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CRIMEA: PEOPLE, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS

(Socio-political, Inter-ethnic and Inter-confessional Relations in Crimea)

Socio-political and socio-economic processes, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in Crimea have always been among the factors that have a serious impact not only on the situation in Ukraine but also on its foreign policy and relations with other countries.

In the conditions of political instability in the country lasting for years and serious foreign political challenges (first of all, due to deterioration of relations with Russia and a deficit of security that became evident after the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August, 2008), the Crimean specificity, first of all, its socio-cultural, ethnic and confessional variety, make it especially vulnerable to internal conflicts. Given the special status of Crimea in Ukraine, such conflicts pose a potential threat to stability in Ukraine as a whole.

According to the Razumkov Centre assessments, yet in early 2000s, the Crimean situation might be described as generally stable. However, that stability rested not as much on solution of the most critical problems of the autonomy as on the effective system of presidential control over the local authorities, ability to maintain equilibrium in relations with both the ruling forces and the opposition, first of all – with the political leadership of Crimean Tatars. In 2005, the situation in Crimea entered a new phase, observed now. Specific of it are the following trends:

- *aggravation of contradictions between the central and Crimean authorities, a decrease of influence of the central authorities on the situation in the autonomy;*
- *growth of tension in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations;*
- *activation of pro-Russian political forces and public-political organisations;*
- *growing presence of radical Islamist groups;*
- *serious growth of foreign influence, first of all, Russian¹.*

Further development of those trends poses a risk of involvement of latent and local conflicts in different sectors into active and large-scale ones.

The Ukrainian-Swiss project “Socio-political, Inter-ethnic and Inter-confessional Relations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea – State, Problems, Ways of Solution”, jointly implemented by Razumkov Centre and the University of Basel’s Europainstitut is designed to prevent such developments².

The project is intended to produce an adequate picture of the socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in Crimea, survey the most risky sectors, identify the sources and reasons of conflicts, motives of involved parties. In practical terms, the study is to work out proposals aimed at mitigation of the existing contradictions and prevention of escalation of conflicts with account of the international experience.

The presented analytical report, the first of the two planned, is an attempt to systemically survey different aspects of the identity of the Crimean residents influencing inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the autonomy, foreign policy, political and ideological preferences of representatives of the main ethnic groups, and study the main problems and needs, as they are seen by Crimeans.

This report builds on the following sources: results of sociological surveys held by Razumkov Centre, both previous and conducted as a part of this project – national and Crimea-wide public opinion polls, polls of target groups, including representatives of the main ethnic communities, believers of the most numerous religious organisations, groups with a special social and demographic status³.

This Analytical report consists of four sections.

- First section** describes the specificity of the socio-cultural and civil identity of Crimeans in general and representatives of the main ethnic groups of Crimea in particular.
- Second section** examines the views of the ethnic and religious situation in the autonomy by the Crimean inhabitants, mutual perception of representatives of different ethnic and confessional groups, assessments of the probability and possible reasons of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts.
- Third section** analyses the ideas of Crimeans regarding the main regional problems, the rating of their needs, the attitude to the central and local authorities, ideological preferences and political sympathies.
- Fourth section** presents brief conclusions regarding the main specific features of Crimeans, their opinions of the situation in different sectors of public life, relations among different ethnic and confessional groups, reasons of conflicts observed in the autonomy; that section also outlines the objectives of the subsequent phase of the survey.

¹ This is admitted by the supreme institutes of governance in the country. See, e.g., the President of Ukraine Decree “On the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of September 20, 2006 “On Implementation of the Decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of February 8, 2006 “On Social Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” No. 822 of October 9, 2006.

² Razumkov Centre would like to express its sincere gratitude to professor G.Kreis (University of Basel’s Europainstitut, Switzerland) for his substantial and valuable comments given during preparation of this report.

³ The report builds on the results of national and Crimea-wide public opinion polls held by Razumkov Centre:

– April 20 - May 12, 2006 (11,216 respondents aged above 18 years polled in all regions of Ukraine, the sample theoretical error does not exceed 1.0%);

– May 31 - June 18, 2007 (10,956 respondents aged above 18 years polled in all regions of Ukraine, the sample theoretical error does not exceed 1.0%);

– October 18 - November 9, 2008 (6,891 respondents aged above 18 years polled in Crimea and Sevastopol, the sample theoretical error does not exceed 1.2%).

Target groups were polled on October 18 - November 9, 2008 (10 groups selected by ethnic, confessional and socio-demographic criteria).

1. SPECIFICITY OF SOCIO-CULTURAL AND CIVIL IDENTITY OF THE DOMINANT ETHNIC GROUPS IN CRIMEA

It makes sense to start the study of the social situation in Crimea with the establishment of the specificities of the autonomy residents' identity, or, rather – the identity of its most numerous (dominant) national and ethnic groups. The thing is that for two such groups – Russians and Crimean Tatars – national and ethnic consciousness is especially important and in many aspects shapes the civil identity, and therefore – civil behaviour¹.

Present-day Ukrainian realities also show correlation of the ethnic, civil and religious (or, rather, confessional and church) identity and its influence of the treatment of other ethnic and confessional groups, that is – on inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations, being especially sensitive in the conditions of the polyethnic and polyconfessional Crimea.

This section describes the socio-cultural and civil identity of Crimeans in general and the main national and ethnic groups of the autonomy in particular. Age and gender differences in characteristics and assessments are noted in the text only where they are statistically and substantively meaningful².

Summary results of the public opinion poll are presented in Table “*Specificities of socio-cultural and civil identity of dominant ethnic groups in Crimea*” (p.12).

1.1. SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY: ETHNIC, LANGUAGE, CULTURAL AND CONFESSIONAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Study of the specificities of the socio-cultural identity presumes consideration of such aspects as affiliation of an individual with some national and ethnic group, language self-identification, manifested in the language behaviour (native language, use of language in everyday communication, command of languages), affiliation with some cultural tradition. An important aspect of the socio-cultural identity is presented by the religious and confessional identity that should be examined in correlation with identification on other grounds, including national affiliation, language and culture.

Ethnic identity

According to the poll results, 60.1% of Crimean residents identified themselves as Russians; 24.9% – Ukrainians; 9.1% – Crimean Tatars³. Those three national and ethnic groups make the absolute majority (over 94%) of Crimean population and generally shape the social situation, public spirits and public opinion in the autonomy. However, given the vast numerical superiority of Russians and Ukrainians, their cultural kinship and small mutual social

distance (discussed below⁴), in many cases one may speak about the position of the Slavic community (Russians and Ukrainians) of Crimea, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other. In such cases, Crimea-wide spirits and public opinion are determined by the Slavic community.

Demographic composition of the main ethnic groups in Crimea is of interest. Russians are relatively elder; Crimean Tatars – younger. Respectively, in younger age groups, fewer people call themselves Russians, and more – Crimean Tatars⁵.

The number of self-identified Ukrainians actually does not depend on age. It may be suggested that the group of ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea will remain steady, reproducing in stable numbers. By contrast, the group of ethnic Russians shows a downward trend (it is hard to say though, at the expense of natural reduction, external migration of younger people, or self-identification with the title nation).

There are also differences in the gender structure of ethnic groups: the share of men among Crimean Tatars is higher than among Russians and Ukrainians⁶. The features of ethnic groups related with education and social status are shown on Diagram “*Socio-demographic features of the dominant ethnic groups of Crimea*” (p.4).

¹ That is, emphasis on the ethnic identity for Crimean Tatars in the conditions of deportation, and for Russians after the break-up of the USSR has actually been a condition of survival and reproduction as a separate ethnic community. This issue is especially sensitive for Russians, since while Crimean Tatars returned to their Motherland and under any circumstances see Ukraine as “native”, Russians, on the contrary, appeared in a state seen as “strange”, not “native”. The majority of Russians goes through that situation rather painfully, which influences actually all aspects of their behaviour.

² For full results of the sociological survey, including age and gender aspects, see Annex 2 to this report.

³ 4.9% associated themselves with other national and ethnic groups; 1% of those polled remained undecided or gave no answer. Hereinafter those groups are termed, respectively, “Russians”, “Ukrainians”, “Crimean Tatars” and “representatives of other ethnic groups”.


⁴ See Section 2 of this report.

⁵ This is backed with statistical data: according to the census of 2001, Crimean Tatars are among the youngest ethnoses in Ukraine: the share of people below working age equalled 25.6% (among Ukrainians – 19.3%; Russians – 13.3%); the ageing factor equalled only 14.5% (against 20.8% for Ukrainians and 23.7% for Russians). Average age – 33.4 years (against 38.2% for Ukrainians and 41.9% for Russians).

⁶ According to the census of 2001, among Russian residents of Crimea aged above 16 years, men made 44.3%, among Ukrainians – 44.2%, among Crimean Tatars – 48.5%.



Socio-demographic features of the dominant ethnic groups of Crimea,
% of the polled in each ethnic group



Language identity and language behaviour

Data of the language identity and especially language behaviour of Crimeans witness unconditional domination of the Russian language in the autonomy, preferred at home by the absolute majority of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians and many Crimean Tatars. Additionally, Russian is used as the language of inter-ethnic communication in the autonomy, since the absolute majority of Ukrainians and the overwhelming majority of Crimean Tatars are fluent in it.

Language identity (native language). The language identity of Crimeans does not fully coincide with their national and ethnic self-identification. This primarily applies to Ukrainians and Russians. For instance, the overwhelming majority (81.3%) of Crimeans reported Russian as their native language (compared to 60.1% self-reported ethnic Russians); Crimean Tatar – 9.4% (compared to 9.1%); and Ukrainian language – only 6.4% (compared to 24.9%).

Russian was reported as native language by the absolute majority (95.7%) of Russians, the overwhelming majority (76.7%) of Ukrainians and by quite many (9.1%) Crimean Tatars.

Crimean Tatar language was reported as native by the absolute majority (86.5%) of Crimean Tatars, small shares of Ukrainians (2.2%) and Russians (0.9%).

Ukrainian is the native language for 17.9% of Ukrainians and small shares of Crimean Tatars (2.5%) and Russians (2.1%).

With the decrease in age, the share of those for whom Russian is the native language goes down (from 84.3% in the eldest to 79.6% in the youngest group), and of native Crimean Tatar speakers, goes up (respectively, from 5.2% to 12.2%). Recognition of Ukrainian as the mother language actually does not depend on age. Those data correlate with the age structure of the main national and ethnic groups.

Also noteworthy, the ability to communicate and get information in native language is the most important for Russians – representatives of that ethnic group put it at 4.81 points on a five-point scale (much higher than Russia's possible annexation of Crimea, assessed by Russians at 4.50 points). Such ability is less important for Crimean Tatars (4.73), still less – for Ukrainians (4.57).

Language behaviour (use of language in everyday communication). The use of language at home correlates with the reported native language. The absolute majority (86.5%) of Crimeans speak mainly Russian at home, namely: the absolute majority (97.3%) of Russians, the absolute majority (86.4%) of Ukrainians and more than one-fifth of Crimean Tatars (20.8%).

Ukrainian is spoken by only 8.1% of Ukrainians. By contrast, the overwhelming majority (75.5%) of Crimean Tatars speak Crimean Tatar language at home.

So, some Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars who reported, respectively, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar as their native language, do not use those languages at home, preferring Russian.

The specificities of home use of languages in age and confessional groups are similar to those noted above with respect to recognition of the native language.

Command of languages. The absolute majority of representatives of all national and ethnic groups (97% of Russians, 91.5% of Ukrainians, and 79.9% of Crimean Tatars) are fluent in Russian.

A relative majority (43.9%) of Ukrainians, 20% of Russians, 16.2% of Crimean Tatars know Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language is absolutely unfamiliar for 6.7% of Ukrainians, 12% of Russians, and 18.9% of Crimean Tatars.

The absolute majority (87.3%) of Crimean Tatars are fluent in Crimean Tatar language. The absolute majority of Russians (93.6%) and Ukrainians (85.8%) do not know it at all, but 12.9% of Ukrainians and 5.5% of Russians more or less understand it, and, respectively, 7.1% and 2.3% can speak it.

Therefore, today, the function of inter-ethnic communication in the autonomy belongs not to the official state language but to the language of the largest ethnic group – Russian.

Native language / knowledge of languages spread in Crimea

86.2% of Crimeans for whom Ukrainian is native language are fluent in it. More than a half (53.8%) of those who reported Russian to be their native language are either fluent in Ukrainian (22.2%) or understand and can speak it (31.6%). 11.1% do not know Ukrainian at all. Native Crimean Tatar-speakers reported somewhat worse command of the Ukrainian language: 45.4% can fluently or with some difficulties speak it; 19.2% do not know Ukrainian at all.

Knowledge of the Russian language among representatives of different language groups is higher. 96.6% of native Russian-speakers are fluent in it; among native Ukrainian-speakers, 87.5% are fluent in Russian, 9.5% know it sufficiently for communication. Among those for whom Crimean Tatar is native language, 72.9% are fluent in Russian, 23.5% know it sufficiently for communication.

Crimean Tatar language is known and can be spoken mainly by the people for whom it is native; representatives of other national and ethnic groups reported poor knowledge of Crimean Tatar language.

So, it may be said that Russian is currently used as the language of inter-ethnic communication on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Therefore, many Crimeans appear potentially uncompetitive in the conditions of one state language and prospects of domination of Ukrainian in all sectors of professional activity. It is no wonder that the present constitutional status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in 2007 was supported by only 8.6% of Crimean residents; 20.6% suggested that Ukrainian should be the official state language, Russian – official language in some regions of Ukraine. The majority (62.6%) guessed that both languages should have the status of state languages.

Age differences. There are no differences in the command of the Russian language among different age groups, but young people reported better command of the Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and English languages than representatives of the eldest age group.

Self-identification in terms of cultural tradition

Just as the Russian language dominates in Crimean language environment, the public consciousness of Crimeans is dominated by the Russian cultural tradition, reported by more than a half (55.5%) of Crimean residents. Another 14.6% follow the Soviet cultural tradition. Meanwhile, Crimean Tatar tradition was reported by 8.3% of Crimeans, Ukrainian – by 8.6%.

In terms of nationality, the Russian cultural tradition was claimed by the overwhelming majority (69.9%) of Russians and a relative majority (43.5%) of Ukrainians. The Ukrainian tradition was reported by a bit more than one-fifth (21.6%) of Ukrainians, and by 4% of Russians and Crimean Tatars.

Among both Ukrainians and Russians, quite a few people associate themselves with the Soviet cultural tradition – 16.5% and 15%, respectively. Quite many Ukrainians (10.7%) also associated themselves with the pan-European cultural tradition (among Russians – 6%).

The absolute majority (84.2%) of Crimean Tatars reported adherence to Crimean Tatar cultural tradition. Only small shares of representatives of that ethnic group admitted association with other cultural traditions: roughly 4% each – with the Russian, Soviet and Ukrainian, some 3% – with pan-European.

In terms of **age**, there is an evident trend towards a decrease in the number of followers of the Soviet cultural tradition with younger age (from 23.8% in the eldest age group to 5.3% – in the youngest), and vice versa – an increase in the number of supporters of the Russian cultural tradition (respectively, from 51.4% to 59.4%). Therefore, it may be assumed that the Soviet tradition in Crimea is fading away; however, it is replaced mainly with the Russian (not Ukrainian) cultural tradition.

Meanwhile, Crimeans themselves believe that the prevalence of the Russian cultural tradition will go down in the future, first of all, yielding to pan-European.

For instance, only 40.6% of Crimeans (against the current 55.5% followers of the Russian cultural tradition) believe that the Russian cultural tradition will prevail in Crimea in the future. The pan-European cultural tradition ranked second: its prevalence was predicted by 13.9% of Crimeans; and Ukrainian was ranked third (6%).

At that, future prevalence of the Russian cultural tradition is expected by almost half (49.7%) of Russians and a relative majority (34.6%) of Ukrainians. By contrast, a relative majority (35.9%) of Crimean Tatars are sure that Crimean Tatar cultural tradition will dominate.

The second largest share in each ethnic group belongs to those who believe that the pan-European cultural tradition will dominate in Crimea in the future – 16.8% of Ukrainians, 11.1% of Russians, and 16.5% of Crimean Tatars. Prevalence of the Ukrainian cultural tradition is predicted by 12.1% of Ukrainians and only by 3.7% of Russians and 3.1% of Crimean Tatars.

Age differences. Younger people less tend to associate themselves with the Soviet cultural tradition (such association is stronger in elder age groups). With decrease in age, the shares of people associating themselves with the Russian, Crimean Tatar and pan-European cultural traditions go up. Young people more tend to believe that Crimean Tatar and pan-European cultural traditions will prevail in Crimea in the future.

Therefore, currently, the Russian cultural tradition actually dominates in Crimea. It was reported by the absolute majority of Crimean Russians and a majority of Ukrainians. It should be noted that the majority of Crimeans (first of all, also Russians and Ukrainians) are sure that that tradition will prevail in Crimea in the future. Only a relative majority of Crimean Tatars believe that Crimean Tatar cultural tradition will dominate. The opinion of future prevalence of the Ukrainian cultural tradition is shared by few Crimeans,

including only 12% of Ukrainians. By contrast, almost 14% of Crimeans expect future prevalence of the pan-European culture in Crimea.

Religious and confessional/church identity⁷

Specific of the religious situation in Crimea, compared to other regions of Ukraine, is the presence of a numerous Muslim community that appeared recently, with the repatriation of Crimean Tatars. That community has its Spiritual Administration, whose leadership is elected, but the election is strongly influenced by the Crimean Tatar Majlis that actually names the candidacy of the head of that body⁸.

The most numerous confession in Crimea is Orthodoxy, mainly represented by the Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy of UOC and Crimean Eparchy of UOC-KP.

Relations between the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea and Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy of UOC ranged from neutral to tense, although there were no acute large-scale conflicts on religious grounds between them. Sometimes, there were local conflicts between UOC believers and Muslims, in particular, in connection with disputed land plots or some initiatives of the Eparchial leaders⁹.

Self-identification in terms of faith/atheism and confession. The attitude of Crimeans to religion generally corresponds to pan-Ukrainian trends, including the prevalence of women and elderly people among believers.

Specifically, 67.9% of Crimeans called themselves believers (against 73% in entire Ukraine), 25% – non-believers (against 22%)¹⁰. Interestingly, rather many self-identified believers did not report belonging to any confession (36.9%). So, people identifying themselves with some confession make less than a third (31%) of the adult population of Crimea.

Almost half (49.8%) of those who identified themselves with some confession reported adherence to UOC, 15.4% – to Islam, 11% – to UOC-KP. Almost one-tenth of those polled (9.8%) reported belonging to other confessions and/or churches¹¹.

At that, the poll results show that the **confessional and church self-identification of Crimeans is related with ethnicity**. Say, the majority of representatives of each ethnic group (65% of Crimean Tatars, 59.4% of Russians, and 56.6% of Ukrainians) reported stronger or weaker confidence that ethnic and confessional affiliation of a person should correlate with traditional perceptions¹².

Respectively, the overwhelming majority of faithful Ukrainians (76.6%) and Russians (76.5%) identifying themselves with some confession reported affiliation with Orthodoxy, while 86.6% of the same group of Crimean Tatars reported to be the followers of Islam. On the other hand, less than 1% of faithful Ukrainians and Russians called themselves Muslims, and only 2.6% Crimean Tatars – believers of different Orthodox churches.

There is a notable correlation between the ethnic and language identity, the language behaviour and affiliation with confession, and among the Orthodox – with a specific church.

⁷ The most numerous in Crimea are such confessions as Orthodoxy and Islam. At that, Orthodoxy is represented in the autonomy (as well as in the whole Ukraine) mainly by two churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchy, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchy (UOC-KP). That is why the term “confessional/church self-identification” is used to denote the attitude of Crimean residents to the issues of faith (believer/non-believer) and their association with some confession or church.

⁸ Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea.

⁹ E.g., erection of big crosses in a number of places in Crimea, including near Crimean Tatar settlements, which caused negative reaction of local Muslims.

¹⁰ 7.1% remained undecided in the issues of faith (against 5%). The indices of religiousness in Crimea are somewhat lower, compared to the whole Ukraine, because the highest level of religiousness (over 90% population) is observed in the Western regions of the country.

¹¹ 14% remained undecided about their confessional affiliation or did not answer the question. Therefore, mentioned confessional and church groups also included the respondents who hesitated answering the general question about faith/atheism and affiliation with “some religious body/denomination”, but reported their confessional and church affiliation, answering the question specifying confession and church. The respondents who remained undecided in both cases, and those who affiliated themselves with relatively small for Crimea confessions and churches, are all termed as “other”.

Hereinafter the groups distinguished on the basis of confessional and church self-identification are termed as “believers”, “non-believers”, “believers of UOC”, “Muslims”, “believers of UOC-KP” and “other”.

¹² For Crimean Tatars identifying themselves with Islam, that index is higher – 72.7%.



For instance, 97% of Muslims called Crimean Tatar their native language; the share of those whose native language is Ukrainian among UOC-KP believers makes 19.9%, among UOC believers – only 4.3%. At home, Muslims prefer to speak Crimean Tatar language; believers of UOC and UOC-KP – Russian, although the share of those who speak Ukrainian is notably bigger among UOC-KP believers compared to the UOC believers and Muslims

One may also note the correlation between cultural and religious identity. For instance, the Russian cultural tradition prevails in all confessional and church groups, except Muslims; meanwhile, the shares of followers of the Soviet cultural tradition are significant among non-believers (18%), UOC believers (17.5%) and “other” (13.8%). By contrast, among believers of UOC-KP, there are rather many (24%) followers of the Ukrainian cultural tradition.

The greatest shares of those who predict the prevalence of the Russian cultural tradition in the future are among believers of UOC (48.7%) and “other” (44.2%), the smallest – among Muslims (1.3%). The latter are mainly convinced in the future prevalence of Crimean Tatar (38.1%) and pan-European (17.4%) cultural traditions.

Gender specificity. As we noted above, women are much more religious than men. At that, the majority of faithful women reported affiliation with UOC (while among faithful men, the share of followers of Islam is somewhat higher than among faithful women).

Age differences. With age, the share of believers goes up; among believers, the same occurs with UOC followers, while the share of Muslims in the elder age group is lower than in the younger and medium age groups.

Summing up, it should be noted that the majority of Crimean residents described themselves as believers, although many citizens found it difficult to name a specific confession. At that, the religiousness of women is notably stronger than of men. The most spread religions in the autonomy are Orthodoxy and Islam.

Residents of Crimea tend to associate their confessional and church self-identification with ethnic, language and cultural, which may cause the emergence of whole mental complexes specific of adherents of separate confessions and churches.

1.2. CIVIL IDENTITY OF CRIMEAN RESIDENTS

The features specifying the civil identity of Crimean residents may include, first of all, perception of their country of residence, attitude to their Ukrainian citizenship level of patriotism, as well as, foreign political orientations – as reflection of their level of patriotism, as well as geopolitical and geo-cultural attraction to other countries.

Attitude to Ukraine

The attitude of Crimeans to Ukraine was shaped by circumstances that distinguish Crimeans from the residents of other regions of the country (e.g., changes in the administrative-territorial status of Crimea in the Soviet times, the independence movement of early 1990s). An important factor is presented by the performance of the Ukrainian authorities, reflected in the socio-economic standing of residents of the autonomy, satisfaction of their life needs¹³. The attitude of Crimeans to Ukraine is also influenced by the specificity of their socio-cultural identity described above.

Perception of Ukraine as Motherland. In 2006, the overwhelming majority (74%) of Crimean residents saw

Ukraine as their Motherland, 22.2% did not¹⁴. By 2008, the opinions of Crimeans changed. Now, Ukraine is seen as Motherland by 40.1% of the autonomy residents, is not seen – by 32.9%.

The perception of Ukraine as Motherland witnesses significant differences among ethnic and confessional groups. Ukraine is seen as Motherland by 51.9% of Ukrainians, 44.5% of Crimean Tatars and 34.4% of Russians. Russians are the only ethnic group the majority of which do not perceive Ukraine as Motherland (36.3%).

In terms of confession: Ukraine is seen as Motherland by 47.7% of believers of UOC-KP (against 18.1% sticking to the opposite opinion), 41.1% of Muslims (against 37.8%), 36.7% of UOC believers (against 31.0%).

Patriotism. In 2007, two-thirds (66.7%) of Crimeans called themselves patriots of Ukraine; 26.9% did not¹⁵. Since then, the situation has changed. In 2008, Ukrainian patriotism was reported by only 28.6% of Crimean residents, was not – by almost half (49.3%).

Relatively more patriotic were Ukrainians (40.2%) and Crimean Tatars (39.6%); in terms of confessional and church affiliation – believers of UOC-KP (40.7%) and Muslims (36.6%). There were fewer such people among Russians (22.4%) and UOC believers (27.8%).

Reported not to be patriots: among Ukrainians – 40.4%; Crimean Tatars – 42.6%; Russians – 53.3%. By confession: UOC-KP believers – 32.3%; Muslims – 45.9%; UOC believers – 50.8%.

So, in all of the described groups, including age groups, the shares of patriots and non-patriots are either roughly equal, or non-patriots prevail; one exception is presented by UOC-KP believers, where patriots of Ukraine are in a clear majority.

Attitude to Ukrainian citizenship

The attitude to citizenship is an important aspect of civil identity, as it indirectly features personal attitude to the country of residence. This attitude is manifested in such things as the perception of own citizenship, readiness to change it or get dual citizenship.

Feelings aroused by the Ukrainian citizenship. For the overwhelming majority (68.3%) of Crimeans, citizenship of Ukraine is a purely practical matter that arouses neither positive nor negative feelings. The second rank was occupied by the perception of the Ukrainian citizenship as a burdensome necessity related with the impracticability of changing the country of residence (such was the answer of 13% of Crimean residents). Finally, few Crimeans (10.3%) are proud of being Ukraine's citizens.

Treatment of the Ukrainian citizenship as a burdensome necessity ranked second among Russians, UOC believers and non-believers.

Pride of the Ukrainian citizenship was reported by 19.2% of Ukrainians (against 9.2% of those who see it as a “burden”) and 15.6% of Crimean Tatars (against 5.8%); 20.3% of UOC-KP believers (against 7.7%), and by 16.4% of Muslims (against 5%).

Attitude to the change of citizenship. If they had a chance, 48% of Crimeans would agree to change the Ukrainian citizenship for some other. 80% of them would choose the Russian citizenship instead of Ukrainian.

¹³ For more detail see Section 3 of this report.

¹⁴ However, much fewer people would choose it as Motherland, had they had a choice – 57.1%; those who would not opt for Ukraine made nearly a third (31%).

¹⁵ In this subsection, the answer “patriot” is the aggregate of answers “yes” and “most likely yes” to the question “Do you consider yourself a patriot of Ukraine?”; respectively, “non-patriot” – the aggregate of answers “no” and “most likely no”.

In terms of ethnicity, change of the Ukrainian citizenship for another one is desirable for 54.7% of Russians (against 22.81% who would not do that), 38.7% of Ukrainians (against 40.1%) and only for 28.6% of Crimean Tatars (against 46%). At that, 86.5% of those Russians who would like to change their citizenship and the majority (76.7%) of Ukrainians would prefer the Russian citizenship, 40.6% of Crimean Tatars – Turkish, 35.6% – Russian.

In confessional groups, the only group unwilling to change citizenship are Muslims: only 22.9% would like to change their citizenship – against 48.6% of those who would not. By contrast, the share of those ready to change citizenship among the believers of both Orthodox churches are almost identical: 46.9% – among UOC believers, 47.9% – of UOC-KP. However, among the latter, more people do not wish to change citizenship: 38.1%, against 22.1% among UOC believers.

So, Russians are the most disposed to change citizenship, Crimean Tatars – the least.

Attitude to dual citizenship. The overwhelming majority (70.1%) of Crimeans support introduction of the institute of dual citizenship in Ukraine. 73.8% of them would choose the Russian citizenship as the second one.

Among ethnic groups, such step enjoys the strongest support among Russians, the weakest – Crimean Tatars; among confessional groups, it is more welcome for UOC believers, less – for Muslims; by age – support goes down with the growth of respondents' age.

Therefore, the institute of dual citizenship might be supported by 75.5% of Russians, 62.8% of Ukrainians, and by 55.3% of Crimean Tatars. At that, 82.2% of Russians and 68.1% of Ukrainians supporting the introduction of dual citizenship would choose the Russian citizenship as the second one. Among Crimean Tatars, 34.2% would choose the Turkish citizenship, and 29.3% – Russian.

So, the attitude of the majority of Crimeans to the Ukrainian citizenship is largely formal – as to a purely practical matter, while a minority demonstrates a value-based attitude (positive or negative). It is no wonder therefore that almost half of Crimean residents would change the Ukrainian citizenship for the citizenship of another country, if they had such an opportunity, and that 70% of Crimeans would support introduction of the institute of dual citizenship, not seeing it as a threat to the national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Meanwhile, there are notable differences among different ethnic and confessional groups in their attitude to citizenship.

Can dual citizenship threaten Ukraine's national security?


In view of the August events in Georgia that demonstrated that dual citizenship or citizenship of a neighbouring country may be used for political goals or even as a pretext for forcible actions,

respondents were asked: *Is Russia's granting its citizenship to Ukrainian citizens potentially dangerous for national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine?*

Some Ukrainian politicians think that Russia's granting its citizenship to Ukrainian citizens, in particular, to the inhabitants of Crimea, is potentially dangerous for national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Do you agree with this opinion?

% of those polled



According to the data cited on Diagram, the overwhelming majority of Crimeans (70.7%) and Sevastopol residents (74.1%) are more or less convinced that endowment of the Russian citizenship to Ukrainian nationals poses no potential danger

for Ukraine. This opinion is shared by 78.1% of Russians (against 8.5% of those sharing the opposite pinion), 65% of Ukrainians (against 19.3%), and by 43.1% of Crimean Tatars (against 30.6%).

Foreign policy preferences

The foreign policy preferences of Crimean residents largely ensue from the specificity of their socio-cultural, first of all, ethnic identification, specific geopolitical status of Crimea after the break-up of the former Soviet Union (in particular, stationing of navies of two countries – Ukraine and Russia – on its territory), and effects of a number of other internal and external factors.

Priority line of Ukraine's foreign policy. In 2007, the overwhelming majority (75%) of Crimean residents suggested that relations with Russia should be the priority line of Ukraine's foreign policy, 12.9% gave preference to the EU countries, 4.3% – other CIS countries. Actually no one prioritised the relations with the USA.

In 2008, the picture somewhat changed: relations with Russia were prioritised by 69% of Crimeans, with the EU countries – by 9%, with other CIS countries – 6.7%, with the USA – 2.2%.

Relations with Russia are prioritised by the overwhelming majority (80.8%) of Russians, a majority (59.8%) of Ukrainians, and only by 26.2% of Crimean Tatars. At that, almost as many Crimean Tatars (25.5%) and 13.6% of Ukrainians prioritise relations with the EU countries.

Opinions in confessional groups on that matter differ. The overwhelming majority (82%) of UOC believers and a relative majority (46.3%) of UOC-KP believers prioritise relations with Russia; by contrast, a relative majority (29.9%) of Muslims prioritise relations with the EU countries, and only 18.6% of representatives of that group – with Russia.

Therefore, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars demonstrate greater variety of opinions about the priority lines of the Ukrainian foreign policy than Russians. Similar variety of opinions is observed among believers of UOC-KP and Muslims, compared to the believers of UOC.

Accession of Ukraine to inter-state unions. Assessments of the priority lines of the foreign policy correlate with the attitude of Crimeans to Ukraine's accession to the EU or The Federal State of Russia and Belarus.

The overwhelming majority of Crimean residents (78.6%) support such accession.

This opinion is shared by the overwhelming majority of Russians (86.9%, against 3.4% opponents) and

Ukrainians (74.3% against 10.1%), and a relative majority (38%) of Crimean Tatars (38% against 28.3%); in confessional groups: by 86.7% of UOC believers (against 3.6%), 73.8% of UOC-KP believers (against 10.8%). Among Muslims, the shares of adherents and opponents are almost equal – 32.5% against 30.2%. Worth notice, among Crimean Tatars and Muslims, the shares of those who remained undecided on the issue were the highest – respectively, 33.7% and 37.3%.

Support for Ukraine's accession to the EU in Crimea is much lower: accession is supported by 25.9% Crimean residents and opposed, respectively, by 52.1%.

By ethnic group: accession to the EU is supported by nearly half of Crimean Tatars – 48.3% (opposed – by 23.5%), 30.6% of Ukrainians (against 47.2%), and by 19.5% of Russians (against 59%).

By confessional group: 51.4% of Muslims (against 18.1%), 18.6% of UOC believers (against 57.3%). Among UOC-KP believers, the shares of supporters and opponents of accession are equal – 36% each.

The attitude of Crimean residents to Ukraine's accession to the EU correlates with their feeling "European" or "not European". In particular, in 2007, the majority (52.2%) of Crimeans reported not feeling like Europeans (in 2006, they made even a greater majority – 68.5%). From a third to more than half of those polled explained that did not feel like Europeans due to their low living standard (57.6%), socio-cultural conditions (41.5%), low level of culture and education (39.9%), "non-European consciousness" (30.8%). Only 11% referred to their affiliation with a different culture.

Age differences. In younger age groups, compared to the eldest one, more people believe that relations with the EU countries should be the priority line of Ukraine's foreign policy, and somewhat fewer people prioritise relations with Russia (although adherents of priority relations with Russia prevail in all age groups).

With a decrease in age, the share of those who suggest that Ukraine should join the EU goes up, and of opponents of accession to NATO – goes down (although the overwhelming majority in all age groups oppose accession to NATO). Similarly, young people are less supportive of Ukraine's accession to the Federal State of Russia and Belarus.

Attitude of Crimean residents to initiatives concerning NATO and Russian Black Sea Fleet

In 2007, 76.9% of Crimeans saw NATO mainly as an aggressive military bloc, and only 4.7% – as a defence alliance. Peace-keeping intentions of that organisation were trusted by 6.3% of the autonomy residents. Respectively, 72.6% termed NATO's influence on the global political situation as negative; 79.5% disapproved NATO's eastward enlargement.

As one may see from Diagram "If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held next Sunday, how would you vote?" (p.10), in 2007, 74.6% of Crimeans would vote against, and only 5.9% – for accession.

In 2008, the referendum would have produced actually the same result: against – 77.7%, for – 7.6%.


At such referendum, the absolute majority of Russians (87.4%) and Ukrainians (71.7%), and a relative majority (35.9%) of Crimean Tatars would vote against Ukraine's accession to NATO. The accession might be supported by

22.6% of Crimean Tatars, 11.1% of Ukrainians, and only 3.6% of Russians.

87.7% of UOC believers, 74.4% of UOC-KP believers and 29.6% of Muslims would vote against Ukraine's accession to NATO, 23.1% of Muslims, 11.2% of UOC-KP believers and only 2.8% of UOC believers – for that.

* * *

In 2007, among the possible consequences of accession to NATO for Ukraine, the majority of Crimean residents mentioned deterioration of relations with Russia (64.6%) and participation of Ukrainian soldiers in military operations in the US interests (60.1%). Nearly half suggested that it would lead to imposition of economic sanctions against Ukraine by Russia (48.9%) and aggravate tension in the Ukrainian society (49.1%). 40.0% were convinced that accession to NATO would deprive Ukraine of political independence.



79.3% of Crimeans described NATO enlargement as an unwelcome development, 44.5% said so because they suggested that Ukraine might be involved in confrontation between Russia and NATO.

Other explanations for the negative assessment included fears of greater dependence of Ukraine on the Western countries and a hypothetic threat to Ukraine from the enlarged NATO.

By contrast, the overwhelming majority (70.7%) of Crimeans spoke out for Ukraine's accession to a military alliance with Russia and the CIS states as the best way to guarantee its national security. 23.4% suggested that Ukraine should stay a non-aligned country.

The majority (59.8%) of Crimean residents suggest that in case of a conflict between Russia and NATO, Ukraine should unconditionally side with Russia. A neutral stand was supported by 20.5% of those polled, and 15.3% suggested that in such case Ukraine should be a mediator in conflict settlement.

Rejection of NATO by Crimeans outbalanced their pro-Russian sympathies: 64% would not support Ukraine's accession to the Alliance, even if Russia joined it.

Against the background of mass rejection of NATO, the attitude of Crimeans to the prospects of stay of Russian Black Sea Fleet on the Ukrainian territory seems logical. In 2008, 69.9% of Crimeans suggested that the Ukraine-Russia treaty of its stationing in Sevastopol should be extended.

Extension of the term of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the Ukrainian territory would be supported by the absolute majority (80.6%) of Russians, the majority (62%) of Ukrainians and 28.4% of Crimean Tatars.

Meanwhile, 20.7% of Crimean Tatars and 8.6% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should insist on the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine after the expiration of the treaty. This opinion is shared by only 2.6% of Russians.

9.8% of Crimean Tatars believe that the Russia-Ukraine treaty on stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine should be terminated earlier. Among Ukrainians and Russians, their share is much lower.

Among those who believe that after 2017 the Black Sea Fleet should leave Sevastopol, the share of patriots of Ukraine is higher, compared to those who suggest that the Treaty of the Black Sea Fleet stationing should be extended (respectively, 47.2% and 24.4%), more people see Ukraine as Motherland (respectively, 50.7% and 36.8%), and more people refused to change the Ukrainian citizenship for some other (42.0% and 25.2%).

So, there is a correlation between the view of that problem and values related with Ukraine (patriotism, citizenship, its perception as Motherland).

The attitude of Crimean residents to the "problem of 2017" evidently correlates with their ideas of the priority lines of Ukraine's foreign policy and the attitude to Ukraine's accession to NATO.


In particular, 80.7% of Crimean residents suggesting that the term of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Sevastopol should be extended prioritise the Russian vector of the foreign policy.

Almost half (48.2%) of those who stand for the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol after 2017 prioritise Ukraine's relations with EU, 20.7% – with Russia, and 7.3% – with the USA.

Among those who stand for early withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet, 26.5% prioritise relations with the EU countries; 18.1% – with Russia, 12% – with the USA, and 12% – with other CIS countries.



**It is known that Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed in Sevastopol.
According to the treaty between Ukraine and Russia it is to remain there until 2017.
How should Ukrainian authorities handle this situation?**
% of those polled



The attitude to mentioned problem more directly correlates with the attitude to NATO. 90% of adherents of extension of the term of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in Ukraine oppose its accession to NATO, while more than a half (51.8%) of supporters of withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet after 2017 stand for Ukraine's

accession to the Alliance; among the supporters of early withdrawal, this opinion is shared by 41.8% of the polled. Among the supporters of the two latter options the share of respondents standing for accession to NATO nearly by half exceeds the share of its opponents.

The majority of Crimean residents prioritised relations with Russia as the main vector of Ukraine's foreign policy, although the share of supporters of that choice has decreased recently.

The overwhelming majority of Crimean residents support Ukraine's accession to The Federal State of Russia and Belarus. Every fourth Crimean stands for Ukraine's accession to the EU, but opponents of that step are twice as many. The latter seems logical, since most of Crimeans do not feel like Europeans.

The majority of Crimeans do not support the idea of Ukraine's accession to NATO (against – 87.7%). Instead, the majority of residents of the autonomy stand for extension of Russia's Black Sea Fleet stationing on its territory even after 2017.

Meanwhile, the assessments of foreign political priorities and separate initiatives reveal notable differences among ethnic and confessional groups, and age differences. In particular, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars show greater variety of opinions about the priority lines of the Ukrainian foreign policy, and stronger (to a different extent) support for the initiatives of Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO than Russians. A similar variety in opinions is observed among believers of UOC-KP and Muslims, compared to UOC believers.

Young residents of Crimea more than representatives of older age groups tend to support the development of

relations with the EU countries and Ukraine's accession to that union, and less oppose Ukraine's accession to NATO than representatives of elder age groups.

In accordance with the presented data it may be stated that at the current moment the "Crimean identity" – as a fixed, holistic mental complex inherent for the majority of Crimeans – has not been formed.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that by mentality characteristics as well as regarding their attitude towards Ukraine, Ukrainian citizenship, Crimea's perspectives, etc., the majority of Ukrainian and Russian residents present a unified social and cultural community. This community confronts to a certain extent the Crimean Tatars' community on one hand, but on the other – they clearly separate themselves from Ukraine: Russia's citizens are closer to them by character, habits and traditions than residents of other regions of Ukraine. Thus, the overall low level of patriotism and clear inclination (both geo-cultural and geopolitical) to the neighbouring country are typical for them.

Such a situation opens a possibility of developing – under certain circumstances – a specific pan-Crimean identity (with Crimean Tatar enclave), which may substantially differ from socio-cultural and civil identity of residents of other Ukraine's regions.



Specificities of socio-cultural and civil identity of dominant ethnic groups in Crimea				
	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
I. SOCIO-CULTURAL IDENTITY				
Language identity and language behaviour				
What is your native language?	Crimean Tatar (86.5%) Russian (9.1%) Ukrainian (2.5%)	Russian (95.7%) Ukrainian (2.1%) Crimean Tatar (0.9%) ...	Russian (76.7%) Ukrainian (17.9%) ... Crimean Tatar (2.2%)	Russian (81.3%) Crimean Tatar (9.4%) Ukrainian (6.4%)
How important for you is to communicate and receive information in native language?	4.73	4.81	4.57	4.71
What language do you usually speak at home?	Crimean Tatar (75.5%) Russian (20.8%) Ukrainian (2.1%)	Russian (97.3%) ... Ukrainian (0.8%) Crimean Tatar (0.8%)	Russian (86.4%) Ukrainian (8.1%) Crimean Tatar (3.0%)	Russian (86.5%) Crimean Tatar (8.6%) Ukrainian (2.9%)
How well do you know the following languages?				
• Crimean Tatar	Fluent (87.3%) Do not know at all (6.7%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (3.8%)	Do not know at all (93.6%) Understand in general, but do not speak (3.2%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (1.4%)	Do not know at all (85.8%) Understand in general, but do not speak (5.8%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (5.1%)	Do not know at all (82.6%) Fluent (9.3%) Understand in general, but do not speak (4.1%)
• Russian	Fluent (79.9%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (17.4%) Understand in general, but do not speak (1.6%)	Fluent (97.0%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (1.5%) Do not know at all (0.9%)	Fluent (91.5%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (5.6%) Understand in general, but do not speak (1.5%)	Fluent (93.1%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (4.6%) Understand in general, but do not speak (1.1%)
• Ukrainian	Understand in general, but do not speak (36.6%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (27.5%) Do not know at all (18.9%) Fluent (16.2%)	Understand in general, but do not speak (36.3%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (31.3%) Fluent (20.0%) Do not know at all (12.0%)	Fluent (43.9%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (27.1%) Understand in general, but do not speak (22.2%) Do not know at all (6.7%)	Understand in general, but do not speak (32.4%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (29.7%) Fluent (26.5%) Do not know at all (11.0%)



• English	Do not know at all (67.2%) Understand in general, but do not speak (15.7%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (7.9%) ... Fluent (3.8%)	Do not know at all (67.0%) Understand in general, but do not speak (18.4%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (6.4%) ... Fluent (3.0%)	Do not know at all (59.6%) Understand in general, but do not speak (18.3%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (11.5%) ... Fluent (5.1%)	Do not know at all (64.4%) Understand in general, but do not speak (18.4%) Understand and can speak, but encounter some difficulties (8.1%) ... Fluent (3.7%)
Cultural identity				
With what cultural tradition do you associate yourself?	Crimean Tatar (84.2%) Russian (4.4%) Ukrainian (4.0%)	Russian (69.9%) Soviet (15.0%) Pan-European (6.0%) ... Ukrainian (3.8%)	Russian (43.5%) Ukrainian (21.6%) Soviet (16.5%)	Russian (55.5%) Soviet (14.6%) Ukrainian (8.6%) Crimean Tatar (8.3%)
Which cultural tradition will dominate in Crimea in the future (in 20-25 years)?	Crimean Tatar (35.9%) Hard to say (32.9%) Pan-European (16.5%) ... Ukrainian (3.1%)	Russian (49.7%) Hard to say (29.2%) Pan-European (11.1%) Ukrainian (3.7%)	Russian (34.6%) Hard to say (28.6%) Pan-European (16.8%) Ukrainian (12.1%)	Russian (40.6%) Hard to say (29.3%) Pan-European (13.9%) Ukrainian (6.0%)
Religious (confessional-church) identity				
Do you belong to any church structure, denomination, or faith?	I consider myself a believer of a certain church, denomination (65.1%) I consider myself a believer, but do not belong to any church (15.0%)	I consider myself a believer, but do not belong to any church (41.8%) I consider myself a believer of a certain church, denomination (25.9%)	I consider myself a believer, but do not belong to any church (33.5%) I consider myself a believer of a certain church, denomination (30.7%)	I consider myself a believer, but do not belong to any church (36.9%) I consider myself a believer of a certain church, denomination (31.0%)
With which religious body, denomination, or faith are you affiliated?¹	Islam (86.6%) ... UOC (1.2%) UOC-KP (1.2%)	UOC (66.0%) UOC-KP (8.7%) ... UAOC (1.8%) UGCC (1.3%)	UOC (50.8%) UOC-KP (21.0%) UAOC (4.8%) UGCC (3.7%)	UOC (49.8%) Islam (15.4%) ... UOC-KP (11.0%) UAOC (2.5%)

* On a five-point scale, where "1" means "not important at all", and "5" – "very important".

¹ This question was answered by those who consider themselves believers of a certain church (denomination).



	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
	Connection between ethnic and religious affiliations			
Do you agree that ethnic and religious affiliations of a person should be connected? ²	Yes (65.0%) No (23.8%) <i>Balance</i> ³ (41.2%)	Yes (59.4%) No (27.1%) <i>Balance</i> (32.3%)	Yes (56.6%) No (29.7%) <i>Balance</i> (26.9%)	Yes (58.4%) No (28.1%) <i>Balance</i> (30.3%)
II. CIVIL IDENTITY				
Do you perceive Ukraine as your Motherland?	Yes (44.5%) No (34.1%) <i>Balance</i> (10.4%)	No (36.3%) Yes (34.4%) <i>Balance</i> (-1.9%)	Yes (51.9%) No (24.1%) <i>Balance</i> (27.8%)	Yes (40.1%) No (32.9%) <i>Balance</i> (7.2%)
Do you consider yourself a patriot of Ukraine? ⁴	No (42.6%) Yes (39.6%) <i>Balance</i> (-3%)	No (53.3%) Yes (22.4%) <i>Balance</i> (-30.9%)	No (40.4%) Yes (40.2%) <i>Balance</i> (-0.2%)	No (49.3%) Yes (28.6%) <i>Balance</i> (-20.7%)
What is your attitude to your Ukrainian citizenship?	Purely practical (64.4%) I am proud of it (15.6%)	Purely practical (71.3%) It is a burden for me (14.9%)	Purely practical (63.5%) I am proud of it (19.2%)	Purely practical (68.3%) It is a burden for me (13.0%)
Would you trade in your Ukrainian citizenship? Of which country?	No (46.0%) Yes (28.6%) <i>Balance</i> (-17.4%) • Turkey (40.6%) • Russia (35.6%)	Yes (54.7%) No (22.8%) <i>Balance</i> (31.9%) • Russia (86.5%) • Germany (3.5%)	No (40.1%) Yes (38.7%) <i>Balance</i> (-1.4%) • Russia (76.7%) • USA (6.6%)	Yes (48.0%) No (29.7%) <i>Balance</i> (18.3%) • Russia (80.0%) • Germany (3.8%)
Would you support the introduction of the institute of dual citizenship in Ukraine?/ Which country's citizenship would you prefer? ⁵	Yes (55.3%) No (25.2%) <i>Balance</i> (30.1%) • Turkey (34.2%) • Russia (29.3%)	Yes (75.5%) No (11.7%) <i>Balance</i> (63.8%) • Russia (82.2%) • Germany (2.7%)	Yes (62.8%) No (22.8%) <i>Balance</i> (40.0%) • Russia (68.1%) • USA (5.3%)	Yes (70.1%) No (16.2%) <i>Balance</i> (53.9%) • Russia (73.8%) • Germany (3.3%)
How important for you is to have the possibility to obtain a second citizenship?*	4.02	4.39	4.12	4.27
Do you agree that Russia's granting its citizenship to Ukrainian citizens is potentially dangerous for national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine?	Do not agree (30.9%) Hard to say (26.3%)	Do not agree (68.5%) Hard to say (13.4%)	Do not agree (53.2%) Hard to say (15.6%)	Do not agree (60.4%) Hard to say (15.2%)



Geopolitical orientations				
What line of foreign policy should be a priority for Ukraine?	Relations with Russia (26.2%) With the EU countries (25.5%) ... With other countries (16.4%)	Relations with Russia (80.8%) With other CIS countries (5.4%) With the EU countries (4.5%)	Relations with Russia (59.8%) With the EU countries (13.6%) With other CIS countries (8.8%)	Relations with Russia (69.0%) With the EU countries (9.0%) With other CIS countries (6.7%)
Should Ukraine join the EU?	Yes (48.3%) Hard to say (28.2%) No (23.5%)	No (59.0%) Hard to say (21.5%) Yes (19.5%)	No (47.2%) Yes (30.6%) Hard to say (22.2%)	No (52.1%) Yes (25.9%) Hard to say (22.0%)
Should Ukraine join The Federal State of Russia and Belarus?	Yes (38.0%) Hard to say (33.7%) No (28.3%)	Yes (86.9%) Hard to say (9.7%) No (3.4%)	Yes (74.3%) Hard to say (15.6%) No (10.1%)	Yes (78.6%) Hard to say (13.3%) No (8.1%)
How important for you is to make sure Ukraine joins this Federal State?	3.12	4.67	4.35	4.43
If a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO were held next Sunday, how would you vote?	Against accession (35.9%) Hard to say (29.6%) For accession (22.6%)	Against accession (87.4%) Hard to say (5.5%) For accession (3.6%)	Against accession (71.7%) For accession (11.1%) Hard to say (10.0%)	Against accession (77.7%) Hard to say (9.1%) For accession (7.6%)
How important for you is to prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO?	3.41	4.78	4.51	4.57
View of Crimean prospects				
Would you like Crimea to...? • ...secede from Ukraine and become an independent state	No (46.8%) Yes (30.1%) Balance (-16.7%)	No (35.5%) Yes (34.7%) Balance (-0.8%)	No (43.4%) Yes (35.2%) Balance (-8.2%)	No (38.8%) Yes (34.5%) Balance (-4.3%)

- 2 In his question answer variant "yes" is made up of sum of answers "agree" and "most likely agree"; variant "no" – of "do not agree" and "most likely do not agree".
- 3 Here and further on balance is calculated as a difference between the part of those who give an affirmative answer to the question, and part of those who answer negatively.
- 4 In his question answer variant "yes" and "most likely yes"; variant "no" – of "no" and "most likely no".
- 5 This question was answered only by those who would support introduction of the institute of dual citizenship in Ukraine.



	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
What will you do if Crimea secedes from Ukraine and becomes an independent state?	Hard to say (40.3%) Will welcome such decision (28.6%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (15.1%) Will strive for such decision (10.3%)	Hard to say (41.1%) Will welcome such decision (37.8%) Will strive for such decision (9.1%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (8.0%)	Hard to say (34.5%) Will welcome such decision (31.3%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (13.9%) Will strive for such decision (13.1%)	Hard to say (39.3%) Will welcome such decision (34.9%) Will strive for such decision (10.6%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (10.2%)
• ...secedes from Ukraine and joins Russia	No (68.5%) ... Yes (13.8%) Balance (-54.7%)	Yes (75.9%) No (13.6%) Balance (62.3%)	Yes (55.2%) No (29.7%) Balance (25.5%)	Yes (63.8%) No (23.6%) Balance (40.2%)
What will you do if Crimea secedes from Ukraine and joins Russia?	Will peacefully protest against such decision (42.3%) Hard to say (30.0%) Will welcome such decision (14.3%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (6.5%)	Will welcome such decision (53.2%) Will strive for such decision (27.0%) Hard to say (13.7%)	Will welcome such decision (43.1%) Hard to say (20.3%) Will strive for such decision (17.0%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (14.3%)	Will welcome such decision (46.4%) Will strive for such decision (21.8%) ... Will peacefully protest against such decision (10.7%)
• ...secedes from Ukraine and joins Turkey	No (55.3%) Yes (27.7%) Balance (-27.6%)	No (93.1%) ... Yes (2.1%) Balance (-91%)	No (87.2%) ... Yes (5.5%) Balance (-81.7%)	No (87.4%) ... Yes (5.8%) Balance (-81.6%)
What will you do if Crimea secedes from Ukraine and joins Turkey?	Hard to say (33.5%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (31.5%) Will welcome such decision (17.5%) Will strive for such decision (10.4%)	Will peacefully protest against such decision (69.6%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (8.6%) Leave Crimea (6.3%)	Will peacefully protest against such decision (63.9%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (8.6%) Leave Crimea (6.5%)	Will peacefully protest against such decision (63.6%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (8.3%) Leave Crimea (6.1%)



• ... preserves its current status with existing rights and powers	<p>No (53.3%) Yes (28.3%) Balance (-25.0%)</p> <p>Yes (57.6%) No (29.7%) Balance (27.9%)</p>	<p>No (51.5%) ... Yes (17.9%) Balance (-33.6%)</p> <p>Yes (53.0%) No (28.3%) Balance (24.7%)</p>	<p>No (42.7%) ... Yes (27.9%) Balance (-14.8%)</p> <p>Yes (54.7%) No (22.8%) Balance (31.9%)</p>	<p>No (49.1%) ... Yes (21.9%) Balance (-27.2%)</p> <p>Yes (53.8%) No (27.0%) Balance (26.8%)</p>
• ... preserves its current status with expanded rights and powers	<p>No (75.5%) ... Yes (5.9%) Balance (-69.6%)</p> <p>Yes (57.6%) No (29.7%) Balance (27.9%)</p>	<p>No (40.1%) No (33.7%) Balance (6.4%)</p> <p>Yes (40.7%) Yes (32.3%) Balance (-8.4%)</p>	<p>No (40.7%) Yes (32.3%) Balance (-8.4%)</p> <p>Yes (54.7%) No (22.8%) Balance (31.9%)</p>	<p>No (39.4%) Yes (35.1%) Balance (-4.3%)</p> <p>Yes (53.8%) No (27.0%) Balance (26.8%)</p>
• ... becomes Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine	<p>No (75.5%) ... Yes (5.9%) Balance (-69.6%)</p> <p>Yes (57.6%) No (29.7%) Balance (27.9%)</p>	<p>No (40.1%) No (33.7%) Balance (6.4%)</p> <p>Yes (40.7%) Yes (32.3%) Balance (-8.4%)</p>	<p>No (40.7%) Yes (32.3%) Balance (-8.4%)</p> <p>Yes (54.7%) No (22.8%) Balance (31.9%)</p>	<p>No (39.4%) Yes (35.1%) Balance (-4.3%)</p> <p>Yes (53.8%) No (27.0%) Balance (26.8%)</p>
What will you do if Crimea becomes Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine?	<p>Will peacefully protest against such decision (45.5%) Hard to say (30.7%) Will welcome such decision (11.5%) If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (7.3%)</p>	<p>Will welcome such decision (38.9%) Hard to say (32.8%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (15.2%) Will strive for such decision (9.6%)</p>	<p>Will welcome such decision (34.4%) Hard to say (26.9%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (22.0%) Will strive for such decision (9.6%)</p>	<p>Will welcome such decision (35.1%) Hard to say (30.9%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (19.9%) Will strive for such decision (8.7%)</p>
• ... becomes Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine	<p>Yes (49.4%) No (33.9%) Balance (15.5%)</p>	<p>No (91.9%) ... Yes (2.0%) Balance (-89.9%)</p>	<p>No (81.3%) ... Yes (5.8%) Balance (-75.5%)</p>	<p>No (83.1%) ... Yes (7.6%) Balance (-75.5%)</p>
What will you do if Crimea becomes Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine?	<p>Will welcome such decision (43.9%) Hard to say (20.6%) Will strive for such decision (20.1%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (8.8%)</p>	<p>Will peacefully protest against such decision (60.5%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (13.9%) Leave Crimea (5.3%)</p>	<p>Will peacefully protest against such decision (54.8%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (13.2%) Leave Crimea (5.9%) Will welcome such decision (5.5%)</p>	<p>Will peacefully protest against such decision (53.2%) ... If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms (12.8%) Will welcome such decision (6.9%) Leave Crimea (5.6%)</p>
• ... becomes one of the regions/oblasts of Ukraine as it was before 1991	<p>No (68.3%) ... Yes (5.3%) Balance (-63.0%)</p>	<p>No (72.0%) ... Yes (4.8%) Balance (-67.2%)</p>	<p>No (57.2%) ... Yes (13.9%) Balance (-43.3%)</p>	<p>No (67.1%) ... Yes (7.9%) Balance (-59.2%)</p>



	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	Total in Crimea
What will you do if Crimea becomes one of the regions/oblasts of Ukraine as it was before 1991?	Hard to say (45.3%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (38.0%) Will welcome such decision (5.9%) I do not care (5.9%)	Will peacefully protest against such decision (44.3%) Hard to say (41.4%) Will welcome such decision (4.4%) I do not care (3.9%)	Hard to say (39.9%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (32.8%) Will welcome such decision (10.1%) I do not care (6.5%)	Hard to say (39.9%) Will peacefully protest against such decision (32.8%) Will welcome such decision (10.1%) I do not care (6.5%)
How important for you is to make sure that...?				
• Crimea gets greater autonomy from Ukraine	3.78	4.47	4.17	4.31
• Crimea joins Russia	2.44	4.50	3.94	4.15
• Crimea gets full state independence	3.36	3.97	3.66	3.82
Ideological-political orientations				
What ideology corresponds the most to your own convictions?	Islamic (34.4%) I am not familiar with ideological trends (26.8%) Hard to say (13.2%) None (10.8%)	I am not familiar with ideological trends (30.9%) Hard to say (17.8%) None (16.8%) Communist (14.2%)	I am not familiar with ideological trends (29.9%) Hard to say (16.6%) None (14.6%) Communist (9.8%)	I am not familiar with ideological trends (29.9%) Hard to say (16.8%) None (15.6%) Communist (11.7%)
Political (party) orientations				
Which of the following parties (blocs) do you trust the most?	None (29.9%) BYuT (27.4%) Hard to say (15.8%) NUNS (14.2%)	None (29.9%) Party of Regions (29.8%) CPU (11.0%)	Party of Regions (25.8%) None (21.4%) Hard to say (10.6%) CPU (9.7%)	None (27.4%) Party of Regions (26.0%) Hard to say (10.4%) CPU (9.7%)
Public-political orientations				
Which Crimean public organisations do you trust the most?	Crimean Tatar Majlis (41.0%) None (25.1%) Hard to say (19.6%) Public organisation "Azatlyk" (6.8%)	None (37.9%) Hard to say (28.8%) Russian Community of Crimea (18.6%)	None (35.2%) Hard to say (35.0%) Russian Community of Crimea (17.1%)	None (35.7%) Hard to say (28.3%) Russian Community of Crimea (16.6%)

PROSPECTS OF CRIMEA: REGIONAL STATUS

Opinions of Crimeans regarding the desired future for their region are rather controversial and unsteady, which makes them vulnerable to internal and external influences. For instance, the majority of Crimeans would like Crimea to secede from Ukraine and join Russia (63.8%), and at the same time – to preserve its current status, but with expanded powers and rights (53.8%). More than a third (35.1%) would like it to become a Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine; also more than a third (34.5%) – to secede from Ukraine and become an independent state.

As one may see from Diagram “*Would you like Crimea to...?*”, (p.20), such confusion and inconsistency are specific of actually all age, ethnic and confessional groups.

The issue of the desired status of Crimea remains undecided by its residents. In their approaches, Crimeans reveal confusion, as they sometimes support mutually excluding alternatives. For instance, half (50.1%) of all those polled simultaneously chose at least one option presuming secession of Crimea from Ukraine, and one option presuming its further stay within Ukraine. That is, half of Crimeans may, dependent on circumstances, support both secession of Crimea from Ukraine and an opposite scenario.

The share of those ready to personally act for implementation of secessionist options (as well as of any other) does not exceed a quarter of all of those polled (Diagram “*What will you do if Crimea...?*”, p.21).

Secession of Crimea from Ukraine and joining Russia are supported by the overwhelming majority (75.9%) of Russians and a majority (55.2%) of Ukrainians. Among Crimean Tatars, such prospect is supported by only 13.8%, against – 68.5%.

Meanwhile, a third or more representatives of all ethnic groups (35.2% of Ukrainians, 34.7% of Russians, 30.1% of Crimean Tatars) would like Crimea to secede from Ukraine and become an independent state, although it may be assumed that Crimean Tatar idea of the national substance of that state differs from that of Ukrainians and Russians.

32.3% of Ukrainians and 40.1% of Russians would like Crimea to be a Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine. However, this idea is supported by only 5.9% of Crimean Tatars (against – 75.5%). Meanwhile, the idea of Crimea becoming a Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine is supported by 49.4% of Crimean Tatars and only 5.8% of Ukrainians and 2% of Russians. It is opposed by 81.3% of Ukrainians, 91.9 of Russians and 33.9% of Crimean Tatars (the latter figure may prove that many Crimean Tatars understand the impracticability of creation of Crimean Tatar autonomy in Crimea, where they are in minority, while the majority evidently oppose this).


At that, the overwhelming majority (72%) of Russians, a majority (68.3%) of Crimean Tatars and a majority (57.2%) of Ukrainians are against Crimea losing the status of the Autonomous Republic and again becoming a region (*oblast*) of Ukraine.

As regards the possible reaction of Crimeans to one or another option of developments, it may be as follows (verbal readiness for action):


- The strongest rejection is caused by the prospects of Crimea joining Turkey and transformation into a Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine. 8.3% of Crimeans are ready to oppose the former with arms, if they can; 63.6% – to protest peacefully. The latter option may face armed opposition of 12.8%, peaceful protests of 53.2%;
- Annexation of Crimea by Russia may face armed opposition of 6.5% of Crimean Tatars, 42.3% will protest peacefully. Annexation of Crimea by Turkey will prompt peaceful protests of the majority of Ukrainians (63.9%) and Russians (69.6%), but also 31.5% of Crimean Tatars. Meanwhile, 10.4% of Crimean Tatars are ready to act for that, and 17.5% will hail it. Readiness for armed struggle against it was reported by 8.6% of Ukrainians and as many Russians;
- Transformation of Crimea into an independent state would be hailed by 31.3% of Ukrainians, another 13.1% reported readiness to contribute to that personally. Among Russians, such readiness was reported, respectively, by 37.8% and 9.1%, among Crimean Tatars – respectively, 28.6% and 10.3%. 13.9% of Ukrainians, 8.0% of Russians and 15.1% of Crimean Tatars would protest against it peacefully;
- transformation of Crimea into Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine would be hailed by 34.4% of Ukrainians and 38.9% of Russians; respectively, 22% and 15.2% would peacefully protest against it. 45.5% of Crimean Tatars would protest against it peacefully, 7.3% would oppose it with arms, 11.5% would hail it;
- 54.8% of Ukrainians and 60.5% of Russians are ready to peacefully protest against transformation of Crimea into a Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine; 13.2% and 13.9%, respectively, are ready to oppose it with arms. 20.1% of Crimean Tatars, are ready to personally contribute to such change of Crimean status, and 43.9% will hail that decision; 8.8% will peacefully protest against it, 2.4% will oppose it with arms;
- Mass peaceful protests may be expected in case of restoration of the regional (*oblast*) status of Crimea. 40.4% of Crimeans are ready to protest against it. However, only 3.3% will resolve to put up armed resistance. 32.8% of Ukrainians, 44.3% of Russians and 38% of Crimean Tatars will peacefully protest against transformation of Crimea into a region. Meanwhile, 4.9% of Ukrainians would personally contribute to such decision, and 10.1% would hail it. Among Russians and Crimean Tatars, this opinion is far less popular. However, given that 40.8% of those polled remained undecided, it may be said that the reaction of Crimeans to such developments will be uncertain.

“CRIMEAN SEPARATISTS”: STROKES TO THE SOCIAL PORTRAIT

In this survey, the conventional group of “separatists” included the respondents who, when asked about the desired status for Crimea, gave answers envisaging secession of Crimea from Ukraine (Crimea as an independent state, as a part of Russia or Turkey), and



What will you do if Crimea...? % of those polled



		AGE (CRIMEA)					GENDER (CRIMEA)		CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Secedes from Ukraine and becomes an independent state	Will strive for such decision	10.9	10.9	10.6	11.5	9.5	10.7	10.5	8.0	36.0	5.1	11.6	7.7	13.1	9.1	10.3
	Will welcome such decision	36.3	33.2	35.4	35.0	34.0	35.2	34.6	36.5	25.2	26.8	34.4	38.3	31.3	37.8	28.6
	Will peacefully protest against such decision	9.1	11.1	10.6	10.6	10.1	10.8	9.7	6.8	11.9	17.4	11.0	9.1	13.9	8.0	15.1
	If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.3	2.2	1.1	1.4	3.1	0.3	0.0	1.1	0.5	1.8	1.1	0.6
	Leave Crimea	0.3	1.1	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.5	0.9	0.9	0.3	0.0
	I do not care	3.1	3.7	2.8	2.6	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.8	4.5	5.6	2.0	4.0	4.5	2.3	5.1
Secedes from Ukraine and joins Russia	Hard to say	39.6	39.2	38.9	38.4	40.5	38.5	40.2	41.5	21.4	45.1	39.4	39.5	34.5	41.4	40.3
	Will strive for such decision	20.3	21.5	21.9	21.4	23.9	20.8	22.7	23.8	27.4	1.0	28.9	11.4	17.0	27.0	2.9
	Will welcome such decision	44.5	44.1	47.3	49.1	48.0	47.1	46.2	53.5	37.9	8.6	44.5	55.1	43.1	53.2	14.3
	Will peacefully protest against such decision	11.2	13.0	10.0	12.3	8.0	11.8	9.8	3.3	15.8	51.4	9.3	8.5	14.3	4.1	42.3
	If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms	1.0	0.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.1	0.0	0.4	5.8	1.5	0.6	1.2	0.3	6.5
	Leave Crimea	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	1.1	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.0
Secedes from Ukraine and joins Turkey	I do not care	2.6	2.9	1.7	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.0	2.5	5.3	1.4	3.5	3.3	1.6	4.0
	Hard to say	20.2	17.2	17.5	13.6	16.0	16.5	17.4	17.1	14.9	27.9	14.1	20.6	20.3	13.7	30.0
	Will strive for such decision	1.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.3	1.9	1.4	0.5	1.0	9.3	1.5	1.0	1.1	0.4	10.4
	Will welcome such decision	5.6	5.5	4.7	4.5	2.9	5.1	4.1	1.6	6.3	20.4	4.0	4.2	5.2	2.1	17.5
	Will peacefully protest against such decision	59.2	61.2	62.6	67.8	67.4	62.5	64.5	62.3	58.4	30.5	69.0	62.8	63.9	69.6	31.5
	If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms	9.4	8.3	8.8	7.2	7.5	9.5	7.3	7.9	15.0	0.5	9.2	7.7	8.6	8.6	1.4
Becomes Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine	Leave Crimea	6.2	6.6	7.0	5.7	5.1	5.4	6.6	9.5	8.0	0.5	5.7	5.0	6.5	6.3	1.1
	I do not care	2.6	2.4	1.4	1.9	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.2	0.3	4.5	1.1	3.1	2.0	1.5	4.6
	Hard to say	15.9	14.0	13.4	10.9	14.2	13.7	14.0	16.0	11.0	34.3	9.5	16.2	12.7	11.5	33.5
	Will strive for such decision	8.3	7.4	10.2	8.5	9.0	8.8	8.6	10.9	8.4	0.3	10.0	6.5	9.6	9.6	1.0
	Will welcome such decision	33.4	33.3	35.8	37.9	35.5	35.5	34.8	34.9	46.7	6.3	36.2	37.6	34.4	38.9	11.5
	Will peacefully protest against such decision	20.0	20.9	17.3	21.3	20.1	21.4	18.6	11.6	15.8	55.3	19.8	18.6	22.0	15.2	45.5
Becomes Crimean Tatar national autonomy as a part of Ukraine	If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms	1.6	2.2	2.4	2.1	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.0	2.5	6.5	2.0	1.1	1.9	0.8	7.3
	Leave Crimea	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.0	0.5	0.9	1.2	0.3	0.0
	I do not care	3.3	3.8	2.3	2.4	2.9	3.0	2.9	4.2	1.8	3.8	1.7	4.3	4.0	2.4	4.0
	Hard to say	32.6	32.0	31.7	27.1	30.6	28.7	32.8	36.9	24.1	27.8	29.8	31.0	26.9	32.8	30.7
	Will strive for such decision	2.7	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.5	3.2	2.1	0.5	1.7	21.2	1.8	1.6	1.1	0.4	20.1
	Will welcome such decision	8.0	8.2	7.7	7.2	4.0	7.9	6.0	2.6	2.8	51.1	4.3	5.6	5.5	1.9	43.9
Becomes one of the regions/oblasts of Ukraine as it was before 1991	Will peacefully protest against such decision	49.0	52.7	52.7	56.2	56.1	51.9	54.3	57.5	42.5	5.3	55.6	58.3	54.8	60.5	8.8
	If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms	13.1	11.8	13.6	11.9	13.0	13.9	11.9	10.9	27.2	0.0	15.6	9.6	13.2	13.9	2.4
	Leave Crimea	6.6	5.4	6.4	5.5	4.0	5.0	6.0	7.3	10.5	0.5	5.2	5.2	5.9	5.3	1.3
	I do not care	2.8	2.5	1.4	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.4	2.9	1.7	2.5	1.4	3.2	3.0	1.6	2.9
	Hard to say	17.8	16.4	15.6	14.5	18.5	16.2	17.3	18.3	13.6	19.4	16.1	16.5	16.5	16.4	20.6
	Will strive for such decision	2.7	2.6	2.2	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.6	21.0	0.3	1.8	1.8	4.9	1.6	0.6
	Will welcome such decision	4.8	6.7	7.0	6.9	6.4	5.8	6.6	6.7	16.4	4.5	5.5	6.2	10.1	4.4	5.9
	Will peacefully protest against such decision	40.6	37.6	39.9	42.7	40.6	41.5	39.4	45.9	17.8	46.4	42.7	34.0	32.8	44.3	38.0
	If I have an opportunity, I will fight against such decision with arms	3.9	2.9	3.2	2.8	3.6	3.6	3.1	1.4	2.1	0.0	5.2	2.3	3.8	3.2	2.1
	Leave Crimea	1.1	2.6	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	0.8	0.7	1.8	2.1	1.3	2.0	1.2	2.2
	I do not care	5.7	5.7	4.3	4.5	4.2	4.4	5.2	4.7	7.0	4.8	3.4	7.5	6.5	3.9	5.9
	Hard to say	41.2	41.9	41.6	38.8	40.9	40.5	41.5	37.9	35.0	42.2	39.3	46.9	39.9	41.4	45.3

did not support different options of Crimea staying a part of Ukraine (preservation of the current status, an autonomous republic with expanded powers, a Russian or Crimean Tatar national autonomy or one of Ukrainian regions). Such respondents made 23% of all those polled¹.

The overwhelming majority of representatives of that group wish Crimea to be part of Russia (88.1%), 39% would also support the status of an independent Crimean state. At that, 30.1% support both options at a time, which may witness that they tend to see the status of an independent state mainly as an “intermediate stage” before joining Russia. Only 5% of “separatists” want Crimea to join Turkey. Only 1.8% simultaneously supported independence of Crimea and joining Turkey.

Although the overwhelming majority of “separatists” want Crimea to join Russia, only 24.3% reported readiness to do something for that. That is, **“separatist” political preferences normally do not involve the resolve to take active political steps**. Furthermore, “separatists” see it extremely urgent to avoid “Crimea becoming a zone of an armed conflict” (4.89 points on a five-point scale), and to “guarantee inter-ethnic peace in Crimea” (4.85).

The attitude of “separatists” to the Ukrainian authorities is even worse than among Crimean residents as a whole. For instance, 93.8% of “separatists” “most likely” or totally disapprove the activity of the President of Ukraine (among all Crimeans – 87.6%), the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (respectively, 89.4% and 82.7%), the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (respectively, 87.9% and 81.8%). They also reported lower support than all Crimeans for Crimean authorities: the activity of the Verkhovna Rada of the autonomy is “most likely” or totally disapproved by, respectively, 73.2% and 63%, of the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea – respectively, 77.5% and 66.2%.

The consciousness of some representatives of that group bears traits of “ideological ambivalence”: 16% of its representatives called themselves patriots of Ukraine, 25.1% see Ukraine as their Motherland. Those who do not consider Ukraine their Motherland are only in a relative majority – 48.4% (the rest could not answer the question).

Regarding their views of Crimean socio-economic problems, **representatives of that group somewhat more often mentioned “ethnically sensitive” problems** (such as the impracticability of getting education in the native language – 24.5%, against 15.5% for Crimea as a whole). The problem of restriction of the Russian language use was called extremely urgent, respectively, by 61.6% and 48.2%. Representatives of that group more often report that their cultural needs are not satisfied: for instance, to watch TV programmes in the native language (“rather” or entirely not met – 76%, among all Crimeans – 62.3%); to get education in the mother language (respectively, 52.3% and 43.5%).

Although “separatists” statistically more often than all residents of Crimea noted problems in inter-ethnic relations (respectively, 18.4% and 15.4% reported the existence of rather

acute problems in relations among different ethnic groups), numerically, the difference is not big enough to say that their assessment of the state of inter-ethnic relations might be the factor inspiring separatist spirits. The share of those who believe that Crimea may witness an acute inter-ethnic conflict in that group is lower than among all those polled (respectively, 20.7% and 24.4%). Similarly, fewer people there encountered cases of ethnic discrimination at employment or study (respectively, 7.1% and 11.1%).

There is a notable “cultural distance” between that group and representatives of Ukraine’s regions. This primarily refers to the Western regions – the average mark of assessment of cultural kinship with their residents is only 3.33 – much lower than for the whole array (4.18 points).

By political sympathies, representatives of that group little differ from the rest of the autonomy residents – they more trust the Party of Regions (27%) and CPU (11.4%), among public organisations – the Russian Community of Crimea (13.7%).

“Separatists” produced a higher than Crimean population in general share of ethnic Russians (respectively, 60.1% and 70.8%), while the shares of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars were lower (Ukrainians, respectively, 24.9% and 19.6%; Crimean Tatars – respectively, 9.1% and 4.8%).

Although 19.6% of “separatists” claimed to be Ukrainians, only 1.5% associated themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition (8.6% in the whole array). The overwhelming majority of them reported the Russian cultural tradition (higher than among all residents of Crimea – respectively, 67.7% and 55.5%). Only 2.8% associated with Crimean Tatar cultural tradition (in the whole of Crimea – 8.3%). **One should also note the very little share of followers of the Soviet cultural tradition among “separatists”** (only 2%, while among all Crimeans – 14.6%). This may witness that “Soviet” socio-cultural stereotypes hardly go together with “secessionist” political ideas.

Command of the Ukrainian language among “separatists” is much worse than among Crimean population in general – 62.6% of the former either do not know that language at all, or only understand but cannot speak it, while among Crimeans in general – 43.4%.

By confessional affiliation, “separatists” have a higher share of UOC believers than Crimean population in general (respectively, 27.7% and 18.7%).

It may be stated therefore that on one hand, the group of people with separatist ideas in Crimea is numerous enough to influence the socio-political life of the autonomy. On the other, secessionist spirits of the overwhelming majority of representatives of that group do not involve the resolve or readiness to act for the attainment of their goals.

Ideologically, separatism in Crimea mainly rests on the ideas of reunification of Crimea with Russia. Meanwhile, secessionist spirits do not seem to be motivated by the danger of inter-ethnic conflicts or ethnic discrimination.

¹ By age, sex, education, “separatists” do not differ from the rest of Crimeans. They, however, produced a higher share of city residents (respectively, 67.5% and 62.1%).

2. INTER-ETHNIC AND INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS IN CRIMEA

The state of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations is among the key factors that shape the socio-political situation in the autonomy, and exactly those sectors saw alarming trends in 2005-2008. That is why it is interesting to outline the main features of inter-ethnic relations, the degree of cultural and social kinship or estrangement of the dominant national and ethnic groups, the level of their religious tolerance, and specificities of their understanding of each other's problems, readiness to cooperate in their solution.

Impartial assessment of the situation that arose in relations between ethnic groups in the autonomy also requires consideration of the common and different in their representatives' views of specific aspects of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional problems, assessments of the probability and possible reasons of inter-ethnic conflicts.

This section briefly describes inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The analysis gives grounds for the conclusions of rather a strong estrangement between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities and higher probability of aggravation of inter-ethnic relations, compared to inter-confessional.

Summary results of the poll are presented in Table "Specificities of assessments of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations and risks of conflicts" (p.30).

2.1. INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN TERMS OF CULTURAL SIMILARITY AND SOCIAL (ETHNIC) DISTANCE

Some idea of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy can be produced on the basis of, *first*, self-assessments by representatives of national and ethnic groups of cultural similarity with residents of other regions of Ukraine and neighbouring (referent) countries¹, *second* – measurement of their distance from representatives of other ethnoses and residents of other regions (countries) on the E.Bogardus social distance scale². Summary data of said self-assessments and distances are presented on Diagrams "Cultural similarity of Crimea's ethnic groups to the inhabitants of the regions of Ukraine and referent countries" and "Level of social distance (on E.Bogardus scale)" (p.24).

Cultural similarity. First of all, it should be noted that a high level of cultural similarity with Russia is reported not only by ethnic Russians but also by Ukrainians. At that, their similarity with Russia is more manifest than with Ukraine (although assessments of the degree of similarity with residents of those two countries among Ukrainians differ much less than among Russians). This may be owed to the domination of the Russian (and/or Russian-language) culture in Crimea.

The self-assessment of cultural similarity of Crimean Tatars with Russia is notably lower than of Russians and Ukrainians; they also lower assess their cultural similarity with Ukraine, although the index of similarity with Ukraine among Crimean Tatars is higher than with Russia.

Regarding the self-assessment of cultural similarity with residents of different regions of Ukraine, representatives

of all national and ethnic groups consider residents of Southern regions of Ukraine to be the most similar to them, residents of Western regions – the least similar. Here, the following should be noted:

- Russians more than others differentiate their attitude to residents of different regions of Ukraine. While they assess similarity with residents of Southern regions at 8.01 points, on the average, similarity with residents of Western regions is assessed at only 3.74. At that, they assess their similarity with residents of Eastern regions higher than Ukrainians;
- assessments of Ukrainians are less "polar" by region; this even more refers to Crimean Tatars, who, for instance, assess their similarity with residents of Southern regions lower than Russians, but higher assess their similarity with residents of Western regions³.

Self-assessments of cultural similarity with the EU countries are low. This is especially true for Russians who assess that similarity at 3.66 points (Crimean Tatars – 4.66, Ukrainians – 4.74). Self-assessment of cultural similarity with Turks by representatives of ethnic groups differ fundamentally – for Crimean Tatars, residents of that country are as similar as of Ukraine, while Ukrainians assess that similarity at only 2.17 points, Russians – at 1.34.

Social (national) distance. By and large, among all those polled, the smallest social distance was reported for the groups "Russians inhabiting Crimea" (2.31 points) and "Ukrainians inhabiting Crimea" (2.61), the largest social distance – for Gypsies (5.88), Americans (5.78), Turks (5.52) and Georgians (5.38).





¹ Marks were put on a 11-point scale from 0 to 10, where "0" meant that residents of a certain region or country had nothing in common with the respondent in character, habits, traditions, "10" – that residents of the region or country utmost resemble the respondent in character, habits, traditions.

² The scale tested and modified in Ukraine by N.Panina has the following values: "1" – ready to accept representatives of some groups as family members, "2" – as close friends, "3" – as neighbours, "4" – as work colleagues, "5" – as inhabitants of Crimean, "6" – as visitors of Crimea, "7" – would not even let them in Crimea. Higher scale values correspond to the greater social distance from a certain group.

³ This may witness the influence of the political factor on the assessment of cultural similarity, namely, a stock association of Western regions of Ukraine with a "nationalist" political course prompting Russians to report a large cultural distance from its residents.







Cultural similarity of Crimea's ethnic groups to the inhabitants of the regions of Ukraine and referent countries*, average mark



* On a ten-point scale where "0" means that inhabitants of the given region (country) do not have anything in common in character, habits, traditions, and "10" – inhabitants of the given region (country) are the most similar in character, habits, traditions.

Level of social distance (on E.Bogardus scale)*, average mark



* On E.Bogardus social distance scale (approved and modified in Ukraine by N.V.Panina). Maximum value (7 points) corresponds to the maximum distance from representatives of a certain group, minimum value (1 point) – minimum distance.



Social distance between representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian communities in the autonomy is very small. For instance, for Ukrainians assessing Russians living in Crimea, its value equals 2.30 points, for Russians assessing Ukrainians living in Crimea – 2.53. Meanwhile, the distance of representatives of those two ethnic groups from Crimean Tatars is notably larger: of Ukrainians – 4.39, of Russians – 4.62 points.

At that, Crimean Tatars feel less remote from Ukrainians and Russians living in Crimea – respectively, 3.70 and 3.66 points⁴.

Gender specificities. Women tend to assess their cultural similarity with residents of Ukraine and Russia higher than men, and of Turkey – lower. This may be attributed, in particular, to differences in the ethnic structure of gender groups – among the polled women, there are fewer representatives of Crimean Tatar than among men, while ethnic Ukrainian and Russian women respectively make a greater share⁵.

Age differences. In all age groups, cultural similarity with Russia is described as the strongest (stronger than with Ukraine). But with the respondent age going down, there is a trend towards a lower assessment of cultural similarity with Russia and higher assessment of cultural similarity with the EU countries and Turkey (although, given the low values of the two latter assessments, it would be more accurate to speak about a decrease of the cultural distance from the EU countries and Turkey).

Assessments of the level of the social distance on the Bogardus scale reflect differences in the ethnic composition of age groups (the share of Crimean Tatars is higher in younger groups, of Russians – in elder ones). So, for instance, the indices of social distance for Russians and Ukrainians are the lowest in the eldest age group, for Turks – in the youngest).

The survey results prompt the conclusion that the Russian and Ukrainian communities in Crimea see each other as culturally similar. At that, not only Russians, but also Ukrainians report a higher assessment of cultural similarity with Russia than with Ukraine, which may be attributed to the domination of the Russian and/or Russian-language culture in Crimea.

The assessment of cultural similarity of Crimean Tatars with Russia is notably lower than of Russians and Ukrainians; they also lower assess their cultural similarity with Ukraine, although the index of similarity with Ukraine among Crimean Tatars is higher than with Russia, and equals the self-assessment of cultural similarity with Turkey.

Russians more than representatives of the other two ethnoses differentiate the assessment of their cultural similarity with residents of different regions of Ukraine.

Proceeding from the survey results, it may be assumed that the assessment of cultural similarity is influenced by the political factor, namely – stereotyped association of regions with political forces (since, as we know, there are serious differences in political sympathies of residents of different regions in Ukraine), that is, self-assessment of the cultural distance may reflect the “political distance”.

The social distance between Ukrainians and Russians is very small, while the distance of representatives of those two ethnic groups from Crimean Tatars is much

bigger (it is greater than Crimean Tatars distance themselves from Ukrainians and Russians living in the autonomy). This proves the estrangement between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar population of the autonomy.

As shown below, such estrangement is also demonstrated by the perceptions and assessments of problems of Crimean Tatars (and other repatriates) by the Slavic community, assessments of satisfaction of the rights and needs of different national and language groups, etc.

2.2. GUARANTEE OF RIGHTS OF ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE GROUPS

In polyethnic societies (states), guarantee of rights of ethnic groups and, the main thing, the assessment of their satisfaction by representatives of ethnic (language) groups themselves present an important factor of inter-ethnic relations and the attitude of those groups to the state authorities.

The basic rights (and needs) of ethnic and/or language groups in the first place include the right to education, information and communication in the native language, preservation and development of the national culture. Exercise of those rights conditions and guarantees preservation of ethnic identity of the concerned group and each of its representatives.

Guarantee of rights and national and cultural needs of ethnic and language groups

Analysis of the poll results dealing with the issues of guarantee of rights of ethnic and language groups in Crimea reveals substantial differences in assessments by representatives of ethnic (language) groups of the exercise of their rights and the rights of other ethnic (language) groups. The most critical assessments of the satisfaction of their rights and needs were reported by Russians (Russian-speakers) and Crimean Tatars.

General assessments. If one follows the opinion of Crimeans in general, he/she will come to the conclusion that the rights of Crimean Tatars are secured better, of the Russian-speaking population – worst of all. Meanwhile, if we take a look at the opinions in ethnic and language groups, it appears that representatives of each of them assess protection of the rights of another group higher than of their own. The greatest differences are observed in assessments produced by Russian-speakers and Ukrainian-speakers, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars, on the other.

For instance, the index of guarantee of the rights of Crimean Tatars in the eyes of all Crimeans equals 0.74 (in that, in the eyes of Russians – 0.79, Ukrainians – 0.78), and in the eyes of Crimean Tatars themselves – only 0.34⁶.

On the other hand, the index of guarantee of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the eyes of all Crimeans equals only 0.49 (there, Russians – 0.44, Ukrainians – 0.54), in the eyes of Crimean Tatars – 0.71.

So, each ethnic group believes that the rights of others are guaranteed better than its own. But while the opinions of Ukrainians and Russians on the issue differ insignificantly, their assessments of protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars strikingly differ from the assessments given by Crimean Tatars themselves. Such situation may be viewed as a sign of the

⁴ As regards other deported peoples, representatives of all the three mentioned ethnoses reported rather a large social distance: Ukrainians – 4.60 points, Russians – 4.62, Crimean Tatars – 4.20 points.

⁵ Such sample structure reflects the actual ethnic structure of gender groups in Crimea. According to the 2001 census, among Crimean women, the share of Crimean Tatars is somewhat lower than among men.

⁶ The index of guarantee of rights may range from “1” to “0”, where “1” means that rights are fully guaranteed, “0” – not guaranteed at all.

above-mentioned estrangement and kind of “national deafness” of the Slavic population to the needs of Crimean Tatars.

Education and information in the native language. The survey results let assume that Crimeans in general and each ethnic group in particular experience no major problems with satisfaction of their need to read books and get information from printed media (read newspapers and magazines) – the majority or overwhelming majority of representatives of said groups consider that need to be satisfied⁷.

Problems are reported in the fields of education, getting information from electronic media (TV, radio) and demonstration of movies in cinema theatres.

For instance, the opinions of Crimeans about education in the native language split almost equally: 43.5% believe that need to be not satisfied; 41.2% stick to the opposite opinion. At that, Ukrainians tend to believe that their needs in that domain are satisfied (48.6%, against 39.6% of those thinking otherwise), while Russians and Crimean Tatars stick to the opposite opinion. The ratio of those who suggest that need not to be satisfied, and those who stick to the opposite opinion, among Russians makes 45.2% : 36.7%; among Crimean Tatars – 49.6% : 40.4%.

Regarding electronic media and feature films, the majority of Crimeans cannot satisfy their needs for TV programmes (63.3%), movies (52.6%), and radio (51.2%). In this respect, the greatest dissatisfaction is reported by Russians⁸.

It should be added that despite rather critical assessment of satisfaction of the needs for education and information in the native language, problems related with satisfaction of national and cultural needs did not top the overall list of problems seen as the most urgent and critical by Crimeans. For instance, impracticability of study in the native language was described as an urgent and critical problem by 15.5% of Crimeans, including 14.3% of Ukrainians, 16.6% of Russians, and 13.6% of Crimean Tatars. Absence of opportunities for the development of the national culture was noted by 8.4% of Crimeans: 8.5% of Ukrainians, 6.9% of Russians, and by 18.1% of Crimean Tatars.

Age differences. Younger respondents somewhat higher assess satisfaction of their cultural and information needs, compared to representatives of elder age groups.

2.3. PROBLEMS IN INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS, REASONS AND PROBABILITY OF INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Interesting for impartial assessment of the state of inter-ethnic relations in Crimea are the assessments of Crimeans themselves concerning the presence/absence of problems in those relations, their tensivity, presence/absence of discrimination on national and ethnic grounds, as well as the attitude of Crimeans (including the Slavic community) to the problems of repatriates.

It should also be found out how Crimeans in general and representatives of ethnic groups in particular assess the reasons for inter-ethnic conflicts and the probability of occurrence of an acute ethnic conflict in the nearest future.

Problems in inter-ethnic relations

General assessments. The majority of all Crimeans and representatives of each national group admit the existence of some problems in inter-ethnic relations in Crimea. They were admitted by 62.9%⁹ of Crimeans – only 23% reported that such problems did not exist.

Representatives of different national and ethnic groups differently assess the existence of problems. Fewer problems are reported by Ukrainians (57.2%), while among Crimean Tatars and Russians, they were reported by roughly equal shares of those polled – more than 65% in each group, the only difference lying in the assessment of the acuteness of problems (“some”/“pretty acute”)¹⁰. Among Russians, comparatively fewer people see no problems in inter-ethnic relations – (20.6%), among Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars their shares make about a quarter of the polled¹¹.

Tension in inter-ethnic relations. Admitting the existence of problems, Crimeans at the same time rather modestly assess the level of tensivity in relations between concrete ethnic groups. According to their assessments, relations between Russians and Ukrainians are the least tense, actually normal (average mark on a five-point scale – 1.70), more tense – between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (2.60), still more tense – between Russians and Crimean Tatars (2.77, in the eyes of UOC believers – 3.05).

By and large, this opinion is shared by Ukrainians and Russians. Crimean Tatars describe the relations between them, on one hand, and Ukrainians and Russians – on the other, as less tense, compared to the assessments made by Ukrainians and Russians.

Also interestingly, in the overall list of problems seen as the most urgent and critical, Crimeans did not prioritise the problems of inter-ethnic relations. Tension in inter-ethnic relations was noted as a topical problem important for Crimea by only 16.4% of Crimeans, namely: 17.3% of Russians, 15.5% of Ukrainians and 14.6% of Crimean Tatars. The index of urgency of that problem generally equals 0.44. Crimean Tatars put it as follows – 0.47; Ukrainians and Russians – 0.44 and 0.43, respectively¹². It should be added that the urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic relations is assessed by Crimeans and representatives of each ethnic groups higher than of the problem of tension in inter-confessional relations.

Ethnic discrimination. The overwhelming majority (77.1%) of Crimeans did not encounter cases of ethnic discrimination at employment and/or educational establishments, only 11.1% encountered them.

However, data of cases of ethnic discrimination differ substantially.

For instance, cases of discrimination were not encountered by the overwhelming majority (81.3%) of Russians (against 7.1% of those who encountered such facts) and a bit fewer but also the overwhelming majority (77.5%) of Ukrainians (against 9.8%).

Among Crimean Tatars, the picture is entirely different: the share of those who encountered cases of ethnic discrimination – 36.5% – more than three times exceeds Crimean average, is almost four times higher than for Ukrainians, and more than five times higher than

⁷ In his question answer variant “satisfied” is made up of sum of answers “fully satisfied” and “most likely satisfied”; variant “unsatisfied” – of “unsatisfied” and “most likely unsatisfied”.

⁸ The majority or relative majority is not satisfied with their ability to watch TV programmes (Ukrainians – 50%, Russians – 71.0%, Crimean Tatars – 53.1%) and movies in cinema theatres in the native language (Ukrainians – 47.9%, Russians – 56.5%, Crimean Tatars – 42.6%).

⁹ “Some problems” – 47.5%, “pretty acute” – 15.4%.

¹⁰ 40.6% of Ukrainians admits the existence of “some” problems, 16.6% – of “pretty acute” ones; among Russians, respectively – 49.3% and 16.1%; among Crimean Tatars, respectively – 57.0% and 8.1%.

¹¹ Among Ukrainians – 26.9%, among Crimean Tatars – 25.4%.

¹² The index of urgency of a problem may range from “0” to “1”, where “1” means the highest urgency of the problem, “0” – total absence of such problem.



for Russians. Meanwhile, among Crimean Tatars, one and half times fewer people did not encounter cases of discrimination (52.4%).

Similarly big differences are observed in the opinions of representatives of ethnic groups about discrimination of Crimean Tatars and other repatriates in Crimea.

The majority (56.5%) of Crimeans are sure that such problem does not exist in Crimea. Almost 30% admits separate cases¹³. Existence of discrimination as a phenomenon (i.e., its regular occurrence in most sectors of public life) is admitted by only 5% of Crimeans.

The opinions of Ukrainians on that issue are generally the same as of all Crimeans¹⁴. Among Russians, the ratio changes towards an increase in the number of those who entirely deny discrimination (65.2%), and a decrease in the number of those who admit separate cases (24.3%). Existence of discrimination as a phenomenon is admitted by only 1.6% of Russians.

The opinions of Crimean Tatars fundamentally differ from those of Ukrainians and Russians. Only 13.4% of them believe in the absence of discrimination. The majority (58.5%) admit separate cases, another 23.8% are sure that it exists as a phenomenon.

So, the number of people convinced in the existence of discrimination of repatriates as a phenomenon in Crimea among Crimean Tatars almost five times exceeds Crimean average, more than four times – among Ukrainians, and almost 15 times – among Russians.

The trustworthiness of the opinion of existence of discrimination as a phenomenon in Crimea is indirectly proven by the fact that it was reported mainly by those who personally encountered cases of ethnic discrimination. Say, among Crimean Tatars who admitted the phenomenon of discrimination, 63% personally encountered such cases (against a third of those who did not).

The general Crimean indices are similar: among Crimeans admitting the existence of discrimination as a phenomenon, 61.6% of those polled personally encountered cases of discrimination (against 32.9%), while among those who denied discrimination, only 2.6% personally encountered its manifestations (against 87.8%)¹⁵.

It may be assumed therefore that cases of discrimination of repatriates in Crimea get little attention and no public condemnation. On the contrary, there is an impression that members of the Ukrainian and Russian communities do not wish to see those cases, being another sign of the estrangement between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities in Crimea.

Attitude to problems of repatriates. The list of material problems critical for repatriates is topped by those of jobs, housing, land plots, of political problems – sufficient representation in the authorities of the autonomy and local administrative bodies. However, general assessments of the importance and urgency of those problems for Crimea by representatives of different ethnic groups strikingly differ, proving the above assumption of “ethnic deafness” of Crimean Slavic community.

For instance, the problems of provision of repatriates with jobs, housing, land plots worry 54.7% of Crimean Tatars – and only 10.4% of Ukrainians and 6.4% of Russians.

The urgency and importance of the problem of insufficient representation of previously deported peoples in the authorities the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and local authorities was noted by 49.8% of Crimean Tatars – and only by 6.2% of Ukrainians and 3.6% of Russians.

Especially different are the opinions of representatives of ethnic groups about the main political goals of Crimean Tatars. Say, the overwhelming majority (77.6%) of the Tatars seek the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine for Crimean Tatar nation. However, this wish is supported by only 16.2% of Crimeans, 62.2% is against such status. So, opponents of the status prevail both among Russians (70.3%) and among Ukrainians (60.9%).

Aspiration for official recognition of the Crimean Tatar Majlis as a fully legitimate representative body of Crimean Tatars by the Ukrainian state is shared by 77% of representatives of that ethnic group – and only by 16.5% of Crimeans (against – 52.7%). Opponents of official recognition of the Majlis make 62.4% of Russians, and 48.2% of Ukrainians.

So, Russians demonstrate somewhat higher, compared to Ukrainians, rejection of political aspirations of Crimean Tatars. Meanwhile, both Russians and Ukrainians reported actually equal low understanding of the material problems of repatriates and interest in their solution.

Gender specificities. Women more critically assess satisfaction of rights of the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, while the assessments of satisfaction of rights of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians show no differences on gender grounds. Women less tend to admit discrimination of Crimean Tatars and other deported peoples, they more often object to the prospects of granting Crimean Tatars the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine and official recognition of the Crimean Tatar Majlis (the latter may also be attributed to the above-mentioned differences in the ethnic structure of gender groups).

Inter-ethnic conflicts: reasons and probability

Reasons of inter-ethnic conflicts. The poll results show that Crimeans tend to rest responsibility for inter-ethnic conflicts in the autonomy mainly on the central authorities: a relative majority (44.4%) see the main reason for conflicts in their incompetence or evil intent, that is, in the purposeful support of inter-ethnic tension in Crimea¹⁶.

Far fewer people see the reason for conflicts in socio-economic, political and cultural inequality of national and ethnic groups (15%).

Still fewer (13.2%) people see the main reason for conflicts in incompetence or evil intent of Crimean authorities. And only one in ten Crimeans attributes conflicts to provocative actions and statements of Crimean ethnic public organisations, republican branches of political parties, and politicians.

Opinions of representatives of all ethnic groups very much resemble Crimean average – with the exception that Crimean Tatars less tend to rest responsibility for conflicts on the central authorities, and more – on local. Crimean Tatars also pay more attention to the socio-economic, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups.

¹³ In this subsection, the answer “cases of discrimination” is the aggregate of answers “rarely occurs” and “exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres”.

¹⁴ 54.1% see no discrimination, 30.8% admit its separate cases, 5.6% admit it as a phenomenon.

¹⁵ Among those who believe that discrimination exists but occurs from time to time in certain spheres, cases of discrimination were encountered by almost three times fewer people – 23%, not encountered – by 65.4%. Among those who believe that discrimination occurs rarely, 9.5% encountered it, 75.6% did not.

¹⁶ Incompetence of the authorities – 25.8%, purposeful support for inter-ethnic tension in the Crimea – 18.6%.

Common for all ethnic groups, in each of them only a small minority (3-4%) see the reason for conflicts in provocative actions and statements of foreign state structures, representatives of the authorities, and politicians.

So, the majority of Crimeans, as well as in each of the main ethnic groups, see more or less acute problems in inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy. Only a minority – nearly a quarter – are sure of the opposite. The level of tension in inter-ethnic relations is generally described as not too high, although it is admitted that in relations between Russians and Crimean Tatars and between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars it is higher than in relations between Ukrainians and Russians.

Crimeans rest responsibility for inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea mainly on the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities; few residents of Crimea attribute those conflicts to outside influences.

Probability of a serious inter-ethnic conflict. Given evident differences in the views of representatives of the Slavic and Crimean Tatar population of the autonomy (especially regarding discrimination on ethnic grounds and political aspirations of Crimean Tatars), and rather poor social kinship between Ukrainians and Russians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other, a lawful question arises: can tension in inter-ethnic relations and estrangement between said national and ethnic groups make the basis for an inter-ethnic conflict?

Crimeans have no definite answer to this question: almost a quarter (24.4%) of them consider such conflict possible. The other opinions split almost equally: 37.9% called a conflict impossible; 37.7% remained undecided.

The breakdown of opinions in each ethnic group is similar to Crimean average.

Probability of a conflict is admitted:

- among those who reported “pretty acute problems” in inter-ethnic relations – by 38.9%, against 8.7% sticking to the opposite opinion (the rest remained undecided);
- among those who reported “some problems” – by 28% against 35.6%;
- among those denying any problems – by 13.4% against 63.6%.

Crimeans who believe in the likeliness of such conflict in the near future mainly suggest that its parties may be Russians and Ukrainians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (46.5%)¹⁷; least of all they agree that those parties may be Russians and Crimean Tatars, on one hand, and Ukrainians – on the other (1.9%).

The breakdown of opinions on this matter among all ethnic groups is actually the same as Crimean, with two exceptions: much fewer Crimean Tatars (29.3%) see the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities as the parties to a hypothetical conflict, while more Crimean Tatars admit a conflict between Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, and between Russians and Ukrainians.

Gender specificities. Women less tend to believe in an inter-ethnic conflict between Ukrainians and

Russians, and more – between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic community of the autonomy (72.7% of the women admitting the probability of a conflict suggest that it may arise primarily between Crimean Tatars and the Slavic population (either with the Ukrainian and Russian communities at a time, or only with Ukrainians or with Russians), while among men, this opinion is shared by 65.1%. Men and women showed actually no differences in assessments of the reasons for inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea.

By and large, it should be noted that among all Crimeans and representatives of each ethnic group, quite many (nearly or more than a third) could not give a definite answer, which witnesses to the hesitation and uncertainty of the public opinion regarding the stability of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy.

On the other hand, the breakdown of opinions about the parties to a hypothetical conflict may once again prove the “national deafness” of the Slavic community to the problems of Crimean Tatars and repatriates in general. In reality, that community is well aware of the actual social, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups in Crimea, but this awareness takes forms not of support for fair and lawful aspirations of repatriates, but of fears of a conflict caused by such inequality.

2.4. INTER-CONFESSIONAL RELATIONS

Inter-confessional relations greatly depend on satisfaction of religious needs of believers and mutual attitude of confessional and/or church communities (religious tolerance of communities and believers). So, to describe them, we should cite the relevant assessments and self-assessments of Crimeans, and since there were cases of inter-confessional confrontation in 2000s – assessments of the reasons for conflicts and opinions of actors responsible for such conflicts.

Satisfaction of religious needs. According to the survey results, all Crimeans and representatives of all main ethnic and confessional groups rather highly assess satisfaction of their religious needs – all average marks on a five-point scale were above 4: among Crimeans in general – 4.31; among Russians – 4.35; Ukrainians – 4.29; Crimean Tatars – 4.26.

At that, assessments given by UOC and UOC-KP believers are higher than by all Crimeans and by each ethnic group (average marks, respectively – 4.55 and 4.49).

Attitude to religious organisations of different faiths. The majority (61.3%) of faithful Crimeans treat religious organisations of different faiths positively (29.5%) or tolerate them (31.7%). 29.1% are indifferent to them. A negative attitude was reported by a small share (3.4%) of those polled.

The breakdown of opinions among faithful Ukrainians and Russians is similar to the Crimeans'. Specific of the breakdown of opinions among Crimean Tatars is the lower percentage of those indifferent (17.1%) and somewhat higher – of those who disapprove organisations of different faiths (8.2%).

¹⁷ Noteworthy, Crimeans admitting the possibility of a conflict between the Slavic and Crimean Tatar communities tend to believe that the main reason for inter-ethnic conflicts in the Crimea lies in social, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups.



The percentage of those who positively or tolerably treat religious organisations representing another faith prevails among all three key confessional groups – UOC, UOC-KP and Muslims¹⁸.

Meanwhile, Muslims are less indifferent to religious organisations of different faiths than the Orthodox (14.4%), while more of them treat those organisations negatively or oppose them (10.1%).

Reasons for inter-confessional conflicts. The majority of Crimeans see the main reasons for inter-confessional conflicts beyond religion, first of all – in introduction of political and ethnic contradictions to the sphere of religion (26.2%) and in clashes of economic interests of different ethnic groups using religious slogans as a cover (25.2%). Meanwhile, 10.3% see the reason of conflicts in religious fanaticism, intolerance of believers, 8.5% – in selective, prejudiced attitude of the authorities to different religious organisations, as a result of which, their constitutional rights are not evenly protected. Quite many (29.3%) could not answer the question.

Opinions of representatives of ethnic groups are similar. One small difference is that among Crimean Tatars, compared to other ethnic groups, somewhat fewer people see the main reason for conflicts in the clashes of economic interests of ethnic groups, and somewhat more referred to introduction of political and ethnic contradictions to the sphere of religion.

In each confessional group, the majority also believe that the main reasons for inter-confessional conflicts lie beyond religion. However, among UOC believers and Muslims, twice more people see the main reason for conflicts in politicisation of the religious sector than among believers of UOC-KP (respectively, 32% and 32.7%, against 16.1%).

Meanwhile, believers of UOC-KP more tend to see the main reason for conflicts in clashes of economic interests of ethnic groups (30.8%); among the believers of UOC, this opinion is shared by 27.1%, among Muslims – 18.8%.

The breakdown of answers of Crimeans to the question about the main reason for inter-confessional conflicts, dependent on their attitude to religious organisations of different faiths, is of interest.

For instance, among those who attribute said conflicts to introduction of political and ethnic contradictions to the sphere of religion or selective, prejudiced attitude of the authorities to different religious organisations, the relative majority tolerate religious organisations of different faiths; a positive attitude was second in both categories.

Among those who attribute inter-confessional conflicts to clashes of economic interests of different ethnic groups using religious slogans as a cover, actually equal shares treat positively (25.7%) or tolerate (24.1%) adherents of different faiths.

Among those who attribute conflicts to religious fanaticism and intolerance of believers, relatively more people (26.4%) positively treat religious organisations of different faiths; 18.1% tolerate them.

Responsibility for inter-confessional conflicts.

Crimeans rest somewhat greater responsibility on Crimean and central authorities (average marks on a five-point scale – 3.98 and 3.94, respectively), leaders of Crimean religious organisations (3.87) and believers taking part in conflicts (3.86), smaller – on foreign religious centres (3.53) and representatives of foreign state, political and public structures (3.32), although the spread of assessments was insignificant.

The assessments given by representatives of national and ethnic groups were very similar. However, Russians and Crimean Tatars rest much greater responsibility for conflicts than Ukrainians on central and Crimean authorities and leaders of religious organisations; at that, Crimean Tatars rest greater responsibility on Crimean authorities than on central. Meanwhile, Russians much more than Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians tend to rest responsibility for conflicts on the involved believers.

Russians more often than Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars rest responsibility for conflicts on foreign religious centres, state political and public structures. Crimean Tatars more often than Ukrainians and Russians rest responsibility on leaders of Crimean public and political organisations.

Assessments of representatives of confessional groups somewhat differ from the assessments made by national and ethnic groups. For instance, UOC-KP believers rest much smaller responsibility on each of the mentioned institutes and bodies of power than Crimeans in general and representatives of each national and ethnic group. At that, they rest on the central and Crimean authorities even smaller responsibility for conflicts than on involved believers.

UOC believers and Muslims rest the greatest responsibility on the central and Crimean authorities and leaders of religious organisations; at that, Muslims more tend to blame Crimean authorities, UOC believers – the central. UOC believers rest greater responsibility than Muslims and much greater than believers of UOC-KP on foreign religious centres, foreign state, political and public structures.

It should be added that Crimeans in general and representatives of all national and ethnic groups assess the urgency of the problem of tension of inter-confessional relations much lower, compared to the urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic relations. For instance, the index of urgency of the problem of tension in relations between followers of different confessions made 0.22 – against 0.44 for inter-ethnic relations. In that, among Crimean Tatars: 0.22 against 0.47; for Russians – 0.24 against 0.43; for Ukrainians – 0.26 against 0.44. Additionally, in the overall list of topical problems critical for Crimea, tense relations between believers of different confessions and churches were noted by 7.4% of Crimeans, in that: among Ukrainians – 10%; among Russians – 7%; among Crimean Tatars – by 2.8%.

It may be concluded therefore that at present, inter-confessional relations in Crimea are rather tolerant and evidently less tense than inter-ethnic relations in general. If the issues of religion are not politicised and/or identified with national and ethnic ones, the probability of aggravation of inter-confessional relations or emergence of a conflict on religious grounds looks rather low¹⁹. ■

¹⁸ Believers of UOC: positively – 33.1%, tolerate – 35.6%; UOC-KP: positively – 37.6%, tolerate – 22%; Muslims: positively – 37.5%, tolerate – 32.2%.

¹⁹ Another thing is that conflicts arising from entirely different reasons may take religious forms.

Specificities of assessments of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations and risks of conflicts				
	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
Inter-ethnic relations				
To what extent are your needs at receiving education and information in native language are satisfied? ¹				
• education	Unsatisfied (49.6%) Satisfied (40.4%) Balance ² (-9.2%)	Unsatisfied (45.2%) Satisfied (36.7%) Balance (-8.5%)	Satisfied (48.6%) Unsatisfied (39.6%) Balance (9.0%)	Unsatisfied (43.5%) Satisfied (41.2%) Balance (-2.3%)
• reading books	Satisfied (59.8%) Unsatisfied (32.1%) Balance (27.7%)	Satisfied (72.7%) Unsatisfied (22.8%) Balance (49.9%)	Satisfied (74.4%) Unsatisfied (21.6%) Balance (52.8%)	Satisfied (71.9%) Unsatisfied (23.4%) Balance (48.5%)
• reading newspapers and magazines	Satisfied (61.9%) Unsatisfied (31.0%) Balance (30.9%)	Satisfied (70.6%) Unsatisfied (23.9%) Balance (46.7%)	Satisfied (70.3%) Unsatisfied (24.4%) Balance (45.9%)	Satisfied (69.6%) Unsatisfied (24.7%) Balance (44.9%)
• watching TV programmes	Unsatisfied (53.1%) Satisfied (44.0%) Balance (-9.1%)	Unsatisfied (71.0%) Satisfied (27.7%) Balance (-43.3%)	Unsatisfied (50.0%) Satisfied (47.8%) Balance (-2.2%)	Unsatisfied (63.3%) Satisfied (34.9%) Balance (-28.4%)
• watching movies in the cinema	Unsatisfied (42.6%) Satisfied (35.3%) Balance (-7.3%)	Unsatisfied (56.5%) Satisfied (22.3%) Balance (-34.2%)	Unsatisfied (47.9%) Satisfied (34.0%) Balance (-13.9%)	Unsatisfied (52.6%) Satisfied (27.0%) Balance (-25.6%)
• listening to the radio	Satisfied (45.4%) Unsatisfied (42.8%) Balance (2.6%)	Unsatisfied (57.2%) Satisfied (33.3%) Balance (-23.9%)	Satisfied (48.9%) Unsatisfied (41.5%) Balance (7.4%)	Unsatisfied (51.2%) Satisfied (38.6%) Balance (-12.6%)
To what extent are the rights of the following groups upheld in Crimea? ³				
• Crimean Tatars	0.34	0.79	0.78	0.74
• Russian-speaking population	0.71	0.44	0.54	0.49
• Ukrainian-speaking population	0.77	0.66	0.63	0.66



How urgent for Crimea is the problem of restriction of ...use? • Russian language	Not really urgent (31.1%) Urgent to a certain extent (30.6%) Such problem does not exist (17.8%)	Very urgent (57.9%) Urgent to a certain extent (30.0%) ... Such problem does not exist (2.6%)	Very urgent (40.4%) Urgent to a certain extent (34.3%) ... Such problem does not exist (7.2%)	Very urgent (48.2%) Urgent to a certain extent (31.4%) ... Such problem does not exist (5.3%)
	0.34	0.76	0.61	0.67
Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Russian language use [*] • Ukrainian language	Such problem does not exist (58.3%) Not really urgent (20.9%) ... Very urgent (2.9%)	Such problem does not exist (61.0%) Not really urgent (24.5%) ... Very urgent (1.6%)	Such problem does not exist (51.0%) Not really urgent (25.9%) ... Very urgent (3.8%)	Such problem does not exist (57.3%) Not really urgent (24.8%) ... Very urgent (2.4%)
Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Ukrainian language use [*] • Crimean Tatar language	0.09	0.07	0.13	0.09
Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Crimean Tatar language use [*] Do you agree with the statement that population of Crimea is enduring ukrainisation? ²	Urgent to a certain extent (35.0%) Very urgent (30.6%) ... Such problem does not exist (15.4%)	Such problem does not exist (49.3%) Not really urgent (22.7%) ... Very urgent (1.6%)	Such problem does not exist (42.2%) Not really urgent (26.4%) ... Very urgent (3.4%)	Such problem does not exist (43.7%) Not really urgent (23.0%) ... Very urgent (4.9%)
Index of urgency of the problem of restriction in Crimean Tatar language use [*] Are there any problems in inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?	0.52	0.08	0.13	0.14
Do you agree with the statement that population of Crimea is enduring ukrainisation? ²	Yes (55.3%) No (34.2%) Balance (21.1%)	Yes (84.7%) No (10.5%) Balance (74.2%)	Yes (62.0%) No (30.0%) Balance (32.0%)	Yes (75.2%) No (18.5%) Balance (56.7%)
Are there any problems in inter-ethnic relations in Crimea?	There are some problems (57.1%) There are no problems (25.4%) ... Yes, there are pretty acute problems (8.1%)	There are some problems (49.3%) There are no problems (20.3%) Yes, there are pretty acute problems (16.1%)	There are some problems (40.6%) There are no problems (26.9%) Yes, there are pretty acute problems (16.1%)	There are some problems (47.5%) There are no problems (23.0%) Yes, there are pretty acute problems (15.4%)

^{*} Index of urgency of the problem may have the value from "0" to "1", where "1" means that such problem does not exist, and "1" means very high urgency.

¹ In his question answer variant "satisfied" is made up of sum of answers "fully satisfied" and "most likely satisfied"; variant "unsatisfied" – of "unsatisfied" and "most likely unsatisfied".

² Here and further on balance is calculated as a difference between the part of those who give an affirmative answer to the question, and part of those who answer negatively.

³ According to the index of protection of rights which takes the value from "0" to "1", where "0" means that the rights are not upheld, and "1" – fully upheld.

⁴ In his question answer variant "yes" is made up of sum of answers "agree" and "most likely agree"; variant "no" – of "do not agree" and "most likely do not agree"



	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
Estimate of tension in inter-ethnic relations ⁵				
• Russians and Ukrainians	1.98	1.67	1.63	1.70
• Russians and Crimean Tatars	2.34	2.88	2.67	2.77
• Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars	2.23	2.67	2.62	2.60
Have you encountered ethnic discrimination in the employment process and/or in educational institutions?	No (52.4%) Yes (36.5%) Balance (-15.9%)	No (81.3%) Yes (7.1%) Balance (-74.2%)	No (77.5%) Yes (9.8%) Balance (-67.7%)	No (77.1%) Yes (11.1%) Balance (-66.0%)
Does discrimination against Crimean Tatars and other repatriates exist in Crimea?	Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (48.1%) Exists and occurs in a majority of spheres (23.8%) Does not exist (13.4%)	Does not exist (65.2%) Rarely occurs (14.7%) Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (9.6%)	Does not exist (54.1%) Rarely occurs (20.6%) Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (10.2%)	Does not exist (56.5%) Rarely occurs (16.2%) Exists, but only occurs at certain times in certain spheres (13.7%)
Should Crimean Tatars be granted the status of indigenous people of Ukraine?	Yes (77.6%) No (11.9%)	No (70.3%) Hard to say (21.4%)	No (60.9%) Hard to say (26.0%)	No (62.2%) Hard to say (21.6%)
Should Ukraine officially recognize the Crimean Tatar Majlis as the fully legitimate representative body of the Crimean Tatar nation?	Yes (77.0%) Hard to say (11.8%)	No (62.4%) Hard to say (15.4%)	No (48.2%) I do not care (19.7%)	No (52.7%) Yes (16.6%)
How urgent is the problem of tense inter-ethnic relations for Crimea?	Urgent to a certain extent (48.2%) Not really urgent (20.5%) Very urgent (17.7%) Such problem does not exist (7.0%)	Urgent to a certain extent (42.2%) Not really urgent (26.2%) Very urgent (15.8%) ... Such problem does not exist (7.5%)	Urgent to a certain extent (38.3%) Not really urgent (24.4%) Very urgent (18.5%) Such problem does not exist (9.4%)	Urgent to a certain extent (41.6%) Not really urgent (25.0%) Very urgent (16.9%) ... Such problem does not exist (8.0%)
Could a serious inter-ethnic conflict arise in the nearest future in Crimea?	No (40.8%) Hard to say (32.3%) Yes (26.9%)	Hard to say (39.8%) No (37.3%) Yes (22.9%)	No (37.8%) Hard to say (36.3%) Yes (25.9%)	No (37.9%) Hard to say (37.7%) Yes (24.4%)



If you believe that such a conflict could arise, which of the following groups would most likely be in conflict? ⁵	Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (29.3%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (18.2%) Russians and Ukrainians (15.4%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (14.3%)	Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (50.0%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (17.5%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, on one side, and Russians, on the other (7.4%) Russians and Ukrainians (6.5%)	Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (46.7%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (13.5%) Russians and Ukrainians (11.3%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (7.0%)	Russians and Ukrainians, on one side, and Crimean Tatars, on the other (46.5%) Russians and Crimean Tatars (16.0%) Russians and Ukrainians (9.3%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, on one side, and Russians, on the other (7.0%) Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (6.6%)
What is the main cause of inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea?	Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (18.9%) Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (17.4%) Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for inter-ethnic tension in the region (14.9%)	Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (28.1%) Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for inter-ethnic tension in the region (21.4%) Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (14.3%)	Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (24.3%) Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (16.1%) Hard to say (15.7%)	Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea (25.8%) Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for inter-ethnic tension in the region (18.6%) Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different ethnic groups (15.0%)
How would you assess the results of activity of... in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations? ⁶	Negatively (73.7%) Positively (13.3%) Balance (-60.4%)	Negatively (87.1%) Positively (3.8%) Balance (-83.3%)	Negatively (76.6%) Positively (9.8%) Balance (-66.8%)	Negatively (82.6%) Positively (6.8%) Balance (-75.8%)
• Ukraine's state authorities				
• Crimean republican authorities	Negatively (76.7%) Positively (11.2%) Balance (-65.5%)	Negatively (75.8%) Positively (10.3%) Balance (-65.5%)	Negatively (75.7%) Positively (12.0%) Balance (-63.7%)	Negatively (75.8%) Positively (11.1%) Balance (-61.7%)
Index of urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic relations ⁷	0.47	0.43	0.44	0.44
Inter-confessional relations				
Assessment of conditions for satisfaction of religious needs ⁸	4.26	4.35	4.29	4.31

⁵ On a five-point scale, where "1" means that there is no tension in relations, and "5" – relations are very tense.

⁶ This question was answered only by those who believe that a serious inter-ethnic conflict could arise in Crimea.

⁷ In this question answer variant "positively" is made up of sum of answers "positively" and "most likely positively"; variant "negatively" – of "negatively" and "most likely negatively".

⁸ On a five-point scale where "1" means there are no conditions, and "5" – there are all necessary conditions to satisfy one's religious needs.

	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	Total in Crimea
What is your attitude toward religious organisations associated with faith other than yours? ⁹	Positive (34.2%) Tolerable (29.7%) Indifferent (17.1%) ... Help them/Fight them 3.3%/ 1.9%	Tolerable (34.1%) Indifferent (30.0%) Positive (27.5%) ... Help them/Fight them 1.9%/ 0.7%	Indifferent (32.7%) Positive (30.7%) Tolerable (27.4%) ... Help them/Fight them 1.9%/ 1.2%	Tolerable (31.7%) Positive (29.5%) Indifferent (29.1%) ... Help them/Fight them 2.3%/ 1.0%
How urgent is the problem of tense inter-confessional relations for Crimea?	Such problem does not exist (32.9%) Not really urgent (30.7%) Urgent to a certain extent (21.6%) ... Very urgent (6.4%)	Such problem does not exist (32.3%) Not really urgent (28.0%) Urgent to a certain extent (19.8%) ... Very urgent (8.4%)	Such problem does not exist (32.6%) Not really urgent (26.4%) Urgent to a certain extent (22.8%) Very urgent (9.6%)	Such problem does not exist (32.2%) Not really urgent (27.7%) Urgent to a certain extent (21.1%) ... Very urgent (8.5%)
Index of urgency of the problem of tension in inter-confessional relations*	0.22	0.24	0.26	0.24
What is the main cause of inter-confessional conflicts?	Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (34.2%) Hard to say (25.0%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (19.6%)	Hard to say (28.5%) Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (27.0%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (25.4%)	Hard to say (33.7%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (25.6%) Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (22.8%)	Hard to say (29.3%) Introducing controversial political and ethnic issues into the religious sphere (26.2%) Clashes of economic interests amongst different ethnic groups (25.2%)
To what extent are the following institutes and representatives of authorities responsible for inter-confessional conflicts in Crimea? ¹⁰	Crimean authorities 4.18 Leadership of religious organisations of Crimea 3.95 Ukrainian authorities 3.93 ... Foreign structures 3.03	Ukrainian authorities 4.01 Crimean authorities 4.00 Believers who take part in these conflicts 3.95 ... Foreign structures 3.42	Crimean authorities 3.89 Leadership of religious organisations of Crimea 3.78 Ukrainian authorities 3.77 ... Foreign structures 3.24	Crimean authorities 3.98 Ukrainian authorities 3.94 Leadership of religious organisations of Crimea 3.87 ... Foreign structures 3.32

⁹ This question was answered only by those who consider themselves to be believers.

¹⁰ On a five-point scale where "1" means, that the institute is not responsible at all, and "5" – responsible to the full extent.

3. RESIDENTS OF CRIMEA ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS, THEIR NEEDS, AUTHORITIES AND POLITICS

To yield a complete picture of Crimean situation, it is important to identify the key problems of the region, as they are seen by its residents, as well as the main needs of Crimeans and their attitude to the state and local authorities and local self-government bodies, their ideological preferences and political sympathies.

The attitude to the state authorities and local self-government bodies may be derived from Crimean residents' assessments of the effectiveness of the authorities in different sectors, their correspondence to the dominant political spirits, ideological and socio-cultural likings, satisfaction of economic and socio-cultural needs of Crimeans.

Ideological and political preferences of Crimean residents reflecting specific traits of their identity and the attitude to the policy of the central and local authorities are particularly important in view of the noticeable influence of local branches of the leading political forces and especially public organisations on the inter-ethnic and inter-confessional processes in Crimea.

This section briefly outlines the ideas of Crimean residents regarding the main socio-economic and socio-political problems of the region, the rating of needs of Crimeans, their attitude to the central and local authorities, ideological preferences, public and political likings.

Summary results of the poll are presented on diagrams and in Table "Assessment of activity of central and local authorities by Crimean residents" (p.45).

3.1. MAIN PROBLEMS OF CRIMEA AND NEEDS OF ITS RESIDENTS

Assessments of the main problems of Crimea by its residents are influenced by factors common for all regions of Ukraine, such as the general socio-economic situation in the country, the character of relations between citizens and the authorities, and by regional specificities. The latter in the first place include ethnic composition of the population, its socio-cultural and related foreign political preferences.

Main problems of Crimea. Considered as the most critical, urgent for the whole of Crimea problems were those mentioned by more than half of the polled Crimeans. Such problems are mainly of a socio-economic origin: low salaries and pensions (66.8%), high prices for the basic consumer goods (65.4%), and decline in industry and agriculture (53.7%).

More than a third of those polled also noted: indifference of authorities to the problems of ordinary citizens, jobbery, corruption, low level of medical care, fight over land plots in the resort zone, high unemployment rate, mass alcoholism and drug addiction.

Against the background of those problems, less attention is paid to the poor environmental conditions,

decline in resort industry, problems related with the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing in Crimea and Sevastopol, and much less important and urgent seem all others, from poor operation of the housing and utilities sector to poor transportation.

Such is the rating of problems as seen by representatives of all three main ethnic groups, with the exception that Crimean Tatars mention among the top four problems those directly concerning them: provision of deportees with jobs, housing, land plots and insufficient representation of deported peoples in Crimean regional and local authorities.

Representatives of the main ethnic and confessional groups not too highly assess the importance and urgency of such problems as tense inter-ethnic relations and tense relations between the adherents of different religions. In our opinion, this does not witness the low profile of those problems in the public consciousness, since representatives of all ethnic and confessional groups rank such wishes as "ensure inter-ethnic peace in Crimea" and "prevent Crimea from becoming a zone of an armed conflict" 2nd-3rd by their importance¹. Most probably, this proves that Crimean society has a latent concern about the possibility of conflicts caused by the awareness of available problems in relations among different ethnic communities.

¹ This assumption may be indirectly proven by rather high share of respondents who reported the urgency of the problem of tension in inter-ethnic (to a lesser extent – inter-confessional) relations for Crimea, and of those who do not deny the probability of an acute inter-ethnic conflict in Crimea.

**Assessments of urgency of Crimea's problems*,
% of those polled**

Crimean Tatars			Russians			Ukrainians		
1	High prices for the basic consumer goods	67.4	1	Low salaries and pensions	71.2	1	Low salaries and pensions	59.7
2	Low salaries and pensions	66.2	2	High prices for the basic consumer goods	69.8	2	High prices for the basic consumer goods	57.9
3	Problems of support for repatriates (jobs, housing, etc.)	54.7	3	Decline in industry and agriculture	54.3	3	Decline in industry and agriculture	56.1
4	Insufficient representation of deported peoples in bodies of power	49.8	4	Indifference of authorities to the citizens' problems	39.2	4	Indifference of authorities to the citizens' problems	36.7
5	Decline in industry and agriculture	46.0	5	Jobbery, corruption	37.5	5	High unemployment rate	36.0
6	Indifference of authorities to the citizens' problems	42.0	6	Low level of medical care	36.7	6	Low level of medical care	35.1
7	High unemployment rate	34.5	7	Fight over land plots in the resort zone	34.5	7	Mass alcoholism and drug addiction	35.1
8	Fight over land plots in the resort zone	31.9	8	High unemployment rate	32.5	8	Fight over land plots in the resort zone	34.3
9	Jobbery, corruption	29.7	9	Mass alcoholism and drug addiction	30.9	9	Jobbery, corruption	31.7
10	Problems of land zoning	28.2	10	Problems concerning stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea	30.3	10	Poor environmental conditions	32.3
11	Poor environmental conditions	26.8	11	Decline in resort industry	29.8	11	Decline in resort industry	28.7
12	Low level of medical care	24.7	12	Poor environmental conditions	27.9	12	Poor work organisation in the services sector	28.3

* Only the problems pointed at by 25% and more of the polled, are given in the table.

On a shorter list of socio-cultural and corruption problems, almost half of Crimeans termed corruption and restriction of the Russian language use as “very urgent” problems.

Corruption. The overwhelming majority of those polled in each ethnic group termed the problem of corruption as very urgent or urgent to a certain extent, which points to its particular acuteness. People mentioned as the most corrupt in Crimea the sectors of land issues, medical care, relations of citizens with the State Automobile Inspection officers, education. Acquisition of the Ukrainian citizenship involves least of all known instances of corruption.

At that, Crimean Tatars more often than representatives of other ethnic groups encountered cases of corruption, first of all – at settlement of land issues and in relations with the authorities. Some differences in personal knowledge of cases of corruption are also observed among representatives of confessional groups.

Language problems. Crimean residents assessed the problem of restriction of the Russian language use on par with that of corruption. The least urgent problem for Crimean residents is that of restriction of the Ukrainian language use – it was termed as “very urgent” by only 2.4% of those polled, while more than half sees no problem at all here.

Noteworthy, this opinion is shared by the majority of Ukrainians – their relative majority agrees with the extreme urgency of the problem of restriction of the use of the Russian language in the region. Only 3.8% of Ukrainians called the problem of restriction of the Ukrainian language use “very urgent”.

Instead, Crimean Tatars noted restriction of the Crimean Tatar language use as the second urgent problem in the region (after corruption) – it was mentioned by 30.6% of representatives of that group, while 12.4% of them attached high importance to the problem of restriction of the Russian language use.

Also worth notice, Crimean Tatars assessing language problems demonstrate much greater understanding of language needs of ethnic Russians than the latter do with respect to Crimean Tatars. While among Crimean Tatars,

the problem of restriction of the Russian language use is seen as urgent (very or to a certain extent) by 43% of those polled, among Russians, the problem of restriction of the Crimean Tatar language use is noted by 6%².

Among confessional groups, restriction of the Russian language use, tensivity of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations are seen as more urgent by believers of UOC; restriction of the Crimean Tatar language use – by Muslims.

Main needs of Crimean residents. According to the data cited in Table “Assessment of importance of certain possibilities” (p.39), the most important for Crimeans are the following (average mark on a five-point scale not below 4.5):

- guarantee of economic stability in Crimea;
- guarantee of inter-ethnic peace in Crimea³;
- exclusion of Crimea becoming a zone of an armed conflict;
- opportunity to get a good job in Crimea;
- possibility to communicate and receive information in native language;
- prevention of Ukraine's accession to NATO;
- opportunity to get a good job in Ukraine.

Assessments of the importance of possibilities reveal differences among ethnic and age groups.

For instance, Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians lower than Russians assess the importance of such needs as Crimea joining Russia, Ukraine's accession to The Federal State of Russia and Belarus, prevention of Ukraine's accession to NATO, broader autonomy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from Ukraine, and the possibility to obtain citizenship of another country. Crimean Tatars much higher than Russians and higher than Ukrainians assess the opportunity to get a good job and good education abroad.


The younger respondents are, the higher they value the opportunity to get good education at foreign higher educational establishment and to find a good job abroad, and lower – to prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO, make sure Ukraine joins The Federal State of Russia and Belarus, and Crimea joins Russia.

² Such attitude of Crimean Tatars may be attributed to their better understanding of the socio-cultural problems of other ethnoses caused by their own historic fate, and by the fact that 9.1% of representatives of that ethnic group reported Russian to be their native language, and 20.8% mainly speak it at home.

³ A strikingly high percentage noted the importance of inter-ethnic peace – while tense inter-ethnic relations were termed as the most urgent problem in Crimea by only 16.4 % of those polled.




How urgent are the following problems for Crimea? % of those polled



		AGE (CRIMEA)					CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Corruption	Very urgent	47.4	46.8	52.3	49.2	47.1	50.9	33.6	53.1	50.8	44.1	42.6	50.8	51.1
	Urgent to a certain extent	30.2	34.6	32.4	31.7	30.1	29.3	26.6	33.0	31.6	33.4	33.3	31.4	32.6
	Not really urgent	7.4	7.8	5.8	6.6	7.4	5.4	22.7	1.3	7.3	6.5	9.3	6.1	2.7
	Such problem does not exist	2.8	2.8	2.0	3.7	2.3	3.0	4.2	0.5	2.5	3.0	3.5	2.1	1.9
	Hard to say	12.2	8.0	7.5	8.8	13.1	11.4	12.9	12.1	7.8	13.0	11.3	9.6	11.7
Restriction of Russian language use	Very urgent	45.0	45.7	51.4	48.4	50.3	61.3	24.8	6.3	49.8	48.5	40.4	57.9	12.4
	Urgent to a certain extent	31.7	33.6	30.9	30.5	30.8	23.9	37.4	28.5	33.6	32.9	34.3	30.0	30.6
	Not really urgent	12.8	13.4	10.5	10.3	10.1	8.5	24.1	36.5	9.1	10.2	14.7	6.6	31.1
	Such problem does not exist	6.1	5.6	4.6	6.5	4.2	2.8	10.5	19.1	5.0	3.9	7.2	2.6	17.8
	Hard to say	4.4	1.7	2.6	4.3	4.6	3.5	3.2	9.6	2.5	4.5	3.4	2.9	8.1
Tense inter-ethnic relations	Very urgent	16.7	14.7	17.2	18.0	17.8	23.2	14.7	9.6	16.3	15.6	18.5	15.8	17.7
	Urgent to a certain extent	39.9	43.9	45.4	41.6	38.7	41.2	26.3	57.7	41.3	41.9	38.3	42.2	48.2
	Not really urgent	25.8	25.9	25.4	23.7	24.3	19.0	30.2	21.4	28.0	23.4	24.4	26.2	20.5
	Such problem does not exist	7.4	9.2	6.8	8.7	8.0	9.3	21.8	5.3	6.6	7.8	9.4	7.5	7.0
	Hard to say	10.2	6.3	5.2	8.0	11.2	7.3	7.0	6.0	7.8	11.3	9.4	8.3	6.6
Tense relations between the followers of different religions	Very urgent	8.4	7.7	8.7	9.0	8.8	13.2	7.0	3.8	7.9	7.7	9.6	8.4	6.4
	Urgent to a certain extent	21.0	19.1	22.1	20.7	21.9	25.3	21.3	20.6	20.6	19.0	22.8	19.8	21.6
	Not really urgent	27.7	29.3	28.4	27.1	26.6	25.1	19.2	33.7	30.3	25.2	26.4	28.0	30.7
	Such problem does not exist	30.2	34.5	31.9	33.2	31.9	26.4	38.5	36.4	31.6	35.0	32.6	32.3	32.9
	Hard to say	12.7	9.4	8.9	10.0	10.8	10.0	14.0	5.5	9.6	13.1	8.6	11.5	8.4
Restriction of Crimean Tatar language use	Very urgent	6.0	5.2	5.6	4.3	3.5	1.4	3.8	31.2	3.1	5.1	3.4	1.6	30.6
	Urgent to a certain extent	9.1	9.5	9.0	8.0	7.8	4.6	8.0	39.9	6.3	9.1	8.0	4.4	35.0
	Not really urgent	21.6	21.2	25.9	24.4	22.2	15.0	18.9	15.1	26.1	24.5	26.4	22.7	14.0
	Such problem does not exist	44.7	45.3	39.7	43.9	44.6	53.8	32.9	10.6	46.5	41.1	42.2	49.3	15.4
	Hard to say	18.6	18.8	19.8	19.4	21.9	25.2	36.4	3.2	18.0	20.2	20.0	22.0	5.0
Restriction of Ukrainian language use	Very urgent	2.5	2.0	1.7	2.3	3.2	1.6	2.5	0.5	2.5	3.2	3.8	1.6	2.9
	Urgent to a certain extent	8.5	7.7	8.0	8.2	6.1	4.9	13.3	4.0	7.4	10.2	11.2	5.7	6.8
	Not really urgent	22.8	25.1	26.4	25.2	25.1	17.9	21.4	18.7	30.6	20.2	25.9	24.5	20.9
	Such problem does not exist	57.2	58.9	57.8	56.8	56.5	66.3	47.4	67.2	53.5	58.1	51.0	61.0	58.3
	Hard to say	9.0	6.3	6.1	7.5	9.1	9.3	15.4	9.6	6.0	8.3	8.1	7.2	11.1



Do you personally know about the cases of corruption in the following spheres?
% of those polled



		AGE (CRIMEA)					GENDER (CRIMEA)		CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Land issues	I do	58.2	65.2	66.6	64.7	60.9	64.7	61.0	64.7	49.3	76.1	64.4	57.4	59.7	63.1	71.0
	I do not	23.9	22.3	20.5	19.9	22.9	21.1	22.8	23.0	40.6	12.6	18.7	26.9	26.1	20.3	17.4
	Hard to say	17.9	12.5	12.9	15.4	16.2	14.2	16.2	12.3	10.1	11.3	16.9	15.7	14.2	16.6	11.6
Medical care	I do	56.2	60.5	62.5	62.2	60.5	59.0	61.1	62.7	55.9	56.2	64.7	51.8	58.5	61.9	57.2
	I do not	23.6	22.6	23.2	20.9	21.4	24.4	20.7	23.8	35.0	29.5	15.9	29.9	25.3	19.4	28.3
	Hard to say	20.2	16.9	14.3	16.9	18.1	16.6	18.2	13.5	9.1	14.3	19.4	18.3	16.2	18.7	14.5
Relations between citizens and representatives of State Automobile Inspection (SAI)	I do	54.3	56.3	60.3	54.4	47.3	60.3	49.1	52.0	43.0	58.4	56.4	52.1	50.2	55.5	58.0
	I do not	22.2	22.0	21.7	23.2	26.7	20.4	25.7	29.5	35.0	23.4	19.0	24.9	28.4	20.8	23.4
	Hard to say	23.5	21.7	18.0	22.4	26.0	19.3	25.2	18.5	22.0	18.2	24.6	23.0	21.4	23.7	18.6
Education	I do	51.5	47.2	48.8	46.0	40.0	46.6	46.6	47.5	48.8	49.9	49.9	39.1	43.6	47.3	47.7
	I do not	26.8	33.6	33.8	33.0	34.3	33.9	30.6	34.4	35.9	30.7	27.4	39.0	36.4	30.1	33.9
	Hard to say	21.7	19.2	17.4	21.0	25.7	19.5	22.8	18.1	15.3	19.4	22.7	21.9	20.0	22.6	18.4
Relations between citizens and authorities	I do	36.1	41.2	43.7	41.3	35.8	42.6	36.4	40.0	30.5	59.2	35.9	41.7	37.7	37.8	53.2
	I do not	33.9	31.5	31.4	30.4	33.3	30.7	33.6	38.2	36.5	20.4	31.1	31.9	36.3	31.3	26.0
	Hard to say	30.0	27.3	24.9	28.3	30.9	26.7	30.0	21.8	33.0	20.4	33.0	26.4	26.0	30.9	20.8
Relations between citizens and representatives of law-enforcement bodies (excluding SAI)	I do	35.1	37.5	42.2	38.7	32.4	41.7	32.8	28.8	28.3	43.7	39.1	39.1	36.7	36.0	42.5
	I do not	35.0	35.5	32.6	32.1	38.5	33.2	36.4	43.3	41.6	30.8	30.9	35.5	37.9	33.8	32.0
	Hard to say	29.9	27.0	25.2	29.2	29.1	25.1	30.8	27.9	30.1	25.5	30.0	25.4	25.4	30.2	25.5
Relations between citizens and housing and communal services	I do	30.9	33.6	39.4	37.4	32.3	35.4	33.6	31.0	35.5	36.0	34.6	36.3	34.1	33.8	36.6
	I do not	38.3	37.2	36.5	34.5	35.9	37.3	35.9	40.5	40.4	40.6	33.3	38.2	39.5	34.9	40.9
	Hard to say	30.8	29.2	24.1	28.1	31.8	27.3	30.5	28.5	24.1	23.4	32.1	25.5	26.4	31.3	22.5
Cooperation of bodies of state power or establishments with representatives of private industry/business	I do	28.2	28.5	32.5	29.9	25.1	30.0	27.4	30.0	24.5	33.5	27.5	29.3	25.2	29.2	33.4
	I do not	34.8	37.4	34.4	35.9	38.1	36.3	36.0	39.6	38.8	34.5	32.0	40.9	40.8	33.8	36.0
	Hard to say	37.0	34.1	33.1	34.2	36.8	33.7	36.6	30.4	36.7	32.0	40.5	29.8	34.0	37.0	30.6
Obtaining Ukrainian citizenship	I do	14.7	15.4	15.7	17.3	13.5	16.1	14.5	12.3	12.6	39.3	14.6	13.4	13.2	12.3	36.9
	I do not	51.8	55.1	56.0	52.3	53.4	54.8	52.6	58.2	53.1	32.5	53.6	54.9	56.9	54.9	36.5
	Hard to say	33.5	29.5	28.3	30.4	33.1	29.1	32.9	29.5	34.3	28.2	31.8	31.7	29.9	32.8	26.6



How important for you is the following?*
average mark

	CRIMEA	AGE (CRIMEA)					GENDER (CRIMEA)		CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)				
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female	UOC	UOC (KP)	Islam	Other	Non-believers
Ensure economic stability in Crimea	4.82	4.79	4.82	4.83	4.84	4.83	4.80	4.84	4.90	4.68	4.93	4.80	4.79
Ensure inter-ethnic peace in Crimea	4.80	4.77	4.79	4.81	4.83	4.80	4.77	4.82	4.87	4.74	4.86	4.77	4.78
Prevent Crimea from becoming a zone of an armed conflict	4.80	4.78	4.80	4.80	4.81	4.80	4.77	4.82	4.86	4.65	4.8	4.79	4.78
Have the opportunity yourself or provide the opportunity for your children to get a good job in Crimea	4.76	4.75	4.77	4.77	4.79	4.75	4.74	4.78	4.81	4.65	4.94	4.77	4.70
Communicate and receive information in native language	4.71	4.72	4.72	4.70	4.68	4.72	4.69	4.72	4.77	4.42	4.87	4.67	4.74
Prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO	4.57	4.47	4.52	4.56	4.62	4.71	4.51	4.64	4.82	4.49	2.96	4.64	4.6
Have the opportunity yourself or provide the opportunity for your children to get a good job in Ukraine	4.50	4.48	4.49	4.53	4.52	4.49	4.46	4.53	4.47	4.58	4.57	4.49	4.51
Have the opportunity yourself or provide the opportunity for your children to receive education in Ukrainian universities	4.45	4.44	4.45	4.46	4.46	4.42	4.40	4.48	4.30	4.48	4.52	4.48	4.45
Have a possibility to influence the state policy and authorities	4.44	4.42	4.44	4.47	4.49	4.40	4.43	4.45	4.43	4.33	4.40	4.48	4.39
Make sure Ukraine joins The Federal State of Russia and Belarus	4.43	4.34	4.36	4.44	4.45	4.55	4.36	4.49	4.74	4.30	2.80	4.51	4.41
Make sure Crimea gets a broader autonomy from Ukraine	4.31	4.28	4.24	4.32	4.33	4.35	4.28	4.32	4.38	4.18	3.67	4.39	4.25
Have a possibility to obtain, except for Ukrainian, another country's citizenship	4.27	4.31	4.38	4.27	4.29	4.15	4.23	4.31	4.27	4.19	3.87	4.38	4.15
Have the opportunity yourself or provide the opportunity for your children to get a good job abroad	4.17	4.34	4.23	4.20	4.10	3.99	4.18	4.17	3.82	4.25	4.59	4.19	4.28
Make sure Crimea joins Russia	4.15	4.05	4.08	4.15	4.15	4.29	4.07	4.21	4.55	4.01	1.96	4.26	4.13
Have the opportunity yourself or provide the opportunity for your children to receive education abroad	4.10	4.25	4.14	4.12	4.05	3.94	4.09	4.11	3.75	4.09	4.62	4.11	4.22
Make sure Crimea gets a full independent statehood	3.82	3.82	3.75	3.80	3.85	3.84	3.76	3.87	3.80	4.04	2.98	3.94	3.73

*On a five-point scale, where "1" means "not important at all", and "5" – "very important".

Assessments of importance of certain possibilities,
average mark

Crimean Tatars			Russians			Ukrainians		
1	Ensure economic stability in Crimea	4.85	1	Ensure economic stability in Crimea	4.89	1	Ensure economic stability in Crimea	4.72
2	Have the opportunity to get a good job in Crimea	4.81	2	Prevent Crimea from becoming a zone of an armed conflict	4.88	2	Ensure inter-ethnic peace in Crimea	4.72
3	Ensure inter-ethnic peace in Crimea	4.80	3	Ensure inter-ethnic peace in Crimea	4.87	3	Prevent Crimea from becoming a zone of an armed conflict	4.70
4	Prevent Crimea from becoming a zone of an armed conflict	4.76	4	Have the opportunity to get a good job in Crimea	4.83	4	Have the opportunity to get a good job in Crimea	4.67
5	Communicate and receive information in native language	4.73	5	Communicate and receive information in native language	4.81	5	Communicate and receive information in native language	4.57
6	Have the opportunity to get a good job in Ukraine	4.56	6	Prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO	4.78	6	Prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO	4.51
7	Get a good job abroad	4.54	7	Make sure Ukraine joins The Federal State of Russia and Belarus	4.67	7	Have the opportunity to get a good job in Ukraine	4.50
8	Have the opportunity to receive education abroad	4.52	8	Have the opportunity to get a good job in Ukraine	4.52	8	Have the opportunity to receive education in Ukraine	4.42
9	Have the opportunity to receive education in Ukraine	4.50	9	Make sure Crimea joins Russia	4.50	9	Have a possibility of greater influence on the state policy and authorities	4.40
10	Have a possibility of greater influence on the state policy and authorities	4.41	10	Have the opportunity to receive education in Ukraine	4.48	10	Make sure Ukraine joins The Federal State of Russia and Belarus	4.35
11	Have a possibility to obtain second citizenship	4.02	11	Have a possibility of greater influence on the state policy and authorities	4.48	11	Get a good job abroad	4.24
12	Make sure Crimea gets a broader autonomy from Ukraine	3.78	12	Make sure Crimea gets a broader autonomy from Ukraine	4.47	12	Have the opportunity to receive education abroad	4.18
13	Prevent Ukraine's accession to NATO	3.41	13	Have a possibility to obtain second citizenship	4.39	13	Make sure Crimea gets a broader autonomy from Ukraine	4.17
14	Make sure Crimea gets a full independent statehood	3.36	14	Get a good job abroad	4.11	14	Have a possibility to obtain second citizenship	4.12
15	Make sure Ukraine joins The Federal State of Russia and Belarus	3.12	15	Have the opportunity to receive education abroad	4.03	15	Make sure Crimea joins Russia	3.94
16	Make sure Crimea joins Russia	2.44	16	Make sure Crimea gets a full independent statehood	3.97	16	Make sure Crimea gets a full independent statehood	3.66

Therefore, the most urgent for Crimean residents are socio-economic problems and problems in the relations of citizens with representatives of the authorities (corruption). Restriction of the Russian language use is seen as the most urgent humanitarian problem.

Although problems of tension in inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations were not termed as the most urgent, they are also in the focus of public attention.

The main needs of Crimeans lie mainly within Ukraine. Crimeans want socio-political and socio-economic stability and a comfortable socio-cultural environment in Crimea. On the condition of satisfaction of those (and/or change of opinion of Crimean residents, in particular, on NATO) aspirations of Crimea joining Russia or getting state independence may gradually lose urgency.



It may be assumed that socio-economic problems, corruption and restriction of the Russian language use may be the factors that substantially influence the attitude of Crimean residents to the central and local authorities, and to the Ukrainian state as a whole.

3.2. STATE AND CRIMEAN AUTHORITIES: ATTITUDE, ASSESSMENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY

According to the poll results, the majority of Crimean residents are critical to both state authorities and bodies of power of the autonomy, but their attitude to the former is more negative.

Central authorities. The majority of Crimeans fully disapprove the activity of Ukraine's President V.Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yu.Tymoshenko, the Government, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and its Chairman A.Yatsenyuk⁴.

The most critical attitude to the central authorities and their officials was reported by Russians (their disapproval ranges from 65% for A.Yatsenyuk to 80.2% for V.Yushchenko). Among Ukrainians, it ranges between 56%-70.8%. The attitude of Crimean Tatars to the central authorities is a bit more positive. Specifically, disapproval of all mentioned institutes and persons does not exceed 48.9%.

Local authorities. A relative majority of Crimeans fully disapprove also the activity of the local authorities and their leaders – the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Council of Ministers, the Head of the Council of Ministers V.Plakida, the Verkhovna Rada Chairman A.Hrytsenko⁵.

More than half also disapprove the activity of the Representative Office of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Representative of the President of Ukraine. It may be assumed that the negative attitude to that body and its Head, as bearers of the President's policy in the autonomy, presents kind of projection of the attitude to the President himself.

Responsibility of the authorities. A relative majority of the residents of the autonomy (38.7%) rest responsibility for economic and political problems of Crimea mainly on the President of Ukraine. Twice fewer Crimean residents (19.2%) rest the main responsibility on the Parliament of the autonomy; 13.6% – on the Ukrainian Parliament; 7.3% – on the Ukrainian Government; and 4.8% – on the Government of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

Among representatives of ethnic groups, Russians rest somewhat greater responsibility on the President of Ukraine, Ukrainians – on the Parliament of the autonomy.

Assessment of effectiveness of the authorities. The majority of Crimeans (70.4%-54.8%) entirely negatively assessed the performance of the **Ukrainian state authorities** in all sectors – economy, social policy, home and foreign policy, inter-ethnic relations, defence, education and culture⁶.

The majority or relative majority of Crimean residents similarly negatively assess the performance of **Crimean authorities** in the sectors of economy, social and home policy, inter-ethnic relations, education and culture.

The assessments of performance of the central authorities by different ethnic groups differ in the same way as support for the actions of institutes of governance. Especially critical are Russians, somewhat less critical – Ukrainians, still less critical – Crimean Tatars. Such breakdown of answers is specific of assessments of the policy in all sectors without exception.

So, the attitude of Crimeans to the state and Crimean regional authorities is generally negative. No institute of the central and/or local authorities, none of their leaders enjoys significant support of Crimeans; performance of none of the central and/or local institutes of power was assessed mainly positively. Residents largely rest responsibility for economic and political problems on Crimea on the Ukrainian President and Crimean Parliament.

Assessments of the performance of the authorities by representatives of the main ethnic groups somewhat differ. Say, Ukrainians assess the performance of the central authorities a bit higher than Russians, and Crimean Tatars – higher than both.

Such differentiation against the background of the generally negative attitude to the authorities may be attributed, on one hand, to the aversion of the majority of Crimeans (first of all – ethnic Russians) to the central authorities led by the President as “ideologically alien”, on the other – hopes of Crimean Tatars for solution of the problems of their people related both with the central and local authorities.

3.3. IDEOLOGICAL PREFERENCES, POLITICAL LIKINGS, ATTITUDE TO PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS

The public and political life in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea substantially differs from other regions of Ukraine. The differences are the most evidently manifested in the specific ideological likings and political sympathies of residents of the autonomy conditioned by their socio-demographic and socio-cultural features. Also specific of the autonomy, there are influential public and political structures established on ethnic grounds, first of all – Crimean Tatar Majlis and pro-Russian public organisations, reflecting the specificity of the inter-ethnic situation in Crimea.

Ideological preferences. A relative majority of Crimean residents (29.9%) reported no idea of ideological trends. Every sixth believes that none of the most spread ideologies in the country corresponds to his/her convictions. At that, young people were less ideologically certain.

Among the listed ideologies, the communist one won most of all adherents in Crimea – 11.7%. Among the rest, more popular are the social-democratic, socialist and national-democratic ideologies. Less popular are the nationalist, Christian-democratic, Islamist, liberal ideologies.

In all ethnic groups, a relative majority (nearly a third) have no idea of ideological trends. Among Russians, distribution of ideological sympathies generally corresponds to Crimean, with a greater share of adherents of the communist ideology (14.2%). Ukrainians produced fewer adherents of the communist ideology (9.8%), more – of the national-democratic (7.3%). Among Crimean Tatars,

⁴ Respectively, 74%, 66.8%, 64.1%, 63.5%, 59.8%. The poll was conducted before the resignation of A.Yatsenyuk from the post of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.


⁵ Respectively, 46.7%, 45.6%, 42%, 40.1%.

⁶ Hereinafter, policy sectors are listed in the order of decrease in the percentage of people who chose the answer “negatively”.




What ideology corresponds the most to your own convictions? % of those polled

2008






Which of the following parties and blocs do you trust the most?
% of those polled





Which Crimean public organisations do you trust the most? % of those polled



the Islamist ideology dominates (34.4%), the national-democratic one ranks second (5.2%).

In confessional groups, UOC believers prefer the communist, social-democratic and socialist ideologies, UOC-KP believers – communist and national-democratic, Muslims – Islamist, followed (with a large gap) by national-democratic. However, a relative majority in each of those groups have little idea of ideological trends.

Representatives of elder age groups demonstrate greater sympathies to the communist ideology, while younger people have less knowledge of ideological trends.

Political likings. Among all-Ukrainian political parties and blocs, residents of Crimea most of all trust the Party of Regions (26%) and CPU (9.7%)

Trust giving chances to pass the 3% barrier at elections to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was also reported for Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT), Natalia Vitrenko's Bloc "People's Opposition", the "Russian Bloc" Party, Lytyyn's Bloc and Bloc "Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defence" (NUNS).

Now, such previously active in the autonomy parties as the People's Democratic Party, People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh), Party "Union" enjoy little support in Crimea.

Political sympathies of the main ethnic groups differ. Among Russians, they are very much like Crimean average: 29.8% trust the Party of Regions, 11% – CPU. Among Ukrainians, the top two lines belong to the same political forces, while Ukrainians much than Russians more trust BYuT and "Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defence".

Political sympathies of Crimean Tatars fundamentally differ from the sympathies of Ukrainians and Russians. Most of all they trust BYuT (27.4%), followed by NUNS Bloc (14.2%), while the leaders of Crimean sympathies – the Party of Regions and CPU, are trusted, respectively, by 4.9% and 2.0% of Crimean Tatars.

Among UOC believers, the Party of Regions, CPU and Natalia Vitrenko's Bloc "People's Opposition" enjoy the highest trust, among UOC-KP believers – the Party of Regions, CPU, BYuT, among Muslims – BYuT and NUNS.

Support of Crimean Russians and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainians for such parties as CPU, the Party of Regions, Natalia Vitrenko's Bloc "People's Opposition", logically ensues from their greater adherence to the left (CPU, Natalia Vitrenko's Bloc "People's Opposition") or pro-Russian ideology (the Party of Regions). Adherence of some Ukrainians to the national democratic ideology explains their sympathies to BYuT or NUNS. **That is why their political choice may be called ideologically motivated.**

Correlations between ideological preferences and political likings of Crimean Tatars have specific features. Crimean Tatar community is evidently dominated by the Islamist ideology. However, the political sympathies of Crimean Tatars (as the political sympathies of Muslims) are mainly with BYuT and, to a smaller extent, NUNS. Those political forces have nothing in common with the Islamist ideology but traditionally try to win support of Crimean Tatar population and demonstrate readiness to defend their interests in Crimea. **So, it is logical to assume that the political choice of Crimean Tatars is largely of a situational pragmatic nature.**

With the growth of respondent age, their trust in CPU also grows, as does somewhat the trust in the Party of

Regions. However, in the younger and average age groups, much more people than in the elder age group trust no political force.

Attitude to public organisations. The majority of Crimeans (64%) either entirely mistrust public organisations active in the autonomy, or could not answer that question. Among Crimean public organisations, Crimeans more trust the Russian Community of Crimea (16.6%).

Russians more trust pro-Russian organisations – Russian Community of Crimea and the People's Front "Sevastopol – Crimea – Russia"; Crimean Tatars – Crimean Tatar Majlis and (to a smaller extent) public organisation "Azatlyk".

Noteworthy, Ukrainians also more trust pro-Russian organisations – the Russian Community of Crimea and the People's Front "Sevastopol – Crimea – Russia", Congress of Russian Communities of Crimea.

Sympathies of believers of UOC and UOC-KP to Crimean public organisations are actually identical: the most popular among them are the Russian Community of Crimea and the People's Front "Sevastopol – Crimea – Russia". Half of Muslims most of all trust Crimean Tatar Majlis people, 8.5% – public organisation "Azatlyk".

Among young people, there are fewer adherents of pro-Russian public organisations than in other age groups, at the expense of a greater share of those who trust no public organisations.

Therefore, the majority of the autonomy residents reported no adherence to any of the ideologies popular in the country. Ideologically versed Crimeans prefer left and centre-left ideologies.

Among political parties and blocs, more popular on the autonomy are those strongly opposing the current Ukrainian authorities, first of all, the President of Ukraine, less popular – those associated by Crimeans with the Ukrainian authorities.

Noteworthy, despite the low support for Crimean authorities and, first of all, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, where the Bloc "For Yanukovych" is in a majority, the Party of Regions enjoys the highest rating in the autonomy. The probable reason is that Crimeans see that party and its leader as the most realistic and consistent alternative to the political course pursued by the current authorities.

Meanwhile, it should be noted that ideological preferences and political sympathies of Crimean Tatars substantially differ from the preferences of both Russians and Ukrainians living in Crimea. Higher trust of Crimean Tatars in the ruling political forces (BYuT and "Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defence") rests not on ideological likings and not only on traditions of support or present-day agreements but also on the understanding that it would be much more difficult to solve problems of Crimean Tatar people with the Party of Regions or, especially, CPU, should they come to power.

The majority of Crimeans either do not trust Crimean public organisations or can not describe their attitude to them. The attitude of Ukrainians to Crimean public organisations coincides with that of Russians: both groups mainly trust the same pro-Russian organisations. The trust of Crimean Tatars to Crimean Tatar Majlis is much higher than of Ukrainians and Russians. The reason is that Majlis actually presents a body of Crimean Tatar self-government, seen by many representatives of that people as a tool of defence of their interests. ■

⁷ There are no competitive Islamist parties trusted by Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the Party of Muslims of Ukraine registered in 1997 is in the process of liquidation, pursuant to a decision of the 5th party congress dated 17.12.2005, but even on the peak of its activity it proved unable to represent the interests of the whole Muslim population of the country. Furthermore, religious parties in principle do not enjoy sufficient support of Ukrainian citizens.



Assessment of activity of central and local authorities by Crimean residents				
	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
Do you support the activity of...? ¹				
• President of Ukraine V.Yushchenko	Do not support (67.1%) Support (21.1%) Balance ² (-46.0%)	Do not support (92.7%) Support (3.0%) Balance (-89.7%)	Do not support (85.7%) Support (9.8%) Balance (-75.9%)	Do not support (87.6%) Support (7.1%) Balance (-80.5%)
• Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	Do not support (72.0%) Support (11.5%) Balance (-60.5%)	Do not support (86.5%) Support (3.6%) Balance (-82.9%)	Do not support (80.5%) Support (9.9%) Balance (-70.6%)	Do not support (82.7%) Support (6.6%) Balance (-76.1%)
• Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	Do not support (70.2%) Support (11.9%) Balance (-58.3%)	Do not support (87.0%) Support (3.1%) Balance (-83.9%)	Do not support (79.5%) Support (10.9%) Balance (-68.6%)	Do not support (82.8%) Support (6.4%) Balance (-76.4%)
• Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A.Yatsenyuk	Do not support (64.8%) Support (15.8%) Balance (-49.0%)	Do not support (81.2%) Support (4.7%) Balance (-76.5%)	Do not support (73.6%) Support (12.4%) Balance (-61.2%)	Do not support (77.1%) Support (8.3%) Balance (-68.8%)
• Prime-Minister of Ukraine Yu.Tymoshenko	Do not support (50.8%) Support (37.4%) Balance (-13.4%)	Do not support (84.6%) Support (6.6%) Balance (-78.0%)	Do not support (76.4%) Support (15.5%) Balance (-60.9%)	Do not support (78.9%) Support (12.1%) Balance (-66.8%)
Do you support the activity of...? ³				
• Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea	Do not support (62.6%) Support (14.7%) Balance (-47.9%)	Do not support (65.3%) Support (12.7%) Balance (-52.6%)	Do not support (64.0%) Support (18.3%) Balance (-45.7%)	Do not support (64.0%) Support (15.0%) Balance (-49.0%)

¹ In his question answer variant "support" is made up of sum of answers "support" and "most likely support"; variant "no" – of "do not support" and "most likely do not support".

² Here and further on balance is calculated as a difference between the part of those who give an affirmative answer to the question, and part of those who answer negatively.

³ In his question answer variant "support" is made up of sum of answers "support" and "most likely support"; variant "no" – of "do not support" and "most likely do not support".



	Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	TOTAL IN CRIMEA
• Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea	Do not support (64.5%) Support (11.5%) Balance (-53%)	Do not support (67.5%) Support (10.3%) Balance (-57.2%)	Do not support (65.3%) Support (16.7%) Balance (-48.6%)	Do not support (66.2%) Support (12.6%) Balance (-53.6%)
• Representative Office of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea	Do not support (63.7%) Support (11.5%) Balance (-52.2%)	Do not support (76.2%) Support (3.9%) Balance (-72.3%)	Do not support (67.3%) Support (12.7%) Balance (-54.6%)	Do not support (71.9%) Support (7.7%) Balance (-64.2%)
• Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea A.Hrytsenko	Do not support (61.6%) Support (10.2%) Balance (-51.4%)	Do not support (59.8%) Support (15.9%) Balance (-43.9%)	Do not support (59.3%) Support (18.5%) Balance (-40.8%)	Do not support (59.2%) Support (16.5%) Balance (-42.7%)
• Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea V.Plakida	Do not support (58.8%) Support (8.9%) Balance (-49.9%)	Do not support (58.9%) Support (13.7%) Balance (-45.2%)	Do not support (59.2%) Support (14.7%) Balance (-44.5%)	Do not support (58.7%) Support (13.7%) Balance (-45.0%)
Who is the most responsible for economic and political problems in Crimea?				
• President of Ukraine	33.2%	42.2%	33.7%	38.7%
• Verkhovna Rada of the AR of Crimea	18.6%	17.5%	24.0%	19.2%
• Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	11.0%	13.7%	13.8%	13.6%
• Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine	6.7%	7.2%	7.5%	7.3%
• Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea	4.0%	4.1%	5.9%	4.8%
How would you assess the results of activity of Ukrainian authorities in the following spheres? ⁴				
• Home policy	Negatively (72.4%) Positively (16.6%) Balance (-55.8%)	Negatively (90.9%) Positively (3.3%) Balance (-87.6%)	Negatively (79.1%) Positively (12.9%) Balance (-66.2%)	Negatively (85.1%) Positively (8.1%) Balance (-77.0%)
• Foreign policy	Negatively (63.4%) Positively (21.3%) Balance (-42.1%)	Negatively (87.8%) Positively (4.4%) Balance (-83.4%)	Negatively (77.7%) Positively (13.3%) Balance (-64.4%)	Negatively (82.2%) Positively (8.9%) Balance (-73.3%)
• Defence	Negatively (62.3%) Positively (18.5%) Balance (-43.8%)	Negatively (83.0%) Positively (4.8%) Balance (-78.2%)	Negatively (71.4%) Positively (13.1%) Balance (-58.3%)	Negatively (77.0%) Positively (9.1%) Balance (-67.9%)



• Economy	Negatively (79.8%) Positively (8.2%) Balance (-71.6%)	Negatively (92.2%) Positively (2.2%) Balance (-90.0%)	Negatively (83.6%) Positively (7.8%) Balance (-75.8%)	Negatively (88.1%) Positively (4.9%) Balance (-83.2%)
• Social policy	Negatively (70.0%) Positively (16.0%) Balance (-54.0%)	Negatively (87.1%) Positively (5.1%) Balance (-82.0%)	Negatively (76.6%) Positively (12.4%) Balance (-64.2%)	Negatively (82.2%) Positively (8.5%) Balance (-73.7%)
• Education and culture	Negatively (61.9%) Positively (24.3%) Balance (-37.6%)	Negatively (82.5%) Positively (8.6%) Balance (-73.9%)	Negatively (70.6%) Positively (19.9%) Balance (-50.7%)	Negatively (76.7%) Positively (13.7%) Balance (-63.0%)
• Inter-ethnic relations	Negatively (73.7%) Positively (13.3%) Balance (-60.4%)	Negatively (87.1%) Positively (3.8%) Balance (-83.3%)	Negatively (76.6%) Positively (9.8%) Balance (-66.8%)	Negatively (82.6%) Positively (6.8%) Balance (-75.8%)
How would you assess the results of activity of republican power of the AR of Crimea in the following spheres?				
• Home policy	Negatively (77.1%) Positively (10.1%) Balance (-67.0%)	Negatively (76.9%) Positively (10.4%) Balance (-66.5%)	Negatively (74.8%) Positively (14.9%) Balance (-59.9%)	Negatively (75.8%) Positively (12.2%) Balance (-63.6%)
• Economy	Negatively (79.8%) Positively (9.2%) Balance (-70.6%)	Negatively (86.5%) Positively (4.7%) Balance (-81.8%)	Negatively (81.3%) Positively (10.5%) Balance (-70.8%)	Negatively (83.9%) Positively (7.3%) Balance (-76.6%)
• Social policy	Negatively (75.0%) Positively (11.8%) Balance (-63.2%)	Negatively (79.5%) Positively (6.5%) Balance (-73.0%)	Negatively (73.5%) Positively (13.0%) Balance (-60.5%)	Negatively (77.2%) Positively (9.1%) Balance (-68.1%)
• Education and culture	Negatively (66.4%) Positively (20.7%) Balance (-45.7%)	Negatively (71.8%) Positively (12.7%) Balance (-59.1%)	Negatively (64.5%) Positively (21.5%) Balance (-43.0%)	Negatively (69.0%) Positively (16.4%) Balance (-52.6%)
• Inter-ethnic relations	Negatively (76.7%) Positively (11.2%) Balance (-65.5%)	Negatively (75.8%) Positively (10.3%) Balance (-65.5%)	Negatively (75.7%) Positively (12.0%) Balance (-63.7%)	Negatively (75.8%) Positively (11.1%) Balance (-64.7%)

⁴ In his question answer variant "positively" is made up of sum of answers "positively" and "most likely positively"; variant "negatively" – of "negatively" and "most likely negatively".

4. CONCLUSIONS

The most numerous (dominant) ethnic groups in Crimea are Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, with Russians making the majority of the population in the autonomy, and Russians and Ukrainians together – the absolute majority. The relations among those three groups shape Crimean socio-political situation, and the spirits and views of the two former dominate in Crimea¹.

The Russian language as the language of everyday communication for the absolute majority of residents, including the absolute majority of Russians and Ukrainians dominates in the region. Exactly that language, not the official Ukrainian, is the language of inter-ethnic communication in the autonomy.

The majority of Crimeans, including the overwhelming majority of Russians and a relative majority of Ukrainians, associate themselves with the Russian cultural tradition. By contrast, the majority of Crimean Tatars reported adherence to Crimean Tatar cultural tradition. A relative majority of Crimeans, including a relative majority of Russians and Ukrainians, believe that the Russian cultural tradition will prevail in Crimea in the future. A relative majority of Crimean Tatars predict the prevalence of their national tradition.

Interestingly, each of the national cultural traditions – Ukrainian, Russian, Crimean Tatar – has more adherents than people believing that it will prevail in Crimea in 20-25 years, and a similar picture is observed in all ethnic groups. Out of all cultural traditions mentioned in the report, only the pan-European one is expected to have more followers in the future than today.

The majority of Crimeans called themselves believers, although many of them could not associate themselves with any confession/church. Only among Crimean Tatars, the overwhelming majority reported belonging to a concrete confession – Islam. Among Ukrainians and Russians, people with a definite confessional and church affiliation are in a minority. Crimean religious space is dominated by Orthodoxy and Islam. The majority of the Orthodox (both Russians and Ukrainians) belong to UOC. The religious situation in Crimea is greatly shaped by the relations between believers of that church and Muslims².

There is a correlation between ethnic and religious affiliation, seen as natural by the majority of representatives of all ethnic groups. It is especially strong among Crimean Tatars, which may be attributed to greater socialisation of Islam, practical identification of the society and community of believers (ummah) there.

The opinion of Crimean residents bears signs of gradual alienation of Crimeans from Ukraine. Over the past two years, the share of those who called Ukraine their Motherland fell nearly two-fold (although they are still in a relative majority), and for the first time in the recent years, patriots of Ukraine appeared in a minority.

The Russians are the least disposed to consider Ukraine their Motherland, and themselves – as its patriots.

The attitude of the overwhelming majority of Crimeans to the Ukrainian citizenship is purely pragmatic. Only a minority reported a value-based attitude – positive (proud of the Ukrainian citizenship) or negative (consider that citizenship as a burden). Nearly half of Crimeans would agree to change the Ukrainian citizenship for some other (the absolute majority in that group would like to change it for the Russian one). Russians are the most desirous of changing citizenship, Crimean Tatars – the least.

The overwhelming majority of Crimeans also support introduction of dual citizenship in Ukraine, and the majority opt for the Russian citizenship. Evidently, it is seen as a way to satisfy their socio-economic needs, widen their opportunities.

The foreign policy preferences of the majority of Crimeans, on one hand, reflect a set of stereotypes partially inherited from the USSR, partially introduced by the Russian media now: perception of the West as potential enemy, NATO – as an aggressive bloc, Russia – as the centre of future integration of the post-Soviet space, seen as the highest good.

On the other hand, those stereotypes rest on the inability of the Ukrainian authorities (both central and local Crimean) to ensure a proper standard of living for the autonomy residents, create conditions for satisfaction of their basic needs, and wide-spread corruption of the authorities.

This conditions the prevalence in the public opinion perception of relations with Russia as the priority line of Ukraine's foreign policy, rejection of Ukraine's accession to the EU and NATO, support for joining The Federal State of Russia and Belarus. Meanwhile, one should note serious differences in foreign policy preferences of the dominant ethnic groups in Crimea. Anti-Western sentiments are the strongest among Russians and the weakest – among Crimean Tatars. Ukrainians gravitate to Russians in this respect, although their attitude to foreign political objectives generally looks more moderate: they produced fewer adherents of priority relations with Russia and fewer opponents of accession to the EU and NATO.

For the majority of Crimeans (including Russians and Ukrainians), residents of Russia are more kindred by temper, habits and traditions than residents of other regions of Ukraine, and the most kindred among residents of foreign countries.

The smallest social distance was mutually reported by Crimean Ukrainians and Russians. Meanwhile, the social distance between both of those groups and Crimean Tatars is greater than between them and residents of Southern, Eastern and Central regions of Ukraine, and residents of Russia. Noteworthy, Crimean Tatars reported greater social kinship with Ukrainians/Russians than the latter – with the former. Furthermore,

¹ This circumstance largely levels the position of Crimean Tatars at analysis of the results of Crimea-wide studies.

² Another important factor of Crimean religious situation is presented by internal processes in the Muslim community, including the spread of untraditional for Crimea Islamist trends.

Crimean Tatars see their relations with Ukrainians and Russians as less tense, compared to the assessment of those relations by the latter.

There are serious differences in the opinions of Ukrainians and Russians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars, on the other, about guarantees of the rights of ethnic and language groups. In the eyes of the majority of Ukrainians and Russians, rights of Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian-speaking population are upheld the best, of the Russian-speaking population – the worst; in the opinion of Crimean Tatars, rights of the Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking population are upheld the best, of Crimean Tatars – the worst.

The majority of all Crimeans as well as the representatives of each of the dominant Crimean ethnic groups to a smaller or greater extent admit problems in inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy. Each ethnic group noted greater tension in the relations of Crimean Tatars with Russians and of Crimean Tatars with Ukrainians than between Ukrainians and Russians. However, the overall level of tension was termed as relatively low.

The vast majority of Crimeans and the majority in each ethnic group did not personally encounter cases of ethnic discrimination, although the share of those who did among Crimean Tatars is much greater than among Ukrainians and Russians.

There are also serious differences among ethnic groups in their opinions of the existence of discrimination of Crimean Tatars and other deported peoples in Crimea. While the majority of Crimean Tatars admit its existence to a greater or smaller extent, the majority of Ukrainians and Russians deny it. Even greater differences are observed with respect to Crimean Tatar aspirations for the status of an indigenous people of Ukraine and official recognition of Crimean Tatar Majlis as their fully legitimate representative body.

By and large, Crimean Slavic community (and especially the Russians) shows inability or unwillingness to notice problems of repatriates, which may give rise to inter-ethnic conflicts.

However, in each ethnic group, only a minority (although rather significant) admit the possibility of an acute inter-ethnic conflict in Crimea in the near future. But even those who deny it do not make a majority – due to the numerous group of those undecided. Such a high degree of uncertainty by itself points to the unsteadiness of inter-ethnic peace in Crimea.

There are substantial differences as to who may be the parties involved into such conflict. While Ukrainians and Russians more tend to admit its emergence between Russians and Ukrainians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other, the latter are less disposed to share that opinion.

The majority of Crimeans see the reasons for the existing conflicts in the incompetence or bad will of the central authorities, and in socio-economic, political and cultural inequality of ethnic groups. At that, Crimean Tatars more often than Ukrainians and Russians see reasons for conflicts in the incompetence or bad will of Crimean authorities.

All this presents inter-ethnic relations in Crimea as far from harmonious, although not critically tense. However, significant divergence of opinions of Ukrainians and Russians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on

the other, on fundamental issues, and influences of some internal and external factors may catalyse deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy.

Given the high level of solidarity of Russians and Ukrainians, language and cultural russification of the latter, they may be viewed as one socio-cultural community. Proceeding from the above data, it may be assumed that a pan-Crimean identity, common for all residents of the autonomy, will hardly appear in the nearest future. Preconditions exist for formation of Crimean identity of the Slavic population of the autonomy. However, it will rest on confrontation with Ukraine, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars, on the other.

The religious situation in Crimea may generally be termed as calmer than the ethnic one.

Representatives of all ethnic and religious groups in Crimea highly praise their ability to have their religious needs satisfied. They see the reasons for confessional conflicts mainly beyond religion – in introduction of political and ethnic contradictions into the sphere of religion or clashes of economic interests of representatives of different ethnic groups cloaked under religious slogans.

Among different institutes, organisations and bodies of power, greater responsibility for confessional conflicts is usually vested in the central and Crimean authorities, as well as the leaders of religious organisations and believers taking part in conflicts, smaller – on foreign religious centres, state, political and public structures. Meanwhile, representatives of different ethnic and religious groups differently see the importance of those reasons.

Crimeans in general and representatives of all dominant ethnic and religious groups are generally tolerant to religious organisations confessing a different faith – the majority treats them positively or tolerates them. However, among Muslims, more people negatively treat different faiths than among the Orthodox.

The overall religious situation in the autonomy may be termed rather stable, free of significant internal contradictions, but vulnerable to developments in other sectors – socio-political and economic.

The most urgent for the majority of Crimean residents are socio-economic problems and problems of relations with the authorities. Among socio-cultural problems, Crimeans see as “extremely urgent” the problem of restriction of the Russian language use.

Crimean residents consider it the most important: to ensure economic stability in the region; to secure inter-ethnic peace; not to let Crimea become a zone of an armed conflict; to have an opportunity to find a good job in Crimea for them and their children; to speak and get information in the native language; prevent Ukraine from joining NATO; to have an opportunity to find a good job in Ukraine for them and their children.

The majority of Crimeans demonstrated critically low support for both Ukrainian and Crimean institutes and bodies of power. However, there are significant differences in the opinions of ethnic groups. Ukrainians and Russians (especially the latter) stronger disapprove the central authorities. Crimean Tatars are much more tolerant to the central authorities, although they also mainly disapprove them. However, the level of their disapproval of Crimean authorities is actually the same.

Among all Crimeans and in each ethnic group, people rest the greatest responsibility for economic and political

problems of Crimea on Ukraine's President. So, he is the "leader" of disapproval among Ukrainian institutes and bodies of power.

By and large, the extremely low support for the activity of the central and Crimean local authorities and their leaders and generally negative assessment of their performance by the majority of Crimeans reveal deep estrangement between the authorities and residents of the autonomy, which makes its socio-political stability extremely vulnerable to both internal and external negative influences.

A relative majority of all Crimeans and representatives of each ethnic group are unaware of ideological trends. Those who are, prefer mainly leftist and centre-left ideologies. The least popular are the liberal, nationalist and Christian-democratic ideologies. At that, Ukrainians and Russians, on one hand, and Crimean Tatars – on the other show serious ideological differences.

The most popular political parties and blocs are those strongly opposing the current Ukrainian authorities, first of all, Ukraine's President. The picture generally correlates with Crimean perception of the central authorities and assessments of their work.

Interestingly, poor support for the activity of Crimean authorities, first of all, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, where the Bloc "For Yanukovych" has a majority, did not deprive the Party of Regions of the highest rating in the autonomy. The probable reason is that that party and its leader are seen as the most realistic and consistent alternative to the political course pursued by the present central authorities.

Meanwhile, one should note that ideological preferences and political sympathies of Crimean Tatars substantially differ from those of Russians and Ukrainians. Their stronger trust in the ruling political forces (BYuT and "Our Ukraine - People's Self-Defence") rests not only on traditions of support or present-day arrangements but also on their understanding that it will be much more difficult to solve the problems of Crimean Tatar people with the Party of Regions or, especially, CPU, should they come to power.

The majority of all Crimeans, the majority of Ukrainians and Russians either do not trust Crimean public organisations, or cannot formulate their attitude.

The attitude of Ukrainians to Crimean public organisations is the same as that of Russians: both groups trust the same organisations of the pro-Russian trend – first of all, the Russian Community of Crimea. Meanwhile, those organisations are mistrusted by Crimean Tatars. On the other hand, Crimean Tatar Majlis, trusted by Crimean Tatars much stronger than the Ukrainians and Russians trust pro-Russian organisations, is actually not trusted by the Slavic population.

Crimean Tatars strongly trust Crimean Tatar Majlis because they see it, first of all, not as a public organisation but as a body of national self-government, a tool of defence of their interests.

Substantial ideological distinctions and differences in political sympathies between the Slavic population and Crimean Tatars present additional factors of mutual estrangement of those ethnic communities.

Crimeans have no steady idea of the desirous status of the autonomy. Their assessments reveal confusion and inconsistency, as they sometimes support mutually excluding alternatives for Crimean status. Such uncertainty is specific of actually all ethnic, confessional (church) and socio-demographic groups.

Less than a quarter of those polled support only the options of the future status of Crimea involving its cessation

from Ukraine. Meanwhile, the majority of Crimeans would support preservation of the current status of the autonomy with expanded rights and powers.

The most threatening variants of change of the administrative or national status of Crimea presume its transformation into a Crimean Tatar or Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine, or change of its state affiliation. However, since representatives of different ethnic groups report readiness for radical counteraction in case of implementation of such options, this may be used as a safeguard against a change of Crimean status.

The desire of more than half of all Crimeans and representatives of all ethnic groups to preserve the current status of the autonomy, on the condition of expansion of its rights and powers, should be the reference point for the state policy towards Crimea. Meanwhile, Crimean views on the desired status of the autonomy may let concerned parties in Ukraine and beyond make use of this problem.

The public opinion in Sevastopol is basically the same as in the rest of Crimea. Sevastopol residents are generally concerned about the same problems as all Crimeans, they share the same assessments of the main life needs, problems and prospects of inter-ethnic relations in the autonomy.

In some issues, however, the public opinion in Sevastopol demonstrates some differences. For instance, Sevastopol residents worse than other Crimeans treat the central and local authorities, they are more disposed to pro-Russian spirits, as witnessed, first of all, by greater popularity of the ideas of Crimea's annexation by Russia or transformation into a Russian national autonomy as a part of Ukraine. They pay more attention to the problem of guarantee of Crimea's Russian-speaking population rights. Sevastopol residents demonstrate a more sensitive attitude to foreign policy issues, including the prospects of Ukraine's accession to NATO and stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

Said differences have roots in the specific ethnic composition of the population of Sevastopol, its socio-cultural preferences (compared to Crimea, Sevastopol has more adherents of the Russian and Soviet cultural traditions, fewer – of the Ukrainian and pan-European, and much fewer – of Crimean Tatar), and some socio-demographic features.



By and large, the survey demonstrated a number of problems that require deeper study, in particular, using methods of qualitative analysis (e.g., focus groups).

Those problems include:

- processes of formation of Crimean regional identity and its model;
- the character of communication among the dominant ethnic groups of the autonomy;
- ways of solution of political and legal problems of Crimean Tatars and their possible consequences under the present inter-ethnic relations;
- the situation in the Muslim community of the autonomy, spread of the influence of Islamic trends not traditional for Crimea.


Those problems will be examined during the second phase of the project, with the end goal to generate recommendations intended to prevent escalation of the existing and emergence of new inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts in Crimea. ■

COMPREHENSIVE RESULTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS




* Hereinafter those groups distinguished on the basis of confessional and church self-identification are termed as "believers", "non-believers", "believers of UOC", "Muslims", "believers of UOC-KP" and "other".


How well do you know the following languages? % of those polled




With what cultural tradition do you associate yourself, in the first place? % of those polled




In your opinion, which cultural tradition will dominate in Ukraine in the future (in 20-25 years)?
% of those polled




Do you belong to any church structure, denomination, or faith?
% of those polled




With which religious body, denomination, or faith are you affiliated?
% of those who consider themselves to be affiliated with on of churches




Do you agree that there should be some sort of relation between one's ethnicity and religious beliefs according to traditional perceptions, e.g., a Russian – Orthodox, a Pole – Catholic, Crimean Tatar – Muslim, a Hebrew – Jew, etc.?
% of those polled




Do you perceive Ukraine as your Motherland?
% of those polled




Attitude to Ukrainian citizenship, % of those polled




If you had the opportunity, would you trade in your Ukrainian citizenship for the citizenship of another country? % of those polled




For the citizenship of which country would you be willing to forego Ukrainian citizenship?
% of those who would be willing to forego Ukrainian citizenship




Would you support the introduction of the institute of dual citizenship in Ukraine?
% of those polled




If you had an opportunity to obtain a second citizenship, which country would you choose?
% of those who supported the introduction of the institute of dual citizenship




What line of foreign policy should be a priority for Ukraine?
% of those polled




Should Ukraine join The Federal State of Russia and Belarus? % of those polled



Should Ukraine join the EU? % of those polled




To what extent are the rights of the following ethnic and language groups upheld in Crimea?
% of those polled




		AGE (CRIMEA)					GENDER (CRIMEA)		CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Crimean Tatars	Sufficiently upheld	49.1	50.0	50.3	50.8	50.7	50.0	50.3	55.3	35.4	5.5	56.3	48.2	54.6	54.4	12.4
	Insufficiently upheld	24.4	24.3	26.8	26.1	24.6	25.8	24.6	17.9	37.2	46.3	24.0	25.7	24.8	22.4	41.9
	Are not upheld	10.8	13.0	9.7	8.8	6.9	10.3	9.1	6.8	9.5	47.1	7.4	7.0	6.7	5.8	43.1
	Hard to say	15.7	12.7	13.2	14.3	17.8	13.9	16.0	20.0	17.9	1.1	12.3	19.1	13.9	17.4	2.6
Ukrainian-speaking population	Sufficiently upheld	41.0	40.5	42.5	41.3	42.9	42.1	41.4	45.3	25.5	59.9	36.6	47.8	40.0	41.4	53.0
	Insufficiently upheld	27.6	30.2	28.5	27.1	25.4	27.5	27.6	26.5	43.4	17.6	28.8	26.0	32.5	26.0	22.6
	Are not upheld	14.4	15.4	14.9	15.2	15.3	14.7	15.3	9.6	15.4	8.1	19.2	11.9	16.4	15.0	8.4
	Hard to say	17.0	13.9	14.1	16.4	16.4	15.7	15.7	18.6	15.7	14.4	15.4	14.3	11.1	17.6	16.0
Russian-speaking population	Sufficiently upheld	18.3	16.6	18.5	18.1	16.5	19.0	16.4	14.6	18.2	49.6	11.3	24.4	23.3	11.5	44.4
	Insufficiently upheld	53.1	58.0	54.5	54.6	52.6	54.2	54.4	49.0	55.9	28.0	58.9	56.0	53.2	57.5	31.6
	Are not upheld	18.7	19.4	19.7	20.1	21.5	18.8	20.8	24.1	17.1	8.1	23.8	11.8	16.1	23.3	9.1
	Hard to say	9.9	6.0	7.3	7.2	9.4	8.0	8.4	12.3	8.8	14.3	6.0	7.8	7.4	7.7	14.9

Are there any problems in inter-ethnic relations in your region?
% of those polled




To what extent are your needs in native language while receiving education, reading books, newspapers and magazines, watching TV programmes, movies, listening to the radio are satisfied?
% of those polled



		AGE (CRIMEA)					CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Reading books	Fully satisfied	31.6	31.5	30.5	28.0	25.8	30.7	26.2	17.9	31.3	28.5	28.2	31.1	24.0
	Most likely satisfied	43.0	43.3	41.6	42.7	41.9	43.7	33.9	39.5	42.4	44.0	46.2	41.6	35.8
	Most likely unsatisfied	12.4	12.1	12.3	14.7	14.7	9.9	26.6	13.6	13.3	13.6	12.9	13.0	14.9
	Unsatisfied	8.9	9.6	11.5	10.1	10.6	8.3	7.7	20.2	9.8	9.4	8.7	9.8	17.2
	Hard to say	4.1	3.5	4.1	4.5	7.0	7.4	5.6	8.8	3.2	4.5	4.0	4.5	8.1
Reading newspapers and magazines	Fully satisfied	30.7	29.7	29.7	25.8	23.5	28.4	23.4	16.6	29.1	28.7	27.8	28.8	21.7
	Most likely satisfied	40.3	41.9	40.2	44.0	43.1	40.5	26.9	43.6	42.8	43.4	42.5	41.8	40.2
	Most likely unsatisfied	12.2	11.3	11.9	14.1	14.2	9.1	23.8	11.3	13.0	13.6	13.7	12.2	13.6
	Unsatisfied	11.2	11.8	13.2	11.5	11.9	11.6	10.5	21.7	11.5	10.0	10.7	11.7	17.4
	Hard to say	5.6	5.3	5.0	4.6	7.3	10.3	15.4	6.8	3.6	4.3	5.3	5.5	7.1
Receiving education	Fully satisfied	19.7	15.2	16.8	13.9	13.3	12.9	20.6	12.8	15.6	19.0	20.3	13.2	17.3
	Most likely satisfied	28.5	28.7	23.9	24.2	21.7	21.4	28.7	24.1	26.9	25.0	28.3	23.5	23.1
	Most likely unsatisfied	21.8	22.1	24.6	22.8	17.7	19.8	28.0	23.1	22.2	20.6	20.5	21.8	25.1
	Unsatisfied	20.3	22.7	22.4	24.2	20.9	25.5	12.9	26.6	20.6	21.4	19.1	23.4	24.5
	Hard to say	9.7	11.3	12.3	14.9	26.4	20.4	9.8	13.4	14.7	14.0	11.8	18.1	10.0
Listening to the radio	Fully satisfied	18.5	14.6	15.2	13.9	14.5	12.7	19.3	15.1	16.3	15.8	21.1	12.6	18.6
	Most likely satisfied	23.1	23.9	21.9	23.8	23.0	19.6	18.6	27.2	21.3	28.8	27.8	20.7	26.8
	Most likely unsatisfied	21.2	22.5	20.7	19.6	20.4	18.6	29.1	16.9	20.2	23.6	20.9	21.1	17.8
	Unsatisfied	28.4	30.6	31.9	31.7	30.1	35.8	14.0	28.0	33.8	22.9	20.6	36.1	25.0
	Hard to say	8.8	8.4	10.3	11.0	12.0	13.3	19.0	12.8	8.4	8.9	9.6	9.5	11.8
Watching TV programmes	Fully satisfied	16.7	12.4	12.8	10.7	11.7	10.4	19.3	13.1	12.2	15.9	18.2	10.2	18.0
	Most likely satisfied	21.5	22.0	21.1	21.9	22.5	22.4	17.2	30.1	19.7	24.0	29.6	17.5	26.0
	Most likely unsatisfied	18.2	16.7	16.9	18.3	16.6	17.4	20.4	19.9	17.2	16.7	17.7	16.1	20.9
	Unsatisfied	41.8	47.5	47.3	47.1	47.1	48.4	41.4	34.3	49.4	41.8	32.3	54.9	32.2
	Hard to say	1.8	1.4	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.4	1.7	2.6	1.7	1.6	2.2	1.3	2.9
Watching movies in the cinema	Fully satisfied	15.7	11.3	10.9	8.6	9.7	7.3	13.3	13.6	11.4	14.2	15.5	8.9	16.4
	Most likely satisfied	17.4	16.4	15.1	14.5	13.8	10.9	9.8	19.6	17.3	15.5	18.5	13.4	18.9
	Most likely unsatisfied	14.6	12.3	12.0	13.0	10.4	14.4	16.1	10.1	11.3	13.3	14.2	11.7	13.1
	Unsatisfied	38.8	42.0	41.3	40.0	39.3	47.7	51.7	28.9	39.1	37.4	33.7	44.8	29.5
	Hard to say	13.5	18.0	20.7	23.9	26.8	19.7	9.1	27.8	20.9	19.6	18.1	21.2	22.1

How tense are the relations between the following ethnic groups in Crimea?*


average mark





* On a five-point scale, where "1" means that there is no tension in relations, and "5" – relations are very tense.


Have you encountered ethnic discrimination in the employment process and/or in educational institutions?

% of those polled




Does discrimination against Crimean Tatars and other repatriates exist in Crimea?
% of those polled**Should Crimean Tatars be granted the status of indigenous people of Ukraine?**
% of those polled



Should Ukraine officially recognize the Crimean Tatar Majlis as the fully legitimate representative body of the Crimean Tatar nation? % of those polled




What is the primary cause of inter-ethnic conflicts in Crimea? % of those polled




	AGE (CRIMEA)					CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Incompetence of Ukrainian authorities regarding inter-ethnic problems of Crimea	24.5	26.5	26.1	26.8	25.7	30.2	20.6	16.6	31.5	15.4	24.3	28.1	17.4
Purposeful support by Ukrainian authorities for inter-ethnic tension in the region	17.2	19.9	20.1	16.7	19.1	18.9	18.5	11.8	19.6	18.3	12.7	21.4	14.9
Socio-economic, political, and cultural inequalities of different nationalities	14.3	14.4	14.2	16.1	15.8	11.6	9.8	17.9	13.4	20.6	16.1	14.3	18.9
Provocations of Crimean public organisations, regional branches of national political parties, and politicians	11.2	9.2	9.8	11.0	10.2	10.1	11.5	13.4	9.2	12.0	12.5	9.2	11.3
Purposeful support by Crimean authorities for inter-ethnic tension in the region	8.1	8.4	8.5	6.9	7.0	7.7	10.5	13.1	6.8	8.1	9.3	6.2	11.6
Incompetence of Crimean authorities in solving inter-ethnic problems of Crimea	5.2	5.8	6.0	5.7	4.8	5.1	8.0	14.1	4.0	5.8	5.2	4.0	11.9
Provocations of foreign state structures, officials, and politicians	3.0	4.0	3.8	3.0	3.0	3.3	2.4	4.0	3.6	2.7	4.0	3.0	3.7
Other	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.0
Hard to say	16.0	11.7	11.4	13.5	14.0	12.8	18.4	9.1	11.4	17.1	15.7	13.4	10.3

Could a serious inter-ethnic conflict arise in the nearest future in Crimea?
% of those polled**If you believe that such a conflict could arise, which of the following groups would most likely be in conflict?**
% of those who believe that a serious inter-ethnic conflict could arise in the nearest future in Crimea

What is your attitude toward religious organisations associated with a faith other than yours?
% of those who consider themselves the believers




Do you have conditions to satisfy your religious needs?*
average mark



* On a five-point scale, where "1" means that there are no conditions, and "5" – there are all necessary conditions to satisfy the religious needs.

To what extent are the following institutes and representatives of authorities responsible for Inter-confessional conflicts that have occurred in Crimea, in your opinion?*
average mark



* On a five-point scale, where "1" means that the institute does not bear responsibility, and "5" – bears maximum responsibility.

Which of the problems below are the most important and urgent in Crimea, in your opinion?*
% of those polled





	CRIMEA	Sevastopol	AGE (CRIMEA)					GENDER (CRIMEA)		CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
			18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Male	Female	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Low salaries and pensions	66.8	63.5	65.8	63.2	65.8	66.9	70.9	65.7	67.6	69.2	47.9	73.8	67.0	66.8	59.7	71.2	66.2
High prices for the basic consumer goods	65.4	61.3	63.9	64.5	64.9	64.4	68.9	64.7	66.1	68.4	38.8	77.1	65.6	64.4	57.9	69.8	67.4
Decline in industry and agriculture	53.7	49.9	51.7	51.9	54.3	54.7	56.0	54.4	53.3	61.4	59.4	51.6	53.7	47.9	56.1	54.3	46.0
Indifference of authorities to the ordinary citizens' problems	38.4	45.5	35.6	38.2	39.5	39.1	40.1	38.4	38.4	41.3	28.0	48.1	38.2	36.9	36.7	39.2	42.0
Jobbery, corruption	34.9	37.5	34.2	35.5	37.8	36.6	31.6	36.8	33.4	34.1	18.9	37.5	38.8	30.8	31.7	37.5	29.7
Low level of medical care	34.9	37.6	30.2	31.2	33.7	38.0	41.0	32.4	36.9	36.2	42.7	23.1	37.3	31.3	35.1	36.7	24.7
Fight over land plots in the resort zone	34.0	46.5	34.0	34.0	36.0	35.3	31.3	33.9	34.0	31.0	32.5	36.3	36.7	30.5	34.3	34.5	31.9
High unemployment rate	33.5	33.9	38.4	33.9	33.0	33.8	28.2	35.3	32.0	26.8	38.5	32.2	34.4	36.2	36.0	32.5	34.5
Mass alcoholism and drug addiction	31.1	35.2	29.9	28.7	30.7	31.9	33.6	29.6	32.3	30.4	40.9	25.9	34.6	24.0	35.1	30.9	23.7
Poor environmental conditions	28.9	35.1	26.8	27.6	31.1	30.1	29.2	28.1	29.5	29.6	41.6	27.5	27.2	30.2	32.3	27.9	26.8
Decline in resort industry	28.1	29.6	27.1	27.2	29.9	28.2	28.2	27.3	28.8	32.8	43.4	16.6	28.9	23.0	28.7	29.8	15.5
Problems concerning stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea	26.2	53.1	24.4	24.8	26.4	28.0	27.7	25.5	26.8	24.3	10.1	15.6	30.9	24.0	21.9	30.3	14.8
Unsatisfactory housing and communal services	22.4	22.8	20.7	21.6	23.2	23.4	23.3	21.6	23.1	23.0	21.7	16.4	20.2	27.8	24.4	22.5	15.9
Unsatisfactory work concerning settlements development (condition of roads, parks, etc.)	22.1	24.2	21.6	23.2	24.0	21.4	20.9	22.5	21.8	32.7	24.8	21.7	20.1	17.6	22.5	22.8	17.2
Problems of land zoning	21.5	20.3	19.3	20.9	23.9	23.3	20.9	21.6	21.5	19.6	23.8	36.0	23.4	14.8	21.4	20.8	28.2
Poor work organisation in the services sector	21.4	18.8	20.1	20.3	23.4	20.6	22.5	21.9	20.9	20.2	31.1	17.4	18.2	26.7	28.3	18.8	17.6
High crime rate	21.3	19.1	19.7	20.5	22.0	23.4	21.6	19.9	22.5	18.9	25.5	16.9	20.9	24.2	23.5	20.9	17.6
A lot of homeless	20.7	23.6	20.3	18.3	19.7	20.9	23.4	19.2	21.9	20.2	40.6	8.1	21.9	18.2	23.5	20.9	11.2
Large-scale acquisition of property in Crimea by foreign citizens	20.7	19.5	20.3	20.2	23.0	21.8	18.9	21.6	20.0	19.8	14.3	22.7	20.9	21.5	23.6	19.9	18.5
Unlawful sale of Crimean resort facilities	20.4	25.1	18.9	20.2	22.0	21.0	20.1	20.5	20.3	22.5	24.1	17.9	20.0	19.1	20.4	20.9	18.1
Unsatisfactory work of law-enforcement agencies	19.9	25.5	20.0	21.8	21.1	20.0	17.6	20.2	19.7	16.9	16.8	25.7	15.6	29.4	22.0	18.9	21.0
Problems with water supply	19.1	19.3	18.1	20.5	21.4	18.0	18.0	18.1	19.9	20.4	22.7	18.6	17.7	19.3	23.0	18.2	16.6
Lost savings in Sberbank (former USSR savings bank)	17.8	25.4	14.0	14.5	17.3	20.3	22.7	16.6	18.8	15.1	31.5	4.0	22.7	10.9	16.9	20.0	8.1
Poor demographic situation (high mortality and low birth rates)	17.3	13.1	17.4	18.3	18.0	16.9	16.5	17.0	17.6	15.0	24.8	9.6	19.4	15.8	21.3	16.2	12.0
Problems in relations between Crimean authorities and central executive bodies of Ukraine	16.5	17.1	15.1	15.9	18.6	15.1	17.9	17.2	16.0	21.5	13.6	19.8	14.2	17.2	17.2	16.4	16.4
Tense inter-ethnic relations	16.4	20.8	17.1	15.0	17.5	16.1	15.9	16.5	16.3	21.5	23.1	14.9	14.2	15.7	15.5	17.3	14.6
No civil control of the authorities	16.0	14.7	13.9	15.0	16.7	16.3	18.1	16.4	15.6	21.0	11.9	16.9	14.1	16.1	15.6	16.9	13.2
No opportunity to study in native language	15.5	22.1	14.3	16.1	15.0	15.6	16.4	15.1	15.8	15.4	13.6	17.1	14.6	16.5	14.3	16.6	13.6
Mass labour migration	14.7	9.0	14.8	17.3	15.6	15.0	11.7	14.2	15.1	13.0	12.2	14.4	14.5	16.7	17.8	13.8	11.6
Problems of providing repatriates with jobs, housing, land plots	12.0	6.2	12.5	11.5	14.4	11.7	10.3	13.0	11.2	6.3	8.0	69.3	8.5	10.3	10.4	6.4	54.7
Unsatisfactory working conditions in industry	11.9	6.5	11.2	11.9	12.8	12.8	11.1	11.8	11.9	11.3	11.5	6.8	13.9	9.9	12.6	12.5	7.0
Problems concerning stationing of the Ukrainian Navy in Crimea	9.8	8.1	10.5	8.7	11.3	9.5	9.1	10.7	9.2	10.2	13.3	6.3	9.2	10.9	11.2	9.5	7.5
Insufficient representation of deported peoples in regional and local bodies of power of the AR of Crimea	8.7	3.8	9.3	9.8	10.2	8.1	6.5	9.6	7.9	5.0	5.2	65.7	4.4	6.8	6.2	3.6	49.8
No opportunities to develop national culture	8.4	8.0	8.4	8.5	8.4	8.7	7.8	8.8	8.0	8.3	7.3	22.7	6.2	9.5	8.5	6.9	18.1
Arrears of wages and pensions	8.3	4.7	6.7	6.3	8.1	9.0	11.0	7.8	8.7	9.9	12.9	3.8	7.8	8.4	9.5	8.4	5.5
Tense relations between the adherents of different religions	7.4	4.1	8.3	7.0	7.3	7.2	6.9	7.8	7.1	7.7	5.9	2.5	6.8	9.4	10.0	7.0	2.8
Suppression of the freedom of speech	6.8	9.2	6.8	6.5	6.8	7.7	6.4	6.9	6.8	5.4	13.6	6.3	7.1	6.2	7.8	6.1	7.7
Poor transportation	6.2	5.7	5.5	5.1	6.0	5.5	8.3	6.3	6.1	7.0	8.4	5.3	5.1	7.0	7.4	6.1	4.5
Other problems	3.6	4.4	3.4	3.9	3.3	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.1	3.5	2.3	4.2	3.4	2.9	3.9	1.8
Neither	0.4	0.2	0.1	1.1	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.0
Hard to say	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.9	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.3

* Respondents were asked to mark all acceptable answer variants




Support for the institutes and bodies of power of Ukraine, and their leadership, % of those polled

2008




☐ Fully support
 ☐ Most likely support
 ☐ Most likely do not support
 ☐ Do not support
 ☐ Hard to say


Support for the following bodies of power of the AR of Crimea. and their leadership, % of those polled



Who is the most responsible for economic and political problems in Crimea? % of those polled




How would you assess the results of activity of republican power of Crimea in the following spheres? % of those polled



		AGE (CRIMEA)					CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Home policy	Positively	3.7	3.1	3.9	3.6	2.9	2.2	6.3	0.8	4.0	3.6	5.4	2.0	2.5
	Most likely positively	7.5	8.3	10.1	9.5	9.0	9.3	8.7	5.8	10.2	6.7	9.5	8.4	7.6
	Most likely negatively	22.5	24.7	23.8	23.0	23.7	21.7	42.3	31.9	21.5	23.8	25.0	21.6	30.0
	Negatively	52.1	52.3	52.0	53.5	52.0	53.9	34.3	49.7	52.7	53.3	49.8	55.3	47.1
Education and culture	Positively	2.9	2.6	2.1	2.8	2.1	2.3	5.6	1.0	2.3	2.8	3.7	1.8	1.9
	Most likely positively	14.7	13.5	15.5	13.9	12.2	11.7	33.2	15.4	14.8	10.7	17.8	10.9	18.8
	Most likely negatively	22.5	24.8	24.9	22.9	23.1	22.1	27.3	23.2	23.9	24.0	21.9	24.2	21.6
	Negatively	44.2	45.6	45.0	47.1	45.9	46.3	21.0	48.4	44.9	48.6	42.6	47.6	44.8
Inter-ethnic relations	Positively	2.5	2.0	1.9	2.4	1.3	1.7	4.2	0.8	2.0	2.2	3.0	1.3	2.4
	Most likely positively	8.8	9.0	10.1	9.9	8.1	6.7	16.8	6.5	10.8	7.2	9.0	9.0	8.8
	Most likely negatively	25.3	24.5	24.4	22.5	25.1	21.3	36.8	27.0	24.9	24.0	26.7	23.1	22.9
	Negatively	49.6	52.1	51.7	53.8	50.2	54.2	27.7	55.9	50.1	53.3	49.0	52.7	53.8
Economy	Positively	1.4	1.9	1.9	1.8	0.9	0.9	4.9	0.5	1.5	1.8	2.5	0.8	0.6
	Most likely positively	6.4	4.9	5.3	6.1	5.8	3.7	9.1	5.5	6.4	5.6	8.0	3.9	8.6
	Most likely negatively	22.0	24.6	25.6	24.4	22.6	20.0	39.3	23.4	25.8	20.4	25.9	22.7	24.1
	Negatively	59.7	59.6	59.7	61.4	61.2	65.4	40.4	60.5	59.6	60.6	55.4	63.8	55.7
Social policy	Positively	1.3	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.1	1.4	2.4	0.5	1.3	1.9	2.7	0.8	1.1
	Most likely positively	6.9	7.0	8.1	8.6	7.8	4.5	13.3	8.8	8.9	6.4	10.3	5.7	10.7
	Most likely negatively	23.4	23.8	23.7	22.3	20.7	19.8	40.6	23.9	24.7	18.4	22.8	22.3	23.1
	Negatively	52.6	55.0	54.3	54.9	56.1	59.5	29.4	54.0	52.0	59.2	50.7	57.2	51.9
Hard to say	Positively	15.8	12.5	12.4	12.4	14.3	14.8	14.3	12.8	13.1	14.1	13.5	14.0	13.2

How would you assess the results of activity of bodies of state power of Ukraine in the following spheres? % of those polled



		AGE (CRIMEA)					CONFESSIONAL (CHURCH) AFFILIATION (CRIMEA)					NATIONALITY (CRIMEA)		
		18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	UOC	UOC-KP	Islam	Other	Non-believers	Ukrainians	Russians	Crimean Tatars
Home policy політика	Positively	3.6	3.3	3.1	3.9	3.2	1.6	4.5	1.0	4.0	4.0	5.6	1.3	3.5
	Most likely positively	5.8	4.3	4.9	4.2	4.0	2.3	8.4	16.4	4.0	4.5	7.3	2.0	13.1
	Most likely negatively	21.5	24.3	23.0	22.0	20.6	19.3	41.6	34.3	19.4	23.5	26.7	18.9	31.2
	Negatively	59.5	62.6	63.7	65.1	64.8	69.7	40.2	38.0	67.1	59.7	52.4	72.0	41.2
	Hard to say	9.6	5.5	5.3	4.8	7.4	7.1	5.3	10.3	5.5	8.3	8.0	5.8	11.0
Education and culture	Positively	2.8	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.8	3.3	3.5	1.5	2.5
	Most likely positively	13.4	10.4	12.5	11.9	9.2	8.4	35.5	21.5	10.5	9.7	16.4	7.1	21.8
	Most likely negatively	21.3	23.9	23.2	22.2	20.0	21.3	26.5	23.7	20.8	23.5	25.0	20.7	20.2
	Negatively	51.4	55.5	54.1	55.5	57.7	59.4	26.5	39.4	58.1	53.7	45.6	61.8	41.7
	Hard to say	11.1	8.3	8.2	8.1	11.1	8.9	9.4	13.4	8.8	9.8	9.5	8.9	13.8
Defence	Positively	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.4	1.5	0.7	3.8	0.8	2.2	3.2	4.0	1.1	2.1
	Most likely positively	7.4	6.1	7.1	7.5	6.7	5.1	12.6	16.3	6.3	6.7	9.1	3.7	16.4
	Most likely negatively	19.7	21.4	19.6	19.3	18.5	15.6	31.5	25.1	18.0	22.5	23.0	17.7	23.4
	Negatively	53.9	57.8	58.5	59.2	58.6	64.8	35.0	38.2	62.6	51.0	48.4	65.3	38.9
	Hard to say	16.5	12.5	12.6	11.6	14.7	13.8	17.1	19.6	10.9	16.6	15.5	12.2	19.2
Social policy	Positively	1.4	1.7	1.5	2.4	1.5	1.0	1.4	2.3	1.6	2.1	2.7	0.7	3.7
	Most likely positively	7.6	5.8	7.8	6.2	6.4	4.9	11.2	15.4	5.9	7.2	9.7	4.4	12.3
	Most likely negatively	18.7	21.6	20.3	19.6	15.9	14.7	39.5	25.4	18.8	17.8	24.0	15.7	24.1
	Negatively	58.9	63.7	62.6	64.9	66.5	71.3	32.9	42.8	64.7	64.2	52.6	71.4	45.9
	Hard to say	13.4	7.2	7.8	6.9	9.7	8.1	15.0	14.1	9.0	8.7	11.0	7.8	14.0
Inter-ethnic relations	Positively	1.8	1.6	2.2	1.7	1.3	0.9	1.7	1.3	1.7	2.4	3.1	0.7	2.2
	Most likely positively	6.6	6.0	4.6	4.7	3.5	2.6	12.2	12.1	4.7	5.0	6.7	3.1	11.1
	Most likely negatively	23.3	24.5	25.2	24.5	24.3	20.0	36.6	34.4	23.6	24.6	27.4	21.6	30.5
	Negatively	55.3	58.9	58.5	60.9	58.8	65.1	30.7	40.7	61.5	56.6	49.2	65.5	43.2
	Hard to say	13.0	9.0	9.5	8.2	12.1	11.4	18.8	11.5	8.5	11.4	13.6	9.1	13.0
Foreign policy	Positively	2.0	1.7	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.0	3.1	0.8	1.5	2.0	3.3	0.8	1.1
	Most likely positively	7.8	7.1	7.4	8.4	6.6	2.5	13.6	21.7	7.8	6.4	10.0	3.6	20.2
	Most likely negatively	20.4	22.4	20.9	19.7	19.1	18.2	35.0	28.2	18.0	22.5	25.2	17.4	25.3
	Negatively	58.4	61.6	62.8	63.1	63.8	69.8	37.8	36.5	65.0	59.3	52.5	70.4	38.1
	Hard to say	11.4	7.2	7.7	7.4	9.1	8.5	10.5	12.8	7.7	9.8	9.0	7.8	15.3
Economy	Positively	1.2	1.1	2.0	1.1	1.2	0.6	1.0	0.3	1.4	2.0	2.4	0.5	1.4
	Most likely positively	4.3	3.3	3.0	4.2	3.2	1.6	9.1	6.3	3.4	4.1	5.4	1.7	6.8
	Most likely negatively	17.1	19.4	18.2	17.6	16.7	13.6	36.4	28.0	17.3	16.0	23.0	14.1	24.7
	Negatively	67.7	70.8	71.5	71.8	70.9	76.9	45.8	54.8	72.2	70.3	60.6	78.1	55.1
	Hard to say	9.7	5.4	5.3	5.3	8.0	7.3	7.7	10.6	5.7	7.6	8.6	5.6	12.0

CRIMEA TODAY AND TOMORROW: TERRITORY OF RISK OR CONFLICT ZONE?

On December 18, 2008 Razumkov Centre with support from Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Ukraine conducted an expert discussion dedicated to the problems of Crimea and ways of their solution¹.

The discussion took place in the framework of the first stage of the project “Socio-political, Inter-ethnic and Inter-confessional Relations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea – State, Problems, Ways of Solution” which is being implemented by Razumkov Centre together with the University of Basel’s Europainstitut (Switzerland) supported by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education and Research.


Representatives of Ukrainian state authorities, leading scholars and experts working in the fields of politology, sociology, philosophy, religion, representatives of foreign diplomatic missions and international organisations were invited to participate in the discussion.

The participants were asked to express their points of view on the following:

1. Socio-political situation in the AR of Crimea: tendencies of recent years (2005-2008).
2. Problems of Crimea and Crimeans: internal and external factors.
3. Scenarios of situation development in the autonomy: are there grounds for optimism?

Given below are the presentations of the participants².

WHAT WE SHOULD LEARN FROM THE SWISS IS PATRIOTISM



Hennadiy UDOVENKO,
Chairman,
Council for Ethno-National Policy
under the President of Ukraine

First of all, I wish to thank Razumkov Centre for preparation of this topical and balanced survey that rather accurately describes the current situation in Crimea. I wish leaders of the State and political parties shared the veracity and importance of this survey.

My second thanks – to the University of Basel. Involvement of the Swiss side in this project is very important, since the consistency and prudence of Switzerland may help with the building of the Ukrainian independent state, Ukrainian political nation.

The Swiss experience is very important for us, but that is an entirely different country. As you know, Switzerland has four regions formed by the ethno-national principle, which is not the case in Ukraine. But what we should learn from the Swiss is patriotism.

For instance, during World War II, the country remained neutral. Swiss citizens of the German origin did not become the “fifth column” – Switzerland had none. Our difference is that we have a “fifth column”. We should speak about that and oppose that. And learn from the experience of other countries that preserved their identity in difficult historic conditions.

Second. For six years, I worked at the UN Secretariat in Geneva. Every Saturday-Sunday, I saw thousands of soldiers in uniform, with sub-machineguns or rifles, with backpacks on their shoulders, going home for the weekend. Their army is the whole nation, armed nation that must be ready to defend their State, their Motherland at any time.

I understand that the Swiss do not want to make Ukraine another Switzerland, but they really help building the Ukrainian statehood, Ukrainian identity and independence.

Now, to the subject of discussion.

I am not nostalgic about the past, but if we recall the dawn of Ukrainian independence, 1994, Crimea was on the brink of a conflict. It was not a conflict between

¹ For the expert discussion Razumkov Centre prepared working materials based on sociological surveys conducted in Crimea which reflect the specificities of the autonomy inhabitants' identity, their assessment of socio-political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional situation in Crimea.

² Presentations are published in accordance with the records, in an abridged form, in the order of presentation.

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the Ukrainian State and Crimea but a conflict between Tsekov and Meshkov, that could grow into a very serious conflict³ (I always say: Transdnistria is what we may have in Crimea). The situation was tense, in fact, within one or two hours paramilitary groups of those “leaders” could engage in armed clashes. We prevented that and averted growth of the conflict between two persons into an inter-ethnic conflict.

What should be done today?

The central Government should seriously tackle the Crimean problems. As it was in early 1990s. Then, there was a First Deputy of the Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine who kept a close eye on Crimean issues, **the Government at every its meeting discussed problems that concerned Crimean Tatars**. By and large, the Government kept the situation under control. **Now, this is not the case**, and it is not accidental that the attitude of the Crimeans to the central Government, to the presidential power is much worse than to the local Crimean.


At the meeting with Prime Minister, I raised those issues. **Very important problems of the Crimean Tatar people are not being solved**. In particular, the land problem.

Crimean Tatars are a nation that lost land three times within the lifetime of one generation. First – in 1944. 180 thousand Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported over two nights (90 thousand died during transportation alone). For the second time, they lost their land in Uzbekistan, returning to the Crimea – while they made a huge contribution to the economic, industrial, cultural development of Uzbekistan, as was more than once mentioned with thanks by the President of Uzbekistan I.Karimov.

For the third time, Crimean Tatars lost their land, having returned to the homeland. It appeared that their land had already been sold and resold...

Hence, **today, the Government, all governmental structures should seriously concentrate on Crimea** and not farm Crimea out to L.Hrach and his team, now dominating there. This is very important. That is why Razumkov Centre should make the results of this survey known to the President, the Prime Minister, the Government and the Verkhovna Rada. Parliament should do its work – there is still no law restoring the rights of deportees. There is no law on the status of the Crimean people. And the MPs who do not even want to hear about those problems must know what the country risks.

UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE SHOULD PLAY A UNIFYING ROLE IN UKRAINE



Yuriy HNATKEVYCH,
Chairman,
Subcommittee of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Committee for Human Rights,
National Minorities
and International Relations

Today's work of the Government, the President, the Parliament is dominated by social problems. But if we listen to what our colleagues from Razumkov Centre reported, it appears that national problems are even more acute – and it may so happen that those two agendas may come together in time, which may really cause an acute conflict.

The conflicts very often arise after “lawful accidents”. Remember what World War I began with – with assassination of one man. Recent riots in France – with an accidental death of two Arab teenagers. Turmoil in Greece – with an unintentional murder of a teenager. I will remind you that in Crimea, too, acute situations mainly arose when the problem of an ethnic group – Crimean Tatars – was related with a socio-economic problem, for instance, acquisition of land plots, and so on. Hence, **national conflicts, if they exist potentially, may arise and aggravate unexpectedly**.

After the World War II during certain time, many people from different regions of Ukraine moved to Crimea. I more than once visited the Crimean village where only migrants from Kirovohrad and Volyn regions live. To my surprise, it had no Ukrainian school, and almost all Ukrainians and especially youths were speaking Russian. We have just heard that only one in five Ukrainians reported

³ In 1994, the Crimea elected the autonomy's President – Yu.Meshkov, the leader of the pro-Russian forces of the autonomy united in the “Russia” Bloc. The same year, elections to the Supreme Council of Crimea were held, also won by said Bloc. S.Tsekov was elected the Supreme Council Chairman. Soon, he had a conflict with Yu.Meshkov. In particular, the Supreme Council introduced amendments to the local Law “On the President of the Republic of Crimea” that seriously restricted presidential powers. In response, on September 11, 1994, Yu.Meshkov issued the Decree “On Organisation of State Governance in the Republic of Crimea in the Period of Preparation and Conduct of a Referendum on the Draft Constitution of the Republic of Crimea”. The Decree suspended the activity of the Supreme Council of Crimea, district, city and city district councils and invalidated mandates of the members of Crimean Parliament and other councils of the autonomy. Till the passage of the new Constitution, powers of the Supreme Council of Crimea were assigned to the President, local powers – to executive committees. The Supreme Council of Crimea, in turn, issued a number of resolutions cancelling that and other presidential decrees.

Escalation of the conflict between the President and the Supreme Council of the Republic made the Ukrainian State authorities take a number of steps returning the Crimea to the Ukrainian legislative framework. On March 17, 1995, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine invalidated the Constitution and a number of laws of the Republic of Crimea. In particular, it cancelled the post of the President of the Republic of Crimea, and termed the Crimea as an administrative-territorial autonomy within Ukraine.



to be a follower of Ukrainian national traditions, in other words, considers himself a Ukrainian. This means that a great part of the Ukrainian ethnos in Crimea under the indifference or encouragement from the local or central authorities is losing identity and follows a different national culture.

Politically, this may be assessed differently, but we know that exactly those things activate pro-Ukrainian and, how some people term them, nationalist organisations. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the problem of identity in Ukraine in general and in Crimea in particular. It may be described with the term **“crisis of identity”**. I would like to stress that now in Ukraine, the economic and political crises are added with the crisis of national identity. Many Ukrainians residing in the South and East of the country and in Crimea are losing in the conditions of now independent Ukraine their identity, nationally cool off, become cosmopolites. For us, Ukrainian nationalist-patriotic politicians, this is highly important, because it is dangerous. We start to get confident that local authorities purposely direct their policy on further Russification of Eastern and Southern Ukrainians. This makes us design plans of protection of Ukrainians from “de-Ukrainisation”. This problem can become at a certain point much more acute and potentially conflict that it may seem at first.

I will touch upon the language problem. **A language has both uniting and dividing functions.** The God has planned nations, each of them having its unique language. Today, there is a struggle going on around the language issues. If we enter the Internet and take a look at posts and articles published there, we will see the following regularity: an article on an economic subject receives some 5-10 comments, but if an article deals with the language issue, national problems, identity, it gets up to 300 comments. They often have not the regular polemic or dispute nature, but some of them are very harsh, even brutal. Many facts prove that the **national issue in Ukraine remains unsolved**. Now it is unclear **what national model Ukraine strives for, and what its prospects are in this respect**. Whether it is built as a national Ukrainian state, or the state Ukrainian by its name but non-Ukrainian in its form and contents, or as a state made out of two-three parts, in the ethno-language meaning. It is evident that this condition is bearing a serious conflict.

Crimea is a part of Ukraine. Different politicians see the model of development of Crimea in the direction desirable for them. Sometimes these models oppose, or are even hostile to one another. And here it seems to me that we underestimate the unifying role of the two languages: Russian and Ukrainian. It happened so, that I am the person responsible for the problems of ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts in the parliamentary Committee for Human Rights and National Minorities. I understand that if we worked right, waged not a political propaganda but a normal, science-based information campaign among the population, the problem would not look so acute.

Take a look. We in Ukraine only speak about conflicts, while conflicts are actually absent – such as in Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. Why? Because Baltic languages are entirely different from Russian. They belong to different language groups. Russian and Ukrainian languages are very similar. All Ukrainians understand the Russian language, all Russians or Russian-speaking – Ukrainian. Nobody explained to people that **one thing unites us here in Ukraine – it is the passive, receptive command of the Ukrainian language**. In my opinion, language policy in Crimea should be oriented at acquirement by highly educated Crimeans of not only Russian, but active acquirement (ability to speak or write) of the state Ukrainian language. It is hard to believe that if a Ukrainian knows Russian language well, it is good, but if a Russian knows Ukrainian language well, it is bad.

One of the bills I recently introduced to the Verkhovna Rada was to oblige people’s deputies of all levels to have a command of the official language. This caused a true outbreak in Crimean press. Meanwhile, people should simply be asked: what language a deputy should know except the official one. Russian? Wonderful! English? Even better! But a Ukrainian deputy should know the official language. Is there a deputy in Poland who does not speak Polish, and in Russia – the one who does not speak Russian?


Unfortunately, the language issue is aggravated by politicians with different political orientations. On the contrary, they should explain to people the uniting role and functions of the Ukrainian language. But they act as if Ukraine demands from state officials to forget Russian language. The state asks them to be well-bred, educated and law-abiding.

So, we should hand down to the authorities, now concentrated on social problems, all the acuteness of the issues of national identity, language, and so on. Maybe, a special programme of social and national development should be developed for Crimea, outlining its prospects. And, probably, of national development – where to lead citizens. Maybe, that latter programme should include a programme at prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts. People should be led. People never go where they want to. People go where they are led. And I wish our authorities to work out such a programme and lead Crimea in the right direction. ■

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**A LAW-RULED STATE SHOULD RESTORE VIOLATED RIGHTS,
NOT APPROVE THE RESULTS OF A CRIME COMMITTED
BY THE TOTALITARIAN REGIME**



Mustafa DZHEMILYOV,
*Chairman,
Subcommittee of the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine Committee for
Human Rights,
National Minorities
and International Relations*

I wish to express my gratitude for the arrangement of this conference, because the issue of Crimea is a very important and topical one. And I wish to hope that this conference will prompt steps aimed at solution of the problems existing in the autonomy.

I will repeat what was said here: “Crimea is a specific region of Ukraine”. Specific primarily for its ethnic mixture formed for historic reasons. This is the only region of Ukraine whose population is dominated by ethnic Russians, mainly Russian-speaking people resettled to Crimea after World War II, after deportation of Crimean Tatars and some other ethnic groups. Now, post-war migrants and their descendants make nearly 80% of the Russian-speaking population.

After the deportation and genocide of Crimean Tatars and other nationalities the Soviet authorities waged a large-scale campaign of defamation of those peoples. First, immigrants from internal Russian regions were settled in the houses of Crimean Tatars, given all their property and told what bad people the deported Crimean Tatars, Bulgarians, Germans, Armenians were. This was generally accepted by the migrants, because this gave them some peace of mind, justification of possession of other people’s property.

More than that, in 1945, a special conference of the Crimean branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences was held, where historians were instructed how to present the Crimean history. They were to explain that Crimean Tatars and all representatives of deported nations had been barbarians, destructive elements. Russians alone were proclaimed bearers of progress. That propaganda lasted for decades. Of course, it tells of current inter-ethnic relations.

In addition, there are many actors for which inter-ethnic tension is vital – and they maintain it.

I looked through the results of Razumkov Centre’s poll, with some things I agree, with some I do not. For instance, the level of separatist spirits in Crimea is estimated at 34%. According to other surveys annually conducted in Crimea, some 70% of the Russian-speaking population see its future as part of Russia. One of the

most recent surveys of the student audience dealt with the students’ perception of the deportation of Crimean Tatars. The results: only 35% flatly condemn it. If we exclude from that 35% some 13% of representatives of deported nations, sure to condemn the deportation, the situation is very much the same – some 70% of Russian-speaking students support deportation. Some of them even suggest that Crimean Tatars should be deported again.

This is a very dangerous trend, somewhat resembling the situation in Nazi Germany with respect to Jews.

I wish to note that those surveys were held among students who at least read and learned something. And if this situation is monitored on the household level, those chauvinist spirits will be much stronger.

Now imagine how representatives of Crimean Tatars feel – since the same spirits, the same percentage of those who support deportation is to be found in, say, the law-enforcement bodies. By the way, that percentage must be even higher in the Crimean Ministry of Internal Affairs, since most cases of discrimination, most of unlawful actions against Crimean Tatars are committed exactly by law-enforcement bodies. The same refers to courts.

I must say that the authorities, despite numerous requests of Crimean Tatars, despite acute situations, do not react, or react very weakly.

For instance, it would be interesting to monitor the Russian-language press in Crimea. Look at headlines alone – in any civilised country, many of them would have been considered in courts as falling under the Criminal Code’s article of instigation of inter-ethnic enmity. Let me read a fragment of just one article titled “Conflict after Kosovo scenario ripens in Crimea” (previously, they used to say “Chechen”, now – “Kosovo”). So: “...There is a disgraceful page in the modern history of the Crimean Tatar people – mass betrayal in the period of the Great Patriotic War”. One might call it a usual chauvinist article, it does not matter what a journalist writes – after all, we enjoy freedom of speech (although freedom of speech in a civilised country involves responsibility).

But this is written by the head of the Crimean militia. What should Crimean Tatars expect from such a law-enforcement officer, and what authorities do we have, if such Nazi propaganda, instigation of inter-ethnic enmity originate from a law-enforcement officer? We hear all the time that we enjoy freedom. This is true. But in any civilised country a man using such phrases with respect to another nation would only not work in law-enforcement bodies – he would answer to the full extent of the law. In this country, this appears to be allowed.

Another example. The situation in Crimea was considered in Strasbourg and the issue of discrimination of Crimean Tatars at employment was touched upon. Then Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea L.Hrach in my presence cynically said: indeed, the share of Crimean Tatars on public

service is smaller than their share in the total population, because Crimean Tatars cannot compete with Russians. That is, Russians turn out to be more advanced than Crimean Tatars. Meanwhile, say, they appointed a former village librarian the Minister of Education – only because she was a CPU (Communist Party - *ed.*) member. And Crimean Tatar professors are pruning grapes, because they are Crimean Tatars.

All in all, Crimean Tatars now make 13% of the population of the autonomy, while their share in the authorities, dependent from the agency, ranges from zero (for instance, the Security Service, Customs) to 3.5%. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs – some 2.3%.

Recently, the Crimea was visited by representatives of the High Commissioner for Nationalities, and we held a conference at the Ministry of Internal Affairs on how law-enforcement bodies should conduct in a polyethnic society. The Deputy Head of the Police reported: we are a tight-knit family, we have representatives of different nations, Crimean Tatars are sufficiently represented. But this is not true: bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employ some 8,000 persons, nearly 300 of whom are Crimean Tatars; the *Berkut* (special law-enforcement unit) has some 2,000 men – and only one Crimean Tatar. Is that proportional?

In a word, the situation is as follows: lie to the world, and flagrant violation of rights in the autonomy itself.

The Security Service is the most interesting. It has some 2,000 officers in Crimea. They in the Service frankly say: if we enrol Crimean Tatars, the Security Service itself should be halved, since many of its officers are engaged in spying on Crimean Tatars. I cannot understand the policy of the Ukrainian State: everybody admits that “Crimean Tatars are the main Ukrainians in Crimea”. And the whole Security Service of Ukraine spies on Crimean Tatars. I personally saw those “top secret” reports sent to Kyiv from Crimea. On the average, by the number of informers attached to our different organisations, control of Crimean Tatars is 110 thousand times stronger than of anybody else.

Next. We touched upon the issue of passage of laws aimed at restoration of rights of deported nations’ representatives. If those rights are not restored, Crimean Tatars will surely continue to seek their restoration, and this will cause conflicts that, in turn, will be used to destabilize the situation in Crimea.

And what goes out, say, with the land issue? When privatization of land began, we more than once applied to the authorities saying that Crimean Tatars returning to their Motherland should not fall under the common rule. For instance, the Land Code reads that land is given in private ownership to those who worked on it, that is, former members of collective farms. Crimean Tatars were not and could not be members of collective farms on the territory of Ukraine. They were members of collective farms in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in exile. That is why the Land Code should include an article stating that

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Crimean Tatars and other deportees returning to their historic Motherland and settling down in rural areas have the same right to land as collective farmers. This was rejected. As a result, so-called “seizures” began.

Next. We drafted a law on restoration of rights of deportees also envisaging the mentioned solving the land problem. Parliament passed that law, but the former President vetoed it down, largely because of the land issue. Experts had told the President that the law should not be approved because it had an item running contrary to the Land Code. Right, if the Land Code had had this norm, we would not have proposed it. We just say that the law should be passed, and then amendments introduced to the Land Code. But our arguments are rejected.

Among his pre-election promises, V.Yushchenko promised to recall the veto, or, if we have no procedure of recall, to re-submit the law to the Verkhovna Rada and present it to the President. Four years have passed after V.Yushchenko was elected President. The promise is still not met. The latest document I got from the Expert Department of the Ministry of Justice repeats what was once said by experts of L.Kuchma. This is a deadlock situation.

In conclusion, on the spirits among people’s deputies. MP O.Doniy recently registered a bill on restoration of the historic toponymy of Crimea. This is a fundamental document, because after deportation of the Crimean Tatar people and other ethnic groups from Crimea – it was a real ethnic cleansing – all traces of the culture of those nations were eliminated. Cemeteries were demolished, mosques blown up, absolutely all populated localities, except Bakhchysarai, were renamed. 1,118 populated localities changed their names. Now, we raise the issue of restoration of historic names.

However, yesterday, the Verkhovna Rada Committee did not support that bill. The main argument was that it would cause displeasure among Crimean residents.

This actually approves the results of a crime committed by the totalitarian regime. A law-ruled state, instead of restoring violated rights, chooses the way of the least conflict: as soon as Russians already live in Crimea, Crimean Tatars are in the minority and will cause no problems.

I must say that if we go that way, indeed, no good prospects should be expected in Crimea as in one of the most sensitive regions of Ukraine. ■

WE SHOULD CHANGE THE PRIORITIES OF STATE POLICY TOWARDS CRIMEA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AUTONOMY AND THE CENTRE



Anatoliy TKACHUK,
Deputy Minister of Regional
Development and Building
of Ukraine

The subject of our today's discussion is highly important. And when it touched upon the survey results dealing with discrimination on language or national grounds, I recalled the old truth: "In the beginning was the Word".

That is, **many problems originate not from natural but from personal factors**. The main of them is that **in course of 17 years, the State failed to formulate an adequate regional policy**. All efforts of the State were mainly concentrated on the social sector, other issues were neglected. As a result, some regions have built their local space – information, educational, economic, finally – mythological, absolutely not integrated into the Ukrainian context. There is no common Ukrainian space, and this is a very big threat.

When we talk about Crimea, it is worth noting the following points.

First: They in Crimea managed to build "a new historic community – "the Soviet people". Everybody who visited Crimea knows that it differs from all other regions of Ukraine, in particular, by preservation of and adherence to many norms and rules invented in the Soviet times. As they in "Artek" put it: everything here remains, as it was under the Soviet Union. That is, we have a reality – the formed Soviet people that have no clear identity and present a certain psychological type different from others.

Second: aspiration of the Crimeans for expansion of autonomous rights. We see, however, that today, when decentralisation of power and establishment of executive bodies of local self-government on the regional level are on the agenda, Crimea is not the best example. It is the only region of the country that has a full-fledged Verkhovna Rada (with permanent members, a speaker and staff), a full-fledged executive body – the Council of Ministers. But the dynamics of indices of its socio-economic development is not better than in other regions of Ukraine, while administration costs are higher. That is, **many questions deal not with the capital or the State, but with the local authorities and their responsibility**. And we see a paradoxical situation: on one hand, the State gave powers, rather wide autonomy, on the other – the people set to form the bodies of power of that autonomy and demand exercise

of those powers appeal to the State and want the State to solve all problems.

Third: effectiveness of the state policy towards Crimea. For instance, the issue of Sevastopol. State programmes passed on Crimea and Sevastopol were many. **No other Ukrainian region, even Donbas with the problems of mines and others, has as many programmes as Crimea**. But sociology shows that as the result, all those programmes fail to improve Ukraine's image in Crimea.

What does this prove? Probably, the policy of drawing the Crimea closer to Ukraine is erroneous. It is Ukraine that should be present in Crimea. That is, vice versa – **not Crimea should come to Ukraine, but Ukraine should come to Crimea**. It is big enough and has enough resources to do that.

Of course, this should be done in the right way.

Indeed, Russia does a lot for Crimea – and this, naturally, gives rise to pro-Russian spirits. Meanwhile, Ukraine invests in Crimea much more funds, but Ukraine is building gas pipelines, water supply systems, schools, while Russian programmes deal with establishment of mass media, issue of grants for higher education – things that deal with the *word* – the word that later gives rise to conflicts. I guess that the shift of priorities is extremely important here.

On the other hand, we should somewhat change the philosophy of relations between the autonomy and the centre, from the viewpoint of the state policy in Crimea. If Crimea is autonomous, its authorities should be responsible for all sectors specified in the Constitution of Ukraine, Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the effective legislation. It has the power, it has the resources – it should have responsibility. *This is the first point*.

Second: Ukraine should be present in Crimea, first of all, in the information, cultural and educational space. Introduction of external testing demonstrated the fallacy of the idea that national minorities should be localised, self-sufficient. It has been said that the system of national school education is good. It appeared, however, that it is not quite true, because national minorities are not integrated into the Ukrainian society and, unfortunately, become less competitive, compared to others.

Third: the issue of Ukrainisation, how it should be arranged. Very simple – we should start with state officials. I will cite a small example of how I ukrainised heads of district state administrations. A candidate for the post of a district state administration head in Dnipropetrovsk region came to me as an adviser to the President of Ukraine for an interview. Having entered the room, he said "hello" in Russian. I explained that he came to an adviser to the Ukrainian President, not Russian – and returned his documents. No other candidate has ever tried to speak Russian with me. So, if there is the resolve, everything can be done rather quickly...

I wish to say that a package of documents is being prepared on the shift of approaches to the regional policy in general and the policy towards Crimea and Sevastopol in particular. If everything goes well, they will be approved in the first half of 2009, and we will have every chance to promptly change the situation for the better. ■

TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE CENTRAL POLICY FOR THE REGIONS



Ihor ZHDANOV,
President,
"Open Policy" Analytical Centre

Listening to people's deputies, I was impressed by their criticism of the authorities that "do not care about Crimean problems". Dear colleagues, you are the authorities, you are the executive branch, you can pass laws and regulate relations. I understand that this year, the Verkhovna Rada actually did not work, and last year – worked with a different majority... But work goes on, and we should not only complain but pass concrete decisions.

It so happens that it is Razumkov Centre that raises the issues neglected by the state authorities.

While in early and mid-1990s Crimea was dominated by openly separatist spirits, in late 1990s - early 2000s, the situation was stabilised by the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities, and the "political temperature" in the autonomy went down. This was a result of activities of the authorities that really dealt, to the best of their abilities, with the problems of the autonomy.

However, in 2005-2008, another trend appeared. The first factor that played a negative role was that the Crimean residents in their mass supported other than V.Yushchenko candidate for the President. That is why in 2005 the Crimeans felt lost, extremely disposed against the central authorities and cherished serious opposition spirits.

It should be noted that **the central authorities and top executives had no integral systemic policy towards the Autonomous Republic of Crimea**. It was chaotic, irregular and confined to isolated attempts of solving separate problems. The Crimea was actually let adrift, solve its problems by itself, without regard to the capital. The Crimean political elite is actually not integrated into the Ukrainian.

That is, in 2004-2008, the Autonomy saw conservation of negative anti-Ukrainian spirits of the public.

Meanwhile, public spirits are largely shaped by the information policy. The Crimean television and radio stations are transmitting programmes in Russian language, often anti-Ukrainian. As one may see from the survey results, 81% of the polled reported that they personally saw no facts of forced Ukrainisation, but they believed that it took place. This proves the existence of a virtual information space in Crimea, which should be taken into account.

Indeed, freedom of speech is guaranteed in Ukraine, and no media may be banned because they propagate some ideas not involving threats to the national security – this is nonsense that may cause only resistance.

A competitive information product, Ukrainian by its substance, should be created in Crimea. It may not necessarily be in the Ukrainian language, at least at the initial stage, since Ukrainian language version may cause aversion. It is more important to promote Ukrainian ideas than create another newspaper or TV channel not demanded in the autonomy.

Additionally, almost immediately after the return of Crimean Tatars to their homeland, another negative factor arose – the land issue. Although the problem was not unexpected: yet in 2001 we noted that the land issue would become one of the Crimean "apples of discord".

Hence, the main problems of the Crimea are of economic and land origin. Those problems should be somehow solved now. Otherwise the conflict situation will aggravate and bring serious unpredicted consequences. The responsibility for that rests with the Ukrainian central authorities, including the President.

On the scenario of developments in the autonomy, I will be frank: given the current state of affairs, I am not optimistic.

In the first place I wish to dwell upon the problem of 2017, as it may conventionally be termed – the problem related with the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet. Although the central authorities raise that issue in relations with Russia, the public opinion in Sevastopol is not prepared.

If I am not mistaken, quite many branches of Russian higher educational establishments operate in Crimea, including Sevastopol. They appropriately teach young people who, taking rather an active stand, will shape public spirits in Crimea in 2017. Unfortunately, no branches of respected national universities were opened there to offset those educational establishments – the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy or the Kyiv National University, – to turn out Ukrainian-minded intellectuals who could oppose regular pro-Russian spirits.

That is, 2017 is not only a political and legal issue of Ukraine's relations with Russia, a technical issue of withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet, but also an issue of public spirits, including among Sevastopol residents, that will exist at that time.

Without due consideration of those factors, any attempts of Ukrainisation will cause only resistance and negative trends. Unfortunately, **today, resolve alone is not enough to pursue Ukrainian policy in Crimea. There should be respect for the authorities** implementing certain measures.

Threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity are another matter. I am absolutely positive that any attempts of soonest accession to NATO in such conditions may result in the growth of threats to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, or, speaking openly, we can lose at least Sevastopol. Even on the condition of a referendum.

What to do? At least, to publicly discuss now the concept of the regional policy, the concepts of documents drafted by the Ministry, to make our intellectual contribution, to pass those documents, to back their implementation with funds, and to work.

I hope that in 2009, strategic document on the regional policy will finally be passed, to shape the centre's policy with respect to regions, including Crimea. ■

PUBLIC OPINION OF CRIMEANS IS BEING "SOCIALISED", THE ISSUES OF LANGUAGE, TOPONYMY, ETC. RECEDE TO THE BACKGROUND



Vitaliy KULYK,
Director,
Centre for Civil Society Studies

I wish to note that the issues of identity, and moreover – toponymy in Crimea are losing their urgency from the national security viewpoint.

Our Centre also surveyed the public opinion of Crimeans living in one of the Crimean regions – Greater Yalta. We were primarily interested in the issues of effectiveness of local self-government, communication between local council members and voters, and so on. But to see the full picture, we also put a number of general questions. The first stage of the survey was held in May, the second ended on December 5, 2008.

What did we see?

In the social sector. In May, the list of problems that concerned residents of Greater Yalta was topped by unemployment. It was followed, in the descending order, by: refusal of the State from social obligations; mismatch of prices with wages and pensions; utility problems; forced Ukrainisation. The threat of an inter-ethnic conflict ranked 10th.

In December, the list was topped by the mismatch of prices with wages and pensions, followed by refusal of the State from social obligations; unemployment; deepening of property stratification of the population; threat of an inter-ethnic conflict. Forced Ukrainisation moved from the fifth position to the 14th.

Therefore, in December, the situation looked entirely different. While in May, the majority of focus group participants rated the issue of Ukrainisation first or second and tried to speak more about it, in December, the top ranks and 90% of time in focus groups were devoted to the social sector: issues of social policy, unemployment,

wages, pensions, prices, consumer forecasts, etc. That is, Ukrainisation receded into the background. At that, participants of focus groups could not even explain how they understood "forced Ukrainisation". That is, the phenomenon exists but they cannot explain what it means.

That is why I entirely agree with conclusions of Razumkov Centre, we also noticed a decrease in the importance of the problems dealing with language, inter-ethnic relations, etc.

Next: on one hand, residents of Greater Yalta are afraid of an inter-ethnic conflict. At the same time, 75% stand for peaceful co-existence and tolerance among Russians, Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars.

In focus groups involving Russian-speakers and Crimean Tatars, we saw the following picture. Russian-speakers argued that they were quite tolerant to Crimean Tatars, while considering the behaviour of the Crimean Tatar community to be intolerant. Assertions of Crimean Tatars were just the opposite.

That is, there are grounds to admit the existence of two "worlds" that do not speak to each other and, the main thing, do not want to hear each other. Russian-speakers do not want to listen to the arguments of Crimean Tatars, Crimean Tatars do not want to listen to the arguments of Russian-speakers.

While in May, a lot was said about the issues of land, squatting, actions of Police on the Ai-Petri, demolition of illegal constructions, in December, Crimean Tatars and Russian-speakers mainly spoke about unemployment and growth of prices. The issue of squatting also effaced.

In the political sector. While in May, residents of Greater Yalta showed interest mainly in intrigues of BYuT and the Party of Regions in Greater Yalta, competition among different groups of interests in the Party of Regions, contradictions between the Livadiya village Head and Yalta's Mayor, etc., in December, there appeared a watershed between "them" – politicians, political forces, and "us" – residents, citizens facing problems of utilities, neglect of their interests at allocation of land, etc. And politics is "their problem", of minor interest for "us".

While in May, experts of our Centre saw more or less stable ratings, the growing rating of BYuT and decreasing – of the Party of Regions, now, all representatives of the leaders of the public opinion during the expert polls spoke of "floating" ratings. There were seasonal changes – literally within a week, the public perception of political parties was changing by 5-10%.

So, some conclusions can be made.

1) The public opinion is being "socialised", meaning growth of the importance of social issues for citizens.

2) We can state the existence of two "worlds" in Crimea – Crimean Tatars and Russian-speakers, that do



not want to listen – I mean it – do not want to hear the arguments of each other. This is stirred up by the local media shaping steady perceptions that are not subject to logical rational argumentation.

3) Protest spirits are growing. In May, readiness to take part in protests in case of violation of their rights was reported by 25% of residents of Greater Yalta, in December – up to 45%.

Under certain circumstances, such social protests can be canalised to an inter-ethnic conflict, because the blame for the problems may be put on representatives of another ethnic or language group.

For the time being, the “temperature” in Greater Yalta is not too high, but there is a trend towards its rise.

One simple example: in May, locals could easily find work as guards at villas and mansions in the area of Greater Yalta, or as shiftmen at those villas. In December, almost all local workers were fired and replaced with newcomers or representatives of some recruiting companies engaged in security and services. As a result, we recorded growing dissatisfaction of the local population, especially groups that have no big land plots and no opportunity to render quality services during the tourist season, with the owners of big estates in the area of Greater Yalta.

I would term this as kind of “unconscious class consciousness”, a class feeling. The blame for the absence of wages, jobs, growing prices is put on the owners of big real estate, big capital that possess property on seashore. Exactly they are pointed as the cause of all tragedies, woes and misfortunes of the local population, especially experiencing problems with utilities (for instance, almost 65% of facilities in Greater Yalta are not heated), gas cuts and blackouts, etc.

This is especially true for residents of the private sector in Livadiya, whose buildings are not even listed in the real estate register of Greater Yalta and absent on the map. This gave rise to legal actions and problems associated with privatisation of land in Livadiya.

So, in my opinion, as the State has no reliable mechanisms of influence on local processes, emphasis on virtual problems, in fact, simulacra – ukrainisation, confrontation of Crimean Tatars and Russian-speakers, etc. – is dangerous and short-sighted⁴. The problems that concern people now, in December – Crimean Tatars, Russian-speakers, Ukrainian-speakers – are the same: wages, unemployment, prices, but not language or place-names.

If political forces of the country are able to effectively influence those spirits, are able to master mechanisms to prevent canalisation of those protest spirits to an inter-ethnic conflict, then, we will save and preserve Crimea. And create a mechanism of normal tolerant co-existence of representatives of different groups of the population.

If this is not done, conflicts on social grounds will deepen. Then, it will be not a social but a class conflict,

an unconscious class feeling will be transformed in the awareness of the class interest. And the enemy will be seen in those who have a building or a mansion, or a business, and those who belong to a different nationality or speak different language. Then, the situation will get out of control. Political forces representing radical views will become popular. I do not wish to say that they will be solely pro-Russian. They may be radical Islamist and fundamentalist groups, or nationalist racist groups – for instance, boneheads, now present in Sevastopol and Simferopol.

In such case the situation may reach a critical point and bring unpredictable consequences. *So far*, I stress again, the temperature has not reached the boiling point, but it is moving in that direction. If the state does not make attempts to stop this process, I guess that as soon as February, 2009, we will face serious social problems not only in the area of Greater Yalta but all over Crimea. ■

ALL ACADEMICIANS OF THE WORLD WILL NOT GIVE A “SCIENTIFIC RECIPE” HOW TO RESTORE HISTORIC JUSTICE. THIS IS AN ISSUE OF DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE



Yevhen BYSTRYTSKY,
Executive Director,
International Renaissance
Foundation

Our discussion proves that Crimea is a knot of problems, as complex as the problems of entire Ukraine. It is hard to cover it with one study, so, they should be studied further, desirably with greater involvement of Crimean think tanks.

The Renaissance Foundation has long and, I dare hope, successfully been supporting Crimean projects. In particular, jointly with the Government of the Netherlands, the Foundation supported a large-scale programme “Integration of Crimean Tatar Population and other Deported Peoples into Ukrainian Society”, in pursuance of which we worked together, in particular, with Majlis. Results: *first*, textbooks on the basic subjects for 5th-6th grades in Crimean Tatar language were published, which helped mitigate language conflicts. *Second*: a Crimean Tatar library was established – a cultural centre that could provide a platform for communication of different ethnic, cultural, confessional groups and public associations.

We also supported a project of establishment of a dialogue of Muslim communities with Crimean Government, development of ethnic tourism, and so on. In the recent years, together with the European

⁴ Simulacrum (from Latin *simulare* – to pretend), here – an artificial, concocted structure presented as reality.

Commission, we have been working on a tolerance-building project that envisages introduction of lessons of tolerance at schools, on television, etc. Now, we are transferring equipment for Crimean public radio – it may be established.

And, finally, the project in English called *e-governments* – electronic governance in Crimea. In particular, a centre of electronic governance was established in Sudak, thanks to which Sudak and Crimean residents can (or will be able to) get open information and some services from the local government. That is, a dialogue is being established among citizens, public organisations, business and the local government.

Why was this done in Crimea? It offers huge prospects. I wish to say that **despite the slightful look at the so-called “Soviet mentality” spread now, Crimea sometimes shows more “Soviet-type” rationality than other regions of Ukraine.** The Sudak authorities agreed to take part in the project not because they were so democratic but because they saw that they should somehow establish a dialogue with citizens – at least to mitigate the level of social dissatisfaction.

From the practice of work in Crimea I can draw the conclusion that not everything is so terrible there as it sometimes seems. We should just work. If we keep on saying that the authorities should promote or do something – the list may be continued – this will be senseless lamentations. Authorities should do that, but how? To develop a centralised programme? To delegate power, decentralise it, and then control its decentralised operation? How?

I remember the year of 1993, when a “land force” disembarked in Crimea, made up of P.Movchan and S.Khmara who decided to ukrainise Crimea within a week or month. So what? The consequences were much worse than one might have expected. In the wake of democratic renaissance of Ukraine as a nation, a potentially *united nation*, more harm was done to that unity than any external influence could do.

My idea is simple: **attention should be turned to civil society.**

What I heard here is alarming. We have long known that the most active and popular public organisations in Crimea are, as they were termed, “verbal, propagandist organisations”. Those organisations are politicised and pro-Russian. Although they little care for the authorities to be accountable, not corrupt, transparent, to provide quality services, and so on. This controversy deserves attention.

I can say about my personal experience of work with Crimean non-governmental organisations. Most of them like to arrange conferences, round-tables. This is indeed some heritage of the “country of Soviets” where everybody gives advice. As some of their activists put it, “there is no issue on which we could not arrange a conference”. At the same time, Crimean public organisations are less disposed to direct actions. What actions? To insist on publication of some information. On protection and restoration of

somebody’s rights. On establishment of order in land issues ... This is less customary in Crimea.

How to get out of this situation?

As a donor organisation, we will issue grants to organisations that will monitor, lobby, criticise and do in Crimea everything a non-governmental organisation should do. I guess that we will be ready to support Kyiv’s think tanks – for them to manage the establishment of independent think tanks in Crimea. We should do this together with other donors, to involve more Crimean analysts in such discussion...

But this should be done on the Ukrainian scale. **The central authorities after the Orange Revolution, when they swore on civil society, forgot even the words “civil society”.** They became populist and appeal to each of us separately: we will raise your salary, your pension, we will secure you against crisis. They are absolutely unwilling to talk to public associations, serious groups and non-governmental organisations representing different private and collective interests in Ukraine.

For conclusion. I heard a standard for a post-Soviet country suggestion: give us “scientific recipes” – and we will do everything. The thing is that the main problem that needs to be solved in Crimea lies in restoration of *historic justice*. But neither political nor philosophic science has worked out the theory of historic justice. One should not even hope that one day, there will be a science of historic justice – those issues are not academic in their essence.

This is an issue of democratic practice, of the practice of democratisation. So, MPs and all representatives of the authorities should know and be aware that all academicians of the world will not give a reasonable recipe how to do this in Crimea. This is an issue of democratisation of the whole country, an issue of cooperation of the Government with citizens, including civil society. ■

THE MAIN REASON FOR TENSION IN CRIMEA – IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE UKRAINIAN RULING CLASS



Viktor KOTYHORENKO,
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named after I.F.Kuras
of the NAS of Ukraine

The presented survey gives answers to highly topical issues on what is going on in Crimea. But just like any sociological survey, it does not give an answer to the question why this happens, and what to do.

So, according to the results of this survey, as well as of the Yalta survey, proper ethnic, ethno-national, language



and other similar problems in Crimea rank in the second ten, while in Ukraine in general, they rank in the third ten among problems that concern citizens. Almost simultaneously with the survey, we were monitoring the leading Crimean mass media. Judging by it, **the issues of prices and salaries do not dominate in Crimean information space – it is dominated by the issue of discrimination of the Russian language**, witnessed by no one, as the survey proves. **Cancellation of the autonomous status of Crimea is another topical problem.** That is, Crimean information space is dominated by marginal Tyahnybok and marginal Russian nationalists, with the subjects interesting for them.

But Crimean information space is not impersonal. In reality, all information resources in Crimea (and whole Ukraine) are controlled by certain financial-industrial groups that built up a political resource in the form of political parties, blocs, etc.

So, it may be stated for sure that **the main reason for the heightened, or potential danger of conflicts in Crimea lies in political irresponsibility of all Ukrainian national and regional groups of the ruling class** that for their corrupt business and narrow political electoral interests actualise the subjects that in reality do not bother people. Subjects that really concern people are the same in Crimea, Lviv, Chernihiv, Kyiv, and the survey proves this.

The second reason is the unprincipled **struggle of different groups of the ruling class for Crimean land, recreational and other resources**, resting on political irresponsibility. In that struggle, they are using a classical method: to conceal their corrupt (in fact, criminal) acts at seizure and privatisation of Crimean resources, they canalise dissatisfaction of Crimeans to the subject of inter-ethnic relations: the land conflict between the Russian-speaking and Crimean Tatar population, the Russian language, Russification/Ukrainisation, and so on. In reality, the problems are entirely different.

The third reason is also related with political irresponsibility. It is the **inability of the Ukrainian state and local authorities to practically respond to practical challenges, first of all – socio-economic**. One can mention here a few programmes of social adaptation of Crimean Tatars, a few well thought-over, literate decisions and NSDC recommendations and requirements passed under President L.Kuchma and President V.Yushchenko. Today, it may be said with for sure that **none of those programmes and right NSDC decisions has been implemented. Partially – because of incompetence, but mainly – because of corrupt interests.**

The fourth is the **destructive external influences**, first of all, in the information space, primarily from Russia, Saudi Arabia and some other countries. Ukrainian business groups are involved, too. Special services know what foreign states, what political forces in Ukraine finance Hizb al-Tahrir, Tyahnybok and many others.

Hence, **there is tough struggle for access to power as a tool of redistribution of economic resources.** This is the main reason.

What to do? Results of public opinion polls show that problems and conflicts lie not in ethnic, ethno-political, ethno-cultural relations but in the socio-economic sector.

If we want to solve the problems of Crimean Tatars, it is not the issue of their provision with land. In reality, this is the issue of inventory of Crimean land, the state land register, identification of real owners. This is the working out the integral all-Crimean programme of development of Crimean land resources, production, including agricultural, on Crimean territory. Provision of Crimean Tatars with land is only a part of that issue.

Once, it was proposed to grow cotton in Crimea. Profitability of cotton growing is four times higher than of wheat, with its crisis of overproduction and sale. Meanwhile, there are professionals in the branch who came from Uzbekistan...

Then, the issue of resettlement of Crimean Tatars to Crimean shore might be less acute, because Crimean Tatars would be economically motivated to work in the steppe zone, where they were settled, contrary to their traditional habitat before deportation...

Again, **the main task is to fight corruption, corrupt acts committed on Crimean territory** by representatives of both local and central authorities and of business, including Russian. Law-enforcement bodies should resolutely fight those things. But how can they fight, if they are integrated into all existing corrupt schemes?

One may say – let us hold a round-table with journalists, speak about the code of journalist ethics... But all journalists depend on owners interested to canalise problems to inter-ethnic relations, inter-ethnic conflicts. To fish in those troubled waters. This also poses a problem.

Legislative support. As far as I remember, comments to the Law on Restoration of Rights of Deportees had no mention of land – it must be edited and passed. This would at least partially mitigate the tension.

However, the political will is absent. It is absent because there is no interest in practical regulation of the socio-economic situation in Crimea. **Some political forces, financial-industrial groups in Ukraine, including those in power, are interested in the maintenance of the conflict situation.**

And there is, of course, a Russian geopolitical interest – as it now sees it, for some reason suggesting that it will win from a conflict situation in Crimea. It will not, because this will instigate conflicts in Russia itself. But such is the idea of the Russian establishment of the situation in Crimea.

Summing up, I stress once again: the main reason lies in the irresponsibility of different groups of the Ukrainian ruling class, ready to burn their own house for the sake of profit. ■

THE STATE POLICY IS REPLACED WITH PATRONAGE OF CRIMEA BY POLITICIANS FROM CERTAIN POLITICAL PARTIES



Yuliya TYSHCHENKO,
Head of the Council,
Ukrainian Independent Centre
for Political Studies

The presented survey is one of the first attempts to describe some elements of a specific Crimean identity being formed. They in Crimea say “we are Crimeans”, that is, the phenomenon of such regional identity really exists.

We should note, however, that it is kind of a quasi phenomenon. If we analyse what the adherents of that Crimean identity say, we will note that this rests on the doctrine of the *Russian world*, now highly popular in Russia and actually extended to the entire post-Soviet space. To be sure, it is actively promoted in Crimea – by many Crimean politicians, at educational establishments, and by some very active public organisations (including the “Russian Community of Crimea”, integrated into Crimean politics).

An interesting idea was expressed here: “Ukraine should come to Crimea”. In principle, this is true. Then, a question arises: what Ukraine should come, how, and to whom? If we look attentively, **there are many myths in Crimea, but Kyiv also has myths about the relations between Kyiv and Crimea.** What do I mean?

One of those myths is that Kyiv has no state policy with respect to Crimea. I do not want to act as an advocate, but in more or less remote past, a number of fundamental documents were passed, including the State Programme of Socio-Economic Development of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea through 2017. That is, political goals and tasks have been set. The problem is different: very poor implementation of the policy – in land relations, in education, culture, in toponymy (we can keep on saying of irrelevance of the issue of place-names, but if we look at the documents of 2006, they envisage at least study of that issue, so, it was among the priorities of the state policy towards Crimea).

Why is that policy not implemented? Maybe it is an issue of political will, but also of coordination of actions of the central and local authorities, while today, such coordination (or at least communication) on the state level is absent...

So, **Ukraine in principle has come to Crimea, but very specifically.** The state policy is replaced with patronage of the region by politicians from certain political parties.

Isolation of Crimean political elite from the Ukrainian context is also a myth. The membership of parliamentary parties witnesses to the contrary, they have powerful Crimean politicians in their ranks who influence, in particular, the information space of the region and could in principle assist with “Ukraine coming to Crimea”.

Another important issue we often neglect is that of assimilation of Crimean Tatars. I have no ready answer: how, say, Russian assimilation may differ from Ukrainian assimilation of that ethnos in Crimea. If we frankly speak about harmonisation of inter-ethnic relations, removal of risks of a conflict, **we should be aware of the problems of preserving the identity of Crimean Tatar nation. We should build inter-ethnic relations with utmost tolerance and account of the needs of a whole nation** with a very difficult historic fate. Maybe, we should demonstrate greater understanding of the issues of toponymy and, first of all, education.

It was mentioned here that schoolchildren representing national minorities are not competitive at testing. But let us take a look at the system of education for national minorities, at national schools. In fact, there, teaching is organised in Russian language, since they lack personnel, textbooks... This is a separate subject for a separate discussion.

A lot has been said about Crimean information space in the context of “Ukraine coming to Crimea”. In principle, I agree with the proposal of establishment of a medium, maybe in Russian language, to transmit information offsetting external influences on Crimea and Crimean situation. Meanwhile, there are 27 municipal media in Crimea – all in the Russian language. Maybe we should start with two-language versions...

By the way, the code of journalist ethics was mentioned here – for reference: we have one in Crimea for a long time, it was approved yet in early 2000s and signed by all without exception, but nothing has changed. There were surveys, conferences, trainings – but, unfortunately, they change nothing. They only illustrate our usual “fatiuity of efforts”...


One more comment on the information space. The title of our today’s event is “Crimea Today and Tomorrow: Territory of Risk, or Conflict Zone?” – is basically good, but only for an expert community. **Today, we are traditionally trying to associate Crimea with crisis, conflict, risk.** By and large, we ourselves reproduce negative senses and substances. Of course, this has nothing in common with the language of enmity often used by Crimean media. But still, the subjects and even problems should be formulated more positively.

Now, on the Law “On Restoration of Rights of Persons Deported on National Grounds” (its current title). The issue remains unresolved since 2004. Yet in 2007 it was said that the law would be submitted to Parliament as a matter of priority. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Meanwhile, **passage of that Law would help solve a number of issues of Crimean Tatars integration, their status, finally, settle land issues and other problems.**

By the way, the land issue and associated corrupt schemes really deserve a separate discussion. But let us address the decisions now passed by Crimean authorities. For instance, a register of all deportees and their land plots was mentioned. That decision may well be lawful. But why not inventory of all Crimean land? Because that infringes on somebody's unlawfully acquired ownership rights?

...So, what to do with all those problems? To implement the existing reasonable policy. To work with local authorities, since a lot depends on them. I wish to say that our Centre is implementing interesting projects involving local authorities in Crimea. For instance, in 2007, some 300 city mayors passed training with us. I hope that our projects will help "lead Crimea to Ukraine". ■

TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN CRIMEA, ONE SHOULD IN THE FIRST PLACE REFUSE FROM THE POLICY OF FORCED CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE ASSIMILATION...



Volodymyr STUS,
*Head of the group of analysts
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Center for Strategic Initiatives*

Results of the presented sociological survey demonstrate, on one hand, absolute ineffectiveness of the state policy, on the other – inconsistency of the perceptions imposed upon us over the past decades with the real state of affairs. It will be a pity if they are left on a shelf and forgotten, as it happened more than once.

Meanwhile, even our discussion shows that such pessimistic prospects of use of those data are quite probable. Judge for yourselves: while the majority of Crimeans rank the status of Russian language and forced Ukrainisation among their top concerns, we are again told that this is unimportant, "this is not in the first ten". That is, the sociological survey results are actually denied.

While the majority of Crimeans, speaking of the reasons for inter-ethnic tension, put the blame on the Kyiv authorities and speak of their incompetence, more than that – of the provocative character of their policies, the survey contains no mention of this. Instead, we hear traditional: "fifth column", "science-based PR campaign", and so on.

Instead of realising why after so many years of independence we see such "outstanding" indices of Ukrainisation in Crimea and what to do next, how to get out of the situation, we are talking about further Ukrainisation. Ukrainisation may be possible on a bureaucratic level – although this will not make work more effective. But how to ukrainise voters? No answer.

What is the reason for the crisis and the potential conflict? In my view, it lies in the conflict between the growing democracy of society, caused, in particular, by the Maidan (Orange Revolution – *ed.*), on one hand, and continued attempts of forcible cultural and language unification of Ukraine, cultural assimilation of other ethnoses, imposition of language, religion, culture, an idea of history and traditions inherent in one region upon all regions of the country – on the other. This is the main reason for the conflict.

How will the situation be developing?

I am highly sceptical about the prospects of passage of legislative acts mentioned here in 2009. There will be other priorities – the crisis will evolve, the presidential campaign will be in sight, the need to win support, in particular, of Crimean voters – all this hinders the adoption of laws on languages, on repressed nations, on all other issues. One more concrete forecast is as follows: in 2009 and later on, schoolchildren will be allowed to pass tests in their native language, not only in Ukrainian.

At the same time, the pre-election situation will soften potential conflict lines in the region. Before elections, an explosion on the national or any other grounds is unlikely, since people will have an opportunity to demonstrate their position at elections.

What are the ways to improve the situation?

First of all, Ukraine-wide, going beyond the competence of Crimea; it has its specific problems, but **generally speaking, Crimea is the focus point of all-Ukrainian problems.**

The first way presumes refusal from the policy of forced cultural and language assimilation. Refusal of the State from interference in the cultural, information, language sectors. On one hand, this will be a decent response to Russia's influence. As soon as language issues, issues of cultural versatility are removed, Moscow will have no arguments left. On the other, this may win more votes of Crimean voters. Figuratively speaking, one may as long as he wishes compare Crimeans with "wrong bees that make the wrong honey", but those "wrong bees", living in the Soviet past and unwilling to be ukrainised, are voters. Exactly as the effectiveness of a scientist is judged by the correspondence of his analyses and forecasts to realities, the effectiveness of a politician is judged by the number of people voting for him.

The second way presumes decentralisation. It was also mentioned, and also promised by the Maidan.

And, finally, **the last possible way is to raise voters' influence on the authorities on all levels, from a village council and up.** It was reported that corruption topped the rating of complaints about the authorities. However, corruption cannot be defeated from the top, everybody knows that. The only way is to mobilise voters for that struggle. A system of influence is needed, no matter – in Crimea, in Kyiv, in Western Ukraine – of a concrete voter on the authorities in-between elections.

In conclusion, I wish to make one proposal regarding the survey. In the future, I suggest distinguishing between the notions of “Russian” and “Russia’s”. This is very important – a man of the “Russian cultural tradition” means something entirely different from “Russia’s cultural tradition”. Introduction of such differentiation, in my opinion, will clearly delimit and show this semantic difference. ■

THE SITUATION IN CRIMEA MAY BE TERMED AS THE INITIAL STAGE OF COMMUNALISM. THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY OUT – DIALOGUE...



Serhiy DANYLOV,
Deputy Director,
Centre for Middle Eastern Studies

We, too, implemented a project similar to the one discussed today. In the near future, a report on its results will be published – “Islam and Policy of Identity in Crimea: from Symbolic Wars to Recognition of Cultural Variety”.

I wish to say that today’s presentations contain absolutely correct characteristics of the processes taking place in Crimea. I would like to specifically note the point of absence of a dialogue, and complement it.

As you know, the gravest violent conflict happened in 2006 in Bakhchysarai, at Azizleri – a spontaneous market that arose on the site of an old Muslim cemetery. A year after we arranged a seminar with participants of that conflict – representatives of both parties, including one of the leaders of local Cossack organisations. When asked “*Have you ever got together after the conflict?*”, both Crimean Tatars and a representative of Cossack organisations said “No”. “*Did the situation improve one year after the conflict?*” The answers were: “*We are trying but a scar remained*”. “*We will feel this trauma for long, but we never met and talked, we do not communicate*”. “*We communicate as neighbours*”, “*We contact in business affairs*” (some people do business together irrespective of nationality). So, representatives of the parties to the conflict talk about everyday affairs but do not talk about what split them...

The situation may be termed as the initial stage of communalism, which is very dangerous⁵.

All in all, we arranged more than 20 seminars last year that involved some 200 persons – representatives of the local authorities, school principals, journalists (by the way, we also invited editors and journalists of the media which published controversial materials that drew

attention of public prosecutor’s offices, but they ignored the invitation). Our seminars were attended by Cossack representatives of the “Russian Bloc” – people of the newly-acquired specific identity or quasi identity termed by us as “neo-Cossack”.

Actually all participants of seminars intuitively feel lack of a public platform for communication, while reporting readiness for it. That is, on one hand, “we can talk about anything”, on the other – “there is no place where we can talk about those problems”.

That is, there are some “theoretic constructs” in the heads of those people, a highly mythologised image of *others*, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, some fantastic ideas and events standing behind. And when the talk begins, one easily notices, on one hand, the lack of knowledge and understanding of *others*, on the other – the lack of communication, contacts. At that, **many Crimeans, irrespective of nationality, are ready for communication and even want it**. Say, almost all representatives of new Cossacks kept on stressing: “I have a friend – a Crimean Tatar”, “I have nothing against Crimean Tatars”, and so on.

There is also lack of knowledge and understanding of not only *others* but of the very situation in Crimea. The same unfortunately refers to representatives of the authorities and local self-government bodies. Just one example. As you know, Alushta is the home of one of the biggest organisations of Hizb al-Tahriri that *de facto* seized a mosque and publishes the only in the post-Soviet space official newspaper *Tahrir* (“Renaissance”). We took an interview from the Deputy Mayor of Alushta responsible for inter-ethnic relations. When asked whether she knew of any problems in the Muslim community of Alushta, she said: “*What problems? No problems at all. Or, I heard there was something, they quarrelled...*”. That is, **even the authorities totally misunderstand the current processes**, or even worse – do not want to understand them...

This is a certain stage of communalism. There is one way out – to create platforms for dialogue. We should talk. People are ready for that and want that. This especially applies to heads, secretaries, members of village and settlement councils. The situation in cities is worse, especially in Simferopol, as you know.

Furthermore, there is **lack of attention from the capital**. Crimeans want Kyiv to talk to them. Working in Crimea, we continuously heard: “Thank you, it appears that someone in Kyiv concerns about Crimea”. This is a quotation. A standard phrase people write in questionnaires we distribute after a seminar: “It appears that Kyiv knows about our problems”.

That is, **people feel lost**. There may be infantile reactions, reactions of not self-sufficient people or societies suffering from some complexes and requiring compensatory mechanisms, but this is everyday reality.

⁵ Communalism – here: localisation of a community on the basis of religion, confinement within its limits, refusal from communication with other religious communities. Extreme manifestation of communalism may include mutual enmity of the concerned communities and conflicts on religious grounds.

Another point: symbolic and mythological things are not less important for Crimea than realities. Indeed, State recognition of the fact of the crime committed by the totalitarian regime is highly important for Crimean Tatar people. However, the State has failed to do this. Instead, it develops, beyond doubt, necessary but in some respect less important programmes of construction of roads, sewerage, communication lines, etc.

In conclusion, a few words about the results of our project “Islam and Policy of Identities”. By contrast to other regions, in Crimea, religion is turning into a powerful source of public legitimisation and an important mechanism of construction of other group identities. Sanctuaries are in the focus of confrontation among groups. All violent conflicts (with few exceptions) are related with sanctuaries. Continuation and escalation of conflicts containing a religious element, *first*, enhance the risk of radicalisation of some groups within conflicting communities, *second* – create additional opportunities for outside interference, both on the state and sub-state level.

At that, religious organisations are unable and, the main thing, unwilling to be tolerant, being involved in group competition. Meanwhile, in most cases religious organisations involved in conflicts were not their initiators or drivers. The nature of such conflicts is political. Hence, the ways of removal of conflict situations are to be political.

And the last thing. One of our seminars coincided with the Day of Russia. My colleague and I were watching the celebrations, while youths carrying the banner “*Crimea with Russia for ages*” asked us: “*Are you for Russia?*”. Word after word, I thought there will be a quarrel, but suddenly, one of those youths said: “*We do not care about Russia. We are Crimeans*”...

I WISH SURVEYS OF THE SITUATION IN CRIMEA WERE PUBLIC DOMAIN AND A SUBJECT OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION



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Department of Religious Studies,
Institute of Philosophy named after
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of the NAS of Ukraine

I represent the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences, the Department of Religious Studies, where a scientific research group on Islam has been created. We make field trips to Crimea and study the situation locally.

I will not say what I previously wanted to say – about inter-confessional relations, who finances public

organisations, scenarios of development – all this has already been discussed. Instead, I wish to make a number of comments on our studies and the survey presented here today.

Having reviewed the survey results, I understand that this is the first stage, not the final. I hope that it will have a section devoted to intra- and inter-confessional issues, since we are surveying the situation in Crimea and know that there are problems, some of them very acute.

Unfortunately, our **studies are almost not known to the public, only a few people see them**. But we work in that field, just as you do.

Regretfully, today, I did not see an expert discussion. We just spoke, made our views and opinions of the situation in Crimea known to each other, but there was no discussion as such.

There was and there is, here and everywhere, **no communication with state bodies competent in Crimean affairs**. In particular, today, I did not see the official responsible for the inter-confessional situation in Crimea, who, unfortunately, presents not quite true information to Kyiv.

That is why I wish our cooperation continued and be presented to the public, for these surveys to be treated like recommendations for the Government, not to stay our store of knowledge. Thank you for the survey highly valuable for scientists. ■

GETTING OVER THE GENERAL POLITICAL CRISIS IN UKRAINE IS THE KEY PRECONDITION FOR SOLUTION OF CRIMEAN PROBLEMS



Volodymyr FESENKO,
Chairman of the Board,
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The issues proposed for the round-table are extremely urgent, and their discussion proved that problems in Crimea, unfortunately, do not go down and in some respects even go up.

Touching upon the first item, I was struck by the trends of the recent years, namely, **the notable deterioration of the situation with public identity of Crimeans over the past year of two**. This refers to the perception of Ukraine as Motherland, feeling like a patriot of Ukraine. This is a very dangerous trend.

On the other hand, the high level of pro-Russian spirits and concurrent ambivalence of the public opinion deserve attention: 64% of those polled want Crimea to be part of Russia, and 50% – for Crimea staying autonomous within



Ukraine. This, in principle, prompts the conclusion that not everything has been lost, we should not overly dramatise the situation.

Nevertheless, the trends are very dangerous. Why have they arisen so recently?

First of all, because of the political crisis, socio-economic problems in Crimea and the whole country, ineffectiveness of the state authorities. Because of deterioration of the Ukraine-Russia relations – **we cannot view the situation in Crimea separately from the overall background of the Ukraine-Russia relations**. And, of course, the war in the South Caucasus also played a negative role.

Another fundamental issue: is there any policy towards Crimea? It was said here about the regional policy, Crimean policy – whether Crimea should be drawn closer to Ukraine, or, vice versa, Ukraine should come to Crimea.

I believe that decisions, even the correct ones, are not a policy yet. A policy means implementation of those decisions, even with a low efficiency. This is the key problem now – the problem of effectiveness of the state authorities.

Indeed, there are programmes and proposals that may and should be implemented. And I wish to answer to the comment of fallacious programmes: not programmes are fallacious. Fallacious is the implementation of the state policy. I would say that there is no regular policy. Yet under President L.Kuchma, I had an impression that we had a separate policy towards Crimean Tatars, and some separate, rather amorphous policy towards Crimea. A regular, integral policy is absent.

In this context, one more important question arises: who should be the actor of the state policy regarding Crimea? There can be no single state policy if the President and the Cabinet of Ministers fight each other. The plea between them is transferred to Crimea...

Second: the state policy is implemented through the President's Representative in Crimea, but his abilities to influence the situation are very limited. In fact, he is a decorative figure. We should think for the future, who should implement the state policy in Crimea, in particular, put into effect the decisions worked out by NSDC.

I will say one very unpleasant and unpopular thing. This is my personal opinion. In the times of L.Kuchma, Crimean policy was more effective. It was also irregular, inconsistent, but effective. I mean that then, Crimea was slowly integrated into Ukraine. No, we witness opposite trends. **Crimea is parting from Ukraine**. Unfortunately, the activity of the state authorities deserves a negative assessment.

What is next?

I agree that now, there are no grounds for excessive dramatisation, but there are no grounds for optimism as well. No grounds at all. We are entering an economic crisis that will only add to the negative perception of the central authorities. I wish to remind you of the situation of early 1990s. The phenomenon of Meshkov arose against the background of an economic and social crisis in Crimea. What will the economic crisis of 2008-2009 bring to Crimea? I do not know the answer. The question remains open. But I am afraid that we will witness problems.

Other panellists spoke about the critical limit. In my opinion, **the critical limit means aggressive radical pro-Russian forces coming to power in Crimea**. If this happens, the process may become irreversible and uncontrolled. Then, indeed, we may compare the situation

in Crimea with some other territories beyond Ukraine. Now, there are no grounds for such comparison – with South Ossetia of Abkhazia. But if it happens, there will be a risk of losing Crimea.

And the last thing – what to do? A lot has been said, I will say only one important thing. On top of all that was said here, getting over the general political crisis in the country is the key, decisive precondition for solution of Crimean problems. When the crisis in Kyiv is removed, when the effectiveness of the state authorities is raised by at least 10-20%, I assure you – Crimean problems will be solved, too, because our colleagues have prepared many useful and correct proposals. They should only be implemented. I would add that we **should also bring down the level of conflicts in relations with Russia**. If this is not the case, we will see growth of conflicts in Crimea and enhancement of the controversial and very negative identity trends we see now. ■

continued

Anatoliy TKACHUK,
*Deputy Minister of Regional Development
and Building of Ukraine*

Dear colleagues, I listened to the presentations made by all panellists very attentively – I used half of my notebook writing. When somebody says that everything produced by non-governmental organisations and experts is kept on the shelf, he probably does not know that there are bodies of power that use their work. There are many experts here who took part in preparation of important conceptual documents of the Ministry.

Regarding the forecasts of passage of legislative acts in 2009, I wish to say that the Ministry has two lines of behaviour. The *first* envisages preparation of new regulatory documents. The *second* involves implementation of the required measures without waiting for changes to the laws. What was done this year regarding subventions for social facilities without amending the legislative framework very seriously changed the situation in the regions for the better. That is, **no proposal expressed here will be vain**.

On the Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea: there are two bills in Parliament intended to give him the powers and functions mentioned here today. **Decentralisation of power is needed – and it will be done, but it is impossible without state control of the law and order**.

One remark: we touched the subject of school education and testing of students in national languages. But does anybody doubt that a state servant must be literate, must be able to prepare and present decisions? If we take a look at, say, the latest decision of the Odesa Regional Council signed by its head, it deserves a firm D in grammar and style. Qualification and language knowledge are an axiom for a state servant, for a council member, for any official of the authorities and local self-government bodies. Everybody should have equal access to them – so, **we should think how to preserve national identity and simultaneously not make people non-competitive**.

Special thanks to those who arranged this event. ■