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Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War

Before embarking on a discussion of the attitudes toward warfare found in the Islamic religion, it is necessary to say something about conditions in Arabia immediately before the appearance of Islam.[1] The majority of the inhabitants of Arabia were nomads, organized in clans and tribes, and wresting a living from a difficult environment by pasturing camels and other animals. Islam did not originate in the desert, however, but in the small urban community of Mecca, which by the early seventh century was an important commercial center and distinctly prosperous. The people of Mecca were descended from nomads, only a generation or two back, and still retained much of the nomadic outlook and practice. The immediate occasion of the appearance of the new religion was the tension between nomadic attitudes and the demands of a prosperous commerce-based community. It is also to be noted that some nomads had a relationship with Meccan merchants in that the nomads guaranteed the safe-conduct of trade caravans through their territories and in return received payment.

The feature of nomadic life that is of chief concern in the present study is the razzia. This might almost be described as the national sport of the nomadic Arabs. The razzia was a marauding expedition aimed at capturing camels, goats or, less frequently, women from a

hostile tribe. Ideally one launched an attack with overwhelming force on a handful of men looking after a herd of camels. Because resistance was futile the herdsmen could flee without disgrace, and the attackers then drove off the camels. Of course the hostile tribe would seize the first opportunity of playing the same trick. In such a razzia loss of life was infrequent; but occasionally, when there was some deep cause of grievance, the tribes became involved in bloodier wars. It was essentially from the light-hearted razzia, however, that the Islamic idea and practice of the jihād or holy war developed.

THE JIHĀD UNDER MUḤAMMAD

About the year 610 Muḥammad began to receive revelations or messages from God that he was to communicate to his fellow Meccans. Sound scholarship demands that we hold Muḥammad to have been sincere in thinking that he could distinguish these revelations from the products of his own mind, though it does not prevent us taking the view that the messages came from his unconscious. By proclaiming these divine messages, and no doubt by also preaching in similar terms, Muḥammad gathered round himself in Mecca a band of followers, but at the same time roused opposition. Because of the opposition he made the Hijra, or emigration, to Medina in 622 along with about seventy of his followers. Medina was an oasis in which the inhabitants gained their livelihood mainly from growing date palms and cereals. Because the community there had been split in two by a long-standing feud, most sections of it accepted Muḥammad as prophet and became his followers, presumably hoping that he, as an impartial arbiter, would be able to keep peace between the two main factions.[2]

Muḥammad and those Muslims who followed him from Mecca to Medina cannot have expected to live indefinitely as guests of their fellow Muslims there. They presumably did not intend to earn a livelihood by agriculture, though some land of poor quality was still available. They may have intended to make use of their trading skills, but such a course, if successful, would almost certainly have brought them into conflict with the Meccans. The remaining possi-

bility was to engage in raids or razzias against Meccan caravans, which were particularly vulnerable when they passed relatively close to Medina on their way to Syria. Whatever ideas Muḥammad may have had when he first went to Medina, after he had been there about six months he seems to have committed his followers to a policy of razzias; and the histories of the Medinan period of Muḥammad's career are essentially a series of accounts of the razzias or, as they are usually called, "expeditions." About ninety expeditions are listed, though a few are not really razzias. The number of participants varied from thirty thousand to five (or even to single individuals).[3]

In the Qur'ān (which is the collection of the revelations received by Muḥammad) the earliest reference to fighting by the believers is said to be: "Permission is given to those who fight because they have been wronged—God is well able to support them—who have been expelled from their homes unjustly, only because they say 'Our Lord is God.'"[4] The Qur'ān is not arranged chronologically, though there are traditional accounts—sometimes contradictory—of the occasion on which particular passages were revealed. In the case of the verses quoted, the most likely view is that they were revealed during the first year of Muḥammad's stay at Medina. They apply primarily to the Muslims who had emigrated from Mecca, since it was these who had been "expelled from their homes unjustly" and so "wronged"; and it is known from historical sources that in the first few "expeditions" only Emigrants, that is, Meccan Muslims, took part. It is also to be noted that the reason stated for the permission to fight is that the Muslims had been unjustly treated on account of their belief in God. The fact that in the first few expeditions only Emigrants took part is implied by the distinction in 8.72/3 and 74/5 between "those who believed and emigrated and strove with goods and person in the way of God" and "those who gave shelter and support." The latter are the Muslims of Medina and the former the Emigrants; and, as will presently be seen, the phrase "strove with goods and person in the way of God" implies fighting.[5]

Some other early passages dealing with fighting may now be

mentioned briefly. "When you meet the unbelievers, (let there be) smiting of necks (with the sword); then, when you have made great slaughter among them, bind them fast" (47.4). "O believers, fight those unbelievers who are near you, and let them find a roughness in you" (9.123/4). These passages are addressed to all believers, and thus imply that the Muslims of Medina are participating in the fighting. In January 624 a successful razzia brought up the question of whether Muslims were justified in violating the pagan sanctities of time and place. A verse revealed about this time gives an indication of the temper of the Muslims.

> They ask you (Muḥammad) about the Sacred Month and fighting in it. Say: Fighting in it is evil; but restraining (men) from the way of God, and unbelief, and (from) the Sacred Mosque and expelling its people from it is more evil in God's sight; persecution is more evil than killing; they will not cease fighting you until they bring you back from your religion, if they can; whoever of you is brought back from his religion and dies an unbeliever—the works of such men are vain in this world and the next; and they are the people of the Fire, consigned to it for ever (2.217/4).

These passages suggest a picture of a small community struggling for its very survival against opponents who were using military force to try to get some of the Muslims to apostatize.

Not all the Muslims were enthusiastic about fighting. This was particularly the case in the months after the reverse at Uḥud in March 625. The conflict of opinion among the Muslims at this period is reflected in the passage 4.71/3–78/80 (which is not necessarily one continuous revelation). The objectors apparently did not want to risk losing their lives.

> Have you (Muḥammad) not looked at those to whom it was said, Restrain your hands, perform the prayer, and pay alms; and when fighting was prescribed for them, a group of them feared men with the fear (due to) God or a greater fear; they said, O our Lord, why have you prescribed fighting for us? Would you not give us respite until (our natural) end which is (in any case) near? Say: the enjoyment of this life is slight, and for those who fear (God) the Hereafter is better, and they will be in no way wronged. (4.77/9)

The assurance of heavenly reward, mentioned in the closing section here, is repeated more explicitly. "Let those who exchange this

present life for the Hereafter fight in the way of God. Whoever fights in the way of God, be he killed or victorious, to him we shall assuredly give a great reward" (5.74/6). The same assurance is given in several other passages.

The Arabic word commonly used for "holy war" is *jihād,* which properly means "striving" or "expenditure of effort." It occurs only four times in the Qur'ān, though there are over thirty occurrences, in different forms, of the corresponding verb *jāhada.* In 16.110/11 the word "strove" occurs by itself and apparently means "fought": "Then to those who emigrated after being persecuted and who then strove and endured, your Lord after that is forgiving and merciful." On the other hand, it can mean forms of pressure other than fighting, as when God addressing the individual Muslim says: "if (your parents) strive with you to get you to associate with me that of which you have no knowledge, obey them not" (31.15/14). Very often, however, we find the fuller phrase "strive in the way of God" or "strive with goods and person in the way of God," and this seems always to refer to fighting.[6] Occasionally the ordinary word for "fight" also occurs in the phrase "fight in the way of God."[7] In the earliest passages the word "strive" seems to connote "active participation" in contrast to "inactivity," for there is a verse (4.95/7) that expresses the inferiority in God's eyes of those who "sit still" to those who "strive with goods and person in the way of God."

Thus the Islamic conception of the jihād or "holy war" developed gradually out of the circumstances in which the Muslims found themselves in their Arabian environment. Muḥammad's opponents took measures against him and his followers that, in a land where the razzia was normal practice, were bound to lead to razzias or to more serious fighting. On the whole the Muslims were on the defensive. A verse (2.190/86) tells the Muslims to fight those who attack them but not to provoke hostility. If occasionally Muḥammad took the initiative, this would seem to be an instance of attack being the best defense and not the sign of a predilection for fighting, for, once the conflict had reached a certain pitch of intensity, Muḥammad and his followers would have vanished had they not attained military victory.

The original linking of the Islamic religion with fighting was thus

the work of Muḥammad's pagan opponents who by their measures against the Muslims put the latter in the position of having to fight for survival. In the course of time, however, a further linking took place, probably due to the fact that the Muslims formed a political community and to the influence of the conception of the razzia. The essential point is that there can be no razzia against allies. From the time he went to Medina Muḥammad's followers constituted in Arab eyes a federation of clans or tribes. To this belonged besides the small groups in Medina, usually called clans, a number of nomadic tribes. As Muḥammad proved himself successful in his struggle against the pagan Meccans, the federation grew stronger and was able to make more effective razzias, though generally less serious and bloody than the fighting against the Meccans. There was, of course, no question of one member of the federation making a razzia against another member, short of some misdemeanor. Thus when some group became tired of being the object of Muslim razzias, it could avoid the unwelcome attentions by joining the federation. To begin with there may have been pagan groups among Muḥammad's allies, but certainly in his later years he insisted that any group that wanted to enter the federation should first become Muslim.

In a certain sense, then, it may be said that Muḥammad gave to the pagans of Arabia a choice of "Islam or the sword." It seems quite clear, however, that the thought in the mind of those who organized and participated in razzias was not the conversion of those attacked but the plunder to be gained from them. It was the almost fortuitous linking of the Islamic religion with the Arab conceptions of the razzia and the federation that led to the expansion of the Islamic community. It was only to pagans, too, that even in this limited sense Muslims gave the choice of "Islam or the sword"; and this seldom seems to have happened outside Arabia. For Jews and Christians in the first place, and then for Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and even Hindus, another status was possible, namely, that of "protected minorities" (*ahl adh-dhimma, dhimmīs*).[8] These were equally members, though secondary members, of the federation and immune from attack. The rationale for this

status was that the Qur'ān presented Muḥammad as the last of a long line of prophets, all sent by God with a message that was always in essentials the same. Among these prophets were Moses, who brought to the Jews the book called the Torah, and Jesus who brought to the Christians the book called the Injīl or Evangel. Since Jews and Christians were thus accepted as already believing in God, they were not required to change their beliefs but only to pay a tax or tribute, known as the Jizya, in return for protection.

THE JIHĀD AND LATER ISLAMIC EXPANSION

At the time of Muḥammad's death in the year 632 the territory in which his political authority was recognized probably comprised about half of Arabia. Besides the tribes or sections of tribes included in his federation, some small Jewish and Christian groups were attached to the federation as protected minorities. Exactly a century later in 732 the Muslims were fighting near Tours in the center of France, and they had penetrated just as far eastward. To the Islamic empire, as it may now be called, belonged Spain, North Africa, Egypt, Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, northwest India, and parts of Central Asia. In 732 it was still essentially a federation of Arab tribes. Non-Arabs who became Muslims were attached as clients to the Arab tribes, but the vast majority of the inhabitants of the empire consisted of protected minorities.[9]

The phenomenal expansion was primarily a political expansion, and was based on the two concepts of razzia and federation together with a third that may be called military aristocracy. As soon as the revolts that broke out in Arabia at Muḥammad's death had been quelled, the Islamic state began to send out military expeditions in the direction of Syria and Iraq. These expeditions were essentially large-scale razzias. For one thing they provided an outlet for the excess energy of former nomads, who could not be allowed to attack other members of the federation. The primary aim of the expeditions, however, was material gain. This might be either in the form of movable plunder (which could be taken away and sold), or in the form of a poll tax and land-rents paid by protected minorities, and collected centrally by the Islamic state. The par-

ticipants in these expeditions doubtless thought of themselves as "fighting in the way of God" and expected to go straight to Paradise if they died; but the immediate aim of the expeditions seems to have been always material gain or the removal of obstacles to further material gain (as when the resistance of the Tunisian Berbers was overcome). There is no evidence that any expedition was undertaken whose primary aim was to offer pagans the choice of Islam or the sword. The expedition that was defeated at Tours was just such a plundering expedition, and the defeat made it clear to the Muslims that the military cost of plundering in this region was now excessive.

The concept of the military aristocracy was introduced by an arrangement known as the Dīwān of 'Umar (the second caliph, who ruled from 634 to 644). By this arrangement all male Muslims capable of bearing arms, provided they took part in expeditions or performed some other duty for the state, received a stipend from the state, which made it unnecessary for them to do any other work for their living. In other words most of the male population of Arabia was set free for campaigning. Up to the end of his life Muḥammad had insisted that all male Muslims must take part in expeditions when summoned to do so; and early sources show that for a time the jihād was regarded as one of the chief duties of a Muslim. In the course of time, however, things changed. Manpower became more plentiful, and many urban-dwellers were unwilling to risk their lives on distant expeditions. The stipends may also have decreased in purchasing power. Certainly by the first half of the eighth century it had become necessary to recruit men specially for the armies and to offer them material inducements beyond the stipend.

The great expansion of the Islamic state, as already noted, was essentially a political and not a religious expansion. To begin with the only people who became Muslims were pagans like the Berbers who wanted for material reasons to participate in the expeditions. Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians became protected minorities and retained their religion. Nevertheless, because the member of a protected minority was a kind of second-class citizen, there was some social pressure on him toward conversion to Islam; and Islam, which from the first had been a missionary religion, could

hardly refuse converts. On the other hand, nothing was done to encourage converts from the protected minorities; and indeed for a period shortly after 700 conversion was forbidden because it was having an adverse effect on the finances through loss of taxes. Later in the eighth century many Zoroastrians became Muslims. There does not seem to have been any mass conversion of Christians, but rather a steady trickle of converts through the centuries. In other words, though the fighting that led to the expansion of the Islamic state might be called jihād, it was not primarily an operation aimed at conversion.

THE GROWTH OF THE THEORY OF JIHĀD

What has been described so far has been mainly the actual practice of warfare "in the way of God," and this must be clearly distinguished from what the scholars said later as part of their elaboration of the Sharī'a. Since the Sharī'a is often referred to in English as "Islamic law," but differs considerably from law as understood in Europe and America, it is necessary to say something here about the nature of the Sharī'a.[10]

For one thing the Sharī'a is much wider than law as we understand it, and covers every aspect of the daily life of the Muslim. Thus the Sharī'a is concerned with ritual and liturgical matters, and gives precise rules for the performance of the daily prayers and the pilgrimage to Mecca and for the observance of the fast of Ramadān. It also includes matters that we would classify as ethics, etiquette, and even hygiene; an example of the last is the commendation of the use of the medieval equivalent of the toothbrush. More importantly, however, the Sharī'a differs from occidental laws in that it is essentially an ideal law. Much of it is, from its nature, not enforceable by police and lawcourts; but even the rest of it is not actually enforced except in those countries where the ruler or government has decreed that certain courts and judges should administer particular sections of the Sharī'a, such as the rules about marriage and inheritance. The enforceable part of the Sharī'a has never been enforced in its entirety; and nowadays most Muslim countries enforce only small sections of it.

It must not be concluded, however, that the Sharī'a is unimpor-

tant because it is thus largely ineffective. On the contrary countless generations of Muslim scholars have devoted their lives to the study and elaboration of the Sharī'a, and it is still highly esteemed by the great majority of Muslims. The reason for this is that it is a divine law, or way of life, prescribed by God for men and revealed to them by Him in its basic principles. During the first century or so after Muḥammad's death the government of the Islamic state followed as best it could along the lines he had laid down; but when new problems arose, as they constantly did because of the great expansion, it tended to decide in accordance with traditional Arab ideas. There therefore arose a body of men anxious to ensure that all the decisions of the state were based on Islamic principles. This meant in the first place such principles as were expressed in the Qur'ān; but it was soon discovered that many aspects of administration were not mentioned there, and the Qur'ānic principles were therefore supplemented by reference to the example of Muḥammad (often spoken of as his Sunna or "standard practice"). The evidence for this is in the collections of "sound" Traditions, that is, of properly accredited stories of what Muḥammad said or did on particular occasions. On the basis of Qur'ānic verses it came to be held that Muḥammad's sayings and doings were divinely inspired just as much as the Qur'ān itself, and were therefore a source for man's knowledge of the Sharī'a.

The Qur'ān and the Sunna, however, are not the whole of the Sharī'a, but only express its essential principles. The Sharī'a is a total ideal for human life, and therefore infinite. Later scholars expended much effort in the detailed elaboration of certain sections of it, such as the rules of inheritance. It was sometimes felt that they did this not to meet any practical need but to show off their intellectual dexterity. Other sections of the Sharī'a were completely neglected. The treatment of the jihād may be said to come midway between these extremes. Here it may be sufficient to look at two stages in the development of the ideal doctrine of the jihād: first, what is found in the Traditions; and second, the views of an eleventh-century writer.

The oldest of the collections of "sound" Traditions regarded as

canonical was written down about the middle of the ninth century and includes for each Tradition a list of the scholars who are supposed to have handed it on from the person who actually heard and saw Muḥammad. Whereas Muslim scholars accepted this chain of transmission as literal fact, most occidental scholars consider it to have been in part invented and the saying or act of Muḥammad to have been either invented or greatly modified from an actual happening.[11] For the occidental scholar, however, the Tradition is evidence of a view held in the Islamic community at the period at which the Tradition may be supposed to have come into circulation, though of course this is a matter that is to some extent conjectural. Two Traditions about the jihād may be quoted here. "Abd-Allāh ibn-Mas'ūd said: I asked the Messenger of God, . . . 'Which work is most excellent?' He said, 'Dutifulness to parents.' I said, 'Then which?' He said, 'The Jihād in the way of God.'" And again, "Abū-Hurayra said: The Messenger of God said, 'I am commanded to fight people until they say, "There is no deity but God"; and whoever says, "There is no deity but God," is inviolable to me in goods and person, apart from his due payments.'"[12]

The first of these Traditions is presumably to be dated to a period when at least the more pious Muslims still considered it a duty or a "good work" to take part personally in the expeditions sent out by the Islamic state. This is most likely to have been before the year 700. The second Tradition is perhaps a little later, but the assertion that one of the transmitters was a scholar who lived from 670 to 742 may well be genuine. The wording of this Tradition is to be noted carefully. It does not require the opponents to repeat the whole of the Islamic confession of faith—"there is no deity but God; Muḥammad is the Messenger of God"—but only the first half. That is to say, it does not require Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians to change their religious allegiance, and the phrase "their due payments" would most naturally be referred to the poll tax paid by such persons. In other words the Tradition justifies and gives a religious interpretation to what had been a prominent feature of the Islamic state in the century after Muḥammad's death—plundering

raids and warfare against members of these religions until they accepted the status of protected minorities. Thus, although most of the participants in any expedition probably thought only or mainly of the plunder, it was possible for pious-minded men to regard the expedition as having a religious basis.[13]

With this justification of the wars of expansion may be linked a wider process, namely, the transformation of the image of the Islamic state. In Muḥammad's time and for at least a century afterward the Islamic state could be regarded as a federation of Arab tribes. The original members of the federation (as named in the document known as the Constitution of Medina) were all Muslims, and subsequently those who wanted to join the federation were required to become Muslims; but in itself the form of the body politic was something Arab and not Islamic. Gradually, however, this conception was transformed. It became customary to speak of the world as divided into two "houses" or spheres, namely, the house or sphere of Islam and the house or sphere of war. The first consisted of the territory ruled by Muslims and—ideally at least—administered according to Islamic principles, while the latter consisted of territory not under Muslim rule and not subject to the Sharī'a. Thus the Islamic state was seen as having a universal mission to bring the whole world to confess that "there is no deity but God." It was always added, however, that there was no duty to go to war unless there was a reasonable prospect of victory. Though this new conception of the Islamic state was in part idealized, it nevertheless had an important influence on the course of history.

The theory of jihād as expounded by the eleventh-century writer al-Māwardī (d. 1058) is more elaborate than the conceptions found in Traditions (though the latter contain many details that have not been mentioned here).[14] The religious character of the state is marked by the fact that the first duty of the head of state (usually called *imam* rather than *caliph*) is to maintain religion. Other duties include protecting Islamic territories and defending the frontiers; in this it is implied that the enemies are non-Muslim invaders from the sphere of war. The sixth of the ten basic duties is to fight against those who have been invited to become Muslims

and have refused, and to do so until they are converted to Islam or accept the status of protected minorities.

The actual rules for the jihād are found in a chapter dealing with the appointment of a commander or emir for it. Some of the more general points may be mentioned briefly. It is envisaged that there will be both regular soldiers and volunteers. Emphasis is placed on inviting pagans to become Muslims before they are attacked; divergent views among the jurists are recorded, some holding that the commander who attacked without a prior invitation to Islam was liable to a penalty (blood money for those killed). The combatant ought to have the aim of upholding the religion of God "so as to render it victorious over all religion despite the polytheists" (9.33; 48.28; 61.9). In accordance with this aim four possible outcomes of a war are envisaged: the enemy may become Muslims; if the enemy refuse to become Muslims, the men may be killed and the women and children sold into slavery; the Muslims may cease fighting after the enemy has either paid a lump sum or has promised to make an annual payment; the Muslim may, without receiving any payment, make a truce with the enemy for not more than ten years.

Although these are the points of most general interest, there are countless other points of detail. Some are matters of common sense, such as the duty of the commander to choose an advantageous site for his camp and to provide food for his men and distribute it at a suitable time. Others are generalizations from incidents during Muḥammad's battles; thus with regard to the question whether it is permissible to kill the horses of the enemy, one jurist took the negative view because a well-known Muslim had once himself been killed while trying to kill the horse of the enemy commander. On the question of when flight was permissible there was much discussion; because a Qur'ānic verse promised that the Muslims would with God's aid defeat an enemy twice as numerous, some jurists held that the Muslims might flee when the enemy were more than two to one; others, following another verse (8.16), said the Muslims might only flee if they had the intention of renewing the conflict; and so on.

The first thing that strikes the student of Islamic history as he reads this chapter is that most of it is wholly irrelevant to the situation in which al-Māwardī was writing. In the eleventh century the caliph or imam had no political or military power. The Islamic lands were ruled by "warlords" who found it convenient to have a letter from the caliph appointing them governors of certain provinces, but it was they themselves who decided what provinces they ruled by fighting with other warlords. Moreover their wars were not the jihād, nor did they fall into the other categories recognized by al-Māwardī: wars against apostates, against rebels, and against criminals. Why then did intelligent men like al-Māwardī spend so much time in elaborating a practically irrelevant theory? The answer appears to be that they were creating an image of the ideal Islamic state, as a unitary state or empire administered in all respects according to Islamic principles. Although this image had no practical relevance in the circumstances of the time, the fact that it was widely accepted by ordinary Muslims placed certain restraints on the warlords and forced them to pay at least lipservice to Islamic norms.

The influence of the ideal image can also be traced at certain points in later history. It doubtless contributed to the conception of the *ghāzī*, in effect the ideal warrior for the faith, though literally the participant in the razzia. This conception inspired countless men to volunteer for service in Asia Minor on the frontier with the Byzantines from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, and thereby seriously weakened the Byzantines. Through the centuries, again, many leaders have declared that the fight against their enemies is a jihād and have thereby roused in their followers a fervor that was both religious and patriotic. Abuses certainly occurred; some African leaders declared a jihād against a tribe they wanted to enslave, claiming that some slight divergence from their own views rendered it infidel; and the Ottoman sultan in 1914 tried by declaring a jihād to rouse the Muslims of British India against their rulers, but failed because these Muslims realized that he himself was in alliance with infidels. Even these abuses, however, show the potency of the image at certain periods.

These reflections, then, lead to the conclusion that, though the Islamic theory of the jihād was of little use to commanders in the field, it was an important part of the self-image of Islam, and as such was not without influence on the currents of history.

Perhaps as a final word some sayings of the mystics or *ṣūfīs* in a different vein may be quoted. An early ascetic, Sufyān ibn-'Uyayna (d. 814), is reported to have said that the jihād in the way of God consists of ten parts, of which only one is fighting against the enemy while the other nine are fighting against the self. The same thought was expressed in another way by Sahl at-Tustarī (d. 896) when he remarked, "We have returned from the lesser Jihād to the greater Jihād," and then on being questioned added, "The greater Jihād is the struggle against the self." Since jihād properly means "effort," it was claimed that this was the true interpretation of some of the Qur'ānic verses containing the word.[15]

1. A full account of many aspects of pre-Islamic Arab life is found in R. A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs,* 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 30–140. Some old practices still continue in the present century; see Alois Musil, *The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins,* Oriental Explorations and Studies, no. 6 (New York and Prague, 1928), and H. R. P. Dickson, *The Arab of the Desert: A Glimpse into Badawin Life in Kuwait and Sau'di Arabia* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949).

2. For a general account of Muḥammad's career, see W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961; rpt., New York: Galaxy Books, 1974).

3. There is a list of expeditions with the number of participants in W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 339–43.

4. 22.39/40–41. Further references to the Qur'ān will be given in the text; where two verse numbers are given, with a slash mark between, the former is the numbering of the Standard Egyptian Edition, now generally adopted, and the latter the older European numbering of Gustav Fluegel, ed., *Corani Textus Arabicus* (Leipzig, 1834). For an English translation see *The Koran Interpreted,* trans. Arthur J. Arberry, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1955).

5. See W. Montgomery Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 66.

6. 2.218/215; 4.95/97; 5.35/39, 54/59; 8.72/73; 9.19–20, 24, 41, 44, 81/82, 86/87, 88/89; 49.15; 60.1; 61.11.

7. 2.190/186, 244/245.

8. See Watt, *Muhammad at Medina,* pp. 244–46; *Encyclopedia of Islam,* 2nd ed., s.v. "Dhimma"; W. Montgomery Watt, *The Majesty that was Islam* (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 46–49.

9. For the expansion of the Islamic state, see Philip R. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (London: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 139–68, 209–15; Watt, *The Majesty,* pp. 32–44.

10. For the Sharī'a, see Noel J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1964); Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Watt, *The Majesty,* pp. 78–80, 121–30.

11. For the Traditions in the technical sense (Arabic, *hadīth*), see the works mentioned in the previous note and Watt, *The Majesty,* pp. 81–83, 179–80.

12. The first of these is found in the collection of al-Burkhārī, 56.1 and the second in 56.102 and elsewhere. See A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 27–29.

13. Worldly motives for jihād are criticized in many of the Traditions in *Mishkat al-Masabih,* English translation James Robson, vol. 2 (Lahore: S. M. Ashraf, 1963), pp. 806–16, especially p. 811.

14. The fundamental work of al-Māwardī, *Al-ahkām as-sulṭāniyya,* is translated into French as *Les statuts gouvernementaux,* trans. Edward Fagnan (Algiers: A. Jourdan, 1915). Chapter 4 deals with "The Investiture of the Commander of the Holy War" (pp. 71–108). Al-Māwardī's purpose in writing this book is discussed by Hamilton Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam,* ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 151–65. See also Watt, *The Majesty,* p. 217.

15. The first of these sayings is quoted from Margaret Smith, *An Early Mystic of Baghdad* (London: Sheldon Press, 1935), p. 76. The second is from al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Mahjūb,* trans. R. A. Nicholson (London: Luzac, 1936), p. 200.