The "What Ifs?" of Yitzhak Rabin, 20 Years Later

Yitzhak Rabin, 1922-1995

Over the past several days Israeli and Western media have been full of appreciations of the late Yitzhak Rabin, shot down by fellow Israeli Yigal Amir 20 years ago tomorrow. Most of what needs to be said has already been said by others, but I want to add a few thoughts of my own.

Speculating about alternative histories, the "what ifs?", is one of the most tempting, but also most futile, of historical enterprises. But in the two decades since Rabin's death, an entire generation of young Israelis and Palestinians has grown up which never knew the heady first years after the Oslo Accords, when so many things seemed possible, even within reach; as opposed to now, when nothing does.

Rabin was an unlikely candidate for peacemaker, but like Richard Nixon going to China or Menachem Begin making peace with Egypt, that may have been an advantage.

Born in Jerusalem in 1922, he would be the first sabra (native-born) Prime Minister (unless one counts a few days Yigal Allon served in an acting capacity between the death of Levi Eshkol and the election of Golda Meir). Chief of Operations for the Palmach during the 1948 War, Rabin soon began to rise through the ranks of the IDF. As Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the 1967 War, an apparent health issue led to controversy, but he overcame it, He served as Ambassador to Washington in 1968-1973, when, as a young grad student, I first saw him speak. In 1973 he was elected to the Knesset and within a year, after Golda Meir's resignation, he was elected leader of the Labor Alignment and found himself Prime Minister.

A religious dispute led to new elections being called in 1977 and a financial controversy saw the victory of Likud under Begin. He returned to office in the 1980s, as Defense Minister in several governments.

During the eighties I was writing on Middle Eastern defense issues and found myself in Israel almost annually and sometimes more. I met Rabin a couple of times and attended several press conferences and may have asked him a question or two, though I surely never "knew" him. He came across as he did to many of his fellow-countrymen: smart and tough but with a rather abrasive personality; crusty, a chain-smoking, raspy-voiced soldier who didn't smile a lot. His personality was a sharp contrast to his longtime Labor rival Shimon Peres, who came across a a nice guy but not that effective, while Rabin was the tough cop who got things done. That may be unfair, but it is how he came across to his audiences.

Rabin won his second term as Prime Minister in 1992 and the following year came the Oslo Accords. The famous handshake between Rabin and Yasser Arafat at the White House says a lot:
Rabin is rather visibly uncomfortable.  In 2013 I compared it to two other uncomfortable Middle Eastern handshakes: that between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle at Casablanca in 1943 and that between Obama and Qadhafi in Italy in 2009.

Oslo seems distant now. The failures which followed, especially the Camp David II collapse, was not one-sided; Arafat and Ehud Barak were both being asked to agree to something neither was ready to do.

What if Rabin had lived? We'll never know. If John F. Kennedy had lived, would he have pulled out of Vietnam as Oliver Stone but few others believe? If Lincoln had lived, would Reconstruction have been different and Jim Crow avoided? If Rabin had, lived, would we have a two-state solution? Thanks to the bullets of Lee Harvey Oswald, John Wilkes Booth, and Yigal Amir, we're never going to know.

Rabin died 20 years ago tomorrow. Oslo died more recently, and many think it's time to take the two-state solution off life support. Would things have been different had he lived? We'll never know, but I want those born or who have come of age since then to know what once, however improbable, once seemed at least possible and even within our grasp. I still want to believe it might have been so.

And There's a White [Eastern] Christmas in the Forecast for Bethlehem

As Orthodox Christmas Eve celebrations were getting under way in Bethlehem tonight, Israel and the Palestinian Authority were bracing for a winter storm that has already battered Turkey and Lebanon. A white Christmas is pretty rare in Bethlehem, but it appears to be on the way, though most of the religious ceremonies are tonight.

The Truce Has Collapsed, But Egypt and PA Say Truce Talks are Still On

 The "72-hour" truce in Gaza collapsed in something more like two hours, but there's considerable confusion about whether the scheduled talks about a longer truce scheduled for Cairo are still possible. Israel and Hamas seem to believe they're off, and Israeli reports say Egypt "postponed" them, but Egypt's Foreign Ministry says they're still on, as does the Palestinian Authority, which says a joint PLO/Hamas/Islamic Jihad delegation has been appointed and plans to be in Cairo tomorrow.


In the welter of conflicting reports, I would merely note that unless both Hamas and Israel show up, Egypt and the PLO won't have much to talk about. What if they gave a peace and nobody came?

I suspect the prospects are not bright, however much Egypt and the PA may cling to hope, but I'd be glad to be proven wrong.

The Silence of the Arab Regimes

The New York Times has taken note of a phenomenon I had been planning to talk about soon anyway, so I'll use their piece as a takeoff point for my own comments: "Arab Leaders Silent, Viewing Hamas as Worse Than Israel."

As Israel's current operation in Gaza grows into something much longer and deadlier than Cast Lead six years ago, there has been much international condemnation, from Europe, the UN, and human rights groups. The US is less critical and the US Congress openly supportive (and the US is resupplying Israel with munitions in the midst of the operation), but there has been considerable criticism in the media and academia.

But two sources of pressure that helped bring previous Gaza interventions to a ceasefire are absent here. First, domestic support in Israel is higher than in some previous interventions, with polls showing overwhelming support among Israeli Jews, and Israeli peace activists increasingly facing confrontations with supporters of the war.

But even more striking is the fact that, while there has been much sympathy expressed toward Gaza in the Arab "street," the Arab regimes have been mostly silent. Egypt did make a ceasefire proposal early on, which Israel accepted (and which some suspect was negotiated beforehand) and Hamas rejected. But after the Hamas rejection, Egypt essentially washed its hands of the situation. And Egypt, of course, shares a border with Gaza, and by keeping the Rafah crossing closed, is complicit, at the very least, with maintaining the siege of Gaza. It allows humanitarian supplies in, but doesn't allow those under bombardment out.

The other country with diplomatic relations with Israel, Jordan, is also part of the broad Sunni alliance that opposes the Muslim Brotherhood, and which also includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At least there is evidence that the Jordanian street (with its substantial Palestinian component) is restive and supportive of Gaza civilians, if not Hamas.

The Egyptian "street" is another matter. Some of Egypt's talk-show hosts have been so virulently anti-Hamas that Israel has been quoting them in propaganda broadcasts into Gaza. Though Field Marshal Sisi rose to power under the Morsi Presidency, he and his supporters have vowed to crush the Muslim Brotherhood, and of course, Hamas was formed from the Gaza branch. And most indications are that the sentiment is widely shared among secular Egyptians.

With Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis and the UAE forming a solid front against Hamas, and Libya, Syria, and Iraq preoccupied with other matters, Hamas has few friends: Qatar, Iran and Hizbullah, and the latter two are tied down in Syria and Iraq. Whereas the Hamas leadership in exile were once welcomed in ‘Amman, and after that in Damascus, today they are stuck in distant Doha.

I have left out one Arab regime: the Palestinian Authority. Despite the recent reconciliation between Hamas and the PLO under Mahmoud ‘Abbas, and very vocal criticisms by ‘Abbas, and threats to take Israel to the International Criminal Court,the Palestinian Security Forces kept the West Bank largely quiet during the first two weeks of the campaign. Only in the last ten days or so have demonstrations in the West Bank led to open clashes, but ‘Abbas has largely kept the West Bank, if vocal, nonviolent.

We can only speculate whether the post-Arab Spring anti-Muslim Brotherhood alliance encouraged Israel to launch the present campaign; but it has surely encouraged it to seek a more thorough destruction of Hamas' military capabilities than it did in earlier incursions.

From +972 Magazine: "Why Isn't the West Bank Rioting, Too?"

Larry Derfner at the dovish Israeli +972 mag asks and generally answers a question that hasn't gotten much attention: "Why Isn't the West Bank Rioting, Too?."

Gaza's firing rockets, East Jerusalem is seeing riots, but the West Bank is calm.

The Netanyahu government isn't likely to publicly credit Mahmoud ‘Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, which may be why we aren't seeing the question asked more frequently.

(As many of you will know, +972 takes its name from Israel's telephone country code.)

The Vatican Prayer "Summit": Merely Symbolic or Something More?

Stalin allegedly asked once, when someone brought up the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" Most versions claim Stalin said it to Churchill in 1944, but Churchill himself insisted it was actually said in 1935 to the (right-wing, later Vichy) French politician Pierre Laval, of all people.

It's been a long time since any Pope fielded an actual army, but the Papacy still has considerable clout in the world, and not only with Catholic countries, as Pope Francis' hosting of Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud ‘Abbas reminds us. Of course, bringing the two men together to pray and plant trees in the Vatican garden is merely symbolic; this was not a peace negotiation, and Peres is the 90-year old President who is on the very brink of retiring, not the Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who could actually deliver a deal if he chose to.

The Pope says this was a prayer service for peace, not a negotiation or a mediation,saying that is a job for diplomacy, but the Pope has also referred in the past to the role of his namesake, Francis of Assisi, during the Crusades, when the saint met with the Ayyubid Sultan al-Malik al-Kamil, leading to truce negotiations.

But while the event may have been largely symbolic, coming at a time when Netanyahu is refusing to talk to ‘Abbas due the creation of a unity government that includes Hamas, symbols have power. Think of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem: it took two years from there to the Peace Treaty, but the image of the Egyptian President speaking to the Knesset was a breakthrough. Think of American "ping-pong diplomacy" with China in he Nixon years. Yesterday's meeting was clearly symbolic, but it offered the hopeful message I suspected the Pope was seeking.

A Better Turnout in Bethlehem?

For those readers who celebrate Christmas on the Western or Latin date, Merry Christmas! Since most of the Middle East's Christians celebrate on the Orthodox date, Christmas-related posts will continue into January, but for those of you on the Gregorian calendar, Christmas greetings.

A number of reports suggest a larger Christmas Eve turnout for Bethlehem than in some recent years, which is good news for the town. Since the bulk of the pilgrims come from Jerusalem they, plus the Latin Patriarch and his procession, have to pass through a checkpoint in the Israeli separation wall, leading to lots of dramatic pictures, since the barrier between Jerusalem and the Bethlehem and Bait Jala areas is marked by some of the most formidable parts of the wall and watchtowers, leading to plenty of commentaries along these lines:

As Robert Frost put it, "Something there is that Doesn't Love a Wall ..."; but while I find the barrier deeply disturbing, I should note that Bethlehem is not actually walled in, just walled off from Jerusalem and Israeli settlements nearby:

On the other hand, the separation barrier has some strange routing, such as running down both sides of a road and then enclosing Rachel's Tomb, a Jewish holy site on the northern edge of Bethlehem, as shown in this Google Earth shot from a few years ago:

The ‘Arafat Polonium Story

The renewed attention to charges that Yasser ‘Arafat may have died from exposure to radioactive polonium-210, following the exhumation of the remains and a study by Swiss scientists, is naturally drawing a lot of attention. You can find the Swiss forensics report here. The forensic study did not claim conclusive proof, but said that "our observations are coherent with a hypothesis of poisoning, in any case more consistent than with the opposite hypothesis." In any event, what had seemed to many like a wild tale has taken on new life, since it is unclear how both ‘Arafat's body and personal effects could have been exposed in any way other than deliberately. Still, the evidence is not absolutely conclusive, and at this remove (nine years), the evidence is somewhat muddled, and I have little new to add to the debate.

Unsurprisingly, Palestinian officials are blaming Israel, and Israel is denying everything. Of course, Israel was not the only party with reason to want ‘Arafat out of the picture. Clayton Swisher, who originally broke the story for Al Jazeera English in July of 2012, has an op-ed at The Guardian reminding us that many of the unanswered questions about the death might have been answered if the Palestinian Authority had cooperated with French investigators. (Full disclosure: Swisher is s former collealgue of mine at the Middle East Institute.) And this piece at Le Figaro (French) suggests that French intelligence may already know more than they have acknowledged.

We may never know what actually happened. But if we believe this story in The Egypt Independent,

Suha Arafat, widow of late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, has called on Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to help find out the murderer of her husband during a telephone interview with Egyptian television channel, Dream.

She appealed to Sisi to take an interest in the issue and form an international committee to investigate.

I fear she's been reading Egyptian media about  General Sisi's abilities,

Oslo at 20: Two Views on the Two-State Solution

The 20th anniversary of the signing of the Oslo Accords (left) has of course generated a lot of commentary, including the now inevitable debate over whether the two-state solution is dead.

Two informed commentaries that reach (largely) opposite conclusions are worthy of your attention. In Sunday's New York Times Ian Lustick offered a post-mortem on the "Two-State Illusion." Sample:

Yet the fantasy that there is a two-state solution keeps everyone from taking action toward something that might work.

All sides have reasons to cling to this illusion. The Palestinian Authority needs its people to believe that progress is being made toward a two-state solution so it can continue to get the economic aid and diplomatic support that subsidize the lifestyles of its leaders, the jobs of tens of thousands of soldiers, spies, police officers and civil servants, and the authority’s prominence in a Palestinian society that views it as corrupt and incompetent.

Israeli governments cling to the two-state notion because it seems to reflect the sentiments of the Jewish Israeli majority and it shields the country from international opprobrium, even as it camouflages relentless efforts to expand Israel’s territory into the West Bank.

American politicians need the two-state slogan to show they are working toward a diplomatic solution, to keep the pro-Israel lobby from turning against them and to disguise their humiliating inability to allow any daylight between Washington and the Israeli government.

And the alternatives? Lustick continues:

In such a radically new environment, secular Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank could ally with Tel Aviv’s post-Zionists, non-Jewish Russian-speaking immigrants, foreign workers and global-village Israeli entrepreneurs. Anti-nationalist ultra-Orthodox Jews might find common cause with Muslim traditionalists. Untethered to statist Zionism in a rapidly changing Middle East, Israelis whose families came from Arab countries might find new reasons to think of themselves not as “Eastern,” but as Arab. Masses of downtrodden and exploited Muslim and Arab refugees, in Gaza, the West Bank and in Israel itself could see democracy, not Islam, as the solution for translating what they have (numbers) into what they want (rights and resources). Israeli Jews committed above all to settling throughout the greater Land of Israel may find arrangements based on a confederation, or a regional formula more attractive than narrow Israeli nationalism.

It remains possible that someday two real states may arise. But the pretense that negotiations under the slogan of “two states for two peoples” could lead to such a solution must be abandoned. Time can do things that politicians cannot.

A less grim assessment from Hussein Ibish and Saliba Sarsar at The Daily Beast: "Israel and Palestine Vs. 'Blood and Magic'." They strongly disagree:

However, as the latter part of his article makes clear, his "new ideas" are mainly an incoherent jumble of imaginary scenarios, all of which require an alternative reality to emerge at some point in the future. Nothing he suggests can be built on under present circumstances. None of it holds together as a coherent or even semi-coherent counterproposal.

Worse still, most of what he envisages requires by his own admission decades, if not centuries, to become possibilities, and further Israeli-Palestinian conflict is inevitable.

So not only would we have to wait scores of decades, if not centuries, for any of these "alternatives" to begin to emerge, they could only be the product of further wide-scale bloodshed.

Despite Prof. Lustick's passionate dismissal, the two-state solution remains the only viable option for ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. His counterfactual musings don't provide any practicable, coherent or implementable alternatives. It's an interesting thought experiment to dismiss the global consensus, stated position of all relevant parties, logical implementation of international law, and only practicable means of achieving the minimum goals of each party in favor of flights of fancy. But it has no political value whatsoever. Indeed undermining the only plausible conflict-ending scenario, while not suggesting any serious, practicable alternatives, is actually harmful.

Although realizing a two-state solution faces serious and growing obstacles, it alone allows both Palestinians and Israelis to avoid an ongoing struggle with no end in sight. Yes, “Time can do things that politicians cannot,” as Prof. Lustick writes, but the goal must be to achieve a solution in our lifetime—not in 120 years as with Irish independence, or 132 years as with Algerian independence, two of the key examples he cites.

The occupation is an emergency, not a macro- or trans-historical problem, particularly for the millions of Palestinians living under its oppressive rule. They, especially—but we too—do not have the luxury of waiting to see what the next hundred years of history will bring us, good or bad. On the contrary, we must have the courage to act now, and with urgency, within the existing realities, however difficult, to try to create a working solution to a situation that is both intolerably unjust and regionally (and to some extent even globally) destabilizing.

The debate over the two-state solution is growing in recent years. These two articles, I think, encapsulate the opposing arguments rather well. Ibish and Sarsar seem to recognize the urgency of a solution, while Lustick feels the opportunity has already been missed. For those of us without the patience to wait for the long-term historical evolution Lustick describes, I hope the two-state solution can still be salvaged. But given the present leaderships on three sides (including Hamas in Gaza), I fear that Lustick may prove right.

In any event, both of these thoughtful analyses deserve a full and careful reading, not just my brief excerpts.

Rami Hamdallah: The New Palestinian PM

Rami Hamdallah is the new Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, replacing Salam Fayyad. Hamdallah has been serving as President of An Najah University in Nablus, and is a professor of applied linguistics. The PA is struggling with an economic crisis and his appointment has been criticized by Hamas, which claims it violates the agreement on trying to find a reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Haaretz called him "a good man on a suicide mission" today.

Choosing a respected academic not overly identified with the politics of Fatah is probably wise; whether he will face the same obstacles Fayyad encountered remains to be seen, and Fayyad at least had the advantage of being a favorite of the West and of Israel (which, in the end, turned out to be a disadvantage as well).

Fayyad's Fall: Was the West Too Supportive?

The resignation over the weekend of Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad came after weeks of political maneuvering and longstanding issues with President ‘Abbas,but the timing is nevertheless unfortunate given the US attempt to restart the peace process, embodied in President Obama's and Secretary of State John Kerry's recent visits to the region.

There's a wide range of commentary out there (links below), but one emerging theme seems to be this: Did the US (and Israel) actually undermine Fayyad's position by their enthusiastic support for his policies? Did this tend to lead to his being seen as "America's man" (and hence Israel's) in the Palestinian Authority?

Certainly from Fayyad's initial appointment in 2007 the US and the West generally have been enthusiastic in their support of Fayyad's economic policies, reform measures, efforts to build infrastructure and civil society, — and quite justifiably so, in my opinion. But as this perhaps laid on a bit too thick, allowing Fayyad's enemies to label him a Western (read: American) puppet or stooge? That seems to be a criticism being put forward by many of Fayyad's supporters.

For a wide range of English-language analysis and opinion on Fayyad's departure: The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian, The Independent, The Telegraph, The National, Arab News, Haaretz (paywall),  972 Magazine.

November 29, 1947 and November 29, 2012: Is 65 Years Long Enough?

If all goes according to plan, the United Nations General Assembly will vote today on whether the Palestinian Authority should be admitted as a "Non-Member Observer State." Because such a calamity would cause several planets to spin out of their orbits and crash into the sun, the US (and Israel) are opposed. The vote will have a mostly symbolic impact, though Israel may retaliate against the Palestinian Authority in ways that are not at all symbolic.

But there is one major piece of symbolism that has received very little comment in the US media, at least so far as I've seen. (A major exception is Lior Sternfeld's column over at Juan Cole's blog a couple of days ago: "'Let the Palestinians Have Their Kaf Tet be-November.") 

As Sternfeld explains:

On November 29, 1947 the UN general assembly granted the Zionist movement one of its most prominent diplomatic achievements, when it approved the Palestine Partition Plan. The non-binding resolution, never voted on by the UN Security Council, proposed dividing the land of the British mandate into a Jewish State and an Arab-Palestinian state. The Palestinian leadership rejected the UNGA resolution as giving away a substantial amount of territory to which they felt what they viewed as foreign settlers had no right. In contrast, Jews welcomed the idea of partition in principle (though they did not commit to settled borders for Israel) and they moved forward to establish the state of Israel.

Kaf-Tet means 29 in Hebrew letters, and to date every Israeli child can tell by heart what Kaf-Tet Be’November is, even if he does not know what or when November is. Every Israeli child recognizes the old radio recording of the voting process and thus know how Argentina and Australia voted on this issue (abstention and yes respectively). The war that erupted immediately afterwards and the bloodshed that has transpired since prevented the full implementation of the solution.

Yes. Today marks the anniversary of the United Nations vote in 1947 to partition the Palestine Mandate into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. (You may recall a dramatic scene in the movie Exodus, which explained how blue-eyed Paul Newman and blonde Eva Marie Saint founded Israel, in wh8ch listeners wait for the radio account of the roll call.) Yes, the Arabs rejected partition then. But 65 years have passed, and there's something like a consensus for a '"two state solution" but little will to get there.

The Palestinians chose a significant date for their new bid for legitimacy, but other than the post above I've seen little comment on the 65th anniversary of Kaf-Tet be-November.


http://www.juancole.com/2012/11/let-the-palestinians-have-their-kaf-tet-benovember-sternfeld.html

Omar Dajani on "Arafat's Ghost"

The exhumation of Yasser Arafat's body has to be one of the more bizarre and macabre stories of the year, and I must confess I have no idea what the results may be. It's of some personal nterest since my netime MEI colleague Clayton Swisher, now with Al Jazeera English, dug up the story that led them to di g up Arafat. I tend to be skeptical of conspiracy theories, but this is the Middle East, and he had many enemies. (I think Palestinians are reflexively assuming that if he was poisoned it must have been Israel, but a real conspiracy theorist ought to be able to come up with something more Byzantine than that.)

Omar Dajani's post yesterday at Foreign Policy, "Arafat's Ghost," neatly ties the exhumation with the UN vote on Palestine. It's worth a read.

Egypt to Provide Security for Qatari Ruler's Landmark Gaza Visit

It's being reported that Egypt's Republican Guard will provide security for the Amir of Qatar and his entourage during their visit to Gaza. Sheikh Hamad arrives at al-Arish tomorrow, will be flown to the Rafah Crossing in an Egyptian helicopter, and then proceed to a six-hour tour of Gaza via motorcade during which he will inaugurate reconstruction projects.

The visit has already raised hackles with the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, which fears this first visit by an Arab Head of State to Gaza since Hamas took over there will legitimize Hamas; no representatives from Ramallah were invited, most obviously including President Mahmoud
‘Abbas.  Fatah has called for a boycott of the trip.

Nor is Israel happy with the seeming legitimization of Hamas,

If it is confirmed that Egypt will be providing security within Gaza,  it would also seem to further indicate a rapprochement between Egypt, now led by a President from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Hamas regime in Gaza. Hamas originated from the Muslim Brotherhood of Gaza, an offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood from the days of Egyptian control in Gaza in 1948-1967.

AJE's Arafat Report: The Longer Version

On Tuesday I reported on Al Jazeera English's investigative report claiming Yasser Arafat showed traces of exposure to radioactive polonium in his last days. At the time I embedded their first short news report and noted that the full report would be broadcast later that day. I'm now embedding the full report. I know some are calling for exhuming the body while others are saying there's no real evidence. Judge for yourselves.

Clayton Swisher on His AJE Arafat Story

I noted earlier today Al Jazeera English's big story today claiming to have documented the presence of radioactive polonium in Yasser Arafat's body at the time of his death in 2004.  At AJE's blogs, reporter Clayton Swisher, who got the story, discusses his experience with the story.

And again full disclosure, as previously noted Clayton is a former colleague of mine from his days at MEI, pre-Al Jazeera English.

AJE Claims Arafat Showed High Levels of Polonium at Time of Death

Allegations that the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was poisoned have always seemed far-fetched, the usual Middle Eastern conspiracy theories, despite the fact that his doctors never offered a cause of death and there was no autopsy after his death in 2004. Rumors that he died of AIDS, liver disease, etc. were rampant but unproven.

Al Jazeera English is claiming today to have conducted a nine-month investigation and is reporting that a radiation laboratory in Lausanne, Switzerland, has found high levels of radioactive polonium in Arafat's personal affects (clothing, toothbrush, etc.), suggesting his body contained the radioactive substance in his last days. Polonium was responsible for the death of exiled Russian former spy Alexander Litvinenko, who died in London in 2006. According to the AJE report (a fuller hour-long report will reportedly be aired soon):

Polonium is present in the atmosphere, but the natural levels that accumulate on surfaces barely register, and the element disappears quickly. Polonium-210, the isotope found on Arafat's belongings, has a half-life of 138 days, meaning that half of the substance decays roughly every four-and-a-half months. “Even in case of a poisoning similar to the Litvinenko case, only traces of the order of a few [millibecquerels] were expected to be found in [the] year 2012,” the institute noted in its report to Al Jazeera.

But Arafat’s personal effects, particularly those with bodily fluids on them, registered much higher levels of the element. His toothbrushes had polonium levels of 54mBq; the urine stain on his underwear, 180mBq. (Another man’s pair of underwear, used as a control, measured just 6.7mBq.)

Further tests, conducted over a three-month period from March until June, concluded that most of that polonium – between 60 and 80 per cent, depending on the sample – was “unsupported,” meaning that it did not come from natural sources.

I have no idea if Arafat was really poisoned, but this does at least suggest an agent that was used, which  previous conspiracy theories have not.  Palestinians will of course assume Israel was behind any poisoning plot. Whether it is possible to confirm any of this at this late date is of course questionable. And one must wonder why, given the amount of questions at the time, this was not discovered (or revealed) at the time of his death?

Full disclosure: Al Jazeera English reporter Clayton Swisher, who worked on this story for the past nine months, is a former colleague of mine at the Middle East Institute.

The Al Jaseera English report (again, a longer report will be aired later today):

Spring Issue: Now Online

The Spring issue of The Middle East Journal is now available online. You can purchase a download if you're not a subscriber. or become a member here; if you're already a subscriber instructions for online access is here.

• "Continuity and Change in the Social Background of Israel's Military Elite," by Oren Barak and Eyal Tsur. The authors, working with a database that they compiled, analyze the personal backgrounds of high-ranking officers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

• "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: Preliminary Lessons and Projections for the Future," by Omri Arens and Edward Kaufman makes the argument that a "massive, organized, and sustained nonviolent Palestinian resistance" has the best chance of success for Palestinians seeking to establish a Palestinian state.

• "Factors Influencing Military-Media Relations in Turkey," by F. Michael Wuthrich. This article examines the sometimes cozy and sometimes contentious relationship between the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and Turkey's mass media, seeking to explain the factors behind the TAF's "informal mechanisms of power."
• "Democratic Islamization in Pakistan and Turkey: Lessons for the Post-Arab Spring Muslim World," by Juris Pupcenoks looks at two previous case studies, Pakistan and Turkey, and extrapolates some lessons applicable to Islamist political participation in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries affected by the "Arab Awakening."
• "What the Social Sciences Can Tell Policy-Makers in Yemen," by Robert E. Mitchell emphasizes a theme that is close to our core mission here at the Middle East Institute: understanding the importance of a thorough and nuanced understanding of a country’s social and cultural context as critical tools in the formation of policy.
• The book review article in this issue, by As’ad Ghanem, deals with five recent books on Palestinians in Israel within the Green Line, the people usually referred to as Israeli Arabs, and their changing roles and attitudes.

Latin Christmas in Bethlehem Videos

Al Jazeera English's coverage of Latin Christmas in Bethlehem:





Since most Middle Eastern Christians celebrate on the Eastern (Julian calendar) date, there'll be more posts on Christmas in the Middle East as that date approaches.

A Christmas Prediction

It's December 22. Any minute now, all the TV networks should be airing their once a year "Christmas in troubled Bethlehem" spots. At least it helps boost tourism, but Bethlehem's problems are there year round, as is the wall that separates it from Jerusalem.