

Special Articles

South African Jews and the Apartheid Crisis

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THE WIDESPREAD ERUPTIONS of unrest in South Africa in the 1980s have focused attention on various aspects of that society, including its small but influential Jewish community. That community occupies a special place within South Africa itself and also on the worldwide contemporary Jewish scene. In the South African context, Jews have been very important in the economic and cultural development of the country; at the same time, they have been prominent in manifestations of resistance to the apartheid system by which the whites have dominated the society as a whole. In the Jewish context, the situation of South African Jews is highly unusual: a Jewish community that shares in the castelike status of the privileged in a society based upon a system of legalized racial discrimination.

The Distinctiveness of South African Jewry

In 1987 the estimated 115,000 Jews of South Africa constituted no more than one-half of 1 percent of the country's composite population, consisting of 19.7 million blacks, 4.9 million whites, 3.0 million coloreds (people of mixed race), and 900,000 Asians (mainly Indians). Jews belonged inherently to the dominant white minority, forming 2.3 percent of the total. As for the history of the community: it began as an incidental offshoot of British Jewry in the nineteenth century, was consolidated by a broad wave of immigration from Eastern Europe between 1880 and 1930, and was finally augmented by a small influx (numbering some 6,000) of Central European Jews fleeing from Hitler's tyranny in the 1930s.¹

Note: The author gratefully acknowledges the access granted him by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies to its extensive library and archives and the research assistance in South Africa of Jonathan Penkin.

¹According to the South African census of 1980 there were 117,963 Jews. The population figures cited here are estimates for mid-1986. They exclude the independent Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda. See Sergio DellaPergola and Allie A. Dubb, "South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile," in this volume. On the origins of the Jewish community, see Louis Herrman, *The History of the Jews in South Africa* (London, 1935); Israel Abrahams, *Birth of a Community* (Cape Town, 1955); Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, eds., *The Jews in South Africa: A History* (London and Cape Town, 1955). A perceptive study of South African Jewry in the comparative context of some other New World communities is Daniel J. Elazar and

In many important respects, the Jews of South Africa were no different from those of other New World Jewish communities. South Africa offered Jewish immigrants postemancipation freedom in all essentials, as well as great economic prosperity. It also took its toll in the erosion of Jewish identity resulting from acculturation to the surrounding society. Yet a number of factors converged to confer a distinctive character upon South African Jewry.

One was the relatively homogeneous composition of the community. Although the founding generation, numbering some 4,000 by 1880, came mainly from Britain, the formative East European wave, which brought some 40,000 immigrants from 1880 to 1910 and a further 30,000 until 1948, was predominantly from Lithuania. The synthesis of Anglo-Jewish institutional forms with "Litvak," non-Hassidic religious orthodoxy and deep Zionist sentiment that characterized South African Jewry may be attributed largely to this factor. This has been aptly described as the "pouring of Litvak spirit into Anglo-Jewish bottles."² This synthesis endowed South African Jewry with a Jewish Board of Deputies modeled on the Anglo-Jewish prototype, on which were represented most synagogue congregations and communal organizations. Hence, too, the blend of the Orthodox "misnaged" tradition of the Litvaks with London's United Synagogue form of synagogue ritual, which led to a kind of "conservative traditionalism" and a normative mode of religiosity that has been described as "non-observant Orthodox."³ In contrast to the situation in Britain and the United States, the Zionist orientation that most Litvak immigrants brought with them to South Africa did not come into conflict with an established mold of Reform Judaism, with its attendant antagonism to Jewish nationalism. Indeed, Reform Judaism was only introduced into South Africa in 1933, and its founder, Rabbi Moses C. Weiler, endowed it with a moderate mode of Reform and a marked Zionist sentiment. Consequently, Zionism met with only slight resistance in South Africa, and in fact the Zionist Federation that was founded in 1898 became the first Jewish institution to achieve a countrywide organizational framework. What is more, from the outset

Peter Medding, *Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies* (New York, 1983). The most recent work on South African Jewry is Marcus Arkin, ed., *South African Jewry: A Contemporary Survey* (Cape Town, 1984), which also contains an extensive annotated bibliography by Reuben Musiker. An illuminating contribution to the economic history of the community is Mendel Kaplan, *Jewish Roots in the South African Economy* (Cape Town, 1986).

²The expression is that of the doyen of South African Jewish historiography, Gustav Saron. See Gustav Saron, "The Making of South African Jewry: An Essay in Historical Interpretation," in *South African Jewry 1965*, ed. Leon Feldberg (Johannesburg, 1965), 9-48.

³See Jocelyn Hellig, "South African Judaism: An Expression of Conservative Traditionalism," *Judaism* 35, no. 2 (Spring 1986):233-42; also Jocelyn Hellig's chapter "Religious Expression" in Arkin, *South African Jewry*, 95-116.

South African Zionism was deeply involved in local community life. It remained the preeminent ideological orientation of South African Jewry, providing an anchor for Jewish ethnicity no less important than the synagogue was for Jewish religiosity.

At least as important a factor in shaping the distinctive character of South African Jewry was the societal environment into which the immigrants entered. It was one in which an ascriptive attribute—race—was the primary determinant of people's lives. In sociological terms, South Africa was, as it remained, a pluralistic society characterized by the existence of several sociocultural segments with parallel institutional structures within the same overarching political and economic system.⁴ The traditional norms which determined this segmentation long before the term "apartheid" entered the country's political lexicon were buttressed and enforced by the apartheid laws of the state. They remained potent even as the apartheid system, having become largely dysfunctional, was in the process of disintegrating.

It is of interest to note how this mode of what may be described as a "mandatory" pluralism differed from the "laissez-faire" pluralism of American society. In the latter, the sociocultural segments maintained institutions supplementary to all-embracing ones common to the society as a whole. Moreover, the professed attitude of the state to these supplementary institutions was neutral, so that their maintenance was a wholly voluntary matter. By contrast, in the mandatory pluralism of South Africa, the state actively compelled strict separation of the segments and the maintenance of parallel, rather than merely supplementary, sets of institutions for each of them. Indeed, South Africa's pluralism could be said to be multiply segmented. Its primary segmentation was into racially defined, castelike groups, one of which—the whites—was in all respects dominant, but all of which possessed parallel, if unequal, sets of institutions. Its secondary segmentation divided even the dominant group into Afrikaners and English-speakers (in a ratio of about three to two) by compelling further institutional duplication in certain spheres, particularly language and education.

Jewish immigrants to South Africa belonged from the outset to the privileged white segment and normally lived their lives within its confines. Exempt by virtue of skin color from the discrimination suffered by all nonwhites, they enjoyed full civic rights in the parliamentary democracy of the whites. Outside of the economic sphere in which, in common with all whites, they related to the other segments of society as masters to servants

⁴For a fuller discussion see Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience (1910–1967)* (Cape Town, 1980), 1–4. Cf. Elazar and Medding, *Jewish Communities in Frontier Societies*, 211–13.

or as employers to employees, they would never normally participate in any social or cultural institutions whatsoever with nonwhites.

Since the privileged white segment was itself culturally dualistic and of inchoate national identity, the circumstances were highly conducive to the preservation of a separate Jewish group identity. The Jews certainly became acculturated to the white part of society, but it was overwhelmingly the English segment which served as their reference group. However, the most formative factor in the country's history proved to be not the English but the Afrikaners, descendants of the seventeenth-century Dutch settlers, who were marked by an organic national consciousness, Calvinist religiosity, and a sharp sense of grievance against British imperialism. Consequently, the pull of acculturation, with its attendant erosion of distinctive Jewish identity, was considerably weaker than in England itself, where English culture was indigenous and unchallenged. Nor was it as strong as in the United States, where a new all-embracing American identity exerted a powerful attraction. There was, in fact, no unhyphenated South Africanism—no agreed-upon, all-inclusive identity equivalent to that provided by the concept of being “British” or “American.” Hence, considerably more leeway remained for Jews to retain their distinctive identity, not only in the religious sense but also as far as the national element—expressed through Zionism—was concerned.

Jewish Political Orientations Prior to Enforced Apartheid

From the beginnings of a significant Jewish presence in South Africa—and this can be dated to the last quarter of the nineteenth century—the pattern of their political involvement reflected their acculturation mainly to the English-speaking segment of society. Most of the Anglo-Jews involved in politics at the municipal and parliamentary levels, both before and immediately after the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, were attached to the pro-British imperial parties.⁵ At that time, when people spoke of the “race question” they usually meant the conflict between Boer (Afrikaner) and Briton. Within that context, by the 1920s Jews tended to identify mainly with the centrist South African party led by the former Boer generals Louis Botha and Jan Christiaan Smuts. This party followed a policy of conciliation between the Afrikaners and the English and looked toward the molding of a united, bilingual (white) South Africanism. Ever since the British government's Balfour Declaration of November 1917, favoring the development of a Jewish national home in Palestine, in the making of which Jan Christiaan Smuts played a role as a member of the

⁵For the period prior to the creation of the Union of South Africa, see Saron and Hotz, *Jews in South Africa*, 179–212; also Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 61–73.

imperial war cabinet, Jews had held him in high regard. This sentiment, in turn, reinforced their support for his conciliatory, centrist political position. In a major realignment of political forces that took place in the early 1930s, the Afrikaner nationalist leader J. B. M. Hertzog combined forces with Smuts to form the United party. One segment of the nationalists, however, did not agree with this fusion and, under Daniel F. Malan, split off in 1934 to form what was called the "Gesuiwerde" (purified) National party. As minister of the interior in 1930, Malan had introduced the Quota Act, which greatly restricted further Jewish immigration to South Africa. Moreover, his new party succumbed to anti-Semitic influences largely emanating from Nazi Germany. From 1933 until well after the Second World War, pro-Nazi, anti-Semitic groups proliferated in South Africa. The "Jewish problem" became a political issue, and widespread agitation against a loophole in the Quota Act culminated in the Aliens Act of 1937, which halted the entry of Jews fleeing from Hitler's Germany. By 1938 the Afrikaner nationalist opposition headed by Dr. Malan was campaigning on a platform that demanded total prohibition of Jewish immigration and even the imposition of a quota system directed against Jews in commerce and the professions. In these circumstances, all Jewish candidates for political election and the entire Jewish public were clearly associated with Jan Smuts's wing of the United party (with the exception of a lesser number who supported the small Labor party). Furthermore, the Jewish Board of Deputies, intensely engaged in the defense of the Jewish community against anti-Semitic defamation, even departed somewhat from its traditional policy of noninvolvement in politics and lent discreet support to a liberal group centered on the personality of Smuts's political lieutenant, Jan Hofmeyr.⁶

When Hertzog and Smuts split in 1939 over the question of whether South Africa should enter the war on Britain's side against Germany, it was a foregone conclusion that Jews would lend their support overwhelmingly to the Smuts wing of the party, which conducted South Africa through the war period in alliance with Britain. Under Smuts as premier a Jew reached cabinet rank, for the first and only time to this day—Henry Gluckman, who became minister of health in 1945. In light of the Afrikaner National party's attitude toward Jews, they contemplated its victory over Smuts's party in the elections of May 1948 with great trepidation.

⁶See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 152–55. The term "liberal" is used here and throughout this study in its customary South African sense. In Hofmeyr's time this connoted opposition to Nazi influences, the upholding of civil liberties, and the desire to uplift the underprivileged sections of the population and alleviate discrimination and the indignities that were their lot. After 1948, liberals generally meant those who were actively concerned to abolish racial discrimination and to extend equal civic rights to nonwhites within the existing parliamentary system. See Janet Robertson, *Liberalism in South Africa 1948–1963* (Oxford, 1971).

Throughout the period until 1948, very few Jews showed political concern that transcended the interests of the white group. Indeed, when there was an incidental convergence of Jewish and Indian concerns over proposed immigration legislation which, although primarily aimed at stopping Indians from coming to South Africa, would also have hampered the free flow of Jewish immigration, Jewish representatives were at pains to dissociate their case from that of the Indians.⁷ This detachment from the fate of the Indians, who in some respects suffered from disabilities similar to those that applied to Jews in the Russian Pale of Settlement under czarist rule, characterized the Jewish community's political orientation within South African society at that juncture. Preoccupied as they were with their own interests and advancement in a white societal environment not free from anti-Semitism, they showed little concern for the underprivileged racial groups, not even for the Indians whose fate occasionally touched theirs.

At the same time, however—and this too was characteristic—Jews predominated among those few whites who were dissenters and took up the cause of the underprivileged masses. This was especially marked in the struggle for the rights of Indians led by Mohandas K. Gandhi from 1906 until 1914, in which he developed his doctrine of *satyagraha*, later to be employed with empire-shaking effect in India itself. The closest of Gandhi's white associates were in fact Jews, notably Henry Polak, who had come from England, and Hermann Kallenbach, who was Lithuanian-born but had qualified as an architect in Germany. Differences of opinion over the question whether Jews had a moral imperative to support the cause of the Indians or whether Jewish interests rather dictated that they not deviate from the behavior of other whites already encapsulated the controversy, which remained substantially the same thereafter. Polak, for example, explained that he had been drawn into the Indian *satyagraha* struggle "as a Jew who has tried to remember that Judaism is a matter not only of belief but also of action." He said that after coming to South Africa and learning about the Indian problem there, he had realized that "this was the Jewish problem all over again," for there was not a single argument advanced against Indians which had not already been urged against Jews in one or another European country. He was ashamed at the failure of Jews in South Africa to champion the Indians' immigration rights, while defending their own. Drawing a parallel with discrimination against the Jews in czarist Russia, he complained that "either in ignorance or by design, Jews have lent themselves to, or at least not openly dissociated themselves from, racial

⁷This convergence of Indian and Jewish immigration problems occurred in 1902, 1911–13, and 1924. See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 76–80, 90.

persecution." The only consolation he found as a Jew was "that those non-Indians who have taken a leading part in the effort to expose and do away with this persecution are most of them members of our faith."⁸

As for the Litvak immigrant generation in South Africa, they were generally too preoccupied with their economic integration into the country to be concerned with the problems of the social system as a whole. Gauged by the adaptiveness of Jews from Eastern Europe to the codes of behavior underlying the castelike separation of the races and the norms, legal and customary, of white domination, it is doubtful whether their own experiences of discrimination and persecution in the Russian Pale of Settlement had as ennobling an effect upon them as is sometimes imagined. Indeed, most Jewish immigrants quickly became accustomed to regarding blacks as inferiors fit solely to be servants and unskilled laborers.⁹ Yet even among these immigrants there were some early manifestations of revulsion over the indignities and exploitation to which blacks were subjected. In 1917 a Yiddish-speaking group was formed within the South African International Socialist League, the forerunner of the South African Communist party, which rejected all distinctions based on color and recognized only class differences. Moreover, an early Zionist-socialist group, Poalei Zion, formed in 1918, evinced deep sympathy for the oppressed black masses. Still another organized Jewish group which nurtured a leftist-oriented opposition to the South African societal system was the Yiddisher Arbeter Club. It existed from 1928 to 1948, and its membership overlapped somewhat with the similarly aligned Afrikaner Geserd that functioned in the 1930s.¹⁰ In the late 1930s and 1940s the Zionist Socialist party, which formed an integral part of the South African Zionist Federation, also evinced concern for the cause of the black population and participated to a degree in some left-wing alignments.¹¹

⁸See the London *Jewish Chronicle*, Sept. 5, 1913. On Gandhi's Jewish associates, see Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, trans. V. G. Desai (Stanford Academic Reprints, 1954); also Gideon Shimoni, *Gandhi, Satyagraha and the Jews* (Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977).

⁹See Leibl Feldman, *Yidden in Johannesburg* (Yiddish) (Johannesburg, 1956), 241-46; also Michael Pesah Grossman, "A Study of the Trends and Tendencies of Hebrew and Yiddish Writing in South Africa Since Their Beginnings in the Early Nineties of the Last Century to 1930" (unpublished D.Phil. diss., University of the Witwatersrand, 1973), 347-49.

¹⁰See Feldman, *Yidden in Johannesburg*, and also his *Yidden in Dorem Afrika* (Yiddish) (Wilno, 1937), 102-16; also Taffy Adler, "Lithuania's Diaspora: The Johannesburg Jewish Workers' Club 1928-1948," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 6, no. 1 (1979):70-92; Evangelos Mantzaris, "From the History of Bundist Activity in South Africa," *Bulletin of the Bund Archives of the Jewish Labour Movement*, no. 3/31 (Winter 1981-82):1-3.

¹¹See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 188-92.

Political Involvement of Jews Under Apartheid

The ascent of the Afrikaner nationalists to power in 1948 was a critical turning point in the history of South Africa and also for the Jewish community. It inaugurated a new era of anxieties and moral dilemmas. The innovative aspect of Malan's new government lay not in the invention of the system of white domination and racial segregation—this long preceded Malan's ascent to power—but rather in its ideological rationalization and in the institution of far-reaching social engineering to fortify it against the winds of change in Africa. The term "apartheid" entered political usage in the mid-1940s. Although at its crudest level it signified the preservation of *baasskap*, meaning white domination in all aspects of South African society, it underwent a steady process of ideological refinement. Hendrik Verwoerd made the major contribution to the process, starting in 1950 when he first became minister of native affairs ("native" then being the term used for blacks), through his ascent to the premiership in 1958, and until an assassin took his life in 1966. At its most refined level, apartheid purported to be a regulated system of race relations that would guarantee white self-preservation while at the same time providing parallel "separate development" for all the racial groups comprising South African society.

As a program of action, apartheid meant reinforcement of white domination of the political and economic life of the country. It also meant systematization of social and residential separation between the various racial groups on the basis of racial classification of the population. At the same time, it purported to provide frameworks, institutional and territorial, for the proposed separate development of each racial group. Accordingly, measures were taken throughout the 1950s to remove residual irregularities in the political system, such as the long-standing right enjoyed by enfranchised coloreds in the Cape to vote for Parliament on a common voters' roll with whites. Similarly, segregation became more stringently enforced in public places and services, such as railways, buses, and parks. Controls over black migration to the towns were significantly tightened, and harsh measures were taken against those who broke the rules. Job reservation (disqualifying nonwhites from certain jobs) was systematized, and separate industrial conciliation machinery was instituted.

In the field of black education, control was transferred to the government, which sought to withhold from blacks such education as might fit them for positions in society which they were in any case not allowed to hold. Similarly, blacks were now denied access to those English-language universities which had previously admitted them along with whites and were directed to separate colleges that were created for the various racial groups, under strict governmental supervision. At the same time, long-term planning was instituted for the consolidation of territories historically associated

with the various black tribes into projected "homelands." All urban blacks were ultimately to hold citizenship and political rights in the respective homelands of their particular ethnic groups, rather than in the white state of South Africa. This aspect of the policy was called "grand" apartheid, in contrast to the "petty" apartheid of segregated services, pass laws, and the like.

The enormous disruption and suffering resulting from the apartheid system aroused bitter opposition. Ranged against it were an array of black, colored, and Indian political movements, supported by a number of white liberals and radicals, some struggling to reform, others to overthrow, the societal system. Under the leadership of the African National Congress, whose founding dated back to 1912, nonviolent opposition swelled to unprecedented proportions. The 1952 Defiance Campaign openly violated apartheid laws, with the protesters allowing themselves to be arrested. A second wave of protest led to a "Congress of the People" in 1955, and a third wave to the famous Sharpeville demonstration of March 1960, in which the police opened fire on the crowd, killing 69 people and wounding 180.

To this unrest the government reacted with an escalating series of repressive measures. Thousands of protesters of all racial groups were arrested, and hundreds were put on trial and charged with plotting the violent overthrow of the state. It was at this point that the African National Congress and its offshoot, the Pan-Africanist Congress, went underground and launched a campaign of violence.

Apart from the effect of these dramatic events upon the lives of Jews simply as white citizens of South Africa, they had significant consequences for South African Jewry as a community. The reason was the extraordinary prominence of Jewish individuals in the white opposition to the regime of apartheid. Throughout this period Jewish names kept appearing in every facet of the struggle: among reformist liberals; in the radical Communist opposition; in the courts, whether as defendants or as counsel for the defense; in the lists of persons banned (i.e., placed in political quarantine); and among those who fled the country to evade arrest. The prominence of Jews was particularly marked in the course of the great Treason Trial, involving 156 people of all races, which received wide media attention throughout the second half of the 1950s. Twenty-three of those who were put on trial were white, and more than half of them were Jews. Leading the defense was advocate Israel Maisels, who was also a prominent Jewish communal figure. After dragging on for five years, the trial ended in March 1961; the prosecution finally conceded defeat and all the accused were released.

As the battered opposition forces retreated into underground activities, resorting to the use of violence, the government reacted with emergency

legislation of an even more drastic nature, notably the notorious "90-day clause" enacted in 1963, which permitted 90 days' detention without either the need for a warrant or recourse to the courts. In this phase of the conflict the prominent involvement of individual Jews was even more in evidence. Most dramatic were the circumstances of the "Rivonia Arrests" of July 1963, in which leaders of the African National Congress underground were captured. Of the 17 people arrested, 5 were white, all of them Jews. The dramatic effect of this arrest was exceeded only by its sequel: in August, while awaiting trial in a Johannesburg prison cell, four of the prisoners made a spectacular escape. Two were Jews, Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe; the latter settled in London, the former in Israel.

Reacting to this prominence of Jews in the opposition, the Afrikaans press bristled with editorial observations and letters to the editor charging or insinuating that Jews were unsympathetic to the Afrikaners' legitimate political aspirations and that all too many Jews were responsible for liberal trouble-mongering and Communist subversion. Nor were the critics satisfied by declarations of the Jewish Board of Deputies reiterating that the Jewish community had neither collective political allegiance nor responsibility for the political actions of individual Jewish citizens.¹²

It must be borne in mind that the involvement of Jews in the opposition to the apartheid system, notwithstanding its public salience, actually reflected the attitudes of only a very small segment of the total Jewish population. With compelling inherent socioeconomic factors reinforcing their position within the white racial group, for the most part Jews conformed to the norms of English-speaking whites. Empirical studies published in the 1970s indicated that the political preferences of Jews tended to be much the same as those of English-speaking non-Jews of the same socioeconomic status. Factors such as level of education and family income appeared to be more important determinants of political preference than the quality of their Jewishness. On the other hand, some pertinent sociological research on Jewish youth conducted earlier, in 1959, led to the conclusion that "Jews are more favourably disposed towards Natives [blacks], Coloureds and Indians than are the members of any other White group. Jews were found to be consistently more tolerant than other groups in their attitudes to non-Whites."¹³

¹²Ibid., 228-30.

¹³Henry Lever, "The Jewish Voter in South Africa," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (Oct. 1979). See also H. Lever and O. J. M. Wagner, "Ethnic Preferences of Jewish Youth in Johannesburg," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 9 (June 1967):34-37; and Henry Lever, *Ethnic Attitudes of Johannesburg Youth* (Johannesburg, 1968). Since these works, there has been no published research of note on Jewish political behavior. Nor has there been research on the sociology of the community since the publication of Allie Dubb's *Jewish South Africans: A Sociological View of the Johannesburg Jewish Community* (Rhodes University, Grahamstown,

One rough indicator of Jewish political behavior may be found by examining the allegiance of Jewish candidates for election. It appears that throughout the two decades following the 1948 elections the majority of candidates for Parliament, and almost all of those who gained election, belonged to the centrist United party, which followed the political tradition of Jan Smuts. In 1948, for instance, all five of the Jews elected to Parliament belonged to the United party. It should be noted that at that time there already was a further option provided by the small Liberal party, which advocated abolition of apartheid and a discrimination-free, multiracial democracy, whereas the United party, while opposed to apartheid laws, still upheld white political supremacy in all essentials. Jews were certainly prominent in the Liberal party, but gauged by the record in a number of specific constituencies known to have a high proportion of Jewish voters, most Jews still preferred the United party.¹⁴

The Liberal party did not survive long in the political climate of South Africa under Verwoerd and his successor, John Vorster. Multiracial political parties having been forbidden by law, it disbanded in 1968. However, a rather more equivocal liberal option had emerged in 1959 out of the ranks of the United party itself. This was the Progressive party, which, by stages, absorbed other fragments of the disintegrating United party to become finally the Progressive Federal party in 1977. While advocating the abolition of apartheid, in its initial stages the Progressive party spoke of a universal educational qualification for the franchise in a federally ordered, multiracial democracy. The Progressives immediately attracted a considerable segment of Jewish supporters. Two of the five United party members of Parliament who were Jews opted to become Progressives. One of these, Helen Suzman, was reelected in 1961 and remained the sole Progressive member of Parliament for the next three sessions. That the centrist United party still had Jewish support was shown by the fact that five, two, and three Jewish United party members took their seats in Parliament in 1961, 1966, and 1970, respectively. In the 1974 elections Helen Suzman was still the only successful Jewish Progressive party candidate, and there were three successful Jewish United party candidates. However, the United party disintegrated during the ensuing parliamentary session; thereafter, barring a few Jewish National party candidates who repeatedly failed to get elected, all Jewish candidates stood for the Progressives. By 1980 the Progressive Federal party was clearly the one with the greatest Jewish affiliation, and in the 1981 elections all four Jews elected were Progressives.

1977). An illuminating theoretical analysis taking inductive account of the South African case is Peter Y. Medding, "Towards a General Theory of Jewish Political Interests and Behaviour," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 19, no. 2 (Dec. 1977):115-41.

¹⁴See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 303, 304.

Jewish Political Responses to Apartheid in Transition

By the mid-1960s the radical onslaught on the apartheid regime had virtually been suppressed, allowing the system a further lease on life. Although it was again convulsed by the Soweto outburst in 1976, another apparent respite followed, lasting until the great resurgence of resistance that began to envelop the country in 1985. Under B. J. Vorster's premiership, from 1966 to 1978, implementation of "grand" apartheid continued apace. Forced resettlement of population in the homelands, mostly under appalling conditions, encompassed as many as 3.5 million people. Three of the homelands accepted the offer of "independence," while the others remained only self-governing. In other respects, however, this was a period of transition in the apartheid policy. Signs of dissonance began to appear as increasing numbers of urbanized Afrikaners became upwardly mobile in business, manufacturing, and professional occupations.¹⁵ Pragmatic tendencies began to erode ideological dogmatism, and Afrikaner businessmen, no less than their English counterparts, began to balk at the dysfunctional aspects of apartheid in the economic sphere. These were primarily the failure to satisfy industry's hunger for more permanent and skilled black workers and the limited consumer capacity of blacks.

Against this background, a division emerged between two main ideological factions which came to be loosely labeled as *verkramptes* (narrow-minded) and *verligtes* (enlightened). In general terms, adherents of the former were characterized by rigid insistence upon Afrikaner national exclusivism and domination of the South African polity and by uncompromising resistance to modification of the apartheid system in accommodation to criticism from outside the country. *Verligtes* tended to relinquish a measure of Afrikaner exclusivism for the sake of more white unity and to adopt an open-minded attitude to modifications of apartheid which, while not substantially altering long-term goals of "separate development," would soften the hard image of apartheid. Examples of such modifications that aroused the ire of *verkramptes* were mixed sports, admission of black diplomats to the country, mixed audiences in theaters, and the general amelioration of "petty apartheid" measures that offended the dignity of nonwhites more than was necessary for implementation of basic policy.

In the late 1960s this division of opinion led to a split in the ranks of the National party, the *verkramptes* forming the Herstigte (reconstituted) National party, which became the core of the Afrikaner backlash against the *verligte* thrust of Prime Minister Vorster and even more so of his successor, P. W. Botha, who took over in September 1978. In due course an additional

¹⁵On these changes in the Afrikaner sector see Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power* (Cape Town, 1979), 104-27, 217-21.

wave of right-wing reaction led to the foundation of the Conservative party (in 1982), which succeeded in becoming the main opposition party in the all-white chamber of Parliament when it gained more seats than the Progressive Federal party in the 1987 elections.

Having already undergone considerable refinement in Verwoerd's time, the rhetoric of apartheid was further transformed by *verligte* ideological ferment. Racist suppositions were disavowed, blacks were no longer spoken of pejoratively, and less emphasis was placed on the specters of miscegenation and social mixing of the races. By the mid-1970s, *verligtes* tended to exchange faith in separate development as a total ideological solution for more pragmatic considerations of economic reality and ethnic survival. They inclined not only toward removal of petty apartheid discrimination and such racist legislation as the Immorality Act (which made interracial sex a punishable offense), but even toward relinquishing job reservation for whites.

Under P. W. Botha, who served as prime minister from 1978 until 1984 and then, under the new constitution, became state president with executive powers, these tendencies gathered momentum and culminated in a series of reforms. However, with the introduction of emergency regulations to cope with the widespread black unrest that erupted in 1985, the momentum of reform flagged. The centerpiece of these reforms was the new constitution instituted in 1984. It replaced the Westminster-model system with a new tricameral parliament, with one chamber each for the whites, the coloreds, and the Indians. This ostensible step toward political power sharing was greatly flawed, however, not alone by the calculated preeminence of the white chamber but, even more importantly, by the total exclusion of the black (African) majority of South Africa's population. The channel for black political expression was relegated to the various "homelands," four of which had by then accepted independence, while the remaining six were self-governing. As for South Africa's vast population of urban blacks, little more was held out to them than local urban councils with authority limited to what the current lexicon of reformed apartheid referred to as their "own affairs."

At the same time, other specific reforms modifying the apartheid structure erected by earlier Afrikaner governments were introduced, which, in the context of Afrikaner political traditions, certainly represented far-reaching change. Thus, the South African government permitted the creation of legal black trade unions, modified job reservation practices and the pass system, and even took the odious article 16 of the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act off the statute books. The cumulative effect of these reforms signified the virtual dismantling of most of the petty apartheid dogmatically erected in the first two decades of National party rule. Yet,

in practice, it could not be said that apartheid had ceased to exist, since the hard core of apartheid legislation, namely classification of the population according to race and residential segregation, still remained intact—although less rigidly enforced than in the past.

Be that as it may, the ideological rhetoric of government policy was certainly transformed. This rhetoric, and the delicate balance between change and continuity which it veiled, may be illustrated from the National party's electoral campaign of May 1987. The party declared that it would continue the policy of reforms, but only by its own lights and not in surrender to sanctions and threats. It upheld "individual freedom without race discrimination" but predicated this on preserving "the group character" of South African society. Moreover, the National party affirmed that "separate residential areas and voters' rolls for the various groups" still remained official policy. It promised political "power sharing," but qualified this as "own decision making on own affairs and joint decision making on matters of common concern, without the domination of any group by another." The party contrasted this formula for power sharing with the policy of the Progressives, which, it declared, "amounts to a handing over of power."¹⁶

The Progressive Federal party, for its part, in 1987 advocated "an open society, free from statutory apartheid," to be shaped by a national convention comprising the acknowledged leaders of all sections of the population. This implied the inclusion of African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela, who would have to be released from prison. The party would negotiate a new federal constitution which would not exclude the blacks, as the government's constitutional changes had done, and would not divide the population on the basis of racially classified "own affairs."

On the other side of the political spectrum, the Conservative party, born of the right-wing reaction of Afrikaners to Botha's reformist policy, rejected "power sharing" out of hand, advocated partition, and demanded "the restoration of separate development in practice, especially with regard to white residential areas and public amenities." It called for the retention of all apartheid laws, including those that forbade miscegenation and mixed marriages. The Conservatives, furthermore, affirmed what they called "Christian white civilization," although at the same time claiming to "respect freedom of conscience and worship for others."

Although Jews were aware, for the most part, of the still inherent moral defects of reformed apartheid, the fact that it combined renunciation of racist premises with an appeal for the right of the whites to ensure their own survival and welfare against black majority rule struck a responsive chord

¹⁶The quotations in this and the following paragraphs are from pamphlets and brochures issued by the parties during the election campaign of May 1987.

among more and more of them, along with other English speakers. This tendency was perhaps best illustrated in the views of Israel Pinshaw, who was appointed to the State President's Council in 1984. Pinshaw was as identifying a Jew as any in the Jewish community but also an active member of the National party. It is a telling testimony to the transformation of National party political discourse that Pinshaw could depict his role in its ranks as that of a Jew inspired by Jewish values, which were solicitous of human rights irrespective of color or creed, but at the same time insistent upon ethnic-cultural particularism (one may read for this, "own affairs") as a legitimate structural basis for society. Pinshaw claimed that, as a Jew, he urged the National party leadership to move faster and more convincingly toward reforms. In the Jewish press he was reported as stating:¹⁷

I sincerely believe that the philosophy of the National party has completely changed over the years. . . . As a Jew I find bigotry and discrimination repulsive and I believe that through the efforts of the National party accommodation can be achieved amongst our various race groups . . . and as a Jew I will endeavour to see that the decisions to which I am a party will be so designed that they are equitable, just and fair.

Already in the parliamentary elections of 1977 there were indications that the National party was gaining credence in the eyes of Jews. Against a background of some opinion polls that indicated almost a doubling of English-speaking supporters since 1974, the party sponsored the candidacy of a Jew, Abe Hoppenstein, in a Johannesburg constituency (Bezuidenhout) known to have a considerable Jewish population. Hoppenstein, a lawyer by profession, was a National party member of some 20 years' standing and at the same time an identifying Jew associated, *inter alia*, with the Revisionist party of Zionism. In 1974 he was appointed South Africa's trade commissioner in Israel and shortly after that became political counselor in South Africa's Washington embassy. Fresh from that post, he entered the electoral lists to challenge an Afrikaner candidate of the Progressive Federal party, Japie Basson, who had undergone a leftward odyssey in politics after expulsion from the National party. Hoppenstein declared: "Voting for the National party is the best way to provide for our survival in the face of pressure from abroad. We are the only party that can and will bring about effective, meaningful change."¹⁸ In the end, although Basson was elected, he gained a mere 50 votes more than Hoppenstein, and it was evident that

¹⁷*Jewish Herald*, Nov. 27, 1984. Also the author's interview with I. Pinshaw, Sept. 1986. The State President's Council functioned as an advisory body under terms of the reformed constitution. It had 60 members, 41 of whom were white, 13 colored, and 6 Indian. Pinshaw was its only Jewish member until 1987, when he was joined by another Jewish appointee, S. Spilken.

¹⁸The source is newspaper clippings in South African Jewish Board of Deputies Archives (hereafter BD, and in accordance with its classification system), 311.12 and 303.12.

a considerable number of Jewish votes had been cast for the latter. Although his defeat meant that there was still no Jew on the National party benches in Parliament—whereas five Jewish candidates for the Progressives took their seats in the Parliament of 1977—Hoppenstein's close miss was a sign of the times.

To be sure, it was also indicative of the political orientations of Jews that Hoppenstein's candidacy stirred quite a controversy within the Jewish community, with members of the South African Union of Jewish Students (SAUJS) declaring that support of National party policies was a travesty of Jewish ethics and deprecating what they termed Hoppenstein's "contorted rationalizations" in justifying his actions.¹⁹

The increase in the number of Jews tending to vote for the National party was evident in subsequent contests. One was a municipal election in the affluent and largely Jewish ward of Houghton, Johannesburg, an electoral district that had for many years been represented in Parliament by the Progressives' most famous personality, Helen Suzman. In March 1984 the National party ventured to challenge the Progressives, putting up Israel Pinshaw as a candidate. Although the Progressives won the election decisively, with 1,310 votes, Pinshaw managed to gain 573. It is reasonable to assume that most of these votes were cast by Jews.²⁰

In the municipal by-election in the Bellevue-Judith's Paarl ward of Johannesburg in February 1986, in a contest between two Jewish candidates—the Progressives' Tony Leon and the National party's Sam Bloomberg—the Progressives just scraped through with a margin of 39 votes. Since it was reliably estimated that some 35 percent of the eligible voters were Jews, there can be little doubt that many of them voted for the National party candidate. During the contest emotions ran high in the Jewish community: on the one hand, National party posters were defaced; on the other, ultra-Orthodox Jewish residents in the area, mostly elderly persons, were conspicuous in support of the National party's candidate.²¹

Notwithstanding these indications of growing Jewish support for the National party, the main political orientation of Jews was still toward the Progressive Federal party. This may be adduced, in part, from the prominence of Jews in that party's active membership and among its candidates for election. It should be recalled that on the eve of the May 1987 elections all four Jewish members of the white chamber of Parliament were Progressives. At the provincial and municipal levels the prominence of Jews in the

¹⁹See *S.A. Jewish Times*, Oct. 26, Nov. 9, Nov. 23, 1977. Hoppenstein returned to the South African Foreign Service. In 1979 he was appointed consul general in Washington, and in 1980 he took charge of the South African consulate in New York.

²⁰The source is newspaper clippings in BD, 199; 311.12; 100.4A; and 313.12.

²¹*Ibid.*

Progressive Federal party was even more marked. For example, in the March 1977 municipal elections, Jews accounted for 19 of the 38 Progressive candidates.²² In 1986, 16 of the Progressives' representatives on the Johannesburg City Council, as well as the mayor himself, were Jews.²³

At the parliamentary level, the name of Helen Suzman had been the very symbol of opposition to the apartheid system for more than a quarter of a century. She was the South African-born daughter of a Jewish immigrant from Lithuania who prospered in his new country. After a spell in academe teaching economics, she entered Parliament in 1952 as a United party member for the affluent Houghton district in Johannesburg, which had always had a significant Jewish voting population. In 1958 Suzman participated in the first of a series of splits from the United party that ultimately led to the formation of the Progressive Federal party in 1977. For 13 years, from 1961 to 1974, Suzman was the sole Progressive representative in Parliament. Singlehandedly, relentlessly, and with superb analytic prowess, she assailed the apartheid system from the floor of Parliament, where she also had to endure an occasional anti-Semitic taunt.

Suzman, being Jewish, willy-nilly symbolized the relatively liberal stance of South African Jews for people both in and out of South Africa. However, it is perhaps her fellow Progressive Harry Schwarz who came closer to epitomizing the normative orientation of politically aware South African Jews. For whereas Suzman had never taken particular interest in Jewish communal life, Schwarz had been actively involved and, indeed, could be regarded as one of the community's foremost leaders. Born in Cologne, Germany, in 1924, Schwarz came to South Africa in 1934. During the Second World War he served as an officer in the South African Air Force. Afterward he practiced law and engaged in business and merchant banking. After entering Parliament in 1974 as a representative of the United party, Schwarz broke away to found the Reform party, which joined the Progressives, and went on to form the Progressive Federal party in 1977. Within the South African political spectrum, Schwarz was generally identified with the conservative wing of the Progressive Federal party, at least on matters

²²At that stage the name was Progressive Reform party. The United party had not yet disbanded, and 9 out of 31 of its candidates in the municipal elections were Jews. BD, 401.6. See especially the *Jewish Herald*, Feb. 8, 1977.

²³There was a remarkable prominence of Jews in municipal politics, reflected particularly in the number of Jewish mayors. In the 31 years between 1956 and 1987, 12 Jews were elected mayor of Johannesburg; in the 19 years between 1968 and 1987, 8 were elected. (Mayors served a one-year period in office.) In Cape Town, of the 57 aldermen and councillors who held office in the city council from 1976 to 1987, 19 were Jews, and 4 of them had served as mayor in that 11-year period. In mid-1987, 12 of the 34 incumbent councillors were Jews. BD, 100.5A. See also Nathan Mendelow, "Johannesburg's Eighteen Jewish Mayors," *Jewish Affairs*, July 1966, 18-31.

of law and order and the need for military conscription. Much as Suzman was consistently returned to Parliament by the Houghton electorate, so Schwarz was repeatedly successful in the Yeoville constituency of Johannesburg, which also had a considerable Jewish population.

Beginning in the mid-seventies, Schwarz played an increasingly important role on the Jewish Board of Deputies, serving as chairman of its committee on international relations and often acting as spokesman for the board to Jewish agencies abroad. He argued that violent change could ultimately lead to a nondemocratic regime that was not compatible either with Jewish ethics or with the legitimate interests of the Jewish community. He emphasized that Jews needed not only a democratic society for all, but also "the right to follow [their] own religion and love for Israel freely." Typical of his many expressions on this matter was the following:²⁴

To be against apartheid is one thing, but what do we want in its place? What will the post-apartheid regime be like? Will it be a free world type democracy in which human rights are respected and minorities protected? Will it be a regime under which South African Jews will, like other citizens, have religious freedom and under which our communal institutions can be maintained and our love for Zion expressed?

The developing trends in Jewish political orientation were rather more clearly confirmed in the June 1987 general election to the white chamber of Parliament. It was still the Progressive Federal party that fielded the majority of Jewish candidates for election—five out of seven—and that gained most of the votes of Jews in districts known to have large Jewish concentrations.²⁵ Only three Jews gained election—Harry Schwarz and Helen Suzman for the Progressive Federal party and Sam Bloomberg for the National party, the latter thereby becoming the first Jew ever to be elected to Parliament as a representative of the National party.²⁶ As mentioned earlier, Bloomberg had been narrowly defeated when he contested a Johannesburg municipal by-election as a National party candidate in 1986. He now succeeded in the Johannesburg constituency of Bezuidenhout, whose considerable body of Jewish voters, although not predominant,

²⁴Quoted in the *Zionist Record and S.A. Jewish Chronicle*, Dec. 27, 1985, 11; Feb. 6, 1987, 5.

²⁵Four electoral districts had major concentrations of Jewish voters: Houghton, Yeoville, and Bezuidenhout in Johannesburg, and Sea Point in Cape Town (represented by Colin Eglin, the leader of the Progressive Federal party). Only in Bezuidenhout was the Progressive candidate defeated. The Jewish candidates were listed in the *Jewish Times*, May 1, 1987, and the full election results were given in the *Cape Times*, May 8, 1987.

²⁶Another Jew, Theo Aronson, had preceded Bloomberg as a member of Parliament for the National party. However, he was not an elected member. Having suffered defeat when he stood for election in 1981 as a National party candidate, he was appointed to Parliament according to the terms of the new constitution of 1982. BD, 100.4A.

certainly contributed to the 60-percent majority gained by him. His fellow party candidate in the Cape, Esme Chait, was defeated in her constituency, but entered Parliament as a member nominated, under the terms of the constitution, by the National party. The total number of Jewish members of the white chamber thus remained at four, the same as at the close of the previous parliamentary session, but the fact that this number was now equally divided between the government party and the progressive opposition was surely indicative of the trends we have noted.

Yet another noteworthy trend was evident in the 1987 elections, affecting a part of the Jewish vote. Following the example of F. van Zyl Slabbert, who, about a year earlier, had resigned both from Parliament and from the chair of the Progressive Federal party to form the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa, some of the most fervent opponents of the government's policies chose to demonstrate their conviction that the white chamber of Parliament was irrelevant to the real issues facing the country by boycotting the election altogether.

Involvement of Jews in Social Action

The suppression of the radical opposition to the apartheid regime in the 1960s left most of the Jews involved in one or another branch of that opposition either in exile or in prison or under severe banning orders that placed them in political quarantine. Jewish individuals did not, however, fall away from what might be called the liberal-reformist opposition functioning within the bounds of South African laws. To be sure, even this form of opposition was subjected to harassment under the 1986 Emergency Regulations, resulting in new arrests and banning orders. At the English-speaking universities, Jewish students were prominent as opponents of the apartheid system within the leadership of the various Students' Representative Councils and the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). Some of these were at the same time actively involved in Zionist groups off and on the campus. Others, having been awakened to social awareness in the Zionist youth movements, severed their particularistic Jewish bonds and threw themselves wholly into the struggle for a transformed South African society.

Individual Jews were prominent across the entire spectrum of organizations and political groups engaged in the struggle against the government's policies and emergency powers, and on behalf of their victims. In recent years a broad array of new organizations and groups arose, often acting as thorns in the side of the government. The names of Jews were ubiquitous in the leadership of many of these, ranging from Lawyers for Human Rights, headed by Jules Browde, to the End Conscription Campaign, which demanded changes in the law regarding compulsory military service for

whites so that individuals could choose either not to serve in the black townships or do alternative national service.

One outstanding example of activity aimed at alleviating the iniquities of the system was the Legal Resources Center established in 1979 with private funds. It provided desperately needed legal services for thousands of victims of the day-to-day operation of the apartheid system. It also trained paralegal personnel in the elementary legal skills needed to help blacks cope with the maze of apartheid laws which governed their lives. The director and moving spirit of this entire legal aid enterprise was Arthur Chaskalson, who left a brilliant practice as senior counsel at the Johannesburg bar in order to dedicate himself to it.²⁷ Other Jews involved in the founding and progress of the center were Sydney Kentridge, widely regarded as the preeminent lawyer practicing in South Africa, and Basil Wunsh, who was also active in some Jewish organizations. By 1986 the center's staff had grown to some 20 lawyers, 2 paralegal assistants, 8 fellows, and more than 20 administrators. Illustrative of the center's far-reaching achievements were judgements in the cases of two ordinary working blacks, one of which established the right of certain migrant workers to qualify for permanent urban residence, and the other, that of certain black urban dwellers to have their families live with them.

The work of Arthur Chaskalson demonstrated a form of activity which, far more than direct political involvement, characterized the endeavors of Jewish individuals in numbers quite disproportionate to the size of the Jewish population. It was the activity of people born into the privileged status of whites but whose moral conscience drove them to dedicate themselves, within the parameters of what remained legal and possible, to the alleviation of the day-to-day indignities and deprivations inflicted by the apartheid system. At the same time, their efforts formed part of the broader struggle for the reform and ultimate abolition of that system.

Another example of a Jew involved in this manner was educator Franz Auerbach. The author of an academic study of prejudice in history textbooks and syllabi of white high schools, he served from 1981 to 1983 as president of the South African Institute of Race Relations, one of the great pillars of liberal values in South African society. In addition, Auerbach organized the teachers' program of the Funda Center, which provided black teachers with supplementary training.²⁸ Born in Germany, Auerbach fled with his family from the Nazis in 1937, when he was 14 years old. Concurrently with his tireless activities in the broader societal arena, he was active

²⁷BD, biographical files containing, *inter alia*, Rex Gibson's profile in *Optima* 34, no. 1 (Mar. 1986):32-35.

²⁸BD, biographical files.

on the Jewish Board of Deputies and other Jewish communal bodies, notably the South African Yad Vashem Foundation.

Auerbach drew parallels between the Nazi regime in Germany and apartheid. He argued that there was a key parallel in "the organization of a society in which the most important attribute of human beings is their race, as assigned by the state." In defense of similar comparisons made by Archbishop Tutu, Auerbach said that forced removal of black people to "homelands" where there was little food and work was an inhuman practice, even if in the South African case there was no intention of killing them. "The persistence of legally enforced race discrimination," Auerbach said, "makes a comparison between apartheid and Nazism a perfectly valid analogy. . . . In fact I have always held that the experience of the Holocaust obliged me to oppose racial discrimination, especially where it is enforced by law."²⁹

In the business sphere the role of Jews was inherently more ambiguous. Whether big business was a factor either in buttressing apartheid or undermining it was a moot point among academic analysts as well as political activists.³⁰ Be that as it may, in recent years Jews had been in the forefront of those businessmen who, out of enlightened economic self-interest as well as social concern, advocated the dismantling of apartheid restrictions. At the same time, of course, they vigorously called upon foreign corporations not to disinvest and boycott South Africa but rather to remain "constructively engaged" and add their weight to the strategy aimed at attaining change via the economy. In this regard, two particularly important Jewish businessmen were Raymond Ackerman, head of a flourishing chain of supermarkets, and Tony Bloom, head of the mammoth Premier Milling Group. In 1985 they took the lead in drawing up a manifesto signed by 92 of the country's top businessmen, calling for an end to apartheid and for government negotiations with black leaders, not excluding those in detention. Much to the chagrin of the government Bloom also formed a delegation of business leaders who met with African National Congress representatives in Lusaka.

Mendel Kaplan, a prominent businessman who was at the same time South African Jewry's single most important Jewish communal leader, authored a book on the historical role of the Jews in the South African economy, in which he averred that the solution of South African society's

²⁹See F. E. Auerbach's article in the *Rand Daily Mail*, Feb. 24, 1971, and his letter to the editor, *Rand Daily Mail*, Jan. 15, 1985, in defense of Archbishop Tutu's comparisons between apartheid and Nazi Germany.

³⁰See, e.g., F. A. Johnstone, "White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today," *African Affairs* 69, no. 274 (1970):124-40, and Merle Lipton, *Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa 1910-1986* (London, 1985).

problems "will be dependent on the acceptance of every South African by his fellow South African with equality, irrespective of race or religion." Kaplan concluded his study with the statement that "if Jewish businessmen, in particular, fail to give leadership in the movement to abolish all discriminatory practices, they will be betraying their heritage in the country which gave the Jewish people their freedom and opportunities."³¹

Measured against the record of the Jewish community in the past, the most innovative development was the emergence in late 1985 of groups of Jews dedicated to collective Jewish expression of opposition to the apartheid system. In Cape Town one such group initially called itself Jews Against Apartheid, but, with a view to adopting a more positive, less provocative posture, soon changed it to Jews for Justice. Among its founders were Jewish individuals associated with various groups active in resistance to government policies, such as NUSAS and area committees of the United Democratic Front, a broad alignment comprising some 60 groups. At the outset, it also included members of the Habonim-Dror Zionist youth movement. At about the same time, a group of similar composition was founded in Johannesburg under the name Jews for Social Justice. The combined enrolled membership of these groups was only a few hundred, but their public meetings attracted up to a thousand participants.

What made these groups distinctively different in the South African Jewish experience was their attempted synthesis of two foci of identification—bold public protest against the apartheid system, on the one hand, and self-affirming Jewish identification, of which Zionism formed an intrinsic part, on the other. To be sure, the attempt to organize a collective Jewish voice in opposition to apartheid was not entirely without precedent. In the 1950s a minuscule and short-lived group called the Jewish Democratic Association had been formed by Michael Szur. It was a residual manifestation of the leftist Yiddish groups that were referred to earlier in this study. Much as the Jews for Justice groups were now doing, that association invoked the memory of recent Jewish suffering in Europe and argued that if Jews "complained justifiably that the people of the world did not rally to our defense," then "as a community we cannot hide ourselves behind the false slogan of neutrality and keep silent when other peoples are in distress." Unlike the contemporary Jews for Justice, however, the Jewish Democratic Association had upheld the diminutive legacy of leftist anti-Zionism. It had accused Zionism, among other charges, of propagating the false view that

³¹Mendel Kaplan, *Jewish Roots in the South African Economy* (Cape Town, 1986), 28, 389. Kaplan was a Jewish leader of international importance; he was treasurer of the World Jewish Congress, chairman of the board of trustees of the Keren Hayesod, and in June 1987 was elected chairman of the board of governors of the Jewish Agency for Israel.

Jews were really no more than temporary sojourners in the Diaspora, thereby lulling them into passive acquiescence in apartheid.³²

In a newsletter appealing to Jews to join its ranks, Jews for Social Justice declared that it was intended to fill the need for a “united Jewish response” to the South African situation.³³

Our history of persecution imposes a special duty on us to protest any form of discrimination against any people. Judaism is a religion of faith expressed in action; therefore its teachings about human dignity and social justice make it unacceptable for us to be guilty of the complicity of silence in an oppressive society. . . . A vast proportion of the Jewish population does desire a just society and wishes to stake its claim to a future in a democratic South Africa. It is therefore essential for a united Jewish voice to be heard in the struggle for justice. . . . South African Jews are already choosing between leaving South Africa or adapting to changes. If Jews are sincere about staying in South Africa, but are fearful of the changes which must come, it is their responsibility to play a part in these changes and thus participate in the formulation of a new South Africa.

An example of the protests made by Jews for Justice on particular issues was that against the government’s legislation of June 1986, which gave the minister of law and order unlimited power to declare an “unrest area” without possibility of challenge by any court. “Our historical experience of persecution and oppression impels us to protest in the strongest terms against this Bill,” declared Jews for Social Justice. Another example was its protest against the further curtailment of individual freedom enforced by Section 50A of the Internal Security Act, which allowed the police to increase the period of detention without trial to 180 days. In Johannesburg, members of Jews for Social Justice joined a public demonstration against this legislation in June 1986, alongside the Black Sash (a veteran women’s social-action group), the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC), and the End Conscription Campaign.³⁴ In April 1987 Cape Town’s group held a “freedom seder” during Passover, addressed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu—his first to a public meeting under Jewish auspices. Despite a bomb threat, a thousand people came to hear him say, *inter alia*, that although Jews had been in the forefront of the anti-apartheid struggle from the outset, South Africa’s blacks currently felt a sense of disappointment with the Jewish community because of Israel’s close ties with the white regime.

In March 1987 Johannesburg’s Jews for Social Justice participated in the founding of the Five Freedoms Forum, a broad grouping of about 25 white organizations opposed to apartheid, including the Progressive Federal

³²*Jewish Opinion: A Newsletter*, July 1954. This newsletter of the Jewish Democratic Association appeared monthly from Apr. 1954 until June 1962.

³³*Newsletter of Jews for Social Justice*, Nov. 17, 1985, in BD, 303.12.

³⁴Jews for Justice leaflet calling a protest meeting for June 8, 1986, in BD, *ibid*.

party, the Black Sash, JODAC, and NUSAS. This forum was oriented toward the white elections set for May 6, 1987. Similarly, Cape Town's Jews for Justice, while declaring that "the major source of change in South Africa is to be found in the extra-Parliamentary struggle," formulated an appeal "for those who wished to oppose apartheid by voting in the 1987 election" to support only those candidates who "oppose a social system based on statutory racial classification; oppose a legal system in which detention without trial forms an integral part; support a political system in which all South Africans will enjoy the same rights irrespective of colour and in which all will be able to be represented by persons of their own choice."³⁵

Some of the anti-apartheid forces with which the Jewish groups aligned themselves fell victim to bannings under the Emergency Regulations imposed in June 1986. Indeed, of the 22 political, religious, and communal groups with which Cape Town's Jews for Justice was associated at the outset of its involvement in assisting the destitute black inhabitants of the Crossroads squatter camp, all but Jews for Justice itself and the women's Black Sash were afterward muzzled. This may well indicate the authorities' perception that the Jewish group was not really dangerous.³⁶ Also, given the antagonistic attitude toward Jews evinced by some of the Muslim groups associated with the United Democratic Front and the fact that many members of Jews for Justice concurrently had other, more compelling political affiliations, this expression of Jewish social action bore the marks of an ephemeral phenomenon much like its kindred predecessors in the history of the community.

The Policy of the Jewish Board of Deputies

Turning from an analysis of the political orientations of Jewish individuals and groups to the Jewish community as an organized entity, it is the South African Jewish Board of Deputies that must now engage our attention. The board was recognized, by convention, as the representative organ of South African Jewry. Ironically, a retrospective survey of the official statements issued by the board since 1948 reveals an inverse relation between the harshness of the apartheid system and the daring of the board in criticizing it. When crudely racist apartheid was at its zenith in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the board's stance was at its most timid. However,

³⁵*Jews for Justice Newsletter*, no. 2, Apr. 1987, 3.

³⁶Those associated with Jews for Justice who experienced detention were concurrently active in other protest groups. For example, Lisa Seftel of Johannesburg, who was an organizing secretary of JODAC, an affiliate of the United Democratic Front, and Raymond Suttner, a university law lecturer who was an executive member of the United Democratic Front in the Transvaal.

as the ideology of apartheid became more refined and less overtly racist, and as its practice began to crack and reach a stage of near disintegration, the board's statements became progressively bolder and clearer in condemnation of apartheid.

From the inception of the Board of Deputies in 1912, its purposes were perceived in narrowly particularistic terms: to "watch and take action in all matters affecting the Jews in the southern portion of the continent of Africa."³⁷ Its honorary officers, generation after generation, never considered their terms of reference to include a collective Jewish response or contribution to the shaping of South African society as a whole. The board's record is best understood as a characteristic minority-group phenomenon of self-preservation. This dictated a policy of noninvolvement in politics: "that Jews participate in South African public life as citizens of South Africa and have no collective attitude to the political issues which citizens are called upon to decide."³⁸

The explicit justification most often proffered for not formulating a collective viewpoint was that it simply did not exist; that there was "as much diversity of political viewpoint in the Jewish community as in the general population." The implicit justification, more rarely enunciated, was that even if it were possible to formulate a single viewpoint, this would be ill-advised from the point of view of the community's self-interest.

Until 1948 the context in which the board navigated this policy was the intrawhite conflict between the centrist United party, associated with the name of Jan Smuts, and the Afrikaner nationalists, who evinced pro-German and anti-Semitic tendencies after 1933. In that context, as has already been mentioned, the board did align itself, at least discreetly, in the late 1930s with the liberal forces associated with Smuts's lieutenant, Jan Hofmeyr. However, this was hardly inconsistent with the fundamental policy of political noninvolvement, since it was motivated by the wish to resist the anti-Semitic forces in the Afrikaner nationalist camp, and only by association did it implicate the board in the broader political arena.³⁹

After 1948, in the wake of the National party's electoral victory—which was repeated at every election from that time on—and its enforcement of apartheid, the context widened to include issues that transcended intrawhite politics. The crucial question became whether one condoned or opposed a societal system based on legally enforced racial discrimination. Poignant moral dilemmas concerning basic human dignity and rights descended

³⁷A Jewish Board of Deputies was founded in Johannesburg in 1903 and in Cape Town in 1904. The two bodies united to form the South African Jewish Board of Deputies in 1912. See Saron and Hotz, *Jews in South Africa*, 226–69.

³⁸*South African Jewish Board of Deputies Report, April 1958 to August 1960*, 9.

³⁹For a full discussion of this, see Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 152–55.

insistently upon the leadership of the Jewish community. The question whether, as the acknowledged representative body of the community, the Board of Deputies at least ought to say something about those fundamental moral issues which transcended formal party politics was hotly debated at every congress of the board. Some argued that it was impossible to separate moral from party political issues and that the board had no business, in the first place, making statements on any controversial public issue not directly affecting Jewish rights. Others asserted that the agreed principle of noninvolvement in politics did not preclude some statement against racial prejudice and in affirmation of fundamental human rights.

The upshot was the periodic passing of resolutions giving expression to a Jewish ethos sufficiently generalized to be politically innocuous. An example is the one passed in 1955, stating that "the welfare of all sections of the population depends on the maintenance of democratic institutions and the enjoyment of freedom and justice by all," and that "the elimination of inter-group conflict and the abatement of racial prejudice are vital for the national good." At the same time, the board repeatedly declared that "every individual Jew has the right to his own political views and actions" (adding cautiously, "of course within the framework of the law"), and urged every Jewish citizen "to make his individual contribution in accordance with the teachings and precepts of Judaism."⁴⁰

In this way, at a time when apartheid was at its worst, the board trod a precarious path between noninvolvement in the political thicket, on the one hand, and the muffled impulses of Jewish moral conscience, on the other. There can be no doubt that most of the board's executive members throughout the 1950s would have wished to speak out against apartheid but were severely constrained by their concern for the safety of the Jewish community. What intimidated them was not so much the presence of anti-Semitism but rather the very fact that the Afrikaner nationalists had consciously abandoned anti-Semitism ever since coming to power in 1948. A process of Afrikaner-Jewish rapprochement was in progress, facilitated largely by genuine Afrikaner sympathy for the new State of Israel, and the purpose uppermost in the minds of the Jewish communal leadership was to cultivate that rapprochement. In these circumstances they were anxious not to do anything that might undermine it.

The transformation of apartheid's ideological rhetoric, which was discussed earlier, had the effect of extending the boundaries of public moral criticism permitted by the white consensus. By the 1970s it became possible for the Board of Deputies to vent views that would have been regarded as

⁴⁰The seminal resolution adopted at the board's 20th congress in 1955 was reiterated at later congresses. See, e.g., *South African Jewish Board of Deputies Report, September 1962 to June 1965*, 9.

disloyal, if not treacherous, only ten years earlier. Accordingly, the board continued to uphold its traditional policy of noninvolvement in politics but formulated statements which, while clearly liberal in connotation, were sufficiently equivocal to be compatible with the rhetoric of *verligte* Afrikaners. Thus a resolution was passed at the board's congress in 1967 and reiterated in 1970 calling for "the promotion of understanding, goodwill and co-operation between the various races, peoples and groups in South Africa and toward the achievement of a peaceful and secure future for all inhabitants of the country, based on the principles of justice and dignity of the individual."⁴¹

Incrementally more outspoken, yet venturing only ever so slightly beyond the norm of *verligte* rhetoric, resolutions of the board's congresses throughout the 1970s called for the elimination of "unjust discriminations so that all, regardless of race, creed or colour, be permitted and encouraged to achieve the full potential of their capabilities and live in dignity and harmony."⁴² A somewhat less equivocal augur of the real change yet to come in the 1980s was the speech delivered by David Mann, president of the Board of Deputies, at a banquet for Prime Minister Vorster on his return from a visit to Israel in 1976. He said:⁴³

I believe that there is a wide consensus today that attitudes and practices, the heritage of the past, bearing upon the relations between our various racial groups are no longer acceptable. I believe that there is a new sense of urgency abroad in our land, a realization that we must move away as quickly and effectively as is practicable from discrimination based on race or colour, and that we must accord to every man and woman respect and human dignity and the opportunity to develop to their fullest potential. Our task is to translate into concrete patterns of living, and of relationships between man and man and group and group, the great injunction of the Bible, "Justice, justice shalt thou pursue, that thou may live and inherit the land which the Lord thy God gave thee."

In later years, as new waves of black resistance pounded against the apartheid system with unprecedented force, and as President P. W. Botha's government itself began to dismantle old-style apartheid and institute reforms calculated to preserve white supremacy in alternative ways, the Jewish Board of Deputies abandoned its noninvolvement policy, in practice if not in theory. In 1981 there were periodic statements by the board condemning evictions of blacks and pass-law arrests; in 1982, condemnation of detention without trial; in 1983, objection to a university quota system for blacks and to the treatment of squatters at the Crossroads camp near Cape

⁴¹*Report to South African Jewry, 1967-1970* (S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies, 1970), 8.

⁴²See resolution adopted at the Jewish Board of Deputies' 29th biennial congress, May 29-31, 1976, cited in *Report to South African Jewry, 1976-1978* (S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies, 1978), 10.

⁴³*Jewish Affairs*, May 1976, 12.

Town; and in 1982, representations to Parliament calling for the repeal of the racial provisions of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts.⁴⁴

The culmination of this new direction of policy was the unanimous passing of a resolution at the 33rd national congress of the board in 1985, which, for the first time, explicitly rejected apartheid: "Congress records its support and commitment to justice, equal opportunity and the removal of all provisions in the laws of South Africa which discriminate on grounds of colour and race, and rejects apartheid." This was reiterated and elaborated upon at the board's April 1987 congress in a series of unequivocal resolutions, including the following:⁴⁵

Congress resolves that there is an urgent need for enhanced and accelerated dialogue, negotiation and meaningful reform in South Africa, and records its dismay at the lack of meaningful progress in this direction, whilst acknowledging the steps already taken by the Government to repeal certain laws and abolish certain discriminatory practices. Congress also expresses the hope that a climate for peace and calm will speedily be re-established including the lifting of the state of emergency, and that the rule of law will be re-established. . . . Congress endorses the efforts of the National Executive Council in seeking to maintain channels of open communication with all sections of the South African population. . . . Congress recognizes that apartheid is the principal cause of political violence in South Africa and that continued oppression under that policy exacerbates the climate of political unrest and believes that apartheid and racial prejudice are in complete contradiction to the teachings of Judaism.

The Jewish Board of Deputies also continued to concern itself with its original and primary function of monitoring anti-Semitic manifestations and taking action against them where necessary. Although such manifestations ceased to be a serious problem by the mid-1950s, they never entirely disappeared. In this respect South Africa cannot be said to differ from other Western countries. However, something of the thematic admixture endemic to the South African variety of chronic anti-Semitism may be demonstrated by the following extract from a vitriolic news sheet published by the veteran anti-Semite S. E. D. Brown. Responding to the board's resolutions calling for the abolition of apartheid laws, he wrote that these "posturing moralists" had "virtually declared open war on the White nation in South Africa!"⁴⁶

Yet it is they themselves who are the one race—racists par excellence who know just how to discriminate and do so in no uncertain terms, against everyone and

⁴⁴See *Report to South African Jewry, 1980–1983* (S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies, 1983), 17, 18; *Report to South African Jewry, 1983–1985* (S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies, 1985), 11.

⁴⁵See the resolutions adopted at the 34th national congress, Apr. 1987, in *Jewish Affairs*, Apr. 1987, 28–29.

⁴⁶*South African Observer*, Feb. 1986. The article is entitled "The Total Zionist Onslaught on South Africa."

everything that is non-Jewish. They long ago decided that they were the "chosen people" of all the peoples on earth, and the world's most enduring ethno-centrism began. Their endless and bitter campaigns against "racism" imposed with the fervour of the inquisition of the Middle Ages, are serving no other purpose than to break down the racial and national dynamism of all the peoples of the West, while at the same time building up their own fanatical racism. . . . Moreover, they openly identified themselves with world Zionism's "total onslaught" on South Africa . . . in complete phase with the "total onslaughts" of world Communism and the forces of international finance. Furthermore, the S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies and their coracialists made themselves guilty of wilfully stabbing an old friend in the back—South Africa—after all that South Africa had done, and is still doing for Israel and World Jewry.

There was also something of a resurgence of anti-Semitism emanating from a right-wing, reactionary group founded in 1981 under the name the *Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging* (resistance organization). This was a racist, neo-Nazi organization that harked back to the various "Greyshirt" movements that mushroomed in the 1930s as purveyors of Nazi and anti-Semitic views. Its leader, Eugene Terre-Blanche, stated openly that South African Jews would be deprived of political rights under an *Afrikaner* Christian people's government controlled by his organization. He said that "the Jews must decide between two things in this country—political rights or economic freedom. They cannot have both. They cannot have political rights. It is Israel, not South Africa, which they recognise as their fatherland."⁴⁷ President Botha condemned the views and activities of the *Weerstandbeweging* on a number of occasions. In late 1982 it was reported that the police had uncovered arms caches belonging to the group and that a number of arrests had been made.

Although overt anti-Semitism was not expressed in the more respectable sections of the right-wing *Afrikaner* opposition to the government party, their political character and policies also did not augur well for the Jewish community. The *Herstigte Nasionale* party (reconstituted national party), founded as far back as 1969, was committed to what it called "Christian *Afrikaner* Nationalism," a formulation evoking those ideological trends in pre-1948 *Afrikaner* nationalism that were hostile to Jews. The party's newspaper, *Die Afrikaner*, frequently carried articles emanating from so-called revisionist historians who denied the truth of the Holocaust.

The main political group to the right of the present National party was the Conservative party. Formed in 1982, it had already gained more seats than the Progressives in the 1987 elections to the white chamber of Parliament, thereby displacing them as the official opposition. Although disavowing anti-Semitism, this party too emphasized the strictly Christian basis of

⁴⁷Cited in "Anti-Semitism in South Africa," a report by the S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies, issued in Jan. 1986.

the state in ways that had disconcerting associations for Jews. Jewish concern was compounded by the formation of a new cultural organization called Die Afrikaner Volkswag (the Afrikaner people's sentinel) in May 1984. As well as harking back to the Ossewa Brandwag (ox-wagon sentinel), which agitated against participation in the Second World War and against Jews, it presaged a popular drawing together of all right-wing Afrikaners in an extraparliamentary framework conducive to the spread of Terre-Blanche's influence.

The Rabbinate's Response to Apartheid

A balanced evaluation of the record of the rabbinate on the question of apartheid in South Africa requires awareness of some basic differences between its position and that of the Christian clergy. Unlike the major Christian churches, whether Anglican, Dutch Reformed, or Roman Catholic, Judaism had no adherents outside of the white population of South Africa. Consequently, the rabbinate was never answerable to, or responsible for, a black membership suffering directly from the apartheid system; it never had to formulate theological or practical principles either justifying or denouncing discrimination among its members.

On the other hand, the rabbinate had to contend with the minority-group status of Jews within the white racial group. The non-Jewish majority did not differentiate between the statements and actions of rabbis and the position of the Jewish community. This greatly constrained those rabbis who were, over the years, genuinely perturbed by the acute moral issues peculiar to South African society but, at the same time, had a primary sense of responsibility for the safety and welfare of the Jewish community. This situation was most marked in the peak years of racist apartheid—the 1950s and early 1960s—when the leadership of the Jewish community felt intimidated by the assertive Afrikaner devotees of that apartheid ideology. The rabbis, hardly less than the lay leadership, instinctively sensed that outspoken condemnation of apartheid, and even more so public action against it, would have endangered the Jewish community.

Account must also be taken of the inherent proclivity of the Orthodox rabbinate—who served over 80 percent of synagogue-affiliated Jews—for a societal order that fostered ethnic-religious particularism. In recent years, as apartheid ideology began to shake off its racist trammels and to project an ostensibly purified rhetoric of ethnic-cultural survival as the basis for government policies, this was bound to strike a chord of ambivalence, if not actual understanding, in the Orthodox rabbinate.

Since the conventions of South African society always recognized the prerogative of the clergy to speak out on moral issues, rabbis potentially enjoyed considerably more scope in this respect than did lay bodies like the

Jewish Board of Deputies. However, the record shows that most rabbis, particularly the East European-born and the more traditionalist ones, gave but scant attention to the issue of apartheid over the years, some even speaking out in support of government policy in South Africa.⁴⁸ This does not mean, however, that they were oblivious to the glaring evils of the system. Their behavior is explicable, rather, as a function of their essentially insular outlook; their tendency to compartmentalize Jewish concerns and to dissociate them from responsibility for the society as a whole. By their lights, apartheid and its attendant evils were the doing of the non-Jewish majority of white society. Collective Jewish involvement—and the actions of rabbis inevitably would be interpreted as such—was imprudent. It would only invite hostility to the Jews and divisiveness among themselves.

In the first decade of apartheid rule, rare were the occasions when a rabbi adopted a stand of unequivocal opposition to the apartheid system, and when it did happen, the response within the Jewish community was anything but enthusiastic. A case in point is that of Andre Ungar, a young Progressive (Reform) rabbi, newly arrived from England, whose outraged protestations against apartheid led to the withdrawal of his permit of residence in 1956. Neither his own congregants, nor the Jewish Board of Deputies, nor even his rabbinical colleagues, rallied to support him.⁴⁹ Yet it is also true that the head of the Orthodox Federation of Synagogues in that period, Rabbi Louis I. Rabinowitz, chafed at the bit of communal restraints and became increasingly irrepresible in the last years of his tenure before settling in Israel in 1960. His sermons became progressively more outspoken against apartheid, and in one Yom Kippur sermon in 1959 he gave vent to his anguish and frustration in a frank outburst:⁵⁰

. . . What do we do to loosen the bonds of wickedness, to undo the bonds of oppression? . . . There are some Jews in the community who do attempt to do something . . . and when, as a result, they fall foul of the powers that be, the defence put up by the Jewish community is to prove that these are Jews only by name, that they do not belong to any synagogue. . . . Have Jewish ethics ever descended to a more shameful nadir? . . . I have practically abandoned all hope of effecting any change in this matter. The power of fear and of the possibility of our security being affected is too strong. . . . Do not think that I am proud of my record in this matter, that I do not squirm inwardly at the thought that on many occasions I have been infected with that same fear and that same cowardice

⁴⁸An example of a traditionalist rabbi who urged Jews to support government policies is a certain Rabbi Pfeuffer, who is reported to have said that helping black people to power in South Africa would be like giving guns to a kindergarten. See BD, "Press Items of Jewish Interest," no. 23, Dec. 11, 1986, citing the *Star*, Dec. 4, 1986. For the record of the period until the late 1960s, see Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 277–86.

⁴⁹Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 277–86.

⁵⁰The mimeographed text of Rabbi Rabinowitz's Yom Kippur Sermon, Oct. 1959, is in BD, biographical files.

and have failed to rise to the level which my calling demands of me. But when from time to time a blatant, glaring case of injustice occurs, and it is one in which there is a hope that my intervention may possibly have a salutary effect, then no power in the world can prevent me giving expression to what I conscientiously believe to be the authentic voice of prophetic Judaism. . . .

Another important religious leader was Rabbi Moses C. Weiler, chief rabbi of the United Progressive Jewish Congregation until he settled in Israel in 1959. Like Rabbi Rabinowitz, he occasionally joined Christian clerics in protests against particularly outrageous manifestations of apartheid. Weiler upheld the view that the appropriate collective expression for Jewish ethical concerns lay in the practical field of welfare and education for the underprivileged black population. Hence he encouraged the sisterhood of the Progressive congregation to set up such projects as an elementary school with attached health facilities in a poverty-stricken black township near Johannesburg. His successor, Rabbi Arthur Saul Super, continued his policy until he too settled in Israel in 1976. He frequently preached to his congregants against the evils of apartheid and joined Christian leaders in protests against specific iniquities of the system.

Not a few other rabbis, both Orthodox and Reform, who were quite outspoken against apartheid, left South Africa to take up pulpits elsewhere, at least in part out of the conviction that it was unconscionable to participate in such a system. They included the South African-born Orthodox rabbi Abner Weiss, a protégé of Louis Rabinowitz, who left his pulpit in Durban for the United States. Another was the Progressive rabbi Richard Lampert, also South African-born, who left Johannesburg for a pulpit in Australia. Rabbi David Rosen, born in England, is a notable example of another category of those who raised their voices against apartheid, namely, rabbis who spent only a temporary period of service in South Africa.

Over the last two decades, the majority of the Orthodox rabbinate followed the lead of Bernard Casper, chief rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Johannesburg and the Federation of Synagogues. From the outset of his incumbency in 1963, he perceived his task to be limited to nurturing the religious life of the Jewish community; it did not, by his lights, extend to the reformation of the societal order as a whole. To be sure, Rabbi Casper, too, sporadically expressed, in the name of Judaism, revulsion against racism and various particular injustices manifest in South African society. On occasion, he even joined Christian clerics in peaceful demonstrations of protest against extraordinarily acute travesties of justice. However, he was at all times judiciously cautious. When, in 1986, in the wake of the campaign to end compulsory military conscription, Rabbi Casper was called upon to answer the question whether the *halakhah* permitted conscientious objection to military service, since it might involve serving in the black townships, he ruled that it did not.

Taking leave of the community on the eve of his *aliyah* to Israel in March 1987, after 25 years in South Africa, he cautioned the Jewish community to adopt a low profile:⁵¹ "In South Africa we are a small identifiable foreign body and we fool ourselves if we think otherwise, and we as a Jewish community should be careful not to act in such a way as to convey the impression that we can influence the course of events." At the same time Rabbi Casper outspokenly opposed international sanctions against South Africa, saying "I have appealed to my colleagues overseas to adopt a stand against sanctions. . . . Sanctions can only mean hunger and frustration and riots and chaos. I think that is a moral stance that all of us should be emboldened to pursue." To the youth of the community, grappling with the incompatibility between "Jewish values" and the realities of South African society, Rabbi Casper held out a Zionist message: "Go home to the land which belongs to our people, where your views will be welcomed in the society we believe in."

In recent years a few Orthodox and traditional rabbis cast caution aside and ventured to condemn the structural essence of the apartheid system, not just particularities of injustice, going beyond the boundaries of the conventional white consensus. One such rabbi was South African-born Ben Isaacson. A former protégé of Orthodox Chief Rabbi Louis Rabinowitz, Isaacson was a maverick whose checkered career included *aliyah* to Israel in the mid-1960s, return to South Africa in 1974 to serve as a Progressive (Reform) rabbi, and, after disagreements in that framework, formation in 1982 of Har-El, an independent traditional congregation (resembling American Conservative congregations) in the prosperous Houghton suburb of Johannesburg. Throughout these mutations, however, Isaacson was a consistently outspoken critic of the apartheid system.

Isaacson tongue-lashed the Jewish communal leadership and castigated Jews at large for tacitly enjoying the evil fruits of the apartheid system. He also accused Jewish leaders of distorting Bishop Tutu's statements and wilfully spreading the false notion that anti-Semitism was rampant among blacks. To Jewish youths entering military service, Isaacson did not shrink from advising that they respectfully request the authorities to refrain from using them to suppress blacks in the townships. An example of the tenor of his sermons as reported in the general press was this comment:⁵²

The Jewish establishment, taking its cue from the ruling political party, has slowly begun to jump onto the bandwagon of reform and now at least makes the right sounds—albeit spluttering and gurgling sounds. . . . As Jews we should have

⁵¹Reported in the *Zionist Record and S.A. Jewish Chronicle*, Mar. 6, 1987, 3.

⁵²*Sunday Star*, Sept. 15, 1985, 3. The heading of the report of Rabbi Isaacson's sermon is "Jews Should Know Better: Rebel Rabbi Slams Establishment for Not Speaking Out Against Apartheid Exploitation."

known better. We should have instinctively recoiled from perpetrating on others the injustices that we, more than any other people, have suffered.

Rabbi Isaacson's tempestuous style of protest was not only frowned upon by most other rabbis and Jewish communal leaders but also increasingly alienated his own congregants. Finally, in mid-1987, after a fiery lecture tour in the United States, which he made with a black clergyman from Soweto, in the course of which Isaacson was reported to have disparaged his own congregants together with South African Jews in general, the lay leaders of Har-El served him notice and disbanded the congregation.

In Cape Town, another South African-born rabbi, Selwyn Franklin, of the large Orthodox congregation of Sea Point, took a leading role in Jews for Justice. In doing so he initially exceeded the limits of propriety as understood by his congregation's board of directors. At Jews for Justice's first public meeting, he sat on the speakers' platform but refrained from speaking in deference to his board's reservations. With other members of Jews for Justice, Rabbi Franklin assisted the victims of intercommunal fighting in the Crossroads squatter camp near Cape Town and joined multiracial church and Muslim leaders in a series of interfaith services dedicated to peace and justice in South Africa. While on a visit to Israel in mid-1986, Rabbi Franklin also outspokenly criticized the conduct of Israel's relations with South Africa. At that time, notwithstanding moves toward sanctions against South Africa taken by Western countries, Israel sent a treasury delegation to South Africa to renew a trade and investment cooperation agreement. Franklin challenged the claim that such links were in the best interests of the South African Jewish community, suggesting that in the long run, it was bad policy to antagonize the blacks.

Another leading figure was American-trained Rabbi Norman M. Bernhard, who had served the important Oxford Synagogue-Center in Johannesburg for over 20 years. In 1980 his congregation launched a social-action program aimed at improving the quality of life of blacks employed in its area of Johannesburg. In late 1985 Rabbi Bernhard lent his support to the founding of Jews for Social Justice in Johannesburg. However, his cautiously measured statements criticizing the injustices of the apartheid system, and his intimate involvement in the Zionist Federation and the Jewish Board of Deputies, contrasted greatly with the style of the impetuous Rabbi Isaacson. Indeed, Bernhard took issue with the latter's excoriation of the Jewish public and commended Jews for their record as employers and as opponents of apartheid.⁵³

Distinctive to Rabbi Bernhard's stance was his repeated insistence on an

⁵³Deon Delpont, "Rabbi Raps Rabbi: You've Got It Wrong—Most Jews Are Eroding Apartheid," *Tribune*, Sept. 9, 1986, 12; in BD, biographical files.

optimistic prognosis for the future of South Africa. His inspiration for this derived from the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menachem Schneerson, whom Bernhard revered as one endowed with *ruah hakodesh*, the gift of divinely revealed insight and foresight. To his coterie of followers in South Africa, the rebbe had repeatedly expressed optimism that South Africa would ultimately provide a bright and prosperous future for all its peoples and urged Jews not to leave. Echoing the rebbe, Bernhard pointed approvingly to the reforms implemented by the South African government and averred that there still was a great reservoir of residual goodwill between all the races in the country.⁵⁴

The Progressive (Reform) rabbis, whose congregants accounted for some 18 percent of synagogue-affiliated Jews in the community, followed a somewhat more uniform approach than the Orthodox. In sermons and through projects, such as those of their sisterhood organizations, they emphasized the application of Jewish precepts to the problems of society at large and encouraged contributions to welfare work and education in black townships. Following his arrival from Israel in South Africa in 1985, Rabbi Ady Assabi, who was trained at London's Leo Baeck College, took the lead in Johannesburg. Starting close to home, he issued a pamphlet stipulating minimum requirements regarding wages and other working conditions for domestic employees. He also identified with the Jews for Social Justice group.

In sum, it may be said that the rabbis in South Africa differed in their approaches to the country's race crisis no less than the Jewish public in general.

The Impact of Israel's Relations with South Africa

The State of Israel was established in the same month and year as that in which the Afrikaner National party under Daniel Malan ascended to power in what was then the Union of South Africa. Initially, Israel's was the more eager of the two governments to establish relations. To be sure, just two days before his election defeat, Prime Minister Smuts, long an ardent sympathizer with Zionism, had been among the first to recognize Israel *de facto*. However, Malan delayed *de jure* recognition for another full year. It should be remembered that at that juncture South Africa still looked rather more to the vast Arab world for the advancement of her interests than to the weak State of Israel, and that it maintained diplomatic relations with Egypt until as late as 1961. Not until 1972 did South Africa

⁵⁴See the report on Rabbi Bernhard's views in the *Herald Times*, Oct. 10, 1986, 5.

take up reciprocal diplomatic representation in Israel. Israel, in contrast, not only wished to expand its limited diplomatic relations but was also drawn to the warm Zionist Jewish community in southern Africa, at a time when Zionist fund raising was still of weighty significance for Israel's infant economy. Consequently, Israel was willing unilaterally to open a diplomatic mission in July 1949.

It was only toward the end of her first decade of independence, when Israel launched an imaginative policy of diplomatic relations, technical assistance, and trade with the new African states, that the tables were turned. Indeed, the South African government soon felt itself to be the injured party as Israel aligned itself progressively with black Africa's attacks on apartheid in the international forum. This development reached a peak in September 1963, when Israel downgraded its level of diplomatic representation by recalling its minister plenipotentiary and leaving only a *chargé d'affaires*.

Very few Diaspora communities were as affected as that of South Africa by oscillations in the relationship between Israel and their own country. The grave dilemmas precipitated for South African Jewry have been analyzed in detail elsewhere.⁵⁵ In the present context, only a brief overview is required. Between 1961 and 1967, as Israel sided increasingly with the black states against South Africa's white regime, South African Jewry was much discomfited. Somewhat ironically, it was a former South African, Michael Comay, who was Israel's permanent representative at the United Nations in this critical period. In the press, aspersions were cast on the loyalty of Jews to South Africa, and some government ministers exerted subtle pressure on the Jewish community to influence Israel. These were resisted, by and large, by the Jewish leaders.

The deterioration of relations with Israel was compounded by the prominence of Jewish names in the radical opposition to apartheid in the same period. The acutely uncomfortable atmosphere in which Jews found themselves in relation to the surrounding white majority was reflected in a critical article by the editor of an important Afrikaans paper, in which he posed the question: "Where does the Jew stand in the white struggle for survival?"⁵⁶ Although on visits to Israel, South African Zionist leaders discussed the situation with Israeli government ministers, and certainly

⁵⁵See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, especially 235–304. For a survey of the same subject with emphasis upon the attitude of black Americans to the relations between Israel and South Africa, see the chapter "Israel, South Africa and Black America," in Robert G. Weisbord and Richard Kazarian, Jr., *Israel in the Black American Perspective* (Connecticut, 1985), 93–119.

⁵⁶Dirk Richard, "Where Does the Jew Stand in the White Struggle for Survival?" (*Afrikaans*), *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus*, Sept. 26, 1965.

expected their situation to be taken into account, they were uncomplainingly cognizant of Israel's sovereign considerations.⁵⁷ Israel's policymakers, for their part, certainly took cognizance of South African Jewry's delicate position; however, their solicitude did not extend so far as to override the convergence of considerations, moral as well as politically self-serving, that motivated the cultivation of relations with many African states and Israel's correlative alignment with them against the white regime of South Africa.⁵⁸

At issue was not the stance of Israel in principle but rather the question whether, out of consideration for the Jewish community, finer discretion could not be shown by keeping within the parameters of anti-apartheid actions set by the major Western powers. What particularly irked the South African government was Israel's tendency to go to excess in offensively toeing the line of the black states of Africa at the United Nations, even when the Western powers abstained. In December 1961 the South African government gave vent to its resentment by disallowing the transfer of funds raised by South African Jewry for the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem. This stricture, which remained in force until mid-1967, precipitated for the Zionist movement in South Africa the most trying test of its traditional hold over the Jewish community.⁵⁹

The Six Day War of 1967 proved to be the turning point in relations between Israel and South Africa. A wave of public sympathy for Israel swept over white South Africans as the noose tightened around the neck of the Jewish state. This was followed by wonderment and admiration as news came through of Israel's dramatic preemptive strike and decisive victory in the six days of fighting that ensued. At that point Jewish community leaders made an urgent appeal to the South African government to lift the ban on transfers of funds to Israel. It was granted, presaging a return to normalcy in the relations between the two countries. Indeed, the South African government was also responsive to some emergency military needs of Israel during the war.⁶⁰

⁵⁷On one occasion only did South African leaders adopt a self-serving stance and present their objections demandingly. This was in anticipation that Israel would stop El Al flights to Johannesburg at the end of 1963. The upshot was that Israel refrained from doing so. See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 346.

⁵⁸See *ibid.*, 320–26, and Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London, 1972), 234ff.

⁵⁹It is noteworthy that although there was a decline in contributions to Zionist funds (the Israel United Appeal), because Jews knew they could not be transferred to their destination, very few Jews reacted to these events by dissociating themselves from Zionism and its fund-raising functions. See Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism*, 350.

⁶⁰Details of this will be known only when archival records become accessible. However, the military materiel involved was probably related to the Mirage planes used both by Israel and South Africa at the time, spare parts for which were being withheld by France. Some conjectures in this regard are made in James Adams, *The Unnatural Alliance* (London, 1984), 32.

To be sure, the Six Day War did not immediately undermine the position of Israel in Africa. Apart from a breach with one country, Guinea, Israel's bilateral diplomatic relations with African states even expanded, reaching 32 missions by 1972, as did her various technical-assistance programs and trade ventures. However, in the long term, the war proved to be the beginning of a process of alienation from Israel.⁶¹ Between March 1972 and May 1973 seven African states broke off relations with Israel. South Africa, on the other hand, at last took up its option to reciprocate Israel's diplomatic representation there by opening a consulate general in Israel in 1972. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, two more African states broke relations with Israel. Finally, the Yom Kippur War precipitated a landslide of diplomatic ruptures with Israel, with nine more African states severing relations before the fighting was over, and another ten soon after. By 1974 Israel was left with diplomatic relations with only four African states: Mauritius, Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland, four small countries which also maintained relations with South Africa.

Full analysis of the factors that drove Israel toward normalization, and then proliferation, of relations with South Africa, in the course of which trade burgeoned in military-related spheres, must await the time when researchers will have access to archival sources. It does seem obvious, however, that the desertion of Israel by so many African states was a key factor in driving Israel into the arms of South Africa. The latter, prudently setting aside its pique at Israel's earlier behavior, recognized its primary geopolitical interest in associating with the Jewish state and was forthcoming in matters of important strategic need to Israel. An example was the South African government's willingness to permit the use of its ports and fueling facilities by the Israeli Navy, something which no other state in Africa was prepared to grant, not even those that continued to trade with Israel after halting diplomatic relations. With the Suez Canal blocked, this was extremely helpful to Israel.

The facts of Israel's conventional trade with South Africa have always been available. Compared to that of many Western states it was always

⁶¹For the factors involved in Israel's diplomatic displacement in Africa, see Susan A. Gitelson, *Israel's African Setback in Perspective* (Jerusalem, 1974); R. Kochan et al., "Black African Voting Behavior in the U.N. on the Middle East Conflict 1967-1973," in *Israel and the Third World*, ed. M. Curtis and S. A. Gitelson (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976), 289-317. A highly critical analysis of Israel-South Africa relations, arguing that they are in every respect detrimental to Israel, is Naomi Chazan, "The Fallacies of Pragmatism: Israeli Foreign Policy Towards South Africa," *African Affairs* (Apr. 1983):169-99. On the factors influencing more recent attitudes of black states, see Arye Oded, *Africa and Israel: African Attitudes Towards Resumption of Diplomatic Relations*, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations Policy Studies, 18 (Dec. 1986).

small, reaching, by 1985, \$174,654,000 in imports from South Africa and \$63,896,000 in exports. This accounted for less than 1 percent of the total foreign trade of both countries.⁶² Trade related to military materiel, however, was kept secret. Although it was well known that already in the 1970s Israel had sold a number of patrol boats and surface-to-surface Gabriel missiles to the South African Navy, the existence of ramified trade of a military nature was consistently denied by both countries, rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.

Whatever the motives and circumstances may have been, it is evident that Israel's post-Yom Kippur War Labor government, under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Minister of Defense Shimon Peres, embarked on a course of pragmatic self-interest in regard to South Africa, while continuing to condemn the racial discrimination practiced under apartheid. In 1974 and 1975 Israel and South Africa raised their diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level, and in April 1976 Prime Minister John Vorster visited Israel and signed a series of trade and technical cooperation agreements. On this basis Israel's ambassador, Itzhak Unna, pursued a policy that encouraged bilateral relations on all levels of mutual interest, while at the same time frankly disapproving of apartheid—at times more demonstratively than any other ambassador to South Africa.⁶³ The relationship was much enhanced under the Likud government headed by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and during Ambassador Eliahu Lankin's tenure in South Africa from 1981 to 1985.

While the full facts of Israel's arms-related trade with South Africa remained elusive, it is evident that Israel was motivated primarily by the needs of an economy based inordinately on military industries, which, in

⁶²These figures are from *Statistics of Foreign Trade* 18 (Hebrew), Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1986. Figures given in the International Monetary Fund's *Direction of Trade Statistics*, published in Washington, do not differ substantially. The diamond trade is not included since it is conducted through the international commodity market, but it is known that Israel cut about half of all gem diamonds sold through De Beers's central selling agency. See Marcus Arkin, "Israel and South Africa: The Economic Connection," in the supplement to *Barclays Business Brief* (Johannesburg, May 1979). The small scale of Israel's conventional trade with South Africa was evident from comparison with that of some other countries. *International Trade Statistics Yearbook* 1 (U.N. Publishing Division, New York, 1986) gives the following figures for South African trade in 1984 (in millions): with Israel—imports \$83, exports \$129; with U.S.A.—imports \$2,375, exports \$1,458; with U.K.—imports \$1,660, exports \$742; with West Germany—imports \$2,339, exports \$676.

⁶³Unna frequently declared that similarities between the geopolitical position of Israel and South Africa did not efface fundamental differences in the internal social purposes and policies of the two countries. An example of his frank criticism of apartheid was his refusal to attend a performance of the play *Golda* in a Pretoria theater on the grounds that it was not open to all races. See BD, "Press Items of Jewish Interest," no. 12, May 22, 1978; no. 13, June 7, 1978.

turn, was an inescapable function of Israel's struggle against a hostile Arab world.⁶⁴ Likewise, there can be little doubt that, at least as perceived by the South African government, its relationship with Israel was regarded as specially beneficial and cordial, particularly in periods when the Likud party held the offices of prime minister or foreign minister. Yet, outwardly, relations were kept in low profile.

Within Israel's Labor party and also among Foreign Office professionals, a measure of dissatisfaction long existed under the surface. As Western pressures against South Africa intensified after 1985, some elements agitated more insistently for a serious reassessment of Israel's relations with South Africa. The impetus which at last precipitated such a reassessment was a forthcoming U.S. State Department report on other nations' arms trade with South Africa, which carried with it a threat to cut U. S. military assistance to countries engaged in that trade. The very act of reassessment and the ensuing decisions ostensibly to phase out what had never been acknowledged to exist served to confirm that covert military-related trade on a formidable scale had been going on between the two countries. Informed estimates reported in the Israeli press ran as high as half a billion dollars worth of such trade per annum. In due course, the unclassified part of the State Department report issued to Congress confirmed that Israel, together with six Western European countries, had indeed provided considerable military assistance to South Africa.

The Israeli government's timely announcement of a reassessment, on March 18, 1987, a month before the release of the American report, helped to avert the anticipated harm to American relations with Israel. The Israeli announcement reiterated its condemnation of the policy of apartheid and went on to state that it had been decided "to continue to curtail Israel's relations with South Africa" and "to refrain from new undertakings between Israel and South Africa in the realm of defense." In September 1987 Israel's inner cabinet approved a series of sanctions conforming with those adopted by the European Common Market countries. These covered a range of industrial, commercial, scientific, and cultural activities.⁶⁵

⁶⁴An informed analysis of the connection between Israel's external relations and its arms sales (acknowledged to have approached the \$1-billion mark annually in the early 1980s) is Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Washington, 1985). On Israel's relations with South Africa, see especially pp. 151-54. In addition to military-related cooperation, it is possible that there was also cooperation in nuclear development between Israel and South Africa. Far-reaching conjectures are made on this in James Adams, *The Unnatural Alliance* (London, 1984). However, no firm evidence has ever come to light confirming such conjectures. See Gerald M. Steinberg, "The Mythology of Israel-South African Nuclear Cooperation," *Middle East Review* 19, no. 3 (Spring 1987): 31-38.

⁶⁵Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Division, briefings, Mar. 27, 1987; Sept. 16, 1987.

Judged by the moderate response of the South African government, and in the studied absence of any indications as to the duration of existing contracts in the realm of defense, it could reasonably be inferred that some mollifying understanding on essentials had been reached between the two governments. At the same time, as was attested by the resistance which the new guard at Israel's Foreign Ministry had to overcome (notably from Minister of Industry and Trade Ariel Sharon of the Likud party), a perceptible change of course in relations with South Africa had certainly been inaugurated, one which carried within it the seeds of a possible serious breach in the future.

The process of reassessment in early 1987 temporarily thrust the question of Israel-South Africa relations to the forefront of Israeli public attention.⁶⁶ Apart from some demands voiced at small demonstrations sporadically conducted by a minuscule group of anti-apartheid activists, some of whose members were former South African Jews (notably Arthur Goldreich, who dramatically escaped from the hands of the South African security police in 1963), there was no popular call for extreme measures. Regret at the extent of Israel's involvement in arms trading with South Africa was manifest in most newspaper articles, compounded by concern for Israel's long-term relations with the blacks of southern Africa. Yet, on balance, there was acceptance of the fact that, given Israel's economic exigencies and existing arms-trade commitments, anything more than their gradual phasing out would be excessively damaging to Israel's economy. Although apartheid as such was universally condemned by political spokesmen and the press in Israel, the Israeli public was suspicious of international sanctions and all too aware of the close alignment between the most extreme proponents of sanctions, like the African National Congress, and Israel's enemies in the Middle East. Indeed, politically conservative Israelis associated with the Likud party and groups farther to the right evinced considerable sympathy with the dilemma of South African whites and were receptive to the ostensibly survivalist rationale of President Botha's white government, insofar as it disavowed racism and promised reforms.

Anguish over Israel's relations with South Africa was far more intense within the South African Jewish community than in Israel. The leadership of the organized community, whether of the Board of Deputies, the Zionist Federation, or the rabbinate, certainly favored good relations between the

⁶⁶Throughout March 1987 most of Israel's dailies carried reports and comments on Israel-South Africa relations. See especially the views of Eliahu Lankin, Israel's ambassador to Pretoria from 1981 to 1985, in the *Jerusalem Post*, Oct. 10, 1986, and Apr. 8, 1987, and the contrary views of Prof. Shlomo Avineri in the *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 2, 1985, and in *Maariv*, Feb. 13, 1987. The parliamentary debate is in *Knesset Debates*, no. 21, session 309, Mar. 19, 1987, 2250-64.

two countries and had welcomed the comfortable atmosphere that displaced the tensions of the 1960s and prevailed until 1987. Indeed, the Zionist Federation as well as individual Jewish entrepreneurs had been instrumental in the development of trade between their country and Israel. Yet, the scale of the arms nexus between Israel and South Africa surprised even the leadership of South African Jewry. As late as September 1986, at the biennial conference of the South African Zionist Federation in Johannesburg, queries were raised, in a spirit of protest, by the large youth and student delegation concerning rumors and random bits of information about ongoing visits of Israeli military personnel and the use of Israeli weapon systems in the South African Army, which often aided the police in suppressing black unrest. The unanimous response of leaders of both the Zionist movement and the Jewish Board of Deputies was that these reports were highly exaggerated and malicious, and they cautioned the young people not to grant them credence.⁶⁷

The moral conundrum generated by Israel's arms-related trade with South Africa was most intense among the leaders of the Zionist youth movements, especially the largest of these, Habonim-Dror. (The others were Bnei Akiva, Betar, and Maginim.) *Aliyah* to Israel was the educational goal of these movements, yet they were hard put to understand Israel's policy. It seemed to run counter to their conviction that Zionism rested on values correlative with those underlying the struggle of the blacks for liberation and a just society in South Africa. This was a source of dissonance in the Jewish community, since its distinctively Zionist character had long rested upon the extraordinary importance of these Zionist youth movements. Unlike the North American scene, there had never been other than Zionist youth movements in South Africa, with their combined membership of some 6,000 encompassing about 35 percent of the eligible age group in the community in 1987. Since the entire leadership of the youth movements was made up of university students, there was a considerable overlap with the membership of the South African Union of Jewish Students (SAUJS) on the various campuses. They found themselves torn between their identification with Israel and their wish to support the cause of their fellow black students who, however, were stridently anti-Israel.

The embarrassment caused by Israel's relations with South Africa might well have inflicted serious damage on the identification of Jewish students with Israel, were it not for the grotesque, malicious slanders propagated by Muslim students on the various campuses. To the accompaniment of cries of "Death to Zionist imperialism," their propaganda fliers flooded the

⁶⁷The author personally witnessed the discussion at the S.A. Zionist Conference in Sept. 1986.

campuses at "Al-Quds Day" demonstrations with such inflammatory statements as: "These crimes by Begin and gang make Hitler look like an amateur. The illegitimate State of Israel was formed with the blood and lives of innocent men, women and children and has ever since continued its bloody legacy."⁶⁸

These crass excesses tended to galvanize Jewish students, whose total number at South African universities was estimated at over 5,000. The atmosphere contrasted sharply with the relative tranquility of the 1960s and 1970s, when Zionism and the Middle East question attracted no particular interest at South African universities. By 1987, SAUJS was more active than ever before and conducted a spirited campaign in defense of Zionism. Indeed, the provocative calls of the Muslim students for exorcising "Zionists" from the struggle against apartheid tended to vindicate the Zionist contention that Jews could be fully at home only in their own sovereign state.⁶⁹

The publications of SAUJS reflect the poignant ideological dilemma of politically aware segments of South African Jewry. Some of the debates call to mind, if on a smaller scale, the classic ideological conflicts characterizing the Jewish experience in European countries from the beginning of the period of Jewish emancipation until recent times.

On the one hand, views are aired castigating the Jews for prospering from the fruits of the apartheid system, and the organized Jewish community for "abdicating moral responsibilities in favour of ingratiating oneself with the government of the day." According to one student critic, "a twisted morality is produced when Jewish youth are taught to concern themselves with moral issues thousands of miles away from their own reality [in support of Jewish refuseniks in Russia or of issues in Israel] and remain silent on the moral issues of their immediate environment." He goes on to argue that leaving South Africa with "the skills and wealth acquired under apartheid," whether to "Kibbutz Tuval, Dallas, Texas or Adelaide" is abdication of

⁶⁸From a flier issued by the Muslim Students Association at Natal University on May 22, 1987, entitled "Liberate Palestine . . . the Stolen Land." Other typical examples of anti-Semitic motifs spawned by the Muslim Students Association are: "The link between apartheid and Zionism may be expressed in close economic and military ties but is, however, organically rooted in ideology"; "Zionism sees and recognizes itself in the death throes of the apartheid regime"; "The brutality with which this regime handles the Palestinians makes all the alleged tortures of the Nazis seem insignificant." These citations are from leaflets issued at the University of the Witwatersrand, May 22, 1987.

⁶⁹A typical statement of the Muslim Students Association is: "The oppressed in South Africa can never be liberated if we collaborate with Zionism and imperialism in any of its guises." From a newsletter issued at the University of the Witwatersrand Medical School: *Our Message*, May 22, 1987.

responsibility. "The real moral challenge," he avers, "is to fight to end apartheid and build a new South Africa."⁷⁰

On the other hand, the distinctively South African ideological matrix of Zionism is reflected in the following account of one Jewish student leader's intellectual odyssey until settling in Israel.⁷¹

I had always thought that I was a South African and my contribution should be there: to work toward the abolition of the apartheid system and all the iniquities arising out of it. My degree in social anthropology and African culture was, I felt, further testimony to my commitment to the African struggle. . . . My decision to get involved in the South African Union of Jewish Students, and later in the formation of "Jews against Apartheid" was based on the premise that the South African reality had to be taken cognizance of from a Jewish perspective. . . . A large part of the last five years has been spent attempting to reconcile my Jewishness with my South African identity. The turning point came, ironically enough, as a result of my participation in a seminar on the Holocaust at Yad Vashem in July 1985. . . . "Thou shalt not be a perpetrator; thou shalt not be a victim; and thou shalt never, ever be a bystander." The awful clarity hit me then; by returning to South Africa, I would be guilty of violating all three, whether or not I wanted to. . . . In the ultimate analysis, the bitter truth for me was that the South African diaspora had been unable to accommodate both my Jewish and African identities and, however difficult, I had to confront reality and be brutally honest with myself and finally make a choice. . . .

The circumstances of Israel's announced reassessment of policy toward South Africa alleviated but little the dilemma of the Jewish community. The real core of the problem—arms-related contracts—remained, and the South African government's response had been accordingly moderate. President P. W. Botha set the tone during an election rally in March 1987, when he said that he sympathized with Israel's position, as it had been "bullied" by the United States and intimidated by the prospect of losing billions of dollars in American aid.⁷²

The announcement of the Israeli cabinet's sanctions decision in September 1987 evoked predictable disappointment and resentment from the South African government and press, but not out of proportion to their reaction to other countries that had preceded Israel in adopting similar sanctions. For their part, both the Jewish Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation had decisively declared themselves opposed to the application of

⁷⁰Tony Karon, "South African Jewry: An Alternative to Complicity," *Strike*, May 1985, 4-7.

⁷¹Barbara Meltz, "From African Culture to Jewish Identity," *Hame'orer* 5 (Journal of the Movement for Zionist Fulfillment in Israel) (Winter 1986):35.

⁷²One newspaper, the *Star*, provided the following vivid metaphor: "Israel has been handed a knife and told to stab a friend—or be stabbed instead." See BD, "Press Items of Jewish Interest," no. 6, Mar. 26, 1987; no. 17, Sept. 18, 1987. These are the sources for all the citations which follow, unless otherwise stated.

sanctions of any sort against South Africa. Moreover, between the announcement of reassessment in March 1987 and the adoption of specific measures in September, they made persistent representations to the government of Israel urging it not to embark upon a course of sanctions. The Israeli Foreign Ministry was flooded with letters from Jewish citizens of South Africa making similar appeals.

Statements issued by the Jewish Board of Deputies together with the Zionist Federation recognized that Israel, like any other sovereign state, "takes its own decisions to protect its own national interests," but added that "in this regard it is noted that Israel has been subjected to significant pressures from the United States." They declared their opposition to sanctions "on the ground that it undermines the ability to create conditions in which steps can be taken toward the achievement of an apartheid-free and just society in which all peoples can attain their legitimate aspirations." At the same time, these statements averred that the "deep-rooted religious and cultural affiliations" felt by Jews with Israel would endure. The *Zionist Record* reported the president of the Zionist Federation, Julius Weinstein, as saying: "We abhor apartheid—it is un-Jewish, inhuman and we do not accept it as Jews, but we will not participate in any threats or blackmail or sanctions that the western world or any other countries wish to impose against this country." He added: "It has to be explained to the Israelis in no uncertain terms that sanctions which they wish to impose against South Africa will in fact harm the very people that we want to help—and that they want to help."⁷³

A major factor in the considerations determining the Zionist Federation's policy was the encouragement of *aliyah*. One of the attributes of South African Zionism's preeminent strength was the emphasis it had always placed on personal *aliyah*, its record in this area being distinctly superior to that of Zionist organizations in the United States. It was estimated that in 1987, some 14,000 former South Africans were living in Israel, constituting what might be described as a daughter community about 12 percent the size of the mother community in South Africa.⁷⁴

In the atmosphere of uncertainty that prevailed after 1985, causing Jews—not unlike other middle-class whites—to contemplate emigration, there was an unprecedented intensification of efforts to encourage the choice of Israel rather than other Diaspora destinations, such as Australia, Canada, the United States, and Britain. It was of some significance both to

⁷³*Zionist Record and S.A. Jewish Chronicle*, Mar. 27, 1987.

⁷⁴For brief surveys of the history and status of Zionism in South African Jewry, see Arkin, *South African Jewry*, 79–94, and Gideon Shimoni, "Zionism in South Africa: An Historical Perspective," *Forum* 17 (Spring 1980):71–91.

South African Jewry and the State of Israel that the South African government had not hindered activity along these lines. Indeed, the trade agreements periodically renewed between the governments of Israel and South Africa had always included the latter's granting of "approved enterprise" status to certain categories of investment in Israel, among them residential housing. These were limited, however, to agreements renewable every two years and had not been in excess of some 40 million rands (approximately \$19 million) per annum. Moreover, the proceeds from the sale of such investments had to be repatriated to South Africa. Emigrants from South Africa were permitted to take only 100,000 rands (approximately \$34,000) of capital out of the country.

The range and scale of activities now developed to promote *aliyah* were unparalleled anywhere in the Western Diaspora since the establishment of Israel. They included subsidized pilot tours of Israel; group settlement projects in new towns in Israel, such as Kohav Yair; provision of subsidized, furnished apartments as an alternative to absorption centers; creation of loan funds for small businesses; a series of short visits by emissaries who were former South Africans successfully settled in various walks of life in Israel; and an organized letter-writing campaign from former South Africans settled in Israel to friends and relations urging them to "make the right move—to Israel," and "if you want to leave home, come home." In addition, South African Zionists succeeded in setting up a coordinating committee of the Israeli government's Absorption Ministry, the World Zionist Organization, and their own Israel office. One outcome of this committee's recommendations was an exemption for South African settlers from limitations on the size of apartments purchasable with subsidized government housing loans.

Despite the troubled situation in South Africa, the record of emigration was very far from presaging the disappearance of South African Jewry. It was estimated that between 1970 and 1980 about 12,000 Jews settled abroad permanently, one-third of them (4,000) in Israel. After the most recent wave of unrest in South Africa, the number of immigrants to Israel rose rather moderately from 246 in 1985 to 565 in 1986 and 737 in 1987. Moreover, it was estimated that at least 6,000 Israelis were living in South Africa in 1986.⁷⁵ (In the Jewish community rumors had long exaggerated the number to as many as 20,000.) This inflow of Israelis and, even more so, the fact that considerably more of those who emigrated from South Africa chose to settle in other Diaspora lands—mainly Australia, Canada, Britain, and the United States—was a cause of distress and soul-searching among the leaders of a community long considered among the most Zionist in the world.

⁷⁵For these estimates, see Sergio DellaPergola and Allie A. Dubb, "South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile," in this volume.

Attitudes of Black Political Leaders Toward the Jews

Almost no research, historical or sociological, has been conducted into public attitudes toward the Jews outside of the white group. Indeed, the only serious study ever to address itself to this area of inquiry was a 1971 survey of attitudes of matriculation pupils resident in the black township of Soweto, near Johannesburg. Its author was Melville L. Edelstein, at the time chief welfare officer there. His findings showed that the sense of "social distance" experienced in relation to Jews was greater than toward English-speakers in general and was exceeded only by that felt toward Afrikaners.⁷⁶ The explanation for this did not fall within the scope of Edelstein's research, but, noting that his respondents had only the barest actual contact with Jews, and that there appeared to be some correlation between antipathy to Jews and membership in white-oriented churches, he suggested that the explanation possibly lay in New Testament teaching and the cultural transmission of anti-Jewish stereotypes. Edelstein himself, no less than the Jewish community's leadership, was surprised by these findings. Ironically, Edelstein, who had devoted himself to welfare work in Soweto, tragically lost his life in the 1976 Soweto riots.

Similar indications of negative stereotyping of Jews by blacks and coloreds can be culled from incidental references in other works of research. An example is a study of social groups and racial attitudes in a small South African town called Port Nolloth. Although there were very few Jews in the town, it was found that insofar as colored people distinguished between Jews and other whites, Jews were considered more tolerant; however, there was also "a stereotype of them as being avaricious and cunning."⁷⁷

A valuable new source of information was provided by two young scholars, Alan Fischer and Tzipporah Hoffman, who conducted extensive interviews with leading personalities across a broad spectrum of political and ethnic groups in South Africa.⁷⁸ The candid answers elicited by the interviewers' probing questions cast new light on the prevailing attitudes toward Jews of major political activists outside of the white group. In the main, they reflect considerable hostility. This mostly assumes the form of so-called "anti-Zionism," but the anti-Jewish undertones are recognizable.

One current of thought distorts the character of Zionism in order to

⁷⁶Melville L. Edelstein, *What Do Young Africans Think?* (Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1972); also, "The Urban African Image of the Jew," *Jewish Affairs*, Feb. 1972, 6-8.

⁷⁷Martin E. West, *Divided Community* (Cape Town, 1971), 79.

⁷⁸The interviews were to be published in late 1988 by Southern Book Publishers (Johannesburg), under the title *The Jews of South Africa: What Future?* Unless otherwise indicated, the quotations that follow are from these interviews. I am deeply indebted to the authors of this innovative work for making available to me their tapes and transcripts.

delegitimize it. This is accomplished by attributing to it (and by extension to the State of Israel) an innate "Chosen People" ethos of arrant exclusivity and discrimination against outsiders. This putative ethos is then facetly equated with apartheid, so that Israel is criticized for collaborating with the white regime of South Africa, not so much out of self-interest as out of an alleged inherent empathy. Although ostensibly directed against the State of Israel, this hostility attaches itself to the local Jewish community, whose intimate affinity with Israel is all too evident. While the interviews contain some expression of appreciation for those individual Jews who had been active in the opposition to apartheid over the years, a clear distinction is drawn between them and Jews as a community.

Another indication that criticism of the Jews ran deeper than the question of Israel's relations with South Africa was the perceived role of Jews in the South African economy. For example, Saths Cooper, a leader of the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO, a "black consciousness" movement open only to black membership), told his interviewers that the Shylock stereotype was prevalent among blacks and that it was common for the term "Jew" to be used synonymously with "exploiter," whether the reference was to white or black. He said, furthermore, that "the Jewish community, rightly or wrongly, has been seen to be based in capitalism and capitalism has meant propping up apartheid. Oppenheimer [the diamond magnate, actually a convert to Christianity] has been responsible for the greatest single exploitation in this country."

A key black figure was Desmond Tutu, archbishop of the Anglican Church in South Africa, who was recognized throughout the world as a symbol of the struggle against apartheid. Archbishop Tutu repeatedly condemned Israel's ties, military and other, with South Africa, and called upon the Jews of South Africa to oppose the apartheid system with vigor. Tutu also considered Zionism to have "very many parallels with racism," since it "excludes people on ethnic or other grounds over which they have no control." He told his interviewers, rather obscurely, that "in Israel you exclude people and treat those that are excluded as lesser humans." To recognize that Archbishop Tutu, in common with most black leaders, had imbibed the anti-Zionist stereotype was not, however, to say that he was anti-Semitic. Nor had Tutu ever denied Israel's right to exist, as had some of the more extreme detractors of the Jewish state among the black leadership. Indeed, he said that he considered it unrealistic of the Arab world to pretend that Israel did not exist, and that while sympathizing with the PLO, he did not accept its methods. Some of Archbishop Tutu's comments aroused resentment in Jewish quarters and even insidious rumors that he had made blatantly anti-Semitic remarks, but these rumors were given short shrift by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies itself.

Typical of Tutu's acerbic rhetoric is the parallel he repeatedly drew between apartheid and the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis. He said, for example, that the South African government deliberately resettled children where there was no food, thereby condemning them to starvation, adding, "You might even say that the gas chambers made for a neater death." Some Jews took exception, arguing that the evils of apartheid had never extended to systematic annihilation of the blacks and pointing out that no rabbi in Nazi Germany had been allowed the freedom to criticize the regime which Archbishop Tutu enjoyed. His response was to describe this "as a kind of Jewish arrogance." "Jews seem to think that they have cornered the market on suffering," he complained to his interviewers.⁷⁹

Another important figure in the bitter opposition to apartheid was the Reverend Allan Boesak—a colored according to apartheid race classification—who was president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and a patron of the United Democratic Front. Reverend Boesak was less vocal than Archbishop Tutu in criticism of Jews and more sensitive in his rhetoric. He told his interviewers that he rejected as "shameful prejudice" the notion that God did not hear the prayers of the Jews. Yet he too averred: "Zionism is an ideology that does not accept the values of the Jewish heritage as I understand it."

More typical than these reasonably qualified criticisms of Israel in the broad spectrum of views recorded by Fischer and Hoffman were those of Dan Habedi, a leader of AZAPO. Although in regard to the local Jewish community Habedi declared, "We do not split hairs and say the Jewish people are more to blame than other people," he brusquely denied the legitimacy of the State of Israel, stating: "That land as far as I am concerned belongs to the Palestinians." Moreover, he equated Zionism with Afrikaner Calvinism: "They believe that they are the Chosen People, like those who colonized this land believe they are the Chosen People; that they were sent here to teach black people their right ways."

Gatsha Buthelezi, president of Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement) and chief minister of the KwaZulu semiautonomous territory, was an exception to the general rule of hostility toward Israel. Although undoubtedly an important figure in the South African political constellation, Buthelezi was something of an outcast from the mainstream of the black liberation movement. His commitment to an ethnic Zulu constituency was considered dangerously divisive. He refused to toe the African National

⁷⁹On the controversy over Archbishop Tutu's allegedly anti-Semitic statements and the denials issued by the Board of Deputies, see BD, "Press Items of Jewish Interest," no. 3, Feb. 13, 1987; Feb. 26, 1987; also the *Herald Times*, Feb. 20, 1987. Tutu's comparisons with the Holocaust were reported in the *Jerusalem Post*, Mar. 11, 1987. He made much the same remarks in interviews with ABC television on Oct. 16, 1984, and Israel Radio on July 23, 1987.

Congress line on a range of matters, including advocacy of sanctions by outside countries. Moreover, defying the prevalent black taboo on Israel, Buthelezi accepted an invitation to visit there in 1985. In a revealing comment to his interviewers, Fischer and Hoffman, he explained: "I accepted the visit to Israel because I need friends too. The ANC have got Arafat and Cuba." Buthelezi refrained from aiming selective criticism at Israel compared to other countries in the world. However, he was critical of the South African Jewish community for failing "to stand up and be counted." He told his interviewers that Jews "criticize, through their liberal press, the policies of the government" but secretly pray for the retention of Afrikaner power because they feel more secure with it.

The worst manifestations of hostility toward Jews, equaled only by the anti-Semitism of the Afrikaner right-wingers, emanated from political groups in the Muslim community. (This community numbered some 353,000, of whom 176,000 were members of the colored community situated mainly in the Cape, and another 166,000 were part of the Indian population found mainly in Natal and the Transvaal.) A case in point was the political group Call of Islam, formed in 1983 and active in the framework of the United Democratic Front. Interviewed by Fischer and Hoffman, one of its founders, Farid Essak, expressed hatred for the Jews, drawing freely upon anti-Jewish stereotypes found in the Koran. Essak also espoused use of anti-Zionism as an instrument in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Ironically, it was with Call of Islam that the Jews for Justice group, to which we referred earlier, cooperated in coming to the aid of the black population at Crossroads near Cape Town. Yet Essak had no kind words for the members of Jews for Justice, seeing in them not "liberated Jews" but really Zionists in disguise, insidiously infiltrating the freedom movement in South Africa.

Similar deep-seated hostility was expressed by Sheikh Nazeem Mohammed, president of the Muslim Judicial Council in South Africa, who argued that the white press and universities, no less than the country's finances, were wholly controlled by Jews. To his interviewers the sheikh explained candidly that it was inherent to the doctrine of Zionists that they gain control of the media and the educational and financial institutions of the country: they "must have control of the brain structure of the community."

An example of crude anti-Semitism emanating from Muslim sources was a leaflet distributed anonymously in 1985. It listed the names of major business companies, some owned by Jews and others mistakenly attributed to Jewish ownership. "If you have any policies or accounts with these companies," it exhorted blacks, "please cancel them and take out with other companies. These companies are Zionist organizations and send 80 percent

of their profits to Israel . . . who buy arms to murder our Arab brothers. . . . By exploiting our black workers these companies are keeping alive the illegal regime of Israel as well as South Africa."⁸⁰

Ironically, it was the modification of the apartheid system, one aspect of which was the reentry of growing numbers of blacks, coloreds, and Indians into the English-speaking universities, that led to hostile confrontations between Jewish and Muslim students on campuses in Johannesburg and Cape Town. One such clash took place at the University of the Witwatersrand in June 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon. The most recent clash, involving scuffles and fisticuffs, was in May 1987 at Cape Town University, after the Muslim Students Society held a meeting under the banner "Death to the Zionist Imperialists." Moulana Ebrahim Mousa, regional coordinator of the Muslim Youth Movement, declared: "We will not tolerate Zionism's attempts to infiltrate the liberation movements in South Africa," and "if Arafat is a terrorist, then so are Mandela and Tambo."⁸¹

Although the Muslim groups constituted only a small part of the forces of resistance to the apartheid regime, their influence was considerable within the United Democratic Front (UDF). Moreover, as revealed by Fischer and Hoffman's series of interviews, criticism of the Jews bore much the same marks across the entire spectrum of black groups struggling against the apartheid regime.

In the final analysis, it was probably the banned African National Congress (ANC) that would determine the future of South African Jewry, no less than that of the country as a whole. In early 1986 leaders of NUSAS, defying progovernment white public opinion, met with ANC leaders outside of South Africa, in Harare, Zimbabwe, to ascertain their views on a variety of subjects. One of the questions raised concerned Zionism and the PLO. The students reported back that "the ANC distinguishes between the religious manifestation, with which it has no problems, and the political manifestations of Zionism, which they argue, has denied the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to independence." They said the ANC supported the PLO out of recognition of "the right of oppressed people to struggle," and condemned Israel for acting, especially in the military sphere, "as a third party for the imperialist powers in supporting the South African government and other repressive states." At the same time, the

⁸⁰Leaflet entitled "Urgent Appeal!! Boycott," in the author's possession.

⁸¹See BD, "Press Items of Jewish Interest," no. 10, May 27, 1987, and also the exchange of letters from readers in the *Cape Times*, May 23, 1987. Characteristic of the delegitimization of Zionism is one letter calling upon Jews to acknowledge "the distinction between true Judaism and racist Zionism imperialism. We call on all South African Jews . . . to declare Zionism a heresy, as Christians declare apartheid heretical and as Muslims are continuously denouncing Malayism, Indianism and corrupt Saudi Arab states as heresies."

ANC claimed that it was "opposed to anti-Semitism and any form of racism and was not antagonistic to the Jewish community in South Africa," which, it noted, "had offered up many white democrats who actively opposed apartheid."⁸²

Amplification of this attitude may be drawn from an interview with Neo Mnumzama, an ANC spokesperson stationed at the United Nations.⁸³ Recognizing the "different political colours" of South African Jews, he said that the ANC regarded "in a positive light" those Jews who belonged to the broad struggle against apartheid and, above all, "those active in the ANC itself." (The most prominent of these was Joe Slovo, a Communist of long standing and one of the ANC's foremost leaders.) However, it disapproved of those members of the community who had Zionist affiliations. Claiming that there was a distinction between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, Mnumzama averred that "the people of South Africa . . . see parallels of apartheid in Zionism"; that "a major obstacle to Jewish participation in the struggle against apartheid has by and large been Zionism"; and that "Zionism as an ally of apartheid is certainly an accomplice in the perpetuation of the crimes that Pretoria commits against the South African people." Asked to define Zionism as perceived by the ANC, Mnumzama answered that Zionism was "an exclusive organization to which only Jews can belong," "a segregationist movement" on religious and ethnic lines that carried a strong reminder "of the reality of apartheid under which we have to live." He said that Israel, like South Africa, was based on the uprooting and dispossession of the indigenous majority population, and that the exclusion of blacks from the South African national experience as constituted by apartheid was paralleled by the exclusion of anyone who was not in the first place Jewish from "entry into the total experience of Zionist-Israel." Hence "you cannot struggle against apartheid and still adhere to Zionist positions."

Mnumzama also criticized Jews for wilfully refraining from translation of their "dominant role in the South African economy" into political power against apartheid. Moreover, he scoffed somewhat at recent statements of the Jewish Board of Deputies calling for the abolition of apartheid. He said that the situation was too far gone for mere statements of condemnation; "people must translate verbal denunciations into active struggle." Asked what was in store for South Africa's Jews after the attainment of the ANC's objectives, and whether Jews would one day be punished, Mnumzama considered that while a free South Africa would "not tolerate a Zionist

⁸²*NUSAS Talks to the ANC*, report on meeting between the National Union of South African Students and the African National Congress, held from Sunday, 31 March to Tuesday, 2 April, 1986, in Harare, Zimbabwe, 28.

⁸³One of the series of interviews recorded by Fischer and Hoffman.

presence in our country," Jews, like all people, would "have a choice to either abandon segregation as practice and join with the rest . . . in building a free, united, non-racial and democratic South Africa or, to exercise their freedom to leave the country and go to those climates which would be more conducive to Zionism."

In light of both the black perceptions of Israel surveyed here and the closely related record of Israel-South Africa relations discussed earlier, it was hardly surprising that neither Israel itself nor the organized Jewish community of South Africa had meaningful communication with black leaders. The conspicuous exception was Gatsha Buthelezi, himself in an ambiguous situation within the politics of black liberation. Beginning in 1980, the Jewish Board of Deputies' executives in the various provinces of South Africa initiated some "outreach" forums and invited various black leaders to address them.⁸⁴ These included, for example, Nathan Motlana, a prominent civic leader in Soweto, persons in the trade union and labor relations field, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who addressed a committee meeting of the board in June 1986. Given the gravity of the situation in South Africa and the issues at stake, these activities appeared rather perfunctory and futile. Indeed, the Jewish Board of Deputies' invitations to some black bodies met with blunt refusals, and Harry Schwarz candidly commented that addresses by those who have agreed "have been masochistic experiences for the audiences and have probably achieved very little."⁸⁵

As for the State of Israel, the only ray of light penetrating the dark cloud of relations emanated from the Histadrut labor confederation. Its Afro-Asian Institute in Tel Aviv and its Na'amat women's organization sustained some ties with various black civic organizations and trade unions.⁸⁶ By late 1987, a series of groups, numbering in all about 80 black men and women, had attended three- to four-week courses in organizational and leadership training at the institute, which exposed them to Israel's rich experience in these fields. In fact, one of the Israeli government's decisions regarding South Africa, announced in September 1987, was that steps would be taken to create a fund for the expansion of such training programs. Within the Labor party and the Histadrut and in the Foreign Ministry, the advocates of a serious change of course in relations with South Africa were hopeful

⁸⁴On these contacts with blacks see *Report to South African Jewry, 1985-1987* (S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies), 11, 64; *Report to South African Jewry, 1980-1983* (S.A. Jewish Board of Deputies, 1983), 17. For Buthelezi's comments in Israel, see the *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 16, 1985, 5.

⁸⁵Arkin, *South African Jewry*, 142.

⁸⁶The Los Angeles-based Center for Foreign Policy Options, whose research director was Steven Spiegel, was involved in the genesis of this activity. Its field director in Israel was Shimshon Zelniker, a lecturer on African politics at Labor's Beit Berl College. See the article by Tom Tugend in the *Jerusalem Post*, Apr. 18, 1986, 8.

that this modest channel of contact with blacks might one day open wider prospects.

Conclusion

South Africa was a society in transition, the ultimate outcome of which could not be predicted. Whether as dictated by the unilateral reforming policies of the National party government, or as generated by the agitation of revolutionary forces at work in the black population, a transformation was taking place. Relative to changes of political attitudes within the white segment of the population, especially among Afrikaners, over the previous quarter of a century, attitude change in the small Jewish component of that population had only been slight. After all, the political orientation of South Africa's Jews had always placed them, normatively speaking, somewhat to the left of center in the conventional white political spectrum. Concurrently, there had always been an extraordinary prominence of Jewish individuals in the nonconventional political groups seeking to transform the society as a whole on the minimum basis of one-man one-vote. Both of these phenomena had long characterized the Jewish experience in South Africa.

What did change for Jews was less their own political orientation than the gradual political moderation of the dominant Afrikaner group, on the one hand, and the dramatic political awakening and radicalization of the black majority, on the other. By 1987, the National party was situated at the center of the white political spectrum. On its right it was assailed by the reactionary backlash of Afrikaner parties, ranging from the Conservative party through to the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging. On its left were the Progressives and some of its own people who chose to become independents in the 1987 elections. Beyond the white parliamentary spectrum was a complex array of radical forces, political and trade unionist, overt and covert. To the extent that these frameworks were still open to whites, or at least to alignment with like-minded white groups, Jewish individuals were disproportionately prominent—almost as much as in the first decade and a half of apartheid rule.

The gap between the National party and the Progressives had narrowed. Notwithstanding the fundamental difference between the Progressives' advocacy of genuine multilateral negotiations for a new polity and the government party's essentially unilateral reordering of the existing polity, the two approaches were far closer to each other in 1987 than they had been 25 years earlier. Both catered, if with different intensity, to the whites' fear of revolutionary chaos and an ensuing nondemocratic regime; both opposed international sanctions, arguing that they were misguided and counterproductive as a strategy for effecting change in South Africa.

Already in the early 1960s it was quipped that most Jews spoke like

Progressives, voted for the United party, and hoped that the National party would stay in power. By the mid-1980s it could be said that most Jews both spoke as Progressives and felt most at ease with their consciences voting for the Progressives, but still relied on the National party to keep control of the situation. Moreover, increasing numbers of Jews were no longer constrained by a sense of moral unease from actually voting for the National party.

Something of a paradox was evident. On the one hand, much of the Jewish communal leadership was gripped by a sense of crisis. Many young Jews were leaving the country and many more, old and young, were talking of leaving, but probably never would. There was also a disheartening sense of failure at the fact that so many of those who left chose destinations other than Israel. South African Jewry had never been rich in intellectual resources rooted in Judaism itself, and now there was a brain drain of scholars, rabbis, and teachers. Yet, on the other hand, the Jewish leadership was ideologically more at ease than before because the boundaries of liberal opinion permitted by the white consensus had broadened. The Jewish Board of Deputies was now able to say what it had always felt at heart but was constrained from saying, and Jews were able to articulate a collective Jewish voice through groups such as Jews for Justice, without embarrassing the Board of Deputies. Even the South African Union of Jewish Students no longer felt at odds with the board.

The nature of Israel's relations with South Africa, however, aroused some dissonance among Jews. Whereas it embarrassed those who identified strongly with the forces of opposition to the apartheid system, whether in its pristine or reformed shape, the relationship was gratifying for the communal leadership and probably for the average Jew. In this regard the announcement during 1987 of Israel's reassessment of policy and sanctions measures, moderate as they might have been, appeared like a cloud on the horizon, threatening to discomfort them in a manner reminiscent of their experience in the 1960s. Much depended on how far Israel would go against the white regime of South Africa in the future. The Jewish communal leadership, for its part, had made its opposition to sanctions crystal clear.

It was difficult to escape the impression that South African Jewry found itself in a highly deterministic situation, with very little room for maneuver. Jews were inextricably embedded in the white segment of South African society and shared with all whites in the anxieties of the present crisis. Yet an additional dimension peculiar to the Jewish situation compounded their anxiety, as they viewed the growing right-wing Afrikaner reaction and its attendant anti-Semitism with mingled repugnance and fear. Nor did they contemplate with pleasure the prospects on the left. As well as sharing with all whites the fear of socioeconomic upheaval, revolutionary violence, and chaos, they contemplated with growing trepidation the hostility toward

Israel prevalent in black political groups and its attendant anti-Semitic undertones.

Jews could have no more than the most peripheral influence on the determination of South Africa's future. In a sense characteristic of the Jewish minority experience in many past climes and times, South African Jewry was held in a vise. Actions of Israel calculated to gratify black political leaders were likely to raise the level of hostility toward Jews in the ranks of the reactionary white political groups and could even awaken old animosities in the government party itself. At the same time, so-called anti-Zionism and hostility to Israel were already so prevalent among black leaders that it was difficult to imagine how they could be eradicated by any but the most improbably extreme actions of Israel against the South African government. This fostered a despairing frame of mind in the community concerning the chance that a future black regime would tolerate the Jews' natural bonds with Israel. One consequence was the inclination of many Jews to throw in their lot with the present South African government's policies. Another was the example set by Jews for Justice groups and progressive political figures like Harry Schwarz, who worked for the transformation of South African society but who, as Jews, would settle for nothing less than full and free expression of Jewish identity.

South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile

by SERGIO DELLA PERGOLA AND ALLIE A. DUBB

Background

PERHAPS THE MOST SALIENT FEATURE of South African society today is that racial classification determines the basic constitutional rights of each citizen—work opportunities, place of residence, participation in the political sphere, use of public amenities, and so on. Within this legalized castelike hierarchy, whites occupy the most privileged position, coloreds (people of mixed race) and Asians (largely Indians) an intermediate status, and blacks the lowest. According to the 1980 census, the total population of South Africa was 25,016,525, with 17,022,248 blacks, 4,551,068 whites, 2,624,007 coloreds, and 819,202 Asians (see table 1). By mid-1986, the total population was estimated at some 28.4 million.¹

While Jews have been in South Africa since the first British occupation in 1795,² major Jewish settlement dates from the 1880s. From the outset, Jews were part of the dominant white group and, more specifically, of its English-speaking segment. The latter fact is partly explained by the tendency of Jews to gravitate to the main towns and cities, which were predominantly English in character. Also important was the fact that the Afrikaners (the descendants of the original Dutch settlers), like the Jews themselves, were a relatively closed group, maintaining strict social, cultural, linguistic, and religious boundaries. British culture in South Africa, in contrast, was the idiom of the rich and powerful; it was cosmopolitan and not bound up

Note: The research reported in this article was carried out at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Prof. Uziel O. Schmelz read the manuscript and offered valuable comments. Arin Poller and Benny Anderman ably assisted in the preparation of this study.

¹The 1980 total excludes the black homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda, which were already independent, while the latest midyear estimate also excludes Ciskei. The UN, which still regards these territories as an integral part of South Africa, estimates the 1986 population at just over 32,000,000.

²Histories of the Jewish community include Louis Herrman, *A History of the Jews in South Africa* (Johannesburg and Cape Town, 1935); Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, eds., *The Jews in South Africa: A History* (Cape Town, 1955); Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910-1967* (Cape Town, 1980). See also Gideon Shimoni, "South African Jews and the Apartheid Crisis," in this volume.

with membership in a rigidly exclusive social group. To this open and accessible culture, with its more amorphous social identity, were attracted those immigrants—including Jews—who could not or would not become part of the Afrikaner people. Jews who went to live in the smaller towns and villages spoke Afrikaans and often established close and warm relations with their Afrikaner neighbors, but they remained strangers and outsiders.

The difference between Afrikaans- and English-speaking whites and the position of Jews in the ethnic stratification of South Africa is at least partially reflected in the religious distribution of the population (table 1). A breakdown of religious denomination by home language among whites in 1980 shows that three-quarters of all Afrikaans-speakers belonged to one of the three Dutch Reformed churches and a further 9 percent subscribed to the Apostolic faith. English-speaking whites, in contrast, showed allegiance to a wide spectrum of religious denominations, including 6.8 percent who were Jews. In turn, white, mostly English-speaking individuals constituted 97.4 percent of all those who identified themselves as Jews, the remainder being black (1.9 percent), colored (0.5 percent), and Asian (0.2 percent).

The South African Jewish community is relatively homogeneous in respect to its origins, religious patterns, and commitment to the Zionist cause and Israel. The community is relatively small in size and geographically concentrated in the two major metropolitan centers, Johannesburg and Cape Town. For these and other reasons the South African Jewish community has long been regarded in the Jewish world as a model of effective and disciplined organization. Virtually all Jewish religious and secular activities take place within the framework of national coordinating bodies. The most important of these are the South African Zionist Federation, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, the South African Board of Jewish Education, and the Federation of Synagogues of South Africa (which includes the Beth Din).³ Virtually all fund raising is done on a national level through the Israel United Appeal and the United Communal Fund.

From a global point of view, the South African Jewish community ranks eighth in size, seventh in the Diaspora. However, it has contributed beyond its size not only to the financial needs of Israel but, more significantly, to Western *aliyah* (immigration to Israel). In some ways it resembles various Jewish populations in the West, but in others—especially those related to the particular type of pluralism characterizing South Africa—it differs markedly. This article will focus on the major social and demographic characteristics of the Jewish community, viewing them mainly within the context of the white population, which the Jewish community most closely

³Until recently Johannesburg and Cape Town had separate *batei din*.

resembles and of which it is, most immediately, a part. At the same time, some characteristics will also be compared with the South African population as a whole so as to obtain a broader perspective.

Sources

From the point of view of sociodemographic information, South African Jewry is among the best documented Jewish communities in the Diaspora. There are a variety of sources in which the main components of Jewish population structure are described and by means of which selected aspects of population change over the last 100 years can be traced. The data available since the beginning of the twentieth century are especially rich.

The principal sources are the periodic official population censuses. Beginning in 1904, and again in 1911, 1918, 1921, 1926, 1936, 1946, 1951, 1960, 1970, and 1980, censuses have provided information on the various religious denominations, including Jews.⁴ This information includes not only the total size of each group and its geographic distribution, but also selected demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The proportion of the total (white) population which does not report a religion in South Africa's censuses is usually low, which enhances reliability of the results.

The data published by the South African Department of Statistics on the Jewish population have usually included a moderate amount of detail. However, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies was able to arrange for special detailed processing of the 1970 and 1980 data files on the white

⁴The main published sources of data from South African censuses include: *Results of a Census of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 1904* (Capetown, 1905); *Census of the Colony of Natal, 1904* (Pietermaritzburg, 1905); *Census of the Orange River Colony, 1906* (Bloemfontein, n.d.); *Results of a Census of the Transvaal Colony and Swaziland, 1904* (London, 1906); South Africa Bureau of Census and Statistics, *Census of the Union of South Africa: Annexures to General Report, 1911*, part 6 (Pretoria, 1912); South Africa, *Census of the European or White Races of the Union of South Africa 1918* (Capetown, 1920); South Africa Bureau of Statistics, *Third Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, Enumerated 3rd May, 1921*, part 7 (Pretoria, 1923); South Africa Bureau of Statistics, *Fourth Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, Enumerated 4th May, 1926*, part 8 (Pretoria, 1929); South Africa Bureau of Statistics, *Sixth Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, Enumerated 5th May, 1936*, vol. 6 (Pretoria, 1941); South Africa Bureau of Statistics, *Seventh Census of the Population of the Union of South Africa, 7th May, 1946*, vol. 4 (Pretoria, 1954); South Africa Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census, 8th May, 1951*, vol. 3 (Pretoria, 1954); South Africa Bureau of Statistics, *Population Census, 6th September, 1960*, vol. 2 (Pretoria, 1966–1967); vol. 3 (Pretoria, 1966); Sample Tabulations by Census Tracts (Pretoria, n.d.); South Africa Department of Statistics, *Population Census, 6th May, 1970*, Report no. 02–05–03 (Pretoria, 1975); Tabulations by Area and Religion, Metropolitan Areas (Pretoria, n.d.); South Africa Central Statistical Services, *Population Census 80, Religion by Statistical Region and District*, Report no. 02–80–06 (Pretoria, 1985); *Social Characteristics*, Report no. 02–80–12 (Pretoria, 1985).

Jewish population to be provided to the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 1970 the Department of Statistics prepared a comprehensive set of tabulations based on a 10-percent sample of South African Jewry; in 1980 it provided a computer tape of individual records of Jews living in the six major centers of Jewish settlement: Cape Town and Port Elizabeth in the Cape province; Durban in Natal; and Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Germiston in the Transvaal.⁵ Further processing of these data was performed by the authors of this article.

In addition to the censuses, official data are also available on the number and characteristics of Jewish international migrants for the period from the beginning of this century up to the 1950s.⁶

Community-sponsored surveys of the Jewish population of the major cities have provided a wealth of information covering both essential demographic and socioeconomic variables and several aspects of Jewish identity, attitudes, behaviors, and community activities. Surveys of Johannesburg Jews were undertaken in 1935 by Henry Sonnabend,⁷ and in 1968 by Allie A. Dubb.⁸ The major research effort was the 1974 South African Jewish Population Study, sponsored by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies in cooperation with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and directed by Dubb.⁹ The 1974 study used a sample of 2,074 Jewish households in

⁵The more detailed data available for 1980 refer to the six statistical regions which included the largest numbers of Jews. Statistical regions are divided into districts. In each of the regions for which we have data, most of the Jewish population is concentrated in the district named after the largest regional city. The Cape Town region also includes the Wynberg, Simonstown, Goodwood, and Bellville districts; Port Elizabeth includes Uitenhage and Kirkwood; Durban includes Pinetown and Inanda; Pretoria includes Wonderboom; Johannesburg includes Randburg; Germiston includes Alberton, Boksburg, Kempton Park, and Benoni. For the sake of simplicity, in this paper only the names of the chief regional centers will be mentioned. The data, however, relate to the entire respective regions. It should also be noted that an area bearing a particular name frequently has different boundaries in the census than it does when defined according to other criteria (e.g., magisterial district, municipal area, suburb from point of view of municipality, etc.). Furthermore, the census enumeration areas have themselves been altered from census to census. The result is that comparison of areas bearing the same name (e.g., the major metropolitan centers) over a period of years is subject to some error.

⁶See Stuart Buxbaum, "A Profile of Jewish Immigration to South Africa Between 1924-1948 and Its Impact upon the Local Community," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1981* (Jerusalem, 1983), 145-62.

⁷Henry E. Sonnabend, "Statistical Survey of Johannesburg Jewish Population" (Johannesburg, 1935), mimeo; Henry E. Sonnabend, "Notes on a Demographic Survey of a Johannesburg Group," *South African Journal of Science* 33 (Mar. 1937):1055-60.

⁸Allie A. Dubb, *Jewish South Africans: A Sociological View of the Johannesburg Community*, Rhodes University, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Occasional Paper no. 21 (Grahamstown, 1977).

⁹Allie A. Dubb, Sergio DellaPergola, Dorit Tal, Beryl Unterhalter, and Stuart Buxbaum, *South African Jewish Population Study* (Jerusalem, Hebrew University, 1977-1978). Several advance reports were issued summarizing the main findings of the 1974 study. In this paper

Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, and Bloemfontein, randomly selected from current Jewish community lists. The sample, therefore, did not adequately cover the more marginal members of the Jewish population, nor very recent arrivals who were as yet unknown to the organized community. These biases must be taken into account in interpreting the findings.

Records concerning Jewish marriages and Jewish burials have been routinely accumulated for many years by Jewish communities in South Africa. While these vital statistics have not been studied systematically, some of this information relating to Johannesburg Jewry in the late 1960s and early 1970s was analyzed.¹⁰ Some data on synagogue marriages have also been published by South Africa's Department of Census and Statistics.¹¹ An investigation of Jewish births, using records of maternity wards, was carried out in Johannesburg in 1972.¹²

Jewish education in South Africa has been coordinated over the years by two central boards of education which publish periodic reports. In 1982 a systematic census of Jewish schools was taken, as part of the First Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora, by the Project for Jewish Educational Statistics at the Hebrew University's Institute of Contemporary Jewry.¹³ Information was collected about the basic characteristics of institutions, pupils, and teachers.

Other, more specific, pieces of social-science research are also available.¹⁴ All these sources are helpful in obtaining an overview of the changing characteristics of the Jewish population and the Jewish community in South Africa over the last several decades.

these are referred to as SAJPS Advance Reports. See, in particular, SAJPS Advance Report no. 1, *Methodology of the Study*. It should be noted that Bloemfontein, the main center in the Orange Free State province, was included in the 1974 survey but not in the detailed 1980 census processing. The entire Germiston statistical region was covered in the 1980 census tabulations, while in 1974 only parts of the Germiston statistical district were included, and those as part of the Johannesburg survey area.

¹⁰SAJPS Advance Report no. 5, *Mortality*, and no. 13, *Marriage and Mixed Marriage*.

¹¹See Stuart Buxbaum, "Synagogue Marriages in South Africa: An Analysis of Official Statistics," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1973* (Jerusalem, 1977), 171-94.

¹²SAJPS Advance Report no. 7, *First Data on Fertility*.

¹³Nitza Genuth, Sergio DellaPergola, and Allie A. Dubb, *First Census of Jewish Schools, 1981/2-1982/3-International Report*, Project for Jewish Educational Statistics, Report no. 3 (Jerusalem, 1985).

¹⁴See U. O. Schmelz, ed., *Demography and Statistics of Diaspora Jewry, 1920-1970-Bibliography*, I (Jerusalem, 1976), 254-62; Paul Glikson, "Selected Bibliography, 1969-1971," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. J. Gould, eds., *Studies in Jewish Demography-Survey for 1969-1971* (Jerusalem-London, 1975), 242-43; Paul Glikson, "Selected Bibliography, 1972-1980," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. J. Gould, eds., *Studies in Jewish Demography-Survey for 1972-1980* (New York, 1983), 139-44.

EVOLUTION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION

Growth of the Jewish Population

By 1880 there were about 4,000 Jews, mostly from England and Germany, in the four territories that were to become the Union of South Africa in 1910 (the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal). During the two decades that followed, the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa and deteriorating conditions in Eastern Europe drew thousands of Jewish immigrants from Lithuania, Russia, Poland, and Latvia. By the turn of the century, in 1904, the Jewish population had increased ninefold to over 38,000, and constituted 3.4 percent of the total white population of the territories (see tables 2 and 3). Seven years later, the first census after the formation of the Union indicated that the number of Jews had grown by almost a quarter, to 47,000, constituting 3.7 percent of all whites.

As East European immigration moved into high gear, the Jewish population of the Union increased significantly faster than the total white population, until by 1936 it stood at over 90,000, comprising 4.5 percent of all whites. However, with the enactment of the Quota Act in 1930 and the Aliens Act in 1937, this immigration was reduced to a trickle. The last relatively large influx, which occurred between 1933 and 1939, was of refugees from Nazi Germany, which had not been one of the "quota" countries.

The cessation of large-scale Jewish immigration since 1939, a low rate of natural increase, and, during the last ten years or so, a rise in emigration, have led to a decline in the rate of growth of the South African Jewish community, both absolutely and relative to the total white population. Between 1970 and 1980 the number of Jews actually decreased by some 200 persons, to 117,963. By 1986 it is estimated that there was a further reduction—due mainly to a new wave of emigration—to around 115,000, constituting 2.3 percent of all whites.

The breakdown of the South African population in 1980 by religion (see table 1) shows that Jews constituted the smallest major religious group in the total population and that only Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Hinduism had fewer white adherents. Compared with specific Christian denominations in a more detailed census tabulation, however, the number of Jews ranks with medium-sized white churches, such as the Presbyterians, and well above the Baptists, individual Pentecostals, and the various ethnic churches.

Another interesting fact is that a small proportion—less than 0.1 percent in each case—of coloreds, Asians, and blacks declared themselves to be Jews. In 1980 this represented a total of 3,125 individuals (2,320 black, 533

colored, and 272 Asians) in addition to 117,963 white Jews. While it is possible that colored and Asian Jews were either "reclassified" white Jews¹⁵ or their offspring, they had in fact increased by more than 150 percent since 1970 and seventeenfold since 1960.¹⁶ The characteristics of colored, Asian, and black Jews in South Africa will not be discussed in further detail here, but the subject is worthy of research.

International Migrations

IMMIGRATION

Historically, immigration constituted the main determinant of growth of South African Jewry. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a large number of Jews, mainly from the West, joined the diamond and gold rushes in Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand. However, the largest and most important stream of immigration, which also began in about the 1880s and continued until the 1930s, was that of Lithuanian and other East European Jews. The early 1930s saw the arrival of Jews—a large proportion being from Germany—seeking refuge from increasing Nazi pressure and persecution. This immigration continued until the outbreak of World War II. The relative magnitude of each wave of immigration can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy. Gustav Saron gives the following figures: "I estimate that in the thirty-year period from 1880 to 1910, some 40,000 Jewish immigrants entered the country. Thereafter, for various reasons, the numbers decreased, with the exception of the years 1924 to 1930. In all, in the half-century 1910 to 1960, I estimate that perhaps 30,000 Jewish immigrants entered the country. The bulk of these were East European Jews."¹⁷

Year-by-year official statistics relating to the number of Jewish immigrants show a peak in 1928 (2,293 admitted persons) and 1929 (2,788

¹⁵In terms of the Population Registration Act, 1950, all permanent residents were classified according to "population group," i.e., black, white, etc. Reclassification in any direction could be requested by the person him/herself, or by the authorities acting on their own initiative or on the reports of neighbors or others.

¹⁶There were rumors during the 1970s of an Israeli rabbi, who has since left the country, selling conversions to blacks. The probability, however, is that almost all the black Jews in 1970 and 1980 belonged to a sect founded by the self-styled "Rabbi" Mshizana in Soweto, Johannesburg. The sect was never accepted by either the Orthodox or Reform communities as authentically Jewish. First encountered by anthropologist Martin West (now professor and head of the Department of Anthropology, University of Cape Town) in the 1960s, the sect was later reported in the press from time to time. The "rabbi" was detained during the recent disturbances.

¹⁷Gustav Saron, "The Making of South African Jewry," in Leon Feldberg, ed., *South African Jewry, 1965* (Johannesburg, 1965), 13.

persons), and an all-time record in 1936 (3,330 persons).¹⁸ In earlier and later years the volume of Jewish immigration was much smaller. From the available statistics we can also evaluate past fluctuations in the percentage of Jews as a proportion of total immigrants to South Africa. The general trend was a decrease—from a peak of 35 percent in 1929 to 7 percent on the eve of World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s the level of Jewish immigration was below 1 percent of the total.

Action by the South African government in the form of restrictive legislation had profound effects on the volume and nature of Jewish immigration. In May 1930 the Immigration Quota Act came into force. This established a limited quota of immigrants of any race from all those countries specified in the act. Among the regulated countries were those of Eastern Europe, from which most Jews had come. Although it was officially denied that the act was aimed at curbing Jewish immigration in particular, it had exactly that effect. The reasons given for the restrictions emphasized that immigrants from the quota countries were culturally too different to be satisfactorily assimilated into a South Africa wishing to maintain its homogeneity, its basic ethnic composition, and its type of civilization.¹⁹ In 1937 further restrictive legislation, the Aliens Act, was enacted.

During the late 1920s and early 1930s, almost 90 percent of Jewish immigration originated from countries affected by the 1930 Quota Act (see table 4). More than 50 percent of all immigrants came from Lithuania and nearly 20 percent from Poland. Jews constituted 80 percent of all immigrants from quota countries between 1924 and 1932. This pattern changed completely when the Nazis came to power in Germany. Between 1933 and 1939, the proportion of Jewish immigration coming from quota countries was reduced to 30 percent (of which half was from Lithuania), while 70 percent came from nonquota countries, which included Germany (59 percent of the total), other countries under German rule, and the British Commonwealth. The Jewish share of the total immigration from quota countries was reduced to 30 percent.²⁰

In the years 1941–1945 Jewish immigration to South Africa ceased almost entirely. With the end of World War II, immigration resumed. During the early postwar period it was over 500 persons per year, with about half coming from the United Kingdom. Survey data collected in 1974 suggest that between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s the net inflow of Jewish immigrants probably declined to a yearly average of 200–300. Of these, about 25 percent came from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, about 20 percent from Israel, 15 percent from the United Kingdom, and the rest from other

¹⁸See Buxbaum, "A Profile of Jewish Immigration," 146.

¹⁹Ibid., 145.

²⁰SAJPS Advance Report no. 4, *Country of Birth and Period of Immigration*.

European countries, the Middle East, North Africa, North America, and Australia.

The demographic profile of Jewish immigrants changed during the different periods of immigration. During the 1920s a disproportionate number of young, single Jewish males arrived in South Africa (see table 4). Later, the sex ratio of immigrants was more balanced. Some married women and minors were brought to South Africa by husbands and fathers who had preceded them by a few years. Concentration of interwar immigrants in particular years and age groups had an impact on the demographic composition of the Jewish population in subsequent years (see below).

Fragmentary data on occupation before immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe during the 1920s indicate a predominance of salesmen and industrial workers.²¹ By contrast, the occupational composition of Israelis migrating to South Africa between 1975 and 1984 was more than one-half professionals, about one-fifth production workers, and a smaller proportion of other occupations.²²

EMIGRATION

As already noted, a positive international migration balance was for many years the most important factor in Jewish population increase. Nevertheless, while emigration from South Africa has generally been much lower than immigration, it has usually represented a sensitive indicator of changes both within the Jewish community and within South African society at large.

During the period 1924–1945, the ratio between the number of emigrants from South Africa per 100 immigrants was only 4 percent among Jews, as against 59 percent among non-Jewish whites.²³ This reflects differences in the frequency of return migration, different motivations of Jews and non-Jews for immigration and emigration, and the different options for actually moving back and forth that were available to members of each group during the interwar period.

The only country for which detailed data on Jewish migration from South Africa exist is Israel. Between 1924 and 1948, 954 Jews emigrated from South Africa; of these, 265 (28 percent) went to Palestine (see table 5). With the establishment of the State of Israel, the flow of South African *olim* increased significantly, though the pace varied over time. Yearly numbers

²¹Buxbaum, "A Profile of Jewish Immigration," 156–57.

²²Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Migration of Israelis Abroad: A Survey of Official Data from Selected Countries*, Supplement to the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, no. 6 (Jerusalem, 1986), 69.

²³See Buxbaum, "A Profile of Jewish Immigration," 158.

of migrants tended to increase throughout the 1950s and 1960s, particularly after the Six Day War. However, of much greater significance were the repercussions of political unrest in South Africa during the late 1970s, which led to an *aliyah* of more than 1,000 *olim* in each of the two years 1977 and 1978. After a temporary slowdown during the early 1980s, emigration to Israel began to increase in 1985. The total pool of Jews of South African origin living in Israel was estimated at about 14,000 at the end of 1987, including Israeli-born children of South African parents.²⁴ This amounts to about 12 percent of the size of the Jewish population in South Africa in 1980.

In 1974 Jewish heads of households surveyed in the six major centers reported a total of 28,000 children of all ages living at separate addresses. Of these, over 5,000 (19 percent) did not live in South Africa. Of all children whose place of residence abroad was indicated, 33 percent lived in Israel, 32 percent in the United Kingdom, 13 percent in the United States, 7 percent in Canada, 3 percent in Australia, and 12 percent in various other countries. On the other hand, when asked about their intention to stay in South Africa, 78 percent of heads of households stated that they would remain (52 percent definitely and 26 percent probably), 8 percent were not sure, 13 percent contemplated leaving, and 1 percent indicated that they would definitely leave. Of those who specified a possible country of destination, 80 percent indicated Israel, 9 percent the United Kingdom, 7 percent the United States, 2 percent Canada, and 2 percent another country.²⁵ While these attitudes may have changed, and actual behavior may not have been consistent with them—under the impact of more recent events—Israel did stand quite high among possible destinations for those who were considering emigration or whose kin had already emigrated.

Natural Increase and Affiliative Changes

BIRTHS AND DEATHS

In general, the size of a religious-ethnic minority group can be affected by three types of factors: the balance of internal demographic changes—births vs. deaths; the balance of international migrations—immigration vs. emigration; and the balance of identificational changes—accessions vs. secessions.

²⁴Our estimate based on Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Demographic Characteristics of the Population, National Data from the Complete Enumeration, 1983 Census of Population and Housing*, Publication no. 7 (Jerusalem, 1985), and evaluation of changes between 1983 and 1987. The estimate is based on figures on the South African-born and an appropriate inflation factor to account for persons who immigrated from South Africa but were not born there.

²⁵SAJPS Advance Report no. 2, *Emigration*.

With the decline of Jewish immigration during the 1930s, natural increase emerged as the principal factor in the growth of the Jewish population. Birth and death rates are not available, but rough orders of magnitude can be obtained by looking at the number of young Jewish children at various dates and subtracting the known amount of growth due to migration from the total Jewish population growth. It would appear that the rates of natural increase were generally modest and tended to decline—from 6–7 per 1,000 Jews during the 1930s to 3–4 per 1,000 during the 1960s.

Retrospective and recent fertility rates are available from the 1974 South African Jewish Population Study, from a 1972 special investigation of Jewish fertility in Johannesburg, and, indirectly, from the age structure of the Jewish population in successive censuses.²⁶ While some substantive findings are discussed below, it should be noted here that South African Jews exhibited a relatively high level of fertility during the 1940s and 1950s—as compared to most other Diaspora communities—and showed a tendency to decline in the 1960s and especially toward the end of the 1970s.

Given the apparent high levels of natality after World War II, the explanation for the modest rate of natural increase must come from relatively high death rates. The older age composition of the Jewish population appears to have resulted in crude death rates somewhat above those of total whites. Relatively high death rates should not, however, be confused with the intrinsically low levels of mortality among South African Jews. The results of a study of Jewish mortality in Johannesburg in the late 1960s and early 1970s point to a life expectancy at birth of 71.9 years for men and 73.4 for women, as against 64.1 and 71.1, respectively, for total South African whites.²⁷ A similar advantage in the life expectancy of Jews probably prevailed in earlier decades too.

CHANGES IN IDENTIFICATION

Due to a lack of systematic data on changes in affiliation and identification among South African Jews, it has been assumed that the balance of conversions and other identification changes is nil. An inquiry conducted in 1966 found that Christian missionary activity among Jews was minimal, due to a notable lack of success in the past. Moreover, interviews with ministers of several Christian denominations suggested that very few Jews converted on their own initiative or because of outmarriage.²⁸

Regarding assimilation without religious conversion, it should again be noted that although the Jews belong to the white group, this is a legal definition and not a social or cultural one. The Afrikaners maintain strict

²⁶SAJPS Advance Report no. 7, *First Data on Fertility*.

²⁷SAJPS Advance Report no. 5, *Mortality*.

²⁸The inquiry was undertaken by Allie A. Dubb for the national weekly *Zionist Record*.

social and cultural boundaries which cannot easily be crossed, while English speakers do not form a coherent or cohesive social group. Thus, the country lacks clear-cut, generally accepted definitions of what constitutes a "true South African," and this has reduced the pressure on Jews to conform. Moreover, certain advantages (see below) in being Jewish might well play a significant role in minimizing the tendency of individuals simply to drift away from the Jewish community and from self-identification as Jews.

In spite of conversion to Judaism related to marriage (see below), there is no evidence showing that the accretion of converts has been a major factor in Jewish population change in South Africa.

The Jewish Population Equation, 1970–1980

Probably the most intriguing finding about the Jewish population from the 1980 South African census was the final count of the number of Jews. Since the 1970 census, in which 118,200 Jews were enumerated, the emigration of several thousand might have led to the expectation of Jewish population decline, this in spite of the moderate natural increase that still prevailed around 1970. The figure of 117,963 Jews for 1980 contradicted this expectation, pointing instead to surprising stability of Jewish population size during a decade of intense change.

Although every census, even the most sophisticated, carries some problems of quality, there is no way of ascertaining the extent to which the 1970 and 1980 totals may be explained by differences in the general quality of responses or in the coverage of the Jewish population in particular. Only on one specific point is there a known difference: the percentage of the total white population whose religious affiliation was unknown or who did not admit to any affiliation increased from 2 percent in 1960 and 2.7 percent in 1970 to 4.5 percent in 1980. However, the extent of nonresponse to the question on religion—although increasing—was low compared to that found in other Western countries. Were we to assume that a proportional share of Jews was included among those with unreported religion or none, the total would increase to 121,500 in 1970 and 123,500 in 1980. The size of the Jewish population would thus have grown over the intercensal period, making the actual demographic changes even more at variance with popular perceptions.

In order to reconcile the 1970 and 1980 figures on Jewish population, we must rely on partial and sometimes circumstantial evidence. In spite of their limitations, the available data do suggest the main direction and determinants of population change during the intercensal period.

An attempt should first be made to estimate the expected course of Jewish population growth between 1970 and 1980, assuming no international migrations and no identificational changes. These estimates are based on the

age structure of the Jewish population in 1970 and on the levels of mortality and fertility that have been ascertained or inferred from the 1970 and 1980 censuses and other sources. It should be noted that while age composition around 1970 was quite favorable to population growth, structural transformations during the 1970s were bringing about rapid changes in the prospects for growth. Thus, the proportion of those aged over 65 was rapidly increasing, and the number of women of procreative age was beginning to decline—the end of natural increase was approaching.

Applying the available five-year age-specific death and birth rates to the 1970 Jewish age structure, we obtain projected totals of 121,200 for 1975 and 122,400 for 1980, as against 118,200 in 1970. This amounts to an expected excess of 4,200 Jewish births over the number of Jewish deaths. Some moderate increase in life expectancy that might have occurred during the 1970s, which was not taken into account here, has probably led to some overestimate of the expected number of Jewish deaths and an underestimate of the expected growth of the Jewish population (assuming the absence of external migrations).

Considering the actual decline of about 200 in Jewish population size between 1970 and 1980, the total of 4,400 Jews “missing” from the 1980 census can only be explained by a negative balance of international migration. It must again be emphasized that there are no systematic and definitive data on Jewish immigration and emigration. Nevertheless, the few reliable items of information that are available, plus a set of reasonable hypotheses, provide the basis for an interpretation of the migration process.

Let us first consider immigration to South Africa during the 1970–1980 period. This factor has generally been given little attention, aside from periodic rumors about a growing community of Israelis—said to include as many as 20,000 people. In reality, the 1980 census reported a total of 2,261 persons born in Israel and (partially overlapping) 1,927 Israeli citizens. However, to obtain a fuller estimate of the number of Israelis we must also include those who were neither born in Israel nor were citizens of the country, but who had been resident there. Recent Israeli and South African migration statistics show a ratio of former Israeli residents to Israeli-born of about 1.6 to 1.²⁹ If we apply this ratio to the South African census figure of Israeli-born, we obtain a 1980 estimate of 3,618 persons, including a few non-Jews.

The notion of a large Israeli community in South Africa in 1980 must, therefore, be dismissed, although the above estimates of the number of

²⁹Over the period 1975–1979, 1,171 immigrants whose last country of permanent residence was Israel came to South Africa; the number of Israeli-born immigrants was 742. In 1980–1984, the figures were 2,443 and 1,507, respectively. See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Migration of Israelis Abroad*, 68–69.

Israelis should be considered as minimal (see below). They do not include people who might have been defined as Israelis but who either did not report an Israeli origin in the census or escaped the enumeration altogether. Among these were: (a) tourists and other temporary residents who were not obliged to report in the census; (b) persons who were not born in Israel and, being entitled to multiple citizenship, may not have appeared as Israeli citizens; (c) former South African immigrants to Israel who were recorded as both South African-born and South African citizens; (d) any other Israelis who concealed their birthplace or citizenship; (e) those located in the independent black homelands, which are excluded from the census but which in popular perception are still seen as part of South Africa.

A useful clue in the 1980 census on the volume of immigration to South Africa is the number of children born outside of the country since 1970 and thus immigrating to South Africa between 1970 and 1980. There were 837 such children in the six major metropolitan areas for which we have detailed data. Of these, 167 were born in African countries (mostly Zimbabwe), 109 in the United Kingdom, 48 in other European countries, 427 in Israel, and 86 in other countries (mostly the United States and Canada). There was no unusual pattern of concentration in any of the six major centers, other than some underrepresentation in the Cape province. Proportionate weighting of the total figure for the six selected centers (837) gives an estimate for the whole country of 914 foreign-born children aged 0–9.

How many Jewish adults entered South Africa together with these children? We may speculate that the migrants included a disproportionate share of unattached adults; at the same time, some portion of the migrants consisted of entire families. We shall assume, as the central value of a range of hypotheses, that the proportion of the 0–9 age group among the migrants was slightly below that of all South African Jewry in 1980: 12 percent vs. 13.7 percent. Based on this assumption it is estimated that a total of about 7,600 individuals immigrated to South Africa between 1970 and 1980 and remained there in 1980. If the real proportion of children out of all migrants was higher, the total estimate of immigrants would decrease; if it were lower, the estimate would increase. It should be noted that some of these migrant children were probably born abroad to South African parents who emigrated and later returned to South Africa.³⁰ Any children that were born

³⁰As noted above, about one-half of all immigrant children in 1970–1980 were Israeli-born. Children probably constituted a higher proportion of Jewish immigrants from Israel than from other countries. If we relate the 1980 census figures on Israeli-born children to the figures on immigration mentioned in footnote 29, a percentage of 20–25 percent of children is obtained, which seems not unlikely. We assume that the overwhelming majority of the Israeli-born immigrant children were born to Israeli parents and not to former South African *olim*.

in South Africa and that emigrated and returned during the 1970–1980 period are not included at this stage in the calculation. If they were, they would entail an additional number of accompanying adult return migrants.

Before suggesting a fuller estimate of return migration to South Africa, it would be well to consider the matter of emigration. Regarding the latter, the only hard facts are provided by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Over the 1970–1979 period, 7,893 South African residents came to Israel as “new” or “potential” immigrants³¹ (see table 5). At the same time, many more Jews emigrated to other countries. Partial evidence from Australian censuses suggests an estimated net inflow of up to 1,400 South African Jews between 1971 and 1981.³² The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom were other destinations reported by emigrants, but no precise figures are available. Some emigrants might even have moved from one destination to another after a period of a few years. Again the only clue upon which an estimate of further migratory mobility can be based comes from Israel: the proportion of immigrants from the period 1970–1979 who were still in the country in 1983 could be determined from the 1983 Israeli census. It was found that Israel had retained 47.5 percent of these *olim*, and that 52.5 percent, or over 4,100 out of the almost 7,900 individuals, no longer lived in Israel.³³ Some had presumably gone back to South Africa, while others had moved to a third country.

We must now reconcile our estimates of immigration and emigration in order to complete the picture of Jewish population movements between 1970 and 1980. The total number of new immigrants and return migrants to South Africa could range between the 7,600 estimated on the basis of the foreign-born children and accompanying adults in the 1980 census and the 11,700 arrived at by adding all 4,100 former *olim* of the period 1970–1979 who were “missing” in Israel. Lacking further information, we shall choose a middle estimate of about 2,000 returning *olim*, with the rest, presumably,

³¹A “new immigrant” is a person entering to take up permanent residence in Israel under the Law of Return or the Law of Entrance. A “potential immigrant” is a foreign subject who is entitled to an immigrant visa according to the Law of Return and intends to stay in Israel for a period exceeding three months. Potential immigrants are not Israeli citizens nor permanent residents but may apply to obtain either or both statuses. The data also include tourists who changed their status to new or potential immigrant. In recent years, over 90 percent of South African *aliyah* has been composed of potential immigrants. It should be noted that because of different classification criteria in the two countries, persons registered as immigrants in Israel may not have been recorded as emigrants in South Africa.

³²See William D. Rubinstein, *The Demography of the Australian Jewish Community 1981*, Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report no. 1 (Melbourne, 1986).

³³Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data. The number and percentage of the 1970–1979 South African *olim* staying in Israel in 1980 was probably higher, which results in some overestimate in the assumed number of return migrants. See also footnote 34.

having gone to other destinations.³⁴ This would produce a total of 9,600 Jewish immigrants and returning emigrants entering South Africa between 1970 and 1980. In order to attain the previously estimated South African Jewish migration deficit of 4,400 for the same period, an estimated 14,000 Jews would have had to have left South Africa during the intercensal period.

With regard to the destinations of these 14,000 Jewish emigrants, we know that 7,900 initially went to Israel and that 6,100, therefore, went to other countries. In the following years, the latter were joined by former South African *olim* who left Israel and chose not to return to South Africa. If our assumptions are correct, Israel represented the destination of first choice for more than half of those Jews who left South Africa between 1970 and 1980, but retained only roughly one-third of the estimated 12,000 South African Jews (14,000 emigrants minus 2,000 returnees) who had settled abroad permanently.

The basic results of this attempt to reconstruct Jewish population changes between 1970 and 1980 are summarized in table 6. It should be emphasized that only the central values from a much wider range of possibilities are presented. Thus, the Jewish population experienced a moderate annual rate of natural increase: 3.5 per 1,000 vs. 11.4 per 1,000 for total whites. The Jewish birthrate was lower and the Jewish death rate higher than that of total whites, mainly because of the different age structures of the two groups. Immigration rates were similar among Jews and total whites, but Jewish emigration rates were higher. The balance of international migrations was negative for the Jewish population and positive among total whites, despite a deficit in the net migration flows of whites in 1977 and 1978.³⁵ The average annual net migration rates for the 1970–1980 period were estimated at -3.7 per 1,000 Jews and 4.8 per 1,000 total whites. Overall, the Jewish population declined by a yearly rate of -0.2 per 1,000, as against a yearly increase rate of 18.7 per 1,000 among total whites.³⁶

³⁴The main assumption, here, is the total of 2,000 returning immigrants to South Africa. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all came from Israel. We might also assume that fewer former *olim* returned directly to South Africa, while more went from Israel to other countries, and the balance returned from these countries to South Africa. The assumed fixed constraint of 2,000 return migrants seems to fit better with other data and estimates discussed in this paper. While the extremely tentative nature of these estimates is emphasized, it should be noted that some of the biases introduced by our various assumptions tend to mutually compensate.

³⁵The main countries of origin of white immigrants were the United Kingdom and "other African countries" (mainly Zimbabwe). The main countries of destination of white emigrants were the United Kingdom and "other countries in Europe." See *South Africa 1980–81, Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1982).

³⁶There was an unexplained discrepancy in published data on total whites between the total amount of population growth between the 1970 and 1980 censuses and the sum of change components: births, deaths, immigration, and emigration. See South Africa Central Statistical Services, *Births: Whites, Coloured and Asians, 1983*, Report no. 07–01–11 (Pretoria, 1985).

Changes Since 1980

After a decline at the beginning of the decade, beginning in 1985 emigration again started to grow substantially. Using figures from South African Jewish community records for 1983 to March 1987 and Israeli immigration statistics for the same period, it is possible to arrive at an assessment of Jewish emigration since 1980. According to these sources, of a total of 3,500 Jewish emigrants,³⁷ about 50 percent went to Israel. Applying this proportion to the known number of *olim* for the whole period between 1980 and 1987—about 3,000 (see table 5)—we obtain a total of about 6,000 Jewish emigrants. Although not all other destinations can be ascertained, it is known from Australian census returns that between 1981 and 1986, 1,500 to 2,000 immigrated to that country.³⁸

While it is difficult to determine the level of total Jewish immigration to South Africa since 1980, official South African sources suggest that from Israel there has been a net influx of about 2,500³⁹ (this would raise the total number of Israelis from an estimated 3,600 in 1980 to over 6,000 in 1987). Nevertheless, although Jewish immigration and return migration to South Africa have continued as in the past, it is assumed that there has been an ongoing negative migration balance since 1980. Furthermore, by 1985 the increasingly aging Jewish population (see below) had already produced a negative balance of births and deaths. The cumulative effect of these two processes has resulted in a further decline in Jewish population size—estimated conservatively at 115,000 at the end of 1986 (see table 1).

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS

The South-Africanization of South African Jewry

BIRTHPLACE

The major transformation of South African Jewry over the years has been its gradual change from an immigrant to a predominantly local-born group.

³⁷Information kindly supplied by Sally Frankental, Kaplan Center, University of Cape Town. The figure is based on the number of Jewish households known to have left and a multiplier of 2.5 persons per household.

³⁸Based on the increase in the number of South African-born Jews according to the censuses of Australia, from 1,938 in 1981 to 3,425 in 1986. Information kindly supplied by Walter M. Lippmann, Jewish Social Service Council of Victoria.

³⁹See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Migration of Israelis Abroad*, and unpublished data.

This process of South Africanization of the Jewish population has had significant consequences for most other sociodemographic characteristics and trends. Around 1930, a majority of Jews were foreign-born as compared with about 15 percent of total whites. Subsequently, the diminished impact of immigration brought about a steady increase in the proportion of local-born individuals. The process can be followed by looking at the birthplaces of different age groups among South African Jews in 1980 (see table 7). The South African-born represented 46 percent of the group aged 65 and over, 74 percent of the 45–64 age group, 85 percent of the 30–44 group, and 94 percent of the children below age 15.

According to the 1980 census, 79 percent of Jews were born in South Africa, in comparison with 87 percent of all whites (table 8). The proportion of South African-born Jews in 1980 might have been somewhat larger had it not been for a significant increase of Jews born in Zimbabwe and “rest of Western Europe” as compared with 1970; natives of those countries had grown from 1.0 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively, in 1970, to 1.7 percent and 1.1 percent of the Jewish population in 1980. Furthermore, since emigrants were drawn disproportionately from the younger age groups, increased emigration also reduced the percentage of those born in South Africa. It is also probable that the proportion of local-born Jews was greater outside the main metropolitan areas, since new immigrants tended to concentrate in the larger cities.

The different timing of immigration from various countries is reflected in the age structure of different origin groups within the Jewish population (see table 9). In 1980 the oldest group was the East European, with a median age of 69.4, followed by immigrants born in other West European countries, including Germany (65.1) and the United Kingdom (59.8). On the other hand, immigrants born in other African countries (including Zimbabwe) and Israel were younger, with a median age, respectively, of 30.4 and 28.5. South African-born Jews had a median age of 29.8, as compared with 61.0 for the foreign-born.

CITIZENSHIP

Despite the relatively high proportion of the foreign-born in the Jewish population, 93 percent of Jews were South African citizens in 1980, as compared with 91 percent of all whites (see table 10). This reflects both the tendency of Jews to become naturalized and their relatively low level of immigration since World War II. On the other hand, the influx of Jews from Zimbabwe, Israel, and Western Europe, and probably the emigration of South African nationals as well, led to a 2-percent decline in the proportion of Jewish South African citizens since 1970.

LANGUAGE

One further index of the steady South Africanization of the Jewish community is the decrease in the use of Yiddish and "other European languages" as the primary language at home. Table 11 shows that whereas in 1936 nearly 18,000 Jews (19 percent) spoke Yiddish, this number declined to such an extent that after 1960 it was no longer listed separately in the census returns. In a survey of Jews in six major cities in 1974, 2 percent spoke Yiddish or Hebrew as a primary language and a further 7 percent used one of these languages together with English.⁴⁰ By 1980, 94.5 percent spoke English or Afrikaans at home, 1.1 percent spoke a Western European language, and 4.3 percent spoke Yiddish, Hebrew, or some other non-European language. This was similar to the proportion of total whites who spoke a foreign language at home.

Table 11 also provides interesting evidence of the direction of Jewish acculturation in South Africa. Whereas 36 percent of whites spoke English at home and a further 5 percent were bilingual (Afrikaans and English), 92 percent of Jews were English-speaking and 1.5 percent were bilingual. Only 1 percent said that their home language was Afrikaans. Within the white group, Jews constituted only 0.04 percent of Afrikaans-speakers and 6.8 percent of the English-speaking section (see table 1). This reflects the exclusivism of the Afrikaner group, as well as a clear preference on the part of Jews for the more open and cosmopolitan culture of English-speaking South Africans.

Geographical Distribution

COUNTRYWIDE PATTERNS

The earliest Jewish settlement in South Africa was in the Cape Colony, and it was in its capital city, Cape Town, that the first Jewish congregation was formally established in the mid-1840s. With the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand, many Cape Jews, as well as a large proportion of immigrants, moved northward. In the 1904 census (table 12), out of a total 38,000 Jews, 51 percent were in the Cape Colony, 41 percent were in the Transvaal Republic, and 4 percent each were in Natal and the Orange Free State. After the formation of the Union, the Jewish population of the Cape continued to decline until stabilizing at just over one-quarter of the total, while the proportion of Jews in the Transvaal had increased to about two-thirds by 1970. In the Orange Free State, after some years of modest

⁴⁰SAJPS Advance Report no. 6, *Educational Attainment and Languages*.

growth, the proportion and number of Jews dropped steadily during the post-World War II period. Natal has remained with between 5–6 percent of all Jews over at least two decades.

The distribution of Jews in the four provinces paralleled the movement from rural areas and smaller towns into larger towns and cities, and from the larger towns into the major metropolitan areas. Jews had always been one of the most highly urbanized white groups—91 percent in 1911 and 99 percent in 1980 lived in urban areas as compared with 52 percent and 88 percent of total whites for the same years—but had, nevertheless, been scattered throughout the country in communities ranging between a few score and some tens of thousands. This process is reflected in table 13; whereas in 1918, 40 percent of Jews had lived outside of the major urban areas, this proportion had decreased steadily so that by 1980 it was only 7 percent (if the towns on the East and West Rand are included). On the other hand, Jewish settlement in Port Elizabeth and East London increased up until 1960, and in Pretoria up until 1970. Thereafter, with the exception of Durban, these communities also began to decline. By 1980, 57 percent of the total Jewish population of South Africa, or 67,820 out of 117,963 individuals, lived in Johannesburg,⁴¹ with a further 23 percent (26,977) in Cape Town.

INTERNAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION

The patterns of internal migration have not been unidirectional. The two main stages of past geographical mobility within South Africa have been, first, diffusion into a large number of localities, and, more recently, concentration in the largest metropolitan areas. An examination of places of birth of South African-born residents of the major metropolitan areas in 1974 and in 1980 suggests that most of those born in Johannesburg and Cape Town had remained in those cities, and that they constituted the large majority (two-thirds and three-quarters, respectively, in 1974)⁴² of the local Jewish population. In the smaller cities, however, locally born Jews made up 47–57 percent of the population. Of the remainder, 18–33 percent had migrated from the two largest cities, the rest being from the smaller towns and villages. Whereas the migratory balance was ultimately positive for

⁴¹In the case of the Jewish population, redefinition of census areas affected, primarily, the boundaries of Johannesburg and Germiston and the towns constituting the East Rand between 1960–1970 and 1970–1980. In table 13, the composition of the East Rand is held constant, while Johannesburg and Germiston have been combined. In other tables, the three areas are as defined in the 1980 census, with the East Rand being included as part of "Rest of Country."

⁴²SAJPS Advance Report no. 9, *Geographical Distribution and Mobility*.

Johannesburg and Cape Town, it was zero for Durban and negative for the remaining cities.

Reasons for migrating to Johannesburg and Cape Town were not only the lure of the big city, but, in many cases, opportunities for study and work. On the other hand, migration from the two largest cities included many professionals and entrepreneurs who felt that the smaller centers offered better economic opportunities. The numerical stability of the Pretoria and Port Elizabeth communities was maintained primarily by the steady influx from the nearby smaller towns. It is partly because of the virtual disappearance of this source of replenishment that these communities, too, began to decline in recent years. Another possible factor is that with the increased emigration abroad during the 1970s and 1980s of many professionals and others in the higher occupational categories, fewer big-city Jews found it necessary to seek a niche in the smaller centers. The exception to the general trend was Durban: while 15 percent of its Jewish population came from smaller towns, 33 percent were from Johannesburg and Cape Town, and a further 7 percent from the other metropolitan areas. This reflects the general economic expansion of the city during the post-World War II years, and its attractiveness for entrepreneurs, professionals, and others.

One consequence of internal migrations has been the collapse and even the disappearance of organized Jewish community life in scores of small towns and villages throughout South Africa. In most of these places, synagogues and other property have been sold, and all that remains are cemeteries. In many areas there are no longer any Jews at all, while in others only one or two Jewish families are to be found.

Since the mid-1970s and early 1980s, the Jewish population decline of the smaller metropolitan areas has led to serious impoverishment of community life. A case in point is Port Elizabeth. Some 20 years ago the community numbered just under 3,000 persons, maintaining a full set of communal officials, institutions, and amenities—two Orthodox and a Reform synagogue; a Jewish day-school system from preschool to matriculation, a resident *shohet* and a kosher butcher, and so forth. By 1987 the secondary division of the day school had absorbed a large number of non-Jewish pupils (constituting over 40 percent of the total enrollment) in order to maintain itself; there was no longer a *shohet*, *mohel*, or Orthodox rabbi in town; and the large synagogue was relatively empty on the High Holy Days when, previously, extra sitting space had been needed.

RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION IN JOHANNESBURG

Jewish settlement within the metropolitan areas in South Africa follows a pattern common throughout the Jewish world—Jews tend for the most

part to concentrate in certain areas. As their socioeconomic position improves, they move into more desirable locations, but the pattern of concentration is constantly repeated. In South Africa residential separation of the various population groups—black, white, colored, Indian, and Chinese—is enforced by law;⁴³ Jews, as whites, therefore reside in white residential areas.

Although Jews in Johannesburg did not create a ghetto as they did, for example, in Chicago, they tended to cluster within a continuous area. Thus the earliest locus of Jewish residence was concentrated mainly in a band running east and west from downtown (Central, South-Eastern, and South-Western suburbs in table 14). As the community became more affluent, and many of these suburbs became industrialized and run down, Jews started to move northward, toward the northern parts of the central area, the eastern and northern suburbs. These areas remained roughly contiguous, but represented a fairly wide spectrum of socioeconomic levels. By 1960, 80 percent of Johannesburg Jews were concentrated in these areas, constituting in them over a quarter of the total white population. In the period 1960–1980 some Jews began to move out of the central and northern suburbs, mostly eastward to the newly developed suburbs in the east and northeast. To some extent this movement was a response to the establishment of major facilities, such as day schools, in what was at the time a developing residential area most convenient to existing concentrations of Jewish population. As a consequence of movement outward from the city center, synagogues and other facilities built in the areas of early settlement were closed down (though there are some exceptions), and the major Jewish institutions in Johannesburg today are to be found in a broad band running from northeast to west through the northern suburbs. In some of these suburbs Jews constitute the majority of the total white population.⁴⁴

In the other major cities Jews have also tended to concentrate heavily in certain areas, but unlike the situation in Johannesburg, these areas have been scattered, resulting in several geographical foci of Jewish life.

Demographic Characteristics

In discussing the demographic characteristics of the Jewish population, comparisons will be made with other whites rather than with the population as a whole. The justification for this approach is that demographically South

⁴³The Group Areas Act, 1966. Although the act is still in force, it has become government policy to allow areas to become "mixed" if the residents agree. One such area is a central Johannesburg high-rise residential suburb, Hillbrow.

⁴⁴See also SAJPS Advance Report no. 9, *Geographical Distribution and Mobility*; T. Hart and J. G. Browell, *A Multi-Variate Spatial Analysis of the Socio-Economic Structure of Johannesburg, 1970*, University of the Witwatersrand, Urban and Regional Research Unit (Johannesburg, 1976).

African whites resemble other Western populations, while blacks and, to some extent coloreds and Asians, have characteristics more typical of the less-developed countries. Thus, whereas 88 percent of whites, 90 percent of Asians, and 75 percent of coloreds, respectively, lived in urban areas in 1980, this was true of only 38 percent of blacks. The nonwhite groups all had appreciably higher birth and death rates than did whites, resulting in markedly different age distributions. Thus, 28 percent of whites were aged 0-14, 64 percent aged 15-64, and 8 percent aged 65 and over; the proportions of Asians—who differed least from whites—were 37 percent, 61 percent, and 2 percent for the same age groups; among coloreds, children aged 0-14 constituted 39 percent of the population, 58 percent were aged 15-64, and 3 percent were 65 and older; and among blacks the percentages were 40 percent, 57 percent, and 3 percent, respectively.

SEX RATIOS

The sex composition of the Jewish population at the beginning of the twentieth century reflected the recency of its migrant origins (see table 15). High ratios of males per 100 females point to selective immigration of young male adults. Higher sex ratios, as compared to total whites, prevailed among the Jews until about 1960. Subsequently, the decline of foreign-born Jews and the aging of the Jewish population, together with the normally greater longevity of women, brought about a growing numerical predominance of women in the community.⁴⁵

An examination of sex ratios of total whites in 1980, by age, reveals that besides the usual excess of males among young children, sex ratios at ages 30-64 were rather high—an effect of a long period of migratory inflow. On the other hand, sex ratios for Jews of the same ages were rather low, which could be a consequence of stronger emigration or assimilation of Jewish males. The higher sex ratio of Jews at ages 65 and over was an echo of selective immigration in the past, but also reflected comparatively greater chances of survival among elderly Jewish males than among total whites in the same age group. This finding is confirmed by investigations of mortality patterns and estimates of average life expectancy for Jews and total whites of each sex (see above).

The composition of the Jewish population by sex varied in different communities, with a few exceptions to the moderate predominance of women that existed nationally and in the largest cities (see table 18). In 1980 males were more numerous in Pretoria—probably because young men were attracted by government employment opportunities in the nation's capital

⁴⁵SAJPS Advance Report no. 3, *Demographic Characteristics*.

(see below); in Germiston—because of the comparatively higher proportion of children, and thus, of males, among the Jewish population; and in the very small communities and isolated Jewish households scattered all over the country.

AGE COMPOSITION

The age composition of the Jewish population was greatly affected by immigration until the late 1930s. Thereafter, it was more decisively shaped by changing birth and death rates, although the continuing effects of immigration and emigration remained evident. A significant feature was the “age bulge” formed by the comparatively large number of Jews born during the pre-World War I period, which moved conspicuously through the age structure over time (see table 16). From the 1920s on, South African Jewry witnessed a continuous growth in the proportion of those aged 60 and over—from less than 5 percent in 1926, to 13.1 percent in 1960, and 22.5 percent in 1980. Some of these changes reflected the age composition of Jewish immigration to South Africa. On the other hand, the proportion of children below age 10 declined from 18.2 percent in 1926 to 14.6 percent in 1936, and, following the postwar fertility increase (see below), from 17.3 percent in 1960 to 13.7 percent in 1980—reflecting further reduction in the birthrate and, possibly, the emigration of children. The median age of the Jewish population increased from 25.8 in 1926 to 34.9 in 1980, as compared to 22.8 and 28.1, respectively, among total whites.

In 1980 there were proportionally fewer Jews than total whites in each age group below age 50 and more Jews in each age group above age 50 (table 17). The net effect of recent migration exchanges on the age composition of the Jewish population can be judged by comparing detailed data from the 1970 and 1980 censuses. The strongest decline appeared among the 25–29 age group in 1980 (aged 15–19 in 1970), and more generally among the 20–34-year-olds (aged 10–24 in 1970). On the other hand, the group aged 35–44 in 1980 was, on balance, the most stable between the two censuses. It may thus be inferred that the age composition of Jewish emigrants was younger than that of Jewish immigrants. This is confirmed by the age distribution of South African Jewish immigrants to Israel, which included proportionally far more children and young adults below age 30 than did South African Jewry in both 1970 and 1980. Recent migration movements, therefore, have further accelerated the aging process set in motion by the lowering of fertility since the 1960s.

The consequences of the aging process were quite remarkable at the older end of the Jewish age structure. In absolute numbers, between 1970 and 1980 the 65+ age group increased by over 6,400 persons, or 47 percent of

its size in 1970. The 65–69 age group grew by 1,300, or 23 percent; the 70–74 group grew by 1,900, or 46 percent; and the 75+ group grew by 3,200, or 85 percent. Some of these changes reflect the ascent of the already mentioned “age bulge” into the elderly age range. The prospects for further aging are now somewhat less extreme than they were in previous years, because of the relatively “flat” age composition of the age groups from 40–44 to 60–64. But further emigration of younger adults, together with the reduced propensity for emigration among the elderly, may further speed up the aging trend.

Some differences were evident in the age structures of the various local communities (table 18). In 1980 the most youthful group was in suburban Germiston, bordering on Johannesburg, a reflection of the tendency of younger households to move into the newer developing areas. Pretoria appeared to have the highest proportion of adults below age 30. The highest proportion of elderly (aged 65 and over) was found in Port Elizabeth, while Durban and Cape Town, too, had fairly high percentages. Johannesburg differed the least from the country total, which it determined in large part. Finally, the aggregate of smaller communities was probably losing youth and generally stagnating, as shown by the high proportion at ages 45–64.

MARITAL STATUS

About 60 percent of South African Jews aged 15 and over were currently married in 1980 (table 19). Close to 29 percent of males and 20 percent of females were never-married; 3 percent and 17 percent, respectively, were widowed; and smaller percentages were divorced or living together.

The tendency to postpone marriage that has been exhibited in recent years in all Western countries also occurs among South African Jews. Between 1970 and 1980, the proportion already married at ages 25–34 declined from 77 percent to 71 percent among Jewish males, and from 91 percent to 85 percent among Jewish females (table 20). (Marriage postponement did not significantly affect the total whites, among whom in 1980, 83 percent of males and 90 percent of females aged 25–34 were already married.) Between 1970 and 1980, relatively more Jews than non-Jewish whites married after ages 25–34, but not enough to compensate for the much diminished frequency of marriage among younger Jewish adults—males up to 35 and females up to 25. The proportion of ever-married Jews at ages 45–54 continued to be high—above 95 percent and similar to total whites—but this was mainly a reflection of the higher marriage propensities of the past. Based on the continuation for an indefinite period of the rhythm of family formation observed in the different age groups between 1970 and 1980, over 95 percent of total white males and over 92 percent of total white

females could be expected to marry at some time. Among Jews, the percentage ever marrying would be substantially smaller than in the past—88 percent of males and 82 percent of females.

Compared to other Western countries, the recent slowdown in family formation among South African Jews was moderate. In North America, the expected rates of eventual marriage—based on a continuation of the trends of the 1970s and early 1980s—would be lower.⁴⁶

The male-female differential in expected marriage (if the conditions that prevailed during the 1970s were to continue indefinitely) reflected a temporary asymmetry or “squeeze” in the structure of the marriageable Jewish population by sex and age. Considering that men usually marry somewhat younger women, both the 1970 and 1980 census data suggested a more favorable position of Jewish males from the point of view of potential spouse supply. In 1970 there was a countrywide ratio of 185 never-married Jewish women aged 20–34 per 100 Jewish men aged 25–39. In 1980 the same ratio was somewhat more balanced, but, countrywide, there still were 153 never-married females aged 20–34 per 100 males aged 25–39.

The unbalanced sex composition of the marriageable Jewish population reflects past fluctuations in fertility levels and consequent sharp changes in the size of age cohorts, from the smaller ones born during the 1940s to the larger ones born during the 1950s and 1960s. Further reasons could be a higher level of emigration of Jewish males from South Africa, and, possibly, stronger assimilatory processes—with a consequent withdrawal from the Jewish group—among males. Another factor affecting sex ratios at the local level was the different pace of internal migration among young adults of each sex. In Johannesburg, in 1970, the ratio of never-married Jewish women aged 20–34 to five-year-older single Jewish men was 244 to 100—more than twice as many. In 1980 the same ratio was still very high—172 to 100. In several of the smallest communities the imbalance was even greater, though in some cases young Jewish single males were in excess. In turn, these age-sex-marital status imbalances, aside from their direct effect on frequency of marriage and the age-assortment of couples, may powerfully affect other Jewish population trends, enhancing the rate of outmarriage and of outmigration of individuals who cannot find a Jewish marriage partner locally.

The proportion of unmarried young adults living together increased by a factor of four to five over the period 1970–1980. However, the actual percentages reported as living together in 1980 were quite small—overall 1.4 percent of Jewish males and 1.2 percent of Jewish females aged 15 and

⁴⁶See Sergio DellaPergola and U. O. Schmelz, “Demographic Transformations of American Jewry: Marriage and Mixed Marriage in the 1980s,” in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* (New York-Oxford, 1988).

over. The highest frequencies of Jewish persons living together appeared among men 25–29 years old (3.8 percent) and women 20–24 years old (3.4 percent). These rates were only slightly higher than among total whites. We lack information concerning further instances of cohabitation included in the larger “never-married” category.

An increase in the proportion of divorced persons is another aspect of changing family behavior. Thus, 3 percent of Jewish men and 5 percent of Jewish women per 100 ever-married in the 35–44 age group were divorced in 1970. The corresponding figures in 1980 were 5 percent and 8 percent, respectively. Among total whites the increase in divorced persons per 100 ever-married aged 35–44 was somewhat less, from 3 percent among males and 4 percent among females in 1970 to 4 percent and 6 percent, respectively, in 1980. Proportionately more Jews than total whites were currently divorced. This increase contrasts with the high value placed on family cohesion within the Jewish community in the past. It also suggests that there were fewer remarriages than in the past—especially of women—in cases of family disruption. According to 1974 survey data, over one-half of Jewish divorcees were granted a civil divorce only, and less than half were divorced by a Jewish rabbinical court (with or without a civil divorce).⁴⁷

MIXED MARRIAGE

Only fragmentary data exist on the frequency of mixed marriage among South African Jews. According to the 1974 survey, in the major Jewish communities only 1.3 percent of married Jews of all ages had a currently non-Jewish spouse—2.3 percent of Jewish husbands and 0.3 percent of Jewish wives; another 1.1 percent were married to a spouse who had been converted to Judaism. Translated into household terms, this 1.3 percent of outmarried Jews corresponded to an overall figure of 2.6 percent of existing mixed couples, ranging from 5.1 percent in Durban and 4.9 percent in Bloemfontein, to 3.5 percent in Cape Town, 1.9 percent in Johannesburg, and 1.6 percent in Pretoria.⁴⁸ While these in all likelihood are underestimates, some sense of the ongoing trend can be obtained by comparing these same data across two generations. The percentages of the outmarried among adult children of heads of households—again, regardless of age—were higher: 7 percent had a currently non-Jewish spouse and another 3 percent had a converted Jewish spouse.

⁴⁷SAJPS Advance Report no. 13, *Marriage and Mixed Marriage*.

⁴⁸The proportion of mixed marriages is always greater for couples than for individuals, because a homogamous Jewish marriage appears only once in the count of couples but twice in that of the component individuals. See SAJPS Advance Report no. 13, *Marriage and Mixed Marriage*.

Some further, admittedly outdated, indication of the extent of mixed marriage comes from a survey of synagogue marriages in Johannesburg over the period 1966–1970.⁴⁹ At that time 85 percent of marriages were Orthodox and the remainder were Reform. Of grooms marrying in an Orthodox synagogue, 1 percent were converts, while the figure for brides was 2 percent. Among Reform marriages, however, 7 percent of grooms and 27 percent of brides were converts, with another 5 percent of each sex not reporting religion at birth. Considering that Johannesburg was at the low end of the South African continuum in terms of outmarriage frequencies, and that civil marriages or marriages with a non-Jewish religious ceremony were not reported in these data, it was tentatively suggested that the percentage of Jewish grooms or brides marrying a non-Jewish spouse who did not convert to Judaism might range between 8 percent and 14 percent in the 1970s and between 15 percent and 24 percent in the 1980s.⁵⁰ While these figures are little more than conjectural, it seems quite certain that in the particular context of South African society, the diffusion of mixed marriage was slower and at lower levels than among Jewish communities in most other Western countries.

That this may indeed have been the case is reinforced by some further comparative data on attitudes toward intermarriage that may underlie differences in actual outmarriage rates. In 1974 only 5 percent of Jewish heads of household in South Africa were indifferent to, or held a positive attitude toward, possible intermarriage of their children.⁵¹ The corresponding percentage in one Jewish community in the United States, Boston—roughly twice the size of South African Jewry—was 37 percent in 1975 and 39 percent in 1985.⁵² The actual percentages of Boston Jewish residents who outmarried in their first marriage were 20 percent in 1971–1975 and 29 percent in 1981–1985.⁵³ Assuming the existence of some relationship between social attitudes and behavior, the corresponding percentages for South African Jews must be considerably lower.

FERTILITY

The evolution of South African Jewish fertility levels over the past 50 years can be reconstructed along broad lines on the basis of several sources of data. According to a survey conducted in Johannesburg in 1935, Jewish

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Sherry Israel, *Boston's Jewish Community: The 1985 CJP Demographic Survey* (Boston, 1987).

⁵³Ibid.

women aged 45 or over had borne an average of 3.9 children, compared with an average of 4.6 for urban whites and 6.4 among rural whites.⁵⁴ The average number of children per Jewish woman was 4.0 in the least affluent Johannesburg suburbs and declined to 3.2 in the most affluent areas. It could be expected that the increasing socioeconomic status of Johannesburg Jews would result in a further decline of Jewish family size. Taking into account the younger women as well, married Jewish women had 2.6 births on average, as compared to 3.6 in the white population. These figures, while showing lower Jewish fertility than among total whites, also indicated that in South Africa fertility levels were higher than in the United States or England at the same time.⁵⁵

Detailed birth histories collected in 1974, in the framework of the sample survey in the six major Jewish centers, offered the basis for a retrospective evaluation of Total Fertility Rates (TFR)⁵⁶ between the early 1940s and the mid-1970s (see table 21). Around 1940 the Jewish TFR was 2.1—the level that ensures generational replacement and population stability in the long term, under conditions of low mortality and the absence of external migrations—as against 3.1 among total whites. From the experience of Jewish populations in several other Western countries, we know the TFR had declined to below replacement level during the 1930s. In the United States, for example, the Jewish TFR was estimated at 1.3 around 1935, and 1.5 around 1940, as against 2.1 and 2.3, respectively, among total whites.⁵⁷ In South Africa, too, the Jewish birthrate appeared to be quite low during the 1930s, at a time of economic depression and under the impact of Jewish immigration from low-fertility European countries. Jewish fertility had probably started to rise by the beginning of World War II. This trend continued until the mid-1950s, when the TFR reached a level of 3.1 among Jewish women vs. 3.4 among total white women. The late 1950s and 1960s witnessed a moderate reduction in Jewish fertility levels, which preceded a similar trend among total whites by several years.

It should be noted that during the 1940s the fertility levels of Jewish women—though lower than average—increased much more rapidly than among total whites, and that subsequently the TFRs of Jews in South Africa

⁵⁴Sonnabend, *Statistical Survey of Johannesburg*.

⁵⁵See Patrick Festy, *La fécondité des pays occidentaux de 1870 à 1970*, Institut National d'Études Démographiques, Travaux et Documents, Cahier no. 85 (Paris, 1979); Sergio DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *Demography* 17, no. 3 (1980): 261-73; Barry A. Kosmin, "Nuptiality and Fertility Patterns of British Jewry 1850-1980: An Immigrant Transition?" in D.A. Coleman, ed., *Demography of Immigrants and Minority Groups in the United Kingdom* (London, 1982), 245-61.

⁵⁶The TFR expresses the number of children that would be born under the assumption of continuation of the age-specific fertility levels observed for a certain period.

⁵⁷DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility."

were closer to those of the total (white) population than had been the case in the United States, Canada, or France.⁵⁸

For the more recent period, only the cruder fertility measure represented by the Child-Women Ratio (CWR)⁵⁹ is available. Around 1970, for which year both TFR and CWR are available, the ratios between Jews and total whites obtained from either measurement technique were quite consistent. This allows for cautiously inferring more recent trends in fertility levels. Moderate declines occurred during the early 1970s for both Jews and total whites. During the late 1970s the fertility decline was much sharper—close to 20 percent less than in the preceding five-year period. The TFR for Jews possibly reached a level of about 2.4 in 1970–1974 and 1.9 in 1975–1979, as against roughly 2.9 and 2.3, respectively, among total whites.⁶⁰ The TFR for Jews in the United States and Canada at the same dates was estimated at 1.5–1.6, as against 1.7–1.9 among total whites.⁶¹ In South Africa, fertility started declining later, and current levels at the end of the 1970s were higher than in most other Western countries. Thus, Jewish fertility patterns, although also low, were quite exceptional in the framework of the contemporary Diaspora.

Data from the 1974 survey on the number of children born to Jewish women, according to socioeconomic characteristics of husbands, provide further details.⁶² Among older women, aged 55 and over in 1974, a reverse relationship prevailed between the occupational status of husbands and family size. This was consistent with the conventional relationship between educational levels and fertility and probably reflected the preference for smaller families and more effective family planning of the more educated and upwardly mobile Jewish households. Among the intermediate 35–54 age group in 1974, the relationship between socioeconomic status and family size had shifted to a U shape. This probably indicated a positive impact of higher income on fertility after the general spreading of moderately high educational levels among the Jewish population. Among younger women up to 35, whose families were still incomplete, the socioeconomic status-fertility relationship tended again to be negative, pointing to a later start and slower pace of family growth among the more educated and upwardly mobile.

The major explanation for South African Jewish fertility patterns at the

⁵⁸Sergio DellaPergola, "Contemporary Jewish Fertility: An Overview," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1981* (Jerusalem, 1983), 215–38.

⁵⁹Ratio between the number of children aged 0–4 and the number of women aged 20–39.

⁶⁰See South Africa Central Statistical Services, *Births: Whites, Coloureds and Asians, 1983*.

⁶¹U. O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in U.S. Jewish Demography*, Jewish Sociology Papers, American Jewish Committee (New York, 1988).

⁶²SAJPS Advance Report no. 7, *First Data on Fertility*.

community level, then, seems to be tied to the substantial improvement in socioeconomic standards since the end of World War II and continuing through the late 1970s. Relatively high income, adequate housing, and, in particular, easily available domestic help probably facilitated the formation of comparatively larger families. In a broader societal perspective, this clearly reflected the preferential status of whites, including Jews, in the unequal socioeconomic context of multiracial South African society. Nevertheless, the postponement of marriage among younger Jewish adults, which has already been noted, more efficient fertility control, and the general political and socioeconomic situation in recent years combine to make it highly probable that a further decline of Jewish fertility levels must already have begun by 1980.

FAMILY SIZE

In 1974 the average number of persons in Jewish households in the six major centers was 3.35, of whom 3.30 were Jews.⁶³ The survey did not cover Jewish persons in institutions; servants and other permanent household personnel were also not counted as household members. Household structure by relationship to the head was typically nuclear, with 30.1 percent being heads of households (including persons living alone), 23.6 percent spouses, 42.6 percent children, 3.3 percent other relatives, and 0.4 percent nonrelatives. Since 1974, the decline of fertility, an increase in the percentage of the elderly, postponement of marriage, and international migrations can be expected to have resulted in a steady decline in Jewish household size.

Socioeconomic Characteristics

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Even during the early years of settlement, Jewish immigrants, while struggling to make a living, realized the value of education in optimizing the opportunities offered in their new country, which itself was young and full of potential. This was consistent, of course, with traditional attitudes toward study—albeit primarily in the religious sphere—which characterized Lithuanian and other Eastern European Jewry. Thus one hears again and again of immigrant parents stinting themselves in order to educate their children, including, if at all possible, giving at least one of them, particularly a son, university training. During these early days it was not only parents

⁶³SAJPS Advance Report no. 3, *Demographic Characteristics*.

who made sacrifices but also often other relatives. Even siblings frequently helped to educate a promising brother or sister. As Jews prospered, however, it became possible for more families to provide all or most children with whatever education and training they were capable of receiving.

Over several decades, census and other data have shown that South African Jews have been better educated than total whites and, more specifically, than the urban whites whom they most closely resemble.⁶⁴ In more recent years, especially since 1960, the overall educational levels of both urban whites and the Jewish population have steadily improved. Among Jews, the older immigrant generation, whose level of general education was relatively low, was gradually being replaced by the better-educated local-born, and by more recent immigrants from Western countries. At the same time, both Jews and total whites lost a proportionately large number of the better-educated through heavy emigration during the second half of the 1970s.

The improvement in educational standards was more marked among whites as a whole than among Jews, so that by 1980 the educational gap between them had narrowed somewhat—although it remained substantial (see table 22). Thus, while 4 percent of both Jews and total whites aged 20 and over had not gone beyond primary education, 70 percent of Jews and 49 percent of total whites had at least completed secondary school (grade 12)⁶⁵ or attained a nondegree diploma.⁶⁶ Of these, 14 percent of Jews and 6 percent of total whites had a bachelor's degree or the equivalent, and another 1.4 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively, held a master's degree or a doctorate.

It should be noted that levels of education of the main racial and ethnic groups reflect the effects of conventional and legal discrimination against people of color in South Africa. Thus, in 1980 more than half of coloreds and blacks and 39 percent of Asians aged 20 and over had no more than primary schooling. At the upper levels, 15 percent of Asians, 7 percent of coloreds, and 4 percent of blacks had matriculated or obtained a nondegree diploma; of these, 2 percent of Asians and less than 1 percent of coloreds and blacks had obtained university degrees. Although the educational levels of these groups have been steadily improving, both the quantity and quality of their education is still far inferior to that of whites.

⁶⁴SAJPS Advance Report no. 6, *Educational Attainment and Languages*.

⁶⁵Each province in South Africa uses its own terminology to designate grades and its own cutoff points between primary and secondary school. In this paper, Sub (standard) A, Sub B, and Standard 1 through Standard 5 represent grades 1 through 7 and are defined as primary education. Secondary education is from Standard 6 through Standard 10 (or Matriculation), i.e., grades 8 through 12.

⁶⁶"Nondegree diplomas" did not, in all cases, require matriculation level. The category includes a proportion of persons, therefore, who did not complete secondary school.

Variation in educational level of the Jewish population aged 15 and over in 1980, by sex, age, and major metropolitan area is shown in table 23. The major difference, by sex, was the higher proportion of Jewish males with completed university education: 20 percent, compared with 10 percent of women.

Educational differences between age groups clearly reflect the continuous improvement of the overall level over time. The oldest group, those aged 65 and over, included fairly high percentages of persons with a low level of education: 12 percent below grade 8, and, overall, 55 percent below grade 12. These proportions decreased, while the percentage of university graduates increased, from 7 percent among the 65+ age group to 14 percent among the 45–64 age group and to 20 percent among the 30–44 age group. The youngest group (15–29) included a high proportion who had not completed their education and, therefore, a lower proportion with degrees. A similar growth pattern appeared across age groups with regard to the proportion holding nondegree diplomas—from 7 percent at ages 65 and over to 23 percent at ages 30–44.

Only minor differences existed in the educational level of Jews in the different metropolitan areas. The proportion with a completed university education ranged between a maximum of 17 percent in Pretoria and a minimum of 13 percent in Durban, while the proportion of those without matriculation was 28 percent in Pretoria and 36 percent in Durban.

OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

In common with other Western Jewish communities, South African Jews are better educated than other whites and are overrepresented in professional and managerial occupations. This, together with their income and residential distribution, suggests a disproportionately middle- and upper-middle-class population.

Upward economic mobility of Jews in South Africa has been rapid. To a much greater extent than in the United States and Britain, which already had highly developed economies, South Africa was a land of opportunity for immigrants. Hard work, initiative, and a measure of good luck were sufficient to establish an individual independently in business in a country with a large and unsophisticated rural population. The discovery of gold and diamonds, the consequent need for goods and services, and the easy spending habits of the miners also provided economic openings. If the urban experience and skills of Jews were an asset to their advancement in the United States, they were an even greater asset in South Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. The South African situation also favored Jewish economic progress in another way: whereas in the United States and Britain

Jewish immigrants without skills or training were absorbed as laborers, this was not the case in South Africa. There, most unskilled labor was performed by blacks, so that the immigrants were virtually forced into entrepreneurial activities. Thus, in South Africa it was often the immigrants themselves who moved up the socioeconomic ladder.

Considerable changes in the structure of the Jewish labor force were involved in this process of integration and mobility within South African society.⁶⁷ Table 24 compares the occupational characteristics of Jews before World War II with those of more recent years. The number and percentage of Jewish professionals and administrators dramatically increased at the expense of salesmen and production workers—although even in the 1930s the latter constituted a relatively small part of the Jewish labor force.

Although in recent years many of the laws governing the strict division of labor between the races have been amended or repealed, the castelike arrangements of the South African labor force were still evident in the 1980 figures. A comparison of the occupational distribution of the major racial and ethnic groups exhibits, as in the case of education, a wide cleavage between whites on the one side and coloreds, Asians, and blacks on the other. Regarding participation in the total work force, whites had a higher proportion of economically active persons than all other groups—which is mostly explained by the lower proportion of children among whites (table 25). Within only the male work force, however, proportionately three times more coloreds and blacks than whites were agricultural workers; half the coloreds and blacks and 40 percent of Asians were production workers. Women in service and production numbered 9 percent among whites as against 58 percent among coloreds, 46 percent among Asians, and 53 percent among blacks. For the latter three groups these categories involved mainly menial work, including, especially among black women, domestic service. Higher-status blue- and white-collar occupations were consistently and significantly less frequent among coloreds and blacks. Among the highly urbanized Asians, however, the proportion of professionals was about half that of whites; the proportion of male clerical and sales workers was greater than that for whites and the same was true of female Asian sales workers.

Looking at Jews in the context of the white population, we find that the overall differences between Jews and total whites remained relatively stable. Even the comparatively urbanized and high-status white Anglicans (Episcopalians) had intermediate characteristics between Jews and other whites (see table 25). Jews retained their concentration and overrepresentation in professional, administrative, and sales occupations, while relatively few of

⁶⁷SAJPS Advance Report no. 10, *Occupational Characteristics*.

them were engaged in the lower white- and blue-collar occupations. Among Jews, as among all whites, between 1970 and 1980 there was an increase in the proportion of professionals and administrative personnel and a decrease in sales and production workers, as well as among the few Jews in agriculture.

Changes in the overall white occupational structure were probably due to real occupational mobility as well as to a significant positive migration balance among professionals in particular. Upward changes in the Jewish occupational structure reflected the retirement of elderly and less educated workers and their replacement by younger and better-educated ones. Moreover, a unique combination of immigration and emigration possibly resulted in a bias toward an occupationally better-established population. The significant emigration of younger adults, still at the beginning of their working careers, and their replacement by somewhat older immigrants, is also reflected in the higher proportion—and absolute size—of the work force in 1980 as compared to 1970, despite an overall decrease in Jewish population size.

Table 26 analyzes the changes in the occupational distribution of Jews over the periods 1960–1970 and 1970–1980. The net balances mainly reflect the outflow from the labor force of elderly persons in production and sales and the inflow of younger people in professional, technical, and service occupations. Between 1970 and 1980 the professionalization of the Jewish labor force was the leading theme of change, especially for males. Occupational changes among women involved their entering a broader range of occupations—sometimes as substitutes for upwardly mobile men—but here, too, professionalization prevailed.

Jews were not only concentrated in certain characteristic occupational groups but also in specific occupations. Thus, among professionals, 30 percent of Jews in 1980, as compared with 18 percent of whites, were in medical and allied fields (see table 27). There were similar large and disproportionate concentrations of Jews in public accounting, the legal profession, and, to a lesser degree, in the arts. On the other hand, only about a third as many Jews as other whites were engineers, architects, and physical scientists. It is difficult to gauge the proportion of Jews employed in university teaching and research, as the various fields are included in several professional categories.

The major sex-related differences in the Jewish occupational structure in 1980 were in administrative, managerial, and clerical occupations (see table 28). About one in four (24 percent) economically active Jewish males in 1980 was an administrator or manager, as against only 6 percent of females. On the other hand, 7 percent of males and 45 percent of females were clerical workers. Professional and technical work constituted the largest

major occupational group for Jewish males (31 percent) and the second largest for females (28 percent). Men were also relatively more numerous in sales and production.

The occupational profiles of different age groups reflected the significant socioeconomic structural changes within the Jewish population over the past decades. Passing from older to younger age groups, the proportion employed in professional and technical occupations generally increased. The same occurred with administrative and service occupations, the latter also including managerial posts. On the other hand, consistent declines related to age appeared in the once dominant sales sector (from 33 percent of employed Jews aged 65 to 14 percent at ages 15–29), in the small blue-collar production sector, and among the few Jews in agriculture. The comparatively large proportion of Jews in clerical occupations and the low share of administrators among the 15–29 age group reflected for many a stage of entrance into the labor force that would be followed by movement to higher occupational categories.

Some minor variations in the occupational distributions of the six major Jewish communities may be observed in table 28. The single most salient difference was that in Pretoria, the administrative capital of South Africa, 13 percent of Jews were in service occupations, compared with 4 percent for all Jews nationally. As might be expected, few Jews in the metropolitan areas were engaged in agriculture, while farmers constituted a small but visible (6 percent) share of the Jewish labor force in smaller towns and rural areas. These small communities also featured comparatively high proportions of Jews in sales, services, and production, and relatively low proportions in professional, administrative, and clerical occupations. The highest percentage of professional and technical workers was in Cape Town (32 percent); Durban had the highest share of administrators and managers (21 percent); Johannesburg the highest clerical concentration (23 percent); and Port Elizabeth the highest proportion of sales workers (31 percent).

WORK STATUS

A relatively large percentage of the Jewish labor force was made up by employers, including the self-employed. According to the 1980 census, 25 percent of all economically active Jews and 34 percent of Jewish males were employers. The comparable figures for whites were 11 percent for both sexes and 14 percent for males. Looking first at the relationship between occupation and work status (table 29), the two extremes were agriculture, where over 80 percent of Jews were independent farmers, and clerical occupations, in which over 97 percent were employees. In each of the other occupational branches, the proportion of Jewish employers ranged between 35 percent (sales) and 24 percent (services).

Variation in work status by sex and age was significant and reflected the occupational differences already noted. Being an employer was over three times more frequent among males than among females (see table 30). A more interesting feature, however, was the constant decline in the proportion of employers from the older to the younger age groups. Along with life-cycle effects, this reflected a turn from small, family-owned businesses in trade and manufacturing to employee status in large business corporations, professional firms, and public administration. These changes, which directly stem from the much increased educational level of the younger generation, carry significant implications for the position of Jews in the general socioeconomic fabric of South Africa. These same factors probably also account for the 3-percent decrease in the proportion of Jewish employers between 1970 and 1980.

While the proportion of Jewish employers was quite similar in the different metropolitan areas, it was lowest in Johannesburg. In part this may be due to the fact that most public companies are based in Johannesburg, and while Jews may be employed in high-status positions there, they are nevertheless employees in those firms. Secondly, it may be that occupational opportunities in Johannesburg attract many young Jews, who are at the start of their careers, from the smaller centers. Interestingly, Port Elizabeth had a significantly higher proportion of employers than the other larger centers. This is consistent with the large number of Jews who classified themselves as sales workers. These people were probably owners of small shops and reflected an earlier developmental stage in the economic structure of South African Jews. A similar situation, in all likelihood, prevailed in the smaller centers.

INDUSTRY AND TYPE OF EMPLOYER

Turning now to the various economic branches, table 31 shows that Jews were heavily overrepresented in trade (33 percent), finance (20 percent), services (23 percent), and manufacturing (19 percent). Somewhat paradoxically, given their large involvement in trade, only 22 percent of Jews defined themselves as sales workers (see table 29), despite the fact that about 40 percent of the Jewish labor force was employed in sales occupations and/or in the trade sector. The probability is that owners of, or workers in, medium-sized businesses may have preferred to describe themselves as managers and administrators. What is of particular importance, however, is that Jewish participation in manufacturing (according to more detailed data not presented here) is, more often, as owners—17 percent against 4 percent for all whites—or administrators, rather than as production workers. This gives Jews a pivotal position in the manufacturing industry. The role of Jews as

large employers of black labor in industry and trade, especially in the Johannesburg and Witwatersrand areas, could also have important and possibly negative implications for black attitudes during the present period of economic and political upheaval.

About 86 percent of economically active Jews were employed in private business enterprises, including public shareholder corporations, as against 11 percent overall employed by the government and other public authorities, and 3 percent employed by nonprofit organizations (see table 31). With only a few exceptions, private employment, including corporations, was predominant in each industrial branch. Thus, the proportion in the private sector ranged from over 99 percent of Jews in finance and trade to over 95 percent in manufacturing, construction, and agriculture, over 80 percent in transport, and 42 percent in services. In the latter branch, central government and provincial and local authorities constituted the main employers (44 percent), with nonprofit organizations employing 13 percent (see bottom line of table 31). Public-authority corporations were significant employers only in the small transport branch.

From the point of view of type of employer, it appears that the central government and the provincial and local authorities and nonprofit organizations were almost exclusively concentrated in the services branch, while public utilities—mainly gas, water, and electricity suppliers—appeared as employers in transport and manufacturing. With regard to the private business sector, 38 percent of economically active Jews were employed in trade, followed by finance (23 percent), and manufacturing (21 percent) (see upper part of table 31).

The basic characteristics of the Jewish labor force, by type of employer, did not vary substantially by sex, age, or place of residence (see table 32). Jewish women worked more often than men for provincial administrations and nonprofit organizations, but still almost 80 percent of those employed worked in the private sector. A steady increase in the propensity to work for government and other public authorities appeared among younger adults, reaching 20 percent among the 15–29 age group. This was mainly the result of the concentration in Pretoria of a group of highly trained young professionals and administrators attracted by employment opportunities with the central government. But even in Pretoria the overwhelming majority of young adults was employed in private business enterprises.

In comparison with the United States and other Western communities, the proportion of South African Jews with a university education or in professional occupations was not particularly high in 1980. There probably remains substantial room for further socioeconomic mobility in the same direction as has been experienced over the last decades. There is, however,

one area in which some alteration in the previous pattern of occupational mobility might be expected. Given the increasing tendency in South Africa toward large corporations, many Jewish family businesses have become public companies with boards of directors, salaried executives, and, frequently, large minority shareholders. Thus, whereas previously a son could expect favorable employment in his father's store or factory, with the possibility of eventually taking over, these expectations have now been modified by the more complex and competitive administrative structure of the large public corporations. It is possible that in future years the upward occupational mobility of Jews—which has already slowed in relation to the general population—may show a leveling-off trend, although this will not be precisely reflected in occupational and work-status categories as used in the census.⁶⁸

INCOME

Income levels reflect the differences in socioeconomic stratification of Jews and total whites. According to the 1980 census, 68 percent of Jews and total whites aged 15 and over reported some income (table 33). Of these, Jews reported a median annual per capita income of 8,323 South African rands (worth US \$6,658 in 1980), vs. 6,139 rands (\$4,911) among total whites—36 percent more. Among total whites the rural population had a slightly higher average income than urban residents, which points to the relatively prosperous economic situation of white farmers in South Africa. Among Jews, professionals and administrators had higher incomes than workers in other occupations; at peak career ages (45–64), the median income of Jewish professionals was 35 percent higher than that of total Jews with some income.

ASPECTS OF JEWISH COMMUNITY LIFE

Jewish Identification

While an analysis of demographic characteristics and trends is basic to an understanding of past growth and future prospects of any population, these demographic features are themselves closely bound up with a wide range of values, attitudes, and behavior. These last-mentioned factors are

⁶⁸Mervin Cohen and Allie A. Dubb, "Some Socio-Economic Aspects of the South African Jewish Population According to the Official Census of 1970," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973* (Jerusalem, 1977), 149–70.

especially relevant in any discussion of the patterns of continuity and cohesion of a religious-ethnic community. Brief reference has already been made to some aspects of formal community organization among South African Jews, as well as to the issues of assimilation and mixed marriage. In this section we will discuss some of the ways in which Jews identify themselves as such and as part of a Jewish community.

The 1974 survey, which included several questions on religious observance, showed that over 80 percent of Jewish households lit Sabbath candles, participated in some kind of Passover seder and/or fasted on Yom Kippur.⁶⁹ Between one-half and two-thirds observed at least some of the dietary laws, had a festive meal on Friday nights, and/or, where relevant, celebrated bar/bat mitzvah. Moreover, in over one-third of the households one or more members attended synagogue on the Sabbath, which in the majority of cases referred specifically to the Friday-night service. Only 9 percent described themselves as "fully observant."

These findings match those of an in-depth study of Jewish identification conducted on a sample of Johannesburg Jews in 1968.⁷⁰ Both studies suggest, therefore, that select public and family-oriented rituals are most commonly observed, whereas private rituals, such as regular prayer or *tefillin* are performed only by very observant Jews. Similarly, those public and private rituals which require greater effort or commitment—full Sabbath observance, meticulous adherence to dietary laws, rules regarding "family purity," and the like—are also neglected by most Jews. The 1968 study also indicated that the combination of rituals observed by any individual or within a household tended to be arbitrary and idiosyncratic. Furthermore, apart from the completely nonreligious and nonobservant, on the one hand, and the fully observant, on the other, there was no strong relationship between the degree of religious belief and actual observance. The conclusion from the 1968 study was that religious observance, including attendance at Friday-evening and festival synagogue services, was primarily a means of identifying as Jews, rather than an expression of religiosity.

The most significant aspect of Jewish identification among Johannesburg Jews, according to the 1968 study, was in the area of social relations. Thus, three-quarters of the respondents were members (paying and nonpaying) of a synagogue,⁷¹ although less than one-quarter attended services at least once a week. Clearly synagogue affiliation was an important means of formally identifying with the community. Informal social relations were also

⁶⁹SAJPS Advance Report no. 11, *Religion and Religious Observance*.

⁷⁰Dubb, *Jewish South Africans*. Based on a sample of 283 Jews.

⁷¹In the 1974 survey, for six major metropolitan areas almost 90 percent were paying or nonpaying members. See SAJPS Advance Report no. 12, *Jewish Community Activities*.

important: 83 percent of the respondents had only Jews among their closest friends, while 87 percent had only or mostly Jewish acquaintances. In addition, 45 percent said that all their business associates were Jewish, and another 13 percent indicated that most were Jewish. An important conclusion that emerged from the study was that, in Johannesburg at least, it was perceived as being advantageous, both socially and economically, to be Jewish and that this perception was supported by reality.⁷²

Jewish Education

As in other Jewish communities in the West, the main source of Jewish education in South Africa was, for a long time, the afternoon *heder* or some other part-time arrangement. Of all Jews over the age of 15 in 1974, some 70 percent had received a Jewish education in part-time classes, with only 10 percent having attended day schools (table 34). Thus, although over 80 percent had received some Jewish education, the level attained was, on the whole, fairly low, with no more than 17 percent having continued for a while after bar/bat-mitzvah—mostly on a part-time basis—and only 9 percent having taken Jewish studies/Hebrew as a matriculation subject.⁷³ Until the establishment of a teachers' seminary in 1945, the only facilities for postsecondary or advanced studies were in the university Hebrew departments, and these attracted few Jews. The first yeshivah was started in Johannesburg in the 1960s.

Although day schools for Jewish pupils had been established in the earlier period, the first serious attempt by the community to set up a regular school that would provide not only a Jewish milieu but also Jewish studies as an obligatory and integral part of the curriculum was made in Johannesburg in the mid-1940s, with the opening of the King David School. Over the years the day-school movement expanded, and by 1981-82 there were 24 primary and secondary schools in six centers (table 35). In contrast, the *heder* system had declined in the cities and remained important mainly in the small and dwindling outlying communities.

The First Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora, conducted between 1981 and 1983, provides a picture of the current state of Jewish education in South Africa.⁷⁴ In 1981-82 a total of 146 schools with 14,300 pupils were

⁷²Dubb, *Jewish South Africans*, 92ff.

⁷³SAJPS Advance Report no. 12, *Jewish Community Activities*.

⁷⁴Sponsored by the Joint Program for Jewish Education of the State of Israel's Ministry for Education and Culture, the Jewish Agency for Israel, and the World Zionist Organization. See Genuth, DellaPergola, and Dubb, *First Census of Jewish Schools 1981/2-1982/3*, and unpublished data.

affiliated with two boards of education—the larger in Johannesburg and the smaller in Cape Town. This represents a total enrollment of about 55 out of every 100 Jewish children between the ages 3–17. Of these, only 8 out of 100—a total of 2,224 pupils—were enrolled in supplementary schools (*hadarim*). Of the remainder, 3,765 attended Jewish nursery schools and 8,311 Jewish day schools. Although overall enrollments in the two main cities and in the rest of the country were similar, the distribution differed; the *hadarim* had the highest proportion (one-third) of postnursery enrollment in the smaller centers. In Johannesburg one-fifth of primary- and secondary-school pupils attended afternoon schools, while in Cape Town the proportion in these schools was only 6 percent. It is also noteworthy that, unlike the situation in the United States and several other countries, there appears to be little fall-off between lower and higher grades (1st to 6th and 7th to 12th, respectively) in day schools, so that enrollment at the two levels is quite similar.

An important feature of the Jewish educational system in South Africa, as compared with that in many other Diaspora communities, is the strength of Jewish nursery schools. Indeed, the Jewish community has played an important role in the development of the nursery-school movement in South Africa and, in many places, provides the best available facilities. These facilities are, in most cases, open to non-Jews as well; in 1982 these pupils constituted 20 percent of the total enrollment in Jewish nursery schools. Of all Jewish children of nursery-school age (3–5 years), about 80 percent attended these schools.

While there have always been non-Jewish pupils in Jewish nursery schools, less than 1 percent of day-school pupils were not Jewish in 1981/82. Since then, however, the numbers and proportions have increased considerably. In the smaller centers, the declining number of Jews has made it essential to open the day schools to non-Jews in order to ensure their continued viability. In one of these centers—Port Elizabeth—over 40 percent of pupils in 1987 were not Jewish.

By 1987, due at least partly to emigration and to the falling birthrate, enrollment of Jewish children in Jewish nursery and day schools had fallen by 24 percent and 16 percent, respectively.⁷⁵

In the 1981-82 school census, some 991 teaching posts were reported. Of these, 160 were for Jewish studies in day schools and a further 101 posts were in *hadarim*. Overall, over two-thirds of Jewish-studies teachers in day schools and three-quarters of the teachers in *hadarim* were women, who

⁷⁵Allie A. Dobb, "Emigration, Population Change and Jewish Education in South Africa in the Eighties," in U.O. Schmeltz and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1985* (Jerusalem, forthcoming).

also comprised 81 percent of general-studies teachers. Two-thirds of Jewish-studies teachers in day schools had some postsecondary Jewish education and 15 percent were ordained rabbis.

All the day schools in South Africa were Orthodox, as were over 90 percent of the nursery schools. The remaining 6 percent of nursery schools, as well as 12 percent of *hadarim*, were affiliated with the Reform movement. It should be pointed out that the actual orientation of most of the day schools in South Africa is locally defined as "national traditional"; there are also one modern Orthodox school (in the American sense) and two small *haredi* (ultra-Orthodox) schools. The average number of hours of schooling, in particular of Jewish studies, was lower than in most other countries of the Diaspora: out of an average 26 hours a week of schooling in the three lowest grades on the primary level, 6 hours per week were devoted to Jewish studies. The weekly number of hours increased in the three highest grades of secondary school to a total of 32 hours, with 9 hours of Jewish studies.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The sociodemographic profile of South African Jewry is similar in its broad outlines to that of the Jewish populations in other Western countries. Most Jews had arrived in South Africa from Eastern Europe as part of the mass migrations which began in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Now, a century later, the community is overwhelmingly native-born, highly acculturated to the host society, largely middle- to upper-middle class, relatively better educated than the rest of the population, and concentrated in the professions and other white-collar occupations.

Compared with the total white population, of which they are a part, Jews are an aging population, with a significantly lower (and declining) birthrate, a high life expectancy, and, because of the age structure, a considerable death rate; they also marry later and have a greater proportion who remain unmarried. Jews are an essentially urban population, gravitating toward the major metropolitan areas, where, in general, they have tended to form distinct residential concentrations.

There are, however, certain characteristics of the South African Jewish community that distinguish it from most others in the Western Diaspora. Thus, an increase in age at marriage, a tendency not to marry at all, a decline in family size, and an increasingly unfavorable balance of births and deaths have all appeared later and developed at a slower pace among South African Jewry. It is the only Western Diaspora community in which fertility was still probably above replacement level as recently as 10–15 years ago.

Moreover, South African Jews are not as educated or as highly professionalized as, for example, Jews in the United States.

It is on the community level, however, that the uniqueness of the Jewish population in South Africa is most clearly evident. South African Jewry has a highly centralized structure, with a number of national institutions responsible for funding, planning, and organizing facilities and activities in the fields of education, religious life, welfare, and Zionism. In terms of Jewish identity, the particular kind of pluralism of South African society has minimized both the need for, and the possibility of, large-scale assimilation, while at the same time lending legitimacy to the preservation of a distinctive Jewish ethnic identity. Consistent with this, Jews themselves exhibit a high level of commitment to the local community, Israel, and the Jewish people as a whole. This is expressed primarily in a well-developed Jewish educational network, wide-scale synagogue affiliation, and strong support for Zionism.

The issue of Jewish continuity is an important one throughout the Diaspora. Whereas, however, in Europe and North America the focus is, primarily, on an excess of deaths over births and increasing losses through outmarriage and assimilation, the problem in South Africa is different and more immediate. Since the mid-1970s the country has been in a state of tension and turmoil as a result of black uprisings, riots, and strikes. As the situation has become increasingly serious—and with every sign that blacks are determined to continue the struggle at whatever cost—growing numbers of whites have been leaving the country. With regard to Jews, it is estimated that about 14,000 left South Africa between 1970–1979 (mostly as from 1976), and had it not been for a relatively large number of returnees, as well as relatively large-scale immigration from Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Israel, the Jewish community would have been severely depleted. As it is, these migratory movements significantly affected the demographic and social structure of the Jewish population during the 1970s. In addition, there are indications that the quality of community life suffered through these sociodemographic transformations.

After a period of reduced activity, blacks once again stepped up antigovernment action in the mid-1980s, and this led to another peak in white—and Jewish—emigration, as well as reduced immigration. It is probable that the Jewish rate of emigration will continue to be higher than that of whites in general, for two reasons. In the first place, Jews are relatively better educated and are concentrated in those occupations that are more easily transferable. Secondly, increasing numbers of Jews may begin to feel that the future will be worse for them than for other whites as a consequence of black anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism.

The sociodemographic future of South African Jewry is, then, difficult to

predict. While the present balance of internal demographic and identificational factors points to the beginning of a moderate decline in Jewish population size, the crucial factor of external migrations escapes simple projections based on assumed continuation of "present trends." The number and composition of South African Jews will depend, above all, on political developments in the country and on the ways in which Jews respond to them.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, BY RELIGION, ETHNIC GROUP, AND WHITE LINGUISTIC GROUPS, 1980

Religious Denomination	Total	Whites, According to Home Language							Blacks
		Totala	Afri-kaans	English	Bilingual	Coloreds	Asians	Blacks	
Total no. ^b	25,016	4,551	2,465	1,610	233	2,624	819	17,022	
Row %	100.0	18.2	9.9	6.4	0.9	10.5	3.3	68.0	
Column %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Dutch Reformed churches	15.9	45.8	78.8	2.5	36.3	26.1	0.5	7.1	
Anglican churches	6.6	10.1	0.5	26.4	7.5	13.8	1.0	4.8	
Methodist	8.9	9.3	1.3	21.0	19.0	5.7	0.5	9.7	
Presbyterian, Congregational	4.1	3.4	0.4	8.2	4.7	7.4	0.4	3.9	
Lutheran	3.6	1.0	0.2	0.7	0.6	3.9	0.1	4.4	
Roman Catholic	9.6	8.5	0.6	15.4	6.3	10.2	2.5	10.2	
Apostolic	3.1	6.1	9.3	1.8	8.0	9.8	0.5	1.3	
African Independent churches	20.8	—	—	—	—	3.1	—	30.1	
Other Christian	5.5	8.5	6.0	10.2	11.5	8.5	6.9	4.2	
Jewish/Hebrew	0.5	2.6	0.0	6.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Islam	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	6.7	20.2	0.1	
Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	64.2	0.1	
Other or no religion	2.4	1.2	0.5	2.1	1.6	0.8	0.7	3.1	
Object to state	2.7	0.8	0.3	1.5	1.0	0.5	0.5	3.7	
Unspecified	12.7	2.7	2.1	3.2	2.7	3.4	2.0	17.3	

Source: South Africa Central Statistical Services, *Population Census 80, Social Characteristics*, Report no. 02-80-12 (Pretoria, 1985).

^aIncluding linguistic groups other than Afrikaans and English.

^bThousands.

TABLE 2. THE JEWISH POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1880-1986

Year	Total Population	Total Whites	Total Jews	Whites as % of Total Population	Jews as % of:	
					Total Population	Total Whites
1880 ^a	n.a.	474,309	4,000	n.a.	n.a.	0.8
1904 ^b	5,174,827	1,116,806	38,101	21.6	0.7	3.4
1911	5,972,757	1,276,242	46,919	21.4	0.8	3.7
1918 ^c	n.a.	1,421,781	58,741	n.a.	n.a.	4.1
1921	6,927,403	1,519,488	62,103	21.9	0.9	4.1
1926 ^c	n.a.	1,676,660	71,816	n.a.	n.a.	4.3
1936	9,587,863	2,003,857	90,645	20.9	0.9	4.5
1946	11,415,925	2,372,690	104,156	20.8	0.9	4.4
1951	12,671,452	2,641,689	108,497	20.8	0.9	4.1
1960	15,994,000	3,077,699	114,762	19.2	0.7	3.7
1970	21,447,982	3,773,282	118,200	17.6	0.6	3.1
1980 ^d	25,016,525	4,551,068	117,963	18.2	0.5	2.6
1986 ^e	28,400,000	4,900,000	115,000	17.3	0.4	2.3

Sources: Unless otherwise noted, all figures in this and subsequent tables are based on official census results published by South Africa Central Statistical Services (formerly Department of Statistics). The figures for Total Population include blacks, Asians, and coloreds (people of mixed race) as well as whites. Because of difficulties in enumerating blacks, in particular, total population figures are underestimates, especially in earlier censuses.

^aEstimate of total whites for 1880 is the midpoint between 328,000—an unreferenced figure for 1875 quoted by Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz in *The Jews of South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1955), 85, and 620,619—the 1890-91 total for the two Crown Colonies (Cape and Natal) and the two Boer Republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) published in the *Official Year Book* of 1910-1922. Estimate of Jews in 1880 from Saron and Hotz, 89. No estimate of the total population is available.

^bOfficial census of the two Crown Colonies and two Boer Republics after the Anglo-Boer War. First census after Union was in 1911.

^cThe 1918 and 1926 censuses were of whites only.

^dBetween 1976 and 1979, three former black homelands (reservations)—Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda—were granted independence by the government of South Africa and were therefore excluded from the 1980 census. After 1980 a further homeland, Ciskei, was granted independence, and its population has been excluded from all population estimates since 1982 as well as from the 1985 census. The exclusion of these former homelands has not affected the white, colored, or Asian populations significantly, except to increase their proportions within the reduced borders of the republic.

^eTotal and white population figures from South Africa Central Statistical Services, "Mid-Year Estimates: 1970-1986." The UN, which does not recognize the independence of the former homelands, has estimated the total South African population at 32,392,000. Jewish population estimate from U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 1986," *AJYB*, vol. 88, 1988.

Note: "n.a." indicates data not available.

TABLE 3. GROWTH OF JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, 1880-1980

Period	Intercensal Change			Total Whites Annual %
	No.	Jews		
		Total %	Annual %	
1880-1904	34,101	852.5	9.8	3.6
1904-1911	8,818	23.1	3.0	1.9
1911-1918	11,822	25.2	3.3	1.6
1918-1921	3,362	5.7	1.9	2.2
1921-1926	9,713	15.6	2.9	2.0
1926-1936	18,829	26.2	2.4	1.8
1936-1946	13,511	14.9	1.4	1.7
1946-1951	4,341	4.2	0.8	2.2
1951-1960	6,265	5.8	0.6	1.7
1960-1970	3,438	3.0	0.3	2.1
1970-1980	-237	-0.2	-0.02	1.9

TABLE 4. JEWISH IMMIGRANTS TO SOUTH AFRICA, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, SEX, AND AGE, 1924-1948

	1924-1932	1933-1939	1940-1948
Total no.	13,880	9,070	1,895
% of total white immigrants	27.9	22.8	3.3
<u>Country of Birth</u>			
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0
Quota countries ^a	88.5	30.4	18.4
Lithuania	55.5	15.2	5.6
Latvia	10.8	4.6	2.5
Poland	16.3	8.5	6.7
Russia ^b	5.9	2.1	3.6
Nonquota countries ^a	11.5	69.6	81.6
United Kingdom ^c	5.4	5.3	49.7
Germany	0.6	58.8	10.8
Other	5.5	1.3	20.9
<u>Sex</u>			
% Males	58.9	49.8	45.1
<u>Age at Immigration</u>			
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0
0-14	20.0	17.6	15.9
15-29	47.1	34.6	23.6
30-44	23.8	25.5	31.8
45-64	7.8	16.3	20.7
65+	1.3	6.0	8.0
Median age	24.4	29.4	34.5

Sources: SAJPS Advance Report no. 4, *Country of Birth and Period of Immigration*; Stuart Buxbaum, "A Profile of Jewish Immigration to South Africa Between 1924-1948 and Its Impact Upon the Local Community," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1981* (Jerusalem, 1983), 145-62.

^aSee explanation in the text.

^bIncluding other quota countries.

^cIncluding other British Empire.

TABLE 5. JEWISH EMIGRANTS FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO PALESTINE/ISRAEL, 1919-1987

Year	Born in South Africa		Resident in South Africa		Ratio (A)/(C) %
	Total (A)	Yearly Average (B)	Total (C)	Yearly Average (D)	
1919-1923	0	0			
1924-1931 ^a	61	8			
1932-1938 ^a	125	18			
1939-1945	49	7			
1946-5/14/1948	30	12			
5/15/1948-1949	406	271			
1950-1954	386	77	447	89	86
1955-1959	520	104	661	132	79
1960-1964	1,131	226	1,252	250	90
1965-1969	1,467	293	1,719	344	85
1970-1974	2,747	549	3,064	613	90
1975-1976	869	435	1,000	500	87
1977-1979	3,283	1,094	3,829	1,276	86
1980-1982	788	263	837	279	94
1983-1984	574	287	605	303	95
1985-1986	758	379	811	406	93
1987	707	707	737	737	96

Sources: Moshe Sicron, *Immigration to Israel (1948-1953), Statistical Supplement*, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Special Series no. 60, and Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel (Jerusalem, 1957); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem, annual publication).

^aFigures for 1924-1934 relate to South African citizens.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED POPULATION CHANGES AMONG JEWS AND TOTAL WHITES, 1970-1980

Components of Change	Jews ^a		Total Whites ^b
	No.	Yearly Rate per 1,000	Yearly Rate per 1,000
Population in 1970	118,200		3,773,300
Internal change, 1970-1980			
Total	+4,200	+3.5	+11.4
Births	18,700	15.8	19.7
Deaths	14,500	12.3	8.3
External migrations, 1970-1980			
Total	-4,400	-3.7	+4.8
Immigrants	9,600 ^c	8.1	7.8
Emigrants	14,000	11.8	3.0
Total change, 1970-1980	-200	-0.2	+18.7
Population in 1980	118,000		4,551,100

^aRough estimates, medium hypothesis. See text for explanations.

^bRates for total whites do not add and are reported here as they appear in the original official publication. See South Africa Central Statistical Services, *Births: Whites, Coloureds and Asians, 1983*, Report no. 07-01-11 (Pretoria, 1985).

^cIncluding return migrants.

TABLE 7. JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, 1926-1980 (PERCENT)

Year	Total	Born in South Africa	Foreign Born
<u>Jews</u>			
1926	100.0	45.0	55.0
1970	100.0	76.7	23.3
1980 ^a	100.0	79.1	20.9
1980, by age:			
0-14	100.0	93.9	6.1
15-29	100.0	90.7	9.3
30-44	100.0	85.4	14.6
45-64	100.0	73.8	26.2
65+	100.0	45.6	54.4
<u>Total whites</u>			
1926	100.0	85.0	15.0
1970	100.0	89.0	11.0
1980	100.0	87.0	13.0

^aAuthors' processing of census file for the six major metropolitan areas of Jewish residence: Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Germiston. In 1980, 91.5 percent of all Jews lived in these areas.

TABLE 8. JEWISH POPULATION, BY BIRTHPLACE, 1970 AND 1980

Birthplace	Jews				Whites
	1970		1980 ^a		1980
	No.	%	No.	%	%
Total	118,120	100.0	108,007	100.0	100.0
South Africa	89,950	76.2	85,725	79.4	87.3
Zimbabwe	1,220	1.0	1,830	1.7	1.1
Other Africa	1,120	1.0	949	0.9	2.6
United Kingdom and Eire	5,110	4.3	4,402	4.1	4.7
Germany (W and E), Austria	3,030	2.6	2,358	2.2	0.8
Rest Western Europe ^b	290	0.2	1,250	1.1	2.4
Lithuania			3,592	3.3	0.1
Latvia and Estonia			227	0.2	0.0
USSR	13,250	11.2	2,622	2.4	0.1
Poland			1,719	1.6	0.1
Rest Eastern Europe			473	0.4	0.2
Israel ^c	2,590	2.2	1,830	1.7	0.0
Other Asia			288	0.3	0.2
Americas	580	0.5	514	0.5	0.2
Australasia	130	0.1	123	0.1	0.2
Unknown	850	0.7	105	0.1	0.0

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

^bIncludes other unspecified European countries.

^cIn the full 1980 census returns, 2,261 persons stated that they were born in Israel. This figure includes non-Jewish persons.

TABLE 9. JEWISH POPULATION, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH AND AGE, 1980^a

Age	Born in		Foreign Born						Other
	South Africa	Total	Other Africa	United Kingdom	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Israel		
Total no.	85,843	22,524	3,021	4,402	3,212	9,020	1,830	1,030	
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
0-9	16.3	3.7	5.5	2.5	0.8	0.2	23.3	8.3	
10-19	17.3	5.5	17.2	6.1	0.7	0.5	15.6	9.0	
20-29	16.7	6.8	26.5	5.8	1.8	0.8	13.0	10.3	
30-39	14.8	9.6	20.3	12.4	6.4	2.7	21.3	15.3	
40-49	10.6	7.1	10.9	12.1	8.2	2.7	7.8	8.7	
50-59	9.6	15.5	7.8	11.3	16.5	21.6	7.8	13.3	
60-69	9.3	19.2	7.6	18.8	30.8	22.8	3.8	15.5	
70+	5.4	32.6	4.2	31.1	34.8	48.7	7.4	19.5	
Median age	29.8	61.0	30.4	59.8	65.1	69.4	28.5	48.2	

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 10. JEWISH POPULATION, BY CITIZENSHIP, 1970 AND 1980

Citizenship	Jews				Whites 1980 %
	1970		1980 ^a		
	No.	%	No.	%	
Total	118,120	100.0	108,007	100.0	100.0
South Africa	112,100	94.9	100,488	93.0	91.3
Zimbabwe	690	0.6	978	0.9	0.5
Other Africa			132	0.1	0.9
United Kingdom and Eire	2,520	2.2	2,630	2.4	3.9
Germany (W and E), Austria	260	0.2	206	0.2	0.6
Rest Western Europe ^b			859	0.8	2.2
Eastern Europe	440	0.4	299	0.3	0.1
Israel ^c			1,699	1.6	0.1
Other Asia	1,810	1.5	76	0.1	0.1
Americas			465	0.4	0.2
Australasia			96	0.1	0.1
Unknown	300	0.2	79	0.1	0.0

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

^bIncludes other unspecified European countries.

^cIn the full 1980 census returns, 1,927 persons stated that they were Israeli citizens. This figure includes non-Jewish persons.

TABLE 11. JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, BY HOME LANGUAGE, 1936-1980 (PERCENT)

Year	Total %	English	Afrikaans	Afrikaans and English	Yiddish or Hebrew ^a	English and Yiddish or Hebrew ^a	Other
<u>Jews</u>							
1936	100.0	76.0	2.0	1.0	19.0	n.a.	2.0
1974	100.0	88.4	0.0	1.9	1.8	6.9	1.0
1980	100.0	92.3	0.8	1.5	b	b	5.4 ^c
<u>Total whites</u>							
1980	100.0	35.4	54.2	5.1	b	b	5.3 ^d

^aIn the census of 1936 there were 17,686 people whose home language was Yiddish, in 1946 there were 14,045, and in 1951 there were 9,970. In subsequent censuses, Yiddish was no longer treated as a separate category. Yiddish and Hebrew were combined in the 1974 survey.

^bNeither Yiddish nor Hebrew were tabulated.

^cThereof 1.1 percent described as "Western European Languages" and 4.3 percent as "Other Languages." Both Yiddish and Hebrew were presumably included in the second category.

^dThereof 3.3 percent described as "Western European" and 2.0 percent as "Other."

Note: "n.a." indicates data not available.

TABLE 12. JEWISH POPULATION, BY PROVINCE, 1904-1980

Province	Jews					Whites 1980	Jews as % of Whites	
	1904	1911	1936	1960	1970		1980	1904
Total no.	38,101	46,919	90,645	114,762	118,200	4,551,068 ^a		
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	3.4	2.6
Cape	51.2	35.7	31.1	28.0	27.1	27.5	3.4	2.6
Natal	3.9	3.1	4.1	5.4	5.7	5.5	1.5	1.2
Transvaal	40.7	55.2	59.5	63.8	65.3	65.9	5.2	3.3
Orange Free State	4.2	6.0	5.3	2.8	1.9	1.1	1.1	0.4

^a27,329 whites, or 0.6 percent of the total, were living in the black homelands (reservations) in 1980. Thus percentages of whites in each province have been calculated from the base 4,523,739.

TABLE 13. JEWISH POPULATION, BY METROPOLITAN AREA, 1918-1980a

Metropolitan Area	Jews					Whites		Jews as % of	
	1918	1926	1946	1960	1970	1980	1980	Whites 1980	Whites 1980
Total no.	58,741	71,816	104,156	114,762	118,200	117,963	4,551,068		2.6
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		
Johannesburg ^b	34.2	36.0	48.4	51.6	53.7	57.5	17.2		12.1 ^c
Thereof: Germiston	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.2	5.1	2.9	5.5		1.4
Cape Town	15.5	16.3	18.8	19.8	21.7	22.9	10.3		5.7
Durban	2.8	3.4	4.0	4.7	5.1	5.0	7.0		1.8
Pretoria	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.2	2.9	9.2		0.8
Port Elizabeth	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.1	4.1		1.3
Bloemfontein	1.6	1.9	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.6	2.1		0.7
East Rand ^d	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.3	2.5	2.0	6.2		1.1
West Rand ^d	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.7	1.9	1.1	4.7		0.6
East London	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.5	1.5		0.9
Rest of country	40.3	36.1	21.0	11.3	7.8	5.4	37.7		0.3

aBoundaries of metropolitan areas in 1980 have been adjusted, as far as possible, for consistency with those for 1960 and 1970. For this reason there are minor discrepancies between this and other tabulations referring to metropolitan areas. The term "metropolitan areas" in Department of Statistics and other published reports refers to several large urban-industrial complexes, each of which comprises one central city plus one or more contiguous smaller cities and/or towns. In some publications, reference is made to the "PWV area," which combines Johannesburg with Pretoria, the East and West Rand, Germiston, Vereeniging and van der Bijl Park.

bIncluding Germiston. The increase in the number of Germiston Jews between 1960-1970 is probably due to the inclusion of some of Johannesburg's eastern suburbs in the Germiston census district. The subsequent decrease between 1970-1980 may be partly due to further redefinition of districts as well as to a real decline in the Jewish community of Germiston proper. For these reasons Johannesburg and Germiston have been regarded as a single metropolitan area for the purposes of this table. It should also be noted that the towns of Sandton and Randburg are also regarded as part of the Johannesburg metropolitan area and are treated as such in the census tabulations.

cJohannesburg only: Jews and total whites in Germiston census district are excluded.

dEast Rand and West Rand include all the smaller towns and cities on the Witwatersrand goldfields outside of the Johannesburg/Germiston conurbation. For the years 1918 to 1946 they are included in the category "Rest of Country."
 Note: "n.a." indicates data not available.

TABLE 14. JEWISH POPULATION IN JOHANNESBURG, BY AREA OF RESIDENCE, 1960-1980

Residential Area ^a	1960			1980		
	No.	%	% of Total Whites	No.	%	% of Total Whites
Total	55,613	100.0	14.0	63,204	100.0	12.9
Southern	841	1.5	1.3	430	0.7	0.5
South-Eastern	4,329	7.8	7.1	1,390	2.2	3.1
South-Western	380	0.7	0.6	346	0.5	0.6
Central ^b	15,551	28.0	25.8	11,679	18.5	17.8
Eastern	16,761	30.1	40.3	25,802	40.8	39.0
Western	5,359	9.6	24.2	6,064	9.6	13.8
Northern	12,392	22.3	25.3	8,446	13.4	23.9
North Eastern ^c	—	—	—	7,899	12.5	20.0
North Western ^d	—	—	—	590	0.9	1.3
Far Northern ^c	—	—	—	558	0.9	2.9

^a"Residential areas" comprise groups of suburbs. Germiston (see table 13) and "Unknown" have been excluded.

^bDowntown Johannesburg makes up part of the Central area.

^cSandton, a separate municipality, makes up most of the North Eastern and Far Northern suburbs.

^dRandburg, a separate municipality, makes up most of the North Western suburbs.

TABLE 15. SEX RATIOS (MALES PER 100 FEMALES) AMONG JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, 1904-1980

Year	Jews	Total Whites
1904	211	132
1918	125	105
1926	112	105
1936	114	103
1946	106	101
1951	103	101
1960	99	99
1970	98	99
1980	95	99
1980, by age:		
0-14	107	103
15-29	106	104
30-44	93	105
45-64	85	97
65+	83	69

TABLE 16. JEWISH POPULATION, BY AGE, 1926-1980

Age	1926	1936	1960	1970	1980
Total no.	71,816	90,645	114,762	118,120	117,963
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
0-9	18.2	14.6	17.3	15.6	13.7 ^a
10-19	21.2	16.9	17.3	17.0	14.8 ^a
20-29	18.2	21.0	10.4	14.4	14.4
30-39	15.2	17.6	12.6	10.4	13.6
40-49	13.3	12.9	14.6	11.8	9.9
50-59	8.4	9.7	14.7	12.7	11.1
60+	4.9	7.3	13.1	18.1	22.5
Median age	25.8	28.8	34.0	32.8	34.9

^aPublished census data on Jewish population by age do not provide a detailed breakdown within the age group 0-19. The distribution given here is based on the Jewish population of the six major metropolitan areas with a combined Jewish population of 108,007. The same percentage of Jews aged 0-19 (28.5) resulted for the six major centers and for the total of South Africa.

TABLE 17. JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, BY AGE AND SEX, 1980

Age	Jews						Total Whites					
	1970			1980a			1970			1980		
	Total	Total	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Total no.	118,120	117,963	60,485	57,478			3,727 ^b	2,268 ^b	2,283 ^b			
Total %	100.0	100.0	51.3	48.7			100.0	49.8	50.2			
0-4	7.8	6.4	3.1	3.3			10.7	4.4	4.2			
5-9	7.8	7.3	3.4	3.9			10.3	4.8	4.7			
10-14	8.1	7.3	3.6	3.7			10.0	4.8	4.6			
15-19	8.9	7.5	3.7	3.8			9.0	4.5	4.4			
20-24	7.9	7.4	3.5	3.9			8.8	4.4	4.2			
25-29	6.5	7.0	3.5	3.5			8.1	4.1	4.0			
30-34	5.4	7.3	3.7	3.6			6.9	4.1	4.0			
35-39	4.9	6.4	3.3	3.1			5.9	3.8	3.5			
40-44	5.8	5.3	2.8	2.5			5.6	3.1	2.9			
45-49	6.0	4.6	2.4	2.2			5.3	2.5	2.5			
50-54	5.8	5.3	2.9	2.4			4.7	2.3	2.3			
55-59	6.9	5.7	3.1	2.6			4.4	2.0	2.2			
60-64	6.5	5.4	2.9	2.5			3.8	1.7	1.9			
65-69	5.0	6.1	3.2	2.9			2.5	1.4	1.8			
70-74	3.6	5.2	2.7	2.5			1.7	1.0	1.4			
75-79	3.1	3.2	1.8	1.4			1.2	0.5	0.8			
80+		2.6	1.6	1.0			1.1	0.4	0.8			
Median age	32.8	34.9	36.7	33.1			26.1	27.4	28.8			

aDistributions for the 0-19 and 65+ age groups reflect their respective actual sizes in the total South African Jewish population, and their internal breakdown by 5-year age groups among the Jewish population of the six major metropolitan areas.
bThousands.

TABLE 18. JEWISH POPULATION, BY METROPOLITAN AREA, SEX, AND AGE, 1980^a

	Johan- nesburg	Germis- ton	Cape Town	Durban	Pretoria	Port Elizabeth	Rest of Country
Total no.	64,367	4,812	26,975	5,930	3,487	2,436	9,956
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<u>Sex</u>							
Male	47.7	51.3	48.0	48.9	54.3	49.7	54.0
Female	52.3	48.7	52.0	51.1	45.7	50.3	46.0
<u>Age</u>							
0-14	21.3	27.0	19.3	19.5	20.6	21.7	20.6
15-29	22.6	22.3	22.6	17.4	24.4	15.6	18.6
30-44	18.7	24.5	18.6	19.4	19.4	19.4	18.1
45-64	20.6	17.4	20.7	23.8	20.8	23.1	25.8
65+	16.8	8.8	18.8	19.9	14.8	20.2	16.9
Median age	34.1	30.4	35.6	39.8	34.1	39.6	36.6

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing. The "Rest of Country" category was obtained by subtracting the totals for the six major metropolitan areas from those for the total of South Africa.

TABLE 19. JEWISH POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER, BY SEX, MARITAL STATUS, AND AGE, 1980^a (PERCENT)

Age	Total	Never Married	Married	Living Together	Divorced	Widowed
<u>Males</u>						
Total	100.0	28.9	63.6	1.4	2.9	3.2
15-29	100.0	78.3	19.2	1.7	0.8	0.0
30-44	100.0	10.3	83.3	1.9	4.1	0.3
45-64	100.0	5.6	87.6	1.1	4.0	1.7
65+	100.0	6.6	76.1	0.8	3.2	13.3
<u>Females</u>						
Total	100.0	20.5	57.0	1.2	4.5	16.8
15-29	100.0	61.8	34.2	2.0	1.8	0.2
30-44	100.0	7.3	82.5	1.6	7.0	1.6
45-64	100.0	4.4	75.4	0.7	5.7	13.7
65+	100.0	6.3	34.4	0.4	3.7	55.1

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 20. PERCENTAGE EVER-MARRIED AMONG JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, BY SEX AND AGE, 1970-1980

Age	% Ever-Married				Changes, 1970 to 1980		
	Jews		Total Whites		Age	Increase in % Married	
	1970	1980 ^a	1970	1980		Jews	Whites
<u>Males</u>							
15-24	6.0	5.3	14.8	15.0	5-14 to 15-24	5.3	15.0
25-34	77.2	70.9	82.8	83.2	15-24 to 25-34	64.9	68.4
35-44	93.0	93.5	94.0	93.7	25-34 to 35-44	16.3	10.9
45-54	92.8	94.5	95.1	95.4	35-44 to 45-54	1.5	1.4
					Period PEM ^b	88.0	95.7
<u>Females</u>							
15-24	25.9	18.4	34.0	32.2	5-14 to 15-24	18.4	32.2
25-34	90.5	84.6	91.9	90.3	15-24 to 25-34	58.7	56.3
35-44	95.3	94.4	95.8	95.5	25-34 to 35-44	3.9	3.6
45-54	94.5	95.9	94.0	96.1	35-44 to 45-54	0.6	0.3
					Period PEM ^b	81.6	92.4

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

^bPercent of a hypothetical cohort that would ever-marry, assuming the age-specific increases in ever-married during observed period remain constant.

TABLE 21. SELECTED MEASURES OF FERTILITY AMONG JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE POPULATIONS, 1940-1980

Approximate Date	Jews		Total Whites		Ratio (A)/(C) %
	Fertility (A)	% Change (B)	Fertility (C)	% Change (D)	
a. <u>Total Fertility Rates</u>^a					
1940	2.1		3.1		68
1945	2.7	+29	3.2	+3	84
1950	3.0	+11	3.4	+6	88
1955	3.1	+3	3.4	=	91
1960	3.0	-3	3.5	+3	86
1965	2.7	-10	3.5	=	77
1970	2.7	=	3.2	-9	84
b. <u>Child-Woman Ratios</u>^b					
1970	0.589		0.726		81
1975	0.547	-7	0.660	-9	83
1980	0.445	-19	0.551	-17	81

Sources: Sergio DellaPergola, "Contemporary Jewish Fertility: An Overview," in U. O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1981* (Jerusalem, 1983), 215-38; Allie A. Dubb, *Patterns of Fertility and Family Formation Among South African Jewish Women* (Jerusalem, 1979), unpublished paper.

^aChildren that would be born on the average according to age-specific fertility levels prevailing during five-year period around indicated dates. For Jews, five-year periods should be read as follows: 1937-41, 1942-46, 1947-51, etc.

^bRatio of children aged 0-4 to women aged 20-39 at date indicated. Based on retrospective estimates from 1980 population census. Jewish population: six major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 22. JEWS AND TOTAL WHITES, COLOREDS, ASIANS, AND BLACKS, AGED 20 AND OVER, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1980^a (PERCENT)

Standard of Education ^b	Jews	Whites	Coloreds	Asians	Blacks
<u>Total</u>					
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No education	2.9	1.8	12.6	12.6	23.0
Up to std. 5	1.1	2.4	41.0	26.5	40.9
Std. 6-9	26.0	47.1	39.7	45.6	32.0
Std. 10	38.5	27.9	3.2	9.8	2.6
Nondegree diploma	15.8	13.7	3.2	3.7	1.4
Bachelor's degree	14.3	6.3	0.3	1.7	0.1
Master's and doctorates	1.4	0.8	0.0	0.1	0.0
<u>Males</u>					
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No education	1.5	2.3	12.0	5.6	24.9
Up to std. 5	1.0	2.0	37.5	20.8	41.3
Std. 6-9	21.7	43.2	42.4	53.3	29.7
Std. 10	36.7	29.4	4.7	12.9	2.9
Nondegree diploma	16.5	14.1	2.9	4.5	1.0
Bachelor's degree	19.5	8.4	0.5	2.7	0.2
Master's and doctorates	2.3	1.4	0.0	0.2	0.0
<u>Females</u>					
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
No education	3.4	2.1	13.2	19.5	20.5
Up to std. 5	1.2	2.7	44.1	32.1	40.4
Std. 6-9	29.9	51.0	37.1	38.1	35.1
Std. 10	40.1	26.4	2.0	6.7	2.0
Nondegree diploma	15.0	13.3	3.5	2.9	1.9
Bachelor's degree	9.8	4.3	0.1	0.7	0.1
Master's and doctorates	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0

^aThe category "Unknown" was excluded from computations.

^bSee text footnotes 65 and 66 for an explanation of terms relating to grade divisions and diplomas.

TABLE 23. JEWISH POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, SEX, AGE, AND MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA, 1980^a (PERCENT)

	Total	Up to Std. 5	Std. 6-9	Std. 10	Nondegree Diploma	Bachelor's Degree	Master's and Doctorates
Total	100.0	3.8	29.1	38.5	14.4	13.0	1.3
<u>Sex</u>							
Males	100.0	3.1	25.7	36.8	16.9	17.5	2.0
Females	100.0	4.4	32.3	40.0	13.9	8.9	0.6
<u>Age</u>							
15-29	100.0	1.2	27.0	43.8	13.2	14.2	0.6
30-44	100.0	1.3	18.9	36.3	23.2	18.1	2.2
45-64	100.0	2.2	30.1	40.5	13.6	12.1	1.5
65+	100.0	12.1	42.7	31.2	6.8	6.6	0.8
<u>Metropolitan area</u>							
Johannesburg	100.0	4.2	29.2	38.1	14.2	13.0	1.3
Germiston	100.0	3.0	28.9	37.5	17.0	12.7	0.9
Cape Town	100.0	3.3	28.6	39.3	14.5	13.0	1.1
Durban	100.0	2.7	33.2	37.3	13.9	11.6	1.3
Pretoria	100.0	2.7	25.3	41.1	13.9	14.6	2.4
Port Elizabeth	100.0	2.3	30.0	38.7	13.5	14.0	1.5

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 24. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE JEWS, BY OCCUPATION, 1936-1980

Occupation	1936	1960	1970	1980
% Economically active	45.4	40.8	42.6	43.6
Total no.	41,170	45,887	49,750	51,422
Total % ^a	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional and technical	9.7	20.0	22.1	29.1
Administrative	2.0	19.7	16.3	17.5
Clerical	15.5	20.6	22.7	20.3
Sales	48.0	29.1	28.6	23.0
Services	5.3	1.8	3.9	4.4
Production	17.6	7.5	5.4	4.9
Agriculture	1.9	1.3	1.0	0.8

^aPercentages were computed after excluding the "Not classified/unknown" category.

Professional and technical	24.0	29.8	20.8	26.4	14.4	18.9	3.8	7.8	2.2
Administrative	23.1	23.5	12.2	17.0	7.1	10.0	0.5	2.7	0.1
Clerical	8.2	7.0	14.9	10.3	15.1	13.0	6.8	20.4	4.3
Sales	30.5	25.8	12.5	12.8	9.4	9.5	3.1	15.7	2.3
Service	4.2	4.5	5.5	6.2	7.3	8.8	6.6	6.4	9.2
Production	7.0	6.8	26.8	21.6	35.5	31.4	51.2	40.1	51.2
Agriculture	1.4	1.2	4.9	4.3	8.7	6.9	22.2	2.7	22.0
Not classified/unknown	1.6	1.4	2.5	1.5	2.5	1.6	5.8	4.2	8.7
Females									
% Economically active	26.0	29.9	28.7	31.0	23.7	27.7	26.8	16.0	21.2
Total economically active	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional and technical	19.8	26.7	19.2	23.4	17.9	21.7	8.7	12.0	5.9
Administrative	4.8	5.6	1.6	2.9	1.1	1.9	0.1	0.5	0.0
Clerical	48.7	43.9	55.5	52.7	54.1	55.2	8.9	23.3	2.5
Sales	18.5	16.8	11.7	11.4	12.6	10.3	4.9	11.5	4.6
Service	3.6	3.9	5.2	5.3	5.7	6.0	32.6	7.1	43.1
Production	1.5	1.2	2.9	2.1	3.8	2.7	24.9	38.7	10.5
Agriculture	0.2	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.7	8.7	0.8	15.9
Not classified/unknown	2.9	1.8	3.1	1.5	3.9	1.5	11.2	6.1	17.5

TABLE 26. CHANGES IN OCCUPATIONS OF JEWS, 1960-1970 AND 1970-1980

Occupation	Difference 1960-70			Difference 1970-80		
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
<u>Absolute Nos.</u>						
Total	3,438	1,165	2,273	-237	-886	649
Not economically active	-163	983	-1,146	-1,275	596	-1,871
Total economically active	3,601	182	3,419	1,038	-1,482	2,520
Professional and technical	2,264	1,063	1,201	3,335	1,584	1,751
Administrative	-232	-120	-112	37	-228	265
Clerical	1,003	-445	1,448	-169	-524	355
Sales	140	-661	801	-1,860	-2,026	166
Service	1,182	962	220	186	47	139
Production	-779	-541	-238	-174	-150	-24
Agriculture	-92	-98	6	-102	-94	-8
Not classified/unknown	115	22	93	-215	-91	-124
<u>Percentage Change^a</u>						
Total	3.0	2.0	3.9	-0.2	-1.5	1.1
Not economically active	-0.2	4.4	-2.5	-1.9	2.5	-4.2
Total economically active	7.7	0.5	28.2	2.1	-4.3	16.2
Professional and technical	24.7	14.6	64.1	29.2	19.0	57.0
Administrative	-2.6	-1.5	-13.0	0.4	-2.8	35.4
Clerical	10.6	-13.4	23.7	-1.6	-18.3	4.7
Sales	1.0	-5.9	38.6	-13.8	-19.0	5.8
Service	141.1	194.7	64.0	9.2	3.2	24.6
Production	-22.6	-18.2	-50.2	-6.5	-6.2	-10.2
Agriculture	-15.1	-16.7	27.3	-19.7	-19.2	-28.6
Not classified/unknown	12.8	4.1	26.1	-21.3	-16.3	-27.6

^aPercentage change for each cell = $\frac{\text{Total change between the two dates}}{\text{Total number at the earlier date}} \times 100$

TABLE 27. JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE PROFESSIONALS, 1980, DETAILED BREAKDOWN

Professions	Jews	Total Whites
Professionals as % of total economically active	28.7	19.8
Total no.	13,750	378,570
Total %	100.0	100.0
Physical scientists and related technicians	0.9	2.4
Architects, quantity surveyors, engineers, and related technicians	10.7	29.4
Aircraft and ships' officers	0.3	1.1
Life scientists and related technicians	1.4	2.5
Medical, dental, veterinary, pharmaceutical, and related workers	30.1	17.6
Statisticians, mathematicians, systems analysts, and related technicians	2.1	2.5
Economists	0.4	0.4
Public accountants	15.3	7.5
Lawyers, judges, and other legal occupations	9.2	2.5
Teachers and other educational workers	16.8	22.8
Workers in religion	0.8	2.3
Professional, technical, and related workers not elsewhere classified	4.3	3.4
Authors, journalists, and related workers	2.2	1.8
Sculptors, painters, photographers, and related creative artists	3.2	2.4
Composers and performing artists	1.8	1.0
Sportsmen	0.5	0.4

TABLE 28. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE JEWS AGED 15 AND OVER, BY OCCUPATION, SEX, AGE, AND MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA, 1980a
(PERCENT)

	Total	Professional/						
		Technical	Administrative	Clerical	Sales	Service	Production	Agriculture
Total	100.0	29.8	17.6	21.0	22.4	4.0	4.9	0.3
<u>Sex</u>								
Males	100.0	31.0	24.4	7.5	25.6	4.1	7.0	0.4
Females	100.0	27.6	5.5	45.1	16.7	3.8	1.2	0.1
<u>Age</u>								
15-29	100.0	33.9	7.6	29.2	14.4	8.5	6.2	0.2
30-44	100.0	33.5	20.6	17.2	21.9	2.4	4.2	0.2
45-64	100.0	25.9	21.9	19.9	25.4	2.3	4.3	0.3
65+	100.0	21.2	19.1	17.5	32.6	3.4	5.7	0.5
<u>Metropolitan area</u>								
Johannesburg	100.0	29.2	17.1	23.4	21.7	3.5	5.0	0.1
Germiston	100.0	27.9	19.5	19.9	23.6	3.5	4.8	0.8
Cape Town	100.0	32.0	18.1	17.1	23.3	4.0	5.1	0.4
Durban	100.0	29.6	21.3	17.3	21.6	5.3	4.5	0.4
Pretoria	100.0	28.5	15.5	15.2	23.6	12.7	4.0	0.5
Port Elizabeth	100.0	30.0	17.7	14.0	30.8	3.1	3.8	0.6
Rest of country	100.0	22.3	15.8	12.9	29.4	8.1	5.2	6.3

aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing. Percentage distributions were computed after excluding the "Not classified/unknown" category. The "Rest of country" category was obtained by subtracting the totals for the six metropolitan areas from the total.

TABLE 29. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE JEWS AGED 15 AND OVER, BY OCCUPATION AND WORK STATUS, 1980^a

Occupation	Work Status			
	Total	Employer	Employee	Unemployed
	<u>Column %</u>			
Total no.	46,127	11,769	34,272	86
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	(100.0)
Professional and technical	29.8	37.2	27.3	(29.1)
Administrative	17.6	19.8	16.9	(5.8)
Clerical	21.0	1.9	27.5	(41.9)
Sales	22.4	30.9	19.5	(12.8)
Services	4.0	3.8	4.1	(5.8)
Production	4.9	5.6	4.7	(4.7)
Agriculture	0.3	0.9	0.1	(0.0)
	<u>Row %</u>			
Total %	100.0	25.3	74.1	0.6
Professional and technical	100.0	31.8	68.0	0.2
Administrative	100.0	28.7	71.3	0.1
Clerical	100.0	2.3	97.4	0.4
Sales	100.0	35.2	64.7	0.1
Services	100.0	24.3	75.4	0.3
Production	100.0	29.1	70.7	0.2
Agriculture	100.0	81.1	18.9	0.0

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 30. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE JEWS AGED 15 AND OVER, BY WORK STATUS, SEX, AGE, AND MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA, 1980^a

	% Economically Active	Economically Active			
		Total	Employer	Employee	Unemployed
Total	55.9	100.0	25.3	74.1	0.6
<u>Sex</u>					
Males	74.2	100.0	33.6	65.9	0.5
Females	37.6	100.0	10.5	88.6	0.9
<u>Age</u>					
15-29	48.7	100.0	8.8	90.2	1.0
30-44	73.6	100.0	27.1	72.3	0.6
45-64	65.4	100.0	32.1	67.3	0.6
65+	29.7	100.0	37.2	62.5	0.3
<u>Metropolitan area</u>					
Johannesburg	57.0	100.0	22.5	77.0	0.5
Germiston	62.2	100.0	29.9	69.8	0.3
Cape Town	49.2	100.0	29.1	70.0	0.9
Durban	51.0	100.0	28.5	70.4	1.1
Pretoria	60.5	100.0	28.7	70.9	0.4
Port Elizabeth	55.7	100.0	41.0	58.7	0.3

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 31. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE JEWS AGED 15 AND OVER, BY INDUSTRY AND TYPE OF EMPLOYER, 1980^a

Industry	Type of Employer					
	Total	Central Govt.	Provincial/ Local Authority	Public Authority Corporation	Private Business Enterpr. ^b	Nonprofit Organization
	<u>Column %</u>					
Total no.	45,130	2,038	2,731	355	38,596	1,410
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Agriculture	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.0
Manufacturing ^c	18.7	1.8	1.8	29.3	21.3	2.3
Construction	2.6	0.4	1.5	0.8	2.9	0.1
Trade	33.0	2.0	0.4	0.8	38.4	0.3
Transport	2.3	0.5	0.5	47.3	2.1	0.1
Finance	20.1	0.4	0.1	2.0	23.5	0.0
Services	22.9	94.8	95.5	18.3	11.2	97.2
	<u>Row %</u>					
Total %	100.0	4.4	5.9	0.8	85.8	3.1
Agriculture	100.0	0.8	2.9	0.0	96.3	0.0
Manufacturing ^c	100.0	0.4	0.6	1.2	97.4	0.4
Construction	100.0	0.8	3.6	0.3	95.1	0.2
Trade	100.0	0.3	0.1	0.1	99.5	0.0
Transport	100.0	1.1	1.3	16.5	80.9	0.2
Finance	100.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	99.8	0.0
Services	100.0	18.8	25.3	0.6	42.0	13.3

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing. Includes all economically active Jews irrespective of work status.

^bIncludes employers and employees.

^cIncludes the mining and electricity sectors, with 205 and 133 employed Jews, respectively.

TABLE 32. ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE JEWS AGED 15 AND OVER, BY TYPE OF EMPLOYER, SEX, AGE, AND MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREA, 1980^a (PERCENT)

	Total	Central Govt.	Provincial Administration	Local Authority	Public Author. Corp.	Private Business Enterpr.	Non-profit Organization
Total	100.0	4.4	5.0	0.9	0.8	85.8	3.1
Sex							
Males	100.0	4.5	2.7	0.9	1.0	89.6	1.3
Females	100.0	4.3	9.0	1.1	0.4	79.0	6.2
Age							
15-29	100.0	9.4	8.4	0.8	1.3	77.5	2.6
30-44	100.0	3.2	5.0	0.8	0.7	87.1	3.2
45-64	100.0	2.6	3.3	1.2	0.6	88.9	3.4
65+	100.0	2.2	2.3	1.0	0.3	91.1	3.1
Metropolitan area							
Johannesburg	100.0	3.4	4.6	0.8	0.7	87.2	3.3
Germiston	100.0	2.8	4.4	0.3	1.3	89.8	1.4
Cape Town	100.0	5.2	6.6	1.5	0.5	82.9	3.3
Durban	100.0	5.7	4.3	1.0	1.6	84.5	2.9
Pretoria	100.0	19.3	2.9	0.5	1.4	74.3	1.6
Port Elizabeth	100.0	2.5	4.2	0.8	1.0	89.4	2.1

^aSix major metropolitan areas, authors' processing.

TABLE 33. JEWS AND TOTAL WHITES, BY INCOME, 1980

Income Category in S.A. Rands ^a	Jews	Total Whites
% with income out of population aged 15 +	67.9	67.8
Total no.	63,239	2,238,366
Total %	100.0	100.0
2-1,199	6.5	7.4
1,200-2,399	7.9	10.1
2,400-3,599	7.9	11.3
3,600-5,999	15.2	20.2
6,000-8,399	12.9	17.2
8,400-11,999	10.2	15.0
12,000-17,999	13.9	11.8
18,000-29,999	13.3	5.0
30,000-41,999	4.2	1.2
42,000+	8.0	0.8
Median annual income	8,323	6,139

^aIn 1980 the South African rand was equivalent to about \$0.80.

TABLE 34. JEWISH POPULATION AGED 15 AND OVER, BY TYPE AND LEVEL OF JEWISH EDUCATION, 1974^a

Type of Jewish Education	Jewish Education Level Attained				
	Total	None	To Bar Mitzvah	Post Bar Mitzvah	Matriculation
	<u>Column %</u>				
Total no.	66,597	13,989	35,270	11,160	6,112
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	18.7	92.0	—	—	—
<i>Heder</i>	52.9	2.2	74.6	60.7	25.2
Day school	10.1	0.9	5.2	14.2	50.9
Other ^b	18.3	4.9	20.2	25.1	23.9
	<u>Row %</u>				
Total %	100.0	21.0	53.0	16.8	9.2
<i>Heder</i>	100.0	0.8	75.4	19.3	4.5
Day school	100.0	1.7	27.7	23.7	46.9
Other ^b	100.0	5.3	59.2	23.2	12.2

^aSouth African Jewish Population Study, six largest Jewish communities.

^bIncluding private tutorial.

TABLE 35. SELECTED INDICATORS OF JEWISH EDUCATION, 1981-82^a

Indicators	Total	Johannesburg	Cape Town	Rest of South Africa
<u>Schools</u>				
Total	146	56	22	68
Nursery schools	64	25	15	24
Day schools ^b	24	9	5	10
Of these: primary ^c	14	4	4	6
secondary ^d	10	5	1	4
<i>Hadarim</i>	58	22	2	34
<u>Pupils</u>				
Total	14,300	7,722	3,174	3,404
Nursery schools ^e	3,765	2,164	723	878
Day schools ^b	8,311	4,368	2,289	1,654
Of these: primary ^c	4,360	2,145	1,311	904
secondary ^d	3,951	2,223	978	750
<i>Hadarim</i>	2,224	1,190	162	872
<u>% Enrolled out of 3-17 age group^f</u>				
Total	55	54	58	57
Nursery and day schools	47	46	55	42
<i>Hadarim</i>	8	8	3	15
<u>Teaching Posts^g</u>				
Total	991	510	228	253
Nursery schools ^h	235	107	44	84
Day schools ⁱ	655	368	170	117
Of these: Jewish studies ^j	160	108	23	29
General studies	495	260	147	88
<i>Hadarim</i> ^k	101	35	14	52

^aBased on results of the First International Census of Jewish Schools in the Diaspora, conducted by the Project for Jewish Educational Statistics, Institute for Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The census covered the 1981-82 and 1982-83 school years in the Northern Hemisphere and 1981, 1982, and 1983 school years in the Southern Hemisphere. Coverage of schools in South Africa was close to 100 percent for nursery and day schools. Response for *hadarim* (supplementary schools) was somewhat lower, but certainly not below 90 percent.

^bEach nursery, primary-, and secondary-level unit was counted as a separate school.

Continued on the next page

TABLE 35.—(Continued)

^cGrades 1 to 6.

^dGrades 7 to 12.

^eExcludes 946 non-Jewish pupils, countrywide. The proportion of non-Jewish pupils in day schools was 0.9 percent, and has been disregarded.

^fPercentage enrollment = (total enrolled in Jewish schools/total Jewish children aged 3–17) × 100. Figures for “Rest of South Africa” were estimated.

^gTeachers who taught at more than one school were subject to multiple reporting, hence “Teaching Posts” rather than “Teachers.” Since several schools did not report on teachers—in particular, Johannesburg *hadarim*—the percentage of schools which did report is noted in each case.

^hNursery schools reporting: total—89 percent; Johannesburg—72 percent; Cape Town and rest—100 percent.

ⁱDay schools reporting: total—92 percent; Johannesburg and Cape Town—100 percent; rest—80 percent.

^jIncludes 6 teachers who also taught general studies.

^k*Hadarim* reporting: total—67 percent; Johannesburg—23 percent; Cape Town—100 percent; rest—94 percent.