


# Joint Publication 3-61



## Public Affairs



17 November 2015





## PREFACE

### 1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine to plan, execute, and assess public affairs activities in joint operations to include fundamentals, roles, responsibilities, and relationships to joint functions and capabilities.

### 2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives.

### 3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the joint staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



WILLIAM C. MAYVILLE, JR.  
LTG, USA  
Director, Joint Staff

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES  
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-61  
DATED 25 AUGUST 2010**

- Incorporates guidelines and distribution of imagery and operations security throughout the publication.
- Rewrites chapter 1, “Overview,” and chapter 3, “Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”
- Adds new role as primary coordinator for communication integration and alignment to chapter 1, “Overview.”
- Defines public affairs (PA) functions in joint operations in chapter 3, “Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”
- Defines audiences, stakeholders, and publics (incorporated from Joint Doctrine Note 2-13).
- Adds new definition for commander’s communication synchronization and deletes outdated terminology.
- Defines on-the-record, background, deep background, and off-the-record interviews.
- Removes emphasis from how to organize and refocused on what the PA team is required to deliver.
- Adds new appendices on social media and sources for joint PA training.
- Updates appendices on guidelines for release of information, defense media activity, and Joint Public Affairs Support Element (including move to United States Transportation Command).

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Introduces Public Affairs and the Operational Environment.**
  - **Describes Public Affairs Roles and Fundamentals.**
  - **Covers Public Affairs and Commander's Communication Synchronization.**
  - **Discusses Planning, Execution, and Assessment of Public Affairs in Joint Operations.**
  - **Addresses Joint Public Affairs during Operations in the Homeland.**
  - **Discusses Sources, Planning, and Assessment of Visual Information**
- 

### Overview

*The US military has an obligation to communicate with its members and the US public, and it is in the national interest to communicate with international publics.*

The proactive release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences puts joint operations in context, facilitates informed perceptions about military operations, undermines adversarial propaganda, and helps achieve national, strategic, and operational objectives.

Joint operations will be supported by tailored communication that addresses friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences. Public affairs (PA) personnel will focus their communication efforts to a given public or publics. The speed of modern communications and the disparity of multiple audiences increase the importance of quickly and agilely synchronizing communication.

*The First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press, but within the Department of Defense this right must be balanced against the military mission that requires operations security at all levels of command to protect the lives of US or multinational forces and the security of ongoing or future operations.*

The tempo of military operations, operations security (OPSEC) concerns, and the number and variety of other information sources competing for the attention of the populace complicate the joint force commanders' (JFCs') ability to provide information to diverse publics at the same pace as the media and other sources. The ability of anyone with Internet access to share information and provide graphic visuals without validating facts as an event unfolds further complicates the military's effort to accurately inform the media and populace.

JFCs and public affairs officers (PAOs) should evaluate missions to identify public information and visual information (VI) requirements, as well as the means to acquire and move those products in a timely manner. PA planning should include considerations to reduce the time lag between an event and when information about it, if any, can be shared.

*The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.*

By conveying the facts about joint force activities in a proactive manner, PA helps the JFC to impact the information environment, particularly as it relates to public support. The joint force must coordinate all of its messages; further, it must integrate those messages with its partner nations' message as part of the ongoing alignment to maintain unity of effort and stand out in a saturated information environment.

### *Public Affairs (PA) Roles*

The PAO:

- Is the commander's principal spokesperson, senior PA adviser, and a member of the personal staff.
- Provides counsel to leaders.
- Leads PA and communication activities.
- Supports the commander's intent.
- Is the primary coordinator for communication integration and alignment.
- Supports community and key leader engagement (KLE).

### *PA Fundamentals*

Tenets of PA include:

- Tell the truth.
- Provide timely information.
- Practice security at the source.
- Provide consistent information at all levels.

- Tell the Department of Defense (DOD) story.

*PA and Commander's  
Communication Synchronization*

JFCs can use the commander's communication synchronization (CCS) process to coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions (i.e., planning, deployments, operations). The CCS process aligns communication concerning the joint force's mission with the broader national strategic narrative. The JFC should determine who will lead the CCS process for the command, but normally it is the PA office.

**Responsibilities and Relationships**

DOD will provide accurate and timely information, VI, and clear explanations of its activities. Even with the proliferation of information sources, traditional media are still the principal means to communicate directly with domestic and international audiences. While audiences are broad and best reached through the mass media, stakeholders and key publics provide PAOs narrow and well-defined groups that can be reached more directly with face-to-face communication, through very specific channels (e.g., e-mail, a particular newspaper or radio station), or tailored communication products developed by the joint force to best reach a specific public. By removing the mediating effects of mass communication channels, the JFC improves the likelihood that messages are decoded by stakeholders and key publics as the JFC intended.

Line of effort relationships include:

- **Intelligence.** PA is both a provider of information and a consumer of intelligence. As a provider of information, PA media analysis and news summaries can contribute to the sociocultural analysis being conducted by intelligence analysts. As a consumer of intelligence, PA uses intelligence products to plan and enhance media analysis.

- **VI.** The VI function represents a broad spectrum of imagery products derived from various directed and derivative sources, which are often outside of direct PA control.
- **Information Operations (IO).** IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision makings of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.
- **Coordination with Other US Government Departments and Agencies.** Combatant commanders operate in a public information arena with interagency partners whose actions and information can affect public understanding of the facts.
- **Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).** Close coordination with IGOs and NGOs also can be an important PA responsibility.
- **Host Nation (HN).** PA planners should consult with HN governments as appropriate to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the public affairs guidance (PAG).
- **Multinational Partners.** US military forces will rarely work alone to solve an international crisis, thus PA planning should reflect the possibility of multinational partners joining in the effort.

### Public Affairs in Joint Operations

#### *PA Functions*

PA functions are part of a broader communication process focused on supporting the commander and achieving mission objectives. PA functions include providing counsel to the JFC and staff; providing

PA training, research, planning, assessment, and evaluation; developing and disseminating communication products; communicating with publics; and integrating PA and VI into joint operation planning process.

### *Planning*

PA informs and participates in staff planning, including the development of constraints and restraints, identification of potential intended and unintended consequences of planned actions and an appreciation of the nature of information flow in varying cultural contexts. Supporting communication plans highlight higher headquarters PAG and messaging, identify the communication problem or opportunity, identify and segment key publics, define communication objectives that support command/mission goals, develop measurable objectives to achieve these goals and employ communication activities appropriate to the situation and desired outcome. Throughout the planning process, PA professionals will lead communication synchronization to maximize alignment.

### *Execution*

The PA staff is organized to:

- Provide PA counsel and support to the commander.
- Participate in operation analysis, planning, execution, and assessment.
- Participate in all applicable cross-functional staff organizations (e.g., boards, centers, cells).
- Research, develop, and coordinate communication guidance and plans.
- Execute and assess communication actions.
- Disseminate timely, accurate information about military activities.
- Respond to media and public inquiries.

- Educate JFCs and staffs on the role of information and PA in operations.
- Develop programs that support community engagement in the operational area.

### *Assessment*

The primary emphasis of the PA assessment is to identify, measure, and evaluate implications within the operational environment that the commander does not control, but can influence through coherent and comprehensive CCS established by early integration in the planning process.

Media analysis or assessment of tactical PA products and activities using various open sources, in combination with classified information collection sources, can provide updates to the information environment assessment.

### **Joint Public Affairs During Operations in the Homeland**

DOD PA operates in accordance with guidance on incident communications emergency policy and procedures found in the National Response Framework (NRF).

Under the NRF, the Department of Homeland Security is the coordinating agency for federal public communications and is responsible for activation of Emergency Support Function #15. DOD typically acts as a supporting agency.

DOD PA releases its own information and VI, and conducts media operations, but the products should be coordinated with either the primary agency or the joint information center to ensure consistent messages and avoid the release of sensitive information. While operations in the homeland are different than overseas operations, OPSEC and information security issues should still be considered before information is released.

During defense support to civil authorities operations, combatant command PA personnel monitor the National Incident Communications

Conference Line that is used for transmission and exchange of critical and timely (e.g., “breaking”) incident information among federal and affected state, local, and tribal authorities.

### Visual Information

VI is visual media with or without sound and is a visual subset of military information used to support communication synchronization, command information, community engagement, public diplomacy, operational planning, decision making, and training. VI provides legal and historical documentation of military operations and events for official records. VI comes from two sources: directed and derivative.

Directed sources are specialized units, specially trained personnel, and deployable force packages manned by a variety of communication personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped by their supporting military component to collect and produce a variety of official media products for the supported JFC.

Derivative sources for VI include sensors on manned, unmanned, and remotely piloted platforms that collect imagery. These include imagery obtained and processed from intelligence collection platforms, weapons system video, and optical systems.

Unlike other forms of public information such as news stories, press releases, or press conferences, VI documents events as they occur and records military operations, exercises, and activities. VI provides DOD records, which convey an unfiltered view to key audiences. VI enhances US military information activities with visual context to support joint PA themes and messages. VI provides information for planning, helps inform the public, sustains public support, and improves morale. JFCs and PAOs should create, process, transmit, and release VI consistent with OPSEC and foreign disclosure, to support response to the commander’s critical information requirements.

VI products can present special challenges for OPSEC. The need to maintain OPSEC and release imagery in a timely manner must be balanced. For example, photos and videos of military facilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures could provide adversaries actionable intelligence. OPSEC denies critical information about friendly forces to the adversary. However, OPSEC concerns should not prevent the acquisition of VI during military operations. Visual documentation preserves evidence concerning military operations. Discretion on when to release imagery can improve OPSEC.

### **Conclusion**

This publication provides doctrine to plan, execute, and assess PA activities in joint operations.



## CHAPTER I OVERVIEW

*“When we cannot explain our efforts clearly and publicly, we face terrorist propaganda and international suspicion, we erode our legitimacy with our partners and our people, and we reduce accountability in our own government.”*

**President Barack Obama, Speech at 2014 United States Military Academy Graduation**

### 1. Introduction

a. Public affairs (PA) doctrine and principles apply across the range of military operations. PA is a command responsibility and should not be delegated or subordinated to any other staff function below the command group. The public should perceive information communicated by PA as accurate.

b. The US military has an obligation to communicate with its members and the US public, and it is in the national interest to communicate with international publics. The proactive release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences puts joint operations in context, facilitates informed perceptions about military operations, undermines adversarial propaganda, and helps achieve national, strategic, and operational objectives.

c. Over the past two decades, there have been dramatic changes in the information environment. Notably, traditional media is no longer the only voice influencing key publics. The abundance of information sources, coupled with technology such as smart phones, digital cameras, video chat, and social media enterprises, allows information to move instantaneously around the globe. As such, it is imperative for PA personnel to rapidly develop themes and messages to ensure that facts, data, events, and utterances are put in context. Coordination and synchronization of themes and messages take place to ensure unity of effort throughout the information environment.

d. These tools provide the US military the ability to reach various audiences without mass media, as well as create the opportunity to join the conversation (as opposed to simply delivering a message) with an audience. Two-way conversation permits greater transparency and clarity. Joint operations will be supported by tailored communication that addresses friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences. Often, these audiences want to both listen to and be heard by US forces. PA personnel will focus their communication efforts to a given public or publics. The speed of modern communications and the disparity of multiple audiences increase the importance of quickly and agilely synchronizing communication.

e. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press, but within the Department of Defense (DOD) this right must be balanced against the military mission that requires operations security (OPSEC) at all levels of command to protect the lives of US or multinational forces and the security of ongoing or future operations. These competing goals sometimes lead to friction between the media and the military. The Privacy Act of 1974 prevents the release of certain personal information to the media, but does not forbid

individuals from releasing information about themselves in social media. In addition, stringent restrictions exist for protecting personally identifiable information, and there are strict reporting requirements if personally identifiable information is released, even inadvertently.

f. The tempo of military operations, OPSEC concerns, and the number and variety of other information sources competing for the attention of the populace complicate the joint force commanders' (JFCs') ability to provide information to diverse publics at the same pace as the media and other sources. The ability of anyone with Internet access to share information and provide graphic visuals without validating facts as an event unfolds further complicates the military's effort to accurately inform the media and populace. JFCs and public affairs officers (PAOs) should evaluate missions to identify public information and visual information (VI) requirements, as well as the means to acquire and move those products in a timely manner. PA planning should include considerations to reduce the time lag between an event and when information about it, if any, can be shared.

g. The public can get information about the military and its operations from official DOD and unofficial sources (e.g., information disseminated by Service members, distributed by the public, the media, or by groups hostile to US interests). Regardless of the source, intention, or method of distribution, information in the public domain either contributes to or undermines the achievement of operational objectives. Official information can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies and mitigate any adverse effects from unofficial, misinformed, or hostile sources.

h. PA is a command responsibility. Official communication with US and international audiences will have a significant impact on the operational environment (OE). Effective PA is a key enabler for the commander to build and maintain essential relationships.

i. Public support for the US military's presence or operations is likely to vary. The PAO, in conjunction with others on the staff, must be able to quickly and accurately assess the information environment to provide valuable guidance and courses of action (COAs) to the commander. Such assessments enable the commander to better inform relevant audiences about ongoing operations and engender their support.

## 2. Public Affairs and the Operational Environment

a. **General.** Information in the public domain affects the OE and influences operations. Commanders should carefully evaluate how various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions, images, and words impact planned and ongoing operations. PA understands that various audiences have differing information needs and works closely with other information providers to ensure consistency of messaging and accuracy of content. By conveying the facts about joint force activities in a proactive manner, PA helps the JFC to impact the information environment, particularly as it relates to public support. The joint force must coordinate all of its messages; further, it must integrate those messages with its partner nations' message as part of the ongoing alignment to maintain unity of effort and stand out in a saturated information environment. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

*For additional guidance on the OE, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations.*

## **b. Public Perception**

(1) **Perceptions Can Become Reality.** A first impression on the perceptions and attitudes of decision makers, leaders, and other individuals cannot be underestimated. First impressions influence perceptions and judgments, which bias how individuals process subsequent information. Additionally, information that contradicts first impressions may be dismissed altogether. Enemies take advantage of this and often communicate lies or misleading information before we can verify details and communicate the truth. The first side that presents information often sets the context and frames the public debate. It is extremely important in maintaining legitimacy and public trust to get accurate information and VI out first, even information that may portray DOD in a negative manner. Maintaining legitimacy through disseminating rapid and accurate information helps disarm the enemy's propaganda and defeats attempts by the adversary to use negative information against friendly forces. JFCs should be prepared to assume some risk to ensure that public communication activities can be executed in time to ensure the most accurate and contextual information is publicly available.

(2) **Timeliness and Repetition.** Timeliness is a key component of newsworthy information. Providing accurate and useful information in a timely manner increases credibility and relevancy. For information to have an impact, the audience must receive the information in a timely fashion, multiple times, and from multiple sources. Continuous public engagement throughout an operation provides the best chance of success in supporting strategic narratives and themes and in achieving operational objectives.

(3) **Cultural Considerations.** The JFC staff and PA must understand who they are communicating with to enhance reception and understanding of the message. News is produced by people who adhere to the values and cultural system of the society they serve. News media coverage does not always reflect reality, but frames reality by choosing what events to cover and how to present them. During planning, JFCs, their staffs, and PAOs must examine culture to predict how the presentation of news and information affects publics' perceptions. Attempts to mitigate the impact of joint force or adversary actions on public opinion after the fact are often ineffective.

(4) **Impact of Propaganda.** Propaganda is any form of communication misleading in nature designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group to benefit the sponsor. It should not be assumed that all propaganda is misleading or outright lies. While the term propaganda generally implies lies and deceit, enemy propaganda may in fact be honest and straightforward. Propaganda is compelling as it often uses elements that make information newsworthy. Many people are drawn to conflict or violence. Adversaries use conflict and violence reports to influence public opinion to further their objectives and minimize our effectiveness. Anticipating events that adversaries may exploit with propaganda can allow us to mitigate the value of that propaganda through the preemptive release of information. When operations do not allow for preemptive release of information, being prepared to respond quickly with accurate information to counter adversary propaganda is critical. Timely use of VI can often effectively counter adversary propaganda.

*“The emotionally gripping pictures of the war had a huge impact on Egyptian viewers. Egyptian families became emotionally involved, expressing waves of rage, disgust, and anger at seeing pictures of Iraqi bodies torn to pieces littered everywhere, bloodshed, and the destruction of Arab cities and population centers. The image of an American flag draped over Saddam Hussein’s statue was transmitted to tens of millions of Arab viewers and contributed to a sense of the humiliation of their Arab brothers and their fears of American imperialism. This is an excellent example of the power of transnational satellite broadcasts—one soldier makes an individual gesture and an entire region watches in astonishment.”*

**Hussein Amin, Senior Editor, Transnational Broadcasting Studies  
“Watching the War” in the Arab World, No. 10, Spring/Summer 2003**

For example, overhead VI of post-engagement areas can be useful in countering enemy accusations of civilian casualties.

(5) **Media Landscape Complexity.** The type and diversity of media by which a specific audience receives information impacts the effectiveness of communication with that audience. Prior to the advent of internet communication and social media, governments or interest groups could more easily affect public perception and shape a commonly held narrative about specific events, due to the limited number of media outlets to which their publics had access. Today, the ability of these groups to influence audiences has decreased dramatically with the proliferation of media platforms tailored to specific points of view. This more fragmented media environment has allowed the coexistence of multiple, conflicting narratives, making the “defeat” of unfavorable narratives or “memes” difficult, if not impossible. The ability of an organization to influence audiences in this environment has become complicated, and traditional assumptions that have in the past shaped engagement strategies are often no longer valid. Outlandish accusations, which PA practitioners have conventionally ignored rather than helped sustain with a public response, can now often provide their own oxygen and must be addressed.

c. **PA Across the Range of Military Operations.** PA supports military activities spanning the range of military operations, as depicted in Figure I-1. It helps manage and deliver public information and is synchronized with other communication disciplines as well as other PA assets of interagency and mission partners to facilitate unity of effort.

### 3. Public Affairs Roles

a. **Principal Spokesperson and Communication Adviser.** The PAO is the commander’s principal spokesperson, senior PA adviser, and a member of the personal staff. The PAO must have the knowledge, skills, resources, and authority to provide timely, truthful, and accurate information, VI, and context to the commander, the staff, and subordinate and supporting commanders, and to rapidly release information in accordance with DOD policy and guidance to the news media and the public. PAOs and PA staffs must be involved in planning, decision making, training, equipping, and executing operations as well as integrating PA and communication activities into all levels of command and ensuring message alignment. PAOs and PA staffs must also work with information operations (IO) and strategic communication planners to coordinate and deconflict communication activities. This requires PA staff to have the appropriate security clearances for participation in these processes.



e. **Primary Coordinator for Communication Integration and Alignment.** As the primary coordinator of public information within the military, PA plays a key role in communication integration and alignment. Official information released in a timely manner can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies, and help mitigate misinformation and disinformation.

f. **Support to Community and Key Leader Engagement (KLE).** Community and KLE are a critical part of the JFC's operation plan (OPLAN) while deployed and at home station and can facilitate both public and private communication opportunities. PA provides the commander insight on news items that could help shape the KLE. Leaders need to know if media will be present as a part of KLE to determine how the KLE will be used as a public messaging opportunity to various key publics. Comments or feedback from the KLE can then be shared with the JFC and planners to assess the meeting or event. PAOs and staff should also provide commanders with information and updates on social media activity relevant to KLEs. Leaders should provide a meeting summary with supporting VI to the media upon completion of community or KLE meetings and events as needed.

g. Effective PA contributes to:

(1) **Enhanced Morale and Readiness.** PA activities enable military personnel, DOD civilians, and their family members to better understand their roles by explaining the legitimacy of policies, programs, and operations affecting them. PA activities can help alleviate uncertainty and concern regarding Service member participation in crisis and contingency operations, living conditions in the operational area and at home, the duration of separation, the lack of daily communications between family members, and many other factors impact morale and readiness at home and within the unit. Additionally, PA assists Service members and their families in preparing for media events, to include providing relevant, legitimate, and responsive information on topical issues. As global media interest expands to include human interest stories, military personnel and family members can expect the foray of media to cover the impact of military operations on their lives and livelihood, to include their daily activities. Family members, including spouses and children, may be approached for interviews. This will have a direct and indirect impact on morale. This support requires planning and resources and should be incorporated into the command's planning efforts.

(2) **Public Trust and Support.** PA builds public trust and understanding for the military's contribution to national security. PA provides US citizens information concerning the legitimacy of military roles and missions. This information helps sustain support for military operations.

(3) **Enhanced Global Understanding.** JFCs should employ PA in concert with other information-related capabilities (IRCs) to develop and implement communication that inform global, and specifically regional, publics about US military operations. This provides opportunity to explain the US narrative as well as counter potential adversary information campaigns regarding US forces in the area.



(4) **Deterrence.** The credible threat of US military action can be an effective deterrent to adversary action. PA teams assist combatant commanders (CCDRs) to plan deterrence efforts and convey possible responses to the adversary, potentially avoiding the need to use force. PA clearly communicates the legitimacy of US military goals and objectives, what the adversary is illegitimately doing, why international concern is important, and what the United States Government (USG) intentions are for its armed forces if the adversary refuses to comply. Additionally, adversary propaganda frequently targets a known center of gravity, the resolve of the US public. PA's efforts to counter adversary propaganda are focused on informing the US public of the illegitimacy of the threat while simultaneously legitimizing the efforts of the Armed Forces. PA activities may involve highlighting the military's deployment preparations, activities, and force projections to show the domestic, multinational, and adversary public what the commander is actually doing to prepare for conflict. When adversaries are not deterred from conflict, information about US military capabilities and resolve may still shape the adversary's planning and actions in a manner beneficial to the US.

(5) **Institutional Credibility.** PA activities are essential to preserving the credibility of DOD before, during, and after a specific mission, crisis, or other activity. By adhering to the principle of "maximum disclosure, minimum delay," PA is a critical component for defending, maintaining, and when necessary, repairing the reputation of DOD. The application of transparency, especially during crises, is essential to maintaining public trust.

#### 4. Public Affairs Fundamentals

a. **Principles of Information.** DOD is responsible for making timely and accurate information available so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens should be answered quickly.

*For more information, see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5122.05, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]).*

b. **Tenets of Public Affairs.** The PA tenets described below normally result in more effective relationships and help JFCs conduct efficient PA operations and activities and build and maintain relationships with the media. They complement the DOD principles of information and describe best practices. The tenets should be reviewed and applied during all stages of joint operation planning and execution.

(1) **Tell the Truth.** PA personnel will release only accurate, fact-based information. The long-term success of PA activities depends on the integrity and credibility of officially released information. Deceiving the public undermines the perception of legitimacy and trust in the Armed Forces. Accurate, credible presentation of information leads to confidence in the Armed Forces and the legitimacy of military operations. Denying unfavorable information or failing to acknowledge it can lead to media speculation, the perception of cover-up, and degradation of public trust. These issues should be openly and

honestly addressed as soon as possible. Once an individual or unit loses the public perception of integrity, it is nearly impossible to recover.

(2) **Provide Timely Information.** Commanders should be prepared to release timely, factual, coordinated, and approved information and VI about military operations. Information and VI introduced into the public realm have a powerful effect on friendly, neutral, and adversary decision-making cycles and perceptions. The PAO who releases timely and accurate information and VI often becomes the media's preferred source of information. PAOs need to establish expeditious processes for release of information. VI enhances communication by adding imagery (graphics, still photos, and video) to text, sounds and words that inform the public about the joint operation. VI supports other PA functions, and stands on its own via displays and video productions. VI efforts, particularly imagery collection, should be synchronized and integrated with operational planning. Social media is an integral part of DOD operations, requiring that PAOs and staffs assist commanders in making the best use of appropriate platforms. Social media is a dynamic, rapidly changing environment, so it is important to learn and adapt as appropriate. Refer to the DOD Social Media Hub (<http://www.defense.gov/socialmedia/>) for guidance on Web and Internet-based capabilities policies. (See Chapter V, "Visual Information," for additional information on planning and integration of VI.)

(3) **Practice Security at the Source.** All DOD personnel and DOD contractors are responsible for safeguarding sensitive information. DOD members should not disclose critical information identified by the OPSEC process, whether through media interviews, social media, or community engagement. Official information should be approved for release prior to dissemination to the public. Likewise, it is important for interview participants to understand how what they say will be used. There are four categories of attribution for interviews: on the record, background, deep background, and off the record.

(a) **On the Record Interviews.** Information provided in the interview is attributable to the source by name. This is the preferred type of media engagement.

(b) **Background and Deep Background Interviews.** For background interviews, information is attributable to a military official, but not by name. For deep background interviews, both the person and the source are not attributable but the information can be used. The intent of these interviews is specifically to assist in putting "on the record" information in the proper context. When doing these interviews it is important for the PAO to establish the attribution level as part of the ground rules for the interview. It is not unusual for the reporter, either during or following the interview, to request a higher level of attribution for specific comments. It is up to the PAO and the interview subject to determine the appropriateness of agreeing to any portion of the interview being at a higher level of attribution (deep background to background and background to on the record).

(c) **Off the Record Interviews.** Information provided in the interview cannot be used for direct reporting with any kind of attribution. Off the record interviews are used when there is a need to give reporters a larger context for a subject or event than can be given with any level of attribution. Off the record interviews are not preferred by reporters as they cannot directly report from the conversation and present increased risk for PAOs in that the




reporter could break the confidence of the interview. However, if there is a need to provide a reporter with greater context and correct misperceptions and the only way that can be accomplished is if there is no direct reporting of the interview, then an off the record interview may be warranted. A reporter conducting an off the record interview agrees to more constrained ground rules and must trust the PAO and interviewee will provide greater context warranting the greater constraints. If there is any doubt that a reporter will not honor the constraints imposed by an off the record interview, such an interview is not advisable. Used judiciously by an experienced PAO, the off the record interview is a useful tool to facilitate accurate reporting.

(4) **Provide Consistent Information at All Levels.** The public often receives information from a variety of official DOD sources at various levels simultaneously. When this information conflicts, DOD's credibility is put in jeopardy. Before information is released to the public, it must be in compliance with all applicable guidance.

(5) **Tell the DOD Story.** Although commanders designate specific military personnel or DOD civilian employees as official spokespersons, they should educate and encourage all military and civilian employees to tell the DOD story by providing them with information that is appropriate to share. By projecting confidence and commitment during interviews or in talking to family and friends, DOD personnel can help promote public understanding of military operations and activities. Social media has become a popular means for Service members to tell their story, which can be an important means of validating official releases of information. Social media use should conform to all relevant DOD and Service guidance and take into account OPSEC, operational risk, and privacy. JFCs also use social media as another means to communicate with the various publics. Official and personal blogging in local and regional languages may be helpful in reaching the local population, but also poses OPSEC risks and must be carefully monitored.

c. **Audiences, Stakeholders, and Publics.** Scholars in public relations, marketing, and social sciences have a variety of sometimes conflicting definitions for the terms "audience," "stakeholder," and "public." The joint force communicates with audiences, but must also be able to identify and communicate with stakeholders and publics that can affect mission success. Continual assessment and evaluation of stakeholders, publics, and the information environment is critical to effective joint force decision making. Figure I-2 depicts the relationship between audience, stakeholders, and publics.

(1) **Audiences.** An audience is a broad, roughly defined group based on common characteristics. It defines a population that contains relevant stakeholders. Military communications to audiences are generally one-way and are often indirect and without feedback. Audience examples include the American people; DOD military, civilians, contractors, and family members; international, host nation (HN), and local communities; and adversaries. For joint force planners, audiences are not groups on which to formulate a communication approach, but simply the beginning of the planning process for determining stakeholders and assessing publics. Stakeholders are part of the same system or environment as the joint force. More specifically, what stakeholders know, feel, or do has a potential to impact the joint force and vice versa.



**Figure I-2. Notional Diagram of Audiences (Internal and External), Publics, and Stakeholders**

(2) **Stakeholders.** Individuals or groups of people are stakeholders when they are affected by—or are in a position to affect—joint force efforts. Stakeholders could be key individuals in government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), individuals that live outside a military base, etc. For joint force planners, identifying stakeholders means early assessment of the information environment and understanding joint force plans and their potential impacts. PA planners assess the need to communicate with stakeholders based on the extent to which they may be affected by—or might affect—joint force operations, actions, or outcomes.

(3) **Publics.** A public is a stakeholder individual or group that has become more active in its communication efforts. Publics often develop during joint force efforts as opposed to stakeholders, but may also exist prior to the start of any mission. Publics warrant special attention, because they may be attempting to affect joint force operations. Examples may include lobbying groups, adversaries, or other stakeholders that are now actively seeking to communicate about issues or take actions. For joint force planners this means continually assessing the information environment to identify the development of publics, as they require more resources and a greater share of the communication effort. Planners prioritize the need to communicate with publics based on their level of activity. Furthermore, it is important to note that the joint force may need to communicate with one public or stakeholder because of the actions of another public. For example, adversaries will attempt to spread disinformation concerning joint force efforts. The joint force may have identified both another public (key local leaders in the operational area) and a stakeholder group (reporters currently embedded with deployed forces). The joint force may decide that the best use of time and resources is to communicate with both the local leaders and the reporters concerning the misinformation.

d. **Implications for Planning.** The intent of this section is not to create public relations scholars, but rather to describe the impacts on military planning efforts. The existence of stakeholders and publics means that PA and operational planners must assess the information environment early. This assessment helps identify stakeholders and prioritize the use of limited communications resources. Publics may attempt to communicate with the joint force but this is not always the case, so assessment efforts must cast a wide net to successfully identify publics and trends in their behaviors. A thorough understanding of joint efforts will also allow PA practitioners to identify stakeholders, anticipate the development of publics, provide counsel to senior leaders, and prioritize the use of limited resources.

**In the joint and international environment, a clear understanding between the public affairs professional and the commander of the terms ‘audience,’ ‘public,’ and ‘stakeholder’ is critical for the overall communication effort. The terms ‘audience’ and ‘public’ are used synonymously with the term ‘stakeholder’ frequently used when planning communication efforts for ‘target audiences.’**

e. **Narrative, Themes, and Messages**

(1) **Narrative.** A narrative is a short story used to underpin operations and to provide greater understanding and context to an operation or situation.

(2) **Narrative in National Security Strategy**

(a) The national security narrative is formed primarily by broad national policies, as articulated in strategic documents like the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. More specific national strategy is developed in National Security Council (NSC) meetings and executed by the relevant departments.

In war, narrative is much more than just a story. Narrative may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else—policy, rhetoric, and action—is built. War narratives need to be identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself.

War narrative does three essential things. First, it is the organizing framework for policy. Policy cannot exist without an interlocking foundation of “truths” that people easily accept because they appear to be self-evident and undeniable. Second, this “story” works as a framework precisely because it represents such an existential vision. The “truths” that it asserts are culturally impossible to disassemble or even criticize. Third, having presented a war logic that is beyond dispute, the narrative then serves practically as the anointed rhetorical handbook for how the war is to be argued and described.


Michael Vlahos  
The Long War: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of  
Protracted Conflict and Defeat  
The National Interest  
September 5, 2006

(b) For every military operation, the President or NSC staff may create the national/strategic narrative to explain events in terms consistent with national policy. This guidance should be passed along to military planners and provided to the JFC in the terms of operational orders or other strategic guidance. The end result should be a military plan that aligns both operations and communications with the national strategy and is consistent with the national narrative.

(3) **Conflicting Narratives.** Across areas of responsibility (AORs) and during operations within a specified operational area, there can be a struggle to define the prevailing narrative at all levels (internationally, nationally, and within the operational area) on favorable terms. To gain superiority over the adversary’s narrative, diminish its appeal and followership, and supplant it or make it irrelevant, the USG needs to establish the reasons for and desired outcomes of the conflict, in terms understandable and acceptable to all relevant publics. An example of this is the American Civil War. To a supporter of the Union this was a war to preserve the union, and arguably, that narrative prevails due to the Union’s victory over the Confederacy. But to a Confederate the war has a different narrative—it was a war of Northern aggression, and although the Confederacy was defeated more than a century and a half ago, that narrative is still prevalent in parts of the country. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM offers a more recent operational example: A premature detonation of an improvised device in Kandahar City, which resulted in many civilian casualties, was quickly (and falsely) reported to be a Predator strike. Though not true, years later, locals still believed the casualties came from a coalition airstrike.

(4) **Supporting Themes and Messages**

(a) Themes are developed by the NSC staff, Department of State (DOS), DOD, and other USG departments and agencies. JFCs support strategic themes by developing themes appropriate to their mission and authority. Figure I-3 depicts how United States



**Figure I-3. Example of Strategic Narrative Linkage to Campaign Plan Enduring Themes**

Forces Korea established a theater-strategic narrative linked to a long-term campaign plan. Themes at each level of command should support the themes of the next higher level, while also supporting USG strategic themes.

(b) Operational-level themes are often created for each phase of an operation. Operational themes are nested with strategic themes and enduring national narratives to mitigate the risk that phase-by-phase themes appear to give conflicting messages.

(c) Messages support themes by delivering tailored information to a specific public and can also be tailored for delivery at a specific time, place, and communication method. While messages are more dynamic, they must always support the more enduring themes up and down the chain of command. The more dynamic nature and leeway inherent in messages provide joint force communicators and planners more agility in reaching publics.

(d) Theater and operational themes should nest within the CCDR’s and USG’s strategic themes. Theater and operational-level messages must also support themes at their level. This enables consistent communications to local and international audiences, which supports strategic objectives.

(5) Sources of information for the national narrative include Presidential speeches and White House communications (www.whitehouse.gov), Secretary of State speeches and DOS communications (www.state.gov and rapid response unit products), Secretary of Defense speeches and DOD communications (www.defense.gov), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) speeches and communications (www.jcs.mil), and CCDR speeches and combatant command (CCMD) communications. Sources of information for the joint force themes should include the mission, commander's intent, and any other guidance contained within the warning order, planning order, operation order (OPORD), and execute order (EXORD). This is not an exhaustive list; other official sources providing national strategic narratives can contribute to a joint force's narrative. The Defense Press Office (DPO) can help joint force communications with strategic guidance. The DPO routinely coordinates DOD communications with the NSC staff and participating USG departments and agencies.

### **5. Public Affairs and Commander's Communication Synchronization**

a. JFCs can use the commander's communication synchronization (CCS) process to coordinate and synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions (i.e., planning, deployments, operations). The CCS process aligns communication concerning the joint force's mission with the broader national strategic narrative. The JFC should determine who will lead the CCS process for the command, but normally it is the PA office.

b. CCS focuses USG efforts to understand and communicate with key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. As the primary coordinator of public information within the military, PA plays a key role in the CCS process. Official information released in a timely manner can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of national interests and policies, and help mitigate unofficial information, misinformation, and propaganda.

*For more detailed information, see Appendix A, "Public Affairs' Role in the Commander's Communication Synchronization," and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-13, Commander's Communication Synchronization.*

## CHAPTER II RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

*“Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed.”*

**Abraham Lincoln  
Lincoln-Douglas Debate at Ottawa, Illinois  
21 August 1858**

### 1. Overview

a. The joint force PAO plans, coordinates, and synchronizes US military public information activities and resources to support the commander’s intent and CONOPS. The PAO advises the JFC on the implications of command decisions, actions, and operations on foreign and domestic stakeholder and key public perceptions. The joint force PAO plans, executes, and evaluates PA activities and events to support overall operational success. The joint force PAO, in conjunction with IO staff, generates the information requirements to assess the perceptions of foreign key publics and integrates that information into mission planning. The PAO must plan for sufficient PAO capability to execute the commander’s intent early in the operation.

b. DOD will provide accurate and timely information, VI, and clear explanations of its activities. Even with the proliferation of information sources, traditional media are still the principal means to communicate directly with domestic and international audiences. While audiences are broad and best reached through the mass media, stakeholders, and key publics provide PAOs narrow and well-defined groups that can be reached more directly with face-to-face communication, through very specific channels (e.g., e-mail, a particular newspaper or radio station), or tailored communication products developed by the joint force to best reach a specific public. By removing the mediating effects of mass communication channels, the JFC improves the likelihood that messages are decoded by stakeholders and key publics as the JFC intended. The Internet also provides numerous options and challenges to communicate directly with worldwide audiences.

(1) JFCs should be attuned to changes in information technology and social media. Information can be collected and conveyed in real time and at low cost. The Internet provides fast and efficient access to a worldwide audience, often without regard to international borders. Our adversaries exploit the Internet through skillful manipulation of social media. PA can counter biased, incomplete, or factually incorrect information with fast, complete, factual, and credible information.

(2) The joint force PA staff plans to accomplish operational objectives, minimize the adverse effects of inaccurate information and analysis, and counter propaganda, disinformation, and misinformation. OPSEC considerations are integrated into PA planning. PA activities should be incorporated in every phase of joint operations. CONOPS should provide open access to independent reporters and disseminate information widely and quickly, consistent with OPSEC. The PAO should foster an environment that encourages



balanced coverage of operations. In consultation with their PAOs, commanders should expedite rapid release of information in accordance with DOD policy and guidance.

## 2. Responsibilities

### a. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD[PA]):

(1) Assigns the initial source to release information about joint, multinational, and certain single-Service operations and delegates PA release authority to the appropriate commander as soon as practical.

(2) Approves public affairs guidance (PAG) and PA annexes.

(3) Facilitates deployment of the DOD National Media Pool as required.

(4) Activates crisis and wartime PA cells at the Pentagon as needed.

(5) Coordinates PA policy with the CJCS, the Military Departments, CCMDs, the National Guard, and political or military authorities within HNs and multinational forces.

(6) Ensures PAG in CJCS warning, planning, alert, deployment, and EXORDs complies with strategic guidance and intent.

(7) May periodically train accredited national and international media to support media embed programs with operational units.

(8) Supports deployed PA staffs with media analysis.

*Additional responsibilities and guidance are contained in DODD 5122.05, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]), and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5400.13, Public Affairs (PA) Operations.*

**b. Director, Defense Media Activity (DMA).** DMA is a DOD field activity under ASD(PA). DMA provides information, entertainment, training, and VI services to DOD. The Director, DMA, has responsibility to:

(1) Produce and distribute communication products that communicate messages and themes from senior DOD leaders (Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of the Military Departments, CJCS, Service Chiefs, CCDRs), as well as other leaders in the chain of command, to support and improve quality of life and morale, promote situational awareness, provide timely and immediate force protection information, and sustain readiness.

(2) Provide hometown news release services for the joint force to communicate the accomplishments of individual Service members to the hometown audience.

(3) Provide US radio and television (TV) news, information, and entertainment programming, and commander's internal information to deployed joint forces via the American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) as established in DODI 5120.20,



*American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS), and Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 5120.20-M, Management of American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS).*

(4) Provide central DOD receipt, access, distribution, asset and life-cycle management, storage, and preservation of operational and other DOD still and motion imagery, visual and audiovisual information, including combat camera (COMCAM) imagery, and make them available to joint forces and the public through the Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (DIMOC).

(5) Provide direct support to the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations and authorized direct liaison with CCMDs for DOD enterprise-level, VI, and COMCAM coordination, planning, and military operational integration services for worldwide motion and still imagery acquisition and transmission in response to joint force requirements and operations.

(6) Provide PA, broadcast, print, journalism, and VI common core training for all Service members through the Defense Information School (DINFOS).

(7) Provide public-facing World Wide Web infrastructure to support the joint force public communication needs through the Public Web Program.

(8) Provide TV and audio technical services, systems engineering, and maintenance services, including radio and TV broadcast and VI systems for the joint force.

(9) Support and manage Stars and Stripes to inform DOD audiences by delivering accurate information products developed independent from chain of command influence, but not at the expense of HN relations or contrary to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and news and entertainment from commercial sources.

(10) Provide limited mobile training teams from DINFOS to help prepare the PA staffs for operations.

(11) Facilitate live TV interviews with deployed commands and Service members via satellite and network connections.

*For more information on how to access DMA services, see Appendix D, "Defense Media Activity," and DODD 5105.74, Defense Media Activity.*

**c. The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

(1) Develop PA policies and Service doctrine and provide resources (personnel and standardized or compatible equipment). Ensure the immediate readiness and prompt availability of necessary Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) PA resources to support missions and validated CCDR requests for PA augmentation.

(2) Conduct Service-specific PA programs, as required, in support of joint and multinational operations.

**d. The CJCS**

(1) Reviews joint operations, PA annexes, and CCDR exercise plans and orders for consistency with joint PA doctrine, policy, and regulations.

(2) Provides a PA liaison to augment the National Military Command Center response cells during crisis and conflict and coordinates with ASD(PA).

(3) Provides expertise and experience to communicate with the media and domestic and foreign audiences.

(4) Provides PA coordination and planning assistance for the DOD National Media Pool deployment.

(5) Provides PAG in CJCS warning, planning, alert, deployment, and EXORDs.

(6) Reviews and coordinates PAG for joint and combined military exercises, operations, and campaigns.

**e. The CCDRs**

(1) Synchronize commander's communication in support of USG communication efforts.

(2) Integrate communication efforts up and down the chain of command through detailed PA annexes and proposed public affairs guidance (PPAG), coordinate and synchronize PA annexes and PPAG with the IRCs.

(a) Plan priority in-theater air and ground transportation to move media representatives, military personnel supporting PA, and their equipment.

(b) Plan to provide PA resources and establish priorities for PA asset movement.

(c) Provide communications assets, including Internet access and satellite or mobile telephones to PA staff and the media, if no other means of communications exist.

(3) Prioritize communication assets and allocate resources, including access to bandwidth, based on CONOPS, available resources, and the OE.

(4) Plan to support civilian media representatives through all stages of any operation. When operationally feasible, grant civilian media representatives access to relevant CCMD activities and operations. Develop a command climate and procedures that promote robust media access.

(5) Prepare for and assist in the deployment, reception, and operation of the DOD National Media Pool. Designate personnel to support the DOD National Media Pool when activated.

(6) Establish media operations centers (MOCs), as appropriate, to provide timely communication products and services. In coordination with ASD(PA), provide direct PA support, policy guidance, and oversight to subordinate JFCs and their respective MOCs. Be prepared to coordinate US military participation in MOCs established by the responsible multinational force commander. The term MOC will be used throughout this publication to represent any type of media support facility (e.g., combined press information center).

(7) Assist media representatives and military journalists in gaining access to military units and personnel conducting joint and multinational operations, to include commanders, officers, and enlisted personnel directly involved with the military operations. In addition, CCDRs should plan for designated spokespersons to speak with the media regarding the US contribution to the multinational force.

(8) Develop VI sharing plans to facilitate rapid information distribution. VI sharing plans include classified imagery for internal investigations, and declassified VI for public dissemination to counter disinformation or misinformation.

(9) Plan communication programs to support deployed forces, their home stations, and their family members. Establish ground rules to release information and VI to civilian media. Information approved for media release should also be provided to the JFC staff.

(10) Coordinate and provide resource support to assigned/attached PA organizations supporting joint operations.

(11) Identify VI requirements during operational planning and coordinate with appropriate sources to obtain imagery collection, editing, and transmission requirements.

(12) Forward VI of joint operations to DIMOC, DOD's central reception and distribution point for joint imagery. Review imagery for security concerns and clear it for public release at the lowest appropriate level.

(13) Provide family members and hometown media information to sustain public awareness and increase understanding of the joint force's missions.

(14) Identify individual PA augmentees as necessary, to meet operational requirements.

(15) Review and facilitate requests from components, subordinate units, US embassies, and other HN organizations within the geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) AOR for US military assets and personnel that support community engagement/community relations programs that directly support or enhance a GCC's theater security cooperation or campaign plan objectives.

(16) Conduct PA activities in support of joint operations, including actions to research, plan, execute, and assess communication programs for a variety of publics using a variety of digital and traditional media; maintain command-sponsored publicly accessible websites, and implement the DOD principles of information.

(17) Ensure that plans share sufficient and capable PA assets identified in the force list early in the flow to support communication objectives.

f. **Subordinate JFCs**

- (1) Direct and focus PA activities in the assigned operational area.
- (2) Support PA and media access to military operations and personnel consistent with OPSEC. Provide briefs and interviews, and logistics support to enable PA mission.
- (3) Designate a joint task force (JTF) PAO and a MOC director, as appropriate.
- (4) Select a media briefer.
- (5) Participate in media interviews, when feasible.
- (6) Review VI for release to the MOC as soon as possible for potential release to the media.
- (7) Integrate PA personnel in all cross-functional staff organizations.

g. **The Commander, Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE).** The JPASE is part of United States Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM's) Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. JPASE provides ready, rapidly deployable joint PA capability to CDRs to support joint operations, facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, bridge joint requirements, and conduct training to meet evolving theater information challenges. JPASE provides JFCs with trained, equipped, scalable, and expeditionary joint PA capabilities supporting worldwide operations. The JPASE Commander:

- (1) Provides a joint, expeditionary, mission-tailored PA and communication capability.
- (2) Provides a joint, professionally trained, experienced communication subject matter expert and PA adviser to the commander.
- (3) Supports and conducts forward media operations.
- (4) Provides CCMD and joint force planning capability.
- (5) Provides a VI capacity and capability.

*See Appendix E, "Joint Public Affairs Support Element," for additional information on JPASE.*

h. **Service and Functional Component Commanders**

- (1) Provide a JTF staff PAO and MOC director, if tasked.

- (2) Provide media support personnel and equipment.
- (3) Coordinate Service and functional component release of information and imagery with higher headquarters PA.
- (4) Support the movement of media representatives, as directed.
- (5) When deployed, allow media representatives access to communication equipment, as permitted by operational and OPSEC constraints.
- (6) Provide necessary VI documentation teams, if tasked.
- (7) Conduct communication programs and activities for internal and external audiences pursuant to JFC guidance.

### 3. Line of Effort Relationships

a. **Intelligence.** PA is both a provider of information and a consumer of intelligence. As a provider of information, PA media analysis and news summaries can contribute to the sociocultural analysis being conducted by intelligence analysts. As a consumer of intelligence, PA uses intelligence products to plan and enhance media analysis. Intelligence requirements are coordinated with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2). The J-2's historical and human factors analysis provides a context to evaluate and anticipate adversary propaganda and disinformation. PA should coordinate regularly with the J-2 open source intelligence section to enhance media analysis for the JFC and staff.

b. **VI.** The VI function represents a broad spectrum of imagery products derived from various directed and derivative sources, which are often outside of direct PA control. These sources include, but are not limited to, COMCAM; military photo journalists; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; weapons systems cameras; and military broadcast organizations. PA relies on VI products from all these sources and others to accomplish its mission. Planning for and leveraging the various sources of VI to enhance joint PA missions is addressed in detail in Chapter V, "Visual Information."

*Additional information on VI CONOPS, refer to DIMOC (<http://www.dimoc.mil>).*

c. **IO.** IO is the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. PA activities and IO support JFC objectives; counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation; and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO staffs plan public information activities and conduct media analysis, IO differs with respect to their authorities regarding domestic and international populations, scope, and intent. As such, they are separate functional areas with PA serving as part of the JFC's staff and IO staff sections supporting operations from the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). JFCs ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO activities is consistent with the DOD principles of information, policy, legal authorities, and security. The joint operation planning process (JOPP) is a collaborative

process in which both PA and IO integrate and synchronize their respective communication capabilities to support military operations and accomplish the mission.

*For additional guidance on IO, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.*

(1) **Military Information Support Operations (MISO).** MISO are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of foreign target audiences in a manner favorable to US objectives. The respective activities of PA and MISO affect each other and require continual coordination.

(a) The PA and MISO activities should be deconflicted during JOPP. The JFC can form IO working groups or cells for long-term operations. PA and MISO elements can coordinate directly when there are no joint coordination mechanisms.

(b) MISO are by definition directed against foreign target audiences. However, military information support personnel and equipment may be used to support approved defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions. DSCA may be supported by conducting civil authority information support (CAIS). CAIS may include information dissemination, printing, reproduction, distribution, and broadcasting to deliver critical information. All CAIS efforts are coordinated with the lead federal agency, which is solely responsible for the content of any products.

*For additional guidance on MISO, see JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.*

(2) **OPSEC.** OPSEC reduces the vulnerability of US and multinational forces to successful adversary exploitation of critical information. The OPSEC process is a systematic method used to identify, control, and protect critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions associated with military operations.

(a) JFCs and their staffs evaluate OPSEC risks related to information proposed for public release. Security at the source is a guiding principle to protect classified and sensitive material and should govern discussions with the public.

(b) PAOs should assess the potential effects of media coverage on joint operations. They should work closely with operational, intelligence, and risk management planners to develop guidelines to avoid inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. PA representatives should be involved in OPSEC planning, surveys, and security reviews to prevent the public release of critical information.

(c) OPSEC constraints and the need to release information and imagery must be balanced. Timing the public release of information and VI can help maintain OPSEC. Best practices include ground rules to temporarily delay transmission of sensitive information to balance short-term security concerns with media coverage requirements.

(d) PA should consider OPSEC issues relating to the use of widely available mobile communication technologies (e.g., blogging, social networking, smart phones, and streaming media) to communicate as a crisis or contingency is developing. The disclosure or

public release of critical information identified in the OPSEC process must be a PA consideration in crisis response, issue management, and PA planning.

*For additional guidance on OPSEC, see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.*

(3) **Military Deception (MILDEC)**

(a) MILDEC consists of actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC can be employed during all phases of military operations. PA resources cannot be used as MILDEC capability because such use would undermine the legitimacy of the office and destroy future trust in PA messages.

(b) PA operations should be planned, coordinated, and deconflicted with MILDEC operations consistent with policy, legal limitations, and security. The coordination between PA and MILDEC operations must safeguard the essential elements of deception plans and maintain the integrity, reputation, and credibility of PA as a source of truthful information. Safeguarding MILDEC-related information is critical to the success of the operations; as such, details are classified accordingly.

*For additional guidance on MILDEC, see JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.*

d. **Coordination with Other USG Departments and Agencies.** CCDRs operate in a public information arena with interagency partners whose actions and information can affect public understanding of the facts. Communicating a consistent message that supports approved themes is essential during operations. All participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree early in the planning process on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and transporting media members and their equipment. Within DOS, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and PA plays a key coordinating role in this process. The office of ASD(PA) interfaces with the CCMDs, normally through their joint interagency coordination group (JIACG), and passes the information down through PAG. Similarly, the CCMD JIACG representatives participate in planning and can be used to coordinate issues with the agency they represent.

(1) **DOS's Bureau of International Information Programs.** Engages international key publics on issues of US policy, society, and values to help create an environment that can be receptive to America's national interests. Commanders and their staffs should plan for PA activities to function in coordination with these and other national-level communication initiatives.

(2) **Public Diplomacy (PD).** PD consists of overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening dialogue between American citizens, institutions, and their counterparts abroad. It is critically important that PA and PD are coordinated to ensure consistency of their respective messages and to maintain credibility with their respective key publics.



(3) **Interagency Guidance.** Information from the interagency process, DOD, and various levels of command is disseminated through PAG. This guidance is essential to ensure a consistent message is projected. The guidance can change weekly, daily, or hourly as the political and military situation changes.

(4) **Country Team.** The country team consists of key members of the US diplomatic mission or embassy and works directly with the HN government. Its purpose is to unify the coordination and implementation of US national policy within each foreign country under direction of the chief of mission (COM). Country teams meet regularly to advise the COM on matters of interest to the US and review current developments in the country. The COM, as the senior US representative in each HN, controls information release in country. The PA staff should coordinate all themes, messages, and press releases impacting an HN through the respective US embassy channels. The DOS foreign policy adviser at CCMDs can facilitate access to DOS and has reachback to resources for joint PAOs.

e. **Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and NGOs.** Close coordination with IGOs and NGOs also can be an important PA responsibility. For example, if DOD is providing foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), there may be many non-DOD or non-US agencies (e.g., United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Committee of the Red Cross) involved. There will be public and media interest in their activities as well as those of DOD. Close coordination by the joint forces with other involved agencies will help ensure consistent information is presented about the total US response effort.

f. **HN.** PA planners should consult with HN governments as appropriate to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the PAG. This coordination normally is established through the PAO at the respective embassy and in close coordination with IO planners.

g. **Multinational Partners.** US military forces will rarely work alone to solve an international crisis. Thus PA planning should reflect the possibility of multinational partners joining in the effort. In addition to HN sensitivities, the MOC staff should be cognizant of multinational partners' concerns when communicating with the media and the public.



## CHAPTER III PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS

*“The press is not the enemy and to treat it as such is self-defeating.”*

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates  
May 2007

### 1. Overview

a. **PA Functions.** PA functions are part of a broader communication process focused on supporting the commander and achieving mission objectives. PA functions include providing counsel to the JFC and staff; providing PA training, research, planning, assessment, and evaluation; developing and disseminating communication products; communicating with publics; and integrating PA and VI into JOPP. Throughout the entire process, PA will:

(1) **Provide Advice and Counsel to the Commander.** PAOs advise the commander on communicating with the public, including objective counsel on the impact of proposed COAs and policy decisions on relevant populations. They use research and analysis to build a shared situational awareness with commanders and staff on emerging issues and public sentiment. They bring focus to the impact the joint force has on the OE and its publics, improve responsiveness to public interests, articulate potential unintended consequences of planned actions, and quickly identify perceived disparities between actions and words.

(2) **Lead Staff Communication Alignment.** As the primary coordinator of public information, PA is in a unique position to alert the JFC when actions, words, and images are not aligned and to recommend actions to bring them into alignment through the CCS process. The PA staff aligns communication with PAG from higher headquarters down the chain to subordinate commands, and throughout the staff and with key stakeholder commands to include US and multinational forces.

(3) **Lead PA and Public Communication Activities.** The PAO leads the PA staff and public communication efforts.

(4) **PA Training.** PA training prepares commanders and members throughout the command to effectively represent their units, Services, and DOD in interviews with the media, when hosting embedded media or civilian visitors, in casual conversation with non-DOD personnel, and in social media. The PA team must be able to conduct a wide range of training ranging from familiarization for an entire command in an auditorium to focused one-on-one coaching for command leadership and subject matter experts (SMEs). The PAO and PA team also train members of the joint force to increase their understanding of the PA mission, capabilities, role in joint planning process, and support to overall communication effort.

### b. PA Tasks

(1) **Research.** PAOs work with others on the joint staff to proactively scan the information environment to identify emerging issues with potential to impact the joint force.

PAOs use quantitative and qualitative research to better understand and define problems and opportunities, the OE, internal and external publics, and the cultural landscape. This information informs the overall decision-making process, guides planning efforts, and improves the quality of PA counsel and communication alignment. Research is used to anticipate and identify changes in the OE, allowing leaders to adjust and respond, as needed, to ensure mission success. With increased knowledge of cultures, social and political structures, languages, and religions, PAOs better understand audience needs and predispositions, and better design messages to increase audience understanding.

(2) **Planning.** PA plans and activities must support the commander's intent and command objectives. During operation planning, PA involvement begins before the first planning step and uses the information and knowledge gained through research to enhance the commander's understanding of the OE and nature of the problem. This process includes consideration of lessons learned to help guide operational design and assist in anticipating response to future events. This understanding will shape the commander's initial planning guidance and intent, which must include communication considerations. Commands should not develop communication plans separate from operation planning. OPLANs should include communication considerations and activities from the beginning. PA informs and participates in staff planning, including the development of constraints and restraints, identification of potential intended and unintended consequences of planned actions and an appreciation of the nature of information flow in varying cultural contexts. Supporting communication plans highlight higher headquarters PAG and messaging, identify the communication problem or opportunity, identify and segment key publics, define communication objectives that support command/mission goals, develop measurable objectives to achieve these goals, and employ communication activities appropriate to the situation and desired outcome. Throughout the planning process, PA professionals will lead communication synchronization to maximize alignment.

(3) **Media Product Development and Dissemination.** PAOs leverage technology to rapidly develop and disseminate communication products that support the commander's objectives. Products include the written word, VI (photographs, video, multimedia productions) optimized for the intended publics, distribution channel, and ease of sharing by the publics to their networks through a variety of media. In operational areas, military journalists/mass communication specialists/combat correspondents will attach to units at the lowest level, providing commanders with the ability to capture, document, and rapidly disseminate unit actions to prevent and counter adversary misinformation and disinformation.

(4) **Public Communication.** Viewing communication as a social process of dialogue and interaction among people versus a technical process of delivering a message to a specific audience, the PA team proactively facilitates communication with American and international publics (including key leaders) in all OEs at home and abroad. The PAO uses research and communication theory to identify and segment publics and to develop creative communication plans and outreach programs tailored to them. Public communication focuses on internal and external publics and stakeholders. Additionally, the PAO must facilitate communication with representatives from both traditional news media organizations and digital news media organizations. Public communication activities include in-person activities such as tours, distinguished visitor embarks, media embeds, interviews,

town hall meetings, speaking engagements, band concerts, and in-person conversations, along with interactions facilitated using technology such as voice phone calls, e-mails, video conferencing, and social media platforms.

(5) **PA Capabilities.** PA staffs at all levels are small and require augmentation to conduct all the PA tasks and missions. PA planners must assess requirements and plan and request sufficient assets to provide the CCDR the required capability to be effective.

(6) **Assessment and Evaluation.** Measuring the effectiveness of PA activities against command and mission objectives is an integral part of PA. Assessment and evaluation should be included in all planning and execution steps, with feedback used to adapt and adjust actions accordingly.

c. **Considerations.** PA considerations for joint operations include:

(1) **Military operations will draw attention.** Commanders and staffs at all levels must anticipate interest in operations as part of the normal planning process. Unit alerts, increased aircraft activity, and rail or ship loading and other military activities send a message and will almost inevitably lead to media inquiries. This is why it is critical that operational actions and words/images are thoughtfully planned ahead of execution and increased social media activity. Such activities may also cause concern among unit personnel, family members, and the American public. Releasing information or granting access to news media is often directed from the outset by higher headquarters or is subsequently directed when events become known publicly. Whatever the amount of information released or support to news reporting decided upon by a commander, it is not unusual for higher headquarters to direct more information to be released.

(2) **PA should be incorporated in every phase of operations.** Consistent with current DOD PA guidance, and within the constraints of OPSEC, information security, safety, and privacy of US military personnel, their families, and DOD civilians, PA can:

(a) Provide accurate and timely information about US military operations and objectives to internal and external publics.

(b) Support US and international media coverage of US military operations.

(c) Develop messages to communicate US resolve, capabilities, and intent.

(d) Mitigate and counter adversary disinformation (propaganda) and misinformation with accurate and timely public information and imagery.

(3) PA must be highly agile and respond quickly to real-time shifts in the public conversation. PAOs should work with commanders to streamline the joint force public communication process to ensure that it remains timely and relevant.

(4) **Commanders should evaluate PA activities** to determine their effectiveness. Results should also be used to inform future plan development.

## 2. Requirements

### a. General Overview

(1) Joint planners should identify requirements for PA facilities, personnel, equipment, transportation assets, and communication assets as early in the planning process as possible. PAOs should identify specific measures to augment PA personnel and procure, lease, or assign other necessary resources. Identifying and allocating resources generally requires assistance from the supporting CCMDs, Services, and Military Departments.

(2) PA and VI personnel and equipment should be capable of being transported on military and commercial aircraft and aboard military ships. Follow-on items are prioritized through logistics channels. The volume and diversity of media assets influence the organization of PA staff elements.

b. **Facilities.** When feasible, facilities with appropriate infrastructure are designated for PA and may include the requirement to establish and operate a MOC. The command's PA staff is located with the headquarters element. When an independent MOC is established, it should be at a secure location convenient to the media. A primary reason for establishing a MOC away from the headquarters may be to improve media access and alleviate OPSEC concerns. Care must be taken to mitigate increased operational risk by providing adequate security. Specific space requirements might include staff work areas within the headquarters element, separate staff and media work areas in the MOC, AFRTS broadcast and transmission facilities, equipment storage, imaging facilities, access to helicopter landing zones, and vehicle parking areas. Billeting and messing requirements should also be considered.

c. **Personnel.** The day-to-day staffing of most PA offices is likely to be inadequate to respond to the inevitable increase in media and public interest surrounding a crisis. Deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP) identify COAs to address this challenge. Linguists and cultural advisers can also be in high demand but short supply. Augmentation may come from these sources:

(1) **AC and RC PA Units.** OPLANs, OPORDs, or requests for forces (RFFs) should identify PA skill sets required to augment their forces. Members of AC and RC PA units should align their training to support CCDR OPLANs and OPORDs. PAOs must ensure their equipment, personnel, and training requirements are identified and nonstandard requirements are listed in RFFs to ensure funding is made available to purchase equipment, obtain specialized training, or acquire personnel not organic to an organization's structure.

(2) **Individuals.** Service component commanders and supporting CCDRs may also be tasked to deploy individual PA personnel to support JFCs. Supported JFC's should identify billets in advance, and supporting commands should match individuals to JFCs' requirements.

d. **Equipment.** Based on mission requirements, the PAO should identify equipment to support PA. PA planners should identify their communications infrastructure requirements for each contingency and then identify who will provide them. For example, PA support following natural or man-made disasters may require alternative communications equipment,

such as satellite telephones or mobile telephones capable of supplying Internet access to transmit images, news stories, and social media communications for brief, rapid updates. Maintenance and services essential to sustain the resource packages also are considered.

(1) PA should standardize equipment to facilitate interoperability and to minimize additional training requirements, especially for contingencies. Hardware, software, and digital imaging requirements should be identified to support all PA activities. Considerations include TV, audio, and print media; event coordination and scheduling; command briefing preparations; and operating contingency Internet sites. PA staff, translators, and analysts generally will require specialized aggregation and media analysis software, TV monitors, video/digital recorders, and reception capability to review newscasts in support of media analysis and assessment. Most of these items must be requested by the CCDR, especially those that support the DOD National Media Pool, the command's primary MOC, and other PA offices supporting the operation in its earliest stages.

(2) Deployable AFRTS distribution packages (over air radio/TV broadcast, cable, band downlink), if available, should be considered in the overall requirements. Broadcast frequencies required should be provided by the communications system directorate of a joint staff. Subsequent resource needs should be met by balanced support provided by the responsible CCDR, the supporting CCDRs, and the Military Departments.

**e. Transportation**

(1) PA personnel and equipment should be as mobile as other operational forces.

(2) Transportation assets may include:

(a) Vehicles (with drivers and communications assets) to support PA administrative and logistics activities.

(b) Vehicles (with drivers and communications assets) to support the movement of media and PA personnel covering operations.

(c) Force protection assets to travel with PA staffs and media in hostile or unsecured areas.

(d) Aircraft to support the movement of media and military journalists.

(e) Surface and air transportation to move information and imagery products.

**f. Communications.** Communications requirements include:

(1) Bandwidth to transmit PA and VI products, live or as near real time as possible, both intertheater and intratheater, to multiple users simultaneously.

(2) Internet access, to include unfiltered external access for information and imagery release, and local area network access to establish and operate unit and contingency unclassified and classified Web-based sites.

(3) Figure III-1 depicts notional PA communication support requirements.

g. **Other Support.** The PA staff may require specialized contracting support and a government purchase card to obtain goods and services not available within the joint force to establish and execute PA activities throughout the operational area. This may include:

- (1) Contracts for publication of communication products (e.g., newsletters, newspapers, photographs).
- (2) Contracts for products, services, and equipment to support media analysis and assessment.
- (3) Maintenance and service contracts to ensure sustainability of equipment.
- (4) Contracted translation services.

### 3. Planning

a. **Overview.** PA planners participate throughout the planning process.

b. **PA and JOPP.** JOPP is a proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. Examples of specific PA activities conducted or steps taken during JOPP are depicted in Figure III-2.

(1) **Mission Analysis.** PA planners focus on developing situational understanding of the OE to include media infrastructure, capability, and bias, as well as the social and




Figure III-1. Notional Public Affairs Communications Requirements

JOPP Step	Public Affairs Actions
1. Initiation 2. Mission Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Begin analysis of the operational environment.</li> <li>• Participate in JIPOE.</li> <li>• Review the following for PA implications:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ National strategic guidance</li> <li>◦ Higher headquarters planning directive</li> <li>◦ Initial JFC intent</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Provide PA perspective during mission analysis.</li> <li>• Identify intelligence requirements for PA support to planning.</li> <li>• Identify specified, implied, and essential PA tasks.</li> <li>• Develop PA input to the mission statement.</li> <li>• Conduct initial PA force structure analysis including the need for VI support, AFRTS, and the DOD National Media Pool.</li> <li>• Develop PA facts and assumptions.</li> <li>• Develop PA estimates.</li> <li>• Participate in all cross functional staff organizations related to planning.</li> </ul>
3. Course of Action Development 4. COA Analysis and Wargaming 5. COA Comparison 6. COA Approval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participate in COA development; identify needed PA capabilities and forces required as well as shortfalls.</li> <li>• Participate in COA analysis and wargaming; identify advantages and disadvantages of each COA from a PA perspective.</li> <li>• Revise the PA staff estimate as needed based on wargaming.</li> <li>• Provide PA input on COA recommendation.</li> <li>• Continued participation in all cross functional staff organizations.</li> </ul>
7. Plan or Order Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refine PA requirements (capabilities, force structure, equipment/logistics, and other resources) to support the COA.</li> <li>• Provide PA personnel requirements of the request for forces.</li> <li>• Participate in the time-phased force and deployment data build/validation as applicable.</li> <li>• Continued participation in all cross functional staff organizations related to planning.</li> <li>• Provide input to the operational planning process for all applicable annexes including B, C, D, G, O, V, and draft annex F.</li> <li>• Coordinate any administrative or contracting requirements.</li> <li>• Develop and submit proposed PAG to higher headquarters for review/approval.</li> <li>• Coordinate with subordinate PA staffs to ensure plan synchronization and a smooth transition to deployed operations.</li> </ul>

**Legend**

AFRTS	American Forces Radio and Television Service	JOPP	joint operation planning process
COA	course of action	PA	public affairs
DOD	Department of Defense	PAG	public affairs guidance
JFC	joint force commander	VI	visual information
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment		

**Figure III-2. Joint Operation Planning Process and Public Affairs Actions**

cultural characteristics of key areas. PA planners analyze the mission, the end state, and objectives, and review applicable strategic guidance to identify the PA tasks (specified, implied, and essential) and develop initial PA staff estimates.

(2) **COA Development.** PA participates in the development, analysis, and wargaming, comparison, and approval of COAs to identify the needed PA capabilities, forces required, and shortfalls from a PA perspective.



(3) **Plan or Order Development.** PA planners apply the PA planning considerations in subparagraph 3c, “PA Planning Considerations,” to refine requirements and develop annex F (Public Affairs) of the OPLAN and the PPAG, and support the development of other annexes, as appropriate.

(a) **Annex F (Public Affairs).** Annex F of an OPLAN should address all PA-related transportation, communications, billeting, equipment, and personnel resources required to support the plan. However, the details of those PA requirements needed to support an operation should be coordinated and included in other appropriate annexes (Logistics, Personnel, and Communications) to obtain these resources and conduct PA operations as outlined in annex F. Additional planning considerations that should be captured in the annex are included in Figure III-3. The PA annex to the plan or order complements and supports, but does not replace, the PPAG forwarded to the Office of the ASD(PA). The format for annex F (Public Affairs) can be found in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*. Planning considerations for annex F (Public Affairs) is at Appendix B, “Annex F Development.”

(b) **Appendix 10 to Annex C.** Appendix 10 (Combat Camera) to annex C (Operations) provides COMCAM guidance in plans. Coordinating and cross referencing related annexes (e.g., PA, IO, communications, interagency) can increase effectiveness.


1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJSCI) 3205.01, *Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM)*, directs commanders to plan for, task, sustain, and employ COMCAM forces.

2. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-55.12/Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.7A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-61.2/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.41, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera (COMCAM) Operations*, provides guidance for planning, employment, and integration of COMCAM forces.

(c) **Annex Y (Commander’s Communication Synchronization [CCS]).** CCS content is described in CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Planning Formats and Guidance*. Content includes the situation and CONOPS focusing on important CCS-related elements, such as the overview of the information environment, opposition, lines of operation, measures of effectiveness (MOE), tasks, and coordination instructions. PA planners will contribute to the development of annex Y using the information included in annex F to inform the development.

(d) **PPAG.** The JFC submits PPAG through CCDRs to the Office of the ASD(PA) for approval and publication as the PAG per the format outlined in DODI 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*. PPAG should include recommended PA policy, background, contingency statements, message points, answers to anticipated media questions, community engagement guidance, and details governing the release of information and imagery to the public. It should be developed in time to complete coordination and publish initial PAG in conjunction with an EXORD. ASD(PA) will review





**Figure III-3. Public Affairs Planning Considerations**

the PPAG and issue a PAG message approving, approving with modifications, or disapproving the PPAG. PAG should be published prior to deployment activities. Development of additional or supplemental PPAG continues throughout the operation or campaign. The JFC's PA staff recommends additional PA policy, drafts statements, identifies issues, and prepares responses to address likely questions, concerns, and interests of publics or internal audiences.

### **PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE**

**Public affairs guidance (PAG) supports the public discussion of defense issues and operations and serves as a source document when responding to media representatives and the public. PAG also outlines planning guidance for related public affairs responsibilities, functions, activities, and resources. The development and timely dissemination of PAG ensures that all information is in consonance with policy when responding to the information demands of joint operations. PAG also conforms to operations security and the privacy requirements of the members of the joint forces.**

**Various Sources**

(e) **CAP.** In CAP, the JOPP steps are time sensitive and often require accelerated decision making to respond to an actual or imminent crisis. JFCs and their staffs must develop and approve a COA, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, and arrange sustainment and communications systems support. Public and media inquiries may quickly overwhelm organic PA assets and degrade PA planning capability. Immediate augmentation of the PA staff may be necessary to continue planning and simultaneously respond to public and media interest in the DOD response.

*For additional information on joint operation planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning; CJCSM 3122 Series, The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System; and CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance.*

### c. PA Planning Considerations

(1) **Overview.** PA activities should be synchronized across the joint force, and with other agencies, early in JOPP. Authorities to plan, integrate, approve, and disseminate information and imagery should be clearly established. Legal considerations regarding release of information on investigations in the operational area, including those regarding alleged law of war violations, should be addressed as early as possible in the PAG. Coordination of themes, as well as support to media coverage and PAG, should be approved prior to deployment.

(a) Joint force activities to inform the public generally increase immediately prior to and during deployment. To respond to increased public and media interest, the joint force PA staff is generally augmented to expand PA programs and activities. PA demands are highest at the outset of operations or outbreak of hostilities. ASD(PA) may direct that media be allowed to embed with joint forces. MOCs and subordinate MOCs can be established to facilitate PA activities when operations attract a high concentration of media. Where direct access to operations is not possible, media pools may need to be established and supported. The synchronization and integration of PA across the JFC staff, and with DOD and other USG partner activities (e.g., daily press briefings, response to query, and COMCAM documentation) is an effective counter to misinformation.

(b) Many PA activities continue throughout an operation. During stability operations, PA activities should support the transition to civil authority and the repair of the essential information infrastructure. Joint force PA may selectively augment HN radio, TV, and print media to help transition to civil control or meet end state conditions, and support redeployment activities and coverage.

(2) **Timely Coverage.** It is critical to develop plans to get accurate information out in a timely manner to compete in the information environment. PA plans facilitate the media getting a first-hand look at joint operations. To this end, operational planners and JFCs should:

(a) Commit equipped and trained joint PA teams.

(b) Determine lift and logistic support to move PA and media personnel and media products to and from forward locations, as appropriate.

(c) Hold frequent briefings in theater with international and US media—several per day if needed to keep them apprised of operations, as appropriate.

(d) Institute processes for the rapid clearance and dissemination of weapons systems videos, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, and COMCAM products, as appropriate, and in keeping with OPSEC requirements.

(e) Delegate the authority for the release of information and imagery to include COMCAM and other related products to the lowest possible level.

### (3) **Higher Headquarters and CCS**

(a) JFCs develop goals, objectives, estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish their assigned missions based on strategic guidance and direction. Similarly, PA planners conduct analysis of strategic direction, planning guidance, and goals to develop supporting communication plans. Commander's intent should be incorporated throughout synchronization of the communications plan. PA planners should align PA activities with the other IRCs through the IO working group and as part of the CCS process. PA planners should ensure that PA activities are aligned and synchronized across the staff prior to execution.

(b) PA planners establish and maintain a routine, ongoing relationship with other planners within the CCMD and joint force. Synchronization across the staff facilitates the availability of services and support required to execute PA activities. PA planning should include coordination with the HN, the country team, other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, and NGOs, as appropriate.

(c) Synchronized communication planning must also consider interagency and other related organizations' plans to ensure integrated communication is executed. Interagency efforts promote international support from nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance regional and global partnerships. There also is a mutually supporting relationship between the military's PA and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) efforts and similar PA and PD activities conducted by US embassies and other USG departments and agencies.

(4) **Intelligence.** Intelligence analysts use the joint intelligence preparation of the OE process to conduct a sociocultural analysis of the OE. Sociocultural analysis helps identify critical community organizations and individuals that influence the population, media, etc. To satisfy information requirements, PA may request intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to gather imagery to support the PA mission. PA may submit critical information requirements and may request access to relevant intelligence products to assist in the development of communication planning products.

### PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUESTING INTELLIGENCE IMAGERY SUPPORT

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, public affairs personnel in the Joint Air Operations Center monitored current operations for the prosecution of sensitive targets. Public affairs planners in the operations center recommended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms gather imagery on sensitive targets to prove coalition aircraft struck the intended military target rather than surrounding civilian buildings and infrastructure. The imagery was declassified for public release.

#### Various Sources

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for additional guidance.

(5) **VI and COMCAM.** PA planners should identify PA information requirements for consideration when planning VI and COMCAM operations. More information on VI planning is provided in Chapter V, “Visual Information.” Commercial multimedia products are copyrighted and cannot be used without consent from the copyright holder.

(6) **Communication Products.** Commanders should plan for PA personnel to report on military operations and produce communication products for direct release via DOD’s media properties.

(7) **AFRTS.** AFRTS offers the JFC and PAO a means to communicate directly to DOD personnel in the operational area, as well as DOD personnel and family members in other locations.

(a) AFRTS has a wide range of deployable equipment systems, from small unmanned satellite radio and TV decoders used to provide service at small base camps or messing areas to large scale network radio and TV systems. Additionally, AFRTS can provide a MOC with video news gathering capability for joint command messages.

1. During the initial stages of an operation, AFRTS is one of the timeliest channels to get the CCDR’s message to the deployed force.

2. Initial consideration for staffed AFRTS facilities should center on radio service to bare-base and forward areas, with TV considered for rear areas and further expansion as an operational area matures. PA should anticipate the desire of the DOD leadership to communicate directly to deployed forces.

3. Additionally, AFRTS can transmit immediate announcements to DOD personnel when approved by the CCDR. AFRTS TV capabilities can be installed at messing and recreational facilities and further expanded as the operation develops. A wide range of AFRTS options is available to meet operational requirements.

4. In austere environments, AFRTS is capable of providing a small satellite system to receive radio and TV news coverage and obtain other types of DOD information and entertainment products.

(b) Deployment of AFRTS assets into an operational area usually requires special approvals for frequencies, real estate, and facilities, which must normally be coordinated by the MOC. The senior AFRTS officer commands the AFRTS station and serves as a member of the MOC.

(c) AFRTS outlets may not be used for any type of political purpose or MISO and may not produce or broadcast programming to serve interests other than the DOD internal key public.

*Refer to Appendix D, "Defense Media Activity," or contact the DMA ([www.dma.mil](http://www.dma.mil)) for assistance with AFRTS planning.*

(8) **KLE/Community Engagement.** KLE is not a primary PA responsibility, but PA can serve in an advisory role. KLE and community engagement involves key local and regional leaders throughout the OE, not optimizing the schedules of joint operations leaders. Building relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence takes time. Overseas, peace enforcement, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, stability operations, and many other joint operations require multinational forces to influence and impact the attitudes of key local and/or regional leaders. In the US, the continued support of local communities is a must for mission success. Developing messages (for both public and private engagement) and finding an effective means of delivery are challenges, especially in environments where interpersonal relationships are paramount. Understanding cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, and communication methods is essential to any communication approach. An in-depth understanding of cultural/social background, perspectives, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, authorities, spheres of influence, and motivators is necessary for the development of enduring personal relationships. KLE/community engagement works best by building relationships over time with enough strength and depth so that they can then support US military goals and objectives.

(a) **KLE Cells.** A KLE cell, if established, uses face-to-face contact and tailors the topics/messages to local conditions overseas. Representatives in this process include personnel from PA, plans directorate of a joint staff, IO, and civil affairs (CA). Overseas, KLEs are designed to support CCS, IO, PA, MISO, and DSPD objectives. This cell develops a detailed background briefing on each key leader, and then suggests specific approaches to convey the command's overall theme for encouraging support for stability and reconstruction activities. As a tool for implementing a communication program, the employment of KLE cells ensures that whenever commanders meet with leaders, they are delivering an effective, consistent message that supports the command's goals.

(b) **KLE/Community Engagement Assignment and Periodicity.** Tasking KLE/community engagement responsibility to specific individuals will deconflict assignments, ensure desired coverage, and aid in creating a coherent effort. Regular meetings strengthen relationships, increase the level of mutual understanding, and increase the level of support.

1. Analysis to determine appropriate assignment of KLE/community engagement responsibility across the AOR should include the local leader formal status in the hierarchy (tactical/operational/strategic), support base, locality, and sphere of influence. KLE/community engagement should then be assigned to the appropriate leaders to ensure that all local key leaders are covered. Likewise, to maintain unity of effort overseas, key interagency, IGO, NGO, and multinational partners may need to be involved. This list requires careful management to ensure that it does not become too extensive or cumbersome for senior leaders to support.

2. Regular KLE/community engagement meetings, simply to maintain a level of understanding and strength of relationship, must be included in any plan. This makes it even more imperative to spread KLE/community engagement responsibilities across the force, to ensure that these requirements do not become unsupportable. It might be beneficial to consider expanding assignment of KLE/community outreach responsibility beyond the typical set of commanding officers/generals, to include deputy commanders, chiefs of staff, and even some key directorate heads. Without regular and consistent meetings, these relationships often lack the depth of understanding and strength needed to gain support on important issues.

3. KLE participants should be properly prepared. Some basic considerations include:

- a. Understand and focus on the objectives.
- b. Portray a demeanor of mutual respect.
- c. Follow local meeting etiquette.
- d. Be patient and a good listener.
- e. Know when to speak.
- f. When using interpreters, look at the host, not at the interpreter.
- g. Promise only what you can definitely deliver.
- h. Instill local ownership in solutions.
- i. Conclude the meeting by confirming or clarifying agreements.

(c) **KLE/Community Engagement Assessment.** A debriefing immediately after the KLE/community engagement is critical to assessment and supporting well-planned focused future events. The assessment process measures progress toward achieving objectives to attain the end state. Just as KLE products are developed and our leaders briefed prior to the meeting, the post-KLE/community engagement debriefing should be part of the process and scheduled immediately after the meeting while memories and impressions are fresh. To maintain accurate information, debrief information such as what issues were

discussed, key leader positions on the issues, messages/themes delivered, requests made, agreements reached, other considerations surfacing, and impressions.

(9) **Media Access.** The news media is a primary means of communicating with the public and military personnel. DOD guidance typically directs news media access to tactical maneuver units to gain a fuller understanding of an operation.

(a) There is a need for continuous dialogue between the joint force and the media that cover its activities. Open and independent reporting are the principal means of coverage of military operations. Commanders should seek regular opportunities to work with the media. Media coverage of potential future military operations can, to a large extent, shape public perception of the joint force and national security environment. Thus, JFCs and their PAOs continually assess their understanding of the direct and indirect effects of potential actions and signals on perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs, and should formulate and deliver timely and culturally attuned messages. This is true for the US public; the public in allied or partner nations, whose opinions have an indirect effect on unity of effort; and publics in countries where the US conducts operations, as well as in adjoining and other regional countries, whose perceptions of the US can affect the cost and duration of US involvement.

(b) PA plans should include detailed processes, procedures, and supporting requirements to give media the opportunity to meet the personnel actively conducting operations. Commanders may embed media with selected units for certain operations or periods of time whenever feasible. This practice enables media to provide much more in-depth reporting by staying with a particular unit or following an operation to its termination. When embedding media, it is essential that specific ground rules be established and that they are thoroughly understood by both the media and the embedded unit. Planning should include detailed provisions for accommodating and supporting the media when deployed with the joint force and escorted by those not formally trained in PA. The commander's security concerns also are addressed when determining what areas the media are allowed to visit.

(c) Commanders may have media accompany them when they conduct visits to operating units in the field. This concept is desirable to media who cannot embed for long periods of time. Media have the opportunity to meet the personnel conducting the operations and have the perspective from senior leaders.

(d) PA should have the capability to support local and regional media consistent with the JFC's instructions and other guidance. Effective public communication requires both cultural and language capabilities. Media facilitation, media response, and media escort operations should be able to accommodate non-English-speaking reporters, especially those of the HN or regional media outlets. News releases and public information Internet sites should have a local/regional language capability. Media analysis must take into account cultural context to provide nuanced evaluation of PA efforts. Furthermore, families may receive news from non-English sources and offer interviews with joint force members in languages other than English, as appropriate.



## MEDIA ESCORTS

**It is mutually beneficial to the joint force commander and the media to have escorts available to assist the reporters as they move about the operational area. These escorts need not be trained public affairs personnel, but should be knowledgeable members of the visited organizations who have received training in media relations. These individuals support the joint force by serving as facilitators to assist the media. They should neither interfere with the process of reporting nor attempt to inhibit military personnel from talking about their jobs or missions consistent with security and operational restrictions.**

**Various Sources**

### (e) Media Escorts

1. PA personnel should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process. The PA mission includes helping media representatives understand joint force events and occurrences so that media coverage is accurate.

2. Often the media will not be accompanied by PA personnel. US commanders, with the assistance of PA personnel, should identify shortages of escorts and provide training and/or guidance for non-PA personnel who will serve as escorts. Commanders must develop unit plans tailored to local conditions to accommodate reporters operating under this provision and issue guidance about what information and support they will receive. Appendix C, "Guidelines for Release of Information," contains general guidance on support and information to be provided to media representatives.

### (f) Media Credentials and Ground Rules

1. The joint force PAO or the MOC director establishes the criteria to verify credentials of outside journalists. Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists and providing them with information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the operational area. Credentialing media representatives also ensures that, if captured, they are recognized as journalists and treated accordingly under the law of war. Some media will embed with the units for an extended period of time. Embedded reporters will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials or, as appropriate, Geneva Convention cards.

2. Journalists seeking credentials are asked to agree to ground rules tailored to the specific, ongoing joint operation. Commanders should not provide information to non-credentialed, unregistered journalists without guidance from the joint force PAO or the MOC director.

3. The Ccdr should take reasonable steps to ensure all media representatives have proper credentials in a combat zone, although the increasingly open information environment and the large number of journalists who just show up in an



operational area make it very unlikely that all journalists will have the proper credentials. Even though journalists not credentialed by DOD may not necessarily be given the same access as those who have credentials, all journalists should still be considered for media pools and should be strongly encouraged to register with the MOC. During registration, the MOC director should request that non-credentialed journalists abide by the same established media ground rules. Absent unusual circumstances, participating in DOD-hosted training for the media will not be used as a prerequisite for accompanying US forces. The decision to suspend credentials or expel a reporter should only be made with the concurrence of the JFC.

4. Ground rules are developed to protect members of DOD from the release of information that could threaten their security or safety during ongoing operations while facilitating the media's access to timely, relevant information. Ground rules reconcile the desire of the media to cover military operations with DOD security and safety concerns and are in no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, negative, or non-complimentary information. Media ground rules include requirements designed to protect the security, health, and welfare of the media. Media ground rules should also include the process for release of information, media access to the commander, and access to the Internet if not commercially available, and the process for unintentional exposure to classified information.

5. In multinational operations, responsibilities for establishing media ground rules, credentialing media, and, if necessary, expulsion of media, are developed and implemented through appropriate multinational command and staff channels. Media outlets, owned in whole or in part by governments or citizens of non-partner nations, might not receive the same considerations as those working for outlets owned by governments or citizens of friendly nations. However, as in joint operations, non-credentialed journalists may not be given the same access to a combat zone as those who have credentials. They should be encouraged to register at the appropriate MOC.

6. HNs may have different journalist credentialing standards, access rules, special requirements for security escorts, which may impose severe limitations on media activity. One particular area of risk may involve HN denying access to an HN activity in which US forces are participating, but granting access to activities by US-vetted media. The risk can significantly increase if the media representative leverages US access but is not a US citizen and works for a non-US publication. The PA professional must ensure that the access granted by the US is not supporting what may be perceived as foreign information-gathering activities. The joint force PA professional must ensure that the HN and US commander are aware that the media representative has been granted access to US personnel and equipment, and the HN's restrictions will be respected. The PA professional will have to retain close positive control of the media representative at all times. This situation should be written into media guidelines and signed by both the media representative and the PA professional.

**(g) Media Pools**

1. Media pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US military operations. In fact, current communications technology and open media access to most segments of any operational area make media pools more unlikely than in past

operations. However, pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and be disbanded at the earliest opportunity—ideally within 24 to 36 hours of the conclusion of the operation. The arrival of early-access pools does not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

2. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations, on ships, or where space is limited. In such circumstances, PA planning should specify the number and types of media (including internal media) who will form the pool. The military determines the size and composition of the pool, usually establishing categories such as, but not limited to, print, broadcast, and trade media to ensure adequate scope and distribution of coverage. The media representatives should determine who fills the spaces in the pool.

3. The military is responsible for the transportation of pools. To ensure the complete coverage, commanders should provide dedicated transportation if able. Under conditions of open coverage, JFCs should authorize field commanders to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. Commanders should also follow the guidelines in *The Joint Travel Regulations* to ensure standardization of policy and procedures.

4. Consistent with capabilities and the operational conditions, the commander supports PA personnel with facilities to ensure timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool and independent material. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, media, as always, file by any other means available. As with transportation support, commanders employing media pools provide access to communications facilities to transmit news products prepared by the pool. Similar assistance should be provided on a space-available basis for those reporters involved in independent coverage. Commanders should understand the sophisticated communications capabilities available to the media and recognize that early and regular discussions with the media help ensure deconfliction of the electromagnetic spectrum. Figure III-4 outlines some specific considerations for supporting the DOD National Media Pool.

5. Commanders should realize that the formation of a pool places additional support requirements on the organization. In those cases in which commanders decide that media pools are necessary, PA planning should include reimbursement from the media, depending on location and availability of commercial transportation.

#### **d. PA Planning for Specific Operations**

(1) **Overview.** Commanders should ensure PA activities are tailored to support the joint forces across the range of military operations. While the public and the media are interested in the essential facts of any situation, that information is incomplete without an understanding of the background, underlying rationale, and other fundamental elements particular to a certain type of operation. Experience shows that media interest in DSCA, FHA, managing the consequences of incidents, peace operations (PO), and similar operations often peaks early, then diminishes gradually. PA planning should take this into account.

## Department of Defense National Media Pool Support

- Frequent, comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for pool personnel.
- Access to areas of ongoing combat or exercise operations. The personal safety of the news media is not a reason for excluding them. The goal is to treat the news media as noncombatants accompanying forces, allowing them to accompany the organizations in the conduct of their missions.
- Reasonable access to key command and staff personnel.
- An officer from the supported command in the grade of O-5 or O-6 to coordinate news media pool requirements.
- Itinerary planning that will enable news media pool members to disperse throughout the operational area.
- Cooperation from all forces participating in the operation or exercise on a not-to-interfere basis.
- Supported command planning for logistic support for pool and escort personnel out of existing contingency or exercise funds. Required support may include, but may not be limited to:
  - Airlift from the continental US to the operational area or exercise.
  - Theater ground, sea, and air transportation to allow pool coverage of operations.
  - Messing and billeting on a reimbursable basis.
  - Issuance of equipment considered appropriate to the situation (helmets, canteens, flak vests, and cold weather clothing).
  - Access to communications facilities to file stories on a priority basis.

**Figure III-4. Department of Defense National Media Pool Support**

Commanders and their PA personnel should be prepared to discuss, among other topics, organizational structure, strategy, objectives, tactics, training, logistics, intelligence, and troop support issues. Explaining the details of such areas reinforces the media and public awareness of how the military functions within the context of the stated political goals.

(2) **FHA.** FHA operations are DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

(a) These missions involve a delicate balance of political and military objectives. FHA missions include operational and informational coordination with HN, other USG departments and agencies, and NGO relief organizations. Intense media and public interest in FHA operations may require more than usual PA capabilities. The potential for involvement of multiple USG departments and agencies and IGOs and often the representatives of other involved nations can complicate the coordination required to get approval for the release of information and imagery. JFCs and their PA staffs should exercise care so that their attempts to demonstrate DOD responsiveness, concern, and assistance do not preempt the authority of the political leadership or HN or appear to be taking credit for successes at the expense of other

contributing parties. PA planners can emphasize the US support role to HN, local government, and other organizations efforts. PA planning can also focus on unique capabilities of US forces that are required in the effort and augment primary efforts of other organizations.

(b) If a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is established to coordinate relief efforts, PA will work through the CMOC to coordinate activities. In the absence of a CMOC, PA activities will be coordinated through the JTF staff and with other USG departments and agencies involved via the country team.

*See JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for additional guidance.*

(3) **Counterdrug Operations.** There are a number of specific actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking that require special attention during planning. Most significantly, there are legal and law enforcement aspects of counterdrug operations that are extremely sensitive and generate additional concerns in the release of information to the public. Commanders and PA planners must consider the intended and unintended effects of communication when deciding how and when to release information regarding counterdrug operations. The release of information could impact the safety of military personnel, civilian law enforcement officials, and other participants pending judicial cases and the security of intelligence systems and sources. Additionally, DOD most commonly operates in a supporting role as part of an interagency effort; close coordination with agency PA counterparts is critical to ensure a consistent whole-of-government PA message. PA planning should account for the appropriate release of information to the public as well as OPSEC measures.

*See JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, for additional guidance.*

(4) **Combating Terrorism.** Terrorist threats and acts occur in media-intense environments. That, in turn, may make it impossible to prevent coverage that could reveal tactics, techniques, and procedures used in combating terrorism. That means PA planners have to anticipate and make accommodations for the probability of live and near live direct media coverage and strive to provide as much information to the public about DOD activities as possible, consistent with OPSEC and information security. In making information available to the media, PA personnel must balance the legitimate information needs of the public against the value of the information to terrorists. Principal PA objectives of an antiterrorism plan should be to ensure accurate information is provided to the public (including media) and to communicate a calm, measured, and reasoned reaction to the ongoing event. ASD(PA) is the single point of contact for all PA aspects of US military antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations.

*For additional guidance on combating terrorism, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.*

### (5) **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)**

(a) NEOs are conducted to assist DOS in evacuating civilians and noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected HN citizens, and third-country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign HN to an appropriate safe haven.

(b) The JTF PAO, working with embassy personnel, should plan and coordinate releases concerning the NEO and ensure that the COM or the designated representative has approved all PA announcements. Based on the rapid development of this type of operation, PAOs need to be prepared to conduct media operations in any kind of environment, including afloat (e.g., Lebanon NEO in July 2006).

*See JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, for additional guidance.*

(6) **PO.** PO is a broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. A primary PA concern during PO is that the parties to a dispute may release information that is slanted to support their position or gain advantage over another party, which may prolong conflict. These activities may grow into an orchestrated media operation, making it difficult for PA personnel to set the record straight. PA can reduce the level of speculation in the news by providing the media with releasable information on a timely basis.

*See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, for additional guidance.*

#### **(7) Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and CA**

(a) CMO encompass the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. The JFC is responsible for CMO in a joint operation. All CA operations support CMO. By their nature, their missions are normally positive and the results are of interest to the local populace and their media representatives. PA personnel and CA assist in the dissemination of information to local populations. PA personnel have the responsibility to interact with the local media and can assist CA with passing information to the appropriate audiences through those media outlets. Operational risk assessment should be a continuous process to maintain OPSEC and physical security for the CMO personnel and populations assisted, particularly as activities are publicized.

(b) PA elements also have the responsibility, through command information outlets, to keep military elements informed of the displaced civilian situation, methods and procedures for their orderly withdrawal from the operational area, and any other information on this issue deemed appropriate by the JFC.

(c) Publicity regarding CMO is an effective way to demonstrate goodwill by the USG and the US Armed Forces to local populations and to the international community. However, coordination is required to ensure information released about CMO or CA operations by PA does not negatively impact operations. For example, NGOs cooperating with CA to deliver humanitarian assistance may have unique public relations interests. Some NGOs may prefer to publicize work themselves to reach specific donors before the military. Others may shun publicity depicting NGO cooperation with the military to maintain

neutrality with hostile factions. When working with CA, the PAO must be sensitive to multiple interests to maintain the cooperative spirit of CMO. Coordination is primarily established through the CMOC, although normal staff coordination takes place through other agencies, such as the IO cell, on a regular basis. See JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, for additional guidance.

**(8) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)**

(a) CWMD and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management (CBRN CM) are missions that may cross AOR boundaries, requiring an integrated and synchronized effort, and requiring numerous interagency and multinational partners for effective mission accomplishment. DOD will often be acting in support of another lead agency, or even supporting a multinational effort.

(b) PA should work with USG departments and agencies and NGOs to quickly and effectively communicate risk and response information to the public to avoid confusion and hysteria.

(c) The release of information on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) may require non-DOD lines of communications and authority such as DOS and other diplomatic points of contact.

(d) Because of their multimedia capabilities, PA assets can often be used to support CWMD and CBRN CM missions. If appropriately tasked, units such as COMCAM can provide valuable support for the documentation of WMD sites and CWMD activities.

*For additional information, see JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management; JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; and classified CJCSM 5225.01, Classification Guide for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Information.*

**(9) Personnel Recovery (PR).** PR is focused on using military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. DOD personnel (US military, DOD civilians, DOD contractors) may become isolated during combat or non-combat operations. PR has five execution tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The role of PA is extremely important to the support and reintegrate tasks, and may need to be coordinated within DOD, USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, and civilian contracting companies. PA can affect the treatment of isolated personnel and their potential recovery. PA planning should include relevant stakeholders in determining the content and amount of information which is appropriate to release to the public. Released information must be balanced between public disclosure of information and protection of the isolated person. The ASD(PA) provides overarching guidance for all PA aspects of PR messages, but may delegate that responsibility to the relevant CCMD or Service PAO.

*For additional guidance and information on PR, see JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.*



#### 4. Execution

a. **Organization.** The size and organization of a joint force PA staff varies to accommodate mission requirements.

b. **PA Management Activities.** Regardless of how the PA staff is organized, it will:

- (1) Provide PA counsel and support to the commander.
- (2) Participate in operation analysis, planning, execution, and assessment.
- (3) Participate in all applicable cross-functional staff organizations (e.g., boards, centers, cells).
- (4) Scan the information environment continuously, collaborating with other staff.
- (5) Research, develop, and coordinate communication guidance and plans.
- (6) Prepare PA annexes and support other annex development, as required.
- (7) Execute and assess communication actions.
- (8) Make recommendations on future PA priorities, near and long term.
- (9) Coordinate PA activities with other USG departments and agencies, HN, and NGOs, as appropriate.
- (10) Identify intelligence requirements to support PA planning and assessment.
- (11) Identify VI and imagery requirements.
- (12) Establish and manage a MOC, as appropriate.
- (13) Monitor/assess public opinion, media coverage, and sentiment analysis.
- (14) Modify communication guidance and plans based on assessments.
- (15) Develop and disseminate communication products.
- (16) Provide media training to members of the joint force appropriate for each individual's level of interaction with the news media.
- (17) Disseminate timely, accurate information about military activities.
- (18) Respond to media and public inquiries.
- (19) Educate JFCs and staffs on the role of information and PA in operations.
- (20) Develop programs that support community engagement in the operational area.

## 5. Assessment

a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. It occurs at all levels during all military operations. Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force adjust operations to ensure objectives are achieved and the military end state is attained. The primary emphasis of the PA assessment is to identify, measure, and evaluate implications within the OE that the commander does not control, but can influence through coherent and comprehensive CCS established by early integration in the planning process.

b. Assessment begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, or achieving results. Baselines for what is going to be measured are established at this point.

(1) Long-term PA objectives should support OPLAN or campaign objectives. PA planners identify how PA, within its construct and mechanisms, can contribute toward achieving objectives. Assessment of objective progress should include the same MOE and measures of performance (MOP). Impact indicators should be established for each MOE and MOP. This is accomplished by being part of the joint planning process from the beginning and working with the assessment planners.

(2) This initial set of criteria becomes the basis for future assessment.

c. Media analysis or assessment of tactical PA products and activities using various open sources, in combination with classified information collection sources, can provide updates to the information environment assessment. Various assessment methods, including content analysis, coding, and other such methods can be used to provide updates to the commander and planners. During execution, assessments should contribute to adjustments to both current operations and future planning.



## CHAPTER IV

### JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS DURING OPERATIONS IN THE HOMELAND

*“The failure to execute a comprehensive ‘whole of Government’ crisis communications plan for an incident of this magnitude negatively impacted the ability to manage information, direct messaging, and conduct effective crisis communications throughout the response organization.”*

**The Federal Response to Deepwater Horizon: Lessons Learned, December 2011**

#### 1. Overview

a. PA during operations conducted in the homeland is somewhat different than the planning and execution of operations conducted during joint operations as discussed in Chapter III, “Public Affairs in Joint Operations.”

b. Per Presidential Policy Directive-8, *National Preparedness*, DOD PA operates in accordance with guidance on incident communications emergency policy and procedures found in the National Response Framework (NRF). This publication provides detailed guidance to all federal incident communicators during a federal response to an event. It establishes mechanisms to prepare and deliver coordinated and sustained messages, and provides for prompt federal acknowledgement of an incident and communication of emergency information to the public. The incident communications emergency policy and procedures is comprised of two annexes contained in the NRF:

(1) **PA Support Annex.** Describes the interagency policies and procedures for incident communications with the public.

(2) **Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15—External Affairs Annex with Standing Operating Procedures.** Outlines the functions, resources, and capabilities for external affairs including PA.

c. Under the NRF, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the coordinating agency for federal public communications and is responsible for activation of ESF #15. DOD typically acts as a supporting agency.

d. Federal assistance, including assistance from DOD, can be provided to state, territorial, District of Columbia, tribal, and local jurisdictions, and to other USG departments and agencies, in a number of different ways through various mechanisms and authorities. Often, federal assistance does not require coordination by DHS and can be provided without a Presidential major disaster or emergency declaration. The National Incident Management System provides the template for incident management regardless of size, scope, or cause of the incident. It includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multiagency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

e. DOD also assists local authorities under immediate response authorities and/or mutual aid agreements. This type of response can quickly move from a localized incident to a larger national response.

*For further information on operations in the homeland, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.*

### 2. Requirements

a. **Personnel.** PA and VI personnel requirements for operations in the homeland vary based on the situation. There are existing joint OPLANs, contingency plans, and joint manning documents that specify the personnel requirements for certain potential operations. Additionally, the CJCS issues a standing DSCA EXORD annually that allows force providers to consider potential requirements. It allows the CCDR to place needed personnel in a prepare-to-deploy order status. Adequate PA personnel must be staffed early enough to be effective.

b. **Facilities.** Normally, PA activities during operations in the homeland are conducted in fixed buildings (hotels, armories, office buildings, etc.). In many situations, commercial telephone and Internet connections (wired, wireless, and cellular) will be available. In the case of state funerals or other planned operations, the facilities may be pre-designated and wired to support PA. Personnel supporting PA activities will generally use commercial lodging and local restaurants.

c. **Equipment.** When required, PA and VI personnel, who deploy in support of operations in the homeland, should have a cellular phone and a laptop computer with wireless access. PA personnel with access to portable broadcast quality VI transmission systems should be prepared to deploy with and support operations with those systems. PA and VI personnel should deploy with digital cameras and have still and motion imagery editing and data transfer software on their laptops. Personnel will not always have access to the “.mil” domain during operations in the homeland and may have to rely on commercial or public systems for communication. Personnel should deploy with Government Emergency Telecommunications Service and Wireless Priority Service cards, if possible.

d. **Training.** All PA and VI personnel ordered to deploy in support of operations in the homeland should have working knowledge of the NRF as it pertains to PA. Online Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training courses are available at <http://training.fema.gov>.

### 3. Planning

a. PA planning for operations in the homeland essentially follows the same phases as other joint operations. PA planning for DSCA is tailored to support the ESF #15 requirement to provide accurate, coordinated, timely, and accessible information. It is critical that PA and VI activities are planned, coordinated, and integrated across government and private organizations.

b. PA planners ensure that plans and associated annexes delineate responsibilities, processes, and logistics as appropriate in support of ESF #15, as follows:

(1) Coordinate messages with federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments.

(2) Support the joint information center (JIC).

(3) Gather information on the incident.

(4) Provide incident-related information and VI through the media and other sources in accessible formats and multiple languages (as necessary) to individuals, households, businesses, and industries directly or indirectly affected by the incident.

(5) Monitor news coverage to ensure that accurate information is disseminated.

(6) Handle appropriate special projects such as news conferences and press operations for incident area tours by government officials and other dignitaries.

(7) Provide basic services, such as communications and supplies, to assist the news media in disseminating information to the public.

#### **4. Execution**

a. Domestic situations that require a military response are generally short-or-no notice events. Specific DOD PA responsibilities are outlined in various CCMD plans and standing PAG. The EXORD or fragmentary order for the incident will provide the PA posture and media engagement policy. Incident-specific guidance will be developed by the primary agency in coordination with participating agencies.

b. Operations conducted in the homeland may be either homeland defense or DSCA operations and will be planned and executed accordingly. DOD PA support evolves based on the planning for the specific operation.

c. Initial DOD PA involvement in DSCA will often be through the defense coordinating officer (DCO) assigned to the DHS/FEMA region involved and the defense coordinating element (DCE), if established. The DCO and the DCE review and forward requests for military support, then forward mission assignments to military organizations through DOD-designated channels, and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated ESFs.

(1) PA personnel assess the situation for the DCO, DCE, and CCMD PA staff. They also provide initial interface with other deployed federal public information officers, and serve as the DOD liaison to the media.

(2) If the DOD response expands, PA personnel deploy with the operational command post or joint force lead element to coordinate DOD PA activities and involvement in the incident.

(3) Other units tasked to deploy in support of domestic operations should also include a PA element in their headquarters staff. This PA element should be prepared to conduct media engagement to show how the unit is supporting the federal response.

(4) Other departments and agencies may submit requests for PA, COMCAM, and/or VI support.

d. **JIC.** A substantial portion of the PA effort will support the media to facilitate affected populations' access to information. A JIC may be established to coordinate the release of emergency and incident information (see Figure IV-1). Figure IV-1 represents the organization of a JIC under the ESF #15 construct and is implemented at the higher levels of a response, such as the joint or area field office. When supporting the JIC at the local, unified, or incident command post level, refer to the National Response Team JIC manual.

(1) The JIC should be located close to the best sources of information about the situation, such as an incident command post or emergency operations center. Note that DOD and other agencies will often have a separate staff (to include a MOC) performing PA duties and functions on behalf of their own agency. In the absence of a JIC, DOD PA will still coordinate with other agencies and the primary agency.

(2) When a JIC is established, the responsible military commander ensures that adequate PA personnel are assigned when DOD forces deploy. However, the bulk of DOD PA personnel supporting the incident will be assigned to the JIC.

(3) A JIC coordinates timely and accurate information from multiple agencies and organizations for release to the public and other stakeholders. Under the Incident Command System, the public information officer is one of the key staff supporting the command structure. The JIC has three primary responsibilities:


(a) Gather incident data.

(b) Analyze public perceptions of the response.

(c) Inform the public and serve as the source of accurate and comprehensive information about the incident and the response to a specific set of audiences.

(4) DOD PA releases its own information and VI and conducts media operations, but the products should be coordinated with either the primary agency or the JIC to ensure consistent messages and avoid the release of sensitive information. While operations in the homeland are different than overseas operations, OPSEC and information security issues should still be considered before information is released.

e. During DSCA operations, CCMD PA personnel monitor the National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) which is used for transmission and exchange of critical and timely (e.g., "breaking") incident information among federal and affected state, local, and tribal authorities. It is a key source of emerging information for PA activities and communications synchronization.



**Figure IV-1. Notional Joint Information Center Organizational Chart**

(1) If the incident is critical, DHS PA may continuously monitor the NICCL for updates from departments and agencies. The DHS PA staff will maintain a summary of key NICCL communications and interagency coordination actions to inform DOD and other agencies’ PA activities.

(2) DOD and CCMD PAO will receive DHS incident PAG and daily summaries via the NICCL when ESF #15 is activated.

(3) During sustained incident management activity, the NICCL will be used for daily or other incident communications coordination calls. The CCMD PAO will maintain and distribute NICCL information to subordinate PA participants.

(4) There are more than 80 federal interagency partners, 50 states, five territories, the District of Columbia, 562 tribal entities, and thousands of local governments that may be involved in operations in the homeland. The multiplicity of partners and jurisdictions makes PA coordination complex. The NICCL and state incident communication coordination lines can help PA manage this complexity.

f. **DOD PAG.** The ASD(PA) may develop PAG for operations in the homeland that is consistent with other operations and DHS PAG, but also includes information from non-DOD participants. Additionally, while DOD PAG does not apply to other agencies, it should

## **NOTIONAL DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES RESPONSE**

When a no-notice incident occurs, the local jurisdiction handles the initial response, including informing the public, and may establish a joint information center (JIC) to integrate the public communications efforts of local agencies. If the Department of Defense (DOD) is involved at this point, a military public affairs officer (PAO) should participate in the local JIC.

When a Federal response is required, usually the first integrated public affairs (PA) action is for the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) call. During this call, the initial integrated public affairs guidance (PAG) is crafted where control (lead agency for public communications effort), coordination (how supporting agencies will coordinate public communication), and communication (key messages) are addressed. The supported combatant commander's PAO and Office of the Secretary of Defense PAO should be participants in the call. The combatant command promulgates resulting guidance to responding DOD forces.

As the event evolves, emergency support function #15 and a JIC for federal responders is established. This JIC may be integrated with the local JIC or become a stand-alone center. All participating Federal agencies provide representatives to this JIC to represent their agency and serve as the JIC staff. The combatant command PAO recommends PA personnel for the JIC. Personnel assigned to the JIC will perform tasks assigned by the JIC manager.

As military forces arrive at the incident, the joint task force (or similar headquarters element) will establish a PA function primarily to perform significant media support operations. Based upon the PAG, DOD PA personnel will facilitate media access and coverage of the DOD activities. DOD PA efforts will be coordinated with other agencies through subsequent NICCL calls and through the JIC.

The JIC will usually produce products dealing with the overall federal response and coordinate and conduct joint press conferences at or near the incident site. DOD efforts at the incident will be coordinated with the JIC so that federal communication efforts are consistent and mutually supportive. DOD will often participate in or provide subject matter expert support to joint media events.

**Note:** The term "joint" when used in JIC, refers to "multi-agency."

**SOURCE:** US Northern Command Joint Public Affairs Support Element

be coordinated with, and distributed to, all participating organizations. The PAO may produce a PA plan when PAG is not appropriate or feasible.

g. **Command Information.** Based on the ubiquitous nature of the media and multiple channels of communication, command information requirements are not significant in operations in the homeland. However, in extended operations in the homeland, it may take on a larger role.

## 5. Assessment

As with all military operations, assessment of public communication activities during operations in the homeland informs follow-on planning and future operations. How the USG responds to domestic situations will be of interest to other countries and covered by foreign media. PAOs and PA staffs analyze international coverage of DOD activities to assess their reporting as well.

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## CHAPTER V VISUAL INFORMATION

### 1. Overview

a. VI is visual media with or without sound and is a visual subset of military information used to support communication synchronization, command information, community engagement, public diplomacy, operational planning, decision making, and training. VI provides legal and historical documentation of military operations and events for official records. Generally, VI includes still and motion photography, audio and video recording, graphic arts, and other visual presentations. Visual information record identification numbers (VIRINs) uniquely identify each VI asset in DOD. VI comes from two sources: directed and derivative.

b. Directed sources are specialized units, specially trained personnel, and deployable force packages manned by a variety of communication personnel who are organized, trained, and equipped by their supporting military component to collect and produce a variety of official media products for the supported JFC. Specialized communication personnel staffing the directed sources of VI include, but are not limited to, mass communication specialists, combat broadcasters, photojournalists, and combat documentation/production specialists. For more information, see paragraph 2, “Sources.”

c. Derivative sources for VI include sensors on manned, unmanned, and remotely piloted platforms that collect imagery. These include imagery obtained and processed from intelligence collection platforms, weapons system video (WSV), and optical systems. Other derivative sources of VI are explained in paragraph 2, “Sources.”

d. Unlike other forms of public information, such as news stories, press releases, or press conferences, VI documents events as they occur and records military operations, exercises, and activities. VI provides DOD records, which convey an unfiltered view to key audiences. VI enhances US military information activities with visual context to support joint PA themes and messages. VI provides information for planning, helps inform the public, sustains public support, and improves morale. JFCs and PAOs should create, process, transmit, and release VI consistent with OPSEC and foreign disclosure, to support response to the commander’s critical information requirements.

e. Compelling imagery can sometimes transcend cultural and language barriers. People are more likely to remember and connect with messages supported with high-quality images. Civilian media often promulgate stories that, accompanied by compelling visual content, can amplify and extend joint themes through traditional and social media channels.

f. VI is suitable for missions outside of PA, such as, DSPD, IO, operation planning, decision making, legal actions, training, and DOD business functions. VI products created for non-PA missions can potentially be used to support PA objectives. Multi-use examples of VI include documenting domestic disasters to assist FEMA decision-making processes; evidence of war crimes; preserving evidence concerning damage claims against the USG; providing training aids that depict battlefield conditions; depicting the effects of weapon

systems; documenting forensic evidence at incident sites (such as improvised explosive device detonations); and documenting the environmental impact of military operations. Many of these VI products created for non-PA missions can potentially be repurposed to support PA objectives, but the PAO must be aware of availability. Regardless of the mission and conditions under which VI is created, it becomes an official DOD record and may be releasable under the Freedom of Information Act, requests for evidence in litigation, or other sources of legal authority. Accordingly, all VI should be retained and should be labeled with complete captions and metadata to accurately describe the content in accordance with the DOD Captioning Style Guide.

g. To ensure DOD VI records are accurate, official DOD imagery will not be altered except for corrections, modifications, and enhancements specified in DODI 5040.02, *Visual Information (VI)*, Enclosure 10. The integrity of DOD imagery must be rigorously guarded.

### 2. Sources

a. JFCs and PAOs should plan for and employ the various VI platforms to support joint communication objectives. VI from different sources will have different image quality, views (such as hand-held versus overhead), timeliness, and classification at the source. Communicating specific VI requirements, to include the standards (purpose, timeliness, file size, etc.) and conditions under which the forces will operate facilitates the assignment of the correct capabilities necessary to accomplish the mission.

b. **Directed Sources.** In general, directed sources of VI produce VI designed as stand-alone communication packages, such as video news releases, documentation reports, and collections of still photos to tell complete stories. Directed sources plan for, acquire, and produce tailored VI to support JFC and PAO communication objectives, themes, and messages. The primary directed sources of VI are COMCAM, VI activities, PA activities (mobile and organic), and broadcasting activities. An example of how a directed source of VI provided an image that was published on the front page of newspapers around the world can be found in Figure V-1.

(1) COMCAM is a specially trained expeditionary force from Service-designated COMCAM units capable of providing high-quality directed VI during military operations. Service COMCAM units maintain quick-response teams able to embed and operate with tactical units in austere conditions for up to 30 days. The JFC will normally integrate COMCAM into operations. Each Service may also provide unique COMCAM acquisition capabilities such as underwater, aerial, and airborne operations. Deployed COMCAM forces are normally called upon (via RFFs and the global force management process) to provide VI support for military operations, operation planning, decision making, legal activities, training, and DOD business operations, such as described in paragraph 1.a.

*More information is available in ATP 3-55.12/MCRP 3-33.7A/NTTP 3-61.2/AFTTP 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera (COMCAM) Operations.*

Public Affairs Produced Visual Information

Sept. 22, 2014. US military forces and five partner nations undertook military action against ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] terrorists in Syria. The US launched 47 Tomahawk land attack missiles from the USS Arleigh Burke and USS Philippine Sea, which were operating from international waters in the Red Sea and North Arabian Gulf.

MC2 Carlos M. Vazquez II, of Navy Public Affairs Support Element West deployed aboard Arleigh Burke, photographed the ship launching several cruise missiles and the resulting image was published on the front pages of newspapers around the world.



Figure V-1. Public Affairs Produced Visual Information

(2) VI activities are functional elements whose principal responsibility is to provide VI. VI activities are authorized by the component central VI management office and identified by a unique defense VI activity number.

(3) PA activities may be mobile or stationary with varying organic VI-producing capabilities for still, motion, and graphic production designated for use in public and internal information. PA activities may not be used for any type of political purpose or MISO.

(4) Broadcasting activities consist of AFRTS outlets and deployable packages optimized to support the requirement to inform the internal audiences through radio and TV services. AFRTS outlets may not be used for any type of political purpose or MISO and may not produce or broadcast programming to audiences other than internal DOD audiences. See Appendix D “Defense Media Activity,” for further information.

c. An example of how a derivative source of VI provided an image that was released to the media to show the effects of a Tomahawk missile strike can be found in Figure V-2.

## Intelligence Imagery to Visual Information

Sept. 22, 2014. US military forces and partner nations, including Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, undertook military action against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorists in Syria. A mix of fighters, bombers, remotely piloted aircraft and Tomahawk land attack missiles conducted 14 strikes against ISIL targets. Battle damage assessment from geospatial imagery was released to the media to show the effects of the missile strike.



Figure V-2. Intelligence Imagery to Visual Information

(1) **Intelligence Collection Platforms and WSV.** Military operations regularly employ manned and unmanned information collection assets to facilitate command and control, gather intelligence, and to provide security for friendly forces. In addition, some aerial weapon systems include video cameras designed to record the effects of munitions fired from aircraft. In general, processed geospatial products and WSV unique imagery is routed through the air operations center and is classified due to embedded avionics data and other content that could reveal tactics, sources, and methods. Collected imagery is not considered VI by policy until the commander decides to release specific imagery to the public. It then becomes an official VI record and must be assigned a VIRIN and handled in accordance with DODI 5040.02, *Visual Information (VI)*. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance imagery has often proven beneficial to the commander's public information objectives, but requires direct coordination with the J-2 and J-3 to ensure classified handling procedures are followed.

(2) Camera systems integrated into land- and ship-based military equipment, security cameras, and helmet cameras worn by infantry or other non-communications personnel.

(3) Imagery seized, captured, or confiscated by DOD personnel during or after military operations. Captured enemy imagery can be a useful source of information once it has been exploited and declassified by the J-2.

(4) Imagery acquired by the DOD through contract, donation, or transfer. In joint and multinational operations, PAOs may encounter imagery created by DOD or

multinational contract photographers, or even by DOD personnel with privately owned cameras. In these instances, the PAO establishes unlimited rights prior to using such imagery to protect the legal and financial rights of the USG.

### 3. Planning

a. Due to the limited number of directed VI forces available at any given time, it is critical the required VI-producing capabilities and specific VI requirements are identified during the deliberate planning process in the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. Doing so streamlines deployment planning, facilitates movement during plan execution, and ensures efficient use of limited resources. Well-documented requirements for VI shape the RFF, based on capabilities needed to provide the specified kinds of VI requested. For example, joint PA requirements to produce video news releases or photos to support media operations or social media interaction may call for an Army PA detachment or mobile PA detachment. The need for hand-held still and motion images of ground combat patrols, afloat operations, or air crew activities may call for a COMCAM unit type code. Accurate requests for deployable PA and COMCAM forces should be based on tactical, operational, and strategic requirements and coordinated to leverage the directed and derivative VI sources assigned.

b. **Planning Topics.** Planning for the deployment and use of directed VI capabilities in support of PA in joint operations using JOPP should, at a minimum, address the following topics: JFC VI requirements, coordination, management, release, transmission, and archiving.

c. **JFC VI Requirements.** Defining requirements for VI products is the most important aspect of the planning process. Clearly defining requirements early in the planning process ensures the right capabilities are included in all phases of the operation. There are two parts to the VI requirements equation, the VI-producing forces and the type of images required.

(1) **VI-producing forces.** Whenever possible, requirements for VI-producing capabilities should be established in deliberate plans by unit type code using time-phased force and deployment data. Realistic and well-articulated requirements help ensure the right VI-producing forces are in place to produce, acquire, and distribute products during joint operations. The conditions under which the forces operate are critical in determining the correct VI forces. If the tasking supports maritime salvage operations that requires underwater photography, subsurface operations should be listed. Likewise, if hand-held aerial photography will be required, aircrew-qualified VI forces should be requested. If the VI forces are expected to operate with ground combat troops in a hostile or uncertain environment and are required to bring weapons and any personal tactical equipment, the RFF should include this information to ensure COMCAM forces are the correct forces to employ.

(2) **Imagery.** Identify imagery needed to support messages outlined in the CCS by asking the following questions:

(a) What are the operational mission, the commander's intent, and the commander's critical information requirements?



### VISUAL INFORMATION PROFESSIONAL IDENTIFIER

The VISION ID [visual information professional identifier] is used as a component of the visual information record identification number. The VISION ID is assigned to each visual information (VI) professional; to obtain a VISION ID the photographer must register via the VI professional website.

(b) What are the key themes and messages for the operation/exercise?

(c) What types of images can best communicate those messages visually? How will the images be used?

(d) What visual content is most important for the enduring significance of the event? For example, an overseas humanitarian relief operation key theme might be, “The US is a faithful partner during difficult times.” Images supporting that theme might show US and HN military forces working together to provide relief to foreign nationals impacted by natural disaster. Supporting imagery might include US aircraft or other transport in the background while combined forces work to provide relief.

(3) The following are examples of imagery generated to match command themes and messages using the questions listed above:

(a) Imagery depicting more than one Service or government organization working together.

(b) US military interacting with other agencies or allied militaries, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations forces, members of the international community, or NGOs.

(c) Deployment of military personnel and equipment in support of the operation.

(d) US military engineer activity.

(e) US military deliveries of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief supplies.

(f) US military medical teams in action.

d. **Coordination.** Proactive coordination between the joint force and the PA supporting component helps identify VI requirements and expedite the assignment of optimum capabilities. Coordination with the other joint force IRCs helps deconflict VI requirements and make efficient use of VI capabilities. Early coordination with the Joint Combat Camera Center (JCCC) and the Joint COMCAM Program Manager enables timely reception, staging, and onward movement of personnel who produce VI, as well as, VI itself.

(1) Coordination with multinational partners presents unique VI production challenges. The JCCC liaison officer (LNO) assigned to the joint force can help coordinate VI production and sharing with multinational partners. It is important to establish visual information professional identifiers (VISION IDs) for use by foreign and contractor assets based on DOD guidelines because they are used to create VIRINs for their assets. Before PAOs release VI produced by foreign nationals or contract personnel, and before the DIMOC or Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) can acquire and distribute such imagery, the joint force must obtain legal documentation stating that the USG has unlimited rights to the imagery.

(2) Deploying COMCAM forces, until placed under the operational or tactical control of the JFC, belong to their parent Service and will visually document the activities of their parent Service. However, once operational or tactical control is transferred to the JFC, the COMCAM priority is fulfilling JFC requirements. For this reason, the JFC should prioritize Service and joint PA imagery requirements for COMCAM throughout all phases of the operation. For joint PA purposes, planning should include in-theater removal of classified content (via the J-2) and delegation of in-theater release authority to PA for unclassified COMCAM products to expedite release to the media.

(3) Coordinate bandwidth requirements and equipment with the joint network operations control center (JNCC) to support timely transmission of imagery. DIMOC can accept classified, unreleased, and unreviewed imagery. JCCC advises senders on the best transmission means. To provide consistently high-quality VI, PA planners should include metrics and assessments to DIMOC. Assessments should include feedback from each event, to include lessons learned (issues and best practices), as well as, any available after action reports.

e. **Management.** CCMD planners use the Global Force Management tool to request COMCAM personnel. A COMCAM imagery management or liaison team may be assigned to help identify imagery requirements and expedite the release of imagery to the public, after they have been cleared by PA. If assigned, the COMCAM headquarters imagery management team coordinates internal imagery requirements and imagery requests by PA. During joint operations, PA leaders should provide deployed directed-imagery forces with regular situation updates, revised shooting assignments based on emerging requirements, and feedback on the VI content produced in the AOR. The JFC's PA leaders should hold the assigned directed VI capabilities responsible for creating high-quality VI content that fully supports plans, the commander's themes and messages, the PAG, and emerging information requirements as the operation unfolds.

f. **Release Authority.** The JFC has ultimate approval authority to release VI, but annex F (Public Affairs) and the PAG should include the designated release authority for imagery produced during the operation. The PAO is most often the designated release authority. Release authorities conduct a thorough review of imagery prior to public release. The PAO release authority should coordinate as many details as possible (such as pre-staging caption information) prior to the release of imagery. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance video and WSV should also be factored into the overall release plan. Making intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and WSV products available to inform the public is often




required and the responsible element should be assigned. For more information on handling of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and WSV, see paragraph 6, “Acquisition, Declassification/Sanitization, and Transferring Derivative Imagery.” Once imagery is reviewed and approved for release, joint-interest imagery will be expeditiously forwarded to the DIMOC via DVIDS or other suitable transmission means for life-cycle management as a shared DOD resource within 24 hours from when the imagery was acquired. DIMOC can receive both released and unreleased imagery classified up to the Secret level. However, DIMOC is not responsible for clearing imagery for public release.

g. **Transmission.** The following considerations should be addressed for efficient movement of imagery:

(1) PA planners should coordinate with unit or joint force communications and information technology leadership, communication technicians, and the JNCC to assist in establishing imagery transmission requirements. Planners need to answer these important questions: where will the imagery be sent and to whom; what is the deadline for distribution; what is the bandwidth priority level; and are there any known special requirements (e.g., secure/encrypted transmission)? The assigned DIMOC LNO can assist in answering these questions via telephone, e-mail, or the Web ([www.defenseimagery.mil](http://www.defenseimagery.mil)). DIMOC can accept classified, unreleased, and unreviewed imagery. JNCC advises senders on the best transmission means.


(2) PA planners should clearly state the transmission capability requirements for all directed VI capability RFFs. In general, all cleared and released VI products created in joint operations should be transmitted via DVIDS to DIMOC for centralized content management and distribution. PA planners may contact DVIDS to arrange satellite time for live video transmission requirements and periodic movement of communication products to inform the public from the AOR to the hub.

h. **Dissemination.** In addition to operation-unique requirements, including targeted marketing of joint force PA products to media outlets, JFCs and PAOs should clearly articulate the standing DOD requirement for timely dissemination of VI created during joint operations to support the widest possible requirements for new imagery. DOD and USG personnel at every echelon rely on centrally available VI products to support their unique mission needs. Since it is impractical and cost-prohibitive to develop separate VI production and distribution capabilities for every organization and echelon that uses imagery, DOD employs an enterprise VI architecture of transfer and content management activities to meet the widest number of imagery requirements, as illustrated in Figure V-3. Imagery transfer occurs between VI operators and the DIMOC via DVIDS or other suitable transmission means. DIMOC oversees the content management of imagery, including storage, search and retrieval, and dissemination. DIMOC is the official VI records center for DOD, and provides VI records to the National Archives on behalf of all DOD components.



**Figure V-3. Department of Defense Visual Information Enterprise Architecture**

i. **VI Template.** The use of a template similar to Figure V-4 will assist in production of VI. The template provides specific requirements, release authority, transmission means, assets, and assessment. Points of contact also can be included and used as feedback avenues for possible improvements.



**Figure V-4. Visual Information Planning Template Example**

j. **VI Planning and SME Support.** The DIMOC maximizes the effectiveness of VI as a key information resource. The DIMOC coordinates directly with the CCMDs, the Joint

Staff, and the Services for the acquisition, creation, transmission, replication, distribution, storage, and preservation of VI created during military operations. To facilitate the timely and accurate acquisition and distribution of imagery to meet DOD requirements, the DIMOC also plans for, and tracks, deployed forces directed to produce VI. The DIMOC provides SME assistance to PA and other planners for employment of various VI acquisition capabilities. The DIMOC operates in a secure facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, and actively coordinates with PA and military forces up to the Secret level. Assistance to the joint planning and execution community includes actions to:

- (1) Write VI-related requirements into joint OPLANs and strategic guidance.
- (2) Coordinate strategic imagery requirements within the APEX system.
- (3) Locate and coordinate with JFC resources and VI-producing forces.
- (4) VI transmission recommendations.
- (5) Assign VISION IDs.
- (6) Acquire/receive VI and maintain VI for historical records.
- (7) Distribute VI to authorized defense and public activities.
- (8) Coordinate with the Joint COMCAM Program Manager to provide additional support, including RFF, templates, and coordinating requests.

k. **Other VI Planning Considerations.** A template and information, like the above example, can be used in a fragmentary order, PAG, or an annex of an OPLAN. Note that COMCAM and some other VI-producing assets provide imagery for multiple lines of operations based on joint force requirements. Some of these planning considerations include anticipated use, classification, and specific skills required to obtain the imagery. Some examples:

- (1) Public Affairs—imagery acquired for public release to the media, internal information, posted on public websites, used in briefings, incorporated into publications, etc.
- (2) DSCA—imagery acquired to document conditions to help coordinate disaster relief and visually communicate government actions in humanitarian relief operations.
- (3) CA—imagery may include specialized requirements such as underwater photography in disaster areas. (Navy underwater qualified photographers can provide images to document damage and progress of repairs.)
- (4) Other government agencies—local government projects such as school openings and repair of essential services; local security forces conducting checkpoint operations; multinational forces and local security forces working together.

(5) Additional considerations—prioritize and execute by asking such questions as: What capability is most important? What images are most important? How will you get the team to the right place at the right time? Are the events time sensitive, requiring advanced planning and arrival?

1. **OPSEC.** VI products can present special challenges for OPSEC. The need to maintain OPSEC and release imagery in a timely manner must be balanced. For example, photos and videos of military facilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures could provide adversaries actionable intelligence. OPSEC denies critical information about friendly forces to the adversary. However, OPSEC concerns should not prevent the acquisition of VI during military operations. Visual documentation preserves evidence concerning military operations. Discretion on when to release imagery can improve OPSEC. Ground rules allowing transmission delays of potentially sensitive information balance short-term security concerns with imagery public release requirements. Joint force PA and VI plans must allow for the acquisition and management of VI content, including timely security review and public release that follow the principles of information. PA planning should consider the timely review for release of imagery and be designed to identify, control, and protect generally unclassified information that is associated with sensitive operations and activities.

#### 4. Assessment

a. To improve VI, PA planners should provide desired metrics and assessment results to DIMOC. At a minimum, assessments should include feedback from each event, to include after action reports and lessons learned as to whether the imagery met the requirements of the requestor.

b. PAOs may request that the JCCC track VI produced during operations and exercises, and provide feedback comparing VI products to requirements identified in the plan.

#### 5. Defense Support of Civil Authorities Considerations

PA considerations for DSCA operations can differ from deployed operations, and the following areas should be noted:

a. PA in DSCA operations may be complicated because the lead federal agency is responsible for setting certain themes and messages, establishing public release authorities, as well as directing the VI activities and informing the public. In some conditions the incident commander (local law enforcement or fire department chief) retains control of operations. For example, during Hurricane Sandy relief, COMCAM support to the incident commander took priority over documenting DOD efforts in the disaster relief operation.

b. State National Guard units operating in Title 32, United States Code, status or when there is no federal emergency declaration under the Stafford Act, have different PA authorities. For example, Oklahoma National Guard VI documentation by PA personnel during massive tornado relief operations is not automatically considered to be DOD photography when relief efforts are directed by the governor without support from US Northern Command. However, the VI produced by guard personnel during domestic

operations supports ongoing DOD missions and the JCCC will coordinate informally with the state National Guard to receive relevant VI.

c. Continental United States (CONUS)-based military VI personnel have previously arrived during operations in the homeland without prior clearance by the Commander, US Northern Command. DOD operations in CONUS normally require an EXORD to conduct operations within the AOR. The presence of unauthorized military personnel inhibits command and control of VI activities and forces, creates confusion, and is not in accordance with DOD policy and guidance.

## 6. Acquisition, Declassification/Sanitization, and Transferring Derivative Imagery

a. The J-2, J-3, foreign disclosure officer, and PA should work together to acquire, declassify, sanitize, and transfer intelligence imagery, WSV, and other forms of derivative imagery to the media and public. PA's primary objective is to distribute accurate, truthful, and timely information, to include VI, to the media, public, and military.

b. **Acquisition.** The J-2 and J-3 acquire and exploit intelligence imagery and WSV imagery for operations and for information activities. In general, intelligence imagery, WSV, and other forms of classified imagery are acquired in military operations to support command, control, security, and intelligence missions. These sources of imagery can provide persistent visual content that discredits adversary misinformation and propaganda. The large volume of processed intelligence and WSV imagery generated during joint operations can produce hundreds of hours of classified mission video. PA, J-2, and J-3 should establish procedures to quickly locate and pull, edit, sanitize, transfer, and release specific small sections of video footage.

c. **Declassification/Sanitization.** The removal of classified content from intelligence imagery, WSV, and other classified derivative VI sources is primarily the responsibility of the J-2. The J-2 and J-3 should establish classified imagery editing systems capable of masking or stripping telemetry and other restricted data from intelligence imagery, WSV imagery, and classified VI. Once imagery has been identified for potential public release, the classified portions must be quickly removed or masked to be released into the fast-moving information environment. Countering adversary disinformation requires accurate, timely, and compelling imagery. PA, J-2, and J-3 should facilitate in-theater sanitization and delegation of in-theater release of derivative VI products, as well as classified VI, to meet the time-sensitive information requirements.

d. **Transferring.** The transfer of sanitized imagery from classified networks to unclassified networks is the responsibility of the J-2. The J-2 provides PA access to sanitized imagery through unclassified systems capable of handling controlled unclassified information (CUI). All sanitized intelligence imagery, WSV, and other imagery will be handled as CUI until it can be reviewed and released by PA. Once classified content has been removed and the assets are reviewed for release, they are considered VI products and will be given a VIRIN to identify it as a public record. All sanitized derivative imagery must meet the standards for security and release review before it is released to the media or public.

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## APPENDIX A

### PUBLIC AFFAIRS' ROLE IN THE COMMANDER'S COMMUNICATION SYNCHRONIZATION

#### 1. Overview

a. A JFC can use the CCS process to coordinate and synchronize communication (i.e., themes, messages, images) and actions (i.e., planning, deployments, operations) to protect the integrity and consistency of the joint force's communications and align them with the broader national strategic narrative.

b. The CCS process is detailed in JDN 2-13, *Commander's Communication Synchronization*. The JDN provides techniques for achieving consistency across communication means and methods to shape the information environment favorable to friendly outcomes.

c. This appendix is not intended to replace or go into the same level of detail as JDN 2-13, *Commander's Communication Synchronization*. The intention of this appendix is to further describe the role of PA in the CCS process.

#### 2. The Need for Coordinated Communication

a. JFCs can use active, responsive, adaptive, and agile processes and capabilities to manage the continuous and rapid flow of information caused by advances in media distribution channels.

b. The USG has an obligation to inform US citizens about the nature of its activities, consistent with national security and privacy concerns. The JFC has a requirement to communicate with US and international audiences, publics, and stakeholders about joint force activities, intentions, and desired end states. Providing context to the joint forces' operations is in the national interest, and can build and maintain trust, credibility, and support.

c. Nearly continuous media coverage and the growing use of personal communication devices make military operations increasingly transparent. US forces are under constant scrutiny. Media focus can turn a seemingly innocuous tactical incident into one of strategic significance. Propaganda can affect public perception of a crisis and put US joint forces into a reactive posture. Commanders should shape narratives as they plan and conduct other aspects of operations. Official information released in a timely manner—in some cases ahead of military action—can put operational actions into context, help counter enemy propaganda, and contribute to success across the lines of effort while also engendering support.

d. Developing a coherent approach to communication synchronization consistent with operations builds necessary trust and support; facilitates the development of informed perceptions about the military; undermines adversarial propaganda efforts; and contributes to the achievement of national, regional, theater, and operational objectives.

e. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Planning Formats and Guidance*, directs the JFC to include communication goals and objectives in the commander's intent to build unity of themes and objectives among key activities.

f. There are three approaches to the CCS process:

(1) JFC lead.

(2) CCS lead with small coordination staff and supporting CCS working group.

(3) CCS working group and board chaired by the communication directorate or chief of staff.

g. Regardless of which approach the JFC chooses, the PAO should coordinate messages with those from the CCS process.

### **3. Public Affairs in Planning and the Commander's Communication Synchronization Process**

a. The CCS process helps integrate communication consistent with JFC guidance. CCS coordinates themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to implement higher-level communication guidance. In particular, CCS provides operation planners insight concerning how foreign audiences perceive joint operations to allow better understanding to synchronize operations with supporting words and images that further JFC objectives. This process, however, is not meant to replace any direct access to the commander held by PA or other IRCs in the course of their normal duties.

b. Synchronized command communication can help JFCs overcome infrastructure deficiencies, language and cultural differences, and a fragmented media environment. Additionally, CCS can help JFCs manage communication challenges presented by decentralized and instantaneous global reach and adversary counter-messaging and propaganda. Rapid decision making aided by advanced planning and coordination can mitigate these challenges.

c. The PAO serves as a member of the JFC's personal staff as the primary coordinator of public information. Joint PA plans, coordinates, and synchronizes US military public information activities and resources to support the commander's intent and CONOPS. The PAO advises the JFC on the implications of command decisions, actions, and operations on foreign public perceptions. PA also integrates communication into mission planning in conjunction with other IRCs—whether that is individually, through a CCS process, or by other means, such as the IO working group or a CCS working group.

d. PA works *with* IO and other IRCs in the CCS process, but it does not work *for* them. Various entities participating in CCS have different missions, scopes, capabilities, modalities, and authorities. PA is a command function focused on communication at the national, theater, command, and strategic levels to inform and educate relevant audiences. IO, on the other hand, specifically focus on creating effects in the information environment during military operations, largely against the threat but also to influence indigenous

audiences in the operational area. PA and IO have overlapping and sometimes complementary purposes. To that end, PA and IO should deconflict and synchronize their efforts, and the CCS process is the means to accomplish this coordination and deconfliction of IRCs.

e. PA effectiveness is realized through the PAO's direct relationship with the commander, its authority to reach any audience with factual information, and the credibility that comes from a policy of transparency. To maintain that efficacy, PA remains a command function, advising and reporting to the commander.

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## APPENDIX B ANNEX F DEVELOPMENT

The guidance in this appendix provides additional detail and considerations for the development of annex F (Public Affairs) of the OPLAN format found in CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance* (For Official Use Only).

### 1. Situation

a. **General.** Assigns responsibilities and guidance for military PA actions.

b. **Enemy.** Identify expected actions of adversary forces and forces hostile to US interests.

c. **Friendly.** Identify friendly agencies not under JFC control that will contribute to the PA effort. Include ASD(PA), DOS, COM, and multinational partners' PA programs, as appropriate.

#### d. Assumptions

(1) Describe HN preferences and/or sensitivities to be considered in developing and executing PA programs.

(2) CCDRs should be prepared to host the DOD National Media Pool during all stages of operations.

### 2. Mission

State clearly and concisely the essential PA tasks to be accomplished as they relate to the overall operation and commander's intent.

### 3. Execution

a. **CONOPS.** Outline PA efforts for the operation as part of JFC's mission and concept of the operation.

b. **Tasks.** Outline the PA tasks to be completed in various operational phases.

(1) Provide any additional information to the supported CCDR and other supporting commands to include release authority and guidance on casualty and mortuary affairs, US and multinational prisoner of war or missing in action, and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) matters. Consider the establishment of a MOC. Outline PA VI and COMCAM requirements.

(2) Provide detailed personnel and equipment support requirements to component commands. Address the following: access to the on-scene commander, supported CCDR, and the DOS representative, and to the secure voice circuit that connects the MOC; access to

hard copy message facilities between the same points; intertheater and intratheater transportation for escorted media; access to secure and nonsecure Internet access that connects the MOC to other PA outlets; access to digital imagery receiver equipment (could be through an intranet source); access to equipment for review and release of battle damage assessment-type video footage (could be through COMCAM). Coordinate this annex with logistics, communications, CCS, and other planners/processes to ensure required support is detailed.

(3) List Service, component command, and other supporting commands’ support requirements.

**c. Coordinating Instructions.** Identify procedures for the following areas:

(1) **Coordination of Release of Information.** Provide detailed procedures for all supporting commands for handling or forwarding to the supported command queries, responses, and proposed news releases for clearance.

(2) **PA Support to CCS.** Coordinate elements of PA with other IRCs, as appropriate.

(3) Determine requirement(s) for development and coordination of appropriate PAG in accordance with DODI 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*, and with particular attention to appropriate PA postures (see Figure B-1).

Public Affairs Postures			
	Public Affairs Posture	Descriptions	Examples
PASSIVE	No Response	A public affairs (PA) posture of “no response” is for those plans and activities that due to declassification and other sensitivities we will not offer any information on, even when directly requested.	Ongoing special operations; capabilities that are classified.
	Response to Query	A PA posture of “response to query” is for those plans and activities where we will not proactively release information but will respond to queries on the subject using a holding statement and/or questions and answers (Q&A).	Ongoing exercises with partner nations that do not desire proactive announcement of their involvement.
ACTIVE	Restricted Release	A PA posture of “restricted release” is for those plans and activities where it is necessary and/or desirable to do a limited, proactive release or announcement, limited media engagement (as necessary and	Announcement of a raid to capture or kill a terrorist leader.

		appropriate to the circumstances), and response to queries using Q&A.	
	Active Release	A PA posture of “active release” is for those plans and activities where it is necessary and/or desirable to be as proactive and transparent as possible in communicating on a subject to include actively soliciting for media and public attention.	Announcing a personnel policy change; promoting an air show.

**Figure B-1. Public Affairs Postures**

(4) Coordination of requests for interviews and news conferences with the individual’s unit and Service PA offices for returned US personnel, and with the supporting staff judge advocate for EPWs or detained personnel.

(5) Outline required PA coordination with other staff elements involved in release of information outside the command.

(6) Provide guidelines for release of imagery—to include imagery taken by service members on the battlefield.

(7) Provide guidelines for use of social media, to include release authority for communication products.

(8) Establish procedures for keeping PA historical records.

**d. Media Ground Rules**

(1) **Release of Cleared Information.** Establish means for release of information to be cleared and made available to the press.

(2) **Categories of Releasable Information.** Provide precise guidance for release of specific categories of information to the media.

(3) **Categories of Information Not Releasable.** Provide guidance on specific categories of information not releasable to the media.

**4. Administration and Logistics**

a. **Identify administration and logistics requirements for PA support.** Identify OPSEC procedures for PA personnel, including security review procedures. Identify procedures for providing PA, audio-visual, and VI coverage of the operation, including COMCAM requirements. Identify internal information requirements for subordinate and component commands.



b. **Identify detailed personnel and equipment support requirements.** Address the following:

- (1) Secure voice and data connectivity between the MOC and on-scene commander, supported commander, and the DOS representative.
- (2) Inter-theater and intra-theater transportation for escorted media.
- (3) Secure and nonsecure Internet between the MOC and other PA outlets.
- (4) Digital imagery receiver and transmission equipment.
- (5) Equipment for review and release of battle damage assessment-type video footage.

c. **MOC/Sub-MOC/Command Information Support**

- (1) **Personnel.** Identify required personnel.
- (2) **Equipment.** Identify additional standard equipment required to allow MOC or sub-MOC operation in the operational area. Include tentage and individual field equipment on the same basis of issue as the accompanied unit.
- (3) **Services.** Include basic food and shelter, water, office space and materials, clothing, transportation, etc., including portable copying machines, facsimile machines, and automated data processing support.
- (4) **Communications.** Coordinate with communications section regarding the following:
  - (a) Bandwidth priority to ensure timely transmission of PA and VI products to multiple users simultaneously.
  - (b) Bandwidth allocation for PA products, both classified and unclassified, as well as the ability to stream live at five megabytes per second.
  - (c) Internet access to include unfiltered external access for information and VI release, local area network access, and establishment and operation of unit and/or contingency unclassified and classified web-based sites to include social media and other relevant Internet-based capabilities.

d. **Media/Media Pool Support.** Identify details on supporting the media to include: facilities, messing, billeting, force protection, immunizations, emergency medical treatment, transportation and communications, access to unclassified operational information, media pools, and other support.

- (1) Outline plans for support of the media pool.
  - (a) Daily, comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings.

- (b) Access to areas of ongoing operations.
- (c) Access to key command and staff personnel.
- (d) Designated officer from the supported command assigned to coordinate media pool requirements.
- (e) Itinerary planning to enable media pool to disperse throughout the combat area to provide coverage of operations and to regroup periodically to share information and file stories.

(2) **Required Logistic Support.** Outline supported commander responsibilities for planning logistics support for pool and escort personnel. Support should address:

- (a) Existing airlift to/from the point of origin and the operational area.
- (b) Theater ground, sea, and air transportation available to the media.
- (c) Messing, billeting, and reimbursement requirements.
- (d) Issuance of any equipment considered appropriate to the situation (e.g., helmets, canteens, protective vest, and chemical protective gear).
- (e) Access to communications facilities to file stories on an expedited basis.
- (f) Medical support.
- (g) Religious support.

## 5. Command and Control

Identify command relationships for PA including CCS participation (see Appendix A, “*Public Affairs’ Role in the Commander’s Communication Synchronization*”).

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## APPENDIX C GUIDELINES FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

### 1. Release of Information

#### a. Release Authority and Public Statements

(1) Until release authority is delegated to them, units should forward queries and proposed news releases to the CCMD PAO.

(2) No public statements concerning operations should be made by subordinate units without prior coordination with the CCMD PAO.

#### b. Assumptions

(1) All statements will be on the record.

(2) News media will have the ability to transmit instantaneous live reports from the operational area. Failure to plan for and accommodate the media will not stop them from reporting.

(3) News media coverage will be highly competitive, with a tendency to seek access to the operational area and report events as they happen.

(4) News media already on the scene may find ways to get to the operational area(s) and report the activities as they happen without regard for security concerns.

(5) Independent media may be simultaneously deployed with the DOD National Media Pool at the invitation of the Service component headquarters, under guidelines established by CCMD PAO that differ from those which apply to the DOD National Media Pool.

#### c. Security Instructions

(1) PAOs submitting or staffing proposed products for public release must ensure that the information contained therein is fully coordinated and properly classified until approved for release.

(2) Media are not usually given access to classified information that could jeopardize operations or endanger lives. In circumstances where this may be appropriate, PAOs must gain specific approval from the JFC.

(3) Some members of the media may be briefed on planned operations prior to execution if they agree to withhold release until permitted to do so by the appropriate military authorities. Security of classified material is the responsibility of all DOD personnel and DOD contractor personnel.

#### d. Release below the JFC Level

(1) Upon delegation of release authority, component and subordinate commanders may release information and VI within the bounds of policy and guidance set forth by the joint force PAO or MOC director.

(2) A verbatim record of releases and news conferences should be maintained.

(3) Subordinate commanders should report the substance of any interview or responses to query to the MOC.

(4) News conferences should be videotaped or audiotaped.

e. **DODD 5400.07, DOD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program.** Requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act Program should be coordinated through the command's designated Freedom of Information Act representative or the servicing staff judge advocate or legal adviser if no such representative exists.

f. **Title 5, US Code, Section 552a, The Privacy Act of 1974.** DOD personnel shall not disclose any personal information contained in any system of records except as authorized by DOD 5400.11-R, *Department of Defense Privacy Program*, or other applicable law or regulation. Personnel willfully making such a disclosure when knowing that disclosure is prohibited are subject to possible criminal penalties and/or administrative sanctions.

## 2. Discussions with the Media

a. **Preparation.** Preparation results in more effective discussions with the media. Central to the process is identifying what information is to be released based on prevailing PAG and OPSEC measures. Commanders, briefers, and PA personnel should be aware of the basic facts of any operation and sensitive to the various consequences of communicating them to the public.

b. **Security.** "Security at the source" serves as the basis for ensuring that no information is released which jeopardizes OPSEC or the safety and privacy of joint military forces. Under this concept, individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment or in any way to compromise sensitive information.

c. **Briefing Information.** Each operational situation requires a deliberate PA assessment to identify specific information to be released. The following categories of information are releasable in most circumstances. However, operational considerations may necessitate modifications:

(1) The arrival of US units in the operational area once officially announced by DOD or by other commands in accordance with release authority granted by the ASD(PA). Information could include mode of travel (sea or air), date of departure, and home station or port.

(2) Approximate friendly force strength and equipment figures.

(3) Approximate friendly casualty and prisoner of war figures by Service. Approximate figures of adversary personnel detained during each action or operation.

(4) Nonsensitive, unclassified information and VI regarding US air, land, sea, space, and special operations, past and present.

(5) In general terms, identification and location of military targets and objectives previously attacked and the types of ordnance expended.

(6) Date, time, or location of previous military missions and actions, as well as mission results.

(7) Number of combat air patrol or reconnaissance missions and/or sorties flown in the operational area. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as "land" or "carrier-based."

(8) Weather and climate conditions.

(9) If appropriate, allied participation by type (ground units, ships, aircraft).

(10) Conventional operations' unclassified code names.

(11) Names of installations and assigned units.

(12) Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation using general terms such as "multi-battalion," or "naval task force."

(13) Types of forces involved (e.g., aircraft, ships, carrier strike groups, tank, and infantry units).

d. **Classified Information.** Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations must be protected from disclosure to the media. In more general terms, information in the following categories should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to future operations, the risk to human life, possible violation of HN and/or allied sensitivities, or the possible disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. While these guidelines serve to guide military personnel who talk with the media, they may also be used as ground rules for media coverage. The list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each operational situation.

(1) For US (or allied) units, specific numerical information on troop strength, aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat units. General terms should be used to describe units, equipment, and/or supplies.

(2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, including postponed or canceled operations.

(3) Information and VI that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. For datelines, stories

will state that the report originates from general regions unless a specific country has acknowledged its participation.

(4) Rules of engagement.

(5) Information on intelligence activities, including sources and methods, lists of targets, and battle damage assessments.

(6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movement or size, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize OPSEC or lives. This would include unit designations and names of operations until released by the JFC.

(7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrier-based.

(8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of weapon systems and tactics (to include, but not limited to adversary camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures).

(9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed personnel, aircraft, or sunken ships while search and rescue operations are planned or under way.

(10) Special operations forces' tactics, techniques, and procedures, and equipment, which, if disclosed, could cause serious harm to the ability of these forces to accomplish their mission.

(11) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used against US or allied units until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the adversary and is, therefore, released by the JFC. Damage and casualties may be described as "light," "moderate," or "heavy."

(12) Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., offensive and defensive tactics or speed and formations). General terms such as "slow" or "fast" may be used.

(13) Detainees will be protected from public curiosity at all times. Strict compliance with this requirement is essential. There is no distinction between international and domestic media with regard to this obligation. Media attention concerning detainees is likely to be substantial. Commanders and staffs should anticipate such attention and ensure that supporting PA personnel develop procedures, in advance, for dealing with media requests for visits and information. Unless delegated to subordinate commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the sole release authority for photographs or video of detainees. Commanders will prepare and coordinate, in advance, PA plans for events such as detainee movements, transfers, or releases, with both the transferring and receiving commanders.

(a) Requests for interviews or filming of detainees must be coordinated through the staff judge advocate to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, including the law of war.



(b) Photographing, filming, or other videotaping of detainees for other than internal detention facility management and intelligence purposes is prohibited.

(c) Individuals in the custody or under the physical control of the USG, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall not be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.

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## APPENDIX D DEFENSE MEDIA ACTIVITY

### 1. Defense Media Activity

DMA provides a broad range of high-quality multimedia products and services to inform, educate, and entertain DOD audiences around the world. Joint force PA staff may contact the DMA ([www.dma.mil](http://www.dma.mil)) to request support.

### 2. American Forces Radio and Television Service

a. Operated by DMA, AFRTS is a worldwide radio and TV broadcasting system that provides US military commanders overseas and at sea a way to communicate DOD, Service-unique, theater, and local command information to personnel under their commands. In addition to supporting the command's internal information program, AFRTS provides the same type and quality of US radio and TV news, information, sports and entertainment that would be available to them if they were in the US. DODM 5120.20, *Management of American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)*, outlines basic procedures to obtain AFRTS service. Contact DMA for additional guidance and planning assistance.

b. DMA can assist CCMD PA offices in planning and developing AFRTS systems to meet their specific requirements. CCMD PA officials are responsible for planning for AFRTS in any operation as a joint force PA asset. DMA also encourages PA planners to include AFRTS when planning for exercises. Extensive coordination may be required with other staff elements to coordinate communications frequencies and power and logistic requirements based on the level of AFRTS support required for the operation.

c. Several AFRTS options are available to support contingency operations. For all AFRTS contingency activities, DMA Broadcasting plans, manages, and provides operational guidance and support. DMA Technical Services provides technical and logistical support. Upon notification of a contingency support requirement, DMA works closely with the deployed PA planner in coordination with the supported combatant command PA staff to identify and plan AFRTS support requirements, and obtains the necessary support from the supporting command(s) to implement the coordinated AFRTS support package.

### 3. Visual Information

The DMA Defense VI component manages DIMOC, which receives, processes, stores, and distributes classified and unclassified VI products created by globally stationed and deployed DOD VI, COMCAM, and PA personnel. DIMOC is the designated VI records center for DOD and the single point for making VI offerings for accessioning to the National Archives and Records Administration. PA officials can request imagery through the DIMOC website ([www.dimoc.mil](http://www.dimoc.mil)). The DIMOC also operates the JCCC that coordinates strategic VI requirements and plans with the joint force and combatant commands. This includes assisting planners with VI plans.

#### **4. Public Worldwide Web Operations**

The DMA Public Web directorate provides infrastructure for public-facing web pages for DOD customers. They also provide services necessary to create, sustain, maintain, and improve public-facing websites and their content. Contact DMA for additional guidance and planning assistance.

#### **5. Joint Hometown News Service**

The DMA Joint Hometown News Service (JHNS) directorate provides a hometown news program for DOD and military departments. PA staffs submit DOD Form 2266, *Hometown News Release Information*, to JHNS. These releases cover events such as deployments, promotions, awards (military and civilian) or any other event occurring in a military or civil servant career. JHNS sends more than 300,000 news releases a year to 10,000 commercial media outlets about individual members of the services including active duty and reserve members, military academy and Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets, and civil servants. For more information, contact JHNS (<http://jhns.dma.mil>).

#### **6. Emerging and Social Media Training, Education, and Testing**

DMA contributes to PA community proponent activities through the assessment, research, and testing of social media tools and platforms; the development of digital plans to communicate with key audiences; and the addition of new techniques and technologies that may be of use within DOD. This includes the transfer of emerging and social media tools, techniques, and technologies to DOD components for practical application in PA activities. In addition, DMA provides DOD-wide training to adapt DOD PA employees' existing skills to better match the needs of an evolving social media landscape leveraged with effective social media techniques.

#### **7. Blogger Facilitation Services**

DMA facilitates DOD-wide PA activities by linking citizen journalists (bloggers) with DOD leaders and SMEs. This includes original programming that provides relevant bloggers the ability to teleconference with SMEs. The audio and transcription of these events are published online via DOD Live and through the use of tailored digital communications shared with DMA's social media networks. Contact the DMA Social Media branch ([newmedia1@dma.mil](mailto:newmedia1@dma.mil)).

#### **8. Public Affairs and Visual Information Training**

DINFOS is a component of DMA, providing PA, journalism, photojournalism, broadcast operations, broadcast maintenance, still and video documentation, illustration, multimedia and VI production education and training to entry-, intermediate-, and advanced-level DOD and interagency students in the PA, VI, and related career fields. For more information, contact DINFOS ([www.dinfos.dma.mil](http://www.dinfos.dma.mil)).

## APPENDIX E JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT ELEMENT

### 1. Overview

a. The JPASE provides ready, rapidly deployable joint PA professionals who can plan and support implementation of the CCS process within minutes of arrival to help lead the public information effort/narrative.

b. JPASE, located in Norfolk, VA, enables JFCs and their staffs to successfully meet continuously evolving PA and information challenges in their respective theaters of operation.

c. JPASE provides a trained, equipped, scalable, and expeditionary PA capability to include planning and media operations. JPASE is DOD's only joint PA unit and deploys globally to support JTF commanders' needs and provides scalable options that allow requesting CCMDs to tailor required capabilities.

d. JPASE provides PA training for JFCs and staffs through participation in major exercises, seminars, and planning events.

### 2. Organization


JPASE is organized as shown in Figure E-1. This organization facilitates the integration of the JPASE reserves into operations and enhances command and control.

### 3. Operational Support

a. **Introduction.** JPASE serves as an expeditionary joint PA capability for CCMDs and JFCs. JPASE can be rapidly deployed, in whole or in part, to support a wide variety of operational requirements through approved force request processes (e.g., RFF or global response force process). JPASE can support contingencies and operations as well as exercises. JPASE is a first responder, short-term solution, designed to establish a foothold and help prepare the information environment for follow-on sustainment forces.

(1) The deployment of all or part of JPASE provides the JFC with a standing mission-ready joint PA capability whenever and wherever needed. JPASE can respond to a CCDR's request for joint PA planning for potential contingencies, as well as for direct support of operations. As cohesive joint units, JPASE teams fit easily into force deployment packages but require logistical and life support from the requesting command.

(2) JPASE forces can be thought of as DOD first responders for joint PA. Like similar on-call forces, they are designed to respond quickly to the emergent situation until long-term forces are deployed.



**Figure E-1. Joint Public Affairs Support Element Functional Organization**

b. **Capabilities.** Figure E-2 shows the joint PA competencies and capabilities that JPASE can provide to a JFC with scalable crisis response teams, as well as those capabilities JPASE can manage if augmented with additional forces, such as an Army mobile PA detachment and/or other Service capabilities. The size of the JPASE team and equipment required for support will depend upon the capabilities requested. Capabilities required are based on a PA mission analysis conducted by the appropriate combatant command PA staff in conjunction with JPASE leadership. Capabilities not organic to JPASE are noted in the far right column.

Joint Public Affairs Support Element Capabilities			
Role	Capability	Organic	Enhanced w/ external support
Advisor	Advise commander on requirements and employment of joint public affairs (PA) assets	X	
	Advise commander on the impact of proposed policy and operational decisions on public perception	X	
	Advise commander on information environment	X	X
	Advise commander on communication integration and synchronization	X	
	Coordinate with higher and subordinate units on joint PA matters	X	
Planning and Operations	Participate in joint operation planning process working group or process	X	
	Provide long-range or emergent crisis or contingency communication and PA planning	X	
	Develop communication and PA assessment	X	

	mechanisms		
	Identify communication infrastructure needs and joint manning requirements	X	
	Develop joint PA strategy	X	
	Develop commander's communication strategy	X	
	Direct joint PA operations	X	
Media Operations	Identify requirements and coordinate establishment of media support facilities/media operations centers	X	
	Develop a media support plan	X	
	Conduct media accreditation	X	
	Conduct media operations	X	
	Develop PA guidance	X	
	Provide media analysis	X	X
	Conduct/facilitate press briefings	X	
	Produce live uplink capability	X	
	Facilitate media embedding	X	
	Coordinate intratheater transportation for media	X	X
	Conduct media training for staff	X	
	Coordinate content for publicly accessible websites	X	X
	Advise and establish social media mechanisms and engagement strategy	X	
	Provide social media assessment	X	X
Command Information	Manage/coordinate nonorganic command information assets	X	
	Identify command internal information requirements	X	
	Develop command internal information plan	X	
	Coordinate broadcast capability	X	X
	Produce command internal information products	X	X
Defense Support to Public Diplomacy	US embassy/consulate liaison	X	
	Other US Government department and agency coordination	X	
	Nongovernmental organization coordination	X	
Visual Information	Develop visual information (VI) plan	X	
	Provide VI support	X	
	Coordinate with combat camera for VI support	X	
	Disseminate VI products	X	X
Community Engagement	Identify community engagement requirements	X	X
	Develop community engagement plan	X	X
	Facilitate command interaction with local officials	X	X

Figure E-2. Joint Public Affairs Support Element Capabilities

### c. Deployment Considerations

(1) JPASE deploys upon approval by the Commander, USTRANSCOM, as shown in Figure E-3. JPASE provides joint PA teams for emergent events or preplanned contingency operations. In the latter case, the requirement for JPASE capabilities should have been previously identified and coordinated between the supported CCDR and JPASE.



(2) To ensure optimum availability of JPASE personnel for prescribed deployments, JPASE does not fill joint PA billets for which permanent party personnel are not assigned, provide individual augmentees to fill positions on joint manning documents, or participate in standard rotation of forces. JPASE should not be requested unless CCMD and subordinate PA assets are fully tasked and unable to respond to the situation or are unable to provide the required capabilities. Figure E-3 depicts the deployment process, as well as considerations for deployment.

d. **Size and Duration.** The capacity of JPASE to support deployments will vary based on personnel available and other operational requirements. JPASE maintains a team of eight personnel capable of responding to missions for a duration of up to 120 days. In the event that a deployment will exceed established JPASE limits, CCDRs are responsible for identifying requirements and fielding follow-on joint PA forces.

e. **Requests for JPASE**


(1) Commands request JPASE through approved force request processes in accordance with the USTRANSCOM joint enabling capability instructions. The Commander, United States Transportation Command has authority to approve JPASE deployments via a standing EXORD. Requests must identify specific joint PA capabilities required by the scope and breadth of the operation not the number of people.

(2) Past deployments demonstrate the need to get JPASE involved in force requirement discussions early to ensure that requesting commands know what capabilities JPASE has available at the time of the deployment and what capabilities would need to be sourced through other means. Informal coordination between the requesting command PAO and JPASE should be initiated at the earliest indication of a potential need. Once the required capabilities are identified, the requesting command PAO must formally identify the requirement for JPASE (and any other needed joint PA personnel) through the combatant command J-3.

f. **Operational Planning.** Early involvement of JPASE personnel in mission planning will help JFCs develop an integrated CCS process that enhances and guides initial planning and operations. JPASE personnel are readily available to participate in operational planning (via teleconference or in person) for emergent events prior to deployment approval and the movement of the JPASE team into the operational area. Including JPASE in plan development will ensure the best use of follow-on JPASE team members and optimum joint PA support to the commander.

g. **Required Support**

(1) **Connectivity/Information Technology.** JPASE has limited organic communications and information technology capability. JPASE can deploy with the dedicated communication support from the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). JCSE can provide a scalable communication capability that provides JPASE with organic secure/unsecure computer connectivity, satellite phone, secure phone, commercial Internet, Broadband Global Area Network, and commercial/Defense Switched Network lines. This



**Figure E-3. Requesting Joint Public Affairs Support Element**

capability is not inherent to the JPASE deployable team and must be specifically requested when coordinating for JPASE support.

(2) **VI.** JPASE has organic VI capability, to include still and video capture and transmission capabilities. JPASE can partner with COMCAM in order to provide a robust, combined VI capability to the commander. A specific request for this combined capability must be made at the time of request for JPASE.

(3) **Logistics.** JPASE will require work spaces, billeting, messing, power, and in most cases, transportation. JPASE has access to armored and unarmored vehicles. They will usually not travel with JPASE assets unless the operational area and size of mission requires them. In most deployment cases, transportation support will need to be coordinated at the time of request for JPASE.

(4) **Force Protection.** JPASE personnel are assigned full sets of personal protective equipment, up to and including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear personal protective equipment, and are qualified with individual weapons.

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## APPENDIX F SOCIAL MEDIA

*“Social media has affected the military in the same way it’s affected any organization—we’ve benefited greatly from the speed, mobility and the interaction, but it comes with risks. We’ve been working to emphasize the opportunity for leaders to positively influence military culture and discipline by getting involved in the space and being role models online as they are in units. I’ve also watched social media’s role in exposing the military experience to the citizens we defend, ranging from humor to debate. I’m impressed with how our nation’s understanding of the military has changed especially since 2001. As Service members or veterans, we have a role in broadening and deepening that relationship with our nation, and social media can certainly help.”*

**General Martin Dempsey, United States Army  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Facebook Town Hall, December 2013**

### 1. Social Media

Social media describes a variety of platforms through which people, enabled by digital communication technologies, connect with one another to create content, share information, and engage in conversations. While specific mediums, platforms, and technologies may change over time, the overall trend of people connecting with one another enabled by technology only increases. The way people get information has changed, and their desire to have real conversations with individuals, businesses, organizations, and government has increased. PA professionals can assist leaders and organizations who use social media to communicate more effectively with key stakeholders and the public. Managing and posting content to a command or organization’s social media presences is a PA function.

### 2. Why We Use Social Media

a. Social media, as part of the overall CCS effort, is a PA function that helps fulfill the joint force’s obligation to communicate with all publics. It also provides another means of sharing information with internal and external publics. Social media offers some powerful advantages to the JFC beyond traditional means of communicating:

(1) **It is efficient.** Anything you communicate in social media is sent in an instant and is then available anywhere in the world for access. Additionally, social media may provide a means of communications reach that is available when other means (government networks, message traffic, and e-mails) are not due to travel, base closures, and disasters).

(2) **It is unmediated.** There is no gatekeeper, meaning the message will appear to any audience who may access it. Social media users must keep in mind that messages might be misinterpreted. Consequently, they attempt to minimize the possibility of misunderstanding before posting.

(3) **It provides feedback.** Social media provides actionable feedback.

(4) **It promotes trust.** Responsively exchanging information builds a relationship, and in return trust with our audience. By listening, sharing and engaging with others in social media, DOD has the unique opportunity to assume a leading role in discussions about and relevant issues regarding the joint force.

b. Social media is another means to share information with external and internal audiences that enables more symmetrical, two-way communication, and also allows outreach to real and virtual communities.

c. To effectively reach stakeholders, DOD must use the communication channels those stakeholders use. Social media and other technologies present unequalled opportunities for DOD to share its story in an authentic, transparent, and rapid manner while building richer, more substantive relationships with audiences not reachable through traditional communication channels.

d. The use of social media also presents challenges to the joint force. However, if DOD does not participate in social media, conversations about the joint force will still take place, only without the joint force perspective.

### 3. Policy and Registration

a. DODI 8550.01, *DOD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities*, is the DOD's official policy and states that the default for the DOD non-classified network (the NIPRNET [Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network]) is open access so that all of DOD can use the Internet and Internet-based capabilities including social media. This policy provides open and more consistent access across the board, but prohibited content sites (gambling, pornography, hate-crime activities) remain blocked, and commanders at all levels and heads of DOD components continue to keep networks safe from malicious activity and take actions, as required, to safeguard missions.

b. According to DODI 8550.01, *DOD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities*, Service members and DOD employees are welcome and encouraged to use social media to communicate with family and friends—at home stations or deployed—but they should do so safely. The policy emphasizes one's responsibility to protect themselves and their information online and that existing regulations on ethics, OPSEC, and privacy still apply. It also encourages all parties to never post any information that could be considered classified, sensitive, or that might put military members or families in danger.

c. All official social media sites within DOD must be registered with the department at the DOD site registry (<http://www.defense.gov/socialmedia/>). Registration with one of the Service social media directories satisfies this requirement. All official social media sites within DOD and shared content to include VI must comply with DODI 8550.01, *DOD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities*, and other regulations (<http://www.defense.gov/webmasters/>) and must be an approved site.

d. Social media operators must have completed their Service/unit's requisite OPSEC training at a minimum. Because of the public nature of the environment, PA training and technical

expertise are highly encouraged. Further training opportunities are available through the General Services Agency (<http://www.digitalgov.gov/category/socialmedia/>) and through DMA.

*For more information see DODI 8550.01, DOD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities.*

#### 4. Social Media Tenets

Social media is a platform for building and fostering relationships, and as such your use should embody the following tenets:

a. **Authenticity.** It is critical that people know who is communicating in social media to instill trust and form a relationship.

b. **Transparency.** In social media, there is more than an expectation of transparency—there is a demand for it. Attempts to hide embarrassing information or avoid unpleasant topics will not only be ineffective, they will likely be counterproductive and draw more attention.

c. **Consistency.** The publics using social media will quickly go elsewhere to meet their information needs if messages are erratic and inconsistent in delivery.

d. **Responsiveness.** Social media, even more so than traditional media, requires responsiveness on the part of the organization. Answer questions. Acknowledge concerns. Thank people who offer suggestions. This is a two-way medium to build understanding with the publics.

e. **Positive Attitude.** Just like in interpersonal relationships, people using social media want to interact with others who help create solutions, not problems.

f. **Sincerity.** Be genuine. Social media is conversational, and it is appropriate to show some personality, even in an official capacity. Do not be a disembodied voice of the organization.

g. **Humor.** Social media users expect and approve of levity and humor. Know where the line is between appropriate and inappropriate, and use humor cautiously when warranted.

h. **Respect.** Social media is a flat environment. Respect others' opinions, even when different.

#### 5. Social Media Costs and Risks

a. The single greatest cost involved with social media is that it requires time – how much time is defined by the sites and tools that are used, the number of stakeholders and publics, and the amount of interactivity that is generated. Generally speaking, more time spent on social media leads to better outcomes—but, like successful community relations, it is a long-term and slowly-built campaign. That means a relatively small amount of time invested consistently over the long-term will almost always be more successful than a large

amount of time invested all at once. When evaluating if, when, and how to use social media, consider its use not just in addition to existing products and programs but as a possible means of more effectively and economically filling those roles.

b. There are other potential expenses related to social media, such as monitoring services, analytics, training, conferences and more. The expenses above and beyond the investment of time depend on how ambitious the program and how much the command is willing to spend to achieve greater efficiencies in using social media.

c. As for risks, a commonly stated risk of using social media is the loss of control of communication to the public. The reality, however, is that in this flat environment there never is control in the first place. The only communication truly controlled is what is said to whom. Not participating in a conversation in social media does not mean that the conversation is not taking place. In social media, just as in the rest of the world, there is always the possibility that what is said would be spread and possibly misinterpreted. In fact, a distinct advantage of social media is that when misinterpretations occur, active efforts can put out accurate information.

d. The flat environment of social media also allows for many points of view and does not necessarily favor a single authoritative voice. So, a comment about the joint force by a citizen is potentially just as important and authoritative as a comment by an official spokesperson. This equity should not be a deterrent to participating, but rather a motivating factor. Leave it to the public to communicate or participate and lead the conversation. Through consistent and dependable participation in social media, JFCs can build trust with communities and be an outstanding, authoritative voice among relevant conversations online.

e. OPSEC needs to be taken into consideration in all content posted as well as any comments made by the public. Often, information that seems inconsequential by itself can be paired with other information to garner intelligence. Considerations need to also be made regarding the inadvertent release of data, such as geotagging. Some social networks do not automatically remove geotags from the images taken with smartphones or digital cameras, but most devices allow users to turn off geotagging for some or all applications. Do not share personally identifiable information such as birth date, hometown, high school, and current address, which can be used in an identity theft attack. Another point to consider is that information shared on social media channels is near permanent. Even when it is possible to delete information it is often cached on servers and computers that the military has no control over. Care must be taken to ensure that aggregation of information provided via social media does not increase the overall classification of the site.

f. Cybersecurity practices for social media need to be understood by social media practitioners in PA. As tempting as it is, do not login to government social media sites from public wi-fi without a virtual private network or other encryption. Many people understand the dangers of accessing their bank account information from these locations but fail to apply the same logic to social media. A hacker who is accessing the same wi-fi network can use a tool to execute a session hijack, gather enough information to mimic your mobile device, then take control of a government social media site. From there, the hacker can post information on behalf of the government. Strong access controls must be used for



government social media accounts. Limit the number of people who have access to shared accounts and ensure they use strong passwords in line with information security guidance.

g. Social media is a significantly more open and global communication platform than used before, and it has demonstrated real power and benefits in reaching stakeholders and publics. With this openness comes some risks, but these risks can be mitigated through training. In this environment, the real risks are found in not being present.

## 6. Social Media Management

a. Management of command presences does take time, depending on the popularity of the content and the community size. Although some commands find it useful to have just one main point of contact to manage social media sites, it's strongly recommended that any social media presence be run by a small team to ensure that there is no potential single point of failure for being able to manage information in a timely manner. A commander should choose a trusted team of people to monitor the command social media presences, develop and post content when needed, remove public posts when required, interact with those who engage the command within that social tool, and respond to public inquiry when necessary.

b. To ensure consistent management, commands should establish standard operating procedures to monitor, post content, and communicate with people periodically throughout the day to facilitate better monitoring and management of social media. Do not remove content or take a page offline unless there is a specific violation of OPSEC or published business rules. Organizations that remove content simply because that content is unflattering lose the trust of the publics and risk public backlash. The commander enforces the posting policy, but taking something down just because it is unflattering is not recommended and is ultimately counterproductive. If an unfairly negative comment is posted by a user on your social site, chances are that others in the community developed within that social tool will challenge the unfairly negative comment.

c. To maintain consistent messaging, subordinate units should coordinate with JFC's headquarters prior to creating an online presence dedicated to specific operations and missions. These events are typically limited in time and do not warrant the amount of manpower and organization required to effectively maintain the sites. Use established platforms with larger audiences and higher page rankings.

d. Considerations when establishing a social media presence:

(1) **Terms of Service.** Social media presences used by a command need to have approved terms of service agreement with the government.

(2) **Stakeholder(s).** Identify stakeholders and what social media site(s) they use.

(3) **Branding.** The name of the social media presence is critical; this is how people will find the discussion.

(4) **Content.** Think about the kind of content to post and how frequently to post—including responses to those expressing themselves on the site.

(5) **Management.** Identify a team of people to manage the social media presence(s). Trust in them and good judgment are paramount. A diverse team managing the page will be more effective than a single person. A single manager is a single point of failure.

(6) **Policy and Training.** Establish a policy to include business rules on how your team will manage the social media presence(s). Hold them to it. Train personnel and their families on the safe and responsible use of social media and what to expect from a social media presence.

(7) **Senior Leader Involvement.** The involvement of the JFC and senior leaders will greatly increase the value and credibility of any social media presences. Participation by senior leaders does not need to be continuous but periodic, recurring interest and active participation will greatly improve the quality of the social media presence.

e. **OPSEC.** Identify those personnel that are authorized to post content to social media sites.

(1) Establish local procedures to ensure that all information posted on social media is released with release authority.

(2) Ensure all information posted is done so in accordance with PAG.

(3) Monitor social media presences for posts that violate OPSEC and remove as necessary.

(4) Conduct periodic training with personnel and families on what kind of content is not appropriate for posting online—and not just to the command’s social media presences.

(5) Inform Service members and families about maintaining security settings on personal social media sites. Otherwise, their information is available to the world.

(6) Periodically remind personnel and families via social media presences on maintaining OPSEC.

f. **Endorsement of Nongovernment Content.** The same guidelines regarding endorsement of NGOs and charities applies online, but it can be a challenge knowing when they apply. For example, liking a page on Facebook and following an account on Twitter does not constitute endorsement, just as having a subscription to a newspaper is not endorsing the paper. However, posting content about a business, organization, media, or charity, other than approved ones, or repurposing existing content about such groups (such as a retweet on Twitter) from an official command presence could be seen as endorsement if there is not a clear tie to the command. For example, linking to or reposting a link to a story about the command on a local TV station is acceptable, but linking to or promoting that station or stories from that station that are not about the command can be considered endorsement and should be avoided.

## 7. Social Media Planning

Like any overall CCS, consider many of the same things:

### a. Goal

- (1) What is the “big picture” reason for using social media?
- (2) Goals should reflect the command’s communication goals and tie into a broader communication synchronization.

### b. Objectives

- (1) Set realistic and measurable objectives to track progress.
- (2) Plan for the near, medium and long term.
- (3) Consider quality and sentiment, not just headcounts of fans.

### c. Identify Publics

- (1) Identify and prioritize publics to communicate with.
- (2) Be specific (command members, local residents, families, etc.).

### d. Content

- (1) Determine the story to tell and how, which should align with command’s goals.
- (2) Draft posting guidelines and/or comment policy to set expectations and determine after action when a violation of policy occurs.
- (3) Find topics that interest your publics and achieve your communication goals.
- (4) Create a content calendar, providing a quick tool to plan posts.
- (5) Be flexible and allow publics to shape conversations too.
- (6) Listen to publics and enable a real dialogue.
- (7) Go beyond repopulating content prepared for traditional channels.
- (8) Post content that gets publics to communicate with the command and each other.
- (9) Plan to coordinate content across online presences.

### e. Standard Operating Procedures

(1) Develop a standard operating procedure to manage workflow, assign tasks and allow for seamless personnel transitions.

(2) Determine the most appropriate team to manage account(s).

(3) Determine the right roles and level of access for each manager on each tool; involve senior leadership as much as possible.

(4) Plan to coordinate across relevant entities (e.g., Services and USG departments and agencies).

(5) Have a back-up plan for emergencies.

## **8. Social Media in Crisis Communication**

a. Using social media to communicate with stakeholders during a crisis has proven to be an especially effective use of the medium due to its speed, reach, and direct access. Social media has facilitated the distribution of information to key audiences and news media while providing a means for dialogue among the affected and interested publics. Here are some things to consider.

(1) Leverage already existing social presences to build trust. It is important to have a regularly updated channel of communication open to key audiences before the crisis hits so they know where to find trusted information online.

(2) Create a centralized location to funnel information. Do not fragment command into “command emergency services” and “command logistics”. Make the official command page, or a higher echelon page if appropriate, the nexus for information. If there is no command presence, then the people most interested in the crisis may decide to start their own group. Whatever the case, communicate where the people most affected are communicating.

(3) Monitor incoming content posted by users on social sites to understand what information they need and what is happening to them. Staff appropriately to answer questions as best as possible and ensure that the audience knows the command is listening and actively involved in the crisis.

(4) Post cleared information when available. There is no need to wait for a formal press release.

(5) Use mobile devices to keep social presences up to date. Mobile devices allow quick updates.

(6) Answer questions as often as practicable. Avoid just posting information on a social media presence; that is what command websites are for. Be prepared to have people ask questions. Respond back as quickly as possible through the most appropriate means of communication.

(7) Monitor external conversations regularly and correct inaccuracies. This is the best way to stop rumors before they run rampant. Use search engines and other monitoring tools to track discussion on the topic.

(8) Share and cross-promote critical information with your network of trusted social media sites, such as other military command sites, government, and official NGO sites like the American Red Cross.

(9) Encourage on-scene and first responder personnel to communicate via social media by having them either use personal accounts or feed the command information to post on the official command social sites.

(10) Promote the social media presence on outgoing materials like press releases, e-mail signatures, links on the home page and even in conversations with reporters.

(11) Analyze success of crisis communication via social media by looking at click-throughs, conversation, replies and reactions to postings, etc.

b. In crisis situations, information is at a premium. Depending on the event, there may be a distributed population, interrupted communication ability and a rumor mill running rampant. The audience will quickly grow from those impacted first-hand by the crisis to family members and the general public keeping their eyes on the crisis to see how it unfolds. In recent years, organizations like the American Red Cross, among others, have found social media an effective channel of communication during crisis events. A recent survey conducted by the American Red Cross found that almost half of respondents said they would use social media to tell loved ones they are safe during a crisis, this number was up from 16 percent in a previous poll. Of them, 86 percent would use Facebook, with a smaller portion turning to Twitter and other tools. If someone else needed help, 44 percent would try to get help by asking others in a social network to get in touch with authorities.

**(1) Before a Crisis**

(a) Obtain approval from the command to ensure that the command supports this communication.

(b) Establish a command presence on relevant social media platforms, at a minimum Facebook and Twitter.

(c) Plan for and train multiple people at the command to communicate through social media platforms during a crisis.

(d) Identify key-words that might be used when communicating about the command and any potential crisis that might occur (i.e., crash, collision, evacuation, humanitarian assistance).

(e) Identify key publics in a crisis (e.g., families, Service members, employees, community) and how to communicate with them in a crisis.

(f) Ensure key publics in a crisis situation know how information will be made available (e.g., family care line, website, Facebook, local radio, TV).

(g) Understand that communication service (such as the telephone or Internet access) may be interrupted during a crisis. Oftentimes when telephone and cellular phone access is limited, text message and data transmission from mobile devices are the only way to get information out. Devise creative contingency plans for disseminating information, such as the PAO may need to charge his or her Blackberry in a car in order to manage Facebook because of a power outage.

## **(2) During a Crisis**

(a) Communicate as planned, and use all communication channels to get information out to relevant publics.

(b) If the command does not have a social media presence, get one off the ground as soon as possible.

(c) Actively use social media presences to communicate relevant and timely information. Accuracy is important, but do not delay putting out useful information that can affect the safety and security of the publics.

(d) Listen to what publics say via social media and respond appropriately. This is an opportunity to ensure they are informed and gain useful information during the crisis.

(e) Search keywords surrounding the crisis and note what others are putting out. Do they have the correct information about the command? If not, provide them the correct facts to increase avenues to tell the command's stories to correct the record.

## **(3) After a Crisis**

(a) Ask designated communicators for lessons learned and implement changes to the crisis plan.

(b) Continue to provide useful and interesting updates and information to publics to maintain interest in the page.

(c) Thank the community members for spreading the word, helping and supporting each other through this crisis.

## **9. Social Media in Foreign Public Communication**

a. Communication with foreign stakeholders and publics is important. The growing reach of online forums, to include social media, has also made it easier to listen to and communicate with audiences abroad. A foreign public communication program is a natural outreach of the PA mission of the joint force when stationed abroad or operating forward. As with any other PA activity, the same basic tenets of communicating with the public apply.

b. **Missions.** Communication with foreign publics online can contribute to the overall PA mission of the joint force. Specifically, this form of public communication improves:

(1) **Presence**

(a) Communication with foreign publics online helps provide a persistent voice from the joint force and DOD, providing official messages and content.

(b) To maintain an effective presence, the joint force will need to identify and participate in sites that include audiences within the operational area as well as the diaspora. It is likely that the DOS country team is either aware of such sites or is already communicating with them through their own efforts.

(2) **Communication/Building Reach**

(a) Ongoing participation in conversations on relevant sites will build rapport with these publics and further the reach of joint force PA. This active communication presents an opportunity for further dissemination of joint force themes and messages.

(b) This is a continuous process. It is only through steady communication that the opportunities to further the reach with foreign publics will grow.

(3) **Counter propaganda.** Communicating with foreign publics online creates the opportunity to find and refute adversary rhetoric and correct misinformation in public forums with full attribution.

(4) **Environment Sensing and Cultural Advisement.** Monitoring and communicating with relevant foreign publics through online sites also has the benefit of providing information and situational awareness of events, opinions, and trends within the AOR. This contributes to joint force planning broadly and PA planning specifically.

c. Key considerations for online foreign public communication programs:

(1) As PA activities, all activity is fully attributable.

(2) Monitoring and communicating is most effectively done with native speakers as they bring a cultural competence and understanding of nuance that is often missing from those trained in a language. This may mean that the joint force will require contractor support to get this quality of expertise.

(3) A program to communicate with foreign publics online requires constant supervision by PA staff to ensure the native speakers communicating online are doing so in a manner that appropriately represents the joint force, DOD, and the USG.

(4) Themes and messages need to be tailored to the language and culture to be most effective. A simple, literal translation runs the risk of being ineffective if not outright counterproductive.



(5) The most effective way to implement an online foreign public communication program is for it to be integrated with a digital communication team that combines public affairs, language, and technical expertise into a single multidisciplinary unit.

(6) Joint force and interagency coordination are critical in communicating with foreign publics online. Other parts of the joint force have programs to communicate with foreign publics in different ways, at different levels, using varying levels of attribution (e.g., IO, KLE, DSPD). In addition, other parts of the USG (e.g., DOS, USAID) have mandates to work with foreign publics. It is critical that foreign public communication be fully coordinated within the joint force and also with interagency partners to ensure communication alignment and prevent communication conflicts with foreign publics.

## APPENDIX G JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING

### 1. Overview

a. Our nation expects its military forces to be successful in military operations. To do this, PA must be fully integrated into every operation. This means ensuring that PA personnel are trained, but also that the PA function is included in those activities designed to ensure the joint force is prepared to address CCDRs' mission requirements.

b. The challenges of training in a more demanding but more financially constrained environment are likely to continue. A greater reliance on joint training events will characterize military training, meaning that PA personnel will be expected to be able to contribute effectively in a joint environment as a normal part of their duties. Joint competency will not be seen as a bonus that only a few personnel have, but it will be expected that PA personnel are ready to step into a joint role with minimum delay.

c. In joint PA, there are several institutions that contribute directly to both the readiness of joint PA personnel and the training of the joint PA function. This appendix briefly discusses three of those institutions, their functions, and how the joint force accesses their capabilities.

### 2. Sources

#### a. JPASE

(1) The JPASE, which is part of USTRANSCOM's Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, provides a ready, rapidly deployable, joint PA capability to facilitate the establishment of a joint force headquarters and to bridge capability gaps in response to developing crises or contingency operations.

(2) A primary JPASE mission is to provide joint PA training, through participation in the Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development] exercise program, to better enable JFCs and their staffs to successfully meet evolving PA and information challenges in their respective theaters of operation. JPASE civilian PA officers are assigned to each Joint Staff J-7 supported exercise and attend all Joint Exercise Life Cycle events. During execution, the JPASE planner will serve as the PA cell lead, will attend white cell coordination meetings, and will be conversant with current issues relating to Joint Staff and Office of ASD(PA) policies and procedures, as well as all levels of PA issues in the exercise scenario.

(3) Since many of the PA training objectives relate to media relations, the JPASE planner coordinates closely with exercise control, IO, and World News Network (Joint Staff J-7 Exercise Broadcast News capability) to develop the synthetic media environment and ensure news injects are realistic, coordinated, and synchronized for maximum benefit for the training audience. The media environment encompasses traditional broadcast and print media, social media, and opposition forces communication capabilities. The JPASE lead plans and coordinates all face-to-face media engagements with the training audience. In

addition, JPASE is responsible for replicating news agencies and provides role-playing journalists to write stories and conduct interviews.

(4) JPASE is responsible for higher command replication, typically the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the CCMD PA, to facilitate the coordination, guidance, and/or direction necessary to drive PA and communication synchronization processes. The representative is typically a senior military PAO with recent real-world experience at CCMDs and in joint operations. JPASE maintains ongoing relationships with a wide network of active duty PAOs throughout the joint community and the DOD to stay abreast of current issues and processes to ensure JPASE SMEs are prepared for their role. Additionally, they work across functional lines to ensure appropriate stimuli are in place to allow command-wide involvement in the CCS.

(5) In addition, JPASE active duty officers frequently serve as observer trainers for the deployable training teams provided by the Joint Staff J-7 Deployable Training Division (DTD).

(6) JPASE supports primarily CCMD and JTF-level exercises, but will consider other requests on a case-by-case basis. All requests for JPASE exercise support must be entered in the Joint Training Information Management System. The requesting CCMD exercise lead or their representatives will identify the need for specific capabilities, coordinate with the JPASE planners, and ensure that the proper requests are entered into the Joint Training Information Management System.

#### **b. Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director for Joint Training DTD**

(1) The DTD provides deployable training teams to execute worldwide support for JFCs and staffs to enhance their readiness. Joint forces request DTD support through the Joint Staff J-7, while Service components request this support through their Service channels.

(2) The DTD's task-organized teams deliver tailored training and objective analysis to joint and combined force headquarters and their components to enhance operational readiness and inform joint force development.

(3) PA observer trainers support the DTD by providing PA perspectives, observations, and training on all aspects of mission planning and execution not only to PA training audiences, but also cross-functionally to ensure that PA is integrated into all aspects of joint force readiness. They provide feedback to counterparts, including individual and collective training, and collect and share observations and best practices to inform future operations planning as well as subsequent focus papers and doctrine.

#### **c. DMA/DINFOS**

(1) The DINFOS, a component of the DMA, provides PA professionals from all Services with advanced training in a variety of courses to help them prepare to rapidly transition into the duties and responsibilities of delivering effective PA capabilities in an OE. This training emphasizes operational planning and integration of both PA and VI into a joint

staff, while reinforcing basic and intermediate PA skills within the context of a joint operation. Students are exposed to the PA role and responsibilities in APEX and JOPP as well as contemporary communication theory concepts and principles, such as innovations and trends in emerging media capabilities. Students discuss the information environment, ethical principles of military communications, OE communication policies, legal considerations, and issue management best practices.

(2) The school also emphasizes the importance of identifying critical national policy, the development of doctrine and guidance from that strategic policy, and how it links to US values and security objectives. Special emphasis is placed on the use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power employed across the whole-of-government. Students examine the interplay among the USG, NGOs, and IGOs in the information environment and learn how effective communication can inform operation planning, support the JFC's intent, and engender the support of other countries and partner nations in advancing common interests. Instructors review best practices and discuss the critical role of PA in communication synchronization, and how interagency coordination and staff work makes PA professionals indispensable members of a joint planning staff. Students review instances where the US has succeeded or failed to build or to maintain credibility, and review fundamental solutions for helping frontline communicators formulate and deliver synchronized messages.

(3) In all cases, the DINFOS demonstrates a linkage to authoritative joint doctrine, and training content is constantly updated to ensure that it is effectively aligned with evolving operational processes, best practices, and current joint doctrine.

(4) PA personnel attend intermediate and advanced courses at DINFOS as scheduled through their Services. Joint forces or Service-level units can request additional DINFOS support and training (such as mobile training teams) by directly contacting the DINFOS Director of Training.

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## APPENDIX H REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-61 is based upon the following primary references:

### 1. Department of Defense Publications

- a. DOD 4515.13-R, *Air Transportation Eligibility*.
- b. DODD 3002.01, *Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense*.
- c. DODD 3600.01, *Information Operations (IO)*.
- d. DODD 5105.74, *Defense Media Activity (DMA)*.
- e. DODD 5122.05, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA])*.
- f. DODD 5122.11, *Stars and Stripes (S&S) Newspapers and Business Operations*.
- g. DODD 5230.09, *Clearance of DOD Information for Public Release*.
- h. DODD 5400.07, *DOD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program*.
- i. DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*.
- j. DODI 3115.10E, *Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery*.
- k. DODI 5040.02, *Visual Information (VI)*.
- l. DODI 5120.20, *American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)*.
- m. DODI 5122.08, *Use of DOD Transportation Assets for Public Affairs Purposes*.
- n. DODI 5200.01, *DOD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information*.
- o. DODI 5230.29, *Security and Policy Review of DOD Information for Public Release*.
- p. DODI 5400.13, *Public Affairs (PA) Operations*.
- q. DODI 5400.14, *Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations*.
- r. DODI 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*.
- s. DODI 5410.19, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy Implementation*.
- t. DODI 8550.01, *DOD Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities*.

u. DODM 5120.20, *Management of American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS)*.

v. *The Joint Travel Regulations*.

## **2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**

a. CJCSI 1301.01F, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*.

b. CJCSI 3150.25, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*.

c. CJCSI 3205.01D, *Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM)*.

d. CJCSI 3210.01C, *Joint Information Operations Proponent*.

e. CJCSI 3213.01D, *Joint Operations Security*.

f. CJCSI 3270.01B, *Personnel Recovery*.

g. CJCSM 3130.03, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance*.

h. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.

i. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

j. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.

k. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.

l. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

m. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

n. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.

o. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*.

p. JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*.

q. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.

r. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.

s. JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security*.

t. JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*.

u. JP 3-14, *Space Operations*.

- v. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- w. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- x. JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*.
- y. JP 3-50, *Personnel Recovery*.
- z. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- aa. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- bb. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.
- cc. JDN 2-13, *Commander's Communication Synchronization*.

### **3. Multi-Service Publication**

ATP 3-55.12/MCRP 3-33.7A/NTTP 3-61.2/AFTTP 3-2.41, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera (COMCAM) Operations*.



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## APPENDIX J ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

### 1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

### 2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is Joint Staff, Public Affairs.

### 3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*, 25 August 2010.

### 4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JED//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

### 5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

## 6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), ATTN: Defense Foreign Liaison Office, Rm 2A668, Washington, DC 20340.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

## GLOSSARY

### PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AFRTS	American Forces Radio and Television Service
AFTTP	Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
AOR	area of responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
ASD(PA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
ATP	Army techniques publication
CA	civil affairs
CAIS	civil authority information support
CAP	crisis action planning
CBRN CM	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CCS	commander's communication synchronization
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COM	chief of mission
COMCAM	combat camera
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONUS	continental United States
CUI	controlled unclassified information
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DCE	defense coordinating element
DCO	defense coordinating officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIMOC	Defense Imagery Management Operations Center
DINFOS	Defense Information School
DMA	Defense Media Activity
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DODM	Department of Defense manual
DOS	Department of State
DPO	Defense Press Office
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
DSPD	defense support to public diplomacy

DTD	Deployable Training Division
DVIDS	Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
ESF	emergency support function
EXORD	execute order
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
GCC	geographic combatant commander
HN	host nation
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IO	information operations
IRC	information-related capability
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-7	Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development
JCCC	Joint Combat Camera Center
JCSE	Joint Communications Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JDN	joint doctrine note
JFC	joint force commander
JHNS	Joint Hometown News Service
JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JIC	joint information center
JNCC	joint network operations control center
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JPASE	Joint Public Affairs Support Element (USTRANSCOM)
JTF	joint task force
KLE	key leader engagement
LNO	liaison officer
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MILDEC	military deception
MISO	military information support operations
MOC	media operations center
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance

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NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NICCL	National Incident Communications Conference Line
NRF	National Response Framework
NSC	National Security Council
NTTP	Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
OE	operational environment
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
PA	public affairs
PAG	public affairs guidance
PAO	public affairs officer
PD	public diplomacy
PO	peace operations
PPAG	proposed public affairs guidance
PR	personnel recovery
RC	Reserve Component
RFF	request for forces
SME	subject matter expert
TV	television
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
VI	visual information
VIRIN	visual information record identification number
VISION ID	visual information professional identifier
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WSV	weapons system video

## PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**American Forces Radio and Television Service.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**audience.** In public affairs, a broadly-defined group that contains stakeholders and/or publics relevant to military operations. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**combat camera.** Specially-trained expeditionary forces from Service-designated units capable of providing high-quality directed visual information during military operations. Also called **COMCAM.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**commander's communication synchronization.** A process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities. Also called **CCS.** (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**command information.** Communication by a military organization directed to the internal audience that creates an awareness of the organization's goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and keeps them informed about what is going on in the organization. Also called **internal information.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61)

**community engagement.** Public affairs activities that support the relationship between military and civilian communities. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**external audience.** In public affairs, all people who are not United States military members, Department of Defense civilian employees, and their immediate families. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**internal audience.** In public affairs, United States military members and Department of Defense civilian employees and their immediate families. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**internal information.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**Joint Public Affairs Support Element.** A deployable unit assigned to assist a joint force commander in developing and training public affairs forces in joint, interagency, and multinational environments. Also called **JPASE.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61)

**media operations center.** A facility established by the commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of military operations. Also called **MOC.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**media pool.** A limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media organizations for purposes of news gathering and sharing of material during a specified activity. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**message.** 1. Any thought or idea expressed briefly in a plain or secret language and prepared in a form suitable for transmission by any means of communication. (JP 6-0) 2. A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme. Also called **MSG.** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61)

**military journalist.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**news media representative.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**official information.** Information that is owned by, produced for or by, or is subject to the control of the United States Government. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61)

**public.** In public affairs, a segment of the population with common attributes to which a military force can tailor its communication. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**public affairs.** Communication activities with external and internal audiences. Also called **PA.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**public affairs assessment.** An analysis of the news media and public environments to evaluate the degree of understanding about strategic and operational objectives and military activities and to identify levels of public support. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**public affairs guidance.** Constraints and restraints established by proper authority regarding public communication activities. Also called **PAG.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**public information.** Within public affairs, information of a military nature, the dissemination of which is consistent with security and approved for public release. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

**security review.** The process of reviewing information and products prior to public release to ensure the material will not jeopardize ongoing or future operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61)

**stakeholder.** In public affairs, an individual or group that is directly impacted by military operations, actions, and/or outcomes, and whose interests positively or negatively motivate them toward action. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)


**technical documentation.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**visual information.** Various visual media with or without sound that generally includes still and motion photography, audio video recording, graphic arts, and visual presentations. Also called **VI.** (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)



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# JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-61** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

