

**RELIGIOUSLY INSPIRED POLITICAL ACTIVISM:**

**A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY**

**Amber Ranganui**

BA (Hons) Griffith

School of Humanities  
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences  
Griffith University

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of  
Master of Philosophy

January 2009

## **Abstract**

---

What underlies the increased public prominence of religiously inspired political activism, both within church politics and in secular politics in Australia in the late 20th and early 21st Centuries? This thesis draws upon concepts of religious awakenings, Creedal Politics, and 'Cultural Wars' that define religious political activism in the American context. It compares and contrasts the Australian situation with that of the US. It then presents case studies of the Australian Christian Lobby (ACL) an evangelical Protestant vehicle for Christian political mobilization in Australia, and the smaller more conservative, Salt Shakers. This thesis argues that there are two factors that affect Christian political activism that are too often overlooked – these include theological ideas about beliefs and concepts of God; and responses to God and creation. These fundamental principles influence the social and political agenda of religiously inspired political organisations and structure the beliefs and values of their supporters more than traditional church affiliation. This thesis suggests that Christian ideals are not as salient in Australian political and constitutional discourse as in the US, nor do they feed into public 'Cultural Wars' to the extent seen in the US. Despite being encouraged by overseas movements, the context and traditions of political, cultural, and religious life in Australia directly influence, if not substantially shape, the outward forms of religiously inspired political activism in this country.

## Originality of Work

---

This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the thesis itself.

---

Amber Sparrow

## Acknowledgements

---

My ability to complete this thesis was challenged by a car accident in which I sustained head injuries that left me with ongoing health issues. My supervisor (Associate Prof Malcolm Alexander) has supported and encouraged me to continue my work until its completion. I thank him for his infinite patience. I also thank the editorial assistance (from Lauren Fletcher) that alerted me to issues of clarity and writing style, as well as helping me with details that I often overlooked.

## Preface

---

For a number of years I regularly attended the Christian Outreach Centre in Mansfield, Brisbane. My family were connected to the life of the church in various ways, including its Bible College and Primary School. One morning, in October 1995, it was announced that a new Christian lobbying organisation had been formed. This organisation was the *Australian Christian Coalition (ACC)*. Having completed a BA in Political Science some years earlier and achieving Honours in Theology later, the idea of political activism being inspired by religious belief seemed, at first, a novel idea. While I had occasionally read material from the *Australian Family Association*, I had not considered the notion of religion being the inspiration of political activism or RIPA.<sup>1</sup> In the course of the next few years, I followed the ACC's development and at the same time became aware of other religiously motivated (inspired) political organisations both in Australia and overseas. It was then, in 1995 that I discovered the operation of the organisation *Salt Shakers*.

Upon completing the initial research process for this project, I began to focus on finding an accurate description for these organisations. I turned to material from the fields of history, political science, and sociology, then into areas, such as the scientific study of religion, to discover the answers that I was seeking. While social movement theory and identity politics were both useful, it seemed that something was missing.<sup>2</sup> Through this process, it became apparent that issues of structure and operation aside, the key to understanding these organisations lay in the religious inspiration that gave the organisations purpose and an agenda. As a result, I felt that in order to understand religious inspiration, it was necessary to explore its foundation – that is, the theological basis from which religious inspiration arises. Theological differences were not only affecting the churches themselves (Church politics) but also their social message and action. I wondered whether this was somehow linked to the development of these inter-denominational political lobbying organisations.

During the course of the next few years, I began to question not only the viability of these organisations, but also whether they were actually a new phenomenon, or perhaps a continuation of the past. I wondered if the key to understanding their function was to examine them from both an historical and institutional context. The other issue that occurred to me was that whilst research on the relationship between Church and political leadership, including historical material, is available; material on RIPA organisations in Australia was scarce. By default, I turned to the vast amount of material on inter-denominational RIPA organisations and the issue of the Church/State divide in America. Upon reading this material and researching the *American Christian Coalition*, the paramount questions are: is Australia following the trend of the rise of the Religious Right in America? Are we going to experience the same issues regarding the Church/State divide? Is the Religious Right a potentially powerful force in Australia as it is claimed in America? If not, what are

---

<sup>1</sup> The idea of naming this activism 'religiously inspired political activism' – came after realizing the connection between different theological thought and the varying forms of political activism.

<sup>2</sup> At the final stage of editing the thesis, a decision was made to delete one chapter that discussed Social Movement Theory, as well as material from the Sociology of Religion. It was felt that this material did not aid this project as a whole.

the differences and why? The more I investigated these issues; I felt that both nations are unique in their experiences of RIPA and that there are significant historical and cultural foundations for these contrasts.

While I have tried to be as objective as possible, my religious worldview affects my perception, selection, and interpretation of material that has constructed this thesis. However, I believe that having an 'inside view' has allowed me to explore the important connections between theological change, religious revivals and their impact on society and RIPA in a more authoritative way than an external researcher would. Inter-denominational RIPA organisations are only a small part of the story of Christian activism in Australia. They are, however, an integral part because they are not as confined in their political action as denominational organisations or church leaders. This has been a journey of discovery with my curiosity to understand RIPA in Australia underpinning my work and leading me to write this thesis.

## Table of Contents

---

### Chapter 1: Religiously Inspired Political Activism Defined

---

<b>Introduction: The Thesis Questions</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1. Religion in Politics: Religiously Inspired Political Activism (RIPA)</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. What is Religiously Inspired Political Activism?	4
1.2. RIPA in the American Context	5
1.3. RIPA in Australian Politics	8
1.4. Forms of RIPA: The Christian Right and the Christian Left	10
<b>2. The Importance of Religious Political Identity</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>3. Overview of this Thesis</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1. Methodology and Sources	14

### Chapter 2: Christian Inspiration, Activism and Identity

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>1. Links between Religious Inspiration and Activism</b>	<b>16</b>
1.1. The American Creed, Creedal Politics and Activism	16
1.2. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America	20
1.3. The Link: Great Awakenings and Religious, Political and Social Change	24
1.4. Summary	30
<b>2. Christian Identity and Activism: Symbols and Vocabulary</b>	<b>31</b>
2.1. Premillennialism and Postmillennialism	32
2.2. The Image and Nature of God and Political Participation	35
2.3. Liberal Theology and the Fundamentalist Counterattack of the 1920s	38
2.4. What is Fundamentalism?	40
<b>3. Summary</b>	<b>43</b>

### Chapter 3: Christianity and the State in the American Context: Historical Legacies of Christian Politics

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>1. Legacies of Christianity in US Politics and Society</b>	<b>47</b>
1.1. Civic Religion	48
1.2. Constitutional Issues: The Bill of Rights	50
1.3. Tax-Exemption and the Restriction of Political Activity	52
1.4. The American Creed: The Formation of Religious Political Passion	53
1.5. Separation of Church and State: Putting it into Practice	53
<b>2. Typology of Christian Movements and the Role of Theology</b>	<b>55</b>
2.1. Conservative Politics of the Christian Right	57
2.2. An Overview: Countermovements that oppose the Christian Right	61
<b>3. Managing Cultural and Religious Diversity</b>	<b>64</b>
3.1. Anti-Vilification laws in the US	65
3.2. Recognition of Culture and Religion	65
<b>4. Summary</b>	<b>68</b>

## **Chapter 4: The Church and RIPA in Australian Public Life until the 1960s**

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>1. Church-State Accommodation and Religious Pluralism</b>	<b>71</b>
1.1 The Establishment of Religion and its Relationship to Executive Powers	72
1.2 The Constitution: S116 - What it means for Church and State Accommodation	75
<b>2. The Church in Public Life as Education and Welfare Service Providers</b>	<b>78</b>
2.1 Educational Services	79
2.2 Welfare Providers	82
<b>3. Religious Inspired Activism of Christian Movements Organisations</b>	<b>84</b>
3.1 Early Conservative Movement Organisations	85
3.2 Denominational Differences and the Development of Trade Unions and Political Parties	90
<b>4. Summary</b>	<b>92</b>

## **Chapter 5: Times of Change: Challenges for Churches and Christianity in Australia from 1970**

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>1. 1970s: The Shift to Pragmatic Pluralism</b>	<b>97</b>
1.1 Changing Patterns of Educational and Welfare Service Provision: Australia - post 1970	98
<b>2. Social Change and Christianity in Australia after 1970</b>	<b>104</b>
2.1 The Demographics of Religious Affiliation - post 1970	105
2.2 Legislating for Tolerance: the Unanticipated Impact on Christian Identity	107
2.3 Religious Political Parties	122
<b>3. Theological Dimensions of Change: The End of the Third and Beginning of the Fourth Great Awakening</b>	<b>116</b>
3.1 Liberal Theology in Australia - post 1970	117
3.2 Reactions to Liberal Theology: Issues that Divide	118
3.3 Leadership and Laity: Differences of Opinion	122
<b>4. RIPA in Australia from 1970</b>	<b>125</b>

## **Chapter 6: RIPA: The American Model – Why Australia is different**

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>129</b>
<b>1. Church-State relations: America and Australia Compared</b>	<b>130</b>
1.1 Church-State Models	130
1.2 Constitutional Frameworks: How Religion is managed	131
<b>2. The Social Embeddness of Religion in America</b>	<b>137</b>
2.1 Differences of Religious Development	137
2.2 The Great Awakenings	138
2.3 Civic Religion and Creedal Passion	139
<b>3. The Christian Faith: Internal Issues that affect RIPA</b>	<b>140</b>
3.1 Denominationalism: Religious Realignment and RIPA	141
3.2 Culture Wars	142
3.3 Theology and RIPA	143
3.4 Religious Identity and RIPA	144
<b>4. RIPA Organisations</b>	<b>144</b>
<b>5. Conclusion and Final Thoughts</b>	<b>147</b>



## Chapter 7: Examples of RIPA Organisations in Contemporary Australia

### Case Study One: The Australian Christian Lobby

---

<b>Introduction to Chapters 7 and 8</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>1. The Beginnings: The Australian Christian Coalition</b>	<b>152</b>
1.1 Structure of the Organisation	153
1.2 Supporters and Finances	154
1.3 Relationships with other Organizations	155
1.4 Early Strategy and Campaign Practices	156
1.5 The First Campaign: The Northern Territory Euthanasia Legislation	156
<b>2. Reinvention: The Australian Christian Coalition becomes the Australian Christian Lobby</b>	<b>159</b>
2.1 Restructuring	160
2.2 ACL Supporters	164
2.3 Relationships with other Organisations	166
2.4 Strategies	168
<b>3. Two Campaigns for the ACL</b>	<b>172</b>
3.1 Campaign One: Tasmania's Same-Sex Couples Legislation	172
3.2 Campaign Two: The Federal Government's Marriage Amendment Act	174
<b>4. Summary</b>	<b>175</b>

### Chapter 8: The Politics of Religion: Salt Shakers

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>180</b>
<b>1. Salt Shakers</b>	<b>180</b>
<b>2. Structure of the Organisation</b>	<b>181</b>
<b>3. Supporters and Finances</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>4. Strategies</b>	<b>184</b>
<b>5. Agenda</b>	<b>186</b>
<b>6. Important Issues</b>	<b>189</b>
6.1 Euthanasia	189
6.2 Islam: Dealings with the 'Other'	190
<b>7. External Relationships</b>	<b>191</b>
7.1 Relationships with Other Organisations	191
7.2 Relationships with Denominational Leadership and Churches	192
7.3 Relationship with Political Parties and Politicians	193
<b>8. Summary</b>	<b>194</b>

### Chapter 9: Conclusion: RIPA and Religious Fundamentalism in Australia Today

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>1. RIPA: Summing Up</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>2. RIPA: Further Research</b>	<b>202</b>

# Chapter 1: Religiously Inspired Political Activism Defined

---

<b>Introduction: The Thesis Questions</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1. Religion in Politics: Religiously Inspired Political Activism (RIPA)</b>	<b>3</b>
1.1. What is Religiously Inspired Political Activism?	4
1.2. RIPA in the American Context	5
1.3. RIPA in Australian Politics	8
1.4. Forms of RIPA: The Christian Right and the Christian Left	10
<b>2. The Importance of Religious Political Identity</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>3. Overview of this Thesis</b>	<b>12</b>
3.1. Methodology and Sources	14

## Introduction: The Thesis Questions

---

Catastrophic events like “September 11” are often catalysts for increased interest in religious beliefs and their interrelationship with political and social action. In Australia, attention to such interactions, particularly in the media, has varied. With or without these events, the involvement of religious organisations in Australian politics has always been and remains part of the internal dynamics of religious and social transformation in Australia. For some commentators, growing religious commitment, such as the rise of Charismatic/Pentecostal churches, signals the fulfilling of a ‘value or moral vacuum’ in Australian society. Within churches and denominations, internal conflict between theological Liberals with ideals of social justice and acceptance of minorities and religious Traditionalists who defend traditional (biblical) values and exclusivity continues to grow. This thesis will argue that, these theological differences are significant for religion for several reasons. First, because they have created a new type of schism/division that is not denominationally based. Second, these differences affect the way that religious belief functions within the social and political fabric of Australian and American societies. Third, inter-denominational RIPA organisations are formed around these theological differences, attracting supporters from across the denominational spectrum.

The aforementioned events and conflicts, in addition to society’s increased secularization have perpetuated the rapid growth of Christian lobby organisations over the last three decades. The impact of these organisations and the movement they represent are reflected in the recent rise and electoral success of the Family First Party and the increased efforts of major political parties to secure the ‘Christian vote’. This thesis does not seek to describe the Christian Right; rather, it asks three questions concerning religiously inspired political activity. First, is America a model that may be employed to explain this activity in Australia? Second, what motivates or inspires political activism<sup>1</sup> by those self-identifying through religious belief? Third, how does this inspiration influence the way that political activism is conducted? In discussing these questions, Chapter 1 Section 1.1 defines Christian political activism. Sections 1.2 to 1.4 introduce literature reviews of academic writings that are relevant to this thesis. Section 3 provides an overview for this thesis. For ease of readability and categorisation, the use of the word ‘religion’ exclusively refers to the Christian religion unless otherwise stated.

---

<sup>1</sup>Political activism is defined as public activity aimed to impact on decisions (including policy or procedures) made by any governing authority. In the case of religious activity, it contrasts with missionary activity that aims to convert people to Christianity.

## 1. Religion in Politics: Religiously Inspired Political Activism (RIPA)

---

Many commentators expressed surprise at the increased prominence of religiously inspired political activists attributed to the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and the first decade of the 21st Century in secular Western democracies. This trend is most fervent in the US and is identifiable by the rise of the Christian Right but is also evident in Australia. This era is also marked by an increase in fundamentalist<sup>2</sup> religious movements that transcend the globe. Within Christianity, evangelical Protestant movements encapsulate Africa and parts of Asia, while Catholicism enjoys a significant resurgence in the 'Developing World'. In exploring the fundamental question of this thesis - does America provide a viable model for explaining religious political activism in Australia - religiously inspired activism is investigated in the context of Australian and American political trends and culture.

This thesis argues that varying forms of political activism within the context of these countries interrelate with interpretations of Christian belief. It is not Christianity itself, nor being religious, that provokes individuals to identify as Christian and enter into secular politics. What prompts and directs activism is the understanding and interpretation of the Christian gospel; the message of the Bible and/or their perceived image of God, destiny and humanity's place in it. Therefore, there is a significant diversity of approaches, justifications, strategies and actions associated with Christian activism and consequently, heated debate and differences of opinion among Christian political activists.

As a counterpart to this central argument - that opinions vary amongst members of the Christian faith - this thesis does not refer to religiously inspired political activism as 'faith-based politics'. While recognising that much American literature uses this terminology, it has been avoided for two reasons. First, it has become synonymous with the Christian Right in America rather than Christian political activism and secondly, it is not faith (i.e. Christianity) that inspires political activism but the type of Christian belief.

---

<sup>2</sup>The term fundamentalist was originally used to describe people who supported the teachings (doctrine) contained in a twelve-volume series, called The Fundamentals that were published between 1910 and 1915. These paperbacks contained 90 essays on the Bible and related topics. This terminology and its usage are discussed further in Chapter 2, Section 2.3 and 2.4.

### **1.1. What is Religiously Inspired Political Activism?**

---

Activism may be described as intentional action to instigate change within a given society. Often classified as either social or political, the word activism is often used synonymously with notions of protest or dissent. Maintaining a wide range of forms,<sup>3</sup> activism can be inspired by a number of sources - religious belief being one such source. This activism may or may not be extreme in nature; neither need it embody protest or confrontation.

In the case of religious activism, religious belief determines its issue or agenda and propels activism towards the desired social outcome. Religion can provide the motive, means and method for political action; however, not all religious belief leads its adherents into activism.

The Christian religion has been a source of social and political activism throughout the centuries. Likewise, it has provided a source or justification for Pacifist movements and in the case of early fundamentalist movements, (such as the World Christian Fundamentals Association which held its first conference in Philadelphia in 1919)<sup>4</sup> the justification for removing oneself from engaging in social/political issues. Christian activism fulfils two primary and contrasting functions. The first being where religious activists attempt to persuade individuals to adapt their behaviour and the second, where they seek to persuade Governments to amend laws. While Christianity is the underlying impetus for both forms, there are distinctions. Religiously inspired activism (RIA) and the activities and organisations that stem from them, focus on the needs of others through community outreach and support programs. In the course of action, RIA organisations engage in the political arena for purposes such as legislative regulation or financial support; however, the organisational foundations are not in the political realm.

In contrast, religiously inspired activism that principally focuses on the political process is, for the purpose of this thesis, defined as religiously inspired political activism (RIPA). While claiming to represent others, RIPA organisations exclusively focus on political activity, lobbying, educating, and encouraging supporters to be politically active. The principal difference between RIA and RIPA is not the inspiration, but the theological outlook that generates different forms of action, priorities, or outcomes. RIA organisations will politically lobby as a role within their overall function, whereas RIPA organisations' main function is political lobbying.

---

<sup>3</sup>Activism can be such activities as rallies, street marches, strikes, guerrilla tactics, political orientations, (such as forms of letter writing) or political campaigning and lobbying.

<sup>4</sup>Wuthnow, Robert. "The World of Fundamentalism." *The Christian Century*, April 22, 1992, 426-429.

In explaining the differences between types of Christian activism, it is critical to understand the vital role of theological interpretation of sacred texts, such as the Bible and Christian eschatology that propose different scenarios about the events surrounding Christ's promised return to humanity and earth (the 'Second Coming'). A believer in the doctrine of Postmillennialism (i.e. that Christ will return when humanity has readied the earth for His glory) will focus their activism on such preparation - thus dedicating themselves towards the provision of social services and equality. In contrast, a Premillennialist (Christ will return prior to the millennial period) believes that the world is falling further into sin and misery; that Christ's Second Coming will be to judge humankind, punish the wicked, reward the faithful and establish God's kingdom on earth. Therefore, the Premillennialist focuses on moral standards and accountability to God for sin. While providing a simplistic summary, the example illustrates that the inspiration for Christian activists is not exclusively the Christian religion but the particular theological interpretation of sacred text including ones understanding of God and divine expectations for humanity and future events.

Religiously inspired political activism has led to the formation of religiously inspired political organisations or lobby groups. In this context, the most discussed is the American 'Religious Right', which is sometimes portrayed as extremist in nature and/or intent. However, the 'extremist' label is a pejorative construction. The prominent religiously inspired political activist organisations are not extreme in nature or intent as they do not promote the use of civic violence to achieve goals. There are, however, some fringe organisations, whose goals are to replace democratic forms of Government with theocratic ones.<sup>5</sup> While explanations of why religion has become a source of activism are varied, few commentators would argue against the claim that religious political activism has increased worldwide; furthermore, there has been an increase from the 1970s onwards.<sup>6</sup>

## **1.2 RIPA in the American Context**

Discussion now turns to the writings of three scholars who work provides different ways of accounting for RIPA activity in America. Writing on America's creed of liberty and equality and the power of the creed to unify people, Samuel Huntington's *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*<sup>7</sup> offers an interpretative grid that may be applied to religious politics and political

---

<sup>5</sup>These organisations are not the focus of this thesis.

<sup>6</sup>Julian Zelizer, co-editor of *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s* claims that during this time conservative religious organizations and leaders dominated American national politics. Zeiler Julian E. Bruce J. Schulman (Editors) (2008). *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s*. Harvard University Press.

<sup>7</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*. London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981.

activism. The Christian ideals of faith and freedom, the right to believe and the right to dissent undergird the “American Creed” and unite faith, politics, and activism. Huntington argues that these ideas are perennially frustrated by the institutions and hierarchies of democracy so that a gap exists between ideals and institutions or ideology and practice (IvI). Huntington describes these periods as times of creedal passion when moral intensity is not only strong in the political debate but moralism is believed to provide a means for closing the IvI gap. These periods are marked by institutional realignment and organisational reform. During these periods, countermovements<sup>8</sup> arise to narrow the gap. In focusing on this conflict within America, his model provides scope for political actors that include social movements, pressure groups, crusaders, and lobbyists.<sup>9</sup>

The work of two other academics has focused on these periods. Robert Fogel (*The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism*)<sup>10</sup> develops a theory linking “Religious Awakenings” and revivals to social and political changes that occur concurrently. Fogel interprets these events through an economic/social development framework. He argues that revivals are reform movements that transform the Christian religion and affect contemporary social customs and political practices. Fogel contends that “Great Awakenings”<sup>11</sup> move through three distinct phases: the first being an ethical/programmatic phase, the second, a legislative/political phase and finally, a decline phase. During the first phase, religious revival is followed by the development of revised ethics that lead to new political programs and movements and then to a decline phase where these new ethics and politics are challenged.<sup>12</sup> This last phase contains a moment when the activity of the old phase overlaps the new and tension and conflict are created. Within religious circles, each Great Awakening has produced schisms where distinctive theological and ethical principles and programs of reform become the impetus for social reform movements.<sup>13</sup>

Fogel’s theory offers a critical context for the discussion of the impact of religious change by connecting religious, social, and political change and provides insights into when new movements might emerge, what they seek to achieve and when conflict between them and the next generation

---

<sup>8</sup>Countermovements as their name implies, are a movement that seeks to counter or undermine the changes achieved by other movement organisations. Countermovements only organized themselves into politically cohesive and permanent opposition after the social and political changes of the sixties and seventies. Jo Freeman, Victoria Johnson Eds. Waves of Protest: Social Movements since the Sixties. Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 7-9, 105.

<sup>10</sup>Fogel, Robert William. The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

<sup>11</sup>The “Great Awakenings” are period of heightened religious activity, when religious numbers and participation increases, religious thought become challenged, religious schisms take place and new organisations and new religions are formed.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 26.

occurs. His discussion of how different reform movements develop is also most useful in that he links these to technological development and religious change (changes in the churches' agendas). Reform movements, such as the Christian (political) Right and Left differ in their theological outlook. While the Right may emphasise social and personal morality or universal virtues and values, the Left tends to emphasise devotion to Christ's command to "feed the poor and clothe the naked" and is characterised by a commitment to social justice. The disparity between left and right produces different social and political priorities that become the distinctive motivation for these movements and their organisations.

A third scholar, James Hunter, Professor of Religion, Culture and Social Theory at the University of Virginia, also discusses religious belief within a social and political context. In *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*,<sup>14</sup> he is concerned with interpreting and understanding both the surface issues and underlying realities of the contemporary 'culture war' in the United States. Hunter defines 'cultural war' as the "political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding. The end to which these hostilities tend is the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all others".<sup>15</sup> Hunter insists the conflict is about moral authority; beliefs about good and truth; obligations to humanity and even the nature of community.<sup>16</sup> He concludes that the differences are intractable. Hunter's work illuminates the nature of different responses apparent during periods Huntington defines as "creedal politics". His research into systems of moral understanding bears upon this thesis because it reinforces the contention that the old religious animosities between different denominations are being replaced by conflict between two polarized groups - theological Traditionalists and theological Progressives. This corresponds with Fogel's depiction of the second phase of revivals in which theological and ethical differences propel different social reforms.

In summary, Huntington's<sup>17</sup> work helps to explain *why* religious political activism has gained such prominence in the United States - the symbolic link between religion and politics - that may be traced to America's foundations (social, political and civic) and the creed that influences American politics today. Fogel's<sup>18</sup> work explores *how* religious political activism is an outcome of religious revivals creating social and political change in America. Both theorists argue that religious political

---

<sup>14</sup>Hunter, James Davison. *Culture Wars the Struggle to Define America*. New York: BasicBooks, 1991.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>17</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. *Op.cit.*

<sup>18</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op.cit.*, 26.



activism is not a current trend but an important aspect of understanding future and past American political activity. Hunter<sup>19</sup> discusses *what* religious political activism is and how moral issues are intensively divisive in American public life. These academics provide a working framework to understand religiously inspired political activism in the United States. They also construct a template for comparing the American experience of RIPA to the Australian equivalent.

### **1.3 RIPA in Australian Politics**

---

One writer on religion as public antagonism in Australia is Marion Maddox. Her first book *For God and Country: Religious Dynamics in Australian Federal Politics*<sup>20</sup> was based on research that Maddox conducted as a Parliamentary Research Fellow. Her work includes concerns about the influence of the conservative *Lyons Forum* that she argues significantly shaped the previous Federal Government's approach to a number of issues. Her second book *God under Howard: The Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics*<sup>21</sup> is a continuation of the first and in many ways has common material. She remains critical of the influence that the *Lyons Forum* has had in shaping political policy. In the vein of investigative journalism with elements of conspiracy theory, it is much more polemical than the first. She claims that an extreme form of conservative Christianity has been cultivated by John Howard, representing a "serious assault" on Australia's democratic culture. She states that Howard's God "undermines democratic traditions while justifying hatreds: vilification of homosexuals, punishing the unemployed, cruel border protection and illegal war".<sup>22</sup>

In discussing the dangerous alliance between conservative religion and political action, Maddox examines the American experience. Her conclusion is that the worst of American conservative religion is currently being imported to Australia. This thesis maintains however that, whilst there are similarities in the Christian Right of both countries, there are significant contrasts concerning how the organisations operate within their social, legal, and political constraints. Maddox disparages the influence of religious political lobbying organisations in Australia. While her claims about the influence of the Religious Right in the public arena and public affairs is not without justification, the Religious Left, Secularists, Atheists, and those of other religious beliefs also wield influence. Of importance to the debate about the influence of religious organisations is the consideration that the

---

<sup>19</sup>Hunter, James Davison. Op.cit.

<sup>20</sup>Maddox, Marion, and Australia. Dept. of the Parliamentary Library. Information and Research Services. *For God and Country: Religious Dynamics in Australian Federal Politics*. Dept. of the Parliamentary Library, 2001.

<sup>21</sup>Maddox, Marion. *God under Howard: The Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics*. Adelaide: Allen & Unwin, 2005.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 25-26.

Catholic Church has long been politically and socially active and despite upholding traditional theological belief, promotes a strong social justice agenda.

In a similar vein, Amanda Lohrey's book, *Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia*<sup>23</sup> examines a wide range of topics and personalities within a religious-political context. Like Maddox, she is concerned about the "extreme Christian lobby" operating internal to the Liberal Party. Interdenominational organisations, such as the *Family First Party*, are described as the Christian Right in disguise and the *Exclusive Brethren* as an extremist lobby group.<sup>24</sup> The Pentecostal Church, Hillsong is a focal point of the work that details interviews with a small sample of teenage female parishioners. George Pell, Peter Jensen, and John Howard are mentioned alongside Christian lobbyists who are seen as being exploited by politicians.<sup>25</sup>

Lohrey's fear and misunderstanding of the Christian Right is exemplified by her brief description of the *Australian Christian Lobby* and Jim Wallace its Managing Director who she claims aims to establish a "theocratic government" - a claim not evidenced.<sup>26</sup> Lohrey's conclusion is that Christians are refusing to respect the clear separation of Church and State, which presents a dilemma. Additionally, Australia is in danger of being ravaged by the Religious Right, despite neither Lohrey nor Maddox providing substantial evidence of this. Furthermore, both Lohrey and Maddox have overlooked evidence of left-wing social and political influences within liberal Australian churches, such as the Uniting Church and the Anglican Church.

Both Maddox and Lohrey write to an audience who are largely unsympathetic to the belief that religious views have a role in political debate; both view political endeavour as a strictly secular activity and neither examine the issue from the perspective of the participants.

Tom Frame in *Church and State: Australia's Imaginary Wall*<sup>27</sup> has provided another interpretation of the interaction between religion and politics in Australia. Frame, whilst not a supporter of the Religious Right, provides a sense of balance to the discussion of the political influence of the Religious Right in Australia. While arguing that religious people have reason and the right to participate in politics, he does not believe that Christian ideologies maintain a strong position within

---

<sup>23</sup>Lohrey, Amanda. *Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia*. Melbourne: Black Inc., 2006.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 54.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 64.

<sup>26</sup>This Thesis contends that while this organisation does seek political influence and a Christian voice in Federal politics, the organisation has no aspirations of a Christian theocracy.

<sup>27</sup>Frame, T. R. *Church and State: Australia's Imaginary Wall*. University of New South Wales Press, 2006.

the public sphere. Frame does not accept Lohrey and Maddox's theses about Australia descending into Christian Religious Right fanaticism. He argues that politically conservative Christians are both sectarian and disorganised. With somewhat cautious tones about right-wing religious influence on the political process, Frame notes that not all Christian traditions have a socially conservative mindset.

Frame also challenges Lohrey and Maddox's argument that religious influence in Australian political processes is a mirror of the American experience. He notes the different nature of the secular State and that Australia has no constitutional provisions similar to the United States. In other words, there is no formal separation of Church and State in the *Australian Constitution*, nor does Australia have a *Bill of Rights*. While civic religion is a strong factor in American politics and social settings it is not so in Australia. Frame argues that the High Court's judgements regulate interactions between Church and State based on its interpretation of *Section 116 of the Australian Constitution*. He is critical of those he describes as "Secular Humanists" and strict separationists, arguing that not only do they deliberately misread the *Australian Constitution* but they also overestimate the influence of the Religious Right in Australia.

In the conclusion of his book, Frame states that not only does Australia not require a "wall of separation" between Church and State but that developments in the relationship between the two is a reflection of a "broader and more mature outlook on public life", not a shift towards the Right, nor a "greater theological liberalism within the churches".<sup>28</sup>

#### **1.4 Forms of RIPA: The Christian Right and the Christian Left**

---

The topic of religious influence in political debate in America has attracted considerable attention for some time. A vast amount of literature has been produced covering the issue from a range of perspectives. Jim Wallis' work is another American text examined for this thesis. His account discusses the Religious Right and Left and explains issues concerning morality, faith, and their relevance across the Christian faith. He writes as an insider from the Religious Left who, while critical of the Religious Right calls for a deeper connection between the principles of faith and politics from those on the left - including his associates. His book published in 2005, *God's Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get It*<sup>29</sup> combines discussion of faith, culture, and

---

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 95.

<sup>29</sup>Wallis, Jim. *God's Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get It*. New York: HarperCollins, 2005.

politics in America. His audience is the American Christian Right whom he calls upon for reconciliation with Progressives' causes. He defines this as a new sort of politics. Wallis is critical of links between traditional Christian theology and former President George W. Bush's position on terrorism, suggesting that Christian theology has been co-opted to support the former President's position on the "war on terror". His work is helpful because of the links he explores between theological interpretation and social and political action.

In urging the two major political parties to seek common ground in the so-called values debate, Wallis calls for a "prophetic politics" that will act upon moral values grounded in biblical tradition. In criticizing the Right for exploiting this debate, he chastises the Left for ignoring it altogether. In many ways, Wallis is the prophet of the Religious Left who calls the Democrats<sup>30</sup> to embrace a political platform that is entrenched in the Bible while challenging the Christian Right's own theological interpretations (which are also Biblically based).

Wallis' critique of the Christian Right includes his claim that they have hijacked the language of faith, using it to justify their political agenda. He is critical of his Christian Left colleagues, claiming they have failed to acknowledge faith's influence in separating moral discourse and personal ethics from public policy.

This warning brought Wallis to Australia in April 2006. While in Australia, he suggested that Australians were in danger of allowing the Christian Right to influence politics as they have in the United States. His mindset is similar to Maddox and Lohrey in the sense that the Christian Right becomes the villain. There is nothing novel in his exposé of the failings of the Left or Right and his critique is somewhat limited as the Christian Right's political agenda covers more issues in America than he portrays.

## **2. The Importance of Religious Political Identity**

---

Manuel Castells, a Professor of Sociology at the University of California writes, "Identities are sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation." In acknowledging, that identities can originate from dominant institutions Castells maintains however that they only become an identity when and if, "social actors internalize them,

---

<sup>30</sup>In Barack Obama's successful Presidential campaign he aggressively outreached to the religious electorate including evangelical voters. "How the Media Covered Religion in the General Election." The Pew Forum: On Religion & Public Life. 20, Nov. 2008, <<http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=372>>.

and construct their meaning around this internalization". He calls upon sociologists to distinguish identity from what has traditionally been called role and role-sets, such as worker, mother, neighbour, churchgoers etc. Castells proposes that for social actors meaning is organised around a primary identity, which frames all other identities and is self-sustaining. The construction of identity uses "building materials" from a number of sources, including religious revelations.<sup>31</sup>

In discussing religious political identity, Nancy Rosenblum, Professor of Ethics in Politics and Government at Harvard University, is critical of the social sciences. Rosenblum's article in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* is primarily addressed to liberal democratic theorists whom she argues, tend to overlook religion when discussing political identity.

Rosenblum suggests that religious political parties play an important role in constructing, expressing, and mobilizing political identity. They do this by transforming group identity into identity groups. To appeal to voters on religious grounds, religious political parties must draw inspiration from religious values, if not theology. The example given is the European Catholic political identity, which she argues is the result of the formation and action of the Catholic Movement, not the other way around.<sup>32</sup> Both writers are suggesting then that religion enables social actors to form or be part of organisations whose group identity is linked to religious ideas.

Rosenblum believes that religious groups often form political organizations for several reasons. She lists these as being a reaction to perceived threats - such as the "encroachment of a dominant culture seen as inhospitable to faith and corrosive to religious community". Another is the conviction that "religious doctrine or more abstract religious values should guide every aspect of life." Further, that religious doctrine and values are of benefit to both nonbelievers' and believers alike.<sup>33</sup>

### **3. Overview of this Thesis**

---

This thesis is comprised of nine chapters. This first chapter contends that in order to understand religiously inspired political activism (RIPA) it is important to look beyond the concept of faith-based politics and explore the elements of faith that inspire political participation as a distinctly religious

---

<sup>31</sup> Castells Manuel. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume II (The Information Age)*. 2nd ed. 2004. Wiley Blackwell. P7.

<sup>32</sup> Rosenblum, Nancy L. "Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought". *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. 6th ed. 2003. 24.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

activity. As well as providing a definition for RIPA, the first chapter has introduced my discussion of RIPA in America and Australia, and their salient features and differences.

Chapter 2 looks at whether the American experience can be used as a model for RIPA in Australia. I will further consider the work of Samuel Huntington and his discussion of the “American Creed” and its relationship to political activism. I will also discuss in greater depth James Hunter’s work on culture wars in America which highlights the development of and changes to new modes of religious identification. This includes new distinctions in religious interaction and alterations in the line of moral obligation that define religious (Christian) communities. My attention will then return to the ideas of Robert Fogel whose work, as noted above, draws attention to the links between periods of religious awakening and social and political change. His work is important to my argument because he provides a model that connects theological, social, and political change in America. Chapter 3 takes up the possibility of using the American experience as a model of critique for Australia by examining the historical legacies influencing RIPA in America, a matter that Huntington has also considered. The later part of the Chapter is devoted to the typology of Christian movements and the role of theology. Differences in the way America approaches religious diversity compared with the Australian approach is dealt with in Section 3.

To provide a broader historical context, Chapter 4 explores the role of Australian religious organisations as social and welfare providers and political lobbyists until the 1960s. Chapter 5 continues the story from the 1970s to the present. It also discusses the reverberations of traditional and liberal theology, initially on the Australian churches and then on their social and political activities. Concluding this section is Chapter 6, which highlights differences in the cultural and religious legacies of America and Australia. By comparing the two experiences and highlighting the similarities and differences, I will contend that Australia's political, cultural, and religious life has an important formative role in shaping RIPA in this country that is not a duplication of the American experience.

Chapter 7 and 8 present case studies of two religiously motivated political organisations - the *Australian Christian Lobby* and *Salt Shakers*. Both organisations focus on the encouragement of religiously inspired political participation through the education and mobilization of supporters. I will show that their goals are representation in, rather than domination of, the public sphere. I have selected these two groups to both test my hypothesis and validate my conclusions. These two chapters illustrate the link between theology and political action, demonstrating that RIPA is neither

inherently politically Right nor Left in orientation but can transverse the political spectrum depending on the particular theological interpretation being applied to a specific issue. In summary, it is theological interpretation not ideology that determines the stand being taken and the action that it prompts. In my closing chapter, I will offer some final comments on the key questions raised in, and by, this thesis and make some suggestions for further research.

### **3.1 Methodology and Sources**

---

The research for this paper has involved a cross-disciplinary approach drawing on historical, cultural, textual, political, and religious studies in a qualitative approach. Primary and secondary sources have included book and journal articles, as well as on-line resources including websites. The provision of case studies included analysis of documentary collections, accessing archives, analysing publications, oral history interviews and personal interviews with leading figures in the *Australian Christian Lobby* and *Salt Shakers*, as well as a small sample survey of *Australian Christian Lobby* supporters who attended its first national conference in Brisbane in 2000. The research has involved attending the *Australian Christian Lobby's* functions, such as, *Meet the Candidate* Forums; Queensland State and National Conferences; Queensland Board Meetings, as well as spending time in the Brisbane and National offices. Questions relating to my methodology and sources with respect to Chapters 7 and 8 are discussed in the opening section of Chapter 7.

## Chapter 2: Christian Inspiration, Activism and Identity

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>1. Links between Religious Inspiration and Activism</b>	<b>16</b>
1.1 The American Creed, Creedal Politics and Activism	16
1.2 Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America	20
1.3 The Link: Great Awakenings and Religious, Political and Social Change	24
1.4 Summary	30
<b>2. Christian Identity and Activism: Symbols and Vocabulary</b>	<b>31</b>
2.1 Premillennialism and Postmillennialism	32
2.2 The Image and Nature of God and Political Participation	35
2.3 Liberal Theology and the Fundamentalist Counterattack of the 1920s	38
2.4 What is Fundamentalism?	40
<b>3. Summary</b>	<b>43</b>



## Introduction

---

Chapter 1 explored concepts of religiously inspired activism, including religious political activism or RIPA. Chapter 2 examines the framing texts utilised in this thesis in more detail. Section 1 of this chapter commences this task by analysing significant texts by Samuel Huntington and Robert Fogel. Huntington, a political scientist describes America as a disharmonic society that struggles to reconcile American ideals with the less than ideal actualities of American politics; Fogel, an economic historian discusses cycles of reform in American history through an economic/social development framework that incorporates a religious-historical framework. Christian theologies have undergone transformations and revisions over the course of US history. However, the liberal theology of the 1960s did much to create and define the current pattern of theological and social division amongst Christian believers, churches, and denominations. These new schisms described by James Hunter as the moral frameworks of contemporary “culture wars” are also discussed in Section 1 of this chapter.

This chapter outlines the ways in which issues of Christian identity are applicable to the study of RIPA. As this thesis will depict, Christian identity is not singular, nor is it fixed; rather, Christian identities are constructed around diverse theological understandings and their ability to provide answers to social and political issues. Religious concepts and theology create Christian political identity. Section 2 reviews recent research by the American-based *Baylor Institute* that, through intensive interviews and surveys, provide insight into the connections between Americans’ diverse expressions of their common belief in God and the forms of political participation and activism in which they engage. Some basic theological language is also explored and defined.

### 1. Links between Religious Inspiration and Activism

---

#### 1.1 The American Creed, Creedal Politics and Activism

---

Samuel Huntington, in critiquing ‘Pluralist Theory’, emphasizes the theory’s definition of politics as a struggle amongst large numbers of relatively small interest groups. He suggests that interest-group politics describe the dominant form of American politics but not all forms. Rather, there are times when interest-group politics are supplemented or supplanted by creedal politics.<sup>16</sup> According to Huntington, “Creedal Politics occurs when there are times of passion and moral intensity that

---

<sup>16</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. Op. cit., 105.

envelope the American political scene”.<sup>17</sup> There is a direct link between creedal passion and religious political activity in America because the American Creed embodies basic Christian ideals of faith and freedom, the right to dissent and the right to believe according to one's conscience.<sup>18</sup> When these beliefs are threatened, religious political passion intertwines with the driving forces of creedal passion, establishing the grounds for RIPA.

During times of creedal passion, there is a drift to moralism in an attempt to eliminate the gap between ideology and practice to bring political reality into accord with the American Creed. As noted in Chapter 1, Huntington describes the gap between ideology and practice as ideals versus institutions or 'IvI'. It is the belief that this division should not exist that propels the need for reform, creating periods of creedal passion distinguished by institutional realignment and reform. During times of creedal passion, the focus concerns the structure and character of political practices and institutions rather than the role and power of social forces.<sup>19</sup>

The central feature of creedal passion is the exposure of the 'IvI' gap. During these times of passion, movements that focus on specific reforms or causes flourish. Political participation intensifies - with political cleavages cutting across economic class lines. This includes a combination of middle and working-class groups promoting change. In order to limit power and reshape institutions, major reforms of political institutions are attempted. Realignment occurs in the relations between social forces and political institutions. The prevailing ethos, promoting reform in the name of traditional ideals is another distinguishing characteristic.<sup>20</sup>

In the United States, religious organisations that respond to the IvI gap are identified as special agenda or special purpose groups.<sup>21</sup> Conservative organisations challenging the gap in the 1970s included the *Moral Majority*, *Christian Voice*, *Religious Roundtable*, *Prayers of Life*, *Intercessors for America*, *Concerned Women of America*, the *National Christian Action Coalition*, and *Family America*. Together they formed the nucleus of what was later known as, the *New Christian Right*.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-9.

<sup>18</sup>“Why Religious Values Support American Values.” 26 Oct. 2005. [The Heritage Foundation](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Religion/hl899.cfm). <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Religion/hl899.cfm>>.

<sup>19</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. *Op. cit.*, 85.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 86-7.

<sup>21</sup>Wuthnow, Robert. *The Restructuring of American Religion Society and Faith since World War II*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. 395-99.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 205.

### 1.1.1 Periods of Creedal Passion

Huntington identifies four periods of creedal passion sharing characteristics that distinguish them from other periods in American history. They are times of widespread discontent with governmental authority; times when political ideas play an important role in social controversies; when traditional American values, including the popular control of Government and its accountability are stressed in public discussion and finally, when moral indignation over the IVI gap becomes widespread. During periods of creedal passion, politics are characterized by agitation and upheaval beyond the usual routine of interest-group conflict and hostility towards power is demonstrated and defined as liberty versus power.

The four periods of key reform that Huntington cites occur in approximately sixty-year cycles. They are the American Revolution, the Jacksonian Era, the Progressive Movement and the Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam protests. This cyclical pattern emanates from episodes of moralism with strong religious elements that strive to minimise the IVI gap alternating with periods of interest-group-driven “politics as usual”. Thus, Huntington highlights the place of moral passion in American politics and the opportunities this creates for American political culture to draw upon religious symbolism.

In a climate of creedal passion, “[political] ideas become important not primarily for intellectual reasons but for moral ones and moral indignation generates creedal passion and political controversy. There is a rush to moral judgement on the rights and wrongs of politics.”<sup>23</sup> Creedal politics is recognised as being intermittent rather than continuous, passionate but pragmatic, idealistic rather than materialistic, and formulated in terms of right and wrong and reform-mindedness.

Times of creedal passion are characterized by intense and widespread political activity; consequently, people are mobilized for action - often in varying ways. As a result, new voluntary associations develop that, as well as providing a structured environment for political protest, encourage further political participation by supporters.<sup>24</sup>

According to Huntington, the primary explanation for these periods is when established social groups “... fear an imminent changed pattern in the distribution of deference and power and other

---

<sup>23</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. *Op. cit.*, 93.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 97,98.

social groups have reason to think they can and should bring about such a change”.<sup>25</sup> Alternatively, Huntington suggests that periods of creedal passion occur when a number of young people who have a propensity towards moralistic behaviour become active politically. “Much historical evidence suggests that young people have, throughout history, played leading roles in revolutionary movements and political upheavals”.<sup>26</sup> Huntington suggests these times of moral intensity linked to creedal politics are aided by people he classifies as political actors, including social movement members, pressure groups, crusaders and lobbyists.<sup>27</sup> He also believes that the tensions between ideals and institutions are likely to increase.

Another writer discussing cycles of, and linkages between, religious and political change is Robert Fogel. His work is examined in more detail in Section 1.3. In some respects, Fogel expands on Huntington's work in that he explores phases of religious revival, resulting in social, political, and legal change through the religious framework of ‘Great Awakenings’. As his work is from the perspective of an economic historian, it does not rely on the abstract IVI theory or notions of creedal passion as his foundation of explanation but explores the impact of technological advancements on change. Fogel argues there have been four Great Awakenings,<sup>28</sup> much the same as the periods outlined by Huntington. Unlike Huntington, Fogel does not define these periods of intensity as a distinct episode but sees them, as part of longer three-phase cycles. These phases are comprised, first, a period of revival or awakening, a second phase of political consolidation, and finally, a period of completion and decline, that overlaps with the first phase of the next cycle. “The first phase of religious revival is followed by a phase in which the new ethics precipitates powerful political programs and movements. Each cycle ends with a phase in which the ethics and politics fostered by the religious revival are challenged and the political coalition promoted by that revival goes into decline.”<sup>29</sup> Huntington's episodes of creedal passion best describe Fogel's second and consolidation phase where social and political reform and movement activity are strongest and most successful. Fogel does not however emphasise moralism to the extent that it features in Huntington's work.

---

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 145-46.

<sup>26</sup>*Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>28</sup>Most historical, political, and social scientists acknowledge the existence of the first three Great Awakenings; however, the fourth and current Awakening is debated.

<sup>29</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 17.

## 1.2 Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America

---

The mid 1960s to the late 1970s was an era of enormous social and political change. America withdrew its forces from South Vietnam, women's liberation found its voice and many social customs and mores were challenged. These changes influenced all aspects of American society, including religious communities. Akin to the public who held different views on issues, those of the Christian faith adopted diverse positions. These differences are defined by writers such as James Davidson Hunter as 'culture wars' and have been seen as a struggle, a re-defined religious alignment that involve both denominational groups and politically defined positions.

The expression culture war often used to describe ideologically driven conflict in American public culture and politics was made popular by James Davison Hunter's *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. He describes a re-alignment and polarization of moral understandings that has transformed both politics and culture in America.<sup>30</sup> His focus on moral understanding is consistent with Huntington's concept of creedal politics.

Not only has the notion of a culture war been adopted by many, it has become a topic of much debate. Hunter's work builds on Robert Wuthnow's<sup>31</sup> claims that after the Second World War there had been significant changes in American culture and institutions. These changes produced a new cleavage in American religion whereby the older denominations were dissected by a theological Liberal-Traditional divide within the Protestant, Catholics, and Jewish communities.

Essentially, Hunter has taken this cleavage as his foundation, arguing that in the past, cultural conflict has been within the boundaries of a larger biblical culture over issues such as doctrine, ritual observance, and religious organisation. Despite these disagreements, there was underlying agreement about the moral order in both community and national life.

In contemporary society, Conservatives and Progressives are not merely different sides of a "political squabble" on the "same plane of moral discussion"; rather, these opposing alliances operate on different planes of moral discourse. "What ultimately explains the realignment in America's public culture are allegiances to different formulations and sources of moral authority."<sup>32</sup> Traditional

---

<sup>30</sup>Hunter, James Davidson. *Op. cit.*, 42.

<sup>31</sup>Wuthnow, Robert. *The Restructuring of American Religion Society and Faith since World War II*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

<sup>32</sup>Hunter, James Davidson. *Op. cit.*, 118.

Christians can unwittingly re-symbolize their traditions, whereas Progressives tend to do this more consciously to make the traditions compatible with “the spirit of historical change”. Principally, this re-symbolization centres on the rejection of the form and content of orthodoxy. These cultural hermeneutics and the emergence of civic humanism are somewhat similar in that they reject the validity of traditional, religious ritual or symbols and are somewhat hostile towards any form of orthodoxy. Moral truth is perceived as a human construct that somehow perpetually unfolds making it both conditional and relative.<sup>33</sup>

These differentiated worldviews are not always articulated or coherent. They consist of moral visions that take expression as polarizing impulses or tendencies in culture. This is important to consider when examining how moral visions are institutionalized in organisations and how people relate to them. These differences are polarizing a “religiously informed public culture into two relatively distinct moral and ideological camps”;<sup>34</sup> both of which use history as an ideology to support their public position. The mainline Christians emphasise the United States’ Christian heritage and the founding of America as the benevolent action of a Supreme Being. Conversely, Progressives argue that a secular, humanist State was the founding intention.<sup>35</sup> These two understandings have become justification for current positions based on historical interpretations. In broad terms, cultural Conservatives define freedom economically (individual economic initiative) and justice socially (as righteous living), whilst Progressives define freedom socially (individual rights) and justice economically (as equality).<sup>36</sup> “Both biblical and enlightenment themes are present in the historical record. Yet in public discourse, each theme is accentuated by opposing sides at the expense of the other”<sup>37</sup> so that history becomes reduced to an ideology through which political and social interests by both sides are legitimated.

This shift affected denominational loyalty resulting in new alliances being formed across denominations on progressive and traditional lines; creating a new form of cooperative mobilization whereby separate and distinct religious and moral traditions share resources and unite for a common objective. “The associations being formed across traditions among the orthodox and among the progressive are not designed so much to maintain or win adherents against the onslaught

---

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 123-4.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 108-13.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

of secular modernity but to marshal resources against each other and, more importantly, against the larger cultural forces that each side represents.”<sup>38</sup>

As a consequence of the cross-denominational mobilization, special purpose organisations that appeal to shared traditional aspects of different faiths emerge. In discussing the new alignments, Hunter suggests that, paradoxically there are more groups on the progressive rather than conservative or orthodox side in America.<sup>39</sup> Neither the size nor effectiveness of organisations is of as much significance as the realignment of public culture that their existence indicates.<sup>40</sup>

### **1.2.1 Assessment of the Culture War Theory**

In America, the “culture war” theory rapidly became the topic of conferences, books, and publications. Both Os Guinness (*The American Hour*) and N. J. Demerath (*Crossing the Gods: World Religions and Worldly Politics*) have utilised the concept in their work. Guinness describes the core of the crisis as a loss of America’s “cultural compelling power” where traditions, ideals, and beliefs that are central to the character of American democracy lose their power.<sup>41</sup> He agrees with Hunter that the culture war is a result of a “long and profound shift” in the foundations of a culture that construct these changes. This triggers an “avalanche of consequences” that appear unstoppable. The predicted outcome is the eventual decline and/or death of a unified culture.<sup>42</sup> Demerath believes that America shifted from tolerant pluralism to “entrenched conflict because issues, such as abortion and homosexuality have become bitter politics, not only between denominations but political parties as well.” Demerath also agrees with Hunter that the conflict between Traditional and Progressives transcends denominational lines.<sup>43</sup> However, both believe that most Americans would have a mixture of conservative and progressive sympathies.<sup>44</sup> He also believes that the proponents of the cultural war thesis exaggerate the polarization by focusing on the extreme flanks of public opinion and that “it relies on the testimony of the few who call to arms rather than the many who fail to respond”.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>39</sup> This view is not shared by Jim Wallis (*God’s Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and the Left Doesn’t Get It*. New York: HarperCollins, 2005) who argues the reverse (see Chapter 1).

<sup>40</sup> Hunter, James Davidson. *Op. cit.*, 102.

<sup>41</sup> Guinness, Os. *The American Hour: A Time of Reckoning and the Once and Future Role of Faith*. New York: The Free Press. 1993. 26.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>43</sup> Demerath, N.J. *Crossing the Gods: World Religions and Wordily Politics*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 2001. 161-63.

<sup>44</sup> Hunter, James Davidson. *Op. cit.*, 43. and, Demerath, N.J. *Op. cit.*, 165.

<sup>45</sup> Demerath, N.J. *Op. cit.*, 165.

Demerath departs from Hunter's interpretation in suggesting that a culture war must include violence or force to challenge the Government's legitimacy and control of non-economic interests.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, he claims the combination of religion and politics embodies the connotations of a culture war when state power is uncertain.<sup>47</sup> His reworking of the definition argues that actions, such as the killing of abortionists or the bombing of the federal buildings in Oklahoma City are not indicative of this 'war' because changes to officeholders and laws were demanded - not the overthrow of the Government. In reality, they are, skirmishes that represent democracy in action occurring in America.<sup>48</sup>

Entering the discussion, Geoffrey Layman's, *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*<sup>49</sup> investigates the influence of the Progressive-Traditional<sup>50</sup> cultural divide in American politics. He engages the culture war thesis by challenging Hunter's assertion that the old cleavages between Protestants, Catholics and Jews are virtually irrelevant.<sup>51</sup> Layman argues that "ethno-religious" differences are still influential in determining political practices; that, "in contemporary religion and politics, it is likely that the ethno-religious and culture war models are ideal types and the reality lies somewhere between".<sup>52</sup> Though not disregarding the Traditional/Conservative-Progressive/Liberal cleavages, Layman notes the continued alliance of the African-Americans to the Democratic Party even though "African-Americans are much less likely than whites to be secular, and they have higher levels of doctrinal orthodoxy and religious commitment than whites".<sup>53</sup> While conceding that the political-cultural landscape in the US may be in transition, he believes that it is too early to discount the influence of ethno-religious differences.

There is no doubt that the issue of cultural wars, what they are and if they exist, has generated controversy in academic and journalistic circles. A collection of essays on the controversy entitled, *Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*, appeared in 1997.<sup>54</sup> The conclusion from all contributions was that Hunter's ideological bipolar axis is overly simplistic. It obscures and hides more difference than it uncovers. Entrenched conflict may not be as strong or as

---

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 162-165.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 191.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 236.

<sup>49</sup>Layman, Geoffrey. *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2003.

<sup>50</sup>Geoffrey Layman uses the term "Traditional" where James Hunter uses the term "Conservative". They are however both writing about the same groups.

<sup>51</sup>Hunter, James Davidson. *Op. cit.*, 12.

<sup>52</sup>Layman, Geoffrey. *Op. cit.*, 66.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, 308.

<sup>54</sup>Williams, Rhys H. Ed. *Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*. New York: Adline De Gruyter. 1997.



permanent as Hunter argues. There is however, consensus that the culture war rhetoric resonates with a large portion of the US electorate. It has become a useful tool in mobilizing people for political activism and providing a base for both the Christian Political Right and Left in America. The result has been to accentuate differences - both politically and religiously among religious people.

### 1.3 The Link: Great Awakenings and Religious, Political and Social Change

---

Robert Fogel's, *The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism* (2000) looks at this phenomenon in an economic/social development framework. 'Great Awakenings' are not religious events alone. They are understood as reform movements that evolve through three phases of mobilization and activity - an ethical/programmatic phase that is followed by a legislative/political phase – and then a final phase where political programs initiated in the second phase begin to be challenged. The impetus for an Awakening arises from the lag between technological change and institutional adjustment.<sup>55</sup> The full cycles extend over approximately one century. A crucial factor to understanding developments in the late 20<sup>th</sup> Century is that the conclusion of one cycle overlaps with the beginning of the next; therefore, the religious ideals of the preceding cycle are predominant when an enthusiastic minority shapes the ideals that will dominate the next cycle.<sup>56</sup>

Fogel's schema is different to Huntington's in his suggestion that Great Awakenings involve different religious programs. The Third Great Awakening of the 1890s included Progressive and Social Gospel programs. This depicted a postmillennial view of End-Time events<sup>57</sup> with less focus on personal sin and a concern about social justice. It also marked the beginning of Liberal theology that rejected the notion of the Bible being the inerrant, inspired word of God to be interpreted literally. Each period of revival involved a great number of conversions but also "...the emergence of a distinctive set of theological and ethical principles and a coherent program of reform under-girded by zealous reform movements".<sup>58</sup> Single-issue movements tend to emerge halfway through the first phase of the Awakening: examples being, the Temperance and Abolitionist Movements of the 1830s and early 1840s (Second Awakening) and the Right-to-life Movement of the mid 1970s (Fourth Awakening).<sup>59</sup> The shift of political activity to agenda-driven movements and the development of political parties signal a shift towards consolidation and the second phase of the Awakening cycle.

---

<sup>55</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>57</sup>The major difference between Pre and Postmillennialism is the timing of Christ's return to earth. Premillennialists believe Christ will return bringing one thousand years of peace with him, whereas Postmillennialists believe that Christ will return after there has been one thousand years of peace on earth. Further details are contained in Section 2, sub section 2.1.

<sup>58</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 8, 9.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 26.

### **1.3.1 The First Great Awakening – The American Revolution**

The First Great Awakening commenced in 1730 within the American colonial Protestant communities. During the first phase of the Awakening, Congregationalist leader, Jonathan Edwards rejected the Church's strict, Puritan Calvinist doctrine and Predestination theology,<sup>60</sup> instead focusing on the importance of a person's religious experiences. The Political Phase of this Awakening existed from 1760 to 1790, ripening into the American Revolution. Fogel writes that during this time, Americans believed British moral and political corruption was threatening their attainment of spiritual and political virtue. Those leading the dispute on church doctrine were named 'New lights'.<sup>61</sup> Their influence created a new division within the Christian religion, resulting in a reshaping of denominations, including the Congregational, Presbyterian and Reformed Churches and strengthening the smaller Baptist and Methodist denominations. New universities were established on both sides of the theological divide,<sup>62</sup> such as King's College (now Columbia University) and Princeton University.<sup>63</sup> Under religious leader John Wesley's direction, the 'Methodists' became leaders in the social justice issues of the day, including prison reform while introducing Christianity to the slaves and the championing Abolitionist Movement. The *New lights* later became leaders of the American Revolution; providing some of its ideological foundations. They questioned the establishment of existing authority, promoted popular discontent, and according to Fogel, eroded colonial boundaries.<sup>64</sup>

### **1.3.2 The Second Great Awakening – Jacksonian Era**

Between the First and Second Awakenings a number of significant events occurred, including the War of Independence and the French Revolution that saw the spread of rationalistic Deism and Atheism. The Second Great Awakening (1820s–1870s) occurred as a partial response to these events.<sup>65</sup> This Awakening, of shorter duration than the first, had strong impact on American religion and social reform. The political crisis of the 1850s was instigated by a powerful religious upsurge beginning ten years earlier and lasting some twenty years. Economic issues that dominated American politics since the 1800s were neglected for issues of emancipation, temperance and the teaching of the Bible in schools.

---

<sup>60</sup>The Calvinist doctrine of predestination held that only those designated by God before their birth would be saved.

<sup>61</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 20.

<sup>62</sup>When I write about theological divide, I am referring to the new divide that has supplanted the theological divide known as sectarianism.

<sup>63</sup>First Great Awakening. [Enjoying God Ministries](http://www.theopedia.com/Great_Awakening#First_great_awakening_.281730s_-_1740s.29). 3 Oct. 2006. <[http://www.theopedia.com/Great\\_Awakening#First\\_great\\_awakening\\_.281730s\\_-\\_1740s.29](http://www.theopedia.com/Great_Awakening#First_great_awakening_.281730s_-_1740s.29)>.

<sup>64</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 20.

<sup>65</sup>The New York Missionary Society was formed in 1798. The group comprised of Baptists, Presbyterians, and Other Reformed Christians. Meeting on the second Wednesday of every month, they prayed for revival and awakening. Davies, R.E. *I Will Pour Out My Spirit*. England: Monarch Publications. 1992. 115.

According to Fogel, the Second Awakening was generated by technological advancements that promoted rapid urbanisation, the rise of the factory system and mass immigration through the nineteenth Century.<sup>66</sup> The move to abolish slavery began with Northern Church members wanting their leaders to condemn slavery as sin. It initially remained a minority doctrine of some Northern churches with those promoting the concept going against church authority and shifting the struggle to the political arena. From this effort, the Republican Party was formed. The radical reform agenda of the Second Great Awakening functioned through seven Constitutional amendments, including outlawing slavery, black male suffrage, popular election of Senators, prohibition and women's suffrage.<sup>67</sup>

The Second Great Awakening also resulted in the formation a number of new denominations.<sup>68</sup> During this Awakening, the notion of building God's kingdom on earth was preached as the American mission. It was believed that the Millennium (the return of Christ) was imminent. New reform movements sought to prepare America as the place for the Second Coming, hence the rise of the Temperance and the Abolitionist Movements. The Political Phase from 1840 to 1870 saw the Temperance Movement pressure State and Local Governments to control alcohol abuse by issuing licences and restricting access to alcohol. Increasing demands, they pressured thirteen Northern states to prohibit production and the sale of alcoholic drinks. Other social action evolved around preventing child labour, the introduction of compulsory education, as well as reforms to eradicate corruption.<sup>69</sup>

### **1.3.3 The Third Great Awakening – Progressive Movement Era**

The Third Great Awakening known as, the "Missionary Awakening" saw the rise of the Social Gospel Movement, which applied Christian principles to social problems such as poverty, drug use, and prevention of crime. A major theological split among Evangelical churches marked the first phase of the Third Great Awakening extending from 1890 to 1930. The issue being the belief that poverty was "the wages of sin". Belief in the contentious *Prosperity Gospel* - that those with God's grace will prosper financially - became prevalent. Evolutionary theory also promoted splits in both Creed and ethics in addition to challenging the historicity of the Genesis creation narratives.

---

<sup>66</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 15, 16.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>68</sup>Second Great Awakening. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Great_Awakening). 3 Oct. 2006. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Great\\_Awakening](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Great_Awakening)>.

<sup>69</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 21.

According to Fogel, Christian Conservatives held firm on creedal issues with emphasis on the centrality of personal conversion and morality. The most uncompromising of these groups became known as Fundamentalists who were named as such because of their adherence to the teachings of *The Fundamentals* - a twelve-volume series published from 1910 to 1915 that set forth the fundamentals of the Christian faith. The Fundamentalists believed the Bible to be the inerrant word of God. This contrasted from the Modernists or Progressives known as modernist Christians who applied scientific principles to biblical texts. The Modernists' understanding of the Second Coming replaced the pessimism of Calvinist views about humanity's irredeemably with optimism about perfecting American Society; revelations of science replaced divine revelation.<sup>70</sup>

Social issues including corruption, crime, drunkenness, prostitution and political corruption were outcomes of the rapid growth of cities.<sup>71</sup> Economic conditions were now collective moral failures; poverty was a failure of society - not a personal one. The State was held accountable for the role of improving the economic conditions of the poor.<sup>72</sup> As noted earlier, the work of the Social Gospel Movement involved battling issues of child labour, compulsory elementary education, and protection of women from exploitation in factories. There were major crusades for the prohibition of alcohol, as well as abhorrence of cigarette smoking.<sup>73</sup> In the late 1800s, the Temperance Movement broadened its focus to behaviour and institutions relating to alcohol consumption. Significant organisations of this period were the *Women's Christian Temperance Union* and the *Prohibition Party*.<sup>74</sup> Organisations with strong social emphasis included the *Salvation Army*, the *Society for Ethical Culture* and the *Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor*. This latter organisation, continued as one of the important labour organisations of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. Their focus was the cessation of child and convict labour, gaining equal pay for women, cooperative employer-employee ownership of mines, factories, and progressive income tax.<sup>75</sup>

#### **1.3.4 The Fourth Great Awakening – Civil Rights and the Protest Era**

Fogel places the beginning of the Fourth Great Awakening as the late 1960s or early 1970s. During this time, the Christian religion experienced a period of momentous change with the development of forms of Evangelical Christianity that emphasized a personal relationship with Jesus. Furthermore,

---

<sup>70</sup>*Ibid.*, 23, 24.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 22, 23.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>73</sup>The Third Great Awakening. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Great_Awakening). 5 Oct. 2006.

<[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third\\_Great\\_Awakening](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Great_Awakening)>.

<sup>74</sup>Prohibition in the United States. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibition_in_the_United_States). 5 Oct. 2006. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibition\\_in\\_the\\_United\\_States](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prohibition_in_the_United_States)>.

<sup>75</sup>Knights of Labor. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights_of_Labor). 5 Oct. 2006. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights\\_of\\_Labor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights_of_Labor)>.

independent churches, community faith centres, and parachurch<sup>76</sup> organisations developed along with non-traditional churches and megachurches<sup>77</sup> all of which adhered to conservative theology. The Roman Catholic Church launched its own Charismatic Movement while some mainline churches embraced Pentecostalism.<sup>78</sup>

The beginning of this final and current Awakening apparently stemmed from dissatisfaction with egalitarian social and religious values that underpinned the politics of the Post-war Era and the limitations and quiescence of conservative mores in the 1950s. There was a religious component to the '60s and '70s with a Christian countermovement known as, the Jesus Movement arising within the hippie counterculture.<sup>79</sup> Its members were called "Jesus People" or "Jesus freaks". The Jesus movement began on the West Coast of the United States, spreading to Europe and other parts of the world, before waning in the early 1980s along with the Hippie Movement.<sup>80</sup> Members of the Jesus Movement believed mainline denominations were apostate.<sup>81</sup> They, like the hippies were frequently opposed to their Governments' national and international policies. According to Fogel, this Awakening has transferred into its political phase and focuses on spiritual reform.<sup>82</sup>

In discussing the Fourth Awakening, Fogel argues that the egalitarian platform of the Third Awakening was mostly implemented in the 1960s. This is the overlap period between the end of the Third Awakening and beginning of the Forth. Fogel suggests that this overlap period lasted about twenty years.<sup>83</sup> The labour reforms sought by Social Gospel advocates were written into social policy. Consequently, people gained better access to healthcare and other services. Fogel suggests that rather than focussing on material equity the current Awakening's focal point is self-actualisation and the redistribution of "spiritual resources".<sup>84</sup> Fogel believes that these spiritual resources are necessary to cope with the ethical implications created by technological advances, including human organ transplants, gene therapies, and nuclear proliferation.

---

<sup>76</sup>This term is largely used in the United States to define an organisational structure (predominately-evangelical Christian) wherein members of different denominations work together for mission, social welfare, and evangelism. Parachurch. "Parachurch organisation." Wikipedia Foundation. 9 Sept. 2007. <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parachurch>>.

<sup>77</sup>A megachurch is a large church, having around 2 000 or more worshippers for a typical weekly service. "Welcome to Mega Church Talk." 19 Aug. 2008. Victorian Council of Christian Education. <<http://www.megachurchwatch.org/>>.

<sup>78</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 24.

<sup>79</sup>"Fourth Great Awakening." Wikipedia Foundation. 5 Oct. 2006. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth\\_Great\\_Awakening](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Great_Awakening)>.

<sup>80</sup>A website has been developed that gives the history of the Jesus Movement, including information on its founding members. One Way. 20 Mar. 2008. <<http://one-way.org/jesusbomb>>.

<sup>81</sup>Apostate - they believed that the mainline denominations could no longer be considered "true to the Christian faith".

<sup>82</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>83</sup>*Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>84</sup>Fogel identifies spiritual assets as "a sense of purpose, self-esteem, a sense of discipline, a thirst for knowledge". 15.

The 1990s saw a religious upsurge resulting in a culturally oriented political agenda coinciding with the creation of mobilizing reform movements including the Christian Political Right.<sup>85</sup> Initially, the Christian Right's political activity occurred in local county politics in the 1970s before appearing nationally during Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign in the late 1970s.<sup>86</sup> The other important change that occurred during the 1990s was the shift of deeply religious voters from the Democrats to the Republicans. In 1994, only 26 per cent continued to vote for the Democrats with 74 per cent voting Republican. The number of cross-denominational Christian political organisations and lobby groups also increased. Further development of a political reform agenda that focused on the restoration of the 'traditional family' and which emphasised 'equal opportunity' also occurred. These issues have become the principle agenda of Christian Conservatives and a rallying cry of many conservative politicians.<sup>87</sup>

Organisations emerging in this period include *the Promise Keepers*, a non-affiliated Christian organisation for men, and the *Traditional Values Coalition*. Revamped organisations include the *Moral Majority* and the *Focus on the Family's* new organisation, *Action*. From the 1990s, the *Christian Coalition*<sup>88</sup> has sustained a clear focus on politics while showing willingness to compromise on key issues to extend the Coalition. The organisation is more theologically flexible than its predecessor, raising the 'traditional family' above the issue of abortion. It has sought to woo economic Conservatives by integrating tax reductions and calls for 'smaller Government' into their social program.

James Wood writes that there are now over 120 religious offices or lobbies seeking to influence governmental policies at all levels in Washington DC alone. In America there are over 1 840 Christian radio and television stations, 3 400 religious bookstores, 900 religious periodicals and over 200 reporters assigned to cover religious news. There are also thousands of religious educational, social and welfare institutions and programs.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>85</sup>Fogel describes the Religious Right in America as a "zealous reform movement". 16.

<sup>86</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>87</sup>Wallis, Jim. *Op. cit.*, 180.

<sup>88</sup>This organisation emerged in 1979 with a bid to become the vehicle to reunite religious people with a national program of political restructuring that included opposition to abortion, re-establishing prayer in schools and eliminating pornography. It replaced the former Moral Majority organisation.

<sup>89</sup>Wood, James E. Jr. "Public Religion Vis-À-Vis the Prophetic Role of Religion". *The Power of Religious Publics; Staking Claims in American Society*. Eds. William H. Swatos and James K. Wellman. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. 1999, 37.

## 1.4 Summary

---

According to Huntington, the idealistic nature of the American Creed causes disharmony in America. Huntington argues that every third generation of Americans have attempted to reconstruct institutions to reflect deeply rooted national ideas. The antagonism created between the ideals of democracy and the realities of power have resulted in four great political upheavals in American history.

Both Huntington and Fogel recognise periods of political upheaval in American history though both identify the cause differently. Huntington's focus is the Ivl gap, whereas Fogel's discussion of the interrelationship between social, political and religious change provides a useful analysis of the role and effect of developments within the Christian religion and wider social structures. Given that Huntington is writing as a political scientist whereas Fogel is as an economic historian with a strong understanding of Christian revivals, it is inevitable that they attribute different causes to social problems.

Fogel's work is important to this thesis as he illustrates how changes to theological interpretations affect the Christian religion by creating new schisms. Because of these schisms, two major theological movements - traditional and liberal - with different social and political agendas - have emerged. Secondly, he has shown how the Great Awakenings have social and political implications.

Fogel's approach is complementary to comprehending RIPA and the ideas proposed in this thesis. Consistent with his work, I argue for the importance of noting the development of theological concepts, which illuminate how Christians conceptualise their calling, and mission and consequently, why and how they choose to engage in social and political activity. Fogel has noted that all four Awakenings influence the Christian religion, its theologies (from Premillennial and Postmillennial perspectives<sup>90</sup>), churches, and other organisations by challenging existing theology and doctrine.

Since 1970 (the Fourth Awakening), the conservative-progressive divide between denominations and within denominations has grown. Christian organisations of social and political activism have proliferated. In America, the Christian faith has been polarized between the Republican and the Democrat Parties. History reveals that while these divisions are not constant, they do influence political outcomes as both parties actively court 'the Christian vote'. Technological advances in the

---

<sup>90</sup>These are discussed further in Section 2.

area of human reproduction and scientific research have presented challenges as politically conservative Christians have maintained a religiously traditional outlook, and Liberals have adopted a progressive position. Both are developing networks of reform movements, including those functioning as political lobbying organisations. Consequently, the conception of these organisations has led to further polarization of Christians around social challenges and the most appropriate ways to address them.

## 2. Christian Identity and Activism: Symbols and Vocabulary

---

Having presented an outline of religious activism in American from an historical perspective, this next section explores symbols and vocabulary elementary to the Christian faith. This is important. Although the US and Australia are plural societies, religion and ethnicity are key sources of identity. As argued by Rosenblum (see Chapter 1 Section 3) social theory examines identity but rarely expands upon the notion of Christian religious identity. For the purpose of this thesis, I investigate Christian religious identities in as much as they generate different agendas of social and political activism.

Roland Robertson, a sociologist and theorist of globalization at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland believes that sociologists neglect theology.<sup>91</sup> The call for sociologists to incorporate theoretical frameworks from other disciplines was the topic of a conference on ‘morality battles’ in the US in 2006.<sup>92</sup> Understanding theological positions is important to this thesis because religious organisations, including RIPA organisations, justify their existence and actions through their theological traditions.

This following section examines theological thought and the language of religious political identity. It commences by explaining the history of and differences between Pre and Postmillennialist theologies, and then discusses how individuals’ beliefs about the image and nature of God affect their political participation. I also explore the term Fundamentalism and the ways in which it is employed, as well as related terms. Generally, labels such as Fundamentalist are used incorrectly and maliciously, resulting in the misunderstanding of religious organisations, including political ones.

---

<sup>91</sup>Robertson, Roland. *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970.

<sup>92</sup>Papers from this conference were published in *Contemporary Sociology*, 35:4, (2006). At this conference, it was argued that ideally sociologists should have cross-disciplinary training in theology and philosophy. The reason given was it would allow issues relating to religion to be analysed within a larger context of ideas and cultures. Furthermore, this should include historical and philosophical backgrounds of the Reformation, Counter Reformation, and the Enlightenment Movements. Recognizing key aspects of and changes in theological understanding reveals the nature and cause of religious political identity and action.



A major component of this section details the development of liberal theology and the ensuing response by Fundamentalist Christians, as well as Pentecostals and Charismatics. Finally, I consider whether new religious identities have replaced older sectarian divisions to generate a new cultural war.

## 2.1 Premillennialism and Postmillennialism

---

While Christian eschatology<sup>93</sup> is the topic of many publications, how it relates to political and social participation is less well reviewed. This also applies to the Australian experience. It is my contention that political participation is deeply affected by two major theological thoughts based on 'End-Time' events - including how and when they will come about and who and what will be involved.<sup>94</sup> In the Christian context, eschatology refers to doctrines relating to the concept of the destiny of all things; what the Bible states about this is seen as definitive because it contains the Word of God.<sup>95</sup> The End-Times dispute consists of two primary theologies: Premillennialism and Postmillennialism - both affecting the Christian religion, as well as Christian social and political behaviour. Given the depth of this subject, it is only plausible to outline concepts that are paramount to this thesis.

The major difference between Pre and Postmillennialism concerns the interpretation of the thousand-year period of God's rule on earth in relation to the end of time - the Millennium<sup>96</sup> and the expected return of Christ - the Second Coming. The Millennium is mentioned in Revelation 20:2, 4, and 5.<sup>97</sup> A Premillennialist believes that Christ will return to earth before the 1 000-year period

---

<sup>93</sup>The term Christian eschatology is commonly used to mean the study of Christian religious belief concerning all future and final events that are known as 'End Times'. End Times are depicted as times of tribulation that both precede and predict the coming of a Messiah figure. This belief is found in Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faiths.

<sup>94</sup>The scope of Biblical reference provides international, as well as local dimensions. For example, the Western Christian response to the United Nations' planned partition into Jewish and Arab states following World War II was twofold. Progressive Christians condemned Israel's policy and treatment of Arabs, whilst traditional Protestants, especially Premillennialists were vocal supporters of Israel. Even today, traditional American Christians are the stronger supporters of Israel because of the role that they see Israel playing in the End Times. Clouse, Robert G. et. al. Two Kingdoms: The Church and Culture Through The Ages. Chicago: Moody Press, 1993, 566-67.

<sup>95</sup>Christian Eschatology. Wikipedia Foundation. 9 Oct. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian\\_eschatology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_eschatology)>

<sup>96</sup>Millennium formed from the Latin mille=thousand and annus=year: a time of penultimate divine triumph over the forces of evil on earth before God's final conquest of His enemies and the establishment of everlasting righteousness. Bromiley, Geoffrey W. et. al, The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia Volume 3, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1986, 356.

<sup>97</sup>Revelation 20:2 And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years. 20:4 And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them: and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. 20:5 5: But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished. This is the first resurrection. "The Holy Bible, King James version". Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library. 1 Jan. 2009 <<http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbib/toccer-new2?id=KjvReve.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=20&division=div1>>.

and will instigate the Millennium. The physical return of Christ will occur in Jerusalem where he will rule for 1 000 years. After that, there will be a resurrection and judgement of humanity. In contrast, a Postmillennialist believes that Christ's return will occur after the Millennium, brought about by Christians who are inspired by the Gospel and effectively fashion "peace on earth" for 1 000 years. These distinct schools of thought determine different worldviews.<sup>98</sup> This is because a Premillennialist holds to a strong doctrine of biblical inspiration and the literal interpretation of scripture, whereas a Postmillennialist does not.

Premillennialism was originally promoted by a number of renowned preachers/evangelists of the 1700s and 1800s, including Charles Wesley (1707–1788), the leader of the Methodist movement. Following the *Methodist Baltimore Christmas Conference* in 1784, the first Premillennialist church, the Methodist Episcopal Church was founded.<sup>99</sup> The Methodist Movement fostered the emergence of a Holiness Movement continuing Premillennialist thought.<sup>100</sup> A leader of the Holiness Movement, Phoebe Palmer published a book in 1850 titled, *The Promise of the Father*<sup>101</sup> that influenced Catherine Booth the cofounder of the *Salvation Army*,<sup>102</sup> a Protestant Evangelical Christian denomination. Charles Finney (1792–1875) a major leader of the Second Great Awakening also promoted the idea of Christian Holiness.<sup>103</sup> Although Finney did not establish a denomination, his work influenced a number of them, including closed and exclusivist groups, such as the Jehovah's Witness, Mormons and Seventh-Day Adventists, as well as mainstream Christian denominations, the Baptists and Methodists.

Premillennialist organisations that were flourishing in Britain were able to migrate to the United States following the Civil War. *The Plymouth Brethren*<sup>104</sup> were one such organisation.<sup>105</sup> This group of dispensationalist Premillennialists<sup>106</sup> are a Christian Evangelical religious movement originally

---

<sup>98</sup>Thiessen, Henry C. *Lectures in systematic Theology*. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1979, 364.

<sup>99</sup>Methodist Episcopal Church. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodist_Episcopal_Church). 5 Oct. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodist\\_Episcopal\\_Church](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodist_Episcopal_Church)>.

<sup>100</sup>The Holiness Movement is composed of people who believe and propagate the belief that the carnal nature of man may be cleansed through faith and the power of the Holy Spirit. Holiness Movement. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness_movement). 5 Oct. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness\\_movement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness_movement)>.

<sup>101</sup>[Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness_movement). 5 Oct. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness\\_movement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness_movement)>.

<sup>102</sup>The Salvation Army was founded in 1865 by Methodist ministers, William and Catherine Booth.

<sup>103</sup>Holiness Movement. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness_movement). 5 Oct. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness\\_movement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holiness_movement)>.

<sup>104</sup>According to their official website the Plymouth Brethren's beliefs on 'End Times' are; (i) Rapture (ii) Period of chaos and upheaval (iii) Appearing of Christ (iv) Millennial (1 000 years) (v) Final judgement emanating from the great white throne. (vi) The day of God. [Note: the website does not explain what this point means]. An erroneous notion of the rapture. [The Exclusive Brethren Christian Fellowship](http://www.theexclusivebrethren.com/TheRapture.html). 18 Feb. 2007. <[http://www.theexclusivebrethren.com / TheRapture.html](http://www.theexclusivebrethren.com/TheRapture.html)>.

<sup>105</sup>Dispensational Premillennialism: The Dispensationalist Era. Christianity Today. 7 Oct. 2007. <<http://ctlibrary.com/4335>>.

<sup>106</sup>Dispensational Premillennialism traces its roots to the 1830s and the Calvinist theologian, John Nelson Darby. They hold that Christ's return is preceded by a rapture of Christ, which precedes seven years of tribulation, the Armageddon, and

formed in Dublin, Ireland<sup>107</sup> and England in the late 1820s.<sup>108</sup> According to David Marr, the *Plymouth Brethren* were active in political elections in Australia, the United States, Canada, and New Zealand from 2004.<sup>109</sup> Their campaign included the production and distribution of conservative political literature that attacked politically progressive parties.<sup>110</sup> These groups are politically Conservative because of their theological belief. According to the *Religious Tolerance* website, Dispensational Premillennialist theology states that the moral condition of the world and the Church will decline and that once it is 'unbearably bad', Jesus will return to instigate the Millennium. Dispensational Premillennialists are very outspoken on issues such as homosexuality and abortion, which they regard as inherently sinful.<sup>111</sup>

By contrast, Postmillennialists believe that the Gospel will win a majority of humans to faith in Christ so that righteousness will triumph over evil, without the divine intervention of Jesus' second coming. The theology is optimistic about humanity's future, suggesting that the kingdom of Christ will expand through the preaching of the Gospel, followed by a Millennial period in which Christianity prevails throughout the earth in preparation for Christ's return. Christ can, therefore, be manifested through the social movements of today.<sup>112</sup>

Postmillennialists are found among theological traditionalists and liberals. Traditional Postmillennialists agree with the notion of human depravity but believe in the transforming power of the Gospel. Whereas liberal Postmillennialists contend that, the world is improving and that humans move closer to redemption.<sup>113</sup> This confidence in humans' inherent perfectibility owes much to the 18<sup>th</sup> Century view of humans as inherently good and the 19<sup>th</sup> Century preoccupation with inevitable progress.

---

Christ's return. Historical Premillennialists state that the rapture of the church will occur post tribulation with Christians going to heaven to share a thousand year rule. Dispensational Premillennialism. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premillennialism#Dispensational_Premillennialism). 5 Oct. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premillennialism#Dispensational\\_Premillennialism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premillennialism#Dispensational_Premillennialism)>.

<sup>107</sup> According to their website, John Nelson Darby (1800–1882) of County Wicklow left Ireland and the Established Church in 1827. The Exclusive Brethren Christian Fellowship. 18 Feb. 2007. <<http://www.theexclusivebrethren.com/index-1.asp>>.

<sup>108</sup> Plymouth Brethren. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth_Brethren). 18 Mar. 2008. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth\\_Brethren](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plymouth_Brethren)>.

<sup>109</sup> Hell's fury ranks behind outpouring. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 22 Sept. 2006. <<http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/hells-fury-ranks-behind-brethrens-outpouring/2006/09/22/1158431897991.html>>.

<sup>110</sup> The Influence of Hidden Prophets. *Sydney Morning Herald*. 1 July 2006. <<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/the-influence-of-hidden-prophets/2006/07/01/1151174401719.html>>.

<sup>111</sup> "Eschatology, End Times, and Millennialism: Competing theories". [Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance](http://www.religioustolerance.org/millenni.htm). 14 Apr. 2007. <<http://www.religioustolerance.org/millenni.htm>>.

<sup>112</sup> When coupled with the view of Christ's impending return, Postmillennialists may adopt a neutral position about society and social activism.

<sup>113</sup> Question: What is postmillennialism? [Got Questions Ministries](http://www.gotquestions.org/postmillennialism.html). 29 Apr. 2007. <<http://www.gotquestions.org/postmillennialism.html>>.

An optimistic social activist theology buttressed by Postmillennialist eschatology culminated into the influential and widespread Social Gospel Movement of the 1880s and 1890s and was the predominant influence in the Third Great Awakening. Thus, this Awakening had social goals and ambitions. These involved grounded their enthusiasm and commitment in religious belief, references to the Bible and theological identity.

Theology is important because it shapes Christian behaviour.<sup>114</sup> Questions about the future of humanity are critical because the answers affect how Christians behave. The two agendas of historical destiny and eschatological purpose create different agendas for social activism.

## 2.2 The Image and Nature of God and Political Participation

---


Recent research published by the *Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion* (September 2006)<sup>115</sup> provided insight into the relationship between religious and moral values and political attitudes and behaviour in America. This detailed research consisting of approximately four hundred questions, covered a range of topics, including the interrelationship between religious belief and political participation. This data reveals that perspectives held by participants regarding the image and nature of God could be divided into four types: Type A = authoritarian, Type B = benevolent, Type C = critical and Type D = distant.

---

<sup>114</sup>From a theological Pre and Postmillennial perspective, the future of Christians and Christianity on earth is uncertain. Will there be a tiny remnant in a world dominated by evil when Christ returns, or will the world have been transformed by the Gospel of Jesus so that the kingdom of Satan is a minute remnant?

<sup>115</sup>American Piety in the 21st Century – September 2006. [Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion](http://www.baylor.edu/isreligion/index.php?id=40634). 8 Oct. 2006. <<http://www.baylor.edu/isreligion/index.php?id=40634>>

## Categories of America's Four Gods<sup>116</sup>



A benevolent God (Type B) was perceived as very active in daily life and a positive influence in the world; unlike the authoritarian God, the benevolent God was described as less willing to condemn individuals. While the authoritarian God (Type A) was highly involved in daily life, God meted out punishment and was angry at the “unfaithful” or “ungodly”. Those who believed in a critical God (Type C) expressed that He does not interact with the world; however, they believed He observes the world unfavourably and His displeasure will be experienced in another life or through justice in this world. Type D believers resembled Type B in that they do not believe God is particularly angry and He does not have opinions about human activity or world events.<sup>117</sup>

*The Baylor Institute* argues that these images and beliefs about God shape political opinion. The Type A believers (usually Literalists) from each denomination were more politically conservative than other members of their faith were. “Comparing biblical literalists across traditions uncovers that political differences by [denominational] tradition disappear. The biblical literalist Catholic is as politically conservative as the Biblical literalist who is Evangelical or Mainline Protestant”.<sup>118</sup> This finding dispels the myth that political behaviour may be determined by denominational affiliation.

<sup>116</sup>This information is from the Baylor Institute’s Survey. Figure 13: found on page 26 of the report.

<sup>117</sup>Overall, of those surveyed 31.4 per cent believed in a type A God (authoritarian), 25 per cent believed in a Type B (benevolent), 16 per cent believed in a Type C, (critical) whilst those believing in a Type D (distant) were 23 per cent. As would be expected, those who maintain a literal interpretation of the Bible believe in a Type A God (60.8 per cent). Of those who saw God as benevolent (Type B), only 26.5 per cent were Biblical Literalists. This decreased to 10.2 per cent of Type C and 2.5 per cent of Type D.

<sup>118</sup>“American Piety in the 21st Century – September 2006.” *Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion*. 8 Oct. 2006. <<http://www.baylor.edu/isreligion/index.php?id=40634>>.

According to the *Baylor* findings, linking political opinion to denominational affiliation also neglects the opinions of Christians not affiliated with established churches. Of the respondents involved in the *Baylor* research, 10.8 per cent identified in this category.

When specific political responses were analysed it was found that Type A believers consistently reflected a literal biblical position. On the issue of abortion, Type A believers were opposed, unless the pregnancy was a result of rape or the woman's health was in grave danger.<sup>119</sup> Of Type B beliefs, the percentage opposing abortion in all circumstances was lower.<sup>120</sup> The figures declined further for Type D.<sup>121</sup> Anti-abortion organisations would find a more sympathetic audience among Type A and B Christians compared with Type C or D.

These findings were similar when applied to gay marriage.<sup>122</sup> Advocates for gay marriage would find more support from Type D (the distant non-involved God) Christians; however, the Type C group is ambiguous aligning with type A and B on these particular issues.

Similarities were apparent across all types, for instance, when questions concerning the importance of teaching others morals, Type A and Type C had the highest scores. As the chart above represents, the Type A and C, share a common belief in an angry God of judgement. Presumably, these two qualities affect the respondents' attitudes and actions. The other similarity is that the Type A (usually Premillennialist) and Type C (usually Postmillennialist) agree on the depravity of humankind; however, Type C believe the Gospel can transform them.

In questions relating to political affiliation, Type As (authoritarian /active God) identified as supporters of the Republican Party. In addition, this group believed that God favours the United States over other nations. When this question was asked of the Democrat Party supporters a large majority, (81.1 per cent) disagreed.

The *Baylor University* findings support Hunter's (1991) assertions that divisions relate to moral and social issues, and that they are non-denominational. These issues are theological in character and

---

<sup>119</sup>Of Type A belief, in the former situation 41.5 per cent believed that abortion was still wrong where the later was down to 24.7 per cent.

<sup>120</sup>31.7 per cent of Type B believed that an abortion was wrong if the pregnancy was a result of rape whilst 19.5 per cent felt that abortion was not an option if the health of a woman was in danger.

<sup>121</sup>Only 6.9 per cent of Type C and 3.1 per cent of Type D felt that abortion was still wrong even if the woman's health was in danger.

<sup>122</sup>80.6 per cent of Type A believed that it was wrong, 65.8 per cent of Type B also felt it was wrong. Type C was still quite high at 54.8 per cent, whilst Type D was lower at 30.7 per cent.

construction, a point not recognised by either James Hunter or Samuel Huntington but clearly shown by the Baylor Institutes research. However, having said that, the *Baylor* research is consistent with Hunter’s belief that Christian political Conservatives and Christian Political Progressives are not on different sides of a “political squabble”. Their opposing views represent different worldviews, stemming from theological understandings about the nature of God, divine involvement in worldly affairs and Pre and Postmillennial eschatologies.

### **2.3 Liberal Theology and the Fundamentalist Counterattack of the 1920s**

---

The intellectual currents of the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century that were conducive to the Third Great Awakening and the Social Gospel Movement impacted on the formal teaching of theology and the professional training of ministers for the mainline churches. Shifting theological positions on issues such as Millenniumism, literal interpretation and the inerrant status of the Bible coupled with the effects of Enlightenment philosophy and Evolutionary theory saw the emergence of a new kind of liberal theology that sought to redefine certain aspects of Christianity. This period also saw the emergence of conservative theologies, including Fundamentalism.<sup>123</sup> This section discusses the development of liberal theology and the fundamentalist response.

From the late 1800s to early 1920s, approximately 17.6 million people migrated to America. This influx created conditions that inspired and shaped the Social Gospel Movement whose roots originated in Europe. Urban crowding and economic disadvantage saw the Movement promoting the spiritual dimension of pressing social issues, such as fair labour practices and healthcare. Three of the most ardent American campaigners of this period were Walter Rauschenbusch, Washington Gladden, and Horace Bushnell. Encouraging Christians to take responsibility for the betterment of the world as a necessary step in ushering in the next,<sup>124</sup> they presented new interpretations of key biblical text. They had also imbibed European higher biblical criticism in which miracle stories were accepted as allegory, myth, or symbol. They were not to be taken as literal truth. All three were proponents of modern liberal Postmillennial theology. According to Philip Hamburger, some Protestants of the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century defined themselves and their religion in terms of individualism and independence.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup>Section 2.4 also examines Fundamentalism.

<sup>124</sup>A Postmillennial position.

<sup>125</sup>Hamburger, Philip. *Separation of Church and State*. London: Harvard University Press. 2002.

Attempts by Catholics to modernise their faith were led by biblical scholars, George Tyrrell (1861–1909) from Ireland and the French, Alfred Loisy (1857–1940). Tyrrell, a Jesuit priest from 1891 until his expulsion in 1906, and Loisy, a priest, professor and theologian were dismissed because of their liberal theological views - Loisy was removed from his role as Professor at the *Institut Catholique*, Paris in 1893. In response to these events, Pope Pius X issued the decree, *Lamentabili*, which demanded all bishops, priests, and teachers take an antimodernist oath in 1907.

Although the Catholic Church could act authoritatively, Robert Clouse states that there were no similar authoritative structures within Protestantism to address theological liberalism. Thus by the early 1900s liberal theological doctrines became well defined and embraced by progressive denominations in the US and most Western countries. The sources of its doctrine included,

modern science; higher criticism 'the social gospel' American Unitarianism; Schleiermacher's concepts of God-consciousness; Horace Bushnell's redefinition of traditional doctrines in language that emphasises institution, human potential, and social progress; the action-oriented experimental theology of Albrecht Ritschl; and Adolf Harnack's theory that one must separate the permanently valid kernel of the gospel from the changing form of life and thought in which it was given.<sup>126</sup>

In the US, the conservative counterattack relied on Premillennialist claims regarding the necessity of the return of Christ prior to the Millennium. These doctrines among others were outlined in *The Fundamentals* a twelve-volume series published from 1910 to 1915.<sup>127</sup> Containing ninety articles by respected Protestant Bible teachers, these books claimed to demonstrate that biblical inspiration, miracles, and the resurrection were compatible with modern science's contemporary rationality. People who supported this theological position became known as "Fundamentalists".<sup>128</sup> These writings challenged liberal or modernist theology as it became known on two fronts - within the Church and within the host culture. In 1919, the *World's Christian Fundamentals Association* was launched in Minneapolis. Its creed was biblical inerrancy and Premillennialism. Initially its influence and impact spread rapidly. Robert Clouse states that *the Scopes' Trial*<sup>129</sup> of 1925 saw this

---

<sup>126</sup>Clouse, Robert G. et. al. *Two Kingdoms: The Church and Culture Through The Ages*. Chicago: Moody Press. 1993. 536.

<sup>127</sup>This was the founding of the Fundamentalist Movement.

<sup>128</sup>Clouse, Robert G. et. al. *Op. cit.*, 536-38.

<sup>129</sup>The Scopes Trial involved a high school teacher, John Scopes illegally teaching the theory of evolution. Whilst the Scopes Trial by no means ended the debate over the teaching of evolution, it did represent a significant setback for the anti-evolution forces.



fundamentalist movement diminish and retreat from social/political activity into self-imposed exile.<sup>130</sup>

## 2.4 What is Fundamentalism?

---

The terms 'fundamentalism' and 'Fundamentalist' have dominated the media and academic writing since, especially September 11. The proliferation of the use of these terms however, presents a challenge as those using such terminology are not theologically trained and misunderstand, misinterpret or incorrectly define them - using fundamentalism when fanaticism is intended.<sup>131</sup> The organisation known as, *Operation Rescue* is an example of this error. Formed in 1988, *Operation Rescue* promotes civil disobedience as a legitimate means of voicing opposition. While some members picketed abortion clinics and formed blockades; others destroyed abortion clinics and killed workers - many members spent time in jail for these activities. They are fanatics rather than fundamentalists. According to Marty and Appleby, this behaviour is a response to perceived challenges to the core identity of organisations and their supporters. By resorting to real or presumed pasts, they select features that reinforce their current identity, keeping the movement together and building defences around its boundaries.<sup>132</sup>

Roland Robertson speaks of a "generic fundamentalism" that is: "A value-oriented, anti-modern, dedifferentiating form of collective action - a sociocultural movement aimed at reorganizing all spheres of life in terms of a particular set of absolute values". The "leaders of fundamentalist movements, particularly the more intellectualist, attempt to attract potential converts by appealing to distinctively *modern* diagnoses of the discontents of modernity."<sup>133</sup> Therefore, some have described fundamentalism as a specific theology and others, a theological movement.

Recovering from their earlier defeat at the Scopes Trial, fundamentalists reorganised themselves collectively. The ambitions of liberal theology peaked in 1948 when the *World Council of Churches* (WCC) with a strong commitment to ecumenical inclusivity was founded. Concerned by such

---

<sup>130</sup>The creation of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1936), the General Association of Regular Baptists (1932), the Southern Methodist Church (1939), Independent Fundamental Churches of America (1930), and the North American Christian Convention (1927) saw Fundamentalists split from major denominations and not return until approximately twenty years later. Clouse, Robert G. et. al. *Op. cit.*, 550-5.

<sup>131</sup>Fanaticism is an emotion of being filled with excessive, uncritical zeal, particularly for an extreme religious or political cause. Fanaticism. [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fanaticism). 15 Sept. 2007. <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fanaticism>>.

<sup>132</sup>Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott. *The Fundamentalism Project Volume 1: Fundamentalism Observed*. London: The University of Chicago Press. 1991. ix.

<sup>133</sup>Robertson, Roland. *Globalization Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage Publications. 1992. 170.

potential developments, American Fundamentalists formed their own organisations. *The American Council of Christian Churches (ACCC)*<sup>134</sup> began operation in 1941 and continues to be a fundamental, non-denominational, exclusivist, separatist organisation. *The National Association of Evangelicals*<sup>135</sup> was formed in 1942. It adopted a conservative statement of faith but rejected the ACCC's separatist stance.<sup>136</sup>

In the 1950s, a new generation of fundamentalist activists emerged. The *Fuller Theological Seminary*,<sup>137</sup> founded in 1947 was crucial to this process and became the centre of fundamentalist thought for the generation.<sup>138</sup> These Fundamentalists challenged both conservative as well as progressive churches. They argued that earlier fundamentalist intellectuals did not appreciate the true prophetic character of Scripture and threatened the purity of Biblical faith. Their success was symbolised by the founding of the journal, *Christianity Today* in 1956.

During the social upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, the rising generation of Fundamentalists were convinced that America required a pro-religion culture in which they would have a stronger voice in shaping values and images that would guide society. They initiated an ideological battle for control of the way America viewed its past and its future.<sup>139</sup> According to Ammerman, fundamentalist churches became the home to “burned-out hippies to disillusioned liberals to ordinary seekers... In churches, they *found answers and order, love and stability.*”<sup>140</sup> Despite dwelling on the fringes of society, this new generation of Evangelists and their followers would become vital players in the immense political realignments of more recent years. The social conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s revealed to the Fundamentalists that “there was a growing sense that if ‘God’s people’ did not stand up for their principles, the nation might forever be lost. And if those same people did not stand up against an aggressive government in this generation, there *might not be* another generation of believers.”<sup>141</sup> The election of Jimmy Carter, a Southern Baptist with a well-developed streak of

---

<sup>134</sup>American Council of Christian Churches. 16 Oct. 2007. <<http://www.amcouncilcc.org/main.asp>>.

<sup>135</sup>This is a fundamentalist, but not exclusive organisation. National Association of Evangelicals. 18 October 2008. <<http://www.nae.net/index.cfm>>.

<sup>136</sup>Since the 1960s, the Ecumenical Movements have remained the main thrust of mainstream Protestantism in North America. Most Protestant and many Eastern Orthodox churches are allied to federal councils on local national and international levels. Two of these being the World Council of Churches (as mentioned above) and the National Council of the Churches of Christ, an organisation founded in 1950 that is similar to the World Council of Churches.

<sup>137</sup>By 1963, the leadership of the Fuller Theological Seminary, which had been fundamentalist, were replaced by Evangelicals who did not insist on the strict inerrancy of the Bible. Ammerman, Nancy T. “North American Protestant Fundamentalism”. Fundamentalism Observed. Eds. Marty, Martin E. & Appleby R. Scott. London: The University of Chicago Press, 37.

<sup>138</sup>One fundamentalist organisation that was active in secular politics in the 1950s was the John Birch Society.

<sup>139</sup>Ammerman, Nancy T., *Op. cit.*, 47.

<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>141</sup>*Ibid.*, 41.

religious moralism, gave both Evangelicals and Fundamentalists – with distinct streams of conservative Protestantism – a new sense of purpose. The 1970s saw the rise of ‘family-related issues’. In 1979 a group of Pastors with help from conservative political organisers, created a non-partisan political organisation called the *Moral Majority*. This organisation attempted to find common moral grounds on which Christian Political Conservatives could agree; and lobby elected representatives. Other organisations followed. They included, the *Religious Roundtable*, the *American Christian Coalition (ACC)* and later the *American Coalition for Traditional Values*, *Traditional Values Coalition*, and *Christian Voice* were formed.<sup>142</sup>

After the 1970s, the term Fundamentalist was used to denigrate religious organisations that display a high level of militancy. This misattribution of outlook and temperament has brought confusion to the discussions concerning these organisations. I will return to this issue but want to flag it as a matter for further research.

#### **2.4.1. A Word on Francis A. Schaeffer**

The late Francis Schaeffer (1912–1984) was an American evangelical theologian and philosopher who is credited with influencing the development of the Christian Political Right in the USA. Schaeffer published 24 books, with his *A Christian Manifesto*, published in 1981 and selling 290 000 copies in the first year being the most widely read.<sup>143</sup> His work has also found its way into Pentecostal bible colleges in Australia. Schaeffer was opposed to theological liberalism as much as he despised secular humanism. His influence was substantial and decisive, especially in relation to debates over abortion. His writing was prompted and sharpened by the belief that the influence of secular humanism was steadily increasing. His books sought to provide Christian answers to *The Communist Manifesto* (1933) and the *Humanist Manifesto* (1973). The central element in his work was the belief that Western civilization was declining because Western society has become increasingly pluralistic. Although he had no interest in theocracy, he asserted that when the State defies the absolute law of God it loses its authority and becomes illegitimate. The Christian is therefore bound to resist the State by whatever means necessary. His suggested ways of resistance include direct legal and political action, non-violent demonstrations, and civil disobedience. *Operation Rescue*, mentioned earlier, was founded by Randall Terry based on Schaeffer’s teachings, which had been modified to suit the organisations position.<sup>144</sup> As well as his books, Schaeffer gained prominence through his film series, *Whatever Happened to the Human Race?*

---

<sup>142</sup>*Ibid.*, 43.

<sup>143</sup>Francis Schaeffer” [Wikipedia Foundation](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Schaeffer#_note-10). 18 Oct. 2008. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis\\_Schaeffer#\\_note-10](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Schaeffer#_note-10)>.

<sup>144</sup>Details concerning Operation Rescue are in Section 2.4 above.

### 3. Summary

---

The effect of changes in theological understanding is not restricted to religious practices, such as when Christ will return (Pre or Postmillennialism). Theological ideas may be likened to lenses from which the wearer views and interprets the world around them, including subjective decisions concerning what they consider socially and politically important.

The prominence of theological difference has created social cleavages increasingly described as cultural wars. Hunter suggests "... this cleavage [progressive and conservative – liberal theology versus traditional theology] is so deep that it cuts across the old lines of conflict, making the [denominational] distinctions that long divided Americans .... virtually irrelevant."<sup>145</sup> New alliances are now being formed across faith traditions, ignoring differences of doctrinal and ritual observance.<sup>146</sup> Theological reinterpretations support two vastly different worldviews. When issues central to one of these moral visions intersect with people's lives they are inclined to become active. Issues somewhat abstract now become real so that people are embroiled in the controversy. Further, he suggests that while debates on specific issues are important, they signal something deeper. The issues are essentially surface manifestations of underlying tension involving conflicting depictions of theologically defined morality.<sup>147</sup> Beliefs about the condition of the world upon Christ's return and humanity's responsibility for its plight are as significant as the understanding of God and divine interest/involvement in humanity and worldly affairs. From these issues spring beliefs about moral authority and unresolvable differences that are labelled cultural wars.<sup>148</sup>

Different theological positions dictate the degrees of motivation for social activism and the impetus for religiously inspired political activism. *Baylor's* research is insightful as it recognises different stances based on personal belief systems. In all likelihood, the motivation for social and political participation relates directly to beliefs about the image and nature of God. The interconnectedness of this image and moral values relate to the theology of the denomination and the individual, which in turn affects political participation, as well as promoting Awakenings that affect broader society. This research opens avenues for understanding the foundations of religiously inspired social and political activism. To apply simple concepts, such as Christian Right or Christian Left, Conservative or

---

<sup>145</sup>Hunter, James Davison. *Op. cit.*, 43.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>147</sup>"A worldview may be defined as a set of covert values and beliefs that is not often discussed with others and, indeed, is rarely examined by the individual who possess it." Rhoda K. Unger. "Them and Us: Hidden Ideologies-Differences in Degree or Kind?" *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*. 4.3 (2002)

<sup>148</sup>Hunter, James Davison. *Op. cit.*, 42, 49.

Progressive underestimates the diversity of thought and belief held by Christians in the US.<sup>149</sup> Further research would provide a deeper understanding of political participation and social activism. Potentially, it could address how such beliefs can evolve so negatively to legitimate physical violence in the attempt to achieve a spiritual-political goal.

Examining the theological perspectives of Christian movements discloses some key insights into how they operate within wider society and the composition of their supporter base. A theological critique also serves to dispel myths about how dangerous different organisations are likely to be. The tendency to brand all conservative religious organisations as fundamentalist – meaning extremist and potentially violent - is unhelpful and unfortunate. In many ways, a theological perspective illuminates the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. For an organisation to adapt, becoming radicalised and embrace violence to achieve their goals, the organisation would need to reinvent their theological position first.

If the lack of militancy or the absence of fanatical elements defines a movement organisation as fundamentalist then it becomes easy to exclude groups such as *Operation Rescue* due to their adaptation of fundamentalist theology for their own purpose. While organisations such as, the *Moral Majority*, *American Christian Coalition* and *the Traditional Values Coalition* accept *The Fundamentals*, they reject civil disobedience and political violence. Placing all conservative organisations, the aggressive, and the passive within the same category leads to a confusion of theology, concepts, behaviour, and outcome.

This chapter has presented a review of the history of nineteenth and 20<sup>th</sup> Century Protestant political theology in the US. The period of the Third Awakening involved the growth of liberal theology initiated by the idealism and enthusiasm of the Social Gospel Movement. This was an optimistic and ecumenical theology bolstered by Postmillennialist visions of the perfectibility of society. It was compatible with the emerging professional and scientific ethos of universities and was the predominant worldview communicated to those involved in pastoral training and belief in mainstream Protestant churches. Roman Catholicism remained largely untouched from this shift. The reaction to liberal theology emerged through the articulation of the fundamentalist theology propagated in the 1910s. The denominations and churches associated with the *American Council of*

---

<sup>149</sup> I am aware that I also have used these concepts in this thesis. My point here is that we need to go beyond these simple and often inaccurately applied terms. By doing this we will gain a better understanding and description of religiously inspired organisations.

*Christian Churches (ACCC)* and *The National Association of Evangelicals* conveyed fundamentalist belief into the second half of the twentieth century.

The evangelism of the 1950s and 1960s created new religious activity and interest when the next generation of Fundamentalists emerged. This generation took the principles of earlier fundamentalism but with enhanced commitment and political activism. Fundamentalists that had earlier retreat from public life following *The Scopes Trial* of 1925 now became a vigorous counter-attack motivating the foundation of many organisations and religiously inspired activism.

These developments within US religious life have contributed to RIPA in the US. Independently, RIPA also expands within the particular context of Church-State relations. The next chapter considers this context in more detail.

## Chapter 3: Christianity and the State in the American Context: Historical Legacies of Christian Politics

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>1. Legacies of Christianity in US Politics and Society</b>	<b>47</b>
1.1 Civic Religion	48
1.2 Constitutional Issues: The Bill of Rights	50
1.3 Tax-Exemption and the Restriction of Political Activity	52
1.4 The American Creed: The Formation of Religious Political Passion	53
1.5 Separation of Church and State: Putting it into Practice	53
<b>2. Typology of Christian Movements and the Role of Theology</b>	<b>55</b>
2.1 Conservative Politics of the Christian Right	57
2.2 An Overview: Countermovements that oppose the Christian Right	61
<b>3. Managing Cultural and Religious Diversity</b>	<b>64</b>
3.1. Anti-Vilification laws in the US	65
3.2 Recognition of the relationship of Culture and Religion	65
<b>4. Summary</b>	<b>68</b>

## Introduction

---

America is also the focus of this chapter. The First Section provides an overview of the intertwining of the Christian faith and political culture from an historical perspective. Civic religion and Christian symbols left the important legacy of constitutional protection of religion and its practice in American society. In previous Chapters, I discussed the Christian Right and the Christian Left. The focus of Section Two is to identify and define the Christian Right in America while de-mythologizing terms relating to faith-based political activity. This is important to my thesis, which addresses links between theological thought and the political action of Christians. Religious political activity terminology used in sociological, political, and religious literature is often highly charged and incorrectly applied. This debate and clarification provides the grounds for discussion of Christian political activity throughout this thesis.

Section Three considers the position of Christian political activity in the broader multi-religious and multi-contextual American society. Both Australia and America were substantially transformed by the ethnic, cultural, and racial pluralism created by mass immigration throughout their histories. Most transition in the US occurred between 1880 and 1920, while Australia was significantly affected after World War II. This section examines the impact of religious and cultural diversity on American regulation of social tensions through anti-vilification legislation. Despite not having these intentions, religion and religiously inspired activists have been entangled in anti-discrimination legislation and other facets of multiculturalism. Most significantly, attempts to remove religion from political culture results in the removal or neutralisation of Christian thought, symbols, and references embedded in the American political culture.

This chapter and the two following explore the parallels and differences of Christian political activity in the United States of America and Australia. Chapter 6 discusses the conclusions to be drawn from this comparison.

### 1. Legacies of Christianity in US Politics and Society

---

Institutional, cultural, and religious legacies were left by the American Colonial Era (1493–1783) - when a number of countries<sup>1</sup> established settlements and the Formation Years (1776–1789) - when

---

<sup>1</sup>The Dutch, Spanish, French, Swedish, Portuguese, and English.



the American Revolution<sup>2</sup> was won. These legacies<sup>3</sup> have helped construct the social, political, and religious fabric of the nation. *The United States Constitution of 1789* that replaced the *Articles of Confederation* rejected the monarchical structures common to Western traditions. Radically breaking from normative governmental structures of the time, primacy was placed upon individual liberty and limiting the power of the Government through division of powers and a system of accountability.

Over a period of sixteen years (1849–1865), a number of key issues essentially divided the United States into North and South. These included economic considerations and different approaches to government and society, including the issue of slavery. Abraham Lincoln’s election as President from 1861 to 1865; the South seceding to form the Confederate States of America; the Civil War and the ultimate defeat of the South in 1865 contributed to shaping the nation, including its religious practices.

From a religious perspective, these legacies have played a major role in defining Christianity and establishing the notion of a civic religion. While the French, Spanish, and Dutch explored the Americas to find gold and convert indigenous peoples to Christianity, migrants to the English colonies were largely escaping the religious persecution of Europe. Religious ideology also contributed to the character of the new Republic. The churches that were established during colonial periods declined. At the same time, a colonial revival movement resulted in the Baptists and Methodists becoming the largest American denominations.<sup>4</sup> Of importance to the revival were the religious conversions of slaves who embraced Christianity, primarily adopting either Baptist or Methodist doctrines. These identities became fundamental to the African-American cultural identity.

### **1.1 Civic Religion**

---

The expression civic religion dates back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 1762 work, *The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right*. Rousseau used the definition to describe religion as two interrelated notions; a form of social cement that holds society together and unifies the State by giving it sacred

---

<sup>2</sup>This was the war of independence from Great Britain.

<sup>3</sup>The legacies I refer to include the fact that America was founded on principles of Enlightenment, the conflict between the English and the French (17th and 18th Centuries) with the French being ousted from North America and the British Government’s attempts to collect taxes from the North American Colony.

<sup>4</sup>From 1783 to 1820 the Baptist denomination grew from 400 to 2 700 congregations while the Methodists grew from 50 to 2 700 churches.

authority.<sup>5</sup> This simple dogma included individual's views on the existence of God and the after-life; reward for virtue and punishment of vice and the exclusion of religious intolerance.<sup>6</sup> The definition has been restated by N.J. Demerath who suggests that civil religion is a politically distilled, religious common denominator that serves to unite a society or community despite its differences.<sup>7</sup> God is recognised as the Creator or the Almighty Being but is synonymous with the Christian God. According to Robert Bellah,<sup>8</sup> the reference to this 'Being' appeared in official documents, such as George Washington's first inaugural address of 30 April 1789.<sup>9</sup> In the same year, Washington proclaimed 26 November a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, thus establishing the first Thanksgiving Day under the *Constitution*.<sup>10</sup>

The supposition behind the concept of a civic or civil religion is that Americans share common religious characteristics expressed through symbol, ritual, and civil religious belief.<sup>11</sup> This provides a religious dimension to American life. Sometimes referred to as "Americanism", these dimensions are reflected in the values of liberty, justice, and personal virtue. Religious symbols became incorporated into the national psyche, as well as nationalistic practices. These included changes to the *Pledge of Allegiance* in 1954 to include God.<sup>12</sup> In 1956, the national emblem "In God We Trust"<sup>13</sup> became a national motto as a result of the Cold War<sup>14</sup> and the motto "God Bless America"<sup>15</sup> has been used by politicians, political candidates, and others since being popularised by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Furthering Bellah's work, William Swatos states that available research confirms that civil religious beliefs continues to exist, are widely shared and provide a basis for pluralistic social integration. From a political perspective, this research suggests that civil religion influences preferences for political candidates, as well as their stance on policy-making.<sup>16</sup>

The concept of a civic religion that promotes moral aspirations and virtues undergirds the concept of a religious dimension in the political realm. The functional separation of Church and State does not deny a religious dimension to the political realm; rather the aforementioned religious symbol and

---

<sup>5</sup>Bellah, Robert N. "Civic Religion in America." *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science*. 96:1, 1967. 1-21 and Rousseaus, Jean-Jacques. *The Social Contract, Or Principles of Political Right*. Kessinger Publishing Rare Reprints, 2004.

<sup>6</sup>Bellah, Robert N. *Op. cit.*, 1-21.

<sup>7</sup>Demerath, N.J. *Op. cit.*, 50.

<sup>8</sup>Robert Bellah has studied civic religion as a cultural phenomenon.

<sup>9</sup>Bellah, Robert N. *Op. cit.*, 1-21.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 1-21.

<sup>11</sup>Swatos, William H. Jr, Ed. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society*. Alta Mira Press, 1998.

<sup>12</sup>"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands: one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all".

<sup>13</sup>A national emblem appearing on currency.

<sup>14</sup>Clouse Robert G., et al., *Op. cit.*, 569.

<sup>15</sup>This provides an assurance that God will guide and protect the United States.

<sup>16</sup>Swatos, William H. Jr, Ed. *Supra* note 11.

observance marking civic events reaffirm a sense of morality in the political and social order of American society.<sup>17</sup>

## **1.2 Constitutional Issues: The Bill of Rights**

---

*The American Constitution* came into operation on 4 March 1789. Within two years, it had undergone ten amendments, including the embodiment of a Bill of Rights. The opening section of the First Amendment known as, the Bill of Rights specifically addresses religious freedom and the notion of freedom of speech. It states that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”.<sup>18</sup>

When the colonies were formed, each had their own State religion. At Federation, a decision was made to support religion in general but not to privilege a particular religious tradition.<sup>19</sup>

Interpretations of the First Amendment are many and varied. The dominant interpretation is that its intention was strict separation of Church and State. Gageler suggests that the reason for the Amendment was reactionary by those who had experienced religious persecution in their native countries and who wanted to ensure that the State did not interfere in religious affairs in the newly developing nation.<sup>20</sup> Some commentators have argued that the First Amendment was a decision to limit the power of the State to create a secular but limited Government that had no power over religion and unlike the French, no power to impose secular ideology. The First Amendment is interpreted as a guarantee allowing the free exercise of religion as reflected in the Free Exercise Clause - it is a restraint on the Government not on individuals. This ‘free exercise of religion’ is a guarantee that the Government will ‘mind its own limited, secular business’ so that people may enjoy the right to religious liberty.<sup>21</sup> Another popular interpretation argues that the First Amendment concerns whether the Government is forbidden to assist all religions or whether it merely bans exclusive aid to any particular religion. The Supreme Court has asserted the former,

---

<sup>17</sup>Williams, Rhys H., and N. J. Demerath III. “Religion and Political Process in an American City.” *American Sociological Review*. 56.4, 1991, 417-31.

<sup>18</sup>US Constitution – Amendment 1. 19 Feb. 2008. <[http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst\\_Am1.html](http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_Am1.html)>.

<sup>19</sup>Kidd, Colin. “Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America.” *The Historical Journal*. 42:4, 1999. 1007-26.

<sup>20</sup>Gageler, Stephen. *Op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup>“Removing the Cross: American and French Perspective.” *Religious Institutions Group*. 19 April 2006. <<http://www.churchstatelaw.com/treatises/curry.asp>>.

although critics of the Court claim the later. The constitutional provisions denying the State the right to pass law contributing or prohibiting the establishment or exercise of religion is seen as having played a significant role in America's religious pluralism.

Far from protecting, limiting, or clarifying the role of religion or the responsibility of religious leaders in society, the Constitution appears to have become the focal point for endless discussion on the separation of Church and State in America. The responsibility or otherwise of elected leaders and judges concerning the issue of religion are debated through the interpretation of this section of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights plays a central role in America's governance and law. It remains the fundamental symbol of freedom, including religious freedom in American culture.

### **1.2.1 Supreme Court of the United States Ruling of 1947 on the Establishment of Religion**

In 1947, the matter of *Everson vs. the Board of Education* was brought before the Supreme Court. Arch Reverent Everson (taxpayer in the Ewing Township) filed a lawsuit alleging that a New Jersey law authorising the Government school boards to fund of transportation to private, particularly Catholic parochial schools was unconstitutional as it provided indirect aid to religious institutions. Losing the case in the lower courts, Everson appealed to the US Supreme Court on Federal constitutional grounds. In a 5-4 decision, the Court found the New Jersey law was not in violation of the *Establishment Clause* provided the money was not given directly to religious schools or gave them specific benefit. The New Jersey law was deemed applicable to both public and private school students.

The outcome of this case was not significant. However, the precedent it set and principle it enshrined has had enormous repercussions. The Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the principles of the First Amendment, in particular the Establishment Clause to State or municipal Government activities; thus, the Court set the precedent for like cases to be challenged for adjudication. Of more importance was the broad definition of the *Establishment Clause* that the Court provided, which has guided decisions about Church and State separation for decades since.<sup>22</sup> Its impact has made this case one of the most important to Church-State separation in America.

---

<sup>22</sup>The 'establishment of religion clause' of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a State nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion to another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain from the church against their will or force them to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for either entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs; nor church attendance or non-attendance. No amount of tax can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions whatever they may be called, or whatever they may choose to adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organisations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall

### 1.3 Tax-Exemption and the Restriction of Political Activity

---

In 1953, an amendment to the *Federal Income Tax Law* was made. The information on the *United States' Department of Treasury* website states, "To be tax-exempt under section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization ... may not be an action organization, i.e., it may not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities".<sup>23</sup>

There are two arguments on what this limitation actually means. According to *Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (AUSCA)* while the legislation restricts churches from endorsing or opposing public office candidates or providing resources in partisan campaigns, it does not prevent them from educating individuals about issues. They are permitted to fund research supporting their political view if they do not overtly advocate their position on a specific bill. This is how organisations, such as *the Centre for American Progress* and *The Heritage Foundation* produce reports and recommendations on policy proposals.<sup>24</sup> The *Christian Coalition of America's website* notes a case from 2004 when the *AUSCA* filed a complaint with the IRS because the pastor of the First Baptist Church of Springdale Arkansas encouraged people to register to vote using a photo of President Bush signing a ban on late-term abortions. According to the *Christian Coalition*, the current laws do not protect church leaders from expressing personal views on political matters and what the leaders can say and do is very restricted.

In 2005, attempts to modify legislation with the introduction of the *Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act* were made.<sup>25</sup> This legislation was designed to protect churches from losing their tax-exempt status, yet allow for expression of political views including elections. In October 2007, this legislation was referred to the *House Committee on Ways and Means*, where it has progressed no further. This is only one example raising concerns about America's separation of Church and State, the role of religious influence in politics and the *American Constitution*.

---

of separation between Church and State." Reynolds v. United States. Thomson Reuters. 10 April 2008. <<http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=330&invol=1>>.

<sup>23</sup>Exemption Requirements. *United States Department of Treasury: Inland Revenue Service*. <<http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html>>.

<sup>24</sup>Religion, Partisan Politics and Tax Exemption. *Americans United for the Separation of Church and State*. 3 April 2008. <[http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=resources&page=NewsArticle&id=9055&security=1441&news\\_iv\\_ctrl=2422](http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=resources&page=NewsArticle&id=9055&security=1441&news_iv_ctrl=2422)>.

<sup>25</sup>The Library of Congress, <http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.235.IH>:

#### **1.4 The American Creed: The Formation of Religious Political Passion**

---

The *American Creed* was written by William Tyler Page in 1917. It was adopted by the US House of Representatives the following year. A declaration of commitment; it calls upon the American people to acknowledge the elected Government; the union of the States into the United States and the values of freedom, equality, justice and humanity. In its proclamation, citizens swear to love America, to support its Constitution and obey its laws. In effect, it is a promise to uphold 'American ideals', which according to Huntington<sup>26</sup> are not met in practice, but reveal a gap between this ideal and the conduct of American politics. He argues that throughout American history from the Revolution of 1776-83 forward, antagonism between the ideals of democracy as expressed in the American Creed and the realities of power lead to upheavals.<sup>27</sup> He describes this as the clash between the social and political structures of the United States whereby the Government limits certain rights that could infringe on the values and principles of the Creed, resulting in conflict between people and politics - creating the lvi gap.<sup>28</sup>

There is a link between creedal passion and Protestant tradition and symbols. The very idea of a creed or statement of fundamental belief is an imitation of the *Westminster Confession*. The *American Creed* echoes key moral aspects of the Protestant faith albeit without theological referents.<sup>29</sup> When these beliefs are threatened, religious political passion may become one of the driving forces behind creedal passion and a motivation for RIPA.

#### **1.5 Separation of Church and State: Putting it into Practice**

---

The debate about Church and State separation is legally complex and highly charged with emotional rhetoric. James Wood an Emeritus Professor of Church-State Studies at Baylor University provides the best description of America when he notes that it is actually a paradox; a "secular state and a religious society".<sup>30</sup> This paradigm provides the context for political and social activity by religious people. The secular State, in providing for freedom of religion, speech, and organisation creates a boundary for itself and religious activity. Simply, these freedoms of religion do not embrace the

---

<sup>26</sup>This clash, which is seen as increasingly important is not based on economics but people who are differentiated by religion, history, language, and tradition.

<sup>27</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. *Op. cit.*, 12.

<sup>28</sup>A full discussion of Huntington's theory was discussed in Chapter 2.

<sup>29</sup>Religion, Partisan Politics and Tax Exemption. *Supra* note 24.

<sup>30</sup>Wood, James E. Jr. "Public Religion Vis-À-Vis the Prophetic Role of Religion." *The Power of Religious Publics; Staking Claims in American Society*. Eds. William H. Swatos and James K. Wellman, Westport, Praeger, 1999. 37.

right of religious organisations to change the secular nature of the State, though some may seek to challenge its legitimacy.

The debate about separation of Church and State is muddled by unclear constitutional boundaries. The phrase, “Separation of Church and State” is not contained in the Declaration of Independence, or the US Constitution or the Bill of Rights.<sup>31</sup> The Constitution’s definition of the State, its roles and boundaries, radically contrasted normative governmental structures of the time.

From a practical perspective, the common argument is that the *First Amendment* is designed to delineate or define the respective powers of the State and Church. Arguments range from a radical interpretation similar to McGarvie’s who suggests the *Constitution* sought to reconstruct society along liberal lines, replacing colonial Christian communitarianism and classical republicanism with a radical society.<sup>32</sup> McGarvie bases his position on the *Contract Clause* of the *Constitution*, not the *First Amendment* like the majority of experts. Less radical suggestions argue that the statement of separation of powers reflected in the *First Amendment* were designed to protect the Christian religion from governmental regulation or attempts to prohibit free religious expression.<sup>33</sup>

The notion of a religious society creates an expectation for church leaders to be pro-active about moral and social issues. Often driven from the ‘bottom-up’ this expectation legitimates religious leaders’ activity. When this activity shifts to the political realm, it results in religiously inspired political activity and the formation of RIPA organisations. These organisations are designed to mobilize Christians to act collectively as citizens. As a result, the Church becomes involved in the State where it would otherwise be institutionally limited: such action is open and diverse.

The most emotive part of the ‘separation’ debate is somewhat of a misnomer in that the institutional separation is not the primary focus; rather the level of religious influence in the public sphere dominates discourse. One extreme stance argues for the complete privatisation of faith.<sup>34</sup> The opposite end is argued by Guinness who claims, “As time passed, strict separationism grew from being a theory to a doctrine to orthodoxy to a ruling myth that has shaped the course of public

---

<sup>31</sup>The Bill of Rights is the term given to the first 10 Amendments made to the American Constitution

<sup>32</sup>McGarvie, Mark D. *One Nation Under Law: America's Early National Struggles to Separate Church and State*. Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004.

<sup>33</sup>Barton, David. *Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution and Religion*. 3rd ed. Wall Builder Press, 2004.

<sup>34</sup>Wood, James E. Jr. *Op. cit.*, 33.

discussion and constitutional decisions alike”.<sup>35</sup> This myth, evidenced in the work of Stephen L. Carter<sup>36</sup> and Gianfranco Poggi<sup>37</sup> often mobilizes conservative Christians into advocacy.

The First Amendment and the Bill of Rights have guaranteed Americans freedom of expression, including religious expression. The interpretations of both documents are compatible with the concept of a civic religion based on shared beliefs given a common, religiously-infused expression. The Constitution clearly defines the State - its role and purpose - as secular in focus. Yet, civic religion as practiced in America maintains symbolic links to a religious society. Religiously inspired political activism is the outcome of the combination between a secular state and religious society.

## 2. Typology of Christian Movements and the Role of Theology

---

The Christian Right’s prominence in political discourse has skewed debate on religious political activism. The consequence has been the confusion of terminology so that the Christian Right, Religious Right, Christian Fundamentalists, or Evangelicals are sometimes used interchangeably when they are significantly different entities and affiliations. This is problematic, as well as confusing. The Religious Right is a broad label applied to a number of political and religious movements active around conservative social issues. These may or may not be Christian, i.e. they could be Mormon or non-theistic, for instance. The term Christian Right used correctly, applies only to a spectrum of conservative Christian political and social movement organisations characterized by their strong support of social values that compliment traditional Christian values.<sup>38</sup>

Publicity attributed to Christian Right organisations has resulted in them being labelled ‘conservative’ and as ‘reactionary’ counter-movements. This is accentuated in secular social science studies, as its writing tends to lump together movements that are not progressive as countermovements.<sup>39</sup> It is important to recognise that not all Christian organisations are conservative nor are they simply reactionary countermovements. For example, the American organisation, *Sojourners* is a Christian Left organisation. It claims to be politically and socially

---

<sup>35</sup> Guinness, Os. *The American Hour: A Time of Reckoning and the Once and Future Role of Faith*. New York, The Free Press, 1993. 205-06.

<sup>36</sup> Carter, Stephen L. *Op. cit.*

<sup>37</sup> Poggi Gianfranco. *Forms of Power*. Cornwall, MPG Books, 2001.

<sup>38</sup> “The Christian right is a term collectively referring to a spectrum of right-wing Christian political and social movements and organizations characterized by their strong support of social values they deem in line with traditional Christian values in western countries.” “Christian Right.” *Wikipedia Foundation*. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian\\_right](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_right)>.

<sup>39</sup> Operation Rescue (as mentioned in Section 1.2 of the previous chapter) is an example of a Christian conservative countermovement.



progressive. *Sojourners* use symbolism and identity to collectively organise and motivate its members themselves. *Sojourners* are not a progressive countermovement, but a religiously inspired progressive organisation.<sup>40</sup>

Organisations said to be on the 'Christian Left' hold Christian beliefs but can share many socialist or liberal ideals with non-Christians. As noted in previous chapters, Christian duty, and the compassion of Jesus translates into social policy focusing upon social justice issues, caring for the poor, welfare subsidisation and the like.

Hunter's identification of the "theological gap that is fundamental to the bifurcation of moral perspectives"<sup>41</sup> has been challenged by *Sojourners* who seek to create a middle ground combining a liberal moral vision and moral ideals. The vision calls for unity among Christian organisations, presenting a combination of the personal moral values of the Right with the commitment to social justice and peace of the Left. *Sojourners* leader, Jim Wallis convincingly argues that this builds bridges to generate a compelling political vision because he says both personal and social responsibilities are at the heart of Christianity.<sup>42</sup> Wallis' articulates the notion that God's politics do not belong solely to the Christian Right, the Christian Left, or indeed any political party.

In discussing the 2004 American Presidential election results, Rick Warren, the founding pastor of California's Saddleback Church agreed with Wallis' call for new religious politics that encompass social values and personal morality. Warren suggests that a political candidate who espoused both would, in all likelihood, receive approximately 80 to 90 per cent of the vote because "there are a lot of people in America who really do believe the Bible, and they're not just 'religious right' or 'evangelical.' They are Catholics and they are mainline Protestants and there are many who voted in this election."<sup>43</sup> While Wallis' vision for faith in politics is ideologically inspiring, the reality of it being achieved is unlikely unless theological positions held by both conservatives and liberal Christians change. As Wuthnow notes, "liberals look across the theological fence at their conservative cousins

---

<sup>40</sup>Sojourners are a progressive Christian organisation whose focus is on faith, politics, and culture. The Sojourners' website describes the organisation's mission as "... to articulate the biblical call to social justice, inspiring hope and building a movement to transform individuals, communities, the church, and the world." "About Us." *Sojourners*. 14 Dec. 2006. <[http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=about\\_us.home](http://www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=about_us.home)>.

<sup>41</sup>Hunter, James Davison. *Op. cit.*

<sup>42</sup>Wallis, Jim. *Op. cit.*, xxiii.

<sup>43</sup>"Divided We Stand." *Public Broadcasting Service: News Hour with Jim Lehrer*. 5 Nov. 2004. <[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/divided\\_11-03.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/divided_11-03.html)>.

and see rigid, narrow-minded, moralistic fanatics: conservatives holler back with taunts that liberals are immoral, loose, biblically illiterate, and unsaved.”<sup>44</sup>

## **2.1 Conservative Politics of the Christian Right**

---

American conservative Christians have adopted pro-family, traditional values and conservative Christianity as their platform in political campaigning. They have appropriated the notion of rights so that political and moral arguments become based upon the rights of the unborn, the rights of parents, and the rights of religious people. Their political agenda has been expanded to include moral issues encompassing the economy, the environment, and foreign policy. According to John Green, “Christian conservatives had to become skilful participants in a broader conservative coalition that included not just a religious right, but also a broader political right. Central to this understanding was an appreciation of party politics as a critical avenue for movement activity.”<sup>45</sup>

In his analysis of the Christian Right, Green developed a model suggesting the Christian Right have experienced three different phases: where sectarian identities were critical, where new movement identities replaced sectarian identities and where identification with the Republican Party replaced all others.

The first phase in the evolution of the US Christian Right (1960s–1970s) was motivated by what they saw as the moral decay of society. The openness of gays and lesbians, the legalization of abortion and pornography, were all seen as major threats to family life. They were upset by the restrictions on religious expression in public life and what they perceived to be a decrease of respect for religious institutions.<sup>46</sup> The second stage was initiated in the late 1970s when a network of religious organisations, including schools, charities, missions, megachurches and publishing and broadcasting outlets had been constructed. The notion of a ‘moral majority’ resulted in these groups seeing themselves as defenders of a broader American culture and a large moral consensus who engage in politics to arouse the slumbering to action. Despite their initial success, sectarian differences, the movement’s failure to mobilize its members and the realisation that the notion of a ‘moral majority’

---

<sup>44</sup>Wuthnow, Robert. *Op. cit.*, 215.

<sup>45</sup>Green, John. “The Spirit Willing: Collective Identity and the Development of the Christian Right.” *Waves of Protest: Social Movements since the Sixties*. Eds. Jo Freeman and Victoria Johnson. Maryland, USA. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 160.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 156.

was an illusion impeded their further success. Their failure to develop strong grassroots support was attributed to sectarian differences.<sup>47</sup>

Beginning in the 1990s, the third stage saw Christian Right organisations and their leaders embedded in the Republican Party. Green predicts this may see the end the Christian Right as a distinct social movement. An example that supports his claim is when Pat Robertson, the founder of the *Christian Coalition* joined the Republicans and in doing so, created a divisive force in the Republican Party. “Sectarian antagonisms were now replaced by ideological conflicts, with moderate and business-oriented Republicans frequently opposing the movement’s agenda.... On top of these problems, religious and secular liberals began extensive counter mobilization.”<sup>48</sup> Robertson is not the only notable campaigner to leave the *Christian Coalition* to join the Republicans. In 1997, Ralph Reed left the *Coalition* becoming adviser to George W. Bush in 2002. He orchestrated a successful campaign for the Georgian Republican Party that saw the incumbent Democratic Governor and Senator defeated. In the 2004 election, Reed led Bush’s campaign in the southeast. According to William Martin (*With God on Our Side*), many from the Republican Party have been recruited from the Christian Right. However, he notes that they no longer wear the Christian Right label. Martin who supports Green’s model, maintains that Reed’s transition from Christian organiser to mainstream political operative reflects the “maturing of the conservative Christian movement overall”.<sup>49</sup> During the 2004 elections, conservative Christians reportedly dominated the Republican Party’s organisations in at least 18 States and had substantial influence in another 26.

Many religious political organisations did not follow the path of Robertson and Reed, preferring to remain independent. The *Traditional Values Coalition* was founded in 1980.<sup>50</sup> As an inter-denominational public policy organisation it claims to speak on behalf of over 43 000 churches in America from all-racial and socio-economic groups. The focus is upon issues of education, homosexual advocacy, family tax relief, pornography, the right to life and religious freedom. As well as fulfilling the functions of a political lobby organisation it has a sister organisation, the *Traditional Values Education & Legal Institute* whose purpose is to educate and support churches in their efforts

---

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 158.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>49</sup>Martin, William. *With God on our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America*. New York, Broadway Books, 2005, 388.

<sup>50</sup>“A moral code of behaviour based upon the Old and New Testaments. We believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and that the Lord has given us a rulebook to live by: The Bible. We are committed to living, as far as it is possible, by the moral precepts taught by Jesus Christ and by the whole counsel of God as revealed in the Bible.” “ About Us.” *The Traditional Values Coalition*. 11 Mar. 2007. <<http://www.traditionalvalues.org/modules.php?sid=645>>

to restore America's cultural heritage.<sup>51</sup> There is no indication that it intends to embed itself within a political party, suggesting that phase three of Green's model applies to only a section of the Christian Right.

There are a number of other conservative, inter-denominational, political lobbying organisations that operate in America. Dr James Dobson's, *Focus on the Family*<sup>52</sup> remains strong, so too does the *Heritage Foundation*,<sup>53</sup> *The Institute for American Values*,<sup>54</sup> the *Family Research Council*,<sup>55</sup> the *Family Research Institute*,<sup>56</sup> the *American Centre for Law and Justice*<sup>57</sup> and *The Centre for Moral Clarity*<sup>58</sup> to name a few.

*The Moral Majority Coalition* launched in November 2005 was essentially a resurrection of the old *Moral Majority*. Its intention was to utilize the momentum of the 2004 Presidential elections to maintain an evangelical approach to "vote values" at the polls. Christian political conservatives connected with the new organisation include the Reverend Jerry Falwell founder of the *Moral Majority* and his son Jonathan Falwell, Mathew Stayer, the founder of *Liberty Counsel* and leading Christian author, Dr Tim LaHay. Their website features a four-pronged platform: a four-year voter registration campaign conducted through conservative churches and conservative Christian organisations; specific voter activation campaigns in 2008; recruitment and mobilization campaigns and the encouragement of both private and corporate prayer.<sup>59</sup> In 2006, *Focus on the Family*

---

<sup>51</sup>Cited in the Traditional Values Coalition website -<<http://www.traditionalvalues.org>>

<sup>52</sup>Focus on the Family began in 1977 in response to Dr James Dobson's increasing concern for the American family. "About Us." *Focus on the Family*. 11 Mar. 2007. <<http://www.family.org/welcome/aboutfof/A0000111.cfm>>.

<sup>53</sup>"Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute - a think tank whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense." "About Us." *The Heritage Foundation*. 19 Mar. 2007. <<http://www.heritage.org/About/index.cfm>>.

<sup>54</sup>Their website states, "The Institute for American Values, founded in 1987, is a private, non-partisan organization that contributes intellectually to strengthening families and civil society in the U.S. and the world." *American Values Coalition*. 19 Mar. 2007. <[http://www.americanvalues.org/html/institute\\_at\\_a\\_glance.html](http://www.americanvalues.org/html/institute_at_a_glance.html)>.

<sup>55</sup>Started in 1980, the Family Research Council describes itself as "champions of marriage and family as the foundation of civilization, the seedbed of virtue, and the wellspring of society." Believing that God is the author of life, liberty and the family, they promote a "...Judeo-Christian worldview as the basis for a just, free and stable society." "History/Mission." *Family Research Council*. 7 June 2008. <[http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=HISTORY\\_ABOUT](http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=HISTORY_ABOUT)>

<sup>56</sup>Founded in 1982, the "Family Research Institute is a non-profit scientific and educational corporation that believes the strength of our society depends on preserving America's historic moral framework and the traditional family." *Family Research Institute*. 7 June 2008. <<http://www.familyresearchinst.org/>>.

<sup>57</sup>"The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) was formed in 1990 with the mandate to protect your religious and constitutional freedoms." "History of ACLJ." *American Centre for Law and Justice*. 27 March 2007. <<http://www.aclj.org/About/default.aspx?Section=10>>

<sup>58</sup>"The Center for Moral Clarity exists to affect moral change in our nation by encouraging passionate and persuasive Christian leadership, educating Christians, mobilizing believers in an organized fashion and by providing a wide-range of tools needed to equip everyone from the five-fold ministers to the individuals to be a voice in our nation." "Defending Truth, Shaping Culture." *Center For Moral Clarity*. 19 March 2006. <<https://www.centerformoralclarity.net/About.aspx>>

<sup>59</sup>*Moral Majority*. 17 March 2006. <<http://www.faithandvalues.us/>>.

developed a separate political lobby called *Focus on Family Action*. According to their website, this separation was necessary to comply with the IRA code that restricts organisations from lobbying.<sup>60</sup>

How politically effective the Christian Political Right has been remains a disputed matter. According to William Martin, the 1970s in America saw a “wedding together of right-wing religion and right-wing politics” which has made the Right a powerful political force.<sup>61</sup> However, research published in the *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* in 2003 that focused on the distribution of Christian right voter guides showed otherwise. The findings suggested a general lack of support for Christian Right political organisations among mainline denominations such as, Catholics and African-American Protestants, as well as the more progressive denominations.<sup>62</sup> The authors of this research, Beyerlein and Chaves state that their findings are not surprising given the political strategies that national Christian Right political organisations pursue - namely, the adopting of a conventional political repertoire.

Wuthnow’s study of the Christian Political Right concludes that its success lies in its ability to promote issues in the public arena with leadership accessing a wide and effective range of media communications, including television Evangelists that the central or left-oriented Evangelicals have not. Whatever the reason, it is widely acknowledged that the theologically traditional and politically conservative evangelical vote determined the outcome of the Presidential election in 2000 and the closely won election in 2004.<sup>63</sup> John Green, in discussing the 2008-election result noted that the swing to the Democrats was attributed to “religious minorities, including Hispanic Catholics, Hispanic Protestants, and other minority Catholics and Protestants”. Some changes were also noted within the evangelical community, but only by those who do not attend church regularly. There was no change in the vote of worship-attending white evangelical Protestants. According to Green, Barack Obama also gained votes amongst the Jewish and Hispanic voters.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup>“About Focus Action.” *Focus on the Family*. 4 March 2008. <http://www.focusaction.org/Welcome/A000000105.cfm>

<sup>61</sup>Martin William. *Op. cit.*

<sup>62</sup>Kraig Beyerlein, Mark Chaves. “The Political Activities of Religious Congregations in the United States.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 42.2, 2003. 236–37.

<sup>63</sup>Wellman, Jr. James K. & Kyoko Tokuno. “Is Religious Violence Inevitable?” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 43.3, (2004) 291. Martin, William. *Op. cit.* Wallis, Jim. *Op. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> John Green - 2008 for the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion and Public Life's biannual Faith Angle Conference on religion, politics and public life to look at the impact of religious voters in the 2008 election. 27 June 2009.

<http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=209#3>

## 2.2 An Overview: Countermovements that oppose the Christian Right

---

The success of Christian Right organisations' in America has fostered the creation of a number of countermovements. In 2002, the *Secular Coalition for America* became active as a not-for-profit organisation. This status gave them the licence to lobby both state and national legislature. An umbrella organisation, its goal is to be a "powerful voice for change in the political environment of this country",<sup>65</sup> while decreasing the visibility of monotheistic viewpoints and strengthening the "secular charter of the US government".<sup>66</sup>

Arguments concerning Church-State separation have constructed countermovements against the Christian political Right. *Americans United for the Separation of Church and State* claim to be a non-religious organisation open to people of any background. Describing themselves as a grassroots organisation, they function not only as a countermovement but "defend" the separation of Church - the "cornerstone" of religious liberty in America. Their website claims the "single greatest threat to church-state separation in America is the movement known as the Religious Right. Organizations and leaders representing this religio-political crusade seek to impose a fundamentalist Christian viewpoint on all Americans through government action."<sup>67</sup>

During the 2008 Presidential campaign, religious activists with liberal and progressive perspectives have also been active. With an agenda including avoidance of war, eradication of poverty, and response to climate change, the organisations are generally reactionary to the belief that to be religious you have to be conservative. Organisations that are part of this movement include, *Faith in Public Life*,<sup>68</sup> *Catholics United*<sup>69</sup> and *Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good*.<sup>70</sup> Some of these

---

<sup>65</sup>Their website states, "In the past few decades, Christian fundamentalism has taken an increasingly strident political stance in America. Beginning with televangelist preacher Jerry Falwell and his Moral Majority, followed by Reverend Pat Robertson's Christian Coalition, Christian fundamentalists have obtained virtual control of the Republican Party, the party that now controls all three branches of the Federal government in the United States." "About Us." International Humanist and Ethical Union. 25 June, 2006. <<http://www.iheu.org/node/1102>>.

<sup>66</sup>"The Secular Coalition for America is the national lobby representing the interests of atheists, humanists, agnostics, freethinkers and other nontheistic Americans." Secular Coalition for America. 25 June, 2006. <[www.secular.org](http://www.secular.org)>.

<sup>67</sup>"About Us." Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. 10 June 2007. <<http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=aboutau>>.

<sup>68</sup>Faith in Public Life's website states its vision, "Faith in Public Life envisions a country in which diverse religious voices for justice and the common good consistently impact public policy; and those who use religion as a tool of division and exclusion do not dominate public discourse." It describes its mission as, "Faith in Public Life strengthens the effectiveness, collaboration, and reach of faith movements that share a call to pursue justice and the common good." "About Us." Faith in Public Life. 3 Feb. 2007. <<http://www.faithinpubliclife.org/about/index.html>>

<sup>69</sup>"Catholics United is a non-profit, non-partisan organization dedicated to promoting the message of justice and the common good found at the heart of the Catholic Social Tradition. We accomplish this mission through online advocacy and educational activities". "Home: About Us." Catholics United. 19 Feb. 2006. <<http://www.catholics-united.org/?q=node/18>>

organisations are tied to specific religious traditions and a particular type of theology; those of interfaith or ecumenical in nature are not.

*The Interfaith Alliance*, self-described as a nonpartisan advocacy organisation was founded in 1994 to challenge the Religious Right. It claims membership from more than 75 different religions and belief systems. Its board members include Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Its focus is separation of religious influence and political and governmental structures. *The Alliance* claims that religion has become “increasingly entangled [with politics] so that faith is being manipulated to influence policy rather than to unite and heal”.<sup>71</sup>

Members of the *People for the American Way Foundation (PFAWF)* countermovement state its purpose as the mobilization of “like minded” Americans who believe that American society is being threatened by the “radical right” and secondly, to provide a monitoring and research service. “Our research center monitors the power of right-wing groups, documenting their connections, funding, and reporting on their political influence ... the People For the American Way Foundation’s library has files on over 800 groups and almost 300 individuals documenting their activities and providing information about their efforts to reshape society.” This includes a number of Christian political religious organisations, such as the *American Family Association*, *Christian Coalition of America*, *Christian Legal Society*, *Concerned Women for America*, *Family Research Council*, *Focus on the Family*, *Heritage Foundation*, and the *Traditional Values Coalition*.<sup>72</sup>

In 2004 a news article titled ‘Newly Formed Faith-Based Groups Lean Left’ cited the purpose of a newly formed *Centre for American Progress* as a coalition with left leanings concerned over the growing political influence of the religious political right. Holding a conference in Washington D.C, this coalition stated its goal to join clergy and scholars of several faiths with political leaders and policy makers.<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup>“Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good is a non-partisan ... organization dedicated to promoting the fullness of the Catholic Social Tradition in the public square... Catholics in Alliance is a resource for Catholics inspired by our faith’s core teachings about justice, human life and dignity, peace, poverty and the common good.” “ About Us.” [Catholics in Alliance for the Common Good](http://www.catholicsinalliance.org/about-us). 21 Feb. 2006. <<http://www.catholicsinalliance.org/about-us>>.

<sup>71</sup>“About the Interfaith Alliance.” [Interfaith Alliance Protecting Faith and Freedom](http://www.interfaithalliance.org/site/pp.asp?c=8dJIWMCE&b=120694). 7 January 2006. <<http://www.interfaithalliance.org/site/pp.asp?c=8dJIWMCE&b=120694>>.

<sup>72</sup>*People for the American Way*. 19 June 2006. <<http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=3147>>.

<sup>73</sup>“Newly Formed Faith-Based Groups Leaned Left.” *Fox News*. 26 June, 2006. <<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,125449,00.html>>.

The Christian Left may also be understood as a movement mobilizing around a liberal agenda rather than only countermovement activities described above. It is organising itself more effectively than it had in the past. Some of these organisations have elements of countermovements but move beyond this description. Sojourners, an organisation discussed earlier, is one such organisation.<sup>74</sup> The common thread between these organisations is a stated desire to offer a progressive view about the role of faith in politics rather than that of the Right.

In Chapter 1, I noted that Jim Wallis has criticised the growth of Christian conservative organisations and at the same time admonished the Christian Left for failing to be influential because of their separation of moral discourse and personal ethics from public policy.<sup>75</sup> He urges the Left not to deny notions of sin but to argue that the issues are personal; therefore, they should not be open to a social context. Wallis' answer is to create a society where alternative perspectives have appeal. For example, he advocates a pro-life stance on the issue of abortion but is against its legalisation. He argues that focusing on teen pregnancy, the reformation of adoption procedures and increasing support for low-income women would decrease the incidences of abortions.<sup>76</sup>

In his attempt to establish some Christian middle ground, he faces a number of challenges arising from the acute theological differences between the Christian Right and Left on a number of key issues. Additionally, research into the Christian Left's voting patterns suggests that faith is not vital to political thinking. Furthermore, that Christians on the political Left generally oppose the political activity of religious organisations. This research also noted that 70 per cent of the Christian Left (who identified as pluralistic liberal Catholics), mainline and evangelical Protestants and others who did not attend church regularly all voted for George W. Bush, while 21 per cent voted for John Kerry.<sup>77</sup> This changed with the 2008 elections. As noted above in Section 2.1 it was voters that did not attend church on a weekly basis that chose to vote for Barack Obama and the Democrats in the 2008 elections.

---

<sup>74</sup> See also Footnote 199 for details on this organisation.

<sup>75</sup> Wallis, Jim. *Op. cit.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>77</sup> "The Twelve Tribes of American Politics: The Religious Left." Belief.Net. 10 Feb. 2006.

<[http://www.beliefnet.com/story/153/story\\_15355\\_2.html](http://www.beliefnet.com/story/153/story_15355_2.html)>.



### 3. Managing Cultural and Religious Diversity

---

Discussion thus far has focused on questions of Christian identity. The broader context of American society now places Christianity as one of many religions that demand accommodation within the framework of Church-State relations, rights to freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Prominent regulation issues arise through the application of anti-vilification laws that are framed in general terms but impinge on religious expression. However, more problematic is the task of managing religious (i.e. Christian) symbols and referents in civil religion, popular political culture and the *American Creed*. While some Christian activists and organisations have seen the increase of social and religious diversity as an opportunity to expand inter-faith dialogue, others have used religious ideals and theology to oppose these trends.

The following discussion looks at how the Canadian and American Governments have sought to address religious and cultural diversity although the primary focus remains the American experience drawing on Huntington's treatment of diversity. Calls for recognition of social and cultural difference are a phenomenon occurring in western liberal democratic States and the European Union. How these differences present themselves, their social and political outcomes are different from nation to nation. For example, Canada was the first country to enshrine cultural differences into their Constitution by recognising the rights of its Aboriginal people and *The Official Language Act* mandated both English and French as their official languages.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, Canada enacted the *Multiculturalism Act of 1985*, the first of its kind, which came into operation in 1988.<sup>79</sup> This contrasts to the United States where multiculturalism is not a Federal policy but a State initiative. In recent years, the US Government has moved to support many multicultural policies. However, multiculturalism has become associated with notions of political correctness and the rise of ethnic identity politics relying on the *American Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights*.

---

<sup>78</sup>"Canadian Multiculturalism Act." *Canadian Heritage*. 23 April 2008. <[http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/policy/act\\_e.cfm](http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/policy/act_e.cfm)>.

<sup>79</sup>"Canadian Multiculturalism, Canadian Parliamentary Information and Research Service." *Canadian Library of Parliament*. 9 Oct. 2007. <<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/936-e.htm#issue>>.

### **3.1. Anti-Vilification laws in the US**

---

Two types of State anti-vilification laws have appeared before the American courts. It appears that anti-vilification cases in America do not rest on 'hate speech',<sup>80</sup> but on threats of violence; the reason being that the American Government cannot regulate the content of speech but can sanction the harmful effects of speech through defamation laws or incitement to riot laws. The other means of control is through penalty enhancement focusing on violence that is incited and not the incitement itself. In judging these cases, courts have engaged in the complex exercise of weighing one set of human rights against another.<sup>81</sup>

*The Bill of Rights*, which has been relied upon for the right of free speech has posed an issue. Despite apparent constitutional protection, America has experienced an increase in State anti-vilification laws. For example, in California, harassment, intimidation and murder of minority groups has increased; in reaction, the State's legislature enacted two sections of the Penal Code giving law enforcement officials' authority to prevent acts of hate violence and to deter offensive conduct by prescribing criminal penalties.<sup>82</sup>

### **3.2 Recognition of the relationship of Culture and Religion**

---

American, like many nations has benefited from the migration of people from a number of different countries. As these new arrivals establish themselves within the existing communities, they enrich those communities with their own cultural and religious traditions. This creates a diverse social and religious society that is often referred to as a multicultural society. This movement of people from one nation to another has also raised a number of social, religious, and political questions concerning acceptance, adaptability, and incorporation of these traditions. This final section touches on aspects of America's experience in relation to how some Christian organisations have reacted to this experience.

Exponents of the ideology of multiculturalism maintain that all cultures are equal and that the United States must accept its destiny as a universal nation where no culture will be dominant.

---

<sup>80</sup>A general definition of 'hate speech' is: a term for speech intended to degrade, intimidate, or incite violence or prejudicial action against a group of people based on their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation or disability. The term encompasses written, as well as oral communication.

<sup>81</sup>"The new wave of American Anti-Vilification Laws. 22 Sept. 2007." *Australian Journal of Human Rights*. <<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJHR/1994/14.html#Heading9>>.

<sup>82</sup>Knoll, David. "Anti-Vilification Laws: Some Recent Developments in the United States and Their Implications for Proposed Legislation in the Commonwealth of Australia." *Australian Journal of Human Rights* (1994).

Opponents of multiculturalism deem this as an abrogation of the fundamental commitment to democratic nationhood. “The ideal of multiculturalism is a nation which has no core culture, no ethnic core, no centre other than a powerful state apparatus.”<sup>83</sup>

The central metaphor for multiculturalism in the United States has been ‘a melting pot’ where immigrant cultures are amalgamated without State intervention. The metaphor implies that immigrants are assimilated into society at their own pace. America’s national identity with emphasis on symbolic patriotism, allegiance, and national values is believed to facilitate the assimilation process of immigrants. In terms of official policies - apart from rarely compulsory language courses - little has been done to facilitate assimilation. The ‘melting pot’ supporters accepted the idea of immigrants maintaining ties to the culture of origin. One common criticism is that this has succeeded only with immigrants from Europe with Christian backgrounds, failing other immigrants. This has enhanced calls for state-enforced language policies similar to those in Europe.<sup>84</sup>

Assimilation has now succumbed to ‘corporate pluralism’ (known as, the ‘salad bowl’.) Society is seen as a place where racial and ethnic entities are accorded formal recognition, and stand by the State as groups in the national polity. People become defined through group membership rather than as individuals, resulting in ethnicity being linked to group interest rather than the interest of the individual. Examples of Government policies of corporate pluralism include affirmative action and bilingual education.<sup>85</sup>

America’s multinational policy affects the nation externally, impacting on its relationship with other nations. Huntington writes that international conflict is likely to be based on cultural matters rather than economic grounds and nation states; by groups, he identifies as civilizations.<sup>86</sup> Huntington identifies eight major civilizations within Western civilization that act as bearers of Western attitudes and values. He believes these values have been derived from Western Christianity, were shaped by the Reformation and the Enlightenment, and are resisted by all non-Western civilizations to varying degrees. Huntington’s concerns are that the increase of non-Western immigration<sup>87</sup> has created the danger of losing the national identity by failing to ‘Americanize’ immigrants and that America’s

---

<sup>83</sup>Nelson Brent A. America Balkanized: Immigration's Challenge to Government. Monterey, VA: American Immigration Control Foundation, 1994. 31- 26.

<sup>84</sup>“United States: the melting pot.” Wikipedia Foundation. 9 March 2008. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism#United\\_States:\\_the\\_Melting\\_Pot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism#United_States:_the_Melting_Pot)>.

<sup>85</sup>“Multiculturalism, Immigration and Aztlan.” Diversity Alliance for a Sustainable America. 15 May, 2006. <<http://www.diversityalliance.org/docs/Chang-aztlan.html>>.

<sup>86</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. USA: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

<sup>87</sup> Which he states as occurring since 1965.

attempt to restructure the world in its own image has caused the nation to lose sight of its uniqueness and the special value of its creed. The rise of multiculturalism denies the uniqueness of the American culture that is based on a secularized evangelical creed and results in the erosion of American culture. The increase of migrants from Southeast Asia and the spreading of Confucian and Islamic values are perceived as impacting upon the spread of the democratic and ethical ideals of the West.<sup>88</sup>

Huntington's critics suggest that both the Confucian and Islamic civilizations are not without their own deep rifts and communal wars between ethnic groups. Fogel, as well as challenging Huntington's interpretation of American culture, suggests that the issue at stake is the definition of acceptable multiculturalism - this includes the prioritising of different religious and ethnic values that coexist within America.<sup>89</sup>

Issues concerning the recognition of culture and religious difference in America are the subject of debate and difference between Christian Conservatives and their Liberal counterparts. Once again, theological interpretation defines these differences.

Christian Liberals are involved in interfaith alliances that issue joint statements such as, "A Common Word between Us and You" that "identifies some core common ground between Christianity and Islam which lies at the heart of our respective faiths".<sup>90</sup> Conservative organisations such as the *Traditional Values Coalition* list a number of issues particularly relating to the Islamic faith and focus on the differences between Islam and the Christian faith; while Liberals seek common ground. In the document, 'A Common Word', just mentioned, Liberal Christian leaders apologised for the sins of Christians during the Crusades and for the 'excesses' of the global war on terror. This has brought an immediate response from conservative organisations such as, *Focus on the Family* who warned that such statements not only put Christians in Islamic countries at risk, but also raises the deity of Christ for discussion.<sup>91</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup>Huntington, Samuel P. *Op. cit.*

<sup>89</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 233.

<sup>90</sup>"Loving God and Neighbour Together. A Common Word." (joint Muslim and Christian website). 25 March 2006. <<http://www.acommonword.com/lib/downloads/fullpageadbold18.pdf>>.

<sup>91</sup>"Evangelical Leaders Pledge Common Cause with Islam." *Focus on the Family Action*. 6 Sept 2006. <<http://www.citizenlink.org/CLtopstories/A000006202.cfm>>.

#### 4. Summary

---

This chapter has discussed the framework affecting religious activism in America. The *American Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights* are two documents that affect religious practice and involvement in civic society. Civic religion's unclear notions of divine provenance offer the State an extra layer of legitimacy. Civic religion, along with creedal politics provides moral and religious symbols and a framework for US political life. The seemingly endless discussion concerning the separation of Church and State in America highlights links between religious influence and politics. Although the culture war theory may not have strong groundings, it identifies an agenda of items which are utilised by both sides of the US debate.

I have discussed the Christian Right in America and those who oppose its influence because they provide a comparative model for organisations and movements in Australia. Similarly, they reveal a great deal about the new agenda items associated with cultural and religious diversity.

While it may be convenient to view faith-based politics in terms of Christian Right or Christian Left, these categories do not always predict how Christians will vote in elections. In America, many Christian voters moved from supporting the Democratic Party to the Republican Party affecting the outcome of the 2000 and 2004 elections. This also means that voters could return to support the Democratic Party. The results of the 2008 elections are testament of this. Theological understanding, moral beliefs, and politically conservative opinions are important to the Christian Right. On the Christian Left, the connection of faith and politics appear less significant because of their tendency to compartmentalise faith to the personal. Wallis is seeking to overcome this compartmentalization although it is unclear how successful his effort will be. It is important to remember that despite differences on specific issues there is common ground.

The following two chapters focus on Australian Christians' social and political activity. As with this chapter, Chapter 4 begins with historic legacies affecting both churches and religion in public life. With or without Government assistance, Christian organisations in Australia have always been providers of social and welfare services. More recently, they have taken on being political lobbyists. Chapter 5 concludes the Australian discussion, noting a number of social, political, and religious transformations that have occurred since 1970. These next two chapters provide the material necessary to contrast RIPA in America and Australia. Chapter 6 concludes this section of the thesis with a final assessment of whether America is a viable model to understand RIPA in Australia.

## Chapter 4: The Church and RIPA in Australian Public Life until the 1960s

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>1. Church-State Accommodation and Religious Pluralism</b>	<b>71</b>
1.1 The Establishment of Religion and its Relationship to Executive Powers	72
1.2 The Constitution: S116 - What it means for Church and State Accommodation	75
<b>2. The Church in Public Life as Education and Welfare Service Providers</b>	<b>78</b>
2.1 Educational Services	79
2.2 Welfare Providers	82
<b>3. Religious Inspired Activism of Christian Movements Organisations</b>	<b>84</b>
3.1 Early Conservative Movement Organisations	85
3.2 Denominational Differences and the Development of Trade Unions and Political Parties	90
<b>4. Summary</b>	<b>92</b>

## Introduction

---

The purpose of this chapter is to depict religion's influence in public life and how religious movement organisations have developed in Australia.

In order to answer the question of whether America is a viable model to understand RIPA in Australia, I examine the development of the Christian faith, its relationship to the State and its role in the public arena. Fogel's descriptive model linking the Great Awakenings to social and political change was discussed in Chapter 2, subsection 1.3. His work is useful for a similar Australian study as few accounts note the inextricable link between changes occurring in religious movements and technological and social change. Australia's social developments are viewed through a secular lens, void of Fogel's religious content - in particular, the importance of theological change linked to technology and social change.

In discussing Church-State interaction in Australia, Monsma and Soper's study is insightful. "Australia has vacillated among four different church-state models ... establishment, plural establishment, liberal separationism, and pragmatic pluralism."<sup>1</sup> This is different to the American model, which has been one of Church-State separation.

This chapter and the next seek to identify the parallels between America and Australia. In this regard, the particular areas of focus include the church's role as welfare provider in Section 2, while Section 3 discusses religiously inspired political activism. It is through these roles that the changing church-state models that have been adopted in Australia become evidenced.

The material in this chapter examines Australian society including progress in the penal colony, the lack of an official State church, Church-State accommodation in the *Constitution* and Australia's lack of a strong civic religion in contrast to America.<sup>2</sup> Churches developed religious organisations as social and welfare providers in the late Convict - early Colonial Periods as Governments struggled to cope with community demands. It was during the mid 1800s that Christian activists established social organisations in opposition to the 'degradation of society'. These were the forerunners to modern RIPA movements.

---

<sup>1</sup>Monsma, Stephen V., & Soper J. Christopher. *The Challenge of Pluralism*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997. 87.

<sup>2</sup>As the social and political developments were general, I consider the history of change as it occurred in NSW.

There are two questions worthy of consideration in discussing the development of these organisations. First can the growth of these organisations be linked to the changes that occurred during the religious phase of the Second Great Awakening in the United States, and second did the sectarian divisions have any influence in the type of organisations that were developed?

In Australia, Christian activists were involved in the development of trade unions and political parties. The development of the two major political parties are discussed as they highlight the different roles that Christian denominations fulfilled. It is through the growth of trade unions and political parties that the different social messages of church leaders and church laity (of the same denomination) become apparent. Do these differences serve to clarify the development of religious social movements or church cohesion in Australia? Was this the beginning of a culture war, resembling those described by James Hunter?<sup>3</sup>

Significant changes to religious social and political activism occurring from the 1970s are also examined in the following chapter along with the increasingly visible changes in theological thought. Issues concerning church cohesion post 1970 are also discussed in the next chapter.

## **1. Church-State Accommodation and Religious Pluralism**

---

Australia and America's experience of white settlement was dissimilar. Australia was initially a penal colony under British rule; white settlement grew as the number of free citizens increased and prisoners who had served their time were released. This section examines the relationship between the early governors and chaplains and their role in the development of Church-State accommodation; as the Church of England was the short lived official State church, initially the responsibilities of these two leaders intertwined. When secular powers provided financial and other aid to Catholics, Protestants, Presbyterians, and later Jews, religious pluralism was established.

While America's *Constitution* clearly defined limits to Church-State relationships and the US has a strong civic religion, is it so in Australia? The second subsection discusses the development of Australia's *Constitution* and its impact on Church-State accommodation.

---

<sup>3</sup>Hunter, James Davidson. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. USA: Basic Books, 1991.



## 1.1 *The Establishment of Religion and its Relationship to Executive Powers*

---

In the Early Convict Era (1788–1823), Chaplains were officers of the Crown, appointed by the King and responsible to the Governor and the Bishop of London. The Governors, bound by their commissions held complete authority over several aspects of official religious practice. Gregory Grocott writes that Governor Phillip told the Reverend Richard Johnson “to concentrate more on plain moral preaching”. Lieutenant-Governor Gross ordered 6am religious services that lasted 45 minutes. The Government proclaimed that public notices were to be read regularly at church services. J. S. Gregory notes that Governor Macquarie regarded himself as ‘the guardian of the purity and doctrine of the Church of England’, which he accepted as the established church of Australia.<sup>4</sup> In 1794, the Reverend Samuel Marsden joined Johnson, first in Sydney and later Parramatta where he was responsible for religious, educational, and civic affairs. Alan Barcon writes that both Chaplains remained under the formal control of the military until 1804.<sup>5</sup>

The English practice where the Anglican parson acted as magistrate to a Local Court was mirrored in Australia until abandoned in 1827.<sup>6</sup> For political representation, Archdeacon William Grant Broughton was invited to act as member of the Legislative and Executive Councils in 1829; positions he held until 1842.<sup>7</sup>

In essence, the Church of England was the Established Church, receiving exclusive recognition and financial support by virtue of the power vested in the governors as representatives of the Crown.

As early as 1798 in NSW, attempts were made to challenge the exclusivity of the Church of England by three Catholic priests transported from Ireland for complicity in the Irish uprising (1798).<sup>8</sup> However, they were forbidden from ministering. In 1801, Governor Macquarie deported Father O’Flynn who was seeking to establish a permanent Roman Catholic community. In 1803, one of the three priests aforementioned acted in the role of religious leader for a brief time. Nevertheless, no official recognition was granted.<sup>9</sup> However, in 1814 the English Parliament officially appointed two Catholic priests to the New South Wales Colony. With this acknowledgement were two Government

---

<sup>4</sup>Gregory, J.S. Church & State: Changing Government Policies Towards Religion in Australia. North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973. 7.

<sup>5</sup>Barcon, Alan. A History of Australian Education. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1980. 11.

<sup>6</sup>Grocott, Allan M. Convicts, Clergymen, and Churches: Attitudes of Convicts and Ex-Convicts Towards the Churches and Clergy in New South Wales from 1788 to 1851. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980. 2-4.

<sup>7</sup>Gregory, J.S. *Op. cit.*, 25.

<sup>8</sup>“The Church in Australia: The Catholic Tradition.” Australian Catholic University. 12 June 2006 <<http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/staffhome/yukoszarycz/ecc/MOD8.HTML>>.

<sup>9</sup>Gregory, J.S. *Op. cit.*, 6.

funded salaries at the same rate as clergy of the Church of England. Still, the total funding and provision of resources favoured the Church of England. In 1826, the *Imperial Charter* declared that revenue from one seventh of Crown Lands was to support the clergy of the Church of England and the maintenance and support of schools and schoolmasters in their care. Despite being short-lived, the *Church and School Corporation Act* (1825–1833) was designed to give the Church of England a means of support independent of recurrent State funding. Instead, it caused an enormous drain on Government funds that far surpassed amounts available to Catholic and Presbyterian clergy and schools.<sup>10</sup> England's economic depression of 1825 and the Colonial Depression from 1826 to 1828 affected the financial assistance allocated through the *Corporation*.<sup>11</sup> When Governor Richard Bourke arrived in 1831, his task was investigating the issue of funding for religious and educational purposes. Bourke criticised the system of positive discrimination towards the Church of England and suggested all denominations be treated equally. This was in response to the repeated complaints by Catholics and Presbyterians about the inequities of the *Corporation Act*. The Imperial Government took his advice and the *Corporation Act* was withdrawn in 1833.<sup>12</sup> Within the confines of the Christian faith, religious pluralism was an unavoidable reality although privilege remained with the Church of England.

In 1836, the *Legislative Council of New South Wales* passed an "Act to promote the Building of Churches and Chapels and to provide for the maintenance of Ministers of Religion in New South Wales". Known as *The Church Act*, it extended funding to Catholics, Wesleyans, and Presbyterians. As the title implied, the funding was to establish churches and chapels, as well as providing salaries to ministers.<sup>13</sup> This signalled the end of the exclusivity of resourcing that the Church of England enjoyed. Monsma and Soper state that, "*The Church Act* was a secular response to religious diversity by a class of colonial governors who had little spiritual interest in religion". Further, that the State chose to become neutral but that neutrality did not mean the cessation of state aid.<sup>14</sup> *The Church Act* provided free seats to the poor with costs subsidized by the State.<sup>15</sup> The NSW policy of religious pluralism was remarkable for its time, considering that in England, Roman Catholics were barred admission to universities and political emancipation had only recently been granted.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *The Sectarial Strand: Religion in Australian History*. Ringwood Vic.: Penguin, 1987. 37.

<sup>11</sup>Barcan, Alan. *Op. cit.*, 31.

<sup>12</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 38-39.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 38-39.

<sup>14</sup>Monsma, Stephen V. and Soper J. Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 91.

<sup>15</sup>Gregory, J S. *Op. cit.*, 19.

<sup>16</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 92.

Surprisingly, this form of religious pluralism caused bitter sectarian differences as grants were based on census figures. This resulted in some churches, particularly the Church of England receiving more than other churches. In contrast, South Australia did not allocate grants to churches and did not experience the same sectarian rivalry as New South Wales. Hogan writes that South Australia constructed the voluntary principal that religious communities were responsible for their own support. He believes this protected religious equality and rights from State interference. The opposite principle was operating in New South Wales.<sup>17</sup>

Although the *Public Worship Act of 1842* provided funding for dominant Christian denominations in its initial stages, it was not available to non-Christian religions. Two years prior to this act, members of the Jewish faith built a synagogue. In 1842, they applied for Government funds under *Schedule C of the Public Worship Act of 1842*. Wentworth<sup>18</sup> applied for aid and a stipend for the Rabbi, insisting that the *Imperial Act of 1842* overrode the *Colonial Act of 1836*; therefore, all religious groups were entitled to funding. Despite the Council passing the proposal, Governor Sir George Gipps rejected it, stating he would not provide for any purpose other than “Christian worship”.<sup>19</sup> In 1846, grants were extended to Jewish organisations on the same grounds as Christian churches. Monsma and Soper write that the motive for this provision was the State’s attempt to avoid political disputes similar to those that occurred in England where religionists were pitted against each other.<sup>20</sup> The result was to consolidate State-sanctioned religious pluralism.

Monsma and Soper argue that the State’s withdrawal of aid from clergy in 1862 resulted from a new policy of Church-State separationism that was rooted in the Enlightenment principals of liberalism. The other reason given was that it simplified life for colonial authorities as it minimised denominational conflict and empowered churches to provide moral guidance.<sup>21</sup> Hogan agrees in part, noting that an immediate consequence of the *Grants for Public Worship Prohibition Act of 1862* was “the removal of one source of dissention between denominations ... The more long-term consequence was a de-facto withdrawal of the state from intervention in church affairs. Later history was to show that this was by no means the same as the principle of ‘separation of church and state’ which prevailed in the United States.”<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 41.

<sup>18</sup>supported by Lang and Lowe

<sup>19</sup>Gregory, J. S. *Op. cit.*, 29.

<sup>20</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 90.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>22</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 60.

This concludes a general discussion concerning the establishment of the Christian religion in Australia and the beginning of Church-State accommodation. The failure of the Church of England to retain the legal standing as the State Church, facilitated by the establishment of other denominations founded Christian religious pluralism in Australia. Church-State relations appear to correspond with Monsma and Soper's models. The Establishment Phase from 1788 continued until financial aid and support ceased in 1862. In 1813, a form of plural establishment began with the provision of salaries to some clergy. By 1836, this had extended to providing funds for the building of churches and chapels; however, these were exclusive to the Christian faith. By 1846, religious pluralism developed more steadily when financial aid was extended to the Jewish faith. Though not overtly intended, by 1862, the process of liberal separation took a step closer with the termination of funding to all religions - except for schooling.

## **1.2 The Constitution: S116 - What it means for Church and State Accommodation**

---

The thesis now turns to the inclusion of God in the *Australian Constitution* and its impact on Church-State interaction.

Between 1855 and 1890, each of the six Australian Colonies gained 'responsible Government'-meaning that while managing most of their affairs they remained part of the British Empire.<sup>23</sup> The movement towards Federation gained momentum in 1889 after the New South Wales Premier, Henry Parkes, wrote to the premiers proposing to devise a Federal Constitution. Meetings were conducted in Melbourne in 1890, Sydney, and Adelaide in 1891.

Section 116 of the *Australian Constitution* has the only direct reference to "religion" and is therefore the focus of most writing concerning the recognition of religion in the *Constitution*. It was during the *1891 Constitutional Convention* in Sydney that the question of the relationship between religion, the Church and the Commonwealth was first raised. Richard Ely writes that initially there were concerns over whether the Commonwealth Parliament could legislate on issues concerning religion. It was not until 1896 when the *Australasian Federation League* organised a 'People's Convention' that discussions concerning God's inclusion in the *Constitution* adopted a more serious nature. At this time, Catholic and Protestant interest in the Federation Movement escalated.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup>"History of Australia." *Wikipedia Foundation*. 10 Sept. 2007, <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History\\_of\\_Australia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Australia)>.

<sup>24</sup>Ely, Richard. *Unto God and Caesar, Religious issues in the emerging Commonwealth 1891-1906*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1976. 1, 2.

There were two separate campaigns regarding whether the *Australian Constitution* should formally recognise religion. Richard writes that during the period of 1897 and 1898, Protestants and Anglicans held extensive public campaigns arguing for the *Constitution's* inclusion of religion.<sup>25</sup> John Bannon writes that Dr James Jeffris one of the most influential church leaders of the era and pro-Federation campaigner believed that the *Constitution* was instrumental to end what he termed an “unholy compact between Caesar and others who claimed to be the sole representative of God”. He believed, the *Constitution* was the answer to the demand for a “free Church and State”, and would unify denominations.<sup>26</sup> Other church leaders also saw the Federation of Australia as an opportunity for inter-denominational unity.<sup>27</sup>

Richard noted that the Seventh-Day Adventists wanted to ensure church protection from State interference. However, with the inclusion of *Section 116* these fears were alleviated as<sup>28</sup> the text reads: “The Commonwealth shall not make any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, or for the establishment of any religion, or imposing any religious observance, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.” Though disputed and later legally rejected it is interesting to note that in his concluding remarks on the *Federation Bill*, Sir John Downer said, “the Commonwealth will be from its first stage a Christian Commonwealth”.<sup>29</sup>

If the *Constitution* freed the State of religious responsibility, what did it accomplish for Church-State accommodation? There are two distinct arguments to this question. The first states that the *Constitution* created a formal separation of Church and State similar to America. For this stance, Bannon believes, “For many church men, the Constitution, despite being a triumphant affirmation of the separation of church and state, was not in any way godless.”<sup>30</sup> He argues that the purpose of the *Constitution* was driven by needs of a practical nature.<sup>31</sup> Han Mol also believes that the intention was formal separation.<sup>32</sup> The second argument states that while *S116* was modelled on the *First Amendment*, the American separationist model was not intended for Australia.<sup>33</sup> Hogan suggests,

---

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, ix.

<sup>26</sup>Bannon, John. “The Church and Federation in 1901.” *Spirit of Australia Religion in Citizenship and National Life*. Eds. Howe, Brian & Nichols, Alan. Adelaide: Openbook Publishers, 2001. 13.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 7-11.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 74.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>30</sup>Bannon John, *Op. cit.*, 13.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.* 3.

<sup>32</sup>Mol, Hans. *Religion in Australia: a sociological investigation*. Melbourne: Thomas Nelson (Australia) Ltd. 1971. 281.

<sup>33</sup>Monsma, Stephen V. and Soper J. Christopher. *The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies*. Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997. 95, 96.

“The Australian Constitution does not guarantee a separation of church and state; in fact interpretations of the Constitution by the High Court have supported an intermingling of the affairs of both”.<sup>34</sup>

It may be argued that the purpose of *Section 116* was not to protect religion but to limit the State’s ability to control religion<sup>35</sup> as reflected in the *Church Act of 1836* and disagreements over the control of educating children (discussed next). Given Dr. Jeffris and Sir John Downer’s discussion of *The Constitution* and the High Court’s interpretation, Monsma and Soper’s hypothesis that a separationist model identical to America’s was not intended holds validity. What is also important to comparisons between Australia and the US is the *American Constitution’s* incorporation of the *Bill of Rights*<sup>36</sup> that specifically embodies religious freedom through free speech - the *Australian Constitution* has no equivalent. Tom Frame in *Church and State: Australia’s Imaginary Wall* makes a case that this was because it was believed that such a provision was not needed as the non-Establishment Clause (S116) served to guarantee religious freedom.<sup>37</sup>

It is suggestible that the wording of *S116* signalled recognition of existing accommodations through absolving State responsibility for religion and reflected a liberal separationist model. In Australia’s colonial period, limited functional separation of Church and State existed with joint responsibility for functional aspects of religion, including religious services. However, this was not an equal alliance as the Church of England’s bishops were subservient to the governors. Through events including the provision of financial assistance to other denominations and religions, the Church of England lost its position as State church. In effect, *S116* defined existing boundaries in the relationship of Church and State. Whilst the *Constitution* grants no exclusive rights to the Christian religion, history suggests it was implied due to its existence as the only formally structured institutionalised religion practiced at the time.

Section 1.2 has examined Church-State accommodation in Constitutional terms. The next section discusses the practical relationship that developed when Churches maintained roles as social service and welfare providers. The changing church-state models adopted in Australia that differ from the

---

<sup>34</sup>Hogan, Michael, *Op. cit.*, 278-79.

<sup>35</sup>Hogan, Michael. *Op. cit.*, and Ely, Richard. *Op. cit.*

<sup>36</sup>Amendment 1 - “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” *Freedom of Religion*, Press, 12/15/1791, 18 Nov. 2006. <<http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html#Am1>>

<sup>37</sup>Frame, T. R. *Op. cit.*

American experience are reflected in the changes in the ongoing relationship between these entities. The provision of education services and welfare provision provides a way of identifying these changes. This thesis contends that one defining difference between RIPA in Australia and the US can be attributed to the different church-state models. It is also through the church's role as welfare provider that we may draw parallels between Fogel's descriptive model of America and social and religious change in Australia.

## **2. The Church in Public Life as Education and Welfare Service Providers**

---

This section discusses the Church as education provider. "The hold which the churches had over schools in the various colonies was only one indication of the central place of denominationalism in the construction of both the new society and the new state."<sup>38</sup> While denominationalism remained central place, the Church's role as education provider was challenged by the withdrawal of funding and then by the development of the State education system<sup>39</sup>

The second part (Section 2.2) examines church activity in the Community, such as welfare provision. Australia did not adopt the English system of 'Poor Laws' but rather looked to private benevolence and church welfare services. This provided a centred role for denominationally based organisations. However, increasing demand on church-based services resulted in the Government's provision of funding, then its adoption of responsibility for welfare services. Whilst churches continued to provide services, there was an organisational shift from seeing charity as the solution to community welfare problems, to seeking Government intervention in legislation. The shift from service provision to moral reform is a theme in this chapter and the one following. The process of lobbying Governments fostered a growth of new organisations that were forerunners to today's RIPA organisations. These organisations are discussed in Section 3.

Of critical significance to the comparative aspect of this thesis is whether Australia's developments were linked to religious themes in the US in the same period. As described by Fogel,<sup>40</sup> the strong evangelical focus of the Second Great Awakening overlaps with the modernist reformist tendencies of the Third Great Awakening from approximately 1880–1970. All accounts of Australian social diversity in this period represent the modernist reformist movement as independent of religious

---

<sup>38</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 81.

<sup>39</sup>Monsma, Stephen V. and Soper J. Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 93.

<sup>40</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*

content.<sup>41</sup> This may reflect reality but also a lack of attention to the religious dimensions in Australian social history.

## 2.1 Educational Services

---

During the Convict Period in New South Wales, the Governor, under England's direction, was financially responsible for schooling while the Church of England provided the service. "Additional instructions issued to Governor Phillip in August 1789 required that land should be set aside in each town to assist schooling."<sup>42</sup> In England at the time, churches and philanthropists educated children of lower classes. Families of middle and upper classes arranged their children's education.<sup>43</sup>

In 1798, religious participation in education broadened after ministers from the *London Missionary Society* arrived in Sydney. This mission society, with strong Congregationalist and Methodist affinities, provided some funding for four missionaries to undertake religious instruction and education of children. Alan Barcan suggests that despite these missionaries being non-conformists, they taught the Church of England catechism.<sup>44</sup> When Governor Philip King arrived in Sydney in April 1800, he established an orphan school in Sydney and introduced a system of financial support for a school that he also established on Norfolk Island. This consisted of imposing an import duty on goods, which was utilised as an education fund. Also paid into the fund were monetary fines. By 1806, private-venture schools for middle and upper class children were founded.<sup>45</sup>

From 1815, Governor Macquarie sought to transfer more responsibility to the Church of England for education. As a result, the churches faced several difficulties, including the expansion and diversity of the population that encouraged rivalry between denominations and the spread of settlements, making provision for schools difficult. By 1816, the Methodist Church had six Sunday schools attended by 300 children.<sup>46</sup> The British Government appointed J. T. Bigge as commissioner to inquire into the societal conditions of New South Wales, including education. In his 1823 final report, he endorsed the introduction of a National system with its coordination by the Church of England.<sup>47</sup> Barcan also writes that under the leadership of Archdeacon Scott, who arrived in 1825,

---

<sup>41</sup>Information supplied in an email on 7 March 2008 by Dr Julia Pitman, Programs Manager, Australian Centre for Christianity and Culture, Charles Sturt University.

<sup>42</sup>Barcan, Alan. *Op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>43</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>44</sup>*Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, 23,24.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.



the Church of England attempted to dominate education in New South Wales by increasing the number of elementary schools. However, these ambitions were met with increasing resistance from other religious denominations.

In 1825, the *Church and School Corporation Charter* was proclaimed, reinforcing the position of the Church of England and granting priority of funding for religious and educational purposes. One seventh of the colony's Crown Lands were allocated to the maintenance of the Church of England's clergy and schools. No other denomination was issued an equivalent endowment. As noted in subsection 1.1, this was withdrawn in 1833 with little assistance replacing it.<sup>48</sup>

From 1833 until 1844, a number of State proposals for funding were made, but were rejected by churches. In May 1847, the Colonial Secretary announced the Government would allocate funding to introduce a National system of schooling. Barcan believes that opposition from churches to the establishment of State schools was minimal. In 1848, Governor Fitzroy adopted a *Board of National Education* to administer to State elementary schools while the *Denominational Schools Board* administered State Government funding to Anglican, Presbyterian, Catholic and Methodist elementary schools.<sup>49</sup> The National Schools System was mainly restricted to rural areas where church schools did not exist.<sup>50</sup>

In December 1855, the School Commissioner noted economic and educational inefficiencies with the competing *National and Denominational School Boards* and recommended a single supervisory authority. *The Public Schools Act of 1866* abolished the two Boards, replacing them with a *Council of Education*. This marked a decisive shift against church schools who found themselves under considerable State control. In New South Wales, church-based schools declined from 317 schools in 1867 to 211 in 1872.<sup>51</sup>

The first attempt to end State aid to church elementary schools occurred in 1872; though defeated, the campaign continued. During the 1874–75 elections, the Congregationalist, Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches supported the abolition of State aid to church schools. *The Public Instruction Act* - enacted in 1879 - withdrew State aid from church schools from December 1882. According to Barcan, the *Act* was an expression of liberal democratic principles that advanced the separation of Church and State in education. State primary schools were no longer for the lower

---

<sup>48</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op cit.*, 38.

<sup>49</sup>Barcan, Alan. *Op. cit.*, 52.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 57.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 138.

class but for all. Barcan believes that the compulsory attendance of this *Act* serviced to cease children working in factories, shops and on farms.<sup>52</sup>

According to Monsma and Soper, the *NSW Public Instruction Act of 1880* provided Protestants with the belief that secular education was not a threat to religious values.<sup>53</sup> They suggest that it was 'Enlightenment Liberals' with their belief that "the core consensual features of the Christian faith could provide the basis for a common morality" who lead the public school movement. Protestant church leaders did not challenge this liberal vision because "they saw it as consistent with their understanding of the social role of Christianity."<sup>54</sup>

Because of the withdrawal of State aid between 1914 and 1938, a number of small non-denominational private primary schools closed. Whilst church-based primary schools declined, religious secondary schools expanded. Barcan states the reason was the growth of an independent middle class and the adoption of reformed public schools similar to the English model.<sup>55</sup> The Roman Catholic Church remained the leader in denominational education.<sup>56</sup>

The question of funding to denominational schools had not been a significant political agenda for approximately twenty years. The formation of the Democratic Labor Party in 1955 saw the issue return to public debate. However, it was not until the Goulburn Crisis of 1962 that the issue came to a head.

The *New South Wales Department of Education* threatened to withdraw a *Certificate of Efficiency* unless toilet facilities improved in Catholic schools in Goulburn. As a result, the Catholic leaders closed their schools sending the pupils to State schools. The Government schools could not manage the increased number of pupils. An offensive by Catholic leaders to obtain State aid followed the schools' closure. The entire incident was an embarrassment to the New South Wales Labor Government; one that Liberal Prime Minister Robert Menzies was able to exploit. By the 1960s, the Protestant's distrust of Roman Catholics dissolved and they united to lobby for Government funding for their schools.<sup>57</sup> In 1963, Menzies enacted legislation providing Federal Government funding directly to all schools, also offering substantial grants to the States for science education. State

---

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 139-42.

<sup>53</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 93.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>55</sup>Barcan, Alan. *Op. cit.*, 188.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 250-51.

<sup>57</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op.cit.*, 94.

Governments followed; therefore, a system of Commonwealth and State grants per capita for denominational schools developed. The programs that this funding affected included programs for libraries, migrant education, and teacher training. By the time E. G. Whitlam became Prime Minister in December 1972, the issue was not if, but how much money, should be given to non-Government schools. Whitlam formed a Schools Commission administrative system to bring order to the issue.<sup>58</sup>

In summary, religious organisations have always provided educational services to Australian communities. However, lack of Government funding, a reflection of the move to a liberal separationist church-state model, resulted in many denominations closing their schools. Effective RIPA lobbying by the Catholic Church and the re-establishment and expansion of Government funding later saw the denominations once again become significant education providers, as the government began a move to the current pragmatic pluralist model. The Goulburn schools strike illustrated that without religious schools operating, the public system could not operate effectively. Therefore, the issue of re-instatement of State aid to private schools was significant for the education system.<sup>59</sup>

## **2.2 Welfare Providers**

---

Now attention turns to the role that religious organisations have played in welfare provision in Australia. It discusses the development of these services, the challenges faced in its delivery and the Government's response to crises experienced in the Great Depression that resulted in the development of the welfare system. While there is no comparable, study (to Robert Fogel's work) is it possible to see Australia parallels. This question is explored in the next section and in Section 3 where specific organisations and their roles are discussed. The different church-state models that Australia has experienced are also evidenced through religious organisations involvement as welfare providers.

During the Convict Era and early years of colonial development, which Monsma and Soper describe as the establishment phase, the British Government funded Australia's social needs, including provisions for the sick and neglected children. Many services were provided for the military, other Government employees and convicts rather than the free settlers. Unlike England, "the colony was

---

<sup>58</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 251-253.

<sup>59</sup>In 1961, 1 752 of the 2 128 non-government schools of Australia were Catholic. Barcan, Alan. *Op. cit.*, 319.

to take on private benevolence rather than statutory intervention.”<sup>60</sup> It was through this decision that religious organisations provided community services.

In the 1800s, a number of religiously based welfare organisations developed in Australia - their purpose was to provide medical services including *The NSW Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge and Benevolence* established in 1813 and *The Benevolent Society of New South Wales* in 1818.<sup>61</sup> By 1820, the *Benevolent Society* was unable to cope financially and began to receive financial subsidies from the Treasury. In 1838, vocational nursing was pioneered in Australia when five *Sisters of Charity* nuns arrived to work among female convicts. At the close of the century, there were 120 general hospitals in New South Wales - all but one, run by benevolent societies.<sup>62</sup>

There was no Federal Government centralised unemployment assistance program leading up to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The destitute relied on State Government funded employment projects and public work projects. Charities, private organisations and a patchwork of agencies provided some relief.

Until 1932, religious organisations continued to provide the majority of welfare assistance, including to the unemployed.<sup>63</sup> However, by the late 1930s these organisations had insufficient resources for the demand.<sup>64</sup> The States and Commonwealth moved to establish State welfare systems for the unemployed and the aged. State departments increasingly managed health systems where churches funded hospitals and other institutions.

The 1941 *Joint Parliamentary Committee of Social Security Report* noted that many Australians were inadequately housed, clothed, or ill nourished. It recommended that providing welfare services would contribute to the war effort by improving the willingness and morale of workers. The reforms aimed to rectify inadequacies of the earlier wage earners' welfare state. Child endowment, limited funeral benefits, maternity allowances, widows' pensions, unemployment, sickness, and

---

<sup>60</sup>Wearing, Michael, and Rosemary Berreen. *Welfare & Social Policy in Australia: the Distribution of Advantage*. Harcourt Brace, 1994. 4.

<sup>61</sup>*ibid.*, 6-9.

<sup>62</sup>“History of the Benevolent Society.” *Australian Academy of Medicine & Surgery*. 9 Aug. 2007, <[http://www.aams.org.au/contents.php?subdir=library/history/funding\\_prof\\_med\\_au/&filename=1788to1900](http://www.aams.org.au/contents.php?subdir=library/history/funding_prof_med_au/&filename=1788to1900)>.

<sup>63</sup>Date supplied in a telephone conversation with Mr David Patterson, Centrelink, Woodridge, Telephone: (07) 3884-9014 on 4th January, 2002.

<sup>64</sup>“The Great Depression.” *Australian Government*. 20 Sept. 2007. <<http://www.cultureandrecreation.gov.au/articles/greatdepression/index.htm>>.

pharmaceutical benefits were some of the measures introduced.<sup>65</sup> This initiated a welfare state in Australia and took pressure off religious organisations.<sup>66</sup>

Despite welfare, full employment, and economic growth - poverty remained a problem that was 'rediscovered' in the 1960s.<sup>67</sup> Churches and their organisations continued to act as welfare lobbyists, as well as welfare providers. The *Brotherhood of St Laurence* conducted various studies into the needs of low-income families and pensioners. This research stimulated further interest into the issue of poverty.<sup>68</sup>

### 3. Religious Inspired Activism of Christian Movements Organisations

---

In Chapter 2, I discussed Fogel's work concerning the links between the Great Awakening and social change. Although his model is a useful discussion point, its applicability to Australia is limited in that there is insufficient research linking Australian social and political change specifically to the Great Awakenings. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw similarities between the two nations and the Great Awakenings. For example, the adoption of benevolence in the Revival Phase of the Second Great Awakening may have inspired churches to act as welfare providers. The development of the welfare state in America during the Third Great Awakening may resonate with similar changes in Australia. Despite the fact that these connections are not yet transparent, in examining religious organisations it is possible to see them more clearly.

The Political Phase of the Second Great Awakening (1840–1870) saw the practice of charity augmented with a focus upon social reform. It may not be clear whether similar changes occurred in Australia, however, there were some organisations such as the *Women's Christian Temperance Union* who moved from a position of philanthropy to lobby States to prevent alcohol abuse. Such organisations formed the belief that vices, such as alcoholism were the root of poverty; in effect, social purity and temperance would combat poverty more effectively than charity.<sup>69</sup> This designed a shift in Christian organisations' strategies when addressing welfare issues. Whilst not denying charity, the Government increasingly encouraged personal morality in public policy.

---

<sup>65</sup>Mendes, Philip, and NetLibrary Inc. *Australia's Welfare Wars: The Players, the Politics and the Ideologies*. Sydney: UNSW Press, 2003. 14.

<sup>66</sup>Date supplied in a telephone conversation with Mr. David Patterson, Centrelink, Woodridge, Telephone: 3884-9014 on 4th January, 2002.

<sup>67</sup>Mendes, Philip, and NetLibrary Inc. *Op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>69</sup>Wearing, Michael, and Rosemary Berreen. *Op. cit.*, 30.

The first subsection of this section discusses the development of Christian movement organisations. The second sub-section discusses the role of churches in the development of trade unions and political parties in Australia. The importance of denominationalism was evident in that differences between the Anglican and Catholic denominations affected the development of Australia's political parties. The effects continued until the demise of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) in the 1970s, taken by most commentators to signal the end of the church's influence in the face of societal secularisation. This concludes discussion of the Church's role in Australian public life until the 1960s, the changing church-state models, and marks the introduction of inter-denominational religiously inspired political activity organisations.

### **3.1 Early Conservative Movement Organisations**

---

By using Fogel's model of the Great Awakenings, I asked if it is possible to note similar developments in conservative Christian movements in Australia. For example, did the formation of organisations in Australia mirror the development of America's Temperance Movement (1840–1870)?

Christian movement organisations established between 1800 and 1920 were predominantly denominationally based, single-issue organisations. Often short-lived, they were conservative in theology and agenda, focussing on a variety of issues, such as alcohol consumption, conscription, desecration of the Sabbath, labour laws, gambling and the moral decline of Australian society. In 1880, Protestants and Anglicans revived a conservative organisation called the *Lord's Day Observance Society*.<sup>70</sup> The driving issue for this organisation was their belief that Sunday was being desecrated by the Sydney museum opening on Sunday and the acceptance of spiritualist and secularist lectures. They were against the library opening on Sundays because it was considered a day of rest for all people.<sup>71</sup> This organisation did not receive cross-denominational support as the Catholics and some other leaders of the Church of England took a more liberal stance on the issue. Thus, the *Society* found little support among the community and politicians. In Melbourne, however, the *Society* was more successful in that the Victorian Parliament voted to close its museum after opening for Sundays on only six occasions.<sup>72</sup> The *Local Option Lodge* later renamed the *Temperance Alliance* was established in 1882.<sup>73</sup> In 1886, Protestant Ministers formed the *Sydney Ministers' Union*, which, having a broader supporter base among Protestant Ministers soon

---

<sup>70</sup>Lord's Day Observance Society began in 1856 but closed in 1860s. Phillips, Walter. Defending a Christian Country: Churchmen and Society in New South Wales in the 1880s and After. University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1981. 175.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 175-182.

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, 178-179

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 271.

supplanted the *Observance Society* which was the main conservative organisation focussed on the Sunday observance.<sup>74</sup>

Another denominationally based conservative organisation that developed in 1889 was the *Council of Churches* when Protestant churchmen united to oppose divorce law reform and to reinforce religious provisions of State education. In 1898, Anglican clergyman in Sydney formed the *Christian Social Union* to study how moral truths and Christian principles could be applied to social and economic difficulties.<sup>75</sup>

Many organisations were connected to transnational movements functioning in the international arena. Lay organisations, such as the *YMCA*, *YWCA*, and the *Salvation Army* emigrated from America. In November 1889, representatives of the main Protestant denominations formed a local branch of the *Evangelical Alliance* founded in Britain in 1846. This organisation consisted of members from Protestant churches in Europe, North America, and the British Isles. According to Walter Phillips, their goal “was to make Christian influence and principles more strongly felt in moulding the public as well as the social life of the community”.<sup>76</sup> The *Women’s Christian Temperance Union* began in Sydney, originally with women from the main Protestant denominations.<sup>77</sup> These organisations were similar to temperance organisations that had been effective in America during this period.

Denominational differences resulted in the development of organisations when, following the establishment of brewing companies in Australia, the level of alcohol consumption dramatically increased. While the Catholic clergy responded with sermons and exhortations on the subject, the Protestants turned to social and political organisations, creating the *International Order of Good Templars* in 1882. Also concerned with the issue, other Anglicans formed The *Local Option League*, later named the *Temperance Alliance* in the same year.<sup>78</sup>

In 1901, the Presbyterians founded an organisation called the *Australian Protestant Defence Association*. The purpose of the organisation was to counteract the Catholic political influence of people like J. T. Toohey, W. P. Crick, and E. W. O’Sullivan who were members in the Upper House of

---

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, 182-187

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, 75.

<sup>77</sup>Thompson, Roger C. *Religion in Australia : A History*. Oxford University Press, 1994. 45.

<sup>78</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 147.

New South Wales and Catholic publicans. *The Protestant Defence Association's* primary focus was promoting an anti-drinking campaign. Within two years of its inauguration it had 22 000 members in New South Wales. It later went on to have branches in four states.<sup>79</sup>

During the New South Wales State elections held in 1901, candidates supporting temperance issues were fielded. However, organisations such as the *Licensed Victuallers Association (ULVA)* and the *Restaurant Employees Association* also endorsed candidates from each party. When the government was re-elected and the *ULVA* sponsored candidates appeared to be in the majority, Protestant church leaders were forced to reassess their tactics. In 1907, as well as the *Liquor Act of New South Wales*, electors were given the opportunity through a local option poll to vote on reducing the number of liquor licences, this included introducing six o'clock closing for hotels to curb excessive drinking. The poll was successful. The number of licences reduced to 65 and the hotel closing hours changed. These developments introduced at the beginning of the Great War in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania were seen as successes of Protestant conservative organisations. It was not until 1942 that the citizens of New South Wales were asked again to consider the question of hotel losing hours. In this referendum, one million voted against extending closing hours and the referendum failed.

In 1954, another referendum was held on the subject of closing hours. Again, conservative Protestant organisations campaigned against a referendum to extend closing hours. This time the referendum was narrowly defeated. The *Victorian Alliance* conceded that the attempt to curb the amount of alcohol consumed by sectors of the population was having no effect. Acknowledging failure of this plan was a major contributing factor to why the liquor trading hours were re-extended.

A major issue for conservative organisations (both Protestant and Catholic) of this era was that of sexual ethics. *The Social Purity Society* fought against the South Australian Government's plan to alter the age of sexual consent to fifteen, demanding that the age remain at sixteen. According to Walter Phillips, this was a "remarkable demonstration of Christian unity, and Parliament capitulated to it".<sup>80</sup>

Fogel's material on the Great Awakenings suggests that the labour reforms in America occurred during the Third Great Awakening. While he does not provide specific information on the

---

<sup>79</sup>*Ibid.*, 140.

<sup>80</sup>Phillips, Walter. *Op. cit.*, 271



involvement of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States, in Australia the Catholic Church was very involved.<sup>81</sup> A maritime strike, publicly supported by Cardinal Moran, the Archbishop of Sydney made headlines. Though his efforts of mediation were unsuccessful, his support brought a level of legitimacy to the labour movement. This was the beginning of a new role - that of mediation between employers and employees.<sup>82</sup> It also determined the style that characterised Catholic pragmatism foundational to the Labor Party.<sup>83</sup>

A Catholic organisation, the *Melbourne Champion Society* was established in 1922. According to Hogan, "In Catholic social philosophy there had long been a strong element of suspicion of unbridled capitalism". The *Melbourne Champion Society*, a lay organisation began presenting an explanation for world affairs through publications and programs to offer an alternative to communism. Bob Santamaria who latter went on to be a very influential Christian voice in this nation was one of its earliest members.<sup>84</sup>

In 1936, Santamaria helped found a magazine called, *Catholic Worker*<sup>85</sup> that promoted papal social justice doctrine. This publication claimed a circulation of 70 000 copies. His first editorial was against communism and capitalism because he viewed both as de-Christianising the world.<sup>86</sup> One year later, Archbishop Mannix with Santamaria formed *Catholic Action* through which Santamaria drafted social justice statements for the Catholic Bishops of Australia for the next fifteen years. In 1938, Santamaria formed the *Catholic Social Studies Movement (CSSM)*, later known as the 'Movement' - a lay association under loose ecclesiastical control. In 1942, the Australian Catholic bishops voted to grant financial aid to the *Movement* when it was placed under a committee of bishops - except in Sydney.<sup>87</sup> Under Santamaria's direction, the organisation opposed the idea that the world could be reformed by individual acts of charity. "Santamaria's goal was the creation of a Christian social order, with changes in social, economic, political and cultural spheres."<sup>88</sup> The *Movement* having the support of the bishops, later became the force behind the group known as the *Industrial Group*, which was dominated by Catholics within the Australian Labor Party. This contrasts to occurrences in the US during the Third Great Awakening.

---

<sup>81</sup>I have been unable to locate any substantial research that links the Roman Catholic Church in either America or Australia to the Four Great Awakenings.

<sup>82</sup>Thompson, Roger C. *Op. cit.*, 45.

<sup>83</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 143.

<sup>84</sup>*Ibid.*, 219.

<sup>85</sup> This publication continued until 1976

<sup>86</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 219.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 245-6.

<sup>88</sup>Thompson, Roger C. *Op. cit.*, 103.

Another social issue that divided denominations was that of conscription. Some of its leading opponents were active Protestants and Methodists. However, just as Protestant churches were divided on the issue of conscription during World War I, so too were the Roman Catholics.<sup>89</sup> It was this issue that saw Protestant leaders leave the Labor Party, resulting in Catholics fulfilling their leadership positions within the Party and Trade Unions.<sup>90</sup> This is discussed further in the next section.

During the 1950s, other issues were fought and lost by churches and conservative organisations. In 1956, the State Labor Government went against the advice of the Protestant churches and legalized poker machines. The Methodist Church protested in vain in 1958 when the Sydney Rugby League conducted matches on Sundays. An important organisation of the 1950s was the Church of England's *Christian Social Order Movement (CSOM)* that was concerned about post-war order in Australia. It called for the Anglican Church to become involved in reforming 'unjust social structures'. According to Hogan, despite publishing a newspaper, having radio programs, study and parish action groups this organisation only appealed to a minority of Anglicans.<sup>91</sup>

From the 1960s, some Protestant leaders began to modify their opinion concerning their role and that of religion in society. Walter Phillips observes that church leadership began to see the church as representing the minority of Australians. Writing on the proposal to change the Sunday entertainment laws, Phillips notes that the Anglican primate said "... the Churches represent only a minority of the population and have no right to enforce their principles upon the majority who do not hold them".<sup>92</sup> This was the beginning of a significant change for some Protestant churches. Religious belief developed into a private motivation, not a public contributor to social change and science, rationality, and modernism were seen as the public collective tools for progress by some churches.

In summary, this section has examined the development of a number of conservative movement organisations. These organisations were predominantly single-issue and denominational. Beginning in the late 1800s, they moved away from moral environmentalism - the belief that charity will resolve social problems - to lobbying Governments to address social problems. It remains to be determined whether changes in Australia exactly parallel the changes of Fogel's Second Great

---

<sup>89</sup>*Ibid.*, 60-62, 103 – 107.

<sup>90</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 140, 176-179.

<sup>91</sup>*Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>92</sup>Phillips, Walter. *Op. cit.*, 198, 272-273

Awakening in America; whether they were a result of theological changes that occurred overseas; or whether something unique happening within the Australian religious community. However, as this section has sought to show, there were some parallels such as the development of welfare providers and the shift of emphasis by religious organisations from given charity to seeking government intervention to deal with issues such as poverty and excessive alcohol use.

Catholic organisations addressed social issues and spoke against communism and capitalism. These organisations believed that individual acts of charity could not reform society and that all spheres of society, including the political demanded transformation. While based upon a traditional denomination, these organisations' agendas were socially progressive. This raises a question about the framework that should be applied to this type of organisation.

Religious countermovement organisations formed when denominations found themselves on different sides of issues, such as alcohol consumption and hotel closing hours. These differences had long lasting effects on trade unions and the development of political parties (discussed next).

This next section discusses denominational differences among the major denominations by investigating the development of trade unions and the major Australian political parties. It is through these developments that it is possible to observe different social attitudes and beliefs between members of the same denomination; these differences between leadership and laity have continued. In part, this may account for the development of a new style of RIPA that is discussed in the following chapter.

### **3.2 Denominational Differences and the Development of Trade Unions and Political Parties**

---

Research by both Michael Hogan and Roger Thompson establishes the connection between the major Christian denominations and the development of trade unions. By the mid 19<sup>th</sup> Century in Australia, the main Christian denominations - especially Anglicans and Catholics were well established. Hogan writes that at this time they had considerable political power in the metropolitan centres, especially the Anglican clergy in Sydney, Melbourne, Hobart, and Adelaide. This relationship highlights differences between the denominations' public roles, as well as differences between religious leaders and the laity's social attitudes and beliefs.<sup>93</sup> For example, the Protestant clergy preached a gospel of hard work, thrift, social order, and obedience to authority

---

<sup>93</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 143.

while lay leaders brought a different Protestant gospel to trade unions. Their message was one of individual worth, personal contribution to society and high private moral standards. This is where the origins of the Labor Party adopted its strand of moralism, personal mission, and self-improvement. Furthermore, many of the Labor leaders were principled ‘teetotalers’ from overtly religious traditions of social reform. Originally, moralistic Protestants influenced the Labor Party; then the Catholic influence, a strong force dominated later.<sup>94</sup>

The temperance issue of the previous section had implications in the development of the major political parties and accentuated differences between the major denominations. As Catholic support for the Labor Party grew, Protestant policy endorsed the opposition, Liberal Party and the Reform Party.<sup>95</sup> Separate endorsement by the *Temperance Alliance* (discussed earlier) also favoured the Liberals. Protestant organisations were actively involved in the pre-selection of candidates within the Liberal and Reform Party in NSW in the 1904 elections. The outcome of this successful infiltration was that Protestants deepened their influence in the Liberal Party’s membership and agenda, whereas the Catholic *Licensed Victuallers Association (ULVA)* endorsed candidates for the Progressive Party and Labor. The Liberals won. For the next fifty years, Catholics predominantly supported the Labor Party whilst Protestants supported the anti-Labor parties.

Other issues contributed to the polarization between denominations and their connections to different political parties. In 1901, the *Catholic Press* and *Freeman’s Journal* recognised that Catholic interests lay with the Labor Party. Hogan states that Catholic lay people embraced trade unions and the Labor Party because they themselves were working class, taking leadership positions because of the resignation or expulsion of Protestant leaders and members<sup>96</sup> of the Labor Party.<sup>97</sup> By 1905, both leadership and laity supported the Labor Party as Catholics held powerful positions in the local branch structure of the Party.<sup>98</sup>

As mentioned in the previous section, the *Movement’s* foray into politics in the 1930s included sponsoring official ALP candidates and worked towards having Labor candidates elected in unions - thus defeating the communists. “The Labor Party, Industrial Groups, and the Movement provided a crucial organisational framework by borrowing the communist method of forming cell groups which

---

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, 136-138.

<sup>95</sup>Wearing, Michael, and Rosemary Berreen. *Op. cit.*, 151.

<sup>96</sup>Reasons for this were discussed earlier in this chapter.

<sup>97</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 140, 176-179.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, 143.

had regular meetings to plan strategies for union meetings and elections. Seeking to influence ballots for party candidates the CSSM and the Industrial Group, encouraged Catholics to become branch members of the Labor party.”<sup>99</sup>

The *New Guard* and the *All for Australia League* were founded in the 1930s in opposition to the Lang Government. Attempts were made in 1925 and 1937 to launch a religious political party known as the Protestant Labour Party in New South Wales and Queensland failed. During the 1931 elections, both the Nationalists and the UPA Party used moral and religious themes in their political propaganda. Advertisements appeared with slogans such as “Vote for the safe party, the Home party, the solid man who believes in Religion, Christian Marriage, Christian ideals and Christian Morality”.<sup>100</sup> It seems that the appeal to the so-called ‘Christian vote’ was a practice established in the early 1900s.

This last section highlights how the different political opinions of two major denominations illustrates that denominations have never been cohesive in social attitudes and beliefs between leaders and laity and laity and laity. This issue is re-examined in the following chapter as it raises a number of questions regarding the reliability of analysing voter behaviour by denominational affiliation. It may also provide the reason for the development of a new style of RIPA organisation discussed in the following chapter.

#### **4. Summary**

---

This chapter has sought to address a number of questions regarding Church-State accommodation, the evolution of the Christian religion and the creation of RIPA organisations in Australia.

In relation to questions of accommodation, and church-state models, it is interesting to note that during the period that Australia was a penal colony, the governors had responsibility for religious observance and practice; however, this practice was short-lived. *S116 of the Constitution* reflected existing practices rather than amending Church-State accommodation. Government funding was crucial to the development of churches and supporting their role as educational and welfare providers. Likewise, this support assisted the establishment of Australia’s religious pluralism.

---

<sup>99</sup>Thompson, Roger C. *Op. cit.*, 103.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, 72.

In comparing the Constitutions of American and Australia it is noteworthy for this thesis that although *America's Constitution*<sup>101</sup> has a similar section to Australia's *S116*, the application of the *Constitution* coupled with *America's Bill of Rights* and strong civic religion is in contrast to Australia. These differences are discussed further in Chapter 6.

The Church of England's failure to become the State church as in England lends weight to Monsma and Soper's claim that a new form of Church-State accommodation was established. The three models that best define Church-State relations in Australia until the 1960s are: the Establishment Model, Plural Establishment Model, and Liberal Separationist Model. Pragmatic pluralism, which best defines Church-State relations after the 1970s, is discussed in the next chapter. In contrast to Great Britain's officially established church, Australia quickly moved from the Establishment Phase to religious pluralism. The liberal separationist model is attested by the withdrawal of financial and other support from churches and church schools; it is also reflected in the wording of the *Australian Constitution*. According to Soper and Monsma, "(a) basic goal of a liberal, pluralist polity is to ensure freedom of religion while maintaining neutrality in dealing with all faiths, and religious and non-religious world perspectives."<sup>102</sup> The withdrawal of aid and later the re-establishment of aid for religious schools of all faiths in Australia reflect this approach. In summary, Australia contrasts America's strict adoption of Church-State separation and in doing so is discriminatory in some of its practices.

A major aspect affecting the Church's role in Australian public life up to and including the 1960s was that of sectarian divide. In many ways, this hindered co-operative action between Protestant and Catholics. If this supports Hunter's culture war theory that argues these differences are becoming more pronounced, then sectarian divisions should become more of a powerful issue. It would also be expected that countermovement organisations would also increase. This was not however the case.

In discussing the different social messages of the Protestant clergy and lay leaders, I have sought to question the concept of church cohesion and raise questions of whether these differences affected

---

<sup>101</sup>I am referring to the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment that reads in part "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion" and the Free Exercise Clause "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". Taken together this is known as the Religion Clause. "Introduction to the Establishment Clause". [University of Missouri-Kansas City](http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/estabinto.htm). 21 Dec. 2008. <<http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/estabinto.htm>>.

<sup>102</sup>Soper J, Christopher, Stephen V Monsma. "Church and State: Two Models." *Policy Studies Review* 14.1/2, 1995. 205.

the development of RIPA organisations. This question will be discussed further in the following chapter.

Fogel argues that the victor of the split between Conservatives and Modernists in the Third Great Awakening was the Modernists and the Social Gospellers who lay the basis for the welfare state, providing both the ideological foundation and political drive. This led to labour reforms, civil right reforms, and new feminist programs. I have suggested that there are parallels between religious themes that occurred in Australia during the Second and Third Great Awakenings.<sup>103</sup> However, further research in the Australian context is essential.

The 1970s is recognised as a time of social change in many western nations, including Australia. The next chapter continues Australia's story from this period and focuses on Church-State accommodation and RIPA organisations. It also discusses the effects of the liberalisation of theological teachings in relation to churches role in public life.

---

<sup>103</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*

## Chapter 5: Times of Change: Challenges for Churches and Christianity in Australia from 1970

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>1. 1970s: The Shift to Pragmatic Pluralism</b>	<b>97</b>
1.1 Changing Patterns of Educational and Welfare Service Provision: Australia - post 1970	98
<b>2. Social Change and Christianity in Australia after 1970</b>	<b>104</b>
2.1 The Demographics of Religious Affiliation - post 1970	105
2.2 Legislating for Tolerance: the Unanticipated Impact on Christian Identity	107
2.3 Religious Political Parties	112
<b>3. Theological Dimensions of Change: The End of the Third and Beginning of the Fourth Great Awakening</b>	<b>116</b>
3.1 Liberal Theology in Australia - post 1970	117
3.2 Reactions to Liberal Theology: Issues that Divide	118
3.3 Leadership and Laity: Differences of Opinion	122
<b>4. RIPA in Australia from 1970</b>	<b>125</b>



## Introduction

---

The 1970s saw a different era in Church-State relations in Australia. In Stephen Monsma and Christopher Soper's terms, the 1970s ushered in the era of pragmatic pluralism.

The reinstatement of financial aid to non-Government schools that began in the late 1960s set the precedent for extending financial support to any non-Government organisation providing a public service. This trend accelerated with the Governments outsourcing increasing from the 1970s. Section 1 continues the story of the Church's role in education and welfare provision. This is a continuation of the discussion concerning the practical aspects of the relationship between the Church and State as well as the Church continued involvement in social and political issues that began in the previous chapter. This information becomes the basis for a discussion concerning the contrast between Church-State accommodations (including the changing models adopted in Australia) between America and Australia based upon Constitutional interpretations. This thesis suggests that these differences (Church-State accommodation and Constitutional interpretation) influence the operation of RIPA organisations in Australia because Christian ideals are not as salient in either political or constitutional discourse as they are in the US. Section 1.1.1 examines changes to the Government's approach to education in independent schools from the 1970s. Section 1.1.2 discusses expansion of welfare services delivered by religiously based organisations.

Pragmatic pluralism in Australia adopted a new dimension as the century progressed. The immigration of non-Christians meant that policy had to address religious and racial division - not just sectarian division. Section 2 considers how immigration has changed the demographics of religion. Ethnic and racial diversity has raised questions about acceptable multiculturalism, in particular how anti-vilification laws have affected the preaching and practices of religious groups. The general expansion of Governmental power and responsibility for public statements and conduct influences religious activism in Australia. Pragmatic pluralism creates a framework from which all religious activism must operate. Legislation, such as anti-discrimination legislation is one part of a myriad that influences the operation of Christian churches, organisations and those of other faiths in the public arena. Section 2.3 discusses the development of the two religious political parties, the Australian Christian Democrats, and quasi-religious party, the Family First Party.

In Section 3, I highlight internal changes within Christian churches in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There were two notable trends; the first was the rise of liberal theology in mainstream Protestant

churches. Walter Phillips notes that in Australia “... the principal Protestant denominations relinquished the legacy of the 1880s during the 1960s, and adopted a different stance toward society”.<sup>1</sup> The full effects of these changes became evident after the 1970s. The second was the rise of newer denominations. Fogel notes that from 1970, membership of mainline Protestant churches in America declined by twenty-five per cent; whilst newer denominations or ‘enthusiastic churches’ nearly doubled.<sup>2</sup> This also appears to have happened in Australia.

The last section provides an overview of the developments of RIPA organisations in Australia from 1970. While no organisation has been as prominent as the US’s *Moral Majority*, a number of new RIPA organisations have developed in Australia since the early 1970s. These organisations were initially single-issue organisations that were largely denomination based. Many of these original organisations still exist; however, they have been augmented with a recent style of organisation that I identify as supra denominational because of their cross-denominational appeal. These organisations have adopted a ‘family values’ ideology as their preferred mode of self-identity.

## **1. 1970s: The Shift to Pragmatic Pluralism**

---

The 1970s proved to be a time of social and political change in western nations, including Australia. As defined by Fogel, this was the end of the Third Great Awakening that overlapped with the beginning of the Fourth. He writes that the Religious Phase of the Fourth Great Awakening (1960–1990) saw church membership in America grow across some denominations. However, from the mid 1960s, the ‘enthusiastic’ religions have grown the fastest. It is these churches that have led the Revival Phase of the Fourth Great Awakening.

Fogel argues that modernist liberal theology came to prominence in the 1960s: the crossover between the Third and Fourth Awakenings. Liberal theology continued to incorporate modernism into the Social Gospel Agenda of the Third Great Awakening. In Australia, by the mid 1960s, as the ‘Baby Boomer Generation’ reached adulthood, a newly trained generation of clergy with modernist theology and a social justice agenda attended to their congregations and were not well received. Many disgruntled members of the Protestant churches migrated to newer ‘enthusiastic’ churches. This reaction formed the basis for the non-modernist, fundamentalist direction of the Fourth Great Awakening.

---

<sup>1</sup>Walter Phillips. *Op. cit.*, 273.

<sup>2</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 25. These enthusiastic churches included Pentecostals, Adventist, Mormons, and Neo-fundamentalists.

According to James Hunter, post 1980s alignment of religious ideological forces in the US caused a dramatic re-alignment in American politics, which he deems a “culture war”.<sup>3</sup> This has created two distinctive poles in American politics defined by ideological worldview. Hunter provides a simple yet useful definition of these differences of this polarity, as the impulse toward orthodoxy or progressivism.<sup>4</sup> Those inclined toward the former believe that morality and politics are definable, unchanging, external, and transcendent as explained by revelations found in the Bible. The later believe that morality and politics should be informed by fact and experience; that morality is subject to the times and the only ultimate truth we can know is that we define for ourselves. How significant these polarities of ideological worldviews are in the Australian context is discussed throughout this chapter.

### **1.1 Changing Patterns of Educational and Welfare Service Provision: Australia - post 1970**

---

Pragmatic pluralism emerged as a reconciliation of Catholic-Protestant differences. Once in place, its principles of support for organisations disregarding their religious origins meant that Government funding for any Independent school was possible.<sup>5</sup> After twenty-three years as the Opposition, the Federal Labor Party was elected to govern in December 1972. Its successful campaign consisted of wooing the Catholic vote and promising Government funding for church schools among other things. Government funding to non-government schools was challenged under Section 116 of the *Constitution* in the High Court. The decision made by the Court was significantly different to the way the issue was adjudicated in the US. Details of this are discussed below.

The second subsection addresses the Church’s continuing role as welfare service provider. Mainstream churches with their social justice agenda have become involved in welfare provision. For some religious organisations, this has created opportunities to influence the community. As the Government’s funding of non-Government schools reflects pragmatic pluralism, so too does the funding available to organisations, including non-Christian groups that provide welfare services.

---

<sup>3</sup>The definition of Hunter’s, ‘cultural war’ is the “... political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding. The end of which these hostilities tend is the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all others.” Hunter, James Davison. *Op. cit.*, 42.

<sup>4</sup>This includes a range of issues, such as abortion, gun control, and taxes.

<sup>5</sup>The focus is upon Federal funding rather than the States’ because, according to the Centre of Independent Studies, the State Governments allocate the majority of their funding to public schools, while the Federal Government’s funding is weighted towards the non-Government sector. Issue Analysis 17. Centre for Independent Studies. Peter Saunders. 26 March 2007. <<http://www.cis.org.au/IssueAnalysis/ia17/ia17.pdf>>.

### 1.1.1 Education

Government recognition of churches as education providers grew after 1970. In 1964, there was limited funding of non-Government schools; however, from 1970 larger amounts were available.<sup>6</sup> Following the Federal Labor Party's return to power in the 1972 elections, funding capital grants were allocated to Catholic schools.<sup>7</sup> Facing a hostile Senate, the final legislation<sup>8</sup> resulted in victory for all religious-based schools. Approximately eighty per cent of Catholic schools' funding needs were given from Government funds, while those considered financially able received thirty-three per cent. All private schools were able to apply for capital grants to refurbish or extend their schools.

In a case before the High Court of Australia in 1981, the Government's aid to non-Government schools was challenged. Critics argued that funding violated S116 of the Constitution because it assisted in establishing religion. (S116 was discussed in Chapter 4, sub section 1.2.) In this case, Chief Justice Garfield Barwick and Justice Harry Gibbs interpreted *Section 116* to mean that the Commonwealth Parliament could not make a law that would give any particular religion the position of State Church. The plaintiff attempted to use the US Supreme Court's rendering of the *First Amendment's 'No Establishment' Clause*, was rejected by the Australian High Court based on the "radically different language in our Constitution". Justice Barwick also stated that the *Australian Constitution* prohibits Parliament from passing laws that formally establish religion, but it does not prohibit any law that may assist the practice of religion.<sup>9</sup> Government funding for non-State schools has expanded since then. Another significant change for Independent schools occurred in 1997 when the Federal Government removed restrictions constraining them from opening in close proximity to existing Government schools.<sup>10</sup>

The issue of Government funding for non-Government schools once again appeared as an issue in the 2001 and 2004 Federal elections.<sup>11</sup> *The States' Grants Legislation Amendment 2004*<sup>12</sup> for Primary and Secondary Education assistance was introduced at a Federal level and was enacted after the 2004

---

<sup>6</sup>"Australian schools: participation and funding 1901 to 2000." Australian Bureau of Statistics. 21 Sept. 2007, <<http://www.abs.gov.au/Ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/A75909A2108CECAACA2569DE002539FB?Open>>.

<sup>7</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 102.

<sup>8</sup>Federal - States Grants (Schools) Act 1973.

<sup>9</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 102, 03.

<sup>10</sup>The Federal Labor Government's 1985 New Schools Policy restricted this growth. It was abolished in 1997. Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 104.

<sup>11</sup>"Australian Politics". Malcolm Farnsworth. 21 Sept. 2007, <<http://www.australianpolitics.com>>.

<sup>12</sup>"Australian Government Programmes for Schools Quadrennial Administrative Guidelines 2005 – 2008." Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations. 21 Sept. 2007, <[http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/C9EA75DE-EAAE-4CB2-B79E-B5D20D78C6BE/13155/AdminGuidelines2005\\_2008.pdf](http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/C9EA75DE-EAAE-4CB2-B79E-B5D20D78C6BE/13155/AdminGuidelines2005_2008.pdf)>.

election. This legislation provided future funding of non-Government schools during the period from 2005 to 2008. Part of this funding known as *Investing in Our Schools Programme* enabled schools to complete critical infrastructure projects - \$300 million of which was allocated to non-Government schools.<sup>13</sup>

With Government assistance, the number of church-based schools grew.<sup>14</sup> In 1996, Independent schools, excluding Catholic schools totalled 848; by the year 2000, this had increased to 939 and one year later, 957.<sup>15</sup> As of May 2006, there are 2 500 Independent and Catholic schools with approximately 1.1 million students.<sup>16</sup> In August 2007, *The Australian Bureau of Statistics* reported that there were 2 728 non-Government schools making up 28.5 per cent of the schools in Australia. In examining a ten year period from 1997 to 2007, the number of students attending Government schools full-time grew by 1.7 per cent whilst the number attending non-Government schools increased by 21.9 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

The Government's religious pluralist approach has seen other faith schools receive assistance. Of the *Investing in Our Schools Programme*, eight Islamic schools received funding for infrastructure projects.<sup>18</sup> According to the *Australian Federation of Islamic Councils*, there are twenty-three Islamic schools in Australia.<sup>19</sup> More than 12 800 students attend these schools, which receive about \$100 million annually in Commonwealth and State funding.<sup>20</sup>

In 1976, the NSW Supreme Court ruled that prayers, Bible readings, hymns and Grace before public school meals were consistent with the provision of general religious teaching.<sup>21</sup> This is challenged more frequently as Australia becomes more religiously pluralistic. Only four years after this ruling,

---

<sup>13</sup>"States' Grants (Primary and Secondary Education Assistance) Legislation Amendment Bill 2004." Australian Parliament. 21 Sept. 2007, <[http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view\\_document.aspx?id=4852&table=BILLSDGS](http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au/piweb/view_document.aspx?id=4852&table=BILLSDGS)>.

<sup>14</sup>"Globalization and Religion." Christian Research Association. 26 March 2002. <<http://www.cra.org.au>>.

<sup>15</sup>"About Independent Schools." National Council of Independent Schools Association. 27 May 2002, <<http://www.ncisa.edu.au>>.

<sup>16</sup>"Mundine calls for tax breaks for private school parents." The Australian. (May 05, 2006). 12 June 2006.

<sup>17</sup>"4221.0 - Schools, Australia, 2007." Australian Bureau of Statistics. 23 Sept. 2007. <[http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4221.0Main%20Features22007?](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4221.0Main%20Features22007?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4221.0&issue=2007&num=&view=>)

[opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4221.0&issue=2007&num=&view=>](http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4221.0Main%20Features22007?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4221.0&issue=2007&num=&view=>)

<sup>18</sup>"Funding & grants for schools." Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations. 15 Sept. 2007.

<[http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/school\\_education/programmes\\_funding/general\\_funding/capital\\_grants/iios/2005\\_approved\\_grants\\_nongov.htm](http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/school_education/programmes_funding/general_funding/capital_grants/iios/2005_approved_grants_nongov.htm)>.

<sup>19</sup>"Islamic College of Brisbane." Australian Federation of Islamic Councils. 21 Sept. 2007.

<<http://www.afic.com.au/smqld.htm>>.

<sup>20</sup>"Government Funding of Islamic Schools." Crossfire Ministries. 1 May 2004. <<http://www.vox.1earth.net/crossfire/index.html>>.

<sup>21</sup>General Religious Teaching – the principal was discussed in the previous chapter. It was believed that there was a consensual religious belief that could be incorporated into public schools, thus the basis for a common social morality.

the *NSW Minister of Education's Report on Special Religious Instruction (SRI) programs* recommended, "schools should broaden the criteria for determining religious groups' eligibility for access to schools to include 'all groups which are widely recognized by the community as having essentially the character of a religion".<sup>22</sup>

In October 2006, the Federal Government announced a new funding program for schools called the *National School Chaplaincy Program*. This is a voluntary program to assist school communities to "support the spiritual well-being of their students, including strengthening values, provide great pastoral care ..." The program provides annual support of up to \$20 000 for all Government and non-Government school communities that wish to establish a chaplaincy service. The chaplains' role is to provide general religious and personal advice, comfort, and support to both students and staff - irrespective of their religious beliefs and denomination. "Following broad consultation", the local school community chooses the chaplaincy service.<sup>23</sup> With the recent change of Federal Government, the new (Labor) Federal Minister of Education, Julia Gillard has announced that this program should be secular in nature. What this means for the program and schools involved is yet to be determined.

All non-Government schools are required to follow guidelines set by respective State Governments. In New South Wales each school must have an educational program comprising of study based on and taught in accordance with the outcomes of the *Board of Studies Syllabuses* for the six key learning areas (KLAs) of primary education:

- English
- Mathematics
- Science and Technology
- Human Society and Its Environment
- Creative Arts and
- Personal Development, Health, and Physical Education.<sup>24</sup>

However, should a non-Government school consider some of the outcomes incompatible with its religious ideals they may seek the Board's approval to modify outcomes for part of the syllabus.

---

<sup>22</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 110.

<sup>23</sup>"National School Chaplaincy Program." Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations. 19 Oct. 2007. <[http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/school\\_education/policy\\_initiatives\\_reviews/key\\_issues/school\\_chaplaincy\\_programme/#Background](http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/school_education/policy_initiatives_reviews/key_issues/school_chaplaincy_programme/#Background)>.

<sup>24</sup>"Curriculum." New South Wales Gov. 15 May 2007. <<http://rego.boardofstudies.nsw.edu.au/go/faq/curriculum>>.

The Rudd Federal Government has constructed a *National Curriculum Board* to develop a “highly rigorous curriculum” in the four key subject areas of English, History, Maths, and Science by 2011. Other subject areas to be considered are Geography and the Languages. The newly appointed head of this Board, Professor Barry McGraw reportedly said in the *West Australian* (newspaper) on 25 February 2008, he believed the rapid growth of religious schools threatened the social cohesion of the nation. According to the Australian Christian Democratic Party (CDP), this may mean that the current practice of teaching both creationism and evolution in science may no longer be possible. While the new Federal Labor Government has vowed not to amend funding arrangements until one year after the implementation of the new curriculum, the Christian Democrats are concerned that should Christian schools not been seen to cooperate with this new curriculum their funding will be restricted.<sup>25</sup> Currently, issues concerning school curriculum are not addressed by RIPA organisations in Australia; however, if the CDP’s suggested changes occur, it may become a platform in the future. In the unlikely event that this becomes an issue, it would be interesting to see what the High Court would do given its decision in 1981.

Monsma and Soper note that although pragmatic considerations have structured the State’s resolution on Church-State issues, practical solutions to these problems have changed over time.<sup>26</sup> The Government appears to be taking a position of ‘reasonable tolerance’ with faith-based education. While the original intent of State aid may have been to ‘save’, the Catholic School system, a consequence has been the proliferation of non-Catholic religiously based schools. The extension of Government aid to non-Christian religious schools and the opening of Government schools to religious instructions by other faiths challenge the ascendancy of Christianity in Australia, reflecting the expanding pluralistic model of church-state relations. The High Court of Australia’s deliberations on S116 of the Constitution and the provision of government funding to non-government schools confirms that the strict separationist model of the US is not the prevailing interpretation of the Australian Constitution.

### **1.1.2 Welfare**

By the close of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, responsibility for many social services was reinstated to religious organisations. This gave mainstream churches the opportunity to extend their social justice agenda through social welfare programs. With the assistance of Federal Government funding, *Mission Employment*, *Centacare Employment*, and *Employment Plus* worked with *Centrelink* to provide

---

<sup>25</sup>“Impact of New Governments policies on non-Government Schools.” Christian Democratic Party. 3 March 2008. <[http://www.cdpwa.org.au/stories.php?content\\_id=25](http://www.cdpwa.org.au/stories.php?content_id=25)>

<sup>26</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. Opt. cit., 87.

unemployment services. Entirely Government funded, the organisations' profits finance their community outreach programs such as, soup kitchens and drop in centres. *The McClure Report*<sup>27</sup> has had major influence on the style and outcomes of service for the unemployed.

Recently, the number of Government-funded programs delivered by religious organisations has increased. *Reconnect*<sup>28</sup> was established with Federal Government funding in 1997: a family mediation organisation, it works with *Centrelink* to establish the needs of young people who have left home with little or no support. Their services include finding young people accommodation, employment and/or education, as well as mediation with parents and other family members. While not directly stating that they are a Christian-based organisation, many of their ninety services are operated from church premises across Australia.

In May 2005, the Federal Government announced a package of family law reform as part of the *2005-06 Budget*. An additional \$400 million over four years was allocated to the establishment of sixty-five family relationship centres, plus an Advice Hotline and website. *The 2006-07 Budget* saw an additional allocation of \$45.8 million over four years to increase the capacity of the relationship centres and advice line. Rather than depending on the Family Court, the centres and hotline are designed to be a first port of call for families seeking help or experiencing separation.<sup>29</sup> Organisations such as, *Catholic Welfare Australia* through their *Centacare* agencies are establishing Family Relationship Centres to provide this community service.<sup>30</sup> Many other Christian organisations, such as *Anglicare* and *UnitingCare* are providers of the new *Children's Contact Services* and *Early Intervention Services*, as well as the *Family Relationship Centres*.<sup>31</sup>

Although religious organisations have benefited from funding, like other Government-funded organisations they remain under regulatory control. Monsma and Soper write that from the 1960s "(t)he Christian values base and the link between agencies and the local church of many existing religious agencies eroded during the next several decades as organizations hired more professional

---

<sup>27</sup>This was compiled by Patrick McClure, Chief Executive Officer for Mission Australia.

<sup>28</sup>"Reconnect supports young people who are homeless and those at risk of homelessness, to become more involved with their family, work, education, training, and the community." *Reconnect*. 7 Feb. 2008. <<http://www.reconnect.org.au/content.cfm?area=1>>.

<sup>29</sup>"Family Relationship Services Overview of Programs." *Australian Government: Attorney-General's Department*. 19 Feb. 2008. <[http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Families\\_FamilyRelationshipServicesOverviewofPrograms](http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Families_FamilyRelationshipServicesOverviewofPrograms)>.

<sup>30</sup>"Family Relationship Centres." *Catholic Social Services of Australia*. 24 Jan. 2008. <[http://www.centacare.com.au/media/Family\\_Relationship\\_Centres.pdf](http://www.centacare.com.au/media/Family_Relationship_Centres.pdf)>.

<sup>31</sup>"Family Relationship Service Providers." *Australian Government: Attorney-General's Department*. 4 April 2008. <<http://www.familyrelationships.gov.au/Media+Release+4+April+-+Announcement.pdf>>.



social workers and complied with the Commonwealth's welfare priorities."<sup>32</sup> In my limited investigation of *Mission Employment*, I noted a shift from employment of Christians only, to employment of other faiths or those with no religious affiliation - a result of compliance with Government regulation, including anti-discrimination legislation.

The Government's pragmatic approach to welfare provision provokes conflict when the religious organisation is expected to provide services that contrast the Church's teachings. In March 2006, the Federal Government announced a new Medicare payment for pregnancy support counselling provided by general practitioners or other referred health professionals. Worth over \$60 million, the package included funding for a *National Pregnancy Support Telephone Hotline* to provide professional, non-directive advice twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.<sup>33</sup> The then Minister of Health, Tony Abbot reportedly said that he was supportive of church groups tendering for the running of the Hotline service.<sup>34</sup>

Pragmatic pluralism emerged in the 1970s as a political response to the anomalous situation of education funding. The inclusion of non-Christian groups has shifted the scope of the framework and raised issues about public responsibility for the integrity of curriculum and education across the system whilst different problems arise in the welfare sector. Here, public policy standards can directly contrast religious doctrine, forcing church-based agencies into conflict with public funding authorities. In both areas, these issues draw Christian activists into public debate within the confines of the pragmatic pluralist church-state relations. Their religious values are not merely a matter of private choice, but are now part of the public policy process.

## **2. Social Change and Christianity in Australia after 1970**

---

In this section, I consider the social changes that are testing the limits of pragmatic pluralism in Australia. I will now discuss the impact of immigration on the demographics of religious affiliation in Australia. Although the proportion of the population declaring affiliation with a religious organisation is, in most instances, falling, these external changes combine with important internal shifts to change the landscape of Christian church affiliation and strength. The Catholic Church and

---

<sup>32</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 111.

<sup>33</sup>"National Pregnancy Support Telephone Hotline." *Australian Government: Department of Health and Aging*. 10 April. 2008. <[http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/content/996fdabbcd19efbaca25712500012e26/\\$file/abb024.pdf](http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/content/996fdabbcd19efbaca25712500012e26/$file/abb024.pdf)>.

<sup>34</sup>"Abortion Counselling the choice is yours." *Sydney Morning Herald*. 19 February 2006. <<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/abortion-counselling-the-choice-is-yours/2006/02/19/1140283949270.html>>.

its institutions have seen an 'enthusiastic' revival, while Protestantism experiences a movement from older denominations into newer, more loosely organised 'enthusiastic' denominations-particularly Pentecostal. This is consistent with the changes that occurred in the US during the overlap period of the end of the Third Great Awakening and the beginning of the Fourth.

## **2.1 The Demographics of Religious Affiliation - post 1970**

---

The Australian Bureau of Statistics, in their 2008 Year Book of Australia, note that from 1933 to 1971, religious affiliation in Australia remained relatively stable in the high 80% range. By 1976, this had dropped to below eighty per cent to 78.6 percent; declining a further fourteen percent by the 2006 Census to 63.9%.

Migration has helped reshape the profile of Australia's religious affiliation. Following World War II migration from Europe led to an increase in affiliates of the Orthodox Churches and growth in the number of Catholics - mainly from Italian immigration. More recently, immigration from the Middle East and South-east Asia has expanded Muslim and Buddhist numbers. Non-Christian religions accounted for 5.6 per cent of the total population in the 2006 Census - an increase of 2.1 per cent over a ten-year period from 1996–2006.

As the table below depicts, Christian religious affiliation in Australia is changing. Between 2001 and 2006 Pentecostal affiliation increased by thirteen per cent. Because of immigration from Southeastern Europe, the Orthodox Churches grew by nine per cent. The denominations that experienced notable decreases for the period included the Uniting Church which decreased by 9 per cent, the Salvation Army by 10.1 per cent and Churches of Christ by 10.6 per cent.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup>"2008 Year Book of Australia." The Australian Bureau of Statistics. 22 Sept. 2008. <<http://www.abs.gov.au>>.

## Christian Affiliation<sup>36</sup>

	2001	%	2006	%	Change
Anglican	3 881.2	20.7	3 718.2	18.7	-4.2
Baptist	309.3	1.6	316.7	1.6	2.4
Catholic	5 001.6	26.6	5 126.9	25.8	2.5
Churches of Christ	61.3	0.3	54.8	0.3	-10.6
Jehovah's Witness	81.1	0.4	80.9	0.4	-0.2
Lutheran	250.4	1.3	251.1	1.3	0.3
Orthodox	529.4	2.8	576.9	2.9	9.0
Pentecostal	194.6	1.0	219.7	1.1	12.9
Presbyterian & Reformed	637.5	3.4	596.7	3.0	-6.4
Salvation Army	71.4	0.4	64.2	0.3	-10.1
Uniting Church	248.7	6.7	1 135.4	5.7	-9.1
Other Christian	497.9	2.7	544.3	2.7	9.3

The growth of Pentecostalism is exemplified by the development of a new Pentecostal church, the Christian Outreach Centre (COC).<sup>37</sup> Established in 1970, this church is similar to that of the American Assemblies of God (AOG) - also operating in Australia. The COC is a 'megachurch'<sup>38</sup> - similar in respects and history to the AOG Hillsong Church in Sydney. The COC's main church in Mansfield was birthplace to the *Australian Christian Lobby* (discussed in Chapter 7). Pentecostal churches have also inspired the development of a political party, Family First, as well as the development of other new RIPA organisations in Australia.

Fogel has noted that 33 per cent of the adult population in America are Evangelicals or from 'enthusiastic' religions. In the 1982 election, the votes of these 'enthusiastic religionists' were split between the Democrats and the Republicans. By 1994, only twenty-six per cent voted Democrat, while seventy-four per cent voted Republican. As well as the significant swing to the Republicans, more people from the 'enthusiastic' churches voted, thus increasing their influence.<sup>39</sup> While no

<sup>36</sup>Information from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008-Year Book Australia. A publication by the Australian Bureau of Statistics that is available on their website. 21 Oct. 2008. <<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/1301.02008?OpenDocument>>.

<sup>37</sup>Sam Hay of Griffith University's School of Arts, Nathan Campus is currently completing a PhD on the Christian Outreach Centre Church.

<sup>38</sup>As noted in footnote 77 of Chapter 2, the Victorian Council of Christian Education defines 'megachurch' as having around 2 000 or more worshipers.

<sup>39</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 16.

comparable material is available for Australia, John Black from *Australian Development Strategies* argues that Kevin Rudd won the 2007 Federal election with the aid of swinging Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian voters in key marginal seats, particularly in Queensland.<sup>40</sup>

In Australia, Pentecostalism and other 'enthusiastic' religions provide a base from which the US Christian Right's ideas can resonate through conservative religious and political values. There is a small market among the Christian population for their pamphlets, books and electronic communications. Overall, the demand is minimal because it does not relate to Australian conditions. Having said this, the growth of Pentecostal churches in Australia and the decline of mainstream congregations give the former confidence for the future.

## **2.2     *Legislating for Tolerance: the Unanticipated Impact on Christian Identity***

---

The relaxation of Australia's restricted immigration policy by the Holt government commencing in 1966 resulted among other things in an influx of non-Christian people.

This religious pluralism<sup>41</sup> affected Church-State accommodation. As indicated above (Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2) the Government has extended financial aid to other religious groups so that they can provide welfare and educational services to their communities. According to Monsma and Soper, people of other religious origin, such as Jews, Muslims and Buddhists prefer to access services provided by their own communities. The Government has responded by turning to religious and ethnic organisations as primary service providers to access these target groups. Monsma and Soper believe that indicative of the Government's pragmatic approach that has allowed a diversity of religious organisations to develop.<sup>42</sup>

Pragmatic pluralism has shaped the Government's approach to religion through efforts to regulate tensions between ethnic and religious groups experienced in the implementation of multiculturalism. A number of States have extended legal frameworks for civil conflicts of cultural and religious difference in anti-vilification legislation. This section considers the religious dimensions of this legislation. From a regulatory perspective, the *Federal Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC)* demands discussion as it fulfils the role of addressing issues that arise from

---

<sup>40</sup>"On a swing and a prayer". *The Weekend Australian*. 8 March 2008, 30.

<sup>41</sup>The term religious pluralism was once used to describe different denominations of the Christian religion. Now it encompasses all religions with significant presence in Australia.

<sup>42</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 114.

policy decisions. Legislation designed to protect ethnic and religious difference has itself fuelled religious conflict. This will be discussed in this section.

*HREOC*, established in 1986 is a national independent statutory Government body. It is responsible for inquiring into alleged infringements relating to five anti-discrimination laws - three of which were established prior to the *Commission*.<sup>43</sup> Following September 11, *HREOC* has fulfilled a more active role in faith-based conflict. In 2003, it announced a project to uncover religious discrimination, though it was limited to discrimination against the Islamic faith in NSW and Victoria.<sup>44</sup> In February 2006, *HREOC* issued a press release condemning Liberal MP Danna Vale for saying that Australia could be a Muslim nation in fifty years because Australians are “aborting ourselves almost out of existence”.<sup>45</sup> The result of like comments politicises religion and in the process ignites religious conflict, as well as creating agenda items for RIPA organisations.<sup>46</sup> These new tensions relate to the changes in immigration policies, the extension of religious pluralism and the promotion of diversity and multiculturalism as much as they do about the faiths themselves.

Australia’s cultural and religious diversity has resulted in some Sydney and Melbourne suburbs adopting particular ethnic and religious traditions - but not exclusively. According to the *Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006 Census*, almost 50 per cent of the Hindu and Muslim populations live in Sydney. As different social and religious communities interact, tensions may result: the 2005 Cronulla Riots reflected these tensions. While it is difficult to determine to what degree religion inflamed these riots, it is clear that cultural differences based on religious belief<sup>47</sup> played a role in the conflict. Comments of both Christian and Islamic leaders reported in the media have reinforced these tensions. For example, the editorial titled, *How the dean raised the devil*, reported that the Anglican Dean of Sydney, Phillip Jensen’s installation sermon gave “a full-throated assertion of the unique truth of the Christian religion above all others”. Likewise, in an address given to Muslims in Sydney in the 1990s, Imran Bashir called Australian Muslims to “keep the faith”, stating that he

---

<sup>43</sup>These three laws are the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, the Sex Discrimination Act of 1984, and Infringements under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act of 1986. It also handles complaints regarding the Disability Discrimination Act of 1992 and the Age Discrimination Act of 2004. Human Right and Equal Opportunity Commission. 15 March 2006. <<http://www.hreoc.gov.au>>

<sup>44</sup>“Help uncover discrimination and vilification against Arab and Muslim Australians.” Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. 5 Oct. 2004. <[http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/media/media\\_releases/2003/50\\_03.html](http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/media/media_releases/2003/50_03.html)>

<sup>45</sup>Irresponsible comments draw the religion card. Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. 14 Feb. 2006. <[http://www.hreoc.gov.au/media\\_releases/2006/2\\_06.htm](http://www.hreoc.gov.au/media_releases/2006/2_06.htm)>

<sup>46</sup> This issue and the responses by two RIPA organisations are discussed in Chapters 7 and Eight.

<sup>47</sup>One of the issues highlighted through these riots involved young Muslim men approaching bikini-clad bathers on the beach, telling them that they were inappropriately dressed and threatening them with physical injury if they did not put more clothes on”.

backs conflict and war in defence of his faith and that it is an “abasement” for Muslims to live in a “non-believing nation.” Furthermore, it was the responsibility of “the faithful” to transform Australia into an Islamic State.<sup>48</sup>

This current religious rivalry has resulted in members of different faiths using anti-vilification laws and various tribunals to attack other faiths. In 2002, the Victorian Government enacted the *Racial and Religious Tolerance Act*. Its first test case occurred shortly after, involving *Catch the Fire Ministry* and the *Victorian Islamic Council*. The matter was brought before the newly formed *Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal*. *The Islamic Council* claimed that *Catch the Fire Ministry* vilified their religion during a seminar held in March 2002. The Victorian legislation met a mixed response. Amir Butler, the Executive Director of the *Australian Muslim Public Affairs Committee* spoke against the legislation stating that it threatens social cohesion. Commenting on the case against *Catch the Fire Ministry*, Butler said that trying to silence the Christian group had the opposite effect.<sup>49</sup> Because of the publicity it received, other Christians rushed to the *Ministry’s* defence. Furthermore, he noted that Christians are now monitoring Muslim meetings; he believes this would allow Christians to bring counter charges against Islamic organisations.<sup>50</sup> However, this has not occurred.

It is interesting to note that not all denominational leaders supported the Christian organisation in this case. During the hearing, representatives from the Catholic and Uniting Churches attempted to support the *Islamic Council* against *Catch the Fire Ministry*. While the Uniting Church failed in its bid to be heard at the tribunal, a Catholic priest was able to speak against the two christian pastors.<sup>51</sup> As mentioned above, in Chapters 7 and 8, I discuss the way both RIPA organisations, the Australian Christian Lobby and Salt Shakers have reacted to anti-vilification legislation.

In Queensland, the Government passed an amendment to its existing laws - the *Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 2001*. In November of the same year, the *Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of Queensland* heard a complaint by the Chairman of the *Islamic Council of Queensland* against Mr

---

<sup>48</sup>“How the dean raised the devil.” *The Australian*. 18 April 2003 <[http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story\\_page/0,5744,6143250%255E7583,00.html](http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,6143250%255E7583,00.html)>.

<sup>49</sup>Note: This was originally published in *The Herald Sun*, June 24, 2003. “Victorian Governments Anti-Vilification Laws”. *Australian Federation of Islamic Councils*. 13 Sept. 2004. <<http://www.muslimaffairs.com.au/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=34&POSTNUKESID=70f41cd033858c422b17b4cbc2cfcb01>>.

<sup>50</sup>Email received from Brian Pickering, National Coordinator, and Australian Prayer Network on 14 Sept. 2004.

<sup>51</sup>“CHRISTIANITY is on trial this week in Victoria.” *Salt Shakers*. Salt Shakers e-news. 13 Oct. 2004.

Andrew Lamb, stating that part of his election literature was discriminatory. In handing down his decision, Walter Sofronoff QC found in favour of the defendant.<sup>52</sup>

Research suggests that the notion of religious vilification and regulatory control have only become an issue following the 2001 attack on the New York World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in Washington,<sup>53</sup> which has highlighted differences between Muslim and non-Muslims. According to Steve Edwards, “Many academics, politicians, and journalists (particularly self-styled ‘progressives’) contend that the potential harm done by so-called ‘religious vilification’ or hate speech is great enough to justify legal sanctions against any acts of collective religious defamation or vilification.”<sup>54</sup> In the anti-vilification laws debate, Edwards makes a valid, often overlooked observation: religion and race are deemed the same, when they are not. He argues that religion is a personal choice,<sup>55</sup> while ethnicity is inherited.<sup>56</sup>

Following the controversy surrounding the Victorian legislation, a number of States, including New South Wales, Western Australia, and South Australia have shelved similar legislation.<sup>57</sup> New South Wales has had an anti-vilification law, however, it is limited to vilification on the grounds of race, HIV/AIDS status, or transgender status, and it does not protect people with religious beliefs.<sup>58</sup>

Rather than integration policies, another approach to social difficulties resulting from inclusive policies has been to promote the notion of inclusion itself. The Howard Government, when in power, made March 21 ‘*Harmony Day*’, coinciding with the *United Nations’ International Day of Elimination of Racial Discrimination*. Material produced for this day notes that religious diversity now encompasses Australia and slogans used to promote unity include “values that unite us as Australians” and “You, Me, aUStralian”.<sup>59</sup> The Government’s plan was to build community unity

---

<sup>52</sup>Walter Sofronoff QC stated that although he was of the opinion that the pamphlet did incite serious contempt for Muslims as a whole, as the publication in question was used to inform the voting public of Moreton about Lamb’s views on the subject. The public, in deciding whom to vote for, actually had a right to know these views; that to curtail this would have consequences for all material published for election purposes. [Australasian Legal Information Institute](http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/qld/QADT/2001/20.html?query=%7e+muslim). 20 Aug. 2004. <[www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/qld/QADT/2001/20.html?query=%7e+muslim](http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/qld/QADT/2001/20.html?query=%7e+muslim)>.

<sup>53</sup>Historically speaking this is debatable.

<sup>54</sup>Edwards, Steve. “Do We Really Need Religious Vilification Laws?” *Policy* 21.1 (2005): 30-34.

<sup>55</sup>While I would agree, I would also suggest that for many people borne into a culture also means being born into a religion. Whilst in some countries opportunities do exist to change faiths, in others, this is at the risk of being put to death.

<sup>56</sup>Edwards, Steve. *Op. cit.*, 30-34.

<sup>57</sup>“Religious vilification law undermines multiculturalism.” *The Age*. 30 April 2006. <<http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/religious-vilification-law-undermines-multiculturalism/2006/04/30/1146335604488.html?page=2>>.

<sup>58</sup>“N.S.W. Ant-vilification Laws.” *Macquarie University*. 16 April 2006. <<http://www.pr.mq.edu.au/macnews/showitem.asp?ItemID=433>>.

<sup>59</sup>“Australia is Religiously Diverse.” *Department of Immigration and Citizenship*. 23 June 2006. <[http://www.harmony.gov.au/\\_docs/ReligiouslyDiverseHD.pdf](http://www.harmony.gov.au/_docs/ReligiouslyDiverseHD.pdf)>.

around shared values. Authors Patricia Harris and Vicki Williams suggest that certain social and moral values signify “the Australia way” and that “official appeals to social inclusion are linked with ideas of ‘national identity’ that are themselves a product of the moral imagination.”<sup>60</sup>

Another Government strategy has been to promote interfaith contact between congregations. While Judeo-Christian interfaith meetings and committees are not novel, those between Christians and Muslims are. Perhaps as a response to September 11 and the Government’s encouragement of interfaith meetings self-identified moderate Muslims and liberal Christians now hold seminars, conferences and joint public meetings in which they appear to seek common ground between their faiths. These meetings have created further dissent between Christians who are theologically traditional and their liberal counterparts.

Other Government-instigated strategies to decrease religious tension have been to hold symposiums for Muslims, Christians, and Jews. *The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs* held a symposium in Brisbane in November 2005 titled, *A Symposium on Muslims, Christians, and Jews – what brings us together?*<sup>61</sup> The Howard Federal Government established a Muslim Community Reference Group (now disbanded) to facilitate the sharing of a common future with all Australians, including Muslims.<sup>62</sup> Other initiatives include the development of specific integration programs for schools situated in suburbs with either high migrant population or racially violent behaviour.

In Australia’s religious pluralist society, anti-vilification laws and multiculturalism explore issues of religious practice. In particular, anti-vilification laws involve difficult questions about what a church or preacher can proclaim about the validity of their religion or point of view about other religions. Pentecostal and Charasmatics’ lifeblood is to share their religious beliefs and to challenge others. Though public authorities cannot dispute the rights of people to hold such beliefs in private, the voice of public worship is the point at issue. These cases test the limits of pragmatic pluralism in this country. It is within this environment that RIPA organisations are constrained. In recapping the main argument of this thesis, aside from Australia’s pluralist society, other social/political/legal structures provide the boundaries in which RIPA operates in Australia. These include the

---

<sup>60</sup>Harris, Patricia, Williams, Vicki. "Social Inclusion, National Identity and the Moral Imagination in the Drawing Board." *Australian Review of Public Affairs* 3.3 (2003): 205-07.

<sup>61</sup>"Living in Harmony." *Department of Immigration and Citizenship*. 23 June 2006. <<http://www.immi.gov.au/multicultural/index.htm>>.

<sup>62</sup>"Living in Australia." *Department of Immigration and Citizenship*. 23 June 2006. <<http://www.immi.gov.au/living-in-australia/a-diverse-australia/communities/MCRG/index.htm>>.



Constitution and its application, lack of a strong civic religion and the linking of politics and religion in public discourse as occurs in America.

### **2.3 Religious Political Parties**

---

When comparing Australia to European nations, such as the Netherlands or Poland it is apparent that Australia has no national religious political party; nor have RIPA organisations taken the form of religious political parties similar to the European model. As noted in the previous chapter, in 1925 and 1937, attempts to create Christian political parties failed. Despite the development of one Christian political party in the post 1970s period and another that has been inspired by Christian thought, there are no significant changes, nor successes.

The Christian Democratic Party (CDP), originally known as the Call to Australia Party operates as a minor party in New South Wales. Making its debut in 1981 when Uniting Church Minister Fred Nile<sup>63</sup> was elected to the Legislative Council, the CDP at various times has had two to three of its members elected to the Council. Despite having a small but stable electoral base in New South Wales, particularly in the northwestern suburbs of Sydney, it has not succeeded in appreciably expanding its support.<sup>64</sup> In the 2007 New South Wales elections,<sup>64</sup> the CDP won 2.5 per cent of the vote in the Legislative Assembly, a swing of only 0.07 per cent. In the Legislative Council, they received 4.4 per cent of the vote - an increase of 1.4 per cent on the previous election. They were not successful in winning any additional seats; their current representation remains at two seats.<sup>65</sup>

The Party's platform involves traditional theological perspectives on moral issues,<sup>66</sup> such as homosexuality, pornography, and abortion - recently adding its opposition to same-sex marriages to its platform. The CDP's immigration policy favours the prioritization of minority Christian groups suffering religious persecution. In addition, it favours mandatory detention of illegal immigrants, suggesting that legislation, while not impinging on natural justice should prevent extended stays due to legal battles by "persons who have no entitlement to be in Australia".<sup>67</sup> In many ways, the platform of the CDP reflects those of the early Christian Right organisations in America, such as the

---

<sup>63</sup>Fred Nile was also leader of the Festival of Light.

<sup>64</sup>This information was obtained by telephoning their office in August 2001.

<sup>65</sup>"State Elections 2007." [Electoral Commission of New South Wales](http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/state_elections/state_election_2007). 3 Jan. 2008.

<[http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/state\\_elections/state\\_election\\_2007](http://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/state_elections/state_election_2007)>.

<sup>66</sup>Gordon Moyes who joined the CDP in 2003 was elected as Member of the Legislative Council by the Joint Sitting of both Houses of New South Wales Parliament. He is seeking to change the CDP platform to reflect liberal theological ideas.

<sup>67</sup>"Federal Policies of the Christian Democratic Party." [The Christian Democratic Party](http://www.cdp.org.au/fed/policy_federal.asp). 21 Sept. 2007.

<[http://www.cdp.org.au/fed/policy\\_federal.asp](http://www.cdp.org.au/fed/policy_federal.asp)>.

*Moral Majority*. Perhaps the CDP's lack of success relates to the general Christian population's acceptance or lack thereof of the Party's platform.<sup>68</sup>

The newly formed Family First Party has attracted much attention. In 2002, in South Australia, Andrew Evans, former president of the Assemblies of God, was elected to the South Australian Upper House with a primary vote of 4.02 per cent. The 2006 State elections resulted in a second member, Dennis Hood elected to the Legislative Council with a primary vote at five per cent.<sup>69</sup> The 2006 Queensland State Election saw Family First receive primary votes between 7 and 14.5 per cent in contested seats.<sup>70</sup> However, this was not enough to secure a seat in Parliament. Victoria's 2006 State Election resulted in the Party's first preferences increase from 1.9 per cent to 4.27 per cent; however, no candidate was elected.

In the 2004 Federal election, 140 candidates from Family First stood for election. Successful preference deals saw the Party's first Senator elected.<sup>71</sup> No other members have since been elected. In the 2007 Federal Elections, Family First's primary vote for the Senate was 1.62 per cent, a loss of 0.14 per cent.<sup>72</sup> Their House of Representatives primary vote was 1.99 per cent - a decrease of 0.02 per cent from the previous elections.<sup>73</sup>

Although Family First does not promote itself as a religious political party, the governing body consists of a retired Lutheran Minister, Baptist and United Church Ministers, as well as Reverend Neil Milne from the *Adelaide Christian Revival Crusade*. There are clear links between the Family First Political Party and the Assembly of God Church (AOG). It has been heavily promoted through the AOG and the majority of Family First political candidates have been attendees of AOG churches. The AOG's first foray into direct political action began in 2000 when it formed the *Australian Christian*

---

<sup>68</sup>The issue concerning the presentation of a Christian Right agenda is discussed again in the final section of this chapter and Chapter 7 on the Australian Christian Lobby.

<sup>69</sup>"2002 Results for the Legislative Council." State Electoral Office of South Australia. 28 Dec. 2005.

<[http://www.seo.sa.gov.au/archive/2002/legislative\\_council.phtml](http://www.seo.sa.gov.au/archive/2002/legislative_council.phtml)>.

<sup>70</sup>Candidates Formal Votes (grouped by Party) were in ascending order by per cent. "Result of 2006 Elections." Electoral Commission of Queensland. 9 Sep. 2006. <<http://www.ecq.qld.gov.au/elections/state/state2006/results/summary.html#19>>

<sup>71</sup>"Family-values party defends its link with evangelical religion." The Courier Mail. 22 Sept. 2004 and "Power of the pulpit". The Herald Sun. 22 Sept. 2004.

<sup>72</sup>"Senate, First Preference by Party." Australian Electoral Commission. 22 Dec. 2007. <<http://results.aec.gov.au/13745/Website/SenateStateFirstPrefsByGroup-13745-NAT.htm>>.

<sup>73</sup>"House of Representatives, First Preference by Party." Australian Electoral Commission. 22 Dec. 2007. <<http://results.aec.gov.au/13745/Website/HouseStateFirstPrefsByParty-13745-NAT.htm>>.

*Churches*<sup>74</sup> - a political lobby organisation. *The Australian Christian Churches* - supported and staffed by AOG members never prospered, but perhaps its re-invention has been the Family First Party.

Family First identify two motivations for the founding of the political party. First, they argue there is concern for Australian society's shift from conservative family values - this concept has become a rallying cry for conservative Christian organisations in America and Australia. Secondly, a "whole section of society were not being represented in political forums".<sup>75</sup> Whilst their literature is unclear about whom they represent, they appear to attract conservative voters. An area of further research would be to identify whom their supporter base is and whether the Party appeals to many religious communities.

Self-described as pro-conservation, Family First has policies on a variety of issues, including pornography, abortion, euthanasia, IVF for same sex couples, prostitution, legalization of marijuana, poker machines and extended trading hours. They argue that these issues have negative effects on families - which they define as exclusive to heterosexual relationships and extended family members recognised by marriage only. On issues such as involvement in the Iraq War, genetically modified crops, prolonged detention of asylum-seekers and a planned nuclear waste dump, they oppose the Liberal/National Party's position, leaning towards Labor's position.<sup>76</sup>

The Family First Party is not a Christian political party in the sense that the Australian Christian Democrats Party (CDP) are. To date, the CDP would not consider preference deals with any political party or candidate who did not uphold the values of their Party. In contrast, during the 2005 Federal Elections, Family First - to the irritation of the *Australian Christian Lobby* - did a preference deal with the openly anti-Christian, openly gay, Democrat Senator Brian Greg.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, Family First was criticized by Christian conservative organisations when it announced plans to give its third Queensland preference to Democrats rather than the Nationals. The reason for the arrangement was that it was likely that child protection campaigner Hetty Johnson, Pauline Hanson and the Democrats' preferences would flow to Family First and then to the Nationals before the Liberal

---

<sup>74</sup>"Australian Christian Churches." <<http://www.austchristianchurches.com.au/>>. This organisation, started by Assemblies of God (AOG) Hillsong, no longer exists as a lobbying organisation.

<sup>75</sup>"Australia Needs Family First Because." *Family First Party*. 28 March 2005. <<http://www.familyfirst.org.au/whoweare.php>>.

<sup>76</sup>"Power of the Pulpit." *The Herald Sun*. 22 Sept. 2004. In addition, policy statements found on Family First Website <<http://www.familyfirst.org.au>>.

<sup>77</sup>"Election Special Newsletter." *Australian Christian Lobby*. Sept. 2004.

candidate. In effect, their preference deals would maximise critical preference flows.<sup>78</sup> According to the CEO of *Australian Christian Lobby*, Jim Wallace, the reasons that the Democrats were prepared to shape preference deals with Family First, rather than their ally the Green's was that the Democrats wanted room to make a comeback. By doing preference deals, they effectively lessened the chances of the Greens extending representation. They were successful in this ambition as they ensured the Green's did not hold the balance of power. The Greens achieved four Senate seats rather than the seven that Senator Bob Brown had predicted; the Democrats lost four Senators so that their representation was reduced to four and Family First achieved one Senate seat.<sup>79</sup> The 2007 Federal Elections did not see Family First advance further. Despite receiving 1.99 per cent of the vote and achieving fifth place, they failed to gain another Senate position.

Where the CDP has a clearly defined conservative theological and political agenda, Family First appear prepared to disenfranchise conservative religious voters if certain preference deals will secure electoral success. Thus, they are not an umbrella Christian party in the sense that the Christian Democrats are. Rather than identifying Family First as the Religious Right, it may be more accurate to label them a Christian-influenced conservative party.

Given the limited success of the Australian Christian Democrats and Family First there is no strong Christian political party operating nationally or within any of the States or Territories of Australia.

The reason that Christian political parties have not been successful in Australia is twofold: firstly, the structure of the Australian electoral system is not conducive to them and secondly, many political candidates with religious backgrounds or practices are prepared to work within existing major political parties. The history and formation of both the modern Liberal and Labor Parties reveal close ties to the Protestant and Catholic faiths respectively. As noted in Chapter 1, *the Lyons Forum* an organisation formed within the Federal Parliament has been credited by Nikki Savva, press secretary to the former Treasurer Peter Costello, to be "a powerful force within the Howard Government".<sup>80</sup> This forum has been described as a "secretive Christian faction" whose agenda is loosely described as "family issues" within the Federal Coalition by its opponents, which include the polemical Marion Maddox. *The Electronic Frontiers Association's* website claims that the *Lyons Forum* comprises of approximately fifty Coalition MPs. An oppositional faction formed by Coalition

---

<sup>78</sup>"Why it's Family First and Democrats not far behind." *The Courier Mail*. 23 Sep. 2004.

<sup>79</sup>"National Newsletter." *Australian Christian Lobby*. November 2004.

<sup>80</sup>Savva, N., quoted in *For God and Country: Religious Dynamics in Australian Federal Politics*. Maddox, Marion, and the Australia Dept. of the Parliamentary Library, Information, and Research Services. 2001. 199.

members, the *John Stuart Mill Society* counters the influence of the *Lyons Forum*.<sup>81</sup> The Federal Labor Party has a similar organisation to the *Lyons Forum* operating within its caucus called *Faith and Values* - initiated by the current Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd.

Why the CDP has not been able to advance its electoral support among Christians may be due to the presentation of their political platform that reflects the style and language of the old Religious Right in America.<sup>82</sup> The CDP implies that Christian faith is synonymous with social conservatism. This may account for Family First avoiding religious language in their presentation of the organisation and their reliance on the notion of 'family values' language adopted by a number of political parties and organisations in Australia.

This section has considered the post 1970s external social conditions of Australia that impact on religious life and RIPA in Australia. The next section outlines the internal, theologically driven changes inside Australian churches all of which affect RIPA organisations operating in Australia. Discussion then turns to RIPA organisations themselves.

### **3. Theological Dimensions of Change: The End of the Third and Beginning of the Fourth Great Awakening**

---

Fogel's linking of religious-political cycles and technological change highlight a significant shift in the theological thinking that was inherent to the religious change of the Third Great Awakening.<sup>83</sup> New liberal/modernist theology, shaped by insight and methods from social sciences influenced the Christian faith worldwide. With its roots in Enlightenment, it emphasised free-will and reason, as well as the ability of humans to progress. The Bible was treated as an historical document containing stories, but not actual accounts of events. This new theology affected churches by creating:

- a new division between theological Conservatives and theological Liberals within the same church
- the development of new churches

---

<sup>81</sup>[Electronic Frontiers Association](http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/lyons.html) - a civil liberties organisation formed in 1994. 7 May 2007. <<http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/lyons.html>>.

<sup>82</sup>The old Religious Right in America's rhetoric was scripture-based whilst the new Religious Right focuses on issues without biblical reference, arguing from the perspective of what is good for 'the family' or maintaining 'family values'.

<sup>83</sup>This theological change sets the context for the Fourth Great Awakening, which was spearheaded by 'enthusiastic religions', rather than the established traditional churches. It has seen the number of those associated with Charismatic and Pentecostal churches and the development of RIPA organisations increase.

- new forms of division between churches and
- a different worldview<sup>84</sup> that focused on different issues with different solutions to social problems.

Roger Thompson claims that it was not until the late 1950s through to the late 1960s when the effects of new theological teaching in ministry training schools began to effect society. It was then that many young ministers influenced by radical Christian ideas left their seminary schools to attend to their flocks: what they faced were conservative congregations challenged by these new theologies.<sup>85</sup> This is the discussion point in the final subsection.

### **3.1 Liberal Theology in Australia - post 1970**

---

Fogel writes that in America, the Democratic Party combined Evangelical appeals with the reform agenda of the Third Great Awakening. This signalled change where many religious Progressives shifted their allegiances to the Democratic Party.<sup>86</sup> As noted earlier, no similar research linking the Third Great Awakening specifically with religious Progressives and progressive political parties in Australia is available.<sup>87</sup> However, a 1969 survey of 1 138 Protestant clergies in Victoria revealed changed political allegiance as forty-eight per cent of the ministers supported the Labor Party, not the Conservatives.<sup>88</sup> In discussing theological reform in Australia, Thompson noted that these internal reforms correlated with social justice policies over time.<sup>89</sup>

The liberal, theologically driven, social justice agenda is reflected in the life and work of Don Dunstan who became the Premier of South Australia in June 1970. Prior to his election, Dunstan was a lay synod representative in the Anglican Diocese of Adelaide where he was influenced by liberal theological Social Gospel ideals. Once in power, Dunstan and his Labor Party were instrumental in changing a number of laws that decriminalized aspects of personal behaviour. These changes, supported by many South Australian Anglican Church leaders included the decriminalization of

---

<sup>84</sup>It is suggested that religious belief-systems should be seen as worldviews rather than a set of individual theories. Conceiving of Christianity as a worldview has been one of the most significant developments in the recent history of the church. Naugle, David K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. New York. 2002.

<sup>85</sup>Thompson, Roger C. *Op. cit.*, 123.

<sup>86</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 27.

<sup>87</sup> Research has been done on religious affiliation and political behaviour however, I am unaware of any that uses the framework of Great Awakenings and technological change to discuss this as Robert Fogel does on America.

<sup>88</sup>Walter Phillips. *Op. cit.*, 123.

<sup>89</sup>Thompson, Roger C. *Op. cit.*, 116.

homosexuality, extension of liquor licences and opening hours, the implementation of legalized off-course betting and the liberalization of abortion laws.<sup>90</sup>

Liberal theology sought to find solutions to social issues in rational, not spiritual ways. In 1999, the Uniting Church's Wayside Chapel in Sydney opened an illegal 'tolerance room' in which addicts could inject themselves with their own illegal drugs. This was controversial, causing conflict within the church with Conservatives reportedly calling it, "foolish compassion".<sup>91</sup> After ten days of national outcry, the police closed the 'tolerance room'. Following negotiations with the New South Wales Government, an 18-month trial of self-injection rooms began in 2001. The trial has ended and the service has continued to operate.

In 2004, Melbourne Uniting Church's the *Wesley Central Mission* (different to the *Wesley* in Sydney) built an injecting room facility prior to the State Government's endorsement of the project. Following intensive lobbying by a Christian coalition of anti-injecting room organisations, the Government decided not to open the room. Attempts to construct injecting rooms in other states have been frustrated by legislative action and controversy within churches.

### **3.2 Reactions to Liberal Theology: Issues that Divide**

---

The Uniting Church's solution to illegal use of drugs is one example of liberal theology in the public square and the internal division that may ensue. Even though the liberal viewpoint never dominated, public opinion in the 1970s was receptive to notions of social justice and tended to identify the Church as a source. Leadership and spokespeople who embraced a social justice agenda within a church were noted as having something useful to say to society, while those of traditional perspectives were not.

Subsection 3.2.1 explores two issues that have affected churches internally - the ordination of homosexuals and women. Both of these issues have been controversial among the churches for some time. There are also newer issues appearing; for example, late term abortions. Liberal and conservative churches once agreed on the issue; however, in recent debates concerning the abortion drug, RU486, the Senate Inquire was told that the issue was now based on 'when life

---

<sup>90</sup>A biography of his life and political career can be found at the Don Dunstan Foundation website - a project by the [Flinders University and the University of Adelaide](http://www.dunstan.org.au). Don Dunstan Foundation. 15 June 2007. <<http://www.dunstan.org.au>>.

<sup>91</sup>"Church Opens Injecting Room in Sydney to Help People 'Almost Out of Reach'." *Christianity Today*. April 2001. <<http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/aprilweb-only/4-16-15.0.html>>.

begins'.<sup>92</sup> This is a shift from the traditional anti-abortion position maintained by many conservative churches and some RIPA organisations, such as the *Australian Christian Lobby* and *Salt Shakers*, discussed in Chapter 7 and 8.

As discussed above, religious diversity has resulted in some liberal Christians seeking ties with the Islamic faith. Do these differences support James Hunter's, culture war theory in which he argues that Christianity is being divided by different theological interpretations?

Agreement between theologically conservative churches and their liberal counterparts has existed and I suspect will continue to exist on an issue-by-issue basis. One such issue that is significant for this thesis occurred in 1995, when the Northern Territory Government passed legislation to decriminalize euthanasia in certain circumstances.<sup>93</sup> The response of all denominations was uniformly opposition. Fierce lobbying by a number of organisations (including *the Australian Christian Lobby* and *Salt Shakers*) demanded that the Federal Government overrule the Northern Territory's legislation.<sup>94</sup> This successful campaign is discussed further in Chapters 7 and 8.

### **3.2.1 Crisis for the Church: Ordination of Women and Homosexuals**

Fogel describes the Third Great Awakening as sympathetic to 1960s and 1970s' feminist programs.<sup>95</sup> This affected churches internally, leading to discussion concerning women's roles in religious institutions and the ordination of practicing homosexuals. These internal debates provided opportunity for socially conservative RIPA to engage in internal church politics.

Both issues have caused divisions among Christian denominations in Australia. Each side of the argument uses biblical interpretation to support their position. Likewise, the promotion of homosexuals into roles of church leadership has also affected the social agenda of the religious. These same churches support homosexual lobby groups' attempts to change legislation, including the recognition of their relationships as marriage and the removal of other discriminatory practices.

The Uniting Church has been one denomination divided by the issue of homosexuals' ordination. In July 2003, their *National Assembly* voted to allow individual presbyteries to ordain practicing

---

<sup>92</sup>This comment was made by Mr Sullivan from Catholic Health Australia to the Senate Enquiry. [Australian Federal Parliament](http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commtee/S8992.pdf). 20 Dec. 2005. <<http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commtee/S8992.pdf>>.

<sup>93</sup>"Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of 1985" legalized the medically assisted suicide for consenting adults diagnosed with less than twelve months to live.

<sup>94</sup>"Euthanasia stirs emotions of MPs." [The Sydney Morning Herald](#). 17 October 1996.

<sup>95</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 25.



homosexuals and lesbians.<sup>96</sup> The Anglican Communion has faced division on the issue with some churches nationally, and dioceses threatening to leave the international body and form rival networks. The 2000 parish coalition of *English Anglicans* has plans to withhold money from liberal dioceses. The American church has also suffered schisms over the issue. Because of the division, Anglicans held two competing international conferences in 2008: the bi-yearly *Lambeth Conference* was held in England immediately following the *Global Anglican Future Conference (Gafcon)* held in Jerusalem. The latter conference was organised by theologically conservative bishops from Africa and Australia. According to the *Age* newspaper, there are no visible rifts within the Australian denomination.<sup>97</sup> However, Muriel Porter, an Anglican laywoman and author of several books, promoting liberal theological views, is an outspoken critic of both traditional and evangelical Christianity.<sup>98</sup>

In 1991, Joe Dallas the President of *Exodus International* wrote, “The debate over homosexuality – specifically, whether or not the Bible condemns homosexual acts in all cases – will do no less than rip the body of Christ apart within the next decade. It will force believers to declare, in black and white terms, where they stand on issues of sexuality and Biblical interpretation.”<sup>99</sup> While that does not appear to have happened, there is no doubt that it has become a contentious issue, particularly affecting the Uniting Church.

Similarly, the issue of whether it is biblically permissible to ordain women has remained an ongoing agenda item for several local and global Christian denominations. Within the local Roman Catholic tradition, an organisation known as *The Australian Ordination of Catholic Women (OCW)* has developed. With headquarters in Canberra, its purpose has been to seek gender equality within the denomination. Their argument is that women are made in the image of God; that Jesus called both men and women to be his disciples and that there is Scriptural evidence of women’s leadership in the early church.<sup>100</sup> *Women of the New Covenant* is another organisation with the same agenda with similar organisations in both Britain and the United States. The Catholic Church’s response has been that only males may be ordained as it supports existing teachings of the infallible word of God; furthermore, that the Church is not itself empowered to change this practice. In addition, they

---

<sup>96</sup>“Salt Shakers e-news release”. *Salt Shakers*. 17 Jul 2003.

<sup>97</sup>“Conservative moves stir Anglican troubles.” *The Age*. 19 Dec. 2006.

<sup>98</sup> Porter, Muriel. *The New Puritans: The Rise of Fundamentalism in the Anglican Church*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007.

<sup>99</sup>Dallas, Joe. *Desires in Conflict*. Eugene, OR: Harvest House Publishers. 1991, 15.

<sup>100</sup>“Why the Ordination of Women is Biblical.” *The Australian Ordination of Catholic Women*. 1 April 2007.

<[http://www.ocw.webcentral.com.au/why\\_ordain\\_women.htm](http://www.ocw.webcentral.com.au/why_ordain_women.htm)>.

suggest that Christ's choice of male Apostles was not due to social practices of the day, but reflected God's plan for the priesthood.<sup>101</sup>

In 1991, the Lutheran Church in Australia became embroiled in the issue of female ordination with the *Commission on Theology and Interchurch Relations* calling for church-wide feedback on its report. In 2000 and 2006, votes held on whether women should be ordained for the priesthood failed to meet a two-thirds majority.<sup>102</sup> As a confessional church, it requires a consensus on its teaching; however, none was reached.

For other denominations, women's eligibility for priesthood relies on interpretations of certain Biblical passages - not traditional teaching as the Catholic Church does. The Biblical passages relate to teaching and leadership roles. Those taking this approach have been free to change their position in accordance with their interpretation of the Bible. The main passages cited and quoted in this debate include *Galatians 3:28*, *1<sup>st</sup> Corinthians 11:2-16* and *1:34-35*, *1<sup>st</sup> Timothy 2:11-14*, *Acts 21:9* and *18:18*, several chapters in *Romans* and one chapter in both *1<sup>st</sup> Corinthians* and *Philippians* have been used to suggest that women exercised ministries in the Apostolic Church. Denominations, such as the Uniting Church, have ordained women since 1977.<sup>103</sup> As expected for traditional culturally determined denominations, Eastern Orthodox Churches preclude women from leadership positions due to 'Holy Tradition'.<sup>104</sup> However, Baptists and the Salvation Army ordain women while other denominations, such as the Anglicans are divided. The Anglican Diocese of Sydney, along with another three dioceses rejected the 1992 Clarification Canon that permitted women to be ordained to the priesthood.<sup>105</sup>

Pentecostal and Charismatic churches do have a history of women fulfilling leadership roles though some denominations such as, the Christian Outreach Centre and Hill's Christian Church have preferred to ordain husband and wife couples with the husband taking the lead role. That said, the

---

<sup>101</sup>"Apostolic Letter *Ordinatio Sacerdotalis* of John Paul II to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on Reserving Priestly Ordination to men alone." *Vatican*. 3 April 2007 <[http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/john\\_paul\\_ii/apost\\_letters/documents/hf\\_jp-ii\\_apl\\_22051994\\_ordinatio-sacerdotalis\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_22051994_ordinatio-sacerdotalis_en.html)>.

<sup>102</sup>"Introduction to the Summaries on the Teaching of the Ordination of Men Only and the Case for the Ordination of Women." *Lutheran Church of Australia*. 1 April 2007. <<http://www.lca.org.au/lca/synod/ordinationcover.cfm>>.

<sup>103</sup>"Would-be women priests are still knocking on closed church doors." *John Mark Ministries*. 3 April 2007. <<http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/16701.htm>>.

<sup>104</sup>"The Role of Women in the Eastern Orthodox Church." *Australian EJournal of Theology*. Rev Angelo Nicolaides, a Greek Cypriot South African. 3 April 2007 <[http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt\\_4/Nicolaides.htm](http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt_4/Nicolaides.htm)>. Eastern Orthodox sees itself as the original form of Christianity.

<sup>105</sup>"Anglican women regroup to fight ban on ordination." *The Sydney Morning Herald*. 2 April 2007. <<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/anglican-women-regroup-to-fight-ban-on-ordination/2006/10/04/1159641392813.html>>.

history of these Pentecostal movements is filled with women who had considerable leadership positions - for example, Aimee Semple McPherson, Alice Belle Garrigus, Maria Woodworth-Etter, Marie Burgess, Kathryn Kuhlman and Mae Eleanore Frey. The argument in favour of ordination in these denominations is also based on the role of women in the Apostolic Church, supported by scriptural interpretation.

A consideration with this issue is that women are not excluded from all leadership roles in the Catholic or Anglican churches; there are large numbers pastoral workers in Catholic parishes, as well as nuns. Of the 23 dioceses of the Anglican Church in Australia, only three do not ordain women to the priesthood but instead ordain women to the position of deaconate where they can serve in a number of roles, excluding pastoral care.<sup>106</sup>

Whilst different denominations view this issue and the ordination of practicing homosexuals differently, there is no indication that either issue will create the public schisms that Australia experienced in the past over issues such as liquor licences (discussed in the previous chapter – Section 3.1). Nor are these differences between theologically liberal and conservative churches publically discussed to the same extent as in America.

### **3.3 Leadership and Laity: Differences of Opinion**

---

It would be misleading to imply that the social and political message put forth by church leaders has the support of all members of their congregations. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter (sub section 3.2), the development of trade unions and political parties saw the Protestant clergy preach one message, while lay leaders pleaded another. This section considers evidenced differences between clergy and laity on the issues discussed above.

As mentioned earlier, since the liberal teachings of the late 1960s, tension between the ministers and their congregations existed.

Established in 1977, the Uniting Church was a child of modern theology. Their website states that they affirm “the place of ongoing theological, literary, historical, and scientific study. The Church’s

---

<sup>106</sup> “Are women able to be priests in the Anglican Church of Australia?” 2 February 2008. Anglican Church of Australia. <<http://www.anglican.org.au/index.cfm?SID=2&SSID=4&PID=15>>.

Basis of Union (1971) brings together aspects of these writings and traditions and sets out the church's way of living and being."<sup>107</sup>

In Australia, a number of denominations, particularly the Uniting Church, has experienced internal division resulting from the adoption of a liberal social agenda. In an article titled, *Church rejects 'gay poll'*, *The Age* stated in 2004 that a survey of 27 000 members of the Uniting Church had found eighty-eight per cent of the 1 450 congregations were not in favour of homosexual ordination. The article noted that in playing down the results, the leadership promoted the Assembly's support of homosexual clergy.<sup>108</sup> Even though the newspaper implied that the poll should have changed the Assembly's stance, Philip Hughes, a respected theologian in Australia said, "Ethical issues should never be resolved by polls. However, perhaps the sort of principle that Paul evokes in his letter to the church at Corinth (*I Corinthians 8*) regarding respect for the consciences of others might suggest that sometimes, at least, survey results should be taken into account by those making decisions about policy".<sup>109</sup>

Lay members of congregations have depicted two responses to theological changes occurring amongst Anglicans. First, like their Uniting Church counterparts, some have left congregations and joined other churches, such as Pentecostal churches. The exact figure is unknown; however, a large percentage of the growth in Pentecostal churches has been from other denominations. The second response has been the rise of "confessional movements" both here and overseas. "Confessing movements are crossing denominational lines, Christians wearing one label sense spiritual communion with Christians wearing another. And this bonding appears more like a lateral Internet connection than the structure of a hierarchical institution."<sup>110</sup> In other words, those who oppose homosexual ordination were identifying with those of the same social view in other denominations. With respect to this issue, denominational differences are insignificant. This creates a broad supporter base for organisations, such as those discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

While experiencing change in theological interpretation, other denominations appear to have controlled or contained the divisions within their denomination. In the late 1960s, the *Second*

---

<sup>107</sup>"What We Believe." The Uniting Church of Australia. 3 Sept. 2006. <<http://www.sa.uca.org.au/site/page.cfm?u=206>>.

<sup>108</sup>"Church rejects 'gay poll.'" The Age. 28 Jan 2004. <<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/01/27/1075088021978.html>>.

<sup>109</sup>"Attitudes to Issues of Sexuality." Christian Research Association. 4 June 2006. <<http://www.cra.org.au/pages/00000178.cgi>>.

<sup>110</sup>"Ordination of Homosexuals." Anglican Church of Sydney. 27 June 2004. <<http://www.anglicanmedia.com.au/news/archives/002095.php#more>>.

*Vatican Council* modernised Catholicism, but the response to its modernisation has been mixed. Both clergy and laity have taken issue with the church's teaching on contraception, female priesthood, clerical celibacy, homosexuality, and a wide range of issues. However, this has not seen the mass exodus of Catholics from their church as has been experienced by the Uniting Church.

The result of difference between clergy and laity is not only the growth of Pentecostal churches but also the development of supra-denominational RIPA organisations. Despite the fact that no comprehensive information regarding supra-denominational RIPA organisations and their supporters' religious affiliation is available, the organisations discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 claim to have support across the denominational spectrum.<sup>111</sup>

In the past, there have been differences between church leaders and congregation members about the content of their civic message and religious values that have driven political attitudes and activity. In Queensland, many Protestants and Catholics happily voted for the National Party or directed their preferences to them; yet, the leadership were often opposed to such conservative parties. It was not until the exposé of systemic corruption of Bjelke-Petersen Government that Queensland Christians turned away, in appreciable numbers from voting for the State's conservative parties.<sup>112</sup>

By way of a summary, Section 2 has drawn attention to differences within and between churches since 1970. The new liberal theology has resulted in the creation of the Social Gospel with its emphasis on social justice and social welfare, rather than personal sin. The shift to modernist secular interpretations of the Bible and Biblical Creed has resulted in splits amongst churches on public ethics and morality issues. As noted in sub Section 1.2, while membership of churches with modernist/liberal theology has declined, theologically traditional Pentecostal churches have grown. Both of these changes has facilitated the developed of supra- denominational conservative RIPA organisations. As mentioned earlier, Fogel notes that the religious change of the Third Great Awakening included major theological splits that affected the church's solutions to social issues.<sup>113</sup> Whilst he is writing specifically on the America experience of this Awakening, the fact that both Thompson and Phillips write of the same theological changes occurring in Australia during the same period suggests that the Awakening had similar effects in Australia.

---

<sup>111</sup>While researching both organisations, I spoke with a limited number of supporters who were from different denominations.

<sup>112</sup>Phillips, Walter. *Op. cit.*, 273.

<sup>113</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 25.

#### 4. RIPA in Australia from 1970

---

According to Hogan, “Despite the fact that church people are divided among themselves about the content of their civic message and religious values, religious pressure groups are again central to an understanding of Australian society”.<sup>114</sup> Fogel has noted that in America, single-issue movements began to emerge during the Religious Phase of the Fourth Great Awakening.<sup>115</sup> This next section discusses the development of RIPA organisations in Australia from the 1970s. Do the developments discussed by Fogel coincide with similar types of organisations in Australia?

In Chapter 4, I suggested that RIPA organisations of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century until the 1970s were church affiliated, whilst few crossed denominational boundaries - those that did were often short-lived single-issue organisations.

Since the 1970s, a supra-denominational style of organisation has joined denominational ones. Their leadership and financial support is not directly from a particular denomination and neither is their supporter base.

As stated earlier, the theological changes that allowed less restrictive notions of sectarian differences attract like-minded Christians from across denominational divides to construct supra-denominational organisations. The now defunct *Logos Foundation*<sup>116</sup> (possibly one of the earliest supra-denominational RIPA organisations) drew supporters from Charismatic and Pentecostal churches and had ties with some Catholic lay organisations. The organisation modelled itself on the American, *Moral Majority*. *The Logos Foundation* sought to become a Christian ‘think-tank’ for churches and right-wing politics. However, many Australian churches did not support its far right politics of the US model. Coming to prominence during the 1989 Queensland State elections,<sup>117</sup> it sought but failed to gain support from the *Christian Outreach Centre*. *The Logos Foundation* became moribund and ceased to exist when its leader was exposed for adultery.

A number of other supra-denominational organisations arose in the 1970s and 1980s that were not modelled on the American Christian Right, nor supported far right-wing politics. The organisations’ agendas varied from promoting family values, to human rights and cultural diversity issues. Jack and

---

<sup>114</sup>Hogan, Michael. *Op. cit.*, 258.

<sup>115</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 26.

<sup>116</sup>Information on the Logos Foundation was given by Mr Geoffrey Coleman who was one of its founding members. After its demise, Mr Coleman taught for a number of years at the Christian Outreach Bible College.

<sup>117</sup>The Logos Foundation’s moral issues campaign was similar to the Australian Christian Lobby’s and Salt Shakers discussed in Chapter 7 and 8 respectively.

Margaret Sonneman established *The Australian Federation for the Family* on an anti-pornography platform in 1983. Its website states that the organisation is “dedicated to upholding Biblical family values, promoting a Biblical Christian Worldview and educating and mobilising concerned individuals to positively affect their homes, communities, country and world.... One specific goal is the removal of pornography from the family marketplace where children have access.”<sup>118</sup> *The National Alliance of Christian Leaders* was formed in 1985. Although its purpose was non-political, it was instrumental in the founding of the *Religious Freedom Institute Incorporated*. This organisation consisting of human rights advocates and lawyers are “committed to defending Christian liberties; to protect the rights of individual Christians, Churches, Church schools, home-schools, and other Christian bodies, to operate without undue and discriminatory state intrusion”.<sup>119</sup> This organisation works with *Salt Shakers*,<sup>120</sup> providing the organisation with material for its website.

Bill Muehlengerg, who was involved with the *Australian Family Foundation* for many years, established *Culture Watch*. Its website states its purpose as “exploring the major cultural, social, and political issues of the day”.<sup>121</sup> The *Zadok Institute for Christianity and Society* founded in 1976, claims to be an independent Christian organisation that seeks to “promote informed theological reflection, especially by lay people, on contemporary issues in Australian society, and to bring Christian perspectives into public debate”. This organisation is very small, claiming a network of “more than 750 Christians”. Given that the last publication of its journal *Zadok Perspectives* was winter 2008 it is likely that this organisation, if still in existence, is not of political significance.<sup>122</sup>

*The Endeavour Forum* is a countermovement that originally began in the 1970s as *Women Who Want to Be Women*. Responding to the ‘militant feminism’ of the Whitlam and Fraser Government Eras, the organisation claims that many legitimate grievances “went too far”. This theologically traditional organisation lobbies a ‘family’ agenda.<sup>123</sup> *The Family Council of Victoria* was formed in late 1994 upon a pro-life ‘natural family’ platform and claims a number of churches as affiliates.<sup>124</sup> It also has counterpart organisations in Queensland, Western Australia, and South Australia. *The Victorian Council*, an umbrella organisation with twenty-seven affiliates was founded in 1994. Membership includes the *Australian Family Association*, the *Salvation Army*, the *Catholic Church*, the

---

<sup>118</sup> *Australian Federation for the Family*. 4 Sept. 2006. <<http://www.ausfamily.org/>>.

<sup>119</sup> *National Alliance of Christian Leaders*. 10 Sept. 2006. <[http://nacl.com.au/nacl/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=38](http://nacl.com.au/nacl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=38)>.

<sup>120</sup> The organisation is discussed in Chapter 8.

<sup>121</sup> “About”. *Bill Muehlengerg*. 19 Sept. 2007. <<http://www.billmuehlenberg.com/>>.

<sup>122</sup> *Zadok Institute for Christianity and Society*. 21 Sept. 2007. <<http://www.zadok.org.au/>>.

<sup>123</sup> “What We Are About.” *Endeavour Forum*. 10 July 2008. <<http://www.endeavourforum.org.au/intro1.htm>>.

<sup>124</sup> “Home page.” *Family Council of Victoria*. 17 Aug. 2008. <<http://www.fcv.org.au/>>.

*Endeavour Forum, Drug-Arm, and the Festival of Light*. This politically conservative organisation actively lobbies both Federal and State Governments on a range of issues, such as Victoria's *Racial and Religious Vilification Laws*, homosexuality, human cloning, and the definition of marriage.<sup>125</sup>

Since the 1970s, we have seen a development of organisations that focus and lobby on different issues, sometimes in opposition to each other; yet, sometimes unifying. It would appear that the *Logos Foundation* has provided supra-denominational organisations with the important lesson that Christian denominations, including Pentecostal denominations reject far right agendas.<sup>126</sup>

These supra-denominational organisations have not replaced churches from acting as political lobbyists through their own denominational organisations in their own right but rather, they have argument existing and new denominational organisations.

The chapters that follow finalise discussion on issues from this chapter. In Chapter 6, I compare the similarities and differences between the US situation and that of Australia as described in the last three chapters. In Chapter 7, I return to the practices of RIPA in Australia through a case study of the *Australian Christian Lobby*: the most visible and successful of Australian RIPA organisations. In order to explore its theological and religious dimensions, I provide, a counter-case - the less public, *Salt Shakers*, in Chapter 8.

---

<sup>125</sup>"Racial and Religious Vilification Laws." Family Council of Victoria. 17 Aug. 2008. <<http://www.fcv.org.au/index.htm?randid=092097526>>.

<sup>126</sup>The Australian Christian Lobby is an organisation that initially lobbied with a Christian Right platform but has since changed its self-definition and presentation.



## Chapter 6: RIPA: The American Model – Why Australia is different

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>129</b>
<b>1. Church-State relations: America and Australia Compared</b>	<b>130</b>
1.1 Church-State Models	130
1.2 Constitutional Frameworks: How Religion is managed	131
<b>2. The Social Embeddness of Religion in America</b>	<b>137</b>
2.1 Differences of Religious Development	137
2.2 The Great Awakenings	138
2.3 Civic Religion and Creedal Passion	139
<b>3. The Christian Faith: Internal Issues that affect RIPA</b>	<b>140</b>
3.1 Denominationalism: Religious Realignment and RIPA	141
3.2 Culture Wars	142
3.3 Theology and RIPA	143
3.4 Religious Identity and RIPA	144
<b>4. RIPA Organisations</b>	<b>144</b>
<b>5. Conclusion and Final Thoughts</b>	<b>147</b>

## Introduction

---

The preceding chapters have shown how religion resonates external to its sacred sphere more strongly in America than Australia. Religious symbolism has a larger audience in America with 82 per cent of Americans identifying as Christian,<sup>1</sup> while the 2006 *Australian Census* identified the number of Christians at nearly sixty-four per cent. Fogel writes, approximately one third of the American electorate associate with the 'enthusiastic' religions and claim their faith influences their voting practices.<sup>2</sup> In Australia, the number of Pentecostals identified in the *2006 Census*<sup>3</sup> was a minute 1.1 per cent - this figure includes affiliates of Charismatic churches. Comparatively, this is insignificant to the levels prevailing in the US.

The smaller number of Christians per population affects RIPA in Australia in three ways. First, the extent that religious symbolism resonates is more limited than in the US; second, the base from which RIPA organisation mobilize support is a smaller proportion of the population, and third, religiously conservative organisations must appeal to groups other than Pentecostals and Charismatics to sustain themselves. The Australian case studies of Chapters 7 and 8 will investigate the impact of these dimensions in detail.

In comparing the influence of religious feeling in political life across the Pacific, I have noted that their histories are quite dissimilar. These differences are summarised in Section 1 and 2. In the US, historians such as Robert Fogel have used revival movements such as the Great Awakenings and the social change they engender to periodise US history. Americas much publicised church-state separationists model based on constitutional interpretations has facilitated ongoing public discussion concerning the role of religion in American society. Hence, there is much discussion of religious movements and their consolidation into political action. No exact equivalent attention is directed at Australian social history. This may be because Australian RIPA movements having little or no significant impact on politics or society, or because secularised social historians do not consider religion an important source of innovation and change. Consequently, RIPA organisations are insufficiently explored.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>"American Piety in the 21st Century – September 2006." [Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion](http://www.baylor.edu/isreligion/index.php?id=40634). 8 Oct. 2006. <<http://www.baylor.edu/isreligion/index.php?id=40634>>.

<sup>2</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 25.

<sup>3</sup>See Chapter 5, Sub Section 1.2

<sup>4</sup>I am not referring to specific church or denominationally based organisations but specifically to interdenominational (supra-denominational) RIPA organisations.

This chapter addresses the broad comparative question of what makes RIPA different in Australia and America from a societal perspective - as RIPA does not function within a vacuum. Rather, historical, cultural, and legal changes constrain or support RIPA in different ways. Following that discussion in Section 1 and 2, attention turns to matters internal to Christianity that affect RIPA, including concepts relating to religious awakenings and James Hunter's culture war thesis (Section 3). Section 4 contains final thoughts and conclusions to the question of whether American trends may explain the inextricable link between religion and society in an Australian context.

## **1. Church-State relations: America and Australia Compared**

---

In the process of evaluating RIPA in Australia compared to its counterpart, America, I investigated the issue from a broader framework. Rather than directly contrasting the organisations themselves, it seemed important to understand the environment in which they functioned, including the historical legacies of both nations. This section highlights some of the institutional, cultural, and religious legacies that directly or indirectly affect religiously inspired politically focused organisations in both countries.

### **1.1 Church-State Models**

In Monsma and Soper's comparative work, they argue that while Australia has moved between four different Church-State models, essentially, America has had two. The Establishment Phase of both nations are similar as favoured churches were granted tax support and civil authorities exercised control over certain ecclesiastical affairs and later, Government's withdrawal of financial support of religious organisations. By the conclusion of the First Great Awakening in America, all States had abandoned Church establishment. For the next one hundred and thirty years, a loose separation of Church and State prevailed with State schools permitting prayer and Bible readings and Governments enforcing Sunday observance.<sup>5</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, their current separationist model became more strictly defined when the Supreme Court (1947) banned religious elements from public schools, declaring the majority of aid to religious schools and Church-State cooperation unconstitutional.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>For the Christian world, Sunday was a day for religious observance and the cessation of secular employment. From a legal standpoint, it was a day of rest.

<sup>6</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 20, 21.

Since the Establishment Phase, Australia fashioned itself from a liberal separationist model to that of pragmatic pluralism that observes the Governments' finance of religious organisations for community service provision. In contrast, the American separationist model allows Government funding of religious welfare agencies; however, limited funding is granted to non-government schools. This model, in partnership with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the *Establishment Clause of the Constitution*, constructs an internal social conflict that does not occur in Australia. This noteworthy distinction is discussed next.

## 1.2 Constitutional Frameworks: How Religion is managed

The defining quandary for Christian activists concerns the way the *Constitution* of each nation impacts on religious belief and practices - this includes the rights of the State to control religious practice, as well as the way these institutions interrelate.

In Chapter 4, I noted the agreement between many scholars that the *Australian Constitution* was modelled on the *First Amendment*<sup>7</sup> of the *American Constitution*; however, opinions differ on whether the intention was to embrace America's separationist model. Monsma and Soper argue that the provision of finance for religious schools and social welfare service organisations is evidence that this was not intentional; furthermore, the High Court does not aggressively protect religious liberty in its narrow interpretation of *Section 116*.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, the *Constitution* provides little protection for religious belief and practice. They argue that the Commonwealth Government has deliberately left the regulation of religious freedom to the States.<sup>9</sup> This last point is supported by Gageler who in his comparative piece on America and Australia noted that the United States Supreme Court has used the *First Amendment* to limit State power; in contrast, Australia's *Section 116* applies to the Commonwealth and not the States because, it is the States right to legislate for an established Church.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

<sup>8</sup>Section 116 states: "The Commonwealth shall not make any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, or for the establishment of any religion, or imposing any religious observance, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth". Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 95, 96.

<sup>9</sup>Hogan, Michael Charles. *Op. cit.*, 95, 96.

<sup>10</sup>Gageler, Stephen. "Freedom from Religion: What Australia Can Learn from the American Experience of Religious Pluralism." 10 June 2006. <<http://www.lcf.pnc.com.au/freedomreligion.htm>>.

Supporters of Monsma and Sopher’s position include Hogan and Frame.<sup>11</sup> Hogan argues that the Australian principle is one of State neutrality. Complementary to his belief, Frame suggest that *Section 116 of the Australian Constitution*:

- does not specifically guarantee freedom of worship
- prevents the Commonwealth from enacting any law that prohibits the free exercise of religion
- has positively contributed to the conduct of Church-State relations and
- preserves the religious diversity that existed prior to the establishment of the *Constitution*.

Furthermore, the wording highlights the different perspectives on society and State as represented in America and Australia. He argues that the US is a “state built on the aspirations of individuals with inalienable rights, in Australia the State is the institutional embodiment of sovereignty and power”.<sup>12</sup>

In concluding remarks, Frame notes that the High Court does not believe that the drafters of the Australian *Constitution* intended the ‘wall of separation’ to apply in Australia. Furthermore, the Court’s judgements have distinguished between interactions of Church and State that are consistent with *Section 116* and those that are not by infringing on the free exercise of religion or establishment of religion.<sup>13</sup>

Another significant difference between the two *Constitutions* is that the Australian version contains no *Bill of Rights*. Apart from the religious test for public office, there is no discussion of personal, social, or moral aspirations. The *Constitution* did not incorporate the personal rights of Australian citizens’ due to the belief that both their rights and freedoms were protected under common law and that the polity was based on Christian values.

The different constitutional arrangements between the countries’ judicial and legislative institutions also contrast. Australia’s parliamentary sovereignty or supremacy is dissimilar to America’s judicial review that invests power in the Supreme Court of America. The Australian High Court may overrule State and Federal Parliaments by declaring primary legislation (Acts of Parliament) to be invalid “only” when there is a breach of constitutional provision. In America, the democratically elected parliament whose powers are limited by a justiciable Bill of Rights have a constitutional system of

---

<sup>11</sup>Frame, T. R. *Op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 94.

courts that may exercise their power to review “all” legislative and executive acts in the light of the *Constitution* and the *Bill of Rights*.<sup>14</sup>

As the legal systems of both nations interpret their Constitutions differently, religious organisations manipulate their respective Constitutions in different ways. In America, Christian political left organisations regularly present cases to the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of the *Constitution*, specifically its *First Amendment*.<sup>15</sup> These challenges include cases against Christian political right organisations who allegedly seek to ‘create a theocratic State’ and destroy the constitutionally mandated separation of Church and State. This is not so in Australia where Frame notes there have been “very few cases before the High Court of Australia relating to alleged contravention of section 116”.<sup>16</sup>

### 1.2.1 Religion and Education

Both the American Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia’s have been asked for judgements concerning the role of religion in State based education. The American Supreme Court ruling of 1947 resulted in religious elements being banned from public schools and aid to religiously based schools is deemed unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has also prohibited time-release programs whereby children experience religious instruction for approximately an hour each week.<sup>17</sup> As noted in Chapter 5, in 1981, the Australian High Court adopted a different stance on this issue. When the validity of government funding of religious schools was challenged, the High Court ruled that the *Constitution* does not preclude the Government from supporting laws that would assist the practice of religion. This decision set the precedent that the *Australian Constitution* does not enforce the notion of strict separationism.

The Australian Constitution then is less prescriptive in regards to education than its American counterpart. According to Gageler, the implementation of Clause S116 contrasts the application of the First Amendment. S116 would not demand the removal of a portrait of Jesus from a State high

---

<sup>14</sup>Hatchard, John, Peter Slinn, and Ebooks Corporation. *Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence: A Commonwealth Approach: Proceedings of the Latimer House Joint Colloquium*. London: Cavendish Pub., 1999, 54.

<sup>15</sup>In an interview discussing religion and progressive politics in America in 2008, John Green commented that Americans like to do politics through Court; to which Laura Olson Political Science professor at Clemson University replied that taking issues to Court was “another piece of advocacy”. “Religion and progressive Politics in 2008.” *The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life*. 1 May 2008. <<http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=181>>.

<sup>16</sup>Frame, T. R. *Op. cit.*, 53.

<sup>17</sup>Monsma, Stephen V & Soper J Christopher. *Op. cit.*, 21, 31.

school and a student would not be excluded for possessing a Bible or distributing religious literature as in America.<sup>18</sup>

### 1.2.2 Christian Social and Welfare Organisations

Faith-based social and welfare organisations operating in both nations have experienced an increase in numbers of organisations and government funding that sustains them. In America, the obsession with the Church-State divide has seen opposition to the former President George W. Bush's faith-based initiatives program<sup>19</sup> that provides federal funding and grants to faith-based organisations. Its critics claim the funding violates the *Establishment Clause of the Constitution* and the separation of Church and State.<sup>20</sup> Despite this, President Barack Obama's *White House Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships* has announced plans to expand partnerships between the government and faith-based organizations.<sup>21</sup>

In contrast, Australian complaints about the role and influence that religious organisations have in secular areas of society are unable to draw upon the *Constitution* as grounds for denying funding to religious social and welfare organisations. The High Court of Australia's deliberations on governmental support for religious based welfare provision are unlike the Supreme Court of America's - the principle of Church-State separation is embedded in *America's Constitution* with no Australian equivalent.

How do the Constitutional interpretations directly affect RIPA organisations? In Chapter 3, I noted that it creates a type of organisation that does not exist in Australia. The organisation, *America for the Separation of church and State*, is one example. The other effect that I have noted in the US is that it creates a very public, ongoing social and political agenda concerning the boundaries between church and state affairs that do not exist in Australia.

The way that the Constitutions are interpreted differently as well as Australia pragmatic pluralist model of church/state relations, explains why RIPA organisations in Australia have not focused upon the educational system, in the way that it occurs in America. Despite attempts to restrict religious organisations receiving government funding in the US on Constitutional grounds, those who delivery

---

<sup>18</sup>Gageler, Stephen. *Op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup>These programs are overseen by the White House Office of Faith-based and Community Initiatives- a special department designed to co-ordinate, control and monitor the program.

<sup>20</sup>Kaplan, Esther. *With God on Their Side: How Christian fundamentalists Trampled Science, Policy and Democracy in George W. Bush's White House.* New York: The New Press, 2004.

<sup>21</sup>"Government Partnerships With Faith-Based Organizations: Looking Back, Moving Forward". *The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life*. 11 June 2009. <<http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=218>>.

social services, thanks to the President Barack Obama's recent decision to expand the White House Office partnership, look to continue for some time. The difference between government funding arrangements for religious based education and welfare services suggest that America's separationist model is not universally applied.

### **1.2.3 Political Institutions**

The Parliament of Australia is bicameral, combining features of the Parliament of the United Kingdom with some features of the United States Congress. The architects of the *Australian Constitution* appear to have reproduced the Westminster System of Government, while creating a Federation that divides power between the Federal and State Governments. The structure resembles the United States Congress in that there is a House of Representatives elected from single-member constituencies and a Senate consisting of equal numbers of Senators from each State. In functionality, it reflects the Westminster System.

In Australia, voting became compulsory after the 1922 elections, while the American and English voting systems are not. Voter participation for these nations is beneath that of Australia where ninety-five per cent of citizens registered to vote consistently do so.<sup>22</sup> This creates rewards for political activists in Australia who do not need to utilise resources to mobilize voter participation, as occurs in the US. US Christian political organisations such as, *the Christian Coalition of America*, *National Pro-life Religious Council*, and *Priests for Life* actively promote and assist potential voters in registering and fulfilling their voting obligations.

### **1.2.4 Responses to Culture and Religious Differences**

In Chapters 3 and 5, I have referred to how the respective Governments, including their judicial arms address issues of religious discrimination and conflict. How each Government manages these issues provides an example of the different ways that governmental practice and interpretation of their *Constitutions* affects not only Church-State relationships but governs the ways different faiths interact.

In America, the protection of freedom of speech has been achieved through three separate amendments: *The First Amendment* focusing on the right to do something and *The Fifth* and *Fourteenth* Amendments that protect against racial and religious discrimination and focus on the

---

<sup>22</sup>"Compulsory Voting in Australian National Elections, Research Paper for the Parliament of Australia." [Department of Parliamentary Services](http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2005-06/06rb06.pdf). 31 Oct. 2005, No. 6 2005-06. <<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2005-06/06rb06.pdf>>.



victim of discriminatory action. Together their interpretation shields citizens from unacceptable actions, but this does not extend to protection from negative speech.<sup>23</sup>

Australia has no comparable protection enshrined in the *Constitution*. The dilemma of balancing the constitutional right of free speech and freedom from vilification is not the obvious predicament for Australia as it is in America. Consequently, Australian States have addressed incidents of vilification despite being verbal and without actual violence. An example of this was discussed in Chapter 5, concerning Judge Higgins' findings against *Catch the Fire Ministry*. *The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal's* findings were based on the notion of whether the conduct was reasonable and in good faith. Ruling against Pastor Danny Nalliah of *Catch the Fire Ministry* Judge Higgins ruled for the Plaintiff on the grounds that incitement "could" have caused hatred or serious contempt for Muslim people.<sup>24</sup> This differs significantly to America's current treatment of vilification. As noted above, in America, RIPA organisations employ the Constitutional right to "free speech" to protest in ways that contrast Australian organisations that are unable to rely on Constitutional protection.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the Australian Federal Government exercises policies of multiculturalism and social inclusion claiming that Australians' share 'common values' to minimize racial and religious conflict. Right-wing critics dismiss this claim suggesting that it is the "power of the elite moral imagination to achieve continuities of privilege and exclusion in vastly different social and economic circumstances".<sup>25</sup> The effectiveness of the Government's social inclusion strategy and its implementation through anti-vilification legislation is questionable. The issue of religious freedom and the relationships between religions raised by the *Catch the Fire Ministry* case test the outer limits of Australia's pragmatic pluralism.

In summary, important historical legacies affecting RIPA in the US include the *American Constitution* and its *First Amendment, the Bill of Rights* and the powerful influence of civic religion (discussed next). RIPA organisations are constrained by the Supreme Court's interpretations of the *Constitution* with its institutionalized separation of Church and State. Symbols associated with religion and God are more visible in American society than in Australia, so too is public discussion of the role of

---

<sup>23</sup>Knoll, David. "Anti-Vilification Laws: Some Recent Developments in the United States and their Implications for Proposed Legislation in the Commonwealth of Australia." *Australian Journal of Human Rights*. 1994. 21 September 2007, <<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/AJHR/1994/14.html>>.

<sup>24</sup>"Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc (Final) [2004] VCAT 2510 (22 December 2004)." *Australasian Legal Information Institute*. 21 June 2006, <<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCAT/2004/2510.html>>.

<sup>25</sup>Harris, Patricia. Williams, Vicki. "Social Inclusion, National Identity and the Moral Imagination in the Drawing Board." *Australian Review of Public Affairs* 3.3 (2003): 216.

religion in politics. For these reasons, support of RIPA organisations in America is much greater than for its counterparts in Australia. The negative side for the Christian religion in America is religion itself and the institutionalised separation of Church and State becoming political issues. As noted in Chapter 3, this has resulted in some Christian organisations opposing each other by petitioning courts to enforce Church and State separation. In Australia, infrequent discussion concerning the division of Church and State and the appropriateness of religious organisations receiving Government assistance for welfare programs occurs. However, the level of debate and litigation occurring in Australia when compared to America is minimal. As the issue of religious educational funding has revealed, the High Court has effectively endorsed the Federal Government's pragmatic pluralist approach to religious issues.

## **2. The Social Embeddness of Religion in America**

---

### **2.1 Differences of Religious Development**

Unlike Australia, America was explored and settled by a number of European countries. While Christianity was the founding faith of both nations, the importance of religious practice in the social context was dissimilar. While the 1620 landing at New Plymouth was marked with Bible readings and prayers, when Governor Phillip landed at Sydney Cove in January 1788, the British flag was raised and only military - not religious - rites were carried out.<sup>26</sup> In America, many of the colonies were founded by those escaping religious persecution, while Australia was established as a convict settlement.

In America, many of the States had exclusive establishment of one denomination. As this changed, agreement to support religion but not prescribe particular religious tenets was reached.<sup>27</sup> As noted in Chapter 4, Australia was initially established for the rehabilitation of convicts - the role of religion was to aid this rehabilitation. For a time, the Church of England maintained the role of official State religion, but this was short-lived.<sup>28</sup> Both nations developed various Christian denominations, experienced sectarian differences, and settled for a generic public religion that integrated into civic society. This thesis suggests that this process has been more socially, politically and religiously significant in America than Australia.

---

<sup>26</sup>Mol, Hans. *Op. cit.*, 1.

<sup>27</sup>Kidd, Colin. "Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America." *The Historical Journal* 42.4 (1999): 1025.

<sup>28</sup>Hogan, Michael, *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

The Revival Phase of the First Great Awakening (1730–1760) saw an increase in membership for the Baptist and Methodist churches and a decline in membership of the Anglicans. The growth among the Baptists and Methodists was augmented by the American slaves. America’s Revolutionary War, in which it won independence from Great Britain, saw people across sectarian divides working together for freedom.<sup>29</sup> Australia maintained ties with its English ancestry and monarch, thereby significant allegiance and membership in the Church of England. There is a further legacy of this period: America developed a complex network of symbols, traditions, rituals and practices deriving from the religious enthusiasm of the Great Awakening that were assimilated into a civic religion to which there was no parallel in Australia.<sup>30</sup>

In summary, lack of Australian specific research material has made it difficult to determine whether the impact of religious revivals (Awakenings) linked to technological and social change have been experienced in Australia to the same extent in Australia. However, I have sought to show that similarities do exist.

## **2.2 The Great Awakenings**

This thesis has sought to explore Robert Fogel’s model of the Great Awakenings for two reasons. First to see if changes that took place during the Great Awakenings in America resonated with changes in Australia, second, to explore any similarities between the developments of RIPA organisations in both nations. Fogel noted that the leaders of the Second Great Awakening (1800-1920) preached the imminence of the millennium, and the need for personal and social perfection (post-millennial doctrine). An array of reform movements, including the temperance movement, became established during the political phase of this Awakening (1840-1870).

I have noted in Chapter 4, that during this period, organisations that were similar in nature and agenda existed in Australia. American temperance movements sought to convince individuals to cease drinking. By the end of the second phase, however the temperance movement turned to the government to pass legislation that would restrict the flow of alcohol. In Australia, organisations such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union also transitioned their agenda this way.

---

<sup>29</sup>“United States History.” [Encyclopaedia Encarta](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_1741500823_3/United_States_History.html). 15 Sept. 2006. <[http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\\_1741500823\\_3/United\\_States\\_History.html](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_1741500823_3/United_States_History.html)>.

<sup>30</sup> I am here referring back to the discussion of symbols, traditions, and rituals that I mentioned in Chapter 3 that are unique to America. Some of these are discussed in the next section.

Other areas of social change that Fogel links to the Great Awakenings in America that also occurred in Australia include the moves to compulsory education and the emergence of the women's suffrage movements of the Second Great Awakening. Similarly, the labour reforms of the second phase of the Third Great Awakening (1830-1970) were also the political agenda of churches in Australia (see Chapter 4, section 3.1). The rise of the women's rights movements and the Christian countermovements of this period is another similarity in both nations.

In the US during the decline phase of the Third Great Awakening (1970 - ) political groups of the religious right were formed. This included the Christian Coalition. In Chapter 5, I have identified a similar group, the Logos foundation, forming in Australia. Just as the number of RIPA organisations have developed in the US since then so have they in Australia.

### **2.3 Civic Religion and Creedal Passion**

In America, religious political passion and creedal passion are enmeshed in the *American Creed*; therefore, American culture has a strong civic religion in which Christian rituals and practices enjoy a very public role. Language such as, "*God Bless America*" and social practices like Thanksgiving Day supports the Creed.

The intertwining of religious symbolism and the American Creed is not replicated in Australia, which holds a different notion of Christianity as a public religion. Australia's Coat of Arms - the equivalent of the American National Emblem - does not refer to God, whereas the American version contains "In God We Trust" and appears on American currency. From 1994, Australians may exclude God from their *Pledge of Commitment* when undertaking Australian citizenship - not so in America where they proclaim "*one Nation under God*". In addition, Australians do not recite the pledge of commitment on a regular basis. By way of contrast, America's is recited regularly in schools and at public events. These powerful symbols of the American psyche have no direct counterpart in Australia. The symbols of civic religion create a connection between the religious and the public in ways unseen in Australia. Consequently, RIPA organisations in America are able to exploit these connections in ways Australian organisations cannot.

Huntington's linking of religious political passion, the American Creed and the IVI gap theory is insightful for American politics; however, it has limited applicability in Australia. Firstly, Australia has no Creed in the American sense and secondly, Australia does not have a strong civic religion. As

noted in Chapter 3, the American Creed is central to Huntington's argument, as it is through this medium that the ideals of American democracy are expressed. Consequently, this acts as a benchmark to measure democratic practices and identify the gap between what is and what should be. The response to this gap or creedal passion creates political activity and controversy.

Because of the importance of the American Creed and the strength of America's civic religion, the perceived dominance of the Religious Right could be attributed to a response to the Ivl gap. Organisations are outcomes of religious passion that cite the American Creed as the ideal for their political activity - it is openness of religious discussion and the function of civic religion that promotes RIPA organisations. In Australia, RIPA organisations could operate because of an Ivl gap; however, they do not have a Creed to use as model for an ideal society. As stated above, Australia has no strong civic religion that allows discussion of issues in ways occurring in America. For example, in the prelude to the American Presidential Elections, many of the major candidates as part of their political campaigning make their religious beliefs known. Their success is decided by who will appeal to the religious liberal or conservative voters. Civic religion constructs the discussion of religion and politics in America. In contrast, an Australian political candidate's religious beliefs are referred to on occasion. Comments - usually negative in nature - appear in the media when a political candidate participates in religious events, such as *Hillsong*. However, in general the wider Australian community does not deem religion, including a political candidate's faith an important campaign issue.

### **3. The Christian Faith: Internal Issues that affect RIPA**

---

Debate concerning theological change in the context of RIPA is a popular topic in American literature; this is not so in Australia. As noted, this has made comparative work challenging and therefore difficult to draw specific conclusions. In general terms, it may be deduced that theological interpretations and changes in theological thought are similar in both nations.

In America, these internal religious transformations are viewed as the motivation behind the Christian political Right and Left. Is Australia also experiencing similar divisions? My sense is that RIPA in Australia is fundamentally different and Hunter's culture war thesis does not resonate with the Australian experience. There is no concerted political Christian Right opposed to an equally concerted political Christian Left existing in Australia as in America. Is this disparity a result of the external historical differences that were discussed in the previous section of this chapter?

Alternatively, is it something internal to the nature of Christianity and churches that account for these differences in RIPA? This thesis suggests that it is both.

### **3.1 Denominationalism: Religious Realignment and RIPA**

Hunter's cultural war thesis makes the claims that denominational division in American have become less significant and divisive.

In the 1960s in America, research that collected material on denominational differences was published. The discovery was a trend towards relaxing denominational loyalty and identity and an increase in positive sentiment towards the notion of cooperation amongst local churches in community projects, the sharing of facilities and even worship.<sup>31</sup> The social chiasmic or divergence that had previously distinguished adherents of different Christian denominations has become less pronounced. Noting this change, Hunter states:

Whatever the cause, the reality is clear; denominational loyalty receded considerably as a vital element of the religious landscape. It is only against this *backdrop that* one can see the changing place of para-church organizations in religious experience. For here we see something of an institutional inversion: while denominations have become *less* important for the religious life of the republic, para-church organizations-independent organizations often drawing support from a broader inter-denominational base on behalf of a particular political, social, or spiritual mission – have become *more* important. This is particularly true as far as they provide the primary institutional framework within which an even broader and more portentous cultural realignment takes form.<sup>32</sup>

In Australia while denominational identification still appears to have significance, I have noted that in Brisbane there is an increase in the level of cooperation between churches from different denominations. In my area of Brisbane South, pastors are often invited to address the congregations of other denominations. Joint functions such as prayer walks, joint conferences, and shared special events like Christmas and Easter celebrations also occur.

Hunter's insights into the importance of what he described as "para-church organizations-independent organizations" applies equally to America and Australia. In some aspects, RIPA

---

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 88.

organisations create a space where people from varied denominational affiliations or none at all can meet for the purpose of social and political action rather than religious observance. As history has revealed, it is not unusual for Australian congregations to have social, political, and theological beliefs that oppose those officially held by denominations and leaders. RIPA organisations provide a vehicle where by these differences can be expressed.

Denominational loyalties although not as strong as they were in the past are not likely to become redundant in the near future. However, for the growing number of people who do not attend church services but are involved with home fellowships, independent Bible reading groups and House Churches, denominational names hold no significant meaning and it is these people whose political, social and religious views are least understood.

### **3.2 Culture Wars**

While Australia does not experience the ‘entrenched conflict’ between Christian Liberals and Conservatives found in American politics, these differences are becoming more defined. Issues such as the legitimacy of keeping people in detention centres, abortion, the acceptance of all religions as equally valid and support for same-sex relationship registration have created conflict between members of the Christian faith. It is such issues that highlight divisions and form the basis of RIPA - Hunter reinforces this statement:

The associations being formed across traditions among the orthodox and among the progressive are not designed so much to maintain or win adherents against the onslaught of secular modernity but to marshal resources against each other and, more important, against the larger cultural forces that each side represents.<sup>33</sup>

This may be the case in America; however, in Australia these issues are not publicly debated to the same extent as in the US. As a result, these theological, social, and political differences remain implicit.

In my view, in the Australian context, it is debatable that these developments evidence the deepening of division or furthering of conflict as one would expect to see in a Christian “culture war”. In addition, from an Australian perspective, divisions are generally fluid, issue-driven and are not fought in the public arena or at the High Court of Australia. While theological interpretations

---

<sup>33</sup>*ibid.*, 98.

and the political and social agendas that arise from these interpretations in Australia and America are the same, the worldviews with differing moral visions are institutionalized differently.

### 3.3 Theology and RIPA

This thesis has argued that the major theological interpretations relevant to social and political activism amongst Christians are Premillennialism and Postmillennialism. Particularly so if you link these theologies to the Baylor Institute of Religious Studies Survey (discussed in Chapter 2 and following this section) that noted Type A found to be primary premillennialist while Type C were usually Postmillennialist. While theological identity is discussed further in Section 3.4, it is worth noting here that 31.4% of respondents identified themselves through a theological identity. It is through the interpretations of End Times that the inextricable link between theological thought and political action is most apparent.

Generally, traditional theology is predominately Premillennialist,<sup>34</sup> while the progressive or liberal forms of theology are Postmillennialist.<sup>35</sup> The latter theological position focuses on Christ's teaching so that political activism becomes a call for social freedom and economic justice.<sup>36</sup> These translate into, love of humankind - a recreation of Heaven on earth. This is in contrast to the theological Traditionalists whose focus is on economic freedom and righteous living.<sup>37</sup> This leads to notions of human's accountability to God, the lack of moral standards and humankind's "fallen" condition as sinner.

How do these different theologies translate into personal action? This thesis maintains that by understanding the content of the connection between the inspiration (theology) and political activism it is possible to understand why different religious leaders and organisations have different political agendas. This facilitates an understanding of RIPA as the lived experience of Christian activists and exposes the diverse range of religious, political, and social thought and belief that can arise from theological thinking. Simple labels such as, the Christian Right, Christian Left and Fundamentalist conceal these diversities. This applies equally to Australia as America; yet as noted earlier, Australia does not have supra-denominational religiously progressive political left leaning

---

<sup>34</sup>Premillennialist theology relates to Eschatology – when the Messiah returns it will be prior to a great period of tribulation.

<sup>35</sup>Postmillennialist theology also relates to Eschatology – the Messiah will return post tribulation when humankind will be at peace and the Messiah will return to hold his reign on earth.

<sup>36</sup>Hunter, James Davidson. *Op. cit.*, 8-13.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*, 114.



organisations that actively and publically oppose the Christian right as they do in America. This thesis maintains that the difference is Australia's lack of strong civic religion and the contrasting *Constitutions* and Church-State models discussed earlier – it is not that religious thought in Australia is different.

### **3.4 Religious Identity and RIPA**

The survey published in 2006 by the Baylor Institute for Studies of Religion contained two important findings. First, they noted a clear “disconnect between how the media and academics identify American believers and how they identify themselves” – 47.2% of those surveyed identified themselves as “Bible-believing” and 28.5% identified themselves as “Born Again”. In terms of theological identification, 17.6% of those surveyed identified themselves as theologically conservative while 13.8% self identified as theologically liberal.

The other important finding of the survey was the linking of theological concepts of the image and nature of God and political opinion. Moving beyond concepts of denominationalism being the primary deterrent for voting behaviour, their research suggests that it is actually the image and belief about God that shapes political opinion. This then provides insights into both the development and supporter base of supra-denominational lobbying organisations.

The Baylor Institutes findings note that America has a religious landscape that is both deep and complex. There is no reason to suggest that the situation is any different in Australia. Denominations that operate in the US also function in Australia, likewise conservative RIPA organisations. What would be beneficial to understand religious political participation in Australia would be the conducting of a survey as extensive as the Baylor Institute's.

## **4. RIPA Organisations**

---

For the purpose of this thesis, Fogel provides useful insight into RIPA because he examines the interrelationship of religious passion and political action from a unique perspective. As discussed in Chapter 3, Fogel's theory is that rapid development associated with technological change creates cultural, political, and moral crises. Theological crises, as well as political crises are by-products of the extraordinary pace of technological change and economic transformation that has changed human beings - both culturally and physiologically.<sup>38</sup> Fogel's argument is that to understand political

---

<sup>38</sup>Fogel, Robert William. *Op. cit.*, 8.

and ethical trends and forecast future economic developments there must be an understanding of the cycles of religious feeling in American history and the social, economic, and political reform movements (RIPA organisations) it has generated.<sup>39</sup> Research drawing from disciplines such as religion, politics, history, and social sciences in a comparative study with social political and religious change in Australia would be insightful. Particularly so if it were associated with technological change and the social, religious and political implications that technological change creates.

This aside, the public visibility of religious inspired political organisations is different in both nations - affecting their ability to function. While Australia has a number of television Evangelists, their overall role is not significant when compared to America. In America, "All observers are agreed that the role of television evangelists, or the electronic church, has been fundamental in the coming to public consciousness of evangelicalism in general and of the New Christian Right in particular".<sup>40</sup>

There are, however, similarities in structure and the agendas of the Christian Political Right in American and Australia. The Right's agenda principally focuses on traditional and moral values, while the Left lobby around social justice and individual worth. Both countries use similar tactics. In America, the Christian Political Right has become skilled at presenting itself and adopting language that propels them into the broader political conservative coalitions of the Political Right. RIPA organisations in Australia seem to have avoided the extent of alignment with political parties - with the exception of Santamaria and the Labor Party of old.<sup>41</sup> Religiously conservative lobbying organisations show no sign of infiltrating political parties but are eager to develop relationships with both sides of the political spectrum. In America, organisations, such as *the Freedom Council* not only donated finances to the Republican Party but also actively encouraged its members to join warning, "experience has shown it is best not to say you are entering politics because of your Christian belief".<sup>42</sup> Countless publications and academic writing explore the influence of the Christian Political Right, its sponsoring of candidates and influence in George Bush's presidency and administration. The interest is so deep that the Cornell University has constructed a website that monitors the activities of the Religious Right in the US Government. Called *TheocracyWatch*, a project of the *Centre of Religion, Ethics and Social Policy* it claims that the Republican Party has become a "party of

---

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>40</sup>Bruce, Steve. *The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 137.

<sup>41</sup>While many commentators have connected the Family First Political Party to the Assemblies of God Church, the Party has not always followed Christian conservative political opinion – see my comments in Chapter 5.

<sup>42</sup>Martin, William. *Op. cit.*, 265-66.

theocracy".<sup>43</sup> In Australia, concerns have been voiced that the Religious Political Right or religious organisations, such as *the Exclusive Brethren* hold the same level of influence - this remains unsubstantiated, and accordingly to Tom Frame, largely because it is untrue.

In 1953, the American Federal Income Tax-exemption Status was adapted to limit political involvement by tax-exempt organisations.<sup>44</sup> Debate concerning its affect on political activity in America was noted in Chapter 5. Australian RIPA and church organisations have no such restrictions. Given this freedom, it is somewhat surprising that organisations in Australia are not more outspoken.

In Australia, public discussions of RIPA is usually limited to comments on issues relating to Church-State dialogue and whether or not religious leaders have an entitlement to comment on issues outside their respective churches. As noted in Chapter 5, Section 2.3, occasionally a politician's personal faith serves as topic for a book or conversation making headlines for a short period. Of late, interviews with a small number of people attending Pentecostal churches have also become a popular way of examining RIPA. While these positions are worthwhile, from a political point of view, other forms of RIPA are just as important, yet seldom discussed.

Writing on the political influence of Christians in Australia, both Lohrey and Maddox believe the Religious Right in America is often cited as an example of the negative influence that these RIPA organisations could have or are having in Australia. They also believe that should the Christian Political Right gain more power in Australia it would be counter-productive. They would create their own backlash, ensuring their influence is limited. Both state their hopes that religious pluralism will create an equilibrium that will limit Christian Right political activity. These authors suggest that the entrenched conflict between Christian Political Conservatives and Liberals found in America will occur in Australia.

My response is to question whether this is really the case. To date, entrenched conflict between Christian political conservatives and liberals in Australia has not occurred nor is there any indication of this occurring. To understand the RIPA organisations in Australia it becomes important to explore

---

<sup>43</sup>"The rise of the Religious Right in the Republican Party." Theocracy Watch. 21 Aug. 2008.  
<<http://www.theocracywatch.org/>>.

<sup>44</sup>Exemption Requirements. The information on the United States Department of Treasury website states, "To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization ... may not be an action organisation, i.e., it may not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities". Inland Revenue Service. 1 May 2007.  
<<http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html>>.

this question - not from a position of whether the organisations are similar - but whether they are able to operate and influence politics in the same manner. To support my position, I have examined the historical legacies, as well as the development of the Christian religion in both nations and church-state models. In this process, I have discovered that there are significant historical and cultural differences that do not evidence this claim.

While acknowledging the existence of politically left church-institutionalized organisations, this thesis will now explore two supra-denominational Australian RIPA organisations: one is the politically right, *Salt Shakers*; the other, the *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)*, which has transformed from lobbying a politically right agenda to a more 'centred-left' platform. The *ACL*, the focus of the next chapter has taken on a leadership role within the RIPA movement; therefore, it may be considered one of the most prominent of all organisations in Australia.

## **5. Conclusion and Final Thoughts**

---

This thesis has examined the concerns of Australian commentators who suggest that religious political activism in this country will follow the precedent set in the US. Primarily, their concerns rest on the prominence of the Religious Right in US public life, particularly its political influence. The growth of Pentecostalism, tele-evangelism and other imitations of US has led them to suggest that RIPA in Australia is heading toward the same outcome.

The comparative work of the last three chapters suggests that these fears are unfounded. The nature of religious tradition in Australia is different to that of the US; it does not create the same salience of religious commitment to moral agendas in Australian public life. Religiously inspired symbolism and references do not have the same prominence and resonance in public life in Australia as they do in the US. The concept of civic religion, drawing on Christian traditions and symbols has a salience and meaning in the US context that has no equivalent in Australia.

The history and current accommodations of Church-State relations in Australia are quite different from those of the US. The post 1947 judicial clarification of the separation of Church and State in the US is a significant source of symbolic conflict and a mobilizing stance of RIPA in the US. *The Australian Constitution* does not involve statements of religious freedom and the Australian High Court has not seen it as principle. Since the early 1970s, successive Australian Governments have recognized churches' non-religious activities in education and welfare as equivalent to that of any

community group and regulated, managed and funded these activities in a system of pragmatic pluralism.

Examining religious movements internally, I have suggested that Christian theological traditions in the US are somewhat distinct. The predominance of Protestant evangelism in the US means that differences in the details of Protestant theology became the most visible and public areas of religious dispute and contestation. Thus, the shift towards liberal theological positions initiated with the Social Gospel Movements of the 1880s and 1890s created the backlash of Fundamentalism as a theological movement in the 1920s. These lines of division became sharply etched in the 1960s when the next wave of liberal theological thinking emerged. The heightened religious differences of this time stimulated a revival of fundamentalist churches that laid the groundwork for theological conservatism, which in turn, was mobilized by the *Moral Majority* and the *Christian Right*.

Religious conflict in Australia was more focused on the traditional sectarian divides of Catholic and Protestant. The opposition of liberal and fundamentalist theologies does not have a longstanding antagonism as in the US. New division came to Australia with the advent of the 1960s liberal theology in the established churches and public life. Charismatic and Pentecostal churches, with their socially conservative outlooks, appealed to people disaffected with theological liberalism and made rapid advances - largely at the expense of established churches. Overall, the number of members of Pentecostal/Charismatic religions' when compared to the general Christian population of Australia remains quite small.

The next two chapters present case studies of two RIPA organisations in Australia.

## Chapter 7: Examples of RIPA Organisations in Contemporary Australia

### Case Study One: The Australian Christian Lobby

---

<b>Introduction to Chapters 7 and 8</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>1. The Beginnings: The Australian Christian Coalition</b>	<b>152</b>
1.1 Structure of the Organisation	153
1.2 Supporters and Finances	154
1.3 Relationships with other Organizations	155
1.4 Early Strategy and Campaign Practices	156
1.5 The First Campaign: The Northern Territory Euthanasia Legislation	156
<b>2. Reinvention: The Australian Christian Coalition becomes the Australian Christian Lobby</b>	<b>159</b>
2.1 Restructuring	160
2.2 ACL Supporters	164
2.3 Relationships with other Organisations	166
2.4 Strategies	168
<b>3. Two Campaigns for the ACL</b>	<b>172</b>
3.1 Campaign One: Tasmania's Same-Sex Couples Legislation	172
3.2 Campaign Two: The Federal Government's Marriage Amendment Act	174
<b>4. Summary</b>	<b>175</b>

## Introduction to Chapters 7 and 8

---

The focus of this thesis now turns to two case studies of RIPA organisations: the *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)* and *Salt Shakers*. In 1995, I began researching these organisations as the foundation of my thesis and continued this work over a thirteen-year period. In following their development, questions concerning the organisations including what they were, what they hoped to achieve and where they aligned (religiously and politically) were raised.

Since the 1970s, issues of lifestyle choices, where life begins, and the use of illegal drugs caused division internal and external to denominations. Additionally, the demand for inter-faith dialogue, principally by theologically and politically Liberal Christians has also heightened divisions. Like other religions, the Christian religion is not homogenous. It is divided into factions, movements, traditions, and parties. People within the same denomination maintain different opinions on moral and social issues that affect political outcomes. These opinions are often different to the official teachings of a particular church; therefore, RIPA organisations become a voice for these people. Of importance when discussing RIPA organisations and their supporters - whether theologically or politically Conservative or Liberal – is that many religious people view politics through a lens of faith - particularly so for many Pentecostal and Charismatic denominations.

I have contended that identity, based upon the perspective of God's nature, His relationship with humankind and his expectations of them are pivotal to the identity of organisations and their supporters. Further, that that it is theological interpretations that underlie notions of Pre and Postmillennialism that both facilitates and drives political and social action.

Unlike many of their predecessors, the *ACL* and *Salt Shakers* are non-denominational (supra-denominational), theologically traditional, and politically conservative. In contrast to the United States, strong, progressive, exclusively political focused supra-denominational, theologically liberal groups seem nonexistent in Australia.

In the past, church-based lobby organisations were predominately single-issue organisations; in contrast, the *ACL* and *Salt Shakers* lobby with respect to a range of issues. A significant factor contributing to these organisations is their leadership who are a blend of the religious and the political - where congregational leaders have predominately but not exclusively led religious lobbying organisations of the past. Despite the leadership of these two organisations being

members of a congregation and holding lay leadership positions within their respective churches, they were also employed in the wider secular community. Both organisations were formed independently in the mid 1990s: the *ACL* in Brisbane, *Salt Shakers* in Melbourne. As they stand-alone and are non-denominational, their appeal is widespread. In some ways, they reflect a new approach to the all-important relationship between the Church and State.

*The Australian Christian Lobby* is the focal point of this chapter. Beginning with the development of the *Australian Christian Coalition (ACC)* as it was once known, Section 1 concludes with discussion of the defining issue that was fundamental to the development of the organisation. This highlighted the developmental weaknesses of the organisation that decreased its supporter base. This section examines agenda setting and prioritization of issues, the *ACC's* audience, and its relationship with Christian denominations. Significant changes within the organisation that occurred at the start of the millennium that affected its workings and structure are discussed in Section 2. Two specific campaigns with differing degrees of success are highlighted in Section 3 with the purpose of illustrating the evolution of the organisation and function as a movement organisation.

The research conducted on the *ACL* has been from primary sources and personal investigation. Specifically, in 1996 I met John Gagliardi, John McNicoll (two founding members), Jock McLean, and Caroline Cormack (Executive members). In that year, I assisted in the development of their supporter database. In June 2000, I attended their first Queensland Conference on the Gold Coast as an observer, circulating a supporter questionnaire; first interviewed its Managing Director Jim Wallace and John Miller and reinterviewed John McNicoll. Due to large numbers of supporters, a complete survey was impractical; therefore, a sample group of attendees were questioned.

Attending the next *Queensland State Conference* in 2001, I again met Jim Wallace. For the next twelve months, I spent time in the Queensland office on a weekly basis and attended monthly committee meetings as an observer. In 2002, I again attended the *Queensland State Conference* and was asked to join the Queensland Executive committee but declined. During the 2004 Federal Election campaign, I spent considerable time in the Brisbane office with the Queensland State Director. During this time, I observed strategies and noted how issues were addressed by the organisation. I also attended *Meet the Candidate Forums* and gained access to archived documents, including those held in the Queensland office. From 2002 to 2005, I attended the annual *National Conferences* in Canberra, meeting with Jim Wallace on each occasion.



From 1995, I have continually monitored their activities, including viewing their websites, media releases and general alerts sent to supporters. I had email and telephone contact with David Yates, the Chief of Staff in the Canberra National office in 2004. The following year I had similar contact with Robert Law, the Research Officer in Canberra. I have monitored other organisations' comments regarding the *ACL*, had email contact with the Honourable Kevin Andrews MP, and sought media articles about the *ACL*. While no specific research has been conducted on the *ACL*, I have noted the comments made by Marion Maddox (2005), Amanda Lohrey (2006) and Tom Frame (2006) that briefly refer to the group in their books.

## **1. The Beginnings: The Australian Christian Coalition**

---

In 1995, the *Australian Christian Coalition (ACC)* was founded by four men of different denominational affiliation and backgrounds. At this time, three resided in Canberra, the fourth in Brisbane. Essentially, the organisation was the brainchild of John Gagliardi, a lay leader of the large Pentecostal *Christian Outreach Centre* in Brisbane. His stated vision was to create an organisation that would have political influence on behalf of all Christians, regardless of denomination. Promotional material stated that the organisation was to protest against "humanistic legislation" and "minority organisations". Gagliardi's background was in journalism and he held the roles of Editor of the *Townsville Bulletin* and anchorman for the Channel 10 News. With a double Masters degree in business and politics, he later owned and operated a business in Brisbane. John McNicoll, a retired Baptist Minister, turned lobbyist in Canberra before his involvement with the *Australian Christian Coalition*. John Miller, a Baptist held lay leadership positions within his church. The fourth co-founder, John Murphy was from the Church of Christ and was previously a member of the Liberal Party on the Gold Coast, then stood as an Independent before joining Fred Nile's the Christian Democrats.<sup>1</sup> Although the board was inter-denominational, according to the *Christian Research Association*, Pentecostals initially heavily supported the Coalition.<sup>2</sup>

The launching of this new organisation received media coverage, particularly from the *Courier-Mail*. In an article titled 'Values Test for Pollies' published on October 2 1995, readers were informed that the *ACC* was about to launch its Queensland branch. Its purpose was stated as taking "an active role in the federal campaign, supporting candidates judged to have upheld Christian beliefs and family values, and campaigning against those who have not". The article quoted Executive Director, John

---

<sup>1</sup>Background information obtained from attending church functions where John Gagliardi spoke on the beginning of the organisation, giving his own testimony occurred in 1998.

<sup>2</sup>"Pentecostals in Political Push". *The Courier-Mail*. 11 Nov. 1996, 4.

McNicoll as saying the ACC would encourage Christians in Mansfield Queensland to withhold support for ALP candidate, Michael Lavarch (Seat of Dickson) in favour of another ALP candidate, Kevin Rudd (Seat of Griffith), because he “stood up for Christian family values” whereas they said Lavarch did not.<sup>3</sup> Bronwyn Pike in her research on the *Lyons Forum* commented that; “The participation of Christians in the political process is enthusiastically promoted by the ACC and the existence of the Lyons Forum is a testament to this philosophy”.<sup>4</sup>

Further articles publicizing the new organisation appeared in the *Courier-Mail* during October 1995.<sup>5</sup> Favourable coverage continued through 1996 and 1997; however, by 1998 media reports diminished, perhaps because of Gagliardi’s resignation from the Coalition when he left Australia, moving his business to Hong Kong.

The newspaper articles noted above highlight that McNicoll and Gagliardi were intent on the *ACL* publicly supporting some candidates across the political spectrum, while equally opposing others by naming certain politicians that the *Coalition* would not support.

In the beginning, the *Australian Christian Coalition* acknowledged six principles by which it operated. These were, social justice - “justice equally applied to all”; active compassion - “serving our neighbours in love”; respect for life; “good stewardship of God-given natural resources”; reconciliation – “breaking down barriers” and empowerment of people.<sup>6</sup> The *ACL* identified itself as a politically non-aligned, independent organisation of individual Australians who stood for “Christian values” and the “teaching of Jesus Christ”. However, these concepts were not clearly defined. The organisation was incorporated as a private company rather than a non-profit organisation as many similar organisations are.

### **1.1 Structure of the Organisation**

---

The original structure (as released in 1995/96) was to include a National Executive Board, National Board, State Executive Board and supporters. The National Board and National Executive were to act as houses of review. Both National and State Executives directly linked to a special purpose committee, including a research team of specialists in particular areas. Initially, branches were

---

<sup>3</sup>“Values Test for Pollies.” *The Courier-Mail*. 02 Oct. 1995, 3.

<sup>4</sup>Pike, Bronwyn. *A Lyons Share of Power: the influence of the religious right on contemporary Australian politics*. Melbourne: Evatt Victoria Centre, 1998.

<sup>5</sup>These dates include: 9<sup>th</sup> October 1995, 2; 21<sup>st</sup> October 1995, 11<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> October 1995, 3.

<sup>6</sup>Stated in an ACC promotional flyer, 1996.

established in several states; however, with the death of a founding member (John McNicoll), the structure failed. During these early years, (1995–1999) committee members came and went, causing a loss of representation in Victoria, NSW, and the ACT. Only the Queensland office of the ACC remained and functioned with voluntary staff.

## **1.2 Supporters and Finances**

---

Principally, the organisation was supported by monthly, annual, or one-off donations from individuals, businesses, and churches. Two original board members (Gagliardi and McNicoll) with high profiles in their communities initiated the first supporter drive. McNicoll believed the organisation should be a grassroots movement involving parishioners rather than church leadership. Gagliardi, the more influential of the two, focused his efforts on both leaders and laity. Together they became the driving force of the organisation. A graduate of the Christian Outreach Bible College, Carolyn Cormack became involved in the *Australian Christian Coalition*. Fulfilling a leadership role in Queensland, from 1996, Cormack attended different denominational conferences, as well as churches to promote the organisation and sign supporters.

At the 1995 *Christian Outreach Centre's (COC) International Conference* with the support of the President of the COC movement, the ACC was launched. The promotion of this organisation by the COC leadership legitimated its charter, resulting in an influx of supporter applications. However, supporters were not restricted to the one denomination but were drawn from a range, including the Assemblies of God. The exact number of supporters varies with Cormack stating the number had increased to around 60 000 people,<sup>7</sup> while McNicoll contradicted the figure in a *Sunday Mail*<sup>8</sup> interview claiming the supporter base was approximately 100 000 people.<sup>9</sup> From the supporter applications that I examined, supporters represented all Christian denominations. There were two categories of supporters established - those that made financial contributions and those that did not. Monthly newsletters - the main form of communication at that time (1995–1998) - were posted to financial and non-financial supporters and church leaders. If email addresses had been provided, both financial and non-financial members were sent E-newsletters.

---

<sup>7</sup>Background information obtained from Cormack (Board Member and Queensland State Representative) in a telephone interview conducted on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2001.

<sup>8</sup>"Boycott Call For Kids film." *Sunday Mail*. 21<sup>st</sup> Jan. 1996, 5 and "Candidates Now Face Ten Commandments". *The Courier Mail*. 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb. 1996, 15.

<sup>9</sup>It is entirely possible that the ACC like other organisations, such as the *Australian Christian Churches* have counted every congregation member as a supporter if the leadership of that church is supportive of the organisation. However, I was in a position to witness the number of applications to join the organisation collected after the Northern Territory Euthanasia Issue and saw thousands of forms waiting to be processed.

The public launch of the organisation and strong public support was a major disaster. No administrative structure was created to respond to public inquiries. Office staff and programs for supporter databases were unavailable, so Brisbane volunteers designed programs for them. Before the task was completed, this responsibility was transferred to a Board member in Canberra. In interviews with Board Members,<sup>10</sup> I was informed that the person overseeing the project, McNicoll died unexpectedly in 1996; therefore, some information, including financial data and sections of the database were misplaced.

In 1995, following an attempt by another organisation to infiltrate the ACC, a decision to tighten screening of office holders was established. McNicoll sent a letter to Gagliardi stating he had discovered a committee member of the *Logos Foundation*<sup>11</sup> sought to use the ACC for his own political agenda.<sup>12</sup>

### **1.3 Relationships with other Organizations**

---

In 1995, an attempt to seek affiliation with the *Christian Coalition* in the United States was made.<sup>13</sup> In a letter to the US organisation, the ACC asked for materials, such as mission statements, aims, objectives, and structure that could be used to establish the ACC in Australia. In the early stages of the ACC's development, they connected with the *Strategic Leadership Network* in New Zealand.<sup>14</sup> Becoming active within the *Euthanasia-No Coalition*, the ACC networked with a number of organisations, including the Catholic, *Australian Family Association* founded by Bob Santamaria.<sup>15</sup> The *Euthanasia-No Coalition* and the ACC's involvement is discussed further in Section 1.5.

---

<sup>10</sup> Information I received at the National Conference in 2003.

<sup>11</sup>In some ways, the *Logos Foundation* was a pre-cursor to the *Australian Christian Coalition*. In 1989, it involved itself in the Queensland State election; however, according to Wikipedia, its actions caused mainstream Church and religious organisations to distance themselves from it. "Logos Foundation". [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logos_Foundation_%28Australia%29). 21 Sep. 2007. <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logos\\_Foundation\\_%28Australia%29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logos_Foundation_%28Australia%29)> The *Logos Foundation* was extreme in its ideology and theology. This was of concern to the founders of the *Australian Christian Coalition*.

<sup>12</sup>This information was found in a letter to John Gagliardi from John McNicoll in the archive material on the ACC.

<sup>13</sup>Letter from John Gagliardi to Dr. Ralph Reed, *Christian Coalition*, USA, dated 19 July 1995.

<sup>14</sup>*The Network* was set up in Wellington in 1994 as a conservative lobbying group. It collapsed in 1996 before the Elections.

<sup>15</sup>Bob Santamaria was a political activist, ardent anti-Communist, committed anti-Feminist and devout Catholic who had one of the most controversial careers of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century in Australia.

#### **1.4 Early Strategy and Campaign Practices**

---

Their original strategy was stated as advising business people and church leaders on legislation likely to affect their business, such as *the Sexual Discrimination Bill* and *the Privacy Act*. In doing so, they acknowledged the importance of cultivating and maintaining strong relationships with other Christian organisations, including church and denominational leaders. The ACC's leadership were also involved in parliamentary advisory committees from 1996 to 1998. They also focused on other organisations that identified as anti-Christian, including the Homosexual Lobby because of their plans to seek the support of the United Nations if they were unsuccessful in Australia.

During elections, the ACC contacted candidates asking a series of questions; their replies were collated and given to supporters as a 'How to Vote Guide'. The effectiveness of this technique was never been validated. During elections, political candidates are inundated with questionnaires from a myriad of organisations - all but Independents being constrained in the answers by Party platform and ideologies. I noted that many of the non-independent candidates were reluctant to respond to these questionnaires and in some cases in Queensland; they stated they were told not to respond.<sup>16</sup>

#### **1.5 The First Campaign: The Northern Territory Euthanasia Legislation**

---

The *Australian Christian Coalition* was still in its establishment phase when the Northern Territory Government introduced legislation to legalize euthanasia. While this issue was not the catalyst for the foundation of the organisation, it aided its growth. Through this issue, the ACC received recognition by the media as a source of reference, more importantly it was able to build networks with organisations and selected politicians.

In February 1995, the then Northern Territory Chief Minister, Marshall Perron first introduced a bill to legalize medically assisted suicide for consenting adults diagnosed with less than twelve months to live.<sup>17</sup> The Assembly first voted on the *Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill* on May 25<sup>th</sup> 1995. *The Bill* was read a second time, passing with 15-10. The final reading came after a ten-hour debate.<sup>18</sup> The legislation was challenged in the Supreme Court and the High Court; however, these failed and the Bill stood awaiting proclamation.

---

<sup>16</sup>When working as a volunteer in Queensland, I completed follow up phone calls to candidates who failed to respond to the ACC's questionnaire.

<sup>17</sup> Catholic MP's told to Vote No. *The Courier Mail*. 2 Feb. 1995. 26 Sep. 2002. <[www.newstext.com.au/archives](http://www.newstext.com.au/archives)>.

<sup>18</sup>Euthanasia Bill Passes First Test. *The Courier Mail*. 25 May 1995. 26 Sep. 2002. <[www.newstext.com.au/archives](http://www.newstext.com.au/archives)>.

### 1.5.1 The Strategy

Those opposing the *Bill* included Christian organisations and church leaders, many of whom united under the banner of *Euthanasia-No*.<sup>19</sup>

During interviews with Cormack,<sup>20</sup> Gagliardi, and Miller,<sup>21</sup> I was informed that their main strategy had been to ensure that the biblical representation on euthanasia was not neglected in the debate. From this, came a working relationship with Kevin Andrews MP who the ACC claimed, advised them on possible strategies.

Contacting church leaders all over Australia, the ACC argued that the legislation was “morally wrong” and “socially dangerous”. It encouraged leaders to inform congregations of the ACC’s desire for opponents to write letters to Federal politicians to seek intervention. Templates for a variety of pro-forma letters created by the *Euthanasia-No Coalition*<sup>22</sup> were distributed by the ACC who also informed churchgoers on how to write their own letters to Members of Parliament and Senators. These pro forma letters, 4 of which were addressed to the Senate and 16 to the House of Representatives discussed a wide range of concerns regarding the Northern Territory Legislation. According to Cormack, in a three-week period, the ACC and the *Euthanasia-No Coalition* collected approximately 40 000 letters opposing the legislation.

In an effort to increase awareness about the debate, the *Australian Christian Coalition* held a meeting in Parliament House in Brisbane, also releasing a position paper on palliative care (*ACC policy paper number fifty-four*). The paper was based on information supplied by *Trust*’s<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup>*Euthanasia-No* described itself as “a communications and resource centre for the coalition of diverse community interests united against the legislation of euthanasia. It is not a membership organisation but a coordinating body for the specific limited purpose of the current campaign. It was formed at a meeting in NSW Parliament House in mid 1995 which was co-chaired by members of the Labor, Liberal and National Parties ... The meeting was called following reports that a euthanasia bill was to be introduced to the NSW Parliament.” This coalition disbanded after the Federal Government introduced legislation that effectively overrode the Northern Territory’s Government legislation. This information was documented in the archive of *the Australian Christian Lobby*, Nathan Campus, Griffith University.

<sup>20</sup>Cormack had recently completed Bible College at the *Christian Outreach Centre*. During the course, Cormack- also a nurse- wrote a paper on euthanasia. She argued that the concept was morally wrong and socially dangerous, as well as being an attack on the Church. This paper was used as background to the ACC’s involvement in this issue.

<sup>21</sup>Interviews were conducted in 1998 at the *Australian Christian Lobby Queensland Conference*.

<sup>22</sup>According to the *Queensland Right To Life Association*, the *Euthanasia-No Organisation* was established in August 1995. A confidential number of politicians from the three major political parties drew major support from pro-life organisations, Christian churches, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Ba'hai and other non-Christian organisations, disability organisations, medical, legal and nurse organisations, palliative care institutions and *the Australian Christian Coalition*. Euthanasia. *Queensland Right to Life*. 24 April 2005. <<http://www.qrtl.org.au/euth/greg.htm>> This is a different account to Maddox’s in *God Under Howard* (Allen & Unwin 2005), which relied on the political editor of *The Australian* newspaper’s account of the organisation which was given as a “highly organised bipartisan parliamentary network”. (64).

<sup>23</sup>*Trust* is a national body of doctors and lawyers opposed to euthanasia who promoted palliative care as an alternative to early death.

Queensland representative, Dr David Van Gend.<sup>24</sup> The purpose of the paper was to discuss the notion of compassion as an expression of palliative care, as well as provide a working definition of euthanasia.

Still having the favour of the Christian Outreach Centre,<sup>25</sup> an ACC article on euthanasia was printed in its national *Outreach Magazine*<sup>26</sup> - copies were disseminated to all congregations in Australia.

### 1.5.2 Outcome

The Federal Government responded to pressure and acted swiftly. Within one month of the Northern Territory's Legislative Assembly passing the legislation, the Senate, initiated by members of the Lyons Forum,<sup>27</sup> proposed *A Matter of Public Interest* debate.

Kevin Andrews MP also presented a private members bill amending *Schedule 1 of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act of 1978* to the House of Representatives on 10 December 1996. It was designed to restrict the NT Legislative Assembly's right to establish laws that effectively permitted the intentional killing of a person, specifically the act of euthanasia or the withdrawing or withholding of medical support that would prolong life. The bill also contained identical amendments to the *Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1998* and the *Norfolk Island Act of 1979*.<sup>28</sup>

The Senate's Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee held an inquiry receiving submissions at a public hearing on 14 February 1997.<sup>29</sup> Lobbying organisations in attendance included the *Euthanasia-No organisation*, the *Voluntary Euthanasia Societies* and their QC, the *Australian Catholic Bishops' Conference* and the *Coalition of Organisations for Voluntary Euthanasia*, which included the *NSW Council for Civil Liberties*, the *Doctors' Reform Society*, and the *AIDS Council of NSW*. Apart

---

<sup>24</sup>David Van Gend was also a medical advisor to the *Australian Family Association*, both of which were Catholic organisations. The *Australian Family Association* still exists, while *Trust* does not.

<sup>25</sup>The Christian Outreach Centre is a homegrown denomination, similar to the Assemblies of God that originated in America. Christian Outreach Centre is an international denomination claiming to function in over thirty nations.

<sup>26</sup>Euthanasia – what it is and what it is not. [Christian Outreach Centre, Outreach Magazine](#), September 1994. Brisbane: Brisbane Christian Outreach Centre.

<sup>27</sup>This Forum is described as a Shadow Government within the Government, and was extensively involved in the Private Members' Bill that overturned the Northern Territory legislation on voluntary euthanasia. Beware the Lyons sanctuary, [The Weekend Australian](#). 3 May 1997, 2.

<sup>28</sup>Amendment of the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 Bill 1995, [Australian Parliament](#). 2 Aug 1999. <<http://search.aph.gov.au/search/ParlInfo.ASP?action=view&item=6&from=browse&path=Legislation/Old+Bills+Lists&items=12>>.

<sup>29</sup>Those presenting submissions to the committee included Dr Margaret Somerville from McGill University in Canada and the Chief Minister of the ACT Government. Also present were representatives from the Attorney-General's Department, Mr Joseph Santamaria QC and 2 other legal representatives.

from its involvement with the *Euthanasia-No organisation*, the *Christian Coalition* did not present its own submission.

The response towards the *Christian Coalition's* involvement by Liberal politicians who were facing an election was unfavourable. Members of the Liberal Party ostracized Kevin Andrews who introduced the *Private Members' Bill* that resulted in this legislation being overturned. The result was a major conflict between the *Australian Christian Coalition* and Andrews.

In summary, the importance of networking by organisations is clearly demonstrated in the formation of the *Euthanasia-No Coalition*. The outcome for the ACC was a degree of acceptance by sections of the media but also from other organisations, including religious ones. Whether the *Australian Christian Coalition* was the dominant player in the crusade or how effective its strategies were is difficult to gauge. What is apparent is that the issue aided the ACC's momentum and contributed to the growth of the organisation.

## **2. Reinvention: The Australian Christian Coalition becomes the Australian Christian Lobby**

---

Having monitored this organisation since its inception and struggle in the early years to expand as a national organisation, then withdrawing to Queensland as a State organisation, I was personally surprised when the ACC reinvented itself and developed as a national entity. The following section outlines changes undergone by the organisation, suggesting motivations for the change and discussion of its current mode of operation as it seeks to expand its supporter base and sphere of influence.

The *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)* has been influenced by the ideologies of *Sojourners' Jim Wallis*.<sup>30</sup> *The Age Newspaper* noted that; "Brigadier Jim Wallace, founder of the Australian Christian Lobby, said he had read the first few chapters of Mr Wallis' book and agreed with everything. 'Where he's coming from is exactly where the Christian Lobby tries to be.'"<sup>31</sup> In 2007, Wallis wrote, "As I have travelled around the country [USA], one line in my speeches always draws cheers: 'The monologue of the Religious Right is over, and a new dialogue has now begun. We have now entered

---

<sup>30</sup>*Sojourners* are an organisation self-described as providing a "...progressive Christian commentary on faith, politics, and culture. It seeks to build a movement of spirituality and social change." *Sojourners*. <<http://www.sojo.net/>>.

<sup>31</sup>"Christian Warns of Religious Right Rise." *The Age*. 9 April 2006. <<http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/christian-warns-of-religious-rights-rise/2006/04/09/1144521210678.html>>.



the post-Religious Right era. Though religion has had a negative image in the last few decades, the years ahead may be shaped by a dynamic and more progressive faith that will make needed social change more possible.”<sup>32</sup> This approach appears complementary to the doctrines and direction that Wallace is navigating the *ACL* towards. Wallis’ advocacy tends to focus on social justice issues and hence earns primary support from the religious left.

## **2.1 Restructuring**

---

### **2.1.1 New Leadership and a New Name**

The year 2000 saw the *Australian Christian Coalition* undergo several changes; the Executive made a decision to change its name and with the existing Director moving to the USA, a new Managing Director was appointed - the charismatic Jim Wallace,<sup>33</sup> who had had a distinguished career in the military as head of the SAS. He was already known in Canberra.

The first visible change, the adoption of a new name, to the *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)*, was politically and practically motivated.<sup>34</sup> In 2000, the Assemblies of God created a political-networking lobby organisation under the name, the *Australian Christian Churches*, thus both organisations shared the same acronym of *ACC*. This new organisation had affiliate membership<sup>35</sup> outside of the Assemblies of God denomination although the Christian Outreach Centre refused to join. Early press releases stated its aim was to defend the right of Christians expressing their views in public and political forums. Following meetings between both organisations, the *Australian Christian Coalition* chose to change its name. In interviews with Wallace, I was informed the new name primarily reflected the organisation’s purpose - namely lobbying. However, the development of a competitive organisation was viewed by other members of the Executive as a direct threat. While the networking of the *Australian Christian Churches* remained, its lobbying side did not.

---

<sup>32</sup>“The Religious Right Error is Over”. *Time On-Line Magazine*. 15 April 2006. <<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1590782,00.html>>.

<sup>33</sup>Wallace was a soldier for thirty-two years. He commanded the SAS Regiment, the Special Forces Organisation, and the Army’s 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade. He is a graduate of Duntroon, the British Army Staff College, and the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies. He was made a Member of the Order of Australia in 1984 for his services to counter-terrorism.

<sup>34</sup>For ease of readability, the *Australian Christian Lobby* will now be referred to as *the Lobby* or by the acronym of *ACL*.

<sup>35</sup>According to the website of John Mark Ministries, many independent churches are affiliated with the *ACC*, including *Abundant Life Fellowship International*, *Apostolic Churches of Australia*, *Assemblies of God*, *Bethesda Movement of Australia*, *Christian Churches in Australia*, *Christian Life Churches International*, *Riverview Church* in Perth and *Waverley Christian Fellowship* in Melbourne. *Australian Christian Churches*. *John Mark Ministries*. 2 Oct. 2004. <<http://jmm.aaa.net.au/articles/183.htm>>.

### **2.1.2 The New National Office and Organisational Structure**

With the head-office now established and staffed in Canberra the co-ordination of State Directors and their tasks functioned from there. Following the 2004 Federal Elections, the ACL moved into new offices strategically placed in the National Press Club where they took over the defunct Australian Democrats former national office.

The principal task of the State Directors has been to attract supporters and influencing marginal seats in their respective States. Speaking to church organisations and attending denominational meetings to raise their supporter base has continued to be a role of the State Directors. The nature of the work in the Canberra office has been to act as a representative lobbying organisation. Wallace identified his primary task to first develop relationships with leaders of denominations, churches, and politicians and second, to facilitate communication between church leaders and Federal politicians.

Since 2000, a number of other organisational changes have occurred. The organisation has become more centrally controlled with the primary role of individual State offices becoming that of satellite offices with one to three paid workers to maintain administrative support for the State Chair.

The organisational structure has been simplified with the special purpose committee and National and State research teams not functioning as part of the overall structure. With Wallace as Managing Director and the establishment of the national office in Canberra, branches with respective committees in the ACT, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and Western Australia were re-established.

After the re-organisation, the National Board consisted of five Directors, two of which were past Presidents. The Executive committee develops policy and strategy for the Board to approve, directing the activity of the State Executives, implementing Board decisions, and coordinating public relations. They also construct and monitor the annual budget and liaise at a national level with churches, political parties and other lobby organisations.

The State Executive committee consist of a Director appointed by the National Board. Members are invited to join and are appointed by the National Board with the State Director's consultation. The Executive meets monthly - its function is to implement National policy and provide administrative

support. The State Executive - with the approval of the National Executive - conducts State campaigns and public relations exercises. A noteworthy point about the entire structure of the ACL organisation is that it is very centralised and hierarchical in nature.

### **2.1.3 Developing the Organisation: New Initiatives**

A new initiative implemented by the group has been to have staff attend both houses of Parliament (Federal) when they sit in an effort to legitimate their role and lift the status of the organisation.

During the *2003 National Conference*, a sub-organisation the *Young ACL* was formed with a three-fold purpose. First, to activate politically people aged between seventeen and thirty years of age, stressing their role within politics. Second, to assist those interested in future roles as politicians and third, to produce new leaders for the organisation itself. In some respects, this mirrors the strategies of political parties, such as the *Young Liberals* and *Young Labor* organisations. Initially, recruitment for the *Young ACL* drew from Christian groups within universities rather than church organisations or Christian youth organisations. To this end, they have worked with existing organisations, such as *Focus* and *Students for Christ*; therefore, officeholders are required to be active members of these particular Christian organisations. The justification given being that the *Young ACL* leaders will have fellowship with other Christians and continue to be “fed the Word of God” through involvement with these organisations. Conversely, anyone enlisting in the *Young ACL* in the hope of furthering themselves in politics must maintain a level of active faith through regular church attendance. While exact numbers of universities with active branches are unknown, Latrobe, Monash (in its two Melbourne campuses), and Melbourne Universities are current advocates.

In 2007 at the *Australian Gospel Music Festival*, an annual youth event held in Toowoomba, the ACL operated several forums. The aim was to encourage youth to engage in the political process. Issues at the forum included industrial relations, overseas aid, social cohesion, immigration, and the environment. The ACL indicated that they intend to run these forums annually at this event, as well as other large Christian youth events.<sup>36</sup>

The ACL also trialed a pilot project in Canberra where a university student worked in conjunction with a federal politician in an intern-like arrangement. This process has now been extended to State Parliaments and in the form of overseas exchange programs. Links have been developed with the United Future Party, who until recently held the balance of power in New Zealand, as well as with

---

<sup>36</sup>ACL National Newsletter, May 2007.

parties in the UK and America. Senior politicians and backbenchers at both State and Federal levels reportedly offered funding for this project themselves - apparently, seeking to employ young Christian academics.<sup>37</sup> These young people would be offered employment on a part-time basis and full-time work in the holiday periods. The stated purpose was to give these interns firsthand experience in the political arena; likewise, it is an innovative means of connecting the ACL with specific politicians.

In the later part of 2007, the ACL began publishing a quarterly journal called *Debate: debating tomorrow's public policy*. The journal provides "decision makers with refreshing and thought provoking approaches to complex public policy issues". The first issue in November of 2007 covered the federal elections, as well as articles on employment, 'the war on terror', housing affordability and nuclear power. Continuing issues contain no scriptural reference or material on issues, such as abortion or homosexual rights; thus, the journal appears to be avoiding theological labelling and appeals to the Politically Progressive, while attempting to avoid political bias.

A new strategy developed in 2007 has been to create another website designed to "assist the Australian public to respond to political issues in a timely and effective manner". Designed with young people in mind, the webpage discusses a number of current social and political issues, providing the facility to email politicians directly through the page itself.<sup>38</sup>

During the prelude to the 2007 Federal Elections, the ACL designed yet another web page<sup>39</sup> containing information, such as responses from political parties on issues the group deemed significant. Other material on the website included how MPs and Senators voted on conscience issues, as well as information on which female Labor candidates were members of a feminist pro-abortion political network, *Emily's List*.

At the conclusion of 2007, another initiative of the ACL's fifteen to twenty year vision was to launch a training program in partnership with the New Zealand-based, *Compass Foundation*.<sup>40</sup> The training program was designed to "assist top students in attaining strategic and influential positions in their

---

<sup>37</sup>Telephone interview with Mr Dean Hyde, Chief-of-Staff, ACL Canberra, 25 November 2003.

<sup>38</sup>Make A Stand: make polities sit up and listen. [Australian Christian Lobby](http://www.makeastand.org.au/home/index.stw). 4 May 2007. <<http://www.makeastand.org.au/home/index.stw>>

<sup>39</sup>Australian Votes. 19 Aug. 2007. <<http://www.australiavotes.org>>

<sup>40</sup>*Compass* declares that are not an organisation but "a group of people who share a common vision and use our complementary talents together". About Us. [Compass](http://www.compass.org.nz/index.cfm/links/index.cfm/About_Us). 1 Feb. 2008. <[http://www.compass.org.nz/index.cfm/links/index.cfm/About\\_Us](http://www.compass.org.nz/index.cfm/links/index.cfm/About_Us)>

profession. The Compass leadership program was formed with the goal of getting students into these positions”.<sup>41</sup> *The Compass Foundation* has been running the same program in New Zealand for the last five years.

## 2.2 ACL Supporters

---

In a December 2007 press release, Wallace stated the number of ACL supporters at around a half a million people;<sup>42</sup> however, there is no means to verify these figures. The database that was originally held in the Brisbane office before being sent to Canberra in 2002 was significantly lower than these numbers.<sup>43</sup> What happened to the applications by people seeking to support the organisation during the early period of the organisation (1995–1998) that had not been entered into the database is unknown. As mentioned above, it is believed that this was part of the information lost upon the death of McNicoll.

In June 2000, while at the first *National Conference* I asked some delegates to complete a small questionnaire for my research. When asked about the main purpose of the ACL, the responses could be categorised into two groups: first, the promotion of ‘family values’ and secondly, to influence politicians to pass legislation consistent with ‘Christian views or beliefs’ that are held by its supporters. When questioned about whom they voted for on a federal level, it was evident that the majority supported the Liberal-National Coalition. Of the group, only one identified as a member of a political party, fulfilling the role of Councillor in the Logan City Electorate/Division. While recognising the limitations inherent to this small sample of twenty-eight who attended this first meeting, it does provide some information on the demographics of the ACL’s supporters.

In interviews conducted with the Managing Director in 2003,<sup>44</sup> I was informed that over an eight month period, financial supporters increased by 1 500 people. In October 2004, the *Canberra Times* noted that support continued to increase at a rate of approximately 150 supporters per month.<sup>45</sup> This may be accounted to Wallace’s regular trips to the different Australian States. In the April 2007 National newsletter, the ACL claims, “to be the fastest growing lobby group in Australia, with an

---

<sup>41</sup>Interview - David Yates, Co-coordinator, *Compass Australia*. [Australian Christian Lobby](http://www.acl.org.au/national/browse.stw?article_id=18560). 12 Dec. 2007.

<[http://www.acl.org.au/national/browse.stw?article\\_id=18560](http://www.acl.org.au/national/browse.stw?article_id=18560)>

<sup>42</sup>Arrest this abomination. [Australian Christian Lobby](http://www.acl.org.au/national/browse.stw?article_id=18665). 12 Dec. 2007

<[http://www.acl.org.au/national/browse.stw?article\\_id=18665](http://www.acl.org.au/national/browse.stw?article_id=18665)>

<sup>43</sup>I was involved in the distribution of the Queensland newsletters that were sent to a database containing both financial and non-financial members. In 2002, this database was sent to the National office in Canberra where it is now maintained.

<sup>44</sup>Interview conducted in the *ACL National Office* in Canberra on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2003.

<sup>45</sup>Downie, Graham. Christian Lobby Group Continue to Grow. *Canberra Times*. Monday, 11 October 2004. 16 Oct. 2004.

average of 60 to 80 new supporters each month since inception". That would equate to between approximately 5 000 and 6 720 new supporters since 2000. The article further declared that 300 new supporters signed their support in the month of February 2007 alone.<sup>46</sup>

### **2.2.1 Mobilization: Keeping in Touch with Supporters**

Spending considerable time in the Queensland office, I observed a range of communication forms utilised by the organisation. Perhaps one of the most effective approaches to keeping supporters informed and activated was through their system of rapid response teams - divided into email, telephone, fax, letter and prayer teams. The coordination of the project was maintained by a paid office worker. Initially, disseminated information was both detailed and regular; however, with the centralization of the database, communication became less frequent and now appears to have been replaced by weekly emails only.

Generally, the National and State E-newsletters centre on informing rather than activating supporters. The Managing Director explained that issues tend to "expire" after three days; therefore, a monthly newsletter is an inefficient way of activating supporters.<sup>47</sup> In their stead are weekly update emails focusing on the organisation's actions, including its contact with the Christian and non-Christian media.

Notably absent from their newsletters, were Scriptural and Biblical references or language of biblical interpretation and theological overtones, which they had featured prior to 2000. In the 2003 National Conference promotional material, Wallace wrote, "FOR TOO LONG CHRISTIANS...have been perceived as attempting to claw society back to some moral median line, instead of being out there in the debate influencing its progress. Largely this reactionary tag is deserved." The slogan that once appeared on newsletters, "Righteousness exalts a nation - Proverbs 14:34" has been replaced with "Australian Christian Lobby voice for values".

From 2000 to 2004, emails from the National Office became sporadic. Supporters were not informed about several issues in 2004, including the rights of homosexuals to adopt children in the ACT, or that the Queensland Government was seeking public feedback on same-sex adoption. By

---

<sup>46</sup>We're Growing. ACL National Monthly Newsletter. [Australian Christian Lobby](http://www.acl.org.au/pdfs/load_pdf_public.pdf?pdf_id=830&from=national). 1 May 2007. <[http://www.acl.org.au/pdfs/load\\_pdf\\_public.pdf?pdf\\_id=830&from=national](http://www.acl.org.au/pdfs/load_pdf_public.pdf?pdf_id=830&from=national)>.

<sup>47</sup>In an interview with Wallace in 2006 he claimed that the use of the Internet via web pages and periodical emails were now the primary mode of informing and activating supporters.

late 2004, email communication improved although a considerable quantity related to the Federal Government's decision to define marriage in legislation rather than exploring specific State issues.

Today, all emails are formulated and sent from the central office in Canberra on a weekly basis. Generally, the focus remains upon specific social issues. Wallace, in a 2003 interview said that the supporter base would not be inundated with information and requests for action - rather, the *ACL* would be selective about issues it highlights to their supporter base. This is in significant contrast to the original newsletters and emails that covered a diversity of topics.

## **2.3 Relationships with other Organisations**

---

### **2.3.1 Organisations they network with**

Networking with other organisations remains a primary focus and tactic of the *ACL* as it harbours the pooling of resources and expertise and provides a united front on issues. Wallace stated in 2002 that, despite having contact with the *American Christian Coalition* previously, the relationship had dissolved.<sup>48</sup> Instead, with the introduction of the *Young ACL*, relationships are being forged with similar politically motivated groups both in Australia and offshore.

One overseas organisation that has cooperated with the *ACL* is the *Religious Liberty Commission* - an arm of the World Evangelical Alliance that monitors the persecution of Christians around the world. According to Wallace, the *ACL* has united with a representative of the organisation, Elizabeth Kendal who lobbies Federal Parliamentarians on behalf of her organisation.<sup>49</sup>

Nationally, the *ACL* is cooperating with the *National Christian Leaders Organisation* that meets annually in Canberra. Acting as an umbrella organisation, they draw together people from churches and organisations that have a political dimension in their activities. Primarily, the purpose of these meetings is to make associations and discuss current issues and strategies beneficial to campaigns. Collaboration continues to occur with organisations, including *Focus on the Family*, *Family Institute*, *Australian Family Association*, *Right to Life* associations, *Catholic Bishops' Conference*, *Salt Shakers*, the *Fatherhood Foundation*, and the *Festival of Light*. In addition to exchanging information, they attend each other's major functions often acting in the role of guest speakers. They also amalgamate with these groups on short-lived coalitions.

---

<sup>48</sup>Interview with Jim Wallace, December 2002, after the National Conference in Canberra.

<sup>49</sup>Interview with Jim Wallace, December 2003.

Articles produced by the ACL are featuring in the newsletters and on-line articles of other organisations, contributing regularly to *Sight Magazine*.<sup>50</sup> *Christian Today's*<sup>51</sup> Australian edition has reproduced ACL articles addressing the Internet, media safeguards, and pro-terror DVD classifications. ACL's comments on the Howard Governments industrial relations reform appeared in the *Sydney Anglican Network*. In the past, the ABC's *Stateline* program interviewed both Wallace and the ACL Chief of Staff, Rob Ward. Wallace and other members of the executive committee have also been guests on various ABC programs and stations, including *ABC National Radio*, *PM*, *Sunday Nights with John Cleary* and *Differences of Opinion*. Wallace has also appeared on *Channel 7* and *WinTV* discussing religious influence on political processes.

### 2.3.2 Political Parties

ACL denies possessing specific relations with any particular political party. However, guest speakers at the *2003 National Conference*, held in Canberra included Andrew Evans from the newly formed Family First Party. Evans, a former state and national leader of the Assemblies of God formed the political party in South Australia in September 2001. Senator Steve Fielding of the Family First Party was also keynote speaker at the ACL's Tasmanian conference held on 1 June 2007.<sup>52</sup> Another political party acknowledged at the conference, despite no representative being invited to speak was the Australian Christian Democrats.

As well as Evans, politicians from the main political parties that addressed the National Conference were the Honourable Tony Abbott MP (Liberal) and Harry Quick MP (Labor), from the Federal arena. At the *2006 National Conference* in Canberra, Kevin Rudd (now Prime Minister of Australia) addressed the delegates. Other speakers included Peter Costello and John Anderson from the Coalition and the ALP's Wayne Swan. In September and October of 2006, the ACL held *Policy Forums*, originally with the Liberal Party, followed by the Labor Party. The then Prime Minister John Howard and Opposition leader Kim Beazley hosted these meetings that were attended by the Cabinet and Shadow Cabinet respectively.<sup>53</sup> It is difficult to gauge the depth of the relationship these MPs that the ACL have or to establish who benefits from these relationships the most. Having spent time in the Queensland State office my observations are that relationships do exist between

---

<sup>50</sup>*Sight Magazine* is an Australian website that covers local and global news from a "Christian perspective". The website appears to be operated by a group of people who are editorially independent from religious or political affiliation. <<http://www.sightmagazine.com.au/index.php>>.

<sup>51</sup>*Christianity Today* is an Evangelical magazine and webpage based in the USA with Australian affiliations.

<sup>52</sup>"e-news May 2007". Australian Christian Lobby, National.

<sup>53</sup>ACL National Newsletter, November 2006.



certain conservative thinking politicians from the major political parties and some Independents and the ACL.

It seems apparent that Wallace is ensuring that the *Australian Christian Lobby* does not imbed itself within a political party as its counterpart in America has consciously attempted to do. During the 2005 Western Australian State Elections, a Western Australian newspaper quoted Wallace saying he does not see his organisation “wedded to the Right of politics and believes Labor can win with preferences of parties like the Christian Democrats and Family First by recanting on it is recent dalliance with the devil”. Furthermore, “I think Labor should be trying to win it (the Christian vote) back...They only lost it by aligning themselves with some abhorrent philosophies of people like the Greens ... instead of standing up for the things that traditionally Labor has, the family, the marriage.”<sup>54</sup>

Whether reacting to the evolution of the Family First Party or attempting to woo the Christian Vote before the most recent election, Kevin Rudd’s visits to churches in key marginal seats suggest that the Labor Party was out to ensure it no longer alienated the Christian vote. At the *Australian Christian Lobby National Conference* of October 2005, Kim Beazley presented the keynote address - his topic, “How the Labor Party plans to win back the Christian values vote”. According to the ACL it was, “a politically sensitive issue within the Labor Party”.<sup>55</sup> With Kevin Rudd the successor to the Labor Party leadership and their subsequent landslide victory in the 2007 Federal elections it would be of benefit to decipher how many Christians previously voting for the Liberal-National Coalition voted Labor. According to John Black, from *Australian Development Strategies*, the Labor Party won key marginal seats with the aid of the ‘religious vote’. In Black’s analysis of the election result, he claims that in Queensland, the Labor Party’s Kevin Rudd was supported by Pentecostals and Evangelicals.<sup>56</sup>

## 2.4 Strategies

---

As mentioned, the ACL is primarily using the Internet as its major communication device. A visitor to the ACL’s website will find two sections that are updated daily at the top of the page, “*Breaking News*” and “*Key Issues*” while the remaining index page is devoted to “*Articles of Interest*” covering a

---

<sup>54</sup>Taylor, Robert. “Fight for Australian values goes onward: Christian ex-soldier”. *The West Australian Newspaper*, 22 Feb. 2005, 6.

<sup>55</sup>“ACL Action Issues 1.7.05.” Email News Update by the *Australian Christian Lobby*.

<sup>56</sup>“The Christian Vote in Federal Politics”. *The Religion Report*. ABN News Radio. 19 March 2008. 20 March 2008. <<http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport/stories/2008/2193534.htm#transcript>>.

diverse range of international and local issues. Each State has its own link, as does the *Young ACL* group. The range of social, moral, and political issues canvassed; include abortion, drugs, euthanasia, gambling, IVF, HIV and AIDS, Gene technology, prostitution and sex. Issues on social justice, teens, families, suicide, gambling, and film violence are prevalent with censorship, child welfare, domestic violence, employment, environment and palliative care. Further issues of concern; include political honesty, the Occult, the *Eros Foundation*, the *United Nations* and International Law. Issues relating to other religions, such as Islam have also appeared more frequently in recent times.

The primary strategy since the organisation's re-invention has been increasing its supporter base and continued selectivity about issues to campaign. Wallace commented that previously the *ACL* had erred in addressing all issues rather than their focus of marriage and family issues. Furthermore, this strategy is of great consequence as Wallace considers that these issues have resonance with the general Australian community, thus potentially providing a wider *ACL* support base.

The *ACL* has also revived its original ideals of having designated *ACL* representatives based in all congregations and denominations across Australia. Regular business breakfasts with guest speakers and fundraising dinners for the corporate sector are hosted. High profile speakers, such as the former Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson are exploited to elevate the organisation's profile among the Christian business community to seek financial support. According to the *Queensland Branch Newsletter*, they have proved most successful in the past.<sup>57</sup>

Over the last eight years, using his past involvement in the SAS and the military, Wallace has sought to build relationships with politicians across all parties, as well as the heads of various Federal Government Departments in an effort to legitimate the organisation and to raise the profile and status of the organisation. This strategy has carried over into the media. With recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Wallace as ex-head of the SAS was interviewed concerning Australia's role in the conflict. From *the ACL's* perspective, they hoped this would establish friendly contacts in the media so that when Wallace vocalises the *ACL's* opinions about issues in his role as Managing Director the media would respond positively.

---

<sup>57</sup>"*ACL Queensland Newsletter.*" May 2007.

### 2.4.1 Strategies for Elections

*Meet the Candidates Forums* was a strategy first attempted in the 2001 Federal elections, particularly targeting marginal seats in Queensland, the ACT, Victoria, and New South Wales with all Lower House candidates standing for these seats invited. Churches and individual supporters were informed of these meetings and local Christian radio advertising encouraged listeners to attend. The audience posed questions to the candidates and were allocated time constraints in which to respond. The size of the meetings varied from several hundred supporters to that of around fifty people. These meetings were deemed a successful way of informing and activating supporters, as well as allowing candidates a forum where they can meet local people.<sup>58</sup>

*Meet the Candidate Forums* have also been held in marginal seats in State Elections. For example, during the 2004 Queensland State Elections the ACL organised *Meet the Candidate Forums* in 22 electorates, primarily in Brisbane, the North and South Coasts, Toowoomba, Bundaberg and Maryborough. These meetings were held with the assistance of local churches from the Baptist and Uniting denominations and the Christian Outreach Centre and Assemblies of God. As well as being advertised through local churches, they were also promoted on the *Good Morning Australia Show* aired on Channel 10.

Following the 2004 Federal elections, the ACL issued a press release stating that over 6 000 people attended the forty-one *Meet the Candidate Forums* held across Australia. The electorates of Braddon, Bass, Solomon, Paterson, Hinkler, Longman, Petrie, and Deakin were all highlighted as examples where large crowds attended with positive co-operation from the local churches.<sup>59</sup>

Writing on the 2004 Federal elections, Wallace stated;

In terms of politicians with Christian values, this election has been one of gain. Some supporters have left Parliament, but others have joined and some are in positions of influence. Still, the task is by no means over. ACL will continue to support politicians with Christian values in all parties and work towards righteousness, mercy, and justice in legislation.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup>Material on the Federal Elections of 10 November 2001 [Australian Christian Lobby](http://www.acl.au.com/indexfed.html). <<http://www.acl.au.com/indexfed.html> on 2.11.01>. Hard copy stored in archived material.

<sup>59</sup>"Recognising The Influence Of Christian Values". ACL Media Release 11th October 2004.

<sup>60</sup>"Recognising The Influence Of Christian Values". ACL Media Release 11th October 2004.

During the lead up to the 2007 Federal Elections, the *Meet the Candidates Forums* were extended to candidates running for the Senate. Held over a period of three weeks, 52 forums were attended by an estimated 4100 people – a decrease from the stated numbers of the 2004 forums. However, the Internet was used more extensively with a live web-cast debate called, *Make it Count 2007* was held in which John Howard and Kevin Rudd performed speeches and answered audience’s questions. The *ACL* claimed that 100 000 people from 880 churches gathered at 702 venues to view and participate in this debate.

In addition, the *ACL* distributed 500 000 hard copies of election material, as well as special election packs which were sent to 5 800 churches around Australia.

#### **2.4.2 Religious Differences: Dealing with Islam in Australia**

As discussed in Chapter 5, following the Victorian Government’s decision to introduce the *Racial and Religious Tolerance Act*, the Islamic Council of Victoria began proceedings against *Catch the Fire Ministry* for ridiculing Muslims. Initially when interviewed regarding his opinion on how the legislation would affect Christians in Australia, Wallace replied that the Bill was an “honest attempt by the government to remove discrimination”, but voiced concerns about participants manipulating the legislation during its drafting to ensure their views were not subject to public scrutiny. From the viewpoint of the effect of the legislation, Wallace believed that should the Tribunal find against *Catch the Fire Ministry* then the repercussions would be that Christian pastors would refrain from debating the merits of different faiths.

When questioned whether the *ACL* had been directly involved in the issue, Wallace admitted the organisation’s funding of the court case. Regardless, while it had been on the *Salt Shakers’* agenda for some time, it only emerged on the *ACL’s* agenda in 2004, several years after entering the statute books. In the past, the conflicts between particular forms of Islam and Christianity were contained to limited articles on the *ACL website*, but this transformed making front page of the January 2004 *National Newsletter*. Wallace’s editorial read, “Many see the current challenge of Islamic terrorism as the inevitable ‘clash of civilizations’ that was always set to occur between the Islamic and Christian worldviews. There is a lot to support this view.” ‘A clash of civilizations’ re-appears on page two under the title, *Cultural Wars*. When queried about an article on Middle Eastern crime in Australia’s, *Quadrant*, Wallace stated, “It seems that the silence is finally being broken on the clash

of cultures clearly evident in Australian society between our traditional Christian culture and the Islamic culture of more recent Arab arrivals in particular.”<sup>61</sup>

### **3. Two Campaigns for the ACL**

---

The following two campaign case studies illustrate the issues that the *Australian Christian Lobby* selects to involve itself in, adopted strategies and how effectively they achieved their objectives. The Tasmanian campaign was one in which the *ACL* did not network with other organisations, but of significance is their transformation of their original traditional theological position to a more centred position - one that is not theological and politically ‘left’, but not as conservative as the initial doctrines of the *Australian Christian Coalition*. This shift is a reflection of the change in leadership of 2000. In interviews with Wallace in 2005, he indicated that he sought to broaden *ACL*’s supporter base by appealing to Christian Progressives, as well as Christian Traditionalists. During the second campaign, the group conglomerated with a number of organisations to lobby the Federal Government over planned changes to the definition of marriage.

These two campaigns functioned somewhat differently than the euthanasia campaign discussed in Section 1. While supporters were emailed and invited to contact politicians this was implemented through the Internet rather than specific meetings or letter writing campaigns held in churches as occurred in the euthanasia campaign. In both campaigns, the *ACL* adopted a representative role more so than with the euthanasia campaign with its primary focus on activating individuals to respond to the legislation.

#### **3.1 Campaign One: Tasmania's Same-Sex Couples Legislation**

---

In 2003, *the ACL* was contacted by *Insight* from SBS TV requesting permission to film their involvement in proposed changes to relationship laws in Tasmania. These amendments effectively recognised same-sex couples and heterosexual unmarried couples’ relationships granting them the right to adopt children. The new law proclaimed early in 2004 was passed by a margin of seven votes to five.

Becoming aware of the proposed legislation, the National Executive made a decision to involve the *ACL* believing it was “something that they could influence” the outcome. The campaign strategies

---

<sup>61</sup>National Newsletter of the Australian Christian Lobby, January 2004, 1-2.

included, encouraging church members to write, email, or visit their local member to ask them to oppose the legislation. Additionally, Wallace visited members of the Tasmanian Upper House<sup>62</sup> arguing that the legislation was unnecessary as current laws already addressed discrimination and that the existing legislation allowed for enduring guardianship rights. Furthermore, they suggested that a *Joint Standing Committee on Community Development* recommended the removal of discrimination against homosexual relations and suggested the recognition of these relationships as a subset of de-facto relationships - in effect removing discrimination in cases of inheritance but drawing the line on adoption and registration of a “marriage style”.<sup>63</sup> The *ACL* presented their opposition on these grounds.

### 3.1.1 The Strategy

During *Insight* interviews, speaking on behalf of the *ACL*, Wallace stated the issue was the rights of children, “This isn’t a heterosexual-homosexual issue for us. What it’s about is the rights of children and we believe that the rights of children are being threatened by this attempt to give homosexuals the right to adopt them.” Wallace and Ferguson of the *Tasmanian Family Institute* put forth a proposal to the Upper House that suggested amending the existing de-factor laws rather than creating new legislation.

A component of the campaign was involving a marketing and research organisation (*Enterprise Marketing and Research Services*) to canvas the opinions of Independent elected members of parliament regarding the proposed legislation.<sup>64</sup> According to the *ACL*, the results indicated that voters opposed the legislation, was disseminated to the Press where it appeared in the local Tasmanian newspaper, *The Mercury*.<sup>65</sup> The public declaration of the findings inspired conflict between themselves and several members of the Upper House, including Independents, Sue Smith, and Kerry Finch, who perceived the *ACL*’s action as a veiled threat that they would lose their seats in the next state election if they supported the legislation.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup>The Tasmanian Upper House consisted of five ALP members and ten Independents

<sup>63</sup>*ACL*'s National newsletter September 2003 Newsletter. 8.

<sup>64</sup>It was reported in the September 2003 edition of the *ACL* National newsletter that the *ACL* paid \$8 000 for this service.

<sup>65</sup>*ACL* Press Release dated 19 August 2003.

<sup>66</sup>“Christian lobby admits mistakes”. *The Mercury*. 29 August 2003, Edition 1, 2.

### 3.1.2 Outcome

Undoubtedly, the way in which the *ACL* managed the issue contributed to its failure. After the legislation was passed, Wallace acknowledged that, “I think we would change the way we did it. I must say that this particular campaign came a little bit early for us”.<sup>67</sup>

Following the campaign, the *ACL* revised its position on the legal recognition of homosexual relationships reneging on their stance of refusal to accept homosexual relationships on any grounds.<sup>68</sup> The argument of old was founded on traditional reading of certain passages of scripture,<sup>69</sup> while their new approach neglects scripture, arguing that “unreasonable discrimination” that limits an individual’s ability to allocate his or her own finances or property should be removed from law. Further, that the *ACL* would not oppose a system registering the relationship through a paperwork process without an official ceremony or celebrant<sup>70</sup> - a significantly adapted position that reflects its recent centralised position. A number of organisations including *Salt Shakers*, *Right to Life* and the Rev. Fred Nile have publicly opposed the *ACL*’s position, claiming it is a compromise to the homosexual lobby and the liberal church. This has the potential to affect the *ACL*’s ongoing ability to form future coalitions with these organisations.

### 3.2. Campaign Two: The Federal Government’s Marriage Amendment Act

---

From July to August of 2004, a number of organisations, including the *Australian Christian Lobby* united in support of the then Federal Government’s legislation to define and limit the recognised institution of marriage as a relationship between one man and one woman only. This was in response to mounting pressure by homosexual lobbying organisations and individuals advocating legalisation changes through the states and territories and homosexual Australians whose relationships were legally accepted overseas, and were seeking the same recognition when returning

---

<sup>67</sup>“Open the Gate.” *Insight SBS TV*. 4 September 8:30pm. 4 Sept. 2003. <<http://www.sbs.com.au/insight/index.php3?archive=1&artmon=9&arty=2003#>>.

<sup>68</sup>In the *ACL* Newsletter of July 2001 in discussing IVF for Lesbians the comment was made that homosexual families were an “abominable notion of family”. Again, in February 2002, Wallace stated, “As a Christian community we love the sinner but we continue to stand firm in opposing any inroads of the sin to gain acceptability.”

<sup>69</sup>The traditional and progressive positions on homosexuality rely on different interpretations of a number of key scriptures. *Genesis 19*, the story of Sodom and Gomorrah is one such chapter; others are found in the *New Testament*. The traditional interpretation is that God destroyed these cities because of the sinful behaviour of the inhabitants, i.e. their homosexual behaviour. The liberal interpretation is that it was not the practice of the act of homosexuality that was the issue but that the men of the city were planning to rape male visitors. That it was the intent to commit mass rape that caused God to destroy the cities. “Allegedly anti-gay ‘clobber’ passages in the Bible. A brief description of passages from the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament)”. *Religious Tolerance Organisation*. 6 May 2007. <<http://www.religioustolerance.org/hombiblot.htm>>.

<sup>70</sup>“ACL e-news Weekly Update.” *Australian Christian Lobby*. 5 April 2007.

home. The Federal Bill, which aimed to define marriage, was passed through the Lower House, but was blocked by the Democrats, Greens, and Labor in the Senate. After returning to the Lower House for amendment, it was returned to the Senate where it was sent to a committee for public comment. In response to the controversy, the *National Marriage Coalition*<sup>71</sup> was formed, consisting of the *Australian Christian Lobby*, the *Australian Family Association*<sup>72</sup> and the newly formed foundation appearing in 2002, the *Fatherhood Foundation*.<sup>73</sup>

With the help of Senator Guy Barnett (Liberal, Tasmania) these organisations, arranged a public meeting, *the Marriage Forum* occurring in Parliament House in Canberra. Over one thousand people reportedly attended the forum.<sup>74</sup> Of the attendees were leaders of the Federal Government and Opposition Parties, including Senators.<sup>75</sup> According to Phillip Bailey, Acting Secretary to the *Senate Legal & Constitution Committee* there were 16 074 submissions received in which 90 per cent expressed opposition to same sex marriage and adoption. Despite, its initial rejection, when the Bill was again presented to the Senate it was passed by 38-6 - a substantial swing.<sup>76</sup>

This situation suggests that the ability of organisations to form single purpose coalitions remains an effective strategy as the coalition, in cooperation with other organisations were able to pressure the Labor Party, resulting in an altered position. Their change of position endorsed the legislation, allowing it to pass in the Senate.

#### 4. Summary

---

Founded in 1995 the *Australian Christian Coalition's (ACC)* faltered due to its lack of infrastructure and inability to handle the number of supporter applications. Coupled with internal problems,<sup>77</sup> the ACC decreased in size with representation in most states, to one functioning office in Queensland.

---

<sup>71</sup>According to the website of the *National Marriage Coalition*, it was formed in July 2004 to "act as a national clearing house for information on, and activism about, the institutions of marriage and family. It will feature research and other information on its website, hold national conferences, and produce publications as needed. It will work with existing organisations in seeking to uphold and support marriage, the most fundamental of Australian institutions."

<sup>72</sup>The predominantly Catholic, *Australian Family Association* is a national body with branches in every State. Their goals are to promote the natural family, to help children and to protect marriage. *Australian Family Association*. 17 Sept. 2007. <<http://www.family.org.au>>.

<sup>73</sup>"The National Fatherhood Foundation." 18 Aug. 2004. <<http://www.fatherhoodfoundation.org>>

<sup>74</sup>"Labor backs ban on gay marriage." *The Age* 18 Aug 2004. <<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/08/04/1091557919497.html?oneclick=true>>.

<sup>75</sup>Political leaders that attended included the then Prime Minister John Howard and his Deputy the Honourable John Anderson. The former leader of the opposition, the Honourable Mark Latham declined but sent the Shadow Attorney General Nicola Roxon.

<sup>76</sup>Personal Email sent on 19 August 2004 by Phillip Bailey, Acting Secretary, and Senate Legal & Constitutional Committee.

<sup>77</sup>Primarily the death of a founding member and financial mismanagement.



Since appointing a new Managing Director, Jim Wallace and developing a National office, the organisation has been reborn. With offices and committees in all states amalgamating with the reported increase in support, the *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)* appears to be focused and an influential force.

The *Australian Christian Lobby* may be identified as a movement organisation in terms of its function and organisation. Operating within formal political channels, its collective action is linked to pre-existing identities. With politically conservative goals,<sup>78</sup> the *ACL* uses Christian identity and values to determine and promote the organisation's values and ideologies. This identity is pivotal as it creates the basis that attracts its supporters. The identity of the *ACL* is loosely linked to a traditional Christian, Pre-millennial theology. This was a position that it promoted in the earlier *ACC* era but no longer does so. By carefully constructing arguments in non-religious language and avoiding scripture, the organisation is seeking to widen its support to include theologically Liberal Christians with Post-millennial politically progressive beliefs. In interviews with Wallace he informed me that this was a key strategy to increasing the organisations supporter base.

While it appears an effective strategy for increasing a larger grassroots support base, it will come at an expense. The Tasmanian case study depicting their willingness to negotiate on issues deemed absolute by theologically traditional Christians might create the potential to alienate the *ACL* from its original supporter base, as well as potential coalition partners. If the organisation re-negotiates its position on other controversial social/moral issues it may result in support being withdrawn and contrasting organisations developing, especially theologically conservative ones, while the *ACL*'s appeal shifts to the theologically and politically Liberal.

Issues aside, the *ACL* is somewhat unique in that its identity and structure are free of particular denominational financial support, membership and leadership, in contrast to organisations of the past (discussed in Chapter 4 and 5) that were either denominationally bound or short lived, single-focused organisations. Because of this particularity, the *ACL* expresses its religious views differently, obscuring any denominationalism and tries to hug the middle ground. An outcome has been its ability to recruit supporters from a number of denominations in Australia. An area of further study would be to identify the percentage of *ACL* supporters who are Christian without fixed denominational affiliation, from those with loyalties.

---

<sup>78</sup>With the exception of the legal acceptance of homosexual relationships.

Establishing the *ACL* as a private company rather than a non-profit organisation has given the organisation several advantages. As well as having less regulatory requirements, the Board is able to spend the organisation's income as it determines.

Despite identifying itself as a non-aligned political organisation, they have definite relationships with some political parties and individual politicians that they have drawn upon to position themselves in the political system. Suffice to say, opening doors to politicians assists organisations of this sort. If the *Lyons Forum* is still as influential in the Federal National-Liberal Coalition as claimed,<sup>79</sup> then employing a strategist and forming a national office based in Canberra may have revived the *ACL* and allowed its agenda to be heard in the political halls of power. The *ACL* has not repeated mistakes made by the *American Christian Coalition (ACC)* embedding itself in one political party – which proved detrimental when the Republicans are not in power, thus diminishing the influence of the *ACC*. The *ACL* have a close relationship with Kevin Rudd, now Prime Minister. However, the strength of this relationship and whether Rudd has neutralised the religious vote, making it non-party determined remains to be seen. By developing relationships with both major political parties, the *ACL* has positioned itself in such a way that regardless of which political party is in power, it will maintain its position and working relationship, and in doing so created a sustainable lobbying organisation.

The *ACL* has also successfully formed working relationships with a number of organisations to form coalitions in response to specific issues. The Northern Territory euthanasia issue being one such example, the *Marriage Amendment Act of 2004* another.

While the focal point of the organisation seems to be harbouring relationships in Federal politics to bring legitimacy and credibility to the organisation, its communication with supporters has been limited. Monthly newsletters were absent for a time; however, this has been rectified with emails and weekly e-news updates. This process of informing and activating Christians has been enhanced by the re-instatement of Church representatives who are able to promote *ACL* and its message within their congregations. While their website lists a number of current political and social issues, its decision to focus on family values and the traditional family model allow for effective use of resources while not taxing its supporter base.

---

<sup>79</sup>This claim has been made by Marion Maddox and Amanda Lowrey.

New initiatives such as the *Young ACL* and the *Compass* program could well see an increase in support, activity, long-term political influence and perhaps, new direction for the organisation. The web presence designed to appeal to younger supporters could prove beneficial in providing all supporters with direct political contact. The 2007 Federal election has seen existing strategies extended and the initiation of others.

If the information that ACL is providing on the increased number of supporters is correct this is likely to secure the organisations future. Perhaps, the increased supporter base is due to the issues raised through multiculturalism and the inter-faith dialogue of religious liberals as much as specific agenda items or divisions between churches on their social message. The continued existence of the *ACL* into the new century suggests that religious political action is very much part of the State and Federal political landscape of Australia.

## Chapter 8: The Politics of Religion: Salt Shakers

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>180</b>
<b>1. Salt Shakers</b>	<b>180</b>
<b>2. Structure of the Organisation</b>	<b>181</b>
<b>3. Supporters and Finances</b>	<b>182</b>
<b>4. Strategies</b>	<b>184</b>
<b>5. Agenda</b>	<b>186</b>
<b>6. Important Issues</b>	<b>189</b>
6.1 Euthanasia	189
6.2 Islam: Dealings with the 'Other'	190
<b>7. External Relationships</b>	<b>191</b>
7.1 Relationships with Other Organisations	191
7.2 Relationships with Denominational Leadership and Churches	192
7.3 Relationship with Political Parties and Politicians	193
<b>8. Summary</b>	<b>194</b>

## Introduction

---

The focus of this chapter is the organisation known as, *Salt Shakers*, which was founded in October 1994 - prior to the *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)* in 1995. Initially the two were similar in focus and strategy; however, *Salt Shakers* has maintained its traditional theological interpretations and use of biblical language. As both organisations have adapted over time, the differences have become more apparent; therefore, *Salt Shakers* creates an illustrative contrast organisation to the *Australian Christian Lobby*. This chapter introduces background information on how the organisation began; then, it explores their agenda, supporters and the way in which it functions. As the chapter develops, I examine the areas of similarity and difference between the organisations. Should the *Australian Christian Lobby* continue in the theologically liberal direction and adopt a politically progressive position in the future, these differences could be significant to the organisations' ongoing development and relationship.

My research into *Salt Shakers* was little different to my approach to the *ACL*. This study included drawing on historical, cultural, textual, political and religious studies approaches, while implementing methods of oral history interviews and update interviews with Peter and Jenny Stokes its founding members and also a member of their committee. Over the years, email contact has been maintained with Jenny Stokes. I extensively used archives, analysis of publications, examinations of their lobbying activities and contacted supporters as components of my research.

### 1. Salt Shakers

---

The name *Salt Shakers* is an adaptation of the scripture contained in the *Beatitudes*. *Mathew 5:13-16*<sup>1</sup> speaks of Christ's disciples being salt and light to the world. By way of expanding this definition, *Salt Shakers* note that salt is not exclusively seasoning and a preservative, but also contains antiseptic properties. The other scripture used to define them is *2 Chronicles 7:14*.<sup>2</sup> This scripture acts as their mandate to assist Christians in understanding 'Biblical Times' and values and the ethical issues affecting society today.

---

<sup>1</sup>*Mathew 5:13* "You are the salt of the earth. But if the salt loses its saltiness, how can it be made salty again? It is no longer good for anything, except to be thrown out and trampled by men. *5:14* You are the light of the world. A city on a hill cannot be hidden. *5:15* Neither do people light a lamp and put it under a bowl. Instead they put it on its stand, and it gives light to everyone in the house. *5:16* In the same way, let your light shine before men, that they may see your good deeds and praise your Father in heaven". 26 May 2007. <<http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=matthew%205:13-16;&version=31>>.

<sup>2</sup>*Chronicles 7:14* "if my people, who are called by my name, will humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from their wicked ways, then will I hear from heaven and will forgive their sin and will heal their land. [Gospel.com](http://www.gospel.com), [International Bible Association](http://www.internationalbibleassociation.com), [The Lockman Foundation](http://www.lockmanfoundation.com). 26 May 2007. <<http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=matthew%205:13-16;&version=31>>

A group within the Crossway Baptist Church founded the *Salt Shakers*. Issue driven, its inauguration followed a three-year campaign by the church to ban the introduction of poker machines in the Forest Hill Chase Shopping Centre in Melbourne. Initially, the groups focus was informing the local church on this issue and later other issues within their community. Having started with a one-page newsletter, a year later in November 1995, this had increased into a twenty-page journal. Today, *Salt Shakers* are self-described as an “interdenominational organisation” and a “Ministry”. Their website claims supporters are mostly lay Christians, but also some pastors and denominational leaders. The organisation identifies its work as “Christian ethics in action”. A reactionary organisation, their primary agenda is current events in society - both socially and politically and issues are interpreted through a theologically premillennial traditional biblical-based Christian worldview.

*Salt Shakers’* aim is, “informing” and “activating”. They define “inform” as “to help Christians understand the times in which they live” and to “create an awareness of the ‘poor moral state’ of our nation”. To activate is “to encourage Christians to take up the challenge to do something ‘about it’ so that the Christians will be the light and salt to the world - a scriptural command”. Their perception of the role of the modern church is one that influences society with “traditional Christian values”. Furthermore, they envision themselves as “part of an international network of Christian organisations that attempt to alert Christians to the cultural and social attacks on marriage, family and the Christian church across the world”.<sup>3</sup>

By way of contrast to the *ACL*, the majority of *Salt Shakers’* communication is addressed to its Christian audience; hence, their aspirations are to encourage others to lobby in terms of contacting politicians. In personal interviews, Peter and Jenny Stokes said they believed that if Christians were more politically astute they would be capable of giving a ‘correct’ biblical response to social and political issues in the world. This forms the foundation of the organisation’s beliefs.

## **2. Structure of the Organisation**

---

As noted in the previous section, *Salt Shakers* initially functioned under the banner of the Crossway Baptist Church but later became a separate entity functioning as a non-profit organisation, guided by a nine-member board from various denominations in Melbourne. This contrasts with the *ACL*, which

---

<sup>3</sup>As stated in an email sent by Peter Stokes of *Salt Shakers*, titled SALT SHAKERS - Two important articles on marriage & free speech, 9 Oct 2003.

remains a private company. The *Salt Shakers'* board hold half-yearly meetings to discuss infrastructure and financial concerns, as well as meeting monthly to address issues and decide directions. Since 1995, Peter Stokes, the Executive Officer has been employed in a full-time capacity. Perhaps surprisingly, he lacks a formal political or theological background; rather, he was involved in sales, advertising, radio and is a joiner by trade. Shortly after, his wife Jenny joined him on full-time staff as Research Director. She is a secondary school teacher by profession with a Bachelor of Arts in mathematics and politics. A secretary is employed with volunteer workers supporting the office. In 2006, a Reference Panel was established to incorporate outside experts. In contrast to the *ACL*, it has maintained an office in Melbourne exclusively and has not established a similar administrative structure with State Executives and functioning offices.

In the past, *Salt Shakers* discussed the idea of decentralizing the organisation so that specific contacts in each State would focus on issues specific to their State; however, this has not been pursued. Like the *Australian Christian Lobby*, *Salt Shakers* has attempted to adopt a structure of Church representation at a local level to address local issues; however, this structure has been abandoned.

### **3. Supporters and Finances**

---

Supporters of *Salt Shakers* fall into two broad categories - paid and voluntary. The paid category includes those who donate regularly and/or subscribe to the monthly journal; unpaid are those who are on the free emailing subscription lists. The Internet is the primary means of contacting supporters as daily emails are sent. Depending on the supporter's interest, they may receive emails on specific or general issues. As noted earlier, supporters are across Christian denominations, including Pentecostal and Charismatic groups. Like the *ACL*, *Salt Shakers* do not keep socio-economic data on their supporters.

The exact numbers of supporters of *Salt Shakers* is difficult to estimate. In 2003 Peter Stokes indicated that the monthly journal was posted to approximately 3 000 recipients. This list includes individuals, churches, Christian fellowships, some private schools and colleges, as well as sympathetic politicians. As churches disseminate the journals, several copies are mailed to the one address; therefore, the numbers of journals distributed is greater than the recipient list. Unlike other organisations, such as the *Festival of Light*, *Salt Shakers* do not send their publication to all politicians. This protectionism may be noted in their comments that the journal itself is the

“ministry” to the people who receive it, whereas other “ministries send out newsletters about their ministry”. Despite these efforts, Gay Rights organisations in Melbourne reprint articles from the *Salt Shakers*’ journal warning of the dangers of homosexual lifestyles without refuting or responding to the information.<sup>4</sup>

Like many other organisations, *Salt Shakers* relies on subscriptions and donations to operate. Through their website, they encourage ‘visitors’ to contribute one-off or regular credit card donations - a method of fundraising later copied by the *ACL*. An additional source of finance is the annual subscription charge of \$35 for the monthly journal.

*Salt Shakers* have found the most effective way of increasing support has been to address church services.<sup>5</sup> In these instances, they speak to the congregation about why Christians should be politically active. Furthermore, they hold weekend seminars called, *Worldview Schools* that emphasise a particular ‘Christian worldview’<sup>6</sup> coupled with evangelistic techniques. Subjects covered in the ‘worldview’ include explanations concerning a Biblical position on: war, economics, and moral/ethical issues like abortion, IVF, homosexuality, euthanasia, justice, and politics. They are regularly invited to participate in church fellowships, home groups, Bible colleges, and Christian schools. *Salt Shakers* do not hold annual conferences to promote awareness of their organisation like the *ACL* because they do not believe they are an effective way of enhancing the organisation or establishing important relationships with politicians. However, they do hold an annual dinner in August with guest speakers including State and Federal politicians.

While some businesses pay for advertising space in the monthly journal, the core of their financial support depends on churches and individuals. Unlike the *ACL*, they have not offered paid advertising on their website. In the past, both organisations commented on the conservative nature of many Christian business people who, when considering donating to an organisation focus on overseas missions rather than political organisations as recipients for their financial support.

While the *ACL* does not appear to be involved in denominational or church politics, *Salt Shakers* is. When the occasion arises, they challenge supporters to question decisions made by their denominational leadership. For instance, during the recent Iraq War, *Salt Shakers* called upon

---

<sup>4</sup>Email response to this question about who receives their Newsletter. 18<sup>th</sup> October 2004.

<sup>5</sup>Interviews in Melbourne, February 2003.

<sup>6</sup>This refers to a specific collection of philosophical and religious beliefs based on a traditional interpretation of the Bible.



supporters to confront church leaders who had claimed that Muslims and Christians worshipped the same God.<sup>7</sup>

#### 4. Strategies

---

Like the *ACL*, the formation of special purpose coalitions has proven an effective strategy for *Salt Shakers*. The development of position papers on major issues (produced from their own research or that of other organisations, such as the *Australian Family Foundation*) provides the organisation with material used in its campaigns. Approximately seventy to eighty per cent of the Stokes' time is spent researching issues and informing supporters about these issues.<sup>8</sup> Like the *ACL*, *Salt Shakers* rely on sharing information and strategies with other groups, as well as providing resources, including literature, discussion papers, speakers and support to groups establishing 'ethical action organisations'. (These particular organisations are discussed in section 7.1)

*Salt Shakers* have had an Internet presence that predates that of the *ACL's*. The *Salt Shakers'* webpage is designed to inform supporters of current and past issues, as well as the organisation itself. This includes the use of RSS Feeds (Really Simple Syndication) that allows supporters to automatically download information from Salt Shakers without going to their web site. As issues arise, emails providing information on the issue with information on how to contact relevant politicians are sent to supporters. The dispatch includes advice on what stance to adopt and how to communicate their position when making visits, telephone calls or sending emails to politicians. Email alerts also encourage supporters to telephone different hotline numbers or visit Internet sites, such as the *Sun Herald* in Melbourne to register opinions on current media issues or on-line polls.

The organisation's long-term goals and priorities are focused on the dissemination of information, rather than directly influencing elections as the *ACL* aims to do. The production of the monthly journal and the continued development of the webpage and email systems were deemed part of these priorities.

Unlike the *ACL*, *Salt Shakers* are openly evangelistic in nature. Owning a 'prayer bus', this organisation implores supporters to gather, driving around Melbourne praying for the city; furthermore, they 'prayer walk' in locations such as, Parliament House and the Casino. Prior to

---

<sup>7</sup>Theologically traditional Christians, Jews, and Muslims oppose the belief of 'One God but many faiths'.

<sup>8</sup>Information provided in interviews in February 2006.

2000, the *ACL* mirrored this strategy. Since its restructure and Wallace becoming Managing Director, this practice has ceased.

Unlike the *Australian Christian Lobby*, *Salt Shakers* extensively use scripture and Christian language in their written material. Typical language includes describing Australia as being in a “poor moral state”. A recent journal article read, *The Church is being torn apart from within and taking society down with it.*<sup>9</sup> As mentioned previously, *Salt Shakers* is openly evangelistic, promoting a literal interpretation of the Bible. Thus, their language has a religious flavour such as, “Ministry” and “Mission fund”, used to describe money needed to support the organisation’s infrastructure. As noted in the previous chapter, the *Australian Christian Lobby’s* promotional material and supporter material is devoid of similar language.

In attempts to shape or contribute to public debate, *Letters to the Editor* of State and National papers are regularly sent by *Salt Shakers’* staff and supporters. However, the bias of the media that seems to exist against such groups opinions tends to prevent their views from regularly appearing in print.

State and Federal elections are managed differently to the *Australian Christian Lobby*. *Salt Shakers* recognise the significance of party politics and its affect on how politicians will vote for particular legislation, whereas, the *ACL* encourages its supporters to vote for the candidate rather than the Party. Therefore, rather than sending lengthy questionnaires to candidates as the *ACL* does, *Salt Shakers* provides supporters with a one page summary of the political parties’ positions on current issues, including minor parties such as the Greens, Democrats and Family First. It is interesting to note that during the 2007 Federal Elections, the *ACL* adopted this strategy, publishing specifically designed information on its website for the elections.<sup>10</sup> Unlike the *ACL*, *Salt Shakers* do not run *Meet the Candidate Forums* during election campaigns.

Like the *Australian Christian Lobby*, which acts as an information service to politicians, *Salt Shakers* is to a lesser degree a contributor of perspectives; however, *Salt Shakers* will openly criticise Governments over decisions and policies, while the *ACL* remains more constrained.

---

<sup>9</sup>Stokes, P. “The Church Is Being Torn Apart from within and Taking Society Down with It.” *Salt Shakers Journal* 9.1 (2003).

<sup>10</sup>This web site is: <<http://www.australiavotes.org>>.

In 2007 *Salt Shakers* sought to appeal to young Christians with the implementation of the project, *Resistance Thinking*: its stated purpose being to create opportunities for youth to engage with important matters of the day. Their target audience is both senior high school students and young adults. While fundamentally similar to the *ACL's Make a Stand* project, their operations contrast. The *Resistance Thinking* website<sup>11</sup> has constructed an open forum for discussion, as well as articles and reviews of books and latest movies. The website's focus is upon faith, culture, and society while encompassing the goals of *Salt Shakers* - to inform and activate. On the other hand, the *ACL's Make a Stand* website with its slogans 'make pollies sit up and listen' and 'put your hand up and be counted' are intended primarily to promote direct action. This is achieved through, 'fire off a pollie mail' that generates emails to politicians or its 'Letters to the editor' links. These differing approaches reflect the directions these two organisations have taken. Where the *ACL* has become a lobbying organisation focused on State and Federal politics, *Salt Shakers* has maintained focus on the Christian community, providing space for discussion and debate.<sup>12</sup> These approaches ensure that neither organisation duplicates the other's efforts, yet both provide avenues for political activism and supporter growth.

As part of their educational strategy, *Salt Shakers* have conducted worldview conferences: one such event was held in 2003 when the *Centre for Worldview Studies (Summit Ministries, Colorado Springs USA)* ventured out to lead the conference. Topics explored included, "Developing a Biblical Mind, Should Christians Change Cultures and Reformation, Not Just Revival?" The January 2008 topics included Biblical Christianity, Secular Humanism, Marxism, Islam, and Postmodernism in the areas of theology, philosophy, history, law, and economics operating over six days. This strategy has recently been adopted by the *ACL* who also held its first similar conference in January 2008.

## 5. Agenda

---

Visiting the *Salt Shakers'* website or glancing at their monthly newsletters confirms an extensive agenda encasing a variety of issues from global warming and politics to the typical moral and social issues. Specific issues include euthanasia, witchcraft, multiculturalism, marriage, homosexuality, child abuse, Christianity and politics, global warming, cloning, family, illicit drugs, Liberal Christianity, prostitution, and Islam.

---

<sup>11</sup>"Resistance Thinking". *Salt Shakers*. 21 Nov. 2008. <<http://www.resistancethinking.com/>>.

<sup>12</sup> This is also evidenced in the web site with the slogans "Salt Shakers helping Christians make a difference" and "Watchmen on the Wall".

*Salt Shakers* has always possessed an extensive agenda, whereas it has only been since 2005 that the *ACL* website has expanded on its topics. For those interested, *Salt Shakers* provide a world news service whereby they circulate web links on articles produced by a variety of authors, including militant Islamic organisations.

The Melbourne Mid-summer Mardi Gras and the Sydney Mardi Gras events remain issues for *Salt Shakers* who employ a different tactic in addressing the issue compared with the *ACL*. Initially, both organisations sought the cessation of these annual events by lobbying the events' financial sponsors - both reaped some success as many corporate sponsors withdrew their support. Without the New South Wales Government injecting considerable funds into the Sydney Mardi Gras in 2005, the event would have become bankrupt and been forced to cease. Since 2000, the *ACL* have become subdued on these events,<sup>13</sup> while *Salt Shakers* remain a vocal opponent, also challenging the popularity of these events by questioning the accuracy of crowd attendance statistics. They did this by counting crowd attendees themselves and sending photos to the media to support their findings. When asked about the motivation for this approach, I was informed that, "we do this because fraud is illegal and it is fraud to exaggerate attendance figures and then use those figures to establish a 'financial value' in order to get sponsorship from governments and private companies".

In interviews conducted with Peter Stokes in 2000, he identified two areas as major concerns challenging Christian churches in Australia: first, apathy within denominations concerning issues of a moral nature and secondly, the "humanist agenda" of numerous lobby organisations and politicians. Re-interviewing Stokes in early 2003 revealed a shift; he identified the divide within churches as a primary concern. Of interest to this debate was his comment that politicians manipulate liberal religious leaders as a means of legitimizing their position on proposed legislation. The example he gave was when the Victorian Government decided to amend its anti-discrimination legislation, it publicised that prominent liberal church leaders supported the amendments and used this information to argue that the legislation was supported by all Christian leaders – which it was not.

The issue of the development of a *Relationships Register* is one example where the *ACL* and *Salt Shakers* have conflicting approaches and attitudes. As discussed in the previous chapter, the *ACL* endorses the register because it will cease "unreasonable discrimination" against same-sex

---

<sup>13</sup>Prior to Wallace holding leadership of the *ACL*, their newsletters featured a number of articles on both Mardi Gras and homosexuality. Where the *ACL* provide links to other organisations' information on the Mardi Gras, *Salt Shakers* have produced their own material.

couples.<sup>14</sup> While the *ACL* has unmistakably shifted to a social justice position supporting the policy preference of liberal theologians, *Salt Shakers* has not: remaining true to their traditional interpretation of scripture like the *ACL* of the past.

The social policy direction that the organisations are moving in is also different. It is this that drives the differences that are now appearing in their agenda. In a newspaper interview in 2006 Jim Wallace spoke of the direction that he believed the *ACL* should take. As noted in the previous chapter, Wallace believed that the best interest of *ACL* would be to adopt a similar social agenda to that espoused by the American writer and political activist Jim Wallis. This approach is in stark contrast to *Salt Shakers* traditional conservative agenda.

Another political organisation that *Salt Shakers* has formed short-lived coalitions, with that has experienced a challenge to its traditional conservative agenda is the Christian Democrat Party (CDP). Gordon Moyes appears to be keen to see the organisation transition towards a more centred agenda. Moyes stated in a weekly email that the CDP required an evangelical “in the middle” framework to attract mainline denominations.<sup>15</sup> This transition appears to mirror that of the *ACL*. How these developments will affect *Salt Shakers*’ capacity to cooperate with these organisations is will depend on the outcome of this attempt by Moyes to change the CDP. As discussed, *Salt Shakers* has experienced some difficulty working with the *ACL*’s Wallace - the worldview conference evidenced this. The initial plan of a joint venture was rejected by Wallace’s decision to adopt a centrist theological position and lead the *ACL*’s own conference. Given the conference’s foundation in theology, it is assumed the conference was based on a central/liberal interpretations, while *Salt Shakers* maintains its original agenda based on traditional scriptural interpretations.

*Salt Shakers* will often react to issues prior to the *ACL* - the conflict between the *Islamic Council of Victoria* and *Catch the Fire Ministry* being one such example. When the Victorian Government’s *Racial and Religious Tolerance Bill of 2002* was debated in Parliament, *Salt Shakers* composed a paper outlining flaws with the legislation, while the *ACL* ignored the issue.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, *Salt Shakers* embraced a coalition of sixteen organisations, including *the Family Council of Victoria*, *Rise Up Australia* and *the Australian Family Association* to challenge the proposed legislation. Where *Salt Shakers* openly supported *Catch the Fire Ministry*, Wallace, in interviews I conducted, refused to

---

<sup>14</sup>*ACL National Newsletter*, May 2007.

<sup>15</sup>“Christian Fundamentalism Dies”. *Christian Voice in Politics*, 24 May 2007.

<sup>16</sup>*ACL*’s response to the issues between *Catch the Fire Ministry* and the *Islamic Council of Victoria* was discussed in Chapter 5.

publically support the Ministry. However, the *ACL* has since entered discussions concerning the Islamic faith, Islamic terrorism, and the Islamic faith's ability to co-exist in Western nations when it does not recognise a functional separation between Church and State. Compared to *Salt Shakers* however, these discussions have been quite limited in both the printed publications and internet sites of the organisation.

## **6. Important Issues**

---

This paper now examines two issues instrumental to the development and ongoing existence of the organisation. This section first discusses the *Northern Territory Euthanasia Bill*, which proved itself significant to *Salt Shakers*. Like the *ACL*, it presented opportunities to shape rapport with other organisations in the *Euthanasia-No* Coalition, as well as expand its contacts with politicians. The second issue at the forefront of religious debate since September 11 has been the formulation of links between Islam and acts of violence (Islamic Jihad). As stated above the *Salt Shakers'* response has contrasted with that of the *ACL*.

### **6.1 Euthanasia**

---

As noted in the previous chapter, a number of religious organisations and Christian leaders united to form *Euthanasia-No* to lobby the Federal Government to revoke the Northern Territory's legalization of euthanasia. *Salt Shakers* formed part of this coalition and like the *ACL*; the issue assisted in cementing relationships between organisations and afforded them a level of legitimacy.

According to *Salt Shakers*, the *Euthanasia-No* Coalition was formed following discussions that Peter Stokes had with Steve Blizzard a Liberal Member and Warwick Marsh from *Praize Corroboree* at a *National Prayer Breakfast* in Canberra. The trio then approached other organisations, including the *Australian Christian Lobby* and the *Festival of Light* inviting them to join. Tony Bourke (an electoral assistant to a NSW Labor MP) was then employed by the *Euthanasia-No* organisation to draft letters utilised by coalition organisations and supporters. The *Salt Shakers* claim that the *ACL* adapted the letters for their own distribution. The reason attributed to the success of the *Euthanasia-No* campaign was the united assault from religious organisations that prevented the Federal Government from employing the frequently used tactic of creating conflict between denominations or church representatives.

## 6.2 Islam: Dealings with the 'Other'

---

The connection between the Islamic faith and acts of violence by international extremist groups has become an area of discussion monitored by *Salt Shakers*. Information is sent via email to supporters who have expressed interest in this area. This news service, consisting of links to overseas and local media articles has increased the flow of information and comments since September 11. Their focus is not exclusively upon the radical element of Islam, but the advances the religion is making across a number of Western countries, including England, Canada, the USA and Australia, as well as the social problems of integration, unemployment and gang violence occurring in Europe.

When interviewing the Stokes in January 2003, I questioned them about their response to the proposed *Victorian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act*. Their first response had been contacting supporters by email encouraging them to respond to vote-lines operated by an on-line newspaper. After receiving a copy of the proposed legislation from the *Justice Department*, *Salt Shakers* prepared a two-page response outlining its views of flaws with the legislation and advising supporters of appropriate action. The campaign to prevent the proposed legislation was waged under a loosely formed coalition of fifteen organisations, including the *Family Council of Victoria*, *Rise Up Australia* and the *Australian Family Association*. Despite opposition to the legislation, over 10 000 letters and 5 500 submissions against, and only 500 in favour, the legislation passed into law.

When queried on the effects of the legislation on churches in Victoria, Peter Stokes replied that it has many "running scared" and silenced many churches that have "dumbed down so they don't offend". According to Stokes, the issue of the *Islamic Council* taking *Catch the Fire Ministries* to the Administrative Tribunal has enhanced this reaction.

*Salt Shakers* have expressed apprehension about the increase of inter-faith dialogue, particularly, who is involved and who benefits from it. In 2003, the *Age* and *Herald Sun* newspapers published articles signed by various denominational and Muslim leaders stating, "all people - regardless of race, nation or religion - are the family of God...We pray that peace will descend from God...We commit our faith communities to pray and work together for peace and for good community relations."<sup>17</sup> In an email response, Peter Stokes wrote, "We are deeply concerned about a 'Letter to

---

<sup>17</sup>Published on Friday 21<sup>st</sup> February 2003.

the Editor' in *The Age* and *Herald Sun*, by many Victorian Christian leaders and two Muslims, which compromise our Christian faith."<sup>18</sup>

In May 2007, *Salt Shakers* emailed an alert and "call for action" regarding the *Brisbane City Council's* decision to publish a web-based booklet, *Islam in Brisbane*. The organisation described the booklet as an "apologetic for Islam". The emailed alert stated that following unsuccessful discussions between the *Festival of Light* and the Brisbane Lord Mayor, it would be beneficial for *Salt Shakers'* supporters to write to the Lord Mayor demanding the removal of the pamphlet. The *ACL's* Queensland office quickly responded by sending their own email on the issue, acknowledging that some Christians may be concerned about the booklet; however, the *ACL's* position was that it was of no concern and it represented "democracy in action". The email attempted to defuse the issue by singing the praises of the Lord Mayor, Campbell Newman, further stating that the *ACL* had been working with denominations to create a Christian webpage on the *Brisbane City Council's* website for some time. As of November 2008, the project has not been implemented and there has not been an indication from the *ACL* National Office that it will. The *ACL's* response made it apparent that it was opposed the *Salt Shakers'* view. Furthermore, they were not keen on the issue being raised. This response is further evidence of the *ACL's* move from its political conservative and theological Right position to a more central/left position.

## **7. External Relationships**

---

This section examines the relationships that affect both *Salt Shakers* and the *Australian Christian Lobby*. As mentioned earlier, networking with other organisations has proven an effective form of operation.

### **7.1 Relationships with Other Organisations**

---

*Salt Shakers* regularly form coalitions that respond to specific amendments to State and Federal legislation. The primary advantage of these amalgamations is the sharing of information and resources. These coalitions appear to be the common means for how both *Salt Shakers* and the *ACL's* work with other organisations and are founded over single issues, then disbanded when resolution is achieved. New coalitions reform when the next contentious issue arrives.

---

<sup>18</sup>Emailed February 24 2003.



*Salt Shakers* exchange newsletters with a range of different organisations in Australia, including the Pro-life and Right to Life organisations, *the Festival of Light* and *Focus on the Family*. Another organisation mentioned in interviews with Peter Stokes as an associate organisation is the *Endeavour Forum*.<sup>19</sup> Overseas organisations that *Salt Shakers* network with include the *Institute for American Values*, *Fatherless America*, and *Christian Action Resources (CARE)* a large Evangelical alliance in England. *YWAM* in London and *Human Life International* are also two organisations that they in regularly contact with. *Salt Shakers* maintain an ongoing association with the *Centre for Worldview Studies* - part of the *Summit Ministries* in the USA. *The Barnabas Fund*, an organisation working with persecuted Christians across the world, especially in Islamic countries also maintains regular contact. The Internet is used extensively to maintain contact and exchange information with overseas countries.

The ACL's proposal concerning the regulation of gay relationships through a registration process has resulted in *Salt Shakers'* potential coalition partners adopting opposing sides on this issue. Both Reverend Dr. Brian Edgar, Director of Public Theology for the *Australian Evangelical Alliance* and the Reverend David Palmer of the Presbyterian Church of Victoria have written papers in support of the ACL's political position.<sup>20</sup> *The Festival of Light*, *Life Ministries'* Roger Birch, a lecturer in New Testament Greek and Theology at Unity College in Canberra, and Bill Muehlenberg<sup>21</sup> has written papers supporting the *Salt Shakers'* position. While these arguments between Christian organisations do not appear in the mainstream media to the extent that they do in America, they do exist. These differences are irreconcilable, resulting in the organisations working separately and independently of each other.

## **7.2 Relationships with Denominational Leadership and Churches**

---

In interviews conducted in Melbourne in 2003, Peter Stokes stated his belief that, "if the pulpit was not politicized then the people in the pew were unlikely to be". This might account for *Salt Shakers* holding specific information meetings for church leaders. Furthermore, he identified an agenda that would politicize many pulpits: the introduction of discrimination laws as they would effectively silence the Church on issues relating to homosexual practice and second, the Church would lose its right to employ those who profess the Christian faith exclusively - including in religious-based

---

<sup>19</sup>*Endeavour Forum*. Accessed 21 Sept. 2007. <<http://www.endeavourforum.org.au>>

<sup>20</sup>These papers are available on the *Evangelical Alliance Website*. <<http://www.evangelicalalliance.org.au>>

<sup>21</sup>Bill Muehlenberg is renowned within Christian circles as an outspoken figure in the Australian Christian Right. He has held positions with the *Australian Family Association*, *Australian Christian Lobby* (in its early phase), *Focus on the Family Australia*, and *Salt Shakers*.

schools. His comments have proven relevant. In late 2002, the Queensland Beattie Government introduced legislation removing exemptions allowing religious schools to employ solely from their own faith. While some denominational leaders voiced concerns regarding the proposed legislation, churches with liberal theology remained silent. Both the *ACL* and *Salt Shakers* attempts to be involved in this issue were ignored by denominational leaders who chose to handle the issue themselves.<sup>22</sup>

As noted earlier, as well as criticising State and Federal Governments, *Salt Shakers* criticize denominational leadership. In October 2003, they dispatched an email requesting that their supporters sanction Uniting Church leaders for their ongoing support of legalized drug injecting rooms in Sydney.<sup>23</sup>

According to *Salt Shakers*, many leaders of the traditional denominations in Victoria possess liberal views on a number of social and moral issues; thus, they are unsupportive of the *Salt Shakers'* traditional biblical interpretation of issues. Nevertheless, *Salt Shakers* have embraced the support of some individual church leaders and members of congregations and harboured relationships. From mainstream denominations, Presbyterian leaders were identified as supportive of *Salt Shakers* more so than other church leaders. Akin to the *ACL's* findings, Peter Stokes commented that Catholic and Pentecostal pulpits were becoming increasingly politicalized and as the larger churches maintain their own political structures; therefore, they do not rely on external organisations alone.

### **7.3 Relationship with Political Parties and Politicians**

---

In 2001 discussions regarding *Salt Shakers'* relationships with members of the major political parties, Peter Stokes stated there was a need for a morally conservative political party. While he did not envisage the role of *Salt Shakers* as creating such a party, he suggested that they were working towards “stimulating a ground swell for something new”. Furthermore, that *Salt Shakers* would endorse this new party - Family First - at a Federal level. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Family First does not profess to be a religious party, nor use biblical language in its material. Instead the Party identifies as a ‘family values’ party, despite forming relationships with members of the Assembly of God denominations.

---

<sup>22</sup>Lead by Cormack, the Queensland Office of the *ACL* contacted three of the largest churches in Brisbane- the Assemblies of God (Garden City), Christian Outreach Centre at Mansfield and the Gateway Baptist offering to act as their representative on the issue. They declined the *ACL's* offer, preferring to represent themselves to the Government.

<sup>23</sup>*Salt Shakers* email alert of 22 October 2003, subject: [news] salt shakers & injecting rooms.

*Salt Shakers'* relationships with major political parties (Liberal, National and Labor) appears similar to that of the *Australian Christian Lobby*. Having said that, *Salt Shakers* have found the Federal Liberal Party more responsive to their lobbying compared with the Victorian branch.

Peter Stokes unsuccessfully ran as a candidate for the 1998 Victorian elections and has no plans to campaign again. Stokes now believes that, in comparison to an individual politician who is subjected to party pressures, religious lobbying organisations are more effective in creating awareness and pressuring Governments to act on issues. *Salt Shakers* has no affiliation with any particular political party and all parties and independents are lobbied in a similar manner. As expected, they receive a more favourable response from the Christian Democrats and other conservative parties when compared with the Greens or Democrats.

## **8. Summary**

---

The purpose of introducing *Salt Shakers* has been to present an organisation largely unnoticed by academic writers, including mainstream sociologists and to provide a contrast organisation to the *Australian Christian Lobby*. Despite both organisations having the same biblical foundations, the *ACL* appears to be shifting toward a theologically liberal, politically progressive position. In examining two fundamental issues, namely the recognition of homosexual relationships and multiculturalism, I have sought to illustrate that while *Salt Shakers'* position has remained constant, the *ACL* has adapted. This shift is a direct result in their change in theological interpretation and transformation from a moral agenda to one of social justice. This thesis suggests that in order to gain understanding of why religious political organisations, such as the *ACL*, *Salt Shakers*, and *the Festival of Light* exist, it is important to understand their theological perspective. When investigations of organisations in Australia and America occur, religiously based groups are often categorised as 'Fundamentalist' and then summarily labelled irrelevant or are dismissed completely. However, discussion and investigation of organisations is more prevalent in America than in Australia, regardless of the strength of their existence, their function, and their influence being equal to that of other organisations.

*Salt Shakers* was initially formed as an action group based within a megachurch in Melbourne. It was formed to fight on a single-issue; that of poker machines in a local community. The organisation and its agenda quickly grew with *Salt Shakers* becoming an independently registered not for profit organisation. Self-described as a "ministry", they focus on provision of information to parties

interested in current social and political issues from a 'Christian perspective'. Relying on traditional biblical interpretation, they promote Christian action on current social and political issues; reactionary in nature, their agenda is quite broad. Believing that Christians have a cultural mandate to be the 'moral conscience of society', as well as to convert disciples to Christ, *Salt Shakers* perceive their task as informing and supporting Christians in this process. Here, *Salt Shakers* differ from the *ACL*, which has established itself as a representative of the 'Christian voter'. While encompassing the roles of activist and advocate, *Salt Shakers* tend to be more active while the *ACL* maintains an advocacy role. While information on *Salt Shakers'* supporters and budget has been impossible to determine, it is undeniable that they appeal to the theologically traditional, politically conservative Christian voters. The division between theologically liberal and traditional Christians has constructed an environment in which organisations such as *Salt Shakers* survive and thrive.

In the early stages of their development, the two organisations were relatively similar despite *Salt Shakers* using Christian scripture and adopting a more evangelistic approach than the *Australian Christian Lobby* who once quoted scripture and used traditional biblical interpretation to support its position. *Salt Shakers* produce significantly more material and contact for its supporters than the *ACL*. Consequently, *Salt Shakers* are more proficient at providing information to educate their supporters. As noted earlier, *Salt Shakers* utilise their time researching and communicating for the most part, while approximately five per cent is allocated to lobbying. This is in considerable contrast to the *ACL* whose focus is predominantly lobbying with only a small percentage of time dedicated to communicating with supporters. *Salt Shaker's* primary consideration is on the Christian community, whereas the *Australian Christian Lobby's* homepage states their focus as the provision of "voices for values"- suggesting a direct engagement between the *Christian Lobby* and politics. While the *Australian Christian Lobby's* homepage now provides a 'Breaking News' and 'News' service, supporter emails are mailed weekly unlike the *Salt Shakers'* daily communication whose content is more extensive with more articles. As noted earlier *Salt Shakers* have adopted the RSS Feeds technology as a way of keeping in touch with supporters whereas the *ACL* has not embraced this technology. Furthermore, the *Australian Christian Lobby* does not provide links to national and international newspapers like *Salt Shakers*.

As noted earlier, *Salt Shakers* were openly supportive of *Catch the Fire Ministries* in their conflict with the Court and *Islamic Council of Victoria*. While supporting *Catch the Fire Ministry* financially, the *Australian Christian Lobby* did not inform its supporters about this issue until some time later and in less detail than the *Salt Shakers*.

Initially sharing similar supporter bases and agendas focusing on informing and activating the Christian community, both now feature articles on Islam and its relationship to Christianity. While it has only been since the latter part of 2003 that the *Australian Christian Lobby* has initiated discussion on the issue, *Salt Shakers* have been providing their supporters with Internet links and other information since 2001. *Salt Shakers* has increased information and warnings to Christians regarding those of the Islamic faith seeking influence in Western nations and its threat to Christianity while the *ACL* has not adopted this stance.

*Salt Shakers* and the *ACL* have transformed to fulfil different needs within the Christian community. While the *Australian Christian Lobby* has established their head office in Canberra, dedicating time to direct interactions with politicians and heads of governmental departments, *Salt Shakers* have remained in Melbourne. They have also not established State offices even though their supporter base is national. The organisational structures of both movement organisations are different, particularly as *Salt Shakers* is a non-profit organisation while the *Australian Christian Lobby* is a private company. *Salt Shakers* do not hold National or State conferences, nor *Meet the Candidates* meetings. *Salt Shakers'* monthly journal strongly contrasts that of the *ACL*. The *Salt Shakers'* material utilises traditional theological interpretation, including scriptural references and focuses on moral issues while including social justice issues, viewed through a traditional theological lens. The glossy *ACL* journal with paid business advertising does neither. The common ground is their stated desire to influence young Christians and increase their appeal to this audience.

Neither organisation are Fundamentalist<sup>24</sup> nor Reconstructionist in nature; preferring to operate within existing political and social structures in Australian society. The goal of both organisations is to educate and activate supporters, challenging the interconnections between private and public morality. In substantial ways, the activities of these organisations have developed a supporter base for the Family First Party by informing and educating supporters. The increased attempts to court the 'Christian vote' by political parties is further evidence of the value placed on both the politically conservative and liberal.

As discussed in Chapter 5, both organisations result from Christian denominational changes, as well as social changes in the wider Australian community. While it would be neglectful to dismiss the agenda of Secular Humanists as a factor contributing to the creation and support of religious political

---

<sup>24</sup>In terms of how the word is often applied to describe organisations that seek to overthrow existing political and social structure and replace it with a theocracy.

organisations, it is moral reconstruction and the growth of other religious faiths that could see both organisations continue to grow and develop. Given the increasing number of people attending Pentecostal or Charismatic churches where political activism is now encouraged, it is likely that both movement organisations will exist for some time.<sup>25</sup>

*Salt Shakers* appear to possess sound research capabilities and effective distribution mechanisms; whereas the *ACL* claims its strength is the relationships formed in Federal Parliament that directly influence legislation. These differences have shaped an alliance where research conducted by *Salt Shakers* is shared with the *ACL* who use it to inform politicians or departmental heads.

While Australia does not experience the ‘entrenched conflict’ between religious Progressives and Conservatives found in American politics, clashes are increasing. Issues such as the legitimacy of refugee detention centres, the notion of all religions being valid and worshipping the same God and the support of homosexual agenda have created conflict within the Christian community and found its way into the media. While the *Australian Lobby* and *Salt Shakers* originally held the same positions on these issues, change has occurred. The question remains - how far the *ACL* will move politically from its originally conservative position and whether it will further embrace a liberal theological social agenda.

---

<sup>25</sup>It is perhaps an indication of the success of these organisations that the “Australian Counter-Fundamentalism Movement” was formed in 2003.

## **Chapter 9: Conclusion: RIPA and Religious Fundamentalism in Australia Today**

---

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>1. RIPA: Summing Up</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>2. RIPA: Further Research</b>	<b>202</b>

## Introduction

---

This thesis began by asking three sets of questions: is America a model that is applicable to RIPA in Australia; will religious activism in Australia consolidate into a significant political force comparable to the Religious Right in America and are there signs of a bifurcation of religious activists into Right and Left factions with extremist elements? In addition, has the intensity of religious conflict escalated into a polarization of social attitudes – a cultural war – in Australia as in the US? A second set of questions related to the internal understanding of RIPA: what motivates or inspires committed religious people to engage in political activism<sup>1</sup> and how is this activity understood and justified in terms of their theological stance and commitment to Christianity? A third set of questions relate to the operation of religiously inspired political activism within the political sphere: do the foundations of religion constrain and dictate the agendas of RIPA organisations or affect the way they function as compared to other lobby or advocacy groups? These questions have been addressed in the course of the first six chapters. This chapter contains my conclusions and some suggested areas of further research.

### 1. RIPA: Summing Up

---

Chapters 3 to 6 have provided a comparative account of RIPA in Australia and America and highlighted important historical legacies and experiences in the US that have no equivalent in Australia's history and social formation. These chapters establish the foundations to examine why RIPA in the two nations is fundamentally different. These disparities are most evident in the way that religion is incorporated into the two nations' *Constitutions*, the underlying Protestant Christian symbolism in both nations and the influence of civic religion and culture in the US. These differences have also become evident in the way that each governmental and judicial system has approached sectarian conflict among Christian churches. In recent times, this conflict has extended to include conflict among individuals and religious leaders of different faiths.

A primary component of these comparative chapters was the illustration of different patterns and traditions of Christian theological thought in Australia and America. In America, RIPA is inextricably linked to the wider social movements characterised as the Great Awakenings. Chapter 3 adopted the concept of the Great Awakenings as developed and articulated by Fogel and used the theory as a

---

<sup>1</sup>Political activism is defined as public activity aimed to impact on decisions made by any governing authority. In the case of religious activity, it contrasts with missionary activity that aims to convert people to Christianity.



framework to map the lines of division between Liberal theology and fundamentalism in America from the 1880s until the present day. In Chapter 5, I argued that religious change and conflict in Australia in the 1960-1970s paralleled those in the US at the same time. This period experienced tensions between the Liberal theology of the Third Awakening in its final Decline Phase and the minor, but enthusiastic religious movements that introduced the Fourth Great Awakening.

Likewise, prior to the 1960s, a number of internal religious movements in Australia corresponded with those in the US and were enhanced and aided by advancements in communication from radio and television to the Internet. American evangelism has extensively exploited these means of mass communication in the US, making international expansion effective and efficient. However, Chapters 4 and 5 established that religious movements and religious symbolism have a much less significant place in Australian society than in America. Essentially, Australia lacks the infrastructure of symbolism, rhetoric, and sympathy that generates resonance for RIPA organisations and agendas in the US.

The case studies of RIPA organisations in Chapters 7 and Eight have explored these issues from the viewpoint of the activist organisations themselves. The case study of the *Australian Christian Lobby (ACL)* suggested that a Christian Right-Left polarization among RIPA organisations is not occurring in Australia as in the US context. The *Australian Christian Lobby*, is not consolidating as an organisation of the Christian Right, but seeks to claim a middle ground, similar to Sojourners in the US. In the general reviews of Australian RIPA organisations in Chapters 4 and Five, I found no cases of supra-denominational religiously inspired Christian Left lobby groups that oppose politically and religiously conservative such as the American groups mentioned in this thesis. I would argue also that Australia has not had extremist RIPA organisations similar to the American, *Operation Rescue*.

Given that Australia does not have extremist Christian organisations, how might one define fundamentalism in Australia? Essentially, fundamentalist theology is a belief that God is a distinct entity whose 'being' structures the shape of history. Furthermore, the Bible is the inspired, infallible word of God that provides guidelines on how to live – it is a worldview. This entirely conflicts with the inaccurate definition often used to identify people who embrace antisocial behaviour and extremist activity. This is where countless commentators writing external to a religious perspective blur the lines between fundamentalist theology and acts of extremism.

Fundamentalism is a distinct religious tradition defined in opposition to the liberal theology of the 1920s in the USA. Despite being defeated in some public arenas, it endured as a significant and deeply embedded subculture into the 1950s. Because of this subculture, American views on social, political and world issues are affected by this religious tradition; for example, technological changes are discussed within the framework of a religious worldview - this is not the case in Australia. In this sense, Australia is a more secular society and does not possess similar religious symbolism and framework that is embedded in America popular culture. From an historical perspective, Americans appear more open and comfortable discussing the role of religion in their society than Australians. These social differences are profound, affecting how RIPA operates, as well as the type of RIPA organisations that exist.

Thus, this thesis argues that the American experience of religious and political polarization will not occur to the same extent in Australia. Australia will have RIPA organisations, religious movements, and churches that attain inspiration and resources from US movements and organisations. However, the heritage of religious thought in Australia, even within Protestantism cannot rely on the extensive and rich tradition of theological thinking codified as fundamentalism that has been sustained in the US. The external setting in which RIPA must operate in Australia also varies. Religiously inspired elements in the American Creed and civil religion in the US have no counterpart in Australia. Finally, the case studies of two RIPA organisations in Australia suggest that while one has maintained its Christian Right agenda, the other, the ACL no longer perceives an advantage in identifying and positioning themselves as the Christian Right but rather is seeking to broaden its supporter base.

Australian commentators' fears about the Christian Right in this country have largely examined the external contexts in which RIPA operates. This thesis agrees with their general assessment that these external conditions for the emergence of a Religious Right in Australia are not strong; nevertheless, this thesis contributes another dimension to this assessment. It has argued that the internal differences of theological and religious traditions in Australia and the US are also significant. Theological concerns - later codified as fundamentalist theology and its Premillennialist variants - have left important symbolic and cultural legacies in the US that create a context for RIPA organisations to forge support. They also fashion their agendas and operation in particular ways. RIPA in Australia is both free of the constraints that this legacy creates, but equally lacks the infrastructure of embedded ideas and traditions that perpetuates the mobilization of RIPA in the US.

## 2. RIPA: Further Research

---

There remain a number of areas relating to this thesis that would benefit from further research.

These areas include:

- ❖ What impact is the exodus of parishioners from traditional churches to the Charismatic and Pentecostal churches likely to have on RIPA?
- ❖ Non-denominational religious organisations, such as home churches are largely absent in existing studies. Research identifying these groups, their theology, and political beliefs is necessary.
- ❖ Amanda Lohrey (*Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia*)<sup>2</sup> and Margaret Simons (*Faith, Money, Power: what the religious revivals means for politics*)<sup>3</sup> have both sought to inform readers about Pentecostal churches and their involvement in politics. Both works are part of a series of laments regarding increased political activity by Christians who refuse to respect a clear separation of Church and State. Marion Maddox's (*God Under Howard: the Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics*)<sup>4</sup> central thesis is that Australian democracy is being ravaged by an ascendant Religious Right; however, her work is not demonstrated with substantial evidence. Furthermore, all three authors negate evidence of the firmly embedded Left-wing commitments found in many Australian theologically liberal churches. Evidently, there is a need for further research.
- ❖ This thesis has raised questions and made observations on the applicability of Robert Fogel's model for understanding the role and effect of the Great Awakenings in Australia. Linking technological change to religious, social, and political change within the Australian context is one area that could benefit from further research.
- ❖ Further research, particularly from the Australian perspective is required to understand beliefs about God, including Christians' perception of the image and nature of God and its impact on social and political participation.
- ❖ Separating fundamentalist organisations from radical fundamentalist organisations provides an apparent contrast between the two. This also raises a number of questions that this thesis has not addressed. For example, do organisations transition from one stance to the other and why?

---

<sup>2</sup>Lohrey, Amanda. *Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia*. Melbourne: Black Inc., 2006.

<sup>3</sup>Simons, Maragaret. *Faith, Money, Power: What the Religious Revival Means for Politics*. North Melbourne: Pluto Press Australia, 2007.

<sup>4</sup>Maddox, Marion. *God under Howard: The Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics*. Adelaide: Allen & Unwin, 2005.

- ❖ As noted earlier, the importance of theological interpretations underlying social and political outcomes for Christians remain as potent today as in the past. Are these different theologies changing and how will this affect religion itself?

## Bibliography

---

Abrams, E. E. and Donald Kagan (1998). *Honor Among Nations*. Washington D.C, Ethics & Public Policy Centre.

Akbarzadeh, S. and A. Saeed (2003). *Islam and political legitimacy*, Routledge Curzon.

Amstutz, M. R. (1999). *International Conflict and Cooperation An Introduction to World Politics*. Dubuque, IA, McGraw-Hill Companies.

Anderson, K. A. H. (2000). *Hedley Bull on International Society*. Chippenham, Wiltshire, UK, Antony Rowe Ltd.

Andrian, C. F., David. E. Apter. (1995). *Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics*. Hampshire, UK, MacMillian Press Ltd.

Arrighi, G. B. J. S. (1999). *Chaos & Governance in the Modern World System*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Bader, Veit (2003). "Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously. Arguing for an institutional Turn." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6.

\_\_\_\_\_ (2003). "Religions and States. A New Typology and a Plea for Non-Constitutional Pluralism." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6.

Bainbridge, W. S. (1997). *The Sociology of Religious Movements*. New York, Routledge.

Bandow, D. (1988). *Beyond Good Intentions: A Biblical View of Politics*. Weaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

Bannon, J. (2001). *The Church and Federation in 1901. Spirit of Australia Religion in Citizenship and National Life*. B. N. Howe, Alan. Adelaide, Openbook Publishers.

Barbrook, a. (1975). *Patterns of Political Behaviour*, St Martin's Press.

Barcan, A. (1980). *A History of Australian Education*. Melbourne, Oxford University Press.

Barton, D. (2004). *Original Intent: The Courts, the Constitution and Religion*. Aledo, Texas, Wall Builder Press.

Bellah, R. (1967). "Civic Religion in America." *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 96(1).

Bennett, William J. J. (1992). *The De-Valuing of America*. New York, Summit Books.

Berger, P. (1990). *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, Ancor.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1998). *The Limits of Social Cohesion Conflict and Mediation in Pluralist Societies*. San Francisco, Harper Collins.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1999). *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*. Michigan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Betz, H., G. I., Stefan (1998). *The New Politics of the Right*, St Martin's Press.

Beward, I. (1998). *Australia: "The Most Godless Place Under Heaven?"* Melbourne, Beacon Hill Books.

Beyer, P. (1999). "Secularization from the Perspective of Globalization: A response to Dobbelaere." *Sociology of Religion* 60(3).

\_\_\_\_\_ (2001). *Religion in the Process of Globalization*. Wurzburg, Germany, Ergon Verlag.

Beyerlein, K. C., Mark (2003). "The Political Activities of Religious Congregations in the United States." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(2).

Bishop, P. N. P. (2000). *Local Government Public Enterprise & Ethics*. Leichhardt, NSW Australia, The Federation Press.

Black, A. E. (1983). *Practice & Belief Studies in the Sociology of Australian Religions*. North Sydney, George Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1991). *Religion in Australia Sociological Perspectives*. North Sydney, George Allen & Unwin Australia.

Bluhm, W. T. (1974). *Ideologies and Attitudes: Modern Political Culture*. New Jersey, USA, Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Bouma, G. D. E. (1996). *Many Religions, All Australian: Religious Settlement, Identity and Cultural Diversity*. Adelaide, Open Book Publishers.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1999). *Managing Religious Diversity*. Survey Hills, New Litho Pty Ltd.

\_\_\_\_\_ (2003). "Estimating the Extent of Religious and Spiritual Activity in Australia Using Time-Budget Data." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(1).

Brennan, F. (2007). *Acting on Conscience: how can we responsibly mix law, religion and politics*. University of Queensland Press.

Brett, J. (2003). *Australian Liberals and the Moral Middle Class*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bromley, D. G. (1997). "Remembering the Future: A Sociological Narrative of Crisis Episodes, Collective Action, Culture Workers, and Countermovements." *Sociology of Religion* 58(2).

Bromiley, G. W., Everett F. Harrison et al, (Editors) (1988). *The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia*.

Browning, G. K., A. Halcli, et al. (2000). *Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present*, Sage Publications.

- Bruce, S. (1988). *The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Burgmann, V. (1993). *Power & Protest: Movements for Change in Australian Society*, Allen & Unwin.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000). "The Point of Protest: Advocacy and Social Action in Twentieth Century Australia." *Just Policy* 19/20(September).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2003). *Power, Profit and Protest: Australian social movements and globalisation*. Crows Nest NSW Australia, Allen & Unwin.
- Burleigh, M. (2007). *Sacred causes: the Clash of Religion and Politics, from the Great War to the War on Terror*, HarperCollins.
- Calhoun, C. J. (1994). *Social theory and the politics of identity*, Blackwell.
- Carey, H. M. (1996). *Believing in Australia: A Cultural History of Religions*, Allen & Unwin.
- Carter, A. G. S. (2002). *Democratic Theory Today*. Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Carter, S. L. (2000). *God's Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in Politics*. New York, Basic Books.
- Casanova, J. (2001). "2000 presidential address: Religion, the new millennium, and globalization." *Sociology of Religion* 62(4).
- Castells, M. (1997). *The Power of Identity*, Blackwell.
- Chaves, M. A., Gorski, Philip S. (2001). "Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27.
- Clark, C. M. H. (1962). *A History of Australia*. Carlton, Melbourne University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1980). *A Short History of Australia*, Mentor.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1980). *Selected documents in Australian History*, Angus & Robertson.
- Clouse Robert G., R. V. P., Edwin M. Yamauchi (1993). *Two Kingdoms: The Church and Culture Through The Ages*. Chicago, Moody Press.
- Coles, R. (1999). *The Secular Mind*. Princeton, USA, Princeton University Press.
- Corbett, M., J. C. Hemeyer (1999). *Politics and religion in the United States*, Garland Pub.
- Culter, P. (2974). *God Bless Australia*. Hawthorn, Lloyd O'Neill Pty Ltd.
- Curry, T. J. (1987). *The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment*. USA, Oxford University Press.
- Dallas, J. (1991). *Desires in conflict*. Eugene, OR, Harvest House Publishers.
- Davie, G. (2000). *Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates*. London, Oxford University Press.

Davies, A. F. (1966). *Private Politics: A Study of Five Political Outlooks*. Carlton, Melbourne University Press.

Davies, R. E. (1992). *I Will Pour Out My Spirit*. England, Monarch Publications.

Davis, C., J. Milbank, et al. (2005). *Theology and the political: the new debate*, Duke University Press.

Davis, D. H. (2003). "Thomas Jefferson and the 'wall of separation' metaphor." *Journal of Church and State* 45(1).

Davis, G. F., G. F. Davis, et al. (2005). *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, Cambridge University Press.

De Angelis, Massimo, (1998). "Towards a theory of Globalization as a Strategy." Annual conference of the European Association of Evolutionary Political Economy, Lisbon.

Della Porta, D., H. Kriesi, et al. (1999). *Social movements in a Globalizing World*, St. Martin's Press.

DeMar, G. (1984). *God and Government: A Biblical and Historical Study Volume 1*. Tennessee, Wolgemuth & Hyatt Publishers Inc.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1984). *God and Government Issues in Biblical Perspectives Volume 2*. Tennessee, Wolgemuth & Hyatt Publishers Incorporated.

Demerath, N. J. (2001). *Crossing the God's: World Religions and Worldly Politics*. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press.

Diani, M., D. McAdam (2003). *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, Oxford University Press.

Duff, N. J. "Locating God in All the Wrong Places: The Second Commandment and American Politics." *Interpretation* 60(2).

Eatwell, R. W., Anthony Wright (Editors) (1993). *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. London, Pinter Publishers.

Edwards, S. (2005). "Do We Really Need Religious Vilification Laws?" *Policy* 21(1).

Eidsome, J. (1984). *God & Caesar - Christian Faith in Political Action*. Weaton, Crossway Books.

Eliot, T. S. (1939). *The Idea of a Christian Society*. London, Faber & Faber Limited.

Ely, R. (1976). *Unto God & Caesar, Religious Issues in the Emerging Commonwealth 1891-1906*. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press.

Emy Hugh V, O. E. H. (1991). *Australian Politics: Realities in Conflict*. London, MacMillian Education Aust Pty Ltd.

Engle, F. G. (1984). *Australian Christians in Conflict and Unity*. Melbourne, Joint Board of Christian Education.



- Esposito, J. (1998). "Religion and Global Affairs: Political Challenges." *SAIS Review* 18(2).
- Faulks, K. (2000). *Political Sociology A Critical Introduction*. Washington Square, New York, New York University Press.
- Feidman, E. J. (1961). *A Practical Guide to the Conduct of Field Research in the Social Sciences*. Colorado, Westview Press.
- Fells, E. (2001). "The Proliferation of Identity Politics in Australia: An Analysis of Ministerial Portfolios, 1970 -2000." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38(1).
- Fenn, Richard K. (Editor) (2003). *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion*. Oxford, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- Finer, S. E. (1996). *Anonymous Empire*. London, Pall Mall.
- Fleming, J. I. H. (2001). *Motivating Ministers to Morality*. Chippenham, Wiltshire, UK, AnAntony Rowe Ltd.
- Fogel, R. W. (2000). *The Fourth Great Awakening & The Future of Egalitarianism*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Forrester, D. B. (1989). *Beliefs, Values and Politics*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Foster, G. M. (2002). *Moral Reconstruction: Christian Lobbyist and the Federal Legislation of Morality, 1865-1920*. North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press.
- Fower, S. (1988). *The State in Light of the Scriptures*. Republic of South Africa, Potohefstroom University of Christian Higher Education.
- Fox, J., S. Sandler (2004). *Bringing religion into international relations*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Frame, T. (2006). *Church and State: Australia's Imaginary wall*. Sydney, NSW, University of New South Wales Press.
- Frankel, B. (2000). "Radical Politics: The Falterings of a Third Way." *Just Policy* (September).
- Frankfort-Nachmias Chava, Nachmias, D. (1996). *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. New York, St. Martin's Press.
- Freeman, J. (1983). *Social movements of the sixties and seventies*, Longman.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Victoria Johnson (Editors) (1999). *Waves of Protest*. Maryland, USA, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Furedi, F. (2005). *Politics of Fear*. London, Continuum International Publishing Group.
- Gamble, A. (1981). *An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought*. London, MacMillian Education Australia Pty Ltd.

- Gamson, W. A. (1975). *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey Press.
- Garson, G. D. (1978). *Group Theories of Politics*. Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications.
- Gill, A. (2002). "The Study of Liberation Theology: What Next?" *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 41(1).
- Gill, R. E. (1996). *Theology and Sociology*. London, Cassell.
- Gitlin, T. (1996). *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars*. New York, USA, Henry Holt and Company Inc.
- Grant, B. (1983). *The Australian Dilemma*. Rushcutters Bay, MacDonal Futura Australia.
- Green, J. (1999). "The Spirit Willing: Collective Identity and the Development of the Christian Right." *Waves of Protest: Social Movements since the sixties*. Freeman, Jo, Victoria Johnson. Maryland, USA, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and M. J. Rozell, et al. (2003). *The Christian right in American politics: marching to the millennium*, Georgetown University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007). *The Faith Factor: how religion influences American elections*, Praeger Publishers.
- Gregory, J. S. (1973). *Church and state: changing government policies towards religion in Australia: with particular reference to Victoria since separation*, Cassell Australia.
- Grey, J. D., Jeff (Editors) (1992). *Vietnam War, Myth and Memory*. St. Leonards NSW, Allen & Unwin.
- Grocott, A. M. (1980). *Convicts, Clergymen, and Churches: Attitudes of Convicts and Ex-convicts Towards the Churches and Clergy in New South Wales from 1788 to 1851*, Sydney University Press.
- Guinness, O. (1993). *The American Hour A Time of Reckoning and the Once and Future Role of Faith*. New York, The Free Press.
- Hamburger, P. (2002). *Separation of Church and State*. London, Harvard University Press.
- Harding, S. F. (2000). *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language & Politics*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Harman, G. S. (1969). *Pressure Groups and the Australian Political System*. Wagga Wagga, Wagga Wagga Teachers College.
- Harris, D. et al. (1982). *Shape of Belief: Christianity in Australia Today*. Homebush West, NSW, Lancer Books.
- Harris, P., Williams, Vicki (2003). "Social Inclusion, National Identity and the Moral Imagination in The Drawing Board." *Australian Review of Public Affairs* 3(3).

- Hatchard, J., P. Slinn, et al. (1999). "Parliamentary supremacy and judicial independence: a Commonwealth approach": proceedings of the Latimer House Joint Colloquium, June 1998, Cavendish Pub.
- \_\_\_\_\_ and M. Ndulo, et al. (2004). *Comparative Constitutionalism and Good Governance in the Commonwealth: An Eastern and Southern African Perspective*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hawker, G., RFO Smith, Patrick Weller (1979). *Politics and Policy in Australia*.
- Haynes, J., (Editor) (2006). *The Politics of Religion: A survey*. Haynes, Jeffrey. London, Routledge.
- Hearn, F. (1997). *Moral Order and Social Disorder*, Walter De Gryter Inc.
- Heelas, P. (1996). *The New Age Movement*. Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers.
- Henderson, G. (1982). *Mr. Santamaria and the Bishops*. Sydney, Southwood Press Pty Ltd.
- Hervieu-Leger, D. (2000). *Religion as a Chain of Memory*. New Jersey, Rutgers University Press.
- Hogan, M. C. (1987). *The sectarian strand: religion in Australian history*. Ringwood, Victoria, Penguin.
- Hood III, M. V., Smith Mark Caleb (2002). "On the Prospect of Linking Religious-Right Identification with Political Behavior: Panacea or Snipe Hunt?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41(4).
- Horsburgh, M. (1994). CSAC Working Paper Series 1 No. 16 "The Church Doing Caesars Work". Sydney, Centre for the Study of Australian Christianity.
- Hughes, P. J., T. Blombery, et al. (1990). *Patterns of faith in Australian churches: report from the Combined Churches Survey for Faith and Mission*, Christian Research Association.
- Hunt, F. J. (1978). *Socialisation in Australia*. Melbourne, Aust. International Press & Pub. Ltd.
- Hunter, J. D. (1991). *Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America*. New York, BasicBooks.
- Huntington, S. P. (1981). *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*. London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Simon & Schuster.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004). *Who are we? : American national identity and the challenges it faces*. New York, USA, Simon & Schuster.
- James K. Wellman, J., Kyoko Tokuno III, N. J. Demerath (2004). "Is Religious Violence Inevitable?" *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43(3).
- Jelen, T. G., C. Wilcox "Conscientious objectors in the culture war?: A typology of attitudes toward church-state relations." *Sociology of Religion* 58.
- Jennett, C. S. R. G. (1989). *Politics of the Future: The Role of Social Movements*. Melbourne, MacMillian Company of Australia.

- Jensen, T. E. (2000). *Secular Theories on Religion Current Perspectives*, Denmark.
- Kaplan, E. (2004). *With God on Their Side: How Christian Fundamentalists Trampled Science, Policy, and Democracy in George W. Bush's White House*, New Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton.
- Kaufman, P. I. (1990). *Redeeming Politics*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- Kennedy, R. (1985). *Charity Warfare: The Charity Organisation Society in Colonial Melbourne*. South Yarra, Melbourne, Hyland House.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1989). *Australian Welfare: Historical Sociology*. Melbourne, MacMillan Company.
- Kidd, C. (1999). "Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America." *The Historical Journal* 42(4).
- Kildea, J. (2002). *Tearing the Fabric: Sectarianism in Australia, 1910 to 1925*, Citadel Books.
- Kivsto, P. E. (2001). *Illuminating Social life: Classical and Contemporary Theory Revisited*. Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005). *Illuminating Social Life: Classical and Contemporary Theory Revisited*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. London, Sage Publications.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005). *Incorporating Diversity: Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age*, Paradigm Publishers.
- Knoll, D. (1994). "Anti-Vilification Laws: Some Recent Developments in the United States and their Implications for Proposed Legislation in the Commonwealth of Australia." *Australian Journal of Human Rights*.
- Kultert, H. M. (1986). *Everything is Political but Politics Is Not Everything*. Grand Rapids, William B Eerdmans Publishing Company.
- Kuo, J. D. (2006). *Tempting faith: an inside story of political seduction*, Free Press.
- Kurth, J. (2000). "The Real Clash." *The National Interest* 37.
- Kurtz, L. (1995). *Gods in the Global Village: The World's Religions in Sociological Perspective*. California, Pine Forge Press, A Sage Publications Company.
- Lane, R. (1997). *Political Science in Theory and Practice: The Politics Model*, M. E. Sharpe.
- Laver, M. (1997). *Private Desires, Political Action*, Sage Publication.
- Lawrence, B. B. (1995). *Defenders of God: The fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age*. Carolina, University of South Carolina Press.
- Layman, G. (2003). *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics*. Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press.

- Liebman, R. W., Robert (Editors) (1983). *The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation*. New York, Aldine Publishing Company.
- Lo, C. Y. H. (1982). "Countermovements and Conservative Movements in the Contemporary U.S. *Annual Review of Sociology* 8(1): 107-134.
- Lofland, J. (1996). *Social Movement Organizations*. Hawthorne, New York, Walter De Gruyter, Inc.
- Lohrey, A. (2006). *Voting for Jesus: Christianity and Politics in Australia*, Black Inc.
- Lukes, S. (1977). *Essays in Social Theory*. London, MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Maddock, K. W. B. (1987). *War, Australia and Vietnam*, Sydney.
- Maddox, M. and Australia. Dept. of the Parliamentary Library. Information and Research Services (2001). *For God and country: religious dynamics in Australian federal politics*, Dept. of the Parliamentary Library.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005). *God under Howard: the Rise of the Religious Right in Australian Politics*. Adelaide, Allen & Unwin.
- March, D. S., Gerry (1984). *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. London.
- Marr, D. (1999). *The High Price of Heaven*. St. Leonards, NSW, Allen & Unwin.
- Marsh, I. (1995). *Beyond the Two Party System: Political Representation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Marshall, D. P. (1984). *Thine is the Kingdom: A Biblical Perspective on the Nature of Government and Politics Today*. United Kingdom, Marshall Morgan & Scott.
- Marshall, P. (1998). "Religion and global affairs: Disregarding religion." *SAIS Review* 18(2).
- Martin, D. (1986). *Religious Vision and Political Reality*, Lecture Delivered at the Faculty of Arts, University of New England and printed by them.
- Martin, W. (2005). *With God on Our Side: the Rise of the Religious Right in America*. Portland, OR, USA, Broadway Books.
- Marty, M. E. A., R Scott (Editors) (1997). *Religion, Ethnicity and Self-Identity*. London, University Press of New England.
- Marty, M. E. R. S. A. (1991). *The Fundamentalism Project Volume 1: Fundamentalism Observed*. London, The University of Chicago Press.
- Max L. Stackhouse, Shirley J. Roels, et al. (1995). *On Moral Business Classical and Contemporary resources for Ethics in Economic Life*. Grand Rapids, Michigan, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

- McGarvie, M. D. (2004). *One Nation Under Law: America's early National Struggles to Separate Church and State*. DeKalb, Ill., Northern Illinois University Press.
- McGaughey, D., (Editor) (1988). *Australia: "the most godless place under heaven"?* Melbourne, Beacon Hill Books.
- Mendes, P. and NetLibrary Inc. (2003). *Australia's Welfare Wars: the players, the politics and the ideologies*, UNSW Press.
- Merki, P. S., Ninian (Editors) (1983). *Religion and Politics in the Modern World*. New York, New York University Press.
- Meyer, D. S., N. Whittier, et al. (2002). *Social movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, Oxford University Press.
- Mirola, W. A. (2000). "Asking for Bread, Receiving a Stone: The Rise and Fall of Religious Ideologies in Chicago's Eight-Hour Movement." *Social Problems* 50(2).
- Misztal, B., A., Shupe (1992). *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective*. CT, USA, Praeger Publishing.
- Mol, H. (1971). *Religion in Australia: a Sociological Investigation*, Thomas Nelson (Australia).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1985). *The faith of Australians*, Allen & Unwin.
- Mowbray, M. (2000). "Beyond 'a Thousand Tiny Empowerments' Advocacy and Social Action in Australia." *Just Policy / Advocacy and Social Action* September.
- Mulder, J. M. and J. F. Wilson (1978). *Religion in American history: interpretive essays*, Prentice-Hall.
- Nash, K. A. S. (2004). *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*. Malden, MA, USA, Blackwell Publishing.
- Neem, J. N. (2006). "One Nation Under Law: America's Early National Struggles to Separate Church and State/The Founders on God and Government." *Journal of the Early Republic* 26(2).
- Nelson, B. A. (1994). *America Balkanized: Immigration's Challenge to Government*. Monterey, VA, American Immigration Control Foundation.
- Nicholls, D. (1995). *God and Government in an Age of Reason*. New York, Routledge.
- Niebuhr, R. (1995). *Christian Realism and Political Problems*. London, Faber & Faber Limited.
- Nincic, M. J. L., Editors (2000). *Being Useful*. Michigan, The University of Michigan Press.
- Nisbet, R. (1986). *Conservatism: Dream and Reality*. Milton Keynes, England, Open University Press.
- Norris, P., R. Inglehart (2004). *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*, Cambridge University Press.

O'Farrell, P. J. (1992). *The Catholic Church and Community: an Australian history*, New South Wales University Press.

Ormonde, P. E. (1968). *Catholics in Revolution: Challenging New Views on Communism and War*. Hong Kong, Landsdown Press.

O'Sullivan, N. (1976). *Conservatism*. London, J M Dent & Sons Ltd.

Pakulski, J. (1991). *Social movements: the Politics of Moral Protest*, Longman Cheshire.

Panikkar, R. (1983). *Religion or Politics; The Western Dilemma. Religion and Politics in the Modern World*.

Parker, C. (2001). *A Century of Care: Mt St Margaret Hospital Ryde, 1891-1991*. Hurstville, Parker Pattinson Publishing.

Patterson, E. (2004). "Different Religions, Different Politics? Religion and Political Attitudes in Argentina and Chile." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 43(3).

Peterson, A., Manuel Vasquez, Philip Williams (editors) (2001). *Christianity, Social Change, and Globalization in the Americas*. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press.

Phillips, W. (1981). *Defending "a Christian country": Churchmen and Society in New South Wales in the 1880s and After*, University of Queensland Press.

Pike, B. (1998). *A Lyons Share of Power: the Influence of the Religious Right on contemporary Australian politics*. Melbourne, Evatt Victoria Centre.

Poggi, G. (2001). *Forms of Power*. Cornwall, MPG Books.

Porter, Muriel. *The New Puritans: The Rise of Fundamentalism in the Anglican Church*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007

Powell, W. W. C., Elisabeth S (Editors) (1998). *Private Action and the Public Good*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Preston, N. (2001). *Understanding Ethics*. Leichhardt, NSW Australia, The Federation Press.

Ray, J. J. (1974). *Conservatism as Heresy an Australian Reader*. Sydney, Australia and New Zealand Book Company.

Robbins, T. (1988). *Cults, Converts and Charisma: The Sociology of New Religious Movements*. Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications.

Robertson, R. (1970). *The Sociological Interpretation of Religion*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1992). *Globalization Social Theory and Global Culture*. London, Sage Publications Ltd.

Robinson, J. A. T. (1963). *Honest to God*. London, S C M Press.

Rosenblum, N. L. (2003). "Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Should of Liberal Democratic Thought." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6.

Royce, J. (1968). *The Problem of Christianity*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Schaeffer, F. A. (1981). *A Christian Manifesto*. Weaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

Schneider, L. E. (1964). *Religion, Culture and Society*. New York, John Wiley Publishers.

Scruton, R. (1980). *The Meaning of Conservatism*. Middlesex, England, Penguin Books.

Segers, M. C. J., Teg G (1998). *A Wall of Separation? Debating the Public Role of Religion*. Maryland, USA, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Sethi, S. P. (1995). "The Righteous and the Powerful: Differing Paths to Social." *On Moral Business: Classical and Contemporary Resources for Ethics in Economic Life*. Max Stackhouse, Dennis P. McCann, et al (Editors), Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Simons, M. (2007). *Faith, Money, Power: What the Religious Revival Means for Politics*. North Melbourne, Pluto Press Australia.

Skita, L. J. M., Elizabeth (2002). "The Dark Side of Moral Conviction." *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*.

Sopher J, C., Stephen V Monsma (1995). "Church and State: Two Models." *Policy Studies Review* 14(1/2).

\_\_\_\_\_ (1997). *The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in Five Democracies*. Maryland, USA, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Stackhouse, M. L., Diane B. Obdenchain (2002). *God and Globalization: Christ and the Dominions of Civilization*. Harrisburg, Trinity Press International.

Stark, R. (2003). *For the Glory of God: How Monotheism led to Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts, and the End of Slavery*, Princeton University Press.

\_\_\_\_\_ (2005). *The victory of reason: how Christianity led to freedom, capitalism, and Western success*. New York, Random House.

Stewart, R. G. (1999). *Public Policy Strategy and Accountability*. South Yarra, Macmillan Publishers Australia Pty Ltd.

Swatos, W. H. J. (1992). *Twentieth-Century World Religious Movements*. United Kingdom, Edwin Mellen Press.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1998). *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Society*. Walnut Creek, California, Alta Mira Press, A Division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.



\_\_\_\_\_ (2005). *Globalization and Religious Fundamentalism. Illuminating Social Life: Classical and Contemporary Theory Revisited*. P. Kivisto. Thousand Oaks, Calif. London: Sage Publications.

\_\_\_\_\_, J. W., James K Jnr (1999). *The Power of Religious Publics Staking Claims in American Society*. CT, USA, Praeger Publishing.

Tacey, D. J. (1995). *Edge of the Sacred Transformation in Australia*. North Blackburn, Victoria, Harper Collins Publishers.

Tacey, D. J. (2000). *ReEnchantment: The New Australian Spirituality*. North Blackburn, Victoria, HarperCollins Publishers.

Tarrow, S. G. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, C. (1986). *First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment*, Oxford University Press.

Thompson, R. C. (1994). *Religion in Australia: A History*, Oxford University Press.

Tinder, G. (1991). *The Political Meaning of Christianity - The Prophetic Stance*. San Francisco, Harper Collins.

Todd, G. (1996). *Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture Wars*. New York, NY, USA, Henry Holt and Company Inc.

Truman, T. (1960). *Catholic Action and Politics*. Melbourne, Georgian House.

Turner, S. P. E. (1996). *Social Theory & Sociology*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Tyrer, J. H. (1993). *History of the Brisbane Hospital: A Pilgrim's Progress*. Brisbane, Boolarong Publishing.

Ukes, S. (1977). *Essays in Social Theory*, MacMillian Press Ltd.

Unger, R. K. (2002). "Them and Us: Hidden Ideologies-Differences in Degree or Kind?" *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 2(1).

Vasquez, M. A. (2003). "Tracking Global Evangelical Christianity." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 71(1).

Vincent, A. (1992). *Modern Political Ideologies*. Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers.

Wallerstein, I. M., W. G. Martin, et al. (2007). *Making waves: worldwide social movements, 1765-2005*, Paradigm Publishers.

Wallis, J. (2005). *God's politics: Why the Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn't Get It*. San Francisco, USA, HarperSanFrancisco.

- Wallis, R. (1979). *Salvation and Protest: Studies of Social and Religious Movements*. London, Frances Pinter Ltd.
- Ward, R., Humphreys, Robert (1995). *Religious Bodies in Australia*. Wantirna, New Melbourne Press.
- Watson, I. (2002). *Rethinking the Politics of Globalization: Theory, Concepts and Strategy*, Ashgate.
- Watts, R. (2000). "Politics and Social Action in an Era of Globalisation." *Just Policy* 19/20 (September).
- Waugh, G. (1993). *Renewal Journal*. Brisbane, Australia, Geoff Waugh.
- Wearing, M., R. Berreen (1994). *Welfare & Social Policy in Australia: the distribution of advantage*, Harcourt Brace.
- Weber, T. P. (1987). *Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming: American premillennialism, 1875-1982*, University of Chicago.
- Webster, F. (2001). *Culture and Politics in the Information Age: a new politics?*, Routledge.
- Weinberg, L., Ami Pedahzur (2004). *Religious Fundamentalism & Political Extremism*. London, Frank Cass.
- White, S. (1984). "Political Culture in Communist States Some Problems of Theory and Method." *Comparative Politics* 16(3).
- Wieloch, N. (2002). "Collective Mobilization and Identity From the Underground: The Deployment of "Oppositional Capital" in the Harm Reduction Movement." *The Sociological Quarterly* 43(1).
- Wilkes, J., (Editor) (1962). *Forces in Australian Politics*. Canberra, Australian Institute of Political Science.
- Williams, R. H., N. J. Demerath. III (1991). "Religion and Political Process in an American City." *American Sociological Review* 56(4).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997). *Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*. New York, Aldine de Gruyter.
- Wilson, B. (1983). *Can God Survive in Australia*. Sutherland, NSW, Albatross Books.
- Wilson, B. C., Jamie (Editors) (1999). *New Religious Movements: Challenge and Response*. New York, Routledge.
- Wogaman, J. P. (2000). *Christian Perspectives on Politics*. Kentucky, Westminster John Knox Press.
- Wood, J. E. J.,) (1999). "Public Religion Vis-à-vis the Prophetic Role of Religion." *The Power of Religious Publics; Staking Claims in American Society*. William H Swatos, James K Wellman, (Editors) Westport, Conn., Praeger.
- Wuthnow, R. (1976). *The Consciousness Reformation*. California, University of California Press.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1988). *The Restructuring of American Religion Society and Faith Since World War II*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1990). *The Restructuring of American Religion*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1992). *Rediscovering the Sacred: Perspectives on Religion in Contemporary Society*. Michigan, William B Eerdmans Publishing.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1992). "The world of Fundamentalism." *The Christian Century* April 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_ (1998). *After Heaven Spirituality in America Since the 1950s*. London, University of California Press.

\_\_\_\_\_ (2003). "The Social Integration of Practitioners of Non-Western Religions in the United States." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(4).

\_\_\_\_\_ (2004). "How Religious Groups Promote Forgiving: A National Study." *Journal For the Scientific Study of Religion* 39(2).

Zeiler Julian E. Bruce J. Schulman (Editors) (2008). *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s*. Harvard University Press.