

MOBILIZING for the STORM

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD
AND DESERT STORM

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2001

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MOBILIZING FOR THE STORM:

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM

“Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on the Saudi border capable of initiating hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Given the Iraqi government’s history of aggression against its own citizens as well as its neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would be unwise and unrealistic.”

President George Bush, Address to the nation, August 8, 1990

The mobilization of the Army National Guard for Desert Shield came 40 years to the month after the last big mobilization of the Guard for the Korean War in 1950. Superficially, there were similarities between the outbreak of the two wars. Both occurred in distant countries that the average American would be hard-pressed to locate on a map, and both wars broke out after American diplomats delivered less than clear messages that the threatened nations would be protected by American arms should they be attacked. In both instances, greedy dictators gambled that the American president would not expend American lives for such marginal strategic goals. In both cases, the dictators were badly mistaken.

But the parallels between the Korean War and Desert Shield/Desert Storm diverge quickly after that. The Army that achieved a “Certain Victory” during its “Whirlwind War”¹ through Kuwait and Iraq was a completely different organization from the one that struggled to a stalemate in Korea 40 years earlier. The destruction of Task Force Smith revealed the hollowness of the post-World War II Army when it first encountered the North Koreans in the summer of 1950. The Army that deployed to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1990 was arguably the most combat-ready peacetime fighting force in the nation’s history. It was a confident, all-volunteer force that reflected in its realistic training and doctrine the hard-learned lessons of the Vietnam War, and had enjoyed unprecedented growth and modernization during the preceding decade. The incredible logistical success of deploying over 500,000 troops and their equipment in record time into an austere environment was only overshadowed by the mechanized blitz that reduced the Iraqi army “from the fourth-largest army in the world to the second-largest army in Iraq in 100 hours.”²

In 1990, the Army National Guard began the year some 456,000 strong and contained 46% of the combat, 32% of the combat support, and 26% of the combat service support forces in the total Army.³ Thus, the Army Guard could not help but be a key player in this most one-sided victory in American history. In all, some 62,411 soldiers in 398 units were ordered into active federal service, with 1,132 additional Army Guardmembers volunteering

The long-held belief that the Guard could not be ready in time to help the Army win a modern war was convincingly disproved.

for active duty.⁴ Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico contributed units. Some 297 units consisting of 37,848 soldiers were certified and deployed to Southwest Asia⁵, while an additional 84 units and 10,132 soldiers were deployed throughout the U.S. and Europe, or were validated but awaiting deployment. The remaining soldiers, mostly members of the three mobilized Roundout Brigades, were in the process of obtaining validation for deployment when the war came to its quick and victorious conclusion. The Guard contribution to Desert Shield/Desert Storm was not limited to individual augmentees or small units: 60 of the Army Guard units that deployed to Southwest Asia were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels, including

the 142d and 196th Field Artillery Brigades, the only two Army Guard combat units to fight in the war.⁶

Unlike their Korean War predecessors, who in most cases spent months at their mobilization sites and had their units stripped repeatedly of equipment and experienced personnel, the Guardsmen and women who were called up for Desert Storm were deployed quickly and in the same units they had trained with in peacetime. Sixty-seven percent of all Army Guard units deployed within 45 days of being mobilized; 28% within 20 days. In many cases, the limiting factor in getting units into the field was not the amount of train-up time required to validate a unit for deployment, but the lack of assets - especially sealift - necessary to transport equipment to Southwest Asia. The long-held belief that the Guard could not be ready in time to help the Army win a modern war was convincingly disproved.

INVASION

In retrospect the warning signs preceding Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait were there for the world to see in the first half of 1990. A lengthy and exhausting war with Iran had left Iraq with a large and experienced army, but also with crushing debts. These debts, mostly owed to Arab neighbors, were difficult to pay off because the price of oil - Iraq's major source of foreign income - was at an historic low. Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, blamed this on an overproduction of oil by his tiny Persian Gulf neighbors, the Sheikdom of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, that had glutted the world's oil market and brought prices down. He demanded compensation from Kuwait for the money Iraq lost as a result of these low prices, as well as a slowdown in future production in order to make oil prices rise. He further accused Kuwait of stealing oil from Iraq by "slant-drilling" underneath the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border in the Rumaylah oil field that straddles the two countries, and which Iraq claimed for itself. In bombastic public speeches, Hussein tapped into the widespread Arab distrust of the United States when he claimed that U.S. subversion was behind the worldwide drop in oil prices and threatened military action against Kuwait if it failed to reduce oil production. By this time, in late July 1990, Iraqi troops were massing on the border and last minute diplomatic efforts failed to convince Hussein that the rich and largely defenseless prize of Kuwait should be denied him.

On Thursday, August 2, 1990, at 2:00 a.m. local time, Iraqi armored formations swept across the border and brushed aside Kuwaiti resistance. Hussein declared that Iraq had reclaimed Kuwait as its "19th Province," and his army stood poised - or so it appeared - to continue into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There was little there to stop him. Saudi Arabia was a rich country, with high-quality military equipment mostly of U.S. manufacture, but with relatively few soldiers, and poorly trained ones at that. The Iraqi army was, by some estimates, the fourth largest in the world, well-equipped and combat-experienced, with a core of loyal, professional troops manning the armored and mechanized divisions of Hussein's elite "Republican Guard." The Iraqi army was also known for its use of chemical weapons, both in the war against Iran, and against rebellious minorities at home. Against this kind of force, the Saudi army - like the Kuwaiti army - would be little obstacle. But as the largest exporter of crude oil to the United States and the world, Saudi Arabia was also a nation whose continued independence was in the vital interests of the United States.

President George Bush's reaction to the invasion of Kuwait was swift and decisive. Immediately freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, he declared a trade embargo. While rallying international support among U.S. allies and in the United Nations, Bush dis-

General H. Norman
Schwarzkopf,
Commander, U.S.
Central Command
(NGB)



patched Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia to offer U.S. assistance in the defense of that nation should Hussein choose to continue his attack south to secure more oil fields. On August 6, the same day the UN Security Council voted to impose a worldwide embargo on

Iraq, Secretary Cheney met with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and gained the worried monarch's consent to host U.S. forces on Saudi soil. The following day, at President Bush's order, Operation Desert Shield began and U.S. Air Force F-15s flew to Saudi Arabia. The United States would not

be alone in its support of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - before it was over, 33 other nations would join the coalition to restore Kuwait to its rightful rulers. While the U.S. commitment of troops would be the largest - in excess of 527,000 servicemen and women deployed to the Gulf region - there were also large contingents from Saudi Arabia (110,500 servicemembers), the United Arab Emirates (43,000), the United Kingdom (42,000), Egypt (40,000), Oman (25,500), Syria (21,000), and France (20,000).⁷

U.S. Army forces followed quickly on the heels of the first Air Force fighters. The Ready Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, the first of approximately 280,000 Army troops that would deploy to Southwest Asia, began arriving in Saudi Arabia on August 9. That same day, Sergeant First Class Palmer Burchstead and Sergeant First Class Timothy Hester, volunteers from South Carolina's 228th Signal Brigade acting as a mobile communications unit, claimed the honor of being the first Army Guardmembers to arrive in the theater when they reached Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in Riyadh just hours after the first 82d Airborne troops. There they set up a Single Channel Tactical Satellite Set for the Third U.S. Army, the major Army component of CENTCOM.⁸

While sending a message to Iraq that America was committed to defending Saudi Arabia, the light forces of the 82d Airborne Division were vulnerable to armored attack. Heavier reinforcements were needed. As quickly as possible, the mechanized infantry and armor of the 24th

Infantry Division and the helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were loaded aboard ships and transport planes and sent to Saudi Arabia. A key component of the 24th Infantry Division, one of the division's three ground maneuver brigades, was a roundout unit from the Georgia Army National Guard, the 48th Infantry Brigade. Neither the 48th, nor an additional roundout infantry battalion from the South Carolina National Guard, were mobilized when the 24th Infantry Division was alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia.

Following closely on the heels of the 101st and 24th Divisions, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Cavalry Division both began shipping their equipment from Texas ports to the Persian Gulf. Rounding out the 1st Cavalry Division, but also not mobilized, was Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade plus a roundout battalion from the Texas National Guard. The Army's handling of the roundout units was to become the source of great frustration for the Guard in a war otherwise full of success stories.

THE ROUNDOUT UNITS

The Roundout program, first instituted by the Army in 1973, paired a reserve component brigade with an active duty division for purposes of training and deployment. The program saved money, since Guard and Reserve units on average cost the taxpayer one-quarter of what the equivalent active duty unit would cost, and it gave Guardmembers a wartime mission on which to focus their peacetime training. The active component division would have peacetime oversight of the Guard brigade's training, and direct command of the unit in wartime, thus creating a sense of "ownership" for the division and fostering closer ties between the active and reserve com-

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ponents. Furthermore, the program was designed to ensure that the Army would never again fight a major war without engaging the American people by calling up the Guard and Reserves, a decision consciously made by the Army Staff in the wake of the Vietnam War. Nine active component divisions at one time or another were organized with roundout brigades,

with an additional seven separate Army Guard battalions also rounding out active component divisions.⁹

In theory, Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade should have been mobilized as soon as its parent unit, the 24th Infantry Division, was alerted for deployment to Saudi Arabia. Rather than request immediate authority from President Bush to mobilize roundout units in the National Guard, the Army leadership decided to deploy the 197th Infantry Brigade - an active component unit - instead of the 48th. The 197th was a separate brigade not affiliated with any Army division, but which served the Infantry School at Fort

Benning, Georgia.

The 197th was sent to Saudi Arabia despite the fact that it was equipped with older M-60A3 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers, unlike

the 24th Infantry Division and 48th Brigade, both of which had the modern M-1A1 Abrams tank and M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle. The 197th would learn to operate this new equipment while occupying the front lines in Saudi Arabia, awaiting an Iraqi attack. In a similar fashion, the Army chose to deploy the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division to roundout the 1st

Cavalry Division instead of Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade, the designated roundout unit for the 1st Cavalry Division. Neither the 197th Infantry Brigade nor the 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division, had ever trained with the divisions they were about to join. This last-minute change in the Army's war plans that sent less-ready (especially in the case of the 197th) active component units to war in place of Guard units was devastating for many in the Guard. In the words of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, "The bottom line was painfully clear to us in the Guard. There were plenty of active Army units that wanted to get into the fray and there was little real chance the active Army leadership would send Guard troops in the active's place, war plans or no war plans. The fact was and remains, the active Army missed a tremendous opportunity to solidify their total force policy position with the 48th."¹⁰

The roundouts weren't the only Guard combat units not called up. War plans called for the 82d Airborne Division to be reinforced with Guard TLAT (TOW Light Anti-Tank) battalions to bolster the 82d's anti-armor capability, but these rapid-deploying units were never called. Many Guard combat units, like South Carolina's 1st Battalion, 151st Aviation and 4th Battalion, 178th Field Artillery, were assigned (through a program the Army

called CAPSTONE) to reinforce a particular theater or Corps - in this case, XVIII Airborne Corps - but were replaced by active component units. The commander of the 1st Battalion, 151st Aviation summed up his frustration with this situation when he stated: "Senior Department of the Army officials were unwilling to accept any National Guard combat aviation units as deployable. However, these same reserve units were asked to provide individual aviators and aircraft as fillers to positions identified as unfilled by active component forces."¹¹

THE GUARD IS CALLED

Despite the Army's lack of interest in using Guard combat units, the need for reserve component support troops to bolster the defense effort in Saudi Arabia was abundantly clear from the very outset of Operation Desert Shield. This was especially true for logistical planners in CENTCOM who were responsible for supplying a growing number of troops with all the basic essentials. Within days of the Iraqi invasion the National Guard Bureau was preparing for a major mobilization - setting up a 24-hour Emergency Operations Center, identifying key soldiers (especially Arab linguists) and units for early deployment, issuing orders that prevented personnel from voluntarily leaving the Guard during the emergency, and halting scheduled inactivations and conversions of units.¹²

The official call was not long in coming. On August 22, President Bush issued Executive Order 12727, ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty. "By the

authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 121 and 673(b) of title 10 of the United States Code, I hereby determine that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula. Further, under the stated authority, I hereby authorize the Secretary of Defense to order to active duty units of the Selected Reserve."

It would become the largest mobilization of the Army National Guard since the Korean War, and the first combat mobilization since 1968 when some 7,000 Guard soldiers were sent to Vietnam in units or as individual replacements in response to the Tet offensive. Rather than declaring a partial mobilization of the reserves, which would have obligated reservists for service up to a year and could have been challenged by the Congress, President Bush opted to declare a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC), using his executive authority to mobilize up to 200,000 reservists for 90 days, with the option of extending the Call-up an additional 90 days. The situation in Saudi Arabia was still uncertain at the time - Iraq could withdraw and end the standoff quickly, or U.S. troops could be stationed in Saudi Arabia indefinitely. The PSRC allowed the President to respond to the immediate crisis, and allowed him time to gain the support of Congress and the American people should a longer mobilization be necessary.



A soldier from Arizona's 222d Transportation Company negotiates an obstacle during post-mobilization training for Operation Desert Shield (*Defense Visual Information Center*)

It was up to the Secretary of Defense to inform the various services how many and what kind of reservists they could call. After consulting with senior Army officers on his staff, Secretary of Defense Cheney instructed the Army to mobilize only Combat Support and Combat Service Support organizations. He placed no such similar restrictions on the other services. Guard leaders were taken by surprise by this exclusion of combat forces. "This decision to eschew calling Army Guard combat units, apparently struck at the staff level in the Department of the Army in connection with the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), came one day after General Carl E. Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army, told senior military association executives...that the call up of the 48th Infantry Brigade would be announced the next day."¹³

In fact, the Army did not intend to deploy the roundout brigades in operations short of a major war and a full mobilization. "Despite public discussion to the contrary, it had never been assumed by the Army Staff that any of the roundout units would deploy with their parent organizations in a short-term scenario that did not involve the Soviet Union."¹⁴ Indeed, a 1988 General Accounting Office report to Congress stated that the Army, contrary to what it told the Guard, intended to deploy active component divisions with separate active component brigades instead of their roundouts.¹⁵ Mobilizing the roundouts when the Army had no intention of using them also made no sense. The Army had been severely criticized following the 1961 Berlin Crisis mobilization when it called up reservists for what was

perceived to be no reason, and it had no desire to be subjected to that kind of criticism again.¹⁶

Despite all the debate which continued to cloud this issue long after the war was over, the decision not to deploy the roundouts had little to do with their readiness for war. Due in part to congressional pressure, the Army finally mobilized three Roundout Brigades three months after the first active component divisions had deployed to Saudi Arabia. While these Guardsmen hoped that they would deploy to the Persian Gulf to fight alongside the active component divisions they had trained with, this was a slim prospect. No plans were made, or sealift allocated, to deploy the roundouts to Saudi Arabia prior to the start of the ground offensive. They would be held as a strategic reserve.

This policy was never clearly stated at the time of the war, for several reasons. The possibility existed that the Guard might have to deploy to the Gulf if the war lasted longer than anticipated, expanded to other areas, or inflicted far higher casualties than estimated. Additionally, no one wanted to tell the Guardsmen undergoing combat training at Fort Polk, Fort Hood, or Fort Irwin that they had been called up to merely silence congressional critics and to act as an insurance policy. Subsequent accusations, aired in the press and attributed to "anonymous Army sources," that these roundout units were not deployed because they could not meet the criteria for deploying were not only inaccurate; they miss this central point entirely.

Yellow ribbons adorn a row of trees near Fort McCoy's main entrance - one ribbon for each unit that used the Wisconsin post for its mobilization base (*Larry Sommers, WI Dept. of Military Affairs*)



THE MOBILIZATION BEGINS

What the Army needed from the Guard was support troops, and these the Guard began supplying immediately. On August 24, the National Guard Bureau sent Alert Order #1 to 69 Army National Guard units, warning them that they would soon be mobilized in support of Operation Desert Shield. This alert phase, though usually only lasting a few days, was a crucial time during which units began preparing their soldiers for eventual mobilization, getting a “jump-start” on the process. Most

importantly, the states used the time to “cross-level” (redistribute) any needed individuals and equipment from units that were not called into units that were about to be called. The end result was that a remarkable 97% of Guard units met deployability criteria on the first day they were mobilized.¹⁷

Mobilization followed quickly for some. In the early morning hours of August 27, orders went out to 19 Army National Guard units totaling 482 soldiers

in 13 states. The honor of being first was determined by a coin toss that took place in the Alabama Guard Emergency Operations Center when two separate mobilization orders arrived simultaneously at 2:00 that morning. The winner was the 1241st Adjutant General Company (Postal), which became the first Army Guard unit to be called to active federal service since the Cuban boatlift of 1980.¹⁸ The 1207th Quartermaster Detachment (Water Purification), which lost the coin toss, was second. Before the war was over, Alabama would provide more units than any other state or territory - not a surprise in a state where Guard service is a tradition and mobilization readiness exercises were regularly conducted to ensure maximum deployability of units.¹⁹

As every veteran knows, even the most carefully laid plans made in peacetime fail to anticipate actual requirements when a war breaks out. The selection of the 1241st Adjutant General Company as first to mobilize served to further illustrate this point. "Ironically, 1241st AG Company was Alabama's lowest priority unit in accordance with 200,000 call-up lists, Southwest Asia 'Capstone' lists and the like. At no time did the 1241st come up on any of the 'usual' Army mobilization lists. The incident only served to emphasize that all Army National Guard units at all levels must be ready for call-up to active duty at any time."²⁰ Indeed, the 1241st would not be the last unit to be surprised that it was called up. The Army largely ignored its peacetime plans once an actual crisis broke out: only 103 of the 398 units that were federalized were in the war plans for deployment to Southwest Asia.²¹



Members of the District of Columbia's Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 372nd Military Police Battalion relax aboard the upper deck of an Air Force C-5 on the way to Saudi Arabia (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)

Colorado's 1158th Transportation Detachment (Movement Control) became the first mobilized Army National Guard unit to deploy to Southwest Asia when it arrived in Saudi Arabia on September 9, 1990, followed the next day by North Carolina's 382d Public Affairs Detachment - a unit which had been mobilized just ten days earlier. Alabama's 1241st Adjutant General Company, the first unit called up, was the third unit in-country on September 13. By September 15, 32 units had been mobilized; nine (with 223 soldiers) had deployed to Southwest Asia. News reports indicated that the U.S. had 150,000 troops of all services in the theater.²²

Back in Washington, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) was struggling to keep up with the almost daily changes to the force lists supplied by the Department



(ABOVE) Typical base camp out in the desert - this one belongs to the Wisconsin Army National Guard's 13th Evacuation Hospital, which operated a field hospital near the Iraqi border (WI ARNG)

(RIGHT) PFC William McIntyre of Maryland's 200th Military Police Company phones home from the lone telephone near his unit's outpost in Eastern Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield (1LT John Goheen, MD ARNG)



of the Army, due to the changing needs of CENTCOM for different kinds of units. NGB also fulfilled its customary mission of issuing instructions to the states while channeling information between the Army Staff and the states. In addition, myriad other duties busied the staff, from input on proposed legislation to assist Guard and Reserve soldiers, to developing guidance

on medical standards for mobilization where such guidance was lacking. The 22 years that had passed since the last wartime mobilization created many unanticipated difficulties as a host of procedures were tested for the first time. In general, morale remained remarkably high. The Guard - both Army and Air - was eager to serve, a message that Lieutenant General Conaway conveyed to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in a late September meeting. Conaway urged Powell to call more Guard troops, while Congress pressured the Army leadership and the Secretary of Defense to explain why they had delayed in calling up Guard and Reserve combat units.²³

While 180 days was considered more than enough time to mobilize reserve component support units and rotate them through a deployment in the Persian Gulf, it was not enough time, according to the Department of Defense, to deploy reserve combat units - at least in the Army. Secretary Cheney, in response to written inquiries from several prominent members of the House Armed Services Committee, stated: "To date, I have not authorized the call-up of Army combat units for Operation DESERT SHIELD for two reasons. First, my senior military advisors have not advised me that the call-up of such units is necessary at this time. Secondly, the statutory time limits on the use of Selected Reserve units imposes artificial constraints on their employment. ... Too much of the 180-day statutory maximum period for activated Selective Reserve units would be consumed by preparation, pre-deployment training, and

transportation to and from the Middle East, with the result that the Reserve forces could not be stationed in the region for a full rotation period.²⁴ The Marine Corps apparently did not share the Army's concerns, as indicated by the mobilization of two armor companies from the Marine Corps Reserve. These companies - which had been assisted in their peacetime training and wartime mobilization by the Army Guard - transitioned from the M-60A3 tank to the newer M1 just days before arriving in Saudi Arabia, and joined the 4th Marine Division's 4th Tank Battalion one day before going into battle. During the attack, they played a key role in liberating Kuwait City, destroying 59 Iraqi tanks in 90 seconds in an epic armored battle.²⁵

As the Guard commitment to Desert Shield increased (89 units and 8,735 soldiers on federal active duty as of October 15, 1990), Lieutenant General Conaway and a few members of his staff paid a visit to Saudi Arabia. In a brief meeting with General Schwarzkopf, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was encouraged to find that his soldiers and airmen were doing excellent work that was heartily appreciated by the CENTCOM commander. As could be expected, the topic of the Guard roundout brigades was raised. Schwarzkopf, who had commanded the 24th Infantry Division, and thus was familiar with

the capabilities of the 48th Infantry Brigade, knew it was an issue he had little control over: "I hear ya John, I hear ya. That's for the politicians back in Washington to figure out. What I need now is more support units and that's what you guys have a lot of. If we get call-up authority for a longer period of time, I'd love to see the brigades called up and deployed over here."²⁶

Indeed, the initial 90-day call up authority was drawing to a close, though President Bush would soon sign an extension to make it 180 days.²⁷ The mission of the U.S. forces arrayed in the Gulf was about to change. The arrival of heavy forces from the United States and various other coalition countries to shore up the defensive "line in the sand" in Saudi Arabia was essentially complete by the end of October. With the threat of an Iraqi attack receding and economic sanctions showing no signs of causing Saddam Hussein to budge, America's political and

Arkansas Guardsman confers with Kuwaiti civilian (AR ARNG)



Typical sleeping quarters in a warehouse in Dhahran (W/ ARNG)



military leaders began to explore offensive options as the only method still remaining for removing the Iraqis from Kuwait. While an attack was possible with the forces already stationed in the Gulf, the odds were not as favorable as the commanders would have liked. If an attack was going to be made, then all agreed it should be made with overwhelming force. Accordingly, on November 8, President Bush ordered a massive increase in force in the Persian Gulf, to include the addition of heavy armored forces from the Army's VII Corps in Europe and the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas. A further large increment of Guard and Reserve troops would also have to be mobilized - in fact, far more than had been called previously. These troops would not only support the planned offensive in the Gulf,

but provide backfill for the units departing Europe or serve as a strategic reserve in the United States should a second conflict break out while the bulk of the active Army's forces were tied down in the Persian Gulf. These forces would include five combat brigades drawn from the Army National Guard - the 48th Infantry, 155th Armored, and 256th Infantry Brigades, and the 142d and 196th Field Artillery Brigades.

PREPARING FOR WAR

For troops already in the desert, as well as those waiting to deploy, there were the age-old questions that soldiers always ask. Will we attack? Will the enemy attack? And increasingly, How long will we be sitting here? In fact, it was not until President Bush ordered the build up, followed by the issuance in late November of UN Resolution 678 (setting a January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraqi withdrawal) that the soldiers began to understand that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would end quickly - one way or the other.

The pace of the call ups increased rapidly following the decision to prepare for an offensive. Whereas on November 1, there were 91 Army Guard units containing 9,102 soldiers on active duty, a month later there were 231 units with 36,689 soldiers in federal service. By the 15th of

December that number had climbed to 301 units and 50,040 soldiers on active duty. While some 40,000 of these Guardmembers were still in their mobilization stations, compared to nearly 10,000 on the ground in Southwest Asia, the number of Guard soldiers deployed to the Persian Gulf would increase rapidly as the January 15 deadline drew near. By that date, over 23,000 Guardmembers would be on the ground in the theater, preparing for a war they knew was coming soon.²⁸

A typical Guard unit, like Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 369th Transportation Battalion out of New York City, was called up and processed in relative haste. The 369th, like many Guard outfits, has a long and storied history. It traces its lineage to one of the National Guard's most famous African-American combat outfits, the 369th Infantry, known as the "Hellfighters from Harlem," and was

(BELOW) Christmas in the Gulf (NGB)

(RIGHT) Modern day Bedouins cross the Saudi desert in an ancient Mercedes truck. Conducting searches of civilian vehicles like this could be a lengthy process (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)





Keeping track of the mail was a monumental job, as units moved from one location to the other. Americans showed their support by sending thousands of care packages to Saudi Arabia labeled "To any U.S. servicemember" (NGB)

one of the most decorated units in the American Expeditionary Force in World War I. In September 1990, a subordinate element of the 369th, the 719th Transportation Company, had been mobilized and deployed to Saudi Arabia, where it supported the 101st Airborne Division. On December 1, another subordinate element, the 1569th Transportation Company, was alerted for active duty. Finally, on December 5, the battalion headquarters detachment itself was alerted for mobilization in the unit's Harlem armory on December 11. There they spent three days, completing actions that were typical to all the Guard units that were called: show-down inspections to check that all issued gear was on hand; inventory and loading of unit equipment, and seemingly endless in-processing - filling out of forms, listening to briefings, completing wills and powers-of-attorney, and ironing out pay problems. Family Support officers, military lawyers and chaplains were made available to help solve the variety of problems that arose with mobilization. After completing these tasks, the 52 assigned per-

sonnel under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Francis Kairson, Jr. made the relatively short trip across the Hudson River and down the New Jersey Turnpike to their "mob" (pronounced "mobe", for mobilization) station, Fort Dix, New Jersey.

At the mob station, Army Guard units typically conducted weapons qualification and training in such areas as chemical defense, and cycled through more screenings and briefings. Guardmembers were screened for dental, cardiovascular, and other problems to determine if they were medically fit to deploy overseas. The dental screening in particular was harrowing for some soldiers. While only two soldiers were disqualified from deploying because of their teeth, over 13,000 were classified as probably requiring emergency dental care within the next 12 months.²⁹ For many of these soldiers, the required treatment was to have one or more teeth pulled peremptorily by Army dentists who had hundreds of patients and no time for lengthy - if cosmetically more pleasing -



Massachusetts Guardsmen of the 1058th Transportation Company carry paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division on their truck into Iraq during the ground offensive (SSG James Smith, MA ARNG)

root canal surgery. Mobilized units spent a great deal of time at their mob stations packing gear and preparing vehicles for movement overseas, to include a coat of desert camouflage paint. In contrast to their vehicles, the supply of desert camouflage uniforms was usually so limited that few reservists were issued any prior to deploying to Southwest Asia - indeed, many soldiers did not receive these until they were ready to come home!

With only limited post-mobilization training, the Headquarters Detachment of the 369th Transportation Battalion flew out of McGuire Air Force Base for Dhahran, Saudi Arabia two days after Christmas. Given little time to acclimate to their new situation, they were integrated into the 32d Transportation Group. With over 800 soldiers from six attached Guard and Reserve transportation companies (including the 1569th) under its command, the 369th coordinated the transportation of tracked vehicles and other equipment from the

port of Dammam to the front lines.³⁰ Operations were reaching a fever pitch as heavy equipment continued to come in from Europe and the United States in preparation for the ground offensive. Later, after the January 15 deadline had passed and the air war began, the men and women of the 369th, along with thousands of other soldiers, began shifting the VII and XVIII Corps 200 miles west from their initial locations south of the Saudi/Kuwaiti border to new positions out on the right flank of the Iraqi army. It was a tremendous logistical achievement, done completely without Iraqi knowledge, the equivalent of "moving the entire population of Akron, Ohio, and all of their vehicles and worldly goods westward to Fort Wayne, Indiana, while the neighbors in Cleveland, a few miles north, think they are still at home."³¹

THE FATE OF THE ROUNDOUTS

The quick pace of call up, screening, validation, and deployment seen with units like the 369th was not matched when it came to the three Roundout brigades that were called in November. That these units would be treated differently was made clear from the moment Secretary Cheney announced that the Roundouts were being activated: “I want to be absolutely certain that the units drawn from the Guard and Reserve have the opportunity for the additional workup training our people think they require. I’m not eager to send units that are not fully ready... Before they go, they need to go to the National Training Center to get into shape as if they were an active duty division.”³² However, not a single active duty brigade or division then in Saudi Arabia was required to complete a rotation at the National Training Center following its alert for deployment.

Virtually every reserve unit requires a period of post-mobilization training in order to be ready to deploy, and each of the roundout brigades was confident that they could complete their post-mobilization training in a fairly short time. Indeed, all three brigades met the Army’s deployability criteria established in the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) on the day that they were mobilized, and had been rated as combat ready by their respective active component division commanders prior to August 2, 1990. As with the other reserve units that had been called up, the members of the roundout brigades expected a

fairly straightforward process of post-mobilization training and preparation that took into account the work they had already accomplished during weekend drills and annual training - but that was not to be. “When the 48th and 256th [roundout to the 5th Infantry Division, still based in the U.S.] reached their mobilization stations on November 30th (the 48th at Ft. Stewart, Georgia and the 256th at Ft. Polk, Louisiana), the unit commanders were told that the combat readiness rules had been changed. They were told that they would have to be retrained, going through the long, drawn-out instruction process commonly referred to in the Army as ‘crawl, walk, run.’”³³

The deployment readiness requirements for the roundout brigades were set by the Army at the highest level - “C1.” The C rating is an objective measurement based on the percentage of authorized manning in a unit, the percentage of authorized equipment on hand, the number of soldiers who have the requisite military qualifications for their positions, an acceptable level of operational readiness, and other factors. The AMOPS requirement for deployment of Guard and Reserve units is generally C3, a standard which 97% of Guard units met on the day they were mobilized. Active component units can deploy with a C2 rating, though most went overseas with a C1.

In addition to the imposition of a higher readiness standard for the roundout brigades, the units were not permitted to

train or evaluate themselves. The 48th Brigade's pre-war plans had recommended 42 days of post-mobilization training prior to deployment. These plans were developed before the war broke out, in coordination with and based on the guidance of the commander of the 24th Infantry Division, and were reviewed by the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Army. Rather than follow these plans, active component trainers and evaluators instituted a training program for the brigade that discounted the pre-mobilization training that had already been conducted - essentially treating them like a unit of new recruits. This policy was even applied to battalions that had successfully completed rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) within the past few years, where the Army's most realistic and demanding maneuvers take place. In addition, new tasks such as obstacle breaching and counter-reconnaissance training were added to the list of requirements necessary to achieve a "combat ready" certification.³⁴ Although

these additional tasks were assigned as a reasonable precaution based upon the assessment of the Iraqi opponent, nevertheless Guardsmen chafed at being further delayed from deploying to the combat zone.

Following their November 30 call up at their home stations, the 48th assembled at its mobilization station, Fort Stewart, Georgia, on December 5. After completing



2d Lieutenant Troy McNeely of Georgia's 48th Infantry Brigade says goodbye to his girlfriend when his unit departs Macon for its mobilization station, Fort Stewart (NGB)

in-processing, screening, and some soldier and crew level training, the 48th loaded its equipment onto railcars and proceeded across the country to Fort Irwin, California, home of the NTC. Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade, meanwhile, assembled at its mobilization station - Fort Polk, Louisiana - and engaged in New

they were called up that they were required to attend Army schools. This was particularly true among NCOs, who under the pre-Gulf War AMOPS regulations were considered deployable if they were qualified in their occupational specialties, but now, like their regular Army counterparts, were required to be qualified for the grade

This behavior demonstrated serious morale and discipline problems in the roundouts, especially after it became clear that there was no way the units could deploy to Saudi Arabia in time for the impending ground war.

at which they were assigned. Eight company commanders from the 256th were replaced because they couldn't handle the stress, while the commander

Equipment Training (NET) for transition from the M-113 to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade conducted most of its training at Fort Hood, Texas. A great deal of national media attention focused on these three units, and many of the problems they had training up to the C1 deployment standard were widely publicized.

of the 48th was replaced by his deputy commander on the order of the Second Army Commander.

One key criticism was weakness in leadership in the brigades, especially among junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). For many leaders, inexperience, lack of schooling, and greater stress than they had ever previously encountered in their military careers were overwhelming. Compounding the stress of the mobilization was the fact that many leaders in the roundout units learned after

Other criticisms focused on equipment and maintenance. There were serious equipment shortages in some of the units, particularly a lack of chemical defense gear, in part due to cross-loaning to other Guard or Active component units which had deployed earlier.³⁵ The 48th also had difficulties maintaining its equipment while training at the NTC, a complaint exacerbated by the Army's decision to field a new computerized unit logistical system in the 48th after it mobilized. As a result, many unit logisticians were in classrooms learning how to operate the new system while their units struggled to maintain vehicles in the field without them.

Perhaps the most damaging roundout brigade mobilization story for the Guard came in early February, 1991, when 53 soldiers from Louisiana's 256th Infantry Brigade - at that time training at Fort Hood - went AWOL or overstayed their passes, and while doing so complained to the local news media about the poor conditions they were experiencing in Texas. These complaints concerning such issues as poor food and living conditions, made while there was a shooting war going on in the Persian Gulf, were not well received by either the Army or the public. This behavior demonstrated serious morale and discipline problems in the roundouts, especially after it became clear that there was no way the units could deploy to Saudi Arabia in time for the impending ground war. Regardless of their reasons, this very public breach of discipline was a black eye for the Army Guard delivered at the same time that their fellow Guardmembers were doing yeoman service in the Gulf. Most of the offending soldiers were discharged as a result.³⁶

Despite all the added tasks, changes and problems, after 91 days (51 of them at Fort Irwin), the 48th Infantry Brigade enjoyed significant success against the NTC Opposing Force and was certified as "combat-ready" by its active component evaluators. The 91 day figure was somewhat inflated by the 15 training days lost due to movements and administrative tasks, and by the 30 days of additional training focused solely on assaulting Iraqi-

style defenses - tasks that active component combat units trained on after arriving in Saudi Arabia.³⁷ Ironically, certification came on the final day of the ground war, February 28, 1991. In the opinion of many Guardmembers, the prolonged certification process for the 48th and the passing over of many other Guard combat units for deployment was done with the specific intent of keeping National Guard units out of the fight. Major General Robert Ensslin, President of the National Guard Association, was one of the most vocal critics of the Army's policy when he said "...many of us in the Guard have gained the perception that our combat arms units were put in a position where it was almost impossible to succeed. Because the Army did not need them in Saudi Arabia and because many active Army officers instinctively disbelieve that a Guard maneuver unit (infantry and armor) can be combat ready, they set up a self-fulfilling prophecy."³⁸ One Adjutant General saw a deeper motive for the exclusion of Guard maneuver units - the regular Army's fear of post-war force reductions. "It adds up to us the way two plus two adds up: If the Guard was mobilized, and did well in the theater, the Army would be in worse shape in sustaining the force structure of the active components."³⁹

FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE GULF

The treatment of the two Guard field artillery brigades upon their mobilization was in stark contrast to the training regimen the Army created for the roundout brigades. The artillery was needed in Saudi Arabia where its offensive punch would be a welcome addition to the ground attack. Their mobilization and deployment, as a result,

proceeded with remarkable smoothness. Tennessee's 196th Field Artillery Brigade's post-mobilization training and validation was based on clear standards and a concise set of missions. After a one-week field deployment to validate collective tasks, the brigade conducted a three-day command post exercise and then shipped their equipment to Saudi Arabia. While the



An Oklahoma Guardsman from the 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery, aboard his MLRS launcher (NGB)



equipment was in transit, the unit remained at Fort Campbell to polish up on individual skills, before flying off to marry-up with their equipment.⁴⁰ One element of the 196th, West Virginia's 1st Battalion, 201st Field Artillery (whose lineage includes units that fought on both sides of the Civil War) found itself in Saudi Arabia two months after being mobilized and conducting its first fire mission, in support of the French 6th Light Armored Division, only two and a half weeks after that.⁴¹

Arkansas' 142d Field Artillery Brigade was ordered into federal service on November 21, 1990, and had packed and shipped its howitzers and rocket launchers by December 15. Exactly one month later the brigade was in Saudi Arabia picking up its equipment and moving forward to support the 1st Infantry Division. Later, during the ground offensive, the 142d supplied artillery support for the British 1st Armoured Division. Their contribution created a lasting impression on the commander of the British 4th Armoured

Brigade: "By golly, they were good. ... For 45 minutes, there was what I can only describe as a running roar as MLRS submunitions exploded in a carpet right the way across the full depth of the enemy position. Talking to the Iraqi artillery commander after the war, he told me that 90 percent of his crews on that position had been killed or wounded when this initial bombardment had gone in. He lost more than 70 guns in the space of an hour, which was a pretty major achievement."⁴² Oklahoma's 1st Battalion, 158th Field Artillery, the first unit in the reserves to be equipped with the Multiple Launch Rocket System, fired over 900 rockets during the war, in the process achieving the highest fire rate of any artillery unit in the Third Army.⁴³ The rapid deployment and devastating firepower delivered by the Guardsmen in these two artillery brigades was a significant example of what the Guard could do when entrusted with the combat mission.

8" Howitzers from Arkansas' 142d Field Artillery conduct a fire mission (AR ARNG)

LIFE IN THE DESERT

Everyday life for the average Guardmember deployed in Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield varied depending on the soldier's job and where his unit was located. For soldiers fortunate enough to be stationed in a city or on a military base, some of the more basic amenities - hot water, flush toilets, telephone access - were available, even if the living quarters amounted to little more than a cot on a warehouse floor with a hundred other roommates. For those bivouacked out in the desert, living conditions could be a bit more challenging. Sand and dust were ever-present facts of life, kicked up by every wind or passing vehicle, getting into everything, and increasing wear and tear on any object containing moving parts. Sandstorms were regular events, whose high winds tore down tents and carried off loose objects. Everywhere soldiers looked was the same monotonous, flat terrain. Surprisingly for most Guardmembers arriving in late 1990 and early 1991, the Arabian winter was cold and wet - nothing like the overbearing sun and heat they anticipated.

Soldiers - as they have always done throughout history - continued to adapt and improve their positions for as long as they stayed in them. "Building things became a form of therapy to combat bore-

dom and stress," a relaxation method that, before long, had converted scrap wood into tables, dressers, benches and even a gazebo in one company's area. Security was always an issue - "If you weren't busy, you would go fill sandbags" - but soldiers also spent their leisure time doing laundry, exercising, writing letters, or even - in the case of one unit - getting in a round of golf on an improvised six-hole golf course laid out by unit members. Cleanliness - even for soldiers in a relatively stable camp environment - was a fleeting virtue. Soldiers had varying opportunities to take



Guardmembers demonstrated their ingenuity by building many amenities out in the desert (COL James Engeler, WI ARNG)



Staff Sergeant Brad Clark of the 1267th Medical Company plays on a six hole golf course constructed near his unit's base camp. The 1267th was one of a few Guard units shared by two states, Missouri and Nebraska (*1267th Medical Company, NE ARNG*)

guide books detailing the “do’s and don’ts” of behavior, to include prohibitions against displaying the Bible or any religious jewelry, discussing politics or religion with any Arab, or eating, smoking or drinking anything in public during the day for the duration of the holy month of Ramadan.⁴⁵ Jewish and Christian religious services were limited to American camps, and conducted by chaplains who were euphemistically referred to as “morale officers” around the Saudis. Even the display of the American flag was discouraged outside of American compounds, though this proscription fell by the wayside as the war

approached. In an effort to appease Saudi sensibilities, female servicemembers were restricted from appearing outside of their camps without headgear or in T-shirts. Even so, it was shocking for many Saudis to see American women, in the course of performing their duties, driving vehicles, wearing pants, and giving orders to men.

advantage of field showers, but the end result was always the same: “We were clean until we stepped out of the showers, ...[but] as soon as the wind and dust hit you, you were dirty again.”⁴⁴

Restrictions on what the soldiers could and couldn’t do were ever present. U.S. and Saudi authorities were extremely concerned about the influence hundreds of thousands of non-Islamic westerners would have on the highly religious, traditional and conservative Saudi society. Saudi Arabia is home to the two holiest sites in the Muslim world, and incidents of cultural insensitivity could serve to break down the Arab/Western coalition arrayed against Iraq. American servicemembers were given numerous briefings and issued

Though the soldiers serving in Saudi Arabia during Desert Shield were not in a shooting war, there were still dangers to cope with. Perhaps most familiar to soldiers who served in Transportation, Ordnance, and Quartermaster type units was the “thrill” of frequent missions along MSR (Main Supply Route) Dodge, more commonly referred to as “TAPline Road,” after the Trans-Arabian Pipeline which

A field haircut
is administered
by a member of
Tennessee's 212th
Engineer Company
(NGB)



(LEFT) Keeping fit in the desert (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)

(BELOW) Staff Sergeant Ronald Yabor, from DC's 372d MP Battalion, and his pet Arabian Gila Monster. Soldiers in the unit "adopted" several lizards and held races with them (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)





Ropes stretched between tents make excellent clothes lines for SPC Laurie Biermann of Wisconsin's 107th Maintenance Company (WI ARNG)



Captain Seth Greene, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 372d MP Battalion, does his laundry in a washbasin (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)



paralleled the road for hundreds of miles. The soldiers, of course, had an even more descriptive name for it - "Suicide Alley." The sheer boredom of driving hundreds of miles in a straight line along this single-lane, no shoulder, no speed-limit highway was broken by moments of extreme panic as impatient soldiers or crazy local drivers swung into oncoming traffic to attempt a pass. Sleepy drivers often found themselves drifting off the pavement into surrounding sand, with sometimes tragic consequences. Accidents along MSR Dodge were a leading cause of death and injury before, during, and after the war.

(ABOVE) Base camp for Nebraska's 24th Medical Company. The unit evacuated 251 patients during their deployment - many of them accident victims along "Suicide Alley." (24th Medical Company, NE ARNG)

(LEFT) Sergeant Quintan Hardy, of Iowa's 1133d Transportation Company, guards Iraqi prisoners he is transporting from Kuwait City to a holding compound (IA ARNG)

“ . . . if we get into an armed situation, he’s going to get his ass kicked.”

President Bush, December 20, 1990⁴⁶

While many of the Guard units called up in November and December of 1990 were still in the process of packing gear, completing paperwork, and conducting post-mobilization training, time was running out on the January 15 deadline imposed by the United Nations on Iraq. Last minute diplomatic efforts - “going the extra mile for peace” - failed to offer any hope of resolution short of war. American resolve stiffened, even in a divided Congress where three days of impassioned debate culminated in a resolution to support the use of all necessary means to remove Iraq from Kuwait. When January 15 came and went without any change in the Iraqi army’s disposition, the only remaining question was “When will the war start?”

The hammer fell on Iraqi forces early in the morning of January 17, 1991. In the United States, where it was still the evening of January 16, the air and missile attacks coming in over Baghdad were broadcast live as the networks broke in on their evening lineup. Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater made the announcement to the nation. “The liberation of Kuwait has begun. In conjunction with the forces of our coalition partners, the United

States has moved, under the code name Operation Desert Storm, to enforce the mandates of the United Nations Security Council.”

The aerial pounding would last for 38 days before the ground war began on February 24. The U.S. and coalition air forces dominated the skies, while the much-vaunted Iraqi air force barely challenged the assault. Those Iraqi planes that



(RIGHT) Medical Evacuation helicopter from Nebraska’s 24th Medical Company is offloaded from an Air Force C-5 upon reaching Saudi Arabia in December 1990 (24th Medical Company, NE ARNG)

were not destroyed on the ground attempted to flee to internment in neighboring Iran.⁴⁷ The allied air campaign systematically began to destroy Iraqi air defenses, military facilities, transportation infrastructure, and numerous other targets, down to the individual armored vehicles dug in along the Saudi border. The development since the Vietnam War of precision-guided munitions - cruise missiles, TV and laser-guided bombs - made for a revolutionary increase in the accuracy and effectiveness of aerial bombardment. The Iraqi military in Kuwait, a combat-hardened force with thousands of modern armored vehicles and artillery pieces, was cut off from Iraq and decimated. It was the most stunning bombing campaign in the history of the world.

While delighted with the success of the air campaign, and confident that victory would eventually be theirs, allied planners remained worried about the casualties that they would suffer once a ground offensive began. Coalition forces would have to breach a series of deadly obstacles laid out by the Iraqi army over the past six months along the Saudi border. Breaching operations are among the most complex and perilous types of missions an army can undertake. Allied units - slowed by Iraqi minefields, ditches, and wire - would be vulnerable to both direct and indirect (artillery) fires and possibly even chemical or biological attacks.

The Iraqis, after all, had shown no moral qualms about using these weapons before. Behind these obstacles were dug-in infantry, and behind them were the thousands of armored vehicles of Hussein's elite Republican Guards units. Even the greatest air campaign in history could only reduce this threat, not eliminate it. Freeing Kuwait would require removing these forces with ground troops. The American media made much of the fact that U.S. forces were stockpiling thousands of body bags in anticipation of heavy casualties. Statistical comparisons of the opposing forces, using formulas based on previous wars, predicted heavy losses among coalition forces. The price for winning "the mother of all battles" could be very steep.

SADDAM RESPONDS

For Guard soldiers this was a time of furious activity - probably the best medicine for the nervous anticipation everyone felt. Army aviators and field artillerymen (including those from the Guard) got their first tastes of combat during this period, conducting cross border raids and artillery strikes. But for most soldiers, knowledge that they were at war came through observation of the increased pace of operations - particularly at the air bases - increased workloads for everyone, increased security, and SCUD attacks. All the chemical defense drills and training became very real as the marginally "guided" Iraqi missiles made almost nightly appearances over major Saudi cities and military bases, causing soldiers to don chemical protective "MOPP" (Mission Oriented Protective

Posture) gear and seek shelter. The world watched nightly on the news as streaks of light soared through the sky - inbound SCUDs met by outbound Patriot air defense missiles, hurriedly modified with software that enabled them to intercept enemy missiles in addition to enemy aircraft.

Hussein also launched SCUDs at Israel, which was not a member of the coalition, an obvious ploy to provoke retaliation from the Jewish state. Hussein's gamble was that Israeli retaliation would generate sympathy for Iraq among Arabs throughout the Middle East and thus drive a wedge in the Arab/Western coalition arrayed against him in Saudi Arabia. Despite the deaths and terror inflicted upon the Israeli population by

Iraqi missiles, the United States was able to persuade its close ally to forego retaliation against Iraq. In exchange, the U.S. detailed several Patriot missile batteries to defend Israeli cities.



Members of Massachusetts's 772d Military Police Company assist a wounded Kuwaiti (COL George Rojic, DC ARNG)

Unable to hold on to Kuwait, Saddam Hussein ordered the destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells during the last days of the war (NGB)



Unable to effectively stop the attacks raining down on his forces, Saddam Hussein lashed out at the environment instead, ordering the release of oil into the Persian Gulf in late January in a vain attempt to poison the water supply of his Gulf neighbors. While this spill was thwarted with American precision bombing of the outlet valves, it proved only a prelude to Hussein's later bid at environmental and economic destruction. As the inevitable ground war approached in late February, Hussein ordered Kuwaiti oil wells set on fire. The skies turned black in the middle of the day as over 500 well heads spewed flame and billowing clouds across the desert landscape. While it made the air noxious and flying conditions perilous for aviators over parts of Kuwait, Hussein's environmental crime had little other impact on the war - though it would require years to clean up.

Aside from sacrificing a battalion of mechanized troops in late January in an ill-fated assault on the abandoned Saudi bor-

der town of Khafji, the Iraqi armed forces showed little appetite for offensive action during the coalition air campaign. As a result, U.S. Army combat units had the freedom to continue training for the ground offensive up until the last minute. Training was conducted with a sense of urgency that only imminent battle can produce. Peacetime conditions afford few opportunities for large combat units, whether they be active or reserve, to conduct maneuver training, a complaint Major General Paul Funk, commander of the 3d Armored Division, made when he noted in a February 1991 interview that his division not ready for combat.⁴⁸ This was particularly true for the VII Corps units just recently arrived from Europe. Fortunately, with ample resources and plenty of unrestricted training space available, commanders had sufficient time to complete their post-deployment training prior to the start of the ground war in late February.

THE CALL UPS CONTINUE

Even as the air war raged and the ground war prepared to kick off, Guard units were continuing to be called up back in the United States. On February 20, the Guard's 20th Special Forces Group (from Alabama, Mississippi and Florida) was mobilized and began an intensive training cycle to become validated. The certification program they followed was devised for all Special Forces units by the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, and the 20th Special Forces Group was able to certify three battalions and the group headquarters in 45 days -

half the 90 days allotted for the process.⁴⁹ After the war ended, members of Florida's 3d Battalion, 20th Special Forces Group would participate in Operation Provide Comfort, providing humanitarian assistance to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq.

In the Gulf, Guardmembers continued to provide support in anticipation of the impending ground offensive. Five Army National Guard C-23 "Sherpa" aircraft and their crews deployed to Southwest Asia to provide quick transport of critical spare

Chief Warrant Officer Steven Deaton and Sergeant First Class Karl Jorgenson, both of the Oregon National Guard, trade headgear with their Saudi hosts while deployed with their C-23 Sherpa (OR ARNG)





parts for aviation units. The Sherpas - slow but rugged airplanes that specialize in short takeoffs and landings on unimproved airstrips - carried over 400 passengers and 700,000 pounds of supply items over 200,000 miles within the theater. Iowa's 1034th Quartermaster Company (Supply and Service) was converted to a water distribution company after mobilization, and supplied 800,000 gallons of water a day to the multi-national force and civilians in their area. Nevada's 72nd Military Police Company (Guard) established a huge prisoner-of-war camp and received and processed the war's first Iraqi POWs. The eight personnel of Washington's 241st Transportation Detachment (Movement Control) worked in shifts in the VII Corps Movement Control Center and shared responsibility for establishing and controlling the supply routes between logistical bases and the front lines, coordinating

transportation requirements for the Corps, and even such important, if mundane tasks, as rounding up "lost," stolen or abandoned transportation assets spread throughout the theater.⁵⁰ The variety and complexity of tasks performed by Guardmembers to prepare the combat forces for the attack was staggering.

(ABOVE) Staff Sergeant Carla Welding, Motor Sergeant for the 24th Medical Company, prepares to service a Saudi water truck at a ground POL (Petroleum, Oil Lubricants) point. SSG Welding's motor maintenance section received the Fifth U.S. Army and National Guard Bureau's top maintenance award for light units in 1991 for its performance in Desert Storm (24th Medical Company, NE ARNG)

THE GROUND WAR BEGINS

The long-awaited ground offensive kicked off at 4:00 a.m. local time, February 24, 1991 with U.S. and coalition ground forces striking directly across the border toward Kuwait City. Simultaneously, the VII Corps and the attached British 1st Armoured Division began a massive “left hook” along the western border of Iraq and Kuwait, with the goal of engaging the Republican Guard and cutting off the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Still further to the west, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the attached 6th French Light Armored Division screened the movements of the VII Corps and protected its left flank from Iraqi attack. The pace of the offensive, expected to be rapid, exceeded even the expectations of Army planners. Iraqi defenses, which after months of extensive preparations included barbed wire, minefields, anti-armor ditches and “fire trenches,” fell swiftly and relatively bloodlessly to the well-rehearsed and well-coordinated breaching operations of the allied armies. General Schwarzkopf urged his commanders to move to their objectives even faster than called for by the plans, placing even more of a strain on the logisticians attempting to refuel and rearm the heavy forces.

The Tennessee National Guard’s own 212th Engineer Company (Combat Heavy) was in the lead early on during the ground offensive. Assigned to the 62d Engineer

Battalion, an active component unit supporting the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 212th Engineer Company was selected to begin laying out a six-lane supply road into Iraq starting six days before the offensive began. According to the 212th’s commander, Captain Terry Saltsman, his battalion commander chose the Guard soldiers because “he understood our troops were older and more mature than his, and that they had more construction and combat experience, so he said we would be first to cross.” Indeed, 40% of Saltsman’s company were Vietnam veterans. While they were not made aware of it until later, the 212th Engineer Company, equipped with little more than their dump trucks and graders, was one of the first conventional Army units to cross into Iraq.⁵¹

By the second day, February 25, Saddam Hussein was characteristically declaring victory while at the same time ordering his forces to withdraw from Kuwait. At this point, with over 25,000 Iraqis taken prisoner, the Iraqi army was already disintegrating and the idea of an organized withdrawal was ludicrous. Despite Saddam’s apparent new-found willingness to withdraw, and a new Soviet offer to broker a peace agreement, the coalition attack continued. By February 26, Kuwait had been liberated and the VII Corps was engaging Republican Guard formations in Iraq and along the western Kuwaiti border. In battles that raged

through the night and up until the cease-fire the next day, these elite Iraqi formations, the backbone of Hussein's military force, were largely crushed.

Captain Debra Clark, commander of Arizona's 222d Transportation Company (Medium Truck Petroleum) out of Tucson, demonstrated initiative that was typical of Guardmembers during this phase of the war. Two days into the ground war, she was faced with a dilemma. Ordered to support the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions as they raced towards a rendezvous with the Iraqi Republican Guards, she had 200,000 gallons of fuel and nobody to give it to. "Our orders were to remain approximately 50 miles behind the advancing 1st Armored Division. But they were advancing faster than planned. We were stopped in the desert with 44 trucks loaded with fuel." Her orders were to wait for trucks from the 1st Armored Division Support Command (DISCOM) to pick up her fuel, but after almost two days, there were no trucks in sight. "I knew what I had to do. I was convinced that we needed to drive

fuel to the front lines. We had no communications, maps or coordination from the active components."⁵² Captain Clark was able to track down the Executive Officer of the 1st Armored Division's DISCOM and get him to guide her forward to the thirsty tanks. Her soldiers, who had been in their trucks and driving for 27 hours, were finally able to refuel the attacking armor about an hour and a half before it ran dry. Her initiative enabled a key element of the VII Corps to continue its mission and seal the fate of the Republican Guards prior to the cease fire.

With the objective of liberating Kuwait accomplished, and Saddam's military in ruins, President Bush was able to sternly announce a conditional cease-fire to take place at midnight, Eastern Standard Time, on February 27, exactly 100 hours after the start of the ground war. "Kuwait is liberated...Iraq's army is defeated...Our military objectives are met."⁵³



Iraqi troops, many of them unwilling conscripts, often surrendered at the first opportunity to allied forces (NGB)



(LEFT) Iraqi troops trying to flee Kuwait met their destruction along the "Highway of Death" (SPC Craig Heathscott, AR ARNG)

(ABOVE) Hull art on the side of an Iraqi tank recovered by Tennessee National Guard units. Many pieces of captured equipment were shipped back to the U.S. for museum display (NGB)

THE COSTS OF WAR

The cost to Iraq for Saddam Hussein's refusal to withdraw from Kuwait will probably never be known; unofficial estimates of up to 65,000 Iraqi casualties coupled with over 86,000 taken prisoner and probably another 100,000 desertions, give some idea of the devastation suffered by the Iraqi army. Thousands of pieces of expensive Iraqi military hardware littered the desert floor, useful, in most cases, for little more than scrap metal. The cost in American lives for this crushing victory was remarkably

small. Desert Storm was probably the first major war in human history where the military death toll from all causes during the war was less than the comparable military death toll during peacetime. "During the previous, peaceful year of 1989, a total of 1,684 service men and women died, mostly in automobile accidents. The death rate was 79 per 100,000. The death rate in the Gulf area, based on a force of 540,000 men and women (and including combat deaths), was 68 per 100,000."⁵⁴ The main reason for these lower figures was that

automobile accidents usually account for the majority of military deaths, and most automobile accidents involve alcohol. Alcohol was off-limits in Saudi Arabia because its consumption is outlawed by Islamic law, a policy which American generals - who remembered the problems alcohol and drugs created in Vietnam - were happy to go along with. Of the 148 combat deaths suffered by American forces, none were Guardmembers. In all, 34 Guard soldiers died of all causes during the entirety of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 18 of these while deployed to the Gulf.⁵⁵

The Army Guard had been involved in nearly every aspect of the war, both in Southwest Asia and acting as backfill for active units in the United States and Europe. In some military occupations the Guard was particularly well-represented. For example, military police units were called in great numbers out of the Guard in late 1990, most serving as traffic-controllers and guards for the over 71,000 Iraqi prisoners of war captured by U.S. forces during the war. Puerto Rico provided five MP companies that all served in the Gulf; California sent four companies, a

2d Lieutenant Hava Shevat of New York's 206th Military Police Company coordinates Enemy Prisoner of War movements while in Saudi Arabia (TSgt John Malthaner, NY ANG)



battalion headquarters, and a detachment; Missouri sent four companies; the District of Columbia, Mississippi and North Carolina each provided three companies and a battalion headquarters; Ohio sent three companies, Michigan sent two companies, a battalion headquarters, and a detachment; Rhode Island sent two companies and a battalion headquarters; Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia sent two companies each; and Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin each provided a single company or detachment or both. The Guard was also heavily represented in the fields of Transportation, Quartermaster, Medical,

Public Affairs, Field Artillery, Engineers, and Ordnance, as judged by the numbers of units called.

The last Army Guard unit mobilized under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up to return from Southwest Asia was Alabama's 111th Ordnance Detachment, which finally came home on September 17, 1991. Some soldiers - all of them volunteers - stayed in Southwest Asia as members of "Residual Force Units," tasked with "cleaning up" what was left behind in the theater after the bulk of the forces departed. The last "Residual" Army Guard unit left the Persian Gulf on March 6, 1992.

After Desert Storm, captured ordnance is loaded onto a five-ton truck from the Mississippi Guard's 1461st Transportation Company (Defense Visual Information Center)



THE HOMECOMING

For most Guardmembers, the best part about Desert Storm was coming home from it. Countless people, from the President to media pundits to many a 20-year veteran, commented on the stark contrast between this homecoming reception and the one that

President Bush emphasized the differences from twenty years earlier when he told the troops “We promised you’d be given the means to fight. We promised not to look over your shoulder. We promised this would not be another Vietnam. And we kept that promise. The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”

soldiers received following the Vietnam War. It wasn’t just the fact that their families, friends, and complete strangers came out to greet them amidst a sea of yellow ribbons, it was also the fact that they came home in units, not as individuals.

Returning home to New York City in late April, the 719th Transportation Company was able to represent the rest of the 369th Transportation Battalion, still deployed in Saudi Arabia, as they proudly marched up the “Canyon of Heroes” on lower Broadway during New York City’s June 10 victory parade.⁵⁶ While most units didn’t experience a homecoming reception on quite the same scale, the satisfaction and pride felt by returning Guardmembers across the nation was at least as great. President Bush emphasized the differences from twenty years earlier when he told the troops “We promised you’d be given the

means to fight. We promised not to look over your shoulder. We promised this would not be another Vietnam. And we kept that promise. The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian Peninsula.”⁵⁷



(LEFT) Members of the 719th Transportation Company return home to New York City to march in the June 10, 1991 victory parade (NY ARNG)

(BELOW) The DC National Guard marches proudly in its home town during the National Victory parade (NGB)



AFTERMATH

Desert Shield and Desert Storm validated the Army's post-Vietnam War commitment to using the Guard and Reserve as integral parts of the Total Army, insofar as the leadership of the Army was willing to test it. Mobilized in haste, Army Guardmembers exceeded everyone's expectations with the speed in which they deployed, and the professionalism with which they did their jobs. From hauling ammunition and supplies, to guarding prisoners, to caring for the wounded, to firing rocket and tube artillery, in units ranging from detachment to brigade size, they took on whatever tasks were assigned them. Rather than resent the call up, as some in the public and the active Army feared might happen, the response from Guard soldiers was quite the opposite - most embraced the chance to serve, while those who were not called often regretted missing the chance to show how well they could serve.⁵⁸

The Persian Gulf War marked the first time in history that America fought a war without a single ground maneuver unit from the Guard. The assertion - implied or otherwise - that modern ground combat had become too difficult a mission to be performed by reservists was at odds with the success that Guardmembers had with every other mission assigned to them. This includes Guardsmen who volunteered for active duty and served as individual

replacements in active Army infantry, armor, and aviation units.

Many of the units, both Active and Guard, that returned from the Gulf War carried their colors proudly in victory parades and then directly into storage. The "peace dividend" - the reduction in defense spending that Americans had been expecting since the end of the Cold War - was finally extracted from the Department of Defense's budget, with the result that numerous units were quickly retired. Ironically, had Saddam Hussein waited a year or two to launch his attack on Kuwait, the U.S. Army would have been forced to use many more Guard combat units to achieve the same overwhelming odds it had in 1991.

The Gulf War doomed the Roundout concept. Briefly replaced by the "Roundup" program, where full-strength active duty units were assigned an Army Guard unit as a follow-on reinforcement, the concept was completely dropped after the Defense Department's 1993 Bottom-Up Review. Henceforward, the active Army would organize a smaller number of complete divisions while the Army Guard would provide select "Enhanced Brigades" - units designed to augment the active forces following 90 days of post-mobilization training. As for the remainder of the Guard's combat power, contained primarily in eight combat divisions, the Army

throughout the 1990s did not include them in any warplans - arguing at one point that it would take an entire year to prepare a Guard division for combat.

Within a decade of the Gulf War, with peacekeeping missions abounding and the threats of further force cuts apparently receding, the tension between the active Army and the Army National Guard had faded somewhat. The Army Guard, either with volunteers or as a result of further Presidential call ups, had deployed in support of military operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Guard divisions were given command over active troops in Bosnia. The Army developed a role for Guard divisions, pairing them with active divisions

and assigning them to active corps. The Guard has been asked to assume increasing counter-drug duties, homeland defense against weapons of mass destruction, and even a role in the proposed National Missile Defense program. The huge drawdown in all Army forces since 1991 has led to an even greater reliance on



SGT John Daley of New Hampshire's 744th Transportation Company salutes the flag during "Welcome Home" ceremonies. His unit spent five months in the Gulf. (SSG Lorna Geggis, NH ARNG)

the Guard for everyday missions - not just as a reserve in the event of a major war. Many of these missions are new responsibilities not traditionally shouldered by the nation's citizen-soldiers, but as has been true in the past, the Guard will be ready...

Always Ready, Always There.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE GULF WAR

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
ALABAMA			
1207th Quartermaster Co	Wetumpka	8/27/1990	SWA
1241st AG Company	Montgomery	8/27/1990	SWA
715th Maintenance Co	Birmingham	9/12/1990	SWA
123rd Maintenance Co	Goodwater	9/12/1990	SWA
1208th Quartermaster Co	Lineville	9/12/1990	SWA
1659th Transportation Det	Troy	9/12/1990	SWA
1167th Transportation Det	Troy	9/20/1990	SWA
HHD, 731st Maintenance Bn	Tallassee	9/27/1990	SWA
778th Combat Support Co	Jackson	9/27/1990	SWA
638th Ordnance Co	Brewton	9/27/1990	SWA
1128th Transportation Co	Clayton	9/27/1990	SWA
HHC, 226th Theater Spt Gp	Mobile	9/27/1990	SWA
1135th Gen Spt Co	Selma	11/17/1990	SWA
781st Transportation Co	Fort Deposit	11/17/1990	SWA
1206th Quartermaster Det	Wetumpka	11/17/1990	SWA
127th Medical Det	Ashland	11/17/1990	SWA
129th Medical Co	Mobile	11/21/1990	SWA
109th Medical Hospital	Birmingham	11/21/1990	SWA
1165th Military Police Co	Butler	11/21/1990	SWA
946th Quartermaster Co	Reform	11/21/1990	US
214th Military Police Co	Alexander	11/21/1990	SWA
HHC, 440th Ordnance Bn	Camden	11/29/1990	SWA
900th Maintenance Co	Brundidge	11/29/1990	SWA
1209th Quartermaster Det	Wetumpka	11/29/1990	SWA
2d Bn, 152nd Armor	Oneota	11/30/1990	US
644th Ordnance Co	Bessemer	12/6/1990	SWA
666th Ordnance Det	Jacksonville	12/6/1990	US
HHD, 1103rd Transportation Co	Eufaula	12/11/1990	US
HHD, 111th Ordnance Gp	Opelika	1/31/1991	SWA
1st Bn, 20th Special For Gp	Huntsville	2/20/1991	US
Spt Co. 20th Special For Gp	Pell City	2/20/1991	US
HHC, 20th Special Forces Gp	Birmingham	2/20/1991	US
ARKANSAS			
1122nd Transportation Co	Monticello	9/20/1990	SWA
296th Medical Detachment	Charleston	11/17/1990	US
216th Medical Co	Lake Village	11/17/1990	US
2nd Bn, 142nd Field Arty	Fort Smith	11/21/1990	SWA
HHB, 142nd Field Arty Bde	Fayetteville	11/21/1990	SWA
1st Bn, 142nd Field Arty	Harrison	11/21/1990	SWA
148th Medical Hospital	N. Little Rock	11/21/1990	SWA
224th Maintenance Co	Mount Home	11/21/1990	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
HHB, 217th Maintenance Bn	Russellville	11/29/1990	SWA
204th Medical Det	Little Rock	12/6/1990	EUROPE
25th Combat Support Ctr	Little Rock	12/6/1990	SWA
119th Adj Gen Co	Camp Robinson	1/22/1991	US
212th Signal Battalion	N. Little Rock	1/25/1991	US
ARIZONA			
2220th Transportation Co	Phoenix	9/20/1990	US
2221st Quartermaster Co	Tucson	9/20/1990	SWA
2222nd Transportation Co	Douglas	11/17/1990	SWA
222nd Transportation Co	Tucson	11/17/1990	SWA
363rd Ordnance Det	Mesa	11/21/1990	SWA
855th Military Police Co	Phoenix	12/6/1990	SWA
259th Engineer Co	Phoenix	12/7/1990	SWA
1404th Transportation Co	Show Low	12/11/1990	SWA
416th Aviation Platoon	Phoenix	1/17/1991	SWA
356th Signal Co	Phoenix	2/6/1991	US
CALIFORNIA			
224th Transportation Det	Los Alamitos	9/20/1990	SWA
2668th Transportation Co	Fresno	9/20/1990	SWA
1113th Transportation Co	Sacramento	9/27/1990	SWA
126th Medical Co	Mather AFB	11/21/1990	US
HHD, 185th Transportation Bn	Fresno	11/29/1990	SWA
270th Military Police Co	Sacramento	12/6/1990	SWA
870th Military Police Co	Pittsburg	12/6/1990	EUROPE
970th Military Police Co	San Mateo	12/6/1990	SWA
980th Medical Detachment	Sacramento	12/6/1990	SWA
649th Military Police Co	Alameda	1/3/1991	SWA
143rd Military Police Det	San Mateo	1/17/1991	SWA
HHD, 185th Military Police Bn	Pittsburg	1/17/1991	SWA
COLORADO			
1158th Transportation Det	Camp George West	8/27/1990	SWA
1157th Transportation Det	Camp George West	9/20/1990	SWA
928th Medical Co	Cortez	11/17/1990	SWA
947th Medical Co	Las Animas	11/21/1990	SWA
HHD, 217th Medical Bn	Pueblo	11/29/1990	SWA
220th Military Police Co	Camp George West	1/3/1991	SWA
104th Public Affairs Det	Denver	1/7/1991	US
193rd Military Police Det	Camp George West	1/17/1991	SWA
CONNECTICUT			
142 Medical Co	New Haven	11/21/1990	SWA
143 Military Police Co	Windsor Locks	1/3/1991	SWA
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	New Haven	2/1/1991	US
1109th Avn Class & Rep Dep	Groton	2/13/1991	US

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA			
547th Transportation Co	Washington DC	9/20/1990	SWA
115th Medical Hospital	Washington DC	11/21/1990	SWA
273rd Military Police Co	Washington DC	1/3/1991	SWA
276th Military Police Co	Anacostia	1/3/1991	SWA
274th Military Police Co	Washington DC	1/3/1991	SWA
HHD, 372nd Military Police Bn	Anacostia	1/7/1991	SWA
DELAWARE			
HHD, 736th Supply & Service Bn	Delaware City	11/21/1990	SWA
249th Engineer Det	New Castle	11/21/1990	SWA
FLORIDA			
743rd Maintenance Co	Fort Lauderdale	10/11/1990	SWA
325th Maintenance Co	Lake Wales	10/11/1990	SWA
221st Ordnance Det	Camp Blanding	11/21/1990	SWA
269th Engineer Co	Live Oak	11/21/1990	SWA
HHD, 202nd Medical Gp	Jacksonville	11/29/1990	SWA
705th Military Police Co	Cocoa	12/6/1990	SWA
653rd Signal Company	Perry	12/6/1990	SWA
153rd Finance Spt Unit	St Augustine	1/22/1991	US
710th Composite Svc Co	Apalachicola	1/25/1991	SWA
213th Medical Bde (HSLD)	St Augustine	2/1/1991	US
199th Medical Co (Air Amb)	Lakeland	2/1/1991	US
144th Transportation Co	Marianna	2/15/1991	EUROPE
3rd Bn, 20th Special Forces	Camp Blanding	2/20/1991	US
GEORGIA			
190th Military Police Co	Atlanta	9/20/1990	SWA
1148th Transportation Co	Augusta	9/20/1990	SWA
165th Quartermaster Co	Savannah	10/11/1990	US
138th Medical Co	Atlanta	11/17/1990	SWA
HHC, 265th Engineer Gp	Marietta	11/21/1990	SWA
122nd Combat Support Ctr	Lawrenceville	11/21/1990	SWA
166th Combat Support Co	Hinesville	11/28/1990	US
HHC, 48th Infantry Bde	Macon	11/30/1990	US
848th Engineer Co	Douglas	11/30/1990	US
Trp E., 348th Cavalry	Griffin	11/30/1990	US
1st Bn, 230th Field Arty	Waycross	11/30/1990	US
148th Combat Spt Bn	Forsyth	11/30/1990	US
1st Bn, 108th Armor	Calhoun	11/30/1990	US
1st Bn, 121st Infantry	Dublin	11/30/1990	US
2nd Bn, 121st Infantry	Albany	11/30/1990	US
202nd Ordnance Det	Atlanta	12/6/1990	US
124th Public Affairs Det	Atlanta	1/7/1991	US
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Atlanta	2/1/1991	US

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
GUAM			
731st Military Police Co	Anderson	1/3/1991	SWA
IOWA			
1133rd Transportation Co	Mason City	9/27/1990	SWA
134th Medical Co	Washington	11/17/1990	SWA
209th Medical Co	Iowa City	11/17/1990	SWA
1034th Supply & Service Co	Camp Dodge	11/21/1990	SWA
1187th Medical Co	Waterloo	11/21/1990	US
1168th Transportation Co	Red Oak	12/6/1990	SWA
186th Military Police Co	Camp Dodge	1/3/1991	SWA
34th Military Police Det	Camp Dodge	1/17/1991	SWA
224th Engineer Bn	Fairfield	1/25/1991	EUROPE
3654th Combat Support Co	Knoxville	1/25/1991	US
IDAHO			
148th Public Affairs Det	Gowen Field	12/7/1990	SWA
ILLINOIS			
1244th Transportation Co	Cairo	9/20/1990	SWA
1544th Transportation Co	Paris	9/27/1990	SWA
HHD, 108th Medical Bn	Chicago	11/17/1990	SWA
1644th Transportation Co	Riverside	11/21/1990	SWA
233rd Military Police Co	Springfield	11/21/1990	SWA
933rd Military Police Co	Chicago	1/17/1991	EUROPE
INDIANA			
838th Transportation Det	Camp Atterbury	9/27/1990	SWA
1015th Adjutant Gen Co	Michigan City	10/16/1990	SWA
1438th Transportation Co	Camp Atterbury	12/11/1990	SWA
138th Finance Spt Unit	Indianapolis	3/15/1991	US
KANSAS			
170th Combat Support Co	Hays	11/29/1990	SWA
KENTUCKY			
137th Transportation Det	Danville	8/27/1990	SWA
217th Quartermaster Det	Danville	9/27/1990	SWA
2123rd Transportation Co	Bowling Green	10/11/1990	SWA
475th Medical Hospital	Frankfort	11/21/1990	SWA
133rd Public Affairs Det	Frankfort	12/7/1990	SWA
1st Bn, 623rd Field Artillery	Glasgow	12/9/1990	SWA
223rd Military Police Co	Louisville	1/3/1991	SWA
438th Military Police Co	Louisville	1/7/1991	US
LOUISIANA			
1090th Transportation Det	Camp Beauregard	8/27/1990	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
1083rd Transportation Co	Jonesville	10/11/1990	SWA
1086th Transportation Co	Jena	10/11/1990	SWA
3673rd Maintenance Co	New Orleans	10/16/1990	SWA
Troop E., 256th Cavalry	Natchitoches	11/21/1990	US
812th Medical Co	Pineville	11/21/1990	SWA
1087th Transportation Co	Vidalia	11/29/1990	SWA
HHC, 256th Infantry Brigade	Lafayette	11/30/1990	US
256th Engineer Co	Opelousas	11/30/1990	US
1st Bn, 141st Field Arty	Jackson Barracks	11/30/1990	US
199th Combat Support Co	Alexandria	11/30/1990	US
1st Bn, 156 Armor	Shreveport	11/30/1990	US
2nd Bn, 156th Infantry	Abbeville	11/30/1990	US
3rd Bn, 156th Infantry	Lake Charles	11/30/1990	US
39th Military Police Co	Jackson Barracks	12/6/1990	SWA
527th Engineer Bn	Bossier City	12/6/1990	SWA
159th Medical Hospital	Jackson Barracks	12/8/1990	SWA
MAINE			
3620th Transportation Det	Augusta	8/27/1990	SWA
HHC, 286th Supply & Svc Bn	Gardiner	11/17/1990	SWA
112th Medical Co	Bangor	12/6/1990	EUROPE
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Augusta	2/1/1991	US
MARYLAND			
290th Military Police Co	Towson	11/15/1990	SWA
200th Military Police Co	Salisbury	11/15/1990	SWA
1229th Transportation Co	Crisfield	11/17/1990	SWA
HHD, 29th Aviation	Edgewood	12/11/1990	SWA
MASSACHUSETTS			
704th Transportation Det	Camp Curtis Guild	9/12/1990	SWA
1058th Transportation Co	Hingham	9/20/1990	SWA
972nd Military Police Co	Newton	11/21/1990	SWA
181st Engineer Co	Whitman	12/6/1990	SWA
772nd Military Police Co	Taunton	1/7/1991	SWA
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Camp Curtis Guild	2/1/1991	US
MICHIGAN			
460th Quartermaster Co	Midland	9/20/1990	SWA
1009th Transportation Det	Lansing	9/20/1990	SWA
1461st Transportation Co	Jackson	9/27/1990	SWA
1073rd Maintenance Co	Greenville	11/17/1990	SWA
1439th Engineer Det	Camp Grayling	11/21/1990	SWA
1440th Engineer Det	Camp Grayling	11/21/1990	SWA
207th Medical Hospital	Detroit	11/21/1990	SWA
210th Military Police Bn	Detroit	12/6/1990	US
745th Ordnance Det	Camp Grayling	12/6/1990	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
144th Military Police Co	Owosso	1/3/1991	SWA
1072nd Maintenance Co	Sturgis	1/7/1991	EUROPE
1776th Military Police Co	Detroit	1/7/1991	SWA
146th Military Police Det	Owosso	1/17/1991	SWA
MINNESOTA			
109th Maintenance Co	Duluth	10/9/1990	SWA
257th Military Police Co	White Bear Lake	12/6/1990	SWA
MISSOURI			
1138th Military Police Co	West Plains	11/15/1990	SWA
1221st Transportation	Dexter	11/17/1990	SWA
1139th Military Police Co	Pleasant Home	11/21/1990	US
1267th Medical Company	Jefferson City	11/29/1990	SWA
HHC, 35th Support Cmd	Jefferson City	12/6/1990	SWA
1137th Military Police Co	Kennett	1/3/1991	SWA
3175th Military Police Co	Warrenton	1/17/1991	EUROPE
MISSISSIPPI			
114th Military Police Co	Clinton	9/12/1990	SWA
193rd Transportation Det	Laurel	9/20/1990	SWA
HHD, 112th Military Police Bn	Jackson	9/27/1990	SWA
162nd Military Police Co	Crystal Springs	9/27/1990	SWA
1355th Supply Co	Ocean Springs	11/17/1990	US
786th Transportation Co	Lucedale	11/17/1990	SWA
624th Quartermaster Co	Waynesboro	11/17/1990	SWA
367th Maintenance Co	Philadelphia	11/28/1990	US
210th Finance Det	Jackson	11/29/1990	US
Inst Spt Unit, Cp Shelby	Shelby	11/29/1990	US
HHC, 155th Armored Bde	Tupelo	12/7/1990	US
134th Engineer Co	Carthage	12/7/1990	US
Troop A., 98th Cavalry	Louisville	12/7/1990	US
2nd Bn, 114th Field Arty	Starkville	12/7/1990	US
Troop A., 98th Cav	Louisville	12/7/1990	US
HHD, 106th Support	Monticello	12/7/1990	US
1st Bn, 198th Armor	Amory	12/7/1990	US
2nd Bn, 198th Armor	Greenville	12/7/1990	US
1st Bn, 155th Infantry	McComb	12/7/1990	US
623rd Service Co	Collins	1/7/1991	EUROPE
750th Adjutant Gen Co	Jackson	1/25/1991	US
113th Military Police Co	Brandon	2/6/1991	US
2nd Bn, 20th Special Forces	Jackson	2/20/1991	US
MONTANA			
103rd Public Affairs Det	Helena	12/7/1990	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
NORTH CAROLINA			
139th Support Ctr	Morrisville	8/27/1990	SWA
382nd Public Affairs Det	Raleigh	8/30/1990	SWA
210th Military Police Bn	Sylva	9/12/1990	SWA
211th Military Police Co	Clyde	9/20/1990	SWA
121st Transportation Det	Raleigh	9/20/1990	SWA
1454th Transportation Co	Concord	9/20/1990	SWA
HHD, 540th Quartermaster Bn	Lenoir	9/27/1990	SWA
1450th Transportation Co	Jefferson	10/11/1990	SWA
HHD, 690th Maint Bn	Kinston	11/17/1990	SWA
691st Maintenance Co	Fremont	11/21/1990	SWA
731st Maintenance Co	Reidsville	11/21/1990	SWA
1451st Transportation Co	Boone	11/29/1990	US
514th Military Police Co	Greenville	11/29/1990	US
HHC, 30th Support Gp	Durham	11/29/1990	SWA
213th Military Police Co	Washington	12/6/1990	SWA
130th Military History Det	Raleigh	12/6/1990	SWA
130th Finance Det	Morrisville	1/25/1991	US
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Raleigh	2/1/1991	US
1st Bn, 130th Aviation	Morrisville	2/12/1991	US
NORTH DAKOTA			
132nd Quartermaster Co	Cando	9/12/1990	SWA
134th Quartermaster Det	Camp Grafton	9/12/1990	SWA
131st Quartermaster Det	Camp Grafton	9/20/1990	SWA
818th Medical Detachment	Bismark	11/17/1990	SWA
133rd Quartermaster Det	Cando	11/29/1990	SWA
HHD, 136th Quartermaster Bn	Camp Grafton	11/29/1990	SWA
191st Military Police Co	Mandan	12/6/1990	SWA
842nd Medical Det	Bismark	1/25/1991	US
NEBRASKA			
24th Medical Co	Lincoln	11/17/1990	SWA
Det 1, 1267th Medical Co	Lincoln	11/29/1990	SWA
NEVADA			
72nd Military Police Co	Fallon	12/6/1990	SWA
NEW HAMPHIRE			
744th Transportation Co	Claremont	11/17/1990	SWA
1159th Medical Co	Concord	11/21/1990	US
NEW JERSEY			
328th Transportation Det	Pemberton	9/27/1990	SWA
253rd Transportation Co	Cape May	9/27/1990	SWA
144th Quartermaster Co	Hammonton	11/21/1990	US
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Sea Girt	2/1/1991	US

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
NEW MEXICO			
720th Transportation	Las Vegas	11/17/1990	SWA
Air Defense Arty Tng Activity	Las Cruces	1/22/1991	US
NEW YORK			
10th Transportation Det	Latham	8/27/1990	SWA
719th Transportation Co	New York City	9/20/1990	SWA
102nd Combat Support Co	Brooklyn	11/21/1990	SWA
145th Maint Co	Fort Drum	11/21/1990	SWA
HHD, 244th Medical Gp	Brooklyn	11/21/1990	SWA
134th Maintenance Co	Rochester	11/21/1990	SWA
206th Military Police Co	Buffalo	12/6/1990	SWA
1569th Transportation Co	New York City	12/6/1990	SWA
HHD, 369th Transportation Bn	New York City	12/11/1990	SWA
107th Military Police Co	Utica	1/3/1991	SWA
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Latham	2/1/1991	US
OHIO			
1487th Transportation Co	Eaton	11/17/1990	SWA
1486th Transportation Co	Ashland	11/17/1990	SWA
5694th Engineer Det	Shreve	11/21/1990	SWA
641st Quartermaster Det	Covington	11/29/1990	SWA
323rd Military Police Co	Toledo	12/6/1990	EUROPE
1485th Transportation Co	Mansfield	12/11/1990	SWA
324th Military Police Co	Youngstown	1/3/1991	SWA
838th Military Police Co	Youngstown	1/7/1991	US
337th Adjutant Gen Co	Worthington	1/22/1991	US
OKLAHOMA			
2120th Combat Support Co	Wewoka	9/20/1990	SWA
HHD, 120th Medical Bn	Midwest City	11/17/1990	SWA
145th Medical Co	Broken Arrow	11/21/1990	SWA
1st Bn, 158th Field Arty	Fort Sill	11/21/1990	SWA
1045th Ordnance Det	Fort Sill	11/29/1990	SWA
745th Military Police Co	Oklahoma City	12/6/1990	SWA
245th Medical Company	Midwest City	12/6/1990	EUROPE
1245th Transportation Co	Tishomingo	12/11/1990	SWA
1345th Transportation Co	Ardmore	12/11/1990	SWA
1120 Maintenance Co	Sulphur	1/2/1991	US
445th Military Police Co	Mcalester	1/7/1991	US
OREGON			
206th Transportation Det	Portland	8/27/1990	SWA
2186th Combat Support Co	Clackamas	11/21/1990	SWA
PENNSYLVANIA			
228th Transportation Det	Allentown	9/20/1990	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
131st Transportation Co	Williamston	10/11/1990	SWA
3623rd Maintenance Co	Bethlehem	11/21/1990	SWA
121st Transportation Co	Lebanon	11/29/1990	SWA
28th Finance Unit	Lebanon	3/15/1991	US
PUERTO RICO			
219th Quartermaster Det	Juanadiaz	9/27/1990	SWA
201st Medical Hospital	Juanadiaz	11/21/1990	SWA
544th Military Police Co	Yauco	11/21/1990	SWA
162nd Fld Service Co	Juanadiaz	11/21/1990	SWA
1467th Medical Det	Fort Allen	12/6/1990	EUROPE
1600th Ordnance Co	Arroyo	12/6/1990	SWA
225th Military Police Co	Ponce	1/3/1991	SWA
240th Military Police Co	Penuelas	1/3/1991	SWA
755th Military Police Co	Arecibo	1/3/1991	SWA
480th Military Police Co	San Juan	1/3/1991	SWA
3678th Ordnance Co	Toa Baja	1/7/1991	EUROPE
RHODE ISLAND			
HHD, 118th Military Police Bn	Providence	11/21/1990	SWA
119th Military Police Co	Providence	1/3/1991	SWA
115th Military Police Co	Pawtucket	1/7/1991	SWA
SOUTH CAROLINA			
265th Quartermaster Det	Allendale	8/27/1990	SWA
132nd Military Police Co	Florence	9/12/1990	SWA
1052nd Transportation Co	Kingstree	11/17/1990	SWA
264th Engineer Det	Allendale	11/21/1990	SWA
742nd Maint Co	Columbia	11/28/1990	US
1st Bn, 263rd Armor	Mullins	11/30/1990	US
251st Support Ctr	Columbia	12/6/1990	SWA
251st Medical Hospital	Columbia	12/27/1990	SWA
108th Public Affairs Det	Columbia	1/3/1991	EUROPE
218th Adjutant Gen Co	Columbia	1/22/1991	US
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Columbia	2/1/1991	US
SOUTH DAKOTA			
57th Transportaion Det	Brookings	8/27/1990	SWA
747th Transportation Det	Rapid City	9/12/1990	SWA
740th Transportation Co	Milbank	11/17/1990	SWA
1742nd Transportation Co	Watertown	11/17/1990	SWA
730th Medical Co	Winner	11/21/1990	SWA
HHC, 109th Engineer Gp	Rapid City	11/21/1990	SWA
TENNESEE			
HHD, 176th Maintenance Bn	Johnson City	8/27/1990	SWA
130th Support Ctr	Smyrna	8/27/1990	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
776th Maintenance Co	Elizabethton	9/15/1990	SWA
1175th Quartermaster Co	Carthage	9/20/1990	SWA
251st Supply & Svc Co	Lewisburg	9/20/1990	SWA
212th Engineer Co	Tracy City	10/11/1990	SWA
1174th Transportation Co	Dresden	11/17/1990	SWA
663rd Medical Det	Nashville	11/21/1990	SWA
268th Military Police Co	Ripley	11/21/1990	SWA
300th Medical Hospital	Smyrna	12/6/1990	EUROPE
155th Engineer Co	Waverly	12/7/1990	SWA
775th Engineer Det	Camden	12/7/1990	SWA
1st Bn, 181st Field Artillery	Chattanooga	12/9/1990	SWA
HCB, 196th Field Artillery Bde	Chattanooga	12/9/1990	SWA
269th Military Police Co	Dyersburg	1/3/1991	SWA
118th Public Affairs Det	Nashville	1/7/1991	SWA
568th Adjutant Gen Co	Nashville	1/22/1991	US
HHC, 213 Med Bde (HSLD)	Nashville	2/1/1991	US

TEXAS

1104th Transportation Det	Austin	9/20/1990	SWA
149th Adjutant General Co	Austin	10/11/1990	US
149th Aviation Co	Grand Prairie	12/6/1990	SWA
3rd Bn, 141st Infantry	McAllen	12/7/1990	US
1836th Medical Det	San Antonio	12/27/1990	US
217th Medical Hospital	San Antonio	12/27/1990	SWA
49th Aviation Platoon	San Antonio	1/17/1991	SWA
49th Finance Unit	Austin	1/22/1991	US

UTAH

120th Quartermaster Det	American Fork	8/27/1990	SWA
TM A, 142nd Mil Intel Bn	Draper	8/27/1990	SWA
TM B, 142nd Mil Intel Bn	Draper	8/27/1990	SWA
TM C, 142nd Mil Intel Bn	Draper	8/27/1990	SWA
TM D, 142nd Mil Intel Bn	Draper	8/27/1990	SWA
144th Medical Hospital	Salt Lake City	11/21/1990	SWA
625th Military Police Co	Murray	12/6/1990	SWA
Co A, 142d Mil Intel Bn	Draper	1/3/1991	SWA
1457th Engineer Bn	American Falls	1/25/1991	EUROPE

VIRGINIA

986th Medical Det	Sandston	9/20/1990	SWA
1033rd Transportation Co	Gate City	10/11/1990	SWA
1032nd Transportation Co	Big Stone Gap	11/17/1990	SWA
HHC, 176th Engineer Gp	Richmond	11/21/1990	SWA
HHC, 1030th Engineer Bn	Gate City	11/21/1990	SWA
116th Military History Det	Manassas	12/6/1990	SWA
183rd Adjutant Gen Co	Sandston	1/3/1991	SWA
229th Military Police Co	Chesapeake	1/7/1991	SWA

UNIT	HOME STATION	FEDERALIZED	DESTINATION
HHC, 213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Richmond	2/1/1991	US
Co B, 2nd Bn, 224th Avn	Sandston	2/12/1991	US
VERMONT			
131st Engineer Co	Burlington	11/29/1990	SWA
150th Air Traffic Ctrl Plt	South Burlington	1/17/1991	SWA
103rd Aviation Company	South Burlington	1/17/1991	SWA
172nd Adjutant Gen Co	Winooski	1/25/1991	US
213th Med Bde (HSLD)	Winooski	2/1/1991	US
WASHINGTON			
1444th Transportation Det	Tacoma	8/27/1990	SWA
241st Transportation Co	Tacoma	11/17/1990	SWA
116th Support Ctr	Tacoma	12/6/1990	SWA
541st Adjutant Gen Co	Camp Murray	1/25/1991	US
WISCONSIN			
1122nd Transportation Det	Madison	9/20/1990	SWA
107th Maintenance Co	Sparta	9/20/1990	US
1158th Transportation Co	Monroe	11/17/1990	SWA
13th Medical Hospital	Madison	11/21/1990	SWA
1157th Transportation Co	Oshkosh	12/6/1990	SWA
229th Engineer Co	Prairie Du Chien	12/6/1990	SWA
132nd Military History Det	Madison	12/6/1990	SWA
32nd Military Police Co	Milwaukee	1/3/1991	SWA
WEST VIRGINIA			
146th Medical Co	Parkersburg	11/21/1990	SWA
157th Military Police Co	Martinsburg	12/6/1990	SWA
1st Bn, 201st Field Artillery	Fairmont	12/9/1990	SWA
152nd Military Police Co	Moundsville	1/3/1991	SWA
WYOMING			
1022nd Medical Co	Cheyenne	11/21/1990	SWA

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Schwarzkopf, GEN H. Norman, with Peter Petre. It Doesn't Take a Hero. New York, Bantam Books, 1992.

Sifry, Micah and Cerf, Christopher, eds. The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. New York: Random House, 1991.

Summers, Harry. On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992.

ENDNOTES


- 1 Titles of two US Army official histories of the war; *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* (Scales, BG Robert H., Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993) and *The Whirlwind War: The US Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM* (Schubert, Frank N. and Theresa Kraus, eds., Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1995).
- 2 LTG Tom Kelly, Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as quoted in *CNN War in the Gulf*. (Allen, Thomas F.; Clifton Berry; and Norman Polmar, Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1991) p. 215.
- 3 Schubert, *Whirlwind War*, p. 36. Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1990, p. 20.
- 4 While the majority of Guardmembers were men, 7% of the Army Guard was composed of women, the largest percentage since the first women were permitted to join the National Guard in 1956. Of those Guardmembers mobilized for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 8.8% were women.
- 5 More popularly known as the Persian Gulf region or Arabian Peninsula, the U.S. Armed Forces defined the geographic region in which the “Gulf War” took place as Southwest Asia, and defined it to include all of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and the surrounding waters and airspace.
- 6 All figures in this paragraph drawn from *Army National Guard After Action Report* (hereafter cited as NGB AAR) pgs 1-7 and *Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau*, 1991, Appendices E & F.
- 7 *Military Review*, September 1991, pgs. 80-81.
- 8 Interview notes and Information paper, NGB-ARG, Subject: South Carolina Army National Guard Success Stories: Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
- 9 Historical background to the Roundout concept can be found in “Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony” by David Shaver (Strategic Studies Institute, The US Army War College, February 11, 1992) and “The Army’s Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War” by Robert L. Goldich (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, October 22, 1991).
- 10 Conaway, LTG John B. with Jeff Neligan. *Call Out the Guard!* Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Co, 1997, pgs. 178-9.
- 11 Spratt, Rep. John (D-SC) “The Call-up of National Guard Combat Units During Operations Desert Shield/Storm,” Report to Chairman Les Aspin, House Armed Services Committee, Sep 1991, p. 8.
- 12 NGB AAR, pgs. 115-130.
- 13 Schwarzkopf, GEN H. Norman. “The 48th Brigade: A Chronology from Invasion to Demobilization”; *National Guard*, May 1991, p. 13.
- 14 Schubert, p. 71.
- 15 Chapman, MAJ Craig S. “Non-Deployed: The Story of the Roundouts in the Persian Gulf Crisis.” Unpublished final draft located in National Guard Association library, p. 18.
- 16 Goldich, p. 11.
- 17 NGB-ARR Information paper; “Issue: ARNG and USAR availability.” The comparable first-day deployable figure for the USAR was 70%. The 11 Guard units that did not meet deployability criteria on the first day were all either undergoing reorganizations or were authorized a lower level of readiness by CENTCOM.
- 18 Over 4,400 Guardmembers served two week tours of federal active duty acting as military police in the refugee camps, including all of Arkansas’ 142d Field Artillery Brigade, which was also called up for Desert Storm.

- 19 Conaway, p. 168; NGB-ARR Information Paper: "Alabama Army National Guard Success Stories: Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM." 32 Alabama Army Guard units were called for Desert Shield/Storm; 27 units served in Southwest Asia.
- 20 Blake, Thomas G. *The Shield and the Storm*. Point Pleasant, NJ: The Commemorative Group, 1991. National Guard Section, p. 32.
- 21 NGB-ARG Information Paper, 27 January 1992, "Issue: Total Force Policy and CAPSTONE programs, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM." Additionally, only 50% of the units CAPSTONE to Southwest Asia deployed there.
- 22 NGB AAR, pgs. 134-137.
- 23 Ibid; Conaway, p. 171.
- 24 Letter, Secretary Cheney to Chairman Aspin, September 18, 1990; reply to 6 Sep 90 letter from Committee members Les Aspin, GV Montgomery, Beverly Byron, & Dave McCurdy. Even accepting that 180 days was too short a time to mobilize, train and deploy a Guard combat brigade, the Department of Defense could have ordered the roundout brigades to begin extended annual training under Title 10 or Title 32, USC and not start the clock on overseas deployment until they were ready to deploy. None of these assumptions about length of time to train up were ever made regarding Combat Support or Combat Service Support units.
- 25 NGB-ARG Information Paper, 28 Feb 1992, "Subject: ARNG Assistance Provided to USMCR Armor Units ODS."
- 26 Conaway, p. 172.
- 27 Call-up extension was by Executive Order signed November 12, 1990. The day after the air war began, Congress passed legislation declaring a partial mobilization, thus authorizing the call up of up to 1,000,000 reservists for up to two years - far longer, it turns out, than was needed.
- 28 NGB AAR, pgs. 147, 150, 156.
- 29 NGB AAR, p. 69.
- 30 Desert Shield/Desert Storm Experience Questionnaires, HHD 369 Trans Bn, 719 Trans Co, 1569th Trans Co.; also Headquarters, 369th Transportation Battalion memorandum, "Subject: After Action Review, 27 Sep 1991." The companies attached to the 369th would transport 292,000 short tons of supplies and equipment and travel over 3,100,000 miles during and after Desert Storm.
- 31 Allen, et al., p. 198.
- 32 "Washington Tie-Line" *National Guard*, December 1990, p. 4.
- 33 Conaway, p. 177.
- 34 Schwarzkopf, "The 48th Brigade," pgs. 12-15.
- 35 When the 24th Infantry Division mobilized at Fort Stewart for Desert Shield in August 1990, it stripped vehicles belonging to the 48th Infantry Brigade for spare parts in order to deploy as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, this was not explained in later press accounts that criticized the 48th's maintenance status.
- 36 Schubert, pgs. 122-124; NGB-ARR Information Paper, 28 Oct 1991, "Subject: Absent Without Leave (AWOL) Incident, 256th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), LA ARNG."
- 37 Youngman, COL D. Allen. *Citizen Soldiers, Combat and the Future: America's Army at War With Itself*. Washington DC: American Defense Coalition, n.d., p. 15. The 48th returned to Ft. Stewart where it was released from active duty on March 23d. Mississippi's 155th Armored Brigade replaced the 48th at NTC and was certified deployable after a two week rotation.
- 38 "President's Message", *National Guard*, May 1991, p. 2.
- 39 The Adjutant General, South Carolina, Major General Eston Marchant, as quoted in Spratt, p. 2.
- 40 NGB AAR, p. 11.

- 41 Ibid., p. 4.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 NGB-ARG Information Paper, 27 January 1992, "Issue: Army National Guard Artillery in Operation DESERT STORM."
- 44 Hartman, 2LT Douglas. *Nebraska's Militia: The History of the Army and Air National Guard, 1854-1991*. Virginia Beach: Donning Company, 1994, pgs. 221-226.
- 45 Department of the Army, *A Soldier's Guide to Saudi Arabia*. November 1990, pgs. 15, 19, 20.
- 46 Englehardt, LTC Joseph P. *Desert Shield and Desert Storm: A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 25 March 1991, p. 40.
- 47 U.S. and Coalition forces flew over 116,000 combat sorties (a sortie is a single flight by a single aircraft) during the war, losing a total of 75 aircraft (42 combat, 33 non-combat losses). Iraq lost 42 aircraft in air-to-air engagements, 81 destroyed on the ground, and 137 aircraft flown to Iran. Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Almanac*, 1991.
- 48 Schwarzkopf, "The 48th Brigade," p. 15.
- 49 NGB AAR, p. 33.
- 50 NGB-ARG Issue Papers: "ARNG Aviation in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM"; "ARNG Composite Services Units in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM"; "Army National Guard Military Police in Operation DESERT STORM"; and Desert Storm Experiences Questionnaire, 241st Transportation Detachment.
- 51 Blahut, CPT Phil. "Red Carpet, show of stars to be seen by five Guard captains" *On Guard*, April 1992, p. 6 ; NGB-ARR Information Paper, "Tennessee Army National Guard Success Stories: Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM."; Scales, pgs. 39-40.
- 52 Blahut, p. 6; NGB-ARG Information Paper, "Arizona Army National Guard Success Stories: Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM,."; E-mail correspondence, LTC Clark and author, 8 February 2001.
- 53 *Military Review*, September 1991, pg. 77.
- 54 Allen, et al., p. 220. These figures are for American forces only and do not take into account losses sustained by other members of the coalition.
- 55 NGB Survey, "ARNG Casualties during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM", by CW2 John Listman. Of the 34 deaths worldwide, 13 were from auto accidents, 10 from natural causes, 6 as a result of two separate helicopter crashes (one in Honduras, the other in the U.S.), and one death each from suicide, accidental shooting while cleaning a weapon, rim explosion while conducting a tire change, picking up unexploded ordnance, and stepping on a land mine after hostilities ended. U.S. Forces deployed in the Gulf region suffered 145 non-battle deaths.
- 56 Riley, MAJ Bill "Harlem Hellfighters Keep Ground War on the Move" *National Guard*, August 1991, pgs. 80-81.
- 57 Radio address to U.S. Armed Forces stationed in the Persian Gulf, March 2, 1991.
- 58 Only three Army Guard soldiers of 62,411 called refused to report for active duty; none refused to deploy. 6% of the soldiers called were judged non-deployable for various reasons; e.g., soldier in high school or OCS, awaiting basic training, medically unfit, etc. Source: NGB AAR p. 6.

Enthusiastic
crowds welcomed
the troops home
(NGB)





MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Syria

Lebanon

Damascus

Baghdad

Israel

Jerusalem

Amman

Iraq

Jordan

Neutral Zone

Kuwait

Tapline Road

Egypt

Al Manama

Riyad

Saudi Arabia

Sudan

RED SEA

Boundary Under

Yemen



★ Tehran

Afghanistan

Iran

Pakistan

Iran

Aj-Dawlah

Qatar

Abu Zaby

United Arab Emirates

Gulf of Oman

Masqat

Oman

ARABIAN SEA

ined



SOUTHWESTERN ASIA

Drawn by Kevin Hittle, NE ARNG



Captain Les' Melnyk wrote *Mobilizing for the Storm* while assigned as the Army National Guard Historian at the National Guard Bureau.

A native of New York City, he holds a Bachelor's degree in English and History from Queens College, City University of New York, and both an M.A. and an M.Phil. in History from the Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York. He has taught courses in European, World and Military history at Queens College, Hunter College, and Queensborough Community College, and is currently writing his doctoral thesis on the National Guard's role in shaping defense policy between the World Wars.

Commissioned in 1988 out of St. John's University ROTC as a Military Intelligence officer, Captain Melnyk served ten years as a traditional Guardsman in New York City's 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry (the "Fighting 69th") and 1st Battalion, 69th Air Defense Artillery. He performed a number of assignments, including Tactical Intelligence Officer, Assistant Air Defense Tactical Operations Officer, Air Defense Platoon Leader, and Battalion S-2. He entered active duty in 1998 to take on his current assignment.

Captain Melnyk lives in Washington, DC with his wife, Stephanie Scott-Melnyk, and their son Zennon. They eagerly await the arrival of a second child in late 2001.