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# **The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus**

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**A Research Paper**

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*SOV 86-10016X  
April 1986*

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# The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus



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**A Research Paper**

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**The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus**

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**Summary**

*Information available as of 15 March 1986 was used in this report.*

The Soviet Union devotes major resources to conveying Soviet views and disseminating anti-Western propaganda to an increasingly large and diverse audience. Moscow's primary instruments for attacking Western initiatives and promoting Soviet policies on a day-to-day basis are its news agencies and radiobroadcasts, as well as the coverage it gets in the foreign media. Many other activities that serve a propaganda function—cultural exchanges, scholarships, and high-level visits, for example—are used in an effort to evoke in foreign audiences a positive sentiment toward the Soviet Union and to negate Western influence.

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TASS, the Soviet Union's official news agency, has offices in 126 countries. Its effectiveness has been hampered by the Soviets' failure to tailor its articles for specific foreign countries, but

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] TASS is attempting to make its copy "more readable" for its audiences by including more human-interest stories.

[Redacted]

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The USSR's "unofficial" news agency, APN (Novosti), distributes information to at least 5,000 press and information organs in 110 countries. In contrast to TASS, APN emphasizes the tailoring of propaganda for individual countries, particularly developing countries. This effort includes using foreign nationals, introducing a teletype service, and relying more on photographic materials. APN also conducts a grant program that brings substantial numbers of foreign journalists and public officials to the USSR.

[Redacted]

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the program is designed to motivate recipients to speak and write favorably about the Soviet Union upon their return. In 1983 the program had 2,000 recipients from around the world.

[Redacted]

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The Soviets have the capacity to reach virtually every corner of the globe with their radiobroadcasts. For the past 20 years they have gradually been increasing their radiobroadcasts, and by the end of 1984 they were broadcasting for 2,167 hours per week in over 80 languages. In addition to their overt broadcasts, the Soviets operate two "unofficial" stations, which

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purport not to be run by the Soviet Government, and at least four clandestine radio stations, located in the USSR, East Germany, and Afghanistan, that support Soviet views. 

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The Soviets have a number of outlets for their television broadcasts, but, for the near term, Soviet television is unlikely to have a major propaganda impact. All direct broadcasts are aimed primarily at the domestic audience and are conducted in Russian. They can be picked up outside the USSR only with special, expensive receiving equipment. The Soviets do, however, place television programs abroad through official agreements, and various Soviet representatives abroad provide television materials, usually at low or no cost, to commercial outlets. 


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The Soviet Union carries out an extensive cultural exchange program worldwide.  the USSR has intergovernmental agreements or formal programs with 120 countries. For the Soviets, "cultural relations" is a broad term that includes such activities as science, education, literature, music, sports, and tourism. The breadth and diversity of these activities enable the Soviets to appeal to a wide variety of foreign audiences. The Soviets also provide numerous foreign scholarships, particularly to students from developing countries. In December 1984 over 57,000 students from less developed countries were studying in the USSR.

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International Communist front organizations, although only covertly associated with the Soviet Union, are an integral part of the foreign propaganda effort because they strive to rally world opinion around Soviet causes. Among their numerous activities, which sometimes get wide media coverage, are rallies, conferences, and demonstrations. Additionally, each of the major front organizations issues a regular publication and various ad hoc writings that tout the Soviet line. 

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The propaganda management apparatus is a large, highly centralized organization. Propaganda policy is formulated by the same authority that approves Soviet foreign policy—the Politburo—with inputs from the CPSU International Department and other party and government bodies. This ensures that propaganda supports policy and can be changed when

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policy demands it. The coordination of the propaganda effort with the Soviet media organs is largely the job of the CPSU International Information Department (IID), headed by Leonid Zamyatin.




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We have no objective means for measuring the overall effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in influencing public thinking and policies abroad, but the huge investment the Soviet Union has made in its propaganda effort—in radiobroadcasting, news agencies, publications, and cultural and information activities—attests to Moscow's high regard for propaganda instruments as political tools.



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In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders have continually voiced concern about the quality and timeliness of their foreign propaganda.



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The lack of credibility of their news and information is the most serious problem for the Soviets. They combat this shortcoming in part through repetition—presenting their propaganda on a particular theme in a number of outlets, both overt and covert. They also use the foreign media as a vehicle for their propaganda, hoping their ideas will gain the Western media's credibility. Soviet commentators, particularly since Gorbachev became General Secretary, have been appearing regularly in the foreign media to present the Soviet version of issues and events.



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Timeliness is also a problem that, on major issues, will not be resolved easily. Various incidents have shown that the propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions from the top are not forthcoming or when bureaucratic interests are conflicting. Close party controls and inflexible procedures also contribute to inertia and delays. Soviet leaders have acknowledged that these delays mean their interpretation of events is not the first heard by foreign audiences and thus loses some of its impact. The presence of a strong leader may reduce some of the delays. There have been rumors that Gorbachev plans to reorganize the propaganda apparatus by merging the IID with other Central Committee departments. This

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change is unlikely to resolve all of the conflicting bureaucratic interests that have caused problems in the past on issues of major importance, but it may speed up the process by reducing the number of players in the coordination process. 


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The Soviets are currently undertaking a "massive new effort" to educate people around the world about Soviet proposals and policies because they feel that their ideas are not being heard. 


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 the Soviets are likely to emphasize greater use of radio and television and introduce additional clandestine radio stations targeted at Western Europe in the near future. Additionally, Gorbachev has ordered the propaganda apparatus to:

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- Improve the supply of publications, especially books, with most of the increase probably going to developing countries.
- Double the equipment budget of propaganda agencies for the purchase of more sophisticated computers and radio, television, and other audiovisual equipment.
- Tailor the propaganda for individual countries and regions. 

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In addition, we believe that TASS and APN will continue to increase the number of subscribers to their services, offering the services at low or no cost, and that Soviet commentators will increase their use of the foreign media as a propaganda outlet. 

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**The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus**

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**Scope Note**

This paper describes the instruments and techniques of Soviet foreign propaganda and analyzes the bureaucratic apparatus that formulates its themes and strategies. It assesses trends in the management and tactics of this propaganda but does not analyze its content.

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[Redacted] Open-source Soviet publications provided information on the reach and scope of the Soviet propaganda organs. The United States Information Agency provided valuable information on Soviet cultural and informational activities as well as radio and television broadcasting.

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### The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus



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#### Outlets for Soviet Propaganda

##### Press Agencies

The Soviet news agencies occupy a central position in most foreign propaganda endeavors. A number of Soviet papers and news services have representatives abroad,<sup>1</sup> but the most active foreign propaganda vehicles are the press agencies—TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) and APN (Agentstvo Pechati Novosti). The primary role of these agencies is to respond to world events, particularly actions by the United States, and to publicize Soviet policies.



**TASS.** TASS, the oldest of the Soviet news agencies, is the major publicist for the Soviet leadership. It is the official news service of the Soviet Government and party and the acknowledged spokesman for the Soviet political bureaucracy in affairs of state. Its responsibilities are quite broad—the collection and dissemination of information for both domestic and foreign audiences as well as the provision of commentaries to explain the official Soviet viewpoint.

Sergey Losev has been the director general of TASS since 1979. Losev was appointed with the support of Leonid Zamyatin, the previous head of TASS and currently the head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Information Department, so that Zamyatin could maintain control over that organization. The headquarters staff of TASS in Moscow totals approximately 3,000 personnel; about 1,000 are journalists, and the remainder are support personnel. TASS also has a substantial overseas representation.

the agency has over 400 Soviet nationals serving abroad at any one time—including correspondents, engineers,

<sup>1</sup> The Soviet newspapers that are known to have representatives abroad are *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, *Trud*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, *Novoye Vremya*, *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, *Selskaya Zhizn'*, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, *Sovetskaya Kultura*, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*.

#### Sergey Andreyevich Losev



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*Director General, TASS, since 1979 . . . age 58 . . . international affairs specialist . . . apparent protege of Leonid Zamyatin, Chief of the Central Committee International Information Department . . . current position appears stable under General Secretary Gorbachev . . . chief editor of TASS foreign affairs editorial office, 1967-72 . . . fluent in English, French, and Spanish; speaks some Hebrew.*

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and typists. It has correspondents accredited in 126 countries—nearly every country that has relations with the USSR.<sup>2</sup> In most major capitals of the world there are several TASS correspondents and often several locally hired office workers and stringers.

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<sup>2</sup> The Soviets probably have correspondents stationed in only about 90 countries because journalists often cover more than one country, particularly in Africa and Asia. In comparison, Reuters, also one of the world's largest news agencies, has correspondents or news offices in about 70 countries.

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
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A major activity of TASS is providing copy to foreign news agencies, newspapers, radio and television networks, and ministries of information. In the past 20 years, the number of countries receiving TASS releases has almost doubled. TASS has also substantially increased the number of outlets for its news. According to TASS's own accounting in 1985, its information now goes to more than 600 networks, agencies, newspapers, and radio stations in 115 countries. [redacted]

A major selling point for the TASS news service is its low cost. At full price it is substantially cheaper than Western news services, a major advantage for information agencies in developing countries that are short on hard currency. Moreover, the Soviets have provided TASS services free of charge to some countries—for example, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Tunisia in 1984 and Lesotho in 1985. In Suriname, the Soviets agreed to supply both radio receiving equipment and TASS's services for free. The US Embassy in Paramaribo noted, as a result of that agreement, an appreciable increase of TASS reporting in the Suriname News Agency (SNA) bulletin. In addition, because the two privately owned and operated newspapers in Suriname had access only to SNA for their news feed, they often had no choice but to present the Soviet view on issues. [redacted]

From the standpoint of many recipients, the chief drawback of the TASS service has been the failure of the Soviets to tailor it to meet the needs of specific foreign consumers; hence, most national agencies, particularly in developing countries, have found only a small portion of the service usable. [redacted]



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Figure 1. TASS headquarters (top) and APN headquarters (bottom) in Moscow [redacted]

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**APN.** APN, or Novosti, purports to be an unofficial, nongovernmental organ. It was formed in 1961 by a group of ostensible Soviet "public organizations."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> APN's founding organizations were the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and the National Union for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge. [redacted]

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Like all Soviet information agencies, however, it is controlled by the Communist Party. APN provides "supplementary" material on all aspects of the political, economic, and cultural life of the USSR not normally covered by TASS, and it occasionally duplicates TASS reporting on issues. It has a wider variety of methods and uses a less stilted writing style than TASS to deliver Moscow's message to foreign audiences. [redacted]

APN has been headed by Valentin Falin, former Ambassador to West Germany and later a first deputy chief of the Central Committee International Information Department, since March 1986. According to its own accounting, as of 1983 APN provided information to 5,000 information organs in 110 countries. It prepares books, pamphlets, articles, commentaries, press releases, interviews, conversations, surveys, sketches, communiqués, and illustrations to be distributed to the foreign press, information agencies, publishing houses, and radio and television organizations. The APN publishing house produces books, brochures, guides, and booklets in over 50 languages with combined editions of around 17 million copies annually. Additionally, APN publishes both abroad and at home a number of journals, newspapers, and pamphlets for foreign audiences (see inset). [redacted]

[redacted] (circa 1978) [redacted] APN headquarters in Moscow had about 2,100 personnel—1,100 journalists and approximately 1,000 technical and administrative personnel. The number of APN correspondents serving abroad in 1983 was reported to be about 80, not including foreign employees of APN. [redacted]

Among APN's most important assets are the Soviet Information Departments (SIDs). [redacted] SIDs are located in most embassies abroad. They get their press materials from APN and act essentially as APN bureaus. [redacted] Moscow considers the SID in India to be one of its best information departments. [redacted] 164,000 articles based on Soviet materials were printed in the Indian press in 1984. These materials included Soviet Government

**Selected APN Foreign Language Publications**

- Soviet Weekly—published weekly in Great Britain and disseminated to more than 70 countries.
- Soviet Life—published monthly in the United States for the American public.
- Soviet Land—published biweekly in 13 native languages of India.
- Moscow News—weekly newspaper in Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Arabic, with a total circulation of about 1 million in 140 countries.
- Sputnik—monthly illustrated digest-journal disseminated in several languages in 100 countries. [redacted]

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documents, APN articles, commentaries, and back-grounders, as well as materials from other Soviet mass media. As of early 1985, the SID in New Delhi was publishing five periodicals in English and 12 other national languages with a combined overall printing of 1.5 million copies a month and issuing 40 to 50 book titles yearly with an overall printing of 550,000 copies. It sent propaganda materials in English and in the Indian languages to the APN bureaus in Asian countries, and it distributed more than a million copies of books and pamphlets from the APN publisher. The SID in India, with its main office in New Delhi and branch offices in Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay, had 42 Soviet employees and about 400 Indian employees in early 1985. [redacted] the cost of this effort in 1984 was 20 million rubles. [redacted]

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APN places a great deal of emphasis on preparing propaganda tailored for individual countries, particularly developing countries. APN is increasingly using foreign nationals in its foreign activities because the Soviets believe that local personnel understand their audience better and are able to operate more freely and more effectively than Soviet citizens. The introduction in July 1983 of a teletype service called APN Press Information for News Agencies of the Developing Countries was another effort to attract the developing countries. Additionally, [redacted]

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[redacted] APN places a high priority on providing photographic and other illustrative materials to

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
the foreign press because, in developing countries with a population at a basically low level of literacy, the people are "frequently influenced more convincingly by visual photoinformation." [redacted]

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An important propaganda and active measures activity for the USSR is the APN grant program for visits to the USSR. According to public Soviet statements, as of late 1983, the grant program had about 2,000 recipients annually, including journalists, writers, and public figures from more than 80 countries. During their trips to the Soviet Union, the selected foreigners travel around the country to sightsee and meet with Soviet political leaders, academics, and others. One Soviet official noted that, upon returning from the USSR, the foreign guests annually publish as many as 3,500 articles devoted to the Soviet Union. [redacted]

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The grant program, which apparently is conducted in every country that has an APN office or representative, is administered by APN correspondents overseas.



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[redacted] although the Soviets do not exact firm commitments from the grantees, it is generally understood that, upon returning from their all-expense-paid, two- to three-week visit to the USSR, the grantees will write and speak favorably of the USSR and their experience. [redacted]

**Journalists as Lobbyists.** Soviet journalists [redacted] can play a major role in political influence activities. Journalists have good access to a wide range of individuals—more so than Soviet diplomats and trade officials. Through frequent contact over extended periods of time, these journalists try to build rapport and influence the views and reporting of their colleagues, particularly those in the media. [redacted]

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[redacted] APN officials believed that the program had been successful in Europe, and, as a result, the CPSU Central Committee agreed to increase funding elsewhere. One official stated that the majority of the increase would go to Third World countries, with particular attention to Latin America.

**Publications**

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The Soviet Union is one of the world's largest exporters of printed material. In 1982 it officially exported about 50,000 titles and more than 70 million copies of books and pamphlets, a figure that does not include those disseminated through means other than direct sales—the sale of rights, free distribution, copublishing, publication abroad, and book exchanges with libraries and other institutions. According to a Soviet book trade official, in the period between 1973 and 1982 the Soviet Union increased its book exports more than two and a half times. Soviet official statistics on the ruble value of exports of printed matter (including books, journals, newspapers, and other material) indicate that their monetary value has more than tripled in the past decade. In 1973 the value of printed matter exports was 23.5 million rubles, and by 1984 it had increased to 74 million rubles. [redacted]

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According to a study done by the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1983, Soviet publications have the advantages of low prices and wide-spread availability. They appear to have large readerships mainly in countries where Western publications are expensive or are difficult to obtain. For example, according to USIA, inexpensive Soviet books are popular in Sri Lanka. [redacted]

The Soviets participate in a number of domestic and foreign book exhibits each year. The Moscow Book Fair, which has been held every two years since 1977, is of major importance to the Soviets. There publishers from around the world display their books in the hopes of boosting sales. The Soviet book agency, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (MK), did more than 100 million rubles worth of business in the 1985 fair. Over 100 publishers participated, compared with 94 publishers in 1983. Countries represented for the first time included Botswana, Cameroon, Mauritania, Malta, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe. The number of companies and organizations represented increased steadily from 1,535 in 1977 to 3,300 in 1985. [redacted]

There are six major Soviet publishing houses involved in the export of books: Aurora, Mir, APN, Progress, Raduga, and Russkiy Yazyk. Soviet books have a number of outlets abroad, including bookshops owned by local Communist parties or friendship societies, book fairs, Soviet embassies, and cultural and "friendship" organizations. [redacted]

Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, an all-union association under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is the middle-man for the selling and buying of publications abroad. It handles all foreign trade in books, newspapers, magazines, music, phonographic records, tape recordings, illustrations, postage stamps, and foreign "rights" to Soviet publications. MK has ties to over 1,000 firms in 140 countries and an export catalogue that includes over 5,000 titles of newspapers, periodicals, and specialized journals published in 21 foreign languages. [redacted]

[redacted] MK [redacted] did most of its work with the Communist parties, bookstores, and publishing houses of various countries. It used these outlets to fund the activities of the

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### *Selected Soviet Foreign Language Periodicals*

- Soviet Literature—*monthly distributed in 10 languages to over 100 countries.*
- Soviet Woman—*monthly published in 14 languages.*
- Culture and Life—*monthly published in five languages.* 25X1
- New Times—*weekly published in nine languages.*
- Soviet Union—*monthly published in 20 languages.*
- Asia and Africa Today—*monthly published in Russian, English, French, Arabic, Persian, and Portuguese.* [redacted] 25X1

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local Communist parties and to disseminate propaganda materials, mostly in the native language. [redacted] [redacted] MK tended to emphasize materials of a political nature targeted to influence the local population. [redacted]

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### **Periodicals**

[redacted] in 1981 the Soviet Union produced 245 journals and periodicals for foreign readers. Many such publications are printed outside the Soviet Union, probably because of the poor quality of Soviet printing and the legal advantages of circumventing local laws against importing Communist literature. Some periodicals are printed in other Communist countries, on foreign presses under contractual arrangements, by certain international organizations and other groups under Communist influence, or by Soviet embassies in local languages (see inset). [redacted]

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### **Radiobroadcasting**

The Soviets have long recognized the propaganda value of radio as a medium unrestricted by geopolitical boundaries; Lenin stated that radio would be "a newspaper without paper and without distances." The Soviets have had for some time the capability to reach virtually all parts of the globe with their radiobroadcasts and, in the past few years, have been intensifying their effort by adding more broadcasts in a variety


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**Figure 2**  
**Weekly Hours of International**  
**Radiobroadcasts by the USSR<sup>a</sup>**



<sup>a</sup> These total figures represent total broadcasting time in terms of program hours per week. The regional figures represent the total time Soviet broadcasts are targeted to geographic regions. In many cases such programs are broadcast to more than one region simultaneously. The figures include the output of Radio Moscow as well as all other Soviet stations originating external broadcasts (Radio Peace and Progress and the regional stations).

Source: United States Information Agency.

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of languages. By the end of 1984, total Soviet international broadcasting was over 2,167 hours per week in more than 80 languages (see figure 2).<sup>4</sup>

Many union-republic radio centers have been given foreign broadcasting responsibilities. Sometimes they broadcast in the native languages of their republics to audiences across the border that speak the same or similar languages, as in the case of Radio Yerevan's Armenian service. They also broadcast in the languages of other non-Soviet target audiences; for instance, transmissions from Baku and Tashkent are in Persian. Other republic radio centers that have foreign responsibilities are those in Dushanbe, Kiev, Riga, Tbilisi, Vilnius, Alma-Ata, Tallinn, and Minsk.

<sup>4</sup> Soviet foreign broadcasts to areas other than North America total about 2,090 hours per week. In comparison, US foreign broadcasts to areas other than the USSR and Eastern Europe were about 986 hours per week at the end of 1984. The US figure does not include Radio Marti, which did not start broadcasting until November 1985 and is on the air for 101 hours per week.

The focus of Soviet radiobroadcasts changed little in 14 years. Europe and East Asia are still high in Soviet broadcasting priorities, and Africa and North America appear to have moved up slightly. The downturn in broadcasts to Latin America, instead of indicating a lessening of Soviet interest, undoubtedly reflects the role of Cuban broadcasts in the area: as of December 1983, Cuba was the leading Communist broadcaster to Latin America with about 283 hours per week of transmissions.

**Programming.** Radio programming consists of news, commentary, and features (on subjects ranging from political, economic, and trade affairs to science, culture, education, and sports) interspersed with music. The structure and style of the programming are repetitive; many programs are played two or more times in the timespan of a day or a week. Moreover, official policy lines are set forth in authoritative statements

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that, in turn, form the basis for lower level commentary, which reinforces the theme. The broadcasts to specific target audiences discuss local and regional topics, in an effort to create listener interest. [ ]

In the past few years the Soviets have improved their radiobroadcasts both quantitatively and qualitatively. The improvements have included:

- The introduction in October 1978 of an English-language service called the Radio Moscow World Service. The service is now broadcast continuously throughout the world.
- An increase in total external broadcasts of 75 program hours per week in 1980, the largest increase in over 10 years.
- The revamping and expansion of Radio Moscow's French broadcasts in 1983 to form a new service called Radio Moscow International. On the air 46 hours per week, the program is beamed to both Europe and Africa. [ ]

**Radio Peace and Progress.** In addition to programs emanating from Radio Moscow and the union republics, a special foreign radio service known as Radio Peace and Progress (RPP) was initiated in 1964. Like APN, RPP was established as a station of Soviet "public organizations" and thus is claimed to be a nongovernmental broadcasting station. Its self-defined task is to "promote mutual understanding and trust among the people of all countries," but in practice it seems to concentrate on the countries of Asia and Africa. RPP uses the technical facilities of Radio Moscow, although the Soviet Government disclaims any responsibility for the content of the transmissions. [ ]

RPP currently produces 161 hours per week in 13 languages. Although the themes addressed are standard ones that follow the official line, RPP broadcasts are sometimes notably more tendentious and outspoken than those of Radio Moscow, purveying propaganda lines for which the Soviet Government might wish to disclaim responsibility. RPP programming is customarily tailored for individual target audiences. The propaganda is often directed at countries with which the Soviet Union maintains friendly relations.

In the late 1960s, for example, RPP's commentaries on Indian politics caused irritation and protests from India's Government and press. [ ]

**Radio Magallanes.** A Chilean radio station that operated in Santiago until the fall of Allende, Radio Magallanes was offered airtime by RPP and has broadcast from the USSR since January 1977. The station broadcasts in Spanish to Chile seven hours per week and is shrill in its hostility toward the Pinochet regime. [ ]

**Clandestine Broadcasting.**<sup>5</sup> The USSR has engaged in extensive clandestine radiobroadcasting since World War II. Most clandestine radio stations disseminate antiregime material to target countries. Many of them work for the cause of a local, pro-Soviet Communist party and therefore probably are managed by the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Over the past two decades, new stations have appeared and old ones have disappeared as political changes have occurred. Two clandestine radio stations currently operate from the Soviet Union: Radio Ba Yi (or 1 August) and the National Voice of Iran. [ ]

Since its initiation in April 1979, Ba Yi has cast its commentaries to suggest that it represents the views of dissidents in the Chinese armed forces. Technical observations, however, indicate that the transmitter is located in the Soviet Far East. Ba Yi attempts to foment disaffection with the policies of the Government of the People's Republic of China and indirectly encourages support for Soviet positions. Its broadcasts are irregular and in the past have been suspended for varying lengths of time for technical and, possibly, political reasons. For example, during the summer of 1985 Ba Yi shut down briefly during a period when negative commentary on the PRC in the Soviet media was substantially reduced. This shutdown, apparently a political gesture to the Chinese, lasted only about six weeks. [ ]

Founded in 1959, the National Voice of Iran began broadcasting in Persian, and since at least 1967 it has also broadcast in Azerbaijani. It is believed to use

<sup>5</sup> Clandestine broadcasting is defined as that which does not admit to, or attempts to mislead listeners about, the origin of transmission. [ ]

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Radio Baku's transmitter. The station's broadcasts are vehemently anti-Khomeini and sometimes promote the Tudeh Party. [redacted]

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The Soviets apparently also support at least one and possibly two other clandestine radio stations that began broadcasting in Persian to Iran in 1984. [redacted]

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[redacted] the Radio of Iranian Toilers broadcasts 10 and a half hours per week from a location in northwest Afghanistan, near Herat. The program is designed to convey to Tudeh members in Iran that the party is still functioning. The Soviets probably also support another clandestine broadcast—the Voice of the Iranian Communist Party—which is on the air 21 hours per week. It appears to originate in either the USSR or Iraq. [redacted]

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**Television**

The potential of television as a medium has long been recognized by Soviet propagandists. A Soviet media official stated that "public opinion is, in our day, having an ever greater influence on world affairs. In view of this, great efforts are being made by states to shape public opinion on a worldwide scale, and the mass media—especially television—are being used for this purpose with increasing sophistication." [redacted]

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We believe the USSR also supports the two clandestine radio stations broadcasting to Turkey and the Middle East from East Germany—Our Radio (Bizim Radyo) and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party. The two stations portray themselves as indigenous voices of the Turkish people and working class. In addition to their avid defense of Soviet policies, the stations strike at the Evren regime and at Turkey's ties to the West. [redacted] the Turkish Government approached the East German Government in early 1982 and requested that it terminate the broadcasts, but East Germany denied knowledge of either the stations or their locations. At that time, Our Radio was broadcasting about 21 hours per week and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party about seven hours per week. [redacted]

In a 1980 meeting between Vitaliy Kobysch, an official of the International Information Department, and Foreign Ministry officials, Kobysch called for diplomats to make a major effort to exploit the medium of television. He suggested using television to portray all facets of Soviet life—politics, culture, trade, and economics—anything, in fact, that would present the Soviet Union in an attractive light. [redacted]

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There are five means through which the Soviets can have their television programs broadcast abroad: Intersputnik, a communications exchange with East European and other friendly countries; Intervision, a program exchange run by the International Organization for Radio and Television; official agreements between the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) and foreign information agencies; Soviet domestic broadcasts transmitted via communications satellite; and the placement of Soviet programing abroad by Soviet representatives. [redacted]

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Intersputnik<sup>6</sup> is an organization that leases capacity on Soviet satellites for the exchange of television programs and other communications among its member and user countries. The programing is a combination of that provided by Intervision, Soviet domestic

<sup>6</sup> The members and users of Intersputnik are the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, South Yemen, North Korea, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Nicaragua, Libya, and Angola. [redacted]

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programming, programming from the individual user and member countries, and, occasionally, West European programs and some material from Western news organizations.

Intersputnik provides the USSR with a number of political and propaganda advantages. The organization coordinates radio and television news, as well as broader political information and cultural policies, among Warsaw Pact broadcasters and their allies. All Intersputnik communications must go through Moscow, which ensures Soviet control over the system.

Intervision is a program exchange network under the auspices of the International Organization for Radio and Television.<sup>7</sup> It coordinates the daily exchange of television programs among member stations, and the USSR supplies about one-third of its programs. It disseminates programming abroad through daily exchanges with its West European counterpart, Eurovision. This exchange is unequal, though; in 1984 Eurovision took only 388 news items from Intervision, compared with over 7,000 news items that Intervision took from Eurovision.

Many Soviet television programs are currently shown abroad within the framework of bilateral agreements worked out by Gosteleradio and foreign broadcasting organs. For example, Gosteleradio and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information signed an agreement this year whereby both parties will send each other television features and documentaries about their own countries as well as radio programs and recordings of music. Similar agreements have been recently signed with Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

In expanding their broadcasting capabilities to cover the USSR, the Soviets have created a technical infrastructure that allows them to send their domestic television beyond their borders. They can beam television signals to virtually any place on earth with their satellites. However, special, expensive equipment must be used to receive the signals from their satellites. Even with the new Ekran series satellites, special antennas and signal converters are necessary.

<sup>7</sup> Organization members include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, East Germany, Hungary, Iraq, Cambodia, North Korea, Laos, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Sudan, the USSR, Vietnam, and South Yemen.

With the proper equipment, stations and/or receivers beyond the borders of the USSR can pick up Soviet television "live." The legality of individual receiving installations is in question in most European countries; they are illegal in West Germany and the Netherlands and are heavily restricted in most other countries. There appears to be a market, however, for Soviet television on cable and subscription TV systems, which are usually approved by the government in most countries. A cable television system in the Netherlands carries a very limited amount of Soviet programming. In Sweden, where the government is testing cable television as part of an evaluation of alternatives to state-run television, Soviet programming is readily available and free for the cable companies. The Soviet channel (in Russian) received in Sweden, TV-1, has more than double the daily broadcast time of either of the two Swedish channels and provides a good mix of programming, including news, the arts, children's programs, and documentaries.

The Soviets have had some success in placing their television programs abroad outside of official agreements. Representatives from APN, Gosteleradio, and Soviet embassies play a major role in providing television materials, particularly to commercial outlets. The type of programming provided varies from country to country. It almost always includes cultural films and programs and often also includes children's programs, documentaries, and international news items. Soviet efforts in this area in the early 1980s were limited by the unattractiveness of Soviet material in competition with that of the rest of the world—a frequent complaint has been that it was too propagandistic—and a scarcity or lack of television sets and/or television equipment and networks in the developing countries. As with the news services, however, Soviet television broadcasts are often provided at low or no cost, and the media in some developing countries have few alternatives.

The Soviets recently have made great progress in improving the quality of their television broadcasts, which have been widely known for their dull format, poor sound and photography, and "talking heads" news with no live footage. The Soviets are improving the format, presentation, technical quality, and program mix of their broadcasts. News broadcasts in

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particular appear to have been modeled after Western television and have included some US footage of US troops training in Central America. Despite these changes, however, Soviet television broadcasts remain well below the standard of those of the West. [redacted]

Aside from the format and content shortcomings, Soviet television broadcasting suffers from a major problem for foreign audiences—it is in Russian. The Soviets may begin to tailor television broadcasts for foreign audiences in the future, but we are currently seeing no indications that they intend to do so. It is possible the Soviets feel the expense of improving their television broadcasting and tailoring it for foreign audiences outweighs the potential benefits of such an effort. Television equipment is still scarce in most developing countries, a major target of Soviet propaganda. Moreover, to compete effectively with the West in the area, the Soviets would have to make substantial improvements in both their broadcasting capabilities and their programming. More likely, the Soviets will continue efforts to get coverage on foreign television, rather than revising their own for foreign broadcasting. [redacted]

#### Cultural Activities

The Soviet Union maintains cultural relations with 140 countries worldwide. Unlike other forms of propaganda, cultural activities do not usually contain a specific political message. Most seek to instill in the viewer or participant a general feeling of admiration or good will for the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, "cultural relations" is a broad concept that includes such activities as science, education, literature, the graphic arts, music, public health, sports, tourism, and disaster relief. [redacted]

Soviet cultural contacts are extensive in scope and diversity, and they are growing—in 1975 they were two and a half times their 1965 level, according to Soviet statements. The Soviets offer something for just about everyone, from sports to the fine arts, and there is virtually no aspect of culture or art that has not been utilized by the Soviets for purposes of international contacts. According to a Soviet cultural official, the Soviets expect their cultural relations "to influence the audience's mind, to direct it in a certain direction." [redacted]

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#### *Soviet Cultural Agreement With Uganda*

*The cultural agreement between Uganda and the USSR for 1985-86 calls for:*

- *Educational exchanges consisting of 50 undergraduate and 15 postgraduate scholarships in the USSR for Ugandans and, at the same time, the assignment of Soviet lecturers to work at Makerere University.*
- *Health exchanges that include Soviet Ministry of Health officials visiting Uganda and Soviet medical specialists continuing their work in Uganda.*
- *Cultural exchanges, including Ugandan cinematic participation in two film festivals in the USSR and Soviet film weeks in Uganda.*
- *Sports exchanges, including a visit by Soviet football teams and a basketball coach as well as unnamed exchanges of sports teams.*
- *Cooperation in the field of information, including cooperation between Gosteleradio and the Ugandan Information Ministry based on the 1978 agreement, continued TASS cooperation in the field of information exchange, and strengthening cooperation in the field of book exchanges.* [redacted]

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The Soviet Union prefers to conduct its cultural relations on a planned basis through cultural agreements. As of this year, it had intergovernmental agreements and programs with 120 countries, [redacted] [redacted] Cultural agreements are negotiated and directed by the Cultural Relations Department of the Foreign Ministry, headed by Yuriy Kirichenko since 1982. They usually fall into two categories: general, which are usually with socialist countries and include the two parties pledging to support each other in virtually every area, and restrictive—agreements with mostly non-Bloc countries that detail carefully each area of cooperation. Some of the activities often provided for in bilateral cultural agreements are detailed below. [redacted]

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**Cultural Presentations and Exhibits.** [redacted]

[redacted] in 1984 more than 100 artistic collectives, over 400 soloists, and 40 exhibitions were sent by the USSR Ministry of Culture to West European countries alone. Soviet cultural presentations worldwide consist of Soviet artistic touring groups, such as ballet companies, symphonies, dance groups, and smaller musical groups; exhibits of photographs, books, and art; and the circus. Although the quality and renown of a touring group often depends on the competition it faces in various countries and the potential commercial rewards for the Soviets, they manage to send groups to all of the countries that want or agree to have them. According to a study by the USIA in 1983, Soviet cultural presentations, even in developing countries where the Soviets normally send "lesser" artistic groups and companies, were well received worldwide. This was particularly true in Latin America and Western Europe, where the companies often performed for large and diverse crowds. Cultural exhibits, including those of art, books, and photographs, were also often popular but normally drew smaller crowds. Contrary to the purpose of most cultural and information activities, some of those exhibits focused on political themes, emphasizing topics such as the arms race. In Nicaragua, Soviet books and photos emphasized propaganda against capitalism, imperialism, and US "interventionist" activities. [redacted]

**Trade and Technical Exhibits.** Through their participation in trade exhibits, the Soviets seek to portray their industrial achievements, progress, and power; to present the USSR as a model for economic and industrial development; to display Soviet industrial items, machinery, and tools for export; and to provide an opportunity to pass out literature and show films. Soviet participation in trade and technical exhibits is a comparatively minor effort compared with other cultural and information activities—the Soviets participated in or sponsored fairs in only 42 countries in 1983. However, as the fairs and exhibits undoubtedly reach a different audience from most cultural activities, they provide a good complement. [redacted]

When Soviet participation in trade exhibits is not part of bilateral cultural agreements, it is coordinated by the USSR Chamber of Commerce, which also manages the Soviet exhibits. In the early 1980s there was



Figure 3. Soviet Cultural Center in Vientiane, Laos [redacted]

no noticeable increase in Soviet participation in trade fairs worldwide except in Latin America, where, between 1982 and 1983, the Soviets increased their participation in fairs and exhibits from five to nine countries. [redacted]

**Cultural and Information Centers.** The Soviets utilize cultural and information centers, libraries, and reading rooms abroad as centers for short- and long-range programs to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideology; to expose urban audiences to selected aspects of Soviet culture and achievements; and to induce sympathy, understanding, and support for Soviet policies and programs. Russian-language training is usually provided at these centers because of the potential use of local citizens trained in Russian for Soviet aid projects and the long-term potential of such training as a vehicle for indoctrination. [redacted]

The cultural facilities of the USSR abroad range from small reading rooms to two- to three-story centers that may contain a library, a theater, an exhibit area, and classrooms. They may be part of the diplomatic mission, separate from the mission but run by diplomatic "cultural" officers, or they may be run by local Soviet friendship societies or sympathetic political parties. As of 1983 the Soviets supported in some fashion at least 97 facilities in 56 countries. [redacted]

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Figure 4. A group of Indian students studying in Moscow to be subway drivers [redacted]



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Operational responsibility for stocking Soviet libraries abroad, and probably for the overall physical arrangement of the centers, rests in the Ministry of Culture. The activities of the facilities usually include seminars, lectures, films, exhibitions, language instruction, and cultural programs, and many have libraries stocked with books in Russian and the local language or languages. The target audiences are primarily students, younger members of the working class, and dissatisfied members of the intelligentsia. The degree to which polemical literature is stocked depends upon local conditions. [redacted]

Information from USIA officials abroad suggests that the impact of the facilities can be significant in some countries. The library-cultural center is a point at which the direct dissemination of Soviet propaganda and information can be accomplished, questions can be answered, and attitudes favorable to the Soviet Union can be fostered. Where authorized, these centers provide legal public meeting places where like-minded individuals and groups can get together. Although a cultural center is too public and too obvious to be used for clandestine meetings, it can help identify potential sympathizers. In short, the assets that the centers provide the Soviets far outweigh the sometimes small number of individuals who use them. [redacted]

**Scholarships.** Between the late 1960s and 1983 the number of foreign students in the USSR more than quadrupled, [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet foreign educational activities sponsored by this ministry are concentrated in the developing countries. As of December 1984, there were approximately 57,485 students from less developed countries studying in the USSR, and an additional 3,000 left their countries for technical training in the USSR in 1984. The Soviets hope that many in this group will return home as potential leaders sympathetic to Soviet causes. Educational exchanges with the developed countries, on the other hand, are used by the Soviets primarily to collect scientific and industrial information. The number of students from the West in the Soviet Union is believed to be less than 8,000. [redacted]

Most student exchanges with the USSR are arranged through bilateral cultural agreements. However, some scholarships are provided through Soviet embassies and consulates, foreign Communist parties, and "public" organizations, such as friendship societies and front groups. The Soviets have been known to recruit students without the permission of the local government. For example, according to an article that appeared in the Thai daily, *The Nation*, in 1979 the Soviet Embassy staff in Bangkok decided to recruit

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Thai students without the approval of the Thai authorities. The article reported that the Thai Foreign Ministry estimated about 200 students left, undetected, for the USSR.

agronomists in some African countries, and a few have even risen to high government posts. Moreover, the Soviets have recently made attempts to organize their "alumni" in some African countries, a program that could be of propaganda value to them.

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There is apparently a great deal of difference in the extent and impact of educational exchanges from region to region. According to information from USIA officials stationed abroad, as of 1983, Soviet educational exchanges were virtually nonexistent in East Asian and Pacific countries, and in Western Europe were limited to a small number of countries. However, educational exchanges were judged to be one of the most significant of the Soviets' cultural and informational activities in Latin America, the Near East, and Africa. In the period from 1979 to 1983, they increased more than 40 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and more than doubled in the other two regions.

**Sports.** Like trade fairs, Soviet sports activities attract foreign audiences that may not be drawn by other forms of Soviet propaganda, and they often get wide media coverage. The Soviets send teams abroad for a wide variety of sports, including basketball, gymnastics, table tennis, soccer, and ice hockey. They also send coaches and trainers to train teams in other countries, and they occasionally donate sports equipment. Moscow values these activities because they provide exposure, help build good will and contacts, and supply the opportunity to create audiences more favorable to the USSR, particularly among the young.

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For undergraduates, the scholarships generally cover expenses for four to six years' study plus transportation (there are no tuition fees for higher education in the USSR). Additionally, students were receiving a stipend of 90 rubles per month in 1984. Similar arrangements are made for graduate students and technical trainees.

The USSR Committee for Physical Culture and Sports has control over athletes and athletics in the Soviet Union and supervises participation in international and binational competitions and other activities.

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#### **Front Organizations**

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Although the Soviets place a great deal of emphasis on their program, it is not without flaws. Many countries do not recognize Soviet degrees—a major problem for graduates seeking employment upon returning home. In many countries where the degrees are accepted, they are often not highly regarded. Many students do not find their experiences in the USSR rewarding and return with a dislike for the country, bitter complaints of racial discrimination (by Africans in particular), resentment at having to learn Russian and sit through tiresome Soviet propaganda sessions, and a growing understanding of the limitations of the Soviet system. Thus it is not surprising that not all of the Soviet scholarships available in some countries are taken.

The Soviet Union directs, and heavily subsidizes, about a dozen major international front organizations as well as several hundred minor front and friendship organizations. Although they strive to appear independent and democratic, they are widely known to be instruments of Soviet foreign policy. Front organizations are commonly grouped with Soviet active measures because their association with the USSR is not acknowledged by the Soviet Union. However, they are controlled propaganda organs that strive to rally world opinion to Soviet causes. Among their numerous activities, most of which get wide media coverage, are meetings, rallies, conferences, and demonstrations. Additionally, all of the major front organizations issue a regular publication and ad hoc writings that tout the Soviet line.


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On the other hand, many foreign students find the experience a positive one. Soviet-trained graduates provide a large contingent of doctors, engineers, and

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**Figure 5  
Main Soviet Organizations  
Concerned With Foreign Propaganda**



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The major front organizations were created to appeal to a variety of audiences. The largest organization is the World Peace Council, and others are the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Christian Peace Conference. One of particular value to the USSR in its media activities worldwide is the International Organization of Journalists, which has five schools in the Eastern Bloc and Cuba that it uses to train developing-country journalists.<sup>8</sup> [Redacted]

foreign policy, thus ensuring that propaganda supports policy. Moreover, the centralization of the apparatus means that propaganda can be flexible—lines can be changed whenever policy requires it. However, another consequence of that centralization is that the propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions from the top are slow or nonexistent. [Redacted]

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**The Apparatus for Propaganda Management**

The Soviet propaganda management apparatus is a large, highly centralized structure. Propaganda policy is formulated by the same bodies that create Soviet

The ultimate authority for propaganda policy is the CPSU Politburo, presided over by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. There are also three CPSU secretaries with responsibility for propaganda issues: senior secretary Yegor Ligachev and junior secretaries Aleksandr Yakovlev and Mikhail Zimyanin. The responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing foreign propaganda within the framework established by the Politburo rests largely in the International, International Information, Propaganda, and Bloc Relations Departments of the CPSU Central Committee and with the Foreign Ministry [Redacted]

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<sup>8</sup> Other major international Communist front organizations are: the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the World Federation of Teachers Unions, and the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace. [Redacted]

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
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*Yegor Kuz'mich Ligachev*

*Mikhail Vasil'yevich Zimyanin*



*Has been "unofficial" second secretary and Politburo member since April 1985 . . . secretary, CPSU Central Committee, since December 1983 . . . believed to have close personal and professional relationship with Gorbachev . . . chief party ideologue with general oversight for propaganda-related activities . . . also supervises cadres policy . . . playing major role in current party personnel changes, including those in the propaganda apparatus . . . engineer by training . . . deputy chief, Russian Republic section, Central Committee Agitation and Propaganda Department in early 1960s . . . first secretary of Tomsk Obkom during 1965-83 . . . age 65. [redacted]*

*Party secretary since 1976 . . . responsible for internal ideology, propaganda, and counterpropaganda—an increasingly important area as Soviets try to "neutralize" Western effects on Soviet society . . . spent early career in Belorussian party ranks as an apparent protege of then secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria . . . moved to foreign service after Stalin's and Beria's deaths in 1953 . . . served as Ambassador to North Vietnam and Czechoslovakia and briefly as deputy foreign minister . . . brought back to party work by General Secretary Brezhnev . . . in 1965 became chief editor of Pravda and in 1966 a full member of CPSU Central Committee . . . age 71. [redacted]*

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**International Department**

The International Department (ID) reportedly plays a major role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. It coordinates and reviews inputs on Soviet foreign policy matters from the Foreign Ministry, [redacted] the military, and the various research institutes, and apparently from those inputs develops policy proposals that go to the Politburo. It has special responsibility for overseeing CPSU relations with nonruling Communist parties and other foreign leftists and front groups. [redacted]

the department has the job of developing them into decision memorandums—general plans of action—which are then either approved or disapproved by the Politburo. Additionally, whenever an article appears in either the foreign or domestic press that pertains to nonruling Communist or leftist parties, the ID reportedly must approve it. [redacted] this was the case with articles in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*.<sup>9</sup>

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The International Department also plays a major role in the propaganda process. [redacted]

[redacted] ideas for propaganda and active measures campaigns originate in the ID, as well as in the Politburo [redacted] After ideas surface,

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In addition to its role in the formulation and coordination of propaganda campaigns, the ID contributes to the propaganda effort by working with the groups it oversees to promote, coordinate, and fund propaganda campaigns. Through its International Social Organizations Sector, the ID controls the activities of the international front organizations. Control runs from this sector through the Soviet affiliate of the front to a Soviet representative at the front's headquarters. The International Organizations Sector apparently controls "friendship" organizations in a similar manner.

The International Department is also responsible for the publication of a monthly journal, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, known in English as the *World Marxist Review*. Although ostensibly an international publication edited in Prague, the editorial board of the *Review* is controlled by the ID. Through this publication the department openly communicates policy lines to foreign groups.

The ID has a staff of about 200 officials working in about 20 geographic and functional sectors, and was headed until March 1986 by former candidate Politburo member and Central Committee secretary Boris Ponomarev. Ponomarev was forced to retire at 81 after more than 30 years in the post. Anatoliy Dobrynin, longtime Ambassador to the United States, was recently named party secretary and apparently took over the ID position.

**International Information Department**

The International Information Department (IID) was established in early 1978 to improve the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda activities abroad and of domestic propaganda on foreign affairs. It has been headed since its inception by Leonid Zamyatin, former director of the Soviet news agency TASS. Its primary responsibilities appear to be coordinating and overseeing the activities of the media involved in propaganda on Soviet foreign policy and international issues, and advising the Soviet leadership on world events.

In a June 1983 plenum speech, then Politburo member Konstantin Chernenko stated that the IID coordinates the work of TASS, APN, Gosteleradio, and "other departments concerned with foreign policy propaganda." Although those organizations function

as separate entities, they reportedly rely on the IID for guidance on sensitive subjects and the most important propaganda themes.

TASS director general Sergey Losev is totally dependent on instructions from the IID on media policy questions.

The coordination of propaganda campaigns with the other major Soviet party and government organizations, is probably the IID's responsibility.

The IID does not have responsibility for the domestic press organs such as *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*; they fall under the Propaganda Department's purview. However, it appears that, possibly because of the IID's expertise in foreign policy propaganda, it is consulted on foreign policy issues portrayed to domestic audiences.

although the chief of the IID had no authority over the newspaper, Zamyatin occasionally called *Pravda* editors. Zamyatin has stated that the IID's responsibilities include "internal and external propaganda, with the accent on external." Moreover, IID officials frequently appear on Soviet television and write articles and columns in the Soviet domestic press.

The IID appears to be the office responsible for the overall tone and style of Soviet foreign propaganda. In addition to their tasking and oversight responsibilities, IID officials often prepare articles and scripts that are then parceled out to media outlets and information offices abroad. IID officials are also frequent actors on the Soviet propaganda stage. They give interviews, deliver lectures, and speak at meetings during their frequent trips to the West. Their "freewheeling" style has increased the flair and sophistication of the products of the Soviet media.

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**Zamyatin and the IID**



*Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin has been Chief, International Information Department, CPSU Central Committee, since 1978 . . . age 64 . . . key foreign press spokesman for the Kremlin . . . plays major role in tightly controlling the public image the Soviets want to project abroad . . . believes it is important to counter what he claims is the increased antisocialist propaganda generated by the Reagan administration . . . helps orchestrate Gorbachev's public relations campaign at home and abroad . . . career foreign service officer; headed the Foreign Ministry Press Department until 1970 . . . served as director general of TASS . . . speaks English and German.*

*Zamyatin reportedly convinced General Secretary Brezhnev of the need to create the IID and, either because of Zamyatin's close ties to Brezhnev or*

*because of bureaucratic rivalries with other Central Committee departments or with the Foreign Ministry, the future of the IID and its chief have been the subject of speculation since Brezhnev's death in November 1982. After the Andropov succession, rumors circulated in Moscow that Zamyatin was to be removed and the IID either scrapped or merged with other departments.*

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*After a similar flurry of negative rumors immediately after the Gorbachev succession, Gorbachev regarded Zamyatin highly and that Zamyatin's position was assured. Moreover, Zamyatin has maintained a high profile since Gorbachev's succession, reflected in his presence at Gorbachev's September 1985 Time interview and with the General Secretary on his trips to Britain in 1984 and to France and the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in 1985.*

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*the chief of the Central Committee Propaganda Department, Aleksandr Yakovlev—not Zamyatin—reportedly was given the responsibility for much of the propaganda activity during the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, possibly indicating that Zamyatin is being eclipsed by him.*

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Other changes in the Soviet media have also been directly attributed to the IID. They include the introduction of Radio Moscow's World Service in English in 1978 and the introduction of two Soviet domestic television programs that offer commentary on international developments. Both programs, *The World Today* and *Studio Nine*, attempt to provide lively, sophisticated, and persuasive discussion of foreign policy issues.

The IID has played a role in providing information to the Soviet leadership on international affairs. Zamyatin used to brief General Secretary Brezhnev on world events early in the morning while Brezhnev shaved. In a meeting in April 1983, General Staff official Nikolay Chervov told US officials that Zamyatin's office had prepared the background materials for a press conference given by then Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.

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**Propaganda Department**

Before 1978 the Propaganda Department was the principal CPSU organ overseeing media operations both at home and abroad. The foreign aspect of the Propaganda Department's job has been assumed by the International Information Department, and the Propaganda Department's concerns now are domestic indoctrination and ideological work directed at Soviet citizens. As noted, it probably shares responsibility for propaganda on international subjects going to the domestic audience with the International, International Information, and Bloc Relations Departments. The department, the largest in the Central Committee, is currently headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev—reportedly an ally of Gorbachev's. [redacted]

*Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev*



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**Bloc Relations Department**

Formally known as the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, this department is responsible for the coordination of CPSU relations with ruling socialist parties. It apparently must coordinate on any press item or broadcast involving the Bloc countries. No replacement has yet been identified for Konstantin Rusakov, who headed the department from 1977 until he was removed at the recent party Congress. [redacted]

*Chief, Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Committee, since August 1985 . . . age 62 . . . veteran propagandist and international affairs specialist . . . close adviser to Gorbachev . . . promoted to party secretary at recent Congress . . . responsible for promoting ideology in all party, government, and other Soviet organizations . . . defines and communicates the leadership's main policies and concerns to the Soviet public . . . has written some harsh anti-US propaganda in recent years, [redacted]*

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**Cadres Abroad Department**

The Cadres Abroad Department, headed by Stepan Chervonenko, is responsible for the administrative supervision of all Soviet personnel abroad. It is also responsible for the processing and approval of travel abroad by Soviet citizens. During the past few years, possibly in connection with increased attention to defections and counterpropaganda, the Cadres Abroad Department appears to have assumed a more active role in foreign propaganda operations at overseas missions. [redacted]

*[redacted] studied at Columbia University (1959-60) . . . deputy chief of Propaganda Department during the early years of the Brezhnev regime . . . [redacted]*

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*[redacted] . . . Ambassador to Canada (1973-83) . . . director of Institute of World Economic and International Relations (September 1983–August 1985) . . . has written at least two books about the United States. [redacted]*

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**Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The Foreign Ministry can play a role in the key decisions on propaganda campaigns through its head, Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze. At a lower level, the Ministry has a role in the coordination of propaganda. According to a number of [redacted] [redacted] major articles and books on foreign affairs—particularly those on diplomatic affairs—require Foreign Ministry clearance. The Press Department reads the articles and the regional and area departments clear book manuscripts in their specialties. [redacted]

The Foreign Ministry also has a prominent role in the implementation of propaganda campaigns. The Press Department in Moscow serves as a major outlet for propaganda on international issues. In 1984 it started a regular press briefing, usually conducted by Press Department chief Vladimir Lomeyko. Using a “Western” format, Lomeyko fields questions from both Soviet and Western reporters. In addition, the press departments of Soviet embassies overseas often issue written policy statements and, more recently, have been conducting their own press briefings. [redacted]

The Foreign Ministry’s Department for Foreign Cultural Relations negotiates and directs Soviet cultural agreements. Moreover, through its embassies and consulates, the Ministry organizes and supervises many of the cultural and information activities abroad. [redacted]

**State Committees**

Four state committees are heavily involved in the propaganda apparatus: Goskomizdat, Glavlit, Gosteleradio, and Goskino. Although they are ostensibly independent organizations, they effectively operate as extensions of the party apparatus in administering the day-to-day affairs of many of the propaganda outlets. [redacted]

**Goskomizdat.** All publication activities in the Soviet Union, including those involving foreign dissemination, are controlled by Goskomizdat—the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade. Goskomizdat, established in 1972 as a continuation of the Committee on the Press, supervises the publishing and printing industry and exercises national control over the thematic trend and content of literature. A “superconglomerate,” as of

**Vladimir Borisovich Lomeyko**



*Chief of the Foreign Ministry Press Department since November 1984 . . . age 50 . . . deputy chief of the press department from August until November 1984 . . . rapid promotion to chief indicates his success as spokesman for the Soviet Union . . . in the press entourage for the November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev meeting . . . considered to be a competent foreign policy technician who knows what is expected of him . . .* [redacted]

*. . . attache in East Berlin, 1961-62 . . . worked in youth organizations during 1962-66 . . . was in the now extinct CPSU Central Committee Information Department in 1966 . . . chief of the APN bureau in West Germany, 1970-72 . . . deputy chief editor (1968-70) and chief editor (1972-84) of the main editorial staff for Western Europe . . . speaks German and several Scandinavian languages and is studying English in his spare time.* [redacted]

1978 Goskomizdat supervised 200 publishers, 60,000 bookshops and kiosks, 360,000 libraries, and all printing establishments in all Soviet republics. [redacted]

**Glavlit.** Officially attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, Glavlit, or the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press, [redacted]

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[redacted] Glavlit maintains a countrywide network of censors, estimated to number at least 70,000. Although the agency's title invokes only the written word, its responsibilities also include radio and television broadcasts. Located at printing plants, editorial offices, and broadcasting studios, Glavlit censors scrutinize all media material before stamping it for public release. Its mission is to ensure that no information affecting the security of the Soviet state appears in public communications. [redacted]

[redacted] ideas for propaganda campaigns in support of Soviet policies can originate in the Politburo, [redacted] or the International Department; reportedly the IID plays a minor role in the early formulation phase. Once an idea is generated, the ID creates a plan of action that is approved or disapproved by the Politburo. After the Politburo makes its decision, it issues a directive to the organizations involved in the propaganda campaign. This directive, which is evidently signed by either the general secretary or the senior ideology secretary, calls for the various agencies to take whatever measures are needed to fulfill it. [redacted]

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[redacted] the censor's *Index*, a classified handbook on "state secrets" that may not be disclosed in the media. The *Index* also incorporates Defense Ministry instructions. [redacted]

**Gosteleradio.** In 1957, radio and television operations were removed from the Ministry of Culture's jurisdiction and placed under a separate entity. It was formally established as a committee of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1962 and elevated to state committee status in 1970. Now, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, known in the Soviet Union as Gosteleradio, is responsible for organizing the internal and external broadcasting activities of the Soviet Union and directing all domestic recording activities in the country. [redacted]

[redacted] there are also regular meetings of the heads of the major media organs and representatives from the ID, IID, Foreign Ministry, [redacted] where guidance is given, apparently based on the directives. These instructions are thorough—they include not only the general line on major issues but also, for example, suggestions on the type of articles to be written. [redacted]

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[redacted] The Ministry of Communications is responsible for the facilities and personnel used to transmit, relay, and broadcast radio and television signals. [redacted]

these meetings were once chaired by Zimyanin but have probably been chaired by Ligachev since he assumed responsibility for propaganda. [redacted]

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**Goskino.** The State Committee for Cinematography, headed by Filipp Yermash since 1972, plans and directs all activities concerning the making and distribution of Soviet films as well as international contacts in the area of cinematography. [redacted]

[redacted] the coordination of foreign propaganda campaigns outside of the planning meetings is largely the responsibility of the IID, working on instructions from the ideology secretaries and the Politburo. The IID tasks the media to write specific articles and also oversees production to assure that the items adhere to the official line. The other Central Committee departments, as well as the Foreign Ministry [redacted] apparently approve articles involving their areas of interest. [redacted]

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**The Propaganda Process**

The party maintains control of the propaganda apparatus by issuing general policy guidance and appointing personnel to key positions. Broad policy guidance on the direction of Soviet propaganda is given in occasional speeches or messages by the party officials responsible for ideology and propaganda—General Secretary Gorbachev and secretaries Ligachev, Yakovlev, and Zimyanin. [redacted]

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
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
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**Delays in Propaganda Responses**

The Soviet propaganda apparatus has been unable to handle a number of major foreign policy issues quickly. Such delays probably have been caused by the absence of strong leadership in the Politburo as well as bureaucratic coordination and logistic requirements.

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


**Leadership Dissatisfaction**

The Soviet propaganda apparatus has long been the subject of leadership concern and criticism because of its perceived inability to compete effectively with other foreign media. In the early 1970s the Brezhnev regime resorted to a series of personnel and organizational changes in an effort to improve the performance of Soviet media organizations. In spite of those efforts, the various media services continued to demonstrate serious coordination problems and failed to tailor their output for maximum effect on foreign and domestic audiences through the 1970s.

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


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The IID publicly received its charter at the Central Committee plenum in November 1978. General Secretary Brezhnev told the Central Committee that the propaganda media had been ineffective in dealing with economic and social life and in the treatment of international events.

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Stressing that the media relied too much on "accepted truths" in interpreting international events, Brezhnev called for reports that were more prompt and factual and better analyzed. He betrayed the seriousness of Soviet concern by announcing that the Politburo had set up a special commission to study ways to analyze the problems he had outlined and to improve "ideological, mass-political work." [redacted]

Brezhnev's criticisms were apparently directed at the Propaganda and International Departments, which had borne most of the responsibility for international propaganda before the formation of the IID. His charges were probably intended to clear the way for Zamyatin to take control of foreign propaganda.

[redacted] the IID (and its chief, Zamyatin) were disliked within the Central Committee because they detracted from the authority of the Propaganda Department.

Criticism of the apparatus continued in 1979, when the Central Committee issued a decree calling for an increase in the "party-minded zealotry" of media. In the decree, foreign policy information was found to be particularly derelict in melding "persuasiveness and concrete analysis with a forthright attitude toward the ideological enemy." This decree, in particular, highlights the central dilemma facing the Soviet propaganda apparatus: establishing credibility as a source of information while supporting Soviet interests. [redacted]

In the early 1980s, leadership concern over the effectiveness of foreign propaganda seemed to focus on the ability to respond quickly and flexibly to what Moscow viewed as increasingly strident criticism in the Western press. [redacted] a

Soviet propaganda official stated in an address that the West was mounting a massive propaganda effort against the USSR, but the Soviet Union was unable to respond in the same manner. [redacted]

[redacted] in late 1983, the Soviets set up a counterpropaganda group to coordinate reaction to hostile, anti-Soviet news items or trends and to ensure that the reaction would be consistent and timely. [redacted]

Leadership criticism of foreign propaganda underwent a subtle change in 1983. In addition to the now standard calls for more substance and promptness in Soviet propaganda, the leadership appeared concerned about its style. In June 1983 Politburo member Chernenko attacked the "cliche dispatches and commentaries" appearing in Soviet media and criticized Moscow's "foreign policy propaganda" as not sufficiently "active and masterful" in combating the West's "antisocialist bias." Without enhancing the "appeal and journalistic qualities" of material addressed to foreign audiences, Chernenko said, the USSR "cannot hope for success in foreign policy propaganda in the long term." [redacted]

Gorbachev, whose active role in Soviet propaganda has been apparent in the stream of initiatives from the Kremlin since he took office, is apparently taking a more activist role in propaganda activities than his predecessors. [redacted]

[redacted] Gorbachev is making major revisions of Soviet propaganda activities and policy, which he described as "obsolete." His changes include:

- Increasing the size of the propaganda effort.
- Improving the credibility of Soviet propaganda by getting foreign journalists to report on the USSR and Afghanistan and by gaining access to the foreign media for Soviet spokesmen.
- Increasing the sophistication of Soviet propaganda by differentiating for individual foreign audiences and by toning down the Communist rhetoric.
- Improving the timeliness of Soviet propaganda with more modern equipment.

Although all of these ideas have been brought up before, either under previous general secretaries or by Gorbachev, his personal involvement should help speed improvements. [redacted]

#### Rumors of Change

To facilitate these improvements, Gorbachev is apparently considering a reorganization of the propaganda apparatus and is attempting to get rid of corruption and inefficiency. According to some rumors, the IID would be merged with the ID. This reorganization

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would, presumably, be along substantive lines and would put both the formulation and implementation of foreign propaganda in one department. [redacted]

ideas across. Although the methods differ, the purpose seems to be the same: to keep world attention focused on Soviet proposals, policies, and reactions. [redacted]

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Another possible reorganization of the apparatus—along functional lines—was reported recently [redacted]

**The New General Secretary**

The long period during which a string of ailing Kremlin bosses and a heavyhanded Soviet propaganda apparatus gave the West an advantage in international image making ended when Gorbachev became General Secretary. The 55-year-old leader, along with his wife Raisa, has shown a great deal of public relations savvy. As a US official put it, "The Soviets have been improving their propaganda skills in recent years, but they've never had the talent to pull it off. Now, they have the talent." The substance of the Soviet message has not changed profoundly, but its language and the way it is propagated are becoming more flexible, modern, and "Western." Many of these changes undoubtedly are attributable directly to the new General Secretary. [redacted]

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the IID and another, unspecified, Central Committee department might be put under the control of a new culture-propaganda organization, which would comprise the Central Committee Culture and Propaganda Departments and be headed by Yakovlev. [redacted]

[redacted] Zamyatin vigorously opposed the subordination, and the issue was, as yet, undecided. The subordination of the IID to the Culture-Propaganda Department would apparently mean that all media organs directing propaganda to both domestic and foreign audiences—including *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, TASS, and APN—would be overseen by one department. Substantive approval for particular articles would undoubtedly still have to be received from the various offices responsible for the subject. However, the new department would apparently have the responsibility for ensuring that articles on both domestic and foreign issues contain the proper ideological content and level of sophistication for their various audiences. [redacted]

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[redacted] Gorbachev is also trying to root out corruption and inefficiency in the propaganda apparatus. Gosteleradio chairman Sergey Lapin, who was recently replaced, was apparently a victim of this purge. [redacted]

In addition to his personal appeal, the Soviet leader is probably responsible for a number of propaganda initiatives from the Kremlin since his succession. Moreover, his good health and personal style have led to more traveling abroad than any general secretary has done in some time—trips that receive wide media coverage. For example, his four-day visit to Paris in November 1985 received saturation coverage in the major West European press, including front-page editorials, commentaries, news analyses, and back-grounders complemented with extensive reportage. However, although there was extensive coverage, not all of it was positive. Much of the press, although lauding Gorbachev's "Western-style" handling of the press, noted the "transparent propaganda" of the succession of surprise arms control proposals before and during the meeting. [redacted]

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[redacted] Gorbachev is unhappy with the process for foreign propaganda implementation. At the very least, he appears set on streamlining the process for coordinating propaganda campaigns by subordinating the IID to a larger organization. [redacted]

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**Propaganda Techniques and Recent Improvements**

In the past few years, and particularly since Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary, the Soviets have developed a variety of methods for getting their




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Figure 6. General Secretary Gorbachev with French President Mitterand in Paris



### Press Conferences

The practice of press conferences is not new in the Soviet Union—Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave a few—but their frequency and form are new. Soviet spokesmen and now the General Secretary are regularly fielding questions from reporters before a battery of television cameras. The Soviets value press conferences as a chance to state, and thus promote, Soviet positions to international audiences. Also, [redacted] Soviet leadership believes that Gorbachev comes across well in press conferences, particularly in the one he gave after his meeting with President Reagan. [redacted]

Gorbachev's news conferences in Geneva and Paris highlight this trend. In addition, since mid-1984 press briefings have been held in the Soviet Foreign Ministry at least once a month. Their increased frequency appears to be related to Moscow's evident dismay at the public relations debacle it suffered after the KAL incident and the INF walkout, which coincided with increasing concern on the part of the Soviet leadership over Moscow's "counterpropaganda" capabilities. [redacted]

An important factor in the leadership's appreciation of the news conference is its credibility, achieved from its similarity to its Western counterpart. There are, however, some notable differences between the Foreign Ministry press briefings and those of the West. Although some questions are received orally, many are submitted in writing and deposited in small boxes at either side of the stage, where they are periodically picked up by Soviet officials. This procedure assures the briefers that the questions they want to answer will get asked, and in a manner favorable to them. Additionally, it gives officials a chance to consider an answer before speaking or, perhaps more to the point, not to answer the question at all. [redacted]

The performances of Soviet officials thus far have been fairly good; they have generally deflected hard questions well and not allowed themselves to be drawn into comments that go beyond stated policy. [redacted]

### Gaining Access to the Foreign Media

The Soviets are getting better at using the Western media to their advantage. With increasing frequency, the Soviet view of an international event or some [redacted]

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aspect of Soviet foreign policy is being presented abroad by Soviet spokesmen. It is now common to see Soviet personalities such as Georgiy Arbatov, Leonid Zamyatin, or Vladimir Pozner being interviewed by Western TV commentators or press correspondents.

[redacted]

A recent example of the new "accessibility" of Soviet spokesmen was the performance of Soviet officials in Geneva in November 1985. Arriving well before the summit, the Soviets deluged journalists with a series of briefings, stacks of translated press releases and Gorbachev speeches, and a press luncheon.

[redacted] the information curtain that separates normally tightlipped Soviet officials from Western journalists in Moscow parted in Geneva, and the Soviet spokesmen seemed eager to make themselves available.

Another Soviet method for gaining access to the foreign media has been through the co-optation of foreign journalists stationed in Moscow. For many foreign journalists, reporting in a Soviet-biased or pro-Soviet manner can result in gaining access to otherwise inaccessible Soviet officials or receiving "inside information." Moreover, if foreign journalists refuse to cooperate, they may be the target of provocations, and some journalists have been charged with "hooliganism," espionage, or illicit behavior and have been deported.

When the Soviets cannot get foreign journalists to write their stories, they have another means of getting foreign coverage: purchasing advertising space in newspapers. The advertisements almost always carry a political message and are usually purchased by the Soviet embassy.

**The Controlled Leak**

Approved government leaks from official and unofficial sources help the Soviet Union gain access to the foreign media with their "hot news" items. Soviet or Soviet-backed sources occasionally provide information to the Western press or Western officials on Soviet affairs, particularly leadership issues. One example is Viktor Louis, a KGB agent and mouthpiece whose self-proclaimed occupation is that of a Moscow correspondent for a British newspaper. Louis,

who has been a major source of information on Soviet dissident Andrey Sakharov, provided Western correspondents with a film of Sakharov in 1985. It was intended to show Sakharov healthy and being well cared for. Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, has since stated that the film was made up of clips taken by the KGB before Sakharov's illness and misrepresented the state of his health at the time it was released.

[redacted]

**Exploitation of UN Information Organs**

[redacted] the Soviets developed interest in the United Nations in 1954 when they saw some hope of winning sufficient votes to make it a useful propaganda vehicle.

[redacted] they have been successful in using it to support their propaganda activities worldwide.

[redacted] the Soviets have tried to gain control of the UN Secretariat's news service—the Political Information and News Service (PINS). PINS was established by the United Nations to provide the Secretariat staff and member states with synopses of media reports. A Soviet national, Vyacheslav Ustinov, heads the office that supervises PINS. He has delegated editorial responsibilities to his special assistant, another Soviet. A review of PINS products indicates an anti-US bias and an absence of unfavorable coverage of the USSR.

[redacted] the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) plays a crucial role in the government's propaganda efforts, despite the fact that the resolution that established the department decreed that it should not engage in propaganda. The DPI arranges for national and international media coverage of UN activities. The influence of Soviet officials working in the department frequently results in the presentation of a selective and distorted image of the UN's activities. The DPI occasionally issues pamphlets, such as one in late 1984 on colonialism, which are grossly biased against Western countries.

[redacted] Soviets in the UN Secretariat are instructed to arrange for the UN Secretary General to make favorable references to the

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statements of Soviet leaders or announcements of the Central Committee. The Soviets circulate these statements as well as announcements of the Soviet Government in UN documents. As a matter of practice, the United Nations allows documents of any delegation to be entered in the record and circulated as official UN documents. The fact that they have been circulated in the United Nations is used by the Soviet press and other media in a way that gives the propaganda more credibility. [redacted]

**Conclusions and Prospects**

We have no objective means for measuring the overall effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in influencing policies abroad, but the huge investment the Soviet Union has made in its propaganda effort—the radiobroadcasting, news agencies, publications, and cultural and information activities—attests to Moscow’s high regard for propaganda instruments as political tools. [redacted]

In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders have continually voiced concerns about the quality of their foreign propaganda. Gorbachev is taking a more activist role in the propaganda area and has ordered changes that, if implemented, will increase the size of the effort and possibly improve its credibility, sophistication, and timeliness. [redacted]

Improving the credibility of their news and information is the most serious problem for the Soviets. They combat this shortcoming in part through repetition, by presenting their propaganda on a particular theme through various media outlets, hoping that each will add to the credibility of the other to produce a convincing story. They also use the foreign media as a vehicle for their propaganda, hoping that their ideas will gain the Western media’s credibility. Soviet commentators, particularly since Gorbachev became General Secretary, appear regularly in the Western media to present the Soviet views on issues or events. [redacted]

Timeliness is also a serious problem that, on major issues, will not be solved easily by the Soviets. Various incidents have shown that their propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instructions from the top are not forthcoming or when bureaucratic interests conflict. Close party controls and inflexible bureaucratic procedures also contribute to inertia and delays. Soviet leaders have acknowledged that these delays mean their interpretation of events is not the first one heard by foreign audiences, and its impact is reduced. The presence of a strong leader may reduce some of those delays. Even a reorganization of the apparatus, however, is unlikely to resolve the conflicting bureaucratic interests that have caused problems in the past on issues of major importance. [redacted]

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The Soviets are currently undertaking a massive new effort to educate people around the world about Soviet policies and proposals because they feel their ideas are not being heard. [redacted]

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[redacted] in the near future the Soviets are likely to emphasize greater use of radio and television and introduce additional clandestine radio stations targeted at Western Europe. Additionally, Gorbachev himself has ordered the propaganda apparatus to:

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- Improve the supply of publications, especially books, with most of the increase probably going to developing countries.
- Double the equipment budget of propaganda agencies for the purchase of more sophisticated computers and radio, television, and other audiovisual equipment.
- Tailor propaganda for individual countries and regions. [redacted]

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In addition, TASS and APN will undoubtedly continue to increase the number of subscribers to their services, offering them at low or no cost, and Soviet commentators will make increasing use of the foreign media as a propaganda outlet. [redacted]

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