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Intelligence Identities Protection Act

In our previous issues we have reported extensively on the Intelligence Identities Protection Act—S. 391 and H.R. 4. The measure has resulted in a lively debate within the legal community. In order to seek clarification on some of the basic criticisms that have been raised, Intelligence Report put some questions to Mr. John S. Warner, for many years general counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The questions and his answers to them are printed below.

Q. Why is this type of legislation needed?

A. There are certain groups whose avowed purpose is to destroy the U.S. intelligence effort and as a means to this end they have published lists of names identifying them as CIA agents. They place such people and their families in physical jeopardy and certainly impair and impede U.S. intelligence activities. Legislation presently on the books is not specific enough to deal effectively with this situation. The U.S. Congress has mandated the carrying out of intelligence activities by authorizing and appropriating the necessary funds. Thus, it has a responsibility to take steps to protect the safety of the people concerned and their activities. Passage of this legislation is one such step.

Q. As you are aware, the constitutionality of this legislation has been challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union and by a number of legal scholars. What is your answer to these critics?

A. Three committees of Congress have said the legislation is constitutional. Last year the Senate Intelligence Committee approved and reported such a bill. Also the House Judiciary Committee and the House Intelligence Committee approved and reported such legislation. This happened after full debate and detailed hearings where assertions of unconstitutionality were fully aired.

Q. Is there any precedent in Supreme Court opinions to support the view that the First Amendment is absolute and would prevail over this legislation?

A. Among the advocates of the absolutist view of the First Amendment were those who asserted such views in court and urged that Marchetti and Sneppe could not be

held to their secrecy agreements—that the higher law was the First Amendment. The Supreme Court clearly and firmly stated the U.S. government can take steps to protect its intelligence secrets, specifically stating that the First Amendment privilege does not prevail in all circumstances. In the Agee case, just decided (see elsewhere in this Report), it seems to me the Supreme Court has laid to rest such absolute views regarding a First Amendment conflict with this legislation.

Q. It has been said that legislation should not attempt to penalize publication of agent identities which are already in the public domain and have, in fact, been put there by the U.S. government. There have been a number of references, for example, to the fact that careful study of the State Department Biographic Register will in most cases reveal to informed persons the identity of CIA agents using State Department cover. Is it accurate that the government itself frequently puts the identity of intelligence agents into the public domain?

A. No, it is not—such assertions are not true. Agent identities are not routinely put in the public domain. It is
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Case Note—*Haig v. Agee*

Germane to *Intelligence Report's* coverage of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act now pending before the House Intelligence Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, is the recent (June 29, 1981) Supreme Court case of *Haig v. Agee*. This decision held that Agee's passport could be revoked because of the serious damage he had caused or was likely to cause to national security and/or foreign policy.

Reviewing the background, the majority finding noted that in 1974 Agee, who had been employed by the CIA from 1957 to 1968—

“Called a press conference in London to announce his ‘campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating.’ He declared his intent ‘to expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the countries where they are operating.’ Since 1974, Agee has, by his own assertion, devoted consistent effort to that program, and he has traveled

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extensively in other countries in order to carry it out. To identify CIA personnel in a particular country, Agee goes to the target country and consults sources in local diplomatic circles whom he knows from his prior service in the United States Government. He recruits collaborators and trains them in clandestine techniques designed to expose the 'cover' of CIA employees and sources. Agee and his collaborators have repeatedly and publicly identified individuals and organizations located in foreign countries as undercover CIA agents, employees, or sources."

When his passport was lifted in December 1974, Agee, instead of seeking an administrative review of the revocation as he had been advised was his right, went directly to the courts. He filed suit attacking—

"The Secretary's action on three constitutional grounds: first, that the revocation of his passport impermissibly burdens his freedom to travel; second, that the action was intended to penalize his exercise of free speech and deter his criticism of government policies and practices; and third, that failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process."

With respect to the various constitutional defenses raised by Agee, Chief Justice Burger's opinion of the court states:

"Agee's disclosures, among other things, have the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of intelligence personnel. *They are clearly not protected by the constitution.*" (Emphasis added.)

It would seem that the seven to two decision of the court in *Haig v. Agee* would weaken the arguments of those witnesses who opposed the Intelligence Identities Protection Act on constitutional grounds and it should, therefore, strengthen the chances of passage.

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true that certain government publications in the past provided clues which, when put together with other information, permitted deductions to be made by knowledgeable persons which in some cases were accurate. But this is a far cry from the charge that the government has put in the public domain the very information the publication of which this legislation makes a criminal act.

Q. Some of the critics have argued that instead of seeking restrictive legislation the U.S. government would be better to devise improved procedures for keeping the identity of its agents secret. Do you consider such an approach a viable alternative?

A. Continuing efforts *are* being made by the government to protect such identities. In fact, the greater

number of agent identities are and have been adequately held in secrecy. The provision in the legislation requiring the president to establish procedures to ensure effective cover is a welcome step to formalize and require uniform executive branch adherence to an inherently complicated matter. But, criminal prohibitions are needed to provide additional protection and to reassure agents in all capacities that the U.S. government will act against those who willfully publish and expose their identities.

Q. The critics have charged that this legislation would have a chilling effect on the press. They assert the identification of the single agent who may have been involved in a criminal action would subject the press to prosecution under the law. Would the press really be chilled by the legislation in its present form?

A. This is strictly a red herring thrown out by those who either don't believe we should have secret intelligence or who have not taken the trouble to read the protracted hearings and debates. These clearly demonstrate that the careful drafting of this legislation in no way will inhibit discussion, debate, and criticism of intelligence activities. The Senate version requires a showing of a "pattern of activities" and the House version requires a specific intent to "impair or impede" foreign intelligence activities.

It is indeed naive to think that our aggressive and well-informed media will refrain from acting in their role of informing the public. It indeed will chill those who have published lists of names, some accurate and some inaccurate, after extensive counterespionage-like operations in pursuit of their proclaimed objective of destroying American intelligence, with little or no concern if a few of those identified are shot, maimed or killed.

Iranian Claims Case

The Supreme Court, on July 2, 1981, eight days after hearing arguments, unanimously upheld the actions taken by Presidents Carter and Reagan to carry out the claims agreement that ended the hostage crisis.

Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the court, stressed that this was a decision limited to the facts of this case, and that the court was upholding the proposed settlement of such claims because it was done incident to the resolution by the president of a major foreign policy dispute and "crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claims settlement by executive agreement."

The court noted that future litigation from dissatisfied claimants in the matter was not precluded by this decision.

This is another in a series of Supreme Court decisions (draft registration, Agee) in which the court states its belief that it has a limited role in defense and foreign affairs, giving wide discretion to the president and the Congress.

Larry Williams

How the KGB Operates: Answers from a KGB Defector

This is another interview in our series of articles describing the operations of the KGB, in the United States and world-wide, in the words of men who until recently served as part of this apparatus.

Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a former KGB officer, defected from the Soviets early last year and is now living in England under official British protection. His escape from Geneva with his family bears many points of resemblance to the hair-raising account of the escape of Victor Barisov, the Soviet defector who plays a central role in the best selling novel, "The Spike," written by Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave. The real life story of this escape is indeed thrilling, and fraught with danger and excitement, but for reasons of security it cannot be fully told.

Your editor recently was able to meet personally with Dzhirkvelov, in a safe place in London, thanks to the intervention of Leonid Finkelstein, an earlier Soviet defector, now with the BBC, who had known Dzhirkvelov in the Journalists Union in Moscow during the 1960's. Dzhirkvelov was then the KGB apparatchik in the Union. Instead of attempting to ad lib an interview with Mr. Dzhirkvelov, the editor presented him with a series of prepared questions so that he could do a careful job of drafting his replies. (Finkelstein is an old friend of the committee and its chairman, having lectured many times before our Teacher Training Institutes.)

Q. Will you introduce yourself, please?

A. I am Ilya Grigoryevich Dzhirkvelov, 54, a Georgian. Until April 1980 a citizen of the USSR. Married, with one daughter born in 1975.

Q. For how many years did you work for the KGB, in what capacities, and when did you leave their service?

A. In the organs of the KGB (then NKVD) I worked since 1944. I was recruited in Tbilisi, Georgia, and sent to the short training course for junior officers. Immediately afterwards I was dispatched to the Crimea and joined the so-called special detachments. For a while I was taking part in the combat and intelligence operations against the Germans but then our detachment was given the task to supervise the deportation of Crimean Tartars from their homeland. In February 1945 we guarded the Yalta Conference. After the war I graduated from an advanced KGB school in Moscow. On graduation I was sent to Romania for intelligence work but in a short while got recalled to Moscow and was given a job in the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)—first against Middle East countries and then, for a short spell, against the United States.

During 1953-54 I worked for the Second Chief Directorate (Counterintelligence) where I looked after the embassies of the Middle East countries and foreign journalists stationed in Moscow. Then I was again moved to the First Directorate, into the position of Deputy Head, Section 10. That Section conducted frontier area

intelligence and I was mainly responsible for Turkey and Iran.

In March 1956 there was some unrest in my native Georgia, where a peaceful demonstration was met by a hail of bullets. Right after those events I was sent to Georgia—against my will. Until the end of 1957 I was Deputy Head, First Section, of the Georgian KGB, at which time I applied for voluntary discharge, giving personal reasons. My application was granted and I joined my family in Moscow. My last KGB rank was captain.

However, my unofficial connection with the KGB was never severed. They were in touch with me both in Moscow where I was appointed Deputy Secretary General of the Union of Journalists and later abroad, when I was TASS correspondent in Tanzania and the Sudan from 1966 to 1972.

Q. Do you have any direct knowledge of the KGB disinformation operation, and if you do, could you describe some concrete examples in which you were involved or which came to your attention?

A. The KGB disinformation service took shape in 1947 when political intelligence of the KGB merged with the military intelligence (GRU) for "the more active counteractions to the cold war." The above services merged into the Committee of Information attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In charge of the new Committee was Vyacheslav M. Molotov.

At that time the Fifth Directorate was formed. Its task was to conduct disinformation "undertakings" in Western and other independent countries. Initially, the Directorate was not responsible for the organization of sabotage, unrest or similar "extra-actions" as they were known. "Extras" were the responsibility of a separate section—the one headed by the notorious Colonel (then General) Sudoplatov and later one B. Studnikov. Now, however, both functions are entrusted to one and the same department in the KGB First Directorate. I think it is known as Department 13.

During my work in Tanzania and the Sudan I several times took part in the distribution of disinformation material. One example, in Tanzania, was our "work" to discredit the American Peace Corps. The line was that it was a CIA front organization and its subversive activity had to be "exposed." We tried, often successfully, to place prepared articles into local papers—preferably signed by the Tanzanians. The "authors" were always paid well, and "their" articles worked: Tanzania, and then Uganda, started refusing Peace Corps Services.

The other example was in the Sudan. When an agreement was signed on the reopening of the American Cultural Centre, we were immediately ordered to spread rumors among politicians and other local dignitaries that the new Centre was no more than a CIA branch which had the task to destabilize the Jaafar Numeiry regime. We quoted "reliable American sources." Later, I succeeded in placing an article in a local newspaper with a

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strong indirect hint that the U.S. "special services" wanted to change the regime in the Sudan.

Such articles invariably get reprinted by the Soviet press and broadcast by the Soviet radio quoting the "source" chapter and verse.

Similar means are used for defaming those politicians and statesmen in the developing countries whom the Soviets do not like. The easiest publications for such defamation, as well as for placing articles extolling the "achievements" in the USSR, are, naturally, Communist and other left or "independent" papers and magazines.

Finally, here is a fresh example of "pure" disinformation. On May 26, 1981, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* under the heading *CIA Sabotage* informed its readers that the paper *Noticiac de Beira* of Mozambique published a series of articles (a series, not just one article) on the subversive activity of the CIA. The series "revealed" that "from 1961 to 1976 the CIA organized nearly 900 operations against politicians and governments in different countries." It is a remarkable analytical work—especially if we recall that in 1961 the present Mozambique (and its apparently formidable intelligence service) simply did not exist. The source, therefore, is quite clearly distinguishable.

I must, however, make it absolutely clear that in disinformation the KGB is only the arm, the tool, the performing force. The aims for disinformation are set, the targets are chosen and the plans made only by the "apparatus" and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee.

Q. What can you tell us about the role of the KGB in manipulating front organizations and orchestrating international campaigns like the recent campaigns against the neutron warhead and the modernization of theater nuclear weapons? What specifically does the KGB do to assist these campaigns?

A. Every Soviet organization—be it a state office or a "society" of any kind—is studded with KGB officers and informers if this organization deals with foreigners. This is true also for Soviet delegations at any international congress or meeting, whether the host organization is a front one or a genuine one. But the KGB itself does not "supervise" front organizations; neither does it launch or conduct any campaigns. This is the prerogative of the Central Committee departments, acting on the sanction of the Secretaries. The actions of various kinds may indeed be performed by the KGB officers using some cover in the international organizations—but never on the decision of just the KGB. The KGB capabilities abroad, especially in the West, are certainly used to propagate the Central Committee line and "mobilize" public opinion in campaigns against neutron warheads, etc. But no more than "used."

Q. The author Claire Sterling in her recent book charges that the KGB has been heavily involved in

supporting international terrorism. Is this a matter about which you have personal knowledge, and if you do, could you tell us what you know about the degree of this involvement, the geographic target areas, the principal surrogate organizations through which the KGB has worked, and its mode, or modes, of operation?

A. Let us speak separately of two kinds of terrorism. There are terrorist groups like the "Red Brigades" in Italy or the former Baader-Meinhof group in Germany and the like. I dare say that the KGB has nothing to do with those—even if they use Soviet made weapons. The KGB did "liquidate," or made attempts to "liquidate" some leaders of anti-Soviet organizations, of emigres like Bandera, Rebet, Konovalenko and others—among them former Soviet citizens who remained, or intended to remain, in the West. But that was done by the KGB itself, without relying on usually unstable terrorist groups, often hostile to the Soviet Union.

There is, however, the other kind of international terrorism helped and sponsored by the KGB. I mean the "national liberation" movements in African, Asian, Latin American and even European (Ireland) countries. Prominent in this category is, no doubt, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. It is certainly used as one of the main tools in the fight against Israel and even against the Western democracies. In the training of the "fighters" for the Palestinian and other "movements" active assistance is sought (and received) from Bulgarian, East German and Cuban special services. The urban guerrillas are trained on Soviet territory, in the three above mentioned "brotherly" countries and now also on the territory of several African states—like Angola, Congo, Mozambique and possibly Libya.

The supply routes for those "movements" may vary. In my time a lot of weapons and ammunition was sent through Tanzania. However, the goods—and especially arms—for the Soviet sponsored terrorists do not always safely reach their destinations. I remember a case when a consignment of 30,000 automatic rifles and other military equipment was delivered from the USSR to Tanzania under some disguise—and then disappeared without a trace. Rumors persisted in Africa that a group of smart Tanzanian "businessmen" had sold the arms "on the side" for an astronomical amount of money and the Soviet Union thought it wise not to claim the loss.

Q. There have been reports in the West that it is official Soviet policy to wage what has been called a "resource war" by progressively denying the West access to vital raw materials. In your KGB experience, did you hear talk about the "resource war," and could you tell us what you know about the direct involvement of the KGB in this war?

A. The Soviet government has been paying much attention to the "resource war" since the mid-forties. It started with oil. As early as 1945 or 1946 a Soviet-Iranian oil company called Kivirhurian was formed. The Soviet director of the company was the KGB officer Artavazd Mangasarov, a trained oil specialist. The aim was to build

a pipeline for getting cheap oil from both Iran and Bahrein and gradually to make the Soviet Union their only customer. These plans were thwarted by Mossadegh who, on seizing power in Iran, immediately nationalized all Soviet-Iranian companies.

Very significant from the point of view of the "resource war" was the turn in the long-range Soviet policy towards Arab countries and Israel. I remember how surprised we were in the KGB when it became clear that the Soviet Union froze her relations with Israel—initially very warm—and took the side of her Arab foes. Our opinion was that Israel, a predominantly socialist country, well disposed to the Soviet Union, was a much more useful ally in the Middle East than any Arab country. Israel could have become an excellent vehicle for intelligence and other penetration into the U.S.; indeed the saying was that whatever would happen in the U.S. tomorrow was already known in Israel today. Yet the Soviet leader—then Stalin—decided to support the Arabs against Israel, and the reason, we were told, was oil. The anti-Communist mood of the late Egyptian president Nasser was ignored; it was his pan-Arabic designs that tempted the USSR to gain control of oil deposits in the Middle East. This long-term policy has been carried on since. It is worth stressing that at that time the USSR had virtually unlimited oil resources and therefore the Soviet interest in Middle East oil was clearly political: *to deny the use of oil to the West.*¹

In 1971, when I was the TASS correspondent in the Sudan, the Foreign Trade Minister of the USSR, Patolichev, visited that country. He spoke to Soviet personnel in Khartoum on the aims and methods of Soviet foreign trade. He mentioned as an achievement the new treaty with Iran on supply of the natural gas which, according to Patolichev, the Soviet Union could re-sell to the West at a good profit. But he also stressed that, trade advantages aside, oil and gas had, first of all, great strategic and political importance. "Stalin himself understood it well," said the Soviet Minister.

As for the role of the KGB in the "resource war," it is serious enough. Both the KGB and the GRU are gathering intelligence world-wide on the availability of various resources—to enable the Soviet leadership to act precisely in the way which would hurt the Western countries most. Then, the KGB is ordered to concentrate its efforts on the countries important for their mineral resources—both to obtain more information and to influence the events in those countries. Stalin's goal of depriving the West of the mineral resources of the planet is still pursued.

Q. How much control does the KGB have over intelligence operations conducted by Cuba and other Communist bloc countries, how does the KGB exercise

¹Translator's note. As a Soviet journalist in 1956, the translator attended a briefing on the Middle East by the Central Committee lecturer German M. Sverdlov, who said: "Nasser is a Fascist but he has his finger on the jugular vein of the West—and therefore we support him."

that control, and how is the entire operation coordinated?

A. It is a little misleading to speak of "control" by the KGB over the intelligence services of other "socialist" countries. There is rather a very close partnership in subversion against the West and in supporting various anti-government organizations in the rest of the world. Naturally, the KGB is an undisputed "senior partner" but one should not diminish the initiative and activity of others—notably of the Bulgarian, East German and especially Cuban special services. A lot of support for "national liberation" forces in Latin America and Africa comes from those three countries.

The major actions, big concerted operations are discussed and agreed in advance with the Soviet side—but then not just with the KGB, often at the higher level (where the KGB is now, of course, represented by virtue of its Chairman Yuri Andropov being a full Politbureau member). Apart from that, in the intelligence services of most "socialist" countries there are, as a rule, the KGB "advisers" who coordinate (and possibly to a certain extent control) all joint operations. They may be, of course, just "keeping an eye" as well.

Q. As you are aware, there has been a good deal of debate in the United States over the morality of covert operations. Does the Soviet Politbureau impose any restrictions on the kinds of covert operations conducted by the KGB? For example, does the KGB engage in the full range of covert operations from sabotage and assassination to support for pro-Soviet parties and organizations in the West? Could you give us a few examples of KGB covert operations in each category?

A. All major operations conducted by the KGB abroad are to be approved in advance by the top Central Committee leaders—one of whom is, of course, the KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. But if such an "offer of an operation" is made to the Central Committee Secretariat, it very seldom is turned down, not only because Andropov is in the Politbureau, but also because serious operations are discussed by top KGB people beforehand with the Central Committee "apparatchiks" who are privy to such matters and who prepare the decisions finally made by the Politbureau or Secretariat.

Here is an example from the past, but, to my best knowledge, the decision-making process in this respect has changed very little.

When we planned covert operations in Iran—like abductions or "liquidations" of undesirable persons or "evacuation" of our valuable agents from there—we had to obtain the go-ahead from Politbureau level (not necessarily the whole Politbureau; there were members of it who made decisions on behalf of that whole body). When, after the debacle of the KGB-staged uprising in Iranian Azerbaidjan, we made plans for rescuing the Central Committee members of the Tudeh party which was the driving force behind the uprising, those plans had to be approved by Stalin himself. I was then the

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participant in the planning and performing of that operation and I remember that Stalin rejected the idea of sending an aeroplane to Iran (incidentally, to the same plateau where much later a helicopter rescue operation by some other country proved to be not really successful). In any event, the Tudeh leaders were evacuated from Iran by various individual routes. I personally organized the border crossing by the Central Committee Secretary called Kombakhsha, dressed as a woman, from Iran to the Turkmenistan desert.

Q. At the time you defected from the USSR, the post-Watergate campaign against the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies was still going on. What can you tell us about the KGB reaction to our self-mutilation of our intelligence capabilities? Do you have any knowledge of KGB involvement in the campaign against our intelligence agencies?

A. Denunciations and "exposure" of the CIA and other special services of the Western countries is, of course, one of the most favored lines of the Soviet propaganda machine. In this activity the help from the KGB is always sought; it advises on targets, names, etc., inside the USSR, for internal consumption, and conducts some "mobilization" of public opinion abroad. Naturally, the KGB was delighted that the U.S. Congress and the U.S. media were doing such a good job for them. Yet it must be emphasized that the KGB was not really taken in by the campaign. The KGB bosses never believed that the CIA was "demolished" or "utterly incapacitated." The KGB still retains a great deal of respect for the CIA as the most sophisticated service of its kind in the world. The American "self-mutilation" was, for many a KGB chief, simply some strange decadent propaganda.

Possible Use of Military To Enforce Drug Laws

The House of Representatives (see House Report 97-71, Part 2) is considering a "rider" to the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, which would authorize the military to provide assistance to federal, state or local law enforcement agencies to aid in the enforcement of laws against illicit drug traffic. The proposed provisions of the law would, among other things, authorize as exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) the sharing of information, training of civilian officials, and the use of military personnel and equipment. The Senate is considering similar legislation (see Senate Report 97-58).

The Department of Defense, speaking through its general counsel, William H. Taft IV, generally recommended enactment but noted that such use could, despite the legislative language, involve the military in confrontational situations with American citizens, the possibility

of civil liability, and a derogation from the military mission.

The House Committee on the Judiciary has recommended enactment of its version. There were dissents from other committee members (John F. Seiberling, Don Edwards and John Conyers) who reiterated Mr. Taft's views, discussed the Kent State case, and quoted Senator Ervin: "The military forces should never be used for law enforcement purposes, even for the purpose of suppressing the drug traffic."

Final action by the Congress has not been taken.

Larry Williams

Law Professor Workshop

The Committee on Law and National Security and the International Law Section, together with the newly established Center for Law and National Security at the University of Virginia School of Law, co-sponsored a Law Professor Workshop, "U.S. Foreign Policy: A New Beginning?" at Charlottesville, Virginia, June 5-6, 1981. The program which included presentations and commentary by the new Ambassador to the Organization of American States and former Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf, former Ambassadors Covey T. Oliver (Colombia) and Herman Eilts (Saudi Arabia and Egypt), and Congressman J. Kenneth Robinson (R.-Va.), was well received by the more than ninety law professors, members of the Bar and representatives of other disciplines who participated in the workshop.

The program addressed the basic question whether "a new beginning," the campaign slogan of the Reagan candidacy, is achievable in the continuum of U.S. foreign policy. That slogan provided an excellent vehicle to look at the key issues which have already emerged for the new administration: the attempt to redefine the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the face of the threatened military imbalance and Soviet resort to force in Afghanistan, support for radicalization of the Caribbean, and threats to the free labor movement in Poland; the search for peace in the Middle East; international monetary policy and the crisis in oil; the problem of access to strategic minerals; and the law of the sea negotiations with special emphasis on the regime for mining the seabed.

What clearly emerged is that new initiatives are being taken, former policies are being reviewed and Congressional attitudes concerning defense spending and foreign policy have changed. The last point was brought home in a most convincing way by Congressman Robinson, the workshop's banquet speaker.

The emphasis on the activism of the Reagan administration tended to overshadow the reality that certain situations and relationships have a constancy which, because of institutional, geopolitical or historical factors, tend to resist change and, thereby, make difficult a dramatic "new beginning."

Bernard A. Ramundo