

**THE ORIGINS OF
WAR IN MOZAMBIQUE**

A History of Unity and Division

Sayaka Funada-Classen

Translated by Masako Osada

**AFRICAN
MINDS**

*The author alone is responsible for what is written and all the interpretations in this book.
None should be attributed to any persons or institutes that have provided assistance to the author.*

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“The peace has arrived, but we still don’t know where this war came from.”

“We haven’t been told why this war came to us. If both sides were all Mozambicans, we need to tell the young people the truth in order not to continue.”

“The truth is painful, but it’s necessary.”

“We want to forget, but we need to make sure our children understand that there was a war in our country and many people died.”

(Extracts from interviews with Makhuwa women in Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, in August 2011)

Preface

In 1994 I was about to leave Mozambique after having completed my work for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), when I was suddenly struck by serious doubts. How could I leave this place like this? How dare I speak as a UN functionary about peace and democratisation to local people when I knew so little about their country? I was ashamed of my ignorance and arrogance. While looking down at the red earth from the window of the aeroplane, I remembered the silence and sharp gaze of those who I met there. True, I had always wanted to work for “peace” since my childhood – I was born on the 6th of August (the day the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima). Yet, was the decision to continue working for the UN correct, ignoring, as it would, the uniqueness of local communities and the individualities of people? Would that be the right way to achieve peace and democracy?

The next time I was offered a job working for a UN mission, my mind was clear. It was time to leave the blue UN cap behind. I shouldn't become a “mission bird”. I was resolved that I would seek out the vast experience hidden behind people's silences and their unspoken fear and would let the world know about it, however many years it might take.

Eighteen years have passed since then. Finally, I am able to fulfil the promise I made to myself. This book attempts to reveal the origins of war in Mozambique, paying attention to the structural process of various relations at international, regional, domestic, local and personal levels. In the course of the research which was conducted over a fifteen-year-period since 1996, I have used all available primary sources of information, sourced archival research in five countries and interviewed more than 350 people.

I finished writing the Japanese edition in 2005. It was not easy to decide how much of the discussion and overview of the situation from that time to include in the English edition published seven years later. New books and articles have been published in the meantime. Politics changes constantly. However, I had to draw a line. This book might attract severe criticism for not reflecting the most recent information, but if that happens, I thought, I would write another book, a better one, taking the criticism and new findings into account.

The book focuses on an area called Maúá, not because I believe Maúá represents the whole of Mozambique as such, but because highlighting a specific area and people helps to understand the Mozambican history more deeply and comprehensively. In any case, it would be impossible to study the experience of all Mozambicans. I am not attempting to write a history textbook of Mozambique, or a glorious history of the liberation struggle, but rather trying to fill a gap in the descriptions of contemporary Mozambican history by delving into matters that have not been written about before.

Although my intention was always to write this book in both English and Portuguese, I published it in Japanese first since there were virtually no Japanese academic books on contemporary African history, let alone any on Portuguese-speaking Africa. This delayed

the book's publication in the languages with which many scholars and stakeholders are more familiar.

Translation itself turned out to be a colossal task. My translators and editors had a tremendous job, due mainly to the sheer volume of the book (669 pages in Japanese). Moreover, in my Japanese book, I quoted passages, originally written in English, Portuguese or French but which had already been translated into Japanese. For this book, I had to find the original texts. Some were unobtainable in Japan and had to be translated into English from Japanese.

Spelling was another headache. Some place and people's names were spelled differently, depending on references, interpreters and scholars. For instance, a Makhuwa chief "Mwalia" is also spelled as "Mualia" and "Mwaliya"; and "*sipaio*" (an African policeman) as "*cipaio*" and "*sipai*". In most cases, I have adopted the spelling used locally. The names of provinces, districts and cities are spelled according to the maps made in Mozambique (e.g., Maúá and Moçambique District). Widely accepted English spelling, if any, is prioritised (e.g., Makonde and Nyanja instead of Maconde and Nianja). Some words are not translated because I fear the nuance may be lost in translation (e.g. *assimilado*). Plurals of Portuguese and Makhuwa words are indicated by non-italic "s" added to the end (e.g. *capatazs* and *mwenes*). Furthermore, common English spelling is used ("Swahili" and "Makhuwa") rather than linguistic spelling ("Kiswahili" and "Emakhuwa") for African languages.

Many readers might ask themselves what a Japanese academic could have to say about Mozambique, especially about such a big topic. Of course, the history of Mozambique belongs to the people of Mozambique. Yet, I believe that it is because I am not a Mozambican that it was possible to tackle the controversial history. I hope that this book will prompt other scholars to look at the history of Mozambique as part of a larger picture of world history and study it through the lens of the local communities and people living there.

The title of the Japanese edition was *History of Armed Liberation Struggle in Mozambique*, the same as that of my Ph.D. dissertation. For the English edition, I have changed the title to *The Origins of the War in Mozambique* in order to attract the attention of not only those involved in Mozambican issues but also those interested in conflict and peace.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAG	Associação das Artes Gráficas (Printers' Association – Mozambique)
AHM	Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique (Historical Archive of Mozambique)
AHMilitar	Arquivo Histórico Militar (Military Historical Archive – Portugal)
AHU	Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Overseas Historical Archive – Portugal)
AIM	Agência de Informação de Moçambique (Mozambique Information Agency)
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
BSAC	British South African Company
CEA	Centro de Estudos Africanos (Centre for African Studies)
CIO	Central Information Office (Southern Rhodesia)
CONCP	Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of Nationalist Organisations of Portuguese Colonies)
COREMO	Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Mozambique Revolutionary Committee)
DGS	Delegacia Geral de Segurança (General Security Directorate)
DOI	Departamento de Organização do Interior (Department of Interior Organisation)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front- Algeria)
FPLM	Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique/FRELIMO army)
FPLN	Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (National Liberation Patriotic Front/Patriotic National Liberation Front)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
GE	Grupo Especial (Special Group)
GEP	Grupo Especial Paraquedista (Special Group of Parachutists)
GUMO	Grupo Unido de Moçambique (Mozambique United Group/United Group of Mozambique)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ISANI	Inspecção Superior Administrativa sobre Negócios Indígenas
JDDA	Junta de Defesa dos Direitos d' Africa (Council for Defence of the African Rights)
JEAC	Junta de Exportação de Algodão Colonial (Colonial Cotton Export Board)
KANU	Kenya African National Union
MANC	Mozambique African National Congress
MANU	Makonde African National Union
MANU	Mozambique African National Union
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MFA	Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement – Portugal)
MNC	Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement)

MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MUD	Movimento União Democrático (United Democratic Movement)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party (Southern Rhodesia)
NESAM	Núcleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundários de Moçambique (Nucleus of African Secondary Students of Mozambique)
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OMM	Organização das Mulheres Moçambicana (Mozambique Women's Organisation/Organisation of Mozambican Women)
ONUMOZ	Operação das Nações Unidas em Moçambique (United Nations Operations in Mozambique)
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PIDE	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police)
RAU	Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina (Overseas Administration Reform)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambique National Resistance: MNR)
RF	Rhodesian Front
SAAVM	Sociedade Algodoeira Africana Voluntária de Moçambique (Voluntary African Cotton Society of Mozambique)
SADF	South African Defence Force
SAN	Sociedade Algodoeira do Niassa (Niassa Cotton Society)
SCCI	Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações (Information Centralisation and Coordination Service)
SCCIM	Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações de Moçambique (Information Centralisation and Coordination Service of Mozambique)
SRANC	Southern Rhodesia African National Congress
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TT	Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais: Torre do Tombo (Portugal)
UDENAMO	União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic Union of Mozambique)
UEM	Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane (Eduardo Mondlane University)
UNAMI	União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente (African National Union for Mozambican Independence/National African Union of Independent Mozambique)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UPA	União das Populações de Angola (Union of the Peoples of Angola)
WNLA	Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
ZANLA	Zimbabwean National Liberation Army

Figure 1 Southern Africa




Ciment, 1997:vii.

(Some names corrected by the author)

Figure 2 Mozambique (by Regions and Provinces)



Figure 3 Northern Mozambique and the locations of Maúia and Erati



(Drawn by the author)

*To the people of Maúia,
Hans-Juergen and Kai*

INTRODUCTION

Seeking the Origins of Unity and Division

On the Western shore of the Indian Ocean
A revolutionary ship slips in and we bid farewell to dear brothers
Dear brothers, farewell
Until the day we meet again
Don't despair of your rescue but be brave
Dear brothers, until the time we meet again
Don't be frightened by the orders you receive but face them cheerfully
For so small am I but fought bravely and got my life back.
(“The Last Good-bye”, a poem by a FRELIMO soldier, 1966)¹

We have gone through three wars. We know war is still on ... Conflicts haven't disappeared yet. We women are not allowed to get a word in ... Before we go to sleep at night, we decide on which direction our feet should face, so that we can escape at any time ... Peace and prosperity in the name of independence hasn't arrived yet.

(From an interview with a woman in Maúa, 1999)²

Mozambique in contemporary world history

Mozambique from the 1960s to the mid-1970s

Globally, the concept of colonial rule became increasingly questioned and was losing its hold on the world. Sometimes this was as a result of protest from the colonised, and in other cases, due to a change in stance, and subsequent withdrawal, by the coloniser. As was the world norm, many countries in Africa gained independence in the early 1960s. However, the situation was much harder in southern Africa. Added to the “normal” complexities of power change and independence, countries in this part of Africa were faced with the reality

that South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where white settlers held political power, had close economic ties with the Western nations and were considered to be the citadels of the worldwide anti-communist strategies pursued by the West.

In Mozambique and Angola, for example, political demands by people under colonial rule were severely suppressed by Portugal, whose dictator António Salazar insisted on the country's colonies being considered as "overseas provinces", and who was determined to defend and hold onto them to the last. Despite his anachronistic colonial policies and fascist character attracting international criticism, Salazar succeeded in forming a military alliance with the Western nations as early as 1949. This was thanks to his neutrality in the Second World War, his anti-communist stance and the geopolitical importance of the country's colonies. In other words, despite having confirmed the principle of self-determination during the Second World War, Western nations such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom prioritised anti-communism over the liberation and democratisation of colonies. This not only made it possible for white governments in southern Africa to continue to exist, but also made it doubly difficult for Africans³ in the region to gain liberation.

Mozambicans faced yet another problem. They had to contend with the historically and culturally meaningless borders that were artificially created during the "scramble for Africa" at the end of the nineteenth century. They, therefore, had to fight for liberation simultaneously with endeavouring to form and unify a nation. Due to the vastness of the territory, diverse ethnic and religious groups and oppression by the colonial authority, this was no mean feat.

Yet, inspired by the independence of other African nations, people in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique organised themselves and began armed struggle against Portugal's colonial rule. It was the first large-scale armed liberation movement in Africa since the Algerian War of Independence in the late 1950s to early 1960s.⁴ It was also the first serious armed defiance of colonial authority in southern Africa. Resistance by Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), in particular, attracted public attention not only in Africa but also in the world. This was because: (1) it confronted Portuguese colonial rule, the "weakest link" among white powers in southern Africa; (2) it received full support from Tanganyika (later Tanzania),⁵ where the headquarters of the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was situated and (3) the liberation of Mozambique made the armed struggle against white rule in neighbouring Southern Rhodesia and South Africa geopolitically easier.

Hence, the liberation struggle in Mozambique interested not only Africans who longed for total liberation from colonial rule. It also interested white rulers in southern Africa, who were afraid that their power might be taken away; the Soviet Union and China, which hoped to gain more allies; Western nations, who were afraid of communist expansion in the world; people in the Third World, who had experienced liberation struggles in Asia, the Middle East and Latin America and some citizens in Western societies, especially socialists. As a result, numerous bodies representing various stances intervened in or assisted the liberation struggle in Mozambique in a multitude of ways. Certainly, there were definitely

times when what took place in Mozambique was watched with keen interest internationally, and played a role in contemporary world history. Mozambique's independence in 1975 was a direct consequence of a bloodless coup in its metropole, Portugal. It was also indirectly achieved through the "solidarity"⁶ instilled by various movements that aimed at liberation from Portuguese colonial rule.⁷ The terms that represent the main thesis of this book – "solidarity", "unity" and "division" – do not fully reflect the reality although they have played an important role both domestically and externally. They are written in inverted commas to indicate the author's intention to disclose what actually happened on the ground beyond the world of words or images. "Unity" and "division" are translations of the Portuguese words "*unidade/união*" and "*divisão*", both of which are often used in politics in and studies on Mozambique. This book uses "unity" and, in some cases, "solidarity" for the translation of "*unidade/união*". Certainly, the liberation and independence of Mozambique was given a place in "the third wave of revolutions" and formed part of a new trend in world history which emerged in the late 1970s.

Mozambique from the end of the 1970s to the early 1990s

As Mozambique gained its independence after an armed struggle through mass mobilisation, many intellectuals saw this achievement as a successful example of "national unity". In their interpretation, it was the power of "solidarity" and "unity" – the advancement of nationalism – that defeated colonialism, whose governing principle was "divide and rule". Initially, even the more cautious observers thought highly of FRELIMO's ability to lead the "national front" and its efforts to establish "national unity" over an 18-month period.⁸

High expectations were set when the Mozambican liberation movement evolved into a "revolutionary war",⁹ eventually establishing a socialist nation after independence – similar to China, Vietnam and Cuba.¹⁰ FRELIMO manifested its intention to pursue socialism by adopting the People's Republic of Mozambique as the name of the country on its independence on 25 June 1975.¹¹ On 24 July, the first president of the country, Samora Machel, declared the nationalisation of land, asserting: "We fought to free Mozambicans through liberation struggle. It is meaningless that land remains in the hands of specific groups of people. People cultivate land. Land belongs to people."¹²

The experiment of first colonialism, next nationalism and then socialism in a small African country called Mozambique captured people's imagination around the world, and they demonstrated their solidarity in various ways. Many "*cooperantes*" (co-operators) rushed to the country, not only from the socialist camp but also from the West. At the time of independence, Mozambique's sole university had produced only one African graduate – the rest being whites and *mestiços* (people of mixed parentage). The *cooperantes* compensated for this shortage of human resources and played a major role in promoting public health and school education. FRELIMO had emphasised the importance of this since the days of the liberation struggle and continued to put a great deal of effort into education as part of its national strategy. As a result, the number of primary school students, which was a mere 70,000 in 1974, increased nearly twenty-fold by 1981 to 1,376,000 (half of which

were girls¹³).¹⁴ The budget for public health in 1979 was three times as much as that at independence and comprised 11 per cent of the national budget.¹⁵ The new Mozambique seemed to be full of energy and the climate of the day suggested that anything was possible – nothing was insurmountable.¹⁶

Sadly, only a few years later it was a very different Mozambique that again took centre stage in international news. Instead of celebratory and optimistic Mozambicans, during 1983 and 1984 the world repeatedly saw images of Mozambican women and children as skeletons and refugees. Those who had celebrated the country's independence in 1975 were shocked at these sad figures, and the plight of many nameless Mozambicans who had stood up against such an enormous colonial power, and who had, as a people, appeared to be so full of hope. How could the situation turn into such misery and so quickly?

The people who had been the leaders of transformation just a decade or so before were now victims or mere aid recipients. During the liberation struggle, there was “solidarity” and “unity” between guerrillas and elders. Within a few years after independence, however, this was replaced by “division” or “confrontation”, and ruthless “civil war” in which many people were slaughtered by their fellow countrymen.

The objective of this book

Armed conflict between the FRELIMO government and the anti-government guerrilla movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR),¹⁷ began in 1977, two years after independence, and lasted for 16 years.¹⁸ The conflict resulted in one million deaths, 1.5 million cross-border refugees and 4.5 million domestic refugees.¹⁹ Even now, it is remembered as one of the most tragic conflicts of the 1980s.

How should we make sense of these developments in contemporary Mozambican politics, of the shift from “solidarity” and “unity” to “division”? Was the “unity”, supposedly fostered through many years of liberation struggle, destroyed due to external intervention? Or, did “unity” never really take root among Mozambicans, who could not overcome “tribalism”? In other words, should we interpret it as the result of the failure of nation building? Or, should we put all the blame on the socialist policies adopted by the FRELIMO government? Or, alternatively, should the cause of conflict be sought in the “radicalism” of the FRELIMO government, as is widely presumed?

The objective of this book is to investigate and demonstrate the realities and origins of “unity” and “division”, the two contradictory characteristics of contemporary Mozambican politics. This book offers the view that “unity” during the liberation struggle and “division” during the post-independence armed conflict represent not a contradiction but rather a continuity. However, this then begs a number of critical questions. What, for instance, happened at national and regional levels, and how did people react during the liberation struggle period? How did international relations influence the situation? How was this related to the post-independence armed conflict? In order to address these questions there needs to be a particular focus on local communities, where the liberation war²⁰ and post-independence armed conflict took place. Rural communities in northern

Mozambique are used as a case study in this book and are examined in relation to various actors.

It is an indisputable fact that Mozambique has become a unified country despite its history of prolonged armed conflict and its vast territory, which extends 2,515 kilometres from north to south, and it is clearly the fruit of the liberation struggle. Moreover, to discuss “division” alone risks falling into a common argument used since the scramble for Africa on the “division” in African politics, which is to underestimate the efforts that African people have made since then in order to overcome this “division”. It is noteworthy that FRELIMO’s first congress, held on 23 September 1962, was based on the following realisation:

The first Congress defined solidarity as the fundamental weapon of struggle against colonialism and proved that division among Mozambicans was the biggest cause of failure of the historical resistance of our ancestors against colonialism.²¹

This book comprehensively examines not only the origins of “division”, but also the efforts of Mozambicans to achieve “unity” and “solidarity”. Despite its conjoint interest in “unity” and “solidarity”, it is clear that “division” has posed one of the major challenges at any level, at any time, in contemporary Mozambican politics. Importantly, however, this should not be attributed only to the failure of organised liberation movements or their leadership, or to the diversity of ethnic groups or the so-called “backwardness” of African societies. This book examines the issue in the context of a larger historic process of change from the late nineteenth century to the late twentieth century. It deals with various levels of actors, such as individuals, local communities, national politics, the southern African region and international politics. In particular, it hypothesises, and then demonstrates, that the liberation struggle from 1962 to 1975 was an important period that fostered “unity” and “division” concurrently and fomented post-independence armed conflict.

It is hoped that this book will provide a fresh perspective on understanding the origins of the armed conflict in post-independence Mozambique and the challenge and potential of contemporary Mozambican politics.

Discussions on post-independence armed conflict

This section will draw on previous academic literature and proffered theories in order to provide a context for the hypothesis that: (1) post-independence armed conflict, the symbol of Mozambique’s division, has its roots in the liberation struggle and (2) to investigate why the liberation struggle, which aimed to unify the country, divided it instead.

Theories focusing on external factors – the onset of the armed conflict in the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s

From the beginning of the armed conflict in 1977 to the end of the 1980s, most scholars sought the cause of post-independence armed conflict in Mozambique in external factors.

Works by Isaacman and Isaacman (1983), Hanlon (1984), Fauvet (1984) and Saul (1987) seem to demonstrate the following: (1) Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were deeply involved in the creation and operation of MNR; (2) the main actors of MNR were ex-Portuguese secret police and the army in Southern Rhodesia as well as white settlers and (3) the objective of the actors and supporters was to overthrow the FRELIMO government. Ken Flower, head of the Central Information Office (CIO) in Southern Rhodesia, who played an important role in the formation of MNR, openly admitted the involvement of his government in MNR in his autobiography and during an interview.²²

However, MNR's actual soldiers on the ground were Africans from Mozambique. Why did Africans willingly fight for a cause that was not altogether their own or, as it turned out, not necessarily in their best interests? Paul Fauvet, a British news editor at *Agência de Informação de Moçambique* (AIM: Mozambique Information Agency), suggests that explanations lie in: (1) the "collaboration with the Portuguese", that is, covert manoeuvres by the Portuguese who created the anti-FRELIMO "elite units" of Africans during the liberation war and (2) "neo-colonial manipulation at independence", that is, intervention by some Portuguese citizens in the political leadership struggle among Mozambican elites. In other words, he points out that the Portuguese took advantage of a rift among Mozambicans brought about by the liberation war at the end of colonial rule.²³

According to Margaret Hall, a researcher on African affairs at the British Foreign Office, and Tom Young, a political scientist at the School of Oriental and African Studies, MNR guerrillas co-opted by the founders of MNR were former members of the special forces and commandos who were originally from central Mozambique, close to the Rhodesian border, and fled the country just before independence.²⁴ The guerrillas were first led by a Portuguese settler, Orlando Cristina, a former agent of the Portuguese secret political police (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado [PIDE: International and State Defence Police]/Delegacia Geral de Segurança [DGS: General Security Directorate]), who played a major role in fighting against FRELIMO during the liberation war. However, due to his origin and background, Cristina was clearly not suited for the job.²⁵ Subsequently, André Matsagaissa, a former commander of the Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (FPLM) or FRELIMO army and an African from central Mozambique, was appointed as leader.

Fauvet describes the nature of the MNR:

[MNR] was founded by the secret services of Ian Smith's Rhodesia and, after the independence of Zimbabwe, it was revived by the South Africans who have been running it ever since. But neither the Rhodesians nor South African Military Intelligence worked in a vacuum. They availed themselves of Mozambican material that was already there, ready to be moulded into an anti-Frelimo force.²⁶

Matsangaissa, a former FPLM commander, had escaped to Southern Rhodesia from a "*campo de re-educação*" (re-education camp), where he had been placed on a charge of

corruption and theft. In order to increase the number of MNR guerrillas, Matsangaissa attacked re-education camps and took anti-FRELIMO inmates, with the same origin and background as his, to Southern Rhodesia.²⁷ Among them was Afonso Dhlakama, who later led RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) following Matsangaissa's death.²⁸ The Southern Rhodesian army provided these anti-FRELIMO Africans with a base and military training. They started operating in mid-1977.²⁹

Initially, MNR was mainly engaged in “*desestabilização*” (destabilisation) such as attacks on infrastructure and local residents.³⁰ This was intended to threaten the Mozambican (FRELIMO) government, which exercised economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and openly supported the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA). As the armed liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia became active in 1978, however, the Southern Rhodesian army had MNR attack ZANLA bases and the villages that supported it.³¹ MNR, with its headquarters in Southern Rhodesia, freely crossed borders and intensified attacks in the south-eastern part of Southern Rhodesia and in the central part of Mozambique.³² Journalists and researchers in Mozambique, as well as the FRELIMO government, publicised cruel acts committed by MNR, calling them “*bandidos armados*” (armed bandits)³³ and “puppets”.³⁴

As the white minority rule of Southern Rhodesia made way for the black majority rule of Zimbabwe in 1980, MNR, supposedly a “puppet” of the Southern Rhodesian army and intelligence, was expected to disappear. On the contrary, it increased its number of soldiers from about 1,000 to nearly 7,000 and expanded its operational area.³⁵ This is because Southern Rhodesia, realising the dawning of an independent Zimbabwe, negotiated with South Africa to take over its support of MNR. A result of this was that by the time of Zimbabwe's independence, South Africa's support for MNR by far exceeded that of its predecessor.³⁶ In order to help MNR become a more independent armed force, the South African army: (1) provided more training; (2) helped to increase the number of soldiers and (3) assisted MNR to relocate its base to the Mozambican territory.

With South African backing, MNR moved its military base from Southern Rhodesia to the Gorongosa National Park in central Mozambique. The targets of its attacks shifted from various facilities to villages. By burning the *aldeia comunal* (communal villages) and killing FRELIMO supporters, MNR attempted to sabotage the rural development policy that FRELIMO was promoting, and to secure food and recruits. William Minter, a leading US specialist on the southern African region who interviewed villagers, pointed out that most of the guerrillas who joined MNR after the independence of Zimbabwe were forcefully recruited through intimidation and kidnapping, just like the guerrillas before them.³⁷ The much greater support provided by the South African army than that of the Southern Rhodesian army enabled MNR to realise large-scale forceful recruitment and to increase its number of fighters.

Active military intervention by the South African government was not limited to Mozambique. Around this time, the South African army intensified military intervention in Namibia and Angola. Minter referred to South Africa's intervention as “apartheid's *contras*” and a “hidden war” and lamented that it attracted much less attention in the West

than conflicts in Nicaragua and Afghanistan.³⁸ South Africa's active military intervention in neighbouring countries from 1980 is generally interpreted as a reaction to the weakening of white rule in southern Africa. As Minter points out, these armed conflicts in southern Africa could be understood as "the legacy of the 1980s".³⁹ Joseph Hanlon, a British social scientist, journalist and activist, calls armed conflict in Mozambique "Apartheid's Second Front",⁴⁰ which was heightened by the birth of the Reagan Administration with its anti-communist and pro-South African stance.⁴¹ President Ronald Reagan pursued direct and indirect military intervention all over the world in order to obstruct the 14 revolutions that took place in the 1970s.⁴² With US backing, South Africa exercised direct and indirect military intervention in neighbouring countries including Mozambique.⁴³

By the start of the 1980s, the *détente* between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc which had prevailed from 1969 to 1979 was ending. The world was about to enter the second Cold War.⁴⁴ In this change of international political climate, Afonso Dhlakama, leader of MNR/RENAMO, deepened relationships with Western governments by, for example, visiting Portugal, France and West Germany and securing assistance.⁴⁵

As a result, by the end of 1981 MNR/RENAMO was conducting larger scale military activity than ever before. Between 1981 and 1983 MNR/RENAMO caused several million US dollar's worth of economic damage and several thousand deaths, destroying 140 villages, 840 schools, 200 primary healthcare centres and 900 shops.⁴⁶ Initially it launched attacks from its base in central Mozambique, hitting the surrounding areas. It established a secret base in Malawi by mid-1982 and intensified activity in northern Mozambique from 1983 onward. This shift is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the majority of schools in the areas near the Malawian borders were destroyed or forced to close down: 88 per cent in Zambézia Province, 98 per cent in Tete Province and 69 per cent in Niassa Province in 1983.⁴⁷

By 1984, extensive war damage, food shortages caused by drought, economic and political chaos, as well as a worldwide recession had brought the FRELIMO government to its knees. It asked Western countries for food assistance. In January 1984 it became one of the first African or socialist countries to start negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank. In March 1984 it concluded the Nkomati Treaty with South Africa. These "concessions" in many ways debased the FRELIMO government both domestically and internationally. The assistance it obtained was not only ineffective but increased the country's dependence on external sources and weakened the functionality of the government.⁴⁸ International food assistance was intentionally delayed, purportedly resulting in about 10,000 deaths.⁴⁹

Thanks largely to the increasing assistance of the South African army just before the conclusion of the Nkomati Treaty, MNR/RENAMO became even more active after the signing of the non-aggression treaty. In August 1985, the Zimbabwean-Mozambican army attacked and occupied MNR/RENAMO headquarters in Mozambique. There, they found documents that disclosed: (1) not only that SADF (South African Defence Force) officials, but also Louis Nel, South Africa's deputy foreign minister under the administration of Roelof Frederik "Pik" Botha, had secretly visited there and (2) the

South African army had not stopped assisting MNR/RENAMO despite the treaty.⁵⁰ The assistance consisted of sufficient armaments and food to last for six months. After this discovery, the international community became sceptical about the effectiveness of the non-aggression treaty.

The external supporters of MNR/RENAMO, such as the governments of South Africa and Malawi, put more pressure on the organisation to transform itself into a “Mozambican” one. According to Alex Vines, then an expert from Human Rights Watch in Africa, MNR/RENAMO had to rely increasingly on captured armaments and its own food production, which led to an increased level of violence against the population in the areas that it controlled. The violence intensified in 1986 when Malawi yielded to the international pressure and expelled the organisation from the country.⁵¹

By the end of 1987, MNR/RENAMO attacks had caused damage to 2,600 schools (36 per cent of the total), disrupting schooling of 500,000 pupils (47 per cent of the total), 800 clinics (31 per cent of the total), 900 shops and transportation systems, including 1,300 buses. Two to three million civilians were said to be affected.⁵² This resulted in even harsher international criticism of MNR/RENAMO and the South African government.

However, commentators at the time, who emphasised external factors, seem to not always have paid attention to the situation in the rural areas where the actual conflicts took place, nor had they sufficiently analysed the relationships between MNR/RENAMO guerrillas and the local population. This was probably due to the difficulty (especially for outsiders) of conducting field surveys in the midst of the conflict. More importantly, since external forces – such as some whites in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa – were heavily involved at the early stages of the violence, journalists and researchers from Western countries may have felt their mission was to expose assistance for MNR/RENAMO by their own countries and their allies and therefore stressed “external factors”.⁵³

MNR/RENAMO rapidly expanded its territory from 1983 onward and brought rural areas in the north under its control by 1984. Hence, it became difficult to explain the nature of the conflict by looking only at external factors, as less than 10,000 guerrillas could not have placed such a vast area under its control by intimidation and force alone. Local communities must have cooperated in some way.

Mozambique was divided into three: (1) areas controlled by MNR/RENAMO; (2) areas controlled by the government (mainly cities and towns); and (3) areas controlled by neither. According to Figure 4 compiled by Vines, 18.8 per cent of the land was under RENAMO control when the conflict ended in 1992.⁵⁴

MNR/RENAMO could no longer be dismissed as “armed bandits”, “terrorists” or a “puppet”. There had been external forces involved, but conflict in Mozambique had become involved in all-out civil war.

Theories focusing on internal factors – the late 1980s to the early 1990s

The result of the survey by French anthropologist Christian Geffray and Mogens Pederson, a Danish researcher, published in the mid-1980s attracted wide attention both inside

Figure 4 RENAMO-controlled areas (as of 1992)




Vines, 1996:2.

(Ethnic composition taken out by the author)

and outside of Mozambique.⁵⁵ The pair conducted field research in Erati, a Makhuwa⁵⁶ habitation, in the north-east of Nampula Province, where RENAMO had expanded its military occupation (Figure 3).⁵⁷ They concluded: “Those whose misery, unreasoning hatred and outrage are exploited by RENAMO and who sometimes take up arms with the movement are not, by their social position, ‘enemies of the people.’”⁵⁸ Until then the cruelty of RENAMO, which had been seen as “enemies of the people”, and the forced co-operation of villagers had been reported on without proper investigation into the

Figure 4 continued

Province	Province Area	RENAMO Area	Percent(%)
Cabo Delgado	80,555	4,170	5.2
Nampula	79,795	23,735	29.7
Zambézia	103,935	41,152	39.6
Tete	102,412	6,176	6.0
Manica	62,210	8,463	13.6
Sofala	67,175	33,464	49.8
Inhambane	67,363	3,614	5.4
Gaza	73,666	11,154	15.1
Maputo	21,856	3,395	15.5
Niassa	126,691	12,118	9.6
Totals in sq. km.	785,758	1,474,411	18.8



Author's note:

- (1) The data originally based on internal UN map (July 1993) and Hall (1990);
- (2) The data, especially on Niassa Province, is not accurate.

circumstances of the actual conflict in the areas. The findings fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of the FRELIMO government and its image as a victim.

Even though the authors stated that the study was limited to the Erati area and was a mere hypothesis, the West, which had been backing RENAMO from behind the scenes, welcomed the findings.⁵⁹ The scholars, who were in effect challenging the prevailing “external factors” theories, concluded that the field survey had proved that Mozambicans were in fact opposed to FRELIMO’s socialist policies and supported RENAMO. Some even interpreted the study as indicating that RENAMO was not “a puppet of external forces” but “a movement”, and was instead certified by experts as a “political force rooted in the Mozambican society”.⁶⁰

The study was published in Portuguese in 1986 and in French in 1988. However, it was only after William Gervase Clarence-Smith of the SOAS, London University, published

a review of it in 1989 that it made a profound impact on the English-speaking academic world and international community.⁶¹

A report by Robert Gersony, published in April 1988, had an even larger impact in the English-speaking countries. Gersony, a consultant at the Bureau of Refugee Programs in the US state department, submitted a report on RENAMO to the US ambassador in Mozambique and the offices that handled African affairs. He had visited 25 internal refugee camps in 48 districts and interviewed as many as 200 refugees. His report includes details of the systematic violation of human rights and cruel actions by RENAMO.⁶²

The report had a profound impact, popularising once again the view that the population under RENAMO control cooperated from fear and by force, thereby influencing the US perception of the Mozambican conflict.⁶³ Together with the autobiography of Ken Flower, a former CIO chief which was published around the same time, the report reinforced the external factor theories and the cruelty of RENAMO among the US high officials.⁶⁴

The above-mentioned seemingly contradictory findings regarding armed conflict in Mozambique naturally produced two completely different perceptions of MNR/RENAMO: the external factor theorists presented them in negative terms, such as “armed bandits”, “bandits”, “pseudo-terrorists”, “pseudo-guerrillas”, “puppets” and “warlords” on one hand; and the positive images, such as “freedom fighters from communism and authoritarianism”, “representatives of the West that promoted liberalism, a multi-party system, and a market economy” and “a popular movement”, on the other.

The emergence of these differing perceptions and the deteriorating state of affairs in Mozambique prompted heated debate as to whether “co-operation” of local people with MNR/RENAMO was driven by fear, or because the people in fact supported it. If the latter was true, the question was whether the people’s support was driven by their opposition to the rural policies of the FRELIMO government or not. The advocates of external factors theories asserted that the local population cooperated with MNR/RENAMO out of fear and by force, while those behind internal factors believed that the main reason for the deteriorating situation was Mozambican people’s opposition to the FRELIMO government.

The paradigm shift – the early 1990s

It was Clarence-Smith who widely introduced the arguments between proponents of external factors and those of internal factors in a comprehensive way to the English-speaking world. In his article in the *Southern African Review of Books* in 1989 he argues that “the emphasis used to be placed on Pretoria’s policies and actions, whereas the main focus is now on why did Frelimo’s agrarian policies go so disastrously wrong”. He concludes that Geffray and Pederson’s paper prompted the “paradigm shift” of external factor theories and introduced the internal factor theories as a new paradigm.⁶⁵ This conclusion did not settle the dispute between external factor advocates and internal factor advocates but instead fuelled even greater debate.⁶⁶

In the late 1980s, communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed one after the

other, leaving communism to be regarded as a failure in the international community. In Mozambique too, many policies that had been adopted appeared doomed. Criticism of the FRELIMO government was never harsher, and its credibility was damaged both domestically and internationally. The FRELIMO government had weakened due to its loss of credibility, the protracted and violent conflict, domestic chaos, the introduction of structural adjustment, intervention through aid and the loss of assistance from the Eastern bloc. In the meantime, RENAMO continued to expand its areas of control.⁶⁷

Despite this, RENAMO was also impacted by the international climate and experienced a loss of external support due to the resolution of the East-West conflict and the collapse of the apartheid government. In other words, it had to transform itself from an organisation built for combat that relied completely on external assistance, to a domestically-rooted political entity that rivalled FRELIMO. In June 1989 RENAMO held its first national congress and tried to impress its transformation domestically and internationally.⁶⁸ FRELIMO, on the other hand, officially abandoned Marx-Leninism and announced its transition to a multi-party system at its fifth party congress in July 1989. As a result, RENAMO lost a significant point of contention to justify its armed opposition.⁶⁹


At the same time, the external factors (the neighbouring white governments and the Cold War)⁷⁰ of the violent conflict disappeared, and the cause of the armed conflict out of necessity became increasingly rooted in internal factors. Also, around this time, some detailed papers were published on RENAMO.⁷¹ Geffray, the pioneer of internal factor theories, announced, based on the research he conducted alone in 1987, that his original hypothesis had been proved.⁷² He concludes in his book: “public support for Renamo was much more fierce and spectacular and constituted a serious and profound phenomenon.”⁷³

The dismantling of the Cold War and apartheid from 1989 to 1990 gave rise to hope for the end of the conflict in Mozambique. Without external support, neither side could continue to feed its soldiers. This, and a severe drought in southern Africa in 1991 and 1992, prompted peace negotiations.⁷⁴ Western countries were supportive of the peace negotiation process due to the disappearance or the loss of credibility of the communist states, which had previously been such strong backers of the FRELIMO government. As a result of these new international and domestic political climates, researchers were prompted to re-evaluate RENAMO.

Largely as a result of the efforts of Western countries, RENAMO was officially elevated to a substantial political force, equal to FRELIMO, in the peace agreement in October 1992.⁷⁵ A massive trust fund was set up to transform RENAMO from a combative group to a political party and to enable RENAMO leaders to step out of their boots and adjust to city life.⁷⁶

As part of the UN peace-keeping operations, the Operação das Nações Unidas em Moçambique (ONUMOZ: United Nations Operations in Mozambique) was deployed at the end of 1993. In October 1994 the first multi-party election was held. RENAMO had organised itself as a political party better than many had anticipated and it gained a significant amount of votes – not, in fact, far behind FRELIMO.⁷⁷ RENAMO’s success in

Figure 5 Districts where FRELIMO and RENAMO obtained more than twice as many as the opponent's votes (1994)




Brito, 1995:493.

Table 1-1 Mozambique national elections result “Assembly of the Republic”

	1994	1999	2004	2009
Registered Voters	6,148,842	7,099,105	9,142,151	9,871,949
Total Votes	5,404,199	4,833,761	3,321,926	4,387,250
Voter Turnout	87.90%	68.10%	36.30%	44.40%
Invalid/ Blank Votes	630,974	701,438	276,497	493,392
Total Valid Votes	4,773,225	4,132,323	3,045,429	3,893,858

Figure 6 Simplified ethnographic map of Mozambique (20th century)



Pelissier, 1994:33.

gaining so many votes in the 1994 election overturned the previous negative perception of it as a “puppet of external forces” that did not have popular support, and promoted it instead as a legitimate opposition party.

Currently, it is widely accepted that the rapid introduction of Marxist-Leninist policies, especially rural policies, by the FRELIMO government was as problematic as external factors.⁷⁸ Nowadays, nobody refers to RENAMO as “armed bandits” or “terrorists”.

Theories focusing on ethno-regionalism – mid-1990s

In the late 1990s research on Mozambique focused more or less exclusively on domestic politics, especially the two elections that showed an ethno-regional⁷⁹ tendency.⁸⁰ Based on FRELIMO's victory in the south and the northern end, and on RENAMO's victory in the habitations of Makhwua-Lomwe⁸¹ in the central and northern parts, ethnic or regional factors attracted attention as the cause of the conflict.⁸² Indeed, it is possible to trace regional deviation in voting patterns, as seen in the results of the 1999 and 2004 elections (Tables 1-1 and 1-2, and Figure 5).⁸³

The central region had long been considered the RENAMO support base as the MNR was established by people from the region sharing a border with Southern Rhodesia.⁸⁴ Some saw RENAMO as an ethnic movement of the Ndaus because all of its leaders were Ndaus from the central region. However, this view is not necessarily accurate, considering that many senior members were not Ndaus although they spoke the language and furthermore, the majority of the RENAMO soldiers, including children, were not Ndaus but were forcefully drafted from other ethnic groups.⁸⁵ Still, the eligible voters in the central region tended to vote for RENAMO and it won a landslide victory there in the first three general elections.⁸⁶

In 1994 FRELIMO was expected to win by a large margin in the southern region because most FRELIMO leaders were from this region and because RENAMO's cruellest attacks took place there.⁸⁷ The result was as expected.

The result in the northern region was hardest to predict since, unlike the mostly homogenous southern and central regions, various ethnic groups lived there and the historical experience of each group (such as the process of relation-building with FRELIMO or RENAMO) was diverse.⁸⁸

In the end, RENAMO won in the southern half of the two northern provinces, Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and Nampula Province. Many interpreted the result as due to the ethnic votes of the Makhwua-Lomwe, which is the largest ethnic group in Mozambique and constitutes 40 per cent of voters.

However, it is possibly problematic to conclude from the election result that the conflict had a significant ethno-regional tendency because there was undoubtedly large-scale manipulation during the armed conflict and in the process of introducing a multi-party election system. In fact, in the 1994 election, Dhlakama repeatedly gave addresses to mobilise ethno-regional supporters. He called the eligible voters in the Makhwua habitations "Makhuwas" and claimed that they had been discriminated against by FRELIMO although they were the largest ethnic group in Mozambique. He asserted: "Only with Dhlakama in power will this country advance, and will the Makhwua population of Nampula see their rights protected."⁸⁹ Yet, ethno-regional manipulation in elections became more conspicuous after 1994.⁹⁰

Keeping this discussion in mind, evidently one cannot say, as the FRELIMO government claims, that the armed struggle was caused by "criminals" or "internal enemies" conspiring with the external enemy⁹¹ and that this alone obstructed "national unity". Mozambique's

first president, Samora Machel, made a speech in 1980 on this issue in Beira, the second largest city in Mozambique, which is located in the central region:⁹²

Who are the perpetrators of these crimes? They live and talk within the population. They use tribalism as their social base ... We are infiltrated. And there are many who are aware of this and do nothing because bandits call on tribal backing. But our struggle killed the tribe. It was the first thing we killed because the enemy's strength is tribalism ... We killed the tribe to give birth to the nation.

It seems important to investigate: (1) what the reality of so-called “national unity” was; (2) to what extent ethno-regional factors were involved in the reality of “national unity”; (3) how the post-independence policy influenced unity and ethno-regional reality; (4) what sort of inter-relationship it had with the expansion of RENAMO; and (5) how much the above-mentioned background affected the election results. To date, discussion on the ethno-regional tendency and national unity in Mozambican politics has focused either on unity or on ethno-regional division, without a phase-by-phase examination. Michel Cahen, a French historian and leading advocate of internal factor theories, presented a report entitled “*Estado sem Nação: Unicidade, Unidade ou Pluralismo do Estado em Moçambique e Algures*” (State without Nation: Unicity, Unity or Plurality of the State in Mozambique and Elsewhere) at an academic conference in Maputo at the end of 1992. He asserted that what the FRELIMO leadership called “*unidade nacional*” (national unity) was actually “*unicidade*” (unicity) and that its denial of ethnicity led to the “civil war”. An extract follows:

It is very often argued that colonialism has worsened the tribalism in order to divide and rule and that, on the contrary, the liberation struggle against colonialism created the foundations of the unity. I think these two tendencies existed always, but it is wrong to say that they were the only ones. The struggle of liberation also created divisions and colonialism did not always divide ... Here I will only say the following: denying ethnicity and imposing nationalism and its technocratic induced development model was in my view an important cause of the Mozambican civil war.⁹³ (*Underlined by the author*)

A collection of reports, including Cahen's, was published as *Moçambique: Etnicidade, Nacionalismo e o Estado Transição Inacabada* (Mozambique: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Unfinished Transition State) in Maputo in 1996.⁹⁴ Carlos Serra and his colleagues at the Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA: Centre for African Studies) and the Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane (UEM: University of Eduardo Mondlane), take a different position as indicated in their publications *Identidade, Moçambicanidade, Moçambicanização* (Identity, Mozambicanity, Mozambicanisation) and *Racismo, Etnicidades, Poder* (Racism, Ethnicities, Power).⁹⁵ Serra criticises Cahen and others, saying:

The naturalisation of the ethnic phenomenon is currently done without pain and is somehow reviving the old colonial spaces of social representation that the FRELIMO revolution attempted to extinguish.⁹⁶

In the same book, Severino Elias Ngoenha, a Mozambican philosopher, asserts: “Never since the proclamation of independence, has identity [*Moçambicanidade*] been so threatened as today.” He further states that nothing can replace the *Moçambicanidade*, that is, the *Identidade Moçambicana* (Mozambican identity) that ensures the social relations among Mozambicans.⁹⁷ He explains the notion of “*Moçambicanidade*” as follows:

The Mozambican identity is somewhat of an inheritance from the courage and bravery of many men and women who fought, sacrificed themselves and the many who died for our independence, our sovereignty, our freedom ... The identity of a Mozambican results from the creation of a nation ... Historically, the *Moçambicanidade* is a natural political project ... In the heart of the Mozambican political project is the aspiration to independence ... This project proposed to unite all micro-community politics and integrate them into a single political dynamic. The *Moçambicanidade* wanted to be an ideal community of citizens. It simply acknowledged individuals as equal and ignored ethnic, regional, cultural, linguistic and religious particularities. The *Moçambicanidade* was essentially opposed to micro-nationalism, tribalism, regionalism, which can only live in isolation, each with its peculiarity ... If the various players agree to integrate into a single political project despite obvious (micro)-national and (micro)-cultural differences, it is because the unit, despite differences, is the necessary condition for the independence (sovereignty) of all and, supposedly, of each ... A spirit of national solidarity is more serious. If the Mozambican society as a whole is not capable of solidarity, we risk serious and even indelible social disruption. The *Moçambicanidade* exists. It is a gift that we inherited, but it is mainly a task, duty, a responsibility which can only be performed by Mozambicans.⁹⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

One could criticise the book, *Identidade, Moçambicanidade, Moçambicanização*, both academically and/or politically as it seems to make assertions rather than provide comprehensive analysis. However, considering that the efforts of national formation in newly independent African countries has tended to result in armed conflict and division, we should not brush these offerings off as anachronistic assertions but rather see them as good material for deliberation.

Moreover, it could be considered that the “Cahen side” and the “Serra side” were talking at cross-purposes. Cahen regarded the centralisation of power and the resulting enforcement of policies as deeply problematic, while Serra minimised this and insisted on the importance and legitimacy of FRELIMO’s effort for achieving unity. Yet, Serra was correct to point out that it would be problematic to treat ethnicity as something given

and self-evident as Cahen does. In this way, it is important that Serra stated, “It is more appropriate to speak of identification than of identity.”⁹⁹

Eduardo Medeiros, a Portuguese anthropologist, has also often commented on the identity issue in Mozambique, based on his own anthropological and historical research of Makhuwa habitations. After independence, Medeiros was engaged in research and education in Mozambique and contributed to the *História de Moçambique* (History of Mozambique) series with Serra and others. He asserts:

FRELIMO’s political project aiming at creating the national identity of Mozambique failed to create ... a society transcending ethnicity ... Nor did it solve the inequality that it inherited from the colonial era. It brought forth the opposite reaction to that which it had desired, resulting in polarisation and the violence of 1977 to 1980 and 1992.¹⁰⁰

Although his conclusion is close to that of Cahen’s, Medeiros disagrees with the argument that an ethnic sense of belonging is autogenetic. He regards inequality as a problem and points out the importance of the relationship between external and internal factors in the formation and decline of ethnic groups.¹⁰¹

It becomes important, it would seem, to avoid the dichotomic argument – national or ethno-regional, FRELIMO or RENAMO, FRELIMO or colonial rule – because to emphasise only one of the two does not help one find a political possibility for a better Mozambican future. In reality, however, quite often Mozambican conflict has been argued in dichotomic terms. In many ways, this book is an endeavour to overcome the dichotomy.

The liberation struggle period as the origin of the post-independence armed conflict

Different stances on the liberation struggle and its role

Too often and for too long the debate on the Mozambican crisis centered on whether and how far “external” (e.g. South African economic and military destabilisation) as against “internal” (e.g. politics of economic modernisation) factors are to blame.¹⁰²

This is how, in 1988, Bertil Egerö, a Swedish social scientist and former *cooperante* working for the FRELIMO government from 1978 to 1980, describes the sharply divided opinions regarding post-independence conflict. He continues:

The interaction between “external” and “internal” factors is immediately realised, if we accept that the armed bandits constitute the very narrow social basis of the fascist financiers whose sole objective is to recuperate what they lost in 1975.¹⁰³

In other words, Egerö is suggesting that decolonisation was at the root of the Mozambican conflict and that the dichotomy of external and internal factors has its limitations as an explanation.

Similar to Egerö's work, the author of this book takes the view that the post-independence armed conflict was not caused by either external or internal factors. Instead, based on a literature review and the author's own research, it seems that both factors contributed jointly to creating a breeding ground for the conflict. This book however is not intended as an exploration of "who is the perpetrator of the war in Mozambique" but rather presents some findings and thoughts on the many factors that contributed to post-independence armed conflict and how "division" and "unity", which remain a challenge of Mozambican politics, have been simultaneous drivers and outcomes.

Nevertheless, this effort out of necessity inevitably leads to a close examination of the liberation war because all of the factors, internal or external, as well as the actors in the armed conflict, came together at the end of the colonial era and especially during the liberation war. So in effect, the polarised discussions regarding the post-independence conflict have their roots in the disagreement over the assessment of FRELIMO's liberation struggle.

Those who regard FRELIMO as the only legitimate force which unified the fragmented Mozambican population and succeeded in creating Mozambican nationalism perceive that post-independence conflict was brought about by external forces and that FRELIMO was a "victim". Understandably, many advocates of external factors as the cause of all the trouble have been involved in Mozambique and with FRELIMO since the liberation war.

For those who maintain that FRELIMO gained power thanks to a pro-FRELIMO left-wing faction in Portugal, although it had only part of Mozambique under its control and other political forces existed in the territory, believe that the single-party rule by FRELIMO did not have legitimacy and its radical policies resulted in the conflict.

Previous studies on the liberation struggle and the liberation war

Various publications on the Mozambican liberation war came out simultaneously as it unfolded. These included pamphlets and journals published by Mozambican liberation organisations, governmental publications by Portugal and Mozambique, newspaper and magazine articles, diaries, essays and academic papers. As the liberation war in Mozambique began in the 1960s when, "[a]s a result of the complex set of relationships that existed in the international system, fundamental shifts on the local, national, or global level resonated with and grew out of each other,"¹⁰⁴ not only did the war draw attention from people all over the world but also concerned parties who routinely dispatched their opinions internally and externally. These publications naturally reflected the political stance of the authors and the publishers and were used as an opportunity for the supporters of the liberation war and its opponents to express their opinions. While being influenced by this trend, researchers assembled their arguments from various perspectives.

The *Struggle for Mozambique* by Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, FRELIMO president,

is a pioneering study on liberation movements in Mozambique and a distinguished work of great effort. Mondlane was the first African from Mozambique to obtain a doctorate and worked as a UN official and a university lecturer in the United States of America. The book depicts his experiences from the time of his appointment as the first FRELIMO president in 1962 to the year before his assassination. His descriptions of the influence of colonial rule on Mozambican society, the origin of anti-colonial movements, the development of the FRELIMO liberation struggle and its internal conflict, reflect both the analysis and understanding of a researcher and the record and self-justification of an activist. In this sense, the book is valuable both as a primary resource and a secondary resource and has greatly influenced later studies on Mozambican history and its liberation struggle.

The book, *Emerging Nationalism in Portuguese Africa*, edited by Ronald H. Chilcote of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, is a pioneering work on various liberation movements in Portuguese Africa, including FRELIMO. However, although it contributed to future research, it is more of a summary than an analysis.

A good example of serious academic work on the liberation struggle in Mozambique is the 1973 doctoral dissertation of Walter Opello. Opello focused on the rivalry and conflict amongst various liberation groups from the viewpoint of studies on revolutions, but his work is limited in the sense that it regards the liberation war as an internal war.¹⁰⁵

Keith Middlemas' work, published in 1975, contends that political dynamics in the southern African region greatly influenced the liberation of Mozambique from the late 1960s when FRELIMO shifted the location of its armed struggle from north to central Mozambique. Middlemas bases his argument on interviews and materials collected in the locale.

Moreover, two very different books, both published in 1983, are important and comprehensive studies on the liberation struggle in Mozambique. Barry Munslow, a British political scientist, used FRELIMO publications to demonstrate how the liberation struggle was formed under colonial political and economic environments and how it changed during the armed struggle. Thomas Henriksen, an American historian at the Hoover Institution, on the other hand, examined the conflict between the actors of Mozambican liberation movements and the colonial authority and its supporters, from the perspective of "revolution and counter revolution", using various primary sources and interviews. Since he seems to have drawn conclusions without conducting enough research on the reality of local communities (where the actual battles were fought), he assessed how people tackled the issue by mainly relying on the sources from the colonial authority and overlooking the diverse means adopted by the residents who sided neither with the colonial authority nor with FRELIMO. Henriksen argues people's responses only in the dichotomic framework of "revolution" and "counter revolution".

Many studies by other researchers and the writings of journalists share the same tendency. Most seem to classify local residents either as "collaborators" of the colonial power or as "supporters" of FRELIMO, without sufficient investigation or awareness of the more subtle nuances. Is it appropriate to group the local population into "actors of

transformation” and “anti-revolutionary/reactionary” or “collaborators obedient to their masters” and “rebels participating in subversion”? Before people were grouped in these ways, had there been a consideration of matters such as what situation the population was in; how they tried to tackle it and what were the consequence of their actions. Had it been considered that analysis and interpretations would vary, depending on what period was looked at – since the population responded differently as time progressed? It would seem that many of the early studies had drawbacks. With the benefit of hindsight, historical studies by researchers in post-colonial Mozambique have advantages.

The history of the liberation struggle as a national history

Like in other African countries, historical research and history education became an important national task in Mozambique just after independence. A revision of history would play a crucial role in regaining the dignity of the population which had been under colonial rule for many years. Moreover, it was essential to create and disseminate a common national history for the citizens of a new Mozambique in order to enhance the unity of the nation and solidarity among the people. The national history had to describe the historical process up to the end of the liberation war, at the same time placing the history of the liberation struggle at its centre.

There are three reasons for this. Firstly, in order to create the consciousness of being a Mozambican among a population without a common language, culture or social structure, the government needed to emphasise the common historical experience that people suffered under Portugal’s oppressive rule and the idea that they voluntarily rose up against colonial rule and jointly liberated themselves. In other words, what made people in Mozambique identify with being “Mozambican” had to be found in Portugal’s oppressive colonial rule and the experience of the liberation struggle including armed struggle. Secondly, the concept of the liberation struggle as a process that they led themselves against colonial rule enabled them to regain their sense of self and autonomy and also implied a shift from the deprivation of history¹⁰⁶ to the recovery of history.¹⁰⁷ Thirdly, FRELIMO, the sole liberation organisation that fought the armed struggle, wanted to establish permanent legitimacy of its power.

In Mozambique under Portuguese rule, history education entailed memorising the history of Portugal. No textbooks on Mozambican history existed, and it was impossible to learn how the African societies in the territory were formed. Therefore, the few who had received education during colonial rule knew very little about other ethnic groups although they were familiar with the oral history of their own groups. The author’s interviews confirm that many of those who had received education during the colonial period knew all the place names in Portugal but did not know the geography of Mozambique.¹⁰⁸ Even during the liberation struggle, FRELIMO compiled history textbooks as an attempt to regain the dignity of people and to develop a common awareness as a people. It used them to educate prospective leaders and school children at its base in Tanzania and in liberated zones. The history book, edited and published by the Department of Education and

Culture of FRELIMO in 1971, still mid-liberation struggle, says this in the introduction:

The method that will be taken to study the history of Mozambique is a method that will adapt to the current conditions of struggle of the Mozambican people, and is therefore, a revolutionary method. All stories that have been written about Mozambique are based on the actions that the Portuguese exerted on our country ... Like all other peoples of the world, Mozambican people have a history. Therefore, we will study the history of Mozambique from a Mozambican viewpoint, based on the history of Mozambican people. But to write a history, you need to have sources of information about the past, and most of these sources were left by the Arabs and the Portuguese themselves. Thus, in trying to know the past we cannot secure information before the year 1300. It was around this time that a very important civilisation, the Mwanamutapa [Monomotapa, or the Kingdom of Mutapa], originated in the region between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. This civilisation reached its highest point around the year 1500 and profoundly marked the history of Mozambique. We think it appropriate to begin the study of the history of Mozambique with the history of Mwanamutapa.¹⁰⁹

The textbook then devotes four chapters to describe the rise and fall of the Kingdom of Mutapa in detail. The following chapters are about the Portuguese settlement (Chapter 6), armed resistance against Portuguese rule (Chapter 7) and the rule by concession companies (Chapter 8). Partly because it was compiled in the midst of the liberation war, the book does not mention colonial rule under the Salazar administration and the resistance against it despite the importance of this period. In order to overturn the perception that whites, with a highly developed civilisation, were great and invincible and to make independence through armed struggle appear more realistic, it instead emphasises that: (1) Africans in Mozambique used to have an advanced civilisation and (2) armed resistance had taken place in many parts in Mozambique, just like the contemporary armed struggle.¹¹⁰

This history textbook, however, was not sufficient to create a national history after independence. Firstly, it did not describe colonial rule and the liberation struggle as common experience. Secondly, the primary sources did not include oral traditions or archaeological materials.¹¹¹ Thirdly, it paid too much attention to the kingdom that was later criticised by FRELIMO as being feudal. What was needed after achieving independence was the kind of historical description that would help to unite diverse and fragmented Mozambicans.

After independence, the history department and CEA at UEM were put in charge of collecting historical materials and conducting historical studies. A team consisting of foreign researchers and Mozambican students, including Portuguese students who chose to remain in Mozambique, collected and wrote down oral histories in different areas, gathered colonial administrative documents and conducted archaeological research. The result was the *História de Moçambique* (History of Mozambique) series, published by the university.¹¹²

The series was compiled for the history education of eleventh graders and older. It intended to publish the history of Mozambique from 200 or 300 to 1975 in four volumes. The first volume was published in 1982. Typical of work in the early 1980s, it looked at various societies in Mozambique and colonial rule in world history. Furthermore, it spotlighted the recovery of the identity of those deprived of history, by describing how people in Mozambique had faced multi-layered historic developments and what sort of meaning and impact this would have had and continued to have on society. The fundamental characteristic of the series was its historical view based on class struggle, as clearly stated by Serra, the editor of the series, in the introduction to the 2000 edition of a bound copy of Volumes 1 and 2:

We started from the assumption that: (1) gold, ivory, slaves, copra, sisal, cotton, etc., were the product of asymmetric social relations that we should reveal and analyse; and that (2) these relationships were not only the effect of the coloniser, but also of local ruling classes ... [This book was] passionately criticised locally in the 1980s as being “impregnated” with ideological *apriorism* and was acclaimed internationally in the 1990s as excellent, even by those who had been hostile to “leftist” readings in the past. This new edition ... keeps the original architecture and especially remains faithful to the paradigm of social reading as the theatre of class conflict.¹¹³

Unlike the textbook published during the liberation struggle that treated the Kingdom of Mutapa in a positive way, this series, while acknowledging its historical importance, paid far more attention to social differentiation and the class struggle.¹¹⁴ This was as a result of the criticism of many African historiographies, compiled after independence, which, trying to counteract colonial rule and the West-centred historical view, over-praised past civilisations and kingdoms, and ended up dividing the image of the country into several kingdoms and belittling the population at the bottom of the society. The authors of the textbook attempted to introduce, in the historical description, the fundamental principle of FRELIMO from the time of the liberation struggle period, which denied any exploitation (colonial rule, imperialism or feudalism) and aimed at the equality and unity among people from different backgrounds:¹¹⁵

This work has an ambitious title: *History of Mozambique*. It would have been perhaps prudent to give it a title less arrogant, for example, *Contribution to the History of Mozambique*. But it was our intention (and was our action) to write the history of Mozambique, which has nothing to do with writing all facts of our history or with summarising and dating these same facts ... This is a history of Mozambique. It has chosen a party, it has taken a position ... But we think the whole “scientific” way of writing history is determined by the political “way” that we live the history ... We wanted to write “this”, “this” history, “this” way of writing history as a way to fight.¹¹⁶

The last volume, dealing with the liberation struggle period from 1962 to 1975, was completed in the late 1980s but was never published.¹¹⁷ However, by good fortune the author had access to the unpublished manuscript. It describes the activities of various actors during the liberation struggle period, based on interviews and colonial documents.¹¹⁸ It also contains many entries that reflect less than positive aspects of FRELIMO's liberation struggle and discloses that not all people in Mozambique or all of those who joined FRELIMO fought voluntarily, actively and justly. It can be surmised that some of the FRELIMO leadership considered it harmful to publish when they were endeavouring to promote the legitimacy of their post-independence authority. Volume 4 has not been published to this day.¹¹⁹

For primary schools, the FRELIMO government prepared a history textbook which emphasises the legitimacy of FRELIMO and its leadership as the only liberation force and the only nationalist movement. Needless to say, the main emphasis is on the FRELIMO liberation struggle. Those who left FRELIMO were described as “*novo explorador*” (new explorer) or “*traidor*” (traitor), and the textbook praised the achievements of the FRELIMO leadership, that is, the nucleus of the post-independence government.¹²⁰ In this way, the textbook presents the history of the FRELIMO-centred liberation struggle as the centre stage of national history.

As seen above, historical description was more than just for research and education. It was considered important as a basis of post-independence authority and for the creation of a national history. As a result, oral history was actively recorded in the former liberated zones but not in the areas that were not. This results in a partial record and description of history and limits the study of the history of the liberation struggle. This tendency was not confined to Mozambique but has been seen in many newly independent African countries.

In the meantime, in sub-Saharan Africa an economic crisis in the late 1980s, the introduction of the structural adjustment policy, together with the market economy and political liberalisation – both of which were imposed by the West and IMF/World Bank after the Cold War – led to the collapse or loss of credibility of centralised power in sub-Saharan African countries. The former liberation organisations, which had become ruling parties after independence and continued one-party rule, now introduced multi-party systems. Consequently, historical descriptions were eagerly reviewed.¹²¹ However, the weakening governments were naturally strongly opposed to such attempts since historical legitimacy was the last ground of their authority.

While it is important to fully recognise the historical importance of the liberation struggle, and that it in many ways depicts the resistance of Africans against the deprivation of their personal history by the colonial authority and Western society, it is nevertheless important to view the liberation movement as an historical process. In other words, it is important also to write a comprehensive history of diverse people, including the “collaborators” of the colonial authority, the “traitors” of the liberation struggle and women.¹²²

João Paulo Borges Coelho, who wrote part of the fourth volume of *History of Mozambique* and taught at the history department of the UEM, tackled this challenge and greatly advanced the study of this topic. He uses Tete Province as a case study and

demonstrates the movement of the FRELIMO liberation army and the response of local communities, which prior to this study had been described without sufficient grounding. The following extract is from his first book, published in 1984:

The study of the years 1966 and 1967 begins to show that behind the armed struggle itself, which was virtually nothing then and was restricted to some initiatives in early 1965, there were many other problems, successes and failures. Above all, there was the amassing of experiences and the establishment of relationships, which was very important for the further development of the liberation struggle in that area.¹²³

Unfortunately, after Borges Coelho, few researchers attempted to uncover the reality of the liberation struggle in specific communities or areas.¹²⁴ The reasons could be: (1) field research became difficult to conduct due to the outbreak of armed conflict with MNR/RENAMO;¹²⁵ (2) FRELIMO did not want their “glorious history” to be examined through empirical field research; and (3) the few researchers and students that existed were mobilised for various fact-finding surveys, which were necessary for nation building. Thus, research on the local communities where liberation battles were fought had to wait until the end of the conflict in 1992.

Consequently, interviews and reports conducted in the liberated zones just after independence became sole and valuable historical sources. No proper research was done on the Makhwa habitations as they were considered to have remained on the side of the colonial authority and had not actively cooperated with FRELIMO.¹²⁶ As MNR/RENAMO expanded the areas under its control in the Makhwa habitations during the armed conflict, the Makhwas were widely perceived as “anti-FRELIMO”; thus the “collaborators of the colonial rulers” and “pro-RENAMO”.

This book endeavours to transcend the binary labelling of the local population in an historical study of the liberation struggle in Mozambique and instead re-examines the development of contemporary Mozambican politics, paying attention to the rural communities and keeping the majority of the population, who did/could not participate in FRELIMO’s liberation struggle, firmly in mind.

The increasing interest in the “colonial war” in Portugal

As armed conflict intensified in Mozambique in the late 1980s, the study of Mozambique’s liberation struggle further stagnated. Indeed, the changes that took place on the African continent as a whole, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, further detracted from a historical focus on the issues prevalent in the liberation struggle in the 1960s and 1970s. Interestingly, in the formal colonial power Portugal, interest in the “colonial war” increased during this period.¹²⁷

In the late 1980s the Portuguese Armed Forces started to review the “colonial war” from 1961 to 1975 and compiled a series of books called, *Guerra Colonial* (Colonial War),

based on military reports. The fourth volume, published in 1989, was on Mozambique.¹²⁸ The series has high value as a primary source, and describes the activities and geographical distribution of the Portuguese Armed Forces deployed all over Mozambique. However, it does not disclose the detail of actual activities. In this sense, it is more like a general sketch than a detailed illustration.

John Cann, a former British navy officer and an historian, wrote *Counterinsurgency in Africa* in 1997, fully utilising the series and other primary sources.¹²⁹ As its subtitle, *The Portuguese Way of War*, suggests, Cann perceives Portugal's experience as a successful case of counter-guerrilla warfare, that is, a low intensity conflict (LIC), and hoped that the experience would be used for counterinsurgency after the Gulf War. The main objective of the book is to elucidate how a small state with limited funds and resources like Portugal managed to conduct counterinsurgency wars in three African territories simultaneously. Cann concludes that the counterinsurgency strategy adopted by the Portuguese Armed Forces succeeded but that a political blunder negated it.¹³⁰ That the Portuguese translation was published in the next year demonstrates the keen interest in books related to the "colonial war" in Portugal.

Interest in the "colonial war" by the Portuguese Armed Forces and military experts like Cann was possibly re-ignited because of the change in world politics after the Cold War. Western countries were under pressure to deal with subversions and LICs, which occurred frequently in the 1960s and the 1970s and which were revitalised after the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹³¹ Many years before, the Portuguese Armed Forces had received the know-how on guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla tactics from NATO members. It was their turn to pass them on from the experience of Portugal in Africa.

Cann's book looks at the liberation struggle in Mozambique only from a military point of view. Still, it remains highly valuable as it demonstrates how counterinsurgency tactics were formed, what Portuguese soldiers thought and how they acted, based not only on military archives but also on interviews conducted with commanders and soldiers.

There were other people and bodies in Portugal in the late 1990s who showed interest in the "colonial war" and counterinsurgency warfare. *Diário de Notícias*, a prominent daily Portuguese newspaper, for example, published a series of articles on the "colonial wars" every Sunday for one year from September 1997. The series was published in 2000 as an encyclopaedic book on the "colonial wars".¹³² Portuguese readers had often perceived "colonial wars" as being close to themselves, but they had seldom been highlighted in the media before.

The "colonial wars" stir up complex feelings in many ordinary Portuguese people. Nearly 100,000 men were sent to the African colonies as soldiers and 5,797 of them lost their lives. Many in Portugal experienced deaths and injuries of their loved ones.¹³³ As a result of this suffering, many people supported the bloodless coup in 1974, known as *Revolução dos Cravos* (Carnation Revolution). However, after the independence of all of the Portuguese colonies in 1975, people in Portugal often kept silent, in keeping with the denial of the impact of colonial rule and the "colonial wars". Since a "reign of terror" and the "colonial wars" sustained the final stage of the Salazar/Caetano administration,¹³⁴ the change of government prompted many connected to the previous government to leave the

country. Those who remained in Portugal kept silent in order to avoid being accused of supporting the former regime. Thus, it became a sort of taboo in Portugal to talk about the “colonial wars”.

The launch of the European Union (EU) in 1992 strengthened Portugal’s economic and political ties with other European states. People started to feel the advent of a new era. Nostalgic interest in the colonial era and the “colonial wars” rose again amongst Portuguese people. War veterans actively published their memoirs. Many books were also published on the “colonial wars” for the Portuguese people by Portuguese writers.

Portuguese researchers also started to publish new works, drawing from colonial archives and interviews, which had been newly collected, classified and disclosed. In April 2000, an international symposium on the “colonial wars” was held in Lisbon.¹³⁵ As of January 2004, many publications are still being produced, including on the inner workings of the Salazar administration, the reality of the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE: International and State Defence Police), Portugal’s secret police and the memoirs of commanders and soldiers during the “colonial war”. These have disclosed what the works written from a viewpoint of liberation struggle history could not, such as the perceptions and activities of those at the centre of colonial power.

The “colonial war” in Mozambique, in particular, also attracted a lot of attention. A Portuguese Armed Forces commander in active service published a doctoral dissertation, *Análise Global de Uma Guerra – Moçambique* (Global Analysis of a War – Mozambique) 1964–1974.¹³⁶ In 2000, a master’s thesis on the formation and implementation of the anti-FRELIMO strategies of the Salazar administration was completed, using the recently disclosed PIDE archives.¹³⁷ It was Fernando Amaro Monteiro who supervised these young researchers.

Before teaching international relations and Islamic studies at the Universidade Independente (Independence University) in Lisbon, Monteiro worked for the Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações de Moçambique (SCCIM: Information Centralisation and Coordination Service of Mozambique), the intelligence service directly under the governor-general, from 1965 to 1970 and proposed psycho-social action strategies.¹³⁸ From 1970–1974 he worked at a research institute of the University of Lourenço Marques while serving the governor-general as a strategic consultant.¹³⁹ Monteiro published many papers on northern Muslims in Mozambique, based on the primary sources to which other researchers did not have access. Monteiro played an important role in the liberation war of northern Mozambique, and his work should be examined as not only secondary but also as primary sources.

These are some of the early studies published in Portugal.¹⁴⁰ All these works discuss armed struggle within the context of the “colonial war”. Consequently, the reality in the colonies was often presented as a mere battlefield and those who joined the armed struggle were perceived merely as guerrillas or soldiers. This is the limitation of counterinsurgency studies by Cann and others. The “colonial war” sounds like a total war involving the entire colony whereas counterinsurgency studies describe those who fought for decolonisation as subversive elements that had nothing to do with ordinary people.

Such a viewpoint precludes a broader perspective as well, and fails to convey the reality of local communities.

Attention to local communities

Early studies focusing on local communities

As discussed so far, the assessment of the liberation struggle in Mozambique has mainly relied on: (1) the studies conducted during the liberation struggle (the 1960s to the 1970s) and during the transition period (the 1970s to the early 1980s) or (2) the studies conducted in Portugal after the late 1980s, focusing on the involvement of Portugal. Consequently, the real situation of the rural communities in Mozambique during the liberation struggle has only been partially investigated. The liberation movement adopted the tactic of armed struggle, forcing communities and people to take the side of either the liberation struggle or the colonial authority.¹⁴¹ People who lived outside of the liberated zones were labelled as “collaborators” of colonialism by the liberation movement and as “applaudable allies” by the colonial authority. This stance did not change greatly after independence and significantly influenced how the armed conflict, which broke out immediately afterwards, has been understood.

Descriptions of the conflict, such as who did what in the war zones and how the residents responded, often tended to be used politically because they concerned the legitimacy of the parties involved in the conflict. Therefore, any fact-finding research that took place in the war zones became extremely important and sensitive. It was also very difficult to do, due to the danger and restrictions that accompanied the situation. As a result, the work by Geffray received disproportional attention until the end of the conflict.

As discussed earlier, in their first joint research project, Geffray and Pederson described the resentment of local residents towards the FRELIMO government and its rural policies, especially the villagisation and the liberation movement’s perceived disrespect for traditional authority. To this end they predicted that people would support MNR/RENAMO.¹⁴² When MNR/RENAMO established a military base in Erati, their research location, their prediction was regarded as corroborated. In 1988, Geffray conducted another research project in Erati in the maelstrom of war. After stating that “the public support for RENAMO was much stronger” he concluded: “Entire societies with their local leaders were mobilised, and several tens of thousands of people placed themselves well out of reach of the FRELIMO state and within the geographic and social space, militarily controlled by RENAMO.”¹⁴³

This evoked a strong reaction because people’s cooperation with MNR/RENAMO contradicted the general image of the people¹⁴⁴ as being victims of MNR and as those protected by the FRELIMO government. In other words, those observers that favoured the internal factor explanation claimed that the FRELIMO government was also responsible for causing the conflict; in their minds proven by the cooperation of the people with RENAMO.¹⁴⁵ External factor advocates, on the other hand, insisted that there was no

cause-and-effect relationship between villagisation and the increasing support for MNR/RENAMO, based on the fact that MNR/RENAMO did not settle in the places where villagisation was advanced.¹⁴⁶

The arrival of the internal factor theories and subsequent disputes contributed to shifting the centre of the debate to the relations between the people and the two forces. This led many researchers to the war zones and refugee camps. Otto Roesch, for instance, interviewed about 200 peasants, a mixture of FRELIMO sympathisers and RENAMO sympathisers, in Gaza Province during May and June 1990. However, his paper did not clarify the relationship between local communities (as opposed to individuals) and RENAMO or FRELIMO, as much as Geffray's explorations did.¹⁴⁷ Importantly, the research that focused on the activity of the people in the war zones was also trapped in the dichotomy of the external factor theories and the internal factor theories.¹⁴⁸ In other words, depending on the stance of the researcher, the cooperation of the people in the conflict was used as proof of legitimacy of either MNR/RENAMO or the FRELIMO government.

After the peace agreement was concluded in October 1992, not only did field study become possible but researchers were also freed from this dichotomy. Researchers inside and outside of Mozambique energetically conducted studies on former war zones and those involved in the armed conflict. Many of them did research on post-independence armed conflict, focusing on the reality in local communities.¹⁴⁹

The importance of international conditions

Despite this surge of activity, the research that focused on the local communities tended to look at domestic factors only, especially FRELIMO's radical socialist policies, and came to similar conclusions as the earlier studies which embraced internal factor theories. The importance of international and historical contexts appeared to have been forgotten, and the cause of the war was sought in domestic or regional problems.

There are many research questions that seem vital for a clearer, more accurate picture: if FRELIMO policies had not been radical, would armed conflict have broken out? Did the national policies of FRELIMO alone sustain and expand the violence? Had FRELIMO adopted a different type of policy, could the division in Mozambican politics have been avoided? What sort of nation-building was possible in the formation of a nation in Africa, which has been referred to as "nationalism without nation"? Why and on what grounds did FRELIMO adopt these problematic policies? In other words, during the liberation struggle, what kind of relationship did FRELIMO have with the various communities in Mozambique and what kind of perception did they have about them? When it gained state power, what policies did FRELIMO put in place and how did it try to implement them? Serra claims that FRELIMO perceived Mozambican society as divided during the liberation struggle and tried to overcome this by creating a unified identity, but what was the actual reality?

If we want to clarify the problems of contemporary Mozambican politics by stressing the reality of local communities and their diversity, and by placing them in inter-relations with

actors at various levels – without confining them in a limited context of “collaborators” or “revolutionaries” – then we need, once again, to pay attention to the historical background.

The lack of research on the liberation struggle in certain geographic areas

Of course, most researchers on the war in Mozambique refer to, and draw on, history to some degree. However, often the studies look at the change from colonial rule to independence and do not sufficiently examine the liberation struggle and the liberation war, which greatly influenced the shift. Many, for instance, begin by describing the birth of FRELIMO and the internal conflict under colonial rule and then portray FRELIMO as the monopoliser of state power subsequent to independence.

However, it was not due to a so-called natural course of events that FRELIMO gained state power or that it adopted radical policies after the country’s independence. As FRELIMO members themselves have stated, these phenomena were based on the party’s experience during the liberation struggle. Previous studies, referred to earlier in this chapter, describe this historical process in detail, but often fail to fully examine the reality of local communities. In other words, there is a limit to the picture that is painted in terms of internal factors related to post-independence conflict. On the other hand, the argument presented by some researchers pays much attention to local communities but tends to ignore the liberation struggle period. This book intends to fill this gap.

In some ways, whether a researcher focuses on the liberation struggle period as a background for post-independence armed conflict depends on which area he or she has chosen as their field of study. As seen in Figure 7, the liberation war was fought only in the north and in part of central Mozambique, not throughout the whole country.


In southern Mozambique, the population who were considered to be FRELIMO supporters were politically oppressed by the colonial authority. However, their experience was very different from that of people in the north and the centre where the war was fought. Therefore, the importance of the liberation struggle period or of the liberation war in the analysis of post-independence conflict would be different.

Also, one cannot ignore the influence of the liberation struggle or the liberation war on local communities, bearing in mind that RENAMO established many bases in central and northern Mozambique and, furthermore, that the relationship that FRELIMO had with local communities during the liberation struggle greatly influenced its principles and policy formation. These factors remain largely unexplored.

The lack of research on the liberation struggle in Makhuwa society







The majority of the population in Nampula Province in northern Mozambique, where Geffray conducted his fieldwork, were Makhuwas. During the liberation war, the general headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces was set up in the city of Nampula in order to fight the FPLM soldiers entering Mozambique in the north from Tanzania. Therefore, Makhuwa people and other residents of this province are often described as the “collaborators

Figure 7 Progress of the Liberation War by FRELIMO (1966-1974)



Ministério de Educação, 1986:38.

(Translated by the author)

- | | | |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------------|
|  | Semi-liberated zone: 66-67 | ● Important operational base |
|  | Liberated zone: 67-68-69 | ← Scouting reconnaissance |
|  | Liberated zone: 70-72 | ○ Clandestine activity area |
|  | Semi-liberated zone: 73-74 | ⊙ Second FRELIMO Congress |
|  | Guerrilla activity area | |
|  | Infiltration area | |

of the colonial power” in the liberation struggle. Virtually no research has been done to date as to what actually happened to and within the local communities in Nampula.¹⁵⁰

In contrast, the experience of the population in the northern parts of Mozambique who actively cooperated with FRELIMO (non-Makhuwa areas in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, that is, the northern half of the two provinces) has been actively studied for the creation of the national history, mainly by the education ministry and the public media – but not by researchers.

In other words, the reality of the Makhuwa habitations has not been studied sufficiently either in Nampula Province or in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, where many liberated zones were set up. The only study on the Makhuwas during the liberation war is the one by Monteiro mainly concerning the influence of Islam. Medeiros conducted interviews in the Makhuwa habitations in Niassa and Cabo Delgado just after independence, gathering a lot of data that has a bearing on the relationship between local residents and the liberation war. However, he has not published any work about this period.

One could surmise that the lack of sufficient historical study and publications on the Makhuwa habitations, where RENAMO expanded its control in the late 1980s, is one of the reasons that Geffray did not deal with the liberation struggle period in his works.

Geffray points out that those who actively cooperated with RENAMO in Erati were not the Makhuwas in general but the traditional authority of the Macuane,¹⁵¹ a subgroup of the Makhuwa group.¹⁵² He has been praised as a pioneer for introducing the reality of local communities – what Tom Young, a British political scientist, referred to as “local dynamics”¹⁵³ – into the analysis of the Mozambican conflict. Geffray suggested that there were two main reasons for the Macuane chief’s support of RENAMO: (1) *oposições históricas* (historical opposition) to the Eratis, who were on the side of the authority before and after independence and (2) the opposition to FRELIMO’s policies such as the marginalisation of traditional authority and the compulsory villagisation. Only an anthropologist who did fieldwork in the area for many years would be capable of such analysis. It is interesting in the sense that he includes the reality of the local community both before and during the colonial era. Geffray emphasises the importance of considering historical continuation, pointing out, “no ethnic atavism can explain the tribal polarisation of populations in the war.”¹⁵⁴ However, the historical continuation that he points out does not, in fact, include the liberation war period and therefore is somewhat limited.

Geffray’s research site, Erati, is situated on the main route that connects Cabo Delgado Province and Nampula Province (see Figure 3). For people coming from Cabo Delgado, it is an entry point to Nampula, the centre of northern Mozambique. This would have been the same for the FRELIMO guerrillas, who journeyed south from their headquarters in Tanzania to Cabo Delgado. In those days, Erati was considered as a strategic location both by the colonial authority and by FRELIMO. As José Alberto Gomes de Melo Branquinho, an anthropologist, administrator and a researcher for the colonial intelligence in the late 1960s, comments: “Erati ... is the most important in the district [current Nampula Province] from all points of view.”¹⁵⁵

Branquinho explains why Erati became a culturally and strategically important place:

Erati ... was the target of infiltration of a subversive nature in 1965 ... and in 1966, which resulted in the arrests of five *regedores* [chiefs appointed by the colonial administration] and other traditional authorities ...¹⁵⁶

Branquinho depicts the close political relationship between the Erati traditional authority and the Makhuwa-Metto¹⁵⁷ traditional authority in Cabo Delgado and describes the support that these traditional authorities gave to FRELIMO guerrillas.¹⁵⁸

Geffray illustrates the local politics in Erati, that is, the relationship between the Eratis and the Macuanes in more detail.¹⁵⁹ Historically, the two groups (in anthropological terms both are sub-groups of an ethnic group) had a confrontational relationship. The Eratis had a centralised political system, which the colonial authority took advantage of to further their rule. It educated the Eratis at Catholic churches and employed them at the colonial administrative offices. Although the Macuanes were more numerous, they were in a disadvantaged position because they tended to be militant, had a decentralised political system and were not close to the colonial authority, either in terms of physical location or relationship. While the Macuanes were “*os marginais turbulentos do Estado colonial*” (the turbulent marginalised people of the colonial state), the Erati became “*colaboradores, opressores, arrogantes do colonizador*” (collaborators, oppressors, snobs of the colonisers). After independence, the status quo did not change “*a herança da administração portuguesa*” (the legacy of Portuguese administration), and the FRELIMO government continued to appoint the Eratis to important local posts. When RENAMO appeared, the marginalised Macuanes joined the fight against the FRELIMO state. The Eratis, on the other hand, “facing the aggression of RENAMO, and supported by their former enemies and subordinates, placed themselves under the protection of the FRELIMO army to a great extent and continued to provide it with legitimacy.”¹⁶⁰ Thus, “*polarização local no conflito*” (local polarisation of the conflict) began.¹⁶¹

This explanation by Geffray seems plausible and chronologically well structured and adds to our knowledge of what might have occurred: there was a confrontational relationship between the two groups in the first place; the colonial authority favoured one over the other; the FRELIMO government continued to treat them differently and as a result one moved to the FRELIMO side while the other joined the RENAMO side. It describes the “internal logic” of the post-independence conflict, or “local dynamics”. However, the following important historical fact is left out of his argument.

Comala (or Komala) IV, the supreme chief and *régulo*¹⁶² of the Eratis, was arrested in 1965 for cooperating with the “subversion” that infiltrated from Cabo Delgado.¹⁶³ His predecessors, Comala II and Comala III, had also resisted colonial rule. Comala II relocated his people from the Erati Mountains to Namapa near Cabo Delgado in order to flee from colonisation.¹⁶⁴ He was captured, shot and buried under a tree in front of the Namapa administrative post.¹⁶⁵ Comala III joined the German army coming from Tanganyika in 1917 (during the First World War) and fought against the Portuguese army.

After the German army left, he was jailed in Lourenço Marques.¹⁶⁶ Having completed his sentence, he was taken back to the Erati area and was “re-integrated” into the society as the *régulo* at Alua. Branquinho states that the experience of armed resistance by the Comalas is still viewed as “an historical element and a living oral tradition” and that “in a current conflict, with psychological characteristics, even these sentimental ties can be used by the subversives to obtain the endorsement of all the Eratis.”¹⁶⁷

Branquinho’s research in the late 1960s presents a very different view from Geffray’s understanding of the Eratis. As is clearly seen in the case of the Maúá, discussed in detail in this book, the fact that the Eratis were colonial officials does not necessarily mean that they were “colonial collaborators”.¹⁶⁸ The exposure of Comala IV’s cooperation with FRELIMO in 1965 made the colonial authority suspicious about the loyalty of the Eratis. Moreover, Branquinho suggests that the blanket arrest and imprisonment of the traditional authorities, suspected of being FRELIMO supporters in 1965, created a vacuum of traditional authority in this area and destabilised local politics.¹⁶⁹

Geffray does not refer to these issues. Instead, he criticises FRELIMO for marginalising “traditional authorities” as being “collaborators of colonial rule”; and then appointing those from slave families who had no “traditional” legitimacy to higher positions in the village such as *secretário da aldeia* (village secretary). Geffray also introduces the case of Mahia, a traditional chief and a *régulo* during the colonial era who decided to join the dissidents and go to the forest and let RENAMO build “the main camp of the war”.¹⁷⁰ In other words, Geffray believes that the main cause of the intensification and expansion of the conflict was that “traditionally” legitimate chiefs moved with their people out of the FRELIMO state to the *mato* (forest) under RENAMO control in order to regain their “traditional authority”, which had been robbed by FRELIMO. He describes it as “[a] *reconquista da dignidade e da identidade perdidas*” (the re-conquest of lost identity and dignity).¹⁷¹ However, what is “the identity and dignity” that Mahia, a former *régulo*, wanted to recover? Is it appropriate to declare it “tradition”?

It is beyond the scope of this book to comment in detail on what took place in the Erati area, but an observer should be cautious about how she or he interprets and presents what was witnessed at a certain point in time. This is especially important at the present time when conflict studies could influence, directly or indirectly, the situation on the ground.¹⁷²

In the Erati area, both colonial rule and the liberation struggle by FRELIMO greatly impacted on social transformation and the state of “traditional authority”. After having been interfered with by the colonial administration throughout the colonial era and the liberation struggle period, “traditional authority” cannot simply be discussed in terms of “tradition” alone. Such experience must have become not a mere historical memory but a basis of political development in the area after independence. Regretfully, Geffray does not deal with this point in his argument.

In the beginning of his book, Geffray cites the following illuminating comment by an Erati woman:¹⁷³ “This war that torments us today was caused by ‘*abaixo*’ (down).”¹⁷⁴

In a footnote, Geffray explains that this “*abaixo*” means FRELIMO.¹⁷⁵ However, perhaps

one should look beyond the literal meaning of this comment. The key to understanding the depth of this armed conflict can be found in the inter-relation of various factors at different levels (local, national, regional and global), in which the woman, her ancestors and neighbours had been placed for many years, and the accumulation of their historical experience.

It was not simply either internal factors, or external factors that caused and extended the tragic armed conflict, but rather the synergy of both factors, combined with violence in the form of war. In other words, people in Mozambique chose armed struggle as a means to achieve unification as “Mozambicans” and liberation from colonial rule, in response to various international as well as regional conditions, and the progression of the war nurtured both a sense of solidarity on the one hand and led to division at the local community level on the other.

This book has this as its focus and draws on the historical experiences of people in Mozambique, especially the residents of Maúá. It re-examines some of the common perceptions of the Makhuwas as the “collaborators of the colonialists”; “anti-FRELIMO”;¹⁷⁶ “pro-RENAMO”; those who re-emphasised traditional authority and those who rebelled against the FRELIMO policies and became “pro-RENAMO”.¹⁷⁷

Previous studies on the Maúá District

The characteristics of the Maúá District


This book uses the Maúá District in Niassa Province in northern Mozambique as a case study. The Maúá Circumscription during the colonial era was twice as large as the present Maúá District and included the entire Nipepe District and part of Majune and Marrupa Districts (Figure 8). Therefore, with the exception of the review of earlier studies and the concluding chapter, this book is concerned with the Maúá Circumscription as it existed at the end of the colonial era.¹⁷⁸

In 1997 the population of Maúá District was around 40,000, the majority of whom were Makhuwas.¹⁷⁹ Similarly to the Erati, the colonial authority controlled this area throughout the liberation war period, and RENAMO took over most of the district and won the first two general elections here (Figure 9). RENAMO also won the third general election in December 2004.¹⁸⁰

The author’s field research conducted in 1997, 1999 and 2003 confirms some of the same characteristics as Geffray’s research in Erati: the repulsion against the post-independence FRELIMO policies such as the communal village policy and the marginalisation of traditional authority.¹⁸¹ Maúá District seems a meaningful focus for the following reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates the diverse nature of the relationship between the Makhuwa society and RENAMO and FRELIMO.

Secondly, it enables exploration of Makhuwa habitations in general, and provides further illumination on previous statements such as that the Makhuwas were the “collaborators of the colonialists”, “anti-FRELIMO” and “pro-RENAMO”. It, therefore,

Figure 8 Area of Maúia Circumscription during the late colonial era shown on the current provincial map of Niassa




(Drawn by the author)

presents an opportunity to challenge previous studies that have focused only on internal factors. Thirdly, it contributes to local history during the liberation struggle, on which so little study has been done and thus is useful in terms of tracking history from the liberation struggle to post-independence armed conflict. It also throws light on the challenges of current Mozambican politics.

The author's oral survey in Maúia District revealed that local residents situated and understood the post-independence armed conflict not simply as part of post-independence history but rather as originating far further back in time, and being as a result of many influences, such as slave trading.¹⁸² Many residents talk about the liberation war and the post-independence armed conflict in the same context, which indicates the extent of the

Figure 9 1994 National Assembly election result (Niassa Province) (by Districts)



(Translated by the author)

Brito, 2000:50-51.

influence of the former on the local community. Moreover, in spite of the oppression by the FRELIMO government, stressed by Geffray, the traditional social structure was not fixed or stagnated as far as Maúá District was concerned.¹⁸³

The traditional structure of Makhuwa society and its historical change

As Geffray points out, *mpéwé* (referred to as *mwenes* in this book),¹⁸⁴ the traditional chiefs, played a big role in Makhuwa society. The traditional chiefs here do not mean kings (the Makhuwas have never had a kingdom), but chiefs of rural communities. Each community was highly autonomous.

Mwenes, a council consisting of the heads of families and the “mothers” of each group, who played an important religious role, made decisions in the community, based on consensus. This is elaborated on in Chapter 2, but in essence the core of the community is the *mwene* and the *puiyamwene* (a common mother). A rural community would be born when the first *mwene* moved his people to a new location due to a particular problem and established a new community. The following generations of *mwenes* repeated relocations and re-settlements in order to overcome difficulties or to seek a better life for the group. In other words, the quality of a *mwene* was judged by his ability to lead his group to a new location where further growth and development of the group was possible.¹⁸⁵ In this sense, the fact that *mwenes* moved their people to the RENAMO camp or the FRELIMO camp indicates the continuity of the historical and cultural experience of the Makhuwas.

Close examination of the situation in Maúá reveals that the authority of the *mwene* in the traditional structure of the Makhuwa society was not necessarily fixed in time or space. The establishment of colonial rule impacted on the traditional social structure more than anything else. Even before that, however, the nature of the authority of traditional chiefs, that is, the relationship between chiefs and the relationship between chiefs and their people, was constantly changing. The active slave trade in the late nineteenth century, in particular, transformed Makhuwa society.

In *A Causa das Armas* (The Cause of Arms), Geffray treats the traditional authority in Erati as something fixed and concludes that the only change it experienced was due to FRELIMO’s rural policy after independence. However, local communities in northern Mozambique underwent a tremendous change between the late nineteenth century and the end of the twentieth century. It seems problematic to view the traditional authority as a fixed entity, without carefully examining the effect of the events during this period on the internal mechanisms of the society.

It also seems important to bring to light information on how the Maúá residents perceived their experiences in the past century, such as: slave trade, colonial rule, the liberation war, independence, the armed conflict and peace; how they responded to them and how their responses affected the larger world.

Division in the local community

Chapters 2 and 5 detail much about Maúa's historical development. In brief, during the post-independence war, one of the largest RENAMO military bases in Niassa Province was set up in this District. As a result, there was an influx of guerrillas moving into the district, and at the same time many lives were lost in the district and residents fled as refugees or were displaced. As of 1997, it is estimated that 1,624 out of 40,000 people living in the district were repatriated refugees from other countries; about 25,000 were returnees who had been internally displaced¹⁸⁶ and 833 were discharged guerrillas/soldiers. By July 1994, 343 discharged soldiers from the district and their families had returned to Maúa. Since the statistics do not include the casualties of the war or those who had been displaced inside the district, they do not fully reflect the effect of the post-independence war on the residents of the district. Even taking this shortcoming into consideration, one can safely say that more than half of the population in the district, at the very least, had been relocated from elsewhere.


The district was divided into: (1) RENAMO-controlled area (including military bases); (2) FRELIMO-controlled area (the district capital only); and (3) no-man's land (Figure 10). As RENAMO advanced, the residents lived either in the RENAMO or FRELIMO-controlled areas, or outside the district. From 1986 it was no longer possible for the Maúa residents to live without being controlled either by RENAMO or FRELIMO. For nearly 10 years, the residents of one village were frequently divided into friends and foes.

As part of the author's research on the origins of the division, she interviewed the residents of nine rural groups about their century-long history of relocation and concluded that it was not just RENAMO or the conflict that caused the division. It was equally unlikely that the "tribal rivalry" in the pre-colonial era or the power struggle in the region from the colonial era to the FRELIMO era was the cause, as suggested by Geffray. Rather, it seemed that the division was created through a larger, dynamic historic experience, coinciding with the changes in the external environment, including international relations. Her hypothesis is that what happened during the liberation war was closely related to the historical division of the rural community, which has lasted to this day.

Niassa Province, bordering Tanzania and Malawi, played an important role for FRELIMO from the very early stages of the liberation struggle. It was there that FRELIMO established military bases and liberated zones and held its first party congress in Mozambique. Niassa was significant not only in the history of FRELIMO but also as a symbol of solidarity in the country's national history. While the northern part of the province became a liberated zone at an early stage, the Makuwa habitations in the south were held by the colonial rulers until independence. In Maúa Circumscription, situated in the south of Niassa, brutal battles were fought between the FRELIMO liberation army, infiltrating from the north, and the Portuguese Armed Forces, which had a base there.


Mwapula Village and Muela Village in northern Maúa Circumscription in particular, were frequently visited by FRELIMO guerrillas and became the centre of power struggles,

Figure 10 Maúa District during the post-independence armed conflict



(Drawn by the author)

Figure 11 Movement of the villagers of Matia District after the 1992 Peace Accord (until 2000)



(Drawn by the author)

partly because they were situated at the edge of the Miombo forest, which extended into Tanzania. Consequently, the traditional authority in this area was at the mercy of fortune, people were dispersed and each group was divided.

The liberation war was not just the origin of both unity and division at a national level. It was also the origin of them both at a local community level in Maúa District. Therefore, in addition to examining the realities of the local community during the liberation struggle, this book also investigates why FRELIMO's liberation struggle took the form it did, why it developed in the way it did in Maúa and why FRELIMO adopted such radical rural policies after independence.

Previous studies on the Makhuwas, Niassa Province and Maúa District

As already mentioned, there are very few previous studies on the Makhuwa habitations during the liberation war. The only exceptions are the research and reports by the colonial authority, especially the SCCIM, including reports by Monteiro on the Muslims in the north and another by Branquinho on the traditional Makhuwa forces.

However, if one broadens the search, there are rich pickings to be found on the Makhuwas. Many reports were generated by Catholic priests with anthropological or linguistic backgrounds. Also, many reports were written by expedition teams during the "scramble for Africa".

Some academic scholars interested in this area have already been mentioned. Medeiros, a leading scholar of the Makhuwa society, conducted pioneering research on the Makhuwa-Metto in Cabo Delgado Province. Geffray, a pioneer of the internal factor theories, wrote a doctoral dissertation on the Makhuwa society. Baptista Lundin has tried to clarify the relationship between the armed conflict and the traditional authority through an energetic field study in Nampula Province and Cabo Delgado Province since the peace agreement was concluded.¹⁸⁷ Adelino Zacarias Ivala, who completed his MA thesis under the supervision of Medeiros, documented the historical experience of the Makhuwas in north-western Nampula Province (the Alto Lúrio area) drawing from colonial archives and interviews.¹⁸⁸ Bento Bartolomue, a Makhuwa from Nampula, received a post-graduate education in Portugal. He later became a lecturer at Universidade Católica (Catholic University) in Nampula City and studied and taught on the power structure of the Makhuwas.¹⁸⁹

As for Niassa Province, there are numerous studies by Gerhard Liesegang, a history professor at Eduardo Mondlane University;¹⁹⁰ the historical study of Niassa and Cabo Delgado from 1836 to 1929 by Medeiros¹⁹¹ and the work by P. Luis Wegher, an Italian priest.¹⁹² However, none of these authors mention the liberation war.

In terms of Maúa, Francisco Martinez Lerma, a Spanish anthropologist and a Catholic priest from Consolata Missionaries in Maúa from 1971 to 1974 and in Cuamba from 1974 to 1980, wrote a book about the culture and customs of the Makhuwas living in Maúa. Although limited by the short research period during which he conducted his study, it is the only academic book on Maúa and is interesting because the author lived in Maúa

District during the liberation war and just after independence.

Perhaps Juseppe Frizzi, a Catholic priest from the Consolata Missionaries, knows about social change in Maúá District more than anybody else, although he has only focused on linguistics and culture. However, having lived in Maúá District since 1977 through the post-independence war and post-conflict period to the present, he has a deep understanding of the language, culture and politics of the Makhuwas and has trained foreigners involved in the Catholic Church on the Makhuwa language, culture and society. Frizzi's knowledge was indispensable to the author's own research.

This said, there are not abundant materials on the Makhuwas, Niassa or Maúá. The author acknowledges that the time she spent on her research was limited out of necessity. To supplement it she had personal consultations with Medeiros (2000, 2001 and 2004), Lerma (1999 and 2004), Monteiro (2004), Bento (1997 and 1999) and Frizzi (1997, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010).

The structure and sources

The structure of this book

Chapter 1 discusses the period when the issue of “unity” first appeared in contemporary Mozambican politics, followed by the historical background of the political movement, which eventually became FRELIMO, and the reality of the Portuguese rule of Mozambique. The period covered in this chapter begins with the Berlin Conference and the “scramble for Africa” in 1885 when the geographical territory called “Mozambique” first emerged, and continues to the end of the Second World War in 1945.

To open the book with the “scramble for Africa” may be perceived as neglecting the subjectivity and history of African people. However, although the territory of “Mozambique” was adopted voluntarily at the time of the liberation struggle and independence, its outline as a territory was originally decided unilaterally by world political players at the end of the nineteenth century. Chapter 2, which focuses on the local community, examines the situation which existed before the “scramble for Africa” because the formation of the local community in the Maúá region started in the mid-nineteenth century and had no direct connection with the “scramble of Africa”. Even though the territory of “Mozambique” was already established, it took a long time for it to influence the reality of the local community. The timing and the extent of influence were varied. It should be noted that the national-level periodisation and the community-level periodisation do not correspond throughout the book – this is intentional.

Chapter 2 also considers how colonial policy at a national level was implemented in the local community and what impact it had on the community. It also examines how the issue of unity, which was just emerging at a national level, was dealt with in Maúá. The chapter covers the period from about 1840 when the ancestors of the present residents of Maúá District started to settle in the region, to the end of the Second World War in 1945 when colonial rule was established in the region.

Chapter 3 covers the period from the end of the Second World War, when anti-colonial movements and nationalism was intensified domestically and internationally, up to 1960 when various organisations seeking liberation were formed. During this period, people in Mozambique started different resistance movements and political organisations. In other words, people in Mozambique started to perceive unity as a concrete issue and began to take action. The process invited various kinds of pressure and intervention from the Salazar administration. Furthermore, Chapter 3 looks into post-war international politics, which impacted on the mobilisation of the Mozambican population and the counterinsurgency strategy of the colonial authority.

Chapter 4 first demonstrates how different liberation movements were consolidated into FRELIMO and how the colonial authority responded to the development. Next, it describes how FRELIMO transformed liberation struggle into armed struggle and how the colonial authority prepared itself against it. The chapter then goes on to explain the overall changes seen as a result of the liberation war and how FRELIMO and the colonial authority acted during it. The period covered is from 1962 to 1975.

Chapter 5 considers how this overall change affected the local community, that is, how the liberation war was experienced in the Maúá community, by carefully examining FRELIMO, the colonial authority and the local community. In addition to this, it focuses on the response of local residents – the Maúá residents in this book.

The conclusion summarises issues covered in the previous chapters such as FRELIMO's activities, the response by the colonial authority, the experience of the Maúá residents and the change in international politics, and also demonstrates what type of society and political ground had been created by the time of independence. It discusses what happened to FRELIMO's ultimate goal of unity throughout the liberation struggle, and considers this to be as a result of multi-layered historical dynamism – finally making some links as to how this was related to the post-independence armed conflict.

Research sources and method

This book is based on the following field studies: in former Maúá Circumscription in Niassa Province (current Maúá District and Majune District) and the surrounding areas in July to September in 1997, August and September of 1999, August and September of 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010 (nine times in total); in the south part of Cabo Delgado Province from 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 and Zanzibar and southern Tanzania in 2005 and 2006.

Primary sources are based on archival research in Mozambique, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Tanzania, Zanzibar and other countries from 1997 to 2011. Details are outlined in the bibliography.

For the interviews, the author stayed in each village with one of two interpreters, Eusébio Aurélio¹⁹³ and Matias Mussondiwa,¹⁹⁴ who were born and lived in Maúá District (they speak the Makhuwa and Portuguese languages). In the beginning of her research, she did not prepare a question list but rather let the interviewees speak freely. During the

basic research in 1997, the author mainly conducted group interviews with nine rural communities in Maúa District. First, she asked about the history of relocation of each group and learned about their historical experience and in-group changes in the past century. After the group interviews, she interviewed the traditional authority and group members at their individual homes.

On doing the field research in 1999, the author mainly conducted individual interviews with the Muhoco, Mwapula and Muela groups in Maúa District and the Revia group in Majune District. She interviewed both men and women, including the traditional authorities who were already adults when the post-independence violence broke out, that is, those who experienced the liberation war and the post-independence conflict. She visited each of them at his or her home.

In addition, the author interviewed former FPLM soldiers, Portuguese army soldiers, former militias who were in Maúa during the liberation war. Many of them were living in Cuamba, the second largest city in Niassa Province. She visited the home of each person and interviewed him or her. She prioritised female former guerrillas because their views had not been sufficiently canvassed in the past. She also interviewed former RENAMO guerrillas and supporters during the same research.

In 2003 the author interviewed the above-mentioned three groups in Maúa District and their splinter groups, focusing on the issues where she felt she did not have a full comprehension. Moreover, she interviewed the traditional authorities and the religious authorities in the neighbouring Marrupa District. During the course of seven years the author interviewed a total of 113 people.

She visited the area every year from 2005 to 2011 to conduct follow-up research. From 2005 she expanded her research to Tanzania, Zanzibar and Cabo Delgado Province, especially its Makhuwa areas such as Pemba City, Mocimboa da Praia City, the districts of Mecúfi, Montepuez, Chiúre, Namuno and Balama. In total, she interviewed more than 350 people.

In conducting field research, the author first interviewed those involved in the Catholic Church, NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and the administration, and confirmed the characteristics and situation of the local community. From 1997 onwards, she met them before and after each research trip and consulted with them about the validity of her findings and thoughts. In addition, before selecting the first nine groups, the author researched the characteristics and historical experience of each village, using primary sources such as colonial archives, and then conducted basic research. As for the experience of each group, she interviewed neighbouring groups or splinter groups and examined the contents of the interviews from a different angle. She also met the “outsiders” of each group, such as teachers and those involved in churches, and created an opportunity to re-examine the interviews from their point of view.

Notes

- 1 "The Last Good-Bye", in *25 September*, no. 17, 1966:7.
- 2 Maúa/Niassa: 18/8/1999. Hereafter, interviews by the author will be noted in this order: the name of the interviewee, the location of the interview, the date.
- 3 Various words have been adopted to represent indigenous people in Africa. Present-day studies of Mozambique commonly use "*os africanos*" (Africans) while "*os autóctone*" (autochthons) was used in the colonial era, followed by "*os nativos*" (the natives) or "*os naturais*" (the locals). Neighbouring South Africa employs the term "blacks" partly because its long-term settlers of Dutch origin call themselves "*Afrikaners*" (Africans) and partly because of the influence of the American and French movement that perceives "black" as a positive identity. This book uses "Africans" in accordance with academic practice in Mozambique.
- 4 This indicates the difficulty that Africans in the Portuguese territories faced.
- 5 Tanganyika became independent in December 1961. It united with Zanzibar in April 1964, forming the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which was renamed as the United Republic of Tanzania in October the same year. This book refers to the country as Tanzania when the concerned period refers to 1964 and later.
- 6 See, for example, records on the formation of FRELIMO and the first party congress (Mondlane, 1969:119-121;122). For an example of scholarly work that uses these terms, see Chabal et al., 2002:20-22.
- 7 It was, in a way, the lessons and the fruit of various liberation movements in Portuguese colonies which aimed at victory through "solidarity" that enabled the self-same captains who had experienced the "colonial wars" to lead the coup in Lisbon. As explained in Chapter 4, these liberation movements made a distinction between the Portuguese government (the Salazar administration) and Portuguese people and actively appealed to Portuguese soldiers. As a result, the officers engaged in the "colonial wars" not only began to have doubts about their own government, but also became awakened to the significance of living of their free will. According to Fabião, military governor in Guinea-Bissau, the longer a subversive war lasted, the more the officers assimilated the ideas of the enemy [the oppressed] (Chabal et al., 2002:16). The *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA: Armed Forces Movement) declared three months after the coup, "The colonized peoples and the people of Portugal ... are allies. The struggle for national liberation has contributed powerfully to the overthrow of fascism and, in large degree, has lain at the base of the Armed Forces Movement whose officers have learned in Africa the horrors of a war without prospect (*sem finalidade*), and have therefore understood the roots of the evils which afflict the society of Portugal ..." (*Vóz da Guiné Bissau*, 10 August 1974, in Davidson, 1977:22). However, one should not forget that "solidarity" between liberation organisations and these Portuguese soldiers was possible, mainly due to the alliance between the former and the Portuguese communist party.
- 8 Isaacman and Isaacman praise the complex ethnic structure of the FRELIMO Central Committee as a rare case of success, compared with other African movements or governments (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983:111-113).
- 9 As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, for now this issue remains in inverted commas.
- 10 Saul believes that nationalism in Mozambique took a different route from that of other African countries due to its experience of liberation struggle; it produced a "true revolution" and gave hope for the creation of a post-revolution society (Saul, 1985:51-53).
- 11 It was at the third party congress, from 3 to 7 February 1977, that concrete policies and fundamental ideologies were presented. Delegations from the Soviet Union, China, Albania and Yugoslavia participated in the conference which was unusual, considering the situation (rivalry among communist countries) of that time (Burchett, 1978:188). This episode is one of the incidents that symbolises Mozambique's "solidarity" beyond its borders.
- 12 Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 1986:92. Just before this, the "nationalisation"

- of education and public health facilities was announced. See Burchett (1978:166-177) for the detail of the process as explained by Machel himself.
- 13 Education of girls was given little attention under colonial rule partly because the Department of Overseas Provinces (the department in charge of colonies) was not keen on changing the traditional social structure and “detrivialising” local residents.
 - 14 Comissão Nacional do Plano, Moçambique: Informação Estatística 1980/1981, 1982:72, in Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983:139.
 - 15 Carlo Barker, “Bringing Health Care to the People,” in Saul, 1985:325.
 - 16 Many journalists and scholars visited Mozambique just after independence and came into direct contact with this feverish excitement. Burchett, an Australian journalist who reported on the Vietnam War, detailed the experimental schools in Tete Province, which aimed at “the formation of the New Man for the New Society” (Burchett, 1978:162-166).
 - 17 The organisation used the English acronym, MNR, until 1980 and the Portuguese acronym, RENAMO (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*), thereafter. In this book, MNR/RENAMO is used until the mid 1980s and RENAMO thereafter.
 - 18 Various terms have described the post-independence armed conflict, including “terrorism”, “destabilisation” and “civil war”, depending on the position that users take. In this book “armed conflict” is used. This is the term used in the peace agreement.
 - 19 The total population at the end of the armed conflict in 1992 was 16.8 million, according to UNDP (1993).
 - 20 The term “armed (liberation) struggle”, commonly used in contemporary African history, reflects the initiative of people who drove the movement and held its legitimacy against one-sided labels given by colonial rulers such as “terrorism” or “insurgency”. While recognising the significance of the term, this book refers to the period of actual fighting as “liberation war” or “colonial war” as this term entails anti-revolutionary activities against the armed struggle of liberation movements and therefore includes the experiences of ordinary people in conflict areas. It is not adequate to use words such as “liberation” and “armed struggle” to describe the lives of ordinary people who were not part of the activities of organised liberation movements. At the same time, it is not desirable to conclude that their lives were not a struggle. Since it is one of the objectives of this book to re-examine the history of the liberation struggle as a method of historical description, this book uses the term “liberation war”. The “colonial war” is used to explain the policy and activities of the Portuguese government. When special focus is on FRELIMO’s activities, “liberation struggle” or “armed struggle” is used instead.
 - 21 Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 1986. This sentiment is echoed in *History of FRELIMO*, published by FRELIMO (FRELIMO, 1981:3).
 - 22 Flower, 1987; John Murray (in Vines, 1996:15). In a documentary, *Mozambique: The Struggle for Survival*, produced by Bob and Amy Cohen, Ken Flower admitted that Southern Rhodesia created a “secret army” called the Mozambique National Resistance, recruiting Portuguese soldiers and defectors of FRELIMO, in order “to find out what ZNLA was doing”.
 - 23 Fauvet, 1984:108-112.
 - 24 Hall and Young, 1997:117.
 - 25 It is because he would not have been able to obtain sympathy from Africans, who had just been liberated from colonial rule.
 - 26 Fauvet, 1984:108.
 - 27 Vines, 1996:16.
 - 28 Dhlakama is still the leader of RENAMO and ran for president in all four elections.
 - 29 The exact date is unknown.
 - 30 Vines, 1996:16.
 - 31 Ibid.
 - 32 Until mid-1979 all the attacks were launched from a training base in Southern Rhodesia and were

limited in the central part of Mozambique.

- 33 The Mozambican government did not recognise MNR/RENAMO as a political entity and continued to call them “*bandidos armados*”. Accordingly, AIM used the terms “armed bandits” and “MNR bandits” in its English monthly magazine *Mozambiquefile*. The terms greatly affected the way observers outside Mozambique perceived the organisation. After the peace agreement in 1992, it was called the “former rebel movement” instead.
- 34 Fauvet and Gomes, 1983:8.
- 35 Vines, 1996:19.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Minter, 1994:175-176.
- 38 Ibid.:1.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Hanlon, 1986a.
- 41 Hanlon, 1986b:27.
- 42 Ibid.:27; 131-150. The Reagan Administration toppled a revolutionary government in Granada by direct military intervention, provided military assistance to counter-revolutionary movements in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua and expanded military assistance to the pro-US governments in El Salvador and Pakistan, which were on the verge of being overthrown.
- 43 Hanlon, 1984:160.
- 44 Halliday, 1986:3.
- 45 Young, 1990:496.
- 46 Bowen, 1989:135, in Roesh, 1989:1.
- 47 Azevedo, 2002:33.
- 48 Christie and Hanlon, 2001:75. Christie and Hanlon argue that the strategic use of food assistance by the US played a role in promoting corruption and making the distribution system less functional in Mozambique. The US made it a condition of food assistance that the distribution of donated food was entrusted to NGOs that had close relationships with the US government. According to USAID’s Julius Schlotthauer, “We are fully aware of the shortcomings mentioned. However it has never been the USA’s political and aid-related intention to go in and strengthen Mozambican public administration ... Quite the opposite ...” (Ibid.).
- 49 Hanlon, 1991:29.
- 50 Hanlon, 1986b:150; Vines, 1996:24.
- 51 Vines, 1996:27.
- 52 Hermele, 1988:259.
- 53 Hanlon, 1984; Mozambique Angola Committee, 1984. The latter was published together with the Anti-Apartheid Movement in London and written by Fauvet. It relied heavily on the information and photographs provided by the governmental information agency, AIM.
- 54 Vines, 1996:2-3.
- 55 Geffray and Pederson, 1986.
- 56 Previously, “Makhuwa” was spelled “Macua” in Portuguese and “Makua” in English. Presently, “Makhuwa” is gaining popularity, based on the latest orthography.
- 57 Geffray and Pederson went there to conduct research on the implementation of the *aldeia comunal* policy in the communities, sponsored by *Centro de Estudos Africanos* of Eduardo Mondlane University.
- 58 Geffray and Pederson, 1988:28-30. This book used the French edition.
- 59 According to a diplomatic source, the US embassy translated the study from Portuguese into English and circulated it among Western diplomats in Maputo.
- 60 In this regard, Geffray responded in his 1991 book as follows: “Evidently RENAMO is not an association of bandits. But it is also true that it is not a political organisation and does not have any project and has lived off the population for almost fifteen years” (Geffray, 1991:25-26).
- 61 Clarence-Smith, 1989a.

- 62 Gersony, 1988. It has since been pointed out as problematic that his survey was conducted in the
 63 refugee camps that were controlled by the FRELIMO government.
 64 Wilson, 1994:3.
 64 Herman Cohen, who worked towards putting an end to armed conflicts in Africa under the Bush
 administration, describes in detail in his autobiography that, because of its negative perception as
 being cruel, government officials had to be much more careful when handling RENAMO than
 when handling UNITA in Angola (Cohen, 2000:182-193).
 65 Clarence-Smith, 1989a:10.
 66 In response to Clarence-Smith's review in April/May 1989, Minter, Cahen and Fauvet wrote
 letters to the editor, published in the August/September edition. The dispute was continued by
 Cahen and Roesch in the December 1989/January 1990 edition and by Fauvet in the June/July
 1990 edition. Around the same time, Young (1989) brought a new classification of "external and
 internal dynamics" into the argument.
 67 Military assistance from the Soviet Union and East Germany was indispensable in order to sustain
 the Mozambican national army (Alden, 1997:147).
 68 Vines, 1991:79. Although it is said that the MNR National Council adopted a political manifesto
 in August 1981, it was only around the time of this national congress that RENAMO started to be
 significant as a political entity.
 69 After the end of the armed conflict, RENAMO publicised FRELIMO's change as its victory of the
 "second war of liberation" (author's observation at election campaigns in 1994 and 1999).
 70 As far as the Korean Peninsula is concerned, however, one cannot say for sure that the Cold War
 structure had completely collapsed upon the disintegration of the USSR.
 71 See, for example, Hall, 1990; Vines, 1991.
 72 Geffray, 1991:24-25. The 1990 edition was in French. This book draws on the Portuguese edition
 published in 1991.
 73 Ibid.:24.
 74 Religious leaders, both Catholic and Protestant, and neighbouring nations played an important role
 in realising the peace negotiation. However, one cannot forget the strong will of the Mozambican
 people who longed for peace. The author believes that in order to illustrate the reality of the
 conflict, it is essential to look at it from the point of view of ordinary people who had to live
 through the conflict although they were not the active actors. This book will focus on the period
 until independence.
 75 The biggest challenge of the peace negotiation was that neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO
 recognised the other, that is, FRELIMO did not recognise RENAMO as a "political force" while
 RENAMO did not recognise the legitimacy of FRELIMO as a "government".
 76 Western countries, including Japan, contributed to the trust fund, which was originally intended
 to give financial assistance to various political parties in order to establish a multi-party system in
 Mozambique. However, the majority of the fund was given to RENAMO, whose leaders enjoyed
 staying in an expensive hotel. Even now, the money spent is not accounted for and the issue
 has become politicised. On the other hand, some employees of international organisations and
 researchers praise the "success" of the trust fund in terms of the prevention of the recurrence of the
 conflict (Chris Alden, London, 13/1/2004).
 77 In the 1994 election RENAMO received 37.78 per cent of the votes while FRELIMO won 44.3
 per cent. The 1999 elections recorded 38.81 per cent for RENAMO and 48.54 per cent for
 FRELIMO. For detail of votes, see Tables 1 and 2. For analysis of the elections, see Funada, 2000.
 78 See, for example, Young, 1997:120-155; Cahen, 1992; 1993.
 79 A "region" as in northern, central and southern regions within Mozambique correspond to the
 locally-used word, *região*. However, in the discipline of international relations, "region" is often
 used for a larger area. For example, southern Africa is perceived as a "sub-region" of the "region" of
 Africa and South Africa as a "sub-regional super power".

- 80 See, for example, Baptista Lundin, 1995; Brito, 1995.
- 81 Makhuwa-Lomwe (also known as Macua-Lomwe) is a general term for Makhuwa speakers living in the northern region (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula) and the central region (Zambézia). The Makhuwa-Lomwe in the northern region is usually described simply as Makhuwa. This book uses the term Makhuwa when referring to the Makhuwa-Lomwe in the northern region although there is some reluctance to view the Makhuwa or the Makhuwa-Lomwe as an established ethnic group. The social structure of the Makhuwa tends to be fragmented, and macro-identity was introduced by the Swahili when the colonial rulers asked them to explain local ethnicity. This is similar to the ethnic formation in Kenya (Matsuda, 2000:59-60). On the other hand, ethnicity is increasingly featured in present-day Mozambican politics. Considering all of the above, in this book the term Makhuwa is used to describe an entity of Makhuwa speakers as an identity that has become embodied. As for the comments and realities of the Makhuwa, see Funada-Classen, 2002.
- 82 Young points out that while ethnic or ethno-regional sentiment was important among FRELIMO supporters, the FRELIMO government was indifferent to such sentiment (Young, 1997:127, 131).
- 83 This book points out that it is not sufficient to focus on ethnic or regional tendencies in order to understand the voting patterns of Mozambican voters in 1999 (Funada, 2000). While it is important to analyse the results based on regional divisions such as north, centre and south, the number of votes cast varied greatly from one district to another and even between one voting station to another. Moreover, it is problematic to equate the voting trends with the support during the conflict, because some votes were forced or strategically distributed ("strategic votes") (Funada, 1997; 2000).
- 84 However, residents in central Mozambique were also attacked by RENAMO and widely displaced. Therefore, the 1994 election result was difficult to predict right to the end.
- 85 Vines, 1991:85 and Funada, 1997:148.
- 86 *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Special Issue, no. 25, 13/12/2004. RENAMO lost a lot of support in the most recent election in 2009: FRELIMO 51.2 per cent; RENAMO 22.8 per cent; MDM (a splinter group of RENAMO) 23.3 per cent in Sofala Province. In Manica Province: FRELIMO 70.8 per cent and RENAMO 24.8 per cent. For details, see Table 1-2.
- 87 Fauvet, 1990:21.
- 88 For the distribution of ethnic groups, see Figure 6, compiled by Pélissier. One should keep in mind that such ethnic grouping is, however, problematic. It was only during the colonial era that ethnic classification was established. Also, many ethnic names were originally disparaging. Medeiros states that it was quite recently that groups, which can be called ethnic, were formed and that not only has the formation not been completed but some groups are disappearing (Medeiros, 2001; 2003b). Furthermore, both the relocation of groups and intermarriage between groups are traditionally common in Africa. Matsuda also points out the problem of fixed ethnic classification that ignores historical background (Matsuda, 2000:56-61). This book adopts a widely used classification and examines its significance. However, there is a reluctance to call Mozambican people a "nation" and their liberation movement "nationalism", as given this book focuses on the process of "nation" or "nationalism" – for the same reason the author feels uncomfortable about describing the group of Makhuwa speakers a "nation". Therefore, while using the term "ethnic groups", this book examines what it actually means and how it was formed.
- 89 AIM, *Mozambiquefile*, Nov. 1994:13, and Funada, 1997:156-157.
- 90 Funada, 1997:141. Ethno-regional manipulation became even stronger in the second multi-party election in 1999.
- 91 For the discussion concerning "internal enemy" or "enemy within", see Funada, 1997. FRELIMO has used "tribalism" as a comprehensive term to include ethnicity, regionalism, religions and traditional authority and referred to it as one of its "enemies within" since October 1966 (Funada, 1997:133). This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
- 92 Machel, 1985:76-77.

- 93 Cahen, 1992:1; 7.
- 94 Magode (ed.), 1996.
- 95 Serra (ed.), 1998; 2000. Both books were based on a series of lectures at the UEM.
- 96 Serra, 1998:11-12.
- 97 Ngoenha, 1998:19.
- 98 Ibid.:17-32.
- 99 Serra, 1998:10.
- 100 Medeiros, 2003b:1. Translated from the Japanese.
- 101 Medeiros, 2001:3.
- 102 Egerö, 1988:41. This passage was originally written as a reply to the review of his book by Yussuf Adam, published in the SAPEM (Southern African Political Economy Magazine).
- 103 Ibid.
- 104 Fink, Gassert and Junker, 1998:2-3.
- 105 After Mozambique gained independence, Opello used the term, “independence war”.
- 106 The “deprivation of history” of Africans was committed not only by people involved in colonial policies but also by Western intellectuals. A well-known example is the writing of Hegel: “In Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence ... At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit.” This type of view predominated in various Western sciences in the nineteenth century (Hegel, 1956:93, 99). Moreover, most African societies, except in current Ethiopia, Cameroon and part of Libya, did not have their own written language and therefore did not leave documentary records of their own history. As a result, African history was written by others such as Arabs and Westerners, which promoted the further deprivation of African history.
- 107 Ghana’s first president Nkrumah wrote in *I Speak of Freedom*: “Africa has been left behind and suppressed for too long, but this giant continent is now awakening. We must face the future with confidence. We are grateful to all the other nations of the world that have helped us and that have spoken on our behalf, but I firmly believe that *only the African* can speak for the African and *only the African* can be the spokesman of this great continent” (Nkrumah, 1961:48).
- 108 Matias Mussondiwa, Maúa Sede, 1/9/1999; Vitorino Amade, Cuamba Sede, 31/8/2003. A similar phenomenon was observed in the British colony of the Gold Coast (presently Ghana) (Usami, 1996:13).
- 109 Departamento de Educação e Cultura da Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: FRELIMO, 1971.
- 110 The compilation of African history by African historians in the 1960s onward was based on similar thinking.
- 111 It was understandable because it was impossible to conduct such research under colonial rule.
- 112 Departamento de História, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, *A História de Moçambique*, Livraria Universitária, Maputo. The first edition of Volume 1 (200/300-1885) was published in 1982, Volume 2 (1886-1930) in 1983 and Volume 3 (1930–1961) in 1993.
- 113 Departamento de História, 2000:ix-x.
- 114 Ibid.:xi. Departamento de História, 1988:10.
- 115 However, Serra’s following recognition is important: “my’ paradigm is clearly a minority in today’s Mozambican social sciences” (Departamento de História, 2000: xi). This is discussed later.
- 116 Departamento de História, 1988:10. The passage was originally in the introduction of the first edition.
- 117 The bulletin of the history department confirms that the manuscript had been finished by 1987 (*Boletim do Departamento de História*, no. 5, Fev. 1987).
- 118 Ibid.
- 119 Alexandorino José, an expert on the history of the FRELIMO liberation struggle and a former CEA director and a high-ranking officer of the *Ministério para os Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes*

- (Ministry of Veterans Affairs), claims that the publication did not go ahead because the description “was not accurate” (Maputo, August 2005). It is not clear what he meant by not being “accurate”, but political sensitivity may have played a role, judging from the fact that there have been no books written on the liberation struggle period as a historical subject.
- 120 Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, *A História da Minha Pátria* (5a Classe), 1986. This point can be confirmed in the first edition in 1986 and the second edition in 1992.
- 121 At an international conference on this matter held in Japan, it was pointed out that there was a lack of women’s and gender viewpoints in the national history as the history of the liberation struggle, and opinions as to how the re-writing of history would be possible provoked lively debate. For the detail, see Funada-Classen, 2003.
- 122 In Japan, too, many have attempted to write a new African history. A good example is Miyamoto and Matsuda, 1997.
- 123 Borges Coelho, 1984:1.
- 124 Bowen points out that none of the previous sources constitute well-documented research on peasant views in the liberation struggle, and mentions: “no research speaks to the question at all in terms of detailed empirical material” (Bowen, 2000:214).
- 125 According to Borges Coelho, even he could not conduct field research because of the war (Borges Coelho, Maputo, 20/08/2002).
- 126 For more detail, see Funada-Classen, 2002. For the inter-relations between FRELIMO liberated zones and the Makhuwa habitations, see Figures 6 and 7.
- 127 In Portugal, the term “colonial war” is used instead of “armed (liberation) struggle” and “colonial liberation war”. This book uses the “colonial war” with inverted commas when it refers to writings by the Portuguese.
- 128 Estado-Maior do Exército, 1989.
- 129 Cann, 1997. Cann learned about the “colonial war” while he was stationed in Portugal as a NATO naval officer from 1987–1992.
- 130 Cann, 1997:xiii.
- 131 According to Kato, the number of LICs increased after the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the new world order, advocated by President Bush, was not realised. Facing the danger of a chaotic world full of LICs, people involved in security issues raised their awareness as to how to solve LICs and how to build a multi-dimensional new world order after the Cold War (Kato, 1993:3-5).
- 132 Afonso and Gomes, 2000.
- 133 Ibid.:528; 518. The number of Portuguese army soldiers was about 150,000, including those from outside of Portugal. Of this number, 8,290 were killed in the wars.
- 134 As the prime minister from 1930 to 1968, Salazar established an autocratic regime, the *Estado Novo*. Caetano succeeded him as the prime minister in 1968 and maintained more or less the same system. Therefore it is widely accepted that the Salazar regime continued until the coup in 1974. This book refers to the government from 1968 to 1974 as the Salazar/Caetano administration.
- 135 For detail, see Teixeira, 2001.
- 136 Garcia, 2003.
- 137 Correia, 2000.
- 138 In 1964 Monteiro conducted field research on an Islamic society in the Mozambican northern region along the coastline of the then Cabo Delgado District. In his meeting with the governor-general, he predicted an imminent uprising. In those days, nobody in Lourenço Marques suspected that a similar situation to Angola or Guinea-Bissau would occur in Mozambique in the near future. A few weeks after his “prediction”, FRELIMO began its armed struggle, and Monteiro was invited to join the SCCIM as a high-ranking officer (Fernando Amaro Monteiro, Carvaceo, 7/1/2004).
- 139 The brief personal history of Monteiro is based on the author’s interview with him (Fernando Amaro Monteiro, Carvaceo, 7/1/2004). After independence, he left Mozambique for South Africa and then returned to Portugal where, upon the request of the new government, he worked for the

- army research institute and was involved in the restructuring of the intelligence service.
- 140 Monteiro told the author that he feels there was little interest in this theme. A younger generation of researchers tend to emphasise relations with the EU members more than those with the ex-colonials.
- 141 Bowen, 2000:22; 214.
- 142 Geffray and Pederso, 1988:29-30.
- 143 Geffray, 1991:24. As Geffray himself left Erati after the situation deteriorated, his Mozambican research assistant and interpreter gathered the data on his behalf.
- 144 “The people” in this context means “ordinary people”, especially rural residents in Mozambique, who do not belong to the FRELIMO government, RENAMO soldiers or leadership.
- 145 Cahen, 1989/90:21.
- 146 Fauvet, 1989:26; 1990:21.
- 147 One must be careful about generalising the findings of Roesch’s study since his field was Gaza Province, FRELIMO’s stronghold which was fiercely attacked by RENAMO. The same thing could be applied to the study of Geffray. Later on, however, Roesch conducted research in Nampula and stated that he saw the same tendency in Nampula as Geffray suggested (Roesch, 1989/1990:20-22).
- 148 The same can be said about the early study of the liberation war, as seen earlier in this chapter.
- 149 Chingono, 1996.
- 150 Funada-Classen, 2002:50.
- 151 This book spells Macuane here as Geffray spells it.
- 152 For details of the classification, see Chapter 2.
- 153 Young, 1997:138.
- 154 Geffray, 1991:59-60.
- 155 “With a population of around 166,000 souls ... with an area of 8,923 km² ... the municipality of Erati is too vast and too populated for the administrative authority in charge of Erati to establish a regular and continuous contact with as many as 36 administrative posts and *regedorias*” (Branquinho, 1969:114).
- 156 Ibid.
- 157 Some also spell it “Mêto” or “Meto”. Based on the recommendation of Frizzi, this book uses “Metto”.
- 158 Ibid.:114-120.
- 159 Geffray, 1991:59-61.
- 160 Ibid.
- 161 Ibid.:62.
- 162 The word *régulo* (small king) was coined by the Portuguese and referred to a chief of local residents in the colonies. See Chapter 1 for more details.
- 163 Branquinho, 1969:114-116.
- 164 Ibid.:24; 114-116.
- 165 Ibid.:315.
- 166 Ibid.
- 167 Ibid.
- 168 See, for details, Chapters 2 and 5.
- 169 Branquinho, 1969:118-120.
- 170 Geffray, 1991:34-35.
- 171 Ibid.:59.
- 172 It should be noted that Geffray’s work was published during the war. O’Laughlin commented in 1992: “Geffray’s analysis would be a helpful rewriting of Mozambican history that is all too convenient for many who now hold political and economic power in that country” (O’Laughlin, 1992: 33).
- 173 It has a strong impact because it is made by the “traditional authority” of the Eratis who fled to the FRELIMO side.
- 174 Geffray, 1991:27.

- 175 Ibid.
- 176 Young points out that the ethnic sentiments remained strong in the FPLM particularly against the Makhuwas and that these sentiments appeared to have been shared by Machel (Young, 1997:144); Abrahamsson and Nilsson point out that due to the tension between the Makondes and the Makhuwas in Northern Mozambique, FRELIMO's rapid advance was halted at the traditional border between the Makondes and the Makhuwas (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995:25-26.)
- 177 This was frequently mentioned to the author by local people, other Mozambicans and foreigners.
- 178 The historical changes of territorial divisions and the impacts of these on the local residents will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
- 179 Thirty-nine thousand to be more precise (Anuário Estatístico/Niassa, 1997:17). A UNHCR/UNDP publication of the same year cited 40,017 as the population (UNHCR/UNDP, 1997:3). There have not been any statistics according to ethnic groups, but the colonial archives, the author's interviews and Lerma (1989/1998), suggest that the majority of the population speak the Makhuwa language.
- 180 For the 1994 election, see Funada, 2000. The result was: FRELIMO 27 per cent and RENAMO 38 per cent in 1994. RENAMO took even more votes in 1999 – 30 per cent against FRELIMO's 30 per cent (STAE, 2001:CD-rom).
- 181 Geffray and Pederson, 1986; Clarence-Smith, 1989a and b; Cahen, 1989/90; 1992; Roesch, 1989/90; Fauvet, 1989; Geffray, 1988; 1991; O'Laughlin, 1992; Baptista Lundin, 1992; Young, 1997.
- 182 For details see Funada-Classen, 2002.
- 183 An American anthropologist criticises Geffray's dichotomised view of the "traditional world of peasantry" and the "modern world of the cities" (O'Laughlin, 1992:25-33).
- 184 Mwene will be used since the word is used among the Makhuwas in Niassa.
- 185 The role of *muenes* will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
- 186 UNHCR/UNDP, 1997:3.
- 187 Baptista Lundin, 1992. The Brazilian anthropologist conducted research in Mozambique for many years and served as an advisor to the FRELIMO government at the Ministry of State Administration (MAE) on how to use "traditional authority" in the local government. She hosted many seminars, compiled a series of books on traditional authority and then returned to the Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais (ISRI: Higher Institute of International Relations), where she remains.
- 188 Ivala, 1993. Later, he became the representative of the ASSANA, an NGO for the Makhuwas in Nampula. He has been actively involved in the democratisation process and presented papers at a number of seminars (Ivala, 1995).
- 189 Bento passed away in 2003 without compiling his research.
- 190 Liesegang has been involved in historical research and education since Mozambique's independence. He contributed to a series edited by the history department, *History of Mozambique*, and various academic journals. He is currently writing a book based on his research. His main research subjects are the Nyanjas and the Yaos.
- 191 Medeiros, 1997.
- 192 Wegher, 1995.
- 193 The late Eusévio Aurelio, a Muslim and a Makhuwa-Xirima speaker, has worked for the author since ONUMOZ in 1994. He was from the neighbouring village of Muhoco, Maúa and moved to Cuamba in 1984 due to the deterioration caused by war after independence.
- 194 Matias Mussondiwa, a Catholic and a Makhuwa-Metto speaker, is from the Nekutho group in Maúa District. The author took a different interpreter to the same group in a different year to confirm the content of the previous interviews.

CHAPTER 1

Emergence of “Mozambique” and Social Changes under Colonial Rule

Emergence of Mozambique

Principle of "effective occupation" and Portuguese colonial rule


Despite being a minor player in Europe in the sixteenth century, Portugal was the first country to establish various trade bases along the African coast. Portugal's strategy was at times criticised, perhaps out of rivalry among other reasons, and it was derided as the “first to come, last to go” by other countries.¹ Until the end of the nineteenth century, Portuguese colonial rule on the African continent had concentrated on exploitative economic activities along the coast such as the slave and ivory trade, and it had focused little on establishing a government or exploration of the interior of the continent.²

Throughout the eighteenth century, Portugal's trade bases in the coastal areas of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique had been used almost exclusively for slave trade to the Americas, especially to Brazil. This situation continued into the nineteenth century with some adaptation over time.³

The Berlin Conference, which mounted international pressure on colonial powers for effective occupation, was the turning point for the distribution of Portuguese colonies held from 1884 to 1885. The principle of effective occupation formalised the scramble for Africa among the European powers that invaded, attacked, occupied and annexed the African continent. One of the criteria established for the colonies by the Berlin Conference was that the colonial power had to ensure economic development in all designated territories.⁴ Prior to this, no real military or administrative controls had been exercised in the extensive colonies that Portugal had claimed for itself.⁵ It had been unable to suppress insurgencies by African chiefs, even in *prazos*,⁶ situated in the Zambezi River gorge area in the middle region of Mozambique, over which Portugal was considered to have the strongest influence. As a result, Portugal never managed to establish the administrative structures vital for occupation and, therefore, the Berlin Conference decision was a significant blow.⁷

Five years after the Berlin Conference, Portuguese colonies were finally confirmed. From the latter half of the 1870s to 1890, expectations and interest in creating their own

Figure 12 Portuguese “mapa cor-de-rosa” in Africa in the late 19th century



Newitt, 1995:342.

(Some spellings changed by the author)

empires were heightened more than ever among European countries.⁸ Britain was one of the most active European countries seeking to expand its empire by exploring the interior of the continent. British imperialists, such as Cecil Rhodes, actively sought to secure areas between Cape Town and Cairo as their own, through various methods including diplomatic efforts. Though the main objective was to frustrate the ambitions of German imperialism, Portugal was most affected by the British.

The Portuguese government established the Comissão Central Permanente de Geografia (Permanent Central Commission of Geography) in 1876 to stop the “erosion” of its territories by other European countries and also sent numerous expeditions to the interior of the African continent. Since it no longer had “historical rights” to existing colonial territories, Portugal needed to raise as many Portuguese flags as possible by forming treaties with African chiefs in the respective areas. In 1883 the Portuguese government adopted a national policy that comprised drawing a map to establish its territories. At the beginning of 1884 three major expeditions were dispatched into the interior of the continent.⁹ In 1886, immediately after the Berlin Conference, the government presented a “pink map” (*mapa cor-de-rosa*) showing the empire expanding from the east coast (Mozambique) to the west coast of Africa (Angola), including what is now known as Zimbabwe and Zambia. This territory was named as the Província Anglomoçambicana (Province of Anglo-Mozambique).¹⁰

However, this plan was thwarted by the interventions of Belgium, which had successfully colonised Congo, and by Britain, which planned to expand its empire through the middle of the African continent.¹¹

The dominium of the Zambezi River region became a particular source of conflict between Britain and Portugal. Rhodes used Livingston’s missionary activities in the region to try to persuade the Portuguese government that Britain had a right to protect the inhabitants. In January 1890, British Prime Minister Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil Salisbury sent an ultimatum to the Portuguese government to withdraw from the region, which left Portugal with no option but to agree as they were economically dependent on Britain.¹² This marked the end of Portugal’s ambition as challenger to Britain’s expansion plans. After the collapse of the dream of the pink map, the territory called Mozambique officially emerged following negotiations with the British government between 1890 and 1891.

This negotiation was completed without consideration for, or in consultation with, local inhabitants; hence the new territory was meaningless to those people. However, the principle of “effective occupation” required that Portugal pursue the notion of “territorial integrativity” and “effectivity” in the Portuguese colonial territory of Mozambique. This, in theory, required tighter control over all African inhabitants living in the area. However, in reality, it was impossible for the Portuguese government, incapable of even controlling the areas designated as *prazo*, to control a vast area ten times larger than its own country.¹³ Furthermore, Portugal’s position became precarious as it was carrying a heavy debt at the time and its constitutional monarchy government of the Progressive Party had suffered a loss of dignity after being forced to abandon a part of the colony, especially Central Africa, which it believed belonged to it.¹⁴ In January 1891, an anti-monarchy movement

led by republicans broke out.¹⁵ Republicans tried to capture public sentiment though promoting republicanism and combined it with some of the principles of nationalism and colonialism. To this end, the 300th anniversary commemoration of the death of Luís de Camões was organised in Lisbon in 1880.¹⁶

The constitutional monarchy government responded with the following strategies: (1) concession companies would receive concessions on business, mining, taxing and land ownership, and in return they would develop the outlined area; and (2) the Portuguese Armed Forces would carry out a “pacification campaign” that would establish total control over the groups not yet ruled by Portugal. These strategies were developed to comply with international pressure for effective occupation and at the same time would enable Portugal to maintain a strong hold over its colonies.¹⁷

As a result, more than 800,000 square kilometres, nearly 65 per cent of the territory designated as Mozambique, was entrusted to the following patent companies: the Nyassa Company (Companhia do Niassa), which occupied the far north of Mozambique (25 per cent of total land); the Zambezia Company (Companhia da Zambézia), which together with other companies,¹⁸ occupied the Zambezi River Basin (15 per cent of total land) and the Mozambique Company (Companhia de Moçambique) which occupied the middle region of Mozambique (25 per cent of total land). This is illustrated in Figure 13.


Leroy Vail comments that the patent company system resulted in denationalisation due to the fact that there were too few Portuguese investors who wanted to invest in these companies, despite its original purpose, which was to safeguard Portugal’s rights and profit in Mozambique. On the other hand, Barry Neil-Tomilson argues that the system enabled Portugal to retain its territories and therefore it did benefit the country. However, both researchers agree that the system did not result in the intended economic development of the area, or in any benefits for people in Mozambique, but rather, had disastrous results for local inhabitants.¹⁹

Concession companies

The leasing contracts given to concession companies were used as a tool to avoid the intervention of other European powers, forcing the Portuguese to implement effective rule, and, at the same time, served as an aid to collecting foreign currency needed for the colony’s development. However, it was less effective as a strategy against the military resistance led by the African chiefs, which the Portuguese colonial army had failed to suppress. One of Portugal’s intentions was to suppress insurgencies that had been breaking out frequently within its territories.²⁰

The area downstream of the Zambezi River, which was entrusted to the Mozambique Company in 1891,²¹ had a long history of armed resistance by Africans partly because it was in the *prazo* area.²² The anti-colonial movement led by an alliance of African chiefs had increased in intensity in 1888, following the strengthening of the Portuguese colonial army’s rule in the aftermath of the scramble for Africa. Hence, the Portuguese government entrusted the area to the Mozambique Company with the condition that it “pacify” the

Figure 13 Areas of operation of Mozambique concession companies



Newitt, 1995:366.

(Some spellings changed by the author)

area.²³ However, the company not only failed to pacify the area, but its very existence caused further insurgency. The leader of the insurgency was Hanga, the chief of the Barué. His top priority was to see the eviction of the Mozambique Company from the area.²⁴ Learning from the mistakes of previous insurgencies in which conflict among African chiefs had contributed to its failure, he attempted to form an association of chiefs regardless of their ethnicity or race²⁵ in the Zambézia area.²⁶ Hanga also criticised Portuguese colonialism for not bringing “modernisation” to the area. He said:

For a long time, I have had the wish to have an able white man for a friend. I see how you white men advance more and more in Africa, on all sides of my country companies are at work; on the Zambezi steamers are running; from Beira the railway leads to Mashonaland [Rhodesia at that time]; in Umtali [the border between Rhodesia and Mozambique], Macequece and other places townships have risen. My country will also have to take up these reforms and I am quite prepared to open it up to the whites ... I am pleased to see Englishmen and Germans with me. Only the Portuguese are not allowed to remain here. Now I am at war with them, and intend to remain at war.²⁷

The military resistance led by Hanga established the Barué region as the centre of anti-Portuguese activities and was known from Zumbo, an inland border town in Mozambican territory to the Indian Ocean coastal region.²⁸ The following passage was written by a staff member of the Mozambique Company in the minutes of a meeting regarding a *conselho*²⁹ (town council) in 1901.

The Barué insurgency created a dangerous threat, for the vast populations who reside in the territory of the Mozambican Company hardly respect the prestige of the Portuguese government and have no fear of the weak Portuguese army. Each day the indigenous population become more reluctant to pay the taxes and provide forced labour. They consider the situation of the Barué as most desirable.³⁰

Barué’s insurgency also influenced the neighbouring Kingdom of Mutapa,³¹ and rival chiefs joined Hanga’s anti-Portuguese alliance.³²

The colonial government of Mozambique, threatened by the alliance of African chiefs, ordered the Mozambique Company to take military action. When this failed, the government decided to suppress the insurgency on its own in 1901. Over 20,000 African soldiers and policemen were gathered from Lourenço Marques (the Chopi, although they came from Inhambane), Inhambane (the Ngoni), Moçambique (the Makhuwa) and as far away as Angola and were sent to Barué in June, 1902.³³ The colonial army won after a fierce battle and captured local chiefs who were sent to São Tomé Island, a Portuguese colony in the Atlantic Ocean. Hanga and other chiefs managed to escape to Rhodesia, but their defeat marked the end of the strategy to build a united kingdom of African chiefs.

The Nyassa Company was established by a merchant from Lisbon in 1891 with the purpose of developing the area around the Nyassa Lake in 1894.³⁴ However, in effect, the company merely acted as a middle station for the slave trade, deriving the majority of its income from customs duties.³⁵ This was possible because the recruitment of labour by "free will" was still permitted after the slave trade was outlawed. In this way sending labour forces out to islands belonging to French colonies in the Indian Ocean was allowed to continue.³⁶

Meanwhile, from 1850 to 1870, African society had been greatly transformed due to many African chiefs' involvement in the "gun-slave cycle". This activity, trading slaves for guns, began in the middle of the eighteenth century and created a cycle in which those chiefs who possessed guns would start a war to obtain slaves, which would prompt other chiefs to trade their slaves for guns in order to ensure their own safety. Africans were thus enabled to accumulate significant amounts of weapons and military facilities by the end of nineteenth century.

As was evidenced by the Barué rebellion, these military attacks were gradually directed towards the Portuguese colonial administration and concession companies as colonial rule strengthened.³⁷ To counteract the attacks, the governor-general of Mozambique passed a law to stop the trading of firearms completely. The law affected the Nyassa Company, which faced bankruptcy as its income from trading guns for slaves was dramatically reduced.³⁸


To this end, in 1897 a group of British investors called the Ibo Syndicate took over the Nyassa Company and started to charge African inhabitants in their territory "hut tax" in order to supplement their income previously derived from custom tax.³⁹ Once the taxation of inhabitants became their only source of income, the company actively promoted military expeditions into the interior of the country in order to supplement their income.

The Portuguese colonial army, which had begun to expand its military control from the coastal area of the Indian Ocean towards the interior of Mozambique at the time, also tried to take control of the Nyassa Company's territory in 1899.⁴⁰ This move was met with fierce resistance from African inhabitants of the territory. The resistance from Yao chiefs and Makonde people, in particular, was so fierce that it became legendary.

In the early years of the twentieth century, the Witwatersrand region (the region around current-day Johannesburg) suffered a serious shortage of mine labourers. To maintain a steady supply of labourers, mining companies, as well as their British investors, formed the Nyassa Consolidated in London in 1908. In the same year, 764 labourers were sent to work on South African mines from Nyassa.⁴¹

With the extra income gained from recruiting and exporting migrant workers to South Africa, the Nyassa Company began its fight against the armed African chiefs. For inhabitants in northern Mozambique, the operations of the Nyassa Company ushered in a new era of military occupation, heavy taxes and forced labour. For Portugal, it helped to solve its obligations to ensure economic development, "pacification" of indigenous inhabitants and the establishment of an administrative system in its colony.⁴²

Figure 14 Trade route in the Indian Ocean from the late 18th century to the mid 19th century



Drawn by the author, based on Medeiros, 1988:48.

Fundamental characteristics of Portuguese colonial rule

Compulsory labour

The previous section illustrates that the two main purposes of the concession companies were to collect hut tax and to secure the labour force. These activities ultimately helped Portugal to achieve effective occupation and military control of its vast territory. The economic activity in the territory under the direct control of the Portuguese government (which constituted 35 per cent of Mozambique) was similar to that of the concession companies.⁴³ The economic importance of southern Mozambique in particular increased following the discovery of precious minerals in South Africa. Because of this, the Portuguese governor’s palace was moved from the Mozambique Island to Lourenço Marques, the southernmost location adjacent to the South African border.

By the end of the nineteenth century, southern Mozambique had become a reserve for the supply of labour to the South African mines. The Mozambican governor’s palace responded to the growing demand for labour by passing a series of new laws which effectively ensured that African males living in the southern areas were sent to South African mines. This suggests that the 1875 royal decree with its “Principle of Assimilation” (*Assimilação*), and the fundamental policy of Portugal’s colonial rule that “nobody shall be subject to enforced labour” were in fact simply token gestures on the part of the Portuguese government.⁴⁴

In reality, the main purpose of economic development and effective rule was to exploit African labour, regardless of whether the territory was controlled by a government or by the concession companies. African peasants who engaged in subsistence farming were not integrated into the monetary economy, tended to show little interest in earning money and were reluctant to comply with the government’s request to become paid labourers. Tax was therefore introduced as a strategy to force them out of their communities. Durão, a member of the Portuguese parliament, famously said during his visit to Zambézia in 1903, “Tax is a legitimate weapon to make Africans work.”⁴⁵

In an attempt to avoid tax payments, African peasants went into hiding or reduced the number of their huts, and some of them escaped to the border areas or to neighbouring countries. From 1895 to 1907, over 50,000 inhabitants of the northern region were estimated to have fled to the British territories.⁴⁶ Others stayed and cultivated cash crops in order to pay tax.

Irritated by unwilling African peasants, António Enes, the governor of Mozambique, tried to force them to work by introducing a series of laws.⁴⁷ Enes insisted the laws of his home country did not apply because “black people possessed particular characteristics.”⁴⁸ In 1894 the colonial government, led by Enes, introduced the notion of “reformatory labour” instead of imprisonment as a punishment for those who refused to work. It also established the first administrative circumscription (*circunscrição*) in Lourenço Marques and started to collect hut tax.⁴⁹

More than just a reflection of António Enes's personality, these policies could be seen as a reflection of the Portuguese government's perspective. James Duffy, a British researcher, quotes the following statement from the Portuguese government committee documents in 1898.

[T]he state, not only as a sovereign of semi-barbarous populations, but also a depository of social authority, should have no scruples in obliging and if necessary forcing these rude Negroes in Africa, these ignorant Pariahs in Asia, these half-savages from Oceania to work, that is to better themselves by work, to acquire through work the happiest means of existence, to civilize themselves through work...⁵⁰

Since the Age of Great Navigations, described by the Portuguese as the Age of *Descobrimento* (Discovery), Portugal's slogan for its colonial territories had been "a mission for civilisation". However, in order to justify its contradictory policy of labour exploitation, they devised a new statement, which was: "forced labour helps bring civilisation to African people". To assist this process, a labour law was introduced in 1899 in Mozambique, which forced Africans to work out of "moral obligation". This was amended in 1907 to ensure more effective control of African labourers.⁵¹ All areas of Mozambique were divided into small administrative sections and a network of administrations was established,⁵² which formed the basis for mobilisation of labourers in response to the economic and political demands of the colonial government.

The export of Mozambican labourers became more and more systematised following the agreement on migrant labourers, which was signed in Pretoria in 1909 and in Salisbury in 1913.⁵³

The control of the "native" labour force

Following the amendment to the law in 1907, African peasants in Mozambique became subject to layers of administrative divisions that were controlled by the national government. Firstly, agricultural areas, excluding towns (*conselho*), were divided into circumscriptions (*circunscricção*) and further divided into administrative posts (*posto de administração*). Each administrative post was then divided into smaller districts called "*regedorial/regulado*". A "*regedoria*" was an area governed by a local African chief called a *regedor* or *régulo*⁵⁴ and it became the smallest unit of the administrative sections. Hence, the "traditional authority" was placed at the end of the colonial administrative mechanism.⁵⁵

The most important of the many roles the *régulo* had was to control the movements of inhabitants and to secure labour when necessary.⁵⁶ African police, known as "*sipaio*" (*cipail/sepail/cypai*),⁵⁷ played an important part in supporting the thorough implementation of the *régulo*'s role.

The word *sipaio* originated from the word "*sepoy*" – an Indian soldier serving under the British order. *Sipaio*s worked as guards, civilian soldiers, police or tax collectors. In some

cases, the *sipaios* were more powerful than *régulos* and even arrested African chiefs who failed to fulfil their duties of collecting taxes and supplying labour.

In 1910, the Portuguese army soldiers who supported the Republican Party led the revolt against Portugal’s King Manuel II. While the king took exile in Britain, the Republican Party took power and manipulated dissatisfied Portuguese people by promoting nationalism and imperialism.⁵⁸ The new republican government encouraged people to seek their national identity in the empire rather than in the history of the Portuguese monarchy. All the buildings erected in the Age of Great Navigations were designated as objects of cultural heritage and the words of the national anthem were changed to suit the republican dream of the empire’s re-construction.

These political changes in Portugal inevitably led to a demand for the “effective” use of the colonial territory. The Ministry of Colonies was established and the administration overhauled. The Republican Colonial Law in 1914 sought to clarify the interpretation of contradictory policies such as the “assimilation policy” and the policy of compulsory labour. As a result, Africans who had already been assimilated (*assimilados*) became “citizens” while other Africans, the “indigenous people” (*indígenas*), were obliged to work against their will, disguised in the form of contracted labour.⁵⁹ *Assimilados* were allowed to live in the towns while *indígenas* had to remain in the farming villages.

This law officially established two categories amongst Mozambican Africans. One category, the *assimilados*, included Africans who spoke Portuguese and were Catholics, but they were regarded as “second-class citizens”. Another category was the *indígenas*, who lived in rural villages and were used as labourers by the colonial government whenever necessary. Under article 227 of the *Orgânica da Administração Civil das Províncias Ultramarinas* (Overseas Provinces Civil Administration Law), the complete separation between *assimilados* and the “rest” was confirmed and the governor was given the role of “guardian of the *indígenas*”. The law provided that “indigenous culture had to be improved gradually” though “they were not allowed to have the political rights of Europeans”.⁶⁰

The changes in the law affected the fabric of African society in the area dramatically, deepening divisions among Africans and legitimising the view that the *indígenas* only existed as a source of cheap labour, and without the rights or means to improve their lives. The impact can be summed up by the following two points: (1) African chiefs lost their authority as they became “collaborators” of the colonial rulers and (2) it became difficult for peasant families to continue traditional agricultural production as males were taken away as labourers. Above all, it was humiliating for African chiefs to be positioned as minions of an outside power, with the result that their authority plummeted in the eyes of local society.⁶¹

In the traditional African rural communities, the concept of land ownership had been flexible due to the mobile agricultural style (slash and burn) and the tendency to fragment into smaller groups. A group would split and a newly formed group would move to other land when the group became too big or the quality of the land deteriorated. Conflict within the groups was also a contributory factor. It is unsurprising therefore that the

administration's new laws, forcing people to relinquish their traditional farming system at the behest of the colonial power, triggered resistance by African chiefs all over the country.

The Portuguese government mobilised its colonial army against this resistance, but it was forced to seek help from Britain and South Africa due to its lack of funds. Even with the help of foreign funds, resistance led by African chiefs was fierce, and it was only after the First World War that the Portuguese government was able to effectively control this resistance. Complete military control was implemented in Mozambique by 1920. This meant that African society which, since the sixteenth century, had managed to keep a certain degree of autonomy – although limited and in spite of the slave trade – finally succumbed to the direct control of the Portuguese government and thus became subject to all of its regulations and colonial controls.

In essence, the root of colonial control applied by the Portuguese in Mozambique was “exploitation” of the local labour, and this basic characteristic did not alter much even after the abolition of slavery. Conversely, it was strengthened by the exploitation of labour in the rural areas. The colonial state became directly involved in the collection of local labour due to: (1) the increased demand for labour for the construction of railways and plantations in the colony and (2) the potential to earn vast amounts of foreign currency through exporting labour to the South African mines.

Having said this, the Portuguese government failed to adequately resolve the inconsistency between the legal system and its actual implementation. The maintenance of the administrative structures and the introduction of the *regedoria* system had not progressed in the territories held by concession companies, which occupied more than a half of the country, or in the territories controlled directly by the Portuguese government. Although concession companies such as the Nyassa Company and the Mozambique Company were set up to help economic development in the colony, they instead concentrated on “exporting” Africans from the territories as labourers. It could be said that a large contributing factor to the diversity in Mozambican society was born out of regional differences brought about by the colonial economy and its system.

Resistance movements by African people

The initial armed resistance

While the characteristics of Portuguese colonial control had changed over the years, from the end of the nineteenth century through to the beginning of the twentieth century, various resistance activities were still being organised by African people.

The Battle of Barué, The Battle of Yao and The Battle of Makonde were some of the well-known armed resistance movements against Portuguese colonial control,⁶² and many others were fought by different African chiefs in various regions. Often the colonial army had temporarily been able to control them with the help of the expeditionary forces from the concession companies and *sipaíos*, but the resistance movements were re-ignited during the First World War and fierce battles took place in many areas of the country.

At the beginning of the First World War, the dominant classes of Portugal were divided into two groups: pro-English and pro-German. However, the republican government took the side of the Allied forces in order to defend its colony (the south of Angola and the north of Mozambique) from German threats. Portugal confiscated German merchant vessels on the Tejo in February 1916, and Germany retaliated by declaring war against Portugal the following year.

In the African colony, the German army from East Africa (currently, Tanzania) attacked the Quionga Delta situated near the border of northern Mozambique, killing soldiers from the Nyassa Company.⁶³ In November the same year, just before this incident occurred, 1,500 soldiers from 15 battalions of the Portuguese government’s first expeditionary force arrived at Port Amélia (current Pemba City). However, 20 per cent of the soldiers returned home within six months due to illnesses or other reasons.⁶⁴ A second expeditionary force of 1,500 soldiers was dispatched in October 1915, but 75 per cent of them also became ill and were not able to take up their duties.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the German army led by Von Lettow-Vorbeck comprised 300 European soldiers, 1,700 African militia (*askaris*) and 3,000 porters. Unlike the Portuguese force, they strategically built allies with the local chiefs for their campaign.⁶⁶


The Portuguese army was compelled to accept help from the British army in order to face attacks by African chiefs as well as the German army. One thousand British soldiers arrived at Port Amélia, and two units arrived in Mozambique from Nyasaland and Rhodesia in 1918.⁶⁷

However, very few battles actually took place, leading German soldiers to refer to it as “a comical war.” The First World War came to an end in Mozambique when the German army left the country in September 1918.⁶⁸ The remaining African leaders were gradually suppressed by the now reinforced Portuguese colonial army.

The armed uprising by African chiefs against the Portuguese colonial army, which had persisted since the scramble for Africa, became one of the main reasons Europeans called for the civilisation of “barbaric Africans”. However, Basil Davidson argues that the African chiefs’ armed uprising was an act of resistance against oppression and was not, as cited by colonialists, a manifestation of their African character. This view is widely accepted nowadays, and the uprisings by African chiefs are viewed as the “primary resistance”,⁶⁹ often perceived as the foundation of later liberation struggles.⁷⁰ For example, the relationship between armed resistance by the Makonde and Yao people and later liberation struggles has been examined by many researchers. It is interesting to note that René Pélissier remarks that the Makondes were the last to end the resistance and the first to begin the struggle for liberation – with a gap of only 47 years between the two.⁷¹

More importantly, the leaders of the liberation struggle appeared to recognise the “primary resistance” as the origin of their liberation movement and capitalised on it to raise morale.⁷² This is evident in the names of military bases established during the liberation war. For example, a military base in Niassa Province situated in the far north of Mozambique was named after Gungunhana, the last king of the Gaza kingdom, which used to exist in the far south of Mozambique.⁷³ It is told that Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO’s first

Figure 15 Process of the military occupation of the Portuguese Colonial Army in northern Mozambique




Departamento de História, 2000:227.

(Some spellings changed by the author)

president, and Samora Machel, its second president, grew up listening to the story of the anti-colonial war of Gungunhana, in which their grandfathers and relatives fought. These armed uprisings also featured widely as “Portuguese colonialism and resistance of Mozambique people” in textbooks written after independence.⁷⁴ Furthermore, Machel, who became the first president of Mozambique, gave the following symbolic statement at his inauguration speech on independence.

In the course of all the historic process of the wars of conquest, the Mozambican people rose up heroically, constantly and everywhere against the colonialist plunder. From the resistance of the Muenemutapa to the insurrection of

Figure 16 Military situation of northern Mozambique during WWI (1916–1918)



Departamento de História, 2000:240.

(Translated by the author)

Barué, Mozambican history prides itself on the glorious deeds of the masses in the struggle for the defense of freedom and independence.⁷⁵

Although the various “primary resistances” certainly contributed towards later liberation struggles, in some ways they never became more than individual struggles led by individual leaders (i.e. kingdom, alliance, clan or lineage), or became part of a wider movement, because the African chiefs were unable to overcome the geographic, cultural and social differences which existed amongst themselves. The lack of a common means to communicate and interact amongst them and the absence of a unified political body hindered them from achieving a united front against the Portuguese colonial army as

discussed earlier.⁷⁶ Moreover, the colonial army used and entrenched differences among African chiefs to its advantage. The inferior quality of available weapons and the arrival of the colonial rulers at different times also weighed against the unity of African chiefs. On the positive side, the leaders of the liberation struggle learned from this experience and realised the importance of solidarity among African people. This enabled them to acknowledge armed struggles as the “primary resistance”. Machel commented as follows:

The defeat of the historic resistance of the People is due exclusively to the treason of the feudal ruling classes, to their greed and ambition, which allowed the enemy to divide the People and so conquer it.⁷⁷

Machel’s views continued to influence the armed liberation struggles that took place later. Equally, the prototype of the counter-insurgency strategy of the Portuguese colonial authority could be found in the suppression operations during this time, as the following extract demonstrates:

You must burn all the rebel villages destroying all the fields, confiscating all their cattle and taking as many prisoners as possible including women and children ... It is indispensable that these actions be carried out as rapidly and violently as possible in order to terrorise the local population and prevent further revolts.⁷⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

“Fear tactics” using violence became commonly used by the colonial government of Mozambique. In April 1917, through the British consul-general in Salisbury, the government ordered a huge supply of machine guns and automatic rifles with the intention of shoring up the military. The British government accepted the request in order to protect the rail line between Beira and Rhodesia and the British-owned Sena Sugar Company.⁷⁹ This is an example of how strengthened economic ties between Portugal and Britain in the southern part of Africa affected the political situation in the area.⁸⁰ As a result, the Mozambican liberation movement shifted its struggle from only focusing on colonial rule, to also include liberation from capitalism that was spreading throughout the country.

Day-to-day resistance and flight

Allen Isaacman identifies five types of non-violent resistance activities: (1) day-to-day resistance; (2) flight; (3) maroonage; (4) social banditry; and (5) peasant insurrections. He explains that social banditry and peasant insurrections occurred frequently at the beginning of Portuguese colonial occupation, but later day-to-day resistance, flight and maroonage became more common.⁸¹

Although these activities were regarded as “passive” resistance, this may not be completely accurate as in reality local residents did not have any other choice under armed control. In fact, day-to-day resistance and flight were effective insofar as they prevented the

colonial power from exercising effective labour control. For example, a Rhodesian official commented on the local people's resistance, stating: "These natives ... [t]hey have always avoided the payment of taxes by crossing the border ..."⁸²

However, even passive resistance became more difficult under the rule of the pro-colonial *régulos* and *sipaios*. After Africans fled to work elsewhere in order to avoid paying the colonial authority's imposed taxes, the government entered the migrant labour market as an employment agency and started to charge a brokerage fee. In the end, Mozambicans were thwarted at every turn and certainly would have had to give up the possibility of armed uprising.

The Portuguese demand hut tax. If we want to go and work in English territory we are not allowed to, as the Portuguese want to sell us like slaves to the English labour companies... (Worker from Zambézia to Southern Rhodesia)⁸³

By 1910, the promotion of labour export to surrounding countries by the concession companies resulted in most foreign currency being earned by the colonial government of Mozambique from brokerage fees imposed on Mozambican migrant workers and the usage fees of railways and port facilities imposed on British firms. Interestingly, from 1910 to 1920, 20 to 22 per cent of Mozambican products were exported to South Africa but only five per cent were exported to Portugal, illustrating the weak economic ties between Mozambique and Portugal, as well as the Portuguese government's dependence on the surrounding British colonies. Consequently, the colonial administration in areas further away from South Africa and Rhodesia (e.g. northern Mozambique) failed to become as quickly established. The situation changed towards the end of the 1920s when a dictatorial regime took over power in Portugal in the middle of the Great Depression.

Changes in colonial rule

Economic crisis and the birth of the Salazar administration

Portuguese colonial policies were greatly influenced by the following major incidents: (1) Portugal's economic crisis due to its participation in the First World War; (2) the political crisis following a military coup and the fall of the republican government; and (3) the beginning of the Great Depression.

Debt, which had mounted as a result of participation in the war, was at a record high. In 1920, the budget deficit increased by 12 times since the last days of the monarchy, and the price of commodities increased by 452 per cent in five years. In short, the Portuguese economy and politics were in a state of crisis. In 1922, the value of the escudo (Portuguese currency) against the pound sterling fell from 7.9 to 109.4 in 1918, which contributed to the outward flow of capital.

Meanwhile, textile factories had started to operate in the north of Portugal marking the beginning of Portugal's transition from an agricultural to an industrial country. From 1900

to 1924, factories quadrupled their production.⁸⁴ However, the worldwide increase in the price of cotton (which increased ten times during the period from 1915 to 1922), together with devaluation of the currency, forced the Portuguese textile factories to pay more than double the amount of the Portuguese external debt, just to import cotton. This created a massive trade deficit amounting to two and a half times more than its imports.⁸⁵

The need to counteract this problem became an urgent matter for the Portuguese government and cotton industries. It aimed to drastically increase the percentage of cotton produced in the colonies in total production from 5 per cent (one third being produced in Mozambique) and the percentage of textile goods produced in Portugal in the colonial markets from 25 per cent.⁸⁶

Growing cotton had been tried before in Mozambique, and Portuguese textile industrialists started to invest in cotton in 1920.⁸⁷ When this attempt failed, concession companies financed with foreign capital took it over and expanded cotton production around southern Mozambique. However, they were unable to increase production as much as was hoped. Furthermore, most of the cotton sales were consigned to the international market, and therefore did not benefit the Portuguese textile industry.

Portuguese citizens became increasingly angered with their incompetent government during the economic crisis, which they deemed incapable of capitalising on the resources of the colonies.⁸⁸ Historically, the failures of colonial policies had triggered a change of government in Portugal, and this time was no exception. A military coup took place in 1926. The new government announced the Law Decree no. 11,994 and tried to re-establish cotton production in the colonies.⁸⁹ This law abolished the previous cotton policy, which had promoted the establishment of white-owned cotton plantations funded through foreign investment, and instead introduced a policy which forced African peasants to cultivate cotton.⁹⁰ This new policy was modelled on the forced cotton cultivation model used in the Belgian colony of the Congo.⁹¹

The Portuguese government organised various measures to secure a more favourable export to the metropole, as well as introducing a new policy to increase cotton production. It also started to consider Mozambique as an ideal place to grow cotton.⁹²

However, the colonial government of Mozambique had not yet established a sufficient mechanism to force local peasants to grow cotton. Furthermore, the international cotton price, which had gone up in 1927, steadily declined towards 1931. These factors made it difficult for the colonial government to secure private investment, and no companies were interested in obtaining concessions.⁹³ Consequently, less cotton was produced in Mozambique in 1931 than in 1926,⁹⁴ leading Portuguese textile companies to prefer other sources with steady supply.

Two years after the military coup, the policy of “self-reliance” in cotton production was supported enthusiastically by the Portuguese economist Salazar (who later became the Minister of Economy in 1928), and the policy was, in 1930, incorporated into the Colonial Act. This law required a dual function of the colonies for the benefit of the metropole: to become a supplier of raw materials to the metropole, and to become a market for its production.⁹⁵

Having turned around the Portuguese economy, Salazar became the Minister of Overseas Issues in 1930 and later the prime minister in 1932. He declared the constitution for the Estado Novo (New State) in 1933,⁹⁶ which marked the beginning of the autocracy that then subsumed the colony for the next 40 years.

Changes in positioning the colony under the Estado Novo regime

The Estado Novo regime aimed to utilise all resources in the metropole and the colonies for the state, building on the slogan “*Tudo pela Nação*” (All for the Nation) originated by Salazar.⁹⁷ The policy of *nacionalismo económico* (economic nationalism) cut short the lease periods of the land to the concession companies and reversed the autonomy that Mozambique and Angola had enjoyed since 1920, requiring them to become economically and politically subordinate to the metropole. Under the policy of economic integration, the colonies were forced to import cotton products, wine and tobacco only from Portugal and were obliged to export primary products such as sugar, cotton and coffee more cheaply to the metropole.

The Colonial Act was completed by the Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina (RAU: Overseas Administration Reform) in 1933, which determined the colony’s two concrete functions (production of primary products and supply of its market) contributing towards the metropole’s economic development.⁹⁸


In terms of the RAU, unified administrative sections were introduced into all colonial territories, including concession company territories, so that all colonial inhabitants were placed under the metropole’s administration. Following clause 12 of RAU, the *governo geral* (governor-general) was designated as the overall authority. Under him were the *governo provincial* (provincial governor), the *administrador de distrito* (district administrator), the *administrador de circumscrição* (administrator of circumscription) and the *chefe do posto* (chief of administrative post). The governor general became subordinate to the Ministry of Overseas.

The Ministry of Overseas was responsible for supervision, conduct, instruction, adjustment and control in all issues concerning the colony. The distinction between towns (*conselhos*) and circumscriptions continued to exist, and “*autoridades gentílicas*” (gentilic authorities, that is, traditional authorities) were appointed as administrative aides in the circumscriptions.


Clause 91 provided that “natives” must live in *regulados* (*régulo*’s territories), which were further divided into *grupo de povoação* (group of settlements) or *provação* (settlements), depending on the size of the group. It further banned their free movement.⁹⁹ Circumscriptions that were introduced by the RAU continued to exist until the independence of Mozambique.

As detailed previously, in order to realise the re-building of the economy and economic nationalism set up by the Estado Novo, it was vital to develop the production of primary resources and the territory of former concession companies. To do so without investing a vast amount of money, the government had to rely on the workforce of the colonial inhabitants. Regulations were needed which would allow the colonial power to make

Figure 17 Hierarchy of colonial administration under RAU



Graph 1 Metropole’s cotton imports from the colonies and non-Portuguese territories (1926–1961)



Source: Isaacman, 1996:29; 31, (1926–41); Bravo, 1963:70 (1942–61); author’s calculations.

better use of the African workforce. To this end, the RAU specified a range of legal compulsory labour for local inhabitants: (1) compulsory labour for road and sewage system constructions, which were considered important for the local communities; (2) a maximum of six months compulsory labour for public work if an African male could not prove he was in employment; and (3) compulsory labour as a penalty for unpaid poll tax.¹⁰⁰

However, there was a vast discrepancy between the provisions of the law and its actual application in different areas. Many people were not affected by the law, partly because the concession companies were just beginning to fall under the direct rule of the government at the time of its proclamation. The “self-reliance” cotton policy pursued by Salazar also met with resistance from peasants.

In areas where private investment was unavailable, the chiefs of the administrative posts (*chefe do posto* – also known as “white chiefs”) were responsible for organising the compulsory cotton growing. They ordered *régulos* to assemble peasants, explained how to grow cotton and distributed cotton seeds and sacks to them. Each peasant had to allocate one hectare of their land for cotton growing and had to deliver the crop to the administrative post.¹⁰¹ At first, peasants believed that cotton growing would earn them money but soon realised the many challenges of cotton cultivation. For example, growing cotton left the soil in an inferior condition, and peasants had to spend time cultivating cotton at the expense of their own crops. In addition, they received little payment as

the cotton they grew was of the lowest grade. They were unable to buy food or pay hut tax. As a consequence, they refused to grow cotton in the following year. In response, the administrative post officials used oppressive measures with the assistance of *sipaios* to enforce continued cotton growing but they were met with strong resistance from peasants.

When forced cotton cultivation was first introduced, peasants responded with different forms of resistance all over Mozambique. Some sabotaged crops by boiling cotton seeds while others fled to South Africa, Tanganyika and Nyasaland.¹⁰² Responses were similar to those that took place from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century when the colonial power attempted to strengthen its power.

Cotton production did grow in 1934 due to the increased participation by private companies from two to nine. However, production was frequently interrupted by ongoing resistance by peasants and was still insufficient to satisfy the demands of the metropole. Cotton production from the colonial territories constituted only 12.5 per cent of the metropole's overall imports in 1936. The international environment in the mid to late 1930s changed the situation dramatically.

Changes in agricultural policies during the Second World War

Changes in the international situation and the expansion of the "Cotton Frontier"

The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the Second World War (1939–1945) stimulated the Portuguese economy that had previously relied on the agricultural industry. As a result, Portugal was able to reduce its imports, to develop a substitute industry and to increase its exports. Traditional small-scale industries such as the textile industry and oligopoly companies such as tobacco, ship-building and chemical fertilizer, in particular, grew significantly.

However, although the economic situation was to improve, in 1936 still only 22.7 per cent of all cotton imported to Portugal came from the colony, while the rest came from foreign countries. In Mozambique, only 80,000 to 100,000 out of the estimated labour force (3.9 million) actually grew cotton although all the rural residents were obliged to do so.¹⁰³ Therefore, a more forceful policy on cotton production was required in order to help the Portuguese economy to grow. The government realised that it needed to implement a policy together with private companies, as alone it lacked the political and economic resources to govern the vast colonial territory and was unable to force African peasants to grow cotton to the degree it needed.

Consequently, Junta de Exportação de Algodão Colonial (JEAC),¹⁰⁴ or the Colonial Cotton Board, was established in 1938 and undertook the task of increasing cotton production and monopolising the cotton business (from cotton production to sales) on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture.¹⁰⁵

First, the JEAC allocated areas suitable for cotton growing to several private companies. This incorporated areas previously untouched by colonial control into the system, and thus formed the "Cotton Frontier".¹⁰⁶ Northern Mozambique, which was designated as one of

the main cotton growing areas, was especially affected by the introduction of compulsory cotton growing. The area had previously remained mostly untouched by colonial control, but now more than half of it was occupied by cotton companies. However, these companies did not have unfettered control; they were obliged to follow the rules of “Economic Nationalism” and were controlled by the JEAC. They were pressurised to prioritise cotton growing, but they had to receive governmental approval before cotton was exported. Also, they were only permitted to export to Portugal.

Unlike the Ministry of Agriculture, the JEAC was able to directly intervene in cotton growing. The JEAC, together with cotton companies, colonial administrations and Christian churches, “encouraged” African peasants to grow cotton. The role of the *chefe do posto* was strengthened by the government ordinance in 1933 and in 1938, which granted them power to punish those who did not comply with the “encouragement”. In other words, it legalised enforced cotton growing.

Compulsory cotton cultivation in Mozambican villages helped not only to increase cotton production but generated more capital, which enabled the government to establish a system in which all peasants would be involved. Each peasant was required to carry a card recording his name, address, the size and type of his land, the quality of seeds, frequency of weeding and the amount of produce. By so doing, problems such as undeveloped administrative systems, inadequate registration of residents and the non-existent monetary economy were solved at once.¹⁰⁷


This dramatically increased the number of registered cotton growers to nearly one million in 1940, a year after the outbreak of the Second World War. As a result of changes within the colonial territory, as well as the international circumstances and the resultant efforts by the Portuguese government, Mozambique’s African peasants were finally brought under the colonial administrative system.

Reinforcement of compulsory cotton production

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the cotton supply in the global market rapidly decreased as main producers such as the United States of America and Asian countries were at war. The international price of cotton escalated leading to an insufficient supply of cotton textiles worldwide. This situation presented an opportunity for Portugal to improve its international trade balance and to stimulate its economy; hence it became an urgent national policy to secure a cheap supply of cotton. To help systemetise the production of cotton in Mozambique, Bettencourt was appointed as Governor of Mozambique by Prime Minister Salazar.¹⁰⁸ Bettencourt did not hesitate to use the most oppressive measures for the economic development of his colony and issued the following statement in a confidential circular in 1944:

As long as major powers are preoccupied with the war, we shall never receive any criticism over our action on the international labour system, however despotic it is.¹⁰⁹

Figure 18 “Scramble for Mozambique” by cotton companies (1942)



Fortuna, 1993:117.

This comment more than hints at Portugal's concern about international criticism against its colonial policies, which took precedence over the interests of protecting the rights of the people of Mozambique. It also suggests that the main characteristics of Portuguese colonial rule were the exploitation of labour and sensitivity towards international opinions, especially those of Britain.¹¹⁰

Without considering whether the land was suitable or not for growing cotton, Bettencourt employed a so-called "tyrannical labour system" forcing peasants to grow cotton under the watchful eyes of African police, *sipaios*, and cotton company field agents.¹¹¹ The colonial authority again tried to use the "traditional authorities" such as *régulos* and *chefes* to force the peasants to cooperate.

Chefe do posto ordered *régulos* to gather all inhabitants, including women and children, and to force them to work in the communal cotton fields under the surveillance of the *sipaios*.¹¹² Those who refused to obey were imprisoned by the administrative post.

Because cultivating cotton required more than 150 working days a year, there was a huge demand for labourers to work in the fields, with the result that peasants had insufficient time to tend to their own crops, leading to famine and social anxiety.¹¹³ The colonial authority was forced to introduce a farming system where cotton was produced in a fixed acreage of land designated to each household, and a fee was paid according to the amount of cotton produced.¹¹⁴ In 1940, a newly appointed governor allowed the cotton companies to employ *capatazes*, or overseers, to closely manage the cotton production of each household.¹¹⁵ Another strategy to increase the number of labourers and to bring women into the labour force was the introduction in 1942 of a tax on each inhabitant instead of taxing a hut.

As a result, cotton production in Mozambique increased from 20,464 tonnes in 1940 to 51,007 tonnes the following year and satisfied more than 40 per cent of the demand from the metropole.¹¹⁶ In 1943, 90 per cent of the demand from the metropole was met by cotton produced by the colonies (see Graph 1), and after 1942 the amount of cotton produced by the colonies surpassed the metropole's demand. Portuguese manufacturing industries grew by over 4.4 per cent annually from 1933 until 1945. Considering the situation of textile industries at that time, it is obvious that behind this prosperity there was great suffering for the Mozambican people.¹¹⁷

People's resistance and the use of the "traditional authority"

The Cotton Policy, which enabled the colonial power to control the lives of African peasants by force, gradually came under pressure as inhabitants became more and more frustrated with the harassment (such as beatings, torture, sexual abuse and imprisonment) inflicted on them by both the colonial administration and concessionary companies.¹¹⁸ Food shortages often occurred as women had to replace growing food with growing cotton. Realising that the existing system was beginning to become increasingly problematic, the colonial authority began to manipulate the social system to which peasants belonged by appointing the traditional authority as *régulos* and *chefes*, entrusting them with the management of

cotton production.¹¹⁹ Even so, *régulos* and *chefes* were not given complete authority, but were still controlled by *sipaios* and cotton company field agents.

In 1944, a law was introduced to re-organise and to determine the responsibilities of assistants of administrative structures such as *régulos*, *sipaios* and interpreters. *Régulos* were given the role of “an instrument of Portuguese intervention” in rural areas, whereby they received a percentage of the tax and cotton sales as rewards. Villagers living under the *régulos*’ management were required to work in shifts in his cotton field. Thus, *régulos*, who were formerly regarded as the traditional authorities, in effect became administration contractors and subsequently became detached from their own people. Each lower-ranking administrative official, such as head of an administrative post, handled the traditional authorities differently, and relationships between those appointed as the *régulos* and *chefes* and their communities varied depending on the areas. Yet, the colonial authority did not try to understand these variances and different nuances.

Aldeida explained at the Colonial Congress (*Congresso Colonial*) in Lisbon in 1940 that the word “*régulo*” did not exist in Portuguese society as it was used to describe “a leader of a tribe” and had meaning only in the colonies.¹²⁰ However, in many cases, the “*régulos*” that the colonial government acknowledged as leaders of “tribes” were not those the community recognised as “traditional leaders” because the legitimate traditional leaders who opposed the colonial occupation had already been removed from the villages. Instead, “collaborators” of the colonial power were selected. Also, as a form of resistance, African groups would sometimes send a slave or those of slave origin disguised as a “traditional leader” to the colonial government.¹²¹

The introduction and application of various colonial rules disrupted the ranking system of group leaders, as the colonial power determined rank according to the size of their groups, that is, *régulos* at the top of the ranking, next *chefes de grupo de povoação* (settlement group chief) and then *chefes de povoação* (settlement chief) (see Figure 17). Traditionally, the ranking of groups was decided by factors such as how long the group had been settled in the area and the original ranking of the clan, not by the size of the group. The new ranking system introduced by the colonial power created many *chefes*, who were traditionally ranked higher than those appointed as *régulos*. This confused relationships among *régulos*, *chefes* and other members of the group.

As previously discussed, Mozambican peasants revolted against the oppression and intervention, although their resistance activities were limited after the end of military control in 1920.¹²² The colonial power executed “traditional and legitimate” leaders who led armed resistances and intervened in the selection of their successors, causing some groups to split up and hence weaken. Furthermore, the manipulative use of the “traditional authority” undermined their legitimacy and leadership. Due to this lack of leadership, ordinary people resorted to day-to-day resistance and desertion.

According to the British protectorate’s records and statistics, many Africans moved from Mozambique to the neighbouring British protectorate of Nyasaland.¹²³ Although not completely accurate, trends show that, for example, the number of Mozambican “migrant workers”¹²⁴ in South Africa was 80,000 in 1939 but increased to 105,000 in 1941 and to

137,000 in 1945.¹²⁵ Similarly, "migrant workers" in southern Rhodesia increased from 68,000 in 1940 to 93,000 in 1944. There were certainly more migrant workers from Mozambique than there were from northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, which were also British protectorates and situated next to southern Rhodesia.¹²⁶ In southern Tanganyika, half of the sisal plantation workers came from Mozambique.¹²⁷ The number of Makhuya tax payers in southern Tanganyika doubled between 1930 and 1948.¹²⁸

Migration to the British protectorates increased during the Second World War not only as a result of oppression in Mozambique but also in response to the need for workers to support economic growth in the protectorates. These figures represent the official number of migrant workers gathered by the colonial government. The actual number of people who migrated into the British protectorates was probably greater. They were, in many cases, the traditional authorities who refused to become accessories to colonial rule and who led their groups or, when there were no such leaders, "family units".¹²⁹ At the same time, an increase of individual migration was recorded. The flow of Mozambicans into the British protectorates became a source of great concern for the Mozambican colonial authority.

People who lived far away from the borders escaped to areas where colonial administration was not yet fully developed. For example, many villages of Maúa Circumscription relocated to northern Maúa, which had not yet been affected by colonial rule.¹³⁰ These forms of "resistance by flight" were intercepted by the colonial authority. In the end, the only means of resistance for the remaining Africans was to express their anger and sadness in songs, dances and their religion.¹³¹


Northern Mozambique as a "suitable land" for cotton production

Establishment of colonial rule in the far north of Mozambique (Niassa District and Cabo Delgado District, which used to be the Nyassa Company's territory) was greatly delayed, even after it was integrated into the territory under the direct authority of the colonial government. This was primarily due to its low economic value and the lack of resources (financial and manpower) since the end of the nineteenth century. For this reason, it was attractive to the many Africans who moved there from Moçambique District (Nampula District) where colonial control had become tighter.¹³²

The region became less "remote" when cotton cultivation was introduced as a national policy in the 1940s. Northern Mozambique was identified as suitable for cotton production because of its environmental and cultural conditions.¹³³ The traditional social structure, which was retained in the region due to its remoteness, was considered to provide cultural conditions suitable for small-scale farming and its management. Bravo, who studied cotton cultivation in northern Mozambique, stated the following in a report in 1963:


Cotton cultivation in northern Mozambique ... helped not only to respond to the demand from the metropole but also to reduce the debt. If the Portuguese government had to buy cotton produced in this area at the international price,

Graph 2 Cotton shipping volume in Mozambique (by region)



Source: Recenseamento Agrícola, 1940–1941; Estatística Agrícola, 1941–1960; author's calculations.

Graph 3 Cotton production in northern Mozambique, 1939–1961



Source: Bravo, 1963:135; author's calculations.

it would have ended up with a debt of 2,774,000 contos between 1947–1955.¹³⁴

Many cotton companies moved into northern Mozambique and started to force “*non-assimilados*”, or “natives”, living in their territories to grow cotton.¹³⁵

In Niassa District, instructions were given that one hectare per couple, and half a hectare per widow or the second wife thereafter, had to be used for growing cotton. However, because many men had “escaped” forced cotton growing by leaving the country, the government ordinance was changed to refer to individual cotton production.¹³⁶ Women were forced to take responsibility for growing cotton and the *régulo* and *chefe* became responsible for the management of the people.

Whereas infrastructure development in Niassa District had been delayed since the Nyassa Company era, now road and railway construction rapidly progressed to facilitate the transport of cotton. Road construction in Niassa extended the road network from 2,500 kilometres to 10,000 kilometres within a few years.¹³⁷ Pereira commented on this development in his doctoral dissertation in 1952:

Cotton saved the economic disaster in northern Mozambique. It contributed to not only the economy of the metropole, but also the colony. Cotton also opened the door (railways and roads) to the north.¹³⁸

It was the forced labour of local Africans that made the construction of roads and railways possible. In addition to forced cotton cultivation, now forced “public works” created many more fugitives from the northern area. Isaacman explains the impact of the Mozambican “cotton regime” on the local society:

The absence of motor transport and all-weather roads helps explain why many northern households were only partially integrated into the colonial economy before the imposition of the cotton regime ... It was precisely the fact that until the 1930s a large part of the north was only minimally incorporated into the colonial economy – and therefore not contributing its share to accumulation in the metropole – that made the region so attractive for cotton production.¹³⁹

The “heavy door” of the Niassa district, away from the influence of the colonial economy, was finally forced to open due to the “cotton regime”.

Mozambican society after the Second World War

The subsuming of rural society into colonial rule

The Second World War indirectly influenced the life of Mozambique’s people, especially of Africans. While it provided Portugal with economic benefits, it also facilitated the extension

of colonial rule to rural areas. The Portuguese colonial occupation in Mozambique, which had formerly been associated with a lack of funds and “exploitation of its African workforce”, finally obtained funding which enabled it to exploit the workforce more effectively. This brought the life of African peasants and their community under the strong influence of colonial rule.

Cotton cultivation connected African peasants more directly to the metropole government and its economy through vertical systems of control. *Régulos* or local “traditional authorities” reported to *capataz*, or African field overseers, of the cotton companies. *Sipaïos*, or African police, reported to the *chefes do posto*, or chiefs of administrative posts, and they to the cotton company staff. This hierarchy was one-sided and inflexible.

Peoples’ lives in the northern region, which the colonial rulers regarded as the “last frontier” and which Africans regarded as “a destination of escape”, were also affected by the colony’s politics and economy. The colonial power bore only part of the “reproduction cost” and, during the food crisis, it encouraged the people to eat cassava rather than reduce the cultivation of cotton.

The despotism of the colonial government completely contradicted the slogan “a mission for civilisation”. The Catholic Church, which was supposedly responsible for bringing “civilisation” to the colonies, could be described instead as assisting this “tyranny” rather than condemning it. According to the agreement “*Concordata e o Acordo Missionário*”, the Catholic Church was entrusted with the primary education and propagation of Christianity amongst the local people. The agreement had been entered into by the Salazar government and the Vatican in 1940. The Catholic Church maintained that its support of the cotton-growing campaign in 1939 and 1940 helped Africans to work. Catholic students were made to grow cotton on church-owned land. This is a further example of how the Mozambican people were subsumed under the colonial structures, through the “cotton regime” enforced by alliances between the government, private companies and religious organisations.

As the growth in the economy impacted on society, economic differences started to appear among African peasants in Mozambique. Triggered by the outbreak of the Second World War, growing cash crops created gaps between areas and individual members of the society. Also during the Second World War, the sudden economic growth in southern Africa and the demand for more labour intensified the movement of Mozambican male migrant workers. As a result of these social changes, the cash economy in Mozambican rural areas progressed rapidly. Although it differed from one region to another, gaps among individuals, families and groups began to appear.

Emergence of economic differences

The story of the father of Mozambique’s first president, Samora Machel, is a good illustration of the differences created among rural people during this period. He started by buying a single plough from his earnings as a migrant worker on the South African mines at the beginning of the 1920s. By expanding his work gradually, his wealth

increased. His operation grew as he cultivated 30 hectares of fertile land around the Limpopo River, called Chókwè in southern Gaza Province, with four ploughs. He later went on to become a wealthy peasant, by African standards, owning several hundred cows by 1940.¹⁴⁰ This story was not an exception. At that time in southern Mozambique there were several factors which made it possible, even for Africans, to become farm owners. These were: (1) the increased food demand following the development of Lourenço Marques, the colonial capital; (2) a rapid increase of world-wide demand for primary products during the Second World War; (3) systematised migrant work on the South African mines; (4) the accumulation of capital for property investment such as hoes, ploughs and cows and (5) the collapse of the traditional social structures. However, for reasons discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, it was only possible in southern Mozambique for Africans to become farm owners.

The colonial authority considered it pointless, as well as dangerous, to educate Africans. The Salazar government entrusted the Catholic Church with providing primary education as well as the spiritual “pacification” (*pacificação*) of Africans, and the church took great care to provide the most basic education while preventing Africans from becoming rebellious. If African youth wished to progress beyond elementary education to secondary education, which was normally reserved for white children, they had to fulfil various difficult conditions, the greatest of which were the economic conditions imposed on them.

The difficulty in obtaining an education continued even after 1940. In 1942, nine-year-old Samora Machel received his primary education at a Catholic church. In order to progress to secondary education, he had to be baptised as well as donate ten sacks of maize and five sacks of beans to the church. Other FRELIMO leaders experienced similar difficulties, and many of them converted to Catholicism before Mozambican independence.

Since there were also many Protestant churches in the southern region, many FRELIMO leaders therefore had a Protestant background. One such leader was Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO’s first president. Like Machel, Mondlane was born in a rural village near the Limpopo River in the Gaza district. He lost his father at the age of two and his mother was his father’s third wife. In spite of unfortunate family circumstances, he was able to receive an education as his elder brothers worked as migrant workers at the port and on the South African mines. In 1931, Mondlane started at a public primary school at 11 years old and graduated at 16 years old. After passing the graduation examination, Mondlane left Lourenço Marques and found a job at a hospital through an affiliation with the Swiss Calvinist Protestant Church.¹⁴¹ With the help of the church, he gained opportunities to study in South Africa (at a high school and a university), Lisbon (at a university) and in the United States of America (for his post-graduate education). Mondlane went on to receive a doctorate, the highest academic degree an African from Mozambique had so far achieved. Protestant churches also provided the opportunity for many other African youths to become educated. Since the Protestant churches were mainly situated in southern Mozambique, especially in Lourenço Marques, youths in these areas were more able to access sport, and hence a better education.

Conclusion

The “Mozambique” which emerged between the British territory and the Indian Ocean was mostly unfamiliar to the African people who had long lived in the area. The territory became more substantial with the establishment and expansion of colonial rule during the Second World War. The international situation affected Portugal, as well as the world economy, and led to the exploitation of the local people’s workforce. The structures of the Portuguese colonial administration in Mozambique developed through the management of the local workforce but also needed the economic development of the surrounding areas and foreign investment. As a result, Portuguese colonial occupation was characterised by the exploitation of the local labour force by despotic rule in the name of the “structural overhaul of the system”.

Mozambique, a land ten times bigger than its metropole with a history of less than 50 years since the armed struggle, had been a home for people with dozens of different languages. Its regions had also been affected by Portuguese colonial rule and its monetary economy. Also, many Africans, most of them men, had repeatedly migrated to areas beyond the colonial territory. It was a monumental but necessary task to unite this artificially constructed “Mozambique” consisting of people from diverse backgrounds into a “nation” in order to be independent from colonial rule. This challenging task was left to the Mozambican people to manage.

The oppression that characterised Portuguese colonial control paradoxically gave Mozambican people the opportunity to develop a unified identity for the future. African chiefs learned the importance of solidarity during the insurgency led by Hanga, which helped them to unite. People who escaped to British territories and migrant workers were also able to compare and experience different forms of colonial rule by Britain and Portugal. However, the solidarity among African people in Mozambique was limited due to the political and economic divisions created by the colonial power.

Notes

- 1 One of the main motivating factors for Portugal to become the first country in Europe to begin exploring the world by sea was that it enabled it to establish a “modern nation-state” before any other European country (Birmingham, 2002:8-9).
- 2 The triangular trade was developed in the middle of the sixteenth century and European products, African slaves and cash products were traded in the Americas. It contributed to the development of “the capitalist world economy”. As a result, the total number of slaves from Africa and the Americas was said to have increased from 1.2 million to 2 million. Forty per cent of slaves were transported by Portuguese traders (Miyamoto and Matsuda, 1997:260).
- 3 Gouda, 2000:428. In spite of the pressure from England and the abolition of the slave trade, the export of slaves from Mozambique continued until the end of the nineteenth century.
- 4 Vail, 1976:390.
- 5 The governor of middle-northern Mozambique, where the base of trade was established, lamented in 1876 that he only had sufficient soldiers to guard the town in which he stayed (Vail and White, 1980:16).
- 6 The *prazo* (literally meaning “a period of time”) system was originally devised to establish Portuguese rule by legitimising the land seized by deported convicts, either by force or by marriage alliance with African chiefs. Later, *prazos* were granted to orphaned daughters and destitute widows of royal servants. The property rights were valid for three generations, namely the original lessee, her eldest daughter and her eldest granddaughter – with the condition that she married a Portuguese man. Despite Portugal’s intention of creating a large population of Portuguese people in its colony, *prazo*-holders married locally and amalgamated *prazos* through intermarriage. As a result, it was said that 14 or 15 powerful *prazos* controlled 112 *prazos* in 1801 (Vail and White, 1980:8).
- 7 Isaacman, 1976:11.
- 8 It was affected hugely by a serious economic recession in 1873.
- 9 Madeira Santos, 1997:24-25.
- 10 Ibid.:26.
- 11 Birmingham, 2002:191.
- 12 Ibid.:190-191; 212.
- 13 Portugal covers an area of 88,940 square kilometres.
- 14 Portugal had suffered constant insolvency since 1850. By 1890, 45 per cent of its revenue had been used for debt repayment, and eventually the government declared bankruptcy in June 1892 (Hammond, 1966:203-214).
- 15 Birmingham, 2002:191. After the Paris Commune and the establishment of the Spanish Republican government in 1873, the number of Republicans in Portugal increased. They sent representatives to the Portuguese Congress for the first time in 1878 (Gouda, 2000:430).
- 16 Forty thousand Lisbon residents were said to be at the ceremony (Ibid.:436).
- 17 Portugal called this military suppression the “pacification” (*pacificação*).
- 18 The Zambezia Company, which was financed by the same investor as the Mozambique Company, had a territory which included 126 *prazos* out of the 134 that existed in Tete District. Many of these areas had not been “pacified.” The Shona Sugar Company was formed by an ex-*prazo* owners’ union which acquired the concession over the downstream area of the Zambezi River (Newitt, 1995:367).
- 19 Vail, 1976:394; Neil-Tomilson, 1977:109.
- 20 Newitt, 1995:368. Birmingham once described the war against African chiefs in Mozambique as fierce but short. “After achieving pacification in the areas, foreign enterprises were entrusted to control most of the areas.” Later, however, he said this statement was not in fact accurate (Birmingham, 2002:213). The Portuguese did not achieve military control over the whole of Mozambique until 1920 after its military power had increased during the First World War.

- 21 The Mozambique Company retained its concession from 1891 to 1941. This dates back to 1878 when Andrade, of a former *prazo* family, was given a concession for mines and timber in this area. Andrade tried to ensure the territory remained Portuguese. The Mozambican Company received French investment in 1888 but was controlled by a Belgian financier by 1895 (Newitt, 1995:368).
- 22 The Portuguese government tried hard to abolish *prazos* which began rebelling against it in 1838. However, *prazos* continued to exist until 1930 because of their important role during the scramble for Africa.
- 23 Isaacman, 1976:62.
- 24 Ibid.:58.
- 25 *Prazos* were originally established to strengthen Portuguese colonial rule, but as a result of localisation, some mixed-race *prazo*-owners were no longer loyal to Portugal.
- 26 Isaacman acknowledged this as a sign of the emergence of “Zambezi Consciousness” and called it the “birth of the Zambezi Nation” although it was short-lived (Ibid.:39).
- 27 Hanga said this to Peters who visited the area (Carl Peters, *The Eldorado of the Ancients*, in Ibid.:56-57). In 1893, Hanga tried to persuade the Portuguese government to acknowledge the Barué’s sovereignty, but when his efforts were unsuccessful, he approached Britain which was competing with Portugal over the territory towards the end of 1880s. In Barué, the British had already begun digging for gold and Cecil Rhodes was starting to show an interest in the area (AHM, Fundo de Século XIX, cx.4-131, M3, 14 Nov.1894, in Ibid.:56). As the Portuguese military action strengthened against the Barué, Hanga sought military support from the British government in 1898. Britain, however, having already reached an agreement with Portugal over the territory in 1890, rejected Hanga’s request, saying that the territory of Barué was outside of British territory. However, it did implicitly accept the asylum of Hanga and his men and instructed them to report to the “indigenous” committee chairman as soon as they entered Rhodesia (RNA, LO5/4/25, General Letter no.133: Copy of telegram from Acting Under Secretary to C.J. Rhodes, 8 June 1899, in Ibid.:57). From Hanga’s comments and the episode described above, one can sense his strong hatred for Portugal. He criticised the Portuguese government’s attitude towards Barué and in retaliation he manipulated the conflict between powerful countries.
- 28 Isaacman, 1976:57.
- 29 A *conselho* was a lower administrative unit in a *distrito* (district) during the colonial era and was mainly populated by settlers and *assimilados* (assimilated people) rather than *indigenas* (natives). The word originated from the medieval Portuguese, meaning “autonomous community”.
- 30 ACM, “Extracto da Acta da Sessão do Conselho d’Administração de 17 de Setembro de 1901” in Ibid.:57-58.
- 31 This kingdom stretched from the middle of Mozambique to the east of Zimbabwe. It produced gold and built the Great Zimbabwe Ruins, which are now a UNESCO World Heritage site.
- 32 Peters, *The Eldorado*: 129, in Ibid.:58.
- 33 Less than three per cent of the soldiers were Portuguese. While Isaacman observes a possibility of solidarity beyond ethnicity in Hanga’s association of African chiefs, united against Portugal, he believes that the failure of the insurgency was partly due to the fact that the colonial government took advantage of ethnic division and used Ngoni policemen (Ibid.:65).
- 34 Development continued until 1929.
- 35 Slave traders moved their trading bases from the territory directly ruled by Portugal to the northern coast of the Indian Ocean in order to avoid escalating pressure to abolish the slave trade.
- 36 Sugar plantations were thriving in Réunion at the time when France declared the abolition of slavery in all the French colonies during the French Revolution in 1848. Plantation owners were forced to look for an alternative workforce, which led to illegal slave trading with Mozambican slave traders. They legalised their activities by calling slaves “free-willed labourers” (*engages*). For the Mozambican slave traders, Réunion became an important destination for exporting slaves alongside the Spanish territory of Cuba once the slave trade with Brazil was banned in 1853.

- Although these labourers were given the right to return home after five years of labour, very few did. Vail and White quote the following comment by an English prosecutor of slave ships in 1866 to illustrate the barbaric nature of the slave trade at that time: “Never before has the slave trade flourished as now. Even the Arabs living in the coastal areas are shocked by the barbaric treatments of slaves” (Vail and White, 1980:31-32; 34).
- 37 Ibid.:23. Hanga was said to have accumulated 70,000 rifles by the end of the nineteenth century.
 38 Neil-Tomilson, 1977:114-115.
- 39 Ibid. However, they only managed to collect tax from 10,709 huts in one year despite the vast size of the area controlled by the company (present Niassa Province and Cabo Delgado Province). The Governor D’Amorim remarked that the “minor occurrences which took place in the tax gathering show how badly disposed the natives were in some places to the authorities” (Ibid.).
- 40 Medeiros divided the Portuguese military control in the Nyassa Company territory into five stages: (1) the time prior to becoming the Nyassa Company’s territory (until around 1894); (2) 1899 to 1902; (3) 1902 to 1909; (4) 1915 to 1916; and (5) 1917 to 1920 (Medeiros, 1997:50-151).
- 41 At first, it was prohibited to recruit the inhabitants of northern Mozambique. However, due to the increased demand for labour, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), the South African mines’ recruitment company, agreed that workers should be sent from the Nyassa Company in 1903. The number of mining workers sent from southern Mozambique in the same year amounted to 71,213. The high mortality of immigrant workers (6.4 per cent) finally led to the prohibition of immigration in 1913 (Neil-Tomilson, 1977:118).
- 42 Newitt, 1995:368.
- 43 Only 35 per cent of Mozambican territories became directly controlled by the Portuguese government. These territories were all of southern Mozambique, which became the supply base of migrant workers to South African mines; Nampula (Moçambique) District, where the first governor’s palace was established and Quelimane and Barué circumscriptions, where the political situations were not yet stable immediately after being “pacified” by Portugal.
- 44 Political reform began in Portugal in 1851. In 1869, under the Progressive Party (Partido Progressista) government, the slave trade in the Portuguese colonies became illegal. At the same time, movements to protect the civil rights of colonised people became active. However, in 1873, a law was brought into effect to force Africans in Mozambique to provide labour. Also, freed slaves were contractually obliged to work until 1878.
- 45 Isaacman, 1976:85.
- 46 This estimate was based on the British Blue Book by a resident German hunter, Carlos Wiese (Wiese, 1902: 241, in Ibid.: 107).
- 47 Ranger, 1988: 1026; Cunha, 1949:144; 151.
- 48 Enes’s statement had a strong impact on Portuguese colonial policies (Alfane and Nhacale, 1995:56).
- 49 During the colonial period, the *distritos* (districts) situated in rural areas where “natives” lived were sub-divided into *circunscrições* (circumscriptions).
- 50 António Enes, “Relatório da Comissão,” published in *Antologia colonial portuguesa* (Lisbon, 1946), in Duffy 1967:140.
- 51 The Portuguese government encouraged the export of labour to cacao plantations in its colony São Tomé Island, while prohibiting “voluntary migration” to the French Colonies. It was reported that violent measures were used by the Portuguese administrative officers that were not dissimilar to those used during the time of the slave period. Isaacman estimated that 10,000 to 15,000 Mozambicans were sent to São Tomé Island in the ten years between 1907 to 1917 (Isaacman, 1976:84).
- 52 Alfane and Nhacale, 1995:56
- 53 Isaacman, 1976:85-87.
- 54 In this book, a generalised term “*régulo*” is used.
- 55 It is uncertain how much authority the so-called “traditional authorities” actually possessed in the

local community. The word “traditional” was often used without knowing how long the tradition had survived in a particular society. In this book, the word “traditional” is often used in inverted commas to reflect its fluidity. The author believes that customs and social structures change depending on different periods in history and in different circumstances and should therefore be treated as flexible entities.

56 Alfane and Nhacale, 1995:57.

57 This version of spelling “*sipaio*”, which was used mainly in the Maúá District, will be used in this book.

58 Many Portuguese citizens were frustrated with the Portuguese government giving in to the demands of the British government over the territories in Africa. Although the Republican Party won the parliamentary election in 1908 and 1910 in Lisbon, it only managed to gain three seats in the whole country as it was not popular outside of the capital (Gouda, 2000:436). Considering the Conservative Party’s strong hold over the rural areas, the Republican Party resorted to a military coup in order to gain political power.

59 Hoshi and Hayashi, 1979:255.

60 Alfane and Nhacale, 1995:57-58.

61 In retaliation, it is reported that many chiefs sent a person of slave status when the colonial authority summoned them. In Quelimane, which was placed under colonial rule at an early stage, the colonial authority intervened in the appointment of local chiefs. As a result, the legitimacy of local chiefs was entirely dependent on the external force, making them mere agents of Portugal (Isaacman, 1976:81-82).

62 It is now understood that most African groups in Mozambique joined resistance movements albeit in many different ways (Pélissier, 1994:360).

63 After the incident, Germany apologised for its attack and retreated. However, at around the same time, the German army started its attack in southern Angola (Garcia, *Guerra na 1ª Guerra Mundial*:2).

64 Ibid.

65 Together with between 210,000 to 250,000 soldiers from the Allied forces, Portugal is said to have mobilised 20,000 Portuguese soldiers, 12,000 African soldiers and 90,000 porters against the German army (Ibid.).

66 Departamento de História, 2000:242.

67 Ibid.:243.

68 Pélissier, 1994:422.

69 Ranger, 1968.

70 Ranger, 1988:84.

71 Pélissier, 1994:413.

72 Mondlane, 1969:102-103.

73 After 1951, the Portuguese government called its African colonies “overseas provinces”. Therefore, Mozambique was called a “province” and Niassa a “district”. FRELIMO called Niassa a “province” from the start of the liberation war. In this book, the term used by those in power at the time is used: for example, Niassa District and Maúá Circumscription during the colonial period and Niassa Province and Maúá District after independence. At times other terms are introduced in brackets. Gaza Kingdom was a kingdom situated in southern Mozambique.

74 Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 1986:39-48.

75 Samora Moises Machel, Independence Proclamation (25 June, 1975).

76 Isaacman, 1976:148; 177; xxii-xxiii.

77 Samora Moises Machel, Independence Proclamation (25 June 1975).

78 ACM, Cs 1857: Telegram from the Governor in Beira to Commandante Militar, Beira, 4 May 1917, in Isaacman, 1976:170.

79 RAN, A3/18/38/3 (11 April 1917), in Ibid.:169.

- 80 However, the scale of this military support was limited as the British government needed to distance itself from Portuguese colonial occupation. This is why it accepted the exile of African chiefs who rose against the Portuguese. Having said this, it should be remembered that the British government exploited cheap labour promoted by the Portuguese colonial authority through the southern African colonies and concessionary companies.
- 81 Isaacman, 1976:101. Day-to-day resistance in many cases consisted of a series of undefined actions and were not recorded in historical accounts, which relied on written sources. Hence, it is sometimes called “hidden resistance” or “weak person’s resistance”. In recent years, however, with the development of the social history accounts and methods of collecting oral history, there is an increasing interest in researching day-to-day resistance.
- 82 RNA, RC3/3/10, Salisbury, 4 Feb. 1905, in Isaacman, 1976:109.
- 83 RNA, N3/26/2/6/8: A statement by Kugayisa to S. Marley, in *Ibid.*:87.
- 84 Armando Castro, *A Economia Portuguesa do Século XX 1900–1925*, 1973:68, in *Ibid.*:29.
- 85 In 1924, Portugal’s external debt was 75 million escudo. Meanwhile, the amount of foreign produced cotton imports increased to 178 million escudo (Bravo, 1963:29).
- 86 AIA, JEAC, “PM: Elementos Para o Século”, Gastão de Melhho Furtado, 15 June 1954, in Isaacman, 1996:29.
- 87 *Ibid.*:26-27.
- 88 *Ibid.*:30.
- 89 Fortuna, 1993:114. Fortuna disagrees with Hammond’s (1966) statement that Portuguese colonial rule was “non-economic” imperialism, after conducting a detailed analysis on the Portuguese colonial policy regarding cotton production (*Ibid.*:37).
- 90 *Ibid.*; Isaacman, 1996:30.
- 91 Cotton production in the Belgian colony of the Congo increased rapidly from 12 tons in 1917 to 30,000 tons in 1920 due to the introduction of forced cotton growing. A Belgian agricultural ministry official who visited Mozambique commented that: “the forced cotton growing is the only way to increase the production”. (Fortuna, 1993:114).
- 92 Until this time Mozambique had not contributed substantially towards the colonial economy. Therefore, together with its climate and soil conditions, cotton growing was considered to be suitable for its economic development.
- 93 Fortuna, 1993:60.
- 94 Isaacman, 1976:30.
- 95 Changes in the colonial policy on cotton production were referred to as the establishment of the “Cotton Regime” by Isaacman. After studying it from 1928 to 1930, Isaacman concluded that the success of cotton growing in the colonies became a touchstone for future mercantilism (*Ibid.*).
- 96 The Estado Novo regime was also called the “Salazar Regime”. It is generally known as a fascist regime, or “Salazar’s dictatorship”. In this book, the Estado Novo regime or the Salazar government are used interchangeably depending on the situation.
- 97 Salazar formed the National Union (*União Nacional*) and adopted the slogan in July, 1930. Only candidates from his party were able to stand for election (Gouda, 2000:447).
- 98 Aminaka (2003) argues that the colonial policies under the Salazar government did not reduce the importance of migrant labour, which had already existed for some time in southern Mozambique. Importantly, this suggests that the Portuguese colonial policies in Mozambique, especially in relation to the British colony, did not change significantly despite the protectionist intention of Portugal. The 1930 Colonial Act, more particularly the section stipulating forced cotton growing, enabled Portugal to carry out complete implementation of colonial rule.
- 99 Alves, 1993:1. As explained in the introduction, the term “*chefe*” was used for the chief of a village. Several *chefes* were supervised by a *régulo*.
- 100 Hoshi and Hayashi, 1979:256.
- 101 This was the situation in Bela Vista, southern Mozambique in 1932.

- 102 MNA, LSDA, PHDAR for 1934, in S1/88/35. 30 Jan, 1934.
- 103 Fortuna, 1993:118. Total population of Mozambique at this period was estimated at five million, and it is very probable that women, elderly and young people were included in the “working population”.
- 104 The JEAC was formed by the representatives of textile, trade and colonial cotton companies. Its headquarters were in Lisbon.
- 105 Departamento de História, 1987:44.
- 106 In some areas, the control of cotton companies was established prior to the establishment of the colonial administrations.
- 107 Departamento de História, 1993:91.
- 108 Isaacman, 1996:43-44.
- 109 Circular Confidencial no.1041/D7, do Governador-Geral, 1944 (AHM-ISANI, cx.77).
- 110 Britain played a significant role in the abolition of the slave trade and slave systems, and the British military was even allowed to inspect the inside of Portuguese ships.
- 111 Isaacman, 1996:43-44.
- 112 Sick people and pregnant women were not exempt. At harvest time, they had to work, even in the evenings (Ibid.:78). This was revealed during interviews conducted in many areas after independence.
- 113 Agricultural production of food was traditionally a woman’s job. However, forced cotton growing reduced the time for women to grow their food crops. In addition, the “flight” or “emigration” of men from Mozambique meant women had to spend more time growing cotton, resulting in frequent famines.
- 114 According to Isaacman, the reason that the Salazar government encouraged cotton production by each household was to spread the Christian value of the importance of maintaining a nuclear family rather than improving production efficiency (Ibid.:49-50).
- 115 As the production units became smaller, they needed to be supervised closely by colonial agents. For this task, *capatazs* were employed by cotton companies and in some places they were placed under the supervision of *sipaios*.
- 116 Isaacman, 1996:46.
- 117 Gouda, 2000: 450. The textile industry was the largest of the Portuguese manufacturing industries in terms of the number of factories (297) and the employment of people (32,800). The significant development of the industry during the Second World War was made possible not only by the hard labour of the colonised peasants, but also the workforce of women and young people (Kinshichi, 2003:232).
- 118 Exploitation of power had already been exercised by concessionary companies’ agents and chiefs of administrative posts. During this period it both intensified and became more wide-ranging.
- 119 Isaacman, 1996:51.
- 120 Almeida, 1940:534.
- 121 Baptista Lundin, 1992:26.
- 122 Occurrences of armed resistance were extremely rare (Ibid.:63).
- 123 Smith, 1937:28. Smith was an official in Nyasaland and was in charge of tax collection.
- 124 It is easy to imagine that the majority of people emigrated to escape from the Portuguese colonial rules rather than simply to work abroad, hence inverted commas are used here when using the word “migrant workers”. Also it should be noted that even when they were called “migrant workers”, the people had a strong tendency to return home.
- 125 BPP, Comd.5949, 1939: 184; Departamento de História, 1999:10.
- 126 Neves, 1998:365.
- 127 Kuczynski, 1949:344.
- 128 Alpers, 1984:375.
- 129 The “family unit” includes the nuclear family as well as the extended family. Here, the term

represents the lowest ranking groups within the village communities, normally represented by lineage groups.

130 See Chapter 2 for more details.

131 Isaacman, 1976 and 1990; Departamento de História, 1993; Manghezi, 2003.

132 Funada-Classen, 2002:106-108.

133 Bravo, 1963:219.

134 *Ibid.*:243.

135 Isaacman, 1996:52.

136 This was designated according to age groups. For example, 110 square metres of land was allocated to men between 18 and 30 years old and 45 square metres of land to women from 18 to 35 years old. Cotton growing was compulsory for women up to 50 years old, whereas men who were older than 55 were still required to grow cotton ("critério mandado" no.9 de 30/9/1947, in Bravo, 1963:115).

137 They were untarred roads.

138 Taveira Pereira, 1952, "O Algodão na Economia de Moçambique", in Bravo, 1963:247.

139 Isaacman, 1996:75

140 Christie, 1989:3-6.

141 Mondlane, 1969:xvii-xviii.

CHAPTER 2

Characteristics of Maúa and the Process of Colonisation

Drawing on research conducted in the Maúa area, this chapter explores how the residents of Maúa responded to Portugal's colonial rule and what historical and social changes the region underwent prior to the country's liberation.

The area and people of Maúa

Overview of the Maúa area of Mozambique

The focus of attention is an area in Mozambique which became known, during the liberation struggle, as Maúa Circumscription (*Circunscção de Maúa*). Lying between two rivers, the Lúrio and the Lugenda, it fell within Niassa District (*Distrito de Niassa*) in northern Mozambique.¹ This district was surrounded by Tanganyika (now Tanzania) to the north, the Moçambique District (now Nampula Province) to the south, Cabo Delgado District to the east and Nyasaland (now Malawi) to the west.

The Niassa District had the largest land area and the least population density of all the circumscriptions in the country.² Furthermore, the district was ethnically diverse: the Yao in the north, the Nyanja on Lake Nyasa/Lake Malawi (Lago Niassa) in the west and the Makuwa in the south. It was also home to a small number of the Ngoni.

The majority of the residents were Makuwa. Originally, Maúa Circumscription was a lower-level administrative post (*posto administrativo*) falling, until 1942, under Amaramba Circumscription³ and thereafter under Marrupa Circumscription.⁴ When attacks by FRELIMO intensified in the late 1960s, the colonial administration reorganised the administrative structure in the area and made a decision to upgrade Maúa in January 1968 from an administrative post to a circumscription.⁵ It existed until just before the country's independence.

Maúa Circumscription was divided into four administrative posts: Revia in the north; Maúa Sede in the centre; Nipepe in the south and Nungo in the east (see Figure 8).⁶ Each administrative post was further divided into *regedoria*, territories of traditional authorities called *régulo* as discussed in the previous chapter.

After independence, Mozambique was “upgraded” from an overseas province (*provincia ultramarina*) to a state (*estado*). Consequently, Niassa District (*distrito*) became a province (*provincia*) and Maúá Circumscription (*circunscricção*) became a district (*distrito*). Among the administrative posts in Maúá, Revia was incorporated into Majune District, and Nipepe became a district on its own.

The study under discussion is primarily focused on the post-independence Maúá District, that is, the former Maúá Sede Administrative Post. However, this book also includes discussion on Maúá District during the liberation struggle, which at that time contained Maúá Sede, Revia and Nipepe. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, colonial documents were used as one of the primary sources of this book; secondly, Revia was strongly affected by FRELIMO activity during the liberation struggle and lastly, many residents in Maúá Sede had relatives in Revia and Nipepe.

As the focus of this book is the liberation struggle period, the area under discussion is mainly referred to as “Maúá District”. However, when referring to the period prior to 1968, the term “Maúá Administrative Post” is adopted. When reference is non-specific to any period the “Maúá area” or “Maúá” is used.

It is important to note that the colonial administrative division of Maúá District did not necessarily correspond to the geographical and cultural area defined by the local residents. “Maúá” as a place-name originated in Muwa (often written Mua), the chief with the highest authority in the area, literally, “a person who falls”.⁷ The Makhwa, who relied on slash-and-burn farming and needed to relocate frequently, did not perceive their territory as a fixed location. The area concerned therefore came to be known as Maúá only after Mwene (Chief) Muwa settled down there, which was thought to be relatively recently. Borders between village communities shifted each time groups relocated, while colonial authorities changed administrative borders many times in order to achieve effective control of the colony, mostly disregarding the locals’ needs or circumstances. To add to the confusion, the administrative areas were further subdivided after independence, also without considering the relationship between the various areas and the inhabitants. As a result, the notions of “territory” and geographical borders for many Mozambicans were frequently at odds with those of the colonial authorities, and later the state. These anomalies and the consequences of these are addressed later on in this chapter and elaborated on further in Chapter 5.⁸

What was the Maúá region like in the colonial days? As noted earlier, Niassa was an inland district in the north of the country and the colonial economy reached here later than any other part of the country. Furthermore, Marrupa Circumscription was the least densely populated in the district and was also the most difficult place in the country for the colonial authorities to access.⁹ As a result, administrative structure was far less organised than in other regions. However, this did not mean that the area had no importance for the econo-politics of this region. Historically, Marrupa and its surrounding areas had been considered as the crucial midpoint along the route that connected Lake Nyasa/Vila Cabral (the capital of Niassa District) and Porto Amélia (the capital of Cabo Delgado District).

During the First World War the Portuguese/British allies and the German army fought

in and around Marrupa, and the fleeing Germans set up camp along the river. *Marupi*, a cereal the Germans ate, started to grow on the banks, and the area became known as Na-marupi (the people of *marupi*, meaning “those who brought or planted *marupi*”). After the Germans had retreated, the Portuguese arrived and asked locals the name of the place. They were told: “Namarupi”. The Portuguese wrote it down as “Marrupa”.¹⁰ It could be inferred from this episode that the area was unknown to the Portuguese before the First World War.¹¹ Even then it seems it failed to attract any formal attention. Neither a place-name nor a division called Marrupa appeared in the 1940 census. It was only later that Marrupa Circumscription was established under the development policy of the northern region and a colonial office was set up in order to control cotton production in the surrounding areas.¹²

Nova Freixo was the capital of Amaramba Circumscription, to which Maúa Administrative Post belonged until 1942. Nowadays it is called Cuamba and is the largest city in Niassa Province. Because of its proximity to Nyasaland, which was a British protectorate, the Portuguese colonial army aimed to conquer Nova Freixo in 1899, earlier than any other place in Niassa District. It also had appeal as it was on the planned route of the main road and the railroad which were to connect the inland with the Indian Ocean. It appealed further because its climate was well suited for agriculture and attracted many inhabitants.¹³

Maúa Administrative Post was situated between Amaramba Circumscription and Marrupa Circumscription, and so like other areas in Amaramba Circumscription, it had a favourable climate for agriculture and was densely populated. At the same time, it had the same “marginality” of Marrupa Circumscription and, for a long time, was little known to whites. This is partly why colonial rule was late in prevailing here despite its large population. To Africans, however, the Maúa region was far from being an insulated location. In the late nineteenth century, Maúa played an important role as a relay point between the slave-supplying inland and the slave-shipping coast on the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Yao route through Marrupa, this route was only used by the allies of the Makhuwa chiefs. The Portuguese and the British knew about it but, unlike the Yao route, did not use it for exploration and other purposes.¹⁴

The people of Maúa

It is important to look at who settled in the Maúa area and how. The overwhelming majority of residents in Maúa Circumscription spoke Makhuwa. As seen in Figure 19, the Lugenda flowed through the northern end of Maúa Circumscription (the Revia Administrative Post). To the north of the river were Yao settlements.¹⁵ The Maúa Circumscription was on the borders of Makhuwa settlements and Yao habitations. It was at the most northern part of Makhuwa habitations, together with Marrupa Circumscription in Niassa District and Montepuez Circumscription in Cabo Delgado District.

The Makhuwa-Lomwe, the largest ethnic group in Mozambique, live in Niassa District, Cabo Delgado District, Moçambique District and Zambézia District. As discussed in

the introduction, “ethnicisation” in Mozambique is a recent phenomenon. It should be noted that “Makhuwa” as an ethnic name and classification was first used by colonial rulers. “Makhuwa” means “barbaric”, “primitive” or “outsider”. Importantly, it was the name originally used by others, not by the group itself, and therefore the classification of “Makhuwa” as people should not be understood as given or arising from within.¹⁶ Over the years, however, people started recognising themselves as the Makhuwa and the classification became meaningful both for outsiders as well as insiders.


The criteria that have been used for defining the “Makhuwa” as an ethnic group are: (1) language (Makhuwa); (2) culture, customs and social systems (tattoos, rituals, etc.); (3) common mythology (the worship of Mount Namuli as their original home); and (4) self-perception (“I am not a Yao or Nguni”). Archaeological findings suggest that Makhuwa people could well be the descendants of the Bantu who moved from one of the lake areas in central Africa to Mozambique around the tenth century.¹⁷ According to common mythology, however, all Makhuwa ancestors descended from Mount Namuli in the north of Zambézia District and hence the mythology and worship of Namuli is common amongst Makhuwa people. In conversation, Mount Namuli, for instance, is often referred to as “the mountain where all the races lived and all the plants grew”. It was then believed that group by group, leaders called *nikhoto* (the first ancestors and *mwene*) took their people down the mountain and settled in various locations.¹⁸ In this way, Mount Namuli is the “home” for all Makhuwa people, the present clans and lineages derived from the leaders who came down the mountain.¹⁹

Some researchers have confirmed this mythology, but in terms of timing there are several theories.²⁰ In all likelihood there were probably several big waves of migration, the most recent possibly being during the 1820s when drought brought about famine.²¹ Significantly though, many of the current Makhuwa inhabitants, who are spread all over northern Mozambique, are relatively new and that, however geographically far from each other, they share the same mythology and ancestral history.

However, the Makhuwa cannot be defined as a single group of people, as its components have been reorganised and influenced by the many changes in contexts and circumstances within which the group and its parts exist. According to Lerma, who conducted research on the Makhuwa people in Maúá and wrote *O Povo Macua e a Sua Cultura* (Makhuwa People and their Culture), Makhuwa-Lomwe can be divided into three major sub-groups and four smaller sub-groups. The former are “Macua Interior” (Nampula and Niassa), “Macua-Meto” (Niassa and Cabo Delgado) and “Macua-Lomwe” (Zambezi and Niassa); while the latter are “Macua Rovuma” (near the Tanzanian borders), “Macua Chaca” (the south of Cabo Delgado and the north of Nampula), “Macua Chirima” (the north-west of Nampula) and “Macua Litoral” on the coast.²²

There are other possible classifications, but this book draws on the classification most widely used currently and divides Makhuwa speakers in Maúá Circumscription into two: Makhuwa-Metto and Makhuwa-Xirimá. The former live in the north-west and the east of Maúá Circumscription (the Revia Post and the Nekutho²³ territory), while the latter live in the centre and the south of the circumscription (Sede and the Nipepe Post).²⁴

Figure 19 Transition of the habitations of each ethnic group in northern Mozambique (mid 18th century)



(Some spellings changed by the author)

Medeiros, 1997:47.

The Makhuwa-Metto and the Makhuwa-Xirima not only speak differently but have specific and clearly defined features in terms of geographical distribution, the direction of migration, sacred places and blood relations. They distinguish themselves from each other through self-perception as well (Makhuwa-Metto or not).

The Makhuwa-Metto lived mainly in the south part of Cabo Delgado District. From the mid to late nineteenth century a centralised *Confederação de Mêto* (Metto Confederation) was formed.²⁵ Later they moved west to the present location but still have many relatives in Cabo Delgado.²⁶ The habitations of the Makhuwa-Xirima are not confined to Maúia Circumscription; they live beyond one of the main rivers, the Lúrio in Amaramba Circumscription (Alto, or upper Lúrio), and also on the west side of Mozambique District.²⁷ “Xirima” means “to go around the skirts of a mountain (*oxerema*)”. Their ancestors are thought to have come down the mountains near Mount Namuli, ranging from the north of Zambézia District to the west of Moçambique District.²⁸ Therefore they have blood relations to the south-east of their location, unlike the Makhuwa-Metto whose relations hail from further east.

However, these classifications are far from fixed. People in Maúia identify themselves first and foremost as part of the lineage group, which forms the basis of their village community, or as part of an overarching *nihimo* or *nihimu* (clan). It has only been more recently that they have become conscious about “Makhuwa” as a concept that shapes their group. Therefore, the distinction of Metto and Xirima is only meaningful in order to note the influences that their distinctive historical and geographical experiences have made, not to examine cultural or linguistic difference.

History of settlement

Settlement of Muwa

It is useful to hone in on the migration of Mwene Muwa (also known as Mahua or Mua by the Portuguese), who was the first Makhuwa chief to settle in the Maúia region and from whose name the place-name “Makhuwa” originated. As discussed earlier, the first Muwa lived in Mount Chalau situated in what later became Malema Circumscription in Moçambique District. The chief took his people across the Lúrio to the north, won the battle against the Yao who lived there, and put down roots in the area.²⁹ This has been confirmed by Ivala, who conducted research in Malema,³⁰ and Medeiros who estimates that the first Muwa crossed the Lúrio between 1935 and 1940.³¹

However, there appears to be no written record of Muwa’s migration together with his followers. Although Ivala suggests that the reason for the migration could have been a conflict inside the family, the widespread drought around this time could well have been an influential precipitating factor. Another factor that fits temporally, and hence could be included in the list of possible influences, could have been slave trade-route conflict.³² The Yao, the original inhabitants of Maúia, were well known for trading in slaves. Mwene Muwa fought against Yao chiefs during the height of the slave trade. Figure 14, which is a

trade route map of the late nineteenth century compiled by Medeiros, shows that caravans travelled from southern Nyasaland (the British colony) to Cuamba to Maúia to Mwalia (or Mwaliya/Mualia) to the coast. Raqui Muhoco, an elder of the Muhoco group, a sub-group of the Muwa, spoke of it as follows:

Some fathers and uncles killed elephants. They took ivory to the coast and brought clothes back. It took three men to carry a tusk. They needed helpers to carry all the clothes they received in exchange for the tusk ... Beeswax could also be exchanged for clothes. There was a slave trade relay point between here and Cuamba.³³

After establishing themselves north of the Lúrio, Muwa's people and the neighbouring Mwalia repeatedly attacked the Yao, eventually driving them north of the Lugenda.³⁴ From then on, the first Muwa presided over other groups that would arrive in this area. They had to ask permission from him to settle down. From the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Muwa had the highest authority over a vast area from the Lúrio in the south to the Lugenda in the north, from the Luluxi in the west to the Mwalia territory. Henry O'Neil, the British consul in Mozambique Island (where the office of the Portuguese governor-general was located), said that "Mua" (Muwa) was one of the most powerful among the Makhuwa chiefs to the north of the Lúrio.³⁵


Interestingly, though, O'Neil never visited Maúia himself. Around the time of the inland exploration (1880–1890), many exploration teams from Portugal and Britain travelled to the north of Mozambique, but none went to Maúia across the Lúrio. The Maúia area was left as a blank in the maps drawn by various explorers.³⁶

When the territory of Mozambique was demarcated in 1891, the most northern part was incorporated into the Nyassa Company. The Portuguese colonial army later conquered that area. Yet, Maúia remained untouched. After fighting against the neighbouring Mwalia in 1900, the Portuguese army did not go to Maúia but instead advanced to the north and fought against the Yao (see Figure 20).³⁷

Later, the Portuguese army placed the area around Lake Nyasa under its control and an administrative post was established in Niassa. It was only in January 1902 that the first white man travelled to Maúia. Sergeant Graça, an assistant to the administrator, was exploring various places in Niassa when he met Mwene Muwa and obtained permission from the "ageing Makhuwa *régulo*" to raise the Portuguese flag in his land.³⁸

Muwa established the regional capital north of the Lúrio around 1902 and at this time had the whole area under his control. However, due to a serious drought during this period and consequent famine he was soon forced to leave the capital.³⁹ It was Muwa II who moved the group near to the present Maúia Sede. Today the grave of Muwa II remains revered as an important religious site.⁴⁰ The "ageing Makhuwa *régulo*" that Graça met with was therefore not Muwa I, the "powerful chief" described by O'Neil, but his successor. Muwa must have known that the neighbouring Mwalia lost to the Portuguese in 1890. Facing the famine, the Muwa group would not have been in a position to stand up to the

Figure 20 Yao's diaspora, 1840–1880



Gerhard Liesegang, *Historia do Niassa*, C. 1.600-1920, AHM, 1993, in Medeiros, 1997:83.

(The spellings of chiefs are not corrected)

white sergeant. This probably explains why Muwa II agreed to raise the Portuguese flag without protest.

As for chiefs or groups other than Muwa and his people, there are even fewer records to be found and it is therefore extremely difficult to comment on or track their specific migration paths. Oral tradition, however, helps to piece some of the fragments together.

It seems that Muwa I had many sons from different women. First Vatiwa and Kuviri (or Kuvi/Kuvir/Cuvi/Cuviri), then Nipepe and Hamela, followed their father across the Lúrio to the north. The sons of Muwa I later played colonial roles as *régulos* in Maúia.⁴¹

Traditionally, Makhuwa is a matrilineal society. The successor of a *mwene* is not his biological son but his younger brother or a son of his sisters. It is interesting therefore that the sons of the first Muwa followed their father, as they would have in fact been subordinate to the brothers of their mothers. One explanation could be that their mothers were slaves. Slaves were taken out of their original communities and did not officially have brothers. Therefore, the sons of slaves had no uncles on their mothers' side to be subordinate to and would have been free to follow their father.⁴² That the four sons each belonged to a different clan supports this theory.

Historically, Makhuwa groups had a tendency to split into smaller groups. Since they depended on subsistence farming, group size and growth was an acute problem. To address this problem kidnapping women, or obtaining them as slaves, was common and considered a way of securing the means to reproduce and thus expand the next generation as well as to increase the work force for food production. It also influenced the future social structure of the group. In the late nineteenth century, slave trade became an important economic activity among the Makhuwa chiefs, and slaves were easily obtained. The sons born from female slaves were strategically used to secure the trade route. Ivala illustrated this using Chief Comala of Moçambique District as an example.⁴³ It was not uncommon that a *mwene* kept a nephew close to him as a successor and deployed his sons from female slaves to the surrounding areas or along the trade route. As the area north of the Lúrio was scarcely populated, it was possible to move to and settle in a new location without having to fight against former occupants as Muwa did. The method of slave transport was a long-distance walk. It was therefore essential to have places to provide food and porters along the route in order to transport slaves quickly and safely. It was also necessary to have allies along the route to safeguard against attacks and robbers. It was not uncommon for traders themselves to be attacked by armed locals, captured and sold as slaves.

The important point here is not whether the sons of the first Muwa who relocated with their father were slaves or not, but rather that the migration of the first Muwa to Maúia was probably a strategic move in order to occupy the area north of the Lúrio effectively. It is noteworthy that Vatiwa and Kuviri, then Nipepe and Hamela, who were later appointed as *régulos* by the colonial authority, were the sons (thus not even rightful successors) of the first Muwa and that the colonial authority treated the four "sons" as equal to Mwene Muwa, their "father," by appointing them as *régulos*, though they should have been placed under Mwene Muwa in the traditional pecking order. This demonstrates that, although

the colonial authority appeared to use or include the traditional social structure, it did so without fully understanding it. This point is important in connection with the liberation war and will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.

After the first Muwa and his sons conquered Maúá, late-comers had to accept their authority in order to be allowed to settle there. Not only Mwene Muwa, but also his strategically placed sons, exercised authority in each *mwene* territory as the first settlers over the groups that arrived later.

Other groups of the Maúá area of Mozambique

The Ntepo group, which tried to settle on Vatiwa's land, tell of the establishment of the Muwa group as follows:


The first Ntepo, who used to live in Umpuhua [in current Nampula], took his people across the Lúrio. The land had been occupied by Vatiwa. Vatiwa, a powerful *mwene*, said, "I wouldn't permit it unless you kiss my foot." Ntepo said no, fought against Vatiwa and lost. There was hardly anybody left. Eventually, Ntepo II went back to the other side of the Lúrio. When white men showed up, they crossed the river again and went into Vatiwa's land. They didn't fight this time because they had a common enemy.⁴⁴

From this fragment of oral history, we can deduce that: (1) the Ntepo group is originally from near Mount Chalau in the Malema Circumscription and their relations can be traced back to before the crossing of the Lúrio; (2) there was always the possibility of wars breaking out when newcomers did not accept the authority of the existing occupants; and (3) the advent of white men changed the relationships among chiefs.

It should also be remembered that there were often existing relationships between the Muwa and other *mwene* groups who arrived after the Muwa group. They would most often have been former neighbours of the Muwa group in the Alto Lúrio (Malema, Ribábue, Laláulà).⁴⁵ This is confirmed by Ivala's research conducted in the areas where the groups had lived prior to the migration. The research findings of this project corroborate this, confirming that the ancestors of these groups originally lived in the Alto Lúrio. They left their homeland for different reasons. The first Muwa and his sons probably made a strategic move for slave trade, as discussed earlier, while many other groups moved in order to escape colonial oppression. Ivala explains as follows:

Muwa forms a large chieftaincy in the present Maúá District. The group relocated here from Malema [the Alto Lúrio], leaving many relatives behind. When the remaining relatives encountered the Portuguese here, the existence of Muwa made it easy for them to relocate to the north [the Maúá region] and settle there.⁴⁶

Figure 21 Migration track (*niphito*) of the Ntepo Group



(Drawn by the author)

The encounter with the Portuguese in Malema and subsequent migration took place over four separate periods. The first was at the end of the nineteenth century when the Portuguese army placed the Alto Lúrio (Moçambique District) under its control and the colonial authorities started to impose compulsory taxes and labour on locals. Many Makhuwa chiefs attempted armed resistance against the colonial army in vain. They left for Maúa or Cuamba, which were the territories of the Nyassa Company, across the Lúrio. The second was during the First World War when the Portuguese tried to punish the chiefs for allegedly assisting the invasion of the German army in this area.⁴⁷ The third was from 1928 to 1933 when many *mwenes* and their groups fled from the compulsory labour service imposed by the colonial authorities for road construction taking place between the inland areas and the coast. As a result, the population around the Alto Lúrio decreased from 20,000 to 8,175. The fourth period was from 1932 to 1950 when the construction of the railroad began to connect Nyasaland and the Nacala port and many local people were mobilised as labourers.⁴⁸

Every time the Portuguese tightened its control, people living in the Alto Lúrio moved to the Maúa region, fringe areas for the whites, as well as to British Nyasaland and Cuamba, where their relatives had already settled. One can infer therefore that those who migrated in one of the four periods were closely related to the Muwa group.

Branquinho, who studied traditional Makhuwa authority on the request of the Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações de Moçambique (SCCIM: Information Centralisation and Coordination Service of Mozambique), the Mozambican intelligence agency, during the liberation war, wrote in his report that a *mwene* and the majority of his group ran away from the Alto Lúrio during the First World War (the second in the four periods) and settled in the habitations of Nipepe (a son of the first Muwa) and the Muela group. Many remained in the area and, together with Mwene Nipepe, became *régulos* and *chefes* after the colonial administrative structure was established.⁴⁹

The *mwenes* and their groups who moved in the third period headed for Nyasaland or Cuamba. After the First World War, the German army left Maúa and colonial rule was strengthened. Muwa and other group members were banished. Therefore, many Alto Lúrio residents chose British Nyasaland as their destination, instead of Maúa.

Only the Vatiwa group went to Maúa.⁵⁰ Vatiwa was a son of the first Muwa. The group crossed the Lúrio but for an unknown reason crossed back again and settled in Malema. Soon after, Mwene Vatiwa was captured by the colonial administrator and banished for two years. As soon as he came back from exile, he secretly took the entire group across the river again and settled in Maúa.⁵¹

As mentioned earlier, according to the present Vatiwa, the group crossed the Lúrio to flee from the hard labour of railroad construction, settling in the southern part of Maúa Circumscription around 1926 to 1928.⁵² Mwene Vatiwa was later appointed as *régulo*.⁵³ Branquinho praised the Niassa provincial governor for giving such generous treatment to the fugitive. It is said that he thought that this was the appropriate attitude to capture the heart of African traditional authority and that the “punishment” meted out by the Malema administrator was counterproductive.⁵⁴

It seems that migration, until the mid-twentieth century when colonial rule was being established, was mainly strategic and groups tended to gravitate to places where blood relatives had already settled. Initially there were conflicts and even wars among groups, for example, in the case of the Ntepo group and the Vatiwa group. Later, however, it became more important to flee from the whites – the common “enemy”. The Maúa area, which was the “last frontier” for the whites, became the “place to escape” from for Makhuwa people in the Alto Lúrio (Makhuwa-Xirima). While the Makhuwa on the coast and Muwa’s neighbour Mwene Mwalia (Makhuwa-Metto) resorted to armed resistance, the ancestors of the Makhuwa residents (people originally from the Alto Lúrio) instead opted to flee as an attempt to try to escape the constraints of colonial rule. Their flight was effectively the last means of resistance under the increasingly powerful colonial rule from the end of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Importantly, the unit of the migration was not an individual or a family but rather as a whole village community (lineage group) with a *mwene* as a leader. Hence, in the northern part of Mozambique where colonial

economy was late to arrive, the traditional social structure was still functioning reasonably well and far from collapsing as in other parts of the country.

The traditional social structure and its transformation

Migration track

Historically the Makhuwa relocated regularly. Significantly, these collective movements were far from random but, as seen in the examples of Muwa and other *mwenes*, were very strategic.⁵⁵ The migration track is referred to as a *niphito* (a route of community migration) in the Makhuwa language. In rituals, it is repeatedly referred to when relating and describing the origins of the group.⁵⁶ The territories of Makhuwa-Xirima and Makhuwa-Metto in Maúa, illustrated in Figure 22, in fact overlap with their *niphito*. Their relocation, which the colonial rulers may well have interpreted as mere “movement” or “flight”, were generally highly elaborate manoeuvres and would have taken into account many factors, such as the relationship among *mwenes* (conflict, social order, alliance, etc.), the historical experience of the group and the strategy based on their own concept of the area. These strategies undoubtedly had an important bearing on groups during the liberation struggle period.


Resultant influences on Maúa dwellers include: (1) each group did not have a strong tie with its new home, Maúa; (2) groups tended to be small and stayed away from each other; and (3) the relationship between groups was not strong. The Makhuwa society, which had never had a centralised political structure, became even more fragmented after the migration.⁵⁷

Traditional social structure

Prior to colonial rule, according to anthropologists, the political and social structures of the Makhuwa tended to be matrilineal, segmented and scattered.⁵⁸

The smallest social unit is *erukulu*.⁵⁹ This means “uterus” in the Makhuwa language and signifies a matrilineal extended family, descending from a common mother. An *erukulu* thus includes the maternal grandmother, her daughters (their mother and aunts), their siblings and cousins. In effect this is the basic unit of production. The eldest uncle on the mother’s side (*tata* or *atata*, with respect) plays an important role as the head of the family in making decisions on family matters such as production and distribution.⁶⁰ Because tradition requires the husband to live in his wife’s village, the husband of the mother is placed under the authority of the *tata*.⁶¹ The “biological father” does not have a say in the future of his children and has to leave it to the *tata*, the “social father”. As polygamy is permitted, the husband is perceived as an outsider to his wife’s family. Several *erukulus* form a *nkoto*, which Lerma refers to as a “lineage segment”.⁶² Since it consists of direct descendants of the same woman (four to seven generations), the *nkoto* members have the same clan name (*nihimo*). A marriage between a man and a woman with the same *nihimo* is taboo.

Figure 22 Migration track (*niphito*) of Makuwa-Xirima and-Metto (20th century)



Based on the interviews by the author
 (Muwa, 10/8/1997; Muela, 23/8/1997; Nekutho, 21/8/1999; Vatiwa, 23/5/1999)

For Makuwa people, the most important social unit is *nloko* which Lerma called a “*unidades uterinas*” (uterus unit).⁶³ A *nloko* was originated by the leader who took the groups to the new land (*nikhoto*).⁶⁴ Its components include several *nkotos* that accept the authority of their *nikhoto* and his rightful successor *mwene*.⁶⁵ Members of a *nloko* use the same *nikhoto* name for their residential territory (a village community) and have obligations rooted in brotherly bonds, such as respect, mutual assistance, the usage of common land

and participation in funerals.⁶⁶ The geographical sphere of a *mwene's* authority is called a *ntthete*. Anybody living in a *ntthete* has to accept the authority of the *mwene* and the religious authority of the *pwiyamwene* (usually the *mwene's* sister or a daughter of the sisters), who embodies the “common mother” as the symbol of unity.⁶⁷

Like the founder (*nikhoto*), the *mwene* is expected to lead his people diligently by, for example, making a decision to move the group to new land when it faces a crisis, such as famine. However, he is not allowed to make singlehanded decisions affecting the group; any decision concerning the whole group has to be made by consensus at a so-called council meeting, attended by all the *humus* (heads of the *nkotos*). This is called a *pwattaphwatta* in the Maúia area.⁶⁸ Moreover, the *mwene* has to consider the opinions of both the *pwiyamwene* and the *mapili* (an advisor to the *nkoto*). The selection of a new *mwene* (from maternal brothers and nephews of the last *mwene*) is also based on consensus of the *humu*, while respecting the late *mwene's* will. Hence, the “authority” of the *mwene* is not necessarily equate to “power” because of the segmentation and independence of the *nkoto*.

After four to seven generations, a *nkoto* splits from the *nkolo* that it belongs to and forms a new *nkolo*. This mirrors the founding *nikhoto* who left his original *nkolo* and started his own when he moved his people to a new location. This is one of the explanations for the geographic expansion of the same clan (*nihimo*) and why the authority of the *mwene*, the head of the most fundamental social unit, the *nkolo*, never becomes centralised. When a *humu*, head of a *nkoto*, becomes embroiled in an internal problem pertaining to his particular *nkolo*, or finds himself at odds with his *mwene*, he has the option to move his *nkoto* to a new location and begin a new *nkolo*. One of the important consequences of these traditional social structures is that the Makhuwa society has become segmented and scattered, with no centralised kingdom – unlike the paternal societies found in central and southern Mozambique (even though Makhuwa also experienced slave trade).⁶⁹

Historical changes

Naturally the above-mentioned “traditional” social structure has not remained fixed, becoming, over time, more diverse and flexible. For instance, as Makhuwa chiefs became more actively engaged in the slave trade in the late nineteenth century, they began to form alliances. Another example is that at times, particularly in terms of political decision-making, *mwenes* would have had the final say rather than awaiting a council's consensus. The slave trade was a very lucrative economic activity and for the Muwa during this time it would have invariably led to an increase in power. As the first Muwa and his people settled in Maúia at the height of the slave trade, and also because they were warring against the Yao, the group became comprised of two social classes: “free” (*netthi*) and “slave” (*epottha*).⁷⁰ The succession to *mwene* was hence swayed by whether the candidate was from “superior lineage” or “inferior lineage”.⁷¹

There were what could be described as five major structural characteristics of the Makhuwa society. Some of these characteristics remain today and those that have changed

or disappeared have nevertheless had an important influence on the fabric of the group: (1) the most important units (village communities) were lineage (*nkolo*); its heads (*mwene*) became *régulo* or *chefe* in the colonial administration; (2) since succession to a *mwene* was matrilineal, the *pwiyamwene*, the female authority, was also significant; (3) the authority of the *mwenes* and the *pwiyamwenes* was not necessarily equal to their political power. In the decision-making process, the consensus by all the heads of *nkotos* (*humus*) was essential; (4) a *nkoto* could split from the *nloko* it belonged to and form a new *nloko*; (5) as a result of (4), a *nloko* was relatively small in size, did not have a long history as a group and was therefore unlikely to centralise.

The ways in which traditional chiefs operated in the Maúia region were very different from what the colonial government expected from *régulos* or *chefes*. A response to political or other change for Makhuwa people has historically been to relocate and reform – this continues to be true today.

The social order outside the lineage groups further complicates the social relationship among the Makhuwa. For clarity it is useful to recap a bit and also to note that the reason why an understanding of these structures is so critical is that although some may have disappeared or been adapted, many remain in place and whether still in existence or not have had, and continue to have, an enormous influence on how Makhuwa people have responded to change over time. *Nkolo* (lineage) is an important social unit, but *nkolo* members are also affected by *nihimo* (clan). The history of *nkolo* is retained through oral tradition over four to seven generations – thereafter it will probably be lost due to the segmentation of groups and the deterioration of memories. *Nihimo* connects people who were originally from the same *nkoto* but have, over many generations, become dispersed.

There are hundreds of lineage names but only about ten clan names. Among the *mwene* who have the same *nihimo* traditional rank, established over many years, this remains important. Traditionally a *mwene* would regularly consult someone of a higher rank about a problem in his *nkoto*. He may belong to a different *nkolo* and may live hundreds of kilometres away but is still regarded as being superior. *Nihimo* has a special significance when a *nkoto* considers leaving its *nkolo* and moving outside its living space (*ntthete*). They often only decide on the destination after taking into consideration their relationship with other *nkolo* that belong to the same *nihimo*.

In other words, a Makhuwa belongs to a *nkolo*, a village community, and is affected by the social relationship inside the *nkolo* while maintaining connection with the *nihimo* of the same name as his in other areas. The importance of clan relations means that people still have a sense of belonging and a sense of security from being part of a broader network, even when their lineage relations are under strain and in threat of fragmentation. This phenomenon has also accelerated the Makhuwa's tendency for segmentation and high mobility. Men in particular have many opportunities to travel, visiting their home *nkoto* and the leaders of the same *nihimo*, and are able to form a dynamic network which is supportive as they live in their wives' community (*ntthete*) and not where their own clan is.⁷²

In addition to the ranking of lineage and clan, there is a social order related to geographical territory. A group is not permitted to occupy new land unless it recognises

the authority of the former occupants. If not, newcomers have to fight for their place in the same way that the Muwa and Ntepo groups did.

Traditional social order was therefore far from simple and frequently underestimated and misunderstood by the colonial rulers. It was multi-layered and organic in the region, in the clan, in the lineage and in the segments (slaves or not). Moreover, despite the matrilineal system, the status of women was not in fact that high and the authority of the *pwiyamwene* was largely religious or symbolic.⁷³ Women belonged to the uncle on the mother's side, the husband, the *mwene* and their brothers. They had no say in decision-making. The political status of a young man was also low, first as an under-age child belonging to his uncle and, after marriage, as an "outsider" husband, unless he himself became the "uncle". This factor contributed to the high mobility of Makhwa males.

In the traditional Makhwa society where people relied on agriculture – which generally only provided a subsistence standard of living – the complex social order and lines of authority did not therefore necessarily mean that there was a vertical power structure. However, the slave trade in the late nineteenth century transformed this, introducing a vertical power structure. The social structure then changed again in the early twentieth century as a result of the changes in international relations, colonial policies and environmental crises. More precisely and firstly, the slave trade stopped completely; secondly, the colonial army conquered powerful chiefs; thirdly, another vertical power structure (colonial rule) penetrated local communities, and fourthly, droughts and locusts devastated local agriculture.

A recent trend is to look at the impact of environmental factors on the people. For the Makhwa the deterioration of the natural environment on which it relied so heavily for its survival radically influenced the community, changing power relations among people and among groups. For instance, food shortages could lead to violence over food or result in a group leaving their chief who could no longer distribute food adequately. As a result, existing power structures changed or collapsed.

When Sergeant Graça, as the first white man to visit *Maúa* in 1902, met *Mwene Muwa*, the society was in the midst of these difficulties. If the famine in 1901 to 1902 forced the *Muwa* group to abandon their capital and move to another location, as *Medeiros* pointed out, the authority of the then *mwene* (*Muwa II*) would have become much weaker than his predecessor. This was a large factor contributing to the *Maúa* residents' accepting the Portuguese flag without armed resistance.

Establishment of colonial rule

Maúa during the First World War

Colonial rule finally reached *Maúa* in the first decade of the twentieth century. Due partially to the region's geographical remoteness, it had been left alone until then as the *Nyassa Company*, under which the region was placed from 1894 to 1929, had a weak financial base and hence resources and capacities were limited.⁷⁴

In 1907 the Nyassa Company set up a military post (*posto militar*) in Maúa.⁷⁵ It is unclear, however, what exactly this comprised of. As in some instances, it could have simply been a Portuguese flag, as promised by Sergeant Graça. Elders of the community say that whites only started to live in the region after the “Germans’ War” (*Guerra de Jarmane*), their term for the First World War.⁷⁶ It is probable that Maúa was still largely devoid of colonial rule before the First World War.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the territory of the Nyassa Company became a battlefield between the German army and its *askari* (Swahili meaning African soldiers), coming from its east African territory in the north, and the Portuguese–British alliance. The Germans formed an alliance with local African chiefs who were resistant to Portuguese colonial rule, and this alliance enabled them to hire guides who had intimate knowledge of the terrain, allowing them rapid advancement through northern Mozambique. Figure 16 demonstrates how the German reconnoitring party entered Niassa near the eastern shore of Lake Malawi, went through the Yao habitations and reached the most northern part of the Makuwa habitations such as Maúa and Montepuez. It also shows how the German army moved throughout northern Mozambique during the course of about a year from November 1917 to September 1918.

In May 1917, Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, a German general in the Imperial German Army and the commander of the German East Africa campaign, sent a major to the Makuwa chiefs, including Muwa III, in order to persuade them to form an alliance with the Germans against the Portuguese.⁷⁷ It seems an agreement must have been reached as the fifth platoon, led by Von Lettow-Vorbeck, remained in Maúa in February 1918.⁷⁸ However, two months later, a British-Portuguese battalion arrived in Maúa and, after a battle, took over the German barracks.⁷⁹

How did the Maúa residents respond to what they call the “Germans’ War” and how do they remember it? It seems that, on arrival, the Germans and the “blacks who spoke Swahili” requested food and porters. The Maúa residents largely assisted them out of fear – being the first white people they had encountered and who wielded mighty firearms.⁸⁰ The present Muwa suggests that chiefs in northern Mozambique, including the then Muwa, played an active role in the alliance: “An armed force called the Germans came, but its main force was comprised of blacks. Its leader was Nikepele. The Germans were in alliance with Mozambicans from Makuwa, Makonde and Maputo.⁸¹ It was like FRELIMO [consisting of people from various ethnic groups and from different regions within Mozambique]. They fought against the white allied force of the British and Portuguese.”⁸²

Due to resistance to Portuguese colonial rule, as detailed earlier, it would make sense that Makuwa chiefs would have been open to other options. It has been documented that during these times the Germans formed alliances in many places by promising African chiefs that they would ensure that they “regained their sovereignty”. Nevertheless, how actively the original occupants of Maúa cooperated in the white men’s war is uncertain.

The author was told by inhabitants of this region that when they were “passing time” with the Germans, “the major and others came”.⁸³ Aroni Caisse from Revia⁸⁴ in northern Maúa said:

The Germans came and said, “Tell us where the British will enter.” The Portuguese said the same thing before ...⁸⁵ People fled. To the Lugenda. The Germans went from here to Makonkwa, where the British caught up. They had four battles. Neither side won. They scattered and both the British and the Germans left. Only the Portuguese stayed.⁸⁶

There are many different versions of events that took place in the region during the First World War period, however eight “acts” seem consistent: (1) the Germans came; (2) people did not refuse cooperation; (3) the Germans sometimes used them as porters, but their treatment was, all in all, “not too bad”; (4) surprised by battles, many tried to flee; (5) the British and the Portuguese also used them as porters but treated them badly; (6) the war brought no benefits for residents; (7) many died in the “Germans’ War”; and (8) many groups moved to even more remote locations, thinking, “We shouldn’t live in such a bad place.”⁸⁷ The Muwa group stayed where they were. Sancho Afia Amisse, a “son” of Muwa IV and a younger brother of Muwa V, commented on events after the war:⁸⁸

Muwa III was banished to the Mozambique Island because he rejected the British and Portuguese armies that came to this land in the Germans’ War. People had to select a new Muwa and did so, according to the tradition. The Portuguese couldn’t get involved in the selection. The new Muwa, Muwa IV, told his people to obey the Portuguese because he too would be banished otherwise, because the Portuguese were more powerful. As a result, we started to live with the Portuguese.⁸⁹

Henceforth, the actual colonial rule in the Maúá region began. During the battles between the German army and the British/Portuguese army, Maúá residents were to witness the powerful weapons of the white men. The exile of Muwa, the ultimate authority, and the colonial intervention in traditional authority dampened the momentum of vigorous resistance.⁹⁰ Moreover, a severe drought throughout Mozambique, as well as an influenza outbreak in 1919, further affected residents negatively. It is estimated that as many as 50,000 Africans lost their lives in northern Mozambique between 1914 and 1922.⁹¹ People in the Maúá region would remember the First World War as the beginning of a new, and bad, era.

The early days of colonial rule in Maúá, the “land of escape”

In the early days of colonial rule in Maúá, Muwa and other African chiefs, who were considered to have cooperated with the German Army actively or passively, were captured and were either executed or exiled. Portugal, which had previously battled to conquer all of Mozambique due to it being part of the victorious allied forces, now found itself in a powerful position. It succeeded in not only keeping its colony but also was able to finally place the northern part of the country under military control. It established military

posts in newly-conquered areas such as Maúa, and especially in locations which had been occupied by the Germans. The Nyassa Company, on the other hand, ceased its meagre investment altogether and increasingly relied on forced labour and hut tax as a source of revenue. New administrative posts were set up in the interior for easy exploitation of Africans, rather than for development. In 1923, the Nyassa Company established its first administrative post in Maúa (*Conselho de Maúa*). It was realigned as an administrative post of the colonial government in 1926.⁹²

Under the supervision of the *chefe do posto* of the Nyassa Company and *cypaio* (African policemen attached to local administration office), *mwenes* were expected to collect the poll taxes that were imposed on female residents.⁹³ Having experienced the “Germans’ War”, witnessed the exile of their highest authority Mwene Muwa, and having been faced with drought and disease, Maúa residents and other *mwenes* in Makhuwa accepted the taxes without resistance. However, inhabitants were still able to move around relatively freely and as there was still much land left where no white men had yet entered, many groups, such as the Muela, the Nihava and the Mwapula, quietly moved to even more remote places in the forests of northern Maúa.⁹⁴

However, the Muwa group, and other groups under the authority of Mwene Muwa, “decided to get used to *colonos* (colonial rulers)”.⁹⁵ Since the new Muwa, Muwa IV, had no other choice but to accept colonial rule, the groups under him made a decision to share his fate. It is unclear though to what extent this was compulsory, and if it was compulsory, whether it was made so by colonial rulers or by Muwa IV. It must have been difficult to flee after being witness to the overwhelming military power of the Portuguese and later the “authority” of an administrative post that had been established in the midst of their land.

Nevertheless, despite the establishment of an administrative post and the commencement of tax collection, the existence of the Nyassa Company did not have an immediate effect on the lives of Maúa residents. The vast territory and the lack of resources made it impossible for the company to control the region effectively and thoroughly. While company officials forced the *mwenes* to collect taxes and provide labour, the *mwenes* resisted them in many different ways. The settlements were scattered, resident numbers were under-reported, and many adults hid in the forests when *sipaio*s made their rounds. When hut tax was introduced, as a countermeasure, they reduced the number of huts. When life became intolerable, an entire group would flee at night to an even more remote area, placing themselves, even if only temporarily, out of reach. These resistance measures are still much talked about amongst present day Makhuwa residents.

The Nyassa Company’s rule ended due to an economic crisis in Portugal and the subsequent rise of Salazar. Portugal unilaterally abrogated the ninety-nine-year lease of the Nyassa Company in 1929 and placed the former territory of the company under the direct control of the government. With this as a turning point, Niassa would undergo a sudden change and its “remoteness” lost, as pointed out by Isaacman.⁹⁶

The introduction of the “Cotton Regime”

Cotton companies, colonial administration and their alliance with African assistants

The 1930 *Acto Colonial* (Colonial Act) placed the whole of Mozambique, including the area controlled by the Nyassa Company, under the direct rule of Portugal. Even the remote Maúá became a part of Mozambique, at least on the map. However, this policy change affected local communities only after the establishment of the “Cotton Regime”. That is, the formation of the Junta de Exportação de Algodão Colonial (JEAC: Colonial Cotton Export Board), the concessions given to private cotton companies and the appointment of José Tristão de Bettencourt as governor-general. In 1939, the majority of northern Mozambique was carved up among cotton companies (see Figure 18). As cotton growing was systematically forced on local residents, the colonial rule structure was formalised expeditiously.

The vast Niassa District, including Marrupa and Maúá District, was placed under the control of the Sociedade Algodoeira do Niassa (SAN: Niassa Cotton Society). Unlike the office of the Maúá Administrative Post, which was an old “hut” made of local materials and used by the Nyassa Company, the SAN office and the houses of its agents were concrete buildings. Cotton companies forged ahead in terms of infrastructure far more quickly than the colonial administration.⁹⁷ First, private companies took hold of Maúá, and then the colonial administration secured its base – not vice versa.⁹⁸ This has characterised Portuguese colonial rule since the end of the nineteenth century. In effect, the introduction of cotton growing in the land of the former Nyassa Company played a major role in constructing the colonial administrative structure. Both cotton company agents as well as colonial administrators jointly made sure that residents in the area grew cotton.

However, it is evident from ISANI, a report of the *inspector dos negócios indígenas* (inspector of native affairs) who visited Amaramba Circumscription (where Maúá Administrative Post was), that the relationship between cotton companies, colonial administration and African police was not necessarily cordial.⁹⁹ According to the *diário de serviço* (service diary) of the Amaramba administration quoted in the report, Sermenho, a SAN manager, visited the administrative office of the circumscription and said:¹⁰⁰

Mr Sermenho says, “This area is infamous in Nampula¹⁰¹ because it does not produce cotton this year. An administrator who doesn’t produce cotton should be replaced.” He knows very well that natives in this area are not keen to grow cotton. Moreover, he knows very well that this area must produce enough cotton by the order of the district governor and that the administrator sent all the *sipaíos* to the locations to make the natives obey the order, because many of them didn’t want to grow cotton. Therefore he easily complained to his superiors, when *sipaíos* don’t do good work, they should degrade the administrator.¹⁰² In my observation, the SAN seems to think that they only

need to force the residents to produce cotton, without spending money, and by fair means or foul.¹⁰³

Reflected here are the tensions that were present between the various parties: the cotton companies who were often just after a quick buck; the provincial governors (appointed by Governor-General Bettencourt), who were concerned about production volumes and the administrators, who forced local people to achieve production volume targets. This extract also suggests that a SAN employee had the power to dismiss an administrator. The service diary recorded that SAN's non-payment to the *capatazs* (foremen) or residents for four months was negatively affecting the cotton growing expansion campaign by the administrative government.¹⁰⁴

Cotton growing in Amaramba Circumscription began in 1939. In 1940 only 366 tons of cotton was produced. By 1941 production increased to 972 tons but increased again only marginally by 1942 to 1,010 tons. Significantly, the number of cotton growers increased from 10,652 in 1940 to 21,891 in 1941, though they slightly decreased in 1942 to 20,353 (see Graph 4).

The entry in the above-mentioned service diary illustrates the cotton companies' irritation towards the administration, which could not mobilise local people to plant cotton, as well as the administrators' frustration at their own inability to mobilise sufficient people to comply with their demands. Cotton companies and administrative officials blamed each other for people's unwillingness to grow cotton. Both tried to achieve their objectives, not by changing their own ways, but by putting more pressure on residents.


In Maúa Administrative Post, forced cotton growing started around 1940 and Maúa was no longer the last refuge in Mozambique. It was around this time that many Africans began to flee to the neighbouring British territories from Maúa.¹⁰⁵

Incorporation of the local communities

In order to force locals to grow cotton, it became evident that it was essential to co-opt the help of the traditional authorities. The introduction of the *regedoria* system in the Maúa region was thorough.¹⁰⁶ Traditional authorities, or *mwenes* (heads of village communities), were designated either as *regulos* or *chefes* depending on the size of the community, and were made responsible for internal affairs within each group. A *regulo*, in particular, was responsible for all the affairs in his territory (*regedoria*) and was imprisoned if he failed to collect taxes.


The pressure and consequent humiliation experienced was sometimes so extreme that the *mwenes*, who were placed on the bottom of the colonial administration as *regulos*, attempted to flee. Even members of the Muwa group who had chosen, albeit unwillingly, to get "used to the white men" at the onset of colonial rule, tried to flee. This was recorded in an administrative telegram dated 11 January 1941 as, "the information on the flight of Maúa residents."

Graph 4 Cotton production in Amaramba and Marrupa Circumscriptions



Source: Bravo, 1963:140; 142; author's calculations.

Graph 5 Number of cotton producers in Amaramba and Marrupa Circumscriptions



Source: Bravo, 1963:140; 142; author's calculations.

The administrative secretary of Amaramba Circumscription, who investigated the matter, reported to the governor-general's office as follows:

According to Maúa Administrative Post, Régulo Cuvir [Kuviri] sent and gave the small firearms, which he stocked for self-defence, to the post.¹⁰⁷ The *régulo*, accompanied by his people, was leaving this area to live with the former Régulo Mahua [Muwa], who is his brother-in-law in Nyasaland ... The natives believe that the former Régulo Mahua sent lions to capture the relatives of two of Cuvir's wives.¹⁰⁸ I sent *sipaio*s in plain clothes to capture the messenger of the former Régulo Mahua.¹⁰⁹

The telegram documents that Mwene Muwa, who was a *régulo*, left the Maúa region sometime between 1920 and 1941 and settled in Nyasaland.¹¹⁰ It also describes how a successor of Mwene Kuviri, a son of the first Muwa, attempted to travel to Nyasaland with his people and a collection of small firearms in 1941. This episode indicates that *mwenes* were not always obedient to the colonial authorities that were trying to coerce them to work for the system. The establishment of a vertical authority system, which ignored the traditional social order, and the cotton growing, which was forced through violent measures, was intolerable for many ordinary people and *mwene* alike.¹¹¹

Frustrated with the slow expansion of forced cotton growing, the colonial government sought alternative measures. The 1944 regulation regarding the local assistants (*régulo*, *sipaio* and interpreters), mentioned in the previous chapter, was to encourage them to promote cotton growing by offering them fees out of the cotton sales' profits as well as from the taxes that *regulos* collected from group members. As a result, some *regulos* started to change their attitude. Amisse described this change:

From a certain time, *mwene*, who became *régulo*, started to ride *maxila* (palanquin) as if they were white men.¹¹² They no longer walked on foot and instead rode on the shoulders of Africans. This happened during the reign of Muwa VI.¹¹³

The inspector of native affairs who visited Maúa Administrative Post in 1944 described the conditions at the post as follows, suggesting the successful control over residents despite scarce resources:¹¹⁴

There is no telephone at the administrative post or at the official residence of the *chefe do posto*. The road to connect the post and other locations can be used only during the dry season. Without repairing it every year, the road is not passable. It requires maintenance but they have little money. It's a mystery how they manage to do it when the area is so thinly peopled.¹¹⁵

Mocha Penpena, a Muhoco elder, talked about the intensification of public works which came with the introduction of cotton growing.

They made us cut down trees of many meters long to build a bridge. It was hard to carry *sipaíos* on top. They beat weak ones up. They said this was a man's job and it was compulsory. *Sipaíos* came around to houses at night and captured men. Some fled into the forests. Sometimes the government summoned *régulos*. *Régulos* ordered *chefes*. Each *chefe* had to collect a certain number of men. To build roads was a job for men and women. We carried sand from the mountains and made roads. We used hands to carry sand and soil. We were also made to cut trees and pull the roots.¹¹⁶

The answer, it seems, to the "mystery" that the inspector referred to was the oppression by *sipaíos* and the utilisation of *régulos* and *chefes*. The same method was used for cotton growing. SAN agents and the *chefe do posto* ordered the *régulo* to gather up locals in his territory and then, under the *sipaio's* supervision, people were forced to plant cotton from morning until night, first in the field of the *régulo* and then in the field of the *puiyamwene*.¹¹⁷

Incorporation of local residents and the end of the "land of escape"

Despite these measures, as in other areas, people continued to flee. As a further effort to combat this resistance the administration then introduced a quota system. A household with a husband and a wife was required to plant cotton on one hectare of land. A household headed by a widow or a wife, other than the first wife, had to plant half a hectare of land. Having thus been incorporated into the system, women also had to endure a heavy workload and a life characterised by oppression. One woman in Maúa said:

The cotton growing campaign lasted long. *Capatazs*, who were paid [by cotton companies], beat us. Some were imprisoned. Sometimes we were ordered to take *capim* (weeds) to the administrator to prove we were doing cotton work. Even old people were forced to work. There was not enough to eat. Desperately we asked men for help. Those days men and women worked together in the field.¹¹⁸

Division of labour between the genders was firmly entrenched in every aspect of daily life in Makhuwa society. Agriculture was mainly women's work because it was related to food.¹¹⁹ However, growing cotton on one hectare of land was more than a woman could do, and husband and wife worked together. Still, the workload of women doubled because they had to work on the cotton field in addition to producing food for their family's consumption. When the men, who loathed the farm work and forced growing thrust upon them, fled home to become migrant workers, the women were left to cultivate one hectare of land all

by themselves. If they failed to fulfil this quota, they had to endure unpleasant consequences, such as sexual violence by the *capataz* who did not belong to the community.

The Maúa region, which used to be the place to which people from other areas fled for cover, had now, under colonial rule, changed drastically. Yet, even with the oppressive measures outlined, it was not easy to force the residents to fulfil the quota because the men frequently fled. As an attempt to counteract this, the administration took the next step which was to count the residents and register them in order to control the population on an individual basis. Until this time, neither population registration nor census was conducted in the region, although these were essential for tax collection. The registration of cotton growers was thus the first population registration which took place in Maúa.¹²⁰ The colonial administration issued cotton grower registration cards to all residents including children and elders.

It can be seen how the introduction of cotton growing drastically changed the modus operandi of local administration, enabling the colonial rulers to control people in Maúa for the first time in history.

In the whole of the Marrupa Circumscription, which oversaw Maúa Administrative Post, 690 people were registered as cotton growers in 1942. The number increased almost 45-fold to 29,158 by 1943. The main reason for this dramatic increase was that the registration process started full scale when the Marrupa administrative office was established in 1943. However, these numbers were short-lived and cotton growing may well have met with resistance from the Marrupa residents. The number of registered growers decreased very significantly again, to 9,011 in 1945, as these coercive measures did not have a continuous impact.¹²¹

According to Isaacman, cotton growers constituted 50 per cent of the total labour force in Marrupa Circumscription, the second largest proportion in Mozambique after the neighbouring Montepuez Circumscription in Cabo Delgado District.¹²² The figure reflects that the colonial administration impacted hugely on the local community, and during the Second World War, accelerated cotton growing exponentially. The high proportion of cotton growers was achieved, mainly due to Maúa Administrative Post, which was highly populated and had the most suitable environment for cotton growing in Marrupa.¹²³

However, the actual figures need to be treated with caution, as it was only the cotton growers that were registered and hence the estimate of the entire labour force could be inaccurate. There is also a possibility that the *régulo* reported smaller population figures than were actually the case in order to alleviate the burden of taxes and forced labour on their people. Importantly, upon the introduction of cotton growing many men fled to the neighbouring British territory and became migrant workers.¹²⁴

Yet undeniably, many people started to grow cotton within a short period of time (1940–1945), and the impact of this accelerated production on traditional society was enormous. Graph 4 demonstrates that cotton production by “African peasants” in Marrupa Circumscription doubled every year from 1942 and peaked in 1949 (4,379 tons). Thereafter, it fluctuated between 1,151 and 3,949 tons. This provides evidence that the change in Portugal’s colonial policy in the Second World War transformed the

northern-most area of Mozambique, which in the past had merely been a “frontier” for colonial rulers and the colonial economy (see Graph 2).

These figures and official archives do not, however, depict how life was for local people, who continuously and mostly desperately tried to escape colonial control. The number of men in Maúia who left home as migrant workers peaked during the period of forced cotton growing.¹²⁵ These men went to Tanzania in the north, Nyasaland in the west and Rhodesia in the south, counting on the support from their brothers, parents and relatives as they sought better-paid jobs. Rhodesia was the most popular destination because of its high wages and more favourable work conditions, but was difficult to reach due to its distance.¹²⁶

Working in different countries had its own influences. It was during this time that the Islamic faith began rapidly spreading amongst Maúia residents. It became a trend, especially among upper-class people (*nethi*), to learn Islam in Tanzania whilst working as a migrant labourer. Nyasaland was a popular destination because of its proximity and family connections – the ancestors of many Maúia residents had moved there.

After the Second World War, “international pressure against despotic conduct”, as feared by Governor-General Bettencourt, was revived.¹²⁷ In addition, the number of cotton growers, as well as production, decreased throughout Mozambique. This forced policy-makers to look for an alternative to coercive measures.¹²⁸ In order to secure stable production, the Portuguese government introduced a “price incentive”.¹²⁹ In 1946 it became obligatory for cotton companies to set up cotton markets that fell within a 15 kilometre radius of the various cotton fields, and in locations approved by the local administrator.¹³⁰ It was hoped that this measure would partly reduce the burden for cotton growers who previously had to transport their cotton great distances to markets.

However, this decree-law had an unexpected effect when it was executed in local communities because it gave authority to the administration to relocate the villages that were out of the control of the Maúia Circumscription. The *chefe do posto* ordered *régulos* and *chefes* to relocate villages closer to easily accessible roads.¹³¹ For example, the Muela group, which had fled to the Miombo forest (Makonkwa, near the Lugenda) in the north, was recalled to Maúia, 80 kilometres away.

One woman recalls: “I was born in Makonkwa. The administrator ordered us to come to this side. I was still a young girl. There was no proper road. I had twenty kilograms of food on my head and walked to Xapalango (Xaparango, Xapalanco, Xapawango). I was scared because I didn’t know what was going to happen.”¹³²

Another person remembers: “Makonkwa was in Majune Circumscription. The *chefe do posto* said that Muela was no longer ours. We were ordered to come back here, Xapalango.”¹³³

Similar things happened to Mwapula groups: “When we were near the Luluxi, a *chefe do posto* called ‘Bombeia’ ordered us to move close to the road so that it would be easier to sell cotton. He said, ‘Get out of here. Move towards Maúia.’”¹³⁴

Bravo commented: “Cotton growers used to walk fifty kilometres to reach cotton markets. Thanks to cotton companies, they only have to walk fifteen kilometres.”¹³⁵ Furthermore, in 1948, the JECA started to register “more productive” male growers as *agricultores do algodão* (cotton agriculturists). African villagers were hence no longer

forced cotton growers but became specialised agriculturists.¹³⁶ After having agreed to plant one hectare of cotton (and an additional 0.5 hectare per wife), cotton agriculturists would receive technical assistance from the government and were allowed to move to a *concentração* (cotton community), comprising of scattered cotton farms joined together and divided into several blocks. This made production easier and was also intended to improve the standard of living of growers by providing some infrastructure.¹³⁷ Cotton growers and their families were relocated to *concentração*. Colonial officers emphasised the benefits and significance of these changes. However, not everything was as beneficial as it was presented. For the groups that lived in remote places and away from colonial influence, it meant forced emigration. This is exactly what happened to the Muela and Mwapula groups mentioned earlier. Furthermore, in order to create cotton agriculturists, the colonial administration needed to gather up local residents into accessible locations. Xapalango, where the Muela group was made to relocate, was one of the *concentração* locations. Other groups such as the Muhoco, Punhala, Menikwa, Namarica and Ntepo were taken to a designated *concentração* in Mount Txonkori in the north-west of the administrative post. Muhoco people have described the move as follows:

A *colono* called Brito worked with the administrator to relocate people to the land suited for cotton growing. The Muhoco group was asked to move as they thought the residents of Muhoco knew best about cotton growing. We agreed because we thought we could make more money if we could produce more cotton. All of us got on a truck and moved. Nothing was left, no animals, no household goods.¹³⁸

The policy change “from coercion to incentives” by the Portuguese authority really meant “stronger control over local people” who fell at the bottom of the colonial administration. Those who tried to run away from cotton growing were easily caught. Their sorrow was vividly described by a Muela elder, Amisse Muripa: “Suffering (*ohawa*) is the cotton campaign. At that time we came here from the Lugenda. We suffered. But there was no place to flee to.”¹³⁹

In effect people in Maúa lost all means of escape and through these new dispensations they finally became fully incorporated into the colonial system. Every aspect of people’s lives, including their levels of production, was watched over by the local *mwene* (who became a *régulo* or a *chefe*), the *sipaio*, attached to the administration and the *capataz*, the foreman. The only option was acceptance.¹⁴⁰

Makhuwa-Xirima and Makhuwa-Metto

So far we have discussed the historical experience of the people who were originally from the Alto Lúrio and later settled in the Maúa region, that is the migration, the settlement and the colonial experience of the people who had close relations with the Muwa group who spoke the Makhuwa-Xirima language. However, Maúa Circumscription was also

home to the Makhuwa-Metto. They too revered Mount Namuli but their original dwelling area (the track of *niphito*) was Cabo Delgado District. The Metto had close relationships with people on the coast and, as a result, many were both Muslims and goods traders. Also, contrary to the traditional Makhuwa tendency to segment and decentralise, the Econi clan, as mentioned earlier, formed an alliance and united with the Makhuwa-Metto.¹⁴¹ Among the chiefs who became powerful, due in part to the firearms obtained in the course of the slave trade, was Mwene Mwalia, Mwene Muwa's neighbour. Many Makhuwa-Metto chiefs, including Mwene Mwalia, would have clashed with Yao chiefs, who had already been active in the slave trade, due to their geographic proximity. It was no doubt convenient for Mwalia that Muwa, a fellow Makhuwa, won a battle against the Yao and moved into the area, previously occupied by the Yao.¹⁴² Due to their historical links, the Muwa and the Mwalia were aligned as they attacked Yao habitations together and shared a long-distance trade route. In this sense, the classification such as Makhuwa-Xirima or Makhuwa-Metto is politically meaningless.

Anthropologist Medeiros, an expert on the history of Makhuwa-Metto, comments: "The difference between them is not much. In terms of social relations, clans are more important."¹⁴³ The current residents of the Maúá district often echo this. For example, there is no traditional restriction of marriage between the members of the two groups. In fact inter-marriage is quite common. Sometimes, Metto members live under a Makhuwa-Xirima chief and vice versa. That clans with the same names (*nihimo*) exist in both Makhuwa-Xirima and Makhuwa-Metto suggests that the two were related many generations ago. Another important point is that very few residents in Maúá call themselves Xirima or Metto. The actual usage of these terms is to indicate different dialects, not different groups. As discussed before, various words are used by the colonial authority, catholic priests or scholars to describe Makhuwa people in southern Niassa, and academics have not agreed on the term. It can be surmised that the difference between the two is not big enough to constitute an "ethnic" one.

However, it is not true to say that the two terms are therefore rendered completely meaningless, as there are important differences in the experiences of the people. For example, Mwene Mwalia (Metto) and his people armed themselves and vigorously resisted colonial rule while Mwene Muwa (Xirima) did not take up arms. One of the reasons is that some of the Makhuwa-Metto, such as the Mwalia, lived near the coast, which enabled their chiefs to engage in the slave trade at an early stage, accumulate firearms and create a centralised system. Moreover, because the Nyassa Company, which had headquarters on the nearby Ibo Island, often intervened, the Makhuwa-Metto developed a stronger apathy towards colonial rule than did the Makhuwa-Xirima, who could cross the river and flee. In any case, the colonial army destroyed and burned down the capital of Mwalia in 1900. Mwene Mwalia and his people fled to the mountains and continued their resistance from there.¹⁴⁴ Two years later in 1902, a Portuguese flag was raised in the domicile of Mwene Muwa.

Perhaps the difference between the Makhuwa-Metto and the Makhuwa-Xirima is most notable in each *niphito*. In other words, it lies at the centre and the direction of the group's

particular network. As shown in Figure 22, the groups that speak Makhuwa-Metto such as the Nekutho and Revia live in the east and north parts of Maúa Circumscription. The author's interviews revealed that these groups have moved around within Cabo Delgado District and the *niphitos* (tracks of the group) are very different from those of the Xirima people. This has created a difference in their relationships with relatives and how they associate with other groups. Many people in the Nekutho and Revia groups frequently mix with Metto in Cabo Delgado, while the Xirima group, like the Muwa, have closer relationships with people in the Alto Lúrio, where they originated from. This does not necessarily mean that they had an exclusive relationship that mirrored the alliance between Mwene Muwa and Mwene Mwalia. Makhuwa people often married Yaos, against whom they fought. In this way, the frameworks such as "ethnic groups" (Yao or Makhuwa) or "sub-groups" (Makhuwa-Metto, Makhuwa-Xirima) are not fixed but flexible.¹⁴⁵ Having said that, the network of Makhuwa-Metto groups tends to be close to the Makhuwa-Metto in Cabo Delgado and Makhuwa-Xirima groups tend to look towards Alto Lúrio (the inland of Nampula District).

It should always be remembered, however, that although the Makhuwa-Metto and the Makhuwa-Xirima lived in Maúa Circumscription this was primarily the result of the administrative division introduced by colonial authorities and not based on any decision by its inhabitants. If Africans had been asked to create their own administrative divisions, it would probably have been totally different, or certainly they would not have created fixed administrative divisions. Maúa Circumscription was established independently from any input from the inhabitants and it so happened that its centre was positioned in the place where Mwene Muwa of Makhuwa-Xirima lived. Understandably, Mwene Muwa was affected by this new order.

In this way the Makhuwa-Metto people in Maúa Circumscription were to all intents and purposes treated as a minority group. Another important point is that in 1940 a Catholic church was built in a Metto chief's (Nekutho) territory. The church produced many Mettos who became teachers and interpreters, and who played a significant role in colonial rule. This would begin to seriously impact on local politics after the Second World War, especially after the 1950s. This impact is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Conclusion – the formation of local community characteristics

The characteristics of the Maúa area and its residents (mainly Makhuwa-Xirima) prior to the liberation struggle can be summed up in the following nine points: (1) they moved there relatively recently and their settlements were scattered; (2) the area was "the land of escape", the migration destination for groups to flee from colonial rule; (3) Muwa and many others originated from the Alto Lúrio; (4) they attempted to resist Portuguese rule by forming an alliance with the German force but failed and were overwhelmed by the "white men's war"; (5) upon its establishment colonial authorities banished Muwa and intervened in the selection of his successor; (6) colonial rule was established later than in other areas, after cotton growing started around 1940; (7) it became essential to

incorporate the traditional authorities in order to introduce cotton growing; (8) Muwa fled to Nyasaland and returned in the early 1940s; and (9) the administrator eventually took a firm stance with cotton growers, even dictating where they should live.

Collectively, residents in the Maúa region did not have much in their favour when it came to armed resistance against white rule, let alone individually. The only resistance available to them was to flee in twos and threes to places beyond the reach of the colonial rulers. However, after the “Cotton Regime” was established, their choices became even more limited and in the main they were forced to accept colonial authorities. However, Portuguese colonial rulers could not afford to send many administrators to Maúa Circumscription, which remained remote and had a low economic value for them. They therefore opted to utilise the existing traditional authority as they did in some other places. This was effective to some extent as the traditional communal way had not been destroyed, due to the particularly slow establishment of colonial rule and monetary economy in the area. Furthermore, at this point, there was no economic or educational divide within the community itself, which later would present challenges. Although many men left to find work as migrant workers, this was in fact sporadic, with the exception of Nyasaland. This was unlike in the south where leaving to find work across the borders had become institutionalised for many years – or as in the case of the Makonde and Nyanja people who had relatives across the borders. The most common destination was Tanganyika but the main reason to go there was to study Islam.

After the introduction of the “Cotton Regime” in 1940, the society changed drastically with colonial rule becoming very firmly established. Another two features of this time included the first Catholic church which was built in Marrupa Circumscription in 1940; and the introduction of forced tax and labour. However, because these were developed based on existing social structures and in collaboration with the traditional authority, it took a long time to transform the relationship between individuals and society. When the Catholic church and the church schools were established, their potential influence on people’s minds could have helped accelerate social changes. However, the majority of Maúa residents believed in the traditional religion (ancestor worship) on which their original society was based while the traditional authority (or the aristocratic class) adopted the Islamic faith during the slave trade era. Just prior to the church being built, the numbers of people converting to Islam had grown due to the amount of migrant work in Tanganyika and Zanzibar. On the other hand, the conversion of Maúa residents to Christianity was slow even though children in the territory of Régulo Nekutho were sent to the church school from an early age.¹⁴⁶

One of these children was Valentim Limas Necuto, a son of Régulo Nekutho who would later work for the colonial administration.¹⁴⁷ Like him, graduates of the church school during the 1940s and 1950s became elementary education teachers in a system that was increasingly systemised during the time of the decolonisation movement. The Portuguese national force and the colonial administration found them very useful as “assistants”. Some, however, became involved in the liberation movement, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Importantly, although the systems which would change local traditional society (such as forced cotton growing and a Catholic church) started in Maúia in 1940, this occurred a lot later than in other parts of Mozambique. For this region the changes took place only about 20 years before the onset of the liberation struggle.

Notes

- 1 Niassa District was created on 27 October 1929 when Portugal re-acquired the area from Nyassa Company, and separated from the adjacent circumscription of Cabo Delgado. After several name changes, it became Niassa District under Decree-Law no. 39,858 on 20 October 1954.
- 2 The land area is 119,720 square kilometres, 15.5 per cent of the total 771,125 square kilometres of the country.
- 3 Until 1945, Amaramba Circumscription covered the whole southern part of Niassa District, including Maúia Administrative Post. As of 1942, the circumscription was 35,985 square kilometres with a population of 87,516 (Anuário, 1950:21). After Marrupa Circumscription was established, Amaramba Circumscription was limited to the south-western part of the district.
- 4 Marrupa is an administrative circumscription that controls the eastern part of Niassa District. It was established under Decree-Law no. 31.896 on 27 February 1942, around the time when cotton growing began in earnest. After the first administrator was appointed, it started operating on 10 May 1943 (AHM-ISANI, cx.96, Circunscrição de Marrupa, 23/6/1944:1). Until the Decree-Law no. 39.858 of 1968 established Maúia Circumscription as one of the four circumscriptions of Niassa District, Marrupa stretched from the Mecula region on the borders of Tanzania in the north to the borders of Nampula District in the south.
- 5 During the liberation war, administrative divisions were changed (often subdivided) in many areas. This is detailed in Chapter 5.
- 6 Strictly speaking, Revia and Nipepe were established immediately after an attack by FRELIMO in March 1966. Nungo was temporarily incorporated into Maúia but later became part of Marrupa Circumscription and Cabo Delgado. This book does not include Nungo in Maúia Circumscription in its discussion.
- 7 Pedro Baina, the administrator of Maúia District from 1996 to 1999, who is from the area, explains that “*Ma*” means territory, thus “*Ma-Muwa*” means “the place of Muwa” (Pedro Baina, Maúia Sede, 29/7/1997). However, Frizzi, a linguist, rejects the explanation, saying that “*Ma*” is a prefix indicating second person plural and that the Portuguese misunderstood what locals were saying (Juseppe Frizzi, Maúia Sede, 3/9/2011).
- 8 About the discordance of administrative areas and cultural areas, Pedro Baina said: “This was the cause for the confusion and difficulty of the administration” (Pedro Baina, Maúia Sede, 25/8/1997).
- 9 In 1940, the population was 223,367 while the population density was as low as 1.86 people per square kilometres. The number of whites was 137 (Instituto Nacional de Estatística-Estado de Moçambique, IV Recenseamento Geral da População, 4 a Distrito do Niassa, 1970:XXXI). The present Niassa Province then formed Mozambique District, together with the present Cabo Delgado Province in the east and the present Nampula Province in the south (Censo 1940, v. “População Indígena”:6-7).
- 10 Interviews with five *mwenes* in Marrupa (Mwene Telewe, also often written as Teléue; Mwene Nanangawiya; Mwene Rukuliya; Mwene Nampaha; Mwene Bwanause, Marrupa Sede, 28/8/2003) and with Jome from Marrupa (“Jome” António Diwa, Cuamba Sede, 17/8/2003).
- 11 In terms of the administrative division and the place-name, the inspector of “native” affairs wrote as follows: “Marrupa is a name without a meaning (AHM: A/28: ‘Namrupi is correct, not Marrupa’). If it is coined, a Portuguese-sounding name would be better. Or, they should have maintained an historic name Metarica, a legend in this area. When the administrative activity was most difficult, this powerful *régulo* greatly helped our military conquer in the fight against an enormous enemy, Mataca” (Ibid:6). This indicates that the administrative division was not based on any real understanding of the local history by the local administrator.
- 12 Due to its altitude, Marrupa itself was not suited for cotton growing. It later became the third largest city in Niassa District and a white settlement.
- 13 A train station opened in this town in 1950.

- 14 This can be verified from the maps used by each exploration team (see for example, Medeiros, 1997:118).
- 15 Although Portuguese scholars and administrators called them “Ajaua” in the colonial era, this book uses “Yao” which is the present-day term and also the English term.
- 16 Lerma, 1998:64. It is said to have been used since the sixteenth century.
- 17 Ibid.:62.
- 18 Muwa, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997; Muhoco, Muhoco, 11/8/1997; Muela, Muela, 23/8/1997; Mwapula, Mwapula, 25/8/1997; Nihava, Munhanli, 30/8/1997.
- 19 Rita-Ferreira, 1975:37.
- 20 Lerma, 1998:64. Monteiro recorded mythology in Makuwa-Xirimia in the upper stream of the Lúrio (Monteiro, 1993:101).
- 21 Medeiros, 1997:74.
- 22 Lerma, 1998:62. Some divide them according to the linguistic characterisation such as “Macua-Litoral”, “Macua-Macuana”, “Macua-Meto (or Medo)” and its variety “Acherima”, “Macua-Nyassa”, and “Macua-Lómuè” (Simões, 1961:51-68, in Ivala, 1993:8). These classifications concern researchers and do not reflect the way of living of the people classified. As Ivala points out, Xirimia should not be considered as a variety of Macua-Metto (Ibid).
- 23 Nekutho is also written as Necuto. In this book, Nekutho is used.
- 24 In terms of *regedoria* (territory of each *régulo*), Metto is spoken in Nekutho and Revia while Xirimia is spoken in the rest, that is, Maúa, Muluku, Nipepe, Vatiwa, Hamela, Vahiwa and Muela.
- 25 Medeiros, 1997:65. This political consolidation process failed in the twentieth century due to intensified colonial rule.
- 26 This is partly because the clan in Nekutho and Revia was not Econi/Ziconi, the most powerful clan of Metto, but Ajopa.
- 27 This group is classified as “Macua Interior” by Lerma, “Lómuè” by Medeiros and “Macua Niassa” by Simões. They are referred to here as “Xirimia,” the name currently used in Maúa.
- 28 Unlike Metto *mwenes*, many Xirimia *mwenes* talk about Mount Namuli. Traditionally, researchers classified Xirimia as a dialect of the Makuwa language or as a sub-group of Makuwa people. Recently, it attracted attention as the oldest Makuwa language. Makuwa people themselves prefer “Xirimia” to “Makuwa”, which is an almost derogatory term used by others (Interview with Josepe Frizzi, Mitúcue, Cuamba District, 13/8/2003).
- 29 Branquinho, who recorded the oral history in 1966, wrote “Chalaué”, but the official map in 1999 says Chalau (Branquinho, 1969:127; Direcção Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro 1999:#31, Malema). In terms of the migration of the Muwa group, information has been gleaned from the above-mentioned report by Branquinho; the report by Ivala; and the author’s own interviews with the present Muwa (Muwa VII), the present *pwiyamwene* and the brother of Muwa V (Muwa, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997; Sancho Afia Amisse, Maúa Sede, 30/7/1997).
- 30 Ivala, 1993:74.
- 31 Medeiros, 1997:74. This estimate is probably correct because the present Muwa commented that he was the seventh and that World War I broke out during the time of Muwa III; and because a battle between Muwa and Yao chiefs took place around 1840.
- 32 After speaking with Eduardo Medeiros, the author came to the conclusion that his hypothesis was probably correct (Figueira da Foz, Portugal, 7/8/2001).
- 33 Raqui Muhoco, Muhoco, 28/8/1999. His name reveals his father was Mwene Muhoco.
- 34 Medeiros, 1997:83.
- 35 O’Neil, 1882:201-205. O’Neil also mentioned the names of Makuwa *mwenes* such as “Namurola” and “Muhemela”.
- 36 Santos, 1964:71-85.
- 37 It was probably because the Muwa, unlike the Mwalia, did not resist the advancement of the army.
- 38 Vilhena, Ernesto Jardim de, Compahia:322-324, in Péllissier, 1994:371. At this point, Muwa did

- not play the role of *régulo*, the rank in the colonial administration. That the Portuguese recorded him as such indicates that they called all African chiefs *régulo*, disregarding the administrative reality.
- 39 Medeiros, 1997:75.
- 40 It is symbolic that the headquarters of a cotton company would be built in front of the grave.
- 41 Kuviri became a *régulo* in the Metarica Administrative Post, west of Maúá.
- 42 Of course they were not “free” in a real sense because they were slaves.
- 43 Ivala, 1993:61-62.
- 44 Author’s interview with the elders of the Ntepo group (Ntepo, Maúá Sede, 9/8/1997).
- 45 Ivala, 1993:61-62.
- 46 Ibid.:53.
- 47 Ibid.:50.
- 48 Ibid.:53. The construction started in Lapala in 1932, in Ribábuè in 1934, in Iapala in 1936, in Malema in 1939, in Mutuáli in 1941 and in Cuamba in 1950. (Ibid.:72).
- 49 Branquihó, 1969:220-221; Ivala, 1993:50. Colonial rulers recognised the authority of Nipepe, the first settler and a son of the first Muwa, and appointed him *régulo*. Other *mwenes* became *chefe*, either *chefe de povoação* (village chief) or *chefe de grupo de povoação* (chief of village group) according to the population of their group. Muela fled into the territory of Nipepe, was appointed as *chefe de povoação*, but later escaped to northern Maúá.
- 50 Ivala, 1993:51.
- 51 Ibid.:36.
- 52 Mwene Vatiwa said: “The first Vatiwa who came down Mount Namuli died in Munguli (the south of the Lúrio). The era under the second Vatiwa was the time of railroad construction and *maxila* (palanquin). People were forced to work like slaves. The third moved near here (in the Maúá Circumscription)” (Vatiwa, Maúá Sede, 23/8/1999).
- 53 Branquinhó, 1969:127. This was also confirmed in the author’s interview (Vatiwa, Maúá Sede, 23/8/1999).
- 54 It is significant that this report was submitted in 1968 when FRELIMO began popping up all over Maúá and the Alto Lúrio region, and the political situation drastically changed. Branquinhó paid attention to the oral history not because of his training as an anthropologist, but because of his intention to gather essential information in order to tip the scales of the political situation (local people were sympathetic to the liberation movement) in favour of colonial authorities. He believed that incidents in the past continuously influenced the local society and people, and that one could learn from the past failures of colonial rule in order to capture people’s hearts.
- 55 This trait would be repeated during the liberation war. In many cases, those who appeared to be simply running away in fact had put careful thought into who they went with and where they went to.
- 56 Medeiros, 1985:24.
- 57 Makhuwa people do not have a centralised political structure because of the matrilineal system, although the alliance of *mwenes* was formed from time to time, as seen in the case of Makhuwa-Metto. There was also an Islamic influence.
- 58 All the ethnic groups to the north of Zambézia in northern Mozambique (Makhuwa, Yao, Nyanja and Makonde except for Nguni, who are originally from the south) have a matrilineal system.
- 59 Medeiros, 1985:26.
- 60 Ibid.:27.
- 61 Ibid.:14.
- 62 Lerma, 1998:92-93.
- 63 Ibid.:84.
- 64 It means “a person who leads” (Medeiros, 1985:23).
- 65 Medeiros, 1985:1; Lerma, 1998:83-84.

- 66 Medeiros, 1985:23-24.
- 67 Her role is to make her clan prosperous and increase the population (Ibid.:25). The word itself is *pwiyamwene* but usually an honorific prefix "a" is added.
- 68 Medeiros thinks the term *pwattaphwatta* is only used in Maúa, as he has never heard it used in other regions. It is commonly used in Maúa, and Frizzi believes that it is linguistically meaningful. The author uses *humu* to explain the social structure and *pwattaphwatta* to refer to a "title" of those of the Maúa region.
- 69 Among the Makhuwa-Litoral on the coast, who were strongly influenced by the Swahili culture, Islamised Afro-Asian chiefs formed kingdoms. Due to the Islamic influence patrilineage is more and more valued and the traditional social structure is changing.
- 70 Pedro Baina, Maúa Sede, 27/7/1997.
- 71 This is based on the interviews that were conducted by the author in Maúa District (Muela 23/8/1997 and 2-4/9/1999; Mwapula, 25/8/1997 and 5-7/9/1999; Muhoco, 11/8/1997 and 27-29/8/1999).
- 72 Men are often called back to their home *nkoto*, especially when a man is chosen as a successor after a *tata* or *mwene* dies. He will often leave his wife and children, who belong to his uncle-in-law, return to his home group, marry another woman and lead a new life (Muela, Maúa District, 23/8/1997). In other words, for Makhuwa men, lineage is a temporary affiliation. More important and permanent social relations are based on their clan relations. Of course, slaves do not have a home village or clan relations. *Mwene* wanted slaves for this political reason, in addition to using them for trade and for increasing the population.
- 73 It may have been different before the slave trade era. The first leader who led the Muela group to new land was a *pwiyamwene* according to the elders of Muela (Muela elders, Muela, 24/8/1997). Her name, Muhuwa Ekoto, symbolically means "a person who creates wars" in Makhuwa. The introduction of Islam and the colonial system may have changed gender relations between *mwene* and *pwiyamwene*. No researchers have dealt with the question regarding the female authority in Makhuwa society in detail. This should be explored in the future.
- 74 Lerma, 1989:50.
- 75 Medeiros, 1997:160.
- 76 Interviews with the elders of the following three groups: Muwa, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997; Muhoco, Maúa Sede, 11/8/1997.
- 77 Pélissier, 1994:170.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 Lerma, 1989:50. Botelho, 1936:694-697, in Pélissier, 1994:85.
- 80 Muwa, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997; Muhoco, Maúa Sede, 11/8/1997; Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997; Muela, Maúa District, 23/8/1997; Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 81 These were probably Ngoni, who moved north from southern Mozambique in the eighteenth century. Some of them settled in Niassa District.
- 82 Muwa, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997.
- 83 Interview with eight *pwattaphwattas* in Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997 and 5/9/1999-6/9/1999; the elders in Revia, Majune District, 8-11/9/1999.
- 84 Revia is a Makhuwa-Metto group. It would appear that the Makhuwa-Metto kept a more detailed account of the "German War" than the Makhuwa-Xirima.
- 85 It probably meant the British exploration teams at the end of the nineteenth century.
- 86 Aroni Caisse, Mwapula, Maúa District, 5/9/1999.
- 87 For example, many groups that live in northern Maúa such as Mwapula and Muela settled there after the "German War". Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997.
- 88 Amisse knows more about the oral tradition of the Muwa group than Muwa VII. Some say there was a "traditional" problem in the "succession" of the present Muwa. It probably has something to

- do with “the former *régulo* Muwa in Nyasaland,” which is elaborated on in Chapter 5.
- 89 Muwa VII, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997.
- 90 The new Muwa, chosen as an expedient measure, could not take his own initiative because traditionally they could not choose a new Mwene Muwa before confirming the death of the previous *mwene*. A similar problem would be repeated during the liberation struggle period.
- 91 Pélissier, 1994:120.
- 92 The post was planned in 1920 but set up only in 1923 (Medeiros, 1997:164).
- 93 At first, a cup of sorghum (staple food for Makhuwa people) was collected as taxes. They taxed women because it was easier to capture women than men (Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997).
- 94 Muela, Maúa District, 23/8/1997; Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997; Nihava, Munhanli, 30/8/1997.
- 95 Muwa, Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997.
- 96 Isaacman, 1996:75.
- 97 AHM-ISANI, cx.96, Circunscrição de Marrupa, 1944:6. Until the 1960s, the only concrete buildings were those of SAN (M.M., Maúa Sede, 1/9/1999).
- 98 Service diary of the Maúa Administrative Post started in 1935 (AHM-ISANI, cx.96, Circunscrição de Marrupa, 1944:5).
- 99 Capitão Carlos Henrique Jones da Silva, who was in charge of the administrative supervision of the Amaramba Circumscription for a month from 20 April 1944, compiled a report on 20 May 1944 (“Relatórios sumários e respectiva documentação referentes a inspeção ordinária, feita na Província do Niassa,” in AHM-ISANI, cs.96, vol.III).
- 100 Because the administrator of the circumscription was out of the office visiting the district governor, a secretary met Sermenho and recorded the visit in the service diary.
- 101 As a major city in the north, Nampula oversaw three districts.
- 102 The administrative offices were responsible for *sipaios* as their employers.
- 103 Secretaria da Administração de Amaramba, Abel Bentes de Aboim, Diário de Serviço (14/1/1941), in AHM-ISANI, cx.96 vol.III.
- 104 Diário de Serviço (31/1/1941), in AHM-ISANI, cx.96 vol.III.
- 105 Revia, Majune District, 9-11/8/1999; Muhoco, Maúa District, 27-28/8/1999.
- 106 From an entry in the 1944 administrative audit report: “[t]he biography of the native authority and the advisor to the *régulo* is not registered”, it is clear that the colonial government attempted to accumulate the personal information of traditional authority. However, it was not done in local communities. Secretaria da Administração, Amaramba, Abel Bentes de Aboim, Telegrama a Província (25/4/1941), in AHM-ISANI, cx. 96, vol.III, Circunscrição de Amaramba, 1944:3.
- 107 This is Kuviri, a son of the first Muwa, who crossed the Lúrio with his father and later became *mwene* of the new group. His successor was appointed as *régulo*. This episode indicates that “traditional” kinship was maintained through marriage.
- 108 In the Makhuwa society, lions appear at the time of misfortune or conflict. Mentioning the appearance of lions is a metaphor for the occurrence of a conflict or “sorcery”. Another telegram was sent later, which said, “The lion was a two-legged human and a messenger of the former Régulo Mua [Muwa].” Secretaria da Administração de Amaramba, Abel Bentes de Aboim, Telegrama a Província (25/4/1941), in AHM-ISANI, cx. 96, vol.III, Circunscrição de Amaramba, 1944.
- 109 Ibid.
- 110 After independence, Muwa VII escaped to Malawi where he had relatives.
- 111 The negligence of the “traditional” order will be discussed later.
- 112 A *maxila* is carried by four men. Without motor vehicles or proper roads, *maxila*, which was placed on the body of others, was long considered to be a “symbol of power”, especially a “symbol of white rule”. The first time locals saw a white man on a palanquin, they thought the passenger was ill.
- 113 Sancho Afia Amisse, Maúa Sede, 30/7/1997. Neither Amisse nor the present Muwa (Muwa VII) talked about the “former Muwa” (Muwa VI) probably because it would cause a problem in terms

- of the legitimacy of Muwa VII who succeeded him as Muwa. Similarly, there were omissions when discussing the liberation war against colonial rule. Taking various factors into consideration, the *muene* who headed for Nyasaland appeared to be Muwa V. It is very likely that Muwa VI lost his authority in the “traditional” order because he was chosen during the absence of the legitimate *muene*. Therefore, he needed to use the authority of the colonial rulers.
- 114 As of 1944, taxes were collected from 2,347 huts and the total amount was 609 escudo (AHM-ISANI, Circunscrição de Marrupa, 1944:5). The population of Maúá Administrative Post was 27,266 in the 1940 census, although the number is debatable. The total number of households is unknown but nevertheless tax collection was improving.
- 115 AHM-ISANI, Circunscrição de Marrupa, 1944:6.
- 116 Mocha Penpena, Muhoco, Maúá District, 29/8/1999.
- 117 This manifests a pecking order in the local community under the colonial administration.
- 118 Maria Vossa, Muhoco, Maúá District, 28/8/1999.
- 119 The cultivation of a new field was men’s work.
- 120 It was not only in Maúá but all over the country until the mid-1940s that the local governments did not have basic data such as population figures, which was vital for colonial administration. Even in Amaramba Circumscription, where colonial rule was best established in Niassa District, for example, only three marriages, one birth and three deaths were recorded between 1932 and 1944 (AHM-ISANI, cx.93, Circunscrição de Amaramba, 1944:3).
- 121 The number was the largest in 1942 (29,158) and stayed around 12,000-15,000 after that. See Graph 5.
- 122 In Montepuez Circumscription, cotton growers constituted 31 per cent of the total labour force in 1940 and 63 per cent in 1945 (Isaacman, 1996:77).
- 123 No other parts in Marrupa Circumscription were suitable for cotton growing because both Marrupa Sede (the Marrupa city and its surroundings) and Mecula Administrative Post in the north were situated was on the plateau.
- 124 Revia, Majune District, 9-11/8/1999; Muhoco, Maúá District, 27-28/8/1999.
- 125 Revia, Majune District, 9-11/8/1999; Muhoco, Maúá District, 27-28/8/1999; Mwapula, Maúá District, 5-7/9/1999; Muela, Maúá District, 2-3/9/1999.
- 126 Raqui Muhoco went to Rhodesia twice, with nine other men from Maúá and fourteen men respectively. It took them thirty days on foot, securing food on the way by weeding on others farms. Raqui Muhoco, Muhoco, Maúá District ,28/8/1999.
- 127 Circular Confidencial no.1041/D7, do Governador-Geral,1944 (AHM-ISANI, cx.77)
- 128 Isaacman, 1996:124-130; Pitcher, 1995:120-121.
- 129 Pitcher, 1995:121. Pitcher thinks the effect was evident immediately after the policy adoption in 1946, while Isaacman reckons it took longer (Isaacman, 1996:125).
- 130 Decree-Law, no. 35.444 (Ibid.:130).
- 131 From the author’s interviews in the Maúá District, 29 to 30 August 1997 and 21 August to 11 September 1999. It is estimated to have taken place in the 1950s.
- 132 Assuria Wassi, Muela, Maúá District, 22/9/1999.
- 133 Pachide Nahoxa, Muela, Maúá District, 3/9/1999.
- 134 C.G., Mwapula, Maúá District, 5/9/1999.
- 135 Bravo, 1963:219. The number of markets increased, but they were not created near the habitations, but near the places that were convenient for the colonial administration, which then moved people nearer to the markets.
- 136 Isaacman, 1996:133; Bravo, 1963:117.
- 137 Isaacman, 1996:135.
- 138 Muhoco Council of Elders. Muhoco, Maúá District, 11/8/1997.
- 139 Amisse Muripa, Muela, Maúá District, 4/9/1999.
- 140 Ntepo, Maúá Sede, 9/8/1997.

- 141 Econi is called Ziconi around Maúa and its surroundings. This book uses Ziconi when the clan is referred to in Maúa.
- 142 Medeiros, 1997:74; Liesegang, *História do Niassa*, in Medeiros, 1997:83.
- 143 Interview (Eduardo Medeiros, Figueira da Foz, Portugal, 10/8/2001).
- 144 Pélissier, 1994:368-370. This was also confirmed in the author's interviews in 2005 (Mwalia, Balama District, Cabo Delgado Province, 21/08/2005).
- 145 Interviews with a Ntepo group confirmed that groups belonging to Xirima fought among themselves. "In old days, two *mwenes* would start fighting as soon as they met" (Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997).
- 146 Matias Mussondiwa, Maúa Sede, 1/9/1999; Mwene Nekutho, Nekutho, Maúa District, 21/8/1999 and 29/8/2003.
- 147 Valentim Limas Necuto, Maúa Sede, 21/8/1999.

CHAPTER 3

Mozambique

Before the Liberation Struggle

Changes in the international environment and Portuguese colonial policy

Liberation struggles in Asia and the intensification of colonial rule in Africa

The Second World War impacted on every country, either directly or indirectly, leaving the world a different place once it ended. Colonial rule, previously thought to be unshakable, started to crumble. By battering the losers and exhausting the winners, the war in effect prepared the world for decolonisation. “It was a paradox of the postwar decolonization,” according to Fred Halliday, a Cold War academic. “The most tenacious were the colonists who had remained neutral in World War II and might by that token have appeared most vulnerable, the Portuguese.”¹

As examined in previous chapters, Portugal benefited from the war, as it was able to firmly establish colonial rule over its vast territory in Africa. However, as colonised people all over the world began to rise up against their colonisers, strengthening their solidarity with other colonised peoples and creating increased pressure for decolonisation, this presented a new challenge for Portugal.

Even before the Second World War, various movements existed in different parts of the world geared towards seeking liberation from colonisation and domination. Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, in particular, had a long history of liberation movements associated with nationalism or socialism. The war enhanced awareness in these regions and revitalised the movements. Moreover, the post-war vision of the Allied Powers based on the 1941 Atlantic Charter, which promoted the principle of no territorial gains against the wishes of the people and self-determination, raised the hopes of the oppressed.²

However, the Allied Nations did not carry forward the project of decolonisation immediately after the Second World War. For example, France did not recognise the independence of Vietnam and its formation of a democratic republic in 1945.³ While many colonies gained independence where battles had taken place, the reality of decolonisation in Africa became even more remote due to developments in international relations after the war.

Far from the battlefields, Sub-Saharan Africa had flourished as a supplier of primary commodities, which increased its post-war importance.⁴ War-weary European nations tried to compete with the United States of America by strengthening economic ties with their colonies.⁵ They relied on their African colonies to help them downscale their imports from the dollar bloc, and began to draw on them more heavily in terms of food and raw materials.⁶ This is one of the reasons why the French government established its colonies as “overseas provinces” immediately after the war, despite the agreed upon principle of self-determination. Naturally, European nations were reluctant to decolonise their own territories. The Cold War only hardened this attitude.⁷

There are different opinions and interpretations about the existence, starting time and origins of the Cold War. Halliday, who focused on relations with the Third World, defines the Cold War as, “a particular period of globalised conflict, namely one in which the emphasis is upon military and strategic confrontation and in which negotiation is minimal or non-existent.”⁸ Halliday cites three ways, in which the competition of the two social systems differed from previous conflicts among great powers: (1) the rivalry is *globalised* and “involves the whole world in its political and military dynamics”; (2) “the rivalry rests upon a *bipolar* conflict between the USA and the USSR, the two states which emerged as dominant forces in their respective domains at the end of World War II”; and (3) the conflict is “not just between rival states” but is *systemic*.⁹ A conflict between two systems sharing these characteristics causes both sides to intervene in every incident in every part of the world to some extent, especially in the Third World which was actively pursuing decolonisation. Above all, Western governments distrusted liberation movements in general, as they perceived them to be based on socialism.

Examples of how the globalised Cold War impacted on the Third World can be drawn from Korea and Vietnam. After Japan surrendered in August 1945, some Koreans enthusiastically demanded a fundamental transformation in politics, economy and society as a whole, while others were opposed to it. The intervention of the USA and the USSR in this conflict, each supporting opposing factions, developed into a large-scale war – the Korean War.¹⁰ While the seeds of conflict were sown as a result of Japanese colonial rule and the struggle against it, the Korean War was finally motivated by the interference of foreign powers due to the systemic conflict of the Cold War in the process of decolonisation. As a result, not only did complete liberation, eagerly hoped for by Korean people, recede into the distance, but the physical division of Korea became entrenched. As Cumings points out, “Korea was a minor backwater to Americans in 1945, yet it pointed the way to a future that other countries and regions would later traverse.”¹¹

Vietnam was one of these other countries. After declaring independence, Ho Chi Minh sent at least eight memorandums to President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes over four months from October 1945.¹² Ho insisted that the USA should recognise Vietnam’s independence due to the principle of self-determination, stipulated in the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations. The Truman Administration, however, viewed Ho as a communist in terms of his relations with the USSR, and continued to approve France’s sovereignty even after the onset of the First Indochina War in December 1946.¹³

This support began with military assistance to France in 1950 and later translated into the funding of a third of France's military expenses in 1952. Subsequently, the Vietnamese people's plea for liberation from colonial rule, as well as their claims based on international norms, was rejected.

Eastern Europeans similarly formed a united front and fought for liberation during the Second World War.¹⁴ After the German occupation, they demanded total liberation including land reform and searched, by trial and error, for a new kind of democracy, that is, "people's democracy".¹⁵ Yet people's democracy, despite its manifold possibilities, did not materialise as the USSR changed its policy towards Eastern Europe and formed the Communist bloc under its control. Furthermore, in order to counter the stronger containment policy after the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, the USSR regarded Eastern European countries as the bulwark of its "Socialism in One Country" policy and endeavoured to construct communist governments, closely connected to the Soviet Communist Party, and Soviet-type socialism. Consequently, communist parties in Eastern European countries, backed by the USSR, eliminated opposing forces, and it became virtually impossible to seek diversified socialism.¹⁶ The liberation dream that colonised people in many places in the world had harboured during the Second World War was shattered in that the issue was no longer confined to relations between the ruler and the ruled but became tangled up in complicated international relations.

In the following chapter the decolonisation of Africa and the impact that post-war international politics had on this process is discussed in detail. This chapter focuses on how liberation movements in Africa came into being before the end of the Second World War.

Two nationalisms in Africa

Until the end of the Second World War, nationalism and anti-colonialist movements in Africa were not as active as those in Asia. African nationalism was in fact quite different from what it was in other parts of the world. Doudou Thiam, a Senegalese diplomat, politician and lawyer, identified two categories of nationalism found in Africa: micro-nationalism and macro-nationalism. In the former, the nation was "the old territory, with its boundaries settled by the metropolitan power, which wants to rise and become a nation, to form a state",¹⁷ while the latter was identified as pan-Africanism, which sought to create and develop a nation, transcending artificially established boundaries.¹⁸ Thiam summed up the situation in Africa at the time of the publication of his book in 1965: "Although micro-nationalism is now dominant in black Africa, there are forces working in the opposite direction – towards pan-Africanism, or macro-nationalism."¹⁹

Pan-Africanism was, in the main, developed by intellectuals of African origin who were living in the West Indies – and it then spread to the USA, Europe and the African continent. It advocated racial equality, solidarity amongst native Africans and those of African heritage in the world, as well as the restoration of the identity of native Africans and those of African origin, in the framework of the existing power structure. Later, it

struck out strongly against colonialism as illustrated by the slogan “Africa for Africans” and played a major role in the decolonisation of Africa.

Micro-nationalism, on the other hand, was not as well developed in pre-WWII Africa as pan-Africanism because it was not based on a framework voluntarily developed in the region. For people living within the borders arbitrarily circumscribed by imperialist powers at the end of the nineteenth century, the “nation” existed only in name. In other words, micro-nationalism in Africa was “nationalism without nations”. Therefore, it was macro-nationalism, or pan-Africanism, that first played an important role in the formation of nationalist movements in Africa.

However, in reality, before the Second World War, pan-Africanism was mainly a movement comprising black people in the West and amounted to nothing more than a protest movement. This situation changed drastically after the war, however, when many young leaders from the African continent participated in the Fifth Pan-Africanist Congress in Manchester in October 1945. They discussed the situation in each colony and issued the following declaration:²⁰

The delegates to the Fifth Pan-African Congress believe in peace ... Yet if the Western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve Freedom, even if force destroys them and the world ... We are determined to be free ... We demand for [*sic*] Black Africa autonomy and independence ...²¹

The declaration signified the shift from being a mere petitioner to becoming a pro-active movement, which approved of armed struggle in order to achieve the decolonisation of Africa. The “reformist” way of thinking was rejected. With this as a turning point, young leaders from the African continent started their journey towards decolonisation.²² The key characteristic of the decolonisation movement in Africa became evident: the synergy between “micro-nationalism”, which aimed at the independence of a country, and “macro-nationalism”, which sought the independence and unity of Africa as a whole. This shift would greatly change Africa.²³

Kwame Nkrumah, who was later to become the first prime minister of Ghana, and who had drafted the bulk of the declaration, reflected upon the congress in Manchester as follows:

We listed the report of conditions in the colonial territories and both capitalist and reformist solutions to the African colonial problems were rejected. Instead the Congress unanimously endorsed the doctrine of African socialism based upon the tactics of positive action without violence. It also endorsed the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Human Rights and advised Africans and those of African descent wherever they might be to organize themselves into political parties, trade unions, co-operative societies and farmers’ organizations in support of their struggle for political freedom and economic advancement.²⁴

As Oda, a leading political scientist who studied Africa around the time of “the year of Africa”, points out, however, that the word “socialism” does not appear in the declaration.²⁵ It may have been omitted purposefully, but it is clear from Nkrumah’s memoir that pan-Africanism in those days was closely linked to socialist thinking. As explained in the next chapter, this link would make liberation more difficult for some countries during the Cold War.

Decolonisation fever, spreading from Asia to Africa, and pan-Africanism, expanding from the USA to Europe, to Africa, began to influence Mozambican people living under the strict social control of the Estado Novo regime.²⁶ Yet, this influence was not evenly spread over the country but was generally limited to the *mestiço* (people of mixed parentage) in urban areas, intellectuals such as the *assimilados*, those educated at missionary schools, teachers and migrant workers from surrounding regions (mostly men).²⁷ These groups were later to become engaged in labour movements and political activity which would eventually evolve into FRELIMO.

The Salazar administration under international pressure

Despite its system being similar to the fascist Axis powers – the coalition headed by Germany, Italy and Japan in the Second World War – the Salazar administration in Portugal profited from the war by maintaining neutrality. However, at the end of the war it faced strong pressure for democratisation from both inside and outside of the country. To justify his system, Salazar announced in October 1945 that national elections would be held the following month. A faction calling for democratisation hastily formed the Movimento União Democrático (MUD: United Democratic Movement). It started an election campaign but, after persistent sabotage by the government, withdrew from the election, complaining that the elections were illegitimate.²⁸ The same pattern was to be repeated many times: an election was announced, the government would obstruct the election and the opposition would withdraw. The secret police, Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE: International and State Defence Police) was active behind the scenes.²⁹

In the process of building his Estado Novo system, Salazar had established Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado (PVDE: State Defence and Surveillance Police). Because the PVDE had become infamous worldwide as an oppressive secret police, the PIDE was created instead after the Second World War with the purpose of cracking down on “movements against national security”. However, the PIDE was even more oppressive than the PVDE. A new law established in 1946 enabled it to legally exercise the kind of brutal measures that its predecessor was required to do secretly and illegally. As a result, any call for democratisation was clamped down as a threat to “national security”. The PIDE slipped its spies into every social network, including into the places of work, schools, communities, churches and even families, thereby targeting anyone suspected of threatening national security, many of whom were participants in the democratisation movement.³⁰ The lives of Portuguese people were placed under various forms of surveillance, and it became impossible to openly campaign for democratisation in Portugal.

In addition to dealing with the internal call for democratisation, the Salazar administration had to respond to increasing international criticism of its colonial policy. The re-establishment of international institutions, such as the formation of the United Nations in April 1945, signified the re-emergence of regulation by international law. This was particularly feared by the Mozambican Governor-General Bettencourt, the implementer of the high-handed policy of forced cotton growing. Almost as if he had been anticipating this moment, Captain Henrique Calvão, a Portuguese parliamentarian, submitted a report disclosing the situation of forced labour in Portuguese colonies in Africa to parliament.³¹ Although the report was never made public, it was published secretly and served to raise international condemnation against the cruelty of Portuguese colonialism.³²

As outlined in Chapter 1, Portuguese colonial rule had faced political, economic and military challenges from European powers since the nineteenth century. Above all, the slave trade provided the United Kingdom with a perfect excuse to interfere in Portuguese colonial policy. However, after the slave trade ended in the Portuguese colonies at the end of the nineteenth century, international rules such as “effective rule” and the abolition of forced labour were used as justification for further interference. Since Portuguese colonial rule depended on the exploitation of local labour, the modernisation of the colonies was not promoted. This delay in modernisation and the exploitation of local labour formed the basis of much of the criticism levelled at Portuguese colonial rule in the twentieth century.³³ Salazar responded by promoting “Luso-tropicalismo”, Portugal’s notion of multicultural-multiracialism, and argued that colonial rule had introduced the concept of racial equality to Africa.³⁴ However, the report by Calvão revealed the true condition of forced labour in Portugal’s African colonies.

The Cold War in many ways rescued Salazar from this predicament. Portugal was allowed to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 as one of the Western nations which shared an anti-communist strategy.³⁵ As the military rivalry between the two sides in the Cold War expanded to a global scale, the strategic importance of Portuguese colonies in Africa and the Atlantic Ocean increased, enhancing the desirability of Portugal as a member of NATO.³⁶ The Archipelago of the Açores, in particular, was ideally located as a logistical base for US aeroplanes en route to the Middle East and was essential for US global military strategy. Consequently, Portugal’s colonial rule was tacitly approved of, with NATO valuing the geopolitical importance of Portugal’s colonies above the country’s anti-communist stance. This is noteworthy by the exclusion from NATO of Spain, which also took an anti-communist stance but did not have overseas territories.³⁷

Portugal did not, in fact, immediately agree to join NATO as Salazar had a long-standing mistrust of the USA.³⁸ But, as it turned out, NATO membership prolonged the life of the Salazar administration and the maintenance of its colonies.³⁹

While the global pressure for self-determination and decolonisation after the Second World War encouraged people in Portuguese colonies and in southern Africa, the Cold War linked their liberation closely to international politics. In addition, the decolonisation of Mozambique was greatly influenced by the situation in southern Africa.

Change of economic structure in southern Africa

Economic development in southern Africa

Portugal's national policy supported the nationalisation of the economy, as is evidenced in the self-sufficient cotton-growing policy initiated by the Salazar administration. From about 1930, the country attempted to form exclusive economic relations with its colonies, which was partially attained through the participation of other world powers in the Second World War and the exploitation of its people in the colonies. However, Portugal's effort did not affect Mozambique as its foreign reserves were mainly derived from surrounding British territories. Its relations with them even strengthened after the war because the economies of these countries had developed during the war, and because Portugal could not pursue its nationalisation policy when other world powers resumed their normal economic activities.

The Second World War had economic benefit for the southern African region as a whole, but especially for South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁰ Due to abundant mineral resources in South Africa, exports continually exceeded imports. Both exports and imports rapidly increased after 1938, though imports declined after 1945,⁴¹ indicating that growing industrialisation supplanting the need for foreign imports was completed during the war.

The same trend was apparent in Southern Rhodesia, which had relied mainly on mining. Production in manufacturing exceeded that of mining in 1943, resulting in manufacturing becoming the largest industry.⁴² The agricultural sector also changed during the Second World War due to land expropriation by the colonial authority. Whites owned increasingly large tracts of land and successfully managed plantations – this phenomenon was recorded as “European agriculture” in statistics. Whereas “European agriculture” produced about half the revenue of mining before the war, by 1945 it slightly exceeded that of mining production, becoming the second largest industry after manufacturing.⁴³

Mozambique's dual roles

The economic development in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia further strengthened economic relations with Mozambique since they needed the excellent Mozambique ports in order to export their products, as outlined in Figure 1. In addition, by this stage Mozambique had become a supplier of cheap labour to offset its lack of natural resources and Portugal's weak financial position.⁴⁴ In other words, Mozambique played a dual role in the economic development of the southern African region: as a supplier of distribution routes and as a supplier of labour.

The historical origin of these dual roles lay in the 1901 provisional agreement between the Transvaal government in South Africa and the Portuguese government. The agreement required that Portugal allow South Africa's Transvaal Chamber of Mines to import mine workers from Mozambique while the Transvaal Chamber of Mines was allowed the use of the Lourenço Marques port.⁴⁵ Article 32 of the intergovernmental agreement between

South Africa and Portugal in 1928 stipulated that the government of South Africa “ensures that 50–55% of the total tonnage of goods imported via sea destined for the territory pass through the Port and Railways of Lourenço Marques facilities.”⁴⁶ Bundling up the use of railways and port, customs and labour supply in the agreement was, as the Japanese historian Akiyo Aminaka pointed out, “repeatedly renewed until 1963 with minor changes and became the fundamentals of the economic relations between Mozambique and South Africa.”⁴⁷

The role that Mozambique played in the Southern Rhodesian economy was greater than that in South Africa’s, as the Mozambican railroads and ports were much more critical to landlocked Southern Rhodesia. Consequently, the private British South Africa Company (BSAC) took on a traditionally governmental role and constructed a railway connecting Southern Rhodesia to the Beira port in middle Mozambique.

Mozambique was also an important supplier of labour to Southern Rhodesia. The 1901 provisional agreement between the BSAC and Rand Mines, Ltd. provided that: (1) the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) would not procure labour in Southern Rhodesia, Ngamiland or Zambézia and (2) the WNLA would have an exclusive right to procure labourers in Mozambique, which would in turn supply 12.5 per cent of the labourers to Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁸ Despite this agreement, however, not a single worker was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia then negotiated directly with Portugal and in 1913 it concluded a labour agreement which allowed Southern Rhodesia to recruit up to 15,000 labourers in a one-year contract from Mozambique.⁴⁹

In reality, even prior to this agreement, many migrants from Mozambique were already working illegally in plantations in Southern Rhodesia, with the blessing of and encouragement from Southern Rhodesia. In the 1930s and 1940s, Southern Rhodesia set up a free transport system for illegal migrant workers from Mozambique, commonly known as *ulere*, near the borders. Bus stops, mission schools, health centres and shops were established along the borders. By the 1950s there were as many as 200,000 Mozambican migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia.⁵⁰

The economic development in the southern African region after the Second World War, which strengthened Mozambique’s economic and personal ties with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, had two contradictory effects on Mozambique’s decolonisation: South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were both formidable opponents of decolonisation while the economic relations with the two countries (ports, migrant workers, etc.) played an important role in fomenting the anti-colonial movement and nationalism.

Africans in Mozambique were restricted from freely organising any sort of movement or receiving a formal education under Portugal’s Estado Novo regime of political oppression. Therefore, the residents of Mozambique were slow to learn about developments in the international political environment after the Second World War. They gradually got to learn of these developments through migrants working in neighbouring countries. Moreover, economic development in the surrounding areas helped cities in Mozambique to develop, which in turn introduced various job opportunities and new political trends to the residents of Mozambique.

Education and urbanisation of Africans

Development of Mozambican cities

In addition to producing primary commodities to supply the manufacturing industry in Portugal, Mozambique expanded its service sector during the Second World War, linked to the economic development in the surrounding areas. In particular, the harbours in Lourenço Marques and Beira experienced remarkable development. They not only offered job opportunities for Africans but also transformed the two urban areas into international cities. However, their economic development was limited, as it was solely based on the service industry. The populations of the two cities increased during the war, although by 1952 grew to no more than 93,303 in Lourenço Marques and 42,530 in Beira.⁵¹

Moreover, as examined previously in Chapter 1, the influx of people into the urban areas was strictly regulated by the colonial administration of Mozambique so as to allow for the exploitation of African labourers. The majority of Africans were classified as “*indígena*” (native) and had to carry identity papers. The *indígenas* who could not identify their employers were immediately detained and made to undertake *chibalo* (forced labour). It was vitally important for the colonial authority to retain Africans in the rural communities where their cheap labour was needed. While Africans were confined within their circumscriptions, only a small number of *assimilados*, *mestiços* and non-Africans such as whites and Asians were allowed to live in *conselhos*, or towns.

In the 1952 census, 99 per cent of the population in Mozambique was deemed to be “*non-civilizado*” (uncivilised persons), but they constituted only 60 per cent of the population in Lourenço Marques and 72 per cent in Beira.⁵² Apart from these cities, very little urbanisation was apparent in Mozambique. According to the same census, the population of all the *conselhos* combined was 783,502, or 13.6 per cent of the total population (5,732,317).⁵³ Hence, 87.2 per cent of *non-civilizados* (99 per cent of the total population) lived in the *regedoria* in rural areas while more than half (57.9 per cent) of the *assimilado* lived in urban areas.⁵⁴ In other words, Africans in Mozambique were divided into two distinctive groups: a small number of the *assimilados*, who lived in urban environments, received Portuguese education and engaged themselves in supplementary jobs under the colonial authority, and the majority of the population, who cultivated land in rural areas under the *regedoria* system that took advantage of traditional authority.

This division presented Africans in Mozambique, especially those in rural areas, with fewer opportunities to prepare effectively for international developments.⁵⁵ At the same time, it prevented the *mestiços* and the *assimilados* from recognising the *indígenas* as equal or from considering rural affairs as part of their problem. The same happened in other Portuguese colonies such as Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Angola. In February 1970, at a memorial service for Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, and the “father” of the Mozambican liberation struggle, Amílcar Cabral, the “father” of the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, discussed this division as follows:

The experience of colonial domination shows that, in the effort to perpetuate exploitation, the colonisers not only create a system to repress the cultural life of the colonised people; he also provokes and develops the cultural alienation of a part of the population, either by so-called assimilation of indigenous people, or by creating a social gap between the indigenous elites and the popular masses. As a result of this process of dividing or of deepening the divisions in the society, it happens that a considerable part of the population, notably the urban or peasant *petit bourgeoisie*, assimilates the coloniser's mentality, considers itself culturally superior to its own people and ignores or looks down upon their cultural values ... A reconversion of mind – of mental set – is thus indispensable to the true integration of people into the liberation movement. Such reconversion – re-Africanisation, in our case – may take place before the struggle, through daily contact with the popular masses in the communion of sacrifice required by the struggle.⁵⁶

By the time Salazar publicly declared in 1951 that Portugal's overseas provinces were not colonies and that residents in these provinces were all Portuguese citizens, the social hierarchy in the colonies had created a definitive gap amongst people in Mozambique, with whites at the top, followed by non-Africans such as Asians below them, the *mestiço*, then the *assimilado* and the *indígena* at the bottom. The hierarchy was defined in terms of place of residence, the legal system and education. The gap between different groups was only to widen over time.

Disparity in educational opportunities

Due to the above-mentioned conditions, the foundational organisations of anti-colonialism which Mondlane referred to in the context of "early nationalism",⁵⁷ were formed among the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* in urban areas, mostly in Lourenço Marques and in a more limited fashion in Beira. The movement did not spread to rural areas where the social hierarchy isolated the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* not only from the *indígena* but also from whites. A growing sense of isolation fuelled dissatisfaction among the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* and nurtured political dissention. This feeling is clearly illustrated in the poetry of intellectuals engaged in cultural resistance in the 1940s and 1950s when political movement was repressed. For instance, Noémia de Sousa, a *mestiço* poet, published the following poem:

He was taught when he was small, "we are all the children of God, and each human is a brother of another human" ... Once, seeing a man, he said innocently, "Brother". But the pale man fulminated with the eyes filled with hatred and replied to him, "Negro". (From "Sangue Negro")⁵⁸

The "indigenous intellectuals", the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* who were isolated from both Africans and whites, turned to what Cabral called "re-Africanisation". Realising this, the

colonial authority tried to stop the influx of Africans into urban areas while refusing to educate more Africans than was required.⁵⁹

In 1929 there were only 11 government-run schools for *ensino primário* (primary education) in the whole of Mozambique and half of them were in the south. There were 1,184 Africans registered as students, not many more than the number of registered Europeans (1,064), though there was a far smaller European population.⁶⁰ The increasingly low enrolment rate of Africans partially is as a result of the introduction of the three-year compulsory “*ensino primário rudimentar*” (rudimentary primary education), which meant that Africans, who did not speak Portuguese, attended these schools rather than primary schools. Taking into account this change in the education system, Africans’ enrolment in primary education became increasingly diminished to 410 in 1938.⁶¹ Clearly the intentional division between whites and Africans in education was successful.

In 1940 primary education, including rudimentary primary education, for the *indígena* children officially fell under the responsibility of the Catholic Church. The number of Africans enrolled in public primary schools further decreased to 76 in the 1942/43 year. Church schools, on the other hand, doubled from 296 in 1940 to 542 in 1944. Students enrolled in church schools increased from 52,238 in 1940 (one per cent of the total African population) to 94,494 in 1944,⁶² although this still amounted to less than two per cent of the total African population.

The increase in the number of Africans enrolled in schools after 1940 signified an increase in the number of Christians, albeit temporarily. The rudimentary primary schools run by the Catholic Church mainly taught the words and knowledge necessary to understand the Bible. If children wished to pursue their education at primary schools, they were required to be baptised. It is noteworthy that the Catholic Church had already made significant inroads into Mozambique before, or at the same time as, they were charged with the responsibility of primary education. More schools meant more Christians. However, the propagation of primary education in Mozambique was more than the dissemination of knowledge, the modernisation of education or the conversion to Catholicism: its ultimate objective was to produce “obedient and exemplary workers”.⁶³ The Catholic Church was actively involved in the promotion of cotton, with the belief that the activity was good for moral education, as seen in Chapters 1 and 2.

Spiritual suppression through the Catholic Church occurred not only in Portuguese colonies but also in Portugal itself. The 1940 agreement between the Salazar administration and the Vatican made Catholicism a national religion and bestowed the responsibility for primary education in colonies on the Catholic Church. In Portugal, too, many did not complete primary schooling. Some writers assert that the support of the Catholic Church and the low level of education of Portuguese citizens enabled Salazar to maintain his political power for as long as he did.⁶⁴

In Mozambique, even young whites did not have sufficient educational opportunities. In 1952, there were only six secondary schools (one public and five private) in the whole country – all of them were for whites, and all of them in Lourenço Marques. It was virtually impossible for Africans to obtain secondary education.

Pioneers

It was at about this time that a small group of young Africans emerged who tried to pave their own way, despite facing multiple impediments. It was these young men and women who sowed the seeds of the anti-colonialist and nationalist movements and later came to form the core of FRELIMO. They were largely drawn from a minority that had experienced slightly better opportunities than most Africans in Mozambique. As seen in Chapter 1, some of them were wealthy African farmers in southern Mozambique, like the father of Samora Moisés Machel. Others had benefited from secondary school education. There was an enormous economic, political and social gap between the south and the rest of Mozambique, with the south of the country being far better resourced, housing the capital and being closer to South Africa.

As mentioned previously, it was in the interests of the colonial authority to maintain different educational systems for Africans and non-Africans, and these young pioneers were deprived of educational opportunities. Hence, any young person from the south who wanted to study further and had the wherewithal to do so, tried to get to South Africa, following the information and networks that their families and relatives had established through many years of migrant work. One of these young people was Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane who became the first African from Mozambique to obtain a Ph.D. and later became the first president of FRELIMO.

Germination of the anti-colonial movement in urban areas*New movements after the Second World War*

In 1949 educated young Africans in Mozambique formed the Núcleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundários de Moçambique (NESAM: Nucleus of African Secondary Students of Mozambique) as a subordinate body of the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique (CAN: Association Centre of Mozambican Blacks).⁶⁵ The majority of them had received secondary education in South Africa at the time when the political organisation, the African National Congress (ANC), was actively expanding. Young members of the ANC formed a youth league in 1943, listing armed struggle as an option in their fight for liberation from the apartheid regime. This made a great impact on young activists from Mozambique.⁶⁶ NESAM's activities soon attracted the attention of the colonial authority. Many members were interrogated by the PIDE and imprisoned, forcing the organisation to the brink of dissolution; however, the organisation went underground where it continued to operate until 1964.⁶⁷ NESAM later contributed greatly to the FRELIMO liberation movement through sharing its human resources and its networks, developed through many years of continuous activity in Mozambique.⁶⁸ NESAM's formation was like a breath of fresh air for the youth under the oppressive Estado Novo regime and brought with it a taste of freedom from oppressive decolonisation. Perhaps one of NESAM's greatest contributions to the nationalist movement was Mondlane's position as one of its founders, which created

a network of African and *mestiço* “intellectuals”⁶⁹ who were loyal to him.⁷⁰

Even though the colonial authority recognised NESAM and its leading members as a potential threat to the colonial system, it attempted, in the early 1950s, to placate competent Africans like Mondlane by educating them in Portugal – with the hope of creating a group of Africans who would cooperate with the system. Since this was 10 years before the formation of the first liberation movement in the Lusophone African colonies, the colonisers still perceived Africans as controllable subjects.

Ironically, it was this misperception and strategy by the colonial authority in the early 1950s that produced the leaders of various liberation movements, notably, Mondlane (the first president of FRELIMO), Marcelino dos Santos (one of the founders of CONCP [Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas: Conference of Nationalist Organisations of Portuguese Colonies] and the vice president of FRELIMO), Amílcar Cabral of PAIGC, Agostinho Neto and Mario Pinto de Andrade of MPLA. These men were sent to Lisbon as promising candidates for later collaboration with the colonial authority. However, amongst themselves, the young men came to realise that the problems of each colony could not be solved without freedom from colonial rule.⁷¹

Nativismo and the Association Movements

The roots of the nationalist movements and anti-colonial movements by “intellectuals” from Portuguese African colonies after the Second World War lay in the *nativismo* (nativism) among the *mestiço* which had long influenced Mozambican politics.

At the end of the eighteenth century, political refugees and deportees arrived in Mozambique from Portugal and Brazil. Among them were liberals, republicans and revolutionaries. Whites living in the coastal urban areas were politically diversified.⁷² As described by António Figueiredo, a Portuguese citizen who participated in the *oposicionista* (opposition) movement in Mozambique in the 1950s, “Mozambique was farther and freer” from Portugal.⁷³

The social status of the *mestiço* was relatively high in Mozambique at the end of the nineteenth century. They were called *filho da terra* (the sons of the land) and expressed their political views through writing in publications, including the *Clamor Africano* (African Clamour) and the *Revista África* (Africa Magazine).⁷⁴ The *filho da terra* were critical of Portugal’s colonial policies which they argued would not bring progress to Mozambique and they demanded the autonomy of each colony. Their opinion was rooted in the resentment and rivalry that they felt towards the government and people of Portugal, who they felt did not properly understand the colonies. Some Portuguese, such as António José Enes, a Mozambican governor-general in the late nineteenth century, sympathised with their cause and insisted on the decentralisation of the colonies, citing the “diversity of the colonies” as his reason. The *filho da terra* argued that Mozambique should not be treated in the same way as other colonies because of its “special situation”, that is, the necessity of maintaining a large population of labourers, and therefore that it was not desirable to pursue universal assimilationism.

Having seen that RAU (Colonial Administration Act introduced in 1907 for the effective exploitation of the labour force) had the effect of leading to the impoverishment of Africans in rural areas, *nativistas* began to criticise the colonial authority in Mozambique, instead of Portugal. The front-runner of this criticism was the *Grémio Africano* (African Guild), organised in 1906. It started a newspaper called *O Africano* (The African) in 1908, which voiced its disapproval of a “new” trend of discrimination against Africans.⁷⁵ The main members of the guild⁷⁶ were *mestiço* and *assimilado* “intellectuals”. In the newspaper they called for the “protection of the rights of the indigenous population”.

Once republicans had established the Portuguese government in 1910, various associations and *sócio-partidária* (social partisan) organisations were born in the metropole and its colonies including Mozambique.⁷⁷ In Mozambique these were largely organised by whites from Portugal to protect their own rights and interests, and they took after the increasingly active labour movement in their home country.⁷⁸

Several of these organisations accepted members of all races, including the Centro Socialista de Moçambique (Socialist Centre of Mozambique) of the Partido Socialista Português (Portuguese Socialist Party), the Associação do Pessoal do Porto e dos Caminhos de Ferro de Lourenço Marques (APPCFLM: Port and Railway Workers’ Association of Lourenço Marques) and Associação das Artes Gráficas (AAG: Printers’ Association). They helped to raise the political awareness of the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* and facilitated their political organisation. The AAG was the most “militant” of all. The personnel of the *Imprensa Nacional* (National Printing) office was said to be “composed of three races living indiscriminately, but in the best harmony and comradeship.”⁷⁹ Also in 1911, with the support of the white members of the AAG, African members formed the União dos Trabalhadores Africanos (African Workers’ Union), although it had a limited life span.

The members of the African Guild, AAG and the Socialist Centre of Mozambique had socialist ties. A few of the editors of *O Africano* actively made socialist assertions. In particular, João Albasini, one of *O Africano*’s founders and a well-known intellectual in Portugal, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies in Africa, used several pen names to express his opinions, such as the following passage:⁸⁰ “It would be communism, the only idea that a black can conceive, assimilate and tolerate regarding ownership, because he is a born socialist.”⁸¹

Albasini believed that African society was traditionally of a collectivist nature and he saw an affinity between this and socialism. Similar arguments were put forward by two prominent African leaders – Leopold Senghor and Sékou Touré, the first presidents of Senegal and Guinea respectively.⁸²

We discovered that we had already achieved socialism before European presence. We would conclude that we have a vocation to renew it by helping him [the native African] restore his spiritual dimensions.⁸³

African society is essentially communal. Collective living and social solidarity gives it an underlying tone of humanism, envied by many peoples.⁸⁴

It is worth noting that Albasini, being familiar with the work of Marx and Hegel, pointed out the importance of labour union struggle and expressed his solidarity with the 1917 APPCFLM strikers.⁸⁵ However, nativists around that time should not be regarded as socialists or pan-Africanists because the African Guild was driven in the main by nostalgia for “Mother Africa”, compassion for their “brothers” as forced labourers and, above all, anger at having to accept their lowly position in the social hierarchy. Equally, “solidarity with white workers” should not be over emphasised as the majority of the white workers became more racist in the economic crisis following the First World War, when the colonial government intentionally attempted to widen the gap between whites and other races.⁸⁶ As a result, the social status of the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* was lowered and they were given fewer employment and promotion opportunities than whites.

The value of the British pound, the main currency in Lourenço Marques, fell after the First World War. Prices soared and many urban dwellers became impoverished. Consequently, the African Guild placed priority on protecting the rights of Africans.⁸⁷ In 1918 it changed the newspaper’s name from *O Africano* (The African) to *O Brado Africano* (The African Cry). Rocha, a Mozambican professor at UEM and an expert on association movements in Mozambique, argues that the guild represented “all Mozambicans” and that its newspaper was “the leader of the indigenous race”, but the actual readership or geographical distribution is unknown.⁸⁸ Although it was read by migrant workers on the South African mines and sections of it were written in local languages (Tsonga), its readership was limited due to the comparatively very small number of literate people.

Economic chaos after the First World War plunged Portugal into crisis. Its deficit from 1919 to 1920 grew to 12 times as much as the average deficit during the last years of imperial rule.⁸⁹ Trade unions responded by escalating their activities. The Confederação Geral do Trabalho (CGT: General Confederation of Labour) and other unions demanded improved treatment for workers and took to holding strikes and other industrial action.⁹⁰ In Mozambique, the Centro de Esquerda Democrática (Democratic Left Centre) was set up and a newspaper called *O Emancipador* (The Liberator) was published in 1925. However, this was the last socialist organisation to be set up for many years in Mozambique as the 1926 military coup put an end to political freedom.

The Colonial Act of 1930, targeted at economic nationalism, killed off the relatively free political atmosphere in Mozambique. The Estado Novo regime, which started around this time, legalised political oppression throughout Mozambique. The Censorship Act of 1933 brought the labour movement under the Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional (National Work Act). Any association activities which insisted on a class-based argument were prohibited and the newspapers published by various associations and nativist organisations were banned.⁹¹ Indeed, although there were 97 newspapers in 1926, this number was halved within four years.⁹² In 1937 *O Brado Africano* was put under the direct control of the colonial administration. The African Guild was restructured as a semi-governmental organisation called the Associação Africana da Colónia de Moçambique (AACM: African Association of Mozambican Colony) in the late 1930s.⁹³

Pan-Africanism in Mozambique

There are various opinions regarding the assessment of the *nativismo* and the association movements between 1910 and 1926 during the republican administration. Although these cannot strictly be called anti-colonialist or nationalist movements, they did provide the basis for the future anti-colonialist or nationalist movements. Mario de Andrade,⁹⁴ a founding member of the Angolan Communist Party and MPLA, refers to them as “*movimento unitário*” (unitary movements) or “*protonacionalista*” (proto-nationalist)⁹⁵ and emphasises the continuity between them and the later liberation movements of the 1960s.⁹⁶ In Rocha’s view, these movements expanded the social basis of “modern nationalism in Mozambique”.⁹⁷ As Andrade points out, however, one should take not only their continuity but also their “discontinuation” into consideration.⁹⁸

Pan-Africanism in Mozambique has not been explored comprehensively by researchers,⁹⁹ with the notable exception of Rocha, who listed three routes of pan-Africanism into Mozambique: (1) the association activities in other Portuguese colonies; (2) South Africa; and (3) Portugal.¹⁰⁰ By the end of the nineteenth century there was a well-established interchange of information and publications between other Portuguese colonies. Therefore, Portugal’s tightening of its colonial administration impacted not only Mozambique but also other colonies such as Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe. Just like the African “intellectuals” in Mozambique, people in other African colonies had increased awareness of the need to protect the *causa Africana* (the interest of Africans). The forming of the African Guild and the publication of newspapers in Mozambique was, therefore, welcomed by *nativistas* in other colonies, and they influenced each other.¹⁰¹

In South Africa, the pan-Africanist movement started at the beginning of the twentieth century. The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed in 1912, and was renamed as the African National Congress (ANC) the following year. Due to the two countries’ geographical proximity, this initiative strongly influenced *nativistas* in Mozambique. The April 1919 issue of *O Brado Africano* expressed sympathy with the slogan of African workers in the Transvaal, “Africa for Africans”.¹⁰² Also, several *seitas messiânico-profeitas* (messianic-prophet sects), which were *igrejas separatistas* (separatist churches) from South Africa, rapidly and widely spread throughout southern Mozambique. These were the so-called independent churches which refused to be subordinate to traditional European Christian churches and split from them.¹⁰³ Pan-Africanism spread through these religious activities as well as through migrant labourers, and greatly influenced peasants in southern and central Mozambique.

Nativistas in Portuguese colonies advocated the protection of the rights of Africans in the colonies.¹⁰⁴ The Junta de Defesa dos Direitos d’Africa (JDDA: Council for Defence of the African Rights), set up in Lisbon in 1912, aimed at organising all of the groups in Portugal’s African colonies by establishing a central committee in each colony, like a confederacy. Albasini became the director of the Mozambican committee. The objective of its newsletter, *A Voz d’Africa* (The Voice of Africa), was to encourage people of various classes and races to compromise their individual interests and to work instead towards

achieving the prosperity of their common nation. The spirit was clearly demonstrated in the name of a new newsletter, *Portugal Novo* (New Portugal), published in 1915.¹⁰⁵

In the wake of the Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919, some of the JDDA founders formed the Liga Africana (African League). The objectives of the league were: (1) to promote the moral and social progress of the African race and to protect the legitimate interest and rights of Africans in Portuguese colonies; (2) to confederate the existing groups of Africans in the Portuguese colonies; (3) to have the Portuguese government invite a certain number of people from each colony to study in Portugal; and (4) to maintain contact and cooperate with similar groups in other countries.¹⁰⁶

Around this time, Albasini wrote from Lisbon to the African Guild: “Mozambique must have a direct and undivided link with the African League. Here in Lisbon is the headquarters of the delegations in Africa.”¹⁰⁷

According to researchers such as Rocha and others, the pan-Africanism adopted by the Liga Africana was reformist in nature and kept a certain distance from Marcus Garvey’s “Africa for the Africans”.¹⁰⁸ The following is a contributed article by the chairperson of the league published in *O Brado Africano* in 1921:

The African regionalists do not proclaim, as some scatter-brained people do, “Africa for Africans”. Neither can they accept “Africa only for Europeans”, as many think but do not say. What regionalists want is firm cooperation between whites and natives on the basis of equality, in a word, “Africa also for Africans!”¹⁰⁹ (*Underlined by the author*)

Also in 1921, the JDDA formed the Partido Nacional Africano (PNA: African National Party). Its objective was to lobby for more rights for Africans within the colonial framework in a similar way to its rival, the Liga Africana. During this period, nativist organisations in Portugal and its colonies were strengthening ties with international movements. The Liga Africana sent two members to the Pan-African Congress in 1921 and it became one of the founding members of the Associação Pan Africana (Pan African Association).¹¹⁰ It requested the third Pan-Africanist Congress in 1923 to be held in Lisbon. The 1923 congress took place in London and Portugal.

For the first time people in Portuguese colonies were able to link directly with pan-Africanism internationally. However, the stance of the members of the Liga Africana was sometimes unclear, and at times they appeared to be actively defending Portugal’s colonial policies.¹¹¹ This attitude was not necessarily peculiar to pan-Africanists in Portuguese colonies since pan-Africanism before the Second World War was generally reformist rather than anti-colonialist.

Although these developments should be considered, it is not particularly useful or appropriate to divide nationalism in Portuguese colonies in Africa into two kinds, as elaborated on in Chapter 2. As people involved in the Liga Africana advocated, it is necessary to include “mezzo-nationalism” such as “regional nationalism”.¹¹² Political opinions in Portuguese Africa need to be analysed at three levels: macro-nationalism (pan-

Africanism), micro-nationalism (independent nations) and mezzo-nationalism (regional Africanism).

Among African “intellectuals” in Portugal before the Second World War, mezzo-nationalism was favoured, while members of the African Guild in Mozambique¹¹³ were strongly attracted to the assertion of “Africa for Africans”.¹¹⁴ In general, the notion was most strongly accepted in Mozambique, which was of course furthest from Portugal and closer to South Africa. African “intellectuals” in Mozambique at that time attached much importance to regional Africanism due to the commonalities between “intellectuals” in the region, such as the fact that Portuguese was a common language. They were also beginning to pay attention to pan-Africanism. However, micro-nationalism was yet to come into its own.

In summary, many contradictions existed among nativist movements during this period, and furthermore, activities were significantly curtailed on the establishment of the Estado Novo regime. However, they did influence the liberation struggle in Mozambique in three important ways. Firstly, they laid the foundation of the thinking that later unified Mozambican “intellectuals” in the area. Secondly, they fostered solidarity, albeit partial and temporary, with international movements and especially with those in Portugal and other Portuguese colonies. Thirdly, they experienced a joint struggle with white movements (especially socialist parties and trade unions), which was to be the foundation of the solidarity between anti-establishment whites and FRELIMO.

Social expansion and the limitations of various movements

The extent to which the above-mentioned movements influenced Mozambique’s trajectory remains unclear, even today. As outlined earlier, certainly it would be accurate to say that southern Mozambique was more strongly influenced than other areas. This being due to its proximity to the capital, Lourenço Marques, which was the axis of new thought. Educational and media organisations were also concentrated in this area, and it had many migrants working or living in South Africa, where pan-Africanism and trade union movements were thriving. It was also this area that had experienced the collapse of the traditional social system, and was therefore more open to the influx of new thoughts and religions.

Jeanne Marie Penvenne, who meticulously followed the daily lives of African workers in Lourenço Marques, points out that, “the Grêmio membership was hardly representative of the urban population as a whole”.¹¹⁵ The leaders of these movements were exceptional, even for urban residents. According to the 1940 census, the literacy rate in Lourenço Marques was 1.78 per cent and only 11,320 people could read Portuguese.¹¹⁶ These figures illustrate the limitations of the African Guild whose main activity was the publication of newspapers in Portuguese.

Much research has been conducted on the proletarianisation of African workers. The current prevailing understanding is that the capitalist world economy and colonial rule intentionally prevented workers in remote areas from becoming proletarianised. In other words, rural villages where workers originated from were forced to cut production costs.

The colonial government in Mozambique implemented labour exploitation by forcing male “natives” to become engaged in legally forced labour or to sell their labour in order to pay taxes, while at the same time the traditional social structure was maintained in these rural areas. Therefore, because Africans in Mozambique provided the cheapest labour, they in effect contributed to the formation of a capitalist economy. These factors not only prevented Mozambique and its people from developing at their own pace and of their own free will, but also prevented workers from becoming proletarianised.

In the 1930s nativists and the association movements led by the *mestiço* and the *assimilado* experienced radical changes. The Estado Novo regime banned socialist parties. Also, the increased influx of Portuguese immigrants from 1931 lowered the social status of the *mestiço* and the *assimilado*, which had already been slipping following the First World War. It became impossible for the different races to fight together in the workplace.¹¹⁷ Penvenne’s work, mentioned earlier, demonstrates that African workers in urban areas, including the *mestiço*, developed a class consciousness as “Africans under the exploitation system”, which was more closely related to a sense of racial discrimination rather than an understanding of themselves as a class of workers.¹¹⁸ It was a common belief at the time for people living in Lourenço Marques, from the educated *mestiço* lawyers to the uneducated African lower-ranking municipality employees, that the white men “ate the blood of other people [Africans]”.¹¹⁹

This impacted on the development of political movements in Mozambique in two ostensibly contradictory ways: firstly, it led to the stagnation of the joint struggle with white inhabitants, and, secondly, it led to a shift towards a new movement. The intensification of colonial rule (white rule in urban areas), and repulsion against it; the increase of migrant workers due to the economic development in southern Africa as a whole; the vitalisation of the labour movement in neighbouring regions and the surge of liberation movements in the world – were all factors which had a strong influence on the political consciousness of the people of Mozambique. The movements developed quietly and only began to surface after the Second World War. One of these was a labour movement of unskilled port workers, which was active from 1947 to 1949.¹²⁰

The workers organised a succession of protest actions. They, for instance, went on strike in July 1947 protesting against the imposition of overtime work. Later that year they also caused a riot protesting against poor meals, and in April 1949 they went on strike again. About 300 forced labourers, considered to be the lowest among all the port workers, participated in the first strike. Six of the seven leaders were former migrant workers from South African mines.¹²¹ Possibly, the labour movement of Mozambican port workers was prompted by the large-scale strike in South African mines in 1946. In turn, the industrial action of the port workers encouraged plantation workers near Lourenço Marques to take action.¹²²

These efforts temporarily improved the treatment of workers, but relatively soon the movement was forced to a standstill due to blanket arrests of the protestors, the exile and penal labour imposed on the leaders and strikebreaking.¹²³ As a result, no other labour movement confronted the colonial authority from 1949 until the late 1950s.

Nevertheless, the labour movements in urban areas, mainly in Lourenço Marques, from about 1910 to the end of the 1920s and just after the Second World War, played a significant role in the formation of the nationalist and the anti-colonial movements by nurturing its identity, consolidating thinking, accumulating knowledge and experience, building a network and creating a legacy. However, there was very little link to the rural areas. The leaders of the movements had more in common with the political consciousness of “intellectuals” in Lisbon and other Portuguese colonies, pan-Africanists in other parts of the world and movement leaders in the neighbouring countries, than with the rural deprived of Mozambique.

The intensification of colonial rule and the germination of the anti-colonial movement in rural areas

The intensification of colonial rule in rural areas

Chapter 1 looked at how African peasants resisted forced cotton growing using every possible means. It was highlighted that the resistance took the form of fleeing from, rather than confronting, the colonial authority, as well continual small daily resistances once the uprisings by local chiefs had failed.

The worldwide waves of anti-colonisation and the winds of pan-Africanism reached rural areas only fragmentally. This was partly due to the vast distances between the urban areas (especially Lourenço Marques), which were the centres of various pioneering movements, and the rural areas, specifically in central and northern Mozambique. It was only those rural people working in the urban areas who were likely to learn of the changes, and this varied according to where they worked and the type of work they did.

Forced cotton growing had been successfully introduced in Mozambique just after the Second World War, and colonial rule was established to a greater or lesser degree in every rural corner of the country. As seen in Chapter 2, the administrator and agents of the cotton companies moved communities into remote areas where they could be easily administered. The *régulos* and the *sipaïos* were so highly valued as assistants of the colonial administration that they rode about in palanquins during this time. The number of *sipaïos* increased to as many as 18,333 in 1951.¹²⁴

Many people in rural areas became increasingly discontented with the ever-growing power of colonial rule. However, their unhappiness could not find expression in anti-colonial movements, let alone nationalism, yet it was unsafe to live grudgingly in rural areas for fear that ill feeling would be reported to the authorities, resulting in harsh punishment. Since Africans could no longer escape colonial rule and regulate themselves within the country, many were forced to move out of the Portuguese colonial territory. In the main, the only way for rural Mozambicans to escape their dissatisfaction and to come into contact with the latest movements, such as the anti-colonial and early nationalist movements, was to become migrant workers.

The experience of migrant workers

Graphs 6 and 7 illustrate the change in the number of Mozambicans working in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia respectively.¹²⁵

The influx of migrant workers from Mozambique to neighbouring countries was confirmed by a 1958 report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which noted that, “[a]ccording to the available statistical data, Mozambique is the African territory where migration abroad attains the highest proportions.”¹²⁶

The report listed two factors related to the increase in labour migration: “push” factors and “pull” factors. Push factors included the increase in the population, the collapse of traditionally self-sufficient agriculture and Africans’ new lifestyle obtained through the new monetary economy. Pull factors were the development of production activities such as plantations and mines and the worldwide economic boom following the First World War.¹²⁷ The report did not, however, examine structural issues, such as the influence of the states, colonial governments and businesses. Nor did it sufficiently explain why Mozambique was the largest provider of migrant workers.¹²⁸ Moreover, the report ignored the effect of the world capitalist economy (as suggested by the dependency theory and the theory of the world-system),¹²⁹ the relations with the apartheid system (as pointed out by Ruth First and Mitsuo Ogura)¹³⁰ and the state of Portuguese colonial rule.¹³¹

An analysis of labour migration which focuses on formal agreements between governments, or between a government and a mining company or a private corporation, inevitably excludes illegal or informal migration, as well as migration to areas that are not included in the agreements. Consequently, little light has been shed on the true situation of the labour migration of Africans in Mozambique after the late 1930s, the overwhelming majority of which was illegal. On the other hand, an interpretation of the relocation or labour migration of colonised people as “escape” or “resistance” has also been common,¹³² and not only among researchers. The testimony of migrant workers, as well as reports by the administrators of the places where migrants settled seems to confirm this perspective.


The report of a provincial governor of southern Tanganyika in 1933, after the introduction of the *Estado Novo* in Portugal and its colonies, illustrates this:

“... oppressive measures adopted by neighbouring Authorities”, ... was causing “considerable movement of Natives across the Rovuma into the Tunduru District [southern Tanganyika]”. ... “[O]ppression by the Portuguese and seizure of their women-folk” was forcing the migration of a prominent Matengo headman and his followers in Tanganyika ... “[T]he oppression must have been very severe to make him move, as he is a very old man ...”.¹³³

Similar movements took place all over Mozambique, perhaps with regional variations in severity and timing. Many Africans left Mozambique for neighbouring British territories.

It is interesting to look at how Africans fleeing from Mozambique themselves saw the situation. An escapee from central Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia is quoted in the

Graph 6 Mozambican mine workers in South Africa (1901-1973)



Source: CEA, 1998:204; author's calculations.

Ph.D. dissertation of Joel Maurício das Neves,¹³⁴ a Mozambican professor in the History Department of UEM and a director of Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique (AHM), who conducted research on regional relations between Zimbabwe and central Mozambique:¹³⁵

Young boys were often caught on the roads or local paths by *sipaios* on their way to school. One day, on the way to Jecua Mission School, fifteen boys were caught by *sipaios*. Five of them, myself included, ran away. A big rope was tied around the waists of those who could not run. Then they were taken to the local administration and road construction sites. [...] During the colonial period we did not have peace. We were always threatened by the Portuguese authorities who forced us to work on white farms. Although we had our fathers, we were frightened and always hiding in the bush. Because of this situation, we preferred to go to Zimbabwe and to work there.¹³⁶

Edward Alpers, an expert on south-eastern African history, points out that the traditional research that focuses on push and pull factors, structural factors or the “escape” factor cannot sufficiently explain the more sophisticated strategies and active decision-making employed by escapees.¹³⁷ In addition to higher wages and higher standards of living, Neves points out that reasons for migration included opportunities for education, welfare, entertainment such as soccer and cinemas and political freedom.¹³⁸ Stephen Christian Lubkemann, who studies diaspora in Portuguese-speaking southern African countries, asserts that we should recognise the proactive and reactive aspects of migration. In addition, he argues that not everybody participated equally in migration, citing gender and age factors.¹³⁹ In connection with the liberation struggle, Alpers notes that, “while these Mozambicans rejected Portuguese colonial rule, they did not necessarily reject the capitalist regime with which they had become familiar in Tanganyika.”¹⁴⁰ This was true especially with the Makonde (MANU) leaders, such as Nkavandame, whose aspiration was to become “a small capitalist farmer and trader” and ultimately “a local petty bourgeoisie”.¹⁴¹

There are two important points to be kept in mind. First, labour migration after the Second World War significantly affected rural residents all over Mozambique. Second, without understanding this phenomenon and situation, one cannot understand the transformation of rural society in Mozambique, let alone the liberation movement. In 1948, for example, 61 per cent of the male work force in Mossurize, 31 per cent in Manica and 19 per cent in Chimoio left for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, leaving a labour shortage in Manica-Sofala District of as many as 45,000 people.¹⁴² In 1940, 23,000 (26 per cent of the male labour force) left from the Inhambane District in the south to find work in South Africa.¹⁴³ Similarly, in 1953 between 15 per cent and 17 per cent of Makonde males in Cabo Delgado District in the north worked in Tanganyika.¹⁴⁴ Even from the official data, which has a tendency to under-record the true figures, it is evident that there was large-scale migration (especially males) from all over Mozambique.

Concerning the role that the experience of migrant labour played in the liberation struggle in Mozambique, many researchers have cited the acceptance of new ideas

(nationalism and decolonisation) and the formation of class-consciousness.¹⁴⁵ This process and the actual situation of Mozambican migrants has not been studied sufficiently however, in the same way that the *nativismo* and the association movements in urban areas have been under-researched.¹⁴⁶ The importance of examining migration and migrant workers in relation to the formation of the liberation movement is highlighted by the fact that all three liberation organisations out of which FRELIMO was formed were established towards the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s by Mozambican migrants who had lived in neighbouring regions, such as in Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Nyasaland. These three organisations were born in these countries, later relocated to Tanganyika and were eventually absorbed into FRELIMO.

The experience of Mozambican migrants in South Africa

From the end of the nineteenth century, African males from the southern part of Mozambique, the economic and political hub of the colony, systematically went to South Africa as migrant labourers. There they encountered new political ideas, foreign to Mozambican Africans from other regions, and became aware of the political movement among South African blacks. These were the men who, prompted by the mining strike in South Africa in 1946, organised a port strike in Mozambique. Moreover, as a new church movement (independent churches) prevailed among southerners, pan-Africanism began to blossom. As Luís António Covane, who conducted research on migrants from southern Mozambique points out, many migrant workers learned how to write through their participation in church activities in South Africa. This is illustrated by the letters that they wrote in their mother tongue (of Tsonga or Chopi), to their families back home in Mozambique. Upon returning to their hometowns, they then taught others how to write.¹⁴⁷ This was regarded as a threat by the colonial government and often resulted in arrests.¹⁴⁸

Many leaders and supporters of FRELIMO during the liberation struggle were from the south, undoubtedly influenced by the educated migrants. However, researchers did not pay much attention to FRELIMO's influence on southern rural residents as the armed struggle of 1964 had not yet reached the rural south and also because its attempt at fomenting an uprising in the urban south had failed. To shed light on FRELIMO's impact on the south, the CEA (Centro de Estudos Africanos of Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane) conducted research between 1984 and 1986. Teresa Cruz e Silva, the report's author, refers to southern Mozambique as, "the fourth region of FRELIMO" and describes its "illegal" activities there in detail.¹⁴⁹

It is still unclear, however, how Mozambicans from the south lived in South Africa; to what extent they participated in the labour movement and political activities there; what sort of networks they developed; what type of ideas and movement they encountered and brought back home; how their new ideas influenced struggle politics in Mozambique and how they became engaged in the liberation movement from 1960 onward.¹⁵⁰ Not only those who studied abroad, like Mondlane, but other migrant workers must have been influenced by liberation movements such as the ANC. Further research is needed to

shed light on how they participated in these movements or how they took forward these activities once they returned home.

In South Africa, the Union parliament passed the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, and the Public Safety Act and Criminal Law Amendment Act were promulgated in 1953. This legislation made it impossible for Mozambicans to organise anything of a political nature in South Africa. Mozambican migrants working in South Africa, especially on the mines, were restricted from participating in the South African labour movements because they were under the control of various South African or Portuguese institutions. Although they might have been able to gather information about new movements, they would not have easily been able to form their own movements in South Africa or even in their hometowns.

Social changes in southern Mozambique resulted in migrant labour becoming the main form of economic activity for African males. Many men chose to return to urban areas in Mozambique or stayed in South Africa, but others did return to the rural areas. Here, some men used their savings to establish themselves as successful farmers. Over the years, money earned in South Africa filtered into the local economy and into local communities, transforming the traditional way of life.

As an example, whereas young men used to have to rely on their fathers to pay *lobolo* (bridewealth), they could now earn money to pay it themselves. As a result, the number of polygamous marriages, early marriages and divorces increased. Because of long absences when men went away to work, more and more families were headed up by women. Women were therefore required to shoulder a much heavier burden than before. In addition, the position of the chiefs, who formerly had played a major role in the distribution of land and wealth, and who had dealt with any crisis in the community, weakened. While it is true that the traditional authority in communities played a significant role as *régulo*, and acting as subordinate assistants of the colonial administration allowed them to accumulate wealth, the traditional social structure in the south was already starting to crumble when the colonial power tried to incorporate it into the colonial administrative structure. In this way, the situation was very different from that in the north, as discussed in Chapter 2. These factors made it difficult for southerners to organise a movement based on communal relations or kinship.

On the other hand, the monetary economy enabled individuals to earn a living in diverse ways and to pursue different ways of life. Consequently, a large number of men from the south went to Tanganyika on hearing that FRELIMO was formed in early 1960s. The weakening of traditional social systems is one of the reasons that southerners, including women, responded positively to FRELIMO's stance on anti-tribalism.¹⁵¹

In summary, migrant labour transformed the perception and lifestyle of the working men, as well as the social structures in the rural areas where they originated, impacting also on the perceptions of the women who stayed behind. However, although this formed the foundation for the understanding of new ideas and movements, it did not lead immediately to the engagement of Africans from Mozambique in the wider political movement due to the factors outlined above.

The experience of Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia

The União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO) was formed in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, in 1960. Despite the historical significance of the organisation in Mozambique's liberation struggle, its background was virtually unknown until Neves's 1998 Ph.D. dissertation. This was because: (1) the UDENAMO headquarters relocated to Tanganyika in 1961; (2) many UDENAMO members, including Adelino Gwambe, its first leader, and Uria Simango, a future deputy secretary-general of FRELIMO, later formed a splinter group and were engaged in anti-FRELIMO activities;¹⁵² and (3) research on Mozambicans in Southern Rhodesia has tended to focus on them as "migrants" or "workers".


Many researchers have suggested that the formation of Zimbabwean nationalism in Southern Rhodesia was closely related to the labour movement.¹⁵³ Unionism, in particular, is said to have been against ethnic divisions in urban African communities.¹⁵⁴ This socio-political environment encouraged Mozambican migrant workers to become more politically aware, and hence they often joined workers from Southern Rhodesia and other British territories in the labour movement, while also nurturing their own "(micro) national" consciousness.

Neves points out that until the Great Depression of 1929 the majority of workers in mining towns in Southern Rhodesia were not in fact from Southern Rhodesia.¹⁵⁵ The number of migrants from Mozambique working in Southern Rhodesian mines continued to increase, almost doubling from 4,658 in 1933 to 9,534 in 1937.¹⁵⁶ During the Second World War the numbers remained relatively stable at 11,000–12,000. Graph 8 illustrates that Mozambican migrants formed the majority of workers in Umtali (current Mutare) and Salisbury (current Harare) in 1945.¹⁵⁷

Yet, only 12 per cent of the 93,977 Mozambican migrants in Southern Rhodesia in 1945 worked on the mines;¹⁵⁸ the majority worked in various industries, such as on the railways and in agriculture.¹⁵⁹


Forced cotton growing, introduced after the second World War, was the major cause of the influx of Mozambicans to Southern Rhodesia. Many people left central Mozambique once Portugal started to exercise direct control of the colony after the last concession to Mozambican companies expired in 1942 and the work imposed by the colonial government was unattractive to them. When it became urgent for the colonial government to develop infrastructure in central Mozambique whose modernisation was substantially delayed due to company monopoly, Africans were drafted into public works. To do this, the administration imposed six-month-long stints of forced labour per year on all men in central Mozambique who were not engaged in growing cash crops or stock farming.¹⁶⁰ When the cotton companies had been active, there were some years when not a single man had been drafted. Now, in Mossurize Circumscription in central Mozambique, for example, nearly 1,000 men were forced to provide labour every year. To avoid this, many men and boys crossed the borders to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa.

Graph 7 Workers in Southern Rhodesia (1930–1952)



Source: Native Labour Immigration Annual Report, 1941, in Neves, 1998:356; author's calculations.

Graph 8 Origins of mine workers in Southern Rhodesian cities (1945)



Sources: Southern Rhodesia Statistical Year Book, 1947:98; author's calculations.

In addition, the economic boom in Mozambique around this time required a large number of workers, and labour was actively recruited near the borders. However, more people probably moved to Southern Rhodesia to avoid forced labour, as in 1939 the number of Mozambican workers surpassed that of Nyasaland, which had been the largest supplier of workers since 1933, as seen in Graph 7. As in South Africa, the migrants from Mozambique were influenced by their experiences in Southern Rhodesia.

The labour movement in Southern Rhodesia became active just after the First World War. The first strike was at the Bulawayo Railways, thereafter industrial action spread throughout Southern Rhodesia. Between July 1919 and January 1920, Africans from a wide range of industries took part in country-wide mass-action labour-related activities which were successful in halting the decline in wages that had been accelerating since the First World War. It is not clear how many Mozambican workers were involved, though many of the miners in Bulawayo – the centre of Southern Rhodesia's labour movement – were from Mozambique.

The period just after the First World War is considered to have been important for the formation of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia. Also formed in this period were labour movements, self-help groups and political organisations such as the Rhodesia Native Association (RNA) and the Rhodesia Bantu Voters' Association (RBVA). Among self-help groups, the Tete Burial Society was the most significant.

The *African Weekly* newspaper reported in 1955 that the first burial society in Salisbury was formed in 1918 by people from Tete in Mozambique, which led to the formation of other "tribe"-based burial societies.¹⁶¹ The fact that Mozambican migrants established one of the first self-help groups, if not the very first, may reflect that it was more difficult for them to receive public or private support than Africans from Southern Rhodesia or other British colonies. The burial societies were especially significant during the influenza epidemic, which raged in the latter half of the First World War in eastern and southern Africa, and claimed the lives of three million people in Southern Rhodesia. A further 2,000 were kept in isolation. Mutual support among immigrants became essential. Members of support groups could expect that coffins, burials and communication to their families would be organised in the case of their deaths.¹⁶² Self-help groups also helped those disabled by illness or injury to go back to their home-towns.

Following the formation of the Tete Burial Society, many self-help groups for Mozambican Africans were formed. In the mid-1920s, the Mozambique Native Association was founded in Salisbury. The association became prominent in mines and industrial centres all over Southern Rhodesia and established branches in various locations.¹⁶³ In addition, many more burial societies were formed.¹⁶⁴

Motoji Matsuda, a social anthropologist, illustrates how ethnicity was reinforced through self-help groups such as burial societies among urban residents in Kenya which adopted names that suggested their ethnic identity or region of origin.¹⁶⁵ However, the formation of organisations based on ethnic groups or regions of origin did not always translate into strict ethnic divisions between locals and Africans from Mozambique, or among Africans from Mozambique. In many cases, the burial societies based on ethnicity

or region of origin were too small, so people had to join those of other ethnic groups or regions. It was also important to obtain a wider support base which the increasingly active labour movement provided. Therefore on the whole, “boundaries” of each support group were not exclusive. For instance, the Mozambique Native Association in Gwelo incorporated members who were not from Mozambique, and conversely the majority of the members of the Port Herald Burial Society in Shamva, formed by people from Nyasaland, were from Mozambique. All the workers at the Umtali mine belonged to the Nyasaland Beni Society, irrespective of where they were actually from.¹⁶⁶

Self-help groups created social networks among Southern Rhodesian workers which played a significant role in the formation of the labour union movement.¹⁶⁷ In the 1940s, the labour movement was stronger than any ethnically based self-help group.¹⁶⁸ The manufacturing industry in Southern Rhodesia flourished thanks to the outbreak of the Second World War and required many more African workers. In Bulawayo, for example, the number of African workers rose from 18,211 in 1941 to 52,553 in 1946. It increased by 96 per cent in the manufacturing sector and 113 per cent in municipal public works.¹⁶⁹ During the same period, between 30,000 and 40,000 Africans travelled from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia every year for work. Many of them found work on construction sites, textile factories, flour mills, mines, farms and in white households.

The sudden influx of people from within and outside Southern Rhodesia into industrial centres accelerated urbanisation, but also resulted in lower wages and a reduced standard of living. At the same time, in rural areas the land of many Africans was expropriated by whites. Droughts and soil erosion led to further deterioration of the situation.¹⁷⁰ There were food shortages among urban workers who had relied on the food produced by their families and relatives in rural areas. This led to the intensification of industrial disputes.¹⁷¹ Strikes, which has been frequent after the First World War and then waned, became common once more. The first was again led by Bulawayo Railway workers in 1942, which sparked repercussions throughout the country. A general strike went ahead in 1948. In Umtali, a workers’ committee was formed, consisting of 12 members – each representing a different sector. António Rapozo from Zambézia, Mozambique, was selected as the factory workers’ representative.¹⁷²

From this it can be inferred that many factory workers in Umtali at the end of the 1940s were from Mozambique, and that they also took part in the labour movement, together with workers from other areas. In 1952, 80.74 per cent of African workers in Salisbury were from Nyasaland and Mozambique. In 1956, 40 per cent came from Mozambique.¹⁷³ Six hundred workers went on a strike in a large-scale industrial dispute at a factory in Umtali in February 1954. They threw stones and demanded better working conditions. Many of them were from Mozambique.¹⁷⁴

However, Mozambican migrants could not freely participate in the labour movement due to the oversight of the *curadors*,¹⁷⁵ the Portuguese “curators” sent to Southern Rhodesia by the Mozambican colonial government in order to keep an eye on African migrants from Mozambique. Some strikers were repatriated back to Mozambique, and some were later exiled to São Tomé. Interviews conducted and perusal of administrative

documents by Neves reveal that the *curadors* established an intelligence network which enabled them to intervene frequently in the lives of those from Mozambique in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁷⁶ The intelligence network took advantage of various associations of Mozambican migrants.

By the early 1950s, most Mozambican migrants belonged to one of the two main associations, namely the Mozambique Club in Bulawayo and the Tete Burial Society in Salisbury. Often, members of these associations participated in meetings and cultural events organised by other associations and political organisations where they became strongly affected by Southern Rhodesian politics. These associations were not yet operating as “national” organisations. The Tete Burial Society, for instance, used Nyanja (or Chewa) as its main language of communication and had stronger links with people from Nyasaland than those from other regions in Mozambique. The Mozambique Club consisted of members who spoke various languages, but until the 1950s, the members came from only a select number of areas, as illustrated in a statement by a Mozambican member: “Our notion of Mozambique was very limited to our region [Tete, Zambézia and Manica-Sofala] of provenance.”¹⁷⁷

The opening of a railway connecting southern Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia in 1956, allowed a greater number of migrant workers to travel from southern Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia. In the late 1950s, Southern Rhodesia was a more popular destination for migrant workers as it provided greater political freedom than South Africa. Perhaps in response to the high number of foreigners working in Southern Rhodesia, an anti-foreign worker campaign started in 1958.¹⁷⁸ These activities led to the development of a broader “solidarity among Mozambicans” which transcended regional differences.¹⁷⁹

Alarmed, the colonial government in Mozambique established the Associação dos Indígenas Portugueses de Sena (Shona Portuguese Native Association) in Salisbury and the Clube dos Indígenas do Império Português (the Portuguese Imperial Native Club) in Bulawayo in the hope of attracting Mozambican migrants away from the more independent and voluntary Mozambique Club and Tete Burial Society.¹⁸⁰ In addition, the colonial administration clamped down on returnees from Southern Rhodesia from the mid-1950s. Migrant workers were detained by the local police at a railroad station on their return. The police showed them a photograph of Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who was active in the liberation movement in Nyasaland, and who was later to become the first President of Malawi. Depending on their reaction to the photograph, returnees might be arrested. Many similar types of incidents were recorded.¹⁸¹ The Foreign Migrant Act of 1958 caused cracks to form in the solidarity established between Mozambican workers and workers from other regions. Foreign workers were not allowed to enter Southern Rhodesia, let alone purchase houses in Salisbury. The leaders of the Southern Rhodesian labour movement welcomed the Act, complaining in the *African Daily News* that Mozambican workers “were the present cause of low wages in this colony”.¹⁸² João da Chunga,¹⁸³ who came to Southern Rhodesia as a young boy in 1927, became an active trade-unionist and, in the mid-1950s, was an important figure in the Portuguese African Society, collaborating with the Portuguese *curadors* to monitor migrants. He was then appointed as the president

of both the Associação dos Indígenas Portugueses de Sena in Salisbury and the Clube dos Indígenas do Império Português.¹⁸⁴ Chunga had a contrary view:

I strongly disagree that we P.E.A. [Portuguese East African] aliens [depress] wages and undercut local Africans in the matter of housing ... I am still in the same battle ... Does Mr Maluleke think that I and many more thousands working in the colony do not want money and are in fact undermining the battle for improved salaries?¹⁸⁵

This contention suggests that nationalists in Southern Rhodesia perceived not only whites, but also Mozambican migrants, as enemies. Mozambicans started to recognise differences (and social ranking) between themselves and those from the British colonies, including Southern Rhodesians. They saw themselves as “outsiders” from a Portuguese colony and keenly felt the need to organise themselves and protect their rights. Portuguese *curadors* exploited the opportunity by presenting themselves as the “guardians” of Africans from Portuguese colonies and taking the initiative to organise Mozambican migrants.

Under these circumstances, Mozambican migrants were confronted with two options: to go back to Mozambique or to remain in Southern Rhodesia. Because of the harsh political environment and forced labour regime in Mozambique, many still chose to remain.

A national identity as “Mozambicans” became increasingly attractive to migrant workers because of three factors which emerged in the late 1950s: (1) the oppressive colonial rule in Mozambique; (2) the social exclusion experienced in migrant destinations and (3) the nationalist fever spreading throughout Africa. Around the same time, “intellectuals” belonging to independent churches in central Mozambique, crossed the borders to southern Mozambique in order to escape from the ever-increasing political oppression. One of them was Uria Simango who later joined UDENAMO and became the deputy president of FRELIMO. In the late 1950s, these exiled “intellectuals” and migrant workers joined forces to form the Associação Moçambicana da África Oriental (Mozambique East African Association) in Bulawayo and the Tete East Africa National Globe Society, or Tete Portuguese East Africa National Globe Society (hereafter referred to as the Tete Globe Society).¹⁸⁶

Although ostensibly these were social organisations, in reality they were created for political purposes. They attempted to ally with nationalist organisations in Southern Rhodesia, and encouraged Mozambican migrants to join local political organisations such as the City Youth League and the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC). This had a positive effect in that SRANC leaders now rejected the expulsion of foreign workers and adopted pan-African solidarity in their labour movement. The security police in Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, were wary of organisations formed by Mozambican migrants, resulting in organisations using the word “Portuguese” in the name of their organisation (“Portuguese East African Society”) in order to elude the vigilance of the police.¹⁸⁷

At this time Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia formed a federation together with Southern Rhodesia, but their independence remained under discussion. Nationalist

movements in Southern Rhodesia were as active as ever. The SRANC rapidly increased its influence in rural areas. Responding to a sense of impending crisis, the white government of Southern Rhodesia banned the SRANC in February 1959, and enacted one law after another clamping down on Africans. The legislation relating to “native” affairs was amended. The Unlawful Organisations Act was introduced after the government declared a state of emergency in 1959, followed by the Law and Order Maintenance Act and Emergency Power Act in the next year.¹⁸⁸ The National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed in January 1960, following the banning of SRANC. Although it was not permitted to operate in rural areas, it gained as many as 250,000 members in 1961. The circle of political activity in Southern Rhodesia was expanding at tremendous speed.¹⁸⁹

Seeing the resultant oppressive measures enacted against Southern Rhodesian Africans by the white government, Mozambican migrants had to consider their own political activity. In 1960 the Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) was formed in Salisbury and the UDENAMO in Bulawayo. Both included the words “Mozambique” and “national” in their names. This was the moment that micro-nationalism surpassed mezzo-nationalism.

Mozambican nationalism was nurtured by Mozambican migrants from diverse backgrounds who enjoyed political freedom in Southern Rhodesia. Their experience in a British colony helped them to look beyond mezzo-nationalism, which was the traditional approach of Mozambican “intellectuals” to emphasise their position as Africans in Portuguese colonies. Mozambican nationalism combined macro-nationalism in the form of pan-Africanism together with micro-nationalism, which aimed at the independence of colonies. This point should be noted in relation to the FRELIMO liberation struggle.

To what extent did the situation in Southern Rhodesia influence rural communities in Mozambique? Clearly, there would have been a lot of movement between Southern Rhodesia and central Mozambique due to geographical proximity and the railroad between them. Although there is still little research on this issue, it would seem possible that there was a connection between the protests in various places in central Mozambique in 1956 and the energetic trade unionist activities of Mozambican workers in Southern Rhodesia in the mid-1950s. Similarly, the events in Mozambique also had significant impact on Southern Rhodesia. For instance, when the Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala (Negrophile Nucleus of Manica and Sofala), which had its base in independent churches, became involved in protests in central Mozambique, its leaders fled from the resultant crackdown by the colonial government to Southern Rhodesia, and later formed the Mozambique East African Association.¹⁹⁰

Further research is needed to determine how much these activities actively influenced rural areas in Mozambique. Undoubtedly, the collective experience of working in Southern Rhodesia for many years changed life in central Mozambican communities, but it is unclear to what extent it changed political awareness and the society itself. One notable impact on migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia is that many of them established lives there and did not return to Mozambique, unlike migrants who went to South Africa. The men sent from southern Mozambique to the South African mines were obliged to return home

once their contract ended as the intergovernmental agreement did not permit long-term employment.¹⁹¹ Migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, often remained there for a long time, because: (1) many were not bound by a contract; (2) the majority of residents in Southern Rhodesian cities were from other areas; and (3) their language and culture was similar to that of Shonas who formed the majority of the population in urban Southern Rhodesia. In addition, it was less attractive for “illegal” migrant workers to return because of forced labour, prevalent from 1942 to 1961, and political oppression in Mozambique in the 1950s. Moreover, many migrant workers obtained an education in Southern Rhodesia. Neves points out that many former migrant workers cited educational opportunities as a reason for going to Southern Rhodesia. Clearly then, money was not the sole reason that Mozambicans chose to find work in Southern Rhodesia – as many of those from central Mozambique were able to obtain an education in English. It is likely, therefore, that many of those remaining in Southern Rhodesia lost ties with their home communities in rural Mozambique.

Because of these factors, the liberation movement formed in Southern Rhodesia by people from central Mozambique was characterised as a movement of exiles. Later, the “revolutionary lines” of FRELIMO criticised them for being “elitists”. This is discussed in the following chapter, but for now it should be noted that the liberation movement formed in Southern Rhodesia was very different from the regional Africanism advocated by “intellectuals” in Portugal’s African colonies. Also important to note here is that in the same way that Chunga of the Portuguese African Society was seen as a “servant” of the colonial authority, so too was the newly formed UDENAMO infiltrated by the PIDE. Adelino Gwambe, the first representative of UDENAMO, was previously a PIDE informant in Mozambique.¹⁹² He began to work for a railway company in Southern Rhodesia in 1952 and joined UDENAMO after confessing to his past.¹⁹³ In addition, the MANC was also suspicious about the PIDE’s involvement in UDENAMO, and vice versa. Their mutual suspicion not only prevented them from joining hands but also caused chaos during the liberation struggle period.

The experience of Mozambican migrants in Tanganyika

Researchers have paid the most attention to migrant workers who went to Tanganyika and their role in the liberation struggle. Literature dealing with Mozambique’s contemporary history frequently refers to the Makonde African National Union (MANU), formed by Makondes, as one of the earliest anti-colonial organisations. It later changed its name to the Mozambique African National Union (MANU) and became a parent body of FRELIMO. The organisation is considered important because of its success at the large-scale mobilisation of rural residents in Mozambique.

Mozambican migrants crossed the Rovuma River and settled in Tanganyika from as early as the seventeenth century. As seen in Chapter 2, there were long-established relations between inland Mozambican residents in the north and trade centres such as Kilwa and Zanzibar. Crossing the river was something of a “familiar option” for people facing serious

problems.¹⁹⁴ However, large-scale migration to the north of the Rovuma River was a more recent phenomenon – closely related to Portugal's colonial rule in Mozambique.


The population influx from northern Mozambique to Tanganyika took place in several waves. The first wave occurred just after the last armed resistance of Yaos and Makondes was crushed and they were brought under the control of the Nyassa Company.¹⁹⁵ Tanganyika's colonial administrator stationed in Songea listed heavy taxes, forced labour, low wages and the sexual abuse of women by African policemen as the reason for the 1922 migration.¹⁹⁶

The second wave took place around 1933 when several thousand people moved to Tanganyika. The Tanganyika colonial administrator reported that they had relocated because they were unable to pay the exorbitant taxes.¹⁹⁷ In the first two waves, people migrated in units of families and kinship groups. The purpose of these migrations was to flee rather than to seek work. By 1940, however, the Tanganyika colonial government reported that many migrated for work purposes.

[Migrants from Mozambique] ... enter the Territory in large numbers each year, often with their wives, and work for varying period[s] from six months upwards ... Those who could not find work ... found their way north ... A certain percentage become [*sic*] semi-permanent squatters but the large majority work for a definite period and then return home.¹⁹⁸

According to the 1942 census in southern Tanganyika, out of 12,901 male workers on sisal plantations, 6,348 (nearly 50 per cent) were from Mozambique.¹⁹⁹ Work on sisal plantations was considered to be work of the lowest form in Tanganyika – unbearable for Tanganyikans. Wages for unskilled labourers were, in real terms, lower in 1940 than those in 1927, while prices shot up during the world war.²⁰⁰ The colonial government in Tanganyika needed to recruit workers, even using forced labour, since the demand for sisal was high due to the lack of primary commodities during the war. The working conditions on sisal plantations were wretched. Sixty per cent of the draftees ran away in their first week.²⁰¹ In spite of the poor conditions, workers from northern Mozambique continued to seek out work at sisal plantations as they were escaping forced cotton growing at home which had intensified around this time.²⁰²

The 1948 census recorded that there were 27,489 Makondes from Mozambique, the majority of whom lived permanently in Tanganyika. The records show that only 1,390 worked on sisal plantations.²⁰³ This number seems too low, and probably does not include short-term migrant workers. Taking into consideration that the total number of Makondes in Mozambique was less than 200,000, it is apparent that a significant portion of them had migrated to Tanganyika. The census also reports that the number of Makhuwa tax payers in the Masasi District in Tanganyika doubled from that of 1930.²⁰⁴ Although the population migration from northern Mozambique to Tanganyika cannot be adequately followed from these fragmented statistics, it can be assumed that a large proportion of people living in the most northern part of Mozambique left for Tanganyika by the end of the Second World War.

Graph 9 Migrant workers from Mozambique in Tanganyika (1951–1963)

Source: Tanganyika Labour Department, 1952:34, in Alpers, 1984:378; author's calculations.

As discussed in Chapter 2, when the colonial authority reviewed the forced cotton growing policy after the Second World War, some migrants from Mozambique returned home.

There is now a tendency for these people to return to Portuguese East Africa and it is believed that this has been caused by relaxation in the labour laws there and by the fact that Portugal has ample supplies of dollar currency. Particularly the latter means that those consumer goods desired by the Africans are in much freer supply, though more expensive than in Tanganyika.²⁰⁵

In the 1950s, the planting of cash crops such as coffee, cotton, sisal and cashew nuts became a boom industry in Tanganyika. Plantations were severely short-staffed. Consequently, working conditions were improved to some extent in order to attract workers.²⁰⁶ Sisal was particularly important. Tanganyika produced 47 per cent of sisal in the world. Sisal constituted 55 per cent of Tanganyika's total exports. The price of sisal increased from 55 pounds per ton in 1947 to 164 pounds in 1951.²⁰⁷ In this climate, northern Mozambican residents flowed into Tanganyika again. The lack of manpower was less severe in the south, so many Mozambican migrants who went to the south were taken to other regions. This was confirmed in the 1957 census of the labour force. The census reported that Makondes from Mozambique were spread all over: 644 in Northern Province, 10,222 in Southern Province and 6,315 in Tanga Province. Interestingly, the ratio of women was very high, constituting 36.6 per cent in Northern Province and 47.7 per cent in Southern Province, indicating that migrant work in Tanganyika was a family affair. Of course as Harry West, who wrote a Ph.D. dissertation

on the transformation of the Makonde society points out, many men were engaged in short-term migrant labour, whereas the high ratio of women was probably calculated based on the number of long-term residents, excluding short-term migrant workers.²⁰⁸

Graph 9 illustrates the change in the number of Mozambican employees from 1951 to 1963. Africans from Mozambique's other ethnic groups (e.g. Makhuwas,²⁰⁹ Yaos, Nyanjas) may not have been counted as foreigners. Therefore, it is possible that more Mozambican migrants may have worked in Tanganyika than is reflected by historical statistics.

The influx of Makondes from northern Mozambique was particularly conspicuous. According to a census, 12.7 to 14.5 per cent of 136,079 (or 155,939)²¹⁰ Makondes from northern Mozambique were in Tanganyika in 1957. The percentage rises to 14.8 to 17 per cent if only males are included, though the real figure was probably even higher.

Having investigated the action of Africans from northern Mozambique, who seemed to respond so quickly to changes in the political and economic environments in Tanganyika and Mozambique, Alpers concludes that migrant work, which was traditionally perceived as the "refuge from Portuguese oppression", was actually "a more positive assertion of their own class interests".²¹¹ He adds that Makondes from Mozambique were becoming "small capitalist farmers" and merchants, taking advantage of the boom in cash crop growing in the 1950s.²¹² Alpers gives a related example of Lázaro Nkvandame, a future MANU leader, who became a "small capitalist trader" after having obtained his wealth working as a labour broker for sisal plantations.²¹³ Furthermore, Jorge Dias and his team reported in their anthropological research conducted at the request of the Portuguese government on Makondes, that returnees from Tanganyika faced land shortages in the Mueda Highland and were obliged to buy land from local chiefs.²¹⁴

However, penetration of the capitalist economy cannot alone explain the formation of political consciousness. It is essential to look at other historical factors. Peasants in Tanganyika organised themselves quite early. They established their first organisation, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association, in January 1925.²¹⁵ In 1936 the Ngoni-Matengo Cooperative Union was set up in Songea, near the Mozambican border, where many Africans originally from Mozambique lived.²¹⁶ Also, sisal plantation workers had organised sabotage actions in various regions from 1932 to 1938. Tanga Province, which was the centre of sisal plantations, experienced 32 strikes and three revolts in eight months from January 1938.²¹⁷

As Masahisa Kawabata points out, "it was always sisal plantation workers and port workers that led labour movements in Tanganyika." It should be noted that the industrial action of labour by both sisal plantation workers and port workers started in Tanga Province, where the early nationalist movement of Makondes was later formed. Industrial action by sisal plantation workers took place frequently even after 1949. The first labour union of sisal plantation workers in Eastern Province was formed in 1956. It developed into the Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association in 1958. Strikes on sisal plantations grew in intensity.

It is unclear, however, to what extent Mozambican migrants participated in labour movements in Tanganyika. Kawabata asserts that the employment of foreign workers decreased during this period. It is not clear whether there was an anti-foreigner movement

by local workers in Tanganyika, similar to the one in Southern Rhodesia around this time; or whether Mozambican migrants went home because they could not make a living in the chaotic situation.²¹⁸ Whichever was the case, fierce and frequent strikes in Tanganyika must have been refreshing for those from Mozambique, who were not used to being allowed the freedom to express their complaints.

The labour movement, as well as the change in political climate in Tanganyika, greatly impacted on migrants from Mozambique. The African Association was formed in the late 1920s and played an important role in organising people politically and forming nationalism. Its manifesto was based on the Constitution of the Convention of the People's Party of the Gold Coast, quoted in *The Gold Coast Revolution* by George Padmore from the Caribbean, the "father" of pan-Africanism.²¹⁹ The manifesto, adopted in July 1954, must have left a strong impression on Mozambican migrants in Tanganyika in a number of important ways.

1. To prepare the people of Tanganyika for self Government and Independence, and to fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing and independent.
2. To fight against tribalism and all isolationist tendencies amongst the Africans and to build up a united nationalism.²²⁰

Upon the adoption of the manifesto, the organisation renamed itself as the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) to demonstrate its further emphasis on political activities.²²¹ The birth of TANU also greatly influenced Mozambicans living in Mozambique. The Sociedade Algodoeira Africana Voluntária de Moçambique (SAAVM: Voluntary African Cotton Society of Mozambique), the first peasant association in Mozambique, was formed in 1957.

The formation of the SAAVM was led by employees and merchants from the Mueda Highland who were members of the Catholic Church.²²² These included Nkavandame, a merchant; Cornélio Mandanda, a former teacher; João Namimba, a church cook; Alberto Chipande, a young teacher and Raimundo Pachinuapa, a catholic teacher.²²³ Yussufo Adam, who conducted an historical study of Makondes in Cabo Delgado District, draws attention to the fact that all of these individuals were relatives of local heavyweights like *régulos*, and were not peasants themselves.²²⁴ Among them, Mandanda, Namimba and Nkavandame had remained in Tanganyika as migrant workers.²²⁵ The SAAVM was called *linguilanilu* (mutual assistance) in the Makonde language. In its second year, the SAAVM already had about 3,000 cotton growers as members in the Mueda Highland and surrounding areas. Peasants willingly joined the SAAVM because membership entitled them to certain privileges: members could excuse themselves from forced labour in sisal plantations; and membership helped them to solve land-related problems. Yet, as Adam points out, the membership did not require cooperative activities whatsoever, and each member still had to plant cotton on his designated four-hectare piece of land.²²⁶

The colonial government under the Estado Novo regime allowed Africans to form a cooperative association because of the policy changes in 1955. As discussed in Chapter 2,

it became clear by this time that forced labour by licensed cotton companies had its limitations. International pressure against forced labour was also increasing. Instead, the colonial government took the approach of encouraging Africans to form cooperatives and to plant cotton voluntarily. Thus, cotton growers' associations were introduced as "a vehicle of civilisation and a useful method for collaboration of indigenous productive activities in their regions".²²⁷ A further pressure on the authority was the need to provide peasants with a means of income in order to prevent their outflow to Tanganyika. As the cotton production from 1955 to 1956 was especially low, many had gone to Tanganyika which required an urgent response from the colonial government.²²⁸

Added to this the Catholic Church believed it essential to dispel the discontent of Africans in order to counter the increasing trend of Islamisation in Tanganyika. After his field study, Dias expressed surprise at the number of Makondes who converted to Islam and who were traditionally thought to be resistant to it. Makondes of all ages were being converted.²²⁹ The rapid Islamisation among northern Mozambicans should be examined not only in the cultural context but also in the political context. Although it is dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5 in detail, it should be noted here that the Islamisation of Makondes was partially characterised as an "anti-Portugal movement". The Dutch Catholic Church had probably realised this and thought it was not possible to counter the movement towards Islam without the decolonisation of Mozambique. Consequently, the Dutch Catholic Church supported the formation of the SAAVM.²³⁰

The formation of the SAAVM was also convenient for SAGAL, a private cotton company, which was enabled to save the management costs of forced labour (travel expenses of the foremen and auditors) and administrative costs. Since the interests of various stakeholders coincided, the SAAVM functioned smoothly, and more and more people became voluntarily involved in the formerly hated cotton growing: their numbers growing from 4,262 in 1958 to 4,979 in 1959 and to 5,104 in 1960.²³¹

The TANU won overwhelmingly in the first election held in Tanganyika during September 1958. The independence of Tanganyika was now just a matter of time, and it became a realistic possibility for Mozambique as well. In anticipation of this eventuality, it became essential for the colonial authority to govern without force and to reduce wage differentials. The colonial authority had high expectations of the SAAVM.

Africans in Maconde District earned 452 escudos per head from cotton growing in 1957, 497 escudos in 1958 and 520 escudos in 1959, doubling their previous wages by about 200 escudos. This could not be attributed solely to the SAAVM since the average income of cotton growers outside Maconde District also shot up during the same period.²³² The price of cotton (the lowest price for second-rate cotton) increased from 1.90 dollars per ton (1951–1955) to 2.20 dollars (1956–1960) as a result of the new incentive-based policy.²³³ It is not clear, however, how much the SAAVM actually benefited ordinary members. Some left the organisation feeling that they did not derive any economic benefit from it, complaining that, "it only made the wealthy even wealthier".²³⁴

Ordinary members of the SAAVM harvested four to five bags of cotton. In contrast, Nkavandame, the head of the SAAVM, netted 150 bags and Mandanda, the deputy-

head, 30 bags.²³⁵ Alpers concludes that former migrant workers in Tanganyika, including Nkavandame, learned the capitalist way of running farms and shops and, after coming home, became the “local petit bourgeoisie”.²³⁶ Adam emphasises a gap between ordinary peasants and the SAAVM leaders, who were not peasants but church employees and merchants, as well as relatives of local chiefs.²³⁷

Mondlane, the first FRELIMO secretary-general, valued the SAAVM to some degree, particularly for its role as pioneering political organiser of rural Africans in Mozambique.²³⁸ There are no other examples, either before or after the SAAVM, in which as many as 5,000 African peasants organised themselves in this way. Moreover, even if the SAAVM pursued a capitalist economy that might have created an income gap among peasants, it had a political significance since it followed the example of peasant cooperative movements in Tanganyika. The SAAVM was not formed just with the intention of being a self-help organisation or to enrich a small number of the leaders, but in order to bring about the same political change that took place in Tanganyika, that is, eventual independence. This objective was illustrated when, just after its establishment, the SAAVM sent Namimba to Tanganyika and told him to contact the TANU leaders. They told him: “It is necessary to create a sort of association of peasants in order to have them organised and to develop political discussions.”²³⁹

Only the TANU leaders, who had over the years built up a rural cooperative association movement and a political movement, could give this kind of advice. It also suggests that the SAAVM leaders were not motivated by personal enrichment alone. In order for the SAAVM to transform itself from an organisation for Makondes into an anti-colonial movement or nationalist movement, it needed to generate more political thoughts and activities. This was not easy inside Mozambique under the strict surveillance of the colonial authority. Ultimately, the political basis of the movement was driven by the Makondes living in Kenya and Tanganyika.

As the political environment changed in the mid-1950s in Tanganyika, Makonde youths born or raised in Tanganyika became involved in political activity and set up many organisations in 1957.²⁴⁰ Although many were short-lived, the Associação Maconde para Libertar os Macondes de Moçambique e Tanganica (Makonde Association for the Liberation of Makondes of Mozambique and Tanganyika), formed by Faustino Vanomba in Tanga (also known as the Tanganyika-Mozambique Makonde Union), became the basis of the Makonde African National Union (MANU).²⁴¹

These organisations were initially formed as an alliance of Makondes, including those from Mozambique. However, with the independence of Tanganyika close at hand, they started to emphasise the liberation of Makondes in Mozambique. Moreover, influenced by the climate of anti-tribalism among pan-Africanists and in Tanganyikan politics, the MANU changed its name to the more inclusive Mozambique African National Union.²⁴² Importantly, their initial objective was not the liberation of Mozambique but the liberation of Makondes, including those in Mozambique, and they did not embrace a comprehensive notion of “Mozambican nationalism”. In other words, the MANU founders did not stress “macro”, “mezzo”, or “micro” nationalism, but rather “ethnic” nationalism.

Probably influenced by the independence of Tanganyika, the MANU believed that the independence of Mozambique could be achieved through negotiation. It is likely that this would not have been deemed possible if its members had grown up in Mozambique, especially in the urban areas in the south and central parts of the country where political oppression was most severe, or had they gone to South Africa or Southern Rhodesia as migrant workers. In other words the MANU leaders started the organisation after having experienced a peaceful transition of power in Tanganyika. It is not clear whether they understood how different relations were between the United Kingdom and its trust territory of Tanganyika, and those between autocratic Portugal and Mozambique. Nor is it clear whether they understood the unique geopolitical position facing Mozambique. Nevertheless, MANU members visited Maconde District in Mozambique several times between 1959 and 1960. Helped by the SAAVM, they carried out political propaganda activities. They also requested a meeting with the colonial administrator, but were told to come back in six months.²⁴³ When they returned to the colonial administrative office in high spirits, they were detained. Several hundred people gathered to protest against the arrests, and the Portuguese army opened fire on them. This came to be known as the Massacre of Mueda – the most infamous incident in the history of Mozambique.

Nkavandame and others who survived the massacre and became the leaders of MANU, later joined FRELIMO when it was formed in 1962. They played an important role in FRELIMO's armed struggle from 1964 onwards. However, later Nkavandame had a confrontation with the FRELIMO leadership over the management of the liberated areas. He surrendered to the PIDE and was expelled from FRELIMO in 1969. Nkavandame then formed a splinter group to seek the independence of Cabo Delgado District – it also took part in anti-FRELIMO activity. He was captured by FRELIMO during the transition period and died in the re-education camp, as did Uria Simango, a former UDENAMO leader.

Because of these events, both the MANU and the SAAVM have been poorly regarded since independence. Despite this, the role they played in keeping daily contact with rural residents in Mozambique and trying to organise them cannot be ignored. In this regard, they were quite different from other organisations which were formed by migrant workers and exiles in surrounding regions, and which were eventually consolidated into FRELIMO, without ever managing to establish ties with communities in Mozambique, especially with rural communities. They also differed from the movement of urban “intellectuals” in Mozambique, who also did not attempt to work with rural communities.

The Makondes' movement was able to play a different role from other movements, not because of the quality of its leaders or their ideology, but mainly because of geographical circumstances. The Makonde habitations were situated adjacent to the borders of Tanganyika. Tanganyika had been placed under the control of Germany until the end of the First World War and was made a trust territory of the United Kingdom in 1920. Africans in Tanganyika enjoyed greater political freedom than those in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, where white settlers had political control. The Makondes who stayed in Tanganyika and witnessed its decolonisation process perceived decolonisation and independence as a viable future. Moreover, unlike in central Mozambique, the colonial

control was insufficient in the area, due to its remoteness from the centre of the colonial economy, and the residents were able to cross the borders freely. These circumstances helped to quickly relay the news of what happened in Tanganyika to the north end of Mozambique, and to exert a strong influence in the region. The following words by Dias vividly describe the social and political atmosphere in Mueda Highland in 1957.

All of these actions [2000 *indigenas* carried out public demonstrations in Dar es Salaam] impacted on the north of Mozambique although nobody mentioned them because the natives knew perfectly that for the time being they could not make any protest.²⁴⁴

The “north of Mozambique” here refers to the area relatively close to Tanganyika. The Makhuwa habitations, which were located in the south of these northern districts, were not impacted on with the same speed or to the same extent. This will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

The role of religion

The Portuguese Catholic Church, which was active throughout Mozambique, did not introduce the international trend of decolonisation as the church was part of the Estado Novo regime. Although the bishops of Porto and Beira criticised the Salazar administration in writing in 1958 demonstrating that the church was not monolithic,²⁴⁵ this was to no avail as both bishops were deported, and the Portuguese Catholic Church as an entity continued to support the Estado Novo regime.²⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the young Africans who attended the church schools were exposed to new ideas and potentialities, although theirs was, strictly speaking, a religious education. They started to question the status quo. Thousands of Mozambican youth questioned the contradictions they saw between the reality of living under colonial rule and the teachings of the church, expressed in Sausa’s poem as, “we are all the children of God, and each human is a brother of another human.” Young Africans educated in the church schools were quick to respond to the trend of decolonisation. As Mondlane writes, many members of the FRELIMO Central Committee were Catholic.²⁴⁷ Of course, not all Catholics were FRELIMO supporters.

Moreover, one can hypothesise that some orders and priests of non-Portuguese Catholic Churches may well have taught about decolonisation – as was the case with the Dutch Catholic Church in the Makonde habitations. However, it was the Protestant Churches that primarily spread pan-Africanism or anti-colonialism among Mozambican peasants. As illustrated above, the movement of independent churches spread in the south via returnees from South Africa. In central Mozambique, too, people accepted Protestant Churches which they had become accustomed to in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.²⁴⁸ In this sense, the case of Kamba Simango (the father of Uria Simango who joined the UDENAMO in Southern Rhodesia) is interesting.²⁴⁹

Kamba was born in Chiloane, a village in Sofala Province, at the end of the nineteenth century.²⁵⁰ While working as a waiter, he attended a night school run by a Protestant church in Beira. He was awarded a scholarship from the church that allowed him to major in education at Colombia University in New York. After obtaining a degree, the first African from Mozambique to do so, he married a woman from the Gold Coast (today Ghana) whom he met in the United States of America. They lived in her homeland before settling at the American Board Mission School in Southern Rhodesia, near the Mozambican border.²⁵¹ He moved back to Mozambique in the 1920s and opened a hotel and a coffee shop for Africans. While assisting the Mozambique Company, which controlled central Mozambique, he helped to set up an American Board Mission School in Mozambique. Kamba experienced racial discrimination in the church, and so attempted to spread a new type of education and religion, that is, schools and a religion for Africans that taught the Bible in Ndaú, and which broke away from the church of the whites.²⁵²

During the 1920s, when the association movements by the *mestiços* became active, a Muslim association was established by some *mestiços*.²⁵³ With the assistance of the association and the Mozambique Company, Kamba and his supporters set up a mission school called the Grémio Negrófilo (Negrophile Guild) on 7 March 1935.²⁵⁴ As the Mozambique Company did not consent to education in Ndaú, Portuguese was used as the language of education. When the Mozambique Company was reintegrated into the colonial government in 1943, the guild was made illegal. Kamba tried to re-register the school under the name of the Núcleo Negrófilo (Negrophile Nucleus),²⁵⁵ a forerunner of the Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala (Negrophile Nucleus of Manica and Sofala), recognised by a decree-law of the colonial governor-general in 1947.²⁵⁶ The colonial authority suspected that the Núcleo Negrófilo was involved in the revolt in Machanga in 1953 and started to interrogate and crack down on its participants. Permission for its establishment was cancelled on 24 March 1956 and its leaders fled to Rhodesia.²⁵⁷

Even before the 1950s, the activities of the Protestant churches in central Mozambique had been a source of concern for the colonial administrator and the Catholic Church. Even Sebastião Soares de Resende, the Bishop of Beira who was deported because of his criticism of the Salazar administration, was critical of the formation of the Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala:

This Protestant group obtained the privilege of the town with a large response²⁵⁸...They will not accept Catholics in the Núcleo. Its doors will remain closed to the Catholics like a sort of fifth column.²⁵⁹

It is well known that Nyanjas, who lived along Lake Nyasa in the north, were influenced by the Anglican Church which was based in the British territory of Nyasaland. Ever since the race for securing territories at the end of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese government had been suspicious of the Anglican Church. The church headquarters in west Niassa District and the local colonial administration had frequent clashes. The Anglican Church members became anti-Portuguese colonialists because of the oppressive measures

they experienced under colonial rule. Upon hearing of the formation of FRELIMO, many students from the Anglican Church school rushed to Tanzania to become its first guerrillas.

Islam also contributed to spreading the idea of decolonisation amongst rural residents in northern Mozambique. As Muslim leaders in northern Mozambique traditionally perceived Imams in Zanzibar as mentors, they were influenced by the movement in Zanzibar to challenge its status as a protectorate. The previous section has already outlined the relationship between the rapid Islamisation of Makondes and the anti-colonialist movement.

In the 1950s, the worldwide trend of decolonisation was so widespread that even people living in the frontier regions came into contact with it through various intermediaries. The intermediaries, methods, extent, speed and content of these messages varied according to location and actors involved. Migrant workers to the neighbouring countries were most influenced and were best able to organise their own movement. Yet, they were not that successful or fast in changing the “consciousness” of people in the rural areas that they came from. It is worth noting that, on experiencing the colonial authority’s labour exploitation, rural Africans in Mozambique responded by becoming migrant workers while Africans in Zimbabwe adopted instead the “peasant option” and raised the “peasant consciousness”.²⁶⁰ Although sporadic “rebel” activities were recorded in Mozambique in the mid-1950s,²⁶¹ Mozambique did not have the right conditions to unite these scattered activities. On the contrary, the colonial authority was able to confront the challenge and became even more cohesive.

The 1950s and Salazar’s determination to retain the colonies

The previous sections of this chapter have examined the experience of Mozambican Africans inside and outside of the colony from the Second World War to the end of the 1950s. This has included looking at how and what kind of awareness they developed, and the networks they established in various locations, as well as how this related to the worldwide trend of decolonisation.

The following sections look at the policies and measures the colonial authority took in order to counter decolonisation. This next section focuses on the period before the 1960s, which was a big turning point, both domestically and internationally.

Change in international environments – the decolonisation of Africa and the Cold War

As covered in Chapter 1, the Cold War began just after the Second World War. By 1950 it affected most parts of the world. The US policy of “containing” Soviet expansion was continued by President Henry S. Truman; the so-called Truman Doctrine of 1947 which occupied an important position in US foreign policy.²⁶² The National Security Council (NSC) statements 48 (30 December 1949), 64 (27 February 1950) and 68 (14 April 1950) formed the basis of US foreign strategy. The NSC 48 concluded:

Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia are ... [d]evelopment of sufficient military power in selected non-Communist nations of Asia

to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism. It symbolised the US military and foreign policy thereafter, which provided military assistance even to autocratic regimes as long as they maintained an anti-communist stance.²⁶³

The NSC 64 “[o]n the Position of the US with Respect to Indochina”, concluded that, “it is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.”²⁶⁴ The NSC action essentially authorised the USA to reply favourably to France’s request for military assistance and led to its intervention in Vietnam. NSC 68 analysed the crisis as follows: “The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.” It then defined the role of the United States of America as “the centre of power in the free world [which] places a heavy responsibility upon the US for leadership.”²⁶⁵

Finally, it concluded that the USA needed to develop sufficient military power to stop the expansion of communism in certain non-communist areas in Asia, and that it should provide military assistance to any anti-communist government, even to despotic states. This decision of the NSC demonstrated a change in their policy from mere “containment” to a “rollback policy”, which advocated active counterattacks against communism. Hence, the US world policy was established. It would embroil the rest of the world in fierce confrontation in bipolar politics, including Africa.

John Foster Dulles, the father of the containment policy and the then Secretary of State, summed up the basis of the US foreign policy in the 1950s in a letter, stating:

[I]t is necessary as a practical matter to choose the lesser of two evils [Communism and Colonialism] because the theoretically ideal solution is not possible for many reasons – the French policy being only one.²⁶⁶

Colonised people who were struggling against colonialism were deemed “the lesser of the two evils”. However, the USA perceived that their strong desire for liberation was inspired by communist motivations and saw them as joining hands with Soviet expansionism and therefore endangering US security through causing a domino effect.²⁶⁷ The USA had already felt threatened by a series of events: the Soviet’s successful atomic bomb experiment in September 1949; the birth of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The USA became even more suspicious of liberation movements in the colonies when the Soviet Union increased the number of its allied nations to 20. Feeling threatened Dulles announced, and implemented, the

rollback policy in 1953 as the Republican, Dwight Eisenhower, became president. The USA established military alliances all over the world, while the CIA started operations with the aim of overthrowing governments that were unfriendly to it.²⁶⁸

In this international context, Portugal joined NATO in 1949. Consequently, the liberation of people in the Portuguese colonies became even more difficult. In 1955, the CIA began to send trainers to the PIDE.²⁶⁹ The Salazar administration interpreted this move as the USA's endorsement of its colonial rule, especially considering that the PIDE had opened branches in the colonies in the previous year even though, in reality, the US policy towards an autocratic Portugal since the 1930s had not always been coherent or firmly established.

In 1943 George F. Kennan, a US consul in Lisbon and the future father of the containment policy, proposed in his report to Washington two contradictory policies towards Portugal in order to secure access to the Açores after the Second World War: to overthrow the Salazar administration and to gain the trust and confidence of Salazar.²⁷⁰ Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the USA officially strengthened its bilateral relations with Portugal while at the same time covertly attempting to topple the Salazar regime. However, emphasis was increasingly placed on the former.

The NATO membership did not immediately secure Portugal's international status and the country had to wait until 1955 before it was accepted by the United Nations. In 1952 the UN Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, an extraordinary committee, became a permanent one. Subsequently, Article 73(e) of the UN Charter was implemented, which obliged UN members to submit "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions" in their colonies.²⁷¹

Noting the change in the international climate regarding non-self-governing territories, the Salazar administration renamed the Império Colonial Português (Portuguese Colonial Empire) to *Província Ultramarina* (Overseas Provinces) in 1951 and amended the constitution accordingly.²⁷² Of course, the renaming did not make the *ex-colónias* (ex-colonies) equal to the metropole, but rather reinforced their centralised control by Portugal. People in the colonies were not organised enough to be able to voice their dissatisfaction with this kind of superficial change. Salazar hoped that he could withstand the increasing international pressure by implementing cosmetic changes. In 1955 the Western bloc secured the UN membership of Portugal, in exchange for the memberships of countries in the Eastern bloc.

The integration of colonial administration into the home government led to the further subordination of the territories to Portugal and greater centralisation inside the territories themselves. As a result, the governor-general, the top post in the colonies, became even more subordinate to the *Ministério de Ultramar* (Ministry of Overseas Provinces). Indeed, the colonial system became firmly established throughout Mozambique during the 1950s and the 1960s.²⁷³ Mozambique's subordination to Portugal, the centralisation and the control of rural areas by the colonial authority, were intensified once the liberation war started in 1962, reflecting Salazar's determination to retain the colonies.

At the same time, a wave of decolonisation was moving from Asia towards Africa. In Asia, many populations rose up to overcome the various difficulties brought about by colonialism. The victory of the Vietnamese Communist Party against the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, in particular, became the torch of hope for Africans suffering under colonial rule. It was no coincidence that the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN: National Liberation Front) was formed in Algeria in November in the same year and armed uprisings broke out all over the colony.

The deepening of the Cold War, however, impacted not only on Europe and its surrounding areas, but also on Asia, Africa and Latin America. The outbreak of the Korean War prompted a handful of leaders in Asia and Africa to take the third route – that of belonging to neither the Western bloc nor the Eastern bloc. In April 1955 the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, which adopted “the Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation”, including the principles of the United Nations Charter. A joint communiqué confirmed the key principles, including: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country; abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country; promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; the recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, both large and small and the promotion of peaceful coexistence and opposition to imperialism and colonialism.²⁷⁴

The wave of decolonisation in Asia reached Africa through the Asian-African solidarity movement. There was an international trend against colonial powers.²⁷⁵ In the late 1950s, many newly independent countries joined the United Nations. With the backup of the Eastern bloc nations, they exerted strong pressure on Portugal to liberate its colonies. As a result, Portuguese foreign policy after 1956 was largely concerned with how to respond to criticism related to the colonial issues raised at the United Nations.²⁷⁶

Yet, in southern Africa with its large population of white settlers, there was still a very long road to decolonisation, as the intensification of the Cold War had made the region strategically important for Western powers. The white governments in the region were placed in the role of serving as a bulwark against communism, and therefore white minority rule and colonial rule continued to be supported.

A turning point was reached in March 1957. The first independent nation in Africa, the Republic of Ghana, was born. This was the moment when micro-nationalism overtook macro-nationalism, although it did not result in the end of African nationalism such as pan-Africanism. Rather, the independence of Ghana became the first embodiment of “the total decolonisation of the African continent”, advocated at the Pan-African Conference in 1945. The following address by the first president, Kwame Nkrumah, in fact marked the beginning of the height of pan-Africanism, which lasted until 1963.

As far as Africa is concerned, I have long ago stated a postulate that Ghana's Independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa and with the projection of the African personality in the international

community. Our resolution on this issue is unshakable and the Government will continue to give every support to freedom fighters in all parts of Africa.²⁷⁷

Newly independent African countries held the first Conference of Independent African States in the Ghanaian capital of Accra in April 1958. They declared the implementation of a Non-Aligned Movement policy and their stance of non-subordination. Moreover, they adopted a resolution which included support for the Algerian liberation war, the promotion of independence in non-liberated areas and the condemnation of racist policies. As Oda points out, it was “practically the first governmental-level pan-African conference and a monumental conference where ‘the unity of Africa’ was declared as a concrete objective.”²⁷⁸ The conference was significant not only in the history of pan-Africanism but also in the Asian-African solidarity movement, with the Non-Aligned Movement as its axis. One of the participants, Frantz Fanon of the FLN, described the feverish atmosphere at the conference as follows:

After Asia, Africa. ... That, which strikes the observer in Accra, is the existence at the level of a very spontaneous, organic, even biological, solidarity. But, above this sort of emotional communion, it was indeed determined to use all existing means to expel colonialism from the African continent. ... The future of colonialism was never so dark as after the Accra Conference.²⁷⁹

Around this time, even the colonial masters were domestically divided on issues related to colonies. The end of the Algerian War was in sight – the country had been in chaos since 1954.²⁸⁰ The birth of the enormous Non-Aligned group made Western colony-holders a minority. Demand for the decolonisation of Africa could no longer be suppressed in Africa or in the international arena.

When considering the relationship between the Cold War and Africa’s decolonisation, Fanon points out that various objections to colonial rule resulted in the weakening of Western countries with colonies while strengthening the Communist bloc.²⁸¹ This point will be further discussed in the next chapter. The following section looks at how changes in the international environment in the 1950s affected Portugal’s colonial policy.

Portugal’s determination to retain its colonies

Salazar could no longer fool the international community with a mere name change. Instead of a fundamental revision of colonial policies, however, he introduced makeover measures to improve the appearance of the colonies, such as providing a better education system, health facilities in rural areas and better work conditions.²⁸² School education was considered most important, and the government desperately wanted to show an improvement in statistics.²⁸³

In 1951, 148,209 young Africans enrolled in rudimentary primary education.²⁸⁴ The figure represented 2 per cent of the total African population, which constituted the entire

“*non-civilizados*” (uncivilised persons).²⁸⁵ Even this small number was a great improvement from 1940. This was due to the rapid expansion of the Catholic Church, which ran most of the rudimentary primary schools (930 out of 998 schools).²⁸⁶ However, secondary education did not fare as well: there were only six schools and 467 African students in 1951.²⁸⁷ In addition, although the number of the *assimilado* increased 2.4 times, from 1,776 in 1940 to 4,349 in 1950, it still constituted 1.6 per cent of the African population. The rudimentary primary education provided by the Catholic Church failed to lead to an improvement of the social status of Africans.²⁸⁸

The creation of Overseas Provinces in 1953 automatically made residents in the colonies “Portuguese”. However, this did not mean that they were given citizenship as demonstrated in the fact that there were only 156,537 Portuguese citizens with voting rights in Mozambique in the same year and most of them were whites or *mestiço*.²⁸⁹

Since Mozambique lagged badly behind in social development, there was a pressing need for the Salazar administration to improve it in order to respond to international pressure. The cosmetic improvements did not lead to fundamental change. It was also geographically imbalanced. Still, its significance lay in the fact that the Portuguese government undertook the education of Africans in the colonies. Although it was not sufficient, rural Africans now had far more educational opportunities than previously.²⁹⁰ The number of students enrolled in the *ensino rudimentar de adaptação* (rudimentary adaptation education; the former rudimentary primary education),²⁹¹ and in the *ensino primária comun* (common primary education; primary education for whites) exceeded 400,000 in 1957/58 and reached 430,000 in 1960/61. Of these, 346,506 Africans attended the rudimentary adaptation education and 17,642 Africans attended the common primary schools.²⁹² Yet, this was still only 0.05 per cent of the total African population (estimated at 6.5 million). It was only towards the end of the 1960s that the number of students in primary schools exceeded half a million. By then, however, Africans who completed primary education were drafted into the Portuguese Armed Forces, and therefore the pro-liberation forces did not benefit from the fruits of education.²⁹³

Research on residents in the colonies and the search for a placation strategy

As the independence of Tanganyika, Malawi and Zambia drew closer in the late 1950s, a sense of crisis grew among officials in Portugal and its colonies. As referred to earlier, by the mid-1950s, Africans from Mozambique residing in these surrounding areas became politically aware and were beginning to organise themselves. This awakened political awareness disconcerted the colonial rulers. In order to retain colonial rule, they had to create a system that would manage the colonies more efficiently while shielding the inhabitants from the world trend of decolonisation. Thus, the Salazar administration undertook to develop intelligence networks inside and outside the colonies and to conduct research on the culture and political awareness of Africans.

Portugal had already done some research. Upon the introduction of the cotton regime during the Second World War, it became essential to effectively control rural areas

and African peasants. To achieve this, the *Inspecção Superior dos Negócios Indígenas* (Superior Inspector of Native Affairs) was established in Lisbon in 1946.²⁹⁴ The office was renamed as the *Gabinete dos Negócios Políticos* (Political Affairs Office) in 1959. It analysed information gathered from diplomatic establishments abroad, the PIDE and the governments-general in the colonies.²⁹⁵ Also, the *Escola Superior Colonial* (Higher Colonial Academy) was established in Lisbon in 1946 to resolve the chronic shortage of administrators.

Various research facilities set up in the Ministry of Overseas Provinces conducted surveys and research on the colonies. For instance, the *Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais* (Centre for Social and Political Studies), attached to the *Junta de Investigações do Ultramar* (Overseas Provinces Research Council), undertook anthropological research on the social and political structures of African residents in the colonies. After Adriano Moreira, a founder and professor at the *Escola Superior Colonial* (Higher Overseas Academy),²⁹⁶ became the Minister of Overseas Provinces in 1961, the link among researchers, educators and working-level officials became even stronger.²⁹⁷

The research on Africans and their society, which was actively conducted over 15 years from the end of the First World War to the birth of FRELIMO, was more than the mere accumulation of academic knowledge. Information derived from the studies was used in the administration of the colonies. Research on Makondes by Jorge Dias is especially important in relation to this book. Dias, the first Portuguese recipient of a doctorate in anthropology, became the head of the *Missão de Estudos das Minórias Étnicas do Ultramar Português* (Study Mission of Ethnic Minority of Portugal Overseas), which was established in the *Centro de Estudos Políticos e Sociais* in 1956. Dias conducted pioneering research on ethnic minorities. The main objective of his research was to conduct detailed studies on the ethnic groups which were likely to become major players in *subversão* (subversion) or liberation movements.²⁹⁸ His organisation carried out anthropological research in Angola and Mozambique in 1957.²⁹⁹

Around this time, many Portuguese researchers attempted to analyse Africans in the colonies. They did not use the one-sided romantic approach of “primitiveness and savageness” but instead approached their studies from a “scientific” point of view in order to contribute towards the exercise of better political control.³⁰⁰ Although the researchers’ own beliefs are unclear, they expressed some doubt about the effectiveness of colonial control built on coercion. As Dias noted:

We see in Africa today that the great bonfire of demands for, and aspirations to, autonomy is growing alarmingly. Severe and rigid discipline can keep these people quiet for a while, but we cannot ensure their future loyalty. As a simple ethnologist, I cannot say how they can be resolved, but it [their increasing dissatisfaction] is not just the consequence of ideologies spread by the subversive propaganda.³⁰¹

This suggests the delicate position of the researchers under the *Estado Novo* regime.³⁰² On

the one hand, there appears to be some sympathy for the colonised people. On the other hand, their work was used to help develop the anti-insurgency strategy used during the colonial war.

It was the PIDE that played an important role in the anti-insurgency strategy; such as suppressing the political awareness of colonised people, nipping new movements in the bud and intervening in emergent political movements. According to 1951 statistics, there were 46 PIDE employees in Mozambique in that year. Seventeen of them were “native” assistants. Its sole office was in Lourenço Marques.³⁰³ The Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP: Public Security Police) had 227 employees.³⁰⁴ In 1950, 2,761 Africans were arrested for disturbing “public order” (17 whites were arrested for the same reason) and 10,769 were arrested for violating labour regulations for “natives”.³⁰⁵ The majority of the reported arrests occurred in urban areas, suggesting that the local administration offices did not submit reports of their assigned police work to the headquarters. For rural Africans, “police” meant the *sipaio*. There were 1,833 *sipaio*s in Mozambique, 15 to 30 assigned to each circumscription (one or two for each administrative post).³⁰⁶

In 1954 the PIDE set up the Quadro Especial do Ultramar (Overseas Special Unit) in each overseas province, ordained by Decree-Law no. 39.749. The unit was merged with the PSP, bringing the total number of employees to 755.³⁰⁷

Suppression of the democratisation movement and the secret police

The principles of democratisation and self-determination contained in the Pacific Charter aroused anger even amongst the Portuguese against the Estado Novo regime. People who were against the regime had no option other than exile. Some immigrated to the colonies, such as Mozambique,³⁰⁸ and many prominent members of the MUD and dissident groups had immigrated there by 1950.³⁰⁹ The Portuguese residents who fled to the colonies in the mid-1950s brought with them news of the political situation and trends in Portugal.³¹⁰

Bruno Oliveira Santos, who interviewed the prominent members of the PIDE, reports that 1958 was “one of the most unsettled years for the Estado Novo” because Humberto Delgado, a young and promising general, declared his candidacy in the presidential election in June 1958, and he was endorsed by the communist alliance.³¹⁴ This electrified those citizens all over the country who demanded democratisation. However, due to various obstructive tactics by the PIDE and the government, the election was won by Rear Admiral Américo Tomás, Salazar’s chosen puppet.³¹² General Delgado was suspected of being close to the US government because he had coordinated the British and the Americans in the conclusion to the Açores agreement during his posting in Washington D.C. from 1952 to 1957.³¹³ General Delgado contested his defeat. Although he had some supporters in the northern part of Portugal, he took refuge in Brazil and established an opposition movement in exile. He was eventually assassinated by the PIDE.³¹⁴

The PIDE’s sense of urgency grew in 1958. It intensified its censorship and surveillance of the democratisation movement. It also kept an eye on the activists who had fled the

Table 2 Portuguese Armed Forces personnel who received training with the support of the US government (1963–1971)

fiscal year	officers				enlistee				number of those who completed training	training cost (U.S. dollar)
	army	navy	air force	total	army	navy	air force	total		
1963									59	
1964	21	18	3	42		20	1	21	63	48,299
1965	45	7	12	64		7		7	71	62,289
1966	36	9	1	46		2		2	48	26,532
1967	2	8	1	11		4		4	15	36,734
1968	35	11	1	47	2	52		54	101	120,147
1969	31	14	7	52		81		81	133	118,807
1970	38	13	2	53		36		36	89	136,165
1971	37	14	49	100		10	1	11	111	252,550
total	245	94	76	415	2	212	2	216	690	801,523

St. Mark, 1990:81.

country. Before the 1958 election, General Delgado had become a hero for white settlers in Mozambique.³¹⁵ However, suppression by the PIDE intensified just before the election. Many involved in the MUD and the opposition movement were obliged to move to Brazil and Angola.

A dissident by the name of António Figueiredo pointed out that the South African secret police and the PIDE worked in close cooperation from as early as 1958.³¹⁶ Though generally Portuguese dissidents in Mozambique did not support decolonisation.³¹⁷ Once mass arrests and political suppression brought the opposition movement in Portugal and the colonies under control, the PIDE shifted its attention to the decolonisation movement which had become increasingly threatening. In 1960 it set up branches in the border districts such as Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado, which were thought most likely to revolt. There were more Africans than whites in the branches, indicating that locals were co-opted for intelligence gathering and political oppression.³¹⁸

The Portuguese army's preparation for the Colonial War

The army became actively involved in issues relating to decolonisation far later than other authorities. The *Forças Ultramarinas* (Overseas Forces), deployed in the colonies, had too many structural problems in order to effectively fight the *Guerra Colonial* (Colonial War). Hence, the Salazar administration undertook a radical reform of the military system in the colonies.³¹⁹ The colonial forces were integrated into the *Forças Armadas Portuguesas* (Portuguese Armed Forces). From 1958 onwards, expeditionary forces were required to stay in a colony for three years. The forces no longer concentrated only on the city housing the government-general, but were also deployed in the countryside as well.

In addition, from 1958, the officers of the Portuguese Armed Forces participated in counter-guerrilla training courses organised by NATO member countries. Every year nearly 100 officers were taught various counter-guerrilla tactics in different countries.³²⁰ The USA accepted 690 Portuguese officers for training between 1963 and 1971.³²¹ With the help of these trained officers, the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares (Institute of Higher Military Studies) set up the first training programme for counter-subversion strategy in Portugal.³²²

The army officers and the officials at the Ministry of Overseas Provinces regarded the decolonisation movement by colonised peoples as “subversion” and defined it as “activity to destabilise the nation”. To help develop their anti-subversion strategy, they collected information, conducted research and offered opinions.³²³ In particular, they studied the strategies and tactics of the British forces in the Malay Peninsula, the French in Algeria and the American in Vietnam, and exchanged information and personnel with relevant forces.³²⁴ The works by Mao Zedong and Lenin were even examined.³²⁵

The South African defence minister visited Lisbon in March 1959 and met relevant people in politics and the military in preparation for military activity.³²⁶ A sense of crisis was growing among existent power holders in southern Africa. Politicians, the military forces and the police forces started to prepare for changes in the domestic and international environments. At this point, colonised people in Portuguese territories had not yet begun armed struggle. The organisation of people in Mozambique had just begun. International pressure challenged the Salazar administration with burning issues.³²⁷

Notes

- 1 Halliday, 1989:26.
- 2 As Youichi Kibata points out, the United Kingdom had no intention of parting with its colonies and wanted to stop the independence of India (Kibata, 1996:78-80).
- 3 Ishii, 2004:262.
- 4 The main exports were copper, chrome, iron, manganese, gold, radium, sisal, cotton, coffee and tea (Oda, 1996:244). As the demand for industrial diamonds and strategically important metals increased during the war, southern Africa became more significant (Kitagawa, 1999:76).
- 5 By 1948 the US took up half of the industrial production, a third of the export, 70 per cent of gold holdings and three quarters of overseas investment globally (Kitagawa, 1999:76-77).
- 6 The United Kingdom amended the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in 1945, and France set up the Fond d'Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social (FIDES: Socio-economic Development Investment Fund) in 1946 (Ibid.:78). In 1947, the United Kingdom was hit by the worst economic crisis in history (Kibata, 1996:96).
- 7 The impact of the Cold War is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
- 8 Halliday, 1986:9.
- 9 Ibid.:31-32. Halliday importantly pointed out that: "The fundamental nature of the conflict between the two social systems ..." are "organised on the basis of contrasting social principles. This antagonism is, however, rooted not just in the contrast of social organisation but ultimately in the different social interests which they represent ... This difference is reflected in a second distinction, that both systems stake an ideological claim to be world systems, ideal societies which others should aspire to follow ... For the very social interests embodied in the leading capitalist and communist states are present, in a fluid and conflicting manner, in the third countries; the result is that the clash of the two blocs is constantly reanimated and sustained by developments in these other states that may be supporters or allies of one or other bloc." (Ibid.:32-33)
- 10 Cumings, 1981:xxi-xxvi.
- 11 Ibid.:xxvii. Cumings demonstrates that the same "reverse course" that took place in Japan happened in southern Korea within three months after the defeat of Japan and the liberation of the Korean Peninsula in August 1945. This suggests that the beginning of the Cold War may have been earlier.
- 12 Fujimoto, 2004:114.
- 13 Ibid.:115.
- 14 The liberation was achieved mostly by the Soviet army, with a limited contribution by the local resistance movement (Shiba, 1996:47).
- 15 Ibid.:69. For information on the people's democracy in Eastern Europe, see also Momose, 1979; and Minamizuka, 1990.
- 16 That Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in June 1948 and later played an important role in the Non-Aligned Movement is not only interesting but demonstrates the globalisation of world politics in that period.
- 17 Thiam, 1965:7-9.
- 18 Ibid.:10-21. The nationalist movement in Portuguese colonies in Africa did not fit this classification.
- 19 Ibid.:9.
- 20 Oda, 1982:47.
- 21 Ibid.:176.
- 22 Many leaders accepted Padmore's theory of African triple revolution – by first achieving independence in each country; second socialist revolution in each country and finally regional unity such as the United States of Africa (Ibid.:50).
- 23 Oda, 1996:241.
- 24 Nkrumah, 1971:52-53.
- 25 Oda, 1982:48.

- 26 The idea of pan-Africanism had already been accepted by Mozambicans of mixed parentage and assimilated intellectuals at an early stage.
- 27 There were also regional gaps.
- 28 Gouda, 2000:452.
- 29 It was renamed the Delegacia Geral de Segurança (General Security Directorate) or DGS in 1969 when a new government was formed.
- 30 The organisation had 1,000 full-time employees and 10,000 part-timers (Kinshichi, 2003:242).
- 31 See Chapter 4 to find out what became of Calvão after imprisonment.
- 32 Calvão arranged for the report to reach Basil Davidson, a British journalist and scholar of African history, who was leading the anti-colonial movement in the United Kingdom. The report was also handed to researchers such as James Duffy and Marvin Harris (Figueiredo, 1998:366). On the international condemnation against forced labour in Portuguese colonies, see also Shepherd 1962:110-112.
- 33 Many international conferences on slavery were held in the 1930s. First Belgium and then Portugal became the target of criticism (Madeira Santos, 2004:2-5).
- 34 Research on Luso-tropicalism has actively been conducted in recent years. For details see Castelo, 1998; Moreira and Venâncio, 2000.
- 35 The Cold War in Europe came to a head with the Berlin Blockade in June 1948.
- 36 Teixeira, 1998:79; MacQueen, 1997:53.
- 37 Portugal insisted that Spain join NATO at the same time to maintain the solidarity of the fascist governments in the Iberian Peninsula (Teixeira, 1998:79).
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Portugal concluded military agreements with the US on: the mutual use of Mozambique in 1950; the use of air and naval facilities in the Açores and on military aid to Lisbon in 1951. The agreement on the use of the Açores was renewed in 1957. It concluded a military cooperation agreement with West Germany in 1952.
- 40 The establishment of British South Africa Company (BSAC) by Cecil Rhodes, after obtaining a charter from the British Government in 1889, marked the beginning of Rhodesia. For details, see Kitagawa, 1999. A “responsible Government” by immigrants was set up in Southern Rhodesia in 1923.
- 41 Martin, 1990:135.
- 42 In 1943 mining brought in 8.9 million pounds, manufacturing 9.5 million pounds and “European Agriculture” 6.7 million pounds (Tow, Leonard, “The Manufacturing Economy of Southern Rhodesia: Problems and Prospects,” No .850, National Academy of Sciences: 4, 1960, in Nishiura, 2003: Figure 11).
- 43 In 1945 mining produced 8.1 million pounds, “European agriculture” 9.8 million pounds and manufacturing 14.1 million pounds (Ibid.).
- 44 The total foreign investment by governments, listed corporations and unlisted corporations in Portuguese colonies in Africa between 1870 and 1936 was 66.73 million pounds (34.761 million pounds to Mozambique). This was only a tenth of the total foreign investment in British colonies in southern Africa, that is, 66.92 million pounds (Frankel, 1967:158-159).
- 45 Aminaka, 2002:118.
- 46 Ibid.:126-127.
- 47 Ibid.:119.
- 48 Kitagawa, 1999:241.
- 49 Neves, 1998:25.
- 50 Anuário, 1951-52:19.
- 51 Ibid.
- 52 The term “*non-civilizado*” was used only for Africans. All whites, even uneducated ones, were automatically classified as “whites” in the category “*civilizado*” (the civilised). Similarly, Asians

- were classified as “Asians” or “*amarelo*” (yellow race) in the sub-category of “*civilizado*”. In other words, Africans were registered as “*non-civilizado*” or “*indígena*”, except for those “*civilizado*”, who were classified “*assimilado*” in “*civilizado*”.
- 53 Anuário, 1951-52:22.
- 54 Ibid.:19-22.
- 55 Living in cities did not automatically guarantee that Africans had access to information.
- 56 “Libération Nationale et Culture. Conférence prononcée au 1er Mémorial dédié au Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, Université de Syracuse”, Syracuse, NY, Feb. 20, 1970, in Cabral, 1980:218.
- 57 Mondlane, 1969:104.
- 58 Sousa, 1988:80.
- 59 The objective was to confine African labourers to the rural areas.
- 60 The population of whites was 17,842 in 1928, 5.9 per cent of whom were registered as primary school students. The population of Africans in 1930 was 3,849,977. Only 0.03 per cent of them were registered at primary schools (Anuário, 1972/73:141-143).
- 61 Almeida, 1940:59-76.
- 62 Departamento de História, 1987:70.
- 63 The agreement with the colonial authority entrusted the church with responsibility for the “moral improvement” of the *indígena*.
- 64 Birmingham, 1993:161.
- 65 Cruz e Silva, 2001:83.
- 66 The ANC formulated an action plan in 1949. It rolled out a civil disobedience movement and grew to be a large organisation involving many black people.
- 67 Mondlane, 1969:114.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Some call them “African elites”, as in “*elites africanas*” (Opello, 1973). However, it is not appropriate to call the Africans under colonial rule who were educated or had a job, “elites”, because the word normally implies people on the side of authority. It is also problematic to call them “*assimilados*”. The classification was the creation of the colonisers and included people of different social statuses from different parts of the colonies. Only a small number of them later became leaders of the anti-colonial movement. In colonial Mozambique where it was difficult to complete secondary education, so few Africans could be called “intellectuals” in the narrow, traditional sense. Yet, this book employs the word “intellectuals” with inverted commas because the educated Africans who became actively involved in the anti-colonial movements are close to the notion of “organic intellectuals” as coined by Antonio Gramsci. Hobsbawm states as follows: “In backward or underdeveloped countries this may include anyone with secondary or even in some areas, one with primary schooling; in developed countries it increasingly tends to mean anyone with a post-secondary education, but not necessarily those whose education, at whatever level, has been primarily vocational, such as accountants, engineers, business executives and artists” (Hobsbawm, 1973:245).
- 70 For example, Joaquim Chissano, who became the second president of Mozambique.
- 71 Cabral, 1974:62-63. Often they did not immediately form a liberation movement on returning to their respective regions, but only later after the changes in the international situation and according to their own personal growth.
- 72 Rocha, 2002:128-129.
- 73 Figueiredo, 1998:354.
- 74 Ibid.:129. The former was published in Quelimane in 1892 and the latter in Mozambique Island in 1881.
- 75 Rocha, 2002:186-187. The African Guild was not officially recognised until 1920.
- 76 No membership data at its inception is available. As of May 1921, the guild had 150 investors. They were employees in the commercial sector, employees in the public sector, workers in the

- machinery and printing sector, office workers, railroad workers, businessmen, merchants, agricultural businessmen, a journalist, and high-ranking officials at plantations (from Cabo Verde) (Andrade, 1990:16).
- 77 The movement was called *associativismo*. The first associations formed in Mozambique were the Workers' Association of Commerce and Industry in 1901 and the Entrepreneurs' Association in 1905, although the movement only became active after 1910 (Rocha, 2002:133).
- 78 The republican government permitted the right to strike. There were 162 strikes in the country in 1911 (Gouda 2000:438).
- 79 This was because: (1) the nature of their occupations presented them many opportunities to connect with foreign ideas and (2) many of its members were "exiles". The organisation also had an international network which had contact with, for example, printers' associations in South Africa and Portugal (Rocha, 2002:147).
- 80 Albasini was born in the outskirts of Lourenço Marques in 1876. His grandfather on his mother's side was a king of Maxaquene (the centre of Lourenço Marques) while his grandfather on his father's side was a Portuguese hunter and ivory merchant and later became Portuguese consul in the Transvaal. Albasini studied at a Catholic school and worked in the Lourenço Marques post office. In addition to *O Africano*, he wrote for *Diário de Notícias* and a party bulletin of the Socialist Party in Portugal (Ibid.:446-447).
- 81 *O Africano*, 30/04/1913, in Ibid.:196.
- 82 Yamaguchi (1991) presents an interesting argument about the affinity between African nationalism and socialism.
- 83 Senghor, 1961:71.
- 84 Touré, 1961:128, in Yamaguchi, 1991:40. Translated from Japanese into English.
- 85 *O Africano*, 02/06/1917; 06/06/1917; 20/06/1917. Albasini paid attention not only to regional nationalism in other Portuguese colonies but also to the labour movements in South Africa, such as the series of strikes which took place in the Transvaal in 1914 (Rocha, 2002:197).
- 86 Departamento de História, 1993:12. For instance guards at washrooms were traditionally Africans but by 1920 most were replaced by whites.
- 87 Rocha, 2002:201-202.
- 88 Ibid.:199.
- 89 Gouda, 2000:441.
- 90 Ibid.:441-442.
- 91 *O Emancipador* was suppressed in 1937.
- 92 Rocha, 2002:322.
- 93 Detesting it, the *assimilado* set up the Instituto Negrófilo (Negro Institute) but were forced by the colonial government to change the name to the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique (Association Centre of Mozambican Negros).
- 94 After the independence of Angola, Andrade fell out with Neto, another leader, and lived his life in exile, living for a period of time in Mozambique.
- 95 Munslow uses the word "proto-nationalism movement" to describe various liberation organisations which developed into FRELIMO (Munslow, 1983:79).
- 96 Andrade, 1990:9.
- 97 Rocha, 2002:235.
- 98 Andrade, 1990:9.
- 99 Rocha criticised previous research for interpreting the influence of pan-Africanism in Portugal's African colonies too simplistically (Rocha, 2002:344).
- 100 Ibid.:350.
- 101 Ibid.:351.
- 102 *O Brado Africano*, 26/04/1919.
- 103 Departamento de História, 1993:18. They included Watch Tower and the Zionist movement.

- 104 Rocha, 2002:353.
- 105 Ibid.:356.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 *O Brado Africano*, 01/03/1957.
- 108 The Liga Africana adopted the reformism of Dr Du Bois (Friedland, 1979:119-120; Davidson, Isaacman and Pélissier, 1990:701).
- 109 *O Brado Africano*, 13/08/1921.
- 110 Rocha, 2002:361.
- 111 Because of the intervention of the Liga Africana, the second congress included, in the final declaration, a sentence stating that no different treatment was practiced between whites and blacks in Portugal and its colonies (Ibid.).
- 112 This book refers to nationalism situated between macro-nationalism and micro-nationalism as “mezzo-nationalism”.
- 113 The guild admitted 39 new members in 1922. Among them were 18 employees in the public sector, nine entrepreneurs, three employees in the commercial sector, two farmers, two employees in the agricultural sector, one public servant, one primary school teacher, one bookkeeper, one carpenter and one goldsmith (Andrade, 1990:16).
- 114 *O Brado Africano*, 12/09/1924.
- 115 Penvenne also mentions that many editors of *O Africano* and *O Brado Africano* were “gifted observers and compassionate allies of the urban labour force.” While pointing out the importance of analysing newspapers as a source of the social history, she emphasises the importance and difficulty of having access to the “voice of ordinary Africans” (Penvenne, 1995:12-13). However, when the author of this book interviewed her in September 2004, she agreed that it could not be denied that these newspapers might have been read more widely than she originally thought (Jeanne Marie Penvenne, Maputo City, September 2004).
- 116 Censo de População, 1940:IV. The literacy rate was that of Portuguese. It did not include the alphabetical notation of local languages, which was promoted by Protestant churches.
- 117 There were 199 Portuguese immigrants to Lourenço Marques in 1931. The number increased every year. The total amounted to 2,181 by 1938. In 1946, 198 Portuguese immigrants came to Lourenço Marques (Penvenne, 1995:99). The number of whites in Lourenço Marques was 14,316 in 1940 and 16,149 in 1945, which was 1.59 times and 1.79 times as much as that of 1928 respectively (Ibid.:101).
- 118 Penvenne herself emphasises racial discrimination and does not use the word “class”. However, there is evidence to suggest that a sense of class related to race was being formed.
- 119 Ibid.:158.
- 120 In 1946 the number of port and railway workers increased by 20 per cent from the previous year (276 assistants and 10,201 junior workers). African workers were unhappy about their wages, which remained the same from 1933 to 1957, especially in the face of high post-war inflation rates (Ibid.:120).
- 121 Ibid.:124.
- 122 Mondlane, 1969:115-116.
- 123 Sixty-eight were arrested. The seven leaders were banished to Niassa for two years. The rest were sentenced to 60-day corrective labour (Penvenne, 1995:123). This indicates that the colonial administration considered Niassa as a fringe area.
- 124 There were 1,228 *sipaio*s in each district capital and 605 in each administration post (Anuário, 1951-52:474).
- 125 It is generally difficult to obtain the correct basic data of foreign workers. The data of Mozambicans in neighbouring British territories is particularly inadequate. The only reliable data is that of organised mine workers from southern Mozambique in South African mines.
- 126 ILO, 1958:135.

- 127 Ibid.:127-129.
- 128 As for the migration from southern Mozambique, there is a debate between Harris (1959), who presents the traditional social system as a push factor, and Rita-Ferreira (1960), who searches for the reason in the policies of South African mines and the colonial government.
- 129 See, for example, Amin, 1972:518-524; Wallerstein, 1995.
- 130 See, for example, First, 1983; Ogura, 1992.
- 131 First, 1983; CEA, 1998; Covane, 1996 and 2001.
- 132 Departamento de História, 1993:19. Pioneering research on this argument, conducted by Asiwaju (1976), sees the exodus of Ivoirians as “revolt”.
- 133 TNA, Sec 21484, Grierson, in Alpers, 1984:370-371.
- 134 He submitted his dissertation as “Joel Maurício das Neves” but currently calls himself “Joel Maurício das Neves Tembe”. This book uses the name that appeared in the dissertation since the citations come from it.
- 135 Neves pays special attention to the forced labour and migration of minors, which has been understudied despite the important role it played in Africa (Neves, 1998:196-232).
- 136 Neves’s interview with Simão Ruvai, Manica Mundonguara village, 22 July 1996 in Ibid.:207.
- 137 Alpers, 1984:379.
- 138 Neves, 1998:252.
- 139 Lubkemann, 2000:24-30. Lubkemann is against the argument that perceives war refugees as a result of forced migration and emphasises the proactive nature of the phenomenon.
- 140 Alpers, 1984:380.
- 141 Ibid.
- 142 Without a noteworthy industry, Mossurize was a supplier of forced labourers and a location of forced cotton growing, which resulted in the high ratio (Neves, 1998:245).
- 143 The percentage was always twenty-something until the late 1950s (First, 1983:113).
- 144 Calculated using the data from the Tanganyika Labour Department, 1953:40, in Alpers, 1984:377 and Dias, 1998:19. The data in Dias was taken from the Mueda Administrative Post before 1957 but the exact year is unclear.
- 145 See, for example, Isaacman, 1983; Munslow, 1984; Mondlane, 1969. The AHM (Mozambican National Archive) also mentioned at the beginning of the 1993 special edition that, “[t]he migratory work provided refuge from oppressive colonial conditions and integrated the protagonists into the colonial economy and international economy ... On the other hand ... the migratory work was also one of the most significant factors responsible for introducing nationalist ideas to the region, in an identical process with other frontier regions of the country” (Arquivo, 1993:3).
- 146 This excludes Alpers (1984) and Neves (1998).
- 147 Covane, 1996 and 2001.
- 148 Reading and writing in African languages was allowed only in relation to Catechism (Ibid.:213-214).
- 149 Cruz e Silva, 1990:127.
- 150 Covane (1996 and 2001) mainly looks at how former migrant workers became engaged in agriculture after returning to Mozambique and how it influenced the transformation of rural areas. He does not discuss much about the transformation of political awareness.
- 151 For a discussion relating to “tribalism” and “anti-tribalism”, see Funada, 1997.
- 152 Like many other leaders of the splinter group, Simango was impounded in FRELIMO’s “re-education camp” (a facility to encourage anti-FRELIMO sympathisers to convert) during the transition period before independence. He was later executed.
- 153 Ranger, 1985; Hyslop, 1986; Neves, 1998:255.
- 154 Hyslop, 1986:35.
- 155 Unlike migrant workers, local Africans who worked in mines lived with their families in smaller mining towns in rural areas. In 1927 only 4.2 per cent of the workers at Shamva, one of the largest

- mines, were from Southern Rhodesia. Around this time it became impossible to earn enough money through planting cash crops and many local Africans got work at plantations owned by Europeans or went to South Africa to work (Neves, 1998:256-257).
- 156 Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia, Annual Report, 1937, in *Ibid.*:257.
- 157 The basic data is taken from the Southern Rhodesia Statistical Year Book, 1947:98.
- 158 Departamento de História, 1993:110.
- 159 Yoshikuni established, from the 1911 census in Southern Rhodesia, that Mozambicans constituted a significant labour force in urban workplaces such as railways, with white families and hotels (Yoshikuni, unpublished article "The 1911 Census and the African Workers of Harare: A Historical Demography":7-19).
- 160 Lubkemann, 2000:88-91.
- 161 *The African Weekly*, 19 Oct. 1955, in Yoshikuni, 1989:457. The Sena Burial Society claimed to be the first mutual support group (*Ibid.*:458).
- 162 Neves, 1998:260-261. Similar societies were formed in urban areas in Tanganyika in the 1930s (Kawabata, 2002:71).
- 163 Yoshikuni, 1989:458; Neves, 1998:259-260.
- 164 The Zumbo Burial Society, the Sena Burial Society, the Quelimane Burial Society and the Beira Burial Society, to name a few. Neves confirmed the list of burial societies in confidential documents of the Portuguese colonial administration (Neves, 1998:260).
- 165 For details, see Matsuda, 1983; 1995.
- 166 Neves, 1998:261.
- 167 Van Onselen, 1973:237-255. Yoshikuni argues out that it was not the case that the latter developed when the former declined, stating, "We cannot explain as the development of one led to the development of the other. We should rather perceive both as a new cultural tendency of African workers" (Yoshikuni, 1989:451).
- 168 Neves, 1998:267.
- 169 Hyslop, 1986:36.
- 170 In reviewing urbanisation in Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia, Yoshikuni divides the period from 1890 to independence into six historical stages. The first stage was from 1890 to 1898 when the city was formed. Many workers were from neighbouring areas such as South Africa and Mozambique, which were already a part of the southern African economic system. The second stage was from 1898 to 1918 when colonial rule was established. A large number of workers come from the north (Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia) and the east (Mozambique), 95 per cent of whom were males between the ages of 10 and 29 years old (Yoshikuni, 1989:2-3). The third stage was from the end of the First World War to the mid-1920s when the infrastructure was developed and the city was industrialised. It was during this period that the labour movement and welfare groups were born. The fourth stage was from 1925 to 1935 when Africans from Southern Rhodesia constituted half of the population. Shona overtook Nyanja (or Chewa) as the common language (*Ibid.*:4). The fifth stage was from 1935 to 1958 when the migrant worker system faced a crisis. Local peasants flooded into the city. People felt a sense of unrest. After 1945, strikes and riots frequently broke out. The last stage began in 1958. This was the period when the removal of foreign workers was active, having become official policy. In 1969, as many as 83 per cent of the workers were local (*Ibid.*:5). Ranger explains in detail the background to the locals leaving rural areas (Ranger, 1985:46;54-91). Previously, rural peasants could grow cash crops as a means of resistance to the pressure from the colonial government, white settlers and private corporations to turn them into industrial workers. However, following stronger pressure from the colonial government, they were forced to abandon this route.
- 171 Neves, 1998:267.
- 172 *Ibid.*:269.
- 173 *Ibid.*

- 174 Forty per cent of the workers were Southern Rhodesians while 20 per cent came from Nyasaland (Raftopoulos, 1995:82).
- 175 The *curadores* were sent to Southern Rhodesia as “guardians” of people from Portuguese colonies but their real role was more like that of inspectors.
- 176 Ibid.:275.
- 177 Ibid.:274.
- 178 The campaign for the expulsion of foreign workers intensified at the end of the 1950s.
- 179 Ibid.
- 180 Neves, 1998:275.
- 181 Ibid.:278.
- 182 *African Daily News*, 15 August 1958, in Ibid.:283.
- 183 According to Neves’ interviews and the administrative documents, Chunga was a spy and a henchman of the colonial authority (Ibid.:287).
- 184 Ibid.:275.
- 185 *African Daily News*, 15 August 1958, in Ibid.:283-284.
- 186 Departamento de História, 1993:240; Neves, 1998:284-285.
- 187 Ibid.:284. The name is written as “Portuguese East African Association” in Departamento de História, 1993:240.
- 188 Inoue, 2001:4.
- 189 Ibid.:10.
- 190 Departamento de História, 1993:240.
- 191 Another reason was that they were fully paid only after they returned to Mozambique.
- 192 Gwambe was originally from Inhambane. After running away from a job in Lourenço Marques, he worked in Salisbury and Bulawayo (Neves, 1998:299).
- 193 Munslow, 1983:80.
- 194 Alpers, 1984:371.
- 195 Yussuf Adam, the authority in this area at the CEA, divides the migration into three periods: (1) after military conquest; (2) during colonial rule; and (3) after the Massacre of Mueda (Adam, 1993:16). This book uses the same classification.
- 196 PRO, CO 691/57:334-335, in Alpers, 1984:372.
- 197 TNA, Sec 21484, HMK, in Ibid.:373.
- 198 Alpers, 1984:374.
- 199 Kuczynski, 1949:344. n.2.
- 200 A monthly wage for an unskilled labourer in southern Tanganyika was 10 to 26 shillings in 1927 which decreased to 8 to 15 shillings in 1940 (Kawabata, 2002:73).
- 201 Ibid.:156-157.
- 202 There is a strong possibility that this contributed to the lower wages of unskilled labourers.
- 203 Ibid.:375.
- 204 Ibid.
- 205 Tanganyika, 1948:101, in Ibid.:374.
- 206 Wages became less after the price index conversion (Kawabata, 2002:264).
- 207 Ibid.:230. The reasons for the price hike were: (1) post-war recovery in developed countries; (2) the delay in the recovery of the sisal industry in Indonesia; and (3) special procurements due to the outbreak of the Korean War. Therefore, the boom died down when these conditions no longer existed (Ibid.:230-231).
- 208 Around this time numerous men from Mozambique went to Tanganyika as short-term migrant workers. The author agrees with West that the high ratio of women was quite unlikely and that the calculation did not include short-term migrant workers (West, 1997:105).
- 209 According to the Tanganyika Labour Department, the number of Makuwa-Mettos increased from 1952 (Tanganyika Labour Department, 1953:40, in Alpers, 1984:377).

- 210 The former was the population of Makondes recorded by Jorge Dias in 1957 (Dias, 1998:19). This figure probably did not include those who were from the area but did not live there. The latter, in the parentheses, is the total number of Makondes in the labour force in Tanganyika according to the 1957 census.
- 211 Alpers, 1984:379-380.
- 212 Ibid.
- 213 Ibid.:381.
- 214 Dias and Guerreiro, 1959:8-9.
- 215 Kawabata, 2002:59. The Cooperative Societies Ordinance was enacted in 1932.
- 216 Ibid.:57.
- 217 C.H. Grierson, Provincial Commissioner, to Chief Secretary, 12 September 1935, TNA, 26102/6; A. Tambila, "A History of the Tanga Sisal Labour Force 1936-1964", MA, University of Dar es Salaam, EAF, HD7066, 1974:90-95, in Kawabata, 2002:72-73; 76.
- 218 Iliffe, 1979:540-542.
- 219 Padmore, 1953:254-266.
- 220 The Tanganyika African Association Constitution, in Kawabata, 2002:341; 435.
- 221 Ibid.:350-352.
- 222 In 1924 in Nangololo, the Dutch Catholic Church built its first church in the Mueda Highland. More followed. All were situated some distance away from Porto Amélia, the centre of the colonial administration (Adam, 1993:15). This indicates a delicate relationship between the Catholic Church and the Portuguese colonial authority. According to Mandanda, a Dutch priest encouraged him to contact Mondlane (Ibid.:22). As seen in Chapter 2, the Catholic Church played an indispensable role in education in Mozambique where the public education system was not well developed. After conducting a field study, however, Dias lamented that the Church did not teach Portuguese, let alone train Portuguese interpreters (Dias and Guerreiro, 1959:12). The calculation, based on the population survey by Dias, shows that only 0.4 per cent of Makondes in Mozambique could speak Portuguese in the late 1950s (Dias, 1998:19).
- 223 Departamento de História, 1993:233.
- 224 Adam, 1993:9.
- 225 Ibid.:21.
- 226 Local residents said in the interviews, "it was similar to the relationship between SAGAL [a cotton company] and peasants" (Ibid.:20).
- 227 BO 51, 17.12.1955, in Departamento de História, 1993:234.
- 228 See Graph 9 which shows the population outflow. The average annual income of cotton growers from 1950 to 1955 was 240 escudos. It was only 96 escudos in years of 1955 to 1956 (Ibid.:233).
- 229 Dias and Guerreiro, 1958:13-15.
- 230 Chambino, 1968:449-450. However, not much is known about the role that the Catholic Church, other than the Portuguese Church, played in the decolonisation of Mozambique.
- 231 Bravo, 1963:145.
- 232 Ibid.:142-145.
- 233 Ibid.:179.
- 234 Adam, 1993:23.
- 235 Departamento de História, 1993:237.
- 236 Alpers, 1984:381.
- 237 Adam, 1993:23-24.
- 238 Mondlane, 1969:104.
- 239 Interview by History Department of Eduardo Mondlane University (Departamento de História, 1993:234).
- 240 One of them was the Tanganyika-Mozambique Makonde Union (Ibid.:240).
- 241 Adam, 1993:26. According to Adam, it was based on a self-help group of Makondes though the

official name is unknown. A book edited by the Departamento de História refers to an ethnic but “progressive” self-help group which formed the basis of the MANU (Departamento de História, 1993:241). This is probably the same group. The former is based on the interviews of Vanomba’s relatives while the latter is based on colonial documents.

242 Adam, 1993:26.

243 Ibid.:26-27.

244 Dias and Guerreiro, 1959:10.

245 They criticised the rapidly growing Zionist Church as, “conducting a large-scale conversion, being our enemy, spreading the communist ideology from the revolutionary Russia via South Africa, and using a dangerous slogan, ‘Africa for Africans’” (AHM-FGG, no. 224: Annual report of the Diocese of Beira, 1947). The criticism of the regime by the bishop of Beira, as that of the Dutch Catholic Church, may have been the result of the trend among Africans who were converting to a “new religion”, and avoiding the Catholic Church which was linked to colonial rule.

246 In 1967 Pope Johan Paul II visited Portugal and gave 150,000 dollars to the government for its “overseas provinces”. The pope also commended the PIDE chief, Silva Pais (*Mozambique Revolution*, no. 44, 1970 Jul.–Sep.:25). The pope later changed his position and, on 1 July 1970, met the leaders of FRELIMO, the PAIGC and the MPLA, which were seeking the independence of Portuguese colonies in Africa.

247 Mondlane, 1969:71.

248 The most influential among them were the Presbyterian Church in the south and the America Board Mission in central Mozambique. The Africa Methodist Episcopal Church and the Anglican Church also played an important role. For further details on the influence of Protestant churches in the south and central Mozambique, see Cruz e Silva, 2001.

249 Mondlane, 1969:71.

250 Some say he was born in Machanga (Neves, 1998:291), but this book follows the report by a colonial administrator based on the interrogation of Sixpence Simango, an old friend and student of Kamba (AHM: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, cx.21, no. 18, “Certidão, 30/11/1955”:75). Barnabé Lucas Ncomo wrote that he was born in Maropanhe Locality (Ncomo, 2003:55).

251 Although not recorded in the colonial documents, Kamba studied at this school before going to the USA (Neves, 1998:291).

252 Andrade, 1989:127; AHM: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, cx.21, no. 18, “Certidão, 30/11/1955”:77. The colonial administrator pointed out the similarity between Kamba’s movement and the church for Africans in South Africa that split from the American Board and used the slogan of “Africa for Africans”.

253 For instance, the Associação do Culto Mahometano e Beneficência (AHM: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, cx.21, no. 18, “Certidão, 30/11/1955”:78).

254 The head of the Muslim Association came from the same area as Kamba.

255 Andrade, 1989:140; 142.

256 The establishment was approved by Decree-Law of 4 January 1947 (AHM: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, cx.21, no. 18, “Portaria 11.404”). The Núcleo Negrófilo had nine branches in total, including one in the Transvaal in South African and another in Umtali in Southern Rhodesia.

257 The administrator reported: “Just like an instance in Machanga, the Núcleo Negrófilo encourages local residents to rebel against the legal authority ... and conducts religious ceremony in a local language” (AHM: Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, cx.21, no. 296/1 Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil, em Lourenço Marques, 27/12/1955:1-2).

258 It probably means that the organisation attracted a lot of attention in the town.

259 AHM-FGG, no. 224: “Annual Report of the Diocese of Beira 1947”, 17/03/1948:16-17.

260 Ranger, 1985:25.

- 261 Revolts broke out in Machanga, Mambone and Búzi in the central part of the country, and Manjacaze and Xinavane in the south. The detail of these uprisings are still unknown.
- 262 The containment strategy was presented by George F. Kenan, then acting ambassador in Moscow, in 1946. The Truman Doctrine was announced in the State of the Union Address on 12 March 1947.
- 263 NSC 48/2, on the position of the United States of America with respect to Asia, December 30, 1949.
- 264 NSC 64, "On the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina", 27 February 1950.
- 265 NSC 68, "On the United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", 14 April 1950.
- 266 Dulles to Frank C. Laubach, 31 October 1950, Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, in Kolko, 1987:80-81.
- 267 The domino effect is a phenomenon where it is speculated that if one region comes under the influence of communism, the surrounding countries follow like a falling domino. It was the basis of US foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1980s.
- 268 See, for example, US Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975.
- 269 Interview with Ahílio Pires, who was one of those interns, in Santos, 2000:41. Later, Pires became a liaison officer between the CIA and the PIDE.
- 270 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943: vol. II:558-561.
- 271 Hanzawa, 2001:83.
- 272 Decree-Law no. 2066, 1953.
- 273 Consequently, the term "colony" is used here unless otherwise indicated, even when referring to the period after 1951.
- 274 The Bandung Conference was originally held as part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Representatives from Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Gold Coast (Ghana) attended.
- 275 After the Bandung Conference, the Asian-African solidarity movement became active at a civic level. The first Asia, Africa, Latin-America People's Solidarity Movement was held in December 1957 (Nakamura, 1998:193).
- 276 Teixeira, 1998:81.
- 277 Nkrumah, speech at the Parliament, 4 July 1960.
- 278 Oda, 1996:242.
- 279 Fanon, 1969:155-159.
- 280 Charles de Gaulle was inaugurated as the president of France at the end of 1958. The self-determination of Algeria was approved in a referendum in January 1960, although fierce battles continued until its independence on 1 July 1962.
- 281 Fanon, 1984:123. Fanon also made it clear that the decolonisation movement from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s could not be separated from international politics.
- 282 According to the 1950/51 annual report, there were only eight hospitals in Mozambique. Rural villages had only primary health care centres. Also, regional disparity was significant. Of the 149 doctors, 52 were stationed in Lourenço Marques and 26 in Beira (Anuário, 1951-1952:52-53).
- 283 Around this time, researchers disclosed one harsh reality after another of Portugal's Overseas Provinces. Partly because of this, the government hastily attempted to improve figures and revise laws.
- 284 Anuário, 1951-52:136-144. Gómez cites the number as 165,729, based on the 1980 documents of the Department of Education (Gómez, 1999:68). The figure probably includes whites (11,520).
- 285 The annual report cites the total *non-civilizado* population as 5,640,363 (Anuário, 1951-52:20). By this time the "*assimilado*" (assimilated person) and the "*indígena*" (native) were called the "*civilizado*" (civilised person) and the "*non-civilizado*" (uncivilised person) respectively.
- 286 There were only 31 Protestant mission schools and 36 public schools (Gómez, 1999:131). In the same year, 116 dioceses were set up all over Mozambique; 37 in Lourenço Marques, 41 in Beira and 38 in Nampula (Ibid.:96).
- 287 Ibid.:146-155. All in all, there were 902 secondary school students.

- 288 Women constituted 37 per cent (665 out of 1,776) in the 1940/41 report and 41 per cent (770 out of 1,788) in 1951/52 (Anuário, 1940-1941:21; Anuário, 1951-52 Ibid.:21). Many of the female *assimilado* lived in Lourenço Marques and Beira: 59 per cent in 1940 and 64 per cent in 1950 (Ibid.).
- 289 Ibid.:477. Mozambique was allowed to send representatives to the Portuguese parliament, but it was allocated only three seats out of 120 (Shepherd, 1962:108).
- 290 Universal education had a greater social impact than education for a selected few.
- 291 In the 1950s, rudimentary primary education was renamed as “rudimentary education for adaptation” and was included in “primary education”.
- 292 The number of students at church schools was 385,304 in 1957/58 and 401,581 in 1960/61. Education offered by the church was still important for Africans (Anuário, 1962:160).
- 293 Gómez, 1999:68.
- 294 Decree-Law no. 35.962 of 20 November 1946.
- 295 It belonged to the Ministério de Ultramar.
- 296 Following the amendment of the Constitution, it was renamed as the Instituto Superior de Estudos Ultramarinos (Higher Institute of Overseas Provinces Studies) in 1954.
- 297 In 1961, the academy was incorporated into the Universidade Técnica de Lisboa (Lisbon University of Technology) (Sousa, 2000:7-9).
- 298 CEA: pasta 9/c.
- 299 The resulting report was Dias and Guerreiro (1959). Dias also published the ethnography of Makondes as *Os Macondes de Moçambique* in 1964, which was republished by the Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses (National Commission for Commemoration of the Portuguese Discovery) in 1998.
- 300 These include António Rita-Ferreira, who published *Agrupamento* (Ethnic Groupings) (Overseas Provinces Research Council) in 1958, and Alexandre Lobato, a historian and an MP from Mozambique.
- 301 Dias and Guerreiro, 1959:15-16.
- 302 For example, in April 1962 the historian Alexandre Lobato demanded further economic independence and the decentralisation of administration in the colonies (Garcia, 2003:95).
- 303 Anuário, 1951-52:470-471.
- 304 Ibid.:470-471.
- 305 Ibid.:220-221. Women numbered 237 and 450 respectively.
- 306 Ibid.:474.
- 307 The number of employees almost quintupled to 3,203 in 1968 and 3,580 in 1972 (Mateus, 2004:24; 34).
- 308 The author’s interview with J.V., a son of an immigrant who became a principal at a secondary school in Lourenço Marques (J.V. Maputo, 28/3/1999).
- 309 Figueiredo, 1998:357. Figueiredo himself was an activist and an emigrant to Mozambique.
- 310 According to a PIDE document, the Angolan PIDE discovered the pamphlets of an opposition group in cargo travelling from Lisbon to Mozambique and warned the Mozambican PIDE (IAN/TT.PIDE/DGS.Serviços Centrais, Eleições Presidenciais de 1958, proc.1546/57, vol 3, fls.589-592). The pamphlets were addressed to Santos, a Portuguese lawyer living in Mozambique (Ibid.:361-362).
- 311 Santos, 2000:53.
- 312 Soares and Cavaco pointed out that eligible voters (1,198,322) constituted only 14.6 per cent of the entire population (8,182,647) (Soares and Cavaco, 1998:497-498).
- 313 Antunes, 1994:76. PIDE Óscar Cardoso, a prominent PIDE member, denied the allegation in an interview (Santos, 2000:75). However, the author’s investigation of the diplomatic documents at the US National Archives II suggests that Delgado was not very popular in the Portuguese embassy in Washington D.C. or the foreign ministry in Lisbon. Therefore, it is unclear how close his relationship with the USA actually was (NAII, SDLF RG59, Entry 5296, EUR/SPP, Record

- Relating to Portugal 1957-1966, Box 1; NA II SDCE, RG59, EUR/SPP, 1960-63, Box 1813).
- 314 Ibid.; Gouda, 2000:453.
- 315 Soares and Cavaco, 1998:363. Residents in the colonies were allowed to vote, but there were only 133,665 eligible voters in all the colonies combined, which was only 9.5 per cent of the total eligible voters. General Delgado obtained 34.1 per cent of votes in Mozambique, higher than in any other colonies or islands. Moreira argues that the reasons for this lie in the distance from Portugal, the degree of urbanisation and industrialisation, the strength of external links and a campaign by Alameda Santos, a prominent lawyer (Moreira, 1998:498-505).
- 316 Ibid.:367-368.
- 317 The exception was the Movimento Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Movement), formed by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and General Delgado, which advocated a united front with colonised people (Garcia, 2003:90-91).
- 318 Atunnes, 1996:641-646. The headquarters were established in Lourenço Marques. A liaison office with the army was set up in 1972.
- 319 Decree-Laws, nos. 41.559 and 41.577.
- 320 In 1957/58, two were sent to Belgium, three to Spain and three to Algeria (a French anti-guerrilla school) (Afonso and Matos, 2000:32-33). In 1958/59, five officers went to the United Kingdom and learned about the experience in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. In 1959, six officers received training with 200 French officers at an anti-guerrilla training centre in Alger (Cann, 1997:40-41).
- 321 St. Mark, 1990:81.
- 322 Correia, 2000:13.
- 323 As explained in the introduction, this book uses “subversion” and “counter-subversion” in inverted commas when describing the strategy adopted by the Portuguese colonial authority.
- 324 Between 1958 and 1960, they mainly studied the experience of the United Kingdom and France (Cann, 1997:40-47).
- 325 “Subversão e Contra-subversão” (1963).
- 326 According to Shepherd, the Portuguese minister of Overseas Provinces visited South Africa in 1959 and stated as follows: “We are accomplishing a parallel task in our territories and, if Western civilization is threatened on this continent, South Africa and Portugal now should work together” (Shepherd, 1962:115).
- 327 According to Nuno Severiano Teixeira, a historian on Portuguese external relations, the main problem for Portugal’s diplomacy between 1956 and 1961 was a “colonial issue” (Teixeira, 1998:81).

CHAPTER 4

World Politics from 1960 to 1975 and Mozambique's Liberation Struggle

This chapter explores both international and domestic influences during the 1960s and how these impacted on Mozambique's liberation struggle.

The beginning of the volatile 1960s and the international situation

Change in the international situation towards decolonisation

Asahiko Hanzawa, a political scientist specialising in the decolonisation process, commented in an article entitled "The end of the Cold War and World Politics in the 1960s" published in *International Relations* that:

"Any form of colonialism is the act of evil", now an international norm, was still in the formative stage in the 1950s. At the beginning of the 1960s, it became without doubt the mainstream ideology in the international community.¹

He pointed out that the expansion of anti-colonialism within the United Nations had contributed to this significant shift in thinking. However, there were many contributing factors and it took many years of struggle, influenced by regional power relations, as well as the Cold War, before southern Africa felt the full effects of liberation.

Youichi Kibata, an international relations historian who used Southeast Asia as a case study to demonstrate the process of the disintegration of the British Empire, presented three theories to explain decolonisation, each of which emphasises different factors: (1) factors relating to the colonies; (2) factors relating to international situations; and (3) factors relating to the imperialism of the metropolises.² Hanzawa's approach would be embraced by the second theory. However, as John Darwin, a historian of the British Empire, and Kibata point out, the collapse of the empire cannot be explained by one of these factors alone.³

British prime minister at the time, Maurice Harold Macmillan, aptly expressed the rapid changes in international politics in the following seminal speech to the South African Parliament (South Africa being the bastion of white rule) in February 1960:

In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through Asia ... Today the same thing is happening in Africa, and the most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national consciousness ... The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.⁴

The turn of phrase “the wind of change” is still used today as a symbolic expression to describe the inevitability of decolonisation in Africa against the backdrop of changing international politics. However, Macmillan did not intend to abandon imperialism altogether, as it was originally interpreted. Rather he was urging the white rulers in South Africa to take a more conciliatory attitude. The Macmillan administration itself maintained the policy of “orderly decolonisation”, the gradual transfer of rights to the colonies.⁵ The idea was not particular to the United Kingdom but was already well established among colonial powers by the end of the Second World War. The metropolises were trying to retain their positions in international politics by becoming the centre of a group consisting of themselves and their ex-colonies, such as the Commonwealth and the *Communauté française* (French Community).

After the Suez Crisis in 1956 however, the United States of America pressured the United Kingdom and France into decolonisation, worrying that newly independent countries would turn to the Soviet Union. Allen Welsh Dulles, the director of the CIA, commented on the Suez Crisis in the US National Security Council as follows:

Unless we now assert and maintain this leadership all of these newly independent countries will turn from us to the USSR. We will be looked upon as forever tied to British and French colonialist policies. In short, the United States would survive or go down on the basis of the fate of colonialism if the United States supports the French and the British on the colonial issues. Win or lose, we will share the fate of Britain and France.⁶

As discussed in the previous chapter, John Foster Dulles, the US secretary of state who had proposed the “roll back policy” advocated at the beginning of the 1950s that colonial powers be preferred to the liberation force as “the lesser of two evils” as they tended to be pro-communism. Facing the Suez Crisis, however, US government officials who saw the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement promoted at the Bandung Conference in 1955, began to search for an alternative to choosing one of the two evils.⁷

The US government’s stance began to appear in its dealings with the United Nations. For example, Dulles sent the following official telegram to the US Embassy in France

concerning the reluctance of the French government to approve Guinea's admission to the UN:

We frankly see serious difficulties for US abstain ... At the same time we look with grave concern at possibility US voting differently from France in SC [Security Council] on issue of importance to France ... If Western powers should abstain or even if friendly SC members fail to sponsor Guinea's request this will be exploited by elements unfriendly US and France, and Guinea's admission will appear to be obtained solely through Soviet and Afro-Asian efforts. Repercussions of this on Guinea in particular and Africa in general could be serious for overall Western interests ... It is accordingly our strong hope that France may yet find it possible or at least agree to sponsor Guinea's admission ...⁸

In the end, the French government rejected the US government's plea and voted against Guinea's admission to the UN on the grounds that a bilateral negotiation between France and Guinea had not been concluded. Yet, as reflected by the change in the United States' foreign policy, the pressure on colonial powers in the international arena grew increasingly strong towards the end of the 1950s.

So too was the British government obliged to hasten its process of decolonisation. In January 1957 the Official Committee on Colonial Policy compiled a report at the request of Prime Minister Macmillan, to allow some of its colonies to become independent within ten years.⁹ The report concluded by stating: "any premature withdrawal of authority by the United Kingdom would seem bound to add to the areas of stress and discontent in the world," indicating the commitment of the British government to gradual decolonisation.¹⁰

By the end of the 1950s, and particularly after the Sinai War, the Macmillan administration had begun to lose its hold and found itself confronted with liberation movements in many colonies. It was also feeling the burden of economic ties with its colonies. Consequently, the government started to look at the option of granting independence if a colony wished and if it had so-called credible political leaders with a certain degree of public backing.¹¹ This policy was promoted by Iain MacLeod, who became the secretary of state for the colonies in 1959. His African policy was based on the following idea:

Were the countries fully ready for independence? Of course not. Nor was India, and the bloodshed that followed the grant of independence there was incomparably worse than anything that has happened since to any country. Yet the decision of the Attlee Government was the only realistic one. Equally we could not possibly have held by force to our territories in Africa. We could not, with an enormous force engaged, even continue to hold the small island of Cyprus. General de Gaulle could not contain Algeria. The march of men towards their freedom can be guided, but not halted. Of course there were risks in moving quickly. But the risks of moving slowly were far greater.¹²

“The risks of moving slowly” meant that the increasing dissatisfaction with colonial rule could well lead to the rise of a radical liberation movement and, as a result, former colonies would be incorporated into the Eastern bloc, rather than joining the framework prepared by the United Kingdom, such as the Commonwealth. The loss of many years of economic rights and interests in the colonies would be another risk. The Belgian government and the country’s business sector had the same concerns, leading to its round table discussions at the end of 1960 to review Congo’s independence.

It was in this international climate that, in 1960, a series of incidents which further prompted decolonisation took place: the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa; and the sudden announcement by France and Belgium that they were granting independence to their African colonies.¹³

The Sharpeville Massacre in which the police force killed and injured many black South African protesters demonstrating against the apartheid regime, ignited strong international criticism towards the white South African government and its apartheid system. Responding to the incident, an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council passed a resolution to condemn South Africa and set a precedent that the principle of non-intervention, stipulated in Article 2 Clause 7 of the UN Charter, would not be applicable on issues of the race and colonies.¹⁴ Moreover, at the fifteenth United Nations General Assembly, the following request was made to all member states: “[Requests all States] to consider taking such separate and collective action as is open to them, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to bring about the abandonment of these policies.”¹⁵

Belgium and France’s sudden change of attitude towards their colonial policies shocked Britain, which prided itself in its “progressive” colonial policies.¹⁶ The decisive moment for the British government’s colonial policy came when the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (UN Resolution, 1514XV) was adopted on 14 December 1960 at the fifteenth UN General Assembly. With this resolution, “self-determination”, which used to be understood as a “principle” in the UN Charter, became a “right”. This was expressed in the second paragraph as “all people have a right to self-determination”.¹⁷ Furthermore, proclaiming that “colonialism should be brought to a speedy and unconditional end”, it sent a strong message to colonial powers. The resolution, jointly proposed by 43 Asian and African nations, was adopted, with 89 nations voting in its favour. There was not a single negative vote and only nine nations, including the United Kingdom, France and the USA abstained.¹⁸

Discussions about the proposed resolution had been taking place in the US government since October 1960. As the Soviet Union was said to have proposed the resolution, the USA considered counter-measures such as proposing a resolution to declare Soviet expansion as colonialism, submitting a counter-resolution or an amendment to the Soviet draft, and attempting to secure massive abstentions or negative votes. When Asian and African nations, rather than the Soviet Union, submitted a draft incorporating US recommendations, President Eisenhower decided to cast a Yes vote.¹⁹ However, after receiving a telegram from Macmillan, “our strongest ally”, he changed his mind and ordered abstention.²⁰ The US government ultimately demonstrated its alliance with

Britain but the fact that it was prepared to cast a Yes vote shocked the British government.

At the same assembly, a harsh resolution was passed against the Portuguese government on 15 December. Resolution 1542XV, concerning the "Transmission of Information under Article 73e of the Charter", regarded the "overseas provinces" of Portugal and Spain as non-self-governing territories and demanded that Portugal clarify its responsibilities on these territories and disclose information immediately.²¹ This translated into open criticism by the UN General Assembly of Portuguese colonial rule. It basically declared that what Portugal claimed were "overseas territories as integral parts of metropolitan Portugal" were in fact colonies.²² This resolution became the foundation of UN resolutions related to Portugal.²³

Many discussions took place within the US government prior to this resolution. In the National Security Council in January 1960, President Eisenhower urged Portugal to adopt the most enlightened policies in Africa to gain long-term benefit.²⁴ On his visit to Portugal in the same year, he tried to persuade the Portuguese government to learn from France's mistakes and to make an effort to have nationalist movements in Africa on the side of the West, instead of trying to silence them by force.²⁵ However, Portugal's prime minister, António de Oliveira Salazar, rejected Eisenhower's pledge by stating, "African Nationalist forces were allied with communists."²⁶ In the end, the US abstained from voting. Christian Herter, the state secretary, explained the reason for the US abstention to its permanent mission to the UN simply as "to take the unprecedented action in singling out Portugal and Spain will not, we believe, produce desired results", avoiding the issue related to the legitimacy of Portuguese colonies.²⁷

Resolution 1542XV was adopted with 68 in favour and 17 abstentions – clearly indicating the harsh international opinion against the Salazar government. The sixteenth UN General Assembly set up the "Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" to monitor the implementation of the resolution. Unlike the information committee mentioned earlier, it had a mandate not only to discuss, decide and recommend on all aspects of colonial issues, but also to listen to colonised people and to dispatch missions of inquiry.

East–West rivalry over decolonisation and Africa

On 6 January 1961, less than a month after the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted by the UN General Assembly, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, announced Soviet support for "national liberation wars" all over the world.²⁸ Earlier in 1956, Khrushchev had launched a new approach towards the decolonisation movement at the twentieth Party Congress.²⁹ Until then, the Soviet Union had maintained Stalin's stance that "[t]he Nehrus, Nkrumahs, Sukarnos and Bellas were servants of their indigenous upper classes" and that Africa should wait for the communist revolution.³⁰

After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev launched an aggressive foreign policy towards the Third World, in which the Soviet Union would support anybody, socialist or not, that sought help from her.³¹ As a result, leaders of liberation movements in Africa moved closer to the Soviet Union.³² This initiative by Khrushchev was not new in Soviet history. Lenin regarded colonies as “the weakest link” of imperialism and came to the conclusion that an alliance between the Soviet Union and the colonised would make certain “the final victory of socialism”.³³ Also, it is well known that the Communist International (Comintern) officially included colonial issues in its strategy to achieve world revolution in the Second World Congress in 1920.³⁴

On the other hand, the US policy towards colonial issues, as discussed earlier, was not consistent in the late 1950s. This could well have been a reflection of the many challenges it was facing during this period. The civic movement in Japan opposing the renewal of the security treaty with the USA, the collapse of pro-USA governments in Korea and Turkey, a succession of anti-USA riots in Central and South America, the intensification of conflicts in South East Asia and the closer relationship between Cuba under Castro and the Soviet Union – all of these promoted the multi-polarisation of world politics and lowered the relative position of the USA. The change of climate was most notable in the UN General Assembly. A report by the International Bureau of the State Department compiled on 4 March 1959 noted that a combination of Asian and African votes (34 or 35) and communist votes (10) would together surpass more than half of the total number of votes (87). The report also analysed the influence of the increasing number of African member states. It concluded that the USA was no longer in a leadership position in the UN General Assembly and that the opinions of Asian and African nations, working together with the communist states, would control the colonial issues.³⁵

On 7 January 1960, the US permanent mission to the UN dispatched the following official telegram, indicating the difficulty of attracting African nations to the Western bloc:

Growing importance of African group in UN ... and tendency of Africans (including Liberia and Ethiopia to increasing degree) toward “neutralism” pose important problems for US in coming years. One key problem is to assure as effective a pro-Western leadership within African group as possible.³⁶

Within the US government, some tried to use African nations to gain advantage in the East–West confrontation while others sought to alleviate the confrontation itself. In 1959, Khrushchev visited the USA and met his counterpart in Camp David. The Eisenhower administration was beginning to recognise that “the small number of old powers” alone could not build a fort in order to contain Soviet expansion.

A month after the resolution on decolonisation was adopted, Eisenhower left office and John F. Kennedy was inaugurated on 20 January 1961. In order to indicate its departure from the previous Republican government, the USA cast a “Yes” vote, together with the Soviet Union, to a resolution of the UN Security Council on 9 June 1961 that condemned the armed suppression of the Angolan liberation movement by the Portuguese Armed

Forces. The gesture elicited enthusiastic applause from the Third World.³⁷ The United Kingdom and France abstained. The USA's "Yes" vote indicated a shift of focus from the NATO alliance to anti-minority rule and anti-colonialism. Kennedy also announced that his government would not allow Portugal to use NATO military equipment outside the North Pacific.³⁸

Decolonisation had become mainstream in world politics. Salazar's insistence on referring to colonies as overseas provinces looked ludicrous. By 1963, the United Kingdom, a former champion of "progressive" colonial policies and one of the last colony holders, granted independence to Tanganyika (later Tanzania), Uganda and Kenya.

Most colonies on the African continent gained independence from France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Yet the road to liberation remained unclear in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia where white settlers held power, as well as in Portuguese colonies where the metropole continued to dictate.

The Portuguese policy on the Kennedy administration

International change, and in particular the US government's shifting stance, raised the expectations of people in the colonies and heightened Portugal's sense of isolation, as it had considered the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as its last hope.³⁹ On her visit to Lisbon at the end of October 1960, Janet Mondlane, the wife of Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), reported seeing the phrase "*Abaixo América*" (Down America) written on walls all over the city and citizens holding an anti-US gathering in front of the balcony from which Salazar usually made his speeches.⁴⁰ A similar gathering was held after the UN resolution of 9 June 1961.⁴¹

In the speech entitled "The Portuguese Overseas Territories and the United Nations Organization" made during the extraordinary session of the National Assembly held on 30 June 1961, Salazar analysed the change in US policy towards Portugal as follows:

Although with different intentions, the US is now engaging on a parallel policy to the Russian one in Africa [to subvert it as a way to get round and overcome the resistance put up by Europe], perhaps because of its strong idealism, perhaps also as a result of its historical past, which does not provide us with any analogy. Fundamentally this policy is weakening Europe's resistance and depriving it of its human, strategic or economic strong points, for its own defence and the defence of Africa itself, and it is therefore irreconcilable with what America seeks to do through the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴²

Salazar then explained his understanding of "overseas territories":

It was clearly a serious misunderstanding to consider the Portuguese overseas territories as mere colonies ... The Portuguese nation, the moral principles which underlay the discoveries and our colonization have meant that national

territory knows no form of discrimination and that multi-racial societies have been formed, redolent of the spirit of friendly intercourse and cooperation and only for that reason peace-loving political integration would not spring from a complete assimilation but especially from the fraternization established without distinction of belief or colour, and the creation of the consciousness of a common nation and common homeland, obviously far faster than the limited horizon bounding the movements of men and their tribes.⁴³

He declared his determination:

Whatever the difficulties we meet with and whatever the sacrifices we are called upon to make to overcome them, I can see no other attitude for us than to continue on our way. This decision is the dictate of the national conscience which I feel in unison with those whom we have charged with the task of defending the land of the Homeland in far-off territories by force of arms. This decision is imposed on us by all those, white, black or half-caste who work, struggle, die or see their families cut to pieces, and who by their very martyrdom confirm that Angola is part of the land of Portugal!⁴⁴

Clearly, Salazar did not yield to the international pressure he was under. On the contrary, it appeared to make him even more persistent in retaining his policy of “overseas territories”. He brushed off Kennedy’s Africa policy as “self-defeating” and “benefiting only the communists”.⁴⁵ Moreover, in retaliation for the Yes vote of the USA to the UN resolution condemning Portugal, he immediately announced that his government would not renew the lease agreement of the air force base in the Açores, which was to expire in 1962.⁴⁶



The Bureau of European Affairs (“the Europeanists”) and the Bureau of African Affairs (“the Africanists”) within the US State Department could not agree on how to handle the situation.⁴⁷ For the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of International Affairs, “tolerance” towards Portugal’s blatant colonial rule was not an option while the Bureau of European Affairs and the US national forces considered the strategic importance of the archipelago.⁴⁸ Military research in July 1960 concluded that the air base in the Açores was too important to lose because of its strategic location between the Middle East and the US.⁴⁹

As seen in the resolution on Angola, Kennedy’s stance was less pro the colonies than his predecessor. However, when it came to policies relating to East–West conflict, he was more confrontational and placed anti-communism at the centre of his Third World strategy. Therefore, Portugal presented a problematic case for the Kennedy administration.⁵⁰

Kennedy’s first State of the Union Message demonstrated his anti-communism stance and his sense of crisis over the growing influence of the Eastern bloc. He emphasised that “time has not been our friend” and that “the first great obstacle is still our relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China”, adding that, “our task is to convince them that aggression and subversion will not be profitable routes to pursue these ends”.⁵¹

1

Niassa Province immediately after the end of the war




- 1 A church destroyed by MNR/ RENAMO (Mecanhelas, Niassa, 1994)
- 2 Women lining up to vote in the 1994 election (Cuamba, Niassa, 1994)
- 3 A demobilised government soldier (Cuamba, Niassa, 1994)
- 4 A child with a self-made UN car (Lichinga, Niassa, 1994)

People who fought in the Liberation War



- 1 FRELIMO veterans from Niassa (Pemba, Cabo Delgado, 2005)
- 2 A FRELIMO veteran from Maúá (Cuamba, Niassa, 1999)
- 3 A FRELIMO veteran from Maúá (Cuamba, Niassa, 1999)



4 A former *sipaio* who had been operational in Maúá (Maúá, Niassa, 1999)

5 A former militiaman who operated in Maúá (Maúá, Niassa, 2002)

6 A former GE (Grupo Especial) member (Majune, Niassa, 1999)

7 A former 'guide' of the local colonial authority (Maúá, Niassa, 1994)

8 Ex-African soldiers of the Portuguese Armed Forces (Maúá, Niassa)

9 An ex-soldier of the Portuguese army who had been stationed in Maúá in the 1960s (Cuamba, Niassa, 1999)

Makhuwa traditional authorities



- 1 A *curandeira* (traditional healer) (Maúa, Niassa, 1997)
- 2 The grave of Muwa II, now a location of worship (Maúa, Niassa, 1999)
- 3 A *banja* (meeting) of traditional leaders with a local administrator (Maúa, Niassa, 1999)





4 Mwene/Régulo Muwa (Muwa VII) (Maúa, Niassa, 1997)




5 "Heart of the Makuwas, Mount Namuli (Zambézia, 1999)


6 Makuwa-Metto Mwenes/ Régulos who were detained in the Ibo prison in the 1960s (Namuno, Cabo Delgado, 2005)



Women of Maúá



1



3



2

- 1 A woman crushing *mapira* near the Lúrio River (Maúá, Niassa, 1999)
- 2 Young girls crushing *mapira* near the Lúrio River (Maúá, Niassa, 2006)
- 3 A woman peeling cassava (Maúá, Niassa, 2009)
- 4 *Mapira*, the traditional staple food of the Makhuwas (Maúá, Niassa, 1999)



4

Migrant workers from Maúa



- 1 A former migrant worker who returned home from Southern Rhodesia in front of his "Rhodesian"-style house (Maúa, Niassa, 1999)
- 2 Migrant workers and their descendants from Maúa (Zanzibar, 2006)
- 3 A former tobacco plantation worker in Tanganyika who has planted tobacco next to his house in Mozambique (Majune, Niassa, 1999)

Colonial documents and propaganda leaflets from the Liberation War



- 1 A leaflet distributed by the Portuguese army as part of their “psychological” operations: “There is war in the forest. There is peace in the *aldeamentos* (settlements).” (Henriksen Collection)
- 2 “Present yourselves to us. Inform us where the guerrillas are hiding weapons. You will be treated well and rewarded.” (Henriksen Collection)
- 3 A colonial document marked “Classified”. It lists the number of residents who surrendered to the administration. (Situation Report of the Niassa District, November 1969)

Legacy of the colonial occupation



- 1 Cotton fields (Cuamba, Niassa, 1994)
- 3 A cannon at the fort (Mozambique Island, Nampula, 1997)

As for the Third World strategy, the USA sent a military advisor to Vietnam in February 1961, violating the Geneva Accord.⁵² On 17 April, it carried out an abortive invasion of Cuba (the Bay of Pigs Invasion). In his Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs on 25 May, Kennedy declared that the Third World was the “great battleground for the defence and expansion of freedom today” and asserted that revolutions supported by communists in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America were a threat to US security and a challenge to the international order that the USA had tried to protect throughout the twentieth century.⁵³

According to Kan Matsuoka, who conducted a study on Kennedy diplomacy, “the Third World was a dangerous battlefield between democracy and communism” and “the decline of former colonial powers, the appearance of a dangerous vacuum, the aggressive assistance by the Soviet Union and its increase of prestige and influence, posed serious problems for the US.”⁵⁴ The situation developed just as Frantz Fanon predicted – discussed in the previous chapter.⁵⁵

Fearing the appearance of a “dangerous vacuum” and taking the strategic importance of the Açores into account, US policy became “flexible” by the time the agreement was about to expire.⁵⁶ The US ambassador to Portugal, the Bureau of European Affairs, military officials and the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services campaigned actively and managed to involve heavyweights such as Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defence, and Walt W. Rostow, a major advisor on national security under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Finally, President Kennedy discussed the matter with Franco Nogueira, the Portuguese foreign minister, on 24 October 1961. Prior to the meeting, the State Department made the following suggestion to the President:⁵⁷

You might then say that the occasions in the recent past when we have taken a position opposed to that of Portugal have given us no joy or elation. On the contrary, we have sincerely regretted the necessity of doing so ... The US has no ambitions to displace Portugal or another power in Africa, politically, economically, commercially, or in any other way ... We hope Portugal will accept these assurances of our good faith, so that we can work more closely together in the future.⁵⁸

It is not certain whether Kennedy followed this advice. However by the end of 1962 many government officials had stopped making remarks against Portugal's overseas territories. On 11 December 1962, the USA, together with the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, voted against the UN arms embargo against Portugal.⁵⁹

This would infer that of the two evils, colonialism and communism, the US government opted for the former. However, the international environment became a harsher one for Third World leaders and liberation movements in the colonies. Rostow wrote in his memoir:

They [leaders of the Third World] built their domestic policies, in varying degrees, around continued “anticolonialism” as a hopefully unifying theme in

inherently fragmented societies. They established, essentially, one-man rule. And they engaged in more or less bloody exercises in the expansion of power in their regions. The roster of leaders that fall into this category includes: Mao, Ho, Castro, Sukarno, Nasser, and Nkrumah.⁶⁰

Rostow perceived armed struggle for decolonisation as a communist tactic, and assistance given by a newly independent country to the colonised as an action to expand its influence to surrounding regions.⁶¹

This view was substantively different from the sentiment of African leaders fighting for liberation. Julius Nyerere, leader of the Tanganyikan liberation movement who later became Tanzania's first president, said in July 1961:

This means that the people who anxiously watch to see whether we will become "Communists" or "Western democrats" will both be disconcerted. We do not have to be either.⁶²

Sékou Touré, who was Guinea's first president, expressed the following sentiment in his autobiography:

Everybody desperately tried to draw us to this side or that side, but our wish was to remain on the side of Africa. The world does not consist of only the East and the West.⁶³

As the "lesser of two evils" Kennedy was not necessarily unsympathetic towards decolonisation or the liberation movement.⁶⁴ It emerged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Kennedy administration had contact with the leaders of liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique⁶⁵ and organised financial assistance, albeit a small amount, to be secretly delivered to them.⁶⁶ A similar overture had been made under the Eisenhower administration.⁶⁷ Even the Bureau of European Affairs said, that "[i]f the US does not maintain contact with Nationalist leaders, we face the risk that Communist powers will fill the gap which our lack of contact creates."⁶⁸

At the same time, being wary of the possibility of nationalist movements turning communist, the USA tried to justify its military involvement in Indochina as a "struggle of [the] free world against communist authoritarianism". Moreover, Kennedy agreed to Salazar's request to stop assistance to liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique in exchange for the use of the Açores.⁶⁹

As recorded in the following passage from an internal document of the State Department, Mondlane criticised the US government's change in stance in his talk delivered at the US FSI (Foreign Service Institute) on 24 August 1962:⁷⁰

Mr Mondlane was openly and repeatedly critical of the Department of State and the US Government. In the previous Administration he had been allowed

to come to the Department of State, although only on Saturdays, he said, but at present he cannot talk to Governor Williams. "I am not allowed to see him," he remarked. He strongly implied that activities of the public relations firm of Selva and Lee has recently produced a striking change in US official policy toward Portuguese African nationalists.⁷¹

After this incident, a call was made from the State Department to the FSI, requesting that Mondlane never be invited to give talks again.⁷²

Thus, in late 1962, the renewal of the Açores agreement turned the tide in favour of the Salazar administration. Consequently, a rift between African leaders seeking the liberation of Portuguese territories and the US government deepened. From 1962 onward, the Kennedy administration voted against all the UN resolutions against Portugal.⁷³

The ideology of liberation movement leaders in Africa

Anti-colonial movements in Africa could not escape the effects of the Cold War. African leaders around this time were more favourably disposed towards the Soviet Union than the USA. George W. Shepherd, who has studied African politics since the 1950s, cites two reasons for this: the Soviet Union transformed itself from a backward country into the second largest economic power in the world in 40 years; and African leaders approved of the ideological attacks by the Soviet Union on Western imperialism and white supremacy.⁷⁴ Moreover, Shepherd comments on the "political astuteness and positive leadership of many African nationalists". To this end he asserts: "Although anti-imperialist, they have not been taken in by Communist tactics. They mean to chart their own policies, independent of the pressures of both East and West."⁷⁵

The decolonisation movement in Africa was linked to pan-Africanism and the Non-Aligned Movement. As evident from Nyerere's address and Touré autobiography, African leaders desired to be freed from colonial rule and did not necessarily wish to be involved in the Cold War.⁷⁶

As Shepherd points out, the ideological basis of many African leaders was anti-imperialism. It was not only because of historical factors that pan-Africanism had been socialist-oriented but also because the thinking was directly related to internationalism and colonies as "the weakest link" of imperialism, as described by Lenin. Moreover, these African leaders understood how colonial rule had influenced their societies; grasped the international situation where decolonisation was a trend; learned from the process of liberation struggle and interacted with liberation organisations in Asia and Latin America.

This section will investigate the practical understanding of anti-imperialism by these African leaders and how they applied it.

As discussed in Chapter 1, colonial rule in Africa was established after the scramble for Africa by imperial powers at the end of the nineteenth century.⁷⁷ Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which was widely read among liberation leaders in Africa, states the relationship between imperialism and colonialism as follows:⁷⁸

The period being examined [the end of the nineteenth century] is characterised as the final stage of the division of the world. The word “final” does not mean that subdivision is impossible – to the contrary, subdivision is not only possible but inevitable – but it means that capitalist nations have completed their colonial occupation of all the previously unoccupied land on this planet ... Therefore, we are living in a unique age of “the last stage of capitalism” and the global colonial strategy, which is most closely linked to finance capital.⁷⁹

According to Lenin, the economic characteristics of imperialism are: (1) the rise of monopolies, resulting from the concentration of production and capital; (2) the rise of finance capital as the result of the merging of industrial cartels and banks; (3) the export of capital, rather than goods; (4) the division of the world market by international cartels; and (5) the completion of colonial division by imperialist powers.⁸⁰ Many liberation movements in the world during the 1960s embraced this theory, originally presented in 1916. At the first Tri-Continental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, held in Cuba in January 1966, African nationalist leader Amílcar Cabral announced that the 512 representatives from 82 countries on the three continents shared the following view with him:

The political statement drawn up by the international preparatory committee of this conference, for which we reaffirm our complete support, placed imperialism, by clear and succinct analysis, in its economic context and historical co-ordinate ... We will simply state that imperialism can be defined as a worldwide expression of the search for profits and the ever-increasing accumulation of *surplus value* by monopoly financial capital, centred in two parts of the world; first in Europe, and then in North America.⁸¹

Imperialism, which began to emerge as a contentious issue in the late nineteenth century, was still deemed problematic in the 1960s. This was partly due to the fact that many newly independent nations were not actually “independent”, politically or economically. The Congo Crisis is a good example.

The problems of decolonisation in Africa: the Congo Crisis

The Congo Crisis and the assassination of its first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, has been debated for many years. Different theories have been presented, emphasising different factors such as internal conflict, the Cold War, the UN peace-keeping operations and economic interests. Contemporary leaders of African liberation movements have interpreted the crisis in the context of neo-colonialism or imperialism. For example, Fanon wrote in February 1961:

Just before 1 July 1960, the Katanga operation was launched. Its purpose? Naturally, to safeguard Union Minière. But beyond this operation, it was the

Belgian view that was defended. A unified Congo with a central Government was counter to Belgian interests.⁸²

This view did not become the mainstream for a long time. The recent disclosure of official archives in the USA and Belgium, however, proved it was not far off the mark. After having closely studied archives, Ludo de Witte, a Belgian researcher, concluded that the primary responsibility for the assassination of Lumumba fell on the Katanga government, supported by Belgium and the USA, while stating, "Without the steps taken by Washington and the United Nations during the preceding months, the assassination could never have been carried out."⁸³ De Witte vividly described how the Belgian government created the Congo Crisis in order to protect its economic interest in the resource-rich Katanga and how various actors such as the USA, the UN, the Soviet Union and Congolese politicians responded.

Like Portugal, Belgium did not make an effort to educate its colonial subjects, instead it exploited them over many years. As discussed in Chapter 1, Portugal looked to the Belgian Congo as the model exemplar of forced cotton growing. Facing the world trend of decolonisation, Belgium started to educate some Africans to create *évolués* (enlightened people), just as Portugal created *civilizados*. As a result, a class of *évolués* came into being in the 1950s. However, the number was much smaller than in other colonies, and Congolese people were behind in organising themselves politically. Taking advantage of the situation, the Belgian government announced the concept of the Belgian Congo Community in 1954, an attempt to maintain its control over resource-rich Congo. As political awareness rapidly spread among Congolese people, however, Belgium decided in January 1960 to grant independence to Congo in June of that year and scheduled the first national election at the end of May. In other words, Congo had less than six months to prepare for its independence, as described by Hideo Oda:

No other African country was less prepared on the day of independence than the former Belgian Congo. None achieved its independence in a more unfortunate way than Congo. For Congo, its independence marked the beginning of unprecedented pandemonium.⁸⁴

Contrary to the expectations of the Belgian government, Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC: Congolese National Movement) won a landslide victory. Surprised by this unexpected situation, Belgium removed from the constitution the clause stipulating that provincial governments must be elected by proportional representation based on the result of the national election. As a result, Moïse Kapenda Tshombe formed a centralised government in Katanga.

Furthermore, Belgium began a military intervention into Congo, using as an excuse the "mutiny" of rank and file members of the Congolese army. When Congolese soldiers rose in revolt against the Belgian army in Katanga, the Katanga provincial government and Belgium dispatched troops, thereby triggering what has become known as the Congo Crisis.⁸⁵ On 11 July 1960, Tshombe, having kicked the Congolese national forces out of

the province, declared the independence of the State of Katanga and stated his strong opposition to communism.⁸⁶

Later it was disclosed that the secession had been contrived by the Belgian government in order to maintain economic rights and interests in Congo.⁸⁷ Katanga Province was a world-class treasure trove of mineral resources such as copper, manganese, lead, cobalt, uranium, radium, gold and diamonds. During the colonial era, Union Minière du Haut Katanga, a Belgium mining company, held an economic monopoly in the area. In order to enjoy the same economic advantage after independence, the Belgian government toppled the government of Lumumba, a unificationist and a fierce advocate of anti-neo-colonialism, and tried to establish a puppet state.

Initially, the Eisenhower administration did not think that the Congolese situation had anything to do with East–West confrontation. This is evident from the fact that the US secretary of state wrote, after meeting with the Belgian ambassador, that he was doubtful about the issue being related to the US–Soviet conflict.⁸⁸ However, the USA ignored a request by Lumumba to help bring the situation under control, instead showing allegiance to Belgium, a fellow NATO member state. In the end, the Congolese government requested assistance from the UN. On 14 July 1960, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and called upon Belgium to remove its troops.⁸⁹ However, the Belgium forces did not withdraw and Tshombe rejected the UN troops in Katanga. The ONUC was deployed all over Congo, excluding Katanga, and kept watch on the territories of the Congolese government.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the Katanga government steadily laid its foundations, and the situation escalated. Observing the situation, countries such as the Soviet Union, Ghana and Guinea offered assistance to Lumumba, but UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld blocked these offers, insisting that all assistance should go through the UN.⁹¹ Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga remarked as follows:

The people of the Congo do not understand why we, the victim of aggression, we who are in our own land ... are systematically and methodically disarmed while the aggressors, the Belgians, who are in our conquered country, still have their arms and all their firepower ... The UN forces allow Katanga to consolidate secession ...⁹²

Deciding that the UN was not to be relied on, Lumumba requested military assistance from the Soviet Union. On 23 August 1960, Soviet troops arrived. The CIA station chief in Leopoldville sent the following telegram to its headquarters on 18 August, warning that Congo could become another Cuba:

WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME ... ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TO TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.⁹³

In response, the US National Security Council (NSC) decided on the “removal of Lumumba”.⁹⁴ A week later Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, replied to the CIA office in Congo by a telegram: “Removal [of Lumumba] must be an urgent and prime objective ... a high priority of our covert action. You can act on your own authority where time does not permit referral here.”⁹⁵ Richard Bissell testified at a hearing at the UN Senate committee in 1975 that the CIA on the ground understood the telegram as the president sanctioning the assassination of Lumumba as a method of his “removal”.⁹⁶ Furthermore, the NSC approved a vast amount of assistance to Joseph Mobutu (later, Mobutu Sese Seko), chief of staff of the Congolese National Army, who led a successful coup in 1965.⁹⁷ According to Andrew Tully, a journalist who has a good knowledge of the CIA, Congolese leaders were not merely dependent on foreign governments such as the USA and Belgium but that “Mobutu was ‘discovered’ by the CIA”.⁹⁸

After having been captured by Mobutu, Lumumba was transferred to the Katanga Province and killed in February 1961. The Congo Crisis lasted until March 1965, involving Lumumba supporters, Tshombe supporters, the Belgian army, the UN forces, the USA and the Soviet Union.

The Congo Crisis had relevance for many liberation movements in Africa, including Mozambique's. In his memoir *Welensky's 4000 Days*, Sir Roy Welensky, the second and last prime minister of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,⁹⁹ expresses his sympathy towards Tshombe's idea of the secession of Katanga and reveals the fact that he repeatedly pleaded with Macmillan for the recognition of the Katanga state and the deployment of Rhodesian forces.¹⁰⁰ Although he never received approval from the Macmillan government, the Welensky government was clearly involved in the Katanga matters. After failing to resist UN attacks on Katanga in the end of 1962, Tshombe fled to Northern Rhodesia.¹⁰¹ According to Welensky, the reasons for the involvement of his government in the Congo Crisis are as follows:

The fact is that Tshombe is pro-western and Lumumba is not. If Lumumba wins control of the whole of the Congo there will be a strong Communist influence right in the middle of Africa. In the long term this is a position we should take every step to avoid ... To our mind the security of Southern Africa from Communism requires that the Katanga be recognised de facto by as many countries as possible ...¹⁰²

As Fanon points out, the federation felt a strong sense of crisis because Lumumba supported the liberation of the whole of Africa and declared that the liberation of Congo would be the first step towards the complete independence of central and southern Africa.¹⁰³ Moreover, according to a US diplomatic document on 9 August 1961, entitled “Congolese Army's Reported Arrest of Four Portuguese Soldiers in the Congo”, Portugal told the UN that, “the Portuguese Government might find it necessary to enter the Congo in order to wipe out entries of rebel activity across the border as a means of restoring order in Northern Angola”.¹⁰⁴

The Congo Crisis embodied all the issues that were dominant in Africa throughout the 1960s: (1) rivalries among liberation movements (or African leaders); (2) self-enriching leaders in newly independent nations; (3) the intervention of the world powers to protect their own economic interests; (4) the impact of the Cold War; (5) the involvement of the white regimes of southern Africa; and (6) the partiality of the United Nations. Ironically, the Congo Crisis broke out in 1960 – the most celebrated and remembered year in African history as “the year of Africa”. It represented the grave challenges that African decolonisation encountered. Afterwards the leaders of African liberation movements shared a sense of crisis and keenly felt the importance of such unity.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, they became wary of re-colonisation, or what many African leaders refer to as “neo-colonialism”.

African leaders began to discuss the concept of imperialism in relation to neo-colonialism. This was demonstrated in the General Declaration on the Abolition of Colonialism and Struggle against Neo-colonialism, presented at the fourth executive committee meeting of the Organisation of Solidarity with People of Asia, Africa and Latin America in April 1961, as well as being addressed in the following resolution at the third Asia, Africa, Latin-America People’s Solidarity Movement in February 1963:

Neo-colonialism, a new form of imperialism, especially US imperialism, perfunctorily approves the political independence of emerging countries while sacrificing them to the indirect and ingenious control by political, economic, social, military, and technological means. Hence, it is the largest threat for the African nations which have recently gained, or are about to gain, independence ... In order to maintain their hateful control and exploitation, imperialism and colonialism took on a disguised form of control by transferring authority to corrupt, treacherous agents.¹⁰⁶

Witnessing the birth of neo-colonialism, African leaders realised that in some ways the continent had not been truly liberated. Liberation movement leaders already engaged in armed struggle, such as those in Algeria and Portuguese colonies, were particularly wary of neo-colonialism and started to look beyond political independence. Algeria set its ultimate goal as what Fanon called “*libération totale*” (total liberation) and Guinea-Bissau as what Cabral called the “freedom of the national productive forces”.¹⁰⁷ In this regard, Cabral stated:

We can therefore conclude that national liberation exists only when the national productive forces have been completely freed from every kind of foreign domination ... [T]he objective of national liberation is to regain this right usurped by imperialism, that is to say, to free the process of development of the national productive forces ... This means that, bearing in mind the essential characteristics of the present world economy, as well as experiences already gained in the field of anti-imperialist struggle, the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism. Furthermore, if we

accept that national liberation demands a profound mutation in the process of development of the productive forces, we see that this phenomenon of *national liberation* necessarily corresponds to a *revolution*.¹⁰⁸

Believing that the decolonisation movement in Africa had reached a new stage, Cabral and Fanon respectively voiced the following:

[In Guinea and in Cape Verde] there was division, division in creole, meaning contradiction ... Now, taken together, unity and struggle mean that for struggle unity is necessary, but to have unity it is also necessary to struggle ... The significance of our struggle is not only in respect of colonialism, it is also in respect of ourselves.¹⁰⁹

It is a fact in Africa today that there are traitors. We have to denounce them and fight them. If this is hard after the magnificent dream of a united Africa submitted to the demands of real independence, then so be it.¹¹⁰

Seeing that the prolonged process of decolonisation radicalised liberation movements and set up divides between them, their leaders gradually recognised the importance of unity. However, this did not stop the escalation of violence towards the colonial authority and inside each organisation when liberation movements took up arms. This phenomenon was especially prominent among liberation movements fighting wars in Portuguese colonies.

Liberation movements and anti-establishment movements in Portuguese colonies

Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, all under Portuguese colonial rule, were not even close to decolonisation in the 1960s; in fact oppression was harsher than ever. The question why a relatively small country in Europe could maintain such vast overseas territories despite international criticism alerted liberation movement leaders to the existence of larger enemies supporting Portugal, such as NATO member countries and the white governments in southern Africa. As discussed earlier, they also pinpointed, from their point of view, an even more insidious enemy and a common denominator – that of Western capitalism and imperialism.¹¹¹ Consequently, these liberation movements set their primary objective as the independence of each colony; however their ultimate objective was world transformation.

For people in Portuguese colonies who took up arms, it became essential to make a clear distinction between “enemies” and “allies” in order to achieve their objectives and to protect their own lives in the armed liberation struggle. The significance of this distinction became heightened after the Congo Crisis, where Africans killed and betrayed one another.¹¹² Not only did the main liberation movements (PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO) attempt to label different groups and forces within the colonies, but so too were world forces classified as either “enemies” or “allies”. Thus the Western powers, friends of Portugal, were regarded

as “enemies” and the Eastern nations, potential friends of the movements, as “allies.” Just as Lumumba first asked the USA for assistance and then, when rejected, turned to the Soviet Union, liberation movement leaders in the Portuguese colonies first expected a great deal of the USA, especially the Kennedy administration, but were gradually disappointed, and began to approach Eastern bloc countries.¹¹³

As discussed in the previous chapter, until the end of the Second World War liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies adopted a milder approach than some and adopted a regional Africanism or *mezzo-nationalism* approach. However, after the war, a gathering of people with stronger views began to grow. Based in Lisbon where they had been sent, often because of their political activities in the colonies, they lived in the Casa dos Estudantes do Império (CEI: Imperial House for Students) from the late 1940s to the early 1950s as mentioned in the previous chapter. These included people like Cabral, Andrade, Neto and Mondlane, to name a few. Exchanges about the situation in their various home countries served to heighten their critical stance towards colonial rule and they increasingly came to regard the division between the *assimilado* and rural Africans as highly problematic. They established the Centro de Estudos Africanos (Centre of African Studies) in 1951 and started to study in earnest African cultures and the historical and current state of affairs of each colony.¹¹⁴ These young “intellectuals” later went back to their respective colonies and formed liberation organisations in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.¹¹⁵

As mentioned earlier in this book, just after the Second World War, Captain Henrique Galvão, the Angolan Deputy to the Portuguese National Assembly, brought attention to the reality of forced labour in the Portuguese colonies. He was arrested but escaped from prison in 1958 and moved to Colombia. On 22 January 1961 – as it happens the same day that Kennedy was inaugurated – Galvão hijacked a passenger liner, the *Santa Maria* in the Caribbean together with Portuguese and Spanish members of the Directório Revolucionário Ibérico de Libertação (Iberian Liberation Revolutionary Directorate). They attempted to establish a provisional government in Angola. Acting in concert, the MPAL rose up in revolt in Luanda, Angola, where the government-general was situated. However, their efforts failed and the US navy seized the vessel. Galvão fled to Brazil.¹¹⁶

However, the ball was rolling by now and anti-establishment movements by Portuguese citizens added to the pressure. In April of the same year, Defence Minister General Botelho Moniz and the leadership of the national forces demanded that Salazar resign – with the clandestine backing of the US government. Over this time it was reported that Charles Burke Elbrick, the US ambassador, frequently met with the general¹¹⁷ and reported: “Moniz has been attempting to move Salazar to liberalize the Angolan and Mozambique regimes and has kept us closely informed.”¹¹⁸ He also reported to the Bureau of European Affairs that he had given “support and incentive” to Moniz.¹¹⁹

Salazar, however, managed to weather the crisis with the support of the army and afterwards replaced much of the army leadership. However, the failure of this anti-Salazar movement in Portugal led to an alliance between the anti-Salazar movement outside the country and the anti-colonisation movement. In the same month, the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP: Conference of Nationalist Organisations

of Portuguese Colonies) was formed in Morocco. The CONCP called for a unified front of liberation organisations in different colonies, striving for the end of Portuguese colonial rule and for each colony's independence.¹²⁰ Thus, the first unified body of three nationalisms (macro-nationalism, mezzo-nationalism and micro-nationalism) was born.

In December 1961 India annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa. It was the first step towards the demolition of the Império Colonial Português (Portuguese Colonial Empire).¹²¹

In 1962 anti-establishment *émigrés* formed the Frente Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN: National Liberation Patriotic Front) in Algiers, capital of the independent Algeria. Its leader Humberto Delgado was a co-conspirator of the *Santa Maria* hijacking. FPLN was not a tightly formed organisation but rather a loose federation of liberals, the Socialist Party, people related to the Catholic Church and the Portuguese Communist Party. However, because it was so strongly influenced by the communist party,¹²² many FPLN members, who were not communists, set up a new organisation. When Delgado was assassinated by PIDE in 1965, FPLN was on the verge of collapse. It overcame the crisis by forming an alliance with CONCP.¹²³

During this time people in Mozambique started to organise themselves more cohesively and became increasingly politically assertive. Despite this, the Portuguese government managed to remain intact and intensified its oppression against both internal and external pressures. The next section will detail the formation of Mozambican liberation organisations.

The formation of Mozambican liberation organisations and counter-insurgency strategies

The dual role of migrant workers in neighbouring countries

On 16 June 1960, Diwane Vanombe, a leader of the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), formed by the Mozambican-born Makondes in Tanganyika, visited the colonial administration in Mueda Circumscription, Cabo Delgado, in northern Mozambique, in order to meet with the administrator. Many residents gathered in front of the Maconde Circumscription administration office as they had been called for this meeting between the liberation movement leaders and the colonial administrator.¹²⁴ The colonial administrator divided the population into two groups; the Catholic priest, "Indians" (Asians) and the *régulos* were moved to the veranda of the administration office and the others were left outside. When the Cabo Delgado district governor arrived, the administrator ordered the crowd to salute the Portuguese flag. People refused and the situation became tumultuous. The crowd intervened when two people were tied-up and taken to a car. In response the administrator ordered the *sipaíos* to fire at the crowd, resulting in many people being killed or injured. This incident is known as the Mueda Massacre.¹²⁵

Prior to this, many people in Mozambique had believed it would be possible to achieve independence through negotiations. This incident not only made them realise Portugal's determination to retain its colonies but also, in concert, fuelled the liberation movement to

new heights. Around this time many joined the liberation army. One of them was Alberto Chipande, the future commander-in-chief of the FRELIMO army, FPLM (People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique). Mondlane described the change of perceptions amongst the local population after the Mueda Massacre as follows:

The experience of Teresinha Mblale, now a FRELIMO militant, shows why: "I saw how the colonialists massacred the people at Mueda. That was when I lost my uncle. Our people were unarmed when they began to shoot." She was one of the thousands who determined never again to be unarmed in the face of Portuguese violence.¹²⁶

The interviews of the survivors of the massacre conducted by Adam and Dyuti, historians, tell of how some "*os velhos*" (the elders)¹²⁷ who witnessed the massacre asked a local young man to let relatives in Tanganyika know of the situation. The man describes it as:

In Tanzania, I arrived in Lindi first, and delivered the first note. Then, I went to Dar es Salaam, and delivered another note. I delivered the last note to Tanga. Every time when people asked me about the Mueda Massacre, I explained about it. When I came back here [Mueda], Ntwahumu [probably *cypaio*] was waiting for me to inspect my bag.¹²⁸

The episode suggests: (1) the Makonde elders in Mozambique had an extensive network and links with the Makondes in Tanganyika; (2) the bond was strong enough to be used for exchanging political information; (3) they were capable of communicating in writing, probably in Swahili or Arabic; (4) not all "traditional chiefs" were incorporated into the colonial administration; and (5) some locals were already engaging in espionage activities. The information on the Mueda Massacre, communicated to Mozambican people in Tanganyika through various routes and means, prompted an increase in political activity. In 1961, MANU moved its headquarters to Mombasa in the newly independent Kenya. Matthew Mmole, a Mozambican Makonde born in Tanganyika, undertook to develop the organisation.

The now widely known Mueda Massacre also inspired those people in Mozambique, who had not previously been involved in any anti-colonialism movements or nationalist movements. For example, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO: National Democratic Union of Mozambique) was formed in Bulawayo in South Rhodesia on 2 October 1960, 45 days after the Mueda Massacre. In Nyasaland, the migrant workers from the Tete District, led by an exile Baltazar Chagonga,¹²⁹ formed the União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI: African National Union for Mozambican Independence).¹³⁰

The three organisations above, MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI, were the primary anti-colonialism organisations, or "the proto-nationalist movement", which formed the basis of FRELIMO in 1962.¹³¹ An UDENAMO representative attended a founding meeting

for the CONCP in Casablanca in April 1961 and advocated the importance of unifying all liberation movements in Mozambique.¹³² The African leaders whose overarching aim was to liberate the entire African continent, such as Nkrumah from Ghana and Nyerere from Tanganyika, were also concerned about the tendency of liberation movements to fragment, particularly after the Congo Crisis. Hence, the unification of various liberation movements started to become strongly advocated. Nyerere proposed to move the headquarters of all the various Mozambican liberation movements to Dar es Salaam. Following this proposal, the formation of FRELIMO as a unified organisation was agreed upon.

Despite their differences MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI had a number of common unifying features: (1) they were formed outside Mozambique by exiles and migrant workers; (2) they had regional deviation amongst their participants and their support bases; (3) their respective formations were influenced by the political situation and leading African political organisations in the places where they were set up; and (4) none of them had a strong support base inside Mozambique. MANU was formed by the Makonde from northern Mozambique and operated in Tanzania or Kenya; UDENAMO was established in Southern Rhodesia by the Ndau from central Mozambique and UNAMI operated in Nyasaland and was formed by those from Tete District in the north-west. There was considerable deviation between the different organisations in terms of economic development, education, religion, languages and political perspectives.

In addition, all of them were influenced by the political parties in their respective host countries and as a result developed very similar organisational structures to them, as well as close relationships.¹³³ UDENAMO had a close relationship with the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Southern Rhodesia; MANU with Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanzania; and UNAMI with the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The tie between UNAMI and MCP was closer than the others.¹³⁴ It is said that Joshua Nkomo, the NDP leader, proposed that the UDENAMO leaders move to Tanganyika. Also, a KANU politician allegedly organised the first meeting of MANU after the Mueda Massacre.¹³⁵

The developments and tendencies highlighted above suggest that the migration to neighbouring regions after the Second World War had both positive and negative effects on the liberation struggle in Mozambique. While it contributed to decolonisation, pan-Africanism, "Mozambican consciousness" and opportunities to organise the liberation struggle, it made it difficult to establish the necessary conditions for the development of a unified movement. Nevertheless, it was significant that liberation organisations adopted the word "Mozambique" in their names. Hence, micro-nationalism prevailed over regional nationalism (*mezzo-nationalism*).

The politicisation of Africans in Mozambique

By the latter half of the 1950s, oppression by the PIDE had been intensified in Mozambique. As an example, cultural organisations were banned in 1955. After the 1958 presidential election in Portugal, even a vague remark or action that could be interpreted as being anti-

establishment or anti-colonialism was sufficient reason for detention. Urban “intellectuals” in Lourenço Marques and Beira, who had led protest movements before the end of the Second World War, were forced to keep silent or go into exile. This was so for Joaquim Chissano, a member of NESAM (Núcleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundários de Moçambique) and later the prime minister of the transitional government and the second president and Marcelino dos Santos, the CONCP president (later FRELIMO’s vice president).

It was in this political climate that Mondlane, NESAM’s founder, visited Mozambique as a UN official in mid-February 1961. The PIDE could not touch him as long as he had a passport issued by the United Nations. However, it sent covert agents to the meetings Mondlane attended, hoping to catch “suspects”.¹³⁶ Many young people, fully aware of the risk they were taking, went to meet Mondlane and feel the “wind of change” he brought with him. A week after his arrival, Mondlane attended a mass at an over-crowded Protestant church. Lina Magaia, a future famous novelist, observed:

What was interesting is that people of all beliefs were there, not only those who practiced in the Swiss Mission. There were Muslims. There were Catholics. Everybody came to see Eduardo Mondlane. Why? Because Mondlane meant a kind of victory for the society. Because he was the first black graduate from Mozambique. Because he came from the United States. Because he came from the United Nations.¹³⁷

Conscious of the PIDE agents present, Mondlane made the following speech:

Actually many think they are a type of people who are a little inferior to the rest of humanity ... I mean ... I say because I have had experience of studying and living with people of other nationalities, with people of other races ... We are all human beings. We are all human beings ... We are all children of God!¹³⁸

These comments suggest that Mondlane was reflecting back the perceptions that many Africans of Mozambique had about themselves – a sense of inferiority for being African, a certain state of resignation to colonial rule, and a hope that the UN and, particularly, the USA, with Kennedy as its new president, would help them to sort out their plight.¹³⁹

Factors such as Salazar’s mistrust of the Kennedy administration and the UN resolutions condemning Portugal and favouring decolonisation, raised the expectations that anti-establishment Portuguese citizens and people in the colonies held for the international community, resulting in a series of incidents in Portugal and its colonies from November 1960 to April 1961: the *Santa Maria* hijacking and an MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) uprising in January 1961; an armed attack by UPA (União das Populações de Angola) in March 1961; an attempted coup of the Portuguese army, and the formation of the CONCP in April 1961.

Many people who attended the meetings with Mondlane later joined FRELIMO. One of them was Samora Machel.¹⁴⁰ After meeting Mondlane and hearing that FRELIMO

was launched in Tanganyika in 1962, Machel could not stop thinking when and how to join the organisation. During their stay in Mozambique, Mondlane and his wife set up a scholarship for talented young people to study in Europe. Machel and many of the other recipients later went on to become the leaders of the country. They formed the UNEM in France at the end of 1961. Its members later served Mondlane in the FRELIMO leadership.

Portugal's military build-up and a review of its colonial policies

Although the colonial authority was wary of the anti-colonial movements in Africa, Salazar was more occupied by the new administration in the USA and international pressure.¹⁴¹ However, a grave incident took place in March 1961 which forced Salazar to pay much greater attention to the colonies. The UPA, led by Holden Roberto, attacked Portuguese settlers in northern Angola near the border of Congo-Leopoldville. The incident exposed the inadequacies of the Portuguese national forces in terms of troop strength, deployment and training. Subsequently, the army was expanded in each colony. In Mozambique, the number of soldiers was increased from 3,000 to 13,000, and the civilian governor-general was replaced by an army officer.¹⁴²

It was evident that the imminent war in Mozambique was to be a guerrilla war. The Portuguese army had been preparing for this but had no understanding of the political situation in the colonies. When the colonial war became a reality in Angola, the army asked the PIDE, which was actively involved in espionage activities of Africa, to train the troops in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

Cooperation between the secret political police and the national forces was in line with the ongoing coordination and cooperation among various governmental bodies. This is evidenced from the fact that in January 1962, the military staff, PIDE officials, the administrators and other government officials formed a task force responding to a call from the Ministério de Ultramar (Ministry of Overseas Provinces), and discussed how to handle future insurgencies.¹⁴³

The task force proposed to set up a body to conduct espionage activities and provide information in each colony. In June 1961, the military governor in Angola established the Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações (SCCI: Information Centralisation and Coordination Service). The SCCI was also created in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, but was particularly active in Mozambique.

The objectives of the SCCI were to centralise information gathering by the various governmental bodies, such as the national forces, the PIDE, the administration and diplomatic establishments abroad; to conduct investigations; to propose suitable strategies and policies and to coordinate different bodies if necessary. However, the result was not particularly satisfactory due to the conflict between organisations (especially between the army and the PIDE and between the SCCI and the PIDE), and also the delay in information transmission and the shortage of personnel.¹⁴⁴

The SCCI Mozambique (SCCIM) comprised of six former administrators and researchers.¹⁴⁵ The SCCIM was often a "desktop PIDE" and lacked clout when it came

to investigations. While the PIDE obtained information through interrogation, the SCCI was required to obtain consent before asking questions.¹⁴⁶ Figure 23 illustrates the organisational structure of the intelligence activity of the Portuguese government.¹⁴⁷

Noteworthy is the fact that a comprehensive network linking the Portuguese national forces, the PIDE and the administrative structure of the metropole to the colonies had already been established before FRELIMO was formed. The symposium called *Subversão e Contra-subversão* (Subversion and Counter-subversion), held by the Portuguese government, shared the following fundamental understanding of armed struggle in the colonies:


We cannot say that the subversive war is a war that is against this or that ... This is a kind of war that is implanted in people's minds and, once it comes into being, easily creates a favourable climate for subversive action, irrelevant to their ethnic and cultural expressions, when the social life of the populations concerned is stigmatised by social contradictions. We are certain that this kind of political-military activity is materially or ideologically aided by some countries, but also it is probably caused by Europe's lack of social sense. Europe, forgetting its responsibilities and duties, ignoring its role of mentor to organisations in social transition ... allows the creation of appropriate environmental conditions where subversive agents resort to social violence since they don't think the resolution of problems lies in terms of development or social advancement.¹⁴⁸

The above passage points out that subversion is justified by "social contradictions" and that the "resolution of problems" requires "social advancement". When armed struggle became a reality, Portugal finally attached a great deal of importance to the "*conquista do coração*" (conquest of the hearts and minds) of people in the colonies.

Suddenly, Portugal began to seriously consider the "modernisation" of its colonies for the first time. The "mission of civilisation" was talked about in terms of Christianisation, however, in reality, Portuguese colonial rule had been characterised by exploitation, violence and oppression, such as slave trading, hut taxes, military expeditions and the provision of labour to South African mines, as discussed in Chapter 1. In the new colonial policy, education, social development and the ban on forced labour, which were gradually introduced in the 1950s to pacify international criticism, became part of the counter-subversion strategy. As a result, the budget for education and health care soared in the 1960s.

Social development in the colonies was essential not only for the placation of local residents but also for military operations and economic policies. It is worth noting that the main objective of the second national development plan from 1959 to 1964 was the development of communication and transport networks. To achieve this, Portugal discarded the policy of the *nacionalização da economia* (nationalisation of the economy) and actively tried to attract foreign capital,¹⁴⁹ to which NATO members responded positively.

Figure 23 Flow of information-sharing in the Portuguese government during the “Colonial Wars”



Afonso & Gomes, 2000:239.

(Translated by the author)

Besides the promotion of social development, “soft” measures against the liberation movement included the *acção psicossocial* (psycho-social action), directly aimed at the *conquista do coração*. A body which specialised in the active, systematic and comprehensive placation of local residents called the *Serviço de Acção Psicossocial* (Psycho-Social Action Unit) was launched in each colony. The military budget for “educational and psycho-social work” increased by 2,000 per cent from the previous year in 1961 and then doubled in 1962.¹⁵⁰

A month before the formation of FRELIMO, the military governor in Mozambique issued the following set of directives:

- (1) Develop and strengthen an enlightened national consciousness, mobilising and coordinating all efforts and appropriate means of action in pursuit of the incomparable work of human fraternity that constitutes the legitimate pride of the Portuguese Nation.
- (2) Complete this action and maintain it, together with the preparation and adoption of new social measures, in order to give complete satisfaction to local needs and fragmented populations.
- (3) Awaken

the commitment of the local population in active participation in the fight against any troublemakers, both through the progressive establishment of an appropriate infrastructure and their regrouping, where local conditions impose or advise. (4) Perform recovery actions on those who are diverted from the national cause.¹⁵¹

Significantly and misguidedly, the Portuguese colonial authority tried to base the “national consciousness” of the local population not on their identity as Africans or as those colonised, but on the “pride of the Portuguese Nation including Overseas Provinces”. The 1961 amendment of the related law which was introduced to deflect international criticism, in effect granted the local population in the colonies Portuguese citizenship.¹⁵²

“Those who are diverted from the national cause”, in the fourth clause of the directives recorded above, refers to the residents in the colonies who it was perceived moved closer to the anti-colonialism movement due to a lack of access and exposure to Portuguese nationalism. The directives also demonstrate that in addition to the “conquest of the hearts and minds”, physical “regrouping” was considered important.

From the introduction of the principle of “effective control” at the end of the nineteenth century to this set of directives it was evident that one of the most important issues for the Portuguese colonial authority was to develop methods to control the rural population, spread over a vast area, surely and effectively. They adopted coercive measures such as *pacificação* (pacification) from the end of the nineteenth century to the twentieth century, and forced cotton growing in the mid-twentieth century. As time passed, they realised the limits of coercion. They then tried to co-opt the traditional chiefs as the lowest administrative officials but this move was often less than satisfactory. As the liberation movement became more unified and active, the colonial authority was obliged to tackle the problem more actively. Three months after the formation of FRELIMO, the governor-general of Mozambique issued Decree-Law no. 43.896, which stipulated the subdivision of the administrative division and the restructuring of the *regulado*.

According to the decree, the *civilizado* were required to live in urban areas and the *non-civilizado* in rural areas, as before. It confirmed that the *cidadão* (citizen) should exercise a certain degree of autonomy in urban areas while the traditional chiefs should rule rural areas by customary laws. The decree subdivided the administrative divisions in rural areas, resulting in a smaller geographical and political extent of the discretionary power that the *régulo* could exercise, but a greater and stricter control by colonial authority.

The administrative structure in rural areas was rapidly developed in the 1960s as a counterstrategy against impending “subversion”. Just after the formation of FRELIMO, all rural residents in Mozambique were placed under colonial rule via the traditional authority. In other words, even peasants living in the “remote areas” belonged to the administrative unit of *regulado* or *regedoria*¹⁵³ and to a *povoação* (settlement) and were ruled by the administrative chiefs such as *régulos* and *chefes*.

Clearly, Portugal distinguished “subversion” against colonial rule and the *Guerra Colonial* (Colonial War) from the previous wars concerning the conquering of new territories. For the first time in the history of Portuguese colonial rule, it focused on the *conquista de população* (conquest of the population) although the colonial authority, especially low-ranking officials, the police and the military, did not necessarily understand or follow the policy change. For instance, Silva da Cunha, a future “overseas provinces” minister, called liberation organisations “terrorist organisations” and insisted that they be suppressed by force.¹⁵⁴

The birth of FRELIMO and the choice of armed struggle

The formation of FRELIMO

As partially discussed above, international pressure on Portugal for decolonisation intensified in 1961 and heightened at the end of that year when Tanganyika became independent. Fragmented Mozambican liberation movements became increasingly motivated and inspired to form a united front.¹⁵⁵

UDENAMO and MANU, both of whom had moved their headquarters to Dar es Salaam in response to the aforementioned proposal by Nyerere, were pressed by African leaders at a meeting in Ghana to unite all the organisations and actors involved in the Mozambican liberation movement. Accordingly, Eduardo Mondlane, who was visiting Tanganyika from the USA, and the representatives of these two organisations held meetings in Dar es Salaam from 20 to 25 June 1962. At the conclusion of these meetings, the formation of FRELIMO as a unified liberation movement was announced and Mondlane was elected as the first president.

Prior to the formation of FRELIMO, all three liberation movements as well as the PIDE had allegedly approached Mondlane. The liberation movements had sought to increase their credibility by having Mondlane, who was prominent both internationally and domestically, on their side. Mondlane refused to have anything to do with the PIDE or join any organisation unless it was a unified liberation movement.¹⁵⁶ From his experience of the Congo Crisis as a UN officer, Mondlane believed that the unification of liberation movements was essential to achieve independence and to ensure post-independence political stability. Mondlane accepted the position as the FRELIMO president without hesitation.¹⁵⁷

The events described above are drawn from a book written by Mondlane himself and descriptions by several researchers who had close relationships with him. However, recent studies have suggested that the process was not as problem-free as previously believed. Adelino Gwambe, the UDENAMO president, for example, tried to set up a new UDENAMO in Kenya, following his failed attempt to become the leader of FRELIMO.¹⁵⁸ A connection between the PIDE and Gwambe, “a self-confessed former member of PIDE,” had been suspected when he was in Southern Rhodesia and even after he moved to Tanganyika.¹⁵⁹ The fact that several UDENAMO members later turned themselves in

to the PIDE suggests that UDENAMO hosted a number of PIDE agents.¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless, it would be hasty to conclude that they joined UDENAMO as PIDE informers. Many joined liberation movements, expecting to become leaders of independent Mozambique. When this started to look unlikely it is not altogether surprising that they approached other players, including the colonial authority.

Importantly, these liberation organisations did not have popular support in Mozambique itself; it was the exiles and migrant workers outside Mozambique that created and steered them. Many expected independence to be a piece of cake, after having witnessed decolonisation in other parts of Africa. Witnessing liberation leaders becoming the presidents, ministers and senior government officials in other recently decolonised countries, gave them high hopes for themselves. In this context, the leaders of UDENAMO and MANU became increasingly frustrated that they could not occupy leading positions within FRELIMO although their organisations preceded FRELIMO and they had represented Mozambique at international conferences.¹⁶¹ They probably had a back-up plan in the back of their minds to create a new faction or to approach the PIDE should they fail to realise their ambitions. According to the existing PIDE archives, the secret police, fully aware of their ambivalence, observed their movements and waited for the right moment to contact them. Without the involvement of the PIDE and support by African governments, including Kenya, Zambia and the Western countries, splinter groups could not continue to operate in other countries. The colonial power and its allies did not miss the opportunity to take advantage of internal conflict within the liberation movement.

FRELIMO was formed in Tanganyika on 25 June 1962 as “the united movement” for the liberation of Mozambique though, as later described by Pascoal Mocumbi, “it was not a lineal process.”¹⁶² Mondlane became president, UDENAMO’s Uria Simango vice president, MANU’s Matthew Mmole executive director, UDENAMO’s Paulo Gumane assistant executive director and David Mabunda head of the secretariat.

SCCIM archives provide strong evidence that secret agents were trying to detect any signs of dissonance within the Mozambican liberation movement at this time. An example of this is that on 30 July 1962 the Portuguese consulate in Salisbury sent the PIDE headquarters in Lisbon information that some UDENAMO and MANU leaders were to be excluded from the newly formed FRELIMO, which suggests the involvement of Tanganyika’s government.¹⁶³ The same SCCIM documents disclose that many Mozambicans suspected that Gwambe, the president of UDENAMO, was a PIDE spy and demonstrated their objection to Gwambe’s possible appointment to a key position within FRELIMO by returning their membership cards. Two days after the formation of FRELIMO, Gwambe was arrested by the Tanganyikan police for allegedly destroying UDENAMO documents and was later taken to Moscow when a TANU delegation visited there. A report from Tanganyika states that the Tanganyikan government was determined to exclude Gwambe and that the majority of the 213 UDENAMO members and the 162 MANU members refused to pay the monthly membership fees in protest.¹⁶⁴

It seems clear from these examples that there was considerable dissatisfaction amongst the former leaders of the “early nationalist movements” towards the leadership of the newly

formed FRELIMO, as well as the possibility of a future split. It also suggests that ordinary Mozambican people living in Tanganyika distrusted the former leaders and that the TANU government led by Nyerere provided strong support to Mondlane's particular group within FRELIMO.

Despite the initial internal confusion, a significant number of people in Mozambique, young students in particular, responded positively to the formation of a unified liberation movement and crossed the borders to join the organisation.¹⁶⁵ The first Congress of FRELIMO was held in Tanganyika on 23 September 1962, the same year as its formation.¹⁶⁶ While several agendas were discussed at this congress, "the aims of the party were defined: ... to promote the efficient organization of the struggle of the Mozambican people for national liberation, and [it] adopted the following resolutions to put into immediate execution by the Central Committee of FRELIMO: ... such as for FRELIMO to further the unity of Mozambicans, to employ directly every effort to promote the rapid access of Mozambique to independence, and so on."¹⁶⁷

The congress identified that, "the largest cause of the weakness of resistance against colonialism in Mozambique throughout history was the division amongst Mozambicans and it is this solidarity that constitutes the fundamental weapon to fight against the Portuguese colonialism." It was also confirmed that FRELIMO was a united body comprising three organisations and had its foundation in the alliance of Mozambicans of all classes.¹⁶⁸ The history text-book prepared by the FRELIMO government after independence named the occasion as "the congress of solidarity".¹⁶⁹

Armed struggle as a choice

The first congress did not adopt armed struggle as a means to a solution. As implied by the phrase, "every effort to promote the rapid access of Mozambique to independence", its possibility was not denied, but there was no consensus within FRELIMO. Many rejected the idea, influenced by Mahatma Gandhi's principle of non-violence and hoped to achieve independence through bringing about international pressure.¹⁷⁰ Since many African nations had gained independence without large-scale bloodshed, some criticised the advocates of armed struggle for trying to use unnecessary violence.¹⁷¹ Others refuted it using the Mueda Massacre as an example. Students, who recently fled Mozambique and joined FRELIMO, insisted that negotiations were not an option because the Portuguese government was rapidly expanding its military capacity and developing an intelligence network.¹⁷² Indeed, Portugal's determination to retain its colonies was evident. Steadily, the opinion that the peaceful transfer of power was unlikely became mainstream within FRELIMO.

By then Gumane and Mabunda, FRELIMO executive members at the time of its formation, had left the organisation and formed a new UDENAMO. Mmole, a former MANU leader, had also left FRELIMO and set up a new MANU in Kenya. Within a year of its formation, FRELIMO transformed itself from a united body of "proto-nationalist" organisations to an organisation comprising of people who fled Mozambique at great risk and the *assimilado* who were close to Mondlane.

Many of the risk-takers were from southern Mozambique due to several reasons: (1) more educational opportunities; (2) easier access to information; (3) frequent encounters with racial discrimination; (4) many years of experience as migrant workers, resulting in a large-scale social change, which in turn nurtured individualism and expectations for a new society; and (5) high expectations for and full confidence in Mondlane, who was originally from the south and visited the region in 1961.

Many southerners with a high level of education and political awareness played an important role in FRELIMO after the leaders of UDENAMO and MANU left the organisation. As a result, FRELIMO moved closer to regional (mezzo) nationalism, a traditional ideology of African “intellectuals” in Mozambique, and close cooperation with the liberation movements in other Portuguese colonies became important. Moreover, two other factors contributed to FRELIMO’s taking up arms: armed struggle had already started in Angola, and the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) was preparing for armed struggle in Guinea-Bissau.¹⁷³ Another factor that should not be forgotten is the victory of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) in the Algerian War of Independence.¹⁷⁴

Heated discussions took place within FRELIMO as to what type of armed struggle it should carry out.¹⁷⁵ Some suggested an insurrection in the capital. Others proposed that people gather whatever weapons they could get hold of and attack settlers, as UPA did in Angola. “Guerrilla warfare”, as conceived of by Mao Zedong, and “People’s War”, proposed by Vo Nguyen Giap, were also considered.¹⁷⁶ The first proposal was rejected because of the failed insurrections in Luanda, Angola in 1958, and in Guinea-Bissau in 1959.¹⁷⁷ The second proposal was also turned down because attacks on settlers could lead to a “racial war” and trivialise issues related to colonialism.¹⁷⁸ In the end, the FRELIMO members agreed on the strategy adopted in China and Vietnam.¹⁷⁹ Mondlane’s visit to China in 1963 played a crucial role in this decision. According to the FRELIMO journal, “He [Mondlane] left China convinced that the historical struggle of the Chinese peoples has relevance to the present struggle of the peoples of Africa.”¹⁸⁰

PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau opted for a “People’s War” following a period of trial and error. Learning from the experience of the insurrection by dock workers and seamen in August 1959, which was brought under control within 20 minutes and left 50 workers dead and 100 injured, Cabral changed the strategy in the following year to the mobilisation of armed peasants.¹⁸¹ PAIGC established a political school in the neighbouring Guinea-Conakry in 1960 and conducted political education for its urban members. Next, it undertook the mobilisation of peasants and began guerrilla warfare on 23 January 1963.¹⁸² The experience of PAIGC taught FRELIMO a great deal about armed struggle.

After a great deal of consideration, FRELIMO also opted for a “People’s War”.¹⁸³ In the same month that PAIGC commenced armed struggle in rural areas, FRELIMO sent 50 young people to the newly independent Algeria for guerrilla training.¹⁸⁴ Until just a year before, this was in fact the same location where Portuguese army officers had frequently been sent in order to learn counter-guerrilla strategy from the French colonial army. Samora

Machel, future FRELIMO leader, and Alberto Joaquim Chipande, the first commander-in-chief of the liberation army, were among the young activists sent to Algeria.

The international backdrop to the Mozambican liberation struggle

FRELIMO's preparation for armed struggle was further encouraged by the birth of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. The OAU had a strong influence on pan-Africanism and had four objectives: (1) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; (2) to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (3) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; and (4) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.¹⁸⁵ Article 3 of the OAU Charter binds its member states to "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent states." The Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa (a.k.a. Liberation Committee) played an important role in the decolonisation of the Portuguese colonies in Africa. It especially contributed to the Mozambican liberation struggle as its headquarters were in Dar es Salaam.¹⁸⁶

The Tanganyikan government was determined to realise the liberation of the African continent. In addition, Tanganyika was the only neighbour that was able to provide FRELIMO with a safe haven and military bases for armed struggle. Nyasaland had just gained autonomy in February 1962, but did not gain full independence as Malawi until May 1964. It took five more months before Northern Rhodesia became the independent nation of Zambia.¹⁸⁷

The liberation of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa remained particularly complicated. Unlike Angola and Mozambique, which fell under colonial rule with their governors-general hailing from the metropole, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were ruled by settlers. In Southern Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Front (RF), a political party of right-wing whites, took power in 1962 and demanded "independence" from the United Kingdom while maintaining white minority rule.¹⁸⁸ Expecting the imminent dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the independence of Malawi and Zambia, white settlers in Southern Rhodesia must have felt an enormous sense of crisis and isolation. As reflected by its intervention in the Congo Crisis, Southern Rhodesia had tried to obstruct the decolonisation of its neighbours even before the birth of the RF government. In May 1961, Basil Maurice de Quehen of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB), the intelligence organisation of the Central African Federation (CAF), visited Luanda in order to meet with the local PIDE to discuss the situation in northern Angola and Katanga in Congo. According to the report that the PIDE in Luanda sent to the headquarters in Lisbon, Quehen stated as follows:

Preparation of a meeting between Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola and Lourenço Marques ... The link should be strengthened with the exchange of information and disinformation, whose coverage must be ensured in order to neutralise or suppress all the movements of agitators along the borders of

the participating countries by their proposed “pool” of security. Mr Quehen considers that all these countries face common dangers and that one cannot remain indifferent to what is likely to happen to another, given that Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa have common borders and also common interests whose protection must be organised and strengthened.¹⁸⁹

After this, Quehen left for London for a meeting with the British prime minister.¹⁹⁰ It should be noted that the cooperation between officials of white regimes in southern Africa originated between the respective secret police of the countries due to the initiative of Rhodesia in 1961. The cooperation was prompted by the Congo Crisis, as disclosed by the PIDE archives in Portugal. The Rhodesian government initially cooperated with the PIDE in Angola because the first armed insurgency in the Portuguese colonies broke out in Angola and the Congo Crisis took place near Angola. However, it shifted its attention to Mozambique as the armed struggle in Mozambique intensified.

The South African government also actively cooperated with the PIDE in Mozambique. Colonel F. J. A. Rossouw of the South African police sent the following letter to the PIDE in Lourenço Marques in July 1961:

In view of recent developments on the continent of Africa, it is felt that closer liaison between the security services of Mozambique, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Angola and the Republic of South Africa, would be of considerable benefit to all parties concerned. With this end in view, it has been suggested that a meeting of representatives from our Security Services should take place as soon as possible in order that matters may be discussed in more detail.¹⁹¹

The existing documents reveal that after this the PIDE in Mozambique frequently exchanged information with the South African police and the Rhodesian police.¹⁹² Consequently, those who attempted to go to Tanganyika from southern Mozambique to join FRELIMO were frequently detained by the Rhodesian or South African police on the way and were handed over to the PIDE.¹⁹³ Afterwards, many attempted a route through Swaziland and Bechuanaland (later Botswana). However, the South African police, with an intelligence network all over Swaziland, gathered information related to FRELIMO on behalf of the PIDE.¹⁹⁴

Tanganyika (renamed Tanzania after 23 April 1964) played an important role throughout the liberation struggle. It did not cease in its support of the FRELIMO leadership until Mozambique was liberated.

After the formation of FRELIMO, the Mozambican colonial authority closed its borders with Tanganyika. In addition to the 50,000 Mozambicans who could no longer go home, more and more “refugees” arrived in Tanganyika from a politically oppressive Mozambique. These “refugees” and their care was primarily the responsibility of the Tanganyikan government, with assistance from organisations such as the United Nations

High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), though in reality FRELIMO took care of them.¹⁹⁵

After adopting armed struggle as the route to liberation, it became a matter of great urgency for FRELIMO to secure soldiers. Since the organisation could not operate in Mozambique, they targeted “refugees” from Mozambique. In July 1963, three leaders of FRELIMO – Mondlane, Simango and Nkavandame – held a meeting with Mozambican refugees staying in and around the border town of Lindi. Mondlane told the audience that: (1) independence would be achieved by the end of 1963; (2) they would need to create a real unity; (3) FRELIMO was the shield of Mozambique; (4) they needed to prepare for war; (5) FRELIMO members were all soldiers; (6) they would have to have party membership cards when Mozambique was liberated; and (7) that FRELIMO provided scholarships to five countries and was developing human resources, crucial for the building-up of the nation after independence. He also expressed his gratitude to Tanganyika for allowing Mozambican children to attend its schools.¹⁹⁶

Uria Simango pointed out that only 45 people in the audience had a FRELIMO membership card and urged them to join the movement. He then repeated that independence would be achieved by the end of 1963, and also detailed that: (1) Gwambe and Mmole were “thieves” and were no longer members of FRELIMO; (2) Portugal had already lost Goa in India; (3) the liberation of Mozambique would be easily achieved; (4) the Tanganyikan government had already moved its army to the borders; and (5) Cuba and China had promised to supply weapons.

Lázaro Nkavandame from SAAVM, referring to himself as the leader of the Makonde from Mozambique living in the area, read the following letter at the gathering:

Mr Lázaro, tell the president that the Mozambicans ask for two million FRELIMO cards and want to buy them day and night since they are already fed up with maltreatment by the Portuguese. The Portuguese will slaughter and exterminate us all. Therefore, Mr Lázaro, tell the president that all Mozambicans will be killed this year, in 1963. We are tired of the Portuguese government here in Mozambique. This year will not end without independence, and we will be united to expel the Portuguese so that they will no longer rule Mozambique.¹⁹⁷

This speech implies that Nkavandame had a close link with the Makonde both in Mozambique and in Tanganyika and that party membership cards were considered extremely important. TANU's district secretary concluded the meeting, saying:

We, the natives of Lindi, gladly and single-mindedly support our dear Mozambicans in their fight for independence of Mozambique. We want you, as the president of FRELIMO, to know that if the independence of Mozambique is obtained through blood, that is, through war, then we, people of Lindi, will help the Mozambicans ... Mr President, today we ask you to authorise

us to capture Mozambican spies and put them in prison until Mozambique is independent ... and we are sure that you shall progress the civilisation and hearts of your brothers to become members. If they do not want to be our brothers, then they will no longer receive aid from us.¹⁹⁸

In addition to the offer of strong support, however, this speech also speaks of the discord among Mozambican residents in the area. The SCCIM, which compiled this report based on information provided by local informers, through their analysis were of the view that only a small number of participants had FRELIMO membership cards because of the incompatibility between the party leadership and traditional leaders. The rupture between peasants from northern Mozambique and the highly educated *assimilado* could no longer be ignored.

The task that FRELIMO faced was in effect much more than a “People’s War”. Even Mozambican migrants who had fled to Tanganyika were a fragmented group in terms of language, culture, class, origin, experience and levels of political awareness. In Mozambique itself, differences were even more various and numerous. The territory called “Mozambique” came about as a result of arbitrary borders drawn at the end of the nineteenth century and in the main meant nothing to the people living within them. It was often only when they left the territory that they realised the exact nature and extent of the oppressive colonial rule and then might embrace a common identity and join forces with other Mozambican people who felt similarly.

However, common identity was not always positive or strong, nor was the urgency to return to Mozambique and join forces with fellow Mozambicans necessarily sustained. In Tanganyika, where political safety was guaranteed, differences among “Mozambicans” were often more conspicuous than similarities. For this reason it became increasingly important that people from Mozambique returned to the territory, cooperated with each other and helped to drive liberation and independence. “People’s War”, with its emphasis on the education of the masses, was considered essential for the political awakening and unification of the majority of the population, that is, rural residents, who had had educational opportunities and had never joined a political organisation before.¹⁹⁹

Mozambique just prior to FRELIMO’s armed struggle

The situation in northern Mozambique

Primarily due to the political situation in southern Africa during the early 1960s, FRELIMO had no choice but to use Tanzania as its only real safe haven. It therefore made sense to initiate and advance its armed struggle from two bordering districts, Niassa and Cabo Delgado in the north of Mozambique. During this period, the colonial authority was preparing for the approaching war by studying guerrilla warfare tactics and by building up its military capacity. Although the location of the enemy base and the direction of attack were obvious, the Portuguese Armed Forces faced significant challenges in preparing

for unpredictable guerrilla warfare in a largely unfamiliar territory. In 1963 the Portuguese Armed Forces strategically installed seven *batalhões* (battalions), one in each district in north and central Mozambique and one at the general headquarters in Lourenço Marques.

However, these were remote areas for the Portuguese, with only limited infrastructure, despite the cotton regime that had been imposed (see Chapters 1 and 2). This was a critical advantage for FRELIMO and aided its objective of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the Makonde in the Cabo Delgado district (approximately 150,000 inhabitants) and the Nyanja in Niassa (30,000) had been committed FRELIMO supporters since its formation.²⁰⁰

As examined in the preceding chapter, the Portuguese government conducted a study of the Makonde and its society from early on and used this newly gained information to increase its control. It also dispatched the army. Despite an attempt by the Portuguese government to increase its control of the area through military support, the Mueda Massacre strengthened the determination of the Makonde people to fight in the liberation struggle. Many Nyanja people, influenced by the Anglican Church, had joined anti-Portuguese colonialism movements from the outset, with students from the local mission school often crossing the border in order to actively join FRELIMO. In August 1963 a group of Nyanja FRELIMO members returned to Messumba, where the regional headquarters of the church was, and issued FRELIMO membership cards to nearly 200 residents. A local church school-teacher held several meetings in an effort to set up FRELIMO *celulares* (cells) in Messumba,²⁰¹ and Makonde in Cabo Delgado District also sold FRELIMO membership cards and attempted to create cells.²⁰²

As the news spread of this FRELIMO activity and the opportunities to take action, many of the Makonde and Nyanja people in the region “signed up” and were sent to military camps in Algeria or Tanganyika. As a result, many of the early guerrilla fighters were either Makonde or Nyanja. On their return from training the fact that they were from the area meant that it was easier to co-opt the support of the local communities, which was essential for guerrilla warfare. Though the Yao also lived both in northern Mozambique (127,000) and in Tanganyika, their participation in FRELIMO before the onset of armed struggle was comparatively limited.

The situation in the Makhuwa habitations and the role of Islam

Unless people were living on or close to the Tanganyikan borders, on the whole they were unaware of either the formation of FRELIMO or the independence of Tanganyika. This included the Makhuwa, as although some males migrated to surrounding areas to work, their numbers were relatively speaking very small. Furthermore, as the impacts of colonial rule were slow in coming to their communities, education was also sorely lacking. They were therefore barely involved in the association movements or early nationalist movements. The only exceptions were the Makhuwa-Swahili (presently understood as a different ethnic group, Mwani) and the Makhuwa-Metto on the coast. As they regularly travelled to Tanganyika and Zanzibar they had been exposed and influenced by anti-

colonialism movements from their inception. Zanzibar in particular exercised great influence on the northern coast of Mozambique.


As discussed in Chapter 2, the northern coast of Mozambique had been part of the Indian Ocean trade network since early times. By the early nineteenth century, the area was under the strong influence of Zanzibar. In the late nineteenth century, the Islamic Shafei school of the Ahl-as-Sunnah sect spread from the coast inland.²⁰³ This spread was accelerated in the early twentieth century as a means of “escape” from Portuguese military supremacy. Surprised by the rapid rise of Islam, the colonial government started to crack down on Islamic leaders in 1937.²⁰⁴ The suppression backfired. It provoked the deep-rooted antipathy of Islamic northerners against Portugal’s colonial rule and helped to link anti-colonialism with Islam.

Since the 1950s, Arabs in Zanzibar had been anti-British and pan-Islamic.²⁰⁵ Influenced by these positions, the Makuwa in Mozambique formed the Irmandade de Muçulmanos Macuas (Makuwa Muslim Brotherhood). The colonial government clamped down on the organisation between 1954 and 1955 and restricted Islamic education, also banning the use of Arabic. However, these efforts failed to stem the Islamic movement in northern Mozambique. According to Fernando Amaro Monteiro, who conducted field research on the Muslims in northern Mozambique for SCCIM in 1963, the “Sultan of Zanzibar” awarded the insignia, representing his authority, such as a *catana* (machete), a spear, a staff, stamps and diplomatic letters, to Islamic high priests and Islamic traditional authority in northern Mozambique.²⁰⁶ Based on a SCCIM survey, even in the late 1960s, 176²⁰⁷ out of the 707 Islamic high priests considered the Sultan of Zanzibar as their Imam.²⁰⁸ The strongpoint of Islam in northern Mozambique was on the Mozambique Island, but some people from Niassa and Cabo Delgado went to Zanzibar to study the Koran. Figure 24, compiled by Monteiro and based on his field study, demonstrates the areas under the influence of Zanzibar by 1963, as well as the Islamic network.

Similar reports are to be found in the Zanzibar National Archives. According to an official document of November 1956, too many Africans had arrived in Zanzibar for it to accommodate them, and some were from “Portuguese East Africa”.²⁰⁹ The Zanzibar government issued an instruction to take in Africans from other areas because they were needed as farm labourers.²¹⁰ However, the influx of manual labourers to Zanzibar (or Unguja) and Pemba islands caused dissatisfaction to build up amongst local residents, who were already unhappy about the shortage of land. As a result, the senior district commissioner of Pemba tightened up immigration control in 1962.²¹¹ Senior district commission documents describe how the political activity of the Makondes became a problem although it is not clear whether they were from Mozambique or Tanganyika.²¹² Documents concerning MANU are also kept in the same archives. A document dated 21 November 1960 states: “All Makonde immigrants in Zanzibar have agreed and we have decided to elect the following to be leaders of Makonde Union,” and cites 18 names.²¹³

There must have been a large number of Makuwas from Mozambique, especially Muslim ones, on the island. However, there are no records of them in the official documents in Zanzibar. People interviewed by the author during 2005 and 2006 said that many

Figure 2.4 Islamic route in northern Mozambique



(Some spellings changed by the author)

Monteiro, 1993:Anex 4.

Makhuwas and Yaos from Niassa and Cabo Delgado studied the Koran there but went back either at the time of the Zanzibar Revolution or the independence of Mozambique.²¹⁴

The oldest remaining Makhuwa immigrant on the island is Juma Omar. At the age of ten, he walked from Maúia to the border with his father, brothers and uncles. After working at a sisal plantation in Tanga for a year and a half, they crossed to Zanzibar with eight other Makhuwas and studied the Koran under Hassani Binamir, a local Islamic teacher, for two years. Omar and his brothers became policemen, as did many other Makhuwas and Yaos who relocated to Zanzibar. The Sultan seemed to find the Makhuwas useful because they studied the Koran and spoke Swahili. Later, Omar's father returned to Mozambique because he was elected as the head of the Kuviri group of Maúia.

Some Makhuwa males opted to go to Nyasaland to work, rather than pursue a higher religious education in Zanzibar.

Another Makhuwa man still living in Zanzibar is Benjamin Mwaleia, a son of a *sipaio* from the Nekutho group of Maúia, thus Makhuwa-Metto. He studied at a nearby Catholic school and later taught at the school. Unhappy with the meagre salary he was receiving from the school, he left for Tanganyika during the Christmas holidays in 1950. After working at sisal plantations in Masasi, Lindi and Tanga, he arrived in Zanzibar in 1951 and converted to Islam.²¹⁵ Alberto Velho, who also belongs to the Nekutho group of Maúia and studied at the same church school, said, "Our fathers understood religion and study as different matters. They studied at the church in the morning and taught the Koran at night."²¹⁶

An article in the SCCIM archives, written by a priest in Maúia, states that Islam had spread over the past hundred years and that, without Islam, Christianity would have spread more easily. The article points out that it was essential to create "*uma densa rede de escolas católicas*" (a dense network of Catholic schools) in order to break a "*barreira islâmica*" (Islamic barrier) and laments that they did not have the wherewithal to do so.²¹⁷ Jorge Dias offers the anti-Portuguese colonial rule sentiment as the reason for the rapid Islamisation of the Makonde, who had at one stage had been considered "resistant" to Islam (Chapter 3).

According to Mwaleia, there was an organisation called the Associação Macua e Yao (Makhuwa and Yao Association) in Zanzibar prior to the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964. Later, ethnic-based organisations were disbanded for the sake of the "*unidade nacional*" (national unity) and consolidated into FRELIMO.

In July 1963 the alliance of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) won the election, and Zanzibar became independent as a constitutional monarchy, with the Sultan of Zanzibar as head of state, on 10 December 1963.²¹⁸ Since power remained in the hands of the minority Arabs, the dissatisfaction of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), representing African residents from the mainland, built up and this led to the Zanzibar Revolution on 12 January. However, there does not appear to be much documentation of this. According to a recent study by a Tanzanian scholar, Issa G. Shivji, the revolution was initiated by the ASP Youth League (ASPYL) members and African policemen from the mainland, who had lost jobs due to the "Zanzibarisation" of

the ZNP-ZPPP government. They were joined by left-wing Umma Party cadres who had received military training in Cuba.²¹⁹ Many Arabs, including members of the royal family, lost their lives in the mass killing which followed. The survivors left the island and Abeid Karume of the ASP became the president of the Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba.

The American ambassador in Dar es Salaam watched the developments with alarm:

It would probably lead to Communist takeover of leadership of southern Africa liberation movements. It would bring [outbreak of] war in Mozambique much nearer, further reduce chance of avoiding violence in Southern Rhodesia ... and advance Communism in South Africa. It would afford Communist lodgement on western reaches of Indian Ocean.²²⁰

In October 1964 Zanzibar agreed to unification with Tanganyika, upon the request of President Nyerere. The United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was born, and was later renamed as the United Republic of Tanzania.²²¹

It is not certain how much and in what ways the Zanzibar Revolution directly influenced the liberation struggle in Mozambique. At least, the downfall and flight of the sultan ushered in big changes within the Muslim community in northern Mozambique.

What seems clear is that the revolution prompted many Makhuwa, Yao and Mwani people, who had converted to Islam and were living in Zanzibar, to go home. As a result, the Muslim chain of command was indigenised in northern Mozambique.²²² By 1967, a Muslim network based on kinship which extended from Mecúfi on the coast of Cabo Delgado to Mecula in Niassa (see Figure 24), supported the subversion against colonial rule.²²³ Traditional authority, including many Makhuwa chiefs in Maúa, also formed part of the network.

Mecúfi prospered as one of the main trading cities for Indian merchants. After Abdul Magid (or Majid) set up a mosque and a madrasa, many young Makhuwa-Mettos from inland went there to study the Koran. They returned home as Muslim propagators.²²⁴ Many held senior positions within the traditional authority and this propagated the link between the Muslim network and clans. Chief Megama (whose personal name was Abdul Kamal) of the Chiúre region, including Mecúfi, was considered to be the most powerful of Makhuwa-Metto chiefs at the time.²²⁵

In his youth, Chief Megama learned Portuguese and “the way of white people” on Ibo Island. He was economically active and owned a motor vehicle. For many years he was considered to be an “*amigo de colonialismo*” (friend of colonialism),²²⁶ engaging in collecting forced labourers for the colonial administrative office as a *régulo*. However, later on he was suspected of being involved in anti-colonialist activities and sent to a prison on Ibo Island, which was described as, “*Entra vivo, sai morte*” (enter alive, leave dead), and where he eventually died.

A SCCIM report to the PIDE headquarters states that Abdul Kamal Megama confessed in prison that he was the representative of the Muslim community in Cabo Delgado, and had received messages from Lázaro Nkavandame, a MANU leader, and Rachide Kawawa, the vice president of Tanzania.²²⁷ In addition, José Alberto Gomes de Melo Branquinho,

an anthropologist who researched Makhuwa society for the colonial intelligence agency, reported in 1969 that Megama had pressured other *régulos* to cooperate with FRELIMO.²²⁸ The author has been unable to confirm Megama's exact involvement in anti-colonial activities. However, his "story" suggests that the Muslim network had already spread beyond clans, lineage, ethnicity and borders. Hence, the SCCIM, Governor-General José Augusto da Costa Almeida and the Minister of Overseas Provinces, were threatened and frequently conducted research and shared information, as diplomatic archives suggest.²²⁹

The closure of Tanganyikan borders by the Mozambican colonial authority in 1961 and the Zanzibar Revolution in 1964 disrupted the Muslim network, which had undoubtedly aided and abetted anti-colonialism. As a result of these closures, FRELIMO's expansion suffered. However, although there was no doubt of the influence of the Muslim network on each clan in northern Mozambique, as Monteiro and Branquinho both from SCCIM point out, there is no clear evidence that it led to actual action. This will be discussed in more detail later, but what is important to hold in mind is that when the first FRELIMO guerrillas embarked on their long battle against the metropole, the majority of the population had no understanding about, nor were they prepared for, the enormous changes that lay ahead of them.

The onset of the liberation war in Mozambique

The first armed attack by FRELIMO


On 24 September 1964, FRELIMO's armed struggle finally began. FRELIMO troops launched attacks simultaneously in Chai Circumscription, Cabo Delgado District and in Lago Circumscription, Niassa District. FRELIMO guerrilla fighters continued attacking mainly colonial administration buildings in northern Cabo Delgado District (the Makonde area) and the western Niassa District (the Nyanja area).²³⁰

Despite having insufficient equipment and old and second-hand firearms, FRELIMO guerrilla fighters conducted repeated hit-and-run raids on administration buildings and infrastructure such as bridges, roads and telephone lines.²³¹

FRELIMO's aim at this point was not to have a full confrontation with the heavily-armed Portuguese Armed Forces but rather to destabilise colonial rule at its foundations. It also wanted its presence to be known both within the country and outside its borders. FRELIMO attempted to displace people in areas controlled by the colonial authority, either by making them refugees or relocating them to the areas that FRELIMO had gained under its control. It also drew new recruits from this source. FRELIMO burnt shops, partly in order to plunder goods to replenish its stocks, so they were referred to by the colonial rulers as "*bandidos armados*" (armed bandits).²³²

Orlando Cristina, a son of a Portuguese settler who grew up in Niassa District and spoke Yao and Nyanja languages, was married to a daughter of the local Yao chief. He had a hunting business in the northern part of the country and ran *cantinas* (shops) on a large scale. Indignant at the attacks by FRELIMO, he reportedly shouted at John Paul, an

Figure 25 FRELIMO's sanctuaries in southern Africa and infiltration routes (1964-1974)



(Some Spellings corrected and translated by the author)

Afonso & Gomes, 2000:168.

Anglican missionary, "If the *bandidos* wanted to play the fool like this, they would pay for it."²³³ Cristina had already been coopted as a PIDE spy in Niassa District although Paul was not aware of it at that time. Later he even travelled to Tanganyika on foot, gained the trust of FRELIMO and infiltrated it. Upon his return to Mozambique, he became indispensable for the implementation of an anti-FRELIMO strategy, setting up two units that were made up of Africans and that were most feared by Africans, that is, the Grupo Especial (GE: Special Group) and the Grupo Especial Paraquedista (GEP), through collaboration with the Portuguese Armed Forces and PIDE.²³⁴ For many years Cristina continued to play a major role in anti-FRELIMO activities and headed MNR (Mozambican National Resistance), created by the Southern Rhodesian government in order to destabilise the post-independence FRELIMO government. These activities and consequences will be elaborated on in the Conclusion.

While early FRELIMO guerrilla warfare was characterised by sporadic attacks, the ultimate goal was to awaken and unite all Mozambicans, to win the liberation war and to achieve full independence. Yet, despite support from Tanzania and other African countries, as well as China, eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, it was virtually impossible for FRELIMO to be victorious. There were a number of obstacles that stood in its way. Firstly, there was a shortage of human resources, weapons and provisions as well as limited supply routes. Secondly, the Salazar government had no intention of agreeing to independence. Thirdly, due to Mozambique's size it was impossible to liberate it all at once. Fourthly, its hostile white neighbouring regimes supported Portugal. Furthermore, US policy towards Portuguese African territories began to be reversed by the end of 1962. Finally, at this stage there was more division than solidarity amongst the Mozambican people who were supposed to be fighting as a united front.

Unable to establish a military base inside Mozambique, FRELIMO's most important operational bases were in Cabo Delgado District and Niassa District, both of which bordered with Tanzania. The border was approximately 500 kilometres long making it easy for FRELIMO guerrillas to cross into Mozambique. In addition, the "remoteness" of the two districts created an administrative "vacuum" in the area for the colonial rulers. There were also other geographical features of northern Mozambique that provided favourable conditions for the armed struggle: the Miombo forest and rivers, for instance, allowed guerrilla fighters to hide away from patrol parties. The geographical conditions also made it easier to contact locals scattered in the area in secret. The Portuguese Armed Forces were forced to carry out military operations in difficult conditions, such as the lack of paved roads and bridges.

Due to the participation of young Makondes and Nyanjas in FRELIMO, as discussed previously, it was easier to obtain cooperation, in terms of providing information and supplies, from these ethnic groups, as well as finding shelter and hiding places in their homes. However, this was often risky and spies proliferated.²³⁵

On the whole though, even when the guerrillas were not from the area, the population living near the Tanganyikan borders tended to collaborate with them as they understood that the armed struggle was being fought in order to liberate them. Mondlane cites the

following remark by a Chuabo guerrilla from Zambézia District in his book: "I have fought in Niassa where the people are Nyanjas and they received me like a son. I have worked among Ajuas [Yaos] and Macuas [Makhuwas] who received me as if I were their own son."²³⁶

Slowly but surely the "wind of change" began to blow. Female soldiers with political and guerrilla warfare training played a significant role in propaganda activity,²³⁷ and were often overlooked by the colonial authority as suspects. Paul (1975) suggests that the women often approached the Portuguese soldiers in order to gather information.

Response of the colonial authority

FRELIMO's unexpected advance into the northern end of Mozambique disconcerted the colonial authority. The provincial governors of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, the PIDE and the Portuguese Army Forces grew impatient with the elusive guerrillas and their hit-and-run raids. They directed their exasperation towards the locals whom they believed were cooperating with the guerrillas.

Members of the Anglican Church on Lake Nyasa actively joined FRELIMO against the will of the church.²³⁸ This further antagonised the colonial authorities. African teachers and nurses at the church were summoned by the *chefe do posto* and the *sipaio*s and detained and tortured. When FRELIMO started ambushing the Portuguese Armed Forces, Portuguese soldiers stormed an African teacher's house and showered him with 26 bullets in "retaliation". They then cut off his head and kicked it around like a ball in front of the entire village. The following day, the villagers fled taking refuge on a remote hill. Many of the men headed for Tanzania to join FRELIMO.²³⁹

These kinds of atrocities were contrary to the policy of the Ministry of Overseas Provinces, that is of, "winning the hearts and minds" of the people. However, often after a FRELIMO attack, similar incidents would take place all over northern Mozambique.

After the first attack in Cabo Delgado District, on the administrative office of Chai Circumscription, the Portuguese forces raided a nearby village. A survivor called Bwanachauri Pohomo told the investigator in an interview conducted in 1979 that the Direcção Provincial de Educação e Culutura (Provincial Directorate of Education and Culture) that, on hearing the sound of the gunfire, villagers fled to the forest. They then remembered that the *chefe do posto* had told them a week before not to run to the forest because everybody in the forest would be killed. When they went back to the village, a group of Portuguese soldiers tied them up, locked them up in the houses, set them on fire and threw hand grenades into the houses. Young men were taken away. Pohomo was able to take two of her small sons to the fields to hide.²⁴⁰ The survivors fled to a nearby village for help but the assistant to the *chefe do posto* ordered everybody to gather at the administrative post. Local *chefes* protested. They were arrested and assaulted as punishment. The *chefe do posto* uttered bluntly, "They burnt people so that those in the forest won't be able to get food."²⁴¹

Kudeba Nchamadi, the *régulo* of Chai Circumscription, made the following remark in an interview with the Provincial Directorate of Education and Culture:

A few days later, a white man and a black man came here and said, “When war arrives, nobody will survive. You have brought this evil.” And the war arrived. Many died. Our people started to realise *tropa* [the Portuguese soldiers] were no longer friends ...²⁴²

Numerous young men who were suspected of being guerrilla fighters were killed. Portuguese soldiers intentionally left the bodies and heads on the street, believing that this brutal action would serve as a lesson and discourage locals from cooperating with FRELIMO.²⁴³ It backfired and instead prompted people to leave Mozambique and join the guerrillas, leaving the remaining residents at the mercy of even harsher suppression under the colonial authority.

FRELIMO's earlier strategy

Until 1968 FRELIMO's main attack routes ran from its headquarters in Tanzania to the Mozambican border and further south (Figure 25). Their plan was to control the two northern districts first, then to expand to the south and to place the Makhuwas, the largest ethnic group in Mozambique, under its control; and then to advance to the rest of Mozambique.

A useful route was discovered from the headquarters to the Nyanja habitations in the west of Niassa District, then to the border of Malawi, and finally to Zambézi District or Moçambique District – both of which were gateways to the populated central Mozambique (Figure 26).


From 1966 another popular route lay through the Yao habitations in the north-east of Niassa District to Marrupa Circumscription.²⁴⁴ From there, guerrillas went either south to Moçambique District or east to the south part of Cabo Delgado District.

There are several theories regarding the “alliance” between the Yaos and FRELIMO. Abel Barroso Hipólito, the brigade commander of the Portuguese Armed Forces, confirmed the “dissatisfaction” of the Yaos in his 1970 book.²⁴⁵ The archives of the national forces also reflect this: “While a memory of armed resistance lives in the tribal spirit, they tend to fight against other tribes and would not accept the ideas of opponents.”²⁴⁶

According to David Francisco Xadrique Ndegue, a former FRELIMO commander in Niassa, Mataka, the supreme chief of the Yao, went to Tanzania in late 1965 taking all his people after having met with the FRELIMO delegation led by Samora Machel.²⁴⁷ Wilfred G. Burchett, an Australian journalist who visited Mozambique a year after independence, described the incident, based on an interview with Comandante Laitone Dias, a former FRELIMO army commander, as follows:

In Niassa, there was no attack on Portuguese posts, as there had been in Cabo Delgado, to initiate the armed struggle. It started in the Mataka [Mataka] area, when one fine morning the Portuguese found a number of villages completely deserted.²⁴⁸

Figure 26 Evolution of infiltration and attacks of FRELIMO in Niassa District (Sept. 1964 – Oct. 1966)



Hipólito, 1970: Mapa1; Bernardo, 2003:58.

Mataka's active involvement in FRELIMO's armed struggle was partly due to the fact that he was a descendent of the chiefs who had resisted Portuguese colonial rule with arms "till the last" (just after the First World War), as the Makonde chiefs had done.²⁴⁹ Under the leadership of the powerful Mataka, the Yao, with their more centralised "traditional" social structure, successfully staged a mass breakout from colonial rule and became earnest supporters of FRELIMO.²⁵⁰ That the majority of Yao chiefs were Muslim was another factor in their resistance. The strong support of Mataka, who had a vast influence on north-east Mozambique, became even more important when Malawi closed the Niassa route.

Malawi's contradictory attitude

As an inland nation Malawi relied on Mozambican railroads and ports, and an amicable relationship with Portugal was therefore crucial. On the other hand, as an OAU member, Malawi could not openly pursue a cooperative relationship with Portugal, which was refusing to let its colonies go. Hence, although it did not officially permit FRELIMO to operate in the country, it did accommodate a representative office and offered guerrillas refuge.

Two months after Malawi's independence in July 1964, President Banda faced a political crisis and sacked the education minister, Chiume Chipembere,²⁵¹ who was the closest to FRELIMO within the MCP government.

In January 1965, Chipembere and his 200 supporters rose up against the Banda government and attacked Blantyre, the economic centre of the country, as well as the southern part of the country and the railroad connecting Malawi and the Indian Ocean through Mozambique. President Banda counter-attacked with Portugal's help. A mediator between the two countries was Jorge Jardim, a Portuguese settler in Mozambique who was close to Salazar. Jardim was a wealthy entrepreneur based in central Mozambique and who worked as a secret agent for Portugal. He later became Malawi's consulate-general in Beira.²⁵² Both Jardim and Orlando Cristina of the PIDE played a big role in creating an intelligence network in northern Mozambique and mobilising local residents in anti-FRELIMO strategy.

Chipembere's armed uprising was suppressed within a few months. President Banda hardened his stance against FRELIMO, suspecting its involvement in the uprising.²⁵³ Sometime between late 1965 and early 1966 the Malawian prime minister met with the Portuguese consul in Malawi and stated that FRELIMO and the pro-Chipembere faction were still being trained in Tanzania and had tried to enter Malawi through Mozambique.²⁵⁴ President Banda agreed on the exchange of information between the security sections of the two governments so that Portuguese agents would not violate the sovereignty of Malawi. He also permitted Portugal to conduct appropriate investigations and arrest "terrorists" engaging in anti-Portugal activity in Malawi. In addition, Banda advised Portugal to monitor FRELIMO guerrillas entering Tete District from western Malawi.²⁵⁵ On 20 April 1965, a Malawian was arrested for working for Chipembere near Vila Cabral, the capital of Niassa District.²⁵⁶

Although it was not in the report by the Portuguese consul in Malawi, Jardim was already helping to train Banda's security squad, the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP).²⁵⁷ For this assistance, President Banda sent a letter of gratitude to Salazar in August 1965.²⁵⁸

Because Malawi was a strategically important "safety zone" for the armed struggle of FRELIMO, Mondlane personally tried to improve relations with Banda. However, Banda had leanings towards the Portuguese colonial authority.²⁵⁹ The factors influencing Banda's decision were Malawi's economic difficulties, the domestic power struggle and the effort of the Portuguese colonial authority to take advantage of Malawi's situation. In March 1967, Malawi and Portugal concluded a friendship treaty, making it impossible for FRELIMO to continue guerrilla activities from inside Malawi. Thereafter, FRELIMO shifted its base for the western Mozambican front to Zambia. Therefore, after 1966, FRELIMO attached a far greater importance to the route through eastern Niassa District – the Mataka corridor. Another route through the Makonde habitations in Cabo Delgado District was also tried without much success. As a result, FRELIMO focused on operations in the Niassa District until 1968.

The development of the liberation war and people in northern Mozambique

Diversity in rural villages in northern Mozambique

Initially, the loose grip of colonial rule in northern Mozambique caused by its remoteness was an advantage for FRELIMO's guerrilla warfare. Without colonial rule firmly in place, the traditional social structure was maintained and there was little Western influence in the form of education. This provided opportunities for FRELIMO to ally with anti-colonial Yao chiefs and the Muslim traditional authority. The same features in the region, however, worked against FRELIMO's favour in terms of its relationship with the Makhwa. Mondlane explained this as follows:

In many areas where the population is small and widely scattered, contact between the colonial power and the people has been so superficial that little personal experience of domination existed. There were some groups in Eastern Niassa who had never seen the Portuguese before the outbreak of the present war. In such areas the people had little sense of belonging either to a nation or a colony, and it was at first hard for them to understand the struggle.²⁶⁰

The next chapter focuses on the ramifications of the remoteness of the Maúa Circumscription in particular, and the impact this had for both FRELIMO and the Portuguese. This section focuses on some of the difficulties FRELIMO guerrillas faced in general in these two districts.

According to the initial plan, FRELIMO was to launch attacks on Montepuez, inland of Cabo Delgado District and Porto Amélia (present Pemba City), the capital of Cabo Delgado District, at the same time as attacking Chai and Cóbue administrative posts. However, the

simultaneous attacks failed because guerrilla units that headed for Montepuez and Porto Amélia could not even get close to their target cities.²⁶¹ In subsequent reports this “failure” of the “first attack” has largely been overshadowed by its “success”. At the time it was perceived that the obstacles could be overcome as the armed struggle progressed. However, this “failure” was in fact deeply related to FRELIMO’s fundamental problems. As seen in Figure 7, the Makhuwa habitations were not part of FRELIMO’s “liberated zones”. That FRELIMO succeeded in northern Cabo Delgado District but failed in southern Cabo Delgado District cannot be attributed only to the difference in ethnic groups and their rivalries. In particular, diversity in the local communities and the process of the liberation war should be taken into consideration.²⁶²

Initially, the colonial authority was not able to grasp the strategy and accurately read the state of FRELIMO. While the Portuguese Armed Forces increased the number of its soldiers drastically up to 35,000 following FRELIMO’s first simultaneous attacks, most of them were deployed in Cabo Delgado District. Seeing that Niassa District did not even have enough patrol vehicles, FRELIMO prioritised activity there. The Portuguese Armed Forces were at the mercy of the FRELIMO guerrillas which had the knack of appearing in unexpected places at unexpected times. Filled with fear of these “invisible enemies”, Portuguese soldiers attacked civilians indiscriminately.

In contrast to the oppressive treatment of locals by the PIDE (the Portuguese Armed Forces and administrative personnel on the ground), the Mozambican governor-general ordered the SCCIM to revert to previous strategies, such as that of “winning the hearts and minds” of the people. An outcome was the report entitled *Conquista da Adesão das Populações* (Winning the Aspiration of the People), published in February 1966 by Romeu Ivens de Freitas, the head of SCCIM since its establishment. Freitas had studied applied psychology at Cambridge.²⁶³ The report identified the core group, potential core members and prospective allies of the “subversion” (liberation movement) and suggested how to “win” them over.²⁶⁴

Following the discovery in October 1965 of armed “external” Africans in the district who were suspected to have a link with the local traditional authority,²⁶⁵ the SCCIM under the supervision of the administrator Branquinho, conducted comprehensive research in the strategically important Sofala-Manica District of central Mozambique and published a report in the next year.²⁶⁶ Having studied anthropology, Branquinho’s investigation was unprecedentedly detailed. The report analysed the “traditional” social structure and power relations among the African populations in central Mozambique.

By then, FRELIMO was active in Moçambique District, the most important district in northern Mozambique. Moçambique District was strategically important because: (1) it was the economic, political and administrative centre of northern Mozambique; (2) it had Nampula City, where the General Headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces was later installed; and (3) it was inhabited by the Makhuwa-Lomwe, who comprised the largest ethnic group in Mozambique.

At the early stages of the armed struggle, the colonial authority was not familiar with the social structure or inter-group relations of the Makhuwa and feared that the Makhuwa as

an “ethnic group” would ally with FRELIMO just as the Makonde and the Yao had done. This would enable FRELIMO to expand its influence in central Mozambique. In fact, the Makhuwa lived in the southern half of the two districts, where FRELIMO was active and from where guerrillas were entering Moçambique District.²⁶⁷ It therefore became an urgent task for the colonial authority to understand the traditional social structure and social relationships of the Makhuwa in Cabo Delgado and Niassa Districts. The district governor of Moçambique asked Branquinho to compile a report on the population in Moçambique District, similar to the one he wrote for the central area.²⁶⁸

After two years of fieldwork in the Makhuwa habitations, Branquinho published his findings *Prospecção das Forças Tradicionais* (the Exploration of Traditional Forces) in December 1969. It was the first in-depth research on the traditional society of the Makhuwa and has been cited by many studies to date. Branquinho highlighted the importance of clan relations and religious networks as potential routes for guerrilla intrusion and suggested measures to prevent it.

FRELIMO's internal conflict and change during the liberation struggle

While Branquinho was busy with his fieldwork in Moçambique District, fierce battles were being fought in the districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. Niassa District experienced the most vicious battle in 1968 mainly due to FRELIMO's internal conflict that had been heightening since 1966. As the armed struggle progressed in the two districts, who and how to control the liberated zones had increasingly become a source of discord.

Although the Department of Interior Organisation (DOI) was supposedly in charge of the management of “liberated zones”, Cabo Delgado “Province”, where FRELIMO had its first liberated zone, was entrusted to Lázaro Nkavandame, a former MANU leader, and newly appointed “secretary of the province”. Nkavandame appointed cooperative traditional authorities as “chairmen” to manage liberated zones in the “province”.²⁶⁹ In other words, the administrative structure of Cabo Delgado “Province” was the same as it had been under colonial rule, except that FRELIMO replaced the colonial authority. In 1966 Nkavandame and the chairmen made the residents of the liberated zones work in their private plantations.²⁷⁰ They sold crops grown in liberated zones as they pleased, bought products in Tanzania with the profit and sold them to the residents at much higher prices. The residents and guerrillas felt resentful. Some started to question who they were fighting for, what they were trying to achieve and what they were dying for.²⁷¹

For FRELIMO, “liberated zones” meant more than “the areas it had liberated”. The areas were important strongholds to advance armed struggle as well as “testing grounds” for post-independent Mozambique. Therefore, their management was based on the philosophy and organisational structure of FRELIMO. Nothing was more important there than the continuation of armed struggle. Production was collectivised. Products were either used as supplies or sold through FRELIMO. People's stores provided the residents with essential goods for daily living. However, Nkavandame and the chairmen misappropriated the system for their own personal benefit.

As the armed struggle was prolonged, conflict emerged between the chairmen and the guerrilla commanders, and between the Department of Interior Organisation and the Department of Defence, over the production activity and trade in liberated zones and also the military training of the residents. For what, and from what, and who should hold authority was frequently discussed inside FRELIMO. Subsequently, in September 1967, the FRELIMO Central Committee communicated the following message:

[Our struggle] is first and foremost aimed at building a new Mozambique, where there will be no hunger and where all men will be free and equal. We are fighting with arms in our hands, because in order to build the Mozambique that we want we must first destroy the Portuguese colonial system ... only after this will we be able to use for ourselves our labour and the wealth of our country ...²⁷²

After citing the above, Mondlane wrote:

One of the chief lessons to be drawn from nearly four years of war in Mozambique is that liberation does not consist merely of driving out the Portuguese authority, but also of constructing a new country; and that this construction must be undertaken even while the colonial state is in the process of being destroyed. We realized this in principle before we began fighting, but it is only in the development of the struggle that we have learned quite how rapid and comprehensive civil reconstruction must be ... Before the war two authorities coexisted: the colonial, and that of the traditional chiefdoms subordinated and integrated into the colonial system but retaining nevertheless a certain autonomy. When the colonial power is destroyed by a guerrilla victory in a given area, this leaves an administrative void. The power of tribal chiefs, however, has its origins in the traditional life of the country, and in the last was based on a popular conception of legitimacy, not on force ... In its pre-colonial form, such traditional government often served its purpose quite well within a limited area ... but even in such cases, limited in its scope and based on a small local unit, it cannot form a satisfactory foundation for the needs of a modern state. In other areas, such power already had an element of feudalism, permitting an exploitation of the peasantry ... The survival of such systems is obviously a hindrance to the progress of a revolution that aims at social and political equality. The effect of colonialism, moreover, was to pervert all traditional power structures, encouraging or creating authoritarian and élitist elements.²⁷³ (*Underlined by the author*)

At FRELIMO's second congress in July 1968, it was resolved that the liberated zones should be administrated in order to build "*poder popular*" (popular power), which Mondlane called a new type of authority.²⁷⁴

Around the same time, various conflicts arose in newly independent African countries. What shocked the FRELIMO leadership most was the downfall of President Nkrumah of Ghana, who had made a great contribution to the decolonisation and unification of Africa. In February 1966, while Nkrumah was on a state visit to China, his government was overthrown in a military coup.²⁷⁵ It is now known that the US government was deeply involved in this coup.²⁷⁶ The USA and other Western countries came to regard Nkrumah as dangerous after he declared not only colonialism but also neo-colonialism and imperialism as enemies. Moreover, the deterioration of the domestic economy caused by his socialist economic policies increased grievances towards the centralised government.²⁷⁷ However, the FRELIMO leadership, including Mondlane, saw the following problem at the root of the matter:

... fundamentally it is necessary to encourage the people to partake in the political life of the country. Further it is necessary to reject the concept in which the revolution (socialism) is built by an active nucleus of leaders who think, create and give everything and are followed by a passive mass who limit themselves to receiving and executing. This concept is the result of a weak political conscience and expresses a lack of confidence in the fighting and revolutionary capacity of the people. This is the lesson that recent events in Africa teaches.²⁷⁸

Having realised the danger of a top-down revolution, the FRELIMO leadership saw the necessity of having all people take part in the armed struggle in order to develop their political consciousness and transform them into active participants in the post-independent ideal society.²⁷⁹ This would be a society “where all Mozambicans will have the same rights, where power will belong to the people.”²⁸⁰ Four years of armed struggle taught FRELIMO the importance of politicising the people.

They also learned the potential danger of dividing politics and military affairs after it created such fierce conflict between the Department of Interior Organisation and the Department of Defence, that Nkavandame and the chairmen assigned different roles to the residents in the liberated zones (peasants) and the guerrillas (soldiers). The FRELIMO Central Committee decided on a principle that, “all were to be integrated in the practice of the principal struggle, which was defined as being the political struggle. At the same time, all were to participate in the politics of the main task, armed combat.”²⁸¹

However, the chairmen and their supporters would not listen. The internal conflict culminated in the assassination of Filipe Samuel Magaia, head of the defence department, on his way from Tanzania to Cabo Delgado in October 1966.²⁸² Samora Machel, the revolutionary-inclined successor of Magaia, pushed for the further integration of politics and military affairs.²⁸³ Nkavandame, who was opposed to this development, as well as internal conflict in Cabo Delgado District, began to have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the armed struggle. As a solution, the FRELIMO Central Committee agreed in October 1966 that, “behind the prevailing situation was a regionalist and tribalist concept of the struggle ... so that it decided to intensify its political preparation as well

as its military training.²⁸⁴ The Department of Interior Organisation and the Department of Defence were placed under a newly created Comité Político-Militar (Political-Military Committee), led by Mondlane. Also, the Departamento de Defesa (DD: Department of Defence) was set up to handle all combat.²⁸⁵ The committee then issued the following statement:

[T]he tribalist or regional tendencies shown by certain comrades in the execution of their work, reaffirming solemnly that such attitudes are contrary to the interests of the Mozambican people and impede the successful development of the people's liberation struggle. It emphasizes that the battle against tribalism and regionalism is as important as the battle against colonialism, such a battle being the safeguard of our national unity and our liberty.²⁸⁶

The statement presented "tribalism" and "regionalism" as the cause of the internal conflict and, as the "enemy", was equated with colonialism. However, the establishment of the Politico-Military Committee did not help to close the rift and instead, internal conflict was aggravated.

The seeds of the antagonism between Makonde leaders like Nkavandame and the FRELIMO leadership had existed even at the early stages of FRELIMO. There were very different understandings and expectations in terms of the geographical extent of "Mozambique", the method of struggle and the form that independence would take. In addition, there were problems concerning the political leadership, particularly around the return of exiles and individual ambition. Nkavandame, originally the leader of MANU, a Makonde organisation, who was not educated enough to speak Portuguese, had always been irritated by his inability to hold real power in FRELIMO. Also, he strongly believed that "liberated" Makonde habitations should be managed by people from within those areas.²⁸⁷

As the liberation struggle in Mozambique began to require highly skilled responses at different levels, from military affairs to foreign affairs, people who received tertiary education abroad seized power in the organisation. Many of them were *mestiços* or southerners. Northerners found this hard to swallow because they believed that they were the ones that recognised independence as something achievable and they had been politically organised from early on. The dissatisfaction was especially noticeable among the Makonde. In 1966, Nkavandame and other former MANU leaders insisted on gathering all FRELIMO military forces together in Cabo Delgado and declaring the independence of the district.²⁸⁸

Moreover, Nkavandame and his followers asserted that tactics used by highly trained guerrillas in urban areas were more effective than "People's War", which was based in rural areas and aimed at political transformation while fighting.²⁸⁹ When the FRELIMO defence department argued that, "this would be tantamount to suicide, as the guerrillas could never win a conventional military confrontation given the overwhelming technical superiority of the colonial army," the chairmen "accused them of cowardice."²⁹⁰ While Mondlane and dos Santos contended that the "enemy" was the system, not a particular race, and that

even Africans could be regarded as “enemies” of the people; the chairmen insisted that the “enemy” was “whites” and chasing whites out was equated with independence. This logic appealed to some FRELIMO members.²⁹¹ Nkavandame and his followers spread a rumour that Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santo, the vice president of FRELIMO, were “agents of imperialism” because both had white wives. They openly criticised the fact that the Makondes from the north were not well represented in the organisation. The FRELIMO leadership hit back, labelling the Nkavandame supporters as “regionalists” and “tribalists” since they were disrupting national struggle and pursuing their own interests alone.

The internal conflict slowed down the liberation struggle but did not create a crisis for FRELIMO as an organisation. One of the reasons was that President Nyerere of Tanzania, the TANU and the OAU maintained their approval of FRELIMO as the only legitimate liberation organisation in Mozambique. Moreover, thanks to Tanzania's new socialist self-reliance policy based on agricultural development, adopted in the Arusha Declaration in February 1967,²⁹² the ruling party TANU supported the FRELIMO leadership which was more socialistic than MANU, which was based on Makonde ethnicity.

As FRELIMO expanded its armed struggle into the areas outside the Makonde habitations, Nkavandame's influence inside the organisation shrunk. Furthermore, the Makonde guerrillas, who had developed acute political consciousness through armed struggle, did not necessarily support Nkavandame's ethnically-based ideas. As a result, Nkavandame's stronghold, the Department of Interior Organisation, gradually lost its power.

In April 1967 the Conselho Nacional de Comando (CNC: National Council of Command) was established led by Samora Machel, head of the defence department, as the highest unit in the military division.²⁹³ The reorganisation was also applied to the civilian structure in the liberated zones, which FRELIMO called “provinces”. The provincial military commander held the post of provincial chief as well. Under him were the assistant provincial chief, the under-secretary of the province, the political commissar and the operational chief. In other words, a more powerful structure led by military personnel was created over Nkavandame's head. In the CNC, 12 divisions were set up: (1) operations; (2) recruitment, the training and formation of cadres; (3) logistics; (4) reconnaissance; (5) transmission and communication; (6) information and military publications; (7) administration; (8) finance; (9) health; (10) political commissariat; (11) personnel; and (12) military security. The new system enabled better and easier communication, logistics and the mobilisation of guerrillas and contributed to the greater advancement of the armed struggle.²⁹⁴

As a result of the reorganisation, the liberation army became the centre of FRELIMO activities, and revolution became its main goal.²⁹⁵ The gripes of Nkavandame and the chairmen erupted into violent action. In May 1968, a MANU member attacked the FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam and killed a FRELIMO member. The hostility grew over the location of the second party congress. The FRELIMO leadership decided to hold the congress in Niassa District, which was not as “liberated” as Cabo Delgado. The location was obviously chosen in order to remove the influence of Nkavandame and the chairmen, who in turn boycotted the congress.

The second party congress was held in Machedji from 20 to 25 July 1968. It was later considered to have symbolic importance for the Mozambican liberation struggle. Representatives of each “province” and many foreign media attended it. The fact that it was held inside Mozambique damaged the international reputation of Portugal. Favourable reports by foreign journalists on health care services and the education system in the liberated zones helped to increase support from civic organisations in the West. The congress closed after adopting the following resolutions:

1. The Portuguese government ... still maintains the myth that Mozambique is a Portuguese Province, and, consequently, “part and parcel of Portugal.” It still does not recognize the right of the Mozambican people to their national independence. Nationalist demonstrations are violently repressed with massacres, jailings, torture, assassinations. Under these conditions ... the Mozambican people have decided to follow resolutely the way of armed struggle, by a decisive war of independence or death.

2. Their military force is a powerful one ... Despite the rapid growth of our military power, the Portuguese colonialist army is even stronger ... Furthermore, the geographical and political situation of our country, as well as the political situation of the neighbouring countries – Swaziland, South Africa, Rhodesia, Malawi – makes it difficult to extend the war further to the south. To carry war material into Zambézia, Moçambique, Manica e Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Lourenço Marques Provinces, we have to overcome many difficulties. All these factors put together build the existing imbalance of forces between us and the enemy. Though politically stronger, we are still militarily weak ... Our war will be a hard and long one.

3. Our struggle is a people’s struggle. It requires the total participation of all the masses of the people. For this reason it is necessary to intensify the mobilization and the organization of the masses in the liberated zones, as well as in the regions where the armed struggle has not yet started ... In the present phase of our struggle, our main armed forces are made up of the regular guerrilla forces, but people’s militias do also play a very important role ... All the people – old, young, women and men – who are not part of the guerrillas, must be part of the militias.

4. In order to realize more completely and efficiently the participation of the Mozambican women in the struggle, a women’s detachment has been created whose main functions are: (1) mobilization and organization of the masses; (2) recruitment of young people of both sexes to be integrated into the armed struggle; (3) production; (4) transport of material; (5) military protection for the populations.

5. The phenomenon of desertion is not a specific characteristic of the struggle for liberation of Mozambique ... There are others who, after committing transgressions, fear punishment by the Portuguese authorities. Then, to escape from punishment, they engage themselves in the nationalist movement. Persons with such a behaviour often fail: they are unable to withstand the difficult guerrilla's life, and they can hardly acquire nationalist, political conscience. So they desert. And once out of the movement, they give themselves to inventing excuses to justify themselves. Some spread every kind of rumour in order to discredit the leaders, divorce them from the masses, and disintegrate the struggle. Others give themselves up to the Portuguese Desertions are grave crimes. Deserters are enemies of the Mozambican people.

6. Prisoners of war have a political importance for us. We should treat them well. Through them, we can obtain information on the enemy. We should re-educate them as much as possible, and, according to our interests, eventually let them free ...

7. Our war is essentially a political war, and its direction is defined by the party. The people's army is part and parcel of the party, and its strategic plans are made by the top leadership of the party. In order to conduct correctly the struggle, all the leaders should be involved in the armed struggle.²⁹⁶
(Underlined by the author)

The above resolution confirmed the organisational restructure, which placed the military division at the centre of the organisation, and clarified the ideas, objectives and methods of FRELIMO. In other words, it was decided that the liberation struggle of FRELIMO was a People's War with the participation of the people and that the "liberated zones" were managed in order to create authority of the people by the people. Thomas Henriksen points out that the resolution was inspired by Marxism and linked FRELIMO to the worldwide notion of class struggle. However, conspicuously, the word "communism" was not used.²⁹⁷

The congress expanded the number of central committee members from 20 to 40, many of whom were from the military sections. As a result, the revolutionary line held overwhelming power in the party.²⁹⁸

Observing that the marginalised Nkavandame and his supporters sought to form a separate organisation, Nyerere invited Mondlane and Nkavandame to the border town of Mtwara for mediation in August 1968.²⁹⁹ Nkavandame expected that the TANU leadership would happily cooperate with the formation of a splinter group because Tanzania had recently supported Biafra in the Nigerian civil war. However, Nyerere asked Nkavandame to compromise. Nkavandame then approached the PIDE. He also tried to form a Makonde organisation in southern Tanzania but could not obtain enough support.³⁰⁰

In January 1969, the central committee suspended Nkavandame's membership and

on 3 February 1969 Mondlane was assassinated.³⁰¹ Suspected of involvement in the assassination, Nkavandame surrendered to the PIDE. On 3 April 1969, the colonial authority in Mozambique publicised that the “supreme military leader of FRELIMO has joined the colonialist forces and is collaborating with them in the struggle against nationalist movement – FRELIMO.”³⁰² Later, Nkavandame became “Lisbon’s leading propagandist”³⁰³ and continued to criticise FRELIMO.³⁰⁴

After the loss of its first president, FRELIMO expelled former MANU leaders and formed a triad as its leadership comprising dos Santos, Machel and Simango. It also adopted “protracted war” and confirmed the continuation of armed struggle.³⁰⁵ As seen in the following document by Mondlane, the protracted war had already been discussed and accepted among the FRELIMO leadership:

... war is an extreme of political action, which tends to bring about social change more rapidly than any other instrument ... This is why we can view the long war ahead of us with reasonable calm ...³⁰⁶

Of the three presidents dos Santos, a communist, and Machel, a revolutionary, gained the support of young guerrillas and became the leading faction. The FRELIMO journal summarised the series of events as follows:

We have come to the point where certain alliances could no longer objectively be stood, certain contradictions could no longer be hidden ... All this means that our national struggle is growing and our consciousness is growing, objectively, towards a revolutionary struggle and a revolutionary consciousness.³⁰⁷

Uria Simango, the vice president of FRELIMO, whose support base was formed by people from the central area and students opposed to armed struggle, was aggrieved.³⁰⁸ In November 1969, Simango was expelled from the organisation after the publication of an article “Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO”, publicising the commotion in FRELIMO and expressing his opinion of this.³⁰⁹ Eleven members in the Simango faction, including the former FRELIMO spokesperson, Miguel Murupa, were arrested and jailed by the Tanzanian police.³¹⁰

The support of the dos Santos-Machel revolutionary line and the intervention in FRELIMO’s internal conflict by the Tanzanian government was related to the aggravated domestic politics and the security issue of the country.

Oscar Kambona had been the TANU secretary-general since 1954. He was appointed as the foreign minister and the defence minister in 1965 and later the head of the OAU Liberation Committee. He became increasingly anti-Nyerere and finally fled Tanzania to the United Kingdom in July 1967. In relation to Mozambican liberation movements, Kambona was always close to MANU and UDENAMO.³¹¹ After taking an anti-Nyerere stance, he felt even more antagonistic towards FRELIMO and approached the PIDE. When Kambona published an article in a British newspaper criticising Nyerere as a

“tyrant”, the PIDE sent Jorge Jardim to the United Kingdom and proposed a plan to topple the Nyerere government.³¹² The secret service of the South African Defence Force (SADF) was also involved.³¹³

The important point here is that the domestic politics of Tanzania and the decolonisation of Mozambique influenced each other, both internationally and regionally. The FRELIMO leadership proclaimed the following in the editorial of its journal, published in late 1969:

Contradictions are inevitable in any liberation movement engaged in a protracted armed struggle ... We started with a heterogeneous group of people remotely linked by the idea of independence and the philosophy of “nationalism” ... it was impossible to formulate an ideology broad enough to encompass all the different tendencies represented by the various social, political, economic, religious, cultural groups. The idea of independence and nationalism was the only thing they had in common – and in the beginning this seemed sufficient to ensure the struggle’s advance. But with the evolution of the struggle, there developed a new situation. We started having liberated regions ... This gave rise to certain problems: How to structure the economy in the liberated zones? ... Should we copy the colonialist-capitalist model which had just been removed ...? The contradictions now came to the surface. Those who had come to the revolution to become wealthy, motivated by their personal interest, wanted the system to remain the same ... The revolutionary comrades ... wanted a completely different system where all the vestiges of colonialist and capitalist influence would be eliminated ... After this, the division became more acute. A struggle began, between the groups representing the two lines ... Those who had made themselves completely unacceptable to the revolution were expelled ... And indeed, shortly afterwards, several of these people showed their true colours by deserting and running away to the Portuguese ... Thus, the contradiction did not finish ... as long as the struggle is being fought, desertions will not stop. And even after independence: the example of certain independent African countries shows us that when a truly popular ideology is adopted and implemented, the reactionary elements cannot confirm and run away – and “ask protection” from the capitalists, their spiritual mentors. Thus, to those that say that the desertions in FRELIMO mean that there is a crisis, we answer: No, there is no crisis. These are contradictions which are solved by the struggle itself: the revolution itself ensures the rejection of the impure load it carries.³¹⁴ (*Underlined by the author*)

After this editorial, the journal announced the suspension of Simango’s membership. Clearly, those who “showed their true colours by deserting and running away to the Portuguese” included Simango. In May 1970, the central committee abolished the triarchy and appointed Samora Machel as president and Marcelino dos Santos as vice president. The FRELIMO journal described the appointments as follows:

The spirit which prevailed at the latest meeting of the Central Committee revealed that we have already reached an advanced phase in that process of purifying our ranks ... For the first time in the history of FRELIMO, there were no discordant voices in the Central Committee which where [*sic*] opposed to the revolutionary positions ... We took an important step forward in the consolidation of our unity. We elected a revolutionary leadership. We clarified our political line. We came nearer to the final victory.³¹⁵ (*Underlined by the author*)

FRELIMO's fierce internal conflict from 1966 to 1969 ended with the expulsion of those who did not share its revolutionary stance and with the intensification of its revolutionary ideology. FRELIMO was led by the revolutionary line (the army leadership and communists), and those who opposed it were arrested by the Tanzanian police or formed splinter groups outside Tanzania.

From 1970 onwards, FRELIMO leaders publicised its "unity" to the world. The "unity" was based on the shared objective, that is, national liberation and the end of exploitation. Those who left FRELIMO were regarded as the "enemy" of the entire people of Mozambique, not only of FRELIMO.

The internal victory of the revolutionary line accelerated FRELIMO's armed struggle. The organisation was further restructured. Emphasis was placed on revolutionary ideology.³¹⁶ The emergence of a stronger FRELIMO surprised many watchers who had predicted the weakening of the organisation after the assassination of the well-known Mondlane and the departure of Simango and others. The Portuguese colonial authority was probably more surprised than anybody else. The victory of the revolutionary line, despite the intervention of the PIDE, made the war after 1970 harder for the colonial authority.³¹⁷

Meanwhile, in the late 1960s when FRELIMO was at the height of its internal conflict, the Portuguese Armed Forces were engaged in large-scale military operations and successfully destroyed the FRELIMO military base in Niassa District. Many guerrillas and residents in the area surrendered. Also, the departures of Lázaro Nkavandame and the chairmen from FRELIMO caused confusion among the Makondes in Cabo Delgado District. Therefore, FRELIMO decided to establish a new base in Tete District (see Figure 25).

According to João Paulo Borges Coelho, FRELIMO officially started its armed struggle in Tete in March 1968.³¹⁸ The offensive action in the area was strategically important in order to attract international attention³¹⁹ because the Portuguese were building an enormous dam in Cahora Bassa³²⁰ in order to supply cheap electricity to South Africa. The Portuguese government was attempting to involve other nations in Mozambique's economic development in an attempt to secure support from them in terms of colonial issues. South Africa and the Western countries responded positively. The FRELIMO leadership planned an attack on the dam construction site as a way of publicising Mozambique's situation. Zambia's independence in October 1964 helped FRELIMO to operate actively in Tete. Zambia shared about 400 kilometres of border with Mozambique and therefore was able to play a similar role to Tanzania, that is, of providing a safe haven and a military base.

The development of FRELIMO's armed struggle is reflected in the Portuguese Armed Forces' statistics. In 1968, there were 1,087 attacks by FRELIMO, 44 per cent of which were in Cabo Delgado, 39 per cent in Niassa, 15 per cent in Tete and two per cent in other districts. In the same year, the attacks in Cabo Delgado surpassed those in Niassa for the first time.³²¹ The statistics indicate that between the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane in February 1969 and the appointment of Samora Machel as the second president in May 1970, FRELIMO's military activity was sluggish and largely limited to the laying of landmines. According to a monthly report of the Portuguese Armed Forces in December 1969, the total number of FRELIMO attacks was 162, of which 127 were related to landmines.³²²

Counter-guerrilla strategy of the Portuguese Armed Forces

The statistics do not tell us, however, how people in the battlefields in northern Mozambique lived. While FRELIMO opened its liberated zones to the international public, the situation of the residents under colonial rule was not transparent for a long time. The same year that the SCCIM submitted its report aimed at gaining the loyalty of rural residents, an important concept was introduced in the rural areas. It was officially called "*aldeamento*" (villagisation), also known as the "strategic hamlet" and the "protected village".

Having studied counter-guerrilla strategies adopted in different parts of the world, the colonial authority came to the conclusion that one of the most effective strategies would be to cut off the supply routes of guerrillas and contact between guerrillas and local residents. To this end it moved local residents who lived in a dispersed manner into "villages" situated next to army posts, thus trying to control their movement and sever contact with guerrillas. It was convinced that this tactic, also adopted by the Japanese army in China, the British army in Malaya and the American army in Vietnam, was the key for Portuguese victory.

In the past, the low population density and dispersed habitations had made it difficult for the colonial authority to govern rural areas in the north even after the introduction of the *regedoria* system. It was hoped that the *aldeamento* programme would overcome these difficulties, succeeding in restricting the movement of the residents and advancing social development such as schools and primary healthcare centres. The programme also aimed to help to promote cooperation between the army and the bureaucrats. On paper it seemed like a good plan for the colonial authority, and one that would kill two birds with one stone. However, like any other policy or strategy, actual implementation was a different story. The programme was not only partially implemented but also resented by many local residents where it was introduced.³²³ General Kaúlza de Arriaga, the supreme commander since 1970, who was familiar with guerrilla wars, promoted the *aldeamento* programme more than any of the other supreme commanders.

The number of *aldeamentos* and those of local residents confined in these areas tended to be exaggerated because both the colonial administrators, as well as the Portuguese government, wanted to show off their respective abilities when it came to controlling the

colony. For example, the *New York Times* quoted hugely exaggerated figures announced by the Portuguese government: 63.3 per cent of the residents in Cabo Delgado, 67.7 per cent in Niassa and 44 per cent in Tete lived in the *aldeamentos* as of May 1974.³²⁴ The census of mid-1973 recorded 607,000 people living in the *aldeamentos*: 262,000 in 238 villages in Cabo Delgado; 186,000 in 116 villages in Niassa and 159,000 in 156 villages in Tete.³²⁵

A policy that was as important as the *aldeamentos* programme was the *Africanização* (Africanisation) of the defence system. This was copied from the so-called Vietnamisation – a US policy adopted during the Vietnam War which aimed to increase the ratio of local soldiers and to organise the militia. The policy was adopted in Mozambique in 1966. By 1968 many Africans with primary education had been trained as Portuguese army soldiers. As a result, the ratio of Africans in the Portuguese Armed Forces more than doubled from 15 per cent in 1966 to between 35 and 40 per cent in 1974.³²⁶

Organising the militia was even more important than the Africanisation of the formal army. Each *aldeamento* was expected to set up a militia, which then formed a vigilante group together with the local chiefs such as *régulos* and *chefes*. The ratio of Africans in the formal and informal forces was as high as 60 per cent.³²⁷ In other words, the expansion of primary education from the early 1960s was necessary not only for social development, but also constituted part of a strong military drive. The expansion of liberated zones by FRELIMO and the policies of *aldeamento* and Africanisation by the colonial authority meant that there was a scramble to co-opt rural residents in northern Mozambique. This naturally had tremendous impact on the lives of locals.

After getting rid of the Makonde-originated political leaders, FRELIMO intensified its operations in the Makonde habitations. The Portuguese Armed Forces reported in March 1970 that FRELIMO had been active in Mueda Highland and also started military operations in Tete District.³²⁸ Furthermore, the report stated that FRELIMO had given up on expanding to the south in Niassa District and was instead using the route through Cabo Delgado District. FRELIMO's attacks in Cabo Delgado culminated in June and July 1970.

The Portuguese Armed Forces, led by Supreme Commander General Kaúlza de Arriaga, engineered a large-scale attack named Operation Nó Górdio (Gordian Knot) on FRELIMO bases in northern Mozambique from May to August 1970. The operation, with 35,000 soldiers, enormous funds and state-of-the-art weapons, destroyed many FRELIMO military bases and liberated zones. Yet, it was considered a failure³²⁹ because the concentration of Portuguese forces in the north facilitated FRELIMO's inroads into central Mozambique. Furthermore, the temporary destruction of bases generally does not have a long-term impact in guerrilla wars. So in effect, Portugal poured vast resources into an ineffective operation.

FRELIMO infiltrated Tete as early as 1964 and executed its first attack in the district in March 1968.³³⁰ Machel suggested, after becoming the president in May 1970, that FRELIMO's operation in Tete would draw worldwide attention.

The end of the liberation war to independence

The construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam was important in terms of the geopolitics of the southern African region. To ensure safety at the construction site, the Portuguese army moved most of its forces there. But, in a similar way to the opportunities created by Operation N6 G6rdio, FRELIMO started its operation in Manica-Sofala District in central Mozambique, adjacent to Southern Rhodesia.³³¹

This resulted in further intervention by neighbouring countries in the decolonisation of Mozambique. The Zambian government offered FRELIMO a safe haven and a military base. It did, however, also support the *Comit6 Revolucion6rio de Moçambique* (COREMO: Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique), a splinter group of FRELIMO, while Tanzania gave its full support to FRELIMO in northern Mozambique. Therefore, the route from Tanzania to central Mozambique through Malawi remained crucial for FRELIMO.

In Malawi, however, Hastings Banda, who was sworn in as president for life in November 1970, tried to sustain its authoritarian regime by strengthening political and economic relations with neighbouring white regimes.³³² South Africa took over from the United Kingdom as Malawi's largest export destination and provided 60 million dollars for the relocation of its capital. The Malawian economy relied on railroad systems and port facilities in Mozambique. Jorge Jardim, the Portuguese secret agent mentioned earlier and a Malawian consul in Beira, contributed to the further improvement of diplomatic relations between Malawi and the neighbouring white governments. As a result, Malawi became even more pro-Portugal.³³³

While fighting a liberation war in times of increasingly complicated geopolitics, FRELIMO promoted an increasingly revolutionary ideology. At a meeting of the military committee in July 1972, the notion of class struggle was discussed and adopted as the political practice of FRELIMO and its armed forces. In December 1972, the central committee declared: "The decisions taken at that time, FRELIMO believed, set the movement on its final road to victory. Armed struggle was to be made an integral part of the life of the Mozambican people, it proclaimed, and the war to be truly popularized." It then called for attacks on all the fronts.³³⁴ Indeed, the attacks by FRELIMO were fiercest this year.

Under these circumstances, a sense of impending crisis grew among the white government of Southern Rhodesia (which had already been wary of active liberation movements in the country), the South African business community (which was the main funder of the Cahora Bassa Dam) and Portuguese settlers (many of whom were in central Mozambique).³³⁵

Southern Rhodesia and South Africa urged the Portuguese forces to improve their strategy. They even offered military assistance but could not agree on how to cooperate.³³⁶ In 1971 the ZANLA (Zimbabwean National Liberation Army), an ally of FRELIMO, became active in Southern Rhodesia, freely crossing the borders from its headquarters in Mozambique. In September the same year, Ken Flower, Deputy Commissioner of the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia (BSAP), and a founder and first head

of Southern Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), met the Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano in person and criticised the strategy adopted by General Arriaga. Flower recommended the statesman use local Africans and the secret police and asked for permission to embark on cross-border attacks.³³⁷ The long borders with Mozambique created a strong sense of crisis for Southern Rhodesia. In February 1971 the country took the initiative to form an informal gathering called the “Council of Three”, where the security representatives of Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa met every four months and coordinated cooperative activities.³³⁸ The Southern Rhodesian army began operating in Mozambique. The informal gathering was later formalised as the ALCORA Commission, with its headquarters in Pretoria.³³⁹ Representatives from the police and armed forces of the three countries cooperated and coordinated in the framework.³⁴⁰

The situation did not improve as Southern Rhodesia had hoped, however. In February 1972, Balthazar Johannes Vorster and Ian Smith, the prime ministers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia respectively, met in Pretoria. They agreed that the Portuguese forces were not being effective and that South Africa and Southern Rhodesia would actively intervene in Mozambique in the form of joint military operations.³⁴¹ The operation that Southern Rhodesia thought most important was a Mozambican version of an Angolan special force “*Flecha*” (arrow), which consisted of Africans engaged in espionage and counter-insurgency activities. The Southern Rhodesian CIO would be given a free hand in controlling the Mozambican *Flecha*.³⁴² In March the following year, Ken Flower, the director-general of the CIO, flew to Lisbon to discuss the matter with the Portuguese government but could not get permission for its inception.³⁴³

In mid-1972 an officer of the Southern Rhodesian army conducted research in Mozambique and concluded that the morale of Portuguese soldiers was extremely low. The dissatisfaction of the Southern Rhodesian government was also evident in a report by the CIO, entitled “Mozambique: Threat to Rhodesia”. In the fall of 1972, Ian Smith visited Lisbon again and pressed Marcelo Caetano for the formation of *Flecha* and for permission for cross-border attack.³⁴⁴ Caetano’s remark in a BBC interview after the visit clearly demonstrated a gap of perception between the Portuguese government and their Southern Rhodesian counterpart:

Our timorous neighbours [the Rhodesians] were more concerned over the situation in Mozambique than the Portuguese themselves who are used to such a state of affairs and perfectly capable of coping with it.³⁴⁵

The visit did not result in the formation of *Flecha*, but the Southern Rhodesian army did receive the green light for cross-border attacks. From 1972 onwards it frequently attacked villages in central Mozambique.³⁴⁶ Jeque, a rural community under FRELIMO’s influence, was raided three times between September 1972 and May 1974. Around 100 villagers lost their lives as a direct result of these attacks. An additional 208 died from starvation caused by the military tactics of the Southern Rhodesian army.³⁴⁷

Around this time the South African government set up the South African Special Forces Brigade, also known as the Reconnaissance Commando (the Recces) to conduct secret operations in neighbouring countries.³⁴⁸ In Tanzania, whose government supported FRELIMO, it detonated bombs in several locations in Dar es Salaam under the guise of anti-Nyerere insurgents.³⁴⁹

General Kaúlza Arriaga, the supreme commander of the Portuguese Armed Forces, was branded as “*incapaz*” (incapable) by the white governments in southern Africa. The large-scale operation that he had adopted since 1970 had mostly failed. Yet, he did not entirely give up. He changed his strategy to make frequent use of small units consisting of Africans and whites. He Africanised the commando and moved white soldiers with low morale to non-combat units.³⁵⁰ Moreover, the general set up an all-African GE (Grupo Especial). Training facilities were established in Beira in central Mozambique and Dondo in the north. Volunteer soldiers were recruited and trained.³⁵¹ The person in charge was Jorge Jardim who operated from Dondo.

Unlike *Flecha* formed by the PIDE in Angola, the GE had a strong military component and did not conduct much intelligence gathering. The GE consisted of Makhuwa males from the north and Shona males from the central area, both of which were combat zones. After training they were deployed in rural areas and were expected to fight in local troops, in offensive operations and in militia corps in defensive operations. By 1974, 6,000 to 8,000 Africans had received GE training. Orlando Cristina, a secret agent, recruited soldiers behind the scenes.³⁵² The training of the GE was extremely tough with a penchant for using ruthless measures when it came to fighting. As the GE was separated from other troops, many GE soldiers developed a personal loyalty to General Arriaga and Jardim.³⁵³

In order to achieve a rollback, specially trained units other than the GE and the GEP were thrown into Tete District and various locations in the central region where FRELIMO intensified its attacks. Many local residents became casualties.³⁵⁴ The most infamous incident was a massacre in Wiriamu village, south-west of Tete City in December 1972.³⁵⁵ General Arriaga had jumped to the conclusion that the FRELIMO guerrillas lived in the village and sent the sixth GE unit and the PIDE/DGS. Barely a soul survived.³⁵⁶

Upon receiving the news, a Spanish priest rushed to Wiriamu and was shocked by the horrific sight. Later, Adrian Hastings, a British priest, denounced the massacre to the world. Portugal and Southern Rhodesia were internationally condemned.³⁵⁷ When Prime Minister Caetano was invited to London to attend a ceremony to commemorate the 700-year anniversary of the Treaty of Westminster in July 1973, he was shaken by the strong criticism from the media and the general public.³⁵⁸ In the next month, he replaced General Arriaga with General Tomas Basto Machado.³⁵⁹

In addition to the secret operation in Dar es Salaam and the deployment of armed forces to protect Cahora Bassa Dam and power transmission lines, South Africa set up intelligence headquarters in Beira in April 1973. It also strengthened relations with Zambia.³⁶⁰

The Zambian government led by President Kenneth Kaunda greatly assisted FRELIMO's

activities in Tete District and central Mozambique. Its relations with neighbouring countries were always contradictory. For the inland nation, whose economy depended on exports of copper, relations with Southern Rhodesia and Portugal, which controlled both Angola and Mozambique, were a constant headache. In order to improve the situation, Zambia started the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway in 1970, with the assistance of China and Tanzania. The route was planned to open in 1976. However, Southern Rhodesia closed Zambia's transport route in its territory in December 1972. Furthermore, Tanzanian ports became unavailable from January to August. Zambia had no other option but to cooperate with the Portuguese colonial authority.³⁶¹ It had already concluded a trade agreement with Malawi in May 1971, which enabled it to use the Mozambican ports of Nacala and Beira via Malawi.³⁶² However, for the export of copper, an Angolan port of Lobito was most suited because of the shorter distance between the mines and the port. Prime Minister Caetano, welcoming the situation, instructed General Arriaga in a letter dated 24 January 1973 to, "try to make Zambians talk to us." Jardim, a friend of Banda, entered the scene again as an intermediary.³⁶³ Although the Zambian government continued to assist FRELIMO, it saw an advantage in a "peaceful solution of the Mozambican problem" and tried to mediate a negotiation between the Portuguese government and FRELIMO.³⁶⁴

In summary, from 1970 when FRELIMO began being more active in central Mozambique white regimes of southern Africa entered the scene more actively. Unlike in the north where it only had the Portuguese Armed Forces to contend with and had also had the full assistance of the Tanzanian government, it now faced the geopolitics of the southern African region.³⁶⁵ So it had to face the armed forces of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa who had more sophisticated armaments and better morale than the soldiers of the Portuguese army, as well as having to deal with highly sophisticated negotiations with neighbouring African nations. This situation led to the military intervention by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which continued even after Mozambique's independence.³⁶⁶

As FRELIMO's attacks extended to the central areas of Mozambique, Portuguese settlers in Mozambique became increasingly angry at what they saw as the feckless Portuguese Armed Forces.³⁶⁷ This anger reached an uncontrollable level when 146 settlers were forced to evacuate from Beira for safety reasons in August 1973.³⁶⁸ White settlers demonstrated in Beira as an act of protest against the incompetence of the Portuguese forces. To protect themselves, they started a vigilante group and hired African mercenaries.³⁶⁹ The PIDE/PDS formed a Mozambican *Flecha* using local Africans and in 1973 sent them to different places in central Mozambique.³⁷⁰ *Flecha* operated mainly in the Chimoio plateau, from where FRELIMO entered the region, and succeeded in obstructing FRELIMO operations.³⁷¹

Pleased with the "toughness" of *Flecha*, white settlers gave financial assistance to the unit. Again, Jardim was actively involved in the formation of *Flecha*.³⁷² However, rural residents feared *Flecha* because they frequently resorted to violent measures such as torture and execution. The Portuguese forces resented *Flecha* since they felt their rightful overall control of military action was undermined and because they had been trying to win the

hearts and minds of the people. The discord and friction between the army and the PIDE became aggravated.³⁷³

Fearing a FRELIMO victory, Jardim and other prominent whites in Mozambique started to prepare the unilateral declaration of independence, following the example of South Rhodesia. General Arriaga, a close friend of Jardim, might have been replaced because the Portuguese government learned about his involvement in this.³⁷⁴ A document sent from a Portuguese official in Mozambique to the Portuguese foreign ministry in February 1973 expressed the apprehension among local officials that the training of the GE and the GEP was political and that the loyalty of the soldiers to Arriaga and Jardim was unusually strong.³⁷⁵ In December 1973 General Arriaga, back in Portugal, was placed under house arrest after asking his colleagues if they would join him in a “coup” against the Caetano administration.³⁷⁶

Portuguese people living in Mozambique reviewed the situation they were in: a small white population (approximately 200,000); a vast territory and the policy of the Caetano government, which was to flatly refuse to solve problems politically, just like his predecessor Salazar. They felt that it was critical to form an alliance with moderate African elites in Mozambique. However, under Portugal's colonial system African politicians were not nurtured and developed, and those who did have the potential for political involvement were often FRELIMO members already. Therefore, there was a small pool of possible allies for the white settlers; mainly the African politicians who had been expelled from FRELIMO, the leaders of splinter groups and the former FRELIMO guerrillas who surrendered themselves to, or were captured by, the colonial authority.

As it was obviously against the Estado Novo regime, the Portuguese in Mozambique who had recently arrived from the metropole were not informed of the plan. Jardim and others, working for the unilateral declaration of independence, conceived of an “anti-FRELIMO strategy” and approached the PIDE, high-ranking officials in the national armed forces, politicians, the Southern Rhodesian government, the South African government, President Banda of Malawi and President Kaunda of Zambia.³⁷⁷

Large-scale, long-term wars in three overseas colonies exhausted Portugal, and its citizens became increasingly opposed to what they perceived as meaningless, as well as contrary to international trends. Members of the younger generation who were sent to war witnessed the reality of the African colonies and became doubtful about sacrificing their lives for countries that had not benefited them. Young captains in particular were most dissatisfied and secretly worked inside the national armed forces in corporation with dissident organisations such as the Socialist Party and the Communist Party.

While the morale of soldiers was steadily decreasing in the Portuguese forces, in 1973 the FRELIMO central committee, under the leadership of Samora Machel, again discussed what ideological direction to take and stepped up its revolutionary line.³⁷⁸ As written in its journal in 1970, however, FRELIMO did not introduce existent “forms” of revolution:

The Mozambican revolution is essentially Mozambican. It is not copied from any other revolution ... [T]he experiences of other revolutions help us to

find solutions for certain of our problems, to foresee certain phases of our revolutionary process, to find the most suitable formulas to characterize our situation at each moment.³⁷⁹

During the liberation struggle FRELIMO used the Marxist-Leninist line of thinking but never paraded it as their official ideology although its influence gradually became stronger. In 1973 it decided to lead the transformation of society as a “vanguard party” and set up a party committee in its army. A party school began to teach the history and experience of FRELIMO as well as Marxist-Leninism in January 1974,³⁸⁰ three months before the overthrow of the government in Portugal.

In Portugal, following an “abortive coup” by General Arriaga, one of the supreme leaders of the colonial wars, General António de Spínola, a former military governor of Guinea-Bissau, published a book entitled *Portugal e o Futuro* (Portugal and the Future) in February 1974. The book advocated that Portugal change its relationship with the colonies to one similar to the United Kingdom’s Commonwealth.³⁸¹ It sold a million copies in a very short time, received support from many people domestically and internationally and dealt a serious blow to the Caetano administration. As a result, Caetano began to consider giving more autonomy to Mozambique and to realise multi-racial governance, as suggested by Jardim and others.³⁸²

From 1973 onwards the Caetano administration and FRELIMO actively negotiated with Zambia as a mediator. The terms that FRELIMO proposed to Lisbon were: (1) a guarantee of independence; (2) recognition of FRELIMO as the sole representative institution; (3) the transfer of power; and (4) all the other questions should be negotiable.³⁸³ But Caetano’s offer to FRELIMO in March 1974 specified that the organisation had to first cease fighting and hold a referendum before any major constitutional change was introduced.³⁸⁴ This sentiment was shared by white settlers in Mozambique, including Jardim, the mediator. In other words, while avoiding the sole accession of power to FRELIMO, they tried to buy time and form a strong political alliance between white settlers and their African puppets. Of course FRELIMO would not accept it. Middlemas summarises this point:

FRELIMO could not accept this. FRELIMO needed historic justification for the war, acknowledgement that by its revolt and struggle it had earned the sole right to represent the nation – indeed, that by its struggle it had created the nation – and, in its accession over the heads of all others.³⁸⁵

The negotiations came to a standstill. Then, on 14 April 1974, the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement led by army captains overthrew the Caetano government overnight, without bloodshed. After much meandering, the new government and FRELIMO signed the Lusaka Peace Treaty in September 1974 and agreed that Mozambique would become independent in June 1975. Thanks to its cooperative relationship with the Portuguese Communist Party, FRELIMO was to be given full authority upon independence. The new administration in Portugal and FRELIMO were positioned to set up a transitional

government and push forward with decolonisation in the period between the Lusaka Peace Treaty and independence.

Upon the conclusion of the treaty, armed confrontation between FRELIMO and the Portuguese Armed Forces came to an end. One stage of FRELIMO's liberation struggle, the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial system, was complete. Yet, struggle would continue in order to achieve its social revolution and reconciliation with the enemies that it had made over the years: "*A luta continua*" (The struggle continues).

Notes

- 1 Hanzawa, 2001:82.
- 2 Kibata, 1996:10.
- 3 Darwin, 1991:114; Kibata, 1996:11.
- 4 Quoted from Oda, 1983:46.
- 5 While acknowledging the usefulness of the phrase in order to describe the rise of nationalism, Hanzawa is opposed to its casual usage because it makes the British decolonisation policy look more liberal than it actually was (Hanzawa, 2001:95). The author uses the phrase to describe not so much the colonial policy of Macmillan or the British Empire, but rather the change towards decolonisation within the international arena and in the African colonies.
- 6 Louis, 1985:414.
- 7 At the same time, the US government sent a military advisory body to Vietnam, reflecting what Halliday referred to as “Phase II: the period of Oscillatory Antagonism, 1953–1969” (Halliday, 1986:3).
- 8 Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/1-2758 (28 Nov.1958), telegram from the Department of State to the French Embassy, in FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States), 1958-60. Vol. II:81-82.
- 9 Cabinet Office file 6/18/1, Part III, Prime Minister’s Personal Minute no. M19/57, in Morgan, 1980:96.
- 10 Cabinet Office file 6/18/1, Part 4, in Ibid.:102.
- 11 Kibata, 1996:112-113. Circular 1209 (April 21, 1959) of the US Department of State welcomed the new African policy of the British government (NA II, SDLF, EUR/WEA, Relating to Portugal 1956-1963, box 1).
- 12 Iain MacLeod, “Trouble in Africa”, *Spectator*, 31 Jan. 1965:27, in Goldsworthy, 1971:363.
- 13 The Belgian Congo became independent as the Republic of Congo on 30 June 1960.
- 14 UN Security Council the 134 (1960) Resolution (S/4300), 1 April 1960. Hanzawa quotes a British foreign affairs official as saying that the resolution was, “a dangerous precedent in colonial issues”, and, “it will without doubt be referred to if an incident of the same nature unfortunately takes place in our colonies” (PRO, FO371/153583 (UN1822/114), Memorandum by Uffen, 7 April 1960; PRO, FO371/153579 (UN1822/46), Memorandum by Tahourid on 26 March 1960, in Hanzawa, 2001:87). However, in the face of international criticism, the British government did not dare to vote against it and, together with France, abstained. In the end, nine members of the Security Council including the US voted in favour and none against.
- 15 UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/1598 (XV)) on the “Question of race conflict in South Africa”. Although the UK and the US abstained, the resolution was passed on 13 April 1961, with 78 votes in favour versus zero against (Shepherd, 1963:164).
- 16 Sir Michael Blundell, who attended the Lancaster House conference on Kenya’s constitutional framework and independence as a member of the New Kenya Group, quoted Iain Macleod as saying on hearing Belgium’s granting of independence to Congo: “We are going to be the last in the Colonial sphere instead of the first” (Blundell, 1964:271).
- 17 UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/1514 (XV)).
- 18 The abstainees were: Australia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the USA and the UK.
- 19 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. II: 399-400; 430-432; 450-451. The secretary of state had to persuade a reluctant president on the telephone on 8 December by saying: “This (Afro-Asian) is a bad resolution, but we are afraid of an alternative Soviet resolution ... This is a really tough one but on balance we felt we would go along since the resolution would pass anyway” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations, in Ibid.:455-456).
- 20 British Prime Minister Macmillan wrote that he was “shocked” that the USA intended to vote in

- the UN General Assembly for the Afro-Asian resolution on colonialism. Macmillan urged, "Do let us stand together" (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D204, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. II:457).
- 21 UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/1541; 1542(XV)), 15 Dec. 1960.
- 22 In 1957, in order to stop this type of resolution being adopted, the Portuguese government began to send delegations to countries such as Brazil, Pakistan, the UK, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Peru, Nepal and Thailand for meetings with high officials. In 1960 delegations met with Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN secretary-general, and US President Eisenhower (Teixeira, 1998:81). The efforts did not alter the unfavourable atmosphere in the United Nations.
- 23 Afonso and Gomes, 2000:55.
- 24 NSC 6001 on the United States policy on South, Central and East Africa (19 January, 1960); António José Telo, "As Guerras de África e a Mudança nos Apoios Internacionais de Portugal", *Revista de História das Ideias*, 1994, vol.16: 357-358, in Rodrigues, 2002:30.
- 25 FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. VII: 639-643.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/11-160, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. II:435-436. Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, 4 Nov. 1960.
- 28 Matsuoka, 1999:51.
- 29 Taga, 1991:251.
- 30 Gavshon, 1981:89.
- 31 Morton, 1971:21-22; Kanet and Bahry, 1975:10.
- 32 It is also true that very often liberation movement leaders had an affinity with socialism. This is elaborated on in more detail later in the chapter.
- 33 Gavshon, 1981:89.
- 34 Kurihara, 1998:143-145. After Lenin's death the notion of "world revolution" was dismissed. The seventh and last congress of the Comintern in 1935, held under Stalin's authority, made the defence of the Soviet State against fascism the duty of each and every branch (Ibid.:150).
- 35 "... In fact, however, all the present Asian and African members do not always, or even usually, vote together or with the Soviet bloc ... The Africans and Asians come closest to voting together on "colonial" and economic development issues but definitely split on East-West issues ... The US will encounter the greatest difficulty in an expanding UN on those matters where a simple majority vote is required ... The difficulties presented by the new UN for US leadership and for a relatively small number of older powers. This is particularly true in view of the disposition of the majority of UN members to favor 'universality' and to be antagonistic to 'colonialism'" (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/3-459, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. II:108-116).
- 36 Department of State, Central Files, 303/1-76, in Ibid.:213-214.
- 37 The resolution stated that the many deaths and oppression in Angola divided the international community and impeded world peace and security. It requested Portugal to take immediate steps to transfer authority to the Angolan people and all the other non-self-governing territories (UN Security Council 163rd Resolution (1961) of 9 June 1961, S/4835). The resolution also decided that the UN would dispatch a fact-finding commission to Angola. Both the Soviet Union and the USA voted for it (MacQueen, 1997:53-54).
- 38 Houser, 1974:20. According to the US-Portugal Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 1951, arms provided by the USA were to be used to promote the comprehensive defence of the Atlantic under the MAP (Mutual Assistance Programme). However, despite repeated requests from the US ambassador in Lisbon, the Portuguese forces used the US arms in Angola. It was reported that US Air Force-owned napalm bombs were used in Angola (*London Observer*, 20/08/1961).
- 39 In spite of its initial reluctance to join NATO, the Salazar administration came to enjoy the political and military advantages of being one of its members (Teixeira, 1998:81).
- 40 Manghezi, 1999:155.

- 41 Rodrigues, 2002:87.
- 42 Salazar, 1961:6-7.
- 43 Ibid.:8; 18-19.
- 44 Ibid.:24. Translated from Portuguese by the Portuguese foreign ministry.
- 45 "Briefing Papers 1961," March 8, 1961, in NA II, SDLF, Records relating to Portugal 1957-1966, box 1.
- 46 Houser, 1974:20-21.
- 47 The disagreement is mentioned by Arthur Schlesinger, a special assistant and court historian to President Kennedy from 1961 to 1963 (Schlesinger, 1965:562). It is also clearly illustrated in the internal documents of the US government such as FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XXI: 541-585 and NA II, SDLF, Entry 3093, box 1.
- 48 "Portuguese Territories in Africa", 21 February 1961, NA II, SDCE, 1960-63, box 1815; "Official-informal Letter" of Charles Burke Elbrick to Foy Kohler, 1 March 1961, NA II, SDLF, 68D401, Entry 5296, box 1.
- 49 Memorandum from Samuel H. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), dated on June 29, 1961, in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. XXI: 545; "Comment on AF Paper on Portuguese Overseas Provinces", 17 February 1961, NA II, SDLF, Entry 3093, box 1. According to a document sent from the Bureau of European Affairs to the under secretary, "[t]he importance of the Azores might be measured by the estimate that 87 per cent of our military air traffic with Europe transits the Azores" ("Briefing on Angola," 30 June, 1961, NA II, SDLF, Entry 3093, box 1).
- 50 The East-West conflict and the Third World strategy became key issues in the 1960 presidential election. Kennedy won the race, claiming that Eisenhower's "US potency" (Kolkko, 1987:112) lowered the USA's international prestige (Matsuoka, 1999:29).
- 51 John F. Kennedy, eleventh annual message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 30, 1961. Kennedy interpreted Khrushchev's addresses supporting liberation wars as the Soviet's declaration of war against the USA or its intention of imperialist expansion to emerging nations (*J. F. Kennedy 1960 Campaign*, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1961, 1-2:3, in Matsuoka, 1999:51-53).
- 52 The decision led the USA into a much deeper involvement in Vietnam.
- 53 John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs, May 25, 1961.
- 54 Matsuoka, 1999:55.
- 55 For details, see Section 6 of the previous chapter.
- 56 Rodrigues, 2002:161-189; FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. XXI:553-585.
- 57 NA II, SDLF, Entry 3093, box 1.
- 58 "Memo. To the President, meeting with Portuguese Foreign Minister," 24 October, 1962, in NA II, SDLF, Entry 3093, box 1.
- 59 UN General Assembly Resolution 1807(XVII) on Territories under Portuguese administration (14 December 1962); on "Use of NATO Arms in Africa" (27 September 1962).
- 60 Rostow, 1972:192.
- 61 Rostow to Sorensen, Oct.9 POF-SM, JFKL, in Matsuoka, 1999:634-635.
- 62 Julius Nyerere's address on the opening of Kivukoni College, Dar es Salaam, July 29, 1961, in Shepherd, 1962:front page.
- 63 Touré, 1961:152. Translated from Japanese.
- 64 In a speech in 1957, when he was still senator, Kennedy expressed his support for the independence of Algeria (Matsuoka, 1999:94).
- 65 "Portuguese Africa", Memo. Feb. 8 1962, in NAI, SDCE, Record Group 59, 1960-63, Box 1819. Notes in this document, of a meeting between an official of the Bureau of African Affairs, the state department and Mondlane, revealed that they had already established a relationship.
- 66 Details of the relationship between Mondlane and the CIA are unknown to this day. When

- he moved from the USA to Tanzania to take up the position of FRELIMO president, he was accompanied not by a Mozambican but a member of the CIA personnel (Opello, 1975:73). However, it is unclear whether Mondlane knew the identity of this person. Later, he expelled him from FRELIMO (MacQueen, 1997:54). The USA's assistance probably took place only at an early stage as later Mondlane criticised the CIA and the US government in his 1969 book (Mondlane, 1969:198-209).
- 67 Based on the analysis that the UPA would be the easiest to persuade to change sides to the Western bloc out of the various Angolan nationalist movements, the CIA and the embassy had frequent contact with the UPA (Rodrigues, 2002:104-106). State Department documents contain records of contacts between the UPA and the CIA Leopoldville, as well as records of financial assistance. The US government instructed the CIA to provide funds indirectly through private institutes such as the American Committee for Africa. "Letter from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), dated May 23 1961", in FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XXI:543-544; "Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson, dated June 18, 1961," in *Ibid.*:544-545.
- 68 "Contact with African Nationalist Leaders", 23 October, 1962, in NAII, SDLE, Entry 3093, box 1.
- 69 However, the contact with, and assistance to, the movements through the American Committee on Africa continued (*Ibid.*); Mahoney, 1983:203-222.
- 70 According to the FSI's official website it is the Federal Government's primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the US foreign affairs community (<http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/>). By extending an invitation to Mondlane, the closeness of his relationship to the US government becomes apparent.
- 71 "Summary of certain remarks by Professor E. Mondlane at FSI Aug 24, 1962", September 5, 1962, NA II, SDLF 95925, box 1.
- 72 "Professor Eduardo Mondlane," September 5, 1962, NA II, SDLF 95925, box 1.
- 73 Analysing the relationship between Portugal and the USA around this time, Rodrigues suggests that the crisis developed throughout 1961 adding, "this crisis will gradually weaken over the following years" (Rodrigues, 2002:8-9). He concludes that the increasing involvement of the USA in the Vietnam War helped to improve its relationship with Portugal (*Ibid.*:11).
- 74 Shepherd, 1962:143.
- 75 *Ibid.*:155; Laqueur, 1961:621.
- 76 There was also an issue related to the rejection of French colonialism and the rejection of Soviet communism, pressed by French anti-communist leftists (Fanon, 1969:81-82).
- 77 In 1876, 10.8 per cent of the land area in the world belonged to the European powers. By 1900, the figure soared by 79.6 per cent to 90.4 per cent, with the highest rate of increase being in Africa between 1876 and 1900. The percentage of the land under European rule was lowest in Africa in 1876 (Alexander Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der europäis-chen Kolonien*, 254, in Lenin, 1999:124).
- 78 Cabral, 1980:183-203; Fanon, 1969:123-129.
- 79 Lenin, 1999:124-125. Translated from the Japanese translation.
- 80 *Ibid.*:8.
- 81 Cabral, 1974:79-80. Cabral declared that the decolonisation movement would evolve into an anti-imperialism movement and said: "We will not shock anybody by admitting that imperialism – and everything goes to prove that it is in fact the last phase in the evolution of capitalism – has been a historical necessity, a consequence of the impetus given by the productive forces and of the transformation of the means of production in the general context of humanity, considered as one movement, that is to say a necessity like those today of the national liberation of peoples, the destruction of capital and the advent of socialism."
- 82 *Africa Action*, Vol. 19, 20/02/1961, in Fanon, 1969:190-191.

- 83 De Witte, 2001:xiii.
- 84 Oda, 1986:137. Similarly, Shepherd quoted a diplomat saying, “The Belgians did not leave too soon, they left too suddenly”, and commented, “[t]here were only a handful of trained Congolese administrators when independence came, and not a single Congolese officer in the army” (Shepherd, 1983:156).
- 85 De Witte, 2001:7.
- 86 Ralph Bunche, a UN official, sent the following telegram from Congo to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld on 6 August 1960: “[Tshombe was] a puppet manoeuvred by the Belgians, that he took no decision that was not inspired by the Belgians, that no official meeting was held without the presence of a Belgian and that without the Belgians, he would never have come to power” (De Witte, 2001:13-14).
- 87 De Witte:7; Misu, 2002a:15. A Belgian senator who investigated the matter agreed in general (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 2001). Frédéric Vandewalle, a Belgian colonel who became an officer of the Katangan army-gendarmerie, said that it was a put-up job by Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens (Misu, 2002b:5).
- 88 Misu, 2002b:4.
- 89 This decision was not an adjuration. Nor did it set the timetable for the withdrawal of the Belgian forces.
- 90 De Witte, 2001:9.
- 91 Takuya Misu, who studied recently-disclosed archives of the United Kingdom and the USA, concluded that, “the UN troops in Congo functioned as part of the US undertaking to set up a pro-US government” and therefore questions the neutrality of the UN Secretariat and its forces (Misu, 2007:205).
- 92 CRISP, Congo 1960:615, in De Witte, 2001:9.
- 93 CIA Cable, Leopold to Director, 8/18/60, in US Senate, 1975:14.
- 94 “The committee has received solid evidence of a plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. Strong hostility to Lumumba, voiced at the very highest levels of government may have been intended to initiate an assassination operation ... The evidence indicates that it is likely that President Eisenhower’s expression of strong concern about Lumumba ... was taken by Allen Dulles as authority to assassinate Lumumba” (Ibid.:13; 53-59). The document chronicles the discussion in the White House until it reached this conclusion. It demonstrates that the White House staff could not agree on whether it meant the assassination order by the President (Ibid.).
- 95 CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60, in Ibid.:52.
- 96 Bissell, 9/10/1975:33-34, in Ibid.
- 97 *Washington Post*, July 21 2002.
- 98 Tully, 1962:220.
- 99 The federation comprised Southern Rhodesia and the British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and existed from 1953 to 1963 when Northern Rhodesia gained independence as Zambia and Nyasaland as Malawi. Southern Rhodesia declared its independence unilaterally as the Republic of Rhodesia.
- 100 Welensky, 1964:209-266.
- 101 Ibid.:265-266.
- 102 Ibid.:214.
- 103 Fanon, 1969:191.
- 104 “Congolese Army’s Reported Arrest of Four Portuguese Soldiers in the Congo,” NA II, State Department Central Files, Record Group 59, 1960-63, box 1815.
- 105 Ibid.:191-196. President Nyerere also stated at the OAU emergency meeting in Dar es Salaam on 12 February 1964 that the unity of Africa alone could liberate Africa (*Mozambique Revolution*, no. 2, 1964 Jan.:1).
- 106 Okakura and Royama, 1969:251.
- 107 Fanon, 1969:128; Cabral, 1974:83.

- 108 Cabral, 1974:83.
- 109 Cabral, 1980:30; 33.
- 110 Fanon, 1969:195.
- 111 The first issue of the FRELIMO journal already treated imperialism as “the enemy”, indicated in the following passages: “Our struggle will not end when independence is won. We will always guard our country against our old enemy (imperialism) in new disguise, against exploitation and social degradation, camouflaged by a ‘new’ friendship” (*Mozambique Revolution*, no. 1, 1963 Dec.:1).
- 112 Ibid.
- 113 Although there was also an ideological factor, these leaders were not necessarily socialists from the beginning. Rather, they became socialists as they gained knowledge and experience.
- 114 Mondlane, 1969:115.
- 115 The formation of the Movimento para a Independência Nacional de Guiné Portuguesa (MING) and the Partido Africano da Independência (PAI) in Guinea-Bissau in 1954/ 55 led to the birth of the PAIG in 1956 (Kawabata, 1980:252). In Angola, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which later became the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), and the União Nacional de Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) were formed.
- 116 After getting involved in the matter at the request of the Portuguese government, the USA learned that Captain Galvão was not a “terrorist” but an “opposition” and a supporter of democracy. It subsequently softened its attitude. Although the USA helped to rescue hostages in Brazil and confiscated the ship, Portugal was offended (Rodrigues, 2002:39-45). By this time, a socialist government had been established in Brazil. The country became a stronghold for anti-Salazar activists. After a military regime came into power, however, Brazil became pro-Salazar/Caetano administrations. When the Portuguese regime was toppled in 1974, many former government officials took refuge in Brazil.
- 117 Jan. 30, 1961, NA II, SDCE, 1960-63, box 1813; Feb. 10, 1961, NA II, SDCE, 1960-63, box 1813; Feb. 18, 1961, NA II, SDCE, 1960-63, box 1260; March 6, 1961, NA II, SDCE, 1960-63, box 1819.
- 118 “Internal Ferment in Portugal”, 11 April 1961, NA II, SDLE, 1957-1966, box 1.
- 119 Charles Burke Elbrick to Raymond Valliere, 14 March 1961. NA II, SDLE, Entry 5296, box 2.
- 120 Cabral, Andrade and dos Santos took the lead in the formation of the CONCP.
- 121 Rodrigues, 2002:8.
- 122 Chilcote, 1967:37.
- 123 In 1966 FRELIMO’s propaganda flyers, targeting the soldiers in the Portuguese Armed Forces, were impounded. It was explicitly written that FRELIMO was allied with the FPLN and that it would accept any person (TT-PIDE/DGS, Pr.2826/62-SR-N.T.3213-no.2289, Po.1000.1609, 1/8/1962).
- 124 In this section the author refers to Adam and Dyuti (1993) and Borges Coelho (1993), who investigated the incident from oral tradition and the colonial archives.
- 125 More than 500 people were killed (Mondlane, 1969:117). It is pointed out that the number of deaths was probably lower than this earlier estimate (Adam and Dyuti, 1993:119). Whereas they established through interviews that the *sipaïos* (African police officers) were the ones who fired at the crowd, Mondlane concluded that the shooting was actually carried out by the Portuguese Armed Forces (Mondlane, 1969:118).
- 126 Mondlane, 1969:117.
- 127 Although it is not specified whether these elders were the *régulo*, or traditional authority or religious authority, the context suggests that it was traditional authority.
- 128 Adam and Dyuti, 1993:127.
- 129 Chagonga set up the *Associação Nacional Africana de Moatize* (Moatize African National

- Association) in 1959 when he was working as a nurse at Moatize Coal Mining Company in Tete District. In 1961, fearing for his life, he fled to Nyasaland (Borges Coelho, 1989:52).
- 130 Researchers do not agree on when they started to operate. For example, Borges Coelho states that the activity started in August 1962, two months after the formation of FRELIMO (Ibid.). Mondlane regards UNAMI to be a similar type of organisation to UDENAMO and MANU but does not specify when it was formed.
- 131 Munslow, 1983:82.
- 132 Mondlane, 1969:119.
- 133 Munslow, 1983:79.
- 134 Borges Coelho calls UNAMI *uma forma mimética* (a mimicking form) of the Malawi Congress Party, claiming that Hastings Banda, the leader of the Malawi Congress Party, assisted the formation of UNAMI with the intention to incorporate northern Mozambique into Malawi (Borges Coelho, 1989:52). It was nonetheless significant in the sense that the people of Tete District formed a political organisation.
- 135 Munslow, 1983:80. Although Mondlane referred to these movements as “nationalist movement”, distinguishing them from “early nationalist movement” in the 1920s (Mondlane, 1969:101-120), this book uses Munslow’s term of “proto-nationalist movement” because the participants of these movements were regionally and ethnically defined (Munslow, 1983:79).
- 136 Janet Mondlane arrived in Mozambique a few months earlier than her husband. She was reportedly quite frightened (Manghezi, 1999:189).
- 137 Ibid.:190. Magaia, then a fifteen year-old girl, later became a world famous novelist who wrote a novel about the brutality of RENAMO in southern Mozambique and denounced the war to the rest of the world.
- 138 Ibid.:194.
- 139 Ibid.:155.
- 140 Christie, 1989:13.
- 141 Responding to Ghana’s condemnation of forced labour in Portuguese colonies, the ILO dispatched a fact-finding mission to the territories in December 1961. To ease international pressure, the Portuguese government requested that the minister in charge of “Overseas Provinces” strictly observe the newly legislated Código do Trabalho Rural (Rural Labour Code) (TT, Gabinete dos Negócios Políticos ao Ministro do Ultramar, no. 1009/S, 12/11/1963).
- 142 Munslow, 1983:83.
- 143 Pinheiro et al., 1963. This indicates that the Salazar administration began to look for concrete measures in order to hold on to its colonies.
- 144 Cann, 1997:113.
- 145 The author’s interview with Monteiro, a former SCCIM agent (Amaro Monteiro, Carcavelos, 07/01/2004).
- 146 Amaro Monteiro, Carcavelos, 07/01/2004. We should probably take the remark with a pinch of salt.
- 147 Afonso and Gomes, 2000:239.
- 148 Pinheiro et al., 1963:11.
- 149 Portugal set up the Banco Nacional de Investimentos (National Bank of Investments) in 1959 to provide long-term loans (Hoshi and Hayashi, 1979:257).
- 150 *Notícias de Beira*, 22 May 1975, in Munslow, 1983:83.
- 151 Decreto-lei no. 2.214 (*Boletim Oficial de Moçambique*, no. 20, 17 Mar. 1962), in Correia, 2000:78.
- 152 In reality the majority of the population did not have the right to vote.
- 153 As discussed in Chapter 2, these administrative units did not necessarily correspond to the traditional sense of territories.
- 154 We can detect the high expectations that the colonial authority had for the traditional authority in Cunha’s writing: “We have to negotiate! With whom? ... With the guerrilla chiefs? Can they represent the tribes they belong to?” (Cunha, 1977:21).

- 155 The pressure on the Salazar government was increased internationally on 19 December 1961 when the sixteenth UN General Assembly decided to set up the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1699 (XVI) on Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV)).
- 156 For detail, see Mondlane, 1969:121.
- 157 Ibid.
- 158 Manghezi, 1999:218-224.
- 159 Munslow, 1983:80.
- 160 Manghezi, 1999:218.
- 161 Ibid.:218-219.
- 162 Ibid.:219.
- 163 TT-PIDE/DGS, Pr.2826/62-SR-N.T.3213-no.2289, Po.1000.1609, 1/8/1962. This suggests the possibility that some members of liberation movements (probably UDENAMO) moved from Salisbury to Dar es Salaam in order to spy for the consulate.
- 164 This report also contains detailed information about the four senior FRELIMO members from Dar es Salaam and the previous leaders of UDENAMO and MANU (TT-SCCI-no. 160-21/6/1963).
- 165 Munslow, 1983:81-82.
- 166 This meeting was attended by 80 representatives and 500 observers (Ibid.:81).
- 167 Mondlane, 1969:122-123.
- 168 Munslow, 1983:82. The classes here refer to peasants, labourers and petit-bourgeoisies.
- 169 Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação, 1986:66-67.
- 170 Opello, 1975:42.
- 171 Mondlane, 1969:123. The FRELIMO journal also pointed it out (*Mozambique Revolution*, no. 44, 1970 July-Sept.:1-2).
- 172 Manghezi, 1999:225.
- 173 PAIGC was a member of the CONCP, which contributed to the formation of FRELIMO. The PAIGC and FRELIMO greatly influenced one another because both fought against Portuguese colonialism and also because their leaders developed personal relationships.
- 174 Opello, 1975:42.
- 175 Munslow, 1983:84-85; Manghezi, 1999:250.
- 176 Aquino de Bragança, "La Longe Marche de Samora", *Afrique-Asie*, 18 April – May 1977, in Munslow, 1983:85. They referred to the collected sayings of Chairman Mao published by the Chinese Communist Party and Giap (1962).
- 177 The Indochinese Communist Party was initially engaged in street-combat in the big cities but later made strategic retreats to the countryside on its own initiative (Giap, 1962:46).
- 178 Mondlane later stated in an interview that FRELIMO wanted to avoid the unnecessary massacre of innocent people (Chilcote, 1965:6).
- 179 The argument is detailed in Mondlane's book (Mondlane, 1969:128).
- 180 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 1, 1963 Dec.: 9, in Henriksen, 1973:49.
- 181 Cabral, 1974:108. Cabral admitted that as a result of their lack of experience they had been wrong to believe that they could use strikes and other methods in cities (*Tricontinental*, 1969 May and June, no. 12 in Cabral, 1980:122).
- 182 Cabral, 1974:123-132.
- 183 Henriksen, 1983:32.
- 184 Immediately afterwards, 70 more joined the training (Mondlane, 1969:128).
- 185 Oda, 1991:136.
- 186 Initially the committee comprised of Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tanganyika, Zaire, Guinea, Senegal and Nigeria. It was inactive during the 1960s but became active after the OAU decided to assist liberation movements more aggressively in Portuguese Africa in February 1970

- (Ibid.:140).
- 187 When FRELIMO began its armed struggle in September 1964, it had less than 250 guerrillas. Therefore, even if Zambia and Malawi had been independent by that time, they could not have been used as effective sanctuaries.
- 188 The first general election at the end of 1962 forced the white settlers to choose between the eventual multiracialism of the United Federal Party and the racialism of the Rhodesian Front (Inoue, 2001:4-5).
- 189 “Ligação com os Serviços Secretos”, Proc.960.17 UL 243 (31/5/1961), TT-PIDE/DGS-AC-SCCI(2) 6341A.
- 190 On 30 November 1961, the Rhodesian army and the FA intelligence division discussed the situation in Katanga with the governor-general in Angola and the PIDE in Luanda (432/61-GAB Director-General PIDE from PIDE Luanda, 16/12/1961).
- 191 No. 819/61 (10/7/1961), TT-PIDE/DGS AC SCCI(2) 6341A.
- 192 TT-PIDE/DGS AC SCCI(2) 6341A.
- 193 The number amounted to several thousand (Munslow, 1983:83).
- 194 For example, on 3 October 1963 the commissioner of the South African police sent information about FRELIMO activities in Swaziland, including the names of its members (S 8/156, TT-PIDE/DGS AC SCCI(2) 6341A).
- 195 Manghezi, 1999:216.
- 196 The record of the meeting was sent from the SCCIM to the PIDE headquarters via the PIDE Mozambique. Although the accuracy of the content is questionable, it is interesting to learn how the FRELIMO leadership talked to people from Mozambique and what kind of cooperation they asked for. The record also reveals what information the colonial authority had (TT-PIDE/DGS-375 –389-no.2460/63:3-13/9/1963).
- 197 Ibid.:5.
- 198 Ibid.:6.
- 199 Mondlane, 1969:127-129.
- 200 See Figure 6 for the areas of residence.
- 201 However, a spy sent by the head of the administrative post informed on them and many were arrested. The missionary of the Anglican Church, John Paul, describes how students and teachers of his church school got involved in FRELIMO (Paul, 1975:97-99).
- 202 Direcção Provincial de Educação e Cultura, 1979:1-3. The spies of the colonial administrative office posed as would-be members and detained the ringleaders.
- 203 Medeiros, 2003:2. The teachings were spread by the *confraria* (religious confraternity). (The author’s interview with the elders, Ilha de Moçambique, 3/9/2003).
- 204 Medeiros, 2003:2. The absence of the Catholic Church in the north is another reason for the particularly harsh attitude of the authority.
- 205 Tominaga, 2001:136. Michael F. Lofchie, an American political scientist, points out that the emergence and growth of Arab-nationalism in Zanzibar can be divided into three phases. The proto-nationalist phase from 1949 to 1953, consisting of a brief excursion into anti-colonial protest; the associational phase from 1954 to 1956 when Arab nationalists fought to win over the Arab Association in order to use it as the vehicle of their anti-colonial protest and the multi-racial phase from 1956 to 1964 when Arabs assumed the leadership of a multi-racial nationalist movement, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), to seize power from the British (Lofchie, 1965:130-131).
- 206 Monteiro, 1993:90.
- 207 This number is the lowest estimation and includes the Makhuwa, the Metto, the Lomwe and the Yao (Ibid.:99).
- 208 Ibid.:98.
- 209 “Questions to be asked by the Honourable Rashid Hamidi at the next meeting of the Legislative

- Council on Immigration Restriction,” dated 7/11/1956, in ZA-AB 26/79.
- 210 Ibid.
- 211 “Immigration Control,” dated 01/01/1962, in ZA-CGF 12/66.
- 212 “Wamakonde Activities”, dated 27/03/1962, in ZA-CGF 12/18.
- 213 “Election of Makonde Leaders”, dated 21/11/1960, in ZA-GC 1/24.
- 214 Juma Omar, 11/09/2005, Consular of the Republic of Mozambique, Zanzibar.
- 215 Benjamin Mwaleia, 11/09/2005, Consular of the Republic of Mozambique, Zanzibar.
- 216 Alberto Velho, 17/08/2005, Pemba. He became a FRELIMO guerrilla.
- 217 AHUltramar, PAA600 Proc.945 (26 June 1964).
- 218 For detail, see Lofchie, 1965:183-220; Shivji, 2008:20-33.
- 219 Shivji, 2008:43-51.
- 220 Leonhart to Sec. State, Jan. 28, 1964, NSFCF (National Security File Country File), box 103, LBJL, in Gleijeses, 2002:58.
- 221 The background of the unification process has elicited many suggestions and arguments, such as the pressure by the United Kingdom and the UN in the Cold War context; Nyerere’s pan-Africanist tendency and his desire to form a federation with newly independent East African nations and Karume’s effort to curb the influence of Banu, the Umma Party leader with a communist tendency (Mwakikagile, 2008; Shivji, 2008).
- 222 Monteiro, 1993:113.
- 223 Ibid.
- 224 Medeiros states that Islam began to spread in this area towards the end of the nineteenth century when trade prospered on the coast (Medeiros, 1986:23). Brito João points out that Islam spread in this area through Asian merchants (Brito João, 2000:50-51). Abdul Magid was born in the south of Mecúfi, at the mouth of the Lúrio. After studying the Koran under a teacher who had studied in Zanzibar, he built the mosque in 1929 at the request of “Muslmano da Índia” (Muslims from India) (Interview with his grandson, Abdul Chafin Atwa. 15/08/2005, Mecúfi).
- 225 The colonial authority regarded him as the most important Makuwa-Metto chief. However, previous research (Medeiros, 1986; Fungulane, 1996; Brito João, 2000) and the author’s interviews conducted in Cabo Delgado emphasised the ranking among the Makuwa-Metto as Matico, Mwalia, Megama and Mecapo, in this order (author’s interview with Cornélio Almeida Vital-Matico dated on 20/08/2005 in Namuno District; Brito João, 2000:42). Chief Megama became prominent through his association with the Portuguese colonial authority, according to Megama’s son (Ayuba Megama Abdul Kamal, 12/08/2005, Pemba).
- 226 The 1950/51 administrative report states: “[Abdul Kamal] was a *régulo* who fulfills and tries to fulfill the orders to the administrative service, and in fact, he was rested with big confidence and admiration (Fungulane, 1996:30).” He was often praised by the colonial authority as “*um chefe modelo e aliado dos brancos*” (a model chief and ally of whites) at various meetings (Departamento de História, 1993:185).
- 227 TT, PIDE/DGS, ACSCSR2826/62-SR “FRELIMO” of 26 January 1966.
- 228 Branquinho, 1969:236.
- 229 Monteiro, 1993:99. For example, the Mozambican governor-general sent a telegram entitled “Muslim community in Mozambique” to the political department of the Overseas Provinces Department on 10 July 1964 (AHUltramar, PAA600 Proc. 945).
- 230 This can be verified by Paul’s reference to the attack around Messumba on 25 September 1964 (Paul, 1975:109).
- 231 They acquired automatic rifles in November (Afonso and Gomes, 2000:134).
- 232 The colonial authority would not acknowledge the political legitimacy of FRELIMO, calling it “*turra*” (a kind of animal), “*bandito*” (bandit), “*bandoleiro*” (outrlaw) and “*terroristas*” (terrorists).
- 233 Paul, 1975:121.
- 234 According to Middlemas, “The GEs were infantry under black officers, qualified after twenty-three

- weeks of training; they were recruited, from 1970, on a homogeneous tribal basis. GEPs were paratroops, trained in groups of 250 for five months along lines similar to Portuguese commandos" (Middlemas, 1975:144).
- 235 Ibid.:110-111. An assistant nurse at the Anglican Church was seen by a *sipaio* talking with a FRELIMO guerrilla and taken away by the PIDE.
- 236 Mondlane, 1969:149.
- 237 Ibid.:190. This role was officially designated to female guerrillas at the second FRELIMO Congress in 1968.
- 238 Paul, a missionary, wrote that on seeing the activity of Protestant churches completely banned in Angola in 1961, the Church tried to keep its distance from FRELIMO as much as possible in order to avoid a similar fate in Mozambique (Paul, 1975:96-98).
- 239 Ibid.:115-117.
- 240 Bwanachauri Pohomo, Povoação Nkwemba:1-3, in Direcção Provincial de Educação e Cultura, 1979.
- 241 Ibid.:7.
- 242 Kudeba Nchamadi, Localidade Chai, Distrito de Macomia:1, in Ibid.
- 243 *Tempo*, 8/2/1981:43. The document contains a photograph of male bodies with tags saying "I am a FRELIMO."
- 244 See Figure 6.
- 245 Hipólito, 1970:18.
- 246 Henriksen Collection, "Moçambique, Palco de uma Guerra Subversiva":9. The date is unknown.
- 247 Ndegue, 2009:139-140.
- 248 Burchett, 1978:138-139.
- 249 The following remark of Rene Pélissier can be applied to the Yao as well: "The Makonde people were the last ethnic group that resisted the colonial conquest and the first to start the war of liberation in 1964. No one should forget that only 47 years separates the 'submission' of 1917 and the beginning of the FRELIMO guerrillas" (Pélissier, 1994:413).
- 250 The "alliance" between an ethnic group (the Yao) and FRELIMO cannot necessarily be attributed to "ethnic" factors. This issue will be discussed using the Makuwa as a case study.
- 251 Borges Coelho, 1989:54.
- 252 Antunes, 1996:199-200.
- 253 Borges Coelho, 1989:54-56. It was also suspected that FRELIMO guerrillas were commissioned to destroy railroad facilities in Mozambique.
- 254 The report of this meeting was sent to the Portuguese foreign ministry and then forwarded to the PIDE. The report has no dates but the context suggests it was sent in early 1966 (TT-PIDE/DGS-AC-SCCI(2) 6341/A: 85).
- 255 Ibid.
- 256 Antunes, 1996:200.
- 257 Young Pioneers was a communal society of youths, sponsored by the Israeli government and modelled on the kibbutz. Jardim wanted to change it to a military organisation for Banda. Cristina was in charge of training (Ibid.:200-204). In other words, Cristina trained African soldiers to be on the side of the Portuguese colonial authority and Jardim gave instructions. This was also the case with GE and GEP.
- 258 Ibid.
- 259 Borges Coelho, 1989:56.
- 260 Mondlane, 1969:102.
- 261 Ibid.:137.
- 262 Some scholars take a critical view on the simplistic explanation based on ethnicity (Henriksen, 1983:97-98). For instance, Opello (1975) contends that manipulation of the rivalry between different ethnic groups by Portuguese colonial rule weakened FRELIMO, using the term "pluralism" to explain the rivalry among its "elites".

- 263 According to the US consul in Lourenço Marques, Freitas “speaks English very well”, and, “some consider him the leading Portuguese authority on the psychology of the native, a knowledge probably gathered during his ten-year stint as Administrator of the District of LM” (from Paul F. Canny to Department of State, 23th January 1962, NA II, SDCE, Record Group 59, 1960-63, box 1819).
- 264 Freitas, 1965.
- 265 Ibid.:1-2.
- 266 Branquinho, 1966.
- 267 The understanding of ethnic elements was considerably deepened after Rita-Ferreira completed his ethnic map (Ferreira, 1958).
- 268 This resulted in a report (Branquinho, 1969).
- 269 Munslow, 1983:91.
- 270 Ibid.:105.
- 271 Sergio Vieira, “O Direito nas Zonas Libertadas,” a paper delivered to the Faculty of Law, Maputo (4/7/1977), in Ibid.:105.
- 272 Mondlane, 1969:163.
- 273 Ibid.:163-164.
- 274 Ibid.:191.
- 275 In 1965, the Algerian and Indonesian revolutionary governments were also toppled in military coups. One should note the influence of the Cold War.
- 276 The correspondence of the US government officials regarding this matter has been disclosed (FRUS 1964-1968, vol. XXIV Africa). For example, nearly a year before the coup, Robert W. Komer, a National Security Council staffer, reported: “FYI, we may have a *pro-Western coup in Ghana* soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark ... The plotters are keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Francophone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good” (Document 253, Memorandum from Robert W. Komer to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 27, 1965).
- 277 Oda, 1989:88. The author agrees with Okakura’s statement: “Various international and domestic factors, inseparably linked to each other, led to these coups” (Okakura, 1967:7). This book only refers to the domestic factors that the FRELIMO leadership considered.
- 278 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 24, 1966 March-May, in Munslow, 1983:102.
- 279 Ibid.
- 280 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 23, 1965 Dec. – 1966 Feb., in Ibid.:104.
- 281 Ibid.:103.
- 282 Munslow states that the assassination was by a Portuguese agent (Ibid.) while the FRELIMO leadership believed that a supporter of Nkavandame was responsible (*Mozambique Revolution*, no. 38, 1969 March-April:10-11). It is widely suspected that internal conflict was the cause of his death.
- 283 Opello points out that Machel was appointed instead of Ribeiro, the deputy head and a northerner, because the majority of the FRELIMO leadership, southerners and *mestiços*, wanted to expand their power base (Opello, 1975:73-74). Quite possibly it was not because Machel was a southerner but because the leadership believed that his revolutionary inclination would bring a favourable result in terms of internal conflict for them.
- 284 Borges Coelho, 1989:46-47.
- 285 Ibid.:47-48.
- 286 Mondlane, 1969:164.

- 287 Christie, 1989; Funada, 1997:135-136.
- 288 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 38, 1969 March-April:2.
- 289 Munslow gives the reason as: "The chairmen were frightened of a protracted people's war as a means to win independence, because its success depended on the growth of people's power" (Munslow, 1983:106).
- 290 *Ibid.*:106-107.
- 291 *Ibid.*:105.
- 292 In September 1967, the Tanzanian government announced the national-level reorganisation of agriculture and the creation of socialistic collective farms called "Ujamaa" (Oda, 1991:12).
- 293 Mondlane, 1969:151-152.
- 294 *Ibid.*:153. Residents in the liberated zones were trained as armed militia. Around the same time, the guerrilla structure was reorganised and made an official military organisation in Guinea-Bissau (Cabral, 1980:135).
- 295 Munslow, 1983:106.
- 296 Mondlane, 1969:189-191. In addition, there were resolutions on the administration of the liberated zones, national reconstruction, social relations and external politics.
- 297 Henriksen, 1983:73. It was probably because FRELIMO wanted to obtain the support of various forces, including the West. The majority of the financial resources of the Mozambique Institute, an educational institute run by Mondlane's American wife, were obtained from the West. Moreover, although Mondlane warmed up to the notion of revolution in the course of struggle, he never called himself a "communist", probably due to his many years of living in the USA. It has also become evident recently that he agonised over the handling of "communists" in FRELIMO, such as dos Santos (Manghezi, 1999:244-245).
- 298 Munslow, 1983:108.
- 299 *Ibid.*:110.
- 300 Isaacman, 1983:98.
- 301 Christie, 1989; Munslow, 1983:110-111. Also see Funada, 1997.
- 302 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 38, 1969 March-April:10. Nkavandame surrendered with a bag filled with important FRELIMO documents (Opello, 1975:76).
- 303 Isaacman, 1983:98.
- 304 According to a Swiss journalist who interviewed Nkavandame, he gave himself to the Portuguese "because FRELIMO betrayed his people, that they were suffering too much from the war, that there were too many deaths and that he wanted to collaborate with the Portuguese in order to live in peace" (*Mozambique Revolution*, no. 39, 1969 May-Aug.:40). His argument had a certain impact, as discussed in the next chapter.
- 305 This was extracted from Mao Zedong's *Strategic Problems of Chinese Revolution*. Mao believed that although it was possible for the Red Army to win the war, a rapid expansion or a quick victory was impossible and therefore the war would be a protracted one (Mao, 1968:279).
- 306 Mondlane, 1969:219-220.
- 307 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 40, 1969 Sept.:2.
- 308 He was especially unhappy that in spite of having been the vice president, he was not appointed to be the president (Munslow, 1983:111).
- 309 Isaacman, 1983:98; Munslow, 1983:140.
- 310 Antunes, 1996:337-338.
- 311 *Ibid.*:362-363.
- 312 *Ibid.*
- 313 Stiff, 2004:46-52.
- 314 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 41, 1969 Oct.-Dec.:1-4.
- 315 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 43, 1970 April-June:1.
- 316 Munslow, 1983:135.

- 317 Opello, 1975:77 note 34; Antunes, 1996:195-198.
- 318 Borges Coelho, 1989:46.
- 319 Ibid.:50.
- 320 It is spelled as Cahora in Mozambique but as Cabora in English.
- 321 Taking into account the dubious accuracy of the statistics and the fact that mine explosions were regarded as attacks, the figures did not necessarily correctly represent FRELIMO activity, but they are still useful to understand the overall tendency. In that year, FRELIMO used heavy firearms for the first time (Afonso and Gomes, 2000:134-136).
- 322 Ibid.
- 323 For instance, villagisation without social development, or no consideration of food production. We will look at the case of Maúa (Chapter 5).
- 324 *New York Times*, May 26, 1974.
- 325 *Washington Post*, Dec. 25, 1968; August 14, 1974.
- 326 Henriksen, 1983:94.
- 327 Ibid.:68.
- 328 Afonso and Gomes, 2000:134-135.
- 329 Henriksen, 1983:51-52.
- 330 Borges Coelho, 1989:46.
- 331 Following the breaking-up of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence and called itself "Rhodesia" and, from 1970, "the Republic of Rhodesia". Since it was never internationally recognised, this book uses "Southern Rhodesia" even when referring to the country after 1965.
- 332 Since 1964/5, anti-Banda activities led by ex-minister Harry Chiume Chipembere, weakened Banda's position. By this time, other Malawians joined Chipembere and formed an opposition organisation called Capricorns. Their delegations existed both in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. As discussed in Chapter 3, FRELIMO had a close relationship with Chipembere; this complex relationship between Banda and African leaders of the surrounding countries was one of the reasons why Banda approached the white regimes.
- 333 Middlemas, 1975:295.
- 334 Munslow, 1983:137.
- 335 For details, see Middlemas, 1975.
- 336 Interview with Ken Flower (November 1982), in Johnson and Martin, 1986:3; Stiff, 1983:109; Flower, 1987:119. In September 1971, Ian Smith ordered Ken Flower, director-general of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation, "to represent our apprehension over the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique and to try to persuade them to allow us to further develop cross-border operations in Tete" (Johnson and Martin, 1986:2).
- 337 Flower, 1987:118; Antunes, 1996:430-431. General Arriaga said that the Rhodesian army was permitted to conduct only three operations in Mozambique (Kaúlza Arriaga, *Guerra e Política*, 356, in Antunes, 1996:430).
- 338 The representatives were from the Rhodesian Special Branch, Mozambican PIDE/DGS and the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) (Middlemas, 1975:283; Antunes, 1996:402-403).
- 339 ALCORA was a South African-Rhodesian-Portuguese intelligence system which operated until 1974. According to Muvuti Evans of the University of Zimbabwe who interviewed a former senior official of the Rhodesian CIO, ALCORA has also been known as ASPRO (Africa do Sul, Portuguese Territories, Rhodesia) (Evans, 1984/5:12).
- 340 Middlemas, 1975:284; Antunes, 1996:429-434. As Middlemas said, "Alcora had been a Rhodesian, not a South African" and it was Southern Rhodesia that needed it most (Middlemas, 1975:288).
- 341 Antunes, 1996:431.
- 342 It was called "*Flecha*" (arrow) because indigenous people in the force carried traditional weapons like bows and arrows in Angola.

- 343 Ibid.
- 344 Flower, 1987:119. Permission for the CIO to form *Flecha* had been postponed.
- 345 Stiff, 2004:85.
- 346 Ibid.; Munslow, 1983:144.
- 347 Interviews of local residents by Munslow in 1975 (Ibid.).
- 348 Stiff, 2004:34-35.
- 349 The Recces used a submarine and a canoe to enter Dar es Salaam (Ibid.:46-51).
- 350 Henriksen, 1983:52; 60.
- 351 According to Henriksen, the training began in 1972 (Ibid.). Afonso and Gomes on the other hand assert that the first training started with 550 GE soldiers in January 1970 (Afonso and Gomes, 2000:596). Antunes thinks that the training in 1970 was "experimental" (Antunes, 1996:357).
- 352 Afonso and Gomes, 2000:596. In addition to GE, GEP (paratroops) were set up and 3,000 soldiers received training, which was managed by Carmo Jardim, the daughter of Jorge Jardim (Antunes, 1996:357-358). Cristina's involvement is based on the interview of Álvaro Récio by Antunes (Ibid.).
- 353 *Notícias*, July 8, 1973.
- 354 Henriksen, 1983:53.
- 355 A small aeroplane on the way from Beira to Tete was shot down. An investigation team was ambushed by FRELIMO guerrillas near Wiriamu. General Arriaga sent troops out in retaliation, and many civilians were killed (Hastings, 1974:51-52; Burchett, 1978:144).
- 356 The Catholic priest who counted the bodies wrote that nearly 100 villagers were murdered (Hastings, 1974:58-60).
- 357 Father Hastings's first public denouncement was an article that appeared in *The Times* in London in July 1973. He continued to publicise the incident. In the introduction of his book, Hastings emphasised the important role that priests played as the only people that collected independent information and told the world the truth despite the difficult situation, when the Portuguese government had already banished many priests from Mozambique (Hastings, 1974:1). This suggests that not everybody in the Catholic Church approved of Portugal's colonial rule.
- 358 Caetano, 1974:182-183.
- 359 As is discussed later, there is a different way of looking at this matter.
- 360 Middlemas, 1975:290.
- 361 Ibid.:297.
- 362 Ibid.
- 363 Caetano to Kaúlza de Arriaga, 24 January 1973, in Antunes, 1996:476. From 1974 to 1975, Lobito handled the largest amount of Zambian products: 600,000 tons, followed by Dar es Salaam (480,000 tons) and Nacala (240,000 tons) (D.G. Anglin, "Zambia and Portugal", *Essays on Zambia's Foreign Policy*:297, in Middlemas, 1975:307).
- 364 Ibid.:476-486; 493-500; Middlemas, 1975:298-301; MacQueen, 1997:137.
- 365 Middlemas, 1975; Henriksen, 1983; Munslow, 1983; Borges Coelho, 1989.
- 366 Johnson and Martin, 1986:2-10.
- 367 Henriksen, 1983:54.
- 368 Ibid.:157.
- 369 Ibid.:55. Several hundred settlers armed themselves with battle rifles and hired security guards trained as commandos.
- 370 Ibid.:61.
- 371 Lt. Col. Ron Reid Daly of the Selous Scouts (a special forces regiment of the Southern Rhodesian army) praised *Flecha*: "The best indigenous African shorttists I came across during my army service in Africa were, surprisingly enough, the *Flechas* of the Portuguese Army (Stiff, 1983:109)."
- 372 Henriksen, 1983.:62.
- 373 Ibid.

374 Ibid.:69.

375 João Matos Proença ao MNE, 1 de Fevereiro de 1973 (AHDME), in Antunes, 1996:463.

376 Middlemas, 1975:316. Arriaga was permitted to "go on leave" to South Africa later on.

377 Ibid.:291; 317; MacQueen, 1997:137; Afonso and Gomes, 2000:241.

378 Munslow quotes the following comments by Machel: "Our struggle was a struggle at the level of ideas, it had to stop being a simple liberation struggle because national unity was no longer sufficient ... Only with revolutionary ideological unity could we conduct the liberation struggle in a fruitful way, in a way which would lead to victory" "Discurso do Camarada Presidente Samora Machel na abertura do Comité Central em Inhambane, in *Datas e Documentos*: 434, in Munslow, 1983:137).

379 *Mozambique Revolution* no. 42, 1970 Jan.-March:28.

380 Munslow, 1983:138.

381 Spínola, 1974.

382 Middlemas, 1975:317.

383 Ibid.:299.

384 Ibid.:300-301.

385 Ibid.:301.

CHAPTER 5

Maúa Circumscription during the Liberation Struggle

We were discussing the plan to go to Tanzania [in 1966]. Then we were betrayed and tortured. PIDE came for us and hanged us until we lost consciousness. They assaulted us with a knife and tried to frighten us into confessing. We kept shouting, “We want independence. Kill us if you want.” Finally, we received the heaviest sentence of all and were sent to Iha do Ibo [Ibo Island].¹ Many *régulos* were there. The prison was known for its harsh conditions, said to be a place to enter alive and come out dead. (Interview with Joaquim Baptista Sargene from Maúa²)

Maúa ... the fourth biggest town of Niassa District is in progress. Our worries have been resolved. We can face the future of Portugal in Africa with confidence ... The Portuguese government has made a sacrifice and brought sincere development to this land, such as building schools in all residential areas. Maúa is taking its first step towards the liberation in the area of education ... compensating for all things that destroy the civilisation and progress, such as propaganda, criticism, jealousy and anger. (Joaquim Baptista Sargene, 1973³)

This chapter explores how the Mozambican liberation struggle was carried out and developed in Maúa Circumscription in Niassa District, in spite of the counter-insurgency strategy of the colonial power.

Geographical, geopolitical and periodisation influences in Maúa during the liberation struggle

Geographical characteristics

In 1950 Maúa was one of the three administrative posts in Marrupa Circumscription.⁴ The population of Marrupa was 50,352 in 1952. It was the least densely populated circumscription in Niassa District, comprising 19.5 per cent of the population and 38 per

cent of the land.⁵ In 1960 the administrative structure was reorganised so as to be ready for the anticipated liberation struggle. As a result, Marrupa Circumscription decreased in size and the number of administrative posts in the circumscription was increased to five.⁶ Just before the onset of the liberation struggle the population of Marrupa Circumscription was 56,687 and its population density was 1.27 persons per square kilometre. It was the second least densely populated after Limpopo Circumscription in Gaza District in southern Mozambique (0.80 persons per square kilometre).⁷

Maúá was the most populated administrative post in Marrupa, with approximately 36,000–40,000 residents,⁸ and was blessed with natural conditions suitable for agriculture. The area should therefore have probably been upgraded to a circumscription sooner rather than later, but the colonial government did not manage to do so due to a lack of capital and resources.⁹ When FRELIMO started its attacks in the northern area of Maúá Administrative Post in March 1966, upgrading Maúá to a circumscription suddenly became an urgent matter.¹⁰ In other words, the colonial administrative structure was underdeveloped until March 1966. Even after the subdivision of the administrative posts in 1960, each post had to control a vast area, and Maúá was no exception. Although it was the most densely populated administrative post in Marrupa, infrastructure was slow to be developed and it was therefore very difficult to effectively control the area, with the exception of the administrative centres of the administrative posts and circumscription. This lack of control presented the colonial authority with a huge challenge once the liberation struggle took hold.

Marrupa Circumscription became one of the most suitable locations for guerrilla warfare in Niassa District due to its unforgiving natural environment, low population density and incomplete colonial administrative structures. Within Marrupa Circumscription, Maúá was best suited for guerrilla activities as a consequence of its remoteness and underdeveloped colonial administration. As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, having an underdeveloped colonial administrative structure did not necessarily translate into local people living freely and without interference from colonial rule. Instead, they were controlled by the *regedoria* system that manipulated the power of traditional authorities over inhabitants.

As examined in Chapters 1 and 2, Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina (RAU: Overseas Administration Reform) made *régulos* responsible for all affairs in *regulados* (the areas controlled by *régulos*). As long as *régulos* fulfilled their duties, making the residents work in cotton production and pay taxes, the colonial administration turned a blind eye to what was happening inside of *regulados*. This tendency was especially strong outside of Maúá Sede (where the administrative post was) because it was not easy to access due to very bad road conditions. In sum, Maúá was not entirely controlled by the colonial authority before the liberation struggle.¹¹

Geopolitical position

The FRELIMO army (FPLM) used two routes for its military operations in Niassa District after setting up its main base near the Tanzanian border. The more important in relation

to this chapter is the Niassa East route, also known as the “Mataka corridor”, which ran through the Lugenda River and Yao habitations (the Mataka territory) to the northern end of Maúá Administrative Post. The FRELIMO guerrillas frequently used the Mataka corridor as it was considered to be safe, albeit longer (see Figure 26).¹² Logistical bases, military bases and liberated zones were set up along the route, which was constantly used until the *limpeza* (clean-up) operation by the Portuguese Armed Forces. However, this route was 400 kilometres in length, and therefore it was not easy for FRELIMO guerrillas to launch their attacks from it, carrying ammunition and food, as well as trying to avoid the Portuguese army.

Despite this, during the initial phase of the liberation war, FRELIMO guerrillas easily infiltrated into the area surrounding the Mataka corridor because of the underdeveloped military and administrative structures of the colonial government. Moreover, fear of the Yao chief Mataka, who had fought against colonial occupation, as well as the fact that the Lugenda River area was surrounded by impenetrable Miombo forest, created the “Myth of Lugenda” in the collective mind of the colonial authority, and contributed to a belief that FRELIMO’s fortress was indestructible. However, the Portuguese army eventually destroyed the myth with a large-scale attack in 1967 and Operation Gordian Knot in 1970.

The results of these battles in the surrounding areas of the Lugenda affected FRELIMO’s military forces in the south-east of Niassa District (the Maúá area), because without a military base around the Lugenda it proved difficult to operate in the Maúá area – 400 kilometres away from the safe haven of Tanzania.

As discussed in Chapter 2, in spite of a wide river, the Lúrio, which divided Niassa District from Moçambique District, people on both sides of the river travelled across frequently and maintained a strong kinship. Whenever colonial rule was strengthened, they moved from one side of the river to the other in order to escape the escalating hardship. The Lúrio, as it turned out, did not prevent regular interaction between Makhwa-Xirimia people and the people who lived in Alto Lúrio (upstream of the Lúrio) as much as the colonial government had predicted. Therefore, as the FRELIMO army advanced towards the south of Niassa District, the colonial authority became concerned about these close and supportive relationships.

The colonial authority was determined to stop the advancement of FRELIMO into Moçambique District and Zambézia District since these were the most populated districts and served as the centre points of economic activity of the northern region.¹³ Also a concern for the colonial authority was the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of these districts were the Makhwa (Lomwe) – as was the case in the southern Niassa and Cabo Delgado Districts. For the FRELIMO army, it was imperative to penetrate these districts in order to spread their liberation struggle all over Mozambique. Therefore, it was conceivable that the interaction between the groups that lived on either side of the Lúrio could sway the outcome of the war. Consequently, Maúá Administrative Post became strategically very important because it bordered on Moçambique District. As a result, fierce battles between FRELIMO and the Portuguese Armed Forces took place all over the Maúá area.

The above situation is reflected in the map of the *Progresso de Luta de Libertação* (Progress of Liberation Struggle) produced by the FRELIMO government after independence – see

(Figure 7). This map indicates that in the Niassa District of Maúá Circumscription, the most northern Makhwua habitations remained as “*zonas de infiltração*” (infiltration zones), whilst the north of Maúá was “liberated” by FRELIMO by 1972.¹⁴ In short, FRELIMO guerrillas managed to “infiltrate” into Maúá Circumscription but not further south.

In fact, many FRELIMO cadres, colonial officials and researchers considered FRELIMO’s lack of advancement towards the south to be due to ethnic factors – the so-called “Makhwua belt” – or “the inhospitable barrier of the Makhwua” as Middlemas put it.¹⁵

To illuminate this point further, the Portuguese Brigadier Abel Barroso Hipólito, immediately after completing his duty in eastern Niassa, published a book in Lisbon in 1970 called *Pacificação do Niassa* (Pacification of Niassa). The book begins with the following statement:

Macua [Makhwua] people are not receptive to new ideologies and they are submissive. They are traditionally loyal to our nation and consider themselves as 100 per cent Portuguese. They don’t cross borders as other ethnic groups do, because no Macuas live on the other side of the border. They work in agriculture and have a tendency to live away from each other. They love to do domestic chores for white people.¹⁶ (*Underlined by the author*)

This view of the Makhwua was common among colonialists at that time. They thought the Makhwua would never oppose colonialism. José Alberto Gomes de Melo Branquinho, on the other hand, painted a very different picture of Makhwas in his report in 1969 after two years of field study:

To think Moçambique District [where Makhwas are a dominant population] is safe shows one’s poor intelligence. It may look calm, but we need to pay close attention. At this moment, the interaction between the peoples [of north and south of the Lúrio] is limited due to the surveillance of the local administration. Although they [the Makhwua] appear to be obedient, we must watch for even a slightest change [in their attitude].¹⁷ (*Underlined by the author*)

The following two comments from a FRELIMO commander and a researcher regarding their views on the Makhwua are illustrative of the perceptions expressed in the quote above:

The Macua [Makhwua] became white people’s informants. Otherwise, we would have been already in Zambézia and Moçambique Districts.¹⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

FRELIMO’s rapid advances in the northern-most Makonde-dominated areas were halted at the traditional border between the Makonde and the Makhwua

in southern Cabo Delgado. In military terms the border was never crossed throughout the whole of the war of liberation.¹⁹

Another important factor in terms of influences and outcomes is the Makhuwa people's relationship with different religions. Monteiro of the SCCIM has pointed out that Maúá was situated on the Islamic route that connected Muslim leaders in northern Mozambique (see Figure 24).²⁰ This route was inhabited mainly by various Makhuwa groups, such as the Makhuwa-Metto, the Makhuwa-Xirima and the Mwani (previously known as the Macua-Litoral) – and also by the Yao.

The Makhuwa's Islamisation, except in the coastal areas, was relatively recent, while the Yao's Islamisation was the result of many years of slave trade. The majority of the Makhuwa traditional authorities who were involved in the slave trade, as well as a high percentage of the *mwenes* in Maúá Circumscription, were Muslims.²¹

However, despite the pervasiveness of Islam, certainly not all the Yaos and Makhuwas were Muslim. Islamisation mainly pertained to traditional authorities and their male relatives. Others, especially women, including *pwiyamuene* who were the symbol of the “mother of the group”, continued to follow the traditional religion derived from ancestor worship.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the authority of a *mwene* was based on the belief in the traditional religion that he was a legitimate successor of the first leader. Therefore, even when a *mwene* became Muslim, it did not undermine the importance of the traditional religion, and he continued to assume the role of a leader in the traditional religion. For *mwenes*, Islamisation of all inhabitants would not have been beneficial, as it could have weakened the traditional religion that united the community. As a result, for a long time, conversion to Islam was only permitted for traditional authorities and the *nethi* class (aristocracy), which comprised of male successors of traditional authorities and male family members.

The situation changed at the beginning of the twentieth century when Islam started to spread amongst ordinary people. An Islamic missionary group moved from the Comoro Islands to Mozambique Island (*Iha de Moçambique*) and encouraged the locals to convert to Islam in the northern part of Mozambique. Towards the middle of the century, many migrant workers who had found work in Tanganyika became Muslim. This phenomenon also impacted on the Makondes who had resisted Islamisation for a long time.

The Islamic route, the network of Muslim traditional authorities, ran from Zanzibar to Mecúfi, the coastal town on the Indian Ocean, to the interior of Cabo Delgado District and eventually to Niassa District.²² Traditional authorities sent the most competent members of their families to Tanganyika and Zanzibar through the network to have them learn the teachings of Islam. Ordinary members of the community only started to become Muslim after many began to travel to Tanganyika as migrant workers in the 1950s. They seem to have been excluded from the network of the Muslim traditional authorities established during the slave trade.²³ In the 1960s, the journey from Mozambique to Tanganyika became difficult as the colonial authority tightened its border control. According to 1970 statistics, 50 per cent of the Maúá population believed in the traditional religion while 35 per cent believed in Islam.²⁴

According to Monteiro, local Muslim traditional authorities looked up to Sultan Said as their highest-ranking religious leader. However, after the death of the sultan in December 1963 and the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964, they started to regard ties among clan members as important and increased their power in each community.²⁵ Branquinho speculates that the combination of these events helped Mozambican Muslims to overcome their inferiority complex of being African.²⁶ Certainly, the political changes in surrounding areas affected the society and politics in Mozambique.

Monteiro states that the creation of *Islão Negro* (black Islam) prompted African Muslim leaders in northern Mozambique to construct a new type of network that emphasised the cultural ethnic pluralism that was not visible from outside²⁷ (Figure 24).

As there are very few historical records, it is not clear how the Muslim network, based on the clan system, influenced the liberation war in the communities located on the Islamic route. Monteiro suggests that the local Muslim network was involved in “subversion” until 1967.²⁸ When “subversive” activities in Marrupa and surrounding areas were uncovered by PIDE in 1966, many traditional authorities from the areas along the Islamic route were arrested. This seems to confirm that there were some anti-colonial activities taking place on the Islamic route before or at the time of FRELIMO’s infiltration into these areas. Muslim traditional authorities in Maúá were probably also involved, although the arrested traditional authorities came only from Nipepe Administrative Post.

Periodisation

This chapter explores several periods in order to further describe the development of the liberation struggle in Maúá.

The first is the pre-liberation war period, prior to September 1964. This section illuminates FRELIMO’s connections with people in Maúá, bearing in mind the long distance from the FRELIMO headquarters in Tanzania; and also how the colonial authority prepared itself for FRELIMO’s advancement.

The second is the period just before the liberation war and covers from September 1964 to March 1966. During this time FRELIMO guerrillas tried to establish contact with local people in order to recruit soldiers. It also set up small-scale bases in the Miombo forest in Revia and Muhoco in northern Maúá Circumscription. In this period, the Portuguese Armed Forces deployed a small company in the area.

The third period includes the beginning of the liberation war, from the FRELIMO attack in Revia in March 1966 to the “clean-up” operations of the Portuguese Armed Forces in March 1967. During this period, those who lived in northern Maúá, particularly in Revia and Muhoco, endured hardships they had never previously experienced. Local leading figures began to involve themselves in the anti-colonial movement which helped FRELIMO to occupy an increasingly stronger position. Frequently caught by surprise by the FRELIMO guerrillas’ unpredictable activities, the colonial army often found itself one step behind.

The fourth period under discussion is the middle of the liberation war, from March

1967 to December 1968. The Portuguese Armed Forces had launched some aggressive attacks in October 1966, but deployed more soldiers and conducted larger scale attacks from March 1967. The attacks peaked in the dry season, July and August 1967, with the clean-up operation of the so-called “FRELIMO Kingdom” around the Lugenda (the Mataka corridor). The operation destroyed the supremacy of FRELIMO guerrillas in the war and made it difficult for them to advance further south through eastern Niassa. Many people were killed on both sides as a result of fierce battles taking place during this period.

As internal conflict emerged within FRELIMO and the Portuguese Armed Forces strengthened their position, the situation calmed down in December 1968. The fifth period covers the time between January 1969 and September 1972. As increasing numbers of FRELIMO soldiers surrendered to the Portuguese, the colonial authority hastened to strengthen its defence structure. Portuguese civilians and the army cooperated in building a system of control.

The sixth and last period is the end of the liberation war and spans from September 1972, when FRELIMO became active in Maúa again, to April 1974, when the coup took place in Portugal.

Maúa during the pre-liberation war period

The emergence of a local anti-colonial movement

In 1961 when I heard Mondlane’s message, I decided to fight for our independence. I explained to those around me the importance of organising ourselves. We heightened our fighting spirits. Since then, we have fought against PIDE. For many years, we believed that a black person could never become the president and that only whites could be the representatives and leaders of our country. However, we realised we could control our own country after seeing what happened in Tanzania and Malawi. We were excited and pleased, saying to each other, “Let’s become administrative chiefs and governors after independence.”²⁹

The above extract is from an interview by the author with Joaquim Sargene. Sargene, a public servant in Marrupa Circumscription, was arrested in 1966 for “subversive” activity, along with more than 80 traditional leaders in Marrupa. According to Sargene, Mondlane called for action in 1961, even prior to the establishment of FRELIMO. In this interview he was probably referring to Mondlane’s visit to Mozambique in 1961. As described in Chapter 4, Mondlane, as a UN official, attended many youth gatherings throughout Mozambique and inspired them with his “wind of change” message. It is highly likely that PIDE spies reported on these meetings to the Marrupa administrative office.³⁰

Around the same time, the “wind of change” reached northern villages via the Islamic route. Branquinho’s report showed that the SCCIM warned about “subversive” activity

in Marrupa as early as 1959.³¹ It is highly likely that the pro-independence movement in Zanzibar instigated by young people close to Sultan Said was known about in northern Mozambique through the Muslim network.

The “wind of change”, that is, anti-colonialist thinking, was spreading in Maúá via different routes and by different actors. However, there are not enough historical sources to be able to identify the leaders and organisational structure of the anti-colonial movement in Maúá. Fragmented remaining sources indicate African officials in Marrupa, such as Sargene and his colleagues, as well as people within the Muslim network, as suggested by Monteiro.³² The Portuguese Armed Forces in Maúá reported that: “Several local government officials were found organising a subversive network in Marrupa.”³³

In military sources, Sargene and his colleagues are listed as the leaders. In an interview with the author in 2003, seven traditional authorities who were jailed with Sargene also cited him as a leader.³⁴ However, both these traditional authorities and Islamic leaders strongly denied their own involvement. Their close relationship with the colonial authority after the 1960s seems to have been the reason for their denial. This will be further discussed towards the end of this chapter. Branquinho comments:

Subversion uses all possible alternatives and resources. In order to mobilise people, it uses anything, including clans, kinship, friendship, religions (Catholic or Islam), contradictions, injustice, ethnic minorities and elites.³⁵

The same could be said about the espionage activities of the colonial authority, but we will return to this.

It is unlikely that most villagers in Maúá had nothing at all to do with the “subversive” movement in Marrupa as the Maúá Administrative Post fell under Marrupa Circumscription. The colonial administration at that time was vertically structured as follows: Overseas Ministry in Lisbon; the Government-General in Lourenço Marques; the Niassa District government in Vila Cabral; Marrupa Circumscription and Maúá Administrative Post. Sargene, who was born in Maúá and received primary education in a Catholic school there, gained his knowledge of the liberation movement and international affairs while serving such a hierarchical local administrative structure. The fact that graduates of the same Catholic school later joined the anti-colonial movement also indicates that African networks were not necessarily clan-based. Then, how was the local community involved in the incident in Marrupa?

Though Sargene was born in Maúá, he was from the *nethi* (aristocratic) class of the Mwene Vahiwa group, which was closely related to the Makuwa-Metto. This means that he belonged to the network of the Makuwa-Metto *mwenes*. Officially Sargene was an *assmiliado* and a Catholic, but he also had connections with Muslim traditional authorities.

These facts suggest the possibility that the “subversive” movement in Marrupa Sede, which started in 1961 and ended with mass arrests in 1966, was known in Maúá through an array of networks, including those educated at Catholic schools, the Makuwa-Metto, Muslim leaders and traditional authorities³⁶ (see Figure 22 and Figure 24).

In fact, the list of those arrested in 1966 contains not only Sargene and other Makhuwa-Metto chiefs in Marrupa and Montepuez, but also every single traditional authority who was Makhuwa-Xirima in Nipepe Administration Post.³⁷

As discussed in Chapter 2, the first Mwene Nipepe, a son of the first Mwene Muwa, was deployed to the location adjacent to the territory of Mwene Mwalia, a Makhuwa-Metto chief, in order to secure the slave trade route.³⁸ Moreover, it was to the Nipepe area that residents in the upper Lúrio, fleeing from the oppression of the colonial government after the First World War, headed for. In other words, Nipepe was the geographical crossroads of the Makhuwa-Metto and the Makhuwa-Xirima (see Figure 22). This also demonstrates that the anti-colonial movement in Marrupa Sede was spread widely beyond the Muslim network. The colonial authority, including the secret police, was shocked to discover that the movement had reached Nipepe, which had a close link with residents in Moçambique District, the econo-political and administrative centre of northern Mozambique. However, it is not clear how deeply the traditional authority was involved in the movement. Apart from Sargene and Mwene Telewe (or Teléuè), who were regarded as “dangerous”, many *mwenes* from Nipepe were pardoned in 1968.

Overhaul of the administrative structure

The anti-colonial movement around Marrupa had been interrupted by intensive intelligence activities undertaken by the colonial authority. In his interview with the author, Sargene spoke of how many activists were arrested after having been tipped off by spies of the PIDE for money.³⁹ Sargene himself was arrested in this way. After having been detained for a month, Sargene was released, but he remained under constant surveillance by the colonial authority.

The colonial authority intensified its quest to find anti-colonial activists when FRELIMO was formed on 25 June 1962. It expected armed struggles to begin in two northern districts, Niassa and Cabo Delgado. At the local administrative post level, the administrative organisation was responsible for arresting anti-colonial activists, though the PIDE also played a significant role in this task. Administrative archives show how numerous orders and requests for investigations were handed down from the top (the Government-General, the district governor’s offices, SCCIM, PIDE and the Portuguese Armed Forces) to the bottom of the administrative system (circumscriptions and administrative posts).

For example, Psycho-Social Action Units were established in all the district administrative offices. Orders from the Niassa District government were sent to a circumscription administration (Marrupa until 1968), then to each administrative post (for example, Maúa Sede administrative post). Information from administrative posts was sent in reverse order; from circumscription administration to the district government.⁴⁰

On 3 April 1963, the Psycho-Social Action Unit in Niassa District ordered Marrupa Circumscription administration to send a report on the number of returnees from abroad in each *regulado* and on the reliability of these returnees.⁴¹ Surveillance activities at local level had already begun at this time. The story of Raqui Muheco, who was photographed

at the border on his way back from Tanganyika, confirms this. When he returned to his village, Mwene Muhoco warned him not to say anything about Tanganyika to the colonial authority.⁴²

Even in Maúa, far from the border, as Bacar Caucha, a 90-something year old man from Muhoco commented, many migrant workers coming back from Tanganyika and Nyassaland spoke of their experience of the “wind of change” to those who had remained in Maúa.⁴³ This is why the colonial authority was eager to collect information on returnees and to organise the surveillance and spying activities at a village level.

Military preparation in Maúa

While the colonial administration intensified its spying activities, the Portuguese Armed Forces deployed units to different parts of the country, especially to northern villages. In 1961 the Portuguese Armed Forces arrived in Maúa for the first time. Renato de Lagoas of Portugal had joined the army to escape from poverty at the age of 19 and was sent to Maúa with 130 other soldiers in the 14th Artillery Company.⁴⁴

Matias Mussondiwa, an African who joined the Portuguese army and the author’s interpreter, noticed that local people were becoming increasingly anxious about the changes happening in the area at that time. His cousin was selling goods obtained while working in Rhodesia and was arrested by the army and sent to prison in Marrupa.⁴⁵

The Portuguese government encouraged discharged soldiers to settle in the area in order to improve the security and economy of Niassa District.⁴⁶ As a result, many soldiers from Lagoas’s Artillery Company became owners of farms and shops after the company was replaced by the 2nd Artillery Company. It is significant that the first concrete building in Maúa was a shop owned by a discharged soldier, Raújo. Even the house of the Maúa district administrator was built of wood. Without cotton growing and, above all, FRELIMO’s armed struggle, the northern villages of Mozambique would not have had even basic facilities.

When Maúa was upgraded from an administrative post to a circumscription in 1968, the number of staff remained the same; a white administrator, a *mestiço* assistant, an African interpreter and two African clerks. The story of Mussondiwa’s cousin indicates that the presence of the Portuguese Armed Forces was more than symbolic; the arrival of hundreds of white soldiers made a strong impact on locals.

In 1964 the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared military action against FRELIMO’s impending attack in earnest. In April the first headquarters were established in Marrupa Sede, and the 639th Artillery Battalion was dispatched from Portugal. In August, the 637th Artillery Company arrived in Maúa and used a former factory of a cotton company as its base. The purposes of this company were: (1) to familiarise itself with the area and to collect intelligence through patrolling; (2) to assist local people on matters of hygiene, education and economic development and to improve the relationship with them as a part of the psycho-social campaign; and (3) to improve infrastructure in cooperation with the administration.⁴⁷ In other words, the Portuguese Armed Forces considered it

important to focus on non-military activities such as intelligence, psycho-social campaigns, administrative and technical support. The company thought it particularly important to befriend locals, to assure their “security”, to attend to sick people, to distribute salt and clothes and to let them understand the significance of the existence of the Portuguese army in the area. Soldiers actually visited villages and held *banjas* (meetings).⁴⁸ They referred to FRELIMO guerrillas as “*turra*” (scary animals living in the Miombo forest), “tailed humans”, “one-legged” and “*bandidos*” in order to make local people scared of FRELIMO.⁴⁹

This propaganda by the Portuguese Armed Forces alerted locals to the imminent arrival of war in Maúa even though FRELIMO guerrillas had not yet reached the area. Puimo Cachoca, who lived in Mwapula in the north of Maúa Sede Administrative Post, explains the situation as follows:

We realised that war was coming when whites brought a projector and made people sing. Then the *régulo* and the *chefe* left. We started to suspect something was happening. One day, Régulo Vahiwa and an African *sipaio* came from Muela looking for a person from Tanzania. He was taken to the field and shot dead. At first, the war was fought without weapons. The Portuguese told us at *banjas* that *turras* had a tail and that if we didn't run away [when we see them], we would be captured and suffer. We were very scared because we didn't think those guerrillas were humans.⁵⁰

This story suggests that in some places it was the Portuguese soldiers and administrators that informed locals of the existence of FRELIMO and the impending war.⁵¹ On the other hand, those belonging to a network in Marrupa (especially traditional authorities), migrant workers and people who lived in northern Maúa, did already know about FRELIMO and its purpose. Wilsonni Muahave in Revia, the northern-most point of Maúa District, gives the following account:

Portuguese soldiers came to warn us about the war approaching from Tanzania. However, I had already heard about it from my uncle.⁵²

The situation just before the liberation war

It is not clear in what capacity Muahave's uncle was involved in FRELIMO. The organisation's guerrillas must have been active in Revia, the area adjacent to the Lugenda, thus falling within the Mataka corridor. However, the Mataka corridor was not fully functional until 1966.

Revia is on the main route between Lake Nyasa and the Indian Ocean. It was on the caravan route of the Yao's slave trade. From the nineteenth century, many white-led expeditions used the route. The vast majority of Revia's inhabitants were Makhwa-

Metto. Due to its location there was considerable exposure to Islamic teachings and many traditional authorities converted to Islam. Revia's position made it easy for men from the area to work in Tanzania, which resulted in strong FRELIMO ties.

Muahave's uncle could therefore have obtained his information from one or a number of sources, but what seems clear is that just before the liberation war, Revia residents somehow knew about the armed uprisings in Mozambique, whilst those in other villages in Maúa, especially its southern part, were not necessarily aware of these activities.

Communication channels created among inhabitants during this period functioned relatively freely due to the colonial authority's underdeveloped intelligence network. As mentioned, this of course changed later on.

Maúa just before the liberation war

FRELIMO's first attack and the colonial authority's response

On 25 September 1964 FRELIMO guerrillas launched an historical armed attack in Chai, Cabo Delgado District. On the same day the first attack struck Cóbue (a Nyanja habitation near Lake Nyasa), Niassa District. Alarmed, the Portuguese Armed Forces immediately moved the 637th Artillery Company from Maúa to Marrupa and began to prepare for FRELIMO's arrival. At this point the Portuguese were more focused on protecting Marrupa than Maúa due to the activities of Sargene and his colleagues. During this time, both the Portuguese Armed Forces and the colonial government only managed to react belatedly to attacks from the elusive FRELIMO guerrilla soldiers.

As FRELIMO did not arrive in Marrupa as anticipated, the 637th Artillery Company returned to Maúa Sede in November and underwent training for counter-insurgency operations.⁵³ In January 1965 the company was sent to Lake Nyasa where a fierce battle was in progress.⁵⁴ As FRELIMO operated mainly in the Nyanja habitations, using the Niassa west route, the Portuguese Armed Forces gathered there.⁵⁵ Corps were deployed all over Mozambique just before the liberation war began, but at this point in time they were only present in the areas where FRELIMO actively operated, such as Cabo Delgado District and Niassa District.

In Maúa, an infantry platoon of the 696th Artillery Company was left in the place of the 637th Artillery Company. As has been mentioned previously it was difficult to patrol Maúa effectively as the infrastructure was poorly developed. As a result, remote areas such as Revia and Nipepe became, in effect, a military vacuum. By then it had been decided that administration posts would be set up in these two areas, however, the colonial authority had no representatives there because *chefe do posto* had not been posted. There were only a few Indian merchants and white staff members of the cotton company. The deployment map of the Portuguese Armed Forces as of 1 July 1965 reflects this situation⁵⁶ (see Figure 27).

The ten-month absence of the 637th Artillery Company as well as the absence of the administrative representatives made northern Maúa (Revia) and south-western Maúa (Nipepe) ideal areas for FRELIMO guerrillas to expand operations. However, FRELIMO

was not able to make full use of this opportunity until mid-1965, this being in stark contrast to its progress in western Niassa District where a “provincial” base was established in northern Vila Cabral in 1965. This could possibly be explained as being because the alliance between FRELIMO and Mataka, the supreme chief of the Yao, had not, at that point, been established.⁵⁷ The governor of Niassa District described FRELIMO’s irritation towards the Yao and the situation in the district at this time:

When FRELIMO was not able to form an alliance with the Yao, it adopted tactics of intimidation. This led the residents to run away to the *mato* [forest]. In short, we let the residents slip out of our control, but this was due to the incompleteness of our defence structure, not due to the enemy’s ideology. The intimidation included violence, and traditional authorities were kidnapped and murdered. The deaths of the *régulos* and *chefes*, who had been faithful to us, were lamentable. Such a situation occurred because FRELIMO needed the residents’ support for all of its activity.⁵⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

Of course, we cannot accept this explanation as the only description of the situation, as it was made by the person in charge of Niassa District. It is true, however, that at this time there was almost no FRELIMO activity in this eastern part of Niassa District. However, this situation changed dramatically in late-1965 when Chief Mataka (Mataka VII), who had claimed the highest authority amongst the Yao chiefs, disappeared from Mozambique and took many residents to Tanzania as his predecessor (Mataka V) had during the First World War.⁵⁹ David Francisco Xadrique Ndegue, one of the FRELIMO cadres who operated in Niassa including the first president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, explains how they managed to receive the acceptance of Chief Mataka and opened the Eastern Niassa Front.⁶⁰

The above-mentioned governor reports that between 1965 and 1966 the “subversion” of FRELIMO spread throughout Niassa District – with the exception of the Amaramba and Marrupa Circumscriptions, because the majority of the residents in both circumscriptions were Makuwas and they did not accept FRELIMO’s propaganda.⁶¹

Facing the realities of minimal military support, a dysfunctional administrative structure and the increasing possibility of FRELIMO attacks in northern Maúa, the Portuguese Armed Forces recalled half of the 637th Artillery Company back to Maúa in November 1965. The 1478th Infantry Company then assumed responsibility of the Maúa Circumscription. FRELIMO, in the meantime, was gearing itself up in northern Maúa Circumscription, making use of the Mataka corridor, which had been opened in collaboration with Chief Mataka. Concerned about this development, the Portuguese army decided to deploy permanent forces in Revia and Nipepe for the first time. An advance patrolling party was sent to both areas between December 1965 and February 1966.⁶²

According to reports, the 639th Artillery Battalion, which had headquarters in Marrupa Sede, resumed psycho-social training and operations in Maúa Circumscription in January

1966 and started to develop an intelligence network. It is also reported that the battalion bribed locals and detained suspects.⁶³

The effectiveness of the army's intelligence network at this point is not clear, but in Maúa the army, the administration and the police used their own "agents" (informants, interpreters, paramilitaries, military policemen, "traditional authority", etc.) and started intelligence activities at a local level (mainly in *regulado*). Intelligence activities became increasingly systemised, drawing from the local population.

Maúa residents' first encounter with FRELIMO

The opening of the Mataka corridor made Marrupa District more accessible and as a result, FRELIMO guerrillas started to appear in Revia in northern Maúa. A son of Revia, who was *mwene* and *régulo* at the time of an interview with the author, spoke about the period just before the beginning of the liberation war in Revia as follows:

I escaped to Southern Rhodesia after the cotton growing campaign started.⁶⁴ When I came back, my younger brother asked me to collect *farinha* [flour of grain]. He said a person would come and ask for it. I asked him, "Who is this?" He said, "Don't worry." Two years later, the war started. My brothers told me that it was these people [FRELIMO guerrillas] who needed *farinha* to fight against white people. I was astonished to hear that Africans would fight against white people. I was sceptical whether they could fight as they didn't have weapons but when they turned up later on, they were armed.⁶⁵

A couple from Revia, who currently live in Mwapula, spoke of their encounter with guerrillas as follows:

We heard about "one-legged". When we went fishing in the river in 1965, guerrillas appeared and we ran away. That was when we knew that the war had started.⁶⁶

Around the same time, FRELIMO guerrillas arrived at the Miombo forest and were getting ready for battle. The same happened in Muhoco, the area situated between Revia and Maúa Sede. The Council of Elders in Muhoco spoke of the experience of Muhoco IV:

Muhoco IV met FRELIMO guerrillas by accident while he was hunting one evening. They gave him money to buy salt for them. He bought salt and sent a man to deliver it to them. It was the only time he helped them. However, there must have been other people who helped guerrillas by giving food.⁶⁷

According to a *Boletim de Informação* (BI: Information Bulletin), issued by Marrupa's administrative office on 20 July 1965, Nungo Administrative Post in eastern Maúa

Circumscription reported that Régulo Muluko put out an order to kill all white-feathered chickens. The bulletin predicted that the same would happen in Nipepe.⁶⁸

White-feathered chickens were actually killed in the territory of Chefe Napasso, which is in the territory of Régulo Muluko. The reason given was that people from Tanzania would kill the owners of white-feathered chickens.⁶⁹

The same bulletin issued on 24 December of that year reported that a *sipaio* (an African policeman) stationed near Maúá administrative post heard a grenade exploding near Nungo, situated on the main route between Maúá Sede and Marrupa Sede.⁷⁰

These reports indicate that FRELIMO guerrillas had finally arrived in the Maúá region towards the end of 1965. Around this time, some Marrupa inhabitants had tried to join FRELIMO. Sargene, who had been under police surveillance since 1961, gave the following account:

After the armed struggle began in 1964, PIDE's intimidation intensified. They said they would kill us if we went to the *mato*. One day, a colleague came back from Vila Cabral [the capital of Niassa District] with a leaflet. It had a message from Mondlane: "Get out from where you are and come to Tanzania to fight together." We decided to respond to the call and started to plan to join the fight.⁷¹

African teachers at the Catholic mission school in Maúá where Sargene studied wanted to join FRELIMO. Valentim Limas Necuto,⁷² the son of Régulo Nekutho describes the situation as follows:

FRELIMO's existence was already felt in Marrupa because African teachers started to understand the meaning of "freedom" while studying Portuguese history at the church school. The keenest was Lino Lemos. He was from Nekutho and was a candidate for the next Mwene Nekutho. He was teaching in Revia. One day, he came to the school and headed for Tanzania with four other teachers.⁷³

Summary of this period

FRELIMO guerrillas who were called "one-legged", "those who wear shoes back to front" and "*turras*", secretly built their base in Revia in northern Maúá and began preparing for the first attack. They were able to get support from some of the residents in surrounding areas including Maúá and took advantage of the natural environment (the Miombo forest) and the relative absence of the Portuguese army. The colonial authority, in the meantime, failed to take any effective countermeasures against FRELIMO guerrillas in spite of detecting their imminent attack through the intelligence network.

In sum, in Maúa, there were those who understood what this war meant to them and tried to take part in it, but they were nevertheless in the minority.

The beginning of the liberation war in Maúa

The first attack in Revia and residents' reaction

In March 1966 the first attack in Maúa was launched at Revia.⁷⁴ A married couple from Revia describe their experience as follows:

In March [19]66, FRELIMO arrived in Revia. It was a guerrilla troop, led by two commanders from the south, who had come back from Tanzania. Around four in the morning, FRELIMO showed up with a lot of weapons. Hearing the news, the Portuguese forces gathered from the military stations in Lichinga, Cuamba and so on and headed for Revia. All the family members fled to the *mato*. We never went back home.⁷⁵

The colonial archives verify that almost all the residents of Revia ran away to the *mato* (forest) after FRELIMO's attack in March 1966 (see Figure 31). The author's interviews corroborate this.⁷⁶ Issa Mapira, one of the village elders, and Muahave, a resident of Revia, appear to contradict one another in their descriptions of the onset of the war and the reaction of the *régulo*.⁷⁷

One morning I suddenly heard a gunshot. The *régulo* ran to António, a white "cotton chief," and told him that the war had started and took him to another white's place. On the way back, the *régulo* was caught by FRELIMO and interrogated. "Why did you take the white man away?" The *régulo* answered, "Because you [FRELIMO] didn't obtain my permission before starting the war in my territory." He was detained on the spot. Having heard that the *régulo* was captured by FRELIMO, people escaped to the *mato*. By then, almost everybody had fled to the *mato*. They had run away after hearing gunshots.⁷⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

The Portuguese said that the war had started. I rushed to the *mato* with my family. This [escape to the *mato*] was decided by Mwene Revia.⁷⁹ (*Underlined by the author*)

A son of Mwene/Régulo Revia, who had been with his father since FRELIMO's first attack, describes the *régulo*'s actions as follows:

The Portuguese wanted to make my father "a cat to catch mice." They didn't want the *régulo* to go to the FRELIMO side because they taught him many

things. If he had not run away, he would probably have been killed by the Portuguese. This is why I fled with him until *ohuru* [independence].⁸⁰... However, we were not certain that we would be safer with FRELIMO. We just fled, not considering on which side we should be. We escaped to the *mato*, which happened to be controlled by FRELIMO.⁸¹ (*Underlined by the author*)

Mwene Revia, who at the time of the interview was over 90 years old, explains:

I was at home when I heard a gunshot. I took a white man to another white man's place and fled to the *mato*. I thought it would be better to go to FRELIMO's side. I thought that I would be killed if I stayed because the Portuguese were threatening us.⁸²

Although there are various stories and interpretations, it is certain that most residents, including Régulo Revia, fled to the *mato* on hearing gunshots. However, as Revia's son says, escaping to the *mato* did not necessarily mean that they joined FRELIMO. Their "escape" to the *mato* could be interpreted in three ways: (1) they just fled and the *mato* was the only place that they could go to; (2) they joined FRELIMO; or (3) they were captured by FRELIMO. Whatever the explanation it is clear that almost all residents disappeared from the territory of Régulo Revia, the area controlled by the colonial authority.⁸³ The number exceeded one thousand.⁸⁴ What happened to those who escaped to the *mato* after the first "appearance" of FRELIMO? Wilssoni Muahave and Asuema Ncumba, a woman from Revia, relate contrasting experiences about their relationships with FRELIMO:

I was in the *mato* for two years. I was not with FRELIMO. I survived in the *mato*, being isolated from everybody. I did not even have clothes to wear, so I put on the bark of a tree.⁸⁵ (*Underlined by the author*)

I escaped to the *mato*. There, I was with FRELIMO. The commander was a Shona man [from the central region], but he was killed in battle. Many people died of starvation. My mother died, my aunt died, and my grandparents were killed by lions. All five children died. I lost my family members within five years. Each family looked for fruits to eat. We ate whatever we found. We couldn't work in the fields.⁸⁶ (*Underlined by the author*)

A nephew of Mwene Revia, describes the attack by the Portuguese Armed Forces and life with FRELIMO as follows:

Tropa [the Portuguese troops] entered the *mato* and attacked people. It came from far away, from the southwest part of Niassa District. Mainly ordinary people were killed. The survivors were taken to the military station. We lived in the *mato* for two years just like animals. Fifty people from "liberated

zones” brought food, carrying it on their heads, but it did not last even a week. Only the soldiers ate this food and people starved. Mwene Mukopwa and the FRELIMO commander acted together. They spoke in Kiswahili. FRELIMO had guerrillas from different backgrounds and they spoke in their own languages. They said that the African people would oust the government for the elapo [“country” in the Makhuwa language], for the Mozambicans and for the Africans. I did not think it was a good idea. The hardship in the mato was too terrible. There were some who ran away because of hunger, but if captured by FRELIMO, they were killed. Food production was prohibited by FRELIMO for *tropa* would find it. In this situation, I thought I would die regardless of whether I was with FRELIMO or the colonial authority.⁸⁷ (*Underlined by the author*)

After telling a similar story, a son of Mwene Revia explains the military draft of FRELIMO:

As my younger brothers said, the war really started. It was started by unknown men from all over Mozambique. Many people died. First, *tropa* killed ordinary people. Regardless of whether they were guerrillas or not, all in the *mato* were shot at. Ordinary people always died in every combat ... Fortunately, we survived. FRELIMO wanted to capture young people and make them soldiers, but the father’s [mwene’s] consent was necessary.⁸⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

Mwene Revia describes the friction with FRELIMO as follows:

I lived in the *mato*, but I did not live with FRELIMO. I did so for four years. I was so exhausted that I wanted to go to Tanzania to rest. Because FRELIMO did not allow me to go, I ran away to Tanzania with my wife and son. When we arrived at Songea [a base located in southern Tanzania], Nyerere gave us food.⁸⁹ (*Underlined by the author*)

The colonial authority’s response to the beginning of the liberation war

According to Abel Barroso Hipólito, the brigade commander of the Portuguese Armed Forces, FRELIMO guerrillas travelled through the Mataka corridor from southern Tanzania to the Lugenda River to Revia and advanced south to Muhoco and then to Maúa.⁹⁰ The attack on Revia took place during the “military vacuum”, immediately after the 637th Infantry Company inspected the area to build an army post.

To counterattack, the 1481st Artillery Company that specialised in guerrilla warfare was dispatched to Revia in March the same year. However, it did not arrive in Revia until the end of the month as soldiers had to repair a bridge destroyed by guerrillas and they were also ambushed. By the time they arrived at Revia, all residents had already fled the area.

The Portuguese soldiers set up a temporary army barracks making use of abandoned shops and began their counterattack on 5 April. There were fierce retaliatory attacks by guerrillas living in the *mato*.⁹¹

Disconcerted, in April the colonial authority decided to set up administrative posts in Revia and Nipepe, however they did not actually function properly until 1968. Therefore the army was forced to take over the responsibilities of defence and control of residents in Maúá without delay.

After the attack in Revia in March 1966, armed struggle spread to eastern Niassa and then to southern Niassa. In the end, the entire Niassa District became a battlefield. The Portuguese Armed Forces dispatched troops to various areas but were overwhelmed by guerrilla surprise attacks. Figure 27 reflects that over a five-month period the Portuguese Armed Forces deployed an artillery company to Revia, another to Nipepe and an infantry company to Maúá Sede.⁹²

In spite of the Portuguese Armed Forces' rapid military reinforcement, FRELIMO guerrillas expanded their activities in Maúá. On 21 May 1966, they initiated attacks in Mwapula, Muela, Mora and Vahiwa, which were populous areas of northern Maúá Sede.

Guerrillas kidnapped three settlers (discharged Portuguese soldiers) from a farm owned by a white man in Mwapula while continuing to loot shops and recruit residents. The Portuguese Armed Forces immediately sent a detachment to defend the area.⁹³

Meanwhile, the 1571st Artillery Company arrived in Revia where the most extreme battles were fought. They took charge of the area in May. In order to gain military supremacy, soldiers started to build runways and army barracks.⁹⁴ The company had reported: "No facilities, no defence mechanisms and not even a runway."⁹⁵

The company suffered many casualties in guerrilla ambushes, particularly when it was moving towards the Lucuisse River, where FRELIMO guerrillas had a base.⁹⁶


By now it had become dangerous for Portuguese soldiers to perform even non-military activities in Maúá. One of their tasks was to protect local residents, but for young and inexperienced soldiers who had just arrived from Portugal it was impossible to tell local residents apart from FRELIMO guerrillas and its sympathisers. FRELIMO's continuous attacks on army barracks and patrolling parties instilled fear and hatred against an invisible enemy in the minds of the Portuguese soldiers. This resulted in the Portuguese Armed Forces attacking all Africans living in the *mato*.

Some of the Revia residents who lived in the *mato* were running away from both forces while others moved around in the *mato* under the control of FRELIMO. All barely survived, suffering severe food shortages and a lack of clothing. Hassani from Revia explains the situation:


Tropa tracked our footprints and found us. FRELIMO guerrillas had already fled, leaving us behind. We had weapons but we didn't know how to use them. We couldn't have beaten the Portuguese in any case. They took us to their station and gave us food until we couldn't eat anymore. We almost forgot they were killers. We became "cows kept in the iron bars."⁹⁷

Figure 27 Deployment of the Portuguese Armed Forces in northern Mozambique (focusing on Maúá) (May 1964–Jan.1967)


① Until 1 May 1964




② Until 1 July 1965



③ Until 10 Jan. 1966



④ Until 6 Jun. 1966



⑤ Until 2 Jan. 1967





Figure 28 Deployment of the Portuguese Armed Forces in northern Mozambique (focusing on Maúa) (May 1967 – Jul.1973)



Mocha Pembena from Muhoco, who was employed as a guide for the Portuguese Armed Forces, describes people from Revia:

During the war, the Portuguese army made me their guide after I was released from a prison.⁹⁸ White people had weapons but I didn't. It was a fierce war. I thought FRELIMO was stronger. Portuguese soldiers captured those who had fled from FRELIMO and sent them back to their villages. The majority were from Maúa. They were starving and wearing clothes made from tree bark. It was a pitiful sight and I really didn't want any more people to die.⁹⁹

People from Revia, who became "residents of the *mato*" but were not on FRELIMO's side, did not surrender to the Portuguese Armed Forces. Many were scared of the Portuguese soldiers as they did not hesitate to shoot Africans whenever they saw them. They believed that if they were caught they would be killed. Only those who were caught alive were taken to the army post in Revia.¹⁰⁰

The Portuguese Armed Forces gradually realised that it needed to change tactics in order to turn the situation around. To this end it tried to create nuclear settlements and better intelligence-gathering operations so that it could isolate FRELIMO from local residents and launch more accurate and intense attacks on FRELIMO bases. However, in reality, the lack of human and material resources, difficulty with transport, as well as the frequent attacks by FRELIMO, prevented the Portuguese Armed Forces from achieving their aims. Their efforts to mobilise residents so as to fight for them also failed.¹⁰¹ Meanwhile, FRELIMO expanded their range of attack in Maúa.

The development of the liberation war outside Revia

In his book, Brigade Commander Hipólito describes how FRELIMO advanced from north to south in Maúa and arrived at the furthest south-west point of Niassa in the middle of 1966.¹⁰² This section discusses what life was like for those who lived outside Revia, especially in northern Maúa Sede.

Northern Maúa Sede was covered by the Miombo forest and was blessed with an abundance of water and fertile land. Military bases were set up here by both FRELIMO guerrillas and RENAMO guerrillas during the liberation war and the post-independence armed conflict. Towards the end of the colonial era, there were many white-owned farms and shops. According to Pachide Nahoxa, from this area, during the colonial period more goods were sold here than in Maúa Sede.¹⁰³ The Miombo forest stretched for several hundred kilometres, from northern Maúa Sede to the Tanzanian border, with a few villages in between. This terrain was very similar to Revia and was suitable ground for guerrilla warfare.¹⁰⁴

As already mentioned, *régulos* were obliged to live in places accessible to the colonial administration because of their position as the lowest unit of the colonial structure. Therefore, Régulo Muela's group, which had moved to Majune, was forced to relocate again to the roadside of northern Maúa Sede at the end of the 1950s. However, most

group members refused to go back to Maúa. Ultimately, only the *régulo* and his immediate family returned. The rest of the group remained near Revia and appointed Arabuna, a close relative of Régulo Muela, as their *mwene*.

At the same time the Mwapula group, relatives of Régulo Muela, were placed under Muela by the colonial administration, and lived on the opposite side (northern side, closer to the *mato*) of the road from where the Muela family lived. This subtle difference in location increased the possibility of the Mwapula group being captured by FRELIMO. C.G., a *pwattaphwatta* (head of a lineage segment), a member of the Mwapula group and a relative of Muela, explains how FRELIMO captured residents:

When 60 residents went out hunting, they encountered FRELIMO guerrillas. Some managed to flee, but others were captured. After two weeks, guerrillas arrived at our village in the evening and took the residents to the *mato*. We were led to believe by the Portuguese that *turra* had a tail. But when we saw them, we realised they were human beings like ourselves. We realised that the Portuguese had lied to us and started to distrust them. We also started to believe that FRELIMO might win with some luck. When FRELIMO guerrillas came for the second time, they took people living on the northern side of the road, including Mwene Mwapula.¹⁰⁵

FRELIMO guerrillas, who had been hiding in the *mato* in northern Maúa, captured people who happened to be in the forest and sent them to Tanzania to train them as guerrillas. Some ran away from FRELIMO while others stayed. Many became enthusiastic guerrillas and went back to their villages to help their families and relatives escape colonial rule. The colonial authority referred to it as “kidnap of residents”, but the reality was not that simple.

Because of its convenient location, lying on the route between Maúa Sede and Revia, FRELIMO guerrillas set up a base in Muhoco around the same time as the one in Revia and tried to convince local traditional authorities to join them. However, the response from the residents of Muhoco was somewhat complex.

The area then called Muhoco was originally called Girane or Mount Txoncori (or Xinkore). The groups previously lived in the area, but in the 1950s the cotton company brought in people from other areas for cotton growing.¹⁰⁶ It seems that the company tried to establish a *concentração* based on the new cotton policy, as discussed in Chapter 2. All the groups were placed under Régulo Muwa, but the Muhoco group worked harder than anybody else in cotton fields and was made responsible for the area.¹⁰⁷ This is why the colonial authority called this area Muhoco.

The Council of Elders of the Muhoco group explains this situation as follows:

FRELIMO captured people from the Matoto, Punhale, Menikwa and Namarica groups, who lived near the *mato*. Those captured came back to each group later on and took their families with them. This angered the administrator of Maúa.¹⁰⁸

The statement confirms the process that people who were “captured” by FRELIMO eventually recruited their own families.

The involvement of traditional authority in FRELIMO

The elusiveness of FRELIMO guerrillas and the mass “kidnapping” or “escape” of residents in northern Maúa made the colonial authority recognise once again the importance of intelligence. The often duplicated intelligence activities between the army and the colonial administration were streamlined, and they finally started to cooperate on gathering information on important cases. One of the priorities was to investigate the exact whereabouts of more than 1,000 residents from Revia as well as FRELIMO’s military bases. The person in charge of this task was a local living in the area. According to *Boletim de Informação* (BI) dated 12 April 1966, he found the place where people from Revia were hiding.¹⁰⁹ BI also reports on Mwene Muhoco:

Responding to a call from terrorists, Chefe Muhoco came to Naprumba. Apart from him, there were four people who had been in contact with terrorists ... Chefe Muhoco, whose name is Impasse, escaped to Tanzania and became a member of a terrorist group in Revia.¹¹⁰

According to BI dated 24 May, there were reports that *bandoleiros* (a group of bandits) from Revia threatened the people of Mwapula, Muela and Vahiwa, which resulted in people from Muela and Vahiwa escaping to Sede. The *régulos* from these groups asked the Maúa Administrative Post for protection. This report indicates local residents’ somewhat contradictory actions; they cooperated with FRELIMO while demanding protection from the colonial authority.¹¹¹ What had actually taken place?

A month after the incident, the administrative chief held a meeting in Muhoco and collected information from the residents. He arrested a man called Adamo, an advisor to Mwene Namupa, who was staying in Muhoco. He gave the following statement after a few days of interrogation by the PIDE:

I joined FRELIMO with the hope that I would one day become prominent because I could read and write. At the time of the attacks on white-owned farms, I contacted Buanatela, Régulo Muela’s advisor. He came to spy on the Portuguese forces to aid FRELIMO’s plan to attack shops in Muhoco. I saw Muítua [Muitthuwa], Chefe Muhoco’s advisor, talking to FRELIMO guerrillas in a house of the advisor of the Napuro group in Revia.¹¹²

BI concludes that Lino Lemos, a teacher and a successor to Régulo Nekutho, was one of the suspects who attacked the farms of the Portuguese settlers in Nekutho.¹¹³ BI suspected that Lemos turned up in his hometown to promote subversion and met several traditional authorities, including Régulo Nekutho.¹¹⁴

It is quite clear that the local traditional authorities (*mwenes*, their advisors and their successors) were involved with FRELIMO. An ex-FRELIMO guerrilla, Adamo used to be an advisor to the traditional authority himself. He was a young man with primary education and stayed in Revia to work for a cotton company. Lemos, who led FRELIMO's campaign in northern Maúa, was also a candidate for *mwene* and was educated enough to be a teacher. In short, young educated people in Maúa, who belonged to the clan of the traditional authorities, supported FRELIMO's campaign; they sought corporation from local traditional authorities through the existing network.

Once names were mentioned, people were immediately jailed even though the allegations against them were unfounded. For example, Buanatela, the advisor and successor of Régulo Muela, was jailed in Vila Cabral and later sent to Lake Nyasa.¹¹⁵ Chefe Jainana (or Iaiane) in Nekutho was jailed soon after receiving a visit from Lemos. As for Muhoco, the administrator of Maúa Sede wrote the following account in BI:

Most of the Matoto and Muhoco groups managed to remain in Muhoco as they lived near army barracks. Chiefs, who were not taken away [by FRELIMO], arrived at Maúa Sede Administrative Post, and each were given 20 armed militiamen to take back with them. It was a sure sign that the situation was deteriorating.¹¹⁶ (*Underlined by the author*)

Thus, traditional authorities, whose job it was to implement orders from the colonial authorities at a local level, gradually turned into the “defenders” of the local community. The examples of the Matoto, Muhoco and Mwapula groups suggests that their historical relationships with the colonial authority affected their geographical condition (i.e. accessibility to the colonial administration offices and to the road), which in turn determined the fate of each group during the liberation war. Having said this, in spite of living very close to Portuguese army barracks, Mwene Muhoco helped FRELIMO and left for Tanzania when the war broke out. So, it is clear also, that there are anomalies and that sometimes individuals acted outside or differently from the rest of their group.

BI, dated 19 September 1966, reported that nearly 50 of the “kidnapped” Namarica people managed to “escape” and “are waiting for help out in the *mato*”. BI, dated 30 September and 12 October, reported that remaining people rejected FRELIMO's call to join them.

People who were left in Mount Txoncori are scared of being captured by armed bandits and as a whole they are on our side.¹¹⁷

Nicuacua, the advisor of Chefe Matoto, who went to the FRELIMO side, came back to Matoto with a letter written in Arabic. He asked for food and tried to persuade Matoto and his wife to come to live on the FRELIMO side. However, Matoto rejected his request and told him that he would remain in Muhoco.¹¹⁸

This episode suggests that the outbreak of the war in Maúa displaced people in Mount Txoncori and divided the group. They were torn between FRELIMO and the colonial authority, and those who remained on the side of the colonial authority became the target of various harassments from FRELIMO. To prevent this from happening, the administrator of Maúa evacuated all the groups in Mount Txoncori, except for the Muhoco, to be close to Maúa Sede. He also accepted some people from the Muhoco group who followed after them.¹¹⁹

Since FRELIMO's first attack in March 1966, the lives of people in Maúa, especially those living in northern Maúa's Administrative Post, had changed dramatically. Apart from suffering the break-up of groups and displacement, many were imprisoned as "suspects". Archives and interviews reveal that prominent members of local communities, such as teachers, traditional authorities and Muslim leaders, were actively or passively involved in the liberation war. The colonial authority did not ignore this.

In November 1966, the PIDE arrested 85 people who were involved in the network of "subversion" against the colonial authority. Among them were officials from the Marrupa Administrative office (including Sargene and his colleagues) and local authorities in the area.¹²⁰ PIDE's report indicates that they were from Balama in Cabo Delgado and the Maúa area of Marrupa Circumscription in Niassa District (Nungo, Nipepe, Revia and Sede administrative posts).¹²¹ In fact, the areas where these suspects came from mirrors the *niphito* map of Makhuwa-Metto and Makhuwa-Xirima (Figure 22) compiled by the author.

A PIDE report describes the punishment meted out to each "suspect". The most severe punishment was imprisonment at Fortaleza São João Baptista on Ibo Island, followed by penal labour at the Mabalane Re-education Camp in southern Mozambique. Convicts whose sentences were lightest were supposedly set free after two years of penal labour. However, the PIDE was reluctant to let them go back to their home villages as many were traditional authorities and it was anticipated they might cause further turmoil in the villages. Instead, relocation was considered.¹²²

PIDE's list of arrestees reflects that the majority were from the habitations of Makhuwa, especially Makhuwa-Metto. Branquinho, who researched the area in the late 1960s, stated that Makhuwa-Mettos in Niassa District and Cabo Delgado District were responsible for anti-colonial activities in Marrupa, Montepuez and Namuno under the leadership of the prominent figures in the clan.¹²³ Furthermore, the PIDE document includes many Muslim names among arrested traditional authorities and individuals. Therefore, as Monteiro points out, it is safe to assume that anti-colonial activities had something to do with the Muslim network – which was being formed in Cabo Delgado and Niassa around this time.¹²⁴ Of course there were many who were wrongly arrested too.¹²⁵

The movement against the colonial authority, organised by prominent Africans (i.e. government officials, teachers, traditional authorities and Muslim leaders) around Marrupa at the beginning of 1960, was completely crushed by the end of 1966. The budding local network was placed under surveillance after losing its leaders and was no longer able to function. The list of arrestees includes all the traditional authorities in

Nipepe Administrative Post and the staff of the Maúa Church School, which produced sympathisers for the FRELIMO commander Lino Lemos.¹²⁶ All the traditional authorities whose group members “escaped” to the FRELIMO side and/or were “suspects”, were temporarily imprisoned and then put under constant surveillance. As a result, the network of local powerful figures that had actively supported FRELIMO’s attacks in Maúa, or had the potential to help them in the future, was completely destroyed by the end of 1966.¹²⁷ As Branquinho points out, the vacuum of leadership occurred in the local society.¹²⁸

The use of local residents by the colonial authority

Local people under the colonial authority were used as tools in order to implement its strategies and policies – as if they had voluntarily taken the side of the colonial authority. The area from Revia to Muhoco became a “no-man’s land” after Muhoco people fled either to FRELIMO’s side or evacuated to the side of the colonial authority.¹²⁹ For the colonial authority, which recognised local residents as its informants, the situation meant there was a “security vacuum”. A superintending officer visiting Maúa Circumscription in September 1970 criticised the administrator for creating an enormous economic vacuum as well.¹³⁰

In order to reverse the situation, after they had evacuated residents from Mount Txoncori, the Portuguese Armed Forces took some back and used them as bait to catch FRELIMO guerrillas or their supporters.¹³¹ However, people did not stay there for long. It is reported that four women, who had been relocated to Muhoco, attempted to get to the Namarica group but were then captured by FRELIMO guerrillas.¹³² The Council of Elders of Muhoco related a similar story to the author.¹³³

The colonial authority became increasingly worried about FRELIMO trying to persuade these evacuees to join them. In January 1967, 800 evacuees were transported to an *aldeamento* called Melo Egidio, situated close to the administration centre.¹³⁴ However, the Muhoco group alone was taken back to the Portuguese army post at Mount Txoncori to fill a “military vacuum”. There, they were forced to play the role of informants, guides and suppliers of food for the Portuguese forces.¹³⁵

In spite of the efforts by the Portuguese Armed Forces, FRELIMO guerrillas continued to appear throughout Maúa. Maúa Administrative Post then appointed two locals who were familiar with the area as militia commanders. They were José Maurício, a *mestiço*, and Alberto Vaquiwa, who worked for the Catholic Church and was experienced in handling guns. He described the development of armed struggle in Muhoco as follows:

In 1966 we heard that FRELIMO had infiltrated into Muhoco. I rushed to the area with a militia whose commander was the son of a Portuguese settler ... The administrator advised the commander to take me with them. When we were patrolling the area, we found a man. The soldiers tried to kill him but I stopped it, assuring that I would get the whole story out of him. When I said to him, “Speak if you don’t want to die,” he told us the location of the Nawawani base

... Soldiers were gathered from all over Niassa to attack the base. They were all whites. So many troops gathered from far away and a convoy of cars lined up for several hundred metres. The troops gathered at Muhoco and walked all night. We found the enemy at five o'clock in the morning. Shooting lasted until eight and the battle ended by nine. As the enemy fled, we took women back home. We found landmines, grenades, weapons and rockets at their base. Planes bombarded the base. Mothers wept with joy when we handed their daughters back.¹³⁶

This attack was probably one of the large-scale clean-up operations that the Portuguese Armed Forces launched in Muhoco from October 1966.¹³⁷ The 1893rd Battalion, deployed in October 1966 with the commanding headquarters in Marrupa, focused on destroying FRELIMO bases between Revia and Muhoco. From then on, Portuguese Armed Forces planned its counterattacks by using locals who were knowledgeable of the area and spoke both Makhuwa and Portuguese, like Vaquiwa, as well as drawing on information collected from people who surrendered and captured guerrillas.¹³⁸


Summary of this period

At the end of 1966 there were several factors that would help the colonial authority prevail over FRELIMO guerrillas in Maúa: (1) the mass arrest and imprisonment of local powerful figures in November 1966; (2) the success of the Portuguese Armed Forces' reviewed policy in terms of local people (i.e. relocating Muhoco residents, using local guides, militiamen and *sipaio*s for military operations, and improving the intelligence network) from the end of 1966 to January 1967 and (3) the improved defence system of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

However, this is in hindsight. Then, even the colonial authority thought that FRELIMO was winning, as indicated in Hipólito's following account:

In the last few months of 1966 we received information that armed bandits had reached the Lalaula area of Moçambique District, the south of the Lúrio. The subversion has spread all over Niassa District and entered its third stage. Our enemy controls Nyanjas, Ajauas [Yaos] and Macuas [Makhuwas] in Revia, Muhoco and Mandimba. In Marrupa and Amaranba, they use pressure such as alliance and intimidation. People are running away and are captured especially in Mandimba, Revia, Muhoco and Mecula. Our enemy has taken the lead all over Niassa and they dominate our forces by surprise attacks. The subversion is very violent and assertive. People are running towards us consumed by fear.¹³⁹ (*Underlined by the author*)

Figure 29 Evolution of infiltration and attacks of FRELIMO guerrillas in Niassa District (Oct. 1966 – Aug. 1968)



Hipólito, 1970: MapII; Bernardo, 2003:59.

(Some spellings changed by the author)

The middle period of the liberation war in Maúá

Winning over residents

The military dominance of FRELIMO and the mass “disappearance” of residents to the Miombo forest or to FRELIMO left the colonial authority in crisis. It faced the following problems and challenges in the Maúá Circumscription: (1) sorting out the so-called military vacuum; (2) preventing northern Maúá residents from escaping to the *mato*; (3) the need to find shelter for the *recuperados* (returnees) and *deslocados* (the displaced); and (4) improving the intelligence network. The surprise attacks and consequent number of soldiers killed made the Portuguese Armed Forces extremely anxious. The 1893rd Infantry Battalion was sent to Maúá in October 1966 in order to boost the military presence in the area.¹⁴⁰

However, the rainy season had hit Maúá and the Portuguese Armed Forces were severely disadvantaged, as there were almost no tarmac roads in the entire district. Moreover, FRELIMO attacks increased dramatically in 1967. The Portuguese Armed Forces, which were able to carry out effective counter-offensives only during the dry season, hurried to set up the first commanding headquarters in Maúá in preparation for the cessation of rain.¹⁴¹ When the rainy season ended in May, the Portuguese Armed Forces were able to carry out numerous counter-offensive attacks on FRELIMO. In August, the number of the attacks was 1,500, the largest so far.

The attacks resulted in many casualties among Maúá residents. According to a report by the 1571st company operating in Revia, it accomplished 12,363 activities in total (including 212 operations) in its two-year duty (of which, one year and two months was spent in Maúá) and caused the following damage to FRELIMO: 174 “IN” (*inimigo*, “enemy”) deaths, 37 injured, 413 detained, 618 people who surrendered and the destruction of 269 camps.¹⁴² The report does not mention that many deaths of “IN” were in fact of unarmed residents.

However, the counter-offensive against FRELIMO had to end when the next rainy season arrived. Rain created the opportunity for FRELIMO to set up the Cassero Base, the largest in the region along the Lugenda, and facilitate strategic operations in Maúá. The Portuguese Armed Forces replaced the 1993rd Infantry Battalion with the 1935th Artillery Battalion that had received special training on guerrilla warfare.¹⁴³ Brigade Commander Hipólito was the commander of this battalion.

The objectives of the 1935th Artillery Battalion that were sent to Maúá were as follows: (1) to gain full knowledge of the area; (2) to prevent the “enemy” from advancing to the south or to the west; (3) to maintain a close interaction with the local residents, detaining them if necessary in order to control them, and to prevent them from joining the enemy; and (4) to maintain permanent peace on the right side of the Lugenda. The battalion installed a “psycho-social operation officer” to achieve the third objective. The officer held meetings in various places, together with the administrative officers of Maúá. As a result, it

reported that, “[a]bout 200 residents of northern Mwapula, surrendered themselves to the army.”¹⁴⁴ It still remains doubtful if this was truly the result of the psycho-social operation. Around this period, not only the forces in Maúá but the entire Portuguese Armed Forces had adopted a new strategy, *recuperação* (recovery), which would not kill people in the *mato*. As a result, the administration had to come up with a system that would place the guerrillas and residents captured by the army under military and administrative surveillance and “recover” them physically and psychologically so that they would not flee back to FRELIMO. To achieve this, *aldeamento* (villagisation) was introduced.¹⁴⁵

Despite the challenges it provided for the Portuguese, the military advantages that FRELIMO enjoyed for a while, having installed a large-scale military base near the Lugenda, were not sustained. It became critical to gain the cooperation (albeit passive or proactive) of the Maúá residents in order for the guerrillas to advance south. However, by the end of 1966, not only the active supporters of FRELIMO, but also the passive cooperators, were detained by the colonial authority. Moreover, the rapid increase in the number of operations by the Portuguese army, as well as the severe living conditions in the *mato*, decreased the number of residents who were willing to stay with FRELIMO. And, the residents (those who were willing to remain under the colonial authority, those “evacuated” or those “recovered”) began to be controlled in the *aldeamento* near the army barracks.

It was in fact the FRELIMO guerrillas themselves that most keenly felt the change in the above-mentioned social environment. A document confiscated by the Portuguese Armed Forces around this time says:

Even if the first plan in Maúá fails, it is alright. We have received a new instruction from the headquarters in Tanzania. We are asked not to attack shops but to try every possible appropriate means to make all the heads of household (*chefe de casa*) become FRELIMO members.¹⁴⁶ (*Underlined by the author*)

During the same period, when the colonial power was trying to corral the residents of Maúá, FRELIMO was also focused on coopting residents, especially heads of households. It was only later, from 1970 to 1972, that the “liberated zones” were set up in the southern part of Maúá. In other words, from 1967, Maúá residents under FRELIMO rule had to live together with the guerrilla fighters in small makeshift bases scattered throughout the forest, or had to risk walking for days to reach larger bases in unknown places and begin a new, unfamiliar life. Therefore, for many Maúá residents, remaining under colonial rule, even if they did not agree with it, was easier than siding with FRELIMO, due to the familiar environment and conditions. Significantly at least, food and goods were in abundance. One can see that for many living under FRELIMO was difficult unless they were driven by political purpose.

FRELIMO's securing of Maúa residents

It is interesting to consider the relationship between FRELIMO and Maúa residents by analysing accounts related by women who became FRELIMO guerrillas.

Teresa Raica from Mount Txoncori, later a commander of the FPLM, joined FRELIMO voluntarily:

My uncle [on my mother's side] was captured by FRELIMO guerrillas when he went hunting. One day, he came back to collect *farinha* [flour]. At that time, I was in my second year of primary school, though my father was against my education. I decided to join FRELIMO to serve my country after talking to my uncle. I was the only one in my family to do so. My mother didn't worry about me because I would be with her brother.¹⁴⁷

Paulina Boma Mataka,¹⁴⁸ also from Mount Txoncori, and Emília Mahungua from the Muela group, became guerrillas reluctantly:

One morning, three strangers visited us. As the night fell, more men turned up and urged us to go with them. We took food and clothes to the *mato*. All of us were taken to Ntapara.¹⁴⁹

Already many people had been taken away from Muela. One evening, all of us [mother and four siblings] were taken away by the person who used to come to the *régulo* all the time. I was still young but was married with children. I had never been to school ... Why I became a guerrilla? Because I was taken [to the FRELIMO side].¹⁵⁰

These stories reflect the varying reasons why people joined FRELIMO, sometimes of their own volition and sometimes by force. However, even if there was no choice, families tended to remain together. Frequently the entire family, with the approval of the head of the family or of their group, joined FRELIMO. According to the prevailing traditional social structure, women lived with or near their mothers even after marriage, and their maternal uncles controlled their lives. It was therefore difficult for young women to behave according to their own free will in Maúa – where a monetary economy or the influence of the Catholic Church had not yet taken root. It was also difficult for women to receive an education (at Catholic Church schools) since the overwhelming majority in Maúa practiced traditional religion or/and Islam. Raica received an education only because a public school was built when the Portuguese army became stationed in Maúa. Many women were still not allowed to attend school even after 1960 when several schools were built. In Raica's case, it was only due to her maternal uncle's permission that she was able to study, as it was against her father's wishes.¹⁵¹

It is paradoxical of course that the colonial authority built schools in order to foster support for itself, but in fact many young people became politically aware as a result of this education.

However, despite a growing political awareness and education amongst rural people, many families were forcefully coerced into joining FRELIMO. Candida Muhivo's family from Revia is another good example:

When I was young, all my family were captured by FRELIMO guerrillas and taken to Tanzania. Why did I become a guerrilla? Because I was forced to. I cried every day.¹⁵²

Raica's experience was somewhat different – bearing in mind she voluntarily joined the ranks:

At first, I was sent to the Gungunhana base and worked as a cook. Then I reached a certain age when I received training at the Msawissi base. I was with many other women. We were all together regardless of our ethnic backgrounds. Each spoke in her own language. We also spoke Portuguese as there was a school to learn the language. There were no old people. Most were in their 20s. We grew cassava, sorghum and vegetables in the field belonging to the cooperative. I was happy with my life because I chose it. Those who were captured didn't escape because many of them began to warm towards FRELIMO's political views after attending meetings and training. I always said to the people who were captured and brought to the base, "This is for your own good. This is for us to be free. We have to kick the whites out. Then, we can live the way we like. Let's fight together so that we can live wherever we want." People at the base always said that *unidade* [unity] meant to free ourselves. *Socialismo* [socialism]? I didn't know about it.¹⁵³

Emília Mahungua from Muela, who later became an instructor for new recruits, told of her experiences:

First, we were taken to the Msawissi central base. All of us were given training. My two cousins and my brother also received training. After the training, we walked 30 kilometres carrying goods. We walked so fast that we arrived at the destination on the same day. In order to experience different environments, we were sent to various bases in Cabo Delgado. Although it was life in battle, FRELIMO was well organised. There were fields managed by the cooperative and many women were receiving training. After three months in Cabo Delgado, I was sent to a base in Tanzania. I was sent back to Msawissi in 1973 and became an instructor there. I taught both men and women. I was scared of change but was very interested in politics. I used to tell trainees "*colonos*

[white settlers] deceived us by calling FRELIMO guerrillas *turras*. FRELIMO is fighting for our common interests, for our same colour of the skin. So join us. When the *oburu* [independence] comes, our suffering will end.” But, I really didn’t know when the war would end. I just fought.¹⁵⁴

Muhiva’s description of the process of becoming a guerrilla adds to an understanding of life during these times:

When I was a small girl, my family was captured by FRELIMO. We went to Tanzania and settled in a village at the border. Tanzanians lived on the opposite side of the road. There were many people from Revia and Muhoco. We stayed there for two years and then only girls were sent to the Nachingea base. Five girls got scared and ran away but I couldn’t. For a year, we were taught how to use weapons, how to march, how to speak Portuguese and Swahili. I didn’t know why we were fighting and what *oburu* was. We were just told that we fought so that our *elapo* [country] would become a normal one. I just cried every day. I was told to think that I was protecting my mother. So I did. Then, I was sent to the Msawissi central base in Niassa. I cooked and worked in the field. But we had no *mapira* or beans [the staple diet of Makhuwa people] to eat.¹⁵⁵ We taught politics to the people whom FRELIMO guerrillas newly captured. You see, we had to make sure that they wouldn’t run away because there were always people who tried to go back home. These people later attacked our bases with *colonos*. That’s why we had to teach them morality and politics. This task was given to the FRELIMO *secretários*. We had to make sure that people’s loyalty was with us.¹⁵⁶ (*Underlined by the author*)

FRELIMO’s success in gathering recruits is reflected in some of these women’s stories and circumstances. Young girls were frequently taken to FRELIMO by their relatives. Often, a family member would become a FRELIMO collaborator and then return home to collect his relatives. Particularly if a collaborator happened to be the chief of a group, whether it was a clan, a lineage, an extended family or a household, it was relatively easy for FRELIMO to both attract and coerce large numbers of people to its side.

As discussed in Chapter 2, people in Maúa traditionally lived in a village community based on their traditional lineage group (*nloko*) and followed the rules of lineage segments (*nkoto*). Within *nkoto*, there were “extended family” units (*erukulu*) and the chief of *erukulu* was the eldest uncle.¹⁵⁷ The smallest social unit was a household (a married couple with unmarried children).

As Mahungua’s experience reflects, a household unit was not as important as an extended family unit (*erukulu*) in Maúa during this time. There were many instances where children were brought up, not by their parents but by their maternal uncle as the “successors” of the family, because it was important to have legitimate successors (nephews and nieces on the maternal side of the family) in order to ensure the continuity and future of the group.

The traditional practices in these groups were plunged into confusion after the onset of the liberation war. This was because: (1) people in Maúa were split into two sides and (2) many “traditional authorities” were imprisoned. When a *mwene*, the head of *nkolo*, went to the FRELIMO side, the people he left behind had an enormous problem in terms of both the traditional and the colonial administration.¹⁵⁸ For Makhuwas, their village only held its traditional legitimacy if the *mwene* and *pwiyamwene* resided there. A village without them was a group without legitimacy. This is why, as happened in the cases of Mwapula and Muhoco, the residents of the village chose to move to the FRELIMO side in order to maintain the integrity of the village when they lost their *mwene* to the FRELIMO camp.

As the war progressed, the split among residents deepened as the colonial authority and FRELIMO both intensively tried to recruit residents to their respective sides. Traditional authorities that went to the FRELIMO side did not wait for their people to join them, but instead actively and strategically recruited them because they desperately needed to have successors (nephews on the maternal side), *pwiyamwene* (the symbol of the group and *mwene*’s sisters or nieces) and their successors (nieces on the maternal side), in order to maintain the community living on the FRELIMO side.

Contacts between traditional authorities and residents were often made after sunset in northern Maúa. The colonial authority was often not aware of these meetings and viewed the “disappearance” of residents as “kidnapping”. However, the colonial authority was also very well aware of the *mwenes*’ strong influence within their communities. Therefore it did not trust them even when they used *mwenes* as head of militia. Especially after March 1966, the colonial authority tightened its grip on traditional authorities as it had become increasingly certain of their involvement in FRELIMO.

During this time FRELIMO’s internal documents stressed the importance of capturing the head of the household for the effective recruitment of other family members. However, it was very difficult to convince residents to join with them after just a few meetings, especially when people were suffering as a result of the war and their chiefs were imprisoned. Therefore, persistent persuasion and political education were deemed necessary.

This process is confirmed by administrative and military reports as well as by the author’s own interviews. After being captured by FRELIMO, Maúa residents were sent to a nearby camp in the Miombo forest. Later, they were taken to larger bases near Msawissi (presently in Mavago District) where they received political education. Old people built houses and younger ones were sent to the Nachingea base in Tanzania to receive further political education and military training. Finally, they were sent to Cassero on the Lugenda River, the central base of Niassa District, and participated in military activities.

The colonial authority’s corralling of Maúa residents

In order to prevent residents from joining the FRELIMO camp, the colonial authority implemented the *aldeamento* strategy. The purpose of this was to make residents stay within close proximity of military and administrative facilities so that the colonial authority could control them effectively. This was also part of a plan to prevent FRELIMO guerrillas from

making contact with residents, to in effect isolate them and eventually thwart guerrilla warfare.¹⁵⁹ This *aldeamento* strategy served both as the “stick” by restricting the movement of residents, and as the “carrot” by promoting social development to win the hearts and minds of the residents.

The construction of *aldeamentos* became an urgent matter all over Maúá and actively began in June 1966. However, in reality the administrative office was not able to perform this task effectively in many parts of the region due to the lack of infrastructure, capital or manpower. In the end, the task had to be taken over by the Portuguese Armed Forces.

In Maúá *aldeamentos* were set up first in Muhoco and Revia because: (1) defences were weak; (2) there were frequent contacts between local residents and FRELIMO guerrillas; and (3) they lacked the facilities to house people who surrendered or were “recovered”.

However, the Maúá inhabitants’ traditional way of living was very different from the “village” concept aimed at by the *aldeamento*. For the Maúá residents who lived scattered and independently from each other, the idea of living together in the structure of *aldeamento* was unbearable. In addition, having already had a similar experience of enforced co-living by the colonial authority during the cotton-growing campaign, it became even more difficult for Maúá people to accept the policy of *aldeamento*. The colonial administration could not persuade locals to cooperate willingly with the construction of *aldeamento* even for the purpose of “defence” and “social development”. It was only in Muhoco and Revia, where local communities had already been broken down due to fierce battles and where the Portuguese Armed Forces felt the need for defence, that *aldeamentos* were successfully constructed.

Aldeamentos provided the colonial authority with a few advantages: (1) it helped to spot “suspects” found in un-designated areas (i.e. army posts and local militias’ posts); (2) it helped to block the “silent infiltration” of ex-resident-turned-FRELIMO guerrillas/collaborators in the middle of night; and (3) it prevented local residents on both sides from informally contacting each other. In principle, the success of *aldeamento* was vital for the colonial authority to win the war. In reality, however, the construction of *aldeamento* did not go smoothly and even in Revia it only started in August 1967.

Reports from various sources suggest that some residents in Revia began to accept life inside of *aldeamento*.¹⁶⁰ It provided, at least, a place to live and plenty of food for people who had lost their houses and had endured the hardship of living in the Miombo forest – even though they were now detained with barbed wire surrounding them.

As soon as the *aldeamento* was constructed in Revia, a stream of *apresentados* (people who voluntarily surrender themselves) started to appear from the Miombo forest. Alberto Vaquiwa, a militia commander, explains the change of tactics of the Portuguese Armed Forces:

After the operation in Muhoco [in 1966], we headed to Revia for another operation. From 1967 onward, we interrogated the captured rather than killing them.¹⁶¹ ... We found a FRELIMO base near Mount Txoncori. There were many local people living there. Unlike before, we had to protect them. We tried to shoot only guerrillas so that local people could escape towards us.¹⁶²

This suggests that the Portuguese Armed Forces finally started to differentiate between guerrillas and local people – this nearly a year after FRELIMO's first attack. It seems that for the first time, the Portuguese Armed Forces recognised that African inhabitants needed protection, rather than being treated as the enemy.

The militia had its own plan. We went to Revia to release Muela people captured by FRELIMO. We tried to capture them without the use of weapons. We persuaded them by guaranteeing their safety and providing better living conditions. As a result, we were able to bring back 140 residents. We took those from Revia to the nearest white-owned farm.¹⁶³ All women were thin and naked, so we handed them milk and towels. We treated the injured, too.¹⁶⁴

The following account is from Issa Mapira of Revia, who was living in the Miombo forest in Revia:

Whites started to say that they shouldn't kill people because they were fighting for people. We were ordered to bring locals to the army post. People living in the *mato* were no longer killed but instead were brought to the army post. Everybody was naked and starving. They were so starved that they couldn't even swallow a piece of bread given to them. They had been divided into the FRELIMO side and the Portuguese side. The ones who went to the FRELIMO side suffered from hunger and illness. Many went back to the Portuguese side so that they could eat, dress and dance.¹⁶⁵ (*Underlined by the author*)

Asuema Ncumba, who lost nine members of her family while they lived in the Miombo forest for five years, told of the reason why she surrendered to the Portuguese:

We discussed amongst ourselves that it would be better to run to the whites because all family members would be dead if we stayed in the forest ... In order to live we ran away from FRELIMO. I went to the whites with my husband and remaining eight children. We were welcomed and given food and clothing. Within a few months, the children started to grow again. We had to live in *aldeamento*. The field was outside of the settlement ... but we no longer suffered from hunger.¹⁶⁶

People in the mato

This change of tactics by the Portuguese Armed Forces made it difficult for FRELIMO guerrillas to keep a tight grip on people who were under their control. Guerrillas were not able to provide enough food for everyone as they had only the food that they were able to carry. Growing food at the bases was prohibited as it could have led to being discovered

by the enemy. By this time FRELIMO bases scattered all over the Miombo forest were at increased risk of being found, thanks to local guides and African militias like Vaquiwa. FRELIMO's attempt to educate people politically was, in the main, not very successful, and a stream of people escaped while they were transported from one base to another for further training. Fear tactics that FRELIMO employed to convince people to stay with them also stopped working after the treatment of local residents by the colonial authority improved.

On hearing this through the informal network in the forest, more and more exhausted "residents of the *mato*" in Revia surrendered to the colonial authority. Realising that they could no longer control residents by persuasion, FRELIMO army commanders severely punished residents who tried to run away. "To surrender to the enemy" was the worst crime that FRELIMO guerrillas could commit.¹⁶⁷ Escaping residents were perceived in the same light.

The surrounding area of the Lugenda (Cassero), where FRELIMO had a base, was situated deep inside of the Miombo forest. It gained the name of "a legendary fortress that the Portuguese could never reach or destroy" as the Portuguese Armed Forces were not able to find the base even after dispatching expeditionary forces several times. After surveying the area, in 1966 the 1571st Infantry Company submitted the following report:

FRELIMO guerrillas are well organised and they control residents. This area is too remote to reach. That's why it became their kingdom.¹⁶⁸

It was the main purpose of the 1935th battalion, led by Hipólito, to destroy this legendary fortress.¹⁶⁹ From April to November 1968, with relentless attacks deploying many soldiers, the Portuguese Armed Forces finally succeeded in occupying the Lugenda area.¹⁷⁰ The Cassero area was renamed as Galgolíua (the land of hunting dogs), and the 1796th company was stationed there. "The legend of the Lugenda" was completely destroyed.

The success of this operation was reported in much detail in daily newspapers in Portugal – even at the end of the 1990s. *Guerra Colonial* (Colonial War), published in 2000, explains the details of the operation using a map, which shows that helicopters and commandoes were also deployed for this operation.¹⁷¹ The Portuguese Armed Forces also sent their army to Ilha de Metarica (Metarica Island), where FRELIMO had a base, and managed to set up a camp. According to the report by the Portuguese Armed Forces, 169 FRELIMO bases were destroyed, 21 guerrillas were killed, 907 prisoners were taken, 753 surrendered to the Portuguese army and 1,168 surrendered to near-by administration offices. The rest of the guerrillas fled to the north,¹⁷² possibly to Tanzania. The Miombo forest was burned down and so were all huts and fields and crops. In November 1968, the 1935th battalion announced the completion of the clean-up operation in the Maúa area.

Around the same time, the Portuguese Armed Forces launched a large-scale operation in western Niassa and destroyed 22 guerrilla bases and the Gungunhana "provincial" military base. This military base, named after a hero in Gaza Kingdom who resisted Portugal's colonial rule to the end, was not found until then despite numerous expeditions

despatched by the Portuguese Armed Forces. However, a FRELIMO commander captured by the Portuguese Armed Forces disclosed the location of the base.¹⁷³

Summary of this period

Against the large-scale operations by the Portuguese Armed Forces, FRELIMO guerrillas' sporadic attacks from their small bases were insignificant and the only thing that they could do was to flee from battle, leaving residents behind. They were no longer able to stop residents surrendering to the colonial authority and above all, morale among FRELIMO guerrillas plummeted, following the betrayal of one of the commanders, which led to the destruction of their most important base, Gungunhana. According to Hipólito:

FRELIMO guerrillas fled to the north and forced their comrades to live under extremely severe conditions. They had no control over residents anymore and many surrendered to the administrative government. The number amounted to 15,000. This deeply affected the morale of guerrillas.¹⁷⁴

FRELIMO guerrillas were forced to give up the idea of going south via the Mataka corridor after their important supply route was cut off and their main bases were destroyed. Instead, they pursued their southbound advancement from Cabo Delgado District and began their activities in central Tete District. By the end of 1968, FRELIMO was forced to abandon or downsize their activities in Niassa District. Meanwhile, the majority of residents in the *mato* surrendered to the colonial authority. In February 1969, after completing its mission, the 1935th Battalion was sent to Zambézia District where FRELIMO's attacks had been intensified.

The later period of the liberation war in Maúá

The residents living in FRELIMO's "liberated zones"

FRELIMO announced that one third of Mozambique, with one million residents, had been liberated as of 1967.¹⁷⁵ However, Miguel Murupa, a former senior member of FRELIMO wrote in his book, sponsored by the Portuguese government, that the number of people who were living under FRELIMO were 86,000 (6,000 of them in Niassa District) and that its controlled area was only eight per cent of the total land area.¹⁷⁶ It is likely that both these sets of figures were politically manipulated, and therefore actual figures are uncertain. The areas marked as "liberated zones" on the map of the Progress of Liberation Struggle (Figure 7) published by the FRELIMO government after independence, does not necessarily match the reality on the ground.

However, as already discussed, the situation changed at a fast pace. For example, the areas once controlled by FRELIMO quickly changed hands after the Portuguese army's clean-up operations. FRELIMO, which could only fight advantageously in guerrilla

warfare, found itself in a very difficult position and mostly failed to recapture occupied territories. It did not have enough soldiers or weapons to protect itself in open battle – being used to adopting the more furtive strategies of guerrilla warfare. So, coming out into the open was dangerous and also enabled the Portuguese army to carry out attacks from the air. This is why FRELIMO did not allow the “residents of the *mato*” of Revia to farm.

As Thomas Henriksen summarises, therefore, FRELIMO’s “liberated zones” could be described as “posts of the *mato*”, that is, small bases which also served as residences concealed in the Miombo forest. The Portuguese army reported the discovery and the destruction of many “posts of the *mato*”. It was an extremely difficult task for FRELIMO to establish and maintain “liberated zones” while fighting guerrilla warfare under such severe conditions. It was Samora Machel who recognised this difficulty.

During FRELIMO’s Central Committee meetings held from 1968 to 1969, Machel repeatedly insisted on spending budget on military operations rather than on the improvement of the “liberated zones”.¹⁷⁷ Henriksen says that Machel hoped for an early military solution.¹⁷⁸ The author believes that Machel understood the limitations of “liberated zones” as a military tactic. Nevertheless, improving the conditions of “liberated zones” was an important issue for both FRELIMO and the residents. As the social development policy of the colonial authority advanced together with the construction of *aldeamentos*, FRELIMO’s propaganda that Portuguese colonialisation equated to the exploitation of people began to lose its power. Thus, it became critical to establish and improve educational and primary healthcare facilities in “liberated zones”. However, despite the installation of state-of-the-art equipment and facilities in “liberated zones”, these efforts of course came to naught when the Portuguese Armed Forces bombed them. This happened, for instance, when General Kaulza de Arriaga became the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique in 1970 and organised Operation N6 G6rdio (Gordian Knot).

Despite this, the construction of “liberated zones” continued as their existence proved that FRELIMO was not a mere “terrorist” group, but a body that could be relied on to organise people, a reflection of a social revolution. As mentioned earlier, women from Maúa were exposed to a new kind of thinking during their training and were influenced by it. Many finally became FRELIMO guerrillas, and more formally FPLM soldiers. “Liberated zones” were thus paramount for FRELIMO in order to provide political education and military training. However, running them was never easy due to a chronic shortage of goods and constant danger. There was also friction caused by cultural differences.

As already discussed, those who had previously lived according to their traditional social norms encountered difficulties in liberated zones. In addition to a shortage of goods, they had to live with others from different backgrounds and accept an unfamiliar social and power structure, based on the FRELIMO army ranking. For those who had experienced “life in the *mato*” in Revia, life in liberated zones was a great improvement. However, those who had been brought to the liberated zones from their villages, especially traditional authorities, were very uncomfortable.

Anacunthave Namphwanida, a sister-in-law of Mwene Mwapula and a *curandeira* (medicine woman), described her experience as follows:

The war continued in Mwapula. Marrupi, an elder brother of the *mwene*, was captured by FRELIMO. Strangers came to take us at night. It was FRELIMO. While we were walking, I thought I was going to be killed. Finally, we were taken to Mataka [a liberated zone]. I liked Régulo [sic] Mataka. There was a lot of food, and everyone was supportive. However, there was no mapira [sorghum] at Mataka. There were too many differences. Although I was a *curandeira*, I couldn't conduct any ceremonies because the drums there were different from drums here. I ran away because I wanted to eat mapira. I ran away with my mother, another woman, a couple and two elderly persons. Were we scared? We had already given up hope. At the military post on the Metarica Island, we surrendered to the Portuguese. They gave us clothes with great pleasure. We ate at PIDE for a month. We were asked if we knew Marrupi. We answered that he was also there. They asked if the *mwene* remained there. We said that he did. We were requested to tell the *mwene* that he could also come back. When we came back to Mwapula, we were welcomed with drums and dance. The new *chefe* appointed by the colonial administration prepared them for us.¹⁷⁹ (*Underlined by the author*)

Diverse reasons, such as starvation, danger, military attacks, exhaustion and cultural differences often led to residents of the *mato* and liberated zones “surrendering” to the colonial authority, which dangled a “carrot”. FRELIMO’s guerrillas could not prevent this due to the destruction of their bases by the massive operations of the Portuguese army. However, those who moved to FRELIMO’s side and “betrayed” Portugal, like Mwene Revia, could not flee back to the colonial authority or stay in a “liberated zone” during this period, and eventually escaped to Tanzania.¹⁸⁰ After losing their leader, the *mwene*, people of Revia, who were hiding in the forest, surrendered to the Portuguese army. This was the reason why FRELIMO had previously refused the request of Mwene Revia to go to Tanzania.

FRELIMO’s military inferiority, as well as the sudden increase of surrenders, was also caused by the intensified internal conflict within FRELIMO.

“Social development policy” to maintain supremacy in the liberation war

From the beginning of the liberation war in Maúá it was a problem for both FRELIMO and the Portuguese Armed Forces to secure human and material resources. In the end, it was the colonial authority that was able to secure the resources and held the control of Maúá from the end of 1968 to the beginning of 1969. In order to sustain this advantage, the colonial authority prioritised the following operations: (1) to construct *aldeamentos*; (2) to organise militias; and (3) to improve the intelligence network.¹⁸¹

Niassa District Governor Egidio started the construction of *aldeamentos* immediately after taking up his post in 1966. He reported that the construction was completed by the end of 1969 and 160,000 people (about 30,000 households) lived in 114 *aldeamentos*.¹⁸² However, this figure was exaggerated and has to be treated with caution, in the same way as the number of residents in “liberated zones” reported by FRELIMO.

The same report states that the Niassa District administrative office constructed 55 schools, 68 primary healthcare centres, 46 wells, six houses for *régulos* and six militia bases in 1969. In addition, 950 contos were spent to provide food, clothes and teaching materials for those “recovered”.¹⁸³ In order to improve the standard of education, 84 public schools were built all over Niassa. As a result, the number of students increased 27-fold, from 149 in 1960 to 4,155 in 1969.¹⁸⁴ This indicates how the pressure of the war actually led the colonial authority to promote the social development of northern Mozambican villages.

As for the Catholic Church, a diocese was established in Vila Cabral in 1963 in order to convert locals to Catholicism. According to a report written by the governor, Melo Egidio, the catholic population in Maúá rapidly increased from 29,000 to 600,000 in just six years. This increase was closely related to the increased number of missionary schools, which rose from 225 to 385. Consequently, the number of students also increased, from 15,000 to 26,499.¹⁸⁵


A healthcare centre was set up in each district to provide a service to the residents.¹⁸⁶ However, one healthcare centre was unable to look after thousands of residents. Therefore, the local administrative office had to rely on the medical services provided by the Portuguese Armed Forces. In some cases, the medical care provided by the military service was better than the one provided by the local administration due to their abundance of equipment, medicine and skilled medical staff. It is not mentioned specifically in the governor’s report, but the active involvement of the Portuguese Armed Forces was essential in almost every sphere of social development, from the construction of *aldeamentos* and schools to the installation of wells. This was especially so in areas such as Maúá, which had been a “remote place” for so many years and which became a battlefield in the war.

According to Hipólito, the Portuguese army took more than 4,000 “detainees” and “surrenderers” to *aldeamentos* in eastern Niassa District between 1966 and 1968. The Portuguese army also constructed 47 *aldeamentos* and repaired five *aldeamentos* in Marrupa and Maúá during this period. The number of “natives” to whom the soldiers of the 1935th battalion gave assistance was 37,840 in stationed units and 66,724 in mobile units. Soldiers also distributed food and clothes to 120,000 people.¹⁸⁷

Hipólito stated that this kind of practical assistance was actually much more effective than “psycho-social actions” designed to change residents’ perceptions of the colonial authority.¹⁸⁸

The unsophisticated public does not learn from verbal communication but they instinctively know who really wants to help them ... There are numerous examples. A unit in Muhoco set up a permanent healthcare centre with a nurse and a stock of medicine. The army in Revia distributed clothes to the residents

Figure 30 Map of psychological vulnerability drawn by the Portuguese Armed Forces (Mar. 1969)



Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica, 2005:28.

(The location of Maúia added by the author)

of *aldeamentos* and gave daily meals to construction workers, women and children. Some soldiers gave two or three children food and education using their own money. Residents as well as the administrative staff were moved by such generosities.¹⁸⁹

A lull in the battle in Niassa District enabled the Portuguese Armed Forces to advance towards the centre of Mozambique. This meant that the Maúa administrative office was no longer able to rely on support from the Portuguese army. To compensate, the administration started to organise the militia.

Construction of aldeamentos and the "Africanisation" of the defence


In Maúa, *aldeamentos* were constructed from November 1967 to February 1968 and, contradicting the report by Hipólito, only one *aldeamento* was established in each of Revia, Muhoco and Maúa Sede (Melo Egidio).¹⁹⁰

When Maúa Circumscription was newly created after Maúa Administrative Post was separated from Marrupa Circumscription in 1966, the construction of *aldeamentos* became one of the most important tasks for the new circumscription. However, even the Portuguese Armed Forces doubted the ability of the administrative office to control residents and openly predicted that the administrative office would not even be able to complete the registration of residents without the help of the army.¹⁹¹ Despite these reservations, according to the Situação de Forças Administrativa (Situation of Administrative Forces) compiled by the Maúa administrative office, as of October 1971 there were 15 *aldeamentos* in Maúa Sede, accommodating 32,574 people; nine in Nipepe, with 46,996 people and one in Revia, with 1,183 people.¹⁹²

However, again it became apparent later on that these figures were greatly exaggerated. On 10 December 1971, the governor of Niassa ordered the administrator of Maúa to submit detailed photographs of each *aldeamento*. He received a reply saying that there was actually nobody living in the *aldeamentos* in Maúa Sede.¹⁹³ After investigating the situation with the *régulos* and *chefes*, the administrator reported to the governor that residents had already moved out of the *aldeamentos* and were living in nearby areas growing crops. He cited one of the reasons for residents' resistance as being due to the poor condition of the soil near the *aldeamentos*.¹⁹⁴ However, this sequence of events does suggest that when the governor of Niassa declared the construction of *aldeamentos* as being complete, the residents had in fact already left there and moved to a new area or back to the area they used to live in.

Similar incidents happened in areas outside of Maúa. The *aldeamento* policy was seriously implemented in both Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts where the main battles were fought during the liberation war. Although residents were very much against the policy, it was very difficult for them to actively protest as they feared being accused of, and punished for, subversion. Therefore it was with the reluctant cooperation of the residents that the colonial authority and the Portuguese Armed Forces constructed *aldeamentos*.

Figure 31 War situation in Maúia (30 Sept. 1968 – 30 Mar. 1970)



AHMoçambique, A28.

(Some spellings corrected by the author)

However, similarly to what happened in Maúia Sede, the residents in both districts moved out immediately after construction was completed. Where this was not possible, the residents' frustration escalated so that it became difficult for the local authority to ignore the situation. José Alberto Gomes de Melo Branquinho gave the following warning to the colonial authority:

The purpose of *aldeamento* should be to help local residents. Residents who were taken into the Marrupa *aldeamento* went hungry because the food given was not sufficient. That is why they went to Maúia in search for food ... We have learnt from the example of the Montepuez that the traditional rules should be respected when we build *aldeamentos*. We have to follow their traditional politics. People ran away because they were not allowed to live in the territory of their *régulo*. However, it is more likely that their action was motivated by their unhappiness about the way that the *aldeamentos* were constructed, rather than by the influence of their relationship with FRELIMO. ... *Aldeamentos* are absolutely necessary but they do fuel the frustration of people in the areas where violent uprising had not been experienced. First,

psycho-social operations have to be carried out in each village so that local leaders will understand the benefit of *aldeamentos*. One should especially try to convince women that it will benefit their sons. These women will naturally persuade men.¹⁹⁵ (*Underlined by the author*)

It is uncertain how many local administrators took heed of the advice of Branquinho, the so-called expert on Makhuwa's traditional social structure. Certainly it would seem that the construction of *aldeamentos* did not progress in places other than Revia and Muhoco. The governor of Niassa and senior military officers blamed this failure on Maúá administrative office's incompetence but the reality was not that simple. Strong resistance from residents also contributed to its failure. In addition, the departure of the Portuguese Armed Forces from Niassa at the end of 1968 worked against the implementation of the policy.

Nevertheless, the construction of *aldeamentos* became an important issue once again as FRELIMO revitalised its activity in Niassa in 1972 and actively wooed residents. The residents in northern Maúá were forced to construct *aldeamentos*. What did residents think of the forced construction? Amance Alumuchare, a woman from northern Maúá where the battle was most fierce, fled from one of FRELIMO's liberated zones, and Amani Singano, a man from the same area, explain their experiences and views on *aldeamento*.

I didn't like *aldeamento*. It was very noisy with drunken people, the sound of drums and young people. There was only one entrance, which a militiaman guarded. Diseases spread easily as we were crammed inside. There was no toilet and flies were swarming over *cima* [staple diet]. Everybody fell ill. There was only one nurse at the healthcare centre. We had no wells, and the water had to be collected from a tank. Life was hard but nobody escaped. Everybody was scared. One couldn't revolt alone.¹⁹⁶

I really felt the war when I was put in the *aldeamento*. We started to live with people from other groups. *Tropa* was near the road. Even though we had a school, it was as if we were living in prison, surrounded by steel wire. We needed a permit to go outside. In the evening, the militia came to interrogate us.¹⁹⁷

Aldeamentos were constructed annexed to military facilities, and people were forced to live inside the fortified zone. Harassment against women by the militia became frequent and problematic.

However, after enduring life in the *mato* for a long time, people of Revia surrendered to the colonial authority one after the other from 1967 onwards and started to live in an *aldeamento* next to army barracks. Asuema Ncumba, a mother who lost many children during life in the *mato*, expresses herself as follows:

When we became ill, we were treated at the army post. We used to have a school but it was destroyed in the war. The Portuguese rebuilt it. Children went to school and some even finished primary school. War. The colonial rule. But I enjoyed [the life in the *aldeamento*].¹⁹⁸

Some from Revia at first adjusted positively to life in the *aldeamento*, probably because they arrived at the *aldeamento* after having endured the terrible hardships of living in the forest for such a long time. However once settled, there was a constant stream of people who tried to escape from the *aldeamento*. Many could not stand the cramped living conditions, food shortages, cultural friction and constant surveillance. The Portuguese Armed Forces stationed in Revia reported on 9 April 1968 that many residents were planning to escape due to severe food shortages.¹⁹⁹ After investigating the matter, Lopes Junior, an assistant to the administrator of Maúa Circumscription, reported that the area surrounding the *aldeamento* was not suitable for agriculture and that residents were very frustrated because they were not allowed to go to a more suitable area, 15 kilometres away from the *aldeamento*, to grow crops.

He also reported that the problem was exacerbated by “ethnic differences” amongst residents. At the time of the investigation, there were more than 1,000 residents in the *aldeamento*. The overwhelming majority were Makuwa-Mettos, but there were also 31 Yaos, including one adult male, and 85 Makuwa-Xirimas, including 13 adult males.²⁰⁰

All the Macua-Chirima [Makuwa-Xirima] belong to Régulo Muhuela, but they don't have traditional authorities among them. They are still in the *mato*. Therefore, these people want to go to their relation, the current Régulo Muela who lives in the northern Maúa Sede. They want to have “soup cooked by their family.” Chirimas [Xirimas] believe that they are superior to Metos [Mettos]. It is unbearable for them to be under the chief of the Metos [Mettos]. That's why they secretly go to Maúa.²⁰¹

The statements documented above suggest that material factors, such as facilities and food, did not automatically guarantee the success of *aldeamentos*. As Branquinho conveyed, the *aldeamento* policy needed to incorporate traditional politics. Responding to the report from Lopes Junior, the governor of Niassa gave permission to move Yaos to Revia Administrative Post. Yaos were feared most by the colonial authority as they had the longest history of fighting against colonial rule and their supreme chief Mataka was allied with FRELIMO. A few days after giving permission to move Yaos, the Niassa District office sent the Maúa Administrative Post a circular document regarding psycho-social action on “Ajaua Ethnie (Yaos)” and asked for its cooperation in the implementation of this action.²⁰²

In the latter period of the liberation war, the colonial authority in Niassa sought effective ways to control and to persuade residents to remain on their side and started to employ careful measures that would not aggravate the frustration of residents. Since the scale of the Portuguese Armed Forces stationed in Maúa was greatly reduced at this time, the colonial

administration office had to take the initiative and explore non-military measures.

FRELIMO guerrillas started to reappear in Maúá in 1969. The governor of Niassa reported that there were 400 attacks in one year, targeting supply routes and *aldeamentos*.²⁰³ However, he also stated that the military situation remained stable at this time, despite the efforts of FRELIMO to de-stabilise things.

It was the African militia that provided this stability. They became responsible for defending *aldeamentos* together with the “traditional authorities”. Originally, the militia soldiers and guards were allocated to each administrative post, but as the number of guards was limited, the number of militiamen had to be increased to enforce the defence of villages and control residents. The number of civilian soldiers was already substantially increased from 1966 to 1968; however, each administrative post was allowed to hire an additional 50 or more militiamen in 1969.²⁰⁴

Eight years had passed since elementary schools were constructed in Maúá. This led to an increase in the number of Africans who received an elementary education and understood Portuguese. However, having an elementary education did not give them much needed employment opportunities, other than becoming a teacher. This is why many young people chose to join the militia, which provided a salary.²⁰⁵ After being trained, they were dispatched to different *aldeamentos* and worked with traditional authorities and guards.

On 31 October 1971, 15 guards, 166 operational militiamen (*militia de intervenção*, literally, “militia of intervention”) and 538 defence militiamen (*guarda militar*) were deployed in Maúá where the total population was 46,996.²⁰⁶ This translates into nearly 1.5 per cent of the total population being involved in the defending of *aldeamentos* and being employed by the colonial authority. As this figure does not include the number of people who became Portuguese army soldiers, it can be extrapolated that the ratio of males who became militiamen was very high. Looking at different areas in Maúá, Muhoco had the highest number of “defenders”. At Aldeamento Muhoco, where 1,016 people lived, 15 operational militiamen, 50 defence militiamen and one guard were deployed.²⁰⁷ At two *aldeamentos* in Muela (Mwapula), one guard, five operational militiamen and 15 defence militiamen were stationed. At Aldeamento Revia, one guard, 15 operational militiamen and 20 defence militiamen were stationed. These militiamen occasionally accompanied the Portuguese military operations (especially operational militiamen), but their main task was to collect intelligence within *aldeamentos*.

While many educated young men were employed as “defenders” by the colonial authority from the end of the 1960s, others worked at the Portuguese army posts in order to earn cash. Carlos Jaimo, the current Mwene Muela, talks of his experience:

I started school in 1965 when the first public school was built in northern Maúá [Mwapula]. I was 15. I couldn't go to the Catholic school because I didn't have money. There were 40 students in the school and I was the oldest. I went to school for three years and then worked at the laundry in an army post in Maúá. I worked there for six years and earned money.²⁰⁸

Bicassi Xiwamba from Revia, who later volunteered to join the Grupo Especial (GE: Special Group) speaks of his experience:

I fled to the *mato* when FRELIMO came to Revia. Within a year, I was captured by *tropa*. I started to work as a soldier at the army barracks in Revia. After three years, I was told that something called GE would be set up and I volunteered. The salary of GE was high and we were supplied a uniform with emblems on its shoulders.²⁰⁹

Many young men from Maúá joined the Portuguese Armed Forces following its “Africanisation” policy. The following is an account by Matias Mussondiwa from the Nekutho group, who later became a rural guard.

I started school in 1961. I went to school until 1964 and finished fifth grade. Then I started to work as a waiter for the commander at the army post in Maúá. I earned 35 escudos monthly, which was a lot. In 1968, the commander told me to join the Portuguese army. I was sent to Nampula and received training for six months. After I was sworn to the Portuguese flag, I was attached to a company in Muhoco and when I completed my duty in 1971, I finally came back to Nekutho. All demobilised soldiers were supposed to become *polícia miliciano* [military policeman] but I refused. Others became military policemen for money. But in 1972, the Maúá administrator summoned me. He told me that I had been ordered to become *guarda rural* [rural guard]. I had to receive training again and was posted to an *aldeamento* in Maúá in 1973.²¹⁰

“Africanisation” by the colonial authority not only meant using ordinary people for military purposes but also using former FRELIMO guerrillas for spying and military activities. As discussed earlier, the destruction of Gungunhana Base, the largest base in Niassa, was only possible because of the “betrayal” of a former FRELIMO commander. Administrative archives in 1969 describe in detail how a militia commander, an ex-FRELIMO guerrilla, tried to persuade his former colleagues and brothers to surrender to the colonial authority.²¹¹ Later his colleagues were surprised to learn that the ex-guerrilla was earning 7,000 escudos monthly working for PIDE – in other words he was far from being punished. This kind of story seemed to have persuaded some FRELIMO guerrillas to surrender to the colonial authority.

A similar operation was attempted in Revia. A PIDE official who was stationed in Nova Freixo (presently Cuamba) recommended to the Maúá administrator the following measures to handle surrendered FRELIMO guerrillas:

The FRELIMO guerrillas currently in Aldeamento Revia should be left there so that they would influence their former colleagues. To control the residents,

the guerrillas have spread the rumour that the surrendered will be killed. If the residents know that the guerrillas are alive, they will realise that the rumour is untrue.²¹²

The fact that many former FRELIMO guerrillas worked for the colonial authority has been well documented in the administrative and military reports regarding Maúa. Many former guerrillas were described as “currently militiaman” or “currently soldier”. Bicassi Xiwamba, a former GE member from Revia, stated that most of his colleagues were ex-guerrillas even in GE, a specially trained African counter-guerrilla unit.²¹³ The opening essay of the FRELIMO bulletin in 1972 includes the following comment by the Central Committee:

Special importance was attached to the definition of who is the enemy. Owing to the fact that the Portuguese colonialists instituted a system of direct administration and exploitation in Mozambique, the people naturally tend to identify colonialism with the Portuguese, the white man, and to apply this concept generally to all Portuguese, to all whites. However, FRELIMO’s popular and revolutionary line is opposed to this generalisation and defines the enemy not on the basis of race or national origins, but rather on behaviour. From the very outset, FRELIMO has maintained that our enemies are not persons of white colour, or of Portuguese origin, or any other nationality, but all those persons, white or black, Mozambican nationals or foreigners, who are opposed to our ideals of freedom and total independence.²¹⁴ (*Underlined by the author*)

Prior to this, the bulletin attempted a definition of the enemy and urged “not to hesitate to shoot black militiamen, soldiers or policemen.”²¹⁵ However, these African militiamen and soldiers did not necessarily become the collaborators of colonialism, dedicating their “hearts and minds” to the colonial authority. For example, there was a case where militiamen, who were deployed to defend the Nihava group, went to the FRELIMO base near Revia and became guerrillas.²¹⁶

In sum, during this time many people were pressurised one way or the other into making decisions that they did not always understand, or had no choice but to make for their own survival and the survival of their families. For instance, people living in Maúa after 1968 under colonial rule were obliged to play a certain role for the colonial authority. Traditional authorities were not an exception.

“Traditional authorities”

The complex interaction between FRELIMO and the traditional authorities during the liberation war has been prolifically discussed from many different angles – for instance Christian Geffrey’s argument discussed in the introduction. The post-conflict FRELIMO government also conducted a study on the role of traditional authorities in the process

of democratisation.²¹⁷ To date, the main debate has been whether or not the traditional authorities were “colonial collaborators”, thus “anti-FRELIMO”. However, there has not been enough empirical research to answer this question.

During the liberation war, both FRELIMO and the colonial authority criticised each other’s “terrorism against the traditional authorities” and used it for their respective propaganda campaigns. It is noteworthy that the SCCIM (Information Centralisation and Coordination Service in Mozambique), as early as 25 January 1965, urged each local administrative office to tell traditional authorities that FRELIMO was killing *régulos*.²¹⁸

As far as *Maúá* is concerned, the role of the traditional authority was strategically very important during the war. Both the colonial authority and FRELIMO tried, in many different ways, to capitalise on their relationship with it and failed. For instance, the colonial authority constantly mistrusted traditional authorities and did not hesitate to torture and imprison them if they had any suspicion, justified or not, that they were involved in “subversive” activity. FRELIMO, on the other hand, tried to form an alliance with traditional authorities and then, when this was not possible, accused them of being “collaborators”. In other words, both sides perceived traditional authorities as a “threat” and as “collaborators”. For both, the traditional authority was the key that had the potential to connect them with local communities and held the power to manoeuvre people for or against them.

The so-called “traditional authority” was not a monolithic group, but what it actually meant varied, depending on the time, the place and the group, especially after colonial rule was established. Taking *Maúá* as an example, some traditional authorities went to the FRELIMO side and others remained under colonial rule. Some became FRELIMO guerrillas and others became militia commanders. Some were sent to prison and others were given concrete-built houses. Some became *Makhuwa* chiefs in the “liberated zones” and others nearly starved to death in the *Miombo* forest and escaped to Tanzania. Some stepped on mines set up by FRELIMO, and others were executed by the PIDE.

There were nearly 60 traditional village communities in *Maúá*. Based on interviews conducted in 1997, 1999 and 2002, the next section examines the various situations that traditional authorities found themselves in, and how they responded to the situation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, in *Maúá*, *régulos* and *chefes*, who were entrusted with the role of administrative officers by the colonial authority, and *mwenes* (traditional chiefs) were in most cases the same people. This was due both to the late introduction of colonial administrative structures as well as to the late intervention by the colonial authority in the area. In other areas, especially in *Moçambique* District, there were cases where the colonial authority removed the traditional chiefs that opposed it and put in place a person who was more sympathetic towards them as *régulo* or *chefe*.²¹⁹ In these cases, the person chosen as *régulo* or *chefe* was not called *mwene* since he did not hold traditional legitimacy. Often behind the scenes, the group members secretly maintained either the former *mwene* or a new *mwene* chosen in the traditional way. In some cases, they deliberately sent a person of slave origin to the administrative office for the position of *régulo* and *chefe*.²²⁰

It created conflict and chaos in the group when two leaders, one chosen by the colonial authority (*régulo* or *chefe*) and the other chosen traditionally by residents (*mwene*) co-existed.

Traditionally, when there were conflicting factions in a group and they could not find a way to solve the problem, one group branched out and moved away from the main group.²²¹ Although there were many restrictions, there was always the possibility for anybody to become the first leader of a group, in other words a *mwene*. Nevertheless, even during the slave trade period, where violent conflicts among groups were frequent, these conflicts were contained between groups. Never, before the time of the liberation war, had there been a situation in which two *mwenes* existed within one group. Of course this did not necessarily mean that the colonial authority did not previously intervene in the selection of traditional authorities in Maúá. For example, after Muwa III was banished to an island on suspicion of being a German collaborator during the First World War, it was the colonial authority that played an active role in choosing Muwa IV. However, this turn of events was relatively rare and due to Maúá's remoteness, the traditional authorities were mostly left to their own devices. On the whole when colonial rule was established, it did not intervene as long as the traditional chiefs performed their assigned tasks as *régulos* or *chefes*, such as collecting tax, forcing group members to grow cotton and organising forced labour.

So, the situation regarding the traditional chiefs in Maúá just before the liberation war can be generalised as follows: (1) the same person performed the role of *mwene* as well as that of *régulo* or *chefe*, unlike other areas that had two authorities and (2) unlike other areas where *régulos* and *chefes* functioned as colonial supporters, those in Maúá could still exercise their authority over group members to some extent. One can therefore extrapolate that in 1966 when the liberation war reached Maúá, the traditional authorities were still legitimate in the eyes of the residents of this area, and would have had a strong influence over their groups. This probably enabled traditional authorities all over northern Mozambique to create strong networks amongst themselves.

It is highly likely that these networks became the base of the "subversion" network of prominent local figures, which was exposed and crushed in November 1966. It is not yet clear who in Maúá were involved and how, but the involvement of the following traditional authorities has been suggested: Mwene (Régulo) Revia and his subordinate *mwenes*; Mwene Muhuela and his subordinates; Mwene (Régulo) Nekutho; Mwene (Régulo) Nipepe and his subordinate *mwenes*; Mwene Muhoco and other *mwenes* in Mount Txoncori. In particular, Figure 22 (*niphito*) illustrates, based on interviews by the author, the network of *mwenes*, and how this parallels the areas where the arrested prominent figures were from. It therefore strongly indicates the possibility that Maúá's traditional authorities actively participated in "subversion" against colonial rule in Marrupa from 1961 to 1966, as testified by the ringleader Sargene. However, of course, the relationship between Maúá's traditional authorities and FRELIMO differed from person to person and it was only until March 1966 that the traditional authorities were able to act on their own initiative.

The following is the examination of the actions of these traditional authorities, based on primary source information and the interviews by the author, keeping in mind cultural background (Chapter 2) and the development of the war in Maúá (Chapter 5).

a. (Régulo) Mwene Revia: Revia Administrative Post

There were five reasons why FRELIMO set up its first military base in the territory of Régulo Revia.²²² First, since it was situated at the southern end of the Mataka corridor, it was easy for FRELIMO guerrillas to contact the local residents without alerting the colonial authority. Second, the area included the *niphito* with Cabo Delgado as its centre and had active interaction with residents around Marrupa where the “subversion” was planned. Third, *mwenes* in this area were Makhwa-Metto who were particularly antagonistic towards colonial rule following their uprising against it and the execution of their *mwene*, Revia I. Fourth, residents believed that the beginning of colonial rule was the beginning of a “bad world”. Therefore, they thought that if colonial rule ended, they could go back to a “good world”. Fifth, the Revia group actively interacted with various groups as the area was situated on the slave trade route and the border with Yao habitations. All above conditions worked favourably in connecting the Revia group and FRELIMO.

However, all of the above does not automatically imply that Revia, the *mwene*, was an unwavering supporter of FRELIMO. He was tolerant and supportive of it, but he did not necessarily accept life under FRELIMO. It can probably be assumed that Revia knew that FRELIMO would begin the war in his land one day but when he heard the first gunshot, he realised that it was the FRELIMO commander, not him, that took the initiative. It can be imagined that he felt extremely undermined. At the same time, he knew that staying in Revia would be dangerous for him and his people, as the Portuguese Armed Forces would attack them, identifying them as FRELIMO supporters. The only place that they could escape to was the Miombo forest where FRELIMO had a stronghold. Mwene Revia reluctantly decided to move there, apparently only after taking his son’s advice that this was the best option as at least FRELIMO would not kill them.

However, from the moment that Revia moved to the Miombo forest, he was no longer a *régulo*. He also lost his authority as a *mwene* because he could not fulfil his responsibility as a leader of his people since his decision to flee to the *mato* endangered their lives. One of a *mwene*’s important duties was to store food for emergencies, but he was unable to provide food for his starving people in the forest. His later escape to Tanzania with his family further embittered his people who were left behind in the forest.

Issa Mapira’s statement, “the escape to the Miombo forest was the decision of *mwene*, but he left us there,” reflects the feeling among his people.²²³ Abandoned by their *mwene*, people began distancing themselves from FRELIMO and instead surrendered to the Portuguese Armed Forces, particularly when the army changed its strategy and started to protect them instead of kill them.

Clearly, Mwene Revia was not a collaborator of the colonial forces or a FRELIMO supporter, he was merely at the mercy of his circumstances. In the end, the majority of his people surrendered to the colonial authority and lived in the *aldeamento* without a *mwene*. There they were pressured by the colonial authority to choose a new *régulo* and as a result Swabu was chosen. He was one of Mwene Revia’s sons from a different mother. However, Mwene Revia was still alive and it was forbidden for anybody else to become a *mwene* if the

current one had not died. Also, the secession was only possible from a brother to another brother, or an uncle to a maternal nephew in the Makhwua tradition. In the end, Swabu sent a message to Mwene Revia through people in the *mato* and was given permission to become “acting *mwene*” for the Revia group living in the *aldeamento*.

As this incident indicates, neither the war nor *aldeamentos* could prevent members of the Revia group living in different areas from interacting with each other. Both FRELIMO and the colonial authority used this informal communication network for their intelligence activities.

b. (Régulo) Mwene Muhuela: Revia Administrative Post

According to a former subordinate traditional chief, Mwene Muhuela (Muhuela I), the other *régulo* in Revia Administrative Post, became a keen FRELIMO supporter. After leading his people to the Msawissi base, he went to Tanzania with FRELIMO guerrillas.²²⁴ Mwene Muhuela dispatched his nephew to a group of relatives in Maúa Administrative Post with the task of convincing them to come over to the FRELIMO side. However, the nephew was arrested by the Portuguese army in northeast Maúa in April 1967.²²⁵


c. (Régulo) Mwene Muela: Maúa Administrative Post

Mwene Muela and his group lived in Maúa Administrative Post before the Second World War. They moved to the *mato*, in the Yao settlement, situated in the north of Revia (currently Majune District), in order to escape forced cotton growing.²²⁶ Angered by this illegal action by the residents, the chief of Maúa Administrative Post tried to force them back, but it was impossible to bring the large number of residents back. In the end, Muela II went back to Maúa with his closest family and left his brother as Muhuela I in Majune.²²⁷ This probably happened sometime in the 1950s.²²⁸

Interaction between two groups was frequent even though they lived in separate circumscriptions. Muhuela’s nephew, who was arrested by the colonial authority, was the son of Muela III, and he used to live in Muela’s territory in Maúa Administrative Post, not in Revia where the Muhuela group settled.²²⁹ It was natural that after becoming a keen FRELIMO supporter and taking all of his people to FRELIMO’s side, Muhuela I tried to persuade the Muela group in Maúa to join them.

Also, this is why the Muhuela group begged to rather be sent to Mwene Muela in Maúa when they were about to be sent to the *aldeamento* in Revia. The majority of the residents in the *aldeamento* in Revia were from the Revia group, and were thus Makhwua-Mettos. It must have been hard to tolerate living under “Régulo Revia” (the son of Mwene/Régulo Revia) who was not legitimate in the traditional sense. Without waiting for permission from the colonial authority, the Muhuela group endangered their lives in order to reach Mwene/Régulo Muela in Maúa. They arrived in February 1969.²³⁰ The colonial authority, which strictly observed the boundary between administrative divisions, ordered them

Figure 32 Family connection between Mwene Mwapula and Mwene Muela



Lived with the Muhueda group and became a FRELIMO guerrilla, but caught by the colonial authority and confessed.

to go back. In the end the Muhuela group went missing.²³¹ An assistant chief of Maúia Circumscription treated this matter as an “ethnic problem” and urged the governor of Niassa District to be more considerate to the group, but the reality was more complicated. The bond between groups had been forged over many years and it was not confined to their geographical locations (village communities, *régulo* territories or administrative divisions).

By 1964, Muela III had passed away and Mwehiva, the nephew from the maternal line, succeeded him as Muela IV.²³² Although the colonial authority was suspicious of his relationship with FRELIMO, in 1967 he was also praised as a model *régulo*, loyal to the colonial authority. In fact, the 1935th battalion reported how the *régulo* exercised his authority over the residents and actively cooperated with the army at a meeting held in his territory on 10 March 1969.²³³ However, Muela IV, praised as a model *régulo* and trusted as a militia commander, suddenly disappeared one evening. The Muela Council of Elders explained that Muela IV was captured by the PIDE and died in the prison in Lichinga.²³⁴ What then happened to this model *régulo* Muela?

The initial reason why the Portuguese Armed Forces came to Muela in March 1969 was to investigate the disappearance of 51 residents from Regulado Muela (in fact, they were from the Mwapula group, but the group lived under the rule of Régulo Muela). Seventeen of them surrendered to a detached force in Mwapula on 28 February. Administrative officers as well as the Portuguese army came to Régulo Muela to investigate the incident. At the same time, Emília Manhungua from the Mwapula group, who later became a FRELIMO guerrilla, stated that Muela IV had frequent contact with FRELIMO.²³⁵

Her statement illuminates the other side of Muela IV, a loyal *régulo* who helped the colonial authority to investigate the disappearance of the residents. It was naturally difficult to ask about this politically sensitive matter when speaking to the Muela group.²³⁶ Therefore, the author obtained further information from the neighbouring Mwapula group.

d. (Chefe) Mwene Mwapula

Mwene Mwapula had assumed the position of *mwene* before the liberation war. Having this seniority and his kinship with the Muela family, he acted as a proxy when Régulo Muela was absent. Together with Régulo Muela, he was a traditional chief as well as a lowest-ranking colonial officer in the northern Maúia Sede area. As discussed earlier, many of the Mwapula group were recruited by FRELIMO. Mwene Mwapula explains the situation as follows:

It was just before the start of the cotton campaign that I became *mwene*. One day, the eldest brother went fishing in Luluxi River and was captured by FRELIMO. He was sent to the Nachingea base. After becoming a FRELIMO guerrilla, he went to the Msawissi base. One evening, he came back to Mwapula and took 50 people including my mother, my aunt, my wife and children. That was the first time. Myself and other *mwenes* were imprisoned

in Marrupa for six months as punishment. Only three were released and were able to go back home.²³⁷

It was probably during the incident of January 1969, mentioned earlier, that Mwene Mwapula's family was taken away.²³⁸ Mwene Mwapula was imprisoned on suspicion of his involvement in the incident but was later released, probably due to insufficient evidence. Mwene Mwapula continues:

FRELIMO came again but this time, it was Anihunde [an uncle of Régulo Muela]. The administrative chief found out about it.²³⁹ Sipaio Vaquiwa gathered traditional chiefs. Each of them searched for Anihunde carrying weapons in their hands. I think Mwene Muela was suspected, as there was no evidence that his weapon was used. PIDE took Muela to Lichinga [Vila Cabral] by car. I assume he was decapitated there.²⁴⁰

PIDE captured Muela IV on suspicion of sheltering his uncle. He has been missing ever since. Vaquiwa himself explains:

Régulo Muela was sent to Lichinga [Vila Cabral] from Marrupa because he hid Samora Machel. We didn't trust him.²⁴¹

Chefe/Mwene Mwapula, sensing his life was in danger, opted to go to FRELIMO rather than waiting to be killed in Marrupa. He decided on this action after his brother, who became a FRELIMO guerrilla, and his mother visited him. Later Mwene Mwapula, no longer *chefe*, became the chief of all the Makhuwas in FRELIMO's central base in Mataka (Mavago).²⁴²

This illustrates that *régulos* and *chefes*, who were thought to be cooperating with the colonial authority, were in fact not necessarily loyal to them. They kept in contact with FRELIMO guerrillas from their groups as well as with residents under FRELIMO control. From the outset of the establishment of colonial rule, this dual role-playing was characteristic of the traditional authorities and *régulos*. Vaquiwa, a Makhuwa-Xirima who became a *sipaio* and later a militia commander, was familiar with this trait amongst the traditional authorities, and as a result did not trust any *régulos*. It was due to this awareness of the traditional authorities' dual roles that many *chefes* and *régulos* were sent to jail or were beaten to death, as in the case of Mwene (Chefe) Ntepo.²⁴³

e. (Chefe) Mwene Muhoco

According to the colonial archives, Chefe Muhoco collaborated with FRELIMO and travelled with it to Tanzania.²⁴⁴ Mocha Penpena, a brother of Mwene Muhoco (Muhoco V), explains:

Muhoco IV (Methutxo) died in a hospital in Marrupa. His cousin from his mother's side, that is, my brother Nanxamira [also called Npasa] was chosen

as Muhoco V. However, as soon as he became [Mwene] Muhoco, he was sent for by a *mwene* in Revia. He met FRELIMO there. He couldn't come back here because the war started. That's why he went to Tanzania. He is still alive.²⁴⁵

One of the reasons why the Muhoco Council of Elders was not able to talk about the fate of Muhoco V during the author's interview was because he might be alive. As has already been discussed, it was traditionally taboo to choose a new *mwene* while the current one was alive, regardless of the circumstances. As long as the current *mwene* was alive, the group could only appoint a proxy. Accordingly, when the *mwene* was imprisoned in 1969, a representative of the Muhoco group introduced himself as "acting *mwene*".²⁴⁶

This was in fact not dissimilar to the colonial administrative law concerning the appointment of new *régulos*. However, in terms of traditional practice, the next *mwene* would not be chosen until the present *mwene* passed away, whereas the colonial administrative law provided that it was possible to appoint the next *régulo* as long as the present *régulo* was legally deposed. This enabled the colonial administrative officers to appoint a new *régulo* or *chefe* after deposing the previous one who either went to the FRELIMO side or was imprisoned due to their alleged connection with FRELIMO.

One of the oldest in the community and a *humu*, Bacar Caucha, and Mocha (the brother of Muhoco V) continue their story:

After Muhoco V went to Tanzania, Régulo Muwa was sent for because people needed a *mwene*. In the end, a *mwene* was chosen from an inferior family lineage because there was no suitable candidate from the legitimate family. Régulo Muwa chose the *mwene*. It was difficult because everybody wanted to be *mwene*. Some were even killed in the [internal] conflict.²⁴⁷

After Muhoco V went to Tanzania, Muhoco VI was chosen from a different family lineage from us [Muhoco V and Mocha]. Muhoco VII is a child of the sister of Muhoco VI. Therefore, Muhoco VI and VII are not members of our family lineage.²⁴⁸

These statements suggest that after the traditionally legitimate Muhoco V went to Tanzania, some of the family members followed him and the remaining family were not considered as candidates for the next Muhoco VI because they were suspected of being FRELIMO collaborators. Due to the traditional custom against choosing a new *mwene* while the current one was still alive, intervention of the highest authority, Régulo Muwa, became necessary. That Régulo Muwa chose a new Muhoco from an inferior family lineage created confusion in the community which continues today. A similar type of confusion arose in the Nipepe group, whose *mwene/régulo* was imprisoned by the colonial authority.

f. (Régulo) Mwene Nipepe and (chefe) *mwenes*

At the roundup of the “traditional authorities” in November 1966, all the *mwenes* (including the two *régulos*, Nipepe and Muluku) in Nipepe Administrative Post were imprisoned. According to PIDE documents, all the *chefes* under Régulo Muluku were sent to the Mabalane prison in the south of Mozambique.²⁴⁹

As well as creating turmoil among residents, this caused a problem for the administration in the area. It was recognised that it was necessary to have a traditional authority in order to control the residents. However, it was difficult to depose the present *chefes* and *régulos* until the investigation of PIDE was completed and their sentences determined.

The process took a long time. The governor of Niassa District grew impatient and, on 2 January 1968, urged PIDE in Vila Cabral to release those *chefes* who were most likely to be found innocent. Sentences were finally handed down on 13 December 1968.²⁵⁰ Ultimately, some of the *chefes* were pardoned and returned to their villages, but most were found guilty, were deposed and were not allowed to return to their villages.²⁵¹

Residents resisted the order from the colonial administrative office to choose new *mwenes* because their *mwenes* were still alive. However, they eventually succumbed to pressure from the colonial authority and selected new *régulos* and *chefes*.

Perhaps it was the effect of Branquinho’s recommendation discussed previously, but several *mwenes* who were imprisoned were later allowed to return – the acting *régulos* and *chefes* already in place.²⁵²

It is evident that the nature of traditional authorities in Nipepe Administrative Post changed dramatically before and after November 1966 and in some cases, a group had two *mwenes*.

The existence of two leaders in one community became one of the most enduring and serious problems for the Maúa residents. It often caused splits, with some of the community supporting FRELIMO and others the colonial authority. It was hard for all residents to compromise on the traditional idea of only replacing a *mwene* once he had passed away, but many succumbed as they did not really have the means and probably strength to resist the situation. As a result, they chose an “acting *mwene*” who would perform the role of “*régulo*” or “*chefe*” and informed the authority of their choice, as happened in Revia, Mwapula and Muhoco.

The “acting *mwene*” was often someone previously identified by the *mwene* from a number of candidates (nephews and young brothers from his maternal family line) to assist him. This allowed the group to maintain some unity and continuity during the absence of the *mwene*. However, the situation became complex when these legitimate acting *mwenes* passed away. Moreover, when there was no legitimate candidate, doubt was cast on the legitimacy of the next *mwene* or the acting *mwene*, as happened in the case of Muhoco and Mwapula.

In the case of Muela, following the *mwene*’s sudden disappearance one evening, the acting *mwene* was chosen and he functioned as *régulo*. However, the next Mwene Muela was chosen only after independence.²⁵³

g. (Régulo) Mwene Nekutho

In the case of the Nekutho group, legitimate succession was threatened when Lino Lemos, who was the assistant as well as the strongest candidate for the next Nekutho, became a FRELIMO guerrilla.

(Régulo) Mwene Nekutho was a Makhuwa-Metto, and all Nekutho traditional authorities were Muslim. However, after the first Catholic church in Marrupa area was built in Nekutho in 1940, many residents converted to Christianity and became *assimilados*. Many Africans who later worked as administrative officers and teachers were the graduates of the Maúa Missionary School in Nekutho. It is not clear whether they genuinely believed in Christianity, and many graduates were also involved in the Muslim movement in Marrupa in the 1960s. Upon his graduation from the Maúa Mission School, Lemos became a teacher in Revia and later a FRELIMO platoon leader. This suggests that the simple assumption that “Catholic school graduates are Christians and the supporters of the Portuguese colonial authority” is not necessarily accurate. As in many other areas, in Nekutho “white-feathered chickens” were also slaughtered in 1966.²⁵⁴ In interviews conducted by the author in 1999, the Nekutho Council of Elders explained that they killed chickens because they were “scared”. Some said because they “wanted to be free”.²⁵⁵ At last, the story of killing white-feathered chickens reached Nekutho and some followed suit. Probably, the network of “subversive” activity in Marrupa had spread to Nekutho by then. After all, Marrupa’s residents were predominantly Makhuwa-Metto, and so were those of Nekutho.

(Régulo) Mwene Nekutho (Nekutho VII) was arrested by the Maúa Administrative Post during the roundup of traditional authorities in 1966 and died suddenly in 1967.²⁵⁶ It is not clear how he died, but at the time of his death, Lemos, the chosen successor, was with FRELIMO. The chief of Maúa Administrative Post intervened in the selection of a successor. Background checks on Nekutho’s four sons were arranged but during the process the administration must have learned that a son was not eligible to be a *mwene*. In the end, a nephew of the late *mwene* from his maternal family line was chosen according to tradition. The colonial authority acknowledged that he was loyal towards them, though his quality as *mwene* was questioned when he tried to send women for training in the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Vitorino Amade and Valentim Limas Necuto, both close relations of the family of *mwenes* in Nekutho, claim that the current Nekutho is not a “*próprio*” (proper) *mwene*.²⁵⁷ In fact, Lino Lemos was still alive when his *sadaka* (funeral) was held during the liberation war. Amade believes that a priest from the Catholic Church lied about his death in order to avoid further accusations from the colonial authority that Lemos had become a FRELIMO commander as he had studied at a church school, implying that the church had sent him to Revia. The Nekutho group probably also decided that it would be better to treat the legitimate successor as dead.

The following description in *Boletim de Informação* clearly suggests the collaboration of the new *mwene* (Nekutho IX) with the colonial authority:

Six men from Nekutho voluntarily joined the “recovery” operation [of the Portuguese army]. They brought 29 residents [the recovered] back to Mwapula.²⁵⁸

Because the Nekutho habitations were located at the centre of the colonial administration, the group found it strategically important to maintain a good relationship with the colonial authority. Also, the new *mwene*, lacking in traditional legitimacy needed the support of the colonial rulers to maintain his authority. With an increasingly reinforced Portuguese army and tighter intelligence network, the lives of Nekutho people came under closer scrutiny and control. They were rarely able to take part in any anti-colonial activity. Even a younger brother of Nekutho IX became a colonial authority informant.²⁵⁹

h. (Régulo) Mwene Muwa

After the mass arrest of legitimate traditional authorities in 1966, the number of *régulos* and *chefes* who worked for the colonial authority was increased. Since Maúa Administrative Post and the headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces were in Maúa Sede, which was the *regulado* of Mwene Muwa, residents were under constant surveillance by the colonial authority. It is symbolic that the first administrative and military post in Maúa was established in 1907 in front of the grave of Muwa II, which was regarded as a sacred place. After Muwa IV was banished, successive *mwenes* became *régulos* and forged close relationships with the colonial authority.

Enforced cotton growing, introduced in Muwa VI’s reign, strengthened the *mwenes*’ role as *régulo*. Around this time, ten *régulos* (Muwa, Nekutho, Nipepe, Hamela, Vatiwa, Muluku, Muela, Vahiwa, Revia and Muhuela) travelled around on palanquins and performed the role of subcontractors of the colonial authority. These *régulos* were responsible for each *regulado*, and they were all treated equally, even though, traditionally, Mwene Muwa was the highest-ranking chief. That the first *mwenes* of Nipepe, Vahiwa and Hamela were the sons of the first Mwene Muwa, defined the relationships of the following generations – Muwa was always acknowledged as the “father” of other *mwenes*, and thus more superior, regardless of age.

Some of the reasons as to why the colonial authority deliberately treated African chiefs equally despite their obvious hierarchy have been detailed in Chapter 2. The colonial authority dismissed complicated politics in African society as “tribal politics” and instead tried to impose what they thought was more effective. However, once the liberation war started, it became necessary for the colonial authority to pay more attention to traditional political relationships in the local community. Detailed studies on local affairs and subsequent recommendations, like those of Branquinho, made the colonial authority more aware of the importance of the traditional role of Mwene Muwa as the “supreme chief”. However, as the political system of the Makhuwa society was decentralised, Mwene Muwa did not necessarily have political power, despite being recognised as the legitimate highest-ranking traditional authority.

Wearing a red beret (the colour red is the symbol of *mwene* while a beret symbolises Portugal), Eusébio Malico, who became Muwa VII in 1971, described the situation during the liberation war:

Many people escaped from Txoncori and Mwapula. They were escaping from FRELIMO. *Tropa* were stationed at the back of the administrative office and patrolled the area all the time. The administrator and the representatives from the government told us at meetings, "Work hard to grow cotton and maize. Capture thieves and strangers and bring them to the authority. Make children study with the priests." I asked them to build a house for me because the *régulo* in Marrupa had his house built of concrete. I was happy that I was given everything I asked for.²⁶⁰

Military archives disclose that FRELIMO set traps near the house of Régulo Muwa several times.²⁶¹ In September 1970, the inspector who toured the territory of Régulo Muwa, replied to a request from the *régulo* in a meeting as follows:

I will report all to the government. A concrete-built house is needed for Régulo Muwa. Weapons should urgently be supplied in order to keep peace in the Maúa area. If there is anybody who encourages others to stray from the right path, this person should be caught and handed to the authority. Everybody should pay the utmost respect to *régulos* and other authorities.²⁶²

The above suggests that both FRELIMO and the colonial authority tried to use traditional authorities in Maúa during the liberation war. The confusion created regarding the traditional authorities during the liberation war caused contradictions and political issues in each community and much bitterness among residents. These problems continued after independence.

It also became apparent that the colonial authority tried to understand the complex relationship between traditional authorities and the local society, so as to better utilise this knowledge in their campaign to win the hearts and minds of the residents. In this regard, on 19 November 1968 the SCCIM requested all administrative offices to report on current relationships among all the traditional authorities in the region.²⁶³

On the other hand, FRELIMO tried to ally with traditional authorities by means of persuasion. However, it became extremely difficult to have contact with them after November 1966 when the colonial authority tightened its control of them in Maúa. The outcome of the difference in approach will be discussed further below.

"Prominent local figures"

In addition to traditional authorities, the names of males who were close to them (e.g. assistants, advisors, sons and brothers) frequently appear in colonial archives. They were

believed to have been actively involved in FRELIMO because the *regedoria* system gave authority only to *mwenes* and their successors. Even though they were traditionally noblemen (*nethi*), they were not allowed to form a separate group under colonial rule, nor could they improve their status in the community.²⁶⁴ This was especially so for the sons of a *mwene*. They could not succeed their father as a *mwene* but were placed under their cousins (the sons of paternal aunts) who were legitimate *mwene* candidates due to the matrilineal nature of the Makuwas. Also, their status in the community may have been low, depending on the status of their mother's family, especially her brothers.

Furthermore, the forced cotton growing policy that established requirements for each household unit, reduced the importance of the "extended family" (*erukulu*) based on the maternal uncle and instead husband-and-wife based households and father-and-son relationships became more important.²⁶⁵ The more cotton a household produced, the more income it received. This new situation affected the power balance within the community.

Missionary work by the Catholic Church and the introduction of primary education also contributed to changes in traditional village community life. The Catholic Church promoted monogamy and a family unit with a married couple at its centre, and encouraged primary education with the intention of converting people to Christianity.

Education provided by the church brought new opportunities for the sons of *mwenes*. They could work towards the promise of a new status and financial security under the colonial system. The colonial authority also urgently needed local people who were capable of working in the expanding administrative system and was keen to support prominent local and powerful figures. The education of these local figures was further accelerated when church schools were built next to the houses of *régulos*.

Young people educated in church schools left their communities and obtained jobs such as teachers, foremen in cotton companies and interpreters at administrative offices. Some became "collaborators" of the colonial authority while others maintained a close observation of it, resented it and eventually joined FRELIMO. Joaquim Baptista Sargene, Lino Lemos and Adamo (full name unknown) were examples of the latter.

The colonial authority began to actively investigate these potentially influential people and their sons in order to better understand them. On 27 December 1968, Hipólito, the commander of the 1935th Artillery Battalion, asked the Maúa administrative office to provide him with information on the "leader" of the region, if there was such a person.²⁶⁶

The acting administrator replied:

There is nobody who could be called a leader in this circumscription ... However, there are individuals who represent the general opinion because of their role in their tribes or in the [colonial] administration. We cannot guarantee that they are on our side to unite the nation. As has happened in other areas, our assumptions may turn out to be wrong. Still, we believe these individuals are useful to us because of their above-mentioned roles and the privilege they enjoy among the natives. Should they receive good education to help them become completely loyal to our nation and politics, they will

influence people around them and guide them towards our side. However, among traditional authorities, *regedors (régulos)* that have been appointed by law as representatives of the administrative structure, cannot be called “leaders.” They work to carry out orders from the administration and to improve the relationship between the government and their people. This kind of authority does not inspire people and is only capable of giving orders, instructions and suggestions.²⁶⁷ (*Underlined by the author*)

This statement is noteworthy because here an administration officer openly admitted that *régulos* and *chefes* did not “inspire people” in Maúá as of 1969. In other words, people did not fully acknowledge their authority. This supports the author’s argument that, following the mass arrest of November 1966 and the subsequent loss of legitimate *mwenes* by imprisonment, execution or escape to the FRELIMO side, and although *régulos* and *chefes* held official positions, real leadership was lost.

Although the acting administrator said that there were no leaders in Maúá, he did name 15 important local figures. The list includes interpreters and five town councillors, as well others mentioned in this book such as Régulo Muwa, Régulo Vahiwa, Régulo Muela, Chefe Munhanli, Chefe Jaiane [Iaiane], Chefe Nantole, José Maurício, Sancho Afia Amisse and Alberto Vaquiwa (the last three were militia commanders).²⁶⁸ All of them had close relationships with the colonial administration.

a. Sancho Afia Amisse, militia commander

Sancho Afia Amisse was a son of Muwa IV’s brother. He is one of three men who were sent from Maúá to Macau (also a colony of Portugal) as a soldier of the Portuguese Armed Forces from 1955 to 1956. Amisse is a close relative of the *mwene (nethi)* and regarded as an important person who knows much about the Muwa group. However, due to the matrilineal system, Amisse does not belong to the Muwa group, and therefore is not considered as having high status in the group. He explains the process of him becoming a *sipaio*:

There weren’t any other paid jobs [in Maúá], so I joined the army. After being discharged from the service, I worked in the field. Because I was able to use weapons, I took the job of a militia commander in the administrative office in Maúá Sede. I taught militiamen how to use weapons and how to march.²⁶⁹

Amisse remained in Maúá as a militia commander. His name is often mentioned in colonial documents because he was the only person from Maúá among the local staff in the administrative office and because his hereditary descent (his authority as a relative of Muwa) and his contacts and information were considered important. He was indispensable to the Maúá administrative office as an expert on the Maúá region, an experienced soldier who fought in Macau, a translator and a guide. He was known for his versatility.²⁷⁰ Consequently, he was considered as a “colonial collaborator” for a long time. However, at

the beginning of the liberation war, he became sympathetic towards FRELIMO:

The Portuguese publicised that FRELIMO were not black. They also said that blacks would not possess weapons. But when FRELIMO soldiers came to Maúia, we realised that they had weapons and they were black. Then, I thought I could surrender this land to FRELIMO because this is the land of black people.²⁷¹

b. Alberto Vaquiwa, another militia commander

The Catholic Church arrived later in Maúia than in other areas. The first church was established in 1940 when the Salazar government and the Vatican signed the agreement, *Curia Romana*. In order to provide Christian teaching and introductory education, it was necessary to engage an African Christian who could understand Portuguese as an assistant to the white priest. However, since the majority of people in Maúia were practitioners of the traditional religion and/or Muslim, there was no suitable person for this role. Alberto Vaquiwa, who later became a militia commander, took on this role:

I was born in Malema (upstream of Lúrio), Moçambique District, in 1922. After finishing the second year of the church school in 1944, I came to Maúia. My job was to wash the priest's clothes but I accompanied him whenever he went to villages. After establishing several churches in Maúia, I became a guard for the shop owned by a Portuguese called Raújo. As I was good at using guns, he gave me a uniform and paid me to patrol. The commander was Raújo's son and the head of the militia was a black person called Afia Amisse. I became his assistant.²⁷²

Vaquiwa's career reflects the situation of intelligent African young people in Mozambican villages towards the end of the liberation war. Together with Amisse, his versatile activities in the military, intelligence and administration are confirmed in the colonial documents. His work was recognised to the extent that he was presented to the governor-general of Mozambique. This indicates how important the defence of Maúia was for the security of the whole of Mozambique.

I was invited to Maputo [Lourenço Marques] in 1967. I went to the government-general and spoke to Governor-General. He praised my good work and promised me a medal after the war. When I came back, I was assigned to Revia. I was given a house in 1968.²⁷³

By then, Vaquiwa was regarded as a "hero" among the colonialists. He conducted several successful operations and persuaded residents of the *mato* to turn themselves over to the colonial authority without using force. However, like other African "collaborators", the

colonial authority did not necessarily fully trust him either. The report from the Nova Freixo (currently Cuamba) administrative office to the Maúá administrative office states that the Metarica administrative post had recommended that Vaquiwa be constantly watched.²⁷⁴

Significantly, people working for the colonial authority, and those people who took on the responsibility of “protecting” the villages, did not work together harmoniously, but they competed for the authority’s attention and continuously watched each other’s movements. This worked to the advantage of the colonial authority, creating a favourable environment for intelligence activities. Conversely, the competition between the traditional authorities and new types of authorities (militiamen, guards, soldiers) made life complicated and difficult for residents.

c. Teachers

Children of *régulos* and *chefes* who received education and young people who excelled at school worked as soldiers, policemen, guards, interpreters, guides and militiamen for the colonial authority. Some of them were motivated by the fact that Africans were fighting against the colonial authority in the Miombo forest. Lino Lemos and Joaquim Baptista Sargene were two such young men who participated actively in the movement against colonial rule between 1961 and 1966 although they had both previously worked for the colonial authority. The father of Pedro Baina, a former Maúá District administrator, was another.

According to Baina, his grandfather, the boss of Sancho Afia Amisse, a militia commander at Maúá Sede administrative office,²⁷⁵ was originally from Mwapula but immigrated to Tanzania with his family. He studied at a church school there and became a Catholic. After returning to Maúá, he sent his son to the Maúá Missionary School. Pedro Baina’s father obtained a teacher’s certificate and in 1955 started to teach at the school where he had studied until he was transferred to a school in Marrupa in 1959. In 1967, the family returned to Mwapula after the war’s effects began to be felt in Marrupa.²⁷⁶

Sargene, a leader of the “subversion” in Marrupa in 1966, was in fact a brother-in-law of Baina’s father. One day in 1970, while watching the Portuguese air force fly towards the north, Baina said that the Portuguese airplanes were going to fight against bandits (*bandidos*). The father became very angry, demanded to know where he learned such a word and hit him. Around 1972, Baina’s father often went to the nearby forest, hoping to be “captured” by FRELIMO.²⁷⁷ Even those who ostensibly collaborated with the colonial authority secretly sympathised with their African “brothers” who were fighting for independence. Mocha Penpena from Muhoco, who served as a guide for the Portuguese Armed Forces after imprisonment, reveals his thoughts of this time:

The Portuguese showed us a picture, in which a white man and a black man were shaking hands. I thought, “Well, this could be possible.” When I looked at the picture carefully, I realised that the black man’s hand was on top of the white man’s. I came to the conclusion that the picture suggested that blacks would outrank whites one day. I thought FRELIMO would win and one day

we would be reunited with the people in the *mato*. But I never told anybody what I thought, even to my family. Otherwise I would have been killed.²⁷⁸

Even in the village, people were not able to relax as they were surrounded by the vigilant intelligence activities of the colonial authority.

d. *Civilizados* (“Civilised” people)

According to colonial documents, the number of *civilizados* living in Maúa in 1972 was 260 in total – 146 *negros* (blacks), 82 *brancos* (whites), 25 *mestiços*, and 7 *asiáticos* (Asians).²⁷⁹ In other words, only 0.03 per cent of 46,996 African residents in Maúa were categorised as “civilised”. A great majority of people lived under *régulos* and *chefes* – “traditional authorities” designated by the colonial authority.

Considering that Maúa was so remote that it did not have a church or a school until 1940, however, the count of 146 African *civilizados* in 1972 suggests a significant change between these periods. It is the author’s opinion that this change was attributed more to the start of the liberation war than to the Catholic Church. This is due to the emergence of the Portuguese Armed Forces and the subsequent budget increase in social development, which facilitated the spread of primary education in Niassa District where colonial rule was least established. Maúa was no exception. Most public primary schools were set up after the arrival of the Portuguese Armed Forces. The army contributed greatly to the construction of educational institutions.

In fact, it was during the liberation war that a Portuguese-style education system was spread in Maúa. Even children living in remote areas who previously had little contact with the colonial authority received education offered by the colonial authority. Differences in the type of education that the different generations received – traditional, Muslim and Western – affected their relationship with FRELIMO or the colonial authority.

Summary of this period

In the annual report, the governor of Niassa District reflects on the period between 1969 and 1970 as a time of stabilisation of an area under the colonial authority and the inferior position of FRELIMO in the district.²⁸⁰ The same report notes that the activities of FRELIMO in the district had ceased in 1968 and that there were only a few sporadic activities observed in 1969.²⁸¹

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the January 1969 assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, greatly contributed to this change. Mondlane’s death caused a negative impact and confusion among domestic and international FRELIMO supporters, resulting in a slackening of FRELIMO activities. In Niassa District, as discussed earlier, the colonial authority developed the defence system using local residents, especially “prominent local figures”, leaving FRELIMO in a weaker position in the area.

By April 1970, the appointment of Samora Machel as the second president provided new momentum for FRELIMO's military activities. However, the colonial authority's fortified defence system made the renewed activity in northern Mozambique difficult. As a result, FRELIMO shifted its target to the central region. Thus, in Maúá, the existence of FRELIMO was no longer felt.

The end of the liberation war in Maúá

FRELIMO reappears in Maúá

Reports by the Maúá administrative office and the Portuguese Armed Forces demonstrate that FRELIMO revitalised its attacks and the recruitment of the residents in northern Maúá from September 1972. To counter this, the colonial authority deployed the 3888th Artillery Battalion in Marrupa in August 1972 and sent a unit from the battalion to Maúá, Revia and Muhoco. The battalion reported a sudden increase of FRELIMO attacks:


On 18 September 1972, nine FRELIMO guerrilla fighters detained 70 residents in Mwapula. Fifteen of them managed to escape. On the 20th, a security squad in Mwapula discovered landmines in the footpath between Muhoco and Mwapula. On the 23rd, eleven people, who had been captured by FRELIMO in Mwapula, turned up. Ten more appeared at the Revia military post on the 24th. Two more returned on the 25th ... On 23 October, an enemy unit attacked and kidnapped 30 residents in Mwapula. Resisting the attack, 13 died. These two were the only FRELIMO attacks in Marrupa and Maúá circumscriptions between August and October 1972. Our forces, on the other hand, carried out 864 usual patrols, 44 patrols for psycho-social operations and 58 military operations.²⁸²

By then, the liberation war had been fought in Maúá for six years. Young people from the area who had been captured by FRELIMO at an early stage of the war returned home as experienced guerrilla soldiers and mobilised their families and neighbours under colonial rule. In order to stop this kind of "silent" operation at night, more *aldeamentos* had to be built urgently.²⁸³

Maúá immediately before the coup d'état

The map of guerrilla activities, compiled by the Portuguese Armed Forces, demonstrates that as of December 1972, FRELIMO attacks were concentrated on Tete and Zambézia.²⁸⁴ It also shows that FRELIMO actively operated in Cabo Delgado in December 1973 and that it attacked Maúá again on 1 March 1974, immediately before the coup in Lisbon. A report by the unit in Maúá describes how FRELIMO revitalised operations in the area. Already in February, the "infiltration" of FRELIMO was detected north of the Messalo

Figure 33 War situation in Maúia (5 Apr. 1974–2 Jul. 1974)



AHMoçambique:A28.

(Some spellings corrected by the author)

River in northern Maúia. Army patrols became more frequent, more local soldiers were trained and many residents were arrested on suspicion of cooperating with FRELIMO. Moreover, the defence of the two main roads – one between Mwapula and Maúia Sede and the other between Muhoco and Revia – was necessary because FRELIMO frequently planted landmines.²⁸⁵

According to the documents of the Portuguese Armed Forces, on 7 February, 16 residents who had been captured by FRELIMO and run away from them turned up at the Maúia Sede administration office and informed that FRELIMO had established a new base in northern Maúia. On the same day, a unit of 50 FRELIMO guerrillas attacked Aldeamento Namarrica and took away 30 residents. During the attack, one resident died, 35 huts were burnt and the shops were plundered. FRELIMO had buried two landmines on a small road leading to the *aldeamento*.²⁸⁶ Portuguese soldiers rushing along the road stepped on them and were injured. The battle ended in a fierce shoot-out between African militia and FRELIMO guerrillas.²⁸⁷

Responding to these attacks, the colonial authority deployed the 106th GE (Grupo Especial) in Maúia on 20 February. Units consisting of African soldiers were increasingly being used in the fight against FRELIMO. The GE in particular, which were counter-

guerrilla special units, were engaged in offensive actions. Thus, towards the end of the liberation war in Maúá, FRELIMO guerrillas mainly fought against African soldiers rather than Portuguese soldiers.

Bicassi Xiwamba, a former GE soldier from Revia, describes his experience:

I returned to Revia after the training. There were no military posts for GE. Each house was a base. Members gathered when the flag was raised. The salary for the GE was high. The uniform had the emblem on both shoulders, unlike that of the Portuguese army. Besides me, about 20 people were chosen from Maúá and received training. Many died.²⁸⁸

The “Africanisation” of defence from 1969 resulted in an increase of African militiamen and policemen in Maúá, but they were still required to assist white people and follow their orders. However, the shift in the counter-insurgency strategy mainly involving the use of African soldiers caused a deep split among Mozambican people. The war was no longer between “white colonialists” (the Portuguese colonial authority) and “African anti-colonialists” (FRELIMO) but between Africans and Africans.²⁸⁹

GE was not part of the Portuguese Armed Forces and therefore did not stay at the army posts. As Xiwamba explains, they worked where they lived. They occasionally worked with the Portuguese army, but generally they were expected to work independently. In short, GE was a mercenary-like counter-insurgency unit consisting of local Africans.

From the coup d'état to the peace agreement

On 15 April 1974, a bloodless coup took place in Lisbon leading to the fall of the Caetano government. A political solution to the colonial issues was promised – that of granting independence. However, as a ceasefire was not agreed upon, the war continued in Maúá. The Portuguese Armed Forces continued to be deployed there and FRELIMO continued with its attacks.

The report by the 3888th Battalion on 8 May 1974 warned of the possibility of intensified attacks in northern Maúá and stressed the necessity of constant vigilance against *aldeamento* residents being recruited by, or cooperating with, FRELIMO.²⁹⁰ Fighting continued even after the coup, partly because a peace agreement had not been reached, and partly because the extremely low morale of Portuguese soldiers made it easy for FRELIMO to conduct its military activities. Residents in Maúá were unaware of the coup in Portugal and therefore did not know that the war was nearly over. Matias Mussondiwa, the militia commander in an *aldeamento*, talks about his experience:

At the *aldeamento*, a white security commander was waiting for me. He asked me to take his place because he was going back to Portugal. I was surprised because the post was always assigned to a white person, not a black person like

me. He also told me not to shoot the enemy and to inform everybody that the war is nearly over. He said that when FRELIMO came in the evening, I should only question them. Then, FRELIMO entered the area.²⁹¹

On 25 September 1974, the new Portuguese government and FRELIMO finally signed the peace agreement in Lusaka, Zambia. Responding to a call from Father Vital of the Catholic Church in Maúa, the commanders of FRELIMO who had been active in the area and the Portuguese Armed Forces stationed in Maúa, met in the Miombo forest and agreed on a ceasefire. Father Lerma, who was in a church in Maúat at the time, explains the situation as follows:

A ceasefire was agreed in Lusaka on 7 September 1974. This information came from Cuamba. I couldn't believe it. FRELIMO was about to come to Maúa Sede from Ngoma [a midpoint between Marrupa and Maúa]. On 25 September, Father Vital from Brazil, sent Bernardo, a local person, to call out to FRELIMO guerrillas in the *mato* for a ceasefire. It was arranged that FRELIMO commanders and the Portuguese Armed Forces meet together unarmed with Father Vital as the mediator. They acknowledged the *Acordo de Maúa* (Maúa Accord) and decided to observe a ceasefire.²⁹²

Immediately after the peace agreement, an interim government was established. It was jointly run by the new Portuguese government and the FRELIMO representatives. The Portuguese Armed Forces left Maúa shortly before independence. Mussondwiwa, then a security commander in an *aldeamento* in the northwest of Maúa, describes this period of transition:

As the previous security commander predicted, FRELIMO entered Maúa in June 1975. We sent militiamen as FRELIMO attacked shops. Manjamo [a Nyanja], a FRELIMO commander, set up his post in an elementary school. I tried to escape but was captured. He ordered me to bring militiamen and give up our weapons to them. Then FRELIMO entered Maúa Sede with a truck full of weapons.²⁹³

Uneasiness and hope

Puimo Cachoca, a resident of Mwapula, describes how the information on the ceasefire spread among the local residents and how FRELIMO soldiers appeared:

Four men encountered FRELIMO soldiers when they were fishing in the Lureco River. Two of them were captured. Three days later, the two came back with FRELIMO. They sat by the Messalo River and talked to people. They

told the people to bring them the *chefe* [the proxy of Mwapula installed by the colonial authority] and the security commander, unarmed. The *chefe* didn't go, but the militia commander went to him instead. He came back and declared, "The war has ended." Everyone went to *mato* to embrace each other. We danced, danced. We were happy. The Portuguese also came. The Portuguese happily started their preparations for returning home. Manjamo and Murupa [Mwene Muhuela on the side of Revia who went to the FRELIMO side in the beginning of the liberation war] came. Thus, we finally understood that it was our brothers who were fighting. We were pleased. We were satisfied. After all, it was a war. There was no reason to continue this hostility [among us].²⁹⁴

Amance Alumuchare, a woman from Mwapula, describes the time when the Portuguese soldiers left.

When FRELIMO appeared, the Portuguese said, "This is your land. FRELIMO won. They will do what we did to you." But I didn't think so. During the colonial period we were beaten with sticks. I thought that the treatment would be better, and problems would be solved by giving chickens, like old times.²⁹⁵ I believed that we [those who remained and those who went to the FRELIMO side] would be friends again.²⁹⁶

Similarly, Rodrigues Akimo and Maria Muossa, residents of Muhoco who were profoundly affected by the war, said:

When the Portuguese were leaving, they said: "We are leaving because we are tired. However, the arms remain. You will have a hard time." But I didn't understand what they were talking about at that time.²⁹⁷

When the Portuguese soldiers left, they looked happy. And, they said, "You will suffer." I didn't know what they meant. Now looking back, I think that they knew what was going to happen afterwards.²⁹⁸

The aftermath of the liberation war in Maúa

A "scramble" for the residents

During the war, both FRELIMO and the colonial authority endeavoured to achieve the "*conquista de corpo e coração*" (conquest of the body and soul) of Maúa residents, especially in the northern part. As a result of the struggle for this objective, the foundations of their livelihoods were destroyed, groups were split and residents were divided into supporters of FRELIMO or supporters of the Portuguese.

Of course, this does not mean that people in Maúa had been completely passive. There were those who had voluntarily joined FRELIMO's armed struggle, and there were those who had wanted to do so but could not. This chapter attempts to examine the reality and process of their alliance, cooperation, betrayal and suffering.

Careful examination seems to reveal that the situation was too severe for people in Maúa to act of their own will and that there was strong external pressure from both the colonial authority and FRELIMO. It has been suggested that Maúa remained under the colonial authority until the end of the war, but it seems this is an inaccurate observation, and not everybody in Maúa did so. Ultimately, many remained under colonial control, but there were quite a few who went to the FRELIMO side, although many eventually surrendered to the colonial authority as seen in the case of Revia.

What is very clear is that the life of people in Maúa was torn apart by two opposing armed forces. When the war ended, a deep divide among residents remained.

What remained in Maúa

Almost all village groups in northern Maúa Circumscription were affected by the war and experienced the disintegration of their communities. They either settled in the areas under FRELIMO control ("liberated zones" near the border of Tanzania and the Msawissi base and small military posts in Niassa District) or under the colonial authority (*aldeamentos* in northern Maúa Circumscription where the battles took place and in their own villages in other parts of Maúa).

The movements of the traditional chiefs caused confusion in the internal politics of the group, for example when *mwenes* went to the FRELIMO side (Revia, Muhoco, Mwapula and Muhuela groups) or when *mwenes* were either imprisoned or executed (Muela and Nipepe groups). Although the acting *régulos* and *chefes* lacked traditional legitimacy as *mwenes*, the colonial authority acknowledged them as genuine. The colonial authority revitalised the once lost authority of Mwene Muwa and had him intervene in the selection of the new *mwenes* of the groups that had lost legitimate leaders.

The breaking-up of groups led to the collapse of the functional *regedoria* system. Traditional authority (*mwene*) was no longer necessarily the lowest-ranking implementer of the colonial policy (*chefe* or *régulo*). In some cases, two groups shared the same name, one on the FRELIMO side and the other on the colonial authority side. Moreover, whether each "chief" could maintain his authority depended not only on his traditional legitimacy but also on the approval by the actual ruler of the area, such as FRELIMO or the colonial authority.

These experiences left a deep cleavage in each group. For example, Mwene Mwapula could only return to his own village in 1996, nearly 25 years after independence. The war itself may have caused the rift or it may have helped to cause it by deepening an existing conflict.

During the war, Mwene Mwapula fled to the FRELIMO side and ceased to be the *chefe* appointed by the colonial administration. However, he continued to be revered as

mwene, the traditional authority, by the members of the Mwapula group in the *mato* (the FRELIMO side) and in *aldeamentos* (the colonial authority side). Ultimately, those who remained under the control of the colonial authority appointed an acting *chefe* officially, as well as a proxy *mwene* informally under the pressure from the colonial authority.

However, there was nobody who could become a traditionally legitimate acting *mwene* because Mwene Mwapula had joined FRELIMO, taking *pwiyamwene* (the symbolic “mother” of the group) and his legitimate successor with him. As a result, somebody from *pwattaphwatta* or *humu* (a head of clan in the community) was chosen as a proxy *mwene* or acting *chefe*.²⁹⁹ The *pwattaphwatta* was the chief of the lower lineage segment (Figure 32). Traditionally, the only way for him to become a *mwene*, a head of the lineage, would have been to leave the current group, move to a new place and start his own group. However, due to the pressure from the colonial administration which attempted to secure control of the local residents, a person who was not traditionally supposed to be *mwene* ended up being chosen.

However, in a conversation with the author, the Conselho dos Velhos (the Council of Elders) referred to this *pwattaphwatta* as a nephew of Mwene Mwapula, that is, the legitimate successor.³⁰⁰ This was especially stressed by the maternal nephew of this *pwattaphwatta* who became an acting *chefe* and proxy (almost acting) *mwene* himself after the death of the *pwattaphwatta*.³⁰¹ Mwene Mwapula comments on this issue:

What C.G. said was a lie. He is not from our family lineage. His uncle, who became a proxy *mwene* was not from the Mwapula family either. He was from Muela. Even worse, he was from a family line of a former slave given by a Mwapula member to Mwene Muela.³⁰²

Evident discrepancies in the interviews indicate that conflicts that had risen more than 30 years ago during the liberation war still existed, but also that the strife originating in the slave trade era before the colonial period contributed to these conflicts.

The *pwattaphwatta* may have tried to cleanse his slave background by taking advantage of confusing situations during the war, but the truth will never be known now that he is dead. At least his appointment was endorsed by Anamuhotiwa (*pwiyamwene*) and thus traditional integrity was partially preserved.³⁰³ Anamuhotiwa was the eldest daughter of Anahelawa, the first *pwiyamwene*, who was a sister of the first Mwapula. She was the only person with traditional legitimacy remaining on the colonial authority’s side. Therefore, her endorsement was essential. However, what really elevated the status of the *pwattaphwatta* was his appointment by the colonial authority as *Chefe Mwapula*.

The *mwenes* who joined FRELIMO also experienced a decline in their authority. To recover their authority, they tried to bring the people who remained under colonial control to their side and recreate their group in FRELIMO’s land. For these purposes, an escaping *mwene* always attempted to take his successor (nephews on maternal side or younger brothers) as well as the *pwiyamwene* and her successor (*mwene*’s mother, sisters or nieces) with them or, if that was not possible, tried to bring them over later. The current Mwene Mwapula confirmed

this in his interview.³⁰⁴ This is why women from Maúia who later became FRELIMO soldiers stated that they were taken with their mothers, rather than with their fathers.

The Makhwa society is a polygamous one and matrilineal marriage is common. Women continue to live with their mothers after marriage, and therefore their husbands were often not present when women were snatched in the middle of the night. This is one of the reasons why women were taken away, but another is that *mwenes* and other heads of families needed women to reproduce the group. Those left on the colonial side without the legitimate successors of the *mwene* encountered many problems. Without the *mwene* as an authorised mediator, solving disputes within the group became impossible.

The colonial administration officers started to realise that newly appointed *régulos* and *chefes* did not hold sufficient authority among the residents. Consequently, the colonial authority was eager to build more *aldeamentos* to corral the population when FRELIMO returned to northern Maúia in 1972. Moreover, it deployed a large number of militiamen to each village.

The following circular notice dated 2 January 1974 confirms that towards the end of the liberation war the colonial authority had difficulty finding measures to control local residents:

In order to organise the *aldeamentos*, a resident registration and an identification card (with a photograph) have to be issued to each person. To assure the control of the inhabitants, not only *chefes*, but also heads of family have to be made responsible ... The importance of this should be recognised for the effective control of the inhabitants.³⁰⁵ (*Underlined by the author*)

While the trust placed in *régulos* and *chefes* was fading, the colonial authority realised that it needed the help of the heads of smaller family units (*erukulu* and heads of household) and at the same time explored ways in which to control individuals directly, rather than through “traditional” chiefs. For the first time, and only a year before Portuguese colonial rule came to an end, Portuguese colonialism recognised the village inhabitants in their colonies as individuals.

The end of the war for Maúia residents

Life in the Maúia region changed completely during the eight-year liberation war in terms of: (1) the place of residence (the formation of new villages either on the FRELIMO side or the colonial authority side); (2) division among the residents; (3) the absence of *mwenes* or the duplication of the “traditional chiefs”; (4) the fall of the authority of the *mwenes*; (5) the lack of “traditional” rituals and education; (6) the spread of Portuguese-style education and Catholic education; (7) young people becoming wage labourers such as soldiers and militiamen; and (8) diverse composition of village population.

The neighbouring Muela group chose a proxy *mwene*, thus acting *régulo*, after the disappearance of Mwene Muela IV. He was appointed as a *régulo* by the colonial authority

but could not become a *mwene* since he was not from Laponi, the Mwene Muela's clan, but from Mirassi, the clan of Mwene Muela's paternal family.³⁰⁶ It was only in 1987 under the occupation of RENAMO that the legitimate successor of Muela IV was chosen.

After Mwewe Muhuela (of Revia) joined FRELIMO, the Muhuela group members scattered all over northern Maúá. Some persevered with the hardships in the *mato*. Some lived in the *aldeamento* in Revia. Others could not stand life in the *aldeamento*, fled to Muela (in Maúá Sede), were chased away on the order of the colonial administration and ended up in the *mato*.

In Revia, the location of FRELIMO's first attack in Maúá, many inhabitants joined FRELIMO in the *mato*. However, after Mwene Revia departed for Tanzania, the majority surrendered to the colonial side and were taken to the *aldeamento*. A nephew of Mwene Revia from the paternal line, who had no traditional legitimacy, became a proxy *mwene*, and thus an acting *régulo*.

In Muhoco, the second site of FRELIMO attacks, Mwene Muhoco also joined FRELIMO, and Régulo Muwa intervened in the selection of the successor who was from an inferior family line. To this day the legitimate Mwene Muhoco has still not returned home.

Many women from Maúá stressed how much these events changed the society and their everyday lives. Lemeiha Rumanva, an 85-year-old maternal aunt of Mwene Muhoco and Mairossi Nahotxe from Muela, talks about the relationship between those who joined FRELIMO and those who remained behind:

People are now living scattered all over the place. Muhoco people live even near Nihava [near Mwapula] and near Majune. We will never be reunited with them ... Our group has been broken up.³⁰⁷

Those who became FRELIMO guerrillas have gone to Lichinga, Marrupa and Tanzania. They didn't want to come here after the war. We lost contact with those who went to Majune [FRELIMO's liberated zones]. They have become like Yaos.³⁰⁸

In September 1974, the sudden end of the war was welcomed with enthusiasm. However, the restoration of the shattered society was only attempted at an individual level. Samora Machel, the second president of FRELIMO and later the president of Mozambique, issued the following message on the occasion of the investiture of the Traditional Government following the Lusaka Accord with Portugal:

We see our people, and particularly the people in the countryside, living in subhuman conditions of poverty and exploitation. We see destruction, resentment and hatred created by centuries of oppression and instigated by the colonial war of aggression the reactionaries, colonialists and fascists launched in order to divide and confuse us. It is thus a complex situation that

the Transitional Government has before it, and the tasks it faces, therefore, are difficult ... The decisive factor for our success is the unity of our people from the Rovuma to Maputo. The enemy rose and will always rise against this unity: yesterday's colonialism and today's reactionaries and imperialists, exploiters from every race ... We will make relentless use of the same liberating fire that wiped out colonialism in opposing racism, tribalism and regionalism, because these are the commanders-in-chief of the enemy's forces which attack and destroy our People's unity, the main weapon in our struggle. These are the essential instruments which weakened our people in the past and allowed them to be dominated.³⁰⁹ (*Underlined by the author*)

It is interesting that Machel acknowledged that not only “unity” but also “destruction, resentment and hatred” as well as “division and confusion” existed among people in Mozambique. However, he laid the blame only on “colonialism”, “reactionaries”, “imperialists” and “exploiters”. He also expressed the following determination:

Tribalism, regionalism, racism and unprincipled alliances are serious onslaughts on our political line and divide the mass ... Anyone who thus deforms our line can expect no tolerance from us. We shall be intransigent on this, as we were during the hard war years.³¹⁰

The division and confusion that people in Maúá experienced during the liberation war was not necessarily caused by the “reactionary tendency” of those who remained on the colonial authority's side. It has also become clear that statements such as “Makhuwa people were loyal servants of colonialism and anti-FRELIMO”; or “the Makhuwa belt was an ethnic line that prevented FRELIMO's southern advancement” were not necessarily true. In short, one cannot only blame “tribalism” and “regionalism”, as Machel did.

Of course, it is equally wrong to blame only FRELIMO for the cause of the division and confusion. Rather, we should take other factors into consideration, such as the resistance of the Salazar/Caetano government to the worldwide trend of decolonisation, white governments in southern Africa and the Cold War structure, which directly and indirectly supported these governments. Without these external conditions, FRELIMO would not have needed to fight such a prolonged war that was so devastating for the Mozambican people. One must not forget that although the Salazar/Caetano administration collapsed, the above mentioned conditions remained. So it was in 1977, still during the transitional period from a colony to an independent country, that another war began.

Nevertheless, FRELIMO's uncompromising attitude, nurtured through internal conflicts and wartime activities, made reconciliation in local communities after the liberation war difficult, and their policies after independence further deepened the division.

Notes

- 1 Ibo Island is located offshore of Cabo Delgado District and used to be the headquarters for the Niassa Company. The fort built by the Portuguese during the Age of Great Navigations was used as a prison.
- 2 Joaquim Baptista Sargene, Cuamba District, 4/9/1997.
- 3 *Ressurgimento*, 27/02/1973:23. Sargene sent this letter to the magazine after returning to Maúa. Also, in 1970, he wrote the following passage in the same magazine: “Those who are opposed to the Portuguese government should come here. Portugal is no doubt the queen of civilisation and compassion. It is a country that keeps its promise. It calls on the people to live like brothers. Racial mixture is its characteristic” (Joaquim Baptista Sargene, 1970).
- 4 The total area was as large as 46,444 square kilometres.
- 5 Anuário, 1950:19-20. There were 58 “*civilizados*” (“civilised” people). In the same year, it was reported that the total population of Niassa was 258,090.
- 6 The area was reduced to 44,576 square kilometres. Niassa District consisted of four circumscriptions in 1950, but was reorganised into two *conselhos* and two circumscriptions in 1960. The majority of the residents in Marrupa were “*non-civilizados*” (“un-civilised” people), in other words, “natives”, and Marrupa remained a circumscription. In 1970, the number of circumscriptions in Niassa increased to five. By then, Maúa had become separated from Marrupa and was made a circumscription.
- 7 Anuário, 1962:32-33.
- 8 If the population grew in Marrupa (including Maúa) from 1960 to 1970 by 20 per cent, Maúa’s population in 1960 would have been about 36,000. However, it is highly likely that it was larger than 36,000 as the area was severely affected by the liberation war.
- 9 The total population of Niassa District was 285,329, of which white people constituted 2,566 (Anuário, 1971/72:32). The 1970 statistics recorded the population of Maúa as 43,201 although only 25,011 were registered in Marrupa Circumscription.
- 10 As of 1971, 46,000 people lived in Maúa Circumscription (32,000, 13,000 and 1,000 in the three administrative posts of Sede, Nipepe and Revia respectively) (AHM, A/28).
- 11 However, this was only possible when traditional authorities who became *régulos* did not prioritise their roles as colonial administration officers.
- 12 This confiscated document from FRELIMO guerrillas described the route as follows: “The Miombo forest continues until the Ilha de Metarica [or Metarica Island]. Then, the route runs along the left side of Lugenda (it is safe as there isn’t even a small path for white people to walk). It takes a whole day to go up along the the Lugenda River. There are several settlements on the way. After the Luambala River, you enter the Miombo forest. Once you arrive at the Msawise [Msawissi, Msawisi or M’sawize] River, there is nobody around. At the mouth of the Luambala River, the Lugenda starts and continues to Nova Freixo.” (Hipólito, 1970:115-116).
- 13 The colonial authority’s strong will to prevent FRELIMO from infiltrating into the Makhuwa area manifested in the following actions: to hasten the research on Makhuwa people in 1968 and to transfer the headquarters of the Portuguese Armed Forces from Maputo to Nampula in 1970.
- 14 Since it was the FRELIMO government that produced this map after independence, it is highly likely that its content might have been exaggerated in favour of FRELIMO.
- 15 Middlemas, 1975:156. Machel explained that FRELIMO withdrew from the Zambézia frontline because 2,000 of its guerrillas had surrendered (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995:25).
- 16 Hipólito, 1970:18.
- 17 Branquinho, 1969:446-447.
- 18 Hipólito, 1970:76. It is not clear whether this was true or not, though it was said to have been written in a document confiscated from FRELIMO soldiers. However, Hipólito had no reason to make up a story; therefore, it is safe to believe that the document existed.

- 19 Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995:25.
- 20 Monteiro, 1993:Anexo 4.
- 21 Lerma, 1989:31. However, according to the author's research in 1997 it was revealed that there was one Catholic *mwene*.
- 22 The "network" here is similar to the one that Tachimoto, a Japanese sociologist, uses to describe Malay people's locality. Tachimoto argues that the Malay society is a "network society", rather than a "nucleus society", and is characterised by "dispersion", "commerciality" and "connectability". Tachimoto calls this kind of social relationship "interpersonal relationship" and contrasts it with the Japanese-type "interdependent relationship" or "group-oriented relationship" (Tachimoto, 1999:124-214). Makhuwa society can be described as "interdependent relationship" since lineage groups form the community. However, it can be also described as "interpersonal relationship" for their emphasis on clan relationships. Therefore, the community is not closed or rigid. It consists of kinship groups scattered in various places ("dispersion"), which are connected through clan relationship ("connectability"). Commerce (slave trade) and religion (Islam) spread through such "interpersonal relationships". The reason that Islam only spread among traditional authorities was that clan relationships did not apply to those of slave status.
- 23 Branquinho believes it was due to the influence of maternal family lineage that only 10 per cent of Makhuwa people in Moçambique District became Muslim in spite their long-term contact with the religion. The Muslim population in Mozambique in 1957 was between 700,000 and one million, of which 500,000 lived in the three northern districts. However, he pointed out a rapid increase in the Muslim population in the district: from 150,000 to 200,000 in four years since 1960, and recommended keeping an eye on Islamisation (Branquinho, 1969:415-418). Anti-colonialism was one of the reasons for rapid Islamisation as was discussed in the previous chapter.
- 24 Ten per cent were Catholic and 5 per cent were other religions (Lerma, 1989:33).
- 25 Monteiro, 1993:99.
- 26 Branquinho, 1969:425
- 27 Monteiro, 1993:99.
- 28 Ibid.:113.
- 29 Joaquim Baptista Sargene, Cuamba Sede, 4/9/1997.
- 30 It is also possible that Sergene's memory served him wrongly and that it was actually 1962.
- 31 Branquinho, 1969:127.
- 32 AHMoçambique, 22/5/1968, A/27.
- 33 AHMilitar, 2-7-102-3.
- 34 Marrupa Sede, 28/8/2003.
- 35 Branquinho, 1969:431.
- 36 Indeed, David Francsico Zadrique Ndegue, a former FRELIMO guerrilla from current Lago District of Niassa Province, revealed recently that a man from Maúa, Francisco Auasse, who was working at the administration office in Maúa as a typist, was selling FRELIMO's membership cards to the teachers in the surrounding areas. Auasse was imprisoned in 1964 due to his activities (Ndegue, 2009:134).
- 37 AHMoçambique, 22/5/1968, A/27.
- 38 For details, see Chapter 2 and Funada-Classens, 2002.
- 39 Joaquim Baptista Sargene, Cuamba Sede, 4/9/1997.
- 40 AHMoçambique, Circunscricão de Marrupa, Boletim de Informação:1963-67.
- 41 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, A/27, no.155/1/6.
- 42 Raqui Muheco, Muhoco, Maúa District, 28/8/1999.
- 43 "When FRELIMO's war started, I was told it was the people's war. Those who came back from migrant work told us about Africans' governments, each of which was seeking its independence" (Bacar Caucha, Muhoco, Maúa District, 27/8/1999).
- 44 Renato de Gouveição Lagoas, Cuamba Sede, 17/9/1999.

- 45 Matias Mussondiwa, Maúa Sede, 1/9/1999.
- 46 This was common practice in the Portuguese colonies from the Age of the Great Navigations.
- 47 AHMilitar, 2-7-85-15:1964-66.
- 48 Ibid. *Banja* originated from the Makuwa language, but it was used all over Mozambique by the colonial administration and the Portuguese army.
- 49 Around this time Rodrigues Akimo, who had just begun attending a recently established school, heard the Portuguese army explaining about FRELIMO at a meeting: “*Turras* wear shoes the other way around. Their toes are where the heels should be. Therefore, they can’t go to the place they want. Instead, they go back to where they come from” (Rodrigues Akimo, Muhoco, Maúa District, 20/8/1999).
- 50 Puimo Cachoca, Mwapula, Maúa District, 7/9/1999.
- 51 Assuria Wassi, a woman in her 50s, and Murihiwa Mucutuweriwa, both from Muela, were also told by Portuguese soldiers that FRELIMO would kill all the residents and destroy everything (Assuria Wassi, Muela, Maúa District, 22/9/1999; Murihiwa Mucutuweriwa, Muela, Maúa District, 3/9/1999).
- 52 Wilssoni Muahave, Revia, Majune District, 10/9/1999. He is *nethi* and a Muslim.
- 53 AHMilitar, 2-7-85-15:1964-66.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 On 29 December 1964, Olivença Administration Post was attacked.
- 56 It shows that there was no Portuguese Armed Forces troop stationed in the Maúa area.
- 57 Mataka’s collaboration with FRELIMO was well known, while other chiefs, especially Metalika (or Metarika, Metarica), cooperated with the colonial authority.
- 58 AHMoçambique, Governo de Distrito do Niassa (1969), Relatório Anual:182.
- 59 Amaral, 1990:56. Originally written in 1968.
- 60 Some of the interviews contradict each other, but in sum, Chief Mataka, who was originally suspicious of FRELIMO and its capacity to beat the Portuguese, agreed to ally with FRELIMO, and left with the entire population to the forest either in the end of November or December 1965 (Ndegue, 2009:139-140).
- 61 AHMoçambique, Governo de Distrito do Niassa (1969), Relatório Anual:183.
- 62 AHMilitar, 2-7-85-15 (Platoon of Companhia de Artilharia no. 637).
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 It must have been between the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.
- 65 Son of Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999.
- 66 Aroni Caisse and Lucia Nicuacua, Mwapula, Maúa District, 5/9/1999.
- 67 Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1997. The explanation is not accurate. It will be referred to again later.
- 68 This information was provided by a local informer.
- 69 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, no.16/965.
- 70 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, no.19/965.
- 71 Sargene, Cuamba Sede, Cuamba District, 4/9/1997.
- 72 This is how his name is spelled on his document.
- 73 Valentim Limas Necutho, Maúa Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 74 Ndegue, 2009:159.
- 75 Aroni Caisse and Lucia Nicuacua, Mwapula, Maúa District, 5/9/1999.
- 76 Revia, Majune District, 8-11/9/1999. Interviews with nine residents including the Mwene Revia and his assistant.
- 77 It often happens that different people offer different explanations about a person’s behaviour. Many “stories” exist depending on the relationship between the speaker and the person referred to, the level of the confidence in the interviewer, the lapse of memory and misunderstanding on the part of the interviewer. Moreover, where the time period from the event to the time of the interview is

- long, it is highly possible that the “memory” and/or the “perception” change greatly, depending on the events that happened inbetween. The author conducted these interviews in 1999 about events taking place in 1966, more than 30 years before. It would therefore be problematic to describe what was told as “facts”. This is especially true in the study of a society that experienced “division”, like the societies described in this book. The author reviewed the content of each interview, taking the background of the interviewee into consideration and compared it with different points of view, such as colonial archives and interviews in the neighbouring village.
- 78 Issa Mapira, Revia, Majune District, 10/9/1999.
- 79 Wilssoni Muahave, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 80 In Maúa District, the Swahili word “*ohuru*” is used for “independence” instead of the Portuguese word “independência”, even now.
- 81 Son of Revia, Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999.
- 82 Mwene Revia, Revia, Majune District, 8-9/9/1999.
- 83 It was not surprising that the *régulo* thought that if he stayed in Revia he would have to take responsibility (i.e., he would be killed) for FRELIMO’s first attack taking place in his territory. Whenever an “untoward event” occurred in the *regedoria*, the *régulo* was called by the administrative office and was imprisoned. This kind of “stick” was one of the methods that the authority adopted in order to exercise “indirect rule” through the “traditional authority”.
- 84 AHMoçambique, A/28. The number of the original residents might be more than this number because the number of Revia residents later detained in the *aldeamento* was about 1,000.
- 85 Wilssoni Muahave, Revia, Majune District, 10/9/1999.
- 86 Asuema Ncumba, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 87 Nephew of Revia, Hassani, Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999.
- 88 Son of Revia, Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999.
- 89 Mwene Revia, Revia, Majune District, 8-9/9/1999.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 The 1471st Artillery Company was replaced by the 687th Artillery Company as the former was re-deployed to Muhoco (AHMilitar, 2-7-102-3).
- 93 The Niassa District governor reports that 11 settlers were kidnapped by FRELIMO in order to create panic among the European residents (AHMoçambique, Governo do Distrito do Niassa, 1969:184).
- 94 AHMilitar, 2-7-102-3:1966-68. The 1571st Artillery Company was sent to reinforce the 367th Infantry Company.
- 95 Ibid.
- 96 The company reports on this operation as: “Day by day, soldiers of this company scattered to occupy this area. Most of the operation was performed by sacrificing the security of soldiers. Patrolling had to be done without the support of wireless communication, and we had to take a risk to succeed in the operation” (AHMilitar, 2-7-103-7).
- 97 Nephew of Revia, Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999.
- 98 Saide Mocha was sent to a prison in Marrupa for nine months as his return from Tanzania had aroused suspicion that he was a collaborator of FRELIMO. The fact that his brother, Mwene Muhoco fled to Tanzania, also made him guilty in the eyes of PIDE (Mocha Pembena, Muhoco, Maúa District, 29/8/1999; 29/8/2003).
- 99 Mocha Pembena, Muhoco, Maúa District, 29/8/1999.
- 100 The 367th company was posted in Revia in August 1966.
- 101 AHMilitar, 2-7-85-9, the 639th Artillery Battalion.
- 102 Hipólito, 1970:41.
- 103 Pachide Nahoxa, Muhela, Maúa District, 3/9/1999.
- 104 “There was nothing but the Miombo forest to the Tanzanian border, so we only had to keep

- walking” (Amissi Muripa, Muela, Maúa District, 4/9/1999).
- 105 C.G., Mwapula, Maúa District, 5/9/1999. Amance gave a similar account of the incident as C.G. (Amance Alumuchare, Mwapula, Maúa District, 6/9/1999).
- 106 Interviews with the Council of Elders in Muhoco and Ntepo (Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1999; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1999).
- 107 Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1999; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1999.
- 108 The Muhoco Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1999.
- 109 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 4/966.
- 110 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 5/966.
- 111 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 10/966.
- 112 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 14/966. BI dated 21 July reports that Adamo was a 30-year old former *capataz* (foreman) of a cotton company called IAM.
- 113 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 18/966. It also reports that teachers from Marrupa were involved in the attack.
- 114 Régulo Nekutho has so far rejected this allegation.
- 115 Muela, Maúa District, 23/8/1997.
- 116 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 22/966.
- 117 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 26/966.
- 118 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 27/966.
- 119 The company helped to transport food as well as residents. The number of evacuees exceeded 2,000. As a result, food shortage became a serious problem. The army transported food from Mount Txoncori on 11 November 1966.
- 120 Hipólito, 1970:42.
- 121 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, A/27, no.397/1/27 (22/5/1968). A PIDE document, compiled on 4 December 1966, states that Sargene was sentenced to exile on Ibo Island.
- 122 AHMoçambique, no.397/A/27.
- 123 Branquinho states that the network against the colonial authority was disclosed in 1965 and many traditional authorities were imprisoned by 1966 (Branquinho, 1969:320-321). His statement corresponds with the interviews by the author and historical sources.
- 124 Monteiro, 1993:113.
- 125 Many of them were pardoned in 1968.
- 126 AHMoçambique, Moçambique, Marrupa, no.397/A/27.
- 127 From his first arrest in 1961 until 1966, Sergene may have been left at large so that the colonial authority could expose the informal network. Further investigation is necessary but it would be difficult as many involved were already dead, including Sergene.
- 128 Branquinho states that the problem was not solved even in 1969 since legitimate traditional authorities had not yet been released (Branquinho, 1969:321).
- 129 It is problematic to think that the Muhocos escaped being under the protection of the colonial authority. In the interviews regarding the *niphito* (trajectory) of the Muhocos and the Ntepos, it became clear that they had fled to their traditional territories (Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1997; Ntepo, Maúa Sede, 9/8/1997).
- 130 AHMoçambique, Governo Distrital do Niassa, 1969:63-64.
- 131 AHMilitar, 2-7-102-3.
- 132 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 33/966.
- 133 It is not clear who killed these women (The Muhoco Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1997).
- 134 Hipólito, 1970:69. Melo Egidio is named after the governor.
- 135 Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúa District, 11/8/1997.
- 136 Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúa Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 137 Hipólito, 1970:59.

- 138 The Portuguese Armed Forces conducted different operations after the arrival of the 1571st Company on 27 May 1966. However, the full-scale attacks were launched only after the arrival of the 1893rd Battalion in October 1966. The battalion was renowned for being specialised in guerrilla warfare (AHMilitar, 2-7-102-3).
- 139 Hipólito, 1970: 43-45.
- 140 AHMilitar, 2-7-102-3:1966-1967.
- 141 However, the commanding headquarters had to control a vast area, reaching 50,000 square kilometres.
- 142 AHMilitar, 2-7-103-7. The numbers reflect the situation in the northern area of Maúia Administrative Post because it took place when the 1571st company was most active in Revia in August 1967. The term “activities” includes daily activities whereas “operations” are specially prepared for military action.
- 143 AHMilitar, 2-7-104-1.
- 144 Ibid.
- 145 AHMilitar, 2-7-104-1.
- 146 Hipólito, 1970:129.
- 147 Teresa Raica, Massanica, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1000.
- 148 Officially spelled with a “c” in her identity document.
- 149 Paulina Boma Mataka, Cuamba Sede, 16/9/1999.
- 150 Emília Manhungua, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999.
- 151 Teresa Raica, Massanica, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999. As explained in Chapter 2, traditionally, maternal uncles had more authority than fathers in Makhuwa society.
- 152 Candida Muhivo, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999.
- 153 Teresa Raica, Massanica, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999.
- 154 Emília Manhungua, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999.
- 155 They were not entirely comfortable being in Lucuisse, which was a Yao habitation. Makhuwas who were brought to FRELIMO bases became dissatisfied with the unfamiliar food and culture.
- 156 Candida Muhivo, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999.
- 157 Medeiros, 1985:27.
- 158 For example, without a *mwene*, they were not able to perform traditional ceremonies. *Mwene* also functioned as middle-men in dealing with the colonial administration.
- 159 Branquinho, 1969:432.
- 160 AHMilitar, 2-7-85-15:1964-66.
- 161 Vaquiwa said that Maurício, the other militia commander, tried to kill all those captured in spite of the change of tactics (Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúia Sede, 2/9/1999).
- 162 Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúia Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 163 It seems that the *aldeamento* was not completed at that time.
- 164 Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúia Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 165 Issa Mapira, Revia, Majune District, 10/9/1999.
- 166 Asuema Ncumba, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 167 See the resolution of the Second Party Congress.
- 168 AHMilitar, 2-7-1571.
- 169 AHMilitar, 2-7-104-1.
- 170 In April 1968 the 1796th company succeeded in setting up a camp.
- 171 Afonso and Gomes, 2000:209.
- 172 AHMilitar, 2-7-104-1.
- 173 Afonso and Gomes, 2000:212.
- 174 Hipólito, 1970:198.
- 175 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 58, 1974 January-March:2.
- 176 Murupa once belonged to the Uria Simango faction within FRELIMO, but when Simango

- fell from power in 1969, he was arrested by the Tanzanian police and sent to FRELIMO's "re-education camp". He escaped and surrendered to the colonial authority and became an "African propagandist" of the Portuguese government.
- 177 Henriksen, 1983:149.
- 178 Ibid.
- 179 Anacunthave Namphwanida, Mwapula, Maúá District, 6/9/1999.
- 180 Mwene Revia, Revia, Majune District, 8-9/9/1999; Son of Revia, Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999.
- 181 The *aldeamento* section of the Niassa village committee was in charge of the planning, construction, guidance and support of *aldeamentos*. The committee was attached to the district administrative office. The local administrative office was designated to be in charge of actual maintenance of *aldeamentos*. The main issue then was food production for residents. Each family was allocated a two-hectare field to cultivate. Tractors were rented out to prepare the soil.
- 182 Henriksen, 1983:16-17.
- 183 1 conto is 1,000 escudos. Twenty schools, 16 primary healthcare centres, six militia bases, three houses for *régulos* and five wells were planned to be built in 1970. In addition, 400 contos were set aside in the budget to support the "recovered" (Ibid.:40-55).
- 184 Ibid.:40.
- 185 Ibid.:55-57.
- 186 Ibid.:119-120.
- 187 Hipólito, 1970:68.
- 188 Ibid.:73.
- 189 Ibid.:73-74.
- 190 This is a comprehensive conclusion based on the interviews of the residents and the document, AHMoçambique, Maúá, A/27. According to Lerma, there were 100 "traditional" villages in Maúá Sede, Nipepe and Maiaca posts. Within Maúá Sede, there were 29 villages, excluding those in Revia Post (Lerma, 1989:28). This indicated how few *aldeamentos* there were in Maúá.
- 191 AHMilitar, 2-7-104-1.
- 192 AHMoçambique, GDN, Dispositivo das Forças Administrativas, 31/10/1971, A/28.
- 193 AHMoçambique, Maúá, 10/12/1971 and 31/12/1971, A/33.
- 194 AHMoçambique, Maúá, 30/1/1972, A/2 (from wireless records).
- 195 Branquinho, 1969:432-435. It should be noted that the women's role was recognised at this time.
- 196 Amance Alumuchare, Mwapula, Maúá District, 6/9/1999.
- 197 Amani Singano, Mwapula, Maúá District, 6/9/1999.
- 198 Asuema Ncumba, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 199 AHMilitar, the 1935th battalion.
- 200 Ibid.
- 201 Ibid.
- 202 AHMoçambique, 1/3/1968, 72/S/GAB.
- 203 Ibid.
- 204 Ibid.:15.
- 205 C.G., Mwapula, Maúá District, 5/9/1999.
- 206 AHMoçambique, GDN, Dispositivo das Forças Administrativas, 31/10/1971, A/28.
- 207 Ibid.:4.
- 208 Carlos Jaimo, Muela, Maúá District, 4/9/1999.
- 209 Bicassi Xiwamba, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 210 Matias Mussondiwa, Missão de Maúá, Maúá District, 1/9/1999.
- 211 AHMoçambique, SITREP (Niassa), annex B, 48/69.
- 212 AHMoçambique, 28/2/968,47/A/27.
- 213 Bicassi Xiwamba, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.

- 214 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 53, 1972 October-December: 2.
- 215 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 49, 1971 October-December.
- 216 Mwene Nihava, Munhanli, Maúa District, 30/8/1997.
- 217 Baptista Lundin, 1995.
- 218 AHMoçambique, Maúa, A/28.
- 219 For example, in Alto Lúrio (Ivala, 1993:72).
- 220 Baptista Lundin, 1992:26.
- 221 It was not unusual for the succession struggles to result in murder by poisoning. However, in many cases, *mwenes* selected their successors while they were still alive and used them as their assistants to unite the group.
- 222 There have been alliances and marital relations between Yao people and residents of Revia for a long time. According to Revia's son, his grandfather participated in Mataka's uprising at the end of the nineteenth century. This confirms that relationships between different ethnic groups were not that fixed (son of Revia, Revia, Majune District, 9/9/1999).
- 223 Issa Mapira, Revia, Majune District, 10/9/1999.
- 224 AH Moçambique, 15/4/967, Marrupa, BI, 63/67.
- 225 Ibid.
- 226 The Muela Council of Elders, Muela, Maúa District 23/8/1997.
- 227 Following the examples of Colonial Archives, this book calls the group next to Revia "Muhuela" and the one in Maúa "Muela" although they were originally the same group.
- 228 Assuria Wassi, in her fifties, said that this happened when she was a small girl (Assuria Wassi, Muela, Maúa District, 22/8/1999). Forced migration as part of the cotton-growing policy was implemented in the 1950s.
- 229 AHMoçambique, 15/4/967, Marrupa, BI, 63/67.
- 230 AHMoçambique, 28/2/69, 152/A/27.
- 231 Ibid.
- 232 AHMoçambique, A/28.
- 233 Ibid.
- 234 The Muela Council of Elders, Muela, Maúa District, 23/8/1999.
- 235 "I remember that when I was in Muela, FRELIMO used to come to the *régulo* in the evening" (Emília Manhungua, Cuamba Sede, 15/9/1999).
- 236 The Muela group was involved in armed conflict after independence. Internal conflict is still rife, and it is difficult to ask the group about politically sensitive issues. In such cases, it is more effective to get the story from the residents of neighbouring groups.
- 237 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula, Maúa District, 26/8/1999 and 6/9/1999.
- 238 This was the first recorded recruitment of the Mwapula residents.
- 239 Régulo Vahiwa was believed to be a "colonial collaborator" in the area.
- 240 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997.
- 241 Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúa Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 242 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula, Maúa District, 6/9/1999.
- 243 Mwene of the Ntepo group from Mount Txoncori was held responsible for a landmine explosion and he, together with his wives, were beaten to death.
- 244 AHMoçambique, Marrupa, BI, 5/966.
- 245 Mocha Penpena, Muhoco, Maúa District, 29/8/2003.
- 246 AHMocambique, Inspector Freiria, 1970.
- 247 Bacar Caucha, Muhoco, Maúa District, 27/8/1999. Muhoco Muiithwa, the mother of the present Muhoco (Muhoco VII) also spoke about the danger that people faced during the selection of the *mwene* (Muhoco Muiithwa, Muhoco, Maúa District, 28/8/1999).
- 248 Mocha Penpena, Muhoco, Maúa District, 29/8/2003.
- 249 AHMoçambique, no. 397/A/27-DV. (22/5/1968).

- 250 AHMoçambique, no. 397/A/27.
- 251 AHMocambique, Inspector Freiria, 1970.
- 252 AHMoçambique, A/28 (26/10/1968).
- 253 Muela, 25/8/1997; Carlos Jaimo, Muela, Maúa District, 4/9/1999; Amissi Muripa, Muela, Maúa District, 4/9/1999.
- 254 The colonial authority suspected that this incident indicated a relationship between traditional authorities and FRELIMO.
- 255 The Nekutho Council of Elders, Nekutho, Maúa Sede, 21/8/1999.
- 256 AHMoçambique, 31/5/967, BI, 5/967.
- 257 Valentim Limas Necuto, Maúa Sede, 21/8/1999; Vitorino Amade, Cuamba Sede, 31/8/2003.
- 258 AHMoçambique, 31/5/967, BI, 5/967.
- 259 Vitorino Amade, Cuamba Sede, 31/8/2003.
- 260 Eusébio Malico (Régulo Muwa), Maúa Sede, 10/8/1997.
- 261 AHMilitar, 2-7-103-7.
- 262 AHMocambique, Inspector Freiria, 1970:65-66.
- 263 AHMoçambique, SCCIM, no. 306.
- 264 Before colonial rule, even the children of the slave wife of the first Muwa became the *muenes* of their own groups. However, this was not possible under the *regedoria* system created by the colonial administration.
- 265 Medeiros, 1985:30.
- 266 AHMoçambique, AP-702, no.1514/ AP-702, 27/12/968.
- 267 AHMoçambique, 83/A/27, 1/2/969.
- 268 Ibid.
- 269 Sancho Afia Amisse, Maúa Sede, 29/7/1997.
- 270 He is still regarded as an important figure – the “Maúa’s living dictionary”.
- 271 Sancho Afia Amisse, Maúa Sede, 30/7/1997.
- 272 Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúa Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 273 Alberto Vaquiwa, Maúa Sede, 2/9/1999.
- 274 AHMoçambique, A/28. This was a result of Vaquiwa fighting for authority against a local traditional authority rather than the allegation of him protecting FRELIMO officers.
- 275 Sancho Afia Amisse, Maúa Sede, 30/7/1997.
- 276 Pedro Baina, Maúa Sede, 29/7/1997.
- 277 Pedro Baina, Maúa Sede, 29/7/1997.
- 278 Mocha Penpena, Muhoco, Maúa District, 29/8/1999.
- 279 AHMoçambique, A/33, Maúa, 17/2/72.
- 280 AHMoçambique, GDN, 1970:185-186.
- 281 Ibid.
- 282 AHMilitar, 2-7-1-A-67-M.
- 283 Ibid.:Capítulo II.
- 284 Henriksen Collection.
- 285 AHMilitar, 2-7-1-A-67-M:Capítulo II.
- 286 Ibid.
- 287 Ibid.
- 288 Bicassi Xiwamba, Revia, Majune District, 11/9/1999.
- 289 FRELIMO itself treated this as a war between “colonialism and anti-colonialism” and not as a war between races, but as far as Maúa was concerned, it was understood as “white people against black people”.
- 290 AHMilitar, 2-7-1-67:06/74.
- 291 Matias Mussondiwa, Maúa Sede, 1/9/1999.
- 292 Francisco Lerma Martinez, Inhambane District, 15/4/1997.

- 293 Matias Mussondiwa, Maúa Sede, 1/9/1999.
- 294 Puimo Cachoca, Mwapula, Maúa District, 7/9/1999.
- 295 In order to solve the problem within the group, chickens were often used as fines. The accused had to give a certain number of chickens to the victim on the instruction of the *mwene* or the Council of Elders.
- 296 Amance Alumuchare, Mwapula, Maúa District, 6/9/1999. Amance continued to state: "But the situation went back to that of the colonial era."
- 297 Rodrigues Akimo, Muhoco, Maúa District, 29/8/1999.
- 298 Maria Muossa, Muhoco, Maúa District, 28/8/1999.
- 299 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula (Estrada), Maúa District, 18-19/8/2003.
- 300 The Mwapula Council of Elders, Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997.
- 301 The Mwapula Council of Elders, Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997; C.G., Mwapula, Maúa District, 5/9/1999.
- 302 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula (Estrada), Maúa District, 18/8/2003.
- 303 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula, Maúa District, 18-19/8/2003.
- 304 The Mwapula Council of Elders, Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997.
- 305 The Mwapula Council of Elders, Mwapula, Maúa District, 25/8/1997.
- 306 Mwene Mwapula, Mwapula, Maúa District, 18/8/2003; Amissi Muripa, Muela, Maúa District, 20/9/2003.
- 307 Lemeiha Rumanva, Muhoco, Maúa District, 28/8/1999.
- 308 Mairossi Nahotxe, Muela, Maúa District, 3/9/1999.
- 309 *Mozambique Revolution*, no. 60, 1974 July-September:17-19.
- 310 *Ibid.*:18.

CONCLUSION

From the Liberation Struggle to Post-independence Armed Conflict

This book attempts to unravel why the liberation movement in Mozambique, which aimed to unify the people, also resulted in deepening divisions. The book undertook a multi-layered investigation of individuals, regional societies, national politics, the southern Africa region and international politics in order to try and draw some conclusions and present some understandings. The book's main aim is to explore and present the hypothesis that the liberation struggle, which took place from 1962 to 1975, concurrently cultivated two contradictory tendencies – unity and division – and therefore fomented post-independence armed conflict.

After summarising the preceding chapters, this final chapter demonstrates how the intricate interrelationship amongst various actors, created during the liberation struggle period, led to post-independence armed conflict.

Summary of previous chapters

FRELIMO's endeavour for unification and its limitations

Previous chapters examined the formation and development of anti-colonial movements in Mozambique, including at the level of international politics and local communities. Various conditions defining Mozambican society limited the number and types of people participating in liberation movements and forced them to establish their headquarters outside Mozambique. Chapters 3 and 4 explain that, although there were regional variations, early participants of the movements were urban dwellers (*assimilados*, *mestiços*, the educated), port labourers, male migrant workers in surrounding areas and those engaged in religious activity (Protestant, Catholic and Islam). Moreover, since the Mozambican economy was reliant on the surrounding countries, the liberation movements were greatly influenced by the social, political and economic conditions as well as by the migrant labour systems in those areas.

In the main rural residents who formed the majority of the population in Mozambique had little to do with the decolonisation movement, except for those who lived near the

borders in the north. The key to the success of the liberation struggle was for FRELIMO to win over these rural residents. However, it was extremely difficult to operate inside Mozambique where society was strictly controlled by the colonial authority. In addition, rural residents had not yet developed the kind of social foundation that would enable them to accept FRELIMO's liberation struggle.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, Portugal initially ran its colonies based on exploitation. The education of Africans was considered necessary only when decolonisation became a world trend in the 1950s. Even so, there was no concerted attempt to provide education in rural areas until the 1960s, and as a result very few people had benefited from educational opportunities. The Catholic Church only provided rudimentary religious education to those in its schools. Once the liberation struggle began, formal school education developed and helped to produce those employed in the lowest echelon of the colonial authority, such as interpreters, soldiers and militias. Nevertheless, only a handful of people in Mozambique had sufficient opportunities and education to lead the anti-colonial movements, including FRELIMO and earlier political organisations.

As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, it remained difficult for FRELIMO to establish close relationships with residents inside Mozambique. Yet, it was essential to engage as many locals as possible in the liberation war in order to challenge Portugal, a NATO member, and to gain independence. Thus, various methods were used to involve local people throughout the war.

Internal disparity within FRELIMO was more serious than originally anticipated. The organisation, which had been created to unify different movements that already existed, became increasingly fragmented with the intervention of the Portuguese secret police, PIDE/DGS. The context of war created additional pressures where a rift could easily develop into violence. Many splinter groups – “*inimigo interno*”¹ (enemy within) – emerged towards the end of the 1960s. As the liberation war progressed the revolutionary line triumphed within FRELIMO with the backup of the Tanzanian government and other foreign supporters, as well as local people longing for independence.

Chapter 4 details the increasingly intensified internal conflict and how the slow expansion of armed struggle prompted the FRELIMO leadership to adopt the notions of a “protracted war” and “revolutionary war”. Armed struggle was regarded as a revolutionary war and war was seen as a means of achieving revolution. Importantly though, for FRELIMO, the success of the liberation struggle took on a meaning beyond that of merely a victorious armed struggle and independence. It ultimately came to stand for the transformation of people in Mozambique into “Mozambicans” and the creation of a “Mozambique nation” (*nação moçambicana*) and of a “new Mozambican society”.

When FRELIMO's armed struggle reached central Mozambique it presented a grave menace for the Portuguese colonial authority as well as for the white administrations in southern Africa. With the boosted confidence gained through its successes, the revolutionary line believed that the divisions among residents could be overcome in due course. They believed that anybody who stood in the way of their liberation struggle, even an African, was an enemy. As a result, the number of people considered as the

“enemy within” continued to grow. At the same time, however, internal solidarity within FRELIMO strengthened after excluding the “enemy within” and created an illusion of unity.

Restraining the movement and winning the hearts of the rural population

It was not easy for FRELIMO to create a feeling of fellowship as “Mozambicans” among the rural population and to transform them into the “*homen novo*” (new man), a pillar of the forthcoming “*sociedade nova*” (new society), while fighting a war. Ideally, FRELIMO should have formed cooperative relations with residents or civic organisations before it started its armed struggle and while the colonial authority was still off guard. However, partly due to regional factors in southern Africa and partly due to the establishment of the Estado Novo regime, this was possible only in the northern end of Mozambique near the borders of Tanganyika, where the Makonde, Nyanja and Yao people lived. As described in Chapter 5, FRELIMO’s relations with the local population in other areas were either weak or coercive. The shortage of resources and harsh wartime conditions only worsened the situation.

When FRELIMO adopted guerrilla tactics, its objective of obtaining human resources became more important than that of expanding its territory. It tried to bring, even forcefully, as many people as possible under its control and to shape them into active participants in the liberation movement through education and training.

The colonial authority, on the other hand, attempted to move the rural population to the *aldeamentos* and make them sever contact with FRELIMO. Yet, it was unable to stop strong-willed individuals or groups from escaping due to its weak economic situation and its insufficient control of the rural areas. In order to prevent local people from voluntarily joining FRELIMO, the Portuguese Armed Forces, the PIDE and the colonial administration employed psychological strategies such as placation through social development, propaganda using the “traditional chiefs” appointed by the colonial administrators, the creation of a tight intelligence network both in urban and rural communities and the “Africanisation” of the defence force.

During the liberation war of 1964–1974, it was most important for both FRELIMO and the colonial authority to achieve physical and mental control over the rural populations. People living on the battlefields in northern and central Mozambique were particularly affected by the battles between the two forces, where they were physically displaced and psychologically damaged. Chapter 5 outlines how rural residents tackled the situation in the Maúa Circumscription.

Liberation struggle and Maúa on the front line

From 1966, Portugal and FRELIMO scrambled for the strategically important Maúa Circumscription. The residents were caught in between the two opposing forces. The budding voluntary anti-colonial movement formed by local strongmen (administrative officials, teachers, traditional authorities and Muslim leaders) in Marrupa, did not take

root amongst the Maúa people and, by 1966, it had been completely destroyed by the colonial authority. Throughout the armed struggle, the majority of the population of the area continued to fall under the control of the colonial authority.

The movement in Marrupa therefore only had a limited impact on the adjacent Maúa Circumscription, largely because of merciless suppression by the colonial authority. There were also geographical, cultural, social, economic and political factors such as: (1) the long distance from Tanzania and the coast; (2) the slow establishment of colonial rule (remoteness for colonisers); (3) experience during the First World War; and (4) the maintenance of the traditional social structure.

Social factors contributing to the limited involvement of Maúa residents in FRELIMO were: (1) its relatively short history as a settlement; (2) a tendency to be fragmented; (3) a tendency to be dispersed over large areas; (4) a tendency to avoid political difficulty; and (5) a lack of capitalist-worker class distinction due to the delay in colonial control. At an early stage of the liberation struggle, a small number of traditional authorities and educated individuals had some contact with FRELIMO. They were personally motivated by reasons such as the anti-colonial thinking based on Islam and an expectation of possible gain after independence, rather than by the driving force of the FRELIMO leadership, which was the ideal of Mozambican nationalism, as well as a hatred of exploitative feudalism.

In order to win a protracted revolutionary war, FRELIMO had to bring about a shift in consciousness among the politically unawakened rural population. The “liberated zones” played an important role in this. Some of the youth, including some women, became attracted to the ideas, objectives and actions of FRELIMO and decided to become guerrillas. However, in the main, due to the geological and cultural conditions particular to Maúa residents, FRELIMO had to adopt more coercive methods of persuasion. Moreover, many residents in the FRELIMO-controlled areas became disappointed as they were a long distance from the safe zones and they were impoverished by a shortage of resources.

The colonial authority, on the other hand, realised the strategic significance of Maúa after having disregarded it as a “remote area” for a long period. From 1966 onward, it poured many resources into the area and opted for the tactic of gentle persuasion.

Ultimately, this concentration of resources and the progression of armed struggle brought about the collapse of traditional society in Maúa. The commencement of armed struggle enabled Portuguese soldiers from the metropole to make inroads into rural areas and the consequent permeation of a monetary economy. Discharged soldiers were encouraged to start shops and plantations near army bases and borders. The colonial administration, the army and civilians continued to pour more resources into Maúa during the liberation war than during any other period. Direct contact with Portuguese people instilled new ideas and a different way of life into the minds of local youths, and they realised the value of money. It is ironic that people in Portugal were experiencing hardships due to conscription and the cost of the war, while in contrast this remote area in Mozambique experienced rapid modernisation and a higher standard of living. This was due to the new policy of “winning the hearts and minds” of the population. Ultimately, the revolution which Salazar had feared most took place in the capital of the metropole and not in the colonies.

In Maúá, the “people of *mato* (forest)”, or those who escaped colonial control by joining FRELIMO, experienced severe hunger due to difficulties in logistics and production. However, at this time the colonial authority introduced various social development schemes, such as a primary health care service and the distribution of clothes and food. Without a strong personal determination and commitment to FRELIMO, even those who would have liked to join the anti-colonial movement were reluctant to leave their homes where goods were abundant, in exchange for the forest where hunger and danger awaited. The majority of people in Maúá had no opportunity to develop the determination or the commitment for this before the war began.

Although the liberated zones established the legitimacy of FRELIMO in the eyes of the world, in reality they were like small islands scattered in the Mozambican *matos* (forests) under colonial rule and they were not equipped to provide sustainable social welfare services. They had to operate under dreadful conditions. They were subject to the constant threat of bombing from the Portuguese forces. Supplies had to be carried in on the heads of dozens of people while being under constant threat of danger.

Nevertheless, some liberated zones managed to overcome these unfavourable conditions. For example, the base in the Cassero region, known as “*o coração dos Yaos*” (the heart of the Yao), was the largest in Niassa District. The residents were engaged in cooperative production, received military training and developed proactive political awareness. Transforming women into active guerrillas was especially significant.

Yet, these liberation zones were far from Maúá, situated three to four days’ walk away and required people to slip past the surveillance network of the colonial authority. Moreover, the Makhuwas of Maúá felt insignificant and marginalised in liberated zones which had been established in the Yao, Nyanja and Makonde areas. As a minority group, they felt unsympathetic and even resentful towards a call for *anti-tribalismo* in liberated zones. For instance, one Makhuwa (Xirima) woman left a liberated zone and surrendered to the colonial authority simply because she wanted to eat *mapira* (a type of grain) and was not allowed to conduct traditional ceremonies. This is an extreme case, but it demonstrates how difficult it would have been for many Makhuwas in this area to strengthen a much-needed sense of solidarity.

Liberation struggle to independence

People and the situation in Maúá around independence

When asked to describe the liberation war period, the overwhelming majority of people in Maúá answered, “*ohawa*” (suffering). Almost without exception, people had wanted the war to end, displaced villagers to come home and their group members to reunite. They wanted to live quietly as they pleased in a place without disturbance. They said that hunger, the break-up of groups and the *aldeamento* were the biggest difficulties they experienced in this period. Divisions among the group between support for FRELIMO and the colonial authority caused internal conflict and confusion and made it difficult to

maintain traditional religious practices. Being confined to the *aldeamento*, the residents could work at autonomous production activities. The intensification of colonial rule and the advent of armed struggle coincided to exacerbate their “*ohawa*”.

When a sudden coup in the metropole brought an end to armed struggle and FRELIMO arrived in the Maúá Circumscription, the residents were filled with joy. As they were unfamiliar with the ideology or policies of FRELIMO, the people equated FRELIMO and the *ohuru* (liberation) that they imagined it brought with what they had been longing for – liberation from *aldeamento*, liberation from white dominance, the freedom of movement and production, the distribution of wealth formerly limited to the whites and the arrival of a “rich life”. They did not yet know that their expectations were incompatible with the ideals of FRELIMO.

The formation of FRELIMO’s rural policy

During the liberation struggle period, FRELIMO developed a loathing towards those communities that did not voluntarily join the organisation and who chose to remain on the colonial authority side. It regarded not only the colonial authority and its collaborators, but also the “traditional” social structures in rural areas, as enemies of the liberation struggle. It said that traditional society was feudalist and was an enemy which needed to be overthrown since it was used by the colonial authority and constrained rural residents to *escuridão* (darkness) and kept them from the struggle of and reform by FRELIMO. After the defeat of its number-one enemy, namely colonialism, became certain at the Lusaka Accord, FRELIMO’s sole objective became “social revolution by eradicating the legacy of colonialism and feudalism.” According to the terms of transfer of power, FRELIMO took complete control of the Mozambican territory. As a result, the ideas and policies cultivated during the liberation struggle period were promoted as the national policies of the FRELIMO government.

As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, FRELIMO initially conducted its armed struggle in league with traditional chiefs. By the end of the 1960s, however, it had developed a distrust of traditional authority. With a slogan, “*sociedade nova*” (new society), it attempted to create a new social structure in liberated zones, based on the hierarchy of its army. Although the traditional leaders on the side of FRELIMO were expected to mobilise people under them, their power was limited and their lives were endangered if they opposed FRELIMO commanders. Having gained confidence from the successful control of liberated zones due to its military approach, the FRELIMO leadership felt encouraged to expand the same system to the whole of Mozambique after independence.

The practicality of the plan was problematic, however, considering that the majority of the territory had not been “liberated” at the time of independence. This book focuses particularly on this conundrum – treating the Maúá region as a case study. Chapters 2 and 5 demonstrate that although the Maúá society was greatly influenced by colonial rule, it could not be described as “feudal”. Moreover, the society changed tremendously during the liberation war with the disintegration of “traditional” village communities.

Maúá residents interpreted the news of the peace agreement and independence as a call to bring dispersed people back home and to rebuild the community. People longed to leave the *aldeamento* and their bad memories behind.

The tragic disparity between the expectations of the rural Maúá people and FRELIMO widened after independence. The FRELIMO government did not encourage the reconstruction of those communities that had disintegrated during the war, but instead started to implement their own new social order. FRELIMO did not want the *mwenes* who sided with it to return to their original habitations. Nor did the existence of a “new authority”, or *régulo/chefe*, established during the liberation war, make it easy for the *mwenes* to go home. Consequently, the legitimate *mwenes* of Revia, Muhuela, Muhoco and Mwapula never returned to Maúá after the liberation war.

The application of FRELIMO policy in Maúá

In effect the liberation war dislocated rural communities in Maúá. In the eyes of a former FRELIMO commander, a non-Makhuwa who came to the region in order to “overcome tribalism”, the Maúá society was a feudal society – a “traditional society that did not change even during the liberation struggle.” In order to promote a complete change of social order, the FRELIMO administrators in Maúá forcefully implemented the policies formed by the central government.²

The dreams of Maúá residents for the reconstruction of their communities, autonomous life and access to the wealth that had been created by colonial rule were completely shattered. The FRELIMO government believed it possible to sublimate the division among Mozambicans, which had been complicated by Portuguese colonial rule and the war, into the *unidade nacional* (national unity) through its social revolution. Whilst Portugal had failed to bring the whole of Mozambique under its total control, FRELIMO tried to attain the unification of 800,000 square kilometres of land, with limited resources in terms of finance, human capacity, facilities and communication. This is the land that FRELIMO could not manage to liberate totally on its own, even after ten long years of armed struggle. By the time of independence, battles as well as control by the colonial authority intensified in rural settings, and FRELIMO had not been able to make direct contact with local residents in those areas which were far from its safe-haven. The conditions facing the newly independent Mozambique were extremely harsh even for FRELIMO, which had overcome one difficulty after another to achieve its goal. Nevertheless, the leaders, members and overseas supporters of FRELIMO believed, perhaps euphorically, that the organisation could once more overcome the current difficulties. After all, did FRELIMO not survive the very long, hard war?

After the transfer of power, FRELIMO registered every single Mozambican as a citizen and demanded his or her political participation. However, for the rural residents who did not live in the liberated zones, it was a new and unwanted experience, forced upon them by authority. The physical and mental control of rural residents, which both the colonial authority and FRELIMO had struggled to achieve during the liberation war, re-emerged

as a challenge of the new state. Both the original traditional authority and those installed by the colonial administration, which had worked as an intermediary between the colonial authority and local residents, were now ignored and excluded as a “legacy of colonialism”.

Though Maúa residents had longed for freedom of movement and autonomous life after many years of oppressive rule and fierce war, this was not compatible with FRELIMO’s policy of organising and “capturing” all Mozambicans. FRELIMO introduced a policy of the *aldeia comunal* (communal village) to prevent rural residents from fleeing from state control (“physical escape”) and from engaging in clandestine resistance (“psychological escape”), both of which occurred frequently during the colonial occupation.

Maúa, as a “remote place” even in the new Mozambique, could not hope to get a sufficient allocation of resources. The *aldeia comunal* was built where the *aldeamento* had previously existed. The person in charge was a former FRELIMO commander from the south who did not speak the local language. This was a deliberate appointment based on the national policy of “anti-tribalism” in order to boost the solidarity of Mozambicans.

So, freedom after independence was short-lived. Maúa residents found themselves, once again, physically contained, this time, in the *aldeia comunal*. Moreover, those who had been put in positions of authority as *régulo* or *chefe* by the colonial administration in the absence of authentic *mwenes* were denounced as “traditional authorities” and became marginalised by FRELIMO administrators, who were not familiar with the local situation. In other words, many communities in northern Maúa lost both *mwenes* and their proxies. FRELIMO tried to fill the vacuum of political authority with a new order, but it only led to deepening confusion.³

It could be argued that the post-independence policy of *aldeia comunal* was introduced not only to promote a socialist idea of collective production, as is commonly thought to be the case, but also, in effect, as the continuation of the physical and mental control of rural residents, which had been practiced since the armed struggle period. The FRELIMO leadership may not have been that conscious of this, but many Maúa residents perceive the liberation struggle and post-independence FRELIMO policy as one continuous historical experience.

The most notable aspect in the post-independence relationship between the FRELIMO government and Maúa residents was that the *aldeia comunal* was erected in the place of the former *aldeamento* – established by the colonial authority. The locations of *aldeamentos* were ideal for setting up *aldeia comunal* because of the already established infrastructure, easy access and the existing divisions in the community. The policy of communal villages was first implemented in Mwapula, Muela. This triggered conflict between the FRELIMO administrators and the proxies of the absent *mwenes* appointed by the colonial administration, which eventually led to the marginalisation of the latter. L.N., who worked under a FRELIMO administrator as a *chefe do posto* in Maúa District and who was feared by local residents as a *tira-dentes* (teeth puller), remembers those days:

The traditional structure was firmly incorporated into colonialism. It was in a way reasonable to try to destroy it. To implement the policy of the *aldeia*

comunal successfully, however, we needed to utilise the structure, not simply deny it. For example, we threatened the families who refused to move to an *aldeia communal* that they would be relocated to a village of a different *mwene*. Many didn't like the idea because they didn't want to be away from their group. After this, nobody left the *aldeia communal* and they stayed with their group.⁴

The outbreak of post-independence armed conflict

The establishment of an anti-FRELIMO network

While one should not dismiss the devotion and sacrifice that FRELIMO members displayed under harsh conditions, the victory of FRELIMO did not necessarily end happily for areas outside the liberated zones. Neither internal nor external environments surrounding Mozambique could be viewed optimistically. The slogan “*A luta continua*” (The struggle continues), repeatedly used by the FRELIMO leadership, was more than a mere slogan. It was a true reflection of their determination and of the reality in Mozambique.

Although the worldwide perception is that FRELIMO won the liberation war, in many ways it only picked up where Portugal left off when it pulled out of the war and the colony. FRELIMO was successful in the sense that it managed to put pressure on Portugal, using the blood, sweat and tears of its members and supporters. It was also a victory for FRELIMO in the sense that because liberation movements in Africa claimed to fight a war against colonialism and fascism, not a war between races, it inspired the captains in the Portuguese Armed Forces to stage a coup.

However, FRELIMO did not in fact achieve a military victory. It did not attain independence by wresting power from the colonial rulers. Nor did it arouse sufficient passion among all fellow Mozambicans to collectively evict the colonial rulers. At the time of the coup in Lisbon, FRELIMO controlled a limited number of people in parts of the vast territory of Mozambique.

Rather, the end of the liberation war and the subsequent independence of Mozambique were brought about through political change in its metropole, Portugal. Allies within the various anti-Salazar movements constituted the main force behind the coup. One of these organisations was the Portuguese Communist Party, which had a strong relationship with FRELIMO, and which had a vested interest in transferring power to FRELIMO. The allied movements did not consider anti-FRELIMO elements in and outside of Mozambique or the divisions among Mozambicans.

Chapter 4 outlines the challenges, and often anomalies, that various bodies, particularly the Portuguese military, faced. For instance, some of the generals who commanded the colonial war understood the political motivators behind the war, and thus presented their view that a military solution would be impossible. They instead proposed an alliance with moderate African elites in the colonies who did not take an anti-colonialist position, to attempt to establish a federation of the metropole and its former colonies. General

António de Spínola argues this position in his book *Portugal and the Future*. The proposal was favourably received and was considered as a realistic, or even inevitable, plan by some people, especially in Angola and Mozambique where there were a large number of white settlers with interests and rights strongly connected to the metropole.

Mozambican white settlers felt particularly threatened when FRELIMO's military targets were expanded to include their plantations and towns. Realising that the Portuguese Army Forces could not be relied on to protect the colonial structure and white interests, they tried to ally with African mercenaries and anti-FRELIMO elites. As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, Jorge Jardim and Orlando Cristina were at the centre of this activity.

After the coup in Lisbon in April 1974, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA: Armed Forces Movement), the main coup instigator, pursued the total liberation of all Portuguese colonies. The Junta de Salvação Nacional (National Salvation Junta) was reluctant to include white settlers like Jardim in the transition process, fearing that white settlers and their black allies in the army and the police might declare unilateral independence like Southern Rhodesia.

The fear was not completely unrealistic. In 1974, white hardliners "flatly opposed a transfer of power at all" and formed FICO, which is the acronym of Frente de Independente de Convergência Ocidental and also means "I stay" in Portuguese. Its "main underpinning was rejection of black majority rule."⁵ The main supporters of FICO were white farm owners, entrepreneurs and shop owners. The organisation formed an alliance with similar movements in South Africa and Angola. Other whites chose to accept the inevitability of working together with FRELIMO to maintain political stability and started the Democratas de Moçambique (MUDM: Mozambican Democrats).⁶ The conflict between the two groups led to physical attacks by FICO members on MUDM and FRELIMO members.⁷ The intervention of the secret police DGS (a new PIDE) only escalated the violence, as described by Middlemas:

Members of the DGS, operating either from within army intelligence, at large in Mozambique, or from Rhodesia, used recruits from the flechas and white commandos to set up a clandestine organization dedicated to resisting a negotiated peace ... efforts were made to capitalize on tribal animosities, and the fear, particularly among Macua [Makhuwa], that FRELIMO rule would be to their disadvantage.⁸ (*Underlined by the author*)

This clearly reflects that the DGS members tried to take advantage of the rift amongst Africans, including mercenaries, in order to ensure their own survival and to create a role for themselves which they had lost after the revolution in Portugal. The active support by the pro-Portuguese of African political organisations resumed. This time, the recipient was not FRELIMO but Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) and Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUMO).

COREMO was a rival "front" of FRELIMO based in Zambia, whose first leader, Gwambe, was exposed as a Portuguese agent. Militarily it was active only briefly in 1971.⁹

GUMO was led by Dr. Joana Simeão (Yvette Tchilenhwe), a lawyer and a Makhuwa.¹⁰ It was originally a moderate settler organisation, which Marcelo Caetano had allowed to be formed in September 1973.¹¹ DGS and Jardim were involved in both organisations.¹² Jardim informed Silva Pais, head of PIDE, in his letter that, “Joana Simeão Fonseca ... as you know, returned to Portugal and will shortly leave for Mozambique. She will collaborate with me.”¹³

In August 1974 Simeão and the old COREMO leadership formed the Partido da Convenção Nacional (PCN: National Convention Party) which was based in Beira.¹⁴ Groups purporting to represent the interests of the Makhuwa emerged, and one of them was FRECOMO, which was led by Simeão.¹⁵

Various actors in the metropole and the colonies took advantage of the political vacuum following the collapse of Portugal’s formidable regime and made a grab for power. Many of these attempts had their roots in the social gap and contradictions formed during colonial rule and the liberation war. Thus, FRELIMO was required to fight a political war of power with various actors, unlike the previous war, which was a military war for liberation.

The MFA leaders were fully aware of this shift. Accordingly, during the transition period from September 1974 to June 1975, Portugal’s new government took steps to root out the legacies of the Salazar administration in Mozambique, such as the PIDE/DGS, the army, white settlers and nationalists, together with, or in some cases on behalf of, FRELIMO.

Participants in the reign of terror during the previous regime were disconcerted by the change of government as a result of the coup. Those in Portugal left for Brazil, while those in the colonies tried to destroy proof of their involvement by, for example, burning down the PIDE headquarters. They fled to Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. FRELIMO’s direct enemy, the colonial authority, disappeared from Mozambique overnight. However, its legacy remained.

As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, the anti-FRELIMO network which was formed during the liberation war consisted of many actors including: the Portuguese Armed Forces, the secret police, intelligence agents, white settlers, shop owners, the owners of concession companies, African soldiers, militia and policemen, some *assimilado* politicians and FRELIMO splinter groups that had been protected by the colonial authority, as well as the white governments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Crucially, the network was not destroyed after the coup in Lisbon but was reorganised. The anti-FRELIMO network became the driving force behind the formation of MNR/RENAMO.

The resurgence of war

As a crucial backdrop to Mozambique’s internal state of affairs, change was afoot in surrounding countries and regions. In December 1974 Samora Machel told the OAU Liberation Committee that Mozambique would support the liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁶ In March 1976, the Mozambican government imposed total sanctions, based on the UN resolutions, against Southern Rhodesia. The sanctions cost Mozambique two million US dollars a year from the loss of employment and loss in port and railroad usage fees.

Adding to the shifting landscape in the southern African region, while Mozambicans were overjoyed at the sudden liberation from colonial rule and subsequent independence, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa watched the progress with apprehension. As a result, fearing the impact of the FRELIMO government in Mozambique on its own existence, the white government of Southern Rhodesia gathered together anti-FRELIMO network members in order to topple the FRELIMO government. Their common objective was to place Mozambique under their control, with the protection and assistance of Southern Rhodesia.

The FRELIMO government had complex relationships with different regions, communities and individuals inside Mozambique. However, the legacy of years of colonial rule and the liberation war were not eradicated in the excitement of independence.

Upon independence, President Machel talked about not only a bright future but also about the “enemy”. What prompted him was not merely his military or revolutionary way of thinking because independence was not just a new beginning but was built on the past. And the past brought with it many challenges such as internal division, economic problems and the anti-FRELIMO network. The FRELIMO leader knew this better than anybody else.

Since there had been so little development in Mozambique during the many years of colonial rule, there were few resources or able personnel at the time of independence. Mozambique had not received sufficient assistance from other states within the Cold War framework either. In addition, 90 per cent of Portuguese citizens (approximately 200,000 at the time of the coup), who had been responsible for the majority of economic activities in Mozambique, left for Portugal, Southern Rhodesia or South Africa, causing economic activities to slow down radically or grind to a halt. The Mozambican economy had been developed based on a heavy reliance on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia – as seen in Chapters 1, 3 and 4. As a result, the new Mozambique had to sacrifice economic sustainability in order to realise its political objectives.

The high hopes and expectations of Mozambicans dwindled rapidly due to the deteriorating economy and the confusion caused by the lack of capacity and experience of the FRELIMO government. There was a concerted attempt to overcome this economic, political and administrative vacuum. There were some successes, for example the education and sanitation policies of the new government demonstrated remarkable achievements over a short period of time.¹⁷

However, the challenge of mobilising disparate peoples for the purposes of nation-building in a territory so vast that even the colonial authority could not fully control it was much more difficult and on a far larger scale than the experimentation in liberated zones during the liberation war. The FRELIMO government also had to contend with enemies within and outside Mozambique. Under these circumstances, it adopted a high-handed style of nation management.

In the meantime, Southern Rhodesia bombed Mozambique in retaliation for Mozambique's border blockade. The tension between the two governments was high. The anti-FRELIMO network gathered in Southern Rhodesia during 1976–1977 in order to

form the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance), later called RENAMO (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique). Jorge Jardim and Orlando Cristina facilitated the formation of the MNR. They had created special forces of Africans (GE) during the liberation war and had strong relationships with both white and black governments in southern Africa. After Portugal's coup, they set up a guerrilla unit of African Mozambicans in Southern Rhodesia with the assistance of its government, and deployed it to Mozambique for subversive activities.

After only a few years of enjoying the feverish atmosphere of independence, the Mozambican people were, once again, thrust into war. At first, MNR/RENAMO took one step at a time in order to expand its area of control, but then suddenly exploded throughout the country. In 1986 it reached Maúa where local communities had been divided during the armed struggle period and had a complicated relationship with FRELIMO following independence.

In 1984 Malawi yielded to the pressure from other African countries and decided not to allow RENAMO to pass through its territory. In response RENAMO moved its headquarters to Milange, a town on the borders of Zambézia Province and Malawi. It tried to expand its control in Mozambique and plundered food and arms, resulting in the explosive dissemination of violence all over the country, from Zambézia Province, to Nampula Province, to southern Niassa Province, to southern Cabo Delgado Province. In Niassa Province, RENAMO set up its headquarters in the south in order to avoid the FRELIMO army and finally reached Maúa in 1984.

Maúa, a battlefield again

RENAMO reached Muhoco, the western end of the Maúa District. During the liberation war, battles had also been fought in Muhoco. Because of the *aldeia comunal* policy, the residents were relocated from the *aldeamento* in Mount Txoncori, where the Portuguese Armed Forces had been stationed, to a place along the road.

A RENAMO member in Muhoco described its incursion into the area as follows:

We were happy when *oburu* [independence] came because we thought peace and good life would follow. But once more, we were placed in the *aldeia cadeia* (village prison). War started again. This meant that independence hadn't come. We began to be sceptical [about FRELIMO]. There was no intermission between one war and another.¹⁸

One night, a RENAMO messenger visited our *mwene* and told him that they would not harm us if we didn't run away. That's why the *mwene* accepted them. They burnt the *aldeia comunal* and moved the Muhoco and other groups in the neighbourhood nearer the river [the forest area near the *Muhoco Aldeamento*].¹⁹

Some people fled to Sede where the government army was stationed. Why then did “Mwene Muhoco” not leave? As outlined in the previous chapter, this “*mwene*” was the proxy of the legitimate Muhoco V, who joined FRELIMO’s side during the liberation struggle. He was appointed Muhoco VI with the intervention of Régulo Muwa, a superior *mwene*, “from the family that had a low traditional rank.”²⁰ Neither of his two main backers, the colonial authority nor Régulo Muwa, were around after independence. FRELIMO’s policy of marginalising traditional authorities robbed him of any real power. Then FRELIMO introduced the party ranking system into the community. Consequently, Muhoco VI lost his role as a traditional chief and the role of a *chefe* under colonial rule. The Council of Elders described the situation as follows:

After we were relocated to the *aldeia comunal*, *abaixo* (down) slogans were adopted: “Abaixo Mwene,” (down with Mwene) “Abaixo Pwattaphwatta” (Down with clan heads). Everybody was unhappy because the traditional political structure was belittled. Then the *Organização das Mulheres Moçambicana* (OMM: Mozambique Women’s Organisation) started its activity. Women from the OMM criticised polygamy. Nobody wanted to marry a woman from the OMM. We thought this would eventually go away as colonial rule did. We said to each other, “Let’s see. They will get tired soon.” Then war returned.²¹

Muhoco VI remained where he was and accepted negotiations with RENAMO probably because of the complex situation he was in and his dissatisfaction with the FRELIMO policy. It is interesting to look at the tactics used by RENAMO to expand its territory. The “traditional authority”, not the authentic *mwene*, was selected as its main counterpart for negotiations and enabled RENAMO to strategically increase the area and people under its control. How did the people in Muhoco live under RENAMO?

After burning the *aldeia comunal*, RENAMO gathered Muhoco and other nearby groups around the river and set up a military base with ten commanders and 100 guerrillas.²² This was the first RENAMO base in Maúa District. The Muhoco group started to live “with the army” once again:

RENAMO guerrillas set up a base in the centre and made local residents live around it to protect it from a surprise raid by the government army. RENAMO guerrillas patrolled to prevent residents from fleeing. The RENAMO commanders summoned the *mwene* and his assistant whenever they wanted. One night, an old man was executed in a cruel manner. Seeing it, the *mwene* contacted the residents and they ran away to Sede. Next morning, RENAMO realised that only a handful of people remained. Thus, the Muhoco was divided into two groups, one on the FRELIMO side and the other on the RENAMO side.²³

M.M., one of those left behind, told the author:

Nobody told me about the escape. The same happened to Mwene Quingui of the Quingui group in the next village. I was left behind while fishing. There was nobody to look after the Muhoco people, so I did.²⁴

Once more, the Muhoco group was divided by war. As in the liberation struggle, the remaining group members chose the *mwene* proxy. M.M. was a paternal nephew of Muhoco VI and worked as a liaison between the *mwene* and RENAMO. However, his clan was Lucasse while Muhoco VI belonged to the Mirole clan.²⁵ I.A., who was there as a RENAMO guerrilla, explained the flight of Muhoco VI and his followers, and the situation for the remaining residents as follows:

At first, people freely moved around and went all the time [to the FRELIMO side and to the RENAMO side]. An old man was assigned to take food to RENAMO. When he went to Sede, the government army ordered him to put poison in the food and kill them all. Somebody reported it to RENAMO.²⁶ RENAMO sent for the old man. He begged forgiveness. RENAMO decided to punish him as a warning to prevent others from doing the same. They assembled the residents, showed them the old man, who was tied, and asked them, "Is it good to kill or try to kill others?" "We should kill him to make a lesson, shouldn't we?" Then, they killed the old man in front of the residents. Everybody started to cry. The commander pointed a gun and said "Rejoice. If you cry, the same fate is waiting." People clapped their hands and pretended to rejoice, while crying inside. That night, almost all the residents fled. However, those who were thought to be on the RENAMO side were not asked to leave.²⁷

Muhoco VI and his people fled to Sede, but they did not trust the FRELIMO government completely. This is evident from the fact that they did not live in Sede but instead moved to nearby Namope.

R.A., who was born in the Muhoco group in Mount Girane and is a FRELIMO member, describes the fate of a group torn apart by war, not once but twice:

When the Portuguese gave power to FRELIMO, nephews and uncles started to kill each other. The peace and progress [that were promised] were all lies. This is what the Portuguese meant when they said while leaving, "you will suffer because of weapons." My brother was captured by RENAMO. They cut his neck and legs because he couldn't keep up with training. The government army found his body tied to a tree. RENAMO said the government army killed him. Whether you went to the right or to the left, you would die. Both sides had deep-rooted distrust. Three sons joined FRELIMO and killed their own father. Four people who cooperated with RENAMO were killed by RENAMO in the end.²⁸

RENAMO set up three military bases in Maúa District (Figure 10). The most important was in Mwacanha in the north of the district where Portugal had built an *aldeamento*. The Muela and Mwapula groups living there describe their lives from independence to the time just before the arrival of RENAMO as follows:

After independence, the administrator and the *secretário* (local secretary) banned traditional ceremonies and religion and abolished the *régulo*. The order was effective because we knew from our experience in the colonial era that those who opposed such rules would be jailed. “Words mean fear.” Our *régulo* died in jail during the liberation war. Only the *pwiyamwene* remained. When FRELIMO formed the government, *regulos* were made redundant. We had no *régulo* but the village was still there ... The *aldeamento* set up by the Portuguese was guarded by soldiers and it was difficult for FRELIMO to approach. It was well controlled. Whether in this *aldeamento* or the *aldeamento* after independence [*aldeia comunal*], we were forced to stay inside. There was no other option but to accept the order.²⁹

During the war [liberation struggle], Mwene Mwapula was not here. The FRELIMO government threw out *mwenes* and appointed *secretários* and village chiefs instead. Nyanjas became district administrators instead of the Portuguese. We still lived in an *aldeamento* [*aldeia comunal*]. It was very hard. We didn’t like it because Africans were not used to living so close to each other. Once chickens were lost, they were never found. The Nyanja *secretário* was also a problem. He had no sympathy and would not let the residents go far to attend to the fields.³⁰

The above testimonies reveal that the Muela and Mwapula groups did not distinguish between the *aldeamento* and the *aldeia comunal*. It also illustrates that the proxies of *mwenes* and chiefs in the low-end groups, who had been given authority by the colonial administration in the absence of legitimate *mwenes*, were marginalised when *secretários* were appointed. In Muela and Mwapula, outsiders were appointed as *secretários* and they did not handle the residents kindly. Although people were unhappy they continued to lead their daily lives without taking action, probably due to their experience during the liberation war. Then, RENAMO entered the scene.

How then did the post-independence armed conflict start in the north of Maúa District? People living in the Aldeia Comunal Mwapula, the first RENAMO target in the area, describe the events:

The government army came in vehicles and started fighting at five in the morning. This is how we learnt that the war broke out. We all fled. Then RENAMO arrived and warned, “We are opposed to the *aldeia comunal*. If you

go back to your *aldeia comunal*, we will kill you.” They made us go back to fetch our belongings and then burned the *aldeia comunal*. They told us to get out of the village. We came here [the place where they were living at the time of the author’s research in 1999]. We have been here for ten years. There was always a battle on the side of the road. We were scared. We thought the war would continue until the end of the world.³¹

RENAMO came early in the morning. Children on the way to school ran back, shouting, “War!” They said that houses in the *aldeia comunal* were being burnt down. RENAMO went through Muhoco and came to Mwacanha. We grabbed our children and fled to Sede with no belongings. In Sede, the government army told us that it was safe to go home. We did and were captured by RENAMO.³²

The war of RENAMO started. Wars always start here. They never go past here. They come here because we have *mato* and plenty of food. We heard that among them were the people who hacked the chests of people in Mecanhelas [near Malawian borders in Cuamba District]. The FRELIMO *secretário* made us listen to the story on the radio. He called them “*bandidos armados*” (armed bandits) but we didn’t know what they were. Then, finally, RENAMO entered the area. The FRELIMO army also came. We heard gunshots but thought they were cleaning weapons. When we saw injured people, we fled to Sede in a hurry. RENAMO was already there and told us to go home. When we returned, there was nothing that remained. Everything was taken to the base. A month later, there was a meeting. We were told that we could no longer escape and that FRELIMO would no longer come. RENAMO explained that it was against FRELIMO’s policies, such as on cooperatives, which wouldn’t allow one to work on his own, *lojas populares* (people’s stores), which created long queues, and the OMM, which sent women to the cities leaving their husbands in the villages. We thought it was good and stopped fleeing. But, RENAMO killed people in front of others, probably as a warning so that we wouldn’t run away. We were forced to live under the laws that RENAMO created. Life in jail did not cease. People lived crying all the time.³³

Thus, the Mwapula group tried in vain to flee from RENAMO and continued to live under its rule. In nearby Muela, elders explain:

RENAMO first ordered us to move out of the village in the direction of the field [north]. This enabled us to leave the *aldeia comunal*. In the end, people were divided into the FRELIMO side [Sede] and the RENAMO side [the field]. Both sides fought over people and information. RENAMO needed

somebody to help to control the residents. It started to look for *régulos*, *mwenes*, *pwiyamwenes*, *humus* [*pwattaphwattas*], *adjuntos* (assistants), diviners and witch doctors. It also unbanned religion.³⁴

After Mwene/Régulo Muela IV “mysteriously” disappeared (actually he was executed by the PIDE) during the liberation war, the Muela group lived under his proxy who was appointed by the colonial administration. The proxy was not from Lapone, Mwene’s clan, but from Mirasse, Mwene’s clan on his paternal side. When FRELIMO’s hierarchy was introduced into the community there was no need for the proxy. RENAMO tried to make use of any authoritative figure as long as they had not been introduced by FRELIMO. Since the *mwene* alone could not manage the occupied area in wartime, RENAMO appointed influential people in local communities to be *mambos*, the equivalent of *mwenes* in central Mozambique where RENAMO came from.

RENAMO looked for the successor to Régulo Muela, who was the high authority throughout northern Maúa until the end of the colonial era. As the last Mwene Muela was already deceased, the present Muela V was chosen as his successor. Carlos Jaibo remembers his appointment:

I was in Mora, married to a local woman, when RENAMO came. Young people were sent to the *mato* and old ones to the Mwapula group. One day, my uncle told my father that I had been selected to be a *mwene*. I am not sure why they chose me from the five children. I divorced my wife in Mora and married a woman here.³⁵

The family of Jaibo, the present *régulo*, was not closely related to the one of his predecessor but was not considered “inferior” because of its closeness to the first Mwene Muela and the second Mwene Muela (Figure 32). It is likely that the Muela group did not have many other candidates since some of Carlos’ brothers had joined FRELIMO while others fled to Sede. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Muela group in Maúa reduced in size following the introduction of the colonial administration’s cotton policy in the 1950s and became even smaller once the liberation war divided the group.

In neighbouring Mwapula too, RENAMO looked for a person with traditional authority. The group had even fewer candidates than Muela because many residents, including the *mwene* and the *pwiyamwene*, supported FRELIMO during the liberation war. Eventually a person was appointed as the *mambo* who had previously been appointed *chefe* as the proxy of Mwene Mwapula during the last days of the colonial era. Proxies of *mwenes* who had lost their backers and become marginalised after the colonial authority left, were once more raised to authoritative positions under RENAMO.

Traditionally, there was a definite hierarchy among *mwenes*. In RENAMO-occupied areas, however, anybody who was considered a “traditional chief” could become a *mambo*. To each *mambo*, RENAMO allocated about twenty hostages brought back from raids to be new residents under him.³⁶

When a *mambo* died, his maternal nephew succeeded. This was the case with C.G. whose ancestors were slaves in Mwapula, and M.N. in Muela who came from the paternal side of the *mwene*. Neither of them would have previously had authority in their groups. They tried to strengthen their positions in the groups by pledging loyalty to RENAMO.

Small cracks that had been created in local communities through the historical process deepened into a ravine through the liberation war and the post-independence war. The external force of RENAMO had infiltrated the local communities with its overwhelming force and political manoeuvring and caused deep divisions among the residents.

In conclusion

People did not want another war. However, post-independence violence became inevitable due to global factors (the Cold War), regional factors (apartheid), historical factors (decolonisation) and, above all, division among the people created through many years of colonial rule and the liberation war. Just when people thought that a long-awaited independence and a new era had arrived, war returned.

RENAMO succeeded in creating favourable conditions for itself in the areas that had failed to establish an alliance with FRELIMO during the liberation war. The Maúa region in the south of Niassa District in northern Mozambique serves as a case study for this book. Similar studies should be undertaken in other areas. Hopefully this book succeeds in its objective of demonstrating the historical background of the prolonged war in Mozambique. It is hoped that this research inspires and prompts further research on the historical experience of people in various areas in Mozambique.

Notes

- 1 After the outbreak of the armed conflict in late 1970s, Samora Machel and his government often used the term “*inimigo interno*”. Machel published a book entitled *Declaramos Guerra ao Inimigo Interno* in 1980. The phrase “*inimigo interno*” has its origins in the liberation struggle.
- 2 Geffray attributes this to the fact that the FRELIMO leaders were Marxist urban intellectuals, and asserts that they regarded rural areas as a “blank page” (Geffray, 1991:14-16). As discussed in the introduction, other researchers have made similar arguments. This book takes the approach that, before discussing the rural policy of the FRELIMO government, it is necessary to investigate how the relationship between FRELIMO and rural residents in Mozambique developed during the liberation war, as this may have impacted on the perception of rural society by FRELIMO leaders.
- 3 Muhoco Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúá District, 11/8/1997.
- 4 L.N., Maúá Sede, 5/9/1997.
- 5 Middlemas, 1975:325-328.
- 6 Newitt, 1995:539.
- 7 Hall and Young, 1997:44.
- 8 Middlemas, 1975:329.
- 9 Newitt, 1995:524.
- 10 Hall and Young, 1997:41.
- 11 Newitt, 1995:539
- 12 Jardim, 1976:288.
- 13 Antunes, 1996:503-505. According to Fernando Couto who conducted research on PIDE archives, Simeão later distanced himself from Jardim due to his support of Miguel Murupa, an African leader who she considered to be incompetent (Couto, 2011:109).
- 14 Newitt, 1995:539.
- 15 Robinson, *Contemporary Portugal*, 208-210.
- 16 Egerö, 1985:9; 13.
- 17 Hanlon, 1983:139-141.
- 18 Muhoco Muihwa, Muhoco, Maúá District, 28/8/1999.
- 19 M.M., Muhoco, Maúá District, 11/8/1997; I.A., Muhoco, Maúá District, 15/8/1997.
- 20 For details, see the genealogy of Mwene Muhoco in Figure 38.
- 21 Muhoco Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúá District, 11/8/1997.
- 22 I.A., Muhoco, Maúá District, 15/8/1997.
- 23 Muhoco Council of Elders, Muhoco, Maúá District, 11/8/1997.
- 24 M.M., Muhoco, Maúá District, 11/8/1997.
- 25 See the genealogy of Mwene Muhoco in Figure 38.
- 26 I.A. did not tell the author who this man was. Putting the accounts of various people together, he was probably M.M. or Mwene Quingui.
- 27 I.A., Muhoco, Maúá District, 15/8/1997.
- 28 R.A., Muhoco, Maúá District, 29/8/1999.
- 29 Muela Council of Elders, Muela, Maúá District, 22/8/1997.
- 30 P.C., Mwapula, Maúá District, 7/9/1999.
- 31 A.S., Mwapula, Maúá District, 6/9/1999.
- 32 A.A. (female), Mwapula, Maúá District, 6/9/1999.
- 33 P.C., Mwapula, Maúá District, 7/9/1999.
- 34 Muela Council of Elders, Muela, Maúá District, 22/8/1997.
- 35 Mwene Muela, Muela, Maúá District, 4/9/1999.
- 36 Nihava Council of Elders, Maúá District, 30/8/1997; Muela Council of Elders, Muela, Maúá District, 23/8/1997.

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I dedicate this book to people in Maúa, Hans-Juergen and Kai.

This book was going to end with the sentence above. However, as I was preparing for its publication, unprecedented disasters – an earthquake, a tsunami, and a nuclear power-plant accident – struck Japan in March 2011. I realised that the African proverb, “When two elephants fight, the grass suffers” did not apply only to Africa or Mozambique. In Japan, while people in the disaster areas, especially children, are suffering from the ever-increasing negative effects of the nuclear accident, politicians both in the government and the opposition are fighting among themselves.

However impossible the situation may look, there should be a way to overcome the difficulty. Unity and division go hand-in-hand. The important question is how to prevail over division. I am certain that a clue can be found in people. This is the time to put into practice what we have learned from contemporary Mozambican history!

8 September 2011, at the Maputo Airport
Sayaka Funada-Classen

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