

2002年度 財団法人交流協会日台交流センター歴史研究者交流事業報告書

Nationalism in Practice: Overseas Chinese in Taiwan and the Taiwanese in China,
1920s and 1930s

中央研究院近代史研究所

藍適齊

招聘期間（2002年8月28日～11月27日）

2003年4月

財団法人 交流協会

*Nationalism in Practice: Overseas Chinese in Taiwan and the Taiwanese in China,
1920s and 1930s*

Lan, Shichi*

In 1895, Taiwan was turned from a province under the Qing rule to a “newly claimed territory” of the Japanese Empire. To the Chinese, Taiwan—as a Japanese territory—legally became a foreign land. And to the residents of Taiwan—as Japanese subjects after a two-year grace period of choosing between Japanese and Chinese nationalities expired in 1897—China became legally a foreign territory. For the next half a century, the people of China and the people of Taiwan were subjected to separate sovereignties, which were caught in conflict, antagonism, and at times belligerency with each other throughout most of this period.

For the people of China the first half of the twentieth century is a period epitomized by rising Chinese nationalism against mostly aggression from the Japanese. But during this period of five decades, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits did not stop interacting with each other. In fact, people on both sides continued to move back and forth across the Straits—and overcome many straits too in the process. The Chinese went to Taiwan for jobs, education, and various other purposes; so did the Taiwanese. There were strict regulations and restraints imposed by government authorities on both sides, but the two-way flow of people never ceased and actually grew steadily over time. The Chinese expatriates in Taiwan became known as “overseas Chinese in Taiwan (*Taiwan*

* Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, University of Chicago. Please email comments to slan@midway.uchicago.edu. Part of the archival research for this paper was supported by a Taiwanese—Japanese History Scholars Exchange Program Fellowship from the Interchange Foundation (Taipei) in 2002, for which the author is thankful. The author would also like to express gratitude to Professor

huaqiao)”; and the Taiwanese in China were known collectively as “Taiwan-registered people (J: *Taiwan seikimin*, C: *Taiwan jimin*). These two groups of people and what they underwent through in the first half of the twentieth century were of particular significance to our understanding of Chinese nationalism and the Taiwan—China relationship.

Before the Chinese government took over Taiwan in 1945, overseas Chinese in Taiwan constituted a distinct group of people—among the entire population of China—who had actually experienced and therefore had first-hand experiences with the “Taiwanese” and “Taiwan”. As Chinese living abroad, overseas Chinese were constantly confronted with the issue of identity: who and what we “Chinese” are vis-à-vis indigenous population of the host society. In terms of the development of nationalism, it was at such a position that the boundary of *being* Chinese was constituted. For the overseas Chinese in Taiwan in particular, a combination of three *objective conditions* overtime made their position even more complicated—as well as enlightening for understanding Chinese nation-formation. First, they encountered in Taiwan a foreign population as well as a foreign territory that were legally Chinese before 1895. In other words, legally Chinese and Taiwanese were the same but not any more and they remained different for fifty years. Second, as China and Japan were engaged in direct military conflict since 1931, to these overseas Chinese the Taiwanese population and territory—both as Japanese subjects—had been an enemy population and an enemy territory. In addition to being legally different, Chinese and Taiwanese were enemies for a significant period of time. Thirdly, at the end of the world in 1945 the once foreign (and enemy) population and territory of Taiwan became legally Chinese. In other words,

Komagome Takeshi, Professor Chen Peifeng, Professor Lin Man-houng, Professor Xu Xueji, Professor Kawashima Shin, and Lin Qionghua for their invaluable assistance.

Chinese and Taiwanese were legally different but they became the same after 1945. Studies of overseas Chinese have helped to shed light on the ways these Chinese negotiated, defined, and re-shaped who—and what being—Chinese were in daily activities, particularly in their real-life interaction with the indigenous population. In short, overseas Chinese best demonstrated Chinese nationalism in *practice*. As for overseas Chinese in Taiwan in particular, their experiences would provide insight into Chinese nationalism in practice from two complementary perspectives: through the Chinese behaviors in Taiwan toward the Taiwanese and through the Taiwanese behaviors toward the Chinese in Taiwan. Considering circumstances surrounding overseas Chinese in Taiwan during the 1930s and 1940s, studies of overseas Chinese in Taiwan would help to contextualize nationalism—vis-à-vis a crucial object (Taiwan and the Taiwanese) of its (national) imagination—in practice by the *Chinese*.

And for the “Taiwan-registered people”, they were a group of Taiwanese who, as Japanese subjects, had actually experienced and therefore had first-hand experiences with “China” and the “Chinese” before the Chinese government took over Taiwan in 1945. Like the overseas Chinese in Taiwan who were confronted with the issue of national identity under the aforementioned three objective conditions, Taiwan-registered people in China also had to deal with the issue of identity vis-à-vis the population of the host society—thus the Chinese, under exactly the same conditions. At such a position, Taiwanese people’s experiences in China would be able to reflect the formation of national identity from two complementary perspectives: through the Chinese behaviors toward the Taiwanese and through the Taiwanese behaviors toward the Chinese. In other words, studies of the Taiwan-registered people in China would not only shed light on the

formation of identity by the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the Chinese. For a better understanding of Chinese nationalism, these studies would provide an insight into the formation of identity by the Chinese. Having been contested as an *object* of China's national imagination, the Taiwan-registered people in China experienced in real life the ways in which the Chinese defined who these Taiwanese were. In doing so, the Chinese were defining who—and what being—Chinese were in relation to these Taiwanese. In other words, experiences of the Taiwan-registered people in China reflected the formation—in daily practice—of national identity by the Chinese. Therefore, from a perspective that was quite an opposite to the studies of overseas Chinese in Taiwan, studies of the Taiwan-registered people in China would provide a nice complement to the contextualization of Chinese nationalism in practice as well.

This paper will start with studies of Chinese nationalism in practice—focusing on the period characterized by heightened conflicts between the governments of China and Japan from 1931 to 1945—through accounts of overseas Chinese in Taiwan, followed by accounts of Taiwan-registered people in China. Through the contextualization of Chinese nationalism vis-à-vis the Taiwanese in practice—first in Taiwan then in China—this paper aims to juxtapose nationalism in narratives against nationalism in practice and to delineate the *timing* of nationalism in formation.

Part I: Overseas Chinese in Taiwan (*Taiwan huaqiao*)

Flow of Chinese across the Taiwan Straits

In 1895, Taiwan became a Japanese territory. For the next 50 years, Taiwan was a foreign territory to the Chinese, and thereby any Chinese came to Taiwan became overseas Chinese in Taiwan (*Taiwan huaqiao*). Under strict regulations imposed by the

Japanese authorities in Taiwan, Chinese migration to Taiwan was highly controlled and limited. By 1920, among the 10,000 yearly quota set by the Taiwanese Government-General for Chinese immigrants to Taiwan, about 80% were seasonal labor. These Chinese labors usually returned to China in a few years after their short-term contracts expired. But gradually, more and more Chinese immigrants chose to settle in Taiwan. After a few years making a living in Taiwan, many decided to bring their families in China to Taiwan. In early 1920s, population of overseas Chinese in Taiwan topped 23,000,¹ and it continued to increase for the next two decades.

What does this flow of Chinese to Taiwan—a Japanese-par-enemy’s territory—during the supposedly rising tide of Chinese nationalism tell us about Chinese nation-formation? The following section will try to provide some answers by focusing on several key activities of overseas Chinese in Taiwan.

Need for a Chinese Consulate in Taiwan

A group of “overseas Chinese representatives (huaqiao daibiao)” from Taiwan to the National Assembly petitioned for the establishment of a Chinese Consulate General in Taiwan as early as 1926. Subsequently the Chinese Native Place Association (zhonghua huiguan) in Taiwan and other overseas Chinese organizations in Taiwan made similar petitions. Their efforts received positive response from the Chinese government as China’s Foreign Minister proposed to establish a Chinese Consulate in Taiwan—as a branch of the Chinese Consulate General in Kobe though—to the Japanese authority in early 1928. At the time, it was estimated that Chinese population in Taiwan was around

¹ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.45.

30,000.² To the overseas Chinese in Taiwan, the establishment of a Chinese Consulate in Taiwan meant their interest could be further protected and unfair restrictions imposed on them by the Japanese authority in Taiwan might be removed. But having a Chinese Consulate in Taiwan was not simply a practical matter for the overseas Chinese in Taiwan. It served a deeper function. By identifying their interest—and thereby themselves—with the presence of a Chinese Consulate, overseas Chinese in Taiwan also distinguished themselves from the rest of the island population, who were represented as “indigene that became assimilated (by the Japanese) and failed to realize they were originally Chinese people and people of our country”.³

The Chinese authority subsequently took concrete steps to establishing a Consulate in Taiwan. In May 1930 the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo proposed to the Japanese Foreign Minister its plan to appoint Lin Shaonan as the Chinese Consul General in Taipei.⁴ Lin was officially appointed in 1931, and the Chinese Consulate General in Taipei officially opened its door in April 1931.⁵ At the time the Chinese population in Taiwan had grown into more than 45,000,⁶ and the figure reached to its peak in 1936—between 60,000 to 140,000 in various accounts.⁷ The figure is more significant if it is put in the context of overseas Chinese (*huaqiao*) population in other major cities in Japan. By one account in 1933 the *huaqiao* population in Taipei alone was more than 14,000; the number in Tokyo was less than 3,700, and less than 9,000 in two major cities in Korea

² Japanese Foreign Ministry Archive (hereafter JFMA), M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 1.

³ *Minguo ribao* (Fujian), December 27, 1927, in JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 1.

⁴ JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 1.

⁵ *Taiwan shinminpo*, no. 359, April 11, 1931. Cited from Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.112.

⁶ The figure was 45,745 in 1930, according to a report by the Bureau of Police Affairs, Taiwanese Government General. In JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 1.

combined.⁸ In other words, in the 1930s Taiwan might have the greatest concentration of overseas Chinese within the sphere of influence under the Japanese Empire. And in comparison, the Taiwanese population in China—according to the Japanese official account—was estimated at less than 10,000 in 1930.

As of 1933, Chinese government had established Consulate General—under its Embassy in Tokyo—in Yokohama, Kobe, Seoul, and Taipei.⁹ But antagonism between China and Japan escalated into armed conflicts as the 1930s progressed. As a result, account of the Chinese Consulate General in Taipei was scant during most of the 1930s. Records showed that the Chinese Consulate General—under the Nationalist government—operated for nearly seven years throughout the 1930s till it was closed in early 1938 amidst the escalated conflict between China and Japan.¹⁰ It is worthy to note that not long after the Chinese government established its first Consulate General in Taiwan (Taipei), the newly found Manchoukuo also established its General Consulate in Taipei.¹¹ The Chinese Consulate General—under the Nationalist government—operated throughout the most of 1930s till it was closed in early 1938 amidst the escalated conflict between China and Japan.¹² Despite that one major issue China and Japan fought over

⁷ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.151-156.

⁸ JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol.2.

⁹ JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 2.

¹⁰ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of monographs on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), p.501.

¹¹ No record has confirmed the specific date on which the Manchoukuo Consulate General in Taipei was established. But Japanese diplomatic correspondences showed that Manchoukuo must have set up its Consulate General in Taipei by April 1934. In a letter dated April 13, 1934 from the Japanese Ambassador to Manchoukuo to the Japanese Foreign Minister, it was mentioned that there were Manchoukuo Consulate Generals in Osaka, Seoul, and Taipei. See JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-48.

¹² Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the

during this period was the existence of Manchoukuo, a Chinese Consulate General, ironically as it may be, co-existed and operated side by side with a Manchoukuo Consulate General in Taipei for as many as four years.

As statistics showed, during most of the tenure of the Nationalist Chinese Consulate General in Taipei the *huaqiao* population in Taiwan continued to rise throughout this period. And unlike those *huaqiao* who went to Taiwan for short-term jobs—usually on a contractual base—in the 1910s and 1920s, more and more Chinese immigrants in the 1930s brought their families with them and chose to settle in Taiwan.¹³ Soon after the Nationalist government established its Consulate General in Taipei in early 1931, the confrontation between China and Japan escalated over the issue of Manchuria. But statistics showed that based on the number of years of residence in Taiwan (as of 1940), about two third of the *huaqiao* population in Taiwan actually migrated to Taiwan during the period of 1930 and 1940.¹⁴ In other words, the flow of *huaqiao* to Taiwan continued amidst—and in spite of—escalation of conflicts between China and Japan. On a yearly basis, the *huaqiao* population experienced a significant drop in 1937 (from more than 60,000 in 1936 to around 46,000). But the figure remained stable with a gradual increase till the end of the war in 1945.

Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), p.501.

¹³ It has been pointed out that in mid-1930s, the majority of *huaqiao* population in Taiwan had their families in Taiwan as well. See Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.22-23, 154.

¹⁴ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.155.

As the Nationalist government severed its diplomatic tie with Tokyo in 1938,¹⁵ other political regimes in China took over the role in maintaining a Chinese official presence in Japan. Out of consideration for the continuing need of the *huaqiao* population in Taiwan, the Provisional Government in Beijing proposed to the Japanese Foreign Ministry in 1938 to establish an office in Taipei (in addition to offices in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki).¹⁶ And in 1940, the Chinese authority—represented by Nanjing—began to discuss with the Japanese authority about the possibility of “re-opening” facilities of the old Consulate General in Taipei.¹⁷ In December 1940, the Nanjing Nationalist government appointed Zhang Guowei as its new Consul General to Taipei. Ma Changliang, who succeeded Zhang in January 1943, served as China’s Consul General till the end of the war in August 1945.¹⁸ It was also shown that postal service between Taipei and Hsinking (Xinjing) was maintained throughout this period.¹⁹

In the orthodox Chinese historiography, the period between 1937 to 1945 was represented as China’s period of “war of resistance” (*kangzhan*). But in spite of rising armed conflicts between Japan and China—represented by the KMT in Chongqing and the CCP in Yanan, records showed that the Chinese continued to migrate to and stay in Taiwan throughout this period. It was true that after the full-scale war between China and Japan broke out in July 1937, there were resistance activities initiated by overseas

¹⁵ The Chinese Embassy of the Nationalist government to Tokyo was closed in June 1938. See Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), p.515.

¹⁶ JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 4.

¹⁷ JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 4.

¹⁸ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), pp.523-524.

¹⁹ JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 2.

Chinese in Taiwan against the Japanese authorities.²⁰ But the scope of action and participation was quite limited. A broader and closer look at the overseas Chinese in Taiwan and their experiences would show that what they did in Taiwan, especially during the period of “war of resistance”, was not all resistance against the enemy.

As discussed earlier, two third of the entire *huaqiao* population in Taiwan, as of 1940, first came to Taiwan between 1930 and 1940. In addition, at least another 6,000 Chinese came to Taiwan between 1940 and 1945.²¹ The very fact that more than 35,000 Chinese migrate to and chose to stay in Taiwan—an enemy territory—between 1930 and 1945, which was a period characterized by rising Chinese nationalism and ultimately an all-out war against the enemy no other than Japan, was worth probing. Based on the limited accounts available to us today, several characteristics about the community of overseas Chinese in Taiwan between 1930 and 1945 could be drawn. First, in terms of the male-female population ratio, female population amounted to 28% of all overseas Chinese in Taiwan in 1930. The number went through a steady increase during the previous fifteen years (from less than 16% in 1915), and this upward trend continued for the next fifteen years (it topped 36% in 1945).²² Statistics did not indicate the respective purposes of these female overseas Chinese migrating to Taiwan. But records showed that

²⁰ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), pp.501-504.

²¹ The number of Chinese in Taiwan was 45,661 as of 1940, and it went up to 51,885 as of 1945. Considering the number of Chinese moved back to China between 1940 and 1945, the actual number of Chinese migrated to Taiwan during this period was certainly more than the absolute increase of 6,000 in population. But the actual number is not available due to the lack of yearly statistics of Chinese moving in and out of Taiwan during this period. See Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.152.

there was a significant increase in the number of people who migrated to Taiwan under the category of “family members” throughout most of the 1930s (more than 2,200 in 1935 alone).²³ It would be fair to conclude that a great number of the female overseas Chinese who came to Taiwan during the 1930s and 1940s came to join their family members who already were in Taiwan. In other words, a significant and increasing number of overseas Chinese settled in Taiwan with their family during this period.

As more and more Chinese families settled in Taiwan, several issues would rise facing this community. Among which one of the most emphasized was education. In places around the world, many overseas Chinese set up “overseas Chinese schools (*huaqiao xuexiao*)”, sometimes with assistance from the Chinese government, to give their younger generation a “nationalist education (*guomin jiaoyu*)”.²⁴ In other words, education was important for the overseas Chinese since it was the means through which they fostered and kept themselves as Chinese. But what distinguished overseas Chinese in Taiwan was that the Taiwanese Government-General, throughout its fifty years of rule, never approved any attempt to establish overseas Chinese schools in Taiwan.²⁵ Facing this peculiar condition, what did the overseas Chinese in Taiwan do about their youngsters’ education? Instead of sending their children back to China or elsewhere for a Chinese education, many overseas Chinese in Taiwan chose and tried (as many failed due to enrollment limit) to send their children to study at local schools which the local Taiwanese students attended. Reports by the Chinese Consulate General in Taipei

²²Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.152.

²³Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.155.

²⁴ Li Yinghui, *Huaqiao zhengce yu haiwai minzu zhuyi (1912-1949)* [policies regarding overseas Chinese and overseas nationalism, 1912-1949] (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1997), pp.580-581.

showed that one major business for the Consulate was to make arrangement with the local Japanese authority so that Chinese students could attend local schools. Many overseas Chinese in Taiwan who had schooling-year children visited the Consulate General in Taipei solely, and repeatedly, for this purpose. As a result, for a period it became a routine for the Deputy Consul General to pay visits to local high schools for the aforementioned arrangement.²⁶ And it was more than high schools that Chinese students attended in Taiwan. Records showed that the schools attended by Chinese students ranging from Police Academy to the Medical School of the Imperial University in Taipei. And some local overseas Chinese leaders in Taiwan were planning and asking assistance from the Chinese Consulate-general in Taipei to send their children to Tokyo for advanced studies.²⁷ The education these Chinese students got in Taiwan was far from the Chinese nationalist education that most overseas Chinese schools offered elsewhere. All school instruction was conducted in Japanese, and what was more, education during the wartime was used to serve as a means of mobilizing the public for the interest of the Japanese Empire. It was also worth noted that in addition to children of the Taiwan *huaqiao*, there were other Chinese students in schools in Taiwan too. There were Chinese who came to Taiwan during this period solely for the purpose of education, they were

²⁵Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.113-114.

²⁶“Zhu Taibei zonglingshiguan gongzuo baogao [work reports by the Consul-General in Taipei]”, February, March, April, September, and October, 1944, in *Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu zhuri dashiguan dangan* [archives of the Embassy in Japan, by the Nationalist Government, Republic of China] , Toyo Bunko, 2-2744(-44).

²⁷“Zhu Taibei zonglingshiguan gongzuo baogao [work reports by the Consul-General in Taipei]”, February, March, and June, 1944, in *Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu zhuri dashiguan dangan* [archives of the Embassy in Japan, by the Nationalist Government, Republic of China] , Toyo Bunko, 2-2744(-44).

Chinese “students abroad (*liuxuesheng*)”. Most of these “students abroad” were from the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian.²⁸

Since education in Taiwan was by no means mandatory, it was under a free will that these overseas Chinese in Taiwan and Chinese “students abroad” chose to obtain a Japanese—or rather a Japanization—education in Taiwan. Why did they do so? And what did this phenomenon represent in terms of formation of national identity among these Chinese? One explanation might lie in the Chinese parents of these students. As mentioned earlier, most of the earliest generation of overseas Chinese in Taiwan migrated to Taiwan as hard labors. Most of them were illiterate in Chinese, not to mention in Japanese. As of 1920, the percentage of overseas Chinese in Taiwan who were literate in Japanese was 1.9% and a mere 3% if all those who could speak Japanese were included.²⁹ Lack of proficiency in Japanese might not seriously hinder those earlier generations of Chinese hard labors that came to Taiwan merely for a short-term contract-based job. But for those Chinese who chose to settle their families in Taiwan, proficiency in Japanese became a necessity rather than a novelty. And in the 1920s and 1930s, for overseas Chinese in Taiwan (but by no means for them exclusive) the value of a Japanese education could mean more than a mere necessity. On the one hand, the longer overseas Chinese settled in Taiwan the more closed connected with the sphere of Japanese influence their ways of making a living became. On the other hand, with Japan’s continuing military and economic expansion throughout Asia, the sphere of Japanese influence grew further and further. With proficiency in Japanese, or better a Japanese

²⁸ “Zhu Taibei zonglingshiguan gongzuo baogao [work reports by the Consul-General in Taipei]”, February, March, April, and October 1944, in *Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu zhuri dashiguan dang'an* [archives of the Embassy in Japan, by the Nationalist Government, Republic of China], Toyo Bunko, 2-2744(-44).

education, overseas Chinese in Taiwan would be able to exploit opportunities that were not available to Chinese before. Therefore, it made sense for overseas Chinese in Taiwan to send their children to acquire a Japanese education instead of a Chinese one.

In fact, Chinese enrollment in Japanese schools was not limited to overseas Chinese in Taiwan. In China, there were a significant number of Chinese students attending Japanese schools established in Chinese soil. As early as 1908, elementary schools with Japanese-language instruction had been set up in the province of Fujian, just across the Taiwan Straits from Taiwan. The local Taiwan Association (*taiwan gonghui*), with assistance from the Japanese colonial authority established these schools in Taiwan, mainly for the purpose of educating children of Taiwan-registered persons living in China.³⁰ But among the student population at these Taiwanese-par-Japanese elementary schools, the majority was from local Chinese community. Records showed that at one of these schools the number of Chinese students exceeded the number of Taiwanese students as early as 1916, and Chinese student population remained as the majority till 1930.³¹ Other records showed that the total number of students at three such schools in Fuzhou, Amoy, and Shantou was 924 as of 1926; among them there were 586 Chinese students (or 63%, in comparison to 332 Taiwanese students).³² And in 1930, there were 733 Chinese (or 65%) and 391 Taiwanese among a total of 1126 students at the same

²⁹ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.46.

³⁰ Liang Huahuang, *Taiwan zongdufu de “dui an” zhengce yanjiu* [studies of the “cross straits” policy of the Taiwanese Government-General] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2001), pp.108-109.

³¹ Liang Huahuang, *Taiwan zongdufu de “dui an” zhengce yanjiu* [studies of the “cross straits” policy of the Taiwanese Government-General] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2001), pp.127-128.

³² Taiwan Sotokufu, *Taiwan Sotokufu gakushi* [education under the Taiwanese Government-general] , vol. 25 (Taihoku: Taiwan Sotokufu, 1926), p.49.

three schools.³³ It would be fair to conclude that these statistics showed that Japanese education intended for Taiwan-registered persons (Taiwanese) in China attracted Chinese parents, who considered a Japanese education valuable—and may be more valuable than a Chinese education—to send their children to Taiwanese-par-Japanese schools *in* China. Scholars have recently studied the phenomenon of “transnational traversals” in the late twentieth century among overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. One underlining feature was that many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia sent their children to obtain an English-language education abroad so that they could acquire “transferable cultural capital”.³⁴ In the case of overseas Chinese in Taiwan, a Japanese education in the 1930s and 1940s could well represented *the* transferable cultural capital at the time. Chinese enrollment in Japanese schools in China further demonstrated the desirability of acquiring a Japanese education among the Chinese in the 1920s and 1930s. Therefore for the overseas Chinese in Taiwan, a Japanese education for their children in Taiwan—considering the potential it might bring—just made more sense than a Chinese education elsewhere. Further, the above analysis shows that “transnational traversal” was actually occurring much earlier among the overseas Chinese in Taiwan. And as far as the formation of national identity was concerned, under such circumstances expediency took precedence of ideology.

Another major issue facing the overseas Chinese in Taiwan was their relationship with the host society. This issue could be analyzed on two different but inter-related fronts: one dealing with the Japanese colonial authority, the other with the indigenous

³³ Taiwan Sotokufu, *Taiwan Sotokufu gakushi* [education under the Taiwanese Government-general] , vol. 28 (Taihoku: Taiwan Sotokufu, 1929), p.52.

Taiwanese population. It had been said that the establishment and rapid expansion of the Chinese Native Place Associations (*zhonghua huiguan*), the first major overseas Chinese organization in Taiwan, in during the 1920s signified “an awareness of nation” and “need for national solidarity” among the overseas Chinese in Taiwan.³⁵ But a closer look at activities of major overseas Chinese organization in Taiwan would show that this growth of national (Chinese) consciousness hardly prevented overseas Chinese in Taiwan from cultivating and maintaining a friendly relationship with the Japanese authority in Taiwan.

As mentioned earlier, the first major overseas Chinese organization in Taiwan was the Chinese Native Place Association (Chinese Association for short), which was founded in 1923. It was later re-organized as the General Chinese Native Place Association (*zhonghua zonghuiguan*), and as of 1933 there were thirty local branches throughout Taiwan.³⁶ From its onset, the Chinese Association made a great deal of efforts in building an amiable relationship with the Japanese authorities in Taiwan. It mobilized its members in celebrating the arrival of Izawa Takio, the new governor-general to Taiwan, in 1924 and invited Japanese colonial officials to all its meetings as honorary guests.³⁷ As anti-Japanese sentiment was building up at home in mid-1920s, some overseas Chinese in Taiwan began raising money to support labors who participated in strikes against the Japanese in Shanghai. But instead of lending its support behind this

³⁴ Donald M. Nonini, “Shifting Identities, Positioned Imaginaries: Transnational Traversals and Reversals”, in Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini, ed., *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), pp.210-211.

³⁵ *Taiwan minpo*, no.128, October 24, 1926, quoted in Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.48, 75.

³⁶ In addition, there was a correspondence office in Amoy, Fujian. See Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.89-91, 104-106.

³⁷ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai ‘huaqiao’ yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), p.107.

fund-raising drive, the Chinese Association went along with the Japanese authority's prohibition of such activities in Taiwan. Unlike the indigenous Taiwanese media that publicly denounced the prohibition, leading members of the Chinese Association went as far as to pass a resolution opposing any forms of fund-raising in the name of the Association.³⁸

As conflict between China and Japan continued to escalate throughout the 1930s, many overseas Chinese became engaged in various forms of anti-Japanese campaign. Some returned to China and tried to mobilize public opinion through various publications. Even indigenous Taiwanese joined Chinese in these anti-Japanese activities. Records showed that numerous Taiwanese had worked for anti-Japanese publications with the Chinese in Amoy and Shanghai. These anti-Japanese joint forces were so significant that they attracted a great deal of attention from Japanese Consulates throughout China.³⁹ In Taiwan, however, what overseas Chinese did was far from anti-Japanese. As mentioned earlier, very limited anti-Japanese activities were found among overseas Chinese in Taiwan throughout the 1930s. Considering the tight surveillance and prevalent oppression by the Japanese colonial authority,⁴⁰ it was not too hard to understand this lack of resistance among overseas Chinese in Taiwan. But what was more intriguing, and worth probing further, was the aggressive action taken and by overseas Chinese in

³⁸ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of "overseas Chinese" in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.92-93.

³⁹ Reports by Consul in Amoy, Jan. 12, 1932 and Oct. 24, 1932; reports by Consul-General in Shanghai, May 26, 1928 and Sep. 6, 1931, in JFMA, I.4.5.2.3-11; report by Consul-General in Shanghai, Jan. 9, 1935; in JFMA, A.5.3.0.3-4.

⁴⁰ Xu Xueji, "Riji shiqi de 'Taiwan huaqiao' ['overseas Chinese in Taiwan' during the period of Japanese rule]", in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), pp.502-506.

Taiwan in showing their allegiance and support to Japan's war effort and imperialist ideology between 1937 and 1945.

Several major activities by overseas Chinese in Taiwan drew the most attention in historical records. One of them was paying tribute at Japanese shrines (*jinjia*). Records showed that as early as 1938, overseas Chinese in Taiwan had been paying tribute at local Japanese shrines as a demonstration of their support to the Sino-Japanese friendship promoted by the Nanjing Nationalist regime.⁴¹ As the war progressed, paying tribute at Japanese shrines continued. Representatives from the Chinese Association in Taiwan, often led by Chinese Consul-General in Taipei, made regular trips to pay tribute at Japanese shrine in 1944. Usually each trip consisted of a group of a few dozen overseas Chinese.⁴² Typically it was the *Japanese* who paid tribute at these shrines. As the embodiment of the Japanese spiritual essence that was centered on the unequivocal supremacy of the Emperor, Japanese shrines signified and were considered a core element of the Japanese national culture. Therefore, the act of paying tribute at Japanese shrines could be seen as a significant performance that represented acceptance of—if not commitment to—the Japanese nation. The significance of paying tribute at Japanese shrines to the formation of Japanese national identity was best illustrated by the ceaseless efforts forcing Taiwanese to pay tribute at local Japanese shrines during the era of “forced imperialist subject (*kominka*)” between 1939 and 1945. Paying tribute at Japanese shrines had been considered a showing of allegiance to the Japanese nation, and

⁴¹ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), p.507.

⁴² “Zhu Taibei zonglingshiguan gongzuo baogao [work reports by the Consul-General in Taipei]”, February and October 1944, in *Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu zhuri dashiguan dang'an* [archives of the Embassy in Japan, by the Nationalist Government, Republic of China], Toyo Bunko, 2-2744(-44).

therefore had been promoted by Japanese and loathed by the Chinese. It was particularly enlightening to compare the aforementioned activities by overseas Chinese in Taiwan during the war with an earlier occurrence of paying tribute to Japanese shrine by a group of Chinese reporters in 1937. This group of reporters from the province of Fujian made a week-long visit to Taiwan in March 1937. Upon their return to China, these reporters published numerous articles commenting on their visit to Taiwan. Most of these articles gave high mark to the Japanese rule and its achievement in Taiwan. But one article in particular made an explicit complaint and critique of an inappropriately arranged visit to Japanese shrine during the group's tour in Taipei. The author stated, "it was ridiculous for us (Chinese reporters) to pay a tribute to the Japanese shrine, where those Taiwanese who died in fighting against the Japanese occupation were buried".⁴³ Obviously, paying tribute at Japanese shrines was offensive to some Chinese in 1937. And it was considered offensive exactly because it was a major nationalistic issue. Just years later, ironically, the same issue became a regular practice for some other Chinese living in Taiwan. Of course some may argue that the overseas Chinese in Taiwan, like the indigenous Taiwanese population, were coerced by the colonial authorities in Taiwan into paying tribute to Japanese shrines. It might well be true. Those overseas Chinese who paid tribute to Japanese shrines might well just *perform* to avoid further repression by the colonial authority in Taiwan. But the point here is not whether under the surface of performance overseas Chinese were loyal to their Chinese national identity. Rather, accounts of overseas Chinese paying tribute to Japanese shrines in Taiwan nicely

⁴³ Lin Qinxin, "Taiwan shicha yizhoujian zhi yinxiang [impression from a week-long inspection in Taiwan]", *Fujian minbao*, March 31, 1937; Japanese translated in JFMA A.3.5.0.2-4.

demonstrated how the abstract idea of nation/national identity was negotiated, and sometimes challenged under expedience in daily life.

Other activities of overseas Chinese in Taiwan during the war went beyond the level of “moral support” ensued in performance such as paying tribute at Japanese shrines. In the 1940s, one major activity for overseas Chinese in Taiwan was organizing volunteers and fund-raising to support Japan’s war efforts. Act of committing manpower and money to the Japanese war machine was more significant than paying tribute at Japanese shrines as it contributed, however indirectly it might be, to inflicting real physical damages to the people of China. These activities started on a seemingly humanitarian ground when local branch of Chinese Association began to send condolence money to families of those who died in Sino-Japanese conflicts in 1938.⁴⁴ At this time, efforts by overseas Chinese in Taiwan were not directed toward the Japanese authorities. In fact, when overseas Chinese in Taiwan attempted to raise money to entertain Japanese troops in Amoy in late 1938, their offer was turned down by the Japanese authority.⁴⁵ But overseas Chinese in Taiwan were not discouraged. They continued to pursue this cause, and finally in 1939 a group of overseas Chinese in Taiwan realized the goal of entertaining Japanese troops in the Chinese provinces of Guangdong and Fujian.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), pp.508, 510.

⁴⁵ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), p.509.

⁴⁶ Xu Xueji, “Riji shiqi de ‘Taiwan huaqiao’ [‘overseas Chinese in Taiwan’ during the period of Japanese rule]”, in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), p.513.

As the war protracted, activities by overseas Chinese in Taiwan in support of Japan's war efforts were diversified and intensified. For example, the United Association of Overseas Chinese (*huaqiao lianhehui*) in Taipei held rally to support Japanese soldiers in early 1944.⁴⁷ Later that year, Chinese Association formally organized Volunteer Work Corps (*laowu tingshendui*) in several cities throughout Taiwan.⁴⁸ An event in 1944 might best epitomize overseas Chinese activities supporting Japan's war efforts during this period. A proposal was made and adopted by representatives of overseas Chinese at a meeting in Taipei in February to donate an airplane, aptly named "Overseas Chinese (*Taiwan huaqiao hao*)", as a support to the "Greater East Asian War".⁴⁹ Although very little details were recorded as what these Volunteer Work Corps actually did and whether the "Overseas Chinese" airplane ever took off, accounts of these activities by overseas Chinese in Taiwan helped to shed new light on nation-formation. During the Second World War, similar work force was organized among the indigenous Taiwanese population to undertake logistic and other jobs that civilians could do for Japanese military. For the Taiwanese, these works were by no means "volunteer" as the name suggested since they were Japanese subjects who were obliged to state authority. For overseas Chinese in Taiwan, who might face as much repression from the colonial authorities as the Taiwanese did, they did have a little more room of maneuver. But like

⁴⁷ "Zhu Taibei zonglingshiguan gongzuo baogao [work reports by the Consul-General in Taipei]", February 1944, in *Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu zhuri dashiguan dangan* [archives of the Embassy in Japan, by the Nationalist Government, Republic of China], Toyo Bunko, 2-2744(-44).

⁴⁸ There were Volunteer Work Corps organized by overseas Chinese in Taipei, Douliu, and Jilong. See "Zhu Taibei zonglingshiguan gongzuo baogao [work reports by the Consul-General in Taipei]", September and October 1944, in *Zhonghua minguo guomin zhengfu zhuri dashiguan dangan* [archives of the Embassy in Japan, by the Nationalist Government, Republic of China], Toyo Bunko, 2-2744(-44).

⁴⁹ Xu Xueji, "Riji shiqi de 'Taiwan huaqiao' ['overseas Chinese in Taiwan' during the period of Japanese rule]", in Zhang Yanxian, ed., *Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji di liu ji* [compilation of papers on the Chinese history of maritime development, vol. XI] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo, 1997), pp.527-528.

the above analysis of overseas Chinese paying tribute at the Japanese shrines, the point here is not whether deep-at-heart these overseas Chinese were loyal to their Chinese national identity. Volunteers or not, by devoting their resources into Japan's war efforts, what overseas Chinese knowingly did in Taiwan worked against what some Chinese in China were pursuing. But at the same time these overseas Chinese in Taiwan never forsaken their national identity as Chinese. This seemingly self-contradictory phenomenon nicely showed an interesting and crucial side of nation-formation. To be more specific, this analysis of overseas Chinese activities in Taiwan during the war was meant to demonstrate how contingency dictated the way nationalism/national identity was practiced. But these activities hardly constituted, and should not be viewed as, betrayal to nation. Rather, they served as a proof—as well as a reminder—that under certain circumstances, consideration of expedience took precedence of national identity in daily life.

It was worth noted that on the one hand the Chinese Association continuously and openly advocated fostering “national consciousness (*minzu yishi*)” among overseas Chinese in Taiwan as its main goal.⁵⁰ And on the other hand, overseas Chinese in Taiwan continuously to make whatever accommodations and sometimes compromises considered needed in their daily life, regardless of the integrity of their nation or national identity. Since 1895, overseas Chinese in Taiwan had been actively building an amiable relationship with the Japanese authority. For several decades, this relationship, which had proved to be vital to the survival and prosperity of the overseas Chinese in Taiwan, had been well maintained. But after 1937 maintaining this relationship certainly took a lot

⁵⁰ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.97

more from the overseas Chinese in Taiwan. Many overseas Chinese in Taiwan chose what to do based on expediency rather than a strict dichotomized definition of national identity. As a whole, experiences of overseas Chinese in Taiwan demonstrated that the formation of Chinese national identity was far from homogeneous or holistic. In terms of the timing of nationalism, the process of nation-formation among overseas Chinese in Taiwan demonstrated that national identity meant different things to different groups of Chinese. In other words, daily practice clearly showed a disjunction in time vis-a-vis the same process among Chinese elsewhere who were forming an unequivocal Chinese identity with a hard boundary.

Part II: “Taiwan-registered People (*Taiwan jimin*)” in China, 1931 to 1945

With ancestral and cultural connection with China, people of Taiwan continued to keep a close relation with China after Japan took over Taiwan in 1895. Of course, with their newly assumed (or rather given) identity as Japanese subjects, Taiwanese went to China after 1895 went legally as foreigners, or to be more precise as “Taiwan-registered people (*Taiwan jimin*)”.⁵¹ In terms of nation-formation, between 1895 and 1945 the Taiwanese were undisputedly considered as being outside the external border of China. But as people who had formerly been inside the external border of China (represented by the Qing Empire), how were Taiwan-registered people in China treated by Chinese? To

⁵¹ All Taiwanese in China were officially recognized as “Taiwan-registered people”. But as records showed, many Chinese acquired this status and held multiple nationalities for various reasons. See Lin Man-houng, “Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk (1895-1935)”, in *Modern Asian Studies*, 35, 4 (2001), p.998, and Liang Huahuang, *Taiwan zongdufu de “dui an” zhengce yanjiu* [studies of the “cross straits” policy of the Taiwanese Government-General] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2001), pp.104-105, 184-189. Experiences of those “Taiwan-registered people” who were not sojourners from Taiwan are not what this paper is set to study. Instead, this paper will focus on experiences of those “Taiwan-registered people” who *were* sojourners from Taiwan. And for the purpose of

be more specific, were Taiwan-registered people treated as inside or outside the internal border? And in particular, were they treated differently as war between China and Japan escalated? When Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, China was yet to become a nation-state based on the modern concept of nation. In other words, nationalism developed in China while Taiwan was a Japanese territory and the Taiwanese Japanese subjects. And in 1945, China, as a modern nation-state, took over Taiwan. From being Japanese subjects to citizens of the modern nation-state of China, the Taiwanese had been a contested object in China's nation-formation. In earlier chapters this paper has studied the discursive aspect of Chinese nation-formation in terms of representations of Taiwan in Chinese narratives between 1931 and 1945, now the focus is shifted to the practice side of Chinese nation-formation. As a contested object in Chinese ongoing process of nation-formation, Taiwanese experiences reflected the way in which the Chinese were forming and defending a clearly defined national identity in daily practice.

As Japanese subjects, the people of Taiwan had been going to China since 1895. In other words, Taiwanese experiences in China spanned over a period of half a century. The following section will focus on experiences the Taiwan had in China between 1931 and 1945. As discussed earlier, the choice of this period is based on the consideration of the following factors in particular. First, on a more historical ground, it was during this period that Taiwan became an issue of the Chinese discourse of nationalism. Second, with the establishment of Manchoukuo in 1932 and the continuing expansion of Japan's sphere of influence in China, more Taiwanese went to China during this period. And thirdly, on a more theoretical ground, this was the most volatile period—in terms of

clarity, this paper will refer to these people simply as Taiwanese in China. The term of "Taiwan-registered people" would only be used when primary or secondary sources quoted dictate.

nation-views—in modern Chinese history that would shed light on the multiplicity of representations as well as the dialectic relation between historical and contemporary representations of China as a nation. As scholars have pointed out, nationalism arose in China when “state power, national identity, and national sovereignty” became problematic.⁵² The period of 1931 to 1945 was exactly a period in which crisis after crisis turned all issues related to “nation” problematic. Throughout this period, China was at war against both external and internal enemies. As a result, the conception of China as a nation was shaped and repeatedly reshaped in intense competition and ambivalence. And it was amidst these crises that China re-constituted its relation with Taiwan. As a result, the issue of Taiwan (or rather of the “restoration” of Taiwan) became inevitably intertwined with China’s changing conception(s) of nation throughout this period. Considering these factors, the modern “warring period” between 1931 and 1945 provided the perfect setting to explore the relationship between Taiwan and China’s “construction of the Janus-faced discourse of nation”.⁵³

As mentioned earlier, the Chinese population in Taiwan was more than 45,000 in 1931⁵⁴ and it reached its peak in 1936—between 60,000 to 140,000 according to various accounts.⁵⁵ In comparison, the Taiwanese population in China—according to the Japanese official account—was estimated at less than 10,000 in 1930. This figure might have increased in the next fifteen years. But among hundreds of million of Chinese population, population of Taiwanese in China was relatively insignificant in terms of its

⁵² Zheng, Yongnian, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.15.

⁵³ Bhabha, Homi, “Introduction”, in Homi Bhabha, ed., *The Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990).

⁵⁴ The figure was 45,745 in 1930, according to a report by the Bureau of Police Affairs, Taiwanese Government General. In JFMA, M.1.5.0.3-8, vol. 1.

sheer number. Nevertheless, this community of several thousand Taiwanese consisted of people in all walks of life. And these Taiwanese were all over China throughout the period from 1931 to 1945. There were Taiwanese working as physicians, businessmen, military personnel with the Japanese forces, and government-employees with the Nationalist governments (including Chongqing and Nanjing), the Chinese Communist regime, and Manchoukuo, just to name a few.⁵⁶ In southern China (provinces of Fujian and Guangdong), an area that was geographically the closest to Taiwan, there were 12,900 Taiwanese in as of 1936 according to the Japanese official account. And in Fujian alone, the number was estimated at 20,000 including those who were not registered with the Japanese authorities. In metropolis like Shanghai, there were 800 Taiwanese at the eve of the full-scale conflict between China and Japan in 1937.⁵⁷ Even in remote places such as Manchuria, there were reported more than 600 Taiwanese as of 1937.⁵⁸ As the above information showed, despite the relatively small number of Taiwanese population in China, Taiwanese experiences in China were well rounded in terms of their reflection of Chinese nation-formation. Due to the scope of this paper, it is impossible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Taiwanese experiences in China even for a very limited time-span. Therefore, depending on the sources available today, studies in this paper will be conducted alternately between a topical and a geographical approach. Due to the limit of

⁵⁵ Wu Wenxing, *Riju shiqi zaitai 'huaqiao' yanjiu* [studies of “overseas Chinese” in Taiwan during the period of Japanese occupation] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1991), pp.151-156.

⁵⁶ *Oral History*, no. 5 (June 1994), p.4.

⁵⁷ Lin Manhong (Lin Man-houng), “Jingmao yu zhengzhi wenhua rentong—riben lingtai wei liangan changcheng guanxi touxia de bianshu [trade and political/cultural identity— variables contributed by the Japanese take-over of Taiwan in long-term relationship across the Taiwan Straits], in *Zhongguo lishishang de fen yu he xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* [compilation of monographs presented at the Conference on the division and unification in Chinese history] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan, 1995), p339.

⁵⁸ Lin Chongsheng, ed., *Manzhi luxing nianjian* [Manchuria-China travel yearbook] (Fengtian: Jiapan turisuto byuuroo, 1938), pp.342-343.

space, the following section will focus on Taiwanese experiences in China during the immediate pre-1931 period.

Before 1931:

As mentioned earlier, Taiwanese had been working in all walks of life in China.

Generally speaking, Taiwanese experiences in China before 1931 showed that national distinction between the Taiwanese and the Chinese was hardening in China's identity-formation. Interestingly, this national distinction was found in both friendship and animosity between the Taiwanese and the Chinese. And notably, despite the fact that more and more Taiwanese went to China, this national distinction had gradually become a burden to the Taiwanese sojourners.

In particular, one event in the late 1920s attracted the most attention in historical accounts and hence provided focal point to begin the studies of Taiwanese experiences in China. It was the founding of the Taiwanese Communist Party in 1928. After the success of communist revolution in Russia in 1917 and the subsequent establishment of the Comintern (Communist International), Marxism and communism were soon introduced all over the world. In the 1920s, Marxism and communism were turned into concrete action throughout Asia. The Chinese Communist Part (CCP) was established in Shanghai in 1921; a year later the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was founded in Japan. In comparison, the Taiwanese Communist Party (TCP) was founded relatively late on April 15, 1928 in Shanghai. Records showed that TCP was first planned as the Taiwanese National Branch (*Taiwan minzu zhibu*) of the JCP and was founded *not* under the

directive of CCP.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the preparation and subsequent activities of TCP largely took place in China in late 1920s. Therefore, studies of the experiences of founding members of TCP, in particular their experiences with Chinese communists, would provide valuable insight into Chinese nation-formation as reflected in Taiwanese experiences during the immediate years preceding 1931.

There were eighteen founding members of TCP, among them eight were present at TCP's founding meeting in Shanghai.⁶⁰ Most founding members of TCP came to China during the 1920s.⁶¹ Among them, the drafters of the TCP Manifesto of 1928, Lin Mushun, Weng Zesheng, and Xie Xuehong were widely considered the key figures in the establishment of TCP.⁶² Before the founding of TCP, Lin, Weng, and Xie had all maintained extensive relationships with Chinese communist and various communist organizations. Weng, as well as eight other founding members of TCP, reportedly joined CCP during the 1920s.⁶³ In addition, between 1925 and 1927, Weng, Lin, Xie, and at least six other TCP founding members had respectively attended Shanghai University.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Chen Fangming, *Xie Xuehong pingzhuan* [commentary biography of Xie Xuehong] (Taipei: Qianwei chubanshe, 2000), pp.86-91.

⁶⁰ The number and names in attendance vary in different accounts. Because no record from the founding meeting has been found, this paper chooses to rely on recollection by TCP members who were present at the founding meeting. See Xie Xuehong's memoir, Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), pp.249-251.

⁶¹ Lin arrived in Shanghai in 1924. Weng attended high school in Fujian around 1920 and had remained in China till 1933. Xie made her first visit to China in 1919 and another short visit in 1923, but most of her experience in China began in 1924. See Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998), p.53, 102, 118, and Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), pp.122-123, 145-153, 159-262.

⁶² Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998), pp.217-218.

⁶³ See Xie Xuehong's memoir, Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), p.250, and Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998), p.105.

⁶⁴ Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998), p.104. Chen listed twelve TCP members who had attended Shanghai University, among them nine were listed as founding members of

The enrollment of Taiwanese at Shanghai University epitomized a crucial period in the relationship of Taiwanese and Chinese communists. As a joint venture between KMT and CCP, Shanghai University was one of the first schools established by CCP. Before it was closed in 1927, Shanghai University was largely run by CCP members to promote the study of Marxist ideology and had been hailed as “People’s College”. Notably, CCP leader Qu Qiubai served as the Department of Sociology at “Shang Da” (Shanghai University). In the history of CCP, Shang Da was as significant as “Bei Da” (Beijing University) was in terms of its role as a higher education institution paving the way for communist revolution in China.⁶⁵ With respect to the development of TCP, it was at Shang Da that future TCP figures such as Weng joined CCP and many TCP founding members got acquainted and established a network that facilitated the later creation of TCP.⁶⁶ Furthermore, while students at Shang Da, future TCP figures Lin and Xie were chosen, upon recommendation and support by CCP, to study at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow.⁶⁷ It was in Moscow that Lin and Xie received command from Comintern to initiate the establishment of TCP upon their return in 1927.⁶⁸ Although Comintern decided to put TCP under the directive of JCP, TCP

TCP in Xie Xuehong’s account. See Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), p.250.

⁶⁵ Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998), pp.104-105, and Lin Qionghua, “Nu gemingzhe Xie Xuehong de ‘zhenli zhilu’ (1901-1970) [The ‘tour of verity’ of the female revolutionist Xie Xuehong (1901-1970)”, paper presented at Ershi shiji Taiwan lishi yu renwu xueshu yantaohui (twentieth century Taiwanese history and prominent figures conference) (Taipei, 2001), pp.22-23.

⁶⁶ Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998), pp.103-104.

⁶⁷ Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), pp.184, 221, and Lin Qionghua, “Nu gemingzhe Xie Xuehong de ‘zhenli zhilu’ (1901-1970) [The ‘tour of verity’ of the female revolutionist Xie Xuehong (1901-1970)”, paper presented at Ershi shiji Taiwan lishi yu renwu xueshu yantaohui (twentieth century Taiwanese history and prominent figures conference) (Taipei, 2001), p.23.

⁶⁸ Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), p.223.

members had been in contact and often assisted by CCP members even before TCP was founded.

As the experiences of these TCP founding members illustrated, the relationship between Chinese and Taiwanese communists was nothing short of being cordial. And being assisted by many Chinese, these Taiwanese were granted opportunities that were not available at home to pursue their causes. But in terms of national identity, this friendly relationship should not be over-interpreted as nationalistic affinity between the Taiwanese and the Chinese. Instead, a closer look at Taiwanese experiences would show that beyond the communist comradeship and newfound opportunities in China there was a more complicated relationship—in terms of national identity—between the Chinese and the Taiwanese.

Above all, the relationship between TCP and CCP was worth probing further. The TCP was first founded, with full acknowledgement by CCP, as a communist organization that was at the same time independent from CCP and of, by, and for the Taiwanese. At the TCP founding meeting on April 15, 1928, the *TCP Manifesto (taigong gangling)* was adopted by TCP members. In this *Manifesto* of 1928, there was the “Political Guideline (*zhengzhi dagang*)” which began with a section titled “Development of the Taiwanese Nation (*Taiwan minzu*). It was stated:

“The first inhabitants of Taiwan were barbarians....in 1660 Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) was defeated by the Qing Manchu and led his force eastward to cross (the Taiwan Straits) to Taiwan....Thereafter more and more Han people migrated to Taiwan from the southern part of China. The so-called *Taiwanese nation* was originated from the aforementioned migration of southerners to Taiwan”.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ According to Xie Xuehong’s account, all TCP documents were taken away by the Japanese authorities in Shanghai during the raid on her home on April 25, 1928, see Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), p.255-257. Till today, none of the original documents was found. One of the most reliable account of these TCP founding documents should be Japanese Consulate reports from Shanghai after the raid, see Confidential Intelligence Report No. 450, by the Consul General in Shanghai, May 26, 1928, in JFMA I.4.5.2.3-11. For a similar but more

The Political Guideline went on to discuss the significance of the Qing rule in Taiwan, cession of Taiwan to Japan, the futile attempt by the Republic of Taiwan—as an “independent nation-state”—to resist Japan’s rule, and exploitation of Taiwan by the Japanese. It concluded by stating that the “Taiwanese nation, through these historical stages, was fostered and strengthened in a unique process of economic development”, and it was TCP mission to pursue “national independence” by eradicating the class of bourgeoisie.⁷⁰ The same point of Taiwan as an independent nation was emphasized again in the more concise TCP “Policy Guideline” (*zhengce*). Following its foremost goal of “overthrowing dictatorship of the (Taiwanese) Government General—overthrowing Japanese imperialism”, there were “saluting the independence of Taiwanese nation” and “establishing the Republic of Taiwan”. And the TCP Guideline concluded with “pledging support to the Soviet Union” and “pledging support to Chinese revolution”.⁷¹

Unequivocally, TCP made a strong point in its *Manifesto* about a Taiwanese national identity that was clearly defined as distinct from the Chinese. So, how action did the Chinese communists in response to this TCP move? At the TCP founding meeting, Peng Rong, a representative from the CCP, was present.⁷² In fact, Peng’s interaction with Taiwanese communists began even before TCP was founded. Days before the TCP founding meeting, Peng met and had extensive discussion about the development of TCP

extended version in Japanese, see Taiwan Sotokufu, *Taiwan keisatsu enkakushi* [history of the development of police in Taiwan], middle section, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Taiwan shiryō hozonkai, 1969 re-print), p.601. For its Chinese translation, see Taiwan Zongdufu (Wang Naixin and et. al., trans.) *Taiwan shehui yundongshi* [history of social movement in Taiwan], vol. 3 (Taipei: Chuangzao chubanshe, 1989), pp.24-26.

⁷⁰ Confidential Intelligence Report No. 450, by the Consul General in Shanghai, May 26, 1928, in JFMA I.4.5.2.3-11, and Taiwan Sotokufu, *Taiwan keisatsu enkakushi* [history of the development of police in Taiwan], middle section, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Taiwan shiryō hozonkai, 1969 re-print), p.601.

⁷¹ Confidential Intelligence Report No. 450, by the Consul General in Shanghai, May 26, 1928, in JFMA I.4.5.2.3-11, and Taiwan Sotokufu, *Taiwan keisatsu enkakushi* [history of the development of police in Taiwan], middle section, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Taiwan shiryō hozonkai, 1969 re-print), p.611.

with key members of TCP. Peng stated: "I have reviewed the draft of (TCP) Guideline that you sent me, in principle it looks fine. Since we do not know much about situation in Taiwan, (we) can not make any concrete suggestion". He also gave suggestions regarding the procedure of the founding meeting, selection of participants to the founding meeting, and TCP's subsequent development.⁷³ On the TCP founding meeting, the CCP representative acted further to express his stand regarding the Taiwanese situation. The CCP representative joined the newly founded TCP members and the representative from the Korean Communist Party and issued a proclamation of "China, Taiwan, and Korea working together to assist the oppressed nations and to realize Taiwanese and Korean independence". Peng also spent a significant time in introducing the history of CCP and criticizing the recent rise of "opportunism" in CCP.⁷⁴ After the TCP founding meeting, Peng continued to meet with key TCP members. He not only provided advice on the development of TCP; he also expressed his approval of TCP's plan for further expansion.⁷⁵

As these records showed, Peng was highly involved in the founding of TCP. His efforts, represented CCP's contribution to the founding of TCP, was well received by TCP. At the founding meeting of TCP, TCP members read a "Letter to CCP Centrality". In the Letter, TCP members expressed their gratitude to CCP. They also acknowledged that since "many TCP members had joined and received training from CCP, the founding

⁷² Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), p.250.

⁷³ Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), pp.249-253. According to Xie, CCP leader Li Lisan had confirmed that Peng Rong was also known as Peng Pai. Peng, who was a leading CCP figure in Shanghai, died in 1929.

⁷⁴ Confidential Intelligence Report No. 450, by the Consul General in Shanghai, May 26, 1928, in JFMA I.4.5.2.3-11.

⁷⁵ Xie Xuehong (Yang Cuihua ed.), *Wuode banshengji* [autobiography of half of my life] (Taipei: Yang Cuihua, 1997), pp.252-253.

of TCP was closely connected to CCP”. The Letter concluded, “revolution of Taiwan was highly related with revolution of China” and “expecting full guidance and support from CCP to TCP”.⁷⁶ Conspicuously, the relationship between TCP and CCP was more than cordial and mutually supportive at the time.

Considering these extensive interaction and intensive involvement in TCP, it would be fair to conclude that Peng himself and CCP leaders who appointed Peng to represent CCP were clearly aware of the national distinction—regarding Taiwanese as an independent nation—made in *TCP Manifesto*. And what Peng and CCP responded, before and after the founding of TCP, to this TCP principle was to establish and maintain a cordial relationship between CCP and TCP. These activities clearly represented a CCP endorsement of the *Manifesto*, and this endorsement was certainly extended to the underlying national distinction stated in the *Manifesto*. The CCP endorsement certainly should not be interpreted as it was the Chinese communists who intentionally created this national distinction. But the CCP responses to and involvement with the founding of TCP demonstrated that CCP members did not make any significant attempts to remove this distinction either. It was worth noted that in October 1928, half a year after the founding of TCP in Shanghai, a “CCP Taiwanese Branch“ was established in Taiwan. But records showed that this move was basically an internal power struggle among TCP members with very limited CCP involvement.⁷⁷ It did not represent any change in the underlying CCP’s practice—as analyzed above—of keeping a national distinction between Chinese and Taiwanese. Therefore, it would be fair to argue that that by the dawn of 1930s the

⁷⁶ Confidential Intelligence Report No. 450, by the Consul General in Shanghai, May 26, 1928, in JFMA I.4.5.2.3-11.

⁷⁷ Chen Fangming, *Zhimindi Taiwan—zuoyi zhengzhi yundong shilun* [Colonial Taiwan—historical discourse of the Left-wing political movement] (Taipei: Maitian chuban, 1998),pp.111-117.

Chinese communists recognized and chose to continue a clear national distinction between the Chinese and the Taiwanese. Unequivocally, this national distinction did not affect the development of a close relationship between the Chinese and the Taiwanese communists. And reciprocally, a close relation between the Chinese and the Taiwanese communists did not yield to, and therefore would not represent, any attempts on the Chinese side to challenge this national distinction or to treat the Taiwanese as constituting members of China (as a nation). Notably, this CCP practice of distinguishing the Taiwanese as an independent nation in the late 1920s was consistent with the representation of Taiwan as a “weak and small nation”, as analyzed in an earlier chapter of this paper, commonly found in CCP narratives during the period of 1931 and 1945. In other words, the above analysis of the Taiwanese communists’ experiences in China showed that in terms of Chinese communists’ definition of Chinese vis-à-vis Taiwanese, CCP practice in the late 1920s was consistent with its representation during the period of 1931 and 1945.

In China, the Taiwanese communists encountered and had kept a close relationship with many Chinese, in particular members of CCP. With regard to other Chinese, the Taiwanese communists had at best mixed experiences. But in terms of nation-formation in practice however, their experiences showed that even in a cordial relationship built upon common belief and ideology such as what they had with members of CCP, the Chinese in general upheld a clearly demarcated national distinction between the Chinese and the Taiwanese. And over all, analysis of Taiwanese experiences in China showed that in the Chinese practice of nationalism the Taiwanese came rather late as an object of Chinese national imagination.