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TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No. 629



AFRICA

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO FEEL EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM

Reaction to Survey Reported

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Feb 79 pp 9-11

[Article: "Decolonization Evaluated by Africans"]

[Excerpts] We are publishing here the most significant reactions of our readers to an exclusive survey, "How Frenchmen today evaluate colonialism," which appeared in JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 935. The sample which follows is characteristic of the whole, of which 70 percent of the letters came from France, from nationals or Africans who have emigrated. On the other hand, we are the ones who asked J. Ki-Zerbo, Sally Ndongo, and L. S. Senghor for their opinions.

How They Feel

Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal: First an observation in light of the results. Fundamentally racism does not exist in France--particularly with regard to blacks. Because the majority of Frenchmen have made their congeniality towards African countries obvious, whatever party they belong to. But I stress firmly that I have dwelt principally on Black Africa.

Second observation. Opinions differ nevertheless between the majority and the opposition on the question more ethical than political, i.e., the blessings of colonialism. Most of the majority feel that colonialism was a blessing for France. Most of the opposition feel that it was not a blessing. But a significant part of the opposition feel that it was a blessing. Those who feel so are, in my opinion, the ones most loyal to true socialist theory. They have set forth there an honest opinion.

For historians of colonialism admit that Europe was able to become industrialized as a result of its colonies. At first glance, we would tend to misjudge those members of the opposition who feel that it was a blessing for France. Basically, that is the truth. The others are observing activists of the left superficially. Emotionally. In short, the survey you have

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undertaken is in favor of France. There is the congeniality towards Africa, on one hand; and there is condemnation--subtle condemnation--of colonialism, on the other hand.

To return to French racism. It is not really racism. It is a social phenomenon. People are against immigrants who compete with them, regardless of the color of their skin. Of course skin color does not reduce hostility. And the color of their skin has not given North Africans any privileges. They are, as a rule, whites, in contrast to black Africans. The ones affected here are the Arabs. It is towards Arabs that aversion is expressed. And I think that the reaction is much more against Arab civilization and the oil policy of OPEC, most of whose member countries are Arab.

There is also a majority of Frenchmen who say that, since independence, Africa is rather less well off. This is reacting out of spite. The French are taking their desire for fact. In Senegal's case, our per capita income has increased from 160 dollars to 360, despite draught in nine years out of 18. The number of salaried jobs has more than doubled. The economy, which represented 10 percent of gross domestic production, now represents more than 27 percent. So let no one tell us Africa is not as well off. Frenchmen have reacted out of spite--jealous spite.

Prince Joseph Ki-Zerbo, a historian and politician from Upper Volta:

Objectively, racism has increased. Before there were not very many Africans in France. People then looked at us with an ethnologist's eye, somewhat amused. Today the number of Africans has grown. The tolerance threshold has been passed. Frenchmen think that every black they see in their country has come to steal their jobs from them?

Sally Ndongo, secretary general of the General Union of Senegalese Workers in France:

I feel that this survey resembles all surveys. The questions are no better worded. They do not concern the people most directly involved. Apart from that, I am not surprised to see that most Frenchmen, for the most part, are in favor of colonialism. How could they have survived without it?

As far as finding out whether things are rather better or less well off in Africa since it became independent? "Better" or "less well off" means there was a change in rule. If Africa was really independent, then yes, you could ask the question?

Furthermore, I like South African racism better than France's current attitude towards Africa. At least it is frank. But the racism of France's authorities is underhand. How can one say, "Africans are our friends" or "Africa for Africans" and, at the same time, reinforce Africa's enemies? Who is arming South Africans? And, in France, they prefer to expel Africans

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and North Africans, who are today more aware and more aggressive, so as to open their arms to Asians because, for the time being, the latter are more easily handled and will not dare open their mouths. Emigrants in France are no more than domestic colonialism.

When all is said and done, the danger of a survey like this is that it starts public opinion and that, in the case of interference abroad, the government can always point to it. Furthermore, I would say that it is interesting because it bears out what we already knew.

British, French Colonialism Viewed

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 p 76

[Editorial by Peter Enahoro, a Nigerian journalist: "To Each Its Colonizers: The French and British Left Specific and Indelible Marks on Africa"*]

[Text] Why do Africans not denigrate the French as much as the British and Americans? Were they not victims of their colonialism? Immediately following independence, did they not suffer the burden of their interferences? Without a doubt, the explanation must be sought deep within colonialism's history. Take the British. They called their colonies, not cynically, "possessions," and their inhabitants "colonial subjects." The French did not make a distinction. As far as they were concerned, the Africans under their authority had full French citizenship. They lived in "overseas departments."

British colonists lived in isolation. Not for anything in the world would they have ventured off of their "reserves" or golf clubs. This scorn was severely resented by the "colonized." The French were not as distant and willingly shared their privileges with some Africans.

Their educational policies were also different. The British, as a result of their horizontal system, taught more of their "subjects" to read and write than did the French. But the vertical system of the latter was more selective. Hence France's reputation for having provided Africans with better education. Some French-speaking African leaders were classmates of political authorities in the mother country. Some even sat in the National Assembly as members of French political parties. This type of relationship fostered that characteristically French team spirit between colonialists and the colonized that is not found with the English. The British establishment, the product of a few very exclusive grammar schools, never mixed with the future leaders of English-speaking Africa. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the English-speaking countries asking the Government in London to help them establish an African deterrence force as the leaders of former French colonies did at the Paris summit in 1978.

Men like Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Sedar Senghor, who are sometimes irreverently called "black Frenchmen," have few counterparts in English

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speaking Africa. But if we must condemn, in a general manner--and with reason--the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage, we have to admit that French-speaking Africa suffered more serious damage. The English never succeeded in really imposing a cultural imperialism. It is difficult to believe in the cultural superiority of an absent-minded official, who wears a monocle, stutters when he speaks his own language, and is unable to name some of his country's best writers.

It is understandable that the redirection of "past investments" in men, sensitivity, and techniques has kept French-speaking Africa from putting France in the same class as English-speaking Africa puts Great Britain. On the other hand, it is difficult to explain why English-speaking Africa so often remains unconcerned by French scheming.

Perhaps France's image is the reason for the way things are. English-speaking Africans do not know the French. Therefore, they do not understand them. Their only objections to France have been passed on to them by the English. But the picture of the voluble and excited Frenchman contrasted to that of the stiff and imperturbable Englishman is considerably more attractive to them. So they think the French are not shrewd, sly, crafty, cunning, and deceitful but, instead, slightly insane. Perhaps English-speaking Africa is also of the opinion that the actions of the French in French-speaking Africa are only the result of their sphere of influence. In which case, it is difficult for it to see itself taking on the role of its African brothers' watchdog.

Whatever the motives holding English-speaking Africa from opposing France, it is still true that the latter will pursue its destructive policy in French-speaking Africa until a spoke has been put in its wheels. But in this area, one can scarcely depend on French-speaking Africa, because France holds most of these countries in the palm of her hand. And it is certainly a pity.

* JEUNE AFRIQUE does not necessarily support the opinions published in this column under their authors' responsibility.

Franc Zone's Survival Examined

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Feb 79 p 76

[Text] The franc zone is in good health. Faithful to their annual meeting, the 14 member countries--13 African countries¹ plus France--are meeting in Paris on 5 February. So, even though the sterling zone has not weathered decolonization and the dollar's zone of influence is a collection of countries linked to the United States by very diverse, reciprocal monetary ties, the franc zone is continuing to exist in the middle of controversy.

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Devaluations

Its detractors see in this a vestige of colonialism and an instrument for economic and diplomatic domination. Its supporters--some of whom quote socialist theory--see here primarily a framework for monetary stability strongly promoting economic development. We cannot forget that the franc zone came into existence in 1939 to associate the French Empire's monetary reserves in the protection of the franc.

For this reason, as soon as they became politically independent, certain member countries rejected this tutelage. The countries of Indochina in 1954, Guinea in 1959, Tunisia and Morocco in 1955, and Algeria in 1964 created their own currencies and thereby took themselves out of the franc zone. Nevertheless, the effects of this decision were gradual. It was not until 1967 that the four African countries regained complete independence in their financial relations from abroad, thereby breaking the last tie binding them to the zone. Mauritania and Madagascar left it in 1973. Mali, which had left it in 1962, returned in 1968. Mauritania could well do the same in the near future.

How can one establish a stable currency when the economy, completely oriented towards the former mother country, is too weak to open up the resources, particularly the exports, necessary to maintain the new national currency? Mali was not able to solve the problem--Mauritania is struggling with it today--and the Malian franc returned to the franc zone at the cost of a 50-percent devaluation.

Moreover, this desire for monetary independence is manifested in varying degrees by all countries, owing to the fixed parity between the franc and other currencies in the zone.² France imposes on member countries successive devaluations from which they do not derive any profit because their exports are much too inflexible. On the other hand, the cost of their imports from outside the zone constantly increase and prevents them from diversifying their trade partners.

In 1972, the disenchantment of some members and the sullenness of others led France to pledge the 1972-1974 reforms, which gave the franc zone its current structure. African countries are now grouped into two monetary unions each equipped with a joint central bank.³ French authorities sitting on the administrative boards of the central banks no longer have the power to resist statutory decisions taken unanimously by African members. The zone's currencies are henceforth ensured against an eventual devaluation of the French franc.

Those opposed to the zone, however, have not been appeased. They are expounding three major arguments. They see the freedom of monetary transfers as an obstacle to the creation of domestic savings and an opportunity for foreign businesses to send their gains back to their countries. They add that, because there is a structural surplus in the foreign exchange reserves

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of African countries in the zone, France continues to manage them in its favor, paying nominal rates. They begrudge finally the fact that France has the opportunity to thus impose a deflationary monetary policy on them that scarcely favors the financement of their development.

Renewal

To respond to the first point, supporters of the zone say that, on the contrary, monetary stability and guaranteed transfers attract private foreign investors and encourage them to reinvest their profits locally. On the second point, they feel that, while France is indeed managing almost a million francs in foreign exchange reserves belonging to its African partners, it is devoting two-thirds, or two billion francs, of its public assistance to Africa to members of the franc zone and that one equalizes the other. As far as the last point is concerned, supporters of the franc zone readily point to Zaire to show that inflationary ease leads to bankruptcy instead of development.

The imminent prospect for a European monetary union, however, could change the terms of the debate by inviting 54 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, which are currently negotiating to renew the Lome agreements with the European Community, to add a monetary dimension to their community of interests. How long until an African association of payments linked to Europe and to the major monetary zones via negotiated ties?

FOOTNOTES

1. Benin, Cameroon, Central Africa, Comores, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, and Togo.
2. One CFA franc - 0.02 French francs; one Malian franc = 0.01 French Francs.
3. Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO); Bank of the Central African States (BEAC); Mali and Comores have their own institutions.

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EASTERN AFRICA SHACKLED BY WAR

Paris JEUNE AFRICA in French 14 Mar 79 p 21

[Article by M. Y.: "Transport Paralyzed in Central and Eastern Africa"]

[Text] The Ugandan-Tanzanian war was all it took to complete the total confusion of transport in central and eastern Africa.

Threatened by the raids of Angolan anti-Marxist guerrillas, the Benguela railroad, which crosses Angola and links Shaba Province in Zaire and Zambia with the Atlantic Ocean, had already ceased operating. Because of a lack of maintenance, use of the Tazara (Tanzania-Zambia railroad built with the aid of the Chinese) was becoming increasingly hazardous.

Crossroads

As the crowning blow, the taking at the end of February of the important crossroads of Masaka and Mbarara in southern Uganda by Tanzanian troops upset land and air communications between over a half dozen countries.

Uganda was actually a commercial hub linking the Nile Valley, the Horn and the heart of the black continent. Along a horizontal axis stretching from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to the isolated regions of Rwanda, Burundi and eastern Zaire (Kivu Province), trade was constant.

Split

Even at the beginning of February, the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, Juvenal Habyarimana and Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, concluded important agreements with their Kenyan colleague, Daniel Arap Moi, for the purpose of facilitating the transport of goods through Uganda as far as the Indian Ocean. But the intensification of the fighting forced Kampala and Nairobi to introduce a ban on 26 February banning access to Ugandan territory to the trucks carrying loads going to Rwanda and Burundi. As a result, nearly 200 vehicles, mainly tank trucks, were blocked at the border.

Between the Arab world and black Africa, the "split" is also spectacular. This was demonstrated on 1 March by the forced landing in Mwanza, Tanzania,

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of a Boeing 707 cargo plane headed for Kampala from Djibouti. The aircraft, belonging to a Belgian company, was to carry Ugandan coffee to Europe via Djibouti on its return. At the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Nairobi, the delegation from the young republic did not conceal its apprehension because, deprived of mining and agricultural resources, Djibouti is basing its hopes exclusively on the development of transit traffic.

Sudan, whose southwestern region is far from the ports on the Red Sea and therefore risks suffering the economic and political effects of the war between Uganda and Tanzania, has expressed its concern. Chief of State Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, currently president of the OAU, has intensified his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Egyptian Products

Even Egypt, which in February proposed sending commercial missions to central and eastern Africa to facilitate the marketing of its products, risks being caught short by events.

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THIRD WORLD SLOW TO TAKE STAND ON AVOWED PRINCIPLES

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Mar 79 p 94

[Article by Scnnen Andriamirado]

[Text] The Third World is at war. Its traditional spokesmen pretend not to notice it. Under our very eyes, principles are thwarted and the slogans that once served as a kind of force for unity -- albeit relative -- are contradicted.

When Vietnam, behind a "Cambodian Front" that came out of nowhere, invaded the People's Republic of Cambodia, our leaders remained silent. When, in order to "punish" the Vietnamese, China sent its troops into Vietnam, Africa's reactions were confined to those -- as could be expected -- from Angola and Ethiopia, which were joined by Mozambique, disappointed for several months over the de-Maoization, and by Tanzania, which expressed its "sympathy with Vietnam which is fighting to safeguard its territorial integrity." From the other African nations, nothing but silence.

What is more serious, the war has also taken hold of Africa against the same background of silence. When, in October 1978, Marshal Idi Amin Dada had his troops occupy the Tanzanian region of Kagera, the Africans said nothing, officially because the matter had not been taken to the OAU. The Africans undoubtedly needed a meeting to express themselves and condemn an act of aggression! Since that time, things have changed. Counterattacking, the Tanzanians have penetrated Uganda, coordinating their actions with those of the Ugandan opponents who have decided to have done with Idi Amin Dada. But here again, while one may grant Tanzania the right to reprisals, the Africans remained mute. Only the Front Line countries of southern Africa, meeting in Luanda on 3 and 4 March, supported Tanzania and condemned Uganda. From the other Africans, nothing but silence, silence like that they have observed ever since Libya has occupied part of the Chadian territory or since Chad has heard France's proposal of a federal solution, a synonym, in this case, for dismantlement.

What has become of the principles so dear to the African leaders? What has become of the principle of the intangibility of borders, whose safeguarding

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would this time have merited the establishment of an inter-African force to stop the war between Uganda and Tanzania as early as October? What has become of the condemnations of imperialism which this time could have applied to Vietnam as well as to China?

Actually, the Africans are now living through the crisis of conscience that has seized the leftists in Europe for several years. Europe experienced Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. The Third World is now falling apart in Cambodia, Vietnam and China. Before long, Africa will be forced to look reality in the face, for example, when it will have to take the side of Chad against Libya, or perhaps, when the Mauriticians ask the Moroccan troops to leave their soil.

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LOME CONVENTION TALKS, AID DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEEN'S in French 24 Nov 78 pp 3079-3080

[Text] The European Community has just completed a study of trade between the EEC and the ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries] during the period 1972-1977. Its analysis brought out the following characteristics of this trade:

The ACP countries represented only a relatively small part (between 3 and 4 percent) of total world trade (including petroleum). The share represented by the developing countries as a whole was substantially larger, however: approximately 30 percent.

The EEC continues to play a very important role in the trade of the ACP countries: in 1977, 43 percent of all exports from these countries went to the EEC, from which they received 48 percent of their total imports. Most of the ACP countries depend on two or three products for their export revenue: in trade with the Community, a total of 10 products or groups of products make up 80 percent of all imports of the nine members of the EEC from the ACP. In the case of certain basic products, the ACP countries play a very important role as suppliers of the EEC, which purchases 45 percent of its coffee, 83 percent of its cacao, 41 percent of its copper, 67 percent of its sugar and 54 percent of its peanut products from the ACP countries.

Proposal for Continuation of the Special "Beef" Program

The European Commission has just transmitted to the Council of Ministers of the EEC a proposal to extend until March 1980 (the date of expiration of the present Lome Convention) the special regulations covering exports of beef from Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar and Swaziland to the Community market. These regulations provide for a 90 percent reduction in imposts (other than duty) levied at the moment of importation, on condition that a tax in an equivalent amount be collected by the four countries at the moment of exportation.

These special measures were scheduled to expire on 31 December 1978, but a delegation sent by the commission determined that the income of the meat producers in these countries would be seriously impaired in the event the measures were scaled down or eliminated.

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Principal Currents of EEC/ACP Trade in 1977

Principaux courants d'échanges CEE/ACP en 1977				
A) Importations CEE (1)				
(2) Provenance	(3) Valeur réelle (1 000 uce)	(4) Valeur cumulée (1 000 uce)	(5) Valeur réelle (en %)	(6) Valeur cumulée (en %)
-	-	-	-	-
1) Nigeria	3 474 773	3 474 773	27,9	27,9
2) Côte d'Ivoire (7)	1 471 201	4 945 974	11,8	39,7
3) Zaïre	1 079 355	6 025 329	8,7	48,4
4) Cameroun (8)	526 325	6 551 654	4,2	52,6
5) Kenya	520 471	7 072 125	4,2	56,8
6) Ghana	458 573	7 530 698	3,7	60,4
7) Zambie (9)	458 133	7 989 031	3,7	64,1
8) Gabon	421 390	8 420 421	3,5	67,6
Total	-	12 460 825	-	100,0
B) Exportations CEE (10)				
1) Nigeria	4 602 529	4 602 529	36,8	36,8
2) Côte d'Ivoire	850 300	5 452 829	6,8	43,6
3) Libéria	791 793	6 244 622	6,3	49,9
4) Soudan (11)	480 212	6 724 835	3,8	53,8
5) Gabon	453 823	7 178 658	3,6	57,4
6) Kenya	447 700	7 626 358	3,6	61,0
7) Zaïre	445 065	8 071 443	3,6	64,6
8) Cameroun	428 909	8 499 352	3,4	68,0
Total	-	12 502 505	-	100,0

Key:

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| 1. EEC Imports | 7. Ivory Coast |
| 2. Origin | 8. Cameroon |
| 3. Real value (1,000 UCE [units of account]) | 9. Zambia |
| 4. Cumulative value (1,000 UCE) | 10. Exports |
| 5. Real value (in percentages) | 11. Sudan |
| 6. Cumulative value (in percentages) | |

From 1 January 1979 to 1 March 1980, the reduction in imposts levied at the moment of importation would be applicable as follows:

From 1 January 1979 to 31 December 1979, a total of 27,532 tons of boned meat would be eligible, distributed as follows: Botswana, 17,360 tons; Kenya, 130 tons; Madagascar, 6,956 tons; Swaziland, 3086 tons.

From 1 January 1980 to 1 March 1980, a total of 4,595 tons, distributed as follows: Botswana, 2,895 tons; Kenya, 25 tons; Madagascar, 1,160 tons; Swaziland, 515 tons.

Continuation of this privilege would entail for the Community budget a decrease in revenue (nonreceipt of a part of the amounts deducted) totaling 33 million units of account in 1979 and 5.6 million in 1980.

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The new president of the Republic of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, went recently to Brussels, where he conferred with the chairman of the European Commission, Roy Jenkins, and the commissioner in charge of cooperation for development, Claude Cheysson. These several conferences dealt basically with the current negotiations for renewal of the Lome Convention and also with the various forms of cooperation within the framework of the Convention. The program of the fourth European Development Fund provides for grants to Kenya totaling 72 million units of account. The greater part of the financing has already been approved, and the remainder is expected to be approved during the first half of 1979.

Balance of Trade of the EEC With the ACP Countries From 1972 Through 1977

(Balances expressed in millions of UCE; coverage of imports by exports expressed in percentages)

Balance commerciale de la CEE avec les pays ACP de 1972 à 1977				
(Balance en millions d'uce, Couverture export/import en %)				
	1972	1974	1976	1977
1) Total ACP :				
Balance commerciale (2)	- 854.4	- 4 377.8	- 588.5	+ 42.7
Export/Import (3)	82.5	58.3	94.4	100.3
4) Afrique occidentale :				
Balance commerciale	- 653.0	- 3 017.4	+ 217.8	+ 1 170.5
Export/Import	74.3	49.6	103.7	117.3
5) Afrique centrale :				
Balance commerciale	- 234.1	- 1 064.3	- 370.8	- 699.1
Export/Import	75.1	52.8	80.6	70.5
6) Afrique de l'Est :				
Balance commerciale	- 78.0	- 201.1	- 84.9	+ 3.0
Export/Import	91.0	86.1	94.5	100.2
7) Océan Indien :				
Balance commerciale	+ 9.9	- 5.1	- 85.4	- 99.2
Export/Import	107.0	97.7	74.7	74.5
8) Caraïbes :				
Balance commerciale	149.2	58.8	- 102.4	- 76.4
Export/Import	149.6	115.0	83.7	88.7
9) Pacifique :				
Balance commerciale	- 48.7	- 148.6	- 162.8	- 256.1
Export/Import	44.0	27.7	23.4	17.2

Key:

- | | |
|---|-----------------|
| 1. Total for ACP; | 6. East Africa |
| 2. Balance of trade | 7. Indian Ocean |
| 3. Percentage of imports covered by exports | 8. Caribbean |
| 4. West Africa | 9. Pacific |
| 5. Central Africa | |

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DETAILS ON CLUB OF DAKAR PROPOSALS GIVEN

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Mar 79 p 614

[Text] On 1 March in Brussels, Mohamed T. Diawara presented details on the proposals adopted at the end of November in Libreville by the Club of Dakar of which he is president, proposals aimed at renewal of the EEC/ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (associated with the EEC)] Lome Convention (see MARCHES TROPICAUX, No 1726 of 8 December 1978). These suggestions, grouped together under the topic "For the Strengthening and Expansion of Cooperation Between Europe and Africa," were summed up as follows by the former planning minister of the Ivory Coast:

Legal and institutional aspects: The drafting, by the EEC and the ACP nations, of a treaty of association of an unspecified duration. It would resemble the Rome Treaty and would define the main principles and terms of cooperation.

An organic reorganization, involving the establishment of an annual conference of chiefs of state which would exercise the powers of orientation now belonging to the Council of Ministers and the setting up of a committee emanating from the Council of Ministers to ensure, on a basis of equality, continuity in the management of joint policies between the sessions of the Council of Ministers, which sessions should be more frequent.

The budgeting, at the EEC level, of resources going to the EDF [European Development Fund].

Financial cooperation: A substantial increase in financial resources from the EEC and made directly available to associated nations through the EDF and the European Investment Bank (BEI). The Club of Dakar's minimum proposal of a doubling of such resources would not even correspond, by 1985, to the aid objective of 0.7 percent of their GNP subscribed to by the EEC nations within the framework of the United Nations, since reaching that objective would require that current funds be increased 2.2 times on the basis of an inflation rate of 7 percent.

Concerning the allocation of funds, priority given to the poorest associated nations and projects which, because of their nature, would not have other means of financing.

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The establishment, within the framework of the EDF, of a guarantee, rebate and consolidation mechanism aimed at helping the associated nations -- in keeping with their repayment possibilities -- to mobilize the largest possible volume of capital available at market conditions.

The establishment at the Community level of an investment guarantee system to complement existing national systems, which would make it possible to have a substantial increase in the investment flow, particularly in the mining and energy fields.

Expansion of the mechanism for the stabilization of export receipts of associated countries, coupled with partial consideration of the effects of inflation during the period of reference.

Commercial cooperation: Continuation and expansion of free access of agricultural and industrial products of associated nations to EEC markets. (Exceptions made necessary by circumstances should be the subject of preliminary negotiations and be expressly limited in time.)

Industrial cooperation: With a view to vigorous concerted redeployment between Europe and the associated countries, it would be a question of combining the actions and grants of the EDF and the BEI with aid given by the EEC for regional, sectorial and specific reconversion within the framework of its own industrial policy. Procedures for concerted efforts could be followed within the association, which would include public officials, investors and corporate partners in the study of the mutual implications of the redistribution of activities between Europe and associated nations.

This orientation would be expressed in a redefinition of the Industrial Cooperation Committee set up by the Lome Convention, with this committee being called upon to promote a continuous and active policy of cooperation for the redeployment of industrial activities between the EEC and associated nations.

The Center for Industrial Development (CDI) would have increased means and its action would have new foundations, particularly through the organization of a more effective liaison with promotional bodies of the associated nations and with private investors in the EEC countries.

Energy and mining cooperation: The application, in the field of new types of energy, particularly that of solar energy, of specific scientific and technical cooperation in the direction of the research and development of products and procedures suited to the needs and limitations of the associated nations.

Regarding the conventional forms of energy, particularly hydroelectric power, an effort toward cooperation is necessary and will involve terms suited to the financing conditions relating to the equipping of hydroelectric sites in the associated countries.

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Regional cooperation: A substantial increase in the portion of the EDF sum reserved for the financing of regional projects and programs.

The drafting of prospective development plans for the associated nations based on major geoeconomic regions.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

FAC AID TO AFRICA IN 1978 REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 pp 555-556

[Article: "Aid and Cooperation Fund [FAC] Assistance to African and Indian Ocean Countries in 1978]

[Text] In 1978 the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) gave assistance to African and Indian ocean countries totaling 515.5 million French francs. Another 5 million francs went to the Republic of Haiti for agricultural development and airport construction.

These contributions come under title VI of the budget (investment expenses) and so do not include expenses for technical, budgetary and research aid also covered by FAC.

The sectoral distribution of Aid and Cooperation Fund for 1978 (in millions of francs and percentages) breaks down as follows:

	M.F.	Pct
General studies	21.5	4.1
Industrial and mining development	218	41.9
Industrial and mining development	50.6	9.7
Infrastructures	97.7	18.8
Health	35.2	6.8
Education	78.9	15.2
Cultural relations and information	16.9	3.2
General expenses	1.7	0.3
Total	520.5 M.F.	100 pct

The main contributions break down as follows (in millions of francs):

General Studies	M.F.
Congo: Equipment for the Congolese Geographical Institute	0.5
Operations of general interest: Basic cartographic equipment	3.8
Technical and economic studies	5.7
Inter-government operations: Ougadougou regional teledetection center	1.0
Energy use: General Sahel program	10.5

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Rural Development

Benin: Ouidah-North palm grove irrigation	1.8
Burundi: Forestry pilot project and reforestation in Mumirwa	1.0
Cameroon: Technical aid for the development of Upper Nkam	1.6
Participation in the cocoa development program	3.2
Participation in the Yagoua rice fields development program	7.0
Participation in the Mbandjock feed lot	1.1
Cape Verde: Research and development of underground water	2.7
Development of Sao-Nicolau island	1.5
Scientific research support for rural development	1.0
Establishment of a diagnostic veterinary laboratory	2.2
Central African Empire: Logistics support for the technical planning bureau	1.7
Congo: Agricultural projects studies	0.5
Eucalyptus plantings in the Pointe-Noire region	1.5
Agronomical research support	1.5
Ivory Coast: Financial participation in the sedentary cattle raising project of the North region	2.0
Participation in silk development	1.0
Djibouti: Completion of a pilot project for irrigated crops in Attar	0.3
Guinea-Bissau: Peanut production development	1.8
Shrimp fishing development: one fishing boat	3.0
Upper Volta: Sourou threshing works	0.3
Development of the Volta valleys and agricultural projects	7.6
Study of Sourou valley hydro-agricultural development	3.0
Participation in agricultural development	2.5
West Volta food products project	2.5
Well drilling in the western Sahel	5.0
Madagascar: Continued management staffing in coffee cultivation on the east coast	1.2
Management staffing in cotton cultivation	1.0
Support to Tananarive University for training researchers	1.0
Agro-industrial studies	1.5

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Mali:	Baguineda truck garden'ng and cannery production	2.2
	Mopti operation rice fields development	2.0
	Management staffing of the Kayes region hydro-agriculture perimeters	2.0
	Technical support for the marketing of fruit, vegetables and cereals	1.0
	Reforestation in the Bamako region	2.8
	Integrated development of peanut-growing regions	4.0
	Program for the intensification of corn cultivation	0.5
	Support for cattle raising in the Sahel zone	0.9
	Mauritius:	Port-Louis slaughterhouse and pork treatment
Experimental fishing trawler		0.5
Mauritania:	Establishment of a research station in the Banc d'Aguin national park	1.5
	Construction of the Kaedi agronomic research center	1.0
	Pump irrigation of villages in the Senegal valley	1.6
	Well maintenance at Tidjikja	1.0
	Hydro-agricultural studies in the Senegal valley	1.5
	Study of hydro-agricultural development of the R'Kiz lake	2.2
	Hydro-agricultural study for Tamourt in Naa	1.3
Niger:	Establishment of the National Office of Agricultural Projects	3.0
	Agricultural development of the Dosso district	2.7
	Development of the Niger river; development of the Tiaguirire basin and the Lossa perimeter	3.5
	Participation in the program to restart peanut growing	1.5
	Cotton and cooperative management staffing	1.2
Rwanda:	Rural development in Bugesera-East and Gisaka Migongo	3.0
Senegal:	Establishment of a hydrogeologic service	1.0
	Development operations in the Senegal river valley (construction of a dike, Debi-Lampsar project, N'Diaye center, cattle and goat feed lot)	12.0
	Crop protection	0.8
	Thies-Dakar fairgrounds study	0.4
	Contribution to repair of the tuna fleet	6.0
	Intensification of cereals production in eastern Senegal	2.1
	Economic reforestation	1.5
Experimental irrigated reforestation unit	0.5	

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Seychelles: Creation of tuna fleet	10.0
Chad: Integrated development programs in south Chad	13.2
Togo: Integrated development of the maritime region	1.9
Cocoa and coffee production development	1.4
Cotton zone development	4.8
Research on the swollen-shoot (cocoa disease virus)	0.3
Zaire: Development of the Kinshasa truck gardening belt	2.0
Development of grape and vegetable crops around Mbanza-Ngungu	1.0
Establishment of an agricultural action group	3.0
Operations of general interest:	
Participation in establishing rural family houses	2.8
Subsidies to private works (Benin, Upper Volta, Mali, Chad)	0.6
Participation in the expenses of the secretariat of the Sahel Club	1.7
Intergovernmental operations:	
Subsidies to the Lake Chad Basin Commission (development of cattle raising in the regions of Assale, Chad, of Serbeouel, Cameroon, and of Bornou, Nigeria)	3.7
Subsidy to the Inter-African Committee of Hydraulic Studies	1.2
Subsidy to the Intergovernmental Committee to Combat Drought in the Sahel	4.5
Subsidy to the Association for the Development of Rice Crops in West Africa (miscellaneous projects)	2.4
Contributions to the Cooperation Council (integrated rural development of the savannahs of the northeastern Ivory Coast, cattle-raising development program in Niger, Senegal and Mauritania)	7.6
Industrial and Mining Development	
Benin: Allahe industrial unit for citrus juice and extracts	0.9
Central African Empire: Subsidy for the Saint-Floris operation (Manovo-Gouda zone)	0.7
Ivory Coast: Participation in financing the Borotou sugar complex	7.0
Gabon: Mineral prospecting	3.0
Guinea-Bissau: Geological and mineral prospecting mapping in the Gabu region	2.0
Upper Volta: Phosphate research in Arly-Kodjari-Tansarga and Aloub-Djonana	3.0

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Mali:	Mineral planning and geological mapping	1.8
Mauritania:	Study for building an electrical generating plant in Nouakchott	0.8
Senegal:	Participation in studying the iron deposit of Faleme	7.1
Zaire:	Subsidy to mining mission activities	1.5
	Participation in the inventory of mineral resources	1.5
General interest operations:		
	Participation in the program of the Bureau of Geological and Mineral Research	21.3
Infrastructures		
Benin:	Modernization program of the Benin-Niger Common Organization	4.0
Burundi:	Equipment furnished to the Bujumbura airport	1.1
Cameroon:	Realignment and modernization of the Douala-Edea link of the trans-Cameroon railway	4.0
	Subsidy to the Urbanism Cell	0.8
Central African Empire:		
	Establishment of a light road maintenance unit in the Bossembele-Bossangoa region	3.5
Congo:	Participation in the realignment work of the Congo-Ocean railway	7.0
Djibouti:	Establishment of an earth-bound satellite telecommunication station	4.5
Upper Volta:	Road materials supply	3.0
Madagascar:	Supply of public works materials and workshop equipment for the Malagasy engineering regiment	4.0-
Mali:	Participation in the railway modernization program	4.0
	Participation in completing the Selingue dam	8.5
Mauritius:	Road studies	1.5
	Supply of an electrical power station on Rodrigue island	0.4
Mauritania:	Participation in the construction of the Kiffa-Nema road	6.0
	Help for civil protection in Nouakchott	1.2

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Niger:	Dosso-Zinder wireless beam	7.2
	Construction of two bridges on the Maggia river	5.2
Rwanda:	Support for the urbanism and dwellings group	1.6
	Construction of an airplane hangar	2.0
Chad:	Moundou-Doba road project	2.0
	Equipment for the Ndjamena telephone station	4.9
Togo:	Tsevie water supply	3.0
Zaire:	Studies for the Banana-Moanda port and urban industrial complex	1.5
Intergovernmental operations:	Participation in the Asecna equipment expenses	14.7
Social Development		
Benin:	Aid to public health	0.5
Burundi:	Materiel for the Burundian Press Agency and the "Voice of the Revolution" radio program	1.1
Cameroon:	Equipment for the Yaounde Superior Polytechnic School; construction of the Ngaoundere technological university; aid for professional and communal personnel training	10.2
Cape Verde:	Participation in the Santa Catarina school complex	2.4
Central African Empire:	Aid for the struggle against great enemies and modernization of the Bengui hospital center	2.1
Congo:	Radiological equipment for the Brazzaville hospital and equipment for workshops and laboratories for the Brazzaville technical lycee	2.8
Ivory Coast:	Professional training for radio and television agents; participation in the television education program; aid for professional advancement and for the National Office of Advancement for Ivorian Business	12.0
Djibouti:	Aid for the anti-tuberculosis campaign; hospital technical equipment and a study for the construction of a teachers normal school	2.5
Gabon:	Subsidies for professional training	1.7
Upper Volta:	Aid for rural health and participation in the construction and equipping of the Superior Polytechnical Institute	5.5
Madagascar:	Aid for professional training and supply of a translating station for Malagasy Radio-Television	1.0

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Mali:	Aid for public health (hospital at point G in Bamako and completion of the Ministry of Finance building in Bamako)	2.5
Mauritius:	Equipment for the Radio-Television Office; microfilming of Mauritian archives; modernization of the Rosehill theater and aid for public health	1.7
Mauritania:	Participation in purchase of sanitation equipment for Nouakchott; aid for training refrigeration technicians in Nouadhibou and supply of materiel for the Nouakchott professional center	3.5
Niger:	Equipment for Niamey University and sports equipment for Dosso stadium	3.8
Rwanda:	Modernization of the Ruhengeri hospital, support for agricultural and veterinary education in Butare and construction of the theater at Kigali	6.7
Sao Tome and Principe:	Equipment for the biological analysis laboratory of Sao Tome	0.9
Senegal:	Participation in the construction of Saint-Louis University; hotel personnel training; commune personnel training; addition to the official printing office	15.2
Seychelles:	Aid to the Training Center; to the fishing trade; to the Mahe Culture House; supply of radiophonic equipment	2.2
Chad:	Aid for the struggle against great enemies and construction of the Ndjamena School of Public Works	3.2
Togo:	Equipment for modernizing the Sokode hospital	4.1
Zaire:	Training of agents for the telecommunications network and technical support for the Voice of Zaire complex	10.1
General interest operations:	Subsidies to private works (Cameroon, Congo, Central African Empire, Bagon, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Mali, Rwanda, Chad, Togo and Senegal) to the Pasteur Institutes of Dakar, Bangui, and Antananarivo, contribution to the building of an African Higher School for Railroading, supply of technical and teaching equipment, provision for the education of French children, credits for television broadcasts, etc.	26.9

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Intergovernmental operations:

Contribution to the campaign against onchocerosis in the Volta basin; to medical efforts against widespread endemic diseases; aid for truck drivers' training and for training rural equipment engineers 10.1

In addition, a general allocation of 23.3 million francs is on the 1978 program of the Aid and Cooperation Fund to supply and transport food to recipient countries.

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CHAD

NATION'S DISINTEGRATION CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 p 30

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Chad: Disintegration?"]

[Text] Chad has reached a point of no return. Its short-term orientation is toward a change of regime and perhaps toward a dramatic division between the North and the South. The federal solution proposed on 15 February by the French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing at a press conference, already appears in the eyes of some to be a lesser evil in relation to what is in danger of happening. However, on 15 February it seemed to depend on surgery that would be too brutal.

The country is ungovernable today and it would take a showdown between belligerents or successful mediation to prevent explosion or disintegration. Even Nd'jamena, is not being governed, and the rest of Chad is occupied by rival armies, particularly by the part of FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] led by Goukouni Oueddei.

The collapse was accelerated by the armed confrontation between President Felix Malloum and his prime minister, Hisssein Habre. For Malloum, Habre has again become "head of the opposition" and for Habre "Malloum's team is made up of malefactors, thieves and crooks."

The economic situation is one of the most precarious. The ministries and administrations have been practically abandoned by their incumbents; the banks are closed, including the issuing bank; trade is only partially operating; the national radio is silent; electricity and water are lacking in several quarters; pupils are on forced vacations; the planes of the regular airlines are avoiding Nd'jamena and ground communications are increasingly difficult.

Fear has come to be added to this partial paralysis. The antagonism between North and South, heretofore limited to a struggle for power, has degenerated into increasingly murderous confrontations between the blacks of the South, Christians or animists, and the Muslims of the North. Thus, 50 Muslims were killed at Moundou, in the South, on 22 February. And intervention by French troops was required to prevent a more violent massacre. This fury was a reaction to extortions committed in other regions.

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Thousands of "Southists" have deserted Nd'jamena, which is controlled in large part by the soldiers of Hissein Habre.

France is especially embarrassed, because the central government she supports is disappearing. The territory over which she exercises her influence continues to grow narrower. And despite an actual alliance between Paris and Khartoum (where President Valery Giscard d'Estaing is to go soon), rival influences are growing stronger--especially those of Tripoli and Lagos.

Nigeria wants to checkmate the Sudanese mediation. On 25 February she proposed her own "reconciliation conference" between the two main Chadian factions. But are there not more than two? Felix Malloum is already outflanked by Abdelkader Kamougue, chief of the gendarmerie, as well as by Col Djogo, who thinks he is the exclusive representative of the people of the South. For the North, there are Hissein Habre, Goukouni and Ahmed Acyl; each with his groups and his alliances.

In any case, the present situation cannot go on any longer. President Malloum is in control of only a small part of his capital. All the rest of the country is getting away from him.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

NATION CHARACTERIZED BY TERROR, ECONOMIC STAGNATION

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 Mar 79 p 40

[Article by Annick Benoist: "In the Kingdom of Terror"]

[Text] "The only god", "the only miracle Equatorial Guinea has produced," he is president for life and holds 46 official titles. He would have been crowned king if those close to him had not dissuaded him. Finally, as he loves to repeat, his country would not exist without him. One wonders if that would not be better. Since Francisco Macias Nguema, a former burgomaster and civil servant, became president in September 1968, Equatorial Guinea has experienced terror and economic depression.

However, when independence was proclaimed on 12 October 1968 after 90 years of Spanish colonization, this small country of 28,000 square km, sandwiched between Cameroon and Gabon, had good assets. Its economy, resting on the world's best cocoa, coffee and wood, gave it a relatively high per capita income for black Africa. The infrastructure was solid, the level of education of the population satisfactory. For the some 280,000 inhabitants the future seemed promising.

But the economy very quickly became disjointed. Spain is growing tired of the new president's incessant appeals for aid. Plantations are in jeopardy, agricultural production is diminishing from year to year. Since 1968 cocoa exports have gone from 38,000 tons to 3,500 tons. The flight of the scarce capital and the expulsion of foreign technicians contribute to accelerating the country's bankruptcy; the rate of inflation in 1974 was one of the world's highest.

Finally, according to an Equatorial Guinean refugee, "Real independence lasted only 145 days, from 12 October 1968 to 5 March 1969. Since then, Macias has abolished the law of association, forbidden political parties and created the PUNT (Workers National Single Party), to which every citizen is forced to belong...since its birth. He has institutionalized a reign of terror by imprisoning or eliminating any real or imaginary opponent."

For the low work by which he himself is repelled the president has found people to carry it out in the Youth on the March with Macias Movement, a

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terrorist militia, basically composed of delinquents. Through their attentions two villages, Mbe and Ekokete, were entirely massacred in March 1977. In the prisons, common law criminals were forced to torture political prisoners.

The repression being carried out with the vigilance of the basic committees charged with national security is especially aimed at intellectuals. It has resulted in a flight of the elite to neighboring countries. In addition to these political refugees, there are many who have had to leave the country for economic reasons. Today over 100,000 Equatorial Guineans--or at least a third of the population--have fled. Sixty thousand are refugees in Gabon, 30,000 in Cameroon, 5,000 in Nigeria, 6,000 in Spain.

The socialist countries (Soviet Union, Cuba, China) that maintain cooperation with Macias Nguema, the Western countries (France and Spain) that still have interests on the spot, the Vatican, which is seeking to avoid definite rupture with formerly very Catholic countries, scarcely seem worried about the situation. Their silence perpetuates the terror.

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GHANA

AUSTRIAN LIVESTOCK COOPERATION--In February Austria delivered materiel and equipment in the amount of 4.5 million cedis for the Pramposo livestock project in the Brong-Ahafo area. We may recall that this project, carried out as a joint venture by Austria and the Brong-Ahafo Regional Development Corporation (BARDEC), represents a total cost of about 10 million cedis and is expected to extend over an area of nearly 1,000 hectares (MTN of 6 October 1978 p 2655). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Mar 79 p 633] 856A

USSR-GHANA PRESS COOPERATION--An agreement was reached in Moscow in the middle of February between the Ghanaian press agency, called GHANA NEWS AGENCY (GNA), and the Soviet press agency, called NOVOSTI (APN). The signers of the agreement were Mr K. B. Brown, GNA general manager, and Mr Katen Khachaturov, APN vice president. The two agencies pledged mutual assistance and exchanges of information and photographs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Mar 79 p 633] 856B

NEW CURRENCY ISSUE--The Ghanaian Military Government has just issued new currency to combat the fraud perpetrated against the local currency--the cedi. The borders have been closed and will remain closed throughout the operation of exchanging the paper money in the bank offices, that is, from 13 to 26 March, and all departure or entrance of persons or assets is forbidden during that period. New bills will be exchanged for old bills at a rate of 70 new cedis for 100 old cedis for amounts not exceeding 5,000 cedis and at a rate of 50 new cedis for 100 old cedis for sums exceeding 5,000 cedis. Coins are not involved in this measure; nor are bank deposits, treasury bonds, shares and securities quoted on the stock exchange. In this way, the military government expects to obtain an appreciable reduction in the amount of currency in circulation, and it has issued severe warning to anyone who might infringe upon the steps taken. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 694] 856B

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GUINEA

BRIEFS

FRENCH DAM FEASIBILITY STUDY--In accordance with the terms of an agreement which has just been signed in Conakry by Guinean Prime Minister Lansana Beavogui and a representative of French Electric Company (EDF), the French company will conduct studies relative to Konkoure Dam. The contract is for 25 million francs. The project for a dam on the Konkoure River is not new. It will be recalled that the Konkoure file had been closed by the French in 1958 at the time of Guinean independence. Subsequent to that time several attempts were made by Guinea to reopen the project with the aid of other countries, particularly the USSR and Italy, but to no avail. The financing of the study will be assured in part by a gift from the French Government; the rest will come in equal parts from guaranteed commercial credits and a loan from the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. The dam is to be built at a point on the river which is 150 km north of Conakry, not far from the Friguia aluminum plant whose current capacity of 700,000 tons could be doubled by new investments. Text / Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 690/ 8568

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LIBERIA

TOLBERT'S VISIT TO FRANCE EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN TIES

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Mar 79 pp 551-553

[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Liberia: the Essential Link in a Euro-African Policy"]

[Text] Responding to the invitation of Olivier Stirn when he was in Monrovia last November, William Tolbert, president of the Republic of Liberia, will be the guest of France late in March. This official visit will be his first since he succeeded President Tubman in 1971. It is expected to tighten the bonds--rather loose bonds, to tell the truth--which have united our two countries to this day and which may be consolidated by a trip to Liberia by Valery Giscard d'Estaing before the end of 1979.

For reasons connected both with history and folklore, French diplomacy seems to have long believed that Liberia was an enclave of American influence in West Africa, where our contractors and exporters had of necessity to come up against positions previously taken and solidly defended. Inherited from colonial protectionism, these routine views had their day. Far from being an obstacle to the development of our economic relations with Liberia, the fact that the American dollar is still the country's legal currency is in its favor. This monetary commonality in fact constitutes security for Liberia's suppliers, explaining--as much as the country's mineral and agricultural wealth--why the rather firm ratio resulting from the proportion of servicing the foreign debt (\$19,000,000) to its net commercial income (\$60,000,000 in 1977) does not at all diminish the credit it finds in large institutions and banks of America, Europe and Arabia, the income from the balance of accounts remaining "hard to control" there, in the very words of the IMF experts. In assuming the functions of a central bank since 1974, the National Bank of Liberia has not exhausted these unofficial receipts, but has regularized and canalized them, also regulating compensation business with respect to other banks and playing the role of economic adviser to the government.

Generally speaking, one of Liberia's attractions as a partner is the gradual unification of the two structures that have long coexisted there, one at bottom a market economy which is concerned only with the 40,000 American-Liberians, the other self-subsistence, affecting the remainder of the population, or 1,450,000 inhabitants.

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Conscious of the threat that in the long run would have weighed heavily on the pioneers by the rapid demographic growth of the aborigines (the birth-rate, 3.36 percent, is one of the highest in West Africa), President Tolbert, on the sociological level, encouraged an assimilation policy that blurs the ethnic contours of the upper class and associates the elite of the interior with the government. For the first time since Liberia was founded in 1847 a Liberian by blood, Methodist Bishop Bennie Warner, is vice president of the Republic, and he is the person President Tolbert sent to Tanzania and Uganda to attempt to reconcile their two chiefs of state.

However, this in-depth unification work leaves intact the empirical and mercantile foundations of the Liberian state, which give it its originality in relation to the other neighboring states--English or French speaking--that are basically much more legalistic. The Liberian state has thus been able to avoid military coups d'etat--not that the army is nonexistent there, but it is not the support of any tradition enjoining it periodically to put the institutions back on their feet by discipline and financial severity. On the other hand, public life there is animated by veritable civilian coups d'etat, characterized by resounding changes of managers reputed to be incapable or corrupt. The last of these, which occurred last October, cost three ministers their posts, including David Moore, who was heading the important department of Commerce, Industry and Transportation.

The Face of Liberian Diplomacy

Marching toward its social and political maturity, Liberia owes it to itself to have a diplomacy that reflects that maturity. Indeed its diplomacy was especially active during the year 1978, during which the president and his direct associates visited most of the chiefs of state of West or East Africa, or received them in Monrovia. Moreover, this kind of activity widely overflowed the continent, Mr Tolbert having gone to Peking, Mr Warner to Romania, and a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR having been received in the Liberian capital.

Peace is the essential objective of this activity, whether it is addressed to Marshal Idi Amin Dada, South Africa (Mr Vorster was Monrovia's guest in 1977), Namibia or the Western Sahara. In Monrovia they believe that a reconciliation, even an imperfect one, is always more profitable than a face-to-face war. Olivier Stirn, in a speech at the dinner given in his honor by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Cecil Dennis, paid homage to that constant desire for mediation, recalling in particular that Mr Tolbert's efforts were not unknown in Franco-Guinean reconciliation, which was spectacularly made concrete by Giscard d'Estaing's recent trip to Conakry.

Eclectic though it may be, not rejecting a priori any partner in dialog, that diplomacy nonetheless "bids its suit" with no complexes. In 1977 the government promptly terminated the indiscreet activities of the AGENCE TASS correspondent, whose departure was itself followed by a change of ambassadors. Last June in Peking President Tolbert was not afraid to invoke "always-powerful God and humanitarian capitalism" in terms that a conservative chief of

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state might find it hard to use in Europe, in his own district, but which did not seem to unduly shock the Chinese officials who were listening to them.

Finally, the third aspect of Liberian diplomacy: the desire to initiate and seal political ententes by means of specific economic agreements. This was the case with Sierra Leone on the theme of developing the Mano River Valley; by instituting, with Guinea, harmony in areas as diverse as fishing, justice and cattle raising; by signing, with two Ivorian state companies, SODEPALM [Company for the Development and Exploitation of Palm Oil] and SATMACI [Technical Assistance Company for Modernized Agriculture in the Ivory Coast], study contracts for creating palm oil, coffee and cocoa plantations. Taking an important part in African intergovernmental programs--Pan African Highway, Pan African Telecommunications, Postal and Air Coordination--Liberia is known to be participating finally in the CEDEAO (West African States Economy Community) and the African Development Bank. It is animating the ADRAO (Association for the Development of Rice Culture in West Africa), which headquarters in Monrovia and whose last congress, bringing together 50 delegates representing 14 African countries and the large international credit and technical cooperation organizations, was held in the capital on 24 May 1978.

In the civil tradition, tainted with Masonic Methodism, mentioned above, this desire for cooperation has not been manifested to this day in the military area. On the contrary, Liberia on several occasions has evidenced hostility toward creating an inter-African armed force, through the voice of Emmett Hermon, its ambassador to the United Nations, and of William Tolbert himself, who on the occasion when the credentials of the Ivory Coast ambassador were handed over, shortly after the Kolwezi operation, indicated that in his opinion Africa "did not need armed interventions, munitions and weaponry, but medicine, food products and schools."

The coincidence of these statements being made at the same time as the events in Shaba and the very choice of the person to whom they were addressed could not have been fortuitous, and caused the opportunity to materialize for bringing harmony between the French and Liberian point of view concerning Africa's political situation--their points of convergence being many.

In deciding to send an observer to the next Franco-African Conference at Kigali, the Liberian government is still a long way from giving its approval to the French theses. But the rather favorable echoes of the Conference published in the official Monrovia SUNDAY EXPRESS, like the sympathetic judgments formulated on certain aspects of French cooperation in comparison with the American formulas, might indicate that an evolution on the part of William Tolbert is not impossible. One or more direct contacts with Giscard d'Estaing can only favor it.

In any case the evolution on the tactical level would be of greater interest, as an approach in the other African English-speaking states that unfortunately are showing it toward France--this is especially apparent in Tanzania and Nigeria--of a somewhat anachronistic distrust. There is still solidarity of English-speaking people between these states and Liberia, but the latter historically escapes this latent hostility. Perhaps through its agency

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it might have been possible to reduce a fracture between English-speaking and French-speaking states that has constituted--much more than the opposing Bantu and Sudanian concepts dear to ethnologists--the principal difficulty in African attempts at political or economic unification over the last 20 years.

The Liberian Economic Framework
The Action of France

On the other hand, a political rapprochement might encourage French investors and exporters to interest themselves in a geographic sector which unfortunately is pointed out by a wide white spot on the map of our African activities. Solidly implanted in neighboring countries, having at its disposal because of this a base for tooling and personnel facilitating submissions of public bids, France has hardly been able to use these advantages to penetrate the Liberian market which on the other hand has served to introduce numerous firms of other European nations over the whole of West Africa.

However, it has been demonstrated that this market was not a preserve kept by the United States, since the countries of the European Economic Community, foremost among which is the Federal Republic of Germany, today constitute in their totality the primary suppliers (\$110,000,000 or 30 percent) and the primary customers (\$269,000,000 or 64.6 percent) of the country. In this game France does not play as high a role as it might, ranking only sixth among the suppliers, after the Netherlands, with a modest percentage of 3.3 percent. However, the sixth place it also occupies among purchasers, with a much more interesting percentage of 8 percent, gives it a good position from which to promote its activities.

In the area of lumber, for example, which seems to promise a handsome future for Liberia, since with a production of 600,000 cubic meters it is in fifth position among exports (\$35,000,000) and gives rise to widespread reforestation operations, France has occupied first place among buyers of rough timber, with 80,000 cubic meters. However, no French name appears on the list of firms, chiefly Dutch and German, which have taken advantage of tax exemptions customs reductions granted to foreign investors for installing a lumber industry in Liberia.

The catalog of French activities in Liberia remains very scanty, with the exception of the agencies of our large import-export companies. Contracts were concluded in 1976 and 1977 with a French public works firm to build two bridges, one over the Mesurado River, the other over the St. Paul River.

That is not much compared to the financial volume of those contracts--\$12,000,000 in all for investments anticipated for the 1976-1980 Plan, or \$415,000,000 including \$287,000,000 from abroad, notably from the international credit organizations that France subscribes to or participates in. The credits provided for road work have reached \$140,000,000. In addition, our firms might be interested in credits for port development, rebuilding and housing (\$50,000,000), without prejudice to the share reserved for building by the health and education departments. What finally appears especially

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regrettable is the absence of French firms and study bureaus in the large regional Mano River Union development project, bringing together Liberia and Sierra Leone, which includes in addition to constructing a 200-meter bridge, done for a worthy purpose by a German firm, a vast hydraulic and hydro-electric extension.

The Pillars of the Liberian Economy: Iron and Rubber

The situation is even less favorable to France in the two sectors that are essential to Liberia, iron and rubber.

American investments in the area of Para rubber go back to 1926, on which date development began of the Firestone plantations at Gatekarbo on the Cavallo River and Harbel, 40 km east of Monrovia, the latter remaining to this day, with 36,400 hectares, the largest plantation in the world under single ownership. Then six other foreign companies, notably Goodrich and the Salala Rubber Company, were also established. In all, 56,200 hectares of concessions, of which 50,000 are in production, representing about 49 percent of the Para rubber surface area. The remaining 51 percent forms the domaine of the small African planters, whose production, because of lower yields, represents just a little less than a third of the total tonnage. Production decreased between 1974 and 1977 by about 20 percent, to be stabilized at around 60,000 tons. Selling prices themselves have constantly declined. They were \$1,210 a ton in 1951 and went as low as \$731 in 1976. However, a rapid new start is anticipated for this crop because of the demand, which will increase by 80 percent before 1985. Firestone envisages bringing its own production in Liberia to 100,000 tons; the local processing industry (Allen Grant and Liberian Rubber Processing Corporation) will of course follow a similar progression.

Although little possibility exists for the French rubber industry to insert itself into a structure so well defended and enjoying such a considerable advance in paid-for installations and technology--the Ivory Coast seems to be a better place for French attempts in those areas--, the situation might be less closed where iron ore is concerned, whose average exports of 25,000,000 tons, valued at \$335,000,000, with an average content of 68 percent and reserves valued at nearly 2,000,000,000 tons, including 1,000,000,000 just for the Wologosi deposit, put Liberia in the first rank of African producers and in the third rank among world producers. In 1976 total ore exports represented 70 percent of the country's total exports.

The importance of iron ore reserves in Liberia makes it the axis of European supply for the next 50 years, ahead of Mauritania, Guinea, Angola and Sierra Leone. Two of the four principal deposits, those of the Liberia Mining Corporation, an affiliate of Republic Steel, and Lamco [Liberian American Swedish Minerals Company], have declining production. But the National Iron Ore Corporation, which operates on the Mano River, and the Bong Mining and Concentrating Company are in full yield, while the deposits of Wologosi, Biemantam and Putu have barely begun. The first was conceded to a group whose leader is Amax (USA) in liaison with two other American companies and a Japanese consortium, which will also finance an ore tanker port at Robertsport, northwest of Monrovia.

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It is significant that no French firm is participating in these various exploitations or projects, whereas the world price of steel will be conditioned in the future by the tonnages extracted from Liberia. The ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community] has contributed, however, through a loan to the German firms Finsider, Estel, August Thyssen Hutte and Fried Krupp Huttenwerke, to the extension of Bong Mining, in terms of a contract reserving for the Liberian government 50 percent of the shares and profits, to which is added a royalty of 3 percent on the sales, the contracting firms pledging themselves to purchase the entire production.

A French member of Parliament in 1976 was alarmed about the origin and methods of financing. The Brussels Commission replied that "the Community was far from filling the ore needs of the European metallurgic industry, the latter having necessarily to expand and diversify its sources of supply, not to mention the broadening of the bases of common interest resulting from the Lome Convention."

Although the argumentation is flawless, the affair puts a finger on the difficulty in industrial redeployment. The support given for years by the state to our steel industry has not prevented its partial elimination; but it has contributed to excluding France from exploiting these deposits, although she did participate, through the CECA, in financing that enabled German steel firms to be assured of control.

France's Entry into the Liberian Economic Circuit

The inadequacy of the economic ties with Liberia are being felt increasingly in our African strategy. It is a sign of the times that, to draw them tighter, the first steps must be taken by France. Supported monetarily by the United States, strong in natural riches, Liberia can in fact dispense with our capital and our cooperation. The amount of the public loans contracted for in 1978 on the foreign market (about 30,000,000,000 CFA francs) bear eloquent witness to this.

At least this situation will keep out of the game, in Liberian minds, any suspicion of a desire on our part to exert unjustifiable "pressure", and will perhaps make it possible to grapple in total freedom with certain thorny problems, such as the flag of convenience, in the sense of a revision of the conditions of registration of ships in its maritime role. Liberia's laxness is no doubt as great as was sometimes claimed in the wake of the Amoco Cadiz disaster, but the salaries paid on these ships are ten times lower than those in the United States and lower still by 60 and 30 percent than those of Italy and Greece. An official report by the Liberian government itself at the time of the explosion of the oil tanker Argo Merchant at Nantucket Island on the American coast, mentioned the inadequacy of controls and the need to stiffen the sanctions in cases where the standards are not respected.

On the other hand, the practice of the flag of convenience no longer assumes vital importance for Liberia, contributing only 10 percent of the state's total resources. It seems the question might be attacked in a spirit of reciprocal understanding, William Tolbert having shown, in other circumstances,

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his open-mindedness and the importance he attaches to Liberia's image abroad.

That delicate parenthesis closed, the problem, for our capital and products, of inserting ourselves into the Liberian economy remains untouched. If we cannot or do not want to enter into partnerships of capital for exploitation of iron ore, agriculture is at least one area in which we might be interested.

Liberia has not experienced the spectacular declines in production recorded in other countries, such as Nigeria or Guinea, where mineral production has upset the data of national production. But this is above all because that agriculture, almost with the exception of Para rubber, has still only weakly entered the market economy cycle. It is noteworthy that the official initiatives in favor of rice, whose production increased regularly from 1973 to 1978, going from 225,000 to 280,000 tons, had coincided with a parallel fall in cassava production, which during the same period fell from 250,000 to 105,000 tons, so that the operation, no doubt for lack of a socio-economic substratum, resulted in a food shortage that forces Liberia to import increasingly larger quantities of rice every year: 31,000 tons in 1975, 60,000 tons in 1977.

Actions conducted in collaboration with Ivorian state-owned companies, with sub-contracting intervention by the IFCC (French Institute of Coffee, Cocoa and Other Plant Stimulants), the IRHO (Institute for Research on Edible Oils and Oleaginous Products), and the BDPA (Bureau for the Development of Agricultural Production) in the areas of palm oil, coffee and cocoa, have been heightened. Palm oil, in which to tell the truth the Liberian government has been interested for 10 years, has raised some doubts. Between 1972 and 1974 production increased appreciably, thanks chiefly to palmetto oil. On the other hand it showed a declining net during the years following, going from \$8,000,000 to \$3,000,000 in value.

The intervention of our cooperation, better aimed than any other in the area of selection of plant material, growing techniques and popularization in the peasant milieu, would no doubt allow Liberia to avoid these saw-toothed performances, in particular by the introduction of intermediary structures, which have been successful in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, and of which Liberia itself has had positive experience in the Para rubber area. In the same way, more satisfactory results might be obtained in yield and tonnage of cocoa, production of which steadily declined from 1974 to 1977, going from 7,200 to 2,000 tons.

President Tolbert's journey to Paris, although it should bring into relief the objectives common to both diplomacies, will mitigate--we hope--the differences, which perhaps depend more on intellectual categories and emotional tradition than on strictness of reasoning. In any case, it is not immaterial that this meeting comes before the next Kigali Conference.

The very history of Liberia, whose resources have been developed by foreign initiatives lending support in the beginning to a human nucleus which was aggregate, interested, then in large part promoted to positions of responsibility in an agro-industrial and mining economy, explains why its president's

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meritorious efforts to give the whole population the benefit of the national resources by associating them in production, had been more willingly tempted by technocratic ways than by training and professionalizing the peasants. This is a little like the disease suffered, for other reasons, by an Angola whose socialistic government, up until now, has shown action in the agricultural area only by substituting large state structures for those of the colonial companies. On this theme an economic and political dialog could be established with President Tolbert, outside of any imperialistic hidden motives. It would be a fruitful dialog, dedicated to improving the Eurafrikan social and economic space.

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MALI

IDA FORESTRY DEVELOPMENT LOAN TO HELP ENVIRONMENT

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 689

[Text] The International Development Association, branch of the World Bank, which operates under preferential conditions, has just approved a loan of \$4.5 million to aid a forestry project in the Republic of Mali. This is the first forestry project financed by IDA in this country. It will help meet the requirements for heating and construction wood in urban areas and, on an experimental basis, introduce modern techniques of forestry development.

This project will create 3,400 hectares of industrial plantation area under normal rainy conditions near Bamako and 70 hectares of experimental plantation area partially irrigated near Mopti. Sixty additional hectares of plantation area under normal rainy conditions will be created on an experimental basis near Segou. Three nurseries will also be planted. Modern techniques of forestry development will be tried out and studies will be conducted to consider the possibilities of rural forestry activities involving the participation of local people.

The consequences of the project on the environment will be considerable. It is expected that the production of heating wood will be sufficient to avoid the cutting of about 10,000 hectares of brush at the beginning of production and as much as 30,000 hectares in subsequent years. This project will prevent soil erosion and will increase the fertility of the land by lengthening the period during which the land will remain unplowed.

The total cost of the project is \$9.4 million. The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation and the Aid and Cooperation Fund, two French organizations, will furnish \$1.4 million and \$1.3 million respectively to finance the project.

The IDA loan is granted for a period of 50 years, including a 10-year period of deferred amortization. It does not bear any interest, but an annual commission of 0.75 percent will be charged to cover IDA's administrative expenses.

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MALI

CORRUPTION TRIAL ENDS, VERDICTS RENDERED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Mar 79 p 689

Text The trial of four members of the Military National Liberation Committee and five other military and civilian individuals, accused of misappropriating public funds, opened on 8 March and closed the next day, 9 March, with severe sentences.

In fact, the Special State Security Court sentenced former Minister of Defense Kissima Doukara to death and ordered him to pay, all suits combined, more than 3.89 billion Malian francs (38.9 million French francs), the amount of the misappropriations with which he is charged.

The court sentenced Joseph Mara, former minister of justice, former mayor of Kati and former chairman of the committee of investigation, to 20 years at hard labor and ordered him to pay more than 19 million francs; Kalim Dembele, former minister of transport, to 10 years of the same and a payment of more than 9 million francs for his part in the misappropriation; and Tieroco Bagayoko, former director of security, to 5 years imprisonment for the same offense. Bagayoko was accused of receiving funds and using them for the operation of his service without legal authorization.

The court also sentenced two of the accused to 1 year of imprisonment and acquitted three others in the trial of the nine former officials and accomplices charged with manipulating public funds, misappropriation and corruption.

The sentences pronounced against Doukara, Bagayoko and Dembele are to run concurrently with those handed down on 21 October 1978 for their attempted coup d'etat. At that time, the first two had been condemned to death and the third to 20 years at hard labor.

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