

Congo: The Electoral Process Seen from the East

I. INTRODUCTION

Voter registration that began across the Congo in April 2011 concluded on 17 July, on time even in troubled regions such as the Kivu provinces and the Ituri district, and produced a nearly 6.3 million increase in the electorate, 24.5 per cent over the 2006 exercise. If it went relatively well, it was mainly because the voter card also serves as an identity card, so is as useful to militiamen as to ordinary citizens. Neither civil society nor political parties fundamentally challenged the operation at the local level, but this is not synonymous with satisfaction. The surprising results the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced and lack of dialogue and verification by the voters themselves feed latent but widespread suspicions in the opposition and civil society. To ensure credible elections, it is necessary to improve transparency, respect the electoral law and establish a forum for dialogue between INEC, the parties and civil society.

Ituri and North and South Kivu form a key region for two reasons: they are the sole part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) still harbouring armed groups, and they provided an important reservoir of votes for the ruling party in the 2006 elections. With Katanga and Maniema, it was the East – Orientale (including Ituri) and the Kivus – that elected Joseph Kabila and his People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), giving it more than 90 per cent support. However, the political landscape has changed in this region: an opposition party has emerged – the Congolese Union for the Nation (UNC) led by Vital Kamerhe, the former chair of the National Assembly – and the popularity of the government is falling due to persistent insecurity.

In an area that is electorally and militarily strategic, the campaign has just begun, in an atmosphere of relative political freedom that does not exclude, however, some restrictions and intimidation. Access to the media remains unbalanced, and there is pressure on the opposition, especially the UNC, because it is very active in this region. Nevertheless, due to the asymmetry of political forces, local politicians regard the presidential election as already decided in the East and the main stakes to be the legislative and provincial elections.

The electoral process in the East has generated suspicion on a national scale that risks developing into a crisis of confidence in the whole electoral process. Based on Crisis Group's

regional observations, the following measures should be taken across the country:

- ❑ the international community should observe the entire electoral process in detail, particularly in rural areas;
- ❑ political parties and civil society should prepare now for observing the voting, and the former should be allowed to campaign freely;
- ❑ INEC should scrupulously respect the electoral code, especially regarding accreditation of observers, and should establish a formal platform for dialogue with political parties and civil society at both the national and provincial level;
- ❑ INEC should establish transparent and widely publicised procedures for receiving grievances from civil society and the political parties regarding the approaching elections;
- ❑ INEC should publish the voters list and the breakdown of registration by district and territory in 2006 and 2011, and publicly explain its methodology for finalising the voters roll;
- ❑ INEC should establish a standardised procedure for challenging the results and publish those results by each voting station;
- ❑ the Superior Audiovisual and Communication Council should quickly become operational;
- ❑ all stakeholders in the electoral process should accept the code of conduct introduced by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General; and the UN mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) should encourage a more sustained respect for political freedom and dialogue between INEC, the political parties and civil society at both national and provincial level, since dialogue is the key element in building trust;
- ❑ MONUSCO should continue to deploy its troops in the areas where armed groups are active;
- ❑ MONUSCO and the international community should increase their crowd management training program for the Congolese police;
- ❑ MONUSCO should increase its logistical support for the timely distribution of electoral material; and

- the presidential majority and the opposition should, for the contingency that postponement of the elections cannot be avoided, negotiate an agreement that sets a new deadline for the elections and provides that government would limit itself to routine business until they are held.

Having already analysed the main challenges of the electoral process nationally in the report *Congo: The Electoral Dilemma*, Crisis Group in this briefing examines voter registration and the beginning of the campaign on the ground in the East, putting the preparations for elections in late 2011 in their local context and highlighting the electoral stakes in a region that remains fundamental for durable stability in the country.

II. AN UNUSUALLY FLAWLESS ELECTORAL REGISTRATION PROCESS

On 17 July, INEC announced the end of the electoral registration period, completing the redrawing of the DRC's electoral map¹ and opening up the way for the registration of candidates in August and their validation in September. Although the process caused a brief confrontation in the capital with one of the main opposition movements, the Union for Social Democracy and Progress (Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social – UDPS),² the problems were of a different nature in the East.

INEC says it registered 1,600,000 million voters in Ituri, 3,003,246 in North Kivu and 2,022,960 in South Kivu, more than the expected numbers in all three areas.³ INEC had calculated the expected number of voters by taking into account the numbers registered in 2005 and 2006 and the estimated population growth (20.56 per cent in five years). However, these figures and the general approval that greeted them⁴ did not hide the debatable nature of the proc-

ess. In the East of the DRC, armed groups did not disrupt the process but the opposition was unable to fulfil the role of observer effectively and civil society was marginalised.⁵

A. THE LOGISTICS ARE MORE PROBLEMATIC THAN THE SECURITY SITUATION

In the East, as in other regions,⁶ INEC has been hampered by logistical problems and the inexperience of data entry staff, a situation that no INEC representative has tried to hide or underestimate. In Ituri, the kits used in 2011 were less robust than those used in 2006.⁷ In North Kivu, problems with the data encryption and entry software delayed registration and required the deployment of technical specialists to remedy the situation.⁸

However, INEC officials say that deployment of resources at the registration centres posed most problems. Although provincial governments helped fund the “itinerant registration centres”, there were organisational shortcomings: lack of fuel and voter registration forms, fragility of the materials and delays in paying officials.⁹ INEC officials in Ituri went on strike for two days between 31 May and 2 June 2011 to demand their pay. In order to avoid this problem in South Kivu, INEC requested civil society's assistance in providing accommodation and meals for officials. In North Kivu, delays in MONUSCO's logistical support delayed the opening of registration centres in two locations in Lubero territory.¹⁰

The extent of the territory to be covered required the deployment of itinerant registration centres.¹¹ INEC deployed 43 itinerant centres in five territories of Ituri district – most of them in Djugu territory.¹² In South Kivu, INEC deployed 180 itinerant registration centres, a figure contested by the opposition parties and civil society.¹³ In North Kivu, INEC deployed 286 itinerant centres but not in all territories. How-

¹“La CENI enregistre 32.024.640 électeurs à la clôture de la révision du fichier électoral”, Agence Congolaise de Presse, 1 August 2011.

²On 4 July, when a UDPS representative submitted to INEC a memorandum alleging fraud during voter registration, the police clashed with UDPS supporters on the Boulevard du 30 Juin in Kinshasa. Although the police used non-lethal anti-riot techniques one of the demonstrators died. “Tension au top dans les états-majors politiques – Echauffourées entre les partisans de Tshisekedi et la police: 1 mort!”, *Le Palmarès*, 5 July 2011.

³See the INEC website for the figures: www.cei-rdc.cd. There has been no census of the DRC population since 1984. The UDPS boycott of the 2006 elections meant that an unknown number of eligible voters did not register.

⁴Statement by the U.S. Department of State's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs on the Electoral Process in the DRC, press release, U.S. Embassy, Kinshasa, 25 July 2011.

⁵For a general description of the electoral process, its challenges and risks and a presentation of the main competing political forces, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°175, *Congo: The Electoral Dilemma*, 5 May 2011.

⁶“La CENI ramasse les kits électoraux à Kinshasa”, *Le Potentiel*, 10 August 2011.

⁷Crisis Group interview, INEC officials, Bunia, 18 July 2011.

⁸Crisis Group interview, INEC officials, Goma, 29 July 2011.

⁹Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Bunia, 18 July 2011.

¹⁰INEC said that registration began late in Fatowa and Mangorijipa, in Lubero territory, because of the unavailability of MONUSCO helicopters. Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Goma, 29 July 2011.

¹¹Ituri district and the two Kivus cover an area of 190,171 km², which is almost the same area as Senegal (196,722 km²).

¹²Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Bunia, 18 July 2011.

¹³Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, civil society and political parties, Bukavu, 25 and 26 July 2011.

ever, INEC refuses to say which territories were not covered by the itinerant centres.¹⁴

Operations were constrained by problems associated with physical access and communication. In North Kivu, INEC says that communication remains problematic in Masisi, Walikale and the west of Rutshuru territory even though officials are equipped with Thuraya satellite telephones. This problem could hinder the transmission of election results.¹⁵ In South Kivu, civil society and opposition parties criticised the distribution of satellite communication equipment which they say was only made available to some officials in the field.¹⁶

Lack of security only disrupted registration at a very local level. In Irumu territory, INEC relocated registration centres in Bahema-Mitego and Bahema-South after they were looted.¹⁷ In Djugu territory, a kit was stolen but rapidly replaced. In North Kivu, registration centres were attacked by armed men in Lubero and Rutshuru territories.¹⁸ In Walikale territory, registration was disrupted by fighting between the Mayi-Mayi Cheka and the Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain – APCLS). In North Kivu, INEC decided not to attempt registration in a small number of places.¹⁹ In South Kivu, armed men stole registration kits in Kabare, Kalehe and Mwenga.

In Shabunda territory, soldiers of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratique pour la libération du Rwanda – FDLR) registered.²⁰ Displacement of the population in Shabunda territory following attacks attributed to the FDLR forced INEC to relocate some centres. Security incidents were restricted to a few territories (Masisi in North Kivu, Shabunda in South Kivu and Irumu in Ituri).

B. THE ARMED GROUPS: ARE THEY REALLY A PROBLEM?

Paradoxically, registration went ahead unhindered in the areas of greatest militia density in the two Kivus and Ituri. The worsened security situation during the first half of the year did not prevent registration.²¹

In Irumu territory, the last pocket of militia violence in Ituri district,²² the number of voters registered was 118 per cent of the expected figure. In South Kivu, the corresponding figure was 122.84 per cent in Fizi territory, where the Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba and the FDLR are present; 102.25 per cent in Shabunda territory, where the FDLR and the self-defence group Raïa Mutomboki operate²³; 96.81 per cent in Kabare, where the Maï-Maï of the National Congolese Resistance (Résistance nationale congolaise – RNC), are allied to the FDLR; and 98.82 per cent in Kalehe, ravaged by the Mayi-Mayi Kirikicho, also allied to the FDLR. In North Kivu, the figure was 93 per cent in Rutshuru territory, where the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups are active; 108 per cent in Walikale territory, a stronghold of the APCLS and the FDLR; and 97 per cent in Masisi territory, despite the presence of the Mayi-Mayi Cheka and self-defence groups.²⁴

In Ituri district, the FPJC militia clashed with the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) from time to time and pillaged some locations but did not block voter registration. From the beginning of the voter registration process, the FDLR let it be known that it would not disrupt electoral operations in South and North Kivu.²⁵ In North Kivu, the FDLR facilitated

¹⁴ Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Goma, 29 July 2011.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society and political parties, Bukavu, 23 July 2011.

¹⁷ An electoral kit was stolen in Kagoro, and another in Bikina, by militiamen of the Front for Justice in Congo (Front pour la justice au Congo – FPJC). Militiamen from the same movement also tried to steal materials from the centre at Kadjudji.

¹⁸ The registration centres at Kirumba, Kanyabayunga and Kashehe, in Lubero territory and Tongo and Rubare, in Rutshuru territory, were attacked.

¹⁹ INEC was unable to conduct registration operations in seven places in the west of Masisi territory. Crisis Group interviews, INEC members, Goma, 29 July 2011.

²⁰ “Sud Kivu: Des FDLR s’entraînent de force à Shabunda”, *Africa News*, 8 June 2011.

²¹ For more on the security situation in the East of the DRC, see Crisis Group Africa Report N° 165, *Congo: No Stability in Kivu despite Rapprochement with Rwanda*, 16 November 2010; and Crisis Group Report, *Congo: The Electoral Dilemma*, op. cit.

²² The FPJC is a residual movement from the Revolutionary Patriotic Front for Ituri (Front révolutionnaire patriotique pour l’Ituri – FRPI), mainly located in Walungu Bindi in Irumu territory. It is intermittently led by Colonel Cobra Matata. The former FRPI leader left the FARDC in June 2010 to join Sharif Manda’s FPJC. Sharif Manda’s arrest on 2 September 2010 in Arua, Uganda, left Cobra Matata and David Mbadu, respectively first and second lieutenants, in a position of strength and began a power struggle within the FPJC. Following the disappearance of Cobra Matata, who was apparently arrested in Uganda, David Mbadu has taken command. Crisis Group interviews, members of MONUSCO and civil society, Bunia, 18 July 2011.

²³ In order to fight the FDLR, local armed groups, known as “self-defence groups”, were formed to compensate for the FARDC’s absence after the armed forces were reorganised into regiments in February 2011 in Shabunda territory, South Kivu and Masisi territory, North Kivu.

²⁴ Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Goma, 29 July 2011.

²⁵ Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society, Goma and Bukavu, 23 and 27 July 2011.

access by INEC teams in the areas under its control.²⁶ In South Kivu, they went so far as to ensure security around voter registration centres.²⁷ When the Mayi-Mayi Cheka clashed with the APCLS, the latter guarded registration kits and returned them to the INEC.²⁸ The FDLR wants to register its members because the voter cards can be used as identity cards and therefore allow them to circulate in the Great Lakes region.

Anxious to obtain the precious voter cards, the armed groups have so far not posed a threat to the electoral process, which does not mean that this will continue to be the case. Except for the theft of registration kits, the FPJC, FDLR and the Mayi-Mayi have not sought to disrupt INEC activities. The FARDC are therefore still waiting to deploy. In North Kivu, the FARDC chose to partly redeploy the first regiments formed from former CNDP troops in Masisi and Walikale territories. In Rutshuru territory, where the security situation is worsening,²⁹ the FARDC decided to base a reserve regiment composed of officers without a command and those who are wounded and retired. In South Kivu, following a demonstration during the visit of Roger Meece, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, the governor promised to prioritise the redeployment of the FARDC to Shabunda territory.³⁰

C. POLITICAL PARTIES INACTIVE AND CIVIL SOCIETY MARGINALISED

Political parties are far from satisfied with the voter registration process, including the PPRD in North Kivu,³¹ even though the parties were the major absentees in the process. Unlike in South Kivu, where arrangements for registration supervision were better, only a few party agents monitored voter registration in North Kivu and Ituri because of a lack

of funding. Unable to pay party agents, the main political parties were unable to follow registration closely.

In North Kivu, no party agents were accredited by INEC and so no complaints were submitted. In Goma, INEC only opened accreditation for observers and party agents two days before registration was due to start even though the law requires seven days.³² However, INEC's flagrant violation of the electoral law does not seem to have troubled the political parties. The opposition says INEC is not neutral and that such behaviour is to be expected.³³ Only the PPRD was critical but it has not raised questions about INEC's work.³⁴ The United Nations does not seem to consider this violation of electoral law to be important and prefers to attribute the lack of transparency during registration to a lack of mobilisation by the political parties.³⁵

The UNC believes there were irregularities but was not in a position to complain because none of its party agents were accredited by INEC. In South Kivu, Vital Kamerhe's party believes there were few irregularities and that they did not justify submitting a complaint.³⁶ In Ituri district and North Kivu, the UNC even wanted the INEC to pay a daily allowance to allow observers to monitor registration.³⁷

In South Kivu, the UDPS made a collective complaint on 16 July 2011, about irregularities noted by its party agents. It drew attention to mistakes on six voter cards, the registration of a minor and one case of duplicate registration. It also alleged that soldiers and police officers had registered³⁸ but this was not documented. INEC notified the national office of the complaint but criticised the lack of evidence on the registration of soldiers and police officers. INEC believes it cannot take action unless the UNC reveals the identities of the soldiers and police officers concerned.³⁹

The UDPS argued that security reasons prevented it from supplying the information and asked INEC to compare entries on the electoral register with the biometrical identification

²⁶ Crisis Group interviews, members of the United Nations, Goma, 26 July 2011.

²⁷ Report of the meeting on the revision of the electoral register, 18-22 May 2011, Network of Civil Society Organisations for Observing the Elections (Réseau des organisations de la société civile pour l'observation des élections – ROSOE), 23 May 2011.

²⁸ Crisis Group interviews, members of MONUSCO and INEC, Goma, 21 July 2011.

²⁹ "Rutshuru: l'insécurité rend difficile l'accès des humanitaires aux populations vulnérables, selon Ocha", Radio Okapi, 4 August 2011.

³⁰ On 19 July 2011, during a visit by a United Nations delegation led by Roger Meece and the governor of South Kivu, Marcellin Cishambo, to Shabunda, South Kivu, demonstrators called for more security against the FDLR and threw stones. The governor, who "believes that the situation is significantly calmer in Fizi than in Shabunda", announced deployment of the FARDC. "Shabunda-Fizi: Marcellin Cishambo annonce le déploiement des contingents des FARDC", Radio Okapi, 21 July 2011.

³¹ Crisis Group interviews, PPRD members, Goma, 28 July 2011.

³² Article 39 of Law n°11/003 of 25 June 2011 amending and completing Law n°06/006 of 9 March 2006 on the organisation of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local elections.

³³ Crisis Group interviews, members of political parties, Goma, 26 and 27 July 2011.

³⁴ Crisis Group interviews, PPRD members, Goma, 28 July 2011.

³⁵ Crisis Group interviews, members of MONUSCO, Goma, 20 July 2011.

³⁶ Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

³⁷ Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, Bunia, Goma and Bukavu, 17, 22 and 25 July 2011.

³⁸ In the DRC, soldiers and police officers do not have the right to vote. See Law n°06/006 on the organisation of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local elections, appendices.

³⁹ Crisis group interview, provincial executive secretary, INEC, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

files of soldiers and police officers⁴⁰ – a measure that MONUSCO’s electoral experts deemed to be dangerous because, it says, this could result in more soldiers registering. However, even if the computers used for registering voters and soldiers were identical, the encryption programs used for these two registers are different.⁴¹

Although the PPRD and the Presidential Majority (MP) think that the INEC has done a remarkable job,⁴² the PPRD deplores the fact that INEC only allowed two days for accreditation of party agents, in violation of the electoral law. Suffering from a lack of funds in North Kivu, like the other parties, the PPRD was also unable to deploy its party agents.⁴³

There is no doubt that civil society was more active in monitoring registration. In South Kivu, it placed observers in all the territories.⁴⁴ In North Kivu, it tried to deploy observers but was unable to submit observations because INEC had not issued accreditation to party agents. In Ituri, as in South Kivu, civil society criticised INEC for making announcements about centres that did not in fact exist; for not deploying itinerant registration centres;⁴⁵ and for registering FARDC soldiers, members of armed groups and Rwandan nationals.⁴⁶ However, the political parties did not take on board these criticisms and did not therefore submit corresponding complaints, which shows the lack of interaction between the political parties and civil society.

In addition to the short accreditation period in North Kivu, opposition parties did not get very involved in monitoring registration because of a lack of funds and the fact that they were too busy establishing their own local structures. Civil society, which has a greater capacity for mobilisation, was restricted to the role of observer and unable to directly or indirectly influence the electoral process.⁴⁷ In addition, whether its actions were biased, as in North Kivu, or transparent, as in South Kivu, INEC did not seek dialogue with either opposition movements or civil society.

In North Kivu, INEC did not systematically invite opposition parties to its information meetings and, in South Kivu, nine opposition parties decided to stop participating in meetings organised by INEC because it paid no attention to the reports submitted by party agents.⁴⁸ Despite its mandate to “facilitate broad and regular exchanges with INEC”⁴⁹, MONUSCO restricted itself to passively deploring this lack of dialogue and the marginalisation of the opposition.⁵⁰

D. CREDIBILITY IN DOUBT

In North Kivu, the number of voters registered was 161 per cent of the expected figure in Goma and 216 per cent in Nyiragongo territory. This raises questions. Civil society denounced the practice of “deporting voters”, which involves those political parties that have the necessary resources moving voters from one constituency to another so that they could register several times.⁵¹ The number of registered voters in Goma rose from 180,955 in 2006 to 351,455 in 2011 (the expected number was 218,000) and in Niragongo territory, from 41,083 in 2006 to 107,458 (the expected number was 49,700).⁵² Registration figures at the national level also brought some surprises, the first of which was

⁴⁰ Complaint about the revision of the electoral register in South Kivu, 16 July 2011.

⁴¹ According to experts of the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform in the DRC (EUSEC), the different software used made it impossible for INEC to include lists of FARDC soldiers in the electoral register. Crisis Group interviews, EUSEC members, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

⁴² Crisis Group interviews, PPRD and MP members, Bunia, Goma, Bukavu, 18, 25 and 28 July 2011.

⁴³ In Goma, the PPRD did not receive financial support from its head office in Kinshasa to fund the deployment of observers. Crisis Group interviews, PPRD members, Goma, 28 July 2011.

⁴⁴ In South Kivu, ROSOE deployed 343 observers at 303 registration centres. Report of the Meeting on the Revision of the Electoral Register 18-22 May 2011, ROSOE, 23 May 2011.

⁴⁵ In Ituri district, the centres at Loda and Likopi were apparently not open for the entire registration period. In Uvira territory, South Kivu, INEC is reported to have publicised registration but not deployed itinerant registration centres in the rural areas. Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

⁴⁶ In Rubaya, in Masisi territory, FARDC soldiers reportedly registered. At the Mavumu registration centre, in North Kivu, the population reportedly chased away Rwandan nationals who had come to register. In Fizi territory, South Kivu, the Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba reportedly registered, as did members of the FDLR in Shabunda territory. Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society, Goma and Bukavu, 19 and 25 July 2011.

⁴⁷ “Observers ... must not interfere, either directly or indirectly, in electoral operations”. Article 45 of the law amending and completing Law n°06/006 of 9 March 2006 on the organisation of presidential, legislative, provincial, urban, municipal and local elections, 15 June 2011. In addition, in 2011, unlike in 2006, civil society is not represented on the INEC. For more details, see Crisis Group Report, *Congo: The Electoral Dilemma*, op. cit.

⁴⁸ Crisis Group interviews, members of political parties, Goma and Bukavu, 19 and 26 July 2011.

⁴⁹ “MONUSCO shall support the organisation and conduct of national elections ... by supporting the CENI in facilitating dialogue among various Congolese stakeholders, by monitoring, reporting and following-up on human rights violations in the context of the elections, and by using the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of Congo as required”. Resolution S/RES/1991, United Nations Security Council, 28 June 2011, Article 7.

⁵⁰ Crisis Group interviews, members of MONUSCO, Goma, Bukavu, 19 and 26 July 2011.

⁵¹ “Nord Kivu: ‘Déporter’ des électeurs pour gagner des voix”, *Syfia Grands Lacs*, 23 July 2011.

⁵² Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Goma, 29 July 2011.

the increase in the electorate by nearly 6.3 million people since 2006, over one million more than expected by INEC.⁵³

In South Kivu, civil society and opposition party representatives denounced the absence of itinerant registration centres in Uvira territory, where the number of voters registered was 88.74 per cent of the expected number. This was the only territory in the province where the figure was lower than 95 per cent.⁵⁴ INEC explained that no more voters were applying for registration, two weeks before the closure of registration, but it refuses to say how many itinerant registration centres were deployed in Uvira territory.⁵⁵

Members of civil society and political parties say there were many irregularities without being able to prove them. The main criticism of the INEC provincial teams was bias because, with the exception of data entry personnel, the INEC teams were not replaced as provided for in the law on INEC.⁵⁶ In South Kivu, the opposition accused the provincial secretary of having links with the majority.⁵⁷ In North Kivu, the problem was the lack of transparency displayed by INEC's refusal to share information.⁵⁸ In the two provinces, civil society and the opposition parties affirmed that soldiers and foreigners were registered.⁵⁹ In Ituri district and North Kivu, INEC was accused of not always displaying electoral registers for voters to verify they had been registered correctly.⁶⁰

The law on voter registration stipulates that voters have seven days to lodge an appeal after the display of voter lists at the registration centres,⁶¹ but this was only partly observed, contrary to what INEC affirms.⁶² INEC's announcement of the presence of 119,941 duplicates on the electoral register⁶³ (0.37 per cent of registered voters) also casts doubts on the

credibility of this revision of the register and shows that voter verification of voter lists was not systematic.⁶⁴ In 2006, the number of duplicates reached 292,353 and around 2,000 police officers, soldiers and foreigners were found to be on the register.⁶⁵ The UDPS and opposition senators requested access to the INEC server but this was rejected, which is currently the subject of a lively controversy with the opposition in Kinshasa.⁶⁶

Despite the refusal for dialogue by INEC branches in the East and the passivity of the United Nations mission towards this situation, the political parties have decided to participate in the elections. The lack of dialogue and the surprising registration figures announced by INEC fuel the suspicions of a large part of civil society and the political class in the Kivus and Ituri district. These suspicions are strengthened by the non-observance of the electoral law (accreditation period for observers, display of voter lists, etc) in North and South Kivu. The lack of a factual or any other response to local criticism means there will continue to be doubts about the credibility of electoral operations and also the final results.⁶⁷

III. ANYTHING NEW IN THE EAST?

In 2006, Ituri district and the two Kivus voted overwhelmingly for Joseph Kabila, who had promised to bring peace.⁶⁸ In 2011, these regions no longer seem to be so supportive of the outgoing president, all the more so because the UNC leader, Vital Kamerhe, is from South Kivu. However, despite the uncertainties about the popularity of Joseph Kabila, politicians in the East are more focused on the legislative and provincial elections in 2012 than the presidential elections. In this part of the country, the balance of electoral

⁵³ For the complete results, see Appendix C.

⁵⁴ Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Organic law n°10/013 on the organisation and operation of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 28 July 2010, Article 38.

⁵⁷ INEC's provincial secretary in South Kivu is related to the minister of agriculture, Norbert Basengezi Katintima. Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society and political parties, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

⁵⁸ Crisis Group interviews, members of the opposition, Goma, 27 July 2011.

⁵⁹ Crisis Group interviews, members of civil society and political parties, Goma, 22 July 2011.

⁶⁰ Crisis Group interviews, members of political parties, Bunia and Goma, 18 and 27 July 2011.

⁶¹ Law n°04/028 of 24 December 2004 on the identification and registration of voters in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Articles 39 and 40.

⁶² "Éléments de réponse au mémorandum de l'UDPS", INEC, 11 July 2011, p. 2.

⁶³ "Sénat: les annexes à la loi électorale envoyées à la commission PAJ", *Le Potentiel*, 12 August 2011.

⁶⁴ In Bas Congo as well, voters were not able to check that their names had been included on voter lists at their registration centre. Crisis Group telephone interview, member of civil society, Kinshasa, 31 August 2011.

⁶⁵ "Elections 2006, rapport final", the European Union Electoral Observation Mission to the DRC, p. 32.

⁶⁶ "RDC: les sénateurs de l'opposition réclament plus de transparence du scrutin", Radio France Internationale, 12 August 2011; "Elections 2011: l'UDPS exige la contre-expertise du fichier électoral", Radio Okapi, 30 August 2011. The opposition is demanding access to the server and the UDPS is calling for protests outside the INEC offices in order to put pressure on to win the case.

⁶⁷ "Nettoyage du fichier électoral: l'Asadho veut voir clair", *Le Potentiel*, 17 August 2011.

⁶⁸ In the second round of the presidential election in 2006, the Congolese electorate voted on the basis of the geographical origin of the candidates, with the West mainly voting for Jean-Pierre Bemba and the East mainly for Joseph Kabila. In the second round, Kabila received 96.45 per cent of the votes in North Kivu and 98.27 per cent in South Kivu. Figures from Thierry Coosemans, *Radioscopie des urnes congolaises* (Paris, 2008).

forces is such that the outgoing president is unlikely to be defeated but the contest is however much more open in the other elections.

A. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN STARTS BUT IT IS AN UNEQUAL CONTEST

The electoral campaign has made a slow start in the East but has already shown that it will be an unequal contest even though there is so far no question about the freedom to campaign.

It is impossible to assess the strength of the two leading opposition parties in the East because of their non-participation in the previous election and the very high number of votes received by the presidential party in 2006. Although the UDPS has been an opposition party for a long time, it is no more than a “memory in the east of the country”.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Vital Kamerhe’s UNC is established in the Kivus and has an important ally in Ituri in the shape of the Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des patriotes congolais – UPC).

The UDPS has no presence in Ituri district and remains a marginal party in the Kivus.⁷⁰ In North Kivu, Étienne Tshisekedi’s party has three different federations, in Goma, Butembo and Beni, while it has only one in South Kivu. In South Kivu, the UDPS tries to compensate for its lack of popularity by attempting to unite the smaller opposition parties, as shown by the statement on voter registration signed by 14 opposition parties and submitted to INEC.

In Ituri district, the MP’s platform is nothing but an empty shell. Neither the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani Mouvement de Libération – RCDKML) or the Social Movement for Renewal (Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau – MSR) have cordial relations with the PPRD. In South Kivu, voter registration presented an occasion for some representatives of small local parties in the MP to attract attention to themselves by calling on voters to vote for Joseph Kabila in the presidential elections.⁷¹ The PPRD’s elected representatives castigate the choice of electoral system used in 2006, which forced them to make alliances in order to obtain a majority in the national and provincial assemblies.⁷² In North Kivu, the PPRD fears that voters will think it is the same as the

former presidential coalition and insists that the MP is a new PPRD-led coalition.⁷³

For the moment, in the East, the two main opposition movements have only limited access to state media but this problem is partly compensated by their access to community radios and to Radio Okapi, the United Nations radio station in the DRC. There are many community radios in the Kivus⁷⁴ and they broadcast opposition messages and cover their demonstrations. This freedom of expression on the radio has so far only been troubled by the suspension of a community radio broadcaster by the provincial minister responsible for information and the press, Naason Kubuya Ndoole, for “defamatory and injurious comments about the authorities”,⁷⁵ on 3 August 2011. However, while waiting for the creation of the Superior Audiovisual and Communication Council (Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel et de la communication – CSAC), only the High Authority on the Media (Haute autorité des médias – HAM) has the power to take such measures and the minister of communication has praised the freedom extended to journalists in the DRC.⁷⁶

Following the example of the PPRD, the opposition parties have now begun their electoral campaign. Unlike his first visit, Vital Kamerhe was able to hold a meeting in Goma on 22 June 2011 without incident, and then in Bukavu on the following day. Although, the UNC is free to hold meetings in South Kivu, that was not always the case in Goma where party representatives claim that the mayor continues to refuse to authorise its public demonstrations.⁷⁷ In Ituri, except for a rapidly resolved dispute about a flag in front of the UNC office in Geti, Irumu territory, this party has been able to establish itself without difficulty.⁷⁸ The same can be said of the Kivus. In South Kivu, where the UNC has attracted support from several provincial elected representatives,⁷⁹ Vital Kamerhe’s party claims

⁶⁹ Crisis group interview, member of civil society, Bunia, 14 July 2011.

⁷⁰ The UDPS claims 23,000 members in South Kivu and 1,800 members in Goma. Crisis Group interviews, UDPS members, Bukavu and Goma, 25 and 28 July 2011.

⁷¹ “M. P.: Enrôlement du Secrétaire général du ML 17 Emmanuel Mudurha au Sud-Kivu”, Digital Congo, 23 July 2011.

⁷² Crisis Group interviews, PPRD members, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

⁷³ Crisis Group interviews, PPRD members, Goma, 29 July 2011.

⁷⁴ In North Kivu, Vibia FM, Kivu One and Michabi Voice TV compete with state media. In South Kivu, Maendeleo, Iriba FM, Radio Maria, Radio Santi Yarema, Radio Star and Vision Shala do the same.

⁷⁵ “RD Congo / Un ministre provincial du Nord-Kivu suspend un animateur de radio”, Reporters sans frontières, 3 August 2011.

⁷⁶ “We are a bad example to the autocratic regimes on our continent. We are criticised for being too lax. But we say there can never be enough freedom”. Interview with Lambert Mende Omalanga in “Le temps est à la préparation des échéances”, *Afrique Magazine*, no. 310, July 2011, pp. 104-105.

⁷⁷ Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, Bukavu, Goma, 25 and 28 July 2011.

⁷⁸ Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, Bunia, 13 July 2011.

⁷⁹ The Bitakwira provincial deputies of the Congolese Party for Good Governance (Parti congolais pour la bonne gouvernance – PCBG), a member of the MP, elected in Uvira, and Aimé

150,000 supporters and a further 90,000 in North Kivu, which would make it the leading opposition party in these two provinces.⁸⁰ The UNC's alliance with the UPC⁸¹ could make it the leading opposition force in Ituri district as well.

Despite the freedom to campaign, there has been some intimidation of the UNC. In Uvira territory, in South Kivu, a UNC supporter was arrested by the National Intelligence Agency (Agence Nationale de Renseignement – ANR) for saying that Joseph Kabila could not win the elections. In Goma, North Kivu, the person responsible for mobilising voters was imprisoned in the central prison for the same reason in May 2011.⁸² On 15 August 2011, a UNC spokesperson and famous broadcaster in South Kivu, Kizito Mushizi, wrote to the head of state to denounce death threats made on 11 August in Bukavu.⁸³ On that day, a Bukavu shopkeeper who reportedly funded the UNC, Patrick Mborero, was killed at his home by armed men. On 15 August, members of the Republican Guard abducted M. Issa Selemani of the UDPS for whom an arrest warrant had been issued for insulting the head of state.⁸⁴ UNC leaders in North Kivu accuse the local authorities of having tried to disrupt the visit of Vital Kamerhe.⁸⁵

Meanwhile, after the failure of its attempts to integrate the armed groups at the start of the year,⁸⁶ the government

launched major roadworks in the main cities (Goma, Bukavu and Bunia). Following the example of Kinshasa, the central avenues in Bunia, Goma and Bukavu are being rebuilt. Although financed by private companies and external partners,⁸⁷ these works have been undertaken as part of the Five Priorities and relaunch of state action promised by Joseph Kabila during his campaign in 2006.⁸⁸ Faced with this abundance of resources, the opposition, which is finding it hard enough to get established, does not have the resources to implement a communication campaign.

B. THE ELECTORAL ISSUES IN THE EAST

As so often, the focus of the elections is not the same in the provinces as it is in the capital. While the capital only thinks and talks about the presidential elections and the main candidates are known,⁸⁹ it is the legislative and provincial elections that occupy minds and strategies in the East to the extent that many people in the Kivus and Ituri regard the presidential election as already decided.

In North Kivu, the weakness of the opposition and the alignment of the provincial political barons with the government means it is unlikely that there will be a change in the head of state. Even though the RCD-KML's Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi has not yet declared his support for Joseph Kabila, there is no doubt that the current minister for decentralisation supports the incumbent and his party is a member of the MP.⁹⁰ In addition, Eugène Serufuli, a founder

Bodji Sangara (PPRD), elected in Walungu, publicly announced their support for the UNC.

⁸⁰ Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, Bukavu, Goma, 25 and 28 July 2011.

⁸¹ The Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des patriotes congolais – UPC) is an opposition political party based on the Héma ethnic group, whose militia was supported by Uganda. For more details, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°64, *Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri*, 13 June 2003.

⁸² Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, Goma, Bukavu, 25 and 28 July 2011.

⁸³ “Dénonciation à Bukavu d’un projet d’assassinat politique”, Agence congolaise de presse, 24 August 2011.

⁸⁴ Crisis Group telephone interviews, member of civil society, 18 August 2011.

⁸⁵ On 22 June 2011, the security services arrested three armed men, who were presented to the press as bandits. The UNC affirms that its own security service arrested these men before handing them over to the security services. Crisis Group interviews, UNC members, 28 July 2011.

⁸⁶ At the beginning of 2011, the government launched a campaign to integrate armed groups (see Crisis Group Report, *Congo: The Electoral Dilemma*, op. cit.). The Federalist Republican Forces (Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes – FRF), formed by the Tutsi ethnic group, were among the most important armed groups integrated in this period. Because of their links with Rwanda, the integration of the FRF provoked many different reactions within the FARDC, mainly by integrated officers from the Congolese Patriotic Resistance (Patriotes résistants congolais – PARECO). The mass rapes in Fizi territory, attributed to Colonel Kifura, ex-PARECO, followed the sending of

FRF troops to the Fizi training centre where Colonel Kifura and his troops were stationed. The colonel, who officially surrendered on 7 July 2011, has still not been referred to the military courts and is currently stationed at Luberizi, in accordance with the command given to him. The Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba were also briefly integrated in April 2011 but immediately defected.

⁸⁷ In Bunia, the Bego Congo Company carried out the work, financed by the mining company AngloGold Ashanti. In Goma and Bukavu, Chinese companies (Traminco and the Chinese National Bridges and Roads Company) carried out the roadworks.

⁸⁸ The Five Priorities (infrastructure, health and education, water and electricity, housing, and employment) were the basis of Joseph Kabila's electoral program in 2006 and are currently the central pillar of his communication strategy. See: Cinq chantiers de la RDC-Programme du président de la République, www.cinqchantiers-rdc.com/home.php.

⁸⁹ Etienne Tshisekedi, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Vital Kamerhe, Léon Kengo wa Dondo (current president of the Senate) and Joseph Kabila have all been chosen as their respective party's candidate. “RDC: le parti au pouvoir choisit Kabila comme candidat à la présidentielle”, *Jeune Afrique*, 21 August 2011. Jean-Pierre Bemba, who has been detained in The Hague since 2008, had asked for temporary freedom to be able to register but this was refused by the International Criminal Court. “Decision on applications for provisional release of 27 June 2011”, International Criminal Court, 16 August 2011.

⁹⁰ Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi's party, the RCD-KML signed the MP Charter on 5 April 2011.

member of the RCD-Goma, and originally from Rutshuru territory, has just joined the MP after leaving the RCD to create his own party, the Congolese Union for Progress (Union des congolais pour le progrès).⁹¹ In this province, the PPRD has no worries about the presidential election but fears losing ground in the provincial assembly where it currently occupies fourteen of the 48 seats.⁹²

The focus is therefore on local rather than presidential elections. On 14 May 2011, MP deputies organised a march in Goma against the provincial governor, Julien Paluku (RCD-KML). A second attempt to march against the governor was organised on 14 June. The Petit Nord's economic actors wanted to use these protests to denounce the import taxes that they believe are higher than in the Grand Nord, and to accuse the governor of promoting the interests of his own ethnic group. In order to satisfy the Petit Nord's economic actors, the North Kivu governor reduced fuel tax by 50 per cent. This pressure shows the intensity of the political and economic rivalry between Grand and Petit Nord.

In fact, the 2006 elections allowed the Nandé to gradually take control of North Kivu. Thanks to a slight demographic superiority,⁹³ the Nandé have been able to dominate the local legislatures: Julien Paluku, governor of North Kivu since 2006, is a Nandé; the Grand Nord has 25 seats in the National Assembly and the Petit Nord has 23 while they respectively have twenty and eighteen seats in the provincial assembly. The recent voter registration exercise reversed this situation. In the Petit Nord, mainly populated by Rwandaphones and which includes Masisi, Rutshuru, Goma and Nyiragongo Territories, 1,389,994 voters were registered. While in the Grand Nord, mainly populated by the Nandé ethnic group and which includes Beni, Beni ville, Butembo and Lubero Territories, 937,995 voters were registered.

Rutshuru territory, which is sparsely populated (481,054 voters, eight seats in the National Assembly and six seats in the Provincial Assembly) and where the population includes Nandé, Hundé and Rwandaphones, will have a key role in the legislative and provincial elections. Petit Nord politicians are therefore positioning themselves for the legislative and, especially, the provincial elections to come.⁹⁴

In South Kivu, Vital Kamerhe's birthplace, the focus is also on the legislative and provincial elections in a very fragmented local political context. This could be the province where the UNC does best and it is therefore expected to work hard in the legislative elections to fight for a leading role in the opposition and go on to do the same in the provincial elections. The UNC is strongest in the territories of Fizi (191,295 registered voters), Uvira (297,624), Walungu (265,963), Bukavu (290,069) and Idjwi (95,074).⁹⁵ Vital Kamerhe's party potentially has 1,140,025 voters out of the total of 2,021,685 voters registered in the province, which is 56 per cent of voters. However, it is necessary to keep the UNC's potential in perspective because it shares part of its electorate with the UDPS, which also claims to be very popular in Fizi territory and Bukavu. Moreover, the Bashi ethnic group, of which Vital Kamerhe is a member, is divided and its traditional chiefs support Joseph Kabila.⁹⁶

The PPRD is nevertheless worried about the provincial elections.⁹⁷ In order to counter the emergence of a strong opposition in the legislative and provincial assemblies, the MP will be forced to seek alliances with the independents that have seven of the province's 32 seats in the National Assembly and the small parties. Since 2006, Joseph Kabila has tried to woo the Bashi community, which is represented in the government by the minister of agriculture, Norbert Basengezi Katintima. The PPRD has launched a wide-ranging charm offensive towards this community in Walungu territory by appointing Eugène Mukubaganyi Mulume as coordinator of the MP. Mulume is the local authority leader in Mwenshe, home of the governor, Marcellin Cishambo and the UNC president, Vital Kamerhe. Eugène Mukubaganyi Mulume's appointment to the position of MP coordinator is all the more symbolic given that Vital Kamerhe prevented him from standing for governor in 2006.

In Mwenga territory, the MP may be able to count on the National Party for Democracy and the Republic (Parti national pour la démocratie et la république – PANADER), represented in the government by the minister of the economy, Jean-Marie Bulambo Kilosho. The MP may also be able to count on the Alliance of Congo Democratic Forces (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques du Congo – AFDC) led by Modeste Bahati Lukwebo, who was forced into resigning from his post as internal finance and administration

⁹¹ "Eugène Serufuli a signé hier la Charte de la Majorité Présidentielle", *La Prospérité*, 12 April 2011.

⁹² Crisis Group interviews, PPRD members, Goma, 29 July 2011.

⁹³ In 2006, 1,172,693 voters registered in the Petit Nord and 1,289,319 in the Grand Nord. Grand Nord voters then accounted for 52 per cent of North Kivu's electorate.

⁹⁴ The 2006 elections had allowed the Nandé to take control of North Kivu and to trade with Uganda. For more details, see "Les frontières: lieux de division ou passerelles d'échange? Impact de la fermeture de la frontière entre Goma et Gisenyi", *Fissure* n°5, Pole Institute, January 2007.

⁹⁵ Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Bukavu, 26 July 2011.

⁹⁶ "RDC: Vital Kamerhe esseulé, son mwami renouvelle sa confiance à 'Joseph Kabila'", *Kongo Times*, 14 April 2011; "Selon Mwami Ndatbaye, Kamerhe ne serait pas opposant à Joseph Kabila", Bukavu online, 7 June 2011.

⁹⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Vice-President of the Provincial Assembly, Bukavu, 25 July 2011.

at the National Assembly, when Vital Kamerhe came out in opposition to Joseph Kabila.

As in North Kivu, where registration has inverted the demographic balance of forces between Petit and Grand Nord, voter registration has reduced the political weight of the Bashi community in South Kivu. In Shabunda, Mwenga, Fizi and Idjwi, where the Bashi community is in the minority, the number of voters registered was more than expected.⁹⁸ Although Fizi and Idjwi do not have much political weight,⁹⁹ that should nevertheless reduce the electoral influence of the Bashis in the local political system.

In both North and South Kivu, local people feel it will be impossible to defeat the outgoing president and consequently the current majority is focusing on the legislative and provincial elections in 2012.

IV. CONCLUSION

Contrary to the west of the country, the provincial elections are at the top of the agenda in the East. The voter registration operation reconfigured the political balance of forces in the provinces but did not change the asymmetry between the majority and the opposition in the balance of electoral forces. The lack of any major disruption by armed groups strengthens the impression that the national election is not a priority. The only real attempts by armed groups to influence the electoral process during the voter registration period were limited to Masisi territory in North Kivu and if that has any influence at all, it will be on the 2012 provincial elections. In Ituri district, the FPJC poses a problem of territorial control rather than a political threat.

For the moment, INEC is the only actor casting a shadow over the electoral scene. Whether it acts transparently, as in South Kivu, or not transparently, as in North Kivu, INEC is going it alone. INEC's refusal to open a dialogue with the opposition during voter registration and its failure to pay due attention to the grievances of civil society and political parties does not augur well for the future. Its failure to listen to criticism has already generated a well of suspicion that will become even deeper in the months to come.

In order to avoid a crisis of confidence in electoral operations and strengthen the credibility of the electoral process, it must be more transparent, scrupulously respect the elec-

toral code and establish a formal dialogue with the political parties and civil society. The international community should closely observe the electoral process, especially in rural areas. The political parties and civil society should mobilise their human and financial resources now so they can take full advantage of the freedom to campaign. Only their presence at every stage of the elections will guarantee acceptance of the results by all.

In order for the electoral campaign to proceed in a peaceful climate, freedom of expression must be respected and political parties must be able to conduct their campaigns without hindrance. The Superior Audiovisual and Communication Council should quickly become operational and all stakeholders in the DRC should accept the code of conduct introduced by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. MONUSCO should encourage INEC, the political parties and civil society to dialogue and INEC should establish a formal framework for dialogue at the national and provincial levels. MONUSCO should also ensure a presence in the territories affected by a lack of security, to protect the civilian population. MONUSCO and the international community should help to prevent a spiral of violence by continuing their national police training program and supplying non-lethal crowd control materials.

Only scrupulous respect by INEC for the laws regulating the electoral process will allow it to organise free and transparent elections. It will only be recognised as independent if it treats all actors equally in the electoral process. INEC should establish a transparent and well-publicised procedure to deal with the grievances of civil society and the political parties regarding the forthcoming elections and should provide accreditation to party agents and observers in accordance with the electoral code. Given the question mark over the outcome of voter registration, it should publicly explain the methodology it used to revise the electoral register and publish the registration figures for each district and territory for 2006 and 2011. The INEC should publish the results for each polling station and establish a standard procedure to challenge them.

The INEC's decision to extend by one week the period allowed for the registration of candidates is a commendable step to promote peaceful elections.¹⁰⁰ However, this adjustment to the electoral calendar should be accompanied by an increase in MONUSCO's logistical support, especially aerial support, for the distribution of electoral materials within the agreed period. If the elections are postponed, the majority and the opposition should negotiate an agreement setting a new date for the elections and limit government action to routine business until they are held.

Kinshasa/Nairobi/Brussels, 5 September 2011

⁹⁸ Idjwi territory, 107.38 per cent; Fizi territory, 122.84 per cent; Mwenga territory, 113.71 per cent; Shabunda territory, 102.25 per cent. Crisis Group interviews, INEC officials, Bukavu, 26 July 2011.

⁹⁹ Number of voters registered: Idjwi territory, 88,537; Fizi territory, 191,295; Mwenga territory, 240,826; Shabunda territory, 146,685. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Press release, INEC, 25 August 2011.

APPENDIX A

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



APPENDIX B

EAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



APPENDIX C

THE SURPRISES OF ELECTORAL REGISTRATION

Provinces	Registered voters 2006	Seats	% of electorate 2006	Expected number of voters	Expected growth rate in electorate	Registered voters 2011	Real growth rate in electorate	Seats 2011	% of electorate 2011
Ville de Kinshasa	2,963,912	58	11.53%	3,573,399	20.56%	3,287,745	10.92%	51	10.27%
Bas-Congo	1,232,416	24	4.79%	1,485,850	20.56%	1,502,939	21.95%	23	4.70%
Bandundu	2,949,237	57	11.47%	3,555,702	20.56%	3,553,322	20.48%	55	11.10%
Equateur	2,973,525	58	11.56%	3,584,982	20.56%	3,960,643	33.19%	62	12.37%
Province Orientale	3,257,291	63	12.67%	3,927,123	20.56%	3,886,524	19.31%	61	12.14%
Nord-Kivu	2,462,012	48	9.58%	2,968,297	20.56%	3,003,246	21.98%	47	9.38%
South-Kivu	1,666,615	32	6.48%	2,009,336	20.56%	2,022,960	21.38%	32	6.32%
Maniema	629,894	12	2.45%	759,427	20.56%	874,809	38.88%	14	2.73%
Katanga	3,517,922	69	13.68%	4,241,326	20.56%	4,627,302	31.53%	72	14.46%
Kasai-Oriental	2,021,418	39	7.86%	2,437,108	20.56%	2,643,905	30.79%	41	8.26%
Kasai-Occidental	2,038,310	40	7.93%	2,457,453	20.56%	2,661,245	30.56%	42	8.31%
Total	25,712,552	500	100%	30,999,978		32,007,551	24.48%	500	100%

Source INEC, <https://www.cei-rdc.cd>, consulted on 31 August 2011.

The expected rate of growth in the electorate assumed by INEC was 20.56 per cent for all the provinces. As the above table shows, the registration rate in each province was above 99 per cent of the number expected, except for Kinshasa.

The growth in the electorate (24.48 per cent) is nearly 4 points above expected growth and varies between 10.92 per cent in Kinshasa to 38.88 per cent in Maniema. Although there has not been a census of the population since 1984 and INEC's registration operations encountered logistical difficulties, the 24.48% growth in the number of registered voters in a five year period implies an annual rate of growth in the population of nearly five per cent, while the country's population growth is estimated at between 2.8 per cent and 3 per cent.¹⁰¹

In addition, the electorate in Equateur and Katanga has increased by more than one million while the capital only registered an increase of about 300,000, a figure that is only slightly higher than the remote province of Maniema.

The increase of almost 6.3 million voters in five years is all the more surprising given that the number of registration centres fell from 9,120 in 2005 (for the 2006 elections) to 6,917 in 2011 and the registration period was six months in 2005 and four months in 2011. INEC seems to have done better than the preceding elections in less time and with less registration centres. The lack of monitoring of demographic change in the DRC makes it impossible to explain these significant variations in the electorate between 2006 and 2011.

¹⁰¹“Les objectifs du millénaire”, United Nations Development Program, Country File, Democratic Republic of Congo, www.cd.undp.org/omdinfo.aspx.

APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY

AFDC	Alliance des forces démocratiques du Congo (Alliance of Congo Democratic Forces), political party created in 2010 by Bahati Lukwebo and part of the Alliance of the Presidential Majority (Alliance de la majorité présidentielle – AMP).
ANR	Agence nationale de renseignement (National Intelligence Agency).
APCLS	Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo), Maï-Maï militia led by Colonel Janvier.
CNDP	Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People), political movement created in July 2006 by Laurent Nkunda.
CSAC	Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel et de la communication (Superior Audiovisual and Communication Council).
FARDC	Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo), name used to refer to the Congolese national army after the start of the transition.
FDLR	Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), a Hutu rebel group created in 2000 and mainly composed of members of ALIR and other Hutu armed rebel groups.
FPJC	Front populaire pour la justice au Congo (Popular Front for Justice in Congo), militia group formerly led by Sharif Manda and currently led by David Mbadu.
FPRI	Front révolutionnaire patriotique pour l’Ituri (Ituri Revolutionary Patriotic Front), a Lendu militia in the south of Ituri.
FRF	Forces républicaines fédéralistes (Republican Federalist Forces), a Banyamulenge militia, South Kivu, led by Michel Rukunda.
HAM	Haute autorité des médias (High Authority on the Media), replaced by CSAC in 2011.
INEC	Commission électorale nationale indépendante (Independent National Electoral Commission).
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, replaced MONUC on 1 July 2010, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925.
MP	Majorité présidentielle (Presidential Majority), new presidential alliance that replaced the AMP on 18 March 2011.
MPCR	Mouvement du peuple congolais pour la république (Movement of the Congolese People for the Republic), opposition party led by Jean Claude Vuemba Luzamba.
MSR	Mouvement social pour le renouveau (Social Movement for Renewal), political party, member of the MP, led by Pierre Lumbi.
PACE	Project d’appui au processus électoral (Electoral Process Support Project), support fund managed by the UNDP.
PANADER	Parti national pour la démocratie et la république (National Party for Democracy and the Republic), South Kivu political party led by Jean-Marie Bulambo Kilosho.
PANU	Parti de l’alliance nationale pour l’unité (Party of the National Alliance for Unity), South Kivu political party led by Justin Kalumba Mwana Ngongo.
PARECO	Patriotes résistants congolais (Congolese Patriotic Resistance), Maï-Maï militia, North Kivu.
PPRD	Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy), created in 2002 by Joseph Kabila. Evariste Boshab has been Secretary General since 2007.

RADECO	Rassemblement des démocrates conciliants (Rally for Conciliatory Democrats), opposition party led by Marguerite Lusamba Tatcher.
RADER	Rassemblement des démocrates pour la rupture et le renouveau (Rally of Democrats for a New Start and Renewal), opposition party led by Auguste Mampuya.
RCD	Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy), a former rebel movement set up in 1998, that became a political party and member of the transition government (2003-2006) under the presidency of Azarias Ruberwa.
RCD Goma	Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie – Goma (Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma), former rebel movement created by Emile Ilunga in 1999.
RCD-KML	Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie – Kisangani Mouvement de Libération (Congolese Rally for Democracy – Kisangani Liberation Movement), former rebel movement, became a political party in 2003, led by Mbusa Nyamwisi.
RNC	Résistance nationale congolaise (Congolese National Resistance), Mai-Mai militia in South Kivu.
UDEMOMO	Union des démocrates mobutistes (Union of Mobutu Democrats), created in 2004 on the initiative of Mobutu Nzanga.
UDPS	Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (Union for Democracy and Social Progress), party founded in 1982 by Etienne Tshisekedi and others and currently led by Tshisekedi.
UNC	Union pour la nation congolaise (Union for the Congolese Nation), Vital Kamerhe's party.
UPC	Union patriotique congolaise (Congolese Patriotic Union), party founded by Thomas Lubanga and currently led by John Tinanzabo.

APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

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APPENDIX F

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