



From left to right: Wilson, Lenarduzzi, Valentine, Bridge, Ragan, James, Samuel, Norman, Sweeny, Vrablic, Dolan

## Tony Waiters

Tony Waiters (49) was goalkeeper with the English First Division club *Blackpool* from 1957-69, with 257 first team appearances. Later on, he was transferred to Burnley where he finished his career as a player. He played five times for England: against

Brazil, Wales, Ireland Rep., Belgium and the Netherlands.

Waiters began his career as a manager quite successfully: in 1973 he won the European Championships with the *English youth team*. In the same year he was appointed manager of the Third Division club *Plymouth Argyle* and managed to be promoted to the Second Division with this team in 1975.

In 1977 Waiters went to Canada. With the *Vancouver Whitecaps* he was at the same time president, general manager and coach. In 1979 this team became champions of the NASL.

In 1983 he took over the Canadian national team, working at the same time in an advisory capacity for the Canadian Soccer Association. Canada qualified for the soccer tournament of the Olympic

Games in Los Angeles in 1984. After a victory over Cameroon (3:1), a draw against Iraq (1:1) and a defeat against Yugoslavia (0:1), Canada achieved the Quarter-Finals. The game against Brazil ended in a draw (1:1), Canada lost the shoot-out and were eliminated.


## Development

The Canadian youth team managed to qualify for two World Youth Championships (WYC). At the WYC '79 in Japan, Canada caused a great surprise with a 3:1 victory over Portugal. After losing to Korea Rep. (0:1) and to Paraguay (0:3) the Canadian side were eliminated. Four players from the select team for Mexico were first string players of that youth national team: *Bridge, Gray, Segota* and *Sweeney*.

From the team participating in the WYC '85 in USSR no players were admitted to Canada's Mexico team.

No less than 13 players, however, were already present at the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.





Surprisingly, there were only few changes of players in the Canadian team. Segota (9), who was nominated for the Canadian squad only subsequently, was used as a joker in all three games.

## The Players

The North American Soccer League (NASL) was disbanded in the beginning of 1985. This also caused the dissolution of many professional clubs. The international players Wilson, Ragan, Samuel, James, Dolan and Habermann could not find a new club. Therefore, they were available to their national manager for a long preparation programme.

About half of the Canadian players got a job with clubs of the Major Indoor Soccer League (MISL) and thus were able to participate in the American indoors championship.

Three players found a job abroad: Bridge played at La Chaux-de-Fonds (Switzerland), Moore was under contract with Glentoran Belfast and Vrablic scored goals for Seraing in Belgium. Youngster Paul James was invited for a test training by Arsenal, but was not engaged.

The Canadian team were composed of players from various countries. Seven of the standard players were born abroad, emigrated to Canada later on and became naturalized: Gray and Norman came from Scotland, James from Wales, Lettieri was born in Italy and Samuel in Trinidad. Vrablic's country of origin was the CSSR and Segota came from Yugoslavia.

## Team Organization

The team organization and the conception of play were typically British: a classic 4-4-2 system with an overall zonal marking.

Young Dolan guarded the goal in Canada's first game against France. In the following matches standard goalkeeper Lettieri was given preference again.

The four-men defence played three times in the same formation. The central defenders Bridge and Samuel

covered each other in the middle. Lenarduzzi was used as right full-back. The team's senior and captain Wilson was charged with the position of the left full-back.

The indefatigable Ragan played in the left midfield during all the games. Although he did not have the qualities of a playmaker he was nevertheless the Canadians' central organizer and their driving force. He was supported by Gray in the encounters with Hungary and the USSR. Against France, Ragan was assisted by the talented James whose qualities as a slightly retreated right winger came to bear very well in this position.

Norman was given an offensive role on one of the flanks. Against France, Sweeney ran wide on the left side, operating as a retreated winger.

Three players were available for the two positions up front. The lightning-quick Valentine was used in all three games. Vrablic, Canada's goalgetter, was nominated for the first two matches and was then replaced by Mitchell against the USSR.

## Attacking Play

The attacking play was based on the physical and mental qualities of the Canadians: fastness, stamina, running power and fighting spirit. They bridged the midfield as fast as possible and directly went for the opposing goal.

As soon as the defenders had conquered the ball, they tried to bring the forwards into action by long passes. The midfield players immediately followed up and tried to run clear. One of their main tasks was to chase or to fight for the rebounds in order to launch their strikers once again.

Other characteristics of the Canadian offensive play were swift runs down the flanks followed by sharp crosses and shots from all positions and distances. But in the penalty-area the players mostly

lacked vision and coolness. Some Canadians did not dispose of the necessary skill, an essential factor at full speed. This is also a reason why the Canadian team did not score one of their many opportunities.

## Defensive Play

The strong points of the Canadian team were undoubtedly to be found in defence. They were well organized at the back. The positional play of the defenders was next to perfect. Their mutual understanding proved to be very good. One really had the impression that this team have been built up over years, with only some few changes.

The physical qualities of the defenders proved to be quite useful in all their defensive actions. The two central defenders Bridge and Samuel could not be harassed by high crosses. Thanks to the well-trained abilities in tackling and the uncompromising commitment of all the defenders, the Canadians were able to stand their ground even against teams provided with superior skills without having to resort to unnecessary fouls.

## Conclusions

Manager Waiters presented a well-balanced team with a good mutual understanding. They had their strong sides certainly in the mental field. The disciplined party were provided with an exceptional morale. Each player was willing to devote himself completely to the team. There was no other team at this World Cup tournament with such a highly developed feeling of solidarity.

Some players arrived in Mexico - coming from the Canadian indoors championship - just a few days before their first game and thus could hardly adapt themselves to the altitude. Nevertheless, the team appeared to be in good shape. The Canadians

set a good example that even at top level it is possible to cope with difficult situations with determination and enthusiasm.

Manager Waiters was clever enough to let his team perform their familiar soccer, regardless of altitude and heat. To play with a pressing means that all team members have to run a lot and that the harmony among them has to be excellent. As soon as the ball was lost, the opponents were attacked and put under pressure. For this reason, they had enormous difficulties to develop their own game and to find their rhythm.

Canada made great trouble to the French team and had to concede the crucial goal only ten minutes from time. Against Hungary, the Canadians assaulted continuously the opposing goal. It was only because of a lack in coolness and a great deal of bad luck that they did not win a point in their best game. The Soviets too were faced with some problems. It took them 60 minutes to break down the astonishing Canadians.

Canada's first participation in the World Cup Finals must doubtlessly be regarded as a gain. The fighting spirit of all players, their commitment and enthusiasm deserve congratulations!

### Canada-France 0:1 (0:0)

0:1 Papin (79')

### Canada-Hungary 0:2 (0:1)

0:1 Esterhazy (2')

0:2 Detari (75')

### Canada-USSR 0:2 (0:0)

0:1 Blokhin (58')

0:2 Zavarov (74')

# Korea Rep.

## Preparation

The government and the Football Association of Korea Rep. spared no expense to give the Korean team the best possible preparation for the World Cup Finals.

Only one month after the successful qualification for Mexico, at the beginning of December 1985, the national team made at first a trip to Los Angeles where they played a first international game against Mexico. Immediately afterwards the Korean squad flew to Mexico-City. There, the Koreans participated in an international tournament with Hungary, Algeria and hosts Mexico. Three further encounters against Mexican club teams formed the close of the tour.

At the beginning of February 1986, the Korean side started for a second extensive preparation tour. During an intermediate stop in Hongkong international games were played against Hongkong and Paraguay. Then the trip was

*The South Korean Kyung-Hoon tries with all means to prevent Maradona from receiving the ball. The Asiatics proved to be a gain for the World Cup, managed to win one point and to score four goals.*



continued in Europe where totally 7 games took place in Germany, Belgium and Monaco, partly against famous club sides.

At the beginning of May, the Koreans moved to an altitude retreat in Colorado (USA), during which they went down to sea level three times. In San José and in Los Angeles further preparation games were staged (against England and Peru). On May 18 the Korean delegation departed for Mexico.

### Preliminary Matches

Nepal	- Korea Rep.	0:2
Malaysia	- Korea Rep.	1:0
Korea Rep.	- Nepal	4:0
Korea Rep.	- Malaysia	2:0
1. Korea Rep.	4 3 0 1 8:1	6
2. Malaysia	4 2 1 1 6:2	5
3. Nepal	4 0 1 3 0:11	1
Korea Rep.	- Indonesia	2:0
Indonesia	- Korea Rep.	1:4
Japan	- Korea Rep.	1:2
Korea Rep.	- Japan	1:0

### Preparatory Matches

Mexico	- Korea Rep.	2:1
Hungary	- Korea Rep.	1:0
Mexico	- Korea Rep.	2:1
Algeria	- Korea Rep.	0:2
Atlante	- Korea Rep.	1:1
Puebla	- Korea Rep.	0:0
Pumas	- Korea Rep.	0:2
Hongkong	- Korea Rep.	0:2
Paraguay	- Korea Rep.	3:1
Anderlecht	- Korea Rep.	2:3
Leverkusen	- Korea Rep.	2:1
GFR U-21	- Korea Rep.	0:0
Monaco	- Korea Rep.	1:4
Guadajhala	- Korea Rep.	2:0
England	- Korea Rep.	4:1
Peru	- Korea Rep.	0:2

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Argentina 1:3	2nd Match Bulgaria 1:1	3rd Match Italy 2:3	¼ Final	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Cho	Byung-Duk	26.05.58	Hallelujah FC							
2	Park	Kyung-Hoon	19.01.61	Pohang Iron & Steel							
3	Chung	Jong-Soo	27.03.61	Yukong			45				
4	Cho	Kwang-Rae	19.03.54	Daewoo	68	72					
5	Jung	Yong-Hwan	10.02.60	Daewoo							
6	Lee	Tae-Ho	29.01.61	Daewoo							
7	Kim	Jong-Boo	13.01.65	Korea University		45	20				
8	Cho	Young-Jeung	18.08.54	Lucky Gold Star FC							
9	Choi	Soon-Ho	10.01.62	Pohang Iron & Steel							
10	Park	Chang-Sun	02.02.54	Daewoo							
11	Cha	Bum-Kun	22.05.53	Bayer Leverkusen							
12	Kim	Pyung-Suk	22.09.58	Hyundai FC	22						
13	No	Soo-Jin	10.02.62	Yukong		45					
14	Cho	Min-Kook	05.07.63	Lucky Gold Star		18					
15	Yoo	Byung-Ok	02.03.64	Han Yang University	45						
16	Kim	Joo-Sung	17.01.66	Cho-Sun University			45				
17	Huh	Jung-Moo	13.01.55	Hyundai FC							
18	Kim	Sam-Soo	08.02.63	Hyundai FC							
19	Byun	Byung-Joo	26.04.61	Daewoo			70				
20	Kim	Yong-Se	21.04.60	Yukong	45						
21	Oh	Yun-Kyo	25.05.60	Yukong							
22	Kang	Deuk-Soo	16.08.61	Lucky Gold Star							



From left to right, back: Cha Bum-Kun, Jung Yong-Hwan, Huh Jung-Moo, Cho Young-Jeung, Choi Soon-Ho, Oh Yun-Kyo; front: Byun Byung-Joo, Park Kyung-Hoon, Kim Joo-Sung, Cho Kwang-Rae, Park Chang-Sun

## Kim Jung-Nam

Kim Jung-Nam, born on January 28, 1943, began his footballing career with the team of *Korea University* in 1962. From 1966 he played in the Korean army team *Yang-Ji* and achieved one time the Korean championship. During half a year Kim played in Australia with *Sunderland Sidney*, where he could profit



a great deal by the English coaches. After his return he joined the team of the *Korea Foreign Exchange Bank*. Altogether Kim was selected about 70 times for the national team and took part in the Olympic Games of Tokyo.

By profession Kim is a lawyer, but after having finished his career as a player, he preferred to be faithful to football and to work as a coach. In 1976 he became responsible coach of *Korea University* and gained with his team the title of the College League. Two years later he was engaged by *Pohang Iron Steel*. Beside his club activity he was also engaged as assistant coach of the national team.

In 1980 he was ap-

pointed manager of Korea Rep., but after two years he was dismissed for lack of success. He took over the professional team of the *Yu-Kong Oil Co.*, where he is still active today. Besides, he was called back for the national team. One year later Kim became the sole responsible for the Korean team.

Kim attended several coaching courses in Germany FR and also took part in the training courses organized by FIFA/Coca-Cola.

## Development

The Korean youth team achieved already three times the Final Round of the World Youth Championship (WYC). This means that Korea Rep. is the most successful country of the Third World.

From the Mexico team '86 Oh Yun-Kyo, Jung Yong-Hwan, Kim Jong-Se, Lee Tae-Ho and Choi Soon-Ho were used at the WYC '79 in Japan.

At the WYC '81 in Australia the following three players took part: Kim Sam-Soo, Kang Deuk-Soo and again Choi Soon-Ho.

Yoo Byung-Ok and Kim Jong-Boo, both members of the Mexico squad, played in the Korean youth team that were placed fourth at the WYC '83 in Mexico.



All in all, 18 players got a chance in the Korean team. In the first match, Cho Min-Kook (14) played sweeper in the place of Cho Young-Jeung (8).

## The Players

The pool of players was composed of footballers from ten different clubs. No less than 18 team members came from the professionally managed clubs of the Super League, where the players in general are professionals. Three internationals played in University teams and one in the German Bundesliga. The average age of the Korean team was rather low: 26.5 years.

Three members of the Korean squad had already gained international experience abroad. Cha Bum first played with Eintracht Frankfurt and has now become a dreaded goal-getter at Bayer Leverkusen. The left full-back Huh Jung-Moo played with the Dutch top club PSV Eindhoven between 1980 and 1983. Sweeper Cho Young-Jeung played in the USA, with the Chicago Stings.

## Team Organization

Usually, Korea Rep. plays with a classic 4-3-3 system, with two true wingers. At the World Cup Tournament, manager Kim Jung-Nam made his team play with a 4-4-2, whereby the man-to-man marking was applied in the zone.

In front of the slightly retreated sweeper (Cho Young or Cho Min), the three defenders Park Kyung, Jung Yong and Huh Jung were playing. If the opposing team lined up with only two forwards, they were closely marked by the two first named defenders. In this case, the internationally experienced Huh used to advance to the left side in midfield.

Closely in front of this defensive block, Cho Kwang, an extremely agile player, proved to be very strong in the role of a defensive midfielder. Captain Park Chang, as the actual playmaker, exclusively acted in the longitudinal axis of the

field. The two other midfield players were mainly expected to keep their positions on the flanks. But whenever the Korean team started an attack, these two players suddenly became true wingers. Byun Byung and Kim Joo excelled by their baffling dribbles along the touch-lines.

Up front the two lightning-quick Cha Bum and Choi Soon were a constant worry for the adverse goal. Both certainly ranked among the best players of their team.

## Attacking Play

The South Koreans showed quite a simple style of play: they tried to start off their attacks on the most direct way and to surprise their opponents through quick moves up front. They knew very well how to play this kind of counter-attacks.

The entire attacking play was based on the fastness and the agility of their offensive players. With quickly played combinations and plenty of direct passes they tried to put pressure on the opposing side. The constant effort to keep up the rhythm of the game made the Koreans demonstrate a spectacular play – but at the same time caused an unusual number of lost balls, often already in their own half of field.

Thanks to the extraordinary quality of the two forwards, who were time and again fed by Korea's indefatigable midfield star Park, the team created in all their games a number of good opportunities. The majority of them were missed because of lacking cold-bloodedness. But the four goals were all scored in great style. Both goals against Italy were taken after superb moves. Kim Jong scored his goal after a real masterstroke and Korea's face-saving goal against Argentina was realized by captain Park with a powerful long-range shot from 25 m.

## Defensive Play

The very goal average of 4:7 in three matches clearly reveals that the weak point of the Korean team was to be found rather at their back positions. In defence the team was not very well organized. The positional play of the defenders left much to be desired. Too often there were problems of coordination and misunderstandings among the players. It happened frequently that players involved in tackling or in offensive actions were not covered behind.

The Korean team could often compensate for these obvious defects by their outstanding reaction ability and their courage to plunge into the action, heedless of the danger of an injury.

Due to their physical inferiority they were at a disadvantage in tacklings. Owing to their extraordinary take-off power they could stand their ground in heading duels. At any rate, Korea Rep. had to concede only one goal by a header.

## Conclusions

With their reckless style of play and direct drive on the opposite goal, the team of Korea Rep. made a very good impression.

In the opening game against Argentina it became obvious that the Korean players, on an international level, had very little experience. Because of nervousness and over-zeal they committed some unnecessary fouls of which the Argentines took advantage, scoring two goals on free-kicks within the first twenty minutes, thus coming to an early and comfortable 2-0 lead.

With a little bit more cleverness they could have won the game against the disappointing Bulgarians. In their last match against Italy they gave the reigning World Champions a real challenge and

proved their considerable progress.

During the tournament it turned out that the team of Korea Rep. was not so well-balanced as most other teams. The limited number of top players, selected from an only small potential of active footballers, proved to be a big disadvantage. Thus it became understandable why this side, like no other team, had to suffer from enormous ups and downs; stunning actions were often followed by elementary mistakes.

All this the Korean players made up with their tremendous enthusiasm and unshakable morale. There was no slackening or giving up with this team. In all three games Korea Rep. had to run after an early goal. Twice they managed to equalize.

The enthusiasm of the Asians soon inspired the crowds: Korea Rep. became so one of the favourites of the spectators.

### Korea Rep.-Argentina 1:3 (0:2)

0:1 Valdano (6')  
0:2 Ruggeri (18')  
0:3 Valdano (46')  
1:3 Park Chang-Sun (73')

### Korea Rep.-Bulgaria 1:1 (0:1)

0:1 Getov (11')  
1:1 Kim Jong-Boo (70')

### Korea Rep.-Italy 2:3 (0:1)

0:1 Altobelli (17')  
1:1 Choi Soon-Ho (62')  
1:2 Altobelli (73')  
1:3 own goal (82')  
2:3 Huh Jung-Moo (89')

# Morocco

## Preparation

In March 1986 Morocco qualified for the Final of the African Cup in Egypt and for the World Cup Finals in Mexico.

As a first step, Morocco's manager José Faria asked the Football Association to make all international players permanently available to him from January until the end of the World Cup. This meant that the Moroccan championship was finished without the Mexico candidates. The co-operation with the Moroccan Football Association allowed Faria a preparation period of totally four months for the World Cup Finals.

At the beginning of January, a first training camp of three weeks was held at the national sports centre of Rabat. Subsequently a first test game was arranged (in Spain).

In the middle of February the internationals came together for another three weeks training camp in Rabat, right before the team flew to Egypt at

*The Moroccans, the winner of Group F, played in the Second Round against FRG. Here, the Moroccan defence keeps in check the German forwards Völler and Briegel.*

the beginning of March. In the African Cup Morocco had to face Algeria, Cameroon and Zambia in the Group Games, Egypt in the Semi-Final and Ivory Coast in the Third Place Play-Off.

Faria organized another gathering (with a length of ten days) for the members of the national team, which took place in Saillon, Switzerland. Two training games against local clubs served as a preparation for the next international game against Northern Ireland in Belfast.

At the beginning of May all Mexico candidates met again for one week at the sports centre of Rabat, before the entire Moroccan delegation left for Mexico already on May 6.



### Preliminary Matches

Sierra Leone	- Morocco	0:1
Morocco	- Sierra Leone	4:0
Morocco	- Malawi	2:0
Malawi	- Morocco	0:0
Egypt	- Morocco	0:0
Morocco	- Egypt	2:0
Morocco	- Libya	3:0
Libya	- Morocco	1:0

### Preparatory Matches

Spain U-21	- Morocco	3:0
Morocco	- Bulgaria	0:0
Martigny	- Morocco	0:4
N. Ireland	- Morocco	2:1

### African Cup of Nations

Algeria	- Morocco	0:0
Cameroon	- Morocco	1:1
Zambia	- Morocco	0:1
Egypt	- Morocco	1:0
Ivory Coast	- Morocco	3:2

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Poland 0:0	2nd Match England 0:0	3rd Match Portugal 3:1	¼ Final Germany FR 0:1	½ Final	Final
1	Zaki Badou	Ezaki	02.04.59	Real Mallorca						
2	Khalifa	Labd	55	KAC Kenitra						
3	Lamriss	Abdelmajide	12.02.59	FAR Rabat		72				
4	El Biaz	Mostafa	12.12.60	KACM Marrakesh						
5	Bouyahiaoui	Noureddine	07.01.55	KAC Kenitra						
6	Dolmy	Abdelmajid	19.04.53	Raja Casablanca						
7	El Haddaoui	Mustapha	07.03.56	Lausanne-Sports	87		67			
8	Bouderbala	Abdelaziz	26.12.60	FC Sion						
9	Krimau Merry	Abdelkarim	13.01.55	St-Etienne						
10	Timoumi	Mohammed	15.01.60	Murcia	88					
11	Merry	Mustapha	21.04.58	Nîmes		86				
12	Hmied	Salahdine	61	FAR Rabat						
13	Rhiati	Abdelfettah	25.02.63	MAS Fez						
14	Ouadani	Lahcen Hcina	14.07.59	FAR Rabat		18				
15	El Haddaoui	Mohamed Monsif	21.10.64	AS Selé						
16	Amanallah	Azzedine	07.04.56	Niort						
17	Khairi	Abderrazak	20.11.62	Valladolid	2					
18	Sahil	Mohamed	11.10.63	WAC						
19	Jilal	Fadel	04.03.64	WAC						
20	Bidar	Abdellah	19.08.67	OCK Khouribga						
21	Soulaimani	Abdelaziz	30.04.58	MAS Fez	3	4	23			
22	Mouddani	Abdelfattah	30.07.56	KAC Kenitra						





From left to right, back: Krimau, Ouadani, Bouderbala, Bouyahiaoui, El Haddaoui, Zaki; front: Timoumi, Dolmy, Lamriss, Khairi, Khalifa

## José Faria

José Faria is of Brazilian nationality. He started his career as a player with *Bonsucesso FC*. After five years he was transferred to the world-famous *Fluminense FC* for which he played as right winger.



After the end of his career as a player, he acquired the coaching licence of the Brazilian Association of Coaches. During eleven years he trained the *juniors of Fluminense*. Within this period he won over 35 national titles.

In 1979 Faria went to Qatar. There, working together with Evaristo Macedo, he built up Qatar's youth team during two years. At the World Youth Championship 1981 in Australia, Qatar sensationally became Vice-World Champions.

In 1984 Faria moved to Morocco and coached the well-known *F.A.R.* (Force Armée Royale). Already in his first year with this club he won the Moroccan championship and one year later his side won the African Cup of the Champions.

When his compatriot Jaime Valente resigned his job as

manager of the Moroccan team, Faria was additionally entrusted with the coaching of the national team.

## Development

The Moroccan junior team only participated in the first World Youth Championship (1977) in Tunisia. For the following four tournaments Morocco did not manage to qualify.

Not one of the talented players of those teams found his way into Morocco's Mexico squad of 1986.

In return it was basically the team of the World Cup '86 who represented Morocco at the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.



Merry played in midfield during the first two matches. Against Poland he operated on the left, against England on the right flank. Bouderbala's role was modified from game to game.

## The Players

The Moroccan squad was formed by players from thirteen different clubs. The national champions FAR (Forces Armées Royales) were represented by five and Kenitra AC by three internationals. Five players were selected who played abroad, in France and Switzerland. Morocco had one of the few brother pairs of this World Cup tournament in their lines: «Krimau» Merry Abdelkarim and Merry Mustapha.

## Team Organization

Morocco played a 4-5-1 system with zonal marking. In front of the tall and very calm Zaki the Moroccan defence was formed by four men: El-Biaz and Bouyahiaoui played as central defenders, the latter operated sometimes slightly behind his teammates. The two full-backs Khalifa and Lamriss took actively part in the construction of the game, but rather rarely were involved in the Moroccan attacks.

The midfield consisted of five players. Dolmy acted as a sweeper playing in front of the defensive chain. El Haddaoui, a midfielder with fine skill, was used on the right flank. On the left side Khairi was charged with a similar role. He had much offensive drive and shot two goals against Portugal.

Timoumi was entrusted with the control of the left midfield. His exceptional vision and his ideas might have brought the Moroccan team still more if – after a long absence due to a grave injury – he had been better in form.

The light-footed Bouderbala had an enormous sphere of action. He proved to be a constant worry to the opposing goal by his long rushes and his elegant dribbles.

Krimau as the only striker always operated as Morocco's foremost player, near the off-side line. With short sprints

he often managed to go away from his defender, and when he had received the ball he skilfully kept it by means of his magnificent control and great experience.

In the first two games also Merry got a chance. Against Poland he played on the position of Khairi and against England he substituted for El Haddaoui.

## Attacking Play

The launch of attacks was effected at a rather slow pace. The North Africans proved to be very clever in circulating the ball through their own lines. They made use of many cross and back passes.

Thanks to their agility in the tackles, their continuous effort to run clear and their frequent changes of position, the Moroccan players hardly ever lost the ball in their own half of the field.

A tactical variant of their game were sudden changes of pace: they tried to surprise the opposing defence through unexpected solo runs by Bouderbala, who could hardly be dispossessed of the ball, or quickly taken double passes with Krimau.

Midfield ace Timoumi fed his advancing team-mates with wide diagonal passes in the open space on the wings. Such defence-splitting passes confronted the Portuguese defence with an unsolvable problem more than one time. All three goals were scored after runs on the wing that were concluded by wide crosses into the penalty-area.

## Defensive Play

Morocco's style of play was entirely based on a solid defence. As soon as they had lost the ball, the whole team moved very quickly backwards to be in numerical superiority at the back. Centre forward Krimau remained up front, but he had the clearly defined task to disturb the

development of the opposing attacks.

El Haddaoui and Khairi receded immediately from their positions on the wings to the midfield and – together with Bouderbala and Timoumi – formed a first reception net.

The small Dolmy with the big fighting spirit was in action closely behind. It was he who chased after the rebounds and involved the opponents who had the ball in ruthless tackles.

The last bastion in front of the Moroccan goal was the four-men defensive chain who usually played on a level. Morocco's back four complemented one another excellently and showed a remarkable harmony.

Zaki ranked among the best goalkeepers of these World Cup Finals. In four games he was only beaten twice: Portugal scored from a rebound when Morocco's victory was already a fact. In the Second Round clash with GFR, he was left without a chance against Matthäus' free-kick, after his defenders had placed the wall very badly.

## Conclusions

Morocco presented a well-balanced team without real weak points. Thanks to their «Brazilian» skill they built up their attacks very calmly and intelligently. The players were able to adapt themselves quickly to all situations.

Morocco's style of play was founded on the extraordinary agility and quickness of all team members. They distinguished themselves by wit and a perfect control of the ball. The Africans knew how to keep the ball in their own lines and deliberately aimed at chasing around and wearing down their opponents as early as possible: the infernal heat of Monterrey was their ally.

With this over-cautious attitude Morocco had won two points after their goalless draws with Poland and England. The Moroccans re-

vealed their real class only in the third match which took place in Guadalajara, a venue with a more agreeable climate. They outclassed Portugal and, with more determination in front of goal, might have won with an even higher scoreline than 3:1. Unfortunately, this quite interesting team did not continue to perform in the same way and fell back to his temporizing style of play.

Against Germany FR, the Moroccans speculated again on a 0:0 draw. They seemed to be ready to take the risk of a penalty shoot-out. Manager Faria banked on the extraordinary reflexes of goalkeeper Zaki. But this speculation failed. Two minutes from time the Germans scored from a free-kick.

Morocco had demonstrated the enormous progress of Africa in front of the whole footballing world and had honourably represented the black continent. On the other hand, they wasted the unique opportunity to achieve an even better result at this World Cup.

**Morocco-Poland 0:0**

**Morocco-England 0:0**

**Morocco-Portugal 3:1 (2:0)**

1:0 Khairi (19')  
2:0 Khairi (26')  
3:0 Krimau (62')  
3:1 Diamantino (80')

**Morocco-GFR 0:1 (0:0)**

0:1 Matthäus (87')

# Mexico

## Preparation

Since Mexico as the organizing nation were qualified automatically, Bora Milutinovic could build up his team with a long-term program. Since 1983 the Mexicans made tours to Europe, South America, Africa, Asia and the United States.

Milutinovic had gathered his international players in a permanent training camp since the summer of 1985. The Mexican clubs had to play the championship without their internationals! The games against Italy, England and FRG in June 1986 gave Mexico's manager the first information about the standard of performance of his team.

In August Mexico played five preparation games against Chile, Bulgaria, Peru (twice) and Corinthians São Paulo in California. In mid-October a trip to Libya, Yemen Arab Rep. Jordan, Egypt and Kuwait was carried out.

Two games against Argentina, the first of which took

*Mexico showed their best display during their 2.0 victory over Bulgaria in the Second Round. Centre forward Sanchez also performed well in this game. The goals, however, were scored by Negrete and Servin.*

place in Los Angeles, were a further test for Mexico.

During the draw (of the Groups) in Mexico-City in mid-December, an international tournament with the participation of Algeria, Korea Rep. and Hungary was staged.

San José was the venue of the international game against GDR, and in Mexico-City the hosts played against USSR. The matches against Denmark and Santos (Brazil) took place once again in Los Angeles.

The last seven warm-ups for the World Cup Finals took alternately place at home and in California.



### Preparatory Matches

Mexico - Italy	1:1	Mexico - Hungary	2:0
Mexico - England	1:0	GDR - Mexico	2:1
Mexico - Germany FR	2:0	Mexico - USSR	1:0
Chile - Mexico	1:2	Mexico - National (Uruguay)	1:0
Bulgaria - Mexico	1:1	Denmark - Mexico	1:1
Peru - Mexico	0:0	Santos - Mexico	0:0
Peru - Mexico	0:1	Mexico - Argentinos Juniors	5:1
Corinthians - Mexico	1:1	Uruguay - Mexico	0:1
Libya - Mexico	3:1	Mexico - Universidad de Chile	2:1
Yemen Arab Rep. - Mexico	0:2	Mexico - Universidad de Chile	1:0
Jordan - Mexico	0:0	Mexico - Canada	3:0
Egypt - Mexico	2:1	HSV - Mexico	0:2
Kuwait - Mexico	0:0	England - Mexico	3:0
Argentina - Mexico	1:1		
Mexico - Argentina	1:1		
Korea Rep. - Mexico	1:2		
Mexico - Algeria	2:0		
Mexico - Korea Rep.	2:1		

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Belgium 2:1	2nd Match Paraguay 1:1	3rd Match Iraq 1:0	½ Final Bulgaria 2:0	½ Final Germ. FR 0:0 a.e.t.	½ Final	Final
1	Larios	Pablo	31.07.60	Cruz Azul							
2	Trejo	Mario Alberto	18.09.61	América							
3	Quirarte	Fernando	07.07.61	Guadalajara							
4	Manzo Ponce	Armando	16.10.58	América							
5	Javier Cruz	Francisco	24.05.66	Monterrey	11	13	11		50		
6	De los Cobos	Carlos	10.12.58	América			79	11	88		
7	España	Miguel	04.04.61	UNAM	21	33					
8	Dominguez E.	Alejandro	09.11.60	América			29				
9	Sanchez	Hugo	11.06.58	Real Madrid							
10	Boy	Tomas	05.07.56	Univ. Nuevo León	69	57		79	32		
11	Hermosillo	Carlos	24.08.64	América							
12	Rodriguez	Ignacio	12.06.56	UNAM							
13	Aguirre	Javier	08.09.60	Osasuna					100*		
14	Cruz	Felix	04.04.60	UNAM							
15	Flores	Luis E.	08.08.62	Sporting Gijón	79	77					
16	Muñoz	Carlos	08.09.62	Univ. Nuevo León							
17	Servin	Paul	29.04.63	UNAM							
18	Amador Flores	Rafael	16.11.57	UNAM			61		70		
19	Hernandez G.	Javier	01.08.61	UNAM							
20	Heredia Orozco	Olaf	19.10.57	Univ. Nueva León							
21	Ortega Martinez	Cristobal	25.07.56	América							
22	Negrete	Manuel	15.05.69	Sporting Lisboa							



From left to right, back: Muñoz, Larios, Boy, Quirarte, F. Cruz; front: Aguirre, Sanchez, Negrete, Servin, Trejo, Flores

## Velibor "Bora" Milutinovic

Bora Milutinovic (47) started his career as a player with *Partizan Belgrad* in 1956. With this club he won four titles altogether. During this time he was several times nominated for Yugoslavia's B-team. After having reached the age

limit required by the Yugoslavian Football Association, Milutinovic left his country and successively played for *Monaco*, *Nice* and *Rouen*. Then he went for a short guest performance to Switzerland (FC Winterthur).

In 1972 Milutinovic moved to Mexico and joined the well known university club *UNAM* (Universidad Autonoma de Mexico), which today is known under the name of *Pumas*.

The end of his career as a player in 1977 meant at the same time the start for a successful activity as manager with the same club. After having finished twice as Vice Champions, his team won the Mexican championship in the third year of his activity as manager. In the following season Milutinovic's side won the CONCACAF-Cup of the Champions.

After Mexico had failed to qualify for the World Cup Finals '82 in Spain, Bora Milutinovic was appointed manager. His elder brother, Miodrag, was manager of Yugoslavia until the World Cup '86.


## Development


Mexico is the only nation which managed to qualify for all five World Youth Championships (WYC) staged up to now.

From Mexico's youth national team 1977 no players were to be found in the Mexican squad of 1986.

Goalkeeper *Pablo Larios* represented Mexico's colours at the WYC '79 in Japan. The left full-back *Raul Severin* played in the youth team of 1981 that achieved the WYC in Australia.

In the World Youth Championship at home (1983), *Carlos Muñoz* took part. *Francisco Javier Cruz* was one of Mexico's key-players at the WYC '85 in the Soviet Union.





In the first two matches, Mexico lined-up with the strikers Sanchez (9) and Flores (15). Afterwards manager Milutinovic confined himself to one forward and completed his side by an additional midfielder.

## The Players

The Mexican team was composed of players from eight different clubs. UNAM (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) was represented by eight players and América by five. Universidad Nuevo León provided Milutinovic's team with three internationals whereas only one was selected from the Mexican champion Monterrey.

The standard formation was based on five players from UNAM and two from León, but not a single one came from América!

## Team Organization

Mexico began the Mundial with a classic 4-4-2 system. In the first two matches against Belgium and Paraguay, Sanchez and Flores formed the front pair. For the third game against Iraq Sanchez was suspended because of two cautions. He was substituted by the midfielder player De los Cobos. Henceforth, Mexico lined up with just one striker. The physically strong central defence was formed by sweeper Felix Cruz and central defender Quirarte. In the first two games Trejo was used as right fullback. Later on the tall Amador took over this position. Servin, a defender with remarkable offensive qualities, played as left fullback.

In midfield, Muñoz operated as a kind of second sweeper. Aguirre's task mainly consisted in running wide, thus providing the Mexican attacks with pressure from the flanks. Against Belgium and Paraguay he played this role on the right side. After España had taken this position, Aguirre acted as a kind of re-treated left winger.

As long as Mexico lined up with two forwards, Negrete, a player endowed with outstanding skill, had to assume a position near the left touch-line. After the Mexicans had modified their system and

played with only one striker, Negrete was given a larger sphere of action and he operated more in the longitudinal axis of the field. It was obvious that his extraordinary qualities took better effect in this position.

Skipper Boy proved to be the actual leader on the field. He organized the game, gave orders to his team-mates and thanks to his superb vision he also determined the rhythm of the game.

## Attacking Play

The conception of play of the Mexican team was a mixture of South American and European football. The attacks were carefully built up and every risk was avoided. The rather small but extremely agile and quick Mexicans kept the ball by rapidly played touches in their lines.

In front of the opposing penalty-area, however, only two Mexicans were able to provide the decisive impulses: Boy and Negrete. With running passes Boy tried to feed his team-mates who advanced down the flanks. By his subtle and often screwed passes he prepared some scoring chances for Sanchez. The swift and skillful Negrete turned his direct opponents time and again by his feints and sometimes also harassed the defence by breakthroughs on the wings.

As long as Mexico played with two forwards, Flores' pace and his constant changes of position produced gaps in the opponent's defence. Sanchez and the attacking midfield players tried constantly to take advantage of such situations.

Owing to his marvellous control of the ball, his dribbles and his powerful acceleration, Hugo Sanchez was a constant worry for the opponent – but unfortunately also with his provocative dives in or around the adverse penalty-area.

## Defensive Play

Although Mexico had to concede only two goals, its defence was not beyond all doubt. Manager Milutinovic's defensive conception was based on a man-to-man marking in the zone but the Mexicans had often problems when the opposing strikers changed their positions. The direct opponents were sometimes pursued too long, thus the Mexican defenders had to leave their own zone. Therefore, the organization at the back got mixed up on some occasions. Yet, the Mexican defenders made good many mistakes thanks to their agility and reaction speed.

The only average body-height of most defenders proved to be a disadvantage. Both goals the Mexicans conceded (Belgium and Paraguay) were scored by headers.

## Conclusions

The Mexican team had two faces. There were phases with bold and powerful play, but then some minutes later the same players failed in performing the simplest things.

In the starting minutes of every game the Mexicans, supported by their enthusiastic fans, took unconditionally the offensive. The opponent was pushed back, in some games even beleaguered. Milutinovic obviously aimed at scoring an early goal. However, they succeeded only once in doing so: against Paraguay Flores shot his team into the lead after only two minutes. Mexico took the lead in the other matches, too, but it took them much longer to score their goals.

The initial vehement assault must have caused a loss of substance in the Mexican team. In every case the Mexicans never managed to calm down and to control the game after having taken the lead. Each time, they lost the

initiative, retired to their own half and contented themselves with occasional counter-attacks.

The insufficient effectiveness of Mexico's offensive actions was compensated by the variable execution of standard situations. The team scored six goals altogether: two were scored from free-kicks and two from counters.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that central defender Quirarte with two and full-back Servin with one goal scored half of the Mexican goals.

The fact that the small Mexicans realized three goals by headers proved their courage and their extraordinary take-off power.

### Mexico-Belgium 2:1 (2:1)

1:0 Quirarte (23')  
2:0 Sanchez (39')  
2:1 Vandenberg (45')

### Mexico-Paraguay 1:1 (1:0)

1:0 Flores (3')  
1:1 Romero (85')

### Mexico-Iraq 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Quirarte (54')

### Mexico-Bulgaria 2:0 (1:0)

1:0 Negrete (35')  
2:0 Servin (61')

### Mexico-GFR 0:0 Pen. 1:4

# Northern Ireland

## Preparation

As most of the Irish internationals play with English League clubs, they are only rarely available to their national manager Billy Bingham. Therefore, Bingham had to put up with a minimal preparation program – just like the two other British national managers.

Northern Ireland's first preparation game took place in Paris against France. Since the ground was covered with snow and ice, this match could hardly give any information about the real standard of the teams.

At the end of March, Northern Ireland played against Denmark in Belfast; the Danes had to line up without some of their key players.

For the third preparation game, Morocco were invited to Belfast. Morocco were chosen to make the Irish team familiar with the peculiarities of the North African game, since Billy Bingham's team had to face Algeria in

*After having lost 0:3 to Brazil, Northern Ireland were out of the World Cup. Not even with combined strength McCreery, McDonald and Campbell succeeded in preventing Edinho from finishing a Brazilian attack.*

their first game in Mexico. Shortly afterwards, Northern Ireland flew to Bagdad to be confronted also with the Asiatic style of play. Iraq's team proved to be a good touchstone.

From May 8 to May 25 the delegation of Northern Ireland went for an altitude retreat to Albuquerque, New Mexico. Billy Bingham chose this place because the conditions with regard to altitude and climate were quite similar to those the Northern Irish team were going to face in Guadalajara, the venue of the "Irish" Group in Mexico. At short notice, a training game with Scotland was arranged to be staged at the University of New Mexico.



### Preliminary Matches

Finland	- N. Ireland	1:0
N. Ireland	- Romania	3:2
N. Ireland	- Finland	2:1
N. Ireland	- England	0:1
N. Ireland	- Turkey	2:0
Turkey	- N. Ireland	0:0
Romania	- N. Ireland	0:1
England	- N. Ireland	0:0

1. England	8	4	4	0	21.2	12
2. N. Ireland	8	4	2	2	8.5	10
3. Romania	8	3	3	2	12.7	9
4. Finland	8	3	2	3	7.12	8
5. Turkey	8	0	1	7	2.14	1

### Preparatory Matches

France	- N. Ireland	0:0
N. Ireland	- Denmark	1:1
N. Ireland	- Morocco	2:1
Iraq	- N. Ireland	1:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Algeria 1:1	2nd Match Spain 1:2	3rd Match Brazil 0:3	1/8 Final	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final
1	Jennings	Patrick	12.06.45	Tottenham Hotspur							
2	Nicholl	James	28.12.56	West Bromwich Alb.							
3	Donaghy	Malachy	13.09.57	Luton Town							
4	O'Neill	John	11.03.58	Leicester City							
5	McDonald	Alan	12.10.63	Queens Park Rangers							
6	McCreery	David	16.09.57	Newcastle United							
7	Penney	Steven	06.01.64	Brighton	67	53					
8	McIlroy	Samuel	02.08.54	Örgryte							
9	Quinn	James	18.11.59	Blackburn Rovers							
10	Whiteside	Norman	07.05.65	Manchester United	81		68				
11	Stewart	Ian	10.09.61	Newcastle United	23	37					
12	Platt	James	26.01.52	Coleraine							
13	Hughes	Phillip	19.11.64	Bury							
14	Armstrong	Gerard	23.05.54	West Bromwich Alb.			20				
15	Worthington	Nigel	04.11.61	Sheffield Wednesday		68					
16	Ramsey	Paul	03.09.62	Leicester City							
17	Clarke	Colin	30.10.62	Bournemouth	9						
18	McClelland	John	07.12.55	Watford							
19	Hamilton	William	09.05.57	Oxford United		22	22				
20	NcNally	Bernard	17.02.63	Shrewsbury Town							
21	Campbell	David	02.06.65	Nottingham Forest			70				
22	Caughy	Mark	27.08.60	Linfield							





From left to right, back: McDonald, Donaghy, Jennings, Clarke, O'Neill, Whiteside; front: McCreery, Penney, Worthington, McIlroy, Nicholl

## Billy Bingham

Billy Bingham (54) can look back on a very successful football career. He played successively with *Glentoran Belfast*, *Sunderland*, *Luton Town*, *Everton* and *Port Vale*, where he finished his career as a player. Between 1951 and 1964 he was selected for the Irish national team no less than 56 times. As a tricky left-

winger he scored ten goals for his country. At the World Cup '58, in Sweden, Northern Ireland achieved the Quarter-Finals; Bingham was used in all five games.

Bingham started his career as a coach with *Linfield*. Then he became national manager of Greece. After his return from Southern Europe, Bingham

became manager of *Everton* as well as national coach of Northern Ireland (1967-71). Bingham's next station was *Mansfield Town* before he became manager of Northern Ireland for the second time (1980), succeeding Danny Blanchflower.


With Northern Ireland Bingham won the British championship in 1980 and 1983. At the

World Cup '82 in Spain, Northern Ireland topped their group and, for the first time, qualified for the Second Round. The Irish team failed to qualify for the Final Round of the European Championships in France only because of their worse goal average. With the qualification for the World Cup '86 Billy Bingham became the most successful manager Northern Ireland ever had.

## Development

The youth national team of Northern Ireland did not manage to qualify for one of the five World Youth Championships staged up to now. One of the reasons for this failure might be the fact that the English top clubs engage the greatest talents of Northern Ireland as football apprentices already at a very early age so that for international games they are only rarely available to the coaches in charge of the Irish youth teams.





In the team of Northern Ireland the effected changes only concerned the four most offensive positions. From the beginning, in place of Penney, Clarke and Worthington, also Campbell, Hamilton and Stewart were used.

## The Players

From the 22 men selected for Mexico only two played in their own country. The whole rest of the party were engaged in England; fifteen of them in the First Division.

Manager Bingham's squad were recruited from 19 different clubs. Only West Bromwich Albion, Leicester City and Newcastle United supplied two players.

In the first two games the initial line-up of the Irish team consisted of players coming from eleven different clubs!

## Team Organization

Ireland played a classic 4-4-2 system with a four-men zonal marking at the back, four midfield players and two actual centre forwards. In the encounter with Brazil, Bingham introduced a fifth midfielder at the expense of a forward.

The defence remained unchanged during all the games. In front of goalkeeper Jennings performed the two central defenders McDonald and O'Neill as well as the full-backs Nicholl and Donaghy. In midfield McCreery acted the part of an advanced sweeper, McIlroy was their key player in midfield. Against Algeria and Spain, Penney and Worthington manoeuvred as retreated wingers, combining the roles of midfielder and winger. Campell and Stewart replaced them in the last match against Brazil.

Norman Whiteside played in the first two games as a true forward. Against Brazil he had to assume a role further back in midfield.

Centre forward Hamilton was used from the beginning only against Algeria. In the following games he came on the field only as substitute. Clarke was then charged with spearheading the Irish attacking play.

## Attacking Play

Northern Ireland displayed a typical British football. From the back they tried to provide the strikers with long passes, the forwards were expected to play the ball back for the advancing midfielders. But too often these mostly high running passes were intercepted by the attentive defenders of the opponent. The Irish side were definitely more dangerous when they attacked from the wings. With dribbles by the «midfield-wingers» Penney and Northington and fast advances by the full-backs Nicholl and Donaghy they tried to break up the adverse defence. Their sharp crosses created many a dangerous situation in the opponent's penalty-area.

As soon as McIlroy was involved in the Irish attacks, their game proved to have more inspiration and imagination. Thanks to his enormous sphere of action and his precise passes he became the actual pivot in midfield. But in the first half against Spain and during 90 minutes against Brazil he was not very well supported by his team-mates.

With regard to variants at the taking of free-kicks and corners, Ireland had nothing special to offer. Generally these kicks were aimed at the heads of their numerous tall players. Yet, they had no success with this kind of attacks. Only a few free-kicks were directly converted in the course of these World Cup Finals. Norman Whiteside realized one of these goals, giving his team the lead against Algeria.

## Defensive Play

The defensive conception of the Irish team was aimed at stopping their opponents already in midfield. That's why the defenders advanced as quickly as possible to ward the midfield, thus reducing

the space between defenders and midfield players.

As soon as the opposing team had played the ball into the midfield zone, the whole Irish team moved forward. The player nearest to the ball at once attacked the man in possession of the ball and was covered by his team-mates. Through a constant pressing they wanted to induce their opponents to overhasty passes and to mistakes. This kind of pressing made it more difficult for the opposing team to penetrate into the Irish defensive zone. Against Algeria they were successful with this style of play, but Spain were of a different stamp: the Irish were too down after only 20 minutes. Therefore, they changed their defensive attitude in the clash with Brazil. As soon as they had lost the ball, the whole team retired to their own defensive zone and left Brazil the control over the midfield. Only Clarke as the one nominal forward remained up front and watched for counter-attacks. But very soon the Irish defence was totally overtaxed; the pressure of the Brazilian attacking waves became too strong.

## Conclusions

In their first two games against Algeria and Spain, Northern Ireland played a positive and at the same time an aggressive football. As all British players also the Irish distinguished themselves by their extraordinary fighting spirit.

The physical fitness and the stamina of the internationals were excellent. Nevertheless, in all three games, they gradually lost their initial rhythm during the second half. Also the physically strong British players had to pay tribute to the high pace of the game and to the strange climatic conditions. In such phases of increasing weariness one could notice considerable

gaps between defence and midfield. The team did not always manage to withstand the constant pressure of the opposing team.

Northern Ireland played with very much enthusiasm, but their actions up front lacked inspiration. A good organization, a great deal of discipline and enthusiasm may sometimes cover up certain deficiencies in a team. But without a sufficient number of players who stand above average with regard to skills, the progress of a side will always remain limited. Northern Ireland is a small country with a restricted number of active football players. Their performances during the World Cup Finals in Mexico were not bad at all.

### N. Ireland-Algeria 1:1 (1:0)

1:0 Whiteside (6')  
1:1 Zidane (59')

### N. Ireland-Spain 1:2 (0:2)

0:1 Butragueño (1')  
0:2 Salinas (18')  
1:2 Clarke (46')

### N. Ireland-Brazil 0:3 (0:2)

0:1 Careca (15')  
0:2 Josimar (42')  
0:3 Careca (87')

# Paraguay

## Preparation

After the very difficult World Cup qualification ties, which were completed only in mid-November 1985, national manager Cayetano Re worked out an extensive preparation program.

When at the end of January 1986 the first preparation game was played against Canada in Vancouver, most of Paraguay's internationals playing abroad were not available. At the following international Miami-tournament Paraguay had to face Jamaica and Colombia (represented by Deportivo Cali). In mid-February the Paraguayan team started for an extensive Asia tour. At a tournament in Hongkong they played against the hosts and Korea Rep. Then the team flew to Jakarta where two other matches took place. In the first days of March, Paraguay played two games in Qatar, one in Bahrain and a last one in Saudi Arabia.

*Paraguay placed second of Group B but in the Second Round were clearly defeated (0:3) by England. All the same their goalkeeper Fernandez (right) impressed the crowd by his reflexes.*



After having come back Cayetano Re organized further training games against club sides.

Shortly before the World Cup, Paraguay moved to Colombia to hold a training camp at high altitudes (3800 m). From this extreme height they went down twice to Bogotá (3500 m) where two further games were played.

Subsequent to this long altitude retreat, the Paraguayan delegation left for Toluca (2700 m).

### Preliminary Matches

Bolivia	- Paraguay	1:1
Paraguay	- Bolivia	3:0
Paraguay	- Brazil	0:2
Brazil	- Paraguay	1:1

1. Brazil	4 2 2 0	6:2 6
2. Paraguay	4 1 2 1	5:4 4
3. Bolivia	4 0 2 2	2:7 2

Paraguay	- Colombia	3:0
Colombia	- Paraguay	2:1
Paraguay	- Chile	3:0
Chile	- Paraguay	2:2

### Preparatory Matches

Canada	- Paraguay	0:0
Jamaica	- Paraguay	1:4
Colombia	- Paraguay	2:0
Hongkong	- Paraguay	1:1
Korea Rep.	- Paraguay	1:3
Indonesia	- Paraguay	2:3
Indonesia	- Paraguay	0:6
Qatar	- Paraguay	1:1
Qatar	- Paraguay	0:3
Bahrain	- Paraguay	1:2
Saudi Arabia	- Paraguay	0:0
Paraguay	- Independiente	3:2
Denmark	- Paraguay	1:2

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Iraq 1:0	2nd Match Mexico 1:1	3rd Match Belgium 2:2	¼ Final England 0:3	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Fernandez	Roberto	22.07.56	Deportivo Cali							
2	Torales	Juan	18.03.58	Libertad		75		64			
3	Zabala	Cesar	18.11.61	Cerro Porteño							
4	Schettina	Vladimiro	08.10.55	Guarani							
5	Delgado	Rogelio	12.10.59	Olimpia							
6	Nunez	Jorge	18.02.61	Murcia							
7	Ferreira	Buenaventura	16.08.59	Deportivo Cali							
8	Romero	Julio César	28.08.60	Fluminense							
9	Cabañas	Roberto	11.04.61	América							
10	Cañete	Adolfino	13.09.56	Cruz Azul							
11	Mendoza	Alfredo	31.12.63	Independiente	88	62	67				
12	Bataglia	Jorge	12.01.60	Sol de América							
13	Caceres	Virginio	28.06.66	Guarani							
14	Caballero	Luis	17.09.62	Guarani							
15	Cabral	Eufemio	21.03.55	Guarani							
16	Guasch	Jorge	17.01.61	Olimpia	2	28		26			
17	Alcaraz	Francisco	04.10.60	Nacional							
18	Isasi	Evaristo	26.10.55	Olimpia							
19	Chilavert	Rolando	22.05.61	Guarani		15	23				
20	Hicks	Ramon	30.03.60	Sabadell							
21	Alonso	Faustino	15.02.61	Sol de América							
22	Coronel	Julian	23.10.58	Guarani							



From left to right, back: Zabala, Schettina, Torales, Delgado, Fernandez; front: Ferreira, Romero, Cañete, Cabañas, Nuñez, Mendoza

## Cayetano Re

Cayetano Re began his career as a player with *Cerro Porteno*. As forward he soon made a name for himself, was selected several times for the national team and participated in the World Cup '58 in Sweden. Although Paraguay were already eliminated after the Group games, Re had something to be proud of: he had scored a goal against Scotland.

His good performances at the World Cup allowed Re to accept an offer from the Spanish First Division club *Elche*. Three years later, in 1962, he even joined the famous *CF Barcelona*. In 1966 he was transferred to their town rivals *Español Barcelona*, where he finished his career in 1972.

In the next year already, Re started his career as a coach with the Spanish provincial club *Eldense*, after one year

he changed to *Onteniente* and in 1978 to *Córdoba*. From 1980 to 1984, Re coached his former club *Elche*. Then he returned to Paraguay and took over the First Division club *Guarani*. With this team he won the Paraguayan championship.

At the beginning of 1985, Re

was given charge of the national team. After the successful qualification for the World Cup, he resigned his post, thus protesting against unjustified criticism. Soon afterwards, the Football Association managed to call him back and he resumed his work.



## Development

Paraguay's youth team managed to qualify already three times for the WYC. At the WYC '77 in Tunisia, the team were eliminated in the Group games. From this side not one player reappeared in Paraguay's Mexico team of '86! At the WYC '79 in Japan, Paraguay reached the Quarter-Finals, losing to USSR in the shoot-out. Manager Re nominated four players from this very strong team for the World Cup in Mexico: *Romero, Cabañas, Delgado* and *Coronel*.

From the team that took part in the WYC '85 in the Soviet Union nobody was selected for the World Cup Finals '86.



The Paraguayan team remained almost unchanged during the whole tournament; no other team manager did effect so few substitutions. Chilavert (19) played for a short time against Mexico and Belgium.

## The Players

Paraguay's manager Caetano Re had selected no less than six players who were engaged at foreign professional clubs. Fernandez, Nunez, Ferreira and Cabañas played in Colombia, Cañete in Mexico and Romero in Brazil. All six players had a firm place in Paraguay's squad and were used in all four games.

Paraguay was the only team of this World Cup to begin all four games with the same line-up. Only in the third match, against Belgium, Guasch had to substitute for the left full-back Schettina who had been booked twice.

## Team Organization

Paraguay played a classic 4-3-3 system with a very special kind of zonal marking.

It was striking how far the whole team was drawn asunder both during the attacking – and during the defensive phase. Therefore, the co-ordination of the different lines did not always function well. In front of the tall goalkeeper Fernandez, Paraguay's back four operated on a level. The two central defenders Delgado (skipper) and Zabala alternated with each other in the marking of the opposing strikers. According to the situation, Delgado also assumed the part of a sweeper. When it was necessary they assisted their full-backs on the sides. The Paraguayan team disposed of two disciplined full-backs: Torales and Schettina.

The defensive midfielder Nunez had quite an extraordinary sphere of action and turned out to be the driving force of the team. Romero and Cañete were both entrusted with offensive tasks in midfield and managed to co-ordinate their actions in a very clever way.

Ferreira was a typical right winger – fast, agile and strong in dribbling. He mostly stayed on the touch-line, try-

ing to cut in from the wing and to penetrate into the penalty-area. Centre forward Cabañas usually remained in the central attacking position, near the offside line. Mendoza, the left winger, tended to move towards the middle, thus opening the room for the players who followed up.

## Attacking Play

The whole offensive conception was concentrated on making for the opposing goal on the most direct way. The ball was played as fast as possible to the attacking positions. Goal-keeper Fernandez did it in the most striking way: his powerful goal-kicks caused many delicate situations in the opponent's penalty-area. Against Belgium, Cabañas even succeeded in scoring a goal after a goal-kick.

As soon as they had won the ball at the back, the Paraguayans passed it to one of their midfield players who all disposed of excellent skills. This allowed them to control the ball, even when they appeared to be marked by their direct opponents. They managed to disengage themselves by surprising feints even when faced with a violent pressing. With short passes the midfield was crossed as fast as possible. Then, in opportune moments, Romero and Cañete launched the three agile strikers by subtle passes.

Romero did not only excel as a brilliant playmaker, but also as a dangerous goalscorer. He proved to have the flair to be on the right spot in the right moment. Against Iraq and Mexico, he was taken clear by Cañete several times. Twice the opposing goalkeeper was left without a chance.

When the strikers were marked, the Paraguayan midfielders tried to bring into action Cabañas by a long ball. Despite his height, the vigorous centre forward was very agile and a constant worry for

the opposing goalkeeper, above all by his powerful headers.

## Defensive Play

With two attacking midfield players and three strikers whose defensive work was far from being overwhelming, the Paraguayans were necessarily confronted with problems regarding their defensive organization. They coped with these difficulties in quite a clever way, by continuous improvisations at their back. Sometimes the direct opponents were followed step by step when they changed their position, in the next action, however, they were given over to a team-mate. The covering of advancing defenders was not always ensured. It often happened that the Paraguayan defenders were not in numerical superiority at the back; several times they were even outnumbered.

Such shortcomings in defence engendered countless turbulent scenes within the Paraguayan penalty-area. But thanks to the outstanding anticipation and reaction ability of the two central defenders and a very reliable goalkeeper, the harm could be kept within bounds. Paraguay conceded but three goals in their three Group games. Against England, however, the defenders' individual qualities alone were no longer sufficient.

## Conclusions

Paraguay presented a very harmonious and extremely well prepared team, whose style of play was completely aimed at the offensive. The special merits of this really sympathetic side were the team-spirit and the extraordinary fighting-strength of all players. Paraguay's game reflected the pride and the joy of a footballing nation that had qualified for a World Cup tournament for the first time since 28 years.

After a painful victory over

Iraq in their opening game, Paraguay had to run after an early goal in each of the three following matches. They wrested a highly deserved draw from hosts Mexico, who were never defeated during these World Cup Finals. In a thrilling game, Belgium, the later Semi-Finalist, was brought to the verge of defeat. During the Second-Round tie against England, Paraguay was in control of the game till Lineker's opening goal. It was not before they were cheated out of an unquestionable penalty that they gave in.

During this World Cup, Paraguay managed to confirm fully the high repute they had acquired in South America over the last years.

### Paraguay-Iraq 1:0 (1:0)

1:0 Romero (35')

### Paraguay-Mexico 1:1 (0:1)

0:1 Flores (3')

1:1 Romero (85')

### Paraguay-Belgium 2:2 (0:1)

0:1 Vercauteren (30')

1:1 Cabañas (50')

1:2 Veyt (59')

2:2 Cabañas (76')

### Paraguay-England 0:3 (0:1)

0:1 Lineker (31')

0:2 Beardsley (56')

0:3 Lineker (73')

# Poland

## Preparation

After the successful qualification for the World Cup Poland received World Champion Italy in Chorzow. At the beginning of December, after the championship had been interrupted for the winter pause, the team played two international games in Tunisia and in Turkey.

The actual preparation for the World Cup began with a sports-medical investigation at the Air Force Academy. Following this check-up a training camp (in Wisla) took place from January 5 to January 17, 1986. On January 20 the Polish team departed for Camerino (Italy) and played a series of test matches against local clubs.

From Italy they flew straight to South America. Three friendlies against Argentine top clubs and an international game against Uruguay were on the program.

At the beginning of March, the Polish championship was resumed whereby the games

*In the game against England Poland's defence revealed some unexpected flaws. Goalkeeper Mlynarczyk was not at his best either and could not prevent Lineker from scoring a hat-trick.*

followed one another in a fast rhythm (Sunday—Wednesday—Sunday).

The championship was only interrupted for the international game against Spain in Cadiz.

After the end of the season the national team took up quarters for another training camp in the South of Germany (Allgäu). Two test games against Bundesliga teams provided Poland's manager with further information about the actual form of his players. Subsequent to this gathering Poland played against Denmark in Copenhagen. On May 21 the Polish delegation flew to Mexico. As Poland were to play in the Monterrey Group it was not necessary to go for an altitude retreat.



### Preliminary Matches

Poland	– Greece	3:1
Poland	– Albania	2:2
Belgium	– Poland	2:0
Greece	– Poland	1:4
Albania	– Poland	0:1
Poland	– Belgium	0:0

1. Poland	6	3	2	1	10:6	8
2. Belgium	6	3	2	1	7:3	8
3. Albania	6	1	2	3	6:9	4
4. Greece	6	1	2	3	5:10	4

### Preparatory Matches

Poland	– Italy	1:0
Tunisia	– Poland	1:0
Turkey	– Poland	1:1
Pisa	– Poland	0:2
Boca Juniors	– Poland	0:1
River Plate	– Poland	5:4
Racing Club	– Poland	0:1
Uruguay	– Poland	2:2
Spain	– Poland	3:0
1.FC Nürnberg	– Poland	0:1
Eintracht Frankfurt	– Poland	1:5
Denmark	– Poland	1:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Morocco 0:0	2nd Match Portugal 1:0	3rd Match England 0:3	¼ Final Brazil 0:4	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Mlynarczyk	Jozef	20.09.53	FC Porto							
2	Przybys	Kazimierz	11.07.60	Widzew Lodz	45			57			
3	Zmuda	Wladyslaw	06.06.54	Cremonese							
4	Ostrowski	Marek	22.11.59	Pogon Szczecin							
5	Wojcicki	Roman	08.01.58	FC Homburg							
6	Matysik	Waldemar	27.09.61	Gornik Zabrze			45				
7	Tarasiewicz	Ryszard	27.04.62	Slask Wroclaw							
8	Urban	Jan	14.05.62	Gornik Zabrze	35						
9	Karas	Jan	17.03.59	Legia Warszawa		34	67				
10	Majewski	Stefan	31.01.56	FC Kaiserslautern							
11	Smolarek	Wlodzimierz	16.07.57	Eintracht Frankfurt		75					
12	Kazimierski	Jacek	17.08.59	Legia Warszawa							
13	Komornicki	Ryszard	14.08.59	Gornik Zabrze		56	23				
14	Kubicki	Dariusz	06.06.63	Legia Warszawa	45						
15	Buncol	Andrzej	21.09.59	FC Homburg			45				
16	Palasz	Andrzej	22.07.60	Gornik Zabrze							
17	Zgutczynski	Andrzej	01.01.58	Auxerre		15					
18	Pawlak	Krzysztof	12.02.58	Lech Poznan							
19	Wandzik	Jozef	13.08.63	Gornik Zabrze							
20	Boniek	Zbigniew	03.03.56	AS Roma							
21	Dziekanowski	Dariusz	30.09.62	Legia Warszawa	55						
22	Furtok	Jan	09.03.62	GKS Katowice				33			





From left to right, back: Mlynarczyk, Majewski, Pawlak, Wojcicki, Urban, Ostrowski; front: Boniek, Matysik, Dziekanowski, Komornicki, Smolarek

## Antoni Piechniczek

Antoni Piechniczek (44) won with his first club *Zryw Chorzow* the Polish junior championship. As he was studying at the sports academy in Warsaw, he joined *Legia Warsaw* in 1961. In the course of his four years' activity with this club he won one time the Polish Cup.

After having finished his studies in 1965 Piechniczek returned to his native town and joined *Ruch Chorzow*. With this team he gained one time the national title. In 1972 Piechniczek moved for a short time to France, playing with a club of the Second Division: Châteauroux.

Antoni Piechniczek was selected three times for Poland's national team and seven times for the Olympic team. He began his career as a



coach in the Second Division with *BKS Bielsko-Biala*. After two years Piechniczek took over *Odra-Opole*, whose team he led to the First Division. In 1979 he was appointed technical director of the regional football association. Two years later the responsi-

ble members of the Polish Football Association elected him to be Poland's manager. With his team Piechniczek qualified for the World Cup '82 in Spain and achieved a remarkable third place.

## Development

In the past years, Poland had one of the most successful youth teams in Europe. They managed to qualify for three World Youth Championships (WYC).

From the team taking part in the WYC '79 in Japan, manager Piechniczek selected *Kazimierski, Buncol* and *Palasz* for the Mexico team.

At the WYC '81 in Australia, Poland were placed only tenth; four players of this side were nominated for the World Cup in Mexico: *Tarasiewicz, Urban, Wandzik* and *Dziekanowski*.

At the WYC '83 in Mexico, Poland finished third, but only *Wandzik* asserted himself later on and got a place in Poland's A-team.



The position of the right full-back was the most contested one. After Kubicki had got a chance in the opening game, Pawlak substituted for him, in the second and third match. Against Brazil, Przybys was eventually entrusted with this role.

## The Players

The 22 members of the Polish squad were recruited from eleven different club sides. The three most important clubs of the Polish League provided Piechniczek's team with totally 14 players: Gornik Zabrze with six, Legia Warszawa with five and Widzew Lodz with three. The remaining eight clubs each supplied one player.

At the time of the World Cup four Polish internationals were engaged at foreign clubs: Boniek (AS Roma) and Zmuda (Cremonese) both in Italy, goalkeeper Mlynarczyk at Porto in Portugal and central defender Majewski at Kaiserslautern in the Federal Republic of Germany.

## Team Organization

Poland played a 4-4-2-system with a man-to-man marking in the zone.

Goalkeeper Mlynarczyk was used in all four games. At the back, sweeper Wojcicki remained far behind his defenders and only rarely left this position. Central defender Majewski was always charged with the marking of the foremost adverse striker. No less than three players got a chance as right full-back: Kubicki, Pawlak and Przybys. On the left side Ostrowski remained uncontested.

In the Polish midfield there were several modifications during the tournament. In the three group matches Matysik assumed the role of the defensive midfielder. In the Second Round clash with Brazil he was replaced by Karas, a player with more offensive qualities.

Komornicki was also to be found in the initial line-up of the three group games. In the third game against England, Karas substituted for him in the 23rd minute, when Poland were already 0:2 down.

In the opening game against Morocco, Buncol was given an offensive role in the right

midfield. But in the following games he had to put up with the substitutes' bench and was only allowed to play in the second half against England.

The agile and dynamic Urban came on the field during the second half against Morocco. He performed quite well and secured a firm place for the three following games.

Dzikanowski, regarded as a future star by many experts, was taken from the field against Morocco, because of an insufficient performance. For the following games he found approval again, but was provided with another task.

Boniek assumed the leading role in Poland's game. He tried to organize the team on the field and acted as a pivot for most attacks. Frequently, he retired far back to the Polish midfield. Then suddenly he turned up as foremost striker, showing his finishing abilities.

Smolarek acted as foremost forward on the left wing. From there he tried time and again to cut in and to penetrate into the penalty-area.

## Attacking Play

The launch of the Polish attacks was effected at a slow pace. They usually played a lot of short cross passes. By direct combinations and numerous double passes, sometimes even within their own half of field, they tried to elude hard tackles.

The co-ordination of the several team parts worked excellently. All ten outfield players took part in the construction of the attacks. Since the full-backs constantly tried to run clear out on the touchlines, their team-mates were allowed to feed them with long diagonal passes and so to displace surprisingly the focus of attack.

## Defensive Play

Poland's defence consisted of experienced players. Apart

from the full-backs all defenders had already participated in the World Cup Finals '82 in Spain. Most of them were very athletic and tall. Therefore, they usually dominated their opponents in the air. In contrast, they had great pains to control quick and nimble strikers.

In general, the defence made a solid impression, but was sometimes faced with problems of organization. As soon as the foremost adverse forward broke out to the wings and thereby lured out the Polish central defender Majewski, the individual flaws of some defenders were revealed. Sweeper Wojcicki lacked quickness and therefore was not always able to stop the gaps. These deficiencies caused some turbulent situations in and around the Polish penalty-area.

In the first two games goalkeeper Mlynarczyk remained unbeaten. Against England and Brazil, however, he had to concede seven goals. Four of these goals were scored after standard situations: one goal from a corner against England, one by a free-kick and two on penalty against the South Americans.

## Conclusions

In their Group Poland were placed third. In the Second Round clash with Brazil they took a 0:4 beating, despite their excellent starting minutes.

The Polish team have always distinguished themselves by a style of play based on teamwork and tactics. Hardly another team worked as hard on various automatisms during the preparation training as the Poles. The running power and the quickness of the players were the main criteria for being picked for the Mexico squad.

The Polish teams were always prepared very carefully for the World Cup Finals. This excellent preparation was mostly the basis of their marvellous successes in the past.

This time the four professionals engaged abroad were available only temporarily, so that the harmony within the side left much to be desired.

Obviously, manager Piechniczek was faced with problems of co-ordination in midfield. This was clearly shown in the opening game against Morocco. Boniek was given an offensive role in midfield and played on the right wing. After the disappointing 0:0 the tasks were newly distributed. Boniek operated now as striker on the right side. Dzikanowski had to recede to the midfield, where his finishing abilities were hardly noticed.

This new midfield was a good combination of skill, fighting strength, running power and dynamism, but there was an almost total absence of imagination and inspiration. Smolarek and Boniek were only rarely launched as they like it: with long passes into the open space. Thus, one of the main arms of the Polish team was hardly used at all.

### Poland-Morocco 0:0

#### Poland-Portugal 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Smolarek (68')

#### Poland-England 0:3 (0:3)

0:1 Lineker (9')  
0:2 Lineker (14')  
0:3 Lineker (34')

#### Poland-Brazil 0:4 (0:1)

0:1 Socrates (30': Penalty)  
0:2 Josimar (55')  
0:3 Edinho (79')  
0:4 Careca (83': Penalty)

# Portugal

## Preparation

Until the end of the Portuguese championship manager José Torres had planned only three international games. All three preparation games took place in Portugal – all three opponents ranked among the smaller footballing nations of Europe!

In mid-January Portugal played against Finland in Leiria. Two weeks later the match against Luxemburg was on the program in Portimao. In mid-February the promising GDR team were received in Portugal.

As Portugal had to play in Monterrey at the World Cup Finals, the preparation program did not include an actual altitude retreat. After the close of the national championship the internationals were gathered for a two weeks training camp in Lisbon.

At first the 22 players had to take various physical and sports-medical tests. After the long and hard season the

*The two points from their 1:0 victory over England remained the only positive result for Portugal. After defeats against Poland and Morocco the Portuguese were eliminated prematurely.*

main accent was put on an active recreation.

Before the team flew to Mexico on May 11, the players were allowed to return to their families for four days. In Mexico the Portuguese took up quarters in Seltillo (1500 m, 80 km away from Monterrey).

The whole training program was divided into four stages: First an acclimatization of one week during which there was only one daily training. For the second stage an intensive physical training was planned. The third stage was mainly dedicated to the tactical instruction, including several daily training sessions. In the last four days the players were made familiar with the English style of play.



### Preliminary Matches

Sweden	– Portugal	0:1
Portugal	– CSSR	2:1
Portugal	– Sweden	1:3
Malta	– Portugal	1:3
Portugal	– Germany FR	1:2
CSSR	– Portugal	1:0
Portugal	– Malta	3:2
Germany FR	– Portugal	0:1

1. Germany FR	8	5	2	1	22:9	12
2. Portugal	8	5	0	3	12:10	10
3. Sweden	8	4	1	2	14:9	9
4. CSSR	8	3	2	3	11:12	8
5. Malta	8	0	1	7	6:25	1

### Preparatory Matches

Portugal	– Finland	1:1
Portugal	– Luxemburg	2:0
Portugal	– GDR	1:3

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	Firstname(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match England 1:0	2nd Match Poland 0:1	3rd Match Morocco 1:3	¼ Final	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Galrinho	Bento Manuel	25.06.48	Benfica							
2	Silva	Pinto João Domingos	21.11.61	F.C. Porto							
3	Gomes	Sousa Antonio Augusto	28.04.57	F.C. Porto			65				
4	Pimentel	Ribeiro José Joaquim	02.11.57	Boavista							
5	Monteiro De Magalhães	Alvaro	03.01.61	Benfica			55				
6	Correia Santos	Carlos Manuel	15.01.58	Benfica							
7	Moreira	Pacheco Jaime	22.07.58	F.C. Porto							
8	Nobre Rosa	Frederico	06.04.57	Boavista							
9	Soares	Gomes Fernando Mendes	22.11.56	F.C. Porto	69	45					
10	Santos	Futre Paulo Jorge	28.02.66	F.C. Porto	21	45					
11	Bandeirinha	B. Fernando Oscar	26.11.62	Académica Coimbra							
12	Martins Da Silva	Jorge Manuel	22.08.54	Belenenses							
13	Farinha Henriques	Morato A.M.	06.11.64	Sporting Lisboa							
14	Fernandes Magalhães	Jaime	10.07.62	F.C. Porto		17					
15	Jesus	Oliveira Antonio Henrique	08.06.58	Benfica							
16	Prudencio C.B.	José Antonio	29.10.57	Belenenses	7						
17	Fernandes Miranda	Diamantino M.	03.08.59	Benfica	83		25				
18	Peixoto Gonçalves	Sobrinho L.F.	05.05.61	Belenenses							
19	Lopes	Aguas José	28.04.60	Benfica			35				
20	Soares	Inácio Augusto	01.02.55	F.C. Porto							
21	Santos Ferreira	André Anton D.	24.12.57	F.C. Porto		73					
22	Alfonso	Damas de Oliveira V.M.	08.10.47	Sporting Lisboa							



From left to right, back: Frederico, Oliveira, Inacio, Alvaro, Bento; front: André, Pacheco, Gomes, Sousa, Diamantino, Carlos Manuel

## José Torres

Twenty years ago José Torres (48) was one of the best known football players in Europe. His powerful headers were a constant threat to all rearguards and made him an extra-class centre forward. Torres began his career as a player with *Torres Novas* in



1956. After three years he moved to *Benfica Lisbon* and had a considerable share in the unique series of success of this club. He could celebrate with his side no less than nine Championships and five Cup wins.

In 1961 *Benfica*, playing with Torres, Eusébio and Coluna, won for the first time the European Cup of the Champions with a victory over CF Barcelona. One year later the Portuguese repeated their success, defeating Real Madrid in the Final.

With the Portuguese national team Torres had a great deal of success, too. At the World Cup '66 in England Portugal placed third; José Torres scored three goals. In all he played 21 international games and scored 14 goals.

In 1971 José Torres left *Benfica Lisbon* and joined *Vitoria Setubal*.

Torres began his career as a coach with *Estoril Praia* in 1978. After two years he was engaged by *Estrela Amadora*. From 1982 to 1984 he worked with *Varzim*.

After the European Championships '84 in France José Torres was selected to be manager for the national team.

## Development

Portugal as one of the small footballing nations in Europe found it very hard in the past to assert themselves against the great powers of football.

The Portuguese junior team managed only one time to qualify for the World Youth Championship: in 1979 they achieved the remarkable seventh place. Manager José Torres placed confidence in one player of this team, selecting him for the World Cup Finals: *Diamantino*.



## The Players

National manager José Torres selected players from half a dozen different clubs. Benfica and Porto each provided the Portuguese team with six internationals, Sporting with four. Belenenses were represented by three and Boavista by two players. One member of the Portuguese Mexico squad played at Coimbra.

The standard formation was only composed of players from the three leading Portuguese clubs, with the exception of Frederico from Boavista Porto.

## Team Organization

Portugal played a 4-5-1 system with zonal marking. But in all three games a second forward was nominated: Diamantino in the first two matches and Futre in the last one. Both, however, were given a task in midfield rather than in attack.

Bento, the Portuguese standard keeper and captain, only played against England. Due to an injury suffered in training he had to be replaced by Damas for the following games.

The defence was newly shaped by Torres in view of the World Cup Finals. It remained unchanged during all matches. The key player at the back was Frederico, the sweeper of Boavista. Benfica's central defender Oliveira only played his second match for the Portuguese squad. These two formed a good partnership and complemented one another quite well.

Alvaro as right and Inacio as left full-back were responsible for the zones along the touch-lines. Both remained behind even when there were no opponents in their zones. They did little to support the midfield players by this defensive attitude.

Pacheco was the central player in the defensive midfield.

In the first two games he was supported in his defensive work by André.

The two driving forces in the offensive midfield were Carlos Manuel and Sousa. They took a hand in almost all attacks. They determined the rhythm of the game and after counter-attacks fully went for the opposing goal.

Diamantino acted far retreated on the right side. However, in the decisive match against Morocco, Jaime was given preference. Gomes as centre forward was very isolated and mostly left to his own resources

## Attacking Play

The Portuguese took great care that they did not lose the ball. It was obvious that they avoided every risk. Through plenty of cross and back passes, they made use of the whole width of the field. Torres' team aimed at being always in numerical superiority around the ball. This required that all players constantly tried to run clear to offer their team-mate who had the ball several possibilities to address his pass.

By this style of play Portugal intended to force their opponents to a great deal of running and so to wear them out. These tactics proved to be very effective in the extraordinary heat of Monterrey. The Portuguese wanted to spare their forces for the really decisive phases of the game. It was above all the duo Gomes/Diamantino who tried to embarrass their opponent by sudden changes of pace. Through individual breakthroughs or swiftly played double passes the Portuguese created several chances. But their finishing abilities were far from being excellent.

The substitutions effected by Torres illustrated too what tactical orders the Portuguese manager gave to his players. When in the first match the English players revealed signs of fatigue, he re-

placed Gomes by the highly-talented Futre. After some minutes Portugal scored the clincher.

Against Poland, Torres tried to do the same thing. Futre, who had substituted for Gomes again, immediately livened up the actions up front. But this time the decisive goal was shot by the opponent.

## Defensive Play

After having lost the ball, no other team withdrew to their defensive zone as quickly and systematically as the Portuguese. Thus, the opponents were practically not disturbed in their development of attack.

In front of their own penalty-area the Lusitanians built up a barrier. Centre forward Gomes alone remained up front to be ready when his side launched their counters. The five midfield players formed the first reception net. Just behind them the four-men defence, that could not be unbalanced easily, was in action. If the opposing side tried to feed their own strikers with running passes, the Portuguese defenders built up an offside trap in a flash. The British were taken in time and again.

## Conclusions

Portugal presented a team provided with outstanding skill. They disposed of a disciplined defence and a flexible midfield with a great deal of imagination. The forwards, however, were rather isolated; they often got not enough support from behind.

At the European Championship 1984 in France, Portugal proved to be quite an attractive team with a modern defensive conception. The players interpreted the zonal marking very intelligently during this tournament. The opponent in possession of the ball was already side-swiped in midfield and then encircled by the Portuguese. This

pressing induced the opponent to take over-hasty and often inaccurate passes. Owing to their natural agility and quickness the Portuguese intercepted many of these inexact passes. Thus, they were able to start off new attacks at once.

At the Mundial Portugal diverged from this style of play. They deliberately left the midfield to the opponent and blocked up their goal with ten players. So, a breakthrough became extremely difficult for the opposing team. But after having conquered the ball in or near their own penalty-area, the Portuguese had each time to make quite an effort to arrive in front of the other goal. This led to the situation that very frequently only few Portuguese players disengaged themselves from their compact defence to take resolutely the offensive.

With this style of play, based on counter-attacks, Portugal were successful against England. It was indeed a counter that led to their winner. But since neither Poland nor Morocco exposed themselves at the back, Portugal's plan did not work in these encounters. They did not manage to score against Poland. In the Morocco game, the face-saving goal was only realized when the match was already decided in favour of the North Africans.

### Portugal-England 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Carlos Manuel (76')

### Portugal-Poland 0:1 (0:0)

0:1 Smolarek (68')

### Portugal-Morocco 1:3 (0:2)

0:1 Khairi (19')  
0:2 Khairi (26')  
0:3 Krimau (62')  
1:3 Diamantino (80')

# Scotland

## Preparation

After Jock Stein's death Alex Ferguson was appointed interim national coach, but despite this additional activity he remained manager with Aberdeen. The fact that many Scottish top players played for English First Division clubs and that Archibald was engaged in Spain and Souness in Italy rendered the task of the national manager even more difficult. Not for one single preparation game all Mexico candidates were available to him.

At the end of January, the Scottish team flew to Tel Aviv where Ferguson could watch his players for the first time in the international game against Israel.

Only two months later the second preparation game took place: Scotland met Romania in Glasgow. At the end of April, Scotland first played against their arch-rivals England in London and then against the Netherlands in Eindhoven.

*With tremendous physical commitment the Scottish defence tries to prevent Briegel from heading at their goal. A single point resulting from the draw against Uruguay was not enough to achieve the Second Round.*



Since the championships in Scotland and in England were finished only on May 3 and on the following weekend in both countries the Cup Finals took place, Ferguson could gather his internationals only in mid-May. In a two weeks altitude retreat in Santa Fe, New Mexico (USA), the Scottish team was given the final touch.

### Preliminary Matches

Scotland	- Iceland	3:0
Scotland	- Spain	3:1
Spain	- Scotland	1:0
Scotland	- Wales	0:1
Iceland	- Scotland	0:1
Wales	- Scotland	1:1

1. Spain	6	4	0	2	9:8	8
2. Scotland	6	3	1	2	8:4	7
3. Wales	6	3	1	2	7:6	7
4. Iceland	6	1	0	5	4:10	2

Scotland	- Australia	2:0
Australia	- Scotland	0:0

### Preparatory Matches

Israel	- Scotland	0:1
Scotland	- Romania	3:0
England	- Scotland	2:1
Netherlands	- Scotland	0:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Denmark 0:1	2nd Match Germany FR1:2	3rd Match Uruguay 0:0	1/8 Final	1/4 Final	1/2 Final	Final
1	Leighton	James	24.07.58	Aberdeen							
2	Gough	Richard	05.04.62	Tottenham Hotspur							
3	Malpas	Maurice	03.08.62	Dundee United							
4	Souness	Graeme	06.05.53	Glasgow Rangers							
5	McLeish	Alexander	21.01.59	Aberdeen							
6	Miller	William	02.05.55	Aberdeen							
7	Strachan	Gordon	09.02.57	Manchester United	75						
8	Aitken	Roy	24.11.58	Celtic Glasgow							
9	Bannon	Eamon	18.04.58	Dundee United	15	75					
10	Bett	James	25.11.59	Aberdeen							
11	McStay	Paul	22.10.64	Celtic Glasgow							
12	Goram	Andrew	13.04.64	Oldham Athletic							
13	Nicol	Stephen	11.12.61	Liverpool		60	70				
14	Narey	David	12.06.56	Dundee United							
15	Albiston	Arthur	14.07.57	Manchester United							
16	McAvennie	Francis	22.11.59	West Ham United	29	30					
17	Archibald	Steve	27.09.56	Barcelona							
18	Sharp	Graeme	16.10.60	Everton							
19	Nicholas	Charles	30.12.61	Arsenal			20				
20	Sturrock	Paul	10.10.56	Dundee United	61		70				
21	Cooper	David	25.02.56	Glasgow Rangers		15	20				
22	Rough	Alan	25.11.51	Hibernian							





From left to right, back: Strachan, Sharp, Narey, Gough, Leighton, Aitken; front: McStay, Nicol, Albiston, Sturrock, Miller

## Alex Ferguson

On September 10, 1985, the legendary national manager Jock Stein deceased on the coaches' bench, at the end of the World Cup qualification game against Wales in Cardiff.

Alex Ferguson, manager of *Aberdeen*, took the responsibility to coach the Scottish team until the end of the World Cup Finals. But at the same time, he continued to be manager of Aberdeen.

Ferguson was a good football player; as centre forward he played with *Queen's Park* and *St. Johnstone*. Further stations in his career as a player were *Dunfermline*, *Glasgow Rangers*, *Falkirk* and lastly *Ayr United*.

As manager he took over *East Stirlingshire*, then coached *St. Mirren* and finally was engaged by Aberdeen in 1978. Ferguson led this club to a unique series of success.

Aberdeen won both the Scottish championship and the Scottish Cup three times. In the Final of the European Cup of the Cup Winners Aberdeen beat *Real Madrid* 2:1.



## Development

In Scotland, for decades extremely talented young players have appeared time and again. Many among them are engaged by English top clubs already at a very young age.

In spite of the great number of such talents, the Scottish youth national team succeeded only once in qualifying for the World Youth Championship.

At the WYC '83, in Mexico, Scotland were eliminated in the Quarter-Final by Poland. From this side, only *Paul McStay* was selected by Ferguson for the Mexico team.



The Scottish manager Ferguson used no less than 19 players. Up front, three different formations got a chance.

## The Players

National manager Ferguson recruited his players from four different national championships. Thirteen players were from Scottish clubs and seven were engaged in England. Souness was under contract with Sampdoria Genova and Archibald in Spain with CF Barcelona. Kenny Dalglish, who acted as a playing coach at Liverpool, had to recall at short notice due to injury.

## Team Organization

The Scottish team played their usual 4-4-2 system with zonal marking.

Miller and McLeish formed the central defence. The latter was replaced by Narey after the first game. Gough played as right full-back in all three games. Malpas was in action as left full-back, whereas, in the last game against Uruguay, Albiston took this position.

Souness was entrusted with the central role in midfield. In the decisive third match he was substituted by young McStay. Aitken played in the defensive midfield, while Nicol was given an offensive role on the left side. More and more Gordon Strachan developed into the actual pivot in midfield.

No less than five players were used in the two forward positions: Nicholas, Sturrock, Archibald and Sharp. McAvennie, the top scorer of the English league, came on the field as a substitute twice.

## Attacking Play

Offensive style of play is characteristic of Scottish football. A high pace and physical fitness are their trumps. The players are aggressive and like to run a risk. By putting on constant pressure the opponent is to be induced to make mistakes. Ferguson and his key players thought to suffer shipwreck

with these tactics in Mexico. Therefore they tried to play a style adapted to the climatic conditions.

The attacks were started slowly, including many cross and diagonal passes. The two full-backs Gough and Malpas were often included in the development of the game. Frequently, flowing moves were to be seen in midfield. At times they tried to achieve a breakthrough by triangle play on the flanks. Much later than usual the forwards were included in the attacks.

In the first two matches against Denmark and Germany FR this style of play proved to be quite attractive – but lacking in efficiency!

## Defensive Play

Like all British teams Scotland were well organized in defence. Through their two-club connection at the back, including players from Aberdeen and Dundee United alone, the mutual understanding was guaranteed.

After having lost the ball the Scottish players did without their usual pressing. They withdrew behind the halfway line without strong resistance. The two strikers were practically dispensed of any defensive work.

It was interesting to see that in the match against Denmark Scotland diverged from their usual defensive play. At times Miller assumed the role of a sweeper. Somewhat sluggish McLeish marked Elkjaer. Malpas, the left full-back, changed to the middle to guard Laudrup.

This tactical move made obvious that the Scots didn't start their games as careless and selfconfident as before. The opponent was exactly analysed and the Scottish team prepared accordingly. In spite of this additional security through sweeper Mislser the Scottish defence showed some difficulty when the Danes performed their swift and refined moves through the middle. It was in

this way actually that Elkjaer scored the decisive goal.

It was proved once more that it is very difficult for a team manager to change a style of play which has been employed by players since their early youth. Particular problems arise when the players' minds should be changed from their original football of high pace to a more considered and more variable game. It takes months, sometimes years, to achieve this. Ferguson didn't have this time. He had to content himself with a minimum preparation programme. Thus, Scotland's elimination seems logical – with the slight reservation that sometimes football reality belies every logic.

## Conclusions

Ferguson tried to teach his team a synthesis of British and continental football. It was by a richly varied construction of play and by many displacements of the game that the midfield was bridged. But some deficiencies came to light in the adverse defensive zone.

No defender or midfield player managed to give creative impulses in this zone. Only very rarely the two strikers were really taken clear. Risky dribbles, surprising double passes or swift moves through the middle were hardly to be seen. The Scots, being used to a high speed, were not able to split the opposing defence by changing immediately from slow moves to a sudden acceleration of play.

The players' charges in midfield did not seem optimal. Souness played in quite a backward position and from there tried to launch the Scottish attacks. But only rarely he appeared near the opponents' penalty-area where his excellent skill and his subtle passes would have been required most urgently. Aitken was most active on the defensive. Nicol only endangered the adverse goal by his

runs down the left flank and his sharp crosses.

Only Strachan's elegant dribbles with surprising turns and his sudden accelerations were suited to trouble the opponent. It was by such an individual attack that he actually scored the only Scottish World Cup goal against GFR. Strachan was a good individual player, performing with exemplary commitment – but collectively his effect was limited.

After a good start against Denmark and a powerful first half against GFR, the Scottish game was losing in effectiveness. The players visibly lost self-confidence. In their match against Uruguay – during 85 minutes they played against only ten South Americans – the Scots did not manage to achieve a single opportunity.

### Scotland-Denmark 0:1 (0:0)

0:1 Elkjaer (57')

### Scotland-GFR 1:2 (1:1)

1:0 Strachan (18')

1:1 Völler (23')

1:2 Allofs (49')

### Scotland-Uruguay 0:0

# Spain

## Preparation

The successes of the Spanish clubs in the three European Cups affected the preparation of the Spanish team considerably. Since the Finals with Real Madrid and Atletico Madrid took place only at the beginning of May, Spain's manager Muñoz had to put off the departure for Mexico, planned for May 5. The shortening of the training camp, to be held in Tlaxcala, was all the more grave as Muñoz had to put up with a modest preparation program.

From November 1985 onwards Spain could play an international game every month. As the first team, the Spaniards received Austria in Zaragoza, in December Bulgaria came to Valencia. In January, Muñoz's team played against USSR in Las Palmas. The match against Belgium in February was held in Elche. The last preparation game against Poland took place in Cadiz.

After the arrival of the Span-

*Spain impressed the fans by their 5:1 victory over Denmark. In this Second Round game Butragueño beat the Danish keeper Høgh (No. 22) no less than four times.*



ish delegation in Mexico there was a very easy training during the first week. Only gradually the Spanish coaches increased the training rhythm. Various games against Mexican clubs relaxed the ordinary training sessions.

### Preliminary Matches

Spain	- Wales	3:0
Scotland	- Spain	3:1
Spain	- Scotland	1:0
Wales	- Spain	3:0
Iceland	- Spain	1:2
Spain	- Iceland	2:1

1. Spain	6	4	0	2	9:8	8
2. Scotland	6	3	1	2	8:4	7
3. Wales	6	3	1	2	7:6	7
4. Iceland	6	1	0	5	4:10	2

### Preparatory Matches

Spain	- Austria	0:0
Spain	- Bulgaria	2:0
Spain	- USSR	2:0
Spain	- Belgium	3:0
Spain	- Poland	3:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Brazil 0:1	2nd Match N. Ireland 2:1	3rd Match Algeria 3:0	¼ Final Denmark 5:1	¼ Final Belgium 1:1 a.e.t.	½ Final	Final
1	Zubizarreta	Andoni	23.10.61	FC Barcelona							
2	Reñones	Tomas	09.08.60	Atletico Madrid					45		
3	Camacho	José Antonio	08.06.55	Real Madrid							
4	Maceda	Antonio	16.05.57	Real Madrid							
5	Muñoz	Victor	15.03.57	FC Barcelona							
6	Gordillo	Rafael	24.02.57	Real Madrid		53					
7	Señor	Juan Antonio	26.08.58	Real Zaragoza	8		29		75		
8	Goicoechea	Andoni	23.08.56	Athletic Bilbao							
9	Butragueño	Emilio	22.07.63	Real Madrid			45				
10	Carrasco	Francisco José	06.03.59	FC Barcelona							
11	Moreno	Julio Alberto	07.10.58	FC Barcelona							
12	Setien	Enrique	27.09.58	Atletico Madrid							
13	Urruticoechea	Francisco	17.11.52	FC Barcelona							
14	Gallego	Ricardo	08.02.59	Real Madrid							
15	Chendo	Porlan Miguel	12.10.61	Real Madrid							
16	Rincon	Hipolito	28.04.57	Real Betis Sevilla		12					
17	Lopez	Francisco	01.11.62	Sevilla FC	82			7			
18	Caldere	Ramon Maria	16.01.59	FC Barcelona		37					
19	Salinas	Julio	11.09.62	Atletico Madrid		78		45	63		
20	Olaya	Eloy José	10.07.64	Real Sporting Gijon			45	45	57		
21	Michel	Gonzalez Miguel	23.03.63	Real Madrid			61	83			
22	Abianedo	Juan Carlos	02.09.63	Real Sporting Gijon							



From left to right, back: Zubizarreta, Salinas, Michel, Goicoechea, Camacho, Gordillo; front: Butragueño, Victor, Francisco, Tomas, Gallego

## Miguel Muñoz

Miguel Muñoz (64) was the oldest and certainly also the most experienced of all managers present in Mexico. He was born in Madrid and started his career as a player with *Racing Santander* (1945/46) and *Celta de Vigo* (1946-48). Then he joined *Real Madrid* and had a decisive share in helping this club to an international reputation. As right midfielder player he won several titles and Cup competitions. As captain of Real Madrid he led his side to three victories in the European Cup of the Cup Winners: in 1956 against Stade Reims (4:3), in the following year against Fiorentina (2:0) and in 1958 against AC Milan (3:2). After having finished his career as a player in 1958, Muñoz was appointed coach of *Plus Ultra* (today Castilla), a team affiliated to Real Madrid. After two years Real Ma-



adrid called him back and entrusted him with the coaching of the first team. After only four months he gained the European Cup of the Champions, with a 7:3 victory over Eintracht Frankfurt. In the same year Real Madrid also won the Intercontinental which then was staged for the first time - against Peñarol Montevideo (5:1, 0:0). During 14 years Muñoz led his club to countless successes.

After having left Real, he successively took over *Granada*, *Sevilla* and *Las Palmas*. After Spain's disappointing performances at the World Cup '82 in their own country, Miguel Muñoz was selected to be the successor of national coach Santamaría. At the European Championships in France his team surprisingly achieved the Final, losing in a dramatic game to hosts France (0:2).

## Development

After USSR, Spain's junior teams turned out to be the second strongest European nation at the World Youth Championships (WYC). Nevertheless, only two former junior internationals succeeded in getting a place in Spain's Mexico squad.

*Ricardo Gallego* played at the WYC '77 in Tunisia, *Francisco Lopez* took part in the WYC '81 in Australia.



Standard sweeper Macedo could only play the opening game due to injury. In the subsequent matches Gallego took over his position. In the Quarter-Final clash with Belgium, the suspended Goicoechea was replaced by Chendo.

## The Players

The Spanish team were composed of players from eight different clubs. Champions Real Madrid (7) and Barcelona (5) were the main suppliers of players to the Spanish side. Three internationals were selected from Atletico Bilbao and two from Sporting Gijon and Atletico Madrid. Real Zaragoza, Betis Sevilla and Sevilla FC provided the national squad with one player.

## Team Organization

Spain's defensive conception was based on a combination of man-to-man and zonal marking. If the opponent played with only two forwards, they were closely marked by two Spanish defenders. In this case, the free full-back moved forward to the midfield.

Against Brazil sweeper Macedo directed his defence. Tomas, Goicoechea and Julio Alberto formed the defence. In midfield Camacho was charged with guarding Socrates. On the right side playmaker Francisco was supported by the dangerous Michel. On the left side Victor's defensive role proved to be very valuable.

Since Macedo was no longer available because of an old injury, the midfield player Gallego was converted into the new sweeper against Northern Ireland. Julio Alberto's position as left full-back was taken by Camacho. On the left side in midfield the dynamic Gordillo did his best to bring more pressure into the Spanish attacking play.

For the third game against Algeria there was only one change in the initial line-up: the injured Gordillo was replaced by Caldere, a player known for his great running abilities.

In the Second Round clash with Denmark, Goicoechea guarded Elkjaer and Camacho tried to neutralize Lau-

drup. Francisco had to stay on the substitutes' bench for the first time. Julio Alberto was used for the second time.

In the Quarter-Final clash with Belgium, Goicoechea was suspended because of two cautions. In place of him, Chendo was entrusted with the marking of Claesen, the only nominal striker of the Belgian side.

## Attacking Play

In the game against Brazil Spain preferred a style of play based on counter-attacks. The two forwards, however, did not receive enough support from the midfield and were often too isolated. Although Butragueño with his skillful turns and his quick dribbles was a constant worry to the Brazilian defence, the effectiveness of the Spanish attacks remained rather modest. Midfield strategist Francisco had no real impact on the course of the game.

With a totally different attitude Spain took the offensive against Northern Ireland and Algeria. Direct running passes, brilliant double passes and quick moves on the wings, mainly on the left side, proved to be the main features of their attacking play. Even at top speed the Spaniards displayed their outstanding skill. It was Michel who particularly caught the eye by his precise passing. Francisco impressed the experts by his tremendous sphere of action. After having taken the lead in both encounters, they slowed down the pace and kept the game under control.

## Defensive Play

At the back, Spain seemed to be fairly compact. The defenders were used to mark their opponents closely and tackled hard.

Their defensive conception was built on a pressing in midfield. Victor and Caldere disposed of an enormous

range of action and usually attacked their opponents already at the halfway line, trying to win back the ball very early. In the further advanced zone the offensive midfield players Francisco and Michel constantly disturbed the players who were in possession of the ball, tempting them into over-hasty actions.

When the Spanish team were one goal down, they began with this intensive pressing already near the penalty-area of their opponent. In doing so the two strikers Butragueño and Salinas proved to be extremely clever. Two Spanish goals emerged from situations in which their opponents were attacked so early.

## Conclusions

During these World Cup Finals, Spain presented a team provided with great poise and fighting spirit. In front of the well organized defence players like Gamacho, Victor and Caldere, all very strong in tackling, complemented in an ideal way those team-members (Francisco, Michel) who disposed of brilliant skills. Up front the tall and vigorous Salinas and the lightning-quick and nimble Butragueño formed an excellent partnership.

Muñoz had succeeded in providing his team with a modern and effective style of play. The players took on responsibility and were able to adapt their play to the circumstances. They had the ability to put under pressure every opponent and to control them in each zone of the field. This kind of pressing combined with the well-known Spanish temperament gave Spain's opponents only little room and time to construct their play. However, the Spanish team were sometimes lacking in creativity and imagination which came to light in certain critical situations.

As soon as the Spaniards were one goal down, as against Brazil, Denmark and

Belgium, they seemed to be panic-stricken and assaulted the opposing goal, but in such moments completely lacked ideas. They too often ran through the middle. All midfield players went ahead at the same time and left a large gap behind, inviting the opponents to launch their counters. In such hectic situations Gallego's calm and vision were missed. Playing sweeper he was a great help in starting off attacks from the back, but in midfield he could not be replaced fully.

In five games Spain scored eleven goals. Four of them were scored from standard situations (two penalties, one free-kick and one goal from a corner). Four goals were realized after typical pressing situations. Three goals were taken through counter-attacks. But not a single goal was scored after a flowing combination!

### Spain-Brazil 0:1 (0:0)

0:1 Socrates (62')

### Spain-N. Ireland 2:1 (2:0)

1:0 Butragueño (1')  
2:0 Salinas (18')  
2:1 Clarke (46')

### Spain-Algeria 3:0 (1:0)

1:0 Caldere (15')  
2:0 Caldere (68')  
3:0 Eloy (70')

### Spain-Denmark 5:1 (1:1)

0:1 J. Olsen (33': Penalty)  
1:1 Butragueño (43')  
2:1 Butragueño (56')  
3:1 Goicoechea (68': Penalty)  
4:1 Butragueño (80')  
5:1 Butragueño (88': Penalty)

### Spain-Belgium 1:1 (1:1, 0:1)

0:1 Ceulemans (35')  
1:1 Señor (85')

Pen. 4:5

# USSR

## Preparation

At the beginning of January 1986 the Soviet national team moved from their wintry home to the sunny Canary Islands for two weeks. This first stage of the preparation was marked by three trainings daily. During a tournament in Las Palmas, organized at short notice, with the participation of the two German Bundesliga teams Saarbrücken and Leverkusen, the players were tested for the first time. The international game against Spain formed the conclusion of this training camp.

The Soviet delegation moved directly on to Toluca in Mexico where a first training camp at high altitudes took place. Various sports-medical examinations were carried out in order to inform manager Malofejev about the endurance of his players. After ten days of intensive training a first game (against Atlas) was carried out. Three days later the game against Mexico fol-

*The USSR and France drew 1:1 after the Soviets had outclassed Hungary 6:0. So, their defeat against Belgium was quite an upset.*

lowed and later on a third match against Irapuato.

In the Soviet Union the national championship began in March, interrupted by the official international matches against England in Tiflis (March 26), Romania in Bucharest (April 23) and Finland in Moscow (May 7). After the disappointing results in these games Malofejev was dismissed and replaced by the coach of Dynamo Kiev, Valerij Lobanovski.



### Preliminary Matches

Ireland Rep.	- USSR	1:0
Norway	- USSR	1:1
Switzerland	- USSR	2:2
USSR	- Switzerland	4:0
Denmark	- USSR	4:2
USSR	- Denmark	1:0
USSR	- Ireland Rep.	2:0
USSR	- Norway	1:0

1. Denmark	8	5	1	2	17:6	11
2. USSR	8	4	2	2	13:8	10
3. Switzerland	8	2	4	2	5:10	8
4. Ireland Rep.	8	2	2	4	5:10	6
5. Norway	8	1	3	4	4:10	5

### Preparatory Matches

1. FC Saarbrücken	- USSR	1:1
Bayer Leverkusen	- USSR	0:1
Spain	- USSR	2:0
Atlas	- USSR	0:3
Mexico	- USSR	1:0
Irapuato	- USSR	0:2
USSR	- England	0:1
Romania	- USSR	2:1
USSR	- Finland	0:0
USSR	- Torpedo Moscow	1:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Hungary 6:0	2nd Match France 1:1	3rd Match Canada 2:0	¼ Final Belgium 3:4 a.e.t.	½ Final	Final
1	Dassaiev	Rinat	13.06.57	Spartak Moscow						
2	Bessonov	Vladimir	05.03.58	Dynamo Kiev						
3	Chivadze	Alexandr	08.04.55	Dynamo Tbilisi						
4	Morozov	Gennadi	30.12.52	Spartak Moscow						
5	Demianenko	Anatoli	19.02.59	Dynamo Kiev						
6	Bubnov	Alexandr	10.10.55	Spartak Moscow						
7	Yaremchuk	Ivan	19.03.62	Dynamo Kiev						
8	Yakovenko	Pavel	19.12.64	Dynamo Kiev	72	68		79		
9	Zavarov	Alexandr	24.04.61	Dynamo Kiev		58	29	72		
10	Kuznetsov	Oleg	22.03.63	Dynamo Kiev						
11	Blokhin	Oleg	05.11.52	Dynamo Kiev		32	61			
12	Bal	Andrei	16.02.58	Dynamo Kiev						
13	Litovchenko	Gennadi	11.09.63	Dnepr						
14	Rodionov	Sergei	03.09.62	Spartak Moscow	21	22		48		
15	Larionov	Nikolai	19.02.57	Zenit Leningrad						
16	Chanov	Viktor	21.07.59	Dynamo Kiev						
17	Yevtushenko	Vadim	01.01.59	Dynamo Kiev	18			41		
18	Protasov	Oleg	14.02.64	Dnepr			57			
19	Belanov	Igor	25.09.60	Dynamo Kiev	69		33			
20	Aleinikov	Sergei	07.11.61	Dynamo Minsk						
21	Rats	Vasili	25.04.61	Dynamo Kiev						
22	Krakovskii	Sergei	11.08.60	Dnepr						





From left to right, back: Dassaiev, Demianenko, Aleinikov, Kuznetsov, Bessonov; front: Yakovenko, Rats, Larionov, Yaremchuk, Belanov, Zavarov

## Valerij Lobanovski

From 1958–1965, Valerij Lobanovski played at Dynamo Kiev, then moved to Odessa and concluded his career at Shakhtyor Donez.

In 1968, he began his career as a coach with Dnjeptr. In



1973, he went to Dynamo Kiev. With this team he could celebrate six national titles and four Cup wins. In 1975/76, Lobanovski was appointed manager of the USSR team for the first time, got a chance again in 1981/82 and took over the national team in 1983, before the qualification games for the European Championship. After his team had failed, he was replaced by Malofejev. But only three weeks before the opening game of the World Cup Finals in Mexico, Lobanovski was called back.

Eduard Malofejev (44), in his youth player at Spartak Moscow and Dynamo Minsk, has also had a share in the development of the Soviet team.

After having finished his career as a player, he went to Holland for a short time to

study the Dutch soccer (Ajax). After his return, he became manager of Dynamo Minsk whose team were promoted to the First Division in 1978.

In 1983, Malofejev first coached the Olympic team and then became responsible for the Soviet national team. He banked primarily on the players of his former club Dynamo Minsk and with this new side managed to qualify for Mexico. But in the preparation games the Soviets were no longer convincing, although now ten players from the Soviet champions Dynamo Kiev were selected.

After Dynamo Kiev had won the European Cup in style and the USSR had only drawn against Finland (0:0), Malofejev was dismissed.


## Development

The Soviet junior teams have always been very successful. They managed to qualify for four World Youth Championships (WYC).

USSR won the WYC 77 in Tunisia. From this successful side Bessonov and Bal were picked for the World Cup Final Competition.

At the World Youth Championship in Japan USSR finished second. Three players of this side were to be found in the World Cup team: Zavarov, Chanov and Krakovskii.

At the WYC 83 in Mexico, however, the Soviet team placed only 15th. Of this team, Yakovenko, Litovchenko and Protasov were later on selected for the national team.



After the Soviets had already qualified for the Second Round, manager Lobanovski used no less than nine new players against Canada.

## The Players

The pool of players of the Soviet squad was recruited from only six teams. Dynamo Kiev, the Soviet champion and winner of the European Cup, were represented by twelve players. This club also supplied the manager of the national team, Valerij Lobanovski. Four internationals were from Spartak Moscow. Dnepr was represented by three men. Dynamo Tbilisi, Dynamo Minsk and Zenit Leningrad provided the USSR team with one player each.

## Team Organization

The Soviet manager Lobanovski, in former times known as an advocate of a defensive style of play, surprisingly presented the most offensive team of all World Cup participants.

At the back, the Soviets used to play with a mixed man-to-man zonal marking. Goal-keeper Dassaiev also distinguished himself by his long and rapidly taken throw-offs. Despite his excellent skill and his nimbleness, sweeper Besonov only rarely supported the Soviet attacking play.

If the opposing team lined up with a forward and a winger, central defender Kuznetsov marked the centre forward and one of the full-backs the winger. Aleinikov, as in his club side, was then charged with a defensive role in midfield. But if the opponent played with two strikers in the central attacking position, Aleinikov had to guard one of these forwards.

Right full-back was first Lariovov. After his injury he was replaced by Bal. Demianenko, a full-back with tremendous offensive qualities, played as usual on the left side.

The lean Yakovenko proved to be the key player in midfield. His outstanding skill, combined with his exceptional vision, made him the actual mastermind of this team. Al-

though he was sometimes a little playful, he had a good eye for the quick release of running passes.

The attack consisted of two different lines. Up front the lightning-quick Belanov played. He was constantly in motion and often drew away his direct opponent from the centre. Zavarov, the second forward, also manoeuvred at the centre, but mostly in a slightly retreated position. This very talented striker disposed of an excellent control and an enormous accelerating power. As soon as the USSR team came under pressure, Zavarov retired to the midfield and had to take on defensive tasks.

In the second line the small and extremely agile Yaremchuk played on the right side. During the attacking phase, with his surprising dribbles, he became an actual right winger. Whenever the opponents were in possession of the ball he actively took part in the Soviet pressing.

On the left side, also Rats proved to have many qualities of a true winger. When he was fed with long passes, he could hardly be held by his opponents and prepared his team-mates a number of excellent opportunities, above all with his strongly cut crosses.

## Conclusions

The Soviet team surprised the footballing world with their perfect skill and tactical variants. Their displays were based on the joy to play and not primarily on factors like stamina and fighting strength. Even when there was no room and the opposing team set up a violent pressing, the Soviets had no trouble to control the ball. At top speed they managed to «kill» the ball and to run with it, to produce well-timed passes, to shoot or to head from all positions. In tackling all players revealed toughness and agility.

The attacks were usually

launched from a well-covered defence. Since all players were fairly quick, they hardly ever failed in doing so.

In attack the positions were constantly changed, from left to right and from behind to front and vice versa. In this respect the players demonstrated the versatility of their training and at the same time baffled their opponents.

Through their tremendous amount of running the USSR succeeded time and again in achieving a numerical superiority near the ball. This caused their tactical advantages in defence and in attack. In the first game the Hungarian actions were frequently stifled by the constant numerical superiority of the Soviet players.

In the decisive match against Belgium, the Soviet team, for all their excellent and convincing performances, were defeated. There were several reasons for this upsetting result. Primarily, one has to appreciate the Belgian performance. After having equalized in the first minutes of the second half, the Belgians cast off all fear of the favourites and profited by their large international experience. The Soviets incomprehensibly took in sail, slowed down the pace and tried to keep the ball in their possession. Also the defenders took part in this kind of play. Now the Belgians had more room and they energetically took advantage of it. After the leveller, the Soviets lost control of the game; they continued to run and to fight, but their actions were no longer convincing. Individual mistakes eventually led to Belgium's victory. Rhythm plays an important part in soccer. Each player has his own and the team their particular rhythm. The key players determine the pace of the game. The USSR squad – as it was composed in Leon – were obliged to put their stamp on the game, to be in command and to assault the opposing goal. That is their play. They had not such a

complete command of the other style of play: to slow down the pace and to keep the ball in their rows.

Each team has to learn to put through their style of play over 90 minutes. Only then it can be labelled a real first class team. Each player must do what he knows best and not try what his team-mates know better. The true master proves himself in limitation. This is true for each player as well as for the whole team.

We shall soon see again the Soviet team on the international scene. We may look forward to that!

### USSR-Hungary 6:0 (3:0)

1:0 Yakovenko (2')  
2:0 Aleinikov (4')  
3:0 Belanov (24': Penalty)  
4:0 Yaremchuk (66')  
5:0 Yaremchuk (75')  
6:0 Rodionov (80')

### USSR-France 1:1 (0:0)

1:0 Rats (53')  
1:1 Fernandez (60')

### USSR-Canada 2:0 (0:0)

1:0 Blokhin (58')  
2:0 Zavarov (74')

### USSR-Belgium 3:4 (2:2, 1:0)

1:0 Belanov (27')  
1:1 Scifo (56')  
2:1 Belanov (70')  
2:2 Ceulemans (77')  
2:3 De Mol (102')  
2:4 Claesen (110')  
3:4 Belanov (111': Penalty)

# Hungary

## Preparation

Already in April 1985, Hungary, as the first European team, were qualified for the World Cup Finals. Therefore, in June a Hungarian delegation, including manager Mezey and several scientists, departed for Mexico to study the conditions on the spot precisely one year before the start of the World Cup.

The actual preparation of the team began in October 1985 with an international game against Wales in Cardiff.

In the first days of December, Hungary flew to Mexico to participate in an international tournament with Algeria, Korea Rep. and hosts Mexico.

After an indoor tournament in Lucerne the Hungarian team moved on to Southern Spain (Benidorm), where the Hungarian coaches directed a training camp of three weeks (in January 1986). In Spain, Hungary played some training matches against local clubs. From Spain the Hungarian delegation flew direct-

*The Hungarian defence with goalkeeper Disztl and defender Péter had not the least chance against the Soviet strikers; in particular Belanov (No. 19) could hardly be controlled.*

ly to Qatar. Three games in Doha allowed Mezey to give all his internationals an opportunity to perform before the start of the second round in Hungary.

At the beginning of March, the championship was resumed. With several English weeks the Mexico candidates got used to the rhythm of the World Cup. On March 16, an international game was played against Brazil in Budapest. After the end of the championship, the Hungarian internationals were gathered in an altitude retreat in the Austrian alps, before the team left for Mexico in mid-May.



### Preliminary Matches

Hungary	- Austria	3:1
Netherlands	- Hungary	1:2
Cyprus	- Hungary	1:2
Hungary	- Cyprus	2:0
Austria	- Hungary	0:3
Hungary	- Netherlands	0:1

1. Hungary	6	5	0	1	12:4	10
2. Netherlands	6	3	1	2	11:5	7
3. Austria	6	3	1	2	9:8	7
4. Cyprus	6	0	0	6	3:18	0

### Preparatory Matches

Wales	- Hungary	0:3
Korea Rep.	- Hungary	0:1
Algeria	- Hungary	1:3
Mexico	- Hungary	2:0
León	- Hungary	1:4
Asian Selection	- Hungary	0:3
Asian Selection	- Hungary	0:2
Qatar	- Hungary	0:3
Hungary	- Brazil	3:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match USSR 0:6	2nd Match Canada 2:0	3rd Match France 0:3	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Disztl	Peter	30.03.60	Videoton						
2	Sallai	Sandor	26.03.60	Honved						
3	Roth	Antal	14.09.60	Pecs	13	62				
4	Varga	Jozsef	09.11.54	Denizli						
5	Kardos	Jozsef	22.03.60	Ujpest Dozsa						
6	Garaba	Imre	29.07.58	Honved						
7	Kiprich	Jozsef	06.09.63	Tatabanya						
8	Nagy	Antal	17.10.56	Nancy		62	45			
9	Dajka	Laszlo	29.04.59	Honved	28	28				
10	Detari	Lajos	24.04.63	Honved						
11	Esterhazy	Marton	09.04.56	AEK Athen						
12	Csuhay	Jozsef	12.08.57	Videoton						
13	Disztl	Laszlo	04.06.62	Videoton						
14	Peter	Zoltan	23.03.58	Zalaegerszeg	62					
15	Hannich	Peter	30.03.57	Nancy			45			
16	Nagy	Jozsef	21.11.60	Haladas						
17	Burcsa	Gyözö	13.03.54	Auxerre	77	28				
18	Szendrei	Jozsef	25.04.54	Ujpest Dozsa						
19	Bognar	György	05.11.61	MTK/VM			25			
20	Kovacs	Kalman	11.09.65	Honved			65			
21	Hajszan	Gyula	09.10.61	Raba Eto Györ						
22	Andrusch	Jozsef	31.03.56	Honved						



From left to right, back: Disztl, Roth, Kardos, Esterhazy, Dajka, Garaba; front: Detari, Varga, Hannich, Sallai, Kovacs

## György Mezey

György Mezey's career as a player had no exciting highlights. He began with the youth team of *RAC Budapest*. After having stayed with this small Fourth Division club for five years, he joined (in 1959) a club which performed one category higher: *TF Buda-*

*pest*. After further five years, Mezey climbed another step of the ladder: he joined for three seasons *Budafok FC*, which at that time played in the Second Division. At the age of 27, Mezey managed to join a club of the First Division: with the famous *MTK Budapest* he played the last five years of his career.

Already in the course of his career as a player, Mezey trained to be a certified P.T. instructor and a football coach. He also showed a great interest in the latest sport-scientific findings. The highest diplomas of the sports college in Budapest allowed Mezey a direct transition from the career as a player to his future job as a coach. In 1974, he took over the first team of *MTK Budapest*. This team finished third four years later.

In 1980, Mezey was engaged

by the Hungarian Football Association as assistant coach of the national team. In this function he also participated in the World Cup '82 in Spain and was the most important collaborator of manager Kalman Meszöly. In 1982, Mezey was given charge of the U-21 team and of the Olympic team. Already in the following year he was appointed national manager.

## Development

The Hungarian youth team took part in three World Youth Championships (WYC) up to now. In 1977, in Tunisia, they were placed tenth. From this team *Zoltan Peter* was selected for the World Cup team of 1986.

From the team taking part in the WYC '79 in Japan, the following five players are to be found again in Hungary's Mexico team: *Peter Disztl, Sandor Sallai, Antal Roth, Jozsef Kardos* and *Jozsef Nagy*.

From the very strong side which finished ninth at the WYC '85 in the Soviet Union only forward *Kalman Kovacs* managed to get a place in the actual national team.





There were numerous changes in the Hungarian team. Kiprich for example, substituted for Kovacs on the right wing during the first two games. Daika and Hannich were replaced by Bognar and Nagy in midfield.

## **Excellent Preparation**

In the computer age one is inclined to compare the Hungarian team of Mexico '86 to a black box. Manager Mezey and his collaborators know what they put into it – organization and form of the training; number, selection, degree of difficulty of the preparation games and training partners; adaptation to heat, altitude and time-shift in Leon; medical, physical and psychological care in the training camp – and they were struck with terror when they observed what came out of it. The outside observer can merely guess, maybe imagine, but certainly not know what was going on within the team, inside of the black box.

## **Only Victories before the World Cup**

Since 1983 the Hungarians have played 27 international games: only four were lost, five matches ended in a draw and 18 games were won. In their qualification group Hungary held their own against the Netherlands, Austria and Cyprus. They had a whole year to prepare for Mexico: During this time they played eight friendlies that – with the exception of one – were all won. In Cardiff Wales lost to Hungary 0:3 and the Brazilians were defeated with the same score in Budapest. The Hungarians had no difficulties in their training games in Leon, just before the beginning of the Mundial. They were all won and at the same time used to stabilize the defence, to practice attacking moves and standard situations. The preparation appeared to be accomplished successfully and the Hungarians approached the World Cup with very much self-confidence. There was only one absence that later on proved

to have grave consequences: Nyilasi could not be used due to injury.

## **The Disastrous First Game**

Then the first World Cup game against the USSR took place and everything turned against the Hungarians. After only four minutes the Soviets had taken a 2:0 lead and outplayed their opponent on every point. The Hungarians were stunned. After their 3:0 lead at half-time the superiority of the Soviet side became so immense that instead of 6:0 they could have also won 10:0. Hungary were never able to recover from this crushing defeat as the following games were to prove.

The fear of failure is a psychological phenomenon. It paralyzes mind and body and leads to black-outs which for other persons are incomprehensible and completely illogical. The Hungarian team seemed to have forgotten all they had learnt. Next to nothing worked, both in defence and in attack most actions went wrong... Ninety per cent of all tackles were lost, at the back there was complete disorder and up front the forwards did not run clear. The outside observer had the impression that the team acted as if they were paralyzed. They were neither a match for the Soviets with their pace nor for the French with their flair and wit. They could not even dominate the robust Canadians.

It was to no avail to discuss on things like line-up, system, tactics and strategy. Hungary were completely put out and played far below their value. After the second goal against Canada there was a glimmer of hope. Now the anguish was shaken off and Hungary performed at their best for the remaining 15 minutes. Playing France the Hungarians had some other good phases: at the beginning of

the first half and immediately after the interval. But after the French had taken the lead in the first half and the decisive 2:0 in the second half, the Hungarians fell out of step and uncertainty prevailed again.

## **Conclusions**

Whoever tries to analyse Hungary's failure has to take into consideration the psychology of soccer. He will soon find out that top players and first class sides abound in self-confidence, that they are convinced of their abilities and are not even afraid of the devil. These are the basic requirements for success.

Then other aspects come in, the problems regarding physical fitness, tactics or skill. And here one is faced with another weakness of the Hungarians: they failed to keep up with a high pace. The modern player is forced to perform all his actions at a high pace and under pressure of the opponent. He has little room and time. His direct opponent chases him, other players encircle him and block the routes. Just as there are only two playing situations – attack and defence –, there are only two real problems on the field: space and time. Much space means much time to assert oneself properly both in attack and in defence. When challenged by the best, one is short of time and space and the opponent's pressure mounts. Good players have to get used to such situations, during practice sessions as well as in their national championships and international games. Such a development takes time and cannot be achieved overnight.

This is another experience that the Hungarian players – above all the highly talented Lajos Detari – took home. Only those who learn from experiences get on in life. Who covers up a bad experience by excuses will always fail.

### **Hungary-USSR 0:6 (0:3)**

0:1 Yakovenko (2')  
0:2 Aleinikov (4')  
0:3 Belanov (24': Penalty)  
0:4 Yaremchuk (66')  
0:5 Yaremchuk (75')  
0:6 Rodionov (80')

### **Hungary-Canada 2:0 (1:0)**

1:0 Esterhazy (2')  
2:0 Detari (75')

### **Hungary-France 0:3 (0:1)**

0:1 Stopyra (29')  
0:2 Tigana (62')  
0:3 Rocheteau (84')

# Uruguay

## Preparation

Uruguay was one of the first nations which, in April 1985, qualified for the World Cup Finals. That gave manager Borrás the opportunity to offer his team a long-term preparation.

As two thirds of the Uruguayan internationals were employed with foreign clubs and only rarely were released for preparation games, Borrás could give several young players the chance to distinguish themselves on an international level.

In May 1985 a first tour led the national team to Peru, Colombia and Brazil. At the end of May six training games were played in Japan. In mid-September Uruguay, as South American Champion, faced European Champion France in Paris, on the occasion of the newly created Artemio Franchi-Cup. The last international game in that year was staged in October in Chile.

At the beginning of February

*Uruguay's defence under pressure: goalkeeper Alvez between his defenders Acevedo (No. 3) and Bossio (No. 5). With only two scored goals Uruguay qualified for the Second Round. Then Argentina meant the end of the road for Borrás' team.*



1986, Uruguay participated in an international tournament in Canada, where they played against Canada, USA and Colombia. Shortly afterwards Poland's team arrived in Montevideo for an international game.

On April 1 the members of the Uruguayan squad were gathered in Montevideo. After a short time the team flew to Los Angeles where they played a match against Mexico. Uruguay's next opponents were Wales and Ireland Rep. on the British Isles.

At the end of April, Uruguay went to their altitude retreat in Colombia. Several games against club teams were organized. On May 18 the whole delegation arrived in Toluca.

Preliminary Matches		
Uruguay	- Ecuador	2:1
Chile	- Uruguay	2:0
Ecuador	- Uruguay	0:2
Uruguay	- Chile	2:1
1. Uruguay 4 3 0 1 6:4 6		
2. Chile 4 2 1 1 10:5 5		
3. Ecuador 4 0 1 3 4:11 1		

Preparatory Matches		
Peru	- Uruguay	2:1
Colombia	- Uruguay	2:1
Brazil	- Uruguay	2:0
Japan	- Uruguay	1:4
France	- Uruguay	2:0
Chile	- Uruguay	1:0
Canada	- Uruguay	1:3
USA	- Uruguay	1:1
Colombia	- Uruguay	0:2
Uruguay	- Poland	2:2
River Plate	- Uruguay	1:1
Mexico	- Uruguay	1:0
Wales	- Uruguay	0:0
Ireland Rep.	- Uruguay	1:1

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Germany FR 1:1	2nd Match Denmark 1:8	3rd Match Scotland 0:0	¼ Final Argentina 0:1	½ Final	Final
1	Rodriguez	Rodolfo Sergio	20.01.56	FC Santos						
2	Gutierrez	Nelson Daniel	13.04.62	River Plate						
3	Acevedo	Eduardo Mario	25.09.59	Defensor				61		
4	Diogo	Victor Hugo	09.04.58	Palmeiras						
5	Bossio	Miguel Angel	10.02.60	Valencia		19*				
6	Batista	José Alberto	06.03.62	Deportivo Español			1*			
7	Alzamendi	Antonio	07.06.56	River Plate	82	57	6			
8	Barrios	Jorge Walter	24.01.61	Olympiakos Athen	56					
9	Da Silva	Jorge Orosman	11.12.61	Atletico Madrid			84	45		
10	Francescoli	Enzo	12.11.61	Racing Paris						
11	Santín	Sergio Rodolfo	06.08.56	Nacional		56				
12	Alvez	Fernando	04.09.59	Peñarol						
13	Vega	Cesar	02.09.59	Danubio						
14	Pereyra	Alfonso Dario	19.10.56	São Paulo						
15	Rivero	Eliseo	27.12.57	Peñarol						
16	Saralegui	Mario Daniel	24.04.59	Elche	34		20			
17	Zalazar	José Luis	26.10.63	Peñarol		34				
18	Paz	Ruben Walter	08.08.59	Racing Paris				29		
19	Ramos	Venancio Ariel	20.06.59	Lens	8	33	70			
20	Aguilera	Carlos Alberto	21.09.64	Nacional						
21	Cabrera	Wilmar	31.07.59	OGC Nice				45		
22	Otero	Celso	01.02.58	Wanderers						





From left to right, back: Alvez, Diogo, Gutierrez, Pereyra, Acevedo, Santin; front: Ramos, Barrios, Francescoli, Cabrera, Batista

## Omar Borrás

In his young years Omar Borrás (57) studied to become a sports coach. This may be also the explanation for his all-round-talent in sports. In addition to soccer he has practised other sports, too. At the Olympic Games of 1968 he acted as chief of the track-and-field athlete's team. But even as a basket-ball coach

he made a name for himself. In football Borrás was engaged by *Peñarol Montevideo* as technical director in 1963. From 1964 he worked in this function during five years for *Cerro*. The next two years he was active at *Huracan Buceo*. In 1973 he moved to *Wanderers FC*.

Omar Borrás carried out all these functions on a part-time basis. His chief occupation was teaching sports at the University of Montevideo.

Borrás had his first contacts with the Uruguayan team in 1966 when he was appointed responsible for the physical training of the national team for the World Cup in England.

In 1978, Borrás was appointed technical

director by the Football Association, in 1982 he was then additionally given charge of the national team.

## Development

After Brazil Uruguay is the second most successful country at the World Youth Championships (WYC). At the WYC '77 in Tunisia, the following six players from Borrás' Mexico squad took part: *Diogo, Alvez, Rivero, Saralegui, Paz* and *Ramos*. Two years later at the WYC '79 *Gutierrez, Bossio, Barrios, Alvez* and *Ruben Paz* played.

Also at the WYC '81 in Australia some World Cup participants gained their first international experiences: *Gutierrez, Batista, Da Silva, Francescoli* and *Aguilera*. At the WYC '83 in Mexico *Zalazar* and *Aguilera* made themselves familiar with the conditions in Mexico.





After Bossio and Batista had been sent off against Denmark and Scotland respectively, one forward had to assume more defensive work.

## The Players

Uruguay's manager Borrás selected no less than 14 players who were active abroad. Nine of them played with South American clubs. Five arrived from Europe. The selected players were recruited from altogether seven countries.

## Team Organization

In Uruguay most teams play with a zonal marking and with the four defenders on a level. This defensive conception was not taken over by manager Borrás. He preferred to play with a sweeper and a central defender. But he kept the zonal marking. When the opposing players changed positions they were immediately given over.

Standard goalkeeper Rodríguez could not be used due to injury; he was well represented by Alvez. After various tries the team manager decided on Acevedo as sweeper. The central defenders were Gutierrez and later on Pereyra. Diogo operated as right full-back in the first three games. On the left side Batista was used first; after he had been sent off Rivero substituted for him.

In midfield Bossio assumed the most defensive role. Sometimes he even operated as second central defender. Barrios had his strong points in the defensive area, too. In the match against Argentina he had to mark Maradona. Santín proved to be a player with excellent skill and good vision.

In the attack, formed by three men, only Francescoli had a firm place. He was Uruguay's key player and the pivot of the team. From his position inside left he often broke out to the sides.

On the right wing Alzamendi and Ramos alternated with each other. As centre forwards Da Silva and Cabrera played alternately.

Ruben Paz was allowed to

play the last thirty minutes against Argentina. This was the strongest phase of the Uruguayan team at this World Cup tournament.

## Attacking Play

Uruguay had the intention to adapt themselves to the special climatic conditions of Mexico with an economic style of play. For this reason they tried at first to slow down the pace. With a sudden change in pace they wanted to catch the opposing defence on the hop.

Such a style of play, however, would demand that each team member constantly tries to run clear. It can only be successful if the respective player in possession of the ball is offered several possibilities to direct his pass.

But mostly only the player ran free who was nearest to the ball. Sometimes even that was omitted. In no other South American team there was so much running with the ball as in the Uruguayan one. This made their attacks so transparent. Therefore, Uruguay could hardly create real chances.

In four games the team scored two goals. Twice they profited by generously offered gifts. Against FRG, Alzamendi took advantage of a failed back pass by the German midfielder player Matthäus and thoughtfully placed the ball past Schumacher. Against Denmark, Francescoli shortened the result (1:2) by scoring a penalty.

## Defensive Play

Sweeper Acevedo directed his defence in superior style. He always tried to push forward his defenders so that there were no gaps between defence and midfield. The room was thus considerably narrowed. At least eight players were always involved in the defensive work.

All the same Uruguay had to concede nine goals in 360

minutes, six alone in the game against Denmark. Just in this match a disagreeable weakness of the Uruguayan football was revealed:

The players did not understand to tackle correctly. The opponent in possession of the ball was often attacked too early. If this player then dribbled or made use of a feint, he was frequently floored with a brutal tackle.

Some of the players were not used to the energetic interventions of the referees. They seemed to be surprised and lost part of their self-confidence. After Barrios had been sent off so early, the Uruguayans were afraid of attacking the Danes properly. Frequently, several players rushed at the opponent who was in possession of the ball, but then they seemed to be afraid of a real tackle.

The experienced Danes never lost their calm. They circulated the ball cleverly. The Uruguayans were simply not able to contain their swift moves.

## Conclusions

Manager Borrás tried to combine the South American skill with the European fighting strength. This attempt clearly failed.

The Uruguayans concentrated too much on destroying the game of their opponents. For this reason, the ability to develop their own attacking play did hardly correspond to the temperament of the Uruguayans.

Moreover, such a defensive attitude provoked clever opponents to attack Uruguay already in midfield and to involve them in tacklings. Against Denmark it became apparent that Borrás' men were not used to a pressing. When they were under pressure, they reacted precipitately and lost control. The fact that they lost plenty of balls prematurely made them even more nervous and some South Americans lost their self-control. With two players

sent-off they were digging their own grave.

The real qualities of this very skillful team did only come to light when, being 0:1 down in their Second Round clash with Argentina, they had nothing left to lose. Suddenly the Uruguayans demonstrated remarkable moves. They succeeded in troubling the Argentine defence seriously and created within 20 minutes more opportunities than in the three preceding matches altogether. No other team during these World Cup Finals embarrassed the defence of the World Champions in such a way. Unfortunately, it was too late when Borrás and his players called to mind that they should have built up their game primarily on their exceptional playing abilities!

### Uruguay-GFR 1:1 (1:0)

1:0 Alzamendi (4')  
1:1 Allofs (84')

### Uruguay-Denmark 1:6 (1:2)

0:1 Elkjaer (11')  
0:2 Lerby (41')  
1:2 Francescoli (45': Penalty)  
1:3 Laudrup (52')  
1:4 Elkjaer (68')  
1:5 Elkjaer (79')  
1:6 J. Olsen (89')

### Uruguay-Scotland 0:0

### Uruguay-Argentina 0:1 (0:1)

0:1 Pasculli (42')

# World Cup Report—Conclusions

The XIII World Cup in Mexico was a football festival. A football "fiesta". It was an excellent tournament and the overall quality of play was minimally affected by the high altitude and the heat. It was clear that the players were physically better prepared than 16 years before when, under identical circumstances, they were frequently in need of oxygen bottles.

For the second time (Spain was the first) 24 teams participated in the tournament. Each one proved to be an integral part of the competition. Football from the Third World definitely made its mark. Morocco was not only the first African team to get past the first round, but was the proud winner of its group – in front of England, Poland and Portugal.

The World Cup was divided into two different phases: the preliminary tour of 36 games in the form of regular league play, after which 8 teams were eliminated. The remaining 16 teams played for the title under the single elimination Cup formula. Hence, three of the four quarter-final games were decided by a penalty shoot-out as is called for by the rules. The penalty kicks are a far better way of determining a winner than flipping a coin. There was simply not enough time to replay tie games. It was encouraging to see the game for third place be more than a "formality". The game between France and Belgium was intense and saw six goals scored. Both teams were able to showcase players who had not seen action during the weeks before. The Final was a most memorable game with Argentina emerging as a worthy champion of the world and the German team a proud second.

In the course of the tournament different teams caught the eye and fancy of the spec-

tators. First the Russians were admired for their physical presence, their attacks originating on defense, and for their use of space.

Then the Danes captivated the public with their short crisp passes and movement of the ball. In the preliminary phase these two teams put on a veritable demonstration of football and each won three games. But their first game defeats in the final round surprised the world. Had they given too much in their first round encounters? Had they "peaked" too early? And then came the game the media called "The Game of the Century" between France and Brasil. A pity it was that one of the two had to disappear.

Suddenly, the Belgians rose to the forefront. Having finished third in their group after losing to Mexico, they climbed into the semi-finals. Contrary to the predictions of the experts, the four semi-finalists included three European squads and one from South America. Nonetheless, the latter became World Champion. Also in this World Cup, we saw that football has become more physical and athletically demanding. The game has gotten tougher, but not to the detriment of its artistry. Here we must mention Maradona. He often dominated because of athletic qualities by dribbling through entire defenses. Not only did he demonstrate his technical superiority, but he showed great speed coupled with an ability to evaluate situations. He provided the greatest surprises both in passing and scoring. And in the final, when the opponent did all it could to limit his effectiveness, he was a model of good behavior. Though he didn't score, he did make the decisive pass for the third Argentine goal.

During this World Cup, no truly new tactics were seen. We

have already spoken about the style of the Danish squad and the talent of the Russians. However, we can talk about some general tendencies. To increase efficiency, the optimal occupation of the lateral back position is becoming more and more important. Most of the time they are the ones who have the largest space in front of them. The lateral backs can greatly influence a game. They can also score. The Brazilian Josimar, the German Berthold, the Russian Deminenko, and the Frenchman Amoros were the most effective defensive players.

Their colleagues, the center backs, were not to be slighted: the Dane Morten Olsen, the Argentine Brown (who also scored a goal), the Belgian Renquin. The stoppers as well: the German Förster, the Brazilian Julio Cesar and the Mexican Quirarte who scored twice.

In the midfield, we didn't see the dominant team leader. This responsibility often changed hands in different situations. Hence it is difficult to compare the performances of the midfielders. Offensively, Burruchaga, Lerby, and Matthäus were impressive. On the defensive end the Frenchmen Fernandez and Tigana, and the South Americans Elzo, Batista, and Nunez stood out for their fine play.

At the origin and conclusion of the 132 goals scored in this World Cup were strikers 60% of the time, this signifying a "Renaissance" for attackers.

The Britain Lineker led the pack with 6 goals. Maradona was the leader if we take into account goals and "assists".

The two did not shine alone. They were joined by the Spaniard Butragueño, the Dane Elkjaer-Larsen, the Russian Belanov, and Yakovenko, Zavarov, Careca, Valdano, and Altobelli.

The following pages contain a detailed analysis of the successful and delightful 1986 World Cup.

Walter Gagg

*In Mexico, Maradona was in a class by himself. He proved to be superior in all respects and at the zenith of his career. He has also a talent for the show as he demonstrates here with his jump over Förster and goalkeeper Schumacher.*



## Return to the Offensive

The World Cup 1986 in Mexico brought a pleasing development of football. The quality of the game improved in general. One could observe another increase in pace. It was obvious that most teams tried to play a more offensive style of play.

The worldwide adjustment upwards was a conspicuous fact of this World Cup. There were no more weak teams who were not able to challenge their opponent. Three apparently strong teams had to accept the highest defeats of this tournament: secret favourites Hungary (0:6 against the USSR), South American Champions Uruguay (1:6 against Denmark) and Denmark (1:5 against Spain), who after the First Round had become one of the top favourites.

Mexico—what a surprise—presented us with the rebirth of the forwards. These World Cup Finals showed us that despite an increasingly collective style of play individual performances become more important again. A brilliant individualist, clearly surpassing all other players of this World Cup, helped a good team to win the World Cup: Maradona. Perfect control of the ball, explosive acceleration, both an exceptional playmaker and a goalgetter—the footballing world has got a new genius.

### **Hardly any Problems with Altitude and Climate**

Before the World Cup, the altitude and the special climatic conditions of Mexico had become the main topic of many discussions. A multitude of experts asked leave to speak and thereby expressed the most contradictory views in the mass media. All this led to a feeling of insecurity on the part of players and coaches. For that reason the first games were played with a certain reserve by most teams. But soon it became obvious that the players en-

dured the altitude and the heat much better than during the last World Cup in Mexico in 1970. The improvement of the game, new findings in training theory and in sports medicine contributed to the fact that today's footballers can much better adapt to extreme conditions than previously. It was also proved that the players are mentally solid enough to assert themselves even under unfavourable circumstances.

Most apprehensions because of Mexico's altitude proved to be unfounded; many predictions did not come true. An offensive style of play with a high pace was possible, it was even the most striking feature of some games, as for example USSR-Hungary, Denmark-Uruguay, France-USSR, Paraguay-Belgium, Spain-Denmark, USSR-Belgium, France-Brazil and Belgium-Spain.

Only in the lower situated Monterrey the extreme climatic conditions of this region had an effect on the performances of the players. Every human performance suffers with more than 40°C in the shade and a very high humidity.

### **Despite a More Offensive Style of Play Fewer Goals**

In Mexico a total of 132 goals was scored in 52 games, which means an average of 2,5 goals per game. There are several reasons for this slight decrease in comparison with the World Cup 1982 in Spain. In the extraordinary heat of Monterrey merely nine goals were scored in eight matches or not even half of the goals realized at other venues. If the games in Monterrey had produced the same number of goals as in the other stadiums, this World Cup would have been the tournament with the largest number of goals within the last 20 years. The considerably better goal

average of the footballing Third World countries is a second and important reason. In Spain, these teams had to concede 40 goals, in Mexico only 23. At the World Cup 82, El Salvador took a 1:10 mauling from Hungary—in Mexico, Algeria's 0:3 defeat against Spain meant the worst result of a so-called minnow.

The change-over to the cup system after the Group games had positive effects. The players took more risks, the style of play of most teams was now characterized by a fast pace. There were some really upsetting results. All this led to the pleasing fact that more goals were scored. During the 16 matches of the tournament's second stage 48 goals were shot which corresponds to an average of 3,0 goals per game. Since the World Cup 1958 in Sweden such a high average was never again achieved.

### **The Great Importance of Taking the Lead**

The psychic factors become more and more important in soccer, too. How else should we account for the fact that never before during a World Cup tournament the opening goal did mean the preliminary decision as frequently as in Mexico. The 52 games were won 34 times by the team who had taken the lead. 14 matches ended in a draw and only four times that side left the field as winners who were behind initially.

In the Group games, only Germany FR—against Scotland—managed to transform an early 0:1 into a victory (2:1). In the Second Round clash Denmark—Spain a failed back pass by Jesper Olsen led to Spain's equalizer. The Danes did not recover from this shock and took a sensational 1:5 beating. The biggest upset, however, was caused by Belgium in the game against the USSR. The

Belgians were twice one goal down, but refused to give in and won 4:3 after a dramatic encounter. In the Third Place Play-Off, Belgium did not succeed in defending their lead and after extra-time lost to France 2:4.

### **The Risks of an Exaggerated Adaption**

Before the start of the World Cup, Italy's manager Bearzot was convinced that scoring chances would only result from an attacking play based on short passes. For that reason he let his squad frequently practice on small fields of play in order to achieve a complete command of short passes. Moreover, he instructed his players to operate extremely in the zones. By this tactical order he wanted to achieve an efficient team organization and an economic style of play.

During the starting phase of each game, the Soviet side demonstrated an attacking play which ranked among the best displays ever seen. They wanted to take the lead at once or at least impress and intimidate their opponents. After this starting offensive the pace used to be reduced as planned. The players slowed down deliberately to save their strength for the next attacking waves.

In view of the World Cup Finals in Mexico, England's manager Bobby Robson had built up a team with three extraordinary playing personalities in midfield: Wilkins, Hoddle and Brian Robson. Assisted by left winger Waddle they were expected to set up chances for the two top scorers Hateley and Lineker.

An economic style of play with short passes, a game based on high pace interrupted by phases of recovery, a careful construction of the game with surprising changes of pace in front of the penalty-area—all this corre-

sponded to a realistic estimation of the tactical possibilities in Mexico.

However, such a style of play was against the footballing tradition of Italy, the USSR and England. A modification of the conception of play and an adaptation of the style of play to unusual conditions is always connected with big risks. Players, who from their earliest youth have been familiar with just one style of play are confronted with difficulties when they have to adjust themselves to a new style at short notice. So much the more as the mental strain at a World Cup tournament is far bigger than during every other competition.

Italy created only very few chances during their four games. Altobelli converted four of them and in addition the Italians profited by an own goal of a South Korean.

After the USSR had already taken the lead early against Belgium, they slowed down the pace of the game. But while doing so they lost the control of the game and were beaten by the Belgians 3:4 after a dramatic encounter.

England performed rather weakly with the above mentioned formation. Sometimes one had the impression that the players in certain situations did not know what to do. Just the experienced English professionals were confronted with an obvious feeling of insecurity.



*Readiness to take more risks -  
courage for an offensive style of play.*

## Third World Countries on the Advance

After their astounding results at the World Cup 1982 in Spain (victories of Algeria over Germany FR and Chile, Cameroon eliminated without a defeat), the Third World countries could no longer hope for an effect of surprise. And yet, for the first time a Third World team managed to be on top of their Group after the First Round. Morocco realized the unexpected feat to precede England, Poland and Portugal.

The South Korean attack succeeded in scoring at least one goal in each match. Against World Cup holders Italy, the Asiatics even hit two marvellous goals. The South Koreans contributed much to the animation of this World Cup by their enthusiasm and their total commitment.

Iraq impressed the experts by their well-organized style of play. They lost all three games, but each time with a difference of just one goal.

Canada were defeated by France and the USSR only in the last phase of the game. Algeria won a point against Northern Ireland and also embarrassed seriously Brazil. If one takes into account the problems these teams were faced with during the preparation stage for the World Cup, their performances deserve full appreciation.

### Further Development of Skill

Good skills are the precondition for an economic style of play. Those players who are able to control the ball without problems are not so often dispossessed of it and they need less strength to reconquer it.

In Mexico, another improvement in skill was observed. Deflections of the ball, refined double passes and skilful lifters were part of the repertoire of the first class players.

Undoubtedly, the defenders made the biggest progress

with regard to the skill factor. In Mexico most of them had such a high level that they were always able—even under hard pressure—to pass to a team-mate and only rarely had to resort to uncontrolled releasing kicks. Consequently, there were fewer losses of the ball in the defensive zone. The better control also allowed the defenders to get increasingly involved in the construction of the game. This meant that most teams played better and more variable from the back.

### The Game without Ball Becomes More and More Important

Argentina and Uruguay are two countries with a great footballing tradition. In the Second Round these two teams had to play one another. There were but two essential differences between them: on the one side the game without ball and on the other side—Maradona.

One can practise the game without ball, but it takes character, playing intelligence and self-confidence. Maradona, however, is certainly a godsend for every coach.

Argentina and Uruguay play a similar style. Their game is based on excellent skills. The accuracy of the passes is more important than the quickness of the action. Both teams prefer to keep and to circulate the ball and to limit the amount of running to a minimum.

In Mexico both teams performed with the same attacking conception. The launch of attacks was effected by short passes. The ball was kept as long as possible; at a slower pace in Uruguay's team, more directly in Argentina's side.

In the team of the World Champions, the player who had the ball could usually choose from several possibilities to address his next pass, whereas the Uruguayans did

not run clear sufficiently and thus had difficulties to find an unguarded team-mate. Therefore, their attacks were not variable enough and their conception of play was quite transparent. Argentina built up their attacks with more variations and so posed many problems for their opponent. When an Argentine attack came to a standstill due to a good defensive work by the opponent, the Argentines passed the ball to Maradona who was able to receive and to keep it even in the most difficult situations. He was at any time capable of disengaging himself from the adverse embrace or to send the ball through to a team-mate by a refined pass. Bilardo's men knew that Maradona—even in critical moments—was always ready to receive the ball and to guarantee the continuation of the respective attack.

The Uruguayans obviously did not have this security. They hesitated in delicate situations during which the player in possession of the ball depended all the more on the support by his colleagues. They avoided every unnecessary risk and only ran clear in safe areas. These, however, were mostly at the back of the player who had the ball. Thus, the ball was not lost and was circulated quite nicely in their lines, but without gaining in room—it was therefore not astonishing that the Uruguayans had but few scoring chances.

In four games they merely scored two goals. The first one was realized after an unfortunate back pass by Matthäus (FRG) and the second one was scored on penalty (against Denmark).

Argentina became World Champions not least because of Maradona's ability to animate his team-mates to run clear incessantly. South American Champions Uruguay, however, had to go home earlier than expected.

### Team Organization

The numbers (4-3-3, 4-4-2, 3-5-2) that ought to correspond to the tactical systems apparently do not say much about the actual organization of a team. The functions of the players can be constantly modified during a match: according to the possession of the ball, the scoreline and the opposing way of performing. The USSR are a good example to illustrate this. Belanov operated as foremost striker. Just behind him acted three players provided with all qualities of a striker: Yaremchuk, Zavarov and Rats. As soon as the opponent had the ball, all three assumed the defensive tasks of actual midfield players. However, when the ball was in their own lines they rather acted as forwards. Thus, one could interpret the Soviet playing system by a 4-5-1, but just as correct by a 4-2-4.

At the back, one could observe basically three different forms of organization: Firstly the defence without sweeper and with all defenders on a level, with central defenders who cover each other mutually and two full-backs. All British teams, but also Canada, Iraq, Portugal and Brazil gave preference to this variant.

Some teams played with a libero/sweeper, a central defender and two full-backs. This traditional division of roles, however, seems to disappear gradually. As examples one could mention France, Belgium, Mexico, the USSR and Algeria.

A third form of organization consisted of a sweeper, two central defenders who had to mark the opposing strikers, an anchor player and two midfield players instructed to cover the flanks. Argentina, Spain, Denmark and Uruguay used to play with such an organization.

According to the players available to the team managers, the midfield was organized in different variants. In this respect one could hardly notice any uniform tendencies.



### ***Man-to-Man Marking Loses in Significance***

The individual close marking as an actual defensive conception for the whole team has disappeared. However, it is still employed on some positions. For instance, many central defenders follow their direct opponents when they change their position.

Several team managers gave orders to use a man-to-man marking on the opposing playing personality in midfield. Thus, the Spaniard Camacho was instructed to pursue the Brazilian playmaker Socrates during ninety minutes. But this did not prevent the Brazilian from deciding the game by his header. In the encounter with France, the Italian Baresi was not more successful than Camacho. Despite the man-to-man marking, his direct opponent Platini put France into the lead.

Maradona, whom we regard as a striker, had to put up with a special man-to-man marking several times. The managers of Korea Rep., Italy, Uruguay and GFR tried with differing success to limit his range of action.



*Maradona was always able—thanks to one of his dribbles—to break away from the opposing marking and continue the attack (above).*

*Group winner Morocco—ahead of England, Poland and Portugal—advanced to the eighth finals and was more or less an equal partner for Germany FR (right).*

## **Zonal Marking Has Been Generally Adopted**

In Mexico, all 24 teams gave preference to zonal marking. Several variants were chosen according to the training and mentality of the players being at disposal.

During the past years, the way of marking has more and more oriented itself towards the ball. By a clever encircling and surrounding of the player who has the ball one puts pressure on him in order to provoke an over-hasty action, a harmless back pass or a short cross pass. The player in possession of the ball was frequently not attacked directly, by actual tackles. The interception of over-hasty and often inaccurate passes became increasingly important.

Such a defensive play requires a very elastic defence. High demands are made on the physical and mental flexibility of the defenders. They must be capable of adapting themselves constantly to new situations. Aggressive defenders who try to intimidate their opponents by an uncontrolled commitment and an exaggerated toughness are in the minority today.

### **The "Windscreen Wiper" in Front of the Defence**

Over the past years, a new role has been formed in midfield: the sweeper in front of the defence. It is interesting to note also the different naming of this new position. In Brazil, Belgium and France it is called "windscreen wiper" (essuie-glace); in England anchor player or midfield libero and in Germany FR "Vorlibero".

Contrary to the former defensive midfielder, who mostly tried to mark closely the opposing playmaker, the anchor player operates in zonal marking in the immediate nearness of the central defenders. His main task consists in stabilizing the defence by primarily intercepting the opposing passing runs through

the middle. Part of his field of activity is also the covering of his own defenders when they advance from behind.

At the World Cup 86, many teams played with such an anchor player. Batista assumed this role in Argentina's team. But he did not confine himself to defensive tasks as quite a number of players did in the other teams. He was constantly in motion, tried to run clear and after having received the ball fed his team-mates with intelligent passes.

Batista's example illustrates once more that not the position of a player within the team organization is decisive, but rather what he makes out of it. Batista was obviously accepted by his team-mates as a strong playing personality and was therefore also constantly involved in the construction of the game.

The Argentine took cleverly advantage of his increased liberty on this position. He had more room and time as his fellow-players who operated more in front. Being frequently in possession of the ball he developed into a kind of playmaker in the defensive midfield. From this retired position he managed to give more impulses to the Argentine attacking play than Olarticochea, Giusti and Enrique who mostly played in front of him.

### **Modified Role of the Full-Back**

In modern soccer, many teams play without true wingers. This fact will have further consequences for the role of the full-back in future. Today's attacking formations with one forward as trouble spot up front and a second striker who comes more from deep will even accelerate these changes.

On the one hand, the full-back has still to assert him-

self against an opposing forward in man-to-man marking. Due to the growing concentration in midfield the launch of attack is now very often effected out on the flanks. This requires that the full-backs constantly run clear in order to offer additional possibilities to the teammate who has the ball.

Advances down the flanks become a dangerous offensive weapon provided that the full-backs are capable of setting up chances for their team-mates by precise crosses or intelligent back passes.

Since running passes to the wings are often not advisable, full-backs endowed with quickness and a tight control can allow a team to break up the opponent's defensive block from the wings. Coaches should train the finishing abilities of the full-backs as it occurs frequently that after breaks the direct way towards the opposing goal is open.

Taking into account all qualities required for this position, one should designate the role of the full-back rather as a combination of midfielder and winger.

In Mexico some full-backs excelled by spectacular actions, but all in all these rushes were not very successful. It is true that the full-backs scored a total of five goals, but three of them resulted from standard situations. Only the Brazilian Josimar realized two stunning goals after flowing moves: the first by a long-range shot against Northern Ireland, the other one by a solo run against Poland.

Full-backs were not often directly involved in the preparation of scoring chances, either. Nine goals were set up by full-backs, three of them from standard situations. Servin (Mexico), Ayache

(France), Khalifa (Morocco), Zdravkov (Bulgaria) and Gary Stevens (England) gave the decisive pass or cross. Amoros (France) was fouled in the penalty-area after a breakthrough during the game against Belgium. He converted the penalty himself.

Two reasons might be responsible for this rather modest output. Firstly, the open spaces on the wings were not yet exploited perfectly. Because of lacking courage or insufficient control of the ball the numerous advances only rarely progressed up to the opposing goal-line. The players mostly preferred to take a relatively harmless diagonal cross into the penalty-area. Secondly, surprising weaknesses came to light when the full-backs tried to center after having succeeded in their breakthroughs on the wings.

During the 52 games in Mexico it often happened that two opposing full-backs had to play against one another. The most striking example of such a situation occurred in the Final when Berthold (GFR) and Olarticochea (Argentina) were confronted with one another. They neutralized each other. None of them was able to provide his side with decisive impulses. In this field there are certainly still great possibilities for development!

### **Playmakers are Dying Out**

Due to the particular conditions in Mexico one had expected that those players provided with an exceptional skill would set the tone of the World Cup. The midfield strategists were ready to prove their real value. But then everything was completely different.

Germany's midfield ace Magath managed to provide their own attacking play with

some inspiration only in the Semi-Final clash with France. The French Platini and Giresse could display their uncontested abilities but occasionally, Socrates used to have an impact on the Brazilian style of play merely during the first 45 minutes of a game. The performances of the Mexican playmaker Boy fell off to such an extent that he was replaced four times during the match. The English Hoddle was subject to considerable inconsistency. Souness was left on the substitutes' bench by his manager for the decisive match against Uruguay. The Uruguayan Santin had excellent moments but his impact on Uruguay's attacking play remained modest.

Borghi (Argentina), Scifo (Belgium), Dziekanowski (Poland) and Detari (Hungary), who before the World Cup had been considered as big hopes, were for various reasons not or only partly able to come up to the expectations. The two North African playmakers Timoumi (Morocco) and Belloumi (Algeria) had suffered grave injuries during the preparation stage for the World Cup. Both had to undergo operations and understandably did not achieve their usual performance.

Platini and Zico, too, had not completely recovered from wearisome injuries.

The above mentioned long list of players who did not fully meet the expectations put into them may be accidental. But perhaps there are real reasons for the increasing difficulties of the midfield strategists.

Today's soccer with the overpopulated midfield limits the room of activity in this zone to a large extent. Little time is left for the control of the ball and the vision of the game.

The player who awaits the ball standing or in slow run, is

attacked immediately and put under strong pressure. The midfield stars have the tendency, however, to wait for the ball. To run constantly clear is not always one of their strong points. But as strong personalities they are only accepted unreservedly



*A captivating duel between the Brazilian Elzo and the Frenchman Giresse during "the match of the century" in Guadalajara between France and Brazil. Too bad that one of the two had to be eliminated.*

by their team-mates as long as their performances are outstanding. Whenever they show a slight decrease in efficiency, they lose their central position and their impact on the game.

All players who were not in top physical shape and who therefore were not able to run clear constantly to get involved in the attacking actions, did not bring much to their teams. With regard to the equivalence of many teams, neither outstanding skills nor tactical moves could compensate for insufficient stamina or lacking willingness to perform. Mexico did not allow any half-hearted thing.

Those midfield players who excelled in Mexico distinguished themselves by at least one of the two following qualities. Either they disposed of a good anticipation

ability and above-average qualities in tackling so that they were very often able to win back the ball by themselves. Or they were willing to disengage themselves constantly from their direct opponents in order to get involved in the course of the action.

lected the ball into the net after the ball had bounced off the post and unfortunately hit his back.

It is in the nature of sports that the winner is celebrated and the loser is forgotten. Only the winner sets an example to other people. Soccer is not an exception in this respect.

World Champions Argentina have not disclosed new dimensions to soccer. Within an outstandingly organized team with clear hierarchic structures the great Maradona stimulated his team-mates to become better from game to game and thus to gain in security. This self-confidence was probably decisive in the Final against GFR.

The teams of the USSR and Denmark may claim to have shown the most dynamic and spectacular style of play. Whether the Soviet or the Danish style will be showing the way in future cannot yet be said today. Somewhat exaggerated seems to be the statement that the Soviets were stopped by their own pace and the Danes by their overdone self-confidence.

Also in football, today's truth has already often turned out to be the error of tomorrow.

Among the first group ranked Matthäus (GFR), Lerby (Denmark), Tigana (France) and Elzo (Brazil). The second group was formed by players such as Ceulemans (Belgium), Burruchaga (Argentina), Yakovenko (USSR), Arnesen (Denmark) and Bouderbala (Morocco).

### **Truth of Today— Error of Tomorrow**

Football is a simple game. But the requirements are complex. Even experts are hardly able to predict the result of a game in advance and for that reason soccer is so fascinating—and often unjust. During the penalty shoot-out against France, the Brazilian goalkeeper Carlos had better dived to the other side or not reacted at all. His team would then have possibly achieved the Semi-Final. But since he dived to the right side, he def-