mecca-Jidda-Yanbu-Medina sea passage rather than that by land. When the amir and the valis embezzled much of the subsidy that was due the nomads for protecting the land route, the Bedouins attacked the caravans as they traveled on land between the major towns.

The amir's power was contested in the deserts by tribes who were unsatisfied with the arrangement for revenue-sharing worked out by the amir and the valis. Bedouin payments were made in notes that had to be sold at a substantial discount, sometimes as much as one-half, in order to gain cash to buy supplies. A note entitling the bearer to one ardeb of wheat was worth only one-half of the actual market cost of an ardeb. The drought and locusts of 1887–89 increased the needs of the tribes; at the same time, Ottoman troops were weak and poorly equipped to overawe the nomads. High troop mortality rates were made even higher by the corruption rampant among Hijazi officials responsible for supplies. The amir could supply some men from his own retinue and, on occasion, could secure allies from among the tribes, but the Ottoman-amirate forces were insufficient to hold most parts of the region against large-scale or determined opposition.

Sultan Abdulhamid recognized that the amir's influence had to be expanded to the north of Mecca, but he ordered the grand vezir to go slowly; the safety of the pilgrims then in the Hijaz and the concern of the foreign states for their welfare meant that little could be done in the short run except to promise the nomads that their payments would be made more equitably in the future.[8] The amir concluded an arrangement with the nomads whereby they received a cash payment for their runaway slaves, blood money for

their losses in recent fighting and raids, and a promise that in the future refugee slaves would not be harbored in Jidda. Booty seized in caravan raids did not have to be returned. This extraordinary concession was opposed by the vali, but he was dismissed and replaced by the formidable Osman Nuri in the summer of 1892.

The return of Osman for a second tour as vali led all the tribes to submit out of fear of his vengeance. The reinforcements of 5,000 troops who came with him also ensured the restoration of order, but Osman stayed only six months before departing again. He subsequently became vali of Damascus.

In addition to the nomads, Awn al-Rafiq was opposed by the notables of Jidda and Mecca, including many sharifs who petitioned the sultan asking for the amir's dismissal in 1891–92. Instead, two commissions were sent to investigate their charges of embezzlement of waqfs, oppression, and persecution.

The commissions were led by Ahmet Ratib Pasha, an imperial aide-de-camp and naval officer, who was also ordered to look into the condition of the military. Ratib had been present in the Hijaz during the end of Ismail Hakki's governorship and again in the short second term of Osman; in December 1892 Ratib himself became vali and commander of the military forces, a post he held until June 1894. Although he knew no foreign languages, Ratib had traveled twice to India, and while there he became strongly anti-British. He enjoyed the confidence of the sultan. During his investigations before assuming the governorship of the Hijaz, Awn al-Rafiq gave him a bribe of at least T. L. 14,000 to ignore the notables' complaints and to himself complain against the alleged meddling of the vali in the amir's affairs. It was at Ratib's urging that Vali Osman was dismissed and Ratib was appointed governor.[9]

The ideological base of Ottoman rule was made clear in a speech written for Ratib by the imperial palace to give to soldiers in the Hijaz. In his talk he was to urge the soldiers of Islam to remember that the sultan, who was also the successor to the Prophet Muhammad, wished for the best for his always victorious troops. They were to fight under a banner bearing the declaration of faith in the oneness of God and the prophethood of Muhammad. The sultan in turn acknowledged his obligation to the whole Islamic world to protect the two Harams. Ratib was ordered to remind troops that service in the Hijaz carried with it the privilege of a reduction of one-third in the required years of army service, but it

also carried with it an obligation of strict loyalty to the sultan-caliph's orders.[10]

Declining health conditions made these pronouncements seem somewhat beside the point. In 1894 Field Marshal Asaf Pasha arrived in Jidda with T. L. 40,000 and a staff of 150 to build hospitals and investigate the health of the Hijaz. Both Awn al-Rafiq and Ratib were suspicious of him and brought about his rapid return to Istanbul. Before going, he was able to bring about the dismissal of Ratib on the grounds that he had not done enough to stop the cholera epidemics. Ratib objected that there had not been enough money to carry out the military, religious, and health requirements obligated by Istanbul.

The new vali, Hasan Hilmi Pasha, had formerly governed Konya Vilayet. He was weakened by not being given the command of the troops in the Hijaz. After making the pilgrimage, Hasan left sweltering Mecca for the relative coolness of Taif. The provincial treasurer and the amir were left in charge of the government as Hasan pled ill health. He did, however, force the amir to end some of his more flagrant extortions of the pilgrims.

The Jidda kaimmakamate provided no alternative source of administrative energy or policy. Most of its occupants between 1888 and 1899 were former members of the valis' staffs, and they held office for only short periods of time.

Power gravitated to the amir. His distance from Jidda and his lack of concern about health matters created a situation, however, where there was no effective leader available to help stop the spread of cholera or to quell the growing tensions in Jidda relating to health issues. When the sultan ordered Asaf Pasha, the one man with enough rank and authority to act, back to Istanbul, a crisis occurred.

THE CRISIS OF 1895

Numerous epidemics of cholera after 1832 led to the creation by the European powers of the Sanitary Administration of Egypt at Alexandria and the Health Council of Constantinople, two quarantine stations for pilgrims at Tor and Kamaran in the Red Sea, and the annual sending of an Ottoman medical mission to the Hijaz.[11] The Ottoman government rejected much of the attempted European intervention in the Hijaz on the grounds that diseases were

being carried to Mecca from abroad, where they had begun. If this view of the origins of cholera had been correct, then quarantine measures outside the Hijaz would have been more valuable than improving the cleanliness and water systems of Jidda, Mecca, and Arafat. The Ottoman delegate to the Paris Convention of 1894 refused to sign its final health agreement on the pilgrimage because it would have given an internationally controlled body supervision over the pilgrimage.

The health situation in the Hijaz from 1890 to 1895 indicated that urgent measures to improve the safety of the pilgrims needed to be undertaken by someone, whether Europeans or Ottomans. Cholera broke out four times in six years: 1890, 1891, 1893, and 1895. In 1890 an estimated two thousand people died in Jidda from cholera, yet the Ottoman authorities seemed unconcerned. The French consul saw pilgrims struck by disease outside the town dragging themselves near the walls to die. The sick died without care. In 1891 the medical vice-consul of Britain at Jidda, Dr. Abdur Razzack, brought about some improvement in the cleanliness of Jidda, but the vali rejected protests about the dirtiness and filth in Mecca's streets only two weeks before a major cholera outbreak took place there. In the extreme heat of the pilgrimage in July and August of that year, when the temperature at Arafat reached 48° C., casualties from cholera alone were 3,100. The lazaret in Jidda functioned so poorly during the epidemic of 1893 that the pilgrims were completely without medical assistance, and more than one thousand died that year at Mecca. In 1894 doctors from the Ottoman army and navy who inspected the health of Mecca proposed a ban on the drinking of water from Zamzam, which they considered a source of disease, and the establishment of two disinfecting machines to cleanse the property and clothes of the pilgrims. European consuls supported these proposals strongly. Amir Awn al-Rafiq, who controlled access to the Zamzam well, vetoed the first proposal, but the disinfectant machines were set up in Mecca and Jidda in May 1894, and were used in the relatively mild cholera attack of April 1895.

Popular reaction among Jiddawis to these health measures was extremely negative. It was observed that those who used the hospital and the disinfecting mechanisms frequently died; people in Jidda argued that it was a case of cause and effect. This *post hoc ergo propter hoc* logic was not completely invalid, given the

wretched conditions of the hospital and, in general, most quarantine facilities. Unhappiness with the Europeans grew as most of the Ottoman garrison of Jidda and the kaimmakam went to Mecca on 28 May for the pilgrimage. Only about fifty soldiers were left in Jidda.

On the evening of 30 May 1895, William Richards and Dr. Abdur Razzack, the British consul and vice-consul, George Brandt, the acting Russian consul, and C. Dorville, the chancellor of the French consulate, were sitting on a bench just outside Jidda near the Medina gate. They were attacked and shot. Abdur Razzack was killed, Brandt was seriously wounded, and Richards and Dorville were lightly wounded. On the same day in Mecca, a disinfecting machine was completely destroyed and the building in which it was housed was torn apart by Utaybah Bedouins and Meccans. Two days later the Mecca hospital was attacked, and the hospital's doctors fled, some in disguise. The vali forbade the use of troops against the rioters because he objected to bloodshed in the area of the Haram. Then the disinfection machine in Jidda was destroyed by Bukharan pilgrims; the medical inspectors there also fled, in this case to vessels in the harbor. Two doctors at Taif also disappeared because they feared for their lives.[12]

Catching those who had attacked the consuls was a frustrating problem. The real attackers had fled by camel and seemed beyond the reach of the vali, who felt that the attack had been a case of mistaken identity—the Bedouins had thought those they were assaulting were quarantine doctors, not consuls. The commander of the Ottoman Red Sea fleet joined the European and local Muslim mourners for the funeral of Abdur Razzack. In Paris the Ottoman ambassador to France expressed official regret at the attack. More troops were ordered to Jidda to ensure order.

None of these measures satisfied the British or French, who sent warships to Jidda. Since the kaimmakam of Jidda had returned from Mecca with 700 more soldiers, the threat of further violence in Jidda was ended, but the punishment of the attackers remained. The amir said that they were members of the Sahhaf section of the Harb tribe. Instead of proceeding against the Harb, Vali Hasan Hilmi went to Taif, citing his health as the reason for delay. The vali did order the construction of the Jidda hospital stopped, the streets patrolled, and the walls guarded, but most of the European community of Jidda fled to vessels in the harbor anyway. Istanbul dis-

missed the vali and appointed, for the second time, Ahmed Ratib Pasha as vali on 20 June.[13]

As soon as the grand vezir in Istanbul heard about the attack, he ordered the amir and vali to go to Jidda and reestablish order with troops from Yemen. The sultan warned the two leaders of the Hijaz that foreign military intervention was likely; it could be stopped only by the reestablishment of security in Jidda. Sultan Abdulhamid especially cited the loss of Ottoman prestige that might ensue from foreign intervention during the pilgrimage season.[14]

The amir arrived in Jidda on 10 June and promised to attack the Sahhaf after the pilgrimage. But as the weeks slipped by, it became clear that Awn al-Rafiq intended to do as little as was possible. Acting consul Alban suggested to his ambassador that the dismissal of the amir by the sultan was the only way to secure justice. Alban suspected that the amir was paying off old scores by falsely accusing the Sahhaf. It was even suggested that the amir and the vali, who had both quarreled repeatedly with Abdur Razzack, had instigated the attack upon the vice-consul.

In September foreign pressure for action increased. The British ambassador argued that responsibility for the attack should rest with the vali. The amir had no standing in international diplomacy, and, more importantly, he could not be pressured as easily as the vali. The dismissal of the kaimmakam of Jidda and his replacement by the active and energetic Sami Bey, the Ottoman naval commander of the Red Sea squadron, seemed to indicate that foreign pressure was beginning to work. On 20 September the sultan informed Ambassador Currie that the vali had received T. L. 4,000 to give to the tribal sheikhs so as to secure the guilty persons. Currie responded by suggesting that the amir had had a hand in the murders; this was rejected by the sultan, who argued that it was the amir who was the chief maintainer of law and order and therefore he could not have done such a thing! France also threatened the Ottomans. She unofficially suggested that the great powers might jointly act to internationalize Jidda if the killers were not soon punished.[15]

The consequences of all these threats were minimal. The amir did offer to give the Harb three sharifs as hostages to guarantee a fair trial for the accused. This offer was rejected by the Sahhaf, who pointed out that sharifs could not be injured because of their religious status; in the event that the amir broke his word, the hostages

could not be punished. Instead, the Sahhaf asked for the amir's secretary as a hostage. This time the amir refused the deal.

More Ottoman troops were sent to the Hijaz: there were 4,000 more there by January 1896. The amir obtained men from the Utaybah and other tribes to march against the Sahhaf, who were raiding the Jidda-Mecca and Mecca-Medina paths from their base at Asfan. Utaybah cooperation was not purely voluntary; several of their sheikhs had been arrested in Mecca by the amir so as to apply pressure upon the tribe to participate in action against the Sahhaf. The same tactic was used in Jidda, where sheikhs of the Harb clans other than the Sahhaf were arrested in October and November 1895. Supplies and subventions to the Bedouins were stopped until they joined the amir's planned expedition, and as a result, security for caravans was greatly lessened.[16] The campaign against the Sahhaf that finally took place was desultory and accomplished little.

The consequences of the 1895 attack were extremely unsatisfactory from the foreign point of view. British and French pressure upon the vali was weakened in March 1896 by the withdrawal of the warships at Jidda that had been present since June 1895. The few Bedouin prisoners who had been held by the amir as a means of exerting pressure on the Harb were released in April 1896 so as to make possible camel leasing for the upcoming pilgrimage.

Both the French and British consuls unsuccessfully called for the removal of the amir and vali. Alban attacked Vali Ratib Pasha:

> I have had some experience of good, bad and indifferent Turkish and Arab functionaries, but I have never I think met one who displayed incapacity, dishonesty, official discourtesy and unblushing mendacity in a more striking degree than Ahmed Ratib Pasha, and in saying this I am not in any way exceeding the popular estimate of his character.[17]

The French consul asked that as compensation for the attacks the amir should be fired, the Bedouins disarmed, the consuls ought to nominate the pilgrim guides, a railroad concession for the Jidda-Mecca route should be given, and Muslim vice-consuls for Mecca should be appointed.[18] None of these extraordinary suggestions was in fact adopted by the French government. More to the point, the vali and the amir, who had done so little to catch the attackers, stayed in office for many years. Awn al-Rafiq remained as amir until his death in 1905, and Ratib was vali until the 1908 Revolution. After 1895 the two leaders established a close cooperation.

Politically, little changed as a result of the 1895 attack. Halil Rifat Pasha became Ottoman grand vezir precisely because he advocated not giving in to foreign pressures. The new kaimmakam of Jidda, Omer Ali Bey, served only from October 1895 to July 1896, when he was recalled because of poor health, the enmity of Admiral Sami Pasha, and the dislike of the vali founded on Omer's good relations with the consuls.

Security along the Medina-Mecca and Jidda-Mecca routes remained poor in 1896. One could go from Mecca to Taif in late 1896 only by paying for a Harb escort. The leading robbers on the Jidda-Mecca path were the Sahhaf, who had been accused by the amir of murdering Abdur Razzack. Ottoman punishment of them extended only to withholding their usual subventions.

In subsequent years attacks on sanitary facilities continued. Bedouin camel-drivers attacked the Yanbu military hospital, which contained a disinfecting machine, claiming that the disinfectants were designed to kill people. Nine died in the ensuing riot in 1896. Three years later, a quarantine at Jidda and disinfection measures against the plague caused a riot by 1,500 Jiddawis. Bedouins, camel-drivers, soldiers, and women attacked the quarantine yard and seized the goods stored there because a quarantine would have severely damaged the success of the impending pilgrimage and thereby the economic well-being of Jidda. The consuls, who doubted the efficacy of the quarantine measures, successfully sought the intervention of their ambassadors in Istanbul to reopen passage from Jidda to Mecca, thereby ending the rioting and turmoil.

Despite these problems, public health in Jidda and Mecca did improve in the late 1890s. The cause was the active and public support for cleaning the streets and disinfecting houses by Abd Allah Nasif, who allowed his house to be disinfected; and by the new kaimmakam of Jidda, who spent honestly a good deal of money for that process. The kaimmakam appointed a committee composed of six local notables, headed by the judge of the Jidda commercial court, to supervise the cleaning of water cisterns, streets, and buildings. In this way the notables of Jidda secured what foreign and Ottoman doctors could not: public tolerance for health measures.

FOREIGN AND REGIONAL INTERESTS

Sultan Abdulhamid II was greatly worried about the growing intervention of Europe in his empire during the nineteenth cen-

tury. He blamed nationalist revolts on outside agitators. In Arabia he saw Great Britain as the chief problem, for it ruled, or had great influence over, nearby Egypt and most of the eastern and southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula. His emissary in Egypt, Gazi Ahmed Muhtar, reinforced his suspicious attitude by describing alleged British plots to destroy Ottoman dominion on the western shore of Arabia.[19] In light of the eventual emergence of the British-supported Arab revolt in 1916 led by the Amir Husayn against the Ottoman Empire, it might have been plausibly argued that the sultan was correct in the 1890s and 1900s. But in fact Britain was then opposed to any expansion of influence in the Hijaz because of British fears of the religious reaction this might cause among Muslims in its own possessions.

Undoubtedly 1879 had been the high-water mark of British political influence in the Hijaz. In that year both the amir and the vali secretly asked for British aid and assistance. Amir Husayn relayed to the British a letter from Shir Ali, of Kabul, in which the latter asked for the blessings of the amir for a rising of Muslims in India against the British. The amir refused on the grounds that his master, the sultan, had friendly relations with Great Britain. In addition to divulging this correspondence, the amir promised to aid the British secretly, though he would do so only as long as nothing was done contrary to the interests of the sultan. In 1879 Vali Nashid Pasha asked the British consul to write his ambassador in Istanbul to urge the Ottoman government to send troops to the Hijaz and to undertake reforms there.

Abdulhamid was so suspicious of the British and the amir that he ordered Osman Pasha, the new vali, to be on the alert against the Hijazi tribes who were allegedly being subverted by bribes from the British. The sultan's suspicions were heightened by Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani," who suggested in 1883 that Great Britain wanted to establish an Arabian caliphate based at Mecca. In 1891 the sultan asked the vali of the Hijaz if it was true that the amir was conspiring with the British to revolt against Ottoman authority. In 1900 a book published in Egypt presented the most amazing of all these suggestions of conspiracy. According to the author, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, a convention whose purpose was the renovation of Islam had been held in Mecca recently. The delegates to the convention were strongly anti-Ottoman, and favored an Arab caliphate. The account was recognized at the time as being fiction, but it caused speculation about Arab separatism in the Hijaz to ap-

pear for years thereafter. There seems to have been no foundation in fact for suspicions of the loyalty of the amirs of Mecca. Despite his suspicions the sultan retained Awn al-Rafiq as amir; his long rule sufficiently indicated Istanbul's continuing support.

If the British were disinclined to interfere in the Hijaz, despite the Ottoman perception to the contrary, other European states had even less interest in doing so. France's chief concern was to gather intelligence from pilgrims about opposition to its rule in other Muslim areas, and the French maintained agents in Jidda and Mecca for this purpose. Germany, Russia, and Austria made no effort to exert any political influence in the Hijaz.

A crisis might well have occurred involving Egypt when that country's government under the control of Ahmad Urabi was crushed by the British invasion of 1882. In Damascus the ouster of Urabi was vigorously protested by the local ulema, and the Ottoman army was mobilized to suppress popular discontent.[20] Urabi had sent a letter to the amir of the Hijaz; unfortunately, its contents are unknown. There was some popular enthusiasm for Urabi, especially among the Khalwatiyah Sufis; but despite the fears of the consuls in Jidda, there were no riots or anti-foreign incidents following upon his arrest and exile. Because of the changed situation in the Red Sea, the Ottomans did send additional naval and army units to the Hijaz.

More serious for the Hijaz was the uprising in the Sudan against Egyptian control. The Sudan was directly across the Red Sea from the Hijaz, there were many Hijazi merchants who traded with the Sudan regularly, and part of the Sudan had recently been under the administration of the Hijaz. In 1881 Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah declared in the Sudan that he was the expected mahdi. The Ottoman government ordered the vali of the Hijaz to take special precautions against mahdist agitation. In December 1882 three mahdists were arrested in Medina. The police, who were searching houses for more suspects, were met by the resentful householders with the question, "Are you Muslims?" The three emissaries of the mahdi had to be released because of popular insistence. Some Hijazis even volunteered and fought for the mahdi in the Sudan. The theological students in Mecca were strongly in favor of the mahdi in 1884, and Hijazi merchants objected to the British blockade of the Sudan that began in 1885.

The success of the Sudanese mahdists against the Egyptians

ensured the continuing presence of the movement in the Hijaz. In 1888 about two hundred Sudanese mahdists landed north of Jidda, but Ottoman troops captured one hundred fifty of them and sent them back to the Sudan before they could rouse the nomadic tribes of the Hijaz to rebellion. Subsequently, Istanbul announced that it intended to double the size of the garrisons in the Hijaz and to rebuild the walls of Jidda.

The main branch of the Mirghaniyah Sufi brotherhood in the Hijaz favored the British cause in the Sudan. In 1884 the leaders of the Mirghaniyah went to Suakin in order to persuade their followers in the area to actively oppose the mahdi.

Although the mahdi and Urabi aroused some popular enthusiasm and thus worry for the amir and vali, their primary concern with British-dominated Egypt lay in a completely different area. Egyptian troops continued to occupy small villages in the northern Hijaz lying along the route of the land pilgrimage from Cairo to Medina and Mecca, even after the general Egyptian withdrawal from the Hijaz in 1841. This occupation was clearly in defiance of the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant of 15 July 1840, which called for the complete withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Arabia. The passage of time had seemingly authenticated the Egyptian presence until Vali Osman Pasha discovered that new barracks were being built by the Egyptians at Wajh. Osman wrote the grand vezir to suggest that the Hijaz extended up to Aqaba, and that Egypt had no right to station troops anywhere in the Hijaz. Nothing was done about this until 1887, when 200 Ottoman troops arrived at Wajh and Egyptian troops left after a short confrontation. In 1892 the Ottomans regained Muwaylih and Diba, and the khedive ordered the withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from the Hijaz.

The expansion of Ottoman interest in Yemen in the 1890s and 1900s affected the neighboring Hijaz. The region of Yemen closest to the Hijaz, Asir, was the scene of continual unrest, including a general uprising against the Ottomans in 1902. Asir's capital, Abha, had to be evacuated by the Ottomans in 1903; it was recovered in 1904, and lost again in 1905. Even though the amirs of Mecca were related by marriage to the Aid family, the amirs' pleas for peace and reconciliation were futile. The rise to power of Muhammad al-Idrisi in Asir in 1906 posed a potential threat to the amirate, for his claim to power was based on a charismatic religious-political leadership in rivalry with the amirs.[21]

In 1904 most of Yemen rose against the Ottomans. Sana fell in April 1905. In that year more than 55,000 Ottoman troops landed in Yemen to suppress the revolt. Two missions were sent by the amir of Mecca to try to reconcile the imam to the sultan's rule. Although the first mission in 1906 was courteously received by the imam, it failed in its purpose. The second mission consisted of ulema from Mecca and Medina, who visited only Ottoman-held territory and addressed their exhortations principally to the townspeople of Sana. They achieved little.[22]

The rise of Abd al-Aziz, the leader of the Saudi dynasty in Riyadh, did not pose as immediate a threat to Ottoman interests as did the fighting in Yemen. Still, the result of Saudi assertiveness in Najd was to draw in Ottoman regular troops in support of the Rashidis. Medina was used in 1904–5 as a military base for 2,500 Ottoman infantry in Najd and Qasim, although most of the troops employed there came from Iraq. In 1906 Qasim and Najd were yielded to the Saudis because of their military victories.[23] Ottoman dominion in central Arabia came to an end. Ottoman setbacks in Najd and Yemen emphasized the importance of increasing the speed of military transportation—the completion of the Hijaz Railroad became even more important to Istanbul. Another consequence of the fighting was the presence of political refugees in the Hijaz.

The former amir of Bahrayn and his family took refuge in Mecca in the 1880s, and they received a small subsidy from the sultan. The descendants of the Caucasian leader Shamil were given pensions. A number of palace eunuchs and imperial concubines were sent to Medina and Mecca. Kurdish chieftains and Istanbul liberals were all held in Mecca and Medina so as to isolate them. Their dissents were of no consequence in the conservative and religious Hijaz, and they did not impress in any fashion pilgrims from abroad.

PUBLIC SECURITY, 1896–1908

The maintenance of a minimum of public order was a prerequisite to remaining in power. War, robberies, army mutinies, and clashes with the Bedouins became the major problems confronting the vali and amir. These problems did not raise the issue of social change associated with fear of the Christian foreigner that

had been responsible for the 1895 attacks. Unlike earlier periods, the same individuals were retained for long periods as amir, vali, and sheikh of the Haram in Medina.

During the thirteen years following 1895, the Ottoman Empire engaged in only one war: the brief conflict with Greece in 1897 was quickly concluded by an Ottoman victory. The war posed no dangers to the Hijaz, since it was far distant from the scenes of fighting in the Balkans. The number of pilgrims declined not because of the war but because of fears about disease in Mecca. Prayers were said in the towns for the victory of the sultan's armies. Greek citizens left Jidda, and freight rates increased because Greek-flag vessels were no longer available; but otherwise no economic consequences of the war were seen. The kaimmakam of Jidda increased security and particularly kept a careful watch on the boatmen's guild so as to avoid any outbreaks of violence in the town. None took place.

Much more dangerous to the peace of the Hijaz was the relationship of the amir and the vali with the Bedouins. In order to maintain themselves in office, enhance their own influence, and enrich themselves, the chief officials responsible for relations with the Bedouins embezzled a substantial portion of the aid and subsidies supposed to go to them. In turn the Bedouins from time to time rose against the government to secure funds, food, fodder, and guns. Perceived necessity on both sides led to constant clashes. The vali, the amir, and his agent at Jidda benefited even when the Bedouins were paid, since they were usually given drafts rather than cash or food. These drafts were discounted by the supply officials and intermediaries, and the officers of the state were thus enriched.

The easiest way for the nomads to recoup their losses was to raid pilgrim caravans. Between 1896 and 1898, the Jidda-Mecca route was raided constantly and caravans had to pay protection money in order to pass. Robberies with seizure of all property and, more rarely, loss of life occurred. When foreign merchants were robbed, they asked their consuls in Jidda for compensation from the Ottoman governor. The vali in turn requested the amir to investigate these claims and, if possible, to recover the goods from the nomads. Although most claims were reduced, they ultimately were paid by the amir, even if after years of delay.

The Ottoman military was not able successfully to oppose the

nomads. In the late 1890s, the permanent garrisons usually included only 4,000 men. Many were withdrawn for emergencies elsewhere in the empire, and for those who remained there was a high rate of illness. Men whose tour of duty had expired were still kept in the area; they sometimes secured their release from the army by peaceful demonstrations. In the 1890s the Amir Awn al-Rafiq and Vali Ahmed Ratib witnessed a series of riots and strikes by soldiers protesting their poor conditions. In 1891 an infantry company that had already served one year beyond its term was in Jidda, where they seized a mosque that they held until promised their seven months' back pay, transport to Istanbul where they would be discharged, and the right to keep their weapons until they left the Hijaz. In the correspondence from Istanbul during a similar event in 1894, it was clearly shown that the palace understood the problem and viewed it as being important. The reduction of one year in the standard tour of duty as a bonus for conscripts who served in the Hijaz and their prompt payment were held to be especially important because misbehavior would be so visible to foreign Muslim pilgrims. Still, only temporary solutions were found, so there were recurrences of troop mutinies.

In 1896 soldiers in Jidda seized the Akkash mosque in the bazaar and demanded payment of their back salaries, their dismissal from the service, and return to their homes. These demands were granted after new troops arrived in Jidda and after protests by the British embassy in Istanbul about the insecurity reigning in Jidda. The troops were poorly fed, housed, clothed, and paid. Medical facilities were lamentable. And there was little improvement over the years. In the 1900s soldiers even had to sell their rifles to the Bedouins to get enough money to eat! In 1901 more than one-half of the total 3,000 soldiers in the Hijaz had filled their time of service and yet were still detained there. A mutiny that same year even led to the seizure of the Meccan Haram for two months to protest military conditions. Only when they received most of their back pay and were promised transport to Anatolia did the troops desist.[24]

Money and food for the soldiers were in very short supply in the 1890s and 1900s. The Ottomans provided more than 4,000,000 okas of wheat and 2,000,000 okas of barley from Syria and Iraq in 1892/93, most of which went to the military. The cost to the province for its purchase, shipment, and transportation inland was itself a major item of expense. By 1898 the central government owed the

Hijaz more than T. L. 67,000, and the vali was aware that military supplies were low. In 1899, according to Vali Ratib Pasha, the price of flour was up, the Bedouins had no grain, there was only a ten days' supply of fodder on hand for the armed forces' animals, the Jidda and Hudayda customs receipts had been used for local administrative expenses, contractors refused to deliver supplies, and the customs workers had not been paid. As a result of the financial crisis, the Jidda garrison went for six weeks without receiving supplies, and the price of bread in Mecca began to increase rapidly. The approaching pilgrimage season made the arrival of food and money essential. Although the crisis then was ended, by 1903 the same problems had reemerged. No flour was available either for the small northern garrisons or the major ones in Jidda and Mecca. By 1904 Jidda merchants were owed more than T. L. 10,000 for foodstuffs delivered to the armed forces but not paid for at the time. Money was being spent on the Hijaz Railroad, not on meeting the basic needs of the army in the region.

When troops were present in large numbers, there was still no guarantee for merchants or pilgrims of immunity from attack. A 600-camel caravan with eighty-five mounted soldiers was attacked in daylight only ten miles from Jidda in 1899. The Egyptian mahmal was attacked by the Utaybah, even though there were three hundred soldiers with it as guards. Since pilgrims preferred to travel during the cooler night hours, robberies were easier for the nomads, who could hide behind hills or in gullies under protection of the darkness before attacking the caravans.

Fortunately for travelers, the amir and the vali were sometimes able to stop the raids. When absolutely necessary, the amir would buy peace by giving gifts to tribal leaders. Sometimes large numbers of troops would temporarily overawe the nomads and thereby break blockades of towns. Bargaining, compromise, the exchange of hostages for good conduct, and the prospect of profits from camel rentals could be used by the amir to ensure temporary peace. Since the Bedouins wanted to buy goods in the towns, they had to be on reasonably good terms with the town authorities. Also, since the nomads did not coordinate their attacks, the amir was able to play off one tribe against another.

The townspeople usually posed no serious threat to the security of the Ottomans, but fighting among and between tribesmen sometimes broke out in the towns. In Mecca in 1897, the Hudhayl

and the Harb quarreled over camel thefts that had taken place; when the amir's agent refused to intervene, fighting led to the death of three Bedouins. This episode in turn made the leaders of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan anxious about the safety of the route going through Harb territory. The muftis of Medina, the guides of the caravan, and the officials of the Medina Haram urged the amir to allow them to take the eastern path, which was outside the Harb territory.

In the decade of the 1900s, security on land deteriorated. In 1901 the vali himself was attacked while traveling to Taif, and the governor of Medina was forced to journey via Rabigh rather than Yanbu to avoid trouble. Causes for the unusually numerous incidents included the failure to pay full subsidies to the tribes, corruption among officials, feuding among the tribes, declining numbers of pilgrims in the late 1890s, less rain than was normal, and possibly repercussions from troubles in Yemen. To end the constant robberies, Awn al-Rafiq fired his deputy in Mecca and dismissed the governor of Taif. The amir then mobilized 1,000 Hudhayl tribesmen to attack robbers along the Jidda-Mecca route. In 1904 an expedition by the Utaybah against the Harb, supported by the amir, failed. Other steps taken to reduce the violence included allowing caravans to travel only by day, keeping Ottoman troops as unobtrusive as possible so as to minimize tension, and allocating freight-hauling to a different set of nomads in the Jidda area. These measures were only partially successful, since they did not deal with the basic causes of the robberies. The raids continued and even increased.

One example of the threats posed by the robbers took place in 1904 when 400 Ottoman troops joined the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan that already had 180 Egyptian infantry, two cannons, and 40 cavalry as protection. However, they were soon faced with 6,000 nomads, who demanded their back subsidies. Sultan Abdulhamid himself followed the ensuing negotiations closely, as did the British in Egypt. Ultimately, the caravan went to Medina by a different part of the desert so as to avoid the tribesmen.

After the installation of the new amir, Ali (r. 1905–8), robberies decreased sharply. For instance, during the pilgrimage of 1906 not one robbery of a British-Indian subject was reported. Tribal feuding at Mecca was stopped by the amir; Bedouins who committed murder as part of blood revenge for a prior murder were

executed in Mecca by the new ruler. He promised to pay in full, and promptly did so, the tribal subsidies as well as extracting thorough and swift justice against lawbreakers. Successful pacification was also aided by increased rainfall in 1905. As a result,. the pilgrimage routes became safer, the tribes were peaceful, and the number of pilgrims started to increase.

POLITICS STABILIZED AND THEN THREATENED ANEW, 1896–1908

Political stability created the preconditions for order in the governing of Medina and Jidda, the reorganization of local government, the suppression of political enemies, and the relatively easy transfer of power in 1905 when Awn al-Rafiq died.

Political longevity in Mecca was made possible by close contacts and alliances with leading figures in Istanbul. Many of the sultan's advisers were Arabs who consciously promoted ties with the notables of the Arab provinces. Such relationships were mutually beneficial. The patrons in the capital provided information and advice to the provincials; when the provincial leader fell from power, his patron would welcome him to Istanbul and do everything possible to restore him to imperial favor and influence. In return, the notables gave money and gifts to the patron and provided him with information on local conditions.

Abdulhamid II was personally encouraging to Arabs who sought high posts, for he considered Arabs to be natural leaders in the Pan-Islamic movement he was so assiduously fostering. The sultan's second secretary from 1880 to 1892 was Abd al-Qadir Qadri al-Qudsi, of Aleppo. A successor, Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-Abid (1855–1924), of Syria, became a confidant of the sultan in the 1890s. It was he who persuaded the sultan to build the Hijaz Railroad. Ahmad Asad (d. 1906), who became an adviser to Abdulhamid, was born in Medina. He held the honorary position of a sweeper at the Prophet's tomb and was also a leader in a Sufi order in Medina. Ahmad's daughter married a son of Amir Awn al-Rafiq in 1896. Asad was alleged to have brought about the dismissal of one supervisor of the Medina Haram and competed for influence with Muhammad ibn Hasan Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi (1850–1909), the former naqib al-ashraf of Aleppo, who tended to favor Abd al-Muttalib's clan of the amirs. Abu al-Huda with the approval of the sultan helped expand the Rifai Sufi order—three new Rifai build-

ings were established in Arabia by Abu al-Huda. Muhammad Zafir al-Madani, son of a distinguished Medina theologian, was a leader of the Shadhili Sufis in the Hijaz and in North Africa and an adviser to the sultan.[25] These Arabs, plus the Hashimites living in Istanbul, provided the Hijazis with access to the corridors of power.

In Medina the influence of Amir Awn al-Rafiq was limited by the considerable authority of Osman Pasha, who was for most of the period 1891–1908 both sheikh of the Haram and governor (muhafiz) of the city. He was dismissed from office in 1898 because of bitter quarrels with Vali Ratib Pasha, but was reinstated after visiting Istanbul. Osman was a useful balance for the Ottomans against the vali and the amir, and was entitled to write directly to Istanbul rather than through the vali. Even though Osman was incapable of resolving the crisis brought on by the imposition of a sanitary tax in Medina in 1903, he was reappointed as sheikh then. In 1904 soldiers blocked the entrances to the Haram as a means of enforcing their demands for ten months' back pay, and the Haram workers complained against Osman. At the demand of crowds of Medinans, Mufti Osman Daghistani asked the Medina consultative council to request the sultan to dismiss Osman. Only the arrival of the Syrian pilgrimage guards rescued Osman from virtual house arrest. But instead of dismissing Osman, Sultan Abdulhamid sent 1,300 troops from Aqaba and Yemen. Once military strength was great enough and the coincidental mutinies in Jidda and Mecca were suppressed, the leaders of the Medina crowds and their highly placed official sympathizers were arrested. The qadi was exiled to Damascus, and 37 military officers were tried. The Medina garrison showed itself to be unreliable in times of crisis; it had intermarried with the local population and identified with it.[26] Despite the insurrection, Osman was kept as sheikh of the Haram until 1908.

Jidda was governed by a series of kaimmakams from 1895 to 1899; including acting governors, there were at least seven officials holding that post in five years. When a kaimmakam under the influence of the amir held office, the vali attempted to force his ouster, and vice versa. On one occasion the grand vezir and the minister of the interior could not agree on a candidate, causing delay and confusion. Awn al-Rafiq placed his own choice in the position of head of the municipality, but the struggle for control of the kaimmakamate was won by the vali in August 1899, when he secured

the appointment of Ali Yumni, who remained in that post until 1907.

Ali, who was born in 1861 in Jidda, was the son of a liberated Ethiopian slave who had been owned by an Ottoman official living in the Hijaz. Ali's mother was the daughter of an Egyptian silversmith. He grew up and was educated in the Hijaz, where he attended the Meccan Ottoman school. He became an apprentice clerk in the provincial advisory council office and then a clerk in the Jidda customs, both jobs being the result of patronage appointments. Ali shared his father's alliance with the Nasif family of Jidda and his enmity toward Vali Osman Nuri. Ali resigned from office twice when Osman was governor of the Hijaz. In 1892 Ali became chief clerk for the advisory councils and chief Ottoman correspondence clerk for the amir.[27] His detailed knowledge of the Hijaz and of Ottoman administration, his amiability, and his willingness to go along with the duumvirate of the amir and the vali made him a perfect compromise choice for the governorship of Jidda, and he was successful in most areas. He repaired public buildings, rebuilt part of the town wall, and kept the streets of Jidda relatively clean of refuse. Insofar as Jidda's extremely limited revenues permitted, the town was maintained well. Neither the perpetual troop disorders nor the insecurity of the Jidda-Mecca path were his responsibility. His fall from power took place as the result of a quarrel with the vali over the division of the profits from camel rentals and from the shipping pool. Ali had received about T. L. 1,000 per year, but in 1907 the vali proposed to freeze him out of these lucrative opportunities for personal profit. After sending his family to Istanbul, Ali boarded a steamer at Jidda and then wired the vali his resignation.

When even the vigorous measures of Ali Yumni brought about only limited improvement in the services given by government to the people, it is easy to see why the subunits of provincial government were weak and why they had little impact. The organization of the administrative divisions of the Hijaz and the establishment of advisory councils meant little more than reshuffling of existing forms and officials.

In the 1880s the provincial subdivisions, both the kazas and nahiyes, gained advisory councils. Taif and Yanbu in 1887–88 had councils both for the towns themselves as well as for the areas around them. Lit, Khaybar, Rabigh, Wajh, and Suwarqiyyah were

officially given regional governments in the 1880s and 1890s. Al-Ula gained a regional government in the 1900s. At the provincial level, and even more so at the lower levels, the councils were merely devices by which the vali and the amir secured support for their own wishes.

The capital of the province had been officially changed from Jidda to Mecca, and it was indeed there that the vali usually resided. During the summers he lived in Taif; occasionally Ratib would visit Jidda, leaving the qadi of Mecca to act as vali in his absence. Both Ratib and Awn al-Rafiq had deputies in Jidda to watch their personal interests. When the agents quarreled, so did their masters, usually over jurisdictional disputes.

By 1907 the political structure in Mecca had become articulated along functional lines, though the concentration of all real power in the hands of Ratib and the amir made much of the structure meaningless. Ratib was governor and commander of the ground forces. The qadi of Mecca and his deputies were chiefly responsible for justice, with the assistance of the Hanafi mufti and the police. More specialized functions were filled by the following: the defterdar; the head of the clerks; the supervisor of imperial charities; the admiral commanding the Red Sea fleet; the health commission; the commander of the gendarmerie; the provincial advisory council; the telegraph and post director; the guest house director; the government schoolteachers; and the hospital manager. Mecca directly supervised the local government of Taif. The amirate was responsible for order in the Haram, the amir's own justice system, and various clerks and secretaries. Medina's Haram was under the control of Osman Pasha. Medina had its own qadi as well as separate treasuries for both the town and the Haram. The local government duplicated Mecca's, with officials for justice, the post office, hospitals, telegraph, and so forth. A census clerk was listed, though apparently no census was ever taken. Khaybar's governor was directly controlled from Medina, and there were also local regional administrations for Yanbu, Umm Lajj, Wajh, Aqaba, Suwarqiyyah, al-Ula, and Diba. Jidda was governed by the kaimmakam, who had basically the same staff with the same functions as the governor of Medina. In addition, Jidda had a more specialized court system, quarantine officials, a waqf supervisor, a government storehouse supervisor, an inspector of markets, a passport officer, a representative of the tobacco monopoly and public debt

authority, tax collectors, and, most numerous of all, those employed by the government in the Jidda customs house facing the shore. The Jidda municipal council employed an engineer, street cleaners, police, doctors, and the port authorities. The Red Sea naval headquarters was in Jidda. Rabigh was controlled by Jidda; Lit had its own local government.[28]

Elaborate plans were drawn up at various times for the total reorganization of the administration of the Hijaz. In 1896, for instance, the imperial council of ministers contributed detailed suggestions for new rules to direct the Hijazi civil service, advisory councils, and police. However, the plan was not put into effect. Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, the sultan's representative in Egypt, noted in an official report that many of the amir's responsibilities could and should be transferred to the vali.[29] Nothing came of this proposal because it was felt the pilgrims valued the amirate highly for its religious significance; to downgrade the amir might be likely to cause a reduction in the pilgrimage. Another probable reason for the absence of significant structural reform was the political strength in Istanbul of men tied by bonds of money and sympathy to the amir. Sultan Abdulhamid himself sent holograph letters periodically to the amir that indicated his esteem and regard. When investigative missions from Istanbul did arrive in the Hijaz, the members were bribed to report back that all was satisfactory and no changes needed to be made.

The long tenure of the amir and vali that made the administration relatively stable was also a result of the amir's local popularity. He issued very popular sumptuary legislation in 1899 designed to limit dowries and restrict lavish wedding ceremonies. Awn al-Rafiq gained favor among some of the pious by tearing down saints tombs near Jidda, curbing some Sufi ceremonies, eliminating the use of the term "sayyid" for those who were not truly descendants of the Prophet, and clearing away buildings overlooking the Haram. By a careful policy of favors, threats, and intrigue, he gained influence among the leaders of the nomads. Poems written in praise of him were published in Egypt. He was also famous for his love of flowers and his gardens at Taif and Mecca, for which he imported trees from Syria and India.

Awn al-Rafiq built up a group of protégés who felt their interests to be dependent upon his continued stay in power. These included the members of the Jidda shipping pool, the camel rental

monopoly, and the pilgrim guides. Umar Nasif, in Jidda, who was the amir's busines agent, and Muhammad Ali, the amir's private secretary in Mecca, were intelligent, able, rich, and efficient. The inefficiency and possibly the foreigness of the Ottoman bureaucracy also accounted for much of the power of the amir, who ruled in part by the default of the Ottomans. Both Awn al-Rafiq and Ratib also punished their enemies in the Hijaz by arrest, long confinements without trial, and exile. The carrot and the stick were used, generally with success, except among the nomads, who tended to regard the amir with distrust, hatred, and suspicion.

The diabetic illness of Awn al-Rafiq from 1903 to 1905 began a power struggle even before his death on 17 July 1905 at Taif opened the formal process of selection that lasted until October. The two chief rivals were Abd al-Ilah ibn Muhammad and his nephew Ali ibn Abd Allah ibn Muhammad (b. 1859/60). Abd al-Ilah's case was weakened by his long absence from the Hijaz in Istanbul, his poor health, and his extreme age. Ali had held the rank of pasha since the death of his father, Amir Abd Allah, in 1877. More importantly, he had assisted his uncle Awn al-Rafiq in the governing of Mecca. Vali Ratib actively supported the choice of Ali and made him acting amir. Even though Abd al-Ilah was serving on the Ottoman council of state, the sultan disliked him personally. Finally, Ali was named amir with the rank of vezir.[30]

In the three years of Ali's rule up to November 1908, he accomplished a great deal. Most of the personnel and policies of his uncle were retained, but by a more honest and efficient policy toward the Bedouins, he reestablished order along the caravan routes and stopped most of the tribal raiding.

Substantial changes were needed to ensure law and order. The first step taken to increase Ottoman rule in the Hijaz was the construction of guardhouses between Jidda and Mecca. Military communications were quickened by building a telegraph line. A Damascus-Medina line via Muzeirib, Maan, and Madain Salih had been opened in late 1900 after rapid construction by the Ottoman military. Linkage of Medina to Jidda and of Mecca to Taif proved more difficult because of open opposition by the Bedouins and covert opposition by the amir. The Utaybah destroyed telegraph lines and poles near Mecca despite bribes to their sheikhs. Awn al-Rafiq's uncle, the amir of Taif, failed to reconcile the tribes there to the extension of the telegraph line. The centralization of authority

represented by the new telegraph line posed a threat to the freedom of action of the amir. His outward support of the project concealed an inner opposition to it.

Even more of a danger to the amirate came from the expansion of the Ottoman railroad system south from Syria toward Mecca. In 1900 the sultan announced the intended construction of a railroad designed to link Damascus, Medina, Mecca, and Jidda. Its stated purpose was to promote the pilgrimage, but it was also intended to decrease the independence of the amir of Mecca, increase military capacity, and allow direct rule of the turbulent desert areas of south Syria and the Hijaz. Construction was slow because of inefficiencies in technology and manpower, but as solutions to these problems were found and as money was made abundantly available, the railroad tracks steadily reached south of Damascus toward the Hijaz. The Medina station was opened in 1908. Publicly the amir favored the Hijaz Railroad as a religious project that would increase the number of pilgrims as well as their safety in travel. Privately, he made sure that construction in the Jidda-Mecca area did not take place; for not only would the railroad overawe the nomads, it would likely enable the Ottoman central government to rule Mecca directly with no need for him in particular and for the amirate in general.[31]

As the Hijaz Railroad reached closer and closer to Medina, the tribes in the area who had been hiring their camels to the pilgrims feared the loss of their livelihood. As a result, in 1908 there was an uprising of the tribes and large-scale fighting north of Medina. In response the Ottomans sent troops to crush the tribes; at the same time they increased payments to them.

The opposition of the tribes to the Hijaz Railroad was deep-rooted. Few tribesmen were employed in its construction, maintenance, or operations. Instead, the enemies of the Bedouins, the Ottoman troops and Circassian guardsmen from Amman, were used. As the railroad came south, the tribes feared it would lead to conscription, taxation, Ottoman justice, and direct government. To overcome these well-founded fears, the Ottomans undertook a number of measures besides payments. They backed some tribes against others. The amirs of Mecca were reconciled, at least superficially, by promises of autonomy and a delay in the extension of the line south of Medina. But once the railroad reached Medina in 1908, a new age began locally. Troops could now be transported

rapidly and cheaply from Syria to the Hijaz, and the Bedouins lost their military superiority, at least in the territory close to the railroad tracks.

Even more important for the Hijaz than the Hijaz Railroad was the constitutional revolt of 1908 that eventually ousted not only the incumbent sultan but led to an increase in the secularization of the empire and the final disappearance of it and the sultanate-caliphate following defeat in World War I. The year 1908 in the Hijaz also witnessed the beginning of the events leading to the Arab Revolt of 1916 and to the political independence of those Arab lands then part of the Ottoman Empire.

Few if any of these momentous developments were foreseen by the Hijazis when they finally learned of the military revolt that had forced Abdulhamid II to reinstitute the Constitution of 1876. The amir and vali had suppressed the news as long as possible. On 19 August 1908, military officers at Taif openly proclaimed the constitution. They forced Amir Ali to swear on the Quran his loyalty to the new order, his acknowledgment of equality of sharifs with nonsharifs, his pledge to stop illegal extortions from pilgrims, and his promise to attempt in the future to maintain the safety of the pilgrimage routes. Ali blamed all problems on the vali and was allowed to remain in office until November. There ensued public celebrations, oaths of loyalty to the constitution by the common soldiers and government employees, the freeing of prisoners from Ottoman and amirate jails, and freely voiced criticism of the vali and amir in Taif, Jidda, and Mecca. The vali, the commander of troops, and the governor of Medina were arrested, and sympathizers of the constitutionalist movement took their places temporarily, pending orders from Istanbul. Ratib was sent to Istanbul and ultimately was exiled. Another detained person, Abd al-Rahman Banaja, a prominent Jidda merchant, was released at the request of the Hadramawti community of Jidda.[32]

Amir Ali secured petitions requesting his retention as amir, but he was dismissed anyway by orders from Istanbul. The initial nominee to be Ali's successor was Abd al-Ilah ibn Muhammad, who had resided in the capital since the accession to power of his brother Awn al-Rafiq in 1882. Abd al-Ilah served on the council of state, held the rank of vezir, and was the father-in-law of Abdulhamid's chief secretary. These qualifications proved of no consequence, for he died in Istanbul shortly after being named amir. The

choice for the new amir then became one between Husayn ibn Ali (1853/54–1931), of the Dhawu Awn, and Ali Haydar, of the Dhawu Zayd. Sultan Abdulhamid made the choice, with no apparent role in the process given to the military leaders who had precipitated the 1908 revolution. The sultan suspected that the military and the Committee of Union and Progress favored Ali Haydar, and for that reason Abdulhamid was inclined to name Husayn. The latter's religiosity, his residence in Istanbul for some fifteen years, and his service on the council of state since 1896 also recommended him. He was the nephew of the amirs Abd Allah, Husayn, Awn al-Rafiq, and Abd al-Ilah, and his first wife had been Amir Abd Allah's daughter; Ali Haydar's clan had not held the post of amir since his grandfather Abd al-Muttalib's brief tenure ended in 1882. The grand vezir also favored Husayn, who was appointed officially on 1 November 1908. Foreigners played no significant part in the choice of Husayn.[33]

In addition to a new amir, a new vali was selected. Kazim Pasha (1839–1936) had been in charge of the construction of the Hijaz Railroad; his choice indicated a determination on the part of the regime to continue its construction in the Hijaz beyond Medina toward Mecca. New men were named to the governorships of Medina, Yanbu, and Jidda, and to be the sheikh of the Haram in Medina. Local power in the Hijaz became uncertain: it was unclear whether ultimate authority lay with the amir, the Ottoman civil administration, or the local military branch of the Committee of Union and Progress. The committee was composed primarily of lieutenants and military physicians. Several higher officers and civilian notables joined it after the arrest of Ratib.[34] Anti-committee riots in Mecca in November were suppressed, but the committee was shown to be unpopular. Elections for the Ottoman parliament were held, and the victors were a rich Jidda merchant, the Hanafi mufti of Mecca, a Medina sayyid, and one member who resigned upon his election. Political and military centralization was applied by the central government in Syria to the north and Yemen to the south. By 1908 the end was in sight for the style of government of Awn al-Rafiq; his ally, Vali Ahmet Ratib Pasha; and his successor, Ali ibn Abd Allah (r. 1905–8). But the causes of the changes following 1908 lay outside the Hijaz. The religious-political synthesis there had been stable, but it was threatened because the Hijaz was becoming part of the new international order created by the Euro-

pean states and by the secular nationalism arising in Istanbul after 1908.

The arrival of Amir Husayn on 6 December 1908 marked the end of the first stage of the Ottoman revolution's effects, for he rapidly restored the power of the amirate, curbed the local committee, and began vigorously to oppose the extension of constitutionalism and central control into the Hijaz. Instead of the Ottoman constitution, Husayn argued that the basic law of the Hijaz was and should be the Quran, the holy law of Islam, and the customs of the Prophet Muhammad. However, Husayn's local restoration of the old order was deceptive; the force of circumstances by World War I would compel Husayn to revolutionize the relationship between the Hijaz and the Ottoman Empire. The political-religious synthesis that had prevailed between 1840 and 1908 had ended.

1. BBA, Dahiliye 71061, 5 Shevval 1300; FO 195/1451, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to embassy, 26 September and 20 October 1883.

2. Ismail Uzuncharshili, *Midhat Pasha ve Taif Mahkumlari*; Engin Akarli, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876–1909)," p. 44.

3. BBA, Dahiliye 68401; Sabri, *Miratulharemeyn*, 1:780–82; BBA, Yildiz 33.331. Muberrer. 73.90; Shurayi Devlet 4908, 22 Muharrem 1304.

4. Hurgronje, *Die Stadt*, pp. 184, 222–24; Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca," pp. 16–18; BBA, Dahiliye 79267, 26 Zilhicce 1303; de Gaury, *Rulers of Mecca*, pp. 258–59.

5. BBA, Yildiz 13.112/32.112.6, instructions to the vali, n.d.

6. FO 195/1610, Abdur Razzack (Jidda) to White, 7 September 1888.

7. Yusuf Ibish collection of documents, 13, vali of Syria to military leader of the pilgrimage, n.d.; documents 18 and 20, Medina selection commission to amir, 24 Zilkade 1311 and 24 Zilkade 1312.

8. BBA, Meclis-i Mahsus 5489, 15 Receb 1309; Dahiliye 100251, 27 Shaban 1309; Dahiliye 100283, 26 Shaban 1309.

9. Abdullah, King of Transjordan, *Memoirs*, pp. 41–42; FO 195/1805, Richards (Jidda) to embassy, 27 January 1893; BBA, Yildiz 13.112/11.112.6, draft instructions to Ratib, 11 Cemaziyelevvel 1309; Hususi Irade 1310-Ca-71, 21 Cemaziyelevvel 1310; Yildiz 13.112/13.112.6, draft instructions to Ratib, 27 Rebiyulahir 1310.

10. BBA, Yildiz 13.112/11.112.6, enclosure 2, draft of a speech for Ratib Pasha, n.d.

11. For a discussion of international health precautions and the pilgrimage, see Laverne Kuhnke, "Resistance and Response to Modernization," and McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples*.

12. FO 685/3/2, Richards (Jidda) to Currie, 17 June 1895; Duguet, *Le Pèlerinage de la Mecque*, pp. 183–84.

13. FO 685/3/2, Richards (Jidda) to Currie, 17 June 1895; FO 78/4788, Currie (Istanbul) to Foreign Office, 20 June 1895; BBA, Hususi Irade 1312-Z-45, 26 Zilhicce 1312.

14. BBA, Hususi Irade 1312-Z-1, 7 Zilhicce 1312 and 1312-Z-4, 16 Zilhicce 1312.

15. FO 78/4789, Currie (Istanbul) to Foreign Office, 19 and 24 September 1895. The British apparently opposed a dual occupation of Jidda with the French (see Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," p. 242).

16. BBA, Dahiliye Irade 1313-B-69, 29 Receb 1313; FO 195/1943, Alban (Jidda) to Currie, 5 January 1896; FO 195/1894, Alban (Jidda) to Currie, 11 and 25 November 1895.

17. FO 78/4789, Alban (Jidda) to Currie, 2 April 1896.

18. FO 78/4788, Bobot-Descoutures (Jidda) to French ambassador, 14 June 1895.

19. Orhonlu, *Osmanli*, pp. 278–81.

20. Gross, "Ottoman Rule," p. 336.

21. Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," p. 174.

22. FO 195/2224, Hussein (Jidda) to O'Conor, 8 September 1906; FO 195/2254, Richardson (Hudaydah) to O'Conor, 26 October 1907.

23. Al-Amr, "The Hijaz," p. 198.

24. FY, Guès (Jidda) to ministry, 10 October and 1 December 1901.

25. Gross, "Ottoman Rule," pp. 370–71; Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi," pp. 137, 146–48; Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Sharifs of Mecca."

26. BBA, Hususi Irade 1322-R-171; FO 195/2174, Husain (Jidda) to O'Conor, 6 May, 23 May, and 31 July 1904; Ibrahim Rifat Pasha, *Mirat*, pp. 105–6; Ali Hafiz, *Fusul min tarikh al-madinat al-munawwarah*, pp. 36–37.

27. FO 195/2254, Husain in Monahan (Jiddda) to O'Connor, 26 April 1907.

28. Ottoman Empire, *Salname-i devlet aliye-i osmaniye 1325*, pp. 682–90; FO 195/2286, Monahan (Jidda) to Istanbul, 2 July 1908; Ottoman Empire, *Hicaz Vilayeti Salnamesi 1306*, pp. 259–73.

29. BBA, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi 936/2.59.4; Yildiz, 11.1165.120.5, 9 Rebiyulevvel 1313.

30. FY, Bertrand (Jidda) to ministry, 3 June 1906; BBA, Hususi Irade 1323-N-3, 2 Ramazan 1323.

31. Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad*, contains a more detailed discussion of the railroad and of its implications for the Hijaz from 1900 to 1918.

32. FO 195/2286, Husain (Jidda) to Lowther, 25 August 1908; FO 195/2277, Devey (Jidda) to Lowther, 2 September 1908; FO 368/338, Husain (Jidda) to Lowther, 19 May 1909.

33. BBA, Dahiliye 1326-L-45, 6 Shevval 1326; Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, p. 160 n. 58.

34. BBA, Dahiliye 1326-L-37, 13 Shevval 1326, and 1326-N-62, 29 Ramazan 1326; FY, Bertrand (Jidda) to Pichon, 24 August 1908.

CONCLUSIONS

RELIGION DETERMINED the social, economic, and, to a lesser degree, the political history of western Arabia in the nineteenth century. Religion and religious values, the environment, and, of less importance, economic needs, the actions of rulers, and the increasing interference of European states were the most important factors influencing the political and social history of the majority of Middle Eastern people in the nineteenth century. The primacy of religious institutions, leaders, and values in Hijazi social history is easily ascertained, but the role of religion in determining the limits of local political action is more difficult to see. When situations of stress emerged, however, the determinative force of religion was clearly revealed. Even though a general spirit of conservatism, *raison d'état*, the idea of monarchy, and personal ambition were crucial to politics in the Hijaz, the parameters of political behavior were set by the religious beliefs of the Hijazi townspeople.

Elsewhere, in much of the Ottoman Empire and more generally in the Middle East as a whole, secularizing nationalists gained ascendancy in the nineteenth century because of the perceived need to emulate the growing military power of industrial Europe. The Hijaz was unusually removed from the reach of domestic or foreign secularizers precisely because of the sanctity attached to its two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, its poverty, and the prestige conferred upon the Ottoman dynasty as protectors of the pilgrimage.

Although the Hijaz was exceptional, its example shows that economic or nationalistic determinism are not sufficient to explain the configurations of Arab-Ottoman society in all cases. Even the more satisfying and flexible school of historical analysis centered on Fernand Braudel, who has found ultimate causality in the physical environment and in cyclical economic change, has not dealt convincingly with areas such as the Hijaz because it underestimates the importance of religion.

Imperial structures based upon religion and dynasty have been misunderstood. In light of the numerous catastrophes inflicted upon the twentieth-century Middle East by nationalistic

states, the relative success of the Ottoman Empire's general policies and administration before 1908 now has become clear. The successes of the Ottomans from the perspective of the Muslim majority were seen in their sponsorship of Islam, the defense of the Muslim state against foreign and non-Muslim encroachment, the economic and social integration of the empire that was under way by the end of the nineteenth century, and the glory and stability provided by a six-hundred-year-old dynasty. In addition, Hijazis in particular welcomed Ottoman rule because of its financial benefits, protection of the pilgrimage, and the small scale of local government.

Ottoman problems consisted of the failure to implement rapidly economic and technological changes and, partially as a result, financial difficulties leading to bankruptcy in the 1870s and budgetary austerity thereafter. On the whole, however, Ottoman administration in the Hijaz between 1840 and 1908 was a success. The later separation of the Hijaz from the empire in 1916 was caused not by widespread and long-standing opposition among the townspeople but rather by Amir Husayn's fear that he would lose local power, the opportunity presented by World War I, tribal opportunism, and the growing feeling that the empire could no longer protect the Middle East from European expansionism.

Religion was so important in the Hijaz in part because of the lack of other bases for organizing society. The poverty of agriculture and the inability of the nomads to organize a state contributed indirectly to a close linkage between religion and politics. Hijazis needed exterior help to be able to live in the towns, and this help was predicated upon the holiness of Mecca and Medina in Islam. The prestige of being called the servant of the two Harams was ample compensation to the Ottoman sultan for the expenses attendant upon ruling western Arabia.

Ottoman valis wanted to create the circumstances needed for the protection of the pilgrims, the maintenance of order and religious values in Mecca and Medina, and acknowledgment of Ottoman overlordship. Amirs of Mecca, whose post was dependent upon their family's claimed links to the Prophet Muhammad, wanted autonomy, money, and protection from exterior threats. Since the amirs were in office longer and enjoyed some local support, they were usually successful in reaching their goals despite occasional attempts by strong valis to assert Ottoman power.

Townspeople and nomads both wanted no taxes, freedom from conscription, and subsidies from abroad. All these they received, though sometimes benefits were delayed or embezzled. The holy law and the pilgrimage were maintained, and thus the prerequisites for a moral life and prosperity were preserved by the Ottomans and the amirs.

In the late eighteenth century, several challenges to the system of politics in the Ottoman Hijaz were overcome. Struggles among the sharifs for the succession to the amirate were abruptly replaced as the focus of political life by the taking of Mecca and Medina by the Wahhabis, and the invasion and occupation of the Hijaz by Mehmet Ali. Each of these external threats was defeated, though this was done by groups exterior to the Hijaz. Temporarily imposed changes, whether in the form of religious reforming zeal or secularizing Europeanizing administration, left few traces in the Hijaz after 1840.

The failure of the Wahhabis and the Mehmet Ali regime to create any lasting new institutions was partially caused by their concentration on other parts of their states, the correct perception by the Hijazis that constant military adventures discouraged potential pilgrims, and the great expense of ruling thoroughly all the Hijaz. In addition, there were some underlying factors, central to the later failure of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms in the Hijaz, such as the social diversity of the towns, a general opposition to innovation and the favoring of tradition, the religious conservatism of the Sunni ulema, and the popular respect for the amirs. Financial subsidies from Istanbul benefited all sectors of the economy and the society, and Ottoman rule was less burdensome for most Hijazis than either Wahhabi or Egyptian control. The Ottoman restoration in the 1840s saw a return to power for the amirs and a general return to the pattern of life that had existed before the 1790s.

In the 1850s Ottoman reformism combined with what seemed to the Jiddawis and Meccans to be a threat to their religious and economic interests to create the unsuccessful rebellion of the Amir Abd al-Muttalib in 1855 and the Jidda massacre of 1858. Abd al-Muttalib's supporters in both years worked upon underlying fear and dislike of Christian Europeans and their Muslim merchant protégés. Especially after British rule was firmly established in India, Arab Muslims resented the Christian-ruled nations of Eu-

rope that gave their subjects resident in the Hijaz advantages in tariffs and access to consuls who protected them from the local government in Jidda. International security and peace permitted large-scale credit arrangements beneficial to Indian Muslims. Christian Europeans often tended arrogantly to regard themselves as superior to the supposedly backward and fanatical natives. Europeans exalted nationalism as a basis for political organization rather than religious identity. In 1858 the European powers crushingly demonstrated their military superiority, forcing the Ottomans to execute the instigators of the Jidda massacre. Many Hijazis saw 1858 as a definite victory for Christian Europe over Islam.

There ensued a relative period of tranquillity between 1860 and 1880. Amir Abd Allah ibn Muhammad even kept the nomads relatively quiet. He and the Ottomans expanded their control in Asir, Najd, and the northern Hijaz. From 1857 to 1881, there were fifteen valis, with an average of only 1.7 years per governor. The amirs of the time were more powerful than the valis.

The general military, diplomatic, financial, and political crisis of the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s did not destroy the fabric of Ottoman power in the Hijaz. Vali Osman Nuri was able to arrest Amir Abd al-Muttalib in the 1880s even though the end product of his tenure as vali was the emergence of the most powerful amir of the time. Awn al-Rafiq operated in the 1880s, 1890s, and the first decade of the 1900s within the Ottoman system and with the support of Sultan Abdulhamid II. The murder of Ahmet Midhat Pasha in Taif in 1884 and the dismissal of Osman Nuri in 1886 demonstrated that the empire would not extend secularization, technical change, and political centralization to the Hijaz.

The nomads remained on the edge of the Ottoman system. Political linkages to Istanbul patrons preserved the amirs from deposition, but what was needed to subdue the tribes was Ottoman military power and cash. Ottoman military detachments were stationed in the towns but were largely ineffective against nomads in the desert. Delays in paying soldiers and in releasing conscripts plus the small size of the Ottoman garrisons allowed the nomads to be semiautonomous. To maintain a tenuous peace with the tribes, large subsidies were spent by the Ottomans on the military, grain, gifts to the nomads, as well as salaries to prominent religious and political leaders.

Security on the caravan routes was chancy at best in the 1890s

and 1900s up until the short administration of Amir Ali ibn Abd Allah. However, alleged British expansionism in western Arabia, the Mahdist rule in the Sudan, and the rebellions in Yemen posed no real threats to Ottoman rule of the Hijaz or to the perceived legitimacy of the religious/political synthesis that dominated the Hijaz.

The physical environment of the area dictated certain continuing facts that affected politics as well as society and the economy in the Ottoman era. A harsh, hot, and forbidding climate and mountainous topography created persistent problems for transportation and communications. In other areas of the Middle East, the agricultural cycle dominated concepts of time, but in the Hijaz the Muslim lunar year was the key to the organization of time. Thanks to the diverse situations of the towns, a rich variety of styles, customs, and economic life existed. The desert's extremely hostile environment separated the nomads from town norms and patterns. Only the amirate, as an institution accepted by both Ottomans and nomads, could mediate between the needs of the towns and those of the nomads.

Religion was everywhere, in the desert and in the towns alike. Physically, emotionally, and intellectually, life rotated around the pilgrimage, the Harams, the ritual of prayer, and the inward beliefs associated with external signs of faith. The structures of religious institutions sometimes masked, but could not conceal, the occasional exploitation of religion for purposes of practical gain and the manipulation of religious values for political advantage. Religious institutions were associated with the holy law and the ulema as well as with the mystical rituals and yearnings of the Sufis. The officers of the holy law, the Sufis, the occasional repression of religious innovation, and the officeholders in the harams and mosques acted in such a way as to routinize, preserve, and inculcate religious values and beliefs. Since the Ottoman central government and the amirs appointed most of the key officials and provided much of the money needed for operations, most religious institutions were subservient to state purposes. The Sufis remained outside the political arena in the Hijaz, although they played an active part in the politics of other parts of the Middle East at the time.

It was the pilgrimage that most directly linked political, religious, and economic elites. Secular factors outside Ottoman con-

trol such as health and improvements in technology were crucial to the level of attendance at the pilgrimage ceremonies. But Ottoman and amirate measures designed to improve security on the caravan paths and to decrease disease in the towns sometimes had a favorable impact upon attendance. The worst example of Ottoman adminstration in the Hijaz was the exceptionally incompetent and inadequate measures taken to reduce the great cholera epidemics of the early 1890s. However, those few steps taken by the Ottomans that were intended to improve health, such as quarantines and disinfecting machines, were precisely the most hated aspects of Ottoman rule, as incidents such as the 1895 riots in Jidda and Mecca showed.

The widely disparate groups of people in the Hijaz naturally had varying expectations and needs in regard to education and law. Although religious knowledge and religious texts remained the prime sources for both learning and law, the Ottomans attempted some secularizing changes, which most Hijazis and resident foreigners opposed. Unlike the eighteenth century when Mecca and Medina were among the leading centers of thought, especially for Sufis, in the nineteenth century after 1840 there were fewer original authors and thinkers. Standard theology and poetry continued to appear, as did local handmade products, sometimes including objects of considerable beauty; but innovations such as new genres of literature were not produced.

Life in the cities was relatively safe from crime, which was considered a great blessing; but this was not the case in the countryside, where robbery of merchants and pilgrims by the nomads was frequent.

Local merchants had more to worry about than just safety from robbery. The introduction of steamships, the opening of the Suez Canal, and the growing role of British-controlled India and Egypt in local commerce gravely affected the economic interests of Hijazi merchants. Although foreign Christian merchants were restricted to the coast, foreign Muslims could and did transact business in Mecca and Medina. The exclusion of Christians from the interior was not sufficient to save the local commercial elite from active competition and, in many cases, losses to outsiders. The separation of merchants from the political elite was lessened by the interrelationships established by some merchants who acted as bankers to the amirs and valis and by the shipping ring, which limited com-

petition to the benefit both of political leaders and shipping agents.

Group life among the Sunni Muslims was organized along neighborhood and guild identities, the largest of which was composed of pilgrim guides. Religion played a part in determining status: pious persons and descendants of the Prophet were respected, but since nearly everyone was a Sunni Muslim, other factors were frequently more important. Wealth, gender, ethnicity, servile condition, linguistic skills, and knowledge of Arabic were used more often to determine status than was religion.

Although the slave trade was greatly decreased by the end of the nineteenth century as a result of British and Ottoman actions, slavery itself was still regarded by most Hijazis as religiously sanctioned and morally proper. Resistance to changes aimed at decreasing or outlawing the slave trade and slavery was widespread. The riots and risings of 1855 in Mecca were, to a degree, caused by popular resentment of the foreign-induced Ottoman prohibition of the slave trade.

When the Ottomans themselves changed the basis of the state so as to appease nationalists and increase technicalization and centralization, the consequences were significant for the Hijaz. The local political elite and the general population opposed the Hijaz Railroad, feared and despised the secularizers and nationalists of the Committee of Union and Progress who usually dominated Ottoman government between 1909 and 1918, and despaired of Ottoman efficacy after the disasters of the war with Italy in 1911–12 and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. In 1916 the Hijaz, under the leadership of Amir Husayn, ironically became the leader in what seemed to be a nationalistic upsurge against the Ottoman-Turkish domination of the Arab peoples. However, Husayn himself was scarcely a nationalist. Within a decade after the revolt began, the amir was replaced by the Saudi state, which was headed by a dynasty based upon religious legitimacy and opposed to pan-Arab nationalism. Saudi control of the Hijaz, particularly in the era of oil wealth after World War II, has in many ways replicated the political pattern of the late Ottoman Hijaz. Religion has continued to determine political identity and social structures; the only major change is the new independent role of the economy.

APPENDIX
AMIRS OF MECCA, 1840-1908

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Muin	1827-51
Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib	1851-55
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Muin	1855-58
Abd Allah ibn Muhammad	1858-77
Husayn ibn Muhammad	1877-80
Abd al-Muttalib ibn Ghalib	1880-82
Awn al-Rafiq ibn Muhammad	1882-1905
Ali ibn Abd Allah	1905-08
Husayn ibn Ali	1908-16

Amir	Prince; leader; commander
Caliph	Successor to the Prophet Muhammad
Defterdar	Treasurer
Ferman	Imperial order
Imam	Prayer leader
Jihad	Struggle for Islam, especially in a holy war
Kaimmakam	Ottoman provincial deputy governor and governor of Jidda
Madrasa	Higher religious school
Mufti	Jurisconsult
Muhtasib	Market inspector
Qadi	Judge
Rushdiye	Secular Ottoman government school
Sharif	Descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
Sheikh	Bedouin leader; head of a town neighborhood; general title of respect
Sheyhulislam	Chief mufti of Istanbul and leader of the Ottoman religious establishment
Sufi	Islamic mystic
Sultan	Ottoman ruler
Tanzimat	Reforms in central Ottoman government, especially in the period 1839–76
Ulema	Men of religion
Vali	Ottoman provincial governor
Waqf	Charitable foundation
Zawiyah	Sufi chapel house

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