The Battle of Romani, August 4-5, 1916: Part II

In yesterday's Part I, we discussed the forces engaged and the initial deployments before the Battle of Romani in the Sinai a century ago. The advancing Ottoman and German force had been closely tracked by the British in their trek across Sinai, thanks to the new tool of aerial reconnaissance. the  The Turkish force had an extended logistical line, while the British fortifications were at the railhead of the line they were building across Sinai, and could be quickly rushed reinforcements from Qantara on the Canal. They had had the time to fortify the defensive position at Romani. While the Turco-German force slightly outnumbered the British Imperial forces (mostly ANZACs), they faced the challenges of being on the offense and far from potential reinforcements. Both the head of the German Military Mission, Liman von Sanders, and the local German commander on the scene, Kress von Kressenstein, complained about the decision to advance against the well-entrenched British forces.

As the British lines were anchored on the left by the sea, the Turkish attack was aimed at turning the right of the lines, in the desert. The hope was to drive in the flank and attack the rail line.

This was exactly what Harry Chauvel expected. Initially his main force consisted of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade; the 2nd Brigade was scattered in outposts and on patrol.

At around midnight on August 3/4. the Turkish advance force suddenly encountered the Light Horse on the right of the line. Fire was exchanged, and the Turks fell back to regroup. They began an organized attack around 1 AM. Through the night the Turks advanced, and the 1st Light Horse was forced to steadily fall back to a sand ridge they called Wellington Ridge. Various dunes and sandhills had been given names (Mount Meredith, Mount Royston) which appear in the battle narratives.

With first light around 4:00, it became clear that the 1st Light Horse was in a tenuous position, with its right being outflanked. At 4:30 Chauvel ordered two regiments of the 2nd Light Horse into the line to the right of the 1st, extending the flank. He also moved troops from the left of the line to extend his right, replacing them with troops of the 52nd (Lowland) Division, a British Territorial (or Yeomanry) unit intended got home defense. The Ottoman 32nd and 39th Regiments continued to try to outflank the Australian right, while the 31st Infantry pushed forward against the Territorials. As the morning wore on, the Light Horse were forced to fall back until they threatened to reach the ANZAC camps. But the horse artillery of the Light Horse stopped their advance. The Australians were reinforced by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the 5th Mounted Yeomanry, with the 42nd (Lancashire) Division of Territorial troops arriving by train.

As the day wore on and the Anglo-ANZAC line was reinforced, the Turkish and Germans, who had no reinforcements available or convenient railroad, and ho had marched all night and fought all day in August in the Sinai with little water, found their advance blocked and many began to surrender. By evening, the reinforced ANZACs and British counterattacked against enemy positions on the sandhill they had named Mount Royston.

As darkness fell, the battle had clearly shifted to the British side, By the next day, the reinforced British and ANZAC force would swell to some 50,000, vastly outnumbering their adversaries.

Tomorrow: Pursuit.

The Battle of Romani, August 4-5, 1916, Part I

On July 19 we discussed the Turkish advance into Sinai a century ago. This week marks the centenary of the Battle of Romani, a small but key turning point in the Middle Eastern campaign in World War I: Britain's first victory against the Ottomans after the retreat from Gallipoli and the surrender at Kut. It has also conventionally been seen as the transition between the Defense of the Suez Canal and the beginning of the Palestine Campaign.

Kress von Kressensten

The July post described the beginning of the Turkish advance, largely tracked by aircraft. The advancing column of Turkish and allied forces consisted of the Ottoman 3rd Infantry Division (31st, 32nd and 39th Regiments), veterans of Gallipoli, plus the German "Pasha" Force, including a German aircraft detachment, German light and heavy artillery and mortar, and one Austrian artillery unit. The German Forces were under the command of Freiherr Friederich Kress von Kressenstein, the German Chief of Staff to Jemal Pasha's Fourth Army. As they had advanced toward the British lines, they had established a series of defensive lines in case of falling back.

The British were under the overall command of Egyptian Expeditionary Force Commander General Sir Archibald Murray, at Cairo, and under him the commander of the northern (Number 3) Sector of Canal Defenses, General Herbert A. Lawrence, headquartered at Qantara.

But the man at the front, in the forward defense lines, was Maj. Gen. Harry Chauvel, an Australian commanding the ANZAC Mounted Division, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Brigades of Australian Light Horse with the British Territorial 52nd (Lowland) Division, and soon reinforced by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and other units.

A Young Harry Chauvel

Any readers from Down Under will need no introduction to the Light Horsemen, or to Harry Chauvel. Already bloodied at Gallipoli, where they had fought without their mounts, the Light Horse would ride into fame in the Palestine Campaign, from Beersheba to the victory at Megiddo and the capture of Damascus.

Chauvel After the War

Harry Chauvel would go on to become the first Australian to command a Corps and was later Chief of General Staff.

Kress von Kressenstein might be the Prussian professional soldier,  with a name to match, but a horse soldier from New South Wales was going to be master of the coming battle.

The British front line was at Romani, to which the British had built a rail line, and which lay near the ruins of ancient Pelusium.

By the battle, British and ANZAC forces would number some 14,000, Ottoman/German/Austrian some 17,000.

The British were entrenched with their left on the Mediterranean and the Bardawil lagoon, the main force on a ridge they called Wellington Ridge, and built a line of fortifications along sand hills to a large dune called Katib Gannit.

The action would begin the night of August 3, and develop on August 4 and 5. We'll pick up the story tomorrow.

Light Horse Encampment at Romani

Israel is Said to OK Beefing Up Egyptian Troops in Sinai

Under the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Israel must approve of any strengthening of Egyptian troops in Sinai, but The Jerusalem Post is reporting that the IDF is prepared to approve any such requests as Egypt steps up its response to yesterday's bloody attacks near the border.

Officially, the last Army statement on yesterday's casualties spoke of 17 soldiers killed, but there are many reports suggesting the number was above 60.  Even the state-owned Ahram Online website says that "There have been discrepancies in reports about the number of those killed in the militant attacks."

Bloody Day in Sinai

Today's bloody clashes between jihadists and Egyptian security forces around the town of Sheikh Zuweid in northern Sinai is some of the worst violence yet in the peninsula, and marked the third straight day of bloodshed in Egypt after the assassination of the Prosecutor General on Monday and two bombings yesterday in the Cairo satellite suburb 6 October City.

Claims by the Army, the "Sinai Province of the Islamic State" (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, now Wilayat Sina') conflict, with the Army admitting to about 17 dead on its side after multiple attacks; other estimates of government losses are higher The Army struck back with air and helicopter attacks and claims to have killed 100 of the attackers.Sinai is a closed military zone with no media access, but all reports agree there were multiple attacks against Army checkpoints and police stations and that the attackers controlled the town of Sheikh Zuweid for a while.

And we are only halfway through Ramadan.

The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, 1915: The British Defenses, 2: Ground Force Deployments

Having already looked at the Ottoman plans for the attack on the Suez Canal and the naval and air aspects of the British defensive plans, it's time to look at the overall plan for ground defense of the Canal.

The ground defenses were primarily manned by elements of the Indian Army, mostly from the Xth and XIth Divisions, with Territorial Artillery,  some cavalry and India's Bikaner Camel Corps, which we have met before. The Egyptian Army, which was not a belligerent, provided a few machine-gun positions.

Though the overall command of Imperial Forces in Egypt was under General Sir John Maxwell, the defense of the Canal was commanded by Major-General Alexander Wilson, Commander of Indian Expeditionary Force "E."

The British official history provides a very detailed list of deployments as of January 15, which I reproduce in full below. Between January 15 and the battle on February 3, there were some additional reinforcements: two battalions of the Indian XIth Division moved into trenches on the west side of the Canal between Bench-mark Post and Ballah Ferry; the New Zealand Brigade was brought up from Cairo; its Otago and Wellington Battalions reinforced the El Kubri crossing near Suez, while the Auckland and Canterbury Battalions went into reserve at Ismailia. The January 15 deployments appear below; I've glossed a few abbreviations that may be unfamiliar. Tomorrow, we'll begin to deal with the battle itself.

DISPOSITION OF TROOPS IN THE CANAL DEFENCES, 15TH JANUARY, 1915.

G.O.C., Canal Defences - Major-General A. Wilson.

Chief Staff Officer, Canal Defences - Br.-General A. H. Bingley.

SECTOR I. (Port Tewfik to Geneffe, both inclusive.)

Headquarters - Suez.

Troops.

30th Brigade (24th and 76th Punjabis,

126th Baluchis,

2/7th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

1 Coy. [Company] Bikanir Camel Corps.

1 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Bty. R.F.A. (T.). [Battery, Royal Field Artillery (Territorial)]

1 Indian Field Ambulance.

battalions from the XIth Division, who occupied the trenches on the west bank between the Bench-mark post and Ballah ferry. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade was also brought up from Cairo, two battalions (Otago and Wellington) reinforcing the El Kubri Post north of Suez, while the brigade headquarters, with the Auckland and Canterbury Battalions, detrained at Ismailia to fill up the reserve.

Posts in Sector.

Esh Shatt.

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

1 M.G. [Machine Gun] Section.

Baluchistan

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

El Kubri

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

1 Coy. Bikanir Camel Corps.

1 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Bn. [Battalion] (less 2 coys.) Indian Infantry.

1 Battery R.F.A. (T.).

2 M.G. Sections (Indian Infantry).

Gurkha

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

Shallufa

1 Coy. Indian Infantry

1 M.G. Section (Indian Infantry).

Geneffe

14 men, Indian Infantry.

Suez

2 1/2 Battalions (local reserve).

SECTOR II. (Deversoir to El Ferdan, both inclusive.)

Headquarters - Ismailia Old Camp.

Troops.

22nd Brigade, less 3rd Brahmans (62nd and 92nd Punjabis, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles).

28th F.F. Bde. (51st and 53rd Sikhs, 56th Punjabis, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

Bikanir Camel Corps (less 3 1/2 Coys.).

M.G. Section of Egyptian Camel Corps.

1 Brigade R.F.A. (T.).

1 Battery Indian Mountain Artillery.

2 Field Ambulances.

Posts in Sector.

Deversoir

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

7 men Bikanir Camel Corps.

Serapeum E.

2 Coys. Indian Infantry.

7 men Bikanir Camel Corps.

Serapeum W.

22nd Brigade (less 2 battalions and one half-coy.).

1 Bty. R.F.A. (T.).

1 Field Ambulance.

Tussum

1 Coy. Indian Infantry.

7 men Bikanir Camel Corps.

Gebel Mariam

Observation Post.

Ismailia Ferry

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

Bikanir C.C. (less 3 1/2 Coys.) and M.G. Section Egyptian Camel Corps.

1 Bn. Indian Infantry.

1 Bty. R.F.A. (T.).

1 Section Indian Mountain Artillery.

1 Wireless Section (T.).

1 Field Ambulance.

Ismailia Old Camp

28th Bde. [Brigade] (less one battalion and one coy.).

21st Bty. Indian Mountain Artillery.

(Local Reserve.)

SECTOR III.

(El Ferdan, exclusive, to Port Said, inclusive.)

Headquarters - Qantara

Troops

29th Bde. (14th Sikhs, 69th and 89th Punjabis, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles).

1 Bn. 22nd Bde.

1/2 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

2 Coys. Bikanir Camel Corps.

2 Batteries R.F.A. (T.).

26th Bty. Indian Mountain Artillery.

Armoured Train with 1/2 Coy. Indian Infantry.

Wireless Section (T.).

Indian Field Ambulance.

Detachment R.A.M.C. (T.).

Posts in Sector.

Ballah

2 Platoons Indian Infantry.

Qantara E.

29th Bde. (less 1 coy.).

1 Squadron Imp. Service Cavalry.

2 Coys. Bikanir Camel Corps.

1/2 Coy. Sappers and Miners.

1 Bty. Indian Mountain Artillery.

Wireless Section (T.).

Qantara W.

Armoured Train, etc.

2 Batteries R.F.A. (T.).

El Kab   

1/2 Platoon Indian Infantry.

Tina

1/2 Platoon Indian Infantry.

Ras El Esh

1 Platoon Indian Infantry

Salt Works

1 Company Indian Infantry.

New Canal Works..

1 Company Indian Infantry

Port Said

1 Bn. Indian Infantry (less 2 coys.).

ADVANCED ORDNANCE DEPOT

ZAGAZIG.

Troops.

1 Bn. 32nd (I.S.) Brigade.

ENGINEER WORK

DEFENCE OF RAILWAY AND SWEET WATER CANAL.

Troops.

1 Troop Imp. Service Cavalry,

1/2 Coy. Bikanir Camel Carps,

1/2 Coy. Indian Infantry.

GENERAL RESERVE CAMP, MOASCAR.

Troops.

31st Brigade (less 1 coy.), (2nd Q.V.O. Rajput L.I., 27th Punjabis, 93rd Burma Infantry, 128th Pioneers).

32nd (I.S.) Bde., less 1 battalion (33rd Punjabis, Alwar, Gwalior, and Patiala Infantry).

Imp. Service Cav. Bd.. (less 3 squadrons and 1 troop).

1 Egyptian R.E. Section (Camels),

1 Egyptian Mountain Battery.

2 Sections Field Artillery with Cavalry Brigade.

3 Indian Field Ambulances

The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, 1915, Part II: The British Defenses, 1: Naval and Air Units

Yesterday I began this series on the Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal in January/February 1915 with a look at the Ottoman plans and order of battle. Today  we will look at the British defense preparations. The British preparations are recorded in much more detail, and today I want to begin with looking at naval and air deployments. On Monday, we'll look at the British/Indian/ANZAC ground force deployments. (Other than a few machine-gun units and some logistical support, the Egyptian Army was not used; Egypt was not a recognized belligerent.)

The Royal Navy

Admiral Richard Peirse

While both sides in the Canal battle had ground troops and a handful of aircraft, Britannia still ruled the waves, and the Royal Navy is considered the senior service, so it is appropriate to begin with the naval defense of Britain's vital naval lifeline to India. As we noted last year, the Commander-in Chief of Britain's East Indies Station in the Indian Ocean to Southeast Asia, Vice Admiral Richard Peirse, had transferred his command to Port Said in order to defend the Canal.

HMS Swiftsure

His flagship, HMS Swiftsure, a pre-Dreadnought class battleship, was based at Port Said. and the other British battleship on the scene, HMS Ocean was at Suez at the southern end of the Canal. The other heavy battleship, the French Requin, was an older ship built in 1885 and now classed as  coastal defense ship. It was birthed in a dredged birth in Lake Timsah, in mid-Canal.

Besides the capital ships, there were two protected cruisers, HMS Minerva and the French cruiser D'Entrecasteaux, the British sloop Clio, the British Armed Merchant Cruiser Himalaya (to be transferred fully to the Navy later), and the royal Indian Marine Ship RIMS Hardinge, in the naval service of British India.

The British plan was to deploy these vessels along the length of the Canal, particularly in those areas where their big naval guns could be brought to bear against attackers from the East Bank. There were certain limitations. As the official Naval History notes:

Though the canal provided excellent lateral communication, its advantage was a good deal discounted by the fact that in many places the sand dunes on the east bank were too high for the shell of the heavy guns to clear. This was specially the case from El Ferdan to Lake Timsah, also with all the centre section from Timsah to Deversoir, and finally the four miles between the southern end of the Bitter Lake and Shallufa. This difficulty also necessitated special arrangements for indirect fire wherever the gunlayers could not see over the banks, and their work was further hampered by the almost continuous mirage in the desert. A minor direct fire, however, was obtained by mounting light quick-firing guns and Maxims on the tops. The patrol boats could, of course, in no case fire over the banks, but they had power to enfilade any trenches the enemy might try to establish on the banks themselves.

The ships were deployed along the length of the Canal, a key support for the Infantry and Artillery Forces deployed along the Canal. As the Turkish force approached, the Royal Navy moved to their assigned stations along the Canal.

HMS Swiftsure moved from Port Said to take station just north of Qantara. As noted, she was also the flagship.

HMS Clio

A bit further south at the Ballah Ferry, the sloop HMS Clio took up station.

French coastal defense ship Requin

The French Requin was already berthed in Lake Timsah near Ismailia, as mentioned.

D'Entrecasteaux

Now the French protected cruiser D'Entrecasteaux moved to take position near the Requin,  also in Lake Timsah, but subsequently was moved south to Deversoir near the Great Bitter Lake.

RIMS Hardinge

Near that place the RIMS Hardinge, the aforementioned Royal Indian Marine Ship, was already deployed.
 It stood to the northwest of D'Entecasteaux.

HMS Minerva

The cruiser HMS Minerva took position at the Little Bitter Lake.

Himalaya

To the southward, the armed merchant cruiser Himalaya took position at Shallufa.

HMS Ocean

And finally, anchoring this line of naval power on the south just as Swiftsure was on the north, the other battleship, HMS Ocean, took position at El Shatt, where a major road across Sinai crosses the Canal near Suez.

The British and French aircraft presence

Air power was still very new in January 1915. The Wright Brothers first flew in 1903 and sold an aircraft to the US Army in 1909. In 1911 during the Italo-Turkish War in Libya, Italy became the first country to use aerial bombing in wartime. (They also used Zeppelins.) In the Suez campaign, British land-based aircraft and French seaplanes proved invaluable in detecting and tracking the Ottoman advance across Sinai, thus denying the Turks the element of surprise. As I already discussed that role in a January 13 post,  for completeness' sake I am simply going to quote what I said then, and the passages I quoted then, and the photo I ran then:

The British had only a handful of reconnaissance aircraft available in Egypt, along with some French seaplanes. The British Official History (Military Operations Egypt and Palestine) describes the situation:

Egypt was watchful and fairly well informed. The British aeroplanes available were incapable of long flights. [The detachment under Major S. D. Massy, 29th Punjabis, consisted of three Maurice Farmans sent from Avonmouth in November, two Henri Farmans taken over in Egypt, and one B3.E2a which arrived from India in December. The aerodrome was at Ismailia, with a landing ground at Qantara. For long reconnaissances into Sinai it was found necessary to send out troops to prepare temporary landing grounds some miles east of the Suez Canal. The longest flight ever carried out was 176 miles, for which a specially large petrol tank had to be fitted to the machine. This, however, was after the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal.] The French seaplanes, put at Sir J. Maxwell's disposal in November, of which there were seven in the Aenne Rickmers - a captured cargo steamer equipped as a seaplane carrier at Port Said, were better, though far from powerful enough for the work they were called upon to perform. Hard driven Jan, by an energetic commander, Lieutenant de Vaisseau de l'Escaille, they carried out reconnaissance flights which were remarkable, particularly in view of the fact that the forced descent of a seaplane on land meant almost certain death for pilot and observer. [Thus in December Lieutenant de Vaisseau Destrem, with a British officer as observer, on two occasions flew up the Wadi Arabi from Aqaba and strove to surmount the steep range east of the valley, in order to reconnoitre Ma'an, on the Hejaz Railway. The task was beyond the power of the 80 h.p. engine, but attempts were continued by him and others until Sir J. Maxwell ordered them to stop, fearing that they would cost him one of his invaluable pilots. In the same month Lieutenant de Vaisseau Delage took off from the Doris off El Arish, flew over Gaza, then turned south-east to Beersheba. On his return his engine stopped while he was still ten miles from the sea. The wind just carried the seaplane over the water, but it was in a sinking condition when the Doris steamed up from El Arish (a distance of 35 miles) to its rescue.] From information obtained by them and from the reports of agents it became clear that the attack would not be much longer delayed, and almost certain that it would come through Central Sinai. It was known to the headquarters of the Force in Egypt that a large force, including the 10th, 23rd, and 27th Divisions, was assembled close to the frontier about Beersheba.

A report by General Sir John Maxwell, the overall commander in Egypt, discusses the air situation before and during the attack on the Canal:

Part of 30th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, under the command of Brevet Major S. D. Massy, I.A., with Headquarters at Ismailia, carried out daily reconnaissances without a single important accident. 

The French Naval Seaplane detachment, with Headquarters at Port Said, under the command of Capitaine de Vaisseau de-l'Escaille, whose services were placed at my disposal for Intelligence purposes, was continually employed in reconnoitering the Syrian, and Anatolian Coast from the requisitioned vessels "Raven" and "Anne" The results of their work were invaluable. The "Anne" was torpedoed near Smyrna during an armistice while employed by the Royal Navy, but was fortunately able to reach Mudros, where she was patched up and returned to Port Said. I cannot speak too highly of the work of the seaplane detachment. Lengthy land flights are extremely dangerous, yet nothing ever stopped these gallant French aviators from any enterprise. I regret the loss of  two of these planes whilst making dangerous land flights over Southern Syria.

The air reconnaissance capabilities may have been limited, but they gave the British ample warning that the Turkish Army was moving into Sinai.

HMS Anne (ex-German Aenne Rickmers); 2 seaplanes either side of rear mast

The Scale of Yesterday's Coordinated Attacks in Sinai

Yesterday's wave of terror attacks across northern Sinai  increasingly appear unprecedented in their scope and coordination. As many as 30 separate attacks took place against police and military positions, while there were also civilian casualties. The death toll is officially past 30, with unofficial estimates of over 40, and many wounded.

The attackers were presumably from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, the insurgent group that late last year proclaimed its loyalty to the Islamic State (ISIS). The coordinated attacks took place during a match between Egypt's arch-rival soccer teams Ahly and Zamalek, presumably because security forces might be distracted by the game.

The Turkish Attack on the Suez Canal, 1915: Part I, the Ottoman Plan

Between January 28 and February 4, 1915, elements of the Ottoman Fourth Army attempted an attack on the Suez Canal. Two weeks ago I blogged about the Anglo-French use of aerial reconnaissance to detect the Turkish movements across Sinai; over the next few days, I'll be discussing the campaign itself, beginning today with a look at the Turkish plans.

Kress von Kressenstein in Turkish Service

Djemal Pasha, Commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army based in Syria, and his VIII Corps Commander in Damascus, Djemal Bey (known as "Djemal Kuchuk" or "Little Djemal," subsequently after the language reform known as Cemal Mersinli), and his German Chief of Staff Friederich Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, planned to throw most of the Fourth Army's VIII Corps, reinforced with divisions from Anatolia, against the Canal. Kress von Kressenstein, a military engineer, designed special pontoons for the crossing of the Canal.

"Little Djemal" (Cemal Mersinli)

This force, the Ottomans hoped, would not only attempt to threaten the Canal, cutting Britain's lifeline to India, but might also provoke an uprising in Egypt against British rule. Failing that, they hoped to hold the Canal for a few days and do as much damage to it as possible.

The logistics were daunting, as the British had already sent patrols out to damage wells lest the Turks be able to use them.The historic coast road across northern Sinai via al-‘Arish was considered too vulnerable to shelling by British naval guns, so the force would move across central Sinai instead, via al-‘Auja, where Turkey had concentrated its forces. From al-‘Auja, the force would take several routes in order to reach the Canal at multiple points along its length.

Turkish Camp at al-‘Auja

The force also included a camel squadron to carry water. The map below, in modern Turkish, illustrates the advance





 
 It's usually estimated that the force numbered about 20,000 men.
The order of battle appears to have been as follows:

Fourth Army (Syria) VIII Corps (Damascus)

Mounted troops:
29th Cavalry Regiment and a Camel Squadron.

Engineers: 4th and 8th Engineer Battalions.

Infantry:

23rd Division (Homs):  68th and  69th regiments
25th Division (Damascus) with part of 25th Artillery Regiment and 73rd, 74th, and 75th Infantry regiments
27th Division (Haifa) with part of the 27th Artillery Regiment and the 80th and 81st Infantry Regiments

These units based normally in Syria had been reinforced from Anatolia by the 10th Infantry Division, with part of the 10th Artillery Regiment and the 28th, 29th, and 30th Infantry Regiments.

There were also bedouin units and some forces detached from the Ottoman forces in the Hejaz.

Next time we'll look at the British defensive plan. Below, a 1915 shot of the Ottoman Camel Corps at Beersheba:

January 13, 1915: The British Detect the Turkish Advance Toward the Canal: Air Reconnaissance in Egypt 1915

Continuing our tracing of the centennial of the First World War in the Middle East, we are approaching the most serious threat the Ottomans made on Egypt during the war, the failed attack on the Suez Canal. This had long been anticipated, and the British were prepared. But intelligence about Turkish movements was dependent on aerial reconnaissance, and the aircraft available in January 1915 were limited in range.

Given the dominance of British seapower and the long logistical  lines across Sinai, Jemal Pasha's attack on the Canal depended heavily on the element of surprise. The fliers of the Royal Flying Corps and the French Navy, operating over Sinai, deprived them of that element.

On January 11 the Egyptian press had been told than an attack was imminent. The British had determined that three Turkish divisions were massed at Beersheba, and a small advance force had taken Nakhl in Egyptian Sinai. (Britain had decided against a forward defense of the Sinai border, preferring to defend closer to the Canal where naval guns could bear.) On January 13, the British reported troops moving through al-‘Arish and al-‘Auja on the Sinai border.

HMS Anne (ex-German Aenne Rickmers); 2 seaplanes either side of rear mast

In coming weeks I will be describing the British defenses and the Ottoman advance in considerable detail, but today I want to devote to intelligence gathering.In my earlier post on HMS Doris' raid on the Palestinian and Syrian coast in December, I noted that she regularly put landing parties ashore and also used a seaplane to try to determine Ottoman movements. The British had only a handful of reconnaissance aircraft available in Egypt, along with some French seaplanes. The British Official History (Military Operations Egypt and Palestine) describes the situation:

Egypt was watchful and fairly well informed. The British aeroplanes available were incapable of long flights. [The detachment under Major S. D. Massy, 29th Punjabis, consisted of three Maurice Farmans sent from Avonmouth in November, two Henri Farmans taken over in Egypt, and one B3.E2a which arrived from India in December. The aerodrome was at Ismailia, with a landing ground at Qantara. For long reconnaissances into Sinai it was found necessary to send out troops to prepare temporary landing grounds some miles east of the Suez Canal. The longest flight ever carried out was 176 miles, for which a specially large petrol tank had to be fitted to the machine. This, however, was after the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal.] The French seaplanes, put at Sir J. Maxwell's disposal in November, of which there were seven in the Aenne Rickmers - a captured cargo steamer equipped as a seaplane carrier at Port Said, were better, though far from powerful enough for the work they were called upon to perform. Hard driven Jan, by an energetic commander, Lieutenant de Vaisseau de l'Escaille, they carried out reconnaissance flights which were remarkable, particularly in view of the fact that the forced descent of a seaplane on land meant almost certain death for pilot and observer. [Thus in December Lieutenant de Vaisseau Destrem, with a British officer as observer, on two occasions flew up the Wadi Arabi from Aqaba and strove to surmount the steep range east of the valley, in order to reconnoitre Ma'an, on the Hejaz Railway. The task was beyond the power of the 80 h.p. engine, but attempts were continued by him and others until Sir J. Maxwell ordered them to stop, fearing that they would cost him one of his invaluable pilots. In the same month Lieutenant de Vaisseau Delage took off from the Doris off El Arish, flew over Gaza, then turned south-east to Beersheba. On his return his engine stopped while he was still ten miles from the sea. The wind just carried the seaplane over the water, but it was in a sinking condition when the Doris steamed up from El Arish (a distance of 35 miles) to its rescue.] From information obtained by them and from the reports of agents it became clear that the attack would not be much longer delayed, and almost certain that it would come through Central Sinai. It was known to the headquarters of the Force in Egypt that a large force, including the 10th, 23rd, and 27th Divisions, was assembled close to the frontier about Beersheba.

A report by General Sir John Maxwell, the overall commander in Egypt, discusses the air situation before and during the attack on the Canal:

Part of 30th Squadron Royal Flying Corps, under the command of Brevet Major S. D. Massy, I.A., with Headquarters at Ismailia, carried out daily reconnaissances without a single important accident. 

The French Naval Seaplane detachment, with Headquarters at Port Said, under the command of Capitaine de Vaisseau de-l'Escaille, whose services were placed at my disposal for Intelligence purposes, was continually employed in reconnoitering the Syrian, and Anatolian Coast from the requisitioned vessels "Raven" and "Anne" The results of their work were invaluable. The "Anne" was torpedoed near Smyrna during an armistice while employed by the Royal Navy, but was fortunately able to reach Mudros, where she was patched up and returned to Port Said. I cannot speak too highly of the work of the seaplane detachment. Lengthy land flights are extremely dangerous, yet nothing ever stopped these gallant French aviators from any enterprise. I regret the loss of  two of these planes whilst making dangerous land flights over Southern Syria.

The air reconnaissance capabilities may have been limited, but they gave the British ample warning that the Turkish Army was moving into Sinai.

January 7, 1949: Israel Shoots Down RAF Over Sinai

Sixty-six years ago, in the very last hours of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (Israeli War of Independence), in incidents barely remembered outside the Israeli and British Air Forces, Israel shot down five British Royal Air Force aircraft inside Egyptian airspace in Sinai. Two pilots died; two others were captured, and the British threatened to invoke the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and intervene in the fighting.

Though it may be a footnote to history, its dramatis personae include a Canadian World War II fighter ace, John F. McElroy, who is surely the only fighter ace whose credited kills include German, Egyptian, and British aircraft; an American, "Slick" Goodlin, who was the first test pilot of the Bell X-1 rocket plane, being replaced by Chuck Yeager just before the sound barrier was broken, and who even appears in The Right Stuff; and Ezer Weizman, future Air Force chief, Defense Minister, and President of Israel. That makes for a tale worth telling.

To frame the context a bit: what most people call, for shorthand, "the 1948 war," actually lasted until this date in 1949. Throughout the 1948 war, Israeli strategy always called for achieving as many gains on the ground as possible before a ceasefire was scheduled to go into effect. In December 1948, with the UN actively seeking a ceasefire, Israel sought to cut off and isolate Egyptian Army troops in the Gaza Strip and the Negev, by striking into Egyptian territory in Sinai and cutting off Gaza. This was called Operation Horev (Horev or Horeb being an alternate Biblical name for Mount Sinai), or Operation ‘Ayin because its four major objectives — Gaza (‘Azza in Hebrew), al-‘Auja, Bir‘Asluj, and al-‘Arish all begin with the Hebrew letter ‘ayin (just as three of the four begin with the Arabic letter ‘ayn in Arabic) In an attempt to take al-‘Arish and cut off Egyptian forces in Gaza, the IDF pushed into Egyptian territory in Sinai, I believe for the first time in the war.

West Point map of Operation Horev/Ayin

Complicating matters was the fact that the Royal Egyptian Air Force, the nascent Israeli Air Force, and the British Royal Air Force operating from bases over the Suez Canal Zone, all flew variants of the British Spitfire fighter. The British RAF fighters regularly carried out reconnaissance operations over Sinai, with orders not to cross the border with former Mandatory Palestine. But Israeli ground forces were now inside Egypt, and had faced attacks by Egyptian Air Force aircraft. So Israeli Air Force fighters were authorized to provide ground support for the IDF inside Sinai, while RAF fighters were authorized to patrol up to the international border.

There had been earlier incidents, since the RAF had been flying over the combat zones on recon missions; in November 1948 a British Mosquito on a recon mission over Galilee was shot down, but that was over a combat zone and was shrugged off and such missions ended.
Fairly comprehensive accounts can be found at this 101st Squadron unofficial fan website and also here for the incidents which follow, though I am also drawing this account from other histories of the war.

On the evening of January 5, the United Nations announced that Egypt had agreed to a ceasefire to go into effect at 1600 hours, 4 p.m., on January 7.

Meanwhile, on January 6, British RAF aircraft from RAF Fayid base on the Suez Canal carried out recon up to the border, overflying Israeli lines.

The next morning, another recon mission was flown with four Spitfires from Fayid. They were unaware that a group of Royal Egyptian Air Force Spitfires had just attacked an Israeli column, and when they overflew the damage the Israeli ground forces, the latter, assuming the Egyptians had returned, responded with ground fire, bringing down the Spitfire  piloted by Frank Close, who parachuted but broke his jaw in the landing.

Two Israeli Spitfires arrived on the scene. As many of you may know, the Israeli forces in the war of Independence were joined by many foreign veterans fresh from the Second World War; many but not all of these were Jewish. Collectively known as mahal or machal from a Hebrew acronym for "Volunteers from outside the land [of Israel]," they played major roles. Former US Army Col. Mickey Marcus (played by Kirk Douglas in Cast a Giant Shadow) became Israel's first general officer and is the best known of these, but in no service were the machal so present as the Air Force. The two Spitfire pilots who arrived on the scene were a Canadian and an American.

The Canadian was John F. McElroy, a Royal Canadian Air Force World War II ace who shot down  numerous German kills from World War II, who also had at least on Egyptian aircraft to his credit. The American was Chalmers "Slick" Goodlin,who until 1947 had been Bell Aircraft's test pilot for the X-1 rocket plane, but had been replaced before the attempt to break the sound barren by an Air Force pilot, Chuck Yeager.

There is little question that in the first attack the Israeli Air Force pilots assumed the RAF Spitfires  were Egyptian. McElroy shot down two of them, piloted by Tim McElhaw and Tom Sayers. Sayers was killed in the crash; McElhaw bailed out, landing near Close. The remaining RAF plane, flown by Geoff Cooper, engaged in a dogfight with Goodlin and finally went down, with Cooper bailing out.

Close and McElhaw landed within Israeli lines and were taken prisoner. Cooper came down within Egyptian lines and was taken to Ismailia.

The Israeli aircraft returned to base at Hazor and Goodlin told McElroy that at the last minute he had realized that the colors of the roundel on the plane he shot down were British.

Meanwhile, the failure of the earlier flight to return led to the RAF ordering four Spitfires and 15 Tempests to investigate. They encountered four Israeli Spitfires led by Ezer Weizman, of later fame. Flying with Weizman was Sandy Jacobs, born in Palestine of British parents, and two American volunteers, Bill Schroeder and Caesar Dangott.

Schroeder engaged a Tempest flown by David Tattersfield and shot it down, killing Tattersfield. In a general battle that followed, some of the Tempests reportedly could not distinguish between the RAF Spitfires and the IAF Spitfires (though they were different variants). Finally the outnumbered Israelis withdrew into Israeli airspace., shortly before the ceasefire was to go into effect at 4 pm.

It's much less clear that the Israelis mistook the British in the second encounter as Egyptians, as Egypt did not fly the Tempest.

The RAF did authorize its pilots to engage any Israeli aircraft caught in Egyptian airspace, and Britain did demand compensation, but no retaliation was taken, though the IAF pilots at Hatzor reportedly were on alert for a British airstrike.

Had the clashes occurred earlier in the war the results might have been more serious for Israel; as it was, the clash with the RAF became more of a curious footnote to the war, except for the lives lost.

A Foreshadowing of the Great War in the Middle East: The Taba crisis of 1906

Though as we have seen in our posts on the origins of the Great War in the Middle East a century ago, the British hoped until the last minute to keep the Ottoman Empire from entering the war on the side of Germany and Austria, it was hardly a complete surprise. Given Germany's role in training the Ottoman Army, building the Baghdad railway, etc., they also had plans for the contingency of Ottoman belligerency. In fact, there had been a brief threat of war and a British ultimatum in 1906, in what came to be known as the Taba crisis, or sometimes, especially on the Turkish side, the ‘Aqaba crisis. It was largely forgotten until the 1980s, when in the wake of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, Israel and Egypt submitted a dispute over where exactly the border at Taba ran to international arbitration. Although this post draw on other sources as well, the arbitration decision handed down September 29, 1988, offers a good summary of the background to the 1906 crisis.

I've previously discussed the anomalous position of Egypt: still nominally an Ottoman province ruled by a hereditary Khedive, yet a de facto virtual British protectorate since 1882. (Later this month we'll see how Britain resolved the contradiction in December 1914.)

Before the British occupation of Egypt, the boundaries of Egypt and the remainder of the Ottoman Empire were somewhat fluid. Northwestern Sinai and the northern coast were generally administered from Egypt, while southern and southeastern Sinai were administered from the Hijaz. In the late 19th century the Ottomans considered the boundary to be, and many maps showed it as being, a line from Suez to Rafah, thus excluding most of the southern and eastern Sinai. Egypt however was allowed to garrison locations beyond this line to protect the pilgrimage trade.

After the British arrival in 1882 Britain wanted a buffer zone for the defense of the Suez Canal, A line beginning at Suez would allow Ottoman troops right up to the Canal. The British favored an Egyptian control of the entire geographical Sinai peninsula, seeing the "natural" frontier as running from Rafah to Taba, just short of ‘Aqaba. When, in 1892, the Khedival office passed to ‘Abbas Himi II, the Ottoman Sultan issued the traditional firman confirming him in office and stipulating the claimed line from Suez to Rafah. This was protested by Sir Evelyn Baring, soon to be Lord Cromer, on the grounds that previous firmans had specified Egyptian rights to garrison troops beyond this line. Constantinople assured Egypt it intended to maintain the status quo based on Egypt's right to protect the overland hajj route, but making clear ‘Aqaba would be Ottoman; Baring meanwhile instructed the Egyptian Foreign Minister that Britain recognized Egypt's authority "bounded to the east bya line running in a south-easterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of El Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba," but leaving the town of ‘Aqaba under Ottoman control.

The dispute over the Sinai border led directly to the crisis of 1906. By this time the Ottomans had completed the Hijaz railway as far as Ma‘an in what is now Jordan. A spur line to ‘Aqaba was under consideration; that would give the Ottomans a rail outlet on the Red Sea, freeing them from dependance on the Suez Canal.

In December of 1905 Cromer learned from intelligence sources that in response to Egyptian plans to build a barracks near the claimed border, The Ottoman government was ordering additional troops to the region and planned to establish a guardhouse to prevent this.

The British ordered their Inspector for Sinai, in effect the British officer in charge of the frontier, W.E. Jennings-Bramly (Bramly Bey) to the region with five Egyptian troops to set up tents at Umm Rashrash, the site of the present Israeli port of Eilat. He did so on January 10, 1906. He met with the local Turkish commander at ‘Aqaba, Rushdi, who after consulting Damascus informed Bramly that he was in Ottoman territory and that Turkey was planning to set up border posts at Taba and Kuntilla, two places with water sources on what the British considered their (that is, Egypt's) side of the line.

Confronted with Turkish demands and orders not to provoke, Bramly retreated to his headquarters at Nakhl by January 14. The Director of Intelligence in Cairo, Captain R.C.R. Owen,  ordered the Egyptian Coast Guard Steamer Nur al-Bahr to the area, with Sa‘ad Bey Rifa‘t, who had governed ‘Aqaba for Egypt prior to 1892, and 50 troops,  with orders to land at Ras al-Naqb near Umm Rashrash and possibly at Taba. On January 23 they reported to Bramly that there were Turkish forces at Taba and they had threatened to fire on the Egyptians if they attempted to land. Instead the Egyptian force settled in just offshore, off Fara‘un Island.

Now things began to escalate. The Ottomans also put a force at Ras al-Naqb and began building up troops in the area. Bramly was told to hold his position but not initiate hostilities.  But with the two sides confronting each other, Owen dispatched the Assistant Director of Intelligence in Cairo, o replace Bramly on February 14. Bramly returned to Nakhl and his duties governing Sinai.

HMS Diana

Meanwhile the British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte proposed a joint border demarcation, but this was rebuffed. Diplomacy was, in British style, backed up by gunboats: the protected cruiser HMS Diana was dispatched to the Gulf of ‘Aqaba. As diplomatic exchanges continued in both Constantinople and Cairo for the next several weeks, the Ottoman position not only remained firm: at one point it hardened,  proposing a line from al-‘Arish to Ras Muhammad at the southern tip of Sinai, thus claiming the whole of eastern Sinai.

The situation worsened. When a British agent went ashore at Rafah from HMS Minerva, local Turkish authorities ordered him out and the British reported the Ottomans were destroying the border posts. On May 3, the British had had enough of negotiation and dispatched an ultimatum: the Ottomans must agree to demarcate the line along the Rafah-Taba route or Britain would take military action: not necessarily in this remote area, but by seizing Turkish islands in the Aegean.

It was 1906, not 1914. The Young Turk Revolution was two years in the future. The "Sick Man of Europe" was still quite ill. France and Russia rushed to Britain's support, but Germany held back from backing the Ottomans. The Sultan's government was in a corner, and on May 14,  the Ottomans agreed to a joint demarcation.

That took place during the summer of 1906 and created the present border between Egypt and what are now Gaza and Israel. Taba, today a major resort town, would be the subject of the 1988 arbitration mentioned earlier.

Ironically, when the First World War actually broke out, the British decided it would be too costly to erect defenses along the Rafah-Taba line, and decided to defend the eastern approaches to the canal much closer to that vital artery of Empire.

Who Attacked the Egyptian Navy?

There are still a lot of open questions about yesterday's attack on an Egyptian Navy vessel yesterday, leaving five sailors injured and eight missing. The military claims that with the help of the Air Force four boats were sunk, four attackers killed and 32 arrested. Unconfirmed reports suggested that the Egyptian vessel, whose name and class have apparently not been disclosed, had caught fire.

The Egyptian state media is clearly blaming Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which has been waging an insurgency in the Sinai; after 31 were killed three weeks ago, Egypt declared a three-month State of Emergency and began evacuating a strip of land to prevent infiltration from Gaza. Attcks on soldiers and police have continued in Sinai, and this week Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis announced its adherence to the Islamic State. But if the attack on the Navy ship was carried out by them, it marks a daring new tactic.

The Navy has clashed in the past with smugglers; both goods smuggling and human trafficking is increasingly a problem in unstable parts of North Africa, including Sinai. (Though this attack occurred in the Mediterranean off Damietta.)  But it seems unlikely smugglers would attack a Navy vessel if it carried armament. (Again, if the vessel has been identified I haven't seen it.) It could also be an attempt to smuggle radical Jihadis into Egypt.

Less serious, less lethal attacks continue in Cairo, including one this week in which a "sonic bomb" was detonated in the Cairo Metro. The blast did little damage but 16 people were injured in a stampede trying to escape the Metro station.

Sinai Terror Attack Leads to New Egyptian Crackdown, New Powers for Army

Last weekend's terror attack in Sinai, leaving some 30 Egyptian soldiers dead, is being met by a forceful and in some ways draconian response by the government, limited neither to the perpetrators nor to Sinai. The new measures include  a three-month State of Emergency, expanding the military's powers by declaring state facilities such as power plants, bridges, etc. as military infrastructure, banning Hamas, ending Egypt's mediation efforts with Hamas, closing the Rafah crossing into Gaza and evacuating inhabitants from parts of North Sinai, etc.

The terror threat in Sinai is a real one; radical jihadist groups have been active since the 2011 Revolution. charging "foreign" elements are supporting the Jihadis, and some analysts believe the Sinai Jihadis may now be identifying with ISIS. This theme is also part of the Egyptian media campaign.

Many are wondering, however, if the very real terror threat is being used to justify a tightening of control on domestic dissent.

The newest crackdown, however, comes in a context of major state crackdowns on student protests at universities, which began the new academic year on October 11 and have witnessed demonstrations by student supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and ousted president Muhammad Morsi. These have been widespread and sternly dealt with by police, but today for the first time the Army rather than the police was used, storming the campus of Mansura University in the Delta. And the Prime Minister has announced that "student saboteurs" will be dealt with by Military Courts, not the civilian justice system.

And state propaganda glorifying the military is intensifying.

Today is Also Sinai Liberation Day

April 25 is not just Anzac Day; in Egypt it is also Sinai Liberation Day, the date in 1982 when Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai (except for Taba, which went to arbitration). Israel occupied all of Sinai in 1967; after the 1973 war and the Kissinger shuttles it withdrew from the zone along the Suez Canal. Only in the 1979 peace treaty did Israel agree to withdraw completely by 1982.

The Egyptian patriotic video below touches most of the key points: the crossing of the Canal in the 1973 war;  Sadat in wartime command; Sadat at he Knesset in 1977; Sadat, Carter, and Begin signing either the Camp David Accords or the peace treaty; lowering the Israeli flag and raising the Egyptian one.

What is Actually Going on in Sinai?

Before you plunge in expecting a lot, my answer to the question in the headline is "I don't know."

The widespread reports last week of an "Israeli drone strike" against a jihadi site in Sinai, and claims by various jihadi groups operating in Sinai to the effect that the Egyptian and Israeli armies were cooperating in that operation, were swiftly and sharply (and predictably) denied by Egypt. In reading the denials, however, it is not entirely clear what is being denied: certainly Egypt says it is not coordinating with Israel, but is it also denying any Israeli involvement? Israelis are themselves well aware of the sensitivity of cooperating openly with Egypt, but have done so in the past, especially on issues involving Sinai and Gaza.

For a year, since a jihadi attack on Egyptian border guards, the Egyptian Army has stepped up its operations in Sinai, which had been neglected in the Mubarak years and which became a sanctuary for radical (and some criminal) elements after the 2011 revolution and opening of many prisons. But since the July 3 military coup-or-whatever-it-was, there have been reports of greatly stepped-up operations in Sinai. The military characterizes this as a "war on terror," and since the presence of Egyptian troops in Sinai is limited and restricted under the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, one has to presume that there is at least some consultation between the two countries concerning where Egyptian troops may operate. It is also obvious that that is a highly sensitive subject right now. Israel also recently reported a rocket attack aimed at Eilat which was reportedly intercepted by its Iron Dome defense system; Egypt is aware that any attack launched on Israeli territory from Sinai is destabilizing and could provoke an Israeli incursion into Egyptian territory. How much coordination is taking place beyond these considerations is a trickier issue.

The exact scope of the Egyptian Army's operations are also unclear. (And for the purpose of this discussion, the question of whether they are Army, Border Guards, or Interior Ministry troops or even General Intelligence operatives involved is also somewhat beside the point.)  Some jihadist claims (which of course should not be assumed to be trustworthy) have suggested that the Army has actually been fairly ruthless in Sinai; it's widely believed that one reason the Army moved was a growing sense that President Morsi was not willing to wage a major campaign in Sinai. But as with so much else, the exact details are unclear.

Major operations by Egyptian forces in Sinai do appear to be under way. Beyond that, expect more sensitivity about any Israeli role beyond that required by the terms of the Peace Treaty, and denials of direct cooperation.

Anticlimax: Kidnapped Egyptian Troops Freed

Nearly a week after seven Egyptian security forces were kidnapped in Sinai (one soldier, four State Security, two Port Security), followed by days of confusion and uncerta8nty, growing speculation about growing tensions between Morsi and the Army, stepped up warnings that the Army was about to move and would not negotiate, at least one accidental firing on a bedouin funeral, the whole drama ended anticlimactically today with the peaceful release of the seven captives. Ahram Online's account is, well, obscure:

The details of the hostages' release have not been officially confirmed. A senior military source said that the Egyptian army used a diversion strategy to secure the release of the hostages.

"The armed forces executed a diversion strategy by sending out mixed information through news agencies," the source told Al-Ahram Arabic news website.

"They (tribal leaders) were also the ones who persuaded the kidnappers to release the soldiers in the desert."

According to military spokesperson Colonel Ali, military intelligence officials played a key role in the operation to free the soldiers, who were abducted in North Sinai's capital, Al-Arish.

Whatever that means. I suspect the key line is the one about the tribal elders. This sidebar story suggests that this was more of a retaliation by local tribes than a planned terror operation; as usual, President Morsi is making promises to develop the Sinai and improve life there.

Morsi's Latest Sinai Problem

The kidnapping of seven Egyptian security forces (one from the Army, four from State Security and two from Port Security Forces) in the largely lawless Sinai last Thursday has created a quandary for President Morsi: it underscores the weakness of the central government and its apparent inability to control its national territory, while also embarrassing the Army, which has lately been issuing reminders of its role as a supporter of legitimacy and a guarantor of stability. While Hamas in Gaza, allies of Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood, has reportedly stepped up border security, it's the Wild West lawlessness of northern Sinai that really is the issue.

But there is also the deeper issue of security nationwide, which has been severely degraded since the revolution. Growing incidents of mob violence, locals taking justice into their own hands, and lynchings have occurred in many rural areas of the Delta and Upper Egypt. The growing insecurity adds to the overall impression that the Muslim Brotherhood government is adrift and bereft of ideas.