

Studia Historica Slovenica



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
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Članki in razprave
Papers and Essays

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The Gornji Grad Monastery since the Extinction of the Counts of Heuenburg to the Appointment of Abbot Nikolaj I in 1365

A Time of Crisis in the History of the Monastery

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Abstract:

The author presents a Benedictine monastery in Gornji Grad from the first half of the 14th century, when it was undergoing one of its most turbulent periods. With the addition of select fresh sources and including a renewed analysis of the already known ones, he presents one of the most important ecclesiastic institutions that had its seat on Slovenian territory.

Key words:

Church history, Benedictines, Gornji Grad, estate history.

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Maribor, 3 (2003), No. 1, pp. 9-28, 74 notes, 2 pictures.

Language: Original in English (Abstract in English and Slovene, Summary in Slovene).

The Bavarian noble Dipold Kager and his wife Truta founded the Gornji Grad Benedictine monastery in about 1140. That year they issued a document in Aquileia, by which they confirmed their intention and devoted their estate in the Upper Savinja valley for founding the monastery.¹ The document indicates that the monastery had already been functioning at this time; this document is again another case of subsequent confirmation after a fait accompli, a case that we come across in almost all the ‘foundation’ documents of medieval monasteries. Of their estate, which seems to have covered a nice rounded part of the Upper Savinja valley, they kept only their allodium in Gornji Grad, which comprises the castle, forest, fields, meadows, pastures, fisheries, hunting grounds, income, paths (access), serfs of both sexes and their offspring, by such a method that the Aquileian Church gets possession of the castle, the adjoining court, ten farms and two ‘sintmen’ with their farms, groves and forest with one farm close to the grove, a mill with the adjoining farm, about a hundred ministers of both sexes who were granted the rights of Aquileian ministers, and all their lands. All the remaining estate, all the tilled and untilled fields and some 500 serfs with families, were to become the absolute property of the Gornji Grad monastery (translated by Franc Kos in Material for the History of Slovenians IV.). Günther Bernhard had in recent times extensively discussed the document, its authenticity and the many traps that it may be hiding.² In regard of the fact that the beginnings of the monastery are not the topic of this paper, our intention is not to go into details on this topic, rather only to bring them to attention. From its beginnings the monastery had a deep impact on the events in the Upper Savinja valley area and soon the monks managed to get possession of a larger estate elsewhere in the Styria province, which considerably expanded the monastery’s area of influence.³

However, the monastery’s estates and its economic activity were not the only reason why its influence spread to the nearby and broader environment. It became indisputably the most important ecclesiastic institution in the area of the Upper and Lower Savinja valley and the Saleška valley, by its moral authority as well as by its extensive estates that covered large rounded lands in the area and lands in Friulia. It also exercised its archidiaconate rights at its incorporated parishes. The Gornji Grad monastery was thus an important factor in this area, as well as in the broader

¹ 1140, April 7. Aquileia; 17th century transcription in NALj KAL, f. 82/17, published in StUB I, no. 180, p. 188; abstract in: Franc Kos, *Gradivo za zgodovino Slovencev v srednjem veku* part IV, Ljubljana 1915, no. 157, p. 94. The original document was lost and is preserved only as an interpolation in a document from 17 May 1243 belonging to Patriarch Bertold. Gornji Grad: original document on parchment in NALj, document no. 575. 17th century transcript in NALj KAL f. 82/30. Published in StUB II, no. 420, p. 532. Abstract in: Milko Kos, *Gradivo za zgodovino Slovencev v srednjem veku* part V, Ljubljana 1928, no. 811, p. 388.

² Günther Bernhard, Die Stiftungsurkunde des Klosters Oberburg, in: *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 108. Band, Heft 3-4, Wien-München 2000, pp. 265-290. Cf. also: Günther Bernhard, Der Oberburger Bistumsplan vom Jahre 1237, in: *Römische Historische Mitteilungen*, 39. Band, Wien 1996, pp. 163-181.

³ A preserved book of property records from 1426 best informs us about the vastness of the monastery’s estates (NALj, GG A f. 1). Ignaz Orožen published it in *Das Bistum und die Diözeze Lavant II. Theil Das Benediktiner stift Oberburg*, Marburg 1876, pp. 215-322. Cf. also Ferdo Gestrič, *Gospodarska in socialna struktura gornjegrajske posesti po urbarju leta 1426*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, VI-VII, (1952-1953), pp. 473-514.



Gornji Grad (G. M. Vischer, *Topographia Ducatus Stiriae*, 1681)

territory of present day Slovenia and Austrian Carinthia, to which all nobles who wished to achieve power in the area had to pay heed.

Another consequence of the monastery's economic power was that, due to its lucrative ness, the office of the monastery's advocate became one of the most desired offices among the Savinja region nobles. Among the monastery's advocates we find members of the most prominent families in the region (Žovnek, Konjice (as partial lawyers) and Ptuj families, Counts of Heuenburg). The Counts of Heuenburg took over the advocacy completely at the break from the 13th to 14th century. This was also a period during which the latter intensified their attention to their estates in the Savinja and Saleška valleys and began establishing their new center of power in this region.⁴ The beginning of the 14th century was also a time when the monastery endured its first crisis in its operations, due to tensions in the relationship between the monastery and its Abbot Wulfing I (1295-1308) and its advocates (with Count Friderik Heuenburg in particular). The count even kept the abbot in custody at his Pliberk castle for a short period.⁵ After the abbot was replaced (Wulfing was replaced by Abbot Leopold (1309-May 1342), the relationship between the two sides improved, but not for long. The last male descendent of the Counts of Heuenburg, Count Herman, was assassinated in 1322.⁶ Already in the summer of the same year

⁴ Cf.: Tone Ravnikar, Posest grofov Vovbrških v Šaleški dolini, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje (ČZN), NV 29, (1993), volume 1., pp. 20-32.

⁵ 13 May 1308. Pliberk; a 19th century transcript in StLA, no. 1716^b, abstract in MDC VII, no. 472, p. 178, RHSt, no. 6, 2. 1308, October 9. Pliberk; 19th cent. transcript in StLA, no. 1719^c, abstract in MDC VII, no. 492, p. 185, RHSt, no. 35, p. 10. Compare also: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 82-85.

⁶ 28 June 1322; published in MDC VIII, no. 624, p. 182 ("IV. Kalendas Julii comes Hermannus de Hewn-burch est interfectus.")

his widow, Countess Elizabeta Goriška, issued a document in which she ensures the Gornji Grad monastery and its abbot, after he had pledged his loyalty that she will continue defending the monastery as her husband did before her. If she should re-marry, the monastery reserved the right to choose a new advocate.⁷

Such protection was of course too weak for the monastery, and on 4th September the same year the most important Heuenburg heir, Count Ulrik V. of Pfanberg took over the advocacy (at least by title), promising to respect all the pledges that the late monastery advocate Herman of Heuenburg had made in writ or orally.⁸ Ulrik of Pfanberg's most important mediation as the monastery's advocate was certainly his mediation regarding the illegal building of the Rudenstein castle.⁹ We will also find that the preserved documents help us reconstruct the twenties of the 14th century as a relatively calm period in the monastery's history. This discovery is somewhat surprising considering the rivalry for the Heuenburg legacy between the heirs, which took place near the monastery estates.

A document proving that things did not run so smoothly was issued in 1323. March 10th of that year in Cividale, Konrad, the nephew of the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold, confessed unlawful and improper conduct towards the abbot and the Gornji Grad monastery at the monastery's estates in Budrio and Cividale. He also confessed that the documents he had used were forged and inaccurate, and he pleaded to the monastery and the abbot to pardon him, pledging to return all the documents in question.¹⁰ It is difficult to discriminate all the events in connection with the Friuli estates of the Gornji Grad monastery from the available abstract, but it appears that Konrad tried to use his family ties with the Gornji Grad abbot and proclaimed some of the monastery's estates (among them the document lists the estate in Budrio and the house in Cividale) to be family property. The preserved material further indicates that it was not only Konrad who tried to profit from the monastery's Friuli estates during the conflict between the monastery and the Vrbovec family. Due to the high costs of this conflict the monastery and its abbot were forced to pledge their estate in Friuli, more precisely in Budrio and Kosica, and the house in Cividale for 200 marks in shillings. They wanted to buy off the pledge in 1326,¹¹ but apparently had difficulties doing so. One more court meet-

⁷ 10 July 1322, Pliberk; original parchment in NALj, document no. 1903^a. Cf.: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 99-100.

⁸ September 4, 1322, Gornji Grad; abstract published in CKL, no. 112, 123; Karlmann Tangl, Die Freien von Suneck, Ahnen der Grafen von Cilli part IV, MHVSt 13/1864, p. 61. Compare also: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 100.

⁹ 1326, April 4, Pliberk; orig. doc. on parchment NALj, document no. 1948. Cf.: Dušan Kos, Med gradom in mestom. Odnos kranjskega, slovenještajerskega in koroškega plemstva do gradov in meščanskih naselij do začetka 15. stoletja, Ljubljana 1994, p. 98, and Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 102, 103. Events connected to the dispute regarding construction of the Rudenstein castle were thoroughly analyzed in the above quoted work by Dušan Kos, and we will skip it in this article, which in no way means that we do not recognize its real importance.

¹⁰ 1323, March 10, Cividale; publication Giuseppe Bianchi, Documenti per la storia dell'Friuli II, Udine 1845, no. 336, p. 557; 19th century transcript in StLA, no 1911^d; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 100.

¹¹ 1326, April 8 Gornji Grad; transcript in StLA, no. 1947^a; cf. and: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, 103. The monastery authorized brother "Lempold"!, to hire a loan of 200 marks in shillings and use this money to pay for the costs of the dispute with the Vrbovec family.

ing took place in Udine in 1330; the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold together with the priest Henrik were summoned on one side and the brothers Nikolaj, Rapotton and Odorik on the other. The meeting regarded the damage the brothers had done to the monastery and its estates in the village of Budrio. As the brothers did not respond to the subpoena, Patriarch Pagan, as the president of the court meeting, by Leopold's initiative, accused them of rebellion, ordered that they must cover all the damage they had caused to the monastery, decreed that they have no rights to the monastery's estates, and revoked their right to advocacy.¹² It appears that unlawful profiting from the estates was the main subject of the conflict.¹³ However, the difficulties with the Friuli estates continued. Prior to 1335 the monastery was in dispute with the brothers Ivan and Henrik, the sons of Ingelpert of Cucanea ("nobiles viri d(omini) Iohannes et Henricus fratres quondam d(omini) Ingalperi de Cucanea"), who were advocates for the monastery's estates in Budrio. The core of the dispute was that the brothers had a ten year contract for advocacy over four farms in the village - and of course the right to collect the relevant income ("...quatuor.../ mansis monasterii Obrumburch, sitis in villa Budrii, super quibus mansis dicti fratres advocatiam et jus advocatie dignoscitur habere"). This contract expired in 1335 and the monastery was apparently unwilling to renew it. On the contrary, the brothers were interested in further collecting of the income for legal representation. Since the parties could not come to an agreement on the matter, the patriarch himself had to intervene in April, and decided (as expected) on behalf of the monastery.¹⁴ In May, only a month later, the monastery handed all their estates in Friuli, comprising the villages of Artezza and Kosica and the aforementioned four farms in Budrio, in permanent feud to the nephew of the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold - Konrad 'de Neunburch', citizen of Cividale - for nine marks annually.¹⁵ The same person that had twelve years earlier unlawfully appropriated the monastery's estates!

But the troubles in Friuli did not stop Abbot Leopold from further enlarging the monastery's estates. The same year he purchased a farm in Spodnja Bistrica, with the adjoining mill at the Poreber office, from Kamnik residents Martin Walch and his son Lev, and with the consent of both their wives - all for 21 marks in Aquileian pfennigs.¹⁶ On September 17th the same year, Abbot Leopold rounded up the monastery's Kamnik estate by purchasing a farm near Trobelno north of Šmartno in the Tuhinj valley ('Tobel') from Gerolh Pircher and his son Bartolomew.¹⁷ In 1330 the aforementioned Martin Walch sold to the monastery another farm in Zagorica (near

¹² 1330, March 13 Udine; published in: Bianchi, Documenti per la storia dell Friuli, no. 610, p. 386; two 19th century transcripts StLA Graz, no. 1991^d; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 107.

¹³ Compare also: 1330, September 14 Cividale; abstract in: Božo Otorepec, Gradivo za slovensko zgodovino v arhivih in bibliotekah Vidma (Udine) 1270-1405, Viri za zgodovino Slovencev 14, Ljubljana 1995, no. 625, p. 130.

¹⁴ 1335, April 25 Udine; 19th century transcript in StLA Graz, no. 2082^d.

¹⁵ 1335, May 16 Udine; orig. doc on parchment NALJ, document no. 2084.

¹⁶ 1323, May 13; orig. doc. on parchment NALJ, document no. 1915; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 101.

¹⁷ 1323, September 17; orig. doc. on parchment NALJ, document no. 1916^a, abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 101.

Rove) for 18 marks in Aquileian pfennigs.¹⁸

After the dispute between the monastery and the Vrbovec family concerning the Rudenstein castle was settled in 1325 and 1326, Abbot Leopold continued expanding the monastery's estates. In 1327 he bought an estate from Guncel of Turn in Cerovo and later from Dipold of Chatzenstein in the Šaleška valley. On October 2nd, 1327, Guncel of Turn, his wife Katarina and brother Nikolaj, sold their estate “*datz Cerau da Ulreich vnd sein sun auf gesessen ist /.../ ze richtem aygen vm acht marcht silber die wir gaenzleichen empfangen haben.*”¹⁹ This was an estate the Turns possessed near Šmarje pri Jelšah, as we had argued in an article devoted to this important noble family of the Šaleška valley.²⁰

At the end of the same year Dipold of Chatzenstein, his wife Gertrud, and both their (unnamed) children, sold a piece of their property to the monastery. It comprised of five farms, two in Paška Vas, one in the forest near (the river) Paka, one on Križna Gora and one in Skorno, together with four vineyards along the Paka, for 55 marks in Savinja pfennigs. In this transaction Dipold and his wife negotiated the right to buy back these estates during the next two years, if they failed to do so within the agreed time the estates would become the monastery's permanent property. As an annex to the sales contract they added the statement of both Dipold of Chatzenstein's warrantors “*vnsrer genaediger herre her Fridreich von Saeneck vnd vnsrer besunder vreunt Ulreich der Mertinger,*” that they will see to it that everything is done as written, and if this fails that they and their knights (“*rittermazzigen chnecht*”) will go to the inn in Žalec and stay there until all agreements are fulfilled (“*obstagij*”).²¹

Another of the monastery's gains is worth mentioning. In 1334, Nikolaj of Vrbovec and his wife Gertrud sold to the monastery a farm in Juvan for 10 marks in Aquileian phennigs reserving the right to re-purchase it.²² In this document the sellers named their brother-in-law Wulffing II of Podkrnos as their warrantor (in the document he is addressed as “*vnsern lieber aydem*,” which means son-in-law, yet the next quoted document indicates that he was a brother-in-law, since Wulffing names Nikolaj I of Vrbovec “*meines lieber swacher*”).²³ The latter confirmed

¹⁸ 1330, September 29; orig. doc. on parchment NALj, document no. 1996^c; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 107. About the Walch family of Italian origin cf.: Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 182, and Božo Otorepec, Prebivalstvo Kamnika v srednjem veku, in: Kamniški zbornik 2, Kamnik 1956, p. 82.

¹⁹ 1327, October 2 Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 1964; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 104.

²⁰ Tone Ravnikar, Gospodje Turnski v 13. stoletju, Celjski zbornik, Celje 1992, p. 13.

²¹ 1327, December 1. Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 1966; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 104-105. (“*Ich Diepolt von Chatzenstein vnd mein wirtin frau Traut vnd vnser paidet chinder vnd erben /.../ daz wir /.../ verchauf haben dem ersam herren abt Leupolten von Obernburg vnd seinem gotskause fumf buben dr sint zwo gelegen in dem dorfe an der Pak, vnd einem in dem holcz pei der Pak, vnd ainen auf dem Chraeutzperg, vnd ainnen auf dem Zcoerling da Jacob auf geseze ist, vnd vier weingarten an der Pak /.../ vm fumf vnd fumstzig march Saeuner pheninge.*”)

²² 1334, September 11. Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in: NALj, Gornji Grad documents, no. 2070. 19th century transcript in St LA Graz, no. 2070; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 115.

²³ Wulffing of Podkrnos was married to Neža Vrbovška, the sister of Eberhart of Vrbovec, as shown in

his willingness in writing the same day.²⁴ The father of Wulfing II of Podkrnos (or maybe grandfather) Wulfing I,²⁵ had connections with the Gornji Grad monastery already towards the end of the 13th century. In 1296 he gave the monastery Margareta, the wife of Walhun of “monte beati Stephani” (Štefanja Gora near Cerkle in Gorenjska).²⁶

Another important event took place a few years before these, which had a direct and strong influence on the Gornji Grad monastery and to which Abbot Leopold had to react to settle the new relations. In 1323 Friderik of Khungsperg was forced to pledge his castles in Velenje and Hekenberg to his two nephews Hardegen and Friderik of Ptuj, together with forty marks of property, for two hundred marks in silver for (he claims) the damage he had suffered in the service of the Heuenburg family on his way to Frankfurt.²⁷ Friderik could not fulfil this pledge and both the castles remained in the hands of the Ptuj family until their extinction in 1438. The document doesn't tell when Friderik of Khungsperg escorted Ulrik of Heuenburg to Frankfurt, nor whether the damage was only from travel expenses or whether he suffered some other unforeseen costs along the trip. One way or the other, this document and some others indicate that at the time Friderik of Khungsperg was in serious difficulties. In 1320 he sold some estates around Mureck to Zigfrid of Chranichpreg (of Mureck). These comprised eight houses in Mureck and eleven farms, of which six were in “Cosdichendorf” (maybe the village Gosdorf north-east of Mureck), three in “Nuczendorf”, one in “Jansdorf” (Janežovci, a village near Ptuj?)²⁸ and one in the village of “Lint” (Lipje, village near Velenje?)²⁹, for twenty six

a document from 25 November 1358. (19th century transcript in StLA Graz, no. 2676^a) in which she confirmed that she had given a tithe from Šentpeter in the Savinja valley to the Celje count Friderik, who does not owe her anything for it, but from his kindhearted grace gave her 50 marks in Graz phennigs.

²⁴ 1334, September 11 Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, document no. 2070^a; 19th century transcript in StLA Graz; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 115. (“Ich Wulfing von Gurnitz.../ daz ich willechleich vnd mit verdachtem muete purgel worden pin meines lieben swacher bern Niclau von Altenburch vnd meiner liebem swiger vraun Gerdrauten vnd aller ier erben gegen dem ersam herren Abt Leupolten von Obernburgh vnd seinem Conuentu vni die huobe ze Eywan...”)

²⁵ Probably father and son. A document from March 12 1301 shows that Wulfing I of Podkrnos had a brother Henrik and a son named Ditmar, but there is no word about the other son Wulfing. Yet the span between 1296 and 1334 is quite large and we can presume that Wulfing I of Podkrnos had (at least) two sons, Ditmar and Wulfing II, who was married to Neža Vrbovška and lived at least until 1358.

²⁶ 1296, May 22 Cerkle; orig. doc. on parchment in StLA Graz, no. 1505 (“Ego Whilingus de Gurenz presentibus profiteor me legasse annuente consensu et uoluntate Heinrici fratrei mei, Conuentui ordinis sancti Benedicti domus in Obernburgh, Margaretam exorem Walchuni de monte beati Stephani cum suis heredibus quos habet et habita est.”)

²⁷ 1323, February 3 Ptuj; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS, documents returned from HHStA Vienna; abstract in: Ignaz Orožen, Das Bistum und die Diözese Lavant, Teil V, Das Dekanat Schallthal, Graz 1884, p. 272, Albert Muchar, Geschichte des Herzogtums Steiermark, VI. Theil, Graz 1859, p. 226.

²⁸ Locating according to Pavle Blaznik, Historična topografija slovenske Štajerske in jugoslovenskega dela Koroške do leta 1500, part I., A-M, Maribor 1986, p. 302; as all the locations were close to Mureck it is perhaps better to presume that this is the village Janhovo between Radgona and Mureck.

²⁹ Locating according to Blaznik, Historična topografija part I. p. 434. Considering that in the document Friderik claims to be bestowing the estate in the environs of Mureck, locating “ze Lint” around Velenje is at least questionable; it would be perhaps more correct to locate the toponym in the village Lind bei St. Veit am Vogau, west of Mureck.

marks in silver.³⁰

The same year Friderik of Khungsperg was forced to sell some more property. This time he sold twelve farms for 25 marks and 100 marks in pfennigs of the old Graz weight to Gunter of Hekenberg. The farms lay “*in dem Laz ain huob da Georg auf gesessen ist, in dem Merchlein auf einer huob ist gesezzen Herman auf einer Heinreich auf einer Volreich auf einer Hertweich, dacz Gaberk auf einer Marin auf einer der Supan, datz Praprotschach auf einer Predan auf einer sein sun Marin auf einer Tomas, vnderm Cholm auf einer Marin auf einer Iank.*”³¹ Locating these four places proved slightly troublesome. Pavle Blaznik located them in Gaberke, a village in Plat north of Podčetrtek, Tržec, a village near Polškava near Ptuj, Laze, with a question mark, west of Celje, while he couldn’t locate Prapreče.³² The list of witnesses that attended the event argues that it would make more sense to seek these locations around the Hekenberg castle and maybe also in the area of the Velenje castle, since both were governed by members of the same family.³³ At least for Prapreče we can confidently postulate that it is a village west of Vrasko, and Laze is most probably either Laze in the Tuhinj valley (part of the estates of Miss Hekenberg) or Laze near Velenje (part of the estate of Miss Velenje). Dušan Kos similarly assumes that Gunther of Hekenberg purchased the estate around the Hekenberg castle from Friderik of Khungsperg, and not somewhere else.³⁴

What did the change at Hekenberg and Velenje mean for the Gornji Grad monastery? Primarily, a new solution was needed for the question of advocacy of the estates around Velenje; the Khungspergs had donated them to the monastery, but remained advocates for these estates and they continued defending them. A preserved document exists from 1328, issued by the Styrian Marshal Hardegen (in the document Neitdegen!) of Ptuj, the Gornji Grad Abbot Leopold and the convent; it regards advocacy of these estates, which once belonged to Hekenberg and which Hardegen’s uncle Friderik of Khungsperg pledged to the monastery for 20 marks in pfennigs (“*umb die vogtey, die von alter zue Heckbenberg hat gehört unnd dabey gelegen ist, die mein oheim herr Friderich von Khungsperg versatzt hat umb zwaintzig marckh phening*”). By agreement this advocacy now belonged to Hardegen of Ptuj without a pledge, but he had to promise to uphold only those advocate’s rights, which these farms had always enjoyed.³⁵ It is almost certain that the pledge for

³⁰ 1320, March 8.; after GZS of SAZU.

³¹ 1320, September 29; transcription at GZS at SAZU.

³² Blaznik, Historična topografija, relevant terms.

³³ The listed witnesses were: “*her Wlfinch von Guotenstein, her Diepolt von Chazenstain, Gundacher von Robats, Fridman der Chutnenpacher, Tomas von Hechenberch, Vlschalcb von Ozterwicz vnd Voschalch von Precop.*” They are all knights from the Savinja and Šaleška valleys, the only exceptions are Wulfing of Guostenstein, who is probably in relation with Dipold of Chatenstein and Gundaker Rogaški, whose name allows the postulation that he is from the Hekenberg family and that he is one of the administrative nobles, of which the Žovneški’s settled in Rogatec (cf.: Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 193.). Once more I must emphasize the probable kinship between Mert Rogaški and Oton Schurprant from Eckenstein, who have already been mentioned.

³⁴ Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 70.

³⁵ 1328, June 18 Ptuj; transcription in NALj KAL f. 83/33; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 105.

³⁶ “*Ich Gunther von Hechenberch ... daz ich mit verdachtitem muete vnd mit gutem willen und gunst al-*

advocacy of the Gornji Grad monastery, of which the document speaks, occurred because of Khungsperg's aforementioned financial problems. On the other hand it is also quite probable that Friderik of Khungsperg and his nephew Hardegen of Ptuj wanted to make a profit from the period when the Gornji Grad monastery was without an advocate. This is a period when Count Ulrik IV of Pfannerberg was already moving from the Savinja valley and the relationship between Konrad of Aufenstein and Friderik of Žovne was still unsettled.

Gunther of Hekenberg thus managed to partially gain sovereignty on his estates and feudal estates from the Khungsperg family as well as from the Gornji Grad monastery. In 1329 he donated two farms from his estates the monastery, one, which Gunther had previously purchased from the abbot and the convent for 8 marks in Savinja pfennigs, lay in Prekopa and the other in the area of Tešova (near Vrasko), which Gunther purchased from someone named Geyer.³⁶ In return for the farms the abbot and convent promised Gunther that after his death they would commemorate the anniversary with masses, intercession and vigils.³⁷ Three relatives sealed the document: the person who issued it, Herman of Khungsperg and Tomaž Škudnik of Hekenberg ("Thomas der Schuednik von Hechenberch")³⁸. And the knights from the area participated as witnesses: "Vreich der Mertinger von Ekenstain, Guntzel von Turn purccraf zu Prasperch, Niclau von Obernburg".³⁹

Another important document relating to the question of the fate of the Gornji Grad monastery estate is known from the time when the question of heritage was being settled between the Žovne and Aufenstein families. In 1331 Ulrik Mertinger of Ekkenstein⁴⁰ declared that the estate in Mozirje ("ze Prausperch"), which he pledged to the Abbot Leopold and the Gornji Grad monastery for 56 marks in silver, was now free of the pledge, since Ulrik had received the pledged sum. Thus Ulrik promised to reimburse the monastery all documents concerning the topic that were still in his possession by the next St Michael's Day (20 September).⁴¹ We can add to this period the document from 1332, by which Konrad of Vrbovec donated four farms in Carniola in the village of Zapoge below Smlednik in the Vodice parish to the Gornji Grad monastery, for commemorating the anniversary.⁴² The condition was that at least twenty priests commemorate the anniversary for him, his wife and

ler meinen erben, geben vnd geschaffen hat nach meinem tode dem gotsbause Vnser vraun ze Obernburg vnd dem ersam berren Abt Leopolten vnd seinem conuent zuo huben, den erste leit ze Precop, di ich von den selben ersam berren Abt Leopolten vnd von seinem conuente chauft han um achtn march sauner phening. Den ander leit ze Tessau di ich von dem Geyr chauft han."

³⁷ "So hat auch mir der vorgenante berre Abt Leupolt vnd der conuent daz gelobt saine(?) Got uber mich gepaetut. Daz si in meiner gedenchnusse den selben tag Ewicblichen begen schullen mit vigili vnd mit messen vnd mit allen gepaetten als ez geboenleich ist, iar tage ze begen. Seu und ire nachchoem schullen des gehub des gepunten sein."

³⁸ Concerning the question of the kinship of these knights cf.: Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 70.

³⁹ 1329, April 20. Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 1979c; transcription NALj KAL, f. 83/34; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 106.

⁴⁰ "Ulrich der Meringer von Ekenstain." The Ekkenstein castle stood in the immediate vicinity of the Šalek castle near Velenje.

⁴¹ 1331, June 16; StLA, no. 2010; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 108; I used the transcription from: GZS of SAZU.

⁴² 1332, April 5 Gornji Grad; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no.

his ancestors two days each year within eight days before All Saint's Day. To ensure this would be done, he divided the tithe from the four farms so that the convent received a half, the abbot received a quarter and the last quarter was allotted to the nuns; but the monastery's official, who was appointed as manager of this donated property, had to use these funds for food. The witnesses of this event were "*mein prueder her Seifrid erziagen in Chrain der sein redner ist gewessen vnd mein prueder Niclau vnd Wilbalm vnd der erber ritter her Niclau von Rotenpubel vnd meiner wirtin prueder Fridreich, her Gerloch, Perchtold, Niclau von Gerlochstain, Thomas der Zender purger vnd richter ze Stain.*"

The mention of nuns in the document is interesting because it is one of the rare occasions where they are referred to in connection with Gornji Grad. Ignac Orožen brought to attention that an oral tradition exists, according to which the burial church of St Magdalene in Gornji Grad is a remnant of the nunnery church; this tradition explains the data from the property records, which the Tirovšek office had collected, and among other things, also 300 pieces of so called t.i. "*Nunnenkäse*".⁴³ This of course wasn't cheese used by the nuns or intended for the nunnery, rather, as Ferdo Gestrin already pointed out,⁴⁴ sheep's cheese, which was referred to as "*Nunnenkäse*" in the records, as opposed to cow's cheese, which is referred to as "*Herrenkäse*" or "*caseos vacinos*". However, in the quoted part of the comment, Ignac Orožen suggests that, concerning the mention of nuns in the document, it might be more sensible, instead of looking for a nunnery in Gornji Grad, to think of either the Dominican nunnery in Velesovo, founded in 1238, or the nunnery in Međimurje, founded in 1301. Most probably we are speaking of the Velesovo nuns, since the connection between the Dominican monastery in Velesovo and the Benedictine monastery in Gornji Grad had been known since the foundation of the former. The Gornji Grad Abbot Albert (1228-1240) was one of the initiators of the foundation of the Velesovo monastery and he donated fourteen farms in Polica to it, which he purchased for 100 marks.⁴⁵ Despite some occasional tensions between the two monasteries that occurred when the successor of Abbot Albert, Abbot Henrik I (1241-1246) demanded that the Velesovo monastery returns the 100 marks donated by Abbot Albert - his demands failed to be realized - the relations between the monasteries remained tight. Consequently, the most probable assumption is the mention of the nuns in 1332, where the Velesovo Dominican nuns⁴⁶ are referred to.

However, let us return back to the document from April 1332. We have to inspect one more piece of information from this document - the presence of Sigfrid of Vrbovec, who was at the time the Archdeacon in Carniola. Of all the people originating from the area, Sigfrid probably achieved the greatest ecclesiastic career.

⁴³ 2026a; abstract in: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 108-109.

⁴⁴ Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 109.

⁴⁵ Gestrin, Gospodarska in socialna struktura gornjegradske posesti, p. 482.

⁴⁶ 1238, (before December 11); KUB II, no. 102, p. 74, abstract in: Kos, Gradivo V, no. 698, p. 334, 335. 1238, December 11 Velesovo; KUB II, no. 103, p. 75; abstract in: Kos, Gradivo V, no. 699, pp. 336-338.

⁴⁷ 1242; StUB II, no. 411, 524, abstract in: Kos, Gradivo V, no. 802, p. 384, 385. Compare also: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 24, 25. Regarding the foundation of the monastery see: Janez Močnik, Andeški in samostan Velesovo, in: Grofje Andeško-Meranski. Prispevki k zgodovini Evrope v

First he was the parish priest in Podjuna,⁴⁷ then the priest in Laško,⁴⁸ in Carinthia⁴⁹ and the archdeacon in Carniola and simultaneously also a canon in Cividale.⁵⁰ His excellent career must primarily be attributed to his own capacities, but we can and should also recognize in his career the result of the two hundred years of presence and work of the Gornji Grad monastery; this was not only a group of feudal lords, as most of the preserved documents would indicate, but the monastery was also a powerful moral authority that widely spread its beneficent goal. Just as this fact radiates in the personage of Sigfrid of Vrbovec, the influence of the monastery can also be seen in the architecture, in the construction of the parish and subsidiary churches and in the attracting of good building workshops to the area of the Savinja and Saleška valleys. Nevertheless, since the monastery was disbanded in the 15th century and its influence was ‘covered’ by the activities of its successor the Ljubljana diocese, the monastery’s influence was obscured and poorly studied.

Abbot Leopold remained in his position for an exceptionally long period. The beginning of his service was marked by the dispute between the former Abbot Wulfing I and the Counts of Heuenburg. In 1308 Abbot Wulfing voluntarily (!?) resigned, and Abbot Leopold, an Augustinian monk, was appointed to the office. We have already spoken of his fruitful efforts to settle with the Counts of Heuenburg and struggle for the fate of the monastery in the complicated situation during the struggle for the Heuenburg heritage. We have also called attention to the problems that the abbot managed to overcome with great difficulty at his Friuli estates. Despite all these drawbacks, we can proclaim his period as a successful period in the history of the monastery, during which the position of the monastery was re-consolidated and during which it managed to acquire a great number of estates. Yet, the end of his career was marked by an affair that throws a shadow over all the abbot’s good deeds. In 1341 Abbot Leopold had to confess that he remained in debt to his nephew Konrad “*de Neuburg*” (whom we know in a not very positive light from the thirties of the 14th century) for 40 marks, on account of the caretaking he and his escort and their horses, all of who lived with his nephew, enjoyed, and for a blanket that he and his escort had bought in Cividale at the craftsmen Gubertin and Lott. The abbot pledged, with the entire monastery’s wealth (!), to return his nephew the debt by the next St. Michael’s Day (20 September).⁵¹ This docu-

visokem srednjem veku, Kamnik 2001, pp. 65-75.

⁴⁷ 1307, March 8; abstract published in MDC VII, no. 609, p. 222 (“*Sifrid von Altenburg, plebanus ecclesie sancti Michaelis de Juna.*”).

⁴⁸ 1315, September 14; abstract in: Otorepec, Videmske, no. 361, p. 83 (“*Discretus vir dominus Syuridus de Althemburch plebanus de Tyuir.*”); 1332, June 28 Graz; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 2033; published in CKL, no. 142, pp. 157-159 (“*her Seifrid von Altenburch pharrer ze Tyuer und sein prueder her Fridreich und Eberhart von Altenburch.*”).

⁴⁹ He succeeded his uncle Ulrik I to this position (1307, March 8; abstract published in: MDC VII, no. 609, p. 222).

⁵⁰ 1319, May 28. Cividale; abstract in: Otorepec, Videmske, no. 415, p. 93 (“*Syurido de Altymburch canonico ecclesie Civitatensis.*”); 1319, June 2; abstract in: Otorepec, Videmske, no. 417, p. 93 (“*Syurido de Althimburch plebano de Tyuir.*”); 1335, April 1 Udine; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 33; published in CKL, no. 158, p. 178 (“*Syfrido de Altinburch canonicus Ciuitatensibus.*”).

⁵¹ 1341, August 7 Cividale, orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 2192;

ment was issued in the presence of: monastery brothers “*Federik von Obbradraf*” “*Nikolaus von Neuburg*”⁵² and the knights Dipold of Chatzenstein, Peter, son of the late Lupold of Cividale, “*Sanda*” of Cividale, Nikolaj, son of the late Cirulina of Cividale, and Nikolaj, son of the late “*Prugnusii de Thaglans*.“ It may be concluded that on his trip from the Upper Savinja valley to Friuli in 1341, only the two monks and Dipold of Chatzenstein escorted the abbot.

In view of the contents of this document we must ask ourselves whether the monastery was really confronted with such financial difficulties during this period that it had to pledge its property for a loan of 40 marks, which is quite a fortune. The material in the document does not allow such a conclusion. The monastery’s situation (as it can be discerned from the material) certainly wasn’t immaculate, but also not as desperate as the abbot’s dramatic pledge would suggest. In his quoted work, Ignac Orožen probably correctly concluded that the document is most likely to be the result of financial and maybe some other problems pestering the Neuburg family, which evidently endeavored to profit from their kinship with the Gornji Grad abbot. Ignac Orožen also refers to a document issued on October 17th the same year and which exposes the monastery’s problems, those of Abbot Leopold in particular. It cites a complaint against the abbot that was on that day discussed with Patriarch Bertrand. The complaint declares that Abbot Leopold was appointed to his office after he had to leave the Augustinian brothers due to an earlier trial, claiming that, as the abbot, he did not protect and manage the monastery’s estates properly, but operated with them as a tenant and finally - that he lived a life inappropriate for an abbot. The abbot was absolved of the first two accusations. The arbitration court ruled that the abbot had managed the estates suitably, that it is true that he sold the house in Kamnik, which was one of the main incriminations in the indictment, but that the house didn’t benefit the monastery and that in its stead he bought a better house in Cividale. But he was found guilty of the third charge, that he lived an inappropriate life. Due to his age a further process against him was not initiated. He had to pledge to obey orders and to behave appropriately to his position: that he will not wear laymen’s underwear as a sign of penance, that he will not eat meat on Mondays and that he will go to confession every Friday. The prior of the monastery and the entire convent were ordered to be respectful towards the abbot, who was evidently going to stay at the monastery, and to recognize him as their abbot and the monasteries manager.⁵³

The patriarch’s decisions indicate that the abbot was at this time already old and ailing. He died in May the next year (1342) when another abbot was elected, the former Braslovče parish priest Janez II Abbot Leopold’s office, which started so dramatically in the shadow of the dispute with Ulrik of Heuenburg, then disturbingly ended, symptomatically, almost the same year when the successors of the Heuenburg and Žovnek freemen were promoted to counthood.

The period of Abbot Janez II proved relatively short. He performed the duties

⁵² 17th century transcript in: NALj KAL f. 83/44. Cf.: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 121.

⁵³ Probably another of the abbot’s relatives and Konrad “*de Neuburg*.“

⁵⁴ After: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, pp. 122-123.

⁵⁴ 1352, November 21; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 128.

of the abbot between the years 1342 and 1352, after which we no longer find any mention of him in any documents.⁵⁴ In addition to the mentioned document, which we will deal with later, we must also mention a document issued during the last year of Janez's office. In February 1352 Count Friderik I of Celje declared that he had appointed lower judicature and advocacy over the estates to Abbot Janez, Prior Nikolaj and the convent of the Gornji Grad monastery for an annual tribute of 50 marks in Graz phennigs. The tribute was due for Christmas, the exceptions were ius iudicium sanguinum sangvinis and advocacy over the churches in Braslovče and Škale ("di vogte ze Vrazzla vnd ze Sand Joërgen in Schælechta"), which the count kept for himself.⁵⁵ In the instance that the monastery should fail to pay the 50 marks, the count reserved the right to cover his damages from the monastery's property. At the same time, the monastery made a document in which it recognizes the Counts of Celje as their permanent advocates. During the period of Abbot Janez, in 1345, the dispute between the Counts of Celje, supported by Ulrik of Wallsee, Ulrik, the bishop of Krško, Count Ulrik Pfannberg and the Planina family versus the Ptuj family, in connection with the Rudenek castle was settled.⁵⁶

The Gornji Grad monastery's financial difficulties, which we had discussed at the end of the abbotcy of Janez's predecessor Abbot Leopold, continued. Thus in 1347 Abbot Janez pledged Eberhard of Vrbovec, his wife and his successors the tithes in Vrhopolje ("Aerendorf"), Šentjanež near Vrhopolje ("St. Johannis in dem Dorf") and in Pobrežje ("Pobersach") for 100 marks in Aquileian phennigs. In the document they agreed that the tithe from Pobrežje will be returned to the monastery after four years, without compensations, while the pledge on the tithes of Vrhopolje and Šentjanež can be extended for a period of six more years after the expiration of the four year period and, if after the expiration of these six years the monastery fails to pay the 100 marks in Aquileian phennigs, these will be fully free and will belong to the Vrbovec family.⁵⁷ Ignac Orožen mentions a document from 1476, which proves that the above-mentioned pledge was not settled the due year.

Of course the monastery and its abbot did not only pledge properties. On the contrary - as in the previous periods, the active policy of buying and rounding up the monastery's estates continued (only maybe at a slower pace) during the time of Janez II. In 1348 Kunigunda Fojčer and her son Ivan sold the monastery two cel-lars and a house, all located below the Pilštanj castle.⁵⁸ The document was sealed by


⁵⁵ 1352, February 19; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 120; 19th century transcript in: StLA Graz, no. 2440.

⁵⁶ 1345, April 21 Dunaj; 19th century transcript in: StLA Graz, no. 2258^c. For the dispute compare: Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 96, Hans Pirchegger, Die Untersteiermark in der Geschichte ihrer Herrschaften und Gültten, Städte und Märkte, München 1962, p. 198, 199. The failure of the Counts of Ptuj is one of the key moments (in addition to the loss of Chatzenstein) in the retreat of this family from the first line of the Savinja and Saleška knights. A special discussion should be devoted to this interesting passage of events.

⁵⁷ 1347, Avgust 15, orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, no. 2329^a; 16th century transcript in NALj KAL f. 83/46; compare Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 127.

⁵⁸ 1348, April 24; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, no. 2352^c; Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 128; Ignac Orožen, Das Bistum und die Diözese Lavant, Teil VI, Das Dekanat Drachenburg, Marburg 1887, p. 112.

⁵⁹ Prim.: 1320, February 22 Vitanje; orig. doc. on parchment StLA Graz, no. 1866^b ("Wfr Otto vnd Eber-



The oldest likeness of the parish church of St. George (sv. Jurij) in Škale (Stara Kaiserjeva suita, approx. 1830)

her husband Bertold Ložničan of Pilštanj. The Ložničan's, who were Krško knights at the Pilštanj castle, also governed the Valdek castle near Dolič at the end of the 13th and the first half of the 14th centuries,⁵⁹ which additionally highlights the connection between the (Krško knights) family, the Savinja valley and the Gornji Grad monastery.

We could say that the abbotcy of Abbot Janez II proved relatively short and calm, but the last document from 1352, which he issued while he was still the monastery abbot, is somewhat disturbing. In it, the prior and convent of the Gornji Grad monastery promised that if Abbot Janez resigns they would care for his livelihood, as Count Friderik of Celje had prescribed. Why was the Count of Celje so interested in the wellbeing of Abbot Janez? A document from 1359 can answer this question. There is a document in the Turjak archive,⁶⁰ by which the Gornji Grad Abbot Ulrik,

bart von Waldekk.“) and : 1321, December 20; orig. doc. on parchment in StLA Graz, no. 1894 (“Die-muſt von Eberstain, Eberhartz des Loſenczer von Waldeck wittib.“).

⁶⁰ Documents from the Turjak archive are still privately owned and practically inaccessible. We thus had to work with abstracts made and published by Franc Kommatar, Das Schlossarchiv in Auersperg, Mitteilungen des Musealvereins für Krain XVIII/1905, XIX/1906 in XX/1907. Unfortunately these ab-

who replaced Janez in 1353, Prior Nikolaj and the convent agreed with knight Rudolf of Chatzenstein and his heirs (the owners of Chatzenstein) that a mass will be conducted daily in St. Martin's chapel in the monastery, where the Chatzenstein's vault was located. For conducting this mass the monastery received 70 marks in Graz pfennigs from Rudolf,⁶¹ for which the latter received the tithe around the church of St. Tilen in the Šaleška valley (probably in the village of Arnače). Moreover, this document is additionally interesting because of the preserved coat-of-arms of Abbot Ulrik and the covenant. Abbot Ulrik's coat-of-arms depicted a standing figure of the abbot. At the feet of the abbot, marked by his hat and abbot's staff, stand two more coats-of-arms: to the right is a shield with three stars and to the left a shield with two logs! These are evidently the old and new coats-of-arms of the Celje and Žovne families. The fact that Abbot Ulrik could use them as his personal coat-of-arms proves, beyond doubt, that the abbot was a member of the Counts of Celje family. The most probable assumption would be that he was Friderik's illegitimate son, whom his father wanted to promote to an appropriate position, worthy of his descendent. On the other hand, Ulrik, as an illegitimate son, could not make any claims to his father's heritage. A good position in the church, especially if it was in the 'home' monastery was an ideal solution. For this reason Friderik of Celje went through the ordeal of ensuring Abbot Janez a suitable indemnity and thus made room for his illegitimate son.

Abbot Ulrik's career at the Gornji Grad monastery was short-lived and ended as sorrily as that of Abbot Leopold. Abbot Ulrik officiated the monastery between 1353 and 1365, when he is last mentioned as the monastery's abbot.⁶² The most important event during his abbacy was probably the rivalry for the Vrbovec castle between the Vrbovec brothers Nikolaj II and Friderik II, the Counts of Celje Ulrik I and Herman I and the monastery. In the middle of the 14th century the Vrbovec knights suffered a serious crisis, which forced them to sell their estates. The brothers Burkhard and Eberhard sold half the estate to the Counts of Celje in 1360 for 521

stracts are often too brief and all the data could not be extracted from them. The historian Alfred Siegenfeld from Styria worked at the Turjak archives about the same time as Franc Kommatar, but he copied only specific documents, which he found interesting for the history of Styria; nonetheless, unlike Kommatar, he transcribed the complete documents. These transcriptions are now kept in the collection of documents of the Styrian provincial archive in Graz. In addition to the text, he described and sketched the coats-of-arms preserved in the documents; this served as a determinative piece of data in a particular case.

⁶¹ 1359, January 25, transcription in StLA Graz, no. 2686^d; abstract in: MMVK 18/1905, no. 120, p. 185 ("Wir Vreich von gotes gnaden abt des gotshaus ze Obermburch, ich Nycla prior vnd aller conuent daselbs, wir verieben offēnleich mit disem prief, vnd tu'n chunt, allen den die in sebent oder ho'rent lesen, daz der erber ritter her Ru'dolff von Chatzenstain, vnd all sein nach chomen, die Chatzenstain inn habent, sich mit vns veraint, vnd gentzlich verrichtt habent vmb ain mëss, die wir alle tag téglich vnd auch ewichleibch an allez geit'rd, singen oder sprechen si'llen, in sand Merteins cappell ze Obermburch in dem mut'nster da des vorgenannten bern Ru'dolfs vatter, vnd mut'tter vnd alle sein vordern inn ligent. Da haben w'r vmb von in emphangen sybentzich march grätzer pbenning, der w'r gar, vnd gëntzleich von in gewert sein. Vnd w'r weysen seu darumb auf vnsers gotshaus zebenten der gelegen ist ze sand Gyligen in dem Schélachtal. Wann daz wer, daz wir vns daran vergezzzen, vnd die mess nicht volft'rtten als wir in verbaizzen haben, so schu'llen si vns ermanen mit dem vorgenannten zebenden.").

⁶² 1365, March 12; after: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 138.

⁶³ 1360, April 28 Celje; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 183.

marks and 50 Aquileian pfennigs.⁶³ The brothers Nikolaj II and Friderik II pledged the other half in 1362, with the permission of Duke Rudolf IV, to the Gornji Grad monastery; the counts Ulrik and Herman of Celje rebelled against this pledge⁶⁴ and achieved precedence to purchase it. Already in 1361 (!) the Celje family bestowed the Vrbovec castle in full (!) to the brothers Oton and Hans of Bistrica near Ilz (" ... *daz si* (i.e. Counts of Celje) *vns vnd vnsern erben dy^e selben vest Altenburch mit alle dew vnd darczu geho^rt, swi daz genant vnd gehaizzen sei, leiben sullen vnuerzogenlichen ze rechtem leben*").⁶⁵

One more document significant for the fate of the Gornji grad monastery was issued during the period of Abbot Ulrik. In 1360 the abbot declared that the monastery's officials have no right to intervene in the legal rights of counts Ulrik and Herman of Celje in the vicinity of Gornji Grad. However, the count's officials are permitted to pursue the criminals, if the monastery does not surrender them, also on the grounds of the monastery.⁶⁶ With this the Counts of Celje successfully interfered with the monastery's legal immunity, which was adamantly defended during the advocacy of the Counts of Heuenburg.⁶⁷

In 1365 (between March and July) Ulrik terminated his abbotcy, not as a result of his death or his choice to resign, but (like his predecessor Janez) he was forced to resign from the office. A document from January 1363 cites that Abbot Ulrik had declared that he is returning to the monastery all the estates of which he illegally took possession and that he will cover any and all the damage he incurred thereupon; moreover, that he will not make any new contracts or conduct any monastery business without the permission of the counts Ulrik I and Herman I of Celje!⁶⁸ It is evident that the abbot's past conduct was extremely harmful to the monastery's economic situation and that the damaged caused already should be limited, as well as any new damage prevented. We also imagine that, due to his kinship, Abbot Ulrik felt almost untouchable and consequently allowed himself more than he otherwise might have. Nonetheless, despite their kinship both the Celje brothers acted as the monastery's real advocates and tended to the benefit of the institution vested in them. After the document from 1363, Abbot Ulrik is mentioned again only in the aforementioned document of March 1365. By July of the same year the new abbot of Gornji Grad, Nikolaj (1365-1404/8),⁶⁹ is mentioned in a document by which Ortel von "Preijs" (i.e. Grei^s = Gri^zel!) and his wife Gertrud pledged two farms "*datz Cilli*"

⁶⁴ 1362, November 12 Vienna; following the transcription in GZS of SAZU. 1362, December 20; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 196.

⁶⁵ 1361, July 12; 19th century transcript in StLA Graz, no. 2788^a. Cf. also Kos, Med gradom in mestom, p. 106.

⁶⁶ 1360, June 15; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS CE I, no. 184.

⁶⁷ Prim.: 1241, December 18 Mozirje province; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj GG, no. 563; 17th century transcription in NALj KAL, f. 82/28, in which the Heuenburg count Viljem donates several estates in the Mozirje area to the Gornji Grad monastery, together with all the pertinence, reserving for himself only *iudicium sanguinum*.

⁶⁸ 1363, January 21; orig. doc. on parchment in: ARS CE I, no. 197; cf.: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 137-138.

⁶⁹ 1365, July 4; 17th century transcription in NALj KAL f. 83/57.

⁷⁰ The village Silovo near Šentilju near Velenju. Compare document: 1356, July 15; orig. doc. on parch-

by "St. Ilggen"⁷⁰ to the Gornji Grad monastery and its Abbot Nikolaj for 40 marks in Graz pfennigs, and that these estates will belong to the monastery if the couple does not repay the pledge by the next St. George's Day. It follows that the replacement of the abbot occurred between March and July 1365.

Further events prove that Abbot Ulrik did not easily acquiesce to his removal. Ulrik refused to recognize the newly elected Abbot Nikolaj and continued considering himself the legitimate Gornji Grad abbot. This caused a conflict between him and Nikolaj, who had the monastery's convent on his side. The two parties could not settle their dispute and Count Herman I of Celje had to intervene. On January 10th, 1369, both the parties and a part of the Celje knights convened at a court meeting and resolved the conflict. Count Herman I of Celje presided over the arbitration court and a resolution was reached under his supervision. Three well-preserved documents make it possible to establish a detailed reconstruction of the event and the determinations accepted on this day in Celje.⁷¹ Abbot Nikolaj and the monastery convent first handed count Herman the parish of St. George in Škale, with everything the former parish priest (a monastery brother) Nikolaj Vaist possessed⁷² ("dar über geben haben, vmb di pharrchichen ze sand Jörgen in dem Schalach tal, daz wir diselbe chirchen mit alle dew vnd darzu geboert sei daz gebaizzen ist, swi sey pruder Nikla der Vaizzt innegehabt bat ..."). The count immediately passed on the parish, but he was allowed to do this only once (this was an exception that was probably the compromise, which both sides had to accept in the end) and never again ("zu ainigen mal vnd furbazz nicht mer"). The condition to which both the count and the person to whom the parish was intended agreed comprised the following: that all taxes, including papal, belong to the monastery and nobody may pass them on directly ("Vnd swen wir si also lazzen vnd empelben, geben vnd antwurten, der sol dem abt vnd dem conuent vnd dem gotshaus ze Obernburgh dhaines dinstes, noch dhain gehorsame nicht gepunden sein, noch von derselbe chirchen zegeben dhain gehorsame nicht gepunden sein, noch von derselbe chirchen zegeben dhain zins noch des pabstes zehende, noch collecten den legaten, noch dem patriarchen"). By this means the monastery assured itself permanent inflow of funds from Škale and protected itself from the danger that the Škale parish and its priest would become too independent. Thus the incorporation of this parish remained unchanged. The recipient of the parish could remain its priest for life or until he found a more suitable office ("vnd er sol di chirchen schuldig vnd freilich mit allen iren nutzen innen haben vntz an seine tod oder als lang vntz dz er mit ainer pezzern gotsgabe beraten wirdet"). As soon as Count Herman received the parish he, with regard for an old friendship (in this formulation there is probably also a hidden hint of their kinship!)

ment in NALj, no. 2577, by which "*O'rettl von Greizz*" pledged the same two farms for six years for a sum of 20 marks in Aquileian pfennigs. The pledge on the two farms in Silovo had evidently been extended several times.

⁷¹ 1369, January 10 Celje; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, document no. 3044 in 3044^a in 1369, January 10 Celje; orig. doc. on parchment in ARS, documents returned from HHStA Wien, rep. II.

⁷² Ignaz Orožen presumes that Abbot Nikolaj I is same the Škale parish priest Nikolaj Vaist (Orožen, Das Dekanat Schallthal, p. 71), but from the document's text, in which abbot Nikolaj and the covenant relinquish their right to the incorporated Škale parish and all the rights that "brother Nikolaj Vaist" enjoyed, it becomes clear that in this case these are more probably two people with the same name.

⁷³ 1405, marec 25.; orig. doc. on parchment in NALj, Gornji Grad documents, document no. 4206 ("er-

between himself and the former Gornji Grad Abbot Ulrik, immediately handed over the Škale parish to the latter (“*Nu haben wir angeschen di freundschaft di der erber mann her Vreich der alt abt te Obernburch zu uns hat, vnd haben im geben, vnd geben im auch mit disem brif di eigen chirchen ze sand Jōrgen in dem Schalachtal, mit alle dew vnd darzu gehort mit allen nutzen vnd mit allen wirden vnd rechten in aller der mazze, als vor in disem brif begriffen worden ist*”).

Abbot Ulrik issued his last document as an abbot, in which he renounces all his claims against the new Abbot Nikolaj and the demand that he resumes the abbotcy (“*Ich Vreich pharer ze sant Jörgen in dem Schalachtal, vergich mit disem briefe vnd tun chunt daz ich lobe vnd gelopt han pey mein treuen an aydes stat vnd pinde mith sein auch mit disem brief vmb alle dy stozz chrieg, vnd vordrung, dy ich an ainem tail vnd abbt Nycla vnd der conuent des Gotshaus ze Obernpurch an dem andern tail gehabt haben vmb dy abbtey da selbs daz ich darvmb willichleich vnd gern, vnd vnbetwungeleich gentzleich vnd gar gangen han, vnder dy edeln mein gnedigen Herren graf Vreich vnd graf Herman bruder von Cyli, vnd waz dy oder ir ainer dar vmb ervindent vnd prechent daz lobe ich alles an meinem tail gentzleich stet ze haben vnd volfuren an all anzüig vnd widered vnd an alles geverde vnd sol da vnder nicht tun mit worten noch mit wercken, heimlich noch offenleich, ewichleich*“). He also pledges to return all the letters he kept and which belonged to the monastery (“*vnd der vber han ich in ze ainer vrchunde vnd ze ain statchait gebn vnd geantwurt all mein briefe, dy ich gehabt han, oder noch vinden mochte an alles gewerd über dy egenante abtey, /.../ wie die sein si sein weltleich oder geistleich, gen Christen oder gen Juden, di dem egenanten abbt Nyclan vnd dem conuent, vnd dem Gotshaus ze Obernpurch ze frumen oder ze schaden chomen mochten, das ich in die vnuerzogenleich gebn vnd antwurten sol an alles geuerd*“). The document was sealed by Ulrik himself and by two Celje knights who originate from two of the most important castles in the Šaleška valley during that time, Rudolf of Chatzenstein and Ulrik of Turn. Ulrik of Turn was a representative of the original Turn family; his coat-of-arms still bore a baton and three stars, while the symbol on the coat-of-arms of the other Turn family depicted a fish (at the time the latter governed the Turn castle). This time Abbot Ulrik no longer used the Celje symbols in his coat-of-arms, rather he sealed the document with a coarse seal bearing the image of a standing St. George, with a lance and a star below it, and the inscription: S.VLRICI.P.S'.GEORII IN SCHELACH. Hence he already used the seal of the priest of the St. George parish of Škale. The purpose of the documentation that took place in January 1369 was to confirm a situation that was already in force.

This event ended the dispute that seriously threatened the work and existence of the Gornji Grad monastery. Abbot Nikolaj, who assumed his position in such a distressing situation and with such difficulty, lived and governed the monastery at least until 1405, when he is last mentioned in any document.⁷³ Since his successor Abbot Wulfing II is for the first time mentioned as the abbot in 1408, we can presume that Abbot Nikolaj died between 1405 and 1408⁷⁴. The abbotcy of Abbot Nikolaj was not only one of the longest periods that the monastery was under the

wirdigen geistlichen fürsten abt Nicklasen ze Obernburch.“).

⁷⁴ Compare: Orožen, Das Benediktinerstift Oberburg, p. 162.

leadership of the same person, but also one of the most peaceful periods in the monastery's history. It seems almost as if the monastery was preparing itself for the troubled events of the 15th century that culminated with the death of the last Count of Celje in 1456 and disbandment of the monastery in 1461.

Tone Ravnikar

**GORNJEGRAJSKI SAMOSTAN OD IZUMRTJA GROFOV VOVBRŠKIH
DO NASTOPA OPATA NIKOLAJA I. LETA 1365**
Krizni čas v zgodovini samostana

POVZETEK

Benediktinski samostan v Gornjem Gradu, ki je bil ustanovljen okoli leta 1140, je bil ne samo edini benediktinski samostan na področju današnje Slovenije, temveč je v svojem času predstavljal najpomembnejšo cerkveno institucijo na področju Zgornje, Spodnje in Šaleške doline ter segal s svojim vplivom in s svojimi posestmi skoraj na celo področje današnje slovenske Štajerske. Eno najbolj zanimivih obdobjij v njegovi širistoletni zgodovini je gotovo čas prve polovice 14. stoletja, ki je tudi predmet pričajočega prispevka. V obravnavanem času so se v samostanu zvrstili širje opati: Wulfing I., Leopold, Janez II. in Ulrik. Z izjemo opata Janeza so se ostali trije zapletli ali v medplemiške vojne (opat Wulfing) ali pa pomešali svojo službo z družinskimi zadevami (opata Leopold in Ulrik). Zato bi lahko (mogoče nekoliko pretirano) čas prve polovice 14. stoletja označili kot čas krize gornjegrajskega samostana.

To obdobje se je začelo, ko se je opat Wulfing I. zapletel v vojno za češko krono med Habsburžani in Goriškimi. V tem sporu je nastopal na strani koroškega vojvode in pretendenta na češki prestol Henrika Goriškega, odvetniki samostana in ena najmočnejših rodbin na obravnavanem področju, grofje Vovbrški, pa so stali v vojni skupaj še z npr. svobodniki Žovneškimi, gospodi Ptuiškimi itd. na strani Habsburžanov. Rezultat vojne v korist Habsburžanov je v škripce spravil tudi gornjegrajskega opata, ki je bil nazadnje pod budim pritiskom grofov Vovbrških prisiljen leta 1309 odstopiti.

Zamenjal ga je opat Leopold iz družine Neuburg. Po tem, ko je uspel urediti odnose z Vovbrškimi in je kazalo, da bo uspel samostan voditi po mirni poti, je umrl leta 1322 zadnji vovbrški grof Herman, kar je povzročilo veliko turbolenco v odnosih tako med posameznimi plemiškimi družinami, ki so se potegovali za bogato dediščino, kot seveda tudi v odnosu le-teh do samostana. Pri tem posebej izstopa poskus gospodov Vrbovških, ki so na svojih alodialnih tleh nad Ljubnjim v Zgornji Savinjski dolini zgradili grad Rudenštajn. Gradnja tega gradu bi lahko ogrozila celoten odnos te družine do samostana in posledično celotno, sicer samostansko posest, na kateri so rezidirali Vrbovški. Tega opat in samostan seveda nista mogla dopustiti, zato sta dosegla, da se je takratni odvetnik Ulrik Pfanberški leta 1325 zavezal,

da bo dal grad porušiti. Sam spor z Vrbovškimi pa je za samostan pomenil veliko finančno breme, zaradi česar se je bil prisiljen zadolžiti in zastaviti svoje furlanske posesti. In ravno upravljanje teh posesti je predstavljal jabolko spora, ki se je nato vleklo kar dve desetletji. Omenjene posesti je imel namreč v začetku dvajsetih let v upravljanju nečak opata Leopolda Konrad de Neuburg, ki pa se ni izkazal kot dober gospodar. Že leta 1323 je bil prisiljen opat nastopiti pred oglejskim patriarhom proti svojemu nečaku. Ta je priznal, da je slabo gospodaril, obenem pa se je zavezal vse krivovorjene listine, s katerimi je, kot kaže, dokazoval, da so samostanske posesti njegova last, vrniti oz. jih je proglašil za nične. V istem času pa je bil opat zaradi stroškov ob boju za Rudenštajn prisiljen zastaviti samostanske posesti v Furlaniji. Te zastave pa nato ni mogel mirno prekiniti in posesti odkupiti nazaj, saj so se temu upirali bratje Nikolaj, Rapotton in Odorik, ki posesti niso hoteli vrniti. Šele po dolgotrajni pravdi je leta 1330 uspel doseči, da so se samostanu posesti vrnil. Takoj, ko je opat Leopold uspel urediti vse težave s furlanskimi posestmi in jih končno pridobiti nazaj, pa jih je ponovno oddal v najem nečaku Konradu, ki se je le dobrih deset let pred tem že izkazal kot slab gospodar. Ponovno je torej prevladala pripadnost družini nad pripadnostjo samostanu. Zato ne čudi, da je bil konec obdobja opata Leopolda zaznamovan s sodnim procesom proti njemu. Leta 1341 je opat priznal, da je dolžan svojemu nečaku Konradu za različne usluge in za oskrbo, ki jo je slednji nudil njemu in njegovemu spremstvu v času bivanja na Furlanskem, 40 mark. Zato se je z vsem premoženjem samostana zavezal, da bo ta dolg vrnil. Dejstvo, ki verjetno bolj priča o krizi, v katero se je zapletla družina de Neuburg in ki jo je hotela reševati s pomočjo premoženja gornjegrajskega samostana, kot pa o krizi samega samostana. Za dobo opata Leopolda smo lahko namreč ugotovljali intenzivno nakupovalno politiko, ki jo je slednji vodil v imenu samostana in ki je pripeljala do občutnega povečanja samostanskega premoženja. Kljub temu pa je bil opat jeseni leta 1341 obtožen negospodarnega ravnanja s samostanskim premoženjem, očitano pa mu je bilo tudi, da je bil imenovan na svoj položaj potem, ko je bil prisiljen zaradi neprimernega življenja izstopiti iz reda avguštincev ter da je živel nemoralno življenje. Opat je bil na sodišču oproščen prvič dveh obtožb, ne pa tudi tretje, vendar so ga zaradi visoke starosti in zaradi slabega zdravja pustili na položaju in mu niso naložili nobenih kazni. Že naslednje leto je opat Leopold, tako kot je bilo pričakovati, umrl.

Zamenjal ga je opat Janez II., ki je ostal na tem mestu med leti 1342 in 1352. V njegovem času se je razrešil spor za grad Rudenek, s katerim se je začel dokončni umik gospodov Ptujskih iz aktivnega udejstvovanja na področju Savinjske in Šaleške doline.

Leta 1352 je opat Janez odstopil s svojega položaja, zamenjal pa ga je opat Ulrik. Za nastitev tega na mesto opata gornjegrajskega samostana je bil še posebej zainteresiran celjski grof Friderik I. Listina iz leta 1359 dokazuje, da je bil opat Ulrik predstavnik družine grofov Celjskih, saj je v njej kot svoj grb smel uporabljati kombinirana žovneški in celjski grb. Vse kaže, da je bil opat nezakonski sin grofa Friderika I. Celjskega ter da mu je oče na ta način poiskal primerno službo. Vendar se tudi ta opat ni izkazal vrednega svojega položaja, saj ga je že leta 1365 zamenjal opat Nikolaj. Že dve leti pred tem pa je bil Ulrik prisiljen izjaviti, da враča vso protipravno odtujeno premoženje samostana. Kljub temu se ni kar tako sprijaznil z odstavljivijo s položaja opata. Zaradi tega sta brata Herman I. in Ulrik, grofa Celjskega, posredovala kot samostanska odvetnika ter uredila tako, da je njun polbrat dobil v dosmrtno upravljanje faro sv. Jurija v Škalah, v zameno pa se je le-ta dokončno in nepreklicno odrekel vsem zabavam do samostana ter obljudil vrniti ves protipravno pridobljeni arhiv samostana.

Šele s tem dejanjem in z nastopom opata Nikolaja se je končalo eno najbolj burnih obdobjij v zgodovini gornjegrajskega samostana. Začela se je doba relativnega miru, doba, ki se je končala sredi 15. stoletja, ko je izumrtje rodbine Celjskih pomenilo, da je samostan izgubil svojega največjega zaveznika. Le nekaj let po tem je samostan tudi prenehal obstajati, tudi na njegovi dediščini pa je bila ustanovljena ljubljanska škofija.

UDK 930.85(497.5)“15“
1.01 Wissenschaftlicher Aufsatz

Städtische Kultur in nordwestlichen Kroatien im 16. Jahrhundert

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Kurzfassung:

Der Autor beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob sich in den nordwestlichen Städten Kroatiens - Zagreb und Varaždin - im 16. Jh. eine Form städtischer Kultur entwickelte, oder folgten ihre Bürger vielmehr Kulturformen des Adels und der Kirche. Er schliesst, dass sich das Bürgertum, unter dem Druck der höfisch-humanistischen Kultur einerseit, und der kirchlichen andererseits, mit beiden identifizierte und mittels der Kultur die Ideologie der feudalen Führungsschichten annahm, statt eine eigene zu bilden.

Schlüsselwörter:

Städtische Kultur, Beziehungssystem, Zagreb, Varaždin, Oligarchie, höfisch-humanistische Kultur, kirchliche Kultur.

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Zusammenfassung in Slowenisch).

Ich möchte mich keineswegs in diesem Beitrag mit einer Definition der Stadt beschäftigen, aber um die städtische Kultur definieren zu können, muß man unbedingt verstehen, was man mit den Begriffen Stadt und städtisch in diesem Fall eigentlich meint.

Der Urbanisierungsprozeß im nordwestlichen Kroatien (das heißt in den, von den Türken nicht besetzten Teilen Slavoniens), als Prozeß der Entwicklung nichtagrarischer Siedlungen, hat seine Anfänge im 12. Jh.¹ Im Laufe des folgenden Jahrhunderts erhielten einige Siedlungen, so der Zagreber Gradec und Varaždin, königliche freistädtische Privilegien, wodurch ihre wirtschaftliche Stellung in der Region wesentlich bekräftigt wurde.² Bei den meisten anderen Siedlungen, die durch irgendwelche städtische Charakteristiken gekennzeichnet worden sind, von denen einige ihre königliche (Krapina) oder herrschaftliche (Varaždinske Toplice, Ivanec, Batina, Vinica) Privilegien im 14.-16. Jh. erhielten, handelt es sich überwiegend um Marktflecken mit einem hervorragenden Anteil des Ackerbaus an der gesamten Wirtschaftstätigkeit ihrer Einwohner. So besaßen Ende des 15. Jhs. selbst einige der wenigen Handwerker in Varaždinske Toplice überdurchschnittlich viel Land, wobei sie ihr zusätzliches Einkommen meistens durch Getreideproduktion erwarben.³ Auch in größeren städtischen Siedlungen, so z. B. in Zagreb, spielte der ländliche Besitz eine wichtige Rolle in dem Wirtschaftsleben der Bürger.⁴ Da sich der ländliche Charakter der Wirtschaft auch in der sozialen Struktur abspiegelte, kann man diese Marktflecken kaum als städtisch im westeuropäischen Sinne bezeichnen. Sie sind irgendwo zwischen Dörfern und Kleinstädten einzuordnen, was auch durch die extrem geringe Zahl ihrer Einwohner verdeutlicht wird: die meisten hatten weniger als 300, nur einige bis 500 Einwohner. Lediglich Varaždin und Zagreb hatten mehr als 1000, bzw. 2000 Einwohner im Laufe des 16. Jhs.⁵

Aus diesen Gründen muß man schließen, daß nur die soziale und wirtschaftliche Struktur dieser zwei Städte als eigentlich städtisch zu bezeichnen sei und deswegen auch nur binnen ihrer Stadtmauern die städtische Kultur Nordwestkroatiens zu suchen ist.

¹ Ausführlich darüber: N. Budak, Die Entwicklung städtischer Siedlungen in der nordwestkroatischen Gespanschaft Varaždin im Mittelalter, in: N. Budak - P. Jordan - W. Lukan - P. Moissi (Hg.), Kroatien. Landeskunde - Geschichte - Kultur - Politik - Wirtschaft - Recht, Wien 1995, S. 379-390.

² K.-D. Grothusen, Entstehung und Geschichte Zagrebs bis zum Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden 1967; N. Klaić, Zagreb u srednjem vijeku, Zagreb 1982, S. 73-85; N. Budak, "Budući da smo htjeli u Zagrebu na brdu Gradecu sagraditi slobodni grad..." ("Da wir in Zagreb, auf dem Hügel Gradec eine freie Stadt errichten wollten..."), in: Z. Stublić (Hg.), Zlatna bula 1242-1992, Zagreb 1992, S. 21-32; N. Budak, Die Entwicklung, 379 (Anm. 4 und die dort erwähnte Literatur). Siehe zur Entstehungsgeschichte Gradecs auch mehrere Beiträge in I. Kampuš (Hg.), Zagrebački Gradec 1242-1850, Zagreb 1994.

³ N. Budak, Gradovi Varaždinske županije u srednjem vijeku (Die Städte der Gespanschaft Varaždin im Mittelalter), Zagreb - Koprivnica 1994, S. 99-103.

⁴ L. Čoralić, Zemljivoj posjed i poslovanje građana Gradeca prema zemljivojim knjigama 14.-15. stoljeća (Grundbesitz und Geschäftsgabare der gradecer Bürger nach den Grundbüchern aus dem 14.-15. Jahrhundert), in: Kampuš, Zagrebački Gradec, S. 109-127.

⁵ S. Krivošić, Zagreb i njegovo stanovništvo od najstarijih vremena do sredine XIX. stoljeća (Zagreb und seine Einwohner seit den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts), Zagreb 1981, S. 53-55, 63; Budak, Gradovi, S. 168.

Dabei darf man aber nicht vergessen, daß auch diese zwei Städte der Peripherie der westlichen Städteverbreitung gehören und daß ihre Entwicklung, was den Ausmaß an Bevölkerung, Handel und der Wirtschaftsproduktion betrifft, mit der der mitteleuropäischen Zentren nicht zu vergleichen ist. Zur gleichen Zeit aber besaßen sie auch keine der Zügen osteuropäischer (byzantinischer, türkischer) Städtekultur und Entwicklung.⁶

* * *

Der Begriff „städtische Kultur“ ist keineswegs so eindeutig, wie er auf dem ersten Blick zu sein erscheint. Eine klare Abtrennung der „städtischen Kultur“ von der „Kultur in der Stadt“ ist notwendig, um das bürgerliche Charakter der Kultur festzustellen.⁷

Nicht alles, was an Kulturgütern in der Stadt produziert war, war städtisch. Als Beispiel können wir Pavao von Ivanić nennen. Er war Kanoniker, Notar der königlichen Kanzelei und Rektor des Paulusaltars in der Varaždiner Pfarrkirche. Pavao sammelte und kommentierte die Briefe des Erzbischofs von Gran, Ivan Vitez von Sredna, was als eine hervorragende Leistung in den turbulenten Zeiten der Türkenkriege zu betrachten ist.⁸ Sein Werk aber gehört der kirchlichen und höfisch-humanistischen, nicht der bürgerlichen Kultur, obwohl sein Leben eng mit den Städten Zagreb und Varaždin sowie mit dem Marktglecken Ivanić verbunden war. Für die Ausschaltung seines Werkes aus der damaligen städtischen Kultur gibt es drei Gründe. Erstens gehörte der Gegenstand seiner Kommentare, das Werk von Ivan Vitez, der höfisch-humanistischen Kultur. Zweitens gehörte Pavao selbst der Kirche als dem übergeordneten Beziehungssystem,⁹ und nicht dem Bürgertum. Drittens, sein Werk ist selbst in der Produktion der „Kultur in der Stadt“ eine Ausnahme, und kann deswegen kein Merkmal der städtischen bzw. bürgerlichen Weltanschauung sein.

Muß es aber sein, daß ein Autor nur dann der städtischen Kultur gehört, wenn er selbst Bürger ist, und nicht ein Angehöriger der Kirche oder des (Stadt)Adels? Die Antwort ist sicherlich negativ: es hängt vom Inhalt seiner Werke ab, und nicht von seiner sozialen Herkunft oder Zugehörigkeit, ob ein Autor als Erzeuger des städtischen Kulturgutes zu betrachten sei.¹⁰

⁶ Trotz einiger Vereinfachungen und der fehlerhaften Behauptung, es sei erst der Übergang Kroatiens unter die habsburgische Herrschaft, der die Städte des Landes an den Westen gebunden hatte, siehe dazu K.-D. Grothusen, Südosteuropa - Städtesubstanz und nationale Emanzipation, in: H. Stoob (Hg.), Die mittelalterliche Städtebildung im südöstlichen Europa, Köln-Wien 1977, S. 1-12.

⁷ Die Quellenlage bietet uns leider keine Möglichkeit, über Kultur im breitesten Sinne zu diskutieren. Das Alltägliche muß deswegen mehr oder weniger ausgelassen bleiben. Die Kultur wird in diesem Artikel als Hochkultur verstanden. S. V. Kirchberg, Kultur und Stadtgesellschaft, Wiesbaden 1992, S. 13.

⁸ R. Bogišić, Humanizam u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj (Humanismus in Nordkroatien), in: Radovi Zavoda za znanstveni rad JAZU u Varaždinu 2, Varaždin 1988, S. 417-418.

⁹ Der Begriff stammt aus R. Sprandel, Gesellschaft und Literatur im Mittelalter, Paderborn 1982, S. 13.

¹⁰ J. Janota, Stadt und Literatur im Spätmittelalter, in: H. E. Specker (Hg.), Stadt und Kultur, Stadt in der Geschichte Bd. 11, Sigmaringen 1983, S. 62, 67.

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Ein bedeutender Merkmal der spätmittelalterlichen städtischen Kultur war die Verschriftlichung des alltäglichen Lebens. Dieser Prozeß fing im Nordkroatien etwa ein Jahrhundert später an als im Dalmatien, wo die Verschriftlichung fast gleichzeitig mit der in Italien abließ. Die ersten Städtebücher, aus dem 14. Jh., sind aus der königlichen Freistadt Gradec/Zagreb erhalten.¹¹ Varaždins erste Stadtregister stammen aus der Mitte des 15.¹² Jh. Es wäre natürlich möglich, daß es auch ältere Versuche gab, die Verwaltungs- und Gerichtsbartigkeit schriftlich festzustellen, aber daß die Überlieferungsverluste die Beweise dafür entfernt haben. Das ist doch nicht sehr wahrscheinlich, da die zeitlichen Unterschiede zwischen den Erscheinungen der ersten Verschriftlichungsversuchen in Dalmatien (13. Jh.),¹³ Zagreb (14. Jh.) und Varaždin (15. Jh.) nicht nur der unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstufen der genannten Städte bzw. Städtegruppen genau entsprechen, sie spiegeln vielmehr die zeitlich verschiedene Versuche wider, die städtischen Gesellschaften als Kommunen zu bilden.¹⁴ Wie es schon in der Literatur bekannt gemacht worden ist, steht die Verschriftlichung der städtischen Verwaltung und des Alltagslebens im engen Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der kommunalen Gesellschaft.¹⁵

Es ist selbstverständlich, daß es in beiden Städten, d.h. in Zagreb und Varaždin, auch schon früher eine schriftliche Kultur gab, nur wurde sie nicht von den Bürgern getragen, sondern von den Geistlichen. Das war besonders der Fall in Zagreb, wo die bischöfliche Kanzelei wenigstens seit den Bemühungen Bischofs Stjepan II in der ersten Hälfte des 13. Jhs. eine hervorragende Rolle in Bücherproduktion und -sammeln, sowie in der Ausbildung junger Kleriker gespielt hatte.¹⁶

Die Verschriftlichung des städtischen Lebens hatte jedoch in beiden Städten unterschiedliche Entwicklungsstufen erreicht. Das hing vor allem mit den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Differenzen zwischen Varaždin und Zagreb zusammen. Während in den ersten Phasen des Urbanisierungsprozesses (bis etwa 1450) Zagreb eindeutig das stärkere Zentrum war, wurden beide Städte gleichermaßen von der Krise des ausgehenden Mittelalters betroffen (bis etwa 1550).¹⁷ Gleich danach erholte

¹¹ I. K. Tkaličić, *Dva odlomka za povijest grada Zagreba u XIV vijeku* (Zwei Fragmente zur Geschichte der Stadt Zagreb im 14. Jahrhundert), in: *Starine JAZU* 7, Zagreb 1875, S. 30-46; id., *Monumenta historica civitatis Zagrabiae XI*, Zagreb 1905, S. 227-249.

¹² Z. Tanodi - A. Wissert, *Monumenta historica liberae regiae civitatis Varasdiensis*, t. II, Varaždin 1944.

¹³ Die ältesten Beispiele stammen aus Dubrovnik: G. Čremošnik, *Monumenta historica Ragusina*, vol I, Zagreb 1951.

¹⁴ L. Steindorff, *Die dalmatinischen Städte im 12. Jahrhundert*, Köln - Wien 1984, S. 152-179; Budak, Gradovi (wie in Anm. 3), S. 31, 210.

¹⁵ L. Steindorff, *Stari svijet i novo doba. O Formiranju komune na istočnoj obali Jadrana* (Alte Welt und neue Zeit. Über die Kommunenbildung an der Adriaostküste), in: *Starohrvatska prosvjeta*, ser. III (1987), 16, S. 141-152.

¹⁶ I. K. Tkaličić, *Priporod biskupije zagrebačke u XIII vječku* (Die Wiedergeburt des Bistums Zagreb im 13. Jahrhundert), in: *Rad JAZU* 41 (1877), S. 122-154; N. Budak, Babonić, Stjepan, in: *Hrvatski biografski leksikon*, vol. I, Zagreb 1983, S. 305-306.

¹⁷ J. Adamček, *Agrarni odnosi u Hrvatskoj od sredine XV do kraja XVII stoljeća* (Die Agrarverhältnisse in Kroatien von der Mitte des 15. bis zum Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts), Zagreb 1980, S. 396-407; Krivošić, Zagreb, S. 68-69; Budak, *Die Entwicklung*, S. 135; N. Budak, *Gradec u kasnom srednjem vijeku* (Gradec im spätmittelalterlichen Kroatien), Zagreb 1983, S. 10-11.

sich Varaždin aber schneller und überholte die kroatische Metropole, die lediglich ihren politischen und kirchlichen Vorrang behalten konnte.¹⁸ Die beiden Städten unterschieden sich auch ihrer Struktur nach. Varaždin war eine kleine, einheitliche und überwiegend bürgerliche Stadt. Zagreb war größer, aber aus zwei gleichwichtigen Teilen zusammengesetzt: der bürgerlichen königlichen Freistadt Gradec, und der kirchlichen bischöflichen Stadt Zagreb. Gerade im 16. Jh. wurde Gradec viel schwerer als die bischöfliche Stadt von der wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Krise getroffen.¹⁹ Es gab unter den Bürgern keine Gruppe, die imstande war, die schriftliche Kultur, oder die städtische Kultur überhaupt, zu gestalten.

Man kann für Gradec das folgende Schema vorschlagen:

1. Rückzug der italienischen Kaufleute aus dem zagreber Handel (cca. 1400)²⁰ + allgemeine wirtschaftliche Krise (nach cca. 1450) — 2. wirtschaftliche und soziale Rückständigkeit der Stadt + demographischer Niedergang (nach cca. 1500)²¹ + Nähe der türkischen Grenze²² — 3. wirtschaftliche und geistliche Isolierung

Das letztere kann man gut an der Zahl der Studenten aus Zagreb beobachten.²³ Die meisten studierten an der Wiener Universität in den Jahren 1511-1529, als Gradec zum letzten Mal für eine kürzere Zeit seine ehemalige Stelle im Viehhandel zwischen Italien und Ungarn beanspruchte und dadurch seine wirtschaftliche Lage verbesserte.²⁴ Vor dieser Zeit gab es für die Bürger zwar finanzielle Möglichkeiten, ihre Söhne zum Studium nach Wien zu schicken, es fehlte aber wahrscheinlich an Interesse, weil die wenigen, die überhaupt studieren wollten, lieber die italienischen Universitäten aufsuchten. Im 16. Jh. wurde dann die Wiener Universität die bevorzugte alma matris der Studenten aus Zagreb. Mit der wirtschaftlichen Krise aber verloren die Bürger die Möglichkeit (oder auch den Willen), die höhere Bildung ihrer Söhne zu finanzieren.

Am Ende des 16. Jhs. trat dann noch eine Änderung auf, die vielleicht auch Einfluß auf die städtische Kultur ausübte hat. Im Laufe der Zeit entwickelte sich nämlich eine oligarchische Schicht, die die bisherige, mehr oder weniger demokratische Verwaltung ersetzte.²⁵ Angehörige dieser Oligarchie waren Literaten, Kaufleute und

dec im Spätmittelalter), in: Kampus, Zagrebački Gradec, S. 85-90.

¹⁸ Budak, Gradovi, S. 172-173; ders., Die Entwicklung, S. 135-136.

¹⁹ I. Kampus - I. Karaman, Tisućljetni Zagreb, Zagreb 1975, S. 65-85.

²⁰ N. Klaić, O firentinskoj koloniji na zagrebačkom Gradecu potkraj XIV stoljeća (Über die florentiner Kolonie am zagreber Gradec am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts), in: Balcanica 13-14 (1982-1983), S. 57-72; N. Budak, I fiorentini nella Slavonia e nella Croazia nei secoli XIV e XV, in: Archivio storico italiano CLIII (1995), N. 566, S. 681-695.

²¹ Krivošić, Zagreb, S. 70.

²² Über das Problem der türkischen Grenze im 16. Jh. steht den Forschern eine fast unüberschaubare Literatur in verschiedenen Sprachen zur Verfügung. Nur als Illustration möchte ich auf die zwei Bände der Tagungen "Türkenkriege und Kleinlandschaft", Eisenstadt 1983 und 1986, aufmerksam machen.

²³ F. Šišić, Hrvati na Bečkom sveučilištu od godine 1453-1630 (Die Kroaten an der Wiener Universität 1453 - 1630), in: Vjesnik Zemaljskog arhiva 5 (1903), S. 161-171; Budak, Gradec, S. 88.

²⁴ O. Pickl, Die Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege auf dem Handel zwischen Ungarn und Italien im 16. Jahrhundert, in: Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege, Graz 1971, S. 85-86.

²⁵ N. Budak, Gradske oligarhije u 17. stoljeću u Sjeverozapadnoj Hrvatskoj (Städtische Oligarchien im

Handwerker, die durch Nobilitierung mit den wenigen städtischen Adeligen zwar in eine städtische, aber keineswegs bürgerliche Oberschicht verbunden worden sind. Sie spielten eine Rolle in den Zentralisierungsbestrebungen des Königs und gehörten deswegen dem höfisch-adeligen Kreis an. Man muß also feststellen, daß es in Zagreb im 16. und der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jhs. keine bürgerliche Führungs- schicht gab, die eine bürgerliche, d.h. städtische Kultur, weder fördern konnte, noch wollte.

Alle diese verschiedenen Einwirkungen (wirtschaftliche, demographische, kulturelle) verursachten eine gewisse geistige Isolation, die dazu brachte hat, daß sich in Gradec/Zagreb keine städtische schriftliche Kultur (abgesehen von der Administration) bis in das 17. Jh. entwickelt hat.

In Varaždin war die Situation anders.²⁶ Die Stadt wurde von den Änderungen in den Handelswegen zwischen Italien und Ungarn nicht so betroffen wie Zagreb, und die türkische Grenze lag etwas weiter. Die wirtschaftliche Erholung der Stadt, gefolgt durch den demographischen Aufschwung und Wiederherstellung der städtischen Freiheiten, machte Varaždin Ende des 16. Jhs. zum wichtigsten Zentrum bürgerlichen Lebens in Nordkroatien. Ich glaube, daß man diese Meinung vertreten kann, obwohl eine tiefgreifende vergleichende Studie der beiden Städten immer noch nicht vorhanden ist. Auch die Einwohnerzahl Varaždins, um das Jahr 1600 auf etwa 2000-2300 geschätzt, übertraf plötzlich die von Gradec (nicht aber von Zagreb insgesamt).²⁷ Die Zahl der Studenten verringerte sich trotzdem wesentlich: während noch im ersten Viertel des 16. Jhs. 11 Studenten die Universitäten in Wien und Krakau besuchten, studierten bis Ende des Jahrhunderts nur noch 7 Varaždiner.²⁸ Das war ein klares Zeichen der Ablösung Varaždins, sowie Zagrebs, von den wichtigsten naheliegenden Zentren der Bildung.

Unter solchen Umständen bildete sich in Varaždin der sogenannte Varaždiner literarische Kreis.²⁹ Als seinen Vorläufer betrachtet man den protestantischen Prediger Mihajlo Bučić, dessen Werke allerdings nicht erhalten geblieben sind.³⁰ Den Kreis bildeten vier Schriftsteller: ein Pfarrer (Anton Vramec) und drei Literaten (Ivan Pergošić, Blaž Škrinjarić und Blaž Antilović). Vramec war vorher auch Pfarrer in Gradec, aber er mußte die Stadt verlassen, da er nicht bereit war, seine Frau und Kinder, mit denen er lebte, zu verlassen. Man muß betonen daß Vramec, trotz der Ehe und der scharfen Kritik über die Mißbräuche in der Kirche, doch katholisch geblieben ist, was man auch in seinen Werken erkennen kann.³¹ Vramec war der Autor der ersten weltgeschichtlichen Chronik in kajkavischer Sprache und einer

Nordwestlichen Kroatien im 17. Jahrhundert), in: Internationales kulturhistorisches Symposion Mogersdorf 1988, Bd. 20: Die Entwicklung der bürgerlichen Welt im pannonischen Raum vom 16. Jh. bis zur Französischen Revolution, Zagreb 1995, S. 100-103.

²⁶ M. Ilijanić, Varaždin u 16. stoljeću (Varaždin im 16. Jahrhundert), in: Radovi Zavoda za znanstveni rad JAZU u Varaždinu 2 (1988), S. 447-457.

²⁷ Budak, Gradovi, S. 161.

²⁸ Budak, Gradovi, S. 128-130.

²⁹ Budak, Gradovi, S. 131.

³⁰ F. Bućar, Povijest hrvatske protestantske književnosti (Die Geschichte der kroatischen protestantischen Literatur), Zagreb 1910, S. 14, 16, 18.

³¹ Jembrih, Život i djelo Antuna Vramca (Das Leben und Werk Antun Vramecs), Čakovec 1981, S. 70-83.

kajkavischen Postilla.³² Keines von den beiden Werken kann man in irgendwelcher Weise mit der städtischen Kultur in Zusammenhang bringen, höchstens kann man eine gewisse Sympathie Vramec' für die Stadt als solche in den häufigen Nennungen der städtischen Gründungen (Memfis, Sparta, Genua, Augsburg, Paris, Rom, Sirakusa, Konstantinopel, Mailand, Alexandria, Florenz, Konstanz, Buda, Venedig, Dubrovnik) in seiner Chronik suchen. Aber auch hier fällt ins Auge, daß die meisten Städte, mit wenigen Ausnahmen, Zentren größerer oder kleinerer Reiche bzw. aristokratischer Republiken waren. Diese Nennungen sind also auch kein echter Ausdruck eines bürgerlichen Identifikationsgefühl.

Ivan Pergošić, der zweite bedeutende Mitglied des varaždiner Kreises, übersetzte das bekannte ungarische Gesetzbuch Tripartitum des István Verböczi auf Kroatisch, und zwar gleich in zwei Varianten, eine mehr kajkavische und eine mehr schtokavische.³³ Es handelt sich dabei um feudalrechtliche Gesetze, die auch die Stellung der Städte in der mittelalterlichen Gesellschaft regelten, aber weder war dieses Thema ihr Schwerpunkt, noch konnte das Tripartitum als Ausdruck des bürgerlichen Willens verstanden sein. Leider ist das zweite Werk Pergošićs, Prefationes et epistolae Desiderii Erasmi Rotterdami, verlorengegangen. Wir wissen nur, daß das Buch auch eine Rede gegen die Türken enthielt, was ein typisches Merkmal der kroatischen humanistischen Literatur der Zeit war.³⁴ Alles deutet in die Richtung, in Pergošić einen Humanisten zu sehen, dessen Interesse sich dem gesamten kroatischen (oder slavonisch-kroatischem) Königreich widmete, aber die Stadt und ihr Bürgertum eigentlich mißachtete. Es ist den Humanisten wegen ihres Elitismus auch sonst nie gelungen, die bürgerliche Mentalität zu bestimmen.³⁵

Das Vorwort zum einzigen Buch des Blaž Škrinjarić, De agno paschali, enthüllt eine ähnliche Stellungnahme des Autors.³⁶ Das Buch ist dem Ruhm des Vaterlandes und des slavonischen Volkes, sowie dem Nutzen des christlichen Staates gewidmet, aber kein einziges Wort wird den Bürgern geschenkt, obwohl die Stadt mit eigenem Geld die Veröffentlichung des Buches unterstützte.

Der einzige Autor, der eindeutig für das Bürgertum sein Werk geschaffen hat, war Blaž Antilović. Sein wiederum einziges Werk ist die Übersetzung der Zunftordnung der Metzger aus dem Latein auf Kroatisch.³⁷

Meiner Meinung nach ist es also eindeutig, daß es auch in Varaždin keine eigentliche städtische Literatur gab. Alles was wir haben ist "Literatur in der Stadt," die entweder vom kirchlichen oder feudalen und humanistischen Kreisen beeinflußt war, aber keine bürgerliche, d.h. städtische Züge enthielt. Zunftordnungen,

³² A. Vramec, Kronika vezda znovich zpravljena kratka szlouenzkim iezikom (Eine kurze Chronik neulich in slavonischer Sprache geschrieben), Ljubljana 1578; ders., Postilla na vsze leto po nedelne dni vezda znovich szpraulena szlouenzskim iezikom, Varaždin 1586.

³³ V. Putanec, Kajkavski pisac Ivan Pergošić kao Varaždinac (Der kajkavische Schriftsteller Ivan Pergošić als Varaždiner), in: Varaždinski zbornik, Varaždin 1983, S. 333-337.

³⁴ Putanec, Kajkavski pisac, S. 334.

³⁵ Sprandel, Gesellschaft, S. 244.

³⁶ K. Georgijević, Hrvatska književnost od 16. do 18. stoljeća u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj i Bosni (Die kroatische Literatur im Nordkroatien und Bosnien vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert), Zagreb 1969, S. 48-49; O. Šojat, Hrvatski kajkavski pisci (Die kroatische kajkavische Schriftsteller), B. I, Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti, B. 15/I, S. 151-176.

³⁷ Budak, Gradovi, S. 133.

Protokolle, Rechnungen, Petitionen - das war die Realität der städtischen schriftlichen Kultur in Gradec und Varaždin im 15. und 16. Jh.

Was die bildenden Künste betrifft, so war die Situation ähnlich. Über die eventuelle Tätigkeit der Maler oder Bildhauer in Gradec wissen wir so gut wie nichts. Als klares Symbol ist in Varaždin ein Fenster erhalten geblieben, welches vor einigen Jahren am Haus Ritz entdeckt wurde. Es ist eine Bifora im Renaissancestil, mit einer lateinischen Inschrift, die wieder einmal humanistische Einflüsse auf das städtische Leben beweist. Woher stammt aber dieses einmaliges Merkmal des neuen Renaissancegeschmacks? Man muß nicht weit suchen: ein fast gleiches Fenster befindet sich auf der herrschaftlichen Burg in Varaždin. Es ist ein Ergebnis der umfassenden Erneuerungsarbeiten der italienischen Meister Domenico und Giovanni del' Aglio, welche auf der Burg im Auftrag der Grafen Ungnad von Sonneck durchgeführt wurden.³⁸ Offensichtlich ist das Fenster des Hauses Ritz ein Versuch, das Lebensstil der Feudalherren nachzuahmen. Deswegen ist es auch kein Ausdruck einer authentischen bürgerlichen Kultur.

Die wichtigsten städtischen Symbole im Bereich der materiellen Kultur findet man in der Architektur: Rathäuser, Hospitäler, Pfarrkirchen, Brunnen u.ä. waren die Legitimationsmittel der Städte und des Bürgertums.³⁹

Gradec hatte schon vor dem 15. Jh. ein heute verlorengegangenes Rathaus, ein Hospital und eine Pfarrkirche.⁴⁰ Zu den städtischen Symbolen zählten auch die Türme der Befestigungsanlagen, die gerade hier eine Sonderstellung einnahmen: sie standen nicht an der äußeren Seite der Stadtmauer, sondern an der inneren. Dadurch wurde ihre Abwehrfähigkeit verminder, und man darf vermuten, daß sie in erster Linie den vornehmsten Familien der städtischen Oberschicht als Wohnsitze dienten, was ihre symbolische Deutung noch zusätzlich bekräftigte. Alle diese Bauten gehörten jedoch der Blütezeit Gradec' im 13. und 14. Jh. Aus der Zeit der Krise ist kein Baudenkmal erhalten geblieben, und die derzeitigen Quellen überliefern ein Bild des Zerfalles oder der Funktionsveränderung einiger Bauten. So wurde z. B. die Klosterkirche der Dominikaner, nachdem die Mönche die Stadt verlassen hatten, als Militärmagazin verwendet. Auch andere Orden verließen damals die Stadt. Die spärlichen Mittel, die der Stadtverwaltung zu Verfügung standen, wurden nur noch für Verteidigungszwecken ausgegeben, so für das neue Tor auf der Metzgerstraße.⁴¹ Im 16. Jh. gab es also keine Möglichkeit, die städtische Identität durch bürgerliche Bauten zu fördern, vielmehr drohte den schon vorhandenen das endgültige Verfallen.

In Varaždin war die Lage nicht viel anders. Die Stadt besaß die wesentlichen architektonischen Merkmale schon im 15. Jh.: die Pfarrkirche, den Stadtturm, ein Hospital, Palisaden. Sie hatte aber das wichtigste Zeichen der Stadtlichkeit noch

³⁸ M. Ilijanić, Der Baumeister Dominico de Lilio und sein Kreis an der windischen Grenze, in: Festschrift Fritz Posch, Veröffentlichungen des Steirischen Landesarchivs 12 (1981), S. 369-379.

³⁹ W. Klötzer, Schwerpunkte kulturellen Lebens in der mittelalterlichen Stadt, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Frankfurt am Main, in: Specker, Stadt, S. 39-40.

⁴⁰ V. Bedenko, Zagrebački Gradec. Kuća i grad u srednjem vijeku (Der Zagreber Gradec. Das Haus und die Stadt im Mittelalter), Zagreb 1989.

⁴¹ I. Kampus, O utvrđivanju zagrebačkog Gradačca 1557-1559 (Die Befestigung des zagreber Gradec 1557-1559), in: Historijski zbornik 21-22 (1968-1969), S. 309-327.

nicht errichtet - erst seit 1523, als der Graf Georg von Brandenburg dafür ein Haus schenkte, konnte sich der städtische Rat im eigenen Haus versammeln.⁴² Allerdings wurde das Rathaus bald von den Grundherren von Varaždin beschlagnahmt, erst 1587 zurückgegeben und gleich danach durch die Gemeinde renoviert.⁴³

Das zentrale Symbol des städtischen Selbstbewußtseins wurde also ursprünglich nicht von den Bürgern selbst, sondern von ihren Grundherren gestiftet, und gleich danach entzogen. Über den Stadtturm haben wir keine Angaben in den Quellen, dennoch können wir vermuten, daß er im Laufe des 16. Jhs. das Schicksal des Rathauses teilte.

Die wohlhabenden Bürger Varaždins versuchten ihre Stellung wenigstens durch eigene Wohnqualität zu legitimieren. Spärliche Überreste der Renaissancehäuser am Hauptmarkt sowie selten erhaltene Inventare und Testamente sind Zeugen dieser Bemühungen einer bereicherten, aber dünnen bürgerlichen Oberschicht der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jhs.⁴⁴

Ihr ist es nie gelungen, wie ich es zu zeigen versuchte, eine eigene bürgerliche, städtische Kultur zu schaffen, wofür es mehrere Gründe gab. Wir wissen fast nichts über die bürgerliche Kultur beider Städte im 13.-15. Jahrhundert, als sie sich am Höhepunkt ihrer mittelalterlichen Entwicklung befanden. Wir können nur vermuten, daß sie wenigstens im Baubereich im großen und ganzen die mitteleuropäische Entwicklung folgte. Nach der überstandenen Krise war aber das Bürgertum zu schwach geworden. Das gilt für seine wirtschaftliche, wie auch für seine soziale Stellung gegenüber dem Adel. Der König unterstützte zwar die Städte in ihrem Kampf gegen den Adel, jedoch nicht mit dem Ziel, ihre mittelalterliche Selbstverwaltung wieder ins Leben zu rufen. Seine Absichten waren offensichtlich, die Städte in das neugestaltende Territorialstaat einzuverleiben. Die Literaten, als einzige potentielle Beamenschicht eines solchen Staates, stellten sich dem Herrscher zu Verfügung.⁴⁵

Die Zahl der tatsächlichen Bürger im nordwestlichen Kroatien, also nicht aller Stadt Einwohner, sondern nur solcher, die man als Bürger bezeichnen kann, war sehr gering. Obwohl es noch keine genauere Berechnungen gibt, darf man sie auf nicht mehr als 10% der Gesamtbevölkerung schätzen.⁴⁶ Dazu gehörten viele von den reichersten Bürgern, den ausländischen Kaufleuten und Unternehmern, was in der Anfangszeit der sich bildenden Nationen als Kulturgemeinschaften für die Entwicklung der städtischen Kultur sicher nicht von Vorteil war.

⁴² Z. Tanodi, *Monumenta historica liberae regiae civitatis Varasdini*, t. I, Varaždin 1942, S. 300-301.

⁴³ Budak, Gradovi, S. 141.

⁴⁴ M. Ilijanić, *Prilog istraživanju historijsko-urbanističke situacije na varaždinskom forumu* (Beitrag zur Erforschung der historischen urbanistischen Lage am varaždiner Forum), in: *Zbornik za narodni život i običaje* 49 (1983), S. 183-184.

⁴⁵ Budak, *Gradske oligarhije*, S. 108. Sprandel, *Gesellschaft*, S. 236, deutet an die ständige Zuneigung des Literatentums zu jedem Staat.

⁴⁶ Insgesamt kann man die Bevölkerung der städtischen Siedlungen, also auch der Marktflecken, im 15. Jh. auf etwa 25% der Gesamtbevölkerung Kroatiens schätzen. S. dazu J. Adamček, *Ekonomsko-društveni razvoj u Sjeverozapadnoj Hrvatskoj u 16. i 17. stoljeću* (Die wirtschaftlich-soziale Entwicklung im Nordwestlichen Kroatien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert), in: M. Gross (Hg.), *Društveni razvoj u Hrvatskoj od 16. do početka 20. stoljeća*, Zagreb 1981. Im Laufe des 16. Jhs. stieg ihr Anteil auf nur 15-17% ab. Budak, Gradovi, S. 169-170. Da uns keine genauere Forschungen zu Verfügung stehen,

Auch der Versuch, die städtische Bevölkerung durch Verteilung oder Verkaufen von Büchern mit protestantischen Ideen zu beeinflussen, mußte von seinen Anregern in Tübingen und Urach als mißlungen bewertet sein. Der Protestantismus zwar unter den Bürgern von Gradec und Varaždin seine Anhänger fand, konnte sich aber nicht auf Dauer halten und viel schon am Anfang des 17. Jhs. der Gegenreformation zum Opfer.

Es war gerade diese Bewegung innerhalb der katholischen Kirche, die das gesamte kulturelle Leben Kroatiens in den folgenden zwei Jahrhunderten so deutlich prägte.⁴⁷ Unter der Kultur der Jesuiten und Pauliner lebte das Bürgertum mit seinen Zunft - und Fastnachtfesten als einzigen, wenn auch von der Kirche bestrittenen Identifikationsmitteln.⁴⁸

* * *

Im Laufe des 16. Jhs. gab es in Zagreb und Varaždin keine wesentliche geistliche Produktion, die als städtische Kultur bezeichnet werden kann. Mit den wenigen schriftlichen Werken und noch wenigeren Bauten konnten sich die Bürger weder vom Adel, noch von der Kirche klar trennen. Kultur als Trennungsfaktor der Bürger von ihrer sozialen und geistlichen Umgebung war genauso schwach wie die Kultur als Integrationsfaktor innerhalb der Stadt oder innerhalb des gesamten Bürgertums. Umsonst sucht man in den Städten nach einer ständischen Lebensführung, deren Ziel die soziale Ehre, d. h. das Prestige des Bürgertums war.⁴⁹ Vielleicht könnte man nur die Kultur des alltäglichen Lebens als „städtisch“ bzw. „bürgerlich“ bezeichnen, dazu fehlen aber genauere Forschungen für alle drei Beziehungsgruppen: das Bürgertum, den Adel und das Bauerntum.

Das Bürgertum, unter dem Druck der höfisch-humanistischen Kultur einerseits und der kirchlichen andererseits, identifizierte sich mit beiden. Da sich das Bürgertum mit der Kultur zweier Gruppen identifizierte, zu denen es nicht gehörte, bedeutete das, es hatte mittels der Kultur eigentlich die Ideologie der feudalen Führungsschichten angenommen, statt eine eigene zu bilden.⁵⁰ Dazu war das Bürgertum eindeutig zu schwach. Während in den mehr entwickelten Ländern das Bürgertum seine Vermittlungsrolle in der Verbreitung der kirchlich-höfischen Kultur in eine autonome und kreative umkehrte,⁵¹ blieben die Bürger Nordwestkroatiens noch ein weiteres Jahrhundert meistens nur Konsumenten und Nachahmer einer nichtbürgerlichen Kultur.

können wir nur vermuten, daß lediglich die Hälfte davon Einwohner ‚richtiger‘ Städte waren.

⁴⁷ N. Budak, Gegenreformation in Kroatien, in: Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten aus dem Burgenland, Heft 90 (im Druck).

⁴⁸ Wegen der Quellenlage ist es fast unmöglich, die städtische Volkskultur vor dem 17. Jh. zu erforschen. Mit der kulturellen Produktion der Gegenreformation ändert sich die Lage, was uns ermöglicht, die Auseinandersetzung zwischen der städtischen Volks- und Elitekultur zu verfolgen. Leider sind solche Forschungen erst am Anfang, und es bedarf noch viel Arbeit, eher wir aus der Lage im 17. Jh. auf das 16. Jh. zurückzuschließen können.

⁴⁹ M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tübingen 1972, S. 538.

⁵⁰ Kirchberg, Kultur, S. 27.

⁵¹ A. Hauser, The Social History of Art (zitiert nach: Socijalna istorija umetnosti i književnosti, Beograd 1966), S. 248.

Neven Budak

MESTNA KULTURA NA SEVEROZAHODU HRVAŠKE V 16. STOLETJU

POVZETEK

Avtor se ukvarja z vprašanjem, ali se je v severozahodnih mestih Hrvaške - Zagrebu in Varaždinu - v 16. st. razvila kakšna oblika mestne oziroma meščanske kulture ali pa so njuni meščani zgolj sledili kulturi plemstva in cerkve. Obe mesti sta se takrat uvrščali med manjša oziroma srednje velika evropska mesta in se soočali s skoraj celo stoletje trajajočim gospodarskim, demografskim in družbenim propadanjem. Nahajali sta se na periferiji zahodnoevropske razporeditive mest, zato njunega razvoja v smislu rasti števila prebivalstva, obrti in gospodarske proizvodnje ne moremo primerjati z razvojem v ostalih srednjeevropskih središčih.

Da bi ugotovili meščanske značilnosti kulture, je treba ločiti med pojmom mestna kultura in kultura v mestu. Vsako kulturno ustvarjanje v mestu namreč ne moremo označiti za mestno. Pomembna značilnost mestne kulture poznega srednjega veka je bila ubeseditev vsakdanjega življenja, pa tudi produkcija kronik in ostalih literarnih del.

Ob koncu 16. st. se je v Zagrebu in Varaždinu izoblikovala oligarhija, b kateri so spadali književniki, trgovci in obrtniki, ki so bili nobilitirani in so tako skupaj z maloštivilnim plemstvom tvorili najvišji mestni sloj, ne pa tudi najvišjega meščanskega sloja. Igrali so pomembno vlogo v centralistični politiki kralja in so zato spadali k dvorno-plemiškim krogom. Številni vplivi (gospodarski, demografski in kulturni) so povzročili neko vrsto dubovne izolacije, tako da v Gradcu/Zagrebu vse do 17. st. z izjemo administracije ne najdemo razvite pisne kulture. V Varaždinu se je oblikoval t.i. varaždinski literarni krog, toda dela njegovih avtorjev sodijo k literaturi v mestu, saj ne vsebujejo buržoaznih, torej meščanskih prvin, temveč se v njih zrcalijo vplivi cerkvenih, fevdalnih in humanističnih krogov. Cehovski pravilniki, protokoli, računi, peticije - to je bila realnost mestne pisne kulture v Gradcu in Varaždinu v 15. in 16. st.

V Zagrebu v 16. st. tudi ni bilo pogojev, da bi mestno podobo okreplili z meščanskimi zgradbami; prav nasprotno, še tistim obstoječim je grozil propad. Podobno je bilo tudi v Varaždinu. Ozkemu krogu visokega meščanstva iz različnih razlogov ni nikdar uspelo ustvariti svoje mestne kulture. Po prestani krizi je buržoazija postala prešibka. To velja tako za njen gospodarski kot tudi za družbeni položaj proti plemstvu. Kralj je sicer podpiral mesta v njihovem boju proti plemstvu, a ne zato, ker bi hotel ponovno oživiti njihovo srednjeveško samoupravo, temveč z očitno namero, da bi jih vključil v nastajajočo teritorialno državo. Književniki, edini potencialni uradniški sloj te države, so se postavili vladarju na razpolago.

Buržoazija, ki se je nahajala tako pod pritiski dvorno-humanistične kulture kot cerkve, se je identificirala z obema. S tem, ko se je identificirala s kulturo dveh skupin, v kateri ni sodelila, je, namesto da bi tvorila svojo, dejansko prevzela ideologijo vodilnih fevdalnih slojev. Za oblikovanje lastne ideologije je bilo meščanstvo očitno prešibko. Medtem ko je v bolj razvitih državah meščanstvo svojo posredniško vlogo v širjenju cerkveno-dvorne kulture naredilo bolj avtonomno in kreativno, pa je meščanstvo severozahodne Hrvaške še nadaljnje stoletje ostalo potrošnik in posnemovalec nemeščanske kulture.

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1.01 Wissenschaftlicher Aufsatz

Das Haus Habsburg und das Ende des Patriarchats von Aquileia

Argumente und Polemiken

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Kurzfassung:

Das Patriarchat von Aquileia, eine der wichtigsten Kirchen der mittelalterlichen Christenheit, wurde in der Neuzeit, als sich die modernen Staaten bildeten, zu einem anachronistischen Gebilde. Spätestens seit der Aufklärung achteten die modernen Staaten darauf, daß ihre staatlichen mit ihren kirchlichen Grenzen übereinstimmten. Denn eine Kirche, die noch immer Ansprüche auf Lehenrechte verfechten konnte, war instrumentalisierbar für politische Zwecke. Das erklärt, warum die Republik Venedig und die Habsburger so verbissen um die Kontrolle über das Patriarchat Aquileia stritten und die längste Zeit mit historischen Argumenten versuchten, ihre jeweiligen Standpunkte durchzusetzen. Die Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia war ein politischer Kompromiß, denn beide Seiten verzichteten auf ihre aus dem Mittelalter rührenden historischen Ansprüche. Die Auflösung des Patriarchats ist somit als ein rationaler Vorgang zu werten auf dem Weg hin zum modernen europäischen Staatensystem.

Schlüsselwörter:

Haus Habsburg, Patriarchat von Aquileia, Republik Venedig.

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Seit dem Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts bis zum Jahre 1751 stellten die Streitigkeiten rund um das Patriarchat von Aquileia eines der gravierenden Probleme in den Beziehungen zwischen dem Haus Habsburg und der Republik Venedig dar.¹ Es genügt ein nur kurzer Blick auf irgendeine beliebige Sammlung diplomatischer Korrespondenzen zwischen Venedig und dem Kaiserhof oder auf die Berichte der päpstlichen Nuntien in Wien und Graz - das Problem Aquileia wird in nahezu allen Jahren zumindest erwähnt. Es kann daher nicht Zweck der vorliegenden Darstellung sein, die Entwicklung der Frage detailgenau zu untersuchen - schließlich gibt es vor allem zur Endphase des Patriarchats einige sehr informative Studien, wie jene von Federico Seneca² und Piero Del Negro³ sowie zuletzt das hervorragende Buch von Giuseppe Trebbi über die Geschichte von Friaul zwischen 1420 und 1797,⁴ - sondern im vorliegenden Beitrag soll auf einen bisher nahezu vollständig vernachlässigten Aspekt der Diskussionen über das Patriarchat von Aquileia eingegangen werden: auf die verschiedenen Argumente und Polemiken der Habsburger im Laufe der Frühen Neuzeit, mit denen sie nachzuweisen versuchten, daß die Republik Venedig mit unlauteren Mitteln das Patriarchat erworben habe und daß Aquileia wieder der habsburgischen Kontrolle unterstellt werden müsse. Viele dieser Argumente und Polemiken wiederholten sich im Laufe von 250 Jahren oder wurden nur geringfügig abgewandelt, um erst kurz vor dem Ende des Patriarchats aufgegeben zu werden. Eine Vielzahl von Gutachten und sonstigen Traktaten über das Patriarchat von Aquileia argumentierten mit der historischen Entwicklung, um nachzuweisen, daß das Recht beim Hause Habsburg, das Unrecht aber bei der Republik Venedig zu suchen sei. Um die Gesamtheit der Argumente und Polemiken besser verfolgen zu können, soll im vorliegenden Beitrag chronologisch vorgegangen werden. Denn dadurch läßt sich das gesamte Problemfeld umso besser entwickeln.

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Die Ausgangslage ist bekannt. Im Spätmittelalter war das Patriarchat von Aquileia fest in das System der Reichskirche im Heiligen Römischen Reich integriert. Der

¹ Der vorliegende Beitrag wurde bereits in italienischer Sprache publiziert: Friedrich Edelmayer, *La Casa d'Austria e la fine del patriarcato di Aquileia. Argomenti e polemiche*, in: Sergio Tavano, Giuseppe Bergamini, Silvano Cavazza (Hrsgg.), *Aquileia e il suo Patriarcato. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studio*, Udine 21-23 ottobre 1999, Udine 2000 (= Pubblicazioni della Deputazione di Storia Patria per il Friuli), S. 555-580.

² Federico Seneca, *La fine del patriarcato aquileiese (1748-1751)*, in: Paolo Sambin, Federico Seneca (Hrsgg.), *Saggi di storia ecclesiastica veneta*, Venezia 1954 (= Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie. Miscellanea di studi e memorie, vol. 9), S. 1-104.

³ Piero Del Negro, *Venezia e la fine del patriarcato di Aquileia*, in: Luigi Tavano, France M. Dolinar (Hrsgg.), Carlo Michele d'Attems, primo arcivescovo di Gorizia (1752-1774) fra Curia Romana e Stato Absburgico / Prvi goriški nadškof grof Karel Mihael Attems (1752-1774) med Rimsko Kurijo in habsburško državo / Carl Michael von Attems, erster Erzbischof von Görz (1752-1774) zwischen der Römischen Kurie und dem Reich der Habsburger, vol. II: *Atti del Convegno / Zbornik predavanj / Kongressakten, Gorizia 1990* (= Istituto di Storia Sociale e Religiosa, Istituto per gli Incontri Culturali Mitteleuropei), S. 31-60.

⁴ Giuseppe Trebbi, *Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797. La storia politica e sociale*, Udine-Tricesimo 1998 (= Storia della società friulana, vol. 2).

Patriarch von Aquileia übte als einer der wichtigen Metropolitanbischöfe der römischen Kirche nicht nur die geistliche Herrschaft aus, sondern war als Herzog von Friaul auch oberster weltlicher Herr im Nordosten der italienischen Halbinsel oder, von den Zentren nördlich der Alpen aus betrachtet, im Südosten des Heiligen Römischen Reichs. Gemeinsam mit den Erzbischöfen von Mainz, Köln und Trier, allesamt auch Kurfürsten, sowie den Erzbischöfen von Salzburg oder Magdeburg zählte Aquileia zu den vornehmsten Bischofssitzen im Heiligen Römischen Reich. Denn es war auf Grund seiner antiken Wurzeln⁵ das älteste Bistum auf dem Boden des Reichs, wegen des Patriarchentitels brauchte es, wie es die Österreichische Hofkanzlei um 1720 formulierte, den Vergleich mit Jerusalem, Konstantinopel oder auch Rom nicht zu scheuen.⁶

Im Spätmittelalter hatte sich der Usus verfestigt, daß der Römische König oder der Kaiser den Patriarchen vorschlug, so daß der Papst ihn nur zu konfirmieren hatte.⁷ Wegen der engen Verbindung zwischen der geistlichen und der weltlichen Herrschaft, die der Patriarch ausübte, war es nur natürlich, daß er in die politischen Auseinandersetzungen hineingezogen wurde, die das Heilige Römische Reich mit seinen Nachbarn führte. Ein Konflikt zwischen dem Römischen und ungarischen König Sigismund von Luxemburg und der Republik Venedig, in dem der Patriarch Ludwig von Teck als Lehenträger des Reichs seinen Lehenherrn kraftvoll unterstützte, war es schließlich auch, der 1419/1420 die weltliche Herrschaft des Patriarchen weitgehend beseitigte. Truppen der Republik Venedig besetzten Friaul und vertrieben den legitimen Patriarchen. Rückeroberungsversuche von Teck scheiterten.⁸ Das geistliche Territorium des Patriarchen blieb ab dieser Zeit geteilt - ein Teil gehörte politisch zur Republik Venedig, der andere Teil weiterhin zum Heiligen Römischen Reich. In den Reichsteilen gelang es den dortigen Lehenträgern des Patriarchen, so den Grafen von Görz/Gorizia und jenen von Cilli/Celje, die weltliche Herrschaft zu erlangen, auf venezianischem Gebiet blieben unter der weltlichen Jurisdiktion des Patriarchen aufgrund eines Vertrages von 1445 nur Aquileia, San Vito und San Daniele.⁹

Die Grenze zwischen dem venezianischen und dem Gebiet des Heiligen Römischen Reichs blieb vielfach unklar, weil die lehenrechtliche Qualität vieler Görzer

⁵ Vgl. Sergio Tavano, Aquileia e Grado. Storia - Arte - Cultura, Trieste 1996, S. 27-46.

⁶ Referat der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA [= Allgemeines Verwaltungsbuch] Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol. Zwar existiert ein von Monika Franz angelegtes Verzeichnis der Akten in diesem Bestand, doch haben sich die Signaturen in der Zwischenzeit geändert; vgl. Monika Franz, Die Gründung der Erzdiözese Görz nach Wiener archivalischen Quellen, in: Tavano - Dolinar, Carlo Michele d'Attems, vol. II, S. 153-178.

⁷ Referat der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

⁸ Vgl. dazu die ausführlichen Darstellungen bei Marija Wakounig, Dalmatien und Friaul. Die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Sigismund von Luxemburg und der Republik Venedig um die Vorherrschaft im Adriatischen Raum, Wien 1990 (= Dissertationen der Universität Wien, vol. 212); Marija Wakounig, Von Přemysl Ottakar II. bis zu Maximilian I. von Habsburg, in: Arnold Suppan (Hrsg.), Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Zwischen Adria und Karawanken, Berlin 1998, S. 53-110, S. 428-430.

⁹ Referat der Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.; Trebbi, Il Friuli, S. 22.

¹⁰ Sergio Tavano, Massimiliano I e Leonardo di Gorizia. Il Friuli e il Litorale in nuovi documenti (1496-

Lehen umstritten war. Der Konflikt in Friaul verschärfte sich, als die Habsburger nicht nur das Erbe der Grafen von Cilli antraten, sondern 1500 auch jenes der Grafen von Görz.¹⁰ Denn nun lagen weite Teile des geistlichen Territoriums von Aquileia im direkten politischen Herrschaftsbereich der Habsburger, einer Macht, die sich seit Kaiser Maximilian I., also seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts, im permanenten Konkurrenzkampf mit der Republik Venedig befand. Außerdem widmeten die ehemaligen patriarchalischen Lehenträger im Grenzraum ihre Loyalitäten je nach der politischen Opportunität entweder den Habsburgern oder den Venezianern, was die Situation noch zusätzlich komplizierte.¹¹ Dieser Konkurrenzkampf zwischen Habsburg und Venedig führte zu zahlreichen militärischen Auseinandersetzungen, im Rahmen derer es immer wieder zu territorialen Veränderungen zwischen dem venezianischen und dem habsburgischen Gebiet kam - erwähnt sei nur der Verlust von Gradisca durch die Venezianer im Jahre 1511.

Die Kriege und Friedensschlüsse müssen an dieser Stelle nicht genauer erwähnt werden - mit einer einzigen Ausnahme, die bis in das 18. Jahrhundert hinein immer wieder angeführt wurde, um die Ansprüche des Hauses Habsburg auf das Patriarchat Aquileia zu untermauern: 1542 verloren die habsburgischen Truppen die strategisch wichtige Festung Marano, die 1543 von den Venezianern gekauft wurde. Im Zuge der Kampfhandlungen besetzten die habsburgischen Truppen unter Nicolò Della Torre, dem Kapitän von Gradisca, das patriarchalische Aquileia.¹² Militärisch brachte dieser territoriale Gewinn wenig. Der Schaden, der durch den Verlust von Marano entstanden war, war bedeutend größer. Doch ideologisch war der Besitz von Aquileia für die Habsburger von Bedeutung. Denn in den künftigen Auseinandersetzungen um das Patriarchat von Aquileia konnten sie immer argumentieren, daß sie die besseren Ansprüche hätten, da sich der Patriarchendom auf ihrem Territorium befand.¹³

Bis zum Jahre 1564, dem Ende der Regierung Kaiser Ferdinands I., war der Streit um das Patriarchat von Aquileia vornehmlich ein politisch-territorialer Konflikt, eine Auseinandersetzung um Lehenrechte. Doch spätestens mit den habsburgischen Länderteilungen von 1564 gesellte sich zum territorialen Konflikt auch ein religiöser. In den Jahrzehnten davor waren auch in jenen habsburgischen Territorien, die zur geistlichen Jurisdiktion des Patriarchen von Aquileia gehörten, also in Görz, in Teilen der Steiermark, Kärntens und Krains, protestantische Ideen eingedrungen.¹⁴ Die habsburgischen Behörden in Innerösterreich machten dafür auch die unbefriedigende kirchliche Situation verantwortlich. Denn der in Udine residierende Patri-

¹⁰ 1501), in: Studi Goriziani 86 (1997), S. 1-31; Hermann Wiesflecker, Die politische Entwicklung der Grafschaft Görz und ihr Erbfall an Österreich, in: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 56 (1948), S. 329-384.

¹¹ Vgl. z. B. Furio Bianco, 1511. La "crudel zobia grassa". Rivolte contadine e faide nobiliari in Friuli tra '400 e '500, Pordenone 1994 (= Frammenti di storia, vol. 4), S. 14-32.

¹² Referat der Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.; Trebbi, Il Friuli, S. 139-142.

¹³ Vgl. z. B. die Instruktion Ferdinands II. für Dr. Kaspar Tertz, Ödenburg/Sopron 1625 November 15, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

¹⁴ Vgl. Silvano Cavazza, Un' eresia di frontiera. Propaganda luterana e dissenso religioso sul confine austro veneto nel Cinquecento, in: Annali di storia isontina 4 (1991), S. 7-33.

¹⁵ Es gab auch Ausnahmen: vgl. z. B. Giovanna Paolin, La visita apostolica di Bartolomeo da Porcia nel

arch visitierte seine Kirchenprovinz nicht wirklich,¹⁵ was als eine der Ursachen für den Verfall des Katholizismus angesehen wurde. Außerdem hatte es die Republik Venedig geschafft, die Besetzung des Patriarchenstuhls unter ihre ausschließliche Kontrolle zu bringen,¹⁶ was besonders Erzherzog Karl von Innerösterreich mißfiel. Unter seiner Regierung entstand daher erstmals der Versuch, die Diözesangrenzen den veränderten politischen Gegebenheiten anzugeben.

1577 und 1586 schlug der Pfarrer Girolamo Catta aus Görz vor, vier neue Diözesen auf dem erzherzoglichen Gebiet des Patriarchats von Aquileia zu errichten oder die bestehenden Diözesen zu vergrößern: Für den Anteil Aquileias an Kärnten und einem Teil von Oberkrain sollte in Villach eine Diözese errichtet werden; in der Untersteiermark sollte mit Cilli ein neuer Bischofssitz entstehen; für die Grafschaft Görz und Teile Krains sollte in der Stadt Görz ein neuer Bischofssitz begründet werden; und schließlich sollte die 1461 gegründete Diözese Laibach/Ljubljana um die restlichen Anteile Aquileias in Krain vergrößert werden. Andere Pläne sprachen von Vergrößerungen der Diözese Laibach um alle Teile Kärntens und der Steiermark südlich der Drau und vom Anschluß der Grafschaft Görz an das Bistum Triest/Trieste/Trst. Die Verhandlungen über dieses ehrgeizige Projekt scheiterten erst einmal am Widerstand Venedigs. Als die Angelegenheit schließlich doch noch in Rom behandelt wurde und scheinbar vor einem positiven Abschluß stand, verstarb 1590 der Erzherzog. Der erste Anlauf zur Lösung des Problems Aquileia war damit gescheitert, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil Venedig seinen Widerstand in Rom nach dem Tod von Erzherzog Karl noch verstärkt hatte.¹⁷

Die Gespräche zwischen dem Grazer Hof und der Römischen Kurie hatten allerdings den Beteiligten gezeigt, daß es durchaus möglich war, über die Zukunft von Aquileia zu diskutieren. Derartige Verhandlungen sollten im Laufe der kommenden 150 Jahre noch öfter stattfinden. Die Vorschläge, die die habsburgische Seite dabei präsentierte, griffen immer wieder auf jene Pläne zurück, die in der Zeit von Erzherzog Karl entwickelt worden waren. Ganz wesentlich hingen die habsburgischen Vorstöße in Rom davon ab, wie sich jeweils gerade das Verhältnis zwischen dem Haus Habsburg und Venedig entwickelte. Deutlich wird dies unter Ferdinand II., dem Sohn von Erzherzog Karl. Während er noch Landesherr in Innerösterreich war, brach ein neuer Krieg gegen Venedig aus, der sogenannte Uskokenkrieg (Guerra di Gradisca, 1615-1617).¹⁸ Der Patriarch in Udine wurde damit zu einem feindlichen Ausländer, was erst recht die Pläne Ferdinands II. befürwortete, die Angelegenheit von Aquileia zu lösen. Als Ferdinand auch noch zum Kaiser gewählt worden war (1619) und seine ersten spektakulären Erfolge gegen die Protestanten im Dreißigjährigen

Goriziano nel 1570, in: France M. Dolinar - Maximilian Liebmann - Helmut Rumpler - Luigi Tavano (Hrsgg.), *Katholische Reform und Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich 1564-1628 / Katoliška prenova in protireformaciji v notranjeavstrijskih deželah 1564-1628 / Reforma cattolica e controriforma nell'Austria Interna 1564-1628*, Klagenfurt-Ljubljana-Wien 1994, S. 133-142.

¹⁶ Vgl. die Liste der Patriarchen bei Vittore Dreosto, *Autonomia e sottomissione in Friuli. Gestioni dei poteri e dualismo politico dal sec. VI al trattato del 1756*, Udine 1997, S. 222-223.

¹⁷ Vgl. Johann Rainer, *Die Entwicklung der Diözesaneinteilung Innerösterreichs*, in: Dolinar - Liebmann - Rumpler - Tavano, *Katholische Reform und Gegenreformation*, S. 267-278.

¹⁸ Trebbi, *Il Friuli*, S. 263-270.

¹⁹ Friedrich Edelmayer, *Asburgo d'Austria e Asburgo di Spagna nella Guerra dei Trent'Anni*, in: Silvano

Krieg erringen konnte,¹⁹ fühlte er sich als Verteidiger des Katholizismus stark genug, in Rom neuerlich für die Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia zu werben.

Während des gesamten Jahres 1625 verhandelte im Auftrag Ferdinands II. der kaiserliche Botschafter Savelli mit der Kurie. Als dieser nichts erreichen konnte, schickte der Kaiser den Probst von Rudolfswerth/Novo Mesto, Albrecht Peßler, zur Unterstützung Savellis nach Rom. Ziel dieser Verhandlungen war eine Teilung des Patriarchats - der Patriarchentitel sollte aber beim Haus Habsburg bleiben. Gerade diese Forderung scheiterte jedoch am Widerstand des Papstes, der den Titel bei Venedig belassen wollte, während er eine Teilung der Diözese und die Schaffung eines Bistums in Görz keineswegs ablehnte.²⁰

Ein wichtiger Aspekt im Konflikt um Aquileia war also der Streit um den Titel und um die Dignität des Patriarchen. Denn da die Siedlung Aquileia auf habsburgischem Territorium lag, forderte Rom - dahinter standen aber die Wünsche Venedigs - die vollkommene Zerstörung der Stadt Aquileia. Nur die Domkirche sollte stehen bleiben, über die der in Udine residierende Patriarch die geistliche Jurisdiktion ausüben sollte. Im Falle der Durchführung dieser Maßnahmen wäre die Erinnerung an das alte Patriarchat fast gänzlich ausgelöscht worden. Dagegen opponierte der Kaiser mit Vehemenz. Die päpstlichen Wünsche seien ein Präjudiz für sein Amt als Kaiser, für seine Würde als Erzherzog von Österreich und für das gesamte Haus Habsburg. Erst an vierter Stelle meinte er, die päpstlichen Vorschläge seien auch ein Präjudiz für die Religion. Und schließlich argumentierte er historisch, wenn er meinte, alle Welt wisse, daß das Patriarchat Aquileia immer unter dem Schutz und Schirm des Reichsadlers gestanden, ein wichtiges Mitglied des Heiligen Römischen Reichs und eines seiner vornehmsten Fürstentümer gewesen sei. Seine Güter habe das Patriarchat ausschließlich vom Heiligen Römischen Reich erhalten, weshalb eine Übertragung der Patriarchenwürde auf das venezianische Territorium nicht in Frage komme. Schließlich seien die Stadt Aquileia, die Domkirche und der Patriarchensitz auf österreichischem Territorium. Und als Kaiser sei er zum Schutz der Kirche im Reich verpflichtet - das habe er bei Gott und dem Evangelium geschworen. Würde er den päpstlichen Vorschlägen zustimmen, wäre das ein schlechtes Beispiel für andere benachbarte Länder. Und schließlich sei aller Welt aus der Geschichte bekannt, daß die deutsche Nation nach ihrer Bekehrung zum christlichen Glauben immer treu zum apostolischen Stuhl gestanden sei, sich immer widersetzt habe, wenn diesem Schaden gedroht habe und mit Ausnahme der lutherischen Reformation immer eine tadellose Beziehung zu Rom unterhalten habe. Auch habe sie immer durch geistliche Stiftungen zur Vermehrung der katholischen Religion und durch die Erhaltung der Kirchen zur Ehre Gottes und des Stuhls Petri beigetragen und große Fürstentümer, Graf- und Herrschaften der Kirche geschenkt. Außerdem habe sie im Krieg gegen den Erbfeind der Christenheit, die Osmanen, ihr Vermögen und Blut eingesetzt. Wegen all dieser Verdienste sei sie auch von Gott mit der Kro-

Cavazza (Hrsg.), *Controriforma e monarchia assoluta nelle province austriache. Gli Asburgo, l'Europa Centrale e Gorizia all'epoca della Guerra dei Trent'Anni*, Gorizia 1997 (= *Fonti e studi di storia sociale e religiosa*, vol. 12), S. 29-42.

²⁰ Vgl. die Instruktion Ferdinands II. für Dr. Kaspar Tertz, Ödenburg 1625 November 15, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

²¹ Ebenda.

ne des Heiligen Römischen Reichs, mit stattlichen, ansehnlichen, uralten fürstlichen Häusern und Geschlechtern, mit geistlichen Dignitäten, Klöstern und vornehmen Stiften ausgestattet worden. Eine Übertragung des Patriarchentitels an die Republik Venedig betrachtete der Kaiser zusammenfassend als ganz und gar unsittlich.²¹

Als die Verhandlungen von Savelli und Peßler kein Ergebnis brachten, sandte Ferdinand II. im Spätherbst 1625 noch einen weiteren Sonderbotschafter nach Rom, den Reichshofrat Dr. Kaspar Tertz (Gaspare Terzi). Dieser sollte drei Vorschläge für eine Lösung des Konfliktes machen. An erster Stelle stand die schon bekannte Forderung nach einer Teilung des Patriarchats. Der venezianische Teil sollte einem Bischof in Udine oder dem Patriarchen von Venedig unterstellt werden, der österreichische Teil samt dem Patriarchentitel sollte bei den Habsburgern bleiben. Wollte der Papst diesem Vorschlag nicht zustimmen, sollte - so der zweite Vorschlag - das Domkapitel von Aquileia paritätisch aufgeteilt werden in einen venezianischen und einen österreichischen Teil. Die Domherren sollten bei Vakanz wechselweise einmal einen Venezianer, dann einen Untertanen der Habsburger aus ihrem Kreis wählen. Sollte auch dieser zweite Vorschlag dem Papst nicht genehm sein, hatte der Kaiser auch noch eine dritte Alternative parat: Er wollte dann die Teilung der Diözese des Patriarchats fordern. Beide Seiten sollten einstweilen auf den Patriarchentitel verzichten, bis der Papst eine endgültige Entscheidung getroffen haben würde. In Görz sollte ein Erzbistum errichtet werden, dem die Bischöfe von Trient/Trento, Triest/Trieste/Trst und Pedena/Pican zu unterstellen waren. Diese Erzdiözese Görz sollte dieselben Rechte haben wie die zu schaffende Erzdiözese auf dem Gebiet der Republik Venedig.

Schließlich sollte Tertz vehement gegen die Praxis protestieren, dem Patriarchen gleich Koadjutoren mit Nachfolgerecht im Patriarchat zur Seite zu stellen. Venedig hatte damit ein gut funktionierendes Mittel gefunden, das Wahlrecht des Domkapitels von Aquileia zu beschneiden und zu verhindern, daß ein Nicht-Venezianer zum Patriarchen gewählt werden konnte. 1622 war so Antonio Grimani zum neuen Patriarchen geworden, was Ferdinand II. bekämpft hatte. Eine neuerliche Nachfolge eines Koadjutoren im Patriarchenamt wollte er nicht mehr dulden. Tertz sollte drohen, daß der momentane Koadjutor in Aquileia, sollte er dem Patriarchen automatisch nachfolgen, in den habsburgischen Territorien nicht mehr anerkannt werden würde, weder *in temporalibus* noch *in spiritualibus*.²²

Die weiteren Gespräche in Rom müssen an dieser Stelle nicht mehr erläutert werden. Tertz versuchte zwar, alle Kardinäle, die dem spanischen und dem österreichischen Zweig des Hauses Habsburg freundlich gesinnt waren, zu mobilisieren, doch brachten die Verhandlungen nur geringe Fortschritte. Im Juni 1626 hieß es zwar, Aquileia würde geteilt werden in Aquileia Vetus für den österreichischen Teil, in dem die Kathedrale verbleiben und das Sitz und Stimme am Reichstag haben sollte, und Aquileia Nova mit dem Bischofssitz in Udine.²³ Doch bevor es zur Durchführung dieses Beschlusses der römischen Konsistorialkommission kommen konnte, verhinderte die politische Lage in Italien einen Abschluß der leidigen Streit-

²² Ebenda.

²³ Rainer, Entwicklung, S. 273.

²⁴ Trebbi, Il Friuli, S. 273.

frage. Denn im Erbfolgekrieg um das Herzogtum Mantua stand Venedig auf der Seite des französischen Prätendenten, während die österreichischen Habsburger ihre spanischen Verwandten unterstützten. Als 1628 nach dem Tod des Patriarchen Antonio Grimani der Papst dessen Koadjutoren Agostino Gradenigo konfirmierte, machte der Kaiser seine Drohung aus dem Jahr 1626 wahr und verbot allen seinen Untertanen bei Strafe, den neuen Patriarchen anzuerkennen.²⁴

De facto war damit die Diözese von Aquileia in zwei Teile zerfallen, die endgültige juristische Klärung der Frage sollte dennoch mehr als 130 weitere Jahre dauern. Der negative Nebeneffekt des kaiserlichen Dekrets war der, daß die habsburgischen Untertanen der Diözese Aquileia keinen Oberhirten mehr hatten, was die ohnehin kritischen religiösen Zustände noch verschärfte. Im Jahr 1628 war neuerlich klar geworden, daß der Konflikt um das Patriarchat Aquileia nur lösbar sein würde, sollte es möglich sein, zu einem Vergleich zwischen dem Kaiser und Venedig zu kommen. Während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges war dies ebenso unmöglich wie in den Jahren danach, als das Haus Habsburg im Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Europa mit Frankreich lag und die Wiener Habsburger ab 1683 neuerlich Krieg gegen die Osmanen führten.²⁵ Venedig war in all diesen europäischen Konflikten ein möglicher Bündnispartner, auch wenn die Beziehungen an der Grenze in Friaul gespannt blieben.

Tatsächlich litt aber die Seelsorge im habsburgischen Teil von Aquileia. Dies bewog den Priester Vito Gullin, mit seinem Testament vom 29. Oktober 1686 40.000 Gulden für die Errichtung einer Diözese in Görz unter dem Patronat des heiligen Vitus zu stiften. Gullin hatte nach dem Studium zuerst beim Bischof von Seckau als Hofkaplan gedient. Wegen seines Wohlverhaltens hatte er danach die einträgliche Stadtpfarre von Hartberg erhalten. Dort hatte er mehr als dreißig Jahre gewirkt und die doch beachtlich hohe Summe erspart. Er bestimmte in seinem Testament, daß, sollte das Bistum nicht gleich begründet werden können, mit dem Geld ein Benefizium unter dem heiligen Vitus errichtet, damit täglich eine Messe gelesen und das Patronatsrecht auf ewig bei der Familie Gullin belassen werden sollte. Die Erträge des Benefiziums waren 2.000 Gulden jährlich, es sollte erst bei Gründung einer Diözese in Görz erlöschen.²⁶

Die Stiftung Gullins nahm Kaiser Leopold I. zum Anlaß, wieder einmal einen Anlauf zur Lösung der Fragen um Aquileia zu unternehmen. 1690 richtete er ein ausführliches Schreiben an den Kardinal Johann von Goëss in Rom. Er argumentierte, seine Vorfahren bis zurück zu Erzherzog Karl hätten sich um Görz bemüht. Denn die Republik Venedig würde sich in jenen Teilen Aquileias, die zum Heiligen Römischen Reich gehörten, zwar nicht direkt, wohl aber indirekt einmischen. Daher versuchten die Venezianer auch, die Gründung eines Bistums in Görz zu verhindern. Leopold beschuldigte den damaligen Papst Alexander VIII., als gebürti-

²⁵ Vgl. Oswald Redlich, Weltmacht des Barock. Österreich in der Zeit Kaiser Leopolds I., Wien 1961; Friedrich Edelmayer, L'ascesa di una grande potenza. La monarchia asburgica da Leopoldo I a Carlo VI (1657-1740), in: Gorizia Barocca. Una città italiana nell'impero degli Asburgo, Mariano del Friuli 1999, S. 75-105.

²⁶ Vgl. den Bericht der innerösterreichische Räte an Maria Theresia, Graz 1742 Februar 13, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

²⁷ Leopold I. an Goëss, Wien 1690 Juli 14, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

ger Venezianer parteiisch zu sein. Goëss sollte daher über einige vertraute Minister des Papstes herausbekommen, wie dieser zur Bistumsgründung stehen würde. Zu Aquileia *a parte Imperii* gehörten die schönsten Städte, so Görz mit seiner Grafschaft, Gradisca mit seiner Grafschaft, Villach in Kärnten oder Cilli in der Steiermark, um nur einige Orte zu nennen. In allen Städten, Abteien, Kollegiatstiften, Schlössern und Gütern lebten mehr als eine Million Menschen. Diese - und hier ist eine verstärkte Betonung religiöser Argumente im Gegensatz zu früheren Jahren zu bemerken - würden große spirituelle Schäden erleiden: Bischöfliche Visitationen würden nicht stattfinden; das heilige Öl müsse von auswärtigen Bischöfen erbeten werden; viele Menschen wären nicht gefirmt, käme doch einmal eine Firmung zu stande, wäre sie so teuer, daß das Land sie nicht zahlen könne; die Diözese sei zu groß, was für seine Untertanen große und beschwerliche Reisen bedeute; unter den Klerikern und Priestern würden die größten Exzesse und Skandale geschehen; die Priesterausbildung sei untauglich; viele fragwürdige Subjekte würden im Priesteramt sein, die die Seelsorgeaufgaben nicht wirklich wahrnehmen könnten, etc.²⁷

Insgesamt führte Kaiser Leopold I. 46 Gründe an, warum das Patriarchat von Aquileia geteilt und in Görz ein Bistum errichtet werden müsse. Vor allem meinte er, die Päpste hätten auch früher schon aus anderen Bistümern Teile herausgelöst, um neue Diözesen zu begründen. So sei aus Passau das Bistum Wien herausgelöst worden, aus Salzburg jenes von Wiener Neustadt, aus Aquileia jenes von Laibach. Die Mittel für die Gründung eines Bistums seien außerdem vorhanden. Einige der 46 Punkte enthielten schon genaue Maßnahmen. Die Grenze zwischen dem Patriarchat Aquileia und dem Bistum Görz sollte die Reichsgrenze sein. Leopold dachte sogar daran, wie der Patriarch von Aquileia für den Verlust eines großen Teiles seiner Diözese im venezianischen Gebiet entschädigt werden sollte. Doch blieb ein altes Problem bestehen, nämlich jenes des Vorranges. Denn der Bischof von Görz sollte auf keinen Fall den Patriarchen von Aquileia als seinen Metropolitanbischof anerkennen müssen.²⁸ Ein Fortschritt bei den kaiserlichen Vorschlägen ist insofern bemerkbar, als der Titel des Patriarchen nicht unbedingt für die habsburgischen Länder beansprucht wurde.

Dieser Vorstoß Wiens scheiterte vor allem deshalb, weil bereits 1691 Alexander VIII. verstarb. Der Kaiser beklagte sich auch bitter, aus Rom keine Antwort auf seine Vorschläge erhalten zu haben.²⁹ So dauerte es neuerlich dreißig Jahre, bis in Wien wieder ausführlich über die Angelegenheit von Aquileia gesprochen wurde. Nach dem Ende des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges versuchte nämlich Kaiser Karl VI., die Streitfrage zu lösen. Eng hängen seine Bemühungen mit der Pragmatischen Sanktion zusammen. Da er keine männlichen Erben hatte, sollte die weibliche Erbfolge in den österreichischen Ländern möglich werden. Dabei war es notwendig, umstrittene Rechtstitel zu klären - Aquileia gehörte hier unbedingt dazu.

Es existieren zwei lange, jeweils mehr als einhundert Seiten umfassende Referate der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an den Kaiser, die beide um 1720 entstanden sind.³⁰ In ihnen wiederholen sich all jene Argumente und Vorschläge, die bereits

²⁸ Ebenda.

²⁹ Leopold an Goëss, Ebersdorf 1691 September 12, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

³⁰ Referate der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei für Kaiser Karl VI., [ca. 1720], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart.

von Erzherzog Karl, Kaiser Ferdinand II. und Kaiser Leopold I. vorgetragen worden waren. Die kaiserlichen Räte betonten, daß nun endlich das saniert werden müsse, was sich „*per iniuriam temporum et per Venetorum industriam*“ zum Nachteil des Reichs und der Habsburger entwickelt habe. Um nachzuweisen, daß Venedig im Unrecht sei, argumentierten die kaiserlichen Räte mit dem Evangelisten Markus, der angeblich in Aquileia sein Evangelium geschrieben hatte, mit dem heiligen Hermagoras, dem Patriarchen Elias, den Langobarden, Kaiser Karl dem Großen, dem Patriarchen Poppone und dem mittelalterlichen kaiserlichen Präsentationsrecht für den Patriarchen. Dabei zeichneten sie sich durch hervorragende Kenntnisse der Geschichte ebenso aus wie des Kirchenrechts, um zu beweisen, daß einzig der Kaiser, also das Haus Habsburg, das Recht habe, den Patriarchen zu präsentieren. Die venezianische Praxis bei der Besetzung des Patriarchenstuhles wurde, wie auch schon in früheren Jahren, rundweg abgelehnt. Und es wurde wiederum mit Vehemenz - anders als unter Leopold I. - betont, daß der Patriarchentitel zum Heiligen Römischen Reich gehöre und auf keinen Fall der Republik Venedig überlassen werden dürfe.³¹

Diese grundlegende Zusammenfassung der habsburgischen Standpunkte sollte die Basis werden, auf der die weiteren Verhandlungen rund um Aquileia in Venedig und vor allem in Rom betrieben wurden. Es war also Kaiser Karl VI., der gezielt die Lösung des Problemfeldes anging - er und seine Räte bereiteten das vor, was unter Kaiserin Maria Theresia zu einem Abschluß geführt werden konnte, nämlich die Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia. Zwar konnte auch Karl VI. keine Fortschritte erzielen, doch in der Zwischenzeit hatte auch Rom zur Kenntnis genommen, daß die religiösen Zustände im habsburgischen Teil von Aquileia unhaltbar geworden waren. Deutliche Worte fand hier der päpstliche Nuntius in Wien in einem Schreiben an den kaiserlichen Hofkanzler, den Grafen Zinzendorf, dem er 1737 ein Memoriale überschickte, mit dem er wollte „*di rappresentare /.../ il lacrimevole infelicissimo stato, in cui si ritrova la diocesi di Aquileia a parte Imperii per la salute delle anime, atteso che, per trovarsi interdetti i sudditi austriaci a ricevere da quel Patriarca gli ordini sacri, ogli santi, approvazioni e licenze di sentir le confessioni et investiture ai beneficii, vengono ormai ridotte ivi le parrocchie a non avere più chi le amministri, e per conseguenza i parrocchiani rimangano privi dei sacramenti più necessari, cosa che tra fedeli cattolici, e sotto un piissimo e religiosissimo Imperadore fa terrore e pietà a pensarvi ...*“³² Zinzendorf antwortete auf diese Klagen sehr bestimmt, der Nuntius möge seinen Einfluß beim Papst ausnützen, „*per apportarvi il rimedio conveniente al caso, o con providenza diffinitiva o almeno con qualche temperamento provisionale, per cui Sua Maestà potesse passare senza maggior lesione della sua dignità e senza pregiudicio più diuturno di quei sudditi della Maestà Sua, li quali nello spirituale dipendono dal Patriarca d'Aquileia.*“³³

123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

³¹ Ebenda.

³² Päpstlicher Nuntius an Zinzendorf, [Wien] 1737 April 1, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

³³ Zinzendorf an den päpstlichen Nuntius, [Wien 1737], AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

³⁴ Vgl. den Bericht der innerösterreichische Räte an Maria Theresia, Graz 1742 Februar 13, AVA Wien,

Im September 1741, also noch in ihrem ersten Regierungsjahr, richtete Maria Theresia eine Anfrage an die innerösterreichische Regierung bezüglich des Standes und der Beschaffenheit der oben erwähnten Stiftung von Gullin,³⁴ was als Hinweis darauf zu werten ist, daß die Monarchin das Problem Aquileia wirklich lösen wollte. Zugute kam ihr dabei der endgültige Machtverfall der Republik Venedig, über den sie sich immer wieder äußerte. Sehr deutliche Worte fand sie beispielsweise in der Instruktion für Antonio Turinetti, Marquese di Prié, der 1747 als kaiserlicher Botschafter nach Venedig geschickt wurde.³⁵

Als Hauptprobleme zwischen dem Haus Habsburg und der Republik Venedig wurden in der Instruktion drei Streitfragen benannt: die ungeklärte Grenze zwischen dem habsburgischen Mantua und dem venezianischen Verona entlang des Flusses Tartaro, das Jahrhunderte alte Problem der freien Schifffahrt in der Adria und die Frage von Aquileia. Gleichzeitig machte Maria Theresia in der Instruktion klar, was sie von Venedig hielt: Erst einmal betonte sie den totalen Machtverfall der Markusrepublik. Früher, führt die Instruktion aus, war Venedig um vieles mächtiger und habe mehr Ansehen genossen. Kein Krieg sei in Italien geführt worden, ohne daß sich nicht die Republik eingemischt hätte und meistens für dessen Ausgang mitverantwortlich gewesen wäre. Einige Male habe Venedig dem Osmanischen Reich nachdrücklich Widerstand geleistet. Selbst in der gesamteuropäischen Politik habe Venedig einen bedeutenden Einfluß gehabt. Der Machtverfall der Republik habe dann aus zwei Gründen begonnen, einerseits wegen des Verlustes der direkten Handelsverbindungen nach Indien im 15. Jahrhundert, andererseits wegen der Demütigungen, die ihr die Liga von Cambrai zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts zufügte. Venedig wurde nur noch als ein Schatten seiner früheren Größe bezeichnet, auf die osmanische, die italienische und die europäische Politik habe es nun keinen Einfluß mehr - die Republik sei nur noch durch ihre Botschafter gut über die europäischen Vorgänge informiert. Die letzten Verdienste habe sich Venedig in jenem Krieg gegen das Osmanische Reich erworben, der 1699 mit dem Frieden von Karlowitz/Sremski Karlovci endete. Die 1699 im Frieden erhaltene Halbinsel Morea wurde von Venedig 1715 jedoch fast ohne Schwertstreich verloren, kritisierte die Kaiserin. Die Republik sei nun total verfallen, gänzlich lethargisch und auch für künftige Kriege gegen die Osmanen nicht mehr nützlich. Auch für die Aufrechterhaltung der Ruhe und des Systems in Italien benötige man sie nicht mehr. Außerdem beachte sie ihre Neutralität, ihre erste Staatsmaxime sei es, das Gleichgewicht in Italien beizubehalten, so daß die Freiheit der dortigen mindermächtigen Staaten weder vom Haus Habsburg noch den Bourbonen noch einer dritten Macht gestört werden könne. Doch mangle es der Republik am Willen und an den Kräften, diese Politik dann auch wirklich durchzuziehen.³⁶

Die Instruktion der Kaiserin gibt sehr deutlich das Bild wieder, das die meisten europäischen Kanzleien von der Markusrepublik hatten. Doch spricht aus den Wörtern Maria Theresias nicht nur eine gewisse Besorgnis über den Zustand Venedigs,

³⁴ Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 7 ex 1742, unfol.

³⁵ Instruktion für Antonio Turinetti, Marquese di Prié, Wien 1747 April 13, HHStA [= Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv] Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 6, unfol.

³⁶ Ebenda.

³⁷ Vgl. das Notariatsinstrument über den Willen von Codelli, in Görz ein Bistum zu begründen, Görz

sondern vor allem eine große Genugtuung. Denn im Norden Italiens war nach dem Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg das Zeitalter der „*preponderanza spagnola*“ durch jenes der „*preponderanza austriaca*“ abgelöst worden. Der Machtverfall der Republik Venedig konnte somit zum Vorteil der Nachbarstaaten ausgenützt werden, wie es gerade die weiteren Ereignisse rund um das Patriarchat Aquileia zeigen. Denn obwohl die habsburgische Monarchie in eine ganze Reihe von kriegerischen Konflikten verstrickt war - erst 1739 hatte noch Kaiser Karl VI. den für ihn ungünstigen Frieden von Belgrad/Belgrado mit den Osmanen abschließen müssen, und Maria Theresia sah sich bald nach ihrem Regierungsantritt in den habsburgischen Ländern im Herbst des Jahres 1740 mit dem Konflikt mit Preußen konfrontiert, der zum Verlust von Schlesien führte -, gelang es der Herrscherin, wenigstens an der venezianischen Grenze klare Verhältnisse zu schaffen.

Auch an den finanziellen Gegebenheiten konnte eine Abtrennung des österreichischen Teiles des Patriarchats von Aquileia und die Schaffung eines Bistums in Görz nicht mehr scheitern, da 1747 der Görzer Adlige Agostino Codelli von Fahnensfeld nicht nur 90.000 Gulden für die Errichtung eines Bistums stiftete, sondern auch seinen Palazzo, der früher im Besitz der Familie Kobenzl gewesen war, als Haus für den Bischof zur Verfügung stellte.³⁷ Die kaiserlichen Räte in der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei befürworteten die Genehmigung der Stiftung Codellis mit allem Nachdruck.³⁸ Maria Theresia genehmigte nicht nur gnädig die Stiftung und gewährte Codelli das Vorschlagsrecht für den ersten Bischof,³⁹ sondern nahm die Stiftung zum Anlaß, neuerlich vehement die Gründung eines Bistums in Görz zu fordern.⁴⁰ Da Codelli außerdem sehr rasch Karl Michael von Attems als ersten Bischof für Görz vorgeschlagen hatte,⁴¹ wandte sich die Kaiserin noch im November 1747 an Papst Benedikt XIV. und präsentierte Attems als Kandidaten für den zu schaffenden Bischofssitz.⁴²

Am Ende des Jahres verlagerte sich das Geschehen nach Rom. Denn der Papst mußte nun, da konkrete Vorschläge vorlagen, endlich reagieren. Gleichzeitig war nun Venedig alarmiert. Die Republik sandte im März 1748 Francesco Foscari nach Rom, der die kaiserlichen Vorschläge hintertreiben sollte.⁴³ Foscari war tatsächlich erfolgreich, denn im Mai 1748 präsentierte die Österreichische Hofkanzlei der Kaiserin eine Supplikation von Codelli. Darin beklagte sich dieser nachdrücklich darüber, daß Venedig die Angelegenheit der Bistumsgründung in Rom mit allen

1747 August 2, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 22r-23v.

³⁸ Vortrag der Kommission für Kärnten und Krain der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an Maria Theresia, Wien 1747 September 4, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 23 ex 1747, fol. 4r-17v.

³⁹ Maria Theresia an Agostino Codelli von Fahnensfeld, Wien 1747 November 8, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 1r-7v+fol. 26v.

⁴⁰ Vgl. Maria Theresia an Kardinal Alessandro Albani, Wien 1747 Oktober 14, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 23 ex 1747, fol. 1r-2v+18r-19v.

⁴¹ Vgl. den Vortrag der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an Maria Theresia, Wien 1747 November 3, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 18r-19v.

⁴² Maria Theresia an Benedikt XIV., Wien 1547 November 15, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 25 ex 1747, fol. 24r+v.

⁴³ Seneca, La fine, S. 12.

⁴⁴ Vorstellung der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei an Maria Theresia, Wien 1748 Mai 29, AVA Wien, Alter

Mitteln behindere, und beschuldigte die Kaiserin, sich selbst zu wenig zu engagieren. Daher drohe das Bistumsprojekt wieder einmal zu scheitern. Denn aus den römischen Antworten sei zu entnehmen, daß die Sache wieder nur verschoben werden würde. Außerdem betonte Codelli sein Alter von siebzig Jahren. Noch vor seinem Tod wollte er die Durchführung der Bistumsgründung sehen. Andernfalls bestünde die Gefahr, daß die Stiftung bei seinen Kindern und Erben ins Stocken geraten könnte. Aus all diesen Gründen bat er daher die Kaiserin, sich in Rom neuerlich für die Errichtung eines Bistums einsetzen, auch den Kardinal Mellini einzuschalten und gegen die venezianische Politik etwas zu unternehmen. Auch den päpstlichen Nuntius in Wien beschuldigte Codelli, an der Ernsthaftigkeit des Willens der Kaiserin zu zweifeln. Diesem sollte daher mitgeteilt werden, daß er das Projekt in Rom zu befördern habe.⁴⁴

In ihrem Votum stellte sich die Hofkanzlei nachdrücklich auf die Seite von Codelli und griff die Republik Venedig heftig an. Positiv vermerkten die Räte allerdings, daß der Papst prinzipiell für die Errichtung eines Bistums in Görz zu sein schien, hatte er doch den Auditor und den Datarius beauftragt, die Sache in die Wege zu leiten. Und auch die Räte beschwerten sich darüber, daß die Republik Venedig die Bistumsgründung mit allen Mitteln zu hinterreiben suche.⁴⁵

Die Kaiserin schrieb auf Anraten der Hofkanzlei einige Tage später an den Kardinal Albani, ihren Botschafter in Rom, und forderte erneut die Gründung eines Bistums in Görz.⁴⁶ Außerdem tagte im August 1748 eine Konferenz der Hof- und Staatskanzlei, die die Angelegenheit wieder einmal ausführlich besprach.⁴⁷ Das Problem wurde abermals von allen Seiten beleuchtet und vor allem wieder die Geschichte des Patriarchats Aquileia bemüht, um zu erklären, daß sich Venedig unrechtmäßig die Besetzung des Patriarchenstuhls anmaße. Die Konferenz war erstmalig in der Lage, zwischen zwei unterschiedlichen Ansprüchen auf das Patriarchat zu unterscheiden. Einerseits wurde ein Rechtsanspruch des Heiligen Römischen Reichs auf das Patriarchat Aquileia festgestellt, da dieses noch immer als Lehen des Reichs betrachtet wurde. Andererseits gab es noch einen habsburgischen Anspruch auf die Besetzung des Patriarchenstuhles, da die Habsburger den größten Teil des Diözesangebietes Aquileias politisch kontrollierten. Die Mitglieder der Konferenz diskutierten nun die Frage, ob es möglich sei, beide Rechtsansprüche zu trennen und die Frage der Besetzung des Bischofsstuhls allein zu verfolgen „*salvis iuribus Imperii.*“

Genau genommen war das die entscheidende gedankliche Leistung, die es einerseits ermöglichen konnte, daß Rom die Frage Aquileia weiterhin behandelte, und andererseits für Venedig einen Weg hin zu einem Kompromiß zeigte. Denn damit wurden zwar die lehenrechtlichen Ansprüche des Reichs auf Aquileia nicht aufgegeben, aber nicht mehr weiter verhandelt, weil derartige Verhandlungen oh-

Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.

⁴⁵ Ebenda.

⁴⁶ Maria Theresia an Kardinal Alessandro Albani, Wien 1748 Juni 8, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.

⁴⁷ Protokoll der Sitzung der Konferenz der Hof- und Staatskanzlei, Wien 1748 August 14, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.

⁴⁸ Ebenda.

niedies keinen Erfolg bringen konnten, da Venedig nie die lehenrechtliche Abhängigkeit Friauls vom Reich anerkannt hätte. Mit dem Argument, daß die Seelsorge verbessert werden müsse, konnte freilich die Bistumsfrage weiterverfolgt werden. Die Mitglieder der Konferenz befürworteten diese Vorgangsweise. Damit wurde zusätzlich ein weiterer Schritt gesetzt, der hinführen sollte zur späteren Auflösung des Heiligen Römischen Reichs. Denn österreichische Interessen wurden als wichtiger betrachtet als jene des Reichs.

Nachdem in dieser Frage ein einstimmiger Beschuß gefaßt worden war, kam Bewegung in die Angelegenheit. Die Konferenz diskutierte nun, ob man in Rom einen apostolischen Vikar für Görz fordern solle oder einen Bischof. Prinzipiell hätte die Konferenz zwar die sofortige Errichtung eines Bistums bevorzugt, doch beschloß man, sich einstweilen mit einem apostolischen Vikariat zufrieden zu geben und die Bistumsfrage erst danach weiter zu verfolgen. Die Mitglieder der Konferenz versprachen sich davon mehr Erfolg, hatte doch der Papst bereits einmal die Errichtung eines Vikariats in Aussicht gestellt. Auch dachten die kaiserlichen Minister daran, daß Venedig weniger gegen ein Vikariat als gegen ein Bistum opponieren würde. Daher sollte sich die Kaiserin einstweilen um die Errichtung eines apostolischen Vikariats bemühen, erst später wollte man sich um ein Bistum in Görz kümmern.

Schließlich behandelte die Konferenz auch die Frage des umstrittenen Domkapitels von Aquileia. Denn dort dominierten ebenfalls die Venezianer, österreichische Domherren gab es kaum. Einstimmigkeit wurde insofern erzielt, als die Minister meinten, man solle zufrieden sein, wenn die Hälfte der Domherren von Aquileia Österreicher wären. Die zweite Hälfte könnte den Venezianern überlassen werden, weil die Kapitularrenten teils aus Österreich und teils aus Venedig stammten. Vier Voten sprachen sich allerdings bei diesem Punkt dafür aus, daß - da die Venezianer bei dem vornehmen österreichischen Domkapitel zu Aquileia einen Platz hätten - es nur billig wäre, Reziprozität zu fordern, somit also die Hälfte der Plätze in den benachbarten venezianischen Kollegiatstiften von Udine und Cividale für Österreicher zu verlangen. Dies sollte eine *conditio sine qua non* sein, da die beiden venezianischen Kollegiatstifte einen großen, wenn nicht den größten Teil ihrer Renten aus dem habsburgischen Territorium bezogen, aber in keinem der Kapitel jemals einen Österreicher duldeten.⁴⁸

Nach dieser entscheidenden Sitzung schrieb die Kaiserin an den Papst und forderte neuerlich ein Bistum in Görz oder ein apostolisches Vikariat in den österreichischen Teilen des Patriarchats Aquileia.⁴⁹ Ähnlich lautende Schreiben gingen auch an die Kardinäle Albani und Millini.⁵⁰ Und tatsächlich kamen bald aus Rom Mitteilungen, daß die Errichtung eines apostolischen Vikariats in den österreichischen Teilen Aquileias möglich sei, nicht aber die Gründung einer Diözese in Görz.⁵¹ Die Kaiserin und ihre Minister hatten mit dem Ende des Jahres 1748 einen

⁴⁹ Maria Theresia an Benedikt XIV., Wien 1748 September 4, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.

⁵⁰ Maria Theresia an die Kardinäle Albani und Millini, Wien 1748 September 8, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.

⁵¹ Kardinal Albani an Maria Theresia, Rom 1548 September 21, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 25 ex 1750, unfol.; dieselbe an dieselbe, Rom 1748 Oktober 5, ebenda.

ersten Etappensieg errungen.

Bis das päpstliche Breve in Wien eintraf, mit dem Benedikt XIV. das apostolische Vikariat in Görz für die österreichischen Teile des Patriarchats Aquileia errichtete, sollte es noch ein Jahr dauern. In der Zwischenzeit war Codelli, der eigentliche Initiator des schließlich erfolgreichen Unternehmens, bereits verstorben.⁵² Und die Venezianer versuchten während des gesamten Jahres 1749, die Gründung des Vikariats doch noch zu verhindern.⁵³ Auch waren die kaiserlichen Minister durchaus enttäuscht, als sie erfuhren, daß das päpstliche Breve nicht so weitgehend sein würde, wie man es erhofft hatte. Unklarheiten gab es noch immer wegen diverser Grenzorte zwischen Venedig und den habsburgischen Territorien, obwohl in Wien betont wurde, daß man sich ohnedies über die Grenzstreitigkeiten mit Venedig in den letzten Jahren geeinigt habe.⁵⁴ Doch arbeitete Wien während des gesamten Jahres 1749 unabirrt daran, die finanzielle Ausstattung des künftigen Vikariats zu sichern.⁵⁵ Als der Papst am 29. November 1749 endlich das Breve publizierte, mit dem das Vikariat begründet wurde, bestellte er noch immer keinen Vikar, und das, obwohl ihm der Vorschlag vorlag, Attems die Aufgabe zu übertragen.

Somit hatten die Venezianer noch immer Möglichkeiten, die Ernennung eines Angehörigen des Reichs als Vikar zu hintertreiben. Man gewinnt den Eindruck, als wäre das dem kaiserlichen Botschafter in Venedig gar nicht aufgefallen. Denn er meinte noch im April 1750, die Republik zeige durchaus guten Willen.⁵⁶ Und die Kaiserin betonte noch im Mai 1750, sie habe den aufrichtigen Wunsch, gute Nachbarschaft und Freundschaft mit Venedig zu halten. Sie hoffte, daß das auch die Republik begreifen würde. Die Errichtung eines Vikariats in Görz bezeichnete sie als einen Kompromiß, der ohnedies noch immer die Republik bevorzuge. Ihre Ahnen hätten einem derartigen Kompromiß nie zugestimmt. Gleichzeitig beklagte sie sich darüber, daß der Patriarch von Aquileia die Jurisdiktion über die Siedlung von Aquileia erhalten wollte. Auch über den Kardinal Querini, der im Auftrag der Republik den Papst umstimmen sollte,⁵⁷ fand sie kein gutes Wort. Seine Aktionen in Rom bezeichnete sie mit dem Ausdruck „*Frechheit*.“ Auch amüsierte sie sich darüber, daß die Venezianer von Frankreich keine Unterstützung für ihre Wünsche erhielten.⁵⁸

Am 27. Juni 1750 bestellte der Papst endlich Karl Michael von Attems zum apo-

⁵² Maria Theresia an die Repräsentation und die Kammer in Krain, Wien 1749 August 9, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 32 ex 1749, unfol.

⁵³ Vgl. Seneca, La fine, S. 21-26.

⁵⁴ Vortrag der Staatskanzlei an die Kaiserin, Wien 1749 Oktober 18, HHStA Wien, Staatskanzlei, Vorträge 63/X, fol. 71r-74v; vgl. auch den umfangreichen Aktenbestand zu den Grenzverhandlungen im HHStA Wien, Österreichische Akten, Innerösterreichische Grenzakten 21.

⁵⁵ Maria Theresia an die Repräsentation und die Kammer in Krain, Wien 1749 August 9, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 32 ex 1749, unfol.; dieselbe an dieselben, Wien 1749 November 1, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus, Kart. 123, Nr. 34 ex 1749, unfol.

⁵⁶ Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 April 25, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31, fol. 113r-114r.

⁵⁷ Vgl. Seneca, La fine, S. 44.

⁵⁸ Maria Theresia an Prié, Wien 1750 Mai 30, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 7, unfol.

⁵⁹ Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 6, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31,

stolischen Vikar in den österreichischen Teilen des Patriarchats Aquileia. Die Aufregung in Venedig war groß, denn nun hatte der Papst offensichtlich endgültig einer künftigen Teilung des Patriarchats zugestimmt, erhielt Attems doch den Titel eines Bischofs von Pergamon. Die Aufregung, die das päpstliche Breve in Venedig hervorrief, kommentierte der kaiserliche Botschafter Prié mit Häme: “*Sa il mondo intiero quali siano le pie e sempre giuste intenzioni della Maestà Vostra, ma trattandosi con questa Repubblica che altro non conosce che la conservazione di quanto possiede a che titolo si sia, ho sempre avuto motivo di prevedere che gli affari d'Aquileia, che già da tanto tempo vertono, sarebbero quelli su' quali la medesima non intenderebbe ragione, né colla Santa Sede, né a riguardo della Maestà Vostra.*”⁵⁹

Während Venedig die diplomatischen Beziehungen mit dem Heiligen Stuhl abbrach,⁶⁰ stellte sich die Kaiserin mit Nachdruck auf die Seite der Kurie. Dem venezianischen Botschafter Andrea Tron wurde in Wien drohend mitgeteilt, Österreich werde den Papst vor Venedig schützen. Sonst äußerte man sich in Wien mit Zufriedenheit. Die geistliche Versorgung für die Bevölkerung könne nun verbessert werden. Attems sollte jedenfalls gleich eingesetzt werden, wie es auch den Regierungen in der Steiermark, in Kärnten, Krain, Görz, Gradisca und Tirol mitgeteilt wurde. In geistlichen Angelegenheiten hatte der Patriarch von Aquileia auch *de iure* sämtliche Einflußmöglichkeiten auf das habsburgische Gebiet verloren. Dennoch kam eine Sitzung der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei noch im Juli 1750 überein, nun mit Konsequenz die Schaffung zweier Diözesen und somit das endgültige Ende des Patriarchats betreiben zu wollen.⁶¹

Während in Venedig die Sorge herrschte, nach der Gründung zweier Diözesen würde der Papst dem Bischof in Görz die Patriarchenwürde verleihen und das Heilige Römische Reich beginnen, die weltliche Herrschaft über Friaul zu fordern, erregten sich die Kaiserin und ihre Minister über die Republik. Eigentlich, so Maria Theresia, müßte sie die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Venedig abbrechen, Prié nach Wien zurückberufen und Tron des Landes verweisen. Angeblich aus Rücksicht auf Rom entschloß sich Wien, diese Maßnahme einstweilen zu unterlassen.⁶² Und der kaiserliche Botschafter in Venedig betonte die moderate Politik Wiens und den Extremismus der Markusrepublik: “*Confesserò, come deve la mia sincera fedeltà alla Maestà Vostra, che ogni uno qui si attendeva, che la Maestà Vostra, ad esempio dell'estremità alle quale si è portata questa Repubblica contro la corte di Roma, mi richiamerebbe. La somma moderazione della Maestà Vostra prova sempre più la grandezza di quell'animo, che non ha pari e che ad esempio de' suoi augusti antenati deve provare al mondo intiero li superiori sentimenti, che regnano negli animi de' monarchi, a quelli d'una confusa Repubblica, in cui predomina bene spesso la passione, l'odio e la vendetta, senza riflesso ai fastidiosi seguiti che ne nas-*

fol. 11r-12v.

⁶⁰ Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 11, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31, fol. 31r-36v; vgl. Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 18, ebenda, fol. 43r-46v; Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 Juli 25, ebenda, fol. 53r-62v.

⁶¹ Protokoll der Sitzung der Konferenz der Österreichischen Hofkanzlei, Wien 1750 Juli 17, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 26 ex 1750, unfol.

⁶² Maria Theresia an Prié, Wien 1750 Juli 25, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 7, unfol.

⁶³ Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 August 1, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte

cono. /.../ Purché la Repubblica ci si presti di buona fede, proveranno evidentemente a chi ne avrà conoscenza quali siano le grandi massime di una sì augusta e moderata principessa, sempre egualmente attenta a dare al mondo intiero quella pace e quiete, contro la quale quelli che son privi di sì alti sentimenti, non hanno in mira. Credo poter dire in quest'occasione che ammirabili sarebbero anche simili grandiosi sentimenti, se questa Repubblica fosse una potenza a pretendere parità colla Maestà Vostra; ma la manifesta disparità rende secondo me il ritegno de Vostra Maestà praticato ancor più grande, e deve servir di esempio a quei principi che solo si occupano della grandezza loro ...⁶³

Im Sommer 1750 bestand durchaus die Gefahr, daß zwischen Habsburg und Venedig Krieg ausbrechen könnte. Denn die päpstliche Maßnahme provozierte eine Vielzahl von Problemen. So weigerten sich beispielsweise die venezianischen Domkapitulare von Aquileia, die päpstlichen Breven anzuerkennen und argumentierten mit den Beschlüssen der Konzilien und des kanonischen Rechts. Die kaiserlichen Vertreter in Krain schlugen der Monarchin vor, gnadenlos gegen die venezianischen Domherren vorzugehen und ihnen die Einkünfte zu sperren.⁶⁴ Außerdem mehrten sich im Sommer 1750 die Grenzstreitigkeiten zwischen Österreich und Venedig, und zwar nicht nur zwischen Friaul und Kärnten, sondern auch in Istrien.⁶⁵ Im September drohte die Kaiserin neuerlich, sie werde Prié aus Venedig abberufen, sollte die Republik nicht ihre Beziehungen zu Rom neuerlich aufnehmen und bereit sein, den Streit um Aquileia in Frieden fertig zu verhandeln. Nur der große Langmut Wiens habe die Republik davon abhalten können, zum großen Ärgernis der gesamten Christenheit zu werden, schrieb sie. Venedig wolle keine Kompromißvorschläge Wiens verhandeln, sei unvernünftig, hochnäsig und dürfe sich nicht erlauben, Österreich weiter zu reizen. Nicht einmal eine bedeutendere Macht als die Republik würde das wagen, betonte die Kaiserin.⁶⁶ Eindeutig sind aus derartigen Äußerungen Drohungen einer europäischen Großmacht gegen die zum politischen Zwerg gewordene Republik herauszuhören.

Die habsburgische und die venezianische Position in der Streitfrage schienen im Herbst 1750 weiterhin unvereinbar. Wien verlangte die endgültige Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia und die Schaffung zweier gleichberechtigter Diözesen in Görz und in Udine, Venedig beharrte darauf, daß das Patriarchat von Aquileia nach Udine transferiert werden müsse. Beide Standpunkte widersprachen sich vollständig. Venedig versuchte zwar, die Unterstützung Frankreichs gegen Österreich zu bekommen, was allerdings nicht gelang. Die französischen Diplomaten sahen vielmehr im habsburgischen Vorschlag zur Schaffung zweier gleichberechtigter Diözesen durchaus einen gangbaren Weg, was wohl auch darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß der französische Botschafter in Wien lange Zeit mit dem Minister Kaunitz

⁶³ 31, fol. 75r-78v.

⁶⁴ Repräsentation und Kammer in Krain an Maria Theresia, Laibach 1750 August 22, AVA Wien, Alter Kultus 124, Nr. 33 ex 1750, unfol.

⁶⁵ Prié an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1750 August 22, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 31, fol. 119r-126v.

⁶⁶ Maria Theresia an Prié, Wien 1750 September 24, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 7, unfol.

⁶⁷ Maria Theresia an Prié, Wien 1751 Januar 14, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen

über die Sache verhandelt hatte. Daher begann auch Frankreich, verstärkt Druck auf Venedig auszuüben und die Annahme dieses Vorschlages zu empfehlen. Und Maria Theresia drohte weiterhin, die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Venedig abzubrechen, sollte die Markusrepublik nicht an den Verhandlungstisch zurückkehren und die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Rom wieder aufnehmen.⁶⁷

Politisch völlig isoliert, unter starkem Druck seitens der Habsburgermonarchie und Frankreichs, gab Venedig schließlich nach. Im Januar 1751 nahm es seine diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Rom wieder auf - zur großen Genugtuung der Wiener Politik.⁶⁸ Wien versicherte mit Nachdruck, daß es auch in Zukunft den Patriarchentitel für einen Bischof in Görz nicht mehr beanspruchen oder die Transfierung des Patriarchats von Aquileia nach Görz verlangen würde.⁶⁹

Bedenkt man, wie lange das Problem des Patriarchats von Aquileia die Beziehungen zwischen Venedig und Wien belastet hatte, dann gingen die letzten Verhandlungen, die das endgültige Ende des Patriarchats besiegelten, sehr rasch über die Bühne. Diese fanden im Februar 1751 in Wien zwischen den kaiserlichen Ministern und dem venezianischen Botschafter Tron statt, ein Vertrag konnte im März bereits unterzeichnet werden.⁷⁰ Schon nach kurzer Zeit kamen die Verhandlungspartner überein, daß das Patriarchat abgeschafft und zwei Diözesen in Udine und Görz begründet werden sollten. Beide Diözesen sollten völlig gleichberechtigt sein, die Diözesangrenzen sollten den Grenzen zwischen dem Reich und Venedig folgen. Der Patriarch Dolfin sollte bis zu seinem Lebensende den Titel führen dürfen, allerdings nicht als Patriarch von Aquileia, sondern nur als Patriarch. Österreich versicherte außerdem, keine territorialen Ansprüche an Venedig zu stellen. Die Einkünfte der Kirche von Aquileia sollten so aufgeteilt werden, daß jene aus dem venezianischen Gebiet nach Udine und jene aus dem österreichischen nach Görz fließen sollten.⁷¹

Unklar war zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Vertrages, ob der Papst zwei neue Diözesen oder zwei Erzdiözesen begründen würde. Umso größer war die Zufriedenheit in Venedig und auch in Wien, als im Mai 1751 bekannt wurde, daß der Papst zwei Erzdiözesen schaffen werde.⁷² Die Angelegenheit von Aquileia könne nun sicher bald zu einem Ende geführt werden, schrieb der kaiserliche Botschafter aus Venedig im Juni 1751.⁷³ Und tatsächlich langte dort, ebenso wie in Wien, bald die päpstliche Bulle vom 6. Juli 1751 bezüglich der Abschaffung des Patriarchats

7, unfol.; zur französischen Position vgl. Seneca, La fine, S. 62-73.

⁶⁸ Joseph Rathgeb an Maria Theresia, Venedig 1751 Januar 25, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 32, fol. 19r-20v.

⁶⁹ Ulfeld an Prié, Wien 1751 Januar 30, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 7, unfol.

⁷⁰ Ulfeld an Prié, Wien 1751 Februar 13, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Weisungen 7, unfol.; Plenipotenz für Ulfeld, Wien 1751 März 18, ebenda.

⁷¹ Seneca, La fine, S. 85-86.

⁷² Prié an Ulfeld, Venedig 1751 Mai 8, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 32, fol. 51r-52v.

⁷³ Prié an Ulfeld, Venedig 1751 Juni 5, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 32, fol. 55r-56v.

⁷⁴ Prié an Ulfeld, Venedig 1751 Juni 19, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 32, fol. 61r-62v.

⁷⁵ Prié an Ulfeld, Venedig 1751 August 14, HHStA Wien, Staatenabteilungen, Venedig, Berichte 32, fol.

von Aquileia und der Gründung zweier Erzdiözesen ein.⁷⁴ Die Angelegenheit von Aquileia gibt es eindeutig nicht mehr, sie ist als beendet zu betrachten, schrieb der kaiserliche Botschafter in Venedig im August 1751. Alle Welt sei mit den päpstlichen Bullen zufrieden.⁷⁵ Ein Dauerstreit von 250 Jahren hatte seinen Abschluß gefunden.

* * *

Betrachtet man die glanzvolle Geschichte des Patriarchats von Aquileia im Mittelalter, so war sein Ende im Jahre 1751 unrühmlich und unspektakulär. Eine der wichtigsten Kirchen der mittelalterlichen Christenheit hatte in der Neuzeit keinen wirklichen Platz mehr. Im Gegenteil wurde sie zu einem anachronistischen Gebilde zu einer Zeit, in der sich die modernen Staaten bildeten. Spätestens seit der Aufklärung achteten diese darauf, daß ihre staatlichen mit ihren kirchlichen Grenzen übereinstimmten. Denn nur so bestand die Garantie, daß sich nicht Nachbarstaaten in ihre inneren Angelegenheiten einmischen konnten. Argumente bezüglich der Verbesserung der Seelsorge hatten zweifellos ihre Richtigkeit, traten aber angesichts dieser politischen Notwendigkeiten in den Hintergrund. Denn eine Kirche, die noch immer Ansprüche auf Lehenrechte verfechten konnte, war instrumentalisierbar für politische Zwecke. Das erklärt, warum sowohl die Republik Venedig als auch die Habsburger so verbissen um die Kontrolle über das Patriarchat Aquileia stritten und die längste Zeit mit historischen Argumenten versuchten, ihre jeweiligen Standpunkte durchzusetzen. Venedig hatte in diesem Streit ursprünglich die besseren Karten, weil es seine militärischen und politischen Kräfte zur Verteidigung seines Hinterlandes konzentrierter einsetzen konnte als die Habsburger. Als die Republik aber aufhörte, eine ernstzunehmende politische und militärische Macht in Italien zu sein und die Habsburgermonarchie zu einer Großmacht aufgestiegen war, konnte Venedig eine Lösung der Angelegenheit nicht mehr verhindern. Dennoch war die Auflösung des Patriarchats von Aquileia ein politischer Kompromiß, denn beide Seiten verzichteten auf ihre aus dem Mittelalter rührenden historischen Ansprüche, die sie durch viele Jahre mit allen Mitteln verbissen verteidigt hatten. Die Auflösung des Patriarchats ist somit als ein rationaler Vorgang zu werten auf dem Weg hin zum modernen europäischen Staatensystem.

Friedrich Edelmayer

HABSBURŽANI IN KONEC OGLEJSKEGA PATRIARHATA ***Argumenti in polemike***

POVZETEK

Od začetka 16. st. naprej pa vse do leta 1751 so prepri okrog oglejskega patriarbata predstavljeni enega ključnih problemov v odnosih med Habsburžani in Beneško republiko. V tem prispevku je predstavljen doslej skoraj povsem zapostavljen aspekt diskusij o patriarhatu, namreč argumenti in polemike Habsburžanov v zgodnjem novem veku, s katerimi so skušali dokazati, da so Benečani na nekorenčen način prevzeli oblast nad patriarhatom in da bi Oglej moral pripasti habsburški nadoblasti. V 250 letih se je veliko teh argumentov in polemik ponovilo, nazadnje pa so se jih Habsburžani tik pred koncem patriarhata odrekli. Številne strokovne utemeljitve, s katerimi so Habsburžani skušali dokazati svoj prav, so izhajale iz zgodovinskega razvoja.

Ko se spomnimo bleščeče zgodovine oglejskega patriarbata v srednjem veku, se nam njegov konec leta 1751 zdi nespektakularen in neslaven. Za eno najpomembnejših srednjeveških krščanskih cerkva v novem veku ni bilo več prostora. V času oblikovanja modernih držav se je spremenil v zastarelo tvorbo. Najpozneje od časa razsvetlenstva naprej so države stremele za tem, da so se njihove državne in cerkvene meje ujemale, kajti le to je bilo zagotovilo, da se nobeden od sosedov ne bo vmešaval v njihove notranje zadeve. Argumenti za izboljšanje dušnega skrbstva so tej politični nuji morali dati prednost. Cerkev, ki je še vedno imela pravico do fevdalnih posesti, je bilo namreč moč zlorabiti za politične namene. To tudi pojasni, zakaj so se Beneška republika in Habsburžani tako zagrizeno borili za prevlado nad oglejskim patriarhatom ter skušali svoja stališča utemeljiti s historičnimi argumenti. Benečani so sprva v tem sporu imeli boljše karte, kajti za obrambo svojega zaledja so labko uporabili bolj koncentrirane sile kot na drugi strani Habsburžani. Ko pa je republika izgubila svojo politično moč v Italiji in se je Habsburška monarhija povzpela do statusa velesile, Benetke dokončne rešitve tega spora niso več mogle preprečiti. Kljub temu je bila razpustitev patriarhata politični kompromis, kajti obe strani sta se odrekli svojim na srednjem veku temeljčim zahtevam, ki sta jih poprej tako zagrizeno zagovarjali. Zato labko razpustitev oglejskega patriarhata označimo kot racionalno potezo na poti k oblikovanju modernega sistema držav.

UDC 929 *Tirnberger:271.5(497.4 Ptuj)*

1.02 Review

Tirnberger, the Jesuit Scientist from Ptuj

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Abstract:

We researched the work of the important Lower Styrian scientist Tirnberger (1731-1780). Until the suppression of the Jesuit order he held the most sophisticated pedagogical and scientific positions in monarchy. He collaborated with Hell, the most important Habsburg astronomer of his time. As the supreme specialist Tirnberger lectured on physical sciences at the new and prestigious Miners academy at Schemnitz. He published his data about weather and Aurora Borealis in a special booklet.

Key words:

Ptuj, Graz, Schemnitz, Tirnberger (1731-1780), history of the Jesuit mathematical sciences.

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Biography

In Tirnberger's¹ time there was no secondary school in Ptuj. He enrolled in the Jesuit Gymnasium and entered the Jesuit society in Vienna in 1750. He spent two novice years in Vienna in the 1750 and 1751. Next year, he taught lower classes at Gymnasium of Leoben in Styria. Between 1753 and 1757 he studied philosophy in Vienna and also repeated the courses of mathematics as help for senior students of philosophy. At the same time he was the first assistant of the emperor's astronomer Hell in the years 1757 and 1758.² In 1757 Hell published the first volume of his famous ephemerides with Tirnberger's help. In 1758, Tirnberger taught higher classes of Gymnasium at Judenburg and also headed the Jesuit seminary there. Between 1759 and 1762 Tirnberger studied theology in Graz. As usual for the Jesuit of Austrian province of his time, he made his last vows in Judenburg in 1763.

In that way he was well over thirty when he finished his studies and began his career as a professor. Between the years 1764 and 1771 he was the professor of special astronomy, the head of observatory and the custodian of cabinet for physics in Graz. He spent next two years as the professor of mechanics and hydraulic in the Miners academy in Schemnitz. In 1773, after the suppression of the Society, he settled in Schottwein in Lower Austria for the rest of his life.³

Observations of the satellites of Jupiter

Galileo was the first to describe the satellites of Jupiter. He claimed that the observation of the satellites could be used for the exact estimation of time on the open sea. At the end of 17th century Italian born Parisian astronomer Cassini forwarded Galileo's idea again. But in Tirnberger's own time the time estimation with Jupiter's satellites already lost some of its prestige because of the development of mechanical clocks of John Harrison (1693-1776) and other mechanics.

Tirnberger's fellow astronomers still observed Jupiter's satellites quite a lot. The Vienna astronomer Hell published Tirnberger's data while Tirnberger still taught special astronomy in Graz. The term "*special*" was used for the observational part of astronomy in the same sense as for the experimental physics.

Tirnberger observed at the observatory of Graz on February 14, 1770, April 22, 1770, July 29, 1770, and August 5, 1770. On July 10, 1770 that Jupiter was on opposition. The Earth was situated between Jupiter and Sun. Jupiter was in his nearest position towards the Earth and was therefore seen on the maximal visual angle. At least some of Tirnberger's observations of Jupiter were made at the most favorable conditions.

On the first occasion in February Tirnberger observed the immersion of the first

* We wish to thank the History of Science department of the University of Oklahoma at Norman for all their help.

¹ Karl Tirnberger (Tirenperger, Tirenberger, * October 27, 1731 Ptuj (Pettau, Poetovio, Petovio); SJ October 19, 1749 Vienna; † 1780 Schottwein in Lower Austria).

² Maximilian Hell (Höll, * May 1, 1720 Schemnitz (Schemnitzum, Selmecbánya, Banská Štiavnica); SJ October 18, 1738 Trenčín; † April 14, 1792 Enzerstorf).

³ Ladislaus Lukács SJ., Catalogus generalis seu Nomenclator biographicus personarum Provinciae Austriae Societatis Jesu (1555-1773) part III, Romae 1988, p. 1716.

satellite, secondly the emersion of the third satellite and for last two occasions he noted emersions of the first satellite. During the first two observations the sky was without a cloud, for the third occasion it was clear and for the last observation he got a cloudy weather.

On February 5, 1770, Tirnberger observed how 2/3 of a dark Moon covered the constellation of the Bull on 33 minutes 12 seconds past midnight.⁴

The satellites of Jupiter were also measured in China. In Tirnberger's time Carniolian Hallerstein⁵ in Beijing was nearly seventy and left the observations of Jupiter satellites to his younger collaborators. Between October 15, 1772 and December 15, 1773 the Jesuit Joseph Bernard observed with a telescope 13 foots in length. The Jesuit Aloys Cibolla from Palermo on Sicily used the similar telescope between May 13, 1772 and January 20, 1773.

On the other side of the Chinese wall the Portuguese Jesuit Felix de Rocha observed the satellites of Jupiter during his geographical research.⁶ Hallerstein mailed their data to Hell in Vienna.⁷ Hell published Hallerstein's report in the first part of his Ephemerides where he also published Tirnberger's observations of the Jupiter's satellites.

The European planet astronomy especially developed with the specialized Lambert's magazine *Astronomisches Jarbuch* established in 1774. In Lambert's magazine for a while all the observations of Jupiter were published.⁸

Aurora Borealis

In 1776, Tirnberger published his observation of Aurora Borealis among his meteorological data. He observed in Graz on $47^{\circ} 4' 10''$ of north latitude. Tirnberger observed nine months before Hell in Vienna and Hallerstein in Beijing. On December 14, 1769 Tirnberger began to observe at 9 p.m., and on December 27, 1769 half of hour earlier. On December 30, 1769 he began to measure at half past five a.m. and continued the observations during the next night. Tirnberger did not just note the light and its changes as Hell and Hallerstein, but also measured with the magnetic needle as Cotte⁹ in Montmorency in France. Tirnberger's needle moved towards the east when the stormy clouds with a strong wind covered the sky over the mountains. He used the special equipment to measure the declination of the magnetic needle. He found that the needle trembled facing the point declined from

⁴ Karl Tirnberger, *Observationes Satellitum Jovis factae Graecii in Styria in Collegio Acad. S.J. 1770*. Hell, *Ephemerides astronomicae* 1772, Viennae 1771, 16, p. 256.

⁵ Ferdinand Avguštin Haller von Hallerstein (Lieou Song Ling K'iao Nien, * August 27, 1703 Ljubljana; † October 27, 1721 Vienna; † October 29, 1774 Beijing).

⁶ Avguštin Hallerstein, *Eclipsis solis 1773 Mart. 23 p.m. observata Pekini Sinarum in Collegio S.J. tubo 8 ped. Cum micrometro anglico*. Hell, *Ephemerides astronomicae* 1776, Vienna 1775, Appendix. 20, pp. 21-24.

⁷ Karel Dežman, *Ein Krainer als Hoffastronom in Peking 1739-1774*. Laibacher Wöchenblatt. Organ der Verfassungs - Partei in Krain, (1881), No. 50, p. 2.

⁸ Thomas Hockey, *Galileo's Planet. Observing Jupiter Before Photography*, Bristol/Philadelphia 1999, p. 39, 207.

⁹ Louis Cotte (* 1740 Laon; † 1815 Montmorency).



FIG. 7.—PARIS. RAYED ARC.

The Aurora Borealis in Paris in 1770 (Alfred Angot, *The Aurora Borealis*, London 1896, pp. 24-25 (fig. 7))

the North Pole for 35° .¹⁰

In 1769, after the decade of very rare Aurora Borealis observable south from 55° of the Earth latitude, the phenomena became much more common for about a quarter of century. In 1769, the Sunspots also had a maximum. As much as 106 spots were registered at that year, more than ever before. But Tirnberger's Aurora Borealis was not recorded by anybody else and Tirnberger's data had never been included in later list of Aurora Borealis. The closest to his data was Aurora Borealis seen from the castle Deainvilliers on December 20, 1769, and later published by the academy of Paris. In Graz and in Vienna Aurora Borealis was observed on October 24, 1769. Next Aurora Borealis was observed in Vienna, Trnava and several German towns on January 18, 1770.¹¹

Many Tirnberger's contemporaries were interested in the Aurora Borealis. In 1777, Tirnberger's former teacher Hell published the theory and data about Aurora Borealis in appendix of his *Ephemerides*. He wrote in the form similar to the Newton's *Principia* a century ago. Hell published 125 paragraphs in 118 pages with several pictures. He described the research of Kircher, Mairan, Musschenbroek and Johan Lambert (1728-1777) in his photometry of 1761. Hell mentioned the mathe-

¹⁰ Karl Tirnberger, *Auszug aus den Wetterungsbeobachtungen, welche in der Sternwarte zu Grätz von 1765-1769 gemacht werden sind*, Grätz 1770, p. 33.

¹¹ Alfred Angot, *The Aurora Borealis*, London 1896, p. 95, 97, 199; Hermann Fritz, *Verzeichniss Beobachter Polarlichter*, Wien 1873, p. 72.

matical tools for determining the height of Aurora Borealis,¹² and the observations made in Russia.¹³ Hell used his own research of magnetism in medicine to connect Aurora Borealis with the electrical charge of the Earth.¹⁴ In 1769, Hell observed the transition of Venus over the disc of Sun in Lapland and had a lot of opportunity to watch the Aurora Borealis there.¹⁵

Meteorology

The astronomer Tirnberger published his observations of Aurora Borealis among his meteorological notes. In 1768 and in 1769, he measured the relative humidity of the air.¹⁶ Between the years 1765 and 1768 he took notes about the wind, clouds, average atmospheric pressure and temperature. The results were tabled by months.¹⁷ He noticed the greatest diurnal variations in April 1769.¹⁸

Tirnberger described two earthquakes on December 31, 1767 at 12³⁰ p.m., and on February 27, 1768 at 2⁴¹ p.m. Hi did not connect the data about the earthquakes with the weather or Aurora Borealis,¹⁹ although such theories were popular at his time.

Tirnberger's meteorological observations can be compared with the similar work of Schöttl²⁰ in Ljubljana few years later in 1775 and 1776.

Hell's pump in Schemnitz

The first director of the Mining academy in Schemnitz established in 1762/1763 was professor of mineralogy and metallurgy Nikolaus Joseph baron Jacquin (1727-1817) from Leyden. Jacquin later accepted the chair for botany and chemistry at the University of Vienna.²¹ The botanist and physician Jacquin published in his collected papers some of the data of the Jesuit Franc Ksaver Wulfen (1728-1805), the first professor of Newton's physics in Ljubljana.

In 1769 Janez Anton Scopoli (1723-1788) left Idria in Carniola and became the

¹² Maximilian Hell, *Aurorae borealis theoria nova. Pars I. Ephemeridae Astronomicae Anni 1777.* (March 1770, Appendix ad ephemerides Anni 1777), Appendix 21, p.112.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 54.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 8, 115.

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Karl Tirnberger, *Auszug aus den Wetterungsbeobachtungen, welche in der Sternwarte zu Grätz von 1765-1769 gemacht werden sind,* Grätz 1770, p. 35.

¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 7-16.


¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 14.

¹⁹ Ibidem, pp. 34-35.

²⁰ Gregor Schöttl (* February 14, 1732 Steyr; SJ October 18, 1747 Vienna; † November 5, 1777 Ljubljana).

²¹ Baltazar Hacquet, *La vita di Belsazar Hacquet ed il suo viaggio a vela sulla Sava da Lubiana a Semlin. Autobiografia di Joannes Antonius Scopoli.* A cura di G. Pilleri e D. Mušič, Waldau-Bern 1984, p. 102.

54



Von der
Wassersäulenmaschine beym Leo-
poldischachte.

welche vom Herrn Joseph Carl Höll, Oberkunstmei-
ster, erfunden, und im Jahre 1749. auf dem
Pieber-Erbstollen erbauet worden.

Verhältniß der Haupttheile.

Der metallene Stiefel hat in der Höhe 8 Schuh, im Durchmesser $12\frac{1}{2}$ Zoll, in der Dicke 13 bis 14 Linnen, am Gewichte 13 Centner.

Die senkrechten Einflusserdhren sind hoch 44 Lachter, im Durchmesser $6\frac{1}{2}$ zöllig.

Vom Tage bis 22 Lachter sind hölzerne, nachmals 1 Zoll dicke eiserne Röhren.

Ein Kunstsatz ist 18 Lachter hoch, die Kolbenröh-
ren sind 6 zöllig.

Eviel

Hell's pump in Schemnitz
- (Nocolaus Poda, Kurz-
gefassste Beschreibung
der, bey dem Bergbay zu
Schemnitz in Nieder-Hun-
garn, errichteten Maschi-
nen, Prag 1771, p. 54)

professor of mineralogy and metallurgy at the Mining academy in Schemnitz. In 1776 he accepted the chair of chemistry and botany at the University of Pavia.

Former Jesuit baron Ignaz Born (1742-1791) also taught at the academy in Schemnitz. In 1780, Born moved from Prague to Vienna and became the custodian of the court natural history museum in Vienna.

In the mid-18th century Joseph Karl Hell (1713-1789) constructed his famous pump in Schemnitz without the power supply, just with the help of hydrostatic pressure. It pumped the water from the underground of the Schemnitz mine. Joseph Karl's younger brother Maximilian Hell helped with calculations. Maximilian was at that time teaching in the nearby town Banská Bystrica.

When the compressed air left the pump through the Hell's pipe, the pipe was covered by ice that looked like snow. Gabriel Jars (1732-1769) was the first to describe the effect to the scientific Europe. Jars' father was the director of the mines in the Ghessy and Sain-Bel near Lyon. Between the years 1757 and 1759 Jars traveled with Jean Pierre François Guillot-Duhamel (1730-1816) through Saxony, Bohemia, Austria, Tyrol, Carinthia, Styria, Schemnitz and the Hungarian towns. After his return he was elected honorary member of the Paris academy on January 10, 1761, and the ordinary member on May 19, 1765 in a competition with the first candidate Lavoisier.

Tirnberger's friend Nikolaus Poda von Neuhaus (Boda, 1723-1798) later occupied the chair for mining at the Mining academy of Schemnitz. Tirnberger cooperated with Poda already in 1766 in Graz. Together they wrote a manuscript about the fossils from the collection of the museum of Graz. Poda was the professor of mathematics and physics in Graz and he also directed the nature museum. After Poda left Graz, Tirnberger replaced him as the director of the Graz observatory.


Before he left Graz for Schemnitz, Poda published a treatise about the iron mines in Styria. In 1770, Poda published with Born and Tirberger's help a treatise about the mechanism of the famous Hell's pump. Short after the publication, Tirnberger replaced Poda as the professor of mechanics and hydraulics on the Mining academy in Schemnitz in 1772.

Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), the grandfather of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), published the explanation of the Jars observation from Schemnitz. The famous Slovene Jesuit Gabriel Gruber and his brother Tobias criticized Darwin's ideas on January 1, 1791.²² Hell's pump principle was used for the oil pumping in Pennsylvania almost a century later. In 1867, the famous Slovenian geologist Markus Vincenz Lipold (1816-1883) published a book about the mine of Schemnitz.

Conclusion

Until recently, Tirnberger was relatively poorly known in Slovene historiography. We proved that his works and positions were important enough to be known by broader public.

²² Tobias Gruber, *Bemerkungen über H. Erasmus Darwins Folgerungen aus Versuchen auf die Erzeugung der Kälte durch die mechanische Ausdehnung der Luft u.s.w.* Journal der Physik 1 Heft S. 73, Gren's J. Phys. (1791), 3, pp. 188-196.



INTERNAL VIEW of the SILVER MINES near
SCHEMNITZ, in HUNGARY.

Published by the Author for C. Dresdner & K. Knauder, Dresden, 1823.

The Mine in Schemnitz
([www.antiqueprints.com / Prints/europe_views.html](http://www.antiqueprints.com/Prints/europe_views.html))

Stanislav Južnič

TIRNBERGER, JEZUITSKI ZNANSTVENIK IZ PTUJA

POVZETEK

Predniki Karla Tirnbergerja so se kot ptujski meščani že zgodaj v 18. stoletju ukvarjali s trgovino in gradbeništvom. Karlova mati je bila Marija Katarina, oče Ferdinand pa je bil gradbenik in arhitekt na Ptuju in v Mariboru. Od leta 1737 do 1740 je vodil baročno obarvana dela na razširitvi kapele Pieta v ptujski cerkvi. Karlov starejši brat, minorit Ferdinand Tirnberger (1719–1784), je bil dolgoletni profesor filozofije, provincial na Štajerskem od leta 1764 do 1767 ter vodja ptujskega samostana v letih 1767–1773, 1776–1779 in 1782–1784.

Pomembni sorodniki so zgladili pot mlademu Karlu med vrhove habsburških izobražencev. Na Dunaju je bil leta 1757 in 1758 prvi pomočnik cesarskega astronoma, jezuita Maximiliana Hella. Pri njem se je naučil dovolj, da je labko leta 1764 za osem let prevzel vodenje zvezdarne v Gradcu. V štajerski metropoli je takoj zaslovel z opazovanjem Luninega mrka. Leta 1766 je skupaj s prijateljem jezuitom Nikolausem Poda von Neuhausem opisal fosile iz zbirke graškega muzeja. Leta 1769 je prvi opazoval komet (1769, P1), kar je bil izjemen uspeh za novo graško opazovalnico. Za Halleyevem je bil to šele drugi komet, ki so mu v naslednjih letih dokazali periodično gibanje. Astronomske uspehe je Tirnberger leta 1770 dopolnil z natančnimi meritvami Jupitrovih satelitov in severnega sija.

Ob astronomskih meritvah se je ukvarjal tudi s sorodnimi opazovanji narave. Opisal je potresa leta 1767 in 1768 ter od leta 1765 do 1768 zapisoval natančne podatke o vremenu. Zbrane meritve je leta 1770 objavil v knjigi. Njegove znanstveno dobro zastavljene meteorološke meritve spadajo med najstarejše zapise o vremenskih pojavih v monarhiji in so izjemno pomembne za sodobna razmišljanja o dolgoročnih vremenskih spremembah.

Leta 1772 in 1773 je prevzel katedro za mehaniko in hidrauliko na sloviti rudarski akademiji v Banski Štiavnici (Schemnitz) na Slovaškem, v rojstnem kraju svojega učitelja Hella. Tam je sodeloval tudi z nekdanjim idrijskim zdravnikom Scopolijem.

Astronom in vremenoslovec Tirnberger se je na Slovaškem razvil še v cjenjenega rudarskega strokovnjaka. Bil je med najvidnejšimi štajerskimi prirodoslovci, ki so ujeli nove tokove moderne znanosti. Njegova poklicna in raziskovalna pot je bila značilna za tedanji čas in kraj. Izobrazil se je pri jezuitih in v njihovi kuti dosegel največje uspehe in časti. Pripadal je razmeroma svobodomiselnim krogom, ki so jezuitsko znanost dopolnjevali s prizadevanji za biter napredek monarhije po zahodnih vzorih. Med Tirnbergerjevimi prijatelji je bilo veliko znanstvenikov, ki so po letu 1773 jezuitska oblačila zamenjali za prostozidarske obrede. Tirnbergerjev prijatelj in sodelavec Poda je bil med najtesnejšimi sodelavci Ignaza von Born, ki je kmalu po Tirnbergerjevi smrti postal vodilni dunajski prostozidar.

Tirnberger je veskozi ostal povezan z rodno Spodnjo Štajersko. Sorodniki so ga v Mariboru negovali med bolezniijo. Umrl je razmeroma mlad, še pred srečanjem z Abrahamom. Kljub prezgodnjemu koncu nas njegovi dosežki navdajajo s ponosom.

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The Slovenian Self-government in November 1918

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Abstract:

In the treatise, the author presents the autonomous position of Slovenes in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, which was formed by Habsburg dominion Yugoslavs at the secession from Austria-Hungary on 29 October, 1918. This state existed until 1 December, 1918, when it associated with the Kingdom of Serbia into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The State of SCS encompassed Slovenia, Croatia with Istria and Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this state, Slovenes, for the first time in history, ruled themselves. They had their National Government of the SCS in Ljubljana, which was the first independent and democratically formed Slovene national government. The Slovene National Government, to which the National Council of SCS in Zagreb, the supreme authority in the state of SCS, transferred the supreme authority upon Slovene territory, conducted independently entire political, military, social and economic affairs. Thus, on the territory, which was under its administration, the sole, it was the full and legally supreme authority and bearer of Slovene national statehood in the State of the SCS. Independent state-legal position, which Slovenes achieved in the State of SCS was not preserved at the formation of the centralist Kingdom of SCS.

Key words:

Slovene statehood, State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, November 1918.

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One of the important features in the process of Yugoslav unification in 1918 is certainly the fact that the basis for this process was present in the independent national position of the 'Habsburg Yugoslavs' (Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire), which took shape in the formation, in November 1918, of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (the State of SCS). The State of SCS, therefore, occupies an important place in trends toward Slovene national emancipation, since this was the first time that the Slovenes demonstrated their 'distinctive state-forming component'.¹

The State of SCS was a state established by the Habsburg Yugoslavs when they seceded from the Austro-Hungarian Empire on 29 October 1918.² It existed until 1 December 1918 when it was united with the Kingdom of Serbia, becoming the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (The Kingdom of SCS). At its formation the State of SCS consisted of Slovenia (without the Prekmurje region), Croatia with Istria and Dalmatia (without Medjimurje) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prior to uniting with the Kingdom of Serbia - which was joined by Vojvodina and Montenegro on 25 and 26 November 1918 - the actual territory of the State of SCS became smaller. That is, in the first half of November 1918 the army of the Kingdom of Italy, in accordance with the 1915 Treaty of London, started to occupy Slovene Primorska, Istria, the Quarnero islands of Cres and Lošinj, northern Dalmatia and the Dalmatian islands. The State of SCS was headed by *Narodno Vijeće SHS* (the National Council of the SCS) in Zagreb, the highest body of authority in the State of SHS, the president of which was Dr. Anton Korošec, the leading politician of the time and the leader of the All-Slovene People's Party (VLS).

In the State of SCS, which was, in addition to the Kingdom of Serbia - the second predecessor state of the Kingdom of SCS established on 1 December 1918 - the Slovenes knew a brief period as a politically independent nation which had achieved its own national statehood. It must be pointed out that the State of SCS, which included a political framework for Slovene national and political independence at that time, realised all demands required by international law for the establishment and existence of states. It had its national territory, formed after the Yugoslav lands broke national legal links with Austria and Hungary. It also had its own population, since from 29 October 1918 forward, the population of the Yugoslav lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire belonged to the new State of SCS. The State of SCS also had its own organized government for, after the secession, the authorities of Austria-Hungary no longer exercised absolute power in the Yugoslav lands of the former Empire. Power was exercised by individual provincial (national) governments, and at the state level by *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb, which was the supreme authority, independent in foreign matters and therefore the sovereign state authority. Furthermore, the State of SCS conducted international relations with other countries, realising the last of the requirements for the establishment and existence of states as determined by international law.

Here, it has to be pointed out that the State of SCS proved its capability for

¹ Fran Erjavec, *Slovenci : zemljepisni, zgodovinski, politični, kulturni, gospodarski in socialni pregled*, Ljubljana 1923, p. 76.

² Jurij Perovšek, *Slovenska osamosvojitev v letu 1918 : študija o slovenski državnosti v Državi Slovencev*, Hrватов in Srbov, Ljubljana 1998 (further reading: Perovšek, *Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918*), pp. 48-54.

conducting international relations with other countries despite that it was not internationally recognised. Attention should first be drawn to the fact that the Allied governments - despite not recognising the State of SCS as a state under international law - “*acknowledged the national legal change which took place on 29 October 1918 in the south of Austria-Hungary.*”³ The supreme commander of the Allies at the Salonika Front, the French general Louis Franchet d’Esperey, thus telegraphed to *Narodno Vijeće* on 6 November 1918 that the Allied military forces in the east “*were enthusiastically saluting the Yugoslav Narodno Vijeće in Zagreb and Ljubljana, and the new Yugoslav land and naval military forces.*”⁴ In addition, the last monarch of the Hapsburg Empire, Karel I, ordered on 30 October 1918, a day after the formation of the State of SCS, that the Austro-Hungarian military fleet be handed over to “*the Yugoslav Narodno Vijeće in Zagreb.*”⁵ The view of Karel I of Hapsburg concerning the State of SCS was manifested in a statement by the commander of the First Isonzo Armada of the former Austro-Hungarian army, Lieutenant General Baron Wenzel Wurm, at a meeting with the president of the National Government of SCS, Hon. Josip Pogačnik, on 5 November 1918 in Ljubljana. Wenzel Wurm said “*that he acknowledges the sovereignty of the free Yugoslav state, which was acknowledged also by His Majesty*” and that “*he himself (Wurm) was prepared to appear before the government and repeat that.*”⁶

The national legal change and the sovereign authority of the *Narodno Vijeće* in the South Slavic territory which had been incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian state framework until 29 October 1918 was recognised by a number of other political and diplomatic factors. Thus, at the end of October and in November 1918 the Zagreb *Narodno Vijeće* received greetings, requests and notifications from the Hungarian National Council; the president of the Polish government; the papal nuncio from Vienna as the doyen of the diplomatic corps; the state secretary for foreign affairs of German Austria, Dr. Otto Bauer; the American mission to Bern; the Romanian National Council; the Danish Prime Minister; the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Bavarian mission to Vienna.⁷ In addition, the senior diplomats of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic became of the opinion that the Zagreb *Narodno Vijeće* was a sovereign body. The then people's commissar for foreign affairs, Georgij Vasiljević Čičerin, signed a document intended for the *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb saying that “*the Soviet government /.../ wished to conduct direct negotiations with the Yugoslav national council with the view of defining the conditions for the return to the homeland of all those Yugoslav people who wished to return to the countries under the rule of the Yugoslav Narodno Vijeće based in Zagreb.*”⁸

³ Ferdo Čulinović, Državnopravna historija jugoslavenskih zemalja XIX. i XX. Vijeka, Zagreb 1953, p. 345.

⁴ Franše d'Espere - Narodnom Vijeću, in: Građa o stvaranju jugoslovenske države (1. I. - 20. XII. 1918), tom II. Priredili dr. Dragoslav Janković i dr. Bogdan Krizman, Beograd 1964 (further reading: Građa II.), p. 490.

⁵ Ferdo Čulinović, Državnopravni razvitet Jugoslavije, Zagreb 1963, p. 139.

⁶ Zapisnik seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, z dne 5. novembra 1918, in: Sejni zapisniki Narodne vlade Slovenec, Hrvatov in Srbov v Ljubljani in Deželnih vlad za Slovenijo 1918-1921, 1. del: od 1. nov. 1918 do 26. feb. 1919. Za objavo pripravil Peter Ribnikar, Ljubljana 1998 (further reading: Sejni zapisniki I.), p. 75.

⁷ Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 69-70.

The fact that various foreign political and diplomatic factors recognised the national legal change in the South Slavic countries of the Hapsburg Empire, and *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb as the authority in this territory, was not the only way the State of SCS participated in the international arena at that time. The State of SCS established international relations with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, German Austria and the Kingdom of Serbia. It must be emphasised that the State of SCS was itself individually recognised by German Austria, the Kingdom of Serbia and the Democratic Republic of Hungary. The executive committee of the temporary National Assembly for German Austria thus informed the president of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, in a special note of 30 October 1918 concerning the establishment of a German-Austrian state and recognised Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as “*entirely independent states*.⁹ Moreover, at the Geneva Conference on Yugoslav unity on 8 November 1918, the president and minister for foreign affairs of the government of the Kingdom of Serbia, Nikola Pašić, recognised on behalf of his government *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb as “*the representative and the government*“ of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the former monarchy.¹⁰ According to the expert on issues of Yugoslav unification in 1918, Dr. Momčilo Zečević, “*by recognising the Narodno Vijeće of SCS, the Serbian government also recognised the new State of SCS*.¹¹ This assessment was confirmed by the declaration of the Serbian heir to the throne, Aleksandar Karađorđević, on the occasion of Yugoslav unification on 1 December 1918. He said that he “*declared the unification of Serbia with the countries of the independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs* (underlined by J. P.) *into a united kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes*.¹²

In addition, the State of SCS also received individual internationally recognition from the Democratic Republic of Hungary. Its diplomatic representative, Dr. Aladar Balla, declared, upon arriving in Zagreb on 9 November 1918, that he “*was authorised by the trust of the Hungarian National Council and the Hungarian people's government*“ to greet “*Narodno Vijeće of the absolutely freely formed sovereign Yugoslav state* (underlined by J. P.).¹³ Thus, considering the facts stated, it can be established that the State of SCS *de facto* had the nature of an international legal entity, and was a real state community of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs who had until 1918 been incorporated into the state framework of Austria-Hungary.

If we focus on Slovene national and political as well as national legal independence achieved in the State of SCS, it must be first emphasised that these were based on the internal organization of the State of SCS. It enabled the Slovenes to assert themselves as a sovereign nation, in charge of its own destiny, making independent decisions on all issues which demonstrate the independence of a sovereign and

⁸ France Klopčič, *Kritčno o slovenskem zgodovinopisu*, Ljubljana 1977, p. 281.

⁹ Arnold Suppan, *Yugoslawien und Österreich 1918-1938 : bilaterale Außenpolitik im Europäischen Umfeld*. Wien-München 1996, p. 118.

¹⁰ Zapisnik sa konferencije o jugoslovenskom ujedinjenju, Građa II, p. 523.

¹¹ Momčilo Zečević, *Slovenska ljudska stranka in jugoslovanjsko zedinjenje 1918-1921 : od majniške deklaracije do vidivdanske ustave*, Maribor 1977, p. 151.

¹² Adresa izaslanstva Narodnog Vijeća SHS prestolonasledniku Aleksandru i njegov odgovor, Građa II, p. 676.

¹³ Saopštenje o mađarskoj delegaciji u Zagrebu, Građa II, p. 532.

free national community. In the State of SCS the Slovenes had their own National Government which, with the exception of foreign affairs, incorporated all the highest decision-making, executive and administrative bodies of a state. The National Government had twelve administrative departments (branches): for internal affairs, food, education and religion, justice, social welfare, finance, transport, industry and commerce, public works and trade, agriculture, national defence and health care.¹⁴ This 1918 government, which was the first free and democratically formed Slovene government, consisted of all existing Slovene political parties: the Catholic All-Slovene People's Party, the liberal Yugoslav Democratic Party and the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. The most powerful party in the National Government was the All-Slovene People's Party, with six representatives, followed by the Yugoslav Democratic Party with five representatives, and the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party with one representative. The president of the National Government was Josip Pogačnik, a member of the VLS.¹⁵

The formation of a national government provided the Slovenes with an independent state authority. *Narodno Vijeće*, the supreme authority body in the State of SCS, retained the authority for conducting foreign and military affairs, as well as for decisions on exercising the right to pardon, annulling laws and appointing senior officials. This division of authority between the Slovene National Government and *Narodno Vijeće* in Zagreb first kept its original form; however the National Government later changed it, also starting to exercise state authority in areas which had originally been within the competence of *Narodno Vijeće*. Within Slovenia it thus eventually exercised all state authority, that is, the state authority from its own competence and from that of *Narodno Vijeće*. The Slovene National Government also conducted international relations, and its existence was taken into account by certain European governments in developing their international relations.¹⁶ The Polish ministry of foreign affairs thus communicated to the National Government at the beginning of November 1918 that "they appointed Dr Marcell Szarota as the charge d'affaires at the Yugoslav government in Ljubljana."¹⁷ The Polish representative office in Vienna informed the National Government in mid-November 1918 that "General Adam Novotny had been accredited to represent military interests of the Polish government at the National Government."¹⁸ Regular diplomatic channels were also established between the government of German Austria, or the German-Austrian national office for foreign affairs and the ministry of military affairs, and the Slovene National Government. On 14 November 1918 the commissar Dr. Josip Fasching was presented to the president of the National Government, Josip Pogačnik, "as the authorised person of the German-Austrian state office for foreign affairs in Ljubljana."¹⁹ In addition, the National Government in Slovenia also independently conducted all military affairs, and its authorised bodies (the Department of Justice

¹⁴ Uradni list Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, 4. 11. 1918, no. 1, Državljan ! (further reading: UL NV SHS).

¹⁵ Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 81-82.

¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 77-85.

¹⁷ Zapisnik 14. seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, z dne 13. listopada 1918, Sejni zapisniki I, p. 103.

¹⁸ Zapisnik 19. seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, z dne 19. listopada 1918, Sejni zapisniki I, p. 119.

¹⁹ Zapisnik 15. seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, z dne 14. listopada 1918, Sejni zapisniki I, p. 108.



President of the first
Slovenian national
government Josip
the knight Pogačnik
(Spominski zbornik
Slovenije, Ljubljana
1939, p. 59)

and the Department for National Defence) pardoned persons sentenced by Austrian judicial bodies. It also annulled, independently and at its own discretion, certain of the highest legal acts issued by the bodies of the Austrian state administration, and the acts with the highest legal force adopted by the Austrian state government. The National Government also appointed senior officials.²⁰ These practices were confirmed in a national legal respect by a special “*Decree of the entire government on the transitional administration in the territory of the National Government of SCS in Ljubljana*” (the Decree on transitional administration), which was issued on 21 November 1918 by the National Government in agreement with *Narodno Vijeće*. Under this decree *Narodno Vijeće* as the supreme governmental body in the State of SCS, allowed the National Government to manage Slovene territory on its behalf “*as part of the national, free, independent State of SCS observing democratic principles*.²¹ With this, in Slovene territory the National Government became, also in a formal respect, the only, the complete and legally the highest authority, and the holder of Slovene national sovereignty, in the State of SCS.

²⁰ Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 89-102.

²¹ UL NV SHS, 21. 11. 1918, no. 11, Naredba celokupne vlade o prehodni upravi v ozemlju Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani.

The thus emphasised national emancipation achieved by the Slovenes in the State of SCS only strengthened the already existing basis for a free national development. It was based on the activity of the National Government, which upgraded Slovene statehood in the State of SCS in different areas of social, political, military, economic, and national and cultural life. First it removed all leading representatives of the Austrian state administration on Slovene territory, and determined that heads of courts and heads of public prosecutors' offices must take a vow to the State of SCS while they were in public service. Similarly, it was determined that all Slovene military and gendarmerie must take the oath to the National Government. In so doing it established, as in every state authority, that all natural persons permanently residing in Slovene territory were legally linked to Slovenia or the State of SCS in terms of citizenship.²²

The next action by which the National Government confirmed Slovene national and political independence after seceding from the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the abolition of the political and administrative division of Slovenia into individual regions. Thus, in terms of politics and administration the Government united Slovenia, which then became a national legal entity. With that, the programme of United Slovenia was realised in the first real form. The United Slovenia of 1918 comprised, between 3 and 23 November of that year, given the Italian occupation of Trieste, the Gorizia region, Istria and the Postojna district in Carniola, the majority of the former Duchy of Carniola and the Slovene part of the former province of Styria; in other words, approximately two-thirds of the present territory of the Republic of Slovenia.²³

In the politically and administratively United Slovenia the National Government paid particular attention to creating a new, Slovene state organization in all pivotal areas of state operation - the areas of administrative, judicial and military protection. On 7 November 1918 it thus established a special Administrative Commission committed to drawing up a plan for reforming the public administration, while also reorganizing the structure of judicial institutions in Slovene territory. For this purpose it established a higher provincial court in Ljubljana. This court constituted the highest judicial authority within the territory it covered (former Carniola, Styria and Carinthia), and made the ultimate decisions in all legal matters which had up to that point been under the jurisdiction of the Austrian Supreme Court and Court of Cassation.²⁴ The National Government also established a new independent Slovene military and security system. The Slovene army consisted of 12,375 well-armed and supplied officers and soldiers, and 1773 Serbian soldiers and officers who offered to be under the command of the National Government at the beginning of November 1918 as they were returning from Austrian captivity.²⁵

In addition to the political, national legal and military areas, Slovene independence was also reflected in November 1918 in the creation of new elements of the nation's social and political life. The National Government thus annulled the

²² Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 91, 95, 159-160, 163, 166-168.

²³ Ibidem, pp. 105-106.

²⁴ UL NV SHS, 21. 11. 1918, no. 11, Naredba celokupne vlade o prehodni upravi v ozemlju Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani.

²⁵ Janez J. Švajcér, Slovenska vojska 1918-1919, Ljubljana 1990, pp. 71-72, 109-111, 113, 265.

Austrian state acts on society and assembly laws from 1867, and paragraph 23 of the Austrian state act on the press. In so doing it legalised, in accordance with the requirements of all Slovene political camps (the social democrats, liberals and Catholics) the freedom of gathering, association and free sale of newspapers and magazines. At its first session on 1 November 1918 it adopted the decision that the official language in Slovenia was Slovene, thus giving it a formative role in the new Slovene social life.²⁶

Before concluding the review of the key features of the gaining of Slovene national and political independence in 1918, attention must be paid to another, very important expression of the Slovene independence and national statehood of that time. It was represented by the aforementioned decree on transitional administration, drawn up by the Administrative Commission established on 7 November 1918. The decree on transitional administration had the character of an act with the highest legal force, higher than that of the laws, for it legitimised the bases of the newly established social and political life in a way which was otherwise regulated by constitutional provisions or the constitution. The decree did not only determine the National Government as the supreme authority in Slovene territory, but it also governed the method of Slovene state organization and prescribed the activities of the bodies of Slovene state authority. It also defined in detail the method and form of operation of political administration and self-government in Slovenia, while at the same time freshly justifying the other vital issues of social and economic life in the Slovene lands. Re-formation of its foundations was asserted in education, justice, trade supervision, financial management, post and railway communications, commercial and trade associations, mining management, measurement supervision, agrarian operations, the gendarmerie and the administrative judiciary.²⁷ The decree on transitional administration thus confirmed Slovene statehood in the form of a planned legal act, and the Slovene state-forming capacity, active only during the one-month existence of the State of SCS, was proven.

Slovene independence in November 1918 was, however, not represented merely by the assertion and organization of a national state authority. The Slovenes proved during the existence of the State of SCS that a nation which “*establishes, as the realisation of a political self-determination, its own sovereign, independent state, or realises its self-determination in a common state, is entitled to a right to determine its economic organization and development.*”²⁸ The factor in the new economic development in Slovenia was the National Government, which placed extreme significance on economic issues. The degree of attention paid to them is demonstrated by the fact that as much as half of its departments were assigned to the economy. Namely, the National Government executed its authority via the departments for food, finance, transport, industry and commerce, public works and trade, and agriculture.

Already in its first measures, the National Government began to create suitable conditions for fresh and independent Slovene economic development. First it abolished the militarization of industry plants, thus enabling the introduction of peace-

²⁶ Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 101-102, 169-170.

²⁷ Ibidem, pp. 172-173.

²⁸ Ernest Petrič, Pravica do samoodločbe : mednarodni vidiki. Maribor 1984, p.100.



A large national manifestation on October 29th 1918 on the Congress square in Ljubljana. This manifestation terminated all of the state and law ties with Austria and Slovenians came to a new state community - the state of SHS. (*Spominski zbornik Slovenije*, Ljubljana 1939, p. 57)

time production in Slovenia.²⁹ Then it began to build the Slovene national economy, and in so doing justified in different stages this important element of the Slovene national sovereignty and freedom at the time.

The National Government defined the first stage of building the Slovene economy with nationalisation, that is, declaring Austrian state capital as owned by Slovenia. Thus it started to create Slovene national property. Using a special Transitional Economic Office in Ljubljana it took possession of all military plants previously owned by the Austrian state, while the others (a chemicals factory in Moste and a soap factory in Šiška) were taken over by supervising or renting. In addition, all road and other vehicles of the former Austro-Hungarian armada were proclaimed the property of the National Government. Moreover, all estates and forests of the former Austrian state and religious treasury were declared the possession of the National Government or, as emphasised by the Government itself, a national possession. Slovene national property was also established by taking over for management and use the remainder of Austrian public property in the Slovene lands (the coal mines in Velenje and Zabukovica, the zinc factory in Celje, the powder manufacturer in Kamnik, the tobacco factory in Ljubljana and for a brief period the mercury mine in Idrija). In so doing it put itself in the position of the new owner of these public properties since the former owner, the Habsburg state, no longer existed. The National Government also took possession of the entire production and disposal of material from the paper factory in Goričane which was, however, owned by foreign private capital.³⁰ Except for introducing supervision of Goričane

²⁹ Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, p. 112.

paper factory production, the National Government did not take any measures concerning foreign private property in the Slovene lands. It decided that “*the property of those foreign citizens, who could not manage the property on their own, on account of their absence, should stay under the aegis of the government until the owner returned or took any other relevant measures.*”³¹

The National Government also took all necessary measures to enable undisturbed financial management, and it obtained the necessary financial means for the operation of the Slovene state authority. With respect to this second foundation of the Slovene economy of that time, the National Government decided that the medium of payment issued by the Austro-Hungarian bank, the krona (K), would remain legal tender, and that from 1 November 1918 all taxes, duties and fees were to be paid, accepted and charged in favour of the State of SCS (that is, in favour of the National Government). At the same time it obtained larger quantities of financial means, thus establishing the financial basis for its operation. K 36,500,000 were gathered, and this was the basis for the Government to be able to fund in November 1918 the operation of various governmental bodies and institutions in Slovene territory in the total sum of K 3,086,000, and to allocate a total of K 9,470,000 for the needs of its departments.³²

After providing the foundation for financial operations in the Slovene lands, the National Government proceeded to the third basic stage of building the Slovene economy, namely connecting the national economic forces. The aforementioned decree on transitional administration enabled the government to take control of various branches of the Slovene economy, and to take over the management of trade supervision, mining and measurement offices in Slovenia, and all financial authority, financial offices, treasuries and all monopolistic companies. For the Slovene territory it established a post and telegraph directorate, a directorate for national railways and management for the Southern Railway, which were subordinated to the government. In addition, by adopting certain other decrees it spread the operation of important economic institutions from Ljubljana to the whole of Slovenia, such as the Slovene Agricultural Society, the financial administration and management, the office for foodstuffs, and the chambers of commerce and trade; moreover, the head office of the chamber of engineers was transferred from Trieste to Ljubljana and assigned the entire Slovene territory in which to operate.³³ Parallel to these economic and political measures and wide organizational activity, the National Government also enabled the continuing operation of the existing industrial and agricultural production in Slovenia while paying all necessary attention to the issue of uninterrupted railway transport and the formation of unified supply organization in the Slovene lands.³⁴

During the brief, one-month existence of the State of SCS, the National Government was not able to carry out all ideas related to Slovene land gaining economic independence after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Alongside the

³⁰ Ibidem, pp. 113-114.

³¹ Zapisnik seje Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, z dne 5. novembra 1918, Sejni zapisniki I, p. 76.

³² Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev 1918, pp. 114-117.

³³ Ibidem, pp. 118-120.

³⁴ Ibidem, pp. 120-122, 124-125.

presented measures in the economic sector, the government did not tackle the problems of agrarian reform and the formation of principles for a future customs policy. It also did not take up economic reorganization of the Primorska region and did not assess the role of Trieste in future economic development, which was due to the Italian occupation of both Primorska and Trieste. Despite this, the government defined a historically new quality of national life for the Slovene people, who in the State of SCS proved to be more than capable of meeting key requirements in the economic sector, which constituted the precondition for free national development.

At the conclusion, let us pay some attention to another aspect of the Slovene scene of that time. Parallel to reforming the foundations of the economic sphere, individual spontaneous revolutionary phenomena occurred in November 1918 taking the form of peasants encroaching on the property of large landowners. While the working class at its gatherings limited their demands to fundamental social and political measures,³⁵ the peasants in the beginning of November 1918 briefly took over local power in individual areas (Cerklje, Brestanica, Semič and Bloke). Similar was the case of the workers in the Mežica Valley, who temporarily assumed power in Prevalje na Koroškem at the end of November and founded their revolutionary headquarters. However, the peasants were more direct in their actions. In addition to brief assumption of power in individual areas they plundered some large estates (Libeliče pri Dravogradu, Haasberg v Planini, Snežnik pri Ložu), and even attempted, spontaneously, to carry out agrarian reform. Such a situation was also observed in November 1918 in the Slovene territory outside the State of SCS. In Prekmurje, on 5 November 1918 returning soldiers attacked the castle of the countess of Zichy in Beltinci, and in the following days the revolt spread to neighbouring places. Hungarian authorities soon crushed the revolt.³⁶ At the end of November the Slovene territory which was the constituent part of the State of SCS saw more distinct movements toward strikes by railway and postal workers, as well as court employees in Maribor, all of whom were of German nationality. In expressing social and economic demands this movement supported German tendencies toward Slovene territory and was mainly of a political character. With the support of the Slovene general Rudolf Maister, and after consenting to all social demands, the National Government in the beginning of December 1918 quelled this strike movement in Maribor.³⁷

This is much material for this condensed survey of the situation of the Slovene nation in the State of SCS in November 1918. At the end attention must be drawn to the fact that the national statehood achieved by the Slovenes in the State of SCS constituted only a brief experience of national political independence which marked their path to a new state community of Yugoslav nations formed on 1 December 1918. Within the Kingdom of SCS (in 1929 it was renamed the King-

³⁵ Miroslav Stiplovšek, *O revolucionarnosti v obdobju 1918-1921*, in: *Elementi revolucionarnosti v političnem življenju na Slovenskem*, Ljubljana 1973, p. 51.

³⁶ Jurij Perovšek, Revolucionarne "občine" v Sloveniji v letih 1919-1920, *Kronika*, XXXIII (1985), no. 1, p. 50.

³⁷ Miroslav Stiplovšek, Stavkovno gibanje konec leta 1918 na mariborskem območju in vloga strokovnih sindikalnih organizacij v boju za severno mejo, *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje*, LXV (1994), no. 2, pp. 321-324.



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44, p. 349)

dom of Yugoslavia) Slovenia did not retain its previously achieved national legal independence. The first Yugoslav state constitutionally enacted Yugoslav state centralism and national unitarianism; the latter did not acknowledge the existence of the historically formed individual Yugoslav nationalities, but the existence of only one, that is, the Yugoslav nation. This was the reason why the majority of Slovenes had developed, already by the beginning of the 1920s, demands for national self-determination and an autonomous and federalist re-arrangement of the Yugoslav state. The Slovenes did not give up these demands all the way up to the end of the first Yugoslavia in 1941, and also within all existing Slovene military and political factors during the Second World War. The demand that the Yugoslav state should enable an entirely free and independent Slovene national swing was present also in the second, federative Yugoslav community. In the end it was realised outside of it, with the establishment in 1991 of the independent Slovene national state, the Republic of Slovenia.

Jurij Perovšek

SAMOVLADA SLOVENCEV NOVEMBRA 1918

POVZETEK

Po prelomu državnopravnih vezi s habsburško monarbijo je pred oblikovanjem Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (Kraljevina SHS) 1. decembra 1918 večina slovenskega naroda živelha v kratek čas obstoječi Državi Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov (Država SHS). Ta država ima v razvoju slovenskih narodnoemancipacijskih teženj pomembno mesto, kajti v njej so Slovenci prvič v svoji narodni zgodovini dokazali sposobnost za lastno državno organiziranost.

Država SHS je bila državna skupnost, ki so jo ustavili habsburški Jugoslovani ob državni odcepitvi od Avstro-Ogrske monarhije 29. oktobra 1918. Obstajala je do 1. decembra 1918, ko se je s Kraljevino Srbijo združila v Kraljevino SHS. Država SHS je ob svojem nastanku obsegala Slovenijo (brez Prekmurja), Hrvaško z Istro in Dalmacijo (a brez Medžimurja) ter Bosno in Hercegovino. Državi SHS je kot predsednik Narodnega Vijeća SHS v Zagrebu (Narodno Vijeće), najvišjega organa oblasti v Državi SHS, načeloval tedanji vodilni slovenski politik, prvak katoliške Vseslovenske ljudske stranke, dr. Anton Korošec.

V Državi SHS so Slovenci vladali sami sebi. Imeli so svojo Narodno vlado SHS v Ljubljani (Narodna vlada), v kateri so bili z izjemo zunanjih zadev združeni vsi najvišji organi izvršne oblasti, ki jih ima država. Narodna vlada je imela dvanašt upravnih oddelkov (poverjeništev): poverjeništvo za notranje zadeve, za prebrano, za uk in bogičastje, za pravosodje, za socialno skrbstvo, za finance, za promet, za industrijo in trgovino, za javna dela in obrt, za poljedelstvo, za narodno obrambo in za zdravstvo. Narodno vlado, ki je bila prva samostojna in demokratično oblikovana slovenska narodna vlada, so sestavljali predstavniki vseh tedaj obstoječih slovenskih političnih strank: Vseslovenske ljudske stranke, liberalne Jugoslavanske demokratske stranke in Jugoslavanske socialnodemokratske stranke. Najmočnejša stranka v Narodni vladi je bila VLS, v njej imela 6 svojih predstavnikov, sledili pa sta ji JDS s 5 in JSDS z 1 predstavnikom. Narodni vlad je predsedoval član vodstva VLS Josip vitez Pogačnik.

Z Narodno vlado so Slovenci dosegli lastno nacionalno državnost, ki jo je utemeljeval federativni, deloma pa celo konfederativni položaj slovenskega ozemlja v Državi SHS. Supremacija zagrebškega Narodnega Vijeća nasproti Narodni vladi je veljala le glede vodenja zunanjih in vojaških zadev ter odločanja o izvrševanju pravice do pomilostitve, razveljavljanja zakonov in imenovanja stopenj višjih uradnikov. Te pristojnosti si je za celotno Državo SHS pridržalo Narodno Vijeće. Slovenska Narodna vlada je sprvaupoštevala tako razdelitev državno-oblastnih pristojnosti v Državi SHS, kmalu pa jo je presegla in pričela svojo oblast izvajati tudi na področjih (deloma tudi glede zunanjih zadev), ki so bila v pristojnosti Narodnega Vijeća. S tem je v Sloveniji izvrševala vso oblast, to je oblast iz svojih pristojnosti in iz pristojnosti Narodnega Vijeća.

Samostojnost Narodne vlade je v državnopravnem pogledu potrdila posebna Naredba o prehodni upravi v ozemlju Narodne vlade SHS v Ljubljani, ki jo je v sporazumu z Narodnim Viječem 21. novembra 1918 izdala Narodna vlada. Po tej naredbi je Narodno Vijeće kot vrhovni organ oblasti v Državi SHS Narodni vlad prepustilo, da upravlja slovensko ozemlje "kot del narodne, svobodne, neodvisne, na demokratičnih načelih urejene države SHS." Tako je bila na slovenskem ozemlju Narodna vlada tudi v formalnem pogledu edina, popolna in pravno najvišja oblast in nosilka slovenske samostojnosti v Državi SHS. Ozemlje, ki je bilo pod upravo Narodne vlade in ki ga je Narodna vlada politično in upravno združila v državnopravno enoto, je glede na italijansko zasedbo Trsta, Goriške, Istre in postojnskega okrožja na Kranjskem med 3. in 23. novembrom 1918, obsegalo večino nekdanje dežele

Kranjske in slovenski del nekdanje dežele Štajerske, to je približno dve tretjini današnjega ozemlja Republike Slovenije.

Slovenska državnopravna samostojnost, dosežena v Državi SHS, se po oblikovanju Kraljevine SHS ni obranila. V centralistični jugoslovanski državi so bili prisiljeni v ponovni boj za narodno samoodločbo, ki jo je izražala že v začetku dvajsetih let poudarjena zahteva po slovenski autonomiji v avtonomistično-federalistično preoblikovani jugoslovanski državni zvezi. Tej zahtevi, ki jo je podpirala večina slovenskega naroda, se niso odrekli ves čas obstoja prve jugoslovanske države, polno nacionalno svobodo in suverenost pa so dosegli po drugi jugoslovanski politični in državni izkušnji - z vzpostavitvijo samostojne slovenske nacionalne države Republike Slovenije leta 1991.

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Development of Political Catholicism in Styria in 1918-1923

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Abstract:

The basic organizations of the Catholic side, after World War I active in the framework of the Slovene People's Party in Styria, were the Slovene Peasants' Association, the Yugoslav Professional Association, the Slovene Catholic Social Association - in its framework the Slovene Catholic Women's Association - and the Athletic Society *Orel* (Eagle). The two conservative newspapers in Styria, i.e. the agricultural political weekly *Slovenski Gospodar* and the political newspaper *Straža*, played the most important role in the mentioned period as heralds of the catholic political thought in Styria. To them goes the merit for the spreading of the Catholic movement in this region. The newspapers were issued and printed in the Printing Press of St. Cyril in Maribor. The latter was the connecting point of the Styrian Catholic movement in terms of ideas as well as organization. Here the seat of the Secretariat (*Tajništvo*) of the Slovene People's Party for the whole of Styria, the Mežiška Valley and Prekmurje was from March 1920 to February 1921. Up to the assembly elections in March 1923, the Catholic movement in Styria in the political sense sought support in the organization of the Slovene Peasants' Association, established in 1907, but this did not present a threat to the uniform character of the main Slovene People's Party.

Key words:

Slovenian political history, political parties in Styria, political Catholicism, printing house of st.Cyril.

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The Slovenian People's Party¹ deve loped into a central Slovenian political force owing to widely projected work in the field of ideology, organization, economy and culture in 1908-1911.² While the rise of the party stopped in the Carniola region just before the First World War broke out, it was on the peak of its power in Styria³ after the last parliamentary election in 1911.⁴

A disagreement, which originated in various programme orientations and viewpoints of the party leadership's policy, arouse in the party leadership between the old (Ivan Šušteršič, Ph.D.) and young wing (Janez Evangelist Krek) in 1912.⁵ Unlike Ivan Šušteršič, the head of the party, Janez Evangelist Krek was actively striving for close collaboration of the South Slavonic representatives in the middle of 1916, on the basis of the May Declaration⁶ which anticipated the establishment of a special

¹ From October 1909 to April 1920, the official name of the party was the Pan-Slovenian People's Party. I am using the common name, Slovenian People's Party, for the sake of better illustration of the party's continuous activity and because this name was in common use after the First World War. Until the National Assembly election on 18 March 1923, the use of double appellation was also characteristic of the Catholic political organization in Styria: the Slovenian People's Party and the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance. The Slovenian Farmers' Alliance, the pre-war Catholic political organization, used to belong to the Slovenian People's Party, but on 23 September 1920 it became officially known as the Slovenian People's Party, which is why I use the name Slovenian People's Party for the Catholic political organization in Styria after the First World War.

Tajništvo Slovenske Kmečke zveze in Ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 25. 7. 1919, p. 3; Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5; Slovenska ljudska stranka, Slovenski gospodar, 23. 9. 1920, p. 1; Kaj pomeni kratica SLS?, Straža, 22. 4. 1921, p. 4; Erjavec Franc, Zgodovina katoliškega gibanja na Slovenskem, Ljubljana 1928 (further reading: Erjavec), p. 242; Zečevič Momčilo, Slovenska ljudska stranka in jugoslovansko zedinjenje 1917-1921. Od majniške deklaracije do vidovdanske ustave, Maribor 1977 (further reading: Zečevič), p. 311.

² Zečevič, p. 36.

³ On 21 January 1907, the most prominent representatives of the Catholic political camp in Styria (Anton Korošec, Ph.D., Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D., Josip Leskovar, Ph.D., Ivan Roškar, Ph.D., Franc Jankovič, Ph.D., etc.) established the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance in Maribor framed within the Slovenian People's Party, in order to improve the living conditions of farmers. Thus a long period of political unity among the Styrian Slovenes came to an end. With the establishment of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance, the Styrian Catholic camp was developing in the framework of its district organizations which replaced the former Catholic political associations. The Slovenian Farmers' Alliance in Styria had its own network of branches all over the Slovenian Styria prior to the First World War. Well-off Styrian farmers were joined together under the leadership of President Ivan Roškar and Vice-President Franc Pišek and the party members were also active in the area of education of the Catholic youth in Young Women's Christian Associations and Marian Societies. It almost ceased to operate during the First World War, due to its internal disagreements.

Škofjski arhiv Maribor, fond: Januš Golec, Spomini (further reading: Golec, Spomini), pp. 211-212 and 214-215; Erjavec, pp. 279-280; Škerbec Matija, Pregled novodobnega katoliškega gibanja I. del, Cleveland, Ohio, 1956, p. 62; Gestrič Ferdo, Melik Vasilij, Slovenska zgodovina od konca osemnajstega stoletja do 1918, Ljubljana 1966, p. 274, 282 and 286; Zečevič, page 88; Goropevšek Branko, Občni zbor Slovenske kmečke zveze v Celju, in: Slovenska kronika XX. stoletja 1900-1941, Ljubljana 1997 (further reading: Kronika), p. 148.

⁴ Melik Vasilij, Volitve na Slovenskem 1861-1918, Ljubljana 1965, page 274-275.

⁵ Zečevič, p. 38.

⁶ The May Declaration; the declaration of 33 deputies of the Yugoslav Club, which was read by the chairman of the club, Anton Korošec, Ph.D., in the Vienna Parliament on 30 May 1917. In the declaration the deputies demanded the unification of all Yugoslav countries within the Habsburg Monarchy in an independent state body under the authority of the Habsburg Monarchy. Deputies of the Slovenian People's Party Executive Committee adopted a resolution on unification of the Slovenes

Yugoslav community within the framework of Austria-Hungary.⁷

In December 1916, the clash of opinions continued and caused division between the supporters of Šušteršič and Krek in numerous cultural, educational and professional Catholic organizations, and especially in the Cooperative Union, a business giant of the Slovenian People's Party. In November 1917, Ivan Šušteršič and his closest collaborators were suspended from the leadership position of the Slovenian People's Party.⁸ At the party's rally, on 27 December 1917, a new executive committee was elected (Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D.,⁹ and Franc Pišek¹⁰ were elected to the Central Executive Committee as the representatives of Styria) and Ivan Šušteršič, the leader of the party, was replaced by Anton Korošec¹¹, which ended the

and Croats (on the demand of Ivan Šušteršič, devoid of the Serbs) at a meeting on 25 May 1917. The party, as the most powerful Yugoslav party in the Vienna Parliament, managed to gain the majority of Yugoslav deputies to cooperate in the implementation of the programme aims, which is why its deputies were the most deserving for solving the Yugoslav issue and for the acceptance of the May Declaration. At the beginning of 1918, the party leadership managed to attract increasing number of population in the so-called declaration movement which was crucial for the declaration's success. By the middle of 1918, the deputies of the Slovenian People's Party increasingly began emphasizing the principle of national self-determination, which indicated the discontinuation of the May Declaration frame and the acceptance of the possibility of a complete downfall of Austria-Hungary.

Zečević, p. 59, 61, 64, 67, 98 and 110.

⁷ Ibidem, pp. 38-40 and 89.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 42 and 88.

⁹ Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D., (1873-1964), a theologian and politician in the Slovenian People's Party. He studied theology in Maribor from 1885 to 1897. In 1901, he conferred the doctor's degree in Vienna and was appointed professor of dogmatics at the Theological College in Maribor in 1905. Prior to the First World War, he was mainly concerned with non-political organizations, religious, educational, national defence and economic activities in the Slovenian Christian-Social Union of Styria, where he functioned as Vice-President (President since 1919). In 1917, he worked for the popularization of the May Declaration, which led him into politics. At the time of the 1918 coup, he was the President of the National Council for Styria in Maribor. In 1919-1929, he was a deputy in the Temporary National Representative Body, in the Constituent Assembly and in the National Assembly. As deputy, he was known for his fundamental, well prepared and researched speeches (some of his speeches were issued in a booklet entitled *Za svobodo in pravo*, Maribor, 1923).

Golec, Spomini, pp. 1366-1369; SBL, Volume I, p. 336; Enciklopedija Slovenije, Volume IV, p. 40.

¹⁰ Franc Pišek (1856-1922), a farmer and politician in the Slovenian People's Party. After elementary school he worked in farmers' organizations on the Drava plain (in 1882, he became a trustee of the Savings Bank of Slovenia in Maribor). He strived for the Town Council's activities in the Maribor's surroundings. As a Mayor of Orehova vas, he managed to carry out road repairs and open the railway station in 1912. He was one of the founders of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance. In 1907 he was elected to the Vienna Parliament and in 1909 in The Styrian Provincial Assembly. After the coup, he was a member of the National Council for Styria, appointed to the Temporary National Representative Body in 1919 and elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1920. He worked as Vice-President of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance and was a member of the Cooperative and Business Association committee. In the National Council he represented peasantry's interests, strived for tax equalization, food subsidization for the poor and also for aid granted by the state for natural disasters.

SBL, II. Volume, p. 366.

¹¹ Anton Korošec, Ph.D. (1872-1940), a theologian and politician in the Slovenian People's Party. He studied theology in Maribor and was ordained a priest in 1895 and conferred the doctor's degree in Vienna in 1905. He was elected to the Austrian Parliament as a representative of the general curia in the 1906 election, where he remained until the downfall of Austria-Hungary and was elected to the Styrian Provincial Assembly in 1909. In the same year he also became Vice-President of the Slovenian Parliamentary Club and in May 1914, president of the Croatian-Slovenian Community. In May 1917, he was elected president of the Yugoslavian Parliamentary Club, on behalf of which he read the May

severe internal crisis and re-established a unified political organization.¹² Anton Bonaventura Jeglič, Ph.D., Bishop of Ljubljana,¹³ who played an important role in the party at the time of ideological split, supported the policy of Anton Korošec, contributed to the strengthening of his position in the party and also helped to facilitate the reestablishment of unity.¹⁴ The bishop of the newly founded country did not have as much power to influence the Slovenian People's Party policy as he had before the First World War. The party leadership was striving for the attainment of coexistence with the Orthodox Church¹⁵ but Anton Korošec only occasionally

Declaration on 30 May 1917, demanding unification of all Yugoslav countries within the Habsburg Monarchy in an independent state body under the authorities of the Habsburg Monarchy. In December 1917, he was elected president of the Slovenian People's Party and in August 1918, president of the National Council for Slovenian Countries and Istria. In October 1918, he was elected president of the National Council in Zagreb, which on 29 October 1918 announced the founding of the Independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. He was the head of the National Council until 3 December 1918, when it ceased to function after the Yugoslav unification. In 1918 and 1919 he was the president of the Yugoslav Government, Minister of Supply and Renewal and Minister for the Economy and Mines. In 1920, he was the Minister of Transport, in 1924 the Minister of Education and Theology and in 1928 the Minister of Interior Affairs. From July 1928 to April 1929 he was the president of the Yugoslav Government. After the establishment of the dictatorship in 1929-1930, he was the Minister of Transport and after that the Minister of Forestry and Mines. Between 1935 and 1938 he was the Minister of Interior Affairs and in 1940 the Minister of Education. Beside his political functions, he was also a representative of the Temporary National Representative Body of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 1919-1920. In 1920 and 1921, he was a deputy of the Constituent Assembly and in 1921 and 1922 a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1923, 1925 and 1927, he was elected deputy of the National Assembly. In 1939 he was elected president of the Senate of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. From the formation of the Yugoslav Kingdom to his death in 1940, he was the head of the Slovenian People's Party.

SBL, I. Volume, pp. 517-520.

¹² Zečević, p. 88.

¹³ Anton Bonaventura Jeglič (1850-1937), the Bishop of Ljubljana. He graduated from secondary school in Ljubljana in 1869 and studied at the Theological College in Ljubljana until 1873. In 1876, he conferred the doctor's degree in Vienna. Since May 1878, he was assistant dean at the Theological Seminary in Ljubljana. He was dean in Sarajevo from 1882-1898 and was appointed Bishop of Ljubljana in 1898. As bishop he was striving to reorganize the clerical service, he also served as the patron of education (in 1905, he established St. Stanislav's Institution) and the protector of the Slovenian peoples' rights (he was important for his support to the May Declaration in the so-called Ljubljana Statement.)

SBL, Volume I, p. 390; Enciklopedija Slovenije, Volume IV, p. 279.

¹⁴ Zečević, pp. 86-87.

¹⁵ At the meeting, shortly after the unification, Regent Aleksander and Anton Korošec managed to resolve the disagreements based on principals, which were a threat to the condition of the Slovenian People's Party in relation to the Orthodox Church. This was important for close collaboration of the party with the Yugoslav leader in the future and also to approach the policy of Anton Korošec to the one of the National Radicals. The fundamental reasons for establishing contacts with the Serbian Radical Party were, primarily, the unsettled territory issue among The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Austria and Italy and secondly, the effort to preserve Slovenian autonomy in the new country. These were the fundamental political issues the Slovenian People's Party was dealing with at the time, until the Temporary Representative Body was summoned. The leadership of the Slovenian People's Party supported the National Radicals even though the National Radicals and the Serbian-Croatian Coalition, led by Svetozar Pribičević, ceased to cooperate at the end of April 1919 because the latter managed to reach an agreement with the members of the Serbian Opposition Alliance on amalgamation into a unified party on 11 April 1919.

Zečević, p. 192, 194, 213, 263 and 265.



Franc Pišek (1856-1922)
(PAM, phototeka, inv.
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notified the bishop of current national political events.¹⁶

On 27 May 1918, the deputies of Slovenian political parties - the Slovenian People's Party, the National Progressive Party and the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party - agreed to perform joint action in order to relieve economic and political difficulties at the end of the war.¹⁷ The idea of establishing the National Council for Slovenian countries and Istria, a representative body of the Yugoslav nation in Austria-Hungary, was carried out on 16 and 17 August 1918. The Slovenian People's Party had the majority of 18 out of 47 deputies in the National Council and Anton Korošec took over the leadership.¹⁸ The deputies of the National Council began establishing contacts with the political parties of Croatia and Serbia in order to set

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 189.

¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 110-111.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 115; Perovšek Jurij, Slovenska osamosvojitev v letu 1918. Študija o slovenski državnosti v državi Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov, Ljubljana 1998 (further reading: Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev), pp. 15-16.

up a central representative body for all Yugoslav organizations in Austria-Hungary. National Council in Zagreb, a newly founded representative body, was established at a conference on 5 and 6 October 1918. There were 8 out of 13 Slovenian deputies of the Slovenian People's Party in the National Council and the function of the chairman was being performed by Anton Korošec.¹⁹ The National Council for Styria was established in the Printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor on 26 September 1918. Its deputies mostly discussed the issues related to the establishment of the country's northern border, organized National Guards in Styria and were involved in the takeover of the authority in Styria on 1 November 1918.²⁰

The Printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor evolved from the first Slovenian Catholic Printing Society and was one of the principal economic and cultural factors for the Slovenes in Styria prior to the First World War. Some of the most important newspapers were being published in Styria such as *Slovenski Gospodar* (since 1885), *Straža* (since 1909; from 1925-1926, before it stopped being published, it was named *Naša straža*) and was the only Slovenian printing house in Maribor up to 1919.²¹ At the time of the May Declaration signature collecting in 1917, it became a Slovenian national centre in Styria. The supporters and activists of Catholic political, educational and economic organizations used to gather there.²² The Printing house of St. Cyril played an important part during the two wars by being a central connecting element of political Catholicism in Styria, because the majority of Catholic organizations were based there, including the Secretariat of the Slovenian People's Party - for some time, also for the entire Styria, The Mežica Valley and Prekmurje region (north-eastern Slovenian region).²³

On 29 October 1918, when the Independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs was declared, the Slovenian People's Party demanded a republican form of government and a federal organization of the state. Meanwhile Anton Korošec, the leader of the Slovenian People's Party, managed to provoke disorder and resistance in most of the party's leadership by striving for monarchy and opposing the federal system at negotiations with the Serbian government in Geneva.²⁴ The Republican idea of unification developed in the Slovenian People's Party mainly from fear that the Orthodox Church would disagree with the party's policy and also from conviction that the idea of autonomy, as the basic postulate of party's programme,

¹⁹ Zečević, pp. 119-123; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, pp. 29-30.

²⁰ Mikuž Metod, Oris zgodovine Slovencev v starji Jugoslaviji 1917-1941, Ljubljana 1965 (further reading: Mikuž), p. 57 and 63; Hartman Bruno, Založništvo v Mariboru med svetovnima vojnami, v: Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, 70/NV 35 (1999), No. 1-2, p. 147.

²¹ Hartman Bruno, Založništvo v Mariboru med svetovnima vojnami, and: Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, 70/NV 35 (1999), No. 1-2, p. 145 and 147; Potočnik Dragan, Založniška dejavnost in pregled mariborskih časnikov in časopisja v obdobju med svetovnima vojnami, in: Kronika; časopis za slovensko krajevno zgodovino, (2001), No. 1-2, p. 103; Šlebinger Janko, Slovenski časniki in časopisi. Bibliografski pregled od 1797-1936, and: Razstava slovenskega novinarstva v Ljubljani 1937, Ljubljana 1937 (further reading: Šlebinger), p. 13.

²² Erjavec, pp. 18-19.

²³ Golec, Spomini, pp. 793-797, 1175, 1187, 1190-1191, 1199, 1200-1201 and 1207-1208; Za organizacijo, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 3. 1920, p. 4; Tajništvi KZ v Mariboru in Celju, Slovenski gospodar, 24. 2. 1921, p. 2.

²⁴ Zečević, pp. 142-143 and 161.

would be easier to implement under the Republican system.²⁵ At the same time, Josip Hohnjec, the leading Styrian Catholic performer, was also in favour of the republican form of government.²⁶ Due to the rapidly-occurring events concerning unification, the leadership did not form a unified position about the form of government, which is why the clash of opinions re-emerged between the Republicans and Monarchists in the Slovenian People's Party in December 1920, after the Constituent Assembly election.

Due to the risk of the Italian invasion of the territory of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, on 16 November 1918, the Provincial Government of Dalmatia addressed the National Government in Ljubljana²⁷, proposing the immediate unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro.²⁸ Members of the Slovenian People's Party executive committee were having difficulties reaching a unified position, which is why they established a special 23-member executive committee of the party on 21 November, dealing with political matters of national importance. The committee rejected the proposition and re-established the republican form of government.²⁹ The National Government did not vote on the proposition. The voting was postponed for the National Council's session in Zagreb on 23 November, where they elected a committee of seven in order to form a joint proposition of the National Council.³⁰ Izidor Cankar, member of the Slovenian People's Party, was the only Slovenian member of the committee and his appointment signified the beginning of the approach of the Slovenian People's Party policy to the policy of the Serbian parties and pushed the indeterminate position on the republican form of government aside.³¹ The committee of seven elected a 28-member delegation, members of which were authorised to officially implement the unification of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro on behalf of the National Council and on the basis of elaborated "*directives for the members*." As members of the Slovenian People's Party, Anton Korošec (replaced by Janko Brejc) and Izidor Cankar were also the members of the delegation. However, the provisions of the committee of seven were approved by Lovro Pogačnik on behalf of the party.³²

On 30 December, Janko Brejc and Izidor Cankar participated in the formation of the National Council's memorandum which was read by Ante Pavelić, member of the Council, on 1 December 1918, at the meeting of the National Council's delegation and Serbian leaders in Belgrade.³³ Aleksander Karadorđević announced the unification of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs in the name of King Peter I. (hereafter referred to as: the Kingdom

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 307.

²⁶ Mikuž, p. 70.

²⁷ Zečević, pp. 138, 165-166; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 59.

²⁸ Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 136.

²⁹ Zečević, pp. 168-169; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 137.

³⁰ Zečević, p. 171; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, pp. 139-140.

³¹ Zečević, p. 173.

³² Zečević, p. 173; Perovšek, Slovenska osamosvojitev, p. 145.

³³ Zečević, p. 178.

of SHS) and thereby constitutionally identified the Serbs as the holders of the Yugoslav unification.³⁴ Anton Korošec was not involved in the act of unification, as he did not arrive in Ljubljana before 2 December 1918. After his arrival to the country, he approved the political decisions of the Slovenian People's Party deputies which had been made at the time of his absence, although he disapproved of the party's republican tendencies. He also approved the National Council's memorandum for the Regent Aleksander, doubting that the unification had been hasted.³⁵

The first concentration government of the Kingdom of SHS was formed on 20 December 1918 by Stojan Protić (the National Radical Party) and the post of vice-president was occupied by Anton Korošec.³⁶ The measures regarding liquidation of the provincial governments³⁷ were adopted by the government at the first session, however the new Provincial Government in Ljubljana (Janko Brejc, the chairman) was not appointed until 28 February 1919. There were only 4 commissariats instead of the previous 12 (interior, education, jurisdiction and agriculture), which provoked protests among the members against the Cabinet in Belgrade accompanied by the demands to establish the Provincial Assembly for Slovenia. This conflict is known in historiography as February provincial crisis.³⁸ The demand for the formation of provincial assemblies, to whom the provincial government would be responsible, had already been contained in the memorandum of the National Council from 1 December 1918, which is why on 10 January 1919, the deputies of the Slovenian People's Party and Yugoslav Social Democratic Party reached an agreement to elect 90 deputies to the Provincial Assembly for Slovenia. The leadership of the Slovenian People's Party strived for broad competences of the Provincial Assembly, which caused a dispute with the Yugoslav Democratic Party leaders, who agreed only upon the assembly's supervisory function. The demands met a severe resistance of the government, which urged the initiation of centralistic measures in the government at that time, which is why the formation of the assembly was not approved by the government. According to the Cabinet's decision, the parties were permitted to have non-obligatory meetings and discussions about current political issues, whereas the decision to convene the Provincial Assembly was postponed until after the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.³⁹ Demand for the formation of the provincial assembly was also made in the Styrian Catholic camp on 16 January 1919, when the Constituent Assembly representatives were elected in Celje by the party's confidents. It was stated that the convening of the Provincial Assembly was an indispensable national and economic necessity due to the unsettled border issue in Carinthia, problems with food supply and road network maintenance.⁴⁰

On 20 February 1919, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovenian People's Party in Ljubljana, a decision on the necessary renovation of local organi-

³⁴ Perovšek Jurij, *Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva. Nacionalna politika liberalnega tabora v letih 1918-1929*, Ljubljana 1996 (further reading: Perovšek, *Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva*), p. 99.

³⁵ Zečevič, pp. 177-178, 182, 190 and 193.

³⁶ Ibidem, p. 200 and 202.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 204.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 210.

³⁹ Ibidem, pp. 224-227.

⁴⁰ Zbor zaupnikov Jugoslovanske ljudske stranke v Celju, Straža, 17. 1. 1919, p. 1; Zahtevamo deželni

zations of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance was made, as basic units of the leading Slovenian People's Party. Concerning the party's tendencies to spread its activity, there was talk about establishing the national Yugoslav Farmers' Association⁴¹. Active renewal of the district and local organizations of the Slovenian People's Party took place in Styria in the first half of 1919. At the time, the most active adherents of the Catholic Camp were: Vladimir Pušenjak, Franjo Žebot, Josip Hohnjec, Ph.D., Ivan Vesenjak, Ivan Benkovič, Ph.D., and Mihael Brenčič.⁴² In January, political assemblies started to expand from the wider territory of Slovenske gorice across the Drava region, the Posavje region and the Savinja River Valley.⁴³ The district organization in Maribor was renewed on 19 February 1919; Josip Leskovar, Ph.D.,⁴⁴ was elected head of the district organization of the right bank of the Drava river and Evald Vračko, a cleric, was elected head of the left bank of the Drava river.⁴⁵ At the end of April 1919, the district organization of the Slovenian People's Party was founded in Celje,⁴⁶ under the leadership of Anton Ogrizek, by which the district and

zbor, Slovenec, 12. 2. 1919, p. 1.

⁴¹ The Yugoslav Farmers' Association was established in Ljubljana on 5 May 1919, as a central organization of district and local organizations of farmers under the protection of the Slovenian People's Party. Its official gazette was called *Domoljub* (Patriot), which was being published from 27 March 1919, with a subtitle '*Glasilo Jugoslovanske kmetske zveze*' (the Gazette of the Yugoslav Farmers' Association). The political organization of the peasantry for the increase of Slovenian economic independence was established by the leadership of the Slovenian People's Party framed within the provisions of the constitutional law. The Slovenian Farmers' Alliance in Styria also joined the Yugoslav Farmer's Alliance in May 1919, in compliance with the decisions of the Slovenian People's Party leadership in January 1919. However, its legal status was exceptional compared with other joined members. The Slovenian Farmers' Alliance local organizations in Slovenia, political organizations of the peasantry, were registered as societies, which were directly connected with the Yugoslav Farmers' Association leadership, whereas the Styrian organization of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance was a part of the Slovenian People's Party political organization.

Zborovanje zaupnikov Vseslovenske ljudske stranke; Zbor štajerskih zaupnikov VLS, Slovenec, 17. 1. 1919, p. 13; Ustanovitev Jugoslovanske kmetske zveze, Domoljub, 8. 5. 1919, p. 190; Ustanovitev Jugoslovanske kmetske zveze, Slovenec, 6. 5. 1919, pp. 1-2; Občni zbor Jugoslovanske kmetske zveze, Slovenec, 10. 11. 1922, pp. 1-3; Program Kmečkih Zvez; Pravila okrajnih Kmečkih zvez; Pravila Jugoslovanske Kmečke Zveze, Ljubljana 1920, pp. 12-20; Mikuž, pp. 162-163.

⁴² Slovenska Kmečka zveza, Slovenski gospodar, 9. 1. 1919, p. 2; 16. 1. 1919, p. 2; Središče, Slovenski gospodar, 30. 1. 1919, p. 4; Dopisi, Slovenski gospodar, 6. 2. 1919, p. 3-4.

⁴³ Ljutomer, Straža, 7. 1. 1919, p. 4; Laporje, Slovenski gospodar, 30. 1. 1919, p. 4; Zavrč, Poljčane, Dol pri Hrastniku, Slovenski gospodar, 6. 2. 1919, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁴ Josip Leskovar (1875-1965), Ph.D., a lawyer and politician of the Slovenian People's Party. After graduation in 1896, he studied law in Graz and Vienna where he conferred the title of 'doctor' in 1902. As a lawyer he moved to Maribor in 1910 and devoted himself to the national awakening of the Slovenes in Styria. After the coup he was the head of the defence in the Styrian National Council. From 1919-1926, he was the regent of the Maribor district, in 1920 the government commissioner of the town municipality of Maribor and from 1925-1927, he was the Mayor of the town of Maribor. He was elected president of the regional assembly and committee in Maribor in 1927. After the establishment of dictatorship in 1929, he was the leader of the regional self-government until its abolishment after the country had been divided into provinces.

SBL, I. Volume, p. 638; Menaše, p. 569.

⁴⁵ Štajerska 'Kmečka zveza', Slovenec, 22. 2. 1919, p. 6; Sestanek okrajnih zaupnikov SKZ, Straža, 21. 2. 1919, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Za celjski sodni okraj, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 2. 1919, p. 3 and Straža, 10. 2. 1919, p. 2; Celjska skupina VLS, Slovenec, 22. 4. 1919, p. 3.

local organization of the Slovenian People's Party in Styria were entirely renewed.⁴⁷ The development of the Slovenian People's Party district organizations lagged behind in the Posavje region, where the representative body of the newly founded Independent Rural Party developed its base in June 1919.⁴⁸ The secretariat of the Slovenian People's Party in Celje was established in June and located in hotel 'Beli vol' and in Maribor it was located in the Printing house of St. Cyril in July 1919.⁴⁹ At first, the secretariats were operating mainly as advisory service in tax, legal, military, insurance etc. matters and their establishment achieved the Styrian Catholic camp uniformity and stimulated its activity.⁵⁰

The Slovenian People's Party deputies were pleased with the expansion of the Slovenian People's Party district organizations at the end of 1919, as the number of its members was increasing in spring 1919. There were about 183 district organizations of the Slovenian People's Party registered in Styria.⁵¹ Rapid development of the Catholic organization was also characteristic of other places in Slovenia.⁵² In June 1920, they were able to write in *Slovenski gospodar*. "Our party has now got a structured political organization to the very last mountain village."⁵³ In January 1919, a process of the democrat party unification⁵⁴ began, which is why the Slovenian People's Party leadership began to seriously consider the organizational unification of the Catholic parties at national level. The idea was not new as such efforts had already been initiated in 1917, by Janez Evangelist Krek and Anton Korošec. The Slovenian Catholic circles favourably observed the attempts to reorganize the Slovenian People's Party into a pan-national party, mainly due to the feeling of terror of the Orthodox Church.⁵⁵ On 16 January 1919, at the party's assemblies in Ljubljana and Celje, the party leadership adopted the decision to rename the party into the Yugoslav People's Party, however, the name was not widely accepted due to the subsequent poor results of the pan-Yugoslav Catholic action; Straža was the only newspaper of all Catholic newspapers using this name.⁵⁶

⁴⁷ Organizacija SKZ se lepo razvija, Straža, 28. 4. 1919, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Glas iz Posavja, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 3. 1919, p. 2; Posavska nova politika, Slovenski gospodar, 21. 8. 1919, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁹ Naša politična organizacija, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 7. 1919, p. 3; Organizacija naše stranke, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 8. 1919.

⁵⁰ Politično delo na Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 8. 1919, pp. 2-3; Somišljenikom Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 8. 1921, p. 2.

⁵¹ Politično delo na Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 8. 1919, pp. 2-3; SLS v Mariboru, Slovenec, 11. 10. 1919, p. 3; Naša stranka za potrebe ljudstva, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 3. 1920, p. 1-2; Pred glavno skupščino naše stranke, Straža, 2. 4. 1920, p. 2.

⁵² Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5.

⁵³ Kmetska zveza, Slovenski gospodar, 13. 5. 1920, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Koncentracija je bila zaključena maja 1919 z ustanovitvijo vsedržavne Jugoslovanske demokratske stranke pod vodstvom Ljubomirja Davidovića.

Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva, p. 130.

⁵⁵ Zečević, pp. 245 and 251-252.

⁵⁶ Zbor zaupnikov Jugoslovanske ljudske stranke v Celju, Straža, 17. 1. 1919, p. 1; Zečević, pp. 244-246 and 260-262.

Before the beginning of the Temporary National Representation sessions⁵⁷ in Belgrade on 1 March 1919, the Provisional Constitution of the Kingdom of SHS was adopted under orders on 30 January 1919 by the Cabinet. Its wording was first published in *Službene novine* on 8 February 1919, but was afterwards immediately cancelled. There was an attempt of the Serbian leading parties to expand the Serbian constitution on the territory of the entire country, which was sharply condemned by the Croatian parties' deputies.⁵⁸ The Slovenian People's Party doubtfully accepted the government's provision because the Provisional Constitution anticipated centralistic organization of the state, but however one of the undersigned was also Anton Korošec, vice-president of the government. At a session on 20 February, the leadership declared its opposition to the constitution's wording and appealed against the establishment of democratic principles in adopting the legislation.⁵⁹ Anton Ogrizek officially acknowledged the adopted position in the Styrian Catholic camp, but other Catholic leaders did not take sides regarding the Provisional Constitution.⁶⁰

With the appearance of the Croatian issue⁶¹ at the beginning of 1919, the leadership of The Slovenian People's Party was defending the Government's and the

⁵⁷ The Cabinet delayed the summons of the Temporary National Representative Body and solved the issues under its authority with regulations, which caused confusion in the government and economy. The Slovenian People's Party representatives formulated fundamental political demands, which were a part of the party policy until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The demands were as follows: solving currency issues, agrarian reform implementation, supply for the population with basic necessities of life and legal provisions in the area of educational system to establish Slovenian University. Soon after their arrival in Belgrade, the Slovenian People's Party deputies gathered the Catholic deputies from the other parts of the country, which meant the beginning of implementation of the decision on formation of the Yugoslav People's Party. Under the presidency of Anton Korošec, the representatives established a club of representatives of the Slovene People's Party and Croatian Popular Party in March 1919 (until 7 May 1919, they were still non-organized supporters of the newspaper *Narodna politika*), consisting of 19 representatives; later on the representatives of the Croatian Bunjevsko-Šokačka Party joined the club. On 16 January 1919, the Styrian confidants of the Slovenian People's Party elected the following representatives into the Temporary National Representative Body: Anton Korošec, Josip Hohnjec, Franc Janković, Franc Pišek, Ivan Roškar, Anton Turnšek and Ivan Vesenjak. Josip Hohnjec, Ivan Vesenjak and Franc Pišek were the most active Styrian representatives in the Temporary National Representative Body.

Stenografski zapisniki Začasnega narodnega predstavnštva Kraljestva Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev, Zagreb 1921, volume I/21. 3. 1919, pp. 42-44; 23. 3. 1919, p. 75; 25. 3. 1919, pp. 114-117; 10. 5. 1919, pp. 388-389; volume IV/16. 7. 1919, p. 56; 10. 9. 1919, p. 176; volume III/26. 6. 1919, pp. 72-73; Govor poslanca VLS Ivana Vesenjaka, Slovenec, 1. 4. 1919, pp. 2-3; Govor našega poslanca v proračunski razpravi, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 4. 1919, p. 1; Interpelacije Jugoslovanskega kluba, Slovenec, 13. 4. 1919, p. 2; Položaj in rešitev prekmurskih Slovencev, Slovenec, 13. 5. 1919, p. 5; Povišanje tarifov na južni železnici, Slovenec, 17. 5. 1919, pp. 4-5; Politične vesti. Radi pomanjkanja usnja, Straža, 27. 6. 1919, p. 3; Usnja primanjkuje, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 7. 1919, p. 3; Pomanjkanje soli v Sloveniji, Slovenec, 22. 7. 1919, p. 5; Pomanjkanje soli, Slovenski gospodar, 24. 7. 1919, p. 2; Vesenjak Ivan, V pojasnilo in odgovor, Straža, 9. 9. 1919, p. 1; Zbor zaupnikov Jugoslovenske ljudske stranke v Celju, Straža, 17. 1. 1919, p. 1; Zečević, pp. 212-213, 229-230, 239, 252 and 258; Engelsfeld Neda, Prvi parlament Kraljestva Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca - Privremeno narodno predstavnštvo, Zagreb 1989, p. 112.

⁵⁸ Zečević, p. 234.

⁵⁹ Zborovanje vodstva VLS, Slovenec, 21. 2. 1919, p. 1.

⁶⁰ Ustanovni shod SKZ za Gomilski okoliš, Straža, 16. 5. 1919, p. 3.

⁶¹ The representatives of the Croatian Peasant People's Party lead by Stjepan Radić began demanding the revision of the act of unification, convocation of the Croatian Constituent Assembly and the

National Radical Party policy.⁶² However, in the following years it was rejecting the policy of abstention of the Croatian Republican Peasant Party in the National Assembly.⁶³ Anton Korošec reproached Stjepan Radić for his separatist activity and for provoking the hatred toward the Serbs, whereas Stjepan Radić was rejecting the Slovenian People's Party policy toward the Government. Since they were both defending the idea of autonomy in their programme, the parties were political rivals in the new country. At the beginning of 1919, disagreements between their leaders grew into a public dispute, gaining wider dimensions after the occupation of Prekmurje region by the Yugoslav Army. Despite the decision of the Minister of the Internal, Svetozar Pribičević, made on 2 September 1919, about the indivisibility of mutual territory until the Constitution's adoption, the Croats began taking charge of the south-east part and the Slovenes of the west part.⁶⁴ The Catholic Camp leadership in Styria severely rejected the Croatian interests in the occupied territory: "Now the Croats arrive and want to occupy our territory in the name of Croatia, a territory which is ours for the sake of our language, the nation's desire, historical and geographical circumstances and owing to our continuous, hard work and the Croats are legally not entitled to it by any means."⁶⁵

On 1 April 1919, the Slovenian People's Party reinforced their position in the Government, since Josip Gostinčar took up the post of the Minister of Social Policy and Anton Korošec became the Minister of Food.⁶⁶ The representatives of the Temporary National Representative Body submitted numerous interpellations against him, due to the Government's plans on the repeated requisition of supplies.⁶⁷ However, on 2 July, under the presidency of Anton Korošec, the Cabinet granted the proposition of the Minister of Education, Ljubomir Davidović, to establish the University of Ljubljana.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, on 10 May 1919, the deputies of the Slovenian People's Party, Yugoslav Democratic Party and Yugoslav Socio-Democratic Party signed an agreement for continuation of their mutual collaboration, which lasted

announcement of the Independent Republic of Croatia framed within the Yugoslavian Federation, which provoked disagreements with Serbian centralist parties.

Zečević, pp. 293-294; Gligorjević Branislav, Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji (1919-1929), Belgrade 1979 (further reading: Gligorjević), p. 43.

⁶² Zečević, p. 300.

⁶³ Iz seje vodstva SLS, Slovenski gospodar, 25. 5. 1922, p. 1; Seja vodstva SLS v Celju, Straža, 22. 5. 1922, p. 1; Naše zborovanje pri Sv. Lovrencu na Pohorju, Slovenski gospodar, 27. 4. 1922, p. 3; Kraljevina SHS, Slovenski gospodar, 27. 4. 1922, p. 3; Naša zborovanja, Straža, 3. 5. 1922, p. 2; Veličastna manifestacija za SLS, Slovenec, 19. 4. 1922, p. 1; Zečević, p. 357.

⁶⁴ Zečević, pp. 296-297.

⁶⁵ Slovenski bratje v Prekmurju pozdravljeni!, Straža, 11. 8. 1919, p. 1; Osvobojena Prekmurska!, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 8. 1919, p. 1; Tedenske novice. V Murski Soboti, Straža, 16. 8. 1919, p. 2; Prvi ljudski tabor v Prekmurju, Slovenski gospodar, 21. 8. 1919, p. 1; Gospodom Hrvatom, Straža, 1. 9. 1919, p. 1.

⁶⁶ Zečević., p. 267.

⁶⁷ Ribnikar Adolf, Dr. Korošec za zopetno rekvizicijo kmetijskih pridelkov, Nova doba, 12. 6. 1919, p. 1; Minister dr. Korošec o prehrani v Jugoslaviji, Slovenski gospodar, 5. 6. 1919, p. 1; Nepoštena hujškarija, Slovenski gospodar, 12. 6. 1919, p. 1; Politične vesti. Zakaj napadajo demokrati dr. Korošca?, Straža, 16. 6. 1919, p. 2.

⁶⁸ Zečević, p. 270.

only for a short period of time. Albin Prepeluh and Anton Kristan, the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party deputies, resigned at the Provincial Government meeting on 17 June 1919, causing the Provincial Government crisis and dispute between the deputies of the Slovenian People's Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party.⁶⁹ On 2 July 1919, the Yugoslav Democratic Party leadership demanded a resignation of the entire Provincial Government, which contrary to the central organs, Janko Brejc, the party's president, did not wish to execute.⁷⁰ All the commissioners of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and Yugoslav Social Democratic Party resigned on 5 November 1919, provoking the downfall of the Provincial Government. The new one was established just a day after by Gregor Žerjav, Ph.D., the leader of the Yugoslav Democratic Party, which resulted in the loss of the Slovenian People's Party commanding position in Slovenia.⁷¹ Increasingly, the civil servants supporting the Slovenian People's Party were removed from office and replaced by the supporters of the Yugoslav Democratic Party.⁷²

In August 1919, considerable relationship deterioration appeared between the Slovenian People's Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party, also due to the draft law proposed by Pavel Marinković (Yugoslav Democratic Party), the Minister of Education, for reorganization of educational system in such manner that the separation of school and Catholic Church would be ensured, which was the reason for the beginning of the so-called cultural conflict.⁷³ In connection with democratic initiative to close down the Private female teachers' colleges run by the School Sisters in Maribor, the Slovenian People's Party deputies in Styria also gave attention to the cultural issues of the Government and refused the new law proposal.⁷⁴ In the proposal for the reform and improvement of educational system they demanded good and general school education, Christian education, the assurance of possibility for healthy physical development of school age youth and also the abolition of the whole-day school mainly for rural youth.⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 254 and 269.

⁷⁰ Dr. Brejc Janko, Od prevrata do ustave, in: Slovenci v desetletju 1918-1928. Zbornik razprav iz kulturne, gospodarske in politične zgodovine. Uredil: Josip Mal, Ljubljana 1928, p. 213; Zečević, p. 270; Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva, p. 139.

⁷¹ Zečević, p. 286.

⁷² Ibidem, p. 288; Perovšek, Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva, pp. 139-140.

⁷³ Following the suspension of parliamentary procedures, the solving of uniformity of legislation in the field of cultural policy in the Kingdom of SHS many times reached level of mutual settlements of the accounts among parties and efforts to prevail over cultural and educational institutions, which is characterised as cultural conflict.

Zečević, p. 282; Dolenc Ervin, Kulturni boj. Slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS 1918-1929, Ljubljana 1996 (further reading: Dolenc, Kulturni boj), p. 363.

⁷⁴ Šolske sestre v Mariboru, Straža, 29. 9. 1919, pp. 1-2; Mariborske novice. Ženske paralelke na moškem učiteljišču v Mariboru - dovoljene, Nova doba, 23. 9. 1919, p. 2; Mariborske novice. Kakšno je učiteljišče v mariborskem samostanu?, Nova doba, 2. 10. 1919, p. 2; Katoliška vera in znanost, Straža, 6. 10. 1919, p. 2; Kulturni boj - ka-li?, Nova doba, 11. 10. 1919, pp. 1-2; Nabirajte po župnijah proteste, Straža, 29. 9. 1919, p. 1; Starši, ali vam ni žal otrok?, Slovenski gospodar, 18. 9. 1919, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁵ Hohnjec dr. Josip, Organizacija šolstva v kraljestvu SHS, Straža, 2. 6. 1920, p. 1; Kakor en mož, Straža, 3. 10. 1919, p. 2; K preosnovi šolskega zakona I., II., III., Slovenski gospodar, 24. 4. 1919, pp. 1-2; 8. 5. 1919, pp. 1-2; 15. 5. 1919, p. 2.

The dispute among the ministers of the National Radical and Yugoslav Democratic Party culminated at the proceedings of the Cabinet on 26 and 28 July 1919. The Prime Minister Stojan Protić demanded a resignation of the Interior Minister, Svetozar Pribićević, who did not express his consent. Consequently, on 1 August 1919, the Government tendered its resignation.⁷⁶ During the crisis, Anton Korošec actively strived to smooth relations between the deputies of the clashing parties, for the formation of concentration government, for the regime change in Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia and also for the passing of the law on agrarian reform.⁷⁷ Regarding the solution of the agrarian reform issue, the Slovenian People's Party strived for forest nationalization and distribution of landed property among the peasants, excluding the church property. Land distribution would be under the supervision of a special agrarian reform office in the Provincial Government in Ljubljana. Due to desire to restore the economic cooperative system, they were striving for the immediate realization of the agrarian reform.⁷⁸ The Styrian Catholic camp would emphasise the necessity of just and equitable realization of the agrarian reform for the peasants, the expropriatees and the state.⁷⁹

On 7 August 1919, the regent Aleksander gave a term of office for Government formation to Ljubomir Davidović, who formed a coalition government consisting of the Social Democratic Party deputies and several smaller political groups. Anton Korošec refused to participate in the Government on behalf of the Yugoslavian Club and demanded the formation of Concentration Cabinet on the basis of reconciliation between the deputies of the National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party. Additionally, he also re-established the demand for the Provincial Assembly formation, which Ljubomir Davidović rejected as unacceptable in the respect of national interests.⁸⁰

The Yugoslav club deputies decided to collaborate with the deputies of opposition parties in the so-called 'tactical community' which was established in order to concentrate the split parties in a strong oppositional body.⁸¹ In the public proclamation 'Slovenskemu ljudstvu' they demanded the solution of essential political and economic issues such as: agrarian reform and municipal election implementation, currency change, adoption of the War Profits Act and Election Act, solving of disabled persons' status, introduction of the 8-hour workday etc.⁸² On 11 September 1919, the Styrian Catholic camp representatives ratified the Yugoslav Club policy and at the same time adopted the party's fundamental course of action in the changed political relations. They strived for the convening of the Chamber of Agriculture; establishment of universal, equal and secret suffrage; municipal elec-

⁷⁶ Gligorijević, p. 45.

⁷⁷ Zečević, p. 275; Gligorijević, p. 46.

⁷⁸ Zečević, p. 277; Gligorijević, p. 41.

⁷⁹ Naš agrarni program, Straža, 28. 4. 1920, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Gligorijević, p. 46 and 48.

⁸¹ Zečević, p. 279.

⁸² Slovenskemu ljudstvu!, Slovenec, 26. 8. 1919, p. 1.

tion notice⁸³ and Constituent Assembly election; currency change;⁸⁴ agrarian reform implementation; national financial support for primary education; protection of agricultural land; streamflow regulation and completion of railway links in Styria and general availability of hunting and fishing.⁸⁵

Ljubomir Davidović resigned from his position of Prime Minister on 12 September 1919, due to difficulties which occurred at the signing of peace treaty with the Republic of Austria. However, it was re-established on 16 October, and practically unchanged. On 8 October, Anton Korošec and the Slovenian People's Party deputies deserted Belgrade in protest, arguing that the long-term solution of the government crisis is achievable only by new election notice.⁸⁶ On 9 November 1919, massive protest meetings were held in Ljubljana, Maribor and Celje by the Slovenian People's Party leadership, where the votes of no confidence were passed against the Government of Ljubomir Davidović. Anton Korošec was the main spokesperson in Ljubljana, Karel Verstovšek in Maribor and Anton Ogrizek in Celje.⁸⁷ The government of Ljubomir Davidović was not supported by the Temporary National Representative Body, which is why the government convened sessions only occasionally. Nevertheless, on 15 December 1919, it was suspended by the government until 15 February 1920. The opposition leaders, one of them was Anton Korošec, severely opposed that kind of government action. In the joint resolution 'Razglas ljudstva' from 4 December 1919, one of the demands was to ensure proper functioning of the Temporary National Representative Body until the summons of the Constituent

⁸³ The Slovenian People's Party leadership did not support the demand on municipality election notice in Slovenia in December 1919 anymore, since the party had lost its predominant position in the Provincial Government. At the beginning of 1920, they demanded universal suffrage and organized protest meetings, several of them also took place in Styria. Preparations for an election, during which Franjo Žebot was committed for trial due to an attempt of corruption of a state officer (in order to obtain copies of electoral registers) ran parallelly with the protest meetings. A campaign against Viljem Pfeifer, Ph.D., a government commissioner of the town of Maribor, was launched for the sake of which he resigned in the end, but the president of the Provincial Government, Gregor Žerjav, Ph.D., did not accept his resignation.

Vsiljene občinske volitve, Slovenski gospodar, 8. 1. 1920, p. 3; Občinske volitve pred durmi, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 1. 1920, p. 1; Samostojna in ovdruštvo, Slovenski gospodar, 8. 1. 1920, pp. 2-3; Agitator mariborskih klerikalcev Franc Žebot aretiran, Nova doba, 14. 2. 1920, p. 2; Kako je bil aretiran Žebot?, Slovenski gospodar, 5. 2. 1920, p. 5; Strupeni sadovi demokratske vlade, Straža, 9. 1. 1920, p. 2; Nekaj kritike glede vlade g. dr. Pfeiferja v Mariboru, Straža, 12. 1. 1920, p. 2; Odgovor dr. Pfeiferja, Straža, 23. 1. 1920, p. 2; G. dr. Vilko Pfeifer, Straža, 6. 2. 1920, p. 3; Resnicoljubnim lažnikom, Mari-borski delavec, 7. 2. 1920, p. 2; Shodi za žensko volilno pravico, Domoljub, 25. 2. 1920, p. 8; Shod delavskega ženstva, Večerni list, 13. 3. 1920, p. 2; Zborovanja, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 1. 1920, p. 5; Poročila, Slovenski gospodar, 5. 2. 1920, pp. 3-4; Zečević, p. 291.

⁸⁴ On 12 January 1920, the Government announced its decision to change crown for dinar at a ratio of 4 to 1, which the Catholic Camp - also in Styria - received with disapproval. At the end of 1919, the party reached the decision to change crown for dinar at a ratio of 1 to 1, which had frequently been discussed in the temporary National Representative body by Josip Hohnjec.

Pri zamenjavi denarja se ljudstvo ne sme oškodovati, Domoljub, 3. 3. 1920, pp. 98-99; Zečević, p. 291.

⁸⁵ Shod zaupnikov SKZ za Štajersko v Mariboru, Straža, 12. 9. 1919, p. 3; Zahteve Kmečke zveze, Slovenski gospodar, 25. 9. 1919, pp. 2-3.

⁸⁶ Zečević, pp. 284-285

⁸⁷ Kmetski bataljoni v boju za svoje pravice, Domoljub, 26. 11. 1919, p. 1-2; Politične novice. Zborovanja naše stranke na Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 12. 1919, p. 3.

Assembly or else the Government would be taken away its legitimacy.⁸⁸

On 15 February 1920, the Cabinet of Ljubomir Davidović offered resignation, due to the rejected government proposition about the dissolution of the Temporary National Representation and issued writs for the Constituent Assembly election.⁸⁹ On 19 February, three deputies of the Slovenian People's Party entered the new government of Stojan Protić: Anton Korošec, Minister for Transport, Ivan Roškar⁹⁰, Minister of Agriculture and Water and Franc Jankovič⁹¹, Minister of Religions.⁹² On 25 February 1920, the Slovenian People's Party deputies also established a homogeneous Provincial Government for Slovenia whose president was Janko Brejc. The political predominance of the Slovenian People's Party⁹³ was re-established but the seizure of power caused severe confrontation of the Slovenian Democratic Party and Slovenian People's Party deputies.⁹⁴ The government's position was of crucial importance at the time of the announced municipal and the anticipated Constituent Assembly election, which is why, at the beginning of March 1920, the Slovenian People's Party leadership began emphasising its inclination for the governmental

⁸⁸ Našemu ljudstvu!, Slovenec, 10. 12. 1919, p. 1; Zečević, pp. 287-288.

⁸⁹ Gligorijević, p. 53.

⁹⁰ Ivan Roškar (1860-1933), a farmer and politician in the Slovenian People's Party. After finishing local elementary school, he took over a farm and involved himself in local politics. In 1885, he became a mayor in Malna. In his youth, he was an adherent of political unity and under the influence of Franc Kovačič he connected with Anton Korošec and from 1902-1918, represented electoral district of Ljutomer - Lenart. From 1907-1918, he was a representative of the rural district of Maribor's left river bank and was the founder and the first president of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance (1907). He was a Minister of Agriculture in the Cabinet of Stojan Protić in 1919. As a deputy of the National Assembly and representative of the proprietors of large farms, he was interested in expert farmers' issues such as fire fighting, hunting, improvement of waters, cattle breeding, fruit growing and viticulture. In 1922, he withdrew from the party and confined himself to local politics and took up the post of mayor.

SBL, III. Volume, pp. 142-143.

⁹¹ Franc Jankovič, Ph.D. (1871-1934), a medical doctor and politician in the Slovenian People's Party. He attended grammar school in Celje and Novo mesto. He was nationally and culturally active already in his secondary school years and especially as an undergraduate. He studied medicine in Vienna and conferred the degree of doctor in 1898. He founded the Slovenian Academic Catholic Association Danica at the University of Vienna. After he completed his studies, he worked as a ward doctor in the provincial hospital in Ljubljana, afterwards in the mental hospital in Studenec and in the Vienna army hospital. He established his medical practice in Konjice in 1899, where he was confronted with severe national conflicts. In September 1900, he was appointed district physician in Kozje. As a candidate of the Slovenian Farmers' Alliance, he was elected deputy in the Styrian Provincial Assembly, where he became a deputy governor-general of the province. On 13 June 1911, he entered the Vienna Parliament and was appointed member of the Parliament's Committee for national debt. In 1913, he was the president of the fourth Catholic gathering in Ljubljana. After the coup, he moved to Maribor where he accepted a job as a physician in men's prison. He was the Minister for Religions in the Government of Stojan Protić from 19 February to 17 May 1920, and due to his illness, afterwards withdrew himself from the politics and devoted himself to medical practice.

Golec, Spomini, pp. 1442-1445 and 1468.

⁹² Zečević, p. 292.

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 304-307.

⁹⁴ Gloria tibi felix 'Straža', Mariborski delavec, 9. 3. 1920, p. 2; Dr. Leskovar čisti; 'Črna repatika', Mariborski delavec, 12. 3. 1920, p. 2; Maribor, Nova doba, 13. 3. 1920, p. 3; Novi mariborski komisar, Nova doba, 16. 3. 1920, p. 2; Ali se je kaj spremenilo?, Nova doba, 25. 5. 1920, p. 2; Mariborske novice. Komisar dr. Leskovar pri koritih, Nova doba, 8. 7. 1920, p. 2; Novi vladni komisar, Naprej,



Ivan Roškar (1860-1933)
(PAM, phototeka, inv.
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parties' policy by rejecting the republican form of government;⁹⁵ the provincial self-government was replaced by the autonomy demands.⁹⁶

Ideological and political orientation of the Catholic camp did not vary from the official policy of the party. They turned down the republican form of government,

⁹⁵ 14. 3. 1920, p. 3; Zečević, p. 303.

⁹⁵ Zečević, pp. 304-306.

⁹⁶ Veliko zborovanje delegatov in zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Straža, 9. 4. 1920, pp. 1-2; Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5; Zečević, pp. 308-309 and 311.

acknowledged the existence of a unique nation, expressed a demand for the extensive provincial autonomy⁹⁷ and formed their own point of view with regard to the solution of farmers' economic situation. They demanded that the government deals with the occurrences of corruption, reselling and war profiting and distribution of confiscated property among farmers and workers; the food supply should be taken over by the economic cooperatives.⁹⁸ On 22 March 1920, the propositions were submitted to the Slovenian people's Party executive committee and it was requested that the central organization pays regard to their requests, advices and demands in the field of economy.⁹⁹

During the second half of April 1920, a general strike of the railway clerks broke out. The Provincial Government used force against the workers. The most vigorous engagements between the army and demonstrators occurred on 24 April, on Zaloška cesta in Ljubljana, causing bad relations of the Provincial Government with the Slovenian People's Party policy and also with Anton Korošec as a member of the Cabinet. Appealing to difficult economic and political situation in the county, the deputies of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and Yugoslav Social Democratic Party caused mistrust in the party, especially because Anton Korošec was warning against the danger of the communist movement at the party's meeting.¹⁰⁰ The representatives of the Styrian Catholic camp also rejected the communist movement's revolutionary methods for solving the social issue.¹⁰¹ An alternative offered instead was a system of cooperative economy on Christian social basis.¹⁰²

In view of the revolutionary movements, which accompanied the railway strike, Regent Aleksander gave a mandate to Milenko Vesnić (National Radical Party) for the formation of concentration government. The government, whose underlying goal was the acceptance of constitution, was established on 18 May 1920. Beside the National Radical Party deputies, there were also the Yugoslav Democrat Party deputies, Slovenian People's Party deputies (Anton Korošec as the Minister of Transport) and National club of the Croatian deputies.¹⁰³ After the formation of the government of Milenko Vesnić, the provincial government did not change at first, which provoked discontentment in the Yugoslav Democratic Party.¹⁰⁴ However, it was renewed on 17 August 1920, when the Committees of Jurisdiction and Social Policy were occupied by the Yugoslav Democratic Party deputies, but the rest of

⁹⁷ Edinstvena - ne centralistična vlada, Slovenec, 22. 2. 1920, p. 1; Republika, Straža, 1. 3. 1920, pp. 1-2;
Za državni in narodno jedinstvo, Straža, 8. 3. 1920, pp. 1-2; Naš program, Straža, 21. 4. 1920, p. 1.

⁹⁸ Seja izvršilnega odbora Slovenske Kmetske Zveze, Straža, 8. 3. 1920, p. 2.

⁹⁹ Seja izvršilnega odbora Kmetske Zveze in Slovenske Ljudske stranke, Slovenski gospodar, 25. 3. 1920, p. 3; Shod zaupnikov VLS, Straža, 29. 3. 1920, p. 2; Somišljenikom Kmetske Zveze!, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 4. 1920, p. 1; Pred glavno skupščino naše stranke, Straža, 2. 4. 1920, p. 2.

¹⁰⁰ Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 8. 4. 1920, pp. 1-5; Zečevič, p. 312.

¹⁰¹ Delo, mir in red!, Straža, 23. 4. 1920, pp. 1-2; Kmet in štrajki, Slovenski gospodar, 29. 4. 1920, p. 1; O sedanjem štrajku, Straža, 30. 4. 1920, pp. 1-2; Komunisti - izdajalci domovine, Straža, 17. 5. 1920, p. 1; Revolucija ali evolucija? Sporazum ali nasilje?, Straža, 19. 5. 1920, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰² Socializacija, Straža, 31. 3. 1920, pp. 1-2; Vera, duhovnik in politika, Slovenski gospodar, 15. 4. 1920, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰³ Gligorijević, p. 57.

¹⁰⁴ Zečevič, pp. 315-317.

the seats were left for the deputies of the Slovenian People's Party.¹⁰⁵ The loss of a couple of departments within the Provincial Government was a heavy blow for the party prior to the Constituent Assembly election, which is why the leadership delayed the handing over of the departments.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, Milenko Vesnić resigned on 20 July 1920 and formed a new government on the basis of the 'Protocol Agreement' between the National Radical Party, Yugoslav Democratic Party, Slovenian People's Party and Croatian National Club on 16 August 1920.¹⁰⁷ Anton Korošec delayed the signing of the agreement until the fate of the Provincial government in Ljubljana had been sealed. Although the party leadership was not seriously thinking about giving the notice to the government before the Constituent Assembly election, it began to withdraw from the ruling centralist circles upon the renewal of the Provincial and Central Governments.¹⁰⁸

On 17 October 1920, the government gave orders to the Yugoslav army and civil authorities to withdraw from the plebiscite zone A in Carinthia, but the Provincial government did not comply with orders. Consequently the relations between the central and provincial government were extremely weakened after the plebiscite on 10 October 1920. The inconvenient outcome of the Carinthian plebiscite launched a wave of protests and demonstrations demanding the revision of the plebiscite and the Yugoslav army occupation of zone A.¹⁰⁹ The interference of the Yugoslav army in Carinthia was deprecated in the Styrian Catholic camp, but nevertheless they supported the demand for the revision of the plebiscite.¹¹⁰ They condemned the riots against Maribor Germans and denied being involved,¹¹¹ although the democrats accused Franjo Žebot of active participation in the demonstrations.¹¹² They were also warning that after the plebiscite Yugoslavian politics must focus on protection of Slovenian minority in Carinthia.¹¹³

On 30 September 1920, Anton Korošec presented basic programme guidelines of the Slovenian People's Party for the Constituent Assembly election at the trustees meeting in Maribor: political, economic and cultural equality of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and administrative autonomy of Slovenia, including the provincial

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, pp. 320, 323 and 325-326.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem, p. 318 and 325.

¹⁰⁷ Gligorijević, pp. 58-59.

¹⁰⁸ Zečević, pp. 320 and 322-324.

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem, pp. 327-328 and 330-332; Gligorijević, p. 60.

¹¹⁰ Shodi Kmetske Zveze, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 10. 1920, p. 3; 21. 10. 1920, p. 2; 28. 10. 1920, pp. 3-4; 4. 11. 1920, pp. 2-3; 11. 11. 1920, p. 4; 18. 11. 1920, pp. 3-4; Sklepi kmetov iz zelenega Pohorja, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 10. 1920, p. 2; Boj za našo severno državno mejo na Koroškem in Štajerskem, Straža, 10. 11. 1920, p. 1.

¹¹¹ Naša Slovenska ljudska stranka in mariborske demonstracije, Straža, 15. 10. 1920, p. 1; Mariborska sramota, Straža, 15. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Politične novice. Slovenska ljudska stranka in mariborske demonstracije, Slovenec, 17. 10. 1920, p. 2.

¹¹² Naša Slovenska ljudska stranka in mariborske demonstracije, Straža, 15. 10. 1920, p. 1; Mariborska sramota, Straža, 15. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Politične novice. Slovenska ljudska stranka in mariborske demonstracije, Slovenec, 17. 10. 1920, p. 2.

¹¹³ 'Ljubljanca dolga vas!', Straža, 25. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Vse kar je prav, Straža, 25. 10. 1920, p. 2; Vprašanje krivde, Slovenec, 20. 10. 1920, p. 1.

government and assembly.¹¹⁴ Appealing to the right for self-determination and sovereignty of nations, the Slovenian People's Party leadership in Styria demanded the adoption of constitution with provisions on universal, secret and equal suffrage; equality before the law; religious freedom and freedom of speech, press, unification and gathering; furthermore they strived for the nationalization of large industrial plants and mines and for the agrarian reform implementation as soon as possible.¹¹⁵ The Slovenian People's Party won 36,1 percent of votes at an election on 28 November 1920 and received 14 deputy mandates out of 38 Slovenian mandates,¹¹⁶ in Maribor constituency, consisting of Styria, Carinthia and Prekmurje region, the party won 35 percent of votes and 8 deputy mandates out of 21.¹¹⁷ The following deputies were elected: Ivan Roškar, Franc Pišek, Jožef Klekl, Davorin Kranjc, Vladimir Pušenjak, Jožef Škoberne, Anton Korošec and Josip Hohnjec.¹¹⁸ The National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party won the elections with a relative majority. Parties defending a republican form of government and federal organization of the state, mostly the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Croatian People's Peasant Party (on 8 December 1920, renamed the Croatian Republican Peasant Party), consolidated.¹¹⁹

The Slovenian People's Party was not contented with the final outcome of the election and saw the improvement of situation in carrying out the extensive work to consolidate the party's programme and organization.¹²⁰ The Slovenian People's Party leadership in Styria believed that "*The stagnancy and recklessness that govern in several organizations of the KZ (Translator's Note: Peasant Alliance), has to be eliminated.*"¹²¹ The commentators there interpreted the outcome on the basis of changed internal political picture in the new country, light poll due to the remoteness of the polls, difficult social conditions and large numbers of the parties participating in the election.¹²² In a comment about the election in Maribor, a Styrian correspondent of the newspaper Slovenec publicly scolded the Slovenian People's Party confidants: "*We do not wish to reproach anyone with inaction, but the fact is that many a trustee has been idle during the election campaign in this worst liberal society, and were not concerned in the electoral preparations at all. Many honest and nationally conscious electors lament bitterly that there was no leadership or initiative at all in great many municipalities. The directives, which were sent by the party office, are still located in innumerable houses of those "major confidants" un-*

¹¹⁴ Govor ministra dr. Korošca na sestanku zaupnikov SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 1. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Smernice ministra dr. Korošca za volitve, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 10. 1920, p. 1; Dr. Korošec o volitvah, Domoljub, 6. 10. 1920, pp. 373-374; Vodilne misli za volilni boj v konstituanto, Slovenec, 2. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁵ Slovenskemu ljudstvu!, Slovenski gospodar, 18. 11. 1920, pp. 1-2; Gligorijević, p. 76.

¹¹⁶ Zečević, p. 342.

¹¹⁷ Osem mandatov SLS na Štajerskem, Slovenec, 5. 12. 1920, p. 1; Izid volitev na Štajerskem, Ptuijski list, Ptuj (further reading: Ptuijski list), 5. 12. 1920, p. 2.

¹¹⁸ Naši poslanci, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 3. 1921, p. 2.

¹¹⁹ Gligorijević, p. 89.

¹²⁰ Zečević, p. 343.

¹²¹ Kje so vprašalne pole, Slovenski gospodar, 24. 2. 1921, p. 2.

¹²² Volilna bilanca, Straža, 1. 12. 1920, p. 1; Ostanemo še tudi po volitvah najmočnejša stranka v Sloveniji, Slovenski gospodar, 2. 12. 1920, pp. 1-2; Po končani bitki, Straža, 6. 12. 1920, p. 1; Obletnica volitev,

touched and the leaflets piled without having been distributed.”¹²³

At the beginning of December 1920, the Cabinet began discussing the proposal for constitutional plan, which anticipated a division of the country into 35 districts and abolition of regions and provincial governments. Anton Korošec was the only one who voted against the proposal, causing the government crisis and at the same time announced the policy change of the Slovenian People's Party toward the government. The party leadership disapproved the approaching of the National Radical Party policy to the policy of the Yugoslav Democratic Party, the basic aim of which was to adopt the centralist constitution after the Constituent Assembly election. By the end of 1920, it was gradually isolated from its former political ally - the National Radical Party - and began establishing contacts with the members of parliamentary clubs with programmes for autonomy (the Yugoslav Muslim Organization and Croatian National Club). Anton Korošec met the party leadership on 9 December 1920 in Ljubljana, where his government won the vote of confidence. The leaders emphasised that after the stabilization of the foreign policy situation, the party does not have any reasons for appeasement regarding its legal demands for autonomy.¹²⁴ The policy change was also noticeable in the Styrian Catholic camp already at the beginning of September 1920, whose representatives ceased using the phrase ‘unique Yugoslav nation.’¹²⁵

The approval of the policy of Anton Korošec was of great importance due to disagreements in the party, which were related to the formation of the Yugoslav Club constitutional proposal, after the Constituent Assembly election. The reinforced young wing of the Christian Socials gathered around Ljubljana newspaper *Večerni list* (Josip Gostinčar, Franc Kremžar, Franc Terseglav, Andrej Gosar, Ph.D., Fran Kulovec, Ph.D.¹²⁶ and others) demanded that the position on republican form of government¹²⁷ is included in the party's political programme, which was vigorously rejected by Anton Korošec with the support of the Styrian Catholic camp. He

Slovenski gospodar, 1. 12. 1921, p. 1; Zakaj nas sovražijo?, Straža, 30. 11. 1921, p. 1; Balkovec, Parlamentarne volitve v Jugoslaviji, p. 156.

¹²³ Volitve v mariborskem volivnem okrožju, Slovenec, 3. 12. 1920, pp. 1-2.

¹²⁴ Zečevič, pp. 344-345, 349 and 353.

¹²⁵ Boljševiki gredo, Straža, 6. 9. 1920, p. 1; Pomen obiska našega prestolonaslednika, Straža, 2. 7. 1920, p. 1.

¹²⁶ Fran Kulovec, Ph.D., (1884-1941), a priest and politician in the Slovenian People's Party. He visited grammar school in Kočevje and Ljubljana from 1895-1903, studied theology in Ljubljana and in 1910, conferred the title of doctor in Vienna. In 1919, he founded the Yugoslav Farmers' Association and drew up a programme and organizational statute; in 1928 it was transformed from political into professional organization. In 1919, he was appointed secretary general of the Slovenian People's Party and became editor-in-chief of the newspaper Slovenec the following year. The implementation of organizational statute of the Slovenian People's Party and party's reorganization in 1922 was largely owing to him. At the assembly elections in 1923, 1925 and 1927, he was elected deputy to the National Assembly, where he was operating in several assembly committees - he was especially active in financial department. He was the Minister of Agriculture from July to November 1924 and from February to April 1927.

SBL, I. Volume, p. 582; Menaše, p. 536.

¹²⁷ Smer Ljudske stranke, Slovenec, 14. 12. 1920, p. 1; 'Straža', Slovenec, 17. 12. 1920, p. 2; Oblika države in katoličani, Večerni list, 15. 12. 1920, pp. 1-2; Na pravi poti, Večerni list, 20. 12. 1920, pp. 1-2; Vprašanje državne oblike, Večerni list, 21. 12. 1920, p. 1.



Ivan Vesenjak (1880-1938) (PAM, phototeka, inv. 4274)

believed that the Ljubljana circle's revolt was a result of conscious activity against Styrian adherents.¹²⁸ He had already clearly expressed his loyalty to the monarchy before the elections at the trustees 'meeting on 30 September 1920, in Maribor.¹²⁹ For the first time, the Styrian Catholic camp clearly expressed their unfavourable

¹²⁸ Zečević, pp. 346-48.

¹²⁹ Govor ministra dr. Korošca na sestanku zaupnikov SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 1. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Smernice ministra dr. Korošca za volitve, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 10. 1920, p. 1; Dr. Korošec o volitvah, Domoljub, 6. 10. 1920, pp. 373-374; Vodilne misli za volilni boj v konstituanto, Slovenec, 2. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2.

position on the republican organization of state in April 1919, characterising the republican idea as anti-national.¹³⁰ By the end of 1920, Leopold Lenard in Franc Kovačič, distinguished Catholic intellectuals in Styria, rejected and condemned the requests of the Christian Socials gathered around *Večerni list*.¹³¹ The newspaper ceased being published at the beginning of 1921, which consequently made the Christian social labour movement politically impossible. At the time, the Catholic camp was the most united and homogeneous of all Slovenian political camps.¹³² Although some Styrian Catholic leaders expressed their loyalty to the republican idea in different places (i.e.: Josip Hohnjec, Ivan Vesenjak in Jožef Škoberne), the republican standpoint was not widely supported in the Styrian Catholic camp in the 1920s.¹³³

Because of the manner in which the rules of procedure had been adopted without participation of the Constituent Assembly,¹³⁴ the Yugoslav Club deputies adopted a motion on resignation of the Minister of Transport, Anton Koročec, and proposed the resignation of the entire government on 11 December 1920. Only a day prior to the resignation of Milenko Vesnić on 14 December 1920, the Provincial Government in Ljubljana resigned.

Upon the decision of the Cabinet, Leonid Pitamic, a non-party candidate, took up the duties as president.¹³⁵ On 1 January 1921, Nikola Pašić established a new coalition government with the deputies of the National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democrat Party and four posts within the ministry were held for the government negotiations with deputies of small political parties. The negotiations lasted until mid-March, by which the opposition parties were prevented from connecting by

¹³⁰ Organizacija Slovenske kmečke Zveze, *Slovenski gospodar*, 29. 4. 1919, p. 3; Slovensko ljudstvo na branik!, *Slovenski gospodar*, 10. 4. 1919, p. 1; Razne politične vesti. Socialni demokratije na Črešnjevcu, *Slovenski gospodar*, 20. 3. 1919, p. 2; Na delo!, *Straža*, 7. 4. 1919, p. 1; Politične vesti. Rdeča nevarnost, *Slovenski gospodar*, 17. 4. 1919, p. 3.

¹³¹ Brez demagogije, *Straža*, 10. 12. 1920, p. 1; Konstituanta, *Straža*, 13. 12. 1920, p. 1; Lenard dr. Leopold, Nekaj stvarnih popravkov, *Straža*, 20. 12. 1920, pp. 1-2; Kovačič dr. Franc, Na to pot ne gremo!, *Straža*, 20. 12. 1920, p. 1.

¹³² Tedenske novice. Vodstvo Slovenske ljudske stranke, *Slovenski gospodar*, 5. 1. 1921, p. 2; Iz tajništva SLS. Vodstvo Slovenske ljudske stranke, Domoljub, 12. 1. 1921, p. 14; Politične novice. Vodstvo Slovenske ljudske stranke, *Slovenec*, 8. 1. 1921, p. 2; Zečević, p. 359; Jurij Perovšek, Dvajseta leta v kraljevini Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencov, v: *Zgodovina v šoli*, 4 (1995), No. 3, p. 26

¹³³ Kandidatu SLS, gospodu Skobernetu!, *Kmetijski list*, 17. 3. 1921, p. 1; Mikuž, p. 70; Zečević, p. 174.

¹³⁴ The government announced a decree on Constituent Assembly's Provisional Rules of Procedure on 10 December 1920. At the beginning of 1921, the representatives of the Yugoslav Club, National Club and Yugoslav Muslim Organization strived for the change of provisional rules of procedure in an item which defined deputies' oath to the king in anticipation. However, they took an oath at the end of January in union with the deputies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, or else their participation in the Constituent Assembly would have to be abolished.

Z odprtим vezirjem, *Straža*, 17. 12. 1920, p. 1; Grda igra, *Slovenski gospodar*, 13. 1. 1921, p. 1; Sklepi Kmetske zveze v Loki pri Zidanem mostu, *Slovenski gospodar*, 27. 1. 1921, p. 2; Zečević, pp. 345 and 356-357; Gligorijević, p. 91.

¹³⁵ PAM, fond: Mestna občina Maribor 1528-1941, AŠ 161, Zapisnik o seji mestnega sveta z dne 28. decembra 1920; Nov vladni komisar mesta Maribor, *Straža*, 28. 12. 1920, p. 3; Vprašanje vladnega komisarja, *Straža*, 19. 1. 1921, p. 2; Vprašanje novega vladnega komisarja, *Straža*, 12. 1. 1921, p. 3; Ustavni načrt in SLS, *Slovenec*, 8. 12. 1920, p. 1; Korak SLS; Minister dr. Korošec odstopil, *Slovenec*, 12. 12. 1921, p. 1; Zečević, pp. 345-346.

the Prime Minister.¹³⁶ The Slovenian Party leadership demanded wide coalition government, provincial autonomy, the establishment of women's suffrage and the change of the Constituent Assembly's Rules of Procedure by deleting the provision on deputies' oath to the king. Upon unsuccessful discussion on the entry to the government on 12 January 1921, the Slovenian People's Party leadership adopted a decision about prolonging the activity of the party in opposition, in order to resolve internal disputes and to strengthen the party's position in the Slovenian political arena.¹³⁷ After entering the opposition, the party deputies adopted a more determinate standpoint toward their political opponents, which caused tension in relations with all Slovenian parties in January 1921.¹³⁸

The Constituent Assembly deputies elected a 42-member committee on 31 January 1921, in order to investigate constitutional proposals which were submitted to the Constituent Assembly for discussion by the deputies in accordance with the provisional rules of procedure. The Constituent Committee began the discussion on 2 February and elected 3 deputies of the Yugoslav Club in the committee (the only deputy elected from the Slovenian People's Party was Anton Sušnik). The Yugoslav Club deputies demanded the adoption of the constitution by a two-thirds majority and on the basis of self-determination of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.¹³⁹ On 12 February 1921, a new constitutional plan, which was framed within the constitutional provisions of the Yugoslav Club, was submitted to the committee. The plan anticipated the division of the Kingdom of SHS into 6 autonomous provinces (Serbia; Croatia and Slavonia; Bosnia and Herzegovina with Dalmatia; Montenegro; Vojvodina; Slovenia with Prekmurje region), each of which would have its own provincial assembly and the provincial government, responsible to the provincial assembly and the Central Government in Belgrade.¹⁴⁰

The difference in opinions occurred between Ljubljana and Maribor Slovenian People's Party leadership regarding the formation of the Yugoslav Club constitutional plan. In October 1920, the Styrian Catholic camp did not approve the establishment of self-governing provinces nationally but rather economically and geographically. In order to avoid the development of Great Serbia, they strived for provincial self-government, therefore the self-government of provinces, municipalities and districts, which would result from the power of central authorities in the sense of: "*Powerful and healthy administration, ample and intelligent self-government*"¹⁴¹ In November 1920, the Slovenian People's Party leadership in Ljubljana, defending the pure form of autonomy, formally opposed to the constitutional-legal

¹³⁶ Zečević, p. 352; Gligorijević, p. 97.

¹³⁷ Ko gremo v opozicijo, Straža, 15. 12. 1920, p. 1.

¹³⁸ Začetek kulturnega boja v Sloveniji, Straža, 4. 2. 1921, p. 1; Samostojneži in občinske volitve, Straža, 9. 2. 1921, pp. 1-2; Krinko z obrazal, Straža, 18. 2. 1921, p. 1; Zmešane glave, Straža, 18. 2. 1921, pp. 1-2; Zečević, p. 358.

¹³⁹ Zečević, pp. 357-358 and 363; Gligorijević, p. 104.

¹⁴⁰ Zečević, pp. 388-389.

¹⁴¹ Jeraj dr. Josip, Avtonomija ali centralizem, Straža, 20. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; 22. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Centralizem in samouprava, Straža, 27. 10. 1920, p. 1; Kmetska zveza, Slovenski gospodar, 10. 6. 1920, p. 3; 1. 7. 1920, p. 2; 15. 7. 1920, p. 2; 22. 7. 1920, p. 3; Razgovor z dr. Korošcem, Slovenec, 6. 10. 1920, p. 1; Klerikalci in plemenska avtonomija, Nova doba, 6. 11. 1920, p. 1; Del SLS proti plemenski avtonomiji, Jutro, 5. 11. 1920, p. 1; Tudi demagoštvvo mora biti preračunjeno, Straža, 22. 11. 1920, p. 3.

concept which contained elements of centralism and self-government and was particularly defended by Josip Jeraj, Ph.D., member of the Styrian Catholic camp.¹⁴²

In the midst of February 1921, Leonid Pitamic, president of the provincial government, was replaced by Viljem Baltič, Ph.D., member of the Yugoslav Democratic Party. The Slovenian People's Party understood the replacement as an assault to the party's programme for autonomy, especially at the time the government had ratified the electoral law change for municipal elections only in the provision which anticipated a new electoral register and not the expansion of women's suffrage.¹⁴³ In February 1921, the centralist measures of the government of Nikola Pašić and constitutional plan debates in the Constitutional Assembly stimulated 43 the most prominent Slovenian cultural and scientific workers to sign the Slovenia's declaration of independence framed within the kingdom of SHS, which launched a massive independence movement in Slovenia.¹⁴⁴ On 13 March, there was a large manifestation meeting of the Slovenian People's Party in Ljubljana, which along with the effects of the declaration of independence finally managed to strengthen the idea of autonomy in the party's programme.¹⁴⁵ The position on autonomy was clearly adopted in the Styrian Catholic camp as well, and a journalist of the Straža newspaper wrote: *"From now on we will talk differently. We shall always emphasise that we are Slovenes and only Slovenes."*¹⁴⁶

The Catholic camp election campaign for the municipal elections, which began in March 1921, contained a clear request for the establishment of provincial autonomy in historical boundaries and conclusion of a national agreement on the basis of democratically adopted constitution.¹⁴⁷ The Slovenian People's Party gained 61 percent of votes in the elections which took place in Ljubljana, Maribor, Celje and Ptuj on 26 April 1921,¹⁴⁸ whereas in other Slovenian places the elections were

¹⁴² Zečević, p. 335.

¹⁴³ Uredba o volitvi v občinska zastopstva v Sloveniji, Belgrade 15. 5. 1920, Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, volume 71/1920, 8. 6. 1920, pp. 321-324; Uredba o izpreambah in popolnitvah uredbe o volitvi v občinska zastopstva v Sloveniji z dne 15. 5. 1920, Belgrade 17. 2. 1921, Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, volume 20/1921, 26. 2. 1921, pp. 123-125.

¹⁴⁴ Fran Erjavec, Avtonomistična izjava slovenskih kulturnih delavcev leta 1921 (Iz spominov), in: Zgodovinski zbornik 1958, Buenos Aires 1958, p. 2; Zečević, p. 362.

¹⁴⁵ Zečević, p. 363.

¹⁴⁶ Detomor, Straža, 23. 5. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ Avtonomija - sredstvo za sporazum v SHS kraljevini. Govor ministra na razpoloženju dr. Korošca v seji konstituante dne 15. aprila 1921, Straža, 25. 4. 1921, p. 1; 27. 4. 1921, p. 1; 29. 4. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁴⁸ The Slovenian People's Party gained 17,5 percent of votes and 7 town council members in Maribor (Josip Leskovar, Ph.D., Anton Krepek, Karel Verstovšek, Ph.D., Franc Veronik, Anton Jerovšek, Ph.D., Franjo Žebot and Vekoslav Filipič) and 12,5 percent of votes and 4 town council members in Celje (Anton Ogrizek, Ph.D., Makso Janič, Franc Kuret and Silvester Fohn). In collaboration with the National Party, a collective list of candidates was drawn up in Ptuj and they won 25 percent of votes and 6 town council members, who were not members of the Catholic Camp (Vinko Šerona, Ludovik Jenko, Ph.D., Ciril Tušek, Simon Führer, Bernard Mikuletič and Anton Blažek).

Izid občinskih volitev v avtonomnih mestih Slovenije, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 4. 1921, p. 2; Poraz centralistov pri občinskih volitvah v slovenskih mestih, Straža, 27. 4. 1921, p. 2; Poraz klerikalcev v Mariboru; Izid volitev v štajerskih mestih, Slovenec, 27. 4. 1921, p. 1; Rezultati občinskih volitev, Tabor, 28. 4. 1921, p. 1; Klerikalni poraz v Mariboru; Volitev v Ptiju, Jutro, 27. 4. 1921, p. 1; Volitev v Mariboru; Volitev v Celju; Volitev v Ptiju, Slovenski narod, 28. 4. 1921, p. 1.

carried out until 13 May 1921. Out of all together 834 municipalities, the party attained an absolute majority in 587 Slovenian municipalities and a relative majority in all others. The major election victory was a result of opposition party's position and precisely defined and well introduced programme for autonomy, expressing the majority's opinion of the Slovene nation. The Slovenian People's Party authority takeover in the organs of local administration was aggravated by the Yugoslav Democratic Party deputies in the Provincial Government.¹⁴⁹ Relations between the Slovenian People's Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party had already been weak prior to the municipal election, when on 10 April 1920 the Provincial Government of Viljem Baltič adopted a 'Decree of the Provincial Government for Slovenia as regards the police punishment of demonstrative actions, which are dangerous to the state';¹⁵⁰ Anton Korošec appeared in the Constituent Assembly against the so-called Slovenian Obznana on behalf of the Yugoslav Club.¹⁵¹

On 13 June 1920, the Yugoslav Club deputies left the discussion on constitutional plan of the government in the Constituent Assembly in protest, reasoning that a centralistic constitutional draft makes the establishment of constitutional parliamentary democracy on the basis of unity and equality in the joint state of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes impossible. They rejected the ultimate voting on constitutional plan and thus also responsibility for the consequences of the centralistic constitution on national and state unity. They committed themselves to continue their efforts for constitutional revision immediately upon the constitution's adoption, until the ultimate political, economic and cultural equality of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes is achieved.¹⁵² On 28 June 1921, the remaining deputies of the Constituent Assembly adopted the Vidovdan Constitution with 223 votes for and 35 against, which established a rigorous centralist¹⁵³ organization of the state.¹⁵⁴ The

¹⁴⁹ Zečević, pp. 371-372 and 375-376.

¹⁵⁰ The Decree of Provincial Government for Slovenia regarding the police punishment of demonstrative actions dangerous for the country; the decree was based on proposition of the government and resolution of the Constituent Assembly from 8 April 1921, about the establishment of more severe measures against the Yugoslavian Communist Party's activity. The decree also stipulated that: "*Every public mockery, insulting, belittlement of the state, constitution and laws, army and individual tribes of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, public authorities and regional decrees, as well as every indication of rebellion and instigation against it is prohibited.*" Adoption of the decree was evaluated by the Slovenian People's Party as the government's means of engagement against all the opposing parties - it was named 'Slovenian Obznana'. The Yugoslav Club members tabled a motion for the Minister of the Interior Milorad Drašković on 10 May, as though it was adopted in contradiction to the resolutions of the Constituent Assembly. Even though Minister Milorad Drašković sent the directions to the Provincial Government in Ljubljana in April 1921 to implement more severe measures against the supporters of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, he denied in his reply to the Yugoslavian club deputies the interference of the Cabinet in the decree of the Provincial Government.

Naredba deželne vlade za Slovenijo glede policijskega kaznovanja državi nevarnih demonstrativnih dejav, Uradni list deželne vlade za Slovenijo, volume 47/4. 5. 1921, p. 249; Zečević, p. 377.

¹⁵¹ Jugoslovanski klub proti slovenski 'Obznani', Straža, 13. 5. 1921, p. 1; Interpelacije naših poslancev, Slovenec, 14. 6. 1921, p. 2.

¹⁵² Sporočilo Hrvatom in Slovencem ob odhodu Jugoslovanskega kluba iz konstituante, Straža, 22. 6. 1921 in Slovenski gospodar, 23. 6. 1921, p. 1; Zečević, pp. 379, 381 and 384-385; Gligorijević, p. 107.

¹⁵³ Upon the adoption of the constitution, one of the first government measures was the abolishment of the Provincial Government of Slovenia and its autonomous offices on 9 July 1921. On 2 August 1921, with the help of others Ivan Hribar, regional deputy, established the Regional Administration of Slov-

Slovenian People's Party leadership granted the legitimacy of the constitution and the Yugoslav Club deputies returned to the National Assembly¹⁵⁵ on 2 July 1921, to continue their political ambitions as the representatives of parliamentary parties.¹⁵⁶ Styrian Catholic leader Josip Hohnjec characterized the Vidovdan Constitution as great misfortune for the country and resolved: "We have accepted the present constitution with reservations regarding strong demand for revision of the constitution as soon as possible."¹⁵⁷ From July to September 1921, numerous protest meetings were held in Styria and elsewhere in Slovenia by The Slovenian People's Party against the adoption of the constitution.¹⁵⁸ The fundamental political demands of the party deputies in order to adopt the Vidovdan Constitution were as follows: administrative unity and autonomy of Slovenia, constitutional revision, tax equation, equal position of the government clerks regardless of citizenship and improvement of the

enja, which was provisional; between 1924 and 1927, the powers of the Provincial Government were gradually transferred to the ministries, great mayors and assemblies. Three decrees were declared by the government on 26 April 1922, which helped to legally re-establish the centralist system defined by the Vidovdan Constitution. In contrast to 'Decree on Division of State into Regions', the Official Gazette of the Regional Administration of Slovenia published 'Decree on General Administration' and 'Decree on Regional and District (*srez*) Self-Government' as laws which was legally inaccurate, because the decrees were not adopted by the Constituent Assembly but by the Government on behalf of the king. The Slovenian People's Party rejected the mentioned instruments in accordance with their programme for autonomy, because they anticipated the division of Slovenia into two administrative units. Uredba o razdelitvi države na oblasti; Zakon o obči upravi; Zakon o oblastni in sreski samoupravi, Uradni list pokrajinske uprave za Slovenijo, Ljubljana volume 49/15. 5. 1922, pp. 313-321; Hohnjec dr. Josip, Odvojeno mišljenje Jugoslovenskoga kluba. Stenografske beleške Narodne skupščine Kraljevine SHS. Redovan saziv za 1921-22, volume I, no. 13/ year II, p. 245; Proti nazadnjaškim nakanam „oblasti in *srezov*“. Iz govora poslanca Žebota, Slovenski gospodar, 6. 4. 1922, pp. 1-2; Stiplovšek Miroslav, Slovenski parlamentarizem 1927-1929. Avtonomistična prizadevanja skupščin ljubljanske in mariborske oblasti za ekonomsko-socialni in prosvetno-kulturni razvoj Slovenije ter za udejanjenje parlamentarizma, Ljubljana 2000 (further reading: Stiplovšek), pp. 42-43.

¹⁵⁴ Perovšek Jurij, Unitaristični in centralistični značaj vidovdanske ustave, v: Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, volume 1-2/1993, p. 21.

¹⁵⁵ The Constituent Assembly was not dissolved upon the adoption of the constitution but renamed into the National Assembly. The re-formation of the Constituent Assembly into the National Assembly was defined by the law on the election into the Temporary National Representative Body. Because the competence of such National Assembly was diminished (the deputies were able to adopt only the laws which were in tight connection with the constitution and essential financial laws), the Legislative Committee was founded which took over a great deal of the legislative competence. The Legislative Committee functioned independently of the National Assembly, whereas its members were answerable for their work solely to the Government. Its primary task was the abolishment of the provisional arrangement and preparation of statutory proposals on achievement of law uniformity. The National Assembly functioned in accordance with the Constituent Assembly's Rules of Procedure up to 2 March 1922, when the National Assembly's Rules of Procedure were adopted.

Gligorijević, p. 114.

¹⁵⁶ Korošec dr. Anton, Županom in občinskim odbornikom SLS, Slovenec, 5. 7. 1921, p. 1; Domoljub, 6. 7. 1921, p. 1; Mi in ustava, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 7. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ Naša nova ustava in zahteva SHS naroda, Straža, 4. 7. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Kmetski tabor za cel ormoški okraj, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 7. 1921, p. 3; Shodi v marenberškem okraju, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 7. 1921, p. 4; Naši romarji pri Mariji Pomagaj, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 7. 1921, p. 3; Dobro uspeli shodi v okraju Marenberg; Kmetski tabor v Ormožu, Slovenski gospodar, 21. 7. 1921, p. 2; Naši shodi, Slovenski gospodar, 13. 10. 1921, p. 2; V Braslovčah, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 7. 1921, p. 2; Sv. Barbara, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 7. 1921, p. 3; Politična shoda Kmetske

position of Slovenian soldiers in the Yugoslav Army.¹⁵⁹ In the area of foreign policy they mainly exposed the necessity of solving the issues of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia and Italy. Apart from that they also strived for the assistance of the Yugoslav diplomacy with Russians' efforts to gain an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and in this connection warned about the political interests of Bulgaria and their plans to join the Kingdom of SHS within a short period of time.¹⁶⁰

Due to disagreements between coalition partners, the National Radical Party and Yugoslav Democratic Party, regarding the government legislative activity the government resigned on 4 December 1921.¹⁶¹ However, on 24 December 1921, Nikola Pašić managed to re-establish the government in collaboration with the deputies of the Yugoslav Democratic Party, Yugoslav Muslim Organization and Independent Peasant's Party.¹⁶² At the time, the Slovenian People's Party leadership did not consider the possibility of entering the government.¹⁶³ On 21 July 1921, a communist assassination of Milorad Drašković, Minister of the Interior, was carried out in Delnice, Croatia. His successor, Svetozar Pribičević, submitted a law proposal for the State Protection Act on 1 August to the National Assembly. With the adoption of the law, the prohibition of the Yugoslav Communist Party's activity was legalized and upon the proposal of verification board on 4 August, the National Assembly abolished the mandates of the communist deputies.¹⁶⁴ The Yugoslav Club deputies decisively rejected the adoption of the law from fear of eventual broadening of the abovementioned legislative provisions onto the other political parties.¹⁶⁵ The Slovenian People's Party leadership and the Styrian Catholic camp members condemned its adoption and evaluate the law as "*rough violation of the principles of parliamentarism.*"¹⁶⁶

In February 1922, the deputies began a discussion on enlistment of over 6.000

zveze, Slovenski gospodar, 4. 8. 1921, p. 2; Remšnik; Gortina nad Muto; Št. Janž pri Velenju, Slovenski gospodar, 4. 8. 1921, p. 3; Naši shodi, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 8. 1921, p. 2; Trbovlje, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 9. 1921, p. 3; Mikuž, pp. 210-211.

¹⁵⁹ Iz Maribora. Shod SLS za mesto Maribor, Straža, 10. 4. 1922, p. 3; Shod SLS v Celju, Straža, 12. 4. 1922, p. 2; Mesečno zborovanje SLS za mesto Maribor, Straža, 12. 4. 1922, p. 3.

¹⁶⁰ Shod dr. Korošca v Celju, Slovenski gospodar, 14. 9. 1922, p. 3; Sijajen shod SLS v Volume Jurju ob južni železnici, Straža, 20. 9. 1922, p. 2; Dr. Korošec v Šoštanju, Slovenski gospodar, 21. 9. 1922, p. 3; Shod SLS v Šoštanju, Slovenski gospodar, 12. 10. 1922, p. 3; Zborovanje SLS v Celju, Straža, 25. 9. 1922, p. 2; Zborovanje SLS v Celju, Slovenski gospodar, 28. 9. 1922, p. 3; Shod Slovenske ljudske stranke v Celju, Slovenec, 26. 9. 1922, p. 1; Shod SLS v Celju, Slovenec, 30. 9. 1922, p. 1; Shod SLS v Šoštanju, Slovenec, 10. 10. 1922, p. 2; Ljudska politika na Balkanu, Straža, 27. 11. 1922, p. 2; Narodni poslanec g. dr. Josip Hohnjec, Slovenski gospodar, 9. 11. 1922, p. 3; Poslanec dr. Hohnjec, Straža, 27. 11. 1922, pp. 2-3.

¹⁶¹ Gligorijević, p. 119.

¹⁶² Čulinović II., pp. 292-293.

¹⁶³ Občni zbor Kmetske zveze v Ljubljani, Slovenski gospodar, 17. 11. 1921, pp. 2-3.

¹⁶⁴ Čulinović I., pp. 364-366.

¹⁶⁵ Mikuž, pp. 209-213; Gligorijević, p. 116.

¹⁶⁶ Komunizem, Straža, 8. 8. 1921, p. 1; Veličasten shod SLS v Mariboru, Slovenec, 30. 8. 1921, p. 1; Govor dr. Korošca na velikem shodu SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 31. 8. 1921, pp. 1-2; Veličastno zborovanje Slovenske ljudske stranke v Mariboru, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 9. 1921, p. 2; Veličastno zborovanje naše stranke v Mariboru, Slovenski gospodar, 8. 9. 1921, p. 1.

recruits to assist on the Hungarian border in winter 1921, 1,000 of which were taken ill and 299 died due to the poor supply. The Minister of Army and Navy, Milivoj Zečević, stated that the reason for the emergency call-up was need to increase military preparedness due to the visit of Karl of Habsburg to Hungary in the second half of October 1921. The Government assumed absolute responsibility for the incident that is why the criminal proceeding for extradition of the responsible to the Court, despite the efforts of the opposition deputies, was not instituted.¹⁶⁷ On 12 November 1921, at a political discussion in Maribor, Anton Korošec condemned the emergency military mobilization.¹⁶⁸ Franjo Žebot, the Slovenian People's Party deputy in Styria, appeared sharply against the inefficiency of the National Assembly at a discussion on the soldiers' deaths in April 1922.¹⁶⁹ The one thing that the opposition deputies achieved was the appointment of a special parliamentary committee for the examination of the incident on 24 April 1921.¹⁷⁰

At the end of February 1922, conflicts between the Maribor and Ljubljana Circle, which originated in different opinions on the form of government, began to show in the Slovenian People's Party.¹⁷¹ The renewed appearance of the republican idea in the Slovenian People's Party was related to the political activity of Anton Novičan, Ph.D., who founded the Slovenian Republican Party with the support of Stjepan Radić. The party also appealed to peasants' electoral body.¹⁷² The death of Mihael Napotnik, Ph.D., Bishop of the Lavantin diocese,¹⁷³ on 28 March 1922, was interpreted by the democrats as a sign of the forthcoming changes due to the appearance of young republican orientated clergy, in the sense of prevalence of the republican idea in the Slovenian People's Party.¹⁷⁴ On 9 April 1922, Anton Korošec gave a speech on disagreements in the party at a meeting in Jesenice, where the fundamental aim of the activity of party supporters was the implementation of the adopted religious, social and political programme and preservation of the Slovenian People's Party unity.¹⁷⁵ On 9 May 1922, he accepted the legitimacy of the republican view in the party and announced its realization¹⁷⁶ in a long-term vision

¹⁶⁷ Čulinović II., pp. 396-397.

¹⁶⁸ Veličasten shod SLS v Mariboru, Slovenec, 30. 8. 1921, p. 1; Važna izjava dr. Korošca, Slovenec, 8. 10. 1921, pp. 1-2; Zanimiv interview dr. Korošca, Slovenec, 16. 10. 1921, p. 1.

¹⁶⁹ Kdo je kriv trpljenja naših rekrutov?, Slovenski gospodar, 6. 4. 1922, p. 2.

¹⁷⁰ Mikuž, p. 223.

¹⁷¹ Vsestranski Petrič, Straža, 24. 4. 1922, p. 2.

¹⁷² Ljudstvo odklanja dr. Novačanove fraze, Slovenec, 30. 5. 1922, p. 3; Republiko?, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 6. 1922, p. 1; Ljudstvo odklanja Novačanovo demagogijo, Slovenski gospodar, 1. 6. 1922, p. 2; Krivi prerok; Kako zaupa Radić republikancu Novačanu, Slovenski gospodar, 8. 6. 1922, p. 1; Dr. Novačan v Mariboru, Straža, 12. 6. 1922, p. 3; Položaj na Slovenskem Štajerskem, Slovenec, 17. 6. 1922, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷³ Lavantski knezoškof dr. Mihael Napotnik, Slovenski gospodar, 30. 3. 1922, p. 3.

¹⁷⁴ O složnosti v klerikalni stranki, Slovenski narod, 13. 4. 1922, p. 1; Politične vesti. Notranje borbe v klerikalni stranki, Slovenski narod, 24. 5. 1922, p. 2; Politične vesti. Zaupni sestanek vodstva SLS v Celju, Slovenski narod, 26. 5. 1922, p. 2; Programske bankrot klerikalizma, Jutro, 11. 7. 1922, p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ Dr. Korošec o stranki, Slovenec, 11. 4. 1922, p. 1; Dnevne novice. Dr. Korošec o enotnosti naše stranke, Straža, 12. 4. 1922, p. 2.

¹⁷⁶ Shod SLS v Slovenj Gradcu, Straža, 12. 5. 1922, p. 3; Seja vodstva SLS, Straža, 15. 5. 1922, p. 2; Naše

of the development of the Kingdom of SHS, but however on 21 May, once again decisively rejected the discussion on the form of government at a meeting of the Slovenian People's Party leadership. He pointed out the fight for the independence and integrity of Slovenia¹⁷⁷ as the most important issue in the Slovenian People's Party policy. The risk of the party unity was also presented in a leaflet of Ivan Šušteršič entitled 'My Response,' which was issued in April 1922.¹⁷⁸ The former leader of the Slovenian People's Party severely accused the party leadership in Ljubljana and Maribor and in 1917, broke up legal continuity with the pre-war Catholic political organization.¹⁷⁹ The contents of the leaflet caused irritation also in the Styrian Catholic camp, as Ivan Šušteršič accused the newspapers *Slovenec* and *Straža* of "the sordidness of the public opinion."¹⁸⁰

Regardless of the internal frictions, Anton Korošec expressed his satisfaction over the development of autonomist tendencies of the Slovenian People's Party since spring 1922. The leadership entered into relations with the deputies of the Agricultural Party of Serbia and individual autonomy-orientated groups in the otherwise governmental Yugoslav Muslim Organization and thus expanded the base for the autonomists in the National Assembly.¹⁸¹ Anton Korošec characterised the situation of the Catholic Church in the country as favourable prior to the election to the Constituent Assembly in November 1920.¹⁸² However, he did not have the same opinion in August 1922, which was the result of the long-lasting internal disagreements among Slovenian parties due to the governmental cultural policy.¹⁸³ At the end of April 1922, the Yugoslav Bishops submitted a memorandum to King Aleksander and Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, in which they severely condemned the governmental cultural policy and reproached its hostility toward the Catholic Church.¹⁸⁴

On 23 June 1922, the National Assembly deputies began a discussion about passing the budget for 1922/1923,¹⁸⁵ which was the first parliamentary discussion

¹⁷⁷ smernice, Domoljub, 24. 5. 1922, p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ Mikuž, p. 226.

¹⁷⁹ Šušteršič dr. Ivan, Moj odgovor, Samozaložba 1922 (further reading: Šušteršič).

¹⁷⁹ Šušteršič, p. 23 and 25.

¹⁸⁰ Šuštercijanci na delu, Slovenski gospodar, 30. 3. 1922, p. 2; Šušteršičev gnoj; Edinost v stranki in dr. Šušteršič, Straža, 14. 4. 1922, p. 1; Odpadniki, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 4. 1922, p. 1; Dnevne novice. Obsodba dr. Šušteršiča, Straža, 19. 4. 1922, p. 2; Šušteršič, p. 158.

¹⁸¹ Mikuž, p. 226.

¹⁸² Govor ministra dr. Korošca na sestanku zaupnikov SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 1. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2; Smernice ministra dr. Korošca za volitve, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 10. 1920, p. 1; Dr. Korošec o volitvah, Domoljub, 6. 10. 1920, pp. 373-374; Vodilne misli za volilni boj v konstituanto, Slovenec, 2. 10. 1920, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸³ Katoliški shodi. Maribor, Naš dom, (1922) volume 5, unpaged; Katoliški shod v Mariboru; Za katoliški shod v Mariboru; Znaki katoliškega shoda v Mariboru, Slovenski gospodar, 3. 8. 1922, p. 3; Dr. Anton Korošec, Straža, 11. 8. 1922, p. 3; Veličasten katoliški shod v Mariboru, Straža, 21. 8. 1922, p. 3; Katoliški shod v Mariboru, Slovenski gospodar, 24. 8. 1922, pp. 1-2; Dr. Korošec, Slovenec, 19. 8. 1922, p. 3; Katoliški shod v Mariboru, Slovenec, 22. 8. 1922, p. 2; Klerikalci med seboj, Jutro, 20. 7. 1922, p. 2.

¹⁸⁴ Spomenica jugoslovanskih škofov, Straža, 8. 5. 1922, p. 1; Slovenec, 5. 5. 1922, p. 1; Naši škofje govori, Slovenski gospodar, 11. 5. 1922, p. 1.

¹⁸⁵ Mikuž, p. 233.



Vladimir Pušenjak (1882-1936) (PAM, phototeka, inv. 4162)

on annual estimates.¹⁸⁶ The adoption of budget was rejected by the Yugoslav Club, which expressed the need for thorough restoration of the fiscal system. The greatest attention was intended for the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and expenses of the general administration.¹⁸⁷ It was estimated that the budgetary resources, which

¹⁸⁶ Kakoršna vlada, takšen proračun, Straža, 30. 6. 1922, p. 1; Ekspoze finančnega ministra, Straža, 7. julij 1922, p. 1; Prinzipi državnega proračuna, Straža, 10. 7. 1922, p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ Kakoršna vlada, takšen proračun, Straža, 30. 6. 1922, p. 1; Proračun poljedelskega ministrstva, Slovenski gospodar, 20. 7. 1922, pp. 2-3.

were earmarked for the Ministry of Justice and Army and Navy, were too high.¹⁸⁸ They were also against uneven regional tax burdens on citizens.¹⁸⁹ Because it was adopted without annual accounts for the previous year, which meant that the 'Public Accountancy Act' was broken, Vladimir Pušenjak, Styrian deputy, reproached that the budget was unconstitutional.¹⁹⁰

On 23 November, the government adjourned the sessions of the National Assembly for an indefinite period. The reason for this were the efforts of Ljubomir Davidovič, leader of the government party (the Yugoslav Democratic Party) for the arrival of Croatian deputies in the National Assembly in autumn 1922, which would undermine the government's status.¹⁹¹ Josip Hohnjec made a comment on this measure saying: "*The degradation of our parliament will certainly last as long as the current governmental coalition.*"¹⁹² On 4 December, Nikola Pašić wrote his letter of resignation reasoning that the deputies who were a part of governmental coalition, the supporters of Ljubomir Davidovič, discontinued the policy on which the coalition collaboration was based.¹⁹³ On 16 December, he set up a homogeneous minority government which was characterized by the Catholic Camp as "*the last station on the way of Great Serbian chauvinism and hegemony.*" King Aleksander made use of his constitutional powers and due to the enforcement of the autonomist bloc after the first half of the mandatory period he dissolved the National Assembly and called an election for 18 March 1923.¹⁹⁴

The Yugoslav Club parties issued a joint proclamation to the voters, demanding the implementation of the programme for autonomy and the Vidovdan constitution revision.¹⁹⁵ The Slovenian People's Party introduced the programme for election to National Assembly in a leaflet "*Sodite po delih.*"¹⁹⁶ On the basis of the right for self-determination of the Slovenian people, they demanded constitutional revision

¹⁸⁸ Stenografske beleške Narodne skupščine Kraljevine SHS. Redovan saziv za 1921-22, volume VI., no. 90/year 2, pp. 518-521; Poslanci Jugoslovanskega kluba o proračunu vojnega ministra, Slovenec, 6. 5. 1922, p. 1; Razprava o proračunu ministrstva za pravosodje, Slovenec, 19. 7. 1922, p. 1; Pravosodstvo v naši državi, Slovenec, 21. 7. 1922, p. 2; 22. 7. 1922, p. 2; Država in pravosodje. Seja zakonodavne skupščine 18. julija 1922, in: Za svobodo in pravo. Iz govorov narodnega poslanca dr. Josipa Hohnjeca, Maribor 1923, pp. 71-80.

¹⁸⁹ Ekspoze finančnega ministra. Iz govora narodnega poslanca Vl. Pušenjaka na seji Narodne skupščine z dne 27. m. m., Straža, 7. 7. 1922, p. 1.

¹⁹⁰ Državni proračun proti zakonu, Straža, 12. 7. 1922, p. 1; Državni dolgovi - izmenjava denarja, Slovenski gospodar, 13. 7. 1922, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹¹ Gligorijevič, p. 125 and 127.

¹⁹² Vojaški krediti in Jugoslovanski klub, Straža, 29. 11. 1922, p. 1.

¹⁹³ Gligorijevič, p. 127.

¹⁹⁴ Na zadnji postaji, Straža, 22. 12. 1922, p. 1; Gligorijevič, p. 128.

¹⁹⁵ Razpust Narodne skupščine, Slovenec, 22. 12. 1922, p. 1; Proglas Jugoslovanskega kluba, Straža, 27. 12. 1922, p. 1; Poslanci Jugoslovanskega kluba svojim volilcem, Slovenski gospodar, 4. 1. 1923, pp. 1-2; Slovenci in Hrvati!, Slovenec, 24. 12. 1922, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹⁶ The programme anticipated the Federative State of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs and Bulgarians with joint foreign and defence policies and partly financial policy. Central Parliament would manage joint public affairs and in each of the autonomous provinces the provincial assemblies would be established and governments subordinate to the assemblies. Administration and judicature organization would fall within the legislative powers of the provincial assemblies', the determination of relations between the Catholic Church and the state by defining the church's rights and duties and also the school leg-

and reorganization of the country on the basis of wide political, economic and cultural autonomy, which was an important upgrade of the party's constitutional plan from 1921.¹⁹⁷ "The first and the main concern in politics is integrity," was a slogan made prior to an election, rejecting a discussion on the form of government as an issue of secondary importance and endorsing an absolute internal unity of the party.¹⁹⁸ Anton Korošec raised expectations for success of the Slovenian People's Party at an election on 21 February in Maribor, due to its autonomy, social and Christian programme.¹⁹⁹ The main priority, however, was to condemn the assault of ORJUNA (Yugoslav Nationalist Organization) on the printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor.²⁰⁰

In the framework of Catholic organizations' action for agitation of Catholic papers, which took place from 10 to 25 December 1922, a pamphlet was issued by the Slovenian People's party secretariat in Maribor, critically evaluating the articles of the opposing political newspapers and indirectly also the government's activity. The secretariat collaborators were delivered to the Public Prosecutor's office in Maribor due to the infringement of the "*Protection of Public Order and Security Act of the State.*" The pamphlet, however, contained political programme of the Slovenian People's Party in Styria for the sake of an approaching election. Its wording was as follows: "*These papers (Translator's note: Catholic) vigorously protect the Catholic religion and St. Church against the religious enemies, whereas the independent, liberals and social democrats are assaulting and offending it. These papers strive for Christian school and children's education against the intents of freemason, Pribičević, democrats and the independent, who desire a non-religious school. For these reasons these papers battle against the falconry and falcons, non-religious teachers. These papers strive for the independence or autonomy of the Slovenes and demand that the decisions about their own matters are made by the SLOVENES THEMSELVES AND NOT BY THE SERBIAN PARTIES. However, the independent voted for centralism and therefore subjected the Slovenes to the hegemony of the Serbian parties. These papers vigorously oppose the tax increase, whereas the independent*

islation. Moreover, the Provincial Parliament would supervise the development of the economy, education, health care and social policy. What is interesting is that at the end of 1922, a Styrian deputy Vladimir Pušenjak strived for the formation of a two-chamber parliament, each of them dealing with economic and political legislation separately.

Seja načelstva SLS, Straža, 22. 12. 1922, p. 2; Pušenjak Vladimir, Ob Novem letu 1922, Straža, 30. 12. 1921, p. 1; Sodite po delih! Vsem, ki so dobre volje! Kažipot slovenskim volivcem v boju za slovensko samostojnost, Ljubljana 1923, pp. 42-43, 45-46, 48, 70-76.

¹⁹⁷ Stiplovšek, p. 60.

¹⁹⁸ Seja načelstva SLS, Straža, 22. 12. 1922, p. 2; Zbor zaupnikov Slovenske ljudske stranke za Slovenijo, Straža, 7. 2. 1923, pp. 1-2; Zbor zaupnikov SLS, Slovenec, 6. 2. 1923, pp. 1-3.

¹⁹⁹ Volilni shod somišljenikov Slovenske ljudske stranke v Mariboru, Straža, 14. 2. 1923, p. 5; Volilni shod SLS v Mariboru, Straža, 21. 2. 1923, p. 3; Volilno zborovanje naše stranke v Mariboru, Straža, 23. 2. 1923, p. 3; Veličasten shod SLS v Mariboru, Slovenec, 22. 2. 1923, p. 1; Sijajni shod v Mariboru, Slovenec, 23. 2. 1923, p. 2.

²⁰⁰ ORJUNA supporters broke into the Printing house of St. Cyril in Maribor during the night of 10 to 11 February 1923. They damaged the majority of the printing- machines in order to prevent the camp from issuing the newspapers prior to the election., which however, was unsuccessful; the Catholic newspapers were issued uninterruptedly in an abridged form. The events in connection with the assault were analysed in detail by Darko Friš, Mariborski odbor Orjune in dogodki leta 1923, v: Melikov

and democrats voted in favour of all new taxes. These papers urge for help to the people who suffered from drought, flood and hail. These papers speak for all suffering classes: for farmers and workers, clerks, railwaymen, roadmen, constables and soldiers- which are therefore their true friends. These papers are against armies and demand peace. Consequently, they are also against all expenses for new weapons. The independent, however, voted in favour of 800 million dinars to purchase the rifles and canons for the Minister of War. These papers demand that our fellows do their military service at home in Slovenia, that the number of the soldiers is diminished by half and that the military service is reduced to 6 months. The independent and democrats were against it. These papers scouredg badly the ill-treatments of our soldiers and demanded good food and clothes for them. However, the independent declared that our soldiers in Serbia are well treated and do not lack anything. These papers decisively took sides with our recruits who were taken to Serbia in the worst winter last year and about 600 of them died. The independent did nothing at all for the recruits. These papers wrote fearlessly against Zečević, the War Minister, who was guilty of deaths of innocent recruits and brought to the dock. The independent and democrats, however, voted against the punishment of the War Minister.”²⁰¹

On 18 March 1923, the Slovenian People's Party won 6,4 % of votes at the Assembly election country-wide and 60 percent in Slovenia - this meant 21 mandates in the National Assembly out of 26 Slovenian mandates.²⁰² With approximately 70 % participation in the election in Styria, the Slovenian People's Party gained an absolute victory in all the Styrian electoral districts²⁰³ - 58,1 % and 12 deputy mandates,²⁰⁴ which compared with last year's election showed an improvement of the party's condition in Styria for 27.000 votes or 23 %.²⁰⁵ Improved and restored inner structure, a strong network of cooperative organizations in the countryside and above all the mass voters' support to the autonomy programme and also clear position of the

zbornik, Ljubljana 2000, pp. 933-950. Napad demokratske „Orjune“ na Tiskarno sv. Cirila v Mariboru, Straža, 12. 2. 1923, p. 1; Tedenske novice, „Slovenski gospodar“ in „Straža“, Slovenski gospodar, 15. 2. 1923, pp. 2-3.

²⁰¹ PAM, fond: Državno tožilstvo Maribor, AŠ 414, Dnevnik v kazenskem postopanju zoper dr. Antona Jerovška, Ss 23/22, Maribor 22. 4. 1923; Državnemu pravdništvu k Ss 23/22-5, Ss 23/22/7, Ljubljana 19. 4. 1923; PAM, fond: Državno tožilstvo Maribor, AŠ 414, Tiskarna sv. Cirila v Mariboru, Katoličani! Na agitacijo za krščanske časopise!, Ss 23/22; Za naše časopise, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 12. 1922, p. 2; Vsi somišljeniki, na plan! Na agitacijo za naše liste!, Slovenski gospodar, 7. 12. 1922, p. 3.

²⁰² Mikuž, p. 251; Gligorijevič, p. 150.

²⁰³ Uradne številke o končnem izidu po okrajih, Slovenski gospodar, 29. 3. 1923, p. 2; Straža, 21. 3. 1923, p. 3; Sijajna zmaga slovenskega ljudstva!, Slovenec, 19. 3. 1923, pp. 4-5; Končni izid volitev na Štajerskem, Naprej, 29. 3. 1923, p. 4; Končni volilni izidi na Štajerskem, Nova doba, 24. 3. 1923, p. 2; Izid volitev na Štajerskem, Slovenski narod, 24. 3. 1923, p. 2; Volilni izidi na Štajerskem, Jutro, 23. 3. 1923, p. 2; Končni rezultat volitev v mariborskem volilnem okrožju, Tabor, 23. 3. 1923, p. 1.

²⁰⁴ The following deputies entered the National Assembly: Anton Korošec, Franjo Žebot, Josip Hohnjec, Davorin Kranjc, Vladimir Pušenjak, Ivan Vesenjak, Jurij Kugovnik, Štefan Falež, Jakob Vreečko, Josip Klekl, Geza Šiftar and Andrej Bedjanič.

Poslanci iz Slovenije, Domoljub, 28. 3. 1923, p. 152; Gligorijevič, p. 149.

²⁰⁵ Uradne številke o končnem izidu po okrajih, Slovenski gospodar, 29. 3. 1923, p. 2; Straža, 21. 3. 1923, p. 3; Koliko poslancev dobijo posamezne stranke, Straža, 21. 3. 1923, p. 4; 22. 3. 1923, p. 1;

majority of the Slovenian electoral body against the state centralism and unitarism were the reasons for the victory of the Slovenian People's Party.²⁰⁶

* * *

The Slovenian People's Party achieved its prevalent political position in Slovenia in 1918-1923 on the basis of clearly formatted and excellent autonomy programme, the purpose of which was to achieve the sovereign position of Slovenian people in the State of Yugoslavia. In ideological field the concept of the Catholic reform and closely linked system of total Christianity were emphasised - Christianity on all levels of social and private lives. On the basis of socioeconomic programme of the Christian Socials it defended the idea of socially and justly organized state under strong social control of the capitalist economy.²⁰⁷ In accordance with the above-mentioned limited programme starting-points, the Catholic Camp in Styria was also developing in 1918-1923, although it was still tied to the pre-war political organization of the Slovenian Farmer's Alliance and had divided opinions regarding the key issues of the Slovenian ideological, social and political development several times. Its deputies presented their views on economy, on the formation of the Yugoslav Club constitutional proposal and with reference to the solution of the northern border issue, defending a more conciliatory position towards the resolutions of the plebiscite committee after the Carinthian Plebiscite. During the reconciliation of viewpoints on the form of government in the party, the Styrian Catholic camp supported Anton Korošec, who rejected the republican model as inappropriate for the level of maturity of the Yugoslav State.

Naša zmaga, Slovenski gospodar, 22. 3. 1923, p. 1; Dnevne novice. Glavni volilni odbor za okrožje Maribor-Celje, Straža, 23. 3. 1923, p. 2.

²⁰⁶ Gligorijević, p. 252.

²⁰⁷ Perovšek Jurij, Idejni, socialnogospodarski in narodnopolitični nazori slovenskega meščanstva, in: Zgodovinski časopis, 51 (1997), No. 4, pp. 529, 541, 544 and 546-550.

Mateja Ratej

RAZVOJ POLITIČNEGA KATOLICIZMA NA ŠTAJERSKEM V LETIH 1918-1923

POVZETEK

Slovenska ljudska stranka je v letih 1918-1923 na podlagi svojega avtonomistično-federalističnega programa in s prizadevanji za slovensko nacionalno uveljavitev ter suveren položaj slovenskega naroda v jugoslovanski državi utemeljila svoj prevladajoči položaj v slovenskem političnem prostoru. Predstavniki političnega katolicizma na Slovenskem so na idejnem področju odklonili liberalizem in komunizem, saj so si prizadevali za uresničenje koncepta katoliške obnove in z njim povezanega sistema totalnega krščanstva, čeprav je v 20. letih prejšnjega stoletja v stranki nad omenjenim konceptom še prevladal politični pragmatizem. Večji poudarek je bil namenjen socialni preureeditvi družbe na podlagi krščanskosocialnega programa, tj. z uresničitvijo socialno pravično urejene države in strogo socialno kontrolo kapitalističnega gospodarstva. Na Štajerskem so bile temeljne stanovsko-politične organizacije katoliškega tabora po prvi svetovni vojni Slovenska kmetska zveza in Jugoslovanska strokovna zveza, ki sta bili pod direktnim pokroviteljstvom Slovenske ljudske stranke, Slovenska krščanskosocialna zveza, ki je bila matica Slovenske krščanske ženske zveze, in telovadno društvo Orel. Miselno in organizacijsko povezovalno točko štajerskega katoliškega gibanja je v obravnavanem času predstavljala Tiskarna sv. Cirila in Mariboru, kjer je bil sedež Tajništva Slovenske ljudske stranke. Medtem ko je politična organizacija v obravnavanem času napredovala in je do pričetka zasedanja Začasnega narodnega predstavništva v začetku marca 1919 že dobila jasne obrise, so ostale organizacije katoliškega tabora na Štajerskem občutile posledice prve svetovne vojne, ki je prekinila njihov razvoj. V začetku leta 1921 se je pričel proces njihove organizacijske decentralizacije in bolj poglobljenega delovanja. V razvoju katoliške politike na Štajerskem je v obravnavanem času pribajalo do nekaterih razlik med mariborskim in celjskim katoliškim središčem, ki pa niso prerasle v načelna nasprotja. Celjski katoliški krog je bil do poletja 1919 agilnejši od mariborskega, saj ga je prehitel pri (re)formiranju Orla in odprtju strankinega Tajništva, vendar je bil katoliški krog v Tiskarni sv. Cirila v Mariboru tisti, ki si je prilaščal dediščino predvojne Slovenske kmečke zveze in je stremel za tem, da postane Maribor štajersko katoliško kulturno središče. Slovenska ljudska stranka je imela v Mariboru v primerjavi z ostalima avtonomnima mestoma Celje in Ptuj večjo podporo volivev, tu sta izbjajala oba konservativna časnika, Straža in Slovenski gospodar, bogoslovno semenišče pa je ustvarjalo pogoje za vzgojo mladega političnega vodstvenega kadra. Med ljubljanskim in mariborskim katoliškim krogom je nekajkrat prišlo do nesoglasij zaradi različnih pogledov na obliko vladavine, kar pa ni ogrožalo enotnosti stranke. Septembra 1920 so v štajerski katoliški politični organizaciji uradno prevzeli ime Slovenske ljudske stranke, regionalni partikularizem pa je bil dokončno presežen pred volitvami v Narodno skupščino marca 1923, ko je štajerska Slovenska kmetska zveza opustila naslanjanje na specifiko predvojne politične organizacije.

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1.01 Original Scientific Paper

Hungarian National Politics and the Status Law

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Abstract:

This article analyses the *Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries* in the framework of Hungarian national politics. The origin of the question is the gellnerian incongruence of the boundaries of the Hungarian state and the Hungarian nation. Hungary, as a state concerned with the fate of Hungarians living abroad, considers it a political and moral duty to help Hungarians, especially those who live in the bordering countries. Until recently, the Hungarian state supported principally the institutions of the national minorities, now it supports also the co-national individuals. The main debate was around the definition of the person who is entitled to obtain the Hungarian card, basically on the definition of *who is Hungarian*. Basically two conceptions on the nation characterized the debate. The ethnocultural (ethno-territorial) conception, promoted by the conservative government, emphasizes the unity of all the Hungarians. The civic conception, promoted by the socialist and liberals, concentrates on the Hungarian citizens. Beside the domestic debates, the law became in the center of attention of the international organizations such as the Venice Commission, the High Commissioner for National Minorities, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Key words:

Kin-state, kin-minority, political and cultural nation, Hungary, Hungarians living in the neighboring states.

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Introduction

This paper analyses the *Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries*,¹ which came to be known as the *status law*,² in the framework of Hungarian national politics. First, I will offer a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the status law, and then I will analyze the process of framing the law, especially the political and theoretical questions raised by the status law, and finally, the domestic and international consequences of the law.

If we simplify the question, its origin is the gellnerian incongruence of the boundaries of the Hungarian state and the Hungarian nation.³ As it is well known, Hungary lost a part of its territory, and around 3 millions of Hungarians became national minorities in the bordering states after the First World War. The situation of the Hungarian minorities abroad is a permanent concern for the Hungarian governments. Hungarian national politics, as basically every national politics in Europe, is based on the assumption that the Hungarian state is responsible for the Hungarians living abroad. Between the two world wars, the shock of the Trianon Peace Treaty deeply influenced Hungarian domestic and foreign policy. Hungarian foreign politics was characterized by a strong support for the Hungarian minorities abroad, and irredentism. Parts of an already formed nation, which had been involved in the process of Hungarian nation-building, suddenly became a national minority. Up to 1918, the Hungarians considered themselves the rightful masters of Transylvania, and acted on the basis of this idea. Consequently, after 1918, while being backed ideologically by the revisionist politics of the Hungarian state, the leaders of the Hungarian national minority parties in the neighboring states organized their political and cultural organizations on an ethnocultural basis and promoted a policy of self-defense in regard to the nationalizing thrust of the enlarged neighboring states. The essential point is that the ethnocultural basis of organization, which increasingly characterized the Hungarian politics of nation-building after the Compromise of 1867, prevailed after a part of that nation became a national minority. Obviously, the framework had changed dramatically, but the politics based on the ethnocultural conception of the community remained dominant. Besides striving for different forms of autonomy and self-government, the political elite, with the help of the intelligentsia, had been engaged in the establishment of separate Hungarian institutions. The idea behind this practice is that without such institutions Hungarian culture cannot be preserved and promoted. The nationalization process of the national minority has been influenced both by the 'nationalizing state' and by the 'external national homeland'.⁴ The second Vienna Decision/Award grant to Hunga-

¹ Adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 19th of June, 2001. Available from <http://www.htmh.hu/law.htm>

² Political and scientific discourse refers to it as the 'Sta tus Law'. The official name: *Törvény a szomszédos országokban élő magyarokról* (Act on the Hungarians living in neighboring countries).

³ Certainly, the incongruence between the boundaries of the state and of the nation presented a problem also before 1918, but then the nation was encompassed within the borders of the Hungarian Kingdom.

⁴ See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge 1998, pp. 63-67. See also Rogers Brubaker, 'Myths and Misconceptions in the

ry the Northern part of Transylvania, however, at the end of the Second World War the borders of Hungary had been redrawn almost as they were before 1938. The Soviet system, after 1945, was based on the assumption that socialism will resolve the problems of national minorities. During the communist period, official politics was characterized by the fiction of the ethnoculturally neutral state, and it was often asserted that questions regarding nationality belonged to the internal affairs of the respective country. Until the mid-1980s, Hungary did not show official interest in Hungarians living in other states. In the late 1980s, the problem of Hungarians living abroad, especially in Transylvania, was brought into the center of attention. The breakdown of the socialist/communist system brought to the surface the old tensions between the titular nation and the national minorities, and, similarly, this led to tensions between neighboring states. That was also the case of Hungarian minorities and the titular nations in the neighboring states. The internal national tensions are reflected also in the relationship between Hungary and its neighbors. Obviously, the reverse argumentation may also be valid. The essence is that the relationship between a kin-state and its neighbors is strongly correlated with the (perception of) situation of its minorities and the titular nation.

Following the revolution of 1989, the relationship between Hungary and the Hungarians living in neighboring countries entered a new phase. After the breakdown of the communist regimes, the situation changed even more radically. Finally, the concern for Hungarians living in the neighboring countries was materialized in legislation and governmental politics. In the Hungarian constitution a paragraph was introduced, stating Hungary's responsibility regarding the Hungarians living abroad.⁵ On the basis of this constitutional and 'ethnocultural' responsibility, the Hungarian governments established several governmental institutions and foundations to support Hungarian institutions in the neighboring countries.⁶ A certain part of the Hungarian budget was allocated to finance Hungarian political, educational, and cultural institutions. Important financial assistance was given to students, pedagogues, and artists studying in Hungary, with the aim of bringing up the future Hungarian intelligentsia. Naturally, it has been expected that these people would return to their home country.⁷

Although a detailed analysis suggests that there are important differences among the three post-communist Hungarian governments in the politics towards Hungarians abroad, my paper does not focus on these discrepancies. However, I must note

⁵ Study of Nationalism,⁴ in: John A. Hall, ed., *The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism*, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 272-305.

⁶ Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. Article 6(3): "*The Republic of Hungary acknowledges its responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside of its borders and shall promote the fostering of their links with Hungary.*" See *A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmány* (Constitution of the Republic of Hungary), Budapest 1998, p. 14.

⁷ *Határon Tílli Magyarok Hivatala* (Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad - GOHMA). The Hungarian government also allocated important sums to several foundations that distributed the resources: *Ilyés Foundation*, *Segítő Jobb Foundation*, *(Új)Kézfogás Foundation*, *Apáczai Foundation*, etc.

⁷ Several studies show that only a minor part of those who studied in Hungary returned or intend to return to their home countries.

that the first⁸ and the third⁹ government, both right-winged, gave more emphasis to their concern with the Hungarians living in neighboring countries than the second one.¹⁰ While the right-wing governments (and parties) asserted the ethnocultural unity of all Hungarians, the left-wing government framed its political discourse in view of the community of 'Hungarian citizens'.

In 1997 Hungary became a NATO member, and it is expected that it will soon become a member of the European Union (EU). In this case, Hungary will also join the Schengen agreement, which means that it will have to introduce visa requirements for non-EU citizens. At present, it is obvious that Romania, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine will join the EU at a considerably latter stage.¹¹ As a consequence, many Hungarians living in these states will find it hard to travel to Hungary. This poses the fear that a new Iron Curtain will separate the Hungarians from the above-mentioned countries and their homeland.

A crucial turn happened after 1998, during the FIDESZ-MDF-FKGP¹² government. In the electoral campaign of 1998, FIDESZ raised the question of according double citizenship for the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. After internal debates, in 1999 the governing parties decided to find a solution for the question. Given the international setting (EU accession), granting double citizenship was impossible. Similarly, it is hard to imagine, that the Hungarian parties would have consent to grant double citizenship for around 2-2,5 millions of 'foreign' Hungarians. In order to handle the situation, the Hungarian government raised the issue of according a special status to the Hungarians living in the neighboring states: "*If Hungary is admitted and its neighbors are not, Hungary will find its sovereignty weakened and its larger national project threatened. The government will lose its authority over traditional means of 'caring' for Hungarians abroad. It will have to accept the EU's common immigration policy, and it will lose the power to negotiate bilateral treaties with its neighbors. The Hungarian government is therefore looking for ways to virtually integrate Hungarians from neighboring countries into the EU, even if the state where they live remains outside the union. Dual citizenship for ethnic Hungarians provides one option, but this idea has no support among political parties in Hungary since it would mean representation without taxation. The preferred solution is special status for ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary - allowing, for example, the*

⁸ The government was formed in 1990 by the coalition led by the *Magyar Demokrata Fórum* (Hungarian Democratic Forum), with József Antall as Prime Minister.

⁹ The government was formed in 1998 by the coalition led by the *FIDESZ* (Alliance of Young Democrats), with Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister.

¹⁰ The government was formed in 1994 by the coalition led by the *Magyar Szocialista Párt* (Hungarian Socialist Party), with Gyula Horn as Prime Minister.

¹¹ Slovakia and Slovenia will probably join the EU almost simultaneously with Hungary. Even if not, the citizens of these countries will not need a visa to travel to the EU states. It is also probable that the visa requirement for Romanian citizens will be waived.

¹² *FIDESZ - Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége* (Alliance of Young Democrats), MDF - *Magyar Demokrata Fórum* (Hungarian Democratic Forum), FKGP - *Fiiggetlen Kisgazda Párt* (Independent Smallholders Party)

¹³ Zsuzsa Csergő and James M. Goldgeier, Virtual Nationalism, Foreign Policy, July-August 2001., p. 76.

*possibility of legal employment in Hungary for short periods.*¹³

Related to the issue of citizenship, George Schöpflin states: “*The status law, by offering options for the cultural reproduction of all Hungarians, is a significant contribution towards that strategy and can take its place in other, similar attempts to regulate ethnicity within a civic and etatic framework. In effect, by separating citizenship from ethnic identity and constructing a clear definition of citizen of the Hungarian state and citizens of other states but ethnically Hungarian individuals, the Hungarian status law is enhancing and enriching the concept of citizenship.*¹⁴

As a response to this new situation, some representatives of the Hungarian national minorities advanced the idea of giving double citizenship to Hungarians living in neighboring states.¹⁵ The idea was dropped after the 1998 elections, but, in order to (partially) keep its promise, the government included the framing of the ‘Status Law’ into its agenda.

The Hungarian State and its ‘External Homeland Politics’

Hungary, as a state concerned with the fate of Hungarians living abroad, considers it a political and moral duty to help Hungarians, especially those who live in the bordering countries. Until recently, the Hungarian state principally supported the institutions of the national minorities, now it supports also the co-national individuals. The government considers that the existence of such a law, and the facilities offered, encourages the Hungarians to refrain from emigration, and could moderate the process of assimilation.

The newly formed government expressed the following goals regarding national policy: “*The Government’s policy on ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries aims to build and develop political, cultural, and economic ties between Hungary and Hungarian communities abroad as part of the general process of European unification, as well as to help Hungarians living in neighboring countries to live and prosper in their own homeland. In order to achieve this, the bonds between ethnic Hungarian minorities and Hungary must be settled within a framework of legislation and government, so as to preserve the organic ties of Hungarian communities to Hungary, even after its accession to the European Union.*¹⁶

This program reinforces Hungary’s special relationship with the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, but emphasizes the importance of settling this relationship within the legislative framework. In addition, for the first time it is expressed that the *organic ties* of the Hungarian communities abroad and Hungary are of primary importance. George Schöpflin describes the arguments for such a law as follows: “*In broader terms, the status law can be said to have two dimensions. One of these is the aim to regulate Hungary’s relations with the Hungarian communities in the neighboring states, a problem that was not created by Hungary but*

¹⁴ George Schöpflin, The Hungarian Status Law: political, cultural and sociological contexts, Paper presented at the the Szabad Identitásválasztás conference, Budapest, November 21, 2001.

¹⁵ The debate on this issue was published in Magyar Kisebbség 1 (1999), and 2-3 (1999).

¹⁶ For details, see the Government Program: For a Civic Hungary on the Eve of a New Millennium from 1998. Available from <http://www.htmh.hu/govprog.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 August 2001.

by the victorious powers after 1918. The hard reality is that the very existence of the Hungarian state generates tension between Hungary and the minorities living in the neighboring states, given the intimacies of the shared culture. /.../ Second, the broader context of the law is the historic drive to establish a new narrative for the Hungarian nation in its cultural dimension as a modern community. The loss of empire in 1918 was a catastrophe for the Hungarian model of modernity and ever since, Hungary has been struggling to find a new narrative that would reestablish the model in the new context. Indeed, this model is essential for Hungary's return to Europe and for Hungary's membership of the European Union. The law, therefore, is intended to reflect the requirements of democracy, of the European environment and the needs of the Hungarian state.^{“17}

The official argument for framing the *Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries* was: “*The main aim of this Law is to ensure special relations of the Hungarians living in neighboring countries to their kin state, the promotion and preservation of their national identity and well-being within their home country; therefore to contribute to the political and economic stability of the region, and through this to contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration process of Hungary in particular and the Central and Eastern European region in general. In this context the Law promotes the preservation of the cultural and social cohesion as well as the economic consolidation of Hungarian communities abroad.*^{“18}

The central scope of the law is to ensure the special relations of the Hungarians living in the region, despite their state-allegiances, and to convince the Hungarians living in neighboring countries to remain in their home country. Besides the initial idea that the ‘Status Law’ will serve as a basis for according preferential national visas to the possessors of the ‘Hungarian Identification Document,’ the public debate focused on the effect of this law on the emigration of the Hungarians from the neighboring countries. The expressed goal of the law is explained as follows: “*While promoting the national identity of Hungarians living in neighboring countries, the Law obviously ensures prosperity and staying within the home country. According to the scope of the Law, the codifier applies different provisions to encourage living within the home country and does not support resettling to Hungary. Most forms of assistance will be applied within the home countries of Hungarians living in neighboring countries; the institutional structure needed for any assistance for the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries is established through this legal norm.*^{“19}

However, other aspects cannot be disregarded: “*The Law meets the interest of the Hungarian citizens, since it is protecting and supervising the labor market. This is of a great importance both for foreign companies investing in Hungary and thus, indirectly for the EU. Actually, Hungarians living in neighboring countries are often employed in Hungary - illegally. Should we legalize employing them in Hungary - their contribution to the health insurance system and taxes will increase the amount*

¹⁷ George Schöpflin, The Hungarian Status Law: political, cultural and sociological contexts, Paper presented at the the Szabad Identitásválasztás conference, Budapest, November 21, 2001.

¹⁸ Information on the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (Act T/4070).

¹⁹ Ibidem.

of the central state budget. The contribution of Hungarians living in neighboring countries to the development of economic relations between Hungary and the neighboring countries may be regarded as an economic investment being refunded in the near future.²⁰

While in the early stages of framing the law this second argument was not employed, it later became of central importance, as a partial response to the critics who emphasize that the implementation of the law will cost the Hungarian state a lot.

However, the most salient question is whether the law, once it became operational, will increase or decrease ethnic Hungarian immigration to Hungary. Hungary's official position is that Hungarians from neighboring countries should remain in their home country. The government's argument was that, when the law enters into force, Hungarians from the neighboring countries will prefer to remain in their home country, while being able to work legally in Hungary. The opposition (the left-wing MSZP and the liberal SZDSZ) challenged this view and argued that this law, since it offers the possibility to work legally, will increase emigration to Hungary. According to this argument, those who work for several months in Hungary will have the possibility to find out how to settle in Hungary. A further disagreement concerned the legalization of illegal work. The critiques of the law asserted that cheap illegal work will be preferred both by employees and employers, and, as a consequence, nothing will change. However, both arguments are speculative. Even if public opinion polls support one or another option, from a sociological perspective none of these positions can be confirmed or disproved.²¹

Two further questions were also central to the debate. The first concerns Hungary's forthcoming integration into the EU, which is often perceived as a threat to Hungarians living in neighboring countries. Because the law has no provisions for the period after Hungary's accession to the EU, the Hungarian population in neighboring countries is afraid that traveling to or settling in Hungary will be very difficult. Such a perception influences much more the decisions regarding emigration. Needless to say, the existence or inexistence of the 'Status Law' will have a minor influence on individual decisions regarding emigration. The second question concerns Hungary's increasing demand of skilled workers. The former Prime Minister of Hungary also resorted to this argument: "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 31 May [2001] told a Budapest conference entitled 'The Hungarian Model' that Hungary will have to attract labor from neighboring countries to fuel its soaring economy. He pointed out that without foreign labor, the country's supply of quality labor will be unsatisfactory within four to five years."²²

Many European states face similar problems. The case of Hungary is different only in the sense that there are a large number of people who, culturally and

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ See Ferenc Dobos and István Apró, "Integrációs esélyek és remények: Repräsentatív mintákon regisztrált határon túli és anyaországi vélemények a tervezett státustörvény nébány eleméről" (Chances and Hopes of Integration: Opinions of Hungarians in Hungary and Hungarians from Abroad on Certain Elements of the Status Law), Pro Minoritate, Fall-Winter (2000), pp. 19-43 and "A magyar közvélemény a státustörvénytervezetről" (The Hungarian Public Opinion and the Project of the Status Law), Pro Minoritate, Spring (2001), pp. 100-106.

²² RFE/RL NEWSLINE vol. 5, no. 104, part II, 1 June 2001.

linguistically, can be easily integrated into Hungarian society. On the one hand, there is a preference to keep Hungarians from neighboring countries in their home country; on the other hand, economic reasons may force Hungary to increase the number of immigrants. It is probable that Hungary will prefer Hungarians from neighboring countries to non-Hungarian potential immigrants.

Even if politicians avoid discussing this issue, it is absolutely clear that the practical decisions concerning the implementation of the law pose the question: *Who is Hungarian in the neighboring countries?* The legislators' intention is to include every Hungarian living in neighboring countries, but only Hungarians. However, achieving this goal is not just impractical, but also theoretically impossible. In public debates, this question was formulated as a dichotomy between the freedom of choice in defining one's own national identity and the requirement of proving one's Hungarianness. Theoretically, this dispute can be translated as a debate between the *objective* and *subjective* definitions of the nation.

The law enounces the scope as follows:

- (1) *This Act shall apply to persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and who have their residence in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine, and who*
 - a) *have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary renunciation, and*
 - b) *are not in possession of a permit for permanent stay in Hungary.*
- (2) *This Act shall also apply to the spouse living together with the person identified in paragraph (1) and to the children of minor age being raised in their common household even if these persons are not of Hungarian nationality.“*

One can observe that only the ‘neighboring countries’ are included. For this, the following explanation has been provided: “*The Act will cover those persons of Hungarian national identity who are not Hungarian citizens and reside in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Austria, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine. Therefore the Law exclusively affects individuals of Hungarian national identity in the neighboring countries, and not members of the Hungarian Diaspora (emigration) living in Western Europe, and overseas. However, this Law does not have any negative effect on the established rights of the Diaspora (emigration). Therefore, persons of Hungarian national identity, who have already obtained Hungarian citizenship or are in possession of a permanent residence permit in Hungary are not entitled to become subjects of the law. The definition of the subjects of this law is primarily based on the basic human rights principle on the free choice of identity.*“²³

The reason for excluding the Western Diaspora from the benefits is probably that they live in countries characterized by a better economic situation, and it is considered to be needless to support them with Hungarian state resources. This argument seems logical, but theoretically it undermines the coherence of the definition of nationhood. It seems as if Hungary applied an ethnocultural definition of the nation only selectively, in view of the Hungarians living in the neighboring states.

²³ Information on the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (Act T/4070).

The debate over the objective and subjective criteria of belonging to the Hungarian nation brought into light an old, and irresolvable, dispute about the definition of the nation. While the opposition accepted only self-definition as a basis of stating somebody's Hungarianness, the government parties argued that it is necessary to include also 'objective criteria.' They argued that, in the case of self-definition, many non-Hungarians would declare themselves Hungarian in order to benefit from the privileges accorded by the law, and this exceeds the present economic capacity of Hungary. To avoid the perils of self-definition, the Hungarian Standing Conference (HSC) recommended the following criteria: "*In order for the recommendation to be issued, written identification with the Hungarian nation, application for the recommendation and knowledge of the Hungarian language are required. Under special appraisement, the recommending organization may grant an exemption from the Hungarian language requirement if the applicant meets one of the criteria below:*

- a. he or she is considered Hungarian by the country of citizenship,*
- b. one of his or her parents is of Hungarian nationality,*
- c. his or her spouse possesses a Hungarian Card,*
- d. he or she is a member of a registered Hungarian organization,*
- e. he or she is treated as Hungarian by a church registry,*
- f. he or she has attended, at least, for four years a public educational institution where the language of tuition was Hungarian, or his or her child or children attend(s) such an institution.*

Should the applicants be capable of providing evidence of meeting the above-listed criteria, the recommendation has to be issued irrespective of his or her origin, religion or political affiliation.²⁴

Finally these recommendations were framed in the law:

"§ 21 (1) The evaluating authority will issue the ID if:

- a. the applicant has a recommendation issued by an organization representing the Hungarian communities in that particular neighboring state and being recognized by the Government of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organization,*
- b. the recommendation certifies that the applicant is of Hungarian nationality and includes the followings,*
 - ba. application of the individual,*
 - bb. name, place and date of birth, permanent residence, and maiden name of the mother of applicant,*
 - bc. the name, the print of the official seal of the recommending organization, and the signature of the person acting on behalf of this organization,*
 - bd. the place and date of issue of the recommendation.*

(2) Recommendation issued for the spouse of non-Hungarian nationality

²⁴ See Annex 2 to the Final Statement of the Session of the Hungarian Standing Conference of 13-14 December 2000 concerning the definition of the subjects of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries, 14 December 2000.

and for the child of minor age of the person under this Act, only certifies the family relationship between the applicant and a Hungarian person living outside the borders.“

The Hungarian government, together with the political representatives of the Hungarian national minorities, established organizations that collect the applications for the Hungarian Identity Card. The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Hungary issues the card. The evaluating organizations are selected in accordance with the following principles:

- “(3) The Government of the Republic of Hungary will recognize an organization representing the Hungarian communities in a given country as a recommending organization, which is able to*
- a. represent the Hungarian community in its entirety living in a given country,*
 - b. provide for organizational and human resources for receiving and evaluating applications for recommendations.“*

Besides the principle of the free choice of identity, the law includes several ‘objective’ criteria for the definition of the Hungarian nation (at least regarding those who live in the neighboring countries).

One can draw the conclusion that ultimately the Hungarian state (with the assistance and contribution of the HSC) vindicates the right to decide who is Hungarian in the neighboring countries, advancing an ‘objective’ definition of the Hungarian nation, based on ethnocultural principles. The process of framing the law and the future application of the law can be perceived as a new institutionalization of the Hungarian nation. Even if it does not affect Hungarian citizens, it presumably will have effects - at least on a theoretical level - on the status of the non-ethnocultural-Hungarians within Hungary as well. The law establishes a new relationship between the Hungarian state and Hungarian individuals. The procedure of issuing the cards also suggests the unity of the ethnocultural nation. The cooperation of the evaluating organizations and the Hungarian state reinforces this institutionalization.

Constantin Iordachi offers the following explanation on the scope of the law: *“The scope of the law combines thus an ethnic principle (persons of Hungarian nationality) with a ‘statist’ principle (former Hungarian citizens who have involuntarily lost their citizenship), and with a territorial principle (regards only ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries, and not the Hungarian Diaspora all over the world). It was this combination of territorial and statist elements, as well as the historical reference to the involuntary loss of citizenship, which occasioned allegation of a hidden Hungarian irredenta agenda directed at symbolically reconstructing Greater Hungary. In addition, the territorial applicability of ‘the Statute Law’ law was also seen as controversial. It is stipulated that the recipients will benefit from the facilities granted by the Law ‘on the territory of the Republic of Hungary, as well as on their permanent place of residence in their home countries.’ This extraterritorial character of the Law conflicted with the prevailing concepts of state and territorial sovereignty that characterize national legislations in the neighboring countries. Another controversial aspect is the introduction of a photoed ID entitled the ‘Hungarian Identification Document,’ which certifies that ‘the applicant is of*

Hungarian nationality.²⁵ This ID functions as an official personal card, since it has to be periodically renewed, and can be withdrawn in case the bearer commits legal offences or changes his relation to the Hungarian state. In regard to the assistance given to ethnic Hungarians abroad, the recipient of the law receives ‘certain preferences and certain kinds of assistance’ that fall under the following main headings: education and culture, science, social security and health provisions, traveling benefits, and employment.²⁵

Consequences of the Status Law

Several East-Central European states have already adopted, or are planning to adopt, similar laws. However, the Hungarian ‘Status Law’ was broadly criticized and attacked. Especially the Slovakian and the Romanian governments expressed their concerns regarding the law. They stated that, by implementing the law, Hungary discriminates on an ethnocultural basis among citizens of the neighboring states, it seeks to establish state institutions (the so-called evaluating commissions) on the territory of other states, and that some provisions of the law, especially those regarding the support of profit-oriented enterprises, contradict the principles of a market economy. These governments also resented that Hungary did not inform them about the project of the law. One can debate whether these arguments are valid, but it is highly probable that, given the historical tensions between Hungary and most of its neighbors, the law will have some negative effects on Hungary’s relationship with neighboring states. However, this particular law does not create new tensions, it only reinforces old ones.

From another angle, it is obvious that this law creates tensions among different Hungarian organizations in the neighboring countries as well. There were internal debates on the composition of the future evaluating commissions. Since Hungary finances these organizations and important financial resources are distributed, those who control this process can easily become dominant in a particular Hungarian political sphere. Furthermore, the acquired information is another important source of power.

In summary, the idea of such a law is, on the one hand, to express the (ethno-cultural) unity of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin, and, on the other hand, to enhance the nationalizing process of the Hungarian national minorities. On a theoretical level, two aspects are important. The first is that this law establishes a relationship between the Hungarian individual and the Hungarian state. The second one is that it redefines, and re-institutionalizes the Hungarian conception of the nation.

After 1990, the Hungarian state has been financing the political, cultural, and educational institutions of Hungarians living abroad. The ‘Status Law’ adds another aspect, by creating a relationship between the Hungarian state and individuals belonging to the ethnoculturally defined Hungarian nation, which is similar to the

²⁵ Constantin Iordachi, A nemzet újrarajzolt határai: a magyar “státustörvény” és Románia kettős állam-polgárságára vonatkozó politikája a Moldvai Köztársaságban, In Zoltán Kántor (ed.), A státustörvény: előzmények és következmények, Budapest, Teleki László Alapítvány, 2001., p. 111.

relationship between Hungarian citizens and the Hungarian state. However, Hungarians from neighboring countries - on the basis of the status law - will not acquire Hungarian citizenship. By defining the subjects of the law, one implicitly defines who is Hungarian. The debate focused on the conflicting conceptualizations of Hungarianness. An 'objectivist' definition prevailed, and the aspirants have to prove their Hungarianness with documents. The law refers only to Hungarians living in the bordering countries; therefore one may say that there is a process of institutionalization of the Hungarian nation on an ethno-territorial basis.

Starting from this ethnocultural redefinition of the nation, Hungary also plays an important role in the redefinition of the Hungarian national minorities. Hungarian national minorities in the neighboring countries are involved in nationalizing processes within the framework of their respective states. The 'Status Law' strengthens the symbolic boundaries of Hungary and the national minorities living in neighboring countries. The theoretical question is whether there are several parallel processes of Hungarian nation-building, or only one. The situation existing prior to the 'Status Law' suggests the former, while the post-'Status Law' situation the latter. The 'Status Law' binds all the members of the Hungarian ethnocultural nation (living in the neighboring states) together. In this respect, it has a decisive influence on the politics of the national minorities.

Throughout the last decade, Hungary has been supporting most of the important cultural institutions. In the future, however, it will have also a decisive role in the life-strategies of the Hungarian individuals living in the neighboring countries. Hungarian political elites and intellectuals will be even more dependent on Hungary, and Budapest is meant to become the focal point for every member of the Hungarian ethnocultural community. However, this connection is mediated by Hungarian organizations from neighboring countries, and by this mediation, that is using Hungarian financial resources, they can realize their nation-building project.²⁶

The 'Status Law' cannot be understood if one does not analyze the ethnocultural definition of the Hungarian nation, and does not take into account the underlying assumptions of the Hungarian government, regarding the national minorities as nationalizing minorities. However, it is still a question whether Hungary's politics, as an external national homeland, leads to a general Hungarian nation-building, or to separate minority nation-buildings in the neighboring states.

Romania and Slovakia expressed their concerns on the status law. Immediately after passing the law, on 21 June 2001, Romania's Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase, requested the Venice Commission to examine the compatibility of the Act on Hungarians living in neighboring countries with the European standards and the norms and principles of contemporary public international law. As a response on 2 July 2001, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janos Martonyi, requested the Venice Commission to carry out a comparative study of the recent tendencies of the legislations in Europe concerning the preferential treatment of persons belonging to national minorities living outside the borders of their country of citizenship. At

²⁶ The nationalizing politics of the national minority is implemented by the ethnic party that has a dual role, that is, it functions as a political party and also as a social organization. The ethnic party and the ethno-civil society is led and influenced by the minority political elite and by the intellectuals who set the goals of a particular national minority, and act as its representatives.

its plenary session of 6-7 July 2001, the Venice Commission decided to undertake a study, based on the legislation and practice of certain member States of the Council of Europe, on the preferential treatment by a State of its kin-minorities abroad.

The Venice Commission presented its report on the 22 October, 2001. The most important conclusions are:

- “- A State may issue acts concerning foreign citizens inasmuch as the effects of these acts are to take place within its borders.*
- No quasi-official function may be assigned by a State to non-governmental associations registered in another State. Any form of certification in situ should be obtained through the consular authorities within the limits of their commonly accepted attributions. The laws or regulations in question should preferably list the exact criteria for falling within their scope of application. Associations could provide information concerning these criteria in the absence of formal supporting documents.*
- An administrative document issued by the kin-State may only certify the entitlement of its bearer to the benefits provided for under the applicable laws and regulations.*
- Preferential treatment may be granted to persons belonging to kin-minorities in the fields of education and culture, insofar as it pursues the legitimate aim of fostering cultural links and is proportionate to that aim.*
- Preferential treatment can not be granted in fields other than education and culture, save in exceptional cases and if it is shown to pursue a legitimate aim and to be proportionate to that aim.”²⁷*

The Venice Commission recognized the right of the kin-states to support its co-nationals living in other states. This is a novelty in international minority protection. However, this statement is contested, but now there is an international recommendation on this issue. It is also important that the Venice Commission stated that the kin-state may support its minorities in the field of education and culture, but prohibited other types of support, as preferential treatment in according work permits. The third important statement is that only the authorities of the kin-state may issue acts that certify the entitlement of somebody.

Rolf Ekeus, High Commissioner for National Minorities, made a statement a week after the report issued by the Venice Commission. The statement - formulated in general terms - concerns the Hungarian status law. The text of the statement highlights the divergence between the boundaries of the state and that of the nation, and recognizes the “*interest in persons of the same ethnicity living abroad*”: “*National and State boundaries seldom overlap; in fact there are few pure ‘nation-States’. National groups are therefore often divided by borders. It is a basic principle of international law that the State can act only within its jurisdiction which extends to its territory and citizenry. Although a State with a titular majority population may have an interest in persons of the same ethnicity living abroad, this does not*

²⁷ EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), REPORT ON THE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF NATIONAL MINORITIES BY THEIR KIN-STATE adopted by the Venice Commission at its 48th Plenary Meeting, (Venice, 19-20 October 2001)

*entitle or imply, in any way, a right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over these persons. At the same time it does not preclude a State from granting certain preferences within its jurisdiction, on a non-discriminatory basis. Nor does it preclude persons belonging to a national minority from maintaining unimpeded contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States with whom they share common ethnic or national origins.*²⁸

One week after the report of the Venice Commission, the Hungarian Standing Conference - taking into account the recommendations of the Venice Commission-decided on the criteria who is eligible for obtaining the Hungarian card: “*Hungarian ID may be issued to persons declaring themselves Hungarian and mastering the Hungarian language respectively:*

1. *be/she is a member of any of the registered Hungarian organizations,*
2. *be/she is treated as Hungarian by any of the church registries,*
3. *be/she is treated as Hungarian by the country of citizenship.*²⁹

The report of the Venice Commission was interpreted differently by Romania and Hungary: both parts considered that the Venice Commission supported their point of view. Hungary's debate has continued until December 2001, when Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán Victor and Romania's Prime Minister Adrian Nastase signed the *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries and issues of bilateral co-operation.*³⁰ The memorandum states:

- “2. All Romanian citizens, notwithstanding their ethnic origin, will enjoy the same conditions and treatment in the field of employment on the basis of a work permit on the territory of the Republic of Hungary. Work permits shall be issued under the general provisions on the authorization of employment of foreign citizens in Hungary.
3. The Romanian citizens of non-Hungarian ethnic identity shall not be granted any certificate and shall not be entitled to any benefits set forth by the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries.
4. The entire procedure of granting the certificate (receiving of applications, issue, forwarding) shall primarily take place on the territory of the Republic of Hungary in the county public administration established by the Hungarian authorities and respectively at the Office of the Ministry of Interior, and at the Hungarian diplomatic missions.
5. The Hungarian representative organizations or other entity on the territory of Romania shall not issue any recommendations concerning the ethnic origin or other criteria.
The organizations or other entities on the territory of Romania can provide with information with a legally non-binding character in the absence of for-

²⁸ Statement by Rolf Ekeus: OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, in the Hague, 26 October 2001: Sovereignty, Responsibility, and National Minorities

²⁹ Final Statement of the Fourth Session of the Hungarian Standing Conference, Budapest, 26 October 2001, www.htmh.hu

- mal supporting documents.*
6. *The administrative document that entitles to benefits, issued by the Hungarian authorities, shall be named 'Hungarian Certificate'.*
 7. *The certificate shall contain only the strictly necessary personal data and the entitlement to benefits (name, forename, citizenship, country of residence etc.) and shall include no reference to the ethnic origin/identity.*
 8. *The compulsory criteria on which certificates are granted shall be the following:*
 - Relevant application,
 - Free declaration of the person of belonging to the Hungarian minority in the State of citizenship, founding on his/her Hungarian ethnic identity,
 - Knowledge of the Hungarian language, or
 - The person should have declared himself/herself in the State of citizenship to have Hungarian ethnic identity, or
 - Optionally, the person should either belong to a Hungarian representative organization (notably membership of the DAHR), or be registered as ethnic Hungarian in a church.
 11. *On the basis of common experiences of the Parties, the Government of the Republic of Hungary shall initiate the review and the necessary amendments of the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries in six months after the signature of this Memorandum of Understanding. By the 1st of January 2002, the authorities of the Republic of Hungary shall take the necessary measures in order to implement the provisions of the present Agreement by means of norms of application and shall further on take also into account the recommendations of the Committee on national minorities which shall further on examine the questions concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries.”*

The European Parliament appointed Eric Jürgens as the reporter on the Hungarian status law and other similar laws in Europe. Eric Jürgens presented the draft report on the status law in 11 June 2002³¹. His report concludes that the status law is discriminatory, has extraterritorial implications, and recommends that Hungary should rescind the law. The Hungarian side responded by saying that Eric Jürgens did not fulfill his assignment, since he was asked to compare similar laws in Europe and not focus only on the Hungarian law. At the same time, the Hungarian side argued that Jürgens used a very one-sided approach to the concept of the nation, interpreting it only in the sense of the *political nation*. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe accepted Eric Jürgens' rapport on 25 June 2003. The endorsement procedure, with respect to the report, again highlighted the issue of the nation. In the explanatory memorandum Jürgens states: “*The definition of the concept ‘nation’ in the preamble to the law is too broad and could be interpreted as*

³⁰ Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of Romania concerning the Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries and issues of bilateral co-operation, Budapest, December 22, 2001., www.htmh.hu

³¹ Erik Jürgens, Preferential treatment of national minorities by their kin-states: the case of the Hungarian Status Law of 19 June 2001. (Draft report). Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly.

non-acceptance of the state borders which divide the members of the “nation”.

Since the report fundamentally rests on the political conception of the nation, it came up with an astonishing distinction between the Hungarians and the Magyars. In the conception of the report, Hungarians are the citizens of Hungary, while the Magyars are Hungarians living abroad.³² All Hungarians, in Hungary as well as in the neighboring states, refer to themselves as ‘Magyar’. In the Hungarian language there is no other word to designate those who belong to the Hungarian nation. Hungarian is the term used in English. Romanians use both words: Hungarians (*unguri*) and Magyars (*maghiari*), but there is no systematic distinction between Hungarians living in Hungary and Hungarians living in Romania. In the same logic, German citizens would be *Germans*, while Germans living in other states, i.e. Belgium, Hungary, Romania, etc. would be *Deutsch*. Romanians in Romania would be *Romanians* and Romanians living in Hungary would be *Români*. Consequently, this is an absurd outcome of using - correctly, but unilaterally - the concept of political nation. An analytical approach to the issue including also the competing concept of ethnocultural nation could lead to a deeper understanding of the problem and probably could provide a solution easier.

During the debate surrounding the status law, Günter Verheugen, has written a letter to the Prime-Minister of Hungary, Péter Medgyessy, in which he also focuses on the issue of the nation: “[T]here is a feeling that the definition of the concept ‘nation’ in the preamble of the law could under certain circumstances be interpreted - thought this interpretation is not correct - as non-acceptance of the state borders which divide the members of the ‘nation’, notwithstanding the fact that Hungary ratified several multi-and bilateral instruments containing the principle of respect for territorial integrity state, in particular the basic treatise entered into force between Hungary and Romania and Slovakia.”³³

The letter of Günter Verheugen states that the “*Hungarian nation as a whole*“ can be understood in such way that Hungary is striving for establishing special political links with the minorities in a neighboring state. Therefore, Verheugen recommends that the mentioned term should be replaced with more culturally oriented ones.

The electoral victory of the socialist and the liberals in Hungary in April 2002 placed the question into new light: the new government - especially because of the international critiques - decided to modify the status law. This was done in June 2003. Out of the major changes made - from the perspective of this paper - two are relevant. The first regards the usage of the nation concept. The original law defines its goals as follows: “*In order to ensure that Hungarians living in neighboring countries form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole*³⁴ (underlined by Z.K.) and to promote and preserve their well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country.“ The modification of the law defines the goal as: “*In order to ensure the well being of Hungarians living in neighboring states in their*

³² Magyars = People of Hungarian identity (i.e. citizens of the countries concerned who considers themselves as persons belonging to the Hungarian ‘national’ cultural and linguistic community)

³³ The letter of Günther Verheugen to Péter Medgyessy. Brussels, 5 December 2002.

³⁴ ‘unitary Hungarian nation’ would have been a more proper translation.

home-state, to promote their ties to Hungary, to support their Hungarian identity and their links to the Hungarian cultural heritage as expression of their belonging to the Hungarian nation (underlined by Z.K.).“ The modified law refrained from using the ‘Hungarian nation as a whole’ terminology, and formulated it in terms of belonging to the Hungarian cultural heritage. The other modifications of the law entail entitlements. The modified law puts the emphasis on Hungarian culture, and not on Hungarian individuals. Moreover, it supports Hungarian culture specifically, and not - as intended by the framers - Hungarian individuals living in the neighboring states. However, in practice, virtually the same individuals will benefit from the law, but the underlying philosophy has changed.

Conclusion

The Hungarian status law has both domestic and international aspects. As we have seen, beside the technical and political issue, the definition of the person who is entitled to obtain the Hungarian card, the debate is on the definition of *who is Hungarian*. Basically two conceptions on the nation characterized the debate. The ethnocultural (ethno-territorial) conception, promoted by the conservative government, emphasizes the unity of all the Hungarians. The civic conception, promoted by the socialist and liberals, concentrates on the Hungarian citizens. The neighboring states, that also have similar preferential laws regarding their co-nationals, strongly oppose the Hungarian law. The international organizations partially accept the principle of supporting the co-nationals living in neighboring states, and implicitly accept the ethnocultural conception of the nation, while others conceive as acceptable only the political conception on the nation.

While the framers of the law conceived the law based on the ethnocultural definition of the nation, the domestic opposition and, to some extent, international organizations (represented in particular by Günther Verheugen and Eric Jürgens) emphasized the political conception of the nation. The modified law shifted from an ethnocultural to a political conception of the nation.

The Hungarian status law brought into the center of attention the politics of a number of states with regard to their national minorities and has shown that the attention accorded to kin-minorities is not unique in Europe.

Hungary’s recent proposal with regard to the inclusion of the protection of national minorities in the European constitution, hopefully, will again compel politicians to clarify concepts, as well as refrain them from employing unilateral definitions just because these serve their political interests better.

Zoltán Kántor

MADŽARSKA NACIONALNA POLITIKA IN ZAKON O MADŽARIH, KI ŽIVIJO V SOSEDNJIH DRŽAVAH

POVZETEK

Madžarski statusni zakon ima poleg domačega tudi mednarodni vidik. Kot smo videli, poleg tehničnega in političnega vidika definicije osebe, ki je upravičena do posedovanja madžarske izkaznice, poteka glavna diskusija o definiciji, kdo je Madžar. V principu sta diskusijo zaznamovala dva koncepta. Etnokulturalni koncept, ki ga podpirajo konzervativna vlada, podarja enotnost vseh Madžarov. Državljanški koncept, ki ga podpirajo socialisti in liberalci, pa se osredotoča na madžarske državljane. Sosednje države, ki imajo podoben prednost zakon o svojih so-narodnjakih, izrecno nasprotujejo madžarskemu zakonu. Mednarodne organizacije deloma priznavajo princip podpore so-narodnjakom, ki živijo v sosednji državi in implicitno sprejemajo etnikulturalni koncept naroda, medtem ko ostali priznavajo le politični koncept.

Medtem kot so tvorci zakona zakon postavili na etnikulturalni definiciji naroda, podarja domača opozicija in do neke mere tudi mednarodne organizacije (ki jih predvsem predstavlja Günther Verbeuger in Eric Jürgens) politični koncept naroda. Prilagojen zakon se je od etnikulturalnega premaknil do političnega koncepta naroda.

Madžarski statusni zakon je v središče pozornosti prinesel politiko številnih držav in njihov odnos do njihovih narodnih manjšin in pokazal, da pozornost do sorodnih manjšin ni edina v Evropi.

Nedaven madžarski predlog, ki se nanaša na vključevanje zaščite narodnih manjšin v evropsko ustavo, bo morda spet prisilil politike, da razčistijo koncepte, kot tudi, da jim bo pomagal opustiti vpeljevanje enostranskih definicij le zato, ker te bolje služijo njihovih političnim interesom.

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The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992-2002

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Abstract:

In the treatise history of Federal republic of Yugoslavia, one of five successor states of the former SFRY is described. Author described all the turning points in the short ten-year history of this state: its formation in 1992, all the crises during the wars in the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, process of democratization and process of its inclusion into international community. Author also described very picturesque ethnic structure of FRY, as well as very complicated Albanian-Serbian relation, which already in the past many time determined the destiny of former Yugoslavia. Also the problem of Sandžak is described which in connection with unsolved Serb-Montenegrin relations could become a new focal point of ethnic disputes in the Balkans.

Key words:

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992-2002, Albanian-Serbian interethnic relations,
Kosovo crisis, Sandžak.

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Language: Original in English (Abstract in English and Slovene, Summary in Slovene).

Introduction

In 1992, when the international community officially recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia it meant the end of the former Yugoslavia. However, this was not the end of the Yugoslav crisis and drama. The tragic wars that followed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked the world's history in the last decade of the 20th century. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be formally reorganized to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro based on the 14th of March 2002 agreement (however the constitutional arrangements of this Union are still to be decided), was another successor state of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia that played a key role in the tragic developments of the 1990s. This country, internationally isolated during the regime of Slobodan Milošević, was welcomed into the international community again at the end of 2000 when democratic changes took place there.

After Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared independence, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) once and for all felt apart. In addition to the above-mentioned new states on the ruins of the SFRY, another new state came into being: *Savezna republika Jugoslavija* (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - FRY). The former Socialist Republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the FRY in April 1992.

The FRY proclaimed itself the legal successor of the SFRY - a status similar to that of the Russian Federation after 1990. The difference was, however, that this status was not recognized by the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia as the successor states of the former Soviet Union recognized the Russian Federation.


The FRY was divided into two administrative units, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. We have to remind the reader that, because of a complicated ethnic structure and in order to give certain rights to ethnic minorities, until the end of the 1980s there were two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo), which had to give up their autonomy during the period of 1988 and 1989 to the alter of Milošević's Great Serbian interests.

This article briefly presents the survey of the history of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the last decade of twentieth century and at the beginning of the third millennium. The article is written on the basis of secondary sources (mostly contemporary newspapers reports), however the author believes that also when in fifty-years the archival records will be open for research the picture of the events shall not change significantly. Also American and British historians and political scientists have written dozens of books and hundreds of articles on the basis of available sources. The author used the results of the most relevant of them to write this article. Also Memoirs, especially those written by key personalities are important.

Ethnic Composition of the Territories of FRY before the Dissolution of SFRY

The territory of FRY is around 39,451.4 square miles (102,173 square kilometers; 40% of the territory of the former SFRY). According to the Census of 1991, 10.4 million people lived in this territory. There were two constitutive nations living in the

Map 1: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 1992–2002



The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1991–2002 (Author: M. Klemenčič)

FRY: Serbs, who, with 62.3%, comprised an absolute majority of all the people of the FRY, and Montenegrins, with only 5% of all the people of the FRY. Minorities comprised a substantial part of all inhabitants, most notably Albanians, at 16.6%; Hungarians, 3.3%; and Muslims, 3.1%.¹

The vast majority of ethnic minorities lived in the territories of the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Both of them were formally inside Serbia; after 1974 they had, in accordance with the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, quite substantial responsibilities inside the Yugoslav Federation. Therefore their development differed considerably from the development of so-called Serbia Proper. Thus we are going to deal separately with the ethnic composition of the populations of Serbia Proper, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro.

When we deal with the ethnic make-up of Yugoslavia, we have to remind the reader that the exact numbers of each of the ethnic groups within the federation could not be ascertained, first, due to the different criteria established for the Muslim population, and second, because of the introduction in 1961 of the census categories 'Yugoslavs' and 'other, nationality undefined'. We cannot help but put a question mark on the reality of the ethnic statistics in the Yugoslav census. Substantial differences exist in numbers and percentages between the censuses, especially for specific ethnic groups like Muslims, Vlachs, or Romans. Those differences could be explained by falsification of census data for certain (usually political) needs.²

SERBIA PROPER

For the region of Serbia Proper (Republic of Serbia without Vojvodina and Kosovo), we have to note a substantial decrease in the percentage of the majority Serb population, mostly on account of the fast rise in numbers and percentages of Muslims, Albanians, Gypsies and (after 1961) 'Yugoslavs'.

¹ Miles Litvinoff et al., (Eds.), *World Directory of Minorities*, London 1997, pp. 250-254.

² Jure Petričević, *Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije. Nazadovanje Hrvata i manjina, napredovanje Muslimana i Albanaca* [Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia; Lagging Behind of Croatians and Minorities, Positive Development of Muslims and Albanians], Brugg 1983, pp. 31-58; Vladimir Klemenčič, *Spreminjanje nacionalne strukture prebivalstva Jugoslavije v novejšem razdobju* [The changes in Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia in recent period]. *Geografija v šoli* 1, 1991, no. 1, pp. 7-22.

Table 1: Changes in the ethnic composition of Serbia Proper during 1961-1991.

	1961		1971		1981		1991	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
SERBS	4,459,953	92.6	4,699,415	89.5	4,865,283	85.4	5,081,766	87.3
MUSLIMS ¹⁾	83,811	1.7	124,482	2.4	151,674	2.7	173,871	3.0
MONTENEGRINS	32,383	0.7	57,289	1.1	77,134	1.4	75,258	1.3
MACEDONIANS	19,956	0.4	25,100	0.5	29,033	0.5	30,936	0.5
CROATS	43,817	0.9	38,088	0.7	31,447	0.5	26,827	0.5
ALBANIANS	51,173	1.1	65,507	1.2	72,484	1.3	76,012	1.3
GYPSIES	3,312	0.1	27,541	0.5	57,140	1.0	69,564	1.2
BULGARIANS	54,391	1.1	49,791	1.0	30,769	0.5	25,214	0.4
VLACHS	1,330	0.0	14,653	0.3	25,535	0.5	17,557	0.3
OTHERS	58,538	1.2	42,006	0.8	33,972	0.6	18,335	0.3
'YUGOSLAVS'	11,699	0.2	75,976	1.4	272,050	4.8	145,810	2.5
UNKNOWN ²⁾	2,911	0.0	30,517	0.6	47,943	0.8	83,061	1.4
Total	4,823,274	100.0	5,250,365	100.0	5,694,464	100.0	5,824,211	100.0

REMARKS: ¹⁾ In the earlier censuses this category was named in different ways. In 1948: *Undecided Muslims*; in 1953: *Yugoslavs undecided*; in 1961: *Muslims* as an ethnic group; in 1971, 1981 and 1991: *Muslims as a people*. ²⁾ This includes the census categories: "Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY," "Declared a regional identity," "Declared no nationality" and "Unknown."

SOURCES: Popis stanovništva 1961, Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnička i migraciona obeležja - rezultati za opštine, Beograd 1967; Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Statistički bilten 727: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1972; Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statistički bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama - konačni rezultati, Beograd 1982; Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gazdinstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1995.

The reasons for that development are threefold. First, we have to mention the questionability of Yugoslav statistics, especially when dealing with Muslims, Gypsies and Vlachs.³ A second reason is the low natural increase of the Serbian population, in contrast with the high natural increase of some minority groups, like Albanians, Muslims, Gypsies and Vlachs.⁴ The third reason for the changes in the

³ Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., pp. 145-149.

⁴ Svetlana Radovanović, Demographic Growth and Ethnodemographic Changes in the Republic of Serbia, in: Duška Hadži-Jovanović (Ed.): The Serbian Question in The Balkans, Beograd 1995, pp. 183-210.

nationality structure of Serbia Proper is mass migrations in and out. Serbia Proper represented a magnet for immigration of Serbs from the other regions of the former Yugoslavia; on the other hand, numerous Serbs emigrated for economic reasons or because they found employment in the administration and army in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.⁵

All the above-mentioned reasons affected the specific ethnic composition in the central and eastern Serbia Proper regions, where an ethnically homogeneous Serb population prevailed, as well as the southern and eastern regions of Serbia Proper, where there was an ethnically mixed population. Significantly ethnically mixed regions in Serbia Proper were Sandžak (a border region of Montenegro), with many Muslims, and the region on the border with Kosovo (Bujanovac, Medvedja, Kreševo), with a large number of Albanians.

Since World War II ethnic relations in Serbia Proper showed numerous problems (unsettled relations with Albanians of Kosovo and Muslims from Sandžak), which the authorities did not deal with promptly or dealt with ineffectively. Thus, interethnic conflicts developed within Serbia Proper; from the 1980s onward, differences provoked many armed conflicts and at the end led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

VOJVODINA

In the past, and still today Vojvodina represented, one of the ethnically most mixed regions in Europe. Because of low natural increase, the main role in changes of ethnic composition of the population has been played by migrations. Censuses show that the ethnic structure of Vojvodina after World War II changed slowly but surely, with decreases in the number of Hungarians, Croats and most of the other ethnic minorities; while at the same time the number of Montenegrins, Serbs, 'Yugoslavs' and Gypsies significantly increased.⁶

Individual minorities mostly concentrated in certain narrow regions. Most of the Hungarians live in northern Bačka; Romanians, in southern Banat; Slovaks, in some smaller regions in central Banat and Bačka; Ruthenians, in a smaller region in central Bačka. Croats live in the northern region of Bačka (since the 17th century) and some regions of Srijem. Large Croatian communities live also in Novi Sad and in central Bačka (near Kula and Vrbas).

⁵ Stanko Žuljić, *Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena [Ethnic Structure of Yugoslavia and Currents of Changes]*, Zagreb 1989, pp. 91-99.

⁶ Vladimir Djurić, Slobodan Čurčić and Saša Kicošev, *The Ethnic Structure of the Population in Vojvodina*, in: Duška Jovanović-Hadži (Ed.): *The Serbian Question in The Balkans*, Beograd 1995, pp. 211-226.

Table 2: Changes in the ethnic composition of Vojvodina during 1961-1991.

	1961		1971		1981		1991	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
SERBS	1,017,717	54.9	1,089,132	55.8	1,107,378	54.4	1,151,353	57.2
HUNGARIANS	442,561	23.8	423,866	21.7	385,356	18.9	340,945	20.0
CROATS	145,341	7.8	138,561	7.1	109,203	5.4	74,226	3.7
SLOVAKS	73,830	4.0	72,795	3.7	69,549	3.4	63,941	3.2
ROMANIANS	57,259	3.1	52,987	2.7	47,289	2.3	38,832	1.9
MONTENEGRINS	34,782	1.9	36,416	1.9	43,304	2.1	44,721	2.2
GYPSIES	3,312	0.2	7,780	0.4	19,693	1.0	24,895	1.2
RUTHENIANS	24,548	1.3	20,109	1.1	19,305	1.0	17,887	0.9
MACEDONIANS	15,190	0.8	16,527	0.8	18,897	0.9	16,641	0.8
OTHERS	34,841	1.9	34,811	1.8	39,392	1.9	35,020	1.7
'YUGOSLAVS'	3,174	0.2	46,928	2.4	167,215	8.2	168,859	8.4
UNKNOWN ¹⁾	2,410	0.1	12,621	0.6	8,191	0.4	35,197	1.8
Total	1,854,965	100.0	1,952,533	100.0	2,034,772	100.0	2,012,517	100.0

REMARKS: ¹⁾ This includes the census categories "Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY," "Declared a regional identity," "Declared no nationality" and "Unknown."

SOURCES: Popis stanovništva 1961. Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnička i migraciona obeležja - rezultati za opštine, Beograd 1967; Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Statistički bilten 727: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1972; Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statistički bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama - konačni rezultati, Beograd 1982; Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gospodarstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1995.

This development in ethnic populations had already provoked the development of two blocs of ethnic groups in the 1970s. One consisted of Serbs, Montenegrins and 'Yugoslavs'; the other, Hungarians, Croats and members of the other numerous minorities. It is interesting to note that until the mid-1980s both groups demanded from Belgrade as wide autonomy as possible.⁷ The situation changed significantly from the mid-1980s onward, when Serbs, Montenegrins and 'Yugoslavs' of Vojvodina became among the main speakers in favor of Great Serbian nationalism. Vojvodina attracted immigrants from wealthy strata of the Serbian population of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. All these new immigrants deepened the gap between old settlers (mostly non-Serbs) and immigrants.⁸

⁷ Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., p. 130.

⁸ Djurić, Čurčić and Kicošev, The Ethnic Structure of the Population in Vojvodina ..., pp. 211-225.

KOSOVO

The main characteristics of the demographic development of Kosovo during the past decades were the high natural increase of Albanians, which was, with 28.3%, the highest in Europe, and the mass emigrations of Serbs and Montenegrins as well as Albanians. The migration balance of Kosovo was negative to all Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces with the exception of Montenegro, where most of the Serbs in Kosovo went. Many Albanians from Kosovo left for Macedonia, where they settled in larger Macedonian towns. Albanians from Montenegro migrated also into Kosovo. More Albanians from Montenegro emigrated into Kosovo than Montenegrins from Kosovo migrated into Montenegro. Those migrations would be insignificant if they had not helped decrease the number and percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo.⁹

We should also mention the increase in number and percentage of Muslims and Gypsies and the decrease in number and percentage of Turks,¹⁰ which is due to the above-mentioned problems of the Yugoslav census.

Table 3: Changes in the ethnic composition of Kosovo during 1961-1991.

	1961		1971		1981		1991	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
ALBANIANS	646,05	67.2	916,168	73.7	1,226,736	77.4	1,607,690	82.2
SERBS	227,016	23.6	228,264	18.4	209,498	13.2	195,301	10.0
MUSLIMS ¹⁾	8,026	0.8	26,357	2.1	58,562	3.7	57,408	2.9
GYPSIES	3,202	0.3	14,593	1.2	34,126	2.2	42,806	2.2
MONTENEGRINS	37,588	3.9	31,555	2.5	27,028	1.7	20,045	1.0
TURKS	25,764	2.7	12,244	1.0	12,513	0.8	10,838	0.6
OTHERS	10,298	1.0	11,561	0.9	11,532	0.7	8,161	0.4
“YUGOSLAVS”	5,206	0.5	920	0.1	2,676	0.2	3,070	0.2
UNKNOWN ²⁾	283	0.0	2,031	0.1	1,770	0.1	9,428	0.5
Total	963,988	100.0	1,243,693	100.0	1,584,441	100.0	1,954,747	100.0

REMARKS: ¹⁾ In the earlier censuses this category was named in different ways. In 1948: *Undecided Muslims*; in 1953: *Yugoslavs undecided*; in 1961: *Muslims* as an ethnic group; in 1971, 1981 and 1991: *Muslims* as a people. ²⁾ This includes the census categories “Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY,” “Declared a regional identity,” “Declared no nationality”

⁹ Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena ..., pp. 100-102; Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., pp. 164-166.

¹⁰ Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo, London 1998, pp. 170-172.

and “Unknown.”

SOURCES: Popis stanovništva 1961. Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnička i migraciona obeležja - rezultati za opštine, Beograd 1967; Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Statistički bilten 727: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1972; Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statistički bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama - konačni rezultati, Beograd 1982; Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gospodarstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1995.

Due to the fast decrease in number and percentage of the Serb and Montinegrin populations of Kosovo, and, as mentioned above, due to the high natural increase of Albanians, the percentage of Albanians increased by 15% (from 67.2% in 1961 to 82.2% in 1991). By 1991 Albanians had an absolute majority in all the regions, with the exception of those in the most northern parts of Kosovo (formerly Leposavić commune). The Serb population had been living in smaller or larger groups in all the communes until the crisis of 1998. The larger groups of Montenegrins lived in Peć, Priština, Djakovica and Istok, while in the region of Lipljan and Vitina a few thousand Croats lived.¹¹

This was the situation until 1998, when the crisis in Kosovo led to new migrations and changes in ethnic composition, for which the data are not available yet. In spite of the efforts of the international community, the number of the Serbs and Montenegrins continue to decrease into the 2000s.

MONTENEGRO

This smallest Yugoslav republic was a region where all the problems of ‘national politics’ of the former Yugoslavia were demonstrated. Montenegro had only one-third the population of Kosovo. Montenegrins as South Slavs had their own republic, while Kosovo remained an autonomous province inside of Serbia. In spite of their population size, the Albanians remained a national minority in status.¹²

With regard to Muslims in Montenegro, there were officially only 387 Muslims in Montenegro in 1948. Of course it was a question of census manipulations, similar to what was done in Sandžak. The number of Muslims in Montenegro ‘increased’ significantly after 1961 and that mostly on the account of Montenegrins, i.e., former Montenegrins declared themselves Muslims. During the mentioned period the number of Albanians also increased, especially in the bordering regions with Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. It is interesting to note also the decrease in the Croatian and Serbian population, which mostly was due to the large increase of ‘Yugoslavs’.¹³

In 1991 Montenegrins represented less than two-thirds of the population in their own republic. If a referendum is organized on independence of Montenegro in the future, it will be minorities who decide on the destiny of this republic.

¹¹ Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena ..., pp. 102-104.

¹² Petričević, Nacionalnost stanovništva Jugoslavije ..., p. 136.

¹³ Vujadin Rudić, The Ethnic Structure of the Population in Montenegro, in: Duška Hadži-Jovanović (Ed.), The Serbian Question in The Balkans, Beograd 1995, pp. 243-262.

Table 4: Changes in the ethnic composition of Montenegro during 1961-1991.

	1961		1971		1981		1991	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
MONTENEGRINS	383,988	81.4	355,632	67.2	400,488	68.5	380,484	61.8
MUSLIMS ¹⁾	30,665	6.5	70,236	13.3	78,080	13.4	89,932	14.6
ALBANIANS	25,803	5.5	35,671	6.7	37,735	6.5	40,880	6.6
SERBS	14,087	3.0	39,512	7.5	19,407	3.3	57,176	9.3
CROATS	10,664	2.3	9,192	1.7	6,904	1.2	6,249	1.0
OTHERS	4,953	1.0	3,508	0.6	4,212	0.7	— ²⁾	--
'YUGOSLAVS'	1,559	0.3	10,943	2.1	31,243	5.3	25,854	4.2
UNKNOWN ³⁾	175	0.0	4,910	0.9	6,241	1.1	14,692	2.4
Total	471,894	100.0	529,604	100.0	584,310	100.0	615,267	100.0

REMARKS: ¹⁾ In the earlier censuses this category was named in different ways. In 1948: *Undecided Muslims*; in 1953: *Yugoslavs undecided*; in 1961: *Muslims* as an ethnic group; in 1971, 1981 and 1991: *Muslims* as a people. ²⁾ In the category "Unknown." ³⁾ This includes the census categories: "Did not declare themselves under Article 170 of the Constitution of the SFRY," "Declared a regional identity," "Declared no nationality" and "Unknown."

SOURCES: Popis stanovništva 1961. Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnička i migraciona obeležja - rezultati za opštine, Beograd 1967; Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Statistički bilten 727: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1972; Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statistički bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama - konačni rezultati, Beograd 1982; Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gazdinstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Beograd 1995.

The changes in number and percentage of individual nations in the ethnic composition of Montenegro were influenced by large immigration from the different regions of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time Montenegrins kept emigrating from this republic.¹⁴ Because of the above-mentioned changes in the population of Montenegro, the question of the minority rights of Albanians and even Croatians surfaced very early.

¹⁴ Žuljić, Narodnosna struktura Jugoslavije i tokovi promjena ..., pp. 56-60.


Map 2: POPULATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SETTLEMENTS ACCORDING TO THE REGIONS OF MAJORITY OR PLURALITY ETHNO-NATIONS)

Research: M. KLEMENČIČ; Design and production: Z. DROLE, LJUBLJANA, July 2002

Sources:

Previ rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava, stanova i poljoprivrednih gospodinstava 1991. godine. Bilten br. 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama. (Beograd: 1992).

Duška Hadži-Jovanović (Ed.): *The Serbian Question in the Balkans*. (Beograd, 1995).



Population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Author: M. Klemenčič)

'Serboslavia' or Great Serbia - The Dilemma That Finally Caused the Dissolution of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia

On June 28th, 1989, when Slobodan Milošević at Gazimestan, on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, for the first time mentioned "*a possibility of armed battle in the near future*,"¹⁵ he did not speak without reason. He was aware of the fact that it would be extremely difficult to realize a Yugoslavia in which Serbia and Serbs would have a leading role, at least in part because Albanians, Slovenes and Croats were against it. That the vision of 'Serboslavia' would be difficult to realize could be predicted also by the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which occurred during the 14th Congress of the LCY (January 20th-26th, 1990) after the Slovene and Croat delegates left the congress.¹⁶

In spite of the debacle of his ideas at the party congress, Milošević did not give up his plans, and continued to strengthen his own position in Serbia. In the middle of July 1990 he changed the name of League of Communists of Serbia to Socialist Party of Serbia [*Socialistička partija Srbije* - SPS]. He retained for himself both the presidency of the Republic of Serbia and the presidency of SPS. He gathered even more power in his hands when the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was passed in the Serbian parliament on September 28, 1990. This new constitution considered Milošević as president of the Republic of Serbia and as supreme commander of its armed forces and gave him the right to name the president of the Serbian government.¹⁷

The new constitution still defined the relations between Serbia and the federation; it was written, however, for Great Serbia. Among other things, it proclaimed the right of the Republic of Serbia to take care of the interests of the Serbs who were living outside Serbia. In other words, Serbia would claim its historic and ethnic regions if the Yugoslav federation changed its nature into a confederation or dissolved. The Serbs were interested in protecting their own ethnic minorities outside Serbia, but at the same time would not give the same rights to their own minorities within the Republic of Serbia. The new Serbian constitution did not give any protection to the Albanians of Kosovo.¹⁸ Their already unsecured position worsened after mid-May 1990, after Serbia took over direct control over Kosovo. It worsened further after July 5th, when the parliament of Kosovo and the provincial government of Kosovo dissolved themselves under pressure of the Serbs, and printing in the Albanian language was prohibited. At the same time 15,000 ethnic Albanians lost their jobs, as they had to give up all the leading positions in politics, culture, science, education and the state-run economy; the Serbian government

¹⁵ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation*, New York 1997, p. 72.

¹⁶ Matjaž Klemenčič, Slovenia at the Crossroads of the Nineties: From the First Multiparty Elections and the Declaration of Independence to Membership in the Council of Europe, *Slovene Studies* vol. 14, 1992, no. 1, pp. 9-34 (published in 1994).

¹⁷ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and dissolution after the Cold War*, Washington, D. C. 1995, pp. 120-121; Leslie Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History*, New York 2001, p. 156.

¹⁸ Jože Pirjevec, *Jugoslavija 1918-1992. Nastanek, razvoj ter razpad Karadjordjevićeve v Titove Jugoslavije [Yugoslavia 1918-1992: Establishment, Development and Dissolution of Karadjordjević's and Tito's Yugoslavia]*, Koper 1995, pp. 406-407.

gave those jobs to the ethnic Serbs, which again provoked mass protests of the Albanian population.¹⁹

Fired delegates to the Albanian parliament met secretly in Kačanik on September 7, 1990, and proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation. With the so-called Kačanik Constitution, they proclaimed independence of the Republic of Kosovo as “*a democratic state of Albanian people and of members of other nations and national minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats, Turks, Romanians and others living in Kosovo.*”²⁰ Of course Serbs did not recognize the Kačanik Constitution and reacted with arrests of members of the provincial parliament, who were accused of sapping state unity. The authorities also fired another 45,000 ethnic Albanians from their jobs in state-run enterprises.²¹ This time Albanians did not react with mass demonstrations; a period of ‘passive resistance’ [*pasivni otpor*] began. It lasted through 1997.

Observing the principle of Great Serbia, elections were held. Milošević still left open the question of whether this New Yugoslavia would be formed within or outside of the SFRY. In two election rounds on the 9th and 23rd of December, 1990, the population of Serbia voted unconditionally for SPS; while in Montenegro the Communist Party won. Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović were elected president of Serbia and Montenegro respectively.²² These election results did not surprise because most of the Serbs in reality supported Milošević’s policy, and he also tried to convince the rest of the people of Serbia. At the last moment - after third parties threatened to boycott the elections - he allowed the opposition to introduce their candidates in the media and to participate in the counting of the election votes. He also gave the people of Serbia a raise in their salaries and pensions. The money was not available for that, however, so, without letting the federal authorities know, he ordered the printing of 18 billion dinars (\$1.8 billion US). The result was hyperinflation in the whole of then Yugoslavia. With the help of these measures and an election law that also helped gain deputies for SPS,²³ Milošević succeeded in winning 194 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament and the presidency of Serbia. He received 65% of the presidential votes.²⁴

The 1990 elections in Serbia brought a severe defeat for the opposition parties, especially for Vuk Drašković’s Serbian Movement for Renewal [*Srpski pokret obnove* - SPO] and Šešelj’s Serb Radical Party [*Srpska radikalna stranka* - SRS], which at the beginning of the election campaign were almost equal to Milošević’s SPS.²⁵ The Albanians of Kosovo boycotted the elections. Yugoslav Minister of Defense Veljko

¹⁹ Kosovski kalendar [The Time Table of Kosovo], Vreme International 6, May 1, 1995, pp. 5-9.

²⁰ The Kacanik Resolution, Albanian Democratic Movement in Former Yugoslavia 1990-1993, Kosova Information Centre, Priština 1993; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition - second edition, Boulder 1995, p. 125; Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo ..., p. 245.

²¹ Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 ..., p. 407.

²² Johna R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as Histoy. Twice there was a country, Cambridge 1996, pp. 253-254.

²³ Cohen, Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition ..., pp. 88-162.

²⁴ Dennison Rusinow, Yugoslavia, Balkan Breakup, Foreign Policy 83, Summer 1991, p. 1; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 131.

²⁵ Lampe, Yugoslavia as Histoy. Twice there was a country ..., pp. 353-354.

Kadijević welcomed the results of the elections, because JNA had its own plans. According to these plans, Yugoslavia would be saved by the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (*Savez komunista-Pokret za Jugoslaviju* as the LC inside JNA was named in November 1990). In spite of the fact that this organization, which had plans to become a leading force in the Republic, got only a few percent of the votes, its influence in the political life of Serbia was very large nevertheless because of the support that Mira Marković, the wife of Slobodan Milošević, gave to it.²⁶

In spite all this, not everyone was happy with Milošević's adventurous and radical policy of "protector of the Serb nation." Under the leadership of Vuk Drašković, at the beginning of March 1991 the opposition parties organized mass demonstrations in Belgrade against the 'red mafia'. The demonstrators, joined by students, were attacked by police forces; two students and one policeman were killed. Approximately 90 people were wounded. Because the authorities were not able to calm down the demonstrators, the army with its tanks was sent into the streets.²⁷ The army officers even tried to introduce extraordinary measures for the whole of Yugoslavia, because they thought that these would result in calming down and taking control over Slovenia and Croatia also. They did not succeed in proclaiming extraordinary measures in Yugoslavia, because they did not get enough votes for that in the presidency of Yugoslavia.²⁸

After the March students' demonstrations and strikes in Serbian textile and metallurgical industries, Milošević went on to fire up nationalist passions among Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the first armed clashes took place, in which JNA was also involved. In Belgrade during that period, Milošević, together with Šešelj and Drašković, loudly proclaimed hatred. His followers were singing: "*Slobodane, pripremi salate, bit će mesa, klat ćemo Hrvate.*" [Slobodan, get the salad ready, there shall be meat, we are going to slaughter Croats].²⁹

The chaos in which SFRY found itself started to clear. After the 'ten-day war' for Slovenia, it became clear that the SFRY was dead; and the Serbs started to create Great Serbia. This led to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia became independent states, while Serbia and Montenegro were united in the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995)

The first ideas on unification of Serbia and Montenegro into a new federal state came to fruition after Slovenia and Croatia became independent states. Already during the winter of 1991-92, federal bodies of what remained from rump Yugoslavia began to create documents for the establishment of the third Yugoslavia, which was

²⁶ Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 159.

²⁷ Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, The Third Balkan War, New York 1992, pp. 45-61; Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, Tracking the Break-up 1980-92, London 1993, pp. 281-286.

²⁸ Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 141.

²⁹ Pirjevec, Jugoslavija 1918-1992 ..., pp. 414-415.

set up by the end of April 1992. It came into being under the name of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.³⁰

This state became a country where Slobodan Milošević and Serbia had a leading role. The FRY experienced severe economic and social problems from the very beginning. Its formal legal international status was questionable after it did not ask for international recognition until December 23rd, 1991, as demanded by the European Union. The FRY declared itself a legal successor to the SFRY. The newly established states and the international community opposed this status. Because the FRY was involved in the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community took the legal position, expressed in decisions of the Badinter Commission, that all successor states that came into being in the territories of the former SFRY were equal successors of SFRY. Because of involvement of the FRY in the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question of succession of the former Yugoslavia came to the fore again. The international community did not succeed in reaching an agreement with Slobodan Milošević on a cease-fire, which should have been a condition for a search for a solution to other open questions. The UN introduced economic sanctions against the FRY with *Resolution no. 757/1992*, which isolated the FRY from the rest of the world.³¹

The 'third Yugoslavia' soon got new political leadership. During the period when the whole world was accusing Milošević of being guilty of carrying on the war in the region of the former Yugoslavia, he did not want to provoke the international community any further. Instead he installed his people in the highest positions. The first president of the FRY was the "*spiritual father of the Serbs*," Dobrica Čosić; while an American businessman of Serb descent, Milan Panić, became the new president of the federal government. Panić was a surprise for everyone. Milošević had chosen him because he thought he would be the right man to help to fight the international isolation of FRY, and the U.S. Government counted on Panić to find a solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. So the State Department gave permission for Panić to head the government of the FRY, although it had not given a similar permission for the former governor of Minnesota, Rudolph G. Perpich, to become foreign minister of Croatia. A similar destiny as for Panić, who did not finish his term in office, followed in summer 1993 for the president of the FRY, Dobrica Čosić. Zoran Lilić, who followed him, obeyed Milošević's orders until the end of his term in office.³²

In spite of the fact that legally the decision-makers in FRY were federal office-holders (like the president of FRY, president of the federal government and the federal parliament), in reality the greatest role in decision making was played by the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. Milošević kept denying this role in his defense in front of The Hague tribunal (in February 2002). He kept saying that he only executed what these organs were ordering him to do. In spite of this, he played a major role in the peace making process, because international peace makers on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (like Richard Holbrooke, former Secretary of

³⁰ Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 165.

³¹ Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., pp. 251, 289-294.

³² Silber and Little, Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation ..., pp. 258-263.

State Cyrus Vance, and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington) were aware of the fact of his great influence. All the above-mentioned put pressure on Milošević, who, on the other hand, still followed the plans of the Serbian people for Greater Serbia.

The international sanctions, which were destroying the economy of the FRY and were bringing the Serbian people in the FRY to the lowest level of poverty that these people had ever experienced during the 20th century, started to threaten the position of Milošević. During the parliamentary elections in Serbia, many prominent intellectuals who at first had supported his Serbian national program began to criticize Milošević. Later he was deserted even by the Serbian Orthodox Church, which during the course of history as a rule has supported Serb national leaders. Now it supported the idea of the return of the Karadjordjević dynasty to the throne of Serbia,³³ urging that Aleksandar, the son of the last king of Yugoslavia, Peter II Karadjordjević, should become King of Yugoslavia.

Milan Panić, the greatest opponent of Slobodan Milošević, became president of the federal government. He supported the attempts of the international community to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis at the Conference in London held in the second half of 1992. This especially angered the followers of Slobodan Milošević's SPS and Vojislav Šešelj's Serb Radical Party, who tried to get rid of Panić as soon as possible, before he and the united opposition [*Demokratski pokret Srbije* - DEPOS] could play an important role in the nearing elections.

The elections for federal and both republican parliaments and election for president of Serbia on December 20th, 1992, showed the strength of Milošević's regime, which was based on control of the media. With the help of manipulating the elections, Milošević won a second term as president of Serbia with 56 % of the votes; while his opponent, Milan Panić, received 34 % of the popular vote. Milošević's SPS became the largest party in the federal and Serbian parliaments.³⁴ Milan Panić had to resign as president of the federal government only a few days after the elections. Radoje Kontić from Montenegro became the new Yugoslav prime minister. Although Milan Panić declared that he would continue to fight for democracy after he lost the vote of confidence in the federal parliament, he returned to the USA in March 1993 to continue his business career.

Although Milošević's SPS won an absolute majority in the Serb parliamentary elections, other Serb nationalistic and democratic parties were emerging. While during the first Serb elections it was possible to suppress opposition with a blockade of the media, they could not do the same during the second election because of the bad social and economic position of Yugoslavia caused by the economic sanctions, which had started to work.

FRY paid a high price for its involvement in the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The value of industrial output in Yugoslavia one year after economic sanctions were introduced fell to 20% of that of the year before. At the same time the unemployment rate increased to 50% in 1993.³⁵ The leadership of FRY tried to

³³ Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 361.

³⁴ Slobodan Dukić and Branko Jokić, Popolna zmaga komunistov [Complete victory for communists], Delo, December 28, 1992, p. 5.

³⁵ Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 171.

pay for the expenses of the war by printing money without backing. In doing so, FRY set a world record with an inflation rate that reached 13 million percent a year. The inflation rate in FRY then even exceeded that in Weimar Germany during the years before World War II. The breakdown of the Yugoslav economy brought many people to poverty and, of course, made a new elite of war profiteers. While the society criminalized, tens of thousands of intellectuals left the country. They fled mobilization or they were looking for better economic life conditions.³⁶

Under these circumstances Milošević did not have any other choice but to support a peace plan as proposed by a Contact Group of high representatives of the U.K., Russia, France, Germany and the USA. He hoped that the international community would cease sanctions because of his support of the Contact Group's plan. In August 1994 Milošević finally stopped his direct support of Radovan Karadžić and agreed to participate in the negotiations at Dayton, which put a stop to the first phase of the bloody battles in the former Yugoslavia.³⁷ After many unsuccessful attempts to find a durable solution for peace in the region of former Yugoslavia, Milošević's cooperation became, in the eyes of the West, the most promising hope to reach peace and stability in this region. After the Dayton Agreement was signed, the idea of Great Serbia became history. In Serbian history the leaders under whom such ideas emerged had lost power, but Milošević stayed in power for another six years.

Kosovo - the Durable Serb Problem

After the Dayton Agreement was signed, it became clear that Milošević would try sooner or later to finally solve the question of Kosovo by introducing Serb rule there. Kosovo, which was part of the first Serbian state, Raška, and was considered to be a 'holy place' for the Serbian people because of the battle that took place there in 1389, ought to become Serbian again, he declared. Thus, the Serbian government tried to direct the flow of Serbian refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo. In January 1995, the Serbian government even proclaimed an edict on settlement of 100,000 Serbs in Kosovo, which caused new tensions in this uneasy province.³⁸ In spite of the fact that the Albanians of Kosovo did not react to Serb pressures with mass demonstrations, they continued with their so-called passive resistance, and the army even took the tanks off the streets.

Very few people believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution of the question of Kosovo. The greatest optimist was Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the largest party of Kosovo Albanians, the Democratic League of Kosovo [*Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës* - LDK]. There was a great gap between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo; especially because soon after Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, Kosovo Albanians started to construct a parallel state there. As early as September 22, 1991, the Kosovo Albanian leadership introduced a *Declaration on Independ-*

³⁶ Silber and Little, *Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation ...*, p. 385.

³⁷ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, New York 1999, pp. 79-314.

³⁸ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo ...*, pp. 284-287.

ence and Sovereignty of Kosovo. During September 26-30, 1991, a secret referendum took place in which more than 87% of the eligible voters of Kosovo participated; 99.87% of them chose sovereignty and independence for Kosovo. Only 164 voters were against, and 933 ballots were declared invalid.

On the basis of the results of this referendum and the amended Kačanik Constitution, the Kosovo parliament (that is, the Albanian members of the provincial parliament that was dissolved in July 1990) declared the independence of the 'Republic of Kosovo' on October 19th, 1991, and named Dr. Bujar Bukoshi as president of the government.³⁹ The Serbian state did not recognize the results of the referendum. Kosovo Albanians held parliamentary and presidential elections on May 24th, 1992. LDK got 76.4% of the votes and had an absolute majority in the 130-member parliament, with 96 deputies. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova got 99.5% of the votes for president of Kosovo.⁴⁰ Therefore Kosovo Albanians in mid-1992 organized a parallel state that operated relatively successfully in education at all levels and a private economy - this in spite of the fact that in all vital segments (the economy, financial structure, etc.) it did not have anything to do with the official FRY. It all deepened the differences between the Serbs and Albanians.

Because the Serbs and the Albanians were aware of how serious the situation was, they made some attempts to find a peaceful solution. In May 1992 the then president of the Serbian government, Radovan Božović, invited all the political parties of Kosovo to talks about a solution to all the problems.⁴¹ From this period three versions of some proposals to divide Kosovo into Serbian and Albanian parts are known. Let us remind the reader that 1.7 million Albanians, 190,000 Serbs and 110,000 people of other ethnic groups lived in Kosovo. President of the FRY Dobrica Čosić proposed a solution, according to which 40% of Kosovo's territory would become part of Serbia. Also, Priština and Kosovska Mitrovica, the two largest cities of Kosovo, and all the mines including Trepča (zinc, lead, silver and gold) would become part of Serbia. Eight hundred thousand Albanians living in the 'Serbian' part would have to emigrate in a 'peaceful' ethnic cleansing.

The second proposed solution was the Albanian version, which suggested that 10% of Kosovo's territory would be ceded to Serbia, while the communes of Preševo and Bujanovac, which were part of Serbia Proper from 1945, would again become part of Kosovo. Those communes are 70% Albanian. Albanians offered ethnic minority rights to 150,000 Serbs who live in major cities of Kosovo (Priština, Mitrovica and Gnjilane). Albanians also promised Serbs nationality rights in the Kačanik Constitution of September 1990, according to which the Serbs of Kosovo were a 'nation' and not only a national minority with which Albanization of Kosovo could have been prevented. Serbia would receive territories in northern Kosovo.

The third version offered to the Serbs 20% of Kosovo's territory. Serbia would get mines in the north (Trepča), Serb monasteries and the electricity plant of Obilić and the Patriarchy in Peć in the west. The main towns, Priština, Mitrovica, Gnjilane

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 251-252.

⁴⁰ D. Kostovicova, Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996, Keele 1997), p. 32; Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo ..., p. 261.

⁴¹ Kosovski kalendar [The Time Table of Kosovol], Vreme International vol. 6, no. 236 (May 1, 1995), pp. 5-9.

and Peć, were on the border of this new Kosovo.

According to the statement of German Ambassador to FRY Gerth Aarens, who at the Geneva Convention on Yugoslavia presided over a group responsible for national minorities, Slobodan Milošević also agreed to the proposal in the third version.⁴²

Later they continued to deal with Kosovo at numerous meetings, and suggestions of a solution to the Kosovo problem came from the FRY as well as from outside the country.⁴³ These interested parties suggested different solutions: autonomy (which would not be less than that already gained in the constitutional arrangements of 1974), independence of Kosovo, Kosovo as part of Albania, division of Kosovo (the above-mentioned versions), an international protectorate, etc.⁴⁴ The most sensible solution would be to give the Albanians of Kosovo the right to govern Kosovo, which would remain part of Serbia. It appeared that both extremes (Albanian independence of Kosovo and Serbian dictatorship in Kosovo) had been defeated,⁴⁵ especially after Milošević and Rugova signed an agreement on September 2, 1996, to normalize the education system in Kosovo, so that the Albanian educational system in Kosovo would become a part of the state system of Serbia.

In spite of all these initiatives, the gap between Albanians and Serbs became deeper and deeper, and more and more it became impossible to find a solution to the problem. Albanians patronized their own school system at all levels of education in spite of the above-mentioned Milošević-Rugova agreement. Albanians also maintained their own parallel administration in a province. Serbs, who lived in real 'ghettos', felt even more compelled to emigrate. The Serb authorities in Belgrade prohibited any real estate commerce between members of Serb and Albanian ethnic groups. If an Albanian bought any real estate from a Serb, he would be convicted and imprisoned for sixty days, even if the Serb would sell his property voluntarily. Kosovo, which was under special administration, was facing brutal police repression. On the other hand, numerous murders and bomb attacks for which the Liberation Army of Kosovo [*Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosovës* - UCK] took responsibility also occurred.⁴⁶

During the sharpening of tensions in Kosovo, important political changes also took place in the FRY. In spite of the fact that the United List of the leftist parties - SPS of Slobodan Milošević, Yugoslav Left [*Jugoslavenska levica* - JUL] of Milošević's wife, Mira Marković, and New Democracy [*Nova Demokratija*] - won 46% of the popular vote;⁴⁷ a coalition of opposition parties - 'Together' [*Zajedno*] was the winner of the local elections, achieving majorities in the thirteen largest Serbian cities. Slobodan Milošević wanted to prevent a member of the opposition from becoming

⁴² Blerim Shala, Risanje zemljevidov [Painting of the Maps], *Mladina* 3 (January 26, 1993), p. 32.

⁴³ Dragan Bisenić, Kosovo na dnevnom redu. Rasplet bez gubitaka [Kosovo on the daily order, Way out without losses], *Nedeljna Naša borba*, September 21-22, 1996), pp. II-III.

⁴⁴ Zoran Lutovac, Sve kosovske opcije [All the Options for Kosovo], *Vreme*, May 10, 1997, pp. 18-21.

⁴⁵ Dragan Veslinov, Poraz dve ekstremne politike [Defeat of the two extreme politics], *Nedeljna Naša borba*, September 21-22, 1996, p. IV.

⁴⁶ Svetlana Vasović, Kosovo republika? [Kosovo Republic ?], *Mladina*, November 4, 1997, p. 39.

⁴⁷ Slobodan Dukić, Milošević - modrec in vizionar [Milošević - thinker and visionary], *Delo*, November 23, 1995, p. 5.

the new mayor of the capital city of Belgrade; and with the help of the judges of the Belgrade municipal court, who were faithful to him, he nullified the results of these elections in the city of Belgrade, which caused demonstrations of the followers of the opposition. After three months of mass protests, at which, according to some reports, from 300,000 to a million people gathered in daily demonstrations, Milošević recognized the results of the elections and the victory of the opposition in February 1997. For the first time in the post-World War II history of Yugoslavia, Belgrade got a non-communist mayor, Zoran Djindjić. The victory of the *Zajedno* coalition at the local elections and the mass demonstrations that followed did not prevent Milošević from gaining even more power. Since he could not be reelected president of Serbia (the Serbian constitution allowed only two consecutive mandates), he got himself elected president of the FRY by the federal parliament.⁴⁸ The election of Milošević as president of the FRY and mass arrests of Albanians for membership in UCK already were predicting the next developments in Kosovo....

The international situation exacerbated the problems in Kosovo. Internal difficulties in Albania, which experienced financial collapse, did not help to pacify conditions in Kosovo. That was the situation in the minds of Kosovo Serbs and Albanians when the Kosovo crisis started to erupt.

Kosovo Crisis

Due to extremely bad economic conditions in the FRY as a whole, the relations among the Serbs of Kosovo, Serb authorities in Kosovo and the Serb state on the one hand and the Albanian population in Kosovo on the other started to deteriorate even further. Ibrahim Rugova could not find a common language with the Serb authorities. Young Albanians (70% of the Albanians of Kosovo were younger than 30 years of age) were unhappy with Rugova's willingness to search for compromise. Younger people, who did not have any opportunity for employment or any other perspective, were willing to follow the leaders, who demanded actions against Serbian violence. Adem Demaçi, who spent over 27 years in Yugoslav jails and was named "*the Kosovo Mandela*," gained popularity. The main opponent of Rugova's search for a peaceful solution, Demaçi demanded that OVK act, which soon led to the first fights. In the Klina and Drenica region these developed into a real war at the beginning of 1998.⁴⁹

Escalating of armed conflicts in Kosovo caused new headaches to the international community, because the international leaders were afraid that widening of the conflict could endanger the process of fulfillment of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the Contact Group accepted a special plan on March 9th, 1998, in London, in which they demanded from Milošević the retreat of special forces from Kosovo, international research on the causes of the bloody events and the beginning of dialogue with the Kosovo Albanians. The EU also got actively involved in negotiations between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders

⁴⁸ Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., pp. 175-175.

⁴⁹ Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo ..., pp. 292-313.

and wanted to open an EU diplomatic mission in Priština to observe the events in the province.⁵⁰

In spite of all the attempts, the international community did not succeed in opening a dialogue between Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership. The fights continued, and Milošević opposed all the attempts of the international community to observe the events in Kosovo. In April 23rd, 1998, he even organized a referendum in which 75% of the eligible voters participated; and 94.73% voted against allowing foreign observers to come to Kosovo.⁵¹

Six days later, the international community agreed to new sanctions against the FRY. In July, Kosovo Albanians formed a secret parliament; during the summer of 1998, Serb forces were cleansing Kosovo of UCK troops. On September 24th, NATO gave Milošević an ultimatum, to stop the violence in Kosovo or face air strikes. In October, Richard Holbrooke suggested giving Milošević some time to stop the offensive against the Kosovo Albanians. The UN Security Council demanded that observers be allowed to go to Kosovo to stop the violence. At the same time Serbian troops started to retreat.⁵²

After many months of attempts, the Contact Group finally gathered both sides in Rambouillet Castle near Paris. The Contact Group wanted 'extensive autonomy' for Kosovo short of outright independence, free movement for all international personell under the auspices of the UNHCR, the suspension of federal authority in matters injurious or discriminatory to the Kosovo Albanians, and the stationing of NATO troops in the province. After days of negotiations, on February 23rd, 1999, representatives of the Kosovo Albanians conditionally accepted a draft of the Rambouillet Agreement on the future status of Kosovo; Serbian representatives however did not accept it and labeled it as an attack on the sovereignty of their state.⁵³ The Rambouillet Agreement offered a plan for wide autonomy for Kosovo and demanded an immediate ceasefire. The sides in the conflict were offered an agreement under which Kosovo would become an international protectorate. For the security of the members of all the ethnic groups, an international peacekeeping force would be stationed in Kosovo. Three years later, a new referendum on the future status of Kosovo was foreseen.

During the negotiations in Rambouillet, on February 16th and 17th, 1999, American diplomat Christopher Hill went to visit Milošević and threatened him with air strikes. Milošević was against deployment of NATO peacekeepers. Two day later Milošević said: "*We are not going to give up Kosovo, even if they bomb us,*"⁵⁴ and Western diplomats started to leave FRY. At the end of February, Serbian forces occupied the entire province; on March 1st, Milošević refused all the international negotiators for Kosovo. A day later, Adem Demaci resigned as political leader of UCK, which withdrew the signature from the Albanian side on the Rambouillet Agreement. On March 18th, Kosovo Albanians signed the agreement, while Serbs

⁵⁰ Dragoslav Grujić, Kosovska hronika [Kosovo Chronicle], Vreme, March 14, 1998, pp. 4-5.

⁵¹ Hronologija događaja u 1998. godina ultimatum [Chronology of events in 1998, a year of the ultimatum]. Vreme, January 2, 1999, pp. 6-9.

⁵² Kronologija kosovskega zapleta [The Chronology of Kosovo plot], Delo, March 25, 1999, p. 5.

⁵³ Benson, Yugoslavia, A Concise History ..., p. 176.

⁵⁴ Kronologija kosovskega zapleta [The Chronology of Kosovo plot] ..., p. 5.



Slobodan Milošević (Photo archive of Večer)

boycot ted the event. International observers left Kosovo on March 20th, 1999. Richard Holbrooke for the last time tried to convince Milošević to sign. On March 23rd, the Serb parliament voted against stationing NATO troops in Kosovo; and on March 24th, NATO started air strikes on the FRY.

At the same time as the air strikes on Yugoslavia, a mass exodus, i.e., forced emigration, of Albanians from Kosovo began also. This caused a new international refugee crisis. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 831,000 were forced to leave, including more than 400,000 during the first days of the NATO air strikes. The majority of refugees were ethnic Albanians who escaped to Albania (270,000), Macedonia (130,000), Montenegro (35,700) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (around 8,000). Because the level of pressure of refugees on Albania and Macedonia was too high, other countries also received some refugees from Kosovo. Most refugees immigrated to Turkey and the USA (each 20,000), Spain (more than 7,000), Romania, Norway, Denmark (6,000 each) and Greece, Sweden and Austria; 5,000 each.⁵⁵

Soon after the air strikes began, the attempts to find a solution for the Kosovo crisis continued also. On May 6th, 1999, representatives of the Western European countries and Russia met in Bonn, where they discussed strategies to end the crisis. A few days later, the Western European countries named President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari special envoy for Kosovo. The G-8 Group (the most developed countries

⁵⁵ Kam bodo šli deportiranci? [Where those who were deported will go?], Delo, April 10, 1999, p. 7.

of the West and Russia) wrote a draft of the UN resolution that would end the war. In spite of air strikes, the Yugoslav authorities were still not ready to withdraw their units from Kosovo. By the end of May, the Yugoslav authorities even started to send new troops to Kosovo. After the air strikes intensified, the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević, on June 3rd, 1999, accepted a peace proposal that was brought to him by Ahtisaari and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Černomerdin. The plan foresaw the complete withdrawal of the Yugoslav armed forces from Kosovo and setting up of international troops under UN command. On June 9th, 1999, representatives of the Yugoslav Army and NATO signed a technical plan on withdrawal of the Yugoslav troops in Kumanovo (Macedonia), and NATO stopped attacks on the FRY the next day.⁵⁶

On June 10th, 1999, the UN Security Council also accepted the resolution on Kosovo, with which they adopted conditions to solve the conflict and also established legal grounds for peacekeeping forces to be stationed in Kosovo. UN Security Council *Resolution No. 1244* also determined that the FRY had to immediately stop the violence and repression in Kosovo and withdraw from it with all army troops, police and paramilitary units. International forces, in which civilians as well as soldiers were to serve, would be stationed there for a period of twelve months, with extension of the mandate subject to Security Council approval. The UN Security Council Resolution also allowed for armed interventions by international forces. This resolution also foresaw a temporary civil administration of Kosovo in which its inhabitants would have wide autonomy and develop their own democratic institutions. Albanian refugees are able to return to Kosovo under the control of UNHCR. Members of UCK and other armed Albanian groups must stop fighting and give up their weapons. Negotiations on the future of Kosovo must begin among Serbs and the Yugoslav state and the Albanians of Kosovo. The resolution also guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRY and neighboring countries. This resolution also demanded that all parties concerned in the conflict cooperate with The Hague Tribunal.⁵⁷

While the Western powers were getting ready to divide Kosovo into five sectors, a small unit of Russian soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina quickly ran into Kosovo and occupied the airport in Priština. This event is important because it showed the interest of Russia in serving as the special protector of the Serbs of Kosovo. The Russians simply stayed at the airport ...

Kosovo was, nevertheless, divided into five sectors, where representatives of French, English, Italian, German and U.S. military and civilian authorities started to renew administration. Peace in Kosovo meant, according to some media, “*the beginning of the end of the Serbian myth about Kosovo and the myth of the nation from heaven.*”⁵⁸

After the peace agreement was signed, most of the Albanians returned to their homes; and mass emigration of the Serbs and Montenegrins began. Kosovo experienced ethnic cleansing again. The Serb population remained only in the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, some cities and villages north of Kosovska Mitrovica

⁵⁶ Bitka za Kosovo v 80. dneh [Fight for Kosovo in 80 days], Mladina, July 14, 1999, p. 35.

⁵⁷ Resolucija VS o Kosovu [Security Council Resolution on Kosovo], Delo, July 12, 1999, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Konec mita [The End of the Myth], Mladina, June 14, 1999, pp. 37-38.

and some enclaves in the Priština surroundings. Under the circumstances, there were many within both ethnic groups who did not like peace. Bloody unrest began in Kosovska Mitrovica at the beginning of February 2001.⁵⁹ In March, fights also began in Preševo Valley, in the regions of southeastern Serbia (near the administrative border between Kosovo and Serbia), where the Albanian population prevails. Part of this territory was a demilitarized zone, which came under the complete sovereignty of the FRY again. After some days of fighting, under international peace-keeping forces' surveillance, both sides signed a cease-fire;⁶⁰ then fighting erupted in neighboring communes in Macedonia. The Balkan tragedy continued ...

In spite of resistance of Albanians of Kosovo Hans Haekkerup, the civilian administrator for Kosovo, signed with the representatives of FRY a document of cooperation, which ought to mean "*a beginning of return of Serbia and Yugoslavia to its territory*," as official Yugoslavia commented the event. Albanians, who at the time already were getting ready for elections to the provincial parliament, accepted the decision with discontent.⁶¹ All the opinion polls were predicting that LDK and Ibrahim Rugova would be absolute winners of the elections. Rugova's LDK got absolute majority in 120-member Kosovo provincial parliament. In spite of this Rugova did not get a demanded qualified majority (two third of all members of provincial parliament) when he ran for the presidency of Kosovo since deputies of Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) Hasan Taqui, and Union of Future of Kosovo were boycotting the elections. Similarly it also happened on January 10th, 2002, during the second and third circle of elections. After new civil administrator Michael Steiner intervened Kosovo parliament with 88 votes (three deputies voted against, fifteen deputies abstained) finally elected Rugova as president of the province. At the same time Bajram Rexhepi was elected president of ten member Kosovo government.⁶²

In spite of the fact that Kosovo since Rugova and Rexhepi were named to their positions has all the administrative bodies, which are needed for the functioning of the state of Kosovo, most of the bodies had limited competencies. The real master in the province is still civil administrator who administers province in the name of the international community. He has a veto power over any decision, which would be against *UN Resolution no. 1244* on the mission of UNMIK and KFOR. The status shall not change for some years to come but again no one knows what the future shall bring ...

⁵⁹ Branko Jokić, Nove podobe starega sovraštva [New Images of old Hatred], Delo, February 7, 2001, p. 5.

⁶⁰ Srbi in Albanci podpisali premirje [Serbs and Albanians signed a cease-fire Agreement], Delo, March 13, 2001, p. 1.

⁶¹ Za tri leta odložena neodvisnost Kosova? [Independence of Kosovo postponed for three years?], Delo November 7, 2001, p. 4.

⁶² Rugova predsednik, Rexhepi premier [Rugova President, Rexhepi Prime Minister], Delo, March 5, 2002, p. 24.

The Political 'Death' of Slobodan Milošević - Serbia on Its Way to 'Reconnect' to the World

After he had to admit defeat in Kosovo, Slobodan Milošević started to lose popularity very quickly. Milošević did not make too much fuss about it. At the beginning of 2000, he even changed the federal constitution, which enabled him to retain the position of president of the FRY. He organized elections in October 2000. The people of Serbia were unsatisfied because of worsened economic conditions as well as because Milošević's policy did not serve the interests of the Serb nation, especially in Kosovo. Opposition was still divided, but they succeeded in uniting into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia [*Demokratska opozicija Srbije* - DOS]. They also agreed to a common platform for the elections against Milošević and his regime.⁶³ Dr. Vojislav Koštunica, who was a Serb nationalist and legitimist and an ardent negotiator, became the candidate of the united opposition.⁶⁴

Koštunica won the elections of September 22nd, 2000. He got 48.2% of the popular vote, while Milošević received 40.23%. A DOS representative claimed in a statement to the independent radio station B2-92 that the election commission had stolen 400,000 of Koštunica's votes, while they added 200,000 votes to Milošević's total. Milošević was getting ready for the second round of elections. Koštunica had been receiving his first congratulations from foreign dignitaries and representatives of the Serb Orthodox Church.⁶⁵ People reacted to the stealing of the votes with a general strike and protests. After all of Serbia protested, Milošević admitted that he lost the elections. The election commission "*admitted its mistake*" and the Yugoslav Constitutional Court accepted Vojislav Koštunica as the new president.⁶⁶

The victory of Koštunica was happily accepted in foreign lands; they were happy about it also in Kosovo, although Kosovo Albanians were skeptical, especially because Koštunica was a Serb nationalist after all. There were reservations towards Koštunica also in Montenegro, where only followers of the Socialist National Party of Momir Bulatović participated in the elections, while all the others boycotted elections for the president and for the federal parliament.⁶⁷

Milošević's defeat meant normalization of political life in the FRY; visits of foreign heads of state followed after the federal and Serbian governments were formed. Carla del Ponte, General Prosecutor of The Hague International Tribunal, visited Belgrade in the second half of January of 2001.⁶⁸ Milošević was arrested on April 1st, 2001, allegedly for financial fraud and killings of his opponents while he

⁶³ Branko Jokić, Vstajenje ali padec srbske opozicije [Resurrection or Downfall of Serbian Opposition], Delo, January 12, 2000, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Trmasti nacionalist [Stubborn Nationalist], Dnevnik, October 7, 2000, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Peter Potočnik, Režim vsiljuje pat položaj [Regime is imposing a pat position], Delo, September 19, 2000, p. 3.

⁶⁶ Peter Potočnik, Zmaga Koštunice potrjena [Koštunica's Victory confirmed], Delo, October 7, 2000, p. 5.

⁶⁷ Branko Jokić, Zadržani in skeptični Črnogorci in Albanci [Montenegrins and Albanians restrained and skeptical], Delo, October 9, 2000/b, p. 4.

⁶⁸ Peter Potočnik, Celo košava nemočna pred trdoživo politiko [Even strong winds of košava powerless in front of stubborn politics], Delo, January 27, 2001, p. 4.

was in office.⁶⁹ On June 28th, 2001, another St. Vitus Day, the Yugoslav authorities handed Milošević over to The Hague Tribunal. In protest, Milošević's followers in Belgrade and other towns in Serbia held demonstrations, but they soon ended. It also caused a crisis within the government coalition because President Koštunica declared that surrendering Milošević to The Hague International Tribunal "*was still illegal and unconstitutional, and as such threatened the existence of the FRY.*"⁷⁰

In spite of all the problems inside the governmental coalition, FRY still tried to strengthen the ties of Yugoslavia with the rest of the world. Its representatives also soon signed an agreement on inheritance among the successor states of the former SFRY. Negotiations on division of the wealth of the former common federation began.⁷¹

Until February of 2002, theories and discussion on how to solve the economic crisis in Yugoslavia were the main topic of interest in Serbia. In February 2002, a Milošević trial before The Hague Tribunal began; and every one in Serbia watched the trial ...

Montenegro

The destiny of Montenegro was not yet quite clear when Yugoslavia started to collapse in 1991. In November 1991, when negotiations took place in The Hague under the presidency of Lord Peter Carrington about the future destiny of Yugoslavia, Montenegro was one of the republics of Yugoslavia. Lord Carrington foresaw the same level of independence for it as for the other Yugoslav republics. President of Montenegro Momir Bulatović even accepted his proposal. Later he had to withdraw from this decision under pressure and accept Milošević's proposal to create the FRY as a union between Montenegro and Serbia. Bulatović was under pressure especially from Milošević because Milošević would not be able to claim the rights of the only successor of former Yugoslavia (SFRY). Also the people of Montenegro were still supportive of Milošević's policy.⁷²

Montenegro remained part of the 'third' Yugoslavia, FRY, which was proclaimed with acceptance of the Constitution at Žabljak in Montenegro on April 27th, 1992.⁷³ In accordance with this Constitution, Montenegro retained an equal position with Serbia and was also fairly well represented in federal institutions; in reality it had as much autonomy as Milošević permitted. Montenegro shared the destiny of the rest of the FRY when the economic sanctions of the international community were imposed on Yugoslavia. For Montenegro, whose economy lagged behind even before 1991, it meant even greater poverty.⁷⁴ At this time a majority of Montenegrins were

⁶⁹ Peter Potočnik, Slobodan Milošević vendarle v priporu [In spite of all Slobodan Milošević in Custody], Delo, April 2, 2001, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Božo Mašanović, Milošević izročen haaškemu sodišču [Milošević extradited to Hague Tribunal], Delo, July 29, 2001, p. 1.

⁷¹ Mojca Drčar-Murko, Sukcesija sklenjena [Succession agreed upon], Delo, July 30, 2001, p. 1.

⁷² Silber and Little, Yugoslavia. Death of a Nation ..., pp. 194-196.

⁷³ Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History ..., p. 165.

⁷⁴ Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., pp. 386-389.

still supporting Milošević.

In the second half of the 1990s, a deepening of the economic crisis, widening of social gaps and political instability in the FRY also brought changes in Montenegrin politics. Within the leading Socialist Party of Montenegro, a group of politicians demanded more rights and equality for Montenegro inside the Yugoslav federation. The future president of Montenegro and then president of the Montenegrin government, Milo Đukanović, said, “*Montenegro was not forced to enter Yugoslavia. /.../ It did not enter Yugoslavia to be threatened by the state, nor to flee Yugoslavia.*“ The president of the Montenegrin parliament, Svetozar Marović, was even more direct, when he declared that “*the Montenegrin president will not be chosen any more by staffs of some hired Montenegrins in Belgrade, nor the dukes, nor the wives, nor Politika Express [the Belgrade regime’s newspaper] /.../ Montenegro wishes to have its own president and not a deputy installed by decree at a secret dinner in Dedinje [the government villa quarter in Belgrade] ...*“⁷⁵

Bulatović did not care too much about dissatisfaction among Montenegrins. He paid, however, for his unconditional following of Milošević’s policy by election defeat. Đukanović won the election for president of Montenegro in September 1997 with a margin of 5,488 votes. Bulatović admitted defeat at first;⁷⁶ later, at Milošević’s request, he accused Đukanović of stealing the votes. In January 1998 he even tried to come to power by force. General demonstrations and unrest were organized by followers of Bulatović (and Milošević); 13 demonstrators were arrested, and 100 people were wounded. In spite of uncertain conditions, Đukanović succeeded in retaining power. For the first time in the FRY, a party won that supported reforms and an opening to the world. Also for the first time, Slobodan Milošević got a political opponent worthy of that name.⁷⁷

The change of power in Montenegro took place under very tense circumstances, since the rise of radicalism in neighboring Serbia brought new violence in Kosovo. Because of different points of view towards this life and death issue for Yugoslavia and Milošević, Montenegro and Serbia found themselves at a very crucial crossroads. The new Montenegrin leadership demanded opening towards the world, especially in regard to the economy, with participation in the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions. At the same time, they demanded a quick solution to the Kosovo problem. The Montenegrin leadership demanded development of an open multinational and democratic society, which was more and more confined by Milošević’s policy of deepening the conflict with the international community - which even provoked an attack by NATO against the FRY.⁷⁸

This brought a change in the formerly positive public opinion towards Yugoslavia in Montenegro, which was not ready to lose time while waiting for democratic change in Serbia. Montenegrin politicians even offered Serbia some suggestions

⁷⁵ Svetlana Vasović, Očesi gledata v različni smeri [The Eyes looking into different Directions], Mladina, October 28, 1997, pp. 34-35.

⁷⁶ Branko Jokić, Pod žarometom: Momir Bulatović [Under the Headlight: Momir Bulatović], Delo February 1, 2001, p. 5.

⁷⁷ Vasović, Očesi gledata v različni smeri ..., pp. 34-35.

⁷⁸ Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History ..., p. 177.

on how to change relations in the federation. If Belgrade had given Montenegro enough freedom and independence to enable Montenegro to continue its democratic reforms, even if Serbia was not willing to change its society, Montenegro would have stayed in the federation with Serbia. Since the regime of Slobodan Milošević continued its policy of stifling the development of Montenegro, Montenegrin leaders started openly to demand independence.⁷⁹ The governments of the EU countries and the U.S. Administration were against it because they were afraid of the eruption of a new armed conflict. Montenegrin president Djukanović did not succumb to their pressures. He warned the EU and the United States that Montenegro, which was affected by the NATO bombardment and international sanctions, would leave the FRY if Milošević did not resign.

Montenegro already had been executing its plan in secret. By the summer of 1999, the federal institutions had already lost control over Montenegro. The Montenegrin police, who were faithful to the Djukanović administration, controlled the borders with Albania and Croatia and its Adriatic coast. Montenegro had its own unofficial representatives in Western European capitals, it issued its own visas and had its own foreign minister. Only the inflated dinar and the Yugoslav army, which was still faithful to Milošević, connected Montenegro with Serbia.⁸⁰

Although Milošević had to leave the presidency of FRY after the September elections of 2000, the Montenegrin leadership did not change their position towards independence of Montenegro. Incidentally, Djukanović and his followers almost helped Milošević to stay in power because they boycotted the September 2000 elections.⁸¹

The right of Montenegro to be an independent state was explained with different arguments by the Montenegrin leadership. They pointed to the fact that Montenegro was an internationally recognized state before 1918 and that Montenegro was one of the Yugoslav republics recognized by the Badinter Commission at the beginning of the 1990s as having a right to independence. They also called attention to the experiences after 1990, which showed that it was impossible to secure development of Montenegro inside Yugoslavia. At the end of 2000, Djukanović even announced a referendum on independence of Montenegro because he was convinced that more than 60% of the inhabitants of Montenegro would vote for independence. It should have been held by the first half of 2001 but wasn't because of the election described below. The Serbian authorities were very skeptical about the Montenegrin proposal on Serbia and Montenegro as internationally recognized states. Zoran Djindjić, later the Serbian prime minister, foresaw the possibility of negotiations, while president of the FRY Vojislav Koštunica still insisted on an FRY that was against the Montenegrin position.⁸²

Parliamentary elections followed on April 22nd, 2001. It was the first test of Djukanović's aspirations towards independence. His coalition, 'Victory of Montene-

⁷⁹ Igor Mekina, Novi odnosi [New Relations], Mladina, June 28, 1999, pp. 20-21.

⁸⁰ Ne tako hitro, Djukanović [Not so fast Djukanović], Mladina, July 19, 1999, pp. 32-33.

⁸¹ Branko Jokić, Črna gora in volitve v ZRJ. Bulatović je odpovedal [Montenegro and Elections in FRY, Bulatović gave up], Delo, October 26, 2000, p. 1.

⁸² Branko Jokić, Srbija: potrjena zmaga DOS [Serbia: victory of DOS confirmed], Delo, (December 28, 2000, p. 1.

gro' [*Pobjeda Crne gore*], got a little bit more than 50% of the votes. At the same time, the coalition 'United for Yugoslavia' [*Zajedno za Jugoslaviju*] received a little less than 50% of the votes. The latter were celebrating because this narrow result meant that a referendum on Montenegrin independence would be postponed. Djukanović's coalition got only two deputies more in the Montenegrin parliament. Holding a referendum on independence of Montenegro would have meant that the pro-Yugoslav half of the population would boycott the vote, or under the worst scenario it could even mean a civil war.⁸³ An important explanation of why the Socialist National Party of Momir Bulatović was so successful is that it deserted Slobodan Milošević and entered the federal government of Dragiša Pešić of DOS. Also, the international community's pressure against Montenegrin independence played a role, since the Montenegrin state could not survive without external help.⁸⁴

It became clear that all misunderstandings would have to be solved with negotiations, in spite of the fact that those in favor of Montenegrin independence were still convinced that the conflict on the future destiny of the FRY could be solved only with a referendum.⁸⁵ At the end of 2001, experts began to negotiate on how to change the FRY,⁸⁶ and they continued in January 2002. The European Union (EU) joined the negotiations in February 2002. In Brussels, Montenegrin and Serbian experts in economic, monetary and social issues met and discussed integrating the FRY into the European structure, especially on perspectives for the Stabilization Association agreement between the FRY and the EU, which is the first phase of cooperation between the EU and nonmember states.⁸⁷ The EU intended to sign this agreement with all the states of Southeastern Europe except Slovenia, which is on its way to full membership.

The EU wanted the Yugoslav Federation to remain in existence, changing its name, however, to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Javier Solana, EU representative, proposed that a new state would have a president elected by the parliament; instead of a federal government it could have a coordinative body. Montenegro would even retain the Euro as its official monetary instrument. Montenegrins would serve in the army on Montenegro's own territory after five years (EU proposal) or one year (Montenegrin proposal), Serbia and Montenegro would have the right to decide on their future status by referendum.⁸⁸

Djukanović now found himself in a bad situation, since his coalition partners (the Social Democratic Party and Liberal Union) do not intend for any price to resign following a referendum on independence of Montenegro. If Djukanović accepts the EU proposal, they would enter the opposition, which would bring new parliamentary elections. This would divide Montenegrins even more, which would

⁸³ Jokić, Zadržani in skeptični Črnogorci in Albanci ..., p. 4.

⁸⁴ Peter Potočnik, Beograd slavi Pirovo zmago [Belgrade celebrates Phryus' Victory], Delo, April 24, 2001, p. 4.

⁸⁵ Branko Jokić, Djukanović za dialog, opozicija za Beograd [Djukanović for the Dialogue, Opposition for Belgrade], Delo, November 2, 2001, p. 4.

⁸⁶ Branko Jokić, Poglavljanje spora med očesoma [Widening of the Conflict between Eyes], Delo, December 29, 2001, p. 3.

⁸⁷ Božo Mašanović, EU vztraja pri Jugoslaviji [EU insist on Yugoslavia], Delo, February 5, 2002, p. 4.

⁸⁸ Branko Jokić, Nič več ime Jugoslavija? [No more the name Yugoslavia?], Delo, February 18, 2002, p. 4.

not bring peace to the Balkans. As we write these lines in March 2002, we still do not know what the future will bring ...

Sandžak: Another Potential Theater of Balkan Wars?

During the search for a solution for Serb-Montenegrin relations, the question of Sandžak is surfacing again. Sandžak encompasses the mountainous region of northern Montenegro (communes of Rožaj, Plav, Ivangrad, Bijelo Polje, Plevlja) and southwestern Serbia (communes of Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, Prijepolje, Priboj) settled by Muslims. Today they think of themselves as Boshniaks i.e. Bosnian Muslims. The region lies between the regions of settlement of Serbs in the north and Montenegrins in the south. During the period of Turkish rule it represented a special administrative-political unit (Yeni Pazar Sanjak). After the Turks had to leave the Balkan Peninsula in 1912 it was divided between Montenegro and Serbia. The border has remained unchanged until today.

The Muslims of Sandžak did not gain a special status either during the period of Karadjordjević's Yugoslavia or during Tito's Yugoslavia. Until the Muslims in Tito's Yugoslavia were denied the status of a constitutive nation, the Muslims of Sandžak did not demand any type of autonomy or a special status inside the Yugoslav society. Demands for change of status became louder only after the Yugoslav crisis sharpened, and they began demanding cultural autonomy even more loudly. The SDA for Sandžak was also involved in those demands.⁸⁹

Serbian politicians reacted strongly against these attempts by the Boshniaks of Sandžak. The regime accused the leaders of SDA for Sandžak, Dr. Sulejman Ugljanin and his collaborators, of an attempt of armed resistance.⁹⁰ Under these circumstances, the Serbian and Muslim sides ceased contact and all cooperation on the political level. The Yugoslav army occupied all strategic points. Because of the violence, many even started to consider independence for Sandžak, while others were considering annexation of Sandžak to Bosnia-Herzegovina; still others immigrated to Turkey because they were afraid of violence.

In spite of all the violence, Muslims have not abstained from their demands for autonomy. During October 25th-27th, 1991, they even held a referendum in which the people of Sandžak voted for its autonomy;⁹¹ on January 11th, 1992, they successfully organized a referendum on special status for Sandžak.⁹² The Muslims of Sandžak even established their own parliament a few months later to represent all the Muslims in Serbia.⁹³

Milošević did not want to negotiate the demands of the Boshniaks of Sandžak.

⁸⁹ Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991 - second Edition, Bloomington-Indianapolis 1992, p. 244.

⁹⁰ Peter Potočnik, Sandžak kot klin med Srbijo in Črno goro [Sandžak as a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro], Delo, January 29, 2001, p. 4.

⁹¹ Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 216.

⁹² Milan Andrejević, The Sandžak, The Next Balkan Theater of War?, Radio Free Europe Research Report, November 27, 1992, pp. 26-34.

⁹³ Woodward, Balkan Tragedy ..., p. 143.

For him it was Serbia. Any autonomy would mean a hindrance for Serbia's entry to the Adriatic. Serbs were already afraid because of the high increase in the Muslim population in both the Serbian and Montenegrin parts of Sandžak.⁹⁴

Table 5: Changes in the ethnic composition of Sandžak during 1961-1991.

	1961		1971		1981		1991	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
MUSLIMS	107,265	29.17	160,712	40.77	192,525	46.28	215,291	51.15
SERBS	119,385	32.47	125,239	31.77	105,915	25.46	112,807	26.80
MONTENEGRINS	119,029	32.27	95,247	24.16	103,903	24.98	81,215	19.29
TURKS	15,440	4.19	4,614	1.17	--	--	46	0.01
OTHERS	6,514	1.80	8,307	2.13	13,582	3.28	11,503	2.75
SANDŽAK - Total	367,633	100.0	394,119	100.0	415,925	100.0	420,862	100.0

SOURCES: Popis stanovništva 1961. Knjiga VI: Vitalna, etnička i migraciona obeležja - rezultati za opštine, Beograd 1967; Popis stanovništva i stanova 1971. Statistički bilten 727: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opština, Beograd 1972; Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 1981. godini. Statistički bilten 1295: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opština - konačni rezultati, Beograd 1982; Prvi rezultati popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i poljoprivrednih gazdinstava 1991. godine. Statistički bilten broj 1934: Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opština, Beograd 1995, pp. 28-32.

The first attempts at peaceful cooperation between the Muslims of Sandžak and the Serbian authorities came after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 1995.⁹⁵ SDA even entered the race for the federal parliament in November 1996. The names of many voters of this party were not to be found in the election lists of those eligible to vote, and they were not allowed to vote.⁹⁶

After the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milošević, cooperation between the Serbian state and the Muslims of Sandžak improved. A member of the Coalition for Sandžak, Rasim Ljajić, even became the member of the Yugoslav federal government responsible for minorities. Sandžak still represents a potential danger for future interethnic conflict. Quite often in Serb-Montenegrin disputes, the question arises as to what would happen to Sandžak if Montenegro should really become independent.⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Vujadin Rudić and Milomir Stepić, Ethnic Changes in the Raška Region, in: Duška Hadži-Jovanović (Ed.), The Serbian Question in The Balkans, Beograd 1995, pp. 227-240.

⁹⁵ Perica Vučinić, Perica, Vlast i manjine, Vreme International, May 15, 1995, pp. 22-25.

⁹⁶ Slobodan Dukić and Branko Jokić, V Srbiji prepričljiva Miloševićeva zmaga [A convincing victory for Milošević in Serbia], Delo, November 5, 1996, p. 1.

⁹⁷ Peter Potočnik, Sandžak kot klin med Srbijo in Črno goro [Sandžak as a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro], Delo, January 29, 2001, p. 4.

Conclusion

This article presents the survey of the history of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from its birth, after Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia felt apart in the beginning of 1990s and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established from the two republics i.e. Serbia and Montenegro, until a proposal on new relations between Serbia and Montenegro was signed in February 2002. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at first wanted to play a role Russia played when Soviet Union felt apart as the only successor of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The decisions of Badinter Commission however declared all successor states, successors of Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. Unsolved Albanian question and repression of Albanian ethnic group provoked intervention of international community led by NATO and Kosovo, a cradle of Serbdom, became international protectorate. This meant the beginning of the end of regime of Slobodan Milošević, who lost elections for the presidency of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Vojislav Koštunica, a candidate of opposition. In Montenegro already before the fall of Milošević Milo Đukanović won elections for the presidency and started in movement for the independence of Montenegro. International community however did not support Montenegrin endeavors and EU Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, negotiated a proposal for new confederation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Matjaž Klemenčič

ZVEZNA REPUBLIKA JUGOSLAVIJA, 1992-2002

POVZETEK

Po smrti Josipa Broza - Tita je začela jugoslovanska ideja vedno bolj izgubljati svojo veljavo. Ko pa je konec osemdesetih let 20. stoletja Slobodan Milošević jugoslovansko idejo izrabil za širitev srbskih hegemonističnih in unitarističnih teženj, se je Jugoslavija znašla 'na koncu' svoje zgodovine. Vse pogostejši spori med jugoslovenskimi narodi zaradi različnih civilizačijskih modelov so v začetku devetdesetih let privedli do razpada SFRJ. Na njenih ruševinah je ob Sloveniji, Hrvaški, Bosni in Hercegovini ter Makedoniji nastala tudi Zvezna republika Jugoslavija (ZRJ), ki sta jo 27. aprila 1992 razglasili nekdanji socialistični republike Srbija in Črna gora.

Tako imenovana 'okrnjena' ali 'tretja' Jugoslavija je merila 102.173 km² (okrog 40 % ozemlja nekdanje SFRJ) in štela okrog 10,4 milijona prebivalcev. Kljub temu, da so Srbi tvorili absolutno večino prebivalstva (62,3%), je bila ZRJ država s pestro nacionalno strukturo pre-

bivalstva, saj so manjšine sestavlje skoraj tretjino vsega prebivalstva (od tega Albanci 16,6%, Madžari 3,3%; Muslimani 3,1% itd.).

ZRJ so od nastanka naprej pestile bude gospodarske in socialne težave. Vprašljiv je bil tudi njen mednarodni formalnopravni status, potem ko do 23. decembra 1991 ni zaprosila za mednarodno priznanje, kot je to zabevala mednarodna skupnost. Čeprav se je ZRJ razglasila za edino legitimno državo naslednico nekdanje SFRJ, pa so ji to oporekale tako osamosvojene nekdanje republike kot tudi mednarodna skupnost in OZN.

Nova država je kmalu dobila tudi novo politično vodstvo. Na presenečenje vseh pa Milošević ni kandidiral za najvišje zvezne funkcije, saj v času, ko so ga v svetu obtoževali kot glavnega kriaca za vojno na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije, ni hotel tvegati novega izvajanja mednarodne skupnosti. Na najvišje položaje je 'postavil' svoje ljudi, sam pa kot predsednik Srbije vladal iz ozadja. Kljub vsemu pa mu ni uspelo preslepit mednarodne skupnosti, ki se je dobro zavedala, da je politična moč v glavnem koncentrirana le v njegovih rokah. Zato so mednarodni mirovní posredniki v svojih prizadevanjih po ustanovitvi spopadov na Hrvaškem ter v Bosni in Hercegovini ves čas pritis kali v glavnem le na Miloševića. Tako jim je novembra 1995 le uspelo prepričati Miloševića, da je skupaj s Franjom Tuđmanom in Alijo Izetbegovićem podpisal mirovni sporazum v Daytonu, ki je končal prvo etapo krvavih spopadov na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije.

Po podpisu daytonskega sporazuma je postal jasno, da bo Milošević skušal prej ali slej dokončno 'rešiti' kosovsko vprašanje in ultiči na Kosovu razmere po svoji volji. Zaradi vse hujših srbskih pritiskov je postajal razdor med Albanci in Srbi vse večji, razmere pa iz dneva v dan vse težje obvladljive. V času zaostrovanja napetosti na Kosovu je prišlo v ZRJ tudi do prvih pomembnejših notranjopolitičnih premikov, potem ko so novembra 1996 na občinskih volitvah v Srbiji Miloševićev Socialistično partijo Srbije porazile prodemokratsko usmerjene stranke, združene v koaliciji Zajedno. Vendar pa to Miloševiću ni preprečilo nadaljnega utrjevanja na oblasti. Tako ga je zvezna skupščina 15. julija 1997 izvolila za predsednika ZRJ.

Miloševića izvolitev in nove množične aretacije Albancev so že napovedovalo nadaljnji burni razvoj dogodkov na Kosovu, kjer so se zaradi skrajno zaostrenih mednacionalnih odnosov razmere slabšala iz dneva v dan. Tako so oboroženi spopadi med Oslobodilno vojsko Kosova ter jugoslovansko vojsko in policijo v začetku leta 1998 prerasli v pravo vojno. Stopnjevanje spopadov je povzročilo nove skrbi mednarodni skupnosti, ki nikakor ni uspela vzpostaviti dialoga med Beogradom in kosovskimi Albanci. Ko so se neuspešno končala tudi pogajanja v Rambouilletu pri Parizu, je zveza NATO 24. marca 1999 pričela z letalskimi napadi na vojaške, gospodarske ter komunikacijske cilje v ZRJ. Istočasno je prišlo do množičnega eksodusa Albancev, ki je sprožil novo begunsko krizo mednarodnih razsežnosti (po nekaterih podatkih naj bi bilo razseljenih okrog 831.000 oseb). Šele po 78 dneh bombardiranja je Milošević popustil pred zahlevami mednarodne skupnosti in dovolil mirovnim silam namestitev na Kosovu. Le-to je bilo po prihodu sil KFOR razdeljeno na pet sektorjev (francoski, angleški, italijanski, nemški ter ameriški) in spremenjeno v mednarodni protektorat. Kot so zapisali v nekaterih medijih, naj bi to bil "začetek konca srbskega mita o Kosovu in mita o nebeškem narodu."

Po 'porazu' na Kosovu je začela priljubljenost Miloševića hitro padati. Vendar pa se zaradi tega ni pretirano vznemirjal. V začetku leta 2000 je celo spremenil zvezno ustavo in si tako podaljšal mandat predsednika ZRJ. Na oblasti si je prizadeval ostati tudi po porazu na predsedniških volitvah septembra 2000, vendar pa je moral po nekajdnevni 'beograjski revoluciji' priznati zmago Vojslavu Koštunice.

S padcem Miloševićevega režima se je začelo 'normalizirati' tudi politično življenje v ZRJ. Prvi rezultat normalizacije je bila ponovna vzpostavljanje političnih stikov z evropskimi državami in aretacija Miloševića (1. aprila 2001), katerega so nove jugoslovanske oblasti na Vidov dan (28. junija) predale haškemu mednarodnemu sodišču za vojne zločine na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije. Vse do februarja 2002 so bile v jugoslovanski javnosti v središču pozornosti težke gospodarske in živiljenjske razmere, nato pa je bila pozornost znova

preusmerjena k Miloševiću. Začelo se je namreč zadnje dejanje njegove razburljive politične poti - sojenje za vojne zločne pred sodiščem v Haagu.

Spričo zgrešene Miloševićeve politike so se kmalu začeli krhati tudi odnosi med Srbijo in Črno goro. Še posebej, ko je na volitvah oktobra 1997 Milo Djukanović premagal zvestega zagonovnika Miloševićeve politike, Momirja Bulatovića. To je bil prvi primer v ZRJ, da so volitve spremenile oblast, in da je zmagala reformistična usmeritev, ki je podpirala odpiranje v svet. Bilo pa je tudi prvič, da je Slobodan Milošević tudi doma dobil pravega političnega tekmeca. Zaradi nevzdržnih razmer v ZRJ je novo črnogorsko vodstvo pričelo odkrito razmišljali o neodvisnosti Črne gore. Sčasoma se je razkorak med obema federalnima enotama tako povečal, da sta ju povezovali le še razvrednotena valuta (dinar) in vojska.

Črnogorsko vodstvo svojih stališč povezanih z neodvisnostjo Črne gore ni spremenilo niti po padcu Miloševićevega režima. Tako je Djukanović konec leta 2000 celo napovedal referendum o samostojnosti Črne gore. Vendar pa so se namesto referendumu konec leta 2001 začeli pogоворi strokovnih skupin iz Srbije in Črne gore za preureditev ZRJ, v katere se je februarja 2002 vključila tudi Evropska unija. Po večmesečnih pogajanjih so predstavniki srbskih in črnogorskih oblasti ob pomoči Evropske unije konec marca 2002 v Beogradu podpisale sporazum o izhodiščnih temeljih za preureditev ZRJ.

Sporazum je predvideval tudi preimenovanje ZRJ, ki naj bi se po novem imenovala Srbija in Črna gora. Tako je slabih enajst let potem, ko je začela razpadati SFRJ, izginil še njen zadnji ostanek - Zvezna republika Jugoslavija - ki pa z jugoslovansko idejo ni imel nikakršne zveze, razen simbolne povezave z imenom Jugoslavija.

Vsač začetek oblikovanja nove države - Srbije in Črne gore - na srečo ni primerljiv z doganjavi v zadnjem desetletju, ko je bilo v imenu takšne ali drugačne Jugoslavije po nepotrebnem prelite veliko krvi. Kljub vsemu pa je potrebno pri reševanju ali pa morebitnem zapletanju srbsko-črnogorskih odnosov opozoriti tudi vprašanje Sandžaka, ki je bil že v času turškega cesarstva posebna upravno-politična enota (Novopazarski sandžak). To poselitveno območje muslimanskega prebivalstva, ki se kot klin zajeda med poselitvena prostora Srbov na severu ter Črnogorcev na jugu, velja še zmeraj za potencialno žarišče novih mednacionalnih sprov. Pogosto se omenja v povezavi s srbsko-črnogorskimi nesoglasji, še posebej če bo prišlo do ločitve Srbije in Črne gore in poskusa dejanske razmejitve Sandžaka med dve državi. Kakšne težave predstavlja postavljanje mejnih kamnov pa je znano že od začetkov osamosvajanja na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije ...

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Izvleček: Avtor predstavlja benediktinski samostan v Gornjem Gradu v prvi polovici 14. stoletja, ko je ta preživiljal eno svojih najbolj burnih obdobjij. S pritegnitvijo nekaterih novih virov ter z novo analizo že znanih avtor predstavlja eno najpomembnejših cerkvenih institucij, ki je imela svoj sedež na tleh današnje države Slovenije.

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Jezik: nemški (izvleček namški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: mestna kultura, sistem odnosov, Zagreb, Varaždin, oligarhija, dvorno-humanistična kultura, kultura cerkve

Izvleček: Avtor se ukvarja s vprašanjem, ali se je v severozahodnih mestih Hrvaške - Zagrebu in Varaždinu - v 16. st. oblikovala kakšna oblika mestne oziroma meščanske kulture ali pa so njuni meščani zgolj sledili kulturi plemstva in cerkve. pride do zaključka, da se je meščanstvo, ki je bilo pod pritiskom dvorno-humanistične kulture z ene ter cerkve z druge strani, z obema identificiralo in tako prevzelo ideologijo vodilnih fevdalnih slojev, namesto da bi oblikovalo svojo.

Avtor: EDELMAYER Friedrich

Dr., izredni profesor

Univerza na Dunaju, Fakulteta za duhovne in kulturološke vede, Inštitut za zgodovino

Dr. Karl Lueger-Ring 1, A - 1010 Dunaj, Avstrija

Naslov: HABSBURŽANI IN KONEC OGLEJSKEGA PATRIARHATA

Podnaslov: Argumenti in polemike

Studia Historica Slovenica,

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*

Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 41-60, 75 cit.

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

Jezik: nemški (izvleček namški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: Habsburžani, oglejski patriarhat, Beneška republika

Izvleček: Oglejski patriarhat, v srednjem veku ena najpomembnejših krščanskih cerkvenih institucij, je v času oblikovanja modernih držav novega veka postal zastarela tvorba. Najpozneje od časa razsvetljenstva naprej so moderne države stremele za tem, da so se njihove državne in cerkvene meje ujemale. Cerkev, ki je še vedno imela pravico do fevdalnih posesti, je namreč bilo moč zlorabiti za politične namene. To tudi pojasni, zakaj so se Beneška republika in Habsburžani tako zagrizeno borili za prevlado nad oglejskim patriarhatom ter skušali svoja stališča utemeljiti s historičnimi argumenti. Razpustitev oglejskega patriarhata je bil politični kompromis, kajti nazadnje sta se obe strani odrekli svojim, na srednjem veku temelječim, zahtevam. Zato lahko razpustitev patriarhata označimo kot racionalno potezo na poti k oblikovanju modernega evropskega sistema držav.

Avtor: JUŽNIČ Stanislav

Dipl.ing. tehniške fizike, dr. zgodovinskih znanosti

Fara 2, SI - 1336 Vas, Slovenija

Naslov: TIRNBERGER, JEZUITSKI ZNANSTVENIK IZ PTUJA

Studia Historica Slovenica,

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*

Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 61-70, 20 cit., 3 slike

Kategorija: 1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek

Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: Ptuj, Gradec, Banská Štiavnica, Tirnberger, zgodovina jezuitskih matematičnih znanosti

Izvleček: Opisujemo življenje in delo pomembnega znanstvenika Tirnbergerja iz Spodnje Štajerske. Do prepovedi jezuitske družbe je opravljal najvišje znanstvene in pedagoške funkcije na višjih študijah na Štajerskem in na Slovaškem. Sodeloval je s Hellom, tedaj najpomembnejšim astronomom v monarhiji. Kot vrhunski strokovnjak je predaval fizikalne predmete na prestižni rudarski akademiji v Banski Štiavnici. Svoja opazovanja vremena in severnega sija je objavil v posebni knjigi.

UDK 329(497.4)"1918"
94(497.1)"1918"

Avtor: PEROVŠEK Jurij

Dr., višji znanstveni sodelavec
Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino
Kongresni trg 1, SI - 1000 Ljubljana

Naslov: SAMOVLADA SLOVENCEV NOVEMBRA 1918

Studia Historica Slovenica,

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 71-84, 37 cit., 3 slike

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: Slovenska državnost, Država Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov, november 1918

Izvleček: V razpravi avtor predstavlja samostojen položaj Slovencev v Državi Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov, ki so jo habsburški Jugoslovani oblikovali ob državni odcepitvi od Avstro-Ogrske monarhije 29. oktobra 1918. Država SHS je obstajala do 1. decembra 1918, ko se je s Kraljevino Srbijo združila v Kraljevino Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev. Država SHS je obsegala Slovenijo, Hrvaško z Istro in Dalmacijo ter Bosno in Hercegovino. V Državi SHS so Slovenci prvič v svoji sodobni zgodovini vladali sami sebi. Imeli so svojo Narodno vlado SHS v Ljubljani, ki je bila prva samostojna in demokratično oblikovana slovenska narodna vlada. Slovenska Narodna vlada je v Sloveniji samostojno vodila vse politično, vojaško, družbeno in gospodarsko življenje. Samostojni državnopravni položaj, ki so ga dosegli Slovenci v Državi SHS se ni ohranil po oblikovanju centralistične Kraljevine SHS.

UDK 329.3(497.4-18)"1918/1923"
94(497.4-18)"1918/1923"

Avtor: RATEJ Mateja

Mag., mlada raziskovalka
Univerza v Mariboru, Pedagoška fakulteta, Oddelek za zgodovino
Koroška cesta 160, SI - 2000 Maribor, Slovenija

Naslov: RAZVOJ POLITIČNEGA KATOLICIZMA NA ŠTAJERSKEM V LETIH 1918-1923

Studia Historica Slovenica,

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 85-120, 207 cit., 4 slike

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: slovenska politična zgodovina, politične stranke na Štajerskem, politični katolicizem, Tiskarna sv. Cirila

Izvleček: Temeljne stanovsko-politične organizacije štajerskega katoliškega tabora po prvi svetovni vojni so bile: Slovenska kmetska zveza, Jugoslovanska strokovna zveza, Slovenska krščanskosocialna zveza (v njenem okviru še Slovenska krščanska ženska zveza) in telovadno društvo Orel. SLS je na Štajerskem izdajala kmetijskopolitični tednik Slovenski gospodar in trikrat tedensko politični list Straža. Časnika je izdajala in tiskala Tiskarna sv. Cirila v Mariboru, ki je predstavljala idejno in organizacijsko bazo štajerskega katoliškega gibanja. Do državnozborskih volitev marca 1923 je katoliški tabor na Štajerskem opustil naslanjanje na specifiko štajerske Slovenske kmetske zveze.

UDK 323.15(4=511.141)
341.234(4=511.141)

Avtor: KÁNTOR Zoltán

Dipl. sociol., raziskovalec

Inštitut Teleki László, Center za centralnoevropske študije
Szilágyi Erzsébet fasor 22/c, 1125 Budimpešta, Madžarska

Naslov: MADŽARSKA NACIONALNA POLITIKA IN ZAKON O MADŽARIH, KI ŽIVIVO V SOSEDNJIH DRŽAVAH

Studia Historica Slovenica,

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 121-138, 34 cit.

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: matična država, nacionalna manjšina, Madžarska, Madžari v sosednjih državah

Izvleček: Članek analizira Zakon o Madžarih, živečih v sosednjih državah, v okviru madžarske narodne politike. To vprašanje izvira iz neskladnosti mej madžarske države in madžarskega naroda. Do pred kratkim je Madžarska v glavnem podpirala institucije narodnih manjšin, sedaj pa podpira tudi posameznike so-narodnjake. Glavna diskusija se ukvarja z definicijo oseb, ki so upravičene do posedovanja madžarskih izkaznic, v principu pa gre za definicijo, kdo je Madžar. Diskusijo sta zaznamovala dva koncepta o narodu. Etnokulturalni (etno-teritorialni) koncept, ki ga podpira konzervativna vlada in poudarja enotnost vseh Madžarov. Državljanški koncept, ki ga podpirajo socialisti in liberalci, pa se osredotoča na madžarske državljanje.

UDK 94(497.1)"1992/2002"

Avtor: KLEMENČIČ Matjaž

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Koroška cesta 160, SI - 2000 Maribor, Slovenija

Naslov: ZVEZNA REPUBLIKA JUGOSLAVIJA, 1992-2002

Studia Historica Slovenica,

Časopis za humanistične in družboslovne študije / *Humanities and Social Studies Review*
Maribor, letnik 3(2003), št. 1, str. 139-172, 97 cit., 5 pregled., 2 zemljev., 1 slika

Kategorija: 1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek

Jezik: angleški (izvleček angleški in slovenski, povzetek slovenski)

Ključne besede: Zvezna republika Jugoslavija, 1992-2002, albansko-srbski mednacionalni odnosi, kosovska kriza, Sandžak

Izvleček: V prispevku je orisana zgodovina Federativne republike Jugoslavije, ene od petih naslednic nekdanje SFRJ. Avtor je v prispevku predstavil vse ključne trenutke v kratki desetletni zgodovini te države: nastanek leta 1992, vsa krizna obdobja v času vojn ob razpadanju SFRJ, proces demokratizacije in ponovno vključevanje v mednarodno skupnost. Posebej je predstavil pestro nacionalno strukturo, še zlasti pa zapletene albansko-srbske odnose, ki so še v preteklosti marsikdaj usodno krojili dogodek v nekdanji SFRJ. Na koncu je predstavil tudi problem Sandžaka, ki v povezavi s srbsko-črnogorskimi nesoglasji velja za novo potencialno žarišče novih mednacionalnih sporov na Balkanu.

Studia Historica Slovenica

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