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**2011/2**

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## ***EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES***

**Dr. István TARRÓSY PhD., assistant professor University of Pécs**

### **AFTER THE QUAKE – AN OVERVIEW OF JAPANESE-AFRICAN RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL UNCERTAINTIES**

“We take it for granted that the earth beneath our feet is solid and stationary. [...] But suddenly one day we see that it isn’t true.” (Haruki Murakami (2003): *After the quake*. London: Vintage Books. p. 68.)

#### ***Introduction – toward multipolar geopolitics***

The globalised arena of world politics has been increasingly challenged by numerous and different types of uncertainty, among which ecological and industrial disasters, terrorist attacks, or financial crises can be named immediately. Our global era is characterised by the interactions of all kinds of actors and stakeholders in an interdependent, growingly transnational cob-web, in which although there are more peripheral as well as central regions (players), any impulse spreads all across the net affecting all the actors of the entire web of connectedness. Emerging economies, such as India, China, Russia, Brazil, and many more from Southeast Asia and Latin-America make the world ever so multipolar, balancing the strength and might of the US and countries of the technologically and economically more advanced North. Wallerstein (2003) call it a chaotic world, which can be characterised by a long period with the decline of US hegemony. “There are too many cross-cutting interests at play, too many tactical follies, for anyone to commit himself or herself unreservedly to one side or the other in the endless skirmishes.” (Wallerstein, 2003: 143) As far as this is the political and economic reality of the contemporary world, there are different ways to approach the major cleavage in rather philosophical, and not in purely geographical terms: the North–South divide offers us to turn our attention to the more peripheries, in particular, to the semi-peripheral entities. These, as countries of the South, but with the aspiration to move towards the power centres of the North, or even better to say, to form their centres of power within their own realms of connectedness show us new dynamism, even alternatives for development in the long run. It depends on how they can cope with and respond to the uncertainties that are ahead us, and if they manage, for instance as regards the expansion of their production, or the increase of their military strength, while keeping themselves unified with long-lasting and sustainable development, the

world of today will transform rapidly into something along the lines of ‘Southern will’. In this respect co-operation within the Southern club and beyond, especially when North–South projects are taken into account will matter more than ever.

*Japan<sup>1</sup> as a leading actor in this global scene – spotlight on development assistance*

Since the end of World War II Japan has risen as the leading (mostly economic) actor of its region, but as Yahuda (1996) underlines, “its economy is of global significance and geopolitically it is located at the junction of American, Russian and Chinese interests” (Yahuda, 1996: 229). Due to the historic circumstances, with a heavy influence (if not dominance) of the US on Japanese security policy, which resulted in the development of self-defence capabilities and the virtual non-involvement in meeting global security challenges (such as the Gulf Wars, or the war on terror), Japan is “strongly inclined toward a liberal approach to international relations, one that favours trade and diplomacy over force or the threat of force as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives” (Berger, 2004: 161).

Although in Japanese society, as Takashi Inoguchi (2007) points out, traders were considered as a low-status social group, one of the priorities of any Japanese government has been fostering trade and trade-based co-operation in the global system. As a responsible international power, Japan considers regional (intra and inter at the same time) alliances – for instance, APEC, the Asian-Pacific Economic Co-operation –, together with global agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol as fundamental tools of a fair(er) global context. Among the major tasks of the government we find foreign direct investment, technology transfer and Official Development Assistance (ODA), furthermore, the maintenance of the supremacy of knowledge, training and education as such.

Over the past 15 years, “Japan has devoted 70–75 percent of its total ODA to bilateral programmes, with the remainder given to multilateral international development institutions and agencies.” Its bilateral ODA is organised into “grant aid and loan aid categories” (Arase, 2005: 5). These are connected with industry-focussed, trade- and infrastructure-related projects, mainly within Japan’s closest regions (the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia), but in terms of Afro-Asian relations, too.

Since the 1990s after several crises hit the Japanese economy the government substantially cut its ODA-budget. These cutbacks and such a decreasing trend started somewhere in 1998/1999. Today there is a gradual

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<sup>1</sup> The paper is based upon the intensive research period the author could spend in Kyoto and Tokyo in November and December 2010 thanks to the invaluable fellowship of the Japan Foundation (Intellectual Exchange Program 2010–11).

increase in bilateral ODA, and most of the money is in the form of debt forgiveness. Comparing Japan with the US, or the World Bank, it is still among the first couple of donors towards the developing world. In bilateral aid – as of 2009 – Japan is around the fifth in bilateral largest donor in the world; in multilateral terms, on cash flow basis, Japan is the second after the World Bank. *Figure 1* shows the list of net ODA contributions among the DAC<sup>2</sup> members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).




Figure 1 – Source: [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

For years Japan was known as the DAC’s leading country as regards the so-called “aid volume”, i.e. the absolute quantity of the ODA it gave to the developing world. As Arase (2005) indicates, although Japan “did top the list of DAC donors in dollar spending, [...] its effort in relation to its national income has always remained below the DAC median, and well below the target of 0.7 percent of GDP set back in 1970 by the UN and reaffirmed by all DAC members in 2002.” (Arase, 2005: 6) *Figure 2* proves that Japan’s ODA/GNI (Gross National Income) is well below the desired DAC-average, and ranks Japan 21 out of 23 DAC members (in the late 1990s it was fifteenth or sixteenth out of 22 members, in 2002 its ODA/GNI ration fell again, ranking it eighteenth in the ‘club’ – see more from Arase, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> DAC stands for the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD that groups the world’s main donors, defining and monitoring global standards in key areas of development. See more on [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org).




Figure 2 – Source: [www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)

Since its establishment in 1974 the Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA) has been providing Japanese bilateral aid in the form of technical co-operation, ODA loans and grant aid. Its president, Madame Sadako Ogata – since October 2008 – has been implementing the ‘new vision’ for her organisation, i.e. “Inclusive and Dynamic Development”, which embraces “four missions: (1) addressing the global agenda, including climate change, water security and food supplies, and infectious diseases; (2) reducing poverty through equitable growth; (3) improving governance, such as through reform of the policies and systems of developing country governments; and (4) achieving human security.” (See: Ogata’s address from <http://www.jica.go.jp>).

Japan’s continuous aspiration to get into further leadership positions in the top institutions of global politics was clearly seen since it joined the OECD in 1964. It, however, needs to be taken into account that changes in such positions are ever so inevitable due to the strength of rising powers, for instance, that of China, the rapid growth of other BRICS<sup>3</sup> members, or the “resurgence of American economic and technological power, the expansion of the European Union,” which all mean that Japan’s future “as a global and regional leader is overshadowed” (Arase, 2005: 3). Since its 1964 entry into the donor community Japan has paid a lot of attention to the implementation of most of its foreign aid

<sup>3</sup> The acronym was first used by Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001 for the “Four Large Emerging Markets” (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Today, the political group includes the Republic of South Africa, too, thus, has changed its name to BRICS.



(90 percent) on Asian countries. However, as Lehman (2005) underlines, “Japan has been the only developed country to consistently hold major international conferences on African development”.

### *Japanese–African trade and aid relations in the past*

In the 1880s, during the first decades of the Meiji period<sup>4</sup>, Japan established a consular report system. This was the time when industrialisation started, and as a result, for example, ‘commercial houses’ were looking for new markets to export to. The government established its diplomatic and trading network, mainly in North America and Europe, but after World War I, it began to focus on the Middle East and African countries to expand the export of Japanese goods. The major export products at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century included tea and silk, without the presence of heavy industry yet. After World War I cotton goods were put on the list, too, in particular to East-African countries, but mainly to Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. After 1951 the Japanese government promoted the export of light-industry goods, especially artificial textiles. As heavy industry was gradually developed, this had changed to automobiles.

Japanese position in world diplomacy after World War II was substantially influenced by the US, which seems to be the most important factor to understand Japanese positions towards Africa, too. Later on it can be seen that the US exercised a strong pressure on Japan to increase the volume of aid specifically in Africa.

Another important point to consider for Japan was another influence coming with the process of industrialisation after World War II: first due the expansion of light, later on, heavy industry, then, today the weight of high-tech industry. All the raw materials Japanese companies needed for their production have always been crucial to decide upon which countries to deal with more ever since.

One of the major motives for Japan to get more and more engaged with Africa was the vulnerability of its economy “in the face of scarce natural resources. [...] In 1974 Toshio Kimura, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Egypt and four sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania), for the first time as a Japanese foreign minister to do so. [...] Kimura later explained [that] [...] he became aware of the importance of Africa, as a place with rich natural resources but an almost virgin region for the Japanese economic diplomacy.” (Sato, 2005: 73)

Another important consideration for Japan to look towards Africa and beyond in terms of expanding its diplomatic presence worldwide was connected

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<sup>4</sup> This period between 1868–1912 was Japan’s most important era of opening up and modernisation.

with the historic wounds Japan had caused to numerous Southeast Asian nations (as a result of the conflicts it had had with them, or the wars it had fought against them). These obviously represented a heavy burden for some years to carry out economic activities in the close region of Japan, therefore, building up friendships across Africa was necessary and logical at the same time.

### *TICAD and the new phase of Japanese–African relations*

Japan’s strategy for Africa has always been closely tied with the first ever large-scale conference series in the Asia Pacific under the name “Tokyo International Conference on African Development” held for the first time in 1993. Since then, TICAD has been an axis to think about African development. After 1989–1991 a kind of rupture took shape in the East–West struggle, but within the donor community Japan continued contributing a lot to development projects. Most of the donors, however, – because of “aid fatigue” – cut back their budgets, except for Japan. As Ichiro Tambo of JICA in an interview in November 2010 summarised: “For Africa, Japan was a star, a dream!” During the 1980s, due to a number of factors, such as the austerity measures coming along with the structural adjustment regime of the international donor institutions, or the social pressures arising from them, and thus, the further weakening of states, the African continent was losing ground, and Japan tried to step into and help.

When looking into the motifs for Japan to “enter” Africa, a rather logical series of events can be drawn. In the early 1990s, after the “bubble”<sup>5</sup> burst out and the country faced some years of recession, Japanese economy got secured, and had access capacity. The only “new field” to turn towards was Africa – Latin-America, for instance, was already the backyard of the USA. Southeast Asia (ASEAN countries) had already been very closely linked with Japanese politics and economy, which meant that they were not that interesting for Japan to foster aid programmes with. In political terms, African development needs had always been on the table, and by the early 1990s politicians wanted to give support to African countries. The continent was seen in the eyes of many as a ‘green field’ to provide support for. Last but not least, some considerations of Realpolitik should be added, i.e. the real motif of gaining more strength in the United Nations in the form of 54 votes (one fourth of the total votes). In the words of Sato (2005), “Japan gradually came to see African countries as possible Japanese supporters in the international political scene, particularly at the UN meetings. Such considerations were most salient when Japan became a

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<sup>5</sup> The economy of Japan in the 1980s can be characterised as “bubble” as long as between 1986 and 1991 real estate and stock prices highly inflated. This era combined easy credit with unbridled speculation and eventually drove Japanese equity and real estate markets to astronomical price levels (Encyclopedia Britannica). This occurred gradually up until the early 2000s, and is known as the ‘Lost Decade’ in Japanese economic history.

candidate for the election of non-permanent members at the Security Council. The MOFA<sup>6</sup> consciously worked for the votes of African countries.” (Sato, 2005: 74)

JICA President Madame Ogata told the African Union on one of her recent visits that “Africa has achieved significant changes, but the continent remains fragile and much work remains to be done.” Today, a number of African countries can enjoy steady economic growth, but the question is how sustainable this could be for the long run. *Figure 3* shows how economic growth in Africa accelerated in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Source: McKinsey & Company, 2011).




Figure 3 – Africa is the world’s third fastest-growing region today  
Source: McKinsey & Co., 2011: 9.

JICA, for instance, provides a wide array of support to drive this sustainable growth, mainly in the area of infrastructure including roads and electricity, promoting trade, investment and tourism, the expansion of assistance to support small and medium enterprises and the initiative to double rice production within 10 years (JICA, 2009).

Japan focuses its strategic approach on human security and inclusive development, and as part of this, it promotes ‘African ownership’, which is a significant step towards sustainable development on the continent. It concentrates on some 15 African countries and has a regional approach, rather than a country-based one. When the plan for Africa’s ‘renaissance’ (in all

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs

aspects and walks of life) was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity, later, the ‘successor’ African Union, Japan immediately indicated its continuous support. Actually, the Japanese government “officially announced its support of NEPAD<sup>7</sup> at the TICAD III in 2003.” (Sato, 2005: 81)

The core idea of the ‘ownership’ concept was rooted in the DAC New Development Strategy entitled “Shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: the Contribution of Development Cooperation”, recommending a new approach to development and aid with an emphasis on partnership and the heavy involvement of local levels in managing projects as ‘owners’. Today, “ownership is the pivotal issue with regards to Sector Programs”, which mean the essence of “sector-level structural changes in development cooperation [in the form of] coordination and collaboration among the stakeholders such as donors and governments of developing countries. It is seen as a new form of partnership for development.” (IFIC, 2001: 37, 40)

At the fourth TICAD in 2008 Japan strengthened its firm commitment towards African development by promising to double Japanese ODA by 2012. Then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda announced that Japan would provide up to USD 4 billion in soft loans to improve infrastructure, USD 10 billion during five years to fight the adverse affects of climate change, USD 560 million to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, launch projects in such fields as agriculture, health and encourage wider private business involvement (JICA, 2010). All these are meant to be channelled into supporting the self-help efforts of African entities.

According to the Yokohama Action Plan of 2008, Japan is strongly committed to sectoral strategies, and (among numerous important areas) focuses on infrastructure, trade, investment, community development, peacebuilding and South–South co-operation, in a number of instances, in the form of triangular projects. As an example, the integrated regional development model in Nacala, Mozambique, can be mentioned. The port of Nacala is the second best natural, deep-water port in the region after Durban, and to be able to develop it into a well-equipped international junction of trade, among a number of advantages, there is no need for any drainage. The ongoing Japan–Brazil–Mozambique triangular co-operation will most likely result in not only a modernised water gateway, but the establishment of a new transport and trade corridor, which will benefit the region itself, and as Collier (2006) also indicated, will offer the chance to get the desired preferential market access of African goods to Asian markets, too. *Figure 4* shows Southern Africa’s transport corridors.

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<sup>7</sup> New Partnership for Africa’s Development




Figure 4 – Source: <http://capetocongo.com/2011/03/landlocked-africa-transport/>

Many Japanese scholars think that until TICAD III it was just a big conference, just a ‘talking show’. With TICAD IV Japan thinks maybe it can lead the international community to ignite economic growth in Africa (the previous such plans failed...). To the success of TICAD IV also the private sector contributed – for the first time! Today Japanese officials say that African matters cross their national interests, and that they are going to find those in the continent. In the ODA-field Japan has a big distance between the public and the private sectors. JICA wishes to help Japan catch up as in the US, for instance. The first time ever when an official government visit Japan paid to any country in its region including a large businessmen delegation, too, was in 2007 to Vietnam (200 businessmen joined the government in its efforts to sign deals with the Vietnamese partners). In today’s diplomacy this is a commonsense, but it has not been the case in Japan. From TICAD IV onwards the reform of Japanese ODA makes it possible for joining forces in the form of public-private partnership (PPP). As long as the transnational environment is getting more and more competitive, Japanese ODA must be more national interest-oriented.

### *After Fukushima 3/11 – Concluding remarks*

Due to current economic situation, in particular after the quake of 3/11 and the ecological disaster that followed, the Japanese government surely cannot commit itself again to double its ODA to Africa. However, it can transmit a new message that it shifts from volume to quality. In an era of global uncertainties and fierce competition over a number of issues among the various entities in the web of interconnectedness, in general terms, Africans are increasingly sceptic about big commitments. They prefer the real outcome, for example, how many millions of people can benefit from clean drinking water, or by how many points child mortality rate can be reduced as a result of international aid, partnership, or any such involvement. Africans themselves, therefore, also shift their attention to output-based co-operations, and the community of donors need to adjust their mindset to this.

In one of the interviews I made in December 2010, an expert underlined that Japanese “look at Africa as a continent of hope and opportunities”. The perception of Japanese people in this sense is rather positive. But first of all, Japanese economy need to revitalise itself, for instance, by continuing negotiations about a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific. TICAD and its continuation must necessarily incorporate these big issues, too. Also, after hearing more critical tones over triangle co-operation, as Sato also indicates, “it seems high time for Japan to seriously reconsider the existing Japan–Africa–the third party triangle relationship to establish a better and deepened bilateral relationship between Japan and each African country.” (Sato, 2005: 84) As Hirano (2010) underlined in a draft paper, building peaceful Africa is required also to maintain Japan’s relation with China, as well as to keep up with the sustainability the East Asian economy.

The next TICAD is scheduled for May/June in 2013. Until then, Japan needs to further refine its position in the global ODA-structure as well as in the system of bi- and trilateral relations with African states. Taking into account Du Bois’ idea, that “the connection between Asia and Africa has always been close. [...] for a thousand years Asia and Africa strove together, renewing their spirits and mutually fertilizing their cultures from time to time [...]” (Du Bois, 1965: 176, 200), together with the strategic thinking and the continuously disciplined nature of Japan in global politics, there is a lot to expect from the next phases of co-operation, which – in case it is handled well enough – will bring benefits for Africa’s development in the long run.

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## REACHING OUT TO THE SOUTH: NEW DYNAMISM IN BRAZIL-AFRICA RELATIONS

The 6th of September 2011 Kenya Airways made public the contract between one of Africa's most dynamically growing airlines and Embraer for the delivery of ten aircraft. Titus Naikuni, CEO of the Kenyan airline, stated that the decision to order from the Brazilian company was taken after comparing the fuel consumption and maintenance costs of the three main airplane producers, Boeing, Airbus and Embraer.

This latest success of a Brazilian company over huge American and European rivals illustrates vividly the dynamic changes that transmute the global economy and diversify global commerce. The traditional North to South model is being questioned by the emerging countries, most notably by China, Russia, India and Brazil. Africa has become the main playing field in South to South experiments, with China making most of the headlines, drawing praise from some countries, criticism from others and envy from all. Brazil, on the other hand, has managed to enter Africa from "behind the curtains", mainly through the African countries that inherited the same colonial language, the Portuguese. Brazil's low-profile penetration has been going on relatively unnoticed, but not without results. According to the Financial Times, Brazilian commerce levels have reached US\$25 billion in 2010 and there are now 500 Brazilian companies in operation in the continent (compared to 13 in 1995).<sup>1</sup>

Brazil-Africa relations have a history of almost 500 years, starting from the 16<sup>th</sup> century slave trade that over the centuries turned the South American giant into the country with the second largest black population in the world.<sup>2</sup> This paper, nonetheless, will analyze Brazil-Africa relations starting from the 1960s, decade in which Brazil launched its *Independent Foreign Policy* (PEI - Política Externa Independente) and established bilateral relations with African nations, laying down the foundation for the unprecedented economic and political thrust displayed in the last couple of years.

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<sup>1</sup> "Brazil's economic ties with Africa continue to flourish." *The Citizen*. <http://thecitizen.co.tz/editorial-analysis/20-analysis-opinions/11855-brazils-economic-ties-with-africa-continue-to-flourish.html>. 13 June 2011. Accessed on 25 September 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Currently 76 million Brazilians admit having African ancestry in their bloodline. Nonetheless, this number could be even higher as many Brazilians do not publicly admit miscegenation in their lineage. BESENYŐ, János. "Növekvő brazil érdeklődés Afrikában" Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Hungary. Budapest, 2010. [http://www.regiment.hu/hirek/kulfoldi\\_hirek/novekvo\\_brazil\\_erdeklodes\\_afrikaban](http://www.regiment.hu/hirek/kulfoldi_hirek/novekvo_brazil_erdeklodes_afrikaban). Accessed on 25 September 2011.



"Brazil would not be what it is today without the participation of millions of Africans who helped build our country."<sup>3</sup> Phrases like these from outgoing president Luiz Inácio „Lula” da Silva are responsible for turning him into one of the most popular leaders in Brazilian history. The prioritization of African affairs under Lula has its roots in Brazil’s “moral and ethical obligations towards Africa.”<sup>4</sup> Since the first slave ship arrived at the coasts of the Portuguese colony in 1538 to the emancipation of slaves in 1888, Brazil imported a vast number of black Africans. More than one-third of all Africans destined to work on plantations or in mines of the New World (around 3 million people) were sold on the slave markets of Brazil. These slaves made Brazil a sugar and gold powerhouse for centuries, fueling a monoculture based, feudalist structure of society and giving birth to the system of *fazendas* and *casa grandes*<sup>5</sup>, so well depicted in Gilberto Freyre’s monumental work, *Casa-Grande e senzala*.

At the dawn of independence from Portugal in 1822, there were vague plans to create a Brazilian-Angolan Empire that was quickly vetoed by the British.<sup>6</sup> The “race for Africa” spurred by the Anglo-French rivalry in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century consigned the bystander status to the peripheries as the black continent was divided up among the European powers. The turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw the American continent relatively quiet under the *Pax Americana*, being increasingly dominated by the rising superpower, the United States of America. The World Wars shook Brazil’s multiethnic society, with a large German and Japanese population, and resulted in Brazil’s declaration of war on the Axis Powers in 1942. After the war, Brazil wavered between democratic and military governments, with its foreign policy strongly tied to that of the US and Portugal. As a result, the South American nation did not oppose the decolonization process in Africa, in large part due to Salazar’s attempts to gain supporters for Portugal’s belated imperialistic dreams, but also in part due to strategic considerations, viewing Dakar as an important hub for aerial and naval communication with NATO.

### ***The PEI: my way is the right way***

The short, but turbulent presidency of Jânio da Silva Quadros is the turning point in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation. The Cuban Revolution had

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<sup>3</sup> Speech of President Lula at the summit of the West African regional grouping ECOWAS in Santa Maria, Cape Verde in July 2010. “Brazil's Lula pays tribute to Africa's historic role.” BBC. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10500100>. 4 July 2010. Accessed on 25 September 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Jânio da Silva Quadros, President of Brazil from January to August 1961, founder of Brazil’s its Independent Foreign Policy (PEI - Política Externa Independente).

<sup>5</sup> Large estates, mainly coffee plantations that spread into the interior of Brazil.

<sup>6</sup> VISENTINI, Paulo Fagundes. *Prestige diplomacy, southern solidarity or „soft imperialism”?* Lula’s Brazil-Africa relations (2003 onwards). Seminar, 16 April 2009. African Studies Centre, Leiden, Holland. p. 2.

its repercussions felt in Latin America as well. The loyal NATO-ally starts looking behind the Iron Curtain in an attempt to diversify its foreign relations. Quadros introduces the PEI (Política Externa Independente), Brazil's first Independent Foreign Policy, in an attempt to loosen the dependence on the US and to take advantage of a diversified foreign policy portfolio at the height of the Cold War. In spite of voracious internal criticism from anti-communist forces, Brazil reopens its embassy in Moscow in 1961 and establishes diplomatic relations with four Socialist countries (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania) in the same year.<sup>7</sup> Technical, scientific and educational cooperation agreements are signed – including the Studies Program for Undergraduate Students (PEC) -, and students and experts from Socialist countries are awarded scholarships to study in Brazil. João Goulart (1961-1964) continues his predecessor's politics and Brazil – for the first time in the history – positions itself on the contrary of its former fatherland, Portugal, by supporting the nationalist movements in Portugal's waning African empire. However, the euphoria of national liberation and pro-Socialist movements comes to an abrupt halt with the coup d'état of the military in 1964.

### ***1964-1985: Military government in Brazil and involvement in Africa***

The twenty-year long military government of the country reverts the Brazilian foreign policy back to the pro-American, anti-Communist standpoint. The African continent is once again forgotten, with the exception of Angola, where Brazil has direct economic interests. Petrobras, Brazil's state oil company has been involved in off-shore drilling along the Angolan coast when Portugal suddenly abandons the territory, plunging it into a civil war between the US-financed UNITA and the Soviet-backed MPLA. Brazil is the first to recognize the MPLA as the legitimate representative of the Angolan people. According to Pimentel, Brazil's decision to side with the MPLA is based on a "thorough diagnosis... ..that only the MPLA is "capacitated to maintain the integrity of Angola's territory."<sup>8</sup>

General Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) introduces the politics of *Responsible Pragmatism*, marked not only by a third world distance and condemnation of the apartheid regimes, but by a careful balance between the two superpowers in an attempt to safeguard Brazilian interests on the continent.

The *South Atlantic Treaty Organization* (SATO) is an ambitious vision to create a common defense mechanism of the South Atlantic region, based on the pattern of the NATO. However, this would imply certain levels of cooperation

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<sup>7</sup> SZILÁGYI, Ágnes Judit. *Magyarország és a független külpolitikai törekvéseket övező vita Braziliában az 1950-es és 1960-as évek fordulóján*. In: "Metszéspontok. Tanulmányok a portugál és a brazil történelemről." SZTE Történettudományi Doktori Iskola. Szeged, 2009. p. 179.

<sup>8</sup> SÁ PIMENTEL, José Vicente de. "Relações entre o Brasil e a África subsaariana." In: *Rev. Bras. Polít. Int.* 2000: p. 13. Issue No. 43. (May)

with the Portuguese colonialist regime and South Africa's racist one. During the Medici government, although in political terms the most repressive one of all the military regimes, Brazil becomes the country of the *Economic Miracle*. With its income concentration and fast industrial growth, the country is in need of markets and raw materials, mainly oil. Brazil, on the other hand, serves as a model for many African states: a former European colony that inherited a backward, monoculture economy and has been able to take advantage of the *tropical technology* to generate progress. It is also in Brazil's interest to gain African diplomatic support for the legitimizing of the expansion of its Territorial Sea limits to 200 hundred miles. At the same time, the SATO project comes to a dead end.<sup>9</sup>

### ***1973: Oil means Africa***

The oil crisis of 1973 is a milestone in Brazilian-African relations. The increase of the price of Gulf oil means that Brazil has to look for new providers. Africa seems to be the ideal choice for several reasons: (1) geographically it is situated closer to South America than the Persian Gulf countries; and (2) the suppliers are not all members of OPEC, thus they are less likely to raise prices in a coordinated manner. In the light of Africa's rediscovery, President Figueiredo officially visits the Africa, being the first Brazilian President to do so. On his roundtrip the President signs accords with Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Cape Verde and Algeria. In Angola Brazil has been present since the onset of its independence, partly for being conscious-stricken for having extracted such a large number of slaves from the region, and partly to help the off-shore exploratory drillings in the oil-rich soils of the waters off the coasts of the country.

### ***The South Atlantic gains momentum***

José Sarney (1985-1990) was the first president to look beyond the short-term economic gains and raise an institution based upon common cultural, historical and social values. His idea was manifested in the inception of the *International Institute of the Portuguese Language* (IIPL) in 1989, a forerunner to the *Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries* (CPSC) that was established in 1996. The IIPL's aim was to promote the lusophone culture and the Portuguese language, following the model of Portugal's Portuguese Cultural and Language Institute (ICALP). The IIPL was only institutionalized at the VI Council of Ministers of the CPSC in 1999 and has been serving since then as a center for the dissemination of the Portuguese language and culture. It remains to be seen in the future how the IIPL will "compete" with the Instituto Camões, Portugal's official language and culture institution, given that Portugal is a member in both initiatives.

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<sup>9</sup> VISENTINI, p. 3.

The Falklands War of 1982 shifted the focus from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic and revealed the military superiority of the Western countries over the proud, but ineffective Latin American forces. The humiliating defeat of Argentina led to the creation of the *South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone* (ZPCAS) in 1986. Countries from both sides of the South Atlantic met to discuss security issues and ocean frontiers. Two years later the first *South Atlantic Summit* was held in Rio de Janeiro, with the participation of nineteen African nations alongside the South American countries. Current topics in Africa were on the agenda as well: apartheid, a Peace Plan for Angola and mutual economic development.<sup>10</sup>

### *The 90s: the lost decade*

The end of the Cold War diverted attention away from Africa within Brazil's foreign policy. Intraregional integrations were favored (leading to the establishment of the *Mercosur* in 1991) and relations with the former Soviet bloc countries received more attention than Africa. The number of Brazilian diplomats on the continent declined from 34 in 1989 to 24 in 1995. Itamar Franco (1992-1994) promoted the revival of the forgotten ZPCAS and CPSC, but it was not until the *UN peacekeeping mission in Angola* that Brazil actively engaged itself in Africa. Brazilian Brigadier General Péricles Ferreira Gomes headed UNAVEM I (1988-1991), the first of the three UN Angola Verification Missions, that was deployed in the country to supervise the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

The 90s, although not a very active decade on the political and diplomatic front, inseminated Brazilian culture in the everyday lives of many African families, through the increasingly popular *soap operas* and *Pentecostal Churches*.<sup>11</sup>

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) visited Angola and the post-apartheid South Africa to reassure both countries that Brazil was willing to offer advice and help in the process of reconstruction. *UNAVEM III* already featured 739 troops, 20 military observers and 14 civilian police from Brazil, the largest contingent of all contributors to the peacekeeping mission.<sup>12</sup>

Cardoso was pioneer in arguing that neo-liberal economic principles favor more the developed North than the underdeveloped South and, in what he called the *asymmetric globalization*, Cardoso initiated greater convergence in world diplomatic affairs and in multilateral forums. Celso Lafer, professor and ex-

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>11</sup> There are over 300 temples from the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus in South Africa, and this trend is even stronger in the PALOP countries (Portuguese-Speaking African Countries). Ibid., p.4.

<sup>12</sup> UNAVEM III facts and figures as of 30 June 1997. UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION. [http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem\\_f.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem_f.htm) Accessed on 25 September 2011.

Minister of foreign affairs, credits Cardoso with many of the achievements that are now attributed to Lula, such as South American integration, multilateralism and the emphasis on the newly emerging economies (China, India, Russia and South Africa). One of the major achievements of the Cardoso government in African-Brazilian relations was the signing of a framework agreement to negotiate a *Free Trade Agreement between South Africa and MERCOSUR* during Nelson Mandela's trip to Brazil in December 2000. This was the first step towards an interregional cooperation that would unfold three years later in the world's first transcontinental dialogue forums among developing countries. Cardoso also maintained close relationship and signed several treaties with the *Portuguese-speaking African countries* (PALOP – Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe).<sup>13</sup> Cultural and security trends were emphasized in the transatlantic relations. Unfortunately, less desirable spin-offs of these ties also flourished, namely more active “cooperation” among drug and arms cartels, smuggling and money laundry networks.

#### ***New dynamism in Brazil's Africa-policy: Lula's 'axis of the South'*<sup>14</sup>**

It is undoubted that Luiz Inácio „Lula” da Silva's legacy will remain a preferred topic of research in academic circles for years to come. From his populist election campaign that made investors flee the country and almost plunged the country into a financial crisis to his unprecedented popularity that made some call for amending the Constitution so he could run for a third term, Lula has been a man of contradictions. Nevertheless, there are a few constant traits that helped the first Brazilian president from humble background turn Brazil into one of the leading middle powers of the world:

1. *Belief in the principles of solidarity*: domestic programs like Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) and affirmative action policies helped win the votes of large sections of the lower class population
2. *Self-confidence and high ambitions regarding the post-9/11 world*: “the time has come to bring into the arena players who will be able to put forward new ideas.”<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> MAAG, Isabelle. “Brazil's Foreign Economic Policy: South-South, North-South or both?” In: *Brazil's Foreign Economic Policy, FES Briefing Paper*. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Geneva, Switzerland. March 2005. p. 6-7.

<sup>14</sup> Robert Cox pessimistically declared in 1981: “A third and more remotely possible outcome would be the development of a counter hegemony based on a Third World coalition against core country dominance... and the termination of core-periphery relationship.” ALDEN, Chris and VIEIRA, Marco Antonio. “The New Diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and Trilateralism.” In: *Third World Quarterly* 2005, Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Vol. 26, Issue No. 7., p. 1090.

<sup>15</sup> Lula's speech on a trip to the Middle East in March 2010. SEABRA, Pedro. “Lula's legacy to the world: Brazil on track.” In: *Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*. Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS), Lisbon, Portugal. Spring/summer 2010. p. 57.

3. *Defender of Africa*: Brazil has become the preferred spokesman of the poor countries in multilateral forums like the WTO
4. *South-South partnerships*: Lula relentlessly advocated groupings of developing countries to counterbalance the weight of the developed countries in forums like the WTO and the UN

Africa played a pivotal role in Lula's foreign policy, significantly more attention was dedicated to the black continent than throughout the previous 180 years of Brazil's independence. Lula made eight trips and visited twenty-five nations during his two terms in office. Why did Brazil suddenly turn its eyes towards Africa and Asia and away from the much more lucrative markets of the North?

Lula has never been an ardent fan of the neo-liberal model and the New York terror attacks of 2001 strengthened his conviction that a world of injustices and inequalities cannot be overcome by *laissez-faire* economic principles. A former Union leader and sensitive to the plight of the working class, Lula was keen to transpose this image to the international scene by taking up the role of spokesman for the least developed countries (LDC), most of which are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa. As one of the largest agricultural producers of the world, Brazil has been trying to coordinate the policies of the suppliers, mostly developing countries, in the face of the protectionist measures of the North. Lula's aim has been to achieve "greater negotiation weight and more balanced relations with the great powers EU and USA."<sup>16</sup> The pace at which China and India have been growing has opened up new market opportunities for Brazil's agricultural surplus production, first of all for soy and corn.

At home, In order to pay off the immense foreign debt of his country, Brazil needed to *diversify its exports* and could not rely exclusively on the rich countries. Lula's policies also pleased the large number of Afro-Brazilian voters, who welcomed his opening toward the ancient fatherland, echoing the words of former President Jânio Quadros: "Brazil has a moral and ethic compromise with the African continent."<sup>17</sup> Lula's initiatives to train more diplomats of African origin to serve in Africa and the setting up of research centers at universities were clear signs that the new orientation of Itamaraty does not stop at the rhetoric level.<sup>18</sup> In 2008 the Brazilian government established the *African University* in the city of Redenção, the first to liberate the slaves in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Half the students will be Africans and the fields of specialization will be defined by the African countries.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Visentini, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> A research center was created for every major African country at several Brazilian universities. The Brazil-South Africa Studies Centre, for example, is headed by Professor Visentini at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

### *Multilateralisms, minilateralisms, new regionalisms*

An average Latin American nation belongs to eight agreements, but in the case of Brazil, this number is already exceeded by the number of agreements with Africa alone. At the inaugural lecture given at Rio Branco Institute in April 2003, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim made a balance of the first hundred days of government, what can be considered as the four strategic axis of international insertion of Brazil: (1) *South America*; (2) commitment with *multilateralism* in the construction of peace; (3) an *assertive commercial agenda* and (4) *diversified partnerships* with developed and under-developed countries.<sup>20</sup>

Shortly after taking office, Lula started implementing the third objective via what Visentini calls *more active and affirmative diplomacy*<sup>21</sup>, namely the joining hands of developing nations in the name of common interests and needs. The G-20 was created just days before the fifth ministerial World Trade Organization (WTO) conference of 2003 in Cancún, Mexico. Brazil assumed the role of preferential spokesperson against the protectionist policies and trade-distorting measures. G-20 members represent almost 60 % of world population and 70 % of rural population all over the world, thus their importance in agricultural production and trade is considerable.

The G-20 is a coalition of countries, which has been formed to address the concerns of its members that are also common to most developing countries relating to: the elimination of practices that distort agricultural trade and production; the search for substantial improvement in market access; and the rural development, food security and/or livelihood security needs.<sup>22</sup>

The G-20 did not achieve all the ambitious goals envisaged by its founders (besides Brazil, Argentina, China, India and South Africa), as the US maneuvered cleverly to offer bilateral agreements to member states, shrinking the G-20 to G-12 and then back to G-19.<sup>23</sup> To increase the potential of the G-20, Brazil needs to play a more active role in bringing as many nations under the roof as possible. At the invitation of the Ministerial Conference of the G-90

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<sup>20</sup> Inaugural Lecture given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Celso Amorim, at the Rio Branco Institute in Brasilia on the 10th of April 2003, titled „Diplomacy in the Lula Administration”. VISENTINI, Paulo Fagundes. “The G-3 and the G-20: Brazil and the new international coalitions.” <http://www6.ufrgs.br/nerint/folder/artigos/artigo62.pdf> Accessed on 22 September 2011., p. 9.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> Communiqué of the G-20 Ministerial Reunion, 12 December 2003. Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Being variable the numbers of participants, it started to be called “G-X” or “G-20 plus” by Chancellor Celso Amorim himself, who admitted, in an indirect form, that the United States was being efficient in their attempts to undermine the group.

group, Minister Amorim gave an energetic speech in Georgetown, Guyana on 3 June 2004.

I see the exchange of views between the G-90 and the G-20 as a key element for the success of the Doha Round...  
...Together, the G-90 and the G-20 constitute the bulk of WTO membership. We also share a commonality of interests centered in translating the Doha Development Agenda into reality...  
...But unless we are capable of deploying a broad-based coalition of developing countries, the attainment of the Round's development objectives will be hindered by interest groups in developed countries...  
...The G-90 members stand to gain from the liberalization of agricultural markets and from the elimination of distortions that plague it. But in order to get there, we need the participation of all WTO stakeholders to support our fight. I certainly count on you!<sup>24</sup>

Brazil, in concordance with the last of its foreign policy objectives, is keen on promoting South-South trade among the members of the G-20. The Third Round of Negotiations in the sphere of the *Global System of Trade Preferences* (GSTP) among developing countries took place within this context during UNCTAD XI in São Paulo in June 2004. The GSTP is a multilateral trading system which was established in 1988 as a framework for the exchange of trade preferences in order to promote intra-developing-country trade. The basic idea was that member countries make concessions – on a unilateral basis – that they do not have to extend to developed countries. Negotiations are dealing only with non-agricultural goods as to avoid sensitive issues and to protect smaller nations from agricultural giants like Brazil and India. The idea conceived by President Lula concerning a possible free trade area among G-20 members was also recalled, but was rejected. There are currently 44 participants – among them several African nations – and approximately 900 products are covered by the tariff schedules of the participants.

Multilateralism is an effective tool for pressuring more powerful, but less numerous states. Nevertheless, it has its setbacks, as the higher the number of participants, the lower the likelihood of the “common interests” factor. Also, coordination and leadership pose a challenge to groups like the G-20 and G-90. Brazil, still a novice in world diplomacy, is not yet ready to exercise an leading role in international diplomacy when faced with traditional powers like the EU and the USA.

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<sup>24</sup> Statement by Minister Celso Amorim to the G-90 Ministerial Meeting. Georgetown, June 3rd and 4th 2004. Ibid., p. 11.



### *The IBSA Dialogue Forum or the G-3*

Recognizing the wisdom of not putting all its eggs in one basket, Brazil also pushed for the development of the *IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) Dialogue Forum*, an alternative to its growing alliance platforms. The way for the three-party “dialogue forum” was paved by Nelson Mandela’s visit to Brazil in 2000 and the signing of a framework agreement on a Free Trade Agreement. The idea of creating a unique, South-South, interregional cooperation forum was promoted by Alec Erwin, Minister of Trade and Industry of South Africa. The concept suits well with South Africa’s *butterfly strategy* of diversifying trade with South America and Asia (the wings), while focusing on the African continent (the body). South African fears of being “isolated in a globalized world, in which the abyss between developed and less developed countries is ever growing”<sup>25</sup> was the main motivation for bringing in the two giants into the trilateral agreement. As Danglin points it out, IBSA differs from all previous alliances because (1) it has no members from the “North”, and (2) it functions on a democratic platform.<sup>26</sup>

IBSA (or as often called within UN-circles, the G-3) was formally announced in September 2003 at the 58. UN General Assembly by the respective leaders of the three countries: Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. The goal of IBSA is to unite their voices in the UN, IMF and most importantly in the WTO negotiations. China was left out of the group due its hegemonic ambitions on world trade and state-controlled political structure. Danglin refers to IBSA as *minilateralism*, limiting the number of members to a mere minimum in order to achieve the highest diplomatic and economic efficiency. In addition, the members deepen the bilateral relations with each other, trying to avoid areas which might arouse suspicion or competition. Another important element of this formation is the fact that all three members are vying for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council. The fact that they are located on three different continents does not render them competitors, but actually strengthens their bargaining power when it comes to designate the regional representative for the (to-be-reformed) Security Council. By joining hands in the IBSA, Brazil and India have unofficially given their support to the candidacy of South Africa to represent Africa over Nigeria or Egypt, the two other major pretenders to be included in the “the «Holy Grail» for whomever seeks international status.”<sup>27</sup> Inversely, South Africa and Brazil are likely to vote for India over Pakistan to

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<sup>25</sup> Speech given by Alec Erwin at the Metal and Engineering Industries Bargaining Council on 8 November 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa. DANGLIN, Francois. “Dél-Dél kapcsolatok: három kontinensen átívelő diplomácia.” *Le Monde Diplomatique*. <http://www.magyardiplo.hu/kezdlap/499-del-del-kapcsolatok-harom-kontinensen-ativel-diplomacia> September 2011. Accessed on 27 September 2011. p.1.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> SEABRA, p. 55.

represent the Indian subcontinent, while Brazil's selection to take the seat for Latin America is not likely to be challenged by Mexico.

IBSA is not merely a political formation, it has set up active *working groups* in fields as diverse as biofuels, education, customs administration, nanotechnology and retroviral diseases (AIDS, malaria, etc.). Forums consisting of women, business representatives, members of Parliament, cultural actors were also launched to achieve synergies in common areas of concern. IBSA also created a humanitarian fund – to be managed by the UN Development Program (UNDP) – that would provide emergency assistance to crisis regions (Haiti, Laos, Burundi, Cape Verde, Bissau-Guinea, etc.). On the economic aspect of the cooperation, the target figure of USD 10 billion in intra-IBSA trade was reached in 2008, representing an astounding 156% growth in seven years. The Defence Ministries of Brazil and South Africa agreed on the development of the new generation of air-to-air missiles and in 2008 the navies of the two countries performed a joint maritime exercise at the coasts of the African nation.<sup>28</sup> It is, thus, no wonder why István Tarrósy calls the IBSA “one of the most exciting cooperation networks among the «new regionalisms» of today.”<sup>29</sup>

### ***The Africa Summits, the BRIC(S) and the BASIC***

The busy year of 2003 also witnessed the *Brazil-Africa Summit* in Fortaleza, where food security issues were discussed in addition to current political topics. The *I Africa-South America Summit* (ASA) in 2006 was a milestone in Brazil's relations with West Africa, especially with the *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS). The *Abuja Declaration* recognized the need to intensify cooperation within the group as an alternative pressure force face the unequal new international economic (dis)order. The Declaration led to the creation of research centers on both continents, aiding the dissemination of information and knowledge about both Brazil and Africa to the local population. Seminars are being held at schools and higher education institutions to raise awareness of common historical challenges and achievements. The Summit also created an executive organ, the *ASACOF*, whose activities will be coordinated by Nigeria, on the African side, and Brazil, on the South American side.

First identified in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs report, the *BRIC* (Brazil, Russia, India and China) group would quickly arouse the interest and focus of its peers, for the alleged geo-strategic potential. The overwhelming numbers of their economic force combined – for the past decade, the four countries contributed over a third (!) of the world's GDP growth – have understandably

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<sup>28</sup> DANGLIN, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> TARRÓSY, István. “A globális nemzetközi rendszer «új fizikája» - II. rész.” *Le Monde Diplomatique*. <http://www.magyardiplo.hu/archivum/2011-augusztus/512-a-globalis-nemzetkoezi-rendszer-uj-fizikaja-ii-resz> July-August 2011. Accessed on 21 September 2011. p.5.

brought their activities under a new light, with the world looking upon this gathering with some curiosity and apprehension. At their latest summit in Brasília on 16 April 2010 South Africa was admitted as full member, giving birth to the new acronym *BRICS*.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, BRICS is not as brick-solid as imagined, with the sheer size of the Chinese economy altering Brazil's, in ways both salutary and worrisome. China's insatiable hunger for soy has created the new El Dorado in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, with soy plantation springing up like mushrooms (at the expense of the Amazon rainforest).<sup>31</sup> At the same time, Vale dos Sinos, the center of Brazil's footwear industry is dying, being crushed by cheap Chinese shoes and by increasing leather prices due to the increased demand, spurred by the Asian giant once again.

The latest association of Brazil, South Africa, India and China is the so-called *BASIC*, created in April 2010 with the aim of uniting their voices ahead of the Copenhagen Climate Summit. It plays an active role in negotiations with the US and EU and blames the developed countries for most of the greenhouse gas emissions.

### ***Back to the roots: Brazil's lead over EU, China and India***

The new dynamics of the Brazil-Africa relations can be traced back to the following factors:

- (1) The last two governments' desire to *diversify the export markets* in order to minimize risk from single-source buyers and to raise export revenues in Asia, Africa and Latin-America
- (2) The *failure of external aid policy* has created a need for rethinking development assistance: economic activity is looked upon as beneficial for both sides, given that is conducted under fair trade terms
- (3) *Join the race*: the dynamics of other emerging countries in Africa (most notably China and India) have attracted the attention of Brazil to business opportunities on the African continent
- (4) *Historical, cultural, ethnic ties*: Brazil, having the second largest black population in the world, is the most "African" country outside of Africa. It shares not only the racial make-up of many African countries, but a common language as well with five countries and 80 million people on the continent

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<sup>30</sup> SEABRA, p. 8.

<sup>31</sup> Mato Grosso state has especially benefited from China's soy demand, with its own exports multiplying 27 times by tonne from 2000 to 2009, according to industry group Aprosoja. LÓPEZ, Luciana. "Special report: BRIC breaking: Brazil's China syndrome." *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/24/us-brazil-economy-china-idUSTRE68N1YB20100924>. 24 September 2010. Accessed on 25 September 2011.

Brazil, in addition, starts from a more favorable position than most competitors when dealing with Africa.

- (1) Brazil does not have to overcome the *legacy of colonialism* that still haunts many European countries and provokes distrust and suspicion from the local population
- (2) Brazil shares *linguistic, racial and historical ties* with several African countries (i.e. Angola, Mozambique, Bissau-Guinea, etc.)
- (3) Brazil's post-independence development from a monoculture, raw material exporter country to an industrialized, semi-developed nation can serve as a *model* for many African nations
- (4) Brazilian products are perceived to be *superior in quality* to Chinese and Indian products
- (5) Brazilian business ethics is *less aggressive* and makes use of the local workforce as opposed to Chinese companies, which employ Chinese workers for even the simplest manual labor
- (6) Brazil projects the *image of solidarity* with the nations concerned (debt repayment allowances, technical and scientific cooperation for training of the local workforce, humanitarian relief and assistance in democratic transformation)
- (7) Brazilian *soap operas* have become everyday scenes in the lives of African families, transmitting aspects of Brazilian cultural, social values to all levels of society<sup>32</sup>

### ***Africa in numbers: Brazil's trade figures with the Sub-Saharan region***


As mentioned earlier, there are currently more than 500 Brazilian companies active on the continent (compared to 13 in 1995). The value of total trade between Brazil and Africa has increased by 30 % from 2007 to the end of 2008. In 2008 total trade with Africa was approximately US\$ 26 billion. The graph below illustrates the dynamic evolution of trade between Brazil and Africa from 1997 to 2008.

It is important to highlight the fact that a large part of the imports and exports are made up of crude oil imported from Angola to be refined in Petrobras refineries, which is then sent back to Africa. All the same, trade with Africa has skyrocketed in the last decade and cannot be dismissed as a negligible factor anymore in Brazil's trade balance, especially when we compare it with the modest US\$ 130 million in 1975.

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<sup>32</sup> Brazil has just launched an international TV station broadcasting to 49 African nations. "Brazil launches international TV station for Africa." *BBC*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10152301>. 25 May 2010. Accessed on 25 September 2011.


**Figure 1: Brazil's trade with Africa; US \$ billion**



Source: World Trade Atlas

A more exciting statistic is the change in the composition of Brazil's trading partners on the continent. While South Africa represented 90 % of all trade until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it has been relegated to fourth place, having been overtaken by Nigeria, Algeria and Angola.

**Figure 6: % Total trade of Brazil's top African trading partners**



Source: World Trade Atlas

The top 10 products Brazil imports from Africa represent 95 % of total African imports for Brazil. The top import products from Africa in 2008 were mineral products (86 %); chemical products (7 %); base metals (0.7 %) and food, beverage and tobacco (0.6 %). These products signify 95 % of African exports to Brazil. Brazil's exports are composed mainly of (1) commodities

(soybeans, sugar, tobacco and meat); and of (2) industrial items (civil aircraft, vehicles and parts, steel, chemicals and footwear).<sup>33</sup>

### ***South Africa: from pariah to good friend***

Although Brazil sharply criticized the apartheid government in international forums, trade with South Africa was the only considerable commercial connection between the Latin American nation and the black continent up until the 1970s. The end of segregation meant a new, more open form of trade activity that resulted in a drastic increase in exports and imports. The first framework agreement of 2000 led to the creation of the IBSA and preferential trade terms, with the ultimate goal of reaching a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries (and consequently with their adjoining customs unions, the MERCOSUR and SACU<sup>34</sup>). Most of Brazil's exports to South Africa are industrial goods (vehicles and machinery), while imports are mainly minerals (gold, platinum, chromium, coal).

Besides the economic links, Brazil and South Africa have similarities in other aspects as well: both of them are young democracies with multiracial populations and a bulging economy that has made them *regional powerhouses*, but at the same time created large *inequalities* in the distribution of wealth. In addition, both of them need to tackle problems of *criminality*, drug trafficking and rapid urbanization. IBSA seems to be an adequate platform for finding common solutions to common challenges.

### ***Relations with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPSC)***

#### **Angola: Brazil's African brothers**

Angola is the African nation that is closest to Brazil, both geographically and historically. Large part of Brazil's population can trace back descendance to tribes that once populated Angola. Both territories were colonized for over 300 years by the Portuguese, leaving as a heritage the Portuguese language. In 1975, Brazil was the first to recognize the MPLA government and sent a large contingent of peace keepers to the African country to supervise the armistice in the 90s. SENAI, Brazil's technical training institute, installed a *Mobile Center of Professional Training* with the goal of training locals in the fields of engineering, construction and other technical professions.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> "The African Trading Relationship with Brazil." Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC), 2009.

<sup>34</sup> The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest still existing customs union in the world, established in 1910.

<sup>35</sup> SÁ PIMENTEL, p. 14.

Brazil's *BNDES* (*National Economic and Social Development Bank*) extends generous credit lines to Brazilian and African companies that buy Brazilian equipment for infrastructure and development enterprises in the country. Just to mention the US\$ 50 million projects in Angola: Odebrecht is building the Capanda Hydroelectric Plant, Petrobras is doing off-shore drilling and Costa Negócios e Tecnologia and Volvo Brazil are selling their products with profitable margins. To have a better idea of the major growth in the commercial partnership with Angola it is important to understand the fact that, in 2003, the flow of Brazilian exports to the country was of mere US\$ 235 millions, whereas in 2008 that flow has been elevated to US\$ 1.9 billions – even exceeding the amount of exports to South Africa and to Nigeria!<sup>36</sup>

In the scientific and educational fields, Brazil and China announced in November 2007 that they would distribute free for all the African continent images from the Sino-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS). The images would capacitate the African governments in monitoring natural disasters, deforestations, drought, desertification, etc. The Studies Program for Undergraduate Students (PEC) was also extended to more students from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

### **Mozambique: from civil war to civil coal**

Mozambique is one of Africa's poorest countries plagued by a long-lasting civil war after breaking away from Portugal in 1975. Brazil's "soft imperialism", in the words of Visentini, seems to be a more desirable alternative to Portugal's hard imperialism. Vale do Rio Doce, the world's second-largest mining company, has won a bid to exploit the coal complex of Moatize, located in Northern Mozambique. The US\$ 1.3 billion coal mining project is expected to produce 11 million tones of coal a year, to be exported to Brazil, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In total, the project is expected to generate 8.5 million tons of metallurgical coal, which is used for the production of steel. It will also produce 2.5 million tons of thermal coal, which is used for electricity generation, every year. To accomplish such a project, Vale will also count with the works of other 20 Brazilian companies, enlarging the dimension of the project for bilateral relations.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, an agreement between Petrobras and Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) of Mozambique envisions *research and production of biofuels*, in line with the Brazilian government's promotion of the "revolution of biofuels".

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<sup>36</sup> VISENTINI. *Prestige diplomacy, southern solidarity or „soft imperialism“? Lula's Brazil-Africa relations (2003 onwards)*, p. 9.

<sup>37</sup> VISENTINI. *Prestige diplomacy, southern solidarity or „soft imperialism“? Lula's Brazil-Africa relations (2003 onwards)*. p. 8.

## **Bissau-Guinea: a guinea pig of CPSC cooperation**

Bissau-Guinea has been performing the role of guinea pig for CPSC strategic coordination, with constant challenges that need to be tackled through the CPSC framework. In 1998, the end of hostilities between the conflicting parties was overviewed by ECOWAS and CPSC, with considerable success, according to the Secretary General of the UN and the US and French governments. An unsuccessful attempt was the delivery of Brazilian electric urns for the elections of 2007 in Bissau-Guinea, which faltered on renewed clashes and the postponement of the voting.

CPSC cooperation, nevertheless, has had its brighter moments. Through its International Institute of the Portuguese Language (IIPL), a common *Orthographic Accord of the Portuguese language* was developed. A *trust fund* was established to finance specific projects in the area of education and professional formation. In the latest Meeting of the Heads of States in Luanda, Angola in 2010, the interest for accession to the CPSC was so great, that the president of Equatorial Guinea even offered to amend the Constitution and make Portuguese official language of his country in order to fulfill the requirements of accession. His request was taken into consideration in the Luanda Declaration and will be dealt with in the next Meeting of the Heads of States in 2012. Morocco, Ukraine and Swaziland also applied for the associate observer status.<sup>38</sup> The CPSC is another great opportunity for Brazil to gain supporters in the campaign for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council. President Pedro Pires of Cape Verde paid homage to Lula during their meeting in Santa Maria in July 2010.

Brazil is a country that is respected and listened to, and its president is a great defender of Africa's interests. It should have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.<sup>39</sup>

There are hundreds of other places in Africa where Brazilian companies have been expanding their activities, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Libya and Tanzania, but the major partners are the ones listed above. Nigeria, Brazil's largest trading partner, was not mentioned separately, due to the fact that almost all the trade flow is composed of oil exports towards Brazil. Brazilian exports to Nigeria are minimal.

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<sup>38</sup> *Declaração de Luanda*. VIII Conferência de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Comunidade dos países de língua portuguesa. <http://www.cplp.org/id-2267.aspx?Purge=True> 23 July 2010. Accessed on 25 September 2011. p. 6.

<sup>39</sup> "Brazil's Lula pays tribute to Africa's historic role." *BBC*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10500100>. 4 July 2010. Accessed on 25 September 2011.



### ***The “Africa Cost”: is it worth investing in Africa?***

From a political point of view, Lula’s *New Foreign Economic Policy* achieved its goals of diverting attention away from the traditional markets (i.e. EU and the US) and focused on the South-South partnerships. Huge amounts of energy, monetary and human resources were invested in opening up a relatively closed continent. Pimentel calls the extra cost of doing business with Africa, the “Africa Cost” (*custo África*). This entails the lack of physical, legal and financial infrastructure, security concerns and precarious health conditions, corruption and the low productivity of the labor force.

Influential Brazilian business leaders talk of “prestige diplomacy in a continent without future” and would prefer “less ideology and more strategy.”<sup>40</sup> Celso Lafer calls the creation of an image of a radical new beginning in foreign policy “*política-espetáculo*”, a show by President Lula to divert attention away from domestic issues by issuing a flamboyant foreign policy that has nothing to do with reality. There are no studies or statistics showing numerically the foregone trade with traditional partners that resulted from the rechanneling of resources to the edification of South-South commerce, but Brazil’s representative on agriculture at the FTAA may have been right when stating:

Trade policy should be aligned with countries in which generating trade is possible. It is good to intensify trade with India and China, but they do not replace the US and EU markets.<sup>41</sup>

According to experts, North-South agreements score better on implementation than South-South agreements. This is because North-South agreements can integrate economies with distinct technological capabilities and other different factor proportions and therefore the potential gains are usually greater. Lula’s obsession with partnership-building has led to a “spaghetti bowl” of overlapping arrangements (i.e. G-20, IBSA, BRICS, BASIC) with little transparency and coherence. Alden believes that Brazil suffers from “paradigmatic resilience”, foreign policy paradigms that were defined and first implemented in the past are still influencing the mindset and world view of Brazilian decision makers.

### ***Will Brazil’s new dynamism pay off?***

Yes, it will. But the question is for whom and when. Brazil is expecting to see high returns on the massive initial investments. Lula’s strategy, luckily, has not been focusing on short-term gains, but on long-term, mutual benefits that

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<sup>40</sup> “Empresarios atacam política do governo.” *O Estado de Sao Paulo*. <http://estado.com.br/> 5 October 2004. Accessed on 25 September 2011.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

will help both sides of the Atlantic create long-lasting partnerships. In contrast to China, Brazil is not afraid to stay in Africa. It has prepared the way carefully, paying attention to local conditions and offering assistance and employment opportunities to locals. Therefore, Brazil is unlikely to be perceived as the new neocolonialist peril threatening the existence of African states.<sup>42</sup> For Africa, Brazil's Southern solidarity seems to be the least damaging approaches from a foreign nation for a long time. Compared with the European exploitative colonialism and China's grab-all strategy, Brazil finally seems to have found the golden middle way.

The question remains: will Brazil's new leaders follow in Lula's footsteps or will they turn away from Africa after Brazil enters the elite league of developed nations? On his last trip to Africa, President Lula warned Brazil's next leaders: "Whoever comes after me has the moral, political and ethical obligation to do much more."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> In addition to bringing business opportunities to Africa, Brazil has become one of the largest donors of development aid to the continent, on par with Sweden and Canada, two traditional donor countries.

<sup>43</sup> "Brazil's Lula pays tribute to Africa's historic role." *BBC*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10500100>. 4 July 2010. Accessed on 25 September 2011.

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## ABOUT ECOLOGICAL MIGRATION

### *About climate change*

Global climate change (or as it is often called in the press ‘global warming’) and its causes and consequences have found their way to the focus of natural sciences, and a little later to the forefront of social sciences. Analysing the effects of climate change is a very complex challenge, and the results of the different disciplines can only be interpreted and evaluated together, understanding their interaction. Therefore it is no wonder that the term swiftly entered the vocabulary of the popular-scientific literature and then (in a little different context) that of politics also. The emission of greenhouse gases (mostly carbon-dioxide) is expected to add 2-3 degrees Celsius to the global average temperature, while extreme weather anomalies appear more often all over the world. Permanent droughts, desertification, frosts and violent rainfalls have a devastating effect, and trigger serious environmental, economic and social changes. Arctic ice caps may melt; glaciers continue to retreat at a terrible pace; the hydrological cycle changes, sea levels rise, water scarcity occurs and floods make it harder for large populations to live near the sea. The theory of ‘sustainable development’ – in the 1980s – provided the actors of politics and economy with an adequate explanation to why continuous economic growth necessarily brings about pollution.

We have to observe that the paradigm shift in ecology – the reappraisal of social cohabitation and the relationship of humans and their environment (ecologism) – is a very slow process. A turn for the better came when the concept of ‘sustainable development’ (or as actors of the economic sphere usually find it acceptable: sustainability) gained wide usage. This also led the political decision-makers to accept the need for change and responsible thinking. Although ‘protection of the environment’, ‘reduction of environmental damage’ and ‘support of environment-friendly technologies’ have found their way to political rhetoric, decision-makers tried to deny or lessen the importance of the existence of climate change (and the human responsibility for its causes). Former American president George W. Bush and former Russian president Vladimir Putin have both been quoted numerous times denying the existence of the phenomenon. Naturally, major companies of the oil and chemical industry worked to enlarge uncertainty, and tried to block research and deny the role of anthropogenic factors till the end of the nineties. (Flannery, 2006)

### *Climate change talks*

The countries participating at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the 'Earth Summit', held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992) produced and later ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change. This document set limits on greenhouse gas emissions, although without deadlines, obligations or quotas. Details were worked out at the Conferences of the Parties (COP). Another important step was the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, that set specific target numbers and deadlines. Yet, the document echoed the antagonisms in the international community (especially the economic and political disputes among Western and Eastern powers). It also faced vigorous protests from global NGOs, since the target average reduction of greenhouse gas emission was only 5.2 %. Countries with large numbers of emission, the United States and Australia indicated that they were not going to ratify the treaty, until China and India were also going to get their exact emission limits. The reaction of the Chinese delegation (leaders of the group of developing countries, the G77) was clear: developing economies and countries in transition could not be blamed for the present situation; therefore Western countries had to bear the costs of reducing the effects of climate change (Bíró, 2003: 34-38). The European Union, the flagship of the fight against climate change, tried to negotiate between the parties. Still however, its role is mainly symbolic, as it had to make serious compromises to 'work out' the Kyoto Protocol itself. The disputes are still not settled: views of the US and China have not really changed in the last one and a half decades, while climate change and pollution are not limited by state borders and the problem can only be understood in a global context, therefore its solution should be global as well.

Climate change has become a mainstream topic from 2006 on, not only because the number of extreme weather events multiplied, but also because the British government released the Stern Review. The report, written by Sir Nicholas Stern and his team, entered scientific circles as the economic model for the fight against climate change. It was the first giving a proper picture of the catastrophic effects, and trying to find answers by creating macroeconomic models and policy proposals. Among these, energy-efficiency, adaption and the reduction of effects and damages are featured. By emphasising the latter, Stern makes it clear: climate change cannot be stopped, only slowed down; but that requires a complete transformation of our lifestyles and ways of thinking. Many expect the report to 'popularise' the green cause and promote its importance. Still however, the radical political change that many expected, did not manifest. What is more, some currently popular solutions that have vast political support (e.g. biofuel, energy crops, wind power) only generate new problems and delay taking steps required for real solutions. (Móra, 2008: 130)

### *Decade of disasters*

As a consequence of climate change, the number of extreme weather events dynamically increases; storms, hurricanes, floods, droughts and frost make people's lives harder. Not only developing countries (struck by demographic boom and ecological-social problems), but Western powers also have to bear enormous damages caused by nature. Checking disasters only from the last decade is enough to see startling data. In 2000, the Indian state of Gujarat was shaken by a gigantic earthquake that left 20,000 dead and 500,000 without a home. The earthquakes of Central America (2001) and Afghanistan (2002) also claimed thousands of lives. In 2003, the earth moved in Iran, leaving 40,000 dead and more than 100,000 people without a roof. In the same year 30,000 people in France (50,000 also counting Italy and Spain) died directly (hyperthermia) or indirectly (heart diseases or cardiovascular diseases) because of heat waves. In 2004, Haiti and the Dominican Republic were struck by severe rainfalls, the Philippines by a typhoon and China had to fight with floods. After all these, the deadliest natural disaster of human history occurred. A tsunami swept through the coasts of Southeast Asia, sweeping coastal settlements and infrastructure in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India, also causing serious damage in the Maldives, Thailand, Burma (Myanmar) and also in Somalia, in East Africa. The region immediately got in the focus of world interest and hundreds of rescue teams, thousands of volunteers (doctors, engineers, and epidemiologists) flew to the site to take part in rescue efforts. However, media attention didn't last long, as in 2005 it went on to follow Hurricane Katrina and the Mississippi river destroying New Orleans and the area of the Gulf of Mexico; earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and India and then floods in the latter and China also. The earthquake and tsunami of Indonesia in 2006 could only get media attention for a few minutes, and the floods in Pakistan, India and Ethiopia became customary parts of the news. Hundreds died in the unusually severe storms of Central and South Asia in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan during the autumn of 2007, and numbers reaching thousands leaked from North-Korea also. Next year, the storms reaching Burma took 140,000 lives and in the earthquake occurring in the Chinese province of Sichuan (similar to the 1976 earthquake, taking 80,000 lives) 70,000 people died and 350,000 got injured, with 4,8 million people losing their homes, after the disaster happening on 21 July. The Chinese government initiated a reconstruction package worth 147 billion USD, unprecedented in the country's history. Hurricanes in Central America caused terrible damages for Haiti, El Salvador and Guatemala. The tragic trend of the decade continued in 2009, when Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan were struck by storms and earthquakes. The latter also occurred in Italy, in the region of Abruzzo 300 people died and the homes of 15,000 had been demolished.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/disaster.html>

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat (UNISDR), together with the World Bank and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and more than 100 other governmental and non-governmental organisations published its Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2009.<sup>2</sup> According to the assessment, in the period of 1975-2009 8900 natural disasters have been recorded all around the world and 23 (apocalyptic) catastrophes occurred that took more than 2 million lives each. Great tragedies only account for 0.4 percent of all disasters but cause almost 40 percent of the environmental and economic damages. It is worth seeing that more than 75 percent of the 23 tragedies happened in developing countries, and ‘only’ such Western catastrophes made it to the list as the earthquake of Naples in 1980 (damages est.: 47 billion USD), the Russian floods in 1991 (damages est.: 18 billion USD), the earthquakes devastating Kobe (1995) and Nigata (2004) (with damages of 121 and 28 billion USD) or Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that caused more than 131 billion dollars of damages.<sup>3</sup> The costs put enormous weights on national budgets; not just for developing countries, but for the developed also. Let’s take a minute to compare the countries of Japan and the Philippines – both endangered by cyclones and earthquakes. The average per capita GDP is 31,000 USD for Japan, the Human Development Index<sup>4</sup> (HDI) is 0.953, while these values are 5,100 and 0.771 for the Philippines. In case of a natural disaster, a Filipino has 17 times more chance to survive than a Japanese. Natural disasters have very different effects on different communities. In case of giant states (as Russia, China or India) catastrophes only affect a small part of the society directly, although environmental and economic damages, psychological harms, the feeling of defencelessness can paralyse the whole country, and delay developments for years, or even decades. Countries with a weaker social safety net, underdeveloped traffic and telecommunications infrastructure are naturally less able to solve the problems caused by extreme weather conditions.<sup>5</sup> The World Bank has provided 528 loan contracts (with an amount of 40 billion USD) for purposes of reconstruction since the 1980s. According to estimates, this is only 10 percent of all the cost related to damages caused by natural disasters. (For

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<sup>2</sup> Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, Risk and poverty in a changing climate, United Nations, 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Disasters in numbers, UNISDR; <http://www.unisdr.org/disaster-statistics/pdf/2005-disaster-in-numbers.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> A comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for countries, used since 1993.

<sup>5</sup> El Salvador was struck by an earthquake in 2001. The death toll of the catastrophe is 1200, 300,000 homes were destroyed and the total amount of damages exceed 1.6 billion dollars, 12 percent of the country’s GDP. However, the per capita GDP grew from 2000 to 2002, but it fell in the regions directly affected. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction, Risk and poverty in a changing climate, United Nations, 2009. 10.

comparison: in 2009 alone, 120 billion USD was spent on humanitarian causes.) This amount is merely a drop in the ocean, and according to what has been outlined above, it is unsustainable and useless. Research on the allocation of funds aimed at aid and development clearly show: it is not the amount of money, but the effectiveness of usage and allocation that should be raised.

According to the Munich Re global insurance company, natural disasters consume 13.4 percent of the GDP of developing countries, while this ratio is only 2.5 percent in Western countries.<sup>6</sup> According to the company's calculations for the third quarter of 2010, damages have amounted 50 billion USD only in that year. The sum is lower than the figures for 2008 and 2009, but the average for the last decade is still about 115 billion dollars. The costs of averting damages and financing reconstruction are higher than ever, which puts an enormous weight on the states affected by catastrophes. The effects of environmental degradation and further economic and social consequences are also hard to estimate. Peter Höpfe, a well-known expert of the field of assessing and managing environmental risks thinks, one of the reasons for international aid and development initiatives' failures is that natural disasters destroy the economic-social-political system of the supported countries, time to time. Funds targeted to development are then reallocated, while middle- and long-term strategies are wiped away by immediate rescue and damage-mitigation efforts. In a 2007 study Höpfe emphasises: there is a strong link between developing countries increasingly lagging behind and natural disasters. Developing countries – especially in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean region have financed their reconstruction costs from aids and loans for decades. At the same time, their debts are so high that they have become insolvent and can only acquire new loans if they agree to very strict terms. However, one of the main purposes of development aids would be taking catastrophe-prevention measures, since regional and/or national instabilities and flows of refugees caused by a natural disaster have a very serious impact on the donor country also.

Hopeless misery permanently destabilises the economies and political lives of the damaged communities, it slows efforts to prevent epidemics and infections, it is a driving force of migration and also clears path to extreme ideologies, including terrorism. (Szent-Iványi 2005: 28-45) Facts show that in the future it will be impossible to separately deal with development and climatic-ecological circumstances and trends. Such a policy should be worked out that knows and uses the constantly changing and developing knowledge base of ecopolitics, especially our knowledge on prevention and damage-mitigation of (human and natural) catastrophes.

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<sup>6</sup> [http://www.munichre.com/en/profile/focus/climate\\_change/archive/insurance\\_poorest\\_of\\_the\\_poor/default.aspx](http://www.munichre.com/en/profile/focus/climate_change/archive/insurance_poorest_of_the_poor/default.aspx)



### ***Demography and migration***

Because of urbanisation climate change, natural disasters and ecological changes increasingly affect both the urban communities and the rural population that has lost its lands and housing. The millions moving to the cities have to face great dangers of floods and earthquakes. Urbanisation gathers pace, because of population boom and economic concentration, and it causes serious problems in the developing world.

The population of the developing countries started to grow from the 1960s slowly, then from the 1970s very significantly together with the developments of healthcare and the pharmaceutical industry. Only 100 million people lived in Africa in 1900, while now the population exceeds one billion and is expected to reach 1.9 billion until 2050. (Szabó A., 2008: 41) Some countries of the Sub-Saharan region produce a 4 percent growth of population, and the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda are soon joining the '100 million club'. There is no such economic performance that could keep pace with this. Satisfying the demographic boom and the increasing power consumption may cause temporary or (in a worst case scenario) permanent environmental scarcity and water scarcity (usage of hydropower, the growth of communal consumption). The growing population needs more food; while this food is going to be provided by countries that have agricultural production capable of export. This means that the exploitation of agricultural lands intensifies; developing countries try to put more and more new lands under agricultural production and will need water to do that. Human interference irrigation, chemical control causes environmental degradation and the biological production and usefulness of the land decreases. Almost 38 percent of the Earth's agricultural lands have degraded and this degradation causes the most problems in the developing world. In Africa this ratio has reached 60 percent (!). Forty percent of Africa's GDP is still produced in the agricultural sector, although services account for an increasing share. The growth of agricultural production is 2.5 percent from the 1990s, that is a little less than the growth of population which is 2.6 percent per year. (Sebestyén – Szombathy – Tarrósy, 2007: 235.) This shows that providing food in the affected regions – although at a lower level will still be manageable, but the growing pace of urbanisation, the slow development of infrastructure and the increasing rates of migration will cause serious problems.

According to the latest estimates 8.5–9 billion people will live on the Earth in 2050. Although population grows on a global level, in some regions (especially in Europe) it is expected to decrease and grow older. Half of the planet's population lives in poverty and about a billion people have no chance to break out of indigence. Ninety-five percent of these people live in developing countries. Eight million of them (about 20,000 people per day) die annually from causes directly related to poverty. More than 2.6 billion people (40 percent

of the population) live on less than 2 dollars a day, while 1 billion people live even less than 1 dollar a day. (Szabó A., 2008: 39) The growth of social inequalities, ecological crisis and environmental scarcity cause more and more social tensions in the developing world, while natural disasters, hopelessness and poverty push millions of migrants towards the aging European continent.

In the 1970s, parallel with the growth of population, the swelling of the urban population has begun. Gigantic metropolises grew from nothing in a very short time, which became hotbeds for indigence and crime. Half of the world's population lives in cities, although these settlements take up only 2.8 percent of the lands of the planet. Demography experts' forecasts show that 80 percent of the world's population (7.4 billion people) will live in cities by 2050, taking up 3 percent of all the lands. Urbanisation already causes severe problems, since there are more than 50 metropolises whose population adds up to 1 billion residents living in slums. Rural populations living in poverty begin with consuming the goods in their immediate environment, then proceed with overfishing at an unsustainable level, hunt down all the animals, cut the forests and try to put new lands to agricultural production. It is truly a vicious circle...

Migration does not only manifest in populations moving to urban centres. From the 1970s on it has crossed borders, and as means of traffic developed, North-America and Europe both became easy to reach. In the sixties-seventies the rapid development of the European vehicle industry attracted a huge mass of migrant workforce. Nevertheless, with the slowing economic growth of the 1990s, the need for migrant workforce declined. Still however, the rate of migration did not decrease and at the same time, economic and political (and lately ecological) migrants started to arrive to Europe in greater numbers. Respecting the notions of equity and solidarity, Western-Europe became a host station of migrants. At the same time, ethnic-religious diversity increased tensions in the society, partly because the lack of viability of the notion of multiculturalism and also because the political elite constantly chose to 'turn the blind eye'.

### ***Climate migration***

The IPCC warned the public in its 1990 report already that climate change and the multiplication of extreme weather conditions may initiate migration waves from the regions of Latin America, Africa, South and East Asia and the archipelago of the Pacific Ocean. In case of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it became obvious that even a developed country as the United States is unable to protect itself from cyclones and extreme weather conditions. Based on this, it is quite clear that Bangladesh, India and other Asian, Pacific and Caribbean countries are even more vulnerable to the challenges of nature. Besides storms and floods, currently the rise of sea levels seems to be the greatest problem. According to different scenarios, the rise may exceed 8–17 cm in 2030, but a

rise of 80-90 cm is also possible, depending on the pace of the ice caps melting (Bánfi, 2010: 10) This process may encourage millions of people living in the Nile Delta, the Far East, the archipelago of the Pacific Ocean and also lower regions of Europe to migrate. Due to ecological and climatic reasons, the number of the people leaving their homes rises very swiftly, it is high time their international legal status is defined and settled, and the developed regions affected by this ‘New Migration Period’ should also be prepared.

‘Climate migration’ and ‘climate refugee’ are news concepts for the scientific sphere and publications of the topic. The causes of the mentioned complex phenomena are currently partially unclear, but researchers agree that climate change may cause the biggest migration period so far in history. The legal status of climate refugees is not clear as there are no regulations in national laws concerning ‘climate migrants’ and ‘climate refugees’. One of the main questions is whether the people forced to migrate by ecological reasons (a catastrophe interfering with nature, environment – also including built environment – or human causes) are simply ‘economic migrants’ or they should be handled as refugees. People evacuated, displaced or internally migrating for a longer period due to pollution or developments affecting the environment are usually considered ecological migrants. People forced to migrate by extreme weather conditions, ecological changes or catastrophes, caused by climate change should be defined as ‘climate refugees’ or ‘climate migrants’. In the first case, the migration is controlled and verifiable, with the respective government being responsible for solving the problem. While in the case of ‘climate migration’ since it is a cross-border phenomenon international regulations must be taken into account. Or we must face the lack of such regulations, since there has been no legal definition of the people migrating as a consequence of climate change, either in a group or individually.

There are further questions related to this issue, that must be taken into account when creating definitions. Such questions are whether the people forced to move or flee are leaving temporarily or permanently, if they move according to a plan or spontaneously, what kind of resources they have and what financial and social background they come from. Both ecologic and climate migration is strongly related to such (seemingly unrelated) sectors as public healthcare, education, regional development or law-enforcement, and according to UN estimates, it has affected about 50 million people around the world. (Bánfi, 2010: 5) According to the forecast of world-renowned ecologist Norman Myers, by 2050 there can be up to 200 million people forced to leave their homes due to ecological reasons. A forecast made by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) expects the number of people forced to leave their homes due to ecological reasons to reach 192 million by 2010. As Besenyő notes it several studies, Darfūr and Western-Sahara is especially concerned from ecological perspectives. (Besenyő, 2010)

The main question of the 2010 Climate Change Conference in Cancún (COP-16) was surprisingly not the allocation of quotas in the period after 2012. The parties instead focused on the means of adapting to climate change and helping developing countries. The IOM already proposed defining and regulating the legal status of climate migrants at the 2007 Climate Change Conference in Bali (COP-13). The Bali Action Plan (BAP), accepted after the negotiations, declared that adapting is as important as reducing the negative effects of climate change. It did not however give a proper manual for climate migration. The IOM proposed that the policies related to migration be included in climate policies, not as an individual policy branch. The organisation recommended that all states fight effectively against the negative effects of climate change and if there is no other possibility they should even use relocation to prevent emergency migration waves. They should work out plans to keep migration controlled and verified. The strategy must also take into account certain factors that may give a much more accurate picture of the process, causes and consequences of climate migration. They should also decide whether a specific event of migration is forced, caused suddenly by floods, storm, draughts or pollution, or if it is a slow process, such as in case of rising sea levels or desertification. They should also examine if the migration crosses state borders or stays inland. In the latter case, the 1998 UN Human Rights Committee regulation on relocation should apply. A person or a group of persons that have been forced to leave their homes or usual location of residence (especially in case of fleeing from armed conflicts, a general state of violence, violation of human rights, natural or artificially caused catastrophes), but did not cross the national borders of their country are called 'internally displaced person' (IDP) in international publications. (Csapó, 2010: 13) According to Koser's estimates, the current number of IDPs may be around 25 million, but the figure can soon reach 50 million. In Koser's opinion the definition of IDP is too general and loose. It does not distinguish between the causes of migration and – what is even more interesting from a legal perspective – does not separate the status of economic, ecological refugees/migrants from climate migrants/refugees, thus blurring the line between planned-verified change of location and the forced relocations. (Koser, 2008: 17) Kibreab argues that only environmental causes should be taken into account when judging the status of a climate migrant. Thus they should be viewed as refugees and given protection, without inspecting the political causes of relocation. (Kibreab, 1997: 21) At the Climate Change Conference in Cancún, António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (head of the UNHCR) emphasised that while the regulation of 1998 views climate migrants as internal refugees (and thus protects them), international law knows no such definition, although it would be desirable. In the IOM's proposition *'a climate migrant is a person or a group of persons that is forced to leave its livelihood temporarily or permanently because of sudden or continuously happening changes in their environment, inside the*

*state or by crossing the border and moving/migrating to another country*'. (Mayer, 2010: 1) Both the NGOs and the G77 group hailed victory, when the following text entered the treaty closing the negotiations: the member states should initiate national, regional and international programmes on regulating climate migration. (Mayer – DaSilva, 2011)

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## ***CURRENT ISSUES***

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### **PROFITS AND PIRATES: THE IMPACT OF SOMALI STATE FAILURE ON THE KENYAN ECONOMY**

One would presume that living next to a failed state would generate negative spillover effects for the surrounding countries. Failed states produce or enable a huge array of dangers, „from transnational terrorism to weapons proliferation, organized crime, humanitarian catastrophes, regional conflict, mass migration, pandemic disease, environmental degradation, and energy insecurity.”<sup>1</sup> To this, one should add the negative consequences for the economies of the neighboring states. by one calculation, merely neighboring a failed state reduces a country’s annual growth by an average of 1.6 percent.<sup>2</sup> Negative effects include the flight of investors from countries bordering a failed state, rising transaction and infrastructure costs, tourists who stay away and increased military expenditure.<sup>3</sup> However, as the example of the Kenyan economy shows, there are also positive effects from state failure. Our paper will show that Kenya benefits in a variety of forms from the situation in Somalia.<sup>4</sup>

The overall economic and financial impact of the Somali civil war on Kenya is extremely difficult to estimate. Kenya is confronted by a fair amount of challenges stemming from Somalia, which entail - to a varying degree - sizeable economic costs for Kenya: the housing and caring for the huge number of Somali refugees; the threat of a possible terrorist attack on Kenyan soil and the attention required from the security services to confront it; and cross border-clashes in the Northern Region, affecting the livelihoods, businesses and the delivery of services in the poorest region of the country, just to name a few. Because of these effects from Somalia, Kenya had to allocate funds to confront and mitigate the effect of these developments – money, in short, which could

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<sup>1</sup> Patrick, Stewart: *Weak Links. Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security*, 2011, Oxford: University Press: pp. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Patrick 2010: pp. 44.

<sup>3</sup> Lambach, Daniel: *Close Encounters in the Third Dimension. The Regional Effects of State Failure*, In: Lambach, Daniel – Debiel, Tobias: *State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood*, 2007, Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace: pp. 42.

<sup>4</sup> For a thorough overview on Somalia, see: Besenyő – Kis-Álmos –Resperger 2010: Besenyő, János, Kis-Álmos, Péter, Resperger, István: *Országismertető-Szomália*, 2010, Sereg Szemle kiadvány, az MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság tudományos kiadványa, Székesfehérvár

and should have been spent on other, more pressing things (e.g. education, health care, infrastructure).

On the other side, and perhaps more surprisingly, the Kenyan economy (and its consumers) are also apparently benefiting from the mayhem in Somalia. Many Somali traders and businessmen have left the country since 1991 and moved to Nairobi (and, to a lesser extent, to other Kenyan cities). In Nairobi, most Somali business activities are centered in the Eastleigh neighborhood, which was traditionally inhabited by Kenyan-Somalis. In some respects the vigorous unregulated economy that flourished inside Somalia after the collapse of the state has been exported to Kenya. The economic transformation of Eastleigh has brought a new level of competition to Nairobi, substantially reducing the cost of goods and services. Growing Somali investment in Nairobi has also attracted banks and other service-providers, demonstrating that urban refugees are not necessarily a burden on the state and can be an economic asset.<sup>5</sup>

Somalis in Kenya are active in a wide range of economic sectors. Traditionally, there has always been a sizeable and active cross-border trade between the two countries, mainly in livestock, primarily cattle. Ironically, this cross-border trade grew stronger after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Cattles imported from Somalia have at one point supplied 16% of the meat demand of Nairobi. In the last couple of years, Somalis and Kenyan-Somalis have strengthened the existing trade networks in the livestock trade, while managing to develop new businesses in response to the growing economic opportunities.

One example for Somali investment in Kenya is the transport sector. Somali operators (both Somalis and Kenyan-Somalis) have established direct bus lines such as E-couch, Maslah, Crown and Garissa Bus. Moreover, in the last 17 years, more than ten Somali trucking companies have been established in Kenya. With an initial capital investment of around \$5 million each, these now show substantial annual profits of around \$20 million. Leading companies such as Awale, Tipper Freighters, Dakawe and AINU-Shamsi Transporters operate hundreds of trucks each day. There are also many individually owned and run truck companies operating with two to six trucks, and this growing sector plays a very significant role in Kenyan transport market.<sup>6</sup> Fuel supply is another expanding sector and the number of Somali-owned fuel stations in Kenya appears to be increasing exponentially; it rose from four stations in 2002 to 56 in 2009.<sup>7</sup>

Sugar smuggling has also become big business in recent years. The sugar comes from Brazil or Pakistan via Dubai, enters Somalia through Kismayo,

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<sup>5</sup> Abdulsamed, Farah: Somali Investment in Kenya, March 2011, London: Chatham House: pp. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Abdulsamed 2011: pp. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Abdulsamed 2011: pp. 10.

Mogadishu and Bosaso ports for onward transit to Kenya where the kingpins reportedly have go-downs in major towns. The barons pay the Somali warlords through whose areas the imports pass a protection fee estimated at Sh100,000 per trip. Locally milled sugar sells for up to KSh110 a kilo whereas the smuggled sugar goes for as low as KSh60 a kilo. “Sources privy to the smuggling told the Sunday Nation that those found transporting 200-50kg bags of sugar grease the palms of senior [Kenyan] security officials with at least Sh50,000 whereas those trafficking 100 bags part with a minimum Sh25,000.”<sup>8</sup> The net result for the Kenyan consumers is lower sugar prices. The Kenyan state, however, foregoes import duties.

Even more important than sugar-smuggling has been in recent years the Somali investment in the Kenyan real estate and construction sector, which, thanks in part to the contribution of Somalis, has risen by 14% between 2008 and 2009.<sup>9</sup> A report by the Central Bank of Kenya indicates that investment in real estate residential sector grew to KSh61 billion as of May 2010, compared to KSh19 billion five years ago. “In addition, the number of actual mortgages taken up by individuals and organizations, without putting the figures loaned, grew from 7,834 to 13,803 over the same period, a demonstration of the great potential and growing interest in the sector.”<sup>10</sup> It is no surprise then that some Kenyan property dealers claim that prices have tripled in areas where Somalis dominate, such as Eastleigh. In the words of a Kenyan real estate appraiser: “We are seeing a situation or experiencing a situation where property that was once worth four million shillings is now worth eight, nine, even 10 [million] and they are buying.”<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps the most visible manifestation of Somali real-estate investment in Nairobi are two huge hopping malls, which have been built in the district (named Amal and Eastleigh). The latter contains a hotel, a bank, restaurants, cafeterias, a supermarket, a gym, a college, a travel agent, an FM radio station and a number of shops, and was extremely busy at a visit in November 2010.

All this begs an important question: what is the source of the invested money? “Many Kenyans believe that there is a strong relationship between Somali investors and the pirates and warlords of Somalia. While the Kenyan media have produced some wildly exaggerated reports, there are certainly some properties owned by pirates and warlords in Nairobi and Mombasa.”<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Kenya’s weak anti-money-laundering legislation and enforcement make Nairobi an attractive destination for illegal money. Government spokesman Alfred

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<sup>8</sup> Daily Nation: „Sugar and Arms Barons Rule Somali Border”, 29 May 2010

<sup>9</sup> Germany Trade and Invest: Wirtschaftstrends Kompakt - Kenia/Jahresmitte 2010, July 2010, Köln: Germany Trade and Invest

<sup>10</sup> The Standard: „Bubbling real estate sector draws keen investor interest”, 15 November 2010

<sup>11</sup> Voice of America: „Kenyan Government Investigates Possible Pirate Ties to Real Estate Boom”, 21 May 2010

<sup>12</sup> Abdulsamed 2011: pp. 10.



Mutua even alleged that there is a direct connection between what is happening on the Somali high seas and the price increases of property being purchased by those he calls "foreigners." "They are coming and they are buying the property at any price," said Mutua. "So, they are coming to a person and asking them, 'How much is this piece of land?' The person says, 'Oh, I am sorry, this piece of land or this building is already sold for \$50,000,' and then they say, 'OK, we will give you double and we will pay cash.'"<sup>13</sup>

But in reality the value of Somali trade and investment in Kenya is much larger than the proceeds of piracy. Anecdotal evidence points to investments of over \$1.5 billion in Eastleigh in 2004. Ransoms in 2009 were estimated at around \$100 million. A well-informed source and long-standing Nairobi citizen also thinks that the contribution of piracy-related monies to the recent property boom in Nairobi is wildly exaggerated. "Ransom money is certainly one of the factors behind the rocketing prices, but definitely cannot explain the boom on its own."<sup>14</sup>

Faced with a huge influx of apparently illegally gained ransom money, the Kenyan parliament has been surprisingly timid in countering the problem. The US government has repeatedly urged its Kenyan counterpart to enact a comprehensive anti money-laundering bill, to no avail. The reason for this, all interview partners agreed, is the fact that the Kenyan state did not want to interrupt the flourishing business activity enabled by the influx of illegal money.<sup>15</sup> Only in December 2009, several years after the flow of piracy-related money was registered as a problem, did the Kenyan parliament finally pass the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. It was the fourth attempt since 2004 to pass this bill. Some analysts, however, fretted that it may just be a gimmick by the government to appease international partners. George Kegoro, the executive director of International Commission of Jurists - Kenya Chapter, for example doubted that there is political will to completely stamp out money laundering in Kenya. "The existence of the legislation is not sufficient to deter the vice neither are the stiff penalties that are recommended in the bill," he says. "There is need for genuine support from the government to enact this law. We need a good set of people to be put in place to interpret the legislation."<sup>16</sup>

The law finally took effect on 28 June 2010, and is aimed at sealing existing loopholes in Kenya. The Act provides for the 'freezing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime.' While in the past the verification of sources of funds infused into the formal financial system was not mandatory, the Act seeks to change this. It requires forex bureaus and other money transfer and

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<sup>13</sup> Voice of America: „Kenyan Government Investigates Possible Pirate Ties to Real Estate Boom”, 21 May 2010

<sup>14</sup> Personal interview, Nairobi, November 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Personal interview, Nairobi, November 2010.

<sup>16</sup> IPS: „Anti-Money Laundering Bill Passes, But Does Govt Mean Business?”, 29, December 2009

financial institutions to be vigilant, identify customers and report any transaction of more than US\$10,000 (Kshs 810,000) in hard currency. As of March 2011, however, the law was still not operational. According to Anne Kiuhune, audit and fiscal and financial laws expert, “the various agencies under the Act required for its proper implementation are yet to be set up and there is no indication on when the Government intends to do so. These include the Reporting Centre, the Assets Recovery Agency, the Anti-Money Laundering Advisory Board and the Criminal Assets Recovery Fund.”<sup>17</sup>

Another important socio-economic factor of the recent success of Somali businessmen (be they recent migrants or longstanding citizens) is the fact that it has created occasional resentment among local Kenyans. According to Deborah Osiro, a Kenyan researcher with the Institute for Security Studies, Eastleigh became the fastest growing and one of the most thriving neighborhoods in Nairobi and that is annoying Kenyans, who are trying to maintain their commercial and economic footholds but are unable to do so. “They see the Somalis pricing them out of the lower or middle-income real estate market and wonder how refugees can be doing better financially than their hosts. Of course there are deeper influences at play here, but it's easy to blame the stranger - something that seems entirely new for Kenya.”<sup>18</sup> The success of the Somalis has obviously prompted jealousy and business rivalry from non-Somali business operators, some going as far as to say that “they would like nothing else than to see the Somalis' expansion curtailed.”<sup>19</sup> There was even talk of a law to would have restricted the sale of properties to “foreigners”.<sup>20</sup> Critics cite the absence of public clinics and the low number of state-run schools in Eastleigh as proof of the discrimination of the Somalis by the Kenyan state.

The often heavy-handed approach of the Kenyan security services towards Somalis or Kenyan-Somalis illustrates this fact. When in January 2010 Somali youth demonstrated against the deportation of the Jamaican-born cleric Abdullah Al-Faisal, hundreds of Somalis and Somali-looking persons were arrested indiscriminately. Hassan Guleid, the chairman of Eastleigh District Business Association, accused the government of victimization and harassment of the Somali community. "In the past week the security forces have arrested thousands of people of Somali ethnicity across the country ostensibly to flush out illegal immigrants in the country," Mr Guleid said. He said profiling of Somali people's investments in the country ordered by Office of the President permanent secretary Francis Kimemia was a pointer to the fact that the government had ill intentions.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The Standard: „Why it is business as usual for crooks even with ‘tough’ law”, 4 March 2011

<sup>18</sup> IRIN News: „Raids and rancour”, 27 January 2010

<sup>19</sup> IRIN News: „Raids and rancour”

<sup>20</sup> Reuters: „Kenya says Muslim cleric to be deported in two days”, 18 January 2010

<sup>21</sup> Daily Nation: „Eastleigh traders protest over crackdown”, 22 January 2010

For the Kenyan employees and consumers, however, the growth of Somali business in Nairobi is mainly beneficial. Somali money has attracted banks and other service-providers, and led them to open branches in Eastleigh, thus creating more jobs for Kenyans. Somali-owned businesses have also created jobs for local unskilled workers. It was found that Somali employers tended to pay more for similar work – roughly Ksh 150–250 a day compared with the average Ksh 80–100. Given the amount of capital invested in the areas, many Kenyan residents of the Eastlands area of Nairobi increasingly turn towards Eastleigh to earn a living.<sup>22</sup>

Kenyan consumers also profit from the business boom in Eastleigh. Up-scale brands of fashion, electronics and other consumer items can be purchased at 20 to 30 percent below prices elsewhere in town and services, such as internet and phone, can be obtained at a fraction of normal costs. One minute of online time, for example, costs about \$0.04, while an international phone call to the USA is as low as \$1.00 per minute, compared to \$3.00 by normal means.<sup>23</sup>

Overall, it is clear to see, that the Kenyan economy (and the consumers) are very much profiting from the business activity of the Somalis in the country. It is of course close to impossible to estimate how much of this activity can be traced to the state failure in Somalia. Would the thousands of Somali businessmen who have relocated to Kenya had left their country even if the Somali state had not collapsed? It is perhaps fair to argue, that most of them would have probably stayed put in Somalia, depriving Kenya of sizeable business activity.

Another important and overlooked aspect is the fact, that the Kenyan economy on the whole is increasingly discovering Somalia as an export market. According to the World Bank, during the years 1992-2000 Somalia was not among the top 10 destinations for Kenyan export.<sup>24</sup> Between 2000 and 2009, however, Somalia moved to tenth position for Kenyan export destinations, with an export volume of about \$100 million a year.<sup>25</sup> Most of this trade is probably conducted by Kenyan-Somalis or Somalis living in Kenya.

This all is of course not to say that the state failure in Somalia does not affect the Kenyan economy in a negative way. As we have already argued, the state failure in Somalia entails sizeable economic costs for Kenya. There is also the issue of illegal money flooding the country, providing ample scope for corruption. Theory suggests that the influx of huge sums of money also drives up property prices and, therefore, inflation. Kenyan industrialists warned in December 2010 that the increased risk because of piracy attacks “has pushed up

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<sup>22</sup> Abdulsamed 2011: pp. 12.

<sup>23</sup> Little, Peter D.: *Somalia: Economy Without State*, 2003, Oxford: James Currey: pp. 165.

<sup>24</sup> World Bank: *Running on one engine: Kenya's uneven economic performance*, Kenya Economic Update, June 2010: pp. 14.

<sup>25</sup> World Bank: *Running on one engine*: pp. 14.

freight and insurance costs of shipping raw materials - which must be ultimately be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher retail prices.”<sup>26</sup> The numbers, however, do not bear this out: inflation slowed from 26,2 % in 2008 to 9,2 in 2009 and then to 4,2 in 2010.<sup>27</sup>

Similarly, Kenyan GDP growth does not seem to be very much influenced by events in Somalia. In the recent most peaceful year in Somalia (2006), the Kenyan economy grew slower than in the next year (2007), which saw heavy fighting there and an influx of refugees from Somalia. The drop in 2008 can be attributed to domestic factors (the ethnic clashes in the wake of the 2007 elections).

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
GDP growth (in %)	0.5	2.9	5.1	5.9	6.3	7.0	1.6	2.6	4.9 <sup>28</sup>

**Table 4: Kenya’s GDP growth 2002-2010**

(Source: World Bank)

Overall, just as in the case of benefits, it is very difficult to give an estimate of the size of the costs for the Kenyan economy. Several experts asked about this question refused to make even a wild guess.<sup>29</sup> All in all, however, in the light of the data, the costs do not seem to be huge. To argue counterfactual, the detailed biannual Economic Updates of Kenya from the World Bank do not even mention Somalia as a negative factor at all. Most - though not all - regional experts also opined that the economic benefits of the state failure in Somalia for Kenya are not outweighed by the costs.

And, finally, a rather philosophical remark: perhaps instead of trying to measure the exact costs and benefits of the Somali state failure on Kenya, we should rather realize that there *do are* very substantial benefits for the country’s economy emanating from the Somali civil war – a quite surprising finding. This shows, how neatly Kenya adapted to the state failure in its neighborhood, and how it tries to maximize the potential benefits from it.

<sup>26</sup> The Citizen: „Somali Piracy Raises Costs of Imports”, 8 December 2010

<sup>27</sup> CIA World Factbook.

<sup>28</sup> World Bank: Kenya at the Tipping Point?, Kenya Economic Update, December 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Personal interviews, November-December 2010, Nairobi and Mombasa.

**THE CHANGING SECURITY SITUATION IN SOMALIA  
THE DECLINE OF AL-SHABAAB  
AND THE NEW AGE OF WARLORDS?**

*Executive Summary*

Between 2006 and 2010, al-Shabaab was the most powerful Islamist group in Somalia. However, in recent months, the dreaded militia – which had controlled most of Mogadishu, as well as Central and Southern Somalia since January 2009 – has suffered serious casualties; it was forced to leave the strategic points of the capital and also lost territories in the countryside. The continuous fighting with the ever-stronger AU Peace Keeping Mission, the AMISOM, the deepening gap between the nationalist and Jihadist fractions within the organisation, the lack of public support, the current famine, and the increasing international assistance for the Transitional Federal Government broke the back of the al-Shabaab; thus it lost the possibility of seizing the power in Somalia. The Islamists turned back to their guerrilla warfare and ‘hit-and-run’ tactics, and it is doubtful whether they will be able to reorganise themselves and hold their territories around the capital. But the TFG and the AMISOM do not have the capacity to fill the vacuum left by the al-Shabaab, which can contribute to the strengthening of local militias and warlords.

***The rise of al-Shabaab***

If somebody reads the news about Somalia on the ABCNEWS website, the sentence „*Somalia has had no functioning government in two decades*” will appear quite often. Indeed, Somalia is the most famous failed state ever. After the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime, there were dozens of experiments in order to create a functioning central government, but all of them failed.<sup>1</sup> The last attempt was the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. But during the seven years of its existence, the TFG and the Parliament were incapable of extending their authority to wider parts of the country:<sup>2</sup> they moved

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<sup>1</sup> Menkhaus, Ken: *Somalia. State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004. (Adelphi Paper 364), 15; Rob Wise: *Al-Shabaab*. CSIS Case Study, July 2011, 2. [http://csis.org/files/publication/110715\\_Wise\\_AlShabaab\\_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study\\_WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf). Downloaded: 19-09-2011

<sup>2</sup> E.g. the greatest achievement of the Parliament was that it refurbished its building. Somalia’s Transitional Parliament Extends Mandate. <http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/somalias-transitional-parliament-extends-mandate>. Downloaded: 19-09-2011

back to the country from Kenya only in 2006, and between 2007 and 2010 they controlled a few blocks of Mogadishu – the Presidential Palace and the Airport..

The failure of the state-building processes in Somalia is mainly rooted in the unwillingness of the different political actors to form a strong government. The local warlords, businessmen, and elders had little intention of sharing their power with a central government.<sup>3</sup> Somalia fragmented into mini-states, where local leaders were omnipotent – though their power was territorially very limited, covering only a region, a town, some villages, or even less. In the late '90s, and after the millennium, none of them had enough force to conquer other territories and to become the leading force of Somalia – and they had no intention of doing so either. The warlords were satisfied with their own properties and their working business structures: they taxed the humanitarian aid transports, the markets, the farmers, the nomads, the merchants, and the local businessmen.

However, the problem was that the warlords provided nothing in exchange for the money: there was no security, no law, and no public services available in Somalia. The citizens of the country needed some order in the anarchy, and the Islamists recognised this. They formed different courts in the districts of Mogadishu and introduced the sharia. They organised education, courts, local guards, collected the rubbish from the streets, and opened the port of Mogadishu.<sup>4</sup> In the beginning, the rhetoric of the Islamists was moderate, and they did not urge an Islamist revolution. In 2000 they formed their central organisation, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).<sup>5</sup> Besides other public functions, the ICU organised different militias – one of them was the al-Shabaab, 'the youth'.<sup>6</sup>

From the start, the ICU contained radical elements<sup>7</sup> that tried to seize the leadership among the Islamists, but they were in minority and in the first years after the millennium their voice was not strong enough to completely change the political direction of the organisation. Their time came only in 2006; after the ICU unified Mogadishu and most of the country under its rule and became the first functioning central actor as a quasi-government in Somalia since 1991, Ethiopia, with the support of the Bush administration, decided to destroy the Islamists and their political structures. Both Addis and Washington considered that the ICU was a radical organisation and that it represented a threat to the region. Indeed, the position of the radicals – who played a decisive role in the

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<sup>3</sup> Menkhaus 2004, 37-47

<sup>4</sup> Shay, Shaul: *Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration*. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2008, 100.

<sup>5</sup> Hettyey, András: Szomália története és a környező országok szerepvállalása 2004 óta. *Külügyi Szemle*, VII. (2008), Vol. 4, 94-118; 98-99.

<sup>6</sup> Wise 2011, 3-4.

<sup>7</sup> See Shay 2008.

fight against the US-backed warlords<sup>8</sup> – was strengthened by the successful campaign in 2006, and they grew in power. Already in mid-2006, they had a serious influence among the Islamists. Nevertheless, the leadership was at that time still in the hands of the moderates. The real reasons behind the attack were that the Bush administration could not accept an Islamist regime, even a moderate one, in the Horn of Africa, while Addis preferred a disorganised neighbour to a centralised country in Somalia.

The Ethiopian invasion in December 2006, with the support of the USAF, was the last straw that broke the camel's back – after the attack, the creation of a moderate Islamist regime was no longer a possibility. Ethiopia was the ancient enemy of Somalia,<sup>9</sup> and the Somalis streamed into the arms of the al-Shabaab, because it was the only organised armed force in the country. Somalis fought against the occupation, not because they were Jihadists, but because they wanted to protect their homes from the foreign soldiers. Furthermore, the Ethiopian army's behaviour was deeply hostile from the beginning and they never hesitated to open fire on Somali civilians.<sup>10</sup> The following years of fighting brought endless suffering for the Somalis without any results or meaning, and the real beneficiary of it was the al-Shabaab.

### ***The al-Shabaab at the zenith***

The Ethiopian occupation led to a catastrophe in many respects. Firstly, they successfully destroyed the structure of the ICU and the stability which it provided to the society without being able to fill this vacuum themselves; this led to the recurrence of the age of anarchy and lawlessness. Secondly, although the Ethiopians expelled the ICU from Mogadishu, and most of its moderate members fled to Eritrea, whereas the radicals – e.g. the leader of the al-Shabaab, Aden Hashi Ayro – stayed in Somalia and started a guerrilla campaign against the occupation. As mentioned before, the al-Shabaab became the symbol for the war of independence, and thousands of Somalis joined the militia. Furthermore, the al-Shabaab recognised that the current situation required a nationalist, rather

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<sup>8</sup> The Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) was formed in the spirit of the War on Terror. The ARPCT had three serious handicaps: 1. the warlords, who were members of the Alliance, were unanimously hated by the Somali population; 2. they did not recognise the TFG, which was in principle supported by the US; 3. and last, but not least the fathers of these militia leaders killed the US Rangers and Delta Force soldiers on the streets of Mogadishu in 1993. To sum up, the creation and the support of the ARPCT was a huge mistake on behalf of the American leadership, which jeopardized the credibility of Washington in Somalia. Hettyei 2008, 99, 110

<sup>9</sup> See: Lewis, Ioan M.: *A modern history of Somalia. Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Longman, London, 1980, V.

<sup>10</sup> See: Ethiopian soldiers have opened fire on a civil bus. <http://somaliswisstv.com/2008/03/28/ethiopian-soldiers-have-opened-fire-on-a-civil-bus-in-towfiikh-district-in-mogadishu-killing-at-least-3-passengers-and-injuring-12-others/>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011; Szomália: összecsapások Mogadishuban, 81 halott. [http://hirszerzo.hu/kulfold/63800-szomalia\\_osszecsapasok\\_mogadishuban\\_81\\_halo](http://hirszerzo.hu/kulfold/63800-szomalia_osszecsapasok_mogadishuban_81_halo). Downloaded: 20-09-2011.

than an Islamist, ideology, and therefore used the nationalist rhetoric in its propaganda during these years. Last, but not least, the foreign attack created a global dimension to the war in Somalia. The al-Shabaab, which was basically a national movement, had become, by the first month of 2008, one of the main organisations of the global jihad. From Afghanistan to Australia, hundreds of foreign mujahiddens travelled to Somalia to join their comrades in the fight against ‘unbelievers’;<sup>11</sup> and besides the AfPak mountains and Yemen, Somalia became the most important theatre of global jihad.<sup>12</sup>

The al-Shabaab also contacted al-Qaeda, which caused further developments in its tactics and strategy. The first known direct link between the two organisations was Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the terrorist who was wanted for the attack against the Paradise Hotel in Mombassa in 2002.<sup>13</sup> It is not clear how close the real cooperation was between bin Laden’s ‘core al-Qaeda’ and the al-Shabaab. However, it is sure that the al-Shabaab took over the ideology and the way of warfare of bin Laden, radically changing the nature of war in the Horn of Africa. In 2007, the Islamists committed the first suicide attack, an act that earlier would have been unimaginable among the Sufi inhabitants.<sup>14</sup> But the real wave of ‘shahids’, ‘martyrs’, reached Somalia in 2008, when dozens of suicide attackers killed hundreds of men – mainly innocent civilians. One of the biggest attacks was launched on 28 October 2008, when five bombs were exploded at the same time in the building of the Ethiopian consulate and in the centre of the UN Development Programme. It was the first known suicide bombings in which one of the perpetrators was a foreign – American – citizen.<sup>15</sup> At least 25 people died as a result of the explosions.<sup>16</sup>

The Ethiopian troops – about 20 000 soldiers according to estimations<sup>17</sup> – were not capable of destroying the network of al-Shabaab. The suicide attacks and the IEDs caused serious casualties in the ranks of the occupying forces. With the support of the inhabitants, the al-Shabaab and other Islamist militias, like the Hizb al-Islam or the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) reached successes, and because of their ‘hit and run’ tactics, the Ethiopians could not enforce a decisive battle. The Islamists got support from the Gulf States and Eritrea,<sup>18</sup> and

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<sup>11</sup> Wise 2011, 3-5.

<sup>12</sup> See Mr Barack Obama’s speech on the New Afghanistan Strategy on 2 December 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,664708,00.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>13</sup> Enter the Drones. [http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1096/Enter\\_the\\_Drones](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1096/Enter_the_Drones). Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>14</sup> Hettyei 2008, 104.

<sup>15</sup> Wise 2011, 8.

<sup>16</sup> Suicide blasts hit Northern Somalia.

<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008102993331438553.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>17</sup> Shay 2008, 118.

<sup>18</sup> Shay 2008, 114-115.



both parties used heavy weapons during the street fights, which contributed to the high civilian death rate.<sup>19</sup>

Ethiopia was not the only state in Eastern-Africa to try to find a solution to the Somali crisis. Before the Ethiopian invasion, the IGAD (the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) – gathering Eritrea,<sup>20</sup> Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda – and the African Union had already considered the opportunity of a peacekeeping-peacebuilding mission to Somalia in 2006,<sup>21</sup> and it was also authorised by the UN Security Council.<sup>22</sup>

But the deployment of the 8000-strong IGASOM was delayed. The UNSCR 1725 stipulated that the countries bordering Somalia would not deploy troops to the country. From the eligible IGAD countries, only Uganda offered a battalion, and it also withdrew its proposal because of the growing strength of ICU and the Islamist militias.<sup>23</sup>

The approach of the IGAD and AU countries only changed after the successful Ethiopian campaign. At the beginning of 2007, the AU decided to launch an operation in Somalia called AMISOM, as the IGAD states did not have enough military potential and willingness to do so. The number of AMISOM soldiers did not reach the planned 8 000 troops, and they proved to be only minor actors besides the Ethiopian army. Although Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Rwanda<sup>24</sup> pledged to send forces, until now only Uganda and Burundi contributed significant troops.

The first 1700 Ugandan soldiers arrived in Mogadishu on 17 February 2007.<sup>25</sup> The deployment of Burundian troops was problematic, because the necessary equipments promised them by the US and France did not arrive on time. Therefore, the first 100 Burundian soldiers were deployed to Mogadishu only on 23 December 2007.<sup>26</sup>

Building up the AMISOM to the planned number of troops was difficult. By October 2008, when another Burundian battalion was deployed to

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<sup>19</sup> Hundreds of Civilian Casualties in Somalia Fighting. <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/04/23/hundreds-of-civilian-casualties-in-somalia-fighting/>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>20</sup> Eritrea suspended its participation in 2007.

<sup>21</sup> African Union Endorses Regional Peace Plan in Somalia. <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2005/243/26.shtml>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>22</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1725. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/646/11/PDF/N0664611.pdf?OpenElement>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>23</sup> Uganda: Controversy in Government over Sending Troops to Somalia. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200612110358.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>24</sup> Five killed in Mogadishu attacks. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6301809.stm>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>25</sup> Ugandan Troops Set to Arrive in Somalia. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-02-15-voa31.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>26</sup> Burundi Troops Join AU in Somalia. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7158412.stm>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

Mogadishu, the total number of AMISOM soldiers on the ground still amounted to only 2 200 troops.<sup>27</sup> The first real impetus for the operation came in January 2009, when the Ethiopian government decided to withdraw its troops from Somalia. They suffered too high casualties, and the mission was expensive without decisive successes. After the withdrawal, the Ethiopians used a kind of quarantine strategy: they deployed troops at the border – and sometimes in Somalia – but they did not participate in the clashes in Mogadishu. This meant that the task of protecting the TFG, the Parliament and the international humanitarian organisations passed to the AMISOM. Because of this lack of troops, the contributing countries had to reconsider the operation; they had to either leave Somalia, or send more troops. They chose the latter.

The early months of 2009 were the real time of the rule of al-Shabaab. With their allied militias they controlled most districts of Mogadishu, except the airport, the Presidential Palace and the road linking them – more than 90 percent of the town – and Central and Southern Somalia. They defeated their rival militia, the Hizb al-Islam and forced it into an alliance with the al-Shabaab.<sup>28</sup>

On May 7 2009, the al-Shabaab and its allies launched an offensive against the TFG, and captured numerous strategic points of the capital.<sup>29</sup> On 18 June 2009, a suicide bomber killed the minister of national security, Omar Hasi Aden, and 24 other people.<sup>30</sup> A day after the attack, the speaker of the Parliament, Aden Mohaemmed Nuur, held a press conference and asked the international community to send foreign troops to Somalia within the following 24 hours.<sup>31</sup>

Nevertheless, the TFG held the line. The al-Shabaab had great experiences in guerrilla warfare, but it was not accustomed to face-to-face warfare and to holding extended territories under its control. The successes of al-Shabaab were mainly rooted in the weakness of its enemies, not the real power of the militia itself. The international community recognised that without giving significant support to the TFG and the AMISOM, the Islamists would seize Mogadishu, and they would come into power again – without their

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<sup>27</sup> Rendet csinálnak Mogadishuban.

<http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/0/12788/burundibekefenntartok.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>28</sup> Somalia's Second Islamist Threat: A Backgrounder on Hizb al-Islam.

<http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalias-second-islamist-threat-backgrounder-hizb-al-islam>. Downloaded:20-09-2011

<sup>29</sup> Horadam, Nathaniel: Somalia's Second Islamist Threat. 2010.

<http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalias-second-islamist-threat-backgrounder-hizb-al-islam>. Downloaded: 23-09-2011

<sup>30</sup> Somali Security Minister Omar Hashi Aden killed in explosion.

<http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/13731>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>31</sup> Somalia: Parliament Asks Foreign Troops to Come Within 24 Hours.

<http://allafrica.com/stories/200906200013.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

moderate comrades who came to a compromise with the TFG in 2008.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the US and the European Union raised the level of their financial assistance to AMISOM. Uganda and Burundi increased the number of troops after the Ethiopian withdrawal, and the strength of the mission doubled – from 2 800 to 6 000 – between January and November 2009.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the United States decided to play a larger role in the fight against radical Islamists. On 15 September 2009, the US Special Forces killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the leader of al-Qaeda in Somalia, and the US drones undertook numerous flights on Somalia.<sup>34</sup> It seemed that the power of the al-Shabaab reached its limits. But a huge mistake was needed to trigger the end of the Islamists' unquestionable rule in Somalia: the Kampala bombing.

### *The decline of the al-Shabaab*

On 11 July 2010 – during the Football World Cup Final – two suicide bombs were exploded in a rugby club and in a restaurant in Kampala. The attack resulted in the death of 74 persons and 70 injuries. The al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks as retaliation for Ugandan support for TFG and AMISOM. It was the first serious attack by the al-Shabaab beyond the borders of Somalia.

Although the Kampala bombing was a big tactical terrorist success, its effects were counter-productive in a strategic dimension. The AU ministers agreed during a closed session on July 22 about expanding the mandate of AMISOM, and Uganda and Burundi committed more troops. The international community also promised more help for the mission.<sup>35</sup> By the end of the year, the strength of the AU peacekeeping forces reached 8 000 soldiers, and on 22 December 2010, the UN Security Council gave permission to deploy 4 000 additional troops.<sup>36</sup> Although these goals were only partially achieved, the strength of AMISOM was 9 595 troops on 13 September 2011<sup>37</sup> – more than the double of the estimated number (4-5 000) of al-Shabaab warriors.<sup>38</sup> The

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<sup>32</sup> Hettyei 2008, 104-106. Thank to the deal, Sharif Ahmed became the President of Somalia in January 2009.

<sup>33</sup> AMISOM – Fízetés nélkül küzdenek. <http://www.mindennapiafrika.info/2009/11/27/amisom-fizetes-nelkul-kuzdenek/>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011. Belharc Szomáliában. [http://africaatwar.blog.hu/2009/03/28/belharc\\_szomaliaban\\_aggaszto\\_jelek\\_kongoban](http://africaatwar.blog.hu/2009/03/28/belharc_szomaliaban_aggaszto_jelek_kongoban). Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>34</sup> Enter the Drones 2011.

<sup>35</sup> United Nations Blocks Change of AMISOM Mandate. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201007280079.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>36</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1964 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/706/02/PDF/N1070602.pdf?OpenElement>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>37</sup> AMISOM – Military Component. <http://www.amisom-au.org/default-6>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>38</sup> Floyd, Kathryn H.: Somalia's Stability and Security Situation in Review. July 2010. <http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/Report/Somalia'sStabilityandSecuritySituationinReview.pdf>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

reinforcements allowed the AMISOM and the TFG to launch an offensive against the Islamists in February and May 2011. The attacks were backed by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops and tanks.<sup>39</sup>

In the beginning it seemed that it was going to be another unsuccessful offensive against the Islamists. Although the AMISOM and TFG troops captured some strategic points, e.g. the former building of the Ministry of Defence<sup>40</sup> or the Bakara Market<sup>41</sup>, the al-Shabaab and its allies launched a series of successful counter-attacks. Nevertheless, the power of the Islamists was declining.<sup>42</sup> Their offensive planned for Ramadan collapsed soon, and on 6 August the wonder happened: the al-Shabaab left Mogadishu.<sup>43</sup>

### *The reasons behind the defeat of Islamists*

In the early years of the new millennium, the al-Shabaab became one of the most dreaded Islamist organizations, which could be mentioned together with the Taliban, the al-Qaeda, the Hezbollah or the Hamas. But the successes of the Somali militia was also the reason behind its failure. The al-Shabaab was very popular in Somalia while it fought a liberation war against the Ethiopian troops. However, the new terrorist methods of warfare, adapted from al-Qaeda operating with suicide and IED attacks, the indistinctive use of small arms and heavy weapons in the street fights in Mogadishu, and the religiously motivated atrocities of the Islamist warriors (stonings, mutilations) lead very soon to their losing the support of the population.

However, the cruel behaviour of the Islamist fighters was not the only source of problems for the organization. The changing strategic aim of the al-Shabaab also jeopardized the position of the militia. The al-Shabaab and, the Islamists in general, might have had a chance – mainly in 2006 – to form a functioning Islamist state in the Horn of Africa, but they wanted more and could not reject the idea of global jihad. It radically narrowed their opportunities: even with the support of the Somali citizens for building an Islamist state, it is impossible to bring a whole society under the flag of the global war against the ‘unbelievers’. The Somalis wanted functioning public services, a health care system and education, enough food, fresh water, and, first of all, peace and

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<sup>39</sup> Clashes in Somalia – Gov’t Begins Long Awaited Push.

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12989221>; Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>40</sup> AMISOM Seize Militant Strategic Districts. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201102240089.html>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>41</sup> Al-Shabaab loses Bakara Market to government troops. <http://www.bar-kulan.com/2011/07/28/al-shabaab-loses-bakara-market-to-the-government-troops/>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>42</sup> The sapping strength of al-Shabaab.

[http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/302/The\\_Sapping\\_Strength\\_of\\_Al\\_Shabaab](http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/302/The_Sapping_Strength_of_Al_Shabaab). Downloaded: 20-09-2011

<sup>43</sup> Spokesmen: Islamist Militia Leaving Somali Capital.

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=14244837>. Downloaded: 20-09-2011

stability. The concept of global jihad could not provide them with these, it only promised more fighting, suffering and deprivation. The Islamists lost their remaining supporters – and there is no successful guerrilla war without the support of a significant part of the society. The al-Shabaab lost its resources – money, weapons, and people.

Some of the al-Shabaab leaders recognized these negative trends. Sheikh Mukhtar Robow tried to strengthen the nationalist wing of the organization, and admitted that permitting the gap between the Islamists and the society to grow deeper was a mistake.<sup>44</sup> But since 2008, under the command of Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Godane, many foreign Jihadist warriors got in leading positions within the al-Shabaab. Sheikh Mohammed Abu Fa'id from Saud became the financial manager of the organization; the Pakistani Abu Musa Mombasa is responsible for training and security, the Sudanese Mahmud Mujajir directs the suicide attacks and the recruitment, while the American Omar Hammami – Abu Mansur al-Amriki – produces the propaganda videos and songs.<sup>45</sup> These Jihadists brought not only their knowledge, but also their radical ideology. They are not the warriors of the Somali people but the warriors of global jihad – and it seems unlikely that they would change their mind.

As we could see earlier, these global aspirations jeopardized the power of the al-Shabaab, not only because it lost its local support, but also because it became one of the main targets of the counterterrorist campaign – not only for the US, but also for the EU and the AU. The US and French Special Forces and the drones have caused serious casualties for the Islamists and weakened their morale. The USA uses the same method as in the war in Afghanistan, and the strikes of drones against the al-Shabaab have become regular, making it difficult for the group to move and operate. The attacks of drones are easier as the landscape is more favourable than in Afghanistan.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the financial resources of the al-Shabaab are rather limited compared to those of the Taliban, because they do not have the possibility for opium production and commerce.

While the resources of the Islamists are drying up, the strength of the enemies of the al-Shabaab is continuously increasing. There are also serious tensions between the Hizb al-Islam and the al-Shabaab, and the friendly declarations can not cover it. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, one of the biggest Islamist groups, made a deal with the TFG in March 2010, leading to its almost 3 000 warriors – hypothetically – backing the army of the central government.<sup>47</sup> The AMISOM has been growing ever stronger, and if this trend continues, with the support of the new EU-trained TFG forces, the AMISOM could be strong

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<sup>44</sup> Somali militant group al-Shabaab could split. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/10/08/feud-somali-militant-group-al-shabab-split/>. Downloaded: 23-09-2011

<sup>45</sup> Wise 2011, 6-8.

<sup>46</sup> About Drone campaign in Somalia see Enter the Drones 2011

<sup>47</sup> The TFG makes a deal. [www.stratfor.com](http://www.stratfor.com). Downloaded: 21-09-2011

enough to extend the control of the central government to the countryside. Although the al-Shabaab still has a serious potential, and it is still a long way to go to pacification, after the years of aggressive offensives the militia had to take a defensive position.

***The potential future of the al-Shabaab and Somalia – the new age of warlords?***

The al-Shabaab's spokesman, Ali Mohamed Rage, stated that the withdrawal of his militia was only a tactical manoeuvre, and it would be followed soon by a counter-attack.<sup>48</sup> Indeed, the al-Shabaab did not totally leave the capital. The organization and its allies are launching the same kind of guerrilla campaign against AMISOM and TFG as against the Ethiopian troops during 2007-2009. But we must recognize that it is a setback: the militia, which controlled almost the whole capital, has currently strength only for some local attacks. As we could see in the previous chapter, the al-Shabaab suffered serious casualties – both in human and spiritual sources.

The success of the al-Shabaab comes again from the weakness of its opposition. The TFG and the Parliament are not able to govern the country: they are corrupt, incompetent and divided. They also lost their credibility in the eyes of the Somali people, and a change can only be expected in 2012, when – in order to consolidate the transitional institutions – the Somalis will elect a permanent government,<sup>49</sup> if the current leaders keep their promises.

Currently, the AMISOM is a key factor for the stability in Somalia. However, the current number of troops is enough only for the stabilization of the capital – or even less. It was obvious that the stabilization of Mogadishu – i.e. only one city – after the withdrawal of the al-Shabaab and the filling of the vacuum left by them, is a great challenge for AMISOM and the TFG.<sup>50</sup> The al-Shabaab has strong positions in the Bay and Bakool regions, and a successful attack against the militia is unimaginable without a prior reinforcement of the AU's mission. And although the government of Uganda and Burundi plans to contribute more troops to the mission in Somalia, their deployment depends on financial contributions from abroad, which is still not available.<sup>51</sup> Without further TFG offensives, the al-Shabaab can hold their lines in Central and Southern Somalia; moreover, the militia can be reorganised with new recruits,

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<sup>48</sup> Spokesmen 2011

<sup>49</sup> Somali Leaders Agree to Hold Elections in a Year.  
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=14457294>. Downloaded: 21-09-2011

<sup>50</sup> TFG and AMISOM Battle al-Shabaab in Mogadishu.  
[http://somalireport.com/index.php/post/1516/TFG\\_and\\_AMISOM\\_Battle\\_Al-Shabaab\\_in\\_Mogadishu](http://somalireport.com/index.php/post/1516/TFG_and_AMISOM_Battle_Al-Shabaab_in_Mogadishu). Downloaded: 21-09-2011

<sup>51</sup> Kenya accuses West of neglecting Somalia, anti-piracy flotilla waste of money.  
[http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/UN\\_UN\\_WORLD\\_SUMMIT\\_KENYA?SITE=ILROR&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT](http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/UN_UN_WORLD_SUMMIT_KENYA?SITE=ILROR&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT). Downloaded: 30-09-2010

and it can collect its energy for a new attack. Although it is hardly imaginable that the central government could be overthrown by the Islamists, the prolonged war between the TFG and the al-Shabaab – or other radical groups – could continue for decades.

Another important question for the AMISOM and TFG is how they can work as state building actors. They should extend their central power to the newly seized territories – a thing which has not existed in Somalia since 1991. Mogadishu can be the first bigger territory where the TFG can act as a functioning government and prove its ability for the leadership of the country. It is not too likely, however, that the TFG will be more successful in the whole of Mogadishu than earlier in only some districts of it. Unfortunately, based on the experiences of the last seven years, it is doubtful whether the TFG can create working public services in the newly captured districts of the town, whereas the AMISOM does not have enough capacity and experiences to do it either.

Still, who will fill the vacuum if the TFG is not capable of doing it? The trends of the last month show that it could be achieved by the local strong men. Since the early '90s, they learnt that they have to change their names from 'warlord' to 'governor' or 'president'. Now they do not rule nameless areas, but 'regions' or autonomous 'states'. If we have a quick glimpse at the most realistic political map of Somalia,<sup>52</sup> we find the following entities: Azania, Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug – not to mention Somaliland. While some of them really function as a state – like Somaliland, Puntland – others – like Azania, Galmudug – are rather like the territories formerly ruled by warlords. Their boundaries are indefinite and flexible, sometimes overlapping. The public services run by them are negligible, but all of them has its own 'army' – militias, which are under the control of the local leaders and elders, not the central government – even though most of these regions are namely under the governance of Mogadishu. The most visible activity of these little entities is that they fight local wars between them for the control of taxes and local resources.<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, in many cases, even the external signs of the functioning of state administration are lacking, too: the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama rules its own territories without any direct links to the TFG,<sup>54</sup> although hypothetically the Islamists accept the authority of the central government. It is still an open question how the TFG can extend its control to these entities, when their leaders and 'governors' often

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<sup>52</sup> Somalia's Ever-Changing Boundaries.  
[http://somalireport.com/index.php/post/1282/Somalias\\_Ever-Changing\\_Boundaries?PHPSESSID=8e0dd6dd63667b9bb7fc39c5a6ddaafa](http://somalireport.com/index.php/post/1282/Somalias_Ever-Changing_Boundaries?PHPSESSID=8e0dd6dd63667b9bb7fc39c5a6ddaafa). Downloaded: 21-09-2011

<sup>53</sup> Puntland and Galmudug Reach Deal in Mogadishu.  
[http://somalireport.com/index.php/post/1512/Puntland\\_and\\_Galmudug\\_Reach\\_Deal\\_in\\_Mogadishu](http://somalireport.com/index.php/post/1512/Puntland_and_Galmudug_Reach_Deal_in_Mogadishu). Downloaded: 21-09-2011

<sup>54</sup> Besenyő, János – Kiss, Péter Á. – Resperger, István: *Országismertető – Szomália*. Sereg Szemle, Székesfehérvár, 2010, 69.

conduct hundreds or thousands of troops – and they insist on maintaining their practical independence and power.

During the fights of the recent days, it has become obvious that instead of AMISOM and TFG, which did not have enough capacities for it, the local militias filled the vacuum left by the al-Shabaab. Near Bosasso Village a former officer of the Puntland Security Service, Bashir Said Osman ‘Goobe’ occupied three villages with his forces and blocked the main roads in order to collect taxes from the merchants.<sup>55</sup> In the Wadajir District of Mogadishu the soldiers of TFG had serious clashes with the militia of Ahmed Da’i, the strongman of the area when the governmental forces wanted to capture a checkpoint where Da’i’s men collected tax from the local inhabitants. Similar fights were reported from Dharkenley.<sup>56</sup> In Puntland, the local militia defended a famous pirate leader from the policemen who wanted to arrest him, because he belonged to the same clan as the militiamen and financed their operations.<sup>57</sup>

To sum it up, al-Shabaab lost serious territories and suffered a serious number of casualties. However, the AMISOM and the TFG are not capable to fill the vacuum left by the Islamists, and the abandoned areas now come under the control of the local strongmen and their militias. Because the TFG has no capabilities and clear scenarios how to extend its power, it seems very likely that in the next years the withdrawal of Islamists will not result in the strengthening of the central Somali government, but leave to a new rise of the local warlords, whose power can be as dangerous for the TFG as the rule of the al-Shabaab.

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<sup>55</sup> Militia Take Control of Bosaso Village. <http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1578>.  
Downloaded: 23-09-2011

<sup>56</sup> 4 Killed in Militia Clashes in Mogadishu.  
[http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1501/4\\_Killed\\_in\\_Military\\_Clashes\\_in\\_Mogadishu](http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1501/4_Killed_in_Military_Clashes_in_Mogadishu).  
Downloaded: 22-09-2011

<sup>57</sup> Militia Defends Pirates from Police. <http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1492>.  
Downloaded: 23-09-2011



**PROSPECT OF REFORMS OR DOWNFALL  
SYRIA AT CROSSROADS BY THE "ARAB SPRING"**

*Introduction*

The so called "Arab Spring" since the beginning brought about changes which were unthinkable even a year prior. Regimes so strong and thought to be unshakable like the ones of Zayn al-'Ābidīn Ibn 'Alī of Tunisia or Husnī Mubārak of Egypt were toppled - not mentioning Qaddāfi's Libya - and many others were shaken so deeply, that it seems only the matter of time to fall. Regardless of the name, this chain of events which became called "Arab Spring" had such an effect that it's waves even reached some non-Arab countries of the region like Iran, Israel, or Eritrea. While it would be interesting to analyze the phenomenon as a whole, with great regard to the countries effected by it, in this article I will concentrate to an undoubtedly unique Arab country, Syria, which bares great importance to the region, and to the possible outcomes of the crisis it faces in these days. For that, we have to look into the countries a little which were hit by the "Arab Spring" so far – with a sense of categorization – to see the position of Syria in the region; as well as we have to look into Syria internally to be able comprehend to the occurring events in the country. But even this way, I am trying one of the hardest and most dreaded part of the analytical work, which is fortunetelling. Feared it is, since one can only give possibilities, and even with in-depth knowledge and experience on the field – which I posses after living considerable time in Syria – only the future can prove me right. However, considering the rapidity and unpredictability of the events they may just as well prove me completely wrong. In any case, I wish to present the condition of Syria in the middle of the crisis caused by the "Arab Spring" phenomenon, to give a better understanding.

*The Countries and the Reactions*

Since the beginning of the "Arab Spring" sometime December 2010 almost all Arab states and regimes were challenged by protest and uproars. Their responses and in consequence the results were very different however. So we need to categorize the countries which are "over" their crisis, and only by doing so we can imagine scenarios for Syria. So as far as I see, we could see four categories of Arab states in regard to the "Arab Spring".

First of all, and no doubt this kind is the most untold, is the category of countries which were very lightly hit, or not hit at all. These are Mauritania, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Palestine, and even – regardless of some opinions stating otherwise –

Lebanon. The society in these countries stayed quite indifferent to the wave of protests, but for different reasons. Sudan, Palestine, and Iraq presently face such problems internally, and the violence is in such level that the society had no sensitivity for political changes. In plain language, the people had way bigger problems. Similar to them are Mauritania, and Algeria. Mauritania had three coups since 2005, its economy and foreign ties deteriorated therefore the people need stability above all, regardless of the nature of the government. Algeria between 1991 and 2004 faced a serious internal war on sectarian-religious grounds. The Islamist extremists were only put down, with great sacrifices, and with a lot of blood spilled. Since Abū Taflīqa - a real veteran of Algerian politics - came to power in 1999 he managed to bring peace and stability, and put the economy on its feet once again. Even though there were protests in Algiers in February and March in 2011 the majority of the people did not wish to challenge the rule of Abū Taflīqa in fear of yet another, even bloodier civil war. Therefore the protests could be dealt with swiftly, and in a relatively non-violent manner, by the arrest of some leading opposition figures. The same fear had stabilizing effect in Lebanon. Many say that in fact Lebanon was the first in the chain, since the Lebanese government of Sa‘ad Ḥarīrī was the first to fall, however that change had no effect on the nature of the Lebanese politics.<sup>1</sup> Even though there were protests against the government, the protestors did not wish for the change of the political system, and were equally afraid of a civil war similar to what took place between 1975 and 2000. Similar to that, the people were tired of political conflicts, just like in Algeria, and had their trust, or at least consent for the political system.

The other major group is very similar to the first, with one major difference however. In these countries the protestors did not have economical concerns among their wishes, or least not at the top of their wishes. These countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, and the Emirates. In these countries the main source of discontent was not the economical situation of the country, but the nature of the leadership – since all of these are monarchies – and the foreign policy it exercised. These states have had very fruitful relations with the West, most importantly with America, and by necessity with Israel, which policy was widely considered shameful to the majority of the people. In the case of Saudi it coincided with the strict nature of the system, and its intolerance for respect of religious minorities, most importantly the Shīi community. In these countries the authorities tried to win support by raising salaries, and social support, but protests were put down swiftly, with brutal force. Little was announced about the violent acts of Saudi<sup>2</sup> or Omani<sup>3</sup> authorities since the countries in this category took good use of their positive relations with western states, which prevented them to appear on the agenda of CNN or BBC. Even Jordan, where the opposition was far the most vocal within these countries, and the crisis for a while seemed to reach the level of Egypt, Tunisia did not appear much in the Western media. Strange enough, even the most prosperous Arab state, Qatar had its opposition

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12170608>

<sup>2</sup> <http://newssaudi-today.blogspot.com/2011/03/almazhard-in-saudi-arabia.html>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5355A883-41F0-407F-9F1F-26CE602C669B.htm>

which never really stepped through the groups of Facebook, but had surprisingly big following.<sup>4</sup> Both Saudi and Qatar managed to put the media to good use, since these two countries are the hosts of the two most popular, and influential TV stations, al-Arabiyya, and al-Jazeera<sup>5</sup>. One cannot be surprised that these stations, while they were extremely enthusiastic to broadcast the events in Egypt, Yemen, Libya or Syria, never really said much about the atrocities occurred in Saudi or Oman for example. Quite the contrary, while they did not say much about opposition groups in the Gulf region, logically, they put great pressure to countries more effected by the "Arab Spring" phenomenon. The similar tactic was exercised by other countries as well, like Syria, where the state channel, Sūriya dealt with great detail with the economical problems of the United States, the violent clashes in London, the brutality of Bahraini authorities, and the opposition in Qatar, but since their popularity is far behind the previously mentioned stations their were far less efficient.

The next two categories are the states in which the economical and the political problems met, and brought the ruling class to unease. The difference is that in some of the them limited reforms were on the way for long, and even enjoined some support, while some of them even though brought about some changes in the economy, and even achieved some result, never introduced political change. Quite the contrary. While they focused on the economy, the politics in these states became even more rigid, and considered any little change impossible. The former group by my opinion is Syria, Bahrain and Morocco. While the later Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. I will deal with Syria in more detail later on but here I would concentrate on Morocco. Even though Morocco is a very different state from Syria, but there are quite a lot of similarities in regard to the current crisis, and therefore can make an ideal comparison. In Morocco, in the year of 1999 a new king, Muhammad VI came to power after a very unpopular predecessor, just like it happened in Syria in 2000 and in Bahrain in 1999, who all debuted with a series of political, economical, and social reforms. The slow reforms managed to boost support, and ease the opposition. So when the wave reached the regime, it at least had a ground of argument, and could present itself as a regime sensitive to popular claims. While in Bahrain the initial protests were met with brutal force, and resulted in the intervention of the Saudi army, Morocco exercised very limited security measures against the opposition. All countries hit by the wave of the "Arab Spring" announced reforms - real or facade - but Morocco proved to be the most successful. As protests did not calm, the king stepped to up to show himself at the lead of change. Most of the major wishes of the opposition, with the biggest popular support were put together in a national referendum, which was due to July 1 2011<sup>6</sup>, and accepted with great majority. In that way most of the claims of the opposition lost ground, and the ruling elite proved itself open to change. More important, proved itself sincere. As in Syria they are trying the same thing, Morocco is a curious example for Damascus. But undoubtedly this tactic

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EMfslGn7ZiE> , <http://www.facebook.com#!/revolution.in.qatar>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8EABB03E-1C71-436E-BFDF-1C1755F02192.htm> Strange enough, not Al-Jazeera only informed, that peace returned to the Saudi, but talked almost nothing about the protests.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13964550>

has the precondition of previous reforms, since this can prove the openness of the regime for dialogue. That is one the reasons why the wave arrived relatively late, and did not start in full magnitude.

That precondition is clearly shown by the case of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, or Libya. In his last infamous speech, Ibn 'Alī said numerous times: *Ana fahimtkum!*<sup>7</sup>. Mubārak as well changed the government and promised reforms, only to deepen the crisis, since no one trusted the sincerity of Mubārak nor of Ibn 'Alī, but with their previous rigidity they only managed to show that they are weakening. In Yemen and in Libya the ruling elite did not even shown sign of will for change. In reality, their crisis could be credited to the territorial descent between the different parts of the country which did not benefit equally from the wealth of the country. This is a lesson, which should not be lost sight in the case of Syria either, especially since it has a long history there.

### *Syria before the "Arab Spring"*

Syria has an undoubtedly interesting and quite confusing history. One wishes to understand the situation, however, has to take a better look to both the history and for that the rather complex social and economical landscape of the state in hand. Syria in its current form is a relatively new country which - after four centuries of Ottoman, and more than two decades of French control - only achieved independence within the borders we know now in 1946. While in the first years, until 1949 Syria was a quintessential democratic state, the year of 1949 brought three military coups alone, and military control over politics lasted until 1954. Between 1954 and 1958 democratic measures returned to Damascus, but the old - mostly Ottoman and French educated - political class with no real ideology lost support in favour to the new ideological parties, from which in the long run the Ba'at̄ proved to be triumphant. The steady gain of influence was only halted briefly in 1958, when Syria united with Egypt, but the coup of 1961 which ended the union was backed and organized mostly by the Ba'at̄ and its supporters. With a new coup in 1963 the Ba'at̄ - previously eliminating all possible concurrence - finally rose to power only to carry on the struggle for power, but this time within the party. Between 1963 and 1970, when pretty much the current power constellation took control at the lead of the Corrective Movement, Syria witnessed seven major, and numerous minor coups, counter-coups, and attempts, which not only deteriorated the party organization, but foreign ties and the economy as well. Syria needed to be reconstructed, for which, with newly achieved stability there was a chance, basically the first time since independence.<sup>8</sup>

The inner fight within Ba'at̄ circles can be traced back to the original structure of the party, which from the very foundation was made up of two wings. A civilian - mostly with urban, educated Sunni, and Greek Orthodox following - and a military one - mostly by 'Alawī, Drūz, Isma'īlī, and Christian following, who rose to

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<sup>7</sup> Meaning: I understood you! <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AQm45CGcHo>

<sup>8</sup> Seale, Patrick: *The Struggle for Syria*, London, 1986, I. B. Tauris ; Seale, Patrick: *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East*, 1990, University of California Press

prominent positions from the previously neglected position in the French control. In 1963 the civilian wing took the lead only to be overthrown by the military wing, in 1967. The struggle did not stop, since within the party, even within the two wings, regional, sectarian, and tribal connections were major source of power, but conflict as well. That is true regardless the fact, that the Ba'at ideology stands above these boundaries, and claims national solidarity above these factors, as it was always the official stand of any Ba'at government. When the military wing took control, the power struggle in fact continued between 'Alawī, Isma'īlī, and Drūz officer groups, than between the 'Alawī ones, from different regions of Syria. In 1970, with the Corrective Movement with Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad at it's lead, an 'Alawī officer group took control of the state, mostly from the coastal region of Syria around the city of Latakia. While it is true, that key positions were entrusted mostly to 'Alawīs from the same region where the president was from, as the state and the party had to be reconstructed many Sunnis, and Christians were included into the administration.<sup>9</sup>

Syria enjoyed a certain stability and prosperity, which was used successfully to put the economy on it's feet on Arab socialist grounds. As infrastructure, schools, and hospitals were built in an unprecedented level support actually grew for the leadership, but at same time, as its mainly 'Alawī character became more and more obvious, descent grew against it as well within the more conservative Sunni circles. From 1975 on, radical groups of the Muslim Brothers committed a chain of assassinations and openly challenged the regime. The conflict peaked in 1980 with assassination attempts on the life of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, and the full scale uprising of the city of Hama in 1982, only to be put down with brutal military force, and in the long run with the eradication of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. It worth mentioning that even at that troubled time, the real treat for the regime was not the Muslim Brotherhood, since the key officer, and administration posts were held by 'Alawīs, but within the 'Alawī power circle itself. Any real attempt to take charge by Sunnis, right from the beginning, seemed obviously impossible, but bloody and long enduring nonetheless. For security measures, new army branch, the almost entirely 'Alawī Fourth Brigade, and the Sarayyat Difa'a - defense brigades – were formed, to be led by the presidents brother, Rifa'āt al-Asad, and later on by a younger son of Ḥāfiẓ, Māher al-Asad until now. As the result of the uprising – which shows curious similarities to the current conflict – security measures were introduced, and secret services formed like never before, which indeed turned Syria to a very tightly controlled country. Nonetheless, since that brought peace, and stability after seven years of atrocities, and two decades of ongoing coups, that enjoyed a certain support, and understanding as something needed. The economy kicked in once again, with great help from the Soviet Union, and later on Iran. The economy was reconstructed by tight Arab socialist techniques, and upon that successful social services, and social aid was built. The result was a strongly controlled society, which had no real social classes, but a more homogenous one in which rural areas benefited greatly, and only had a very limited financial elite at the top, close to the president. That economy was

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<sup>9</sup> Van Dam, Nikolaos: *The Struggle for Power in Syria*, London, 1996, I.B. Tauris, pp. 34-88

not refitted even after the fall of the biggest foreign supporter of Syria, the Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

When Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad died in 2000, and the new president became his son, Baššār, not much seemed to change. He benefited from his foreign education however, and very soon he implemented various political and economical reforms. In the economy many previous bans were lifted. Private companies, like one of the biggest, Syriatel, and private banks were allowed. As foreign relations were realigned with most neighbours – even with Lebanon after the 2005 crisis, and with old "archenemy" Turkey in 2009 – Syrian economy prospered greatly. Maybe the most symbolic act of the new policies was the opening of the Damascus Stock Exchange in 2010. It is true, that those who profited the most were in kinship of the Asad family – as we find at the top most of prospering new companies people like Rāmī Maḥlūf, cousin of Baššār al-Asad – and the previously so applauded social net weakened by the global economical crisis, still that did not cause such impoverishment like in Tunisia, and such social rift and great numbers of hopelessly poor people like in Egypt. Upon the reforms, infrastructure developed greatly every year. That is the reason, along with the minor political reforms, why Baššār even enjoyed considerable support from the Sunni population as well, which resented ‘Alawī leadership for long. But just as much, that is the reason why – as I heard from many Syrian friends both living in Syria and outside – the Syrian crisis in the eyes of the society is not an economical one, but rather a problem of dignity and respect.<sup>11</sup>

In the field of politics, changes were put in effect. Political parties which were outlawed by the Ba‘at as it came to power, like the Communist Party, and the PPS were legalized once again. It is true, that the major point of the Syrian constitution which states that the Ba‘at the leading power of the society, and the only party that can recruit among youth organizations, governmental officers, and military personals was not lifted, great allowances were made for that two parties. All parties previously had to run in the elections in the coalition of the National Progressive Front – whose Secretary-general is the president of the republic – however these parties could run independently. Their representation in the Parliament – which has little power anyways – is very limited, but even so these allowances aimed to symbolize the changing times. Even the previously untouchable military was softened in last years, as military service was eased from thirty months to nine in steps. In the same way, the personality cult around the leadership was much softened, which I myself could experience first being in Syria between 2004 and 2011 many times. While previously nor the president, nor any member of the Ba‘at party could be criticized openly, and there was real fear among the people about that, by the years of 2008, and 2010 the people could even openly talk about any issue of politics, except the president. Little these changes may seem in any Western state, the effect on the society, and the feeling of a sort of liberty should not be taken lightly. In short, while the structure of

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<sup>10</sup> Van Dam, pp. 89-117

<sup>11</sup> St. Andrews Papers on Contemporary Syria: *Syrian's Economy and the Transition Paradigm*, 2010, Lynne Rienner Publishers

politics in Syria, and its founding upon the military did not change, major reconstructions within were made in the last then years.<sup>12</sup>

### *Events of the "Arab Spring" in Syria*

One saw the first waves of the "Arab Spring" reaching Syria, and the very weightless results of it, cannot understand how the situation escalated to the current level. But just as much strange, after seeing the rapid fall of Tunisia and Egypt and deterioration of Libya, that compared to them the Syrian regime is still in control. The possible answer lays within the understanding of struggle inside the leadership. Only that way one can give possible explanations to the mixed reaction from the government.

As Tunisia and Egypt fell, the *Day of Fury in Syria* was organized on the Facebook, by the Tunisian, and Egyptian example to 5 February, but strange enough by Syrian expatriates. In Syria it had basically no effect, as police and security was increased that day on the streets, but no protests took place. A week from then, an internet coffee owner was arrested in Damascus, as he was accused of taking part in the organizing of the *Day of Fury* - a phenomenon very familiar to the Tunisian, and Egyptian events - but as protests were organized for that man, no violence took place, and the owner was released in days.<sup>13</sup>

The real problems started later in the southern city of Dara'a. In that city children draw anti-Asad slogans on public buildings. The children, not surprisingly were caught soon, and arrested. As protests were organized to free the children, unconfirmed amount of people were shot, and died. Even though the children were freed in response within a few weeks, tension rose rapidly. By yet another other uncertified account the local authorities, which were informed by the protest for the children, were ordered previously not to take any action and by any means not to use force, but at the morning of the protests were ordered to dissolve any gathering without mercy by high-ranking officers who were not local, but arrived to Dara'a the same morning and disappeared without trace the same day. Whatever the truth is behind this, the tension swiftly reached the level of daily protests around the local 'Umarī mosque, which demanded the fall of the regime. It is undoubted that the military contingents, lead by Rustum Ġazālī<sup>14</sup> took action which resulted to many death in Dara'a and surrounding villages, and the temporal closure of the 'Umarī mosque, which was shameful in the eyes of many Sunni people. The government claimed that it only cleaned the area from foreign militants, and extremists. A claim

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<sup>12</sup> Leverett, Flynt: *Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire*, Washington, 2005, Brookings Institution Press; <http://www.ssnp.net/>

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.facebook.com/pages/%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A/137955249600196>

<sup>14</sup> At that time he was the chief of staff, and had extreme harsh statements against the protestors. Since he is from Dara'a himself, and later on jointed the opposition, one can have the suspicion that he wanted to raise tension from the beginning, to run the events on his own favor. As it is stated before, even now, as between 1975 and 1982 the real treat to the regime is within the inner circles.

which was even supported to a certain degree in a live interview in al-Jazeera, by Aḥmad Ḥassūn, the head muftī of Syria, who is a Sunni himself. As Dara‘a was put down, or taken under control by other words, shooting occurred in Latakia, in one of the most well known biggest ‘Alawī centers. Some accounts argued that as protest were about to take place, sharpshooters loyal to the regime shot people to scare them. Some other accounts argued otherwise, stating that there were no protests, but unidentified sharpshooters opened fire on ordinary people only to sow fear and descent among the ‘Alawī community. None of the scenarios can be proven completely, however it seems unlikely that in a mostly ‘Alawī inhabited city protests would have taken place in such great numbers at that stage, that it would have worth to intervene.<sup>15</sup>

As the situation did not seem so serious, yet worth to make steps to boost support for the government, pro-government protests took place in all the major cities from 16 March on, to take use of the brief calm.<sup>16</sup> It was obvious, that the regime wished to put the time to good use. Two days later Asad appeared in the Parliament first time since the first protest in Dara‘a, which was broadcasted in state television.<sup>17</sup> While sure the confident appearance of Baššār al-Asad could seem reassuring enough for many, and the sympathy protests moved many people, it could not extinguish the fire completely. The protests – which even though were achieved through youth organizations, and labour unions close to the party, were completely peaceful, yet something that in Egypt, or Tunisia proved to be impossible – were not convincing since it was an old tool in Syrian politics in hard times. But more important was, that the president did not apologize, nor did he show any shred of remorse, as he only pointed the finger on foreign agents. The protests went on in falling numbers, and falling intensity, but in more and more cities. Except Aleppo, were even by now there were no proven serious protests, except minor ones in the outskirts. Since Aleppo is the economical and commercial hearth of Syria, and therefore profited the most from the last ten years, one cannot be surprised that the regime seems even now unshakable in that city. On 22 March the governor of Dara‘a was arrested, and imprisoned. Various rumours spread that in many cases the protestors were indeed peaceful, and the police had no intention to use force, some people from the crowd – usually claimed to be foreign agents – or from other direction opened fire on the security forces. Since they are not used to anything like this, they returned fire to any direction, which resulted in deaths and injuries in great numbers, and in the vision that the regime is putting down peaceful protests. Most of these happened in Dara‘a for what the governor was changed, and guns were taken away from the police, to prevent such tragic events. While one can see the good will in that, not the sense for tactics, since the same kind of shooting happed even later on, but with the result of many dead policeman. The next step was the change of the government on 29 of March, what could have been articulated well, but failed so, since the new

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<sup>15</sup> <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320113138901721.html> ,  
<http://www.france24.com/en/20110404-syria-protest-town-has-new-governor>

<sup>16</sup> [http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop\\_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?v=2dfRSN1YcmY](http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?v=2dfRSN1YcmY)

<sup>17</sup> [http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop\\_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?v=2dfRSN1YcmY](http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?v=2dfRSN1YcmY)



government was pretty much the old one, with only few real, but more symbolic changes. ‘Ādil as-Safar himself, the new Prime Minister, was Minister of Agriculture in the previous government, and by popular belief was only chosen because his good reputation as not being corrupt. While the change of government had no magnitude, instantly a revision of constitution, electoral reforms, and a national dialogue was promised.<sup>18</sup>

For the first sign of good will, the Emergency Law, which was in effect since 1973, was rescinded on 21 April. Yet another step, without result. While it was well propagated, the Emergency Law was more the question of principals and ideals. It gave special powers to the police and the security services – powers extremely rarely used – but these powers were step by step granted to the services before the lift, which seriously damaged the sincerity of the regime.<sup>19</sup>

As the Dara‘a area didn't calm, military action was taken once again, but in a bigger scale, as the army, this time the Fourth Brigade lead by Māhir al-Asad, sealed off the city, cut electricity and water. It was well publicized in the Syrian media at that time and even before, that unidentified armed people shot both the protestors, and the government, just to sow descent.<sup>20</sup>

While that was not a challenge for the army, and even with the merciless way it was dealt with, yet the other side of the country flamed up. Baniyas on the coast, and Ğisr aš-Šuġūr in the North, right by the Turkish border. While Baniyas was taken care of like Dara‘a was – even though this time rumors spread that Muslim extremists from other countries were caught in the city – Ğisr aš-Šuġūr proved to be more challenging. Opposition sources told, that the city rose completely, and the military crushed the uprising brutally causing many to flee to Turkey, but the state media argued that terrorists took control of the small city, and mined the highways and bridges into, which the army cleaned out and liberated the city. Both previously and here, I try tell the events from both point of view. That I do not as much in the search of the truth, but more to point out, that the “facts” can be interpreted both ways, as they actually are, and in the long run not the truth is what counts, but what the people think. In the case of Ğisr aš-Šuġūr, after the army took control once again, a mass grave was uncovered, with 12 dead policemen, and soldiers.<sup>21</sup> While in one way that was well interpreted as foreign terrorism, with the “confession” of one of the caught terrorists stating himself recruited in Iraq. Regardless of the veracity of these accounts, Ğisr aš-Šuġūr proved to be an ongoing issue, and a serious diplomatic obstacle since the army presence in that vicinity of the Turkish border caused tension between the two counties. After Ğisr aš-Šuġūr, the situation seemed to reach a stalemate. The tension seemed to ease, occasional pro-government marches – even though more often only in Aleppo, or by people from there – could be organized,

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<sup>18</sup> <http://www.damaspost.com/>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/7704>

<sup>20</sup> Syrian Tv news, April 25-29

<sup>21</sup> Before taking the city, state TV announced 80, and later on 40 as well. Syrian Tv news

but the sporadic protests were ongoing, and the Dara'a area did not cease to be problematic.<sup>22</sup>

That stiff situation went until 31 July, the day before the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan, when the events escalated in Hama. In the few weeks prior to that, the condition was very frustrated in the city, protests were big, and ongoing, but the authorities tried to restrain themselves, as they took camp in the suburbs, and only occasional they hit on certain protesting centers. In 31 July, the army sealed off city, as it surrounded it, and started a systematic take over. That was met with considerable resistance, as the army encountered - mostly in the suburbs, but even in the city center - armed groups, who on one side were presented as desperate locals, but on the other side as "armed terrorist groups" who were mostly foreigners and held the city under oppression. As al-Jazeera presented footages about the army action, the Syrian state media didn't hesitate to air footages on which these resistance groups were seen, with brand new American weapons. Hama was taken with the military, which caused controversy. One part of the society saw the action as the most brutal sin against true believers by an atheist, heretic regime, which did not respect even Ramadan, and therefore huge protests broke out in most of the big cities – except Aleppo – after the *tarawīh*<sup>23</sup>. That was even worse by the fact, that the same situation was ongoing in yet another major city, Dayr az-Zūr, east of Syria, on the bank of the Euphrates river.<sup>24</sup> Other part of the society panicked as they believed the state media, and got scared from foreign intervention. Hama held special place in Syrian conscience. The conflicts peaked in '82 in that city which was put down brutally.<sup>25</sup> Many saw the history repeating itself, and the death toll caused even bigger controversy. As hundred and fifty people died in the first day, and another two-three hundred during the weeks to come many sad, that the same genocide takes place. Many other argued, that the army is only defending the country, just as the state television claimed, since many soldiers, and police died as well. Their argument was even supported by the number of the dead, since it was far from the number in '82, arguing, that if the army used full force in the city with the inhabitation of 700 thousand, thousands would have died at least. So from that point of view the army really liberated a city which was taken over by foreign groups, and extremists. They only felt proven right after the military action was over both in Hama and in Dayr az-Zūr, since the state television made many interviews with locals, who in fact thanked the army to bring back life to normal, but news from here by al-Jazeera stopped. Many thought that two cities would be the real turning point in the chain of events, but that actually didn't happen. There was no real desertion – except few unconfirmed

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<sup>22</sup> <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Syrian-Revolution-News-Round-ups/108855819196476?sk=wall>

<sup>23</sup> Islamic religious tradition, in Ramaḍān. After the evening prayer, the last prayer of the day, local people gather in one place, read the Qurān, and pray together for normally an hour, hour and a half.

<sup>24</sup> That as was a sensitive issues, since the city is the gate to the far side of the river, which is almost completely Kurdish inhabited. Kurds were relatively peaceful, regardless of the long tradition of conflict between them and Damascus, especially after one of the first reforms on the president. On 35 March the president gave citizenship to approximately three thousand Kurds, who were previously, from the legal point of view nonexistent. But as Dayr az-Zūr seemed to get out of control, there was real fear, that the whole Kurdish area would flame up.

<sup>25</sup> the reports of the death toll of the city that year range between 5 to 25 thousand. Van Dam pp. 111

reports – from the army, but even though these cities calmed down, the rest of the country did not.<sup>26</sup>

However, the next event, the conflict in Latakia between 18 and 27 August which seemed to have much bigger magnitude, had considerably smaller impact. The army, right after Hama went on to Latakia, where mostly Palestinians rose up. Many shipments of weapons by boat were caught from Lebanon, and the majority of the Syrian society was sensitive for Palestinians, since Syria sacrificed a lot in its history for them. It seemed risky to use force in a city which is known to be a strong ‘Alawī, and therefore pro-regime stronghold, but in fact the city was not hit, only the southern, poorer, Palestinian inhabited districts. With very few deaths – compared to previous events – the city was taken under control, and seems to be so until now.<sup>27</sup>

Since the end of Ramadan and especially from mid-September Homs in the middle of the country seems to be problematic, and flaming up, which city – mostly its poor, and underdeveloped eastern suburbs – was a hotbed of conflicts since May. More and more reports are to be found about massive desertion in the ranks of the army in the city, but army operations are ongoing, nonetheless. The desertion reached that point, where information was publicized – however still not confirmed by any reliable source – that Free Syrian Army was formed, and its number claimed to reach ten thousand.<sup>28</sup> While this number seems to be big, even the sources admit, that they are scattered along the Lebanese border in the mountains. Since they have no high ranking officer at their lead – and even the one they had, their leader, Ḥussayn Harmūš – was caught in 19 September, and they lack heavy weaponry, they can be dealt with easily, once the army is freed from its duty to control the major cities.<sup>29</sup> Especially if we take the Fourth Brigade into consideration alone, with its thirty thousand well trained and equipped troops, which is almost completely ‘Alawī, and so far absolutely loyal.

So where do we stand now? There is military scale, and there is political. On the military level, the eastern part, with Dayr az-Zūr as the key city, and with its Kurdish population seems to be relatively controllable, even with sporadic protests in smaller, less important cities. So seems the coast as well, with Latakia, and Tartūs, which has great ‘Alawī population, and therefore its support is crucial for the regime. Hama is quite calm as well for now, after the military action, but with reportedly minor military presence. The south, around Dara‘a especially, and Homs in the center still resist the government. The main question about them is not whether they can be put down, since the population is not big, and even Homs which has bigger inhabitation is quite controlled itself in its center, only its suburbs being hit by military action. The question is more that how big defections will they cause in the army. The most important after the coast, which is sensitive for the regime, there is Damascus and even more importantly Aleppo. Damascus with four million, and

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<sup>26</sup> <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Syrian-Revolution-News-Round-ups/108855819196476?sk=wall> ; Syrian tv news July 31

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Syrian-Revolution-News-Round-ups/108855819196476?sk=wall>

<sup>28</sup> <http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=556aef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=77cebe3642>

<sup>29</sup> [http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop\\_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?v=TooF0roBX4E](http://m.youtube.com/index?desktop_uri=%2F&gl=US#/watch?v=TooF0roBX4E)

Aleppo with six comprise almost half of the Syrian population. Aleppo is the economical hearth of the state, after Damascus. While there are serious conflicts in the outskirts of Damascus, like Dūma, the city itself is calm, and Aleppo as well. No uprising can win over Syria from within, while that two cities are under control, and connection between them can be held. Homs is important in this issue, being in between, but so far the link is unharmed.

On political level the question is whether the people will be won over by the resistance or the government. The change of government had no real effect. In mid-September the long advertised National Dialogue started, with all legal political organizations – which are much more than the parties in the Parliament, and with many opposition parties among them –, and youth organizations, to discuss the reform process. The new Election Law was introduced, which will let many more parties participate in the elections, even though the most crucial constitutional degree, which states the Ba‘aṭ as the leading force of Syria is yet untouched. On 18 September the Syrian National Council was officially formed in Istanbul.<sup>30</sup> Behind them we can find quite unknown people, like ‘Usāma Munāğid at the top, who live in Western countries, most of them in America. This group formed communities in the Facebook from the beginning, and providing information through the internet to many. They acknowledge Western, mostly American support behind them, but since their connection to the people is small, they can only be useful tool for Washington, if wishes to penetrate Syria, but not as a force which can rally massive inside support behind them inside. Especially since the majority - protestors, and loyalists as well - refuse for foreign intervention. Many thought, that the fall of Qaddāfī will boost the protests, but after many videos were aired from the destruction of the NATO hits in Libya, many turned away from opposition figures in fear of similar destruction. Even the example of Tunisia, and Egypt start to slowly backfire now. While in the beginning they seemed as tempting examples, since the political situation is still chaotic in Tunisia, and the not much changed in Egypt other then the new - which is a group of army officers, old colleagues of Mubārak - regime humiliated the the last president. As Egyptians seem to turn against Israel with protests attacking the Israeli embassy, extremists attacked many Christians as well, which poses the treat of sectarian conflict in Syria if the current regime falls. Now as Christians are a biggest part of the society in Syira, and their faith is likely to be shared by ‘Alawīs, Drūzes, and Isma‘īlīs as well, that is a prospect what many Syrians fear.

The international level is just as confusing, but important nonetheless. While most Western powers, with America at the lead support the protests, and try to put pressure on the government by sanctions against the most important Syrian politicians, and the state, that so far had only economical effect, and very minor political. The economical effect should not be taken light since on 21 September, the government decided to cease import, to stabilize the foreign currency reserves. Russia stands steadily by Asad, vowing to veto any UN Security Council resolution against Damascus, and can ease the economical pressure as well. So does China.

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<sup>30</sup> <http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=556aef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=8860e9e9e9>

Russia was very vocal about its support, and so far sent many delegations to Syria, to show support. That again seems to be a tie. Iran, a long ally of Syria, and a bulwark of Iranian penetration to the Arab world, stands behind Asad. Even though reports claim that Ahmadīnežād himself turned away from its previous support, the economical aid which it provides to Syria - and which was increased in April - is ongoing.<sup>31</sup> It seems very unlikely that Iran would abandon Syria, since that can do no good for Tehran. If Asad falls, either an Islamist Sunni regime comes, or moderate western fabricated one, and both of them would turn away from Iran, which would cut Iran's ties to the Ḥizb Allah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian issues, which both were on the top of Iranian foreign agenda for long. Turkey shows just as confusing picture. While Erdoğan took much credit by improving relations with Syria, and therefore with the Arab world in consequence, and had many investments in Syria which helped the Turkish economy, could not turn a blind eye to the military actions of an 'Alawī regime, against the Sunni majority since he himself tries to rally conservative Sunni support, and 'Alawīs have a bad reputation for the majority of the Turkish society. Turkey in the middle of the Hama operations sent its Foreign Minister to Damascus, and took credit for the pull out from the city, which took place the next day. When operations started in Latakia, on 19 August Erdoğan announced a 15 day deadline for Damascus to stop the violence. But when the deadline was over, not much happened. The latest event is that the Turkish Prime Minister on 26 September called Asad a liar in a press conference, and called on him to step down. Even promised economical sanctions against Syria.<sup>32</sup> However Turkey was many times accused by resistance, like the Syrian National Council, that secretly helped Asad, and took part in catching Harmūš, head of the Free Syrian Army, even though it gave space to its formation. Turkey is not likely to take serious action, and the answer lies by the tradition of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey was always vocal in regional issues, with statements possible to interpret both ways, but never severed its ties with anyone irreversibly. In short, it was always vocal, but never took any risk of ending up on the loser side.

Lebanon is just as interesting, and just as important. The ties were always tight between Beirut, and Damascus ever since 1976 when Syria interfered in the Lebanese civil war, to bring the case to its favour. The situation was further severed in 2005, when the blame of the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Ḥarīrī was put on Syria, and after massive protests, Asad decided to pull the Syrian troops out. The diplomatic ties were far from free of conflict. Yet now Lebanon expressed its support for Syria, and helped in many ways. It is due to the fact that the current Lebanese government is mainly Ḥizb Allah supported, whose main foreign supporter is Iran, and Syria. Now if Syria falls, so falls the foreign support of the Ḥizb Allah, and possibly the party itself as well. Even though the Ḥizb Allah does not have a majority support in the Lebanese society, the helpful actions of the

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<sup>31</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html?_r=1)

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-257921-erdogan-says-turkey-to-evaluate-options-for-sanctions-on-syria.html>

government towards Syria were welcomed mostly. That is, because many Lebanese fear from Israeli intervention, if America would take ground in Syria.

The action of many Arab, most importantly many Gulf countries are mixed, and they face similar dilemma to that of Turkey. Many of them, most of Saudi, did a lot to shake the ground under the Ba'at government of Damascus, as it is considered "infidel" from their point of view, however now they cannot be so open about their agenda, as they faced protests themselves, and may face again. They know as well, that a stabile Syria is much better than an unstable one, and the "Arab Spring" should be halted, before it shakes them. For sure the Saudi, and the Qatari governments are to found behind al-Arabiyya, and al-Jazeera which cause much trouble for Asad, yet their official statements are rather mild. As later development, the Arab Parliament - which was founded in the 2001 Arab League summit in Amman, and should have started its work in 2010 by original plans with Damascus as its capital - suspended Syria's membership on 27 September. These moves are rather symbolic, however, only to save face for Arab leaders as they could present themselves as doing something, yet not severing their ties with Syria completely. Since Syria has vital strategic location, supporters like Iran, Russia, or China, and an economy of great possibilities they need a Syria just as much Syria needs them.<sup>33</sup>

### ***Conclusion. The Prospects***

By logic, two possible scenarios can be imagined for Syria. The current system will either fall, or stays, least for some time.

The fall may seem possible, by every passing day more unlikely. Tunisia fell within a month, and Egypt less than. Bahrain, where the result was quite the opposite, was also deal with in a month. But Syria, while faces big obstacles is even now far from falling. The possible crash can be internally, or can come from the outside. As we could see before, foreign intervention is unlikely. The US faces presidential elections next year, and Obama, who promised to end the Iraqi and the Afghan campaign yet failed so far to do so, would not risk another campaign - which is still likely to be a hard one, as the Syrian army is stronger than the Iraqi was in 2003, and the people would not welcome an American intervention, therefore would stand by the government. Israel, the next possible attacker is much more concerned by its internal crisis and the developments in Egypt. An action against Syria would only bring the revolting Arab streets together, and would push their respective governments to step against Tel-Aviv, while not gaining much. Israel itself has internal problems, not just as Palestinians push for their acknowledgement as a UN member, but by severe protests against the Netanyahu administration on social grounds. France, which always played crucial role in Syria, and Lebanon and put great pressure on Damascus, faces presidential elections soon as well. As the matter a fact, the whole EU has such great economical crisis with Greece as the most crucial issue, that EU powers simply lack the will, and the capability for the moment. Even

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<sup>33</sup> <http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=556aef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=77cebe3642>

Libya was a very expensive adventure which is yet to be stabilized, and the gains from that campaign to exploited, before any other action could be done. True enough, that Syria has an economy with great potentials, but not with oil reserves like Libya, therefore it is a far less "tempting prize". Turkey with its "always play for the safe" tactic, is not likely to take action on its own. More so, if we consider that Erdoğan tries to gain the favor of the conservatives internally, which he can as long as he is tough against Israel, and can pose as a "peace bringer", but not if he weakens Syria which Israel can exploit on the long run. No other neighbours are to be considered, as they pose no threat. Assad has influential opponents worldwide, but almost equally strong supporters as well, who are for now, are equally far. So foreign intervention is for the moment not likely, and the Syrians do not even wish for that.

A much more likely scenario for the fall of current administration, as it was in the seventies as well, a coup from the inner circles. That is undoubtedly a constant threat, especially Baššār al-Asad himself is not a military person, and therefore not respected by the old military elite of his father, which elite always considered him a weakling, and dangerously liberal. As someone, who would deprive them from their power and influence eventually. Baššār took considerable steps to eliminate that threat from the beginning and in the recent weeks as well. In 2004 he forced Mustafa Ṭalās - possibly the oldest supporter of Ḥāfiẓ, and a rare Sunni on the top layers of the regime - to resign from all of his positions. In 2005 he got rid of ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ḥaddām, who was the head of the internal structure in various positions for decades, as he was removed from his position as Vice-President, but charged with no other. He left to America where he founded the *Sūriyya al-Hurra* TV station, and worked to overthrow the president who got rid of him. Ever since the protests started, he took steps to take advantage of the situation, but he is even less popular than Baššār himself. With constant reshuffles of the government Baššār freed himself from many of his father's old colleagues to replace them with his younger and more liberal supporters. Mostly with young entrepreneurs, like his cousin Rāmī Maḥlūf. He had to be cautious about the old army officers however, since they could easily depose him given they felt threatened. Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, careful eyes could witness some possible moves toward army coups. Mostly, by the aftermath since these were all foiled so far. The first of the chain was possibly Rustum Ġazālī, who was relieved from most positions after his harsh measures which by now could seem as steps for a coup by increasing tension. He left Syria sometime end of August to Lebanon, where he served as commander of Syrian forces while they were present in Lebanon, and where he spoke out against the regime. Many saw him as a possible army leader of the revolution, even though he was unpopular himself, as regarded corrupt, and because of his involvement in the Asad administration. He was shot dead on 21 September by unidentified assassins, who are likely to be Syrian secret service agents. The other line in the chain was Maḥmūd ‘Alī Ḥabīb, an old veteran of the Lebanese civil war, where he fought successfully against the Israelis. He became Chief of Staff in 2004, then in 2009 Minister of Defense. He was relieved in 8 August, and died by a mysterious heart attack the next morning.<sup>34</sup> By some accounts, he

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<sup>34</sup> <http://www.albawaba.com/main-headlines/reports-fired-syrian-dm-found-dead-387588>

committed suicide. On 26 September the Deputy Chief of Staff, Bassām Naǧm ad-Dīn Antakiya died from heart attack, but then again likely to be eliminated, as was suspected that he would turn.<sup>35</sup> By that we can see, that even now, the security services led by Āsif Šawqāt, the brother-in-law of Baššār still in control. As these attempts are foiled either the services can permanently prevent an army coup, or will only make them more closed and organized, so if they try, they will be successful. So far however, the former seems likely. As the main army battalions, the air force, and the special units are under control, as the majority within their ranks is ‘Alawī, only a coup could turn them against the current leadership. From that point of view, even minor desertions are not dangerous, since they can be dealt with easily. With these battalions, the loyalty of the army is given, and by rule, no revolution can win, without at least passive support of the army. Like in Egypt, where the army did not join the protest, but defended the protesters, when loyalists wanted to use force against them. So even passively, the military must be give credit. But that so far, not likely to happen on bigger scale then sporadic desertion of minor army groups in the middle of street fights.

But what would be the consequences of the fall of the regime? If it happens with a coup, most likely as in Egypt, nothing would really change except some symbolic steps would be taken for seemingly bigger freedom of speech. But if the system would "melt down" then extremists would likely to go loose, and that would end up in civil war. First and most of all, against Christians, and ‘Alawīs. That is such a common sense now, that the regime from the beginning of the crisis posed itself as the only possible force capable of preventing sectarian strife, while the opposition did a lot to comfort the Christians, and ‘Alawīs, and present the government as it sows the seeds of sectarianism. Either way, the result is the same. As the uprising fails to reach the "next level", the frustration grows against minorities, which in consequence position themselves around the Asad administration. It is important to point out, that Syria not only has a history with extremist groups. After 2003 when the Americans invaded Iraq, many Syrians - mostly Sunnis from underdeveloped villages, and poor city districts - crossed the border to fight an "infidel" - Christian - power. Damascus turned a blind eye to that phenomenon, it is favourable to weaken the American positions, and have extremists out of the country. That seems to backfire now, as these people now return, and in the eyes of their local community, they are creditable heroes, who they listen to. If the current regime would fall internally by uprisings, than these "heroes" - mostly in their late twenties not knowing much of the world except fighting - are unlikely to restrain themselves. That is why Eastern Christianity supports Damascus relentlessly.<sup>36</sup>

But what if Baššār survives the pressure? His position will either grow much much stronger, as he claimed many times, of course in regard to Syria, or his

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<sup>35</sup> <http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=556aef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=01d539c808>

<sup>36</sup> Last of the numerous visits was an Eastern Christian delegation which visited the Syrian president, to show support.

[http://sana.sy/eng/21/2011/09/26/371715.htm?utm\\_source=SRCC+Loyal+Contacts&utm\\_campaign=01d539c808-News\\_Roundup&utm\\_medium=email&ct=t\(Syrian\\_Revolution\\_News\\_Round\\_up8\\_30\\_2011\)](http://sana.sy/eng/21/2011/09/26/371715.htm?utm_source=SRCC+Loyal+Contacts&utm_campaign=01d539c808-News_Roundup&utm_medium=email&ct=t(Syrian_Revolution_News_Round_up8_30_2011))



authority will deteriorate fatally. The question in that is whether he can rid himself from the "old guard", the conservatives, still keeping skilled liberals by his side. If he cannot, then at the end he will end up with the support of only old conservative generals, who keep him for the moment in conviniety, but will put him down as soon as the dust settles. Maybe in 2014 in the next presidential election, maybe sooner. If he can keep younger liberals by his side, and distance himself from the older party generation, then he will be stronger then ever. He can implement reforms, which he wanted long ago, but could introduce slowly, being careful to the interests of his father's old supporters, and which are necessary after all these unfortunate events, to gain popular support. That way he can walk the path of Morocco, which successfully introduced reforms, by which the Muhammad VI is stronger than ever. In the first scenario he would end up as a puppet in the hands of the army leaders, while in the second, he would be finally in almost full control. Let's not lose sight of the fact, that Baššār took down some hardliners even before the crisis, like Ṭalās, or Haddām. As now we can see that some old hardliners as mentioned before were taken down, and the secret services are effectively preventing any coup, the later seems more likely. It is true that because of the protests, one of the president's strongest supporter, one of the biggest entrepreneur – and his cousin – Rāmī Maḥlūf had to give up his positions, like the one he had at Syriatel, but his return only possible by the current regime, therefore it is unlikely that he, or the ones like him would turn against the government. Quite the contrary. As the economy experiences much hardship, their support can be vital.

Either way, as Baššār al-Asad stated himself in an interview with Diana Sawyer in ABC, in 2007: "Syria will change! It has to change!" But what course destiny will take cannot be known for sure, as we can only guess the prospects now, but the result of the crisis is yet to be seen.

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## **CONSULTATION**

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### **THE EFFECT OF HEAVY METALS, ALCOHOL AND CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ON PORPHYRIN BIOSYNTHESIS**

#### ***Historical review, military references***

*American and Japanese scientists have published numerous studies on the effects of heavy metals, chemical substances and alcohol on the human body. The symptoms of the poisoning of the long-known and long-used heavy metal, lead were described more than one thousand years ago. Discovering their harmful effects, their utilization has significantly decreased, but they cannot be ignored in our everyday life. Some similar steps were taken in the military as well so that the exposure of the soldiers has been successfully decreased. The heavy metals, certain chemical subjects and the alcohol affect the porphyrin metabolism on a similar way. The symptoms of the intoxications caused by these subjects correspond with the symptoms of the inherited disorders of the porphyrin pathway, the porphyrias.*

#### ***Heavy metal intoxication from the ancient times until nowadays***

The lead is the most wide used heavy metal, that's why the most studies deal with the clinical symptoms, the laboratory test results and the diagnostics of the intoxication of the lead.

Lead was one of the first metals used by mankind. Archeological investigations have proved its presence already in the early Bronze Age. In the ancient Egypt and Greco-Roman Age it was a byproduct of the silver-mining. Generally it is thought, that lead poisoning has existed since the industrial revolution in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but the disease itself is known for thousands of years. Hippocrates (BC. 460-377) has already accurately described the symptoms of lead poisoning: lack of appetite, abdominal spasm, pallor, loss of weight, exhaustion, irritability, paralysis. The same symptoms, which are the typical symptoms of lead poisoning today as well [1]. In the ancient Greco-Roman Age and also in the Middle Age one compound of it, the lead acetate

was used to sweeten wine and food. Sweetened wine consumed daily contained more than 20 mg/l lead. It explains the high rate of lead poisoning among the rich Roman citizens. Some authors mean, the increasing number of infertility and psychosis contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire [2].

For the improvement of the quantity and quality of wine aggregates consisting lead were often used in later ages, as well. Lead poisoning reached epidemical levels at the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in England by consuming “upgraded” Spanish and Portuguese wine, rum originating from the colonies, cider consisting aggregates. The soldiers of the Army of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could not choose but drink the false wine. E.g. the wine catering incident of the Army marching in Bosnia in 1878 caused a huge scandal, when hundreds of liters of false wine were poured into the Drava, and serious investigations were carried out against the suppliers of the Army [3].

The industry has polluted the environment since the industrial revolution, but significantly since the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century with the extensive use of heavy metals and producing various – harmful to human organism – chemical substances. These substances got into the human organism via drinking-water, air and food. There were numerous methods developed for decreasing the exposure of these substances. Lead poisoning was significantly moderated by decreasing the lead-content of the diesel oil, controlling the use of paint and printing ink containing lead and the forbidding of the use of lead-based ceramic glaze. Lead and its inorganic compounds cannot be ignored in our everyday life, but in the USA due to the continuous monitoring of the National Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) the lead content of the air, water and food has been significantly decreased [1].

As a result of the monitoring the number of acute poisonings decreased with the decreasing number of the use of highly toxic materials and environmental pollution. The low-concentration but long-lasting exposure of the heavy metals cumulated in the human organism leads to chronic poisoning. The number of the chronic poisoning does not fall. The blood lead concentration during occupational exposure with lead and its inorganic compounds according to Hungarian regulations may not be higher than 300 ug/l (1.5 umol/l) in women between 18-45 yo., and higher than 500 ug/l (2.4 umol/l) in men or in women over 45 yo [4]. Over 350 ug/l a treatment is necessary.

The soldiers, beside the exposure of heavy metal and chemical substances as part of the general environmental pollution (air, drinking water, food) are exposed to other exposure stemming from their work (e.g. lead exposure due to work with military equipment, usage of lead-core ammunition in closed areas, during providing against catastrophe caused by chemical pollution). That’s why certain steps were taken in the military in order to decrease the exposure. U.S. military ship repairing or renewal has a high risk considering lead exposure. The soldiers removing the lead-based paint of the old ships or welding ships are most

exposed to lead poisoning. That's why coast-guards also participated in the program aimed at decreasing the lead pollution of the environment. They measured the lead-level of the air in the ship repairing workshop before and after removing the lead-based paint and welding the ships, and also the blood lead levels of the working soldiers (as a group of people exposed to high risk). The blood level of lead allowed by Center for Disease Control-CDC is 100 ug/l [2]. The data measured in 1991 were compared with those from 2002 or 2003. It shows the effectiveness of the program that in both cases the lead level of the air and of the blood level of the soldiers decreased compared to the data of 1991 (the last one reduced to half, from 102 ug/l to 52 ug/l), which was reached by using protecting mask and unleaded paint [5].

Observing the air pollution of the shooting grounds 20-38 times higher levels of allowed lead pollution were measured at the shooting grounds of the Special Operations Force (SOF) in 2000. The soldiers practicing here had a blood lead level of 139 ug/l. In spite of introducing immediate new regulations, the monitoring had only moderate success. In 2005 the blood lead level of the soldiers was 68 ug/l, the decrease was 51 %. As a first step it is essential to monitor the lead exposure of the shooting grounds, the filtering of the soldiers by occupational medicine, the treatment of the exposed soldiers, and the decreasing of the lead exposure on the shooting grounds taking into consideration that soldiers need to practice [6].

Many of those having mild lead pollution have lack of symptoms. The appearing symptoms are lack of appetite, loss of weight, abdominal spasm, exhaustion, irritability, anaemia, which appear usually in weeks or longer time, sometimes flaming up.

Certain chemical substances and alcohol cause similar symptoms like lead poisoning, because their mechanism of action is similar: they inhibit or induce enzymes of the hem biosynthesis.

Haem is a cyclic molecule consists of an iron atom contained in the center of a large heterocyclic organic ring, which is a prosthetic group of hemoproteins. Haem is necessary for binding and transporting oxygen (hemoglobin and myoglobin), electron transfer (cytochromes), oxidative mechanisms (cytochrom P450 system, which plays important role in the drug metabolism), degradation of hydrogen peroxide (catalase) and activating it (peroxidase), or for oxidating tryptophan (tryptophan pyrrolase)[7]. In the human body hem is synthesized 80 % in the hematogenous system, 15 % in the liver, 5 % in the kidneys and other tissues. Its synthesis is based on the reaction of the amino acid glycine with succinyl-CoA during 8 enzymatic steps [8].

### ***Heme biosynthesis:***

Glycine + Succinyl-CoA  
↓  $\delta$  – amino-levulinic acid synthetase (ALAS)  
 $\delta$  – amino-levulinic acid (DALA)  
↓  $\delta$ - amino-levulinic acid dehydrogenase (ALA DH)  
Porphobilinogen (PBG)  
↓ Porphobilinogen deaminase (PBGD)  
Hydroxymethyl bilane  
↓ Uroporphyrinogen III synthetase (UROS)  
Uroporphyrinogen III  
↓ Uroporphyrinogen decarboxylase (UROD)  
Coproporphyrinogen III  
↓ Coproporphyrinogen oxidase (CPOX)  
Protoporphyrinogen IX  
↓ Protoporphyrinogen oxidase (PPOX)  
Protoporphyrin IX  
Fe<sup>2+</sup> ↓ Ferrochelatase (FECH)  
Heme

*Figure 1. Biochemical – laboratory – variances*

Lead enters heme biosynthesis at many points. Through the inhibition of the d-amino-levulinic acid dehydratase enzyme the d-amino-levulinic acid concentration in urin will be raised which is an important diagnostic sign of lead poisoning. [9]

In acute lead-poisoning the urin coproporphyrin isomer levels will be raised. Doss et al. measured 10-15 fold raise of urine whole coproporphyrin levels in volunteers 12-24 hours after administration of d-ALA per os, which returned to the normal level in the next 24 horus. Raise of coproporphyrin isomers had similar dynamic in all patients: the appearance of coproporphyrin III was followed by that of II- and IV coproporphyrin isomer, which develop on a non-enzymatic pathway from coproporphyrin III, then 48 hours after the administration of d-ALA the levels of all isomers returned to normal. The aim of this study was to prove that per os administrated d-ALA, as an in vivo model, can be used to study the metabolism of the coproporphyrin I-IV isomers in urine. [10]

Through inhibition of the ferrochelatase enzyme the integration of Fe<sup>2+</sup> into the porphyrin molecule will be inhibited as well. It leads to elevated levels of protoporphyrin IX in red-blood-cells and serum iron, and as a consequence decreased levels of hemoglobin and anaemia. [11]

Trichlorethylene, bromobenzyl and styrene of chemical agents decrease the synthesis of hem through inhibition of ALA-DH enzyme similar to lead. Trichlorethylene changes the chemical structure of the enzyme (Tsukamoto et al. 1979, Fujita et al. 1984), bromobenzyl and styrene inhibits the synthesis of the enzyme. (Fujita et al. 1986, 1987)

***Heme biosynthesis:***

***Effect of heavy metals (Pb), alcohol and chemical agents:***

Glycine + Succinyl-CoA	
↓ $\square$ -aminolevulinic acid synthetase (ALAS)	induction
$\square$ -aminolevulinic acid	
↓ $\square$ -aminolevulinic acid dehydratase (ALA DH)	inhibition
Porphobilinogen	
↓ Porphobilinogen deaminase (PBGD)	
Hydroxymethyl bilane	
↓ Uroporphyrinogen III synthetase (UROS)	
Uroporphyrinogen III	
↓ Uroporphyrinogen decarboxylase (UROD)	alcohol inhibition
Coproporphyrinogen III	
↓ Coproporphyrinogen oxidase (CPOX)	alcohol inhibition
Protoporphyrinogen IX	
↓ Protoporphyrinogen oxidase (PPOX)	
Protoporphyrin IX	
Fe 2+ ↓ Ferro chelatase (FECH)	inhibition Fe 3+ → Fe 2+ inhibition (only lead)
Heme	
↓ Hem oxigenase (HO)	induction
CO, bilirubin , Fe2+	

*Figure 2.*

***Symptoms***

Lead intoxication affects three tracts: its symptoms can be related to the affectedness of the CNS, blood-producing organs, and kidney, the last one mainly in acute cases, that's why its incidence decreased nowadays. Acute lead-poisoning in children often presents with ataxia and spasm. A lot of studies and meta-analysis confirmed in the 1980s that in chronic lead poisoning the lower IQ-points of the children can be related to lower lead-levels as well. After the new results the American Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has reconsidered the allowed blood-levels of lead and decreased it by degrees from the 600 ug/l level accepted in the 1970s to the present 100 ug/l. [2] In adults serious CNS symptoms do not evolve till the explosion is not significant or lead is present as a non-organic compound. [9] Organolead compounds are extremely dangerous. In 1925 when tetraethyllead was first used as gasoline additive the workers died in all three factories. Under healthcare "pressure" it was not in use for a short period. Tetraethyllead is a fat-soluble compound, its absorption through the skin

and getting into the brain tissue happens rapidly. Since there were more and more evidences about lead being extremely neurotoxic in low doses as well, since 1978 it was continually taken away from gasoline. [2]

Abdominal spasm, limb pain, nausea, vomiting, obstipation occur in acute poisoning. Tachycardia and hypertension are almost always detectable. Abdominal and cardiovascular symptoms can be evaluated as part of the autonomic neuropathy, tachycardia, hypertension, sudation is caused by sympathetic domination presented as the consequence of the parasympathetic lesion. The affectedness of CNS is shown by mental changes, insomnia, anxiety, depression, hallucinations, convulsion, agitation, confusion, coma. The symptoms of motor neuropathy develop in some days after the intoxication. Beside the muscle weakness starting in the proximal muscles of the lower limb, and spreading to distal, muscle pain and muscle cramp can develop. [12] In case of a chronic lead exposure the symptoms of the motor neuropathy dominate. In the 1960s the radial paresis or paralysis of painters as occupational harm was a classic example of this motor neuropathy. [9]

### ***Pathomechanism***

The exact mechanism of developing polyneuropathy and abdominal spasm is still unclear. As a result of the inhibition of ALA-DH enzyme, the quantity of d-ALA piles up in the body, which is presumably neurotoxic, on the other hand the quantity of heme decreases in the liver and in the nervous tissue.

The direct neurotoxic effect of d-ALA was proved in several studies. During its autooxidation free radicals will be generated, which damage the membrane function. [13]

The heme is the prosthetic group of hemoproteins. In case of lack of heme the enzyme activity decreases which causes vasospasm (NO-synthase), serotonin accumulation (tryptophan dioxygenase, or the disturbance of the metabolism of the neuroactive mediators (cytochromes P450 superfamily). [14]

It is presumed d-ALA has a direct effect causing gut spasm, which occur during numerous already known receptors. At the same time, d-ALA as an alpha adrenergic agonist, causes intestinal ischemia by means of local vasoconstriction. [15] The role of enteric ganglionitis [16] or sensory neuropathy was also revealed.

Kidney damage is less specific than that of CNS of blood-producing organs, however it is proved that proximal tubular dysfunction or Fanconi syndromue in which amino acids, glucose, phosphate are passed into the urine. This tubular dysfunction is reversible, it returns to normal after a treatment with chelating agents. [9] Anaemia is hypochrom, including erythrocytes with basophilic stappeling.



### *Acute and non-acute porphyrias*

Hem biosynthesis is damaged in both acute and non-acute porphyrias, which develop through the inherited decreased activity of certain enzymes in the hem biosynthetic pathway. Depending on which enzyme is damaged certain types can be differentiated. (Figure 3) Except the first enzyme of the biosynthesis, ALAS, the decreased activity of the other enzymes can be inherited. Porphyria cutanea tarda (PCT) is primarily caused by uroporphyrinogen decarboxylase deficiency (UROD), which can be inherited (familial PCT) or acquired (sporadic PCT). The last one is responsible for 80% of the cases, and as we know now, the simultaneous mutation of more genes (haemochromatosis, cytochrom P450, UROD) regulates this reversible, iron-dependent process, during which the enzyme will be inactivated by hepatotoxic agents. [17] Porphyrias are characterized by the increased accumulation and excretion of the porphyrins or their chemical precursors.

#### ***Hem biosynthesis:***

Glycine + Succinyl-CoA

↓ δ – aminolevulinic acid synthetase (ALAS)

δ – aminolevulinic acid

↓ δ- aminolevulinic acid dehydratase (ALA DH)

Porphobilinogén

↓ Porphobilinogen deaminase (PBGD)

Hydroximetil bilane

↓ Uroporphyrinogen III synthetase (UROS)

Uroporphyrinogen III

↓ Uroporphyrinogen decarboxylase (UROD)

Coproporphyrinogen III

↓ Coproporphyrinogen oxidase (CPOX)

Protoporphyrinogen IX

↓ Protoporphyrinogen oxidase (PPOX)

Protoporphyrin IX

Fe 2+ ↓ Ferro chelatase (FECH)

Hem

#### ***Porphyria:***

ALA DH defect porphyria (ADP)

**Acute intermittent porphyria (AIP)**

Congenital erythropoietic porphyria (CEP)

Porphyria cutanea tarda (PCT)

**Hereditary coproporphyria (HCP)**

**Variegata porphyria (VP)**

Erythropoietic protoporphyria (EPP)

Figure 3.

Certain members of the British Royal Family suffered from acute intermittent porphyria (AIP), e.g. King George III (1738-1820). Martin Warren, Professor of Biochemistry of the Queen Mary University of London suggests that the symptoms of King George III's acute porphyria were caused by arsenic poisoning. A lot of arsenic was found in the hair of the monarch- which affecting the hem biosynthesis- induced his disease. However it is unknown, how arsenic got into his body, namely arsenic was used in this era as antifebrile and as hair-cream. [18] In his reign Great Britain has lost 13 of its North-American colonies in the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) to which

the mental illness as a symptom of the acute porphyria contributed. As far as the cause of his symptoms was unknown and his disease couldn't be cured, the King was put under guardianship in 1810, and from 1811 on the regent, the further King George IV reigned.

### ***Alcohol and hem biosynthesis***

The enzymes participating the hem biosynthesis can be inhibited or induced by alcohol as well, so it causes disturbances in the porphyrin metabolism in healthy persons as well as biochemical and clinical manifestations of acute and chronic porphyrias. After excessive consumption of alcohol a higher level of symptom-free coproporphyrin depletion is measurable (secondary coproporphyrinuria). This increased depletion is reversible, but it can become persistent in cases of alcohol-induced liver damage. Nowadays the secondary coproporphyrinuria caused by alcohol is the most common. As long as PCT is characterized by the accumulation of porphyrins in the liver, acute porphyrias are generally characterized by ALAS induction in the liver and hem biosynthesis-disorder with the stimulation of the pathway without storage of porphyrins in the liver. Alcohol causes clinical symptoms via ALAS induction in acute porphyrias as well. In PCT occurring in liver disease the uroporphyrinogen decarboxylation is damaged due to decreased UROD activity, which will be worsened by alcohol. That's why uroporphyrin accumulates in the liver and in certain cases it is followed by their extreme urinary excretion. Especially in persons with a genetic deficiency of uroporphyrinogen decarboxylase (familial PCT), but also in patients with the so-called sporadic variety of PCT, alcohol is able to transform an asymptomatic coproporphyrinuria into PCT. [19]

Alcohol has many biochemical and clinical effects on porphyrin and hem synthesis: suppresses the activity of ALA-DH, UROD, CPOX, FECH, whereas it induces ALAS. Therefore, teetotalism is a therapeutically and prophylactically important measure in acute porphyrias and in PCT as well. [19]

### ***Alcohol and military***

Excessive and regular alcohol use has negative consequences, including less force readiness among military personnel. The identification of variables associated with alcohol use may help to find the group of risk and may help intervention efforts to decrease negative consequences. In a longitudinal, retrospective study in 2010 the alcohol use of soldiers in Iraq was examined. Participants reported a moderate level of general stress at mobilization and demobilization and a minority reported significant combat stress. Alcohol use in the 2 weeks before the demobilization evaluation was associated with younger age, nonactive duty status before mobilization, and more general stress. Male gender was associated with more drinks per drinking day. The results suggest

that younger, nonactive duty male personnel experiencing stress may be a group at risk for increased drinking after deployment and for whom intervention may be helpful. [20]

On the grounds of the above mentioned alcohol and intoxication with heavy metal or harmful compounds leads to less force readiness among military personnel.

*Abbreviations:*

ALA DH- d-aminolevulinic acid dehydratase

ALAS- d-aminolevulinic acid synthetase

AIP- Acute intermittent porphyria

CPOX- Coproporphyrinogen oxidase

DALA- d-aminolevulinic acid

FECH- ferro chelatase

PCT- Porphyria cutanea tarda

UROD- Uroporphyrinogen decarboxylase

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## **FOCUSING ON EXECUTIVE COACHING**

### ***Introduction***

Examining the efficiency and effectiveness of managerial work, knowledge and experience appear as indispensable foundation-stones, on which the “fortress” can be built. For the stability and long-term viability of this “fortress”, the manager’s personality, attitude, approach and mentality as well are essentially decisive. Since, until knowledge is implemented in practice, it has become applicable and unique, by the manager’s personality and charisma, it is not worth much. Besides, self-knowledge is extraordinarily significant.

Executive coaching is one of the most efficient means for the development of the manager’s personality, attitude, approach as well as mentality. It can be customized for the manager both in its content as well as the overall process, and that is the key to the success of executive coaching. Moreover, the development expert, the coach, accompanies the manager’s journey from initial pledging through skills development and practical application, all the way to the commitment to integrate and use the acquired knowledge in daily operations.

### ***Coaching as a support system***

Coaching as one of the most efficient means of individual leadership development, is an advising manner that provides a supporting frame for the manager to his personal development. During support, the coach aspires to strengthen the belief in the manager, by positive attitude and solution-oriented

mentality – building on the manager’s internal motivation and personal responsibility – that he is able to act for the organization controlled by him and able to form his own working practices and leadership style actively for this. The essence of executive coaching is the support for the manager to transform the knowledge, acquired during the solution of their actual challenges and stops, directly into results, bringing profit for the organization. Executive coaching is about “to learn being together with the manager, while they are seeking for the suitable way in their own world, and to realize those moments of cardinal importance when they are the most open for learning.”<sup>1</sup> Beyond this, however, it is concentrated about the development, teaching – about direct conveyance of behaviour elements related to competencies, and about assisting in learning.

Coaching is the means of constant change, revival and development. Coach and his client are in a relation of the same rank, where communication is “like partners among each other”, confidence works on the highest degree. The basis of this confidence is the assumption according to which, everyone has the information, knowledge and resource that are necessary for the solution of their own vital questions. Coaching is the supporting relationship, in which the coach gives a frame for the clients to find their development objectives, the way leading to realization and the steps necessary for realization. The coach creates a time-space dimension, by conscious, directed communication, in which he helps by expedient questions, confirmative feedback, active attention and silence for the client to have an exact view for his strengths, to be able to articulate his development goals, to become aware of his own resources, supporting powers, which help him reach his desired targets .

One of the essential goals of coaching is to increase both personal and leadership efficiency. During coaching work, the coach collaborates with his client to free the person’s hidden powers. Creating the atmosphere of trust is a necessary condition to free these powers, which may ensure the atmosphere of freedom. Carl Rogers professed that the bigger freedom domain a man has, the bigger chance he possesses to activate his internal powers and the potential, hidden in his personality, become known. In Rogers’ opinion everyone has the power and possibility to make his life the happiest possible according to his fancy, and bring out the best of himself. Will is needed for this; the coach strengthens this willingness during his work and helps hit upon the clue, makes the internal sources recognized that lead to the person’s own best solutions.

### ***Characteristics of executive coaching***

In executive coaching, it is essential to apply ***systems approach***. The manager, who takes part in the development, must be considered as an integral part of the organization, since the manager and the organization are in

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<sup>1</sup> Mary Beth O’Neil: Coaching – a vezetői szerep és feladat tudatosítása HVG Kiadó Zrt. Budapest,2008. p17

continuous interaction with each other. The organization and all of its changes have an effect on the manager controlling it; at the same time the change in the manager's attitude, mentality and leadership style also affect the atmosphere of organization. This mechanism of interaction must be followed with special attention from the development expert, because the demand for executive coaching may appear basically in two forms. One of its forms occurs, when the top management of the organization or the human resources development professional suggests the manager of some level of the organization to take part in the development process. The other form occurs, when the manager himself asks for the coaching process. In the first case, special attention must be paid to the trilateral contract made in such cases: between the commissioning organization, the manager as client and the coach. In this case the real motivation for development is created when the manager's individual goals are aligned with the objectives and demands of the organization.

The ultimate aim of executive coaching is to improve the individual's leadership performance – through strengthening consciousness and taking responsibility. This ensures organizational efficiency in the long run. In case of the managers' development it could mean a difficulty, when these managers may think, they certainly do their work well because they do not get any *feedback* of other directions about their work. The members of Arbinger Institute in their book titled "Leadership and Self-Deception – getting out of the box" approach the question of organizational efficiency from the aspect of self-deception. They think that those, who live in the trap of self-deception, behave as if a "box" would keep them in prison. They are blind toward the reality surrounding them, and this undermines both their own and the others' performance. But the problem is hidden in the fact, they do not recognize that they, themselves decrease performance, as they are imprisoned by the box. Consequently, neither they, nor their results change. Actually, executives spend a great part of their time closed in the box. It is exactly the real root of the performance blocking problem, although, on the surface, it often appears as a management or communication issue, the weakness of team spirit, commitment or motivation.<sup>2</sup>

In the coaching process, special attention must be paid to this phenomenon: the development objective will arise from the real situations, and the manager will be able to look out from the box, recognizing his own strengths, weaknesses and opportunities.

The approach of executive coaching is **solution-oriented**. After the identification of problems and stops, it focuses on the solution of the problem and the steps leading out from the problems. Essentially, the coaching process must be less about problems, much more about the goals, possible solutions,

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<sup>2</sup> [www.arbinger.hu](http://www.arbinger.hu)

former results and concrete steps. This demands a fundamental change of attitude on behalf of the manager and the client, as so many organizations have the practice that instead of solutions they examine the causes and roots of organizational problems; they analyze why they appeared, in the expectation of finding the possible solutions during the analysis and exposure of the problems – instead of concentrating on the most efficient way to solve them.

The coach's *objectivity* has a dominant function in the process of executive coaching. The coach does not take over the responsibility of managing the organization, but perceiving the organizational processes as an external observer, acts like an objective point of comparison in the process of development. The coach gives an impartial feedback without interest to the manager about his management work, leadership style, communication, and about his problem-solving and decision-making ability. The coach, observing from another view point from outside, offers partner cooperation for discussing strategic, individual and personal dilemmas, difficulties, in those themes in which the manager could not turn to the internal colleagues of the organization. The loneliness of leadership provided the basis for the establishment of coaching methodology. Being a leader implies loneliness, because the higher position the executive has, the lonelier he is, and it becomes more and more difficult for him to find partners to speak about his problems openly and sincerely. The coach is such a conversation partner, who is able to link profession to relationship and has a view of the manager's various roles that define his activity, reactions and decisions as an integral whole.

According to the executive coach Mary Beth O'Neil, the coaching relationship is based on trust, mutual feedback, and the authentic presence of the coach and the manager. The process itself is extremely interactive. The signature presence of the coach is capable of calling upon the individual, signature presence of the client. With the help of the coach, the manager learns that he can only succeed when he stands for the objectives, challenges and relationships with all his heart.<sup>3</sup>

Beside trust, *self-confidence* has significant importance. Self-confidence is the key of manifestation of the abilities and the performance – says John Whitmore.<sup>4</sup> In the coaching process, it is essential to close a successful process that the manager reaches the result expected by the end of the process. The task of the coach is to make sure that the manager succeeds to have a clear conception of his own activity, systems and position, and – despite the predictable difficulties – to commit him to the action. One main success criteria is to strengthen the self-confidence of the client, to help creating the right self-

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<sup>3</sup> Mary Beth O'Neil: Coaching – a vezetői szerep és feladat tudatosítása HVG Kiadó Zrt. Budapest, 2008.

<sup>4</sup> John Whitmore: Coaching a csúcsteljesítményért, Z-Press Kiadó Kft. Budapest, 2008.

esteem and to support the recognition that the key of the client's success is he himself and his own efforts.

According to the fundamental assumption of the coach, everyone is the most authentic expert for setting his own objectives and for finding his own solutions. The necessary creativity and power to reach changes are available for everyone and through coaching these can be activated.

This liberating power is increased by the learning and development possibilities of the coaching process. The manager, who is *open for learning and for development* indicates several positive effect from the organizational side. When openness is present in the manager's attitude, during the coaching process, it creates a possibility for easy working, multiplies the power of will to act and it brings courage and persistence into the process by the aspect that the manager wants to cope with the situation and for this he uses the means of coaching as a mirror.

The individual effects of the openness appearing during the executive coaching process are the following:

- the manager's authenticity becomes a role model
- a 'pull-effect' starts: manager has a pulling power on the members of the organization
- addresses strengths and opportunities
- the manager is full of positive energy
- mobilizes, makes the organization move and the people as well
- mediates partnership and individuality and openness for communication

The result of openness, from the organizational side, enables the organization to seek and find the ways of change easier, thus the problem-solving ability strengthens. Supporting culture appears on a high level in the organization, which has a significant effect on the willingness to cooperate, hereby the commitment to goals increases. The organization starts to become a learning organization, in which there are confrontational reactions instead of defensive ones and the organization gets to a qualitative level where it experiences whether it is ABLE– able to make changes and to creation. If a manager has a high-level of openness in a coaching process, it is not the coach, who holds a mirror to the manager, but the manager, who holds it to himself.

### ***The power of executive coaching***

Executive coaching helps the manager to find his own compass, to think over the questions, to find the components through which his internal compass can be activated. As authenticity means internal control, during the coaching process, the coach creates an opportunity for self-reflection, and by the good of self-reflexive learning, it also creates an opportunity for the creation and



representation of a stable value set for the manager. These values function as the internal compass, and if the manager listens to them, they keep the directions to follow in his life in the long run. The definition of the values helps the manager to determine the right strategic directions to his organization and to define achievable, but challenging goals for his colleagues. When the manager knows the values directing him, and controls his organizations along these values, performance reaches a higher level, almost without extra effort.

In the coaching process, the revelation of values means great benefits because it both strengthens working relationships and it is applicable for checking the right directions of development and operation and for the right choice of the tasks in accordance with these values.

If a manager is able to commit to a stable value set and to take responsibility for practicing them, concurrently he will be able to look at his colleagues with a new leadership attitude. The leadership style of the former decades was particularly characterized by authoritarian leadership, where managers could tell the others what to do, and press their will on the others. The others-blaming attitude was a frequent phenomenon, which automatically motivated for throwing the responsibility upon. Unfortunately one cannot clearly speak of these questions in the past tense, because it can be ascertained from the experiences during the coaching processes that the autocratic tendency is strongly alive in today's managers. This management practice must be more and more followed by a leadership style building for participation and cooperation that allows the colleagues to make decisions independently and take responsibilities. It must be accepted that making errors is a natural part of the learning process. Employees must be encouraged to take risks, learn from their experiences when something goes wrong and utilize the acquired knowledge in their work. When you analyze the errors, mistakes, a thinking process is always started: we examine the situation, thoughts are rearranged and new approaches come to light.

The coaching process could provide an excellent example for this, in which the manager, with the assistance of the coach, undergo all the pleasure and benefit of engagement and participation, he can experience the impression of his mistakes, wrong decisions and how he could draw the useful conclusion from this regarding the future. Deriving from his personal experiences, through experimental learning, he could build this approach more authentically into his own leadership style.

However, the manager must acquire the ability of delegation to be able to share the tasks. If a manager does not delegate, his employees will not get used to individual working. Moreover, they can lose the ability of independent work and they will only be able to execute commands. Nevertheless, the ability of delegation is significantly more than handing the tasks. Delegation is patience and support. On the basis of my observations, in most cases, managers are not

able to delegate because they do not trust in the colleagues, and the “faster, if I do it” syndrome guide their activity. Although, it is not the manager’s task to execute the work, he should only manage it.

The manager goes through this development in the process of coaching: he will be able to see out from his “box”, lift his eye higher, he will be able to reach the highest efficiency in his activity by solution-oriented attitude, exceeding his limits and hereby he will become capable of driving his employees to the same development direction.

He will be able to make decisions that activate a real change both in his management work, and in the organization’s workings. Experiencing consciousness has a cardinal importance for this. Because you are only able to control what you are conscious of. What you are not conscious of, it controls you. In the strengthening of consciousness, “coaching raises and emphasizes the particular physical-mental abilities of everyone, and at the same time, strengthens them and the person’s self-confidence too without “giving prescription”. Coaching serves the strengthening of independence, self-confidence, self-assurance, and responsibility... The coach possesses the ability to increase our consciousness to the right level and keep it there, namely in the necessary areas.”<sup>5</sup> Feedback is a strictly related notion to consciousness – the manager may benefit from the coach’s conscious, objective feedback during the coaching process. The client strengthens through the process of coaching and the feedback – namely when the client feels good, has the right self-confidence and knows the reasons and intentions of his goals that are set, from then he can distribute, execute and then follow the tasks with the help of the coach or without him easily.

In the process of coaching the manager experiences the operation of the systems theory that may promote the development of his systems thinking. According to the systems theory, organizations are open, complex systems in which the change in one of its elements influences the general effect of all elements. Systems theory means thinking holistically, in totality, charting the greatest number of mutual effect, and the comprehension of the system’s manifestation.

In the executive coaching process, when the manager starts to view and analyze his own goals and solutions at the system level, with this his relationship to the others changes automatically.

According to Peter Senge, systems thinking is an attitudinal and conceptual frame and system of ways and means, whose aim is to direct our thinking to the understanding of the bigger relations and helps the manager of the organization to concentrate on the longer-term, improving effects in the

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<sup>5</sup> John Whitmore: Coaching a csúcsteljesítményért 49 és 51. oldal részlet - Z-Press Kiadó Kft. Budapest, 2008.

course of making decisions and his acts become defined by the important tendencies, patterns and relations hidden in the depths.

Peter Senge puts an emphasis on the fact that in favour of the decrease of the complexity surrounding us, we are inclined to react for the occurrences, happening on the surface, to narrow the situations down into a “here and now” time dimension, instead of revealing the structures hidden in the depths and the cause-effect relations extending in time.<sup>6</sup>

Essential change in the way of thinking is needed for the acquisition of systems thinking that makes the creation of new problem-solving methods and ideas possible. To see the system, the objectives and patterns in it, one should not stay inside it, but it is worth examining it from outside and above. In the process of coaching, the manager is able to experience this change of attitude by looking at his own situation with a new positive way, with a solution-oriented attitude and as being process-oriented. “Problems cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them.” (Albert Einstein)

### ***Outcomes and effects of executive coaching***

The coaching method by its various application, unique attitude and solution-orientation is able to help all the participants in the business world in the increase of performance, efficiency and satisfaction, and also in the improvement of the working conditions and business results. Concentrating on the individual, the coaching method supports putting forth the individual’s abilities, the gradation of self-consciousness and the composition and achievement of personal purposes. According to Tim Gallway, coaching has an influence on three fundamental areas:<sup>7</sup>

- The span of attention extends – the horizon of the client’s observation becomes wider and he perceives new possibilities of the situation description
- The number of options increases, as new action opportunities arise in the client during the coaching process. He comes to realize that he has the possibility to choose from alternatives and he is able to formulate his future.
- Confidence strengthens – the client’s confidence increases in himself and in his abilities, which he can manage in a difficult situation.

Executive coaching creates an atmosphere of confidence for the manager that motivates for development and efficiency, and strengthens consciousness in the execution of expedient activities. The manager is able to get a more conscious and undertaken self-knowledge during the process, which increases

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<sup>6</sup> Senge, Peter M: Az ötödik alapelv, HVG Kiadó, Budapest, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Peter Szabó-Daniel Meier-Hankovszky Katalin: Rövid és tartós coaching (Megoldásközpontú beszélgetések) SAd Librum Kiadó, Budapest 2010.

his self-confidence and his initiative. His openness increases powerfully, and he becomes able to try new aspects and to plan their consequences, he is able to form the attitude of pro-activity. The efficiency of coaching is increased to a great extent by the fact that the coach gives a sense of achievement to the manager by bringing the individual possibilities of the manager to the surface, and increasing his consciousness.

The successes experienced during the process of executive coaching, the immediately utilizable recognitions, the pleasure of value creation, the feeling of competence, right decisions and the responsibility taken for decisions all strengthen the manager in his work, hereby promoting the efficiency of the organization -- the key of which is the improvement of individual leadership competencies and efficiency, and the integration of these into the organization as well.

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## **CHINA RISING BEIJING IN THE 21ST CENTURY WITH HUNGARY ON THEIR MAP**

### ***Introduction – China Rising***

The 1949-born People's Republic of China started to rebuild and strengthen its role as a regional superpower in the 1980s after decades of Maoist chaos. Economic problems, poverty, and the lack of international partners plagued the country and continued when it was in close partnership with the Soviet Union until the 1960s. Its hegemonic ambitions emerged early in the face of international aid and prosperous credits. Until the end of the 1970s, these tools were used to convince partners that it was worth for them to support China against the Soviet Union in the growing ideological debates. (Vörös, 2011) After Mao's death and after getting over the detrimental consequences of the last years of his rule China required new and upgraded policies among the continuing hegemonic ideology. Deng Xiaoping introduced the new economic policy, the so-called "opening up" and led the country towards market economy, but always kept the characteristics of socialism, as the shocking events showed us in 1989 at Tienanmen Square. Since the 1979 opening China stepped on the road of

successful development and in the 21st century the country has the capacity to become a regional superpower in the transforming multipolar world.

The 1.3 billion-large population makes China the most populous nation on earth (for a few more years, when India's population is going to overgrowth them), governing over the fifth of the world's population while its 10 million square kilometers makes China the third largest country (after Canada and Russia). China, with a 5000-year-long civilization emerged from a "middle kingdom" into a regional entity with economic and political power. Since it has the fastest growing economy in the world (average of 9-10 percent over the past 15 years) and is the second largest economy in the world, China has a pivotal role in the global economy and is impossible to neglect its opinion or interest in global decisions. The Asian giant plays a crucial role in the emergence of the Global South, is a key player in Africa with its extensive policies and interests, steps up beside the western powers in conflicts which has the possibility to smash the global market (for example the piracy at Somali coasts, as János Besenyő and Péter Kiss Álmos explain in detail, increases the costs of shipment<sup>8</sup>) and builds up connections with all the developing countries. China acts as a grown-up democracy in its external policies, although it is without question, not even for a minute, that these steps are always driven by well-calculated interests always profiting for Beijing.

China is involved in several regional and global organizations, made up close ties with the ASEAN also achieving a free trade area and is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, gaining huge power in international decisions. Beijing always criticizes the exercise of military power and steps up beside peaceful methods based on its non-interference policy which is popular between the countries of the Global South. Although it is debateable whether its steps, for example in Africa, fit in this policy.<sup>9</sup> But the fact is that there is relative peace and stability throughout China's borders and it is still unknown, whether the rise of China will cause new security issues and dilemmas or will lead to further peace in the region. As for the moment, it is certain that China needs a stable and peaceful region for its further development and any security problems would just block its peaceful and needed rise.

Thanks to China's "adult" behaviour in international relations, their status is more and more accepted in the international community despite the rule of a single party, but the question of human rights still occurs as a doubt in any multi- and bilateral relation, especially in the case of the EU-China framework. European countries are always more concerned of China's internal human right abuses (steps in Tibet or in the Xinjiang Region, the issues of censorship, blocked internet and controlled media) than its rise as a potential superpower. Of

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<sup>8</sup> See: Besenyő, János – Kiss Álmos, Péter (2009): Kelet-Afrika tengeri farkasai – a szomáliai kalózosok fénykora. In: Afrika Tanulmányok, 2009 (III.) 3-4. szám.

<sup>9</sup> Cf.: Vörös, 2010b.

course, this occurs from the recent changes of the world order: while the dominant US sees Beijing's rise as a threat for its loosening position as the sole hegemon in a unipolar world, the EU considers the Asian giant as an important leader of the upcoming multipolar world, where, as the EU believes, there will be also place for European integration, as well as for another regional superpower.

This attitude helps EU-China relations evolve, and due to the growing economic power of Beijing, European countries esteem China as the most important trade partner (even the strongest European economy, Germany hopes to tie connections in the hope of entering China's huge market) and as we will see, Budapest also expects economic advantages from the growing Chinese presence in the Central European regions.

### *Moderate military power*

Although China became an important actor of global relations, Beijing does not have the capacity to maintain military presence outside its borders for a longer time. This situation is not likely going to change soon, even after that the long-debated Soviet Varyag will join the navy: with one aircraft carrier the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will not be able to demonstrate its power and Chinese control of important trade routes, like the US does for example at the Strait of Hormuz.

The PLA is the largest army in the world with 2.3 million troops though it is not really advanced regarding technology and modern military theories. After the "fiasco" in Vietnam in 1979 (the war ended just after 16 days with the victory of the PLA but the fights revealed all the backbones of the huge army, based on Mao's People's War doctrine: low mobility, weak logistics, dated armour and missing co-operation) Beijing decided to modernize the army and lower the number of troops dramatically from 4.2 million in the 1980s.

In 2007 a US Congress Report according to the slow but deliberate modernization noted that "China's leaders have stated their intentions and allocated resources to pursue broad-based military transformation to enable joint operations that encompasses force-wide professionalization; improved training; more robust, realistic joint exercises; and accelerated acquisition of modern weapons. [...] China is laying the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader regional and global objectives." (US Congress Report, 2007)

The development of the army is well planned, starting from military training, through new strategies and the upgrading of the arms and weapons, equipment, vehicles and crafts. Regarding technologies, the upgrade started with purchasing more developed instruments. Later on, China only bought the licenses of these technologies (also from Israel in the case of aircrafts) and Chinese mechanists constructed the planes, tanks etc. Then they designed their

own types (based on the licensed technologies) and nowadays the PLA switches on the Chinese technology which still has to evolve to catch up with US standards.

It is still unknown, how China will react with a well-prepared army; it is the forthcoming question of the middle of the century. In the near future China will not threaten global, not even regional peace and as several analysts noted, their possible role as a co-operative regional power is also likely: “As Chinese forces become more deployable, more effective, and more experienced, they may also become more useful to leading powers’ efforts to cooperatively counter international disorder – including terrorism – should China choose to follow the “responsible stakeholder” model.” (Carter-Bulkeley, 2007)

### ***Challenges in the 21st century***

Despite China’s growing power, its ability to influence political and economical processes, the country has to face multiple challenges in this century, which can set back Beijing’s development. Amongst these challenges, the major problems are connected with internal processes, but an external problem, i.e. the fluctuation of energy supply is far the most important task to cope with, and we should not forget the emergence of another economic crisis in the summer of 2011.

The main process of this century is the shift to the East, in social, political as well as economic terms. Asia’s and mainly China’s hunger for energy makes the energy market face with multiple needs. The economy of the People’s Republic of China is now the second largest and the country is the fastest-growing major economy in the world. Over the past 30 years it has had an average annual GDP growth rate of over 10 percent. To keep this enormous economy going a lot of energy is needed. China’s need for energy is projected to increase by 150 percent by 2020. To maintain this exceptional growth rate China requires increasing quantity of oil (and at the same time needs to increase the efficiency of energy consumption). The country’s oil consumption grows by 7.5 percent per year, seven times faster than that of the US and the ability to provide its own needs is limited by the fact that its proven oil reserves are immensely tiny in relation to its consumption and future needs. Whereas during the 1970s and 1980s the country was a net oil exporter, it became a net oil importer in 1993 and is increasingly dependent on foreign oil. (Vörös, 2010a) Fuelling the economy and the growth is prerequisite for the Communist Party to keep its power and for the country to be able to cope with the huge unemployment and the growing number of migrants from the rural parts of China to the cities.

The current economic crisis is different than the previous one but might show the same symptoms as the 2008 financial crisis. And it has two fundamentally different origins: the US debt crisis and the EU financial crisis. Given that the world is globalised both problems will have impacts on the global

economy. But given the fact that China is the biggest single holder of US treasuries<sup>10</sup> obviously the Chinese much more interested in the American problem-solving processes. However, because it is a different crisis, Beijing does not have to react as soon as possible, and can wait for the improvement of the steps made by the US. As Yi Xianrong notes, “China has maintained rapid economic growth in the past three years due to ample lending and strong government financial support. As the US debt crisis has only a limited impact on China’s economy, the country should focus more on maintaining an annual economic growth rate of around 8 percent instead of unnecessarily worrying about the showdown in GDP growth. [...] Furthermore, the current issues faced by China’s economy are how to maintain relatively rapid economic growth, ease the overly high inflation and reduce the risk in the financial system instead of avoiding a sharp economic slowdown.” (Yi, 2011) Despite the optimistic voices, the domestic housing bubble (the actual loans and figures are more than twice as much as they were in the US when the previous crisis erupted) threatens the economy and the financial system – according to western analysts<sup>11</sup> who tend to forget that China’s relatively different system, the socialist market economy works in a different and (according to the problem-solving) in a more effective way: even if there is a bubble<sup>12</sup>, urbanization, the lowering prices and the different mortgage practices will help to solve the situation or to avoid crash.

Beside these external challenges, Beijing has to face several internal problems which can block the country’s development. These factors are connected at every possible level and while the Party tries to solve these issues and reacts on them, they also have to keep up the Party’s dominance and the stability of the political system. The first, rather big topic is the country’s population. It seems that the birth control needs to be continued so that the growth rate do not exceed the capacity to supply it. Technically, the criticized one-child policy has so far helped the country manage its population, but naturally caused further problems. According to the government, “the policy has helped to usher in rapid economic development. Without it, Beijing estimates there would have been 400 million more Chinese than today’s 1.3 billion, a huge additional strain on resources.” (Bayron, 2006) According to the problems caused, in a decade, “China’s population is expected to peak at 1.5 billion, and then start to shrink. By then, 20 percent of the population will be over age 65, compared with seven percent at present.” (Ibid.) At this situation, Beijing has to think about how to care about this group, coupled with a missing social security system. Reacting on this challenge, Premier Wen Jiabao announced the pension

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<sup>10</sup> 1100-1200 billion US dollar. Source: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt>

<sup>11</sup> Cf.: <http://www.chinesecrash.com/1/post/2011/06/sp-downgrades-china-developers.html>

<sup>12</sup> Signs for example :Significant numbers of vacant or under-performing commercial and residential properties; High price-to-income ratios for real estate and high price-to-rent ratios for real estate. Based on a list published at wikipedia.org and chinesecrash.com



insurance in the nation's 12th Five-Year (2011-2015) Plan which makes possible for the 800 million rural population to join the programme to narrow the gap between them and the urban residents. "Aside from providing pension insurance, the government will move to make elderly care services available throughout the country." (China Daily, 2011) Another problem of the one-child policy is the overvaluation of sons over daughters (originating from the traditional Chinese family model, where the son stays with his family together with his wife and helps his parents, while the daughters move to their husbands' homes) because without a social security system this is the only way they can ensure their future at old age. There are about 40 million men unable to marry, according to the CIA World Factbook 2011, and this could generate tensions in the society. A further challenge for China is also connected to the population, society and the disintegrated traditional family models: urbanization. Every year, 30-40 million people decide to move to the urban area, causing problems in the society, for the cities and for the labour market.

Beijing also has to react on environmental issues: while committed to GDP-growth, the environment gained less attention. The degradation of nature, the pollution, the rapid industrialization and the huge population all have contributed to the highest rates of water and air pollution and land degradation. While continuing to chase the country's huge growth, Beijing has to "go green" and implement new, more energy efficiency and less harmful technologies unless there will not be land to crop, air to breath and water to drink.<sup>13</sup>

Beside these factors there are political issues as well, like ethnical cleavages especially in the western part of the country (Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur), the huge corruption in the Party, merely on local levels and the challenges and influences reaching the political system (Arab Spring).

### *Hungary's shifts towards East*

Despite their differences, since the establishment of the first official contact, the European Community and the Asian giant have been deepening their relations along the common aim of building up global strategies. Diplomatic connections look healthy and intensive between European countries and Beijing while the trade rates also indicate strong ties: "Since 2004, China has become the EU's second biggest trading partner (after the US) and, according to the Chinese sources, the EU has become China's biggest trading partner – ahead of the US" (Casarini, 2006: 7) But, as András Inotai noted, it is a new trend that because of internal problems (and the lack of integrity) the EU is still not a global partner for China. Beijing seeks bilateral connections with each individual member country. So, it is true that import and export rates are growing and we count them together as EU imports and exports, but the

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<sup>13</sup> Cf.: Vörös, 2009

community cannot step up like a global power, which can make decisions. (Inotai, 2010) And the new position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy held by Catherine Ashton will not solve this problem either. Therefore, as we can see, while China is a global player, the European Union is just a bunch of countries in the international political arena and the countries seek connections by their own instead of forming a single EU strategy for international relations. For Beijing, this method is adequate. Few months after a round trip to Greece, Italy and Turkey, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in Europe again in June 2011 for another three-country tour to discuss China's possible participation in supporting and helping the European economies. The Premier visited Hungary, the United Kingdom and finally Germany. Topics such as the euro-crisis and UN-issues also emerged in London and Berlin, the discussion mostly focused on the economic challenges of Europe and on China's growing investments on the continent, and their possible role in saving the common currency of the Community. European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said before the trip that "China has been supportive to euro area countries facing difficulties experienced by the euro, just as the EU supports China's stable development with investment and technology"<sup>14</sup> presenting the connections as mutual benefit.

Following the fact that Hungary is relatively insignificant according to the EU economy, Jiabao's visit to Budapest was a bit surprising but finally seemed to close a long "race" for a so-called "major Central-European partner for China" title between the countries of the region. Although Jiabao's trip was labelled as help for Europe in the euro-crisis, the meeting in Budapest was more of a bilateral meeting than multilateral discussion, so even if Hungary held the Presidency of the EU, the main reason was to build up and strengthen bilateral relations. After the elections in 2010, the new Hungarian government tried to back away from the IMF and Viktor Orbán criticized the Union several times: Hungary, following the new trends, turned towards East.<sup>15</sup> The idea and hope in Budapest is to become a kind of a gate for China to Europe, as a logistic and distribution center. This would generate jobs and huge Chinese investments – both badly needed by the country. As the Chinese Premier noted, China trusts in the Hungarian economy and is willing to purchase government bonds. To promote investments, Beijing is willing to provide a one-billion euro fund for Chinese enterprises to participate in Hungarian projects. China also assumed to invest one billion US dollar in a chemical industrial development and the two sides agreed to double the trade volume by 2015 to 20 billion US dollars. Viktor Orbán praised Beijing's achievements both at economic and social development,

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<sup>14</sup> Commentary: Chinese premier visits Europe at time of debt crisis. 25.06.2011, xinhuanet. Source: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/25/c\\_13950020\\_3.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/25/c_13950020_3.htm)

<sup>15</sup> To report on the debates on the steps the governments wish to follow, to evaluate these sequels is not possible in this paper. The following lines are only dealing with the actual meeting and the possible co-operations with China.

as a pattern worth to follow. The prime minister noted that Hungary is willing to deepen bilateral co-operation on the basis of mutual respect. “The extensive agreements, worth around 3.6 billion US dollars, included plans for joint investment in a Hungarian solar panel production facility; a citric acid factory; and plans to develop Hungary’s neglected Szombathely airport into a major European cargo base. Moreover, Chinese telecommunications manufacturing giant, Huawei, which already operates logistics centers in Hungary, announced in May it would expand its distribution center in the country, where it expects to employ 3,000 people and export a total of 1.2 billion US dollars worth of products this year, making it Huawei’s second-largest supply center in the world. In 2012, Huawei’s Logistics Center in Hungary predicts revenues of 3 billion US dollars.”<sup>16</sup> It is also possible that China is going to invest heavily in the infrastructure developments in the country, especially in the rail transportation presenting their own technics. Their undergoing high-speed train project in Turkey is a reference, as a website noted, and China is planning to start similar investments in Hungary, as well.<sup>17</sup>

After the first planning, the question is the profitability of this shift to the East. As István Tarrósy noted in a report, the Chinese ‘offer’ seems to be familiar to those who know Beijing’s activity, for example, in Africa.<sup>18</sup> To some extent the method is the same: providing money, loans and investments, gaining market, raw materials and profit. To some other extent, the behaviour and communication are rather the same, too, which should not be surprising as they are part of China’s pragmatic foreign policy management, and as in Africa, this kind of “[friendly and non-interfering] behaviour and approach of China [...] certainly pays off.” (Tarrósy, 2011: 31) But all in all, counting all the potential drawbacks, the co-operation is still profitable for Hungary. Although we can expect that their cultural and economic presence is going to be considerable, the possible profit makes it worth ‘giving it a try’. Especially when we note that the Chinese GDP is going to expand by 8.7-9 percent in 2011 with the Europe’s stagnation at the same time.

As for critical voices from the region, even if Poland was also in race for a so-called redistribution center, their attitude changed a bit towards Chinese companies following a scandalous story with a construction company: “A high-profile attempt by China to break into the European transport infrastructure market has turned into a fiasco after Poland cancelled a controversial highway contract with a Chinese company midway through construction. China Overseas

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<sup>16</sup> Is Hungary Becoming China's Hub in Central Europe? 05.08.2011, European Dialogue. Source: <http://eurodialogue.org/eu-central-asia/Is-Hungary-Becoming-China-Hub-in-Central-Europe>

<sup>17</sup> High-speed rail will set the pace in Turkey. 13.07.2011, China Daily. Source: [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-07/13/content\\_12890884.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-07/13/content_12890884.htm)

<sup>18</sup> Tipikus kínai csomagot kapott Magyarország. 01.07.2011, origo. Source: <http://www.origo.hu/uzletinegyed/hirek/20110701-kinai-magyar-gazdasagi-kapcsolatok-parhuzamok-az-afrikai-terjeszkedessel.html>

Engineering Group (Covec) was awarded the contract to build a 50km stretch of the crucial highway between Warsaw and the German border in 2009, after presenting a bid so low that rivals took allegations of price dumping to Warsaw and Brussels. It was the first Chinese company to win such a large European highway contract and had hoped to use the project as a calling card to gain other business in the region.”<sup>19</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

Based on specific events and features of the given era, there is a habit to label the centuries, which empire or international alliance was the dominant of that period. The 17th century was the era of the British Empire, which designed the global rule, established worldwide trade, and became the centre. The next 100 years was the century of the French: humanism, enlightenment, popular sovereignty, democracy – also the foundations of the modern world. The 19th century was about German-Austrian international policy, intrigues, Prince Metternich, diplomatic alliance formations, international status quo – the basics of modern international relations. The 20th century was obviously about the USA, defeating nazism and communism, ruling the unipolar world. As for the 21st century, even if it was already labelled as the century of water, the century of Africa or the century of Asia – it is highly likely that it is going to be the century of China. But this is just one possible scenario, and even the supporters of this theory are unable to underpin their opinions 100 percent: they talk about cultural dimensions, about the superiority of Asian culture, but gaining dominance only with “victory” over Western culture in the globalized modern world is close to lunacy.<sup>20</sup> Anyway, Chinese dominance is on the table, not only in Beijing, but also in the United States, and critics of the US system vision China’s advancement.

The aim of this paper was to briefly present China’s status in the 21st century after the first decade and based on the experience of this first 10 years. Beijing’s development was undoubtedly outstanding: it strengthened its economy and also became a relevant international actor, thanks to the Go Global policy, urging and helping Chinese companies to invest abroad. As we have already mentioned, due to the “adult” behaviour in international relations, their status is more and more accepted in the international community and they have already built up strong connections with the countries of the Global South. Moreover, their steps among the countries of the EU also carry key importance. As an analysis notes, “investing heavily in these [EU-]countries also has a political pay-off. The more dependent they become on Chinese investment and trade, the less likely they are to support common EU actions which China

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<sup>19</sup> China group sees collapse of Poland ambitions. 14.06.2011, Financial Times. Source: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d17dda5a-96b7-11e0-baca-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Vwyrq71h>

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.globaltimes.cn/opinion/top-photo/2009-06/436806.html>

regards as inimical to its vital interests. It is not too cynical to see Beijing building up a kind of China lobby inside the decision-making structures of the EU, where the smallest state is at least notionally equal to the biggest. [...] There is, however, no doubt that Chinese economic power is already reaching deep into Europe – and translating into political influence. Thus, the longer Europe’s economy stumbles in its recovery, the more enticing Chinese overtures will be to the region.” (Ash, 2011)

So, whether it is going to be China’s century or not, the Asian giant will play a huge role in the next decades, as their economy, international relations, financial situation, their changing attitude towards R&D, their stand for innovation and also their steps towards sustainable environment all points towards a leading role and competing position with the US, which for sure is not the only chance: co-operation on several grounds is likely to be more profitable.

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## ***FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES***

**Attila BUGYÁKI PhD aspirant ZMNE**

### ***CONNECTIONS OF TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME***

*Terrorism and organized crime overshadow every day of our lives. Owing to their continuous development and flexible adaptability, they are always able to renew, thus these phenomena mean constant fear and threat to all members of states and societies. The danger and complexity of this problem is well symbolized by the fact that there is no single and adopted definition for organized crime and terrorism. However, if there was such an internationally adopted, clear definition, still we could not be satisfied and lean back, since operations of such organs and groups develop from day to day in our globalizing world, thus enlarging the set of definitions with newer and newer threats and challenges. Widening cooperation of terrorism and organized crime spread not only over illegal, but over legal sectors as well, thus endangering world economy and peaceful symbiosis of democracies. In this essay of mine I aim to present the bases of connections and interlocking between terrorism and organized crime.*

#### ***Introduction***

Terrorism – as a phenomenon – has been present in every periods of our history for centuries. In the beginning, foreign and internal stakes<sup>1</sup> of countries were the motives of terrorism, while modern age terrorism – evolving individuals, organizations and groups – is not without any ethnical, religious and ideological views. Globalization and its effects made this process more dangerous and volatile, resulting in the fact that avoiding and reconnaissance of terrorism became much more difficult.

Tools and methods of terrorists have been continuously changing during the last centuries. While the aim of the destruction was definitely clear until

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<sup>1</sup> Piracy has been a typical form of representing interests since the ancient ages. Piracy – besides organized gaining of benefits – is oriented to gain economic and/or political advantages for the sake of a state. Similarly, providing terrorist organs with either financial or military equipment, or drilling their members in order to reach previously defined goals by governments used to be a natural element of the Cold War.

World War II,<sup>2</sup> and innocents hardly ever became victims, a choosing of targets by chance and destruction have become the main point in the latest ages. This keeps almost every layer of the society in continuous fear. Fear and vulnerability is increased by the appearance of radical suicide bombers moved by ethnical, religious and separatist motives, and also by the danger of chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism. Messages of such terrorism are broadcasted by the media. One of the most notorious and well-known radical Islamic terrorist organ is Al-Qaeda founded by Osama bin Laden in 1998.

Following Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US stayed alone as a single super power without any international enemies, and – parallel to this – the idea and reality of terrorist threats came to the foreground besides organized crime.

September 11<sup>th</sup> meant a turning point and the beginning of a new regime in the fight against terrorism. US, which previously believed to be invulnerable, was attacked on its own area<sup>3</sup> in a form, where hijacked airplanes was not aim but tool of completing actions.

The attack against the US can be considered an attack against globalization as well, which requires a global answer. This forced political leaders to relay on new ways of thinking and close cooperation between countries. Following the terrorist acts, the US immediately introduced operative, legal and administrative steps.<sup>4</sup> While detecting 9/11, it became clear that terrorist organs – especially Al-Qaeda – have scenarios and capabilities to attack European cities. This idea is supported by the attacks against Istanbul, Madrid, London and Moscow following 9/11 in a few years.

While targets of terrorism were previously restricted to each of the countries, nowadays terrorism became asymmetric and international, so that means a threat anywhere and anytime.

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<sup>2</sup> Several hundreds of people were killed all over the world during 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries by terrorists, mainly based on political reasons. Perhaps the most significant one of such events was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28<sup>th</sup> 1914. This assassination became the peg to World War I.

<sup>3</sup> The first organized terrorist act in the US was carried out by a bomb put into the parking lot of World Trade Center On February 26<sup>th</sup> 1993.

<sup>4</sup> The US declared war against terrorism, in which it named its enemy as ‘the axis of the evil’ (Iran, Iraq and North Korea). As a first step, financial sources of terrorists were frozen and measures against money laundering were introduced. Department of Homeland Security was established to work out and implement a national strategy and to inform the president about terrorist threats. Then the US government formed and accepted an act on the fight against terrorism (USA Patriotic Act) just less than 1.5 months without any debates. Echelon of the patrol organs was widely extended by this law in order to make them able to take effective measures against terrorists. Washington broke out a war against Afghanistan and Iraq relying on the reason of wishing to eliminate bases and camps of terrorists. However, these measures often offended human rights breaking out a global echo.



## *Connection between terrorism and organized crime*

The 'need' for a well-organized national terrorism was diminished after the dissolution of the bipolar world. Terrorist groups suddenly standing without contracts started to search for new content and forms of financing to 'legalize' their operations, and the most ambiguous and fit partner proved to be cooperation with organized crime groups. Operations able to fulfill terrorists' aims were gradually extended to areas of organized crime, utilizing opportunities offered by overlaps.

The idea of terrorism was first used under the French Revolution more than 200 years ago.<sup>5</sup> However, still nowadays the definition of terrorism is explained in separate ways by each of the nations, so it does not have a single, internationally adopted definition. In their book called 'Political terrorism', Alex Schmidt and Albert Youngman chose some of the keywords occurring in most of the definitions. According to this, terrorism is: 'violence, political aims, creating chaos and fear, threat, psychological factors, intention and planning, choosing targets in a symbolic way and by chance, and threat aiming to influence the society' [1]. NATO – as one of the most significant international organization – defines terrorism as the following: 'illegal utilization of force or violence against individuals or goods, or threat of doing so, in order to reach political, religious or ideological aims and in attempts to force or terrify governments and societies' [2].

Such as terrorism does not have, organized crime does not have a single, globally declared definition. Among its general characteristics grabbing financial benefits, harmonized and serial acts, terrifying, loyalty, corruption, conspiracy, division of labour, cooperation of several persons or groups can be found. The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime defines organized crimes as follows: 'Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit' [3].

A basic common characteristic of organized crime and terrorism is that a series of countries face them owing to the mutual cooperation between countries, and their operations are tried to be tackled.

The cooperation of the two parties was not common before. However, owing to the increasing international pressure – and utilizing fine opportunities provided by globalization – the two parties are leaning on each other when carrying out operation procedures and sharing their resources. These short- or

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<sup>5</sup> The expression 'terror' (in the form of régime de la Terreur) was first used by Edmund Burke in his debate paper on the French Revolution in 1793.

long-period, occasional or permanent connections can be viewed as organized cooperation between business partners preying on each other and following their own individual political or economic aims.

Both of the organizations have been continuously adapting to the new environment by entering the international scene. The operations of classical terrorist organs – even the smallest ones as well – could be described by hierarchical construction in the past. Each of the organs was built by subordinated and parent members who were controlled by a central direction, to which reports were sent by the leaders of each of the cells. The changing was forced by material and conspiracy motives besides development. Maintaining and running a big organ cost a lot, and the chance for detecting the whole entire network was bigger in the case of discovery. That is why previous rigid structure was altered by a well-organized, modern terrorism, which is more dynamic and flexible owing to the widening and spreading international connections. However, their structure became more ‘unsound’ due to their changed content and divided echelons. A kind of specialization can be seen, their members are well-qualified, often have university degrees, so they employ qualified and language speaking experts. Each of the members has a defined task like in a ‘military organ’. The organizational structure of such organs continuously adopts to the behavior forms of a changing world and the organs have a loose, net-like structure in order to maintain conspiracy. Getting off the mother organ, they found autonomic, independent small groups and cells that are able to operate, make decisions and execute decisions on their own. The cells communicate with each other by developed and well-built links, but they do not depend on each other, neither they give instructions to each other. They exchange information within this loose cooperation, and offer their infrastructure for mutual utilization. For outsiders, they seem to be everyday citizens. Their armaments and equipment are continuously developing and they use simple but more and more sophisticated methods to elaborate their operations. Their financial sources – both legal and illegal incomes – are enough to finance their operations.

Organized crime criminals do their activities in a diversified way based on the division of labour and close and regular cooperation within international frames using their legal and illegal connections. Each member has his own job in such a structure. Their actions are carried out in a precise and hierarchical system. The structure of such an organ can consist of cells, where they do their operations individually, independent from a central direction, or can be multi-leveled, where the control is carried out through several levels indirectly. They intemperately can ‘purchase’ anything and anyone. They can corrupt members of governments, politics, officials or anyone able to fulfill their aims. Also they may ‘employ’ the most eminent experts, so that their power, influence and control can spread over all of the segments of political and economic life

without any limits. If it is required by their stake, they do not hesitate to use violence as members of such organs are professional criminals as well.

Of course, a collision of interest often occurs between organs. Reaching their aims is more important than creating alliances. However, in some cases terrorist organs give up their ideas and aims and get mutated, which means they start to do criminal acts in order to reach material or financial benefits [4].

The main difference between organized crime and terrorism is meant by political and regional aims. Organized crime groups are motivated by accessing to higher and higher profits and getting power and influence, while terrorism is based on terrifying others. Organized crime uses corruption to reach its aims, while terrorism mainly uses violence. While organized crime is oriented to areas having inner economic and political weaknesses or depressions,<sup>6</sup> terrorism makes efforts to dissolve prospering democracies and societies and to establish chaos. Based on these ideas, organized crime presents danger from economic and social aspects, while terrorism tries to put pressure on politics as well.

Terrorist groups usually finance their operations by laundering money gained from illegal trading of drug<sup>7</sup> and weapon and from prostitution, mainly by utilizing the cooperation with organized crime.<sup>8</sup> However, owing to the international cooperation and the financial legislation being stricter and stricter, criminals have to utilize less regulated channels, like the international trade of diamonds and precious stones and other contrabands. Charity funds (donations from members and sympathizers),<sup>9</sup> funding and running non-profit organizations and informal money transfers via hawalah-systems<sup>10</sup> are another special form of financing their operations,

A main difference between financing organized crime and terrorism is that the aim of terrorism is to utilize ‘dirty money’, sometimes without covering its origin. Stockpiling money gained from criminal acts is not always a criminal act in itself, however, terrorist acts financed by such sums – following money laundering – is. Michal Levi – considering organizational structures – defines three different methods of moving money within terrorist organs [6]. First one is

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<sup>6</sup> Places that rather fit for money laundering have been evolved in such countries as these states have less developed and regulated financial systems.

<sup>7</sup> Terrorism and drug smuggling are closely interlocked, that is why the expression of ‘narcotic terrorism’ is wide-spread.

<sup>8</sup> According to IMF’s estimations, financial sources are divided as follows: drug smuggling 30-35 %, donations from governments or elsewhere 20-30 %, classic forms of criminal acts (blackmailing and kidnapping) 10-15 %, other forms (yet unknown) 30-35 % [5].

<sup>9</sup> Donors are not always aware of what kind of goals they donate.

<sup>10</sup> The essence of the hawalah-systems is that the one carrying out money laundering opens an account in one of the hawalah-banks throughout the world, and he can take the sum from it in another continent within a few hours. This system works well as it is bidirectional. That is, there are ones in both of the countries having great sums unneeded (organized crime criminals, terrorists), and they are willing to pay generously to use a paper-less banking system.

when the division of money is controlled from a central point via persons having this task. The second case is when terrorist cells get some starting capital they can utilize. In the third case, they use money by working as a network together with other organs.

Terrorist acts can be solved from a few thousands of dollars;<sup>11</sup> that is why it is quite hard to scout them [7]. However, training (that is, preparing and maintaining the base of terrorism) requires far higher costs. That is why the stress must be put on scouting and eliminating these financial sources and transactions and on freezing the wealth of the known organs. This task is quite difficult as Afghanistan is a perfect place for terrorist bases and places of training and drilling, since in this country they are given a political support, while opportunities of smuggling drugs are an adequate financial background to organize operations. Drugs prepared on plantations are spread by organized crime, thus providing terrorist with income.

Acting against terrorism and organized crime had not meant a task for national intelligence services before, nor had it required any kind of international cooperation [8]. Nowadays this task cannot be solved by mere military force; a mutual cooperation of the intelligence services is required, which increased the role of intelligence and reconnaissance. However, this struggle needs lots of money.

Despite the depression started in 2008, costs spent on tackling terrorism and organized crime have been continuously increasing during the latest years. According to data published in the 2011 yearbook of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1.044 billion dollars were spent on defense globally in 2001, while 1.63 billion was spent in 2010. This means that costs spent on defense are now 1,5-times higher than ten years ago [9]. To compare, the wealth of Al-Qaeda was 5 billion dollars on average between 1999 and 2001, its annual budget was between 20 and 50 million dollars. During the same period, the budget of Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTATC) amounted to 6.4 billion dollars [5].

Finally, it is worth mentioning IMF's calculations, according to which the amount of 'dirty money' laundered by criminals via the international financial system in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is somewhere between 500 and 1500 billion dollars, which is 5 % of the world's total GDP [5]. According to estimates, some 0.9-5.8 % of this amount was to finance radical Islamic terrorism directly.

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<sup>11</sup> The costs of the terrorist bombings in Madrid can be estimated to be some 8000 euros, according to experts.

## *Summary*

By continuously utilizing opportunities provided by globalization, both terrorism and organized crime have adapted to new challenges and have become international during the last period. Terrorism recognized and utilized well-trying channels and well-built infrastructure of organized crime. These two parties are cooperating owing to their wide-spread and sophisticated network of connections and operations showing overlaps. Although their aims, methods and tools often differ from each other, they effectively carry out their operations, to which they have adequate financial sources and well-built channels of communications.

Several international conventions and agreements have been reached to defeat terrorism and organized crime, but – as we have seen it – even creating definitions is difficult. Another obstacle is that those fighting against them are hindered by national collision of interest, which weakens coalitions and the job of international organizations fighting against them.

Everyday activity of terrorists and organized crime endangers democratic institutions and governments; while they make world economy unstable. Their illegal activities are interlocked with legal ones, so scouting them is harder and harder.

Citizens of nations – for the sake of their everyday security and welfare – have to accept that increasing costs spent on defense against terrorism and organized crime is reasonable and also the limitation of their rights is subject to this goal.

Countries must be prepared to threat on an international level as well, and they shall form consequent but similar strategic directives. Agreements have to be continuously harmonized and developed. Amongst utilized tools, the cooperation and change of information between intelligence services and financial institutions have to be equalized to military power and diplomacy, and a legal background of this process is to be established. Eliminating financial background of outlaw groups and organizations must be a basic goal parallel to the reconnaissance and perishing of such groups. In the meanwhile, greater emphasis must be put on knowing and handling their motives and reasons.

Terrorism and organized crime cannot entirely be eliminated. However, all required steps must be taken to tackle that these outlaw organizations became stronger and make new allies or gained access to any of the mass-destructive weapons.

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## **SECURITY FACTORS WHILE DOING CIMIC AND LMT ACTIVITY**

In this study I am going to briefly review the CIMIC and the LMT ability. The CIMIC and the LMT ability take place on operational theatre at present; therefore in the following lines I am going to concentrate on security factors applied there and also written and unwritten rules. By this I mean the negotiation techniques with residents, the security risks in project managements, the treating of interpreters, the way of using social networks and general security factors.

In my opinion, all the soldiers who practice their profession possess most of the pieces of information detailed in this study thanks to their method of military training. However, this knowledge is worth summarising, since we rarely use theoretical knowledge in practice because of underestimating risk factors too much.

### ***The CIMIC ability***

The CIMIC expression is an English acronym; it is the short form of Civil-Military Cooperation. In Hungary the CIMIC acronym spread as a military term. Usually we do not translate the English expression into Hungarian, since this ability is mostly used in an environment where the English language is in focus. The Civil-Military Cooperation Centre was founded in 2003 as a result of the aim we set when joining the NATO. A year later, when the PSYOPS<sup>1</sup> ability appeared in Hungary, the name of the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre was changed to Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Centre.

The definition of CIMIC in AJP-09 is the following: “The cooperation and coordination between NATO commander and civil people for the sake of the task, including the national population and local authorities, international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.”<sup>2</sup> Gábor Boldozsár, PhD states the following: “Antipathy and hatred can evolve against military and police forces serving on operational theatre, which is in most cases based on the fact that people’s earlier sufferings were caused by military, police and half-military forces wearing uniforms. In such circumstances, one of the most important tasks of the CIMIC forces is the familiarization of the tasks and international legitimacy of the forces in favour of peace, arising confidence

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<sup>1</sup> PSYOPS: Psychological Operations

<sup>2</sup> AJP-09: Allied Joint Publication -09

towards the helping people wearing uniforms and informing the international public opinion of the results of collective efforts and the use of supports.”<sup>3</sup>

The most important functions of CIMIC ability are:

- supporting the army
  - civil-military contact
  - supporting civil environment

### *The LMT ability*

LMT is an English abbreviation which stands for Liaison Monitoring Team. Practically, their activity is very similar to the keep in touch activity of CIMIC. At the moment, there are two Hungarian LMT groups in Kosovo on the Balkans, one of them is responsible for the area of Pec/Pejë and the other one is for Podujevo/Podujevë. The fighting strength of the LMT groups comes from that of Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Centre and the fighting strength of other corps trained by the Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Centre. The preparation and training of the LMT groups is carried out by the Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Centre. The activity and aim of the LMT ability can be summarised in the easiest way according to its motto: “Feel the pulse of Kosovo.”<sup>4</sup>

Since the LMT moves and socializes with the population freely in its responsibility area, it becomes aware of certain changes almost immediately. Its formation was made necessary because of the ethnic disturbances in Kosovo in 2004. “There were especially social and economic problems standing behind the events lasting for a longer time and straining the society of Kosovo. The immediate root cause was the dead bodies of three Albanian boys from Kosovo found in the river Ibar. The Albanians charged the Serbians for their deaths, which was nothing but fuel to the fire. The real cause of the deaths of the boys and the identity of the alleged perpetrators are still unknown by the way.”<sup>5</sup>

A sensor system has come into being by the LMT, which projects the different events, so KFOR can prepare for them. Similarly, CIMIC can also project events since they are also in contact with local people. However, they do

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<sup>3</sup> DR. BOLDIZSÁR Gábor: *A haderő feladatai a jövő béketámogató műveleteiben*, in: Nemzetvédelmi egyetemi közlemények: a Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem tudományos lapja, V., 1., Budapest, 2001.  
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<sup>4</sup> HÜSE Csaba: *INFOOPS és békefenntartás Koszovóban*, in: [http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok/infoops\\_es\\_bekefenntartas\\_koszovoban/kuld](http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok/infoops_es_bekefenntartas_koszovoban/kuld), downloaded: 02-02-2011

<sup>5</sup> FÖLDHÁZI Enikő: *A KFOR parancsnok meghosszabbított karja*, in: <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/23538/a-kfor-parancsnok-meghosszabbított-karja>, downloaded: 03-01-2011



not have so many possibilities besides project management and their other tasks, because they concentrate on the keep in touch activity.

Let us take the mission of the Africa Union in Sudan as an example and see what happens when there is no separate CIMIC or LMT group in the given operational area, but another organisation does their duty: “However, from the civilian people responsible for humanitarian affairs the flow of information had already been stuttering, and from the sectors and camps information came almost only when there had already been a crisis. The attack on the town of Sherija was like this, when we were only informed about the fightings thereabouts when almost 5000 refugees had surrounded the camp of the peacekeeping forces having neither drinking water nor food and appropriate accommodation; what is more, within a week a cholera epidemic broke out among them.”<sup>6</sup>

### ***Risk factors***

Both CIMIC and the LMT ability operate mainly in mission areas. Here it is especially needed to pay attention to the different security factors. These are of course very complex because of their nature. We can speak about maintaining the soldier’s good physical health, improving his condition and that his knowledge of weapons should be up-to-date. We can also mention the familiarity with the society of the mission area when keeping in touch with the local residents and also complying with the local habits and rules of etiquette. Moreover, the safety of information should be handled especially carefully.

### ***The family***

Mission areas include countries and societies where the financial situation is worse than Hungary’s situation at present. The worse economic situation goes hand in hand with another type of life. The instability of the state and its economic situation also means the weakness or even the almost lack of the social system in most cases. Where the support system of the state (including the income support and the pension scheme) is weak, insufficient or does not even exist, family relationships and friendships are much stronger than in the more developed countries.

In the more developed parts of the world, where people can live in a way that they are existentially independent, atomization starts among the majority of people. Large families fall to pieces and friendships also degrade to fair-weather friendships. This is because one can reach so much welfare over several generations that he or she is also capable of living individually. Of course, the atomization process of welfare states also has counterexamples. Usually, these

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<sup>6</sup> BESENYŐ János: *CIMIC tevékenység az Afrikai Unió szudáni missziójában (AMIS, )*, in: Sereg Szemle, MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság, VIII., 2., 2010.

are characteristic of communities based on either conservative traditions or religious traditions (for example the Jewish religion, the Mormon religion). In the long run, the key of the society's survival is welfare existence and the unity of the family.

On the operational theatres where CIMIC and LMT groups work, there is very much unity in the family. The inhabitants cannot count on the pension scheme and the state support system because of its lack or insufficiency; that is why they try to create themselves an environment which provides their secure livelihood later. Having more children and bringing them up in the spirit of the love and unity of the family is one of its key factors. Another factor that also strengthens unity is religion. It does not only transmit theological knowledge but also social norms, which are passed and conserved through the upbringing of several generations.

In those societies where large families are determinant, usually the leading role of the family is in the hands of the oldest man or another older masculine member of the family. We learn in the different trainings that we have to get in touch with the leader, the old man. Here I have to note that during a keep in touch activity or any kind of negotiation we should show respect for everybody. If we think in the long run, then who is young now, will soon grow up and we also have to keep his impression and attitude about us in view.

### *The situation of women*

The situation of women in Kosovo and Afghanistan is totally different from that in Hungary. We have to be open towards their culture; otherwise we will not be able to treat women according to local norms for example. In these countries, women are pushed into the background because of religion and social conventions. As for security circumstances, we have to be careful not to be too kind to them. They can consider being too kind as courtship, which involves compulsory marriage in many cases. Even if the compulsory marriage does not take place, still, local people take a dim view of the given person.

In this respect, the society of Kosovo is a little bit different from the society of Afghanistan. Since in Kosovo the situation of women is undergoing change now, the old conservative views and the new Westernized way of thinking are present at the same time, in towns women are freer than in the country. In my opinion, the change of moral norms is a consequence of the war in ex-Yugoslavia, the fast growth of the population and the urbanisation. When the war was over, women were glad that they had stayed alive, and they did not bother about certain expectations any more. Thanks to the surprisingly high birth rate the society has become younger, so the older generation has not been able to transmit their own habits so much to the young people being in the majority over them.

As the consequence of the population growth and the urbanisation, the density of population has become larger in a given area, so the women living there have to fight more for men than earlier, because there are more rivals at a place. In Afghanistan, the dragging on fights have not induced such changes because the density of population is not the same as in Kosovo. We have to note that in the capital of Afghanistan there had been women wearing shorter skirts earlier but these changes were broken on the wheel by the Taliban regime.

Men soldiers can also be exposed to danger by women because of agitation and blackmail. At present, most of the soldiers are men and by different sexual temptations men soldiers can be put in a situation which can give cause for blackmail. That is why men have to react in a properly careful way when approached by a woman. Of course this does not mean that we cannot be likeable for them but we have to be careful.

### ***Religion***

The religion of Afghanistan is almost exclusively Islamic. In Kosovo, the religion of the Albanian population is mostly Muslim, and the Serbian population living here belongs to the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Islamic religion is present in every part of human life here. In Afghanistan this phenomenon is stronger; in Kosovo it is a bit weaker.

Basically, the Islamic religion is very similar to our Christian religious views. However, less and less people know their own religion; that is why the Islamic religion seems so distant for them. So I would not like to dwell on this topic, because first of all I should give full details of the Christian religion and then introduce the Islamic religion. For those who would like to know more about this topic, I recommend “*The Islamic religion*”, a study by István Resperger, PhD.<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately, many of the church supervisors of the involved countries do not get an education of a level they need because of financial reasons, so the theological views they transmit to the followers are often not the church views but their own opinion. If the financial situation of these areas were stabilized, there would be more money also for theological education, making the restoring of safety and cultural development possible in this way, too.

### ***Donations***

One of the tasks of CIMIC ability is to help and support the local people based on the intention of the commander. Where military forces are used, the environment is either destroyed or is in a very poor condition. As a result of basic psychosocial reasons, we like to help those who got into trouble or who

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<sup>7</sup> DR. RESPERGER István: *Az iszlám: tanulmány*, ZMNE, Budapest, 2000.

are in a worse situation than us. Human empathy arises strongly in such circumstances. However, if this feeling is overwhelming, it might mean serious danger for us.



Picture #1: CIMIC relief in Afghanistan

During different missions, many of us have faced with the following situation: when a military group arrives at a given a place or settlement and finds starving children there who are pointing towards their mouths, it is very hard not to give the food we have with us to them. Since hunger is a great motivator, the civilian population attacks the soldiers in the strict sense of the word in order to get food or drink from them.

When the commander decides to help the local residents and he has an appropriate logistics background for this, then he has to decide what he wants to achieve, whom he wants to help and whom he wants to support. When there is a donation or a direct contact with the local residents, the following guidelines have to be kept in view:

- Avoiding the endangerment of military value, for example if we give our water supplies to the local residents, it might mean serious danger for us.
- If we give something to the population, we have to give something to everyone; otherwise we will make more trouble than if we had not given them anything. Those who did not get anything will behave in an aggressive way towards us and their own mates.
- If we decide to donate, we have to organise it in advance, otherwise we will not be able to handle the crowd of people.
- Weapons should be fixed in a safe way, because if we are surrounded by the crowd, people can even steal them unnoticed.

- If we expect beggars, it is worth emptying two pockets in advance so that we can show them inside out. The sight of two empty pockets means the same in every culture.

### *Projects*

The CIMIC ability carries out different projects on the operational theatre and supports the mission of the commander by this. Buildings, schools, hospitals, bridges and streets are built. By doing this, on one hand they increase the acceptance of Hungarian soldiers among the local residents and this also increases the feeling of security in the latter; and on the other hand they help the local society. The choosing of projects always has an aim set in advance. It is important to make the local workers carry these projects out because in this way we create workplaces for them. Moreover, people feel more attached to those things that they do than to those that they get “only” as a donation from others, and they take more care of them later on, too. It is important that people should feel the things they get that they are their own. In this way, in Afghanistan for example there is a smaller chance that they will blow them up later.

Before starting to carry out the projects we should always make the entrepreneurs compete. In this way we get the best offer, there is no corruption and they also learn the competitive spirit of capitalism. By starting a project new workplaces are created, which makes the local economy stronger and thus increases the stability of the state.

In mission areas, investments are not only made by the CIMIC abilities of different countries, but there are also a great number of non-governmental organisations doing similar activities. The experts working in CIMIC or LMT position get in touch with them (depending on who are on a given place) and if they are friendly organisations and are ready to cooperate with us, we can carry out common projects with them in order to avoid duplications. However, as for non-governmental organisations we have to be careful since we can also come across intelligence activity disguised as relief organisations.<sup>8</sup>

### *Taking gifts*

It might happen that the local residents want to give us gifts either because they want to show that they are well-disposed towards us or because they have come to like us. In certain cultures, this is a natural process. At some places it is a sign of respect; elsewhere it might be a duty. What is important is that if someone receives a gift, it should be returned almost immediately or within a short time so that we give as good as one gets. It is worth preparing ourselves in advance for a situation like this. Preparation means that we should

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<sup>8</sup> LÓDERER Balázs: *A civil-katonai együttműködés és a non-profit szektor*, in: III. Hadtudományi Doktorandusz Fórum, ZMNE, 29-10-2010

always have return gift at hand while doing keep in touch activity, which can be given in return if we happen to receive a gift.

It is inexpedient to take gifts of bigger value because it might bring blackmail about. For instance, we should not take golden jewellery of bigger value as a gift. By giving gifts of too much value, they might try to gain that we will be indebted to them, which they want to make recompensed by a winning project application. It is my duty to mention here that such bribery has never happened on the part of Hungarian soldiers yet. However, it has already happened on the part of other nations.

Key leaders' protocol meetings represent another level. Here the accessories of greater prestige count almost as an expectation. Of course, the measure of this is different in certain countries and cultures. However, in meetings and negotiations like this the military executive level takes part only as organisers and only politicians and the military leadership are involved.

### *Office*

There is a check-point system in every military camp, so the inner safety of the camp is assured to a certain level. However, it is not completely separated from the population, so outsiders can also get in or appear just in our own rows and can look around in our office. This is why we should never leave any kind of material on the writing table we are working on. Maps should be covered or materials should be separated in another physical way from the eyes of outsiders. The doors and windows should be closed at the end of the day, and also, documents and external digital storage devices should be encoded and placed in the safe. Pendrives and cameras should never be left in the foreground because earlier information on them can be retrieved.

If we run a CIMIC house or LMT office on the operational theatre, the procedure is the same with the exception that after leaving the office the safety of the room cannot be guaranteed, so the written and digital material used there should always be taken with us to the camp.

### *Taking photographs*

In the case of CIMIC activity we should always take photographs of the finished projects, the inaugurations, the handshakes, and these photos should be published. The investments and developments about which the local residents are not informed are almost as if they had not taken place at all, so a lot of energy should be devoted to the popularization of the activity. The media (newspapers, radio, TV) is planned and made by either the PAO<sup>9</sup> or the

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<sup>9</sup> PAO: Public Affairs Office

PSYOPS but the background material is always worth providing prepared for them.

The LMT also takes lots of photographs because if it sees something which affects the life of the local residents, it also documents it. Here we might think of a demonstration or a minefield which has just been discovered and has an impact on “the restarting of agricultural production, the putting of industrial areas to use.”<sup>10</sup>



Picture #2: LMT is watching a demonstration in Kosovo

For the sake of the safety of information photos from the camera should always be copied to the computer, arranged in folders and old photos should always be deleted from the camera’s card. If we happen to lose our camera, it cannot be possible to conclude from it what pieces of information are important for us. Also, when taking photographs, we should always take into consideration that it is different in certain countries and cultures how much accepted a photo is. For example, taking photos of Muslim women is taboo in certain areas but elsewhere it is possible after asking for permission in advance. At many places, it is taboo to take photos of praying people because it can disturb the intimacy of the prayer.

### *Social networks, communication sites*

Over the last years, different social networks (Facebook, Twitter, iwiw) have become widely used, where one can find friends and add them as friends. These sites have been technically developing more and more, for example we

<sup>10</sup> DR. PADÁNYI József: *A menekültek és a hontalanok visszatelepítése Bosznia-Hercegovinába*, Hadtudomány: a Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság folyóirata, X., 2., Budapest, 2000., in: [http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhht/hadtudomany/2000/2\\_13.html](http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhht/hadtudomany/2000/2_13.html), downloaded: 10-03-2011

can set the type of acquaintance with our friends. We can fill in our data sheet by giving our qualifications, workplace and hobbies.

Online communication programs like msn had appeared a bit earlier than social networks. Here we can also keep in touch with our friends and add acquaintances to our data sheet. The appearance of these programs means a great step forward for the society because people can communicate with each other in a way which has not been possible earlier.

However, from a military point of view the situation is more complex. If we are the members of such websites we should be careful what kind of data we publish and with whom we share our profile. For spies and criminals, social networks are a real paradise because with the help of these they can explore our system of relationships, circle of friends and acquaintances and get photos of us. Moreover, if someone uploads a photo thoughtlessly where military objects and maps can be seen in the background, then these photos can be magnified and these pieces of information can also be turned against us. If a soldier does a keep in touch activity, it is worth thinking it over whether he or she should be a member of a social network website or not. If yes, he or she should think it over what type of information to share. Also, if he or she gets a friend request, should decide which requests to accept and who to share with information about him or herself.

### *Treating interpreters*

In mission areas, it would be the best for soldiers if they could get in direct contact with the locals. However, this is very rare; that is why interpreters are used for this purpose. The national security examination of interpreters is done by the appropriate experts before their employment and a contract is signed with them only after this is done. However, there is no examination which is 100% sure so information should be shared with them carefully and minimalism should be achieved. When employing interpreters, it is an important rule that we should always inform them about a work not much time before their employment, for example one day in advance. It is necessary because in this way our movements are more difficult to model when the interpreters are tapped, for example.

Interpreters should always be informed about the particular task of that day in the car when arriving at the scene. During the negotiation, we should watch his or her body language so that we know if the interpreter behaves in an appropriate way and the negotiation is about what he or she is translates to us. Moreover, when there is a negotiation, the appropriate position and clothing should also be paid attention to, depending on in what field the interpreter's service is used. The things we have just listed here are necessary because interpreters have a working relationship with us which can become a close



relationship in the long run. During the cooperation, they get lots of information about our work. As I have already mentioned before, they go through a national security examination. However, we can never know when they are blackmailed and forced by outer powers to provide information. This is why the rules listed above should be followed.



Picture #3: The keep in touch activity of LMT in Kosovo

### ***The use of mobile phones and “smart phones”***

By the 21<sup>st</sup> century, technology has reached a state of development which could not have been imagined earlier. For example, a few decades earlier military robot technology was only a kind of conception. However, by now different robots like UAVs<sup>11</sup> are used in the armies of many countries. Telecommunications and space technology have also developed in an amazingly fast way, opening up new possibilities for warfare.

So, when using mobile phones, fixed-line telephones and radios; operational secrets, military values, routes and tasks must never be made known because the tapping of these gadgets is considered easy. If we use phones during the connection, information should be coded or we should speak only about open information. If our gadget is capable of it, always make the information coded. Of course, the tapping of SMS and MMS is also possible, so do not publish secret information, routes and maps.

In most places, where secret or confidential information is told, machines are used that disturb radio waves. During commander meetings, mobile and clever phones have to be not only turned down but also switched off. With the development of technology, listening techniques have also developed very much: a phone in operation which is only turned down can be tapped easily with the help of certain techniques. So mobile phones have to be switched off or even

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<sup>11</sup> UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

not taken in during an important negotiation or meeting. Unfortunately, many soldiers do not take it seriously because even though they know that they should do that, they underestimate the possibility of tapping. It is enough to bring a deterrent example from Kosovo: there is a civilian shop 1 km away from a military camp where different tapping gadgets can be bought freely.

### ***Summary***

It is characteristic of military science that in many cases the information we hold cannot be handed over. That is why we cannot write about several things in public because outsiders also read these treatises. So military science should always find the balance between what it can report about and what not. By keeping this thought in view, in the foregoing I wanted to bring some security factors up that had to be followed while doing CIMIC and LMT activity.

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### ***Pictures***

Picture #1: CIMIC relief in Afghanistan, taken by Erika Varga, 11-2007

Picture #2: LMT is watching a demonstration in Kosovo, taken by Sebastian Duna, 03-2011

Picture #3: The keep in touch activity of LMT in Kosovo, taken by Balázs Lóderer, 03-2011

## GENDER IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY

### *The Situation of Women in the South African (National) Defence Force*

#### *Gender Mainstreaming in South Africa*

Gender mainstreaming: as defined by the United Nation Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), this refers to the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels (Suthanthiraraj & Ayo, 2010:9)

The issue of gender mainstreaming is extremely interesting in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa where many women are underrepresented and have limited rights. In some African countries such as Somali and Democratic Republic of Congo still old traditions are preferred. In the context of African women such ancient rules can be: no right for education, inferiority, compulsory marriage, sexual harassment, and genital cutting.

According to the ancient African beliefs, women and nature are closely connected. African traditions and beliefs symbolise them as the hearth of the family, a spiritual soul who prays for health and successful battle. An ancient Ghanaian proverb says: a woman is a flower in a garden, her husband is the fence around it. Changing household roles and women becoming the 'fence' is how female soldiers redefine women's position in society. As many social scientists claim, feminist consciousness is extremely important in order to strengthen women's voice in politics and in other areas of life.

Today's South Africa has one of the most liberal constitutions of the world thus women of South Africa have the possibility to become participants of gender mainstreaming. The liberal constitution was adopted in 1996; two years after the party of blacks, the African National Congress won the elections and the legendary freedom fighter, Nelson Mandela became president. As the constitution claims in Section 9: "the right to equality before the law and freedom from discrimination. Prohibited grounds of discrimination include race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth." This means all the South African women have the possibility to become a soldier.

The famous British journalist, Richard Dowden writes about South Africa: it not just another country (Dowden, 2009: 381) The statement clearly proves that the democratization of South Africa brought success to the country in politics and economics as well. Achievements also include gender issues.

South Africa is ranked fourth out of 53 African countries for its record on women's rights. In the World Economic Forum's "gender gap index" it comes an impressive sixth out of 134 countries in the world. In the United Nations Development Programme's Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)<sup>1</sup> the country also does well, being placed 26th out of 182 countries (The Economist, 2010: Oct.7<sup>th</sup>) Women also do well in political representation, they hold 44,5 per cent of the parliamentary seats.<sup>2</sup> This is the fourth highest proportion in the world and far better than 19,5 per cent, the average in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a remarkable fact that the biggest opposite party (Democratic Alliance) of the ANC (African National Congress) is also led by a woman, Helen Zille. These data mark that South Africa produces very good numbers on paper. Reading these numbers one could think women live their lives without any difficulty in South Africa. I suppose it is not surprising if I claim that the issue is slightly more complicated. This is may be true in theory but it may not apply in practise. The enormously high rate of physical and sexual violence against women in the country also proves this statement. South Africa has one of the highest reported rape incidences in the world. In the past, and nowadays as well, women are effected by some of these troubles in military institutions, too. As the chairperson of the Commission on Gender Equality says, "South Africa still has a long way to go in becoming gender sensitive".<sup>3</sup>

### ***The History of South African Women's Participation in Military Until 1994***

According to the constitution of the Republic of South Africa, every citizen, including women, has the right to join the army. The armed forces of South Africa are called South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The national army of South Africa plays a major role in the context of the black continent and at national levels as well. Since the end of the Apartheid system more and more women join to the army. The government works on reducing the differences between male and female soldiers, which was unconceivable during the Apartheid and earlier than that as well.

The South African Army (in this time officially called: South African Defence Force) first used women only for auxiliary roles. This meant that they

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<sup>1</sup> Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM): is a measure of agency. It evaluates progress in advancing women's standing in political and economic forums. It examines the extent to which women and men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making. (Human Development Report)

<sup>2</sup> Source: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Source: <http://www.southafrica.info/about/democracy/cge.htm>

had non-combat tasks, did not use weapons, and were not fighting. Hence women helped the South African (SA) Army as, for example, nurses. During World War I in 1914 the SA army established volunteer nursing services and sent 328 nurses to serve with SA troops in Europe and East Africa. Women's Auxiliary Army Service began accepting women recruits in 1916. Nearly 12,000 SA women took part in World War I fulfilling clerical and other duties. (South Africa Index) These were the first real participants of SA women in military service. Women were not conscripted but from 1970 they could volunteer for military service. With the military extension of the 1970s the SADF general staff was divided into six parts: finance, intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, and planning, the South African Medical Service (SAMS) was made co-equal with the South African Army, the South African Navy, and the South African Air Force.

During these decades more and more women took part in civil defence organizations and were trained to act against possible terrorist attacks. Nearly half thousand women volunteered for the Johannesburg Civil Defence Program at the end of the 1980s. During the training women were taught the following subjects: weapons training for self defence, anti-riot procedures, traffic and crowd control, first-aid, and fire fighting. Even some black women joined to the Anti-Apartheid struggle.

The Apartheid system (1948-1994) was maintained by the National Party government, the system of racial segregation, which meant the limitation of the rights of black South Africans. The Apartheid system classified people into four races: white, native, Asian and coloured. Each race had different rights and different living areas. Thus the three races, including the black majority, were controlled and isolated by the white minority. Blacks were discriminated nearly in all walks of life. The resistance of the ANC sympathizers seem understandable after this short review of the Apartheid system (which actually comes from the word apartness). The army of the ANC (called: Umkhonto we Sizwe<sup>4</sup> (MK)) was not conventional as the SADF; it was a guerrilla army.

Both in SADF and MK the number of woman soldiers increased dramatically between 1976 and 1990. Women constituted almost 12 per cent of the Permanent Force of the SADF and nearly 20 per cent of the cadres in MK. (Cock, 1992: 2) Numbers may sign the high participation of women in the two armies although they were still underrepresented and the majority of women were still excluded from positions of leadership and authority. The reason of underrepresentation can be the fact that women were not allowed to participate

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<sup>4</sup> The African National Congress (ANC), together with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the members of the Congress Alliance, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress and the Congress of the Democrats, had been engaged in peaceful acts of resistance which aimed at forcing the government to eventually recognize the rights of Black people in South Africa. (South Africa History Online)

in combats. They were only allowed to serve in support branches such as administration, logistic, telecommunication, intelligence, medical service, and welfare.

Some reasons why women were excluded from combat roles:

- women are unsuited to killing;
- women's socialisation is inappropriate;
- women are incapacitated through physiological functions such as menstruation;
- male chivalry: men would find it difficult to prevent themselves from saying 'after you'. (Cock, 1992: 3)

Men and women were accommodated and trained separately in SADF. Due to the sexual division women were trained in the South African Army Women's Collage. The collage was established by P. W. Botha, the prime minister of South Africa (1978-1984)<sup>5</sup> in 1979. Trainees were called "Botha babies." The selection of girls was not focused on technical abilities but on 'who can present the image of women in uniform positively. Introduction to make-up was also part of the lessons. (Cock, 1992:3) This shows that the SADF did not take female representation seriously. Such training for women did not bring them closer to gender equality; it rather kept them in the same lower ranked position. The treatment of women in MK was poled apart form SADF. Men and women received political and military training together; their daily routine was the same.

Women played an important role in MK; they were a real part of the guerrilla army. The MK functioned as a kind of shelter for those black women who wanted to express their resistance against the Apartheid system. The MK always emphasised the importance of women's emancipation. But a female soldier's real life was not that easy. They had to sacrifice a big part of their lives for fighting for freedom. MK women cadres often met difficulties and danger in their daily lives because of military service.

This kind of violent policy was not followed by the ANC in the beginning. First the ANC was a non-violent movement. But this approach was unsuccessful so tactics were required to be changed. The MK's first attack against the SA government was in December 1961; nearly one and a half year after the Sharpeville massacre<sup>6</sup> where the SA police killed 69 black

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<sup>5</sup> Pieter Willem Botha (12 January 1916 – 31 October 2006) was the prime minister of South Africa from 1978 to 1984 and the first executive state president from 1984 to 1989. He was the head of the African National Party. His nickname was "The Big Crocodile".

<sup>6</sup> Sharpeville Massacre happened on 21 March 1960. On this day around 6000 black people demonstrated against pass laws. The number of the protesters was much higher than the police, so after a day of demonstrations the South African police opened fire on the crowd and killed 69 people.

demonstrators. The ANC leader, Nelson Mandela stated the following: “if the government’s reaction is to crush by naked force our non-violent struggle, we will have to reconsider our tactics. In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question on non-violent policy.”<sup>7</sup>

Nelson Mandela was an excellent ideological and political leader; he inspired a lot of black Africans to fight for their freedom. Hence it is not surprising that not only men but also many black South African women felt an inner urge to join to the MK due to the fact that the ANC was a banned party under the South African government and the United States declared MK as terrorist organization.

The number of female MK cadres has highly increased since 1976. That time 20% of the MK members were women. (Cock, 1992: 4) The high representation of women in MK clearly proved the guerrilla army’s open attitude. Female MK activists played a very important role in propagating ANC ideologies. These women risked their lives and let themselves be judged by men due to their activities as cadres. Although they were not judged, instead, rather appreciated by the men in MK. This still did not change the fact that higher positions were still occupied by men. Only few women had advanced positions. In 1994 for example only ten women were colonels. During the 1990s women held warrant officers and brigadiers as highest positions.

### *After 1994*

As it was mentioned before, the constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that women also have equal right to join to the SANDF similarly to men. This included not only the right to equality, but the necessity to be protected from incidents of sexual harassment and gender-based violence. (Heinecken & van der Waag-Cowling, 2009: 526) Due to the new legislation the SADF also needed to set up new methods for the treatment of women in the new democratic South Africa. Firstly the SADF got a new and slightly longer name: South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The SANDF integrated the SADF, the non-statuary revolutionary forces of the MK, the liberation Army of the ANC, the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army of the Black Consciousness Pan African Congress, and the four homeland armies: Transkei Defence Force, Bophutatswana Defence Force, Venda Defence Force, and Ciskei Defence Force (collectively known as the TBVC forces). The integration of the primarily White SADF with the other Black African forces was one of the most expansive and complex undertakings in public reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa. (Heinecken & van der Waag-Cowling, 2009: 518) It is clear that the SANDF’s most important task was (is) to face racial and gender issues.

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The pass listed the African's name, birthplace, and tribal affiliation, contained his picture and serial number, his space for a receipt to prove that he has paid his taxes and to list his arrests.

<sup>7</sup> Source: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk>

During the Apartheid system people judged each other according to racial identity and women were strongly underrepresented. Soldiers, who used to fight against each other, became compeers after the change of the system. Hence changes happened extremely fast while several issues were still left without solution and new challenges arose. People who came from different social, ideological, racial and religious backgrounds had to accept and understand each other to be able to work together. Resocializing people and changing their attitudes toward race and gender could not be managed straightaway. As the South African White Paper on Defence states in Chapter 6, *“The overarching goal is to establish a new institution which is professional, efficient, effective and broadly representative. Representativeness refers to the racial, and gender composition of the SANDF and to the fair integration and equitable representation of the constituent integrating forces at all ranks. Failure to meet this goal will critically undermine the legitimacy of the SANDF.”* (DOD, 1996: 26) Thus a certain policy for change can be witnessed although difficulties following the fall of the Apartheid system should not be underestimated.

**Table 1.** Changed racial profile of SANDF 1994, 2009\* (%)

Race	SANDF 1994 – post-integration	Defence Review targets 1996	SANDF 2009
Africans	39.2	64.5	70
Coloureds	12.6	13.0	13
Indians	1.3	1.3	1
Whites	46.8	24.4	16

\*Latest figures obtained from Department of Defence.

Source: Heinecken & van der Waag-Cowling, 2009: 520

The racial and gender profile of SANDF also changed significantly. In 1994 white women made up 81% of the female component, in 2009 they represented 22% with the majority being African women (65%). (Heinecken & van der Waag-Cowling, 2009: 527)

With the facts above I would like to explain that the gender issue was not the only challenge SANDF has to face in the Post-Apartheid South Africa.

Officially there is no gender discrimination in SANDF nowadays, women receive the same training as men. Unfortunately this does not mean the full acceptance of female soldiers. Men are still one-sided in the context of combat roles. They think this is not a suitable job for women and they should stay in support positions since they are physically weaker. In such cases women have to act like men to be recognised as true soldiers. Female soldiers still have to prove more than males in various areas in order to be accepted in the masculine culture of the military. In this case traditional African culture comes into the



picture too. Most of the male soldiers who are use to their superiority find it difficult to take orders from women. Many men also piqued women because they have to race each other for positions. So it is definitive that women face bigger both emotional and professional challenges during their years spend in military institutions. It is especially true in cases of deployment. In 2008 around 10% of peacekeepers were women. During a peacekeeping deployment, e.g. deployment in a refugee camp, soldiers have to cope with the lack of basic services like cleaning and washing. These difficulties are usually taken harder by women than male soldiers.

Difficulties that women face during a deployment in SANDF:

- adoption to the climate;
- lack of personal hygiene and lustration;
- lack of personal isolation (many times soldiers have to sleep in tents together);
- high number of skin and urinary diseases;
- family related stress;
- sexual harassment.

Against the mentioned problems the number of women participation in peacekeeping actions is getting higher. According to János Besenyő the refugee camps in Western Sahara also prove the increasing number of women peacekeepers: every unit of the camps has an elected leader who is responsible for organisation of the everyday life. Many of the important positions are taken by women... Thus women are fulfilling key roles which support the development of a system different from the traditional Arab “family model”. (Besenyő, 2009: 168)

### ***Family Related Stress and Sexual Harassment***

I suppose family related stress and sexual harassment need to be explained more detailed.

As it was mentioned before gender issues sometimes break and go against traditional male and female roles. However there are some characteristics that can not be changed and transformed so easily. These are basic (biological) functions like the different functions of the body and hormones (e.g. natural maternal instinct). No amount of legislation or modernisation will change the distinguishing and distinctive physical characteristics of men and women. (Memela-Mouti, 2009: 9)

Women are capable to bear a child. A newborn is much more twit with her mother than her father. We have to accept the fact that men support families, and children spend less time with them as with their mothers. Therefore it is understandable why women are more infected by family related stress. This strain is more complicated in the case of single mothers. In this case the family

has to cope with both emotional and financial absence of the mother. Sometimes women have to choose between building a military carrier or loosing their family.

Going back home also can cause problems such as post-deployment stress. After the end of the deployment a woman has to re-integrate herself into her family or relationship. Conflicts caused by long separation can lead the woman wanting to be re-deployed. Staying away from a partner also evokes problems, for example, distrust and jealousy.

Sexual harassment and gender-based violence is also a very crucial issue at SANDF.

Sexual harassment is any unwanted attention of a sexual nature that takes place in the workplace. This is any kind of sexual behaviour that makes you feel uncomfortable, including:

- touching, rude gestures, staring at your body in an offensive way;
- unwelcome sexual jokes;
- unwanted questions about your sex life;
- whistling, requests for sex.<sup>8</sup>

It is clear that women nowadays can enter the formerly typical male dominated areas like army, police services, construction and navy. At these men dominated work places the number of sexual harassment is higher. The SANDF also dispose an own Sexual Harassment Policy, which also discusses the different kind of sexual harassments.

For example in a survey conducted among SANDF personnel, 37 per cent of female employees and 30 per cent of military wives reported that they have been subject to abuse or a violent relationship. (Heinecken & van der Waag-Cowling, 2009: 531)

Despite of the particular regulation many of the incidents are not reported. The reason can be: women do not even know the law or afraid of the consequences. It is true that proving sexual harassment or violence is difficult and complicated. However, the “gender agenda” is taking some strain, and recent reports of sexual harassment, gender violence, or even murder must force us to re-examine how gender integration is taking place in non-traditional work spaces for women.<sup>9</sup> (PeaceWomen, 2010)

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<sup>8</sup> Source: <http://www.mywage.co.za/main/women-and-work/sexual-harassment-1>. Sexual Harassment Laws in South Africa

<sup>9</sup> Source: [http://www.peacewomen.org/news\\_article.php?id=2454&type=news](http://www.peacewomen.org/news_article.php?id=2454&type=news). South Africa: SA Women: Hard Time in Militray, PeaceWomen

## ***Conclusion***

The changing of SA women's situation in the army is unquestionable. As we can witness the female members of the SA(N)DF is increasing significantly. More and more women soldiers and female success stories appear in the media as in the South African Soldier, the DOD's national magazine. The DOD also emphasises the importance of sexual equality at conferences such as the Gender Conference. International Women's Day is also celebrated every year in the SA army.

So it is obvious that the SANDF acts well in promoting gender mainstreaming at military institutions. Although we could realize it is not enough, because number of problems are still left to be solved. It seems clear that SANDF still has a lot to develop in treating female soldiers in a same way as males in practise.

The question is still open weather different laws and action can change common customs such as traditional female and male roles, weather the process of gender mainstreaming is capable to change the traditional roles or if female and male soldiers are considered to be equal in the whole society of South Africa.

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## **IT CAN HAPPEN AGAIN AT THE NEXT ELECTIONS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ZIMBABWE**

*Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in the southern part of the African continent, bordered by South Africa to the south, Botswana to the southwest, Zambia to the northwest and Mozambique to the east. Zimbabwe began as the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, and was ruled illegally by a white settler regime which declared unilateral independence from Britain in 1965. A guerrilla war by African nationalists in the Zimbabwe African National Union of Robert Mugabe, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union of Joshua Nkomo led to independence in 1980. Mugabe has been in power since independence.*

### ***Delicate balance***

On 11 July 2011, we had twenty eight months of the ‘Inclusive (or Unified) Government’ (IG/GNU) following the signing of the ‘Global Political Agreement’ (GPA) just over two years ago; the context remains, however, the militarisation and ‘militarization’ of the Zimbabwean state often referred to as a ‘silent military coup’ under the control of the Joint Operations Command (JOC). The political environment is rocky with inter-party talks stalled and ZANU-PF resisting regional pressure for free and fair elections, the economy has only partially restabilised and the humanitarian situation is precarious. In late January

2009, Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)<sup>1</sup> succumbed to the relentless pressure from regional heads of state in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and agreed to become part of an 'inclusive government' with Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF. The GPA, signed in September 2008, after the post-electoral violence of April – June 2008 that led to this government was far from the desired outcome for the vast majority of Zimbabweans. It was hailed by the SADC summit a few days later as 'problem solved', but the GPA effectively 'rewarded' ZANU-PF by offering it a seat in government despite overwhelming evidence of their responsibility for the violence. Additionally the GPA is a very badly drafted document, and in the context of the problems facing Zimbabwe (especially on human rights violations and related security sector reform needs) is replete with omissions. Most analysts agreed that it lacked a time-frame, was riddled with contradictory statements<sup>2</sup> and laid up as many problems as it solved, as indeed has become apparent. Issues of political control were left undecided which gave the opportunity for Mugabe to sow division amongst his opponents – something at which he continues to be adept, such as in his demands to end the coalition in February 2011 and move to elections – which practically all commentators believe will be violent<sup>3</sup>.

Morgan Tsvangirai's installation as Prime Minister on 11 February 2009 meant legitimacy was restored to Robert Mugabe as president of Zimbabwe and raised the possibility of the end of targeted 'sanctions' and an injection of Western capital into the country's beleaguered economy. Reports of harassment and arrests of members of civil society, especially women, trade unionists, journalists, human rights activists, independent newspaper distributors, lawyers and MDC officials continue to undermine rule of law, the building of a democratic space and public confidence in the political process. The biggest problem is that despite an undertaking in the GPA to deal with violence and perpetrators, despite the overwhelming amount of empirical evidence in this regard, impunity continues to characterise the situation and there is no sanction on the use of these tactics. While levels of violence / intimidation initially

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<sup>1</sup> There are two factions – one under Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and a smaller in under a fractured state – 'MDC-M splits into 3' *The Zimbabwean* vol 5 (33) 20 – 26 August 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Essentially the document is an amalgam of ZANU-PF 'anti-imperialism' concerns over land, sovereignty, external interference and 'sanctions' with MDC concerns over a new constitution, national healing, the role of traditional leaders, youth militias, prevention of violence, a new constitution, and political freedoms. So far the former agenda is in reality the only one being addressed

<sup>3</sup> 'Robert Mugabe "ready to bury the opposition" as opposition warns of beatings and intimidation' [www.telegraph.co.uk](http://www.telegraph.co.uk) 19 December 2010 (at ZANU-PF congress of December 2010); 'Mugabe prepares for a brutal and violent campaign' [www.thezimbabwemail.com](http://www.thezimbabwemail.com) 13 November 2010; See warning from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in 'Emigrants violent homecoming' [www.thezimbabwean.co.uk](http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk) 3 November 2010; 'Civic groups powerless to stop violent elections' [www.swradioafrica.com](http://www.swradioafrica.com) 1 November 2010.

reduced, all reports suggests that requisite levels of fear and related mobilisation necessary to ensure ZANU-PF's continuation in power will be maintained.

The GPA was essentially an uneasy compromise between the two MDCs and ZANU-PF, and resulted from: the weakening of the former single ruling party, ZANU-PF, and the opposition, the weakening of the support base – civil society and trades unions - of the MDCs; the rapid spiralling down of the economy allied to a disastrous humanitarian situation; pressure from SADC, especially after the flawed presidential election second round of June 2008; and growing international isolation of the Mugabe regime. The GPA provided an opportunity for ZANU-PF to maintain its repressive, plutocratic and economically bankrupt rule and attempt through the MDC to reverse economic decline and normalise its international relations. The MDCs, by contrast, entered the agreement as their only possible viable route to power, and to begin a process of national political and economic revival, but also, no doubt, for some a chance to enjoy the rewards of office.

### ***Roadblocks and Roadmaps: Zimbabwe and the Way Forward***

Optimists – there are still some – are looking at the beginning of the endgame in Zimbabwe against the background of the ‘Arab Spring’. The eleven year plus crisis continues in familiar ways, but with one possible key difference. After years of what seemed collusion with the Harare regime, there is now unparalleled scrutiny and pressure on the regime from fellow African leaders in SADC. A roadmap to free and fair elections is being drafted, even if there are as yet no benchmarks for implementation. The areas of independent electoral commission, role of observers, and reform of the security sector are rightly seen as key. There are reports of bitter disagreements between South African president Jacob Zuma and Mugabe at the recent extraordinary meetings on Zimbabwe that SADC held in Livingstone, Zambia and Sandton, Johannesburg.

Pressure from the region on the three major political parties has been building since 2008 when ZANU-PF unleashed violence following its defeat in the first round of elections. SADC initiated both the Global Political Agreement (GPA) with all its flaws, and the Inclusive Government that took office in February 2009. SADC has been only too aware after sustained lobbying by the Movement for Democratic Change and from Zimbabwean and southern African civil society that it is ZANU-PF that has been dragging its feet on the key issues of the GPA. The SADC taskforce on Zimbabwe set up in June and headed by South Africa with Zambia and Mozambique has been in and out of Harare, although talks are so far deadlocked on security sector reform. ZANU-PF alleges reform would undermine the country's sovereignty. Its intransigence, shown on 13 July by the unanimous decision of the politburo to reject the SADC roadmap and push for 2011 elections, is unsurprising. It is the key areas of continued control over the security forces, the broadcast media and the electoral

arrangements by which the party would hope to control the population and ensure by whatever means that the deeply unpopular ZANU-PF wins the election. This would enable it to ditch its hated coalition partners of the two MDC factions. With rumours that Mugabe's constant trips to Malaysia are to treat pancreatic cancer, ZANU-PF wanted elections in 2011 with the unreformed voters roll and its supporters in charge of the process. However SADC and civil society say Zimbabwe is not ready for elections this year without undertaking extensive constitutional and legislative reforms as outlined in the GPA, media and electoral reforms. The region has pencilled in 2012 as the earliest that free and fair elections could be held. Faction fighting inside ZANU-PF to succeed Mugabe and ensure continued access to legal and illegal resources has increased as a result.

SADC pressure is encouraging, but cannot yet halt the sustained violence and intimidation particularly of the rural population for long thought of as ZANU-PF's powerbase, and against women. Also under attack are MDC politicians and ministers, journalists, civil society activists, and church congregations, notably the Anglican Church, the Apostolic Sects, and Catholics. Widespread state-sponsored violence, partisan application of the law, increased deployment of soldiers across the country openly intimidating citizens and campaigning for ZANU-PF all confirm that key state institutions remain unreformed, partisan, politicised and militarised. Mugabe is highly reliant on the Joint Operations Command (JOC) which was supposed to have been dismantled under the GPA but which is still controlling the repression. Brigadier General of the Defence Forces, Douglas Nyikayaramba said in Sandton during the SADC meeting that the JOC regarded Prime Minister Tsvangirai as a security threat and that while he was still in office it was legitimate for the army to remain in politics to counter subversion. This follows on from numerous statements by military and security leaders such as the late army commander Vitalis Zvinvashe and the present incumbent Constantine Chiwenga that they would never salute anyone without liberation credentials i.e. Tsvangirai.

Since the discovery of alluvial diamonds in Marange (Chiadzwa), in 2006, the area has seen violence, social instability, and environmental degradation with diamonds having allegedly become a source of income for corrupt individuals, a repressive ZANU PF regime and its military allies. In 2003 the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KP) was created to prevent the trade of 'blood diamonds' that have fuelled conflicts across Africa. Despite some progress, the scheme has repeatedly been criticised, particularly in relation to its handling of Marange. A temporary suspension of Zimbabwe in 2009 until shortcomings were fixed, and the appointment of a Local Focal Point for civil society have not been successful in overcoming continuing allegations that Marange diamonds continue to be smuggled into world diamond markets.

Current stalemate leads to fear that the whole KP system might collapse, with many possible outcomes, including a separate African system of certification.

So what is the way forward? Zimbabwean civil society sees the following as crucial. SADC, as GPA guarantor, needs to ensure democratic elections comply with SADC principles and guidelines, but also deal with five outstanding disagreements. As well as staffing of the Zimbabwe Elections Commission, and the role of the Zimbabwe Security Forces in repression, these are legislation prohibiting freedom of expression and movement, and the role of election monitors. A new constitution is crucial including electoral reforms like an accurate voters' roll, guarantees for media freedom, promotion of gender equality and equal access by all political parties to state media and repealing legislation hindering free political activity. The roadmap must layout contingency plans of steps to be taken in the event that a constitutional referendum produces a No Vote. All soldiers should be returned to barracks with service chiefs restricting their activities to their constitutional mandate and ceasing interference in political and electoral affairs. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and its secretariat staff need to be demilitarised, independent, adequately resourced and receive direct technical support from the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum. SADC must certify that the environment is conducive to holding free and fair elections before an election date can be set, and must supervise the elections. These should be monitored and observed by local, regional, continental and international groups with unfettered access to all parts of the country and in place three months before and after elections. The international community should extend financial and technical support to help this process including to civil society with its critical role in transition. There could also be increased support to monitoring of the Marange/ Chiadzwa diamond fields, especially support for the Local Focal Point. Not only would this help avert conflict, it would enable the resources to be used for vital reconstruction rather than illegal private accumulation.

### ***Women's roadmap to election***

Women's Coalition of Zimbabwe have called in a recent document for the Zimbabwean leadership, SADC leadership and the mediator, President Jacob Zuma to work towards the production of a gender-sensitive Zimbabwe Roadmap to Elections<sup>4</sup>. The document contains women's basic and minimum demands for fair elections to ensure their free and effective participation. Requirements include a new constitution which guarantees all human rights of women and has provisions for gender equity, equality and non-discrimination. It also upholds the principles of participation of women in electoral and governance processes and guarantees a quota and the 50/50 principle for women and men in decision making positions. Women demand an end to politically motivated violence and

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.genderlinks.org.za/article/zimbabwe-womens-roadmap-to-election-2011-06-17>



intimidation and are asking the state to ensure full security of women and girls during election periods to and end impunity. The women's roadmap mandates political parties, the police, judiciary services and all state agents to preach nonviolence and peace, prevent, mitigate and address issues of violence.

### ***Women's participation in politics in Zimbabwe***

Ever since independence from colonial rule in 1980, the ruling party and government have determined what democracy can be in Zimbabwe. In the pre-independence period, democracy was simply defined as "one man, one vote." The issue of gender parity in decision-making was never on the agenda, and women were not organised in those days. After independence, the government and ruling party redefined democracy to mean the participation of more than one party in periodic elections. However the government has worked to predetermine the results of these elections by putting in place partisan electoral management boards and limiting the operating space for political parties and civil society. All elections since 1985 have been marred by violence at the community and national levels. The situation has deteriorated with each election especially during the period of 2006-2008.

The agenda of political parties is largely shaped by male leadership, and women usually are expected toe the line. Many political parties remain male-dominated and many policies to accommodate women remain merely cosmetic. The result is that women have ended up with only 11% of the positions in the Zimbabwean parliament. The figure has improved significantly in the senate, where women hold 20% of constituencies. None of the opposition political parties have a gender policy or quota system for women, only the former sole ruling party. Women did not participate equally in the negotiations that resulted in the Global Political Agreement. Only one woman, Priscilla Misihairambwi sat at the negotiation table.

### ***Political violence against women in Zimbabwe***

To varying degrees, women in Zimbabwe have been victims of political violence in all the past decades since the beginning of the Liberation War in the 1970s. An early study showed that 36% of the victims seen were women, and this was against the background of the finding that nearly 1 adult in 10 over the age of thirty years was likely to be a survivor of torture. Women were similarly affected during the disturbances of the 1980s in Matabeleland. During the Food Riots in 1998, women were equally targets of the violence inflicted by the police and the army, suffering assaults, torture, and unlawful detention. Since February 2000, women have been continuously reported as victims of political violence, particularly during elections. The most comprehensive data on the violations experienced by women has been provided by Women of Zimbabwe Arise. As the WOZA reports demonstrated, violations against women have been steadily

increasing since 2000, with the number of violations increasing very dramatically between 2006 and 2008<sup>5</sup>. Women's organisations share the common opinion that elections in 2011 would be catastrophic as the 2008 presidential run-off<sup>6</sup>, when they were tortured, raped or abused. Many of them are still affected and bear physical and emotional scars and their perpetrators have never been charged and still able to commit further crimes.

Unfortunately, political violence amongst women is not particular in Zimbabwe in Africa. We know from the past that in times of political tension and conflicts women and children are the most vulnerable. Reports shows that in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda tortures were taking place, in Western Sahara and Morocco women were put in jail and have been raped and tortured<sup>7</sup> in many cases.

### *Testimonies*

Despite considerable documentation on the political violence of 2008, little attention was paid to violence against women. The Research Advocacy Unit's aim is to document these cases and to raise awareness on political violence against women in Zimbabwe<sup>8</sup>.

Reports testify that ZANU-PF tried to win votes in areas of MDC support, especially in rural ones by terrorising and violating people's rights to force them to vote for the 'right party', ZANU- PF. Testimonies show that houses of MDC activists were searched by government forces or youth groups composed of loyal ZANU-PF activists. The latter were given money or were motivated by other means. MDC activists – men mostly- hid to avoid inquisitions. Men thought that in their absence their families would not be hurt. Unfortunately, they were wrong. In places where men were not found at home, aggressors abused the innocent wives and family members as punishment. Women were raped and beaten in their home in front of their children.

RAU's campaign contains documentary films with distressing scenes of desperate women who suffered violence. Margaret Mazvarira recalls how her son was killed in 2000 by ZANU-PF supporters and how she was raped by two soldiers and contaminated with HIV/AIDS<sup>9</sup>. Other women recalls how they were beaten up and abused at several time in several place. It is difficult to quantify the number of victims, although RAU's research suggests around 2000 cases May-July 2008. Women are ashamed and fearful therefore they keep these

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<sup>5</sup> Putting it right: Addressing Human Rights Violations against Zimbabwean Women. A report by the Research Advocacy Unit, March, 2009

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.peacewomen.org/news\\_article.php?id=3702&type=news](http://www.peacewomen.org/news_article.php?id=3702&type=news)

<sup>7</sup> Besenyő, János: A nyugat-szaharai menekültkérdés és az algériai menekülttáborok in Afrika Tanulmányok, 2010. IV/3., Publikon/

<sup>8</sup> interview with Kudakwashe Chitsike, Programme manager, Research and Advocacy Unit, [researchandadvocacyunit.org](http://researchandadvocacyunit.org)

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vThYv6rUP34>

horrific memories secret which has serious impacts of their life in the community. Those women who fear the latter's stigmatisation and lack of forgiveness from their husband may pass HIV contamination within their family. Those women who talk might risk being sent back to their parents with consequences for the breaking up of families and leaving women and children more vulnerable.

As elections are getting closer women are in fear already. RAU tries to communicate as much as possible on these issues both in Zimbabwe and abroad. RAU also points out the importance of election observer missions to come before and stay after elections at least for 3-3 months. Significant monitoring of the situation of women and political pressure from abroad could help in reducing political violence of women in Zimbabwe's next elections.

## ***NEWS, EVENTS, INFORMATION***

### **Official Statement of the Scientific Board**

The Defence Minister creates the MoD-HDF Scientific Board with the 90/2011.  
(VIII.4.) MoD regulation

#### **Members of the Scientific Board**

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