

**A HISTORY
OF THE
24TH MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION COMBAT TEAM
DURING
OPERATION DESERT STORM**

**"The Attack to Free Kuwait"
(January through March 1991)**

Final Edition

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELUDE (OPERATION DESERT SHIELD)	1
PLANNING FOR BATTLE	
Evolution of the Division Combat Team	5
Enemy Situation	6
Chemical Threat	7
Planning Priorities	7
Command, Control, and Communications Plan	8
Logistics and Sustainment Plan	9
Ground Maneuver Plan	11
Briefing to the Secretary Cheney and GEN Powell	12
MOVEMENT NORTHWEST TO TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREAS	
Central Concept	13
Pre-Convoy Preparation	13
Contingency Planning	14
Operational Security	14
Occupation of Tactical Assembly Areas	14
CROSS BORDER COMBAT OPERATIONS	16
THE ATTACK TO FREE KUWAIT	
Attack to Phase Line LION	19
Attack to Objectives BROWN, GREY, and RED	20
Attack Into the Euphrates to Seize Battle Positions #101, #102, #103	21
Attack to Seize Talill and Jalibah Air Bases	23
Attack East Toward Basrah	24
THE PRESIDENTIAL CEASE FIRE (An Uneasy Peace)	27
BATTLE CONTACT AT RUMAYLAH	29

**WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ AND THE LONG
JOURNEY HOME 31**

EPILOGUE 33

BATTLE SUMMARY AND GRAPHICS

"In four days, the 24th Mech had conducted what one American officer called 'the greatest cavalry charge in history.' It had charged all the way around Hussein's Army, almost 250 miles from the barren Saudi Arabian border to the gates of Basrah -- farther and with more firepower than General George S. Patton's entire 3rd Army had hauled across France."

**-- Joseph L. Galloway
"The Point of the Spear"
U.S. News & World Report (March 11, 1991)**

PRELUDE

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

The Defense of Saudi Arabia

At 0300 hours, 7 August 1990, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia. The Division began to organize itself for combat immediately.

The Victory Division launched into an intensive pre-deployment training program. Every tank crew, Bradley crew, DRAGON, AT-4, and aviation door gunner underwent extensive live fire training. Chemical protective overgarments (CPOGs) were worn one to two days per week. Classes were conducted on combat lifesaving, host nation customs and courtesies, desert survival, global positioning system (GPS) navigation, and Iraqi tactics and vehicle identification. The 197th Infantry Brigade moved to Fort Stewart from its home station at Fort Benning, conducted a vigorous seven-day training exercise, and prepared for deployment.

The assumption that drove all pre-deployment decisions was that the Division would be engaged in combat operations soon after arrival in Saudi Arabia. Each ship and brigade combat team were task organized to include supporting chemical defense, air defense, medical, and fire support elements to meet all possible contingencies. Each combat vehicle was transported fully uploaded with its basic load of ammunition and supplies.

Just six days, nine hours, and 57 minutes following alert, the FSS Capella, the first of ten ships (eight fast sealift - FSS; two roll on-roll off - RORO) apportioned to deploy the 1,600 armored vehicles, 3,500 wheeled vehicles, and 90 helicopters of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) commenced her 8,000 mile journey weighing 52,000 tons. The voyage would take the FSS Capella from the Port of Savannah, through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean Sea, through the Suez Canal and Straits of Hormuz, to the Saudi Arabian port of Ad Dammam. Throughout the sea deployment, transit time would average between 15-25 days.

The Division's 18,000 soldiers deployed in 57 aircraft sorties. The first aircraft departed Hunter Army Airfield on 20 August, just 13 days after alert. By 24 August, the majority of the Victory Division soldiers had closed into the Saudi Arabian theater of operations. By 7 September, the Victory Division had 10,000 soldiers representing two brigade combat teams in the field deployed in initial tactical assembly areas. Shortly thereafter, the Division moved to occupy its assigned General Defense Plan (GDP) positions,

just 94 miles from the Kuwait - Saudi Arabia border. The "line in the sand" had been drawn.

The Division's mission during OPERATION DESERT SHIELD was to:

- a. Defend in sector to defeat Iraqi forces;
- b. On order, counterattack to destroy the enemy's lead division of the second operational echelon forces in zone, and;
- c. Be prepared to continue offensive operations and complete the destruction of the enemy's capability to resist.

The 24th Infantry Division's defensive sector was 63 miles wide by 75 miles deep. During the succeeding months, the Division would work to finetune the plan while aggressively confronting the myriad of logistical and sustainment challenges posed by the harsh, austere desert environment. Daily requirements would be enormous - 395,000 gallons of fuel, 213,000 gallons of water, and 2,400 short tons of ammunition if engaged in combat.

Colonel Jimmy King (Commander, Division Support Command - DISCOM), Lieutenant Colonel Ken Koetz (Division G-4), Major Walt Holton (Deputy G-4), and MAJ Bobby Dail (DISCOM Operations Officer) formed the nucleus of a talented group of logisticians led by Brigadier General Joe Frazar (Assistant Division Commander for Support). Together they mapped out plans that managed deadlined equipment vehicle-by-vehicle, enhanced maintenance services in the field environment, and enabled nightly repair parts requisitions (averaging 3,800 in a ten-day period) to be reported directly to U.S. - based depots. They also established a host nation distribution system to deliver approximately 70 aircraft pallet loads of repair parts 153 miles from the Dhahran airport to Division logistics bases every night.

The collective efforts of the Division's logisticians were manifested in the pre-combat operational ready rates. A snapshot of the Victory Division's maintenance status on 18 February (six days prior to the attack) looked as follows:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Operational Ready Rate</u>
M-1A1 Tank	98%
M-2A2 Bradley	97%
Improved TOW Vehicle	92%
155mm SP Howitzer	97%
MLRS	100%
Apache Attack Helicopter	100%
Cobra Attack Helicopter	100%

OH-58D	100%
OH-58C	100%
UH-1 Huey	73%
UH-60 Blackhawk	89%
EH-60 Quickfix	100%

The 24th Infantry Division (Mech) was tasked by Headquarters, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to develop the pilot program for a Saudi - U.S. combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX). Following a multi-echelon training period with a Saudi battalion deployed forward of the Division's defensive area of responsibility, a U.S. - Saudi CALFEX was conducted in December. In conjunction with the combined training program, the Victory Division was asked to plan and construct a sophisticated, field expedient, multi-purpose range for XVIII Airborne Corps. 45 days after conception, the Faisal Multi-Purpose Range Complex was a reality.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD served as a textbook example of junior officer and non-commissioned officer leadership. During the five month period, the Division's accident rate was only half of that experienced at the National Training Center during the same length of time. The hospital admission rate was only 46% of what was expected. Soldier morale remained high because of unit sports programs, rest and recreation centers, mobile PXs, an active news program, and through Saudi-based American citizen host-a-soldier programs.

The Armed Forces of the United States are the most well equipped and modernized force in the world. During DESERT SHIELD, the Victory Division fielded the M-1A1 Abrams Tank with NBC overpressure system and 120mm smooth bore main gun, MK-19 Automatic Grenade Launcher, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), Global Positioning System (GPS), High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), FOX NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS), Mine Clearing Line Charge (MILCLIC), and the Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE). By year's end, soldiers were well trained on their equipment. They knew it was the best in the world. If forced to, they would FIGHT and WIN.

The greatest mental challenge for soldiers during this period was uncertainty. Is there going to be a rotation policy? Will the Division be home by Christmas or soon after the New Year? Were they going to fight?

On Thanksgiving Day, the Victory Division was honored to host the Commander-In-Chief, President George Bush for Thanksgiving dinner. In his holiday address, he reaffirmed our Nation's determination to stand up to Saddam Hussein's aggression and revalidated America's commitment to free Kuwait. There was no mention of unit rotations. No promises of being home

for the Christmas/New Year holidays. Initial feelings of disappointment were soon replaced by looks of determination. The Victory Division had a job to do. They were in-country to stay. The path home lay through Kuwait... through Iraq itself if need be.

OPERATION DESERT STORM THE ATTACK TO FREE KUWAIT

Planning for Battle

In early December 1990, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), summoned the Army's senior leadership in the theater of operations for a top-secret, high-level meeting. He unveiled his operational concept for an attack into Iraq.

After weeks of round-the-clock planning, CENTCOM finalized the attack plan. OPERATION DESERT STORM was both bold and cunning. XVIII Airborne Corps was to conduct a "left hook" attack into the Iraqi flank and rear more than 500 kilometers (312 miles) to the west deep in the desert near the airfield at Rafha.

The Victory Division's mission was to:

- a. Strike swiftly and decisively deep into the enemy's rear and flanks;
- b. Block the Euphrates River Valley;
- c. Prevent the escape of 500,000 enemy soldiers in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), and;
- d. Continue the attack east toward Basrah to complete the destruction of the Republican Guards Forces Command (RGFC).

The challenges confronting the 24th Infantry Division were enormous. The Operation would involve a 517 kilometer (320 mile) tactical road march from the Division's DESERT SHIELD defensive positions to forward tactical assembly areas along the Saudi Arabia - Iraq border; a 300 kilometer (187 mile) attack to the Euphrates River Valley; and a 113 kilometer (70 mile) attack east through the River Valley toward Basrah. The total movement added up to 930 kilometers (530 miles).

Evolution of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Combat Team

XVIII Airborne Corps prepared for the offensive into Iraq. Lieutenant General Gary Luck, the Corps Commander, task organized the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) into a 26,000-soldier, 34 battalion Division Combat Team. Reinforcing units included the 212th Artillery Brigade commanded by Colonel Tom Banks, the 171st Combat Support Group (CSG) commanded by

Colonel Ross Liedy, and the 36th Engineer Group commanded by Colonel Hank Miller.

The Division Combat Team now consisted of about 1,800 tracked vehicles (including 249 M-1A1 Abrams tanks, 218 M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 843 M-113 series Armored Personnel Carriers); 90 helicopters (including 18 Apaches); and 6,500 wheeled vehicles. Indirect fire power added up to ninety 155mm howitzers, twenty-four 8" howitzers, and thirty-six MLRS launchers. If fired at the same time, the total artillery force was capable of delivering 15 tons of high explosives on a given target.

The Enemy Situation

At the start of the Persian Gulf crisis, there were an estimated 63 divisions in the Iraqi Army. 43 (12 armor divisions and 31 infantry divisions) were committed to the KTO. Of these 43 divisions, seven were Republican Guards. The Allied Coalition Forces faced 63% of the Iraqi Army (about 500,000 soldiers). In the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) attack zone, there were seven Iraqi divisions (four Republican Guards, three Regular Army) representing a total of about 138,000 enemy soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Dick Quirk (Division G-2), Lieutenant Colonel Bob Reuss (Commander, 124 Military Intelligence Battalion), and their intelligence staff officers and non-commissioned officers worked round-the-clock to search for the answers to the following Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). The lives of soldiers depended upon the accuracy of their work.

1. Location and strength of enemy artillery battalions and fire control centers which could influence the Division zone.
2. Location and strength of enemy armor and mechanized battalions within 24 hours of the Division zone.
3. Location of enemy division and brigade forward and main command posts within 50 kilometers of the Division zone.
4. Location and strength of enemy deliberate defenses in the Division zone.
5. Location and condition of routes capable of supporting heavy wheeled vehicles in the Division zone - specifically 5,000 gallon tankers.
6. Condition of crossing points across the sebkhas (desert wetlands - the "dismal bog") at the approaches to the Euphrates River Valley.

7. The location of civilian and military fuel stockpiles in the Division zone.

The Chemical Threat

The Iraqi Army presented the most formidable chemical warfare capability in the Third World. Iraq's recent battlefield experience proved that the Army was well trained in the employment of and defense against chemical weapons. Intelligence reports indicated that Iraq possessed large and varied stockpiles of chemical munitions containing both nerve and blister agents. These munitions could be delivered by mortars, artillery, missiles, or aerial spray. Chemical or biological munition storage bunkers were suspected in the vicinity of Talill Air Base, Battle Positions #101, #102, #103, and near the city of An Nasiriyah.

To prepare for Iraq's possible employment of chemical weapons, all 26,000 soldiers of the Division Combat Team were issued a fresh chemical protective overgarment (CPOG). These charcoal-lined suits, affectionately referred to as "odor eaters" by soldiers, were donned about 30 days prior to the attack as the Division prepared to displace forward to tactical assembly areas along the border. Two more CPOGs backed up the one worn by the soldier - one set with the battalion logistics element (field trains), and another set with the DISCOM. If CPOGs became contaminated, replacements were readily available. "PB" tablets were also distributed to increase the effects of the Atropine Nerve Agent Antidote if soldiers were exposed to enemy nerve agents.

The Division was task organized to operate in a chemical environment. Decontamination platoons were attached to the lead combat brigades, the FOX chemical reconnaissance platoon was attached to the Division Cavalry Squadron, and the 327th Chemical Decontamination Company was placed in general support of DISCOM.

Planning Priorities

Given the estimate of the enemy situation and the magnitude of the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) attack, Major General Barry McCaffrey (Commanding General) established the following planning priorities. First, the Division had to think through its command, control, and communications (C³) arrangement. Second, it would need to develop an ambitious yet executable supporting logistics and sustainment plan. Finally, once the "operational envelopes" for the C³ and logistics plan were known, a ground maneuver plan could be developed.

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

Major General McCaffrey would command his division through an echelon of five command posts.

a. **Division Rear Command Post (DREAR)**: This was the rearward-most of all Division command and control centers. From this location, Brigadier General Frazar, Colonel Mike MacLaren (Division G-1), Lieutenant Colonel Ken Koetz (G-4), Lieutenant Colonel Ben Hall (Division Surgeon), and a cross-section of the Division primary and special staffs would orchestrate the complicated task of personnel replacements, logistics, and medical evacuation. A Weapon System Replacement Operation (WSRO) company comprised of three armor and two mechanized infantry platoons would be ready to replace complete weapons systems with crews as combat losses were incurred.

b. **Division Main Command Post (DMAIN)**: The largest of the Division command posts, the DMAIN would be located where it could best communicate with both the Division Commander and higher headquarters. It is considered the tactical nerve center and central information processing node of the Division. During the battle, Colonel John Van Alstyne (Division Chief of Staff), Major Jason Kamiya (Deputy G-3), and the Division Battle Staff would monitor the attack's progress, respond to any contingencies, render reports to higher headquarters, and coordinate the support required by the combat maneuver units.

c. **Division Tactical Command Post (DTAC)**: This command post would move up front with one of the brigade combat teams. It would assume command and control of the Division when the DMAIN was ordered to displace forward. From this command post, Brigadier General Terry Scott (Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver) would closely track the battle. When required, he could link up with the Commanding General to help orchestrate the fight.

d. **Division Assault Command Post**: During the attack, this would be the primary location of the Division Commander. It would move with the lead brigade combat team, often colocated with the brigade TAC CP. From this command post, Major General McCaffrey and the Division G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Pat Lamar, could best see and influence the battle while maintaining reliable communications with subordinate commanders. Division Command Sergeant Major Jim Randolph would also move with the Assault CP.

e. **Division Air Command Post**: This command post consisted of a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter from the 3-24th Aviation Battalion. The aircraft was outfitted with a special communications console with one tactical satellite (TACSAT) radio, three FM radios, and one high frequency radio. It was an offshoot of the Assault Command Post and provided the Division Commander the flexibility to fly forward to a tactical vantage point to better control the battle and command "up front."

Lieutenant Colonel Doug Kenehan (Division Signal Officer/Commander, 24th Signal Battalion) and Major Fred Lehman (Assistant Division Communications Officer - ADSO) provided the technical expertise for the Victory Division to maintain communications connectivity throughout the offensive.

The communications plan was incredibly detailed. It delineated grid coordinates of signal nodes and retrans stations through each phase of the attack. Multi-channel signal nodes were mounted on HEMTTs for added mobility. The sophisticated Division communications network entailed up to 19 ground PCM stations, a multi-channel TACSAT system comprised of:

- four signal nodes;
- nine single channel TACSAT terminals;
- 15 secure FM stations and 12 secure AM/Improved High Frequency Radio (IHFR) stations on the Division Command Net;
- five secure ground FM retrans systems;
- three UH-60 airborne retrans systems, and;
- 14 tactical facsimile stations.

The communications "work horse" of the operation would prove to be the multi-channel and single channel TACSAT radio systems.

LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT PLAN

Fuel, ammunition, and medical services were the three fundamental logistics priorities. The logistics plan to support the Division's 413 kilometer attack would be focused on sequential echelonment of logistics units, employment of a series of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Division Support Areas (DSAs), and throughput of bulk fuel and ammunition by XVIII Airborne Corps and echelons above Corps (EAC).

Estimated Logistics Requirements

The movement to pre-attack positions and the first four days of combat would require an estimated 16.7 million tons of ammunition, 2.3 million gallons of fuel, and 3 million tons of other classes of supply such as rations, water, barrier material, medical supplies, and repair parts. Transportation

requirements were enormous. 698 tractor trailer loads and 473 five thousand gallon capacity tanker loads would be required to move ammunition and fuel alone. To help meet the logistics challenge, DISCOM began prepositioning rations, fuel, ammunition, and repair parts at forward logistics base "Lima-Mike," just south of King Khalid Military City (KKMC) in late December. The logistics base commander was Major Thomas "Chilli" Challendar.

Logistics Organization for Combat

The key to sustaining the Division's attack to the Euphrates lay in establishment of multiple supply routes. In concert with the G-2 terrain analysis section and Colonel Hank Miller (36th Engineer Group Commander), logistics planners selected three routes within the attack zone - Combat Trails Xray, Whiskey, and Yankee. XVIII Airborne Corps MSR Texas, a hard surface road through As Salman in the 6th French Light Armor Division attack zone, would provide a fourth resupply route.

197th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Huffam would follow the 197th Brigade attack in Division left zone utilizing Combat Trail Xray.

224 FSB commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Terry Clayton would follow 2nd Brigade in Division right zone utilizing Combat Trail Yankee.

24 FSB commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jay Erb would follow 1st Brigade along Combat Trail Whiskey in Division center zone.

A logistics task force destined for FOB #1 (the Division's initial logistics operational base in zone; smaller scale than Division logistics support areas established later in the attack) would be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ray Rodon (Commander, 260th Quartermaster Battalion). It would be comprised of sixty 5,000 gallon fuel tankers, 35 combat configured loads (CCLs) of ammunition, and the 5th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH). The FOB #1 task force would follow the 197th FSB along Combat Trail Xray.

The 724 Main Support Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mitch Stevenson would follow 224 FSB along Combat Trail Yankee with the primary mission of establishing DSA #2 (the first Division logistics support area in the attack zone).

Logistics Task Force Shull commanded by Major Pat Shull, once cleared for movement by XVIII Airborne Corps, would move behind the 82nd Airborne Division along Corps MSR Texas with 95 CCLs of ammunition and

50,000 gallons of fuel. TF Shull consisted of 243 trucks. It's mission was to link up with the 724 Main Support Battalion at DSA #2.

Marking of the Combat Trails

Responsibility for marking the three combat trails rested with Colonel Hank Miller and the 36th Engineer Group. Major "Chuz" Chamberlain (Group Signal Officer) came up with the idea of a blinking, light sensitive, yellow construction warning light mounted on a tripod constructed with three engineer stakes bounded by florescent material, and marked with an eight digit grid coordinate (obtained by GPS) of the marker's location. The "Chuz" Combat Trail Marking System was born. Lead engineer elements with the combat brigades would set up "Chuz Points" along each of the combat trails during the attack. This unique day/night marking system proved invaluable to follow-on logistics elements.

GROUND MANEUVER PLAN

Under the leadership and supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Pat Lamar (Division G-3), the Division battle staff worked intensely to develop an attack plan.

Four exhaustive, 18-hour Division map exercises (MAPEXs) were conducted over a large, 1:50,000 scale map using plastic counters representing units down to company/team level. Following each MAPEX, brigades and separate battalions were required to backbrief their battle plans to the Division Command Group. Rehearsals and orders briefs were conducted at all levels throughout the Division Combat Team. These included trafficability analysis and obstacle breaching drills on analog terrain to what was expected in assigned attack zones.

The operation was divided into five phases:

Phase I: The Attack to Phase Line Lion (PL LION)

Phase II: Attack to Objectives Grey, Brown and Red (OBJ GREY, OBJ BROWN, OBJ RED)

Phase III: Attack Into the Euphrates River Valley to Seize Battle Positions (BP) #101, #102, and #103

Phase IV: Attack to Jalibah (OBJ ORANGE) and Tallil (OBJ GOLD) Air Bases

Phase V: Attack East Toward Basrah

**BRIEFING TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

On 9 February 1991, Major General McCaffrey was asked by Lieutenant General Gary Luck (Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps) to travel to Central Command Headquarters in Riyadh to brief Secretary Richard Cheney (Secretary of Defense) and General Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) on the Division plan of attack. At the conclusion of the briefing, Secretary Cheney asked Major General McCaffrey what problems he had. General McCaffrey replied confidently, "Sir, I hesitate to say this but we have none. The Division has rehearsed it's plan. The plan is logistically supportable. We are fully modernized. The requisite amounts of ammunition, fuel, and repair parts are on-the-ground. Our soldiers are the best in the world. We will destroy the Iraqi Army in ten days to four weeks."

THE MOVEMENT NORTHWEST TO TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREAS ALONG THE SAUDI ARABIAN - IRAQ BORDER

The Division's displacement northwest to pre-attack positions along the Saudi Arabia - Iraq border was no simple task. It would be through heroic planning efforts of soldiers like Major Bob Tezza (Deputy G-4) and Captain John Newton (Division Transportation Officer) that would make the 516 kilometer (320 mile) tactical road movement up the Tapline Road possible.

The move was conducted in 10 days in 16 hour increments. Two rapid refuel points were established by XVIII Airborne Corps along the route. Convoys were organized into 67 serials of 150 vehicles each. Despite the physically demanding 18-26 hour trip, near freezing temperatures, rain, and heavy ground fog, only one accident occurred. Credit for this tremendous accomplishment is attributable to strong company/battery/troop chains of command, and to the hard work of the 1-5 Air Defense Artillery Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Otis Ferguson who was responsible for maintenance of communications and traffic control throughout the march route.

Central Concept

The movement plan was based upon one central concept. It was essential for the combat brigades to move task organized with fully uploaded company and battalion task forces. Where possible, forward support battalions (FSBs) would move with their assigned brigade combat teams. Crews would ride inside their combat vehicles uploaded on heavy equipment transporters (HETs). .50 caliber machine gun air guards would be posted throughout each convoy. Movement by combat team would provide the flexibility to respond to and maneuver against preemptive enemy attack during a period of increased vulnerability for the Division.

Pre-Convoy Preparation

In order to prepare and organize brigade combat teams for convoy movement, Marshalling Area Victory (MA VICTORY) was established under the control of the DREAR CP. Brigadier General Frazar and Major Nat DeBruin (DREAR Chief of Operations) provided the central leadership. In the marshalling area, units would "lighten the load," organize into convoy serials, upload HETs, and stage for convoy movement to forward tactical assembly areas.

The established order of convoy movement was 2-4th Cavalry Squadron (Reinforced) accompanied by 1-24 Attack Helicopter Battalion (Apache) and the DTAC CP; Aviation Brigade (-); 2nd Brigade; 212th FA Brigade; DMAIN CP; 1st Brigade; 197th Brigade, and; the DREAR CP and closeout elements. Early in the move, a dismounted element made up of TF 1-18 Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Chamberlain, and TF 3-7 Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Jensen would move by ground and air to serve as the security force to protect the Aviation Brigade.

Contingency Planning

In conjunction with the primary movement plan, the Division's movement planners developed a contingency "break out" plan which could be executed if the Division were forced to self-deploy to forward tactical assembly areas along the border. This scenario was entirely plausible for two reasons: the enemy situation could quickly deteriorate, or; the non-organic heavy transportation lift apportioned to the Division from theater assets could suddenly be cancelled. The plan called for 24 hour per day wheeled vehicle movement along hard surface main supply routes (MSRs) and track vehicle movement along unimproved trails astride the main MSRs. In total, the contingency move would involve the use of 17 multiple routes. If forced to, the Division could close in it's tactical assembly areas along the border within 67 hours (about three days).

Operational Security

Operational security (OPSEC) was of vital concern throughout the Division. While the officer and senior NCO leadership knew the destination, most soldiers did not know where they were going. The fact that XVIII Airborne Corps was moving and taking up attack positions to the northwest had to be protected from compromise. Advanced reconnaissance of the convoy route and tactical assembly areas were done using non-tactical vehicles. Division patches were removed from the uniforms of reconnaissance parties.

Occupation of Tactical Assembly Areas

Upon occupation of assigned tactical assembly areas, combat brigades conducted security sweeps of their assigned sectors. Ground cavalry troops occupied ten platoon-sized battle positions along Phase Line Razor (PL RAZOR) and positioned listening and observation posts (LP/OPs) between PL

RAZOR and the line of departure (LD). Air cavalry troops (attached to Aviation Brigade) screened a three kilometer reconnaissance belt between the ground cavalry's battle positions.

CROSS BORDER COMBAT OPERATIONS

Upon successful occupation of its tactical assembly areas along the border, the Victory Division made final preparations for the attack into Iraq. On 21 February 1991, Major General McCaffrey issued final tactical guidance to the battalion combat teams:

DESTRUCTION OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES

1. **SECURITY**: *(Observation and listening posts, chemical)*
2. **VIOLENCE**: *Speed, flank. (Shoot and then report)*
3. **ARTILLERY**: *Mortars, smoke.*
4. **RISK**: *Work, work, work to reduce.*
5. **MAINTENANCE**: *Vehicles, weapons, communications.*
6. **SAFETY**
7. **SLEEP**: *Water, shave, teeth.*
8. **CASUALTIES**: *Air evacuate to combat trains, do not let bleed, tag.*
9. **PROTECT YOUR HONOR**: *Civilians and enemy prisoners of war.*
10. **PRAY**

PRE G-DAY AND CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS

On 21 January 91, CENTCOM granted authority for limited cross border operations between the LD to PL SMASH (170 kilometers north of the LD). The time had finally come. The preliminary stages of the battle to free Kuwait were about to begin.

The concept behind the Division's pre-G-Day operations plan was to first eliminate low risk targets along the border, and then extend north of the line of departure to PL SMASH. The plan would employ aggressive armed air reconnaissance and be focused at clearing the Division zone of attack of enemy deep strike systems in order to reduce risk to maneuver forces when the attack began.

Three weeks prior to G-Day, the Division employed non-intrusive reconnaissance means and put tight controls on electronic emissions (EMCON). Captain Frank Moreno and Division Long Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Teams were inserted at night to monitor Iraqi border patrol posts. Wire communications and directional antennae were employed. Radio traffic was reduced to a minimum. Passive intelligence collection systems were relied upon to reduce emissions while maintaining the ability to intercept Iraqi electronic transmissions. Selective day/night Apache and OH-58D videotaped reconnaissance missions from positions south of the LD were conducted to verify suspected Iraqi locations in zone, air defense and artillery in particular. Ground cavalry troops continued 24 hour surveillance of the border berms within the Division security zone between PL RAZOR and the LD.

EMCON was lifted two weeks prior to G-Day. The Division continued non-intrusive reconnaissance operations. Combat units validated crossing sites employing stealthy reconnaissance by scout platoons to the border berms just short of the LD. Active electronic warfare collection systems were selectively activated to locate and help identify command and control radio nets. Selected abandoned Saudi border camps were booby trapped to discourage Iraqi cross border violators. Counterbattery radar was activated to detect any incoming Iraqi artillery fire or registration.

Intrusive reconnaissance operations began about one week prior to G-Day. Cross border dismounted infantry night reconnaissance patrols were sent to verify crossing sites, routes, and terrain in brigade attack zones. Armed reconnaissance by Apaches to locate and destroy enemy positions up to PL LION (130 kilometers north of the LD) were also conducted. In conjunction with these missions, Apache pilots were also asked to verify locations of the combat trails. It was on one of these missions that the Victory Division suffered it's first combat fatalities of the ground war.

Two days prior to G-Day, the Division intensified it's intrusive reconnaissance activities. A combination of night attacks by dismounted infantry and Copperhead artillery raids were used to eliminate Iraqi border posts. Long Range Reconnaissance Teams were inserted in the vicinity of OBJ BROWN, OBJ GREY, and FOB #1. MLRS artillery, USAF A-10s, and Apache attack helicopters conducted missions against Iraqi early warning and air defense sites.

At noon on 20 February, the 2-4th Cavalry Squadron was released from border screening operations. D/4 Cavalry Troop and 2-4th Cavalry Squadron (-) were placed under the operational control of 197th Brigade and 2nd

Brigade respectively. Each combat brigade assumed border security responsibilities. (See Figure #1, Battle Summary and Graphics)

The Division security zone was extended to PL OPUS, 10 kilometers north of the LD. PL OPUS would later be designated the LD due to the lack of enemy activity. This allowed the lead brigades to breach and subsequently move task forces in front of the berms prior to G-Day. The stage was set. The pieces were in place. The battle was about to begin.

THE ATTACK TO FREE KUWAIT

"Soldiers of the Victory Division -- we now begin a great battle to destroy an aggressor Army and free two million Kuwaiti people. We will fight under the American flag and with the authority of the United Nations. By force-of-arms we will make the Iraqi war machine surrender the country they hold prisoner..."

"There will be no turning back when we attack into battle. One hundred thousand American and French soldiers of XVIII Airborne Corps will fight on our flanks. We have the weapons and the military training equal to the task. We pray that our courage and our skill will bring this war to a speedy close... We shall do our duty."

**-- Exerpt from MG McCaffrey's "General Order to Attack"
15 February 1991**

The time of the Coalition attack was set for 0400 hours, 24 February 91 (Saudi Arabia time). The Victory Division attack was not scheduled to attack until 0600 hours, 25 February 91 (G-Day plus one). By late morning on 24 February, reports throughout the Coalition front indicated that Iraqi resistance was collapsing. XVIII Airborne Corps reported a marked absence of enemy activity in the Corps attack zone.

Major General McCaffrey received a call from the Corps Commander around noon. The Victory Division was ordered to commence it's attack at 1500 hours, fifteen hours ahead of schedule. Fragmentary orders were issued, final checks were made. At 1500 hours, 24 February 91, the 24th Infantry Division Combat Team thundered across PL OPUS... Destination - the Euphrates River Valley.

ATTACK TO PHASE LINE LION (PL LION)

(See Figure #2, Battle Summary and Graphics)

The Division crossed PL OPUS (LD) three brigades abreast - 197th Brigade commanded by Colonel Ted Reid in left zone, 1st Brigade commanded by Colonel John LeMoyne in center zone, and 2nd Brigade commanded by Colonel Paul Kern in right zone. The Division Assault CP moved with 2nd Brigade's TAC CP. At PL COLT (45 kilometers from the LD), the Division transitioned to a two brigade abreast attack with 1st Brigade following 2nd Brigade in right zone, and 197th Brigade remaining in left zone. Aviation Brigade commanded by Colonel Burt Tackaberry, with attached Air Cavalry

Troops, conducted aerial reconnaissance forward of 197th and 2nd Brigades. The Division MAIN CP and Major Greg Stone's division operations cell remained in the pre-attack assembly area to orchestrate the battle.

Throughout the afternoon and night, the Division attacked through a blinding sand storm. Visibility was negligible. 197th Brigade reported reaching PL LION around 0200 hours, 25 February. 2nd Brigade reached Attack Position DALLAS along PL LION by 0900 hours, 25 February. They were delayed while negotiating a severe escarpment at PL LION. Neither brigade reported enemy resistance. The soldiers of the 5th Engineer Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Terry Maddox (direct support to 1st Brigade), 3rd Engineer Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Rhoades (direct support to 2nd Brigade), and the 299th Engineer Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Dries (direct support to 197th Brigade) worked feverishly throughout the night to emplace and activate "chuz points" along each of the three combat trails.

ATTACK TO OBJECTIVE BROWN (OBJ BROWN).

OBJECTIVE GREY (OBJ GREY).

AND

OBJECTIVE RED (OBJ RED)

(See Figure #3, Battle Summary and Graphics)

197th Brigade with supporting USAF close air support commenced the attack to seize OBJ BROWN through AO HAMMER at 0300 hours, 25 February. Two enemy compounds and approximately 23 enemy vehicles were destroyed. Numerous secondary explosions were reported. TF 2-18 Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rick Olson took 11 prisoners including three officers. Interrogation revealed that the enemy was part of an early warning unit. Weapons were found to be clean and in good working order. TF 1-18 Infantry reported capturing 20 maintenance and electronics vans and about 18 prisoners. OBJ BROWN was secured by 0700 hours. Link up between 3-187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (left flank adjacent unit) and TF 2-18 Infantry was made at 0845 hours.

The 2nd Brigade attack from Attack Position DALLAS, through AO VANGUARD to OBJ GREY commenced at 1300 hours, 25 February. 3-41 FA commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lutz, and 212th FA Brigade (Colonel Tom Banks) provided suppressive indirect fires. The objective was secured around 1600 hours as the Brigade established blocking positions oriented to the east along a major high speed armor avenue of approach into the Division's right zone.

Following seizure of OBJ GREY and OBJ BROWN, 1st Brigade commenced the attack at 1400 hours through AO STEWART and AO LIBERTY to seize OBJ RED. They encountered a large number of frightened and confused Bedouin families throughout the objective area. Several soldiers from TF 3-7 Infantry built warming fires and prepared tea for them.

OBJ RED was secured by 2130 hours. 2-4th Cavalry Squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Leney followed 1st Brigade through AO STEWART and established a screen along the Division's left flank along PL VIKING.

Priority of OH-58D support went to the 2nd Brigade initially, then shifted to 1st Brigade as they maneuvered against OBJ RED.

Lieutenant Colonel Rodon's logistics task force established FOB #1. Aviation Brigade established a forward assembly area (FAA) in the vicinity of the FOB. 724 Main Support Battalion (MSB) established DSA #2 in AO VANGUARD. Logistics TF Shull, having completed movement up MSR TEXAS, linked up with 724 MSB in DSA #2. Due to the speed of the attack, DSA #2 was only operational for about 12 hours -- long enough to serve as the Division's primary logistics base to support the attack into the Euphrates.

ATTACK INTO THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY TO SEIZE

BP #101, BP #102, and BP #103

(See Figure #4, Battle Summary and Graphics)

1st Brigade initiated the Division main attack from OBJ RED to clear AO WOLF and seize BP #102 at 1400 hours, 26 February. Just north of PL VIKING, the Brigade encountered severe lateral sand dunes. A HEMTT cargo vehicle flipped on it's side. In a matter of minutes, the driver summoned a recovery vehicle, supervised the operation to right his overturned vehicle, and promptly continued the attack toward the Euphrates. Such was the resolve and fighting spirit of the Victory Division soldier.

During the attack, stiff resistance was encountered from the 26th Iraqi Commando Brigade. TF 2-7 Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Ware) and TF 3-7 Infantry (Lieutenant Colonel Dave Jensen) smashed enemy vehicles and equipment in a night battle with hundreds of flaming targets. The enemy force fired hundreds of artillery and mortar rounds into 1st Brigade positions. Thankfully, their fire control system was confused and ineffective. As Lieutenant Colonel John Craddock (Commander, 4-64 AR) maneuvered his battalion toward the canal north of Highway 8, he stumbled across a large ammunition storage site. Despite multiple hits by anti-tank rockets that

damaged his tank's main gun sight and fuel cell, Lieutenant Colonel Craddock continued the attack to block the Iraqi main line of communication through the Euphrates Valley. He was later awarded the Silver Star for this action.

Throughout the 1st Brigade attack to seize BP #102, extremely effective counterbattery fire was provided by 1-41 FA commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Floris, and the 212th FA Brigade. Four Iraqi artillery battalions were estimated to have been destroyed by the counter-battery fire and ground attack. BP #102 and AO WOLF were secured by 0110 hours, 27 February. Major General McCaffrey and the Division Assault CP moved into the night battle with Colonel John LeMoyne and the 1st Brigade TAC CP.

At 1400 hours, 26 February, 2nd Brigade launched their attack from OBJ GREY, through AO FOX, to seize BP #103. The objective was secured by 2000 hours. Critical refueling and maintenance operations were conducted to prepare for the attack east toward BP #104 and Jalibah Air Base (OBJ ORANGE). Scattered enemy units were encountered and destroyed.

197th Brigade began its attack from OBJ BROWN to Attack Position KELLEY at 1600 hours, 25 February. The attack was conducted along two routes. Scout and engineer marking teams were used extensively. By nightfall, heavy rains significantly reduced the speed of attack. Shortly after midnight, in near zero visibility, an endless wadi was encountered along the attack routes. The 299th Engineer Battalion and scouts from 2-69 Armor Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rick Sanchez cleared the remaining 30 kilometers to Attack Position KELLEY.

Ordered to proceed with the attack into the Euphrates to BP #101 at 1400 hours, 26 February, the 197th Brigade orchestrated six USAF close air support sorties against two enemy mechanized battalions and one enemy artillery battalion. Scouts reported significant wet sabkhas along the route of attack. The advancing task forces maneuvered to bypass the difficult terrain but a sandstorm accompanied by high winds restricted visibility and navigation. By 1700 hours, 26 February, portions of TF 2-18 Infantry were mired in deep mud.

At 2200 hours, lead task force elements were heavily engaged by the Iraqi 3rd RGFC Commando Regiment. In the midst of the blinding sandstorm, First Lieutenant Larry Aikman Jr., TF 1-18 Infantry Scout Platoon Leader, suddenly discovered his platoon was encircled by a superior enemy force. Despite overwhelming numerical odds and heavy fire, he quickly and decisively led a hasty attack to break out from the encirclement, linked up with his battalion, and provided valuable information on enemy locations and strengths. For his uncommon bravery and leadership under fire, First Lieutenant Aikman was awarded the Silver Star.

Scouts from TF 2-18th Infantry reported 300 dismounted enemy infantry and revetted trucks on the 3d Commando Regiment's right flank. 4-41 FA commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bill Engel shot numerous fire missions including Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM). An estimated 49 enemy soldiers were killed. Six trucks, six jeeps, and a motorcycle were destroyed. The surviving enemy lost their will to fight and surrendered. BP #101 and AO COUGAR were secured at 0430 hours, 27 February.

Aviation Brigade established a FAA in the vicinity of DSA #2 in AO VANGUARD. Due to an unclear picture of the location of friendly units, Apaches were not employed. Two OH-58Ds were placed under operational control of 1st Brigade to support the attack to BP #102.

The momentum of attack forced DSA #3 to be bypassed. DSA #4 (second Division logistics support area in the zone of attack) was established in the vicinity of BP #102 by a small DISCOM control element made up of BG Frazar, a few soldiers, three HMMWVs, and a communications shelter. The logistics task force from FOB #1 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Rodon linked up with BG Frazar's party at DSA #4. Throughout the night, they refueled the 212th FA Brigade, 24, 224, and 197th FSBs. Additionally, the 212th FA Brigade received 40 CCLs of MLRS rockets.

ATTACK TO SEIZE TALILL AND JALIBAH AIR BASES

(See Figure #5, Battle Summary and Graphics)

At 0600 hours, 27 February, 1st Brigade conducted a fixing attack along Highway 8 towards Jalibah Air Base. Major General McCaffrey and the Division Air Command Post flew to collocate with the 1st Brigade TAC CP.

2nd Brigade opened the Division main attack with an enormous artillery barrage by 3-41 FA and 212th FA Brigade (equivalent of five artillery battalions) from 0500-0600 hours. TF 1-64 AR commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Gordon and TF 3-69 AR commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Terry Stanger occupied attack-by-fire positions southwest of Jalibah. Their engagements with enemy tanks and infantry allowed TF 3-15 Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ray Barrett to assault and subsequently clear the airfield. By 1000 hours, Jalibah was secure.

Two thousand enemy soldiers, 80 anti-aircraft guns, and a tank battalion were knocked out of action in this brilliantly executed attack. The airfield fuel supplies and ammunition were blown up in a thunderous roar that could

be heard for 30 kilometers (19 miles). 20 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Colonel Paul Kern and his Brigade had become the "aces" of the campaign. Major General McCaffrey flew into the captured Jalibah airstrip to congratulate Colonel Kern on 2nd Brigade's superb victory.

197th Brigade protected the Division's west flank from BP #101. At 1330 hours, TF 2-69 AR commenced a tank/mech raid to neutralize enemy fire coming from Talill Air Base. XVIII Airborne Corps gave permission for this protective counterattack. The attack was preceded by 28 USAF close air support sorties and heavy artillery preparatory fires. TF 2-69 AR was able to penetrate the main entrance to the airfield despite a 20 foot berm surrounding the facility. Engagements were short but intense. Six MIGs, three helicopters, four ZSU 23-4s, and two T-55 tanks were destroyed. The task force returned to BP #101 leaving behind four combat vehicles which were mired in the mud. They were recovered later in the operation.

2-4th Cavalry Squadron continued to screen the Division's left and rear flank. At 0600 hours, 27 February, the Victory Division assumed operational control of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) commanded by Colonel Doug Starr. The Regiment attacked east from OBJ RED to screen the Division's right (southern) flank and maintain contact with the U.S. VII Corps.

At the direction of Brigadier General Scott, the Aviation Brigade prepared to conduct an aerial movement-to-contact forward (east) of 1st and 2nd Brigades between PL AXE and PL KNIFE. Apaches launched at 0700 hours and completed their mission around noon after numerous engagements along PL KNIFE. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was heavy and two Apaches were damaged by 57mm AAA guns. The Air Cavalry Troops and attack battalion missions destroyed significant enemy forces.

ATTACK EAST TOWARD BASRAH

(See Figure #6, Battle Summary and Graphics)

Jalibah Air Base to PL AXE

The Victory Division readied to continue the attack east. DISCOM established DSA #5 (third Division logistics support area in the zone of attack) just to the north of Jalibah Air Base. The 197th and 224 FSBs were able to obtain badly needed fuel, 120mm tank main gun ammunition, and Bradley 25mm ammunition. The 171st CSG joined DISCOM elements in DSA #5 bringing with them large quantities of artillery ammunition. Throughout the day and night, the logistics team worked to resupply the Division's powerful artillery force.

At 1300 hours, 27 February, the Victory Division began the attack east. 1st Brigade, the Division's main attack effort, attacked in left (north) zone. 2nd Brigade attacked in center zone. The 3rd ACR attacked in right (south) zone. By 1700 hours, the Division reached PL AXE. Enemy artillery fire was heavy at times but not effective. RGFC tank, BMP, and small arms fire was scattered.

The attack was opposed by the RGFC Al Faw and Adnon Infantry Divisions, RGFC Hammurabi Armored Division, and remnants of the RGFC Nebuchadnezzar Infantry Division. The attack zone was a large theater logistics and ammunition storage site. Over 1,300 bunkers of artillery, 500-1,000 lbs air force bombs, and other munitions were seized. Thousands of stunned enemy soldiers surrendered to this blitzkrieg attack to the east. Hundreds of wheel and armor vehicles were destroyed in this classic exploitation attack against a confused and terrified enemy force. The soldiers of the Victory Division demonstrated great compassion for the defeated enemy.

2-4th Cavalry Squadron was ordered to move from AO SABER and occupy a tactical assembly area behind 1st Brigade. The 197th Brigade was ordered to move from BP #101 and occupy a tactical assembly area behind 2nd Brigade. The cavalry squadron and 197th Brigade reported closing in their assigned assembly areas at 1400 hours and 2200 hours respectively, moving through scattered enemy resistance and by-passed small units. They were to protect the Division's rear (west) flank, and if required, were to reinforce the Division main attack to the east.

Onward to PL VICTORY

The Division planned to continue the attack east commencing at 0500 hours the next morning (28 February). Colonel Ron Townsend, Commander, 24th ID(M) Division Artillery (DIVARTY) organized the Victory Division's massive artillery force into position to support the next stage of battle. DIVARTY and Colonel Tom Bank's 212th FA Brigade were joined by Colonel Fred McFarren's 18th FA Brigade. This array of nine and one-third artillery battalions provided massive artillery and counter-battery fires from 1800 hours, 27 February, to 0400 hours the next morning. Indirect fires intensified between 0400-0500 hours as the Victory Division began its pre-attack preparatory barrage. The enemy force in zone was identified as seven tank battalions, five mechanized infantry battalions, and 13 battalions of artillery. A supporting air attack by the 1-24 Attack Helicopter Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Stewart was triggered to commence at 0500 hours.

Notification of a Presidential Cease Fire

Around 0330 hours, 28 February, the Division Main Command Post was notified by XVIII Airborne Corps that a Presidential Cease Fire had been called. Colonel Van Alstyne updated Major General McCaffrey of the situation via TACSAT radio. Although the cease fire was not to take effect until 0800 hours, Division offensive operations were temporarily suspended to avoid unnecessary U.S. casualties. Artillery fires continued until the 0800 hours truce. Final artillery fires included deep targets engaged by the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles of 6-27th FA from the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CEASE FIRE

An Uneasy Peace

The period during the Presidential cease fire is best described as a time of enormous restraint. The Division's number one priority was force protection. Major General McCaffrey, in concert with his maneuver brigade commanders, carefully orchestrated a plan calling for detailed reconnaissance east towards PL CRUSH (limit of advance). 1st Brigade, 2nd Brigade, and the 3rd ACR, maintaining their assigned zones to the left (north), center, and right (south) respectively, established hasty defenses at PL VICTORY. Task force scouts performed reconnaissance forward of PL VICTORY west of the Rumaylah Oil Fields. The DIVARTY was joined by a third artillery brigade as the 196th FA Brigade (Tennessee National Guard) pulled into the Division sector.

The Division's second priority was the destruction of the massive number of captured or bypassed enemy equipment and supplies. In just one day, approximately 34 T-55 and T-72 tanks, 224 trucks, 41 armored personnel carriers, 43 artillery guns, 319 anti-tank guns, 27 air defense guns, and 150 ammunition bunkers and caches were destroyed.

Major General McCaffrey ordered all remaining DISCOM logistics support elements and the Division MAIN CP to displace forward. In a matter of hours, units began the 400 kilometer trek north to close in on the Division Combat Team in the Euphrates River Valley. Throughout the movement, the Division TAC CP assumed command and control of all forces in the attack zone.

DISCOM now established DSA #6 (fourth and final division logistics support area in the zone of attack) near PL AXE. In addition to normal resupply operations, the support element played an active role in the evacuation of thousands of enemy prisoners of war. They also tended to the health and medical needs of thousands of displaced civilians. Over 120,000 MRE meals, 2,500 gallons of potable water, 550 cases of bottled water, and 1,000 blankets were provided to civilians. DISCOM's soldiers captured 20 new Mercedes Benz dump trucks, hot wired the ignitions, and used them extensively to transport enemy prisoners to Corps collection points.

Despite the cease fire announcement, numerous skirmishes and incoming mortar and artillery fire were reported throughout the Division and adjacent unit security areas.

<u>Date and Time</u>	<u>Incident</u>
<u>28 February</u> 1134 hours	30 moving target indicators (MTIs) are observed just east of PL KNIFE. 70 MTIs are observed just east of PL CRUSH.
1157 hours	3rd ACR reports hostile enemy contact while clearing an airfield in sector to recover a downed U.S. helicopter.
1222 hours	3rd ACR reports receiving enemy fire while retrieving enemy bodies from a bunker complex and while securing the U.S. helicopter crash site.
<u>1 March</u> 0001 hours	TF 2-7 Infantry stops a bus load of Iraqi soldiers. While approaching the vehicle, the enemy begins shooting. Fire was returned in self defense. The engagement results in seven enemy killed, six wounded.
1047 hours	Brigadier General Scott receives a report from USAF sources that a battalion of T-72 tanks is moving west toward the Victory Division defensive sector. 3rd ACR reports receiving tank fire. Returns fire in self defense. The engagement results in five T-55s and five ZSU-23-4s destroyed.
1059 hours	1st Brigade reports receiving incoming artillery and mortar rounds. Permission granted to fire counter-battery fire mission.
1104 hours	2nd Brigade reports that enemy artillery and mortar fire impacted in their assigned sector. The Brigade secures the site of a downed 101st Airborne Division helicopter.
2100 hours	Division receives a report from XVIII Airborne Corps that a platoon from U.S. VII Corps was engaged by Iraqi forces. Five U.S. soldiers were wounded.

BATTLE CONTACT AT RUMAYLAH

(See Figure #7, Battle Summary and Graphics)

At 0445 hours, 2 March 91, task force scouts from 1st Brigade reported heavy vehicle movement east of PL CRUSH (limit of advance). At 0720 hours, 20 T-55 tanks, four T-72 tanks, and five BMPs were moving to the north and northwest toward the causeway within the 1st Brigade security zone. It appeared as though remnants of the RGFC Hamurabi Armored Division and composite elements of other enemy forces were attempting to escape through the 24th Infantry Division sector and then to the north. Colonel LeMoyne requested an Air Cavalry Troop in support. Within 10 minutes, the troop was on station under operational control of 1st Brigade.

1st Brigade defended in two up, one back configuration with Lieutenant Colonel Dave Jensen's TF 3-7 Infantry in brigade left (north) sector, Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Ware's TF 2-7 Infantry in brigade right (south) sector, and Lieutenant Colonel John Craddock's TF 4-64 AR in reserve. At 0807 hours, scouts from TF 2-7 Infantry were engaged by RPG anti-tank fires. The scouts did not return fire since the enemy soldiers who fired the RPGs immediately surrendered. While rounding up the prisoners, the scouts were engaged by sagger missiles from Iraqi BMPs and direct fire from T-72 tanks. Lieutenant Colonel Ware requested and subsequently received permission to return fire.

Colonel LeMoyne skillfully employed the Air Cavalry Troop from battle positions north of the causeway to block and seal the northern escape route. Five artillery battalions supported the engagement. Major General McCaffrey ordered FASCAM and DPICM to be fired directly on the causeway and on possible escape routes to the south. The Iraqi column of trucks and armor vehicles were blocked in. Their escape attempt had failed. At 0850 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart was given the order to launch an Apache company under operational control of 1st Brigade. The pilots skillfully engaged targets with HELLFIRE missiles from distances up to 4-5 kilometers. During the battle, the Apaches fired 107 HELLFIRE missiles and achieved direct hits 102 times.

At 0945 hours, Colonel LeMoyne committed 4-64 AR into the fray. The battalion moved to a battle position southeast of TF 2-7 Infantry. At 1030 hours, accompanied by Colonel John LeMoyne, the 1st Brigade TAC CP, and the Division Commanding General, TF 4-64 AR commenced an attack from south to north along the entire length of the enemy columns. TF 3-7 Infantry concurrently established blocking positions to the north.

Hundreds of enemy armored and wheeled vehicles were detected outside of the Victory Division's sector east of PL CRUSH and far north of the causeway. Despite the availability of USAF A-10s for close air support and long range artillery and attack aviation munitions, these enemy forces were not engaged since they posed no immediate threat to the Division Combat Team.

The "Battle at Rumaylah" was over by late afternoon. Over 187 enemy armored vehicles, 34 artillery guns, 400 trucks and other wheeled vehicles, nine multiple rocket launcher systems, and seven FROG missile systems were destroyed. Thousands of enemy soldiers fled on foot to the east back into the "Basrah Pocket." Other fleeing Iraqis moved north on foot across the causeway. Hundreds more were captured. Thousands of muddy footprints marked the retreat of these stunned enemy soldiers. Victory Division losses were one soldier wounded, one M-1 tank destroyed when a T-72 tank next to it exploded and started a fire that could not be controlled, and one Bradley damaged.

So ended one of the most dramatic lopsided victories in U.S. Army history.

WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ AND THE LONG JOURNEY HOME

"We are very proud to represent all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the field, and to have been selected to be the initial group to come home. We are of course the first of many plane loads to arrive in this country to joyful families and to return to our homes and our loved ones."

"I'd like to tell the American people how much we appreciate your support, your prayers, and your confidence during these last seven months. You have truly been our inspiration."

"I don't think it's inappropriate for me to thank our Commander-in-Chief President Bush for his purpose and resolve, and for his concern for us as we pursued this operation to a finish."

-- Brigadier General Terry Scott
(Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver)
Upon Return With the Victory Division Advance Party
Hunter Army Airfield, 0030 hours, 8 March 1991

In early March, President Bush announced to the Congress and the nation that the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) would be the first unit home. At 2000 hours on 4 March, the Division was asked to provide an advance party of 900 soldiers. The group was comprised of a cross section of the Division. They were scheduled for departure on 5 March via C-130 tactical airlift from Jalibah Airfield. However, heavy rain and dense fog delayed departure until the 6 March when they were flown to Dhahran Air Base, boarded C-141 aircraft, and headed home.

On 8 March 1991, the Victory Division was relieved in sector west of Basrah by the 1st Cavalry Division. The 24th Infantry Division (Mech) would withdraw 350 kilometers (218 miles) to Marshalling Area Victory (MA VICTORY) just south of the Saudi Arabia - Iraq border, download artillery and tank main gun ammunition, and prepare to move 540 kilometers (337 miles) by heavy equipment transporters (HET) to the Port of Ad Dammam or Dhahran Air Base for redeployment to the United States.

The withdrawal from Iraq took place in brigade combat team configuration on multiple routes. One route (ROUTE RED) was dedicated to wheel intensive units such as DISCOM, 171st CSG, and Aviation Brigade. Two routes (ROUTE WHITE and ROUTE BLUE) were dedicated to combat units.

The Division's TAC CP supported by Aviation Brigade and TF 3-15th Infantry (under operational control of Aviation Brigade) was assigned the mission to protect a refuel site near OBJ PURPLE.

2-4th Cavalry Squadron (Reinforced), the Aviation Brigade, and the Commanding General in the Division Assault CP were the last Victory Division units out of Iraq. Combat team task forces reverted to "pure" units once arriving in the marshalling area. A total of six HET upload areas were established for each combat brigade, 212th FA Brigade, 36th Engineer Group, and 3rd ACR. Each upload area accommodated seven march units.

BG Frazar exercised overall supervision of the Ad Dammam - Dhahran area. DISCOM managed the Port Support Area (PSA) while DIVARTY managed Victory Forces Dhahran. The latter encompassed Victory Station Rest Center, troop billeting in Khobar Towers, and the Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG) operation.

54 Civil Reserve Air Fleet sorties would be required to return the 18,000 soldiers of the Victory Division to home station. Sea redeployment of equipment and assorted materiel required 14 cargo ships (three Fast Sealift Ships; 11 Roll On-Roll Off) between 7 April and 5 May 91.

EPILOGUE

In just 100 hours of battle, the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) attacked 370 kilometers deep into the enemy's flank and rear. It severed the Iraqi lines of communication through the Euphrates River Valley and systematically annihilated the 26th Commando Brigade, 47th and 49th Infantry Divisions, and four Republican Guards divisions. Over 363 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 314 artillery guns and mortars, 207 anti-aircraft guns, 1,278 trucks, 19 FROG missiles, 22 MRLs, and 25 enemy high performance aircraft and helicopters were destroyed. The Victory Division detonated over 1,300 ammunition bunkers with more than one hundred thousand tons of munitions.

The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) attack spearheaded the ground offensive of the Allied Coalition Force. The Victory Division moved farther and faster than any other mechanized force in military history. The speed, violence, and determination with which it's soldiers fulfilled their mission completely destroyed the enemy's will to fight. Tactical victories such as Talill Air Base, BP #102, Jalibah Air Base, Basrah Plain, and the Rumaylah Oil Field are engraved forever in 24th Mechanized Infantry Division history.


Each soldier returned to families and to an American public filled with a great sense of pride and respect for their personal courage and sacrifices. Their accomplishments, together with other soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who took part in this great battle, have rekindled a new spirit of patriotism throughout our great country. America's confidence in her Armed Forces have been revitalized. America is safer and prouder because of the strength, discipline, and valor of the 24th Infantry Division soldier.

Eight Victory Division soldiers were killed and thirty-six were wounded in the campaign. They will be remembered with both dignity and honor. Their legacy is two million free Kuwaiti citizens and an enduring message to both free and oppressed people throughout the world... There is hope; Freedom is never without cost, and; Americans will fight and die for our principles.

"The war ended at 8 o'clock last Thursday morning in an onion field just off Highway 8, twenty-seven miles west of the southern Iraqi city of Basrah... The owner of that onion field, who awoke Friday morning to find a half-dozen M-1A1 tanks parked atop his produce, added his voice to a chorus in his tiny world, pointing down and shouting 'Saddam Hussein,' then pointing up and shouting 'George Bush.' Then he and his family began repairing the damage to their truck garden."


-- Joseph L. Galloway
"The Point of the Spear"
U.S. News & World Report (March 11, 1991)

**24TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED)
OPERATION DESERT STORM
BATTLE SUMMARY AND GRAPHICS**




POSITIONING FOR THE ATTACK

- ✓ 2-4TH CAVALRY WAS RELEASED FROM BORDER SCREENING OPERATIONS AT NOON ON 20 FEBRUARY (G-DAY MINUS THREE).
- ✓ D/4 CAVALRY TROOP PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 197TH BRIGADE (DIVISION LEFT ATTACK ZONE).
- ✓ 2-4TH CAVALRY (-) PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 2ND BRIGADE (DIVISION RIGHT ATTACK ZONE).
- ✓ 197TH BDE (LEFT ZONE), 1ST BDE (CENTER ZONE), AND 2ND BDE (RIGHT ZONE) ASSUMED BORDER SECURITY MISSION.
- ✓ DIVISION SECURITY ZONE EXTENDED TO PL OPUS (10 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE LINE OF DEPARTURE (LD)).
- ✓ PL OPUS LATER DESIGNATED AS THE LD DUE TO THE LACK OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. ALLOWED LEAD BRIGADES TO BREACH AND SUBSEQUENTLY MOVE TASK FORCES IN FRONT OF THE BERMS PRIOR TO G-DAY.
- ✓ AIR CAVALRY TROOPS ATTACHED TO AVIATION BRIGADE.




PHASE 1: ATTACK TO PHASE LINE LION

- ✓ DIVISION ATTACKED ACROSS THE LD ON 241600(L) FEB 91 (0700 EASTERN STANDARD TIME) WITH THREE BRIGADES ABREAST (197TH BDE IN DIV LEFT ZONE, 1ST BDE IN DIV CENTER ZONE, AND 2ND BDE IN DIV RIGHT ZONE).
- ✓ AVN BDE ELEMENT (WITH ATTACHED AIR CAVALRY TROOPS) CONDUCTED AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE FORWARD OF 197TH AND 2ND BDE. D/4 CAV OPCON TO 197TH BDE. 2-4 CAV(-) OPCON TO 2ND BDE. CONFIRMED COMBAT TRAILS XRAY, YANKEE, AND WHISKEY AND SOUGHT TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY FORCE.
- ✓ AT PL COLT (45 KM FROM LD), DIVISION TRANSITIONED TO A TWO BDE ABREAST ATTACK. 197TH BDE WAS TRAILED BY DIVARTY AND LOGISTICS ELEMENTS OF FOB #1 IN DIV LEFT ZONE. 2ND BDE WAS FOLLOWED BY 212TH FA BDE AND 1ST BDE IN DIV RIGHT ZONE.
- ✓ DIVISION MAIN CP REMAINED IN THE PRE-ATTACK ASSEMBLY AREA TO CONTROL THE BATTLE. THE DIVISION TAC AND ASSAULT CPs MOVED WITH THE 2ND BDE TAC CP.
- ✓ ELEMENTS OF THE 36TH ENGINEER GROUP WERE PLACED WELL FORWARD IN THE ATTACK TO MARK THE COMBAT TRAILS UTILIZING "CHUZ POINTS" FOR FOLLOW-ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES.




PHASE 2: ATTACK TO SEIZE OBJs BROWN, GREY, AND RED

- ✓ FOLLOWING CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND ARTILLERY PREPARATORY FIRES, 197TH BDE, SUPPORTED BY DIVARTY, ATTACKED TOWARD OBJ BROWN, CLEARED AO HAMMER, LINKED UP WITH THE 101ST ABN DIV, AND ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS TO THE WEST.
- ✓ FOLLOWING ARTILLERY FIRES BY 212TH FA BDE AGAINST AN ENEMY EARLY WARNING RADAR SITE, 2ND BDE ATTACKED TOWARD OBJ GREY, CLEARED AO VANGUARD, AND ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS TO THE EAST.
- ✓ FOLLOWING SEIZURE OF OBJ GREY AND OBJ BROWN, 1ST BDE ATTACKED THROUGH AO STEWART TOWARD OBJ RED, CLEARED AO LIBERTY, AND ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS TO THE EAST AND NORTH.
- ✓ 2-4 CAVALRY FOLLOWED 1ST BDE THROUGH AO STEWART AND SCREENED THE DIVISION'S LEFT FLANK ALONG PL VIKING.
- ✓ DISCOM ESTABLISHED FORWARD OPERATING BASE #1 (FOB #1). DIVISION SUPPORT AREA #2 (DSA #2) WOULD LATER BE ESTABLISHED IN AO VANGUARD. WHILE ONLY OPERATIONAL FOR ABOUT 12 HOURS, IT SERVED AS THE PRIMARY LOGISTICS BASE TO SUPPORT THE ATTACK INTO THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY.
- ✓ 36TH ENGINEER GROUP CONTINUED TO MOVE WITH FORWARD ELEMENTS IN EACH BRIGADE ZONE TO MARK THE COMBAT TRAILS AND IMPROVE TRAFFICABILITY FOR FOLLOW-ON COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS.




PHASE 3: ATTACK INTO THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY

- ✓ 1ST BDE CONDUCTED DIVISION MAIN ATTACK TO SEIZE BP #102, ESTABLISHED AO WOLF, AND BLOCKED THE IRAQI LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE EAST. THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND THE DIVISION ASSAULT CP COLOCATED WITH THE 1ST BDE TAC CP DURING THE ATTACK. COUNTERBATTERY ARTILLERY FIRE FROM 1-41 FA BN AND 212TH FA BDE SILENCED FOUR IRAQI ARTILLERY BATTALIONS. DURING THE HEAVY FIGHTING, LTC JOHN CRADDOCK (CDR, 4-64 ARMOR) EARNS THE SILVER STAR.
- ✓ 2ND BDE ATTACKED TO SEIZE BP #103. ESTABLISHED AO FOX AND PREPARED TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK TO THE EAST TOWARD BP #104 AND JALIBAH AIR BASE.
- ✓ 197TH BDE ATTACKED FROM OBJ BROWN TO ATTACK POSITION KELLEY. CONTINUED THE ATTACK TO SEIZE BP #101 AND ESTABLISH AO COUGAR. BLOCKED THE IRAQI LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM THE WEST AND NORTH. DURING THE ATTACK, 1LT LARRY AIKMAN (SCOUT PLATOON LEADER, TF 1-18 INFANTRY) EARNS THE SILVER STAR.
- ✓ 2-4TH CAVALRY CONTINUED TO SCREEN THE DIVISION'S WEST FLANK.
- ✓ RAPID MOMENTUM OF ATTACK CAUSED LOGISTICS EFFORT TO BYPASS DSA #3. DISCOM ESTABLISHED DSA #4 NEAR BP #102 TO SUPPORT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACK EAST TOWARD BASRAH.




PHASE 4: ATTACK TO JALIBAH AND TALLIL AIR BASES

- ✓ 1ST BDE CONDUCTED A FIXING ATTACK FROM BP #102 ALONG HIGHWAY # 8 TOWARD JALIBAH AIR BASE. THE DIVISION COMMANDER AND THE DIVISION AIR CP FLEW TO COLOCATE WITH THE BDE TAC CP.
- ✓ 2ND BDE CONDUCTED DIVISION MAIN ATTACK FROM BP #103 TO BP #104. SUPPORTED BY FIVE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS, CONDUCTED ATTACK AGAINST JALIBAH AIR BASE FROM THE SOUTHERN FLANK.
- ✓ 197TH BDE PROTECTED THE DIVISION'S WEST AND REAR FLANK. ENGAGED BY ENEMY FIRE FROM TALLIL AIR BASE. DIVISION RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS TO CONDUCT COUNTERATTACK AGAINST TALLIL. FOLLOWING 28 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES AND HEAVY PREPARATORY ARTILLERY FIRES, TF 2-69 ARMOR CONDUCTED COUNTERATTACK AGAINST TALLIL AIR BASE. DESPITE A 20 FOOT BERM AROUND THE COMPLEX, WAS ABLE TO PENETRATE THE MAIN ENTRANCE. NUMEROUS ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND ARMORED VEHICLES DESTROYED.
- ✓ 2-4TH CAVALRY MAINTAINED SCREEN OF DIVISION'S WEST FLANK.
- ✓ 3RD ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT PLACED UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 24TH INF DIV. REGIMENT ATTACKED EAST FROM OBJ RED TO SCREEN THE DIVISION'S RIGHT (SOUTHERN) FLANK AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH U.S. VII CORPS.
- ✓ AVIATION BRIGADE CONDUCTED APACHE MOVEMENT-TO-CONTACT FORWARD (EAST) OF 1ST BDE AND 2ND BDE. HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED. TWO APACHES DAMAGED. HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ENEMY FORCES DESTROYED.



PHASE 5: ATTACK EAST TOWARD BASRAH

- ✓ DISCOM ESTABLISHED DSA #5 IN THE VICINITY OF JALIBAH AIR BASE TO SUPPORT CONTINUATION OF ATTACK TO THE EAST.
- ✓ DIVISION ATTACKED WITH 1ST BDE ON THE LEFT (NORTH) FLANK, 2ND BDE FOLLOWED IN THE CENTER, AND 3RD ACR (OPCON) IN THE RIGHT (SOUTH) FLANK. ATTACK ORIENTED ALONG HIGHWAY 8 (MAIN ENEMY LINE OF COMMUNICATION) TOWARD PL AXE.
- ✓ 2-4 CAV ATTACKED FROM AO SABER AND OCCUPIED TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA BEHIND 1ST BDE (NORTHERN ZONE).
- ✓ 197TH BDE ATTACKED FROM TALLIL AIR BASE AND OCCUPIED TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA BEHIND 2ND BDE (CENTER ZONE).
- ✓ UPON REACHING PL AXE, MASSIVE ARTILLERY PREPARATORY FIRES FIRED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT BY 9 1/3 U.S. ARTILLERY BATTALIONS (DIVARTY, 212TH FA BDE, 18TH FA BDE) IN ANTICIPATION OF CONTINUING THE ATTACK EAST AT 0500 HOURS (28 FEB).
- ✓ DIVISION COMMANDER UPDATED BY DIVISION CHIEF OF STAFF AT 0330 HOURS (28 FEB) THAT PRESIDENTIAL CEASE FIRE TO GO INTO EFFECT 0800 HOURS. TO AVOID UNNECESSARY U.S. CASUALTIES, 0500 HOURS ATTACK WAS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. ARTILLERY FIRES, TO INCLUDE THAT OF 196TH FA BDE (TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD), CONTINUED UNTIL 0800 HOURS TRUCE.
- ✓ ATTACK ZONE PROBABLE IRAQI THEATER LOGISTICS SITE. LARGE MUNITIONS COMPLEX SEIZED (OVER 1,300 BUNKERS OF ARTILLERY, 500-1,000 LB AIR FORCE BOMBS, AND OTHER MUNITIONS)



CEASE FIRE PERIOD AND BATTLE CONTACT AT RUMAYLAH

- ✓ DIVISION'S FIRST PRIORITY DURING CEASE FIRE PERIOD WAS FORCE PROTECTION. HASTY DEFENSES ESTABLISHED ALONG PL VICTORY. TASK FORCE SCOUTS CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE TO THE EAST OF PL VICTORY WEST OF THE RUMAYLAH OIL FIELD. PL CRUSH ESTABLISHED AS U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND'S LIMIT OF ADVANCE.
- ✓ DESPITE CEASE FIRE ANNOUNCEMENT, NUMEROUS SKIRMISHES AND INCOMING MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE WERE REPORTED THROUGHOUT THE DIVISION AND ADJACENT UNIT SECURITY AREAS.
- ✓ DISCOM NOW ESTABLISHED DSA #6 NEAR PL AXE. BESIDES NORMAL RESUPPLY OPERATIONS, PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE EVACUATION OF THOUSANDS OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR. ALSO TENDED TO THE NEEDS OF THOUSANDS OF DISPLACED CIVILIANS.
- ✓ AT 0445 HOURS, 2 MARCH, 18T BDE SCOUTS REPORTED LARGE NUMBER OF IRAQI TANKS AND BMPs MOVING TO THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST TOWARD THE CAUSEWAY WITHIN THE 18T BDE SECURITY ZONE. APPEARED THAT REMNANTS OF THE RGFC HAMURABI ARMORED DIVISION AND COMPOSITE ELEMENTS OF OTHER ENEMY FORCES WERE ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE THROUGH THE 24TH INF DIV SECURITY ZONE AND THEN TO THE NORTH.
- ✓ AROUND 0800 HOURS, SCOUTS WERE ENGAGED BY ENEMY TANK AND ANTI-TANK FIRES. PERMISSION TO RETURN FIRE IN SELF DEFENSE APPROVED.
- ✓ 18T BDE DEFENDED WITH TF 3-7 INFANTRY IN THE NORTH, TF 2-7 INF IN THE SOUTH, AND TF 4-64 ARMOR IN RESERVE. AIR CMV TROOP, APACHE BATTALION, AND ARTILLERY (INCLUDING DPICM AND FASCAM) EMPLOYED TO BLOCK ENEMY ESCAPE ROUTE TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH. TF 3-7 INFANTRY ESTABLISHED BLOCKING POSITIONS TO THE NORTH WHILE TF 4-64 ARMOR ATTACKED ENEMY COLUMNS FROM THE SOUTH (ACCOMPANIED BY THE DIVISION COMMANDER AND THE BDE TAC CP).
- ✓ HUNDREDS OF ENEMY ARMORED AND WHEELED VEHICLES DETECTED OUTSIDE OF THE DIVISION'S ZONE EAST OF PL CRUSH AND NORTH OF THE CAUSEWAY. DESPITE AVAILABILITY OF USAF A-10 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND AMPLI QUANTITIES OF ATTACK AVIATION AND LONG RANGE ARTILLERY MUNITIONS, THESE FORCES WERE NOT ENGAGED SINCE THEY POSED NO THREAT TO THE DIVISION COMBAT TEAM.