

# Match for Third Place



## France-Belgium 4:2 a.e.-t. (2:2, 2:1)

0:1 Ceulemans (11'); 1:1 Ferreri (27'); 2:1 Papin (43'); 2:2 Claesen (73'); 3:2 Genghini (104'); 4:2 Amoros (111'; Pen.)

F. Van der Elst/Renquin (46'), L. Van der Elst/Scifo (64')  
Bossis/Le Roux (56'), Tusseau/Tigana (84')

G. Courtney, England

It was an excellent game without vicious fouls and hampering tensions, inspiring the 22,000 fans with enthusiasm. Belgium, playing with their best team – apart from Vercauteren who was replaced by Mommens –, tried to launch their attacks from the back, relying on their quick counter-attacks. France, fielding what could represent their team for the future, showed better control of the ball and were particularly dangerous with their double passes.

After Ceulemans had given Belgium an early 10th minute lead, France responded vigorously and evened the score with a goal by Ferreri in the 26th minute. Three minutes before the interval Papin put his team in the lead, shortly after Rust had successfully withstood Claesen. In the second-half the quality of the match improved and the spectators saw good European football. A fast rhythm and sudden changes in pace, hard tackles, excellent skills, a good organization and surprising ideas contributed to an entertaining game.

After Claesen's equalization in the 72nd minute, Battiston and Bossis, who had come on as a substitute for Le Roux, pushed their side ahead once again. It was an open battle now, neither team had real advantages.

In extra-time the French appeared to be fresher: In the 103rd minute Genghini scored the 3:2 and only five minutes later France were awarded a foul-penalty. Amoros fired in and France were assured of their third place at this World Cup tournament. A merited victory against an excellent and brave Belgian side. At the same time it was a conciliatory conclusion for the brilliant French team.

*The "Small Final" between France and Belgium was another rousing game with six goals. Here, the two Belgians Vervoort (No. 22) and De Mol are in possession of the ball. Only after extra-time they were beaten 2:4.*




The Match for 3<sup>rd</sup> Place was held in a friendly atmosphere. Keeper Pfaff (right) attends the French Ferreri. The latter thanked for this care in his own way, realizing the 1:1 equalization with a violent shot (below). However, it was not until extra-time that the decider came, when Genghini (far to the right), surrounded by three Belgians, shot France 3:2 ahead. After the end of the match, the French players received the bronze medals by FIFA President Dr. João Havelange (below right).





# Final



## Argentina-Germany FR 3:2 (1:0)

1:0 Brown (23'); 2:0 Valdano (55'); 2:1 Rummenigge (74');  
2:2 Völler (80'); 3:2 Burruchaga (83')

Trobbiani/Burruchaga (88')  
Völler/Allots (46'), Hoeness/Magath (60')

R. Arppi Filho, Brazil

Argentina won the World Cup with their imaginative style of play and their convincing team work. The pragmatic Germans preferred a football based on strength and discipline. These contrary conceptions of play made the Final a real dramatic game. Matthäus, who in the matches before had played a leading part in midfield, was charged to mark Maradona.

Sensitively limited in his range of activity, Argentina's captain constantly tried to break away from his central attacking position, giving his team-mates Burruchaga and Valdano room for dangerous advances. By numerous advances down the flanks Berthold and Briegel tried to give an impetus to the German attacking play. Their mostly high crosses, however, hardly embarrassed the Argentine defence. The swift moves of the Argentine forwards and the changes of position of their midfielders caused a constant numerical superiority of the Germans at their back. But at the same time the German midfield was disorganized and weakened. Argentina's 1:0 lead after the first half just reflected their superiority.

In the second half Förster took over the marking of Maradona. Matthäus was supposed to give better support to the German attacking play. Yet, after Valdano had scored Argentina's second goal, the game seemed to be decided. But FRG refused to lie down and after two corners from the left side, both taken by Brehme, Rummenigge and Völler managed to equalize the score.

But only two minutes later, Argentina took the lead again. On the right wing a marvellous pass by Maradona sent through Burruchaga who went away from Briegel and crowned his super performance with the winner.



The preliminaries to the big Final. Argentina and Germany FR are facing each other in the XIII. Final.

Argentina from left: Burruchaga, Valdano, Giusti, Olarticoechea, Enrique, Batista, Brown, Ruggeri, Cuciuffo, Pumpido and captain Maradona. Germany from left: captain Rummenigge, Schumacher, Briegel, Roff, Berthold, Förster, Eder, Allots, Brehme, Magath and Matthäus.

The picture, taken in the second half, illustrates with what commitment a World Cup Final is played. Völler (No. 9) and Hoeness (No. 20), who had come on the field for Allots and Magath, were marked tightly.





The pictures show how the Argentinians achieved their 2:0 lead and were looking like the sure winners. Burruchaga's free-kick sails into the German penalty-area, the advanced goalkeeper Schumacher misjudges the trajectory and the unguarded Brown, who is shielded by the falling Maradona, heads Argentina into the lead (above left).

Ten minutes after the interval Valdano (No. 11), left unguarded by Jakobs (No. 17), is fed with a superb pass (below left) and slides the ball past the advanced Schumacher: 2:0.

The Germans, not least because of Matthäus' strict marking in the first half, managed to reduce Maradona's scoring power, but they could not really contain his effectiveness. The goals were now scored by his team-mates.







And so the Germans managed to even the score within ten minutes. Both times a corner taken by Brehme was the starting point. On the left, below, Rummenigge (on the ground) slides into the pass from Völler and fires home past goalkeeper Pumpido and Enrique (No. 12). And some minutes later Völler was left alone just in front of the Argentine goalkeeper and headed the ball in (above left): 2:2.

Extra-time was approaching. For a long time already, the two team-managers Franz Beckenbauer and Dr. Carlos Bilardo were standing, watching the dramatic game at close distance (above).

That was the decision. Giusti (No. 14) and Maradona in midfield were still controlled by Magath, Jakobs, Matthäus and Briegel (below). But then Maradona set up for Burruchaga (right) who, despite being disturbed by Briegel, placed the ball past Schu-

macher to score the winner. Valdano (No. 11) just observed the action. The World Cup was decided. In an impressive way (pictures below), exultation and disappointment were there together within some few square metres.

Argentina proved to be worthy of being World Champions, the Germans had to take comfort from the fact that they had reached the World Cup Final for the fifth time.







Representative of the Mexican people Mexico's President Miguel de la Madrid receives the fairness prize. Beside him FIFA President João Havelange, FIFA-Organising Committee Chairman Hermann Neuberg and the President of the Mexican organizing committee, Guillermo Cañedo.

The Mexican fans were full of enthusiasm and responded enormously to what was going on down on the field. Moreover, they were competent and had also a heart for the losers. Mexico saw the best World Cup, in such a gorgeous setting as never seen before.

The imagination of the spectators knew no bounds. Beauty and grace went well together with the game of the world.



## ***A Special Thanks to the Public***

The 1986 World Cup gave us two World Champions: the Argentina team on the field and the Mexican spectators in the stands. From Mexico-City, Guadalajara, and Puebla to Queretaro, Monterrey and Leon, the spectators transformed the World Cup into a Mexican fiesta. It was a cordial World Cup in a setting conducive to a spectacle of the highest order. The home team was naturally the favorite, but the spectators quickly spotted the masters of the

game from all corners of the globe. During the qualifying rounds, the Danes and the Russian team were the favorites of the fans. Later Belgium and Spain won the applause. What enthusiasm there was for "the game of the century" between France and Brazil! What an ovation for the winner, what sympathy for the unfortunate loser! The elimination of the Mexican team hardly diminished the general enthusiasm. The public's favor fell then on the

German team and especially the Argentines. In the final, with the game tied, the Estadio Azteca was in a state of indescribable ecstasy. With the chant "ola verde" ringing through the stadium, the spectators communed with the players and passed on their message to the entire world. Everybody took part in the festival: in the stadiums, in the streets, people with or without tickets, everywhere the crowds cheered the play-

ers, symbolic of the Mexican enthusiasm. And the public was justly rewarded: for the first time in history of the World Cup of FIFA, the Fair-Play Trophy was awarded to the fans.

*Joseph S. Blatter*

# The 24 Teams - An Analysis

They contributed to this Technical Report:



*Terry Neill, Günther Furrer, Dr. Jozef Venglos, Dettmar Cramer, Harry H. Cavan, Walter Gagg, José Bonetti, Ivan Toplak, Andy Roxburgh, Erich Vogel*

As Chairman of the Technical Committee of FIFA, I was pleased when the Executive Committee re-affirmed its policy that the Report of the FIFA World Cup in Mexico in 1986, should incorporate a technical study report of the championship. This policy ensures that the knowledge and experience of participation in the World Cup Finals is made available to all other National Associations.

The Technical Committee was authorized to assemble a group of qualified and expert coaches whose task would be to interview the team managers/trainers, technical staffs, medical doctors and players, so that a comprehensive study could be made of the preparation of the qualified teams for the Final Competition of the World Cup and following which, a report of the Technical Study Group would be established for inclusion in the overall Report of the FIFA World Cup.

The members of the established Technical Study Group were:

José Bonetti, Brazil, at Mexico-City/Azteca/Olimpico 68/Neza 86/Toluca

Andrew Roxburgh, Scotland, at Guadalajara/Jalisco  
Ivan Toplak, Yugoslavia, at Monterrey/Universitario/Tecnológico

Terry Neill, Northern Ireland, at Puebla/Cuauthemoc  
Dettmar Cramer, Germany FR, at Leon/Irapuato  
Jozef Venglos, CSSR, at Queretaro/Corregidora

In addition, Messrs. Ram Ruffee (Mauritius), a Member of the Technical Committee of FIFA, Erich Vogel (Switzerland), Technical Adviser of FIFA, and Raju, Technical Chief of the Asian Football Confederation, were entrusted with special tasks, which are reported.

The technical operations of the group were to be directed and co-ordinated by Walter Gagg, Head of the Technical Department of FIFA.

To assist the inquiry into the preparation of the teams and to establish important information for study, a pertinent questionnaire, prepared by Walter Gagg and Erich Vogel, was sent in advance to the qualified National Associations. When completed and returned these questionnaires would provide much of the vital data to be included in the report of the Technical Study Group, which would eventually be circulated to all the members of FIFA.

At a special information workshop held in Zurich in April last, the delegations from those National Associations which were qualified to play in the Final Competition, were informed about the function and requirements of the Technical Study Group and their co-operation was sought, in support of the objectives of the technical study.

It is important that National Associations ensure that copies of the Technical Study Group are made available to

their technical staffs and football coaches so that the report may be used as a text book for the further education and development of football throughout the world.

On behalf of the Technical Committee of FIFA and the members of the Study Group, I would place on record sincere thanks to the National Associations and their teams for their excellent assistance and co-operation. I would also thank the members of the Technical Study Group for their important contribution to the technical study and also for their tremendous assistance in many other duties in the stadia.

I have much pleasure in presenting the Report of the Technical Study Group and I recommend it to the Technical Departments of our National Associations with confidence, and best wishes for the future of World Football.

*Harry H. Cavan*

# Algeria

## Preparation

The Algerian manager Rabah Saadane studied many scientific publications on the performance behaviour of athletes in the altitude before working out a comprehensive preparation program.

At first, in December 1985, his team made a trip to Mexico where they took part in an international tournament with Hungary, Korea Rep. and hosts Mexico.

At the end of January, the Dutch champions PSV Eindhoven were invited to Algeria. After that Saadane's team intensively prepared for the African Cup, which took place in Egypt in March 1986. Two preparation games in Saudi Arabia had to give Saadane the last information about the actual form of his players. The two draws against Morocco and Zambia and the defeat against Cameroon were not sufficient for achieving the Semi-Finals of the African Cup.

In April, a two weeks training

*Despite losing 0:3 to Spain, the Algerian midfield star Belloumi (No. 10) demonstrates his quite exceptional control of the ball and his great vision.*



camp was organized at home in Algeria, but most of the internationals playing in Europe could not participate in it. Matches against Fluminense, the Brazilian champions, the Portuguese top club Porto and Beveren from Belgium were real tests for the Algerian squad.

At the beginning of May, the team went for an altitude retreat to Montana in the Swiss Alps. A last preparation game was played against Switzerland.

In mid-May, the Algerian delegation left for Guadalajara where the last stage of Saadane's preparation program took place.

Preliminary Matches		
Angola	- Algeria	0:0
Algeria	- Angola	3:2
Algeria	- Zambia	2:0
Zambia	- Algeria	0:1
Tunisia	- Algeria	1:4
Algeria	- Tunisia	3:0

Preparatory Matches		
Mexico	- Algeria	2:0
Hungary	- Algeria	3:1
Korea Rep.	- Algeria	2:0
Algeria	- PSV Eindhoven	0:0
Saudi Arabia	- Algeria	0:0
Saudi Arabia	- Algeria	1:1
Algeria	- Fluminense	1:1
Algeria	- Porto	0:0
Algeria	- Beveren	2:0
Switzerland	- Algeria	2:0
African Cup of Nations		
Morocco	- Algeria	0:0
Zambia	- Algeria	0:0
Cameroon	- Algeria	3:2

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match N. Ireland 1:1	2nd Match Brazil 0:1	3rd Match Spain 0:3	¼ Final	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Drid	Naceredine	22.01.57	MP Oran			20				
2	Guendouz	Mahmoud	24.02.53	IR El-Biar							
3	Chebel	Fathi	19.08.56	Rouen							
4	Kourichi	Nouredine	12.04.54								
5	Medjadi/Liégeon	Abdallah	01.12.57	Monaco							
6	Kaci-Said	Mohammed	02.05.58	RS Kouba							
7	Assad	Salah	13.03.58	FC Mulhouse		67					
8	Maroc	Karim	05.03.58								
9	Menad	Djamel	22.07.60	JET Tizi-Ouzou			32				
10	Belloumi	Lakhdar	29.12.58	Mascara	18	79					
11	Madjer	Rabah	15.02.58	FC Porto	27						
12	Bensaoula	Tedj	01.12.54	Dunkerque		23					
13	Harkouk	Rachid	19.05.56	Notts County	63						
14	Zidane	Djamel	28.04.55	Waterschei	72	11	58				
15	Sadmi	Abdelhamid	01.01.61	JET Tizi-Ouzou							
16	Mansouri	Fawzi	17.01.56								
17	Benkhalidi	Fawzi	03.02.63	WO Boufarik							
18	Ben Mabrouk	Abdelhamid	25.06.58	Racing Paris							
19	Chaib	Mohammed	20.05.57	RS Kouba							
20	Megharia	Fodil	23.05.61	CSO Chief							
21	Larbi	El Hadi	27.05.61	WO Boufarik			70				
22	Amara	Mourad	19.02.59	JET Tizi-Ouzou							



From left to right, back: Drid, Kourichi, Harkouk, Mansouri, Megharia, Kaci-Saïd; front: Zidane, Maroc, Belloumi, Madjer, Guendouz

## Rabah Saadane


Rabah Saadane (41) began his career as forward, but in the course of the following years he was gradually entrusted with more defensive tasks. From 1963 he played with *MSP Batna*, two years later he joined *MOC Constan-*

*tine*. In 1968 he was transferred to *JS El-Biar* and the last two years of his career as a player he spent with *USM Bilda*.

Besides several nominations for the junior national team, he was also used one time in Algeria's A-side, in the game against USSR.

From 1970 to 1975 Saadane trained to be a P.T. instructor. Moreover he also acquired the coaching licence in France, attended courses in GDR and participated in a FIFA/Coca-Cola-Academy for African team coaches.

In 1975 Saadane started his career as a coach with *JS El-Biar*, one year later he moved to *JSD Alger*. In addition he also became coach of Algeria's B-junior team. As a trainer for physical fitness he accompanied the A-junior team to the Youth World Championship 1979 in Japan.



From July 1981 to February 1982, Saadane was temporarily responsible for the national team. Then he was appointed assistant of the new manager Khalef. In this function Saadane was present at the African Cup in Libya and at the World Cup '82 in Spain.

After the World Cup he coached the Second Division club *Tablat*, before in December 1984 he was appointed team coach of Algeria.


## Development

Although the junior game is very well organized in Algeria and great efforts have been made for the development of the young footballers, the Algerian junior team managed only one time to qualify for the Youth World Championship (1979 in Japan).

Manager Rabah Saadane was at that time responsible for the physical training of this team. From the youth squad only centre forward *Djamel Menad* was selected to make the Mexico trip.

Seven players of the Mexico squad represented Algeria at the Olympic Games of 1980 in Moscow: *Assad, Menad, Guendouz, Amara, Bensaoula, Belloumi* and *Madjer*.





Against Northern Ireland and Spain, Algeria lined-up with only two strikers. In these two games, Zidane assumed the role of an offensive midfielder.

## The Players

Half of the Algerian team members were engaged at European clubs. This made the task of manager Saadane considerably more difficult. During the preparation stage for the World Cup Finals, he had never all players at his disposal. Therefore, it was very difficult to develop the mutual understanding and to practice automatisms.

The case of the two internationals Fawzi Mansouri and Karim Maroc is worth mentioning in particular. Both played with Montpellier in the Second League in France during last season. Both suffered from an unsteady form and had difficulties to secure a firm place in the team. Since they were not used regularly by their club, the Algerian Football Association repurchased them in the middle of the season and fetched them back to Algeria. There, they could participate in an extensive preparation programme with the Algerian team and play a lot of training games.

## Team Organization

Algeria modified their conception of play and their lineup from game to game. Only three players took part in all three matches: Sweeper Guendouz, Kaci-Said as indefatigable fighter in midfield and Mansouri as reliable left full-back.

Goalkeeper Larbi guarded the goal against Northern Ireland. The three defenders Liégeon, Kourichi and Mansouri operated in a zonal marking. Kaci-Said and Ben Mabrouk assumed the defensive roles in midfield and controlled very attentively the two central Irish midfielders. Maroc was charged with an offensive role on the left flank and Zidane operated as a slightly retreated centre forward. Madjer and Assad kept their positions on the wings during the first phase of at-

tack, but then often disengaged themselves by sudden sprints and were involved in the Algerian combinations.

Against Brazil, standard goalkeeper Drid was used and Megharia got a chance as central defender. For the rest, the defence remained unchanged, but the two midfielders Kaci-Said and Ben Mabrouk had to devote themselves almost exclusively to defensive tasks. The brilliant playmaker Belloumi, who did little for the defensive, played for the first time and by the introduction of Menad a true centre forward was in action up front now.

## Attacking Play

The Algerians performed quite a latin style of play: the players were provided with an excellent skill, a methodic construction of the game from the back and in midfield resulted in a richly varied attacking play up front.

The Algerians had no problems to keep and to control the ball, not even when put under violent pressure. They were also capable of shifting the focus of attack from one side to the other by long diagonal passes.

Belloumi, who could not be used for a long time due to injury, showed his exceptional class when he was running with the ball and advanced towards the opposing penalty-area. But all in all, his impact on the Algerian game did not correspond to his individual abilities. Madjer and Assad, disposing of a tight control, were not able either to exhaust fully their attacking potential by their breakthroughs.

It was only in the second half of the game against Brazil that the Algerian team revealed all their abilities. By quick solo runs from the midfield, surprising double passes and intelligent moves on the wings, the Brazilian defence was embarrassed time and again. Just a lot of bad luck prevented Algeria

from scoring during this excellent phase.

Against Spain, the North Africans unfortunately fell back to their stereotyped attacking play that they had already demonstrated in their starting match against Northern Ireland.

## Defensive Play

The Algerian defence lacked poise and as a whole did not seem to be compact. Sweeper Guendouz, who used to stay far behind his defenders, was not able to hold it together sufficiently. The mutual understanding among the defenders was not perfect. Particularly on the left side there were some painful flaws. Four of the five goals Algeria had to concede altogether were scored after runs down the right flank of the opponent!

Kaci-Said, the key player in the defensive midfield, tried to carry along his team-mates with great fighting morale. But this alone was not enough to make up for the various insufficiencies of the Algerian defence. The tackling abilities of some players, for example, were rather poor.

## Conclusions

The Algerian team had some players with outstanding skills, but the organization of the team and the willingness to perform were insufficient. Their lack of self-confidence and doubts in their own abilities came to light clearly. The various modifications of the conception of play and the constant changes in the lineup did not contribute to the mental stability within the Algerian squad.

The Algerian players did not seem to be particularly convinced by the tactical orders and this resulted in occasional frustrations. As soon as the players came into body contact with their opponents,

they became nervous and lost their calm. Therefore, it was no accident that the matches of the Algerians against Northern Ireland and Spain ranked among the most ruthless and most unfair games of the World Cup Finals in Mexico.

Algeria's single goal was scored from a free-kick. This clearly illustrated the offensive problems of the African side. Assad and Madjer could have done better, but in front of goal they were often lacking in the final concentration so that all their actions were over-hasty or not precise enough. However, it would be too easy to blame the strikers alone. As a matter of fact, they got simply not sufficient support from the midfield. It was obvious that Belloumi was not yet in great form after his long pause due to injury.

With regard to the physical fitness, the team made a good impression. The Algerians were athletic, aggressive, quick and extremely agile. Only Kourichi and Guendouz were rather small.

The Algerian squad lacked a real leading figure who could have calmed his team-mates in difficult situations. This would have also had a positive influence on the quality of the Algerian game.

### Algeria-N. Ireland 1:1 (0:1)

0:1 Whiteside (6')  
1:1 Zidane (59')

### Algeria-Brazil 0:1 (0:0)

0:1 Careca (66')

### Algeria-Spain 0:3 (0:1)

0:1 Caldere (15')  
0:2 Caldere (68')  
0:3 Eloy (70')

# Argentina

## Preparation

After Argentina had ensured their World Cup qualification at the end of June 1985, manager Bilardo began with a purposeful preparation. As no less than seven Mexico candidates played with European clubs, Bilardo decided to carry out two overseas tours. Thus he could test these "Europeans" at least in some games.

In August 1985 the Argentines went for a first altitude retreat to Colombia. On that occasion various medical tests were effected.

In December 1985 Argentina flew to Puebla via Los Angeles (international game against Mexico). During this altitude retreat of two weeks another match against Mexico was played.

At the beginning of January 1986, Bilardo started an intensive preparation training with a team of 15 players. From Tuesday to Friday they trained twice daily under Bilardo's direction in an outly-

*The first Argentine goal in the Final against FRG. Goalkeeper Schumacher misjudged the trajectory of the ball and the advanced Brown (No. 5), strangely alone, heads his team into the lead.*

ing quarter of Buenos Aires. The internationals were allowed to play with their clubs the games of the Argentine championship.

At the end of March, Argentina started for their first Europe trip which included an international game against France and two training matches against Naples and Grasshoppers Zurich. Subsequent to this tour a third altitude retreat - in Ezeiza in their own country - followed.

A second overseas tour led Argentina to Norway and Israel, before a last gathering at high altitudes in Tacana in the north of Argentina was organized. For the first time also the players engaged abroad took part in this camp. On May 5 the Argentines left for Mexico.



### Preliminary Matches

Venezuela	- Argentina	2:3
Colombia	- Argentina	1:3
Argentina	- Venezuela	3:0
Argentina	- Colombia	1:0
Peru	- Argentina	1:0
Argentina	- Peru	2:2

1. Argentina	6	4	1	1	12	6	9
2. Peru	6	3	2	1	8	4	8
3. Colombia	6	2	2	2	6	6	6
4. Venezuela	6	0	1	6	5	15	1

### Preparatory Matches

Mexico	- Argentina (in LA)	1:1
Mexico	- Argentina	1:1
France	- Argentina	2:0
Naples	- Argentina	1:2
Grasshoppers	- Argentina	0:1
Norway	- Argentina	1:0
Israel	- Argentina	2:7

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Rep. Korea 3:1	2nd Match Italy 1:1	3rd Match Bulgaria 2:0	¼ Final Uruguay 1:0	¼ Final England 2:1	½ Final Belgium 2:0	Final Germany FR 3:2
1	Almiron	Sergio Omar	18.11.58	FC Tours							
2	Batista	Sergio Daniel	09.11.62	Argentinos Juniors	76	59	45	85			
3	Bochini	Ricardo Enrique	25.01.54	Independiente						5	
4	Borghi	Claudio Daniel	28.09.64	Argentinos Juniors		74	45				
5	Brown	José Luis	10.11.56	Brest							
6	Passarella	Daniel Alberto	25.05.53	Internazionale							
7	Burruchaga	Jorge Luis	09.10.62	Nantes					75	85	88
8	Clausen	Nestor Rolando	29.09.62	Independiente							
9	Cuciuffo	José Luis	01.02.61	Velez Sarsfield							
10	Maradona	Diego Armando	30.10.60	Napoli							
11	Valdano	Jorge Alberto	04.10.55	Real Madrid							
12	Enrique	Hector Adolfo	26.04.62	River Plate		16	45				
13	Garre	Oscar Alfredo	09.12.56	FC Oeste							
14	Giusti	Ricardo Omar	11.12.56	Independiente							
15	Islas	Luis Alberto	22.12.65	Estudiantes							
16	Olarticoechea	Julio Jorge	18.10.58	Nantes	14	31	45	5			
17	Pasculli	Pedro Pablo	17.05.60	Lecce	75						
18	Pumpido	Nery Alberto	30.07.57	River Plate							
19	Ruggeri	Oscar Alfredo	26.01.62	River Plate							
20	Tapia	Carlos Daniel	20.08.62	Boca Juniors	15				15		
21	Trobbiani	Marcelo Antonio	17.02.55	Elche							2
22	Zelada	Hector Miguel	30.04.57	América							



From left to right, back: Batista, Cuciuffo, Olarticoechea, Pumpido, Brown, Ruggeri, Maradona; front: Burruchaga, Giusti, Enrique, Valdano

## Carlos Salvador Bilardo

Dr. Carlos Bilardo, born on March 16, 1945, is a doctor of general medicine. He began his career as a player with *Deportivo Español*, before he signed with *Estudiantes de la Plata*. As defensive midfielder player he had a considerable share in the three victories

(1968–70) in the *Copa Libertadores* (South American Cup). In 1968 *Estudiantes* won the Intercontinental Cup against *Manchester United*, in 1969 they lost to *AC Milan* and in 1970 to *Feyenoord Rotterdam*.

After having finished his ca-

reer as a player, Bilardo was engaged by *Estudiantes* as manager and stayed with this club for the next five years. During this time his team gained two titles: *Metropolitan* and *National*.

In 1976 Bilardo received an offer from Colombia where he coached *Deportivo de Cali* for two seasons. With this club he won the Colombian championship and achieved the Final of the *Copa Libertadores* against *Boca Juniors*. In 1979, Bilardo came back to Argentina (*San Lorenzo de Almagro*) for a short time, before taking over the Colombian national team.

In 1982 Bilardo returned to his first club *Estudiantes* and won the Argentine championship right in the first season. In January 1983 he was appointed technical director of the national team.

## Development

Up to now, the Argentine youth team succeeded three times in qualifying for the World Youth Championship (WYC). In 1979, in Japan, *Diego Maradona* made his first impact on the international footballing scene. As captain he led his team to the World Champions title, beating USSR in the Final with a brilliant 3:1. Maradona was selected best player of the tournament.

In 1981, in Australia, Argentina failed already in the Group games. In this side *Jorge Burruchaga*, *Nestor Clausen* and *Carlos Tapia* played.

At the WYC '83, in Mexico, Argentina again achieved the Final, losing 0:1 to Brazil. Goalkeeper of the Vice World Champions was *Luis Islas*.





Cuciuffo and Ruggeri changed their positions according to the situation. The frequent changes of position and the numerous diagonal sprints of their attacking players were characteristic of the Argentine style of play.

## The Players

Manager Carlos Bilardo selected his team members from sixteen different clubs. In no other team of this tournament so many clubs were represented. Only four clubs provided the national team with more than one player. Independiente and River Plate supplied three internationals, Argentinos Juniors and Boca Juniors were represented by two players.

From the countless Argentines engaged at foreign club sides, only seven were nominated. Three of them played in the Italian championship: Maradona (Napoli), Pasculli (Lecce) and Passarella (Fiorentina). Two internationals were under contract in Spain: Valdano (Real Madrid) and Trobbiani (Elche). Burruchaga played at Nantes in France and reserve goalkeeper Zelada with America in Mexico. Of these players, only three managed to secure a firm place in Argentina's World Cup team: Maradona, Burruchaga and Valdano. Pasculli was used twice. It is worth mentioning that these four players were entrusted with the most offensive roles by manager Bilardo.

One player was left from the team that won the World Cup in 1978: Passarella. However, he could never play due to illness and an injury suffered during training. Pumpido, Olarticochea, Maradona and Valdano took part in the World Cup Finals 82 in Spain. The two first-named players were never used there.

## European System of Play

Bilardo went several times to Europe to analyse the European football. In view of the World Cup Finals, he did not see a chance with Argentina's traditional conception of play.

Bilardo tried something that had already cost many famous coaches their job: He made his national side famil-

iar with a system of play still unknown in his own country. In Argentina most club sides play with a defence consisting of four men and with a zonal marking. The midfield is composed of three players and up front the teams generally use a centre forward and two classic wingers.

Bilardo considered this conception of play to be out-of-date. He built up his back according to the Italian model. He introduced the sweeper into his team and let two central defenders mark the two opposing strikers. On the left side he used a full-back with offensive qualities. The right flank was assigned to a midfield player. The latter had to be capable to operate, according to the situation, also as full-back.

For the midfield Bilardo tried to pick all-round players, who disposed of above-average qualities both on the defensive and in attack. Up front he made his team play without true wingers. He preferred a line-up with only two forwards. These, however, had to complement one another and to be capable of accomplishing various tactical tasks.

## Young Players

Manager Bilardo had a clear conception of his future team. He knew exactly that he could realize his ideas, which were quite new for Argentina's soccer, only with young and still hungry players. Older players would have probably had difficulties to get used to another style of play.

All those who did not correspond to Bilardo's conception were not selected. Players who were not completely able to translate his ideas into action were put on the substitutes' bench. The organization of the team was everything: All team members had to submit to this idea unconditionally. Bilardo even dispensed with well-known playing personalities who had made a good name for

themselves abroad: goalkeeper Fillol (Atletico Madrid), Daniel Bertoni (Napoli), Juan Barbas (Lecce) and Ramon Diaz (Avellino).

The Argentine squad ranked among the youngest teams of this «Mundial», their average age was just under 26 years.

## Solid Defence - Flexible Attack

Pumpido, at the World Cup in Spain only a substitute, was now Argentina's standard goalkeeper. The position as sweeper was intended for Passarella. Since he could not be used due to his injury, Bilardo assigned José Brown to this position. He still knew him from his former activity as a coach at Estudiantes.

The central defenders were Cuciuffo and Ruggeri. In the opening game Clausen had got a chance in the place of Cuciuffo.

Garre played as left full-back in the first four matches. For the Second Round clash with Uruguay he was suspended after having been booked twice. His successor Olarticochea seized the opportunity. With a convincing performance he secured a place for the remaining games and banished Garre to the substitutes' bench.

On the right side Giusti proved to be a very versatile player. In some matches he manoeuvred along the touchline, in other games he was charged with a special defensive task in midfield.

Batista operated as an actual interceptor in front of the defence. At his club Argentinos Juniors he assumes the role of a playmaker.

All the above described positions and tasks did not change essentially during the World Cup Finals. According to the tactics of the opponent, the Argentina defensive players intelligently adapted themselves to the different styles of play. The tactical tasks of the four offensive

Argentines, however, were modified from game to game!

*You will find a more detailed analysis of the Argentine attacking and defensive play under the title «Argentina's Road to the World Title» on page 186.*

### Argentina-Korea Rep. 3:1 (2:0)

1:0 Valdano (6')  
2:0 Ruggeri (18')  
3:0 Valdano (46')  
3:1 Park Chang-Sun (73')

### Argentina-Italy 1:1 (1:1)

0:1 Altobelli (6' - Penalty)  
1:1 Maradona (34')

### Argentina-Bulgaria 2:0 (1:0)

1:0 Valdano (3')  
2:0 Burruchaga (79')

### Argentina-Uruguay 1:0 (1:0)

1:0 Pasculli (42')

### Argentina-England 2:1 (0:0)

1:0 Maradona (51')  
2:0 Maradona (54')  
2:1 Lineker (80')

### Argentina-Belgium 2:0 (0:0)

1:0 Maradona (51')  
2:0 Maradona (63')

### Argentina-Germany FR 3:2 (1:0)

1:0 Brown (23')  
2:0 Valdano (55')  
2:1 Rummenigge (74')  
2:2 Völler (80')  
3:2 Burruchaga (83')

# Belgium

## Preparation

The actual preparation of the Belgians began in June 1985, a long time before the national team were definitely qualified for the World Cup Finals! At that time, manager Guy Thys made a first trip to Mexico, accompanied by three physicians and the international Hugo Broos. These experts wanted to become acquainted with the conditions on the spot. The player had to undergo various tests by means of which the physicians wanted to analyse the physical adaptation to high altitudes and heat, the results being produced by a top athlete at the end of a long season. For Thys, the results of this examinations were all the more important as his players were only rarely available to him and therefore depended on a very careful planning. After Belgium had qualified for Mexico in two play-off games against the Netherlands at the end of November, manager Thys could at

*Belgium's captain Ceulemans (No. 11) scores the 2:2 leveller against the USSR. After the first extra-time of this World Cup tournament the Belgians had beaten the clear favourite 4:3.*



last lead his team to a first preparation game against Spain in Elche, in mid-February.

Only in mid-April, the next international game was staged: in Brussels, Belgium faced the World Cup participants Bulgaria.

After the end of the Belgian championship, the national team moved to Ovronnaz in Switzerland for an altitude retreat. It took place from May 6 to May 17. One day before the departure for Mexico, Belgium played against Yugoslavia in Brussels (May 19).

Preliminary Matches		
Belgium	- Albania	3:1
Greece	- Belgium	0:0
Albania	- Belgium	2:0
Belgium	- Greece	2:0
Belgium	- Poland	2:0
Poland	- Belgium	0:0
1. Poland 6 3 2 1 10:6 8		
2. Belgium 6 3 2 1 7:3 8		
3. Albania 6 1 2 3 6:9 4		
4. Greece 6 1 2 3 5:10 4		
Belgium	- Netherlands	1:0
Netherlands	- Belgium	2:1

Preparatory Matches		
Spain	- Belgium	3:0
Belgium	- Bulgaria	2:0
Belgium	- Yugoslavia	1:3

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Mexico 1:2	2nd Match Iraq 2:1	3rd Match Paraguay 2:2	¼ Final USSR 4:3 a.e.-t.	¼ Final Spain 1:1 a.e.-t.	½ Final Argentina 0:2	3rd place France 2:4 a.e.-t.
1	Pfaff	Jean-Marie	04.12.53	Bayern München							
2	Gerets	Eric	18.05.54	PSV Eindhoven				111			
3	Van der Elst	Franky	30.04.61	Club Brugge							75
4	De Wolf	Michel	19.01.58	Gent							
5	Renquin	Michel	03.11.55	Standard Liège						53	45
6	Vercauteren	Frank	28.10.56	RSC Anderlecht					106		
7	Vandereycken	René	22.07.53	RSC Anderlecht							
8	Scifo	Vincenzo	19.02.66	RSC Anderlecht		66					64
9	Vandenbergh	Erwin	26.01.59	Lille	66						
10	Desmet	Philippe	29.11.58	Lille	64					37	
11	Ceulemans	Jan	28.02.57	Club Brugge							
12	Munaron	Jacques	08.09.56	RSC Anderlecht							
13	Grun	Georges	25.01.62	RSC Anderlecht		22	89	99			
14	Clijsters	Leo	06.11.56	Waterschei		24		21			
15	Van der Elst	Leo	07.01.62	Club Brugge			1	9	14		56
16	Claesen	Nico	01.10.62	Standard Liège	26						
17	Mommens	Raymond	27.12.58	KSC Lokeren							
18	Veyt	Daniel	09.12.56	KSV Waregem					83		
19	Broos	Hugo	10.04.52	Club Brugge					37		
20	Bodart	Gilbert	02.09.62	Standard Liège							
21	De Mol	Stéphane	11.03.66	RSC Anderlecht	24	68					
22	Vervoort	Patrick	17.01.65	Beerschot							



From left to right, back: Ceulemans, Pfaff, Vervoort, Grun, De Mol, Claesen; front: Gerets, Veyt, Scifo, Renquin, Vercauteren

## Guy Thys



Guy Thys (63) began his career as a player in 1939 with *Beerschot*, where the legendary Rik Coppens was one of his team-mates. In 1950 Thys moved to *Standard Liège*; with this club he won the Belgian Cup. Four years later he joined *Cercle Brugge*, where in 1958 he finished his career.

His first station as a manager was *Wetzel Sport* (1959–63). Then Thys coached *KFC Herentals*, before in 1966 he signed at *SK Beveren* for the next three years. From 1969 Thys coached for four years *Union St-Gilloise*. In 1973 he became manager of *Antwerp Football Club*.

In 1976 Guy Thys was given the full responsibility for the national team by the Belgian Football Association.

## Development

From the 24 countries participating in the World Cup in Mexico, Belgium ranks among those that with their youth national team could never qualify for one of the five World Youth Championships staged by FIFA up to now!





All outfield players of the Belgian squad were used – at least during some minutes – in Mexico. Manager Thys transformed the whole defence after the second game against Iraq.

## The Players

The frame of the Belgian team was formed by seven players from Anderlecht, four from Cercle Brugge and three from Standard Liège. The remaining eight team members were recruited from seven different clubs.

## Team Organization

Belgium applied its usual 4-4-2 system with zonal marking. Against Mexico and Iraq, Franky van der Elst was the sweeper of the Belgian side. In the next games he was substituted by Renquin. At the beginning of the tournament senior Broos got a chance as central defender. Later on Grun assumed this role. Gerets operated as right full-back. On the left side De Wolf was used in the first two games and then was replaced by Vervoort.

In the first two encounters, the midfield was formed by Ceulemans and the three Anderlecht-players Scifo, Vercauteren and Vandereycken. The latter was substituted by his club-mate De Mol for the following matches.

Scifo ran wide on the right side, surprisingly operating as a retreated winger. Vercauteren assumed his usual position inside left. In the middle, Ceulemans proved to be the actual nucleus of the Belgian side.

Belgium began the World Cup with Vandenberg and Desmet as skippers. In the course of the tournament they were replaced by Claesen and Veyt.

## Attacking Play

National manager Guy Thys let his team play without the feared, but also strenuous pressing. He had prepared with his side a very economical conception of play. There was no other team at this World Cup that also in the offensive played almost exclusively in the zones assigned

to each player. This tactical move led to a perfect division of the room and to a very economical style of play which paid for itself later on. Belgium had to go three times into extra-time: they defeated the USSR, whose players were certainly beyond all doubt with regard to stamina. Against Spain, the result (1:1) remained unchanged during extra-time and the penalty shoot-out had to decide. It was only in the Match for 3<sup>rd</sup> Place that the Belgians felt the fatigue and were beaten in extra-time.

## Defensive Play

The defence tried to narrow the room. Sweeper Renquin often played on a level with his defenders and sometimes even in front of them. They still made use of the offside trap, although less systematically as previously.

In seven games Belgium had to concede no less than 15 goals – despite first class goalkeeper Pfaff. This high number of conceded goals was primarily the consequence of Belgium's pleasing offensive attitude. At the same time, this style of play caused some problems of co-ordination at their back.

Secondly, there were some individual mistakes in the Belgian defence. Renquin, for example, misjudged a wide goal-kick by the Paraguayan goalkeeper, ran under the ball and with his head deflected it directly to Cabañas, who fired home without trouble. During the same game, the Belgian offside play did not work for a moment and the South Americans were level. In the Semi-Final against Argentina, Pfaff left the goal although Maradona was surrounded by two Belgians when shooting on target.

The Belgian midfield with Scifo, Vercauteren and Ceulemans had their strong points in the offensive. Their defensive work was not perfect at all. Sometimes they moved

back too late and several times they were not persistent enough in pursuing their direct opponents. This raised considerable problems to their own defenders and made them often look badly. In every case, the opponents succeeded no less than five times in finishing successfully a run through the middle. It was surprising to what extent the Belgian team were prone to standard situations. Mexico and Spain each scored a goal from a free-kick. Mexico and France scored after corners. Moreover, Belgium had to concede two goals on penalty.

## Conclusions

After the rather unsatisfactory performances in the first two games, there were more and more tensions between the older and the younger players. Belgium's experienced manager Thys knew how to transform these conflicts into an increase in efficiency of his side. He began to reorganize the Belgian team. From the initial line-up of the first game against Mexico, six players were replaced successively.

Owing to the introduction of the youngsters Grun, De Mol, Vervoort and Claesen, the Belgian attacking play became more dynamic and above all more variable. In the past, Belgium had been known for operating with quick counter-attacks from a very compact defence. They tried to apply these tactics at the Mundial, too, but without much success. Only against Paraguay, Veyt managed to score from a classic counter.

Directed by midfield ace Ceulemans, the Belgian team tried more and more to take the initiative of the game. Now, the launch of attacks was often effected by riskless short passes. By their wide displacements of the game, Scifo and Vercauteren prepared breakthroughs on the wings which were concluded by high diagonal crosses into

the back of the opponent's defence. This Belgian speciality allowed them to score four goals (two against the USSR and one against both Spain and France).

Claesen, provided with a great running power, constantly made gaps in the opposing defence by his incessant sprints. Thus, the Belgians had frequently the opportunity to score by refined moves through the middle. Ceulemans, the offensive midfield player, shot two goals after such situations. Moreover, he gave the crucial passes for the goals scored by Scifo and Vercauteren.

### Belgium-Mexico 1:2 (1:2)

0:1 Quirarte (23')  
0:2 Sanchez (39')  
1:2 Vandenberg (45')

### Belgium-Iraq 2:1 (2:0)

1:0 Scifo (16')  
2:0 Claesen (19' : Penalty)  
2:1 Radhi (59')

### Belgium-Paraguay 2:2 (1:0)

1:0 Vercauteren (30')  
1:1 Cabañas (50')  
2:1 Veyt (59')  
2:2 Cabañas (76')

### Belgium-USSR 4:3 (2:2, 0:1)

0:1 Belanov (27')  
1:1 Scifo (56')  
1:2 Belanov (70')  
2:2 Ceulemans (77')  
3:2 De Mol (102')  
4:2 Claesen (110')  
4:3 Belanov (111' : Penalty)

### Belgium-Spain 1:1 (1:1, 1:0)

1:0 Ceulemans (35') Pen. 5:4  
1:1 Señor (85')

### Belgium-Argentina 0:2 (0:0)

0:1 Maradona (51')  
0:2 Maradona (63')

### Belgium-France 2:4 (2:2, 1:2)

1:0 Ceulemans (11')  
1:1 Ferreri (27')  
1:2 Papin (43')  
2:2 Claesen (73')  
2:3 Genghini (104')  
2:4 Amoros (111' : Penalty)

# Brazil

The header by Socrates (No. 9) in the 62nd minute decided the game against Spain. Goalkeeper Zubizarreta, Camacho (No. 3) and Gonzalez (No. 21) are really the losers.

## Preparation

As the elections for the presidency of the Brazilian Football Association were held at the end of January 1986, the new national manager could be appointed only in the first days of March. Some days after his appointment Tele Santana selected 29 players who had to be at his absolute disposal from mid-February until the World Cup Finals. The clubs had to play their championship games without the internationals. The four Brazilians engaged in Italy were expected to complete the select team by the end of April.

In mid-February, the actual preparation for the World Cup began in Rio; during four days, the players had to take various tests with regard to their physical fitness. Sports-medical examinations completed the first gathering of the Brazilians. In the following month, the Brazilian team were gathered in a training camp in Belo Horizonte, working hard on the improve-

ment of their physical fitness. In mid-March, however, this stage had to be interrupted because Brazil were obliged to play two international games (in Germany FR and in Hungary), which Tele Santana would have liked to cancel.

From the beginning of April, still in the training camp of Belo Horizonte, the technical-tactical training was placed into the foreground. Moreover, international games took place at regular intervals and with different (Brazilian) venues. The opponents were Peru, GDR, Finland, Yugoslavia and Chile.

At the beginning of May, the Brazilian delegation first left for the higher situated Toluca to return later on to Mexico-City, where a last training camp was held. Several training games against Mexican teams were on the program. At the end of May, Brazil moved to their venue Guadalajara.



### Preliminary Matches

Bolivia	- Brazil	0:2
Paraguay	- Brazil	0:2
Brazil	- Paraguay	1:1
Brazil	- Bolivia	1:1
1. Brazil	4 2 2 0	6 2 6
2. Paraguay	4 1 2 1	5 4 4
3. Bolivia	4 0 2 2	2 7 2

### Preparatory Matches

Germany FR	- Brazil	2:0
Hungary	- Brazil	3:0
Brazil	- Peru	4:0
Brazil	- GDR	3:0
Brazil	- Finland	3:0
Brazil	- Yugoslavia	4:2
Brazil	- Chile	1:1

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Spain 1:0	2nd Match Algeria 1:0	3rd Match N.Ireland 3:0	¼ Final Poland 4:0	¼ Final France 1:1 a.e.t.	½ Final	Final
1	Gallo	<b>Carlos</b>	04.03.56	Corinthians							
2	Boaro	<b>Edson</b>	03.07.59	Corinthians		10					
3	Bernardi	José <b>Oscar</b>	20.06.54	São Paulo FC							
4	Nazareth Filho	<b>Edinho</b>	04.06.55	Udinese							
5	<b>Falcao</b>	Paulo Roberto	16.10.53	São Paulo FC	11	80					
6	Gama <b>Junior</b>	Leovegildo	29.06.54	Torino	79				90		
7	<b>Muller</b> Costa	Luiz Antonio	31.01.66	São Paulo FC	23	31	26	73	72		
8	<b>Casagrande</b>	Walter	15.04.63	Corinthians	67	59	64				
9	<b>Careca</b> Oliveira Filho Antonio		05.10.60	São Paulo FC							
10	<b>Zico</b> Coimbra	Arthur Antunes	03.03.53	Flamengo			22	21	48		
11	Fonseca	<b>Edivaldo</b>	13.04.62	Atletico Mineiro							
12	Carvalho	<b>Paulo Victor</b>	07.06.57	Fluminense							
13	Pereira	<b>Josimar</b>	19.09.61	Botafogo							
14	Silva	<b>Julio Cesar</b>	08.03.63	Brest							
15	<b>Alemao</b> Brito	Ricardo	22.11.61	Botafogo							
16	<b>Galvao</b>	Galvao Mauro	19.02.61	Internacional							
17	<b>Branco</b> Leal	Claudio	04.04.64	Brescia							
18	Oliveira	<b>Socrates</b>	19.02.54	Flamengo			68	69			
19	Coelho	<b>Elzo</b>	22.01.61	Atletico Mineiro							
20	<b>Silas</b> Pereira	Paulo	27.08.65	São Paulo FC				17	30		
21	Candido Filho	<b>Valdo</b>	12.01.64	Gremio Porto Alegre							
22	<b>Leao</b>	Emerson	11.07.49	Palmeiras							



From left to right, back: Socrates, Elzo, Julio Cesar, Edinho, Branco, Carlos; front: Josimar, Muller, Junior, Careca, Alemao

## Tele Santana

Tele Santana was an excellent football player in the 1950-ies. As a right winger he first played with *Vasco da Gama*, later on with *Fluminense*. His career as a coach he started at *Fluminense*, working with the juniors of this club. Soon afterwards he was appointed manager of Flumi-

nense's first team. In 1969 he won his first National Championship.

In 1970 Santana moved to *Atletico Mineiro* and also with this club won the Brazilian Championship. Later on he was manager of *Gremio*

*Porto Alegre*, *Botafogo* and *Palmeiras*.

In 1980 Tele Santana was entrusted with the coaching of the *National Team*. For the World Cup 82 he built up an extraordinary team, that, however, lost to Italy in an outstanding game in the Second Round. With their spectacular offensive style of play, the Brazilians became the clear favourites of the spectators during this World Cup.

Shortly afterwards Santana was engaged by the Saudi Arabian club *Ahli SC Jeddah*. After his various successors with the Brazilian National Team had achieved only mediocre results, Santana was called back for the World Cup qualification ties. In January 1986 he was definitely appointed National Manager by the new presidency of CBF.


## Development

At the World Youth Championship (WYC) 1977, in Tunisia, Brazil where placed third, yet not a single player from this side was to be found in the World Cup team of 1986.

At the WYC '81 in Australia the Brazilian youth team ranked only sixth, but two members of this team were picked for the Mexico campaign: *Josimar* and *Julio Cesar*.

In 1983, in Mexico, Brazil won the tournament for the first time, being World Youth Champions. Surprisingly, not one of these talented football players managed to get a place in the Brazilian team up to now. The Brazilians repeated their success at the WYC '85 in the Soviet Union. From this side *Muller* and *Silas* were selected for the World Cup in Mexico.





Casagrande, who played in the place of Muller in all three Group matches, operated as Brazil's second striker mainly in the central attacking position. Zico substituted twice for Socrates, in the Quarter-Final against France he was brought in for Muller.

## Team Organization

Brazil played a 4-4-2 with a zonal marking in defence. The midfield had the shape of a diamond. Elzo operated as anchor man just in front of the defensive chain. Socrates played in a free role behind the two forwards. Alemão was responsible for the right and Junior for the left midfield zone.

The very flexible midfield dictated the Brazilian game. Once in possession of the ball, the Brazilians calmly and carefully constructed their moves. They waited patiently until they saw a gap in the opposing defence. And by a subtle pass or a surprising dribble they took advantage of such flaws.

The industrious Elzo guaranteed for stability. Socrates provided inspiration and creativity. Junior and Alemão brought professionalism into the Brazilian team.

In all five games Brazil lined up with two forwards. In the first matches one could observe the duo Careca and Casagrande. In the remaining ties Careca played centre forward and Muller was used on the right wing.

Careca and Casagrande did not complement one another. Their mutual understanding was rather bad, although both were well supported from the midfield. Muller's dynamic runs on the wing then gave a new dimension to the Brazilian attacking play. On the flanks Muller was assisted by the two full-backs Josimar and Branco. They proved to be the actual wingers of the team. Their incessant advances down the flanks had a positive impact on Brazil's performances. The goals scored by Josimar against Northern Ireland and Poland proved the efficiency of the full-backs.

The Brazilian conception of play was very flexible, the horizontal and diagonal mobility excellent. Most shiftings of position within the team

were effected spontaneously and not according to certain preconceived schemes. This made the defensive tasks of their opponents considerably more difficult.

Contrary to the World Cup '82, Brazil paid more attention to their defensive organization. The defensive triangle with Julio Cesar, Edinho and Elzo provided security and made up for the extravagances of their team-mates at any time.

## The Brazilian Style of Play

Pace and control of the ball were the striking qualities of the Brazilian attacking play. With superbly timed passes they produced flowing and refined combinations and dictated the pace of the game. In the attacking zone they operated with deflections of the ball, direct passes, double passes and cut crosses. The Brazilians turned out to be past-masters of the short running pass destined for their team-mates lying in wait up front.

The attacking moves, however, were not always carried out at top speed. The player in possession of the ball was thus often prompted to keep the ball and to avoid unnecessary risks.

## Goals! Goals! Goals!

The majority of their opportunities were created by crosses from the right side, frequently from Muller. Three of them led to goals. Many variants of double passes and deflections of the ball made the Brazilian moves through the middle a constant menace to the opposing goal. No less than four times they were successful with this way of attacking. They also managed to score through long-range shots (Josimar) and through the quick reaction to rebounds (Socrates).

## Brazil as a Model

The Brazilian football philosophy asks for imitation. Its most striking aspect is the love of football. In their spare-time the internationals disported themselves on the playground, juggled with the ball or arranged some games. Their passion and their deep-rooted need to express themselves with the ball gleamed through in every training session and in every match.

Headless of the difficulties the players were faced with in a match, they preserved their enthusiasm and their imagination. The confidence in their own abilities remained firm as a rock. Only against Poland they revealed for short moments a lack of mental stability. But this seemed to be an isolated incident.

The sphere of action of some players, however, was limited. Players like Elzo and Alemão had to compensate for this weakness by an increased willingness to perform.

The most negative aspect in their game was the taking of free-kicks and corners. Obviously, the Brazilians had not sufficiently practised the different variants.

## Conclusions

Mistakes of their own, an excellent French team and some bad luck led to the elimination of Brazil. The preponderance of the right side in Brazil's attacking play and the inability of Socrates, Junior and later on Zico to stop the gaps in the left midfield, made the South Americans vulnerable in this zone. It was just there that the French prepared their equalizer.

A certain lack in organization and the fact that they had no real playing personality were the reasons why the Brazilians were not able to put the French under pressure already in midfield.

In a critical phase of the game they thoughtlessly gave away

some of their offensive trumps. For the first time Socrates and Zico played together. Both operated in the same zone. Both had also to fulfill the same tasks. But both had also problems to stand the high pace of the game.

After Muller had gone, the quickness of the Brazilian attacking play was even more reduced. Careca in the central attacking position had to give more room to the advancing Zico and Socrates.

Shortly before the end of the match, the Brazilians for the first time took off their feet from the accelerator – and at the same time were left by fortune. The magic had lost its effect and the amateurs of dynamism, inspiration and wit began to lament about their disappearance.

### Brazil-Spain 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Socrates (62')

### Brazil-Algeria 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Careca (66')

### Brazil-N. Ireland 3:0 (2:0)

1:0 Careca (15')  
2:0 Josimar (42')  
3:0 Careca (87')

### Brazil-Poland 4:0 (1:0)

1:0 Socrates (30': Penalty)  
2:0 Josimar (55')  
3:0 Edinho (79')  
4:0 Careca (83': Penalty)

### Brazil-France 1:1 (1:1, 1:1)

Pen. 3:4

1:0 Careca (17')  
1:1 Platini (40')

# Bulgaria

## Preparation

At the end of January 1985, before they had even qualified for the World Cup Finals, the Bulgarian team made a first trip to Mexico. There, Bulgaria participated in an international tournament with Colombia, Switzerland and hosts Mexico.

The actual preparation for the World Cup began in mid-December 1985 with a preparation game in Spain. At the beginning of January, the international players were gathered for a first two weeks training camp in Teneriffa (Canary Islands).

Only one week after their return, the Bulgarian team flew again to Mexico. In Monterrey, Queretaro, Toluca and Mexico-City they trained and played against various Mexican club teams. On the way back from Mexico the team made an intermediate stop in Morocco where a further international warm-up – against another side qualified for Mexico – was staged.

*The Bulgarian defence puts up a fierce resistance to Argentina. Despite big saves goalkeeper Mikhailov could not avoid the 0:2 defeat.*



After the end of the Bulgarian championship the members of the national team were gathered for a further training camp, which lasted one month and was held in Sofia. During this period Bulgaria played against Denmark at home and against Belgium away.

The Bulgarian squad spent the last days before their departure for Mexico in Germany. In four training games the team was given the final touch.

### Preliminary Matches

Yugoslavia	– Bulgaria	0:0
France	– Bulgaria	1:0
Bulgaria	– Luxemburg	4:0
Bulgaria	– GDR	1:0
Bulgaria	– France	2:0
Bulgaria	– Yugoslavia	2:1
Luxemburg	– Bulgaria	1:3
GDR	– Bulgaria	2:1

1. France	8	5	1	2	15.4	11
2. Bulgaria	8	5	1	2	13.5	11
3. GDR	8	5	0	3	16.9	10
4. Yugoslavia	8	3	2	3	7.8	8
5. Luxemburg	8	0	0	8	2.27	0

### Preparatory Matches

Spain	– Bulgaria	2:0
Puebla	– Bulgaria	1:0
Pumas	– Bulgaria	0:0
Tampico	– Bulgaria	0:2
GDR	– Bulgaria	2:1
Morocco	– Bulgaria	0:0
Bulgaria	– Denmark	3:0
Belgium	– Bulgaria	2:0
Bulgaria	– Korea DPR	3:0
Kaiserslautern	– Bulgaria	2:0
Nördlingen	– Bulgaria	1:5
V. Aschaffenburg	– Bulgaria	1:2
VfB Stuttgart	– Bulgaria	2:5

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Italy 1:1	2nd Match Rep. Korea 1:1	3rd Match Argentina 0:2	¼ Final Mexico 0:2	½ Final	Final
1	Mikhailov	Borislav	12.02.53	Vitosha						
2	Sirakov	Nasko	26.04.62	Vitosha			72	31		
3	Arabov	Nikolai	14.11.53	Sliven						
4	Petrov	Petar	20.02.61	Vitosha						
5	Dimitrov	Georgi	14.01.59	St-Etienne						
6	Jeliaskov	Andrey	09.07.52	Beerschot	16	32				
7	Iskrenov	Bojidar	01.08.62	Vitosha	64	45		20		
8	Sadkov	Anyo	26.09.61	Lokomotiv Plovdiv						
9	Mladenov	Stoytcho	12.04.57	Sredec			54			
10	Gospodinov	Jivko	06.09.57	Spartak Varna	74					
11	Getov	Plamen	04.03.59	Spartak Pleven		58		59		
12	Zdravkov	Radoslav	30.07.56	Sredec			18			
13	Markov	Alexander	17.08.61	Spartak Pleven						
14	Markov	Plamen	11.09.57	Metz						
15	Jordanov	Georgi	21.07.63	Vitosha						
16	Dragolov	Wasil	17.08.62	Beroe Stara Zagora						
17	Kolev	Hristo	21.09.64	Lokomotiv Plovdiv						
18	Velitchkov	Boytcho	13.08.58	Le Havre			36			
19	Pashev	Atanas	21.11.63	Trakia Plovdiv				70		
20	Kostadinov	Kostadin	25.06.59	Trakia Plovdiv	26	45				
21	Diyakov	Iliya	28.09.63	Dobrudzha Tolbuchin						
22	Valov	Iliya	29.12.61	Vraza						



From left to right, back: Dimitrov, Jeliaskov, Mikhailov, Petrov, A. Markov; front: Sirakov, Jordanov, P. Markov, Mladenov, Sadkov, Getov

## Yvan Vutzov

The 46-year-old Bulgarian manager Ivan Vutzov can look back on a long and successful career as a player. From 1958 he played two years for *Gabrovo*, before he changed to the famous *Levski Spartak Sofia* (the club of

the Ministry of the Interior, today *Vitosha Sofia*). In the following ten years Vutzov gained with this team no less than three Championships and four Cup wins. He spent the last two years of his career as a player with *Akademik Sofia*.

During these years, Vutzov was selected 27 times for the Bulgarian side, in which he mostly played as central defender. The participation at the World Cup in England was the climax of his international career. However, Bulgaria – with Vutzov as defender – lost all three First Round matches, against Brazil (0:2), Portugal (0:3) and Hungary (1:3) and were eliminated, being only last of their Group.

In 1974 Vutzov began his career as a coach with *Levski Spartak Sofia*. In the four years of his activity at this club he won one time the Na-

tional Championship and twice the Cup. In 1979 he went to *Spartak Varna*, before being appointed manager of the national team in September 1982.

Despite the fact that Ivan Vutzov's team failed to qualify for the Final Round of the European Championships in France (1984), his results with the national team have not been bad at all: 18 victories and 17 draws against 18 defeats.

## Development

The Bulgarian junior team succeeded only one time in qualifying for the World Youth Championships, which since 1977 have been staged by FIFA every second year.

The Bulgarian junior team which took part in the WYC '85 in USSR played a very attractive football and achieved the Quarter-Finals. Several juniors impressed the observers on this occasion and can hope to be at the beginning of a successful career. None of them, however, managed to get a place in the Mexico squad.







In the match against Argentina, Sadkov marked Maradona and therefore acted primarily in Bulgaria's defensive zone. The two standard forwards Iskrenov and Mladenov were replaced by Pashev and Kostadinov during the tournament.

## The Players

The team members came from eleven different clubs. The two most important clubs of Bulgaria, Vitosha (previous name Levsky Spartak Sofia) and Sredec (previous name CSKA Sofia) supplied the national team with no less than eight players.

The two Bulgarians engaged at French clubs, Jeliaskov (Racing Strasbourg) and Plamen Markov (FC Metz) were used only occasionally.

The 22 players present in Mexico had an average age of 25.6 years. The team was quite young and not yet very experienced in international tournaments.

## Team Organization

The whole defensive strategy was based on zonal marking. In front of goalkeeper Mikhailov there was a very compact four-men defence. Sweeper Arabov used to be only a little behind his defenders and often played in partnership with the central defender Dimitrov. The right flank was covered by Zdravkov. On the left side, two different players were used: Alexander Markov against Italy and Argentina, Petrov against Korea Rep. and Mexico.

In front of the defensive chain, one player acted the part of an interceptor: Sirakov in the Group Matches and Jordanov in the Second Round. On the right side in midfield played the indefatigable Sadkov and a bit further advanced on the left was the very talented Gospodinov.

The two forwards were instructed to move out to the wings when an attack was launched from behind. Thus, the offensive midfield player Getov often found free room in the middle of the attacking zone. As soon as the ball was played into the midfield, both forwards cut in diagonally and thereby opened the room

for breakthroughs out on the flanks.

As forwards no less than four players were used: Iskrenov, Mladenov, Kostadinov and Pashev.

## Attacking Play

During previous tournaments the Bulgarian offensive play had been clearly aimed at quick counter-attacks. At these World Cup Finals the team tried to construct a more variable attacking play. The switching over from defence to attack was generally effected at a rather slow pace, but it was done with great ability. The excellent skill of the defenders allowed the Bulgarians, also near their own penalty area, to start off their attacks with risky passes.

In midfield they often tried to open the game by diagonal passes and to split up the opposite defence. Some players, however, astonishingly often passed the midfield zone by running with the ball. The forwards tried to go away from their direct opponents by constant diagonal sprints. But only rarely they were fed with so precise passes that they could take advantage of their quickness. In turn, players from behind used to move forward and to occupy the free room. In particular the advances from Getov, Sirakov and central defender Dimitrov signified great danger to the opposite goal.

## Defensive Play

At the back the team impressed by their compactness and their harmony. They didn't give room to their opponents and the team-mates were always well covered. The tactical understanding among the defenders was outstanding. Owing to the zonal marking there were hardly any problems concerning the giving over of players. Even under extreme pressure they never lost control of the course of the game.

When the situation required it, the opponents were already attacked in their own half in order to disturb and to stifle the release of the attacks. In such situations the Bulgarians made also use of the offside trap.

The physically strong defenders tackled hard and on the ground were superior to almost all opponents. Surprisingly they revealed some flaws after high crosses, despite several tall players. Altogether, Bulgaria had to concede six goals: three of them were scored through headers!

## Conclusions

The Bulgarian team made a very disciplined impression. With only three cautioned players they ranked among the fairest teams of all World Cup participants.

The used players were tactically well trained. As for the skill factor, most of the players were on a good level. The team proved to be well-balanced, they had really developed their own style.

The Bulgarian internationals certainly did not lack commitment and fighting spirit. They tried to compensate for the missing creativity and imagination by an increased amount of running. Nevertheless something was wrong with this team. Only in the opening game against World Champions Italy, the Bulgarians struggled up with all their might against the imminent defeat. The equalizer five minutes from time was the merited reward of these efforts.

But then the Bulgarian side became weaker from match to match. In the second game they were rather lucky to avoid a defeat after Korea Rep. had levelled the score. In the two following matches against Argentina and Mexico (Second Round), many players felt already discouraged after being one goal down.

In the encounter with Korea

Rep. one had the impression that something had broken within this team. Several key players were obviously not in form and some team members seemed to be worn-out. The self-confidence got lost gradually. Probably the Bulgarians should have had more leader figures like Dimitrov, who are able to take on responsibility and to stimulate their team-mates in difficult situations.

Up to now Bulgaria took part in five World Cups: of the sixteen played matches not a single one was won!

### Bulgaria-Italy 1:1 (0:1)

0:1 Altobelli (43')  
1:1 Sirakov (85')

### Bulgaria-Korea Rep. 1:1 (1:0)

1:0 Getov (11')  
1:1 Kim Jong-Boo (70')

### Bulgaria-Argentina 0:2 (0:1)

0:1 Valdano (3')  
0:2 Burruchaga (79')

### Bulgaria-Mexico 0:2 (0:1)

0:1 Negrete (35')  
0:2 Servin (61')

# Denmark

## Preparation

Since most of the Danish internationals play abroad (some of them even with European top clubs), they are at the disposal of their manager only to a very limited degree. Piontek built up two different teams. Under the name of *Olympic Selection* those team members were brought together who play in Denmark. Allan Simonsen is certainly the best known player of this squad. During the interruption of the Danish championship in winter, the Olympic Selection made a trip to the Middle East with games in Iraq, Bahrain and Qatar.

The Danish A-team met Northern Ireland in Belfast at the end of March and in mid-April Bulgaria in Sofia.

On May 5, Piontek assembled the Mexico team in Ved-aek, north of Copenhagen. On the first day, only ten team members were present; then successively those internationals arrived who play

*Denmark's playmaker Lerby scores the second goal during the 6:1 victory over Uruguay. Goalkeeper Alvez (No. 12) is left stranded.*



abroad. In this training camp everybody worked very hard in order to achieve an excellent physical fitness for the World Cup Finals. Piontek's players had to carry out sprints and speed runs, having on oxygen masks: a special way of simulating the atmospheric conditions of Mexico!

On May 13, Denmark played against Norway in Oslo. Three days later they faced Poland in Copenhagen.

On May 17, the Danish delegation flew to Bogotá for an altitude retreat of ten days. There they fixed, at short notice, two training games against Paraguay and against Colombia's First Division team Cristal Caldas.

Preliminary Matches		
Denmark	- Norway	1:0
Switzerland	- Denmark	1:0
Denmark	- Ireland Rep.	3:0
Denmark	- USSR	4:2
USSR	- Denmark	1:0
Denmark	- Switzerland	0:0
Norway	- Denmark	1:5
Ireland Rep.	- Denmark	1:4
1. Denmark	8 5 1 2	17:6 11
2. USSR	8 4 2 2	13:8 10
3. Switzerland	8 2 4 2	5:10 8
4. Ireland Rep.	8 2 2 4	5:10 6
5. Norway	8 1 3 4	4:10 5

Preparatory Matches		
Iraq	- Denmark	0:2
Iraq	- Denmark	2:0
Bahrain	- Denmark	1:5
Qatar	- Denmark	0:0
Qatar	- Denmark	1:1
N. Ireland	- Denmark	1:1
Bulgaria	- Denmark	3:0
Norway	- Denmark	1:0
Denmark	- Poland	1:0
Paraguay	- Denmark	2:1
Cristal Caldas	- Denmark	2:5

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Scotland 1:0	2nd Match Uruguay 6:1	3rd Match Germany FR 2:0	¼ Final Spain 1:5	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Rasmussen	Troels	04.07.61	AGF Aarhus							
2	Sivebaek	John	25.10.61	Manchester United	15						
3	Busk	Soren	10.04.53	Monaco							
4	Olsen	Morten	14.08.49	1. FC Köln							
5	Nielsen	Ivan	09.10.56	PSV Eindhoven							
6	Lerby	Soren	01.02.58	Monaco							
7	Molby	Jan	04.07.63	Liverpool	10	34		20			
8	Olsen	Jesper	20.03.61	Manchester United	80	8	71	70			
9	Berggreen	Klaus	03.02.58	AC Roma							
10	Elkjaer-Larsen	Preben	11.09.57	Hellas Verona			45				
11	Laudrup	Michael	15.06.64	Juventus Torino		82					
12	Bertelsen	Jens Jorn	15.02.52	Aarau		56					
13	Frimann	Per	04.06.62	RSC Anderlecht							
14	Simonsen	Allan	15.12.52	Vejle			19				
15	Arnesen	Frank	30.09.56	PSV Eindhoven	75		88*				
16	Qvist	Ole	25.02.52	KB Copenhagen							
17	Nielsen	Kent	28.12.61	Bronshoj							
18	Christensen	Flemming	10.04.58	Aarau							
19	Eriksen	John	20.11.57	Servette Genève			45	30			
20	Bartram	Jan	06.03.62	AGF Aarhus							
21	Andersen	Henrik	07.05.65	RSC Anderlecht				60			
22	Hogh	Lars	14.01.59	OB Odense							



From left to right, back: Elkjaer-Larsen, Arnesen, Molby, Sivebaek, Laudrup, Busk, front: Andersen, J. Olsen, M. Olsen, Høgh, Lerby

## Sepp Piontek

Sepp Piontek (46) was born in Breslau (today Wroclaw). His parents soon emigrated to Germany. As a youngster, Piontek played as forward with *Germania Leer*. After having joined *Werder Bremen* he was converted to a defender. Until the end of his career as

a player Piontek participated in 203 Bundesliga matches and scored 14 goals. In 1961, still playing with *Werder Bremen*, he could celebrate the win of the German Cup and four years later he won with the same club the German championship. In the years

1965/66 he played six times for the German team.

After having finished his career as a player, Sepp Piontek acquired the Bundesliga licence with top marks at the sports college in Cologne. In 1972 his former club *Werder Bremen* engaged him as manager. Three years later he moved to *Fortuna Düsseldorf* for one season. Then Piontek was team coach of Haiti for two years. After his return in 1978 he coached *St. Pauli* in the Second Bundesliga. Since July 1, 1979, Sepp Piontek has been working as manager of Denmark. After the qualification for the Final Round of the European Championships in France and the qualification for the World Cup in Mexico, Denmark is now considered to be one of the leading footballing nations in Europe.

## Development

Although the youth promotion is on a high level in Denmark and can be considered as one of the best in Europe, the Danish youth team has not yet managed to qualify for the World Youth Championship. This proves once again that it is very difficult for a small country, with a limited number of young talents, to stand their ground against the big footballing nations.





In the opening game against Scotland, Arnesen assumed a very offensive role in central midfield. Mölby was used in all four games but only against Germany FR he played from the start.

## The Players

The Danish team members flew to Mexico from seven different countries. They brought along no less than seven national titles! So, Laudrup had won the Italian championship with Juventus. Lerby took a large share in the renewed title win of Bayern Munich in FRG. Morten Olsen, Andersen and Friemann became Belgian champions with Anderlecht. Arnesen was successful with PSV Eindhoven in the Netherlands. Mølby took part in Liverpool's "double" in England. One national champion was not represented in Denmark's squad: the Danish one!

## Team Organization

In the opening game against Scotland, Denmark played a 3-5-2 system. In the three following matches Andersen, another defender, was introduced into the team, in place of a midfield player. A combination of man-to-man/zonal marking was applied.

The Danes were excellently organized and all were provided with a special task. Each player operated in a zone where he could manoeuvre freely.

In the first two games Rasmussen guarded the Danish goal then, however, Denmark's third goalkeeper Høgh was given preference. The 36-year-old Morten Olsen played as sweeper often on a level with his central defenders Busk and Nielsen. These two were responsible for the opposing forwards. Andersen as full-back had to block routes down the left. Frequently he moved forward along the touch-line and was involved in the midfield actions.

Bertelsen exclusively confined himself to defensive tasks. He acted as an interceptor in the central midfield. His main task consisted in stopping gaps and in cover-

ing his advancing teammates.

Berggreen operated inside right in the defensive midfield. He mostly played behind Arnesen, covered him and was occasionally involved in the Danish attacks, when he advanced with diagonal sprints.

Lerby's creative abilities took mainly effect in the back part of the midfield. Owing to his vision for wide displacements of the game and by intelligently launching the counter-attacks he proved to be one of the main responsibilities for Denmark's very variable attacking play.

The small, but quite active Jesper Olsen was used both on the left and on the right side. With elegant dribbles he turned his direct opponents and thus launched dangerous breakthroughs on the wings.

Arnesen usually ran wide in the right midfield. With his tight control and unexpected feints he raised great difficulties to his opponents and laid on many chances for his team-mates.

Skipper Laudrup often retired far back to the midfield. When he was in possession of the ball, his extraordinary accelerating power often allowed him to penetrate dangerously into the opposing penalty-area. Up front Elkjaer was frequently left to his own resources.

## Variety of Attacks

No other side of this tournament disposed of such a large number of attacking variants. Lerby's long diagonal passes splitted the opposing rearguards and supplied the necessary width to the Danish attacking play. Extremely quick moves through the middle with refined deflections of the ball and double passes alternated with wide-ranging attacks in which participated often as many as seven players. The breakthroughs on the wings by Arnesen and Jesper Olsen

posed as many problems to the opponent as the individual runs by Elkjaer and Laudrup.

In the game against Uruguay the Danes demonstrated a very effective pressing. The South Americans were resolutely attacked already in midfield and put under pressure. After their 2:1 lead at half-time, Denmark began to recede to their own half, let their opponent come and concentrated on their lethal counters.

## Danish Dynamite

Denmark displayed the most spectacular football during this tournament. The joy to play prevailed over all tactical calculations. Provided with a marked self-confidence they were willing to take great risks. This readiness to risk something, linked to a full physical commitment, provided the Danish game with an exceptional dynamism.

The team proved to be an unity. Each of them played very unselfishly. They all understood that they had to assume ungrateful tasks, too. Against Scotland, Lerby for instance was forced by his direct opponent Strachan to play partly as a left full-back.

## Denmark's Failure

The definitely best team of the First Round lost in the Second Round to a Spanish side who had begun this tournament quite laboriously. From the beginning, Denmark had considerable difficulties to find their rhythm against the aggressive Spaniards. Yet, after the Danes were awarded a penalty and Jesper Olsen had given his team the lead, everything seemed to take its normal course.

Two minutes before the interval Jesper Olsen, shortly before celebrated, committed a blunder of grave consequence. His thoughtless pass from the touch-line into his own penalty-area was inter-

cepted by Butragueño who accepted this gift and equalized the score.

This unfortunate goal lent wings to Spain and broke the rhythm of the Danes. Still, Denmark tried to struggle with all their might against the imminent defeat. But everything they had managed to do quite easily before, failed now. There were more and more insecurities in the Danish game. Scoring chances were narrowly wasted – and with every failed action of the Danes the self-confidence of the Spanish side was increased. They succeeded now in all they did. Each shot hit the net. Denmark were eliminated.

How could it happen that such a talented and experienced player like Jesper Olsen chose the worst from all possible solutions? This question will always remain unanswered. As in all other fields of life also in soccer a momentary, individual failure can lead to a collective defeat.

### Denmark-Scotland 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Elkjaer (57')

### Denmark-Uruguay 6:1 (2:1)

1:0 Elkjaer (11')  
2:0 Lerby (41')  
2:1 Francescoli (45': Penalty)  
3:1 Laudrup (52')  
4:1 Elkjaer (68')  
5:1 Elkjaer (79')  
6:1 J. Olsen (89')

### Denmark-GFR 2:0 (1:0)

1:0 J. Olsen (43': Penalty)  
2:0 Eriksen (62')

### Denmark-Spain 1:5 (1:1)

1:0 J. Olsen (33': Penalty)  
1:1 Butragueño (43')  
1:2 Butragueño (56')  
1:3 Goicoechea (68': Penalty)  
1:4 Butragueño (80')  
1:5 Butragueño (88': Penalty)

# Germany FR

## Preparation

In order to guarantee enough preparation time to the German squad immediately before the World Cup Finals, the Bundesliga dates had to be fixed so compactly that manager Beckenbauer could arrange only very few team gatherings.

But already at the end of the season 84/85 the German team flew to Mexico where they played – without previous adaptation to the altitude – two international matches against Mexico and England. In February 1986 Germany played against World Champion Italy in Avellino and one month later they received Brazil in Frankfurt. At the beginning of April, another warm-up was staged in Basel against Switzerland.

From May 5 to May 10 the Germans were gathered for a course of instruction in Malente, and the next few days the players spent in Kaiserau. During this period the last two preparatory games took

*During their 2:0 victory over France in the Semi-Final, German goalkeeper Schumacher has handled the ball before Platini, who is lying on the ground. The German defence, well organized by central defender Förster, kept the French in check.*



place, against Yugoslavia in Bochum and against the Netherlands in Dortmund. After a four days vacation at home, the German delegation flew to Mexico where they spent the first eight days in Morelia, in order to get used to the altitude and the heat. On May 27 they moved to Galindo where the last preparations were made for the first World Cup games.

### Preliminary Matches

Germany FR	– Sweden	2:0
Malta	– Germany FR	2:3
Portugal	– Germany FR	1:2
Germany FR	– Malta	6:0
CSSR	– Germany FR	1:5
Sweden	– Germany FR	2:2
Germany FR	– Portugal	0:1
Germany FR	– CSSR	2:2

1. Germany FR	8	5	2	1	22:9	12
2. Portugal	8	5	0	3	12:10	10
3. Sweden	8	4	1	3	14:9	9
4. CSSR	8	3	2	3	11:12	8
5. Malta	8	0	1	7	6:25	1

### Preparatory Matches

Italy	– Germany FR	1:2
Germany FR	– Brazil	2:0
Switzerland	– Germany FR	0:1
Germany FR	– Yugoslavia	1:1
Germany FR	– Netherlands	3:1

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Uruguay 1:1	2nd Match Scotland 2:1	3rd Match Denmark 0:2	¼ Final Morocco 1:0	¼ Final Mexico 0:0 a.e.-t.	½ Final France 2:0	Final Argentina 2:3
1	Schumacher	Harald	06.03.54	1. FC Köln							
2	Briegel	Hans-Peter	11.10.55	Sampdoria		63					
3	Brehme	Andreas	09.11.60	Bayern München	45						
4	Förster	Karlheinz	25.07.58	Olympique Marseille			71				
5	Herget	Matthias	14.11.55	Bayer Uerdingen							
6	Eder	Norbert	07.11.55	Bayern München					115		
7	Littbarski	Pierre	16.04.60	Racing Paris	45	76	45	45	5		
8	Matthäus	Lothar	21.03.61	Bayern München	71						
9	Völler	Rudolf	13.04.60	Werder Bremen				45		32	45
10	Magath	Felix-Wolfgang	26.07.53	Hamburger SV							60
11	Rummenigge	Karl-Heinz	25.09.55	Inter Milano	19	14	19		58	58	
12	Stein	Ulrich	23.10.54	Hamburger SV							
13	Allgöwer	Karl	05.01.57	VfB Stuttgart							
14	Berthold	Thomas	12.11.64	Eintracht Frankfurt				64*			
15	Augenthaler	Klaus	26.09.57	Bayern München							
16	Thon	Olaf	01.05.66	Schalke 04							
17	Jakobs	Ditmar	28.08.53	Hamburger SV		27					
18	Rahn	Uwe	21.05.62	Bor. Mönchengladb.							
19	Allofs	Klaus	05.12.56	1. FC Köln							45
20	Hoeness	Dieter	07.01.53	Bayern München					62		30
21	Rolff	Wolfgang	26.12.59	Bayer Leverkusen			45				
22	Immel	Eike	27.11.60	VfB Stuttgart							



From left to right, back: Schumacher, Berthold, Briegel, Rummenigge, Jakobs, Magath; front: Förster, Brehme, Allofs, Eder, Matthäus

## Franz Beckenbauer

The first club Franz Beckenbauer (40) joined in his youth was *SC 1906 Munich*. He soon changed to *Bayern Munich*, where he stayed for 19 years. For Beckenbauer and his club a unique series of success followed: four times they won both the German championship and the Ger-


man Cup. Three times in a row (1974–76) Bayern Munich were successful in the European Cup of the Champions. In 1976 Bayern also won the Intercontinental Cup by defeating *Cruzeiro Belo Horizonte* (2:0, 0:0). In the following year Beckenbauer surprisingly moved to

*Cosmos New York*. In his four years' activity with this club Beckenbauer won the US championship three times. At the beginning of the season 1980/81 Beckenbauer signed a two years contract with *Hamburger SV* and gained the German championship in the second year of his activity in Hamburg. With 103 international games "Kaiser Franz" is Germany's record international. FRG were Vice World Champions at the World Cup '66; at the World Cup '70 in Mexico they were placed third and four years later they won the World Cup in their own country. Two years before the German team and their captain Beckenbauer had become European Champions. Since July 1984 Franz Beckenbauer has been responsible for the German team as team coach.

## Development

Surprisingly enough the youth team of FRG were able only one time to qualify for the World Youth Championship. In 1981, in Australia, the German side brilliantly won the World Youth Championship with wins over Mexico, Spain, Austria, Romania and Qatar. But not one single player of this side found his way into Beckenbauer's Mexico squad!

Two players from the Mexico team represented Germany FR at the Olympic Games of 1984 in Los Angeles: *Andreas Brehme* and *Uwe Rahn*.







The Germans very often modified their attacking positions, Partly, they played with three or even four strikers. At the back, Brehme was used both on the left and on the right side.

## Team Organization

The defensive conception of the German team was based on a mixed man-to-man/zonal marking. With Schumacher, they had one of the world's best goal-keepers at their disposal. Augenthaler played the first two games as sweeper. Then he was replaced by Jakobs. Both interpreted this role rather in a defensive sense.

The forwards were marked tightly by Förster and Eder. If the opponent lined-up with a true winger or played with only one actual striker, Eder assumed a role in midfield. However, his qualities took less effect in this advanced position.

Young Berthold as right full-back impressed with his temperament. He advanced incessantly to the midfield and often pushed through his runs up to the opposing goal line. Briegel's rushes on the left side provided the German attacks with a good deal of pressure.

In midfield Brehme had to fulfill defensive tasks. He covered the offensive actions of his full-backs with much discipline. Thanks to his enormous sphere of action Matthäus brought much dynamism into the German attacking play. Magath as a kind of pivot in the midfield surprised by his great running power. He often directed the German offensive efforts by his subtle passes. But then, during some phases he had absolutely no impact on the game.

Up front there was a constant change. Only Allofs on the left side played all games. Rummenigge and Völler were alternately used on the right wing. Littbarski was brought in as a substitute in five matches. Hoeness, Germany's team senior, came on against Mexico and Argentina to force the success with his powerful heading.

## Five Forwards

Beckenbauer went to Mexico with 22 players but without a team that already functioned well. Of course, it was unfortunate that the three strikers Rummenigge, Völler and Littbarski had suffered injuries before the World Cup Finals and therefore were not at their best in Mexico.

No other team adjusted their style of play to the opponent in such a way as the Germans did. Not a single time the Germans lined up in the same formation as in the preceding game.

The team usually began with two forwards. Against Scotland and Denmark Germany's manager made an attempt with three. On several occasions Beckenbauer replaced a defender or a midfielder by an additional striker during a game. Thus, four nominal strikers were on the field at the end of the encounters with Uruguay and Denmark.

## Man-to-Man Marking in Midfield

The conception of play too was practically changed from match to match. Besides the opposing forwards also dangerous midfield players were taken in man-to-man marking on some occasions; Eder was charged with marking Uruguay's playmaker Francescoli. France's midfielder star Platini was neutralized once again by Rolff. Matthäus followed Maradona step by step for 60 minutes.

The German side could hardly ever find their own style of play with all these modifications and adjustments. Individually, several players distinguished themselves by outstanding performances. With regard to the collective only the defensive block was convincing. Goalkeeper Schumacher guaranteed for stability.

Sweeper Jakobs held the defence together well. Förster was undoubtedly the best central defender of the Mundial. Berthold achieved the international breakthrough and became one of the big discoveries of the tournament. Matthäus developed into the actual motor and combative example of a squad whose commitment was always remarkable.

## Much Fighting Strength - Few Ideas

But just there was the problem of the Germans. Their style of play was concentrated too much on fighting. In midfield there was little inspiration. Imagination, wit and surprising ideas were factors that hardly existed in their game. They neglected the play without ball. Thus, the player who had the ball was often forced to play short and ineffectual passes.

This lack of ideas and flowing combinations also expressed itself in the way the German goals were scored. Only Völler's equalizer against Scotland arose from a move in which several players were involved. The two goals by Allofs against Uruguay and Scotland were - at least partly - a matter of chance. Völler's 2-0 against France was scored after a classic counter-attack when the French had taken all risks to equalize. The four remaining goals of the Germans were taken after freekicks and corners.

When evaluating the performances of Germany FR, one has to take into consideration that they had to play their Second Round and Quarter-Final ties in the infernal heat of Monterrey. With the exception of England's excellent first half against Poland, all games performed in Monterrey were of a low quality. So, the Germans were in good company.

## Reasons of Success

In seven games Germany FR were behind no less than four times. But only twice they left the field as losers. No other team managed to avert an imminent defeat as many times as the Germans. In the Final they would have almost realized the same feat!

This unexpected success was based on an extraordinary willingness to perform and the tactical discipline of all players. The sound self-confidence of the very experienced Germans allowed them to overcome even critical situations. The perfect stamina of the men coming from the hard Bundesliga was the main reason that the German squad became ever stronger towards the end of the tournament. In the Semi-Final clash with France they showed their clearly best performance during these World Cup Finals.

Beckenbauer, in his first job as a manager, had accomplished an excellent result. All amateurs of soccer wish him that his future national sides will at least have a touch of the genius that distinguished him as a player!

### GFR-Uruguay 1:1 (0:1)

0:1 Alzamendi (4')  
1:1 Allofs (84')

### GFR-Scotland 2:1 (1:1)

0:1 Strachan (18')  
1:1 Völler (23')  
2:1 Allofs (49')

### GFR-Denmark 0:2 (0:1)

0:1 J. Olsen (43' - Penalty)  
0:2 Eriksen (62')

### GFR-Morocco 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Matthäus (87')

### GFR-Mexico 0:0 Pen. 4:1

### GFR-France 2:0 (1:0)

1:0 Brehme (9')  
2:0 Völler (89')

### GFR-Argentina 2:3 (0:1)

0:1 Brown (23')  
0:2 Valdano (55')  
1:2 Rummenigge (74')  
2:2 Völler (80')  
2:3 Burruchaga (83')

# England

## Preparation

Manager Bobby Robson was faced with the same problems against which also all his predecessors had to struggle. Every year, the all-powerful Football League puts up such a compact program that for the national team only few free dates are at disposal. Through postponements of matches, due to bad conditions of the ground, and on account of the countless repetitions of drawn Cup matches, England's manager is frequently forced to play without some of his key players. Not one footballing nation can afford any longer to neglect their international team in such a way!

From January on, Bobby Robson's team could play one international game every month. Short training courses with his internationals could not be realized.

At the end of January, the first preparation game took place in Egypt. One month later

*England's Lineker could jubilate six times during the World Cup Final Competition. Here he celebrates one of his goals against Paraguay. He became the top scorer of the tournament and was subsequently engaged by CF Barcelona.*

England played in Israel. At the end of March, England met USSR in Tiflis.

In April, another warm-up for Mexico was played against arch-rivals Scotland in London.

In mid-May, the English delegation departed for a two weeks altitude retreat in Colorado Springs in USA. The training sessions were interrupted by international games against Korea Rep. and Mexico.

After the end of the training camp the English team, being on it's way to Mexico, made a detour to Vancouver, where a last preparation game was played against Canada.



### Preliminary Matches

England	- Finland	5:0
Turkey	- England	0:8
N. Ireland	- England	0:1
Romania	- England	0:0
Finland	- England	1:1
England	- Romania	1:1
England	- Turkey	5:0
England	- N. Ireland	0:0

1. England	8	4	4	0	21.2	12
2. N. Ireland	8	4	2	2	8.5	10
3. Romania	8	3	3	2	12.7	9
4. Finland	8	3	2	3	7.12	8
5. Turkey	8	0	1	7	2.14	1

### Preparatory Matches

Egypt	- England	0:4
Israel	- England	1:2
USSR	- England	0:1
England	- Scotland	2:1
Korea Rep.	- England	1:4
Mexico	- England	0:3
Canada	- England	0:1

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Portugal 0:1	2nd Match Morocco 0:0	3rd Match Poland 3:0	¼ Final Paraguay 3:0	¼ Final Argentina 1:2	½ Final	Final
1	Shilton	Peter	18.09.49	Southampton							
2	Stevens	Gary	27.03.63	Everton							
3	Sansom	Kenny	26.09.58	Arsenal							
4	Hodde	Glenn	27.10.57	Tottenham Hotspur							
5	Martin	Alvin	29.07.58	West Ham United							
6	Butcher	Terry	28.12.58	Glasgow Rangers							
7	Robson	Bryan	11.01.57	Manchester United	79	41					
8	Wilkins	Ray	14.09.56	AC Milan		42*					
9	Hateley	Mark	07.11.61	AC Milan		75		9			
10	Lineker	Gary	30.11.60	Barcelona			84				
11	Waddle	Chris	14.12.60	Tottenham Hotspur	78		16		21		
12	Andersen	Viv	29.08.56	Arsenal							
13	Woods	Chris	14.11.59	Glasgow Rangers							
14	Fenwick	Terry	17.11.59	Queen's Park Rangers							
15	Stevens	Gary A.	30.03.62	Tottenham Hotspur		15		33			
16	Reid	Peter	20.06.56	Everton				57	69		
17	Steven	Trevor	21.09.63	Everton					74		
18	Hodge	Steve	25.10.62	Aston Villa	11	49					
19	Barnes	John	07.11.63	Watford					16		
20	Beardsley	Peter	18.01.61	Newcastle United	12		74	81			
21	Dixon	Kerry	24.07.61	Chelsea			6				
22	Bailey	Gary	09.08.58	Manchester United							



From left to right, back: Butcher, Lineker, Fenwick, Hoddle, Stevens G., Shilton; front: Beardsley, Reid, Hodge, Steven., Sansom

## Bobby Robson

Bobby Robson (53) was an excellent midfielder player. At the age of 17, he began his career with *Fulham*. In 1956

Robson was transferred to *West Bromwich Albion*, but after six years he came back to his first team. In all, Robson made 584 League appearances, scored 133 goals and represented England in twenty international games.

After having finished his career with *Fulham*, the club kept him under contract and offered him the post of a manager. In 1968 Robson went for one season to the *Vancouver Whitecaps* in Canada. From 1969 Robson worked with *Ipswich Town* for thirteen years, building up a young and attractive side. In 1978 Ipswich won the FA-Cup and in 1981 the UEFA-Cup. The Football Associa-

tion soon became aware of Robson's excellent work with Ipswich and in 1978 entrusted him – on a part-time basis – with the coaching of England's B-team. In August 1982 Bobby Robson was appointed manager.

## Development

The coaches of the youth teams are confronted with the same problems as England's manager: the young talents, playing with top clubs, are often not available for international games.

The English youth team managed to qualify for the World Youth Championships in Australia (1981) and in the Soviet Union (1985), but not a single player of these squads was picked for Bobby Robson's World Cup team.





After the first two games, the English manager Robson introduced several new players into his team. The newly formed side is presented in this illustration.

## The Players

The English squad were composed of players from fourteen different clubs. Everton supplied four internationals. Tottenham were represented by three players, Arsenal and Manchester United both by two. League-champions Liverpool, however, had not a single player in the English team.

## Team Organization

For the games against Portugal and Morocco Bobby Robson decided on a 4-3-3 system. In the following matches England played a 4-4-2.

In the classic English defence, playing with a zonal marking and the four defenders on a line, Fenwick and Butcher were the central defenders. Gary Stevens on the right and Sansom on the left side operated as full-backs.

The midfield was formed by three exceptional playing personalities. Wilkins took over the central role in the defensive zone. Tottenham's playmaker Hoddle had to switch over to the right. The most offensive role was intended for Bryan Robson, England's captain and gifted strategist.

In attack the English team began the tournament with Waddle, who played slightly retreated on the left side, Hateley as well as Lineker as actual strikers.

For the crucial Group game against Poland manager Robson was forced to change his team. Bryan Robson and Waddle had to be replaced because of injuries. Wilkins, suspended after being sent off in the Morocco match, was replaced by Reid. Steven (right) and Hodge (left) complemented the midfield on the flanks. This enabled Hoddle to make use of his brilliant skill in the middle. Up front Hateley had to cede his place to the lightning-quick Beardsley.

## Attacking Play

Owing to the heat in Monterrey, England could not play their usual football, characterized by long passes and a high pace. Therefore, the team tried to operate more economically, by well circulating the ball. In the encounters with Portugal and Morocco, however, the forwards were launched with long passes from the midfield. The two full-backs mostly concluded their frequent advances by high crosses, trying to bring into action Hateley, a centre forward very strong in the air. Against Portugal, this typical British style of play created at least some good chances. The only goal, however, was scored by the Portuguese after a counter-attack.

Through the modification of the English line-up their style of play up front changed, too. The introduction of the younger midfield players against Poland brought at once more motion into England's game. Consequently, Robson's men had more room to receive the ball. This gave the English side the possibility to construct their attacks with short passes and to surprise the opponent with unexpected variants. By untiring sprints, both strikers tried hard to disengage themselves from their direct opponents.

## Defensive Play

England's defence was well organized and the automatisms worked excellently. For all their offensive attitude, the English defence was hardly ever embarrassed.

After having lost the ball, Robson's players, quite surprisingly, mostly receded to their own half without seriously disturbing the opposing team. In front of their penalty-area they built up an actual defensive wall and awaited their opponents. The English side were in fairly good command of this atypi-

cal British defensive attitude. In the first two games, the opponents only came to a single opportunity. But the Portuguese Carlos Manuel took advantage of this chance cold-bloodedly, scoring the decisive 1:0.

In the third match, against Poland, England attacked their opponents earlier and tackled more energetically. Thus, the East Europeans never found their rhythm and were overrun by England.

In the Argentina clash the English team played again too cautiously. The South Americans could often occupy the midfield without even having to fight for it. Only after Maradona's second goal, the British emerged from their passivity to have a crack and to put the Argentinians under pressure. The World Champions were suddenly faced with real difficulties and were lucky not to concede the leveller shortly before the end of this Quarter-Final.

## Conclusions

During these World Cup Finals, England presented two different teams. Both tried to adjust their conception of play to the difficult climatic conditions of Monterrey - with differing success. Such a short-term modification of the style of play is always attended with a great risk.

The first team with Wilkins, Hoddle and Robson tried to circulate the ball and to remain in possession of it. Since the three older players had pains to break away from their opponents, this intention could not always be translated into action. Moreover, there seemed to be some problems of co-ordination in midfield. All three midfield players wanted to run through the middle. None of them was willing to run wide over the flanks. That's why the game was too much centred to the middle. There, a breakthrough proved to be very difficult against the com-

pact rearguards of Portugal and Morocco.

It was obvious that the failure of their attacking efforts made the English side feel insecure. In certain situations, the players did not seem to know what to do. The longer a match lasted, the more England fell back into their original attacking play, characterized by long passes for the isolated forwards. The experienced English team became nervous. The fact that a calm player like Wilkins was sent-off speaks volumes.

In the third match England fielded a four-men connection from Everton: on the right side the newly introduced Steven and Reid were added to the «first-string» players Stevens and Lineker. Of course, these one-club connection showed up an excellent harmony. Moreover, they provided the necessary fighting spirit and Hoddle was now allowed to take over command. With quick short passes and plenty of direct moves the attacks were now constructed in a more variable way. Since the two midfielders Steven and Hodge advanced on the wings alternately with the full-backs Stevens and Sansom, the English attacking play was given the necessary width. The first two goals against Poland were scored after splendid moves on the wings.

### England-Portugal 0:1 (0:0)

0:1 Carlos Manuel (76')

### England-Morocco 0:0

### England-Poland 3:0 (3:0)

1:0 Lineker (9')  
2:0 Lineker (14')  
3:0 Lineker (34')

### England-Paraguay 3:0 (1:0)

1:0 Lineker (31')  
2:0 Beardsley (56')  
3:0 Lineker (73')

### England-Argentina 1:2 (0:0)

0:1 Maradona (51')  
0:2 Maradona (54')  
1:2 Lineker (80')

# France

## Preparation

Though European Champions France finally topped their Group, they had to await their last match in mid-November 1985 to be qualified for Mexico. But already before the French team, with a view to Mexico, had faced a South American opponent: in August 1985, a game against Uruguay took place in Paris. During the Christmas holidays all French internationals, accompanied by their families, came together in Font-Romeu in the Pyrenees. This meeting without training has already become a tradition with the French national team.

Since the main structures of the French team appeared to be firmly established and the automatism within the side worked very well, manager Henri Michel could content himself with a modest preparation program. In February an international game against Northern Ireland took place in Paris, but under very

*The superbly taken first goal by skipper Platini in the 15th minute of the Second Round encounter with Italy. Keeper Galli is left stranded on the ground. Bagni (No. 10) watches the mischief from the distance.*

unfavourable conditions. In March an encounter with Argentina followed.

After the end of the championship, in the first days of May, the French went again to Font-Romeu, but now for a ten days altitude retreat. Various sports-medical tests had to be carried out in the course of this camp. The results of these examinations were used for the individual training programs of the players.

On May 14 the French delegation departed for Mexico, where they resided in Tlaxcala until May 29. During this short stay, three games against Mexican clubs were played. On May 30, the team moved to their permanent quarters in Guanajuato near León.



### Preliminary Matches

Luxemburg	- France	0:4
France	- Bulgaria	1:0
France	- GDR	2:0
Yugoslavia	- France	0:0
Bulgaria	- France	2:0
GDR	- France	2:0
France	- Luxemburg	6:2
France	- Yugoslavia	2:0

1. France	8	5	1	2	15:4	11
2. Bulgaria	8	5	1	2	13:5	11
3. GDR	8	5	0	3	16:9	10
4. Yugoslavia	8	3	2	3	7:8	8
5. Luxemburg	8	0	0	8	2:27	0

### Preparatory Matches

France	- Uruguay	2:0
France	- Northern Ireland	0:0
France	- Argentina	2:0

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Canada 1:0	2nd Match USSR 1:1	3rd Match Hungary 3:0	½ Final Italy 2:0	¼ Final Brazil 1:1 a.e.t.	½ Final Germany FR 0:2	3rd place Belgium 4:2 a.e.t.
1	Bats	Joël	04.01.57	Paris St-Germain							
2	Amoros	Manuel	01.02.62	Monaco							
3	Ayache	William	10.01.61	Paris St-Germain							
4	Battiston	Patrick	12.03.57	Girondins Bordeaux							
5	Bibard	Michel	30.11.58	Paris St-Germain							
6	Bossis	Maxime	26.06.55	Racing Paris							64
7	Le Roux	Yvon	19.04.60	FC Nantes							56
8	Tusseau	Thierry	19.01.58	Racing Paris				15			36
9	Fernandez	Luis	02.10.59	Racing Paris				75			
10	Platini	Michel	21.06.55	Juventus Torino				85			
11	Ferreri	Jean Marc	26.12.62	Girondins Bordeaux			20	5	36		
12	Giresse	Alain	02.08.52	Olympique Marseille		83			84	69	
13	Genghini	Bernard	18.01.58	Servette Genève							
14	Tigana	Jean	23.06.55	Girondins Bordeaux							84
15	Vercruysse	Philippe	28.01.62	Girondins Bordeaux		7				11	
16	Bellone	Bruno	14.03.62	Monaco		14			25	69	
17	Papin	Jean-Pierre	05.11.63	Olympique Marseille		76	61				
18	Rocheteau	Dominique	14.01.55	Paris St-Germain	70		29		95		
19	Stopyra	Yannick	09.01.61	Toulouse FC	20		70				
20	Xuereb	Daniel	22.06.59	Paris St-Germain						21	
21	Bergeroo	Philippe	13.01.54	Toulouse FC							
22	Rust	Albert	10.10.53	Sochaux							



From right to left, back: Fernandez, Bossis, Battiston, Ayache, Bats, Amoros; front: Tigana, Stopyra, Papin, Platini, Giresse

## Henri Michel

Henri Michel (39) made his first playing experiences with *Aix-en-Provence* (1964–66), where his extraordinary talent was soon noticed and he therefore was selected for the youth national team.

After his transfer to *FC Nantes*, Michel realized during sixteen years a brilliant career as a professional. With Nantes he gained three national titles (1973, 1977, 1980) and one Cup trophy (1979).

As an elegant midfield player he played no less than 58 times for France, being captain of the team in ten games. In 1978 he participated in the World Cup tournament in Argentina. In the last years of his career, he retired from the midfield to the back, playing sweeper.

Already in 1982, Henri Michel was appointed successor of national manager Michel Hidalgo who wanted to retire after the European Championship in 1984. In the meantime Henri Michel was entrusted with the Olympic team, which he led to the gold medal in Los Angeles.

In autumn 1984, Michel could take over from his predecessor a very successful and well harmonizing team – not an easy heritage!

## Development

Although France ranks among the leading countries with regard to the formation of young talents, the youth national team could qualify only for the first World Youth Championship, held in Tunisia in 1977.

Two key players from this side were among the 22 players selected for Mexico in 1986: *Michel Bibard* and *Bernard Genghini*.

Moreover, four players who won the gold medal in Los Angeles in 1984 were admitted to the Mexico team: *William Ayache*, *Michel Bibard*, *Daniel Xuereb* and *Albert Rust*.







Amoros as left full-back changed to the right side when Tusseau played in the place of Ayache. All 22 team members got an opportunity to play with the exception of goalkeeper No. 3

## The Players

France presented one of the oldest and most experienced teams of this World Cup. The average age of the standard team was about 28, that of the four midfield players about 30.

French champions Paris SG and Girondins Bordeaux each supplied four internationals to the French squad. Monaco was represented by three players. The remaining eleven team members came from eight different clubs.

## Team Organization

Manager Henri Michel had changed the defensive organization of his team after the first match. Against Canada, the French operated with their back four on a level. Battiston and Bossis formed the central defence. Amoros and Tusseau acted as fullbacks.

This surprising experiment did apparently not convince the French manager. At any rate Battiston played again as sweeper in the following games. Central defender Bossis was charged with marking the most dangerous opposing striker. Ayache took over the position of the right full-back. Amoros moved to the left side.

In midfield Tigana and Fernandez had to assume defensive tasks so that Giresse and Platini were free to devote themselves to the offensive.

Up front Rocheteau and Papin were used first. In the second game against the USSR, Stopyra got a chance. He seized the opportunity with a convincing performance. He ranked among the actual discoveries of the World Cup in Mexico.

## Attacking Play

The French team had created its own unmistakable style of play, based on plenty of quick short touches and elegant flowing moves. Platini and Giresse revealed thereby their

perfect command of double passes.

This attractive style of play was built on the willingness of all players to run clear continuously and so to allow their team-mate who had the ball to address his next pass.

Hardly another team had such a multitude of attacking variants. All ten outfield players were included alternately in the offensive actions. Only sweeper Battiston was rarely involved in the French attacking play.

Central defender Bossis displayed powerful runs through the middle. Ayache and in particular Amoros advanced down the flanks, suddenly changing into wingers. Tigana distinguished himself by his enormous sphere of action and his exceptional acceleration that allowed him at any time to pass several opponents. Fernandez often infiltrated into the opposing defence without attracting notice. In this way he managed to score one of the most superb goals in the encounter with the USSR.

The almost South American style of play was quite attractive for the eye, but sometimes it was lacking in efficiency: it would have taken a Platini at his very best to provide the latter quality.

## Defensive Play

The defence passed a long time for the weak point of the French team. In Mexico, however, it proved to be an almost insuperable bastion. Sweeper Battiston had a large share in this stability. He was always on the spot of the danger and often saved the situation in the last moment. Bossis was generally considered as one of the best central defenders of this World Cup tournament. Thanks to his quickness and his qualities in the air, he managed to control perfectly all his direct opponents: Belanov, Altobelli, Careca, Rummenigge, Völler or Claesen.

The French adapted to all new situations with a matter-of-factness which impressed the observers. In this respect, the extraordinary versatility of Tigana and Fernandez proved to be a real stroke of luck for the team. These two players provided the very well organized defence with additional stability.

Brazil was the only team that succeeded in really out-playing the French defence: in the memorable Quarter-Final they took the lead by a superbly constructed move. As for the other goals, the French defenders could not be charged with any of them. The USSR scored their goal with a long-range effort by Rats. Germany FR realized its first goal by Brehme's free-kick, Völler scored the decisive 2:0 in the 89th minute after a counter, when the French had taken all risks. France played the Third Place Play-Off with a completely changed team that will not be included in this analysis.

## Conclusions

The French game was strongly centred on Platini. He was playmaker and goalgetter at the same time. He alone had the vision to detect the smallest gaps in the opposing defence. With passes of diabolical precision he laid on chances for his strikers. His surprising dribbles paved the way for himself as well as for his team-mates. But Platini was above all goalscorer. During the last European Championship he scored eight of the fourteen French goals.

However, Platini was not in peak form in Mexico. He was handicapped by an annoying injury. Not in one game he was able to perform at his best.

In the crucial Semi-Final against GFR, the French lost command of the game after the Germans had taken an early lead. In the second half they seemed to have recovered from this shock and

assaulted the German goal, but without much inspiration. In this critical situation the French tried to find Platini. The French star, however, had disappeared somewhere in the German defence – just not to be found for his team-mates.

France failed to qualify for the Final because in this game they did not manage to achieve the necessary synthesis between skill and fighting strength. For years, the players had relied on Platini's genius when faced with serious problems.

### France-Canada 1:0 (0:0)

1:0 Papin (79')

### France-USSR 1:1 (0:0)

0:1 Rats (53')  
1:1 Fernandez (60')

### France-Hungary 3:0 (1:0)

1:0 Stopyra (29')  
2:0 Tigana (62')  
3:0 Rocheteau (84')

### France-Italy 2:0 (1:0)

1:0 Platini (15')  
2:0 Stopyra (57')

### France-Brazil 1:1 (1:1)

Pen. 4:3

0:1 Careca (17')  
1:1 Platini (40')

### France-GFR 0:2 (0:1)

0:1 Brehme (9')  
0:2 Völler (89')

### France-Belgium 4:2 (2:2, 2:1)

0:1 Ceulemans (11')  
1:1 Ferrari (27')  
2:1 Papin (43')  
2:2 Claesen (73')  
3:2 Genghini (104')  
4:2 Amoros (111'; Penalty)

# Iraq

## Preparation

After the qualification for the World Cup Finals the coaches and their staff from the Iraqi Football Association had worked out an extensive preparation program. The international players were at every time and without restrictions at the disposal of Iraq's manager.

At the beginning of February, three games took place in Bagdad: two matches against Denmark and one against Flamengo (Rio). From February 28 to March 23, a first training stage was carried out in Bagdad. Among other things there were also sports-medical examinations and fitness tests during this phase. Three further preparation games against Chelsea London and Romania livened up the hard training work.

For a second preparation stage the Iraqis went to Brazil. They took up quarters in Teresopolis (1260 m) for a first altitude retreat. Besides, the progress of the team was

*The first appearance of Iraq at a World Cup tournament remained unsuccessful. But they lost all three matches - here against Paraguay - with a difference of only one goal.*

tested in games against America, Flamengo and Bangu, with Rio as venue.

After having returned to Bagdad, the Iraqi internationals had to play two other test matches against Northern Ireland and Schalke 04.

At the beginning of May, the Iraqi delegation left for Toluca, where in a four weeks training camp the Iraqis tried to improve the automatism within the team and to raise their physical fitness to the highest level.



Preliminary Matches		
Jordan	- Iraq	2:3
Qatar	- Iraq	3:0
Iraq	- Jordan	2:0
Iraq	- Qatar	2:1
1. Iraq	4 3 0 1 7:6 6	
2. Qatar	4 2 0 2 6:3 4	
3. Jordan	4 1 0 3 3:7 2	
U.A. Emirates	- Iraq	2:3
Iraq	- U.A. Emirates	1:2
Syria	- Iraq	0:0
Iraq	- Syria	3:1

Preparatory Matches		
Iraq	- Denmark	0:2
Iraq	- Denmark	2:0
Iraq	- Flamengo	0:2
Iraq	- Chelsea	1:1
Iraq	- Romania	1:1
Iraq	- Romania	0:0
America	- Iraq	2:2
Flamengo	- Iraq	3:1
Bangu	- Iraq	1:2
Iraq	- Northern Ireland	1:0
Iraq	- Schalke 04	2:0
Mexico Jun.	- Iraq	0:1
Toluca	- Iraq	0:2
Pumas	- Iraq	0:2
America	- Iraq	2:3

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Paraguay 0:1	2nd Match Belgium 1:2	3rd Match Mexico 0:1	¼ Final	¼ Final	½ Final	Final
1	Salman	Raad Hammoudi	1958	Police Club							
2	Majeed	Maad Ibrahim	1960	Al-Rashid							
3	Allawe	Khalil M.	1958	Al-Rashid							
4	Salim	Nadhun Shaker	1958	Air Force Club							
5	Mahmoud	Samir Shaker	1958	Al-Rashid							
6	Shihab	Ali Hussein	1961	Students Club							
7	Hassan	Haris Mohammed	1958	Al-Rashid	67						
8	Amaiesh	Ahmed Radhi	1964	Al-Rashid							
9	Minshid	Kerim Saddam	1960	Army Club		81					
10	Mohammed	Hussein Said	1958	Students Club							
11	Aufi	Abdul	1963	Army Club	23	9	30				
12	Hamza	Jamal Ali	1956	Students Club							
13	Allawi	Karim M.	1960	Al-Rashid							
14	Hanna	Basil Georgis	1961	Al-Rashid	81	52*					
15	Abidoun	Natik Hachem	1960	Air Force Club			60				
16	Hamza	Shaker Mahmoud	1960	Shabab			22				
17	Tweresh	Ainid	1954	Zawra'a			68				
18	Sharif	Ismail	1962	Shabab							
19	Kassim	Basim	1959	Police Club	9						
20	Jassim	Abdul Fattah	1951	Army Club							
21	Mohammed	Ahmed	1960	Al-Rashid							
22	Al-Roubai	Ghanim	1961	Shabab							



From left to right, back: Natik, Basil, Nadhum, Radhi, Hussein Saïd, Hammoudi; front: Samir, Ali Hussein, Khalil Allawe, Haris, Al-Roubai

## Evaristo Macedo

In September 1985, in the middle of Iraq's qualification campaign, Iraq exchanged his manager *Abdulrazak Bakr* against the Brazilian *Jorge Silva Vieira* (53). The latter had coached America and Corinthians São Paulo in the past years.

After the successful qualification *Vieira*, at short notice, was replaced by *Edu*, who shortly before had coached Brazil for some games.


At the beginning of May 1986, *Edu* was also dismissed and replaced by a third Brazilian: *Evaristo Macedo*. Since *Macedo* was the national coach of Qatar and was still under contract there, he was only loaned until the end of the World Cup.

*Evaristo Macedo* can look back on a very successful ca-

reer as a player: he gained several national titles, playing with *Flamengo*, *CF Barcelona* and *Real Madrid*.

As manager of club sides, *Macedo* worked with *Ameri-*

*ca, Fluminense, Vasco da Gama*. In 1977 he coached the Brazilian youth national team, later on the youth team of Qatar. In 1985 he was temporarily (six games) manager of the Brazilian national team.



## Development

The Iraqi youth team could qualify only for the first World Youth Championship, held in Tunisia in 1977.

After a victory over Austria (5:1) and two defeats against USSR (1:3) and Paraguay (0:4), the Iraqis did not manage to achieve the Second Round. Two of the players used at that tournament were selected for Iraq's World Cup team in 1986: goalkeeper *Raad Hamoudi* and *Mohammed Hussein Saïd*.

However, Iraq surprisingly qualified for the last Olympic Games in Moscow and Los Angeles. No less than 8 members of the Mexico squad took part in these Olympic tournaments.



Against Paraguay, Hussein-Said played as forward. In the two other games he was replaced by Saddam. In the encounter with Mexico goalkeeper Jassim as well as the outfield players Majeed, Ainid and Basim were given a chance.

## **The Players**

The Iraqi team have been built up during several years. They took part in the last two Olympic tournaments. Eight members of the present squad played in Los Angeles in 1984.

The pool of players was composed of seven different clubs. The Al-Rashid Club, who were promoted to the First Division only two years ago, supplied the main part with eight players. The Students Club, the Army Club and Shabab were represented by three men.

In the first two games against Paraguay and Belgium, manager Macedo let his side play in the same formation. Only centre forward Hussein Said was replaced by Saddam. In their third game against Mexico some fresh players got a chance.

Macedo banked on a certain one-club connection: On the whole right side only players from Al-Rashid were used.

## **Team Organization**

The Iraqi team were excellently organized, the tasks were clearly allotted. The whole defensive conception was based on a zonal marking.

In the first two games standard goalkeeper Hammoudi guarded the goal. In the last match Jassim got a chance. The defence was formed by two central defenders, who used to cover one another, and two full-backs, who were involved in the attacks out on the flanks.

In midfield Basil and Natik had to assume the two defensive roles. Haris ran wide on the right, but moved far back whenever his side were under pressure. The small Ali Hussein operated as a slightly retreated left winger.

There were three candidates for the two places up front. The excellent Radhi was used in all three matches. The well-known and extremely dang-

erous Hussein Said surprisingly played only in the opening game. In the other two games he was replaced by Saddam.

## **Attacking Play**

The Iraqi midfield – and attacking players revealed great abilities with regard to the control of the ball. For this reason their style of play was almost completely based on the individual skill.

The release of the attacks was mostly effected at a slow pace, with riskless short passes. The team circulated the ball very skilfully through their rows. According to the Brazilian model, great importance was attached to flowing moves. In front of the opposing goal the Iraqis tried to dribble through or to realize an individual breakthrough on the wings. The two outstanding Ali Hussein and Radhi laid on many excellent chances for their team-mates and themselves. But the finishing of the Iraqis proved to be rather poor.

## **Defensive Play**

At the back, Macedo's squad were fairly compact, they did not leave much room to their opponents. The harmony among the defenders was good. The mutual covering worked quite well.

After having lost the ball, almost all Iraqi players receded to their own half to defend in numerical superiority. Thanks to their good positional play and their natural quickness and agility, they managed to intercept quite a number of adverse passes.

The tall and very robust defenders tackled hard and fearlessly. Just in tackling, however, the lack in international experience became obvious. The Iraqis often attacked their opponents precipitately, came into difficulties and then resorted to unnecessary fouls. Iraq had to pay dearly for this style of play. Against

Mexico, the hosts scored the clincher after a free-kick. The clever Belgians were even awarded a foul-penalty.

After nine men had been booked and one sent off, they had to play their third and decisive game without two suspended players. Iraq, a team with only few outstanding players, could not cope with this disadvantage.

## **Conclusions**

Because of their war against Iran, the Iraqis were forced to qualify without the benefit of one home game. Therefore, their first participation in a World Cup tournament must be regarded as a big success. In one of the probably weaker groups, Iraq were placed only last, with zero points from three games and a goal average of 1:4. In the final ranking the Iraqi squad were placed 23rd, just before Canada.

Nevertheless, the team did not disappoint the expectations. This is clearly shown by the fact that in all three games they were beaten with a difference of only one goal. But the players had to pay dearly for their lacking international experience.

In all three games Iraq started off with much courage and enthusiasm. From the first minutes they tried to set the pace and temporarily even dominated their opponents.

But at the first signs of danger the Iraqis reacted extremely nervously. A supposed wrong decision by the referee upset them immediately. With exaggerated commitment they wanted to impress their opponents. Thus the matches became hectic and the Iraqis lost their calm. Obviously, they were not aware of the fact that the hectic atmosphere strained the considerably more experienced Europeans and South Americans far less than themselves. Therefore, the Iraqi team were beaten below their actual value.

The extreme nervousness

suggested a latent feeling of insecurity of the Iraqi players. The succession of different team managers – the players had to accept no less than three changes within the last eight months before the World Cup – did indeed not contribute to the mental stability of the team.

### **Iraq-Paraguay 0:1 (0:1)**

0:1 Romero (35')

### **Iraq-Belgium 1:2 (0:2)**

0:1 Scifo (15')

0:2 Claesen (19': Penalty)

1:2 Radhi (59')

### **Iraq-Mexico 0:1 (0:0)**

0:1 Quirarte (54')

# Italy

## Preparation

The automatic qualification for the World Cup '86 had for manager Enzo Bearzot the great advantage that he could work out a minute preparation program already very early. Having participated in the World Cup in Mexico, 1970, as an assistant coach of the Italian team, he knew the Mexican conditions from his own experience. Nonetheless, the World Cup holders took part in a tournament in Mexico in Summer 1985, after the end of the Italian championship. With games against Mexico and England Bearzot procured his players an important experience. Moreover, the trip was used by the medical team to carry out various tests that were to give information about the different reactions of the players. In co-operation with the physician of the team, professor Leonardo Vecchiet, Bearzot worked out a detailed training program, taking into consideration also the nutrition.

*Not even the strengthened Italian defence with captain Scirea (No. 6) and Vierchowod (No. 8) managed to stop the French strikers Rocheteau and Stopyra.*



The second stage of the preparation for the World Cup Finals began at the end of April 1986. After the end of the championship, the Italian internationals could spend some vacation days, before they had to go to a training camp (May 2-11) in Roccarasa, a winter resort in the Abruzzes.

Before the Italian delegation took up quarters in Puebla on May 15, the players were allowed to return to their families for some days.

### Preparatory Matches

As Italy was the incumbent World Champion, it qualified automatically for the World Cup. Italy has played the following international matches since its World Cup win:

Italy	- Switzerland	0:1	USA	- Italy	0:0
Italy	- CSSR	2:2	Italy	- Sweden	1:0
Italy	- Romania	0:0	Switzerland	- Italy	1:1
Cyprus	- Italy	1:1	Italy	- Poland	2:0
Romania	- Italy	1:0	Ireland Rep.	- Italy	1:2
Sweden	- Italy	2:0	Greece	- Italy	0:0
Italy	- Greece	3:0	Italy	- Portugal	2:0
Italy	- Sweden	0:3	Mexico	- Italy	1:1
CSSR	- Italy	2:0	Italy	- England	2:1
Italy	- Cyprus	3:1	Italy	- Norway	1:2
Italy	- Mexico	5:0	Poland	- Italy	1:0
Turkey	- Italy	1:2	Italy	- Germany FR	1:2
Italy	- CSSR	1:1	Italy	- Austria	2:1
Germany FR	- Italy	1:0	Italy	- China PR	2:0
Canada	- Italy	0:2			

## The Players and Their Appearances

No.	Name	First name(s)	Date of birth	Club	1st Match Bulgaria 1:1	2nd Match Argentina 1:1	3rd Match Rep. Korea 3:2	¼ Final France 0:2	½ Final	Final
1	Galli	Giovanni	29.04.58	AC Milan						
2	Bergomi	Giuseppe	22.12.63	Internazionale						
3	Cabrini	Antonio	08.10.57	Juventus						
4	Collovati	Fulvio	09.05.57	Internazionale						
5	Nela	Sebastiano	13.03.61	Roma						
6	Scirea	Gaetano	25.05.53	Juventus						
7	Tricella	Roberto	18.03.59	Verona						
8	Vierchowod	Pietro	06.04.59	Sampdoria						
9	Ancelotti	Carlo	10.06.59	Roma						
10	Bagni	Salvatore	25.09.56	Napoli			67			
11	Baresi	Giuseppe	07.02.58	Internazionale		9	23	45		
12	Tancredi	Franco	10.01.55	Roma						
13	De Napoli	Fernando	15.03.64	Napoli		81				
14	Di Gennaro	Antonio	05.10.58	Verona				45		
15	Tardelli	Marco	24.09.54	Internazionale						
16	Conti	Bruno	13.03.55	Roma	65	65				
17	Viali	Gianluca	09.07.64	Sampdoria	25	25	2	32		
18	Altobelli	Alessandro	28.11.55	Internazionale						
19	Galderisi	Giuseppe	22.03.63	AC Milan			88	58		
20	Rossi	Paolo	23.09.56	Verona						
21	Serena	Aldo	25.06.60	Juventus						
22	Zenga	Walter	28.04.60	Internazionale						



From left to right, back: Vierchowod, Bagni, Bergomi, Galli, Altobelli, De Napoli; front: Scirea, Baresi, Cabrini, Galderisi, Conti

## Enzo Bearzot

Enzo Bearzot (born on September 26, 1927) began his career as a professional with the provincial club *Pro Gorizia* in 1946. Already in 1948 he moved to *Inter Milan*, but rarely got a chance to play. For that reason he joined the Serie B club *Catania* in 1951. After three years Bearzot was transferred to *AC Torino* and stayed with this club until the end of his career (apart from one season with *Inter*), always playing as defender. In the course of these years he was selected three times for Italy B and one time for Italy's national team (against Hungary in 1955).

After his retirement he stayed with *AC Torino* and trained the youth team for three years. In 1967 he became coach of the Tuscan Serie-C team *Prato*. Two years later he was engaged by the Italian Football Association. He was

given charge of the Under-23 team. From 1975 Bearzot, together with Dr. Fulvio Bernardini, was responsible for the Italian team. After Bernardini's dismissal Bearzot was



the sole responsible for the national team.

At the World Cup '78 in Argentina, Italy were placed fourth. In 1980, at the Final Round of the European Championships, in their own country, Italy finished again fourth. At the World Cup in 1982, in Spain, Italy surprisingly became World Champions. The "squadra azzura", however, did not manage to qualify for the European Championships in France.

## Development

Up to now, Italy could qualify only twice for the World Youth Championship: in 1977 in Tunisia and in 1981 in Australia.

From the Mexico team 86 goalkeeper *Giovanni Galli* and the two midfield players *Giuseppe Baresi* and *Antonio Di Gennaro* represented Italy at the tournament in Tunisia.

No less than eight members from the actual World Cup team played in the Italian Olympic team in Los Angeles: *Baresi*, *Bagni*, *Vierchowod*, *Trichella*, *Nela*, *Serena*, *Tancredi* and *Zenga*.





Against Korea Rep., the suspended Bergomi was replaced by Collovati. In the Second Round clash with France, Baresi was charged with marking Platini during one half. In all matches, Vialli came on as a substitute during the second half.

## The Players

From the team that won the World Cup 82 in Spain, only Scirea, Bergomi, Cabrini and Conti were able to secure a firm place in the Mexico side. Collovati got at least a chance against Korea Rep. Tardelli and Rossi were never used. At the World Cup 82 Bearzot had built up his team around the block from Juventus. This time he did without a club connection. The standard formation was composed of players from eight different clubs. Only Inter, Juventus and Verona were represented by two players. The average age of the Italian side - 26,8 - was not particularly low, but when judged by their appearances in international games, the team brought along quite little experience!

## Team Organization

Italy played with a mixed man-to-man/zonal marking. Scirea as sweeper generally stayed far behind his defenders Bergomi and Vierchowod. The nominal full-back Cabrini assumed a position in the left midfield where he had a larger influence on the development of the game. From there he frequently penetrated into the adverse penalty-area.

In midfield the Italians applied a zonal marking. De Napoli was charged with the control of the right flank and Bagni, an excellent defensive midfielder, ran wide on the left side. Playmaker Di Gennaro mostly operated in the longitudinal axis of the field. Conti a typical leftfooter, played on the right side as retreated winger, slightly behind the two forwards. Now and then, he switched over to the left wing.

Up front manager Bearzot stuck to his usual conception. He paired a goalgetter, strong in the air (Altobelli), with a quick and agile dribbler (Galderisi).

## Attacking Play

Although Italy's style of play was no longer exclusively founded on counter-attacks, the Italians still proved to be true masters in performing quick counters. With a sudden switching over from defence to attack they tried to catch the adverse defence on the hop. It was astounding that the Italians, even at top speed, never seemed to act precipitately and only rarely lost control of the respective situation.

The tactics of the Italian team was quite obvious: after having crossed the midfield by plenty of short touches they tried to split the opponent's defence with breakthroughs on the wings. The triangle Conti, De Napoli and Bergomi realized some lovely moves down the right flank and concluded them by dangerous crosses.

Di Gennaro was the pivot of the Italian side in the first game against Bulgaria. Owing to his extraordinary control and vision he knew very well how to set the pace and to displace the focus of the game by long passes. However, he could not repeat his excellent performance of the opening game later on. Thus, the Italian attacking play lost part of its initial verve.

Contrary to former Italian teams all ten outfield players actively took part in the offensive actions during this World Cup. Against Bulgaria, for example, sweeper Scirea and central defender Vierchowod had the two biggest scoring chances—with their team being up 1:0!

## Defensive Play

At the World Cup 82, Bearzot had built up his defence on the well-tried Juventus-block: Zoff, Scirea, Gentile and Cabrini. In Mexico, the five defenders came from four different clubs. For that reason, the whole defence did not have the same com-

pactness as four years before.

Bearzot modified the defensive conception of his squad for the games against Argentina and France. Instead of a pure zonal marking in midfield the most dangerous opposing players were taken in close marking.

Argentina's Maradona was followed step by step by his Naples team-mate Bagni. Against France, Bearzot sacrificed his playmaker Di Gennaro and entrusted Baresi with the close marking of Platini. This tactical move proved to be a failure. At half-time Baresi was replaced by Di Gennaro.

## Conclusions

Compared with former times, Italy's football had gained in attractiveness but lost in efficiency. In all three Group matches Italy took the lead—but three times they had to concede the equalizer! Only against Korea Rep. they eventually accomplished their task successfully.

An analysis of the Italian goals reveals that not a single one was scored from a real combination. Altobelli took advantage from a cross after a free-kick and converted a penalty. Twice he reacted quickest and scored from a rebound. He was even largely responsible for the South Korean own goal. Italy's success up front mainly depended on Altobelli's cleverness and his exceptional finishing abilities. Eventually, it turned out that Bearzot had more problems with his defence than with his forwards. Individually the players were still very strong, Bergomi and Vierchowod could hardly be outfoxed in tackling. Bagni and Cabrini were able to neutralize effectively every opponent.

But as a block the Italian defence had lost part of its previous security. As soon as the opponent tried to elude tackling by quick direct play and double passes, a certain

sluggishness of some Italians came to light.

The Italian back four were outplayed at all six goals scored against them. Irony of fate: the Italians, enjoying worldwide renown for their counter-attacks, were eliminated by France with two typical counters.

### Italy-Bulgaria 1:1 (1:0)

1:0 Altobelli (43')  
1:1 Sirakov (85')

### Italy-Argentina 1:1 (1:1)

1:0 Altobelli (6' - Penalty)  
1:1 Maradona (34')

### Italy-Korea Rep. 3:2 (1:0)

1:0 Altobelli (17')  
1:1 Choi Soon-Ho (62')  
2:1 Altobelli (73')  
3:1 own goal (82')  
3:2 Huh Jung-Moo (89')

### Italy-France 0:2 (0:1)

0:1 Platini (15')  
0:2 Stopyra (57')