Kerry Restates Longstanding Policies, Commentators in Uproar

Let's be clear. Though softened a bit under George W. Bush, US policy since 1967 has considered Israeli settlements an obstacle to peace. Through the Reagan Administration, the US routinely abstainedon, rather than vetoed, UNSC Resolution similar to the recent one. John Kerry's recent speech reiterated often restated positions: that failing a two-state solution, Israel will eventually have to choose between democracy and n apartheid state, a position supported by many Israelis.

Whether taking a strong stand at this late date will have much effect is surely debatable, and the upcoming French initiative may indeed be what Netanyahu really fears, but the uproar this week has really made clear how much Netanyahu's defiant attitude to the US has seemingly deranged Israeli policy.

Is the Geneva Process Doomed?

The UN's negotiator on Syria, Staffan de Mistura, had been struggling the past several days to keep the Geneva peace process on Syria from collapsing in complete disarray. The High National Committee (HNC), representing the anti-Asad side, is balking at talking unless the government side demonstrates sincerity by taking measures to alleviate civilian suffering. That's admirable, but there's little incentive for the government side to comply. (If you're not current on the Geneva process, this excellent guide by Aron Lund is a good briefing.)

I wish I could be as optimistic as de Mistura and Secretary Kerry are trying to be. The facts on the ground are not on the side of the HNC. Hard negotiating is possible only when neither side thinks it can win outright. But in fact the regime forces and their Russian, Hizbullah, and Iranian allies are pushing forward steadily on the Idlib and Aleppo fronts and around Der‘a south of Damascus, and Russian air power is clearing the hinterland along the Turkish border. Assuming the Asad regime would define "victory" not as full control of Syrian territory, but rather as controlling a contiguous corridor of "useful" Syria including the main population centers of Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo and the ports of Latakia and Tartus, the Russian intervention is making that seem like a real possibility. Why make concessions when you're winning? I'm not defending the Asad regime, but where's their incentive to compromise? I wish I could be more optimistic.

Vanished States: the Mahabad Republic and the Azerbaijan People's Government, 1945-1946

It's time for another post on "Vanished States" in the Middle East in the 20th century. Previous posts dealt with the Republic of Hatay (1938-39), the Syrian Arab Kingdom under Faisal (four months in 1920), the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hejaz (1916-1925), and the Rifian Republic (1921-1926). 

(Wikipedia)

Today let's deal with two Soviet satellite states declared on Iranian territory in 1945, at the end of World War II and in the midst of the opening moves of the Cold War: the Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad  (usually referred to as the Mahabad Republic) and the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan (or Azerbaijan People's Government). By late 1946, both were gone after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

The two emerged from the occupation of Iran by Britain and the Soviet Union in 1941, when Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Muhammad Reza, in order to facilitate Allied supplies to the USSR. The Allies pledged to evacuate their forces from Iran within six months after the end of the war. These assurances were repeated when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met at the Tehran Conference in 1943.

But as World War II ended and the Cold War began, the Soviets encouraged these two states to declare independence, and Soviet forces remained in northwestern Iran. The Azerbaijani state, which had its capital at Tabriz, was rather different from the Kurdish one: it was run by veteran Communists and closely tied to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, while the Mahabad Republic, with its capital at Mahabad, as led by Iranian Kurdish nationalists of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), in alliance with a military force led by the Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani, founder of the Iraqi KDP and father of the Kurdish Regional Government's President Mas‘oud Barzani.

Ja'far Pishevari

The Azerbaijanis declared their state first. A group of longtime Communists led by Ja‘far Pishevari declared the formation of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party on September 3, 1945, the day after the surrender of Japan. The Tudeh Party, the official Communist Party of Iran, ordered its Azerbaijani branch to join the new movement. The group formed a "peasant's militia" and on November 18, 1945, staged an de facto coup, declaring an "autonomous republic." (Since Iran was a monarchy, how could a republic be autonomous within it?") Pishevari served as President and Ahmad Kordari as Prime Minister.

Azerbaijan Republic Flag

During the approximately one year before its dissolution, there were clearly close links between the Soviet Republic and the "Autonomous Republic" in Iran and Azeri Turkish was made official and Persian banned.  A Soviet-style judicial code was enforced.

To the West, the Kurdish region of Iran also sought to declare itself a Kurdish Republic. The USSR does not seem to have been as enthusiastic there since the Kurdish leadership were more traditional Kurdish nationalists rather than veteran Communists. The Soviets sought to encourage the Kurdish leadership in Mahabad, which during the period of Soviet occupation had been formed of traditional tribal and religious elements, to join the Azerbaijani Republic, but instead they declared thgeir own autonomous state on December 15, 1945 and on January 22, 1946, announced the formation of the Kurdish Rrpublic in Mahabad.

Qazi Muhammad

Its President was Qazi Muhammad, from a family of religious judges, and its Prime Minister Hajji Baba Sheikh, both members of the KDPI rather than traditional Communist Party (Komala) cadres. The Defense Minister was Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the Iraqi Kurdish leader. Historians claim that there was considerable resentment of the Barzani clan's presence in Iranian Kurdistan, where they had fled after fleeing Iraq. But Barzani's forces clearly were a mainstay of the Mahabad Republic's defense forces. Though the Kurdish Communist Party (Komala) supported the Mahabad Republic, the republic's leadership was officially KDPI.

Mustafa Barzani in 1946

Mahabad's more traditional leadership, though it included elements from Komala, resisted merger with the Communist government in Tabriz, and while the Soviets supported it in their efforts to remain in Iran, they seem to have been less trustful of the independent-minded Kurdish state than of the more Moscow-lining regime in Tabriz.But Mahabad was small, since significant parts of Iranian Kurdistan were in the Anglo-American rather than the Soviet-occupied zone, and were thus easily held by the government in Tehran.

The United Nations 

Mahabad Republic Flag

The West saw the Soviet efforts to remain in northwestern Iran in terms of the Cold War and viewed both mini-states as Soviet satellites. The newly formed United Nations was soon wrestling with what came to be called the Iran Crisis, and in fact, three of the first five resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC Resolutions 2, 3, and 5) dealt with Iran; the Soviets were absent for the later resolutions.

Qazi Muhammad (l.) and Mustafa Barzani

In March of 1946, the USSR promised to withdraw its troops from Iran. (Eastern European domination took precedence over Iran, and the US had a nuclear monopoly until the first Soviet test in 1949.) While they sought as many delays as possible, they did indeed withdraw. By June the Pishevari government in Tabriz negotiated an agreement with the Shah's government to replace the "Autonomous Republic" with a Provincial Council. Although Iranian troops did not move into Azerbaijan until November and December 1946, the withdrawal of the Red Army meant the Azerbaijan Communists had no real source of support. Once the Iranian Army returned, Pishevari fled to Soviet Azerbaijan and Kordari was jailed.  In 1947, Pishevari was killed in an automobile accident, which many have found suspect. (We are talking about the Stalin era, after all.)

The end of Mahabad was messier and bloodier. Even as the withdrawal of Soviet support undercut his government, and many traditional tribal shaykhs and aghas were deserting the republic, Qazi Muhammad and his war council pledged armed resistance on December 5, 1946. With the Soviets leaving and Azerbaijan falling back under Tehran's control, this was a futile and rather puzzling gesture, especially given the fact that Qazi Muhammad agreed to the occupation of Mahabad by Iranian troops. During this period, Qazi Muhammad's brother, Sadr Qazi, had been serving as a Deputy in the Iranian Majlis in Tehran and serving as a go-between in negotiations. Nonetheless, after the fall of Mahabad, the Iranian government hanged Qazi Muhammad, Sadr Qazi, and their cousin Seif Qazi. This seems particularly unjust in the case of Sadr Qazi, who had been the go-between negotiator.

Mustafa Barzani and his Iraqi Kurdish forces tried but failed to cut a deal with Tehran and then conducted a fighting retreat toward the Iraqi and Soviet borders, bloodying the Iranian forces. To his credit, Stalin [as much as it pains me to write those four words about Stalin] allowed the Barzani forces into exile in Soviet Azerbaijan. In the 1950s, after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy, they would be allowed to re-enter Iraq.

The Azerbaijan Soviet satellite is largely forgotten, but Kurdish nationalists sill remember the Mahabad Republic as an evanescent moment of Kurdish independence. Unfortunately, they were dependent on Stalin to make that independence last, and Uncle Joe was not a man to depend upon. A YouTube video of the declaration of the republic:

NYT on Sisi at UN; Ahram on NYT on Sisi at UN

Egyptian Field Marshal President Sisi's speech to the UN General Assembly has been portrayed in the Egyptian media as ranking with Pericles' funeral oration, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Churchill's "We shall fight on the beaches," and such like. The New York Times has taken its own account of Sisi's speech and compared it in double column format with the al-Ahram Arabic version of their report. I really don't think I need to comment further here.

The Marshall Islands' Non-Explanation of That Jamil El-Sayed UNESCO Nomination

Remember last week's weird (just really weird) story about how the tiny Marshall Islands had nominated the former Lebanese security chief (and Hariri assassination suspect) Jamil El-Sayed to be their (its?) Ambassador to UNESCO in Paris, and then withdrew the nomination?

It was strange to begin with. (And for what may be the first time since World War II, the Marshall Islands made global news twice in recent weeks, as the Mexican castaway who supposedly survived for nearly a year also washed up on one of their atolls.)

Since you probably don't regularly read or follow the weekly newspaper The Marshall Islands Journal, I thought I'd share their not entirely illuminating background piece:

As officials in Majuro [the Marshallese capital], learned Wednesday that the nomination of al-Sayyed had been officially transmitted to UNESCO — apparently last December — they moved quickly to cancel it. Acting President Tony deBrum communicated with President Loeak and Foreign Minister Phillip Muller while they were enroute to Japan, and a letter rescinding the nomination of al-Sayyed was prepared and signed by Muller who had signed the original letter nominating al-Sayyed in December. RMI [Republic of the Marshall Islands] officials said they were unable to locate the original nomination letter that Muller signed in December. Muller signed another letter Wednesday to UNESCO Director General Irina Bokova cancelling the nomination for al-Sayyed effective immediately. Acting President deBrum told the Journal Wednesday that initial contact about the possible nomination of al-Sayyed was made to RMI leaders during a visit to Palau at the end of September, and then a follow up visit by a representative of al-Sayyed in December, which resulted in the nomination letter being signed. 

So, "they were unable to locate the original nomination letter?" The original approach came via Palau, another Pacific microstate and ex-US Trust Territory?  There was "a follow up visit by a representative of al-Sayyed in December, which resulted in the nomination letter being signed."

And that's all it takes to  nominated an Ambassador to UNESCO for a country Jamil El-Sayed may never have visited?

Why do I feel part of this story is still missing?

Day One of "Geneva 2"

Today's much-anticipated meeting in Montreux marks the beginning of the "Geneva 2" negotiations over Syria. Like most observers, I don't see a high probability of a major breakthrough that leads to an interim government and the removal of Bashar al-Asad; his Foreign Minister ruled that out yet again today. A best-case scenario might be a ceasefire, even a temporary one, that could allow for relief efforts to aid suffering refugees. (Though of course one could hope for more.) The absence from the table of most of he actual rebel groups who control he battlefield makes even a ceasefire hard to achieve, and day one seems to have mostly been a predictable one, with the two sides denouncing each other.

A solution creating an interim government my be achievable in time, but I fear that the Asad regime's internal support may need to crumble a lot more than it has so far, and recent battlefield successes may have actually reinvigorated it.

The curious dance in which Iran was invited and then disinvited may not have helped that much, either, since Iran is a player and probably would need to be involved in any real breakthrough.

Jordan Said to be Set to Take UNSC Seat Saudis Declined

It's being reported that Jordan will probably take the non-permanent UN Security Council seat that Saudi Arabia was elected to but then announced it would decline it.  The UN apparently has still not received formal notification of the Saudi refusal, and cannot officially elect a replacement until it does.

Morocco Cancels Joint Exercise with US over Sahara Rights Dispute

Morocco has canceled a joint military exercise with the US scheduled to begin tomorrow, in a show of its displeasure over a US announcement that it is considering supporting a proposal to give the United Nations force monitoring the Western Sahara, MINURSO, a human rights oversight capability.

The decision to cancel the African Lion exercise followed a meeting of the Royal Cabinet summoned by the King (link in French).

The US can Still Count on Palau and Nauru

The UN General Assembly has voted to grant non-member observer status to the Palestinian Authority. The largely symbolic gesture as predictably opposed by both the US and Israel. Ah, but when I put it that way it sounds as if only the US and Israel were opposed.  Though the UK and Germany and other key countries (a total of 41) abstained, several countries did indeed vote with the US and Israel: we were joined by Canada, the Czech Republic, and the powerful coalition of Nauru, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Micronesia and Panama. Two neighbors and a smattering of island nations, most of them former US territories, plus the Czechs.

November 29, 1947 and November 29, 2012: Is 65 Years Long Enough?

If all goes according to plan, the United Nations General Assembly will vote today on whether the Palestinian Authority should be admitted as a "Non-Member Observer State." Because such a calamity would cause several planets to spin out of their orbits and crash into the sun, the US (and Israel) are opposed. The vote will have a mostly symbolic impact, though Israel may retaliate against the Palestinian Authority in ways that are not at all symbolic.

But there is one major piece of symbolism that has received very little comment in the US media, at least so far as I've seen. (A major exception is Lior Sternfeld's column over at Juan Cole's blog a couple of days ago: "'Let the Palestinians Have Their Kaf Tet be-November.") 

As Sternfeld explains:

On November 29, 1947 the UN general assembly granted the Zionist movement one of its most prominent diplomatic achievements, when it approved the Palestine Partition Plan. The non-binding resolution, never voted on by the UN Security Council, proposed dividing the land of the British mandate into a Jewish State and an Arab-Palestinian state. The Palestinian leadership rejected the UNGA resolution as giving away a substantial amount of territory to which they felt what they viewed as foreign settlers had no right. In contrast, Jews welcomed the idea of partition in principle (though they did not commit to settled borders for Israel) and they moved forward to establish the state of Israel.

Kaf-Tet means 29 in Hebrew letters, and to date every Israeli child can tell by heart what Kaf-Tet Be’November is, even if he does not know what or when November is. Every Israeli child recognizes the old radio recording of the voting process and thus know how Argentina and Australia voted on this issue (abstention and yes respectively). The war that erupted immediately afterwards and the bloodshed that has transpired since prevented the full implementation of the solution.

Yes. Today marks the anniversary of the United Nations vote in 1947 to partition the Palestine Mandate into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. (You may recall a dramatic scene in the movie Exodus, which explained how blue-eyed Paul Newman and blonde Eva Marie Saint founded Israel, in wh8ch listeners wait for the radio account of the roll call.) Yes, the Arabs rejected partition then. But 65 years have passed, and there's something like a consensus for a '"two state solution" but little will to get there.

The Palestinians chose a significant date for their new bid for legitimacy, but other than the post above I've seen little comment on the 65th anniversary of Kaf-Tet be-November.


http://www.juancole.com/2012/11/let-the-palestinians-have-their-kaf-tet-benovember-sternfeld.html

Ahmadinejad Week

Even before Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made his speech to the UN General Assembly, Amin Azad's guest post at Juan Cole's blog pretty much called it: "Has-Been, Lame Duck Ahmadinejad's UN Speech is Empty Mugging for the Camera." 

Ahmadinejad not only will be finishing up his second term, but there's even talk of abolishing the office of President. Ahmadinejad may be enjoying his last moment in the limelight, though as Azad notes:

If nothing extraordinary happens between now and the end of his presidency, the best fate that Ahmadinejad can hope for is to return to teaching civil engineering (his specialty is traffic engineering) at university. One thing, however, could change things for him dramatically, keeping him in the limelight and guaranteeing him a prominent political role well into the future: an Israeli attack on Iran. In such a case, all the Iranian leaders will forget their political differences and form a united front against aggression.

Ahmadinejad's speech today was not his only limelight, as he also gave a number of media interviews. Why, if his influence at home is on the wane? I think part of it is the need to find news in the ceremonial parade of speakers that is General Assembly week.  And, of course, the fact that the US media usually has to go to Iran to interview Ahmadi, and now he's coming to them.

Egyptian President Morsi's UN debut is today's other news, but no one expected Morsi to make huge headlines. For Ahmadinejad, the news seems that he didn't say anything too outrageous about Israel. His last appearance before the General Assembly seems to have been an anticlimax.

But Ahmadinejad was never known particularly for bizarre General Assembly behavior. The late (and otherwise unlamented) Libyan leader Mu‘ammar Qadhafi was unsurpassed in his ability to, well, do whatever it was he did. If you miss the unpredictability, go back three years to this post of mine from 2009: "Qadhafi on Taliban, Vatican, US Civil War, Saving Humanity, etc., etc." 

And believe me, there is a lot in each of those "etc."s. Qadhafi stretched his 15 minutes to 95 minutes and the simultaneous translator gave up at one point. Ahmadinejad never came close.

President Ahmadinejad, we remember Qadhafi. We listened to Qadhafi (and listened, and listened). And Mr. President, you're no Mu‘ammar Qadhafi.

Annan Throws in the Towel

Kofi Annan is stepping aside as the UN peacemaker in Syria. If your first instinct was to respond, "that will make no difference whatsoever," you aren't alone, but to be honest, it's rather pointless for the United Nations to keep pretending there is a "peace plan" in place when clearly there may be a plan but there is no peace. Continuing to push the rock up the hill and watch it roll down again make the UN appear impotent. The United Nations would better serve the cause of peace by doing what Annan has done and in effect admitting defeat. Until and unless the Asad regime starts looking for the bolt-hole, peace plans will go nowhere.

In the Wake of Houla, What Next for Syria and the World?

The massacre at Houla last Friday has shocked the world; though the Syrian regime denies complicity, the deaths of at least 49 children, along with many more men and women, in the rebel town was clearly committed by some force opposed to the uprising, and the sheer, deliberate horror of it has horrified almost everyone. The world has responded with vigor and force.

No, just kidding. They sent Kofi Annan yet again.

Annan has said that Syria is at "a tipping point," and has come to the stunning conclusion that the UN peace plan isn't working. But we knew that already, apparently before he did.

The world fired the other barrel of its outrage today, kicking out senior diplomats from Syrian Embassies in Western capitals. (Kill children and we may have to declare your diplomats persona non grata. Not break relations, mind you, just PNG some diplomats.)

I have long been ambivalent about Western military intervention in Syria, as I noted most recently at some length here. I don't believe you undertake military action without a clear plan for achieving a defined objective. And I am not at all sure that outside intervention, even regional intervention (though the likelihood of the latter seems remote despite rhetoric). And I know that "we" — the US, the West, NATO, whoever — cannot realistically police the world, and some will say, why Syria and not Darfur, or northern Mali, or other places in need of order?

But Syria is a critically important country, a sort of keystone of the Levant; a prolonged sectarian conflict in Syria would not remain in Syria alone; lately the Syrian violence has already spread to Tripoli in Lebanon, and will spread further if it deepens. The troubles already preoccupy Iran and Hizbullah and could be drawn into the growing Iran-Israel tensions, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states see Syria in sectarian terms and increasingly see themselves as defenders of the Sunni world.

I'm not sure what the world can or should do. But I'm increasingly sure the answer is not to keep sending Kofi Annan.

The War Between the Sudans

 I haven't said anything yet about the nasty little border war that has simmered for the past couple of weeks on the still disputed border between Sudan and south Sudan, but with a new front being claimed west of the Heglig oilfield that has been the focus of most of the fighting to date, and African Union mediator Thabo Mbeki warnig that the two Sudans are "locked in a logic of war," perhaps I should.at least acknowledge what's going on.

I'm in no position to judge the rights and wrongs in the case; border disputes between countries that were once united, especially when fueled by oilfields along a still-not-fully-resolved border, usually are not a straightforward question. Since South Sudan's independence last July, little progress has been made in negotiations on the outstanding issues. Like much of the world, I have major reservations about the Khartoum regime due to Darfur and much else, and wish the new kid on the block well; but there seems to be some indication that South Sudan is responsible for upsetting a delicate balance here by occupying the disputed oilfield at Heglig. There are the usual ambiguities: are attacks in South Sudan carried out by local rebels or by Sudan? Whose claims are to be believed about aerial bombings, aircraft shot down, etc.?

The United Nations and the African Union are trying to bring things under control, and both have a lot invested in the peace process that saw the birth of an independent South Sudan. If I don't comment in greater detail for now it is because I fully acknowledge my own ignorance of the rights and wrongs in this case. I am confident of one thing: after decades of warfare starting as far back as the 1950s and with only brief respites, the last thing South Sudan needs after less  than a year of independence is another war. I hope they realize that.

After the Application: Now What?

The Quartet today has agreed on a new Middle East peace proposal that envisions a two-state settlement by the end of 2012. That may suggest that the Palestinian UN application, for all the Sturm und Drang surrounding it, may have had the somewhat salutary result of moving things off the static position in which they had settled for too long. On the other hand, the PLO is reportedly urging the Security Council to make a decision within two weeks, which means that US hopes for a long, slow process may not prove feasible.  Since the US has promised it would veto a Security Council move to admit, it has already suffered damage in the region.

I deliberately didn't write on the subject Friday to give myself a little time to digest the implications. I'm still doing so. With the US moving into a political campaign, its options were limited at best; clearly the US is not in the driver's seat on the Middle East at the moment, but Arab Spring had already made that clear. There is indeed a danger of a renewed intifada or other outbreak of violence, but the Palestinians seem to have decided that the gamble is worth it and that this Israeli government will not otherwise move forward. But it's still dangerous, and if the US is increasingly marginalized, could become more so. On the other hand, nothing has really changed yet, and if the Palestinians cannot muster enough support in the UNSC to win, the US would be spared having to use the Veto. (Though having promised to use it, it has already shown its position clearly.) If Israel reacts sharply and imposes new sanctions on the Palestinians (or the US does, as many in Congress seek), the danger levels rise.

It's certainly time for new thinking, and there are potential opportunities here as well as dangers. Like Arab Spring itself, it will be clearer what to make of this period once it's over. Until then, we have to hang on for the ride.

1948 Revisited

A column in The Economist reminds us of US efforts at the UN in April and May, 1948,  to get the UN to arrange a trusteeship for Palestine and US efforts to prevent an Israeli declaration lf independence. Sound familiar, anyone?

Ambassador Chamberlin on the Palestine Vote

MEI President Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin has a piece in Politico yesterday on not over-dramatizing the UN vote: "UN Palestine Vote: Time To Exhale."

18 Years After Oslo, Is It Time to Reshuffle the Deck?

The iconic moment at left took place 18 years ago yesterday. There were moments in the 1990s, when Yitzhak Rabin was still alive, that a real peace seemed possible. Both sides bear some of the responsibility for its failure, and so does the man in the middle, who pushed Camp David II before he had a real breakthrough in place. For all his posing as a freedom fighter, Arafat was a horribly cautious man. Mahmoud Abbas is nowhere near as charismatic as Arafat, but he does seem more willing to take risks. Arafat knew when to hold 'em and knew when to fold 'em, but wasn't the sort to raise the ante when he wasn't holding a good hand. Is Abbas? It's starting to look like it: or maybe he's holding a better hand than his opponents think.

On October 6, 1973, Anwar Sadat sent Egyptian forces across the Suez Canal. For the first time in an Arab-Israeli war, there was virtually none of the "drive Israel into the sea" sort of rhetoric and a lot of rhetoric about recovering Sinai.  In most military senses the Egyptians ended that war on the losing side: they had a whole Field Army surrounded and cut off from Cairo by an Israeli strike force west of the Canal. But Sadat was able to reopen the Canal and get parts of Sinai back because Henry Kissinger started his shuttle diplomacy. Sadat won a diplomatic, not a conventional military, victory, because he'd had the daring to reshuffle the deck, and also to introduce wild cards (throwing the Russians out: tilting toward the Americans.) (Okay; I'll try hard to refrain from further poker metaphors in the rest of this post.)

An interesting number of people in the blogosphere and media are asking what would be so disastrous if the United States, which claims to want a two-state solution, accepted a United Nations recognition of Palestine. It would be hard, though I'm sure they'd find a way, for Israel to claim that the UN has no right to do that since, well, Israel was created directly through United Nations action. For political reasons and others, the US  will veto any Security Council resolution, but if Palestine wins a big General Assembly vote, the calculus will change.

The US would indeed further isolate itself, as Prince Turki al-Faisal has noted in the NYT, in what seems to be a nearly open Saudi threat to break with the US on this.  Even peace-leaning Israeli commentators are expressing the wish that Israel had sought to constructively engage (and perhaps even forestall) a UN vote, rather than simply throw down the gauntlet of defiance.

I don't really expect the US Administration, beleaguered by economic difficulties and political attacks, to go out on a limb. And I don't expect an Israel under Netanyahu and Lieberman to take daring risks. But neither we nor Israel may be in the driver's seat here. And perhaps we should at least ask ourselves: would s dramatic change in the status quo be a disaster, or perhaps create an opportunity for new thinking.

One last poker image: is it time not just to up the ante, but to kick over the card table and see who's holding what when you pick it up again? It worked for Sadat in 1973.

Are We Facing a Gathering "Perfect Storm" in the Region?

A week ago IDF Maj. Gen. Eyal Eisenberg, the Home Front Commander, made headlines for saying that Arab Spring could lead to an increase in the chances of a regional war. Other Israeli officials backpedaled quickly, but in the wake of the deepening crisis between Israel and Turkey and now the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Egypt, there seems to be a growing sense of tightening siege in Israel. (I know, of course, that residents of Gaza would find it ironic that Israel feels besieged when they are far more literally so, but the fact is that when Israel feels threatened — justifiably or not — it has often resorted to military action. Two of Israel's once dependable allies, Turkey and Egypt, are no longer so dependable for quite different reasons. And the United Nations debate on recognizing the Palestinian Authority as an independent state is looming, with many members of the European Union likely to support the Palestinian effort, despite US and Israeli opposition. If Israel feels that it is increasingly isolated, again rightly or wrongly, the dangers of conflict do escalate.

That this is a dangerous time is indisputable. I may be grasping at straws, but I do find it encouraging that there really doesn't seemto be any party that wants a \war, regional or limited. Some Israelis might welcome another round in Gaza or against Hizbullah, but probably not just now. While some in Egypt might welcome a distraction, no one, not even the Islamists, wants a war. The Palestinian Authority wants legitimacy, not war. Whether the UN ploy brings that closer or makes it more remote is certainly debatable, and since it's being discussed so many places I haven't felt eager to get into it here. It is, however, going to be a rough ride, given so many converging uncertainties. One should hope for cool heads and cautious diplomacy, with revolutions still simmering and Israel jittery. 

No-Fly Zones and Other Military Options

The debate over na No-Fly Zone over Libya is intensifying, and some are calling for more direct military intervention. So much of the rhetoric appears to be occurring in a vacuum that it may be worth returning to a few first principles and home truths. (For the moment, I'm going to leave aside the blowback from playing into Qadhafi's hands by making it look like the rebels are Western puppets: I'm just going to look at the practicalities.)

You cannot commit forces you do not have. I have heard few if any of the advocates of increased US involvement call for 1) a military draft or 2) massive tax hikes to support a huge increase in our military forces, already committed to two wars. I, too, would like for Clark Kent to slip out of the Daily Planet, change into Superman, fly to Libya, and, oh, let's say throw Qadhafi into the sun with a single heave. But I can't find the area code for Metropolis, or even for Gotham City to ask Commissioner Gordon to crank up the Bat-Signal. Absent those solutions, we're stuck with an overcommitted US Armed Forces, many of whose front-line troops are on their fourth or fifth deployment, or worse, with dwindling budgets and massive stress, and they're a volunteer force, so the longer this goes on, the harder replenishment will be. And we don't even have one carrier in the Med. Not one, save a recently deployed helicopter carrier. Take on MiGs and Sukhois with helicopters? You go first, please. Where will we run our No-Fly Zone from? Europe?

Libya is big. Sure it doesn't have many people, and most live near the coast, but the air bases are scattered inland, and by many accounts the African mercenary troops are being flown into desert air bases like Sabha, and a no-fly zone would presumably want to stop that. So you really want to deny the whole airspace. Libya is 679,359 square miles in area; or 1,759,541 square kilometers. The whole of Iraq (and even when the northern and southern no-fly zones were both in place, the whole country was never included) is 169,234 square miles, or 438,317 square kilometers. (Numbers are from Wikipedia.) Or, for the mathematically challenged, Libya is four times the area of Iraq, and some of its key airfields are deep in the Sahara. And we never enforced a no-fly zone over all of Iraq.

You need either carriers or bases nearby. We may be able to dispatch B-2s from Missouri or B-52s from Diego Garcia to make the rubble bounce in troubled regions, but a no-fly zone requires continuing combat air patrol to deny the skies to the bad guys, and that requires fairly close-in bases, large deployments, and high sortie rates. For the Iraqi northern no-fly zone we had NATO bases in eastern Turkey, and for the southern we had carriers in the Gulf and bases in Kuwait, Qatar and, with a wink and a nod, probably Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Now let's look at the options in Libya.

1. Carriers.We would have to bring the USS Enterprise from its current Gulf deployment, and it's due for retirement soon anyway, and is supposed to be supporting those other two wars. Of other NATO allies in the Mediterranean, France has one active carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, homeported in Toulon, and some older ones in mothballs. Italy has two, Garibaldi and Cavour, both short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) carriers, homeported in Taranto and La Spezia, respectively. Spain also has two STOVL carriers, Principe de Asturias and the new Juan Carlos I, only just commissioned in September, both homeported in Rota. These STOVL carriers, sometimes called "Harrier carriers," embark AV-8B Harrier aircraft, which have limitations in speed and range against frontline fighters, and helicopters. Britain has one STOVL carrier still in service, HMS Illustrious, homeported in Portsmouth and not, so far as I know, in the Med. That's it for NATO, unless they can get Russia or India to join the party.
2. Land Bases. One could wish that Egypt would be willing to commit its western air bases or even its Air Force itself nto operations over Libya, but in the present revolutionary situations there and in Tunisia (which has a minuscule armed forces), this seems unlikely, and even offering to host Western forces would be difficult if not impossible. Right now the Egyptian Armed Forces are not only running the country but trying to provide police functions as well, with the State Security Forces somewhere between dissolved and in opposition. Similarly, though the rebel forces are apparently in control of the old British airbase at Tobruk and other Libyan airbases in the east, they seem unlikely to host foreign air operations there. Other nearby land bases could include a) Malta, with a number of bases that served well for the RAF in World War II, but aren't terribly current; b) the British Sovereign Bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia on Cyprus; c) various NATO and Italian airfields in Italy, Sicily, and offshore islands. The closest to Libya would be an airstrip on Lampedusa, apparently just a civil airfield, but I don't think it could sustain combat aircraft operations. A bit farther away is Pantelleria, from which bombers operated during World War II, but neither is exactly ready, so far as I know at least, for modern air war. For all I know there may be covert bases in some of these places, but if so, they're still covert from me.
3. A Regi0nal Operation.There are reports that the Arab League has suspended Libya's membership, OPEC is moving to increase production, etc. If this all proves to be both true and somehow substantive. the possibility of some sort of regional collective action, unprecedented as it might be, could increase, and that could allow a figleaf for, say, the Egyptian Air Force to step in. Experience suggests pigs will fly before this happens, but I must note that experience has not been the most reliable guide lately.
   

Having noted these obstacles to a No-Fly Zone, need I discuss the problems of a ground force intervention?