Fighting fire with fire: missiles against missiles

Christophe Carle

In what circumstances and how far to proceed with the development and deployment of active defences against ballistic missiles has been debated intermittently, and often passionately, over the last fifty years. Each time, the United States has been at the centre of the issue. The current controversy over ballistic missile defences (BMD) and especially national missile defence (NMD)[1] now ranges far beyond the intra-American debate of the last few years. Today, it seems futile to argue for or against NMD as such. All the arguments have been heard, and those opposing NMD have clearly come out on the losing side in Washington. Even as the outcome of the United States presidential elections remains uncertain as of this writing, the United States will, at some point, deploy NMD in some shape. The timing, the manner and the extent of this deployment do matter, but the postponement announced by President Clinton on 1 September 2000 is just that, a postponement. It is a tactic, not a strategy. In fact, the controversy goes well beyond the issue of missile defences in themselves. What matters is the complex web of strategic consequences of deployment. The debate may be salutary, if only because it puts into sharper focus some of the central dilemmas of global security policy which remain unresolved a decade after the end of post-Cold War euphoria.

Precedents

The first attempted missile interceptions took place during the Second World War, when V-1 cruise missiles were countered with anti-aircraft guns, and by British Spitfires nudging them off-course with the touch of a wingtip. The V-2, with its high speed and ballistic trajectory, posed a more difficult problem. The ancestor of all current ballistic missiles inaugurated a phase in weapons development against which fully effective defences have yet to be found more than half a century later. Since the late 1950s, ballistic missiles have been the fastest and most reliable way of delivering nuclear weapons. Paired together in the offensive, nuclear weapons and missiles were also put to defensive use. Early attempts to intercept long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) suffered from their inaccuracy, and therefore relied on a nuclear warhead detonating in the area of the incoming missile. This method applied to Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems developed and deployed during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union.[2] Things changed in the early 1980s when technological advances seemed to hold the promise of other (non-nuclear) means of intercepting ballistic missiles. Electronics, computing and space technology were combined in the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was supposed to

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revolutionize strategy and make obsolete the nuclear-ballistic duo. As these ambitions were cut short by the end of the Cold War, anti-ballistic missile interceptors were used for the first time in combat against Iraqi missiles carrying conventional warheads. Progress in surface-to-air missiles originally designed for anti-aircraft use since the 1960s led to systems such as the American Patriot and the Soviet/Russian S-300 with improving capabilities against short-range ballistic missiles. The next stage in the broader ABM debate centred in the early 1990s around a scaled-down version of SDI known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The main distinguishing feature of GPALS was that it was post-bipolar in its conception. Developed in parallel with strategies for counter-proliferation, GPALS had a clear North-South rather than East-West orientation. It incorporated SDI technology into a thoroughly different design and purpose, aimed no longer at massive opposing nuclear forces, but rather at small-scale attacks, whether intentional or accidental, nuclear, non-conventional or conventional.

Recently declassified official documents in the United States have shed interesting light on the first instalment of the anti-missile debate in the 1960s and early 1970s. Even published secondary sources, however, already showed instructive parallels and contrasts with the current situation, and illustrated some fundamental continuities in the dilemmas raised by NMD.

In the mid-1960s, it was the Soviets who argued that strategic missile defences were purely defensive, and as such, non-provocative. In an often-quoted article, one Soviet military expert argued that "It is obvious that the creation of an effective anti-missile system merely serves to build up the security of the peaceable non-aggressive state. The creation of an effective anti-missile system enables the state to make its defence dependent chiefly on its own possibilities, and not on mutual deterrence, that is on the goodwill of the other side."[3] In the recollection of a veteran Soviet ambassador to Washington, "A defence against missiles, specifically for the protection of civilians, was considered in Moscow as a legitimate matter and was not supposed to arouse suspicion abroad."[4] At the June 1967 Glassboro summit, "In defending his position on the ABM against (President) Johnson, (Prime Minister Kosygin) came close to losing his temper […]. In a loud and resolute voice he said 'defence is moral, aggression is immoral!'"[5] Kosygin also asked: "Which weapons should be regarded as a tension factor — offensive or defensive weapons? I think that a defensive system, which prevents attack, is not a cause of the arms race but represents a factor preventing the death of people. Some persons reason thus: Which is cheaper, to have offensive weapons that can destroy cities and entire states or to have weapons that can prevent this destruction? […] An antimissile system may cost more than an offensive one, but it is intended not for killing people but for saving human lives."[6] Such was the way that the first ABM system in the world was presented by the USSR in the mid-1960s.

At the time, pressure mounted for the United States to deploy its own ABM system. After much resistance, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara announced in September 1967 a decision to deploy a "light" ABM. "The Soviets are now deploying an anti-ballistic missile system. If we react to this deployment intelligently, we have no reason for alarm. […] This is not in any sense a new issue. We have both the technical possibility and the strategic desirability of an American ABM deployment under constant review since the late 1950s. […] In point of fact, we already initiated offensive weapons programs costing several billions in order to offset the small present Soviet ABM deployment. […] We will be forced to continue that effort over the next few years if the evidence is that the Soviets intend to turn what is now a light and modest ABM deployment into a massive one." McNamara stressed that "it is important to distinguish between an ABM system designed to protect against Soviet attack on our cities, and ABM systems which have other objectives", one such objective being "in relation to the emerging nuclear capability of communist China. […] Is there any possibility, then, that by the mid-1970s China might become so incautious as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States or our allies? […] It would be suicidal for her to do so, but one can conceive

conditions under which China might miscalculate […] our strategic planning must always be conservative, and take into consideration even the possible irrational behaviour of our adversaries […]."[7]

Therefore, Robert McNamara concluded, "after a detailed review of all these considerations, we have decided to go forward with this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment, and we will begin actual production of such a system at the end of this year." However, he also cautioned that "the danger in deploying this relatively light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system. We must resist this temptation firmly […]."[8]

Seen from abroad, McNamara's announcement "had almost an air of an anti-climax. His concession to the advocates of the ABM raised a flurry of alarm in the European press, but it had long seemed almost inevitable to anyone prepared to reflect coolly upon the pressure of technological advance and the glutinous pace at which the diplomacy of arms control advanced. (But) what is inevitable is not necessarily innocuous, and it would be wrong to deny that a significant and possibly tragic frontier has been crossed." Yet, according to the same British analyst, it seemed "hard to commend the way in which the United States Administration handled the announcement. The ABM was one issue on which the disarmament section of the Foreign Office believed it had rallied European opinion and substantially influenced the American debate. The apparent absence of real consultation when the decision was being taken is yet another example of the frequent fate of those (including many other branches of the United States Government) who have to deal with the American military establishment. […] McNamara should not be surprised by the poor reception given to his argument concerning China. […] Europeans, who have persistently regarded American fears of China as exaggerated and Chinese pugnacity as largely a result of America's own policy, can hardly look with favour on measures against China that they fear will disturb the much more important Soviet-American relationship."[9]

"Sentinel", the light ABM system announced by McNamara, was reconfigured and re-named "Safeguard" by the Nixon Administration, and was operational for only a few months from October 1975 to February 1976. Unlike today's NMD, however, the single Safeguard site in Grand Forks (North Dakota) was designed primarily for the protection of Minuteman ICBMs and their associated command centres rather than as a shield for population centres. Unlike today's NMD, both the Spartan and Sprint interceptors used by Safeguard carried nuclear warheads.

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The sense of *déjà vu* between 1967 and 2000 is striking. Then, as now, controversy within the United States was closely monitored abroad. The identification of the threat against which to turn missile defences was a sensitive issue, and the reactions of friends and foes alike were much discussed. Central to the debate was the concern to avoid opening a new phase in American-Soviet arms racing in the "action-reaction" mode described by McNamara. Likewise, there was controversy over whether the envisaged ABM system would actually work. In the mid-1960s, ABM discussions took place in a setting in which the future of arms control appeared uncertain, and hinged on the willingness of the then-superpowers to advance both towards an agreement on nuclear non-proliferation (which turned out to be the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or NPT) and towards negotiations on strategic arms (the SALT talks and the ABM Treaty of 1972). A hotly contested internal American debate leading to the compromise solution of deploying a light anti-missile system; the pains taken to convey the message that the system was not turned against Moscow, but against the possible "irrational behaviour" of certain adversaries; the sense, outside the United States, that such a decision had

become a foregone conclusion; the misgivings of Europeans who had liked to think that their opinions held more sway with their senior ally, all seem like a distant precursor of current dilemmas.

There are of course several crucial differences between then and now. First, the world was bipolar, and despite a generally recognized sense of American superiority in many areas of high technology, a rough equivalence of military potential existed between the two rivals. Not only was the USSR an approximate military equal, but it could be argued to be ahead of the United States in some respects. After all, the Soviets had been the first to test an ICBM only about a decade earlier. Second, in the 1960s, the United States and Soviet positions on ABM were radically different from today. The USSR had begun to deploy an ABM system, of which the United States had none. Third, the relevant technologies for missile interception were far less advanced than they are today. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the weight of scientific opinion in the United States made itself powerfully felt against active ballistic missile defences through numerous public statements and hearings in the United States legislature. In the United States in the early 1970s, Congress, and in particular the Senate (most notably the Senate's Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations presided by Albert Gore senior) were broadly sceptical of the value of BMD.[10] The approval of the decision to deploy Safeguard only went through thanks to the deciding vote of Vice President Spiro Agnew. In late 2000, the question is not so much whether the United States legislature might object to NMD deployment in itself, but rather whether it might reject a proposed system because it considers it too weak.

New dilemmas

In practice, when the United States announces and deploys the first stage of its NMD, it may be perceived as something of a non-event. After so much heat generated by controversy and dire threats by both opponents and proponents of NMD, the result, being less than overnight apocalypse, may well appear like a dud.

In some short-term respects, the impression is likely to be justified. Differences on NMD between Western Europe and the United States (and to some extent, as usual, within Europe) have been amply discussed. Across the Atlantic, different perceptions of threats and vulnerabilities, and the different value attributed to the notion of invulnerability are nothing new. Fears in Europe of transatlantic decoupling are not new either. These fears, however, are not significantly more or less warranted with or without America's NMD. Time and again, since the birth of NATO, the decoupling debate has been vastly exaggerated and the NMD episode could perhaps be no exception. The Euro-American alliance's strength and endurance depends above all on non-military factors of history, culture, values, and on shared interests in policies designed to maintain and further these values. If the existence of this or that weapon system were all that the reciprocal Euro-American security commitment relied on, then that commitment would be *de facto* dead anyway.

If the deployment of NMD by the United States turned out to be enough to put the North Atlantic alliance in jeopardy, it would be as a catalyst of deeper differences rather than as a cause in itself. Decoupling in a military sense and fears of a loosening of extended deterrence are not what should concern Europeans. A more fundamental form of decoupling would hinge on principle rather than on operational military strategy, and whether it occurs or not depends on how the United States carries out its NMD deployment. What actually does concern many Europeans is the prospect of a NMD deployment which involves abrogating the ABM Treaty with Russia, ushers in reinvigorated tensions with Moscow, precipitates an acute crisis in multilateral arms control, and signals a genuine outbreak of unilaterlaism in the United States. In time, a United States committed

to unilateral supremacy and prophylactic invulnerability, and Europeans attempting to build and enlarge cooperative security through multilateralism, could only drift apart from each other.

On the other hand, an American agreement with Russia on adapting the ABM Treaty to limited NMD deployment would not only make matters easier for Europeans hosting NMD-related facilities, it would also be a welcome indication that some of the concerns about the "death of arms control" had been exaggerated. In view of Russia's current predicament, it seems possible that some agreement will be struck with the United States on a combination of strategic nuclear arms reductions and accommodation on a limited NMD. The situation could thus be stabilized for some time, assuming that the United States manages to resist future temptation to expand its initial NMD into a heavier defence of the American territory.

The same considerations, however, do not apply to China as many analysts have already discussed.[11] Whereas in 1967 Robert McNamara's announcement of ABM deployment quoted earlier was explicitly turned towards China, the NMD of the early twenty-first century is more ambiguous. The American-Chinese rapprochement of the early 1970s defused the issue, but the odds are against this happening again in the near future. It is often claimed that China would have continued to modernize and increase its strategic nuclear capabilities with or without American NMD. To some extent that may be true. But Beijing will clearly have all the more reason for doing so, and all the more incentive to speed up this process once NMD deployment is announced. If only for this reason, the immediate prospects for a negotiated multilateral agreement banning the production of fissile materials are virtually nil.

Over the longer term, one has to wonder whether concerns about ballistic missile proliferation (exaggerated though they often are) justify building up Russian resentment and accelerating China's strategic modernization, with obvious effects on the nuclear armament of India, and therefore of Pakistan. In time also, nuclear powers situated in regions of tension will seek anti-missile systems for themselves. After all, the availability of missile-related technology and the speed of its dissemination are among the central tenets of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report which was so influential in buttressing the case for American NMD. The United States is for the moment the prime state of concern with regard to NMD proliferation, but it will not be the last. Israel's American-funded Arrow system is a case in point. Likewise, whether it is India or Pakistan that takes the lead, the other will follow suit. Existing systems similar to the Arrow may be acquired from Russia, future ones may be forthcoming from China, and wholly or partly indigenous devices may be developed. Often labelled as tactical missile defence (TMD) by virtue of the 1997 demarcation agreements between the United States and Russia, such systems could obviously take on strategic significance in different regional settings (much as "strategic" and "tactical" nuclear weapons depend for their categorization on geographical context rather than on any of their inherent characteristics). Undoubtedly, these future NMDs (whether dressed up as TMD or not) will, in their turn, be described as purely defensive and as stabilizing. They will also be claimed to have no justifiable impact whatsoever on the adversary's levels of nuclear armament. What a relief.

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Shield or sieve—and does it matter?

In all previous episodes of the missile defence debate, a recurring question has been whether BMD would work as well as advertised, if at all. The difficulties with mid-course and terminal missile interception are well known. So are the mixed results of tests conducted so far. It is common for

opponents of missile defences to argue that the systems in question will not work. Each failed test of components or of complete systems is met with gleeful funeral orations by BMD opponents, and every success is greeted by proponents as proof that the shield can and will work.

The proponents of NMD have an obvious point. Whatever the results of the tests carried out to date, NMD will perform at least adequately, and perhaps well, against the missiles it is designed to intercept. Decades of research and development have been carried out, and many lessons learned. Computing, electronics and space technology have advanced immensely since the 1960s, and it would take a singularly autistic hermit not to recognize the ever-growing extent of American military-technological achievements.

Most of all, whether or not NMD performs up to the standards held up by its critics is quite irrelevant. What does count is that NMD will work well enough to be deployed, and well enough to be taken seriously by the rest of the world. The fact that some "smart bombs" and cruise missiles can and indeed occasionally do go astray does not cause anyone to dismiss them as insignificant. The same will apply to NMD, even if it is less than demonstrably 100% effective (as are all complex systems designed, built and operated by humans in the real world). Many proponents of NMD recognize and accept these limitations. Awkwardly, however, they usually fail to grant the same toleration of imperfection to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements.

Even more irrelevant, seen from abroad, is the American debate on the price tag of NMD. Numerous billions of dollars have already been spent during decades on BMD research and development by the United States. The sums mentioned for NMD by official sources and in the literature are undeniably considerable, but by the mind-numbing standards of contemporary American military outlays, they are nothing extraordinary. If its government, legislature and tax-paying citizens so decide, the most prosperous nation on earth can certainly afford NMD.

It is also objected that NMD is vulnerable to countermeasures and decoys. It is indeed interesting to note that in many dire prognostics of future hostile ballistic missile proliferation, the proliferators are assumed to have been briefed by NMD planners and are expected to adjust their behaviour accordingly. Seemingly, the proliferators should deploy treasures of engineering to produce rapidly the long-range missiles that justify NMD deployment, but their proliferating prowess should miraculously stop just short of equipping these missiles with the countermeasures and decoys to confuse and defeat NMD. In any case, over time, the United States can be counted on to devise countermeasures to such countermeasures, should they appear. And the cycle continues. Likewise, the increasingly frequent proposals for ship-based boost-phase intercept systems supposed to avoid the shortcomings of terminal and mid-course interception, should be mindful of the vulnerability of the naval platforms themselves. The tragic incident of the USS Cole springs to mind.

Another objection is that NMD cannot deal with smuggled nuclear explosive devices (suitcase-bombs, pick-up trucks, cargo ships, and so on). Here, again, the objection is irrelevant, and it makes no sense to criticize NMD for not doing what it was never intended to do. If smuggling is a priority, then invest in anti-terrorism (which opting for NMD does not necessarily exclude). Buy a washing machine if you want to, but instead of bemoaning its inability to cook dinner, buy an oven.

Misguided optimism

It is sometimes claimed that anti-ballistic armaments can be conducive to disarmament. Let us leave aside for the moment the built-in contradiction. As levels of nuclear arsenals are reduced and get close to zero, anti-ballistic capabilities, it is argued, would strengthen confidence by reducing

fears of vulnerability. Supposedly, nuclear-armed states would thus feel safe behind anti-ballistic shields and pursue deeper and deeper reductions. This overlooks the fact that the leap of faith involved in getting at all close to zero nuclear weapons would presuppose far greater confidence than any anti-ballistic systems could provide. The most one could possibly concede to the argument is that in such an optimistic disarmament outlook, the anti-ballistic factor would be negligible, and perhaps altogether irrelevant. But the prognostic is so far removed from current and envisageable circumstances that its relevance to the real world is nil. Worse, this naive scenario, if it were given any credence and effect, would precipitate exactly the reverse of the disarmament objectives it purports to encourage. At most, one could perhaps look upon deployed ballistic missile defences with benign neglect in a world in which powerful disarmament dynamics held sway. But in the real world in which disarmament is — at best — in a lull and in which international suspicions are running high, resort to anti-ballistic armaments will only encourage another round in the offence-defence competition. If disarmament were surfing on a triumphant tidal wave of mutual trust among the major powers, anti-missile weapons might conceivably do little harm — but arms control is solidly stagnant, if not ebbing away. Adding weapons to weapons is at least coherent for advocates of militarized individualistic security and national supremacy. Coming from partisans of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the argument is a curious error of judgement.

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A more common argument consists of seeking solace in the prognostic that anti-ballistic weapons will not — indeed, cannot — cause an arms race. The United States is so much more advanced and powerful in military terms than any other country, it is held, that no other state in the world could presume to compete against it. It follows that for lack of credible competitors, it makes no sense to refer to an arms race. An arms race, it is assumed, is a race only if it opposes approximate equals in military capabilities: the United States and the USSR engaged in an arms race during the Cold War. No such thing could happen today nor in the foreseeable future. With Russia downtrodden, impecunious and at pains to even control the decay of its existing nuclear forces, with China possessing a mere twenty-odd inter-continental ballistic nuclear delivery systems, the very notion of an arms race is held to be irrelevant, and bound to remain so. Leaving aside the open or unavowed motivations behind such statements, their coherence leaves much to be desired.

This argument rests entirely on adopting the Cold War as the one and only pattern of any arms race. Not only is it backward looking, but it is also shallow, seemingly assuming that history began and ended with the Cold War. History is actually replete with examples of armed competition between two or more parties of far from equivalent capabilities. A race is a race, even if it opposes Mr Michael Johnson to a collection of outclassed competitors over 400 metres. In today's globalizing world, a technological race is on, and has clear implications for military technology (whereas in the past, military research and development led and civilian applications followed, the reverse holds now and for the foreseeable future).

The argument is static. It assumes that the existing distribution of power is bound to remain as it stands in the year 2000. Nothing warrants such an assumption. Russia will not remain in its current disarray forever. Its immense human and natural resources, put to purposive use, will someday confound those who have become used to looking down upon Moscow. Whether that evolution is cooperative or confrontational is what matters. Even without the stimulus of anti-missile armaments, Russia, however impoverished, retains the option of allocating more of its resources to two of the activities it knows best: even at the worst of times (unless centrally planned communist management was ever supposed to be resource-efficient) Russian excellence in matters of rocketry and warheads was and remains a matter of fact, not speculation. So is China's vastly untapped potential.

In competitions with as few rules as arms racing, shortcuts are the name of the game for those who would otherwise be left behind. A country that boldly advertises its own quest for "full spectrum dominance" in the military realm — and has a credible claim to just that — cannot expect others to reply in kind. For the time being, no one can. But in time, Russia could, and in time, China will. For others who might not see such supremacy as necessarily benign, adaptations will be necessary — within the bounds of their capabilities. Faced with the complete impossibility of even beginning to catch up in any significant sense with the United States, some will take the obvious path: shortcuts. In the military-technological realm, these shortcuts are known as WMD proliferation. Non-proliferation 'rules of the road' exist to prohibit or at least restrict such shortcuts, but they are far from perfect. In fact, they will be gravely weakened by the tangible demonstration by the most powerful nation on earth that it regards non-proliferation as useless. If even this contemporary leviathan feels vulnerable enough to equip itself with NMD,[12] lesser nations can scarcely be expected to entrust any significant measure of their security to arms control, non-proliferation or disarmament treaties.

Euphemisms

Whatever their future performance, ABM, NMD, BMD and TMD have already proved fearsomely effective as weapons of rhetoric. They have a clear built-in attractiveness. All are defences. Defences are inherently less objectionable, more legitimate and benign than means of offence or attack. The widespread re-naming of war ministries around the world as ministries of defence in the course of the twentieth century illustrates this connotation. Defence, and more particularly national or collective self-defence, has an undeniable public appeal. Advocates of anti-missile capabilities have the inherent semantic advantage. What could possibly be wrong with seeking to protect oneself, and one's friends and allies? But defence and offence are inextricably linked in strategy. Solid defences can be — indeed should be — part and parcel of any credible offensive or coercive strategy. Confidence in the attack, in the intimidating gesticulation of power and in the ability to coerce or compel others into taking a given course of action are all buttressed by robust defences. The distinction is a matter of intentions, and the credibility of intentions is in the eye of the beholder. A parallel is the ever-unresolved distinction between "stabilizing" and "destabilizing" military capabilities. One can argue that the difference is context-dependent. In practice, however, the only guiding axiom which holds sway is that "any given weapon is stabilizing in my own hands, and destabilizing in anyone else's". Inescapably, anti-missile systems are weapons. Anti-ballistic devices are armaments. How they are perceived is subject to all the usual intricacies and ambiguities. Whatever the intentions of whoever deploys such systems, perceptions matter more, because whatever is (rightly or wrongly) perceived as real becomes real in its consequences. A given state's deployment of an anti-missile capability, whatever its actual intentions, can be perceived by others as a shield behind which to wield the sword more effectively and with greater impunity. Anti-ballistic weapons, anti-missile armaments, are elements in the strategic equation that nothing distinguishes qualitatively from other weapons systems.

Defence, and more particularly national or collective self-defence, has an undeniable public appeal.

Strategic BMD has taken on several successive guises: nuclear missiles aimed at other nuclear missiles in order to protect selected cities or military installations; nuclear missiles aimed at other nuclear missiles in order to protect yet other nuclear missiles (one of the culminating points of Cold War arms racing); and lately, conventional missiles aimed at a few conventional, WMD or nuclear missiles in order to offer some protection to the national territory. In a world of nation-states, a sovereign choice can of course be made to resort to such means for purposes of national defence. But this choice does have broader consequences — whether intended or not — and attempting to

reconcile it with arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament is plainly absurd. Under the circumstances, urgent attention needs to be given to all proposals, past and recent, for multilateral transparency and control on ballistic missiles including early warning, detection and tracking, which is in fact one area in which much technology developed for BMD could be put to constructive use. Lastly, the experience, strengths and weaknesses of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty and of the Missile Technology Control Regime need to be comprehensively reassessed.

Notes

[1] This paper focuses on NMD, although some reference is made to tactical missile defence (TMD).
[2] An announcement was made in 1998 that the Russian Federation had taken off the nuclear warheads from interceptors at the Moscow AMB site.
[3] Nicolai Talensky, Anti-missile systems and disarmament, *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 10, October 1964, p. 18.
[4] Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence; Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents*, New York, Times Books, 1995, p. 153.
[5] Ibid., p. 170.
[6] Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, as quoted in David Yost, *Soviet Ballistic Missile Defence and the Western Alliance*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 98.
[7] Robert McNamara, American ABM deployment, *Survival*, November, 1967, pp. 342–46. (The text is an abridged version of the United States Secretary of Defence's speech of 18 September 1967.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Laurance Martin, The American ABM decision, *Survival*, December 1967, pp. 384–86.
[10] For a useful account, see Ernest J. Yanarella, *The Missile Defence Controversy; Strategy, Technology and Politics, 1955–1972,* University Press of Kentucky, 1977.
[11] See, for example, Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic missile defence and strategic stability, *Adelphi Paper* (Oxford), no. 334, May 2000.
[12] See for example, arguments such as the following: "… the main threat arises not from the United States being too powerful but from its being perceived abroad as weak and irresolute." Frank J. Gaffney Jr., in *American Power—For What?*, a symposium published in *Commentary*, January 2000, p. 27.